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May 2019

CORPORATE LAW CORNER

By Pooja Punjabi Oberai
Chartered Accountant
Reading Time 12 mins
2. 
Principal Director-General of Income-tax vs. Synergies Dooray Automotive
Ltd.
[2019] 103 taxmann.com 361 (NCLAT)  Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 205
of 2017 and 309, 559, 671 & 759 of 2018
Date of Order: 20th March,
2019

 

Section
5(20) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Income-tax Department,
Sales tax department and other statutory bodies fall within the ambit of
“operational creditors” and the monies owed to them on account of these
statutory dues is an “operational debt”

 

FACTS


Various regulatory
authorities preferred appeals against resolution plans approved by the National
Company Law Tribunal (“NCLT”) where the demands owed by the corporate debtors
to them were classified as operational debt and their names were included as
operational creditors of such companies. Accordingly, the demands owed were
substantially reduced under the resolution plans and they were not given an
opportunity to attend the meetings of the committee of creditors (“COC”). As
the legal issue arising in the appeals was the same, all of them were combined
and heard together.

 

HELD


There were arguments from
both sides on interpretation of the term ‘operational debt’ as defined u/s.
5(21) of the Code. The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (“NCLAT”)
examined the definition and observed that there was no ambiguity in it. NCLAT
further observed that ‘Operational Debt’ in normal course meant a debt arising
during the operation of the company (‘Corporate Debtor’). The ‘goods’ and
‘services’, including employment, were required to keep the company (‘Corporate
Debtor’) operational as a going concern. If the company (‘Corporate Debtor’) is
operational and remains a going concern, only in such case will the statutory
liability, such as payment of Income-tax, Value Added Tax, etc., arise. As the
‘Income Tax’, ‘Value Added Tax’ and other statutory dues arising out of the
existing law arises when the Company is operational, it was held that such
statutory dues had a direct nexus with operation of the company. It was further
held that all statutory dues including ‘Income Tax’, ‘Value Added Tax’, etc.,
came within the meaning of ‘Operational Debt’.

 

As the statutory
authorities were treated at par with similarly situated ‘operational
creditors’, there was no reason to interfere in the orders passed by the NCLT.

 

NCLAT dismissed the appeals
so filed.

 

3.  Forech India Limited vs. Edelweiss Assets
Reconstruction Co. Ltd.
[2019]
101 taxmann.com 451 (SC) Civil
appeal No. 818 of 2018
Date
of Order: 22nd January, 2019

 

Section
255 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 read with Rule 5 of the
Companies (Transfer of Pending Proceedings) Rules, 2016 as well as Rules 26 and
27 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959 – In a winding-up petition filed before
the High Court where a notice has been served and which is pending in the High
Court, application to transfer the same to NCLT under the Code can be made –
High Court would transfer such a proceeding and it would be treated as an
insolvency petition under the Code

 

Sections
11 and 10 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Application of section
11 is limited in nature – It merely bars a corporate debtor from initiating a
petition u/s. 10 of the Code in respect of whom a liquidation order has been
made – It does not follow that until a liquidation order has been made against
the corporate debtor, an Insolvency Petition may be filed u/s. 7 or u/s. 9 as
the case may be

 

FACTS


F Co filed a winding-up
petition against the corporate debtor in the year 2014 for inability to pay its
dues. Notice in this petition had been served, the existence of debt or
liability has been admitted. Meanwhile, E Co being the financial creditor moved
to the National Company Law Tribunal (“NCLT”) and filed an insolvency petition
u/s. 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“the Code”) in May/June,
2017. This petition was admitted on 07.08.2017. F Co filed an appeal against
the order of admission before the NCLAT and the same was dismissed on the
ground that since the winding-up order had not been passed by the High Court,
insolvency petition was maintainable in the eyes of law.

 

F Co argued that in light
of the provisions of the law, it should be the winding-up petitions filed before
the High Court that should be allowed to continue and not the insolvency
petitions filed by the creditors before the NCLT. E Co, on the other hand,
contended that the whole object of the Code would be frustrated if petitions
for winding up in the High Court were to continue in the face of the insolvency
petitions that have been filed under the Code.

 

HELD


The Supreme Court examined
various arguments and referred to section 255 of the Code along with various
amendments brought out by the Eleventh Schedule to the Code, section 434 of the
Companies Act, 2013 (which relates to transfer of certain pending proceedings),
Rule 5 of the Companies (Transfer of Pending Proceedings) Rules, 2016, as well
as Rules 26 and 27 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959.

 

It was pointed out that
there were divergent views on the interpretation of the aforesaid rules. The
Bombay High Court in Ashok Commercial Enterprises vs. Parekh Aluminex Ltd.
[2017] 80 taxmann.com 359/141 SCL 363
, had stated that the notice referred
to in Rule 26 was a pre-admission notice and hence, held that all winding-up
petitions where pre-admission notices were issued and served on the respondent
will be retained in the High Court. On the other hand, the Madras High Court in
M.K. & Sons Engg. vs. Eason Reyrolle Ltd. in CP/364/2016 held that
the notice under Rule 26 is referable to a post-admission position of the
winding-up petition and accordingly held that only those petitions where a
winding-up order is already made can be retained in the High Court. For this
purpose, the Madras High Court strongly relied upon Form No. 6 appended to Rule
27 and the expression “was admitted” occurring in the Notice of
Petition contained in the said Form.

 

The Supreme Court held that
the view taken by the Bombay High Court was correct in law and the reasoning
laid down by the NCLAT in its order was incorrect.

Further, in the context of
section 11 of the Code it was observed that the same was of limited application
and only barred a corporate debtor from initiating a petition under section 10
of the Code in respect of whom a liquidation order has been made. From a
reading of this section, it does not follow that until a liquidation order has
been made against the corporate debtor, an Insolvency Petition may be filed
u/s. 7 or section 9 as the case may be.

 

The financial creditor’s
application which was admitted by the Tribunal was held to be an independent
proceeding which would be decided in accordance with the provisions of the
Code. The order of the NCLAT dismissing appeal was upheld by the Supreme Court
and F Co was granted an opportunity to apply before the Supreme Court under the
proviso to section 434 of the Companies Act (added in 2018), to transfer the
winding-up proceeding pending before the High Court of Delhi to the NCLT, which
can then be treated as a proceeding u/s. 9 of the Code.

 

4.  SGM Webtech (P.) Ltd. vs. Boulevard Projects
(P.) Ltd.
[2019]
103 taxmann.com 176 (NCLT –  New Delhi) Company
petition (IB) No. 967(PB) of 2018
Date
of Order: 8th February, 2019

 

Sections
5(7) and 5(8) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Commercial Unit
allotted in a real estate development project was not completed in time –
Amounts advanced had to be refunded to the allottee and default in doing so
constituted a default in repayment of financial debt as contemplated under the
Code – Proceedings under the Code could be initiated for the default

 

FACTS


S Co, a private company,
agreed to purchase a commercial unit in a project being developed by B Co. Over
a period of time, B Co raised various demands on S Co which were duly met by
it. An “Office/Unit Buyer Agreement” dated 08.01.2013 was entered into between
the parties. The agreement fructified the terms between the parties qua
the rights of S Co in the commercial unit and the project, B Co’s obligations
of delivery of completed commercial unit as per specifications within 36 months
and consequences of delay thereof including penalty for the period of delay, S
Co’s right to terminate the agreement and also to seek refund with interest.

 

B Co, despite repeated
assurances, failed to complete the construction in the stipulated time. Various
letters were issued by S Co demanding the refund of its money along with
interest for which no reply was furnished by B Co. S Co further stated that a
failure on part of B Co would necessitate further action under Real Estate
(Regulation and Development) Act, 2016. The said action was initiated and the
U.P. Real Estate Regulatory Authority (“UPRERA”) and the authority levied
penalty on B Co.

 

B Co owed money to S Co
which had fallen due on various dates on account of its default in completion
of the allotted unit within time and the default in re-payment (despite
demands) of amount paid by S Co along with compound interest @ 18% per annum
from the actual dates of receipt of payment by B Co till date of repayment
to/realisation of the entire amount to S Co, and penalty thereon as ordered by
UPRERA.

 

S Co thus filed a petition
initiating Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (“CIRP”) under the
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“the Code”) and proposed the name of Amit
Agarwal for appointment as Interim Resolution Professional. B Co, on the other
hand, had filed a further petition with UPRERA and it was contended that since
the proceedings there were pending, the proposed application may not be
proceeded with. It was further contended by B Co that delay arose due to
demonetisation and the order passed by the NGT in respect of the Okhla Bird
Sanctuary; and that in view of force majeure, the claim of S Co was
premature.

 

HELD


The National Company Law
Tribunal (“NCLT”) examined the provisions of section 5(7), 5(8), 7(1) read with
the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (amendment) Ordinance, 2018. The Ordinance provided
that any amount raised from an allottee under a real estate project shall be
deemed to be an amount having the commercial effect of a borrowing and thus
will come within the definition of ‘Financial Debt’ under the Code. The
definition of ‘Financial Debt’ has been amended to specifically include dues of
home buyers and the home buyers are recognised as “Financial
Creditor” under the Amendment Act.

 

The Tribunal observed that
S Co had advanced a sum of Rs. 4,10,68,472 to B Co and a Builder-Buyer Agreement
had also been executed between the parties. It was observed that the present
application was filed by S Co u/s. 7 and all the relevant files and documents
as required for the same along with Form I had been duly filled.

 

The only point of
contention that remained was whether a default in payment of financial debt was
committed by B Co. In that connection, NCLT observed that B Co had failed to
show how the demand made by S Co was premature. The fact that the claim of S Co
had been admitted by UPRERA established that the said claim was in fact a
financial debt as defined under the Code and that there was default on the part
of B Co in repayment of financial debt.

 

NCLT thus admitted the
petition to initiate the CIRP against B Co and declared moratorium in terms of
section 14 of the Code with a direction to the IRP to take further steps as
prescribed under the Code.

 

5.  Satyendra Jain vs. OmwayBuilestate (P.) Ltd. [2019]
103 taxmann.com 111 (NCLT – New Delhi) Company
petition (IB) No. 1013 (PB) of 2018
Date
of Order: 12th February, 2019

 

Section
238A read with section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 –
Insolvency Resolution Process can be initiated against the corporate debtor
even though recovery suit has already been filed and decree has been passed
more than 5 years ago – The applicable period of limitation being 12 years,
application under the Code was maintainable

 

FACTS

O Co took a loan of Rs.
4.35 crore from Mr. S in the year 2010 which it failed to repay as per the
agreed terms and conditions. Mr. S filed a recovery suit before the Delhi High
Court which passed a decree on 19.03.2013 for Rs. 5.75 crore along with pendente lite and future interest. O Co did
not pay its dues even 5 years after the passing of the decree. Mr. S has claimed
that as on 20.07.2018, the total outstanding amount including interest due was
Rs. 10.14 crore.

 

O Co has objected to the
application primarily on the ground that the claim of Mr. S was barred by
limitation. It was further submitted that the Delhi High Court had passed a status
quo
on the assets of O Co which was still in operation and hence no action
could be taken against it.

 

Mr. S brought to the notice
of the National Company Law Tribunal (“NCLT”) that the decree dated 19.03.2013
was modified by the High Court on 04.02.2016 and the said decree had still not
been satisfied by O Co.

 

 

HELD


The
primary objection to the admission of the application was that the claim was
barred by limitation. NCLT examined section 238A of the Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“the Code”) which makes the provisions of the Limitation
Act, 1963 applicable to proceedings or appeals applicable to the Code. However,
NCLT observed that Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides for a
period of 12 years with respect to execution of order or decree of a Civil
Court. In light of this, the argument of application being barred by limitation
did not hold good and NCLT rejected the same.

 

The fact of existence of
the loan which is recoverable with applicable interest has not been disputed by
either parties. Either parties also do not dispute the default of O Co in
repayment of loan in accordance with agreed terms. Mr. S had filled out a duly
complete form along with necessary documents to initiate the proceedings u/s. 7
of the Code.

 

Thus, the application of
Mr. S was accepted by the NCLT and Mr. Lekhraj Bajaj was appointed as the
Interim Resolution Professional (“IRP”). NCLT further declared moratorium in
terms of section 14 of the Code with a direction to the IRP to take further
steps as prescribed under the Code.

 

 

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