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December 2019

CORPORATE LAW CORNER

By Pooja Punjabi Oberai | Pramod S Prabhudesai
Chartered Accountants
Reading Time 8 mins

7. Religare Finvest Ltd. vs. Bharat Road Network Ltd. CP(IB) No. 540/KB/2018 & CP(IB) No.
1060/KB/2018 Date of order: 28th August, 2019

 

Section 7(1),
read with sections 14 and 33 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – An
admission of debt and default was sufficient to initiate the corporate
insolvency resolution process – Any document bypassing such admission was not
to be looked into – Provisions of Indian Stamp Act, 1899 to ascertain the
validity of these documents would not be considered to the extent they are
inconsistent with the Code – A person would be considered as a financial
service provider only when there is license / registration with a regulator to
that effect

 

FACTS

R Co, a non-banking financial institution
(NBFC), advanced a sum of Rs. 50 crores to B Co as a short-term loan for one
year and executed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for the same on 14th
December, 2016. The same was payable with interest on 14th December,
2017. Stamp duty on the MOU was paid by B Co. A loan recovery notice dated 28th
February, 2018 was issued to B Co.

 

R Co contended that the genuineness of the
MOU was not in dispute. Further, B Co had in its balance sheet dated 31st
March, 2019 disclosed the loan payable to R Co and the fact that insolvency
proceedings u/s 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (the Code) were
commenced against it.

 

B Co raised three objections against the
initiation of corporate insolvency resolution proceedings (CIRP). Firstly, the
MOU was a bond within the meaning of the Stamp Act, 1899. Irrespective of the
nomenclature, if the relevant provisions of the Stamp Act applied, it was to be
construed as a bond. Further, if the same was inadequately stamped then the
document would not be enforceable in law and such a document could not be
considered as evidence. Reliance was placed on various decisions to advance
this contention.

 

The second argument was that B Co was a core
investment company and an NBFC as on 31st December, 2018, and most
certainly it was one on 31st March, 2019. It was urged that B Co was
a financial service provider within the meaning of the Code. Although
registration as an NBFC from the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) was yet to be
received, the eligibility for authorisation was to be considered as a
requirement to qualify as a financial service provider under the Code.

 

Thirdly, the person initiating the
proceedings did not have adequate authority to do so.

 

HELD

The National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT)
heard both the parties at length.

 

It was taken on record that R Co was a
registered NBFC and in the course of its business granted the short-term loan
to B Co as per the terms and conditions agreed through the MOU. The amount of
loan, the rate of interest and the fact of failure to repay are not in dispute.
Hence, R Co has filed an application for insolvency.

 

As regards the first contention of B Co,
NCLT examined the meaning of the terms ‘claim’, ‘default’, ‘debt’ and the judicial
precedents on these subjects. It was observed that B Co had obtained a loan,
enjoyed it subject to the MOU and the same constituted a legal and equitable
obligation of B Co. Admitted facts need not be proved and, consequently, there
was no need to examine the legal validity of a document bypassing the admission
of facts made by B Co. Since the facts have been admitted by B Co in its annual
audited statements, there was no need to examine the nature of the MOU or its
enforcement for insufficiency of stamp duty. Further, applicability of the
Stamp Act, 1899 was not to be considered to the extent that its provisions were
inconsistent with the Code.

 

The NCLT also held that in terms of section
3(17), a financial creditor was a person to whom the authorisation was issued
or registration granted by the regulator. In the facts of the present case, B
Co had merely applied for a license / registration with the RBI. There was no
license or registration either on the date of taking the loan, or on the date
of filing the petition u/s 7, or even on the date of the order by NCLT. Thus,
the contention that B Co was a financial services provider was rejected by
NCLT.

 

The contention
as to authorisation was discarded by NCLT on the ground that the person filing
the petition had authority vide a board resolution to file a petition before
the adjudication authority. The adjudication authority being NCLT, the petition
was held to be in order.

 

The contentions raised by B Co were all
discarded and NCLT passed an order admitting the application made by R Co and
initiated the CIRP. A moratorium was declared and an order to make necessary
public announcements was passed by the NCLT.

 

8. Alliance Commodities (P) Ltd. vs. Office of 
Registrar of Companies
[2019] 110 taxmann.com 219 (NCLAT, Delhi) Date of order: 9th July, 2019

 

ROC was justified in striking off name of
‘A’ company where company had failed to file financial statements and annual
returns for various financial years – At the time of striking off ‘A’ company
was not carrying on business or operations

 

FACTS

‘A’ company was
incorporated on 1st February, 2008 with the object of doing business
of trading in all types of commodities. It had been complying with the
statutory requirements of filing returns and financial statements till 2013,
but thereafter failed to abide by the statutory compliances. This resulted in
its name being struck off by the Registrar of Companies.

 

In its appeal
before the Tribunal, ‘A’ company contended that it was unaware of the notice
issued by the ROC and thus the default committed by it was unintentional. It
sought restoration of its name on the aforesaid ground.

 

The Registrar
of Companies contested the appeal on the ground that ‘A’ company failed to file
its annual returns and financial statements for more than two consecutive years
and it did not pray for obtaining the status of a ‘Dormant Company’. The ‘A’
company was accordingly struck off after complying with the mandate of section
248 as there were reasonable grounds to believe that the appellant company was
not carrying on any business, or was not in operation for a period of two
immediately preceding financial years.

HELD

It was observed
by the Appellate Tribunal that the notice contemplated u/s 248(1) of the
Companies Act, 2013 read with Rule 3 of the Companies (Removal of names of
companies from the Register of Companies) Rules, 2016 was issued by speed post
to ‘A’ company and its directors. A copy of the notice was published in the
official website calling for objections to the proposed removal / striking off
of the name of the company within 30 days from the publication of the same . A
copy of the notice was published in the official gazette. A public notice was
published in the Times of India and in a regional newspaper. The notice
published in the official website notified that the ‘company stands struck off
from the Register of Companies’. Thus, no legal infirmity or flaw was pointed
out in adherence to the provisions relevant to the process of striking off of
‘A’ company. It was done after following due procedure laid down in the Act.

 

On the crucial issue of ‘A’ company being in
operation and doing business in consonance with its objects, it was noticed
that the financial statements covering the fiscal period beginning 2013 through
2017 demonstrated that ‘A’ company was not in operation and did not conduct any
business of the nature bearing nexus with its intended object/s. The Tribunal
had tabulated the factual position arising from such financial statements
reflecting the assets, liabilities and turnover of the company as NIL. It was
further observed that indulging in business activity not falling within the
ambit of the objects of the company, or not being incidental or ancillary
thereto, cannot be termed as a legitimate business for demonstrating that the
company was in operation.

 

‘A’ company has
failed to make out a just ground warranting interference with the order passed
by the Tribunal which is neither shown to be legally infirm, nor the findings
recorded therein shown to be erroneous, much less perverse.

 

In view of the
above facts and being devoid of merit, the appeal against the order passed by
the ROC was dismissed.
 

 

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