2. Rajendra K. Bhutta vs. Maharashtra Housing and Area
Development Authority
[2020] 114 taxmann.com 655 (SC)
Civil Appeal No. 12248 of 2018
Date of order: 19th February, 2020
Section 14(1)(d) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016
– The word ‘occupied’ used in the section refers to actual physically occupied
property and not the rights or interest created in the property – Any
occupation handed to the developer (corporate debtor) in terms of a Joint
Development Agreement would stand ‘statutorily freezed’ in terms of section
14(1)(d)
FACTS
A joint development agreement (‘JDA’) was entered into
between a society representing persons occupying 672 tenements, the Maharashtra
Housing and Area Development Authority (‘MHADA’) and G Co (being the corporate
debtor) on 10th April, 2008.
G Co entered into a loan agreement with Union Bank of India on 25th
March, 2011 for a sum of Rs. 200 crores. G Co defaulted on payment of the said
loan and consequently Union Bank of India filed an insolvency resolution
application u/s 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (‘the Code’) on
15th May, 2017 which was admitted on 24th July, 2017. A
moratorium in terms of section 14 was also declared by this order.
On 12th January, 2018, after the imposition of the
moratorium period u/s 14 of the Code, MHADA issued a termination notice to G Co
stating that upon expiry of 30 days from the date of receipt of the notice, the
JDA would stand terminated. It was further stated that G Co would have to hand
over possession to MHADA, which would then enter upon the plot and take
possession of the land, including all structures thereon.
One hundred and eighty days from the start of the Corporate
Insolvency Resolution Process (‘the CIRP’) ended on 19th January,
2018. The NCLT, by its order dated 24th January, 2018, extended the
CIRP period by 90 days as permissible under the Code. On 1st
February, 2018, an application was filed before the NCLT to restrain MHADA from
taking over possession of the land till completion of the CIRP, contending that
such a recovery of possession was in derogation of the moratorium imposed u/s
14 of the Code. The NCLT, by an order dated 2nd April, 2018,
dismissed the aforesaid application, stating that section 14(1)(d) of the Code
does not cover licenses to enter upon land in pursuance of JDAs and that such
licenses would only be ‘personal’ and not interests created in property. An
appeal against this order was preferred to the NCLAT.
Meanwhile, in a parallel proceeding the quantum of time being
taken by NCLT was sought to be omitted from the total number of days allowable
under the Code. While NCLT granted part relief, an appeal filed before NCLAT
proved successful. Pursuant to an order dated 9th May, 2018 issued
by the NCLAT, the entire 55 days taken before the NCLT were excluded.
On 3rd July, 2018, G Co filed a Resolution Plan
which was approved by 86.16% of the Committee of Creditors (‘COC’) before the
NCLT. Ultimately, the NCLAT, by the impugned order dated 14th
December, 2018 (after omitting to refer to the order dated 9th May,
2018), stated that 270 days had passed by, as a result of which the entire
discussion of section 14(1)(d) would now become academic. It also decided that
with the exception of ‘development work’, G Co did not have any right on the
land in question. The land belonged to MHADA and in the absence of any formal
transfer in favour of G Co, it could not be treated as an asset of G Co for
application of the provisions of section 14(1)(d).
An appeal against the aforesaid matter was filed before the
Supreme Court.
HELD
The Supreme Court heard the arguments put forth by all the
sides. It examined the provisions of sections 3(27), 14, 18, 31 and 36(4) of
the Code. It was observed that in terms of the JDA, a license was granted to
the developer (i.e. the Corporate Debtor / G Co) to enter upon the land,
demolish the existing structures and to construct and erect new structures and
allot tenements. At the very least a license has been granted in favour of the
developer to enter upon the land to demolish existing structures, construct and
erect new structures and allot to erstwhile tenants tenements in such
constructed structures in three categories, (1) the earlier tenants / licensees
of structures that were demolished; (2) tenements to be allotted free of cost
to MHADA; and (3) what is referred to as ‘free sale component’ which the
developers then sell and exploit to recover or recoup their cost and make profit.
It was observed that it was not necessary for the purpose of this case to state
as to whether an interest in the property is or is not created by the said JDA.
It was observed by the Supreme Court that section 14(1)(d)
did not deal with any of the assets or legal rights or beneficial interest in
such assets of the corporate debtor. Reference to sections 18 and 36 which was
made by the NCLT was, thus, wholly unnecessary to decide the scope of section
14(1)(d).
For the sake of reference, section 14(1)(d) reads as follows:
Subject to provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3), on the
insolvency commencement date, the Adjudicating Authority shall by order declare
moratorium for prohibiting all of the following, namely:
…
(d) the recovery of any property by an owner or lessor
where such property is occupied by or in the possession of the corporate
debtor.
The Supreme Court observed
that as per section 14(1)(d) what is referred to is the ‘recovery of any
property’. The ‘property’ in this case consists of land admeasuring 47 acres
together with structures thereon that had to be demolished. ‘Recovery’ would
necessarily go with what was parted by the corporate debtor, and for this one
has to go to the next expression contained in the said sub-section.
Referring to the cases of The Member, Board of Revenue
vs. Arthur Paul Benthall [1955] 2 SCR 842; Koteswar Vittal Kamath vs. K.
Rangappa Baliga & Co. [1969] 1 SCC 255; and Kailash Nath
Agarwal and others vs. Pradeshiya Industrial & Investment Corporation of
U.P. Ltd. and another [2003] 4 SCC 305, the Supreme Court
held that when recovery of property is to be made by an owner u/s 14(1)(d),
such recovery would be of property that is ‘occupied by’ a corporate debtor.
Further, referring to the cases of Industrial Supplies
Pvt. Ltd. and another vs. Union of India and others [1980] 4 SCC 341; Dunlop
India Limited vs. A.A. Rahna and another [2011] 5 SCC 778; and
Ude Bhan and others vs. Kapoor Chand and others AIR 1967 P&H 53 (FB),
the Supreme Court held that the expression ‘occupied by’ would mean or be
synonymous with being in actual physical possession of, or being actually used
by, in contra-distinction to the expression ‘possession’, which would connote
possession being either constructive or actual and which, in turn, would
include legally being in possession, though factually not being in physical
possession. The JDA granted a license to the developer (Corporate Debtor) to
enter upon the property with a view to do all the things that are mentioned in
it. After such entry, the property would be ‘occupied by’ the developer /
corporate debtor.
In the context of the MHADA Act, it was held that when it
comes to any clash between the MHADA Act and the Insolvency Code, on the plain
terms of section 238 of the Insolvency Code, the Code must prevail. Further,
the Supreme Court in the context of a moratorium u/s 14 of the Code, observed
that the intention was to alleviate corporate sickness and, therefore, a
statutory status quo has been pronounced u/s 14 the moment a petition is
admitted u/s 7 of the Code, so that the insolvency resolution process may
proceed unhindered by any of the obstacles that would otherwise be caused and
that are dealt with by section 14. The statutory freeze that has thus been made
is, unlike its predecessor in the SICA, 1985 only a limited one, which is
expressly limited by section 31(3) of the Code, to the date of admission of an
insolvency petition up to the date that the adjudicating authority either
allows a resolution plan to come into effect or states that the corporate
debtor must go into liquidation. For this temporary period, at least, all the
things referred to u/s 14 must be strictly observed so that the corporate
debtor may finally be put back on its feet, albeit with a new
management.
In the facts of the case, the resolution plan had been
approved by the NCLT and the limited question before the Supreme Court was
whether section 14(1)(d) of the Code will apply to statutorily freeze
‘occupation’ that may have been handed over under a JDA. Section 14(1)(d) of
the Code speaks about recovery of property ‘occupied’. It does not refer to
rights or interests created in property but only actual physical occupation of
the property. Thus, the section would stand to cover the occupation which has
been so granted under the JDA.
The order passed by the NCLAT was thus set aside and the
appeal was allowed. NCLT was directed to dispose of the application of the
resolution professional within six weeks.
3. Vikramjit Singh Oberoi vs. Registrar of
Companies
[2020] 114 taxmann.com 512
(Madras High Court)
Date of order: 13th January, 2020
Where company allotted shares on rights basis to its
existing shareholders, merely because many of them renounced their entitlement
in favour of more than 50 third parties it could not be said that rights issue
was converted into public issue
It is not necessary to register a pledge in respect of
fixed deposits as charge either under 1956 Act or under 2013 Act; once rights
issue-related expenditure is adjusted against security premium account, i.e.,
by way of adjustment in liability side of a balance sheet, same do not pass
through to assets side of balance sheet
Payment of royalty did not qualify as contract related to
sale, purchase or supply of goods, materials or services, thus not covered by
section 297 of 1956 Act
Where company had availed services such as car rentals,
laundry services, etc., from related party and it had not disclosed same in
Board of directors’ report, since these transactions were in ordinary course of
business on an arm’s length basis, section 134 would not apply
FACTS 1
A show cause notice was issued by the ROC in respect of the
alleged violation of sections 56 and 81(1A) of the Companies Act, 1956 (CA
1956). The company had allotted shares on rights basis to its existing
shareholders and many of the existing shareholders renounced their entitlement
in favour of others who were not shareholders. On that basis, the ROC alleged
that section 67 of CA 1956 is attracted because the renunciation is in favour
of more than 50 persons. In other words, the case of the ROC is that the
renunciation converts the rights issue into a public issue and, therefore,
section 56 of CA 1956 should have been adhered to.
Upon receipt of the show cause notice, it was explained that
section 81(1)(c) of CA 1956 mandates that the company should grant the right of
renunciation to all its existing shareholders while issuing the letter of offer
to such shareholders. Thereafter, such existing shareholders are statutorily
entitled to renounce their rights in favour of any person. It is to be noted
that in such cases the company does not have any control over the aforesaid
process and, consequently, cannot insist that such renunciation should be in
favour of existing shareholders of the company. Therefore, it cannot be said
that the company or its directors violated the relevant provisions of CA 1956.
In this connection, a letter bearing No. 8/81/56-PR dated 4th
November, 1957 from the Ministry of Company Affairs was placed before the Court.
The said letter opined that the issue of further shares by a company to its own
members with the consequential statutory right to renounce their entitlement in
favour of a third party does not require the issuance of a prospectus.
HELD 1
The alleged offence is in
respect of non-compliance of public issue-related requirements. It is the
settled legal position that any public company should make a further issue of
shares only to existing shareholders, in the same proportion, unless a special
resolution is passed authorising the company concerned to issue shares to
others. Such an issue is referred to as a rights issue. It is also the settled
position that when a rights issue is made, the letter of offer is issued to all
existing shareholders and it is mandatory that each shareholder is given the
right to renounce such shares to any person. The relevant provision in this
regard is section 81(1) (a), (b) and (c) of CA 1956. Therefore, the company
does not have any control in respect of such renunciation which may be in
favour of any person, including third parties.
A letter dated 4th November, 1957 from the
Ministry of Company Affairs has settled the issue beyond any doubt.
Consequently, it cannot be said that the rights issue was converted into or was
in fact a public issue merely because renunciations were made in favour of more
than 50 third parties. Therefore, it was held that the company and the
directors did not commit the alleged offence of violating sections 56 and 67 of
CA 1956. Consequently, relief u/s 463(2) of CA 2013 was granted.
FACTS 2
The alleged violation of section 129 read with schedule III
of CA 2013 is the subject matter. The ROC has alleged that the company had
deposits of Rs. 0.04 million with Axis Bank, Jaipur Branch and a further sum of
Rs. 0.07 million with Canara Bank, Chennai aggregating to Rs. 0.11 million. As
regards the aforesaid fixed deposits, Note 15 to the balance sheet for the
financial year ended 31st March, 2015 reflected that the said fixed
deposits were pledged with the Sales Tax Department. However, no charge was
registered under the relevant provisions of CA 1956 or CA 2013 in respect of
the pledged fixed deposits. Therefore, a show cause notice was issued alleging
that section 211 of CA 1956 was violated.
In reply, it was explained that the original fixed deposit
receipts (F.D. Receipts) in respect of the aforesaid deposits with Axis Bank
and Canara Bank were pledged with the Sales Tax Department by handing over the
said F.D. Receipts and that such a pledge is not required to be registered as a
charge either under CA 1956 or CA 2013. It was also explained that CA 1956 and,
in particular, section 211 thereof, does not apply because it relates to the
financial year 2014-15 when CA 2013 was in force. In any event, it was submitted
that a pledge of movable assets is not required to be registered under CA 2013
by filing Form CHG-1, as would be evident on perusal of Form CHG-1. In spite of
this reply, another show cause notice was issued.
HELD 2
The Court observed that under both section 125 of CA 1956 and
section 77 of CA 2013, it is not necessary to register a pledge over movable
assets as a charge. This position became abundantly clear upon perusal of Form
CHG-1 under CA 2013 which excludes a pledge over movable assets. Therefore, it
is not necessary to register a pledge in respect of the fixed deposits as a
charge under the applicable provisions of either CA 1956 or CA 2013.
Consequently, the relief u/s 463(2) of CA 2013 was granted.
FACTS 3
The alleged violation of section 78(2)(c) of CA 1956 with
regard to the manner in which the rights issue-related expenses of Rs. 28.33
million were adjusted against the securities premium account of the company is
the subject matter. According to the ROC, such adjustment should have been
reflected in the Profit and Loss Account and, therefore, a show cause notice
was issued.
In reply it was explained that section 78(2)(c) permits the
utilisation of the securities premium account to write off expenses of any
issue of shares or debentures of the company. It was further submitted that the
company explained in the Note to the accounts of the balance sheet for the
financial year ended on 31st March, 2013 that a sum of Rs. 979.34
million was received towards premium on rights issue of shares and a sum of Rs.
28.33 million was deducted as share issue expenses in connection with the said
rights issue. It was further submitted that the said expenditure is a capital
expenditure which was adjusted on the liability side of the balance sheet and,
therefore, was not carried into the asset side of the balance sheet.
Consequently, there was no question of reflecting it in the P&L account for
that year. It was further pointed out that AS 26 does not have any application
because it relates to intangible assets and has no connection whatsoever with
the issuance of shares on rights basis. In spite of this reply, a show cause
notice was issued by the ROC.
HELD 3
The alleged offence in this case is not reflecting the rights
issue expenses in the P&L account for the relevant financial year. The case
of the company was that the rights issue expenditure constituted capital
expenditure and that the company is entitled to adjust such expenditure against
the security premium account as per section 78(2)(c) of CA 1956. The said
contention is well founded based on section 78(2)(c) of CA 1956. Once the
rights issue-related expenditure is adjusted against the security premium
account, i.e., by way of an adjustment on the liability side of the balance
sheet, the amounts in question do not pass through to the assets side of the
balance sheet. Consequently, such amount cannot be reflected in the P&L
account and it would be an accounting impossibility to do so.
Therefore, it was concluded that the company was entitled to
treat the rights issue expenditure as a capital expenditure and set it off
against the security premium account in accordance with section 78(2)(c) of CA
1956. As a corollary, such expenditure could not have been reflected in the
P&L account for the relevant financial year. Notwithstanding the above
legal position and the explanation provided in that regard, the ROC continued
to allege that there is a violation of law. Consequently, the relief u/s 463(2)
of CA 2013 was granted.
FACTS 4
The payment of royalty during the financial years ended 31st
March, 2013, 31st March, 2014 and 31st March, 2015 is the
subject matter. It was pointed out in this connection that a show cause notice
was issued to the company and a reply had been sent. With regard to the alleged
violation, it was pointed out that section 297 of CA 1956 only applies to
contracts for the sale, purchase or supply of goods, materials or services. In
this case, royalty was paid in connection with the license to use the brand /
trade name. Consequently, it is not a contract for the sale, purchase or supply
of goods, materials or services. It was further pointed out that this position
continues to remain the same u/s 188 of CA 2013 and that none of the
sub-clauses of section 188 relate to licensing of a brand / trade name. It was
further submitted that licensing does not entail sale or disposal or lease of
property and is merely the right to use the brand name.
HELD 4
It is alleged that section
297 of CA 1956 was violated in respect of the payment of royalty to a related
party. The Court observed that section 297 of CA 1956 and the corresponding
provision in CA 2013, section 188, do not deal with the payment of royalty and
instead only deal with contracts for the sale, purchase or supply of goods,
materials or services. In this connection, the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Tata Consulting Services is apposite and royalty does
not qualify as goods, materials or services. In any event, the company and its
officers acted honestly and reasonably and as such are entitled to the reliefs.
FACTS 5
The alleged non-disclosure
of related party transactions in Form AOC 2 in the Board of Directors’ report
is the issue. Accordingly, through a show cause notice the ROC alleged that the
company violated section 134 of CA 2013 read with Rule 8 of the Companies
(Accounts) Rules, 2014.
In reply, the company
pointed out that these transactions are in the ordinary course of business and
on an arm’s length basis. Accordingly, as per the proviso of section
188(1) of CA 2013, the section would not apply to arm’s length transactions in
the ordinary course of business. Consequently, section 134(3)(h) of CA 2013
does not apply. A separate note was also provided by the company in the
Director’s Report under the heading ‘contracts or arrangements’ mentioning that
filing of Form AOC 2 is not required. It was further pointed out that the
present contract is not a material contract; neither section 134 nor AOC 2 is
violated. Hence it was submitted that the petitioners did not violate any of
the provisions of CA 1956 or CA 2013 as alleged by the ROC. Even if there was a
technical breach, such breach was committed honestly and reasonably. Therefore,
a case is made out to grant relief u/s 463(2) of CA 2013.
HELD 5
This relates to the alleged violation of section
134 of CA 2013. Once again, the company replied to the show cause notice and
relied upon the proviso to section 188(1) of CA 2013 on the basis that
the transaction in question is in the ordinary course of business and on an arm’s
length basis. Thus it was held that the breach, if any, is purely technical and
a case is made out to be relieved of liability in this regard.
