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Search and Seizure : Ss. 10(22) and 132(5) of I. T. Act, 1961 : A. Ys. 1984-85 to 1990-91 : Summary assessment u/s. 132(5) : Assessee claiming exemption u/s. 10(22) : Prima facie correctness of claim has to be considered.

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  1. Search and Seizure : Ss. 10(22) and 132(5) of I. T. Act,
    1961 : A. Ys. 1984-85 to 1990-91 : Summary assessment u/s. 132(5) : Assessee
    claiming exemption u/s. 10(22) : Prima facie correctness of claim has to be
    considered.

[Anjum Hami-E-Islam vs. CIT; 310 ITR 37 (Bom)]

    Petitioner Trust was running 12 educational institutions and was entitled to exemption u/s. 10(22) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. In February 1991 search proceedings were carried out in the premises of the Petitioner Trust and fixed deposits worth Rs. 93 lakhs were seized and an order u/s. 132(5) was passed determining the tax liability without considering the exemption allowable u/s. 10(22) of the Act. The Commissioner also rejected the application u/s. 132(11) without considering the claim for exemption u/s. 10(22) of the Act.

    On a writ petition filed by the Petitioner challenging the order, the Bombay High Court held as under :

    “i) When a public trust like the petitioner which ran a number of educational institutions had claimed exemption in view of the provisions of section 10(22) of the Act, the Officer passing orders u/s. 132(5) had to find out at least prima facie as to why and how such trust was not entitled to exemption.

    ii) The order to the extent that he refused to consider the plea of the petitioner for exemption u/s. 10(22) of the Act was liable to be quashed”.

Return : Defect in return : Ss. 139(9) and 292B of I. T. Act, 1961 : Failure by assessee to sign and verify return : Defect could not be cured : Return invalid : Consequent assessment invalid : Tribun

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  1. Return : Defect in return : Ss. 139(9) and 292B of I. T.
    Act, 1961 : Failure by assessee to sign and verify return : Defect could not
    be cured : Return invalid : Consequent assessment invalid : Tribun



 


[CIT vs. Harjinder Kaur; 310 ITR 71 (P&H)].

The return filed by the assessee was neither signed by the
assessee nor verified by the assessee. The Tribunal held that the return of
income was not valid and therefore, the consequent assessment order is also
invalid.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and Haryana High Court
upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“i) The provisions of section 292b of the Income-tax Act,
1961, do not authorise the Assessing Officer to ignore a defect of a
substantive nature and therefore, the provision categorically records that a
return would not be treated as invalid, if the same “in substance and effect
is in conformity with or according to the intent and purpose of this Act”.

ii) The return did not bear the signature of the assessee
and had not also been verified by her. Hence, the return was an absolutely
invalid return as it had a glaring inherent defect which could not be cured
in spite of the deeming effect of section 292B”.

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Reference to Valuation Officer : S. 55A of I. T. Act, 1961 : A. Y. 1996-97 : Reference to Valuation Officer can be made only after AO records opinion that the value had been underestimated by the assessee: Reference before filing of return by assessee : N

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  1. Reference to Valuation Officer : S. 55A of I. T. Act,
    1961 : A. Y. 1996-97 : Reference to Valuation Officer can be made only after
    AO records opinion that the value had been underestimated by the assessee:
    Reference before filing of return by assessee : Not valid.



 


[Hiaben Jayantilal Shah vs. ITO; 310 ITR 31 (Guj)].

For the A. Y. 1996-97, the petitioner assessee had filed
the return of income on 27.08.1996. The assessee had computed capital gain by
adopting the market value of the asset as on 01.04.1981, determined by the
registered valuer to be the cost of acquisition by exercising option u/s.
55(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The assesee received a notice from the
Valuation Officer informing that a reference was made by the Assessing Officer
on 26/04/1996 u/s. 55A of the Act.

On a writ petition filed by the assessee challenging the
reference, the Gujarat High Court held as under :

“i) Clause (b) of section 55A of the Income-tax Act,
1961, can be invoked only when the value of the asset claimed by the
assessee is not supported by the valuation report of a registered valuer.
For invoking section 55A of the Act, there has to be a claim made by the
assessee, before the Assessing Officer can record his opinion either under
clause (a) or clause (b) of section 55A of the Act to make a reference to
the Valuation Officer.

ii) In so far as the fair market value of the property as
on 01/04/1981, was concerned, the petitioner had claimed it at a sum of
Rs.6,25,000 as per the registered valuer’s report. Therefore, the Assessing
Officer was required to form an opinion that the value so claimed was less
than the fair market value. The estimated value proposed by the Valuation
Officer was shown at Rs.3,97,000 which was less than the fair market value
shown by the assessee. Therefore, clause (a) of section 55A of the Act could
not be made applicable.

iii) Clause (b) of section 55A of the Act can be invoked
only in any other case, namely, when the value of the asset claimed by the
assessee was not supported by an estimate by a registered valuer. In the
facts of the present case, clause (b) of section 55A of the Act also could
not be invoked.

iv) The reference was made on 26/04/1996, whereas the
return of income had been filed by the assessee only on 27/08/1996. Hence on
the date of making the reference by the Assessing Officer, no claim was made
by the assessee and the Assessing Officer could not have formed any opinion
as to the existence of prescribed difference between the value of the asset
as claimed by the assessee and the fair market value. Therefore also, the
provisions of section 55A of the Act, could not be resorted to.

v) The only ground on which reference was made to the
Valuation Officer was that the value declared by the assessee as on the date
of the execution and registration of the sale deed was lower by more than
25%. There was no provision in the Act which permits the Assessing Officer
to disturb the sale consideration, at least section 55A of the Act could not
be invoked for the said purpose.

vi) The reference to the valuation officer was not
valid”.

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Business expenditure : Disallowance u/s. 40A(2) of I. T. Act, 1961 : A. Ys. 1991-92 and 1992-93: Incentive commission paid to sister concern : Sister concern paying tax at a higher rate : Not a case of evasion of tax: Deduction to be allowed.

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  1. Business expenditure : Disallowance u/s. 40A(2) of I. T.
    Act, 1961 : A. Ys. 1991-92 and 1992-93: Incentive commission paid to sister
    concern : Sister concern paying tax at a higher rate : Not a case of evasion
    of tax: Deduction to be allowed.



 


[CIT vs. Indo Saudi Services (Travel) P. Ltd., 310
ITR 306 (Bom)].

The assessee was a general sales agent of a foreign airline
S. For the A. Ys. 1991-92 and 1992-93 the Assessing Officer found that the
incentive commission paid by the assessee to the sister concern was half
percent more than that paid to other sub-agents. Relying on the provisions of
section 40A(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Assessing Officer disallowed
the excess commission paid to the sister concern at the rate of half percent.
The Tribunal deleted the additions.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“i) Under the CBDT Circular No. 6-P, dated 06/07/1968, it
is stated that no disallowance is to be made u/s. 40A(2) in respect of the
payments made to the relatives and sister concerns where there is no attempt
to evade tax.

ii) The learned Advocate appearing for the appellant was
not in a position to point out how the assessee evaded payment of tax by the
alleged payment of higher commission to its sister concern since the sister
concern was also paying tax at higher rate and copies of the assessment
orders of the sister concern were taken on record by the Tribunal.

iii) In view of the aforesaid admitted facts we are of
the view that the Tribunal was correct in coming to the conclusion that the
Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) was wrong in disallowing half percent
commission to the sister concern”.

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Appeal to Appellate Tribunal : Fees : S. 253(6) of I. T. Act 1961 : Appeal against levy of penalty : Appeal fees is Rs.500 and not based on income assessed : Tribunal calling for fees based on income assessed : Not proper.

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Reported :

  1. Appeal to Appellate Tribunal : Fees : S. 253(6) of I. T.
    Act 1961 : Appeal against levy of penalty : Appeal fees is Rs.500 and not
    based on income assessed : Tribunal calling for fees based on income assessed
    : Not proper.

 

[Dr. Ajit Kumar Pandey vs. ITAT; 310 ITR 195 (Pat)].

In respect of an appeal filed by the assessee before the
Tribunal, against levy of penalty u/s. 271 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the
assessee had paid Rs.500 as appeal fees. The appeal was decided ex parte.
The assessee applied for restoration of the ex parte order. The
Tribunal agreed to recall the ex parte order and to decide the appeal
on merits provided the assessee furnished the deficit court fee of Rs.8,330.

The assessee challenged the order by filing a writ
petition. The Patna High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under :

“i) In the case of an appeal where the total income of
the assessee is ascertainable from the appeal itself, i.e. when the
appellant was seeking to challenge the assessment of his total income, fees
as mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) would be required to be paid.

ii) Clause (d) deals with other appeals. Imposition of
penalty u/s. 271 of the Act had no connection or bearing with the total
income of the assessee. If a person aggrieved by an order imposing penalty,
approaches the Tribunal by preferring an appeal, imposition of penalty
having no nexus with the total income of the assessee, it would not be
discernible what is the total income of the appellant and accordingly such
an appeal would be covered by clause (d).

iii) The important words used in clauses (a), (b) and (c)
of sub-section (6) of section 253 are ‘total income of the assessee’.
Therefore that may not be discernible.

iv) The order of the Tribunal was liable to be set aside
and the appeal was remitted for decision on merits.”

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Business expenditure : Deduction u/s. 37(1) of I. T. Act, 1961 : A. Y. 2000-01 : Provision for liability is deductible if there is an element of certainty that it shall be incurred : Provision for ‘long service award’ is allowable as deduction.

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Reported :

  1. Business expenditure : Deduction u/s. 37(1) of I. T.
    Act, 1961 : A. Y. 2000-01 : Provision for liability is deductible if there is
    an element of certainty that it shall be incurred : Provision for ‘long
    service award’ is allowable as deduction.



 


[CIT vs. Insilco Ltd.; 179 Taxman 55 (Del)].

The assessee company had evolved a scheme whereby,
employees who rendered long period of service to the assessee, were made
entitled to monetary awards at various stages of their employment equivalent
to a defined period of time. On the basis of actuarial calculation the
assessee made provision for ‘long service award’ payable to its employees
under the scheme and claimed deduction of the same. The Assessing Officer
disallowed the claim on the ground that the grant of award was at the
discretion of the management and therefore, it could not be said to be a
provision towards ascertained liability. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s
claim.

On appeal by Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“i) There was no merit in the submission of the revenue
that the liability of the assessee under the long service award scheme was
contingent as the payment under the said scheme was dependent on the
discretion of the management. It is well-settled that if the liability
arises within the accounting period, the deduction should be allowed though
it may be quantified and discharged at a future date. Therefore, the
provision for a liability is amenable to a deduction, if there is an element
of certainty that it shall be incurred and it is possible to estimate
liability with reasonable certainty even though actual quantification may
not be possible, such a liability is not of a contingent nature.

ii) In the instant case, since the provision for ‘long
service award’ was estimated based on actuarial calculations, the deduction
claimed by the assessee had to be allowed.”

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Collection of tax at source : S. 206C of I. T. Act, 1961 : Tax not collected by petitioner during period of stay by High Court : No failure to collect : No liability to pay u/s. 206C(6).

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Unreported :

  1. Collection of tax at source :
    S. 206C of I. T. Act, 1961 : Tax not collected by petitioner during period of
    stay by High Court : No failure to collect : No liability to pay u/s. 206C(6).

 

[The Satpuda Tapi Parisar Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd.
vs. CIT (Bom)
; W. P. No. 3357 of 1996; Dated 13/04/2009.].

The petitioner is a co-operative sugar factory and is a
manufacturer of country liquor. When the provisions of section 206C of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 were made applicable to the sale of country liquor, the
purchasers of country liquor challenged the provision by filing writ
petitions. The High Court granted stay of the operation of the provision and
the petitioner was directed by the High Court not to collect tax u/s. 206C in
respect of the sale of country liquor to such purchasers. Subse-quently, the
stay was vacated by the High Court. In respect of such cases the petitioner
did not collect tax on such sales only during the period of stay. For the
remaining period and in all other cases the petitioner had collected tax and
had deposited it in the treasury. After the stay was vacated the ITO Nashik
held that during the period of stay the petitioner was required to collect tax
at source of Rs.25,40,738. He therefore held that the petitioner is liable to
pay the said amount u/s. 206C(6) in spite of the fact that the petitioner had
not collected the amount in view of the stay order passed by the High Court.
Accordingly, he raised a demand of Rs.25,40,738 u/s. 206C(6) of the Act. The
Commis-sioner of Income-tax dismissed the revision petition.

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition challenging
the said order and the demand and held as under :

“i) The short question that we are called upon to
consider is whether considering the interim relief granted by this Court
whereby the petitioner herein was restrained from collecting the tax from
the purchasers, would invite the provisions of section 206C of the Act.

ii) U/s. 206C(1) every person, being a seller, had to
collect from the buyer of any goods of the nature specified in clause (2) of
the Table a sum equal to a percentage specified in the said Table. Under
sub-section (6) of section 206C any person responsible for collecting tax in
accordance with the provisions of this section shall, notwithstanding such
failure, be liable to pay the tax to the credit of the Central Government in
accordance with the provisions of sub-section (3). Sub-section (3) of
section 206C sets out that any person collecting any amount has to credit
the same to the credit of the Central Government as prescribed.

iii) On an order passed by this Court restraining the
petitioner from collecting the tax for the period, from the date of stay
till its vacation, is the petitioner liable pursuant to the provisions of
section 206C(6) ? The language used is any person responsible for collecting
the tax and who fails to collect the tax. It is true that the petitioner
being a seller is normally responsible. However, does it amount to ‘failure
to collect’ when he was restrained from collecting the tax ? Would he then
be responsible to collect the tax ? In the instant case admittedly
considering the language of the interim relief itself the petitioner who
otherwise was responsible for collecting the tax was prevented from
collecting the tax. Once the petitioner was prevented from collecting the
tax, it cannot be said that he was ‘a person responsible for collecting the
tax’. The responsibility would have arisen if he could collect the tax. The
expression ‘responsible’, therefore, has to be read in the context of
statutory duty to collect which the petitioner was bound to perform by
virtue of the provisions.

iv) The order of the Court would be binding and had to be
complied with. The issue of collection would arise at the point of sale. The
interim order was a blanket order of restriction from collecting. The
question of the petitioner, therefore, collecting the tax and therefore,
being responsible would not arise. There was bar on him to collect the tax.
If he could not collect the tax at the point of time of order, the question
of he depositing the sum u/ss. (3) or (6) of section 206C would not arise
till such period the disability disappeared. Alterna-tively on account of
the interim relief it cannot be said to be ‘failure to collect’. Failure
would contemplate an act of omission on the part of the party. The party was
aware that he had to collect the tax. This Court however, at the instance of
the buyer restrained him from collecting the tax.

v) In the instant case the disability disappeared on the
stay being vacated by this Court. Thus for the period when the stay was in
operation, as the petitioner was prevented from collecting the tax it cannot
be said that he would be liable under sub-section (6) of section 206C. A
duty was cast on the petitioner by operation of law. Petitioner could not
discharge that duty by virtue of an order of this Court. The question,
therefore, of calling on him to pay the amount which he was disabled to
collect would be illegal. If the petitioner had collected the tax it would
have been in contempt of this Court. We are, therefore, clearly of the
opinion that even though it can be said that considering the provisions of
section 206C a duty had been cast on persons like the petitioner to collect
the tax, by virtue of the interim relief he could not collect the tax for
the relevant period. Section 206C would, therefore, not be attracted.”

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Settlement of cases : Abatement of proceedings : Constitutional validity : By way of interim relief Settlement Commission directed not to consider application of assessee having abated u/s.245HA for want of compliance with S. 245D(2D) as amended by the Fi

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27 Settlement of cases : Abatement of
proceedings : S. 245D(2D) and S. 245HA of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Constitutional
validity : By way of interim relief, Setlement Commission directed not to
consider the application of the assessee having abated u/s.245HA for want of
compliance with S. 245D(2D) as amended by the Finance Act, 2007.


[Sunita Textiles Ltd v. CIT & Ors., 216 CTR 74 (Bom.)]

The constitutional validity of S. 245D(2D) and S. 245HA as
amended by the Finance Act, 2007 was
challenged by filing writ petition. The Bombay High
Court admitted the writ petition and granted interim relief directing the
Settlement Commission not to consider the settlement application filed by the
petitioner having abated u/s.245HA for want of compliance with S. 245D(2D) of
the Income-tax Act, 1961.





 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld
the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) There is no dispute that the earlier CIT(A)’s
order has become final and also the AO passed the consequent orders in
giving effect to the said CIT(A)’s order. There was no further appeals by
the Revenue. Though the said CIT(A)’s order is erroneous in view of the
Supreme Court judgment in the case of CIT v. Venkateshwara Hatcheries
(P) Ltd.,
237 ITR 174 (SC), the same has not been set aside by the
process known to law.

(ii) The Tribunal is correct in holding that the
Assessing Officer has no jurisdiction to reopen the assessment u/s.147.
Unless and until the said order is set aside by the process known to law,
the said order is valid in law, as well as it binds on the lower
authorities. Hence, the Assessing Officer is not entitled to circumvent
the earlier order passed by the CIT(A) which had become final. Under such
circumstances, the Assessing Officer should not reopen the assessment and
seek to adjudicate on the issue which was already adjudicated by the
Appellate authority.

(iii) The Tribunal correctly decided the matter and the
reasons given by the Tribunal are based on valid materials and evidence,
and there is no error or legal infirmity in the order of the Tribunal so
as to warrant interference.”

Valuation of stock : Revenue to prove valuation incorrect : Cannot rely on statement by assessee to its bank

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28 Valuation of stock : Rejection of
valuation : Burden on Revenue to prove valuation incorrect : Revenue
cannot rely on statement by assessee to its bank : A.Y. 1991-92.

[CIT v. Acrow India Ltd., 298 ITR 447 (Bom.)]


For the A.Y. 1991-92, the Assessing Officer made an
addition of Rs.17,79,248 by revaluing the closing stock relying on the
statement given by the assessee to its bank. The Tribunal deleted the
addition.


The Bombay High Court dismissed the appeal filed by
the Revenue and held as under :


“(i) As far as this aspect is concerned, the
statement given by the respondent-assessee to the bank is sought to be
relied on by the Revenue. As far as that aspect is concerned, the
Tribunal has clearly held that the valuation of the stock declared to
the bank is in fact inflated and that the correct valuation of the stock
was not suppressed from the Revenue.


(ii) The Tribunal has relied on the judgment of the
Madras High Court in the case of CIT v. N. Swamy, (2000) 241 ITR
363. There the Division Bench has held that the burden of proof in such
a case is on the Revenue and the same could not be discharged by merely
referring to a statement of the assessee to a third party.


(iii) In our view, there is no reason to interfere
with the decision of the Tribunal, inasmuch as it has followed the
decision of the Division Bench of this Court and the Madras High Court.”

S. 147 : CIT(A) allowed deductions u/s.80HH and u/s.80I : Reopening of assessment by AO on basis of subsequent Supreme Court decision is not valid

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26 Reassessment : S. 147 of Income-tax
Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 1992-93 and 1993-94 : CIT(A) allowed deductions u/s.80HH
and u/s. 80I : Reopening of assessment by AO on the basis of subsequent
Supreme Court decision is not valid.


[CIT v. Ramachandra Hatcheries, 215 CTR 370
(Mad.)]

For the A.Ys. 1992-93 and 1993-94, the assessee’s claim
for deduction u/s.80HH and u/s.80I was disallowed by the Assessing Officer.
In appeal the CIT(A) allowed the claim. The Assessing Officer gave effect to
the order of the CIT(A) and allowed the claim. Subsequently, the Assessing
Officer reopened the assessment for disallowing the claim relying on the
subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v.
Venkateshwara Hatcheries (P) Ltd.,
237 ITR 174 (SC). The Tribunal held
that the reopening of the assessment was not valid.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld
the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) There is no dispute that the earlier CIT(A)’s
order has become final and also the AO passed the consequent orders in
giving effect to the said CIT(A)’s order. There was no further appeals by
the Revenue. Though the said CIT(A)’s order is erroneous in view of the
Supreme Court judgment in the case of CIT v. Venkateshwara Hatcheries
(P) Ltd.,
237 ITR 174 (SC), the same has not been set aside by the
process known to law.

(ii) The Tribunal is correct in holding that the
Assessing Officer has no jurisdiction to reopen the assessment u/s.147.
Unless and until the said order is set aside by the process known to law,
the said order is valid in law, as well as it binds on the lower
authorities. Hence, the Assessing Officer is not entitled to circumvent
the earlier order passed by the CIT(A) which had become final. Under such
circumstances, the Assessing Officer should not reopen the assessment and
seek to adjudicate on the issue which was already adjudicated by the
Appellate authority.

(iii) The Tribunal correctly decided the matter and the
reasons given by the Tribunal are based on valid materials and evidence,
and there is no error or legal infirmity in the order of the Tribunal so
as to warrant interference.”

Cash credit : S. 68 : Long-term capital gain : Transaction of shares : Addition treating transaction bogus : Addition not valid in absence of cogent material

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24 Cash credit : S. 68 of Income-tax Act,
1961 : Long-term capital gain : Transaction of sale of shares : Addition
treating transaction bogus : Addition not valid in the absence of cogent
material.


[CIT v. Anupam Kapoor, 299 ITR 179 (P&H)]

The assessment in this case was completed u/s. 143(3) read
with S. 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The said assessment was reopened on
receipt of the intimation from the DDIT (Investigation), Gurgaon, stating that
the long-term capital gain on sale of shares declared by the assessee was false
and the transaction was not genuine. In the course of reassessment proceedings,
the assessee furnished evidence in support of the claim of long-term capital
gain. The AO made an addition of Rs.1,74,552, being the consideration on sale of
shares, as unexplained cash credit. The Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the
addition, holding that the AO had not discharged his onus and there was no
material or evidence with the AO to come to the conclusion that the transaction
shown by the assessee was a bogus transaction. The Commissioner (Appeals) took
the view that if a company was not available at the given address, it could not
conclusively prove that the company was non-existent. The Tribunal upheld the
decision of the Commissioner (Appeals) and held that the purchase contract note,
contract note for sales, distinctive numbers of shares purchased and sold, copy
of the share certificates and the quotation of shares on the date of purchase
and the sale were sufficient material to show that the transaction was not
bogus, but a genuine transaction.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and Haryana High Court
upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) There was no material before the AO, which could have
led to a conclusion that the transaction was a device to camouflage activities
to defraud the Revenue. No such presumption could be drawn by the AO merely on
surmises or conjectures.

(ii) The Tribunal took into consideration that it was only
on the basis of a presumption that the AO concluded that the assessee had paid
cash and purchased the shares. In the absence of any cogent material in this
regard, having been placed on record, the AO could not have reopened the
assessment.

(iii) The assessee had made an investment in a company,
evidence whereof was with the AO. Therefore, the AO could not have added the
income, which was rightly deleted by the Commissioner (Appeals) as well as the
Tribunal.”

 


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Dividend income : Deduction u/s.80M : Distribution of interim dividend before due date insufficient compliance of requirement.

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25 Dividend income : Deduction u/s.80M of
Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1997-98 : Distribution of dividend before due
date : Distribution of interim dividend before due date is in sufficient
compliance of the requirement.


[CIT v. Saumya Finance & Leasing Co. (P) Ltd., 215
CTR 359 (Bom.)]

For the A.Y. 1996-97, the assessee company had filed return
of income including dividend income of Rs.2,69,16,774 and had claimed a
deduction of Rs.2,19,97,105 u/s.80M of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the basis
of the distribution of interim dividend of Rs.2,19,97,105 before the due date
for filing the return. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim on the
ground that the condition of distribution of dividend before due date is not
satisfied. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, it was contended on behalf of the
Revenue that the interim dividend was declared by the assessee company in the
financial year 1997-98 and out of income accrued in the said year. It was
further contended that the dividend declared and paid in the subsequent year
could not be a permitted deduction from the income in a previous year, since
the said dividend was paid out of income accruing in the subsequent year.

The Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal
and held as under :

“(i) On the bare reading of S. 80M it is clear that the
deduction as permitted is of an amount equal to so much of the amount of
income by way of dividend declared by the company as does not exceed the
amount of dividend distributed by the assessee on or before the due date. S.
80M does not provide for the nature of the dividend distributed by the
assessee company. It does not state that the nature of the dividend
distributed must be for the financial year under assessment.

(ii) Accepting the argument of the Revenue will amount to
laying down an additional restriction to the effect that the dividend
distributed by the assessee company must be for the financial year under
assessment. Laying down such restricting qualification will amount to doing
violence to the plain and clear meaning of the words as contained in S. 80M.

(iii) This is not a case where a literal construction to
be given to S. 80M would lead to an absurd result. The intention of the
Legislature while enacting S. 80M was clearly to ensure that the dividend
income received by the assessee company should be permitted as a deduction
only if it is redistributed as dividend income to its shareholders. The
section provided that the said distribution is to be made before the due
date of the filing of the returns. This has been done by the present
respondent and all the requirements of S. 80M are clearly met by them.”

Cash credit : S. 68 : Gift from NRI : Copy of deed and affidavit filed : In absence of anything to show that transaction was by way of money laundering, addition cannot be made u/s.68 : Absence of blood relationship is not relevant

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23 Cash credit : S. 68 of Income-tax
Act, 1961 : Gift from NRI : Copy of gift deed and affidavit of NRI donor
filed : In the absence of anything to show that the transaction was by way
of money laundering, addition can-not be made u/s.68 : Absence of blood
relationship or close relationship between the donor and the donee is not
relevant.


[CIT v. Padam Singh Chouhan, 215 CTR 303 (Raj.)]

The Revenue had preferred an appeal against the decision
of the Tribunal, deleting the addition made by the Assessing Officer u/s.68
of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The following question was raised in the
appeal :

“Whether in the facts and the circumstances of the
case, the learned Tribunal was justified in deleting the addition of
Rs.4,50,000, Rs.2,50,000 and Rs.2,00,000, which have been received on
account of gift when no relation has been established from whom gifts have
been received, whether the finding of the learned Tribunal is perverse ?”

 


The Rajasthan High Court decided the question in favour
of the assessee, dismissed the appeal and held as under :

“(i) There is no legal basis to assume that to
recognise the gift to be genuine, there should be any blood relationship,
or any close relationship between the donor and the donee. Instances are
not rare, when even strangers make gifts, out of very many considerations,
including arising out of love, affection and sentiments. When the assessee
has produced the copies of the gift deeds and the affidavits of the
donors, in the absence of anything to show that the act of the assessee in
claiming gift was an act by way of money laundering, simply because he
happens to receive gifts, it cannot be said that that is required to be
added in his income.

(ii) The Assessing Officer has assumed doubts against
the donor, merely on the basis of his having deposited certain amounts in
his accounts soon before making the gifts, and that the assessee had
withdrawn the amounts deposited by him, including the amount of the said
gifts in a short span of time. With this, the AO has found, that the facts
created doubts, that how the assessee as well as his family members are
receiving such huge gifts from a person residing abroad, and concluded
that it appears that the gifts are not genuine, and only a managed affair
of the assessee.

(iii) The CIT(A) has reversed his findings by holding
that the assessee had clearly shown from the assessment proceedings that
the gifts were made out of love and affection towards the assessee, and it
is a matter of God’s grace to create love and affection between donors and
donee, and that to have love and affection between two persons, blood
relation is not required, and looking to the status of the donors, the
amount gifted was very meager. Then it was found by the CIT(A) that the
assessee has also furnished the copies of the gift deeds and affidavits of
the donors. In the opinion of the CIT(A), it is not a case where the
assessee had first given such amounts to the donors, and the donors
returned back to the assessee by way of gift. The CIT(A) had gone through
the bank accounts of the donors, copies thereof are on record, and found
that there was sufficient cash balance on the date of gift to the
assessee, in respect of both the donors, and thus, the addition was
deleted.

(iv) The Tribunal has affirmed this finding by relying
upon certain judgments.

Capital gains : Income from sale of milk : Sale of calves : Cost of acquisition not ascertainable : Capital gain not chargeable

New Page 1

22 Capital gains : Assessee deriving
income from sale of milk : Sale of calves : Cost of acquisition not
ascertainable : Capital gain not chargeable to tax.


[Dy. CIT v. Smt. Suniti Singh, 215 CTR 326 (MP)]

The assessee was running a dairy and was deriving income
from sale of cow milk. In the relevant year, the assessee had sold calves. The
assessee claimed that the profit on sale of calves is not chargeable to tax as
the cost of acquisition is not ascertainable. The Assessing Officer observed
that the assessee had claimed depreciation on calves forming a part and parcel
of the live stock and, therefore, it was stock in trade of the assessee and
income from the sale of such stock in trade is liable to tax. Accordingly, the
Assessing Officer made an addition of Rs.68,000. The Tribunal accepted the
assessee’s claim and deleted the addition.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madhya Pradesh High Court
upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) The business of the assessee relates to sale of milk
and the female cows constitute assets and they are exploited for production
of milk. The primary motive of the assessee is to fertilise the cows so that
they can yield milk. The income is derived through sale of milk and all
expenses which have gone into are to upkeep them and maintenance of cows,
like purchase of fodder, medicines, etc. are exclusively designed for
obtaining milk and the said expenditure has been shown as revenue
expenditure in the P&L a/c.

(ii) The calves came into being in the process so that
the female cows can be utilised to produce and eventually the milk is sold.
The male calves are sold as they are of no value to the assessee as they
cannot produce milk. There is no material on record to show that the selling
of calves is a part of the business activity of the assessee. Facts brought
on record clearly show that the asessee is engaged in the business activity
which relates to sale of milk.

(ii) The Tribunal is right in holding that the sale of
calves by the assessee cannot be regarded as capital gain since the cost of
acquisition is not ascertainable.”

Search and seizure : Penalty u/s.158BFA(2) : Is directory and not mandatory : AO has discretion to levy or not to levy penalty

New Page 1

54 Search and seizure : Penalty
u/s.158BFA(2) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Is directory and not mandatory : AO has
discretion to levy or not to levy penalty.


[CIT v. Dodsal Ltd., 218 CTR 430 (Bom.)]

In this case penalty imposed by the Assessing Officer
u/s.158BFA(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was deleted by the CIT(A) and the
order of the CIT(A) was upheld by the Tribunal. In appeal filed by the Revenue
before the Bombay High Court the following questions were raised :

“(i) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the
case and in law, the Tribunal is correct in deleting the penalty levied
u/s.158BFA(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 without appreciating the fact that the
assessee has failed to comply with the conditions stipulated in the 1st proviso
to S. 158BFA(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ?

(ii) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the
case and in law, the Hon’ble Tribunal is correct in interpreting the condition
stipulated in the 1st proviso to S. 158BFA(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 as
directory and not mandatory ?”

 

The Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and
held as under :

“(i) The terminology of S. 158BFA(2) makes it clear that
there is a discretion in the Assessing Officer to direct payment of penalty.
The proviso supports this interpretation. Only if the authority decides to
impose penalty, then it will not be less than the tax leviable, but shall not
exceed three times the tax so leviable.

(ii) It is therefore, not possible to accept the submission
on behalf of the Revenue that once the Assessing Officer comes to the
conclusion that there is breach of the mandate of S. 158BFA(1), then the
penalty should be imposed. Merely because the expression used is “shall not be
less than the amount of tax leviable or not exceeding three times the tax”,
does not result in reading the first part of the Section as mandatory. The
proviso to the sub-section makes it clear that there is discretion conferred
on the CIT(A) for the reasons which are set out therein.

(iii) In the instant case, both the CIT(A) and the Tribunal
have recorded reasons for exercise of their discretion. The Revenue has not
challenged the said finding of fact as to the exercise of discretionary power.
Therefore, the view taken by the Tribunal that the Section is directory and
not mandatory is upheld.”

Reassessment : S. 147 and S. 148 : Reason to believe : AO recording reasons and AO issuing notice u/s.148 different : Notice not valid.

New Page 1

52 Reassessment : S. 147 and S. 148 of
Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 1990-91 and 1991-92 : Reason to believe : AO
recording reasons and AO issuing notice u/s.148 different : Notice u/s.148 not
valid.


[Hynoup Food and Oil Industries Ltd. v. ACIT, 307
ITR 115 (Guj.)]

For the A.Ys. 1990-91 and 1991-92 the Assessing Officer
issued notices u/s.148 for reopening the assessments. But the Assessing
Officer who had issued the notice was different from the officer who had
recorded the reasons.

 

On a writ petition filed by the assessee challenging the
validity of the notice u/s.148, the Gujarat High Court quashed the notice and
held as under :

“(i) The opening portion of S. 147 of the Income-tax Act,
1961, stipulates that action may be initiated if the Assessing Officer has
reason to believe that any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment
for any assessment year. This provision must be read in conjunction with S.
148(2) of the Act which mandates that the Assessing Officer shall, before
issuing any notice u/s.148 of the Act, record his reasons for issuing the
notice. It is, therefore, clear that the officer recording the reasons
u/s.148(2) and the officer issuing notice u/s.148(1) has to be the same
person.

(ii) In the instant case, the officer who had issued the
notice u/s.148 was different from the officer who had recorded the reasons
and hence, the notices for both these years were invalid and deserved to be
quashed.”

 


 


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S. 139 and S. 140 : Return signed by assessee was filed after his death. Not a valid return.

New Page 1

53 Return of income : Signature : S. 139 and
S. 140 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2003-04 : Return of income signed by
assessee was filed after his death. Not a valid return.



[CIT v. Moti Ram, 175 Taxman 27 (P&H)]

The assessee expired on 14-9-2003. Before death, the
assessee had signed the return of income for the A.Y. 2003-04. The return was
filed on 28-11-2003 i.e., after his death. The Assessing Officer
completed the assessment u/s.143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in spite of
contention raised by the legal heirs that the return filed by the assessee was
null and void. The CIT(A) cancelled the assessment holding that the return
filed in the name of the assessee after his death was null and void ab
initio
, and hence any action taken on such a return was also null and
void. The Tribunal upheld the decision of the CIT(A).

On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and Haryana High Court
upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) In the instant case the return was filed on
28-11-2003. On that day, the assessee had already expired. The return filed
with the signatures of the assessee after his death cannot be taken as valid
return filed by the assessee himself. Undisputedly, the return was neither
signed, nor verified by the legal heirs of the deceased.

(ii) The return filed in this case was null and void. In
our opinion, no valid assessment could have been made on the basis of an
invalid and void return.”

 


 


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Ss. 147, 148 and Ch. XIV-B : Block period ending on 24-11-1995 : No jurisdiction to reopen block assessment by issuing notice u/s.148.

New Page 1

51 Reassessment : Block assessment : S. 147,
S. 148 and Ch. XIV-B of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Block period ending on
24-11-1995 : There is no jurisdiction to reopen a block assessment by issuing
notice u/s.148.


[Cargo Clearing Agency (Gujarat) v. JCIT, 307 ITR 1 (Guj.);
218 CTR 541 (Guj.)]

Pursuant to a search on 24-11-1995 block assessment was made
u/s.158BD of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in the case of the petitioner.
Subsequently, a notice u/s.148 was issued by the Assessing Officer for reopening
the block assessment. The petitioner filed writ petition challenging the
jurisdiction to reopen the block assessment by issuing notice u/s.148 of the
Act.

The Gujarat High Court allowed the petition and held as
under :

“(i) When one considers the entire scheme relating to the
procedure for assessment/reassessment as laid down in the group of Sections
from S. 147 to S. 153 and compares with the special procedure for assessment
of search cases under Chapter XIV-B of the Act, it becomes apparent that the
normal procedure laid down by the Chapter XIV of the Act has been given a
go-by when Chapter XIV-B itself lays down that the said Chapter provides for a
special procedure for assessment of search cases. Clause (f) under Ss.(1) of
S. 158BB of the Act provides for reducing the aggregate of the total income
computed for the block period by the aggregate of the total income, in a case
where an assessment for undisclosed income had been made earlier under clause
(c) of S. 158BC, on the basis of such assessment. In other words, it only
means that where a previous assessment has been framed under Chapter XIV-B of
the Act, the aggregate of such total income assessed for the block period in
case of a search where the block period is a different block from the earlier
block period, has to be deducted for assessing for a subsequent block period.

(ii) When this provision is read in the context of S.
158BC, more particularly the first proviso thereunder, it becomes clear that
the Legislature does not intend to reopen a block assessment. Any such
interpretation would run counter to the legislative intent as noted from the
contemporaneous exposition through the memorandum explaining the Finance Bill
as well as the various circulars issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes
explaining different amendments. In S. 158BA of the Act, there is a positive
mandate to the Assessing Officer to assess the undisclosed income in
accordance with the provisions of Chapter XIV-B of the Act, notwithstanding
anything contained in any other provisions of the Act. As against that, S.
158BH states that except as otherwise provided in Chapter XIV-B of the Act,
all other provisions of the Act, shall apply to assessment made under Chapter
XIV-B. Therefore, once the period of limitation has been prescribed u/s.158BE
of the Act, the time limit for completion of assessment of undisclosed income
has to be as provided under the said section.

(iii) The entire Chapter XIV-B of the Act relates to
assessment of search cases, viz., undisclosed income found as a result
of search. One cannot envisage escapement of undisclosed income once a search
has taken place and material recovered, on processing of which undisclosed
income is brought to tax. S. 147 of the Act itself indicates that it is in
relation to income escaping assessment and applies in a case where either
income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment by virtue of either
non-disclosure by way of non-filing of the return, or non-disclosure by way of
omission to disclose fully and truly all material facts for the purpose of
assessment, or processing of material already available on record, if it is
within the stipulated period of limitation. Therefore, to contend that the
undisclosed income has escaped assessment despite an assessment having been
framed under Chapter XIV-B of the Act by adopting the special procedure
prescribed by the said Chapter, is to contend what is inherently not possible.

(iv) It cannot be a case of non-filing of return
considering the provisions of S. 158BC of the Act. It cannot be a case of
non-disclosure of material facts considering the fact that everything which
was undisclosed has already been unearthed at the time of search and the
definition of ‘undisclosed income’ itself indicates that not only what has
been seized or recovered, but even income or property which has not been or
would not have been disclosed for the purpose of the Act has been roped in.
Further-more, S. 158BB of the Act also provides not only for acquisition of
books of account or other documents, but on the basis of evidence found as a
result of search and such other materials or information as are available with
the Assessing Officer, undisclosed income of block period shall be computed.
Therefore, even if assuming that some income has not been disclosed in the
return furnished u/s. 158BC of the Act, the AO is bound to assess all
undisclosed income after processing the entire material available with the AO.
The AO could not be heard to state that undisclosed income has escaped
assessment because the officer failed to apply his mind to the material
available on record, there being no lack of disclosure.

(v) The entire scheme under Chapter XIV of the Act, more
particularly from S. 147 to S. 153 of the Act, pertaining to reassessment and
the special procedure for assessing the undisclosed income of the block period
under Chapter XIV-B of the Act are not only separate and distinct from each
other, but if an effort is made to incorporate the scheme under Chapter XIV of
the Act, for the purpose of assessment of block period there is a conflict
between the provisions which becomes apparent on a plain reading. In the
circumstances, by the established rules of interpretation, unless and until a
plain reading of the two streams of assessment procedure does not result in
the procedures being independently workable, the question of resolving the
conflict would not arise. But in the light of the provisions of S. 158BH of
the Act, once there is a conflict between the two streams of procedure the
provisions of Chapter XIV-B of the Act shall prevail and have primacy. Once
assessment has been framed u/s.158BA of the Act in relation to undisclosed
income for the block period as a result of search, there is no question of the
AO issuing notice u/s.148 of the Act for reopening such assessment as the said
concept is repugnant to the special scheme of assessment of of undisclosed income for the block period. The first proviso u/s.158BC(a) of the Act specifically provides that no notice u/ s. 148 of the Act is required to be issued for the purpose of proceedings under Chapter XIV-B.”

Cash credits : S. 68 : Share application money : Department must show that investment made by subscribers emanated from coffers of assessee to be treated as undisclosed income of assessee.

New Page 1

49 Cash credits : S. 68 of Income-tax Act,
1961 : A.Y. 2001-02 : Company : Share application money : Department must show
that investment made by subscribers actually emanated from coffers of assessee
to be treated as undisclosed income of assessee.



[CIT v. Value Capital Services P. Ltd., 307 ITR 334
(Del.)]

The assessee had received an amount of Rs.51 lakhs as share
application money from 33 persons in the previous year relevant to A.Y.
2001-02. The Assessing Officer accepted the explanation and the statement
given by three of these persons, but found that the response from the others
was either not available or was inadequate. Therefore, he added an amount of
Rs.46 lakhs pertaining to 30 subscribers to the income of the assessee u/s.68
of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The CIT(A) confirmed the addition.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) The principle that has been laid down by the various
decisions rendered by this Court from time to time is that if the existence
of the applicant is proved, normally no further inquiry is necessary.

(ii) Learned counsel for the Revenue submits that the
creditworthiness of the applicant can nevertheless be examined by the
Assessing Officer. It is quite obvious that it is very difficult for the
assessee to show the creditworthiness of strangers. If the Revenue has any
doubt with regard to their ability to make the investment, their returns may
be reopened by the Department.

(iii) In any case, what is clinching is the additional
burden on the Revenue. It must show that even if the applicant does not have
the means to make the investment, the investment made by the applicant
actually emanated from the coffers of the assessee, so as to enable it to be
treated as the undisclosed income of the assessee. This has not been done
insofar as the present case is concerned and that has been noted by the
Tribunal also.”

 


 


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Incentive prize received on coupon given on strength of NSC : Is not lottery : Is casual and non-recurring receipt exempt u/s.10(3).

New Page 1

50. Casual and non-recurring receipt :
Exemption u/s.10(3) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1994-95 : Incentive prize
received on coupon given on the strength of NSC : Is not a lottery : Is casual
and non-recurring receipt exempt u/s.10(3).


[B. K. Suresh v. ITO, 221 CTR 80 (Kar.)]

The assessee, a professor in Engineering College, had
purchased National Saving Certificates (NSCs) in F.Y. 1992-93. The Director of
Small Savings, Government of Karnataka, as a measure to encourage small savings,
framed a scheme under which it offered different prizes to the persons who had
made investment in a small savings scheme, through a lucky draw. By virtue of
the purchase of NSCs, the assessee had become entitled for a coupon.
Accordingly, a coupon was issued to him. In a lucky draw he was adjudged as
prize winner, having bagged third prize. The prize was Indira Vikas Patra of
face value of Rs.5,00,000, the market value being Rs.3,50,000. The assessee
claimed exemption u/s.10(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 of the said amount of
Rs.3,50,000. The AO disallowed the same treating the same as a lottery and made
addition of Rs.3,50,000 in his order u/s.143(1)(a) of the Act. The Tribunal
confirmed the addition.

 

On appeal by the assessee, the following questions were
raised :

“1. Whether in the facts and in the circumstances of the
case, the Tribunal was right in law in holding that incentive award received
by the appellant-assessee constitutes lottery income on the facts and in the
circumstances of the case ?

2. Whether the Tribunal was right in law in holding that
the purchase of National Savings Certificates by the appellant-assessee
constitutes payment of consideration to participate in the lottery ?”

 


The Karnataka High Court concurred with the view of the
Madras High Court in CIT v. Dy. Direcor of Small Savings, (2004) 266 ITR
27 (Mad.) that giving of coupons against National Savings Certificates would not
fall within the definition of ‘lottery’. The Court allowed the assessee’s claim
and held as under :

“(i) The definition of ‘lottery’ inserted by the Finance
Act, 2001 is prospective and not retrospective.

(ii) We have no hesitation to hold that all the authorities
below committed an error in adding the prize money awarded to the assessee on
coupon and draw thereof to the income of the assessee. Thus the said orders
deserve to be set aside and quashed and are hereby set aside and quashed.”

 



 



 

 


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Where percentage of commission is not fixed and varies depending on decision of board of directors, commission paid to directors would not be remuneration u/s.40(c).

New Page 1

48 Business expenditure : Disallowance u/s.
40(c) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Remuneration to director : Where percentage of
commission is not fixed and varies depending on decision of Board of directors,
commission paid to directors would not be remuneration as contemplated
u/s.40(c).


[J. K. Synthetics Ltd. v. CIT, 175 Taxman 22 (Del.)]

The assessee-company paid different amounts to its directors
by way of commission. The Assessing Officer held that wherever payment was above
the ceiling limit of Rs.72,00,000, it was to be disallowed u/s.40(c) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961. Accordingly, he made the disallowance. The disallowance
was upheld by the Tribunal.

 

On appeal by the assessee, the Delhi High Court reversed the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) A perusal of the special resolution passed by the
assessee-company, in terms of which commission was paid to directors made it
clear that the quantum of commission was to be determined at the discretion of
its Board of directors. The commission, that had to be paid in terms of the
special resolution, was up to a maximum limit of 3% of the net profits of the
company. In other words, there was no fixed commission paid to any of the
directors and the amount of commission varied depending upon the decision of
the Board. The factors that the Board was required to take into consideration
had not been spelt out, but one had to proceed on the basis of the decision of
the Board, presuming that the commission payable to the directors was to be
determined on the basis of services
rendered by them or some similar requirements.

(ii) It was possible that the percentage might have a nexus
with the turnover achieved (which was also variable) or the amount of business
given by the director to the assessee (which was also variable). The factors
to be taken into conside-ration for determining the percentage of commission
had not been spelt out in the special resolution. So long as the percentage
was not fixed and was variable, it could not
partake the nature of salary and, therefore, could not partake the nature of
remuneration, which according to the Revenue, is similar to salary.

(iii) Consequently, the commission paid to the directors
could not be said to be remuneration as contemplated by S. 40(c).”

 


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Deduction u/s.36(1)(vii) for bad debt allowable independently, irrespective of deduction for provision for bad and doubtful debts allowable u/s.36(1)(viia) subject to limitation that amount should not be deducted twice

New Page 1

46 Business expenditure : Assessee bank :
Deduction of bad debt u/s.36(1)(vii) and provision for bad debt u/s.36(1)(viia)
of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 1993-94 and 1994-95 : Deduction u/s.36(1)(vii)
for bad debt is allowable independently and irrespective of deduction for
provision for bad and doubtful debts allowable u/s.36(1)(viia) subject to
limitation that amount should not be deducted twice.


[DCIT v. Karnataka Bank Ltd., 218 CTR 273 (Kar.)]

The assessee is a scheduled bank. For the A.Ys. 1993-94 and
1994-95 the assessee bank had claimed deduction of bad debts written off
u/s.36(1)(vii) and also deduction of provision for bad and doubtful debts
u/s.36(1)(viia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer allowed the
claim for deduction of provision for bad and doubtful debts u/s. 36(1)(viia),
but disallowed the claim u/s.36(1)(vii) for bad debts written off. The CIT(A)
upheld the disallowance. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“The Tribunal was correct in holding that deduction
u/s.36(1)(vii) is allowable independently and irrespective of the provision
for bad and doubtful debts created by the assessee in relation to the advances
of the rural branches u/s.36(1)(viia), subject to the limitation that an
amount should not be deducted twice u/s.36(1)(vii) and u/s. 36(1)(viia)
simultaneously.”

 




 

 


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“Good work reward” by assessee to employee : Amount has no relation to profit earned : Does not amount to bonus : Amount not deductible u/s.36(1)(ii) but deductible u/s.37(1).

New Page 1

47 Business expenditure : Bonus : S.
36(1)(ii) and S. 37(1) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : ‘Good work reward’ given by
assessee for good work done by employee : Amount having no relation to profit
earned : Does not amount to bonus : Amount not deductible u/s.36(1)(ii), but
deductible u/s.37(1).


[Shriram Pistons and Rings Ltd. v. CIT, 307 ITR 363
(Del.)]

The following question was raised before the High Court in a
reference filed by the Revenue :

“Whether the Tribunal was right in holding that the
payments made by the assessee to its employees under the nomenclature ‘Good
work reward’ did not constitute bonus within the meaning of S. 36(1)(ii) of
the Income-tax Act, 1961 and were allowable as normal business expenditure
u/s. 37 ?”

 


The Delhi High Court held as under :

“(i) The word ‘bonus’ has not been defined anywhere
including the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965. However, for the purpose of
industrial law, four types of bonus have been recognised : (a) production
bonus, (b) contractual bonus, (c) customary bonus usually associated with
festivals, and (d) profit-sharing bonus.

(ii) The ‘good work reward’ that was given by the assessee
to some employees on the recommendation of senior officers of the assessee did
not fall in any of the categories of bonus specified under the industrial law.
There was nothing to suggest that the good work reward given by the assessee
to its employees had any relation to the profits that the assessee may or may
not make.

(iii) The reward had relation to the good work done by the
employee during the course of his employment and at the end of the financial
year on recommendation of a senior officer of the assessee, the reward was
given to the employee. Consequently, the ‘good work reward’ could not fall
within the ambit of S. 36(1)(ii) of the Act.

(iv) The ‘good work reward’ was allowable as business
expenditure u/s.37(1) of the Act.”

 


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Ss. 36(1)(ii) and 37(1) : Ex-gratia payment over and above statutory limits prescribed under Payment of Bonus Act, 1965, is allowable as business expenditure.

New Page 1

45 Business expenditure : Bonus : S.
36(1)(ii) and S. 37(1) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1993-94 : Ex gratia
payment over and above statutory limits prescribed under the Payment of Bonus
Act, 1965, is allowable as business expenditure.


[CIT v. Maina Ore Transport (P) Ltd., 218 CTR 653 (Bom.)]

In the A.Y. 1993-94 the assessee had made payment of ex
gratia
in the sum of Rs.2,37,702 to its employees in excess of the limit of
8.33% prescribed under the Payment of Bonus Act. The assessee had claimed the
deduction of the said ex gratia payment as business expenditure. The AO
disallowed the claim on the ground that it is in excess of 8.33% maximum
statutory limit under the Act. The CIT(A) allowed the deduction holding that the
amount was paid to maintain healthy relations and industrial peace. The Tribunal
confirmed the decision of the CIT(A).

 

On reference by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“Ex gratia payment in excess of the limits prescribed under
the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965, is allowable as business expenditure, although
the payment did not cover contractual payment or customary payment.”

 


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Wealth tax : Asset : S. 2(ea) of Wealth-tax Act, 1957 : A.Ys. 1997-98 and 1998-99 : Commercial asset used by assessee in business of letting out properties : Not an asset : Not chargeable to tax.

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Reported :

30. Wealth tax : Asset : S.
2(ea) of Wealth-tax Act, 1957 : A.Ys. 1997-98 and 1998-99 : Commercial asset
used by assessee in business of letting out properties : Not an asset : Not
chargeable to tax.

[CIT v. Shankaranarayana
Industries & Plantations (P.) Ltd.,
194 Taxman 189 (Kar.)]

The assessee-company had
developed a property into a commercial complex and was deriving rental income
therefrom. Relying on the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1996, the Assessing Officer
charged wealth tax on the said commercial complex for the A.Ys. 1997-98 and
1998-99, on the ground that the property was used for the commercial purposes
and was not excluded from the definition of the term ‘asset’ in S. 2(ea) of the
Wealth-tax Act, 1957. The Commissioner and the Tribunal accepted the claim of
the assessee and held that the assessee is in the business of letting out
properties and accordingly, the commercial complex in question was excluded from
the definition of the word ‘asset’ as is clear from the Circular of the Board.

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal. The High Court
considered the amendments to S. 2(ea) of the Act by the Finance (No. 2) Act,
1996 and the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1998. The High Court also considered the
memorandum explaining the Finance (No. 2) Bill, 1996, the CBDT Circular No. 762,
dated 18-2-1998 explaining the provisions of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1996 and
held as under :

“(i) After the amendment
came into force, the Central Board of Direct Taxes issued Circular No. 762,
dated 18-2-1998, explaining the substantive provisions of the Act relating to
direct taxes. The said amended Section was in force only for two years and by
the Finance Act (No. 2), 1998, the same underwent a radical change, wherein it
is said that any property which is in the nature of commercial building or
complex do not fall within the definition of the word ‘asset’ as defined
u/s. 2(ea) of the Act.

(ii) It is in this
background, the assessee claims that, as the asset in question is the business
asset of the assessee, and as the assessee is in the business of letting out
properties, as is clear from the Explanatory Note appended to the Bill as well
as the Circular issued by the CBDT after passing of the amendment, the asset
which he had let out did not fall within the definition of the word ‘asset’
and therefore, the company is not liable to pay wealth tax.

(iii) The explanatory note
and the CBDT Circular make it very clear that prior to the Finance (No. 2)
Act, 1996, the commercial properties were not included within the definition
of the word ‘asset’. Therefore, it was felt that if residential houses have
been taken as assets, there seems to be no reason why commercial properties
other than those used by the assessee wholly and substantially in the business
or his profession, will also be not taken as assets. Therefore, by an
amendment, commercial buildings which are not occupied by the assessee for the
purposes of his business or profession other than the business of letting out
property, shall be brought to tax under the Wealth-tax Act, 1957.

(iv) Therefore, it is
clear that the intention was to stimulate investment in productive assets.
Therefore, the Parliament thought it fit to abolish the amended Act, excluding
the business assets, i.e., the commercial establishments, which are not
used by the assessee or which are let out, as they are not stimulative
investment. However, as is clear from the aforesaid Explanatory Note, the CBDT
circular and the subsequent action of further amending the said Section, it is
clear that the intention was not to tax business assets used by the assessee
for the purpose of his business or profession and also the business assets
which are let out, if the assessee is in the business of letting out
properties. All other types of commercial properties were brought to tax under
the Wealth-tax Act.

(v) Both the Appellate
Authorities after carefully going to the aforesaid Circulars, amendments,
Explanatory Note and keeping in mind the intention in enacting the Wealth-tax
Act as well as drastic amendment in the year, we are of the opinion that the
assessee was justified in claiming the exclusion of the properties which are
the subject of the matter of the proceedings, from wealth tax. We do not find
any error or illegality in the findings recorded by the Tribunal. Therefore,
no case of interference is made out.”

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Order giving effect to appellate order is inherent in S. 143 and 144 : Not order u/s.154 : Limitation u/s.154(7) not applicable.

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44 Assessment : Limitation : S. 143, S. 144
and S. 154 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1994-95 : Order giving effect to
Appellate order is order inherent in S. 143 and S. 144 : Not an order u/s.154 :
Limitation u/s.154(7) not applicable.


[Peninsula Land Ltd. v. CIT, 307 ITR 183 (Bom); 175
Taxman 58 (Bom)]

For the A.Y. 1994-95 the AO passed an order u/s.154 of the
Income-tax Act, 1961, on 9-6-2006 giving effect to the order of the Commissioner
(Appeals). In that order he allowed set-off of carried forward depreciation of
the preceding years. Subsequently, he passed another order u/s.154 dated
22-2-2007 withdrawing the earlier order u/s.154, dated 9-6-2006 claiming it to
be beyond the period of limitation as prescribed u/s.154(7). The Commissioner
rejected the revision application made u/s.264 of the Act.

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the
assessee and held as under :

“(i) It was clear from the order dated 9-6-2006, that the
set-off was granted in order to pass on to the assessee the benefit that it
had obtained under the order passed by the Appellate authority in the
statutory appeal. This order was not an order passed u/s.154 of the Act. The
power to pass such order was inherent in S. 143 or S. 144.

(ii) The power of the Income-tax Officer to amend the
assessment in consequence of decision in an appeal, revision, reference or by
a High Court or Supreme Court was not traceable to S. 154, but was inherent
and traceable to S. 143 and S. 144 of the Act. Therefore the limitation as
contained in S. 154(7) would not apply to the passing of such an order.

(iii) The finding that the order passed on 9-6-2006 was
beyond the period of limitation as prescribed u/s.154(7) was erroneous.”

 


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TDS : Salary : S. 192 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 1992-93 to 1998-99 : Assessee was an Indian company engaged in food processing business : Pursuant to a technical collaboration agreement, employees of Japanese company were deputed to India for workin

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Reported :


29. TDS : Salary : S. 192 of
Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 1992-93 to 1998-99 : Assessee was an Indian company
engaged in food processing business : Pursuant to a technical collaboration
agreement, employees of Japanese company were deputed to India for working in
assessee-company : Assessee deducted tax at source u/s.192 only on salary and
perks disbursed by it to employees of Japanese company : Assessee not liable to
deduct tax at source in respect of payments made by foreign company to its
employees.

[CIT v. Indo Nissin Food
Ltd.,
194 Taxman 144 (Kar.)]

The assessee was an Indian
company engaged in the food processing business. Pursuant to a technical
collaboration agreement entered into between the assessee-company and the
Japanese company, the employees of the Japanese company were deputed to India
considering their expertise in the business and they were working in the
assessee-company during the relevant assessment years. The assessee had deducted
the tax at source u/s.192 based on the salary and perks disbursed by it to the
employees of the Japanese company working with it. The Assessing Officer imposed
penalty u/s.271C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the ground that the assessee
company had failed to deduct tax at source in regard to the payments made by the
Japanese company to its employees who were working with the assessee-company.
The Tribunal deleted the penalty holding that the assessee was not liable to
deduct the tax at source in respect of the payments made by the foreign company.

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

(i) It was not in dispute
that the assessee had paid salary to the employees who had been deputed from
the foreign company. S. 192 envisages the assessee to deduct the tax at source
in respect of the payments made by it to the employees. Therefore, the
assessee was required to deduct income-tax at source on the amount payable or
paid by it to its employees.

(ii) There was no record
to show that the amount paid by the foreign company to its employees was made
known to the assessee or the said amount was also disbursed to the employees
of the foreign company through the assessee. Therefore, it was not possible to
accept the arguments advanced by the Revenue, as S. 192 does not deal with
such cases. In the circumstances, when the payment was not made by the
assessee or the amount was not paid by a foreign company through the assessee,
the assessee was not required to deduct the tax at source u/s.192(1).

(iii) When there was no
violation of S. 192(1), the question of initiating the proceedings u/s.271C
did not arise.”

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S. 27 — Notice by Speed Post is deemed to have been served by ordinary post within 2-3 days, further absence of assessee

New Page 2

II. Reported : 



53 Notice : Service by Speed Post : Notice
u/s.143(2) dispatched by Speed Post and not received back is deemed to have been
served in the ordinary course of post within 2/3 days by virtue of presumption
u/s.27 of General Clauses Act, 1897, in the absence of any rebuttal on the side
of the assessee.

[CIT v. Madhsy Films (P) Ltd., 301 ITR 69 (Del.); 216
CTR 145 (Del.)]

Pursuant to the return of income filed by the assessee on
31-10-2001, the Assessing Officer issued notice u/s.143(2) of the Income-tax
Act, 1961, on 23-10-2002 fixing the date of hearing on 29-10-2002 and sent by
Speed Post and completed the assessment after issuing further notices. The
assessee challenged the validity of the assessment order, on the ground that the
notice u/s.143(2) of the Act was not served on the assessee within the
prescribed period. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim and quashed the
assessment order.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court reversed the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) In the present case, the notice has been issued on
23-10-2002 and was sent through Speed Post on 25-10-2002 at the address of the
company. S. 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 provides that service by post
is deemed to have been effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting
by registered post, a letter containing a notice required to be served. Unless
the contrary is proved, the service is deemed to have been effected at the
time when the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post. This
presumption is rebuttable, but in the absence of proof to the contrary, the
presumption of proper service or effective service of notice would arise.

(ii) There is nothing on record to show that the notice
dated 23-10-2002 dispatched on 25-10-2002 by Speed Post was undelivered or
received back. Under the normal circumstances, a presumption will lie that
this notice has reached the assessee within 2/3 days. Since the envelop
containing the notice has not been received back by the Department, there is a
presumption that it has reached the assessee and this presumption has not been
rebutted by the assessee at all. No affidavit has been filed by the assessee
to the effect that the notice was not received by it.

(iii) Under the circumstances, notice u/s.143(2) was served
upon the assessee within the prescribed period and as such the finding given by
the Tribunal that no notice u/s.143(2) has been served upon the assessee within
the prescribed period is hereby set aside and the substantial question of law is
decided in the negative in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.”

Revision : S. 263 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 2001-02 and 2002-03 : Where AO adopts one of courses permissible in law or where two views are possible and AO takes one of possible views, Commissioner cannot exercise his powers u/s.263 to differ with vi

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Reported :


28. Revision : S. 263 of
Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 2001-02 and 2002-03 : Where AO adopts one of
courses permissible in law or where two views are possible and AO takes one of
possible views, Commissioner cannot exercise his powers u/s.263 to differ with
view of AO even if there has been a loss of revenue: When a regular assessment
is made u/s.143(3), a presumption can be raised that order has been passed upon
application of mind and, though this presumption is rebuttable, yet there must
be some material to indicate that AO had not applied his mind to invoke
provisions of S. 263 : Validity of an order u/s.263 has to be tested with regard
to position of law as it exists on the date of the order.

[CIT v. Honda Seil Power
Products Ltd.,
194 Taxman 175 (Del.)]

For the A.Ys. 2001-02 and
2002-03, assessment was completed u/s.143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961
allowing the claim for deduction u/s.80HHC and u/s.80-IB. The Commissioner
invoked the provisions of 263, on the ground that the Assessing Officer had not
applied the provisions of S. 80-IB(13)/80-IA(9) and had wrongly calculated the
deduction u/s.80HHC. The Commissioner, therefore, directed the Assessing Officer
to recalculate the allowable deduction u/s.80HHC. The Tribunal held that the
Assessing Officer had taken one of the possible views prevailing at the relevant
point of time and, therefore, his action could not be said to be ‘erroneous and
prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue’. Accordingly, the Tribunal
cancelled the order of the Commissioner passed u/s.263.


On appeal by the Revenue,
the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :



“(i) In cases where the
Assessing Officer adopts one of the courses permissible, in law, or where two
views are possible and the Assessing Officer has taken one of the possible
views, the Commissioner cannot exercise his powers u/s.263 to differ with the
view of the Assessing Officer, even if there has been a loss of revenue.


(ii) It is also clear that
while passing an order u/s.263, the Commissioner has to examine not only the
assessment order, but also the entire record. Since the assessee has no
control over the way an assessment order is drafted and since generally the
issues which are accepted by the Assessing Officer, do not find mention in the
assessment order and only those points are taken note of on which the
assessee’s explanations are rejected and additions/disallowances are made, in
the instant case, the mere absence of the discussion of the provisions of S.
80-IB(13), r/w. S. 80-IA(9), would not mean that the Assessing Officer had not
applied his mind to the said provisions.


(iii) When a regular
assessment is made u/s. 143(3), a presumption can be raised that the order has
been passed upon an application of mind. No doubt, this presumption is
rebuttable, but there must be some material to indicate that the Assessing
Officer had not applied his mind.


(iv) In the instant case,
there was no material
to indicate that the Assessing Officer had not applied his mind to the
provisions of
S. 80-IB(13), r/w. S. 80-IA(9). The presumption, that the assessment order
passed u/s.143(3) by the Assessing Officer had been passed upon an application
of mind, had not been rebutted by the Revenue. No additional facts were
necessary before the Assessing Officer for the purpose of construing the
provisions of S. 80-IB(13), r/w S. 80-IA(9). It was only a legal consideration
as to whether the deduction u/s.80HHC was to be computed after reducing the
amount of deduction u/s.80-IB from the profits and gains.


(v) There was no doubt
that the Assessing Officer had allowed the deduction u/s.80HHC without
reducing the amount of deduction allowed u/s.80-IB from the profits and gains.
He did not say so in so many words, but that was the end result of his
assessment order. It could not be said that the Assessing Officer had failed
to make any enquiry because no further enquiry was necessary and all the facts
were before the Assessing Officer.


(vi) The validity of an
order u/s.263 has to be tested with regard to the position of law as it exists
on the date on which such an order is made by the Commissioner. From the
narration of the facts in the Tribunal’s order, it was clear that on the date
when the Commissioner had passed his order u/s.263, the view taken by the
Assessing Officer was in consonance with the view taken by the several Benches
of the Tribunal. Therefore, the conclusion of the Tribunal, that the
Commissioner could not have invoked his jurisdiction u/s.263, was correct. As
a result, the Tribunal was correct, in law, in cancelling the order passed by
the Commissioner u/s.263.”

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Manufacture — Twisting and texturising partially oriented yarn amounts to manufacture in terms of S. 80-IA of the Act.

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15 Manufacture — Twisting and texturising partially oriented
yarn amounts to manufacture in terms of S. 80-IA of the Act.


[CIT v. Emptee Poly-Yarn P. Ltd., (2010) 320 ITR 665 (SC)]

The short question which arose for determination in a batch
of civil appeals before the Supreme Court was : Whether twisting and texturising
of partially oriented yarn (‘POY’ for short) amounted to ‘manufacture’ in terms
of S. 80-IA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ?

The Supreme Court observed that it has repeatedly recommended
to the Department, be it under the Excise Act, the Customs Act or the Income-tax
Act, to examine the process applicable to the product in question and not to go
only by dictionary meanings, but this recommendation is not being followed over
the years.

The Supreme Court having examined the process in the light of
the opinion given by the expert, which had not been controverted, held that POY
was a semi-finished yarn not capable of being put in warp or weft, it could only
be used for making a texturised yarn, which, in turn, could be used in the
manufacture of fabric. In other words, POY could not be used directly to
manufacture fabric. According to the expert, crimps, bulkiness, etc. were
introduced by a process, called as thermo mechanical process, into POY which
converts POY into a texturised yarn. According to the Supreme Court, if one
examined this thermo-mechanical process in detail, it would become clear that
texturising and twisting of yarn constituted ‘manufacture’ in the context of
conversion of POY into texturised yarn.

 

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Minimum Alternative Tax — For making an addition under clause (b) of S. 115JB, two conditions must be jointly satisfied, namely, (i) there must a debit to the profit and loss account, and (ii) the amount so debited must be carried to the reserve.

New Page 1

14 Minimum Alternative Tax — For making an addition under
clause (b) of S. 115JB, two conditions must be jointly satisfied, namely, (i)
there must a debit to the profit and loss account, and (ii) the amount so
debited must be carried to the reserve.


[National Hydroelectric Power Corporation Ltd. v. CIT, (2010)
320 ITR 374 (SC)]

The assessee was required to sell electricity to State
Electricity Board(s), Discoms, etc., at tariff rates notified by the CERC. The
tariff consists of depreciation, Advance Against Depreciation (AAD), interest on
loans, interest on working capital, operation and maintenance expenses, return
on equity.

On May 26, 1997, the Govt. of India introduced a mechanism to
generate additional cash flow, by allowing companies to collect AAD by way of
tariff charge. The year in which normal depreciation fell short of the original
scheduled loan repayment instalment (capped at 1/12th of the original loan) such
shortfall would be collected as advance against future depreciation.

According to the Authority for Advance Rulings (AAR), the
assessee supplied electricity at tariff rate notified by the CERC and recovered
the sale price, which became its income; that, in future the said sale price was
neither refundable nor adjustable against future bills.

However, according to the Authority of Advance Ruling (AAR),
when it came to computation of book profit, the assessee deducted the AAD
component from the total sale price and only the balance amount net of the AAD
was taken into the profit and loss account and book profit. Consequently, the
AAR ruled that reduction of the AAD from the ‘sales’ was nothing but a reserve
which had to be added back on the basis of clause (b) of Explanation 1 to S.
115JB of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

The Supreme Court held that on reading Explanation 1, it was
clear that to make an addition under clause (b) two conditions must be jointly
satisfied :

(a) There must be a debit of the amount to the profit and
loss account.

(b) The amount so debited must be carried to the reserve.

Since the amount of AAD was reduced from sales, there was no
debit in the profit and loss account, the amount did not enter the stream of
income for the purposes of determination of net profit at all, hence clause (b)
of Explanation 1 was not applicable. It was not an appropriation of profits. AAD
was not meant for an uncertain purpose. AAD was an amount that is under
obligation, right from the inception, to get adjusted in the future hence, could
not be designated as a reserve. AAD was nothing but an adjustment by reducing
the normal depreciation includible in the future years in such a manner that at
the end of the useful life of the plant (which is normally 30 years), the same
would be reduced to nil.

According to the Supreme Court the AAD was a timing
difference, it was not a reserve, it was not carried through the profit and loss
account and that it was ‘income received in advance’ subject to adjustment in
future and, therefore, clause (b) of Explanation 1 to S. 115JB was not
applicable.

 

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Manufacture — Duplication from the master media of the application software commercially to sub-licence a copy of such application software constitutes manufacturing of goods in terms of S. 80-IA.

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13 Manufacture — Duplication from the master media of the
application software commercially to sub-licence a copy of such application
software constitutes manufacturing of goods in terms of S. 80-IA.


[CIT v. Oracle Software India Ltd., (2010) 320 ITR 546 (SC)]

The assessee, a 100% subsidiary of Oracle Corporation, USA,
was incorporated with the object of developing designing, improving, producing,
marketing, distributing, buying, selling and importing of computer software. The
assessee was entitled to sub-licence the software development by Oracle
Corporation, USA. The assessee imported master media of the software from Oracle
Corporation, USA which it duplicated on blank discs, packed and sold in the
market along with relevant brochures. The assessee made a payment a lump-sum
amount to Oracle Corporation, USA for the import of master media. In addition
thereto, the assessee also had to pay royalty at the rate of 30% of the price of
the licensed product. The only right which the assessee had was to replicate or
duplicate the software. It did not have any right to vary, amend or make value
addition to the software embedded in the master media. According to the assessee,
it used machinery to convert blank CDs into recorded CDs which along with other
processes became a software kit. According to the assessee, the blank CD
constituted raw materials. According to the assessee, the master media could not
be conveyed as it is. In order to sub-licence, a copy thereof had to be made and
it was the making of this copy which constituted manufacture or processing of
goods in terms of S. 80-IA and consequently the assessee was entitled to
deduction under that Section. On the other hand, according to the Department, in
the process of copying, there was no element of manufacture or processing of
goods. According to the Department, since the software on the master media and
the software on the recorded media remained unchanged, there was no manufacture
or processing of goods involved in the activity of the copy or duplicating,
hence, the assessee was not entitled to deduction u/s.80-IA. According to the
Department, when the master media was made from what was lodged into the
computer, it was a clone of the software in the computer and if one compared the
contents of the master media with what was there in the computer/data bank,
there was no difference, hence, according to the Department, there was no change
in the use, character or name of the CDs even after the impugned process was
undertaken by the assessee.

The Supreme Court observed that duplication could certainly
take place at home, however, one should draw a line between duplication done at
home and commercial duplication. Even a pirated copy of a CD was a duplication,
but that did not mean that commercial duplication as it was undertaken in the
instant case should be compared with home duplication which may result in
pirated copy of a CD.

The Supreme Court held that from the details of Oracle
applications, it found that the software on the master media was an application
software. It was not an operating software. It was not a system software. It
could be categorised into product line applications, application solutions and
industry applications. A commercial duplication process involved four steps. For
the said process of commercial duplication, one required master media, fully
operational computer, CD blaster machine (a commercial device used for
replication from master media), blank/
unrecorded compact disc also known as recordable media and printing
software/labels. The master media was subjected to a validation and checking
process by software engineers by installing and rechecking the integrity of the
master media with the help of the software installed in the fully operational
computer. After such validation and checking of the master media, the same was
inserted in a machine which was called the CD Blaster and a virtual image of the
software in the master media was thereafter created in its internal storage
device. This virtual image was utilised to replicate the software on the
recordable media.

According to the Supreme Court, if one examined the above
process in the light of the details given hereinabove, commercial duplication
could not be compared to home duplication. Complex technical nuances were
required to be kept in mind while deciding issues of the above nature. The
Supreme Court held that the term ‘manufacture’ implies a change, but every
change is not a manufacture, despite the fact that every change in an article is
the result of a treatment of labour and manipulation. However, this test of
manufacture needs to be seen in the context of the above process. If an
operation/process renders a commodity or article fit for use for which it is
otherwise not fit, the operation/process falls within the meaning of the word
‘manufacture’. Applying the above test to the facts of the present case, the
Supreme Court was of the view that, in the instant case, the assessee had
undertaken an operation which rendered a blank CD fit for use which it was
otherwise not fit. The blank CD was an input. By the duplicating process
undertaken by the assessee, the recordable media which was unfit for any
specific use got converted into the programme which was embedded in the master
media and, thus, the blank CD got converted into recorded CD by the aforestated
intricate process. The duplicating process changed the basic character of a
blank CD, dedicating it to a specific use. Without such processing, blank CDs
would be unfit for their intended purpose. Therefore, processing of blank CDs,
dedicating them to a specific use, constituted a manufacture in terms of S.
80-IA(12)(b) read with S. 33B of the Income-tax Act.

 

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Capital gains — Gains/loss arising on renunciation of right to subscribe is a short-term gain — Deduction u/s.48(2) is to be applied to the long-term capital gains before set-off of short-term loss, if any.

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11 Capital gains — Gains/loss arising on renunciation of
right to subscribe is a short-term gain — Deduction u/s.48(2) is to be applied
to the long-term capital gains before set-off of short-term loss, if any.


[Navin Jindal v. ACIT, (2010) 320 ITR 708 (SC)]

The assessee was a shareholder in Jindal Iron and Steel
Company Limited (‘JISCO’, for short). The said company announced in January,
1992, an issue of 12.5% equity secured PCDs (party convertible debentures) of
Rs.110 for cash at par to shareholders on rights basis and employees on
equitable basis. The issue opened for subscription on February 14, 1992, and
closed on March 12, 1992. As the assessee held 1500 equity shares of JISCO, the
assessee received an offer to subscribe to 1875 PCDs of JISCO on rights basis.
The assessee renounced his right to subscribe to the PCDs in favour of Colorado
Trading Company on February 15, 1992, at the rate of Rs.30 per right. The
assessee received, accordingly, Rs.56,250 for renunciation of the right to
subscribe to the PCDs. Against the aforesaid sale consideration, the assessee
suffered a diminution in the value of the original 1500 equity shares in the
following manner : the cum-rights price per share on January 3, 1992, was
Rs.625, whereas ex-rights price per share on January 6, 1992, was Rs.425,
resulting in a loss of Rs.200 per share. Consequently, the capital loss suffered
by the assessee was Rs.3,00,000 (1,500 x 200) as against the receipt of
Rs.56,250 on renunciation of 1875 PCDs.

During that year on August 7, 1991, the assessee sold 8460
equity shares of JSL at Rs.240 for a total consideration of Rs.20,30,400, whose
cost of acquisition was Rs.3,63,200 and, consequently, the transaction resulted
in a long-term gain for the assessee in the sum of Rs.16,67,200. Similarly, on
June 20, 1991, the assessee sold 7000 equity shares of Saw Pipes Limited (‘SPL’,
short) at the rate of Rs.103 each, for a total consideration of Rs.7,21,000 from
which the assessee deducted Rs.70,000 towards cost of acquisition, resulting in
a long-term gain of Rs.6,51,000. In all, under the caption, ‘long-term gain’ the
assessee earned Rs.23,18,200 (Rs.16,67,200 + Rs.6,51,000).

The Supreme Court observed that the question of loss was not
in issue in the civil appeals before it. The only question which it had to
decide was the nature of the loss. The Assessing Officer had accepted the
computation of loss on renunciation of the right to subscribe to the PCDs at
Rs.2,43,750, but treated the same as long-term capital loss.

The Supreme Court observed that S. 48 deals with the mode of
computation of income chargeable under the head ‘Capital gains’. Under that
Section, such income is required to be computed by deducting from the full value
of the consideration received as a result of the transfer of the capital asset,
the expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively in connection with such transfer
and the cost of acquisition of the asset. U/s.48(1)(b) of the Act, it is further
stipulated that where the capital gain arises from the transfer of a long-term
capital asset, then, in addition to the expenditure incurred in connection with
the transfer and the cost of acquisition of the asset, a further deduction, as
specified in S. 48(2) of the Act, which is similar to standard deduction,
becomes necessary.

The Supreme Court noted that the basic controversy in the
batch of civil appeals before it concerned the stage at which S. 48(2) of the
Act becomes applicable.

The Supreme Court noted that from the said figure of
Rs.23,31,200, the Assessing Officer had deducted the loss of Rs.2,43,680 as a
long-term loss and applied S. 48(2) deduction to the figure of Rs.20,87,450.
Consequently, the Assessing Officer worked out the net income at Rs.8,28,980 as
against the figure of Rs.6,77,530 worked out by the assessee. The above analysis
showed the controversy between the parties. The assessee treated Rs.2,43,750 as
a short-term loss, and, therefore, he applied the standard deduction u/s. 48(2)
to the long-term gain of Rs.23,18,200 from sale of shares of JSL and SPL,
whereas the Assessing Officer applied S. 48(2) deduction to the figure of
Rs.20,87,450 which is arrived at on the basis that the loss suffered by the
assessee of Rs.2,43,680 was a long-term loss.

The Supreme Court held that the right to subscribe for
additional offer of share/debentures on rights basis, on the strength of
existing shareholding in the company, comes into existence when the company
decides to come out with the rights offer. Prior to that, such right, though
embedded in the original shareholding, remains inchoate. The same crystallises
only when the rights offer is announced by the company. Therefore, in order to
determine the nature of the gain/loss on renunciation of right to subscribe for
additional shares/debentures, the crucial date is the date on which such right
to subscribe for additional shares/debentures comes into existence and the date
of transfer (renunciation) of such right. The said right to subscribe for
additional shares/debentures is a distinct, independent and separate right,
capable of being transferred independently of the existing shareholding, on the
strength of which such rights are offered.

The right to subscribe for additional offer of
shares/debentures comes into existence only when the company decides to come out
with the rights offer. It is only when that event takes place, that diminution
in the value of the original shares held by the assessee takes place. One has to
give weightage to the diminution in the value of the original shares, which
takes place when the company decides to come out with the rights offer. For
determining whether the gain/loss of renunciation of the right to subscribe is a
short-term or long-term gain/loss, the crucial date is the date on which such
right to subscribe for additional shares/debentures comes into existence and the
date of renunciation (transfer) of such right.

The Supreme Court was therefore of the opinion that the loss
suffered by the assessee amounting to Rs.2,43,750 was short-term loss. According
to the Supreme Court, the computation of income under the head ‘Capital gains’,
as computed by the assessee was correct.

Manufacture or production of article or thing — Activity of extraction of marble blocks, cutting into slabs, polishing and conversion into polished slabs and tiles would amount to ‘manufacture’ or ‘production’ for the purpose of claiming deduction u/s.80-

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12 Manufacture or production of article or thing — Activity
of extraction of marble blocks, cutting into slabs, polishing and conversion
into polished slabs and tiles would amount to ‘manufacture’ or ‘production’ for
the purpose of claiming deduction u/s.80-IA of the Act.


[ITO v. Arihant Tiles and Marbles P. Ltd., (2010) 320 ITR 79
(SC)]

In the batch of civil appeals before the Supreme Court, a
common question of law which arose for determination was : Whether conversion of
marble blocks by sawing into slabs and tiles and polishing amounted to
‘manufacture or production of article or thing’, so as to make the
respondent(s)-assessee(s) entitled to the benefit of S. 80-IA of the Income-tax
Act, 1961, as it stood at the material time.

According to the Supreme Court, to answer the above issue, it
was necessary to note the details of stepwise activities undertaken by the
assessee(s) which read as follows :

(i) Marble blocks excavated/extracted by the mine owners
being in raw uneven shapes had to be properly sorted out and marked;

(ii) Such blocks were then processed on single blade/wire
saw machines using advanced technology to square them by separating waste
material;

(iii) Squared up blocks were sawed for making slabs by
using the gang-saw machine or single/multiblock cutter machine;

(iv) The sawn slabs were further reinforced by way of
filling cracks by epoxy resins and fiber netting;

(v) The slabs were polished in polishing machine; the slabs
were further edge-cut into required dimensions/tiles as per market requirement
in perfect angles by edge-cutting machine and multidisc cutter machines;

(vi) Polished slabs and tiles were buffed by shiner.

The Supreme Court further noted that the assessee(s) had been
consistently regarded as a manufacturer/producer by various Government
departments and agencies. The above processes undertaken by the respondent(s)
had been treated as manufacture under the Excise Act and allied tax laws.

At the outset, it was observed by the Supreme Court that in
numerous judgments, it had been consistently held that the word ‘production’ was
wider in its scope as compared to the word ‘manufacture’. Further, the
Parliament itself had taken note of the ground reality and amended the
provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961, by inserting S. 2(29BA) vide the Finance
Act, 2009, with effect from April 1, 2009.

The Supreme Court noted that the authorities below had
rejected the contention of the assessee(s) that its activities of polishing
slabs and making of tiles from marble blocks constituted ‘manufacture’ or
‘production’ u/s.80-IA of the Income-tax Act. There was a difference of opinion
in this connection between the Members of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal.
However, by the impugned judgment, the High Court had accepted the contention of
the assessee(s) holding that in the present case, polished slabs and tiles stood
manufactured/produced from the marble blocks and, consequently, each of the
assessee was entitled to the benefit of deduction u/s.80-IA. Hence, the civil
appeals were filed by the Department.

The Supreme Court also noted that in these cases, it was
concerned with assessees who were basically factory owners and not mine owners.

The Supreme Court held that in each case one has to examine
the nature of the activity undertaken by an assessee. Mere extraction of stones
may not constitute manufacture. Similarly, after extraction, if marble blocks
are cut into slabs that per se will not amount to the activity of manufacture.
From the details of process undertaken by each of the respondents it was clear
that they were not concerned only with cutting of marble blocks into slabs but
were also concerned with the activity of polishing and ultimate conversion of
blocks into polished slabs and tiles. The Supreme Court found from the process
indicated hereinabove that there were various stages through which the blocks
had to go through before they become polished slabs and tiles. In the
circumstances, the Supreme Court was of the view that on the facts of the cases
in hand, there was certainly an activity which would come in the category of
‘manufacture’ or ‘production’ u/s.80IA of the Income-tax Act. The Supreme Court
held that in the judgment in Aman Marble Industries P. Ltd. (2003) 157 ELT 393
(SC), it was not required to construe the word ‘production’ in addition to the
word ‘manufacture’.

Before concluding, the Supreme Court thought it fit to make
one observation. The Supreme Court observed that if the contention of the
Department was to be accepted, namely, that the activity undertaken by the
respondents herein was not a manufacture, then it would have serious revenue
consequences. As stated above, each of the respondents was paying excise duty,
some of the respondents were job workers and activity undertaken by them had
been recognised by various Government authorities as manufacture. To say that
the activity would not amount to manufacture or production u/s.80-IA would have
disastrous consequences, particularly in view of the fact that the assessees in
all the cases would plead that they were not liable to pay excise duty, sales
tax, etc. because the activity did not constitute manufacture. Keeping in mind
the above factors, the Supreme Court was of the view that in the present cases,
the activity undertaken by each of the respondents constituted manufacture or
production and, therefore, they would be entitled to the benefit of S. 80-IA of
the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Interest — Tax — Interest as Government securities not chargeable to Interest Tax

New Page 1

  1. Interest — Tax — Interest as Government securities not
    chargeable to Interest Tax

 

[CIT vs. Ratnakar Bank Ltd. (2008) 305 ITR 257 (SC)].

The question involved before the Supreme Court was whether
interest earned by the assessee-bank on Government securities was liable to be
assessed under Section 2(7) of the Interest-tax Act ? The Tribunal had held
that it was not chargeable. The High Court had upheld the view of the
Tribunal. The Supreme Court observed that the issue was considered by it
earlier in CIT vs. Corporation Bank, (2007) 295 ITR 193 (SC), wherein
the appeals filed by the Department were dismissed. However, the learned
counsel for the Department submitted that the said decision related to the
interest on Government securities. The learned counsel for the assessee
submitted that in the instant case, the interest earned was on Government
securities only. This stand was denied by the learned counsel for the
Department. In the circumstances, the Supreme Court remitted the matter back
to the Tribunal to examine the factual position as to whether the interest
involved in the present case was on Government securities. The Supreme Court
clarified that if the interest was earned on Government securities, the ratio
of the decision in Corporation Bank’s case would apply to the facts of the
present case and if the interest earned was not solely on Government
securities, the ratio of the decision would not apply.

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Appeal — Order set aside to the High Court as the relevant decision was not considered.

New Page 2

 12. Appeal — Order set aside to the High Court as the
relevant decision was not considered.

[CIT vs. Madras Engineering Construction Co-op. Society
Ltd.,
(2008) 306 ITR 10 (SC)].

The Assessing Officer negatived the claim of deduction
under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act on the ground that the income reflected
by the assessee can neither be attributed to actual labour of the members nor
can be treated as arising out of collective disposal of its labour. The
Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) following the earlier orders, allowed the
appeal. The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue’s appeals. Before the Supreme
Court, the Revenue contended that the High Court had failed to notice that the
profit earned by the Society in executing the work was retained by the members
themselves. The Supreme Court, however, found that its decision in Madras
Auto Rickshaw Drivers’ Co-op. Society vs. CIT,
(2001) 249 ITR 330 (SC),
which had prima facie relevance, was not noticed by the High Court. The
Supreme Court therefore set aside the order of the High Court and remitted the
matter to it for a fresh consideration in the light of the aforesaid decision.

Interest-tax — Interest on bonds and debentures bought by a non-banking financial company as and by way of investment would not be liable to interest-tax.

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19 Interest-tax — Interest on bonds and debentures bought by
a non-banking financial company as and by way of investment would not be liable
to interest-tax.

[Commissioner of Income-tax v. Sahara India Savings and
Investment Corporation Ltd.,
(2010) 321 ITR 371 (SC)]

In a batch of civil appeals before the Supreme Court the main
issue which arose for determination was : Whether ‘interest’ which the assessee
earned on bonds and debentures was chargeable to tax in view of the definition
of the term ‘interest’ in S. 2(7) of the Interest-tax Act, 1974 ?

One of the objects of the respondent company for which the
company was incorporated was to buy, sell, invest or otherwise deal in
securities, bonds or fixed deposits issued by any institution, body corporate,
corporation, establishment constituted under any Central or State laws or any
other securities in which the company may be required to invest under any law in
force.

The Supreme Court held that S. 2(7) defines the word
‘interest’ to mean interest on ‘loans and advances including commitment charges,
discount on promissory notes and bills of exchange, but not to include interest
referred to u/s.42(IB) of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, as well as
discount on treasury bills’. S. 2(7), therefore, defines what is interest in the
first part and that first part confines interest only to loans and advances,
including commitment charges, discount on promissory notes and bills of
exchange. Therefore, it is clear that the interest-tax is meant to be levied
only on interest accruing on loans and advances but the Legislature, in its
wisdom, has extended the meaning of the word ‘interest’ to two other items,
namely, commitment charges and discount on promissory notes and bills of
exchange. In normal accounting sense, ‘loans and advances’, as a concept, are
different from commitment charges and discounts and, keeping in mind the
difference between the three, the Legislature, in its wisdom, has specifically
included in the definition u/s.2(7) commitment charges as well as discounts. The
fact remains that interest on loans and advances will not cover u/s.2(7)
interest on bonds and debentures bought by an assessee as and by way of
‘investment’. Even the exclusionary part of S. 2(7) excludes only discount on
treasury bills as well as interest u/s.42(IB) of the Reserve Bank of India Act,
1934. Reading S. 2(7) as a whole, it was clear to the Supreme Court that
‘interest on investments’ was not taxable as interest u/s.2(7) of the said 1974
Act.

Search and seizure — Block assessment — If the assessment is to be completed u/s.143(3) r.w. S. 158BC, notice u/s.143(2) should be issued within prescribed time.

New Page 2

 20 Search and seizure — Block assessment — If the assessment
is to be completed u/s.143(3) r.w. S. 158BC, notice u/s.143(2) should be issued
within prescribed time.

[Asst. CIT v. Hotel Blue Moon, (2010) 321 ITR
362 (SC)]

The point that came up for our determination before the
Supreme Court was, whether issue of notice u/s.143(2) of the Act within the
prescribed time for the purpose of block assessment under Chapter XIV-B of the
Act is mandatory for assessing undisclosed income detected during search
conducted u/s.132 of the Act. While according to the Department, issue of a
notice u/s.143(2) is not an essential requirement in block assessment under
Chapter XIV-B of the Act. According to the assessee, service of notice on the
assessee u/s.143(2) of the Act within the prescribed period of time is a
pre-requisite for framing the block assessment under Chapter XIV-B of the Act.
The Appellate Tribunal held, while affirming the decision of the Commissioner of
Income-tax (Appeals), that non-issue of notice u/s.143(3) is only a procedural
irregularity and the same is curable.

In the appeal filed by the assessee, the High Court,
disagreeing with the Tribunal, held that the provisions of S. 142 and Ss.(2) and
Ss.(3) of S. 143 will have mandatory application in a case where the Assessing
Officer in repudiation of the return filed in response to a notice issued
u/s.158BC(a) proceeds to make an inquiry. Accordingly, the High Court answered
the question of law framed in the affirmative and in favour of the appellant and
against the Revenue.

The Revenue thereafter applied to the Supreme Court for
special leave under Article 136, and the same was granted.

The Supreme Court held that S. 158BC(b) provides for enquiry
and assessment. The said provision reads “that the Assessing Officer shall
proceed to determine the undisclosed income of the block period in the manner
laid down in S. 158BB and the provisions of S. 142, Ss.(2) and Ss.(3) of S. 143,
and S. 144 and S. 145 shall, so far as may be, apply.” An analysis of this
sub-section indicates that, after the return is filed, this clause enables the
Assessing Officer to complete the assessment by following the procedure like
issue of notice u/s.143(2)/142 and complete the assessment u/s.143(3). This
Section does not provide for accepting the return as provided u/s.143(1)(a). The
Assessing Officer has to complete the assessment u/s.143(3) only. In case of
default in not filing the return or not complying with the notice
u/s.143(2)/142, the Assessing Officer is authorised to complete the assessment
ex parte u/s.144. Clause (b) of S. 158BC by referring to S. 143(2) and (3) would
appear to imply that the provisions of S. 143(1) are excluded. But S. 143(2)
itself becomes necessary only where it becomes necessary to check the return, so
that where block return confirms to the undisclosed income inferred by the
authorities, there is no reason, why the authorities should issue notice
u/s.143(2). However, if an assessment is to be completed u/s.143(3) read with S.
158BC, notice u/s.143(2) should be issued within one year from the date of
filing of block return. Omission on the part of the Assessing Authority to issue
notice u/s.143(2) cannot be a procedural irregularity and the same is not
curable and, therefore, the requirement of notice u/s.143(2) cannot be dispensed
with.

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Industrial undertaking — Deduction u/s.80-IB — DEPB/Duty drawback benefits flow from the schemes framed by the Central Government or from S. 75 of the Customs Act or from S. 37 of the Central Excise Act, hence incentives profits are not profits derived fr

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18 Industrial undertaking — Deduction u/s.80-IB — DEPB/Duty
drawback benefits flow from the schemes framed by the Central Government or from
S. 75 of the Customs Act or from S. 37 of the Central Excise Act, hence
incentives profits are not profits derived from the eligible business u/s.80-IB.

[Liberty India v. Commissioner of Income-tax, (2009)
317 ITR 218 (SC)]

The appellant, a partnership firm owned a small-scale
industrial undertaking engaged in manufacturing of fabrics out of yarns and also
various textile items such as cushion covers, pillow covers, etc., out of
fabrics/yarn purchased from the market. During the relevant previous year
corresponding to the A.Y. 2001-02, the appellant claimed deduction u/s.80-IB on
the increased profits of Rs. 22,70,056 as profit of the industrial undertaking
on account of DEPB and duty drawback credited to the profit and loss account.

The Assessing Officer denied deduction u/s.80-IB on the
ground that the said two benefits constituted export incentives, and that they
did not represent profits derived from the industrial undertaking. In this
connection, the Assessing Officer placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme
Court in CIT v. Sterling Foods reported in (1999) 237 ITR 579.

Aggrieved by the said decision, the matter was carried in
appeal to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), who came to the conclusion
that duty drawback received by the appellant was inextricably linked to the
production cost of the goods manufactured by the appellant; that, duty drawback
was a trading receipt of the industrial undertaking having direct nexus with the
activity of the industrial undertaking and consequently, the Assessing Officer
was not justified in denying deduction u/s.80-IB. According to the Commissioner
of Income-tax (Appeals), the DEPB Scheme was different from the Duty Drawback
Scheme inasmuch as the DEPB substituted value-based Advance Licensing Scheme as
well as the Passbook Scheme under the Exim Policy; that entitlements under the
DEPB Scheme were allowed at pre-determined and pre-notified rates in respect of
exports made under the Scheme and, consequently, DEPB did not constitute a
substitute for duty drawback. According to the Commissioner of Income-tax
(Appeals), credit under DEPB could be utilised by the exporter himself or it
could be transferred to any other party; that such transfer could be made at
higher or lower value than mentioned in the passbook and, therefore, DEPB cannot
be equated with the duty drawback, hence, the appellant who had received Rs.
20,95,740 on sale of DEPB licence stood covered by the decision of the Supreme
Court in Sterling Foods (1999) 237 ITR 579. Hence, to that extent, the appellant
was not entitled to deduction u/s.80-IB.

Against the decision of the Commissioner of Income-tax
(Appeals) allowing deduction on duty drawback, the Revenue went in appeal to the
Tribunal which following the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT
v. Ritesh Industries Ltd., reported in (2005) 274 ITR 324, held that the amount
received by the assessee on account of duty drawback was not an income derived
from the business of the industrial undertaking so as to entitle the assessee to
deduction u/s.80-IB.

The decision of the Tribunal was assailed by the assessee(s)
u/s.260A of the 1961 Act before the High Court. Following the decision of this
Court in Sterling Foods (1999) 237 ITR 579, the High Court held that the
assessee(s) had failed to prove the nexus between the receipt by way of duty
drawback/DEPB benefit and the industrial undertaking, hence, the assessee(s) was
not entitled to deduction
u/s.80-IB(3).

On a civil appeal(s), the Supreme Court observed that the
1961 Act broadly provides for two types of tax incentives, namely,
investment-linked incentives and profit-linked incentives. Chapter VI-A which
provides for incentives in the form of tax deductions essentially belong to the
category of ‘profit-linked incentives’. Therefore, when S. 80-IA/80-IB refers to
profits derived from eligible business, it is not the ownership of that business
which attracts the incentives. What attracts the incentives u/s.80-IA/80-IB is
the generation of Profits (operational profits).

The Supreme Court noted that according to the assessee(s),
DEPB credit/duty drawback receipt reduces the value of purchases (cost
neutralisation), hence, it comes within first degree source as it increases the
net profit proportionately. On the order hand, according to the Department, DEPB
credit/duty drawback receipts do not come within first degree source as the said
incentives flow from the incentive schemes enacted by the Government of India or
from S. 75 of the Customs Act, 1962. Hence, according to the Department, in the
present cases, the first degree source is the incentive scheme/provisions of the
Customs Act.

The Supreme Court held that DEPB is an incentive. It is given
under the Duty Exemption Remission Scheme. Essentially, it is an export
incentive. No doubt, the object behind DEPB is to neutralise the incidence of
customs duty payment on the import content of export product. This
neutralisation is provided for by credit to customs duty against export product.
Under DEPB, an exporter may apply for credit as a percentage of the FOB value of
exports made in freely convertible currency. Credit is available only against
the export product and at rates specified by the DGFT for import of raw
materials, components, etc., DEPB credit under the Scheme has to be calculated
by taking into account the deemed import content of the export product as per
basic customs duty and special additional duty payable on such deemed imports.
Therefore, in view, the Supreme Court DEPB/Duty drawback were incentives which
flow from the schemes framed by Central Government or from S. 75 of the Customs
Act, 1962, hence, incentives profits were not profits derived from the eligible
business u/s.80-IB. They belong to the category of ancillary profits of such
undertakings.

The Supreme Court further held that S. 75 of Customs Act,
1962 and S. 37 of the Central Excise Act, 1944, empower the Government of India
to provide for repayment of customs duty and excise duty paid by an assessee.
The refund is of the average amount of duty paid on materials of any particular
class or description of goods used in the manufacture of export goods of
specified class. The Rules do not envisage a refund of amount of an amount
arithmetically equal to customs duty or Central Excise duty actually paid by an
individual importer-cum-manufacturer. The Supreme Court held that basically the
source of the duty drawback receipt lied in S. 75 of the Customs Act and S. 37
of the Central Excise Act.

In the circumstances, the Supreme Court held that profits
derived by way of such incentives did not fall within the expression ‘profits
derived from industrial undertaking’ in S. 80-IB.

Reassessment — Opinion of DVO alone cannot be the basis for reopening the assessment.

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 15. Reassessment — Opinion
of DVO alone cannot be the basis for reopening the assessment.


[ACIT v. Dhariya
Construction Co.,
(2010) 328 ITR 515 (SC)]

The Supreme Court noted that
the Department had sought to reopen the assessment based on the opinion given by
the District Valuation Officer (DVO). The Supreme Court held that the opinion of
the DVO per se is not an information for the purpose of reopening assessment
u/s.147. The Assessing Officer has to apply his mind to the information, if any,
collected and form a belief thereon. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of
the Department holding that it was not entitled to reopen the assessment.

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Companies — Special provisions — Minimum Alternate Tax — In determining the book profit of a private limited company whether depreciation should be allowed as per Income-tax Rules or as per the Companies Act — Matter referred to Larger Bench.

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17 Companies — Special provisions — Minimum Alternate Tax —
In determining the book profit of a private limited company whether depreciation
should be allowed as per Income-tax Rules or as per the Companies Act — Matter
referred to Larger Bench.


[Dynamic Orthopedics P. Ltd. v. CIT, (2010) 321 ITR
300 (SC)]

The appellant-assessee, a private limited company, was
engaged in the manufacture and sale of orthopedic appliances. In the return of
income filed, the assessee returned an income of Rs.1,50,730. In the profit and
loss account, depreciation was provided at the rates specified in Rule 5 of the
Income-tax Rules, 1962 (‘Rules’, for short). While completing the assessment of
income, the Assessing Officer recomputed the book profit for the purpose of S.
115J of the Income-tax Act, 1961, (‘Act’, for short), after allowing
depreciation as per the Schedule XIV to the Companies Act. The rates of
depreciation specified in Schedule XIV to the Companies Act, 1956 (‘1956 Act’,
for short) were lower than the rates specified under Rule 5 of the Rules.

Being aggrieved by the assessment order, the assessee took up
the matter before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) [‘CIT(A)’ for short],
who came to the conclusion that the assessee was a private limited company. It
was not a subsidiary of public company. Therefore, placing reliance on S. 355 of
the 1956 Act, the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) held that S. 350 of the
1956 Act was not applicable to the assessee and, in the circumstances, the
Income-tax Officer had erred in providing depreciation at the rates specified
under Section Schedule XIV to the 1956 Act. Consequently, the Commissioner of
Income-tax (Appeals) held that the assessee was right in providing depreciation
in its accounts as per Rule 5 of the Rules.

Aggrieved by the decision of the Commissioner of Income-tax
(Appeals), appeal was preferred by the Department to the Income-tax Appellate
Tribunal (‘Tribunal’, for short). By judgment and order dated January 13, 1999,
the Tribunal held that since the assessee was a private limited company, S. 349
and S. 350 were not applicable to the facts of the case and, in the
circumstances, the Income-tax Officer had erred in directing the assessee, which
was private limited company, to provide for depreciation as per Schedule XIV to
the 1956 Act, which was not applicable to private limited companies (see S. 355
of the 1956 Act). Consequently, the appeal filed by the Department before the
Tribunal stood dismissed.

Aggrieved by the said decision of the Tribunal, the
Department preferred appeal before the High Court of Kerala which held that S.
115J of the Act was introduced in the A.Y. 1988-89. S. 115J of the Act read with
Explanation (iv), as it stood at the material time, was a piece of legislation
by incorporation and, consequently, the provisions of S. 205 of the 1956 Act
stood incorporated into S. 115J of the Act, hence, the Income-tax Officer was
right in directing the assessee to provide for depreciation at the rate
specified in Schedule XIV to the 1956 Act and not in terms of Rule 5 of the
Rules.

On a civil appeal being filed by the assessee, the Supreme
Court observed that the view of the High Court, in the present case, was similar
to view taken by it in the case of CIT v. Malayala Manorama Co. Ltd. reported in
(2002) 253 ITR 378 (Ker.), which High Court’s judgment stood reversed by the
judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Malayala Manorama Co. Ltd. v. CIT
reported in (2008) 300 ITR 251.

However, the Supreme Court was of the view that its judgment
in Malayala Manorama Co. Ltd. v. CIT reported in (2008) 300 ITR 251 needed
reconsideration for the following reasons : Chapter XII-B of the Act containing
‘Special provisions relating to certain companies’ was introduced in the
Income-tax Act, 1961, by the Finance Act, 1987, with effect from April 1, 1988.
In fact, S. 115J replaced S. 80VVA of the Act. S. 115J (as it stood at the
relevant time), inter alia, provided that where the total income of a company,
as computed under the Act in respect of any accounting year, was less than
thirty per cent of its book profit, as defined in the Explanation, the total
income of the company, chargeable to tax, shall be deemed to be an amount equal
to thirty per cent of such book profit. The whole purpose of S. 115J of the Act,
therefore, was to take care of the phenomenon of prosperous ‘zero tax’ companies
not paying taxes though they continued to earn profits and declare dividends.
Therefore, a minimum alternate tax was sought to be imposed on ‘zero tax’
companies. S. 115J of the Act imposes tax on a deemed income. S. 115J of the Act
is a special provision relating only to certain companies. The said Section does
not make any distinction between public and private limited companies. In our
view, S. 115J of the Act legislatively only incorporates the provisions of Parts
II and III of Schedule VI to the 1956 Act. Such incorporation is by a deeming
fiction. Hence, we need to read S. 115J(1A) of the Act in the strict sense. If
we so read, it is clear that, by legislative incorporation, only Parts II and
III of Schedule VI to the 1956 Act have been incorporated legislatively into S.
115J of the Act. If a company is a MAT company, then be it a private limited
company or a public limited company, for the purposes of S. 115J of the Act, the
assessee-company has to prepare its profit and loss account in accordance with
Parts II and III of Schedule VI to the 1956 Act alone. If the judgment in
Malayala Manorama Co. Ltd. (2008) 300 ITR 251 is to be accepted, then the very
purpose of enacting S. 115J of the Act would stand defeated, particularly, when
the said Section does not make any distinction between public and private
limited companies. It needs to be reiterated that, once a company falls within
the ambit of it being a MAT company, S. 115J of the Act applies and, under that
Section, such as assessee-company was required to prepare its profit and loss
account only in terms of Part II and III of Schedule VI to the 1956 Act. The
reason being that rates of depreciation in Rule 5 of the Income-tax Rules, 1962,
are different from the rates specified in Schedule XIV to the 1956 Act. In fact,
by the Companies (Amendment) Act, 1988, the linkage between the two has been
expressly de-linked. Hence, what is incorporated in S. 115J is only Schedule VI,
and not S. 205 or S. 350 or S. 355. This was the view of the Kerala High Court
in the case of ACIT v. Malayala Manorama Co. Ltd. reported in (2002) 253 ITR
378, which has been wrongly reversed by the Supreme Court in the case of
Malayala Manorama Co. Ltd. v. CIT reported in (2008) 300 ITR 251.

For the aforesaid reasons, the Registry was directed to place
the civil appeal before the learned Chief Justice for appropriate directions as
the Bench was of the view that the matter needed reconsideration by a larger
Bench of the Supreme Court.

 

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Assessment — Reference to Departmental Valuer

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14. Assessment — Reference
to Departmental Valuer.


[Sargam Cinema v. CIT,
(2010) 328 ITR 513 (SC)]

The Supreme Court observed
that the Tribunal was right in coming to the conclusion that the assessing
authority could not have referred the matters to the Departmental Valuation
Officer (DVO) without the books of account being rejected. In the circumstances,
reliance could not have been placed on the report of the DVO. The Supreme Court
set aside the order of the High Court as that aspect had not been considered by
it and restored the order of the Tribunal.

 

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Settlement of cases — Settlement Commission — S. 234B applies to the proceedings of the Settlement Commission — The terminal point for levy of such interest is the date of the order u/s.245D(1) — The Settlement Commission cannot reopen its concluded proce

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 13. Settlement of cases —
Settlement Commission — S. 234B applies to the proceedings of the Settlement
Commission — The terminal point for levy of such interest is the date of the
order u/s.245D(1) — The Settlement Commission cannot reopen its concluded
proceedings by invoking S. 154 so as to levy interest u/s.234B, though it was
not done in the original proceedings.


[Brij Lal & Ors. v. CIT,
(2010) 328 ITR 477 (SC)]

Vide referral orders dated
14-12-2004 and 20-1-2005 certain questions were referred to the Constitution
Bench of the Supreme Court and accordingly a Constitution Bench consisting of
five Judges was constituted to consider the same.

After hearing both the
sides, the Supreme Court reframed the questions for the sake of convenience as
under :

(i) Whether S. 234B
applies to the proceedings of the Settlement Commission under chapter XIXA of
the Act ?

(ii) If the answer to the
above question is in affirmative, what is the terminal point for levy of such
interest — Whether such interest should be computed up to the date of the
order u/s.245D(1) or up to the date of the order of the Commission u/s.245D(4)
?

(iii) Whether the
Settlement Commission could reopen its concluded proceedings by involving S.
154 of the said Act so as to levy interest u/s.234B, though it was not so done
in the original proceedings ?

The Supreme Court held that
in the special procedure to be followed by the Settlement Commission u/s.245C
and u/s.245D, the returned income plus income disclosed would result in
computation of total income which is the basis of levy of tax on the undisclosed
income, which is nothing but ‘assessment’ which takes place at S. 245D(1) stage.
In that computation, one finds that the provisions dealing with a regular
assessment, self-assessment and levy and computation of interest for default in
payment of advance tax, etc. are engrafted [S. 245C(1B), S. 245C(1C), S.
245D(6), S. 245F(3) in addition to S. 215(3), S. 234A(4), and S. 234B(4)].

The Supreme Court further
held that till the Settlement Commission decides to admit the case u/s. 245D(1)
the proceedings under the normal provisions remain open. But once the Commission
admits the case after being satisfied that the disclosure is full and true, then
the proceedings commence with the Settlement Commission. In the meantime, the
applicant has to pay the additional amount of tax with interest without which
the application is not maintainable. Thus, interest u/s. 234B would be payable
up to the stage of S. 245D(1).

The Supreme Court also
considered as to what happens in the cases where 90% of the assessed tax is paid
but on the basis of the Commission’s order u/s.245D(4) and the advance tax paid
turns out to be less than 90% of the assessed tax as defined in the Explanation
to S. 234B(1). The Supreme Court held that there were two distinct stages under
chapter XIX-A and the Legislature has not contemplated the levy of interest
between the order u/s.245D(1) stage and S. 245D(4) stage. The interest u/s.234B
will be chargeable till the order of the Settlement Commission u/s. 245D(1);
i.e., admission of the case. The expression ‘interest’ in S. 245(6A) fastens the
liability to pay interest only when the tax payable in pursuance of an order
u/s.245D(4) is not paid within the specified time and which levy is different
from liability to pay interest u/s.234B or u/s.245D(2C).

The Supreme Court further
held that u/s.245-I, the order of the Settlement Commission is made final and
conclusive on matters mentioned in the application for settlement except in the
two reopened cases of fraud and misrepresentation in which case the matter could
be by way of review or recall. Like the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, the
Settlement Commission is a quasi-judicial body. U/s.254(2), the Income-tax
Appellate Tribunal is given the power to rectify, but no such power is given to
the Settlement Commission. The Supreme Court therefore held that the Settlement
Commission cannot reopen its concluded proceedings by invoking S. 154 of the
Act. The Supreme Court further held that even otherwise, invocation of S. 154 on
the facts of the cases was not justified as there was lot of controversy as to
whether the Settlement Commission had power to reduce or waive interest and also
on the question of terminus.

 

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Penalty : Ss. 44AB and 271B of I. T. Act, 1961 : A. Y. 1992 – 93 : Provisions of s. 44AB not complied with on the basis of legal opinion contained in Tax Audit Manual published by the Bombay Chartered Accounts’ Society : Reasonable cause for default : Pen

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40. Penalty : Ss. 44AB and 271B of I. T. Act, 1961 : A. Y.
1992 – 93 : Provisions of s. 44AB not complied with on the basis of legal
opinion contained in Tax Audit Manual published by the Bombay Chartered
Accounts’ Society :  Reasonable cause for default : Penalty u/s. 271B not
justified.

[ITO vs. Sachinum Trust, 223 CTR 152 (Guj.)]

For the A. Y. 1992 – 93, the assessee trust did not get its
accounts audited under the provisions of Section 44AB of the Income-tax Act,
1961, on the basis of the legal opinion contained in the Tax Audit Manual
published by the Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society. The Assessing Officer
was of the view that the assessee was under an obligation to get its accounts
audited u/s. 44AB of the Act. He therefore, imposed penalty u/s. 271B of the
Act. The Tribunal cancelled the penalty.


On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :


“Legal opinion contained in Tax Audit Manual published by
the Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society constituted reasonable cause for the
bona fide belief of the assessee that its interest receipts i.e.,
gross receipts, and not loan advanced i.e., turnover, being less than
Rs. 40 laks, the provisions of s. 44AB are not applicable in its case and,
therefore, penalty u/s. 271B is not leviable.”



 


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TDS : Ss. 194A, 201(1) and 201(1A) of I. T. Act 1961 : A. Y. 2000 – 01 : Assessee in default : Interest u/s. 201(1A) : Assessee, insurance co. failed to deduct tax at source on interest on compensation to the victims of motor vehicle accidents : Assessee

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41. TDS : Ss. 194A, 201(1) and 201(1A) of I. T. Act 1961 : A.
Y. 2000 – 01 : Assessee in default : Interest u/s. 201(1A) : Assessee, insurance
co. failed to deduct tax at source on interest on compensation to the victims of
motor vehicle accidents : Assessee liable to TDS and interest : Revenue directed
to collect tax from recipient of interest and refund the amount of TDS to the
assessee.

[CIT vs. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., 223 CTR 102 (Kar.)]

Pursuant to the order made under the Motor Vehicles Act,
the respondent insurance company paid compensation to the victims of motor
vehicle accidents. The award amount consisted of the compensation and interest
liability. The Assessing Officer held that the respondent assessee has failed
to deduct tax at source u/s. 194A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and directed the
assessee company to deposit the TDS amount and interest on the TDS amount. The
Tribunal permitted the assessee to split the interest liability for the
respective assessment years and set aside the order for payment of interest
u/s. 201(1A) of the Act.


On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court held as
under :


“i) Levy of interest u/s. 201(1A) cannot at any rate be
construed as penalty. In that view, the contrary finding of the Tribunal is
set aside.

ii) The Tribunal has rightly directed that the interest
paid above Rs. 50,000 is to be split and spread over the period from the
date interest is directed to be paid till its payment. If the spread over is
given, in majority of cases, the respondent may not incur liability to pay
any TDS.


iii) In the event, the respondent remits TDS amount as
directed by the Tribunal, the Revenue is directed to hold suo moto
enquiry by issuing notices to the persons who have received compensation to
find out their tax liability on the interest received. If it is found that
there is a tax liability on the person concerned, the Revenue should collect
the tax from the person concerned and refund the amount to the respondent. So
also, if there is no tax liability on the person concerned, the TDS collected
should be refunded to the respondent, of course, with interest in either
case.”

 

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Depreciation : Option to claim : Deduction under Chapter VI-A of I. T. Act, 1961 : A. Y. 1997 – 98 : Assessee did not claim depre-ciation for computing gross total income : Whether for the purposes of availing deduction under Chapter VI-A, gross total inc

New Page 1

In the High Court

K. B. Bhujle
Advocate

38. Depreciation : Option to claim : Deduction under Chapter
VI-A of I. T. Act, 1961 : A. Y. 1997 – 98 : Assessee did not claim depre-ciation
for computing gross total income :  Whether for the purposes of availing
deduction under Chapter VI-A, gross total income is required to be computed by
deducting allowable depreciation ?  : Question referred to larger Bench.

[Plastiblends India Ltd. vs. Add. CIT, 223 CTR 291 (Bom.)]

In view of the contrary decisions in the case of Grasim
Industries Ltd. vs. ACIT 245 ITR 677 (Bom) and Scoop Industries (P)
Ltd. vs. ITO 289 ITR 195 (Bom) the following question has been referred
to the Larger Bench :

"Whether for the purposes of availing allowable special
deduction under Chapter VI-A, the gross total income is required to be
computed by deducting allowable depreciation even though the assessee has
disclaimed the same for the purposes of regular assessment ? ".

 

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Investment allowance : S. 32A of I. T. Act, 1961 : A. Y. 1991 – 92 : Purchase of plant and machinery in earlier years : Reserve account not created in earlier years in view of loss : Reserve account created and investment allowance claimed in the A. Y. 19

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39. Investment allowance : S. 32A of I. T. Act, 1961 : A. Y.
1991 – 92 : Purchase of plant and machinery in earlier years : Reserve account
not created in earlier years in view of loss : Reserve account created and
investment allowance claimed in the A. Y. 1991 – 92 : Assessee entitled to
investment allowance.

[Velan Textiles Pvt. Ltd., 312 ITR 56 (Karn.)]

For the A. Ys. 1985 – 86 to 1987 – 88 the assessee could
not claim investment allowance on account of the loss incurred in those years.
Accordingly, the assessee did not create reserve account in those years. For
the A. Y. 1991 – 92 the assessee filed the return of income disclosing income
of Rs. 39,78,083. In this year the assessee created the reserve account and
claimed investment allowance of Rs. 11,02,807 relating to A. Ys. 1985 – 86 to
1987 – 88. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim. The Tribunal upheld the
disallowance and held that the claim for investment allowance had to be made
during the relevant assessment year and not when the assessee had adequate
funds for creation of the reserve.


On appeal by the assessee, the Karnataka High Court
reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :


“i) The purpose of the amendment to clause (ii) of
sub-Section (4) of Section 32A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, as brought about
by the Finance Act, 1990, retrospectively from 01/04/1976, is to enable the
assessee to create a reserve in any of the years between the year of
installation of plant and machinery and the year of actual deduction.
Consequently, the assessee need not create a reserve in the year of
installation. If there is no sufficient profit, the assessee can create it
in the year of actual deduction.

ii) It remained undisputed by the Department that the
assessee incurred losses in the A.Ys. 1985-86 to 1987-88. The question of
creating reserve account did not arise since it incurred loss during the A.
Ys. 1985 – 86 to 1987 – 88. Therefore, the Tribunal’s order was to be
quashed.”

 

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Capital gain/loss : Ss. 2(47) and 45 of I. T. Act, 1961 : A. Y. 1998 – 99 : Application for shares : Assessee failed to pay balance amount on allotment of shares : Forfeiture of share application money : Assessee’s right in shares extinguished : Loss on f

New Page 1

36. Capital gain/loss : Ss. 2(47) and 45 of I. T. Act,
1961 : A. Y. 1998 – 99 : Application for shares : Assessee failed to pay balance
amount on allotment of shares : Forfeiture of share application money : Assessee’s
right in shares extinguished : Loss on forfeiture is short-term capital loss.

[Dy. CIT vs. BPL Sanyo Finance Ltd., 312 ITR 63 (Karn) : 223
CTR 461 (Karn.)]

The assessee company had applied for the shares of IDBI and
had remitted the share application money. IDBI allotted 89,200 shares to the
assessee and called upon the assessee to pay the balance sum for issuance of
shares in its favour. The assessee failed to remit the balance outstanding
allotment money. Therefore, the IDBI cancelled the allotment and forfeited the
share application money. In the return of income for the A. Y. 1998 – 99, the
assessee claimed the forfeited amount as short-term capital loss. The
Assessing Officer disallowed the claim. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s
claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld
the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“Consequent to the assessee’s default of not paying the
balance of money on allotment, its rights in the shares stood extinguished on
forfeiture by IDBI. The loss suffered by the assessee, i.e., the
non-recovery of the share application money was consequent to the forfeiture
of its rights in the shares and was to be understood to be within the scope
and ambit of transfer. The Tribunal was justified in holding that it would
amount to short-term capital loss to the assessee.”

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Compounding of offences : S. 279(2) of I. T. Act, 1961 : Offences can be compounded during the pendency of appeal.

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37. Compounding of offences : S. 279(2) of I. T. Act,
1961 : Offences can be compounded during the pendency of appeal.

[Chairman CBDT vs. Smt. Umayal Ramanathan, 313 ITR
59 (Mad.)]

Against the conviction and sentence order passed by the
Trial Court, the respondent filed a petition u/s. 279(2) of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 seeking compounding of the offences u/s. 278 of the Act and Sections
120B, 420 read with Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Joint
Director of Income-tax refused to compound the offences on the ground that the
respondent had been convicted by the Trial Court. The Single Judge set aside
the order passed by the Joint Director of Income-tax stating that the refusal
to compound the offence on the sole ground that the Criminal Court had
convicted her was discriminatory and that in the case of a similarly placed
assessee the appellants had compounded the offence.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Division Bench of the Madras
High Court upheld the decision of the Single Judge and held as under :

“i) The appeal against the order of conviction and
sentence passed by the Trial Court was a prescribed course of action for
enforcing a legal right. The appellants could have compounded the offence
sought for by the respondent during the pendency of the appeal.

ii) The Single Judge had rightly set aside the order
passed by the Joint Director of Income-tax. The respondent was permitted to
pay the amount demanded by the appellants for compounding the offence.”

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S. 143(2) — Service of notice by Speed Post, in absence of material on record, no pre-sumption of service within 24 hours

New Page 2

II. Reported :






 



52 Notice : Service by Speed Post : No
presumption of service within 24 hours : Notice u/s.143(2) dated 29-10-2002 sent
by Speed Post on 30-10-2002 at Delhi address given in the return and redirected
and served at Noida address of assessee on 6-11-2002 : No presumption that the
notice was served at the former address on or before 31-10-2002 in the absence
of material on record.

[Nulon India Ltd v. ITO, 216 CTR 142 (Del.)]

Pursuant to the return of income filed by the assessee on
31-10-2001, the Assessing Officer issued notice u/s.143(2) of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 on 29-10-2002, which was sent through Speed Post on 30-10-2002 at
Delhi address mentioned in the return. The notice was redirected and was served
at the Noida address of the assessee on 6-11-2002. The assessee challenged the
validity of the assessment order passed pursuant to the said notice, on the
ground that the notice was not served within the prescribed period. The Tribunal
rejected the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the assessee, the Delhi High Court reversed the
decision of the Tribunal and held :

“(i) As per material placed on record, the notice in
question has been dispatched on 30-10-2002 and thereafter it has been
redirected to the Noida address of the assessee. There is nothing on record to
show as to on which date this notice was received at the given address of the
assessee and on which date the same was redirected. As per the order of the
CIT(A) placed on record, the Assessing Officer was asked for comments and vide
his letter dated 12/20th October, 2004, the Assessing Officer stated : “The
notice was served by Speed Post which must be delivered to the assessee within
24 hours, that is, by morning of 31st October.” So the AO is also not sure nor
specific as to when the notice in question has been served upon the assessee.
It is only a presumption that notice which has been sent by Speed Post on 30th
October 2002, must have been delivered to the assessee by 31st October 2002.

(ii) There is no presumption under law that any notice sent
by Speed Post must have been delivered to the assessee within 24 hours.
Moreover, there is nothing on record to show at whose instance the notice was
redirected and sent at the address of Noida. So, from the material available
on record, it may be concluded that no notice u/s.143(2), which is mandatory
requirement of law, has been served upon the assessee within prescribed
period.

(iii) Under the circumstances, the appeal filed by the
assessee is allowed and the impugned order passed by the Tribunal is set
aside.”

Capital gain : Capital asset : Agricultural land : S. 2(14) of I. T. Act, 1961 : Purchase of agricultural land in 1989 to set up industry : Shortly thereafter, land acquired by Government : AO treated land as capital asset and assessed capital gain : Not

New Page 1

35. Capital gain : Capital asset : Agricultural land : S.
2(14) of I. T. Act, 1961 : Purchase of agricultural land in 1989 to set up
industry :  Shortly thereafter, land acquired by Government :  AO treated land
as capital asset and assessed capital gain : Not justified.

[Hindustan Industrial Resources Ltd vs. ACIT, 180
Taxman 114 (Del.)]

The assessee had purchased an agricultural land in 1989
with an object of setting up an industry. Shortly thereafter it was acquired
under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and compensation was paid to the assessee
by the Government. The assessee claimed that the land was an agricultural land
and therefore, no taxable capital gain accrued. The Assessing Officer assessed
the capital gains to tax, holding that land ceased to be agricultural land
when the assessee purchased it from the agriculturist for setting up an
industry. The Tribunal upheld the decision of the Assessing Officer.

On appeal by the assessee, the Delhi High Court reversed
the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“i) The Tribunal’s finding of fact was contrary to its
own record and, therefore, was in the realm of perversity. That was so,
because the Tribunal clearly held that at the point of time when the
assessee purchased the said land, it was an agricultural land. The Tribunal
also noted that the award passed on 01.04.1992 by the District Collector
(Land Acquisition) was a document which established beyond doubt that the
land in question was an agricultural land. Thus on the date of purchase, the
land in question was an agricultural land and on the date of acquisition,
the character of the land continued to be agricultural. When those two
findings had been returned, it was apparent that in the transitional period,
that was, between purchase and acquisition, the nature and character of the
land did not change.

ii) The fact that the assessee intended to use that land
for industrial purposes did not alter the nature and character of the land
in any way. The further fact that the assessee did not carry out any
agricultural operations also did not result in conversion of the
agricultural land into an industrial land. It was nobody’s case that the
assessee carried out any operations for setting up any plant and machinery
or of the like nature so as to lead to an inference that the nature and
character of the land had been changed from agricultural to industrial.

iii) In any event, that discussion was not relevant in
the backdrop of the clear finding given by the Tribunal that on the date of
the purchase and also on the date of acquisition, the land in question was
an agricultural land. Having come to such a conclusion, the Tribunal ought
not to have gone into the question of intention of the assessee and
definitely not into the question of intention of the land acquiring
authority, the later being a wholly irrelevant consideration.

iv) In those circumstances, the Tribunal was not
justified in holding that the land acquired from the ownership of the
assessee was not an agricultural land. The impugned order passed by the
Tribunal was to be set aside.”

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Free Trade Zone : Deduction u/s.10A of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2003-04 : Total turnover to exclude freight and insurance : Deduction allowable on foreign exchange gain : Deduction allowable on enhanced profit on account of disallowance of PF/ESIC.

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Unreported
 


39 Free Trade Zone : Deduction u/s.10A of Income-tax Act,
1961 : A.Y. 2003-04 : Total turnover to exclude freight and insurance :
Deduction allowable on foreign exchange gain : Deduction allowable on enhanced
profit on account of disallowance of PF/ESIC.


[CIT v. Gem Plus Jewellery India Ltd. (Bom.); ITA No.
2426 of 2009 dated 23-6-2010]

The following questions were raised in the appeal filed by
the Revenue :

“(a) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the
case, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the exemption u/s.10A of the
Act should be computed after excluding freight and insurance from the total
turnover ?

(b) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the
case, the Tribunal was justified in directing the Assessing Officer to grant
exemption u/s.10A on foreign exchange gain earned on realisation of export
receipts in the year of export and to exclude the gains on sales of earlier
years from the profits of the year under consideration and allow in those
years ?

(c) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the
case, the Tribunal was justified in directing the Assessing Officer to grant
the exemption u/s.10A of the Act on the assessed income, which was enhanced
due to disallowance of employer’s as well as employees’ contribution towards
PF/ESIC ?”

The Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal,
answered the questions in favour of the assessee and held as under :

“(a-i) Ss.(4) of S. 10A provides the manner in which the
profits derived from the export shall be computed. U/ss.(4), the profits of
the business of the undertaking are multiplied by the export turnover and
divided by the total turnover of the business carried on by the undertaking.
Total turnover of the business would consist of the turnover from export and
the turnover from local sales.

(a-ii) In Explanation (2) to S. 10A, the expression ‘export
turnover’ is defined to mean the consideration in respect of export of
articles, etc., received in or brought into India by the assessee in
convertible foreign exchange but so as not to include inter alia freight and
insurance. Therefore in computing the export turnover, the Legislature has
made a specific exclusion of freight and insurance charges.

(a-iii) The export turnover in the numerator must have the
same meaning as the export turnover which is a constituent element of total
turnover in the denominator. Freight and insurance do not have an element of
turnover. These two items would have to be excluded from the total turnover.

(b-i) The Tribunal has followed a decision of its Special
Bench in coming to the conclusion that foreign exchange earned on the
realisation of export receipts in a year other than the year in which the
goods were exported would have to be considered in the year of export for the
for the purposes of exemption u/s.80HHC. The Tribunal has, however, directed
the Assessing Officer, while granting a deduction to the assessee u/s.10A in
the export to exclude the amount from the profits of the year under
consideration simultaneously. This is to ensure that the assessee does not
obtain a deduction twice over.

(b-ii) It has not been disputed on behalf of the Revenue
that the foreign exchange was realised by the assessee within the period
stipulated in law. The assessee realised a larger amount because of a foreign
exchange fluctuation. The fact that this forms part of the sale proceeds would
have to be accepted in view of the judgment of the Division Bench of this
Court in CIT v. Umber Export India, (ITA 1249 of 2007 decided on 18-2-2009).

(biii) In the present case, the assessee has realised a
larger amount in terms of Indian Rupees as a result of a foreign exchange
fluctuation that took place in the course of the export transaction.

(b-iv) For the aforesaid reasons, the question of law is
answered against the Revenue and in favour of the assesee.

(c-i) The assessed income was enhanced due to the
disallowance of the employer’s as well as employees’ contribution towards PF/ESIC
and the only question which is canvassed on behalf of the Revenue is whether
on that basis the Tribunal was justified in directing the Assessing Officer to
grant the exemption u/s.10A.

(c-ii) On this position, in the present case it can-not be
disputed that the net consequence of the disallowance of the employer’s and
the employees’ contribution is that the business profits have to that extent
been enhanced. There was an add back by the Assessing Officer to the income.
All profits of the unit of the assessee have been derived from manufacturing
activity. The salaries paid by the assessee relate to the manufacturing
activity. The disallowance of the PF/ESIC payments has been made because of
the statutory provisions. The plain consequence of the disallowance and the
add back that has been made by the Assessing Officer is an increase in the
business profits of the assessee.

(c-iii) The contention of the Revenue that in computing the
deduction u/s.10A the addition made on account of the disallowance of PF/ESIC
payments ought to be ignored cannot be accepted. No statutory provision to
that effect having been made, the plain consequence of the disallowance made
by the Assessing Officer must follow. The question shall accordingly stand
answered against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee.”
 

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Appellate Tribunal : Powers and duty : A.Y. 1997-98 : Order passed relying on decision not cited in the course of arguments : Assessee to be given opportunity to deal with distinguishable features of case relied on : Matter remanded.

New Page 1

Reported :

40 Appellate Tribunal : Powers and duty : A.Y. 1997-98 :
Order passed relying on decision not cited in the course of arguments : Assessee
to be given opportunity to deal with distinguishable features of case relied on
: Matter remanded.


[Inventure Growth and Securities Ltd. v. ITAT; 324 ITR
319 (Bom.)]

In respect of the A.Y. 1997-98, the Tribunal decided an
appeal relying on the decision of the co-ordinate Bench which was not relied on
by either parties. The assessee therefore, filed a miscellaneous application
u/s.254(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the ground that the Tribunal, while
relying on the decision of the co-ordinate Bench, had not furnished an
opportunity to the assessee to deal with the decision which had not been cited
by either side when arguments were heard. The application was dismissed.

On writ petition filed by the assessee the Bombay High Court
set aside the order of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) It could not be laid down as an inflexible provision
of law that an order of remand on a miscellaneous application u/s.254(2) would
be warranted merely because the Tribunal had relied upon a judgment which was
not cited by either party before it. In each case, it was for the Court to
consider as to whether a prima facie or arguable distinction had been made and
which should have been considered by the Tribunal.

(ii) The distinguishing features in the case of Khandwala
Finace Ltd., which had been pointed out by the assessee were sufficient to
hold that an opportunity should be granted to the petitioner to place its case
on the applicability or otherwise of the decision in Khandwala Finance Ltd.
before the Tribunal. Therefore the appeal and the cross-objections were to be
restored for fresh consideration on the merits before the Tribunal.”

 

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Export profit : Deduction u/s.80HHC of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2000-01 : Profits of business : Expl. (baa) : Insurance claim relating to stock-in-trade not to be excluded.

New Page 1

Unreported :


38 Export profit : Deduction u/s.80HHC of Income-tax Act,
1961 : A.Y. 2000-01 : Profits of business : Expl. (baa) : Insurance claim
relating to stock-in-trade not to be excluded.


[CIT v. The Pfizer Ltd. (Bom.); ITAL No. 128 of 2009
dated 18-6-2010]

The assessee is engaged in the manufacture and export of
pharmaceuticals and animal health products. For the A.Y. 2000-01, while
computing deduction u/s.80HHC, the Assessing Officer excluded 90% of the amount
of insurance claim which was related to the stock-in-trade of the assessee. The
Tribunal held that the insurance claim formed part of the income of the business
of the assesee and was liable to be considered as part of the profits of the
business in view of Explanation (baa) to S. 80HHC. The Tribunal was of the view
that the insurance claim was not in the nature of brokerage, commission,
interest, rent or charges and therefore was not any other receipt of a similar
nature within the meaning of Explanation (baa). The Tribunal, therefore, held
that 90% of the insurance claim could not be excluded.

On appeal by the Revenue the Bombay High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as :

“(i) Receipts by way of brokerage, commission, interest,
rent or charges in Explanation (baa) have been held, by the judgment of the
Supreme Court in CIT v. K. Ravindranathan Nair; 295 ITR 228 (SC), to
constitute independent incomes. Being independent incomes unrelated to export,
the Parliament contemplated that 90% of such receipts would have to be reduced
from the profits of business as defined in Explanation (baa).

(ii) The rationale for excluding 90% of the receipts by way
of brokerage, commission, interest, rent or charges is that these are
independent incomes and their inclusion in the profits of business would
result in a distortion. In determining whether any other receipt is liable to
undergo a reduction of 90%, the basic prescription which must be borne in mind
is whether the receipt is of a similar nature and is included in the profits
of business. To be susceptible of a reduction the receipt must be of a nature
similar to brokerage, commission, interest, rent or charges.

(iii) In the present case, the insurance claim, it must be
clarified, is related to the stock-in trade and it is only an insurance claim
of that nature which forms the subject matter of the appeal. Now it cannot be
disputed that if the stock-in-trade of the assessee were to be sold, the
income that was received from the sale of goods would constitute the profits
of the business as computed under the head profits and gains of business or
profession. The income emanating from the sale would not be sustainable to a
reduction of 90% for the simple reason that it would not constitute a receipt
of a nature similar to brokerage, commission, interest, rent or charges.

(iv) A contract of insurance is a contract of indemnity.
The insurance claim in essence indemnifies the assessee for the loss of the
stock-in-trade. The indemnification that is made to the assessee must stand on
the same footing as the income that would have been realised by the assessee
on the sale of the stock in trade.

(v) In these circumstances, we are clearly of the view that
the insurance claim on account of the stock-in-trade does not constitute an
independent income or a receipt of a nature similar to brokerage, commission,
interest, rent or charges. Hence, such a receipt would not be subject to a
deduction of 90% under clause (1) of Explanation (baa).”
 

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Deduction u/s.80RR of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 1999-00 to 2001-02 : Dress designer is artist entitled to deduction u/s. 80RR.

New Page 1

 Unreported :

36 Deduction u/s.80RR of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 1999-00
to 2001-02 : Dress designer is artist entitled to deduction u/s. 80RR.

[CIT v. Tarun R. Tahiliani (Bom.); dated 14-6-2010]

The assesse is a dress designer. For the A.Ys. 1999-00 to
2001-02 the assessee claimed deduction u/s.80RR of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in
respect of the design fees received from persons not resident in India in
convertible foreign exchange. The Assessing Officer rejected the claim holding
that the assessee is not an author, or a playwright, artist, musician, actor or
a sportsman, and hence did not fall within one of the categories to whom a
deduction can be allowed. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) Counsel appearing on behalf of the Revenue submitted
that (i) The expression ‘artist’ in S. 80RR must be restricted to the field of
fine arts; (ii) The purpose of the provision is to showcase Indian culture
abroad; and (iii) The field of design is an area of technical expertise and
not an art form.

(ii) In a circular (No. 31) of the Board dated 25-10-1969,
it was clarified that the expression artist includes photographers and T.V.
cameramen for S. 80RR. By circular (No. 675) dated 3-1-1994, the Board
clarified that a script writer is a playwright and that a director is an
artist for the purpose of S. 80RR. However, a producer does not fall in any of
the stated categories.

(iii) The expression ‘artist’ is not defined by the
statute. Hence, the Parliament must have intended that an artist must be
understood in its ordinary sense. No artificial constructs or deeming
fictions. There is nothing in the statutory provision which would confine the
meaning of the expression to a person
engaged in fine arts.

(iv) Simply stated, an artist is a person who engages in an
activity which is an art. Artist, as we understand them, use skill and
imagination in the creation of aesthetic objects and experience. Drawing,
painting, sculpture, acting, dancing, writing, film-making, photography and
music all involve imagination, talent and skill in the creation of works which
have an aesthetic value. A designer uses the process of design and her work
requires a distinct and significant element of creativity. The canvass of
design is diverse and includes graphic design and fashion design. An artist as
part of his or her creative work, seeks to arrange elements in a manner that
would affect human senses and emotions. Design, in a certain sense, can be
construed to be a rigorous form of art or art which has a clearly defined
purpose. Though the field of designing may be regarded as a rigorous facet of
art, creativity, imagination and visualisation are the core of design.

(v) Dress designing has assumed significance in the age in
which we live, influenced as it is by the media and entertainment. As a dress
designer, the assessee must bring to his work a high degree of imagination,
creativity and skill. The fact that designing involves skill and even
technical expertise does not detract from the fact that the designer must
visualise and imagine. A designer is an artist.

(vi) The Tribunal was not in error in holding that the
assessee is an artist for the purposes of S. 80RR.”

 

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Export profit : S. 80HHC of Income-tax Act, 1961 : In computing the amount deductible u/s.80HHC(3)(b) freight and insurance is not to be included in the direct cost.

New Page 1

Unreported :


37 Export profit : S. 80HHC of Income-tax Act, 1961 : In
computing the amount deductible u/s.80HHC(3)(b) freight and insurance is not to
be included in the direct cost.


[CIT v. King Metal Works (Bom.); ITA(L) No. 801 of 2010,
dated 7-7-2010]

In this case, the following question was raised before the
Bombay High Court :

“Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case
and in law, the Tribunal has erred in holding that while computing direct cost
attributable to export, the freight and insurance amounting to Rs.1,71,87,614
should be excluded for arriving at export profits while computing the
deduction u/s.80HHC ?”

The High Court answered the question in favour of the
assessee and held as under :

“(i) U/s.80HHC(3)(b), the export turnover has to be reduced
by the direct and indirect cost attributable to export in order to arrive at
profits derived from export.

(ii) While defining the expression ‘export turnover’, the
Parliament has evinced an intent to exclude freight and insurance attributable
to the transport of goods or merchandise beyond the customs station. Such
freight and insurance has to be excluded from the sale proceeds received in
India by the assessee in convertible foreign exchange. The object of the
exclusion of freight and insurance is to ensure that the benefit of the
deduction u/s.80HHC is confined to profits derived from export.

(iii) The case of the Revenue is that though freight and
insurance is excluded from the export turnover as a result of Explanation (b)
to Ss.(4C) of the Section, freight and insurance must be treated as direct
cost and must then be deducted from the export turnover. According to the
Revenue, freight and insurance would be ‘cost directly attributable to the
trading goods exported out of India’ within the meaning of Explanation (d) to
Ss.(3).

(iv) In considering the tenability of the submission which
has been urged on behalf of the Revenue, it has to be noted that for the
purposes of the formula in clause (b) of Ss.(3), the export turnover has to be
reduced by direct and indirect cost attributable to export. Freight and
insurance is expressly to be excluded from the sale proceeds received by the
assessee, in computing the export turnover. Freight and insurance cannot be
regarded as costs directly attributable to the trading goods within the
meaning of clause (b) of Explanation to Ss.(3).

(v) As a matter of fact, freight and insurance attributable
to the transport of goods or merchandise beyond the customs station is already
excluded from the sale proceeds in computing the export turnover. Such freight
and insurance cannot be regarded as part of the direct costs attributable to the
trading goods. To do so, would result in a situation where freight and insurance
attributable to the transport of the goods beyond the customs station, which has
already been reduced from the sale proceeds received by the assessee, would, in
addition, be added back as a part of the direct cost incurred by the assessee.
The language of the Section, in our view, does not warrant such a conclusion.”

 

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S. 133A and S. 132(4) : Statement in survey operation offering income : Not conclusive : Subsequent retraction of statement : Amount offered not assessable as income

New Page 2

44 Survey : Statement : Difference between
S. 133A and S. 132(4) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2001-02 : Statement in
survey operation offering income : Not conclusive : Subsequent retraction of
statement : Amount offered not assessable as income.


[CIT v. S. Khader Khan Son, 300 ITR 157 (Mad.)]

In the course of survey operation, a partner of the assessee-firm
made a statement offering additional income of Rs.20 lakhs. The said statement
was retracted by a letter dated 3-8-2001, stating that the partner from whom a
statement was recorded was new to the management and he could not answer the
enquiries made and as such, he agreed to an ad hoc addition. The Assessing Officer made the addition
on the basis of the statement. The Tribunal deleted the addition.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) The principles relating to S. 133A of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 are as follows : (i) an admission is an extremely important piece of
evidence, but it cannot be said that it is conclusive and it is open to the
person who made the admission to show that it is incorrect. And that the
assessee should be given a proper opportunity to show that the books of
account do not correctly disclose the correct state of facts; (ii) in
contradistinction to the power u/s.133A, S. 132(4) enables the authorised
officer to examine a person on oath and any statement made by such person
during such examination can also be used in evidence under the Act. On the
other hand, whatever statement is recorded u/s.133A is not given any
evidentiary value, obviously for the reason that the officer is not authorised
to administer oath and to take any sworn statement which alone has evidentiary
value as contemplated under law; (iii) The expression “such other materials or
information as are available with the Assessing Officer” contained in S. 158BB
would include the materials gathered during the survey operation u/s.133A;
(iv) the material or information found in the course of survey proceeding
could not be a basis for making any addition in the block assessment; and (v)
the word ‘may’ used in S. 133A(3)(iii) of the Act, viz., “record the
statement of any person which may be useful for, or relevant to, any
proceeding under the Act” makes it clear that the materials collected and the
statement recorded during the survey u/s.133A are not conclusive piece of
evidence by itself.

(ii) In view of the scope and ambit of the materials
collected during the course of survey action u/s.133A shall not have any
evidentiary value, it could not be said solely on the basis of the statement
given by one of the partners of the assessee firm that the disclosed income
was assessable as lawful income of the assessee.”


 

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S. 281 : In order to declare a transfer as fraudulent, appropriate proceedings should be taken as required to be taken u/s.53 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882

New Page 2

45 Void transfer u/s.281 of Income-tax Act,
1961 : In order to declare a transfer as fraudulent u/s.281, appropriate
proceedings should be taken as required to be taken u/s.53 of Transfer of
Property Act, 1882. Order of TRO declaring transfer void was without
jurisdiction.


[Ms. Ruchi Mehta v. UOI, 170 Taxman 289 (Bom.)]

The petitioner purchased rights, title and interest of one
‘S’ who was defaulter under the Act, in a shop and accordingly a sale deed was
executed between the builder and the petitioner. Later, the TRO attached the
said shop for recovery of tax dues of ‘S’. On appeal, the Commissioner set aside
the action of attachment of the subject property. Thereafter, the TRO in
exercise of his powers u/s.281, passed an order declaring the sale of shop as
null and void.

 

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the
petitioner and held as under :

“(i) S. 281 had come up for consideration before the
Supreme Court in case of TRO v. Gangadhar Vishwanath Ranade, (1998) 234
ITR 188. The Supreme Court observed that S. 281 merely declared what the law
was. The Supreme Court further held that S. 281 does not prescribe any
adjudicatory machinery for deciding any question which may arise u/s.281. The
Court further observed that in order to declare a transfer as fraudulent under
this Section, appropriate proceedings would have to be taken in accordance
with law in the same manner as they are required to be taken u/s.53 of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

(ii) Considering the law declared by the Supreme Court in
the case of Gangadhar Vishwanath Ranade, it would be clear that the action of
the TRO in declaring the transfer of the property in favour of the petitioner
as void was clearly without jurisdiction.

(iii) The impugned order also attached civil consequences.
The TRO, before passing any such order, ought to have given an opportunity to
the petitioner if, in law, the TRO could exercise jurisdiction u/s.281. That
opportunity was also not given. The order, therefore, must also be set aside for
violation of the principles of natural justice and fair play.”

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S. 132B : Cash found during search satisfactorily explained : Application for release made within 30 days : Cash should be released.

New Page 2

43 Search and seizure : Release of cash : S.
132B of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Cash found in the course of search satisfactorily
explained : Application for release made within 30 days : Cash should be
released.


[Bipin Vimalchand Jain v. ADIT, 169 Taxman 396 (Bom.)]

In the course of the search action, cash amounting to
Rs.1,28,34,090 was found at the business premises of the petitioner. The
petitioner explained that out of the said amount, a sum of Rs.1.14 crores
belonged to one VJ and the explanation was verified and found to be correct by
the authorities. The petitioner filed application u/s.132B(1)(i) seeking release
of the said cash on the ground that it belonged to VJ. The Assessing Officer
rejected the application on the ground that assessment u/s.153A was pending and
seized cash was required to be applied for satisfying liabilities on completion
of that assessment.

 

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the
petitioner, directed release of cash and held as under :

“(i) Under the first proviso to S. 132B(1)(i), on an
application made for release of the seized asset within 30 days from the end
of the month in which the asset was seized, the Assessing Officer on being
satisfied regarding the nature and source of acquisition of such asset is
empowered to recover the existing liability out of such asset and release the
remaining portion of the asset.

(ii) In the instant case, it was not in dispute that the
application seeking release of the seized cash to the extent of Rs.1.14 crores
was made within 30 days of the seizure. Once the explanation given by the
petitioner regarding the nature and source of acquisition of the seized cash
was, on verification, found to be correct, then the amount of Rs.1.14 crores,
which belonged to VJ, could not be retained by the Assessing Officer by
rejecting the application filed by the petitioner.

(iii) The only reason given in the impugned order for
rejecting the application was that the assessment made u/s.153A was yet to be
finalised. In the absence of any material on record to suggest that the seized
cash represented the undisclosed income of the petitioner, respondent No. 2
could not have rejected the application made u/s.132B(1)(i) merely on the
ground that assessment u/s.153A was pending. In other words, application
u/s.132B(1)(i) could be rejected only if the Assessing Officer had reason to
believe that the seized cash represented the undisclosed income of the
petitioner liable to be assessed in the year in which search took place. In
the impugned order, it was not even remotely suggested that the seized cash
represented the undisclosed income of the petitioner.

(iv) In the circumstances, the impugned order was to be
quashed and set aside, with the direction to the Assessing Officer to release
the seized cash to the petitioner along with interest.”


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S. 263 : After certificate having been issued under KVSS, Commissioner not justified in exercising his revisionary power.

New Page 2

42 Revision : S. 263 of Income-tax Act,
1961 : A.Y. 1995-96 : KVSS 1998 : After certificate having been issued under
KVSS, Commissioner not justified in exercising power u/s.263.


[Siddhartha Tubes Ltd. v. CIT, 170 Taxman 233 (Del.)]

For the A.Y. 1995-96, the assessment of the assessee company
was completed u/s.143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. During the pendency of
appeal the assessee filed declaration under KVSS 1998. The declaration was
accepted and a certificate, as contemplated u/s.90(2) of the Scheme was duly
issued and the matter was finally settled. Thereafter, the Commissioner set
aside the assessment order u/s. 263 with a direction to recalculate the
deduction u/s.80HH, u/s.80-I and u/s.80HHC. The Tribunal upheld the order passed
by the Commissioner.

 

The Delhi High Court allowed the appeal filed by the assessee
and held as under :

“(i) The Commissioner, in his order, had duly observed that
the Assessing Officer was not satisfied with the explanation of the assessee
and had, thus, recalculated deduction u/s.80HH and u/s.80-I after excluding
the profit from export of trading goods. It was, therefore, not on any
concealment of information that it was proposed to procede u/s.263, nor any
steps were suggested for cancellation of the declaration as per the provisions
of the KVSS.

(ii) Under those circumstances, as after the certificate
having been issued under the KVSS, it was not permissible to revise the said
assessment order u/s.263 and the Tribunal, therefore, had erred in holding to
the contrary.”


 

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S. 69D : Where documents represented bilateral transaction and were not on hundi paper, the provisions not applicable

New Page 2

41 Deemed income : S. 69D of Income-tax Act,
1961 : A.Y. 1998-99 : Amount borrowed or repaid on hundi : Document represented
bilateral transaction and not on hundi paper : S. 69D not applicable.


[CIT v. Ram Niwas, 170 Taxman 5 (Del.)]

Amongst the documents found in the course of search, one
document was drawn on a letter-head of the assessee and was treated as hundi. On
the basis of the said hundi and the presumption available u/s.69D of the
Income-tax Act, 1961, the Assessing Officer assessed the amount of such hundi in
the assessee’s hands. The Commissioner deleted the addition and the Tribunal
upheld the deletion.

 

The Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and
held as under :

“(i) The primary requirement for invoking the deeming
provision of S. 69D is that the document must be a hundi and it is only
thereafter that the deeming provision comes into play. The lower authorities
had found that the document was not a hundi. Clearly, the document in question
was not a hundi, because it represented a bilateral transaction and it was
also not on a hundi paper. In the absence of those vital ingredients, the
document could not be described as a hundi and, therefore, the presumption
u/s.69D would not be available to the Revenue.

(ii) The contention of the Revenue that the document was
found from the premises of ‘K’ and, therefore, it must be deemed to be a hundi,
could not be accepted. From where a document is found cannot, by any stretch
of imagination, explain the nature of the document.”
 


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S. 41(1) : Amount in question continued to be shown as liability in balance sheet. S. 41(1) not applicable

New Page 2

40 Deemed income : S. 41(1) of Income-tax
Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1989-90 : Assessee continued to show amount in question as
liability in balance sheet : CIT set aside the assessment u/s.263 on the ground
that proper enquiry of assessability u/s.41(1) not made : Not justified.

[CIT v. Tamil Nadu Warehousing Corporation, 170 Taxman
123 (Mad.)]

After the completion of the assessment u/s.143(3) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 the Commissioner set aside the assessment order exercising
powers u/s. 263 on the ground that the assessee had surrendered the Group
Gratuity Scheme to the LIC and received certain amount; and that while
completing the assessment, the Assessing Officer had not made any proper enquiry
with respect to assessability of the said sum and directed the AO to assess the
said amount u/s.41(1). The Tribunal cancelled the order of the Commissioner
passed u/s.263.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) From the reasoning given by the Tribunal, it was clear
that the assessee had continued to show the admitted amount as a liability in
the balance sheet. The undisputed fact was that it was a liability reflected
in the balance sheet. Once it was shown as a liability by the assessee, the
Commissioner was wrong in holding that the same was assessable u/s.41(1).
Unless and until there is a cessation of liability, S. 41 will not be pressed
into service.

(ii) Thus the reasoning given by the Tribunal was based on
valid materials and evidence and, hence, there was no error or legal infirmity
in the order of the Tribunal so as to warrant interference.”

 

 

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S. 80-IB : Conversion of polymer granules into specialised polymer alloys in powder form amounts to manufacture

New Page 2

39 Deduction u/s.80-IB of Income-tax Act,
1961 : A.Y. 2002-03 : Conversion of polymer granules into specialised polymer
alloys in powder form amounts to manufacture : Assessee entitled to deduction
u/s.80-IB.


[CIT v. Shri Swasan Chemicals (M) P. Ltd., 300 ITR 115
(Mad.)]

The assessee-company was engaged in the manufacture of
plastic powder out of plastic granules. For the A.Y. 2002-03, the assessee’s
claim for deduction u/s.80-IB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was rejected by the
Assessing Officer on the ground that the activity undertaken by the assessee in
producing the plastic powder did not amount to manufacture. The Tribunal allowed
the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“The Tribunal had recorded a finding that the assessee was
manufacturing various products of polymer powders. The finished products were
completely different from the raw materials. The product range itself was wide
and the products carried different technical nomenclature. The Tribunal had
come to the right conclusion which needed no interference.”


 

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S. 54B : Exemption from capital gains tax cannot be denied where land was purchased in the joint name of the son

New Page 2

37 Capital gains : Exemption u/s.54B of
Income-tax Act, 1961 : B. P. 1-4-1988 to 15-7-1998 : Sale of agricultural land
and out of sale proceeds, purchase of agricultural land in his name and in the
name of his only son : Exemption u/s.54B allowable.


[CIT v. Gurnam Singh, 170 Taxman 160 (P&H)]

In the relevant period, the assessee had sold agricultural
land and out of the sale proceeds, the assessee, along with his son, had
purchased another agricultural land and claimed deduction u/s.54B of the
Income-tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim on the ground
that exemption from capital gains was available only in case the sale proceed
was invested by the assessee for purchasing another agricultural land and not in
respect of the land purchased by any other person. The Tribunal allowed the
assessee’s claim.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and Haryana High Court
upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“Undisputedly, the assessee had sold the agricultural land
which was being used by him for agricultural purposes. Out of its sale
proceeds, the assessee had purchased another piece of land in his name and in
the name of his only son, who was a bachelor and was dependent upon him, for
being used for agricultural purposes within the stipulated time. Undisputedly,
the purchased land was being used by the assessee only for agricultural
purposes and merely because in the sale deed his only son was also shown as
co-owner, it did not make any difference, because the purchased land was still
being used by the assessee for agricultural purposes. It was not the case of
the Revenue that the said land was being used exclusively by his son.”


 

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S. 80-IA : Twisting and texturising of Partially Oriented Yarn (POY) amounts to manufacturing or production

New Page 2

38 Deduction u/s.80-IA of Income-tax Act,
1961 : A.Y. 1996-97 : Twisting and texturis-ing of Partially Oriented Yarn (POY)
amounts to manufacturing or production: Assessee entitled to deduction
u/s.80-IA.


[CIT v. Emptee Poly-Yarn (P) Ltd., 170 Taxman 332 (Bom.)]

For the A.Y. 1996-97, the assessee-company’s claim for
deduction u/s.80-IA was disallowed on the ground that the activity of processing
of Partially Oriented Yarn (POY) was not an industrial activity. The Tribunal
allowed the claim.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“From the material considered it would be clear that POY
has different physical and chemical properties and when POY chips undergo the
process of texturising and/or twisting the yarn, i.e., twisted and/or
texturised or both, result in a product having different physical and chemical
properties. In other words, the process applied to POY, either for the purpose
of texturising or twisting, constitutes manufacture as the article produced is
recognised in the trade as distinct commodity pursuant to the process it
undergoes and which amounts to manufacture. Under the Central Excise Act, the
Union of India itself treats POY as distinct from POY drawn twisted or
texturised or both. The process amounts to manufacture as the original
commodity loses its identity. Therefore, the view taken by the Tribunal would
have to be upheld.


 

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Travel business : Expenditure on development of website is revenue expenditure allowable u/s.37(1).

New Page 1

57 Business expenditure : Revenue/Capital :
S. 37(1) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2001-02 : Assessee in travel business :
Expenditure on development of its website : Is revenue expenditure allowable
u/s.37(1).


[CIT v. Indian Visit.com (P) Ltd., 176 Taxman 164 (Del.)]

The assessee was engaged in travel business. The assessee
made all kinds of arrangements for its clients such as booking of hotel rooms,
providing taxi services, booking of air tickets and railway tickets, etc. During
the relevant year the assessee had incurred an expenditure of Rs.20,23,317 on
development of its website. The assesse’s clients could use the said website for
the purpose of availing of the services provided by it. The assessee had claimed
the deduction of the said expenditure as business expenditure u/s.37(1) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim holding that
the expenditure was of capital nature inasmuch as the assessee had acquired an
asset, which would provide it with an enduring benefit. The Tribunal allowed the
assessee’s claim.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held :

“(i) Considered in the light of the principles enunciated
by the Supreme Court, it is clear that just because a particular expenditure
may result in an enduring benefit it would not make such an expenditure
capital in nature. What is to be seen is what is the real intent and purpose
of the expenditure and as to whether there is any accretion to the fixed
capital of the assessee. In the case of expenditure on website, there is no
change in the fixed capital of the assessee. Although the website may provide
an enduring benefit to an assessee, the intent and purpose behind a website is
not to create an asset, but only to provide a means for disseminating the
information about the assessee. The same could very well have been achieved
and, indeed, in the past, it was achieved by printing travel brouchers and
other published material and pamphlets. The advance of technology and the
wide-spread use of the Internet has provided a very powerful medium to
companies to publicise their activities to a larger spectrum of people at a
much lower cost. Websites enable companies to do what the printed brouchers
did, but in a much more efficient manner as well as in a much shorter period
of time and covering a much larger set of people worldwide.

(ii) The Tribunal has correctly appreciated the facts as
well as the law on the subject and has come to the conclusion that the
expenditure on the website was of a revenue nature and not a capital nature.”


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Appellate : Powers in matters remitted by High Court restricted to directions by High Court.

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56 Appellate Tribunal : Powers in matters
remitted by High Court : Powers restricted to directions by the High Court.


[Harsingar Gutkha (P) Ltd. v. ITAT, 176 Taxman 137
(All.)]

In an appeal filed by the assessee against the order of the
Tribunal the Allahabad High Court remanded the matter back to the Tribunal to
redecide the case on the basis of the material on record. Thereafter, by its
order dated 25-7-2008 the Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to record the
statements of D and G to ascertain certain facts.

On a writ petition filed by the assessee challenging the said
order of the Tribunal, the Allahabad High Court held as under :

“(i) We are of the view that it was not open for the
Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to take fresh material on record by the impugned
order dated 25-7-2008. The Tribunal has directed the Assessing Authority to
record the statements of Shri Dinesh Singh, ACA and Shri G. L. Lath,
chartered accountant, which will amount to additional evidence/material in
the case. By the judgment and order passed by this Court, the Tribunal was
directed to adjudicate the matter afresh on the basis of the material on
record.

(ii) When a direction is issued to an Authority or Tribunal
to do a thing in certain manner, the thing must be done in that manner and no
other manner. Other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden.

(iii) In the instant case, the matter was remitted to the
Tribunal by this Court with certain directions and it was not open for the
Tribunal to take fresh evidence in the matter, as no such direction was issued
by this Court. The impugned order by which a fresh direction has been issued
by the Tribunal to the Assessing Officer is legally not sustainable.”


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Question of Law — Investment allowance — Whether allowable in one year or in several years is a question of law — Decision of Madras High Court not applicable.

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14 Question of Law — Investment allowance — Whether allowable
in one year or in several years is a question of law — Decision of Madras High
Court not applicable.


[CIT v. Lucas TVS Ltd., (2008) 297 ITR 429 (SC)]

The Assessing Officer was of the view that investment
allowance u/s.32A is only to be allowed in one assessment year and not in
several assessment years. The appeal related to the A.Ys. 1989-90, 1991-92 and
1992-93. The Tribunal held otherwise. The High Court dismissed the appeal in
view of its decision in Southern Asbestos Cement Ltd v. CIT, (2003) 259
ITR 631 (Mad.) in which it was held that the investment allowance in respect of
the incremental cost of the machinery, necessitated by the fluctuation in
foreign exchange rates is allowable to the assessee in the respective years in
which cost arose in view of S. 43A(1) of the Act.

On an appeal, the parties conceded before the Supreme Court
that S. 43A(1) relates to fluctuations of foreign exchange and its effect on the
valuation of the assets and that it had nothing to do with the question as to
whether it is allowable in one year and therefore the decision of the High Court
had no application. In that view of the matter, the Supreme Court set aside the
order of the High Court and remitted the matter for fresh adjudication after
formulating the question of law involved.


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Appeal to Tribunal : Powers of Single member : S. 255(3) : Income computed by AO less than Rs.5 lakhs : CIT(A) enhanced it to more than Rs.5 lakhs : Single member can decide appeal.

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21 Appeal to Tribunal : Powers of Single
member : S. 255(3) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1996-97 : Income computed by
AO less than Rs.5 lakhs : CIT(A) enhanced it to more than Rs.5 lakhs : Single
member can decide the appeal.


[CIT v. Mahakuteshwar Oil Industries, 298 ITR 390
(Kar.)]

The assessee was a manufacturer of edible oil. For the A.Y.
1996-97, it had declared the total income of Rs.8,660 in the return of income.
The Assessing Officer computed the total income at Rs.2,27,614. The Commissioner
enhanced the income to Rs.13,89,795. In appeal before the Tribunal, the Single
Member of the Tribunal decided the appeal and granted relief to the assessee.

 

In the appeal preferred by the Revenue, the following
questions were raised :

“(i) Whether the single member of the Tribunal had
jurisdiction to decide the appeal when the subject matter of appeal was
exceeding Rs.5,00,000 ?

(ii) Whether the Tribunal was justified in reversing the
findings of the Appellate Commissioner, when the assessee failed to discharge
the burden of proof as required u/s.68 of the Income-tax Act ?

 


The Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal
and held as under :

“(i) A single member of the Tribunal can exercise powers if
the income computed by the Assessing Officer is less than Rs.5 lakhs, even
though the same has been enhanced by the Commissioner (Appeals) in excess of
Rs.5 lakhs.

(ii) The Tribunal had given a categorical finding that the
assessee was willing to examine the creditors as its witnesses to prove that
it had availed of loans from them. No records were produced to show that the
assessee had not made such a statement either before the Assessing Officer or
before the Commissioner (Appeals). When the Revenue had got the records to
show whether the assessee was willing to examine any of the witnesses or not,
when such documents were not placed before the Court, one would have to draw
an adverse inference against the Revenue.”

 


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Scientific Research and Development Expenditure : S. 35 : Whether machine being used for R&D purpose or for manufacturing, AO not authority to decide but prescribed authority u/s.35(3)

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10 Scientific Research and Development Expenditure :
Deduction u/s.35 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1999-00 : Axial machine and
computers : Whether machine being used for research and development purposes or
for manufacturing activity : Assessing Officer not an authority to decide :
Matter to be referred to prescribed authority u/s.35(3)


[CIT v. Deltron Ltd., 297 ITR 426 (Del.)]

The assessee incurred an expenditure of Rs.87,22,447 on
purchasing an axial machine along with machinery spares and computers. For the
A.Y. 1999-2000, it claimed the expenditure as a research and development
expenditure u/s.35(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer looked
at the brochure of the machine and came to the conclusion that the machine was
not used for research and development work and disallowed the claim. The
Commissioner (Appeals) held that the AO could not have disallowed the
expenditure without following the procedure prescribed u/s.35(3). Thereafter,
the Revenue could have made an attempt to find out the actual use of the
machine, but it did not do so. The Tribunal confirmed the view taken by the
Commissioner (Appeals).

The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the
Revenue and held as under :

“(i) The prescribed authority in this case was not the
Assessing Officer and he could not determine whether the machinery was used by
the assessee for research and development purposes or not.

(ii) Even assuming that the Assessing Officer had the
authority, the least that would have been expected from him was to confirm
physically whether or not the machine was being used for research and
development purposes. No conclusion could be arrived at by the Assessing
Officer by merely looking at the brochure. Therefore, there was no error in
the order passed by the Tribunal.

(iii) Moreover, since there was a gap of so many years, it
would not be appropriate to remand the matter to the Assessing Officer to
refer the matter to the prescribed authority to decide the question whether
the machinery was used for research and development purposes or not.”




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Penalty : S. 271B r/w. ss. 44AB and 80P of I. T. Act, 1961 : Failure to get accounts audited within prescribed time : No tax payable by assessee society in view of s. 80P : Penalty u/s. 271B not to be imposed

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  1. Penalty : S. 271B r/w. ss. 44AB and 80P of I. T. Act,
    1961 : Failure to get accounts audited within prescribed time : No tax payable
    by assessee society in view of s. 80P : Penalty u/s. 271B not to be imposed.



 


[CIT vs. Iqbalpur Co-operative Cane Development Union
Ltd.
; 179 Taxman 27 (Uttarakhand)].

The income of the assessee co-operative society was
exempted u/s. 80P of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The assessee society failed to
get its accounts audited u/s. 44AB of the Act within the prescribed time.
Therefore, the Assessing Officer imposed penalty u/s. 271B of the Act. The
Tribunal cancelled the penalty.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Uttarakhand High Court upheld
the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“i) There appeared no intention on the part of the
assessee to conceal the income or to deprive the Government of revenue as
there was no tax payable on the income of the assessee, in view of the
provisions of section 80P. Thus, it was not necessary for the Assessing
Officer to impose penalty u/s. 271B.

ii) On going through the impugned order passed by the
Tribunal, no sufficient reason was found to interfere with the satisfaction
recorded by the Tribunal as to the finding of fact that the assessee had no
intention to cause any loss to the revenue and as such, the penalty was not
necessarily required to be imposed by the Assessing Officer.

iii) Agreeing with the view of the Tribunal, it was to be
held that though an assessee is liable to penalty u/s. 271B for failure to
comply with the provisions of section 44AB but since in the instant case, no
tax was payable by the assessee in view of the provisions contained in
section 80P, the Tribunal had commited no error of law in setting aside the
penalty imposed by the Assessing Officer”.

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Writ petition — Dispute between Government Undertaking and Union of India could be ordinarily proceeded with only after receipt of permission of COD — As the matter was covered by decision of Supreme Court, as an exception, High Court was directed to deci

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  1. Writ petition — Dispute between Government Undertaking and
    Union of India could be ordinarily proceeded with only after receipt of
    permission of COD — As the matter was covered by decision of Supreme Court, as
    an exception, High Court was directed to decide the matter on merits.

[Delhi Development Authority and Anr. v. UOI & Ors.,
(2009) 314 ITR 342 (SC)]

By a writ petition the Delhi Development Authority (DDA)
sought to challenge an order dated 9-9-2005 of the Addl. CIT, Rg. 32, New
Delhi requiring the petitioner to get the accounts of DDA audited u/s.142(2A)
of the Act. According to the petitioner, it had not applied for the COD
clearance as it was not required since the dispute was frivolous and in
support of its contention reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme
Court in Canara Bank v. National Thermal Power Corporation, (2001) 1
SCC 43, (2001) 104 Comp. Cas. 97.

The Delhi High Court however held that it was not possible
at the admission stage to arrive at the conclusion that the dispute raised was
a frivolous one as was sought to be contended. According to the High Court the
decision in the Canara Bank’s case turned on its own facts and was
distinguishable. The Delhi High Court dismissed the petition since the
petitioner had not within one month of the filing of the writ petition,
applied to the COD for permission to litigate. It was however clarified that
the time spent in the litigation would not be counted towards the period of
completion of the assessment and also that the petitioner was not precluded
from approaching the COD for resolution of the dispute.

On appeal the Supreme Court observed that ordinarily it
would not have differed with the view taken by the High Court, but as the
matter was covered by the decision in Rajesh Kumar v. Dy. CIT, (2006)
287 ITR 91 (SC), it directed the High Court to consider the writ petition
filed by the petitioner on merits.

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Refund : Interest u/s.244A of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2001-02 : TDS certificates submitted during assessment proceedings : Delay on refund not attributable to assessee : S. 244A(2) not attracted : Assessee entitled to interest u/s.244A.

New Page 1

Reported :


27. Refund : Interest
u/s.244A of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2001-02 : TDS certificates submitted
during assessment proceedings : Delay on refund not attributable to assessee :
S. 244A(2) not attracted : Assessee entitled to interest u/s.244A.

[CIT v. Larsen & Toubro
Ltd.,
235 CTR 108 (Bom.)]

For the A.Y. 2001-02, the
assessment was completed by an order dated 31-3-2003 passed u/s. 143(3) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961. TDS certificates were filed in the course of the
assessment proceedings. Interest u/s.244A was denied on the ground that the TDS
certificates were not furnished with the return of income. The Tribunal found
that tax was deducted and deposited in the exchequer in time and that the
proceedings resulting in refund, has not been delayed for reasons attributable
to assessee. The Tribunal accordingly directed the Assessing Officer to pay
interest u/s. 244A for the period from
1-4-2001 to the date of refund.

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held
as under :

“(i) S. 244A(2) provides
that in the event the proceedings resulting in refund has been delayed for
reasons attributable to the assessee, the period of delay so attributable
shall be exclude from the period for which the interest is payable. In the
present case, S. 244A(2) is clearly not attracted. The proceedings resulting
in the refund was not delayed for reasons attributable to the assessee.

(ii) Though the TDS
certificates were not submitted with the return and were filed during the
course of the assessment proceedings, the Tribunal has noted that tax was in
fact deducted at source at the right time. In the circumstances, the Tribunal
was correct in holding that since the benefit of TDS has been allowed to the
assessee, interest u/s. 244A could not be denied only on the ground that the
TDS certificates were not furnished with the return of income. Tax was
deducted and deposited in the exchequer in time.

(iii) S. 244A(2) is not
attracted. The appeal, therefore, does not raise any substantial question of
law and is dismissed.”

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Tax Deduction at Source u/s.195

Controversies

1. Issue for consideration :


1.1 S. 195 of the Income-tax Act provides for tax deduction
at source from payment of interest or any other sum chargeable under the
provisions of the Income-tax Act (other than salaries or dividend specified in
S190) to a non-resident or a foreign company at the prescribed time at the rates
in force.

1.2 U/s.195(2), where the payer considers that the whole of
such sum so payable to a non-resident would not be income chargeable of the
recipient, he can make an application to the Assessing Officer to determine the
appropriate proportion of such sum chargeable to tax, and thereupon shall deduct
tax u/s.195(1) only on that proportion of the sum chargeable to tax. Similarly,
sections 195(3) and 197 provide for the payee making an application to the
Assessing Officer for issue of a certificate that income-tax may be deducted at
lower rates of tax or not deducted on payment to be received by him, where such
lower rate or non-deduction is justified.

1.3 The issue has arisen before the courts as to whether, in
a case where the payment to the non-resident or a foreign company does not
comprise any income chargeable to tax in India at all (for example, in case of
payment for purchase of goods imported from the non-resident), whether the payer
has necessarily to apply to the tax authorities for a certificate u/s.195(2) or
whether the payment can be made to such non-resident or foreign company without
any deduction of tax at source, and without obtaining any such certificate
u/s.195(2) or u/s.195(3) or u/s.197.

1.4 While the Karnataka High Court has taken the view that it
is mandatory to obtain such a certificate from the tax authorities, the Delhi
High Court has taken a contrary view that in such cases, the payer can make the
payment without the need for such certificate.

2. Samsung Electronics’ case :


2.1 The issue came up before the Karnataka High Court in the
case of CIT v. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd., 320 ITR 209. Various other appeals
of different resident payers were also decided vide this judgment.

2.2 In this case, the assessee payer was a branch of a Korean
company engaged in the development, manufacture and export of software for use
by its parent company. The software developed by it was for in-house use by the
parent company. During the relevant years, the assessee imported ready-made
software products from US and French companies for its own use. It did not
deduct tax at source from payments made to the US and French companies on the
ground that the payment to the foreign companies was for purchase of products,
and was not in the nature of royalty, and was not chargeable to tax in India.

2.3 The Assessing Officer held that the payment was in the
nature of royalty, that the assessee was bound to deduct tax at source on the
payments, and accordingly treated the assessee as an assessee in default
u/s.201(1), and also levied interest u/s.201(1A). The Commissioner (Appeals)
dismissed the assessee’s appeals against this order.

2.4 The Tribunal held that the payment was not in the nature
of royalty in terms of the relevant provisions of the Double Taxation Avoidance
Agreements. It also held that it was not incumbent on the assessee to deduct any
amount u/s.195.

2.5 Before the Karnataka High Court, it was argued on behalf
of the Department that the payment was in the nature of royalty on which tax was
required to be deducted at source u/s.195. It was argued that the transaction
was a licence and was therefore in the nature of royalty. It was further claimed
that the assessee was bound to deduct tax u/s.195 and that it could not contend
that it was not the income of the recipient. Reliance was placed on the decision
of the Supreme Court in the case of Transmission Corporation of A.P. Ltd. v.
CIT, 239 ITR 587.

2.6 It was argued by the assessee that the nature of payment
was not royalty even u/s.9(1)(vi), on account of the fact that the non-resident
supplier had merely sold a copyrighted article and not the copyright itself,
relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Tata Consultancy
Services v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 271 ITR 401. It was therefore claimed that
the payment was for purchase of articles/goods in connection with the business
carried on by the assessee. It was further claimed that under the Double
Taxation Avoidance Agreements, since the non-resident recipients had no
permanent establishments in India, the entire income of the non-residents
attributable to the payments was not taxable in India. It was therefore claimed
that there was no obligation on the part of the payer to deduct any amount.

2.7 It was also contended by the other assessees that there
was no obligation on their part to deduct any amount from the payments, as they
were fully and bona fide satisfied that the amount was not taxable in the hands
of the non-resident in India. They had therefore not chosen to apply for any
relief or concession in terms of S. 195(2) and (3). It was further argued that
the words used in S. 195 are ‘chargeable to tax’ and hence a person deducting
tax u/s.195 would have to necessarily first see whether the same was chargeable
to tax and then only, if it was so chargeable, he was to deduct tax. It was
contended that if a person was not liable to be charged to tax, then the payer
could not be held to be a person in default u/s.201.

2.8 The Karnataka High Court considered the decision of the
Supreme Court in Transmission Corporation of AP’s case (supra) and of the
Calcutta High Court in P. C. Ray & Co. (India) Private Limited v. ITO, 36 ITR
365, wherein the Calcutta High Court had held that if the term ‘chargeable under
the provisions of this Act’ means actually liable to be assessed to tax, in
other words, if the sum contemplated was taxable income, a difficulty is
undoubtedly created as to complying with the provisions of the Section.’ The
High Court in that case had held that what was contemplated was not merely
amounts, the whole of which were taxable without deduction, but amounts of a
mixed composition, a part of which only might turn out to be taxable income as
well; and the disbursements, which were of the nature of gross revenue receipts,
were yet sums chargeable under the provisions of the Income-tax Act and came
within the ambit of the Section.

2.9 The Karnataka High Court therefore rejected the arguments
of the assessees that the expression ‘any other sum chargeable under the
provisions of this Act’ would not include cases where any sum payable to
non-resident was trading receipts, which may or may not include ‘pure income’.
According to the Karnataka High Court, the language of S. 195(1) was clear and
unambiguous and cast an obligation to deduct appropriate tax at the rates in
force.

2.10 The Karnataka High Court observed that S. 195 was not a charging Section, nor a Section providing for determination of the tax liability of the non-resident receiving the payments from the resident. The amount deducted by the resident was only a provisional tentative amount, which was kept as a buffer for adjusting this amount against the possible tax liability of the non-resident. Deduction of the amount u/s.195 was not the same as determination of the liability of the non-resident, who may be or may not be liable to pay any tax. Determination of tax liability could only be on the basis of the return of income filed by the non-resident. According to the Karnataka High Court, the only scope and manner of reducing the obligation for deduction imposed on a resident payer in terms of S. 195(1) was by the method of invoking the procedure u/s.195(2) of making an application to the Assessing Officer to determine by general or special order the appropriate proportion of such sum so chargeable, and upon such determination alone, being allowed the liberty of deducting the proportionate sum so chargeable to tax to fulfil the obligations u/s.195(1).

2.11 The Karnataka High Court therefore held that in the absence of an application u/s.195(2), the payer was obliged to deduct tax at source u/s. 195(1), even though the payment did not contain any element of income of the non-resident chargeable to tax in India.

    Van Oord’s case :

3.1 The issue again recently came up before the Delhi High Court in the case of Van Oord ACZ India (P) Ltd. v. CIT, (unreported — ITA No. 439 of 2008 dated 15th March 2010, available on www.itatonline.org).

3.2 In this case, the assessee was an Indian subsidiary of a Netherlands company, and was engaged in the business of dredging, contracting, reclamation and marine activities. During the relevant year, the assessee reimbursed mobilisation and demo-bilisation cost to its parent company. This cost related essentially to transportation of dredger, survey equipment and other plant and machinery from countries outside India to the site in India and the transportation of such plant and machinery on com-pletion of the contract, including fuel cost incurred on transportation. These services were contacted by the parent company and were provided by vari-ous non-resident entities. The assessee reimbursed such cost to the parent company on the basis of invoices received by the parent company from the non-resident entities.

3.3 The assessee filed an application to the As-sessing Officer for issue of nil tax withholding certificate in respect of reimbursement of various costs to the parent company. The Assessing Officer issued a certificate of deduction of tax at source at 11%, and the assessee deducted tax at source accordingly on Rs.6.98 crore. In the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer disallowed payments of Rs.8.66 crore made to the parent company u/s.40(a) (i), on the ground that the assessee had defaulted in deducting tax at source u/s.195.

3.4 The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the disal-lowance made by the Assessing Officer. The Tribu-nal confirmed the addition, stating that the asses-see was mandatorily liable to deduct tax at source u/s.195, and that it was not necessary to determine whether such payment was chargeable to tax in In-dia in the hands of the non-resident. The Tribunal further held that the assessee was a dependent agent permanent establishment of the parent foreign company and therefore the reimbursement of expenses to the foreign parent company was to be subjected to tax.

3.5 Before the Delhi High Court, it was argued on behalf of the assessee that the amount reimbursed to the parent company was not chargeable to tax in India in the hands of the parent company, and that the assessee was consequently not liable to deduct tax at source u/s.195. It was argued that the obligation to deduct tax at source u/s.195 was predicated on the condition that tax was payable by the non-resident on the payments received by it, and once it was established that no such tax was payable by the non-resident, the assessee could not be treated to be in breach of its obligations.

3.6 It was pointed out that the reason for fastening the obligation to deduct tax at source of the payment to non-resident only in a situation where such payment was chargeable to tax in India was that it was not the intention of the law to fasten an absolute liability on the remitter to deduct tax at source from the payment to the non-resident, and then subject the non-resident to the rigorous process of filing return and seeking refund and assessment on the basis of such return. Where the remitter was of the opinion that some part of the income may be chargeable to tax in India, the remitter could approach the Assessing Officer to determine the ap-propriate portion of the income that would be sub-ject to tax in India and the rate on which tax was to be deducted at source. Reliance was placed on the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Transmission Corporation of AP Ltd. (supra) and various other cases for the proposition that the obligation to deduct tax at source is triggered only when the payment to be made to the non-resident is chargeable to tax in India in the hands of the non-resident recipient.

3.7 On behalf of the Department, it was argued that S. 195 only determines the proportion of liability and presupposes the existence of liability. It was pointed out that the assessee itself had applied for determination of extent of liability. The statutory obligation of the assessee with regard to deduct tax at source was fully crystallised, and therefore there was no justification on the part of the assessee not to deduct tax at source, particularly when the order passed u/s.195(2) had attained finality.

3.8 The Delhi High Court noted that the issue before the Supreme Court in the case of Transmission Corporation of AP (supra) was whether tax at source was to be deducted by the payee on the entire amount paid by it to the recipient or whether it was to be deducted only on the component of pure income profits. It was therefore in the context of whether tax deductible was to be on the gross sum of trading receipts paid to non-residents or whether only on the income component. It was in that context that the Supreme Court held that “any other sum chargeable under the provision of this Act” would include the entire amount paid by the assessee to non-residents. The observations of the Supreme Court therefore needed to be read in that context. The Delhi High Court noted that the Su-preme Court was not concerned in that case with a situation where no tax in the hands of the recipient was payable at all. The Delhi High Court noted that certain observations in the judgment clearly depicted the mind of the Supreme Court that liability to deduct tax at source arose only when the sum paid to the non-resident was chargeable to tax. Once that is chargeable to tax, it was not for the assessee to find out how much of the amount of the receipts was chargeable to tax, but it was its obligation to deduct tax at source on the entire sum paid by the assessee to the recipient.

3.9 The Delhi High Court relied on certain other decisions of the High Courts, including that of the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT v. Estel Communications (P) Ltd., 217 CTR 102 and the Karnataka High Court in the case of Jindal Thermal Power Company Limited v. Dy. CIT, 182 Taxman 252, where Courts had taken the view that there was no obligation to deduct tax at source since there was no tax liabil-ity of the non-resident in India. The Delhi High Court noted the decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Samsung Electronic Co. Ltd. (supra), and observed that the context in that case was different. The Delhi High Court expressed its disagreement with some of the observations made in that judgment of the Karnataka High Court.

3.10 The Delhi High Court therefore held that the obligation to deduct tax at source arises only when the payment was chargeable under the provisions of the Income-tax Act. The Delhi High Court noted that in the case before it, the income-tax authorities had accepted that the foreign company was not liable to pay any tax in India by accepting the foreign company’s tax return u/s.143(1) and refunding the tax deducted at source. Therefore, the assessee could not be regarded as having defaulted in deduction of TDS u/s.195.

    Observations :

4.1 This issue was also again very recently considered by the Special Bench of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal at Chennai, in the case of ITO v. Prasad Production Ltd., (ITA No. 663/Mds/2003, dated 9th April 2010 — unreported, available on www.itatonline.org).

4.2 The Tribunal in this case considered the decision of the Karnataka High Court in Samsung’s case (supra) as well as that of the Supreme Court in the case of Transmission Corporation of AP (supra). The Tribunal noted that both the Department as well as the assessee were relying upon the Supreme Court decision in the case of Transmission Corporation of AP. It therefore focussed on the observations in that judgment. It noted the provisions of the follow-ing paragraph on page 588 :

“The consideration would be — whether payment of the sum to the non-resident is chargeable to tax under the provisions of the Act or not ? That sum may be income or income hidden or otherwise embedded therein. If so, tax is required to be deducted on the said sum, what would be the income is to be computed on the basis of various provisions of the Act including provisions for computation of the business income, if the payment is a trade receipt. However, what is to be deducted is income-tax pay-able thereon at the rates in force. Under the Act, total income for the previous year would become chargeable to tax u/s.4. Ss.(2) of S. 4, inter alia, provides that in respect of income chargeable U/ss.(1), income-tax shall be deducted at source where it is so deductible under any provision of the Act. If the sum that is to be paid to the non-resident is charge-able to tax, tax is required to be deducted.”

4.3 The Tribunal also noted the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Eli Lilly & Co., 312 ITR 225, as under :

“To answer the contention herein we need to examine briefly the scheme of the 1961 Act. S. 4 is the charging Section. U/s.4(1), total income for the previous year is chargeable to tax. S. 4(2), inter alia, provides that in respect of income chargeable U/ss.(1), income-tax shall be deducted at source whether it is so deductible under any provision of the 1961 Act which, inter alia, brings in the TDS provisions contained in Chapter XVII-B. In fact, if a particular income falls outside S. 4(1), then the TDS provisions cannot come in.”

4.4 From these two decisions of the Supreme Court, the Tribunal concluded that it was abundantly clear that the charging provisions could not be divorced from the TDS provisions, and that S. 195 would be applicable only if the payment made to the non-resident was chargeable to tax.

4.5 The Tribunal also noted the material difference between the provisions of Ss.(2) and Ss.(3) of S. 195. U/ss.(2), the payer made the application for deduction of tax at lower rates. U/ss.(3), the payee could make an application for deduction of tax at lower rate or without deduction of tax. According to the Tribunal, the reason for such difference was that where the payer had a bona fide belief that no part of the payment bore income character, S. 195(1) itself would be inapplicable and hence there would be no question of going into the procedure prescribed in S. 195(2). Ss.(3) deals with a situation where the payer wants to deduct tax from the payment, but the payee believed that he was not chargeable to tax in respect of that payment. Hence the payee was given an opportunity to seek approv-al of the Assessing Officer to receive the payment without deduction of tax.

4.6 The Tribunal interestingly observed that by deciding whether the payment bore any income character or not, the payer was not determining the tax liability of the total income of the payee, but merely considering the chargeability in respect of the payment that he was making to the payee.

4.7 The tribunal also considered the fact that for the purposes of remittances to non-residents, a chartered accountant’s certificate was prescribed as an alternative to the procedure u/s.195(2). This was evident from the CBDT Circular 767, dated 22-5-1998. It noted that the certification covered all types of payment, whether purely capital or revenue in nature, but exempt either under the act or the relevant Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement or payments bearing pure income character. The Tribunal held that the new format of the CA certificate clearly established the legal position of S. 195 that the payer need not undergo the procedure of S. 195 at all if he was of the bona fide belief that no part of the payment was chargeable to tax in India.

4.8 The Tribunal therefore held that if the asses-see had not applied to the Assessing Officer u/s. 195(2) for deduction of tax at a lower or nil rate of tax under a bona fide belief that no part of the payment made to the non-resident was chargeable to tax, then he was not under any statutory obligation to deduct tax at source on any part of the payment.

4.9 When one looks at the provisions of S. 195(1), the language is clear that it applies only to income chargeable to tax, and not to other items at all. As analysed by the Special Bench of the Tribunal, the Karnataka High Court seems to have misapplied the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Transmission Corporation of AP. The better view seems to be that of the Delhi High Court and that of the Special Bench of the Tribunal that if the income is not chargeable to tax in India in the hands of the non-resident recipient, the payer need not obtain a certificate u/s.195(2) for not deducting tax at source.

4.10 In any case, an appeal to the Supreme Court against the decision of the Karnataka High Court has been admitted by the Supreme Court and has been fixed for hearing on 18th August 2010, on which date one hopes that this controversy will ultimately be laid to rest.

Reopening of a completed assessment

1. Issue for consideration :

    1.1 S. 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 permits reassessment of income, where the Assessing Officer has reason to believe that any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for any assessment year so however no reassessment will ensue where there was no failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly the material facts necessary for assessment. No reopening is possible once it is shown that a mind is applied by the AO to the facts of the case unless the reopening is sought to be made in consequence of the possession of information obtained subsequent to an assessment.

    1.2 Very often substantial details are collected and inquiries are made by the AO but assessment orders are passed without reference to such details and inquiries, allowing a deduction or exemption. The factual question that arises in such cases is whether there has been an application of mind by the Assessing Officer during the assessment proceedings to the issue involved, and whether the deduction, exemption or non-taxation was after due deliberation, in which case reassessment proceedings cannot be initiated. The issue gets added dimensions where the assessee is able to show that he has filed details in response to the AO’s inquiry but the AO claims that he had not noticed the same in the myriad of details furnished with him.

    1.3 The issues that have arisen before the courts in such cases are whether, in a case where a regular order of assessment is passed u/s.143(3) without much discussion on a particular issue, there was an application of mind by the Assessing Officer; whether there was disclosure of material facts by the assessee and whether permitting reopening in such cases would amount to giving premium to an authority exercising quasi-judicial function to take benefit of its own wrong. While the full bench of the Delhi High Court has taken the view that no reassessment proceedings are permissible in such cases, the division bench of the Allahabad High Court, recently, has taken a contrary view.

2. Kelvinator’s case :

    2.1 The issue came up before the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT v. Kelvinator of India Ltd., 256 ITR 1.

    2.2 In this case, the assessment of the assessee was completed u/s.143(3). Subsequently, it was noticed by the Assessing Officer that as indicated in the accounts and tax audit report, certain prior period expenditure and certain disallowable expenditure had been wrongly allowed as deductions. He therefore issued a notice for reassessment u/s.147.

    2.3 The assessee challenged the reassessment proceedings in appeal. The Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the assessee’s appeal holding that the assessee had disclosed all the facts, that no new fact or material was available with the Assessing Officer, and that it was a mere change of opinion on the part of the Assessing Officer. The Tribunal upheld the order of the Commissioner (Appeals).

    2.4 Before the Delhi High Court, on behalf of the department, it was argued that the change of opinion was relevant only for the purposes of clause (b) of S. 147, and that initiation of reassessment proceedings was permissible when it was found that the Assessing Officer had passed an order of assessment without any application of mind. According to the department, such application of mind could be found out from the order of assessment itself inasmuch as, if the order of assessment did not contain any discussion on the particular issue, the same may be held to have been rendered without any application of mind.

    2.5 On behalf of the assessee, it was argued before the Delhi High Court that the expression ‘reason to believe’ contained in S. 147 denoted that the reassessment must be based on a change of fact or subsequent information or new law. According to the assessee, income escaping assessment must be founded upon or in consequence of any information which must come into the possession of the Assessing Officer after completion of the original assessment.

    2.6 The Delhi High Court, after considering the various decisions cited before it, observed that it was not in dispute that the Assessing Officer did not have the jurisdiction to review his own order. His jurisdiction was confined only to rectification of mistakes as contained in S. 154. The power of rectification of mistakes could be exercised only when the mistake was apparent, and a mistake could not be rectified where it was a mere possible view or where the issues were debatable. Thus, where the Assessing Officer had considered the matter in detail and the view taken was a possible view, the order could not be changed by way of exercising the jurisdiction of rectification of mistake.

    2.7 The Delhi High Court further noted that it was a well settled principle of law that what could not be done directly could not be done indirectly. If the Assessing Officer did not have the power of review, he could not be permitted to achieve the object by taking recourse to initiating a proceeding of reassessment.

    2.8 According to the Delhi High Court, when a regular order of assessment is passed in terms of S. 143(3), a presumption can be raised that such an order has been passed on application of mind. In terms of S. 114(e) of the Indian Evidence Act, judicial and official acts are presumed to have been regularly performed. If it be held that an order which has been passed purportedly without application of mind would itself confer jurisdiction upon the Assessing Officer to reopen the proceeding without anything further, this would amount to giving a premium to an authority exercising quasi-judicial function to take benefit of its own wrong.

    2.9 The Delhi High Court therefore held that since the material was before the Assessing Officer at the time of assessment, the reassessment proceedings were invalid.

3. EMA India’s case :

    3.1 The issue again recently came up before the full bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of EMA India Ltd. v. ACIT, (unreported — copy of order available on www.itatonline.org).

    3.2 In this case also, the assessment proceedings were completed u/s.143(3), and reassessment proceedings were initiated u/s.147 to disallow prior period expenditure and to tax certain interest which were disclosed in the balance sheet, profit and loss account, tax audit report, and other documents submitted before the Assessing Officer in the earlier proceedings.

3.3 The assessee challenged the reassessment proceedings in a writ petition before the High Court. Before the Allahabad High Court, it was submitted on behalf of the assessee that the initiation of proceedings and issue of notice were based on mere change of opinion and were totally without jurisdiction. It was submitted that the action of the Assessing Officer amounted to review of the earlier assessment order, and that even though the Assessing Officer had noticed such items, he did not assess these items nor add the same to the income during the assessment proceedings. Reliance was placed by the assessee on the full bench decision of the Delhi High Court in Kelvinator’s case (supra).

3.4 On behalf of the department, it was submitted that the initiation of reassessment proceedings was permissible when it was found that certain items of income, though chargeable to tax, had escaped the notice of the Assessing Officer, and no discussion of chargeability to tax of such items of income was made in the assessment order.

3.5 According to the Allahabad High Court, where the assessment order had been passed and certain items of income are not at all discussed and it escaped the notice of the assessing Officer as a result of which the reassessment proceedings were initiated in respect of those items of income, in the circumstances it could not be said that it would amount to review. Since the Assessing Officer did not form any view or any opinion with regard to the items of income which escaped its notice in the original assessment order, it would not amount to review of the order or change of opinion. According to the Allahabad High Court, there could be no change of opinion when no opinion was formed by the Assessing Officer.

3.6 The Allahabad High Court was of review that initiation of reassessment proceedings was permissible where it was found that the Assessing Officer had passed an order of assessment without any application of mind and such application of mind could be found out from the order of assessment itself, inasmuch as, in the event the order of assessment did not contain any discussion on a particular issue, the same may be held to have been rendered without any application of mind. According to the Allahabad High Court, in view of Explanation 1 to S. 147, mere production of account books or other evidence from which material evidence could, with due diligence have been discovered by the assessing authority would not necessarily amount to disclosure. This aspect, according to the Allahabad High Court, had not been considered by the Delhi High Court in Kelvinator’s case.

3.7 The Allahabad High Court therefore held that the reassessment proceedings were valid.

Observations:

4.1 Some controversies do not lead to ‘closements’ soon. The issue being discussed here is an example of one such controversy. Even the attempt in the proposed Direct Tax Code for resolving the controversy in favour of smooth reopening will surely raise new controversies. The issue is fiercely con-tested by the tax payers, in spite of amendments, as they perceive the whole exercise of reassessment as unjust weilding of power by those in the power. One finds a lot of merit in this when one notices the ease with which completed cases are sought to be reopened in large numbers.

4.2 The sting is acutely painful in cases where the reopening is made after expiry of four years, in spite of the fact that there is no failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly the material facts necessary for assessment. Even in such cases the reopening is sought to be justified on the pretext that the AO had not applied his mind to the material disclosed, though it was produced. The action is sought to be explained by resorting to Explanation 1 to S. 147 and in many cases by relying on Explanation 2 to the said section.

4.3 Fortunately for the tax payers the courts have, by and large, frustrated such attempts of the Revenue in cases where disclosure is found to be evident and also in cases where the material has been furnished in response to an inquiry by the AO. The courts have not given great credence to the Revenue’s contention, often made, that the assessment order is silent on the relevant aspect under contest. The courts have advanced the cause of the tax payers even in cases involving reopening within four years on being convinced that material facts necessary for assessment were disclosed. The courts have also taken a unanimous view that the amendments of 1989 have not materially altered the available law on the subject and that a change of opinion can not lead to a valid reopening even post 1989.

4.4 The Courts have been consistent in holding that the law does not permit a review of an order, not even in the name of reassessment. A thing which can not be done directly can certainly not be done indirectly by resorting to the provisions of re-assessment. It is this principle that has been reiterated by the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court by stating that permitting an AO to reopen a completed case in given circumstances amounted to giving a premium to an authority exercising quasi-judicial function to take benefit of its own wrong.

4.5 Whether this position stated in paragraph 4.4 has been changed by insertion of Explanation 1 and 2. The Courts do not think so. Even after the said insertion the courts are more or less consistent, in holding that a change of opinion can not lead to reopening of a completed assessment and further that in cases where the assessee has not failed in disclosing truly and fully the material facts necessary for assessment, reopening is not possible irrespective of the time of reopening.

4.6 The Punjab & Haryana High Court, in the case of Hari Iron Trading Co. v. CIT, 263 ITR 437, observed that the taxpayer had no control over the actions of an AO and that he was not in a position to direct the framing of an order in a manner that would record fully and truly all that had actually transpired during the course of assessment and in such circumstances it was appropriate to assume that the order had been passed with due diligence unless it was otherwise proved by the AO. It is normally seen that an assessment order rarely records the findings of the inquiry by AO where he is satisfied with the assessee’s explanation furnished in response to his inquiry.

4.7 The Bombay High Court, consistently follow-ing the full bench decision of the Delhi High Court, has held that once an assessment order is passed u/s.143(3) and the assessee has not been found to have failed in disclosing material facts, no reopening was sustainable. Asian Paints Ltd. v. DCIT & Ors., 308 ITR 195, Idea Cellular Ltd. v. DCIT, 301 ITR 407 and GT v. Eicher Ltd., 294 ITR 310. The same is the ratio of the decisions of several High Courts and Tribunals including the latest one by the Tribunal in the case of Vardhman Industries, ITA No. 501/ Jd/2008 dated 14-9-2009 wherein the jodhpur Bench held that even within four years it was not possible to reopen an assessment where the material facts were found to have been disclosed by the assessee. It appears that in all cases of assessments completed after scrutiny, a reopening can follow only on the basis of an information received subsequent to assessment.

4.8 Even the Allahabad High Court in the case of Foramer v. CIT & Ors., 247 ITR 436 had held that no reopening was possible on a mere change of opinion in cases where there was no failure to disclose material facts by an assessee, a decision which was later on approved by the Supreme Court. Had this decision been noted by the court in EVA’s case, the outcome could have been different. It is interesting to note that the full bench of the Delhi High Court in coming to the conclusion in assessee’s favour had concurred with the abovementioned decision of the Allahabad High Court in Foramer’s case.

4.9 The twin decisions of the Gujarat High Court in the cases of Praful Chunilal Patel, 236 ITR 732 and Garden Silk Mills, 237 ITR 668, heavily relied upon by the Allahabad High Court in EVA’s case, were not even followed by the same Gujarat high court and importantly the full bench in Kelvinator’s case had specifically dissented from these decisions of the Gujarat High Court. Like Delhi, the Bombay High Court has refused to follow the said decisions of the Gujarat High Court.

4.10 CBDT Circular No. 549 dated 31-10-1989, while explaining the implication of the scheme of reassessment, specifically clarified vide para 7.2, that the new scheme does not bring about a material change in the existing law providing that no reopening would sustain in cases of change of opinion not involving any failure on the part of the assessee to disclose material facts. It is this circular which has helped information of a definitive judicial consen-sus in the era after amendment of 1989. It is need-less to note that the circulars of the Board are binding on its officers in administering the provisions of the Income-tax Act.

4.11 S. 114 of the Indian  Evidence  Act vide clause provides that due care has been taken by a public officer in performing his duty. Therefore on completion of assessment, it can be presumed that the AO has examined the material produced before him. Frankly, Explanation 1 is an unintended but serious reflection on the state of affairs in the Revenue department, indicating that orders as a rule are passed without due diligence, unless otherwise proved.

4.12 Article 14 has been favourably relied upon by the courts to support the contention that permitting an AO to review his order results in violation of the Constitution which guarantees protection against such administrative actions of the executive.

4.13 A point which emerges from the controversy is that the issue is debatable, and the language adopted by the law is capable of two interpretations. If that is so, a view that is favourable to the assessee should be accepted.

4.14 The decision of the Supreme Court, in the case of Indian Newspaper, relied upon by the Allahabad high court in EVA’s case, clearly supported the view that the reopening of an assessment was not possible for reviewing an order.

4.15 The decision in Kelvinator’s case was delivered by the full bench of the high court. The law of precedent required that the division bench of the high court, of two judges, in EVA’s case should have followed the decision of a larger bench instead of following decisions which were specifically dissented by the full bench. The decision in the case of Shyam Bansal, 296 ITR 95 (All.), again relied upon in EVA’s case did not consider the decision of the full bench and in any case the Revenue in that case was in possession of some information obtained post assessment. The binding force of the decision of the full bench in Kelvinator’s case was specifically considered in the case of KLM Royal Dutch Airlines 292 ITR 49 (Delhi) wherein the Court, in the context of the very same issue, had considered the validity of a decision delivered by the division bench in the case of Consolidated Photo and Finvest Ltd. 281 ITR 394 (Del.) wherein the division bench had failed to follow the decision of the full bench in Kelvinator’s case. The Court in KLM Royal Dutch Airlines’ case held that the decision of the full bench in Kelvinator’s case had to be followed by the division bench of the Court. This position in law of precedent has been reiterated by the Bombay High Court in the case of Eicher Ltd., 294 ITR 310.

PF Payments u/s.43B —Retrospectivity of Amendment

1. Issue for Consideration :

    1.1 S.43B of the Income-tax Act provides that certain expenditures, which would otherwise have been allowable as deductions in computing the total income under the Income-tax Act, shall be allowed as deduction only in the year of actual payment of such items by the assessee notwithstanding the method of accounting followed by the assessee. These expenditures are listed in clauses (a) to (f) of the said Section Clause (b) of the said Section refers to the sums payable by an employer by way of contribution to any Provident Fund, Superannuation Fund, Gratuity Fund, or any other fund for the welfare of employees (‘welfare dues’). Accordingly, the deduction of welfare dues is allowed only where payment of such expenditure is actually made.

    1.2 Till assessment year 2003-04, the second proviso to S.43B provided that no deduction of welfare dues covered by the said clause (b) would be allowed unless such sum had actually been paid on or before the due date as defined in the Explanation to S.36(1)(va), i.e., the due date for payment of such welfare dues under the relevant applicable law. From assessment year 2004-05, the second proviso to S.43B has been omitted, and welfare dues covered by clause (b) were brought into the purview of the first proviso, which provides that the disallowance would not operate if the sums are paid on or before the due date of filing of the Income-tax return of the year in which the liability to pay such sum was incurred, and proof of such payment was furnished along with the return.

    1.3 A dispute has arisen as to whether this amendment was applicable to all pending matters, and therefore applied retrospectively, or whether it applied prospectively from assessment year 2004-05 onwards. While the Bombay High Court has held that the amendment would apply prospectively, the Delhi and Madras High Courts have taken the view that the amendment applied retrospectively.

2. Godaveri (Mannar) Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana’s case :

    2.1 The issue came up before the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs. Godaveri (Mannar) Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd. 298 ITR 149.

    2.2 In this case, pertaining to assessment years 1991-92 and 1994-95, the assessee had made payments of provident fund dues before the due date of filing of its return of income, but beyond the due date stipulated under the Provident Fund Act. The amounts had been disallowed by the Assessing Officer, but the assessee’s appeal against such disallowance had been allowed by the Commissioner (Appeals). The Tribunal had also upheld the order of the Commissioner (Appeals).

    2.3 Before the Bombay High Court, it was argued on behalf of the Revenue that the deletion of the second proviso to S.43B with effect from 1st April 2004 only meant that the relaxation in S.43B, insofar as employer’s contribution was concerned, would be governed by the first proviso to S.43B from 1st April 2004 only.

    2.4 On behalf of the assessee, it was submitted that the amendment was curative and was resorted to for the purpose of removing the hardship caused by the second proviso. A similar amendment had been made in relation to clause (a) relating to tax, duty, cess and fees earlier, and in relation to such amendment, the Supreme Court, in the case of Allied Motors (P) Ltd. vs. CIT 224 ITR 677, had held the amendment to be curative and retrospective. It was argued that the proviso which was inserted to remedy the unintended consequences and to make the provision workable, the proviso which supplied an obvious omission in the Section and was required to be read into the Section to give the Section a reasonable interpretation, was required to be treated as retrospective in operation, so that a reasonable interpretation could be given to the Section as a whole.

    2.5 The Bombay High Court went through the history of S.43B and the amendments carried out to it from time to time. It analysed the decision of the Supreme Court in Allied Motors case. It noted that when the two provisos to S.43 B were added, payments under clause (b) and payments under other clauses of S.43B were treated as two different classes. The Finance Act, 1989 substituted the second proviso, noting certain hardships that were being occasioned by the operation of that proviso. The Bombay High Court noted that, in its wisdom, the Parliament chose not to delete the second proviso but substituted it, and therefore intended that S.43B(b) should be treated as a class by itself distinct from the other sub-Sections. The second proviso was omitted based on the recommendations of the Kelkar Committee Report, which responded to representation by trade and industry that the delayed payment of statutory liability related to labour should be accorded the same treatment as the delayed payment of taxes and interest.

    2.6 The Bombay High Court noted the decision of the Madras High Court in CIT vs. Synergy Financial Exchange Ltd., 288 ITR 366, where the Madras High Court held that the amendment was not retrospective, on the basis that fiscal legislation imposing liability is generally governed by normal presumption that it is not retrospective and that in interpreting the statute, the Courts, in the first instance, have to consider the plain written language of the statute. If on so reading, it is not possible to give effect to the intent of the Parliament, then the Courts resort to purposeful interpretation to give effect to that intent. The Bombay High Court also (inadvertently) noted the decision of the Assam High Court in George Williamson (Assam) Ltd. vs. CIT, 284 ITR 619 as rejecting the contention that the amendment should be read as retrospective, though the Assam High Court in that case upheld the contention of the assessee for allowing deduction for the payments on or before the due date of filing of the return of income.

2.7 The Bombay High Court noted that the amendment was made applicable from the assessment year 2004-05. It observed that in interpreting statutory provisions, the Court also considered the mischief rule, namely, what was the state of law before the act or the amendment, and what was the mischief that the Act or the amendment sought to avoid. From the normal aids to construction, the Court observed that the only mischief that the amendment if at all sought to obviate was the need to eliminate the procedural complexities, reduce paperwork, simplify tax administration and to enhance efficiency and also integrate such tax proposals as the system could at present absorb, and acceptance of the representations made by trade and industry that they should not be denied the benefit of deductions on account of delayed payment of taxes and interest.

2.8 According to the Bombay High Court, the law as it stood earlier was that in relation to the employer’s contribution to provident fund, if it was not paid within the due date, was not eligible for deduction. According to the High Court, this position had been remedied, and the remedial measure had been made applicable from assessment year 2004-05. The Bombay High Court therefore took the view that it could not be said that the amendment was retrospective.

2.9 Subsequent to this decision of the Bombay High Court, the decision of the Assam High Court in George Williamson’s case went up to the Supreme Court in a special leave petition as CIT vs. Vinay Cement Ltd. 213 CTR 268. In a short five-line order, the Supreme Court noted that they were concerned with the law as it stood prior to the amendment of Section 43 B, that in the circumstances the assessee was entitled to claim the benefit under Section 43 B for that period, particularly in view of the fact that he had contributed to Provident Fund before filing of the return, and dismissed the special leave petition.

2.10 Subsequent to this decision of the Supreme Court, the matter again came up before the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs. Pamwi Tissues Ltd. 215 CTR 150, relating to assessment year 1990-91.In this case, when the attention of the Bombay High Court was drawn to the dismissal of the special leave petition by the Supreme Court in Vinay Cement’s case, it observed that the dismissal of the special leave petition by the Supreme Court cannot be said to be the law decided. According to the Bombay High Court, for a judgment to be a precedent, it must contain the three basic postulates – a finding of material facts, direct and inferential, statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts, and judgment based on the individual effect of the above. The Bombay High Court therefore followed its earlier decision in the case of Godaveri (Mannar) Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana, holding that Provident Fund payment made after the due date under the PF Act but before the due date of filing of the return of income, were not allowable.

3. Nexus Computer’s    case:

3.1 The issue again recently came up before the Madras High Court in the case of CIT vs. Nexus Computer (P) Ltd., 177 Taxman 202.

3.2 In this case pertaining to assessment year 2000-01, the attention of the Madras High Court was drawn by the Revenue to its earlier decision in the case of Synergy Financial Exchange (Supra), wherein it had held that the amendment was not retrospective, and by the assessee, to the decision of the Assam High Court in George Williamson’s case and the dismissal of the special leave petition by the Supreme Court in Vinay Cement’s case.

3.3 The Madras High  Court in that  case (Nexus Computers)noted that the order of the Supreme Court in Vinay Cement’s case was a speaking order, which gave reasons for rejecting the special leave petition, and that the reasoning given in the dismissal of the special leave petition in that case would be binding on it as the law declared by the Apex Court under article 141 of the Constitution. Therefore, the Madras High Court held that the Provident Fund payments would be allowable under Section 43 B.

3.4 The issue also came up before the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Dharmendra Sharma, 297 ITR 320, in relation to assessment year 2001-02, and in CIT vs. P.M. Electronics Ltd., 177 Taxman 1. The Delhi High Court took note of the decisions of the Madras High Court in Synergy Financial Exchange, the Bombay High Court in Pamwi Tissues, the Supreme Court in dismissing the special leave petition in Vinay Cement’s case, and the Madras High Court in Nexus Computer’s case. The Delhi High Court also observed that judicial discipline required it to follow the view of the Supreme Court in Vinay Cement’s case, and hold the amendment to be retrospective. The Delhi High Court therefore disagreed with the approach adopted by the Bombay High Court in Pamwi Tissues case.

4. Observations:

4.1 The issue of whether the amendment is retrospective in operation or not can be for the time being concluded on examination of the true effect of the Supreme Court order in Vinay Cement’s case, delivered while dismissing the special leave petition. As observed by the Bombay High Court, the question is whether it was a dismissal on merits, laying down a binding precedent. If the decision of the Supreme Court is held to have been delivered on merits, it would be the law of the land and be binding on the Courts; if not, the Courts would be empowered to examine the issue independently.

4.2 As observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Kunhayammed vs. State of Kerala, 119 STC 505 :

“If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order, i.e., gives reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then the order has two implications. Firstly, the statement of law contained in the order is a declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the meaning of article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly, other than a declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded by the Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto and also the Court, Tribunal or authority in any proceeding subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the Supreme Court being the Apex Court of the country. But, this does not amount to saying that the order of the Court, Tribunal or authority below has stood merged in the order of the Supreme Court rejecting special leave petition or that the order of the Supreme Court is the only order binding as res judicata in subsequent proceedings between the parties.”

4.3 Reading the order of the Supreme Court in Vinay Cement’s case certainly gives the impression that though the order is short, the Supreme Court has applied its mind to the issue at stake while dismissing the petition, and dismissed it on merits, and not merely on technical grounds or as not maintainable. The order therefore seems to set a binding precedent, which all High Courts ought to have followed.

4.4 Further, it is no doubt true that the operation of the proviso gave rise to absurd situations where large amounts were disallowed on account of trivial delays of a few days, even when there was reasonable cause for making delayed payments of labour welfare dues. It does seem rather harsh to take the view that such disallowance was always intended by the Legislature.

4.5 The better view of the matter is therefore the view of the Delhi and Madras High Courts that the omission of the second proviso to S.43Bis retrospective in operation, and applied to all pending matters as on the date of the amendment.

Capital Gains Account Scheme — Due Date for Deposit

Controversies

1. Issue for consideration :


1.1 An assessee is entitled to exemption for long-term
capital gains arising on transfer of any asset u/s.54F, if he purchases or
constructs a residential house within the stipulated period (one year before or
two years after the date of transfer for purchase, and three years after the
date of transfer for construction). The exemption available is of such amount of
capital gain in the ratio of the cost of the new house to the net sale
consideration on transfer of the assets.

1.2 Ss.(4) of S. 54F provides that the amount of net
consideration, which is not appropriated by the assessee towards the purchase of
the new asset within one year before the date of transfer of the original asset,
or which is not utilised by him for the purchase or construction of the new
asset before the date of furnishing the return of income u/s.139, shall be
deposited by him before furnishing such return into an account with a bank under
the Capital Gains Account Scheme, and utilised in accordance with such scheme.
If this is done, the amount actually utilised by the assessee for the purchase
or construction of the new asset together with the amount so deposited is deemed
to be the cost of the new asset for computing the exemption u/s.54F. In other
words, pending actual utilisation for purchase or construction of the new house,
the amount has to be deposited in the Capital Gains Account Scheme. The amount
deposited under the scheme can be utilised only for the purpose of making
payment for purchase or construction of the new house.

1.3 At times, it may so happen that the assessee fails to
deposit the amount under the Capital Gains Account Scheme before the due date
for filing the return of income u/s.139(1), but actually purchases or constructs
a new residential house before the due date for filing belated return of income
u/s.139(4), i.e., within the stipulated time period of two/three years.
The question that arises in such a case is whether the benefit of the exemption
u/s.54F can yet be availed of by the assessee in spite of such failure.

1.4 While the Delhi Bench of the Tribunal has held that the
assessee is not entitled to the exemption in such a case, the Bangalore Bench of
the Tribunal has held that the assessee can still avail of the benefit of the
exemption if such utilisation is before the due date for filing belated return
of income u/s.139(4).

2. Taranbir Singh Sawhney’s case :


2.1 The issue first came up before the Delhi Bench of the
Tribunal in the case of Taranbir Singh Sawhney v. Dy. CIT, 5 SOT 417.

2.2 In this case, the assessee sold certain shares on 25th
June 1996, and deposited the sale proceeds in his bank account on 3rd August
1996. He purchased a residential house on 1st December 1997, without depositing
any amount under the Capital Gains Account Scheme. Thereafter, the assessee
filed his return of income on 13th November 1998, claiming exemption u/s.54F of
the capital gains on sale of shares on account of property purchased on 1st
December 1997.

2.3 The Assessing Officer denied the claim for exemption
u/s.54F, on the ground that the conditions specified in that Section were not
fulfilled by the assessee, since the assessee did not deposit such consideration
in an account under the Capital Gains Account Scheme pending purchase of a
residential house. According to the Assessing Officer, the date of acquisition
of the new residential property was 1st December 1997, which was after the due
date applicable to the assessee of furnishing his return of income u/s.139(1),
i.e., 30th June 1997. According to the Assessing Officer, the net
consideration was neither appropriated towards the purchase of residential
property before the due date, nor was it deposited in the account under the
Capital Gains Account Scheme before that date, resulting in non-fulfilment of
the conditions prescribed u/s.54F. The AO therefore denied the exemption
u/s.54F.

2.4 Before the Commissioner (Appeals), the assessee submitted
that he had opened an independent bank account for depositing the sale proceeds
for onward investment in a residential property, that the entire sale proceeds
so deposited in his bank ac-count were ultimately used for acquiring residential
property, that this account was only used for the purchase of property, and
therefore, in sum and in substance, he had complied with the provisions of S.
54F. the assessee claimed that not maintaining a bank account under the Capital
Gains Account Scheme was a technical breach, the conditions specified in S. 54 F
having been substantially complied with. The Commissioner (Appeals) rejected the
assessee’s contentions and dismissed the appeal.

2.5 Before the Tribunal, it was argued that the denial of
exemption was done on a mere technical lapse. It was claimed that the sale
proceeds of shares were utilised only for the purpose of investment in the new
house property and not for any other purpose. Though the sale proceeds were not
deposited in a bank account under the Capital Gains Account Scheme 1988, they
were kept in a separate bank account and utilised only for the purpose of
investment in the house property. Accordingly, the assessee had substantially
complied with the conditions specified in S. 54F. It was submitted that the
exemption provisions should be construed liberally, as held by the Supreme Court
in the case of Bajaj Tempo Ltd. v. CIT, 196 ITR 188, and that the
provisions of S. 54F should be construed in the manner to further its objectives
and not to restrain it.

2.6 The Tribunal noted the fact that the appropriation of net
consideration in the house property was not made before the due date of filing
of the return as specified u/s.139(1), and that therefore the net consideration
ought to have been deposited in a bank account under the Capital Gains Account
Scheme, 1988. Since this had not been done, according to the Tribunal, it
disentitled the assessee from exemption. According to the Tribunal, the plea of
the assessee that it was a mere technical breach was not a relevant criterion to
decide the eligibility of the assessee for exemption. The Tribunal also held
that the plea of the assessee that the provisions be construed liberally so as
to further its objectives was not tenable having regard to the clear provisions
of law. The Tribunal therefore rejected the assessee’s claim for exemption
u/s.54F.

3. Nipun Mehrotra’s case :


3.1 The issue again recently came up before the Bangalore
Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Nipun Mehrotra v. ACIT, 110 ITD 520.

3.2 In this case, the assessee sold shares for a total net sale consideration of Rs.11,10,833, out of which Rs.9,00,000 was paid as part consideration for acquisition of a new flat between February 2000 and June 2000. The assessee had earlier paid an amount of Rs.22lakhs to the builder for purchase of the flat between February 1999 and October 1999.A further sum of Rs.4 lakhs was paid on 4th September 2000 and Rs.3,98,000 was paid after September 2000 till March 2001. The assessee accordingly claimed exemption u/ s.54F of the entire capital gains.

3.3 The Assessing Officer considered only the payments made after the sale of shares, and since the assessee had made payments of only Rs.9 lakhs before the due date of filing of the return of income, denied exemption u/ s.54F in respect of net sale consideration of Rs.2,10,833, on the ground that the assessee should have invested this amount in the Capital Gains Account Scheme before the due date of filing the return of income for assessment year 2000-01, i.e., before 31st July 2000.

3.4 The Commissioner (Appeals) confirmed the order of the Assessing Officer, holding that the language of the statute was clear and unambiguous and that, in the name of liberal interpretation, the provisions could not be circumvented.

3.5 Before the Tribunal, the Department argued that the assessee had not placed any evidence on record to suggest that the sale consideration received from the sale of shares were utilised for the purchase of the new asset, as a sum of Rs.22 lakhs was paid before the shares were sold. According to the Department, the investment of Rs.22 lakhs could not be considered for the purpose of allowing exemption u/ s.54F.

3.6 The tribunal considered the provisions of S. 54F(4). It noted that the assessee had to utilise the amount for the purchase or construction of the new asset before the date of furnishing the return of income u/s.139. Since there was no mention of any sub-section of S. 139, according to the Tribunal, one could not interpret that S. 139 mentioned therein should be read as S. 139(1). Following the decision of the Gauhati High Court in the case of CIT v. Rajesh Kumar [alan, 286 ITR 274 in the context of S. 54(2), the Tribunal was of the view that S. 139 mentioned in S. 54F included not only S. 139(1),but all sub-sections of S. 139.

3.7 According to the Tribunal, the intention behind the insertion of Ss.(4) in S. 54F was to dispense with the rectification of assessments in case the taxpayer failed to acquire the corresponding new asset. Therefore, if the new asset was acquired before the date of filing of the return u/s.139, then the assessee could file such return and there would be no need of rectification. The Tribunal noted that the decision of the Gauhati High Court was not available to the Delhi Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Taranbir Singh Sawhney (supra).

3.8 The Tribunal therefore held that the assessee was entitled to the exemption of the entire amount of Rs.11,10,833 u/s.54F.

4. Observations:

4.1 It is true that the Bangalore Bench has not noted the fact that the subsequent part of S. 54F(4) expressly refers to S. 139(4) – “Such deposit being made in any case not later than the due date applicable in the case of the assesee for furnishing the return of income under Ss.(l) of S. 139 in an account….. “

4.2 However, it is essential to understand the background behind the introduction of the requirement of depositing the amount in the Capital Gains Account Scheme. Prior to introduction of this requirement, it was noticed that assessees would claim the exemption u/ s.54F, by stating their intention to invest in a residential house within the prescribed time period. There was no mechanism for the Assessing Officer to verify whether such investment was made within the prescribed time, and it was felt that many assessees obtained the exemption without any actual investment in a residential house. Hence, this requirement was introduced to ensure that the exemption was not obtained under a false statement that the investment would be made within the prescribed period.

4.3 From that perspective, so long as the investment is made before the date of filing of the income tax return, whether u/s.139(1) or u/s.139(4), the purpose of introduction of the Capital Gains Account Scheme is achieved, namely, ensuring that the investment has actually been made before the return is filed.

4.4 As held by the Gauhati  High Court in the case of Rajesh Kumar [alan (supra), in construing a beneficial enactment, the view that advances the object of the enactment and serves the purpose must be preferred to the one which obstructs the object and paralyses the purpose of the beneficial enactment. Therefore, even if the investment in the house property has been made before the date of filing of the belated return, the purpose of the legislature is achieved, and it is not appropriate to deny the exemption on the ground that there has been a delay in investment, and accordingly a failure to invest in a bank account under the Capital Gains Account Scheme.

4.5 The requirement to invest in a bank account under the Capital Gains Account Scheme is therefore really a procedural requirement to ensure that investment is made in a residential house as claimed in the return of income, where such investment has already not been made. To deny the exemption when there has been substantial compliance by actual investment in a house, on the ground that investment has not been made in the Capital Gains Account Scheme within the prescribed time limit, appears to be unjustified. The time limit therefore needs to be read down as including the time limit for filing of a belated return of income, as held by the Gauhati High Court.

4.6 Therefore,  the view  taken  by the Bangalore Bench of the Tribunal  appears  to be a better view of the matter, as compared  to the view taken by the Delhi Bench.

Restriction on Deduction due to section 80-IA(9)

Controversies

Issue for consideration :

Chapter VIA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 deals with various
deductions. Part A of this Chapter details the scheme of deductions, while part
C contains the provisions for allowing certain deductions in respect to profits
and gains from a business. Section 80A, falling in part A, provides that
deductions are to be made from the gross total income, and that the aggregate
amount of the deductions shall not exceed the gross total income.

Section 80AB, also falling in part A of Chapter VIA, provides
that where any deduction is required to be made or allowed under any section
falling in part C of that Chapter, in respect of any income of the nature
specified in any of the relevant sections which is included in the gross total
income, the amount of income of that nature as computed in accordance with the
provisions of the Income-tax Act shall be deemed to be the amount of income of
that nature derived or received by the assessee and included in his gross total
income.

Section 80IA(9), which falls in part C of Chapter VIA,
provides as under :

“Where any amount of profits and gains of an undertaking or
an enterprise is claimed and allowed under this section for any assessment
year, deduction to the extent of such profits and gains shall not be allowed
under any other provision of this Chapter under the heading
‘C — Deductions in Respect of Certain Incomes’, and shall in no case exceed
the profits and gains of such eligible business of undertaking or enterprise,
as the case may be.”

The question that repetitively arises for the consideration
of the courts is about the quantum of deduction in cases where an assessee is
eligible to claim deduction under more than one section of part C of Chapter VIA
based on different criteria, for instance, u/s.80HHC for export profits and
section 80IA for new industrial undertaking, and the manner of computation of
deductions under both the sections. While the Delhi and Kerala High Courts have
held that for the purpose of computing deduction u/s.80HHC, the deduction
already allowed u/s.80IA has to be reduced from the eligible business profits,
the Bombay and Madras High Courts have taken a contrary view that the amount of
such deduction u/s.80IA is not to be reduced in computing the export profits for
the purpose of deduction u/s.80HHC, so however the aggregate of the deductions
under both the provisions is restricted to the business profits derived from the
eligible business.

To illustrate, if the profits of an eligible business are 100
and the deduction u/s.80IA is 20, the issue is whether, for the purpose of
computation of the deduction u/s.80HHC, the profits of the business are to be
considered as 80 (as held by the Delhi High Court) or as 100 (as considered by
the Bombay High Court). There is no dispute that the total deduction cannot
exceed 100. The issue, therefore, really is whether the profits eligible for
computation of the deduction u/s.80HHC is impacted by the provision of section
80IA(9), or whether the said provision restricts the quantum of deduction
u/s.80HHC after it is computed.

Though the decisions covered in this column pertain to
deductions u/s.80IA and u/s.80HHC, and deduction u/s.80HHC is no longer
available, the principle laid down by these decisions would still be applicable
in the context of section 80IA and other deductions under part C of Chapter VIA.

Great Eastern Exports case :

The issue arose recently before the Delhi High Court in the
case of Great Eastern Exports v. CIT, 237 CTR (Del.) 264, and four other
cases disposed of through a common order.

In all these cases, the assessees had claimed deductions
under both section 80HHC and section 80IA. The Assessing Officer reduced the
amount of business profits by the deduction allowed u/s.80IA for computing the
deduction u/s.80HHC, negating the stand of the assessees that for computing
deduction u/s.80HHC, the eligible profits were to be taken, irrespective of the
deduction allowed u/s.80IA i.e., without reducing such profits by the
amount of deduction claimed u/s.80IA.

The Delhi High Court examined the provisions and the history
of Chapter VIA, and noted that prior to the amendment made by insertion of
section 80IA(9) in 1999, it had been held by the courts that each relief under
Chapter VIA was a separate one and had to be independently determined, and would
not be abridged or diluted by any of the other reliefs.

The argument on behalf of the assessees was that this
amendment had not made any change as to the manner of computation and deduction
of various provisions under part C of Chapter VIA, but only restricted the total
deduction under all those sections to the profits and gains. It was argued that
section 80AB, the controlling and governing section for all deductions under
part C of Chapter VIA, was a non obstante clause and would therefore
prevail over section 80IA(9); it referred to ‘gross total income’, and not ‘net
income’. It was also argued that a harmonious construction should be given
rather than a literal interpretation, considering the object of section 80IA(9)
of preventing deduction of more than 100% of profits and gains of the
undertaking by claiming multiple deductions under different sections.

The Delhi High Court, analysing the provisions of section
80IA(9), observed that by reading the plain language, once an assessee was
allowed deduction u/s.80IA to the extent of such profits and gains, he was not
to be allowed further deductions under part C of Chapter VIA in respect of such
profits and gains, and that in no case the deduction would exceed the profits
and gains of such eligible business. According to the Delhi High Court, the
expressions used ‘deduction to the extent of such profits’ and the word ‘and’ in
this section were very crucial. According to the Court, while the first
expression signified that if an assessee was claiming benefit of deduction of a
particular amount of profits and gains u/s.80IA, to that extent profits and
gains were to be reduced while calculating the deductions under part C of
Chapter VIA. The use of the word ‘and’, signified that the said provision was
independent — namely, the total deduction should not exceed the profits and
gains in a particular year.

The Delhi High Court observed that even a layman who had some proficiency in English would understand the meaning of that provision in the manner that they had explained, and that the provision aimed at achieving two independent objectives. According to the Delhi High Court, if the language of the statute was plain and capable of one and only one meaning, that obvious meaning had to be given to the provision. The Delhi High Court rejected the argument that section 80AB would be rendered otiose by such interpretation, by holding that there was no conflict within the two provisions, as section 80AB dealt with computation of deductions on gross total income, whose purpose was achieved, even otherwise, on reading these provisions and interpreting them in the manner they had done. The Delhi High Court refused to consider the clarification given by CBDT Circular number 772, on the ground that the notice and objects of accompanying reasons were only an aid to construction, which was needed only when literal reading of the provisions led to an ambiguous result or absurdity.

The Delhi High Court therefore held that for the purpose of computing deduction u/s.80HHC, the deduction already allowed u/s.80IA had to be reduced from the profits of the business.

Associated Capsules’ case:

The issue again recently came up before the Bombay High Court in the case of Associated Capsules (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT & Anr., 237 CTR (Bom.) 408.

In this case, the assessee had claimed deduction u/s.80IA at 30% of the profits and gains from the eligible business undertakings and deductions u/s.80HHC at 50% of the profits from the export of goods. The Assessing Officer computed the deduction u/s.80HHC on the business profits computed after deducting 30% of such profits which was allowed u/s.80IA.

The Commissioner (Appeals) held that section 80IA(9) did not authorise the Assessing Officer to reduce the amount of profits of business allowed as deduction u/s.80IA from the total profits of business while computing deduction u/s.80HHC, that both deductions have to be computed independently, and thereafter the deduction computed u/s.80IA has to be allowed in full and the deduction computed u/s.80HHC was to be restricted to the balance profits of the business duly reduced by the deduction allowed u/s.80IA, so that the aggregate of the deductions did not exceed the profits of the business of the undertaking.

The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal reversed the order of the Commissioner(Appeals), following the decision of the Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Asst. CIT v. Hindustan Mint & Agro Products (P) Ltd., 119 ITD 107 (Del). The Tribunal held that section 80IA(9) had the effect of reducing the eligible profits available for deduction u/s.80HHC.

Before the Bombay High Court, on behalf of the assessee, it was argued that the restriction imposed by section 80IA(9) was not applicable at the state of computation of deduction u/s.80HHC(3), but was applicable at the stage of allowing deduction u/s.80HHC(1). It was argued that the plain reading of section 80IA(9) did not suggest that the deduction allowable u/s.80HHC had to be computed by reducing the amount of profits allowed u/s.80IA. It was argued that wherever the Legislature intended that the deduction allowed under one section shall affect the computation of deduction allowable under another section, the Legislature had specifically stated so by using the term ‘such part of profits shall not qualify’, which term was not used in section 80IA(9). It was further argued that the expression ‘profits of the business’ for the purpose of deduction u/s.80HHC had been defined in that section, and that section 80IA(9) did not use a non obstante provision to override that definition.

It was further argued on behalf of the assessee that the basis for deduction u/s.80IA and u/s.80HHC were totally different, and that therefore the restriction imposed u/s.80IA(9) had no relation to the computation of deduction u/s.80HHC. It was further urged that the two restrictions contained in section 80IA(9) have to be read together and on such a reading, it was clear that the restrictions were with reference to allowability and not computability of deductions under other provisions of part C of Chapter VIA. Reliance was placed on the explanatory memorandum to the Finance Bill, 1998 explaining the reasons for inserting section 80IA(9), and to the CBDT Circular number 772, dated 23rd December 1998 for this proposition. Lastly, it was argued that deduction u/s.80IA was on one part of the profits (profits of an industrial undertaking), while deduction u/s.80HHC was on a different part of the profits (profits derived from exports), and that both deductions were not allowed on the same profit.

On behalf of the Revenue, it was argued that a plain reading of section 80IA(9) showed that the deduction to the extent of profits claimed and allowed u/s.80IA could not be taken into account while computing deduction u/s.80HHC. It was claimed that in order to check the misuse of double deduction, it was necessary to exclude the deduction allowed u/s.80IA from profits available for deduction u/s.80HHC. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Great Eastern Exports (supra) and on the decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of Olam Exports (India) Ltd. v. CIT, 229 CTR (Ker.) 206, where a similar view had been taken by the courts. Lastly, it was argued that the restrictions u/s.80IA(9) affected the whole of section 80HHC, and not just the allowability.

The Bombay High Court analysed the background and object behind insertion of section 80IA(9), as explained in the explanatory memorandum to the Finance Bill, 1998, 231 ITR (St) 252. The Bombay High Court also examined the language of section 80IA(9) which provided that the deduction to the extent of profits allowed u/s.80IA shall not be allowed under any other provisions, which, according to the Bombay High Court, did not even remotely refer to the method of computing deduction under other provisions, but merely sought to curtail allowance of deduction and not computability of deduction under any other provision of part C of Chapter VIA. According to the Bombay High Court, the words ‘shall not be allowed’, could not be interpreted as ‘shall not qualify’.

The Bombay High Court considered the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Great Eastern Exports (supra), and noted that the Delhi High Court had failed to consider one of the arguments of the counsel for the Revenue in that case. The counsel had argued that in the matter of grant of deduction, the first stage was computation of deduction and the second stage was the allowance of deduction, and that computation of deduction had to be made as provided in the respective sections and it was only at the stage of allowing deduction u/s.80IA(1) and also under other provisions of part C of Chapter VIA, that the provisions of section 80IA(9) came into operation. The Bombay High Court noted that the Delhi High Court had not rejected this argument and therefore could not have arrived at the conclusion that it did without rejecting that argument. The Bombay High Court expressed its dissent with the views of the Kerala High Court for the same reasons.

The Bombay High Court noted that the object of section 80IA(9) was to prevent taxpayers from claiming repeated deductions in respect of the same amount of eligible income and in excess of the eligible profits, and not to curtail the deductions allowable under various provisions of part C of Chapter VIA. The Bombay High Court therefore held that section 80IA(9) did not affect the computability of deduction under various provisions of part C of Chapter VIA, but affected the allowability of such deductions, so that the aggregate deduction u/s.80IA and other provisions under part C of Chapter VIA did not exceed 100% of the profits of the business of the assessee.

A similar view had been taken by the Madras High Court in the case of SCM Creations v. Asst. CIT, 304 ITR 319.

Observations:

The purpose behind insertion of section 80IA(9) has been set out in CBDT Circular No. 772, dated 23rd December, 1998 as under:
“It was noticed that certain assessees claimed more than 100% deduction on such profits and gains of the same undertaking, when they were entitled to deductions under more than one Section of Chapter VIA. With a view to providing suitable statutory safeguard in the Income-tax Act to prevent the taxpayer from taking undue advantage of the existing provisions of the Act by claiming repeated deductions in respect of the same amount of eligible income, even in cases where it exceeds such eligible profits of an undertaking or a hotel, inbuilt restrictions in section 80HHD and section 80IA have been provided by amending the Section, so that such unintended benefits are not passed on to the appellant.”

The purpose of the amendment gathered from the understanding of the Board clearly seems to be to restrict the total of the deductions to 100% of the eligible profits. Had the Delhi High Court appreciated this part of the contention of the assessee that even the Board, the administrative body, was of the view that the scope of the provision contained in section 80IA(9) was to restrict the aggregate of the deductions under the two provisions of the Chapter C to the overall profits and gains, its conclusion may have been different. The Court instead rejected any need to apply its mind to such an analogy on the ground that adopting such an insidious approach was not called for where the language of the provision was clear. The stand of the Board is clearly derived from the memorandum explaining the provisions of section 80IA(9). In any case, the stand taken by the Board could have been taken as a concession conferred on the taxpayer by the Government.

The Chapter is replete with the provisions introduced for curtailing the base for deduction like section 80HHB(5), section 80HHBA(4), section 80HHD(7), section 80IE(4), section 80P, etc. These provisions use a language materially different to the language employed by section 80IA(9) for restricting the scope of the computation of deduction itself. The Parliament where desired had adopted a clear and different language to convey its aim of diluting the basis of deduction and restricting the scope of the computable income.

Section 80IA(9) as explained by the Memorandum and the Circular merely provides that when a deduction u/s.80IA has been allowed, deduction to the extent of such profits and gains shall not be allowed under any other provision, and does not state that such profits and gains shall not be taken into account for computing such other deductions. The Bombay High Court has appreciated in the proper perspective the difference between inclusion of such profits in a computation and inclusion of such profits in the actual deduction as explained by the Memorandum and the Circular.

G. P. Singh in ‘Principles of Statutory Interpretation’ suggests a departure from the rule of literal interpretation as under:
“It has already been seen that a statute has to be read as a whole and one provision of the Act should be construed with reference to other provisions in the same Act so as to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute.

Such a construction has the merit of avoiding any inconsistency or repugnancy either within a section or between a section and other parts of the statute. It is the duty of the Courts to avoid a ‘head on clash’ between two sections of the same Act and whenever it is possible to do so, to construe provisions which appear to conflict so that they harmonise.”

The Bombay High Court’s interpretation in Associated Capsule’s case is a step towards harmonising the provisions of section 80AB, section 80HHC and section 80IA(9).

It is significant to note, specially in the context of section 80HHC, that the deduction under that section is required to be computed w.r.t. the profits of the business which is artificially defined under Explanation (baa) of the said section and such artificial profits are far detached form the profit that is eligible for deduction u/s.80IA and therefore it is difficult to hold that the double deduction is claimed on the same profit. In any case, as noted, the basis on which the amount of deduction is computed under the two different provisions is significantly different.

A provision introduced for restricting the scope of a benefit under another provision has to contain a non obstante clause which is found missing in section 80HHC and on this count alone, any attempt to curtail the basis of the profit eligible for deduction u/s.80HHC should be avoided. Section 80IA(9) should at the most be seen to be achieving the same thing as is achieved by section 80AB and may be taken as a provision introduced to achieve greater clarity on the subject.

The decision of the Bombay High Court has the effect of overruling the two decisions of the Special Bench in the case of Rogini Garments & Others, 111 TTJ 274 (Chennai) and Hindustan Mint & Agro Products (P) Ltd., 123 TTJ 577 (Del.) and dissenting with the two decisions of the High Courts of Delhi and Kerala. In view of the sharp division of views of the Courts and considering the fact that the issue has the large tax effect, it is desired that the issue be settled at the earliest by the Apex Court.

Netting of interest and S. 80HHC

Controversies

1. Issue for consideration :


1.1 S. 80HHC, inserted by the Finance Act, 1983 w.e.f. 1st
April, 1983 for grant of deduction in respect of the profits derived from
exports of goods and merchandise, has since undergone several changes. The
relevant part of the provision, at present, relevant to this discussion, reads
as under :

Explanation : For the purposes of this Section, :


(baa) ‘profits of the business’ means the profits of the
business as computed under the head ‘Profits and gains of business or
profession’ as reduced by :

(1) ninety per cent of any sum referred to in clauses (iiia),
(iiib), (iiic), (iiid) and (iiie) of S. 28 or of any receipts by way of
brokerage, commission, interest, rent, charges or any other receipt of a similar
nature included in such profits; and

1.2 ‘Profits of the business’ as defined in clause (baa) of
the Explanation requires that the profits derived from exports is computed under
the head ‘Profits and gains of business and profession’ and such profits
determined in accordance with S. 28 to S. 44D is to be further adjusted on
account of clause (baa), namely, ninety percent of any receipts by way of
brokerage, commission, interest, rent, charges or any other receipt of a similar
nature included in such profits
.

1.3 The issue that is being fiercely debated, is concerning
the true meaning of the terms ‘interest, etc.’ and ‘receipts’ used in Expln.
(baa). Whether the terms individually or collectively connote net interest, etc.
i.e., the gross interest income less the expenditure incurred for earning
such income ? A related question, in the event it is held that the terms connote
netting of interest, is should netting be allowed where the interest income is
computed as business income ?

1.4 The issue believed to be settled by the decision of the
Special Bench of the ITAT in the case of Lalsons, 89 ITD 25 (Delhi) became
controversial due to the decisions of the Madras and Punjab and Haryana High
Courts. Again, these decisions of the High Court were not followed by the
decision of the Delhi High Court, upholding the ratio of the Lalsons’ decision.
The peace prevailing thereafter has been short-lived in view of the recent
decision of the Bombay High Court, dissenting form the decision of the Delhi
High Court.

2. Shri Ram Honda Equip’s case :


2.1 The issue arose for consideration of the Delhi High Court
in Shri Ram Honda Power Equip, 289 ITR 475 wherein substantial questions of law
concerning the interpretation of S. 80HHC, Ss. (1) and (3) and clause (baa) of
the Explanation, were raised before the High Court as under :

(a) Does the expression ‘profits derived from such export’
occurring in Ss.(3) r/w Expln. (baa) restrict the profits available for
deduction in terms of Ss.(1) to only those items of income directly relatable to
the business of export ?

(b) Does the expression ‘interest’ in Expln. (baa) connote
net interest, i.e., the gross interest income less the expenditure
incurred by the assessee for earning such income ?

(c) If the expression ‘interest’ implies net interest, then
should netting be allowed where the interest income is computed to be business
income ?

2.2 The two broad issues identified by the Court from the
three questions referred to it were the determination of the nature of interest
income and the issue of netting of interest. The Court noted that the first step
was to determine whether in a given case the income from interest was assessable
as a ‘business income’, computed in terms of S. 28 to S. 44, or as an ‘income
from other sources’ determined u/s.56 and u/s.57 and to ascertain thereafter,
whether while deducting ninety percent of interest therefrom in terms of Expln.
(baa), gross or net interest should be taken in to account.

2.3 It was contended on behalf of the assessee that profits cannot be arrived at by any businessman without accounting
for the expenditure incurred in earning such interest; that the entire clause
(baa) had to be read along with the scheme of S. 80HHC(1) and (3) and given a
meaning that did not produce absurd results; that the interpretation should
reflect a liberal construction conforming to the object of encouraging exports;
that use of the term ‘included in such profits’ following the words ‘brokerage,
commission, interest, rent, charges or any other receipts of a similar nature’
was indicative that such amounts were the ‘net’ amounts and only net interest
was includible in the profits; hence once interest income had been computed as
business income, then netting had to be allowed.

2.4 It was further urged that as per the mandate of clause
(baa) the profits and gains of business or profession had to be first computed
as per S. 28 to S. 44, including S. 37, which envisaged accounting for the
expenditure incurred by an assessee for earning the income. The assessees also
relied on paragraph 30.11 of Circular No. 621, dated. 19-12-1991 which provided
for ad hoc 10 percent deduction to account for the expenses. It was
further urged that the Legislature wherever desired had used the expression
‘gross’ as in S. 80M, S. 40(b), S. 44AB, S. 44AD and S. 115JB, making it clear
that the Legislature in terms of S. 80HHC intended that the interest to be
accounted for in computing the profits should be net interest; that the language
of the Section was unambiguous and therefore there was no need to supply the
word ‘gross’ as qualifying the word ‘interest’. Therefore, applying the same
rule of causus omissus, such word could not be read into the Section.
Reliance was placed on the decision in Distributors (Baroda) (P) Ltd., 155 ITR
120 (SC).

2.5 On the issue of netting, it was submitted on behalf of
the Revenue that even where the interest income was determined to be business
income, netting should not be permitted; that there could be no casus omissus,
in other words, the Court ought not to supply words when none exist; that just
as the assessees argued the Legislature if intended would have used the term
‘net’ and would have said so and in the absence of such a clear enunciation, the
word ‘interest’ has to be interpreted to mean ‘gross interest’; that applying
the strict rule of construction in interpreting the statutes, the expression
‘interest’ occurring in clause (baa) could only mean gross interest and that the
treatment in either case should be uniform.

2.6 On behalf of the Revenue it was further urged that the Legislature had permitted the retention of 10% of interest income to compensate for expenses laid out for earning such income, therefore any further deduction of the expenditure incurred for earning such interest, if permit-ted, would amount to a double deduction which clearly was not envisaged; that clause (baa) of the Explanation to S. 80HHC envisaged a two-step process in computing profits derived from exports, first, the AO was required to apply S. 28 to S. 44 to compute the profits and gains of business or profession. In doing so, the AO might find that certain incomes, which had no nexus to the ex-port business of the assessee, were not eligible for deduction and therefore ought to be treated as income from other sources. Once that was done, then 90% of the receipts referred in clause (baa) had to be deducted in order to arrive at the profits derived from profits. Reliance was placed on the decision of K. Venkata Reddy v. CIT, 250 ITR 147 (AP) in support of this submission. Even if the interest earned was to be construed as part of the business income, the netting should not be permitted since the statute did not specifically say so relying on the judgments in IPCA Laboratory Ltd. v. Dy. CIT, 266 ITR 521 (SC), CIT v. V. Chinnapandi, 282 ITR 389 (Mad.) and Rani Paliwal v. CIT, 268 ITR 220 (P & H).

2.7 The Delhi High Court found merit in the contention of the assessee that not accepting that interest in the context referred to net interest, might produce unintended or absurd results. The Court referring to the decision of Keshavji Ravji & Co. v. CIT, 183 ITR 1 (SC) highlighted that the underlying principle of netting appeared to be logical as no prudent businessman would allow taxation of the interest income de hors the expenditure incurred for earning such income. The words ‘included in such profits’ following the words ‘receipts by way of interest, commission, brokerage, etc.’, was a clear pointer to the fact that only net interest would be includible in arriving at the business profit; once business income had been determined by applying accounting standards as well as the provisions contained in the Act, the assessee would be permitted to, in terms of S. 37, claim as deduction, expenditure laid out for the purposes of earning such business income. The Court noted with approval the proposition for netting of income found from Circular No. 621, dated 19-12-1991 of the CBDT.

2.8 The Court observed that object of S. 80HHC was to ensure that the exporter got the benefit of the profits derived from export and was not to depress the profit further; if the deduction of 90% was of the gross interest itself, the amount spent in earning such interest would depress the profit to that extent by remaining on the debit side of the P&L Account; therefore, it could only be the net interest which could be included in the profits; if netting were not to be permitted, the result would be that the profits of the exporter would be depressed by an item that was expenditure incurred on earning interest, which did not form part of the profit at all; such could not have been the intention of the Legislature.

2.9 The Court did not approve of the contention that the treatment of clause (a) of S. 80HHC(3) should be no different from clause (b) of the same sub-section as the said clause (baa) was relatable only to clause (a) of S. 80HHC(3) and not to clause thereof; the provisions operated in distinct areas and no inter-mixing was contemplated.

2.10 For all these reasons, the Court held that the word ‘interest’ in clause (baa) to the Explanation in S. 80HHC was indicative of ‘net interest’, i.e., gross interest less the expenditure incurred by the assessee in earning such interest. The Court affirmed the decision of the Special Bench of the ITAT in Lalsons Enterprises (supra) holding that the expression ‘interest’ in clause (baa) of the Explanation to S. 80HHC connoted ‘net interest’ and not ‘gross interest’.

2.11 The Court noted that in deciding the issue in Rani Paliwal’s case (supra), the Punjab & Haryana High Court, without any detailed discussion simply upheld the Tribunal’s order and therefore did not follow the ratio of the said decision in these words: “We are afraid that there is no reasoning expressed by the High Court for arriving at such a conclusion. For instance, there is no discussion of the CBDT Circular and in particular para 32.11 thereof which indicates that netting is contemplated in Expln. (baa). Also, it does not notice the effect of the words ‘included in such profits’ following the words ‘receipts by way of interest….’ in the said Explanation. We are therefore unable to subscribe to the view taken by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Rani Paliwal (supra).” The Court accordingly differed with the views of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Rani Paliwal’s case.

2.12 While differing with the decision of the Madras High Court in Chinnapandi’s case, the Court observed as under: “The Madras High Court in CIT v. V. Chinnapandi (supra) held that even where the interest receipt is treated as business income, the deduction within the meaning of Expln. (baa) is permissible only of the gross interest and not net interest. The High Court appears to have followed the earlier judgment in K. S. Subbiah Pillai & Co. (supra) without noticing that in K. S. Subbiah Pillai (supra), the interest receipt was treated as income from other sources and not as business income. Also, the High Court in V. Chinnapandi (supra) chose to follow Rani Paliwal (supra), which, as explained earlier, gives no reasoning for the conclusion therein. Also, V. Chinnapandi (supra) does not advert to either the CBDT Circular or the judgment of the Special Bench in Lalsons (supra), with which we entirely concur on this aspect.”

2.13 The Court accordingly held that the net interest i.e., the gross interest less the expenditure incurred for the purposes of earning such interest, in terms of Expln. (baa), only be reduced from the profits of the business in cases where the AO treated the interest receipt as business income.

    Asian Star Co. Ltd.’s case:

3.1 Recently the issue again arose before the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. Asian Star Ltd. in appeal No. 200 of 2009. In a decision delivered on March 18/19, 2010 the Court was asked to consider the following question of law:

“Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Tribunal was correct in holding that net interest on fixed deposits in banks received by the assessee-company should be considered for the purpose of working out the deduction u/s.80HHC and not the gross interest?”

3.2 The assessee carried on the business of the export of cut and polished diamonds. A return of income for A.Y. 2003-04 was filed, declaring a total income of Rs. 13.91 crores, after claiming a deduction of Rs.13.22 crores u/s.80HHC. The assessee had debited an amount of Rs. 21.46 crores as interest paid/payable to the Profit and Loss Account net of interest received of Rs. 3.25 crores. The assessee was called upon to explain as to why the deduction u/s.80HHC should not be recomputed by excluding ninety percent of the interest received in the amount of Rs.3.25 crores. By its explanation, the assessee submitted that during the year, it received interest on fixed deposits. The assessee stated that it had borrowed monies in order to fulfil its working capital requirements and the Bank had called upon it to maintain a fixed deposit as margin money against the loans. The assessee consequently contended that there was a direct nexus between the deposits kept in the Bank and the amounts borrowed.

3.3 The Assessing Officer, found that the explanation of the assessee could not be accepted since a plain reading of Explanation (baa) to S. 80HHE suggested that ninety percent of the receipts on account of brokerage, commission, interest, rent, charges or receipts of a similar nature were liable to be excluded while computing the profits of the business. In appeal, the CIT (Appeals) held that the assessee had established a direct nexus between interest-bearing fixed deposits and the ‘interest charging’ borrowed funds and he directed the Assessing Officer to allow the netting of interest income and interest expenses. The view of the CIT (Appeals) was confirmed in appeal by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal held that the finding of the Appellate Authority was based on the existence of a nexus between borrowed funds and fixed deposits. The Tribunal followed its decision in the case of Lalsons Enterprises, 89 ITD 25 (Delhi).

3.4 The Revenue contended that for computing the profits and gains of the business for S. 80HHC, ninety percent of the receipts by way of interest had to be reduced from the profits and gains of business or profession and the ‘receipts’ to be so reduced were the gross receipts; consequently, the gross receipts by way of interest could not be netted against expenditure which was laid out for the earning of those receipts; the reduction provided by the law was independent of any expenditure that was incurred in the earning of the receipts; that non -operational income should be excluded as it had no nexus with the export turnover, while on the other hand, it depressed profits by including expenditure which had been incurred for those very items which led to a consequence which could not have been intended by the Parliament having regard to the beneficial object underlying the provision.

3.5 The summary of the assessee’s contentions was that (i) The words ‘any receipts’ denoted the nature and not the quantum of the receipt;
    The expression, therefore, required the nature of the receipts to be examined; (iii) Explanation (baa) referred to any receipts of a similar nature ‘included in such profits’. The words ‘such profits’ meant profits and gains of business or profession computed u/s.28 to u/s.44D; (iv) Profits could only be arrived at after the deduction of expenditure from income and the net effect thereof constituted profits; (v) Explanation (baa) did not use the expression ‘gross or net’. However, having regard to the purpose and object of the provision and the nature of the language used in the Explanation, ninety percent of the receipts that was required to be excluded had to be computed with reference to inclusion of such receipts in profits and gains of business which in turn involved both credit and debit sides of the profit and loss account; (vi) For purposes of Explanation (baa), income from other sources would not come within the purview of the Explanation; Only business income had to be considered and interest in the nature of business income had to be taken into consideration; (vii)Receipts by way of interest in Explanation (baa) denoted the nature of the receipts and inclusion in ‘such profits’ would denote the quantum of the receipts; (viii) The words used by the Legislature suggested what was included in the total income or had gone into the computation of total income. Consequently, both debit and credit sides of the profit and loss account would have to be consid-ered; (ix) The words ‘such profits’ could only mean such profits as computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act; (x) The words ‘receipt’ and ‘income’ in Explanation (baa) were interchangeably used and consequently, receipts would have to be read as income; (xi) The correct interpretation was to take into consideration netting and exclude all expenses which had a direct nexus with the earning of the income; (xii) The provision being an incentive provision under Chapter VIA, must be beneficially construed in order to encourage exports; (xiii)

The word ‘profits’ denoted profits in a commercial sense; (xiv) the object of the exclusion contained in Explanation (baa) was to sequester certain non-operational income which did not bear a direct nexus with export income and as a consequence, the exclusion could not be confined only to credit side of the profit and loss account, but must extend equally to the debit side, subject to the rider that a clear nexus has to be established.

3.6 The Bombay High Court explaining the rationale underlying the exclusion noted that : Ss.(3) of S. 80HHC was inserted by the Finance Act of 1991, with effect from 1st April 1992; the adoption of the formula in Ss.(3) was to disallow a part of the concession when the entire deduction claimed could not be regarded as being derived from export; S. 80HHC had to be amended several times since the formula had resulted in a distorted figure of export profits where receipts such as interest, rent, commission and brokerage which did not have a direct nexus with export turnover were included in the profit and loss account and resultantly became a subject of deduction; by the amendment, the position that emerged was that receipts which did not have any element of or nexus with export turnover would not become eligible for deduction merely because they formed part of the profit and loss account; this aspect of the history underlying S. 80HHC, had been elaborated upon in the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Lakshmi Machine Works, 290 ITR 667.

3.7 The Court further noted that; the Explanation (baa) had to be read in the context of the background underlying the exclusion of certain constituent elements of the profit and loss account from the eligibility for deduction; what Explanation (baa) postulated was that, in computing the profits of business for S. 80HHC, the profits of business had to be first computed under the head profits and gains of business or profession, in accordance with S. 28 to S. 44D; once that exercise was complete, those profits had to be reduced to the extent provided by clauses (1) and (2) of Explanation (baa); that such receipts by way of brokerage, commission, interest, rent, charges or other receipts of a similar nature, though included in the profits and gains of business or profession, did not bear a nexus with the export turnover and consequently, though included in the computation of profits and gains of business or profession, ninety percent of such receipts had to be excluded in computing the profits of business for S. 80HHC; the reason for the exclusion was borne out by the Circular issued by the CBDT on 19-12-1991 which noted that the formula then existing often presented a distorted figure of export profits when receipts like interest, commission, etc. which did not have an element of turnover were included in the profit and loss account; the Court was required to give a meaning to the provision consistent with the underlying scheme, object and purpose of the statutory provision; the Parliament considered it appropriate to exclude from the purview of the deduction u/s.80HHC, certain receipts or income which did not have a proximate nexus with export turnover though such items formed part of the profit and loss account and form a constituent element in the computation of the profits or gains of business or profession u/s.28 to u/s.44D. The interpretation which Court placed on the provisions of S. 80HHC and on Explanation (baa) must be consistent with the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the cases of CIT v. K. Ravindranathan Nair, 295 ITR 228 295 ITR 228 where the Supreme Court held that processing charges, though a part of gross total income constituted an item of independent income like rent, commission and brokerage and consequently, ninety percent of the processing charges had to be reduced from gross total income to arrive at business profits, and Lakshmi Machine Works (supra) where the issue before the Supreme Court was whether excise duty and sales tax were included in the total turnover for the purpose of working out the formula contained in S. 80HHC(3) and the Supreme Court held that the object of the Legislature in enacting S. 80HHC was to confer benefit on profits accruing with reference to export turnover and the Supreme Court in that case had observed that ‘commission, rent, interest, etc. did not involve any turnover’ and ‘therefore, ninety percent of such commission, interest, etc. was excluded from the profits derived from?the?export,’?just?as?interest, commission, etc. did not emanate from export turnover, so also excise duty and sales tax had to be excluded.

3.8 The Court explained the resultant position in law as that while prescribing the exclusion of the specified receipts the Parliament was, however, conscious of the fact that the expenditure incurred in earning the items which were liable to be excluded had already gone into the computation of business profits as the computation of business profits under Chapter IV is made by amalgamating the receipts as well as the expenditure incurred in carrying on the business; since the expenditure incurred in earning the income by way of interest, brokerage, commission, rent, charges or other similar receipts had also gone into the computation of business profits, the Parliament thought it fit to exclude only ninety percent of the receipts received by the assessee in order to ensure that the expenditure which was incurred by the assessee in earning the receipts which had gone into the computation of the business profits is taken care of; the reason why the Parliament confined the reduction factor to ninety percent of the receipts was stated in the Memorandum explaining the provisions of the Finance Bill of 1991; the Parliament, therefore, confined the reduction to the extent of ninety percent of the income earned through such receipts since it was cognizant of the fact that the assessee would have incurred some expenditure in earning those incomes and therefore it provided an ad hoc deduction of ten percent from such incomes to account for the expenses incurred in earning the receipts; the distortion of the profits that would take place by excluding the receipts received by the assessee which were unrelated to export turnover and not the expenditure incurred by the assessee in earning those receipts was factored in by the Parliament by excluding only ninety percent of the receipts received by the assessee; the Parliament thought it fit to adopt a uniform formula envisaging a reduc-tion of ninety percent to make due allowance for the expenditure which would have been incurred by the assessee in earning the receipts, though in a given case it might be more or less as it was considered to be reasonable parameter of what would have been expended by the assessee; in order to simplify the application of the law, the Parliament treated a uniform expenditure computed at ten percent to be applicable in order to ensure that there is no distortion of profits by exclusion of income not relatable to export profits.

3.9 In view of the objective of the Parliament behind the introduction of the Explanation (baa) and its desire to provide uniformity of the treatment and the fact that the deduction of S. 80HHC was related to export turnover, the Bombay High Court held that the ratio and the findings of the Supreme Court in the case of the Distributors (Baroda) P. Ltd. v. Union of India, 155 ITR 120 were not relevant in the context of the issue under consideration by the Court; it was in order to obviate a distortion that the Parliament mandated that ninety percent of the receipts would be excluded; consequently, while the principle which had been laid down by the Supreme Court in Distributors (Baroda)’s case must illuminate the interpretation of the words ‘included in such profits’, the Court could not, at the same time, be unmindful of the reduction which was postulated by Explanation (baa), the extent of the reduction and the rationale for effecting the reduction.

3.10 The Bombay High Court noted with approval the decisions of the High Courts in the cases of K. S. Subbiah Pillai & Co. (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT, CIT v. V. Chinnapandi, Rani Paliwal v. CIT and CIT v. Liberty Footwears. In view of number of reasons advanced and after a careful consideration the Bombay High Court was not inclined to follow the judgment of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in CIT v. Shri Ram Honda Power Equipments as the simi-larity between the provisions of S. 80HHC and S. 80M which was relied upon in the judgment of the Delhi High Court missed the comprehensive position as it obtained u/s.80HHC.Such similarity of the provisions should not result into an assumption that the provisions were identical, when they were not as the Parliament had adopted a fair and reasonable statutory basis of what may be regarded as expenditure incurred for the earning of the receipts. Once the Parliament had legislated both in regard to the nature of the exclusion and the extent of the exclusion, it would not be open to the Court to order otherwise by rewriting the legislative provision. The Court observed with respect that the Delhi High Court had not adequately emphasised the entire rationale for confining the deduction only to the extent of ninety percent of the excludible receipts.

3.11 The displeasure of the Bombay High Court with the decision of the Special Bench in Lalsons Enterprises’s case, can best be explained in the Court’s own words “We are affirmatively of the view that in its discussion on the issue of netting, the Tribunal in its Special Bench decision in Lalsons has transgressed the limitations on the exercise of judicial power. The Tribunal has in effect, legislated by providing a deduction on the ground of expenses other than in the terms which have been allowed by the Parliament. That is impermissible. In the present case, it is necessary to emphasise that the question before the Court relates to the deduction u/s.80HHC. An assessee may well be entitled to a deduction in respect of the expenditure laid out wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business in the computation of the profits and gains of business or profession. However, for the purposes of computing the deduction u/s.80HHC, the provisions which have been enacted by the Parliament would have to be complied. A deduction in excess of what is mandated by the Parliament cannot be allowed on the theory that it is an incentive provision intended to encourage export. The extent of the deduction and the conditions subject to which the deduction should be granted, are matters for the Parliament to legislate upon. The Parliament having legislated, it would not be open to the Court to deviate from the provisions which have been enacted in S. 80HHC.”

3.13 The Bombay High Court allowed the appeal of the Revenue by holding that the Tribunal was not justified in coming to the conclusion that the net interest on fixed deposits in the bank received by the assessee should be considered for the purposes of working out the deduction u/s.80HHC and not the gross interest.

4.Observations:

4.1 The issue has been clearly identified and argued and is further highlighted by sharply contrasting views of the High Courts on the subject. The Apex Court alone can bring finality to this fiercely contested issue.

4.2 As we understand from the reading of the Bombay High Court decision, the case of an exporter for netting of interest, etc. having nexus with the export activity is fortified. It is in cases where such receipts have no nexus with the export activity that a shadow of serious doubt has been cast by the recent decision of the Bombay High Court.

4.3 In bringing a finality to the issue, in addition to the issues which are very succinctly brought to the notice of the Courts by the contesting parties, the following aspects will have to be conclusively adjudicated upon;

4.3.1 While in a good number of cases, it maybe true that the ends of the justice will be met by allowing a deduction of 10% of the income, such a benchmark will be found to be woefully inad-equate in cases where the activity is conducted in an orderly manner, as a business. For example, a broker or a commission agent paying a sizeable amount to a sub-broker or sub-agent or lender of funds advancing loans out of borrowed funds bearing interest. In the examples given, the expenditure surely would exceed the benchmark of 10% of income. The allowance of 10% of income, in such cases, cannot be considered to be reasonable by any standard. In such cases, at least, it will be fair to read that the receipt in question is the net receipt, more so as in the cases of person who had accounted only net receipt in the books.

4.3.2 The allowance of any direct expenditure may have always been presumed and it is for avoiding any controversy in relation to an indirect expenditure that the 10% allowance is granted by the Legislature.

4.3.3 The direct expenditure, if not allowed, will give absurd results inasmuch as the same has the effect of depressing the export profit, otherwise eligible for deduction. If such receipts were to be taken out of the business profits on the footing that they had no connection with the business profits or turnover, it would only be reasonable to hold that expenditure having nexus with such receipts should also be taken out of the business profits on the same footing.

4.3.4 The result surely will be different in case where the assesssee is found to have maintained separate books of account or where the accounting is net of direct cost.

4.3.5 The result will also be different in cases where the assessee on his own had treated the receipt as also the income under a separate head of income.

4.3.6 It is an accepted principle of interpretation that the law has to be read in the context in which has placed. RBI v. Peerless General Finance Investment Co. Ltd., 61 Comp Case 663. The Delhi High Court clarified that it was inclined to adopt this contextual approach further enunciated by the Madras High Court in CIT v. P. Manonmani, 245 ITR 48 (Mad.) (FB). The context in which the word ‘receipt’ is used in Expln. (baa) may mean such receipts as reduced by the expenditure laid out for earning such income. The possible way to reconcile this is as was done by the Delhi High Court by reading the expression ‘receipts by way of brokerage, commission, interest….’ as referring to the nature of receipt, which in the context of S. 80HHC connotes ‘income’.

4.3.7 Paragraph 32.10 of Circular No. 681, dated 19-12- 1991 reads as under: “The existing formula often gives a distorted figure of export profits when receipts like interest, commission, etc., which do not have element of turnover are included in the P&L Account. It has, therefore, been clarified that ‘profits of the business’ for the purpose of S. 80HHC will not include receipts by way of brokerage, commission, interest, rent, charges or any other receipt of a similar nature. As some expenditure might be incurred in earning these incomes, which in the generality of cases is part of common expenses, ad hoc 10% deduction from such incomes is provided to account for these expenses.”

4.3.8 Circular No. 621 explained the provisions of the amendment and in so explaining has favoured netting, as has been highlighted by the Delhi High Court. If that is so, the full effect, though benefi-cial, shall be given to such interpretation advanced by the Circular of the CBDT in preference to the Notes and the Memorandum. Full effect may be given to the above-referred CBDT Circular which acknowledges that ‘receipts by way of brokerage, commission, interest’, etc., are ‘incomes’ and in order to give effect to this expression, the principle of netting will have to be applied.

4.3.9 Due weightage will have to be given to the true meaning of the words ‘included in such profits’ which precede the words ‘receipts by way of brokerage, commission and interest’.

4.3.10 The ratio of the decision of the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Distributors (Baroda) (P) Ltd., though considered by the Courts, will have to be revisited in order to conclusively appreciate the meaning of the words and the expressions ‘receipts by way of’ ‘included in such profits,’ ‘such profits’ and ‘computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act’.

4.3.11 The three different expressions, namely, ‘any sums’, ‘receipts’ and ‘profits’, used by the Parliament will have to be reconciled.

4.4 This controversy has plagued a good number of cases and it will be in the fitness of the things that the Government adopts a reconciliatory approach and issues a dispensation or a directive for addressing the issue that does not clog the wheels of justice.

Interest u/s.234A — Taxes paid but return delayed

Controversies

1. Issue for consideration :


1.1 S. 234A(1) of the Income-tax Act provides for levy of
simple interest at the rate of one percent, for every month or part of the
month, for the default of non-furnishing the return of income u/s.139 or S. 142,
on the amount of the tax on total income as determined u/s.143(1) or on regular
assessment as reduced by the advance tax and the tax deducted or collected at
source and such other taxes as are specified in clauses (i) to (vi) of the said
Section.

1.2 The taxes to be reduced from the tax determined on
regular assessment are :

(i) advance tax, if any, paid;

(ii) any tax deducted or collected at source;

(iii) any relief of tax allowed u/s.90 on account of tax
paid in a country outside India;

(iv) any relief of tax allowed u/s.90A on account of tax
paid in a specified territory outside India referred to in that Section;

(v) any deduction, from the Indian income-tax payable,
allowed u/s.91 on account of tax paid in a country outside India; and

(vi) any tax credit allowed to be set off in accordance
with the provisions of S. 115JAA.


1.3 The interest is payable for the period commencing on the
date immediately following the due date for filing return of income defined
under Explanation 1 to mean the date specified in S. 139(1) and ending on the
date of furnishing the return or where no return is furnished, on the date of
completion of assessment u/s.144. Vide Ss.(2) the interest payable U/ss.(1) is
reduced by the interest, if any, paid u/s.140A towards the interest chargeable
u/s.234A.

1.4 A separate levy for default in payment of advance tax is
provided by S. 234B for levy of simple interest at the rate of one percent, for
every month or part of the month, on the amount of the tax on total income as
determined u/s.143(1) or on regular assessment as reduced by such taxes as are
specified in clauses (i) to (v) of Explanation 1 to the said
Section. Such interest is payable by an assessee liable to pay advance tax
u/s.208 where advance tax paid u/s.210 is less than ninety percent of the
assessed tax for the period commencing on 1st April next following the financial
year and ending on the date of determination of total income u/s.143(1) or
regular assessment. Vide Ss.(2)(i) the interest payable U/ss.(1) is reduced by
the interest, if any, paid u/s.140A towards the interest chargeable u/s.234B.

1.5 In cases involving twin defaults of delayed filing return
of income and short payment of advance tax, the person is made liable for
interest for the same period and in some cases on the same amount under two
different provisions of the Act, namely, u/s.234A and 234B. These simultaneous
levies have prompted assessees to challenge the double whammy without success;
however, some success was achieved in cases involving default of delayed return
of income where taxes were paid after the financial year end but before the due
date of filing return of income. The decision of the Delhi High Court upholding
the plea of the assessee that interest was not chargeable u/s.234A for the
period following the due date and ending on the date of filing of return has
recently been dissented by the Gujarat High Court holding that such simultaneous
levies were possible in law.

2. Pronnoy Roy’s case :


2.1 The issue was first considered by the Delhi High Court in
the case of Dr. Pronnoy Roy & Anr. v. CIT, 254 ITR 755. In that case, the
assessee had earned substantial capital gains for the assessment year 1995-96
for which the return was due to be filed on October 31, 1995. Though taxes due
were paid on September 25, 1995, i.e., before the due date of filing of
the return, the return was filed on September 29, 1996, i.e., after a
delay of about 11 months. While the returned income was accepted in assessment
of income, interest was charged u/s.234A on the ground that tax paid on
September, 25, 1995, could not be reduced from the tax due on assessment. A
revision petition u/s.264 of the Act was filed before the Commissioner
requesting for deletion of interest charged u/s.234A of the Act. The
Commissioner in his order, upheld the action of the Assessing Officer stating
that deduction of tax paid on September 25, 1995, was not provided in S. 234A of
the Act, as it compensated for delay/default in filing of return of income and
not the payment of tax. Against the order of the Commissioner, the assessee
filed a writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, before
the High Court seeking for a writ of certiorari/mandamus in respect of
the said order passed u/s.264 of the Act upholding the levy of interest u/s.234A
of the Act.

2.2 The following contentions were advanced by the assessee,
before the High Court, in support of the case that no interest be levied
u/s.234A for the period commencing with 25th September 1995, i.e., the
date on which the payment of taxes was made.


* The taxes were paid voluntarily before the due date of filing return of income and once the taxes were found to have been paid no interest u/s. 234A could be levied for the period thereafter in-asmuch as there did not remain any basis for such levy.

  •  Levy of interest u/s.234A was compensatory in character and was introduced for compensating the Government for the loss of revenue and as in the assessee’s case there was no loss of revenue, on payment by the assessee, no compensation was due to the Government.

  • There was no deprival of resources for the State and in the absence of that it was not possible for it to seek damages for the same.

  • The taxes paid by him on 25th September, 1995 should be treated as payment of advance tax.

  • A separate provision, namely, S. 271F provided for the levy of penalty for the default of not filing the return of income by due date w.e.f. 1-4-1999.

  • Simultaneous levies for the same period were unjust and resulted in double jeopardy.

  • The provisions  must  be construed  liberally.

  • In case of doubt, the benefit of doubt should be given to the assessee.

2.3 On behalf of the Revenue it was contended that by reason of S. 234A, interest was charged for default in filing return which did not cease or stop with payment of taxes. That not charging interest would defeat the very objective behind introduction of S. 234A.

2.4 The Delhi High Court upheld the contention of the assessee that no interest was to be charged u/ s.234A for the period commencing from 25th September 1995 for the following reasons:

  • Penalty and interest both could not be charged for failure to perform a statutory obligation.

  • Interest, was payable either by way of compensation or damages and penal interest could be levied only in the case of a chronic defaulter.

  • The common sense meaning of ‘interest’ must be applied in interpretation of S. 234A of the Act and even if the dictionary meaning was to be taken recourse to, the Court was supported by the Collins Cobuild English Language Dictio-nary reprinted in 1991, which defined it as; “Interest is a sum of money that is paid as percentage of a larger sum of money, which has been borrowed or invested. You receive interest on money that you invest and pay interest on money that you borrow.”

  • The question raised when considered from an-other angle was that interest was payable when a sum was due and not otherwise.

  • The object of the amendment was to levy mandatory interest where the return was filed late and tax was also not paid. The provisions made an exception for deduction of the amount of the interest if the same had otherwise been paid or deposited. A statute must be construed having regard to its object in view.

  • The Court noted that in Shashikant Laxman Kale v. UOI, 185 ITR 105, the Apex Court held that interest could not be charged when no tax was outstanding. It further noted that in Ganesh Dass Sreeram v. ITa, 159 ITR 221, it had been held that “Where the advance tax duly paid covers the entire amount of tax assessed, there is no ques-tion of charging the registered firm with inter-est even though the return is filed by it beyond the time allowed, regard being had to the fact that payment of interest is only compensatory in nature. As the entire amount of tax is paid by way of advance tax, the question of payment of any compensation does not arise.”

  • Penalty could not be imposed in the absence of a clear provision. Imposition of penalty would ordinarily attract compliance with the principles of natural justice.

  • Levy of penalty in certain situations would attract the principles of existence of mens rea. While a penalty was to be levied, discretionary power was ordinarily conferred on the authority. Unless such discretion was granted, the provisions  might be held to be unconstitutional.

  • In situation of the nature involved in the case, the doctrine of purposive construction must be taken recourse to.

  • The submission of the Revenue to the effect that payment of tax although the same could be made along with the return, could not be a ground for not charging interest in terms of S. 234A; if given effect to, the object and purpose of S. 234A would be defeated and, thus, the same could not be accepted. The object of S. 234A was to receive interest by way of compensation. If such was the intention of the Legislature, it could have said so in explicit terms.

  • Judicial notice was required to be taken of the fact that the Legislature had enacted S. 271F with effect from April I, 1999, by the Finance (No. 2) Act of 1998, providing for penalty, in the case of a person who was required to furnish a return of his income as required U/ss.(I) of S. 139 of the Act who did not do so.

  • When the statute provided that an interest, which would be compensatory in nature would be levied upon the happening of a particular event or inaction, the same by necessary implication would mean that the same could be levied on an ascertained sum.

  • The definition of ‘Advance tax’ was not an exhaustive one. If the word ‘advance tax’ was given a literal meaning, the same apart from being used only for the purpose of Chapter XVII-C might be held to be tax paid in advance before its due date, i.e., tax paid before the due date. A person, who did not pay the entire tax by way of advance tax, might deposit the balance amount of tax along with his return.

2.5 The Court accordingly held that interest would be payable only in a case, where tax had not been deposited prior to the due date of filing of the income-tax return.

3.  Roshanlal Jain’s case:

3.1 The assesseein Roshanlal S. lain (AOP) v. DCIT, 220 CTR 38 (Guj.), had defaulted in payment of advance tax before the year end, but had paid the shortfall after the year end, and before the due date of filing return of income. The return was filed beyond the due date prescribed u/s.139(1) and the Assessing Officer had charged interest u/ s.234A and u/ s.234B including for the period commencing on the day when the shortfall was made up and ending with the due date prescribed for filing the return of income.

3.2 The assessee challenged the validity of interest charged u/ s.234A and u/ s.234B,besides the constitutional validity of the provisions to submit that S. 234A be held to be ultra vires the Constitution to the extent it required an assessee to pay interest even after the tax has been paid before filing of the return. In relation to S. 234B, it was submitted that when the said provision charged interest for the same period for which interest had already been charged u/ s.234A, the said provision should be held to be unreasonable and should be struck down. The assessee strongly relied on the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Dr. Pronnoy Roy, 254 ITR 755 in support of his contentions.

3.3 The Gujarat High Court negatived the contentions of the assessee to hold as under:

  • On a plain reading of the provisions of S. 234A and S. 234B, it was apparent that S. 234A provides for the liability to pay interest for default in late furnishing of return or non-furnishing of return, while S. 234B levied interest for default in payment of advance tax.

  • Both the provisions, i.e., S. 234A and S. 234Bpro-vided for payment of interest on the amount representing the difference between the amount of tax payable on the total income as determined u/s.143(1) or on regular assessment as reduced by the specified taxes.

  • The scheme that emerged on a conjoint reading of S. 4, S. 2(1), S. 190 and S. 207, was that even though assessment of the total income might be made later in point of time, yet the liability to pay income-tax was relatable to the financial year immediately preceding the assessment year in question and such liability had to be dis-charged either by way of having tax deducted at source or collected at source, or by making payment by way of advance tax in accordance with the provisions of S. 208 to S. 219.

  • S. 208 stipulated that advance tax should be paid during a financial year in every case where the amount of such tax payable by the assessee during that financial year, as computed in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XVIIof the Act, exceeded the prescribed limit.

  • A statutory liability was cast on the assessee to pay advance tax during the financial year as provided by the legislative    scheme.

  • In the instant case, the assessee did not dispute that there was default in payment of advance tax.

  • Payment of tax on which the assessee was resting its case was admittedly made beyond the financial year and therefore, contrary to the legislative scheme. In the circumstances, the question that was to be posed and answered was whether an assessee who had acted contrary to the legislative scheme could seek an equity.

  • For computing interest u/ s.234A, the difference of the amount on which interest became payable had to be worked out by deducting the advance tax paid, including any tax deducted or collected at source from the tax on the total income determined at the time of an assessment.

  • In the instant case, the default in filing of return of income beyond the prescribed date was also admitted. Therefore, it was not possible to accept the contention of the assessee that the amount paid beyond the financial year should be deducted from the tax on the total income as determined on regular assessment. This has to be so, considering the definition of the term ‘advance tax’ as appearing in S. 2, which categorically stipulates that ‘advance tax’ means the advance tax payable in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XVII-CoEven if contextual interpretation is adopted considering the opening portion of 5.2 which states ‘unless the context otherwise requires’, the contention raised by the assessee did not merit acceptance; the context and setting of the aforesaid provisions do not even, prima facie indicate that any other law, like the one canvassed by the assessee, was possible.

  • S. 140A stipulated that where any tax was payable on the basis of any return required to be furnished, such tax together with interest payable under any provision of the Act for any delay in furnishing return, or any default or delay in payment of advance tax before furnishing the return shall be paid. In other words, the Legislature had specifically provided that once there was default in either furnishing of return or in payment of advance tax or both, as regards the amount and the period, interest had to be worked out by the assessee himself. Thus, there is an inherent indication in the statutory scheme that any payment made beyond the financial year had to be considered, but such payment had to be accompanied by the interest payable for the default committed in filing of the return of income or default in payments of advance tax during the financial year. For this purpose, the Legislature had not equated both defaults, but had instead provided for computing interest separately for both the defaults. Therefore, merely because some amount was paid beyond the financial year but before the return was filed, the assessee could not plead that it was not liable to pay interest u/ s.234A; nor could it be given credit for such payment made beyond the financial year for the purpose of computing interest u/ s.234B for the default in payments of advance tax.

  • There was no merit in the contention of the assessee that it had not incurred any liability to pay interest either u/ s.234A or u/ s.234B. It also could not contend that there was any overlapping of the period for which it could not be made liable for paying interest under both the provisions, considering the fact that both the defaults were independent of each other.

  • The doctrine of double jeopardy envisaged by Article 20(2) of the Constitution or S. 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 could have no application in these proceedings. The defaults, and not offences, were not one; non-filing or late filing of return and non-payment or short-payment of advance tax could not be equated.

  • The period for which the liability to pay interest arose, had to be computed in accordance with the term fixed by each of the provisions, viz., S. 234A and S. 234B.

  • The contention, that if the statutory provision re-sulted in an absurdity or mischief not intended by the Legislature, the Court should import words so as to make sense out of the provisions, also did not merit acceptance, considering the fact that on a plain reading of the provisions, the discernible legislative intent could not be said to result in an absurdity.

  • If the plea raised by the assessee was accepted, not only would it require the Court to give a go-bye to the entire statutory scheme, but it would also result in discrimination against majority of the assessees who complied with requirements of the statutory provisions. No person was entitled to seek any relief on the basis of inverse discrimination.

  • There was also no merit in the contention  of the assessee that the provisions contained in S. 234A and S. 234B were ultra vires to the constitution. It was true that the nature of the levy of interest u/ s.234A and u/ s.234Bwas compensatory in character, but from that it was not possible to come to the conclusion that there was any arbitrariness or unreasonableness which would warrant striking down the provision.

3.4 The Gujarat High Court specifically dissented from the decision of the Delhi High Court in Dr. Pronnoy Roy’s case, 254 ITR 755 cited before the Court by the assessee and proceeded to dismiss the writ petition filed by the assessee. The submission of the assessee as to the binding nature of the precedent based on uniformity of expression of opinion on the ground of wise judicial policy also did not deserve acceptance. The Court agreed that there was no dispute about the proposition that in income-tax matters, which were governed by an all India statute, when there was a decision of a High Court interpreting a statutory provision, it would be a wise judicial policy and practice not to take a different view. However, this in the opinion of the Court was not an absolute proposition and there were certain well-known exceptions to it. In cases where a decision was sub silentio, per incuriam, obiter dicta or based on a concession or where a view taken was impossible to arrive at or there was another view in the field or there was a subsequent amendment to the statute or reversal or implied overruling of the decision by a High Court or some such or similar infirmity was manifestly perceivable in the decision, a different view could be taken by the High Court.

4. Observations:

4.1 There are several angles to the issue under consideration, prominent being:

  • the true nature of interest charged u/ s.234A; whether the same is compensatory or penal or both,
  • whether any interest can be charged where the State does not lose any revenue,
  • whether interest can be charged without there being any basis. The base, normally, is the amount unpaid or delayed,
  • the true meaning of the term ‘advance tax’, the true meaning of the term ‘interest’,
  • whether the introduction of S. 271F for levy of penalty has made any difference,
  • whether interest can be levied simultaneously under two different provisions for the same period,
  • whether such simultaneous levies resulted in a case of double jeopardy,
  • whether the levy was in violation of the Indian Contract Act, and
  • whether the levy was in violation of the Constitution of India.

4.2 All these issues, including the issue of the binding nature of an available decision of the High Court, were considered in the above discussed judgments by the Courts in delivering the conflicting verdicts. The Courts have touched upon most of these aspects and have provided their views on the same. As these views so provided are conflicting, an attempt is made to express some views on the subject and reconcile some of them.

4.3 The provisions of S. 234A, S. 234Band S. 243C, replaced the provisions of S. 139(8),S. 215 and S. 216 which provisions in the past postulated for payment of interest. The new provisions are in pari materia with the said provisions. The old provisions were held to be compensatory and not penal in nature. The Courts time and again confirmed that the old provisions could not be anything except compensatory in character. The only material difference in the two situations is that while the old provisions conferred power to waive or reduce the levy of interest, the new provisions make the levy automatic.

4.4 The rationale of levy of interest and penalty has been succinctly stated by the Apex Court in crr v. M. Chandra Sekhar, 151 ITR 433, while considering S. 139(8) of the Act, which is in pari materia with S. 234A in the following terms:

“Now, it will be apparent that delay in filing a return of income results in the postponement of payment of tax by the assessee, resulting in the State being deprived of a corresponding amount of revenue for the period of the delay. It seems that in order to compensate for the loss so occasioned, Parliament enacted the provision for payment of interest.”

4.5 Considering the basis for calculation, the period of calculation and nature thereof implies that interest levy is compensatory in nature. The amount on which the interest is calculated is the amount payable by the assessee towards tax, less the amount already paid by him. The amount of tax which ought to have been paid by the assessee but was not paid because of the non-filing or the delayed filing only can attract interest.

4.6 The golden rule of interpretation of a statute is that it should be read liberally where a statute is capable of two interpretations, the principles of just construction should be taken recourse to. The issue surely admits of two meanings as is clear from the different meanings that the Courts have placed upon it. There is a room here for diverse construction and the provision can be construed to be ambiguous and in the circumstances a construction that leads to a result that is more just can be adopted.

4.7 No loss of revenue is suffered inasmuch as tax has already been paid. Interest is payable either by way of compensation or damages.

4.8 The insertion of S. 271F providing for levy of penalty for delay in filing the return of income abundantly clarifies that the levy of interest u/ s.234 A is compensatory in nature as the penalty, if any, for the default in filing the return of income has been provided by S. 271F. Once this is established, it is easier to accept the view that no compensation can be demanded in the absence of loss of revenue where the taxes are paid leaving no basis for calculation of interest. Two different provisions operating in the same field in the same statute is a proposition difficult to comprehend. If the Government itself has thought of introducing a provision of law levying penalty, having regard to the fact that no such provision existed earlier it cannot be interpreted differently by the Department as it is bound by interpretation supplied by the memorandum reproduced hereafter.

4.9 The memorandum explaining the insertion of S. 271F explains the objective behind its introduction; 231 ITR 228 (St) :

“Providing for penalty for non-filing of returns of income – Under the existing provisions, no penalty is provided for failure to file return of income. The interest chargeable u/ s.234A of the Income-tax Act for not furnishing the return or furnishing the same after the due date is calculated on the basis of tax payable.”

4.10 On a bare reading of the provisions of S. 234A it will be clear that in determining the amount on which interest is leviable, the amount paid by way of advance tax is to be reduced. On a careful reading, it will be clear that the term advance tax for the purposes of S. 234A has not been defined. This is clear from a simple comparison with the provisions of S. 234B which also provides for a similar reduction for the advance tax paid which clarifies that such tax is the one that is referred to in S. 208 and S. 210. In the circumstances, it is possible to take a view that any tax which is paid before the due date of filing the return of income is paid in advance and therefore represented ‘advance tax’. At the same time a note requires to be taken of S. 2(1) which defines the advance tax to mean the tax payable in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XVII-C. This conflict clearly establishes one thing and that is that the issue under consideration is debatable and in that view of the matter a view beneficial to the taxpayer requires to be adopted.

4.11 There also is a constitutionality angle to the issue that was examined by the Gujarat High Court specifically in Roshanlal [ain’s case. Whether Article 14 of the Constitution is violated in any manner, more so if it is found that the provisions of S. 234A provide for discriminatory treatment between persons of the same class placed in similar situations. In this connection the Court observed that a taxing statute enjoys a greater latitude and therefore it was difficult to uphold the proposition that the relevant part of S. 234A was unconstitutional. An inference in regard to contravention of Article 14 of the Constitution would, however, ordinarily be drawn if the provision sought to impose on the same class of persons similarly situated, a burden which led to inequality and the Court found that it was not so in the instant case. The assessee also in that case could not successfully contend that there was any unreasonable classification, considering the majority of assessees who comply with the statutory requirements.

4.12 Similarly the contention of the assessee, in Roshanlal [ain’s case, based on the provisions of S. 59 to S. 61 of the Indian Contract Act also could not carry the case of the assessee any further. The statutory scheme u/s.140A provides to make payment of tax and interest for the stated defaults before the return is filed and, therefore, to contend that the Assessing Officer could not have appropriated the amount paid towards interest did not merit acceptance. The Explanation U /ss.(l) of S. 140A specifically provides that where the amount paid by the assessee under the said sub-section falls short of the aggregate of the tax and interest payable U/ss.(l), the amount so paid shall first be adjusted towards the interest payable as aforesaid and the balance, if any, shall be adjusted towards the tax payable. In light of this specific provision under the Act, the general law under the Contract Act cannot be pressed into service by the assessee.

4.13 The views on the issue under consideration have been sharply divided and the conflict is strongly agitated by both the sides as is clear from the wide cleavage arising on account of the diametrically opposite views of the two High Courts. One must concede that both the views are tenable in law and the issue will continue to haunt the Courts unless the law is amended or the finality to the law is provided by a decision of the Apex Court. Sooner the better as the issue has an application to a very wide spectrum of taxpayers.

Authors’ note:

As we go to press, the Supreme Court in 309 ITR 231, has upheld the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Pronnoy Roy, on the ground that interest levied u/s.234A is compensatory in nature. Therefore, according to the Supreme Court, since the tax due had already been paid, which was not less than the tax payable on the returned income which was accepted, the question of levy of interest did not arise.

Revision u/s.264 — Additional Evidence

Controversies

1. Issue for consideration :


1.1 U/s.264 of the Income-tax Act, the Commissioner is
empowered to revise any order passed by an authority subordinate to him, either
of his own motion or on an application by the assessee for revision. Such
revision order is to be passed after calling for the record of the proceeding in
which the order has been passed, and making inquiry or causing inquiries to be
made.

1.2 The issue has come up before the Courts as to whether,
while considering an application for revision, the Commissioner can take into
account any material or evidence which was not placed before the Assessing
Officer or lower authority passing the order, or events subsequent to the order
sought to be revised.

1.3 While the Calcutta and Gujarat High Courts have taken the
view that the Commissioner can take into account such evidence, the Andhra
Pradesh High Court has taken a contrary view that the Commissioner can consider
only such evidence as was before the subordinate authority who has passed the
order sought to be revised.

2. Phool Lata Somani’s case :


2.1 The issue had arisen before the Calcutta High Court in
the case of Smt. Phool Lata Somani v. CIT, 276 ITR 216.

2.2 In this case, the assessee had made certain investments
in respect of which proof of investment had not been filed before the Assessing
Officer, not even during assessment proceedings. No deduction had therefore been
allowed by the Assessing Officer in respect of such investments.

2.3 The assessee filed a revision application to the
Commissioner u/s.264, claiming deduction in respect of such investment, and
furnished the particulars of investment along with the application for revision.
The Commissioner declined to entertain the revision application on the ground
that the assessee failed to produce the evidence relating to the investment made
by her before the Assessing Officer, despite an opportunity being given to do
so.

2.4 The assessee filed a writ petition before the High Court
challenging such rejection of her revision application. Before the High Court,
on behalf of the assessee it was claimed that the order of the Commissioner was
bad in law as the Commissioner failed to consider the scope and purview of S.
264, which is wider than the power vested u/s.263. It was claimed that the
Commissioner ought to have inquired into the matter as to whether the assessee
failed to produce evidence or furnish particulars. It was further pointed out
that the assessee produced copies of the document showing investments which are
required to be exempted and therefore all required particulars were furnished
with the application for revision. Though it was true that at the time of
assessment the assessee could not produce the document for a variety of reasons,
it was urged that in exercise of his plenary jurisdiction, the Commissioner
should have done justice by allowing the assessee to furnish the document so as
to get the exemption. According to the assessee, the term ‘records’ meant such
records as are available at the time of the decision of the Commissioner, not
limited to the records at the time of passing order by the Assessing Officer.

2.5 On behalf of the Revenue, it was argued before the Court
that the power u/s.264 was absolutely a discretionary power, and the
Commissioner, after having perused records and report furnished by the Assessing
Officer, thought it fit not to interfere with the order passed by the Assessing
Officer. According to the Revenue, the Commissioner in lawful exercise of
jurisdiction had found that the assessee was always a defaulter, and in spite of
opportunity being given, the documents of investment and particulars thereof
were not shown. As such, the Commissioner did not give a premium to the lapses
or laches of the assessee.

2.6 The Court noted the difference between the powers u/s.263
and those u/s.264, particularly the fact that while the power u/s.263 could not
be applied at the instance of the assessee or even at the instance of the
Revenue, but only by the Commissioner himself, the power u/s.264 could be
exercised by the Commissioner, either of his own motion or on an application by
the assessee. It noted that in the case before it, the assessee had made the
application. It was the duty coupled with the power of the Commissioner to make
an inquiry or call for records for inquiry.

2.7 According to the Calcutta High Court, this provision
could be invoked on the application of the assessee for his benefit or for
prejudice. Upon inquiry if it was found that the assessee had been prejudiced by
any order of the Assessing Officer, the Commissioner could undo such wrong with
this power by adopting appropriate, just and lawful measure. The Calcutta High
Court noted that the Kerala High Court had examined the scope of the power
u/s.264 in the case of Parekh Brothers v. CIT, 150 ITR 105. It had taken
the view that the regional power conferred on the Commissioner u/s.264 was very
wide, and that he had the discretion to grant or refuse relief and the power to
pass such order in revision as he thought fit. The discretion, which the
Commissioner had to exercise, was undoubtedly to be exercised judicially, not
arbitrarily according to his fancy.

2.8 Therefore, according to the Calcutta High Court, there
was nothing in S. 264 which placed a restriction on the Commissioner’s
revisional power to give relief to the assessee in a case where the assessee
detected mistakes after the assessment was completed, on account of which he was
over assessed. According to the Court, it was open to the Commissioner to
entertain even a new ground not urged before the lower authorities while
exercising revisional powers.

2.9 According to the Court, the Commissioner, instead of relying solely on the reports of the records of the case, should have made inquiry considering the documents placed before him by the assessee. At least this should have been reflected in the order that he had taken note on the date of making application of the revision, of the tax exempt investment. The Court was of the view that there could have been a variety of reasons for not producing evidence at the time of the assessment; this did not mean that the assessee was precluded from produc-ing evidence of contemporaneous nature at a later stage by filing an application for revision.

2.10 According to the Calcutta High Court, the power of the Commissioner u/ s.264 was to do justice, to prevent miscarriage of justice being rendered. From the records, it appeared that the assessee produced unimpeachable documents showing investment which was otherwise eligible to be taken note of for grant of deduction, and if it had been allowed by the Commissioner, then the assessee would not have suffered over-assessment.

2.11 The Calcutta High Court was therefore of the view that the Commissioner had unjustly refused to entertain the assessee’s application, and therefore the Court set aside the order of the Commissioner and remitted the matter back to the Commissioner for deciding the matter afresh on merits.

2.12 A similar view was taken by the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramdev Exports v. CIT, 251 ITR 873. In this case, the assessee had not claimed deduction u/s.80HHC at the time when the returns were filed. The income returned by the assessee had been accepted by the Assessing Officer u/s.143(3), and therefore the Commissioner rejected the revision application without going into the merits of the deduction claimed. The Gujarat High Court set aside the order of the Commissioner, directing the Commissioner to reconsider the application on merits.

3. M. S. Raju’s  case:

3.1 The issue again came up recently for consideration before the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of M. S. Raju v. Dy. CIT, 216 CTR (AP) 203.

3.2 In this case, the assessee was a film producer, and certain damages of Rs 30 lakhs were claimed from him for late release of the film. These damages pertained to incomes which were offered to tax in AY. 2001-02, though the dispute arose after the end of the previous year and the amount was ultimately settled and paid after the end of the previous year.

3.3 The liability was not recorded in the accounts relating to AY. 2001-02, nor was there any reference to such amount in the audit report. The assessee however claimed deduction of such amount from its taxable income, which claim was rejected by the Assessing Officer.

3.4 The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the dis-allowance on the ground that the dispute continued till October 2001. The Tribunal held that the liability did not accrue during the relevant previous year, and therefore could not be allowed as a deduction.

3.5 For the A.Y. 2002-03, the assessee filed its return of income without claiming deduction of such damages. The assessment order was completed u/s.143(3) without any claim for such deduction. The assessee filed a revision application u/ s.264 before the Commissioner, requesting him to direct the Assessing Officer to allow deduction of Rs.30 lakhs paid as damages.

3.6 The Commissioner rejected the assessee’s revision application holding that the assessment order for A.Y. 2002-03 made no reference to any claim for deduction of Rs.30 lakhs having been made by the assessee, and that since no such issue arose in the assessment proceedings, the subject matter of the petition had no bearing on the assessment made for A.Y. 2002-03.

3.7 Before the Andhra Pradesh High Court, it was argued on behalf of the assessee that the Commis-sioner had refused to exercise jurisdiction merely on a technical ground, which had resulted in denial of a genuine deduction available to the assessee. It was further argued that the Assessing Officer, in his assessment order for A.Y. 2001-02, had accepted that the liability for compensation had arisen during the previous year relevant to A.Y. 2002-03, and that the Revenue could not now be permitted to totally deny the relief.

3.8 The Andhra  Pradesh High Court examined the provisions of S. 264 for the purpose of ascertaining whether the Commissioner was entitled to examine the question raised for the  first  time  before  him which did not form part of the record before the Assessing Officer or even part of the order of assessment. The Court noted the explanation to S. 263(1) substituted by the. Finance Act, 1988 with effect from 1st June 1988, which defined the word ‘record’ to include all records relating to any proceedings under the Act available at the time of examination by the Commissioner, and the absence of similar provision u/ s.264.

3.9 According to the Andhra Pradesh High Court, the omission to insert a similar definition of the word ‘record’ in S. 264, while inserting this defini-tion in S. 263, was significant. The Andhra Pradesh High Court expressed its inability to agree with the opinion of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramdev Exports (supra), since the conscious omis-sion by Parliament to insert a provision in S. 264 similar to explanation (b) of S. 263(1) was not
noticed by the Gujarat High Court. It also did not agree with the opinion of the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in Smt. Phool Lata Somani’s case.

3.10 The Andhra Pradesh High Court therefore held that the term ‘record’ u/s.264 was only the record of proceedings before the assessing authority, and as the assessee had not claimed any such deduction in the return filed before the assessing authority, he was held not to be entitled to raise this question for the first time in revision proceedings u/ s.264. The Andhra Pradesh High Court therefore dismissed the assessee’s writ petition.

4. Observations:

4.1 In the case of CRT v. Shree Manjunathesware Packing Products & Camphor Works, 231 ITR 53, in the context of S. 263, the Supreme Court held as under:

“It, therefore, cannot be said, as contended by learned counsel for the respondent, that the correct and settled legal position, with respect to the meaning of the word ‘record’ till 1st June 1988 was that it meant the record which was available to the ITO at the time of passing of the assessment order. Further, we did not think that such a narrow interpretation of the word ‘record’ was justified in view of the object of the provision and the nature and scope of the powers conferred upon the CIT. The revisional power conferred on the CIT u/ s.263 is of wide amplitude. It enables the CIT to call for and examine the record of any proceeding under the Act. It empowers the CIT to make or cause to be made such enquiry as he deems necessary in order to find out if any order passed by the AO is erroneous insofar as it is prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. After examining the record and after making or causing to be made an inquiry if he considers the order to be erroneous, then he can pass the order thereon as the circumstances of the case justify. Obviously, as a result of the inquiry, he may come in possession of new material and he would be entitled to take the new material into account. If the material, which was not available to the ITO at the time he made the assessment, could thus be taken into consideration by the CIT after holding an enquiry, there is no reason why the material which has already come on record, though subsequent to the making of the assessment, cannot be taken into consideration by him. Moreover, in view of the clear words used in clause (b) of the explanation to S. 263(1), it has to be held that while calling for and examining the record of any proceeding u/s.263(1), it is and it was open to the CIT, not only to consider the record of that proceeding but also the record relating to that proceeding available to him at the time  of examination…….”

4.2 From the above observations of the Supreme Court, it is clear that the term ‘record’ has been held to include subsequent records as well, not only on account of the explanation, but on account of the scheme and purpose of S. 263.

4.3 The reason for insertion of the explanation to S. 263(1) was to overcome the issue of different Court decisions. The mere fact that no similar amendment was carried out to S. 264 does not mean that the term ‘record’ for that-Section has a totally different meaning. In the context of S. 264, there was no such controversy till the amendment to S. 263, and therefore no reason for any such amendment.

4.4 As  rightly observed by  the Calcutta and Gujarat High Courts, the purpose of S. 264 is to do justice to the assessee. If a technical and narrow view is taken of the record permitted to be considered by the Commissioner, it will result in a mis-carriage of justice, and defeat the very purpose of that Section.

4.5 As noted by the Supreme Court in the context . of S. 263, the very fact that even u/ s.264, the Commissioner is permitted not only to examine the record, but also to make enquiries, which could throw up additional facts, clearly indicates that he can consider all facts which are before him, and not merely the facts which were before the Assessing Officer. No purpose would be served by the Commissioner making enquiries if he is not allowed to consider the facts arising out of the enquiries.

4.6 Therefore, the ratio of the decisions of the Calcutta and Gujarat High Courts seem to represent the better view of the matter, that the Commissioner can  examine all the  facts  and  record before  him while  passing an order u/ s.264.

Power to examine the validity of search

1. Issue for consideration :1. Issue for consideration :

    1.1 S. 132 provides for the conduct of a search and seizure operation, by the specified person, under a warrant issued in consequence of information in his possession where he has a reason to believe, that the circumstances specified in S. 132 for conduct of search exist.

    1.2 An assessment of the person being searched is made u/s.153A to S. 153C of the Act in cases of search conducted on or after 1-6-2003, which in the past was completed under Chapter XIVB in consequence of search up to 31-5-2003.

    1.3 S. 246A provides for an appeal, before the CIT(A), against such an assessment made in consequence of a search and S. 253 provides for second appeal before the ITAT.

    1.4 It is often that the person being searched challenges, in appeal, the validity of the search action, by contesting the adequacy of reasons, or, at times the very existence thereof. In such cases, the issue that often arises for consideration is about the power of the ITAT to examine the validity of a search action.

    1.5 One school of thought holds that the ITAT being a quasi-judicial authority is not empowered to sit in judgment on the validity of the action of an Income-tax authority issuing the warrant, against whose action no specific appeal is provided in the Act. The other school upholds the power of the ITAT to question the validity of a search action.

    1.6 The issue has been examined recently by two courts delivering conflicting decisions requiring us to take a note of the same.

2. Chitra Devi Soni’s case, 313 ITR 174 (Raj.) :

    2.1 In Chitra Devi Soni, 313 ITR 174 (Raj.), the assessee, Chitra Devi, filed an appeal before the Tribunal challenging the validity of the assessment order on the ground that the said order was violative of the principles of natural justice. The assessee contended that the assessment order was bad in law for the reason that the same was passed merely on the surmises and beliefs of the authority without being in possession of any material as was required u/s. 132 of the Income-tax Act. According to the assessee, there was no material with the Director to form the belief as was required under the provisions of S. 132(1) and in the absence of any material to this effect, the assessment order passed was not maintainable and, therefore, the assessment order deserved to be set aside.

    2.2 The Tribunal in appeal had adjudicated the said issue, after referring to the various judgments on the subject concerning the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to examine the validity of the authorisation when the same was challenged before the Tribunal.

    2.3 The Tribunal noting the failure of the Revenue authorities to produce the records, held that the search action was invalid in the absence of an authorisation. It held that an authorisation for search was sine qua non for the purpose of passing the order of assessment by the assessing authority and in the case before it, even the factum of authorisation based on reasons had not come on record. In those circumstances, the Tribunal passed the order to the effect that search was not valid and consequentially, the block assessment was held to be illegal.

    2.4 In the above background, the Revenue raised the following question in appeal before the High Court. “Whether for having recourse to assessment for the block period under Chapter XIV-B, a valid search u/s.132 is a condition precedent and mere fact of search is not enough to give jurisdiction to the Assessing Officer to have recourse to the provisions under Chapter XIV-B ? If so, whether, in the facts and circumstances of the present case the Tribunal was right to hold that the search conducted in the present case was invalid ?”

    2.5 The Revenue contended before the Rajasthan High Court that the Tribunal could not look into the validity of the search, conducted under the provisions of S. 132 of the Income-tax Act. It was urged that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction or competence to look into this aspect, and therefore, the judgment rendered by the Tribunal was without jurisdiction and went beyond its competence and the Tribunal had no power to declare a search to be illegal or to be invalid.

    2.6 In reply, the assessee submitted that when the basic foundation, i.e., the authorisation for search issued on the basis of the reasons was not in existence, then the Tribunal had no option but to hold that assessment of the block period was illegal and that the search was without valid authorisaton.

    2.7 It was explained to the Court that for a valid block assessment, it was necessary that a search was conducted u/s.132 and for conducting such search, authorisation was required to be given only where the concerned authority had reasons to believe that there existed circumstances enumerated in clauses (a) to (c) of S. 132(1), and in the absence of authorisation based on such reasons, the block assessment itself could not be made.

2.8 The Court took note of the provisions of Chapter XIB and of S. 132 and observed that a bare reading thereof left the Court in no manner of doubt, in view of the use of word ‘then’, that the act of authorising a search had of necessity to be preceded by the existence of reason based on material in possession of the authority. In other words, existence of reason to believe, in consequence of information in possession of the officer was the sine qua non to entitle the authority to issue an authorisation as required by S. 132. It was obvious to the Court that on dissatisfaction of the abovementioned requirements of law, there could possibly be no authorisation, irrespective of the fact that it might have been made and issued and in turn if any search was conducted in pursuance of such an authorisation issued in the absence of requisite sine qua non, the search could not be said to be a ‘search’ u/s.132 of the Act, as contemplated by the provisions of S. 158B of the Act.

2.9 The Court held that the issue of an authorisation based on the reasons recorded in turn on the basis of the material available went to the root of the matter concerning the jurisdiction of the assessing authority to proceed under Chapter XIV-B and in that view of the matter, the Tribunal was very much justified, and had jurisdiction to go into the question as to whether the search was conducted consequent upon the authorisation having been issued in the background of the existence of eventualities and material mentioned in S. 132(1). In the end the Court observed that it was conscious of the fact that it was not open for the Court to go into the question of sufficiency of the reasons on the basis of which the competent authority might have had entertained the reason to believe the existence of one or more of the eventualities under clauses (a) to (c) but then the question as to whether there at all existed any material to entertain the reason to believe, even purportedly, consequent upon information in his possession, with the competent authority was the matter which could definitely be looked into by the Tribunal so also by the Court as the absence thereof would vitiate the entire action.

3. Paras Rice Mills’ case:

3.1 In the case of Paras Rice Mills, 313 ITR 182 (P &H), a search and seizure action u/s.132(1) of the Act was carried out on September 26, 1995, at the business premises of the assessee and the assessment u/s.158BC was completed in consequence of the said search. The assessee preferred an appeal and also raised grounds contesting the validity of search. The Tribunal held that the search and seizure was illegal as no material was produced before the Tribunal to show that the requirements of S. 132(1) of the Act were complied with.

3.2 The Revenue in an appeal before the High Court raised the following question for consideration of the Punjab & Haryana High Court. “Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was right in law in deciding to go into the validity of the action taken u/s.132(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961?”

3.3 The Revenue contended that the Tribunal acted beyond its jurisdiction in deciding the issue of validity of the action by relying upon the judgments of the Delhi Tribunal in Virinder Bhatia, 79 ITD 340 and of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Gaya Prasad Pathak, 290 ITR 128.

3.4 In reply, the assessee claimed that the Tribunal had the power to examine the validity of the search and in support of their claim relied on the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court in Smt. Chitra Devi Soni, 313 ITR 174 and also a judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of Raj Kumar Gupta (ITA No. 50 of 2002 passed on August 21, 2003).

3.5 The Delhi High Court expressed their agreement with the view taken by the Delhi Tribunal in Virinder Bhatia, 79 ITD 340 and the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Gaya Prasad Pathak, 290 ITR 128 and for the same reason, respectfully disagreed with the view taken by the Rajasthan High Court in Smt. Chitra Devi Soni, 313 ITR 174 and observed that the judgment of the Court  in Raj Kumar  Gupta’s case (supra) did  not deal with the issue of scope of the assessing authority and power of the Tribunal to go into the question of validity of search.

3.6 The Court held that the Tribunal when hearing an appeal against the order of assessment could not go into the question of validity or otherwise of any administrative decision for conducting the search and seizure which might be the subject matter of challenge in independent proceedings where the question of validity or otherwise of administrative order could be gone into. The appellate authority in the opinion of the court was concerned with correctness or otherwise of the assessment, only.

4. Observations:

4.1 It is puzzling for an ordinary mind to question the power of the Tribunal to examine the validity of a search action u/s.132, where the Tribunal’s power to otherwise deal with the validity of an assessment, reassessment or revision under the Income-tax Act is accepted without batting an eyelid. Like reassessment or revision, a search also is authorised by one of specified authorities and it becomes difficult to conceive as to how these acts are different in nature so that one is capable of being tried by the ITAT and the other is not.

4.2 On the first blush, it may appear to be obvious to side with the view of the Rajasthan High Court holding that the Tribunal is vested with the power to examine the validity or otherwise of the search action but on deeper examination of the fact one needs to concede that the case of the revenue also deserves due consideration as the same is also found on the edifice of sound reasoning.

4.3 A right of an appeal is not an inherent right but is derived form statute which in the present case is under S. 246A and S. 253. An appeal lies only in cases where the circumstances listed in these sections exist failing which no appeal can lie. On a reading of these provisions, one would agree that they do not specifically provide for an appeal against the action of the authority issuing a search warrant. There is no provision permitting a person being searched to challenge the act of the authority issuing the search warrant before any other Income-tax authority like CIT(A) or the quasi-judicial authority like Tribunal. The only remedy is to approach the Courts, under the writ jurisdiction, vested under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution of India, for challenging the validity of the search action. Relying on this understanding the Revenue authorities including the Courts have taken a view that it is not possible for the Tribunal to examine the validity of the search action.

4.4 It is in the context of what is stated above that the MP High Court in Gaya Prasad Pathak, CIT, 290 ITR 128, in an appeal against the third member order of the Tribunal concerning itself with S. 132A, observed that the jurisdiction exercised by the statutory authority while hearing the appeal could not extend to the examination of the justifiability of an action u/s.132A of the Act. That a search warrant issued by the Commissioner was without jurisdiction or not could not be the subject ma tter of assessment as the same did not arise in the course of assessment and therefore, neither the Assessing Officer nor the Appellate authority could dwell upon the said facet as the same was not a jurisdictional fact within the parameters of assessment proceeding or of an appeal arising therefrom where the scope was restricted to adjudication of the fact to the limited extent as to whether such search and seizure had taken place and what had been found during the search and seizure. The validity of search and seizure, in the considered opinion of the Court, was neither jurisdictional fact nor adjudicatory fact and therefore, the same could not be dwelt upon or delved into in an appeal.

4.5 A note also deserves to be taken of the decision of the Special Bench of the Delhi ITAT in the case of Promain Ltd. 95 ITD 489 wherein it has been held that the Tribunal appointed under the Income-tax Act does not have the power to examine the validity of a search action conducted u/s.132 or u/ s.132A while disposing of appeal against the order of block assessment.

4.6 Having noted the case of the Revenue, let us also appreciate the case of the taxpayer which also is founded on the strong base if not stronger than the Revenue’s base. On a careful observation of the provisions of Chapter XIVB as also S. 153A to S. 153C, it is noticed that a search assessment for the block period is made possible in cases where a search action u/s.132 or u/s.132A has taken place. It is only when the AO is satisfied about the fact of the search that he derives a jurisdiction to make a search assessment and it is at this stage that the authority vested with the power to make a search assessment has to satisfy himself about the validity of the search howsoever limited its scope is. Any failure by this authority to satisfy himself can be a subject matter of appeal before the CIT(A) and the tribunal and it is for this reason that the Appellate authority and with respect, an assessing authority has the power to examine whether the prima facie requirements for issue of a search authorisation were present or not.

4.7 An act of issuing a search warrant is an act carried out by the authority appointed under the Act which provides the very source on the basis of which a search assessment for the block period is carried out and it will be fair to subject such an act to examination by an appellate authority in cases where an appeal is filed against the order made on the basis of the presumption of a valid search. The power of a search assessment is derived only form an action u/s.132 or u/s.132A and in that view of the matter it is just to subject the same to the scrutiny of the appellate authorities otherwise empowered to examine the whole canvass of assessment that is springing form the search.

4.8 Article 323 of the Constitution of India lends the source for setting up of a Tribunal including ITAT. The said Article, vide clause 2(i) provides for power to examine material incidental to assessment by the Tribunal. It is this power that should empower the ITAT to examine the reasons and the validity of search.
 
4.9 It is true that the ITAT, being the creature of the Income-tax Act, derives its power under the statute and therefore its powers should be circum-scribed to those which are specifically vested in it by the Act. In our opinion, there is no reason to restrict the power of the ITAT where it is otherwise empowered to examine the validity of assessment.

Needless to say that when an Appellate authority is required to look into the validity of an assessment whose foundation is based on a single act, in this case a search action, it per force is required to examine the source material leading to such an assessment.

4.10 Initiating a search is an administrative action with dire consequences and therefore attracts principles of natural justice not only requiring but empowering the ITAT to examine the source material for search and its validity. Please see Rajesh Kumar, 287 ITR 91 (SC).

4.11 To contest such a scrutiny power of an Appellate authority only on the ground that as the AO does not have power to do so, the same cannot be done by the Appellate authorities as well is not in keeping with the prevailing times.

4.12 While two diametrically opposite views, genuinely possible, on the subject are considered, it will be fair and just and also equitable to read the power of examining validity of the Tribunal while interpreting its power u/s.253 and such reading will support the principles of natural justice instead of , frustrating it. Till such time a consensus of judicial opinion is achieved, an aggrieved person is advised to explore the possibility of approaching the High Court under Article 226 for suitable remedy which though costly may be expeditious.

S. 14A WHERE NO EXPENDITURE INCURRED

1.  Issue for consideration:
  S. 14A
provides for disallowance of an expenditure incurred in relation to an
income which does not form part of the total income under the Act.
Ss.(1) of the said Section reads as under:
  “For the purposes of
computing the total income under this Chapter, no deduction shall be
allowed in respect of expenditure incurred by the assessee in relation
to income which does not form part of the total income under this Act.”

 
Ss.(2) and Ss.(3) inserted by the Finance Act, 2006 w.e.f. 1-4-2007,
are held to be prospectively applicable w.e.f. A.Y. 2007-08 by the
Bombay High Court in the case of Godrej and Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd., 328 ITR
81. These provisions provide for the manner of determination of the
amount of expenditure liable for disallowance in accordance with the
prescribed method and vests the government with the power to prescribe
the rules for computation. In pursuance of this power, Rule 8D has been
introduced by Notification dated 24-3-2008 which is held to be
prospectively applicable from A.Y. 2008-09 onwards, by the said decision
in the case of Godrej and Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. (supra).

  Ss.(3)
of the said Section provides that the provisions of Ss.(2) shall apply
even in cases where an assessee claims that no expenditure has been
incurred by him in relation to an exempt income.

 The Punjab and
Haryana High Court in some of the cases has held that no disallowance
u/s.14A was possible where the nexus between the expenditure claimed and
the exempt income was not established and where there was no finding by
the AO, of the assessee having incurred expenditure for earning an
exempt income. This finding of the Punjab and Haryana High Court
requires to be tested and considered afresh in view of the observations
of the Bombay High Court in its recent decision.

2.  Hero Cycles Ltd.’s case:

 
In CIT v. Hero Cycles Ltd., 323 ITR 518 (P & H), the Revenue for
the A.Y. 2004-05 raised the following substantial question of law:
 
“Whether on the facts and in law, the Tribunal was legally justified in
deleting the disallowance of Rs.3,48,04,375 u/s.14A of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 by ignoring the evidence relied on by the AO and holding that a
clear nexus has not been established that the interest-bearing funds
have been vested for investments generating tax-free dividend income?”

 
In that case, the assessee was engaged in manufacturing of cycles and
parts of two-wheelers in multiple units. It earned dividend income,
which was exempted u/s.10(34) and u/s.(35). The AO made an inquiry
whether any expenditure was incurred for earning this income and as a
result of the said inquiry addition was made by way of disallowance
u/s.14A(3), which was partly upheld by the CIT(A). The Tribunal held
that there was no nexus with the expenditure incurred and the income
generated and recorded as under:

“We have perused the same and
find that the plea of the assessee that the entire investments have been
made out of the dividend proceeds, sale proceeds, debenture redemption,
etc., is borne out of record. In fact the CIT(A) has also come to a
categorical finding that insofar as other units are concerned, none of
their funds have been utilised to make the investments in question. One
aspect which is evident that the interest income earned by the main
unit, Ludhiana, exceeds the expenditure by way of interest incurred by
it, thus obviating the application of S. 14A of the Act. Even with
regard to the funds of the main unit, Ludhiana the funds flow position
explained shows that only the non-interest bearing funds have been
utilised for making the investments. At pp. 3 to 6 of the paper book are
placed the details of the bank accounts, wherein the amount of
dividend, sale proceeds of shares, debenture redemption, etc. have been
received and later on invested in the investments in question. Such
funds are ostensibly without any burden of interest expenditure. Thus,
on facts we do not find any evidence to show that the assessee has
incurred interest expenditure in relation to earning the tax-exempt
income in question. We find that all the details in question were
produced before the AO and the CIT(A) also. The entire evidence in this
regard, which is submitted before the lower authorities have been
compiled in the paper book, to which we have already adverted to in the
earlier part of the order. Therefore, merely because the assessee has
incurred interest expenditure on funds borrowed in the main unit,
Ludhiana, it would not ipso facto invite the disallowance u/s.14A,
unless there is evidence to show that such interest-bearing funds have
been invested in the investments which have generated the ‘tax-exempt
dividend income’. As noted earlier, there is no nexus established by the
Revenue in this regard and therefore, on a mere presumption, the
provisions of S. 14A cannot be applied. Thus, we find that the CIT(A)
erred in partly sustaining the addition. In fact, in the absence of such
nexus, the entire addition made was required to be deleted. We
accordingly hold so.”

  The counsel for the Revenue relied upon
S. 14A(3) and Rule 8D(1)(b) to submit that even where the assessee
claimed that no expenditure had been incurred, the correctness of such
claim could be gone into by the AO and in the present case, the claim of
the assessee that no expenditure was incurred was found to be not
acceptable by the AO and thus disallowance was justified.  

The
Court was unable to accept the submission in view of finding that the
expenditure on interest was set off against the income from interest and
the investments in the shares and mutual funds were out of the dividend
proceeds. In view of this finding of fact, the High Court held that
disallowance u/s.14A was not sustainable. It observed that whether, in a
given situation, any expenditure was incurred which was to be
disallowed, was a question of fact. The Court rejected the contention of
the Revenue that directly or indirectly some expenditure was always
incurred which must be disallowed u/s.14A, and the expenditure so
incurred could not be allowed to be set off against the business income
which may nullify the mandate of S. 14A. It held that the disallowance
u/s.14A required finding of incurring of expenditure; where it was found
that, for earning exempted income, no expenditure had been incurred,
disallowance u/s.14A could not stand. In the case before the Court, the
finding on this aspect, against the Revenue, was not shown to be
perverse. Consequently, disallowance was held to be not permissible. The
Court relied upon the view earlier taken by the Court in IT Appeal No.
504 of 2008, CIT v. Winsome Textile Industries Ltd., decided on 25th
August, 2009, wherein it was observed as under :

  “Contention
raised on behalf of the Revenue is that even if the assessee had made
investment in shares out of its own funds, the assessee had taken loans
on which interest was paid and all the money available with the assessee
was in common kitty, as held by this Court in CIT v. Abhishek
Industries Ltd., (2006) 205 CTR (P&H) 304; (2006) 286 ITR 1
(P&H) and therefore, disallowance u/s.14A was justified. We do not
find any merit in this submission. Judgment of this Court in Abhishek
Industries (supra) was on the issue of allowability of interest paid on
loans given to sister concerns, without interest. It was held that
deduction for interest was permissible when loan was taken for business
purpose and not for diverting the same to sister concern without having
nexus with the business. Observations made therein have to be read in
that context. In the present case, admittedly, the assessee did not make
any claim for exemption. In such a situation, S. 14A could have no
application.”

  The Punjab and Haryana High Court held that no
substantial question of law arose for consideration in the appeal filed
by the Revenue.

  3.  Godrej and Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd.’s case:
 
The issue of disallowance u/s.14A was recently examined in detail by
the Bombay High Court in the case of Godrej and Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. v.
CIT, 328 ITR 81. In that case the assessee had claimed a dividend of
Rs.34.34 crore as exempt from the total taxable income u/s.10(33) for
A.Y. 2002-03 by claiming that no expenditure was incurred in relation to
the said dividend income. The AO was of the view that if the assessee
had not made investments in these securities, it would not have been
required to borrow funds to that extent and consequently, the interest
burden could have been reduced. On this basis, the AO concluded that a
part of the interest payment of Rs.51.71 crore, claimed as deduction,
pertained to funds utilised for the purpose of investment in shares to
the extent of Rs.6.92 crore and disallowed the said amount by resorting
to the provisions of S. 14A. The CIT(A) relying on the decisions for the
earlier years held that no expenditure was incurred for earning the
dividend income. The Tribunal however restored the matter to the file of
the Assessing Officer to verify whether any expenditure besides
interest was incurred for the year in relation to the said dividend
income.

  On the above facts, several questions were raised for
consideration of the High Court by the company, which inter alia
required the Court to examine the need for establishing the nexus of an
expenditure claimed with that of the exempt income.

  It was
contented by the company in the context that no expenditure was incurred
by it in relation to the said dividend income and the interest claimed
by it pertained to earning of the taxable income and that the investment
in shares on which dividend was received was made out of own funds and
therefore no disallowance was possible u/s.14A read with or without Rule
8D. It was further contended that the Tribunal was in error in
restoring the matter back to the file of the Assessing Officer for
examining the facts afresh, as the facts during the year were the same
as were prevailing in the earlier years for which the disallowance was
deleted.

  The Revenue countered the contentions of the company
by stating that the provisions of S. 14A, in particular of Ss.(3), were
applicable to the case of a company where a claim was made by the
company that no expenditure was incurred by the company in relation to
the said dividend income.  The Bombay High Court, in the context,
observed in paragraphs 25 and 69 to 73 of the judgment that once the
Assessing Officer was satisfied about the fact that some expenditure was
incurred in relation to the income not included in the total income, it
was mandatory for him to disallow an appropriate amount computed under
Rule 8D. It noted that Ss.(3) covered a case where the assessee claimed
that no expenditure was made in relation to the concerned income. The
Court held that the claim of the assessee that no expenditure was
incurred was required to be examined by the Assessing Officer,
irrespective of the finding of fact in earlier year that investment in
the shares was made out of the company’s own funds, inasmuch as some
expenditure besides interest could have been incurred and such a
possibility was not examined by the Assessing Officer. Lastly, the Court
held that irrespective of Rule 8D, the Assessing Officer was entitled
to apportion an indirect expenditure by virtue of S. 14A (1) itself and
once a proximate nexus was established, a disallowance by resorting to
apportionment of an expenditure claimed was permissible in law.

  4.  Observations:
 
The decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court was for A.Y.
2004-05, while that of the Bombay High Court was for A.Y. 2002-03.
Admittedly, the benefit of the provisions of S. 14A(2) and (3) and Rule
8D was not available to the Courts, where those provisions are accepted
to be prospective in their application. Under the circumstances,
irrespective of the relevance of the issue being examined for and from
A.Y. 2008-09, the same would continue to be relevant for assessment
years up to A.Y. 2007-08. Accordingly, for a valid disallowance for
those years, the Assessing Officer should have established that an
expenditure was incurred for earning the income not included in the
total income and should have further established nexus of such
expenditure to the income not included in the total income. The issue,
in our opinion, however continues to be relevant even for A.Y. 2008-09
and onwards.

  It is true that Ss.(3) provides expressly for
applicability of S. 14A even in cases where an assessee claims that no
expenditure has been incurred. But then, it is equally true that Ss.(2)
specifically provides that an AO shall proceed to determine the amount
of disallowance only if he is not satisfied with the correctness of the
claim of the assessee that no expenditure was incurred by him in
relation to an exempt income. In doing so, the Assessing Officer shall
be required to establish the nexus of the expenditure sought to be
disallowed with the income not included in total income before
quantifying the disallowance as per Rule 8D.

  Even the Bombay
High Court in Godrej & Boyce’s case (supra) has confirmed that
satisfaction of the AO is an essential pre-condition for applicability
of S. 14A and of Rule 8D and it is for achieving this satisfaction that
the Court restored the case to the file of the Assessing Officer. In
fact, even Rule 8D requires such satisfaction by the AO before
permitting him to compute the amount of disallowance.

  The stand
of the Income-tax Department that applicability of the formula under
Rule 8D is irrespective of absence of expenditure and that a
disallowance of an amount computed as per Rule 8D is mandatory, appears
to be incorrect. Irrespective of the assessment year involved, the
finding by the AO that some expenditure in relation to an exempt income
was incurred by the assessee would be essential for invoking the
provisions of S. 14A, more so, in cases where an assessee has claimed
that he has not incurred any expenditure. It is in the context of the
continued validity of this proposition, that the case for reading down
clause (iii) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 8D continues to be meritorious, as
the said clause (iii) provides for an ad-hoc disallowance independent of
nexus of an expenditure sought to be disallowed to an income not
included in the total income.

  It will be equally incorrect for
the Income-tax Department to solely rely on the provisions of Clause
(iii) of sub-Rule (2) of Rule 8D to advance the case of disallowance by
stating that the amount computed thereunder is deemed to be an
expenditure incurred in relation to an exempt income. The need for nexus
continues to be of relevance. Further, it is well settled that a rule
cannot travel beyond the provisions of the Section under which it falls.

 
The decisions of the Punjab & Haryana High Court, to the effect
that S. 14A requires a finding by the AO of having incurred some
expenditure before the disallowance can be made, continues to be of
significant relevance.

Reopening of a block assessment

1. Issue for consideration :

    1.1 Chapter XIV-B, inserted in the Income-tax Act, 1961 by the Finance Act, 1995 w.e.f. 1-7-1995, provides for a special assessment procedure for taxing an undisclosed income detected as a result of a search action u/s.132 that took place on or after 1st July, 1995 but before 31st May, 2003.

    1.2 The chapter contains complete mechanism for computation and assessment of the total undisclosed income of the block period and includes mechanisms for filing of a return of income, issue of a notice, payment of taxes, interest and penalty. The chapter, as considered by the Courts, is a code by itself.

    1.3 The regular income, i.e., the disclosed income of the block period continues to be governed by the general provisions of the Income-tax Act including those providing for regular assessment of such income.

    1.4 The provisions for special assessment, under Chapter XIV-B, of undisclosed income and that for regular assessment u/s.143(3), operate in different fields and run parallel to each other for assessment of income of an year; one for taxing an undisclosed income, while the other for bringing to tax a disclosed income.

    1.5 Chapter XIV-B also provides for an application of all those provisions of the Act other than those that are specifically differentiated under Chapter XIV-B. In other words, unless otherwise provided in Chapter XIVB, the provisions contained in general law of the Act will apply to the assessment of an undisclosed income even for a block period, except in cases where the chapter provides for any specific departure from the general provisions of the Act by specially providing a different course.

    1.6 An interesting issue that arises, in the context, is about the possibility of reopening a block assessment made under Chapter XIVB and the consequent reassessment of the undisclosed income of the block period. The Courts have been asked to examine the possibility of application of provisions of S. 147 and S. 148 for reopening of a completed block assessment. While the Gujarat High Court finds it to be not possible, the Gauhati High Court has held that it is possible to reopen a completed block assessment.

2. Cargo Clearing Agency (Gujarat)’s case, 307 ITR 1 (Guj.) :

    2.1 In the case of CIT v. Cargo Clearing Agency (Gujarat), 307 ITR 1, certain loose papers were found and seized during the search proceedings u/s.132 of the Act from the residential premises of one of the erstwhile partners of the petitioner-firm and his statement was recorded. An order u/s.158BD of the Act was made on a total income of Rs.40,50,900 after taking approval of the Commissioner of Income-tax, Rajkot for the block period in the status of AOP pursuant to the return of income for the block period filed showing a total undisclosed income at Rs.30,00,000. The assessment was made after various details and explanation were called for, vide notice issued under Chapter XIVB.

    2.2 Subsequently a notice u/s.148 of the Act was issued seeking to reassess the income for the block period by stating that there was a reason to believe that the income for the block period had escaped assessment within the meaning of S. 147 of the Act and that the notice was issued after obtaining the necessary satisfaction of the Commissioner. In spite of repeated letters asking for the reasons recorded u/s.148(2) of the Act, the same were not supplied. In a correspondence addressed to one of the ex-partners it was stated that it was not obligatory to supply reasons recorded and the addressee was directed to file return immediately. It is at this stage that the petitioner had approached the Court challenging the impugned notice issued u/s.148 of the Act.

    2.3 The principal issue raised in the petition was whether it was open to the assessing authority to issue notice u/s.148 of the Act in respect of an assessment framed for a block period under Chapter XIVB of the Act.

    2.4 On behalf of the petitioners, it was contended that S. 147 of the Act permitted an Assessing Officer to reassess an income which had escaped assessment for any assessment year. Emphasising the language of the provision, it was contended that an assessment Chapter XIB was not in respect of any assessment year but was for the block of years and as such it was impossible for the Assessing Officer to form a belief that any income chargeable to tax for any assessment year had escaped assessment.

    2.5 Based on the provisions of S. 147 of the Act and the proviso therein it was submitted that the scheme would fail in the case of assessment for the block period as the limitation u/s.147 that has been prescribed for issuance of notice has been reckoned from the end of a particular assessment year and as such it was not possible to specify the assessment year, in the case of a block assessment, from the end of which the time limit could be computed.

    2.6 The provisions of S. 151 and S. 153 of the Act were also relied upon by the petitioners to point out that the condition for obtaining the sanction of the higher authority as provided by S. 151 of the Act in cases where four years had expired from the relevant assessment year could not be complied with and fulfilled, as in respect of the block period there was no relevant assessment year w.r.t which the time limit could be observed. Similarly, S. 153 of the Act also provided different period of limitation as against the provisions of S. 158BE of the Act which provides for time limit for completion of block assessment.

    2.7 It was also contended that the order of block assessment was passed after the approval of the Commissioner and therefore a reopening with the sanction of the subordinate authority was bad in law.

    2.8 On behalf of the Revenue, it was submitted that S. 158BH of the Act specifically provided that save as otherwise provided in Chapter XIVB, all other provisions of the Act shall apply to assessment made under Chapter XIVB. It was, therefore, contended that when one considered the definition of ‘block period’ as provided in S. 158B(a) of the Act, it was clear that the said term covered the period comprising previous years relevant to 10/6 assessment years preceding the previous year in which the search was conducted u/s.132 of the Act and therefore, wherever the words ‘assessment year’ appeared in Chapter XIV of the Act relating to procedure for assessment, the term ’block period’ had to be read in the place of ‘assessment year’ to make the scheme workable.

2.9 Referring to Ss.(2) of S. 158BA of the Act, it was submitted for the Revenue that for the purpose of charging tax not only S. 113 of the Act was mate-rial, but even S. 4 had to be considered as laid down by the Apex Court in the case of CIT v. Suresh N. Gupta, 297 ITR 322. It was submitted that the Apex Court has considered the entire scheme of Chapter XIVB of the Act and had come to the conclusion that computation of undisclosed income had to be made u/s. 158BB in the manner provided in Chapter IV of the Act and therefore, the application of the said Chapter was not ruled out by the provisions of Chapter XIVB of the Act; that non obstante clause appearing in S. 158BA of the Act had to be read in juxtaposition with S. 158BH of the Act; that the concepts of ‘previous year’ and ‘total income’ were retained in Chapter XIVB of the Act and, therefore, ap-plication of Chapter XIV of the Act could not be ruled out from the block assessment procedure.

2.10 To begin with, the Gujarat High Court observed that in the aforesaid circumstances, when one considered the entire scheme relating to procedure for assessment/reassessment as laid down in the group of Sections from S. 147 to S. 153 of the Act and compared the same with special procedure for assessment of search cases under Chapter XIVB of the Act, it became apparent that the normal procedure laid down in Chapter XIV of the Act had been given a go by when Chapter XIVB of the Act itself laid down that the said Chapter provided for a special procedure for assessment of search cases and the stand of the Revenue that S. 158BH of the Act permitted all other provisions of the Act to apply to assessment made under Chapter XIVB of the Act did not merit acceptance.

2.11 The Apex Court decision, the Court proceeded further, on which great emphasis has been placed on behalf of the Revenue in fact went on to support the view adopted by the petitioner. The Court noted that the controversy before the Apex Court was in relation to the rate of tax which was to be applied to the undisclosed income assessed in terms of Chapter XIVB of the Act and the Apex Court in that case was concerned mainly with computation of undisclosed income u/s.158BB(1) of the Act. The Gujarat High Court pointed out that it had already noticed that S. 158BH of the Act provided for invoking other machinery provisions to an assessment made under Chapter XIVB of the Act which did not require other provisions of the Act to be applied to a block assessment to be made under Chapter XIVB of the Act.

2.12 The Apex Court decision, the Court further noted, also provided for a harmonious construction on the basis of reading of the mode of computation provided in Chapter IV of the Act and provided under Chapter XIVB of the Act by stating that S. 158BH inter alia, provided that other provisions of the Act should apply if there was no conflict between the provisions of Chapter XIVB of the Act and other provisions of the Act. The Court further noted that in a situation where there was a conflict between the provisions of block assessment procedure prescribed under Chapter XIVB of the Act and other provisions of the Act, it would be the special procedure prescribed under Chapter XIVB of the Act which had to prevail.

2.13 The Court further noted that the entire scheme under Chapter XIV of the Act, more particularly from S. 147 to S. 153 of the Act pertaining to reassessment and the special procedure for assessing the undisclosed income of the block period under Chapter XIVB of the Act, were separate and distinct from each other and in the circumstances, as per the established rules of interpretation, unless and until a plain reading of the two streams of assessment procedure did not result in the procedures being independently workable, only then the question of resolving the conflict would arise; to the contrary, in the present case, in the light of the provisions of S. 158BH of the Act, once there was a conflict between the two streams of procedure, as laid down by the Apex Court, the provisions of Chapter XIVB of the Act shall prevail and have primacy.

2.14 Thus, viewed from any angle, the Court held, the stand of the Revenue did not merit acceptance. Once assessment had been framed u/s.158BA of the Act in relation to undisclosed income from the block period as a result of search there was no question of the Assessing Officer issuing notice u/s.148 of the Act for reopening such assessment as the said concept was abhorrent to the special scheme of assessment of undisclosed income for block period. At the cost of repetition it was required to be stated and emphasised that the first proviso u/d 158BC(a) of the Act specifically provided that no notice u/s.148 of the Act was required to be issued for the purpose of proceeding under Chapter XIVB of the Act.
 
Peerchand Ratanlal Baid (HUF)’s case :

3.1 The brief facts in the case of CIT v. Peerchand Ratanlal Baid (HUF), 226 CTR 189 (Gau.) were that a search in the Baid Group of Companies had taken place u/s.132 in the year 1995 . The assessee, a HUF, as the proprietor of one of the group companies, filed the return for the block period 1986-87 to 1996-97 showing undisclosed income of Rs.60 lakhs. The assessment was completed u/s.158BC of the Act, determining an undisclosed income of Rs.1,17,25,416. The assessee filed an appeal before the Tribunal against the aforesaid order of assessment which was partly allowed and the undisclosed income for the block period was revised to Rs.24,37,850. Subsequently it was found that some of the documents seized in the case of another group company i.e., M/s. Baid Commercial Enterprises, for the same block period i.e., 1986-87 to 1996-97, pertained to the assessee. Accordingly, the AO initiated the proceedings for reopening asking the assessee to explain why the amount of Rs.59,18,246 covered by the aforesaid seized documents or any part thereof should not be added to the total undisclosed income of the assessee for the block period. The explanation given by the assessee having been found to be unsatisfactory the AO added a sum of Rs.13,66,715 to the undisclosed income of the assessee for the block period revising the assessed income to Rs.38,04,570.

3.2 The Gauhati High Court while upholding the order of the Tribunal allowing the appeal of the assessee on merits and other facets of the case, the Court at the request of the counsel appearing for the assessee, adjudicated a question raised by him to the effect that it was not within the power and jurisdiction of the assessing authority to issue notice u/s.148 of the Act in respect of an assessment for a block period made under Chapter XIV-B of the Act by placing reliance on the judgment of the High Court of Gujarat in Cargo Clearing Agency (Gujarat) v. JCIT, 307 ITR 1 (Guj.).

3.3 The Gauhati High Court expressed its inabil-ity to subscribe to the views recorded by the Gujarat High Court and the reasons contained in support thereof. In reaching the aforesaid conclusion the Court relied on a judgment of the Apex Court in CIT v. Suresh N. Gupta, 297 ITR 322 (SC) which in the respectful opinion of the Court succinctly summed up the situation and provided adequate justification for the Court’s respectful disagreement with the views of the Gujarat High Court expressed in Cargo Clearing Agency’s case (supra).

3.4 Culling from the decision on the said case of Suresh N. Gupta (supra), the Court observed that each ‘previous year’ under the Act was a distinct unit of time for the purpose of assessment and the block period under the scheme of Chapter XIVB; it was an expanded unit of time comprising of 10/6 assessment years preceding the previous years; that the unit of time in both situations above remains constant; that it was open for Parliament to treat 10/ 6 previous years as one unit of time for the purposes of assessment for the block period; that the concept of previous year was retained in Chapter XIVB of the Act; that the non obstante clause in S. 158BA had to be read in juxtaposition with S. 158BH and if so read, other provisions of the Act would be applicable to the scheme under Chapter XIVB, if no conflict arose upon such application.

3.5 The principles noted above, the Court observed, took adequate care of the contrary view of the Gujarat High Court holding that S. 147 could not have any application to a block assessment which was made for 10/6 years without reference to any particular assessment year, as S. 147 of the Act provided only for reassessment of escaped income of any assessment year specified therein.

3.6 As regards the observation of the Gujarat High Court to the effect that all material, in course of block assessment following a search, was available with the AO and therefore the conditions precedent for the exercise of power u/s.147/148 were not satisfied, the Gauhati High Court stated that “we may straightway point out that the aforesaid view does not take care of the situation that has arisen in the present case, details of which have been set out hereinabove. We, therefore, deem it appropriate to understand that the view expressed in Cargo Clearing Agency (supra) cannot be considered to be comprehensive covering all situations to justify exclusion of the power u/s.147/u/s.148 from the provision of the special procedure for block assessments contemplated by Chapter XIVB of the Act”.

3.7 The question of limitation dealt with by the Gujarat High Court, in the considered view of the Court, had to be understood in the context of the separate period of limitation provided by S. 158BE of the Act for completion of block assessments and not for reopening such assessment for the block period; that in the absence of any separate and specific period of limitation for reopening of block assessments in Chapter XIVB, on the ratio of the judgment in CIT v. Suresh N. Gupta (supra), the provisions contained in Chapter XIV prescribing the period of limitation for reopening of assessment must be understood to be applicable to assessments under Chapter XIVB of the Act inasmuch as such application would not bring in any conflict between the provisions of Chapter XIVB and those contained in Chapter XIV.

3.8 The exclusion of S. 148 by the first proviso to S. 158BC(a) of the Act was understood by the Court to be in the context of the notice that was required to be issued by the AO following action taken u/ s.132 and/or S. 132A of the Act; that such notice, in the fact of a concluded assessment for any of the assessment years included in the block period, might partake the character of reopening such an assessment, to clarify which the first proviso to S. 158BC(a) had been inserted; that the question that confronted the Court in the case under consideration was in relation to a stage after conclusion of the assessment for the block period, whereas the afore-said proviso dealt with the stage of initiation of the block assessment proceeding. Consequently and in the light of the foregoing discussions while dismissing the appeal of the Revenue, the Gauhati High Court deemed it proper and appropriate to record their conclusion that the provisions of S. 147 and S. 148 would apply to an assessment for a block pe-riod made under Chapter XIVB of the Act.

Observations :

4.1 The controversy surrounds one of the important clauses that saves the application of the other provisions of Income-tax Act, contained in Chapter XIVB. It reads as under :

“Save as otherwise provided in this chapter, all other provisions of this Act shall apply to assessment made under this chapter.”

4.2 On a bare reading of the provisions of Chapter XIVB, it is confirmed that there are no express or apparently implied provisions in the chapter which provides for reopening of a completed block assessment. It is therefore to be examined whether the general provisions for reopening and reassessment as applicable to a regular assessment con-tained in Chapter XIV, particularly u/s.147 to u/s. 153 can be applied to the case of the block assessment under Chapter XIVB for its successful reopen-ing and succeeding reassessment.

4.3 Again on a bare reading of the abovementioned clause, it is apparent that it is possible to apply all those provisions of the Act in situations and circumstances not dealt with by Chapter XIVB. In other words, the general provisions of the Act would not apply where express provision is made in Chapter XIVB, so however, they will apply with equal force where the chapter does not contain any express provision to deal with an unspecified situation. Reopening of a completed block assessment, as noted above, is one such situation which has not been expressly dealt with by Chapter XIVB.

4.4 In the above stated analysis, on a primary reading of the provisions, one is likely to concur with the decision of the Gauhati High Court in the case of Peerchand Ratilal Baid (HUF) which has for the reasons noted has held that subject to compliance of other conditions it is possible to reopen a completed block assessment.

4.5 Having observed that it is possible to reopen a block assessment, it remains to be seen that whether the ratio of the decision in the case of Cargo Clearing Agency (Gujarat) would nonetheless hold water. The Gujarat High Court decision is a very well reasoned and detailed decision has ruled out the possibility of reopening of a completed block assessment and has supported the conclusion with various findings in law.

4.6 The Gujarat High Court in Cargo Clearing Agency’s case in particular held that; (1) while S. 147 of the Act permits reassessment of income that has escaped assessment for any assessment year, assessment under Chapter XIVB of the Act is for a block period of 10/6 years without reference to any particular assessment year, (2) reassessment of escaped income u/s.147 of the Act is made where income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment either due to the failure of the assessee to file return or failure to disclose fully or truly all material facts for the purposes of assessment or where material already on record had not been processed. In a case of block assessment under Chapter XIVB of the Act escapement of undisclosed income, following a search, cannot be envisaged, as all the materials recovered in the course of the search are available with the AO and there can be no case of non-disclosure of ma-terial facts by the assessee, (3) S. 158BA and S. 158BH, read in juxtaposition, leads to the conclusion that in the absence of any provision for reassessment under Chapter XIVB of the Act the provisions contained in S. 147 under Chapter XIV will not apply to assessments made for the block period, (4) the period of limitation for completion of block assessment provided for by S. 158BE of the Act is shorter than the period of limitation prescribed by S. 153 of the Act. It, therefore, cannot be envisaged that the period of limitation u/s.153 of the Act would apply to block assessment. Any such application of the provisions contained in S. 153 will make the scheme visualised u/s.158BE unworkable, and (5) under Chapter XIVB of the Act certain provisions contained in Chapter XIV have been specifically incorporated, whereas certain other provisions have been specifically excluded. S. 148 has been excluded by the first proviso to S. 158BC(a), whereas S. 142, S. 143, S. 144 and S. 145 have been specifically incorporated by sub-clause (b) of S. 158BC.

4.7 Amongst several reasons advanced by the Gujarat High Court for coming to the conclusion, the two that stand apart for our consideration are :

  •  the Supreme Court’s decision in Suresh Gupta’s case was noted and its implications were considered by the Court while holding that it was not possible to read the provisions of reopening into the chapter of block assessment by suitably modifying the provisions of S. 147 to S. 153 of the Act.

  •  the scheme of block assessment per se ruled out any possibility of a reopening of a block assessment altogether.

4.8 The entire present controversy can be considered and appreciated in light of the legislative intent expressed at the time when Chapter XIVB was introduced vide the Memorandum Explaining the Provisions in the Finance Bill, 1995. The purpose and the object for introducing the said Chapter was explained in the following terms :

“Special procedure for assessment of search cases. Searches conducted by the IT Department are important means of unearthing black money. How-ever, under the present scheme, valuable time is lost in trying to relate the undisclosed incomes to the different years. Tax evaders generally manage to divert the focus to procedural and legal issues and often invent new evidence to explain undisclosed income. By the time search-related assessments are completed, the effect of the search is considerably diluted. Legal battles continue for many years to decide which income is assessable in which assessment year. No finality is reached and the seized assets remain with the Department for a long time. In order to make the procedure of assessment of search cases cost effective, efficient and meaningful, it is proposed to introduce a new scheme of assessment of undisclosed income determined as a result of search u/s.132 or requisition u/s.132A. Under this scheme, the undisclosed income detected as a result of any search initiated, or requisition made, after 30th June, 1995, shall be assessed separately as income of a block of years. Where the previous year has not ended or the due date for filing a return of income for any previous year has not expired, the income recorded on or before the date of the search or requisition in the books of account or other documents, maintained in the normal course, relating to such previous years shall not be included in the block.”

4.9 The memorandum referred to above, is a pointer to the fact that undisclosed income, in other words, the income which has not been disclosed and which has not been taxed, has to be assessed by adopting a special procedure. The special procedure has been evolved to save valuable time which is otherwise lost in the process of co-relating the un-disclosed income to different assessment years by obviating the legal battles involving issues of procedure and interpretation of law. The Legislature found it necessary to arrive at a cost effective, efficient and meaningful procedure to avoid litigations which continue for many years to decide which income, or part of income, is assessable in which assessment year.

4.10 Looking from several angles, to us the view expressed by the Gujarat High Court is a better view inasmuch as the reassessment of escaped income u/ s.147 of the Act is made in cases where income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment either due to the failure of the assessee to file return or failure to disclose fully or truly all material facts for the purposes of assessment or where material already on record had not been processed. It therefore pre-supposes a failure on the part of the assessee to comply with the requirements of the law. In a case of block assessment, on the contrary, under Chapter XIVB of the Act, the escapement of undisclosed income, following a search, cannot be envisaged at all, as all the material recovered in the course of the search is available with the AO and there can be no case of non-disclosure of material facts by the assessee. Not using such material indicates a possible failure on the part of the AO for which no power can not be vested in him to confer benefit for inaction. Moreover, the Gujarat High Court did examine the implications of Suresh N. Gupta’s decision in coming to the conclusion advanced by the Court.

The CBDT has made the following amendments vide the Income-tax (Eighth Amendment) Rules, 2011 with effect from 1st November 2011

Changes in the due date of filing TDS returns and other amendments — Notification No. 57/2011/F. No.142/23/2011-SO(TPL), dated 24-10-2011.

The CBDT has made the following amendments vide the Income-tax (Eighth Amendment) Rules, 2011 with effect from 1st November 2011:

  •   The due date for filing TDS returns for Government deductees’ has been prescribed as 31st July, 31st October, 31st January and 15th May for the quarters ended 30th June, 30th September, 31st December and 31st March as mentioned in the Table in Rule 31A.

  •    Additional details to be furnished in the TDS returns of the payees who have furnished pre-scribed forms for non-deduction of TDS due to their taxable income being below the maximum prescribed limits.

  •  In cases where income is assessable in the hands of person other than the deductee, credit for TDS on such income would be given to the other person in cases where the deductee furnishes a declaration to that effect and deductor reports such tax deduction in the name of that other person.

Sale of scrap — Whether income derived from industrial undertaking ?

Controversies

1. Issue for consideration :


1.1 The Income-tax Act, 1961 has provided tax holidays from
time to time in respect of profits derived from certain types of industrial
undertakings, whereby a certain proportion of such profits is allowed as a
deduction under chapter VIA for certain number of years from the date of
commencement of the undertaking. S. 80HH, S. 80HHA, S. 80I, S. 80J and now S.
80IB have all contained such provisions allowing deduction of a certain
percentage of profits derived from such eligible undertakings.

1.2 The common requirement for all such incentive provisions
has been that the gross total income should include profits derived from such
eligible undertakings. Further, the deduction has always been a percentage of
the profits derived from such eligible undertakings. The quantum of the
deduction has therefore been linked to the profits of the eligible undertakings.

1.3 A question has arisen before the Courts as to whether
income from sale of scrap of the eligible undertaking can be regarded as profits
derived from such eligible undertaking, for the purpose of computing the
deduction under the incentive provisions. While the Madras High Court has
consistently taken the view that such income from sale of scrap would form part
of the profits derived from such eligible undertaking, the Madhya Pradesh High
Court has recently taken a contrary view that the income from such sale would
not form part of the profits derived from the eligible undertaking.

2. Fenner India’s case :


2.1 This issue had arisen before the Madras High Court in the
case of Fenner (India) Ltd. v. CIT, 241 ITR 803.

2.2 In this case the assessee was an industrial undertaking
in a backward area manufacturing V-belts, oil seals, O-rings, rubber moulded
products, etc. It was eligible for deduction u/s.80HH in respect of the profits
derived from such industrial undertaking. It claimed a deduction of 20% of the
net profits of such undertaking, including profit on sale of scrap.

2.3 The Assessing Officer disallowed the deduction in respect
of profit on sale of scrap. The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the assessee’s
claim for deduction in regard to the profit on sale of scrap. The Tribunal
however allowed the Revenue’s appeal on further appeal by the Revenue.

2.4 The Madras High Court noted that there was no dispute
that the new industrial undertaking was set up to manufacture V-belts, oil
seals, O-rings, rubber moulded products, etc. and that in the process of
manufacture of the V-belts, oil seals, O-rings, rubber moulded products, certain
scrap resulted. The resulting product of scrap also had a market and was also
sold, such sale being reflected in the turnover of the industrial undertaking.

2.5 Before the Madras High Court, on behalf of the Revenue,
it was argued that profit on the sale of scrap materials could, by no stretch of
imagination, be stated to have been derived from the industrial undertaking, and
if at all, such profits were at best attributable to the industrial undertaking.
It was argued that profits on sale of the manufactured products of the
industrial undertaking alone could be stated to be profits or gains derived from
the industrial undertaking, in respect of which a deduction of 20% was
permissible.

2.6 The Madras High Court noted that an assessee must
establish that his profits and gains were derived from his industrial
undertaking. It was not sufficient if a commercial connection was established
between the profits earned and the industrial undertaking, and the law required
that such profits must have been derived from the industrial undertaking. The
industrial undertaking itself must be the source of that profit and the business
of the industrial undertaking must strictly yield that profit. It must be the
direct source of profit and not a means to earn any other profit.

2.7 The Madras High Court observed that to say that the scrap
materials had no direct link or nexus with the industrial undertaking could not
at all be expected to commend acceptance. The scrap materials came within the
manufacturing process of the industrial undertaking in the manufacture of its
products such as V-belts, oil seals, etc. Therefore, the Madras High Court was
of the view that the profits and gains from the sale of scrap materials were
eligible for deduction of an amount equal to 20% u/s.80 HH, inasmuch as such
gains or profits were derived from the industrial undertaking and includable in
the gross total income of the assessee.

2.8 A similar view had been taken by the Madras High Court in
the cases of CIT v. Wheels India Ltd., 141 ITR 745, CIT v. Sundaram
Clayton Ltd.,
133 ITR 34 and CIT v. Sundaram Industries Ltd., 253 ITR
396.

3. Alpine Solvex‘s case :


3.1 The issue again came up for consideration before the
Indore Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of CIT v. Alpine
Solvex Ltd.,
219 CTR (MP) 499.

3.2 In this case the assessee was a company which had a
solvent extraction plant where soya bean oil was manufactured from soya bean
seeds. The assessee claimed deduction u/s.80HH and u/s.80I on the amount
realised by it by sale proceeds of old gunny bags which were used as packing
material. The sale proceeds of such gunny bags were included in the total
turnover of the undertaking.

3.3 The Assessing Officer rejected the assessee’s claim,
holding that it was not an income derived by the assessee from an industrial
undertaking and that it was therefore not eligible for deduction u/s.80HH and
u/s.80I. The Commissioner(Appeals) allowed the assessee’s appeal. The Tribunal
dismissed the Revenue’s appeal and upheld the order of the Commissioner
(Appeals).

3.4 Before the Madhya Pradesh High Court, on behalf of the Revenue it was contended that the amount earned by the assessee from sale of certain gunny bags lying in the factory could not be said to be the business, much less regular business activity and hence the income derived from sale of such gunny bags could not be said to be an income derived from the industrial undertaking eligible for the benefit of special deduction u/s.80HH/80I. It was argued that the expression ‘income derived from industrial undertaking’ has to be interpreted in a restricted/narrower sense, and hence only income earned directly from the business carried on by the industrial undertaking can be taken into consideration for calculating total income and deduction available under these Sections. Nobody appeared on behalf of the assessee before the Madhya Pradesh High Court.

3.5 The Madhya Pradesh High Court, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Cambay Electric Supply Industrial Co. Ltd. v. CIT, 113 ITR 84, noted that the expression’ derived from’ was more restricted than the term ‘attributable to’, which was a comparatively broader expression. It further placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Pandian Chemicals Ltd. v. CIT, 262 ITR 278, to the effect that the words ‘derived from’ used in S. 80HH must be understood as something which had direct or immediate nexus with the appellant’s industrial undertaking.

3.6 According to the Madhya Pradesh High Court, the main business of the assessee was to manufacture and sell soya oil by extracting it from soya bean seeds in their extraction plant. Therefore, according to the High Court, all income is derived from sale of soya oil has to be held as income derived from industrial undertaking, and so far as income earned out of sale of gunny bags was concerned, it could not be kept at par with the income derived from sale of soya oil. The High Court was of the view that sale of gunny bags was not the main or even ancillary business activity of the assessee, was not even regular or continuous business activity of the assessee, and that no investment was made by the assessee for sale of gunny bags, inasmuch as no industrial undertaking was established for manufacture and sale of gunny bags. Further, according to the Court the gunny bags were not manufactured by the assessee in its plant, which was established only for production of soya oil. According to the High Court, merely because some gunny bags were lying in the factory as surplus or unused or as waste material and were sold to earn some income, it could not be regarded as an income directly derived from the industrial undertaking.

3.7 The Madhya Pradesh High Court expressed the view that in order to derive income from the industrial undertaking, it must be shown that it was so earned by sale of those goods which were manufactured in the industrial undertaking as a part of the main and day-to-day business activity. The Madhya Pradesh High Court therefore held that the sale of gunny bags did not have a direct or immediate nexus with the industrial undertaking. While placing reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in CIT v. Sterling Foods, 237 ITR 579, the Madhya Pradesh High Court expressed its disagreement with the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Fenner (India) Ltd., noting that the Madras High Court decision did not take into consideration any decision of the Supreme Court.

3.8 The Madhya Pradesh High Court therefore held that the profit on sale of gunny bags was not part of the profits derived from the industrial undertaking eligible for deduction u/s.80HH/80I.

4. Observations:

4.1 It is significant to note that the nature of scrap dealt with by the Madras High Court was quite different from the scrap dealt with by the Madhya Pradesh High Court. The Madras High Court was dealing with a situation where the scrap arose directly out of the manufacturing process, and was an incidental part (though insignificant in value) of the very manufacturing process itself. The Madhya Pradesh High Court, on the other hand, was dealing with a case where the scrap was incidental to the acquisition of raw materials (being packed in gunny bags) or to the packing of manufactured goods. The scrap was therefore not a direct outcome of the manufacturing process, but was incidental to activities associated with the manufacture of the goods. Therefore, on facts, it is possible to distinguish between the nature of the scrap resulting in two different views being taken by the High Courts.

4.2 On a broader level, however, the question that arises is whether the business of an industrial undertaking encompasses only the manufacturing process simpliciter or covers the entire business of manufacture. Can the business of manufacture be said to commence only when the raw material is subjected to the physical process of manufacture, or does it also cover the incidental processes of preparation for manufacture, finishing and ‘Packing? If one takes a view that the business of manufacture involves all these steps as well, then the waste gunny bags clearly arise directly out of the business of manufacture, and should be regarded as the profits of the industrial undertaking.

4.3 The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Pandian Chemicals (supra) is clearly distinguishable, as it related to interest on electricity deposit, which as the Supreme Court noted:

“Although electricity may be required for the purposes of the industrial undertaking, the deposit required for its supply is a step removed from the business of the industrial undertaking.”

Similarly, the case of Sterling Foods (supra) involved sale of import entitlements, which process was not part of the manufacturing business at all.

4.4 Viewed in this manner, it appears that the Madhya Pradesh High Court took too technical a view of the matter in holding that the waste gunny bags did not arise out of the manufacturing process. It ought to have considered that any income arising from a process which was directly associated with the business of manufacture, and not only the sale of the finished products, was profits derived from the industrial undertaking. Therefore, the view taken by the Madras High Court that sale of scrap forms part of the profits derived from the industrial undertaking, seems to be the better view of the matter.

Transfer pricing: A. Y. 2006-07: The Assessing officer cannot substitute the method of ‘cost plus mark up’ with the method of ‘cost plus mark up on FOB’ value of exports without establishing that assessee bear significant risks or AEs would enjoy geographical benefits

46. Transfer pricing: A. Y. 2006-07: The Assessing officer cannot substitute the method of ‘cost plus mark up’ with the method of ‘cost plus mark up on FOB’ value of exports without establishing that assessee bear significant risks or AEs would enjoy geographical benefits:

Li and Fung India (P.) Ltd. vs. CIT; [2013] 40 taxmann.com 300 (Delhi):

The assessee, ‘LFIL’, entered into an agreement with its associate enterprise (‘AE’) for rendering sourcing support services for the supply of high volume, time sensitive consumer goods, for which it was remunerated at cost plus mark-up of 5 %.; During the course of Transfer Pricing assessment, the assessee contended that such a transaction was at Arm’s Length Price (‘ALP’) on an application of the TNM method. The Transfer Pricing Officer (‘TPO’) observed that assessee was performing all critical functions, had assumed significant risks and it had used both tangible and unique intangibles developed by it over a period of time, which had given an advantage to the AE in form of low cost of product, quality and had enhanced the profitability of AE. Thus, it held that the compensation of cost plus mark up of 5 % was not at ALP and applied a mark-up of 5 % on the FOB value of exports made by the Indian manufacturer to overseas third party customers. Therefore, the Assessing Officer made addition on the basis of order passed by TPO, which was further affirmed by the Tribunal

On appeal by the assessee, the Delhi High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The impugned order had not shown how and to what extent assessee bore significant risks, or that the AE enjoyed such location advantages, so as to justify rejection of the Transfer pricing exercise undertaken by assessee.

ii)    Tax authorities should base their conclusions on specific facts, and not on vague generalities, such as ‘significant risk’, ‘functional risk’, ‘enterprise risk’, etc., without any material on record to establish such findings. If such findings are warranted, they should be supported by demonstrable reasons, based on facts and the relative evaluation of their weight and significance.

iii)    Where all elements of a proper TNMM are detailed and disclosed in the assessee’s reports, care should be taken by the tax administrators and authorities to analyse them in details and then proceed to record reasons why some or all of them are unacceptable;?

iv)    The impugned order, upholding the determination of certain margin over the FOB value of the AE’s contract, was an error in law. Therefore, the TPO’s addition of the cost plus 5 % markup on the FOB value of exports was without foundation and was to be deleted.”

Educational Institution: Exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iiiad): A. Ys. 2000-01 to 2005-06: The assessee society running 25 educational institutions claimed exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iiiad) in respect of institutions satisfying the conditions: Denial of exemption on the ground that the aggregate receipts of all institutions exceeded limit of Rs. 1 crore: Denial of exemption not proper: Assessee entitled to exemption:

35. Educational Institution: Exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iiiad): A. Ys. 2000-01 to 2005-06: The assessee society running 25 educational institutions claimed exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iiiad) in respect of institutions satisfying the conditions: Denial of exemption on the ground that the aggregate receipts of all institutions exceeded limit of Rs. 1 crore: Denial of exemption not proper: Assessee entitled to exemption:

CIT vs. Childrens Education Society; 358 ITR 373 (Karn):

The assessee society was running around 25 educational institutions. In the relevant assessment years the assessee claimed exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iiiad) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of the educational institutions which satisfied the relevant conditions. The Assessing Officer denied exemption on the ground that the aggregate of the receipts of all the institutions run by the assessee was more than Rs. 1 crore which is the condition prescribed u/s. 10(23C)(iiiad) of the Act. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim and held that the assessee was entitled to exemption us. 10(23C)(iiiad) for each of the institutions the annual receipts of which were less than Rs. 1 crore.  

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The Tribunal was correct in holding that the exemption in terms of the provisions of section 10(23C)(iiiad) was available to the assessee as annual receipt of each of the institutions of the assessee was less than the prescribed limit under the provision.”

Turnover and value of stock adopted by Sales Tax Authorities is binding on Income-tax Authorities: Addition merely on basis of statement of third parties is not proper:

20. Assessment:  A.  Y.  1998-99  to  2002-03:

Turnover and value of stock adopted by Sales Tax Authorities is binding on Income-tax Authorities: Addition merely on basis of statement of third parties is not proper:

CIT vs. Smt. Sakuntala Devi Khetan: 352 ITR 484 (Mad):

The assessee was a trader in turmeric. For the relevant assessment years the Assessing Officer made additions on the basis statement of third parties. The Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to adopt the figures of turnover finally assessed by the Sales Tax Authorities and apply the GP rate accordingly.

On appeal by the Revenue, the following question was raised before the Madras High Court:

“Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the turnover and profit of the assessee for the assessment year under consideration could not be computed in the reassessment on the basis of information received in the course of search conducted in certain cases on the sole ground that the Sales Tax Authorities have accepted the assessee’s purchases, sales and closing stock?”

The High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)    Unless and until the competent authority under the Sales Tax Act differs or varies with the closing stock of the assessee, the return accepted by the Commercial Tax Department is binding on the Income -tax Authorities and the Assessing Officer has no power to scrutinise the return submitted by the assessee to the Commercial Tax Department and accepted by the Authorities. The Assessing Officer has no jurisdiction to go beyond the value of the closing stock declared by the assessee and accepted by the Commercial Tax Department.

ii)    The assessee had placed the sales tax returns before the Assessing Officer in respect of the A. Ys. 1998-99 to 2001-02. Therefore, sufficient materials were placed before the Assessing Officer in respect of those assessment years and accepted by the Authorities.

iii)    The Tribunal rightly found that the Department could not have made the addition merely on the basis of the statement of third parties and, consequently, set aside the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) and directed the Assessing Officer to adopt the figures of turnover finally assessed by the sales tax authorities and apply the gross profit rate accordingly.”

Sum Payable — s. 43B

Controversies

Issue for consideration :


S. 43B of the Income-tax Act
provides that deductions otherwise allowable in respect of certain sums payable
shall be allowed only in the previous year in which such sums are actually paid,
irrespective of the previous year in which the liability to pay such sum was
incurred by the assessee according to the method of accounting regularly
employed by him.

All the clauses of S. 43B
(other than clause c) start with the term ‘any sum payable’. The meaning of the
term ‘any sum payable’ has been the subject-matter of conflicting decisions of
High Courts. Some Courts held that no disallowance could take place u/s.43B
where the liability towards the expenditure had arisen but time for payment was
not due. As against this few Courts had held that the deduction for an
expenditure of the specified nature would be allowed only on actual payment of
dues. In order to avoid any further conflict, an amendment has been made vide
the Finance Act, 1989 with retrospective effect form 1-4-1984 by insertion of an
Explanation 2 to provide for the meaning of the said term ‘any sum payable. The
scope of the Explanation however is restricted to clause (a) of S. 43B. Clause
(a) of S. 43B deals with tax, duty, cess or fee and this clause when read with
the Explanation 2 means a sum for which the assessee incurred liability in the
previous year even though such sum might not have been payable within that year
under the relevant law.

The meaning of the term ‘any
sum payable’ has as noted been the subject-matter of conflicting decisions of
High Courts. The issue which has arisen has been whether such term includes
amounts in respect of liability which has accrued but is not due for payment.
The Andhra Pradesh High Court, in the context of clause (a) prior to the
insertion of Explanation 2, held that the term means only such items which have
become due for payment, and not items which have accrued but not become due for
payment and therefore no disallowance prior to the insertion of the Explanation
2 was possible for claims of expenditure which were due but not payable. On the
other hand, the Delhi High Court, in the context of clause (d) relating to
interest on loans or borrowings from financial institutions, has recently held
that the term includes all amounts in respect of which liability has been
incurred, irrespective of whether such amounts are due for payment or not and
accordingly, the claim for allowance of an expenditure would not be allowed
unless it was actually paid.

Srikakollu Subba Rao’s
case :


The issue first came up
before the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Srikakollu Rao & Co. v.
Union of India,
173 ITR 708.

In this case, the assessee
had challenged the provisions of S. 43B, which had been then recently introduced
with effect from A.Y. 1984-85. Besides challenging the Constitutional validity
of the provisions, the assessee contended that the provisions did not apply to
sales tax. It was further argued that the liability to pay sales tax for the
month of March 1984, which had been disallowed u/s.43B, could not have been so
disallowed.

On behalf of the assessee,
it was pointed out that under the Andhra Pradesh sales tax rules, such tax was
to be paid by the 25th day of the succeeding month. It was urged that where the
statute itself prescribes the date of payment, no exception could be taken,
acting u/s.43B, that the amount was not paid, rendering a justification for its
disallowance. It was urged that S. 43B can have no application to cases where
the statutory liability which was incurred in the accounting year is also not
payable, according to the statute, in the same accounting year.

The Andhra Pradesh High
Court, while accepting these contentions observed that according to it, not only
should the liability to pay the tax be incurred in the accounting year, but the
amount should also be statutory ‘payable’ in the accounting year. According to
the High Court,
S. 43B itself was clear to that extent — it referred to the ‘sum payable’. The
Andhra Pradesh High Court observed that if the Legislature intended, it should
have so provided that any sum for the payment of which liability was incurred by
the assessee would not be allowed unless such sum was actually paid.

Further, keeping in mind the
object for which S. 43B was enacted, the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that it
was difficult to subscribe to the view that a routine application of that
provision was called for in cases where the taxes and duties for the payment of
which liability was incurred in the accounting year were not statutorily payable
in that accounting year. In fact, the Andhra Pradesh High Court noted the
subsequent amendment permitting the deduction of taxes and duties paid before
the due date of filing of the income tax return as evidence that taxes and
duties not statutorily payable during the accounting year did not fall to be
disallowed u/s.43B.

The Andhra Pradesh High
Court therefore held that the term ‘sum payable’ meant not only cases where the
liability was incurred, but which were also actually payable within the year.
Accordingly, the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that S. 43B did not apply to the
amounts not due for payment within the year.

Triveni Engineering’s case :


The issue again recently
came up before the Delhi High Court in the case of Triveni Engineering &
Industries Ltd. v. CIT,
320 ITR 430.

In this case pertaining to
A.Y. 1991-92, the assessee had taken a loan from Industrial Finance Corporation
of India (‘IFCI’). As per the terms of the loan, the repayment of the loan along
with interest thereon was to be made in five yearly instalments payable from
November 1996 to November 2000. The assessee provided for the interest accrued
on the loan till the end of the previous year ended 31st March 1991. The
assessing officer disallowed such interest.

The Commissioner (Appeals)
confirmed the disallowance of interest and further held that the claim of
interest was not allowable in terms of S. 43B(d).

Before the Delhi High Court, the assessee claimed that it was entitled to claim interest because interest accrues daily and it accrued as per the mercantile system of accounting adopted by the assessee with respect to the loan obtained by it from IFCI.

The Delhi High Court observed that merely because the interest was debited in the books of account maintained on a Mercantile basis could not mean that the interest had become due and accrued, because admittedly the interest liability would not become due during the relevant previous year but only in November 1996. According to the Delhi High Court, interest could not be said to have ac-crued to become due and payable in the relevant previous year. The Delhi High Court observed that the stand of the assessee was incongruous because on the one hand it claimed that interest became due and accrued in the relevant previous year, however, in the same breath it admitted that the same would be due and payable only with effect from November 1996. According to the Delhi High Court, the concept of debiting the books maintained on the mercantile basis was on the principle that the payment had become due and payable and, since it had become payable, it was therefore debited in the books of account. According to the Court, admittedly the interest was not due and payable from the relevant previous year.

The Delhi High Court observed that S. 43B directly and categorically disentitled the assessee from claiming benefit of interest deduction with respect to interest due and payable to financial institution till the interest was actually paid. According to the Delhi High Court, S. 43B made it abundantly clear that interest can only be allowed when it was actually paid and not merely because it was due as per the method of accounting adopted by the assessee. The Delhi High Court was of the view that any other interpretation that the interest should be allowed even when not actually paid would defeat the very purpose of S. 43B.

The Delhi High Court felt that the view taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court, that where the amount was not due for payment before the end of the relevant previous year such amount, though having accrued, could not be disallowed u/s.43B, could not be accepted by it, as it would negate the intention of existence of S. 43B and would render otiose the expression ‘actually paid’ occurring in S. 43B. In view of the categorical language used in S. 43B(d), the Delhi High Court was of the view that it need not refer to the other subsections and exceptions of S. 43B.

The Delhi High Court therefore upheld the disallowance of interest accrued but not due under the provisions of S. 43B.

Observations:

Subsequent to the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Srikakollu Subba Rao, Explanation 2 to S. 43B was inserted by the Finance Act 1989 with retrospective effect from 1 April 1984. This explanation, clarifies that ‘any sum payable’ would include sums which were not payable within the year under the relevant law, and therefore to that extent nullifies the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. It is however relevant to note that the scope of the said explanation, is restricted in it’s application only to clause (a) of S. 43B, i.e., to any sum payable by way of tax, duty, cess or fee. It is consciously not extended to other clauses of S. 43B, though the language used in those clauses is also identical. At the time when Explanation 2 was inserted, S. 43B already contained clauses(b)    and (d) as well, which also used the term ‘any sum payable’. It therefore appears that the conscious intention was to make the expression applicable specifically and only to clause (a) and not to any other clauses of S. 43B. Even when clauses (e) and (f) were inserted in S. 43B, Explanation 2 was not amended to cover these clauses.

The view taken by the Delhi High Court, that allowing the claim for expenditure without actual payment of interest accrued but not due would defeat the very purpose of S. 43B and render it otiose, also does not seem to be justified. When S. 43B was inserted, the purpose for insertion of S. 43B was explained by the Honourable Finance Minister in his budget speech of 1983-84 as under:

“Several cases have come to notice where tax-payers do not discharge their statutory liability such as in respect of excise duty, employer’s contribution to provident fund, Employees State Insurance Scheme, for long periods of time. For the purposes of their income-tax assessments, they nonetheless claim the liability as deduction even as they take resort to legal action, thus depriving the Government of its dues while enjoying the benefit of non-payment. To curb such practices, I propose to provide that irrespective of the method of accounting followed by the taxpayer, a statutory liability will be allowed as a deduction in computing the taxable profits only in the year and to the extent it is actually paid.”

A similar reasoning has been given in the explanatory memorandum explaining the provisions of the Finance Bill, 1983. The intention therefore seems to have been to cover cases of non-payment over long periods of time, and not amounts which are not due for payment. S. 43B would continue to apply to such sums which have become due for payment, but have not yet been paid.

Further support for the fact that amounts not due for payment were not intended to be covered by S. 43B can be gauged from the first proviso to S. 43B, which excludes amounts paid before the due date of the filing of the return of income from the applicability of S. 43B.

The better view of the matter therefore seems to be the view taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court, that the meaning of the term ‘any sum payable’ does not include amounts not due for payment, other than taxes, duties, cesses or fees covered by clause (a).

Waiver of interest

Controversies

1. Issue for consideration


1.1 Any amount of tax, specified as payable in a notice of
demand u/s.156, is required to be paid within 30 days of the service of notice
as mandated by S. 220(1) of the Income-tax Act.

1.2 The assessee is liable to pay simple interest @ 1% for
every month or part thereof, for default in payment of the amount of tax
referred to in para 1.1 above, as per S. 220(2) of the Act. The interest levied
u/s.220(2) is to be reduced and the excess interest paid is to be refunded in
cases where the unpaid tax on which interest was levied itself is reduced on
account of orders u/s.154, u/s.155, u/s.245D, u/s. 250, u/s.254, u/s.260A,
u/s.262 and u/s.264.

1.3 A provision has been made for reduction or waiver of the
interest levied or leviable u/s.220(2) by insertion of S. 220(2A) w.e.f.
1-10-1994 by the Taxation Laws (Amendment ) Act, 1984 where-under the CBDT and
now the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner is empowered to reduce or waive the
interest u/s.220(2) on satisfaction of the conditions specified therein.

1.4 The said S. 220(2A) reads as under :

“Notwithstanding anything contained in Ss.(2), the Chief
Commissioner or Commissioner may reduce or waive the amount of interest paid
or payable by the assessee under the said sub-section if he is satisfied
that :

(i) payment of such amount has caused or would cause
genuine hardship to the assessee;

(ii) default in the payment of the amount on which
interest has been paid or was payable under the said sub-section was due to
the circumstances beyond the control of the assessee; and

(iii) the assessee has co-operated in any inquiry
relating to the assessment or any proceeding for the recovery of any amount
due from him.”


1.5 In the context of S. 220(2A), the issue that has come up
for consideration of the Courts, repetitively, is, whether an assessee is
obliged to satisfy all the three conditions laid down in S. 220(2A) for
reduction or waiver of interest or that compliance of any one or two of them
will enable the assessee to seek reduction or waiver of interest. In short, the
issue that is for consideration is whether the compliance of three conditions
specified in S. 220(2A) is cumulative or alternative. Recently, the Karnataka
High Court dissenting from the view of the Kerala, Allahabad and Madras High
Courts held that cumulative compliance of the three conditions is not required
for being eligible for reduction or waiver of interest u/s.220(2A) of the Act.

2. Ramapati Singhania’s case :


2.1 In the case of Ramapati Singhania, 234 ITR 655 (All), the
assessee’s application, made u/s.220(2A), for waiver of interest was rejected
for non-compliance of some of the conditions of the said Section. In the writ
petition filed by the assessee, he inter alia pleaded before the High
Court that for the purposes of seeking a waiver u/s.220(2A) it was not necessary
for him to have complied with all the conditions of the said Section and that he
was eligible for the requested waiver even in circumstances where some of the
conditions of the said Section stood complied with. It was emphasised that
payment of tax on capital gains without permitting the set-off of the amount to
which the petitioner was entitled u/s.50B of the Estate Duty Act, caused genuine
hardship to the assessee and thus the petitioner was justified in not making the
payment of taxes in time.

2.2 The Allahabad High Court observed that to avail of the
benefit, it was for the person seeking the relief to make out a case that the
requirements of those provisions were fulfilled and that on a plain reading of
that provision, it was evident that all the three conditions set out therein
must be satisfied cumulatively and if any of these requirements were wanting in
a given case, the discretion to reduce or waive, might be legitimately refused.

2.3 The Court accordingly upheld the action of the
authorities in denying the waiver of interest charged for delayed payment of
taxes.

3. M. V. Amar Shetty’s case :


3.1 In M. V. Amar Shetty v. CCIT & Anr., 219 CTR 141 (Karn.),
the assessee filed a writ petition being aggrieved by an order dated 21st August
2007 passed by the Chief CIT rejecting his request u/s. 220(2A) of the
Income-tax Act seeking reduction on waiver of the interest payable on the
delayed payment of tax demanded pursuant to a notice issued u/s.156 of the Act
and for defaulting in payment of tax. The petition was rejected by the Single
Judge of the Court, against which an appeal was filed by the assessee before the
Division Bench of the Court.

3.2 It was pleaded for the assessee that the impugned order
passed by the CCIT had been passed in violation of the provisions of S. 220(2A)
of the Act and was passed without an application of mind to the conditions
mentioned under the sub-section and that the request made by the petitioner had
been rejected in an arbitrary manner. It was inter alia submitted that
the finding that the petitioner had not satisfied condition (c) for waiver of
interest charged u/s.220(2A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, by not co-operating
with the Department by filing returns or in the assessment proceedings/payment
of tax demand was not correct and it was also submitted that the CCIT had taken
into consideration the report of the AO, which was not made known to the
assessee and therefore, the order impugned was bad on that ground also.

3.3 For the CCIT, it was submitted that the order passed was
just and proper and did not call for any interference by the Court in the appeal
and that the learned Single Judge was right in dismissing the writ petition.
Reliance was placed upon two judgments in the cases of G.T.N. Textiles Ltd.
v. DCIT & Anr.,
217 ITR 653 (Ker.) and Ramapati Singhania v. CIT & Ors.,
234 ITR 655 (All.) to submit that all the three conditions laid down in S.
220(2A) should have been satisfied before interest could be waived under the
said provision and that in the instant case the CCIT had categorically held that
condition (iii) of S. 220(2A) had not been fulfilled and therefore, the assessee
was not entitled to relief under the said provisions.

3.4 The Court on consideration of the submissions made by both the sides, was not persuaded to accept the submission made on behalf of the CCIT that, all the three conditions laid down in Ss.(2A) of S. 220 should be satisfied before relief could be given to an assessee under the said provision, as was enunciated in the two judgments referred to above and cited before the Court. The Karnataka High Court accordingly directed for due consideration of the assessee’s request for waiver of interest.

4.  Observations:

4.1 S. 220(2A), begins with a non obstante clause and is a self-contained provision. It overrides the charging provision as contained in S. 220(2). At the same time the said provision restricts the power of the authority concerned to reduce or waive the amount of interest paid or payable by an assessee only on satisfaction of the conditions set out in the three causes of S. 220(2A). For claiming relief u/ s. 220(2A), the assessee has to satisfy the three conditions, namely, (i) he has to show that the payment of the amount has caused or would cause genuine hardship to him, (ii) that the default in payment of the amount of tax on which interest has been paid or was payable was due to circumstances beyond his control, and (iii) further that he had co-operated in the enquiry relating to the assessment or any proceeding for recovery of any amount due from him.

4.2 In G.T.N. Textiles Ltd., 217 ITR 653 (Ker.), the assessee had filed an appeal against the judgment of a Single Judge, 199 ITR 347, who had dismissed the original petition challenging the rejection of the application for waiver of interest levied u/ s. 220(2) of the Act. The Court in that case held that the three conditions mentioned above are to be satisfied for the operation of S. 220(2A) of the Act. The Commissioner in the said case had found that one of the necessary conditions for exercising the power u/ s. 220(2A) that the payment of interest has caused or would cause genuine hardship to the assessee was not satisfied in the case of the petitioner who was earning very good income from its business. On the facts of the case, the Kerala High Court upheld the order of the Single Judge.

4.3 In the case of Eminent Enterprises v. CIT, 236 ITR 883 (Ker.), the Kerala High Court again held that even where the first condition was most satisfied, the assessee could not avail waiver of interest.

4.4 Again in the case of Metallurgical & Engineering Consultants (India) Ltd. v. CIT, 243 ITR 547, (Pat.) the Court held that all the three conditions mentioned above are to be satisfied for the operation of S. 220(2A). Where the Commissioner had found that the first condition was not satisfied on the basis of certain facts, and had refused to waive interest u/ s.220(2), there was no scope for the High Court to interfere with such a discretionary order.

4.5 Lately, the Madras High Court in the case of Auro Foods Ltd., 239 ITR 548, held that an assessee for the purposes of waiver of interest u/ s.220(2A) has to satisfy all the three conditions and that non-compliance of anyone of them may expose his petition to rejection by the authorities.

4.6 On a plain reading of S. 220(2A), it is evident that all the three conditions set out therein are to be satisfied cumulatively for seeking a valid relief. Where any of the requirements has not been fulfilled the discretion to reduce or waive may be legitimately refused. Thus satisfaction of one or more but not all conditions may not make an assessee eligible for reduction or the waiver of interest u/ s.220(2A). This is the way the Courts have interpreted the law with the exception of the Karnataka High Court.

4.7 The order of the Karnataka High Court provides for fresh thinking on an almost settled position in law. The Court perhaps has been impressed by the important fact that the provision of S. 220(2A) has been inserted for granting relief to an assessee in circumstances which are found to be judicious by the Court and in a case where the Court finds the case of the assessee to be so judicious, the relief should not be denied on the ground of numerical non-compliance, but instead be granted in a deserving case.

Interest income and mutuality

1. Issue for consideration :

    1.1 Income of certain associations of persons is exempt on the doctrine of mutuality. The common examples of these associations are clubs, societies, trade professional and mutual benefit associations, where the contributors to the fund and the recipients or beneficiaries of the fund are the same persons or class of persons. In other words, such persons are contributing to the common fund for their common good.

    1.2 Receipt of subscription from members to the common fund is exempt on the grounds of mutuality, as in such cases, the contributors and the beneficiaries are the same persons or the same class of persons, and on the same principles, the receipt by the members on distribution is exempt from tax. The difficulty however arises often in cases where the funds are invested for earning interest income; whether such income also qualifies for exemption, on the grounds of mutuality in the hands of the association. The issue gets further complicated if the interest income is earned from investments made with members.

    1.3 For quite some time it was believed that the issue has been settled in favour of non-taxation, as was discussed in the BCAJ in the past. The issue however has reemerged and it appears that the courts presently are divided on this issue under consideration, which fact has made us take note of the same and examine the aspect afresh to ascertain whether the view canvassed in the past requires a reconsideration. While the Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Delhi High Courts have taken the view in a few cases that such interest income is exempt on the grounds of mutuality, the Karnataka, Madras and Gujarat High Courts seem to have taken a contrary view in other cases.

2. Canara Bank Golden Jubilee Staff Welfare Fund’s case :

    2.1 The issue recently came up before the Karnataka High Court in the case of Canara Bank Golden Jubilee Staff Welfare Fund v. Dy. CIT, 308 ITR 202 (Kar.).

    2.2 In this case, the assessee was a society consisting of employees of Canara Bank, established with the object of promoting welfare amongst members who contributed towards the corpus fund. The welfare fund was utilised for advancing loans to members, on which it received interest, which constituted the major portion of its revenue. Surplus funds were kept with the bank, on which interest also was earned. The assessee also earned dividend income on shares.

    2.3 The assessee filed the return of income claiming exemption on the principle of mutuality. The assessment was completed u/s.143(1)(a). Subsequently the income was reassessed, bringing to tax the interest income on investments and dividend income on shares. The Commissioner (Appeals) dismissed the appeals of the assessee. The Tribunal also dismissed the assessee’s appeals.

    2.4 Before the High Court, on behalf of the assessee it was argued that the Society was established for mutual benefit of its members, and funds of the Society, consisting of contribution from the members, were used for advancing loans to members and collecting interest from the members. As such, it was claimed that the income was exempt from tax on the principle of mutuality. It was further claimed that the funds collected by the appellant were used to provide monetary assistance to members, and, as a matter of precaution, the surplus funds were kept in the bank, not with the primary object of earning interest, but to keep such funds in safe custody. Further, such interest earned had been used only for the ultimate benefit of members. It was claimed that while applying the principle of mutuality, it was the source of the deposit that had to be taken into consideration and not the manner in which the funds were applied. Reliance was placed by the assessee on the Supreme Court decision in the case of Chelmsford Club v. CIT, 243 ITR 89 and the Andhra Pradesh High Court decision in the case of CIT v. Natraj Finance Corporation, 169 ITR 732.

    2.5 On behalf of the Department, reliance was placed on the earlier Karnataka High Court decision in the case of CIT v. ITI Employees Death and Superannuation Relief Fund, 234 ITR 308, in which case the High Court had taken the view that such interest income was taxable, to contend that the income in question was taxable.

    2.6 The Karnataka High Court, while discussing the principle of mutuality, observed that the following three conditions should exist before an activity could be brought under the concept of mutuality; that no person can earn from himself, that there is no profit motivation, and that there is no sharing of profits. It noted that the source of funds in the case before it was only from the members of the assessee and that the assessee had not received any donations or other monetary grants from any outside source, apart from the members during the relevant years. It was therefore the member’s contribution which had become the corpus fund which was utilised to advance loans to members and invested, from which the interest and dividend has arisen.

    2.7 The Karnataka High Court noted that the funds of the assessee had been invested in the term deposit with the bank which was not a member of the assessee’s welfare fund, and interest had been earned on such investment. Though the bank formed a third-party vis-à-vis the assessee, it could not be said that the identity between the contributors and the recipients was lost in such a case. The High Court observed that in ITI Employees Death and Superannuation Relief Fund’s case (supra), the ingredients of mutuality were missing as, apart from contributions made by members, there were other sources of funding of the trust fund, including contributions made by the ITI management and donations. Further, in that case, the object of the trust was to invest the funds of the trust in banks and securities for earning interest to discharge the liabilities and obligations created under the trust.

    2.8 Taking into consideration the objects of the assessee, the source of funds during the relevant years and the applicability of the funds for the benefit of its members, and keeping in mind the interest on investments and dividend earned on shares was only a small portion of the total earned by investment of the surplus funds wholly contributed by the members of the assessee, the Karnataka High Court held that the interest earned on investment and dividend received on shares was deemed income from the property of the assessee contributed by its members, and was governed by the principle of mutuality and was therefore exempt.

2.9 The Court noted with approval a similar view which had been taken earlier by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of CIT v. Natraj Finance Corporation, 169 ITR 733. In that case, the assessee was a firm which lent money to its partners, and during the relevant years, received income on out-standing dues from a former partner and on amounts deposited in a savings account with a bank. The Court held that such interest, considering the quantum of such interest in relation to the total income, was also exempt on the grounds of mutuality, as it could not be said that the assessee was carrying on business in order to derive such a small amount of income.

2.10 The Court also noted that the Delhi High Court also, in the case of DIT(E) v. All India Oriental Bank of Commerce Welfare Society, 130 Taxman 575, has held that the principle of mutuality applies to interest income derived by a co-operative society from deposits made out of contributions made by members of the society. In taking this view, the Delhi High Court took a cue from the decision of the Supreme Court in Chelmsford Club v. CIT, 243 ITR 89, where the Supreme Court had laid down the principle that where a number of persons combine together to a common fund for financing of some venture or object and in this respect have no dealings or relations with any outside body, then any surplus generated cannot in any sense be regarded as profits chargeable to tax.

3. Madras  Gymkhana Club’s  case:

3.1 The issue again recently came up before the Madras High Court in the case of Madras Gymkhana Club v. Dy. CIT, 183 Taxman 333.

3.2 The assessee in this case was a sports club providing various facilities to its members, such as restaurant, gymnasium, library, bar, coffee shop and swimming pool. Apart from the surplus funds derived from such activities, it also received interest income from its corporate members on the investment of surplus funds as fixed deposits with them. It claimed that such interest income was covered by the concept of mutuality and was therefore exempt from tax.

3.3 In the course of reassessment proceedings, the income from investment was subjected to tax along with certain other interest income. Both the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal rejected the appeals of the assessee.

3.4 Before the Madras High Court, it was argued on behalf of the assessee that the interest earned by the club out of fixed deposits and other investments made with its own institutional members was covered by the principle of mutuality. On behalf of the Revenue, it was argued that the interest on such investments could not be brought within the concept of mutuality as such investments were in the regular course of business of such club and had no nexus with either membership or regular activities of the club.

3.5 The Madras High Court noted that it had held in an earlier case in Wankaner fain Social Welfare Society v. CIT, 260 ITR 241, that to satisfy the concept of mutuality, the identity was required to be established in relation to the relevant income as regards those contributing to the income and those participating in the distribution of that income. According to the Madras High Court, surplus funds deposited with a member bank enured to the benefit of that member alone, who was in a position to utilise the deposit in any manner it liked, thereby depriving other members of enjoyment of such benefit, which did not satisfy the test of identity of the contributors and the participants. Though the distribution of interest was to all members, there was no identity between the contributors and the participants, inasmuch as the distribution of interest was made both to members with whom funds were deposited and to those with whom funds were not deposited, while the interest was earned only from members with whom funds were deposited.

3.6 The Madras High Court also noted that the club had received donations and gifts as well as sponsorship for programmes and activities, and advertisements. According to the Madras High Court, on a reading of the objects of the club and the provisions for making the investments, the position which emerged was that the investment of surplus funds had nothing to do with the objects of the club. It also noted that substantial amounts had been earned by way of interest from such investment of surplus funds, and that there were no plans for immediate utilisation of such funds.

3.7 The Madras High Court, following the decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT v. Bangalore Club, 287 ITR 263, held that the interest earned on investment of surplus funds, being substantial, could not be held to satisfy the mutuality concept and was therefore taxable.

3.8 A similar view had been taken earlier by the Karnataka High Court in the case of Bangalore Club (supra), where the Karnataka High Court had held that interest on surplus funds placed by the club in fixed deposits with member banks was not exempt on the ground of mutuality. The Court noted that the Karnataka High Court had also earlier in the case of ITI Employees Death and Superannuation Relief Fund (supra) held that interest on investments earned by the fund was not exempt on the grounds of mutuality and so also the Gujarat High Court, in the case of Sports Club of Gujarat Ltd. v. CIT, 171 ITR 504, has held that in the case of a club whose object was to promote the game of cricket and other games and sports, which derived income from investments of surplus funds, the income from interest was not from mutual activity and was therefore liable to tax.

4. Observations:

4.1 When one analyses the decisions on the subject, one notices that the difference of opinion between the Courts hinges on the answers to the following questions:

Firstly, for application of the doctrine of mutuality, in order to claim exemption on the ground of mutuality, is it sufficient that an income arise out of an investment of surplus generated from members, or is it necessary that such income should also arise from members only?

Secondly, does the activity of investment with non-members amount to a separate activity, distinct from the main activity of the entity and therefore not covered by mutuality? Is it not sufficient that the funds invested are out of the surplus of the members and the income received on investment is also for the benefit of the members?

Thirdly, is the object for which funds are invested relevant, is it necessary that the investment income should arise out of the main activity in order for the income to qualify for mutuality?

4.2 The Supreme Court in CIT v. Bankipur Club Ltd., 226 ITR 97, held that a host of factors, not one single factor, have to be considered to arrive at a conclusion as to whether the principle of mutuality applies in a given case or not, and further observed that whether or not the persons dealing with each other are a mutual club or not and whether such persons are carrying on a trading activity or an adventure in the nature of trade is largely a question of fact.

4.3 In the case of Chelmsford Club (supra), the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the annual letting value. of the clubhouse of the Chelmsford Club, which provided recreational and refreshment facilities exclusively to its members and their guests, was liable to income-tax. In that case, certain observations of the Supreme Court indicate that the principle of mutuality has to be considered qua the business or the object thereof. However, one must keep in mind the facts of the case before the Supreme Court, where there was no actual income arising other than out of the activity of the club, and therefore the Supreme Court did not have occasion to consider whether the principle of mutuality should be applied to certain incomes separately.

4.4 In the case of Bankipur Club (supra), the Su-preme Court cited from the Halsbury’s Laws of England as under:

“Where a number of persons combine together and contribute to a common fund for the financing of some venture or object and will in this respect have no dealings or relations with any outside body, then any surplus returned to those persons cannot be regarded in any sense as profit. There must be complete identity between the contributors and the participators. If these requirements are fulfilled, it is immaterial what particular form the association takes. Trading between persons associating together in this way does not give rise to profits which are chargeable to tax.

Where the trade or activity is mutual, the fact that, as regards certain activities, only certain members of the association take advantage of the facilities which it offers does not affect the mutuality of the enterprise.

Members’ clubs are an example of a mutual undertaking; but, where a club extends facilities to non-members, to that extent the element of mutuality is wanting …. “.

The Supreme Court in that case  also cited from Simon’s Taxes as under:

…. it is settled law that if the persons carrying on a trade do so in such a way that they and the customers are the same persons, no profits or gains are yielded by the trade for tax purposes and therefore, no assessment in respect of the trade can be made. Any surplus resulting from this form of trading represents only the extent to
which the contributions of the participators have proved to be in excess of requirements. Such a surplus is regarded as their own money and returnable to them. In order that this exempting element of mutuality should exist, it is essential that the profits should be capable of coming back at some time and in some form to the persons to whom the goods were sold or the services rendered …. “

4.5 In the above referred Bankipur Club’s case, the Court was concerned with the clubs’ entitlement to exemption for (i) the receipts or surplus arising from the sales of drinks, refreshments, etc., (ii) amounts received by way of rent for letting out the buildings, and (iii) amounts received by way of admission fees, periodical subscriptions and receipts of similar nature, from its members and guests. The Supreme Court noted that the amounts received by the clubs for supply of drinks, refreshments or other goods as also the letting out of building for rent or the amounts received by way of admission fees, periodical subscription, etc. from the members of the clubs were only for/towards charges for the privileges, conveniences and amenities provided to the members, which they were entitled to as per the rules and regulations of the respective clubs. It also noted that different clubs realised various sums on the above counts only to afford to their members the usual privileges, advantages, conveniences and accommodation. In other words, the services offered on the above counts were not with any profit motive, and were not tainted with commerciality. The facilities were offered only as a matter of convenience for the use of members (and their friends, if any, availing of the facilities occasionally). On that reasoning, the Supreme Court held that the excess-surplus arising from the mutual arrangement, including amounts received from guests (though third parties), was exempt on the grounds of mutuality. Incidentally, one of the assessees in this case was Cawnpore Club, where the income that was sought to be assessed was derived from property let out and also interest received from ED.R., N.s.C., etc. The Supreme Court delinked that case and did not decide it, directing it to be put up for a separate hearing.

4.6 In the case of Chelmsford Club (supra), the Supreme Court observed :

“It is clear that it is not only the surplus from the activities of the business of the club that is excluded from the levy of income-tax, even the annual value of the club-house, as contemplated in S. 22 of the Act, will be outside the purview of the levy of income-tax.”

” …. we are of the view that the business of the appellant is governed by the principle of mutuality – even the deemed income from its property is governed by the said principle of mutuality.”

4.7 From the foregoing, relying on the views of the the Courts and the commentaries on taxation, the emerging view is that the surplus from the activity of mutual benefit association of any form is exempt from taxation and such exemption is not restricted to some specific incomes.

4.8 An incidental  question  that may as well be addressed is whether the activity of investment is an integral part of the object of the mutual benefit association or is an independent activity which aspect would depend upon the facts of each case. Various factors as follows may be helpful in examining this aspect: (i) Whether the investment is a mere temporary deployment of surplus funds, or of a long-term nature? (ii) Whether the intention behind making the investment is merely to see that the funds are not kept idle, but deployed till such time as required? (iii) Is the quantum of investment income small as compared to members’ contributions ? (iv) Whether the surplus has been built up only out of member contributions? Generally, if the investment income is small in relation to member contributions and the investment is primarily with a view to deploy unutilised funds, the investment activity cannot be regarded as an activity independent of the object of the association, and would be part of the surplus qualifying for exemption.

4.9 The rigours surely will be easy when investment is made with the members of the association. However here also, difference might be carved out between an investment made as an investor and the one made in the normal course.

4.10 The rigours will also be eased in cases where an investment of the association’s funds has been made pending the use of surplus funds on activi-ties of the association.

4.11 With utmost respect for the Madras High Court, the insistence on commonality between the contributors and the beneficiaries in case of investments, seems to be misplaced. The test of commonality is required to be satisfied w.r.t. the members’ contributions, and not w.r.t. the interest income arisng out of deployment of such members’ contributions. It is also helpful that the interest income that arises out of the deployment of surplus funds of members is earned for the members’ benefit, who surely are the participants on distribution of such an income.

4.12 An important principle of mutuality is that the members receive back that which was their own. The fact that in the meanwhile the funds belonging to them were deployed would not materially alter the applicability of the principle where the income remains, in reality, the income of the members.

4.13 The issue however continues to be contentious as is evident from the conflicting decisions of the Courts including the decision in the case of Rajpath Club Ltd., 211 ITR 379 (Guj.), Gulmarg Association & Anr., 90 TTJ 184 (Ahd.) and Sagar Sanjog CHS Ltd. ITA No. 1972, 1973 and 1974/Mum./2005.

4.14 The better view in the meanwhile seems to be that interest income of a mutual benefit association earned on its investments is exempt from tax under the doctrine of mutuality and the case for its exemption is stronger where the deployment of funds is merely a part of and incidental to the object of the association.

Quantum of Exclusion of Export Profit From Book Profit— MAT

Closements

Introduction :


1.1 U/s.115JB, Minimum
Alternative Tax (MAT) is payable by a company, if the Income-tax payable on the
total income as computed under the Income-tax Act (the Act) in respect of any
assessment year is less than the specified percentage of its book profit. In
such an event, the book profit is deemed to be the total income of the company,
on which the tax is payable at the rate of specified percentage. S. 115JB was
introduced by the Finance Act, 2000 with effect from 1-4-2001 to replace the
earlier version of MAT contained in S. 115JA. Initially, the specified
percentage was 7.5%, which is gradually increased and presently the same is 18%
as per the last amendment made by the Finance Act, 2010 with effect from
1-4-2010.

1.2 For the purpose of
determining the MAT liability, every company is required to prepare its profit &
loss account for the relevant previous year in accordance with the provisions of
Parts II and III of Schedule VI to the Companies’ Act, 1956. There are some
other provisions also in this respect with which we are not concerned in this
write-up.

1.3 Explanation 1 to S.
115JB defines the book profit (hereinafter referred to as the said Explanation).
Under the said Explanation, the book profit means the net profit as shown in the
profit & loss account for the relevant previous year, which is to be increased
by certain specified items (upward adjustments) and the profit so increased is
required to be reduced by certain specified items (downward adjustments), if
such items are debited to profit & loss account.

1.4 One of the downward
adjustments is contained in Clause (iv) of the said Explanation which deals with
the exclusion of export profit eligible for
deduction u/s.80HHC(3)/(3A). The said Clause reads as under :

“the amount of profits
eligible for deduction u/s.80HHC, computed under clause (a) or clause (b) or
clause (c) of Ss.(3) or Ss.(3A), as the case may be of that Section, and
subject to the conditions specified in that Section;”

1.5 S. 80HHC provides for
deduction of export profit while computing the total income as provided in the
Section. Earlier, quantum of such deduction was 100% of the export profit.
However, the Government decided to phase out this deduction with a view to
provide a sunset clause for this incentive available to exporters. For this
purpose, the Finance Bill, 2000 introduced Ss.(1B) with effect from 1-4-2000,
which provided restriction on the extent of deduction available u/s.80HHC(1).
Accordingly, the quantum of deduction u/s.80HHC in respect of export profit
available u/s.80HHC(1) was to be reduced to specified percentage every year,
with effect from A.Y. 2001-02 and was to be completely phased out by the A.Y.
2004-05. In the A.Y. 2001-02, such deduction was to be restricted to 80% of the
deduction of export profit determined u/s.80HHC(1) and for the A.Y. 2002-03 the
same was to be restricted to 70% and so on (this restricted amount of deduction
hereinafter referred to as the reduced export profit). Ss.(1B) also provided
that no deduction shall be allowed u/s.80HHC from the A.Y. 2005-06.

1.6 The Circular No. 794,
dated 9-8-2000 [162 CTR (St.) 9], while explaining the provisions of the Finance
Bill 2000, in para 43.5, clarifying the impact of new MAT provisions, pointed
out that the export profit u/s.10A/10B/80HHC/80HHD, etc. are kept outside the
purview of these provisions, as these are being phased out. In the context of S.
115JB similar clarification was also found in the Memorandum explaining the
provisions of the Finance Bill, 2000, as well as in the speech of the Finance
Minister.

1.7 In view of the
provisions for phasing out deduction available u/s.80HHC and the provision for
excluding export profit from the book profit made in Clause (iv) of the said
Explanation for the purpose of levy of MAT, the issue was under debate as to
whether the entire amount of export profit should be excluded from the book
profit or only reduced export profit should be excluded in view of the
provisions contained in S. 80HHC(1B). To clarify the issue, if the export profit
determined u/s.80HHC(3) is Rs.100, then for the purpose of computation of book
profit for the A.Y. 2001-02, the amount to be excluded by way of export profit
should be Rs.100 (i.e., entire export profit) or Rs.80 (i.e.,
reduced export profit). This issue was decided against the assessee by the
Bombay High Court in the case of Ajanta Pharma Ltd.

1.8 Recently, the Apex Court
had on an occasion to consider the issue referred to in para 1.7 above in the
same case of Ajanta Pharma Ltd. and the issue is now finally settled. Though, S.
80HHC is effectively no more operative from A.Y. 2005-06, in a large number of
pending cases, this issue is relevant and therefore, it is thought fit to
consider the same in this column.


CIT
v.
Ajanta Pharma Ltd., 318 ITR 252 (Bom)


2.1 The issue referred to in para 1.7 above, came up before the Bombay High Court in the above case in the context of A.Y. 2001-02. The brief facts in the above case were that the assessee company was assessed u/s.115JB for the A.Y. 2001-02. While computing the book profit, the assessee claimed that the entire export profit computed u/s.80HHC(3) should be deducted and not the reduced export profit as provided u/s.80HHC(1B). The Assessing Officer restricted the deduction to 80%, being the amount of reduced export profit. The First Appellant Authority as well as the Appellate Tribunal accepted the contention of the assessee and took the view that for such purposes, the entire export profit is eligible for deduction. Accordingly, at the instance of Revenue, the issue referred to in para 1.7 above came up for consideration before the Bombay High Court.

2.2 On behalf of the Revenue, it was, inter alia, contended that while computing book profit u/s. 115JB,?only reduced export profit as provided u/s. 80HHC(1B) should be excluded from the book profit and not the amount of entire export profit. As per the Memorandum explaining the Finance Bill, 2000, the reason to introduce S. 115JB was to simplify the MAT provisions. Considering the language of Clause (iv) of the said Explanation, the export profit eligible for deduction should be equal to the amount of actual deduction allowed u/s.80HHC while computing the total income of the assessee under the normal provisions of the Act. If this is not done, an absurdity will be created to the extent that while full deduction is not allowed in respect of export profit u/s.80HHC, for the purpose of S. 115JB, the full amount of export profit will be excluded. This was never the intention of the Legislature while interpreting the provisions of law. An interpretation that results in an absurd situation is to be avoided. It was alternatively contended that even if one takes a view that eligible export profit is referable to only S. 80HHC(3) without applying the restriction contained in Ss.(1B), one has to bear in mind the expression ‘subject to the conditions specified in that Section’ contained in Clause (iv) of the said Explanation (hereinafter referred to as the said conditions). Accordingly, the restriction contained in Ss.(1B), being a condition for allowing deduction u/s.80HHC, has to be considered while determining the quantum of export profit to be excluded from the book profit u/s.115JB. It was also contended that the Finance Minister’s speech and the Memorandum explaining the provisions of the Finance Bill cannot by itself be used to interpret literal meaning of Act.

2.3 On the other hand, on behalf of the assessee-company, various contentions were raised, which, inter alia, include : Considering the expression, ‘eligible for deduction u/s.80HHC’ used in the said Clause (iv), the entire export profit requires to be excluded from the book profit that being the amount eligible for deduction u/s.80HHC. The provision for exclusion of export profit contained in Clause (iv) of the said Explanation is to ensure that the export profits are not subjected to MAT. In the past also, in different provisions made in the Act for the levy of MAT, the export profits have been kept outside the purview of MAT. Therefore, the policy adopted by the Legislature of encouraging/boosting export was considered to be of such importance that the Legislature wished to forego taxes thereon, including MAT. Referring to the dictionary meaning of the expression ‘eligible’, it was contended that it would be beyond any doubt that the word ‘eligible’ has to be read to mean type or class or nature of profit (i.e., qualitative description of profits) and can never take within its ambit, a particular proportion or quantum thereof. The amount quantified for deduction u/s.80HHC(1B) is only a subclass or part of the type/class or nature of profit eligible and hence, the same cannot be considered for this purpose. In short, it was pointed out that Clause of the said Explanation refers to entire export profit and not reduced export profit. It was submitted that the quantum set out u/s.80HHC(1B), is not a condition and the same only provides the extent of deduction available u/s.80HHC(1). This is also supported by the language of S. 80HHC(1), which specifically allows ‘a deduction to the extent of profits referred to in Ss.(1B)’. It was also contended that if two views are possible of interpretation of the said Clause (iv), then the view in favour of the taxpayer ought to be adopted.

2.4 To decide the issue on hand, at the outset, the Court first noted the following settled position with regard to interpretation of a taxing statute [pages 258/259]:

“With the above background, let us now consider the provisions. What the Legislature ought to have done or what language or words or expression ought to have been used, is not for the Courts to consider.?The duty of the Court, in the event, where literal interpretation would defeat the intent of the Legislature or lead to an absurdity or the like would be to ascertain the Parliamentary intent, by applying the rules of statutory interpretation as followed in our jurisdiction. A word of caution, it is only in the event when the literal interpretation would lead to an absurdity or defeat the object or intent of the legislation and not otherwise. The principle of all fiscal legislation is that if the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law he must be taxed, however, great the hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be. On the other hand, if the State, seeking to recover tax, cannot bring the subject within the letter of the law, the subject is free, however, apparently within the spirit of the law the case might?otherwise?appear?to?be.?The?taxing?statutes cannot be interpreted on any presumptions or assumptions. The Court must look squarely at the words of the statute and interpret them. It must interpret a taxing statute in the light of what is clearly expressed; it cannot imply anything which is not expressed, it cannot import provisions in the statutes so as to supply any assumed deficiency [CST v. Modi Sugar Mills Ltd., AIR 1961 SC 1047; (1961) 12 STC 182].”

2.5 The Court, then, proceeded to decide the issue and referred to the provisions of S. 80HHC, as well as S. 115JB, as applicable to the case under consideration. The Court also referred to the earlier version of MAT contained u/s.115J as well as u/s.115JA. After tracing the history of the provisions relating to MAT, the Court stated as under (page 261)?:

“Insofar as MAT companies are concerned, that reduction of export profit while computing the book profits was not available when S. 115J was introduced from April 1, 1988. The benefit was given subsequently from April 1, 1989. Similarly the reduction was not available in the case of S. 115JA which was introduced with effect from April 1, 1997. The benefit was extended only from April 1, 1998. This intent of the Legislature must be considered while interpreting the provisions. The other aspect would be that if Ss.(1B) is not read while computing the book profits and which contains the sunset clause it would mean that even after April 1, 2005, MAT companies could claim deduction of export profits, while computing book profits which would be an absurdity.”

2.6 Proceeding further, referring to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of K. P. Varghese (131 ITR 597), the Court noted that in that judgment it was observed that it is well-recognised rule of construction that the statutory provisions must be so construed if possible that absurdity and mischief may be avoided. If the situation arises where the construction suggested by the Revenue would lead to wholly unreasonable and unjust result, which could never have been intended by the Legislature, then it must be avoided. The Court also noted that this judgment also supports the rule of interpretation that the speech made by the mover of the Bill explaining the reason for the introduction of the Bill can certainly be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining the mischief sought to be remedied by the legislation and the object and the purposes for which the legislation was enacted. Therefore, the Finance Minister’s speech can be relied upon by the Court for the purposes of ascertaining what was the reason for introducing that clause. The Court also referred to various judgments of the Apex Court dealing with principles of statutory interpretation and in particular, dealing with principles of interpretation of taxing statute.

2.7 After referring to the judicial pronouncements with regard to principles of statutory interpretation, the Court stated as under (Page 266):

“The principles elucidated earlier of statutory construction can now be considered for interpreting the provisions of S. 115JB vis-à-vis S. 80HHC. Does a literal reading of S. 80HHC read with S. 115JB(2), Explanation 1(iv), lead to an absurdity and/or does not make clear Parliamentary intent considering the law as it stood before S. 115JB was introduced. In S. 115J and S. 115JA the expression used were ‘profits eligible for deduction u/s.80HHC.’ S. 115JB also uses the expression ‘profits eligible for deduction.’ There really can be no difficulty in understanding what this means. Only those profits which are eligible and computed in terms of Ss.(3) or Ss.(3A) and quantified in terms of Ss.(1B). The computation whether under Ss.(3) or Ss.(3A) are for the purpose of Ss.(1) or Ss.(1A). S. 80HHC(1) permits a deduction to the extent of profits referred to in Ss.(1B). The only question is whether the expression in clause(a), (b) or (c) of Ss.(3) consequent on introduction of Ss.(1B) to S. 80HHC will have a meaning different from the meaning than what was originally understood, considering clause (iv) to Explanation 1 of S. 115JB.”

2.8 Referring to the argument made on behalf of the assessee that for the above purposes, provisions contained in Ss.(1B) should be ignored, the Court stated as under (Page 267):

“…….If the construction sought to be given by the counsel for the assessee is accepted it would make Ss.(1B) irrelevant for the purpose of S. 115JB. Ss.(1B) provides for deduction in terms set out therein. Ss.(3) sets out the method of computation of profits. The computation of profits is, therefore, for the purpose of working out the deduction of profits available u/s. 80HHC(1B). Earlier it was in terms of Ss.(1). Now, S. 80HHC(1) in term refers to Ss.(1B) . All the provisions are interrelated and cannot be read de hors one another. If Ss.(1B) is not read in Ss.(1), then the expression ‘no deduction shall be allowed in respect of the assessment beginning on the first day of April, 2005, and any subsequent year’, shall be rendered otiose.”

2.9 The Court also considered the argument made on behalf of the assessee that the provisions of Ss.(1B) is not a condition, but in the nature of computation and stated that even if we accept this proposition and proceed on that finding, nevertheless it is impossible of reading S. 80HHC(3) or (3A) independent of S. 80HHC(1B). The Court also noted that basically the argument of the assessee is based on the Memorandum explaining the provisions of the Finance Bill, 2000. However, at the same time, in the Notes on Clauses, it is clearly stated that the profits will be reduced by certain adjustments which are eligible for deduction u/s.80HHC. The profits eligible for deduction are Reduced export profits in terms of S. 80HHC(1B). According to the Court, there is nothing in the Finance Minister’s speech of February 29, 2000 to hold otherwise. Noting the argument made on behalf of the assessee that if two views are possible, the view favourable to the taxpayer should be adopted, the Court stated that the question is whether there are two views possible in this case. According to the Court, no two views are possible, but the only view is that the MAT companies are entitled to the same deduction of export profits u/s.80HHC, as any other company involved in export in terms of S. 80HHC(1B). Once that be the case, this argument is also devoid to merit.

2.10 The Court finally concluded as under (page 268):

“……To our mind, the language is clear. The literal meaning does not in any way defeat the object of the Section and/or lead to any absurdity. The object of S. 115JB is to allow even MAT companies to avail of the benefit of deduction. If we consider the assessee’s arguments that MAT companies are entitled to full deduction of export profits, it will lead to anomaly, whereby the companies which are paying tax on total income under the normal rules, for them the deduction of export profits will be lesser than what MAT companies are entitled to. Is this a possible view? When S. 115J was originally introduced, MAT companies were not entitled to deduction of profits u/s.80HHC while working out the book profits…….”

“……Can it now be argued that MAT compa-nies considering S. 115JB(2), Explanation 1(iv) are entitled to be placed in a better position than the other companies entitled to the export deduction under 80HHC, though earlier they constituted one class? No rule of construction nor the language of the S. 80HHC read with S. 115JB, in our opinion, will permit such construction. If such construction is not possible, then both the classes of companies will be entitled to the same deduction. This would contemplate that both would be entitled to deductions of profits in terms of S. 80HHC(1B). So read, it would be a harmonious construction…..”

Ajanta Pharma Limited v. CIT, 327 ITR 305 (SC):

3.1 The above-referred judgment of the Bombay High Court came up for consideration before the Apex Court at the instance of the assessee. To consider the issue, the Court referred to the facts of the case and noted that the following question of law is raised in the Civil Appeal:

“whether for determining the ‘book profits’ in terms of S. 115JB, the net profits as shown in the profit and loss account have to be reduced by the amount of profits eligible for deduction u/s.80HHC or by the amount of deduction u/s. 80HHC?”

3.2 To decide the question, the Court noted the provisions of S. 115JB and S. 80HHC as applicable to the case of the assessee. After referring to relevant provisions, the Court also noted and analysed in brief, the earlier provisions relating to MAT contained in S. 115JA. The Court, then, stated that from these provisions it is clear that S. 115JA is a self-contained code and will apply not-withstanding any other provisions in the Act. The Court then stated that S. 115JB, though structured differently, stood inserted to provide for payment of advance tax by MAT Companies. S. 115JB is the successor to S. 115JA. In essence, it is the same as S. 115JA with certain differences. Accordingly, S. 115JB continues to remain a self-contained code.

3.3 Referring to the object for which S. 80HHC was enacted, the Court noted that the Section provides for tax incentive to exporters. At one point of time, S. 80HHC(1) laid down that an amount equal to an amount of deduction claimed should be debited to profit & loss ac-count and credited to reserve account to be utilised for business purposes. Ss.(1) of 80HHC is concerned with eligibility, whereas Ss.(3) is concerned5 with computation of quantum of deduction. Prior to amendment made by the Finance Act, 2000, the exporters were allowed 100% deduction in respect of the export profit. Thereafter, the same has been reduced in a phasewise manner, as provided in Ss.(1B). The Court also noted that the deduction is available in respect of eligible goods and the same is not available to all assessable entities. Referring to S. 80AB, the Court noted that computation of deduction is geared to an amount of income, whereas the quantification of deduction u/s.80HHC(3) is geared to export turnover and not to the income. On the other hand, S. 115JB refers to levy of MAT on deemed income. This shows that the S. 80HHC and S. 115JB operate in different spheres.

3.4 Dealing with S. 80HHC, the Court further stated that S. 80HHC(1) refers to ‘eligibility’, whereas S. 80HHC(3) refers to computation of tax incentive. According to the Court, S. 80HHC(1B) deals with ‘extent of deduction’ and not with the eligibility.

3.5 The Court then referred to the argument raised on behalf of the Revenue, with regard to applicability of other conditions of S. 80HHC incorporated in Clause (iv) of the said Explanation and noted that based on this, the Revenue contends that the quantum of export profit for this purpose should be subject to Ss.(1B) of 80HHC. The Court then pointed out that according to the Revenue, both ‘eligibility’ as well as ‘deductibility’ of the profit have got to be considered together while applying the said Clause (iv). Rejecting this contention, the Court stated that if the dichotomy between ‘eligibility’ of profit and ‘deductibility’ of profit is not kept in mind, S. 115JB will cease to be a self-contained code. According to the Court, for the purposes of S. 80HHC(3)/(3A), the conditions are only that the relief should be certified by a chartered accountant. Such condition is not a qualifying condition, but it is a compliance condition. Therefore, one cannot rely upon the last sentence of the said Clause (iv) to obliterate the difference between ‘eligibility’ and ‘deductibility’ of profits as contended on behalf of the Revenue.

3.6 Comparing the relevant provisions of S. 115JB and S. 80HHC, the Court concluded as under (page 310):

“As earlier stated, S. 115JB is a self-contained code. It taxes deemed income. It begins with a non obstante clause. S. 115JB refers to computation of ‘book profits’ which have to be computed by making upward and downward adjustments. In the downward adjustment, vide clause (iv) it seeks to exclude ‘eligible’ profits derived from exports. On the other hand, u/s. 80HHC(1B) it is extent of deduction which matters. The word ‘thereof’ in each of the items u/s.80HHC(1B) is important. Thus, an assessee earns Rs.100 crores then for the A.Y. 2001-02, the extent of deduction is 80% thereof and so on which means that the principle of proportionality is brought in to scale down the tax incentive in phased manner. However, for the purposes of computation of book profits which computation is different from normal computation under the 1961 Act/computation under Chapter VI -A. We need to keep in mind the upward and downward adjustments and if so read, it becomes clear that clause (iv) covers full export profits of 100% as ‘eligible profits’ and that the same cannot be reduced to 80% by relying on S. 80HHC(1B). Thus, for computing ‘book profits’ the downward adjustment, in the above example, would be Rs.100 crores and not Rs. *90 crores. The idea being to exclude ‘export profits’ from computation of book profits u/s.115JB which imposes MAT on deemed income. The above reasoning also gets support from the Memorandum of the Explanation to the Finance Bill, 2000.”

* In the given example, this should be Rs.80 crores.

Conclusion:

4.1 In view of the above judgment of the Apex Court, it is settled that for the purpose of excluding the export profit from the book profit while applying the MAT provisions, the entire export profit will be excluded and not the reduced export profit. Primarily, the decision of the Court seems to have been rested on the finding that both provisions (S. 80HHC & S. 115JB) operate in different spheres, S. 115JB is a self-contained code, S. 80HHC(1) deals with the ‘eligibility’, whereas S. 80HHC(3) deals with computation of quantum of deduction, S. 80HHC(1B) deals with the extent of deduction and not with the eligibility, there is dif-ference between the ‘eligibility’ and ‘deductibility’ of profits and the view also gets support from the Memorandum explaining the Finance Bill, 2000.

4.2 Interestingly, in the above judgment, the arguments raised on behalf of the assessee, as well as the view expressed by the Bombay High Court on such argument and the reasons given by the High Court for reaching the conclusion are neither referred to nor dealt with. It appears that perhaps the same arguments must have been raised by the assessee before the Apex Court, which were raised before the High Court.

4.3 On a careful reading of both the judgments, one may notice that the Apex Court has taken a view that while determining the amount of export profit for exclusion from the book profit, provisions of S. 80HHC(1B) are not to be taken in the account, whereas the Bombay High Court had taken exactly contrary view. One of the reasons given by the High Court for taking such a view was that if, while computing the book profit, Ss.1(B) is not to be read with Ss.(1) of S. 80HHC, then there would an absurdity as in such an event, MAT companies would claim deduction of export profit even after 1-4-2005 (refer para 2.5 and para 2.8 above). This reason is also to be treated as impliedly overruled as otherwise, an interesting academic issue may arise as to whether on account of the view taken by the Apex Court, whether MAT companies can attempt to claim the benefit of Clause (iv) of the said Explanation even after A.Y. 2004-05.

4.4 After giving judgment in the case of Ajanta Pharma Ltd., the Bombay High Court in the case of Al-Kabeer Exports Ltd. (233 CTR 443) has also taken a view that the export profit for exclusion from the book profit under the said Clause (iv) has to be computed strictly in accordance with the provisions of S. 80HHC and not on the basis of adjusted Book Profit. For this, the High Court had also placed reliance on it’s judgment in the case of Ajanta Pharma Ltd. referred to in para 2 above. Prior to this, the Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Syncom Formulations (I). Ltd. [106 ITD 193 (Mum.)] had taken a view that for such purpose, the determination of export profit should be based on the adjusted book profit and not on the basis of regular provision of the Act as applicable to the computation of profits and gains of business. The judgment of the High Court in the case of Ajanta Pharma Ltd. also gave an impression that it has overruled the decision of Special Bench in the case of Syncom Formulations (I) Ltd. (supra). Now, in view of the judgment of the Apex Court reversing the judg-ment of the Bombay High Court, even the view taken by the Bombay High Court in the case of Al-Kabeer Exports Ltd. may not be regarded as good law and in that context, the view taken by the Special Bench of ITAT in the case of Syncom Farmulations (I) Ltd. (supra) gets support from the judgment of the Apex Court.

Cryptic order of the AO dropping penalty proceedings Revision u/s.263

closements

Introduction :


1.1 Various orders are passed by the Assessing Officer (AO)
under different provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the Act). Since the
Department has no right of appeal against such orders passed before the first
appellate authority, there is an inbuilt mechanism in the Act to supervise and
monitor the correctness of such orders to safeguard the interest of the Revenue.
Accordingly, a power of revision is vested with the Commissioner of Income-tax
(CIT) to revise, etc. such orders passed by the AO as provided in that Section.

1.2 U/s.263, if the CIT considers that the order passed by
the AO is erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interest of the
Revenue, he may pass such orders thereon as the circumstances of the case
justify, including an order enhancing or modifying the assessment, or cancelling
the assessment and directing a fresh assessment, of course, after providing
opportunity of being heard to the assessee. Such order, under this Section, can
be passed within a time limit provided in the Section. Certain other relevant
terms are also defined in the Section, with which we are not concerned in this
write-up.

1.3 For the purpose of exercising jurisdiction u/s. 263, two
cumulative conditions are required to be satisfied, namely, (i) that the order
of the AO is erroneous, and (ii) that it is prejudicial to the interest of the
Revenue as held by the Apex Court in the case of Malabar Industrial Company
Limited (243 ITR 83). It is further held that the phrase ‘prejudicial to the
interest of the Revenue’ is of wide import and is not confined to loss of tax.
At the same time, the phrase has to be read in conjunction with erroneous order
passed by the AO. Every loss of revenue as a consequence of an order of the AO
cannot be termed as prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue, e.g.,
when the AO has adopted one of the courses permissible in law and it has
resulted in loss of revenue, or where two views are possible and the AO has
adopted one view with which the CIT does not agree, it cannot be treated as an
erroneous order prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue unless the view taken
by the AO is unsustainable in law.

1.4 Once penalty proceedings are initiated against the
assessee under the provisions of Act, in response to the same, various
explanations, etc. are filed by the assessee to show that the case is not fit
for imposing such penalty. After considering the same, the AO decides as to
whether penalty should be levied or not. When the AO decides not to levy the
penalty and passes an order dropping the penalty proceedings without mentioning
reasons for the same in the order, it was under consideration as to whether the
order passed by the AO dropping the penalty proceedings attracts and justifies
the revision by the CIT u/s.263 merely because reasons for dropping the penalty
proceedings are not mentioned in such order.

1.5 Recently the Apex Court had an occasion to consider the
issue referred to in Para 1.4 above in the case of Toyota Motor Corporation.
Though the judgment of the Court is very short, it is felt that it has
far-reaching consequences in the actual day-to-day practice and therefore, it is
thought fit to consider the same in this column.


CIT v. Toyota Motor Corporation, 218 CTR 628 (Del.) :


2.1 In the above case, the financial years involved were
1988-89 to 1997-98. The facts are not available in the judgment. It seems that
the penalty proceedings u/s.271C for non-deduction of tax were initiated. It
also seems that the matter of liability to deduct tax and the fact of
non-deduction of tax were not in dispute at that stage. It also seems that the
assessee had explained his case and had shown his bona fides for the same
and after considering the same, the AO had decided not to levy the penalty and
the following order dated 9-7-1999 was passed :

“The penalty proceedings initiated in this case u/s.271C
r/w S. 274 of the IT Act, 1961 are hereby dropped.”


2.2 The CIT initiated the proceedings u/s.263 to revise the
above order passed by the AO and after hearing the assessee, took the view that
the AO did not verify several issues and facts as mentioned in the order passed
by him, nor did the AO carry out necessary investigations to come to the
conclusion that penalty is not leviable. Based on this, the CIT treated the
order of the AO as erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue and
set aside the same with a direction to pass fresh order after making necessary
enquiries, etc. and after giving opportunity of hearing to the assessee.

2.3 When the order of the CIT passed u/s.263 came up for
consideration before the Tribunal, it was held that the AO had carried out due
verification of relevant facts and the assessee has also shown its bona fides
and its reasonable belief in not deducting tax at the appropriate stage. The
penalty proceedings were not dropped casually by the AO, but the same was done
after verification of full facts disclosed by the assessee in reply.
Accordingly, the order passed u/s.263 was set aside.

2.4 At the instance of the Revenue, the matter came up before
the High Court, for which the following substantial question of law was framed :

“Whether AO could have passed an order u/s. 271C of the IT
Act, 1961 without giving any reasons whatsoever ?”


2.5 For deciding the above question, and after noting the
reasons given by the Tribunal for deciding the issue in favour of the assessee,
the Court observed as under (page 630) :


“We are unable to appreciate this reasoning given by the Tribunal simply because that the AO him-self did not say any such thing in his order. There is no doubt that the proceedings before the AO are quasi-judicial proceedings and a decision taken by the AO in this regard must be supported by reasons. Otherwise, every order, such as the one passed by the AO, could result in a theoretical possibility that it may be revised by the CIT u/ s.263 of the Act. Such a situation is clearly impermissible.”

2.6 The Court, then, stated that it is necessary for the parties to know the reasons for the conclusion arrived at by the authorities. The order of the AO should be self-contained order giving the relevant facts and the reasons for his conclusion. The Court finally decided the issue against the assessee and held as under (page 630) :

“We find that the order passed by the AO is cryptic, to say the least, and it cannot be sustained. The Tribunal cannot substitute its own reasoning to justify the order passed by the AO when the AO himself did not give any reason in the order passed by him.

Under the circumstances, we answer the question in the affirmative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee and remand the matter back to the file of the AO to decide the issue afresh in terms of the order passed by the CIT u/ s.263 of the Act.”

Toyota Motors Corporation v. CIT, 218 CTR 539 (SC) :

3.1 The above-referred judgment of the Delhi High Court came up for consideration before the Apex Court. Somehow, the Apex Court has not dealt with the issue in detail and dismissed the appeal.

3.2 While deciding the issue against the assessee, the Court observed as under :
“We are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order of the High Court. The High Court has held that the AO had disposed the proceedings stating the penalty proceedings initiated in this case u/s.271C r/w S. 274 of the IT Act, 1961 are hereby dropped. According to the High Court, there was no basis indicated for dropping the proceedings. The Tribunal referred to certain aspects and held that the initiation of proceedings u/ s. 263 of the IT Act, 1961 (in short, the ‘IT Act’) was impermissible when considered in the background of the materials purportedly placed by the assessee before the AO. What the High Court has done is to require the AO to pass a reasoned order. The High Court was of the view that the Tribunal could not have substituted its own reasoning which were required to be recorded by the AO. According to the assessee all relevant aspects were placed for consideration and if the officer did not record reasons, the assessee cannot be faulted.

We do not think it necessary to interfere at this stage. It goes without saying that when the matter be taken up by the AO on remand, it shall be his duty to take into account all the relevant aspects including the materials, if any, already placed by the assessee, and pass a reasoned order.”

Conclusion:

4.1 From the above judgment of the Apex Court, it seems that even an order passed by the AO dropping the penalty proceedings should be with reasons. The AO has to record the reasons for which penalty proceedings are dropped.

4.2 Unfortunately, the Apex Court did not appreciate the contention of the assessee that all relevant aspects were placed before the AO for consideration and if the AO did not record reasons, the assessee cannot be faulted.

4.3 In response to show-cause notice for levy of penalty, the only thing the assessee can do is to offer explanation and make out a case for non-levy of penalty. However, it is difficult to understand as to how the assessee can ensure that while dropping the penalty proceedings, the AO should incorporate reasons also in the order? It seems that it is this position which must have led the Tribunal to decide the issue in favour of the assessee after verifying the factual position that the order was passed by the AO after making necessary verifications, etc. Unfortunately, this factual position has neither been appreciated by the High Court, nor by the Apex Court. In both these judgments, there is not even a discussion on this practical as well as legal difficulty faced by the assessee.

4.4 In practice, we understand that in most cases, orders for dropping the penalty proceedings are cryptic and without reasons and the same are, more or less, on the same line as in the above case. Considering the constraints of the administration and the AO in particular, it is necessary to accept the position that if the assessee has given proper explanation and shown his bona fides to the satisfaction of the AO, penalty matters should be treated as concluded even if the reasons for such satisfactions are ‘not formally mentioned in the order passed by the AO. Therefore, the above judgment of the Apex Court, to that extent, requires reconsideration. Till this happens, perhaps, the CITs while exercising. their jurisdiction u/ s.263 should consider this in the interest of justice.

Exemption for Educational Institution

Controversies

1. Issue for consideration :


1.1 S. 10(23C) of the Income-tax Act contains 3 clauses for
granting exemption to universities or other educational institutions — (iiiab),
(iiiad) and (vi). The common requirement for exemption under all these three
clauses is that the university or other educational institution should exist
solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of profit.

1.2 There has been a debate as to the meaning of the term
‘not for purposes of profit’. The tax authorities have sought to interpret this
requirement as meaning that an Institute which earns a surplus would not be
eligible for the benefit of exemption u/s.10(23C).

1.3 While the Uttarakhand High Court has supported this view
of the tax authorities by holding that in a case of surplus, the educational
institution is not eligible for the exemption, the Bombay High Court and the
Punjab and Haryana High Courts have taken a contrary view that the institution
cannot be regarded as existing for purposes of profit simply because it has a
surplus, and would continue to be eligible for the exemption.

2. Queens’ Educational Society’s case :


2.1 The issue came up before the Uttarakhand High Court in
the case of CIT v. Queens Educational Society, 319 ITR 160.

2.2 In this case involving various educational societies
registered under the Societies Registration Act and imparting education to
children, the assessees had claimed exemption u/s.10(23C)(iiiad), on the ground
that they existed solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of
profit.

2.3 The Assessing Officer rejected the claim for exemption.
The Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the benefit of exemption, and the Tribunal
upheld the order of the Commissioner (Appeals).

2.4 The Uttarakhand High Court disapproved the observations
of the Tribunal as hypothetical when the Tribunal noted that there was hardly
any surplus left after investment into fixed assets, that the assessees were
engaged in imparting education and had to maintain a teaching and non-teaching
staff and to pay for the salaries and other expenses, that it became necessary
to charge fees from students for meeting all these expenses, that the charging
of fee was incidental to the prominent objective of the trust of imparting
education, that the school was initially being run in a rented building and the
surplus enabled the Society to acquire its own property, computers, library
books, sports equipment, etc. for the benefit of the students, and that the
members of the Society had not utilised any part of the surplus for their own
benefit. The High Court also noted the Tribunal’s observations that profit was
only incidental to the main object of spreading education, and that if there was
no surplus out of the difference between the receipts and outgoings, the trust
would not be able to achieve its objects.

2.5 The Uttarakhand High Court observed that the reasons
recorded by the Tribunal were hypothetical, and that the Tribunal failed to
appreciate that the profit percentage was 30% and 27% of the total receipts.
According to the Uttarakhand High Court, the law was well settled that is the
profit was proved by an educational Society, then that would be income of the
society as a surplus amount remained in the account books of the Society after
meeting all the expenses incurred towards imparting education. The Uttarakhand
High Court relied on observations of the Supreme Court in the case of
Aditanar Educational Institution v. Addl. CIT,
224 ITR 310 for this
proposition.

2.6 The Uttarakhand High Court observed further that the
objects clause contained other noble and pious objects and the Society had done
nothing to achieve those objects except pushing the main object of providing
education and earning profit. According to the Uttarakhand High Court, with the
profit which it had earned, the Society had strengthened or enhanced its
capacity to earn more rather than to undertake any other activities to fulfil
other noble objects for the cause of poor and needy people or advancement of
religious purposes. The High Court observed that the investment in fixed assets
might have been connected with the imparting of education, but the same had been
constructed and/or purchased out of income from imparting education with a view
to expand the institution and to earn more income.

2.7 The Uttarakhand High Court therefore held that the
Society was not eligible for exemption, as it was existing for purposes of
profit, as evidenced by the surplus earned by the Society.

3. Vanita Vishram Trust’s case :


3.1 The issue again recently came up before the Mumbai High
Court in the case of Vanita Vishram Trust v. CCIT, (unreported — Writ
Petition Nos. 366 & 367 of 2010, dated 6th May 2010 — available on
www.itatonline.org).

3.2 In this case, the assessee was a public charitable trust
registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950. It had been running primary
and secondary schools and colleges in Mumbai since 1929 and in Surat since 1940.
Its main object was education of women. Its memorandum provided that no portion
of the income or property of the Association would be paid directly or
indirectly by way of dividend, bonus or otherwise to the members of the
Association, and that the surplus if any, was not to be paid or distributed
amongst the members of the Association, but to be transferred to another
institution or institutions having similar objects. Till A.Y. 2004-05, the trust
was allowed exemption u/s.10(22) and u/s.10(23C)(vi).

3.3 The assessee filed applications for continuation of
approval u/s.10(23C)(vi) with the Chief Commissioner of Income-tax (CCIT). The
CCIT held that the trust had other objects, such as construction of ashrams for
Gujarati Hindu women, and was therefore not existing solely for education. He
also noted that since the trust had a surplus in excess of 12% of the receipts
from its activities, which was invested in making additions to assets and
increasing bank deposits, it was not entitled to the exemption. He therefore
rejected the applications for approval.

3.4 Before the Bombay High Court, it was argued on behalf of the assessee that for nearly 80 years, the assessee had been carrying on only the activity of conducting schools and colleges and had not carried on any other activity. It was also argued that the incidental existence of a surplus generated from the activity of conducting schools and colleges would not detract from the character of the assessee as existing solely for educational purposes and not for profit, and that the entire surplus was utilised only for the purpose of education, there being a specific provision in the Memorandum under which no part of the profits could be distributed. It was further argued that the existence of a surplus did not disentitle an institution to the grant of approval, and that the purpose of the surplus was to build up corpus for the capital enhancement of the educational institutions conducted by the trust, which was not a commercial purpose, but a purpose directly proximate to the main object of conducting educational institutions.

3.5 On behalf of the Revenue, it was argued that the threshold requirement of S. 10(23C)(vi) was the existence of an educational institution or university, and its existence solely for educational purposes and not for profit.

3.6 Noting the fact that the trust had carried on only the running of schools and colleges for the last 80 years, the Bombay High Court noted that even in the past, the tax authorities had held the trust to be existing solely for educational purposes. The Bombay High Court noted that in a reference made to a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court u/s.256(1) on the issue of whether the same assessee (as was now before it) was entitled to exemption u/s.10(22) on interest earned on surplus funds of the school run by it, the Division Bench had observed that merely because a certain surplus arose from the operations of the trust, it could not be held that the institution was run for the purpose of profit, so long as no person or individual was entitled to any portion of the profit and the profit was utilised for the purpose of promoting the objects of the institution.

3.7 In that case, the Division Bench had relied on the Supreme Court decision in the case of Aditanar Educational Institution (supra), in holding that as a principle of law, if after meeting the expenditure, a surplus resulted incidentally from an activity law-fully carried on by the educational institution, the institution would not cease to be one which was existing solely for educational purposes since the object was not to make profit. The Bombay High Court noted the findings of the earlier Division Bench in the case of the same assessee holding that the assessee existed only for educational purposes which consisted of running educational institutions, and not for earning profits.

3.8 The Bombay High Court also pointed out the provisions of the third proviso to S. 10(23C), which permitted an accumulation not exceeding 15% for a period of not more than 5 years. According to the Bombay High Court, this provision established that the Parliament did not regard the accumulation of income by a university or other educational institution as a disabling factor, so long as the purpose of accumulation was the application of the income wholly and exclusively to the objects for which the institution had been established. The Parliament had however placed a limit on the amount and period of such accumulation.

3.9 Referring to the decision of the Uttarakhand High Court in Queens’ Educational Society’s case, the Bombay High Court observed that that case seemed to be distinguishable, as the assessee in that case was construed to be one which existed with the object of enhancing the income and of earning profits as opposed to the provision of education. However, with reference to the observations of the Uttarakhand High Court that though it was entitled to pursue other noble and pious objects, the assessee had done nothing to achieve them and had only pursued the main object of providing education and earning profit, the Bombay High Court observed that the requirement that the institution must exist solely for educational purposes would militate against an institution pursuing other objects. The Bombay High Court therefore disagreed with the views expressed by the Uttarakhand High Court that the benefit of the exemption should be denied on the ground that the assessee had only pursued its main object of providing education and had not pursued the other objects for which the trust was constituted.

As observed by the Bombay High Court, if the assessee were to pursue other objects, it would clearly violate the requirement of existing solely for educational purposes.

3.10 The Bombay High Court therefore directed the CCIT to grant approval to the assessee u/s. 10(23C)(vi) as an educational institution existing solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of profit.

3.11 A similar view was taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Pinegrove International Charitable Trust v. Union of India, 188 Taxman 402, where the Punjab and Haryana High Court held that merely because profits have resulted from activity of imparting education would not result in change of character of institution that it existed solely for educational purposes.

4.Observations:

4.1 Since all the three High Courts in the above cases have referred to the Supreme Court decision in the case of Aditanar Educational Institution (supra ) in support of the view taken by each of them, and relied on the same observations, it is necessary to understand the ratio of that decision and those observations of the Supreme Court in Aditanar’s case.

4.2 In Aditanar’s case (supra ), the Supreme Court was considering a case of a Society which was running various schools, and had received donations. The tax authorities sought to tax the donations, on the ground that the Society was not an educational institution, but merely a financing body. While holding that the Society itself was also an educational institution existing solely for educational purposes, the Supreme Court observed as under:

“We may state that the language of S. 10(22) of the Act is plain and clear and the availability of the exemption should be evaluated each year to find out whether the institution existed during the relevant year solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of profit. After meeting the expenditure, if any surplus results incidentally from the activity lawfully carried on by the educational institution, it will not cease to be one existing solely for educational purposes since the object is not one to make profit. The decisive or acid test is whether on an overall view of the matter, the object is to make profit. In evaluating or appraising the above, one should also bear in mind the distinction/difference between the corpus, the objects and the powers of the concerned entity. The following decisions are relevant in this context: Governing Body of Rangaraya Medical College v. ITO, (1979) 117 ITR 284 (AP) and Secondary Board of Education v. ITO, (1972) 86 ITR 408 (Orissa).”

4.3 The Supreme Court therefore impliedly approved the ratio of these two decisions of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and the Orissa High Court. In Rangaraya Medical College’s case, the Andhra Pradesh High Court had held that merely because certain surplus arose from the society’s operations, it could not be held that the institution was run for purpose of profit, so long as no person or individual was entitled to any portion of the said profit and the said profit was utilised for the purpose and for the promotion of the objects of the institution.

4.4 In Secondary Board of Education’s case, the Orissa High Court held:

“One of the sources of income of the Board is profits from compilation, publication, printing and sale of textbooks. The profits so earned enter into the Board fund. The income and expenditure of the Board is controlled and the entire expenditure is to be directed towards development and expansion of educational purposes. Even if there is some surplus, it remains as a part of the sinking fund to be devoted to the cause of education as and when necessary. This being the objective and there being various ways of control of the income and expenditure, the Board of Secondary Education cannot be said to be existing for purposes of profit. It exists solely for purposes of education.”

4.5 It therefore appears that so long as the main object is provision of education, surplus arising from any of the activities would not disentitle the claim for exemption, so long as the surplus can be utilised only for education. This view is also supported by the permitted accumulation.

4.6 Further, the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Pinegrove’s case, has rightly observed that there is a definite purpose behind allowing setting up of educational institutions by private sector, including trusts/societies. Various educational colleges could not have been established for want of funds, and the Government which lacked funds thought that the private sector could assist in this regard. The Court observed that in every educational institution, there is bound to be a profit to support growth of the educational infrastructure and activities. Interestingly, the Punjab & Haryana High Court has held that in computing the surplus, capital expenditure has also to be deducted, as that is also an expenditure on the objects of the trust.

4.7 As rightly observed by the Bombay High Court in Vanita Vishram’s case, where S. 10(23C) itself now permits an accumulation of income up to 15% of the income of the trust, a trust cannot be penalised by treating it as existing for purposes of profit merely because it earns and accumulates such a surplus. In any case, today it is restricted from accumulating a surplus exceeding a particular level and beyond a particular period. As observed by the Supreme Court in Aditanar’s case, there is a clear distinction between the objects, which is that of education, and the powers, which is to spend on objects or accumulate surplus.

4.8 The Uttarakhand High Court seems to have misinterpreted the observations of the Supreme Court in Aditanar’s case, regarding the corpus, objects and powers, to mean that the assessee should pursue other objects as well. As rightly pointed out by the Bombay High Court, if this interpretation were adopted and the assessee pursued other non- educational objects, it may in fact result in total denial of the benefit meant only for educational institutions.

4.8 The better view therefore is that of the Mumbai and Punjab & Haryana High Courts, that an educational trust cannot be held to be existing for purposes of profit and not for education merely because it earns a surplus from its activities.

Deductibility of expenditure on stamp duty and registration charges

1. Issue for consideration :

    1.1 The deductibility or otherwise of payments connected with a property under a lease has always been a source of protracted litigation. Some of such issues are :

  •  Whether payment of premium for acquiring a leasehold asset is a revenue or capital expenditure.

  • Whether payment of lease rent in lump sum is a revenue or capital expenditure.

  •   Whether expenditure incurred for repairs and renovation of leasehold property is allowable as a deduction or not.

  •    Whether expenses on construction of building on a leasehold property is a capital or revenue expenditure.

    1.2 One more issue, which regularly comes for consideration of Courts, is about the deductibility of an expenditure incurred on stamp duty and registration charges, in executing a lease deed, paid by a lessee.

    1.3 The issue remained controversial, in spite of several Courts holding the expenditure to be deductible, because of the decisions of the Karnataka and some other High Courts holding the expenditure in question to be not allowable. Recently, the Himachal Pradesh High Court had an occasion to examine the true purpose of the dissenting decision of the Karnataka High Court in adjudicating the issue under consideration, namely, deductibility of expenditure on stamp duty and registration charges.

2. Hotel Rajmahal’s case :

    2.1 The issue earlier came for consideration of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Hotel Rajmahal v. CIT, 152 ITR 218.

    2.2 The facts behind the legal formulation were that the assessee, a firm consisting of five partners, came into force with effect from March 2, 1974. The firm took over a running business with boarding and lodging facilities in the name and style ‘Hotel Rajmahal’ at Bangalore by executing a lease deed dated April 24, 1974, for which it incurred an expenditure of Rs.11,270 by way of stamp duty, registration fee and legal expenses. The lease was for a period of ten years with option for renewal for another period of ten years.

    2.3 The assessee filed a return disclosing an income of Rs.67,220 for the A.Y. 1975-76, the relevant previous year ending December 31, 1974 after deducting the aforesaid sum of Rs.11,270. The AO completed the assessment accepting the return allowing the said deduction, but the Commissioner revised the order u/s.263 of the Act by disallowing the expenditure of Rs.11,270 on the ground that it was of capital nature having been incurred for acquisition of a capital asset. The appeal preferred by the assessee, against the order of the Commissioner, was dismissed by the Tribunal by holding that the assessee had started the business only during the relevant year for the first time and that the lease was for a considerably long period and therefore, the benefit arising from the transaction be considered as of an enduring nature.

    2.4 At the instance of the assessee, the following question of law was referred for the opinion of the Court :

    “Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, Rs.11,270 being the expenditure incurred by the assessee by way of stamp duty, registration fee and legal expenses for the execution of registration of the lease deed dated April 24, 1974, is to be allowed in computing its income for the A.Y. 1975-76 ?”

    2.5 The assessee, urged before the Court that the period of lease was not relevant for deciding whether the sum claimed for deduction was in the nature of revenue expenditure or capital in nature; what was important to consider was whether the said amount spent was a necessary outgoing for the use of a thing from which the assessee was to earn profit.

    2.6 In support of the contention, the assessee relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in India Cements Ltd. v. CIT, 60 ITR 52 as also on the two decisions of the Bombay High Court in the cases of CIT v. Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd., 113 ITR 877 and CIT v. Bombay Cycle & Motor Agency Ltd., 118 ITR 42.

    2.7 The Court observed that the contention of the assessee could have been relevant, provided the assessee was engaged in a business prior to the execution of the lease deed and the expenditure incurred was incidental to such business, but the assessee in the given case, for the first time, entered into the business in respect of which he spent the amount for executing and registering the lease deed and but for the execution of the lease deed, he would not have got the apparatus of the business and the leasehold rights. The Court held that the expenditure had really brought into existence an asset of enduring nature and the expenditure in connection with the acquisition of such rights should be distinguished from the expenditure incidental to the existing business and that the former could not be allowed u/s.37 of the Act, though the latter may in certain circumstances be allowed.

    2.8 The Court further observed that the assessee could not draw support from those decisions of the Supreme Court and the Bombay High Court since they concerned themselves with cases where a certain sum of money was spent towards stamp duty, registration fees, lawyer’s fees, etc., for the purpose of the existing business of the assessee.

    2.9 In the instant case, as already stated by the Court, it was for the first time that the assessee entered into the business by executing the lease whereunder the assessee secured the leasehold rights for an initial period of ten years with an option to renew for another period of ten years and as such the expenditure incurred for securing this kind of asset, by way of stamp duty, registration charges and legal fees was an expenditure of capital nature.

    2.10 At this juncture, we need to take note of the decisions in the cases of United Commercial Corporation, 78 ITR 800 (All) and Govind Sugar, 152 ITR 218 (Kar.), wherein the expenses in question were held to be not allowable, irrespective of the fact that they were incurred after the business was set up.

3. Gopal Associates’ case :

3.1 Recently, the Himachal Pradesh High Court in the case of CIT v. Gopal Associates, 222 CTR 307 was required to consider the issue of allowability of the expenditure on stamp duty and registration charges in executing a lease deed. In that case, during the A.Y. 1994-95, the assessee took on lease, a fruit processing plant from the HPMC. The lease deed was executed on 27th December, 1993 for a period of 7 years but was later terminated. The assessee had spent a sum of Rs.3,44,251 as stamp duty and registration charges on execution of the lease deed. The AO treated this expenditure as capital expenditure by relying upon the judgment of the Karnataka High Court in the case Hotel Rajmahal (supra). On the other hand, the assessee relying upon the judgments of the Madras, Kerala and Gujarat High Courts in Sri Krishna Tiles & Potteries Madras (P) Ltd. v. CIT, 173 ITR 311 (Mad.), Plantation Corporation of Kerala Ltd. v. Commissioner of Agri. IT, 205 ITR 364 (Ker.) and Gujarat Machinery Manufacturing Ltd. v. ClT, 211 ITR 1010 (Guj.) contended that the amount spent as stamp duty and registration charges should be treated as revenue expenditure. The CIT(A) and Tribunal accepted the plea of the assessee.

3.2 The Revenue filed an appeal challenging the order of the Tribunal by raising the following substantial question of law:

“Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the expenditure incurred on stamp duty and registration charges at the time of execution of lease agreement for taking on lease the fruit processing plant for seven years was allowable as revenue expenditure.”

3.3 The Himachal Pradesh High Court noted that the Karnataka High Court in Hotel Rajmahal’s case (supra) did not really discuss the matter in detail but held that when for the first time the assessee entered a lease deed securing leasehold rights for a long period, the expenditure incurred on stamp duty registration and legal fees, etc. should be treated as expenditure of capital nature. The Court however chose to follow the decision of the Madras High Court  in Sri Krishna  Tiles & Potteries  Madras  (P) Ltd. case (supra) which in turn followed the law laid down by the Bombay High Court in ClT v. Cinceita Ltd., 137 ITR 652 (Born.) and accordingly dis-agreed with the decision of the Karnataka High Court to hold that irrespective of whether the incidental expenditure was incurred in connection with or related to capital expenditure, the same had to be treated as revenue expenditure.

3.4 The Court also  noted that the Kerala High Court also took the same view in Plantation Corporation’s case (supra) and the Gujarat High Court in Gujarat Machinery’s case (supra) dealt with the same question and held that the amount spent on registration and stamp charges was a revenue expenditure.

3.5 The Court chose to follow the reasoning given by the Bombay, Madras, Kerala and Gujarat High Courts and respectfully disagreed with the judgment of the Karnataka High Court.

3.6 In view of the findings, the Court decided the substantial question against the Revenue by holding that the expenditure in question was a revenue expenditure allowable as a deduction.

Observations:

4.1 The short but interesting  issue is whether  the expenditure  in question  for drawing  up a proper and effective deed of lease, namely, the expenditure in respect  of stamp  duty,  registration  charges  and professional fees paid to the. solicitors who prepared and got registered  the deed  of lease is an expenditure resulting in an enduring  benefit simply because it is in some manner  incurred  at the same time and is connected  that way to a property  acquired  under a lease. Further,  the fact that the lease is of a longer period will have any bearing in deciding the issue or not.

4.2 We need to note that there is no element of premium in the said amounts claimed as expenditure and the expenditure would have been the same even if the lease had been of a shorter duration. The expenditure in question is not for acquiring the lease-hold right which is normally acquired on payment of premium, but is incurred to meet certain expenses which have necessarily to be incurred in order to conform to the legal requirements laid down in this behalf for getting a legal deed of lease. It is incurred for drawing up and registering a valid deed of lease not suffering from legal infirmities to facilitate the carrying on of the business of the as-sessee.

4.3 The contention that the assessee obtains an en-during benefit by obtaining the lease deeds and any expenses incurred in connection therewith should be treated as capital expenditure, more so when the lease is for a longer a period should be examined in light of the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Empire Jute Co. Ltd. CIT, 124 ITR I, CfT v. Associated Cement Companies Ltd., 172 ITR 257 and Alembic Chemicals Works Co. Ltd. v. CIT, 177 ITR 377, which have laid down pragmatic and practical tests to find out whether an expenditure is revenue or capital in nature. The Supreme Court held that even in a case where expenditure is incurred for obtaining an advantage of enduring benefit, emphasis should be placed on the nature of the advantage in a commercial sense and if the advantage consists merely in facilitating the assessee’s trading operations or enabling the management and conduct of the assessee’s business to be carried on more efficiently or profitably, while leaving the fixed capital untouched, the expenditure should be held to be on revenue account, even though the advantage may endure for an indefinite future.

4.4 The test of ‘enduring benefit’ has been held to be not a decisive or conclusive test: it cannot be applied blindly and mechanically. The question must be viewed in the larger context of business necessity or expediency. If the expenditure is so related to the carrying on or the conduct of the business, it may be regarded as an integral part of the profit-earning process and not for acquisition of an asset or a right of a permanent character. If the expenditure helps in the profit-earning process, it should not be treated as resulting in acquisition of a profit-earning machinery or apparatus.

4.5 The Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. Cinceita Pvt. Ltd., 137 ITR 652, held that though the period of the lease was for 20 years with an option for renewal at a higher rent, yet the expenditure claimed by the assessee was the only expenditure required for drawing up a proper and effective lease deed, namely, the expenditure in respect of the stamp duty, registration charges and professional fees paid to the solicitors, who prepared and registered the lease deed. It noted that there was no element of premium in the amount claimed as expenditure for acquiring the leasehold premises and moreover, the expenditure would have been the same even if the lease was for a shorter duration of any period exceeding one year. Importantly, the Court held that merely because the period of the lease was longer it could not be held that the expenditure resulted in acquiring an asset or advantage of an enduring nature. Therefore, the sum spent was held to be allowable as revenue expenditure.

4.6 The Kerala High Court in the case of Plantation Corporation, 205 ITR 364, held that the Appellate Tribunal had overemphasised the fact that the assessee had acquired an enduring benefit on planting rubber trees by obtaining long-term lease arrangement. The expenditure incurred relating to stamp duty, adjudication fee, registration fee, etc. in respect of lease deeds covering the lands leased to the assessee by the Government was revenue expenditure according to the Court.

4.7 The Madras High Court in the case of Sri Krishna Tiles & Potteries Madras (P) Ltd., 173 ITR 317, held that there was a transfer of interest in the property which was the subject matter of the agreement and the Tribunal was justified in holding that the amount paid as salami was a capital expenditure; however, the sum paid towards stamp duty, registration charges and professional fees to the lawyers was allowable as revenue expenditure.

4.8 The Gujarat High Court in the case of Gujarat Machinery Mfg. Ltd. 211 ITR 1010, in a case dealing with the claim by the lessor, held that the assessee had let an immovable property in consideration of obtaining rent from the lessee and that the assessee (lessor) had not spent any money for acquisition of an asset or rights of a permanent character. On the contrary, the assessee, as a lessor, had parted with some of its rights as owner of the immovable property in favour of the lessee. The assessee was the owner of the property and by executing the lease deed in favour of the lessee, it was not acquiring any new source of income or new asset. Therefore, the expenditure for the stamp duty and the registration of the lease deed could not be said to have been laid out for acquisition of any asset or a right of a permanent nature. The expenditure was laid out for earning rent or was spent as part of the process of profit earning. The expenditure was related to the carrying on or conduct of the business or of earning income by letting out the immovable property which was already owned by the assessee. Merely because the expenditure was related to a capital asset, it did not become a capital expenditure. Therefore, the expenditure incurred by the assessee for letting out the property was revenue expenditure. The Court in arriving at the decision relied on CIT v. Khandelwal Mining and Ores Pvt. Ltd., 140 ITR 701 (Born.) and CIT v. Katihar Jute Mills (P) Ltd., 116 ITR 781 (Cal.).

4.9 In CIT v. Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd., 113 ITR 877, it was held by the Bombay High Court that expenses incurred by way of brokerage and stamp duty for acquiring office premises on lease for a short period of five years were allowable as a deduction in computing the total income of the assessee, since the assessee could not be said to have acquired or brought into existence an advantage of an enduring character.

4.10 The Bombay High Court again in CIT v. Bombay Cycle & Motor Agency Ltd., 118 ITR 42, allowed the claim of the assesses for deduction of the expenses in question. In that case, one of the leases in question was for a period of ten years and the other for a period of five years. The Tribunal had taken the view that the fact that the amounts had been spent in connection with the opening of new branches was by itself no justification for disallowance, that no asset of an enduring nature had been brought into existence, and that the period of the lease by itself was not indicative of securing an asset of an enduring nature and that the expenditure could not be disallowed as of a capital nature.

4.11 It appears that the decisions in the cases of United Commercial Corporation, 78 ITR 800 (All.) and Govind Sugar, 152 ITR 218 (Kar.), wherein the expenses in question were held to be not allowable irrespective of the fact that they were incurred after the business was set up require reconsideration. The view that the expenditure on stamp duty, registration charges and professional fees for drafting the lease deed be allowed as a revenue expenditure is a better view.

Taxability of interest on disputed compensation

Controversies

1. Issue for consideration :


1.1 The Government under the Constitution of India is vested
with the power to compulsorily acquire the private property of its subject in
the given circumstances on payment of compensation. This compensation may in
some cases get enhanced, by the Government or by a Court, where the owner of the
property challenges the quantum of compensation. In such cases of enhancement,
the owner in addition to the compensation is granted interest on the delayed
payment which usually spreads over a period exceeding a year. It is also seen
that the Government in turn challenges the orders of enhancement and interest
thereon, passed by the Courts, before the higher forum, before whom the issue is
finally settled.

1.2 In the circumstances stated in paragraph 1.1, the issues
that arise under the law of income-tax are; whether the compensation received is
taxable or not; whether the interest received thereon is taxable or not and if
yes in which year it will be taxable and whether the interest can be taxed
pending the finalisation of the dispute surrounding the quantum of compensation.

1.3 The first issue referred to in paragraph 1.2 is sought to
be taken care of by insertion of S. 45(5) which provides for taxation of deemed
capital gains on compulsory acquisition of a property. The second issue about
the year of taxation of the interest is rested by the decision of the Apex Court
in the case of Ramabai v. CIT, 181 ITR 400 (SC), wherein it was held that
the interest received on additional compensation should not be taken to have
been accrued in the year of the order, but should be held to have accrued year
after year from the date of handing of the possession of the property till the
date of the order granting the interest and should be spread over the period for
which the same was granted and should be taxed in the respective years. The
third issue continues to emerge repeatedly before the Courts requiring the
Courts to address the issue of the taxability of interest pending its
finalisation.

1.4 A good number of decisions of the High Courts confirms
that the interest on enhanced compensation cannot be taxed till such time the
same is free of any dispute and it is only when the payment thereof is free of
any disputes that it can be brought to tax. As against this, the Revenue
regularly relies on the sole decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court which
held that the interest should be taxed in the year in which the same was
received under the order of additional compensation and the fact that the
Government had filed an appeal against the order of enhancement shall not defer
the taxation.

2. M. Sarojini Devi’s case :


2.1 The issue came up for consideration of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court in the case of CIT v. M. Sarojini Devi, 250 ITR 759. In that
case, land belonging to the assessee had been acquired by the Government in the
year 1966 and compensation was awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer. The
amount of compensation was challenged by the assessee and on reference,
compensation at a higher rate was awarded in the previous year relevant to the
A.Y. 1976-77, together with an interest of Rs.43,642 for the period 1966 to
1975. The State Government challenged the said order of enhancement in an appeal
before the Supreme Court, which was pending. The Assessing Officer held that the
entire amount of interest on enhanced compensation was liable to tax in A.Y.
1976-77.

2.2 The assessment was challenged in appeal before the
Appellate Commissioner who held that the amount of interest received by the
assessee could not be taxed, as the matter had not become final and an appeal
was pending before the Supreme Court. In deciding the issue, he relied on a
judgment of the same Court in CIT v. Smt. Sankari Manickyamma, 105 ITR
172 (AP). On further appeal before the Tribunal, the Appellate Commissioner’s
view was upheld by following the said decision of the Court.

2.3 The Revenue being aggrieved referred the following
question to the Court : “Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the
case, the interest on compensation for the assessment year for which the
interest should be brought to tax is the one in which it was awarded or the year
in which issue of quantum of compensation becomes final ?”

The question raised was reframed by the Court as follows;
“Whether the AO has to wait till the final disposal by the final Court in an
acquisition matter before the interest accrued is taxed ?”

2.4 The Court on consideration of the facts noted that the
question was already answered by the Supreme Court in Rama Bai v. CIT,
181 ITR 400 (SC). The Court observed that the fact that the compensation was
enhanced by the High Court in an appeal and the interest accruing thereon was
received by the assessee made him liable to pay the tax, however, the interest
would be spread over the period for which it accrued to him, in accordance with
the Supreme Court judgment. It also noted that in case the judgment enhancing
the compensation in favour of the assessee was reversed by the Supreme Court,
the assessee, even after payment of tax on the accrued interest, would not be
remediless, as he could seek refund of the tax so paid, by making appropriate
application for rectification of the assessment. Lastly, the Court was of the
view that the judgment relied upon by the Tribunal in Smt. Sankari Manickyamma’s
case, 105 ITR 172 (AP), stood reversed in view of the judgment of the Supreme
Court in Rama Bai’s case, 181 ITR 400.

2.5 The Andhra Pradesh High Court for the above reasons,
answered the question in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.

3. Karanbir Singh’s case :


3.1 The Punjab & Haryana High Court recently was required to
deal with the issue in the case of CIT v. Karanbir Singh, 216 CTR 585. In
that case land belonging to the assessee was acquired by the Punjab State
Electricity Board in 1962. During the previous year relevant to A.Y. 1986-87,
the assessee received enhanced compensation and interest to the tune of
Rs.11,87,485 and Rs.17,06,686, respectively. The State Government filed an
appeal against the said order of enhancement, which appeal was pending at the
time of assessment. The AO held that the entire amount of interest received of
Rs.17,06,686 was assessable in the assessee’s hands for the A.Y. 1986-87, as the
amount was actually received during that year.

3.2 Aggrieved by the order of assessment on this count, the assessee preferred an appeal before the CIT(A) and inter alia contended that the amount of interest received by the assessee was not taxable in his hands during the year in question in terms of judgment of the Supreme Court in CIT v. Hindustan Housing & Land Development Trust Ltd., 161 ITR 524. The CIT(A) did not accept the contention of the assessee, but directed for taxing only that amount of interest which accrued to the assessee during the assessment year in question, by relying on the decision in the case of Smt. Rama Bai v..CIT, 181 ITR 400 (SC).

3.3 The assessee, being still aggrieved, preferred an appeal before the Tribunal where the Tribunal relying upon decision of the Supreme Court in Hindustan Housing & Land Development Trust Ltd.’s case (supra) accepted the appeal of the assessee by holding that no amount of interest should be taxable, as the matter regarding compensation had not attained finality and was still fluid.

3.4 At the instance of the Revenue, the following question was referred to the Punjab & Haryana High Court; “Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the amount of interest on enhanced compensation received in June, 1985 in consequence upon judgment of District Judge and the amount having been utilised/invested in discretion of the assessee was not includible in the total income of the assessee ?”

3.5 The Revenue contended that the principles of law laid down in Hindustan Housing & Land Development Trust Ltd.’s case (supra) were not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case, as the right to receive compensation by the assessee was not in dispute and it was only the quantification thereof on account of which the appeals were pending at the relevant time; that merely because the quantum issue had not attained finality, the amount which had actually been received and was available at the discretion of the assessee could not be held to be non-taxable, as the same would be totally against the spirit of the taxing statute. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in CIT v. Smt. M. Sarojini Devi (supra).

3.6 The High Court noted that against a solitary judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Smt. M. Sarojini Devi’s case (supra), there were many judgments of different Courts taking a view in favour of the assessee on the issue, namely, CIT v. Laxman Das & Anr., 246 ITR 622 (All), Director of IT (Exemption) v. Goyal Charitable Trust, 125 CTR (Del.) 426, 215 ITR 672 (Del.), Chief CIT & Anr. v. Smt. Shantavva, 188 CTR (Kar.) 162,267 ITR 67 (Kar.) and CIT v. Abdul Mannan Shah Mohammed, 248 ITR 614 (Bom.). It also noted that a special leave peti-tion in a similar case was dismissed by the Supreme Court reported in CIT v. [anabaiViihabai Dudhe, 268 ITR (St) 215.

3.7 The High Court agreed that the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Smt. M. Sarojini Devi’s case (supra) had taken the view that the AO need not wait till the matter regarding assessment of compensation attained finality, however, for arriving at the above conclusion, much discussion was not available in that judgment. As against that, the Court found that in a number of judgments as referred to above, different Courts had held that such interest was to be taxed in the year of settlement of dispute and that under similar circumstances, a special leave petition to appeal against the judgment of the Bombay High Court had also been dismissed.

3.8 Keeping in view the totality of circumstances and the ratio of judgment referred to above, the Court decided the issue’ in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue, by holding that the Revenue was not entitled to tax the amount of interest received by the assessee on account of acquisition of land till such time the proceedings in reference thereto attained a finality.

Observations:

4.1 The Supreme Court in CIT v. Hindustan Housing & Land Development Trust Ltd., 161 ITR 524 (SC), held that when the Government had appealed against the award and the- additional amount of compensation was deposited in the Court, it was not taxable at that stage, as the additional compensation would not accrue as income when it was specifically disputed by the Government in appeal.

4.2 A position  that has emerged  and  has gained acceptance on account of the above decision of the Supreme  Court  is that  where  the disputed  additional compensation does not accrue till such time the dispute relating thereto is settled; the question of taxing interest thereon should not arise at all, as the same has also not accrued till then.

4.3 The Bombay High Court following  the above referred Supreme Court decision in the case of Abdul Mannan Shah’s case (supra) held that in view of the said judgment of the Supreme Court, there was no merit in the Revenue’s appeal and that no substantial question of law arose as the judgment of the Supreme Court, on facts, squarely applied to the facts of the case before them. In that case, the Court was required to consider the taxability of the interest on enhanced compensation pending the appeal by the Government.

4.4 Recently a similar view was expressed by the Delhi High Court in Paragon Constructions (I) (P) Ltd. v. CIT & Anr., 274 ITR 413, in a matter pertaining to arbitration where the amount of arbitration award received by the assessee was not held to be taxable till the proceedings attained a finality.

4.5 The issue appears to be fairly settled in favour of the assessee, not only by the decisions of the High Courts, but also by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hindustan Housing & Land Development Trust Ltd. (supra) and in all fairness the Revenue should accept the position law laid down under these decisions to be final where the right to receive enhanced compensation itself is disputed by the Government. This acceptance will in turn avoid any futile litigation. The interest on enhanced compensation whenever in dispute before whichever forum should not be brought to tax till such time there remains no dispute regarding the quantum of enhanced compensation payable or paid in pursuance of an order of compulsory acquisition.

4.6 It is at the same time appropriate to note that the Supreme Court in the above mentioned case of Hindustan Housing & Land Development Trust Ltd. (supra) held that when the right to receive enhanced compensation itself was under dispute and was not absolute that the compensation cannot be said to have accrued, however, where the right was admitted and only quantification thereof was disputed, the taxation of the admitted undisputed amount need not be deferred. In that case, the enhanced compensation awarded by the arbitrators was allowed to be withdrawn on furnishing of a security bond that the amount released would be refunded in the event of the assessee found to be disentitled to the compensation so enhanced. In Abdul Mannan Shah’s case (supra), the case before the Bombay High Court, the assessee was permitted to withdraw the amount of interest deposited in the Court on furnishing the security for refund.

Contact details of Income Tax Ombudsman, at different Centres

Status of ‘Not Ordinarily Resident’ — S. 6(6)

Closements

Introduction :


1.1 In case of Individual (also HUF), if he is ‘Resident’ as
per the provisions of S. 6(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the ‘Act’), he can
also be regarded as ‘Not Ordinarily Resident’ (NOR) if he satisfies the
conditions provided u/s.6 (6) of the Act. Prior to its amendment by the Finance
Act, 2003 (with effect from 1-4-2004), this provision was very useful and
beneficial, especially for Indians residing abroad for a long time and returning
to India after their long stay outside India at their retirement age. These
provisions also became a tool for arranging one’s affairs in such a manner that
one cleared the status of NOR by remaining outside India for a shorter period of
two to three years continuously. Similar provisions were also contained in S. 4B
of the Income-tax Act, 1922 (1922 Act). The status of NOR gives an advantage of
non-taxability of foreign income in most cases. In the post-amendment period
(from A.Y. 2004-05) , the conditions for acquiring the status of NOR have been
made very stringent. However, we are not concerned in this write-up with the
post-amendment provisions and therefore, in this write-up, reference is made
only to pre-amendment provisions. For the sake of convenience, the reference of
HUF is also avoided in this write-up.

1.2 Once an Individual is regarded as ‘Resident’ u/s.6(1), he
can also be regarded as NOR, if, he has not been ‘Resident’ in India in nine
years out of the ten previous years preceding that year [preceding years], or
has not been in India during the seven preceding years for a period of, or
periods amounting in all to, 730 days or more. As stated earlier, similar
provisions were also contained in S. 4B of the 1922 Act. In view of this, an
Individual, who is ‘Resident’ u/s.6(1), unless he is NOR, is regarded as what is
popularly known as Ordinarily Resident. Accordingly, Individual can either be
Ordinarily Resident or NOR.

1.3 The consistent judicial as well as Departmental view was,
if an Individual is ‘Resident’ u/s.6(1), he is regarded as Ordinarily Resident,
if, he satisfies both the conditions contained in S. 6(6), viz. (i) he
should be ‘Resident’ in India [u/s.6(1)] for nine years out of ten preceding
years AND (ii) he should be in India for an aggregate period of 730 days or more
in the preceding seven years. In other words, he can be regarded as NOR, if he
is in India for an aggregate period of less than 730 days in the seven preceding
years. OR effectively, he is ‘Non-Resident’ (NR) for at least two years u/s.6(1)
in ten preceding years. This was the consistent view under the Act as well as
under the 1922 Act till the Gujarat High Court took a different view in the case
of Pradip J. Mehta, which ultimately resulted into amendment in S. 6(6) in 2003
to keep the provisions in line with the view expressed by the Gujarat High
Court. The High Court took the view that an Individual has to be NR u/s.6(1) for
nine years out of the ten preceding years to acquire the status of NOR in a case
where he was in India for 730 days or more in seven preceding years. Therefore,
the controversy came-up with the judgment of the Gujarat High Court and existed
for the pre-amendment period. In fact, the Department was also attempting to
take a view that the amendment of 2003 is clarificatory and will also apply to
earlier years. Therefore, the issue became very vital.

1.4 The judgment of the Gujarat High Court referred to in
para 1.3 above, came up for consideration before the Apex Court recently and the
issue has now got resolved. Therefore, though the provisions have been amended
in 2003, it is thought fit to consider the same in this column, as the same will
be useful in many pending cases of the pre-amendment period.


Pradip J. Mehta v. CIT, 256 ITR 647 (Guj.) :


2.1 In the above case, the brief facts were : the assessee
had claimed status of NOR for the A.Y. 1982-83. The assessee was in India for
196 days in the relevant previous year and was also in India for more than 730
days (1402 days) in the seven preceding years. However, out of ten preceding
years, the assessee was NR for two years and hence, he claimed that as he was
not ‘Resident’ for nine years out of ten preceding years, he should be regarded
as NOR. The Assessing Officer (AO) took the view that for an Indian to become
NOR, he should be NR for a period of nine years out of ten preceding years and
as the assessee was NR only for two years out of the ten preceding years, he
cannot be regarded as NOR and accordingly he is Ordinarily Resident and his
foreign income is taxable in India. The First Appellate Authority, as well as
ITAT confirmed the view of the AO and the issue came up before the Gujarat High
Court at the instance of the assessee.

2.2 Before the High Court, on behalf of the assessee, it was,
inter alia, contended that the intention of the Legislature in enacting
the provisions of S. 6(6)(a) of Act was that, if an individual was not a
‘Resident’ for a period of nine years out of ten preceding years, he should be
treated as NOR. According to the counsel, the assessee was ‘Resident’ in India
for eight years out of ten preceding years, which means he was not a ‘Resident’
in India for a period of nine years out of ten preceding years. Therefore, he
falls in the category of NOR.

2.2.1 In support of his contention, the counsel for the
assessee drew the attention of the Court on the judgment of Patna High Court in
the case of C.M. Townsend (97 ITR 185), in which the High Court, while dealing
with the provisions of S. 6(6)(a) of the Act, has held that the assessee will be
regarded as NOR, if he was not a ‘Resident’ in India for a period of nine years
out of ten preceding years. In that case that was so, though the assessee was in
India for more than 730 days in seven preceding years. Similar view was also
taken by the Authority for Advance Rulings (AAR) reported in (223 ITR 379).
Reliance was also placed on the judgments of the Bombay High Court in Manibhai
S. Patel (23 ITR 27) of the Travancore-Cochin High Court in the case of P.B.I.
BAVA (27 ITR 463), in which also similar view was taken under the 1922 Act. The
attention of the Court was also drawn to the observations on the commentaries of
the learned authors Kanga and Palkhivala in their book the Law and Practice of
Income Tax, 7th Edition, in which similar conditions of S. 6(6) have been
clearly explained by relying on various judgments referred to therein.

2.3 On behalf of the Revenue, the counsel supported the reasonings of the Tribunal in support of its decision. It was also contended that the condition in the first part of S. 6 (6)(a) of the Act requires an individual not to be ‘Resident’ in India for a period of nine years out of ten preceding years for being treated as NOR.
 

2.4 After referring to the provisions contained in S. 6(6)(a) and noting the fact that similar provisions were contained in S. 4B of the 1922 Act, the Court stated that the short question raised for the assessee was that he should be treated as NOR because he was ‘Resident’ in India for a period of eight years and not nine years, as the law requires out of ten preceding years. In other words, he would be NOR, even if for all the remaining eight years out of ten years he was ‘Resident’ in India.

2.5 Referring to the contentions  of the assessee, the Court  stated  as under (page  654) :

“This contention though appearing to be attractive at first blush, is not at all warranted by the provisions of S. 6(6)(a) of the Act. S. 6(6)(a) does not define ‘ordinarily resident in India’, but describes ‘not ordinarily resident’ in India. It resorts to the concept of ‘resident in India’, for which the criteria are laid down in S. 6(1) of the Act. On its

plain construction clause (a) of S. 6(6) would mean that if an individual has in all the nine out of ten previous years preceding the relevant previous year not been resident in India as contemplated by S. 6(1), he is a person who is ‘not ordinarily resident’ in India. To say that an individual who has been resident in India for eight years out of ten preceding years should be treated as ‘not ordinarily resident’ in India, does not stand to reason and such contention flies in the face of the clear provision of clause (a) of S. 6(6) which contemplates the period of nine years out of ten preceding years of not being a resident in India before an individual could be said to be ‘not ordinarily resident’ in India, which position will entitle such person to claim exemption under 5(1)(c) of the Act in respect of his foreign income. An individual who has not been resident in India, within the meaning of S. 6(1), for less than nine out of ten preceding years does not satisfy that statutory criteria laid down for treating such individual as a person who can be said to be ‘not ordinarily resident’ in India, as defined by S. 6(6). A resident of India who goes abroad and is not a resident in India for two years during the preceding period of ten years will therefore, not satisfy the said condition of not being a resident of India for nine out of ten years.”

2.6 The Court, then, noted that as per one of the conditions of S. 6(6)(a), if the assessee is in India for 730 days or more in seven preceding years, he does not become NOR. The Court also noted that u/s.6(1)(c), the individual will become ‘Resident’ if his total stay in India is 365 days or more in the preceding four years. The Court then observed as under (Page 655) :

“…………It would therefore, be strange  to treat a person who has been resident in India in eight years out of ten preceding years as an individual who is ‘not ordinarily resident’ in India. This mis-conception that has also crept in the commentaries of some learned authors on which reliance was placed, arises, because one tries to search for a definition of ‘ordinarily resident’ in India in S. 6(6)(a), which as observed above, only lays down the condition of not being resident in India for nine out of ten preceding years for being treated as ‘not ordinarily resident of India’ besides the other condition of not being in India for seven hundred and thirty or more days in the preceding seven years………..”

2.7 The Court, then, stated that ‘ordinarily resident’ for the purpose of income tax connotes residence in a place with some degree of continuity and apart from accidental or temporary absences. For this, the Court referred to certain decisions given in the UK and stated that the motive of presence here is immaterial, it is a question of quality which the presence assumes.

2.8 The Court, while deciding the issue against the assessee, finally concluded as under (page 656) :

“The foreign income of every resident even when it is not brought into the country is chargeable to tax except when the resident is ‘not ordinarily resident’ in India. For an individual including a resident in order to be ‘not ordinarily resident’ so as to escape tax on his foreign income, it must be shown that the position is covered by clause (a) of Ss.(6) of S. 6 of the Act. When an individual has been a resident in India for nine out of ten preceding years, then in order to escape tax on his foreign income, he must not have been in India for seven hundred and thirty days or more in the aggregate during the preceding seven years. The test is one of presence and not absence from India and the length of presence will determine when an individual is ‘not ordinarily resident’ in India. In order that an individual is not an ordinarily resident, he should satisfy one of the two conditions laid down in S. 6(6)(a) of the Act, the first condition is that he should not be resident in India in all the nine out of ten years preceding the accounting year and the second condition is that he should not have during the seven years preceding that year, been in India for a total period of seven hundred and thirty or more days.”

2.9 In the above judgment, somehow, the Court chose to not to deal with the reasonings of the judgments on which reliance was placed on behalf of the assessee (referred to in para 2.2.1 above).

Pradip J. Mehta  v. CIT, 300 ITR 231 (SC) :

3.1 The judgment of the Gujarat High Court referred to in para 2 above came up for consideration before the Apex Court. For the purpose of dealing with the issue, the Court noted the facts of the case of the assessee in brief. It seems that the Court has believed that the assessee was NR in three years out of ten preceding years while the factual position seems to be (as is apparent form the judgment of the High Court) that the assessee was NR for two years in ten preceding years. However, this factual misleading/wrong noting does not make any dif-ference in principle and therefore, one may ignore the same.

3.2 After considering the facts and the relevant provisions and the observations of the High Court (major part referred to in para 2.5 above), the Court noted the fact that certain decisions of the High Court and AAR (referred to in para 2.2.1 above) were cited on behalf of the assessee in support of his claim. The Court, then, considered those judgments/rulings and observed as under:

“The aforesaid decisions cited by the assessee have been noted by the High Court. The High Court answered the reference in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee, without either agreeing or disagreeing with the view taken by the various High Courts and the Authority for Advance Rulings, which is presided over by a retired judge of the Supreme Court.”

3.3 The Court noted that S. 6(6)(a) of the Act cor-responds to and is in pari materia with S. 4B of the 1922Act. The Court then referred to the background of introduction of S. 4B in the 1922Act and speeches made during the assembly debates on proposed Section at that time which was referred to in the judgment of the Travancore-Cochin High Court in the case of P.B.I. BAVA (supra). Referring to this as well as other judgments, the Court observed as under (page 240) :

“The Indian Income-tax Act of 1922was replaced by the Income-tax Act of 1961.The Law Commission of India has recommended the total abolition of the provisions of S. 4B of the 1922Act defining ‘Ordinary Residence’ of the taxable entities. The Income-tax Bill, 1961 (Bill No. 27 of 1961), did not contain any such provision. On the legislative anvil, it was felt necessary to keep the provisions of S. 4B of the 1922 Act intact and therefore,S. 6(6)had to be enacted in the 1961Act. Referred to Chaturvedi & Pithisaria’s Income Tax Law, fifth Edition, volume I 1998, page 565.”

3.4 The Court also took note of Departmental Circular (being Circular letter dated 5-12-1962)issued by Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal, addressed to Secretary,Indian Chamber of Commerce, (Calcutta) in which also the effect of the provisions was explained, which supports the stand of the assessee. It was also noted that the letter was issued after having communications with the Ministry of Finance.

3.5 The Court also took note of the fact that the Law Commission of India had recommended that the provisions of S. 4B of the 1922 Act be deleted, but that suggestion was not accepted by the Legislature. The Court then stated as under (Page 242):

“………Rather, on the legislative anvil, it was felt necessary to keep S. 4B of the 1922Act intact and, accordingly, S. 6(6), which corresponds to and is in pari materia with S. 4B of the 1922act, was enacted in the 1961 Act. This shows the legislative will. It can be presumed that the Legislature was in the know of the various judgments given by the different High Courts interpreting S: 4B, but still the Legislature chose to enact S. 6(6) in the 1961Act, in its wisdom, the Legislature felt necessary to keep the provisions of S. 4B of the 1922Act intact. It shows that the Legislature accepted the interpretation put by the various High Courts prior to the enactment of the 1961Act. It is only in the year 2003that the Legislature amended S. 6(6) of the 1961Act, which came into effect from April 1, 2004”.

3.6 The Court then clearly stated that it is well settled that when two interpretations are possible, then invariably, the Court would adopt interpretation which is in favour of the taxpayer and against the Revenue. For this, the Court also drew support from other judgments of the Apex Court.

3.7 Referring to the various judgments of the Apex Court, the Court also reiterated the settled position that the Circulars issued by the Department are binding on the Department. The Court also noted that Circular letter issued by the Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal has reference to the correspondence resting with the Ministry of Finance, wherein it is stated that the Department’s view has all along been the same as contended on behalf of the assessee. While deciding the issue in favour of the assessee, the Court finally concluded as under (page 243):

“In these circumstances, a person will become an ordinarily resident only if (a) he has been residing in nine out of ten preceding years; and (b) he has been in India for at least 730 days in previous seven years.

Accordingly, this appeal is accepted. The order passed by the High Court and the authorities below are set aside. It is held that the High Court in the impugned judgment has erred in its interpretation of S. 6(6) of the Act and the view taken by the Patna High Court, Bombay High Court and Travoncore-Cochin High Court has laid down the correct law……..”

Conclusion:

4.1 In view of the above judgment of the Apex Court, it is now clear that in the pre-amended provisions, the assessee has to be ‘Resident’ for nine years out of ten preceding years as well as he should also be in India at least for 730 days in the preceding seven years to be regarded as ‘Ordinarily Resident’. If, anyone of these conditions is not satisfied, he would be regarded as NOR under the preamended provisions.

4.2 The amendment    made by the Finance Act, 2003 is prospective and will not apply to period prior to A.Y.2004-05.

4.3 The Court has emphatically reiterated its earlier position that when two interpretations are possible, then invariably the interpretation favouring the taxpayer and against the Revenue should be adopted.

4.4 One more important principle reiterated by the Apex Court is that the judgments cited before the Courts in support of the contentions should be dealt with and reasons should be recorded for taking a contrary view.

Whether amendment relating to payment of P.F., etc. by ‘due date’ of furnishing return is retrospective ? — S. 43B

Introduction :

    1.1 With a view to prevent assessees from claiming deduction in respect of statutory liabilities, etc. even when they are disputed and not paid to appropriate authority, S. 43B was introduced w.e.f. A.Y. 1984-85. The provision, effectively, provides that deduction in respect of items specified therein will be allowed only on the basis of actual payment. Though originally the provision was introduced to cover statutory liabilities within its ambit, subsequently, the scope thereof is widened from time to time to include within its net bonus and commission payment to employees as well as interest payable to financial institutions, etc. Lastly, to nullify the effect of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Bharat Earth Movers Ltd. (245 ITR 428), even the employers’ liability in respect of provision for leave salary has also been brought within its ambit. Unfortunately, at the initial state, the provisions are introduced in the Income-tax Act (the Act) for a specific purpose (many times justifiable) and then, the scope thereof gets widened to unrelated items even if the judiciary explains the correct effects of the provisions originally introduced. S. 43B is a classic example of this nature.

    1.2 Large number of litigations were found on the effect of provision of S. 43B and finally, an attempt was made to carry out some rationalisation in the provision by the Finance Act, 1987, which introduced the first ‘proviso’ to S.43B w.e.f. A.Y. 1988-89 (hereinafter referred to as the said ‘proviso’). This is inserted with a view to provide deduction of statutory dues, etc. at the end of the previous year if, they are actually paid by the assessee on or before the ‘due date’ applicable in his case for furnishing the return of income u/s.139(1) (hereinafter referred to as ‘due date’) in respect of previous year in which the liability to pay such dues was incurred with certain further conditions with which we are not concerned in this write-up. Accordingly, with this rationalisation, such amount of outstanding at the year end and paid by the relevant ‘due date’ became eligible for deduction under the said ‘proviso’, which was made effective from 1-4-1988. However, this ‘proviso’, at that time, did not apply to items covered (contribution to P.F., etc.) under clause (b) of S. 43B, under which the conditions for allowing deductions were most stringent. In the context of this ‘proviso’, the Apex Court in the case of Allied Motors (P) Ltd. (224 ITR 677) took the view that though the ‘proviso’ is introduced by the Finance Act, 1987 w.e.f. 1-4-1988, the same will apply retrospectively and the benefit thereof will be available even in respect of the assessment year prior to A.Y. 1988-89. The effect of this judgment was considered in this column in the May, 1997 issue of the Journal.

    1.3 Presently, S. 43B covers various items listed in clauses (a) to (f). Till the amendment was made by the Finance Act, 2003 (w.e.f. 1-4-2004), the said ‘proviso’ was applicable to all the clauses of S. 43B except clause (b) of S. 43B. Contribution to employees welfare fund (such as P.F., etc.) was governed by 2nd proviso to S. 43B, under which the payment thereof was required to be made by the due date under the relevant law, rule, etc. in the manner provided in the said 2nd proviso.

    1.4 S. 43B(b) covers the employers’ contribution to any Provident Fund (P.F.) or Superannuation Fund or Gratuity Fund or any other fund for the welfare of the employees (hereinafter referred to as contribution to employees welfare fund). As stated in Para 1.3 above, this was earlier not covered by the said ‘proviso’ and accordingly, payment covered by S. 43B (except the contribution to employees welfare funds) were eligible for deduction if the payment in respect thereof is made by the relevant ‘due date’. The Finance Act, 2003 omitted the said 2nd proviso to S. 43B and amended the said first ‘proviso’ w.e.f. 1-4-2004 and made the first ‘proviso’ also applicable to clause (b) dealing with contribution to employees welfare funds (hereinafter this amendment is referred to as Amendment of 2003). Accordingly, all the items covered in S. 43B [i.e., clauses (a) to (f)] are eligible for deduction if amount is paid by the relevant ‘due date’ even if the same is outstanding at end of the relevant year. We are concerned with the effect of this Amendment of 2003 in this write-up.

    1.5 The issue was under debate as to whether the amendment of 2003 will apply to the assessment years prior to A.Y. 2004-05 as the amendment was expressly made effective from 1-4-2004. After this amendment, various Benches of the Tribunal started taking a view that the amendment is clarificatory in nature and is applicable retrospectively even to assessment years prior to A.Y. 2004-05. For this, reliance was being placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Allied Motors (P) Ltd. referred to in Para 1.2 above. Subsequently, the Apex Court in the case of Vinay Cement Ltd. (213 CTR 268) dismissed the SLP filed by the Department against the judgment of the Gauhati High Court in the case of George Williamson (Assam) Ltd. (284 ITR 619) in a case dealing with the assessment year prior to A.Y. 2004-05, by stating that the assessee will be entitled to claim the benefit in S. 43B for that period particularly in view of the fact that he has made the contribution to P.F. before filing of the return. Many of the High Courts also took similar view that the amendment of 2003 is clarificatory in nature and is applicable to assessment years prior to A.Y. 2004-05 [Ref. : 297 ITR 320 (Del.), 313 ITR 144 (Mad.), 313 ITR 161 (Del.), 213 CTR 269 (Kar.) etc.]. However, the Bombay High Court in the case of Pamwi Tissues Limited (313 ITR 137) took a view that the said amendment of 2003 is applicable only from the A.Y. 2004-05. This was followed by the Bombay High Court in other cases also. Therefore, the debate continued and the assessees within the jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court were suffering the disallowance for the prior years in such cases.

    1.6 Recently, the Apex Court had occasion to consider the issue referred to in Para 1.5 above in the case of Alom Extrusions Ltd. and the issue is now finally resolved. Though the law is amended from the A.Y. 2004-05, in respect of the prior years, many matters are pending and are under litigation (especially in the State of Maharashtra). Therefore, it is thought fit to consider the same in this column.

CIT v. Pawmi Tissues Limited, 313 ITR 137 (Bom.)

2.1 The issue referred to in Para 1.5 above came up before the Bombay High Court in the above case at the instance of the Revenue in the context of the A.Y. 1990-91. The following question was raised before the Court (Page 138) :
 
“The substantial question of law which arises in the present appeal is regarding the correct inter-pretation of S. 43B, S. 2(24)(x) read with S. 36(1)(va) and as to the claim of deductions as claimed by the assessee in respect of the PF, EPF and ESIC contributions especially in the facts and circumstances of the case and in law.”

2.2 On behalf of the Revenue, it was contended that insofar as the provident fund dues are concerned, the amendment is made applicable from the A.Y. 2004-05. In the earlier years, the employers’ contribution to P.F. if not paid within the due date under the relevant law was not eligible for deduction. For this, reliance was placed on the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Godavari (Mannar) Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd. (298 ITR 149).

2.3 On behalf of the assessee, attention was drawn to the judgment of Gauhati High Court in the case of George Williamson (Assam) Limited (supra) to contend that while considering the same issues for the A.Y. 1992-93, the issue was decided in favour of the assessee following the earlier judgments of the same High Court in other cases. It was further pointed out that the Revenue preferred Special Leave Petition (SLP) in the Supreme Court in the case reported as Vinay Cement Limited and the SLP was dismissed. Consequently, the said judgment of the Gauhati High Court in the case of George Williamson (Assam) Limited got approved. Relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Employees Welfare Association (4 SCC 187), it was pointed out that if the Supreme Court has given reasons for dismissing the SLP, that still attracts Article 14 of the Constitution and consequently, it would be a binding precedent.

2.4 After considering the contentions of both the sides, the High Court decided the issue against the assessee and allowed the appeal filed by the Revenue with the following observations [Page 139] :

“In our opinion, the dismissal of the special leave petition as held in CIT v. Vinay Cement Ltd., (2009) 313 ITR (St.) 1 cannot be said to be the law decided. In State of Orissa v. M. D. Illyas, (2006) 1 SCC 275, the Supreme Court has held that a decision is a precedent on its own facts and that for a judgment to be a precedent it must contain the three basis postulates. A finding of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of fact is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the individual effect of the above.”

2.5 In view of the above judgment of the Bombay High Court, the view also prevailed that the said Amendment of 2003 is prospective and applicable only from the A.Y. 2004-05.

CIT v. Alom Extrusions Limited, 2009 TIOL 125 SC IT:

3.1 The issue referred to in Para 1.5 above came up for consideration before the Apex Court in a batch of civil appeals with the lead matter in the case of Alom Extrusion Ltd. For the purpose of deciding the issue, the Court noted the first and the second provisos prior to the amendment of 2003 and the said ‘proviso’ (the first proviso) after such amendment.

3.2 For the purpose of deciding the issue, the Court considered the scheme of the Act and the historical background and the object of introduction of the provisions of S. 43B. The Court also referred to the earlier amendments made in 1988 with introduction of the first and second provisos. The Court also noted further amendment made in 1989 in the second proviso dealing with the items covered in S. 43B(b) (i.e., contribution to employees welfare funds). After considering the same, the Court stated that it becomes clear that prior to the amendment of 2003, the employer was entitled to deduction only if the contribution stands credited on or before the due date given in the Provident Fund Act on account of second proviso to S. 43B. This created further difficulties and as a result of representations made by the industry, the amendment of 2003 was carried out which deleted the second proviso and also made first proviso applicable to contribution to employees welfare funds referred to in S. 43B(b).

3.3 On behalf of the Department, it was, inter alia, contended that even between 1988 and 2004, the Parliament had maintained a clear dichotomy be-tween the tax duty, etc. on one hand and contribution to employees welfare funds on the other. This dichotomy continued up to 1st April, 2004 and hence, the Parliament consciously kept that dichotomy alive up to that date by making the amendment of 2003 effective from 1-4-2004. Accordingly, the amendment of 2003 should be read as amendatory and not as curative.
 
3.4 Disagreeing with the argument of the Department, the Court stated that there is no merit in the appeals filed by the Department for various reasons such as : originally S. 43B was introduced from 1-4-1984 with certain objectives and the conditions thereof were relaxed in 1988 in the context of tax duty and other items [except for contribution to employees welfare funds covered in S. 43B(b)] to remove the hardships. This relaxation appears to have not been made applicable to contribution to employees welfare funds for the reason that the employers should not sit on the collected contributions and deprive the workmen of the rightful benefits under Social Welfare Legislations by delaying payment of contribution to welfare funds. The Court then further observed as under :

“However, as stated above, the second proviso resulted in implementation problems, which have been mentioned hereinabove, and which resulted in the enactment of Finance Act, 2003, deleting the second proviso and bringing about uniformity in the first proviso by equating tax, duty, cess and fee with contributions to welfare funds. Once this uniformity is brought about in the first proviso, then, in our view, the Finance Act, 2003, which is made applicable by the Parliament only with effect from 1st April, 2004, would become curative in nature, hence, it would apply retrospectively with effect from 1st April, 1988.”

3.5 The Court then referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Allied Motors [P] Ltd. (supra) in which the amendment made by the Finance Act, 1987 w.e.f. 1-4-1988 (referred to in Para 1.2 above) was held as retrospective in nature. After considering the said judgment , the Court finally decided the issue in favour of the assessees and held as under :

“Moreover, the judgment in Allied Motors (P) Limited (supra) is delivered by a Bench of three learned Judges, which is binding on us. Accordingly, we hold that the Finance Act, 2003, will operate retrospectively with effect from 1st April, 1988 [when the first proviso stood inserted].”

3.6 To support its conclusion, the Court also drew support from another judgment of the Apex Court in the case of J. H. Gotla (156 ITR 323) with the following observations :

“Lastly, we may point out the hardship and the invidious discrimination which would be caused to the assessee(s) if the contention of the Department is to be accepted that the Finance Act, 2003, to the above extent, operated prospectively. Take an example — in the present case, the respondents have deposited the contributions with the R.P.F.C. after 31st March (end of accounting year) but before filing of the Returns under the Income-tax Act and the date of payment falls after the due date under the Employees’ Provident Fund Act, they will be denied deduction for all times. In view of the second proviso, which stood on the statute book at the relevant time, each of such assessee(s) would not be entitled to deduction u/ s.43-B of the Act for all times. They would lose the benefit of deduction even in the year of ac-count in which they pay the contributions to the welfare funds, whereas a defaulter, who fails to pay the contribution to the welfare fund right up to 1st April, 2004, and who pays the contribution after 1st April, 2004, would get the benefit of deduction u/s.43-B of the Act. In our view, therefore, Finance Act, 2003, to the extent indicated above, should be read as retrospective. It would, therefore, operate from 1st April, 1988, when the first proviso was introduced. It is true that the Parliament has explicitly stated that the Finance Act, 2003, will operate with effect from 1st April, 2004. However, the matter before us involves the principle of construction to be placed on the provisions of Finance Act, 2003.”

Conclusion :

4.1 In view of the above judgment of the Apex Court, the amendment of 2003 referred to hereinbefore is applicable to assessment years prior to A.Y. 2004-05 also and the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Pawmi Tissues Ltd. (supra) is no longer a good law.

4.2 In many cases, especially within the jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court, the assessees have suffered disallowances and the matters are pending. In such cases, the assessees will be entitled to get the benefits of such deductions.