Category: Allied Laws

34. Sanjabij Tari vs. Kishore S. Borcar & Anr.

2025 INSC 1158

September 25, 2025

Dishonour of Cheque – Presumptions of Financial Capacity – Probation allowed for offenders – There is no legal bar to granting probation in Section 138 cases – Not a serious criminal offence. [S. 118 and 139 Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act) S. 269SS of the Income Tax Act, 1961]

FACTS

The Appellant – Complainant, Sanjabij Tari, alleged that he had advanced a friendly loan to Respondent No. 1 – Accused and towards the repayment of the said loan, Respondent No. 1 issued a cheque which, on presentation, was dishonoured due to insufficiency of funds. The Trial Court held that Respondent No. 1 had admitted his signature on the cheque, and the statutory presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act stood unrebutted and accordingly found Respondent No.1 guilty under Section 138 of the NI Act. On Appeal, the Appellate Court rejected the contention of Respondent No. 1 that the Appellant had no means to advance such a loan and accordingly dismissed the Appeal and upheld the conviction. In a Revision Petition, the High Court acquitted Respondent No. 1 ex parte, holding that the Appellant lacked financial capacity to advance such a large sum. The Appellant’s subsequent application for recall was further dismissed on the ground that the court had become functus officio. Hence, an Appeal was filed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

HELD

The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that it is essential to first outline the scope and intent of Sections 138 to 148 of the NI Act. It was held that if the accused admits signing the cheque, a presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act arises. Respondent No. 1 led no independent evidence to show that the Appellant couldn’t have lent the money. Non-reply to the statutory notice under Section 138 allows an adverse inference against Respondent No. 1. The Supreme Court held that there is no legal bar to granting probation in Section 138 cases, it ruled that a convict for cheque bounce under Section 138 of NI Act can be released on probation instead of being jailed, as these are not serious criminal offences.

The Court further held that Section 269SS of the Income Tax Act merely restricts large cash transactions; it does not make such transactions illegal, invalid or statutorily invalid and provides only for a penalty under Section 271D.

Accordingly, the High Court’s acquittal was set aside, and the Trial and Sessions Courts’ convictions were restored.

35. Delhi Development Authority vs. Corporation Bank & Ors.

Civil Appeal No. 11269 of 2016 / 2025 INSC

1161 September 25, 2025

Mortgage of Leasehold Property – Without Consent – Invalidity of Action – Restitution to Innocent Auction Purchaser – Strict procedural compliance is mandatory in public auctions to safeguard fairness and public trust in the debt recovery process. [S. 29, Recovery of Debts Due to Banks Act, 1993]

FACTS

The Delhi Development Authority (DDA) allotted land to one Sarita Vihar Club on leasehold basis. The lease deed expressly required prior written consent of the Lieutenant Governor for any mortgage. The Club obtained a loan of from the Corporation Bank, deposited the original lease deed, and mortgaged the plot without express consent from the Lieutenant Governor. On default, the Bank approached the Debt Recovery Tribunal and the Recovery Officer ordered an auction despite Delhi Development Authority’s objections that the mortgage was illegal and it had rights of unearned increase and pre-emptive purchase. The property was e-auctioned and sold to Jay Bharat Commercial Enterprise Pvt. Ltd. (JBCEPL), the Auction Purchaser.

The Delhi Development Authority filed a Writ Petition in the High Court and the petition was dismissed. Hence, leading to an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

HELD

The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the e-auction conducted by the Bank was invalid and void because the Bank failed to disclose material encumbrances and liabilities attached to the auction property, specifically the DDA’s claim for unearned increase and the lease conditions. The Court further held that this non-disclosure is not permissible and requires full and honest disclosure of all encumbrances in any sale proclamation. The Court emphasised that strict procedural compliance is mandatory in public auctions to safeguard fairness and public trust in the debt recovery process.

Accordingly, the Appeal was allowed and the High Court’s order was set aside, and the Auction proceedings were quashed.

36. Kamlakant Mishra vs. Additional Collector & Ors

Special (Civil) D. No. 42786 of 2025

September 12, 2025

Maintenance of Senior Citizens – Eviction of Parents – Jurisdiction of Tribunal – Maintenance Tribunal had no jurisdiction to direct eviction – Order of High Court set aside. [S. 22, 23 and 24, Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (Act)].

FACTS

The Appellant is an 80-year-old Senior Citizen living with his wife and owns two properties in Mumbai. Respondent No. 3 is the eldest son, financially secure and well-established and capable of supporting his aged parents. Due to old age and health concerns, the Appellant and his wife shifted to Uttar Pradesh, leaving properties in Mumbai. During this time, the Respondent No. 3 took possession of both the properties instead of safeguarding them for his parents. Effectively, the Appellant and his wife were rendered homeless and dependent, while Respondent No. 3 enjoyed the benefits of the properties. The Appellant filed an application before the Maintenance Tribunal under Sections 22, 23, and 24 of the Act seeking eviction of Respondent No. 3. The Tribunal ordered eviction of Respondent No. 3 and maintenance. The Respondent no. 3 filed an appeal before the High Court, where the Court ruled in favour of the Respondent No. 3, stating that the Maintenance Tribunal had no jurisdiction to direct eviction, since Respondent No. 3 himself was a senior citizen, and the order for maintenance and eviction was set aside. Hence, the Appellant approached the Supreme Court.

HELD

The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in holding that the Respondent No. 3 was a senior citizen merely because he had crossed 60 years of age by the time the writ petition was decided. The Supreme Court clarified that the relevant date is the date of filing of the application before the Tribunal; therefore, Respondent No. 3 could not claim the statutory protections available under Section 2(h) of the Act. The Supreme Court emphasised that the Maintenance Tribunal has wide jurisdiction under Section 22 – 24 of the Act to pass necessary and appropriate orders not only for maintenance, but also for the protection of the life and property of senior citizens. The High Court wrongly concluded that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to pass an eviction order and held that such reasoning turned the object of the Act upside down, as the statute is designed primarily for the welfare of aged parents and senior citizens, not to shield defaulting children. The Supreme Court set aside the order of the High Court and restored the orders of the Maintenance Tribunal.

37. Shivranjan Towers Sahakari Griha Rachana Sanstha Maryadit vs. Bhujbal Constructions & Ors

2025:BHC-AS:37175 September 04, 2025

Arbitration – Arbitrability of Disputes – Co-operative Society bound by Arbitration Clause in Members Agreement. (S. 16 – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Act); S. 36 – Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960; S.11 – Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act, 1963)

FACTS

The disputes arose out of a development project, where Respondent No. 2 to 8 were the owners of the land at Pune, and granted development rights to Respondent No. 1, the builder. The builder constructed five buildings and sold flats to individual purchasers through an Agreement for Sale governed by the Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act, 1963 (MOFA). The builder failed to form a society and execute a conveyance in favour of flat purchasers as required under MOFA. The purchasers subsequently formed a society and sought a deemed conveyance before the competent authority under Section 11 of MOFA. The builder invoked Clause 38 of the Agreement for Sale and filed an Arbitration Petition under Section 11 of the Act. The Arbitrator was appointed, granting liberty to the society to raise objections under Section 16 of the Act. The Petitioner Society filed an application under Section 16 of the Act that no arbitration agreement existed between the society and the builder. The arbitrator rejected the application, holding that society’s title flowed through the same sale agreement and it was therefore bound by its terms, including the arbitration clause.

HELD

The Bombay High Court held that the orders under Section 16 of the Act can only be challenged under Section 34 of the Act after the final award. Writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 lies only in cases of patent lack of inherent jurisdiction or exceptional rarity. The Court relied on Section 36 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, which grants a society independent juristic personality but also recognises that members act collectively through the society. The deemed conveyance, being unilateral, could not contain an arbitration clause, but did not preclude arbitration since the underlying rights and obligations stemmed from the earlier Agreements for Sale. The society was not a third party to the arbitration, and having derived rights from the individual purchasers, it stepped into their shoes for all purposes, including dispute resolution through arbitration.

Accordingly, the Bombay High Court found no patent lack of jurisdiction or perversity in the arbitrator’s order and upheld the decision of the arbitrator.

38. Sangeeta Gera vs. Sanjeev Gera

2025:DHC:8356-DB

September 22, 2025

Matrimonial Law – Cruelty and Desertion – Joint Ownership and Benami Transaction Prohibition – Maintenance pendente lite – The title was in both names, the wife was entitled to a 50 per cent share in the sale proceeds of the property – The order of the family court was upheld. (S.13(1) (ia) & (ib), 23(1)(a), 24 and 27, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; S. 4 Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988)

FACTS

The marriage between the parties was solemnized according to Hindu rites and registered in Noida and they lived together in Mumbai until they began to live separately. The husband filed a petition in the Bandra Family Court seeking divorce on the grounds of cruelty. The wife moved a transfer petition before the Supreme Court, which transferred the case to the District Judge, Tis Hazari Courts Delhi. Meanwhile the wife filed application for maintenance Pendente lite and litigation expenses. In a separate proceeding under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, she had already been granted interim maintenance, and later the Mahila Court, Delhi, awarded her interim maintenance. During the marriage, the parties purchased a Flat in their joint names. The entire purchase consideration and EMIs were admittedly paid by the Husband. Subsequently, due to default in repayment, the bank auctioned the flat, adjusted the dues, and deposited the surplus amount in a joint account with HSBC Bank. The Family Court dismissed the husband’s petition, holding that cruelty and desertion were not proved. Hence, an appeal was filed in the Delhi High Court.

HELD

The Delhi High Court held that a husband cannot claim exclusive ownership of a property jointly held with his wife, even if he alone paid the entire purchase price or EMIs (Equated Monthly Instalments). Once a property is registered in the joint names of both spouses, any claim by the husband that it solely belongs to him would violate Section 4 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, which bars enforcement of rights over property held benami. The court also held that a jointly acquired owned property cannot be treated as the wife’s Stridhana, as Stridhana only includes property gifted to her, before or after marriage, for her exclusive ownership. However, since the title was in both names, the wife was entitled to a 50 per cent share in the sale proceeds of the property.

Accordingly, the order of the Family Court was upheld, and the appeal was dismissed.

34. OPG Power Generation Pvt. Ltd. vs. Enexio Power Cooling Solution India Pvt. Ltd.

Civil Appeal No. 3981, 3982 of 2024 (SC)

20^th September, 2024

Arbitration — Method of calculating period of limitation — Possible view taken by the Tribunal — No patent illegality found in the award — Award does not violate fundamental public policy. [S. 34, 37, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; S. 18, A. 58, Limitation Act, 1963]

FACTS

The Appellant had entered into a contract with the Respondent for the construction of a power plant. Thereafter, a dispute arose over the Appellant’s unpaid amount of ₹6.75 crores to the Respondent. The Respondent invoked the arbitration clause, while the Appellant filed counterclaims. The Appellant alleged that ₹6.75 crores were deducted from the Respondent on account of liquidated damages, delayed project completion and towards customs duty paid by the Appellant. However, the Arbitral Tribunal rejected most of the Appellant’s counterclaims, ruling that they were barred by the statute of limitations. Aggrieved, the Appellant challenged the award of the Arbitral Tribunal before the Hon’ble Madras Hogh Court (Single Bench) under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Act). The Hon’ble Court held, inter alia, that the award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal suffered from patent illegality and was against the public policy of India since it adopted different dates to calculate the period of limitation for the claim and the counterclaim, which was not justified, given that both issues stemmed from the same contractual relationship. Aggrieved, an appeal was preferred before the Hon’ble Madras High Court (Division Bench). The Hon’ble Court (Division Bench) observed that the view taken by the Tribunal with regard to the dates for a period of limitation was a possible view. Therefore, there was no patent illegality in the award passed by the Tribunal. Thus, as per section 34 of the Act, the Hon’ble Court refused to interfere with the award passed by the Tribunal. The award of the Tribunal was accordingly restored.

Aggrieved, a Special Leave Petition was preferred before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

HELD

The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that an arbitral award, even if inadequately reasoned, need not be set aside under Section 34 of the Act, provided it does not display any perversity. The Court emphasised that as long as there is no irrationality or serious legal flaw, the award should stand, with courts having the discretion to clarify or elaborate on the reasoning rather than dismiss it altogether. Further, with respect to the issue of the award being violative to the public policy of India [section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Act], the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that for an award to be set aside, the violation must affect a fundamental policy of Indian law. Further, minor infractions of the law are not sufficient to render an award invalid.

Thus, the award of the Arbitral Tribunal was upheld.

35. Directorate of Enforcement vs. Rahil Chovatia

CRL.M.C. 5482/2022 (Delhi)

18^th September, 2024

Money Laundering — Alleged massive scam in the country — Proceeds of crime / money routed through various layers of entities- Arrest on the ground of mere assumption — Bail granted. [S. 439(2), 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973]

FACTS

A First Information Report (FIR) was filed against unidentified persons, marking the beginning of an investigation that allegedly unearthed a massive scam operating in the country. It revealed an extensive scheme of money laundering involving money being looted from the public through various mobile applications on the pretext of high returns on investments. According to the Petitioner, the money received from the public (i.e., Proceeds of Crime (PoC)) of approximately 250 crores were collected in the shell companies (first layer of entities). Thereafter, the money was layered and routed to several other companies (second layer of entities). Ultimately, the money was transferred out of the country under the guise of payments for imports before passing through a third layer of money laundering. During the investigation, the Respondent was arrested. It was alleged that the Respondent, director of a company (third layer of entity), had received funds from the first and second layer of entities. The Respondent had filed a bail application, which was granted by the learned Trial Court. Aggrieved, a petition was filed before the Hon’ble Delhi High Court for the cancellation of bail of the Respondent.

HELD

At the outset, the Hon’ble Delhi High Court highlighted the distinction between setting aside an unjust or illegal order and the cancellation of bail. Further, relying on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Madanlal Chaudhary vs. Union of India [(2022) SCC OnLine (SC) 929], the Hon’ble Delhi High Court reiterated that the ingredients constituting an offence of money laundering are to be strictly construed. Furthermore, the Hon’ble Court noted that the proceeds of crime which were allegedly received by the Respondent was merely an assumption made by the Petitioner. Therefore, the order of the Trial Court was upheld. The Petition was thus, dismissed.

36. Pramod vs. The Secretary, The Sultanpet Diocese Society and Anr.

2024 LiveLaw (Ker) 597

25^th September, 2024

Eviction — Unpaid Rent — Fundamental duty — Cannot seek the protection of law from eviction — Rent must be duly paid. [S. 151, Code for Civil Procedure, Code, 1908]

FACTS

The Petitioners (Original Defendants) are the tenants of the Respondent. A suit was instituted for eviction and realization of unpaid rent from the Petitioners. The suit was admitted by the Trial Court. Thereafter, an interim application was filed by the Respondent (landlord) for payment of unpaid rent. The Court, under section 151 of the Code for Civil Procedure, 1908, accepted the interim application and directed the Petitioner to deposit the unpaid rent. Aggrieved by the interim application, a Petition (OP) was filed before the Hon’ble Kerala High Court (Ernakulam).

HELD

The Hon’ble Kerala High Court noted that the Petitioners had failed to discharge their fundamental obligation as tenants, i.e. paying rent to the Respondent. Further, the Hon’ble Court held that, a tenant who neglects this essential duty cannot expect the protection of the courts in matters of eviction. Furthermore, the Court also noted that a landlord holds the ultimate title to the property, and the tenant’s right to remain in possession hinges entirely on the payment of rent. Furthermore, the Court emphasised that permitting the tenant to prolong legal proceedings in such a scenario would amount to nothing less than an undue burden and harassment of the landlord.

Therefore, the Petition (OP) was dismissed.

37. The Catholic Diocese of Gorakhpur through its President vs. Bhola Deceased and Ors.

Second Appeal No. 461 of 2014 (Allahabad)

10^th September, 2024

Transfer of property — Affidavit — No transfer of land through affidavit — Transfer only through recognised modes such as sale, gift, lease, mortgage and exchange. [S. 2(l), 8, 10, 26, The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976; S. 118, Transfer of Property Act, 1882]

FACTS

The Respondent (Original Plaintiff) had instituted a suit for claiming his ‘bhumidari’ (ownership) rights over the disputed property against the Appellants, namely the Catholic Diocese (lessee) and the State of Uttar Pradesh (lessor). The State of Uttar Pradesh had leased the disputed property to the Catholic Diocese for the construction of a hospital. It was contended by the Plaintiff that the property was illegally acquired by the State of Uttar Pradesh, and hence, the consequent lease deed in favour of the Catholic Diocese was also illegal. Further, in support of the same, it was stated that the said property was never declared as surplus / vacant as per the provision of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (Urban Land Act). The Learned Trial Court, however, held that the Plaintiff had himself relinquished his title by submitting an affidavit before the Learned District Magistrate, and it was only thereafter, that the property was handed over to the State of Uttar Pradesh. Aggrieved, an appeal was preferred before the First Appellate Authority. The First Appellate Authority allowed the appeal and held that the Plaintiff was the owner of the property. Further, any constructions made by the Catholic Diocese (lessee) were directed to be removed at once.

Aggrieved, a second appeal was preferred before the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court.

HELD

The Hon’ble Allahabad High Court outrightly dismissed the contention of the Appellants that the property was transferred or the rights in the property were relinquished based on admissions made in affidavits by the Plaintiff. The Hon’ble Court held that rights in property can only be transferred as per the procedure established in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, or under the Registration Act, 1908. Therefore, the Hon’ble Court held that the State of Uttar Pradesh had never acquired the title of the property legally, and had deprived the Plaintiff of his land for more than 32 years. The appeal was, therefore, dismissed with a cost of RTen lakhs on the Appellant. The order of the First Appellate Authority was upheld.

32 A.S. Rawat vs. Dawa Tashi

AIR 2023 Delhi 252

Date of Order: 13th March, 2023

RTI — Filed by non-citizen — Public Information Officer denied on account of non-citizenship — RTI available to citizens as well as non-citizens. [Ss. 3, 6, 7(1), Right to Information Act, 2005; Article 21, Constitution of India].

FACTS

The Respondent / Right to Information (RTI) Applicant had requested information concerning various aspects such as his employment confirmation letter, children’s education allowance, and all India LTC benefits. In response, the Public Information Officer (PIO) / Petitioner stated that the RTI applicant did not have the right to use the provisions of the RTI Act, 2005, since he was a Tibetan and not a citizen of India. The appeal against this decision was denied. However, in a subsequent appeal to the Central Information Commission (CIC), the CIC ruled that the PIO ought to have provided the requested information to the Applicant. The CIC also found that the PIO’s actions were driven by ill intent and baseless suspicions about the applicant’s citizenship. As a result, the Commission imposed a penalty of ₹25,000 on the PIO.

The PIO filed a Writ Petition before the High Court against the order of the CIC.

HELD

The Hon’ble Delhi High Court held that the RTI is accessible to both Indian citizens as well as non-citizens, and refusing this right to non-citizens would be in conflict with both the Constitution of India and the RTI Act. Thus, the Hon’ble court directed the PIO to comply with the PIL filed by the Respondent. However, the Court quashed the penalty of R25,000 imposed on the PIO, stating that the actions of the PIO were not mala fide or ill-intended.

33 Sree Rengaraaj Steel and Alloys Limited vs. MSTC  Limited

AIR 2023 Madras 278

Date of Order: 25th January, 2023

Limitation — Self-serving and unilateral payment made by the creditor — Cannot be constituted as an acknowledgement of debt or cannot extend the time period of calculating limitation period. [S. 3, 19, The Limitation Act, 1963].

FACTS

The Respondent/ Plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of a sum of money from the Appellant. The Appellant and the Respondent had a contract whereby, the Appellant was liable to pay money in exchange for goods along with interest if the Appellant failed to pay within a grace period of 175 days. The Appellant failed to pay within the grace period of 175 days. The Appellant contested that the suit filed by the Plaintiff was after the expiry of the period of limitation, and thus, the suit was liable to be dismissed. The Trial Court, in its finding, held that the last transaction (which took place on 6th July, 1996) was made by the creditor as payment for adjustment of the demurrage deposit and thus, held that the suit was filed within the limitation period.

On Appeal.

HELD

The Hon’ble Madras High Court held that self-serving adjustment of account by the creditor, in the ledger maintained by the Plaintiff cannot be considered as an acknowledgement of debt (as contemplated by section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963) when it is admitted that no payment as such was received towards the debt or liability as per the ledger account. Thus, the suit filed by the Plaintiff was barred by limitation. The order of the Trial Court was set aside and the original suit was dismissed.

34 Debkanta Chakrabarti vs. State of West Bengal and others

AIR 2023 Calcutta 287

Date of Order: 28th June, 2023

Succession — Membership of Co-operative society — Heritable — Not automatic in the absence of a nominee — Legal heir required to produce probate, letter of administration or succession certificate. [Ss. 70, 92, West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 2006].

FACTS

The father of the Appellant was inducted as a shareholder / member of a cooperative society on 16th June, 1975. A deed of lease was executed between them on 20th September, 1990, to grant the leasehold right of the piece of land to the said member. His name was mutated in the government record of rights. He had since been possessing the land, by constructing a residential house and staying therein. The said person died on 18th July, 1997. The Appellant’s claim is that he and his mother, being the son and wife of the deceased person, are the only legal heirs and successors of the deceased. Therefore, the mother of the Appellant made an application to the Society, on 5th November, 1997, for the transfer of the share of her deceased husband in the Society, in the names of herself and the Appellant, so that they may be inducted as members in the Society, in place of the deceased member. However, the Appellant’s mother died on 10th January, 2018. It is the further case of the Appellant that since the death of his father, he has duly remitted all the expenses and charges payable to the Society, in a manner similar to an existing member. Appellant by his letters requested the Society to record his name as a member of the Society, by virtue of his being the only legal heir of the erstwhile member, since deceased. His letters not being acted upon by Society, the Appellant resorted to lodging his grievance to the registrar and assistant registrar of the co-operative societies. In response, the Society replied that the interest of the deceased member, i.e., the father of the present Appellant, shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions laid down in Section 70 of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 2006 (Act) and the rules framed thereunder.

Aggrieved by this, the Appellant filed a Writ Petition before the Single bench of the Calcutta High Court, which was dismissed. Appeal was filed before the division bench.

HELD

According to Section 92 of the Act, even a nominee has to follow the procedure mentioned in the Act to be inducted as a member of a housing cooperative society. Shares of a cooperative society are heritable and transferable immovable property, and the Appellant does have a right to inherit the same. However, the Appellant is not named as a nominee by his father, and hence, the automatic transfer of interest does not arise. The Appellant should have produced either probate or letters of administration or succession certificate from a competent court of law, as per Section 70 of the said Act.

The appeal was dismissed.

35 Guruprasad Tah vs. Ashoke Kumar Tah and others

AIR 2023 Calcutta 267

Date of Order: 26th April, 2023

Succession — Will — Genuineness of Will in doubt — First Will was revoked — Second Will in favour of executor — Testator was not well at the time of Second Will — Signatures not proper — Witnesses were persons of the executor — Will was not a product of a free and fair mind.

FACTS

Ashok Kumar Tah (Respondent) filed an application for a grant of probate of a Will dated 4th July, 1983, executed by his father Gourpada Tah in respect of his property. Ashok was named as the executor in the Will. Gourpada, during his lifetime, executed two Wills. The first Will was executed on 3rd June, 1964. The said Will was revoked by the later Will dated 4th July, 1983. Ashok is claiming property under the Will dated 4th July, 1983.

The Trial Court allowed the application for a grant of probate. The trial Court was satisfied with the due execution and attestation of the Will by two attesting witnesses.

On an appeal by Guruprasad Tah (Appellant), the eldest son of the deceased.

HELD

There are several reasons to doubt the genuineness of the Will as it is made in suspicious circumstances. The Will is a second Will which revokes the First Will. At the time of the execution of the Second Will, the testator was physically ill and mentally frail. It was incumbent upon the executor and the attesting witnesses to establish the mental ability and physical fitness of the executor to execute the Will. There is no evidence that, at the registration, the testator was in a position to travel to the office for registration. Further, there is no evidence that the Will was registered at the residence of the testator. One of the attesting witnesses stated that he had not seen the other attesting witness at the registry office. The signature of the testator appears to be shaky and at the right-hand corner of the Will instead of the bottom of each page. Also, there is no endorsement in the Will that the sub registrar had explained the contents of the Will to the testator. It appears that the executor had a prominent role in the execution of the Will, and all the witnesses also appear to be the persons of the executor. Hence, it cannot be said that the Will was a product of the free and fair mind of the testator.

The appeal is allowed, and the probate proceedings fail.

 Suo Motu Contempt Petition AIR 2017
SUPREME COURT 3836

 The advocate on record contended in an
extremely agitated manner that a great manipulation had occurred in the
Registry of the Court, in order to favour the opposite party with the objective
of “Bench Hunt”. Alleging that unscrupulous litigants aimed to bench
hunt, the Advocate on record also alleged the involvement of the registry
stating that in deviation from normal Rule of listing the matter before regular
bench, and indulging in constituting a special bench at the eleventh hour is
non-conventional and mischievous act on part of Registry.

It was observed that the contemnor was an
Advocate-on-Record, practicing in that capacity since the year 2009 – not a
novice in the field. He had been representing prestigious institutions, State
Government and Authorities and is obviously quite familiar with the practices
of the Court. He cannot be said to be oblivious to the fact that no bench is
constituted by the Registry, but by the Chief Justice of this Court. Thus, in
an indirect manner, an imputation was impliedly made even against the Chief
Justice, though in the garb of a virulent attack on the Registry.

The contempt jurisdiction is not only to
protect the reputation of the concerned Judge so that he can administer Justice
fearlessly and fairly, but also to protect “the fair name of the
judiciary”. The protection, in a manner of speaking, extends even to the
Registry in the performance of its task, and false and unfair allegations which
seek to impede the working of the Registry and thus the administration of
Justice, made with oblique motives, cannot be tolerated.

It was held that the allegations sought to
be made against the Registry with insinuations directed even against the
Judges, led to the prima facie satisfaction, that the Advocate-on-Record
had committed contempt in the face of the Court, by making such insinuations
and allegations and hence the contemnor was not permitted to practice as an
Advocate-on-Record, for a period of one month from the date of the order.

Joint Property –
Income from joint property used for purchasing property – Joint property.
[Hindu Law]

Pana Devi and Ors. vs. Ayodhaya Prasad
and Ors. AIR 2017 PATNA 145

A partition 
suit  was filed to claim a share
in the property.

The issue was whether the property was
purchased out of the income of the joint property or from the individual’s own
income, since if the property was from the income of individual’s own income,
the plaintiffs would be entitled to get a larger share in the property.

The Honourable Court held that since there
was no reliable evidence to show that there was separate source of income as
claimed by the plaintiffs, the property was considered to be acquired out of
the income of the Joint Property and hence, such property would also be treated
as the joint property.

License to drive
Light Motor Vehicle – Can also drive transport vehicle – Should be of same
class. [Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, Sections 
2(10), 2(21), 2(15), 2(47), 2(48), 3, and 10]

Mukund Dewangan vs. Oriental Insurance
Company Limited AIR 2017 SUPREME COURT 3668

The issue was, what was the meaning to be
given to the definition of “light motor vehicle” as defined in
section 2(21) of the Motor Vehicles Act? Whether transport vehicles were
excluded from it?

It was held by the Honourable Court that
‘Light motor vehicle’ as defined in section 2(21) of the Act would include a
transport vehicle as per the weight prescribed in section 2(21) read with
sections 2(15) and 2(48). Such transport vehicles are not excluded from the
definition of the light motor vehicle. There is no requirement to obtain
separate endorsement to drive transport vehicle, and if a driver is holding
licence to drive light motor vehicle, he can drive transport vehicle of such
class without any endorsement to that effect.

Power of Attorney
holder can appear as witness [Evidence Act, 1872 –Section 118]

Radha Sharan Dubey and Ors. vs. Ram Niwas
and Ors. AIR 2017 (NOC) 828 (ALL.)

The founder trustees had created trust
through their Power of Attorney. The power of attorney was present in the
office of the sub-registrar and had admitted execution of the trust deed. The
trustees had executed separate power of attorneys in favour of the power of
attorney holder which were duly registered, before execution of the trust deed.
Thus, the Power of Attorney had power to depose, having personal knowledge of
the affairs of the trust. His oral deposition cannot be ignored for the fact of
being Power of Attorney holder of the trustees.

The question which arose for determination
before the Court was, as to whether the oral deposition of Power of Attorney
can be ignored only on the ground that he was only Power of Attorney Holder of
the plaintiff trust and, therefore, he had no personal knowledge of the facts
deposed.

It was held that a comprehensive reading of
the procedure as provided under Order III Rule 1 and 2 of Civil Procedure Code
indicates that it does not deal with the merit of the evidence to be adduced in
a civil proceeding as to who may testify or depose. A careful reading of the
Order III Rule 1 CPC further shows that it does not deal with the power of the
General Power of Attorney to depose or the right of the Principal to authorise
his Power of Attorney to depose in his favour. There was also no prohibition
under the Evidence Act for a Power of Attorney to appear and depose on behalf
of his principal. The Power of Attorney Holder is a competent witness and is
entitled to appear as such. His evidence cannot be refused to be taken into consideration
merely on the ground that the parties to the suit i.e. the plaintiff or
defendant choose not to appear in the witness-box. Section 118 of the Evidence
Act provides the category of persons who are incapable of being witness in a
legal proceeding. The Power of Attorney does not fall in any of the said
categories. By cross-examination of the Power of Attorney, it can be seen
whether he has personal knowledge about the facts in controversy. The
evidentiary value of his deposition may be determined after due consideration
of his answer in the cross-examination.

It was thus concluded that the Power of
Attorney Holder was a competent witness and was entitled to appear as such, his
deposition will be read in evidence on record.

Surety – Liability
of surety co-extensive – Prerogative of decree holder as to against which
judgment debtors he should proceed against. [Chit Funds Act 1982, Section 25;
Contract Act 1872, Section 128].

Punyamurthula Venkata Viswa Sundara Rao
vs. Margadarsi Chit Fund Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. AIR 2017 (NOC) 774 (HYD.) (HC)

Civil revision petitions were filed to
execute an order passed against all the judgement debtors in the Arbitration
proceedings. The decree holder represented by its Principal Officer obtained
the award against the principal debtor and all the judgement debtors.

The simple issue which came up for
consideration was whether the decree holder has to proceed against all the
judgement debtors, who are guarantors, by claiming proportionate amount
decreed.

The
Honourable Court held that the law is well settled i.e. the decree holder has
an option to proceed against either the principal debtor or any of the
guarantors or against all of them. The liability of a surety is co-extensive
with that of the principal debtor, unless it is otherwise provided by the
contract, as section 128 of the Indian Contract Act is clearly worded. Hence,
it was concluded that it is completely the prerogative of the decree holder, as
to against whom he should proceed, for realising the debt. _

5. Hindu Law – Alienation by Karta
– Co-parcenor son has no right to challenge the sale made.

 

Kehar Singh (D) thr. L.Rs. and Ors. vs. Nachittar Kaur and
Ors. AIR 2018 Supreme Court 3907

 

The suit filed by the son of the defendant which was founded
on the premise that the suit property i.e. the property based on which the suit
is filed, was and still continues to be ancestral property.

 

In the facts of the case, the Karta (defendant) has sold a
property, which was alleged to be without authority and without consent of the
other members of the Hindu Undivided Family. The plaintiff alleged that his
father (defendant) had no right to sell the suit land without obtaining the
Plaintiff’s consent, which he never gave to his father for sale of the suit
land, that there was no legal necessity of the family which could permit the
defendant to sell the suit land. The only question which was left for
adjudication was that the said sale made by the defendant was not valid since
the approval of the other co-parcenors was not acquired.

 

The Court observed that a Hindu father as such has special
powers of alienating coparcenary property, which no other coparcener has. Such
father could sell or mortgage ancestral property, whether movable or immovable,
including the interest of his sons, grandsons and great-grandsons therein, for
the payment of his own debt, provided the debt was an antecedent debt, and was
not incurred for immoral or illegal purposes.

 

In substance, there should exist a legal necessity due to
which the said property was sold. The legal necessity was defined.

 

It was held that since the said sale was done within the
purview of the powers available to a father to sell ancestral property for the
purposes specified and not for immoral or illegal purposes, hence the said sale
done by the father (karta) was valid.

 

6. Legal Representative –
Remarried widow – Can be a claimant. [Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; Section2(11)]

 

National Insurance Company Ltd. and Ors. vs. Nidhi Goel and
Ors. AIR (2018) Punjab And Haryana 161

 

In this case the legal representatives of the deceased
petitioner died to the rash and negligent driving of the respondents. The
Learned Tribunal awarded a compensation of Rs. 12,89,500 to the claimants along
with interest @ 9% p.a. to the claimants.

 

It was contended that no compensation is payable to the widow
as she got re-married within about three months of the death of her husband. It
was the case that once the widow had remarried, she ceased to be dependent upon
the deceased. Moreover, after her remarriage she became dependent upon the
person who married her and, therefore, there was no question of paying
compensation for her maintenance during her life-time.

 

The Court observed that a
reference, however, can be made to section 2(11) of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908, for its definition where said term means a person who in law
represents the estate of a deceased person, and includes any person who
intermeddles with the estate of deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a
representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of
the party so suing or sued. After the death of her husband, the widow continues
to represent his estate irrespective of her re-marriage because she inherits
part of the estate of her deceased husband. Thus, such widow is included in the
definition of “legal representative” as reproduced above and, thus,
can maintain a petition u/s. 166 of the Act even after her re-marriage.

 

It was held by the Hon’ble Court that the widow of the
deceased person is also entitled to claim compensation. It is beyond the pale
of doubt that the Act is a social welfare legislation and should be interpreted
so as to fulfill the objective with which it was enacted. If the proposition
put forward that a remarried widow is not entitled to get any compensation, it
would militate against the right of a widow to re-marry. This would not be in
public interest or in the interest of the society at large.

 

7. 
Natural Justice – Specific request for a date – AO ought to have giving
such opportunity of personal hearing.

 

Vetrivel Constructions vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Perambur
Assessment Circle 2018 (15) G.S.T.L. 527 (Mad.)

 

The main contention was that the impugned assessment orders
were passed in violation of the principles of natural justice as the respondent
failed to provide an opportunity of personal hearing, inspite of asking for the
same.

 

The petitioner submitted that the respondent having informed
the petitioner that they can avail the opportunity of personal hearing through
their show cause notice dated 29.12.2015, ought to have given such hearing to
the petitioner, especially when the petitioner has specifically requested for
giving such opportunity through their letters dated 31.12.2016 and 11.01.2017.
He further contended that the conclusion arrived by the respondent based on web
report is again in violation of principles of natural justice as the petitioner
was not furnished with those details of the report.

 

The respondent submitted that the petitioner was given an
opportunity of hearing by giving a show cause notice and the impugned orders of
assessment were passed after considering the reply given by the petitioner.
Therefore, he contended that there is no violation of principles of natural
justice warranting interference by this court.

 

The Court set aside the matter to the AO for fresh
consideration on the premise that the department circular mentioned as under;

 

“Fair opportunity is to be given to the assessee and
judicial consideration given to the representations, evidences and materials
furnished by him. But personal hearing need not be given unless the status
requires it (e.g. Section 22(2) or the assessee asks for it.”

 

The Court, while setting aside the matter, also relied upon
the decision reported in (2010) 33 VST 333 (Mad), it has been observed
as follows;

 

“the provision of section 16(1)(a) of the said Act has to
be construed in accordance with the said circular which is by way of
contemporanea expositio. So when a specific demand is made for personal hearing
the reasonable opportunity of showing cause should include the same in the
interest of fairness in procedure.”

 

8. Release Deed – Inadequate stamp
duty paid – Objection to admissibility to be decided when objection raised.
[Evidence Act, 1872; Section 61; Stamp Act, 1899; Section 35]

 

Sudhanshu Shekhar Shukla
vs. Meenakshi Trivedi and Ors. AIR (2018) Chattisgarh 139

 

There was a consent letter whereby rights in a property were
relinquished by few of the sharers in favour of the plaintiff. However, this
consent letter, when brought into evidence, was objected to with respect to its
admissibility under the Evidence Act. 

     

An application u/s. 35 of the Stamp Act was filed reiterating
the pleading of the plaintiff of relinquishment deed dated 20.06.1996 and it
was stated that the said relinquishment deed was executed only on Rs. 10/-
Stamp which is an unregistered document. It was also pleaded that the value of
the property for which the relinquishment deed operates is more than Rs. 100/-,
therefore, as per the Article 55 Schedule 1 A of the Act, 1899 of the Stamp
Act, the stamp duty would be attracted over the value of the property. It was
further pleaded that since the document was insufficiently stamped as such it
could not be admitted u/s.35 of the Act, 1899.

 

Further it was also pleaded that the document is also unregistered one,
therefore, is inadmissible by virtue of section 17 (1) of the Indian
Registration Act, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act, 1908).

 

The lower authority held that whether it is registered or
not, the admissibility of the same would be decided at the time of final
hearing of the case.

The only question before the Hon’ble Court was whether the
document dated 20.06.1996 i.e. the deed of relinquishment is admissible in
evidence or not for want of proper stamp duty and registration.

 

The Court held that the trial Court was directed to decide
the admissibility of the document sought to be exhibited by the plaintiff in
terms of the observation made in this order at the time of taking evidence and
cannot be postponed. If the trial Court finds that the document is
insufficiently stamped and is tendered in evidence then the Court is duty bound
to impound the same and in order to decide the levy of stamp, the document is
required to be sent to the Collector as per sections 33, 35, 38 & 40 of the
Indian Stamp Act, 1899.

 

9. 
Will – No proof of execution and attestation – Natural Succession.
[Succession Act, 1925, Section 63(c)]

 

Didar Singh vs. Gram Panchayat of Village, Meghowal and Ors.
AIR 2018 Punjab And Haryana 172

 

A Will was executed which was disputed by the respondent.

 

The Will propounded by the plaintiff was stated to be forged
and fabricated.

The Court observed that the provisions of the Act envisaged
three situations: one Will has to be attested by two or more witnesses and each
of them had seen the testator to either append his signatures or thumb
impressions or mark or has seen the other person sign the Will in the presence
and by the direction of the testator, or has received from the testator a
personal acknowledgment of his signature or mark, or the signature of such
other person; and third situation, each of the witnesses signed in the presence
of the testator.

 

The Court further observed that the trial Court had discarded
the Will but the Lower Appellate Court reversed the finding by holding that
Will had been proved. However, the aforementioned finding may not be
sustainable as the witnesses of the Will did not depose in terms of provisions
of section 63(c) of Indian Succession Act. There is not a single iota of
statement that he appended the signature on the Will on the instructions of
deceased Chanan Singh. In the impugned Will, no reasons were assigned as to why
Chanan Singh had dis-inherited his line of natural succession, i.e., brother,
Class-II heir or with regard to previous Will.

 

The Court held that since Will set up by the defendants has
been disbelieved by this Court as a necessary corollary, suit property would
devolve upon appellant(s) by natural succession being Class II heir.