Category: Corporate And Other Laws
PART B: RTI Act, 2005 – The Use of Right to Information Laws in India:
It is released in October’ 2013. Executive Summary thereof is being produced in parts in this and further next few issues:
I. Availability of the Annual Reports of Information Commissions on Websites Main findings of the study:
• Although in our previous study we had found the Mizoram State Information Commission defaulting over public disclosure of its Annual Reports, it has now uploaded all Annual Reports up to the year 2011-12. Seven State Information Commissions identified in our study last year, namely, those in Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Manipur, Sikkim, Tamil Nadu, Tripura and Uttar Pradesh continue to be defaulters in terms of displaying their Annual Reports on their websites. These websites do not contain even a link for ‘Annual Reports’.
• Only Maharashtra State Information Commission has uploaded on its website, its latest Annual Report due, for the calendar year 2012. No other Information Commission has uploaded its latest Annual Report due, for either the calendar year (January – December 2012) or the financial year (April 2012 – March 2013).
• The Central Information Commission and 9 Information Commissions in the States of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), Karnataka, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Rajasthan have uploaded their Annual Reports for all the years up to 2011-12. Others have displayed Annual Reports for one year or more but not for the period 2011-13.
• With the exception of the Central Information Commission and the State Information Commissions of Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra and Rajasthan, all other Information Commissions have published their Annual Reports in English only. Recommendations:
• Publishing Annual Reports in a timely manner at least within six months of the ending of the reporting year must become a priority with all Information Commissions.
• Information Commissions will be able to compile their Annual Reports in a timely manner only if they receive statistical data from all public authorities under their jurisdiction. According to Section 25 (2) of the Central RTI Act and Section 22(2) of the J&K RTI Act, the duty of ensuring reporting of RTI returns from all public authorities lies squarely on the concerned Ministries. Unless they apply pressure on public authorities under their jurisdiction they will not fall in line to submit RTI returns in a timely manner. They must insist filing of RTI returns at least every quarter. The nodal department charged with ensuring the implementation of the RTI law under each appropriate Government, must send frequent reminders to the other Ministries and Department to do their mandated job.
• Even if the RTI returns are not forthcoming from the ministries/departments, Information Commissions have the statutory duty to publish a report of their own activities at least and submit it to the respective Legislatures in order to account for spending the taxpayers’ money. This would provide them the opportunity to publicly name and shame the defaulting public authorities and compel compliance with the reporting requirement under the respective RTI laws.
• At the very minimum, all Annual Reports must be drafted in the official languages used by the appropriate Governments.
Gross negligence – Clause 7 of Part I of Second Schedule (contd.)
Series 3
Arjun (A) – Last time you told me about gross negligence. It was a great relief that every negligence is not necessarily a gross negligence!
Shrikrishna (S)–No my dear! Don’t take it so lightly. It is not a licence to commit any blunder.
A – But you only said mere error or even a blunder is not negligence and every negligence is not a gross negligence.
S – It is true. The Council itself has taken that view. But don’t stretch it too far. The line between the two is very thin.
A – But how can one be so perfect? In every audit, there may be some flaw or the other. It is impossible to do any audit so ideally perfect.
S – Agreed. But what is important is your approach and attitude. Moreover, I also mentioned to you that now the amended clause also talks of ‘lack of due diligence’. This is a very wide concept.
A – But how does one judge a member’s attitude? How can one prove that there was no negligence; but only an inadvertent error?
S – Remember, work should not only be done but it should be seen that it is done. You need to maintain working papers.
A – Our clients don’t have a good accountant. There is always a mess in the records. Some how, we manage to draw up the balance sheet ourselves. If there are errors, we get them set right there and then. Who will keep all those queries? We don’t have time nor space to keep so many papers.
S – Understand this difficulty. But you have a double jeopardy. On one hand, clients do not realise how much work you have done. So they don’t pay your fees, let alone increase. On the other hand, your position is vulnerable before the Council.
A – But Council should understand the difficulties of the common practioners. They don’t have so much resources.
S – That is where your attitude comes into play. You have technology at your disposal. You can always email your queries, store them in your computers.
A – But clients can’t understand the queries. They want us only to reply our own queries!
S – But this will at least make him aware of the extent of discrepancies.
A – Now take our accounting standards. They just don’t care. They are not interested even in knowing the implications.
S – You need to use your persuasion skills. Sooner or later, they will realise it.
A – But what to do till then?
S – You need to be assertive. If you tolerate or cover up the flaws, you will be taken for granted.
A – That is already happening. What is the solution?
S – See, my dear. If you compromise once, you invite a great risk. First and foremost, you lose your respect. The value of the profession also goes down.
A – We become helpless.
S – Secondly, if there are flaws in the accounts, you may suffer scrutiny from Revenue Authorities.
A – Yes. We need to ‘manage’ the things over there.
S – And client says, it is your own mistake. So he does not pay for your efforts in taxdepartments.
A – I am told, now-a-days, tax authorities are routinely writing to the Institute about the shortcomings in audited accounts.
S – That’s what I am saying. And even if the client does not pay or hike the audit fees, you have to continue the audit. You are always worried that if some new auditor comes in your place, your mistakes will get exposed! Hence, you perpetuate your mistakes.
A – What you say is true. In a way, we blackmail ourselves and are afraid of deviating from wrong path.
S – Your compromising attitude leads to negligence – or lack of due diligence. Negligence is a very wide term. It covers many things. You can not define it. There can not be an exhaustive list.
A – You mean it is as endless as your manifestations that you described in ‘Vishwa Roop Darshan’!
S – Yes. That I told you the 11th Chapter of ‘Geeta’.
A – Still, you please tell me at least a few illustrations of negligence.
S – It starts right from your appointment. See that it is properly made with reference to applicable laws, that organisation’s bylaws, and so on. You must take an appointment letter. Then, maintain working papers, preserve the queries raised by you and their replies.
A – Yes. I will be careful.
S – Then take Management Representation Letter – MRL. I don’t think you have ever taken it!
A – I have recently started taking. But not in all cases.
S – Prepare a proper audit program covering all aspect of audit. This you studied in exam but never followed.
A – I have seen some CAs who spend lot of time on all these things. They compile heap of files of working papers. This report and that opinion! I wonder whether they really do any audit!
S – It is easy to criticise others. But try to understand the spirit behind it. Then you need to know not only the applicable laws – like tax, company law, FEMA; but also your Institute’s pronouncements like accounting standards, auditing standards, guidance notes, statements, resolutions – and so on.
A – Wait wait! I cannot digest and remember all these things. We will meet again after this July returns, when I will focus on audits.
S – Yes. I don’t mind meeting again. But don’t be under an impression that negligence is invoked only in audits. It also covers tax practice. In fact, it encompasses each and every aspect of your professional functioning. I will explain next time.
Om Shanti !
The above dialogue between Shri Krishna and Arjuna is a continuation of earlier dialogues published in BCA Journals of May 2013 and June 2013. It deals with the terminologies ‘gross negligence’ and ‘lack of due diligence’ used in Clause (7) of Part I of Second Schedule. This is the most important and serious charge of misconduct. Discussion on this clause will continue.
A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 12 dated July 15, 2013
Presently, Indian companies in the manufacturing, infrastructure sector and hotel sector, which are consistent foreign exchange earners, can avail of ECB for repayment of their outstanding Rupee loan(s) availed of from the domestic banking system and / or for fresh Rupee capital expenditure under the Approval Route.
This circular permits the above (i.e. Indian companies in the manufacturing, infrastructure sector and hotel sector) which have established Joint Venture (JV) / Wholly Owned Subsidiary (WOS) / have acquired assets overseas to avail of ECB under the $ 10 billion scheme for repayment of all term loans having average residual maturity of 5 years and above / credit facilities availed of by Indian companies from domestic banks for investment in JV / WOS overseas, in addition to ‘Capital Expenditure’. Some of the important terms and conditions are: –
1. ECB that can be availed of is the higher of 75% of the average foreign exchange earnings realised during the past three financial years and / or 75% of the average of foreign exchange earnings potential for the next three financial years of the Indian companies from the JV / WOS / assets abroad. These projections have to be certified by the Statutory Auditors / Chartered Accountant / Certified Public Accountant / Category I Merchant Banker registered with SEBI / an Investment Banker outside India registered with the appropriate regulatory authority in the host country.
2. ECB availed of under the scheme has to be repaid out of foreign exchange earnings from the overseas JV / WOS / assets.
3. Past earnings in the form of dividend / repatriated profit / other foreign exchange inflows like royalty, technical know-how, fee, etc. from overseas JV / WOS / assets will be reckoned as foreign exchange earnings for the purpose of $ 10 billion scheme.
A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 11 dated July 11, 2013
External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) Policy – Review of all-in-cost ceiling
This circular states that the present all-in-cost ceiling for ECB, as mentioned below, will continue till 31st March, 2013: –
|
Sr. |
Average Maturity Period |
All-in-cost over 6 month |
|
1 |
Three years and up to |
350 bps |
|
2. |
More than five years |
500 bps |
A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 10 dated July 11, 2013
This circular permits borrowers to refinance under the Approval Route, upto 30th September, 2013, an existing ECB by raising fresh ECB at a higher all-in-cost / reschedule an existing ECB at a higher all-in-cost. However, the enhanced all-in-cost must not exceed the current all-in-cost ceiling.
A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 09 dated July 11, 2013
Trade Credits for Imports into India – Review of all-in-cost ceiling
This circular states that the present all-in-cost ceiling for trade credits, as mentioned below, will continue till 30th September, 2013: –
|
Maturity period |
All-in-cost ceilings over |
|
Up to 1 year |
350 basis points |
|
More than 1 year and up to |
A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 08 dated July 11, 2013
Notification No. FEMA.271/RB-2013 dated March 19, 2013
Presently, banks resident in India require specific approval of RBI to acquire shares of the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), Belgium.
This circular grants general permission to a bank in India which has been permitted by RBI to become a member of the ‘SWIFT User’s Group in India’ to acquire the shares of SWIFT.
A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 07 dated July 08, 2013
This circular prohibits banks from banks from carrying out any proprietary trading in the currency futures / exchange traded currency options markets. Thus, banks can undertake transactions in these markets only on behalf of their clients.
A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 6 dated July 8, 2013
This circular permits NBFC – AFC to avail ECB (including outstanding ECB) up to 75% of their owned funds, subject to a maximum of $ 200 million or its equivalent per financial year under the Automatic Route to finance the import of infrastructure equipment for leasing to infrastructure projects. ECB in excess of the above limit can be availed of under the Approval Route. The minimum average maturity period of the ECB must be five years. Where ECB is availed of in the form of Foreign Currency Bonds from international capital markets, than such ECB must be raised only from those international capital markets that are subject to regulations prescribed by regulator in the host country which is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and is compliant with FATF guidelines. Foreign currency risk in respect of ECB will have to be hedged in full.
A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 02 dated July 04, 2013
Presently, resident entities who have hedged their foreign exchange risks are required to submit to their Banks a Quarterly certificate signed by their statutory auditors stating that the contracts outstanding at any point of time with all banks during the quarter did not exceed the value of the underlying exposures.
This circular provides that resident entities now have to submit an annual certificate from their statutory auditors stating that the contracts outstanding with all banks at any time during the year did not exceed the value of the underlying exposures at that time.
Resident entities will have to continue to give an undertaking to the Banks stating that the contracted exposure against which the derivative transaction is being booked has not been used for any derivative transaction with any other bank.
PRESS NOTE 3 (2013 Series) – D/o IPP F. No. 5/3/2005- FC.I Dated June 03, 2013
Review of the policy on foreign direct investment in the Multi Brand Trading Sector – amendement of paragraph 6.2.16.5(2) of ‘Circular 1 of 2013 – Consolidated FDI Policy’
This Press Note has amended the List of States / Union Territories has mentioned in paragraph 6.2.16.5(1)(viii) by adding the name of Karnataka as the State which has given its consent to implent the policy on Multi Brand Retail Trading. With this the name of States / Union Territories that have given their consent has increased to 12. The revised list is as under: –
|
S. No |
Sector/Activity |
% of FDI Cap/ |
Entry route |
|
6.2.16.5 |
Multi Brand Retail |
51% |
Government |
|
|
(1) FDI in…. |
||
A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 01 dated July 04, 2013
Foreign Investment in India – Guidelines for calculation of total foreign investment in Indian companies, transfer of ownership and control of Indian companies and downstream investment by Indian companies
Vide the above Notification a new Schedule – Schedule 14 – has been added in Notification No. FEMA 20/2000-RB dated 3rd May 2000 (Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of Security by a Person Resident outside India) Regulations, 2000). This Notification has come into effect, retrospectively, from 13th February, 2009.
Annexed to this circular are guidelines for calculation of total foreign investment, i.e., direct and indirect foreign investment in Indian companies and for establishment of Indian companies/ transfer of ownership or control of Indian companies from resident Indian citizens to non-resident entities, in sectors with caps. Since these guidelines are to be applied retrospectively, this circular provides that: –
1. Any foreign investment already made in accordance with the guidelines in existence prior to 13th February, 2009 would not require any modification to conform to these guidelines.
2. All other investments, after the said date (i.e. 13th February, 2009), would come under the ambit of these new guidelines. Hence, in case of investments made between 13th February, 2009 and the date of publication of the FEMA notification (notified vide G.S.R. 393(E) dated 21st June, 2013), Indian companies have to intimate the concerned Regional Office of RBI, within 90 days from the date of this circular, through their bank, detailed position with regard to the issue / transfer of shares or downstream investment which is not in conformity with the regulatory framework. They have to then comply with the guidelines within 6 months or such extended time as considered appropriate by RBI in consultation with Government of India.
A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 122 dated June 27, 2013
Presently,
a. Import of gold on consignment basis by banks, nominated agencies / premier / star trading houses is permitted only to meet the genuine needs of the exporters of gold jewellery.
b. All Letters of Credit (LC) to be opened by Nominated Banks / Agencies for import of gold under all categories can only be on 100% cash margin basis and imports of gold will necessarily have to be on Documents against Payment (DP) basis. Thus, import of gold on Documents against Acceptance (DA) basis is not permitted.
This circular clarifies that Banks are required to ensure that credit in any form or name is not enabled for import of gold by the nominated agencies, etc. Import of gold on loan basis by banks & nominated agencies is permitted only for on-lending to exporters of jewellery as the restrictions of non-availing of credit for import of gold is not applicable to them.
Master Circulars dated July 1, 2013
RBI has issued 15 Master Circulars. These Master Circulars consolidate the existing instructions on the subject at one place. These Master Circulars are being issued with a sunset clause of one year. They will stand withdrawn on 1st July, 2014 and be replaced with an updated Master Circular on the subject.
A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 121 dated June 26, 2013
Presently, a Foreign Institutional Investor (FII) is permitted to hedge the currency risk on the market value of their entire investment in equity and/ or debt in India.
This circular clarifies that if a FII wants to hedge the exposure of one of its sub-account holders it must produce a clear mandate from the sub-account holder indicating the latter’s (sub-account holders) intention to enter into the derivative transaction. Banks must also verify the mandate as well as the eligibility of the contract with respect to the market value of the securities held in the concerned sub-account.
A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 120 dated June 26, 2013
Presently, credit enhancement can be provided by multilateral/regional financial institutions, Government owned development financial institutions, direct/indirect foreign equity holder(s), under the automatic route, for domestic debt raised through issue of capital market instruments, such as, Rupee denominated bonds and debentures, by Indian companies engaged exclusively in the development of infrastructure and by Infrastructure Finance Companies (IFC).
This circular states that credit enhancement can be also be provided by eligible non-resident entities to the domestic debt raised through issue of INR bonds /debentures by all borrowers eligible to raise ECB under the automatic route, subject to the following: –
1. The minimum average maturity of the underlying debt instruments must be three years.
2. Prepayment and call / put options will not be permissible for these capital market instruments with an average maturity period of up to 3 years.
A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 119 dated June 26, 2013
Presently, eligible borrowers can avail of ECB for import of capital goods for new projects/modernisation/ expansion of existing production units in the real sector, infrastructure sector and service sector. This circular permits eligible borrowers to avail ECB (under the Automatic Route/Approval Route, as the case may be) for import of services, technical knowhow and payment of license fees as part of import of capital goods by the companies for use in the manufacturing and infrastructure sectors as permissible end uses of ECB, subject to the following: –
(i) There must be a duly signed agreement between the service provider and the borrower company.
(ii) The original invoice raised by the service provider as per the payment schedule in the agreement must be duly certified by the borrower company.
(iii) The importer must give a declaration to the effect that the entire expenditure on import of services will be capitalised.
(iv) The importer must give a declaration to the effect that the entire expenditure on import of services forms part of project cost.
(v) Bank has to ensure the bonafides of the transaction.
Appellate Tribunal — Strictures against Department for filing appeal in avoidable litigation.
The appeal had been preferred by the Revenue authorities u/s.35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944 against the order of CESTAT.
In original proceedings on the issue of deficient payment of excise duty on account of wrongful availment of Cenvat credit were dropped. This order had been upheld by the Commissioner (Appeals) and had been further upheld by the Tribunal. The Tribunal, inter alia, observed:
“The Department deserves to be complimented for their perseverance as the Tribunal’s decision dated 4-7-2008 in the previous set of proceedings on the main issue is in favour of the party, the question of allowing this appeal of the Department does not arise.”
In spite of the above observations, the Department had chosen to file the appeal before the High Court claiming that there is a substantial question of law. The Court held that the above action only shows total carelessness and nonapplication of mind. Apart from the fact that the original authority, the Appellate Authority and the Tribunal decided against the Department, the amount involved was only Rs.39,117. In spite of the judgments of the Supreme Court as well as observations made by the Court, the Department is turning a deaf ear and is wasting public money on avoidable litigation.
Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed with costs at Rs.10,000 to be recovered from the person taking decision to file the appeal within three months and to be deposited with the High Court Legal Services Committee.
Bringing disrepute to the profession (Clause 1 & 2 of Part IV of the First Schedule and Part III of Second Schedule)
A – Cannot cope up with this work of March!
S – Why? March comes every year. What’s new about it?
A – That’s the problem. Nothing new happens. Same old things, only more tiring. Advance tax, service tax, time-barring assessments and returns.
S – Why are there time-barring returns? Can you not file them earlier?
A – No. Some clients have a habit of filing their returns only on the last day.
S – It is their habit or your habit? You could easily push them. Do you communicate with them properly? And in time?
A – No. We ourselves keep it pending for some reason or the other. Many times, there are some issues on which it is difficult to take decision.
S – You simply keep on grumbling but don’t want to improve.
A – This year there is one more menace.
S – What is that?
A – Many clients had taken bills for adjustment of profits. But those suppliers never paid their VAT. And such defaulters’ list is now sent by MVAT authorities to income tax people.
S – Then?
A – Now, our clients had to pay the MVAT evaded by the suppliers. And on the top of it, they are facing disallowance in Income Tax.
S – What is wrong about it? They deserve it if they are falsifying the accounts. My worry is that you CAs should not be trapped into such rackets.
A – A few of my CA friends are doing only this ‘entry’ business. They are minting money and I have to slog like this.
S – I had already told you – you have a right only in the performance of your duty; not in the fruits. Those unscrupulous CAs are now getting the fruits of their deeds!
A – I agree. But the harassment at the tax office is unbearable. Their demands are astronomical.
S – Are you also involved in settling the cases?
A – What to do? There is no alternative. I don’t do it myself. That is why my cases remain pending and I get irritated.
S – Good. That is why you are so dear to me.
A – But I feel, those who settle down, enjoy life.
S – You are mistaken. Before the war in Mahabharata also, you were under similar obsession. That time, I gave you clear vision about life.
A – But that was Dwaparyuga. Today, we are in Kaliyug.
S – True. But that time your thoughts were unbecoming of a Kshatriya (Warrior). Today, your thoughts are unbecoming of a professional.
A – But the profession has degenerated into business.
S – Let the profession degenerate; but not a professional like you. Your thoughts are confused; but fortunately, your upbringing has held you from acting in that manner.
A – I was wondering how you have not mentioned anything about misconduct so far! Is this not covered in our Code of Ethics?
S – How can it not be covered? I told you that there are two schedules to your CA Act that specify different types of misconduct.
A – Then tell me, where it is stated?
S – See, bribery is a crime. If you are a party to it, it is abetment. That again is a crime.
A – But that is only if one is caught! It is a secret deal between the client and the officer. CA is just a middleman.
S – Remember, apart from the specific items of misconduct in the Schedules, section 22 of your CA Act covers ‘other misconduct’ also. That is very wide.
A – You mean, it is not only professional misconduct.
S – No. So if you are caught, you are directly covered by clause (1) of Part IV of the First Schedule and so also Part III of the Second Schedule. That means, convicted of a punishable crime.
A – What else?
S – Clause (2) of Part of IV of the First Schedule is very very wide. It says, if your action brings disrepute to the profession, that is also a misconduct. See, if you are involved as a middle-man, both the officer as well as your client discounts your value. They are happy because they are benefitted; but your image is tarnished.
A – That is true. Many clients treat us as agents only.
S – You should be careful as to how the society perceives your profession. In many scandals, the role of your colleagues is exposed.
A – What are the other instances?
S – What to tell you? There are cases of even CAs demanding dowry.
A – Really? I am aware that in certain communities, CA commands a hefty dowry. I am told, nowadays that rate also has gone down!
S – That is public perception! Do they really respect you? Three CAs formed a company for some business. But the business did not pick up, so they neglected compliances totally. That company was transferred to someone; and due to some friction, the buyer filed a complaint and such negligence brings disrepute to the profession.
A – What was the outcome?
S – They were held guilty, though left on reprimand.
A – Oh! Then it will cover traffic rules also.
S – Yes. Even the indiscipline in behaviour, indecency and so many things! There are complaints of ill treatment of articles, misbehaviour with lady staff and what not!
A – One needs to be cautious everywhere! I thought our Code covers only professional misconduct.
S – Any professional is expected to have exemplary behaviour. It covers punctuality, courtesy, proper communication, personal habits – and what not? It is all-pervasive.
A – I have seen CAs whose personal habits and mannerisms are irritating. They can’t even speak properly. Even in conferences, the manner in which they rush for lunch is not befitting a professional! The less said the better.
S – Good! You have understood it. Take care of public image and you will command respect. Council is concerned with that. Om Shanti! The above dialogue is with reference to Clause 1 & 2 of Part IV of the First Schedule and Part III of Second Schedule which read as under:
Clause 1: is held guilty by any civil or criminal court for an offence which is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months;
Clause 2: in the opinion of the Council, brings disrepute to the profession or the Institute as a result of his action whether or not related to his professional work.
Part III of Second Schedule: A member of the Institute, whether in practice or not, shall be deemed to be guilty of other misconduct, if he is held guilty by any civil or criminal court for an offence which is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding six months.
Further, readers may also refer page 229 of ICAI’s publication on Code of Ethics, January 2009 edition (reprinted in May 2009).
Appellate Tribunal — Precedent — Judicial propriety — Co-ordinated Benches of Tribunal.
Accident claim — Legal representative — Married daughter — Motor Vehicles Act, section 166.
The appellant No. 1 Smt. Joy Minocha was daughter of deceased persons Naresh Arora and Smt. Bharti Arora. The other appellants are minor children of the appellant No. 1. The deceased persons had expired in a road accident. The appellant along with the minor children being legal heirs had filed petition for compensation. The Tribunal dismissed the claim petition on the ground that the appellant No. 1 was married daughter of the deceased persons, therefore not entitled to receive any compensation.
The question that arose before the High Court was whether any compensation is payable where the claim is filed by legal representatives of the deceased who were not dependent on them?
The Court observed that the expression ‘Legal Representative’ had not been defined in the Motor Vehicles Act or the Rules made thereunder. However, it has been defined in s.s (11) of section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 which reads as under:
‘Legal representative’ means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person, and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued;’
Almost in similar terms is the definition of ‘legal representative’ u/s.2(1)(g) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
The Court relying on the decision of Smt. Manjuri Bera v. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., AIR 2007 SC 1474, observed that the right to file claim application has to be considered in the background of right to entitlement. Further section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act corresponds to section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (old Act). It provides that an application for compensation may be made by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased in case where death has resulted from the accident.
In view of the above it was held that though there is no loss of dependency, yet the claimants being legal representatives are entitled to inherit the estate of the deceased persons, therefore, in the facts of the present cases, the appellants were entitled to receive compensation under no fault liability in terms of section 140(2) of the Act. Hence the claim petitions was maintainable as filed by the legal representatives of the deceased.
Amendments To Din Rules 2006
a. The DIN is found to be duplicate
b. DIN was obtained by wrongful manner or fraudulent means
c. Death of the concerned individual
d. Concerned individual is declared lunatic by the competent court or e. Concerned individual is adjudicated an insolvent.
Clarification for Section 372A(3)
The provisions of Section 372A(3) do not permit “any loan to any body corporate to be made at a rate of interest lower than the prevailing bank rate, being standard rate made public u/s. 49 of the Reserve Bank of lndia Act, 1934 (2 of L934).” Through this clarification the Government clarifies that there is no violation of Section 372A(3) by investment in these Bonds as the effective yield ( effective rate of return) on tax free bonds is greater than the yield of the prevailing Bank rate.
Maintenance of Collateral by Foreign Institutional Investors (FIIs) for transactions in the cash and F & O segments
This circular permits FII to offer as collateral, in addition to already permitted collaterals, government securities/corporate bonds, cash and foreign sovereign securities with AAA ratings, in both cash and F & O segments.
Money Transfer Service Scheme – Revised Guidelines
Annexed to this circular are the revised guidelines pertaining to the Money Transfer Service Scheme (MTSS). These guidelines are applicable to Indian agents and their sub-agents.
“Write-off” of unrealised export bills – Export of Goods and Services – Simplification of procedure
|
Write-off by |
% permitted to be |
|
Self “write-off” by an exporter – other than Status Holder Exporter |
5% |
|
Self “write-off” by Status Holder Exporters |
10% |
|
‘Write-off” by Authorised Dealer bank |
10% |
The above limits are cumulative and can be availed of at any time during the year. To avail of this facility, the exporter will have to fulfill the following conditions: –
1. The relevant amount must be outstanding for more than one year.
2. Satisfactory documentary evidence is furnished by the exporter to indicate that all efforts have been made to realise the dues.
3. The exporters case falls under any of the undernoted categories: –
a. The overseas buyer has been declared insolvent and a certificate from the official liquidator indicating that there is no possibility of recovery of export proceeds has been produced.
b. The overseas buyer is not traceable over a reasonably long period of time.
c. The goods exported have been auctioned or destroyed by the Port/Customs/Health authorities in the importing country.
d. The unrealised amount represents the balance due in a case settled through the intervention of the Indian Embassy/Foreign Chamber of Commerce/similar Organisation.
e. The unrealised amount represents the undrawn balance of an export bill (not exceeding 10% of the invoice value) remaining outstanding and turned out to be unrealisable despite all efforts made by the exporter.
f. The cost of resorting to legal action would be disproportionate to the unrealised amount of the export bill or where the exporter even after winning the Court case against the overseas buyer, has not been able to execute the Court decree due to reasons beyond his control.
g. Bills were drawn for the difference between the letter of credit value and actual export value or between the provisional and the actual freight charges, but the amount has remained unrealised due to dishonour of the bills by the overseas buyer and there are no prospects of realisation.
h. The exporter has surrendered proportionate export incentives, if any, availed of in respect of the relative shipments and submitted documents evidencing the same.
4. In case of self-write-off, the exporter will have to submit to the concerned bank, a Chartered Accountant’s certificate, indicating the following: –
a. Export realisation in the preceding calendar year.
b. The amount of write-off already availed of during the year, if any.
c. The relevant GR/SDF Nos. to be written off. d. Bill No., invoice value, commodity exported, country of export.
e. Surrender of export benefits, if any, availed of by the exporter.
Write-off cannot be availed of under the following circumstances without obtaining prior approval of RBI: –
a. Exports made to countries with externalisation problem i.e. where the overseas buyer has deposited the value of export in local currency but the amount has not been allowed to be repatriated by the central banking authorities of the country.
b. GR/SDF forms which are under investigation by agencies like, Enforcement Directorate, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, Central Bureau of Investigation, etc. as also the outstanding bills which are subject matter of civil /criminal suit.
c. Cases not complying with the above conditions/ beyond the above limits.
Notification No. FEMA.256/2013-RB dated 6th February, 2013, notified vide G.S.R.No.125(E) dated 26th February, 2013 External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) Policy – Corporates under Investigation.
Presently, corporates who are under investigation by any law enforcing agency like the Directorate of Enforcement (DoE), etc. can access ECB only under the Approval Route.
This circular permits, with immediate effect, all entities to avail of ECB under the Automatic Route notwithstanding any pending investigations/adjudications/ appeals by the law enforcing agencies, and also without prejudice to the outcome of such investigations/adjudications/appeals. Banks/RBI while approving the ECB proposal will have to intimate the concerned agencies by endorsing the copy of the approval letter to them.
Risk Management and Inter-Bank Dealings
The revised guidelines have withdrawn the restrictions on open positions limits (both overnight and intra-day) of Authorised Dealers involving Rupee as one of the currencies. However, the following restrictions will continue to apply: –
i. Positions on the exchanges (both Futures and Options) cannot be netted/offset by undertaking positions in the OTC market and vice-versa. Positions initiated on the exchanges mt be liquidated /closed in the exchanges only.
ii. Position limit for the trading member bank in the exchanges for trading Currency Futures and Options will be US INR6,152 million or 15% of the outstanding open interest, whichever is lower.
Memorandum of Instructions for Opening and Maintenance of Rupee/Foreign Currency Vostro Accounts of Non-resident Exchange Houses
This circular provides that banks in India can now receive cross-border inward remittances under Rupee Drawing Arrangements (RDA) through Exchange Houses situated in all countries which are FATF compliant under Speed Remittance Procedure.
Items No. 7 and 8 under Part (B) – Permitted Transactions have been modified, as under, to reflect the above mentioned change: –
7. Payments to medical institutions and hospitals in India, for medical treatment of NRI/their dependents and nationals of all FATF countries.
8. Payments to hotels by nationals of all FATF compliant countries/NRI for their stay.
A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 84 dated 22nd February, 2013 Know Your Customer (KYC) norms/Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Standards/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) Standards – Obligation of Authorised Persons under Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002 as amended by PML (Amendment) Act 2009 Money Changing activities.
A. Where the client is a person other than an individual or trust, the Authorised Person shall identify the beneficial owners of the client and take reasonable measures to verify the identity of such persons, through the following information:
(i) The identity of the natural person, who, whether acting alone or together, or through one or more juridical person, exercises control through ownership or who ultimately has a controlling ownership interest.
Explanation:
Controlling ownership interest means ownership of/entitlement to more than 25% of shares or capital or profits of the juridical person, where the juridical person is a company; ownership of/entitlement to more than 15% of the capital or profits of the juridical person where the juridical person is a partnership; or, ownership of/entitlement to more than 15% of the property or capital or profits of the juridical person where the juridical person is an unincorporated association or body of individuals.
(ii) In cases where there exists doubt under (i) as to whether the person with the controlling ownership interest is the beneficial owner or where no natural person exerts control through ownership interests, the identity of the natural person exercising control over the juridical person through other means.
Explanation:
Control through other means can be exercised through voting rights, agreement, arrangements, etc.
(iii) Where no natural person is identified under (i) or (ii) above, the identity of the relevant natural person who holds the position of senior managing official.
B. Where the client is a trust, the Authorised Person shall identify the beneficial owners of the client and take reasonable measures to verify the identity of such persons, through the identity of the settler of the trust, the trustee, the protector, the beneficiaries with 15% or more interest in the trust and any other natural person exercising ultimate effective control over the trust through a chain of control or ownership.
C. Where the client or the owner of the controlling interest is a company listed on a stock exchange, or is a majority-owned subsidiary of such a company, it is not necessary to identify and verify the identity of any shareholder or beneficial owner of such companies.
COMPANIES BIL, 2011 Provisions relating to Accounts and Audit
2. Accounts of companies
Sections 128 to 138 deal with accounts to be maintained by all companies. It is provided in section 128 that every company shall maintain books of accounts on mercantile system of accounting. These provisions are on the same lines as provisions in section 209 of the existing Act. At present, a company can adopt any accounting year for maintaining its accounts. It is now provided that all companies will have to follow uniform accounting year ending 31st March of every year. The existing companies which are following different accounting years will have to comply with the new provisions within a period of two years from the date when the Companies Act, 2011, comes into force. Exemption from this provision can be claimed by obtaining permission of the National Company Law Tribunal (Tribunal) in respect of foreign subsidiary companies which are required, by the laws of the foreign countries, to adopt different accounting year.
3. Financial statements
3.1 Section 129 provides that every company has to prepare financial statements for each accounting year and place them before the Annual General Meeting of the company. The term financial statements has been defined to include Balance Sheet, Profit and Loss A/c. or Income & Expenditure A/c., Cash Flow statement, A statement of changes in equity and notes to accounts. These financial statements have to comply with Accounting Standards prescribed by the Government as provided in section 133. If the company has one or more subsidiary companies, associate companies or joint ventures, the financial statements of these companies and joint ventures will have to be consolidated and these consolidated financial statements will also be required to be placed before the General Meeting. Further, such a company is also required to attach with the financial statements a statement of salient features of the subsidiaries including associates and joint ventures in the prescribed manner. The Government has power to notify any class of companies to which these provisions will not apply.
3.2 Every company will have to prepare financial statements every year in the Form given in Schedule III. This Schedule gives forms of Balance Sheet, Statement of Profit and Loss and General Instructions for preparation of Consolidated Financial Statements. This Form of Balance Sheet and Statement of Profit and Loss is similar to present Schedule VI as revised from 1-4-2011. The above financial statements have to be approved by the Board of Directors. The procedure for adoption of these statements is similar to section 215 of the existing Act.
4. Reopening of accounts
4.2 Section 131 provides that it is also possible for the Board of Directors to revise the financial statements or the report of Board for any of the three previous financial years if they find that these statements and/or report are not in accordance with the requirements of sections 129 to 134. For this purpose, the Board will have to take the approval of the Tribunal. Before giving such approval the Tribunal has to give notice to the Government and the Income-tax Department and invite their comments. Such revision of accounts can be made only once in a financial year. The Board will have to give detailed reasons for such revision of financial statements in its report to the members. Copies of the revised financial statements or Board Report will have to be sent to the members of the company and the Registrar of Companies. The revised financial statements will have to be approved by the members in General Meeting.
4.3 The Government is authorised to make Rules about the form in which application is to be made to the Tribunal for this purpose. These rules will also provide about the role of the company’s Auditors about their report on the accounts audited by them. The Directors have also to take such steps as may be provided in these rules.
5. Accounting and auditing standards
5.1 At present, the accounting standards to be followed by companies are formulated by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI). The Government has appointed a National Advisory Committee on Accounting Standards. This Committee examines these standards and makes recommendations to the Government. Thereafter, the Government notifies the accounting standards to be adopted by companies in the preparation of financial statements. So far as auditing standards are concerned, they are issued by ICAI and auditors have to follow these standards for conducting the audit of companies.
5.2 New sections 132, 133 and 143 give very wide powers to the Government to notify the accounting and auditing standards and to take action against the auditors who do not comply with these requirements. These provisions are as under.
(i) Section 132 provides that the Government will appoint a National Financial Reporting Authority (NFRA) for formulation of accounting and auditing standards and for enforcement of these standards. The NFRA will have a chairman and 15 members who will be appointed by the Government. For this purpose, the Government will notify the detailed rules and procedure.
(ii) The Government will notify the accounting standards as recommended by ICAI in consultation with NFRA u/s.133.
(iii) Similarly, the Government will notify the Auditing Standards as recommended by ICAI in consultation with NFRA u/s.143. This will mean that the present authority of ICAI to formulate auditing standards will now be taken over by the Government.
(iv) NFRA has been given powers to monitor and enforce compliance with the accounting and auditing standards, oversee the quality of professional services of auditors and suggest measures to make improvement in such services.
v) NFRA can investigate about the professional or other misconduct of Chartered Accountants, Cost Accountants and Company Secretaries in practice while rendering professional services to any company and take disciplinary action against the members or firms rendering such services. Once NFRA starts disciplinary proceedings against any member or firm, the respective Institutes cannot take any action against such member or firm. This particular provision will mean that the powers of the three Institutes of Chartered Accountants, Cost Accountants and Companies Secretaries to take disciplinary action against their members in such matters will be transferred to this NFRA appointed by the Government.
vi) NFRA has been given powers of a civil court for conducting this investigation. For the purpose of deciding whether there is professional or other misconduct on the part of the member or firm, it is provided that the items listed in section 22 of the Act governing the three Institutes will apply.
vii) If a member or a firm is found guilty of professional or other misconduct, the NFRA has power to
a) impose a minimum penalty of Rs. one lac on the Individual member and a minimum penalty of Rs.10 lacs on the firm, and
b) debar the member or the firm from professional practice for a minimum period of six months or for such higher period up to 10 years.
viii) Any member or firm aggrieved by the above order of the NFRA can file appeal before the Appellate Authority constituted u/s.22A the
Acts governing the three Institutes.
ix) The detailed provisions are made in section 132 for day-to-day administration of the NFRA, its accounts, audit, etc.
6. Report of the Board of Directors
Section 134 provides that the Board of Directors of a company shall adopt the financial statements for each financial year and get the auditors report on the accounts. The Board has to prepare its report to the members every year and submit to the members at the Annual General Meeting along with the financial statements and audit report. The report of the Board should contain the information as required under the existing Act as well as some additional items as under.
i) Statement of declaration given by Independent Directors u/s.149(6).
ii) In the case of a listed company or any other company as specified by the Rules as provided in section 178(1), the company’s policy on director’s appointment and remuneration, criteria for determining qualifications, positive attributes, independence of directors, etc.
iii) Particulars of loans, guarantees or investments in subsidiaries as provided in section 186.
iv) Particulars of contracts or arrangements with related parties as stated in section 188.
v) A statement indicating development and implementation of risk management policy for the company which in the opinion of the Board may threaten the existence of the company.
vi) Details about policy developed and implementation of corporate social responsibility policy.
vii) In the case of listed and other specified companies a statement indicating formal annual evaluation made by the Board about its performance and of its committees and Independent Directors.
viii) Such other matters as provided in the Rules notified by the Government.
6.2 The Board has to send the financial state-ments with Audit Report, Directors report, etc. to each member before the Annual General Meeting. The Meeting should be held within six months of close of financial year i.e., before 30th September every year. These provisions are more or less on the same lines as existing provisions. These statements and reports have to be filed with the Registrar of Companies in the same manner as at present.
This is a new provision. At present, the Internal Audit can be conducted by the company’s staff. Now section 138 provides that such class or classes of companies as may be prescribed, the Board of Directors will have to appoint a Chartered Accountant, Cost Accountant or other professional for carrying out Internal Audit. For this purpose, the Government is authorised to make Rules as to how this audit should be conducted.
8.1 This is a new provision made in section 135. This section applies to every company having net worth of Rs.500 crore or more or turnover of Rs.1000 crore or more or a net profit of Rs.5 crore or more during any financial year. The Board of such a company has to constitute a corporate social responsibility committee consisting of 3 or more directors of which one should be an Independent Director. The Board Report to the members should disclose the details of composition of this committee.
i) To formulate and recommend to the Board a Corporate Responsibility Policy giving details of activities in the fields listed in Schedule VII.
ii) To recommend about the expenditure to be incurred for these activities.
iii) To supervise the implementation of this policy.
8.3 The Board has to consider the recommendations of this committee and formulate the policy for such expenditure every year. The Board should make all efforts to spend at least 2% of the average profits of the preceding 3 years for this purpose. If the Board is not able to spend this amount it will have to give reasons for not spending the same.
8.4 The type of activities for which the company has to spend for its social responsibilities, as listed in Schedule VII, are as under:
i) Eradicating extreme hunger and poverty.
ii) Promotion of education, gender equity, empowerment of women, reducing child mortality and improving maternal health.
iii) Combating HIV, AIDS, malaria and other diseases.
iv) Ensuring environment sustainability.
v) Enhancing vocational skills and social business projects.
vi) Contribution to P.M. National Relief Fund or any other fund set up by Central or State Governments for social development and relief work, welfare of SC, ST and backward classes, minorities and women.
9. Audit of accounts of companies
Sections 139 to 148 deal with provisions for audit of accounts of companies and auditors. Every company is required to get its accounts audited for each financial year from a Chartered Accountant or a Firm of Chartered Accountants. For this purpose, ‘Firm’ will include a Limited Liability Partnership (LLP) engaged in the profession as Chartered Accountants. U/s.139, the first auditor can be appointed by the Board of Directors. At present, auditors are appointed by the members at the Annual General Meeting every year. Now, at the annual general meeting the members have to appoint auditors for a term of 5 years. Thereafter, on expiry of every 5 years, the members have to appoint auditors for a further term of 5 years. It is also provided in section 139 that the members will have to follow the procedure for selecting the auditors as per the Rules which will be notified by the Government. The company has to file the notice of appointment of auditors within 15 days with the Registrar of Companies.
10.1 In the case of listed companies and such class or classes of companies as may be prescribed a new provision is made in section 139(2) for rotation of auditors. This provision is as under:
i) An Individual auditor shall not be appointed for more than 5 consecutive years.
ii) A firm of auditors shall not be appointed for more than 10 consecutive years.
iii) The auditors who have completed the above term, cannot be reappointed as auditors of that company for a period of 5 years. This restriction for reappointment shall apply to the audit firm which is to be appointed after completion of the above term to any audit firm in which one or more partners are partners in the firm which has completed its term as stated above.
iv) In respect an existing company to which this provision applies it is provided that such company shall comply with the above provision within 3 years from the date of commencement of the Companies Act, 2011.
v) Members of the company can resolve that the firm of auditors appointed by them shall rotate the audit partner and his team every year or the members may decide to appoint two or more audit firms as auditors of the company.
vi) The Government may frame rules about the manner in which the companies shall rotate the auditors.
10.2 As regards Government companies the procedure for appointment and removal of auditors by C & AG is the same as existing at present. The provisions relating to appointment of another auditor in the case of casual vacancy in the office of auditor due to resignation, death, etc. are more or less the same as existing at present.
11.1 The auditor of a company once appointed can be removed before expiry of his term by passing a special resolution after obtaining previous approval of the Government as provided in the rules. If the auditor submits his resignation before the expiry of his term of office, he has to file within 30 days a statement in the prescribed form about the reasons and other facts relevant to whis resignation with the company and the ROC. If this statement is not filed by the auditor he can be penalised by levy of minimum fine of Rs.50,000 which may extend up to maximum of Rs.5 lac.
11.2 On the expiry of the term of the appointment of the auditor, the retiring auditor is to be appointed if he is eligible for this purpose. If the members desire to appoint another person as auditor in his place, special notice from a member is required for this purpose. The procedure to be followed by the company is similar to the existing provisions for appointment of another auditor in place of retiring auditor.
12. Penal provisions
Section 140(5) gives very wide powers to the Tribunal to take action against the auditor or the audit firm. It is provided in this section that if the Tribunal is satisfied on its own, or on an application by the Government or any person that the auditor of a company has acted in a fraudulent manner or assisted in any fraud by the company, its directors or officers, it can order the company to change the auditor. Further, if the Government makes an application to the Tribunal, and it is satisfied, the Tribunal can pass an order within 15 days that the auditor of the company shall not function as auditor and the Government shall, thereafter, appoint another auditor in place of the auditor so removed. It is also provided that if any final order is passed by the Tribunal against the auditor u/s.140, such auditor will not be eligible for appointment as auditor of any company for 5 years. Further, section 447 provides that if found to be guilty of fraud he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a minimum period of six months which may extend up to 10 years. If the fraud involves public interest, the minimum period of imprisonment shall be 3 years. Apart from this punishment, such auditor shall also be liable to pay minimum fine equal to the amount of the fraud which may extend up to three times of the fraud amount.
13. Qualifications of auditors
13.1 Section 141 provides that only Chartered Accountants can be appointed as auditors of a company. A firm of Chartered Accountants or LLP engaged in the practice as Chartered Accountants can also be appointed as auditors.
13.2 It is, however, provided that the following persons cannot be appointed as auditors of a company:
i) A Body Corporate other than LLP.
ii) An officer or an employee of the company or a person who is a partner or who is in employment of the officer or employee of the company.
iii) A person (including his relative or his partner) who (a) holds any security or interest in the company, its subsidiary, its holding or its associate company, etc. It may be noted that if such security or interest is less than Rs.1,000 or such sum as may be prescribed by rules, this provision will not apply. (b) is indebted to or who has given guarantee for any debt in relation to the company, its subsidiary, its holding company or its associate company of such amount as may be prescribed.
iv) A person or a firm has business relationship with the company, its subsidiary, its holding or its associate company directly or indirectly.
v) A person who is relative of a director or is in the employment of the company as a director or key managerial personnel.
vi) A person who is convicted by any Court of an offence involving fraud, and a period of 10 years has not elapsed from the date of such conviction.
vii) Any person, firm or its associate is engaged on the date of appointment in consulting and specified services as provided in section
144.
13.3 A person who is an employee of any other organisation cannot be appointed as auditor of a company. Further, the auditor should not be auditor of more than the specified number of companies as provided by the rules to be framed by the Government.
14. Remuneration of auditors and other functions
The remuneration of the auditors of a company shall be fixed in its General Meeting or shall be determined in such a manner as may be decided by General Meeting. As regards powers and duties of the auditors and the reporting requirements, the provisions are contained in section 143 which are more or less similar to section 227 of the existing Act. It is also provided that every auditor shall comply with the auditing standards as notified by the Government. The Government is also given authority to pass an order specifying the matters on which the auditors have to report. Such order can be passed in consultation with the NFRA appointed u/s.132. If the auditor of a company finds that an offence involving fraud has been committed against the company by officers or employees of the company he has to report to the Government within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed by rules. The above provisions apply even to a Cost Accountant in practice relating to cost audit of a company u/s.148 as well as to the Company Secretary in practice conducting secretarial audit u/s.204.
15. Consultancy services
15.1 Section 144 is a new section in which it is provided that the auditors of a company can render such other services as are approved by the Board of Directors or the Audit Committee. It is, however, provided that such services shall not include:
i. Accounting and book-keeping services.
ii. Internal audit.
iii. Design and implementation of any financial information system.
iv. Actuarial services.
v. Investment advisory, investment banking or any other financial services.
vi. Management services.
vii. Any other services as may be prescribed by rules.
15.2 It is clarified in this section that the above services cannot be rendered to the company either directly or indirectly by the auditors of the company. In the case of an individual auditor or an audit firm, such services cannot be rendered by any relative or any other partners or by any of the associate concerns in which the auditors have significant influence or control or whose name or trade mark or brand is used by the auditor or audit firm or any of the partners of the audit firm.
16. Punishment for contravention
If the auditors of a company contravene the provisions of sections 143 to 145, the auditors shall be punishable with a minimum fine of Rs.25,000 which may extend up to Rs.5 lac. It is further provided that if the auditor has contravened these provisions with the intention to deceive the company or its shareholders or creditors or other persons interested in the company, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend up to one year or with a minimum fine of Rs.1 lac which may extend up to Rs.25 lac. Further, the auditor is also liable to refund the remuneration received by him and pay for damages to the company or other person for loss arising out of incorrect or misleading statement made in the audit report.
17. Some suggestions
17.1 The above provisions relating to accounts and audit contained in the Companies Bill, 2011, will have far-reaching impact on the companies and auditors. It appears that these provisions are being made with a view to curb the present-day tendency on the part of some companies to manipulate accounts with a view to benefit those in management or with a view to reduce tax. Some of these provisions are harsh and they are likely to affect the development of the profession of Chartered Accountants.
17.2 At present, the National Advisory Committee of Accounting Standards (NACAS) is working satisfactorily. There is no need to replace this body by appointment of NFRA. Further, the provisions of sections 132 and 133 giving wide powers to this authority to regulate the auditing profession cut at the very root of autonomy conferred on ICAI which is set up by an Act of the Parliament. It is, therefore, suggested that the existing advisory body viz. NACAS should not be replaced by NFRA.
17.3 Further, ICAI is the only competent authority to issue auditing standards for members of C.A. profession. Therefore, provisions in section 143(10) giving power to the Government to notify the auditing standards will curtail the autonomy given to ICAI under the C.A. Act.
17.4 Section 139(2) provides for maximum limit of 10 years for an audit firm to continue as auditors of any listed or large specified companies. Thereafter, there is a cooling period of 5 years. When this provision is made there is no need of again providing in section 139(4) that the Government can notify the rules for rotation of auditors in cases of such companies.
17.5 The provisions of section 140 for removal of auditors and punishment of erring auditors as discussed in para 11 and 12 above are very harsh and apply to auditors of all companies. It is suggested that these provisions should be restricted to only auditors of listed and large specified companies.
17.6 Similarly, provisions of section 147 providing for punishment and fine as discussed in para 16 above also apply to auditors of all companies. These provisions should be made applicable to only auditors of listed and large specified companies.
17.7 The provisions of section 144 prohibiting auditors from rendering certain consultancy services apply to all companies. This will hamper the development of C.A. profession. It is, therefore, suggested that section 144 should be made applicable to listed and large specified companies only.
17.8 If the present Companies Bill is passed in its present form it will curtail the autonomy of ICAI in relation to issue of auditing standards and disciplinary matters. Further, considering the additional responsibilities being thrust on the auditors it appears that small and medium-size audit firms will find it difficult to continue in audit practice. This will affect the development and progress of auditing profession in India.
Whoever fights monsters should see to it that in the process he does not become a monster.
— Friedrich Nietzsche
Rights Issue by Unlisted Company can Become a Public Issue – Kerala High Court
The issue is important since it is becoming common that unlisted companies issue shares on rights basis. It is also a fact that renouncing rights shares is a statutory right unless taken away by articles, that one can renounce only in favour of another shareholder.
The Kerala High Court has held recently in SEBI vs. Kunnamkulam Paper Mills Ltd. (dated 20th December 2012, WA No. 2203 of 2009, In WPC 19192/2003, Unreported) that a rights issue to more than 50 shareholders would become a public issue if such a right could be renounced in favour of non-shareholders. Accordingly, SEBI required that the whole of the proceeds raised through such rights issue be refunded, with interest, or else the company would face penalty and prosecution.
At the outset, it may be emphasised that this decision would effectively apply only to those unlisted public companies who have more than 50 shareholders and who make a rights issue carrying such right of renunciation. By definition, private companies do not have more than 50 shareholders (the marginal cases of private companies having exactly 50 shareholders or having employee shareholders are not discussed here). Thus, any public company that has more than 50 shareholders would be affected by this decision.
The background of introducing safeguards in case of issue of shares can be easily appreciated. There is a concern that unlisted companies try to raise monies from public without following procedures that are in investors’ interest and are provided in detail under SEBI Regulations/Guidelines and the Companies Act, 1956. To prevent this, certain issues of shares made are deemed to be public issues under Section 67 of the Companies Act, 1956 (“the Act”).
Section 67 (reading its sub-sections and provisos together) provides that any offer/invitation to the public, whether selected as members of the Company or otherwise, would amount to a public offering. However, if the offer is limited to existing shareholders, then it will not amount to a public offer, unless such offer to begin with is to 50 or more persons.
In the present case, the petitioner Company had made a rights issue to its 296 shareholders. The offer document relating to the rights issue permitted renunciation of such rights to non-members. Pursuant to such rights issue, 1,73,995 equity shares were allotted to 163 persons including non-members. The question was whether issue to shareholders – whose number was admittedly more than 50 – carrying the right of renunciation amounted to a public issue. SEBI held that it was indeed a public issue and ordered the company to refund the monies raised with interest. On appeal before the High Court, a Single Judge held that SEBI had no jurisdiction since the company was an unlisted company. SEBI appealed and a two-member bench reversed the decision of the Single Judge.
The Court examined the relevant provisions of the Act, the SEBI DIP Guidelines (as they then were before the SEBI (ICDR) Regulations were notified in 2009), analysed several precedents including decisions of the Supreme Court and held that the issue was indeed a public issue.
The Court observed:-
“No doubt that section 67(3) clearly indicates that such offer or invitation shall not be applicable under certain circumstances as provided u/s/s. 3(a) and (b). But the first proviso to sub-section (3) clearly indicates that the deeming provision u/s. 67(1) and (2) applies in respect of subscription of shares or debentures made to 50 or more persons. That being the situation when a company exercises its power u/s. 81(1)(c) which gives right to a shareholder to renounce right shares in favour of persons who are not shareholders and when such right is given to 50 or more persons that also will be deemed to be an offer made to any section of the public as provided u/s. 67(1) and (2).”. It may be added that the Court also held that such a rights issue would also amount to a public issue for the purposes of the SEBI Guidelines/SEBI Act and thereby SEBI has jurisdiction. This aspect, however, has not been discussed here in detail in view of space constraint. Further, another point of note is that the Court held that SEBI Act, being a special Act, overrides the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956.
The dilemma for public companies having more than 50 shareholders or more can be imagined. On one hand, Section 81(1)(c) provides for a right, unless the articles provide to the contrary to renounce in case of a rights issue. On other hand, such an issue would become a public issue with serious adverse consequences. It needs to be noted that the Court did not hold a final view on the merits of the case but set aside the decision of the Single Judge setting aside SEBI’s order. This was because the remedy for the petition are company against SEBI’s order was appeal to the Securities Appellate Tribunal (“SAT”). Accordingly, the Court asked the petitioner company to appeal to SAT, if it still felt aggrieved.
A few incidental observations:
Letter No. 8/81/56-PR dated 4th November, 1957 issued by the Department of Company Law Administration prescribes that issue of further shares by a company to its members with the right to renounce in favour of third parties does not require registration of prospectus. It would be a matter of consideration whether this clarification would apply to a case particularly where the issue is to more than 50 persons. In any case, the Court’s decision, is quite clear on the issue.
Readers may recollect that in the Sahara companies matter too, an issue had arisen as to where an offer of shares is to more than 50 persons whether it becomes a public offer and the Supreme Court had extensively analysed the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956, and SEBI Act/Regulations. The Supreme Court dwelt on matters such as the power and jurisdiction of SEBI, when an issue of securities becomes a public issue. The facts in that case were of course, very glaring where a very large number of persons were issued securities. A reference can be made to earlier articles in this column though this decision of the Kerala High Court stands on its own. Particularly since it deals with a peculiar situation of rights issue by a public company with right of renunciation.
It is worth considering also what the Companies Bill, 2012, as passed by Lok Sabha provides. The provisions proposed in the Bill seem ambiguous and contradictory in this context. The scheme of the Bill for issue of shares seems to broadly categorize issue of shares into three, namely,
1. a public issue, or
2. as a rights issue or
3. “private placement”.
The provisions clearly state that rights issue need to allow for, as the existing Section 81 also provides, right of renunciation, unless the articles provide to the contrary. Rigorous restrictions have been placed in case of a private placement of shares including prohibition of offer to more than 50 persons in a year. However, in the changed scheme, wordings similar to the existing Section 67 in the Companies Act, 1956, are not there. The way the term private placement is defined and placed alongside a public issue and a rights issue seems to suggest that a rights issue may not be deemed to be a private placement. At the same time, it has been stated that any offer to allot shares to more than 50 persons shall be deemed to be a public offer. Thus, it is not wholly clear whether the intention is to permit issue of rights shares carrying right of renunciation to more than 50 members without deeming such issue to be a public issue. One will have to wait till the law is passed and examine the exact wordings, to understand whether the new law will apply or not to such rights issue.
In conclusion, it may be said that SEBI and the law makers are generally grappling with the issue of companies raising funds from the public without following the statutory safeguards of disclosures, promoters’ contribution, etc. Members of the public may unsuspectingly fall prey to fly by night operators or otherwise do not have the various benefits of listing. if they acquire shares which do not follow the required provisions of law relating to public issue. One has also to concede that in case of a rights issue with a right to renounce in favour of non-members — persons who are not familiar with the company — may end up buying shares of companies promoted by unscrupulous persons. Hence, while companies may find the provision restrictive, it makes sense to restrict the right of renunciation only in favour of existing shareholders or as an alternative, follow SEBI regulations.
In either case, public unlisted companies seeking to issue ‘rights shares’ will have to keep in mind the decision of the Kerala High Court. It would also be interesting to watch what the Companies Bill 2012 finally provides.
Stop Press: – Just as this article was going for print, this author received a copy of unreported decision of Supreme Court in appeal to the Kerala High Court decision discussed above. The Supreme Court has, vide its decision dated 21st February 2013, stayed this judgment of the Kerala High Court. An update will be provided in this column on the final decision of the Supreme Court.
PART A: Judgment of H.C. of Bombay
When some citizens sought certain information from Shikshan Prasarak Mandali Trust (SPM), it responded by taking the stand that SPM is not falling within the definition of Public Authority. The contention of SPM was:
“The argument is that the Trust is not a public authority within the meaning of Section 2(h) of the RTI Act. An Educational Institution, managed and administered by the Trust receives the grants and assistance from the Government. It is at best that Institution which can be said to falling within the definition of the term ‘public authority’ but certainly this will not take within its import or fold the public charitable trust which merely manages and administers the Educational Institution. A public charitable trust pure simple cannot be said to be a public authority under the RTI Act. It cannot be said to be an Authority or body owned or controlled by the State Government.”
The Contention of Maharashtra Information Commission was:
“The term “public authority” as defined in the RTI Act, would make it clear that first part of it clarifies that all statutory bodies and authorities would be covered and the latter part of it includes bodies owned, controlled or substantially financed by the government. Now, when non-Governmental organisations, substantially financed directly or indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate government are brought within the ambit and purview of the RTI Act, then, all the more a conclusion is inescapable that the petitioner trust’s plea could not have been entertained. It is reading the Act as if it applies to an activity or function of a public trust but it will not apply to that public trust even if that activity or function is being performed under its auspices or control. If every single Educational Institution is established, managed, administered and controlled by the public trust or societies or bodies of the present nature, then, a defence will always be raised to resist the application of the Act by urging that the Act will apply to its activity or function and not to it. This will defeat and frustrate the Act. It would run counter to the Legislative intent in making all such bodies, organisations, including non-Governmental ones, accountable and answerable to the public. For all these reasons, it was submitted that the petition be dismissed.
Public authorities should realise that in an era of transparency, previous practices of unwarranted secrecy have no longer a place. Accountability and prevention of corruption is possible only through transparency. Attaining transparency no doubt would involve additional work with reference to maintaining records and furnishing information. Parliament has enacted the RTI Act providing access to information, after great debate and deliberations by the Civil Society and the Parliament. In its wisdom, the Parliament has chosen to exempt only certain categories of information from disclosure and certain organisations from the applicability of the Act.”
The HC quoted some paras from the judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Institute of Chartered Accountants vs. Shaunak H. Satya reported in A.I.R. 2011 S.C. 3336, [ RTIR IV (2011) 82 (SC)] In that context and dealing with some of the provisions of the Act, it was held as under:
“The information to which RTI Act applies falls into two categories, namely
(i) information which promotes transparency and accountability in the working of every public authority, disclosure of which helps in containing or discouraging corruption. Enumerated in clauses (b) and (c) of Section 4(1) of RTI Act. and
(ii) other information held by public authorities not falling u/s. 4(1)(b) and (c) of then RTI Act. In regard to information falling under the first category, the public authorities owe a duty to disseminate the information wide suo motu to the public so as to make it easily accessible to the public. In regard to information enumerated or required to be enumerated u/s. 4(1)(b) and (c) of RTI Act, necessarily and naturally, the competent authorities under the RTI Act, will have to act in a proactive manner so as to ensure accountability and ensure that the fight against corruption goes on relentlessly. But with regard to other information which does not fall u/s. 4(1)(b) and (c) of the Act, there is a need to proceed with circumspection as it is necessary to find out whether they are exempted from disclosure.
One of the objects of democracy is to bring about transparency of information to contain corruption and bring about accountability. But achieving this object does not mean that other equally important public interests including efficient functioning of the Government and public authorities, optimum use of limited fiscal resources, preservation of confidentiality of sensitive information, etc. are to be ignored or sacrificed. The object of RTI act is to harmonise the conflicting public interest, that is, ensuring transparency to bring in accountability and containing corruption on the one hand, and at the same time ensure that the revelation of information, in actual practice, does not harm or adversely affect other public interests which includes efficient functioning of the Governments, optimum use of limited fiscal resources and preservation of confidentiality of sensitive information, on the other hand. While Sections 3 and 4 seek to achieve the first objective, Sections 8, 9 10 and 11 seek to 0achieve the second objective. Therefore, when Section 8 exempts certain information from being disclosed, it should not be considered to be a fetter on the right to information, but as an equally important provision protecting other public interests essential for the fulfillment and preservation of democratic ideals. Therefore, in dealing with information not falling u/s. 4(1)(b) and (c), the competent authorities under the RTI Act will not read the exemptions in Section 8 in a restrictive manner but in a practical manner, so that the other public interests are preserved and the RTI Act attains a fine balance between its goal of attaining transparency of information and safeguarding the other public interests.” “Among the ten categories of information which are exempted from disclosure u/s. 8 of the RTI Act, six categories which are described in clauses (a), (b), (c), (f), ( g) and (h) carry absolute exemption. Information enumerated in clauses (d), (e) and (j) on the other hand get only conditional exemption for a specific period, with an obligation to make the said information public after such period. The information referred to in clause (i) relates to an exemption for a specific period, with an obligation to make the said information public after such period. The information relating to intellectual property and the information available to persons in their fiduciary relationship referred to in clauses (d) and (e) of Section 8(1) do not enjoy absolute exemption. Though exempted, if the competent authority under the Act is satisfied that larger public interest warrants disclosure of such information, such information will have to be disclosed. It is needless to say that the competent authority will have to record reasons for holding that exempted information should be disclosed in larger public interest.”
H.C. then gave meaning to certain words/ terms covered in Section 2(h), e.g. ‘established’, ‘constituted’, ‘owned’, ‘controlled’ or ‘substantially financed by funds provided directly or indirectly.’
The word “established” means “to bring into existence” whereas the word “constituted” does not necessarily mean “created” or “set up” though it may mean that also. The word is used in a wider significance and would include both the idea of creating or establishing and giving a legal form to the body (see A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 868 M/s. R.C. Mitter and Sons vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal). It includes in the later part “any body owned, controlled or substantially financed” and equally a non-Governmental organisation, sub-stantially financed directly or indirectly by funds provided by appropriate government. Thus, any body owned, controlled or substantially financed is being brought within the net and purview of the definition so as to clearly set out its duty and obligation to provide information and thereafter, make it possible for the citizens to enforce it. It is very clear that the Legislature did not exhaust itself but included bodies owned, controlled or sub-stantially financed, directly or indirectly by funds provided by appropriate Government. Therefore, to urge that there is no control over the public charitable trust by the appropriate government or if at all there is any control or the element of public dealings come in, that is only in relation to Educational Institutions which are run, administered and managed by the Trust is nothing but an attempt to escape from being covered by the Act and complying with its mandate. A definition as inserted and worded in Section 2(h) of the RTI Act can safely be termed as partly exhaustive and partly inclusive. The choice of words as noted above would mean enlarging the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the statute.
HC further noted:
“A citizen is not expected to indulge in futile litigation and endless chase in overcoming technical hurdles and obstacles for seeking information. Public authorities are not obliging him by giving him information because the rule of the day is transparency, accountability in public dealing and public affairs and in relation to public funds. In cases of present nature, the information can be sought by approaching both the educational institutions and the parent entity controlling them or either. However, the duty and obligation to provide information as long as the right to seek it is enforceable by the RTI Act must be discharged by the Public Authority. In this case, it is the petitioner Trust.”
For the reasons aforestated, this petition fails, Rule is discharged without any costs. The finding and conclusion that the RTI Act is applicable to the petitioners and they are obliged to provide information in relation to its educational institutions is confirmed.
[Shikshan Prasarak Mandali vs. Maharashtra SIC & ors. Writ petition decided on 18.10.2012] [Citation: RTIR I (2013) 234 (Bombay)]
Copyright – The Need for Registration?
The Copyright Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) deals with the law relating to copyright and the works in which copyright subsists, the rights of a copyright owner, the remedies of a copyright owner in case of infringement, registration of copyright etc. Now, whilst in the case of trade mark law and the law relating to patents, the respective statutes are explicitly clear that infringement can only be of a registered trade mark and of a patent granted under the Patents Act, 1970 respectively2, the Act does not so clarify in express terms. This aspect of registration of copyright and whether or not the same is mandatory in order to avail the benefits of copyright and the remedies provided under the Act has been the subject matter of several judgments, some of which will be discussed in this article. This question has now come to the fore in the light of a recent judgment3 of the Bombay High Court, which has held that registration of copyright is necessary to avail of the remedies provided under the Act.
Hence, in order to address this question, I would like to draw attention to the broad scheme of the Act and the relevant provisions thereof, followed by some judgments on the issue and thereafter, my thoughts on the law as prevailing currently and on the said recent judgment of the Bombay High Court.
Statutory provisions
The Act was enacted to amend and consolidate the law relating to copyright. The Act comprises of 79 sections spread subjectwise over 15 Chapters. For the purposes of addressing the query at hand, it would be necessary to consider the provisions of Chapter III, Chapter X and Chapter XI of the Act. Chapter III of the Act deals with works in which copyright subsists and nature of rights therein. In this regard, reference may be had in particular to section 13 of the Act which provides for, inter alia, works in which works copyright subsists as also in which works copyright does not subsist. Section 14 provides that copyright means the exclusive rights stated therein whilst section 16 provides, inter alia, that no person shall be entitled to copyright or any similar right in any work otherwise than and in accordance with the Act.
The subject of registration of copyright is dealt with in Chapter X of the Act. Section 44 provides that there shall be kept at the Copyright Office a register to be called the Register of Copyrights in which may be entered the names or titles of works and such other particulars as may be prescribed. Section 48 provides that the Register of Copyrights shall be prima facie evidence of the particulars entered therein. Section 50A provides that every entry made in the Register of Copyrights shall be published.
It may also be relevant to note that Chapter XI deals with infringement of copyright and section 51 provides, inter alia, that doing of any act by any person, the exclusive right to do which is conferred by the Act upon the owner, without the licence of the owner would be an infringement of copyright. Copyright is also infringed by allowing for profit any place to be utilised for communication of a work (which is infringing) to the public. Copyright is also infringed when a person offers for sale etc. an infringing copy of the work.
Thus, on a plain reading of the statute, it would be evident that u/s. 13 of the Act, copyright subsists in certain works. Section 13 of the Act makes no qualification as to the need for registration for a copyright to subsist. Similarly, section 51 of the Act does not talk of infringement of a registered copyright but only lays down that if any person without licence does any of the acts which only the owner of the copyright is granted the exclusive right to do, then such person would infringe the copyright.
At this juncture, it may also be relevant to point out that under the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, to which India is a signatory, a provision is made that enjoyment and the exercise of the rights recognised therein shall not be subject to any formality4. This clause was one of the foremost reasons why the United States which has traditionally required registration of copyright did not become a signatory to the said Berne Convention for a very long time. It may be noted that even today, several countries continue to have certain formalities imposed within their legal framework but in such a manner so as to avoid falling foul of their treaty obligations.
Case law
In the light of the aforesaid statutory background, attention is invited to two contradictory judgments of the Bombay High Court on this issue. Both judgments have been passed by bench comprising of a single judge.
The first judgment is in the case of Asian Paints vs. Jaikishan Paints and Allied Products reported in 2002 (4) MhLJ 536 wherein His Lordship the Honourable Mr. Justice Vazifdar has inter alia, held as under,
“Registration under the Copyright Act is optional and not compulsory. Registration is not necessary to claim a copyright. Registration under the Copyright Act merely raises a prima-facie presumption in respect of the particulars entered in the Register of Copyright. The presumption is however not conclusive. Copyright subsists as soon as the work is created and given a material form even if it is not registered (See Buroughs (I) Ltd. vs. Uni Soni Ltd. 1997 (3) Mh.L.J. 914). Thus even if the plaintiffs work was not registered, the plaintiff having established that it had created the same prior to the defendant, mere registration by the defendant of its work cannot defeat the plaintiff’s claim.”
En suite, attention is invited to a recent judgment of His Lordship the Honourable Mr. Justice A. B. Chaudhary in the case of Dhiraj Dharamdas Dewani vs. M/s Sonal Info Systems Pvt. Ltd. reported in 2012 (3) MhLJ 888, wherein it has, inter alia, been held as under,
“Perusal of section 51 clearly shows that it shall be deemed that there shall be infringement of the copyright when any person does anything, the exclusive right to do is conferred upon the owner of the copyright by the Copyright Act or any person makes sale of copies of such work by infringement of the copyright in the said work. It is thus clear from the reading of section 51 that infringement shall be deemed when exclusive right to do of the owner of the copyright is utilized by some other person viz. the infringer. Now unless such person (the infringer) knows that there is any particular owner of the copyright in India or that such owner of copyright has registered his work u/s. 44 of the Act before he did, attributing infringement by him or on his part intentionally or unintentionally, would be preposterous. Such a person who is infringing the copyright in a work must be deemed to have knowledge about the owner of the copyright and such knowledge cannot be attributed unless the provisions of Chapter 10 regarding registration of copyright, publication thereof etc. are complied with. Otherwise a person who is innocent can in that event be easily brought in the net of infringement under civil law or criminally, which can never be the intention of the legislature. Thus, reading of section 51 which defines infringement of right conferred by this Act, with section 45(1) and the word ‘may’ therein to my mind means; if owner of a copyright wants to invoke the provisions of this Act for enforcing civil and criminal nature of remedies before the special forum, namely the District Judge rather than a normal civil Court, he must have the registration….
25. Thus careful survey of the above provisions of the Copyright Act, 1957 to my mind clearly denotes that in the absence of registration u/s. 44 of the Copyright Act by the owner of the copyright it would be impossible to enforce the remedies under the provisions of the Copyright Act against the infringer for any infringement u/s. 51 of the Copyright Act. Thus, I answer point No. 1 in the affirmative.”
Thus, as on date, there are two contradictory views of co-ordinate benches of the Bombay High Court. It must, however, be appreciated that the second judgment has been passed in ignorance of the first in as much as Justice Chaudhary records in his judgment that there does not appear to be a Bombay judgment on the issue and hence, he is required to answer the same. Had the earlier judgment been brought to his notice, he would have been bound by the earlier judgment and even then if he had disagreed with the view, the right course would have been to refer the judgment to a larger bench of the High Court5.
It would also be relevant to note that since the earlier judgment in the case of Asian Paints6 was not brought to the notice of the later Bench, it could be urged that the judgment in Dhiraj Dewani’s7 case is per incuriam and hence, not a binding precedent. The Supreme Court has explained that “Incuria” literally means “carelessness” and that in practice per incuriam is taken to mean per ignoratium8.
Concluding remarks
Even though the Bombay High Court has recently held that registration of copyright is compulsory, it may be appreciated that the High Courts of Delhi9, Calcutta10, Madras11, Kerala12, Allahabad13 and Madhya Pradesh14 have respectively held that registration of copyright is not compulsory or mandatory. The Orissa High Court15 appears to be the only other Court which has taken the view that registration of copyright is compulsory.
Thus, it would be evident that the question of compulsory registration of copyright appears to be a vexed issue on which different High Courts seem to have taken different views over the years.
Without addressing the views already taken by the various High Courts, I would like to address the aspect of whether or not there ought to be a need for registration of copyright generally. It may be appreciated that copyright (taking the view of majority High Courts) is a form of intellectual property that subsists from the moment it is created and requires no registration or formal notice. This is different from the procedure either under trade mark law or law relating to patents or law relating to geographical indications etc. all of which require registration in order to enable their owner to claim statutory remedies.
The idea behind registration is the aspect of notice. Registration tends to amount to notice to the world at large, since if something is noted in a register, it would be possible for people to inspect the same and learn of the different rights being claimed by people. However, with respect to copyright law such a system appears to be optional (taking the view of majority High Courts). Thus, as has been high-lighted in the recent judgment in Dhiraj Dewani’s16 case, there could be instances where the alleged infringer may not even be aware of the rights of a person claiming copyright in his work.
A possible answer to this issue lies in the fact that, at a very basic level, copyright law seeks to prevent copying. The Act grants certain exclusive rights to an owner with respect to his work for example in case of a literary work, the owner has the exclusive right to reproduce the work, issue copies, perform the work etc. Hence, in order for infringement to be established, it would be necessary to show that the work being complained of is a colourable imitation or substantial reproduction of the original work. On the other hand, if there has been no copying even if there be similarities, there cannot be an infringement17. Thus, a person who seeks to copy a work must make due enquiry before doing so. Of course, even in such a situation where a person is bona fide interested in copying a work and is even willing to take a licence, if required, in the absence of the details being entered in an official register, it may not be possible for him to know whether the copyright protection for the work has expired or the details of the owner whom he may wish to approach for a licence etc.
This aspect of details of a work being unknown is even more acute in today’s modern era of cyberspace. Articles and other materials are regularly sourced over the internet but often these articles are not identified as to which is their country of origin or whether they are the subject matter of copyright or who is the owner thereof etc. Hence, in such cases even if a person were willing to bona fide approach a copyright owner for a licence, there could be no means for ascertaining the details of the owner. Some of the works available online may also have expired their term of copyright, but in the absence of a database such as a Register where all such details can be verified, it is almost impossible for people to even bona fide use such works. This results in the non-dissemination or non-communication of works, on account of lack of relevant material, which is against the public good.
Copyright law whilst protecting authors and owners must also recognise the rights of the general public to access such work and hence, must make provisions whereby adequate knowledge of the status of works and their owners is available to the general public, to enable them to access the work and/or obtain appropriate licences as may be necessary.
Hence, it may be necessary considering the advances in technology and the vast materials now available, to consider some amendment to the legal system to ensure the maintenance of proper details with regard to copyrighted works. In this regard, my suggestion would be a hybrid of the present system where under copyright subsists as soon as the work is created, but that the same must be compulsorily registered thereafter so as to provide adequate notice to all concerned.
2 Section 27 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and section 48 of the Patents Act, 1970
3 Dhiraj Dharamdas Dewani vs. M/s Sonal Info Systems Pvt. Ltd. 2012 (3) MhLJ 888
4 Article 5 of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
5 Uttar Pradesh Gram Panchayat Adhikari Sangh vs. Daya Ram Saroj 2007 (2) SCC 138 “Judicial discipline is self discipline. It is an inbuilt mechanism in the system itself. Judicial discipline demands that when the decision of a co-ordinate Bench of the same High Court is brought to the notice of the Bench, it is respected and is binding, subject of course, to the right to take a different view or to doubt the correctness of the decision and the permissible course then often is to refer the question or the case to a larger Bench. This is the minimum discipline and decorum to be maintained by judicial fraternity.”
6 Asian Paints vs. Jaikishan Paints and Allied Products 2002 (4) MhLj 536
7 Dhiraj Dharamdas Dewani vs. M/s. Sonal Info Systems Pvt. Ltd. 2012 (3) MhLJ 888
8 Mayuram Srinivasan vs. C.B.I. 2006 (5) SCC 752
9 Rajesh Masrani vs. Tahiliani Design Pvt. Ltd. AIR 2009 Del 44
10 Satsang & Anr. vs. Kiron Mukhopadhyay AIR 1972 Cal 533
11 Manojah Cine Productions vs. A. Sundaresan AIR 1976 Mad 22
12 R. Madhavan vs. S.K. Nayar AIR 1988 Ker 39
13 Nav Sahitya Prakash vs. Anand Kumar AIR 1981 All 200
14 K. C. Bokadia vs. Dinesh Dubey 1999 (1) M.P. L.J. 33
15 Brundaban Sahu vs. Rajendra Subudhi AIR 1986 Ori 210
16 Dhiraj Dharamdas Dewani vs. M/s Sonal Info Systems Pvt. Ltd. 2012 (3) MhLJ 888
17 Feist Publications, Inc. vs.Rural Telephone Service Company (1991) 499 U.S. 340 wherein the United States Supreme Court, inter alia, held that “To establish infringement, two elements must be proven (1) ownership of valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.”
PART A: Decisions of CIC
Not satisfied with the response of the PIO and FAA, before the Central Information Commission, the appellant in support of his argument referred to the Supreme Court decision dated 4-7-2011, in W/P (Civil) 176 of 2009, Ram Jethmalani vs. Union of India, and submitted that exemption u/s. 8(1)(a) and (f) as claimed by the CPIO was not tenable. He also made a reference to CIC decision (appeal OK/C/2008/00897 dated 15-7-2011) supporting his argument. The CPIO submitted that the government has filed a modification petition which is pending in the Supreme Court.
The public authority brought to the notice of the Commission a para of the judgement dt 4.7.2011 of Honourable Supreme Court in W.P (Civil) 176 of 2009, Ram Jethmalani & Ors vs. Union of India which reads as follows:
“That the special investigation, constituted pursuant to the orders of today by this court, shall take over the matter of investigation of the individuals whose names have been disclosed by Germany as having accounts in Banks in Liechtenstein and expeditiously conduct the same. The Special Investigation Team shall review the concluded matters also in this regard to assess whether investigations have been thoroughly and properly conducted or not, and on coming to the conclusion that there is a need for further investigation shall proceed further in the matter. After conclusion of such investigation by Special Investigation Team, the respondents may disclose the names with regard to whom show cause notices have been issued and proceedings initiated.”
The public authority has also submitted that the Union of India has moved application for seeking recall and/or modification of orders dated 4-7-2011.
The Commission decided that since the information sought by the appellant was sub-judice, the appeal be dismissed.
[Paras Nath Singh vs. CBDT, New Delhi: CIC/ DS/A/2011/003377 & 003607/RM: Decision dated 12-11-2012]
Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act
The appellant had sought certain information from the CPIO including names of assessees/cases in which scrutiny is complete. The CPIO held that Trusts/assessees are public authority and their activities are of public nature and hence information about them should be in the public domain. Accordingly, the number of cases in which scrutiny was completed, was provided. However, names of such assessees were withheld citing that no public interest will be served. The Commission held that disclosure of names of assesssees whose returns have been scrutinised, would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy of the assessee, if this information is placed in the public domain and hence it is exempted from disclosure u/s. 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act. [Rakesh Kumar Gupta vs. Asst. Director of IT (Exemptions), Trust Circle-II & Addl. Director of IT (Exemptions), Range-1, Delhi: CIC/DS/A/2011/ 003072/RM decided on 6-11-2012]
Section 6(1) of the RTI Act
The issue was whether the applicant can extend the scope of his RTI application at the Appellate stage.
Vide RTI application dated 6-9-2010, the appellant had sought comments of the public authority to a complaint which had been filed by him earlier on 11-5-2010 regarding alleged misuse of government vehicles by Smt. C. Chandrakanta, the then Joint Commissioner, Income Tax Range-IV, Jalandhar and other unlawful activities.
Before the CIC, the applicant submitted that he had sought to know whether any enquiry was conducted regarding leaving of the headquarters by Smt. C. Chandrakanta without prior permission from a competent authority. The CPIO had responded that no enquiry was conducted. The AA in his order stated that the appellant had not sought any reasons for not initiating any action in his RTI. As such the order of the CPIO was justified. The appellant insisted that the public authority should provide him the reasons. In support of his submission he quoted CIC order dated 11-9-2008 – Smt. Sarla Rastogi vs. ESIC.
In hearing before CIC, the appellant submitted that in response to his query as to whether any enquiry was conducted in regards to the leaving of headquarters by Smt. Chandrakanta, the CPIO responded that no enquiry was conducted. The appellant submitted that reasons for the same should be provided and referred to section 4(1)(d) of the RTI Act as also CIC decision in the case of Smt. Sarla Rastogi vs. ESIC (Appeal No. CIC/MA/A/2008/01106 dated 11-9-2008). The AA had upheld the decision of the CPIO on the grounds that in his RTI, the appellant has not sought reasons.
Decision:
The Commission observed that the CPIO had replied to the specific queries raised in the RTI by the appellant. With the said reply, the query of RTI application is satisfied. There is no provision to raise subsequent questions as an extension of the RTI query, as sought by the appellant in his first appeal. Hence, the Commission does not find any merit in the appeal. The case is disposed of. [R.K. Mahajan vs Income Tax Department, Jalandhar: CIC/DA/A/2011/0001476/RM: decision dated 7-6-2012]
RTI (Regulation of Fee and Cost) Rules, 2005
The Commission decided that it was in agreement with submissions of the appellant that the application fee sent by him in favour of Accounts Officer, DGIT, New Delhi, should not have been returned and the CPIO was not correct, in asking the appellant to redeposit the application fee in favour of ZAO, CBDT, New Delhi. Rule 3 of the Right to Information (Regulation of Fee and Cost) Rules, 2005 stipulates that the amount is payable to the Accounts Officer of the public authority.
Decision:
The Commission directs the public authority to ensure that in the future, the application fee sent in the name of Accounts Officer is not returned. DoPT orders issued on 5-12-2008 (OM No. F.10/9/2008-IR) shall be brought to the notice of all concerned officials handling RTI matters. Insofar as the RTI request is concerned, the Commission sees no reason to interfere with the order of the CPIO/AA.
[Nitesh Kumar Tripathi vs DGIT (Vigilance), New Delhi: CIC/DS/A/2011/002840/RM: decision dated 21-9-2012]
Transmission Formalities (Part I)
An unexpected demise of a close relative comes as a bolt from the blue for the family and while they are yet mourning, they have to grapple with several succession formalities, such as, death certificates, execution of wills, transmission formalities, etc.
Ironic as it may sound, it is this certainty of death which throws up several uncertainties for the heirs which a deceased may leave behind. Quite often, the family, in its period of grief, overlooks some formalities which snowball into major problems subsequently. Let us look at some of the important formalities which the family of a deceased are faced with and some practical suggestions to deal with them.
‘Transmission’, ‘Succession’ and ‘Inheritance’ are three terms which one often comes across when dealing with the property of a deceased. It would be gainful to understand the meaning of these three terms:
Succession – Black’s Law Dictionary defines the term to mean the devolution of title to property under the law of descent and distribution. Inheritance – succession by descent – East v. Twyford, 9 Hare, 729
Transmission – Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary defines the term as transmission by operation of law, unconnected with any direct act of the party to whom the property is transmitted.
Doctor’s Certificate
The first formality which the deceased’s family needs to immediately comply with when a person dies, is to obtain a Doctor’s Death Certificate. This is the most important document which sets in motion a chain of events. Hence, it always helps to have a family physician. There have been cases where there is no family doctor and when a person dies at home, no doctor is willing to give the certificate.
The Doctor’s Certificate is required in Form 4A under Rule 7 of the Maharashtra Registration of Births and Death Rules, 2000, framed under the Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969. The Forms are issued by the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai. It is very important that the Doctor mentions the name of the deceased correctly just as it appears in all legal documents. If the deceased used aliases, it may be worthwhile to add them also in the Certificate. Get multiple copies of this document since the original would have to be surrendered to the Municipality.
Police Report
Consider a situation where a person is pronounced dead on admission to a hospital or has died at home, but is unsuccessfully taken for resuscitation efforts to the hospital. The hospital would like to rule out foul play in such cases and also the need for a post-mortem.
Hence, in addition to a Doctor’s Death Certificate, the hospital would also require the family to lodge a Police Report. The local Police Station would take down the close relative’s statement in Marathi which would include, the number of members living with the deceased, their ages, occupation and whether or not the family suspects any foul play. The Police Station would also fill up two Forms, Form 4 and Form 5, and obtain the relative’s signature on the Report. The family would be well advised to understand the contents of the Report before signing the same. The Report would be retained by the Police Station.
If the Police suspect a foul play, then they would insist upon a post-mortem before allowing cremation. The hospital would also not hand over the body of the deceased, without this Police NOC or a post-mortem. One age-old issue which often crops up is that of Police jurisdiction. Which Police Station should the family go to? Should it be the one where the deceased resided or the one where the hospital was situated?
Death Certificate from Municipality
A cremation (assuming a Hindu deceased) would be allowed only on the basis of a Doctor’s Death Certificate. The original of the Doctor’s Death Certificate and Police Form 4 along with a copy of Police Form 5 should be handed over to the office of the crematorium where the cremation of the deceased is to take place. The office would hand over a receipt in lieu of all these documents which should be carefully preserved. These documents are transmitted by the crematorium to the local Municipality office. As always, get copies made of this document.
BMC’s Death Certificate
An application for a Death Certificate should be made to the office of the local ward of the Municipality in which the deceased resided. Normally, this application is to be made about a week after the death. Along with the application, a copy of the crematorium’s receipt should also be submitted. Care should be taken to fill in the details of the deceased as they appear in all legal documents.
The family can obtain as many copies of the Death Registry Certificate as they desire. It would be desirable to make copies of this Certificate and to get them Notarised by a Notary Public, since this is the most important document which would be required at several places.
Nomination
If the deceased has made Nominations in respect of his flat, bank account, Public Provident Fund, Insurance Policies, Demat Accounts, Mutual Funds, etc., then the nominee should intimate the fact of death along with a copy of the Death Certificate to these organisations. The assets would then stand in the name of the Nominee. It may be noted that the nominee is only a stop-gap arrangement till such time as the Will is executed or the assets are distributed in accordance with the Succession Law in case of intestate succession.
However, in the case of physical shares and demat accounts, the Nominee is both the legal and the beneficial owner and overrides what is stated in the Will. This is borne out by section 109A of the Companies Act, 1956 as well as the Bombay High Court’s decision in the case of Harsha Nitin Kokate v. The Saraswat Co-op. Bank Ltd, 112 (5) Bom. L.R. 2014. Clause 72 of the New Companies Bill, 2011 also carries forth this position. Hence, a person making his Will should ensure that the Nominee of his demat account is the same person who is the beneficiary of the same under the Will.
Will
Assuming that there is a valid Will left behind by the deceased, the same should then be placed before the family of the deceased by the Executor of the Will. The Executor should start taking steps for transmission of the properties of the deceased. Again, it would be desirable to make copies of this Will and to get them Notarised by a Notary Public, since the Will would be required at several places.
Transmission of Flat where there is no Nomination
On the death of a person, his flat in a co-operative society can be transferred by the Society to his nominee, if a nomination was made, or to his Legal Heir. Section 30 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 provides that in the event of the death of a member of a Society, the Society is required to transfer the member’s interest to the nominee or to such person as may appear to the Committee to be the heir or legal representative of the deceased member.
The Act does not define the term “heir”. The Supreme Court in the case of N. Krishnammal v. R. Ekambaram, 1979 AIR SC 1298, has defined the term as follows:
“…The word “heirs”, as pointed out by this Court in Angurbala Mullick v. Debabrata Mullick (1) cannot normally be limited to “issues” only. It must mean all persons who are entitled to the property of another under the law of inheritance.”
The Act also does not define who is a “Legal Representative”. Hence, one may refer to the Civil Procedure Code. Section 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 that defines a “Legal Representative” as follows:
“(11) ” legal representative ” means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person, and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued;”
The decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Om Siddharaj Co-Op. Hsg. Society Ltd v. The State of Maharashtra, 1998 (4) Bom. CR 506 is relevant:
“…On a plain reading of section 30, it is clear that on death of a member of the society, it is incumbent on the society to transfer the share or interest of the deceased member to” a person or persons nominated in accordance with the Rules”. It is only in the event of there being no nomination of any person, the society can transfer the share or interest of the deceased member to “such person as may appear to the committee to be the heir or legal representative” of the deceased member. The language of the section is clear and unambiguous. …..It is only if there is no nomination in favour of any person, that the share and interest of the deceased member has to be transferred to such person as may appear to the committee of the society to be the heir or legal representative of the deceased member.”
Hence, a co-operative society would be well within its rights to transfer the flat to the legal heirs of the deceased, if there is no nomination. The Society may, for its protection, insist upon a No Objection Certificate from the other legal heirs/representatives (if there are others than the transferee) and an Indemnity Bond from the transferee.
Transmission of Tenanted Property
A common misconception which most people have is that tenancy can be transferred or bequeathed by way of a will. Tenancy is a personal right of the tenant and hence, it cannot be transferred by way of any testamentary document. This principle has also been upheld by the Supreme Court in the case of Vasant Pratap Pandit vs Dr. Anant Trimbak Sabnis, 1994 SCC (3) 481. Tenancy passes on a tenant’s death to any member of his family who was residing with him at the time of his death. In the absence of such a member, it passes to any heir of the tenant. The Supreme Court in the above case has held that from a plain reading of the Rent Act, it is obvious that the legislative prescription is first to give protection to the members of the family of the tenant residing with him at the time of his death. The basis for such prescription seems to be that, when a tenant is in occupation of the premises, the tenancy is taken by him not only for his own benefit, but also for the benefit of the members of the family residing with him. Therefore, when the tenant dies, protection should be extended to the members of the family who were participants in the benefit of the tenancy and for whose needs as well the tenancy was originally taken by the tenant. It is for this avowed object, that the Legislature has, irrespective of the fact whether such members are ‘heirs’ in the strict sense of the term or not, given them the first priority to be treated as tenants. It is only when such members of the family are not there, the ‘heirs’ will be entitled to be treated as tenants as decided, in default of agreement, by the court. In other words, all the heirs are liable to be excluded, if any other member of the family was staying with the tenant at the time of his death.
Transmission of Land
In respect of any land belonging to the deceased, a Probate of the Will would be required, in case the deceased was a Christian or a Hindu, Sikh, Jain or Buddhist whose immovable properties are situated within the territory of West Bengal or the Presidency Towns of Madras and Bombay. A Probate would be required for effecting a change in the Record of Rights, 7/12 Extract, Property Card, etc.
Agricultural Lands of Deceased
U/s. 63 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, any transfer, i.e., sale, gift, exchange, lease, mortgage with possession of agricultural land in favour of any non-agriculturist shall not be valid, unless it is in accordance with the provisions of the Act. An important exception to the provisions of section 63 is the case of succession to agricultural land by a non-agriculturist. Thus, even if the legal heirs of an agriculturist are non-agriculturists or the legatees under his will are non-agriculturists, the succession/bequest in their favour would be valid. In law, succession to property cannot lie in a vacuum and the Act would not override succession laws. The Act has no application to transmission of interest of holder on his death to his successor by any mode of succession of lands held by tenants.– Ghanshyambhai Nakheram v State of Gujarat, (1999) 2 Guj LR 1061.
If any person acquires any right by virtue of succession, survivorship, inheritance, etc., in any land, then, as per the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966, he must give a notice of the same to the Talathi within 3 months of such event. The Talathi would then enter such changes in a Register of Mutations which would alter the original record of rights.
U/s. 4 of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961, the ceiling on the holding of agricultural lands is per “Family Unit”. This is a very unique and important concept introduced by this Act. It is very essential to have a clear picture as to who is and who is not included in one’s ceiling computation, since that could make all the difference between holding and acquisition of the land. A family unit is defined to mean a person and his spouse or more than one spouse if that be the case – thus, if a person dies leaving two or more widows, then they would constitute one consolidated family unit for considering the ceiling – State of Maharashtra v. Smt. Banabai And Anr. (1986) 4 SCC 281. His minor children are also included in the definition of a family unit.
A very interesting scenario arises in the case of testate/intestate succession. For instance, there is a person who is holding land up to the maximum limit permissible. His major son is also independently holding another piece of land up to the maximum limit permissible. The father dies and his sole legal heir is his son. On his death, the land becomes that of the son. Can the son contend that since he has received the land by inheritance, the ceiling should not apply to the second land received by him? The Supreme Court had an occasion to consider this issue in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Annapurnabai and others, AIR 1985 SC 1403. The facts were that the declarant died pending determination of excess ceiling area. A contention was raised that consequently on his death the proceedings stand abated and that therefore, the authorities have no jurisdiction to proceed further with the determination of the excess land under the Act. The Supreme Court held that until the proceedings are completed, there is no abatement and the excess ceiling land has to be computed pursuant to the declaration under the provisions of the Land Ceiling Act and that therefore, the
Government continues to have jurisdiction to determine the excess land. It held that the heirs and legal representatives of a deceased holder cannot be treated as independent tenure holders for fixing ceiling. Therefore, each heir would not be treated as independent tenure holders for fixing the ceiling in respect of agricultural land.
Similarly, the Supreme Court in Bhikoba Shankar Dhumal v. Mohan Lal Punchand Tathed 1982 SCR (3) 218 held that the persons on whom his ‘holding’ devolves on his death would be liable to surrender the surplus land as on the appointed day, because the liability attached to the holding of the deceased would not come to an end on his death. The heirs of the deceased cannot be permitted to contend to the contrary and allowed to get more land by way of inheritance than what they would have got if the death of the person had taken place after the acquisition of surplus land by the Government.
Further, a person holding surplus land, i.e., land in excess of the ceiling area, cannot transfer the same. In Kewal Keshari Patil v State of Mah, 1966 Mah LJ 94 it was held that a Will is not a transfer. When the Will was executed, it is not a transaction which is contravening the ceiling under the Act.
Dwelling House
The Hindu Succession Act earlier made a special provision in respect of partition of dwelling-houses which has now been omitted with effect from 9th September, 2005. A dwelling house has been defined as a house wholly inhabitated by one or more members of the family of the deceased at the time of his death – Narsimaha Murthy v. Susheelabai (1996) 3 SCC 644. It has also been held to mean the home or abode or residence of a person – K Ratnsawamy, (1980) 2 SCC 548.
The Act originally provided that where a Hindu (male or female) died intestate leaving behind both male and female heirs specified in Class I, and his/her property included a dwelling-house wholly occupied by members of his/her family, then, any such female heir could not claim partition of the dwelling-house until the male heirs choose to do so. However, the female heir was entitled to have a right of residence in such house. If such female heir was a daughter, then she was entitled to a right to residence in the dwelling-house only if she was unmarried or had been deserted/separated from her husband, or was a widow. Thus, the section prevented female members from claiming partition of a dwelling-house till such time as the male members decided to do so.
In 2005, this section has been deleted altogether to remove the inequalities. Now, a daughter of the family will also inherit a dwelling house under the provisions of the Act and she can also ask for a partition of such dwelling house where the male members are residing. Thus, a married daughter has a right to ask for a partition of a house where her brother is residing on the death of their father. This is an important provision which should be borne in mind.
Transmission of Demat Account in case of Joint Holders
In several cases, it so happens that the names of the husband and wife are added as first and second holders in demat accounts. The Will of the husband also provides that after his demise, all his assets go to his wife. In such an event, transmission of the demat account from the first holder to the second holder is a relatively easy process.
An application needs to be made to the depository for simultaneous closure of the joint account and transfer of all the securities to a new sole account of the second holder, i.e., the wife. Thus, as a result, all the securities would stand transmitted to a new sole account belonging to the wife, who was the second holder in the husband’s joint account. This application only requires a copy of the Death Certificate and KYC details of the second holder.
(to be continued….)
I Hope the Tea is Hot
About fifteen years ago, we were in the midst of the aftermath of the Harshad Mehta scam. The times were in one respect very similar to, but in one respect very different, from the present. The media was screaming that the corrupt be punished severely and quickly, but there was no 24×7 news coverage, and outside the Government very few people had heard of the Central Vigilance Commission. Vigilance work could thus be carried on the way it was supposed to. Systems, when allowed to function, could still deliver. There is an important lesson in this story, for those who are looking for instant solutions to the problem of corruption.
I had joined the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) as its Additional Secretary just two months earlier. My room was flooded with voluminous files, and I returned home quite late in the evening every day. Even so, I woke up one fine December morning feeling very relaxed. The sun was shining brightly and the air was very crisp. It had rained the previous night, but when I opened my bedroom window overlooking Delhi Haat, a clear blue sky greeted me. I had got through all the pending files the night before; for a change, I had a little time to myself, and I decided to wear my new suit. When I reached my office at Bikaner house, near India Gate, all hopes of being complimented on how smart I was looking quickly vanished.
“The CVC wants you immediately, Sir. The meeting he was to take in the afternoon has been advanced. He wants HA as well. I have already informed him; he’ll be with you in a few minutes.” my secretary told me breathlessly.
“Thanks a lot, S— sahib.” I said. “Do I have time for quick cup of tea or not?” I asked.
“No Sir. K, his secretary, said you should see the CVC as soon as you arrive.
In a few minutes, my colleague HA entered my room. He was looking after the All India services and the Home Ministry. He asked me “Sir, did you get time to read the case?”
“Yes; I did. I’ve already recorded my note and sent it to the CVC.” “I’m sure you’re aware of the complexities involved.”HA told me as we were travelling from Bikaner House to Jaisalmer House, a distance of about a kilometre. “The man we’re dealing with is honest. Do you know Sir, he has topped in every examination that he has taken. He has all the right credentials and many important people, including some of the CVC’s batchmates have spoken to him. So do be careful.”
I thanked HA for this briefing, but before we could carry on the conversation any further, we reached our destination. In the anteroom, we were greeted by a stout middle aged man who gave the impression of being very competent and in total charge of his little office. The moment he saw us he spoke on the intercom and smiled.
“The CVC is expecting both of you,” he said.
The CVC was a short, spectacled, fair complexioned person. He looked detached, austere and gentle, but when warranted could be hard as nails. He was also decisive and quick and brooked no nonsense from his subordinates. Every word he spoke was carefully measured. He never promised anything easily, but if he did, he made sure he delivered. Despite an enormous workload, he always had time at his hands and complete control over the organisation that he headed with so much distinction.
He looked at both of us. “Good morning. Do come in and sit down. Hardayal, I have been through your note and gather that both of you are familiar with the facts.”
“Yes, Sir,” I replied.
“So what is the case that the State Vigilance Department has made out?” “They have argued that the officer caused an undue loss to the Government, and an undue gain to a trust in which the then Chief Minister had an interest. He sold a plot of land at a very low rate. The organisation he headed sold the adjacent plot at about the same time at a much higher rate. So, I guess a case under the Prevention of Corruption Act has been made out. The State Government is seeking permission to prosecute him.”
“Do you see anything going in his favour?” he asked looking as detached as ever. “HA has more knowledge than I do, Sir; but I do sympathise with him. To be very honest, I don’t think he had much choice. He had to choose between the devil and the deep blue sea”. I said. “Given the circumstances, very few people would have been able to say no. The present Government is prosecuting the Chief Minister separately. They feel that this person also played a part in furthering his criminal design.”
HA then pointed out, “But for this case, we have nothing against him. As an officer, he is rated highly and is reputed for his integrity.” I nodded my head in agreement. I knew the CVC had read the file thoroughly himself. He was making me speak, to test out how much I had learnt in the last two months and get some inputs which he needed. But he had such a pleasant way of doing things that I was totally at ease. Then came the inevitable question:
“What advice should we give.” “I am afraid we don’t have much choice in the matter. We have to act according to policy. If we don’t advise prosecution in this case, we’ll not be able to recommend it in other cases, where power is misused to cause a gain to a private person and loss to the government. It will also be unfair to others in whose case we have already advised prosecution on more or less similar facts.”As I said these words, I wondered whether I had spoken too much.
“What about the extenuating circumstances in this case?”
“Those will have to be taken into account by the court, if it convicts him. I gather this has always been our policy, Sir.” He gave me piercing look. “It’s easy for us to sit in judgement and use the benefit of hindsight to judge his conduct. Can you imagine what he must have gone through?” I nodded in agreement.
He went through certain portions of the file; he was only refreshing his memory to see if any vital aspect had been lost sight of. He looked up again and said, “But I totally agree with you. There can be no relaxation of policy. These are professional hazards of being a civil servant, but we have to act correctly. Hardayal, the file will come back to you within an hour, please advise the Ministry today itself to sanction prosecution at the earliest.”
Before I got up, I realised how difficult it must have been for him to come to this decision. He may not have spoken much, but I could see that he could empathise with the plight of the officer – his excellent track record must have reminded him of his own career. Whether he knew him at all, I’ll never know. One doesn’t ask these questions. What weighed with him, in the ultimate analysis, was an important principle which he had sworn to uphold: the Commission can’t decide cases on the basis of its likes and dislikes. It has at all times to be fair, objective and consistent in its approach.
When we stepped out of his office, we found the weather had changed. The sky was overcast and it had begun raining again. Since my staff car was going to take a few minutes, we got tempted into accepting K.’s offer for a quick cup of tea. I was in the midst of sipping it, when the CVC opened the door and gave a few instructions to K. I immediately got up in respect as he was talking. Seeing my unease, he smiled and said: “I am glad K. is looking after you. I hope the tea is hot.”
Postscript: the officer was prosecuted and later sentenced to a term in prison. He took bail and then appealed to the High Court. The latter reviewed the evidence on record and came to the conclusion that the adjacent plot of land which was sold at a much higher price was qualitatively different from the plot under consideration; in other words, it could not form the basis for valuing the latter. He was honourably acquitted. His subsequent career was quite uneventful. He retired from a respectable position and rose as much in his service as he would have, had the incident not occurred. In other words, he did in the end get some justice.
The beauty of this case lies in the fact that, at every stage every functionary who dealt with it performed his duty efficiently and quickly. Contrary to what happens often with disastrous consequences, due processes were not short-circuited. As a consequence, the system delivered. Here is a lesson for all those who want a quick fix solution for dealing with the problem of corruption: there is none.
A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 51, dated 23-11-2011 — External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) Policy.
This Circular revises the all-in-cost ceiling for ECB as follows
This change which has come into force with immediate effect will be applicable till 31-3-2012.
A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 50, dated 23-11-2011 — Comprehensive guidelines on over-the-counter (OTC) foreign exchange derivatives — Foreign currency — INR swaps.
This Circular removes this cap/limit of US $ 100 million on net supply of foreign exchange in the foreign currency — INR swap market.
Moneys of client to be kept in a separate bank account (Clause 10 of Part I of Second Schedule)
Arjun (A) – No. I am not that lucky. My last September’s bill will be received next September.
S – Then what is the secret of your smiling face today?
A – I just booked a foreign tour for my family in the coming vacation.
S – Great! But you go on vacation every year. What is special this year?
A – My son Abhimanyu is in the 10th SSC. Due to his classes and studies, we did not go anywhere for the last three years.
S – Where are you going?
A – Europe tour. But don’t tell Draupadi and Subhadra. I want to keep it as a secret.
S – But you said your clients don’t pay in time. You always crib about money, especially in March.
A – True. Fortunately, one of my clients went abroad for six months and he has kept a sizeable amount with me for his tax pay ments – Advance tax and self assessment.
S – Oh!
A – Another client has also given some amount to be invested in PPF next month. He is also touring for a long time.
S – Then what do you do with that money?
A – It came in handy to me for paying for the foreign trip. Sometimes, I also use it for my investments or share dealings.
S – Don’t you keep it separate?
A – Why? I will pay the tax or put in PPF at the appropriate time. I do it quite often.
S – But it is client’s money!
A – So what? He has entrusted it to me.
S – But there are restrictions. It is not permissible.
A – Why should there be any bar? If the client has no objection, where is the problem?
S – Dear Partha, please read clause 10 – Second Schedule – in Part I.
A – Whatever I do, you always find some fault with it. My friends are also doing the same thing as I do and they deal with huge sums.
S – See, dear. So long as it is going smoothly, there will not be any problem. But basically, it is not ethical. You are using client’s money for your personal things.
A – But what is the logic?
S – There were instances where the CAs never paid the taxes of the clients. They also did not make investments as directed by the clients.
A – Many times, clients pay us for making Government payments. Stamp duty, registration fees and so on. Can we not deposit that amount in our accounts?
S – See, if it is to be expended in a short time, you may keep it. But if it is a long time, then you need to open a separate bank account for clients’ money.
A – This is strange!
S – Yes. It has also happened that CAs were tempted to play with others’ money. Some times, they lost it in the share market or entered into wrong deals.
A – This is alarming. I know one such instance. Fortunately, he could recover with the help of his friends. Otherwise, he had a tough time.
S – That is the wisdom to be learnt. Your Council does not want it to happen to other members.
A – You mean to say, I should not deposit the clients’ money in my account at all? There are no exceptions?
S – Not necessarily. The Council has already thought of practical situations. For exam ple, if an advance fee is received, it need not be deposited in a separate account. It is your money.
A – Good! Sounds sensible.
S – If some payments are to be made on behalf of clients in a short time, then it can be routed through your normal account.
A – Can I put it in short term deposits?
S – Ideally speaking, No. You are not supposed to use that money for personal benefit. You cannot earn out of it.
A – What do you mean by short time?
S – Council has used the expression ‘reasonably short time’. That depends on facts and circumstances of each case.
A – I have heard that lawyers are also required to keep separate account for clients’ money. They receive huge amounts – for court fees, stamp duty and even as stake-holders – as escrow money.
S – Yes. Same principle applies here. Another thing, whatever you receive in your capacity as a trustee, executor or liquidator, you must put it in a separate account.
A – Oh! I need to be cautious now.
S – What is really objectionable is using it for personal benefit. CAs have gone to the extent of even depositing client’s income tax refund order in their account.
A – That is criminal. It is a fraud.
S – But apart from the fraud, he was held guilty under this clause only.
A – You have opened my eyes. I feel like can celling the tour tickets.
S – You need not go that far. But make sure that whatever obligation of your client you have undertaken, fulfill those, please don’t let him down. Faith and credibility are your greatest assets and you can’t afford to lose those. After all, you are a trustee.
A – I agree. Om Shanti! The above dialogue is with reference to Clause 10 of Part I of the Second Schedule which reads as under:
Clause 10: fails to keep moneys of his client other than fees or remuneration or money meant to be expended in a separate banking account or to use such moneys for purposes for which they are intended within a reasonable time. Further, readers may also refer pages 286 – 289 of ICAI’s publication on Code of Ethics, January 2009 edition (reprinted in May 2009).
Extension of Time Limit for Filing Cost Audit Reports and Compliance Reports for the year 2011-12
Extension of Time Limit for Filing Form 23AC/ACA XBRL
Relaxation of Additional Fees and Extension of the last date of filing various forms with the Registrar of Companies.
• The payment of Additional fees has been relaxed on Forms which ought to have been filed post the transition of MCA 21 from TCS to Infosys, but could not be filed due to technical issues in the system.
• Documents which have expired on or after 17th January 2013 due to non submission/resubmission PUCL may be restored.
• All the cases related to filing of court orders/ competent authority where the due date/date of filing was falling on or after 17th January is extended without payment of additional fees
• Name availability which expired due to nonsubmission of incorporation documents will be made available for filing of the same.
• For documents regarding registration of charges, the due date is to be extended by the Regional Director on case to case basis for due dates on or after 17-1-2013. Due dates in these cases is extended till 28-2-2013 based on request received by the RD/ROC and examined on case to case basis without levying of additional fee – the request should be made by the Company/Professional by e-mail/post along with the supporting documents. A ticket will be raised on examining the application and on being resolved, the user will be accordingly informed for filing within the time given in the e-mail. However, stakeholders who are able to file the documents by date of this circular are not eligible for fees relaxation or extension nor refund.
Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 – Import of precious and semi precious stones – Clarification
Opening of NRO accounts by individuals of Bangladesh Nationality.
This circular permits Nationals of Bangladesh who hold a valid visa and a valid residential permit issued by Foreigner Registration Office (FRO) / Foreigner Regional Registration Office (FRRO) concerned to open a NRO account without obtaining RBI permission. However, entities of Bangladeshi ownership will continue to require RBI permission for opening Bank accounts in India.
Foreign investment in India by SEBI registered FIIs in Government securities and corporate debt
Exchange Earner’s Foreign Currency (EEFC) Account, Diamond Dollar Account (DDA) & Resident Foreign Currency (RFC) Domestic Account
Presently, EEFC, RFC (Domestic) and Diamond Dollar account holders can access the foreign exchange market for purchasing foreign exchange only after utilizing fully the available balances in their foreign currency account. This circular has removed the said restriction. Hence, EEFC, RFC (Domestic) and Diamond Dollar account holders can now access the foreign exchange market for purchasing foreign exchange without fully utilizing the available balances in their foreign currency account.
SEBI Investment Advisers Regulations — Formal Birth of a New Profession
Presently, there are certain concerns in respect of persons providing services in investments. Often, they are not paid by the clients to whom they render services, but are paid by the entities whose products they deal in. Even if they are paid by clients, they may get commissions and other amounts from entities whose products they recommend or distribute. Thus, there is an inherent conflict of interest. Further, even otherwise, if an adviser is paid in other manner such as the quantity of stock in which the client has traded or similar criteria, he faces other types of conflict of interest such as making the client trade more, etc. By such conflicts which over a period the client also understands and realises, the concept and field of investment advice itself is brought to disrepute. Some of those engaged in investment advice have been known not to follow a wholly ethical and professional practice. The advice may be without doing due diligence of the client of his risks and objectives. The advice may even be malafide in the sense that the adviser may himself trade in the opposite direction, while advising the client to take a particular direction.
Thus, there was a need for creating such a separate category of advisers who are engaged almost exclusively in rendering such advice, who take fees from the clients and who make due disclosures about the fees he receives and the trades he himself carries out and so on. It appears that the intention was also to either prohibit the adviser from distributing products himself or making due disclosures of that, particularly of the fact of the consideration he receives if the client buys products that he advises. These Regulations are intended to carry out such objectives. However, the intention also seems to exclude several categories of persons who are otherwise regulated by other regulators such as IRDA, by other professional organisations or even by SEBI itself. Important features of these Regulations are explained as follows.
All Investment Advisers will be required to register with SEBI as a pre-condition to carry on the business of rendering investment advice. The term “investment advice” is broadly framed and includes advice on dealing in investment related products. The Investment Advisers will need to have certain basic relevant qualification and also obtain specialised training/certification. The process of registration is elaborate. They are subject to a detailed code of conduct. The requirements of documentation for clients and in particular the advice given are quite detailed. However, these requirements are perhaps impractical or infeasible particularly for small advisers, though they do set a high benchmark of standards of ethics and good business practices.
The Regulations are dated 21st January 2013 and will come into effect from the ninetieth day of their notification. An existing Investment Advisers is required to apply for registration within six months of their coming into effect and if he has done so may to carry on the activity continue till disposal of his application. New Investment Advisers will have to first apply and obtain registration before commencing such activity.
Investment Adviser is a person who is engaged in the business of rendering investment advice to clients or other persons for a consideration. Thus, persons giving free advice/tips are not covered. Having said that, the business need not be the main business (though see later exemptions for certain categories). Investment advice is broadly defined. It essentially means, advice relating to dealing in securities or investment products. It is not clear whether this would exclude products like gold, real estate, etc. since these are investment products too, though the scheme of the Regulations seem to indicate that they may not be intended to be covered. Even otherwise, it is arguable whether SEBI has jurisdiction over investments in gold, real estate, etc. But even then, a large variety of products would be covered, such as shares, derivatives, mutual fund and other units, shares of unlisted companies, company deposits (even bank deposits), insurance policies/products, small savings like national savings certificates, public provident fund, etc. Viewed even in this way, the impression would be that it would cover almost every agent/ broker dealing in financial products. However, since the requirement is that the Investment Adviser should be rendering advise for consideration, and if one takes a view that the consideration should flow from the clients, then many distributors who earn purely through commissions and the like may not get covered.
There are certain specific exclusions and thus the Regulations will not apply to such excluded persons. Insurance agents/brokers registered with IRDA, who offer investment advice solely in insurance products are excluded. So are pension advisers registered with PFRDA advising solely in pension products. Question is whether advisers who advise on multitude of products (subject, of course, to restrictions by the Regulator) would also need registration.
Distributors of mutual funds registered with specified bodies and registered stock-brokers/sub-brokers who render investment advice to their clients incidental to their primary activity are also excluded.
Professionals like Chartered Accountants, Company Secretaries, lawyers, etc. find a special mention. They too are excluded if they provide advice incidental to their professional service/legal practice. However, the wording is ambiguous. For example, Chartered Accountants are excluded if they provide “investment advice to their clients, incidental to his professional service”. There are Chartered Accountants who, for example, as part of their tax advice, also advice on investments. However, there are Chartered Accountants for whom rendering of financial advice is the main and not incidental professional service they render. It is not clear whether the intention is to exclude all practicing professionals or only those whose principle professional service is other than investment advice.
Thus, if giving such advice is not merely incidental to their professional activity, they too may require registration, irrespective of the fact that they may be regulated by their parent body. It is possible that some of such professionals may thus be covered. Entities such as individuals, firms, corporates, etc. are all covered. The Investment Adviser needs to have formal qualification. The recognised qualifications include professional qualification/post-graduate degree/diploma in finance, accountancy, etc. from recognised institutions, etc. Alternatively, the person may be a graduate in any discipline with at least five years’ experience in areas such as advice in financial products, securities, etc. Individuals and representatives of Investment Advisers need to have – in addition to such qualification it appears – a certification in financial planning from recognised institutions.
Corporate Investment Advisers need to have a minimum net worth of at least Rs. 25 lakh. Individuals and firms need to have net tangible assets of at least Rs. 1 lakh. Elaborate responsibilities and code of conduct have been provided. In particular, stress is given on not placing oneself in conflict of interest.
More important to highlight are the elaborate documentation requirements expected of Investment Advisers. Extensive disclosures relating to the Investment Advisers to the clients need to be made. Significant information has also to be collected of the client. A formal process has to be laid down to assess and analyse the client data from various perspectives including risk profiling. There has to be a documented process for selecting investments based on the client’s investment objectives and financial situation. Know Your Client records of the client’s need to be maintained by the Investment Advisers.
Curiously, the investment advice provided, written or oral, and even its rationale, has to be recorded. This innocuous and even well intended requirement can have serious practical and legal consequences. It is interesting that professionals like CAs, lawyers, etc. need not record or render every professional advice they offer in writing, but Investment Advisers are being required to so record. This may be impractical and cumbersome where clients are numerous and amounts of investments involved small, as they often are. Of course, in case of advising high net worth clients and the like, recording such advice makes sense. No specific requirement is made to take acknowledgement of the client of having received such advice and in such a case, the one-sided recording does not make sense.
The Investment Advisers are required to carry out a yearly audit of compliance of the Regulations by a Chartered Accountant or Company Secretary. Moreover, an Investment Adviser, other than an individual, is required to appoint a Compliance Officer for monitoring the compliance of the Act, Regulations, etc.
The scheme of the Regulations has a few puzzling as-pects. Whom do the Regulations really intend to cover and what types of activities? Is the intention to cover only those Investment Advisers who are not otherwise regulated by SEBI or other bodies? Is the intention not to cover mere distribution of investment products? Or is the intention to cover only those people who carry out investment advice business as their primary activity? The Regulations are not wholly clear and it is just possible that any person who carries out, wholly or partly, the business of giving investment advice would be covered. Thus, there will be multiple and even overlapping regulation.
However, in the other extreme, if the intention is to totally exclude persons already regulated by other bodies or totally exclude distributors of investment products, then the scope of the Regulations may be too narrow and the ills sought to be cured by Regulations will remain only partially touched.
There is yet another confusing area. Is the intention to cover only those Investment Advisers who are compensated by the clients and not by the issuer of the products? The Regulations seem to suggest that the Investment Advisers may receive consideration for advice from any source and not merely the client. In such a case too, intentionally or otherwise, the scope of the Regulations is broadened.
In any case, there are many types of investment products where there are thousands of small investment advisers/agents. These include, for example, agents of public provident funds, small savings, etc. It is arguable that though these too render “investment advice”, SEBI may not have jurisdiction over such products/advice. It will also be cumbersome and expensive for such agents to register themselves and difficult for them to maintain the type of records expected of them, apart from other compliances. SEBI could specifically clarify – since this seems to be the intention also – that unless they receive consideration directly from the client, the Regulations should not apply.
Another concern is of multi -service financial companies. It appears that the intention is to create chinese walls between product distribution department and investment advice department and only the latter would come under the purview of these Regulations. However, in practice, these chinese walls can be expected to be porous and this will thus make a mockery of the Regulations.
SEBI needs to relook at the Regulations to consider the difficulties highlighted above and have a dialogue with the industry and its participants, before bringing the Regulations into effect.
A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 25 dated 14th August, 2013
This circular states that it supersedes all earlier instructions is respect of import of gold by Authorised Dealers in Foreign Exchange/Nominated Agencies. The circular provides that: –
a) Import of gold in the form of coins and medallions is now prohibited.
b) All nominated banks/nominated agencies and other entities must ensure that at least 20% of every lot of gold imported into the country is exclusively made available for the purpose of exports and the balance for domestic use. A working example of the operations of the 20/80 scheme is annexed to this circular. The scheme shall be monitored by customs authorities, and will be implemented port-wise only.
c) Nominated banks/nominated agencies and other entities can make available gold for domestic use only to the entities engaged in jewellery business/ bullion dealers and to banks authorised to administer the Gold Deposit Scheme against full upfront payment only.
d) Nominated banks/agencies/refineries and other entities must ensure that there is no front loading of imports, particularly in the first and second lots of imports. Such imports have to be linked to normal quantities of gold supplied to the exporters by the nominated banks/agencies and must not exceed the highest quantity supplied during any one year out of last three years. The quantity thus arrived at, however, will not be imported in one or two lots only. As a thumb rule, imports of more than maximum of two months of requirements of the exporters in a lot would be considered unusual. In case there is no previous record of having supplied gold to the exporters then nominated banks/agencies must seek prior approval of the RBI before placing orders for import of gold for the first lot under the 20/80 scheme.
e) The 20/80 principle would also apply for the henceforth import of gold in any form/purity including gold dore, whereby 20 % of the gold imported will be provided to the exporters. This will be administered and monitored at the refinery level for each consignment at the time of such imports as well as by the customs authorities. The refinery can make available gold for domestic use only to the entities engaged in jewellery business/bullion dealers and to the banks authorised to administer the Gold Deposit Scheme against full upfront payment and sale of gold against any other form of payment shall not be permitted. Import of gold dore can be permitted only against a license issued by the DGFT.
f) Any authorisation such as Advance Authorisation/ Duty Free Import Authorisation (DFIA) can be utilised for import of gold meant for export purposes only and no diversion for domestic use is permitted.
However, entities/units in the SEZs and EOUs, Premier and Star Trading Houses are permitted to import gold exclusively for the purpose of exports only.
A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 24 dated 14th August, 2013
Liberalised Remittance Scheme for Resident Individuals- Reduction of limit from $200,000 to $75,000
This circular has made changes as under to the Liberalised Remittance Scheme (LRS):
1. The existing limit of $200,000 per financial year has been reduced to $75,000 per financial year (April-March).
2. Remittance can be made for any permitted current or capital account transaction or a combination of both. However, no remittance under LRS can be made for acquisition of immovable property, directly or indirectly, outside India.
3. With effect from 5th August, 2013 resident individuals (single or in association with another resident individual or with an ‘Indian Party’ as defined in this Notification) satisfying the criteria as per Schedule V of Notification No. 263/RB-2013 dated 5th March 2013, may make overseas direct investment in the equity shares and compulsorily convertible preference shares in any Joint Ventures (JV)/ Wholly Owned Subsidiaries (WOS) outside India for bona fide business activities outside India within the limit of $75,000.
4. The existing limit for gift in rupees by Resident Individuals to NRI close relatives and loans in rupees by resident individuals to NRI close relatives has been reduced to $75,000 per financial year.
Schedule V [See Regulation 20A]
A. Overseas Direct Investments by Resident Individuals
1. Resident individual is prohibited from making direct investment in a JV or WOS abroad which is engaged in the real estate business or banking business or in the business of financial services activity.
2. The JV or WOS abroad shall be engaged in bona fide business activity.
3. Resident individual is prohibited from making direct investment in a JV/WOS [set up or acquired abroad individually or in association with other resident individual and/or with an Indian party] located in the countries identified by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) as “non-co-operative countries and territories” as available on FATF website www.fatf-qafi.org or as notified by the Reserve Bank.
4. The resident individual shall not be on the Reserve Bank’s Exporters Caution List or List of defaulters to the banking system or under investigation by any investigation/enforcement agency or regulatory body.
5. At the time of investments, the permissible ceiling shall be within the overall ceiling prescribed for the resident individual under Liberalised Remittance Scheme as prescribed by the Reserve Bank from time to time. [Explanation: The investment made out of the balances held in EEFC/RFC account shall also be restricted to the limit prescribed under LRS.]
6. The JV or WOS, to be acquired/set up by a resident individual under this Schedule, shall be an operating entity only and no step-down subsidiary is allowed to be acquired or set up by the JV or WOS.
7. For the purpose of making investment under this Schedule, the valuation shall be as per Regulation 6(6)(a) of this Notification.
8. The financial commitment by a resident individual to/on behalf of the JV or WOS, other than the overseas direct investments as defined under Regulation 2(e) read with Regulation 20Aof this Notification, is prohibited.
B. Post Investment Changes
Any alteration in shareholding pattern of the JV or WOS may be reported to the designated AD within 30 days including reporting in the Annual Performance Report as required to be submitted in terms of Regulation 15 of this Notification.
C. Disinvestment by Resident Individuals
1. A resident individual, who has acquired/set up a JV or WOS under the provisions of this Schedule, may disinvest (partially or fully) by way of transfer/sale or by way of liquidation/ merger of the JV or WOS.
2. Disinvestment by a resident individual shall be allowed after one year from the date of making first remittance for setting up or acquiring the JV or WOS abroad.
3. The disinvestment proceeds shall be repatriated to India immediately and in any case not later than 60 days from the date of disinvestment and the same may be reported to the designated AD.
4. No write-off shall be allowed in case of disinvestments by the resident individuals.
D. Reporting Requirements
1. The resident individual, making overseas direct investments under the provisions of this Schedule, shall submit Part I of the Form ODI, duly completed, to the designated authorised dealer, within 30 days of making the remittance.
2. The investment, as made by a resident individual, shall be reported by the designated authorised dealer to the Reserve Bank in Form ODI Parts I and II within 30 days of making the remittance.
3. The obligations as required in terms of Regulation 15 of this Notification shall also apply to the resident individuals who have set up or acquired a JV or WOS under the provisions of this Schedule.
4. The disinvestment by the resident individual may be reported by the designated AD to the Reserve Bank in Form ODI Part IV within 30 days of receipt of disinvestment proceeds.
A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 23 dated 14th August, 2013
Presently, an Indian Party can invest under the Automatic Route up to 400% of its net worth as on the date of the last audited balance sheet in all its overseas Joint Ventures (JV)/Wholly Owned Subsidiaries (WOS) engaged in any bona fide business activity.
This circular has reduced the above limit of 400% of net worth to 100% of net worth in case of all fresh Overseas Direct Investment proposals under the Automatic Route. Also, in case of fresh investment in overseas unincorporated entities in the energy and natural resources sectors, the above limit of 400% of net worth has been reduced to 100% of net worth in case of all fresh Overseas Direct Investment proposals under the Automatic Route. ODI in excess of 100% of the net worth will be considered by RBI under the Approval Route. Existing JV/WOS set up under earlier regulations will continue to be governed by the same.
However, there is no change as regards investment overseas under the Automatic Route by Navratna Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs), ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL) and Oil India Ltd (OIL), in overseas unincorporated entities and the overseas incorporated entities in the oil sector (i.e., for exploration and drilling for oil and natural gas, etc.), which are duly approved by the Government of India. They can invest without any limit.
A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 20 dated 12th August, 2013
This circular states that applications for compounding must contain details of the bank account of the applicant in the format annexed to this circular to facilitate refund of compounding fees in case the application has to be returned because of nonobtaining of proper approvals or permission from the concerned authorities or for any other reason(s).
Also, annexed to this circular are the revised annexures for submission of information with regards to violation in respect of Foreign Direct Investment, External Commercial Borrowings, Overseas Direct Investment and Branch Office/Liaison Office. In the revised annexures details of PAN and the activity as per NIC codes-1987 have to be given. If the said information is not given, the application will be treated as incomplete. Also, information regarding change in the address/contact detail of the applicant has to be submitted to the Compounding Authority.
A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 19 dated 7th August, 2013
This circular states that RBI is shifting, from 1st October, 2013, the NRD-CSR reporting to eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) platform to provide validations for processing requirement in respect of existing NRD schemes, improve data quality, enhance the security-level in data submission, and enable banks to use various features of XBRL-based data submission, and tracking. The procedure and new formats are given in/annexed to this circular.
A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 18 dated 1st August, 2013
This circular clarifies that an FII can enter into a hedge contract for the exposure relating to that part of the securities held by it against which it has issued any PN/ODI only if it has a mandate from the PN/ODI holder for the purpose.
Banks are expected to verify such mandates. However, in cases where this is difficult they must obtain a declaration from the FII:
a. Regarding the nature/structure of the PN/ODI establishing the need for a hedge operation; and
b. Such operations are being undertaken against specific mandates obtained from their clients.
A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 17 dated 23rd July, 2013
Presently, banks are required to submit a quarterly statement on foreign currency exposures and hedges undertaken by corporates based on bank’s books.
This circular states that banks should now submit the said quarterly report as per the revised format online only from quarter ended September 2013 through the Extensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) system which may be accessed at https://secweb.rbi.org.in/orfsxbrl.
Tenancy – Determination of Annual ratable – Property exempt from Rent Control Legislation – Value – Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, section 154(1) and Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 section 3.
On a difference of opinion in a Division Bench, in an appeal arising out of the decision of a Single Judge, the following question of law was sent for reference to a third judge:
In view of the repeal of the Bombay Rent Act and enactment of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, is the Bombay Municipal Corporation justified in taking into consideration the actual amount of rent received or receivable by the landlord in relation to the units which are let out, but where the lease is exempted from the provisions of the Rent Act for determination of annual letting value with effect from 1st April 2000?
The issue which falls for determination relates to the consequences, if any, that would ensue in computing the ratable value of land or building where the premises in a building are exempt from the provisions of the Rent Control legislation. According to the Municipal Corporation, when the premises are exempt from the operation of the Rent Control legislation, the contractual bargain between a landlord and a tenant is not circumscribed by the provision for the fixation of standard rent in the Rent Act. Moreover, once the premises are exempt from the Rent Act, it is not unlawful for a landlord to receive rent in excess of the standard rent. On the other hand, according to the property owners, the true test to be applied is whether the Rent Control legislation is in operation in the area in which the premises are situated and if it is, it would make no difference that the premises are exempt from the operation of the Rent Control legislation. Hence, according to the property owners, even if the premises are exempt from the Rent Act, the annual value for the purposes of municipal legislation cannot exceed the standard rent under the Rent Control legislation.
The Hon’ble Court observed that where the premises are exempt from the operation of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999, by the provisions of section 3, the Assessing Authority in determining the annual rent at which the premises might reasonably be expected to let from year to year u/s. 154(1) is not constrained by the outer limit of the standard rent determinable with reference to the provisions of the Rent Act and secondly, where the premises are exempt from the provisions of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999, it is not unlawful for the landlord to claim or receive an amount in excess of the standard rent, since the provisions of section 10 would not be attracted. In such a case, the actual rent received by the landlord is in the absence of special circumstances a relevant consideration which may be borne in mind by the Assessing Authority while determining the rateable value for the purposes of municipal taxation u/s. 154(1) of the MMC Act, 1888. The Assessing Authority must have regard to all relevant facts and circumstances while applying the standard of reasonableness u/s. 154(1), including the prevalent rate of rents of lands and buildings in the vicinity of the property being assessed, the advantages and disadvantages relating to the premises, such as, the situation, the nature of the property, the obligations and liabilities attached thereto and other features, if any, which enhance or decrease their value.
Registration – Property – Refusal to Register document – None can transfer a better title than what he has – Indian Registration Act:
Writ petition was filed challenging the orders of the Registering Authority and the Appellate Authority refusing to register a conveyance executed by and between a private limited company which was the builder of the building and the co-operative housing society of flat purchasers which had been registered under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act. The order of refusal set out various provisions of various legislations which are claimed not to have been complied. The order further referred to section 72(3) of the Maharashtra Registration Manual, Part II which requires compliance with sections 19 to 26 and 33 to 35(b) of the Indian Registration Act. Under the impugned orders the Registering Authorities had consistently maintained that the vendor mentioned in the conveyance deed had no title.
The Registering Authority is required to register a document executed by the parties who present themselves before the Registering Authority and admit execution thereof.
Hence, it is seen that the document would have to be presented before the Registration office by the executors or their representatives. Once that is done, the Registering Authority would see that the executors are personally present before him or their representative is present before him. The Registering Authority will also ask whether they admit the execution. The Registering Authority will satisfy himself that the persons before him are the persons they claim to be. If that is done, the Registering Authority must register the document.
It may be mentioned that the registration of a document shows nothing other than the fact that the document which is executed is admitted to have been executed or is executed before the Registering Authority. It does not prove the contents of the document. It is settled law that even certified copies issued by the Registering Authority do not prove the truth of the contents of the documents. They only prove the fact that the document was indeed registered as per procedure. [See Omprakash Berlia vs. UTI, AIR 1983, Bom 1].
The Court observed that the Registering Authority persisted in refusing to register the document on the ground that the title of the vendor had not been shown. It is only the Civil Court which would consider the title. There is nothing in the Registration Act or the Registration Manual, to empower the Registrar to see or satisfy himself about the title of the vendor. Hence, registration entails nothing more than the factum that the executants or their agents attended before the Registrar and admitted the execution of the document.
It is contended on behalf of the respondents that there are many instances where the parties without any title seek to transfer such purported title which they do not have and legitimise the illegal act by the process of registration. That may be the ground reality. The Registering Authority, being conscious of such a fact, may consider himself obliged to prevent transfers by such illegal acts. However, the jurisprudential rule that none can transfer a better title than what he has, is indeed as elementary as it is basic. The Registering Authority, therefore, need not be take upon itself the duty of a Civil Court which alone would go into question of title upon it being challenged. The Registry Authority was directed to register the document within 4 months from the date of order.
Contract – Repayment of time barred debt – Enforceability of debtor liability Contract Act, 1872.
The reference to Division Bench was for deciding the two questions which were:-
(i) Does the issuance of a cheque in repayment of a time barred debt amount to a written promise to pay the said debt within the meaning of section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872?
(ii) If it amounts to such a promise, does such a promise, by itself, create any legally enforceable debt or other liability as contemplated by section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881?
If there is a promise to pay an amount and if a breach thereof is committed, a suit for recovery is required to be filed within the stipulated period of limitation provided under the law of Limitation. After the time provided for filing a suit for recovery expires, the promise ceases to be enforceable. Section 10 of the Contract Act provides that all agreements are contracts, if they are made by free consent of the parties competent to contract for a lawful consideration and with a lawful object and which are not expressly declared to be void under the Contract Act. Section 20 of the Contract Act incorporates a category of void agreements. Sections 19 and 19A provide for categories of agreements which are voidable. Section 23 provides that if the consideration or the object of an agreement is forbidden by law or is immoral or is opposed to public policy, the consideration or object of the agreement is unlawful and the agreement is void. Sections 26 to 30 of the Contract Act also provide for different categories of agreements which are void. Therefore, apart from the agreements which cease to be enforceable by reason of bar of limitation, there are other categories of agreements which are void and, therefore, obviously not enforceable by law.
On a plain reading of section 13 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, a negotiable instrument does contain a promise to pay the amount mentioned therein. The promise is given by the drawer. U/s. 6 of the said Act of 1881, a cheque is a bill of exchange drawn on a specified banker. The drawer of a cheque promises to the person in whose name the cheque is drawn or to whom the cheque is endorsed, that the cheque on its presentation, would yield the amount specified therein. Hence, it will have to be held that a cheque is a promise within the meaning of s/s. (3) of section 25 of the Contract Act. What follows is that when a cheque is drawn to pay wholly or in part, a debt which is not enforceable only by reason of bar of limitation, the cheque amounts to a promise governed by the s/s. (3) of section 25 of the Contract Act. Such promise which is an agreement becomes exception to the general rule that an agreement without consideration is void. Though on the date of making such promise by issuing a cheque, the debt which is promised to be paid may be already time barred, in view of s/s. (3) of section 25 of the Contract Act, the promise/agreement is valid and, therefore, the same is enforceable. The promise to pay a time barred debt becomes a valid contract. Therefore, the first question was answered in the affirmative.
The Court further observed that u/s. 118 of the said Act of 1881, there is a rebuttable presumption that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration. Section 139 creates a rebuttable presumption in favour of a holder of a cheque. The presumption is that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in section 138 for discharge, in whole or in part of any debt or liability. Thus, under the aforesaid two sections, there are rebuttable presumptions which extend to the existence of consideration and to the fact that the cheque was for the discharge of debt or liability.
Under the Explanation to section 138, the debt or other liability referred to in the main section has to be a legally enforceable debt or liability. Merely because a cheque is drawn for discharge, in whole or in part of the debt or other liability, section 138 of the said Act of 1881 will not be attracted. The provision will apply provided the debt or other liability is legally enforceable. Thus, section 138 will not apply to a cheque drawn in discharge of a debt or liability which is not legally enforceable. There may be several categories of debts or other liabilities which are not legally enforceable. A debt or liability is legally enforceable if the same can be lawfully recovered by adopting due process of law. A debt or liability ceases to be legally enforceable after expiry of the period of limitation provided in the law of Limitation for filing a suit for recovery of the amount. Thus, a time barred debt by no stretch of imagination can be said to be a legally enforceable debt within the meaning of the Explanation to section 138.
While considering the second question, the court specifically dealt with a case of promise created by a cheque issued for discharge of a time barred debt or liability. Once it is held that a cheque drawn for discharge of a time barred debt creates a promise which becomes an enforceable contract, it cannot be said that the cheque was drawn in discharge of debt or liability which was not legally enforceable. The promise in the form of a cheque drawn in discharge of a time barred debt or liability becomes enforceable by virtue of s/s. (3) of section 25 of the Contract Act. Thus, such a cheque becomes a cheque drawn in discharge of a legally enforceable debt as contemplated by the Explanation to section 138 of the said Act of 1881. Therefore, the second question was also answered in the affirmative.
Consumer complaint – Builder – Flat sold to other person – Builder to return the amount with interest @ 15% and pay cost: Consumer Protection Act.
Complainant was a flat purchaser and the complainant had booked a flat with the Opponent by agreement dated 20-4-2005. As per the said agreement, flat no.B-203 admeasuring 1100 sq.ft. super built up area on the second floor of the building Palm Towers Co-op. Hsg. Society was agreed to be sold to the Complainant. However, the said flat was sold by the Opponent after construction and possession of the said flat was not given. In respect of the said flat, the complainant had paid an amount of Rs. 19,80,000/-. However, since the flat was not delivered, there was subsequent MOU between the parties dated 5-9-2011. By the said MOU, earlier agreement was cancelled by the Opponent and the Opponent agreed to pay an amount of Rs. 30 lakh to the Complainant. The said amount was to be paid by three installments to be paid on 5-9-2011, 15-10-2011 and 25-12-2011. Out of this Rs. 30 lakh, an amount of Rs. 10 lakh was paid on 5-9-2011 and since the remaining amount had not been paid, the complaint was filed.
It was held that in view of the MOU executed between the parties, the Opponents was under obligation to return the amount as agreed. Since the amount had not been returned, the Opponents were also liable to pay interest on the said amount. Not only that, but since the flat had been sold to another person, naturally, he must have obtained price higher than the price which was agreed between the Complainant and the Opponent. The prayer in respect of allotment of the flat was not allowed in view of the fact that the Complainant had not pressed for the said prayer.
The complaint was allowed and the Opponent was directed to pay the balance amount of Rs.20 lakh with interest @ 15% p.a. from 25-12-2011 onwards till the actual realisation of the amount. By way of costs of the complaint, the Opponent was directed to pay Rs. 25,000/- to the Complainant.
Arbitration – Impleadments of party to arbitration proceeding in absence of arbitration agreement
The Plaintiff had filed the suit for a declaration that there is no arbitration agreement between the Plaintiff and Defendant No. 1
The Plaintiff had also taken out a notice of motion, praying for an order of restraint restraining Defendant No. 1 from proceeding with or prosecuting the arbitration proceeding initiated by it before the International Chamber of Commerce. Defendant No. 2 is a subsidiary of the plaintiff, had an independent existence and, as such, independent contracting capacity.
The Court observed that the present case was squarely covered by the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Indowind Energy Ltd. vs. Wescare (I) Ltd. AIR 2010 SC 1793 wherein the Apex Court in clear terms had held that to constitute an arbitration agreement, it is necessary that it should be between the parties to the dispute and should relate to or be applicable to the dispute. The Apex Court in unequivocal terms observed that, unless the party who is sought to be implicated in the arbitration proceeding is signatory to the agreement, it cannot be roped in the arbitration proceedings. In the present case, it could clearly be seen from the contract as well as the correspondence between the Defendant No.1 and the Defendant No.2, that the Plaintiff was not a contracting party or even a consenting party to the contract between the Defendant No.1 and the Defendant No.2. Not only that, but the entire correspondence with regard to the claim of the Defendant No.1 was only between the Defendant No.1 and the Defendant No.2. It was only for the first time that in the arbitration proceedings the Plaintiff had been implicated and as the words used by the Defendant No.1 itself in the claim “to drag in this arbitration”. Thus, there was no agreement at all between the Plaintiff and the Dr. K. Shivaram Ajay R. Singh Advocates Allied laws Defendant No.1 and therefore, the Plaintiff could not be roped in the arbitration proceedings.
A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 15 dated 22nd July, 2013
This circular has modified the policy for import of gold by nominated banks/agencies as under:
A. Nominated Banks/Agencies
1.
They have to ensure that at least 20% of every lot of import of gold
(in any form/purity including import of gold coins/dore) is exclusively
made available for the purpose of export. Such imports have to be linked
to the financing of exporters by the nominated agencies (i.e. average
of last three years or any one year whichever is higher). Further,
2.
They can make available gold in any form for domestic use only to
entities engaged in jewellery business/bullion dealers supplying gold to
jewellers.
3. They will be required to retain 20% of the imported quantity in the customs bonded warehouses.
4.
They are permitted to undertake fresh imports of gold only after the
exports have taken place to the extent of at least 75% of gold remaining
in the customs bonded warehouse.
5. Any import of gold under any type of scheme, shall follow the 20/80 principle set out at (1) and (3) above.
6. Any other instructions, as regards import of gold on consignment basis, LC restrictions etc. stand withdrawn.
Entities/units
in the SEZ and EOU, Premier and Star trading houses are permitted to
import gold exclusively for the purpose of exports only.
A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 49, dated 22-11-2011 — Foreign investments in Infrastructure Debt Funds.
| Eligible instruments/securities for non-resident investment in IDFs | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Eligible non-resident investor | Eligible instruments | |||
| (i) | SEBI-registered eligible non-resident investors | Foreign currency and Rupee denominated bonds and | ||
| in IDF — Sovereign Wealth Funds, Multilateral | rupee denominated units issued by IDF | |||
| Agencies, Pension Funds, Insurance Funds and | ||||
| Endowment Funds | ||||
| (ii) | SEBI-registered FII who qualify as (i) above | Foreign currency and Rupee denominated bonds and rupee denominated units issued by IDF | ||
| (iii) | SEBI-registered FII who do not qualify | as | (i) | Rupee denominated bonds and units issued by IDF |
| above | ||||
| (iv) | NRI | Rupee denominated bonds and units issued by IDF | ||
A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 48, dated 21-11-2011 — Mid-sea trans-shipment of catch by deep sea fishing vessel.
WOULD BUYBACK RESULT IN AN OPEN OFER? — SAT says no and changes existing interpretation
My preceding articles referred earlier discuss this issue in more detail where I also expressed my views why such increase should not amount to ‘acquisition’. The regulations define ‘Acquirer’ as a person who ‘acquires or agrees to acquire’ shares, voting rights, etc. Hence, if an acquirer acquires:
- 5% or more shares, he has to make certain disclosures.
- 15% or more (under the 1997 Regulations), he has to make an open offer.
- In additions there are other compliance requirements.
The SAT rejected this attempt in fairly clear and emphatic words. In the case under consideration, consequent to a buyback, the holding of the Promoters increased from 62.56% to 75%. While there are other aspects and issues in the case, the essential question before the SAT was whether this increase should result in an open offer.
The SAT relied on the definition of an ‘acquirer’ under the Regulations as well as in a legal dictionary. It held that a passive increase in percentage holding pursuant to a buyback cannot amount to acquisition. It observed (emphasis supplied in all extracts):
“In this context the word ‘acquire’ implies acquisition of voting rights through a positive act of the acquirer with a view to gain control over the voting rights. In the case before us, it is the admitted position of the parties that the appellants (promoters of the company) did not participate in the buyback and that there was no change in their shareholding. The percentage increase in their voting rights was not by reason of any act of theirs, but was incidental to the buyback of shares of other shareholders by the company. Such a passive increase in the proportion of the voting rights of the promoters of the company will not attract Regulation 11(1) of the takeover code. The argument of the learned counsel for the Board that merely because there is increase in the voting rights of the appellants, Regulation 11(1) gets triggered cannot be accepted.”
Does such an increase amount to an ‘indirect’ acquisition? This argument too was rejected by observing:
“He also referred to the definition of ‘acquirer’ in Regulation 2(b) of the takeover code and strenuously contended that a passive acquisition of the kind we are dealing with is indirect acquisition and, therefore, the provisions of Regulation 11(1) are attracted. We have no hesitation in rejecting this argument outright. The words ‘directly’ and ‘indirectly’ in the definition of ‘acquirer’ go with the person who has to acquire voting rights by his positive act and if such acquisition comes within the limits prescribed by Regulation 11(1), it would only then get attracted. Passive acquisition as in the present case cannot be regarded as indirect acquisition as was sought to be contended on behalf of the Board.
The SAT also rightly highlighted another absurdity involved. If the view that passive increase may also amount to acquisition, then even a non-controlling shareholder holding, say, 14% may find the requirements of open offer getting triggered off if he does not participate in a buyback and finds his holding increased to, say, 16%. The SAT observed:
“Again, a non-promoter shareholder may increase his percentage of shareholding without participating in the buyback over which he has no control. In such an event he would be burdened with an onerous liability to make a public announcement. It is a well-settled principle of law that a provision ought not to be interpreted in a manner which may impose upon a person an obligation which may be highly onerous or require him to do something which is impossible for no action of his.”
Other difficulties in adopting such an interpretation were also highlighted. At the end, the SAT, in quite emphatic words, held that “we are of the firm opinion that passive acquisition does not attract the provisions of Regulation 11(1) of the takeover code.”
Once such an interpretation is accepted, the following situations, arising out of buyback and under the 1997 Regulations, need to be considered: 1. If a person’s holding increases to 5% or more, will disclosure be required?
2. If a person holding 5% or more finds his holding increased by 2% or more, will disclosure be required?
3. If a person holds less than 15% finds his holding increased to 15% or more, will an open offer be required?
4. If a person holding 15% or more finds his holding increased, will such increase be counted as part of creeping acquisition or will he be entitled to acquire a further 5% in a financial year ignoring such increase?
5. If a person holding 55% or less finds his holding increased beyond 55%, will he be deemed to have violated the Regulations? — And so on.
Applying the decision of the SAT, the answer to each of the aforesaid questions appear to be in the negative.
However, while this was the position under the 1997 Regulations, the question is whether will it also hold good under the 2011 Regulations. The curious thing is that while the corresponding wording in the definition of ‘acquirer’ under the 2011 Regulations remains exactly the same, the Regulations have made further provisions on the assumption that such a passive increase amounts to acquisition. It has exempted two types of such increases (from below 25% to 25% or more, and more than the creeping acquisition if holding is already more than 25%) if certain conditions are satisfied. It is submitted that considering that even the 1997 Regulations did contain such a provision, the ratio of the decision of the SAT should hold good.
One will have to wait and see whether SEBI appeals to the Supreme Court and, if yes, what view the Supreme Court takes. It is also possible that SEBI may amend the Regulations.
In conclusion, one cannot help expressing disapproval of adopting a practice — approach of SEBI — which results in the law becoming opaque and/ or arbitrary depending on the internal — administrative — preference or practice of SEBI.
PART A : ORDERS of CIC & the Supreme Court
- Section 8(1)(a) & (e) of RTI Act
CIC, Shailesh Gandhi has made an order of great interest.
The following information was sought: 1. Total amount of money deposited by Indian citizens in nationalised Indian banks during the period 2006 to 2010. Provide information for each year separately;
2. (a) Information till date regarding total amount of loan taken but not repaid by industrialists from Indian nationalised banks and total amount of interest accumulating on such unpaid loans; and
(b) Details of default in loans taken from public sector banks by industrialists. Out of the above list of defaulters, top 100 defaulters, name of the businessman, address, firm name, principal amount, interest amount, date of default and date of availing loan.
(c) Steps being taken for putting information sought in query 2(a) and list of defaulters on the website of the respondent — Public authority.
By letter dated 14-10-2010, the CPIO informed the appellant that query 1 was transferred to DEAP, queries 2(b) and (c) were transferred to DBOD/DBS.
By letter dated 22-10-2010, the CPIO denied information on query 2(b) on the basis that it was held in fiduciary capacity and was exempt from disclosure u/s.8(1)(a) and (e) of the RTI Act.
In the first appeal, the FAA stated inter alia that the CPIO, DEAP had provided certain information vide letter dated 12-10-2010. Further he stated: ‘As regards the contention of the appellant with respect to his query at point 2(b) (which relates to the default in loans taken by industrialists from public sector banks and matters associated with them), I find that the CPIO, DBS has specified that the information received from banks, in this regard is held by the Reserve Bank in fiduciary capacity and as such it cannot be disclosed in terms of clauses (a) and (e) of section 8(1) of the Act. There can be no doubt that the information on defaulters received from banks is held by the Reserve Bank in a fiduciary capacity and confidential in nature. Therefore, the exemption claimed u/s.8(1)(e) is, without doubt, proper in the eyes of law. Whether the exemption provided by clause (a) of section 8(1) would be attracted in given case would depend upon the factual position. In this matter, since section 8(1)(e) is clearly attracted, I do not propose to consider the other exemption which the CPIO, DBS has made use of for withholding the information.’
The order of CIC is very powerful and I consider it as gem, for information analysis of section 8. Hence, instead of my summarising it, I reproduce the Completer Decision announced on 15th November, 2011:
“Based on perusal of papers and submission of parties, it appears that no information has been provided in relation to query 2(c), despite the order of the FAA. As regards query 2(b), the respondent has contended that the information sought was exempt u/s.8(1)(a) & (e) of the RTI Act. The Commission will first consider the claim of exemption u/s.8(1)(a) of the RTI Act made by the PIO. The PIO has claimed exemption u/s.8(1)(a) but not explained how this would apply. The first Appellate Authority has not given any comment on this. No justification was offered at the time of hearing as well. Section 8(1)(a) exempts, ‘information, disclosure of which would prejudicially affect the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security, strategic, scientific or economic interests of the State, relation with foreign State or lead to incitement of an offence;’. It appears that the PIO is claiming that the economic interests of the State would be prejudicially affected. It is impossible to imagine that any of the other interests mentioned in the provision could be affected. This Bench rejects the contention of the PIO that the economic interests of India would be affected by disclosing the names and details of defaulters from public sector banks. If it means that such borrowers would not bank with public sector banks for fear of exposure, it would in fact be in the economic interest of the nation. This Commission does not accept the claim of exemption u/s.8(1)(a) by the PIO. It is also unlikely that the economic well-being of the nation could get affected adversely by disclosing the names and details of defaulters. The Indian economy is dependent on far stronger footings.
The Commission will now examine the claim for exemption u/s.8(1)(e) of the RTI Act.
Section 8(1)(e) of the RTI Act exempts from disclosure “information available to a person in his fiduciary relationship, unless the competent authority is satisfied that the larger public interest warrants the disclosure of such information”.
This Bench, in a number of decisions, has held that the traditional definition of a fiduciary is a person who occupies a position of trust in relation to someone else, therefore requiring him to act for the latter’s benefit within the scope of that relationship. In business or law, we generally mean someone who has specific duties, such as those that attend a particular profession or role, e.g., doctor, lawyer, financial analyst or trustee. Another important characteristic of such a relationship is that the information must be given by the holder of information who must have a choice — as when a litigant goes to a particular lawyer, a customer chooses a particular bank, or a patient goes to a particular doctor. An equally important characteristic for the relationship to qualify as a fiduciary relationship is that the provider of information gives the information for using it for the benefit of the one who is providing the information. All relationships usually have an element of trust, but all of them cannot be classified as fiduciary. Information provided in discharge of a statutory requirement, or to obtain a job, or to get a licence, cannot be considered to have been given in a fiduciary relationship.
Information provided by banks to RBI is done in furtherance of statutory compliances. In fact, where RBI requires certain information to be furnished to it by banks and such banks have no choice but to furnish this information, it would appear that such requirement of RBI is directory in nature. Moreover, no specific benefit appears to be flowing to the banks from RBI on disclosure of the information sought by the appellant. Consequently, no fiduciary relationship is created between RBI and the banks.
The respondent has also argued that information about customers is held by banks in a fiduciary capacity and hence disclosure of the same would violate the fiduciary — trust placed by borrowers of the banks. The Commission finds some merit in this argument. Information of customers is held by banks in a fiduciary capacity. If this information is disclosed to the RBI and subsequently furnished to the citizens under the RTI Act — it may violate the fiduciary relationship existing between the customers and the banks. Therefore, the information sought in query 2(b) is exempt from disclosure u/s.8(1)(e) of the RTI Act. However, if a customer defaults in repayment, should the information about the default also be considered as information held in a fiduciary capacity, is a moot question. The lender is likely to take all measures including filing suits to recover the money due, and these actions would mean publicly disclosing the default amounts. In such circumstances the bank would make these details public, and not feel fettered by the fiduciary nature of the relations.
However, I am not going into delving into this trend of thought and accept that the information about the default by a borrower may be considered to be information held by a bank in a fiduciary capacity. When the Commission comes to the conclusion that the exemptions of section 8(1) of the RTI Act apply, it needs to consider the provision of section 8(2) of the RTI Act which stipulates as follows
“Notwithstanding anything in the Official Secrets Act, 1923 (19 of 1923) nor any of the exemptions permissible in accordance with s.s (1), a public authority may allow access to information, if public interest in disclosure outweighs the harm to the protected interests.”
Section 8(2) of the RTI Act mandates that even where disclosure of information is protected by the exemptions u/s.8(1) of the RTI Act, if public interest in disclosure outweighs the harm to such protected interests, the information must be disclosed under the RTI Act. There is no requirement for the existence of any public interest to be established when seeking or giving informa-tion. However, if an exemption applies, then it must be considered whether the public interest in disclosure outweighs the harm to the protected interests.
According to P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s, The Law Lexicon (2nd edition; Reprint 2007) at page 1557, ‘public interest’ ‘means those interests which concern the public at large’. Banks and financial institutions in India heavily finance various industries on a routinely basis. However, it is a fact that large sums of such amounts are sometimes not recovered. In some cases, loans availed of are not repaid despite the fact that the industrialist(s) may actually be in a financial position to pay. Where financial assistance is given to industries by banks, in the absence of financial liquidity, it would result in a blockade of large funds creating circumstances that would retard socio-economic growth of the nation.
At this stage the Commission would like to quote Thomas J. of the High Court of New Zealand 1995, ‘The primary foundation for insisting upon open-ness in government rests upon the sovereignty of the people. Under a democracy, parliament is ‘supreme’, in the sense that term is used in the phrase ‘parliamentary supremacy’, but the people remain sovereign. They enjoy the ultimate power which their sovereignty confers. But the people cannot undertake the machinery of government. That task is delegated to their elected representatives……the government can be perceived as the agent or fiduciary of the people, performing the task and exercising the powers of government which have been devolved to it in trust for the people.
I wish the Government and its instrumentalities would remember that all information held by them is owned by citizens, who are sovereign. Further, it is often seen that banks and financial institutions continue to provide loans to industrialists despite their default in repayment of an earlier loan. The Supreme Court of India in U.P. Financial Corporation v. Gem Cap India Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1993 SC 1435 has noted that “Promoting industrialisation at the cost of public funds does not serve the public interest; it merely amounts to transferring public money to private account”. Such practices have led citizens to believe that defaulters can get away and play fraud on public funds. There is no doubt that information regarding top industrialists who have defaulted in repayment of loans must be brought to the citizens’ knowledge; there is certainly a larger public interest that would be served on disclosure of the same. In fact, information about industrialists who are loan defaulters of the country may put pressure on such persons to pay their dues. This would have the impact of alerting citizens about those who are defaulting in payments and could also have some impact in shaming them. RBI had by its Circular DBOD No. BC/CIS/47/20.16.002/94, dated 23rd April 1994 directed all banks to send a report on their defaulters, which it would share with all banks and financial institutions, with the following objectives:
1. To alert banks and financial institutions (FIs) and to put them on guard against borrowers who have defaulted in their dues to lending institutions.
2. To make public the names of the borrowers who have defaulted and against whom suits have been filed by banks/FIs.
Many Revenue Departments publish lists of de-faulters and All India Bank Employees Association has also published list of bank defaulters. It would be relevant to rely on the observations of the Supreme Court of India in its landmark decision in Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India, (decided on 8-4-2004). The Supreme Court of India was considering the validity of the SARFAESI Act and recovery of ‘non-performing assets’ by banks and financial institutions in India. While discussing whether a private contract between the borrower and the financing institution/bank can be interfered with, the Court observed:
“…. it may be observed that though the transaction may have a character of a private contract yet the question of great importance behind such transactions as a whole having far-reaching effect on the economy of the country cannot be ignored, purely restricting it to individual transactions more particularly when financing is through banks and financial institutions utilising the money of the people in general, namely, the depositors in the banks and public money at the disposal of the financial institutions. Therefore, wherever public interest to such a large extent is involved and it may become necessary to achieve an object which serves the public purposes, individual rights may have to give way. Public interest has always been considered to be above the private interest. Interest of an individual may, to some extent, be affected but it cannot have the potential of taking over the public interest having an impact in the socio-economic drive of the country.” (Emphasis added)
There are times when experts make mistakes, other times when corruption influences decisions. It is dangerous to put complete faith in the judgment of a few wise people to alert everyone. Democracy requires reducing inequality of opportunity. Asymmetry of information deprives the citizens of an opportunity to take proper decisions. The Commission is aware that information on defaulters is being shared by Reserve Bank with an organisation called CIBIL. In such a situation, it is difficult to understand the reluctance to share this information with citizens using RTI. RBI’s Circular of 1994, — mentioned above, — infact appears to promise to share this information suo moto with the public.
In view of the arguments given above, the Commission is of the considered view that the details of defaulters of public sector banks should be revealed since it would be in larger public interest. Revealing these would serve the object of reining in such defaulters, warning citizens about those who they should stay away from in terms of investments and perhaps shaming such persons/entities. This could lead to safeguarding the economic and moral interests of the nation. The Commission is convinced that the benefits accruing to the economic and moral fibre of the country, far outweigh any damage to the fiduciary relationship of bankers and their customers if the details of the top defaulters are disclosed.
Hence, in view of section 8(2) of the RTI Act, the Commission rules that information on query 2(b) must be provided to the appellant, since there is a larger public interest in disclosure.
The appeal is allowed.
“The PIO shall provide the complete information as per records on queries 2(b) and 2(c) to the appellant before 10th December 2011.
The Commission also directs the Governor, RBI to display this information on its website, in fulfil-ment of its obligations u/s.4(1)(b)(xvii) of the RTI Act.
This direction is being given under the Commission’s powers u/s.19(8)(a)(iii). This should be done before 31st December, 2011 and updated each year”.
[Mr. P. P. Kapoor v. PIO & Chief General Manager, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai, [Decision No. CIC/SM/A/2011/001376/SG/15684, Appeal No. CIC/ SM/A/2011/001376/SG]
[Note: Full decision is posted on website of BCAS & PCGT]
As reported in The Times of India on 10-12 -2011, this judgment has been stayed by the Delhi High Court.
The Delhi High Court on 9-12-2011 stayed the direction of the Central Information Commission (CIC) asking the Reserve Bank of India to provide details of industrialists who have defaulted in re-payment of loan taken from nationalised banks.
A Bench of Justice Vipin Sanghi, in its interim ex parte order, asked the information seeker to respond to petition filed by RBI challenging the CIC order.
The Court listed the next hearing on 27th February, 2012, on RBI’s petition which said the CIC’s directives were in violation of the Right to Information Act.
Counsel T. R. Andhiyaarjuna, appearing for the RBI, contended that the CIC’s order would have a far-reaching impact as this kind of information is confidential and the Information Commissioner has dealt with the matter in a wrong way, without considering all the relevant provisions under the RBI Act.
He also said the order of the CIC was beyond its jurisdiction under the transparency law, as RBI is exempted from providing such info u/s.8(1)(a).
- Sections 18 and 19 of the RTI Act:
On 12th December, 2011, the Supreme Court of India has delivered judgment, very powerful and detailed, running into 30 pages dealing with the provisions of sections 18 and 19 of the RTI Act.
As decision reported is of many pages, the same is posted on BCAS and PCGT websites. Those interested may view it there. Only one para of it is reproduced hereunder:
“We are of the view that sections 18 and 19 of the Act serve two different purposes and lay down two different procedures and they provide two different remedies. One cannot be a substitute for the other.”
[Chief Information Comm. and Another v. State of Manipur and Another under civil Appeal Nos. 10787-10788 of 2011 (arising out of S.L.P. (c) Nos. 32768-32769/2010)]
Note: Please see part B for DNA’s report on above decision.
Maintenance — Dependents unmarried daughter — Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 sections 20(3) and 21.
The appellant — husband and respondent — wife got married as per Hindu Vedic rites. Out of the said wedlock daughter Shraddha and son Siddhesh were born. The parties, however, started staying separately due to their differences. The appellant, therefore, filed petition u/s.9 of the Hindu Marriage Act for decree of restitution of conjugal rights. The respondent on the other hand filed petition seeking maintenance for herself and her daughter and other consequential reliefs. The Family Court had found as of fact that daughter Shraddha who was staying with the respondent was pursuing Pilot Training Programme. For that, she had obtained loan of substantial amount to pay fees. The respondent-wife was not in a position to take the burden of the said education expenditure of Shraddha, nor was she in a position to pay the loan instalments. The respondent was being helped by her mother and brother financially. The Family Court found that on the other hand the appellant-husband was well placed in life. His income was substantial. He was engaged in business of restaurant/dhaba. The Family Court held that the husband shall pay maintenance to the wife at the rate of Rs.40,000 per month including accommodation charges payable from the date of this order and shall repay the loan amount of the daughter. The appellant had challenged the direction issued by the Family Court.
The moot question arose whether the wife can seek relief of maintenance for and on behalf of her major daughter/son. The Court observed that the petition was filed by the respondent-wife before the Family Court was one u/s.18 r.w.s. 20 of The Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. Section 18 governs the scheme for providing maintenance to the wife. Section 20, on the other hand, deals with the regime of providing maintenance of children and aged parents.
In the present case, it is not in dispute that daughter Shraddha is residing with her mother. She is admittedly unmarried. Her mother does not own income or other property except the income by way of meager salary earned by her. She is thus not in a position to take the burden of education expenditure of her daughter Shraddha, which is quite substantial for undergoing the professional course. The Court observed that under Clause (v) of section 21 of the Act the term ‘Dependants’ encompasses unmarried daughter as Dependant. Therefore, there can be no doubt that the unmarried daughter was entitled to receive maintenance amount from her father or mother, as the case may be, so long as she is unable to maintain herself out of her own earnings or other property. Admittedly, Shraddha has no earning of her own and is pursuing her further education, as the income of the respondent-wife from her salary is very meager. For that reason, Shraddha would be entitled to maintenance amount and her education expenses from her father (appellant). Rather the father would be obliged to pay the amount towards maintenance of her daughter and for education expenditure, in law the mother is competent to pursue relief of maintenance for the daughters even if they have become major, if the said daughters were staying with her and she was taking responsibility of their maintenance and education.
The appellant would, therefore, be liable to repay the loan amount obtained by daughter Shraddha for pursuing her Pilot Training Programme forthwith.
Doctrine of Spes Successionis — Muslim Law — Relinquishment of future share in property — Transfer of Property Act, 1882, section 6.
One Mr. Meeralava Rawther died in 1986, leaving behind him surviving three sons and three daughters, as his legal heirs. At the time of his death he possessed 1.70 acres of land which he had acquired on the basis of a partition effected in the family. Meeralava Rawther and his family members, being Mohammedans, they are entitled to succeed to the estate of the deceased in specific shares as tenants in common. Since Meeralava Rawther had three sons and three daughters, the sons were entitled to a 2/9th share in the estate of the deceased, while the daughters were each entitled to a 1/9th share thereof.
It is the specific case of the parties that Meeralava Rawther helped all his children to settle down in life. The youngest son, Hassan Khani Rawther, the respondent No. 1, was staying with him even after his marriage, while all the other children moved out from the family house. The case made out by the respondent No. 1 is that when each of his children left the family house, Meeralava Rawther used to get them to execute Deeds of Relinquishment, whereby, on the receipt of some consideration, each of them relinquished their respective claim to the properties belonging to Meeralava Rawther, except the respondent No. 1, Hassan Khani Rawther. The respondent No. 1, Hassan Khani Rawther filed a suit for seeking declaration of title, possession and injunction in respect of the said 1.70 acres of land, basing his claim on an oral gift alleged to have been made in his favour by Meeralava Rawther in 1982.
The issue arose as to can a Mohammedan by means of a family settlement relinquish his right of spes successionis when he had still not acquired a right in the property?
The Court observed that Chapter VI of Mulla’s ‘Principles of Mahomedan Law’ deals with the general rules of inheritance under Mohammedan Law. The Mohammedan Law enjoins in clear and unequivocal terms that a chance of a Mohammedan heir-apparent succeeding to an estate cannot be the subject of a valid transfer or release. Section 6(a) of the Transfer of Property Act was enacted in deference to the customary law and law of inheritance prevailing among Mohammedans.
As opposed to the above are the general principles of estoppel as contained in section 115 of the Evidence Act and the doctrine of relinquishment in respect of a future share in property. Both the said principles contemplated a situation where an expectant heir conducts himself and/ or performs certain acts which makes the two aforesaid principles applicable in spite of the clear concept of relinquishment as far as Mohammedan Law is concerned.
The Court further observed that there cannot be a transfer of spes successionis, but the exceptions are pointed out by this Court in Gulam Abbas v. Haji Kayyum Ali & Ors., AIR 1973 SC 554, the same can be avoided either by the execution of a family settlement or by accepting consideration for a future share. It could then operate as estoppel against the expectant heir to claim any share in the estate of the deceased on account of the doctrine of spes successionis. While dealing with the various decisions on the subject, reference was made to the decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Latafat Hussain v. Hidayat Hussain, (AIR 1936 All 573), where the question of arrangement between the husband and wife in the nature of a family settlement, which was binding on the parties, was held to be correct in view of the fact that a presumption would have to be drawn that if such family arrangement had not been made, the husband could not have executed a deed of Wakf if the wife had not relinquished her claim to inheritance. Thus, the general principle that a Mohammedan cannot by Will dispose of more than a third of his estate after payment of funeral expenses and debts is capable of being avoided by the consent of all the heirs.
Having accepted the consideration for having relinquished a future claim or share in the estate of the deceased, it would be against public policy if such a claimant is allowed the benefit of the doctrine of spes successionis. The five deeds of relinquishment executed by the five sons and daughters of Meeralava Rawther constitute individual agreements entered into between Meeralava Rawther and the expectant heirs. However, the doctrine of estoppel is attracted so as to prevent a person from receiving an advantage for giving up of his/her rights and yet claiming the same right subsequently. Being opposed to public policy, the heir expectant would be estopped under the general law from claiming a share in the property of the deceased.
Natural Justice – Right of cross examination – Is integral part of Natural justice
Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors AIR 2013 SC 58
Not only should the opportunity of cross examination be made available, but it should be one of effective cross examination, so as to meet the requirement of the principles of natural justice. In the absence of such an opportunity, it cannot be held that the matter has been decided in accordance with law, as cross examination is an integral part and parcel of the principles of natural justice.
Export of Goods and Services – Realisation and Repatriation period for units in Special Economic Zones (SEZ)
This circular provides that exporters in a SEZ must now realize and repatriate within a period of twelve months from the date of export the full value of goods/software/services exported by them. In case they require any extension of time beyond the above stipulated period they have to obtain specific permission of RBI.
Guarantor’s Liability
How often have we come
across requests from close friends and relatives to stand as a guarantor
for a loan proposed to be taken by them? The loans could be housing
loans or for business. Further, one is also conversant with promoters of
companies/partners of firms standing as guarantors for loans obtained
by their entities. This is even true in case of large listed companies
where the promoters, managing directors, etc., are required to furnish
promoter guarantee. If the going is good and the original debtor meets
his dues, then all is well that ends well. However, what happens if the
original debtor cannot/does not meet his dues and the creditor/bank
invokes the guarantee furnished by the guarantor? Does the creditor have
to first approach the primary borrower or can he directly approach the
guarantor who may be in a better financial position than the borrower?
Let us look at some of the issues arising in this important aspect of
trade and commerce.
Meaning of Guarantee
Section
126 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 defines a ‘contract of guarantee’
as a contract to perform the promise or discharge the liability of a
third person in the case of the third person’s default. Performance
guarantees/bank guarantees are also instances of contracts of guarantee.
For instance, Mr. A agrees to pay the housing loan amount borrowed by
Mr. C from a bank if Mr. C cannot/does not pay the loan. This is a
contract of guarantee.
A contract of guarantee is not a contract
in respect of a primary transaction but it is an independent
transaction containing independent and reciprocal obligations —
Industrial Finance Corp. v. Cannanore Spg. and Wvg. Mills, (2002) 5 SCC
54.
The person who gives the guarantee is called a surety or a
guarantor, the person to whom the guarantee is given is called the
creditor and the third person on whose behalf the guarantee is given is
called the principal debtor. Thus, the essentials of a guarantee are as
follows:
(a) It is a contract and so all the elements of a valid
contract are a must. Without a contract this section has no
application. Since a contract is a must, it goes without saying that all
the prerequisites of a contract also follow. Thus, if the contract has
been obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, coercion, etc., then it is
void ab initio and the section would also fail — Ariff v. Jadunath,
(1931) AIR PC 79. The contract may be oral or written.
(b) There
must be a principal debtor-creditor relationship. Without this there
can be no contract of guarantee. The surety’s obligations arise only
when the principal debtor defaults and not otherwise.
(c) It is a tri-partite arrangement, involving the surety, the principal debtor and the creditor.
(d) There must be a consideration for the surety. If there is no consideration at all, then the surety agreement is void.
However,
anything done or any promise made for the benefit of the principal
debtor is sufficient consideration to the surety for giving the
guarantee. A contract of guarantee is a complete contract by itself and
separate from the underlying contract. Enforcement of an on-demand bank
guarantee in accordance with the terms of the bank guarantee would not
be the subject-matter of judicial intervention. The only reason why
Courts would interfere if the invocation is not as per the terms of the
guarantee or it has been obtained by fraud — National Highways Authority
of India v. Ganga Enterprises, (2003) 7 SCC 410.
Nature of liability
The
liability of the surety is co-extensive with that of the principal
debtor. However, the contract may provide otherwise. Thus, the guarantor
has to pay all debts, interest, penal charges, etc., payable by the
principal debtor. He is liable for whatever the debtor is liable. Where
the liability arises only on the happening of some event, then the
guarantee cannot be invoked till such contingency has happened. Even if
winding-up proceedings have been filed against the principal debtor, the
surety would remain liable to pay to the creditor. A discharge of the
principal debtor by operation of law does not absolve the surety of his
liability — Maharashtra State Electricity Board v. OL, (1982) 3 SCC 358.
Continuing Guarantee
A guarantee which extends
to a series of transactions is a continuing guarantee. Whether or not a
contract is a continuing guarantee is to be ascertained from the
language of the transaction. For instance, Mr. A guarantees payment of
all dues by Mr. X to Mr. C in respect of goods supplied by Mr. C. This
is an example of continuing guarantee and does not come to an end with
the clearance of the first payment. A continuing guarantee can be
revoked at any time by giving notice to the creditor. However, the
revocation operates only in respect of future transactions.
Alternatively, the death of a surety revokes all future transactions
under a continuing guarantee.
Alterations
Any
variation made in the contract of guarantee without the guarantor’s
consent by the principal debtor and the creditor, discharges the
guarantor from all transactions after the variation. For instance, Mr. C
agrees to lend money on 1st June to Mr. B, repayment of the same
guaranteed by Mr. A. Mr. C instead lends on 1st April. The surety is
discharged from his obligations since the creditor may now demand a
repayment earlier than what was originally agreed upon. However, if
there is an unsubstantial alteration which is to the surety’s benefit,
then the surety is not discharged from his liability. However, if the
alteration is to the disadvantage of the surety, then the surety can
claim a discharge.
Discharge
The guarantor is
discharged by any contract between the creditor and the principal debtor
by which the debtor is released of by any act of the creditor which
results in the discharge of the debtor. For instance, A guarantees the
repayment of the loan taken by X Ltd from C Ltd provided C Ltd supplies
certain goods to X Ltd. C Ltd does not supply the goods as agreed. A is
discharged from his guarantee. Similarly, a contract between the
creditor and the principal debtor under which the creditor gives a
concession or extends the time for repayment to the principal debtor,
releases the guarantor from his obligations.
If the creditor
does anything which affects the rights of the surety or omits to do
anything which we was required to do to the surety, then the guarantee
contract comes to an end. Thus, the creditor cannot gain out of any
negligence on his own accord.
However, it has been held that the
discharge of the principal debtor by virtue of a Statute/Notification
does not discharge the guarantor — SBI v. Saksaria Sugar Mills, (1986) 2
SCC 145.
Guarantor steps into shoes of creditor
On
discharge of the liability of the principal debtor, the guarantor steps
into the shoes of the creditor, i.e., he becomes entitled to all
actions and rights against the principal debtor which the creditor had.
He also becomes entitled to the benefit of all security which the
creditor had against the debtor, whether or not the surety is aware of
the security. The term ‘security’ includes all rights which the creditor
had against the property of the principal debtor on the date of the
contract — State of MP v. Kaluram, AIR 1967 SC 1105.
In case the creditor loses or parts with security without consent of the security, then the surety is discharged to the extent of the value of the security. In one case, the debtor gave a guarantee and a pledge of his goods as security for loan to a bank. The surety was aware of the pledge. However, the bank lost the goods due to its own fault. Held, that the surety was discharged from his obligations — State Bank v. Chitranjan Raja, 51 Comp. Cases 618 (SC).
Must creditor first proceed against debtor?
The law in this respect is very clear. The creditor is free to directly proceed against the guarantor instead of first approaching the principal debtor and then failing him, the guarantor/surety.
In Bank of Bihar Ltd. v. Damodar Prasad, (1969) 1 SCR 620, the Supreme Court held that it is the duty of the surety to pay the amount. On such payment he will be subrogated to the rights of the creditor under the Indian Contract Act, and he may then recover the amount from the principal debtor. The very object of the guarantee is defeated if the creditor is asked to postpone his remedies against the surety. In that case the creditor was a bank. It was held that a guarantee is a collateral security usually taken by a banker. The security will become useless if his rights against the surety can be so easily cut down.
In State Bank of India v. M/s. Indexport, (1992) 3 SCC 159, it was held that the decree-holder bank can execute the decree against the guarantor without proceeding against the principal borrower and then proceeded to observe:
“The execution of the money decree is not made dependent on first applying for execution of the mortgage decree. The choice is left entirely with the decree-holder. The question arises whether a decree which is framed as a composite decree, as a matter of law, must be executed against the mortgage property first or can a money decree, which covers whole or part of decretal amount covering mortgage decree can be execute earlier. There is nothing in law which provides such a composite decree to be first executed only against the principal debtor.”
In Industrial Investment Bank of India
Limited v. Biswanath Jhunjhunwala, (2009) 9 SCC 478, it was held that the liability of the guarantor and principal debtor is co-extensive and not in alternative and the creditor/decree-holder has the right to proceed against either for recovery of dues or realisation of the decretal amount.
SARFAESI Act vis-à-vis Surety
A related question which arises is what is the position of the guarantor under the SARFAESI Act in case he gives a security for a loan borrowed by the principal debtor from a bank/financial institution. The Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (‘the SARFAESI Act’) ensures that dues of secured creditors including banks, financial institutions are recovered from the defaulting borrowers without any obstruction. Secured creditors have been empowered to take steps for recovery of their dues without intervention of the Courts or Tribunals by directly taking over the properties of the borrowers.
In the case of Union Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon, (2010) 8 SCC 110, the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the position of the guarantor under the SARFAESI Act. In this case, the guarantor mortgaged her property as security for the loan given by the bank to the principal debtor. She also executed an agreement of guarantee for the principal and interest amount. The loan account became an NPA and the bank directly approached the guarantor for the amounts due. On her failure to repay, the bank invoked
the provisions of the SARFAESI Act against her and took possession of her mortgaged property. The Supreme Court held that nothing prevents the bank from directly approaching the guarantor without first approaching the debtor. It further held that the action taken by the bank for recovery of its dues by issuing notices under the SARFAESI Act cannot be faulted on any legally permissible ground.
It further held that if the guarantor had any tangible grievance against the recovery proceedings under the
SARFAESI Act, then she could have availed remedy by filing an application u/s.17(1) of the Act before the Debt Recovery Tribunal. The expression ‘any person’ used in the Act is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not
only the borrower but also guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under the Act. Both, the DRT and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under the Act and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective.
Epilogue
The guarantor’s liability is like the proverbial ‘Sword of Damocles’ which is hanging by a very slender thread and can come down at any time. One may even rephrase the legal maxim of ‘Caveat Emptor’ to say ‘Guarantor be aware of what you guarantee’. Thus, it is very important that before giving any promoter/ personal guarantee, a person is well aware of the risks and consequences of the same.
Succession — Right of daughter-in-law — Devolution of interest — Notional Partition — Hindu Succession Act, 1956, section 6.
The Court observed that the 7th defendant preferred the appeal with the ambitious intention of augmenting her share further. While 1/3rd share in terms of the judgment was the correct share to which the 7th defendant was entitled to, the further claim for augmenting her share by claiming a share in a share allotted to her father-in-law making a claim for 1/2 share is only an ambitious claim not tenable in law as the daughter-in-law in the family can claim only through her husband and not as a direct heir to her father-in-law. The appellant cannot get any share from out of the properties allotted notionally to the share of a father-in-law who was no more.
Even otherwise, in Hindu law the shares of joint family members are determined per stripes vis-àvis their position in the family and not by what they would have got with reference to a notional partition that has to be effected at that point of time when a member of the family who is no more as of now. This is not the legal position either by applying the customary law or by the Hindu Succession Act. Therefore, the claim of the appellant for enhancing her 1/3rd share to ½ share was not tenable and the appeal was to be disposed by affirming 1/3rd share granted by the Trial Court.
Insofar as the sharing ratio particularly vis-à-vis the 4th plaintiff was concerned, a daughter in the family, who was married and the partition taking place subsequent to her marriage.
The 1/3rd share allotted to the 4th plaintiff by the learned Trial Judge becomes validated by the strides taken by the legislation in amending section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 by Act No. 39 of 2005. The share claimed by the appellant in the dwelling units on the premise that a married daughter cannot get a share in the dwelling house of the family also does not sustain in the wake of the legislative development, which would apply while disposing of the appeal.
Recovery — Hire-purchase agreement — Taking back the possession of vehicle by use of force is against provision of law and RBI Guidelines — Consumer Protection Act, section 21.
On 4th April, 2000, at the initiative of the respondent, a hire-purchase agreement was entered into between the appellant and the respondent, to enable the respondent to avail of the benefit of hire-purchase in respect of a Maruti Omni Car. Clause 2.1 of the hire-purchase agreement provided for payment of the hire charges in the manner stipulated in the agreement and it also indicated that timely payment of the hire charges was the essence of the agreement. On the failure of the respondent to pay the hire charges in terms of the repayment schedule, the appellant sent a legal notice to the respondent on 10th October, 2002, recalling the entire hire-purchase facility.
Pursuant to a request made by the respondent, the appellant made a one-time offer of settlement for liquidating the outstanding dues of Rs. 1,26,564.84p. for Rs.60,000, subject to payment being made by the respondent by 16th May, 2003, in cash. Thereafter, in keeping with the terms and conditions of the hire-purchase agreement, the appellant took possession of the financed vehicle and informed the concerned police station before and after taking possession of the vehicle from the residence of the respondent. It was also the appellant’s case that subsequent thereto, the date of the settlement offer was extended as a special case, but despite the same, the respondent failed to pay the amount even within the extended period. It is on account of such default that the appellant was constrained to sell the vehicle after having the same valued by approved valuers and inviting bids from interested parties.
In June, 2003, the respondent filed consumer complaint before the Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, against the appellant alleging deficiency in service on their part. By its order dated 22nd December, 2003, the District Forum, directed the appellant to pay a sum of Rs.1,50,000, along with interest at the rate of 9% per annum, from the date of filing of the complaint till the date of payment, together with a further sum of Rs.5,000 towards harassment and cost of litigation. The National Commission, while dismissing the revision petition modified the order of the State Commission. The Commission directed the appellant to pay a sum of Rs.10,000 to the complainant/respondent by way of cost.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court observed that the lower forum had held that the vehicle had been illegally and/or wrongfully recovered by use of force from the loanees. The Court observed that recovery process should be effected in accordance with due process of law and not with use of force. Although till such time as ownership is not transferred to purchaser hirer normally continues to be the owner of goods, but that does not entitle him on strength of the agreement to take back possession of vehicle by use of force. Such acts are in violation of RBI guidelines. Hence, recovery by financial corporation was against process of law and RBI guidelines and hence order of Consumer Forum directing financial corporation to compensate the purchaser was proper.
Month — Interpretation of term ‘Month’ — Number of days in that month is not criterion and month alone is criterion — General Clauses Act — Section 3(35).
The Court observed that there was nothing in the provisions u/s.9 of the Provincial Insolvency Act that the period of limitation is 90 days. As per section 3 s.s 35 of the General Clauses Act, ‘month’ shall mean a month reckoned according to the British calendar. Therefore, it is not 90 days that has to be taken into consideration. Evidently, the months of July and August have got 31 days and consequently, the number of days in that month is not the criterion and the month alone is the criterion. In this connection, reliance was placed on a decision reported in in re V. S. Metha and others, AIR 1970 AP 234, wherein it was held by the Division Bench of the High Court that the expression ‘month’ in the statute does not necessarily mean 30 days, but goes according to the Gregorian calendar, unless the context otherwise requires. Therefore, when the period of three months was mentioned u/s.106 of the Factories Act in that case, the Court held that it does not mean 90 days and it means three calendar months.
Accordingly the appeal was allowed and matter was remanded to consider the matter on merits.
Independent Directors in the New Landscape
Recent corporate scams put to question the usefulness of independent directors (IDs). At one end there are IDs who play a minimalist role, on the other there are examples where the IDs had to take the reins of the company in their own hands and run the company. Take the case of Singapore listed Sino Environment Technology Group. The IDs initiated an investigation over suspicious transactions entered into by the management to buy materials and for investments. The investigation initiated by the ID’s revealed that no raw material or equipment was delivered and no significant work was done at the projects the group had invested in. This ultimately led to the resignation of the executive directors (EDs) leaving the running of the company in the hands of the IDs.
The behaviour of the Boards in India generally tends to be between the two extremes, one where ID’s play a ceremonial role and the other where they play a significant role. This article takes a look at various matters relating to IDs, alongside the requirements of clause 49 of the Listing Agreement, the Companies Bill and SEBI’s Consultative Paper on Review of Corporate Governance Norms in India. The annexure at the end of this article also contains a detailed comparison of the above three documents with regard to matters relating to IDs. At the time of writing this article, the rules have neither been notified nor available for public comment and hence the comments with respect to the requirements of the Companies Bill may not be complete.
Can Independence be defined?
Obviously, an ID has to be independent. The next question is independence from what. The independence is from affiliation of any kind which is likely to prejudice his decisions. As can be seen in the annexure, though the goal is to prevent affiliation of any kind, the three documents differ on the details. The Companies Bill goes farther than the SEBI Guidelines in imposing stricter norms for independence which may go a long way in establishing the role of the ID as an “outside guardian”, which investors currently perceive to be a ceremonial position. Nonetheless, it would be fair to say that independence is a state of mind, and can be legislated only up to a point. For example, whilst a relative of a promoter cannot be appointed an ID under the Bill, a friend of the promoter can be appointed as an ID. Appointing a friend instead of a relative, may be far worse from a point of view of independence. Ultimately, it is the ID’s personality and moral compass that will determine his independence. But that does not mean that legislation has no role to play in this matter. The Companies Bill definition provides a sound basis for ensuring that IDs are independent, and that conflict of interest is minimised. Ultimately it is not the law in itself, but a proper implementation of the law and suitable regulatory intervention from time to time, that may firmly establish independence on the Boards. Implementation cannot be replaced by more legislation.
Whose interest does the ID serve?
The normal expectation globally of the role of an ID is essentially two fold; advisory and monitoring. The ID is supposed to contribute his business expertise which could be a good value addition to a company. On the other hand, the IDs are also expected to serve as a watchdog and protect the interest of the minority shareholders. The role of a strategic advisor and a watchdog are not easy to balance and may run at odds with each other at times.
In India, most IDs view their role principally as that of strategic advisors to the promoters. Relatively, most IDs do not perceive their role to be that of a watchdog over the promoters and the management. An ID is not willing to put on the hat of a watchdog because either he or she does not have the necessary time or the skill sets or is not remunerated enough to specifically take on that responsibility. Very often IDs develop close bonding with the promoter group, which makes it difficult for them to ask uncomfortable questions to the Board. But things have changed in recent times due to high profile instances of fraud in India. IDs are taking a direct interest in reviewing the fraud risk management framework put in place by their organisations for mitigating the risk of fraud. For ID’s of global companies, the risk of non-compliance increases significantly due to certain onerous global legislations such as the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the UK Bribery Act.
In countries such as the US and UK, where shareholding in companies is largely public, the IDs can merely take into account shareholder interest as a common factor. However, in countries such as India, where shareholding is concentrated, there would be two factions; the controlling group and the minority shareholders. The controlling group could extract value from minority shareholders through dubious related party transactions or self dealing transactions, for example, through freeze-out mergers, where the controlled company is merged with another company in which the controlling group has a 100% stake. In the case of dispersely held companies, the challenges are different such as restrictions on control contests, shareholder voting procedures, executive compensation and director’s independence from the management. These differences cause the nature of frauds to be different. For example, frauds like Enron and WorldCom where management misrepresents financial performance to cover up poor performance or to influence compensation are more likely in dispersely held companies. Frauds like Satyam and Parmalat where the controlling group covers up expropriation of funds through financial misstatements are more likely in controlled companies.
In the case of controlled companies, even though the IDs may not have the voting power to stop wrongdoings of the controlling shareholder, he or she has the power to make public any wrongdoing. While the controlling shareholder can remove the ID, such actions are likely to cause unwanted public scrutiny. The press may pick up such resignations, but experience tells us that investor’s memory is too short, and other than in a serious fraud such as Satyam, it is unlikely to be an effective tool, though it may relieve the ID from an onerous engagement. Despite the general perception of the public that IDs should act as a watchdog, it appears that given the actual functioning of the Boards, the supremacy of the controlling group and the few Board/Audit committee meetings (assume average of 6 in a year), the watchdog function is not exhaustively performed. IDs argue that they should not be seen as a panacea for everything and a tool to fix all the wrongdoings.
Which of these two groups, the IDs should represent? Clause 166(2) of the Companies Bill requires directors of the company (which includes IDs90) to act in good faith for the benefit of the members as a whole, the company, its employees, the community and the environment. This requirement goes even beyond protecting the interest of the minority and extends to protecting the interest of the general public at large. This provision is far more onerous than it appears at first reading. For example, minority shareholders may argue that the promoters’ decision in favour of an acquisition, caused them huge losses, which the IDs should compensate them for, as they failed to protect the minority interest.
Schedule IV Code for Independent Directors of the Com-panies Bill requires an ID to safeguard the interest of all stakeholders; particularly the minority shareholders. It is a strange irony that IDs appointed by promoters have to protect the interest of the perceived adversaries of the promotersthe minority shareholders. The ID may not have the time, energy, power, gall or the inclination to set things right and in some cases, after exhausting all efforts to discipline the management, the only realistic option available would be to offer his or her resignation. Just because the Bill sets out the responsibilities of the IDs in greater details, does not necessarily mean that IDs will have adequate powers or remunerated commensurately to fulfill those responsibilities.
Liability of an ID
In the aftermath of Satyam, many IDs resigned from their position across India. Whilst some of the resignations may have been a knee-jerk reaction, it is also possible that the IDs were aware of wrong doings by the company which could not be corrected or they were not provided with enough information to make an appropriate judgment on how the company was being run. More importantly, after realising the onerous nature of his assignment he or she was not prepared to take on those responsibilities. The
position of an ID was no longer going to be an easy occupation for those seeking a comfortable retirement occupation.
There are various legislations that can be used against IDs, some of which are criminal violations and may trigger imprisonment. These include:
1. Violation of clause 49 requirements could generate financial and criminal sanction for directors and IDs under the Securities Contract (Regulation) Act 1956; though this has been infrequently targeted against IDs.
2. The Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices Relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 2003, contains various prohibitions on manipulative, fraudulent and unfair trade practices in securities and a prohibition on dealing in securities in a fraudulent manner or using any manipulative or deceptive device in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.
3. Section 12A and 15G of the SEBI Act prohibit insider trading.
4. Section 62 and 63 of the Companies Act 1956, could hold directors liable for certain misstatements in a prospectus to raise capital. SEBI can also impose sanctions for similar violations under the Takeover Code.
5. Under IPC for breach of trust (section 406), theft and cheating (section 420).
6. Under clause 245 of the Companies Bill, a minority group of members or deposit holders can file a class action suit against the directors and claim damages or compensation for any fraudulent, unlawful or wrongful act or omission or conduct.
7. Under clause 447 of the Companies Bill, a director can be imprisoned for a maximum period of 10 years for any fraudulent conduct.
Clause 149(12) of the Companies Bill clarifies that IDs and other non EDs shall be liable only in respect of such acts of omission or commission by a company that had occurred with his or her knowledge, attributable through Board processes, and with the consent or connivance or where he or she had not acted diligently. From this, it appears that the clause seeks to provide immunity to IDs from civil or criminal action in certain cases. However, clause 166(2) of the Bill seems to be a contradiction. It states that the whole Board is required to act in good faith, in order to promote the objects of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole and in the best interest of the company, its employees and shareholders, the community, and for the protection of the environment. This clause narrows the distinction between IDs and EDs, and so does the definition of an “officer in default” under clause 2(60) of the Bill. Whilst an ID is not key managerial personnel under the Bill, he could be an officer in default. An officer in default under clause 2(60) of the Bill is broadly defined, and includes (a) any person in accordance with whose advice, directions or instructions the Board of Directors of the company is accustomed to act, other than a person who gives advice to the Board in a professional capacity; (b) every director, in respect of a contravention of any of the provisions of this Act, who is aware of such contravention by virtue of the receipt by him of any proceedings of the Board or participation in such proceedings without objecting to the same, or where such contravention had taken place with his consent or connivance.
Whilst there is some kind of immunity, for example, in the case of a bounced cheque where the ID can plead that it was done without his knowledge, certain events have sent confusing signals. The Nimesh Kampani and the AMRI hospital fire event in Kolkata where IDs were imprisoned suggest that there may be no immunity to IDs, even when they were not the cause of or responsible for the problem.
IDs operate in an environment of high uncertainty and confusion over their role. They are not clear whether their action or inaction while serving on the Board could subject them to potential imprisonment for violations and frauds committed by the management or the auditors. Many IDs had probably been served arrest warrants arising out of frivolous claims or bouncing of a cheque. This discourages potentially talented candidates from joining as IDs. Clear principles that attempt to replicate some of the fiduciary duty concepts drawn from Delaware law may provide IDs with more comfort that their actions in good faith will not land them up in prison. Directors’ & Officers’ (D&O) insurance is one means to cover IDs for financial liability, but that does not save them from imprisonment.
IDs argue that when a promoter pays a bribe to win a contract, those matters are not escalated to the Board and there is no way an ID would have known about it. To make the ID responsible for such an act would be highly unacceptable. The MCA general circular no. 8/2011 dated 25th March 2011, probably exonerates the IDs in such situations. The circular requires the ROC to exercise due care while including a non ED as an “officer in default”. It specifically states that an ID of a listed entity would not be held liable for any act which occurred without his knowledge or where he acted diligently in the Board process. Whilst these provisions are also contained in the Companies Bill, the exoneration is based on judgment where there is always a scope for interpretation. Besides the Company law, there are several other legislations in India that may cause havoc in the lives of the IDs.
Remuneration of an ID
IDs generally feel that they are inadequately compensated, given the perceived or real risks post the Satyam and Nimesh Kampani episodes. The existing Companies Act requirement (Rule 10B of the Companies (Central Governments) General Rules and Forms, 1956) prescribes sitting fees for independent directors. For companies with a paid up share capital and free reserves of Rs. 10 crore or more or turnover of Rs. 50 crore and above, sitting fees should not exceed the sum of Rs 20,000 and in case of other companies sitting fees should not exceed Rs 10,000. At the time of writing this article, the rules have not yet been framed under the new Companies Bill. In addition to sitting fees, the IDs are also entitled to a profit related commission. The Bill prohibits an ID from receiving stock options. SEBI’s consultative paper has proposed to amend the listing agreement to also prohibit IDs from receiving stock option.
There is overall support to the provision prohibiting an ID from receiving stock options as that directly impeaches his independence. But most people do agree that for the risks that an ID takes, he or she is not commensurately compensated.
Selection of the ID
The appointment of IDs in a controlled company presents unique challenges. The controlling shareholder has majority voting power and can nominate or replace the ID at their discretion. Therefore, the process of hiring and retaining an ID appears to inherently create dependency of the ID on the promoter group. There has been considerable emphasis in India, on whether one should allow minority shareholders to appoint one or more IDs on the Board, though this could be contrary to basic company law principles of one share, one vote. Further, an overzealous ID could become a deterrent, and may end up causing more harm than good to the minority shareholders. An alternative to minority shareholders appointing IDs is to delegate the director nomination process to an independent nominating committee. This practice is already prevalent in many companies in India. The fact that nomination of IDs is directed solely by an independent committee may result in IDs being more independent, than if they were nominated directly by the promoter group.
In the Companies Bill, a listed company may have one director elected by small shareholders. Under clause 178, every listed company and other prescribed class shall constitute a nomination committee. The nomination committee shall identify persons who are qualified to become directors, and recommend them to the Board. Under clause 150, IDs may be selected from a data bank of eligible and willing persons, maintained by a body notified by the Central Government. Thus there are sufficient provisions in the Bill to ensure that the selection process creates greater independence on the Boards.
Rotation of IDs
Sometimes, familiarity breeds complacency. A long tenure may indicate that the IDs have got too friendly with the promoters and over the years have lost their ability to play the role of watchdogs. On the other hand, the longer the ID has been on the company’s Board, he becomes an expert on the company and that industry and his judgment gets better. An ID that is completely new to the company, has less experience, but comes with a fresh pair of eyes and fresh blood. As can be seen, there are pros and con of rotating IDs, and the arguments are not very different from rotating auditors of a company. The Companies Bill requires rotation of IDs, the requirements of which can be seen in the attached annexure. Overall, it appears to be a step in the right direction.
To sum up
The business of life cannot go on if people can’t trust those who are put in a position of trust. However, from the perspective of IDs, there are a number of questions dogging their minds. What are the stakeholders’ and regulators’ expectations from him? How can he fulfill those expectations in the absence of any effective powers? How does he redress the wrong doings? How much trust should be placed on the information presented to him? How much reliance should be placed on experts, such as lawyers, auditors or valuers? What is the extent of due diligence he should carry out? What is the time he should provide to each company where he is an ID? What should be his remuneration? What is he ultimately liable for? Lack of clarity in these areas will only scare away good talent from taking up the position of an ID, and becoming a scapegoat for the misdeeds of management. The Companies Bill with all its good intention to ensure good corporate governance, does not provide any concrete answers to all the above doubts of IDs.
The office of the ID should neither be a bed of roses, nor a bed of thorns. Everyone agrees with that, but there is no agreement on what is the right balance.
A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 109 dated June 11, 2013
Presently, banks can offer facility to repatriate export related remittances by entering into standing arrangements with Online Payment Gateway Service Providers (OPGSP) for export of goods and services for value not exceeding US $ 3,000 per transaction.
This circular has increased this limit from US $ 3,000 to US $ 10,000 per transaction. Hence, banks can now offer facility to repatriate export related remittances by entering into standing arrangements with Online Payment Gateway Service Providers (OPGSP) for export of goods and services for value not exceeding US $ 10,000 per transaction.
Incorporation of the Corporate Social Responsibility Provision in the New Companies Bill
Filing of Balance Sheet and Profit and Loss Account in XBRL mode for the financial year commencing on or after 01.04.2011.
A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 63 dated 20th December, 2012 External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) for Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs) and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) – engaged in micro finance activities under Automatic Route
Succession Documents
Introduction
Relevance of various Documents
Table-1 shows the different Succession Documents and their applicability to various situations. Let us now examine each one of them in detail.
Meaning: A probate means the copy of the will certified by the seal of a Court. Probate of a will establishes the authenticity and finality of a will and validates all the acts of the executors. It conclusively proves the validity of the will and after a probate has been granted, no claim can be raised about the genuineness or otherwise of the will. A probate is different from a succession certificate. Thus, a probate is granted by a Court only when a will is in place.
Necessity: According to the Indian Succession Act, no right as an executor or a legatee can be established in any Court unless a Court has granted a probate of the will under which the right is claimed. This provision applies to all Christians and to those Hindus, Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists who are/whose immovable properties are situated within the territory of West Bengal or the Presidency Towns of Madras and Bombay. Thus, for Hindus, Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists who are /whose immovable properties are situated outside the territories of West Bengal or the Presidency Towns of Madras and Bombay, a probate is not required. It also applies to Parsis who are/whose immovable properties are situated within the limits of the High Courts of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay. However, absence of a probate does not debar the executor from dealing with the estate.
Procedure: To obtain a probate, an application needs to be made to the relevant court along with the original will. The executor has to disclose the names and addresses of the heirs of the deceased. Once the Court receives the application for probate, it would invite objections, if any, from the relatives of the deceased. The Court would also place a public notice in a newspaper for public comments. The petitioner would also have to satisfy the Court about the proof of death of the testator and the proof of the will. Proof of death could be in the form of a death certificate. However, in case of a person who is missing or has disappeared, it may become difficult to prove ‘death’. U/s. 108 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, any person who is unheard of or missing for a period of seven years by those who would have naturally heard of him if he had been alive, is presumed to be dead unless otherwise proved to be alive.
On being satisfied that the will is indeed genuine, the Court would grant probate specimen of the probate is given in the Act) under its seal. The probate would be granted in favour of the Executor/s named under the Will. The Supreme Court has held in the cases of Lalitaben Jayantilal Popat v Pragnaben J Kataria (2008) 15 SCC 365 and Syed Askari Hadi Ali v State (2009) 5 SCC 528, that while granting probate, the Court must not only consider the genuineness of the will but also the explanations, objections and proof given by the parties of the suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the ‘Will’. The onus of proving the will is on the propounder. The propounder has to prove the legality, execution and genuineness of the will by proving absence of suspicious circumstances and also proving the testamentary capacity and the signature of the testator. When suspicious circumstances are said to exist the onus is on the propounder to explain their non-existence to the court’s satisfaction and only when such onus is discharged the court would accept the will and grant probate – K. Laxman v T. Padmining (2009) 1 SCC 354. Probates can be granted after a minimum time of 7 days from the death of a person. No maximum period has been specified. A registered Will improves the chances of getting a Probate faster. In the case of a registered Will, no one can allege that the Will is fraudulent. However, registration does not mean that it is the last Will of the deceased. Hence, a challenge on the count of it not being the last Will remains open.
Opposition: If any relative, heir of the deceased, or other person feels aggrieved and objects to the grant of a probate, then he must file a caveat before the Court opposing the will. Once a caveat has been filed, the Courts would hear the aggrieved party and he would have to prove that he would have a share in the estate of the testator if he had died intestate.
Why does one need a probate? One of the questions which almost always arises is “why is the probate required?” A probate is a certificate from the High Court certifying the genuineness and finality of the will. Some of the reasons why a probate is required are as follows:
• It is necessary to prove the legal right of a legatee under a will in a court.
• Some listed / limited companies insist on a probate for transmission of shares.
• Similarly, some co-operative housing societies insist on a probate for transmission of the flat.
• The Registrar of Sub-Assurances would insist on a probate usually for registration of immovable properties.
However, it would not be correct to say that no transfer can take place without a probate. There are several companies, societies, etc., which do transfer shares, flats, etc., even in the absence of a probate. They may, as a precaution, insist upon a release deed from the other heirs in favour of the legatee who is the transferee. Sometimes, the company/society also insist on an indemnity from the legatee in its favour against any possible claims/law suits from the other heirs of the deceased.
Effect: A probate of a Will when granted establishes the Will from the death of the testator and validates all intermediate acts carried out by the executor. It is conclusive evidence of the representative title of the executor – Harmusji v Dosabhai ILR 12 Bom 164.
Special Factors : Some of the rules in respect of obtaining a probate are as under:
(a) For obtaining a probate, the applicable court fee stamp would be payable as per the rates prescribed in different states. For instance, for obtaining a probate in the city of Mumbai, the application has to be made to the Bombay High Court and the court fee rates prescribed under the Bombay Court-Fees Act, 1959 would apply which are as follows:
(b) A probate cannot be granted to a minor or a person of an unsound mind.
(c) If there are more than one executors, then the probate can be granted to all of them simultane-ously or at different times.
(d) If a will is lost since the testator’s death or it has been destroyed by accident and not due to any act of the testator and a copy of the will has been preserved, then a probate may be granted on the basis of such a copy until the original or an authenticated copy has been produced. If a copy of the will has not been made or a draft has not been preserved, then a probate can be granted on its contents or of its substance, if the same can be proved by evidence.
(e) A probate petition requires the following con-tents:
• A copy of the will or the contents of the will in case the will has been lost, mislaid, destroyed, etc.
• The time of the testator’s death – proof of death.
• A statement that the will is the last will and testament of the deceased and that it was duly executed.
• Details and value of assets mentioned or covered in the Will for purposes of computing the Court Fees.
(v) A statement that the petitioner is the executor of the will.
(vi) That the deceased had a fixed place of residence or some property within the jurisdiction of the Judge where the application is moved.
(vii) It must be verified by at least one of the witnesses to the will. It must be signed and verified by the petitioner and his lawyer.
Letters of Administration
Meaning: When a person dies intestate, i.e., without making a will, then in order to succeed to the property of the deceased, the heir(s) would require letters of administration. If the deceased was a Hindu, Muslim, Buddhist, Sikh or Jain, then the Letters may be granted to any person who according to the Rules for Intestate Succession is entitled to succeed to the estate of the deceased. If more than one person is entitled, then the Court would be at discretion to grant the letters to one or more of them. If no person applies for such Letters, then the Court can grant them even to a creditor of the deceased. In case the intestate belonged to any community other than that specified above, say, Parsis, Christians, etc., then the Indian Succession Act, 1925 lays down a separate set of rules for granting letters of administration.
Other Situations when Letters are granted: Under one situation, letter of administration may also be granted in case there is a Will. If a Will has been probated in a Court outside the State of residence of the deceased or in a Foreign Court and a properly authenticated copy of such a Will is produced, then ‘letter of administration’ may be granted on the basis of copy of the Will and probate e.g., a Hindu’s Will is probated in London and it includes property situated in Mumbai. Letters may be granted in respect of such a probated Will.
Some of the other scenarios when letter of administration may be granted are as follows:
• In case an executor of a Will fails to take up his executorship or if a valid executor has not been appointed or if the executor dies before the testator and there is no successor executor, then instead of a probate letters of administration would be required.
• Again if no Will is produced but there is a reason to believe that there exists a Will, then letters of administration may be granted as a stop gap arrangement till such time as the Will is produced.
• When executor is absent from State in which application for probate is made.
• When minor is a sole executor.
• Where residuary legatee survives the testator but dies before the estate has been fully bequeathed.
• Where executor cannot be found and residuary legatee cannot be identified, then it is treated as if the deceased died intestate.
Effect: Letters of administration entitle the administration (i.e., the person in whose name the letters are granted) to all the rights belonging to the deceased as if he been granted those rights immediately on his death. However, they do not validate any acts of the administrator which tend to damage the estate of the deceased. They have effect over all the property and estate, whether movable or immovable of the deceased throughout the State in which they have been granted. They are conclusive as to the representative title against all debtors of the deceased and all persons holding property which belong to the deceased. They afford full indemnity to his debtors and persons delivering up such property to the holder of the letters.
Ineligibility: Letters cannot be granted to a minor, person of unsound mind, etc.
Application: An application for letters of administration should be made to the District Judge of the district in which the deceased had a fixed abode at the time of his death. The petition shall be made stating amongst other things, the time and place of death, his family members, details of assets of the deceased, right which petitioner claims etc. The application must also state that to the best of the belief of the applicant, no other application has been made for grant of letters. Letters can be granted after a minimum time of 14 days from the death of a person. No maximum time has been specified. An appeal against the District Judge’s Order lies to the High Court. However, High Court also has concurrent jurisdiction with District Judge and hence, in the cities of Mumbai, Kolkatta and Chennai, the High Court would exercise the jurisdiction.
Opposition: If any relative, heir of the deceased, other person feels aggrieved by the grant of letters, then he must file a caveat before the Court opposing the application. Once a caveat has been filed, the Courts would hear the aggrieved party and the party would have to prove that he would have a share in the estate of the intestate.
Succession Certificate
Meaning: A succession certificate is a certificate granted by a High Court in respect of any debt due to the deceased or securities owned by him. In case the deceased died living behind a will which only empowered the beneficiaries to collect his debts and securities, then the courts would grant a succession certificate instead of a probate. It merely empowers the grantee to collect the debts owed to the deceased. A succession certificate would not be granted if the Indian Succession Act mandatorily requires a probate or letters of administration. Thus, a succession certificate cannot be granted in respect of a flat in a co-operative society of the deceased. It can be used only for debts and securities and no other type of property. Thus, it would cover dues, shares, debentures, provident fund balances, etc.
Application: An application for a succession certificate must be made, along with the payment of requisite Court fees, to a District Judge giving inter alia the following particulars:
• Proof of death and time of death of the de-ceased
• Proof of ordinary residence of deceased
• Details of family members
• Right in which the petitioner claims
• Details of Debts and securities in respect of which the certificate is applied for.
If the Judge is satisfied, then he would grant a succession certificate. The certificate would specify the debts and securities set forth in the application and would empower the recipient of succession certificate to receive interest or dividends and/or negotiate or transfer all or any of the specified securities.
A certificate may be revoked if it was proved that the same was obtained by fraud, the application was defective, etc.
An appeal can be filed to the High Court against the District Judge’s order granting, refusing or revoking the certificate.
Effect of succession certificate: A certificate granted would have validity throughout India. The certificate granted with respect to the debts and securities specified in the certificate, shall be conclusive as against the persons owing such debts or liable on such securities. Further, it affords full indemnity to all persons as regards all payments made, or dealings had, in good faith, with the certificate holder in respect of the debts or securities of the deceased.
Legal Heir Certificate
Meaning: A legal heir certificate or a certificate of heirship is a different kettle of fish altogether and is sometimes required. It is granted under the Bombay Regulation No. VIII of 1827, a pre-independence Order of the then Governor General of India. This is a requirement which several legal practitioners are also unaware about and practically, it can be quite a task to obtain one. Generally, it is issued by a tehsildar. However, in the city of Mumbai, the City Civil Court would issue such a certificate.
It is issued to provide formal recognition of heirs, executors and administrators and for appointment of administrator and managers of the deceased’s property by the courts. The Regulation states that it is generally desirable that the heirs, executors or legal administrators of persons deceased should, unless their right is disputed, be allowed to assume the management or sue for the recovery in Courts of justice. Yet in some cases it is necessary or convenient that such heirs, executors or administrators, in order to give confidence to persons in possession of, or indebted to the estate to acknowledge and deal with them, should obtain a certificate of heir-ship, executorship, or administratorship, from the competent Court.
In Anthony Fernandez and others, 1993(1) Bom.C.R. 580 the Bombay High Court has held that Bombay Regulation VIII of 1827 continues to be in force and the provisions thereof are supplemented in certain respects by the Indian Succession Act, 1925. Conse-quently, an application for recognition of a person as an heir of the deceased can be made under this Regulation.
Effect of Certificate: If an heir is desirous of having his legal heir right formally recognised by a Court in order that it is safer when he deals with persons, then he can apply to the Court for recognition as the ‘legal heir’. The Judge would then invite objections within one month from the date of Notice. If the Judge is satisfied that there are no objections or they are not sufficient, then he would grant recognition in the form of a Certificate in the form contained in Appendix B to the Regulations. The Certificate would regonise the person named as the legal heir, executor or administrator of the deceased.
An heir, executor or administrator, holding a proper certificate, may do all acts and grant all deeds competent to a legal heir, executor or administrator, and may sue and obtain judgment in any Court in that capacity.
An heir, executor or administrator, holding a certificate, shall be accountable for his acts done in that capacity to all persons having an interest in the property, in the same manner as if no certificate has been granted.
Certificate creates No Title: R.8 provides that the Certificate confers no right to the property, but only indicates the person who, for the time being, is in the legal management thereof, the granting of such certificate shall not finally determine nor injure the rights of any person; and the certificate shall be an-nulled by the Court, upon proof that another person has a preferable right.
In Aloysius Manuel D’souza v Mary Kamala William Manuel D’souza, 2006(6) Bom.C.R. 56(O.S.), a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court held that the grant of heirship certificate does not establish the right of a party in property of the deceased by itself. The right, if any, of a person claiming ownership in the property of the deceased are not taken away by grant of an heirship certificate to an heir. On the other hand, the Regulation makes it clear that heir-ship certificate holder is accountable to all persons having an interest in the property for the acts done by him. Based on the heirship certificate simplicitor the heirship certificate holder cannot be said to have acquired any right, title or interest in the estate of the deceased.
In Group Grampanchayat v Sunanda Shamrao Bandishti, 2011 (5) Bom.C.R. 162, it was held that the grant of an heirship certificate to the respondents would not in any way affect the right, title or interest, if there be any, of the petitioner in any of the properties of the deceased. In proceedings for heirship certificate, the Court is not required to determine title of the deceased to any property. It is required only to consider whether the persons claiming heirship certificate are heirs of the deceased. If any person comes forward to claim nearer kinship than the applicants, the rival claims for the applicant and the person claiming nearer kinship and to be an heir would be considered by the Court. The Court may decline to grant heirship certificate to an applicant and come to the conclu-sion that the applicant is not an heir of the deceased or that there are other nearer kins who are entitled to the heirship certificate. The question of title to the property allegedly held by the deceased is alien to such enquiry. Whether the deceased had any title to the property is not and indeed cannot be decided by the Court in an application for ‘heirship certificate’ made under the Regulation.
Required For: It may be required for transferring electricity meter, telephone connection, bank account, etc., of the deceased in the name of the legal heir. It may also be required if a person is buying property belonging to the deceased to establish that the sellers are the true legal heirs.
One other important area where the legal heir certificate is required is for efiling the Income-tax Return of the deceased u/s. 159 of the Income-tax Act. Thus, for the period starting from 1st April of the year in which the assessee expired till the date of death, his legal representative would be assessed u/s. 159. A new feature has been introduced in case of efiling for registering the legal heir to do efiling on behalf of the deceased assessee. The documents required for registering a person as a legal heir are copy of the Death Certificate, Copy of PAN card of the deceased, Self attested PAN card copy of the heir and the legal heir certificate. Thus, this cumbersome certificate is required by the Income-tax Department. This is one area where representations need to be made to the CBDT to do away with the requirement of furnishing a legal heir certificate for efiling the return of a deceased assessee.
Conclusion
As would be evident from the above discussion, there are several succession documents which one comes across when a person dies. Obtaining them can be quite an arduous task for the family of the deceased. Just as the Government has introduced efiling in several areas, such as, income-tax, service tax, company law, etc., time has come for introducing online applications for several of these documents. If that is too much to ask then let us have a separate fast track Court dedicated to obtaining all these succession documents. Why not have an one-stop shop concept for all things related to succession? Till such time as India reaches an utopian situation, I leave you with my modified version of the famous saying, “Where there is a Will, there is a Way” : I conclude by saying:
“Where there is a Death, there is a Succession,
Where there is a Succession, there may be an Argument,
And if there is an Argument, there is a need for a Succession Document!!”
Independent Directors in the New Landscape Part -2
Revision of Stamp Duty on Registration of Articles of Association in Kerala State
Stamp Duty payable for registration of Articles of Association in Kerala revised from Rs.1,000/- to Rs.10,000/- with effect from 01-04-2013 vide THE KERALA FINANCE BILL 2013.
Companies ( Acceptance of Deposits Amendments) Rules 2013
“(x) any amount raised by the issue of bonds or debentures secured by the mortgage of any fixed assets referred to in Schedule VI of the Act excluding intangible assets of the Company or with an option to convert them into shares in the Company:
Provided that in the case of such bonds or debentures secured by the mortgage of fixed assets referred to in Schedule VI of the Act excluding intangible Assets the amount of such bonds or debentures shall not exceed intangible assets the amount of such bonds or debentures shall not exceed the market value of such fixed assets : Rule 11A of “The regional director of the Department of Company Affairs shall be authorised officer to make complaints under s/s. (2) of section 58AAA of the Act.”
is substituted as follows:
“The Regional Director or Registrar of Companies or any other officer of the Csdddddentral Government shall be authorised to make complaints under s/s. (2) of section 58AAA of the Act.
“Full version of the Circular can be accessed on http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/noti_ Rules_20130010_dated_21mar2013.pdf
A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 98 dated 9th April, 2013
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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 96 dated 5th April, 2013
Memorandum of Instructions governing money changing activities
This circular permits Authorised Money Changers (AMC) to sell, to foreign tourists/visitors, Indian rupees against International Credit Cards/International Debit Cards and obtain prompt reimbursement for the same through normal banking channels.
CIRCULAR 1 OF 2013 – D/o IPP F. No. 5(1)/2013-FC.I Dated the 05-04-2013
Consolidated fdi policy
The Government of India Ministry of Commerce & Industry Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion (FC Section) has issued a new Circular laying down the Consolidated FDI Policy. This Circular replaces the earlier Circular and is effective from 5th April, 2013.
Zenith Infotech – A Mini-Satyam? — Disturbing Findings and an Unprecedented SEBI Order
The unprecedented nature of the SEBI Order is that the SEBI has ordered the Board of Directors to give what is effectively a personal guarantee to SEBI, for an amount to cover those funds that have been used for purposes other than for which approval of shareholders was given.
Facts as per Order of SEBI
The Zenith case has been in the news for more than a year now. But a brief summary of the allegations leading to this Order may be worth recounting. It appears that Zenith was not in a position (despite supposedly having large liquid assets in its balance sheet) to repay the first tranche of its FCCBs that had become due for repayment. This, incidentally, caused default of 2nd of FCCBs tranche too on account of acceleration clause. To meet these liabilities, the Company approached shareholders for obtaining their approval for raising large sums of monies by borrowings and through sale of its divisions. SEBI states in its Order that the Company specifically communicated to shareholders that raising of funds through this manner was for repayment of FCCBs. Pursuant to this, the Company sold a division. This sale was in a fairly convoluted way for reasons not clear from the Order. More curiously, this also involved a series of related party transactions. Apparently, the division was first sold to a related party where the Promoters had a 60% stake. It appears (if one reads this Order with certain press reports), the division was eventually sold to a foreign entity.
However, the net sale proceeds of $ 48 million even through this route were not wholly and directly received by the Company. They were only partly received by the Company and the rest by a foreign subsidiary. Zenith received $21 million while the foreign subsidiary received $ 27 million. The Order states that such amount was paid to the foreign subsidiary “as consideration for Software & Intellectual Property Rights of MSD Division held by it”. A further consideration in the form of 15% of shares of another Company with the value of such shares, as stated by Zenith, was $7.4 million, was paid, again, to the foreign subsidiary.
Even after receipt of monies, these were used for payment mainly to related parties for purposes not wholly clear, for payment to creditors (not FCCBs holders) and purchase of capital assets. In other words, as SEBI alleges, not a rupee was paid to FCCBs holders.
Worse, SEBI alleges that the Company made several misleading/false statements and omissions though eventually it admitted the facts. The share price halved twice, once till the date of Company making disclosure and again after such date. In barely a few months, the price of the shares reduced from 190 to 45.
There were other allegations of false disclosures/ non-disclosures under the listing agreement, the SEBI Insider Trading Regulations, etc. Legal proceedings by the FCCBs holders for winding up, etc. are before the court.
Order of SEBI
SEBI passed an interim order directing two things. Firstly, it banned the specified Promoters from accessing the capital markets and dealing in securities.
Secondly, it directed the Board of Directors of the Company to give a bank guarantee in favor of SEBI within 30 days for the amount of $ 33.93 million allegedly diverted for uses other than repayment of FCCBs. The guarantee shall be valid for at least one year during which SEBI may invoke it to compensate the Company in case of adverse findings.
As is discussed later, the Board is not allowed to use the assets of the Company for giving this guarantee making it like a personal guarantee. As the Order states, the Board shall give such guarantee “without using the funds of ZIL or creating any charge on assets of ZIL”.
Effectiveness of laws in such situations
The manner in which the transactions were carried out raises questions once again as to the effectiveness of laws relating to companies. The Company allegedly used funds for purposes other than for what the shareholder approved. However, the consequences of this are curious. Firstly, this does not necessarily mean that the transactions carried out are null and void. Secondly, it is arguable that such transactions can be ratified in a subsequent general meeting and since the Promoters held 64% shares, this should have been easy. Thirdly, the punitive consequences under the Act on the Company, its Board and the Promoters are not stringent. This is of course assuming that the payments were genuine and not diversion/siphoning off of the funds as SEBI alleges. SEBI states:-
“…I note that the promoters/directors of ZIL have in a devious manner attempted to take away the assets of a listed company directly and indirectly for their own benefit or for benefit of entities owned and controlled by them. Such conduct of promoters /directors not only defeats the whole purpose of seeking shareholders’ approval for crucial decisions but also jeopardises the integrity of the securities market.”
However, even if there was diversion/siphoning off, there are no quick remedies for recovery of the monies, repayment to creditors and punishing the directors/promoters concerned.
The provisions concerning related party transactions again get highlighted. The restrictions on them seem flimsy in law and even flimsier in enforcement. Often, companies may get away by mere disclosure.
Direction to the Board of Directors to give guarantee
Coming to the SEBI direction for bank guarantee, many things are curious. Does SEBI have the power in the circumstances to direct the Board to give such a bank guarantee without using the Company funds? On first impression, this appears not only justified but the only appropriate way. The shareholders had authorised the Board to use the sale proceeds for repayment of FCCBs. However, they were used for other purposes. Thus, the Board ought to compensate the Company and for this purpose, giving a bank guarantee that SEBI may invoke to compensate the Company or perhaps directly the FCCBs holders may make sense. Nonetheless, several questions arise.
• Firstly, does SEBI have such powers at all? The powers are to be seen from several angles. Whether SEBI has the have power to punish/ remedy a violation of a provision of the Companies Act, 1956? Whether it has the power to direct the Board of Directors in this manner?
• Secondly, can it direct the Board of Directors as a whole without making a specific finding that it was they who approved such uses of funds? Or that they were negligent in monitoring the use of such funds?
• Thirdly, why not allow the Company, at least as an alternative, to get the funds back? Why insist only on a guarantee?
• Fourthly, even if assuming that the funds were used for other purposes, what if such uses were genuine? For example, if the funds were used for payment to creditors, acquisition of capital assets, etc. There are no findings on record thatthese were bogus, just that these purposes were not for which the Company took approval.
• Fifthly, what if the Company had (and still can, though this is highly unlikely now) obtained ratification of shareholders which, considering the 64% holding of Promoters, would have been quite easy?
• Sixthly, is an Order to the Board as a whole without making a finding of role of the Promoters on one hand and the non-promoter directors on the other, fair and valid? How would it be enforced and punitive action taken, if they are unable to provide such a guarantee? Will the liability be joint and several?
Role of Auditors
While the Order, perhaps because it is directed towards role of the Board, does not discuss the Auditors’ role, if any. However, several press reports had stated that as per the audited accounts, the Company had huge amount of liquid assets, which was more than the total liability under both the tranches of the FCCBs. The Company still defaulted and in fact proposed to raise further funds.
While the SEBI Order does not discuss this, the memory of the Satyam’s case is too recent and one remembers how a large amount of liquid assets shown in that case turned out to be not genuine. One will have to see whether there are any problems in this case too and the implications on this on the role of the Auditors.
All in all, this case, assuming many of the allegations are found true, presents a murky and sordid state of affairs in listed companies and the ineffectiveness of laws, even though they are many and complex.
The case is likely to result in further developments soon, since SEBI has provided post-decision hearing and SEBI may pass a revised order. 30 days are given to the Board to furnish this guarantee and it is possible that they are unable to so provide. It appears quite likely that the Promoters/ Board may appeal to SAT. It will be worth seeing whether this case creates good precedents in law for keeping malpractices in check or it again shows that the action and remedies will be prolonged and perhaps finally ineffective for some or all of the parties who have lost money.
PART C: Informati on on & Around
The Bhopal hospital has been at the centre of a long standing controversy over carrying out drug trials on poor gas victims but had refused to reveal information claiming confidentiality of the client- the drug companies, the hospital and the patients. The CIC has over-ruled the objections by the hospital and ordered it to reveal all information.
The hospital also contended that the trials were conducted when it was run by a trust – an autonomous body – and was not getting any grants from the Central or the State Government. It noted that the hospital had been taken over by the Government only in July 2010 since when the RTI rules should apply.
The CIC held, “Even if the patients do not agree to disclosure of the requested information, it is still open to this Commission to order disclosure of information in the larger public interest.”
Police Manual:
Maharashtra Chief Information Commissioner, Ratnakar Gaikwad has set at rest the prolonged debate over whether the Police Manual is confidential or otherwise. In a land mark order, Gaikwad held that within the meaning of the Right to Information Act, the Police Manual is not a confidential document and copy of it should be provided to applicant P K Tiwari.
“The police manual does not fall within the category of documents, which have been exempted from disclosure. The applicant should be allowed to inspect the manual and be provided the relevant papers. The director general of police should put up the entire manual on the website of the state police within a month.” Gaikwad said in his two page order.
“Taking into consideration the provisions of Section 8 of the RTI Act, it appears that refusal to provide the police manual is wrong. The view taken by the public information officer is contrary to the spirit of the RTI Act. It is essential for the common man to know the provisions of the police manual. Competent authorities should put up all such information on the website in larger public interest,” Gaikwad observed.
Motor Vehicles Tax:
The activist Sujit Nadkarni stumbled upon the scam under which the dealers of vehicles dupe the Government. The Modus operandi was
• On sale of a car, give customer a tax invoice showing that motor vehicle tax has been paid.
• Make a facsimile of the invoice, watering down the actual cost of the car and tax payable on it.
• Give the first invoice to the customer, and the second to the Government
• Pocket the difference in the amount, duping both customer and state exchequer
It was experienced by Nadkarni that when he purchased a Maruti Swift VDI on 30th March, 2008, he was issued an invoice, which said the car’s actual price was Rs. 4,35,886 and the final amount after taxes Rs. 4,90,349.
Nadkarni, however, noticed that another copy of the invoice was prepared by the car dealer for submission to the road transport authorities. The price of the car in this copy was shown as Rs. 4,21,766, while the final amount was Rs. 4,74,487.
While selling the car to Nadkani, the car dealer prepared two invoices with same number, one for the customer and the other for submission to RTO. The motor vehicle tax of Rs. 1,110 was thus evaded, although the same was collected by the car dealer from Nadkarni.
Nadkarni then conducted a sample survey of tax evasion by fraudulent invoicing. Under the Right to Information Act, he requested the Nashik RTO to furnish copies of all vehicle invoices sold in the area during 2006, 2007 and 2008.
There was, prima facie, a loss to exchequer of Crores of rupees. The transport commissioner is to conduct a detailed inquiry and file a report,” the division bench of justices A. M. Khanwilkar and A. P. Bhangale ordered.
PART A: Decision of the High Court
The question for consideration in the instant writ petition is whether the petitioner – Chandigarh University is “Public Authority” within the meaning of Section 2(h) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 (the “RTI Act”). The State Information Commission, Punjab had, by an Order dated 14.12.2012, answered such question in the affirmative. It is this order dated 14.12.2012, passed by the State Information Commission, Punjab that has been impugned before this Court.
Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, at the very outset, conceded that the petitioner- University was a creation by law made by the State Legislature i.e. the Punjab University Act, 2012 of the State of Punjab (Act No.7 fo2012). Learned counsel however, strenuously argued that the petitioner would not fall within the definition of ‘public authority’ u/s. 2(h) of the RTI Act. In furtherance of this submission, it was urged that the statements of objects and reasons of the Act have to be read with the provisions contained in the Act itself, while interpreting the provision. Reliance in this regard was placed upon a judgment of the Apex court in Rameshwar Parshad etc. vs. State of U.P. & others, AIR 1983 SC 383. It was argued that the objective of the RTI Act was not to victimise a private body, person or entity under the garb of eliciting information. The second limb of the argument raised by the learned counsel was that the petitioner University was not an authority or body of self-Government. Much emphasis was laid upon the expression “self-Government” to contend that the same would mean the Office of the Government or State itself which by act of law creates the said “public authority” to carry out the acts and deeds of the State as defined in Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel while impugning the Order dated 14.12.2012, passed by the State Information Commission, Punjab further argued that the petitioner-University is a privately owned and managed Institution which is not re ceiving financial assistance directly or Indirectly from the State and, accordingly, on this count alone cannot be construed as “public authority” as defined under the RTI Act.
The Court observed that there would be no quarrel as regards the first submission raised by the learned counsel that while interpreting the provision of the statute, due emphasis would have to be given to the statement of objects and reasons of the RTI Act. The statement of objects and reasons of the RTI Act indicate that it has “provisions to ensure maximum disclosure and minimum exemption, consistent with the constitutional provisions and effective mechanism for access to information and disclosures by authorities”. The pre-amble to the RTI Act notes that “democracy requires an informed citizenry and transparency of information which are vital to its functioning and also to contain corruption and to hold Governments and their instrumentalities accountable to governed.”
The Court further observed that it is against such background that the provisions of the RTI Act as also definition of “public authority” under Section 2(h) would require to be interpreted. A wider definition would have to be assigned to the expression “public authority” rather than a restrictive one. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Reserve Bank of India vs. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. (1987) 1 SCC 424 noted the importance of the context in which every word is used in the matter of interpretation of statute and held in the following terms:
“Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word of statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place.”
On a plain reading of the provision, the expression “public authority” would include an authority or a body or an institution of self-government established or constituted by a law made by the State Legislature u/s. 2(h)(c) of the RTI Act. The legislature had made a conscious distinction between “by or under” which used in relation to the Constitution and “by” in relation to a Central or State Legislation. As such, it would not be enough for the body to be established under “a Central or State legislation to become a “public authority”. If this be so, then every Company registered under the Companies Act would be a “public authority”. However, this is not the case here. Admittedly, the petitioner-University is a body established by law made by the State Legislature. Clearly, the petitioner would be covered under the scope and ambit of the definition of “public authority” under Section 2(h)(c) of the RTI Act.
The requirement as regards a body being owned, controlled or substantially financed would only apply to the latter part of Section 2(h) of the RTI Act i.e. body falling within the meaning of Section 2(h)(d)(i) or (ii). Once it is shown that a body has been constituted by an enactment of the State Legislature, then nothing more need be shown to demonstrate that such a body is a “public authority” within the meaning of Section 2(h)(c) of the RTI Act.
The Court held that the submission made by the learned counsel to assert that petitioner- University was not a body of a “self-Government” and thereby would not be covered under the expression “public authority”, was also without merit. Self-Government as sought to be portrayed in the pleadings on record and at the stage of arguments would not be a requirement and essential ingredient for invoking the provisions of RTI Act. It would have been a relevant para-meter to fulfil the requirement under Article12 of the Constitution of India in relation to enforcement of the fundamental rights through Courts. The RTI Act, on the other hand, intends to achieve access to information and to provide an effective frame–work for effecting the right to information recognised under Article 19 of the Constitution of India.
For the reasons recorded above, the Court found no infirmity in the impugned Order dated 14.12.2012, passed by the State Information Commission, Punjab holding the petitioner-University was a “public authority” u/s. 2(h) of the RTI Act.
[Chandigarh University vs. State of Punjab & Ors. CWP No. 1509 of 2013 decided on 01.03.2013] [Citation: RTIR I (2013) 353(P&H)]
Related Party Transactions and Minority Rights – Part 1
Related party transactions
(RPTs) that treat shareholders inequitably or oppress minority tend to
damage capital market integrity. Therefore, RPT’s covering both equity
and non-equity transactions, is an important corporate governance and
regulatory issue, dogging the mind of the government. Some inter-company
transactions with 100 per cent owned subsidiaries might present no
great threat of abuse but others where a company has controlling and
minority shareholders, RPT’s can cause significant concern. Around the
world, group structures and concentrated ownership are normal, the
exceptions being the United Kingdom, United States and Australia.
Executive compensation is a key concern in certain jurisdictions,
particularly the United States and this is accompanied by the threat of
financial statement manipulation done in order to retain the job or
maximise compensation.
Every jurisdiction has over a period of
time developed its own mechanism to minimise the abuse of RPT’s, though
there is wide variability in their respective approach. At times, RPT’s
can be economically beneficial and necessary. Therefore, with some
exceptions such as loans to directors, RPTs are rarely banned, in most
jurisdictions. But there is a clear concern globally that such
transactions can be abused by insiders such as executives and
controlling shareholders and hence need to be regulated or monitored.
Searching for the right balance is a difficult but ongoing process which
keeps changing as institutions and economies change.
There are a
number of empirical studies focusing on the relation between the
corporation valuation and cash-flow ownership or control-ownership
wedge. A controlling shareholder often has control of a listed company
but with very few claims on its cash flows. This creates an incentive to
use RPTs to transfer cash to companies in which their rights are
greater. The empirical studies conclude that in general cash-flow
ownership and control-ownership wedge is associated with lower firm
value. Another study shows that the cost of debt financing is
significantly higher for such companies.
Extent of RPT’s in India1
In
India, there has been a tradition of operating through several
companies. The genesis of a multigroup organisation could be traced to
the licensing requirements, labour laws, FDI regulations, financial
structuring, joint ventures, tax planning, etc. For example, because FDI
is prohibited in e-retailing, a local structured entity is set up to
operate at a break-even level on behalf of the investors; and the
profits are retained in the wholesale entity. Subsidiaries are quite
common in the case of real estate companies, as they are the means of
owning a land bank. Whilst there are multiple reasons for group
structures and transactions between them, some of which are absolutely
necessary for various reasons there is no denying that group structures
have also been used to create inequitable treatment of minority
shareholders by the controlling shareholders.
India is
characterised by concentrated ownership and by the widespread use of
company groups, often in the form of pyramids in many different
activities and companies and with a number of levels. One study of the
1470 companies listed on the NSE indicated that as of March 2010
controlling shareholders (i.e. promoters) held 57 per cent of all shares
and institutional shareholders about 20 per cent (Bhardwaj, 2011). One
study (Balasubramanian et al., 2009) of 300 companies indicated that 142
included a shareholder with an ownership stake higher than 50 per cent.
A further 100 included a shareholder holding 30-50 per cent of the
equity. The actual holdings are likely to be more since holdings are
often hidden in other corporate bodies in a pyramid structure or in
benami names.
Ownership of Indian listed companies
| Largest shareholder ownership stake | Number of firms | Per cent |
|---|---|---|
| 75% and more | 19 | 7 |
| 50.01%-74.9% | 123 | 43 |
| 40.01%-50% | 61 | 21 |
| 30.01%-40% | 42 | 15 |
| 20.01%-30% | 26 | 9 |
| Up to 20% | 18 | 6 |
1The statistical information is sourced from the OECD report Related
Party Transactions and Minority Shareholder Rights Of the firms sampled
by Balasubramanian et al. (2009), 165 of them (a little over a half) are
part of an Indian business group which includes one or more other
public firms. Another study states that in 2006, 2922 companies were
affiliated with 560 Indian owned groups, a predominant majority of these
identified with specific families (Sarkar, 2010, p. 299).
Concentrated
ownership and group company structures are associated with a particular
structure of boards. One study found that 40 per cent of Indian
companies had a promoter on the board and in over 30 per cent of cases
they also served as an executive director (Chakrabarti et al., 2008, p.
17). Executives of one group company often serve on the boards of other
group companies as outside directors. Potentially concerning, Sarkar
reports that independent directors are also related to company groups,
with about 67 per cent of their directorships in group affiliates, and
notably 43 per cent of directorships concentrated within a single group.
are not only widespread in India but are also of significant value. An
analysis of company reports by the stock exchanges of 50 companies
indicates that loans, advances, and guarantees account for a high
percentage of net worth of the reporting companies, with subsidiaries
and associated companies accounting for the bulk (see Annexure 2). Key
management personnel, individuals and relatives accounted for an
insignificant share. One study of over 5000 firms for the period 2003-05
reported that most RPTs occurred between the firm and “parties with
control” as opposed to management personnel that is typically seen in
the United States (Chakrabarti et al., 2008).
Some studies
suggest that RPTs have been detriment to the interest of minority
shareholders and to valuations of those companies. Using a sample of 600
of the 1000 largest (by revenues) listed companies in 2004, one study
found that firm performance is negatively associated with the extent of
RPTs for group firms (Chakrabarti et al., 2008).
It is clear that
the structure and ownership of Indian listed companies creates
incentives that, is conducive to RPT’s. This could result in short
changing the minority and compromising their rights. Therefore, it has
to be balanced by corporate governance arrangements, company law,
financial regulations and regulatory environment.
An Expert
Committee (popularly known as JJ Irani Committee) to advise the
Government of India on the new Company Law was set up by the Ministry of
Company Affairs vide Order dated 2nd December, 2004. This eventually
culminated in the Companies Bill, which at the time of writing this
article has been passed by the Lok Sabha and is awaiting passing at the
Rajya Sabha and the final assent of the President of India. The
Companies Bill contains significant provisions to regulate RPT’s, many
of which are discussed in this article. Clause 49 of the listing
agreement contains SEBI’s corporate governance norms which includes
matters relating to RPT’s though they are not as comprehensive as the
Companies Bill.
Who is a related party?
One of
the biggest challenges in regulating RPT’s is defining a related party. A
related party obviously is someone with whom there is a special
relationship. Transactions are entered into with the related party which
may not be at arm’s length, and causes gain to the controlling
shareholders and loss to the minority shareholders. Whilst a spouse is a
related party, a close friend is not a related party under the
Companies Act. Marriage is a legal relationship and hence easy to prove,
friendship is not a legally solemnized relationship and hence difficult
to prove. Obviously such differences create challenges in defining a
related party. In India, there is a tradition of extended families
unlike in the West. Therefore typically in the western countries a
spouse and dependent children are relatives, but in India the regulators
have taken a more form based approach to define relatives and have
specified innumerable relationship. In the western countries, many would
not know who their daughters son’s wife is; but under Indian
legislation the law would treat them as relatives.
A comparison
of the related party definitions under Companies Bill, Companies Act and
Accounting Standards is provided in Annexure 1. The related parties
have been far more extensively defined under the Companies Bill. The
Companies Bill includes as related parties key managerial persons,
holding-subsidiary relationship, etc which were not hitherto covered
under the Companies Act. However, all three, i.e., the Companies Act,
Companies Bill and AS-18 Related Party Disclosures have deficiencies in
the way related parties are defined.
Example 1 & 2 explain
the deficiencies in the AS-18 definition of related parties, whereas
Example 3 explains the deficiencies in the Companies Bill definition.
Companies Bill requires RPT’s to be approved by a special resolution at
the general meeting, if the transaction is not in the ordinary course
or business or not at arm’s length. No member will be entitled to vote
on such resolution, if such member is a related party. However, it is
not clear which related parties will be considered for this purpose.
Consider Example 4. Subsidiary S intends to make royalty payment to
Parent P. It is clear that P is not entitled to vote on the special
resolution. However, it is not clear if investor A who owns 20% of S and
therefore S is a related party to A, entitled to vote or not. Further,
will it make any difference if A is also a related party to P? None of
these questions are clear under the Bill.
To
sum up, the definition of related party needs to be further tightened.
Further, both Companies Act and Companies Bill takes a form based
approach rather than a substance based approach in defining related
parties; particularly the way relatives are defined. The substance
approach would define relatives as financial dependants; whereas a form
based approach would actually spell out innumerable relations. This is
not particularly helpful, if one were to keep in mind, that crooks can
circumvent any law. They can use employees, friends, cooks, maids and
drivers to abuse the law. It is not possible for any legislation to
legislate beyond a point. Legislation cannot be a substitute for
stronger enforcement. Any attempt to substitute stronger enforcement
with legislation would only result in bad and cumbersome laws. Not to
forget there are unintended consequences of bad legislations, for
example, purchase of a share of a company by a distant relative with
whom one may have lost contact, could disqualify the person from being
an auditor or independent director of that company.
Which RPT’s are covered?
The
Companies Bill like the Companies Act contains restrictions over both
equity and non equity RPT’s. The non equity transactions covered under
the Companies Bill are far more comprehensive than the Companies Act and
practically covers almost all transactions (see Annexure 1). The BOD
has to consent to the RPT’s under both the Companies Act and the Bill.
The Companies Bill specifically casts a duty on independent directors to
ensure that adequate deliberations are held before approving RPT’s and
assure themselves that the same are in the interest of the company.
Materiality
thresholds are clearly necessary in establishing an efficient
management regime for RPTs. Care needs to be taken to ensure that a
material transaction does not escape regulation by breaking it into a
transaction of several small amounts. Under the Bill the requirements to
obtain a special resolution apply to a company whose paid up capital or
the RPT value is beyond a threshold amount. Those thresholds will be
prescribed by the rules, which are not yet exposed/published. U/s. 297
of the Companies Act, a company with a paid up share capital of not less
than Rs 1 crore, was required to take previous approval of the Central
Government.
The requirement of section 297 of the Companies Act
does not apply to purchase/sales which were made by cash at prevailing
market prices. Similarly, clause 188 of the Companies Bill does not
require a company to take a special resolution of non related parties on
a RPT, if that transaction was entered into in the ordinary course of
business and was at arm’s length. It is not clear when a transaction
would be not in the ordinary course of business. Given that the Bill was
heavily influenced by what happened in the case of Satyam, an example
of a transaction not in the ordinary course of business may probably be
the proposed transaction of acquisition of Maytas by Satyam, i.e.
acquisition of a real estate company by a software company.
Given
that a special resolution of disinterested parties is required only
when a transaction is not at arm’s length; there would be considerable
pressure on how the term arms length is interpreted. It is defined under
the Bill as “arm’s length transaction is a transaction between two
related parties that is conducted as if they were unrelated, so that
there is no conflict of interest.” The Indian Income-tax Act also
contains a somewhat similar definition. However, there are too many
questions around what is an arm’s length price. Who will judge what is
an arm’s length price? Can the arm’s length price determined under
Indian Income-tax Act be applied for Company Law purposes as well? What
if the income-tax assessing officer disallows the arm’s length price
determined by the company (for which it had not taken a special
resolution of disinterested parties) – would that mean that the company
has not complied with the requirements of the Bill? What if a continuing
royalty arrangement was approved by the Central Government u/s. 297 of
the Companies Act – would that need a special resolution of the AGM on
the Bill being enacted? The Ministry of Corporate Affairs will need to
provide guidance on these issues.
The Companies Bill also
imposes significant restriction on equity related RPT’s. These are
briefly described below and are set out in greater detail in Annexure 1:
•
Loans/guarantees to directors and connected persons are prohibited both
under the Companies Act and the Bill. However, u/s. 295 of the
Companies Act, loans/guarantees can be extended to directors and
connected persons by obtaining Central Government approval. Under clause
185 of the Companies Bill, loans/guarantees can be extended to
directors/connected persons only in limited circumstances such as when
it is pursuant to a scheme applicable to employees or in the case of
companies whose business is to extend loans.
• Loans and
investments under both the Companies Act and the Companies Bill are
subjected to overall limits of 60% of paid up share capital, free
reserves and securities premium or 100% of free reserves and securities
premium. Under the Companies Act any loan made by a holding company to
its wholly owned subsidiary is exempt. The Companies Bill does not
provide that exemption.
• The Companies Bill contains
restrictions on non-cash transactions involving directors. The Companies
Act does not contain similar restrictions.
• The Companies
Act and the Companies Bill contain several provisions protecting
minority rights, though there are slight differences in the two
legislations. The important provisions are on changing shareholder’s
rights, appointment of directors by small shareholders, the requirement
to have a nomination and remuneration committee and stakeholders
committee, restriction on managerial remuneration and prevention of
oppression and mismanagement.
• The Companies Bill imposes more elaborate responsibilities and duties on audit committees and independent directors.
•
The Companies Bill provides the acquirer with powers to acquire shares
of dissenting minority shareholders in a scheme of merger/amalgamation
at a price determined by a registered valuer. The Companies Act also
contains similar requirements, except that there is no specific
provision for price to be determined by a registered valuer.
Numerous
provisions of SEBI are also designed to protect the interest of
minority shareholders. One such example is the open offer requirement in
the takeover code to provide a reasonable exit option to minority
shareholders.
Related Party Disclosures
AS 18
requires significant disclosures to be made in the financial statements
with respect to RPT’s. AS 18, among other matters, requires disclosure
of “any other elements of the RPT’s necessary for an understanding of
the financial statements.” An example of such a disclosure is an
indication that the transfer of a major asset had taken place at an
amount materially different from that obtainable on normal commercial
terms. However, this disclosure is rarely made.
The Companies
Bill requires disclosure in the BOD’s report of contracts/arrangements
with related parties. The report will also disclose justification for
entering into such transactions. These disclosure requirements are not
contained in the existing Companies Act. It may be noted that the
disclosure requirements under AS-18 and the Companies Bill would be
overlapping, but there are some significant differences. Firstly, there
are differences in the definition of related parties between AS-18 and
the Companies Bill. Secondly, AS-18 does not require to disclose
justification for entering into RPT’s; the Companies Bill requires such a
disclosure. AS-18 disclosures are made in the financial statements,
whereas the Companies Bill disclosures are required in the BOD’s report.
Finally, AS-18 allows aggregation of disclosures, the Companies Bill
does not allow aggregation of disclosures.
The Companies Bill
requires disclosure to the members in the financial statements of the
full particulars of loans given, investments made or guarantee given or
security provided and the purpose for which the loan or guarantee or
security is proposed to be utilised by the recipient of the loan or
guarantee or security. No such requirement exists under the Companies
Act. The Companies Bill also requires every listed company to disclose
in the BOD’s report, the ratio of the remuneration of each director to
the median employee’s remuneration and such other details as may be
prescribed. These disclosure requirements did not exist under the
Companies Act.
Post the Satyam episode, SEBI reacted with, inter
alia, new rules in February 2009 requiring greater disclosure of the
promoter shareholdings and any pledging of shares to third parties.
Those disclosures were found to be very useful by investors and
analysts. SEBI also requires promoters to make disclosures of changes in
their shareholdings to the stock exchanges.
The Duty of the Controlling Shareholders
In
some jurisdictions a controlling shareholder has a fiduciary duty to
other shareholders and the company. An abusive RPT would be against the
interests of non-controlling shareholders and thus represent a breach of
duty. A key feature in many jurisdictions is the duty of controlling
shareholders to other shareholders not to infringe the minority rights.
Such a duty opens another legal way of disciplining RPTs. There is an
oppression remedy in India with 447 cases lodged in 2011/12. However,
the process appears to be quite long with 1170 cases pending as at 31st
March 2012.
The Role of Board of Director’s and Audit Committees
Many
jurisdictions require BOD’s, particularly an independent committee to
play a significant role in minimizing the abuse of RPT’s. An important
aspect of the Corporate Governance framework in India concerning RPT’s
is Clause 49 issued by SEBI. With respect to RPTs, it contains the
following requirements:
• Audit committees shall review annual
financial statements (before submission to the board for approval) with
particular reference to several factors, one of which is disclosure of
RPTs.
• Audit committees shall also review, on a more general
basis, any statements of “significant RPTs (as defined by the audit
committee) submitted by management”.
• Listed companies must
periodically give their audit committees a summary statement of
“transactions with related parties in the ordinary course of business”
as well as details of “material individual (related) transactions that
are ‘not in the normal course of business’ or not done on an arm’s
length basis (‘together with management’s justification for the same’)”.
•
For subsidiaries, a significant transactions report must be given to
the holding company’s board along with the board minutes of the
subsidiary.
• A quarterly compliance report on corporate
governance is required to be submitted to stock exchanges. One element
of this disclosure is the basis of RPT’s. Companies must also include a
section on corporate governance in their annual reports and it is
suggested that they include “disclosures on materially significant RPT’s
that may have potential conflicts with the interests of the company at
large”.
In this regard, the Companies Bill is more stricter and
requires pre-approval by audit committee of RPT’s. The Companies Bill
requires the Audit Committee to approve or modify transactions with
related parties and scrutinize inter-corporate loans and investments.
Further, the Companies Bill gives Audit Committee the authority to
investigate into any matter falling under its domain and the power to
obtain professional advice from external sources and have full access to
information contained in the records of the company.
There are
some safeguards for independent directors in the form of numbers. Thus,
in India, 50 per cent will be independent directors if the chairman is
an executive director or a representative of the controlling
shareholder; otherwise it is a third. There is also at least one
independent director from any holding company on the board of a material
non-listed subsidiary. Another protection of independence is via the
nomination and election of board members.
Director liability is
often put forward as a means of ensuring that directors and especially
independents fulfil their duties. The case of Satyam in India indicates
that liability is, nevertheless still important. The scandal has been a
shock for independent directors, with many resignations in the following
year as they reassessed their liability and damage to reputations.
Indeed, liability is sometimes the least important sanction. In Belgium,
France and Israel, it is reported that independent directors are very
concerned about their reputations.
The Companies Bill contains
numerous penalties on directors, and is more onerous than the Companies
Act. For example, with respect to RPT’s, it will be open to the company
to proceed against a director or any other employee who had entered into
such contract or arrangement in contravention of the requirements for
recovery of any loss sustained by it as a result of such contract or
arrangement. This disgorgement provision was not contained in the
Companies Act. Violating the requirements of clause 188 of the Companies
Bill could also land the director in jail for a period of one year.
Similarly violating the requirements of clause 186 with regards to loan
and investment could land the director in prison for two years. However
with respect to independent director’s liability, the Bill is far from
clear.
Clause 149(12) of the Companies Bill clarifies that
independent directors and other non executive directors shall be liable
only in respect of such acts of omission or commission by a company that
had occurred with his or her knowledge, attributable through Board
processes, and with the consent or connivance or where he or she had not
acted diligently. From this it appears that the clause seeks to provide
immunity to independent director’s from civil or criminal action in
certain cases. However clause 166(2) of the Bill seems to be a
contradiction. It states that the whole Board is required to act in good
faith in order to promote the objects of the company for the benefit of
its members as a whole and in the best interest of the company, its
employees and shareholders, the community, and for the protection of the
environment. This clause narrows the distinction between independent
directors and executive directors and also extends the responsibility of
the directors to protecting the environment and taking care of the
community.
The importance of independent board members around the
world in approving RPTs does raise questions whether independent
directors are really independent. Whether an independent director is
likely to stand against policy determined on a group basis by the very
shareholders who have often elected them? Particularly in India
independent directors see themselves as advisors to controlling
shareholders rather than as watchdogs who will ensure equitable
treatment of all shareholders. If controlling shareholders cease to be
pleased with the efforts of an independent director, such a director can
be certain that his or her term will not be renewed. Most investors
would not regard independent directors as effective in India,
particularly in the case of family owned companies.
The ability
of small shareholders to appoint a director of their choice under the
Indian Companies Act (and the Companies Bill) has been ineffective in
dealing with the issue of providing adequate representation to small
shareholders. This is because small shareholders have not been able to
galvanise themselves to appoint the director. In any case, a single
director appointed by small shareholders on a large board is generally
rendered useless.
The role of Minority shareholders
Taking
shareholders approval is a universal practice with regard to equity
RPTs but less common for non-equity transactions. However, clearly in
the context of concentrated ownership voting per se is not enough. Thus
Italy and Israel and to some extent, on an ex post basis, France, call
for approval only by disinterested shareholders, i.e. the majority of
the minority. Israel has also had to recognise another necessary policy
trade-off. Where there is a small free float there is always a
possibility of hold-up by some minority shareholders who can abuse their
position.
Given that independent directors may not be successful
or only partially successful in minimizing the abuse of RPT’s, two
other options were considered by the JJ Irani Committee. The JJ Irani
Committee deliberated on whether transactions/contracts in which the
company or directors or their relatives are interested should be
regulated through a “Government Approval-based regime” as is the case
under the prevailing Act or through a “Shareholder Approval and
Disclosure-based regime”. The Committee looked into international
practices in this regard and felt that the latter approach would be
appropriate in the future Indian context. SEBI felt that whilst the
shareholder approval was a good way of allowing each company to decide
for themselves, a majority shareholder could easily pass a resolution in
favour of the resolution. At the recommendation of SEBI, the Companies
Bill was drafted to require a special resolution of the company in which
the related party would not be allowed to vote. Whilst this addressed
the issue of oppression of the minority by the majority, concerns were
raised of potential “hold ups” which we discuss in the following
paragraphs.
Oppression of Majority by Minority
In
late 2004, KarstadrQuelle, Germany’s largest department-store operator,
risked bankruptcy without an increase in capital. The crisis got out of
hand after a small group of just six shareholders constituting only
0.24% of the entire share capital took legal action to challenge the
shareholders’ resolution to increase share capital urgently required to
rescue the company. KarstadrQuelle was forced into lengthy negotiations
it could ill – afford before finally reaching a settlement with the
minority shareholders. Under the German law just one minority
shareholder could hold a company to ransom and even ruin a company. A
single shareholder with only one share could block shareholders’
resolutions and put major decisions at risk by delaying plans by months
or even years through filing lawsuits.
Over the years,
Germany witnessed considerable growth in professional blackmailers who
touted themselves as Robin Hoods of the investment world. They rarely
had any interest in the company other than holding one share, so that
they could participate in an AGM tourism, challenge shareholders’
resolutions and arm twisting the companies into a hush settlement. This
had become a lucrative profession for them, nuisance to the companies
and rarely benefitted the minority shareholders. In the 15 years prior
to 2004, the number of shareholders’ suits had increased tenfold in
Germany. Around half of the suits were initiated from the same club of
professional minority investor, who brought about a hundred actions each
year. The German government reacted to the phe-nomenon of extortive
shareholders suits and came out with a new legislation UMAG in 2005
expected to partly remedy the problem of shareholder suits.
India
should learn from this experience of Germany. In the Companies Bill a
special resolution is required of non interested shareholders to approve
RPT’s. Given that the attendance of minority shareholders at AGM is
very low, it is possible that a small group of rabble rousers can expose
companies to the same blackmailing experienced by the German companies.
However, given that RPT’s need a special resolution only when they are
not in the ordinary course of business and not at arm’s length, the
requirement of a special resolution by minority shareholders should not
be seen as a harsh step. Besides, companies can make use of postal
ballot, if they believe that a transaction which is not at arm’s length
is actually good for the company and all its shareholders!
The Role of the Government/Regulator
The
dispensation of the Central Government approval for RPT’s and replacing
it with shareholders approval in the Companies Bill is a step in the
right direction, particularly keeping in mind that India needs to reduce
discretionary powers of the Government, at a time when corruption is at
an all time high. But that does not mean that the Government does not
have any role in the administration of RPT’s. Government should function
as a watchdog and ensure that laws are meaningfully enforced. Thus, in
enforcing the requirements of the Companies Bill, the Government will
have to ensure that the company in question has done the following (a)
interpreted meaningfully what is an arm’s length transaction (b)
provided adequate and sufficient disclosure of the proposed RPT to the
shareholders (c) clearly identified the related parties and the
disinterested parties on the transaction, and (d) followed the right
practices and an effective voting system to seek a special resolution of
the disinterested parties.
Government should ensure that there
is an effective voting system. Shareholder meetings and proxy voting
practices in India like many parts of Asia lack efficiency and
accountability. Voting processes need to be modernised to reflect best
market practices and the growing global interest in active share
ownership. Some investors strongly recommend conducting voting on all
resolutions at AGMs and EGMs by poll rather than by a show of hands that
often occurs at present, and allowing proxies to speak at meetings,
irrespective of whether the company law is amended on this point.
Section
179 of the Companies Act states that “any member or members present in
person or by proxy” may call for a poll if they hold shares in the
company giving them not less than 10 per cent of total voting power.
However, in practice it is often far from straight forward since in
part, some custodian banks will not do so, i.e. request a poll on the
basis of proxies received. Under the Companies Bill important matters
are voted by postal ballots, allowing investors to have their shares
counted on issues of significance. However, at the time of writing this
article the bill was not yet enacted and the rules were not yet exposed;
therefore it was not clear what important matters government would
require postal ballot on.
The problem of enforcement is a more
general one in India. Currently there are more than 3 crore cases
pending in various courts in India. Decade long legal battles are
commonplace in India. In spite of having around 10,000 courts (not
counting tribunals and special courts) India has a serious shortfall of
judges. A dispute contested until all appeals are exhausted can take up
to 20 years for disposal. Automatic appeals, extensive litigation by
government, underdeveloped alternative mechanisms of dispute resolution
like arbitration, and the shortfall of judges all contribute to the
state of affairs in Indian courts. Most important, since the same courts
try both civil and criminal matters, and the latter gets priority,
economic disputes suffer even greater delays.
In order to
improve efficiency of enforcement actions, the MCA proposed to change
the CLB to a Tribunal staffed by commercial professionals such as
lawyers and accountants. However, due to certain provisions with regard
to eligibility conditions and qualification requirements for
Chairpersons/member of the Tribunal, the proposal was successfully
challenged before the Supreme Court in 2010. The directions given by the
Supreme Court have been taken into account in the proposed new Company
Bill. If it is passed as planned a Tribunal will be established.
Tribunals will speed up the justice system, but critics argue that the
quality of justice system could fall further.
Compliance with
Clause 49 has been enforced by both the Bombay (BSE) and National (NSE)
Stock Exchanges. The chosen method appears to be through suspensions
either of a short term nature or in some cases for a considerable
period. De-listing is rarely used as that may not be in the interest of
the minority shareholders. The bulk of the problem appears to be PSU’s
and smaller companies, with the top companies mostly compliant. The
issue for the PSU concerns independent director requirements since SEBI
had earlier ruled that government nominees on PSU boards are not
independent per Clause 49’s requirements.
SEBI has been more
effective in blocking IPOs if companies fail to meet the required
standards, including those relating to RPT’s and loans/guarantees to
group companies. In cases of violation of the Listing Agreement, SEBI
has the power to appoint adjudication officers to levy penalties.
However, until recently even serious offences were consented under
SEBI’s consent mechanism scheme. Only recently SEBI decided not to
consent serious offences such as insider trading or fraudulent and
unfair trade practices, and expose them to the regular justice system.
However, in the absence of any significant powers, such as
“wire-tapping”, SEBI has found it extremely difficult to prove insider
trading cases.
The Special Appellate Tribunal (SAT) is a
statutory body set up to hear appeal against orders passed by SEBI. The
post of presiding officer of the SAT has been lying vacant since
November 2011 due to non availability of a suitable candidate. This was
hampering the smooth functioning of SAT. However, the selection norms
for the presiding officer have been eased and this issue may be soon
resolved. Another interesting perception is that a large number of SEBI
decisions are over ruled by SAT. This perception also needs to be
addressed by SEBI.
Multiple regulators in India is a thorny
issue. The RBI, MCA, SEBI & IRDA have frequent spat with each other.
These turf battles provide regulatory arbitrage to the wrong doers,
besides weakening the legislation and its implementation. The Financial
Sector Legislative Reforms Commission (FSLRC) was constituted by the
Government of India, Ministry of Finance in March 2011, to look into the
legal and institutional structures of the financial sector in India.
The institutional framework governing the financial sector has been
built up over a century. There are over 60 Acts and multiples rules and
regulations that govern the financial sector, some of which are
outdated. The RBI Act and the Insurance Act are of 1934 and 1938 vintage
respectively. The main result of the work of FSLRC is a single unified
and internally consistent draft law that replaces a large part of the
existing Indian legal framework governing finance. This is work in
progress and even if accepted would take several years to implement.
Besides critics believe that a unified regulator in the financial sector
will not solve India’s problem. What may work in India small and
incremental steps, which cumulatively could have a significant impact.
Conclusions
RPT’s
that treat shareholders inequitably is no different from “sophisticated
stealing”. Some investors believe that more needs to be done about the
heart of the problem in India: the accountability of controlling
shareholders (i.e. promoters) to other shareholders. There is not just
one silver bullet that will serve to protect minority rights in the
presence of powerful insiders and potentially abusive RPTs.
India
has done a great deal to develop a sound corporate governance framework
both under the Companies Act and Clause 49 of the listing requirements.
The Companies Bill imposes far greater and onerous responsibility on
companies and independent directors to ensure that the abuse of RPT’s is
minimised. It is a significant step in the right direction and is a
significant improvement over the existing Act. However, there are still
some loose ends that need to be tightened. The definition of related
parties and relatives for one is a problem. The definition should be
sufficiently harmonised with respect to different bodies of law such as
accounting standards and income-tax law to avoid misunderstandings and
an excessive regulatory burden, thereby underpinning better
implementation and enforcement. Besides the Bill is not clear on which
related parties are not allowed to vote on a RPT resolution.
Under
the Companies Bill, the role of the board and its independent directors
is underpinned by the right of shareholders to have a say on certain
material RPT’s. In addition, it will be essential to improve the
efficacy of AGMs by ensuring the effective possibility to call for a
poll vote rather than a show of hands as is being done currently.
Providing minority shareholders right to approve RPT’s s might need to
be accompanied by safeguards to avoid potential hold-ups by a small
number of investors. At the same time appropriate regulatory
intervention is required to ensure that companies interpret the term
“arm’s length transaction” sensibly and that all transactions where
arm’s length price is questionable are brought to the AGM/EGM for
approval.
Finally, lack of meaningful enforcement,
multiple-regulators and an overburdened judicial system remain
significant concerns. While laws and regulations are in place, effective
means of redress is lacking. Steps need to be taken to strengthen law
enforcement by both the MCA/CLB/Tribunal and SEBI and especially to
remove civil cases from the overwhelmed court system. The Companies Bill
should not be seen as a panacea for all the current problems with
regards to minority rights and abusive RPT’s. To avoid circumvention,
continuous and close monitoring by the regulator is absolutely
necessary.
A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 60 dated 14th December, 2012
External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) Policy – Review of all-in-cost ceiling
This circular states that the present all-in-cost ceiling for ECB, as mentioned below, will continue till 31st March, 2013: –
|
Sr. No. |
Average |
All-in-cost |
|
1 |
Three |
350 |
|
2 |
More |
500 |
A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 58 dated 30th September, 2013
External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) Policy — Review of all-in-cost ceiling
This circular states that the present all-in-cost ceiling for ECB, as mentioned below, will continue till 31st March, 2014: –
|
Sr. No. |
Average |
All-in-cost |
|
1 |
Three |
350 |
|
2 |
More |
500 |
Notice dated 10th May, 2013 Format for seeking clarifications of FDI policy issues
Corrigendum dated 16th April, 2013 Consolidated FDI policy
A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 100 dated 25th April, 2013
This circular clarifies that any overseas entity having equity participation directly/indirectly of Indian parties cannot offer financial products linked to Indian Rupee (e.g. non-deliverable trades involving foreign currency, rupee exchange rates, stock indices linked to Indian market, etc.) without obtaining specific approval of RBI since the Indian Rupee is currently not fully convertible and such products could have implications for the exchange rate management of the country.
A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 99 dated 23rd April, 2013
Presently, Navratna Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) and ONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL) and Oil India Ltd (OIL) can invest in overseas unincorporated entities in the oil sector (for exploration and drilling for oil and natural gas, etc.), which are duly approved by the Government of India, without any limits under the automatic route.
This circular permits the Navratna Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) and ONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL) and Oil India Ltd (OIL) can invest in overseas incorporated entities in the oil sector (for exploration and drilling for oil and natural gas, etc.), which are duly approved by the Government of India, without any limits under the automatic route.
Mandatory Imprisonment under Companies Bill 2012
In the recent past, there have been several high profile scams where shareholders, creditors, etc. have suffered without remedy and where, at least under the Companies Act, 1956, it was felt that the culprits could not be adequately punished. This has called for the need to provide for severe punishment to wrongdoers who use the corporate form or who are in-charge of such corporate entity. Some of the punishments proposed in the Bill need to be considered in some detail.
This Chapter XXIX provides for imprisonment and fine for several types of situations. A minimum imprisonment (six months/three years) is also provided in certain cases.
Fraud
Clause 447 provides that any person found guilty of “fraud” shall be punishable with imprisonment of at least six months, which may extend to 10 years and a fine. The fine shall be at least equal to the amount involved but may extend to 3 times such amount. If the fraud involves ‘public interest’, the minimum imprisonment would be 3 years.
The term “public interest” is not defined. The term “fraud” is widely and inclusively defined. It has to be in relation to a company/body corporate, public or private, listed or unlisted.
There should be an intent to deceive, to gain undue advantage from or to injure the interests of specified persons. It includes any act or omission or concealment of any fact or abuse of any position.
The affected persons may be the company, shareholders, creditors or any other person. Thus, if a fraud is committed in relation to a company, the loss that may be caused to any of the specified persons is punishable. Further, the fraud may be committed by any person.
The wordings are so broad that many concerns come to mind. Would a wrongful supply of goods by the company to a customer or by a supplier to the company be deemed to be a ‘fraud’? Would a travel voucher of an employee where he includes certain fake or personal expenditure be treated as fraud?
The intentional act or omission, etc. has to be with an objective of gaining undue advantage from or injure interests of other persons. However, it is specifically provided that such person need not have actually gained any amount and the affected person need not have actually lost any amount.
There are no requirements of minimum amount, materiality, etc. for such act/omission, etc. to be treated as fraud. Thus, each of the acts or omissions that may fit within the fairly broad definition of fraud would, at least in theory, attract such stringent punishment, which, to reiterate, includes minimum mandatory imprisonment.
Other provisions treating certain acts/omissions as fraud
While this is the general and principal provision for “fraud”, there are other provisions in the Bill that refer to this clause and deem certain actions to be “fraud” punishable under Clause 447.
For example, Clause 7 states that furnishing of false information, incorrect particulars or suppression of material information in documents filed with the Registrar in relation to registration of a Company amounts to fraud and is punishable under clause 447.
Clause 8, that corresponds to the present section 25 covering certain non-profit companies, provides that if the affairs of the company were conducted in a fraudulent manner, every officer in default shall be liable for action u/s. 447.
Clause 34 refers to the prospectus issued by a company. If the prospectus, “includes any statement which is untrue or misleading in form or context in which it is included or where any inclusion or omission of any matter is likely to mislead, every person who authorises the issue of such prospectus shall be liable u/s. 447.”
A situation having more frequent application is provided for in clause 36. Essentially, it relates to fraudulent statements made either in connection with purchase, subscription, sale, etc. of securities or obtaining credit facilities from banks or financial institutions. Such person may “either knowingly or recklessly make any statement, promise or forecast which is false, deceptive or misleading, or deliberately conceal any material facts, to induce another person to enter into, or to offer to enter into” such agreements relating to securities or credit. Such acts shall also be punishable under clause 447. For example, making of false statements for obtaining credit facilities from banks or financial institutions will attract such severe punishment. So will making of false statements to shareholders, prospective investors, underwriters, etc. to attract them to buy/sell/underwrite shares of the Company.
There are several more of such provisions in the Bill. Each of them will attract the punishment provided for in clause 447.
Making of materially false statements or omitting material facts
Clause 448 refers to intentional making of materially false statement or omitting material facts. These may be in documents such as report, certificate, financial statement, prospectus, or other document required by or for the purposes of the Act or rules. These too will be punishable as fraud under Clause 447.
False evidence on oath/solemn affirmation
Clause 449 states that intentional giving of false evidence while being examined on oath or solemn affirmation attracts minimum imprisonment of 3 years and which may extend to 7 years and with fine. So does giving of such evidence in any affidavit, deposition or solemn affirmation in connection with the winding up of the company or generally in connection with any matter arising under the Bill.
Other provisions providing for minimum mandatory imprisonment
Then there are other provisions in the Bill, which provide for mandatory minimum imprisonment, are also worth considering.
Clause 57 refers to deceitful impersonation of any owner of security or interest in a company to make specified economic gains. Such act is punishable with miniumum one year imprisonment which may extend to three years and with a fine.
Clause 58 refers to refusal of transfer or transmission of shares. The affected party may appeal to the Tribunal which may grant an order in favour of such person. If any person contravenes such order of the Tribunal, it is punishable with miniumum one year imprisonment which may extend to three years and with a fine.
Clause 67 refers to buyback of shares by a company (other than in permitted manner) and grant of finance, security, etc. for purchase of its own shares to any person. Violation of such provision is punishable with miniumum one year imprisonment which may extend to three years and with a fine.
Interestingly, clause 68 which refers to buyback of shares through a specified manner (other than reduction of capital) also provides for such stringent punishment in a broader manner. Minimum manadatory imprisonment is provided not only for violation of the provisions of clause 68 but even for violation of the Regulations relating to buyback of shares that SEBI has prescribed.
There are several other similar provisions.
These offences are not compoundable
Special Court
A new authority to try offences under the Bill named Special Court has been proposed. It shall consist of a single judge appointed by the Central Government with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the jurisdictional High Court.
It will have jurisdiction over all offences under the Bill. The Special Court for the area in which the registered office of the concerned company is situated will have jurisdiction for the offence committed in relation to such company.
There is a provision for a summary trial where the offence carries a maximum imprisonment term of three years. Under a summary trial, maximum imprisonment of one year can be given.
The objective of this new body seems to be to speed up the prosecution process.
Limited exemption for Independent Directors
A concern may be expressed particularly about the role and liability of independent directors in the context of such penal provisions. The general principle of course is that as a rule, independent directors are not liable for such acts. There is a specific and non obstante provision in the Bill in Clause 149 that is worth noting and which reads as under:-
(12) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act,—?(i) an independent director;?(ii) a non-executive director not being promoter or key managerial personnel, shall be held liable, only in respect of such acts of omission or commission by a company which had occurred with his knowledge, attributable through Board processes, and with his consent or connivance or where he had not acted diligently.
The above provision generally helps independent directors and other non-promoter non-executive directors, unless the specified conditions are attracted. The provision is a non obstante one and appears, on first impression, to limit the liability of such persons. However, it is submitted that this may not amount to blanket exemption to such persons particularly from provisions relating to fraud etc. where the conditions of those provisions are satisfied. SEBI has often imposed various types of restrictions, times etc. on independent directors in appropriate cases particularly where through due diligence they (the independent directors) could have become aware of wrong doings in the company.
Conclusion
Frauds, misstatements, etc. have undoubtedly been of serious concern recently. The existing Companies Act is felt to be lacking in penalising frauds and misstatements etc. Even the SEBI Act that governs listed companies does not have strong provisions that can create a strong deterrent. Nevertheless, one wonders whether such stringent, minimum and mandatory punishment for such a broad group of cases is justified and whether these provisions have been adequately debated. I would conclude by saying: Be aware and question.
Will Muslim Law – A Mohamedan cannot by Will dispose of more than a third of surplus of his estate after payment of funeral expenses and debts.
The appellants being the defendants in the Title Suit, denied the claim of the plaintiffs being legal heir of Abdul Khalaque and further stated that the said Abdul Khalaque before his death executed a Will on 19-11-1987 bequeathing the suit land amongst the defendants and the defendants according to distribution made in the Will, mutated the land in heir names and further stated that they are the legal heirs of the deceased Abdul Khalaque and they prayed for dismissal of the suit.
The learned trial court by judgment dated 28-03-2001 decided all the issues in favour of the plaintiffs. Then defendants i.e. the appellants herein, filed Title Appeal before the District Judge. The District Court upheld the judgment passed by the trial Court but re-determined the share of the plaintiffs and defendants according to the Mahomedan Law. Against the judgmentof the First Appellate Court, appeal was filed in the High Court. The High Court observed that certain basic principles of Mahomedan Will or “wasiwaat” are –
Under Muslim law, a Will or “wasiwaat”, is a legal declaration of the intention of a Muslim, in respect of his property he intends, to be made effective after his death. Every adult Muslim of sound mind can make a Will or “wasiwaat”. Such a Will may either be oral or in writing, and though in writing, it is not required to be signed or attested. No particular form is necessary for making a Will or “Wasiwaat” if the intention of the testator is sufficiently ascertained. Though oral Will is possible, the burden to establish an oral Will is very heavy and the Will should be proved by the person who asserts it with utmost precision and with every circumstances considering time and place.
The person making Will, must be competent to make such Will. The legatee must be competent to take the legacy or bequest. The subject and object of the Will must be valid one under the purview of the Muslim Law and the bequest must be within the prescribed limit. The property bequeathed should be in existence at the time of death of the testator, even if it was not in existence at the time of execution of the Will. The limitation to exercise the testamentary power under Muslim Law is strictly restricted upto one third of the total property so that the legal heirs are not deprived of their lawful right of inheritance. A Muslim cannot bequest his property in favour of his own heir, unless the other heirs consent to the bequest after the death of the testator. The person should be legal heir at the time of the death of the testator. The consent by the heirs can be given either expressly or impliedly. If the heirs attest a Will and acquiesce in the legatee taking possession of the property bequeathed,this is considered as sufficient consent. Any consent given during life time of the testator is not valid consent. It must be given after the death of the testator. If the heirs do not question the Will for a very long time and the legatees take and enjoy the property, the conduct of heirs will amount to consent. If some heirs give their consent, the shares of the consenting heirs will be bound and the legacy in excess is payable out of the shares of the consenting heirs. When the heir gives his consent to the bequest, he cannot rescind it later on.
In view of the above, the finding of the First Appellate Court that the Will executed by the deceased Abdul Khalaque was invalid and it was void and inoperative was upheld. The share of the plaintiffs and the defendants to the suit land as determined by the First Appellate Court was found to be according to the Mahomedan Law of Inheritance.
Rijia Bibi & Ors vs. Md. Abdul Kachem & Anr. AIR 2013 Gauhati 34
Partnership firm – Document whether deed of retirement or deed of conveyance : Stamp Act
The petitioners filed a writ before the court and contended that the view taken by the 2nd respondent that the deed of retirement is to be treated as a deed of conveyance; is contrary to law. According to them, the consequences that flow from the retirement of partners cannot be equated to those of conveyance and that there was no justification for respondents 1 and 2 in demanding the stamp duty on that basis.
The 1st respondent stated that the recitals in the document in question clearly discloses that the rights of the retiring partners were transferred by receiving the consideration and that the same amounts to a transaction of sale. He submits that the relevant provisions of law were applied and that the petitioners cannot be said to have suffered any detriment. It is also stated that the petitioners can avail the other remedies, provided for under law.
The Court observed that the very concept of partnership contemplates two or more persons coming together, to carry out a common objective Though the firm so constituted does not acquire an independent legal character, the contributions made by the partners be it in the form of capital or property, become the common property of the firm. The entitlement of each partner vis-a-vis the property held by the firm is determined, in terms of shares, stipulated in the partnership deed. In a given case, the share of a partner may reflect the actual contribution made by him and in other cases, it may not be so. For instance, if the partners of a firm comprise of some who have invested skill and knowledge and others that have arranged capital, land etc., the former are also allotted shares, notwithstanding the fact that they did not contribute any capital or tangible assets. Obviously on account of this typical characteristic of a firm, the Courts held that the interest of a partner in a firm deserves to be treated as movable property notwithstanding the content thereof. It is also common that the share of a partner keeps on changing, with the addition or departure of the partners from time to time.
The change in the nature of rights of a partner vis-a-vis the firm, either when he joins or leaves the firm, cannot be equated to sale or purchase simplicitor. It is so, even with the accrual or loss of interest of such partner is vis-a-vis the immovable property held by the firm. It is for this reason, that the Legislature has provided for a totally different legal regime, in the context of execution and registration of deeds of partnership, retirement or dissolution pertaining to a firm, compared to the one of transfer or conveyance of properties.
In Board of Revenue, Hyderabad vs. Valivety Rama Krishnaiah (AIR 1973 Andhra Pradesh 275), it was held that a deed of release executed by a coowner in favour of another, or a deed, evidencing retirement of partner from a firm, for consideration, cannot be treated as deed of conveyance. However, different results would ensue, in case such release or retirement is favour of one or few out of many co-owners or partners.
Similarly, in Board of Revenue U.P., vs. M/s. Auto Sales, Allahabad, AIR 1979 Allahabad 312 a Division Bench of the Court held that the retirement of a partner, even while his share is determined and consideration is paid, does not amount to transfer of property, and cannot be treated as a deed of conveyance as defined u/s.s. (10) of Section 2 of the Act.
The possibility or occasion for applying the principle underlying Section 6 of the Act would arise, if only a document is capable of being treated under two different provisions. The document in question is the one of retirement from partnership and it is specifically dealt with under Article 41-C of Schedule 1-A to the Act. It cannot at all be treated as conveyance. Therefore, there does not exist any possibility to apply the principle underlying Section 6 of the Act.
Hence, the writ petition was allowed.
M/s. Kamal Wineries & Ors vs. Sub-Register of Assurance & Ors. AIR 2013 AP 36
Evidence – Attested copy – It is secondary evidence, and cannot be weighed in as original
2013 (290) ELT 28 (Pat.) Azaz Khan vs. Union of India
Appeal to Tribunal – Defect Memos sent under registered post acknowledgement due to address given in Memorandum of appeal : General Clauses Act, 1897 – Section 27
On further appeal, it was observed that the defect memos were sent under registered post acknowledgement due to the address given in the memorandum of appeal. Once the letter had been sent under registered post acknowledgement due, it was presumed to be delivered/served in terms of section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and in terms of section 37C(1)(a) of the Central Excise Act, 1944. Since the assessee had taken more than six years to remove the defect and had not removed the objections within a reasonable time, the appeal was rightly rejected as being barred by limitation.
Lakshmi Printing Co. vs. CCE (2013) 18 GSTR 413 (P&H)
Appeal – Dismissal for non prosecution – Counsel was busy in another court – Explanation found acceptable. Appeal restored.
S.D.O. Coil Fabrication vs. C CE 2013 (290) ELT 431 (Tri. Del)
Corporate Restructuring – Position under the Companies Bill, 2012
The Companies Act, 1956 (“the Act”) would soon be repealed and replaced with the Companies Bill, 2012 (“the Bill”)
since the Lok Sabha has already approved the Bill. Thus, the Act has
been asked to retire before it reaches a superannuation age of 60 years!
This is quite a welcome feature because Acts in India are infamous for
hanging around for over 100 years in some cases.
As with any new
Legislation, there is a great deal of fascination amongst the business
fraternity and professionals to see whether the Bill is a turbo-charged
version of the old Act or is it merely “Old Wine in a New Bottle”, does
it continue with the “Old Whine with New Throttle”? While there have
been several new concepts which are sought to be introduced by the Bill,
one area which sees a lot of upheaval is that of corporate
restructuring, i.e., mergers, takeovers, slump sales, shareholders’
agreements, etc. Corporate India has always desired a code which
facilitates corporate restructuring. While one can understand the
Regulator’s desire of protecting interest of all stakeholders, it should
not be at the cost of stifling the transaction itself. The words of
Justice D. Y. Chandrachud in the case of Ion Exchange (India) Ltd., 105
Comp. Cases 115 (Bom) in this context are very apt:
“The basic
assumptions which were the foundation of a closely regulated and
controlled economy have altered in the present day society where
corporate enterprise has to gear itself up to a free form of competition
and an open interface with market forces. The fortunes of corporate
enterprise are liable to fluctuate with recessionary cycles. Changes in
economic policy and economic changes affect the fortunes of business as
assumptions and conditions in which corporate enterprises function are
altered. Corporate enterprise must be armed with the ability to be
efficient and to meet the requirements of a rapidly evolving business
reality. Corporate restructuring is one of the means that can be
employed to meet the challenges and problems which confront business.
The law should be slow to retard or impede the discretion of corporate
enterprise to adapt itself to the needs of changing times and to meet
the demands of increasing competition
Let us examine whether the
Bill lives up to the expectations and whether it impedes or expedites
corporate restructuring? We look at some of the key features in this
respect.
Schemes of Arrangement
We may first consider
the provisions which would impact all Schemes of Arrangement, i.e.,
mergers, demergers, reconstruction, etc. Clause 230 of Chapter XV of the
Bill deals with these provisions. Some of the new features of this
Clause as compared to the provisions of the Act are as follows:
(a) Tribunal:
The National Company Law Tribunal (“Tribunal”) would have power to
sanction all Schemes. Thus, instead of the High Court the Tribunal would
be vested with these powers. An Appeal would lie against the order of
the Tribunal to the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (“NCLAT”)
and against the Order of the NCLAT to the Supreme Court. One important
feature of both the Tribunal and the NCLAT is that Chartered Accountants
can appear before them to plead Schemes of Arrangement. Currently, this
is the exclusive domain of Advocates.
(b) Corporate Debt Restructuring:
Any scheme of corporate debt restructuring (CDR) which is a part of a
Scheme must be consented to by not less than 75% of the secured
creditors in value. There must be safeguards for the protection of other
secured and unsecured creditors. The auditor must report that the fund
requirements of the company after the CDR shall conform to the liquidity
test based upon the estimates provided to them by the Board of
Directors. Here the auditor would be well advised to remember the CA
Institute’s warning that he should not become a party to preparing
estimates. One important facet of the CDR is that the Scheme should
include, a valuation report in respect of the shares and the property
and all assets, tangible and intangible, movable and immovable, of the company of a Registered Valuer.
(c)
Valuation Report: Every Notice of a meeting for the Scheme of
Arrangement which is sent to creditors and members shall be accompanied
by a copy of the valuation report, if any, and explaining its effect on
creditors, key managerial personnel, promoters and non-promoter members,
and the debenture-holders and the effect of the Scheme on any material
interests of the directors of the company or the debenture trustees.
Currently, the valuation report is only available for inspection at the
company’s office. An overwhelming majority of the shareholders do not go
to the registered office to inspect the valuation report. Now the
valuation report would come home since it needs to be sent to the
members and creditors. The Bill is silent as to whether the valuation
workings also need to be sent to them? In this context the following
decisions would throw some light:
• Hindustan Lever Ltd., 83
Comp. Cases 30 (SC)/ Miheer Mafatlal vs. Mafatlal Industries, 87 Comp.
Cases 792 (SC): Valuation is a specialised subject best left to experts
and Courts would not interfere in the same.
• Asian Coffee Ltd., 103 Comp. Cases 17 (AP): Shareholders need not be given detailed calculations of share exchange ratios.
(d) Notice to Regulators:
Every notice shall also be sent to the Central Government, Income-tax
authorities, the Reserve Bank of India, the Securities and Exchange
Board, the RoC, stock exchanges, Official Liquidator, the Competition
Commission of India (CCI) and such other sectoral regulators or
authorities which are likely to be affected by the compromise or
arrangement (e.g., Telecom Regulatory Authority of India for telecom
companies).
Under the Bill, the authorities, to whom Notice has
been sent, can make representations, within 30 days or else it shall be
presumed that they have no representations to make on the proposals.
However, this period of 30 days should be read subject to the time
allowed under any other Statute for approving such Schemes. For
instance, the Competition Act, 2002 allows the CCI a time period of 210
days for passing an order. Therefore, it stands to reason that the
timeline of 30 days will not be applicable to the CCI.
(e) Objection Threshold:
An objection to the Scheme can now be made only by persons holding at
least 10% of the shareholding or having outstanding debt amounting to at
least 5%. This is a welcome move which would prevent frivolous
challenges which lead to undue delays.
(f) Approval: The
resolution for approving the Scheme requires 3/4th majority in value and
can be passed in person, by proxy or through postal ballot. Postal
Ballot has been made applicable to both listed as well as
unlisted/private companies, unlike s.192A of the Act where it applies
only to listed companies.
(g) Accounting Standards: The Scheme shall be sanctioned by the Tribunal only if there is a certificate by the Auditor that the accounting treatment in the Scheme is in conformity with the prescribed accounting standards. Currently, the Listing Agreement contains a similar provision in the case of Listed Companies. The decision in the case of Hindalco Industries Ltd., 94 SCL 1 (Bom) is pertinent in this respect. In this case, the company proposed to write-off the impairment losses and ammortisation loss against the balance standing in the Securities Premium Account by a Scheme of Arrangement. The Scheme was objected to on the grounds that this treatment was in violation of para 58 of AS-28 on “Impairment” since the loss was not routed through the P&L A/c. The High Court over-ruled this objection and held that section 211(3B) of the Act expressly permitted deviation from accounting standards subject to certain disclosures.
The current Accounting Standards are woefully inadequate to address all forms of corporate restructuring, for instance, there are no standards dealing with demergers, reconstruction, reduction of capital, etc. Hence, unless new Accounting Standards are introduced, this would remain an empty formality. In this context Accounting Standard Interpretation (ASI) 11 on AS-14 issued by the ICAI on 1-4-2004 is relevant since it prescribes the stand to be taken in case the accounting treatment specified under the Scheme deviates from the treatment specified from AS-14. Some instances of cases where accounting disputes have been the subject matter of objection to Schemes of Amalgamation/Arrangement, include the following, Gallops Realty, 150 Comp. Cases 596 (Guj); Cairns India Ltd, 101 SCL 435 (Bom); Mphasis Ltd., 102 SCL 411 (Kar); Sutlej Industries Limited, 135 Comp. Cases 394 (Raj),Paramount Centrispun, 150 Comp. Cases 790 (Guj), etc.
(h) Buy-back: A Scheme in respect of any buy-back of securities shall be sanctioned only if the buy-back is in accordance with the provisions of the Bill. For instance, the decisions in the cases of SEBI vs. Sterlite Industries Ltd., (2004) 6 CLJ 34 (Bom); Gujarat Ambuja Exports Ltd (2004) 6 CLJ 117 (Guj) have held that Schemes of Arrangement need not be in compliance with the buyback provisions of the Act since they operate in different fields. The Court held that the s.77A is merely an enabling provision and the Court’s powers u/ss. 100-104 and 391-394 are not in any way affected. The conditions u/s.77A are applicable only to buyback under that section and the conditions applicable u/ss. 100-104 and 391 cannot be made applicable or imported into a buyback of shares u/s. 77A. There is no reason why a cancellation of shares and consequent reduction cannot be made u/s. 391 read with section 100 merely because a shareholder is given an option to cancel or retain his shares. This position would now be modified by the Bill.
(i) Takeover: Any Scheme which includes a Takeover Offer in the case of listed companies, shall be as per the SEBI Regulations. In Larsen & Toubro Ltd, 121 Com. Cases 523 (Bom) a takeover of shares by Grasim avoided the provisions of the SEBI Takeover Code since it was done under a Scheme of Arrangement. Grasim acquired around a 30% equity stake in Ultra Tech Cement Company Ltd from the public shareholders under the Scheme of Arrangement, around 4.5% stake from L&T. Further, it also sold its holding in L&T to an Employee Trust of L&T. As a result of the Scheme, Grasim ended up owning a 51.1% stake in Ultra Tech without triggering the open offer provisions under the SEBI Takeover Regulations. The Bill aims to plug this method of acquisition of shares€.
(j) Minority Squeeze-out: Provisions have been enacted for minority squeeze-out by majority. Majority shareholders (holding 90% of the equity shares capital) who have acquired the majority stake through amalgamation, share exchange, conversion of securities, any other reason, etc., should notify the company of their intention to buy out the remaining shareholders. The purchase price would be ascertained on the basis of the valuation done by a registered valuer.
Merger Schemes
In addition to the above provisions, which are applicable to all Schemes of Arrangement, the following additional requirements which are applicable to a Scheme of amalgamation/ merger are provided in Cl. 232 of the Bill:
(a) A notice for Merger Schemes must also include a supplementary accounting statement if the last annual accounts of any of the merging companies are more than 6 months old.
(b) A transferee company should not, as result of the Scheme hold any shares in its own name or under a Trust for the benefit of the transferee company or its subsidiary company or associate company. Such treasury shares shall be cancelled or extinguished. In other words, the Bill prohibits creation of treasury stocks. This supersedes the decision in the case of Himachal Telematics Ltd, 86 Comp. Cases 325 (Del) which upheld the creation of treasury stock arising on a merger. Several mergers, such as, ICICI-ICICI Bank, Reliance Petroleum-Reliance Industries, Mahindra & Mahindra, etc., had followed this route of creating treasury stock. In fact, ICICI Bank sold its treasury stock on the floor of the stock exchange for a handsome amount.
(c) In case of a merger of a listed company into an unlisted company the transferee company shall remain an unlisted company until it becomes a listed company. If the shareholders of the transferor company decide to opt out of the transferee company, provision shall be made for payment of the value of shares held by them as per a pre-determined price formula or after a valuation is made.
Thus, this provision negates the back-door/reverse merger route of SEBI under which a listed company can merge into an unlisted company and the unlisted company gets automatic listing. This provision is also available for demerger of a listed company into an unlisted company and listing of the shares of the resulting unlisted company. For instance, Cinemax India Ltd, a listed company demerged its theatre exhibition business into an unlisted company. Subsequently, the shares of the unlisted company got listed without an IPO.
The unlisted company gets the gains of listing without the pains of listing. It also bypasses the requirements of Section 72A of the Income-tax Act if the transferee company is a loss-making/sick company. Thus, the unabsorbed depreciation and carried forward losses of the loss-making company are available as a set-off to the healthy company without complying with the requirements of section 72A and Rule 9C since the transferee company is the loss making company. This route is currently available by virtue of Rule 19(2)(b) of Securities Contract (Regulation) Rules, 1957 read with the SEBI’s Circulars CIR/ CFD/DIL/5/2013 and the earlier SEBI/ CFD/SCRR/01/2009/03/09.
Under the Bill, the shareholders of the transferor company have to be provided with a mandatory exit option in the form of a cash payment. It would be interesting to see what happens if more than 25% of the shareholders of the transferor opt out? In such a situation the conditions of Section 2(1B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 are not met since the section requires that at least 3/4th of the share-holders of the amalgamating company become share-holders of the amalgamated company. How would this condition now be met? As a consequence, the merger would cease to be a tax-neutral amalgamation under the Income-tax Act and as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Grace Collis, 248 ITR 323 (SC), an amalgamation involves a transfer of capital asset. You can join the dots to understand what happens next.
(d) The Scheme should clearly indicate an Appointed Date from which it shall be effective and the scheme shall be deemed to be effective from such date and not at a date subsequent to the appointed date. Currently, there is no express requirement in the Act but the decision in the case of Marshall Sons & Co. (I) Ltd., 223 ITR 809 (SC) has held that every Scheme of merger must necessarily provide a date with effect from which the transfer will take place and such a date would either be the date specified in the Scheme or the date so specified/modified by the Court while sanctioning the Scheme. An Appointed Date is also relevant from an income-tax perspective. The decisions in the case of Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd, 147 ITR 294 (Guj); Amerzinc Products, 105 SCL 682 (Guj), etc. are also relevant in this respect.
(e) The fee paid by the transferor company on its authorised capital shall be available for set-off against any fees payable by the transferee company on its authorised capital enhanced subsequent to the merger. This express provision sets to rest the constant objection of the Regional Director on this issue. Several decisions have supported clubbing of the authorised capital – Hotline HOL Celdings, 121 Comp. Cases 165 (Del); Cavin Plastics, 129 Comp. Cases 915 (Mad); Areva T&D, 144 Comp. Cases 34 (Cal), etc.
(f) Every company in relation to which the Tribunal makes an Order, shall, until the completion of the
Scheme, file a statement in such form and within such time as may be prescribed with the RoC every year duly certified by a CA/CS/CMA indicating whether or not the Scheme is being complied with in accordance with the Orders of the Tribunal.
Fast-track Mergers
Clause 233 provides a new concept of fast-track mergers:
(a) A new concept of fast-track mergers has been introduced for mergers between small companies or between a holding company and its wholly owned subsidiary without going through the Tribunal Process.
(b) A Small Company is defined to mean a ‘private company’ meeting either of the following requirements:
• Paid up capital does not exceed the sum prescribed which may range from Rs. 50 lakh – Rs. 5 crores.
• Turnover does not exceed the sum prescribed which may range from Rs. 20 lakh – Rs. 2 crore.
It may be noted that a merger between a holding and a 100% subsidiary could also opt for the fast-track route even though the companies are not small companies.
(c) This route is optional and if the companies desire to adopt the conventional route i.e., the Tribunal-approved Route, then they may adopt the same.
Cross-Border Mergers
(a) The Bill provides that a merger of a foreign company incorporated in the jurisdictions of such countries as may be notified from time to time by the Central government into an Indian company is permissible. For instance, Corus Group Plc (now Tata Steel Europe Ltd), UK merging into Tata Steel and Tata Steel issuing its Indian shares to the shareholders of Corus, wherever they may be located. Currently also, mergers of a foreign company into an Indian company is permissible. Any merger involving an Indian Company would be governed by the Companies Act, 1956. Sections 391 to 394 of the Act deal with Mergers of companies. Section 394 of the Act provides for facilitating amalgamation of companies. Section a.394 states that the section only applies to a Transferee Company which is a company within the meaning of the Act, i.e., an Indian Company. However, the Transferor Company is defined to include any Company, whether Indian or Foreign. Hence, the transferor company can be a foreign company. The decisions in the cases of Bombay Gas Co., 89 Comp. Cases 195 (Bom), Moschip Semiconductor Technology Ltd., 120 Comp. Cases 108 (AP), Adani Enterprises Ltd., 103 SCL 135 (Guj); Essar Oil Ltd, Company Petition No. 280 of 2008 (Guj), etc., clearly support this point.
However, Cl. 234 of the Bill now provides that only companies from specified jurisdictions would be permissible. This restriction is not there currently. Probably, the Government wants to limit the scope to those countries which either have a DTAA or a TIEA with India.
(b) Cl. 234 of the Bill also provides for a merger of an Indian company into a foreign company which is currently not possible. S.394 states that the section only applies to a Transferee Company which is a company within the meaning of the Act, i.e., an Indian Company. However, the Transferor Company is defined to include any Company, whether Indian or Foreign. Thus, currently an Indian company cannot merge into a Foreign Company.
The consideration for the merger may be discharged by the foreign company in the form of cash or its Indian Depository Receipts. Thus, the foreign company cannot issue its shares to the Indian shareholders of the transferor company. For instance, if ACC were to merge into Holcim of Switzerland, Holcim cannot issue its shares to the Indian shareholders of ACC. It must issue IDRs or pay cash. Currently, Standard Chartered Bank Plc, UK, is the only foreign company to have issued IDRs in India. One possible reason for this embargo is that under the FEMA Regulations, Indian residents can acquire shares of a foreign company
only under the Liberalised Remittance Scheme, i.e., by paying consideration in cash. There is no provision for a stock swap in the case of an outbound in-vestment by resident individuals. This is one area which could be liberalised by permitting the consideration to be in the form of shares also.
The Bill provides that the prior approval of the RBI would be required for such a merger of an Indian company with a foreign company.
Registered Valuer
Clause 247 of the Bill introduces a new concept of a Registered Valuer. Where a valuation is required to be made in respect of any property, stocks, shares, debentures, securities or goodwill or any other assets or net worth of a company or its liabilities under the provision of this Act, it must be valued by a Registered Valuer. The qualifications and experience for such a person would be prescribed. It may be recalled that a few years ago, the Shardul Shroff Committee had recommended that valuations should be carried out by independent registered valuers instead of the current practice. Would a CA automatically be registered as a registered valuer or would he have to acquire some additional qualification for the same? What happens in case of a partnership firm or LLP of professionals – would all partners need to obtain qualifications? One wonders whether a CA would be the right person to value property, plant and machinery whereas whether a chartered engineer would be able to value shares and goodwill? Does a one-size fits all approach work or is not the current dual system a better approach?
Some of the valuation areas under the Bill which would require a Registered Valuer include:
• Further issue of shares
• Assets involved in Arrangement of Non Cash transactions involving directors
• Shares, Property and Assets of the company under a CDR
• Scheme of Arrangement
• Equity Shares held by Minority Shareholders
• Assets for submission of report by Liquidator.
Reduction of Capital
Clause 66 of the Bill deals with Reduction of Share Capital of a Company:
(a) A reduction of share capital cannot be made if the Company is in arrears in the repayment of any deposits accepted by it or interest payable thereon by it.
(b) Further, an application for the reduction shall not be sanctioned by the Tribunal unless the accounting treatment, proposed by the company for such reduction is in conformity with the prescribed Accounting Standards. This would require framing of Standards on reduction. (c) The Order confirming the reduction shall be published by the company in such manner as the Tribunal may direct. Under the current provision, the Court has discretionary power to order publishing of reasons of reduction and such other information as it thinks fit.
(d) The current discretionary power of the Court to order the addition of words “and reduced” to the names of the company reducing their capital has been withdrawn. Further, The current power of the Court to dispense with the requirement of the consent of the creditors in case of reduction of capital by way of either diminution in any liability in respect of the unpaid share capital or repayment to any shareholder of any unpaid share capital has been withdrawn.
Slump Sale
Currently, under the Act a public company is required to obtain its members’ consent to sell, lease, etc. of the whole or substantially the whole undertaking of the company. Thus, an ordinary resolution of the members is required u/s. 293(1) for a slump sale. In case of a listed company, this consent is to be obtained by a Postal Ballot.
Under Clause 180 of the Bill this provision of Postal Ballot will now be applicable even to a private limited company. Further, the approval of the members is to be obtained by way of a special resolution instead
of an ordinary resolution. Thus, the regulatory arbitrage available in a slump sale over a demerger is sought to be plugged. This would make it more challenging for listed companies to hive-off their undertakings by way of slump sales.
Specific definition of the terms ‘undertaking’ and ‘substantially the whole undertaking’ have been provided under the Bill as follows:
(i) “Undertaking” shall mean an undertaking in which the investment of the company exceeds 20% of its net worth as per the audited balance sheet of the preceding financial year or an undertaking which generates 20% of the total income of the company during the previous financial year.
(ii) “Substantially the whole of the undertaking” in any financial year shall mean 20% or more of the value of the undertaking as per the audited balance sheet of the preceding financial year.
It may be noted that this definition of undertaking is only relevant for the purposes of the Bill. What constitutes an undertaking for determining whether a transaction is a slump sale u/s. 2(42C) of the Income-tax Act, would yet be determined by Explanation-1 to Section 2(19AA) of that Act, which provides as follows:
“For the purposes of this Cl. , “undertaking” shall include any part of an undertaking, or a unit or division of an undertaking or a business activity taken as a whole, but does not include individual assets or liabilities or any combination thereof not constituting a business activity.”
Thus, what may be an undertaking under the Bill may not satisfy the conditions laid down under the Income-tax Act. Distinctions between the two definitions are given in the Table:
Inter-Company Loans and Investments
Clause 186 of the Bill is at par with the current Section 372A of the Act. However, en masse changes have been carried out in this very important provision. Some of the key features of Clause 186 are as follows:
(a) A Company cannot make investment through more than 2 layers of investment companies. The restriction is on 2 layers of investment companies and not operating companies. An Investment Company means a company whose principal business is acquisition of shares, debentures or other securities. This is one of the most important restrictions under the Bill. This prohibition does not apply in two situations:
A company can acquire any foreign company if such foreign company has investment subsidiaries beyond two layers as per the foreign laws. However, the RBI is known to frown upon such multi-layer structures for outbound investment.
• A subsidiary company can have any investment subsidiary for the purposes of meeting the requirements under any Law.
This prohibition is even applicable to NBFCs and Core Investment Companies (CICs) registered with the RBI and to private companies. One would have expected private companies and CICs to be exempted from this restriction.
(b) The main provision of Clause 186 is the same as Section 372A, i.e., a company cannot make a loan/investment/guarantee exceeding 60% of its paid-up capital + free reserves + securities premium or 100% of its free reserves + securities premium, without the prior approval by way of a special resolution. However, the current embargo on a loan/guarantee to any body corporate has been modified to a loan to any person. Thus, loans to individuals/HUF/firm/AOP/Trust, etc., would also be covered.
An NBFC whose principal business is acquisition of shares and securities, shall be exempt from the provision of this clause in respect of subscription and acquisition of securities.
(d) The loan must be given at a minimum rate of interest equal to the prevailing yield of 1/3/5/ 10 years’ Government Security closest to the tenor of the loan. Presently, the minimum rate is the Bank Rate of the RBI, which currently is 8.50%. The 2011 draft of the Companies Bill also pegged the minimum rate at the Bank Rate but the 2012 version has changed it to its current form.
(c) The current exemptions given u/s. 372A of the Act have been done away with. Consequentially:
• Private limited companies will have to comply with this section.
• Loans by a holding company to its 100% subsidiary would have to comply with this section. Thus, interest free loans to a 100% subsidiary will not be possible even for a private company.
• Acquisition by a holding company by way of subscription, purchase or otherwise the securities of its wholly owned subsidiary would have to comply with this section.
• Any guarantee given or security provided by a holding company in respect of any loan made to its WOS would have to comply with this section.
(d) A company shall disclose to the members in the financial statement the full particulars of the loans given, investment made or guarantee given or security provided and the purpose for which the loan or guarantee or security is proposed to be utilised by the recipient of the loan or guarantee or security.
(e) A company which is in default in the repayment of any deposits/interest thereon, shall not give any loan or give any guarantee or provide any security or make an acquisition till such default continues.
(f) Restrictions have been put on SEBI intermediaries, such as, brokers, merchant bankers, underwriters, etc., from accepting inter-corporate deposits exceeding prescribed limits. One fails to see the logic for this provision when the SEBI Regulations do no prescribe any limits.
Shareholders’ Covenants
Currently, Restrictive Covenants forming part of Shareholders’ Agreement, such as, Tag Along, Drag Along, First Refusal, Russian Roulette, Texas Shoot-out, Dutch auction rights, etc., are the subject-matter of great dispute in the case of public companies.
The Supreme Court has held that they are valid against a company only if they are a part of the Articles of Association or else they remain a private contract between shareholders – V.B. Rangarajan vs. V. Gopalkrishnan, 73 Comp. Cases 201 (SC). A Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in the case of Western Maharashtra Development Corporation vs. Bajaj Auto Ltd., (2010) 154 Comp Cases 593 (Bom), had ruled that a Shareholders’ Agreement containing restrictive Clauses was invalid, since the Articles of a public company could not contain Clauses restricting the transfer of shares and it was contrary to Section 108 of the Act. Subsequently, a two-member Bench of the Bombay High Court, in the case of Messer Holdings Ltd vs. Shyam Ruia and Others (2010) 159 Comp Cases 29 (Bom) has overruled this decision of the Single Judge of the Bombay High Court.
The Bill provides that securities in a public company are freely trans-ferrable but a contract in respect of transfer of securities in a public company shall be enforceable. It is
submitted that this express provision sets at rest once and for all whether public companies can contain pre-emptive rights. This would be a big boost for Private Equity/FDI/Private Investment in Public Equity (PIPE) transactions since they usually come with pre-emptive rights.
Other Important Changes
Some other important changes in the sphere of restructuring include the following:
(a) Infrastructure companies can issue redeemable preference shares having a tenure of more than 20 years provided they give the holders an option to ask for a redemption of a specified percentage every year. Real estate development has been defined as an infrastructure sector along with, air/road/water/rail transport, power generation, telecom, etc.
(b) Prescribed class of companies which comply with accounting standards cannot utilise their securities premium account for paying premium on redemption of preference shares. They must use their profits alone. This is a very important restriction and it would be interesting to see the class which is prescribed. One fails to understand the logic behind this embargo.
(c) Companies which are unable to redeem preference shares can, with the Tribunal’s approval, issue fresh preference shares in lieu of the same and that would constitute a deemed redemption of preference shares.
(d) Prescribed class of companies which comply with accounting standards cannot utilise their securities premium account for buying back shares or for writing-off preliminary expenditure of the company. They must use their profits alone. Again, it would be interesting to see the class which is prescribed.
(e) The time limit between two or more buy-back of securities, whether board approved or shareholder approved, has been made one year. The odd-lot buy-back provision has been dropped as a method of buy-back.
Conclusion
It would be interesting to see what the Rules provide since a bulk of the provisions would be prescribed in the Rules. Hence, the “Devil would lie in the Details (Rules)”. To sum up, there are some laudable amendments, some not so good and some quite serious ones. The Bill is a cocktail of surprises and shocks and corporate India would have to accept both. As Arnold Bennett, the English Author, once said:
“Any Change, even a Change for the Better, is always accompanied by Drawbacks and Discomforts”.