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LOKMANYA

Every educated Indian knows about Lokmanya Tilak. However, very few know about the real greatness, uniqueness and versatility of this multi-faceted son of India. The First of August, 2021 is the 101st anniversary of his death. It will be really inspiring to know about the amazing range of his activities and achievements.

He was born in a very small village in Ratnagiri district. His father was a school teacher. His real name was Keshav but he was popularly known as ‘Bal’. He was one of the well-known trio of Indian patriots called ‘Lal’ (Lala Lajpatrai), ‘Bal’ (Bal Gangadhar Tilak), and ‘Pal’ (Bipin Chandra Pal).

Most leaders of those times did their graduation in literature, political science, history, economics, law, etc. But Lokmanya was a scholar in Mathematics and Astronomy. His brain was like that of a scientist. Once he was asked, ‘Which portfolio would you prefer after India becomes independent?’ He said, ‘It is because of the inaction of people like you that I had to enter politics. After Independence, I would like to be a Professor in Mathematics.’ He wrote two scholastic treatises on Astronomy – ‘The Arctic Home of Vedas’ and the ‘Orion’. He started a ‘panchaang’ (calendar) based on his knowledge of astronomy. His ‘Tilak Panchaang’ is still in vogue. Interestingly, after matriculation and before entering college, he devoted one full year to acquire physical strength. Perhaps he could anticipate the strenuous struggles he would face in his future life.

  •  He established the New English School and Fergusson College. He was a great educationist and his basic aim was national education.
  •  He started two dailies, ‘Kesari’ in Marathi and ‘Marhatta’ in English. He is still respected as a great journalist. The British Government used to be afraid of his editorials.
  •  For almost 20 years of his life, he faced litigations and court proceedings and spent about ten years in jail as a freedom fighter.

His knowledge of the law was amazing. He had done his LL.B. and for a livelihood used to give tuitions in law to students from different states. He inculcated the spirit of patriotism among them. He lost just one case against him in the High Court. He was then sent to Mandalay Jail (kala paani). There, without any reference books, he raised certain points of law and of Hindu traditions (regarding adoption) and he was acquitted by the Privy Council.

His knowledge of philosophy was acclaimed by most world scholars when he wrote ‘Geetarahasya’ (in English) despite the hard and strenuous life of Mandalay. For that, he studied about 400 books from different languages. He also learnt four languages for this purpose.

He was a visionary. He realised the importance of cinema as a powerful medium and supported Dadasaheb Phalke, the first film-maker of India. He encouraged his work through his newspapers and raised funds for him.

He advocated many social reforms. For public education, social reforms and bringing the people together, he started the ‘Ganeshotsav’ and ‘Shivjayanti Utsav’. An anti-alcohol movement was also started by him and he even demanded a prohibition law. This seriously affected the revenue collection of the Government.

He was also an entrepreneur. Hardly anyone knows that he set up his own ginning factory at Latur and a sawmill at Ratnagiri; he also supported the glass factory at Pune. He had a deep sense of commerce and economics. He was one of the promoters of the first Indian joint stock company ‘Bombay Swadeshi Co-operative Stores’, a listed company.

His sacrifice for the freedom of India was unparalleled and he was known as the father of Indian unrest (against British rule).

These are only a few highlights of his life. That was why he was loved and revered by one and all – a real ‘Lokmanya’.

Doesn’t he deserve our humble ‘Namaskaar’?

PDF VIEWERS / EDITORS / CONVERTERS

PDF stands for Portable Data Format, meaning a file format which can be ported across Operating Systems. Whether you use Windows, Mac, iOS or Linux, if you get a file in a PDF format it will look just the same – the formatting does not change or get distorted. As per Wikipedia, Portable Document Format, standardised as ISO 32000, is a file format developed by Adobe in 1993 to present documents, including text formatting and images, in a manner independent of application software, hardware and operating systems.

Opening and viewing a PDF file is very simple – most web browsers will open a PDF file directly within the browser. If you need to view the file multiple times, it may be easier to download it and view it later in any of the PDF file viewers which are easily available online for free. Adobe Reader is one of the most popular PDF viewers available across operating systems.

Creating a PDF file is also very simple. If you are using Word, Excel or Google Docs, just head to the Print option and select PDF from the list of printers available. This allows you to create a PDF of anything that you could otherwise print, including documents, sheets, emails, etc. In any of the above, you could also Save the file as PDF and that would do the job.

By definition, PDF files are ‘read only’. But there could be many situations where you may need to edit them, for example, it may be a PDF form which you need to fill, or a document prepared by a colleague which you need to edit. You may also need to convert from / to PDF format in many situations. Let us see the possibilities and the options available.

Adobe Acrobat Pro DC
This is, by far, the best PDF editor available. It is different from the Adobe Acrobat DC Reader on your PC, which is just a plain reader. If you sign up for the Trial Version of PRO, you get to use the full features of the pro version. You can use PDFs on any device and stay connected to your PDF tasks wherever you go. You can pick up right where you left off across your desktop, laptop, mobile phone or tablet. You can even convert scans, images, web pages and more to PDFs and work on them on any device, anytime, anywhere. You can edit text and images, fill, sign, and work on your PDFs seamlessly and even send a link to multiple reviewers to track status, gather feedback and collect signatures. This version supports a variety of languages across your devices.

The free trial lasts for just seven days and if you wish to use it beyond the trial period, there is a price to pay. It is a bit steep, but it will give you all the bells and whistles that you may desire to use with your PDF files.

Sejda
Sejda (Sejda.com) is an easy, pleasant and productive PDF editor. Apart from editing PDF files, you can merge files, edit and sign files, and also split and compress files. By way of security you can Protect and Lock your files and also insert a Watermark. Conversion to and from PDF format from / to multiple formats is supported – Excel, JPG, PPT, Text, Word. You can extract and / or delete pages selectively within PDFs. A special utility allows you to extract images from a PDF file. OCR is supported with the ability to Resize and Rotate the contents.

You can use Sejda directly online, on the web, or download the Desktop version and use it offline. The Web version works in your browser. Their servers process the files and send them back to you after editing / conversion. Your files stay secure and after processing they are permanently deleted. The Desktop version works offline just like the online version, and the files never leave your computer. You can use the desktop version on Windows, MacOS and Linux.

The free version has daily limits such as three tasks per day, documents up to 50 MB and 200 pages and images up to 5 MB. For a reasonable, nominal fee you could unlock these limitations and use it for unlimited tasks.

XODO PDF Reader
One of the best PDF editors for Android. It lets you create and edit PDFs. You can also write directly onto existing PDFs, highlight and underline text, fill forms, sign documents and take notes on blank PDFs. You can auto-sync the work that you do, with your cloud storage and annotate PDFs with others in real time!

Drawboard PDF
Drawboard PDF is the most intuitive PDF app on the Microsoft Store. Designed to replace pen and paper, an extensive array of tools and intuitive interface make Drawboard PDF the #1 rated productivity app on the Microsoft Store. With a wonderfully intuitive layout and the radial menu button, you can switch quickly between documents and customise your layout style. If you are using a touch screen, the pressure-sensitive ink with colour choice, custom opacity and thickness create an experience even better than pen and paper. You can insert editable shapes, lines, arrows and insert dynamic content like ink signatures, images, text boxes and notes. And, of course, the regular PDF editing tools are all there – rotate, insert, delete pages, annotate, import and export and much more. Available in multiple languages, it also provides relevant industry tools for drafters and engineers to project managers.

ILovePDF
ILovePDF (ILovePDF.com) gives you every tool that you need to work with PDFs in one place. All are FREE and easy to use. Merge, split, compress, convert, rotate, unlock and watermark PDFs all with just a few clicks. Conversion of PDFs is such a breeze with this tool. You may convert to or from the PDF format to multiple formats. All conversions are online and easy to use. You need not download any app for the purpose.

However, if you need a desktop version, you may download from ILovePDF.com/Desktop and use it from the comfort of your device. And, of course, if you need an Android or iOS app, you can install it from ILovePDF.com/mobile. A very efficient tool to manage your PDFs from any device!

There are so many other such tools which help you to handle PDF files on the go. Which one do you like and use? Write to me and share your experiences.

NEW FAQs ON INSIDER TRADING

SEBI has released in April, 2021 a comprehensive set of Frequently Asked Questions (‘FAQs’) on the SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 2015 (‘the Insider Trading Regulations’). Several aspects of the subject have been clarified. A few important ones are discussed here.

BRIEF BACKGROUND OF THE INSIDER TRADING REGULATIONS

Insider trading is an evil of stock markets that is unacceptable across the globe and stringent laws are made against such acts. The concept of insider trading is simple enough. A person close to a company is entrusted with material information about the company and he is duty-bound not to abuse it for profit. It may be information about, say, substantial growth in profits of the company. Yet he goes ahead and buys shares of the company while the information is not yet public. When the information is released, the share price expectedly rises and he thus profits. Insider trading is condemned on several grounds. It reduces faith in the markets as there arises a feeling that the market is rigged against ‘outsiders’. It also amounts to a moral wrong by such a person against the company itself which also loses. The persons who actually invest in the company and thus put their money at risk may be at a loss. Therefore, there are comprehensive regulations against insider trading.

This evil is tackled in various ways under the law. The primary policy of course is to ban trading on the basis of Unpublished Price Sensitive Information (‘UPSI’). Communication of UPSI is also prohibited. Detailed rules are laid down for control over it. A comprehensive and very wide definition of an ‘insider’ is laid down. Several categories of persons who are connected with the company or even connected with connected persons are deemed to be insiders. Further, apart from the ban in law, the company itself is required to self-regulate trading by certain insiders by a code of conduct.

It is not surprising that many areas exist where the law does not appear to be clear. SEBI has now released a comprehensive set of FAQs on the Regulations.

MULTIPLE SOURCES OF GUIDANCE – NOTES, INFORMAL GUIDANCE AND FAQs

Before we proceed to some specific and important FAQs, it is interesting to note the several attempts made to give guidance in various forms to the admittedly complex set of Regulations. The Regulations have this fairly interesting feature of ‘Notes’ to some of them. The notes attempt to explain the nature of that particular regulation. The legal status of such notes is not wholly clear.

Then we have Informal Guidance issued by SEBI in reply to specific queries raised by market participants from time to time. Coincidentally, SEBI has compiled important Informal Guidances on insider trading and released them almost simultaneously with the FAQs. But the legal status of Informal Guidances, too, is ambiguous at best.

And now we have the FAQs which again are specifically stated to be not law and not binding!

Yet, the Notes, Informal Guidances and FAQs do throw light on the complex and loosely worded Regulations and also show the mind of SEBI on how it views the Regulations. The Regulations will, of course, always rule as law but in the field of Securities Laws such supporting material has always been relevant and indeed they enrich the law.

Let us now consider some important FAQs.

DO THE REGULATIONS APPLY ALSO TO DEALINGS IN DERIVATIVES, DEBENTURES, ETC.?

The common understanding of insider trading may be that the Regulations cover dealings in equity shares. This also makes general sense since it is typically equity shares that are affected by release of material information. For example, a jump in the performance of the company affects the price of its equity shares.

However, the Regulations refer to ‘securities’ and not merely to ‘equity shares’. The term ‘securities’ is very widely defined and includes shares of all types, derivatives, debt securities, etc. Thus, the FAQs clarify that such other types of securities (except units of mutual funds) are also covered by the Regulations. Dealings in ADRs / GDRs are also clarified to be covered.

CREATION / INVOCATION / REVOCATION OF PLEDGE AND OTHER FORM OF CHARGE ON SECURITIES

It is common for shareholders to raise loans against their securities or otherwise offer such securities as security for various obligations. The securities are thus subjected to a charge which may be a pledge, a hypothecation, etc. The question is whether the creation (as also the invocation / revocation) of such a charge would amount to ‘dealing’ which is regulated?

On first impression, it would appear counter-intuitive that such acts should be regulated. Pledging of the shares does not result in transfer of risk and reward. If the price of the shares rises or falls, it would be on account of the shareholder; unlike a sale where the risks and rewards get transferred. However, an insider in possession of UPSI may, for example, pledge his shares and obtain a loan. Once the UPSI is released, which, say, is seriously negative news, the price of the shares may fall sharply. The lender thus may suffer as he will not be able to recover his loan even if he had kept a margin.

A ‘Note’ to the definition of ‘trading’ clarifies that this would include pledging, etc., while in possession of UPSI. The FAQs make this clear even further. Thus, creation, etc., of such a charge while in possession of UPSI would amount to dealing that is prohibited. However, the FAQs clarify that under certain specified circumstances such acts are permitted but it would be up to the pledger / pledgee to demonstrate that they were bona fide and prove their innocence.

CONTRA TRADES

As explained earlier, the Regulations attack the evil on several fronts. One of them is by way of ban on short-term trading by insiders which is also known as entering into contra trades within a specified period.

The basic rule is that an insider should not deal in the securities of the company on the basis of UPSI. However, to find him guilty of such an act, SEBI would have to prove several aspects. To avoid this, certain designated insiders have been banned from entering into contra trades within six months. To put this a little simply, if he purchases shares today, he cannot sell shares for six months. And vice versa. This places a brake on insiders doing quick trading which can expectedly be on the basis of UPSI.

However, some aspects are not clear and the FAQs have been released to clarify them.

Can such an insider buy a derivative and then reverse it within six months? The FAQs say he cannot, unless the closure of the derivative is by physical delivery. In other words, if he buys a future for, say, X number of shares, he can close the future by taking delivery and making the payment. However, he cannot close the future by selling it. This again makes sense because buying and selling futures / options may expectedly be on the basis of UPSI.

Can such an insider acquire shares by exercise of ESOPs and then sell them within six months? The FAQs says he can. The FAQs make some further clarifications. If he buys equity shares from the market on, say, 1st January and then acquires further equity shares by exercise of ESOPs, he can sell the shares acquired through ESOPs any time but he cannot sell the shares acquired from the market till 1st July. This would appear a little strange since usually both the categories of shares may be in the same demat account and hence not capable of being distinguished.

Then, the question is would the acquisition of shares through rights issues or public issue also amount to acquisition whereby one cannot sell the shares for the following six months? The FAQs clarify that you cannot sell the shares for such period.

Further, it is clarified that the ban on contra trades would apply not just to the designated insiders but also to their immediate relatives collectively.

IMMEDIATE RELATIVES

It is common, particularly in India, that family investment decisions are made by one person or at least jointly. One person may thus take decisions for himself / herself and other family members such as spouse, parents, children and even further. It would also be very easy for an insider to avoid the ban on trading on himself by trading in the name of a family member. Thus, the definition of insider for specified categories includes trading by ‘immediate relatives’ and they, too, are subject to certain similar regulations.
The question then is, who is an ‘immediate relative’? The definition under the Regulations creates two categories. One is the spouse, the other category is of the parent, sibling and child of such person or his / her spouse who is financially dependent on such person or consults such person while making an investment decision. The ‘Note’ to this definition clarifies this is a deeming fiction and hence rebuttable. The FAQs further emphasise this.
This clarification is important because often, being a mere relative does not necessarily mean that their dealings are in consultation with or even known to other members. A parent may not even know what are the dealings in securities of the child, particularly when the child is an adult, maybe with his own family. The same principle extends to siblings. Even spouses may want to carry out their own dealings. Hence, it would not be fair to extend an inflexible rule covering dealings of all relatives. Nevertheless, it would be more reasonable to expect, particularly in circumstances in India, that dealings of relatives are more likely based on information accessed by the insider. However, the insider can rebut this deeming fiction and establish that such persons do not consult him for their investment decisions and are not financially dependent on him.
CONCLUSION

Insider trading is not only an evil in the securities markets, but being held guilty of insider trading carries its own stigma. A person with such a track record may not get a job again in a reputed company. Investors, particularly those who are close to listed companies, would have to be familiar with the intricacies of these widely-framed Regulations so that they are not held liable under them. A Chartered Accountant in his professional dealings is very often an insider or deemed to be so by legal fiction. He may be a statutory or internal auditor, Independent Director, Adviser, Chief Financial Officer, financial adviser, merchant banker, etc., of listed companies. With his financial expertise, he would also typically deal in securities. Or he may simply park his savings in securities for his retirement. He would have to be even more careful in his dealings. The FAQs issued by SEBI thus help particularly the conservative investor who would educate himself and wade through the minefield of these Regulations safely.
 

Faceless Assessment u/s 144B – Personal hearing demanded by assessee on receipt of show cause notice-cum-draft assessment order – No personal hearing granted – Final assessment order passed – Liable to be set aside

6 Sanjay Aggarwal vs. National Faceless Assessment Centre, Delhi [(2021) Writ Petition (C) 5741/2021, Date of order: 2nd June, 2021 (Delhi High Court)]

Faceless Assessment u/s 144B – Personal hearing demanded by assessee on receipt of show cause notice-cum-draft assessment order – No personal hearing granted – Final assessment order passed – Liable to be set aside

The petitioner, via a writ petition, challenged the assessment order dated 28th April, 2021 for the A.Y. 2018-19 and consequential proceedings. The grievance of the petitioner is that although a personal hearing was sought, on account of the fact that the matter was complex and required explanation, the respondent / Revenue chose not to accord the same. Thus, the respondent / Revenue had committed an infraction of the statutory scheme encapsulated in section 144B.

The petitioner claimed that in respect of the A.Y 2018-19 the return was filed on 27th October, 2018, declaring its income at Rs. 33,43,690.

On 22nd September, 2019, a notice was issued u/s 143(2) read with Rule 12E of the Income-tax Rules, 1962, whereby the petitioner’s return was selected for scrutiny. Two issues were flagged by the A.O.; first, deductions made under the head ‘income from other sources’, and second, the aspect concerning unsecured loans.

A notice u/s 142(1) was served on the petitioner on 6th December, 2020 which was followed by various communications issued by the respondent / Revenue and replied by the petitioner.

The respondent / Revenue served a show cause notice-cum-draft assessment order dated 13th April, 2021 on the petitioner, proposed for a disallowance of Rs. 1,00,26,692 u/s 57. Consequently, a proposal was made to vary the income, resulting in the enhancement of the declared income to Rs. 1,33,70,380. The petitioner contended that, thereafter, several requests were made to the respondent / Revenue for grant of personal hearing. However, the respondent / Revenue did not pay heed to the requests and proceeded to issue a second show cause notice along with a draft assessment order dated 23rd April, 2021. Furthermore, the petitioner was directed to file its response / objections by 23:59 hours of 25th April, 2021.

According to the petitioner, although the time frame for filing the response / objections to the aforementioned show cause notice-cum-draft assessment order was very short, he filed the response / objections on 24th April, 2021. The respondent / Revenue, without according a personal hearing to the petitioner, passed the impugned assessment order dated 28th April, 2021. The petitioner submitted that the impugned assessment order, passed u/s 143(3) read with section 144B, is contrary to the statutory scheme incorporated u/s 144B. It is also contended that such assessment proceedings are non est in the eyes of the law.

The Revenue contended that the expression used in clause (vii) of sub-section (7) of section 144B is ‘may’ and not ‘shall’, and therefore there is no vested right in the petitioner to claim a personal hearing. Thus, according to the Revenue, failure to grant personal hearing to the petitioner did not render the proceedings non est as the same was not mandatory.

The High Court observed the following facts:
• That prior to the issuance of the show cause notice-cum-draft assessment order dated 23rd April, 2021, a show cause notice-cum-draft assessment order was issued on 13th April, 2021. Between these two dates, the petitioner had, on two occasions, asked for personal hearing in the matter.
• After the show cause notice-cum draft assessment order dated 23rd April, 2021 was issued, via which the petitioner was invited to file his response / objections, the petitioner, once again, while filing his reply, asked for being accorded personal hearing in the matter.

Thus, in sum and substance of the requests made, the petitioner continued to press the respondent / Revenue to accord him a personal hearing, before it proceeded to pass the impugned assessment order. According to the petitioner, the request was made as the matter was complex and therefore required some explanation.

The Court also observed that the respondent / Revenue made proposals for varying the income, both via the show cause notice dated 13th April, 2021 as well as the show cause notice-cum-draft assessment order dated 23rd April, 2021. As noticed above, the declared income was proposed to be substantially varied.

The Court referred to the provision of section 144B as to why the Legislature had provided a personal hearing in the matter:

‘144B. Faceless assessment –
(1)…………

(7) For the purposes of faceless assessment —
………….
(vii) in a case where a variation is proposed in the draft assessment order or final draft assessment order or revised draft assessment order, and an opportunity is provided to the assessee by serving a notice calling upon him to show cause as to why the assessment should not be completed as per such draft or final draft or revised draft assessment order, the assessee or his authorised representative, as the case may be, may request for personal hearing so as to make his oral submissions or present his case before the income-tax authority in any unit;
(viii) the Chief Commissioner or the Director General, in charge of the Regional Faceless Assessment Centre, under which the concerned unit is set up, may approve the request for personal hearing referred to in clause (vii) if he is of the opinion that the request is covered by the circumstances referred to in sub-clause (h) of clause (xii);
…………
(xii) the Principal Chief Commissioner or the Principal Director General, in charge of the National Faceless Assessment Centre shall, with the prior approval of the Board, lay down the standards, procedures and processes for effective functioning of the National Faceless Assessment Centre, Regional Faceless Assessment Centres and the unit setup, in an automated and mechanised environment, including format, mode, procedure and processes in respect of the following, namely:—
………..
(h) circumstances in which personal hearing referred to in clause(viii) shall be approved;

[Emphasis]

The Court observed that a perusal of clause (vii) of section 144B(7) would show that liberty has been given to the assessee, if his / her income is varied, to seek a personal hearing in the matter. Therefore, the usage of the word ‘may’ cannot absolve the respondent / Revenue from the obligation cast upon it to consider the request made for grant of personal hearing. Besides this, under sub-clause (h) of section 144B(7)(xii) read with section144B(7)(viii), the respondent / Revenue has been given the power to frame standards, procedures and processes for approving the request made for according personal hearing to an assessee who makes a request qua the same. The Department counsel informed the court that there are no such standards, procedures and processes framed yet.

Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it was held that it was incumbent upon the respondent / Revenue to accord a personal hearing to the petitioner. The impugned order was set aside.

Search and seizure – Condition precedent – Reasonable belief that assets in possession of person would not be disclosed – Application of mind to facts – Cash seized by police and handed over to Income-tax Authorities – Subsequent issue of warrant of authorisation – Seizure and retention of cash – Invalid

36 MECTEC vs. Director of Income-Tax (Investigation) [2021] 433 ITR 203 (Telangana) Date of order: 28th December, 2020 S. 132 of ITA, 1961

Search and seizure – Condition precedent – Reasonable belief that assets in possession of person would not be disclosed – Application of mind to facts – Cash seized by police and handed over to Income-tax Authorities – Subsequent issue of warrant of authorisation – Seizure and retention of cash – Invalid

The petitioner in W.P. No. 23023 of 2019 is a proprietary concern carrying on the business of purchase of agricultural lands and agricultural products throughout the country and claims that it has 46 branches at different places all over the country having an employee strength of about 300. It also deals as a wholesale trader of agricultural products, vegetables, fruits and post-harvest crop activities. The petitioner in W.P. No. 29297 of 2019 is Vipul Kumar Mafatlal Patel, an employee of the petitioner in W.P. No. 23023 of 2019.

The petitioner states that it has business transactions in the State of Telangana also and that it entrusted a sum of Rs. 5 crores to its employee Vipul Kumar Patel for its business purposes. The said individual had come to Hyderabad with friends, and on 23rd August, 2019 their car, a Maruti Ciaz car bearing No. TS09FA 4948, was intercepted by the Task Force Police of the State of Telangana. According to the petitioner, the said employee, his friends, the cash of Rs. 5 crores together with the above vehicle and another car and two-wheeler were detained illegally from 23rd August, 2019 onwards by the Telangana State Police.

The GPA holder of the petitioners filed on 27th August, 2019 a habeas corpus petition for release of the said persons, the cash and vehicles in the High Court of Telangana.

The Task Force Police filed a counter-affidavit in the said writ petition claiming that the discovery of cash with the said persons was made on 26th August, 2019 and that the police had handed over the detenues along with the cash to the Principal Director of Income-tax, Ayakar Bhavan, Hyderabad for taking further action against them.

The Telangana High Court allowed the writ petitions and held as under:

‘i) Admittedly, the Task Force Police addressed a letter under exhibit P5, dated 26th August, 2019 to the Principal Director of Income-tax, Ayakar Bhavan, Hyderabad stating that he is handing over both the cash and the detenues to the latter and the Deputy Director of Income-tax, Unit 1(3), Hyderabad (second respondent in W.P. No. 23023 of 2019) acknowledged receipt of the letter on 27th August, 2019 and put his stamp thereon.

ii) However, a panchanama was prepared by the second respondent on 28th August, 2019 (exhibit R8) as if a search was organised by a search party consisting of eight persons who are employees of the Income-tax Department including the second respondent (without mentioning the place where the alleged search was to be conducted in the panchanama); that there were also two panch witnesses, one from Nalgonda District, Telangana and another from Dabilpura, Hyderabad who witnessed the search at the place of alleged search; that a warrant of authorisation dated 28th August, 2019 was issued to the second respondent u/s 132 to search the place (whose location was not mentioned in the panchanama) by the Principal Director of Income-tax (Inv.), Hyderabad; the search warrant was shown at 9.00 a.m. on 28th August, 2019 to Vipul Kumar Patel who was present at the alleged place (not mentioned specifically); that a search was conducted at the place (not mentioned specifically in the panchanama); and allegedly the cash of Rs. 5 crores was seized at that time from his custody.

iii) Section 132 deals with procedure for search and seizure of cash or gold or jewellery or other valuable things. In DGIT (Investigation) vs. Spacewood Furnishers Pvt. Ltd. [2015] 374 ITR 595 (SC) the Supreme Court dealt with the exercise of power by the competent authority to issue warrant for authorisation for search and seizure as follows: The authority must have information in its possession on the basis of which a reasonable belief can be founded that: (a) the person concerned has omitted or failed to produce books of accounts or other documents for production of which summons or notice had been issued, or such person will not produce such books of accounts or other documents even if summons or notice is issued to him, or such person is in possession of any money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article which represents either wholly or partly income or property which has not been or would not be disclosed. Such information must be in the possession of the authorised official before the opinion is formed. There must be application of mind to the material and the formation of opinion must be honest and bona fide. Consideration of any extraneous or irrelevant material will vitiate the belief or satisfaction. Mere possession of cash of large quantity, without anything more, could hardly be said to constitute information which could be treated as sufficient by a reasonable person, leading to an inference that it was income which would not have been disclosed by the person in possession for the purpose of the Act.

iv) There were no circumstances existing for the Principal Director (Investigation) to issue any warrant for search or seizure u/s 132 on 28th August, 2019 when the cash had been handed over to the Income-tax Department by the Task Force Police on 27th August, 2019 and therefore the seizure of the cash from Vipul Kumar Patel by the respondents and its retention till date was per se illegal. Intimation by the police to the Income-tax Department on 27th August, 2019 would not confer jurisdiction on the Income-tax Department to retain and withhold cash, that, too, by issuance of an invalid search warrant u/s 132; and there was no basis for the Income-tax Department to invoke the provisions of sections 132, 132A and 132B since there was no “reason to believe” that the assessee had violated any provision of law. In the absence of any rival claim for the cash amount of Rs. 5 crores by any third party, the respondents could not imagine a third-party claimant and on that pretext retain the cash indefinitely from the petitioner, thereby violating article 300A of the Constitution of India.

v) For all the aforesaid reasons, the writ petitions are allowed; the action of the respondents in conducting panchanama dated 28th August, 2019 and seizing cash of Rs. 5 crores from Vipul Kumar Patel, employee of the petitioner in W.P. No. 23023 of 2019, and retaining it till date is illegal and ultra vires the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and also violative of Articles 14 and 300A of the Constitution of India; the respondents are directed to forbear from conducting any further inquiry pursuant to the said panchanama under the said Act; and they shall refund within four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order the said cash of Rs. 5 crores to the petitioner in W.P. No. 23023 of 2019 with interest at 12% p.a. from 28th August, 2019 till date of payment to the said petitioner. The respondents shall also pay costs of Rs. 20,000 to the petitioner in W.P. No. 23023 of 2019.’

Penalty – Concealment of income – Notice – Essentials of notice – Notice must clearly specify charges against assessee – Notice in printed form without deleting inapplicable portions – Not valid

35 Mohd. Farhan A. Shaikh vs. Dy. CIT [2021] 434 ITR 1 [Bom (FB)] Date of order: 11th March, 2021 Ss. 271 and 274 of ITA, 1961

Penalty – Concealment of income – Notice – Essentials of notice – Notice must clearly specify charges against assessee – Notice in printed form without deleting inapplicable portions – Not valid

In view of the conflict in the decisions of the Division Benches of the Bombay High Court, the following question was referred to the Full Bench.

‘[In] the assessment order or the order made under sections 143(3) and 153C of the Income-tax Act, [when] the Assessing Officer has clearly recorded satisfaction for the imposition of penalty on one or the other, or both grounds mentioned in section 271(1)(c), [would] a mere defect in the notice of not striking out the relevant words
[. . .] vitiate the penalty proceedings?’

The Full Bench held as under:

‘i) According to the well-settled theory of precedents every decision contains three basic ingredients: (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of fact is the inference which the judge draws from the direct or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of (i) and (ii) above. For the purposes of the parties themselves and their privies, ingredient (iii) is the material element in the decision for it determines finally their rights and liabilities in relation to the subject matter of the action. It is the judgment that stops the parties from reopening the dispute. However, for the purpose of the doctrine of precedents, ingredient (ii) is the vital element in the decision. This indeed is the ratio decidendi.

ii) If the assessment order clearly records satisfaction for imposing penalty on one or the other, or both grounds, mentioned in section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, does a mere defect in the notice – not striking off the irrelevant matter – vitiate the penalty proceedings? It does. The primary burden lies on the Revenue. In the assessment proceedings, it forms an opinion, prima facie or otherwise, to launch penalty proceedings against the assessee. But that translates into action only through the statutory notice u/s 271(1)(c) read with section 274. True, the assessment proceedings form the basis for the penalty proceedings, but they are not composite proceedings to draw strength from each other. Nor can each cure the other’s defect. A penalty proceeding is a corollary; nevertheless, it must stand on its own. These proceedings culminate under a different statutory scheme that remains distinct from the assessment proceedings. Therefore, the assessee must be informed of the grounds of the penalty proceedings only through statutory notice. An omnibus notice suffers from the vice of vagueness. More particularly, a penal provision, even with civil consequences, must be construed strictly. And ambiguity, if any, must be resolved in the affected assessee’s favour.

iii) The Supreme Court in the case of Dilip N. Shroff vs. Joint CIT [2007] 291 ITR 519 (SC) treats omnibus show cause notices as betraying non-application of mind and disapproves of the practice, to be particular, of issuing notices in printed form without deleting or striking off the inapplicable parts of that generic notice.’

[CIT vs. Smt. Kaushalya [1995] 216 ITR 660 (Bom) overruled. CIT vs. Samson Perinchery [2017] 392 ITR 4 (Bom); Pr. CIT vs. Goa Coastal Resorts and Recreation P. Ltd. [2020] 16 ITR-OL 111 (Bom); Pr. CIT vs. New Era Sova Mine [2021] 433 ITR 249 (Bom); and Pr. CIT vs. Goa Dourado Promotions P. Ltd. [2021] 433 ITR 268 (Bom) affirmed.]

Offences and prosecution: – (a) Wilful attempt to evade tax – False verification – Delayed payment of tax does not amount to tax evasion – Misstatement must be deliberate – Burden of proof on Revenue to prove that misstatement was deliberately made to evade tax – Assessee forced to upload return mentioning tax had been paid because of defect in software system set up by Income-tax Department – No offence committed u/s 276C or 277; (b) Company – Liability of directors – All directors cannot be proceeded against automatically – Specific allegation against specific directors necessary; and (c) Cognizance of offences – Accused outside jurisdiction of magistrate – Effect of section 204 of CrPC

34 Confident Projects (India) Pvt. Ltd. and Others. vs. IT Department [2021] 433 ITR 147 (Karn) A.Ys.: 2013-14, 2014-15; Date of order: 28th January, 2021 Ss. 276C, 277 of ITA, 1961 and ss. 202, 204 of CrPC, 1973

Offences and prosecution: – (a) Wilful attempt to evade tax – False verification – Delayed payment of tax does not amount to tax evasion – Misstatement must be deliberate – Burden of proof on Revenue to prove that misstatement was deliberately made to evade tax – Assessee forced to upload return mentioning tax had been paid because of defect in software system set up by Income-tax Department – No offence committed u/s 276C or 277; (b) Company – Liability of directors – All directors cannot be proceeded against automatically – Specific allegation against specific directors necessary; and (c) Cognizance of offences – Accused outside jurisdiction of magistrate – Effect of section 204 of CrPC

Proceedings were initiated by the Income-tax Department against the petitioner company and its directors for offences u/s 276C(2) and 277. Summons were issued.

The Karnataka High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the petitioner company and directors and held as under:

‘i) All the directors of a company cannot be automatically prosecuted for any violation of the Act. There have to be specific allegations made against each of the directors intended to be prosecuted and such allegations should amount to an offence and satisfy the requirement of that particular provision under which the prosecution is sought to be initiated, more so when the prosecution is initiated by the Income-tax Department which has all the requisite material in its possession and a preliminary investigation has been concluded by the Department before filing of the criminal complaint.

ii) The court taking cognizance of an offence is required to apply its mind to the allegations made and the applicable statute and thereafter pass a reasoned order in writing taking cognizance. It should be apparent from a reading of the order of cognizance that the requirement of “sufficient grounds for proceedings” in terms of section 204 of the Code has been complied with. At the time of taking cognizance, there must be a proper application of judicial mind to the materials before the court either oral or documentary, as well as any other information that might have been submitted or made available to the court. The test that is required to be applied by the court while taking cognizance is as to whether on the basis of the allegations made in the complaint, or on a police report, or on information furnished by a person other than a police officer, there is a case made out for initiation of criminal proceedings. For this purpose, there is an assessment of the allegations required to be made applying the law to the facts and thereby arriving at a conclusion by a process of reasoning that cognizance is required to be taken. An order of cognizance cannot be abridged, formatted or formulaic. The order has to make out that there is a judicial application of mind, since without such application the same may result in the initiation of criminal proceedings when it was not required to be so done.

iii) The order of taking cognizance is a safeguard in-built in the criminal justice system so as to avoid malicious prosecution and frivolous complaints. When a complaint or a police report or information by a person other than police officer is placed before the court, the judicial officer must apply judicious mind coupled with discretion which is not to be exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, fanciful or casual way.

iv) Cognizance of any offence alleged being one of commission or omission attracting penal statutes can be taken only if the allegations made fulfil the basic requirement of the penal provision. At this point, it is not required for the court taking cognizance to ascertain the truth or veracity of the allegation but only to appreciate if the allegations taken at face value, would amount to the offence complained of or not. If yes, cognizance could be taken, if no, taking cognizance would be refused. The only manner of ascertaining this is by the manner of recordal made by the court in the order taking cognizance. The order passed by the court taking cognizance should therefore reflect such application of mind to the factual situation. Mere reference to the provisions in respect of which offences are alleged to have been committed would not be in compliance with the requirement of the statute when there are multiple accused; the order is required to disclose the application of mind by the court taking cognizance as regards each accused.

v) Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 provides for postponement of issue of process. Section 202 of the Code provides for safeguard in relation to persons not residing within the jurisdiction of a magistrate, not to be called or summoned by the court unless the magistrate were to come to a conclusion that their presence is necessary and only thereafter issue process against the accused. The protection u/s 202(2) of the Code is provided so as to not inconvenience an accused to travel from outside the jurisdiction of the court taking cognizance to attend to the matter in that court. Therefore, before issuing summons to an accused residing outside the jurisdiction, there has to be application of mind by the court issuing summons and after conducting an inquiry u/s 202(2) of the Code the court issuing summons has to come to a conclusion that such summons are required to be issued to an accused residing outside its jurisdiction.

vi) In the event of an accused being an individual, if the accused has temporary residence within the jurisdiction of the magistrate, again merely because he does not have a permanent residence, there is no inquiry which is required to be conducted u/s 202 of the Code. It would, however, be required for the magistrate in the event of issuance of summons or process to record why the inquiry u/s 202 of the Code is not being held. When the accused has no presence within the jurisdiction of the magistrate where the offence has been committed, then it would be mandatory for an inquiry u/s 202 of the Code to be held.

vii) Income-tax had been paid and the authorities had received the necessary taxes. If at all, for the delay, there could be an interest component which could have been levied. The delayed payment of Income-tax would not amount to evasion of tax, so long as there was payment of tax, more so for the reason that in the returns filed there was an acknowledgement of tax due to be paid.

viii) The 26 AS returns indicated payment of substantial amount of money due to tax deduction at source. Apart from that, the assessee-company had also made several payments on account of the Income-tax dues. But on account of non-availability of funds, the entire amount could not be paid before the returns were to be uploaded, more particularly since the last date of filing was 30th September, 2013 for A.Y. 2013-14 and 30th September, 2014 for A.Y. 2014-15. The assessee had been forced to upload the returns by mentioning that the entire amount had been paid since without doing so the returns would not have been accepted by the software system set up by the Income-tax Department. Therefore, the statement made had been forced upon the assessee by the Income-tax Department and could not be said to be a misstatement within the meaning and definition thereof u/s 277. There was no wilful misstatement by the assessee in the proceedings.

ix) That the order passed by the magistrate did not indicate any consideration by the magistrate, as required u/s 202. It could be ex facie seen that the order of the magistrate did not satisfy the requirement of arriving at a prima facie conclusion to take cognizance and issue process, let alone to the accused residing outside the jurisdiction of the magistrate. The order taking cognizance dated 29th March, 2016 in both matters was not in compliance with the requirement of section 191(1)(a) of the Code and further did not indicate that the procedure u/s 204 of the Code had been followed. The order dated 29th March, 2016 taking cognizance was not in compliance with applicable law and therefore was not valid.

x) That admittedly accused No. 6 resided beyond the jurisdiction of the trial court. It could be seen from the order dated 29th March, 2016 that there was no postponement by the magistrate, but as soon as the magistrate received a complaint he had issued process to accused No. 6 who was resident outside the jurisdiction of the magistrate. The magistrate could not have issued summons to petitioner No. 6 without following the requirements and without conducting an inquiry u/s 202 of the Code.

xi) The prosecution initiated by the respondent against the petitioners was misconceived and not sustainable.’

Non-resident – Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Commission paid outside India for obtaining orders outside India – Amount could not be deemed to accrue or arise in India

33 Principal CIT vs. Puma Sports India P. Ltd. [2021] 434 ITR 69 (Karn) A.Y.: 2013-14; Date of order: 12th March, 2021 S. 5(2)(b) r.w.s. 9(1)(i) and 40(a)(i)(B) of ITA, 1961

Non-resident – Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – Commission paid outside India for obtaining orders outside India – Amount could not be deemed to accrue or arise in India

The assessee company was a subsidiary of P of Austria. The assessee was engaged in the trading of sports gear, mainly footwear, apparel and accessories. The purchases by the assessee consisted of import from related parties and unrelated third parties as well as domestic purchases from the local manufacturers. The assessee was also engaged as a sourcing agent in India for footwear and apparel. It identified suppliers who could provide the required products to the specifications and standards required by W of Hong Kong, which was the global sourcing agent for the P group and for performing such services it received a commission of 3% of the freight on board price. The A.O. held that the assessee failed to deduct tax at source in view of the specific provision of section 5(2)(b) read with section 9(1)(i) and the expenses made by the assessee without deducting the tax at source were not permissible keeping in view section 40(a)(i)(B).

The Tribunal deleted the disallowance.

The appeal filed by the Revenue was admitted on the following substantial questions of law:

‘Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is right in setting aside the disallowance made u/s 40(a)(i) for the sum of Rs. 7,29,13,934 by holding that the income of the non-residents by way of commission cannot be considered as accrued or arisen or deemed to accrue or arise in India as the services of such agents were rendered or utilised outside India and the commission was also paid outside India?’

The Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

‘i) The Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Toshoku Ltd. [1980] 125 ITR 525 (SC) while dealing with non-resident commission agents has held that if no operations of business are carried out in the taxable territories, the income accruing or arising abroad through or from any business connection in India cannot be deemed to accrue or arise in India.

ii) The associated enterprises had rendered services outside India in the form of placing orders with the manufacturers who were already outside India. The commission was paid to the associated enterprises outside India. No taxing event had taken place within the territories of India and the Tribunal was justified in allowing the appeal of the assessee.’

Depreciation – Condition precedent – User of machinery – Windmill generating a small amount of electricity – Entitled to depreciation

32 CIT(LTU) vs. Lakshmi General Finance Ltd. [2021] 433 ITR 94 (Mad) A.Y.: 1999-2000; Date of order: 1st March, 2021 S. 32 of ITA, 1961

Depreciation – Condition precedent – User of machinery – Windmill generating a small amount of electricity – Entitled to depreciation

For the A.Y. 1999-2000, the assessment was reopened u/s 147 on the basis of fresh information about excess depreciation laid on windmills. The reassessment was completed withdrawing the excess depreciation of Rs. 1.10 crores.

The Commissioner (Appeals) found that though the windmills were said to be connected with the grid at 2100 hours on 31st March, 1999, the meter reading practically showed 0.01 unit of power and the A.O. disallowed the 50% depreciation claimed by the assessee on the ground that they were not actually commissioned during the year under consideration. He upheld the decision of the A.O. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim for depreciation and held that the assessee is entitled to 50% depreciation on two windmills.

In the appeal by the Revenue, the following question of law was raised:

‘Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the assessee was entitled to claim depreciation on the windmills even though the windmills had not generated any electricity during the previous year and thus there was no user of the asset for the purpose of the business of generation of power?’

The Madras High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

‘i) Trial production by machinery kept ready for use can be considered to be used for the purpose of business to qualify for depreciation; it would amount to passive use and would qualify for depreciation.

ii) Though the assessee’s windmills were said to be connected with the grid at 2100 hours on 31st March, 1999, the meter reading practically showed 0.01 unit of power and the A.O. disallowed 50% depreciation claimed by the assessee on the ground that the machines were not actually commissioned during the A.Y. 1999-2000. The Tribunal held that the assessee was entitled to 50% depreciation on two windmills.

iii) On the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the assessee was entitled to claim depreciation on the windmills.’

Appeal to Appellate Tribunal – Rectification of mistakes: – (a) Power of Tribunal to rectify mistake – Error must be apparent from record – Tribunal allowing rectification application filed by Department on sole ground of contradiction in its earlier orders and assessee had not filed rectification petition in subsequent case – No error apparent on face of record – Tribunal wrongly allowed rectification application filed by Department; (b) Levy of penalty u/s 271(1)(c)(i)(a) – Failure by Tribunal to consider applicability of Explanation to section 271(1) to cases u/s 271(1)(c)(i)(b) – Not ground for rectification

30 P.T. Manuel and Sons vs. CIT [2021] 434 ITR 416 (Ker) A.Y.: 1982-83; Date of order: 1st March, 2021 Ss. 254(2) and 271(1) of ITA, 1961

Appeal to Appellate Tribunal – Rectification of mistakes: – (a) Power of Tribunal to rectify mistake – Error must be apparent from record – Tribunal allowing rectification application filed by Department on sole ground of contradiction in its earlier orders and assessee had not filed rectification petition in subsequent case – No error apparent on face of record – Tribunal wrongly allowed rectification application filed by Department; (b) Levy of penalty u/s 271(1)(c)(i)(a) – Failure by Tribunal to consider applicability of Explanation to section 271(1) to cases u/s 271(1)(c)(i)(b) – Not ground for rectification

For the A.Y. 1982-83, there was a delay in filing the return of income by the assessee. The A.O. rejected the explanation offered by the assessee for the delay and imposed a penalty u/s 271(1)(a).

The Commissioner (Appeals) partly allowed the assessee’s appeal on the ground that there was a delay of only five months in filing the return which was properly explained and directed the A.O. to determine the quantum of penalty in the light of the directions given by the Tribunal in Ramlal Chiranjilal vs. ITO [1992] 107 Taxation 1 (Trib). The Tribunal confirmed the order of the Commissioner (Appeals).

The Department filed an application for rectification u/s 254(2) contending that the decision in Ramlal Chiranjilal’s case was not applicable and the direction to follow that decision was incorrect and that the Tribunal in the case relating to a sister concern of the assessee decided not to follow that decision. On this basis, the Tribunal allowed the application for rectification.

On a reference by the assessee, the Kerala High Court held as under:

‘i) A mistake which can be rectified u/s 254(2) is one which is patent, which is obvious and whose discovery is not dependent on argument or elaboration. An error of judgment is not the same as a mistake apparent from the record and cannot be rectified by the Tribunal u/s 254(2).

ii) Conclusions in a judgment may be inappropriate or erroneous. Such inappropriate or erroneous conclusions per se do not constitute mistakes apparent from the record. However, non-consideration of a binding decision of the jurisdictional High Court or Supreme Court can be said to be a mistake apparent from the record.

iii) The different view taken by the very same Tribunal in another case, on a later date, can be relied on by either of the parties while challenging the earlier decision or the subsequent decision in an appeal or revisional forum, but cannot be a ground for rectification of the order passed by the Tribunal. It can at the most be a change in opinion based upon the facts in the subsequent case. The subsequent wisdom may render the earlier decision incorrect, but not so as to render the subsequent decision a mistake apparent from the record calling for rectification u/s 254.

iv) The Tribunal was wrong in allowing the rectification application filed by the Department on the basis of a decision rendered subsequent to the order that was sought to be rectified. The reasoning of the Tribunal was erroneous. A decision taken subsequently in another case was not part of the record of the case. A subsequent decision, subsequent change of law, or subsequent wisdom that dawned upon the Tribunal were not matters that would come within the scope of ‘mistake apparent from the record’ before the Tribunal. The Tribunal had not found that there was any mistake in the earlier order apparent from the record warranting a rectification. The only reason mentioned was that there was a contradiction in the orders passed and no rectification application had been filed by the assessee in the subsequent case. The satisfaction of the Tribunal about the existence of a mistake apparent on the record was absent.

v) The Department’s further contention was for the proposition that the reason for filing the rectification application was on account of the omission of the Tribunal to consider the Explanation to section 271(1) (as it then stood). Even though the order of rectification issued by the Tribunal did not refer to any such contention having been raised, such contention had no basis. Penalty was levied u/s 271(1)(c)(i)(a) (as it then stood), while the Explanation applied to the cases covered by section 271(1)(c)(i)(b) (as it then stood). In such view also the rectification application filed by the Department could not have been allowed by the Tribunal.’

Appeal to Appellate Tribunal – Rectification of mistake – Application for rectification – Limitation – Starting date for limitation is actual date of receipt of order of Tribunal

29 Anil Kumar Nevatia vs. ITO [2021] 434 ITR 261 (Cal) A.Y.: 2009-10; Date of order: 23rd December, 2020 Ss. 253, 254(2) and 268 of ITA, 1961

Appeal to Appellate Tribunal – Rectification of mistake – Application for rectification – Limitation – Starting date for limitation is actual date of receipt of order of Tribunal

The order of the Tribunal passed on 19th September, 2018 was served on the assessee on 5th December, 2018. On 3rd June, 2019, the assessee filed an application u/s 254(2) for rectification of the said order. The Tribunal held that there was a delay of 66 days in filing the application and declined to entertain it, stating that being a creature of the statute it did not have any power to pass an order u/s 254(2) beyond a period of six months from the end of the month in which the order sought to be rectified was passed.

The Calcutta High Court allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and held as under:

‘i) If section 254(2) is read with sections 254(3) and 268 which provide for exclusion of the time period between the date of the order and the date of service of the order upon the assessee, no hardship or unreasonableness can be found in the scheme of the Act.

ii) The Tribunal was wrong in not applying the exclusion period in computing the period of limitation and rejecting the application of the assessee filed u/s 254(2) as barred by limitation. The order was passed on 19th September, 2018, and the copy of the order was admittedly served upon the assessee on 5th December, 2018. Therefore, the Tribunal should have excluded the time period between 19th September and 5th December, 2018 in computing the period of limitation.

iii) The appeal is, accordingly, allowed. The Tribunal below is directed to hear the application u/s 254(2) taken out by the assessee on the merits and dispose of the same within a period of six weeks from the date of communication of this order.’

Articles 10, 22 of India-Mauritius DTAA; Ss. 5, 9(1)(i), (iv) of the Act – Mauritius resident FII invested in IDR having underlying shares of a UK resident company and received dividend – Such dividend, though not taxable u/s 9(1)(iv), was taxable u/s 9(1)(i) – However, since it was not ‘dividend’ under Article 10 of India-Mauritius DTAA, it was residual income subject to treatment under Article 22; as taxing rights of such income were vested only in Mauritius up to 31st March, 2017, it was not taxable in India

4 Morgan Stanley Mauritius Co. Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT [2021] 127 taxmann.com 506 (Mum-Trib) [ITA No: 7388/Mum/19] A.Ys.: 2015-16; Date of order: 28th May, 2021


 

Articles 10, 22 of India-Mauritius DTAA; Ss. 5, 9(1)(i), (iv) of the Act – Mauritius resident FII invested in IDR having underlying shares of a UK resident company and received dividend – Such dividend, though not taxable u/s 9(1)(iv), was taxable u/s 9(1)(i) – However, since it was not ‘dividend’ under Article 10 of India-Mauritius DTAA, it was residual income subject to treatment under Article 22; as taxing rights of such income were vested only in Mauritius up to 31st March, 2017, it was not taxable in India

 

FACTS

The assessee was a company incorporated and fiscally domiciled in Mauritius. The Mauritius Revenue Authority had issued it a Tax Residency Certificate. The assessee had invested in Indian Depository Receipts (IDRs) issued by Standard Chartered Bank – India Branch (SCB-India), having shares in Standard Chartered Bank plc (SCB-UK) as underlying asset. Bank of New York Mellon, USA (BNY-US) held these shares as custodian of depository. Shares of SCB-UK were listed on London Stock Exchange and IDRs issued were listed on stock exchanges in India.

 

During the relevant financial period, the assessee received dividends in respect of the underlying shares. The assessee claimed non-taxability under ITA and the Treaty by contending that: the dividend pertained to SCB-UK, which was a foreign company; it was received abroad by BNY-US; hence, dividend neither accrued nor arose in India, nor was it received or deemed to be received in India. It further contended that SCB India was a bare trustee (i.e., akin to a nominee) under the English law for IDR holders. Since dividend was first received outside India, its subsequent remittance to IDR holders in the Indian bank account cannot trigger taxation based on receipt. Further, as per the definition of dividend under Article 10 of the India-Mauritius DTAA, the receipt was not dividend. Hence, it would be subject to the provisions of Article 22. Since taxing rights of income covered in Article 221 are vested in residence jurisdiction, it could only be taxed by Mauritius and not India.

 

After examining the facts and legal framework of IDRs, the A.O. concluded that deposit in bank accounts of IDR holders in India was the first point of receipt of dividend. Till that time, money continued to be in possession of the payer, i.e., SCB-UK. Therefore, it could not be said to have been received outside India. Accordingly, the A.O. proposed to tax dividends u/s 115A(1)(a) @ 20% (plus applicable surcharge and cess).

 

HELD

• While IDR may be issued by an Indian Depository, it is a derivative financial instrument that draws its value from the underlying shares of a foreign company. Though shares may be held by the overseas custodian, they constitute property of the Indian depository which passes on all accruing benefits to IDR holders. For example, if the domestic depository receives dividends or any other distribution in respect of the deposited shares (including payments on liquidation of foreign company), receipts are converted into INR and paid in INR to IDR holders.

• In this case, though shares are held by the Indian depository, they constitute assets of SCB-India, even if as a trustee. Therefore, receipt was not dividend simplicitor from a foreign company but it had a clear, significant and crucial business connection with India.

• Circular No. 4/2015 was issued by CBDT in the context of a situation where, while underlying assets (shares of Indian companies) were in India, depository receipts were issued abroad and investors investing in such depository receipts were also abroad. They had no connection in India, other than the underlying asset of companies. However, under the extended scope of Explanation 5 to section 9(1)(i), such investors would have suffered taxation in India. Circular No. 4/2015 was issued to mitigate such situation.

• The present case is diametrically opposite to that which CBDT intended to cover. Here is a case where, while the underlying shares were abroad, depository receipts were issued in India and the beneficiaries entitled to the benefits of the underlying shares are also in India. Accordingly, Circular No. 4/2015 had no relevance in this case.

• To contend that other than dividend from an Indian company, no other dividend can be taxed in the hands of a non-resident in India because section 9(1)(iv) of the Act deems only dividend from an Indian company to be income accruing or arising in India, is fallacious. While dividend from a foreign company cannot be taxed u/s 9(1)(iv), it can be taxed under sections 9(1)(i) and 5(2). Insofar as the IDR holder is concerned, in reality and in law, the amount is received in India. Hence, for a non-resident IDR holder it will be income deemed to accrue or arise, as also received in India.

• In the context of section 5(2)(a) of the Act, the expression required to be interpreted is ‘income deemed to receive in India by or on behalf of such a person (i.e., non-resident)’, whereas section 7 defines ‘income deemed to be received in a previous year’. There is a clear distinction between the two provisions. The deeming fiction envisaged in section 5, namely, ‘income deemed to be received in India in such year by or on behalf of non-resident’ is not relevant insofar as the scope of ‘income deemed to be received in previous year’ is concerned because, while the former deals with the situs of income, the latter deals with the timing of income. From the facts it is clear that dividend was received in India.

• Article 10 of the India-Mauritius DTAA deals with taxability of dividends. For Article 10 to apply, dividend should be paid by a company which is resident of a contracting state to the resident of the other contracting state. However, as per the facts, dividends can be treated as having been paid either by SCB-UK or by SCB-India, which is a PE of SCB-UK. In either case, payment cannot be treated as payment by an Indian resident. Therefore, Article 10 of the India-Mauritius DTAA will have no application to such dividend.

• Prior to insertion of sub-Article (3) in Article 22 with effect from 1st April, 2017, residuary income, which was not specifically covered under any other Article and which was also not covered under exclusion clause in Article 22(2), could be taxed only in the residence state. Dividend from IDRs is not covered by any of the specific provisions of the India-Mauritius DTAA. It is also not covered by the exclusion clause in Article 22(2). Further, it pertains to the period prior to 1st April, 2017. Hence, only the residence state has taxing right and cannot be taxed in source jurisdiction, i.e., India.

• Observations of DRP as regards the basis of taxability, namely, ‘assessed to tax on account of place of management’ is ex facie incorrect inasmuch as SCB-India is a PE of a UK tax resident company and not an independent taxable entity in India. In CIT vs. Hyundai Heavy Industries Ltd. [(2007) 291 ITR 482 (SC)], the Supreme Court has observed that ‘it is clear that under the Act, a taxable unit is a foreign company and not its branch or PE in India’. Accordingly, the taxable entity in India is SCB-UK, though taxation is limited to profits attributable to its PE, i.e., SCB-India. Also, the place of management of SCB-UK is the UK.

• The tax authority contended that this is a case of triple non-taxation because: an American company incorporates a subsidiary in Mauritius; holds shares in a UK company; through an Indian depository; and does not pay taxes in any of the jurisdictions. He further mentioned that it is a blatant case of India-Mauritius DTAA abuse that must be discouraged. The proposition was rejected by observing that such considerations were irrelevant to the facts of the case before the Tribunal.

• Since the provisions of the India-Mauritius DTAA are more beneficial to the assessee than the Act, they will override the Act. Consequently, having regard to the provisions of Article 22 of the India-Mauritius DTAA, dividends on IDRs will not be taxable only up to 31st March, 2017, while India will have the right to taxation for the period effective from 1st April, 2017 on account of amended Article 22(3) of the Treaty permitting source taxation in respect of income accruing or arising from a source in India.

Section 148 read with section 148-A – Notice u/s 148 issued post 1st April, 2021 – Conditional legislation – The Notifications dated 31st March, 2021 and 27th April, 2021 whereby the application of section 148, which was originally existing before the amendment was deferred, meaning the reassessment mechanism as prevalent prior to 31st March, 2021 was saved by the Notification

2 Palak Khatuja, W/o Vinod Khatuja vs. Union of India [Writ Petition (T) No. 149 of 2021; date of order: 23rd August, 2021 (Chhattisgarh High Court)]

Section 148 read with section 148-A – Notice u/s 148 issued post 1st April, 2021 – Conditional legislation – The Notifications dated 31st March, 2021 and 27th April, 2021 whereby the application of section 148, which was originally existing before the amendment was deferred, meaning the reassessment mechanism as prevalent prior to 31st March, 2021 was saved by the Notification

The petitioners filed their income tax return for A.Y. 2015-16 and F.Y. 2014-15. Subsequently, on the basis of some information available, an initial scrutiny was done; however, no concealment was found but again a notice u/s 148 was issued. It was submitted that on 30th June, 2021 when the notice u/s 148 was issued, the power to issue the notice was preceded by a new provision of law and thereby section 148 is to be read with section 148A. It was contended that as per the amended Finance Act, 2021, which was published in the Gazette on 28th March, 2021, sections 2 to 88 were notified to come into force on the first day of April, 2021 and accordingly the new section 148A was inserted which prescribed that before issuing the notice u/s 148, the A.O. was bound to conduct an inquiry giving an opportunity of hearing to the assessee with the prior approval of the specified authority and a show cause notice in detail was necessary specifying a particular date for hearing.

It was further submitted that since the operation of section 148A came into effect on 1st April, 2021, as such, the notice issued to the petitioner on 30th June, 2021 u/s 148, without following the procedure u/s 148A, that is, without giving an opportunity of hearing, would be illegal and contrary to the provisions of section 148A and it cannot be sustained. It was further submitted that although the Revenue has placed reliance on a certain Notification of the Ministry of Finance, but when the law has been enacted by the Parliament then in such a case the Notification issued by the Ministry of Finance would not override even to extend the period of operation of the section of the old Act of section 148. It was therefore submitted that the impugned notice is illegal and is liable to be quashed.

On its part, the Revenue contended that because of the pandemic and lockdown of all activities, including the normal working of the office, a lot of people could not file their returns and submit the necessary papers. As such, the Ministry of Finance, in exercise of its power under the Finance Act, issued the Notification whereby the application of the old provisions of section 148 was extended initially up to 30th April, 2021 and thereafter up to the 30th day of June, 2021. Therefore, the notice dated 30th June, 2021 would be within the ambit of the power of the Department in the extended time of its operation till 30th June, 2021. Thus, the notice u/s 148 is legal and valid.

The Court observed that the notice u/s 148 was issued for A.Y. 2015-16 on 30th June, 2021. The grievance of the petitioners was that the notice of like nature could have been issued till the cut-off date of 30th March, 2021 as subsequent thereto the new section 148A intervened before the issuance of notice directly u/s 148. The Finance Act, 2021 was Notified on 28th March, 2021 which purports that sections 2 to 88 shall come into force on the first day of April, 2021 and sections 108 to 123 shall come into force on such date as the Central Government notifies in the Official Gazette. The relevant part wherein section 148A is enveloped is covered u/s 42 of the Finance Act, 2021. By introduction of section 148A, it was mandated that the A.O. before issuing any notice u/s 148 shall conduct an inquiry, if required, with the prior approval of the specified authority, provide an opportunity of being heard, serve a show cause notice and prescribe the time. The question raised for consideration was whether, with the promulgation of the Act on the 1st day of April, 2021, the notice directly issued u/s 148 on 30th June, 2021 is valid or not as the bar of 148A was created by insertion of the section on 1st April, 2021.

The Court further observed that on account of the pandemic, Parliament had enacted the Taxation & Other Laws (Relaxation & Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020. In the Act, any time limit specified, prescribed or notified between 20th March, 2020 and 31st December, 2021 or any other date thereafter, after December, 2021, gave the Central Government the power to notify. The necessity occurred because of the Covid pandemic lockdown in the backdrop of the fact that few of the assessees could not file their returns. Likewise, since the offices were closed, the Department also could not perform the statutory duty under the Income-tax Act. Considering the complexity, the Parliament thought it proper to delegate to the Ministry of Finance the date of applicability of the amended section. The delegation is not a self-contained and complete Act and was only made in the interest of flexibility and smooth working of the Act, and the delegation therefore was a practical necessity. The Ministry of Finance having been delegated with such power, this delegation can always be considered to be a sound basis for administrative efficiency and it does not by itself amount to abdication of power.

Reading both the Notifications, dated 31st March and 27th April, 2021, whereby the application of section 148 which was originally existing before the amendment was deferred, meant thereby that the reassessment mechanism as prevalent prior to 31st March, 2021 was saved by the Notification. The Notification is made by the Ministry of Finance, Central Government considering the fact of lockdown all over India and it can be always assumed that the deferment of the application of section 148A was done in a controlled way. It is a settled proposition that any modification of the Executive’s decision implies a certain amount of discretion and has to be exercised with the help of the legislative policy of the Act and cannot travel beyond it and run counter to it, or change the essential features, the identity, structure or the policy of the Act. Therefore, the legislative delegation exercised by the Central Government by Notification to uphold the mechanism as it prevailed prior to March, 2021 is not in conflict with any Act and Notification by the Executive, i.e., the Ministry of Finance, and would be a part of legislative function.

The Court relied on the principle as laid down in the case of A.K. Roy vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1982 SC 710, wherein the Supreme Court held that the Constitution (Forty-Fourth) Amendment Act, 1978, which conferred power on the Executive to bring the provisions of that Act into force did not suffer from excessive delegation of legislative power. The Court observed that the power to issue a Notification for bringing into force the provisions of a constitutional amendment is not a constituent power, because it does not carry with it the power to amend the Constitution in any manner. Likewise, in this case, by the delegation to the Executive of the power to the Central Government to specify the date by way of relaxation of time limit, the main purpose of the Finance Act is not defeated. Therefore, it would be a conditional legislation. The Legislature has declared the Act and has given the power to the Executive to extend its implementation by way of Notification. The Legislature has resorted to conditional legislation to give the power to the Executive to decide under what circumstances the law should become operative or when the operation should be extended and this would be covered by the doctrine of the conditional legislation.

Thus, by the aforesaid Notifications, the operation of section 148 was extended, and thereby deferment of section 148A was done by the Ministry of Finance by way of conditional legislation in the peculiar circumstances which arose during the pandemic and lockdown and the Central Government cannot be said to have encroached upon the turf of Parliament.

By effect of such Notification, the individual identity of section 148, which was prevailing prior to the amendment and insertion of section 148A, was insulated and saved till 30th June, 2021.

Considering the situation for the benefit of the assessee and to facilitate individuals to come out of the woods, the time limit framed under the IT Act was extended. Likewise, certain rights which were reserved in favour of the Department were also preserved and extended at parity. Consequently, the provisions of section 148 which were prevailing prior to the amendment of the Finance Act, 2021 were also extended. The power to issue notice u/s 148 which was there prior to the amendment was also saved and the time was extended. As a result, the notice issued on 30th June, 2021 would also be saved. The petitions were dismissed accordingly.

Immunity u/s 270AA – No bar or prohibition against the assessee challenging an order passed by the A.O. rejecting its application made under sub-section 1 of section 270 AA – Application u/s 264 against rejection of such application maintainable

1 Haren Textiles Private Limited vs. Pr. CIT 4 & Ors. [Writ Petition No. 1100 of 2021; Date of order: 8th September, 2021 (Bombay High Court)]

Immunity u/s 270AA – No bar or prohibition against the assessee challenging an order passed by the A.O. rejecting its application made under sub-section 1 of section 270 AA – Application u/s 264 against rejection of such application maintainable

The petitioner, engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling fabrics and a trading member of the National Stock Exchange, filed its return for the A.Y. 2017-2018 on 31st October, 2017 declaring a total income of Rs. 2,27,11,320. The A.O. initiated scrutiny assessment by issuing statutory notices under sections 143(2) and 142(1) of the Act. He passed an assessment order dated 19th December, 2019 u/s 143(3) determining the total income of the petitioner at Rs. 7,41,84,730. He determined book profit under the provisions of section 115(JB) at Rs. 2,19,33,505. Following this, the A.O. issued a demand notice dated 19th December, 2019 u/s 156 raising a demand of Rs. 1,80,14,619. The petitioner noted that the A.O. had not correctly allowed the Minimum Alternate Tax (MAT) credit available to it while determining the tax liability. Hence it filed an application dated 6th January, 2020 u/s 154 seeking rectification of the assessment order. The A.O. accepted the submission of the petitioner and granted the MAT credit available and issued a revised Computation Sheet dated 14th January, 2020 determining the correct amount of tax liability of the petitioner. He also issued a revised notice of demand dated 14th January, 2020 u/s 156 raising a demand of Rs. 57,356 payable within 30 days from the service of the said notice.

The petitioner accepted the order passed by the A.O. u/s 154 and on 29th January, 2020 paid fully the tax demand of Rs. 57,356. Thereafter, on 30th January, 2020 it filed an application u/s 270AA in the prescribed Form No. 68 before the A.O. seeking immunity from penalty, etc. This application was rejected by the A.O. by an order dated 28th February, 2020. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner filed an application dated 18th December, 2020 before the Pr. CIT under the provisions of section 264. The Pr. CIT rejected this application on the ground that sub-section 6 of section 270AA specifically prohibits revisionary proceedings u/s 264 against the order passed by the A.O. u/s 270AA(4). This order was challenged by the petitioner before the High Court.

The Court observed that under sub-section 6 of section 270AA, no appeal under section 246(A) or an application for revision u/s 264 shall be admissible against the order of assessment or reassessment referred to in clause (a) of sub-section 1, in a case where an order under sub-section 4 has been made accepting the application. This only means that when an assessee makes an application under sub-section 1 of section 270AA and such an application has been accepted under sub-section 4 of section 270AA, the assessee cannot file an appeal u/s 246(A) or an application for revision u/s 264 against the order of assessment or reassessment passed under sub-section 3 of section 143 or section 147. This does not provide for any bar or prohibition against the assessee challenging an order passed by the A.O. rejecting its application made under sub-section 1 of section 270AA. The application before the Pr. CIT was an order challenging an order of rejection passed by the A.O. of an application filed by the petitioner under sub-section 1 of section 270AA seeking grant of immunity from imposition of penalty and initiation of proceedings under sub-section 276C or section 277CC.

Therefore, the Pr. CIT was not correct in rejecting the application on the ground that there is a bar under sub-section 6 of section 270AA in filing such application. The impugned order was set aside and the matter was remanded back to the Pr. CIT to consider de novo.

TDS – Credit for tax deducted at source – Effect of section 199 – Assessee acting as collection agent for television network – Subscription charges collected from cable operators and paid to television network – Amounts routed through assessee’s accounts – Assessee entitled to credit for tax deducted at source on such amounts

7 Principal CIT vs. Kal Comm. Private Ltd. [2021] 436 ITR 66 (Mad) A.Ys.: 2009-10 to 2011-12; Date of order: 26th April, 2021 S. 199 of ITA, 1961

TDS – Credit for tax deducted at source – Effect of section 199 – Assessee acting as collection agent for television network – Subscription charges collected from cable operators and paid to television network – Amounts routed through assessee’s accounts – Assessee entitled to credit for tax deducted at source on such amounts

The assessee acted as the collection agent of a television network and collected the subscription charges and the invoices, raised in the name of the assessee on the subscription income from the pay channels during the relevant year, and remitted them to the network. For the A.Ys. 2009-10, 2010-11 and 2011-12 the assessee was denied credit for the tax deducted at source on such amounts.

The Tribunal allowed the claim for credit of the tax deducted at source.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

‘i) Under section 199(2), credit for tax deducted at source can be allowed only when the corresponding income is offered for taxation in the year in which such tax deducted at source is claimed and deduction of tax at source was allowed without the corresponding income being declared in the profit and loss account.

ii) On a perusal of the agreement dated 14th October, 2002 entered into between the television network and the assessee, it is clear that the assessee was entitled to a fixed commission on the collection amount from the network. The agreement was entered into much prior to the A.Ys. 2009-10, 2010-11 and 2011-12. All these collection charges had been credited to the account “subscription charges” as and when they were billed and this account was debited at the end of the financial year when the sum was paid back to the network. Therefore, the amounts in question had been routed through the accounts maintained by the assessee, which formed part of the balance sheet and, in turn, formed part of the profit and loss account. Therefore, the amount received by the assessee was the collection of subscription charges on behalf of the principal, viz., the television network and did not partake of the character of income chargeable to tax in its hands.

iii) In the assessee’s case, the income chargeable to tax was only the commission income and interest income. Therefore, the subscription charges collected on behalf of the television network was chargeable as income only in the hands of the network and did not partake of the character of any expenditure, revenue or capital in the hands of the assessee. Merely because the income had been offered and processed in the hands of the network, credit for tax deducted in the name of the assessee could not be denied. The assessee was entitled to credit for the tax deducted at source.’

Recovery of tax – Attachment of property – Transfer void against the Revenue – Death of seller before executing sale of house property under agreement – Supreme Court directing seller’s heirs to execute sale – Attachment of property for recovery of income tax due from firms in which heirs were partners for periods subsequent to sale agreement – TRO cannot declare transfer void – Non-release of registered sale deed by sub-registrar – Not justified

6 J. Manoharakumari vs. TRO [2021] 436 ITR 42 (Mad) Date of order: 21st April, 2021 Ss. 226, 281 of ITA, 1961

Recovery of tax – Attachment of property – Transfer void against the Revenue – Death of seller before executing sale of house property under agreement – Supreme Court directing seller’s heirs to execute sale – Attachment of property for recovery of income tax due from firms in which heirs were partners for periods subsequent to sale agreement – TRO cannot declare transfer void – Non-release of registered sale deed by sub-registrar – Not justified

The petitioner, on payment of advance, entered into a sale agreement in respect of the house property (family property) with one JP, the mother of the third and fourth respondents, A and S, who were minors at the time of execution of the sale agreement. However, JP refused to execute the sale deed. During the pendency of the suit filed by the petitioner in the Additional District and Sessions Court, JP died and A and S, who by then had attained majority, were impleaded in the suit filed to execute the sale receiving the balance consideration. On dismissal of the suit, the petitioner filed an appeal before the High Court which directed A and S to refund the advance received by JP. The Supreme Court allowed the special leave petition filed by the petitioner. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition before the Additional District and Sessions Court. When A and S failed to execute the sale deed in terms of the sale agreement dated 30th June, 1994 and the order dated 31st March, 2017 of the Supreme Court in the special leave petition, the Additional District Judge executed the sale deed in favour of the petitioner on 29th June, 2018 and presented it before the Sub-Registrar for registration.

The petitioner was informed through a communication that the property in question was attached for recovery of arrears of tax due to the Income-tax Department from the firms in which S and her husband were partners and, therefore, the petitioner should obtain a certificate to the effect that there were no tax dues in respect of the said property from the Tax Recovery Officer of the Income-tax Department. The Tax Recovery Officer took the stand that the purported sale deed executed by the Court was contrary to section 281, that a copy of the attachment order was served on the office of the Sub-Registrar and an entry of encumbrance in respect of the property was also entered, that the petitioner could not perfect the title over the property, and that the Sub-Registrar could not release the registered sale deed in favour of the petitioner unless the tax arrears were cleared.

The Madras High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the petitioner and held as under:

‘i) Section 281 applies only to a situation where an assessee during the pendency of any proceeding under the Act, or after completion thereof, but before the service of a notice under rule 2 of the Second Schedule, creates a charge on, or parts with the possession (by way of sale, mortgage, gift, exchange or any other mode of transfer whatsoever) of any of his assets in favour of any other person. Only such charge or transfer is void as against any claim in respect of any tax or any other sum payable by the assessee as a result of completion of such proceedings or otherwise. According to the proviso to section 281 such charge or transfer shall not be void if it is made (i) for adequate consideration and without notice of the pendency of such proceeding or, as the case may be, without notice of such tax or other sum payable by the assessee; or (ii) with the previous permission of the A.O.

ii) Admittedly, the transfer of the property was on account of the final culmination of the litigation by the order of the Supreme Court. There was only a delay in the execution of the sale deed due to the pendency of the proceedings as the third and fourth respondent’s mother (since deceased) declined to execute the sale deed under the sale agreement dated 30th June, 1994. The third and the fourth respondents, A and S, who were minors at the time of execution of the sale agreement on 30th June, 1994, ought to have executed the sale deed in favour of the petitioner. The subsequent tax liability of the fourth respondent and her husband for the A.Ys. 2012-13 and 2013-14 could not be to the disadvantage of the petitioner, since the petitioner had been diligently litigating since 2004. Therefore, the benefit of the decree in a contested suit could not be denied merely because the seller or one of the persons had incurred subsequent tax liability. The benefit of a decree would date back to the date of the suit. Therefore, the communication dated 6th July, 2018 which required the petitioner to obtain clearance could not be countenanced.

iii) The tax liability of the firms of which S and her husband were partners arose subsequent to the commitment in the sale agreement dated 30th June, 1994. The Sub-Registrar is directed to release the sale deed dated 29th June, 2018 and to cancel all the encumbrances recorded against the property in respect of the tax arrears of the firms of the fourth respondent S and her husband.’

International transactions – Draft assessment order – Procedure to be followed – Mandatory – Tribunal in appeal from final assessment order remanding matter to Assistant Commissioner / TPO – A.O. straightaway passing final order – Not valid – A.O. bound to have passed draft order first – Order quashed and matter remanded

5 Durr India Private Limited vs. ACIT [2021] 436 ITR 111 (Mad) A.Ys.: 2009-10 to 2011-12; Date of order:  27th May, 2020 Ss. 92CA(4), 143(3), 144C of ITA, 1961

International transactions – Draft assessment order – Procedure to be followed – Mandatory – Tribunal in appeal from final assessment order remanding matter to Assistant Commissioner / TPO – A.O. straightaway passing final order – Not valid – A.O. bound to have passed draft order first – Order quashed and matter remanded

For the A.Y. 2009-10, pursuant to the report of the Transfer Pricing Officer, the Assistant Commissioner passed a draft assessment order against which the assessee filed an application before the Dispute Resolution Panel u/s 144C. Pursuant to the order of the Dispute Resolution Panel, the Assistant Commissioner passed an assessment order u/s 144C read with section 143(3). On appeal to the Tribunal, the Tribunal remanded the case back to the Assistant Commissioner / Transfer Pricing Officer. Thereafter, pursuant to the order of the Transfer Pricing Officer on remand by the Tribunal, the Assistant Commissioner passed the final order.

The assessee filed a writ petition contending that such final order being not preceded by a draft assessment order was without jurisdiction. The Madras High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

‘i) When the law mandated a particular thing to be done in a particular manner, it had to be done in that manner. The final assessment order u/s 144C read with section 143(3) had been passed without jurisdiction.

ii) Once the case was remitted back to the Assistant Commissioner / Transfer Pricing Officer, it was incumbent on their part to have passed a draft assessment order u/s 143(3) read with section 92CA(4) and section 144C(1). They could not bypass the statutory safeguards prescribed under the Act and deny the assessee the right to file an application before the Dispute Resolution Panel.

iii) The final order is quashed and the case remitted back to the Assistant Commissioner to pass a draft assessment order.’

HUF – Partition – Scope of section 171 – Section 171 applicable only where Hindu Family is already assessed as HUF – Deceased father of assessees not assessed as karta of HUF when alive – Inherited property shared under orally recorded memorandum by legal heirs – Proportionate consideration out of sale thereof declared in returns filed by legal heirs in individual capacity and exemption u/s 54F allowed by A.O. – Reassessment to tax capital gains in hands of karta – Unsustainable

4 A.P. Oree (Kartha) [Estate of A.R. Pandurangan (HUF)] vs. ITO [2021] 436 ITR 3 (Mad) A.Y.: 2008-09; Date of order: 2nd June, 2021 Ss. 54F, 148, 171 of ITA, 1961

HUF – Partition – Scope of section 171 – Section 171 applicable only where Hindu Family is already assessed as HUF – Deceased father of assessees not assessed as karta of HUF when alive – Inherited property shared under orally recorded memorandum by legal heirs – Proportionate consideration out of sale thereof declared in returns filed by legal heirs in individual capacity and exemption u/s 54F allowed by A.O. – Reassessment to tax capital gains in hands of karta – Unsustainable

The assessee was one of the four legal heirs of the deceased ARP. Part of the inherited agricultural land was sold without physical division. The share of each heir was orally divided between them under a memorandum of oral recording and the sale proceeds were distributed in proportion with their respective shares in the land and the balance portion of the land continued to remain in their names without physical division. For the A.Y. 2008-09, they filed their returns of income as individuals and claimed exemption from levy of tax on capital gains u/s 54F which was allowed by the A.O. On the ground that there was no physical division of the property, that the memorandum recording oral partition did not amount to partition u/s 171, and that therefore the capital gains was to be assessed in the hands of the estate of the deceased ARP (HUF) and the exemption allowed u/s 54F was contrary to section 171, notice was issued u/s 148 to the estate of ARP (HUF) and a consequential order was passed in the name of the assessee as karta.

The assessee filed a writ petition and challenged the notice u/s 148 and the order. The Madras High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

‘i) Section 171 makes it clear that it is applicable only where a Hindu family is already assessed as a Hindu undivided family. Otherwise, there is no meaning to the expression “hitherto” in section 171(1).

ii) During the lifetime of ARP, the deceased father of the assessees, the family was not assessed as a Hindu undivided family. It was only where there was a prior assessment as a Hindu undivided family and during the course of assessment u/s 143 or section 144 it was claimed by or on behalf of a member of such family which was assessed as a Hindu undivided family that there was a partition whether total or partial among the members of such family, that the A.O. should make an Inquiry after giving notice of inquiry to all the members. Where no such claim was made, the question of making inquiry by an A.O. did not arise and only in such circumstances would the definition of “partition” in Explanation to section 171 be attracted. The definition could not be read in isolation. Where a Hindu family was never assessed as a Hindu undivided family, section 171 would not apply even when there was a division or partition of property which did not fall within the definition.

iii) The notice issued u/s 148 to the estate of ARP (HUF) coparceners and the consequential order issued in the name of the assessee as the karta were unsustainable.’

Exemption u/s 10B – Export of computer software – Assessee omitting to claim exemption in return – Rectification of mistake – Revision – Rejection of rectification application and revision petition on ground of delay in filing revised return – Unjustified – Assessee entitled to benefit

3 L-Cube Innovative Solutions P. Ltd. vs. CIT [2021] 435 ITR 566 (Mad) A.Y.: 2006-07; Date of order: 5th February, 2021 Ss. 10B, 139(5), 154, 264 of ITA, 1961

Exemption u/s 10B – Export of computer software – Assessee omitting to claim exemption in return – Rectification of mistake – Revision – Rejection of rectification application and revision petition on ground of delay in filing revised return – Unjustified – Assessee entitled to benefit

The assessee provided software services and was entitled to the benefit u/s 10B. It failed to claim this benefit in its return of income filed u/s 139 for the A.Y. 2006-07. The assessee received the intimation dated 28th March, 2018 u/s 143(1) on 18th May, 2008. Since the time limit for filing a revised return u/s 139(5) had expired on 31st March, 2008, it filed a rectification application before the A.O. u/s 154. The A.O. rejected the application and held that if there was any mistake found in the return the assessee ought to have filed a revised return on or before 31st March, 2008. Against this rejection, the assessee filed a first revision petition u/s 264 which was rejected; a second revision petition filed was also rejected.

The assessee then filed a writ petition challenging the rejection of the claim for deduction. The Madras High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

‘i) The rejection of the revision application filed by the assessee u/s 264 was not justified as the Officers acting under the Income-tax Department were duty-bound to extend the substantive benefits that were legitimately available to the assessee.

ii) The rejection of the application for rectification by the A.O. u/s 154 was unjustified, since the assessee was entitled to the substantive benefits u/s 10B and the delay, if any, was attributed on account of the system. Even if the intimation dated 28th March, 2008 was despatched on the same day after it was signed, in all likelihood it could not have been received by the assessee on 31st March, 2008 to file a revised return on time. Therefore, the assessee was entitled to rectification u/s 154.’

Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020 – Condition precedent for making declaration – Application should be pending on 31st January, 2020 from order dismissed ‘in limine’ – Appeal to Appellate Tribunal – Appeal dismissed based on mistake on 22nd June, 2018 – Tribunal rectifying order and passing fresh order restoring appeal on 11th May, 2020 – Order passed by Tribunal on 22nd June, 2018 was ‘in limine’ – Appeal pending on 31st January, 2020

2 Bharat Bhushan Jindal vs. Principal CIT [2021] 436 ITR 102 (Del) A.Y.: 2011-12; Date of order: 26th April, 2021 Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020

Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020 – Condition precedent for making declaration – Application should be pending on 31st January, 2020 from order dismissed ‘in limine’ – Appeal to Appellate Tribunal – Appeal dismissed based on mistake on 22nd June, 2018 – Tribunal rectifying order and passing fresh order restoring appeal on 11th May, 2020 – Order passed by Tribunal on 22nd June, 2018 was ‘in limine’ – Appeal pending on 31st January, 2020

For the A.Y. 2011-12, the A.O. passed the assessment order on 21st March, 2014 increasing the taxable income considerably. The assessee preferred an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals), which was allowed on 29th January, 2016. The Revenue filed an appeal on 10th March, 2016 before the Tribunal. The appeal was, however, dismissed by the Tribunal on 22nd June, 2018, based on a mistaken belief that in the earlier assessment years it had taken a view against the Revenue and in the favour of the assessee. This obvious mistake, once brought to the notice of the Tribunal, via a miscellaneous application preferred by the Revenue, was rectified by an order dated 11th May, 2020. The miscellaneous application was filed before the specified date, i.e., 31st January, 2020. As per the information available on the Tribunal’s portal, the miscellaneous application was filed on 13th November, 2018. The Tribunal, realising the mistake that had been made, recalled its order dated 22nd June, 2018 and restored the Revenue’s appeal and directed that the appeal be heard afresh. As a matter of fact, the Tribunal fixed the date of hearing, via the very same order, in the appeal on 6th July, 2020. The assessee filed Forms 1 and 2 with the designated authority under the Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020 in the first instance on 21st March, 2020. The assessee filed revised Forms 1 and 2, on 27th January, 2021, and thereafter on 20th March, 2021. In the interregnum, both sets of Forms 1 and 2, which were filed on 21st March, 2020 and 27th January, 2021, were rejected.

The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

‘i) A careful perusal of the order dated 22nd June, 2018 would show that the Revenue’s appeal was dismissed at the threshold, based on a mistaken impression that the Tribunal had taken a view against the Revenue. Circular No. 21 of 2020 [(2020) 429 ITR (St.) 1] requires fulfilment of two prerequisites for an appeal to be construed as pending on the specified date (i.e., 31st January, 2020) in terms of the provisions of the 2020 Act. First, the miscellaneous application should be pending on the specified date, i.e., 31st January, 2020. Second, the miscellaneous application should relate to an appeal which had been dismissed “in limine” before 31st January, 2020.

ii) There was no dispute that the miscellaneous application was filed and was pending on the specified date, i. e., 31st January, 2020. As regards the second aspect, the order of the Tribunal dated 22nd June, 2-018 could only be construed as an order that dismissed the Revenue’s appeal “in limine”. The Revenue’s appeal was pending on the specified, date, i. e., 31st January, 2020. The order of rejection was not valid.’

Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act – Scope of – Meaning of disputed tax – Difference between disputed tax and disputed income – Appeal against levy of tax pending – Declaration filed under Act cannot be rejected on ground that assessee had offered an amount for taxation

1 Govindrajulu Naidu vs. Principal CIT [2021] 434 ITR 703 (Bom) A.Y.: 2014-15; Date of order: 29th April, 2021 The Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020

Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act – Scope of – Meaning of disputed tax – Difference between disputed tax and disputed income – Appeal against levy of tax pending – Declaration filed under Act cannot be rejected on ground that assessee had offered an amount for taxation

The assessee filed a return of income for the A.Y. 2014-15 u/s 139(1) declaring a total income of Rs. 67,55,710. The assessment was completed u/s 143(3) assessing the income at Rs. 67,66,640. Thereafter, in 2019, a survey action was undertaken at the office premises of the assessee. However, no incriminating material was found. Under pressure, the assessee agreed to offer the amount of Rs. 5,76,00,000 allegedly received as his income. Later, he retracted from his statement under an affidavit filed before respondent No. 2. The assessment for the assessment year was reopened by a notice issued u/s 148. The assessee filed a return showing the amount of Rs. 5,76,00,000 as his income and declared a total amount of Rs. 6,43,69,719 and on reassessment the total amount was assessed at Rs. 6,44,09,400. The assessee filed an appeal u/s 246A before the Commissioner (Appeals) and raised the ground that the respondent had erred in taxing the amount of Rs. 5,76,00,000 as income of the assessee for the relevant assessment year. The appeal was pending. During the pendency of the appeal, the Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020 was enacted. As required under the provisions of this Act, the assessee filed a declaration to the designated authority in the prescribed form. The declaration was rejected on the online portal without giving an opportunity to the assessee observing that there was no disputed tax in the case of the declarant, as the declarant had himself filed a return reflecting the income.

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

‘i) The Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020 and the rules have been brought out with a specific purpose, object and intention to expedite realisation of locked up revenue, providing certain reliefs to assessees who opt to apply under the Act. Such an option is available only to a few persons. The preamble to the Act provides for resolution of disputed tax and matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The emphasis is on disputed tax and not on disputed income. The term “disputed tax” has been assigned specific definition in the Act and would have to be appreciated in the context of the Act. The disputed tax means an income tax payable by assessee under the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the income assessed by the authority and where any appeal is pending before the appellate forum on the specified date, against any order relating to tax payable under the Income-tax Act. It does not presumably ascribe any qualification to the matter / appeal except that it should concern the Income-tax Act. Further the definition of “dispute” as appearing under Rule 2(b) of the Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Rules, 2020 shows that “dispute” means an appeal or writ petition or special leave petition by the declarant before the appellate forum. “Disputed income” has also been defined under clause (g) of section 2(1) to mean the whole or so much of the total income as is relatable to disputed tax.

ii) The scheme of the 2020 Act does not make any distinction and categorise the appeals. The Act does not go into the ground of appeal.

iii) The Department did not dispute that an appeal had been filed by the assessee before the appellate forum. There existed a dispute as referred to under the 2020 Act and the Rules. In such a scenario, the Department’s contention that the assessee had offered the income and as such the tax thereon could not be considered disputed tax, would not align itself with the object and the purpose underlying the bringing in of the 2020 Act. The rejection of the declaration under the 2020 Act was not valid.’

Artheon Battery [TS-863-ITAT-2021 (Pun)] A.Y.: 2014-15; Date of order: 7th September, 2021 Section 28(iv)

8 Artheon Battery [TS-863-ITAT-2021 (Pun)] A.Y.: 2014-15; Date of order: 7th September, 2021 Section 28(iv)

FACTS
The assessee is engaged in the business of manufacturing the complete line of lead-acid batteries, serving domestic and export markets as well. The A.O. found that the assessee had credited an amount of Rs. 25.19 crores being waiver of ECB loan amount. The assessee submitted that the ECB was availed to acquire capital assets and hence was capital in nature. The A.O. did not accept the assessee’s submissions and held that the amount was taxable u/s 28(iv). On appeal, the CIT(A) held the amount to be capital in nature.

Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal before the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal found that the assessee had transferred the waiver amount of ECB directly to its capital reserve. It referred to the Apex Court ruling in Mahindra & Mahindra (404 ITR 1) wherein it was held that ‘in order to invoke the provisions u/s 28(iv) of the Act, the benefit which is received has to be in some other form rather than in the shape of money’. The Tribunal held that the amount received as cash receipt due to the waiver of loan cannot be taxed under the provisions of section 28(iv), and noted that in the instant case the loan amount waived was credited to capital reserve. Therefore, it held that the ratio of the SC ruling would be applicable as the benefit was received in some form other than in the shape of money. The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)’s order.
 

BUSINESS INCOME OF A CHARITABLE INSTITUTION

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Section 11 of the Income-tax Act confers exemption from tax in respect of an income derived from ‘property held under trust’, in the circumstances specified in clauses (a) to (c) of section 11(1), to a charitable institution or a trust or such other person registered u/s12A of the Act.

Section 11(4) provides that a ‘property held under trust’ includes a business undertaking held in trust and the income from such business, subject to the power of the A.O., shall not be included in the total income of the institution.

Sub-section (4A) provides for the denial of the benefit of tax exemption u/s 11(1) and prohibits the application of sub-sections (2), (3) and (3A) in relation to any income being profits and gains of business, unless the business is incidental to the attainment of the main objectives of the trust and separate books of accounts are maintained for the business.

The ‘property held under trust’ is required to be held for the charitable or religious purposes for its income to qualify for exemption from taxation. The term ‘charitable purpose’ is defined by section 2(15) and includes relief of the poor, education, yoga, medical relief, preservation of environment and of monuments or places or objects of artistic or historic interest, and the advancement of any other object of general public utility. A proviso to section 2(15) stipulates some stringent conditions in respect of an institution whose object is the advancement of general public utility, where it is carrying on any business to advance its objects. The said proviso does not apply to institutions whose objects are other than those of advancing general public utility, provided their objects otherwise qualify to be treated as charitable purposes.

The sum and substance of the aforesaid provisions, in relation to business carried out by an institution, is that a business run by it would be construed as a ‘property held under trust’ and its income, subject to the proviso to section 2(15), would be exempt from tax u/s 11. The conditions prescribed u/s (4A), where applicable, would require the business to be incidental to the attainment of the objectives of the trust and separate books of accounts would have to be maintained in respect of the business by the institution.

Some interesting controversies have arisen around the true meaning and understanding of the terms ‘property held under trust’ and ‘incidental to the attainment of the objectives of the trust’ and in relation to the applicability of sub-section (4A) to cases where provisions of sub-section (4) are applicable. The Delhi High Court has held that a business carried on with borrowed funds and unrelated to the objects of the trust could not be held to be a ‘property held under trust’. It has also held that for a business to be incidental to the attainment of the objects of the trust, its activities should be intricately related to its objects. It also held that the provisions of sub-section (4A) and sub-section (4) cannot apply simultaneously. As against the above decision, the Madras High Court has held that a business carried on by the trust is a ‘property held under trust’ and such business would be construed to be incidental to the attainment of the objectives of the trust where the profits of such business are utilised for meeting the objects of the trust and, of course, separate books of accounts are maintained by the trust.

Some of these issues have a chequered history and were the subject matter of many Supreme Court decisions, including in the cases of J.K. Trust, 32 ITR 535; Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association, 121 ITR 1; and Thanthi Trust, 247 ITR 785. Besides the above, the Supreme Court had occasion to examine the meaning of the term ‘not involving the carrying out of any activity of profit’ and the concept of business held in trust in the cases of CIT vs. Dharmodayam Co., 109 ITR 527 (SC); Dharmaposhanam Co. vs. CIT, 114 ITR 463 (SC); and Dharmadeepti vs. CIT, 114 ITR 454 (SC).

MEHTA CHARITABLE PRAJNALAY TRUST’S CASE

The issue came up for consideration in the case of CIT vs. Mehta Charitable Prajnalay Trust, 357 ITR 560 before the Delhi High Court. The assessment years involved therein were 1992-93 to 1994-95; 2001-02; and 2005-06 to 2007-08. The trust was constituted in the year 1971 for promotion of education, patriotism, Indian culture and running of dispensaries and hospitals and many other related charitable objects with a donation of Rs. 2,100. Besides pursuing the above objects, the trust commenced Katha manufacturing business in the year 1972 with the aid and assistance of borrowings from banks and sister concerns in which the settlors, trustees or their relatives had substantial interest. At some point of time, the Katha manufacturing unit was leased to a related concern on receipt of lease rent. The trust made purchases and sales from its head office through the two related concerns.

The exemption u/s 11 claimed by the trust was denied by the A.O. for some of the years and such denial was confirmed by the CIT(A) on the ground that the Katha business was carried on by the trustees and not by the beneficiaries of the trust, as was required by the then applicable section 11(4A), and the exemption was not available to the trust in respect of the profits of the Katha business. In respect of some other years, the CIT(A) held that the business was held under trust and was covered by section 11(4) of the Act and on application of the said section, the provisions of sections 11(4A) were not applicable and therefore the trust was entitled for the exemption. For the years under consideration, the A.O. denied the exemption for the same reasons, besides holding that carrying on of the Katha business was not incidental to the attainment of the objects of the trust. The orders of the A.O. for those years were sustained by the CIT(A) for reasons different from those of the A.O.

On appeal, the Tribunal, following its decision for the A.Y. 1989-90, held that the Katha business carried on by the assessee was incidental to the attainment of the objects of the trust, which were for charitable purposes. Relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Thanthi Trust (Supra), in which the effect of the amendment was considered, the Tribunal held that the said decision squarely covered the controversy in the present case about the business being incidental to the attainment of the objects of the trust.

The High Court noted that the Tribunal did not specifically address itself to the question which arose out of the order of the CIT(A), whether the business itself can be said to be property held under trust within the meaning of section 11(4). There was no discussion in the order of the Tribunal as to the impact of the various clauses of the trust deed which were referred to by the CIT(A) while making a distinction between the objects of the trust and the powers of the trustees. In respect of all the other assessment years, namely, 1993-94, 1994-95, 2001-02 and 2005-06 to 2007-08, the Tribunal followed the order passed by it for the A.Y. 1992-93.

On an appeal by Revenue, the Delhi High Court in appreciation of the contentions of the parties, held as under:
• There was no exhaustive definition of the words ‘property held under trust’ in the Act; however, sub-section (4) provided that for the purposes of section 11 the words ‘property held under trust’ include a business undertaking so held.

• The question whether sub-section (4A) would apply even to a case where a business was held under trust was answered in the negative in several authoritative pronouncements. Thus, if a property was held under trust, and such property was a business, the case would fall u/s 11(4) and not u/s 11(4A). Section 11(4A) would apply only to a case where the business was not held under trust. In view of the settled legal position, the contention of the Revenue, that the provisions of section 11(4A) were sweeping and would also take in a case of business held under trust, was not acceptable.

• In the facts of the present case, and having regard to the terms of the trust deed and the conduct of the trustees, it could not be said that the Katha business was itself held under trust. There was a difference between a property or business held under trust and a business carried on by or on behalf of the trust, a distinction that was recognised in Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association (Supra), a decision of five Judges of the Supreme Court. It was observed that if a business undertaking was held under trust for a charitable purpose, the income therefrom would be entitled to the exemption u/s 11(1).

• In the case before the Court, the finding of the CIT(A), in his order for the A.Y. 1992-93, was that the Katha business was not held under trust but it was a business commenced by the trustees with the aid and assistance of borrowings from the sister concerns in which the settlors and the trustees or their close relatives had substantial interest, as well as from banks. It was thus with the help of borrowed funds, or in other words, the funds not belonging to the assessee trust, that the Katha business was commenced and profits started to be earned.

• There was a distinction between the objects of a trust and the powers given to the trustees to effectuate the purposes of the trust. The Katha business was not even in the contemplation of the settlors and, therefore, could not have been settled upon trust, even where they were empowered to start any business.

• There was thus no nexus or integration between the amount originally settled upon the trust and the later setting up and conduct of the Katha business. Moreover, the distinction between the original trust fund and the later commencement of the business with the help of borrowed funds should be kept in mind in the context of ascertaining whether the particular Katha business was even in the contemplation of the settlors of the trust.

• There was no connection between the carrying on of the Katha business and the attainment of the objects of the trust, which were basically for the advancement of education, inculcation of patriotism, Indian culture, running of dispensaries, hospitals, etc. The mere fact that the whole or some part of the income from the Katha business was earmarked for application to the charitable objects would not render the business itself being considered as incidental to the attainment of the objects. The Delhi High Court was in agreement with the view taken by the CIT(A) in his order for A.Y. 1992-93 that the application of the income generated by the business was not the relevant consideration and what was relevant was whether the activity was so inextricably connected to or linked with the objects of the trust that it could be considered as incidental to those objectives.

• Prima facie, the observations in the case of Thanthi Trust (Supra) would appear to support the assessee’s case in the sense that even if the Katha business was held not to constitute a business held under trust, but only as a business carried on by or on behalf of the trust, so long as the profits generated by it were applied for the charitable objects of the trust, the condition imposed u/s 11(4A) should be held to be satisfied, entitling the trust to the tax exemption.

• The observations of the Apex Court, however, have to be understood in the light of the facts before it. The assessee in that case carried on the business of a newspaper and that business itself was held under trust. The charitable object of the trust was the imparting of education which fell u/s 2(15). The newspaper business was certainly incidental to the attainment of the object of the trust, namely, that of imparting education. The observations were thus made having regard to the fact that the profits of the newspaper business were utilised by the trust for achieving the object, namely, education. The type of nexus or connection which existed between the imparting of education and the carrying on of the business of a newspaper did not exist in the present case. There was no such nexus between the Katha business and the objects of the assessee trust that can constitute the carrying on of the Katha business, an activity incidental to the attainment of the objects, namely, advancing of education, patriotism, Indian culture, running of hospitals and dispensaries, etc.

• It would be disastrous to extend the sweep of the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of the Thanthi Trust (Supra), on the facts of that case, to all cases where the trust carried on business which was not held under trust and whose income was utilised to feed the charitable objects of the trust. The observations of the Supreme Court must be understood and appreciated in the background of the facts in that case and should not be extended indiscriminately to all cases.

The Delhi High Court held that a business carried on with borrowed funds and unrelated to the objects of the trust could not be held to be a ‘property held under trust’. It has also held that for a business to be incidental to the attainment of the objects of the trust, its activity should be intricately related to its objects. It also held that where a property was held under trust and such property was a business, the case would fall u/s 11(4) and not u/s 11(4A). Section 11(4A) would apply only to a case where the business was not held under trust. It therefore held that the Katha business was not a property held under trust, the provisions of section 11(4) did not apply, and the provisions of section 11(4A) would have to be applied. Since the business was not incidental to the attainment of the objects of the trust as required by section 11(4A), the trust was not entitled to exemption in respect of the business income.

The Special Leave Petition filed by the assessee against this decision has been admitted by the Supreme Court as reported in Mehta Charitable Prajnalay Trust vs. CIT, 248 Taxman 145 (SC).

BHARATHAKSHEMAM’S CASE


The issue recently arose in the case of Bharathakshemam vs. PCIT, 320 CTR (Ker) 198, a case that required the Court to adjudicate whether the assessee trust was eligible for exemption from tax u/s 11, in respect of the business of Chitty / Kuri which was utilised for medical relief, an object of the trust, and could such business be considered as a business incidental or ancillary to the attainment of the objects of the trust. In that case, the Revenue had relied on the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Mehta Charitable Prajnalay Trust (Supra) to support the contention that the business carried on by the trust had no connection or nexus with the charitable objects of the trust. It was the Revenue’s contention that the business, being run by the trust, should itself be connected or should have a nexus with the object of medical relief, for example, running a dispensary or a hospital or a drugstore or even a medical college; surely, running a Chitty / Kuri business was none of them and therefore could not be said to be incidental or ancillary to the objects of the trust, and the fact that the profit of such business was utilised entirely for medical relief was not sufficient for excluding the income of the business from taxation.

In this case, the facts gathered from the order of the High Court reveal that the claim for exemption of the trust in respect of its profit from its Chitty / Kuri business was denied by the A.O. on the grounds that such a business was not incidental or ancillary to the attainment of the objects of the trust. The A.O. had also evoked the proviso to section 2(15) which was held by the Court to be irrelevant in view of the finding that the said proviso had a restricted application to the cases where a business was being carried on for pursuing its object of carrying on an activity of general public utility. In the case before the Court, the main object was providing medical relief and the profits of the business were utilised for medical relief which was the main object of the trust.

The first appellant authority held that the business was carried out by the trust for the mutual benefit of the subscribers to the Chitty / Kuri and the substantial profit of the business was passed on to such subscribers and therefore such business, which retained minor profits, could not have been treated as incidental to the objects of the trust. It also held that the profit, even where applied fully to the objects of the trust, could not have deemed the business to be incidental to the main objects of the trust. On appeal by the assessee to the Tribunal, it agreed with the findings of the first appellate authority and also referred to the first proviso to section 2(15) to hold that the business of the trust was not incidental to the attainment of the objects of the trust.

On further appeal to the High Court, relying on a few decisions of the courts, the Kerala High Court held that the proviso to section 2(15) had no relation to the case of the trust which had as its object providing medical relief. This part is not relevant to the issues under consideration here and is mentioned only for completeness.

The Court also observed, though not relevant to the issue before it, that in the aftermath of the deletion of section 13(1)(bb) and insertion of sub-section (4), the distinction between a business held in trust and one run by the trust was not very relevant and the observations in the minority judgment in the case of Thanthi Trust (Supra) should not be applied in preference to the observations of the majority, more so when the court later on delivered a unanimous judgment of the five judges.

On the issue of satisfaction of the condition of sub-section (4A), relating to the business being incidental to the attainment of the objects of the trust, the Kerala High Court exclusively relied on paragraph 25 of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the Thanthi Trust (Supra) for holding that the business of Chitty / Kuri was incidental to the attainment of the objects of the trust. The said paragraph 25 is reproduced hereunder:

‘The substituted sub-section (4A) states that the income derived from a business held under trust wholly for charitable or religious purposes shall not be included in the total income of the previous year of the trust or institution if “the business is incidental to the attainment of the objective of the trust or, as the case may be, institution” and separate books of accounts are maintained in respect of such business. Clearly, the scope of sub-section (4A) is more beneficial to a trust or institution than was the scope of sub-section (4A) as originally enacted. In fact, it seems to us that the substituted sub-section (4A) gives a trust or institution a greater benefit than was given by section 13(1)(bb). If the object of Parliament was to give trusts and institutions no more benefit than that given by section 13(1)(bb), the language of section 13(1)(bb) would have been employed in the substituted sub-section (4A). As it stands, all that it requires for the business income of a trust or institution to be exempt is that the business should be incidental to the attainment of the objectives of the trust or institution. A business whose income is utilised by the trust or the institution for the purposes of achieving the objectives of the trust or the institution is, surely, a business which is incidental to the attainment of the objectives of the trust. In any event, if there be any ambiguity in the language employed, the provision must be construed in a manner that benefits the assessee. The trust, therefore, is entitled to the benefit of section 11 for A.Y. 1992-93 and thereafter. It is, we should add, not in dispute that the income of its newspaper business has been employed to achieve its objectives of education and relief to the poor and that it has maintained separate books of accounts in respect thereof.’

The Kerala High Court, in paragraph 13, examined the facts and the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Mehta Charitable Prajnalay Trust (Supra) relied upon by the Revenue. In paragraph 14 it reiterated the above-referred paragraph 25 of the decision in the case of the Thanthi Trust (Supra) to disagree, in paragraph 15, with the ratio of the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Mehta Charitable Prajnalay Trust (Supra). The Court also held that the Chitty / Kuri business did not require any initial investment and therefore the facts in the case before it were found to be different from the facts in the case before the Delhi High Court. The Kerala High Court also noted that the example cited by the Delhi High Court was relevant only in the context of section 13(1)(bb), which became irrelevant on its deletion; on simultaneous insertion of sub-section (4A), the case was to be adjudicated by reading the substituted provision that did not stipulate any condition that business carried on by the trust should be connected or should have nexus with the charitable purpose for such business to be treated as being carried on as incidental to the attainment of the objects of the trust. It held that the Chitty / Kuri business was incidental to the main object as long as its profits were applied for medical relief, which was the object of the trust. The trust was accordingly granted the exemption in respect of its profits of the Chitty / Kuri business.

OBSERVATIONS
The issue that moves in a narrow compass, is about the eligibility of a trust for exemption u/s 11 where it carries on a business, the corpus whereof is supplied by the borrowings from the sister concerns of the settlor / trustees and the profit thereof is used for the purpose of meeting the objects of the trust; should such business be treated as one ‘held in trust’ and if yes, whether the business can be said to be incidental to the attainment of the objects of the trust.

A business run by a charitable institution, whether out of borrowed funds or from the funds settled on it, is surely a ‘property held under trust’ as is confirmed by the express provisions of sub-section (4) of section 11 and this understanding is confirmed by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Thanthi Trust (Supra). In this case, the Supreme Court observed ‘A public charitable trust may hold a business as part of its corpus. It may carry on a business which it does not hold as a part of its corpus. But it seems that the distinction has no consequence insofar as section 13(1)(bb) is concerned.’ The doubt, if any, was eliminated by the deletion of section 13(1)(bb) w.e.f. 1st April, 1983. Section 13(1)(bb) provided that nothing contained in section 11 or section 12 shall operate so as to exclude from the total income of the previous year of the person in receipt thereof, in the case of a charitable trust or institution for the relief of the poor, education or medical relief, which carries on any business, any income derived from such business, unless the business is carried on in the course of the actual carrying out of a primary purpose of the trust or institution.

The Supreme Court also stated in the Thanthi case:
 ‘Sub-section (4) of section 11 remains on the statute book and it defines property held under trust for the purposes of that section to include a business so held. It then states how such income is to be determined. In other words, if such income is not to be included in the income of the trust, its quantum is to be determined in the manner set out in sub-section (4).
Sub-section (1)(a) of section 11 says that income derived from property held under trust only for charitable or religious purposes, to the extent it is used in the manner indicated therein, shall not be included in the total income of the previous year of the trust. Sub-section (4) defines the words “property held under trust” for the purposes of section 11 to include a business held under trust. Sub-section (4A) restricts the benefit under section 11 so that it is not available for income derived from business unless ……’

The Supreme Court therefore clearly indicated that both sub-sections (4) and (4A) of section 11 have to be read together.

The position now should be accepted as settled unless the A.O. finds that the business is not owned and run by the institution. It is difficult to concur with a view that a business owned and run by a trust or on its behalf may still not be held to be ‘a property held under trust’. Sub-section (4) should help in concluding the debate. Yes, where the business itself is not owned or run by the trust, there can be a possibility to hold that it is not ‘a property held in trust’, but only in such cases based on conclusive findings that the business belongs to a person other than the trust.

The fact that the business is a ‘property held in trust’ by itself shall not be sufficient to exempt its income u/s 11 unless the business is found to be incidental to attainment of the objects of the trust and further the institution maintains separate books of accounts for such business. These conditions are mandated by the Legislature on insertion of sub-section (4A) into section 11 w.e.f. 1st April, 1992. In our considered opinion, the compliance of the conditions of sub-section (4A) is essential even for a business held as a ‘property held under a trust’. A co-joint reading of sub-sections (4) and (4A) is advised in the interest of the harmonious construction of the provisions that enables an institution to claim the exemption from tax.

The term ‘property held under trust’ is not defined in the Act; however, vide sub-section (4), for the purposes of section 11, the words ‘property held under trust’ include a business undertaking held by the trust. This by itself shall not qualify the trust to claim an exemption from tax. In our opinion, it is not correct to hold that once the case falls under section 11(4), the conditions of section 11(4A) will not have to be satisfied. For a valid claim of exemption, it is necessary to satisfy the twin conditions: that the business is a property held in the trust and the same is incidental to the attainment of the objects of the trust and that separate books of accounts are maintained of such business. It is also incorrect to hold that the provisions of sub-section (4A) would apply only to a business which is not a property held in trust; taking such a view would disentitle a trust altogether from claiming exemption for non-compliance of conditions of sections 11(1)(a) to (c) of the Act; the whole objective of insertion of sub-section(4A) would be lost inasmuch as it cannot be read in isolation of section 11(1)(a) to (c).

As regards the meaning of the term ‘incidental to the objects of the trust’, the better view is to treat the conditions as satisfied once the profits of the business are spent on the objects of the trust. There is nothing in section 11(4A) to indicate that there is a business nexus to the objects of the trust, for example, a business of running a laboratory or a school or a hospital w.r.t. the object of medical relief. The profit of the business of running a newspaper or printing press shall satisfy the conditions of section 11(4A) once it is utilised for the charitable purposes, i.e., the objects of the trust, even where there is no business nexus with the objects of the trust.

Attention is invited to the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Wellington Charitable Trust, 330 ITR 24. In that case, the Court held that when a business income was used towards the achievement of the objects of the trust, it would amount of carrying on of a business ‘incidental to the attainment of the objects of the trust’. Importance is given to the application of the business income and not its source, its use and not its origin. Nothing would be gained by exempting an income which has a nexus with the objects of the trust but is not utilised for meeting the objects of the trust. The provisions of section 11(4) and section 11(4A) will have to be read together for a harmonious construction; it would not be correct to hold that section 11(4A) would override section 11(4) as doing so would make the very provision of section 11(4) otiose and redundant. The Court should avoid an interpretation that would defeat the provision of the law where there is no express bar in section 11(4A) that prohibits the application of section 11(4). The provisions should be construed to be complementary to each other.

Having said that, it would help the case of the trust, for an exemption, where the settlor of the trust has settled the business in the trust and the objects of the trust include the carrying on of such business for the attainment of the charitable objects of the trust.

Surbhit Impex [130 taxmann.com 315] A.Y.: 2014-15; Date of order: 17th September, 2021 Section 41(1)

7 Surbhit Impex [130 taxmann.com 315] A.Y.: 2014-15; Date of order: 17th September, 2021 Section 41(1)

FACTS
The assessee was engaged in the business of trading. During the course of assessment proceedings, the A.O. noticed that it owed amounts of Rs. 1.25 crores and Rs. 1.88 crores, respectively, to two Chinese entities and which were outstanding. The assessee submitted that since the consignment received was not of good quality, the payment was not made. The A.O. treated the same as ceased liabilities and accordingly made an addition of Rs. 3.13 crores u/s 41(1). On appeal, the CIT(A) deleted the additions. Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal before the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal noted the undisputed position that at the relevant point of time, proceedings against the assessee for recovery of these amounts were pending before the judicial forums and remarked that these amounts could not have been said to have ceased to be payable by the assessee. The Tribunal further remarked that the very basic, foundational condition that there has to be benefit in respect of such trading liability by way of ‘remission and cessation’ was not satisfied in the relevant year, and thus upheld the CIT(A)’s order.

The Tribunal observed that sometimes Departmental appeals are filed without carefully looking at undisputed basic foundational facts in a routine manner, and remarked that the Income-tax Authorities ought to be more careful in deciding matters to be pursued in further appeals.

Section 142(2A) – Reference to DVO cannot be made by an authority who is not empowered to do so – An invalid valuation report of DVO cannot be considered as incriminating material – In absence of any incriminating material for the unabated assessment years, additions cannot be made

6 ACIT vs. Narula Educational Trust [2021-86ITR(T) 365 (Kol-Trib)] IT(SS) Appeal Nos. 07 to 12 & 42 to 47(Kol) of 2020 A.Ys.: 2008-09 to 2013-14; Date of order:  5th February, 2021

Section 142(2A) – Reference to DVO cannot be made by an authority who is not empowered to do so – An invalid valuation report of DVO cannot be considered as incriminating material – In absence of any incriminating material for the unabated assessment years, additions cannot be made

FACTS
The assessee was an educational institution operating through various institutions. On 13th March, 2014, a search action u/s 132(1) was carried out at its administrative office. During post-search operations, the DGIT(Inv) made reference to the Departmental Valuation Officer (DVO) for valuing the immovable properties. The DVO reported the value of the properties to be higher than the value disclosed by the assessee. Pursuant to the provisions of section 153A, an assessment for the A.Ys. 2008-09 to 2012-13 was undertaken and the A.O. proposed to make an addition based on the report of the DVO. The assessee objected to the valuation methodology adopted by the DVO; accordingly, the A.O. requested the DVO to reconsider the valuation. However, as the DVO did not submit the report within the statutory time limit of six months, the A.O. proceeded to make an addition based on the initial valuation report as called upon by the DGIT(Inv).

Before the CIT(A), the assessee raised the point that since the DVO did not furnish the report to the A.O. within the time limit, hence the reference stood infructuous. The CIT(A), exercising his co-terminus powers (as that of A.O.), himself made reference to the DVO; however, since the DVO did not furnish a reply within the time limit, the CIT(A) deleted the addition on the ground that since the DVO did not furnish a report, hence the earlier report of the DVO [as sought by DGIT(Inv)] stood non-est and could not be relied upon by the A.O.

On appeal by the Revenue before the ITAT, the assessee argued that, firstly, the DGIT(Inv) had no power at that point of time to refer to the DVO for valuation, and secondly, since there was no incriminating material found during the course of the search action, no addition can be made as the assessments for these years were unabated.

HELD
The DGIT(Inv) was empowered to make reference for valuation to the DVO only after the amendment in section 132 made vide the Finance Act, 2017 w.e.f. 1st April, 2017 and not prior to it. Thus, the DGIT(Inv) did not have jurisdiction to make a reference in the year 2014. Accordingly, the impugned additions were directed to be deleted relying on the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Amiya Bala Paul vs. CIT [2003] 262 ITR 407 (SC) where it was held that reference to the DVO cannot be made by an authority that is not empowered to do so.

It was observed that assessments for the relevant years were unabated because no assessments were pending for those years before the A.O. as on the date of the search. Further, the accounts of the assessee were audited, and that neither the search party nor the A.O. pointed out any mistake in the correctness or completeness of the books. On perusal of the panchnama it was evident that the search party did not even visit the educational institutions. Thus, the reference made by the DGIT(Inv) to the DVO was without any incriminating material that was unearthed during the search proceedings. There was no whisper of any incriminating material seized during the search to justify the addition in these unabated assessments other than the invalid valuation report. Such invalid valuation report of the DVO cannot be held to be incriminating material, since it was not a fallout of any incriminating material unearthed during the search to suggest any investment in the building which was over and above the investment shown by the assessee. Therefore, no addition was permissible for unabated assessments unless it was based on relevant incriminating material found during the course of search qua the assessee and qua the assessment year.

Principle of consistency – Where in earlier years in the assessee’s own case the benefit of exemption u/s 11 was allowed, the Revenue’s appeal against the order of CIT(A) was dismissed, thereby upholding the claim of exemption u/s 11, following the principle of consistency

5 ACIT (Exemptions) vs. India Habitat Centre [2021-86-ITR(T) 290 (Del-Trib)] IT Appeal No. 5779 (Del) of 2017 A.Y.: 2014-15; Date of order: 1st February, 2021

Principle of consistency – Where in earlier years in the assessee’s own case the benefit of exemption u/s 11 was allowed, the Revenue’s appeal against the order of CIT(A) was dismissed, thereby upholding the claim of exemption u/s 11, following the principle of consistency

FACTS
The assessee-society was registered u/s 12A vide order dated 13th January, 1989. It had satisfied the requirements of Education, Medical Relief, Environment, Relief of Poor and Claim of General Public Utility and thus, its activities were charitable as mandated in section 2(15).

The Department had started disputing the nature of activities undertaken by the assessee and rejected the claim of exemption under sections 11 and 12 read with the proviso to section 2(15). As an abundant precaution, the assessee started making an alternate claim for exemption under the principle of mutuality, it being a members’ association.

For the relevant A.Y., the A.O. noted that its activities were hybrid, were partly covered by the provisions of section 11 read with section 2(15) and partly by the principle of mutuality. The A.O. denied the exemption u/s 11 and under mutuality since separate books of accounts were not maintained and income could not be bifurcated under the principle of mutuality or otherwise.

Aggrieved, the assessee challenged the assessment order before the CIT(A). The CIT(A) relied on the earlier decisions of the higher appellate forums in its own case and held that the assessee was engaged in charitable activities and granted the benefit of exemption u/s 11. Aggrieved by the order, the Revenue filed an appeal before the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal observed that a coordinate bench of the Tribunal in the assessee’s own case for the A.Y. 2008-09 had reviewed all the case laws and various decisions on this aspect to reach the conclusion that when the society was registered as a charitable trust, its income cannot be computed on the principle of mutuality but was required to be computed under sections 11, 12 and 13. This decision was followed by another decision of a co-ordinate bench in ITA No. 4212/Del/2012 for the A.Y. 2009-10 in the assessee’s own case.

The Tribunal held that the history of the assessee as noted in the submissions of the counsel clearly showed that all the issues raised in the Departmental appeal had been considered and decided in earlier years, therefore, the principle of consistency applied to the same facts. The Tribunal observed that the facts in the relevant assessment year were identical to the facts in the earlier years in the assessee’s own case, the fact that the assessee was a registered society u/s 12A and that the nature of activities and objects of the assessee were the same as had been considered in earlier years.Considering the above background and history of the assessee in the light of various orders referred to by its counsel during the course of arguments and the Order of the ITAT and the Delhi High Court in A.Y. 2012-2013 in the assessee’s own case, the Tribunal did not find any infirmity in the order of the CIT(A) in allowing the appeal of the assessee-society and the Departmental appeal was accordingly dismissed.

In the case of an assessee who had not undertaken any activities except development of flats and construction of various housing projects, expenses incurred by way of professional fees are allowable while computing income offered during survey

4 Anjani Infra vs. DCIT [TS-825-ITAT-2021 (Surat)] A.Y.: 2013-14; Date of order: 26th July, 2021 Sections 37, 68, 115BBE

In the case of an assessee who had not undertaken any activities except development of flats and construction of various housing projects, expenses incurred by way of professional fees are allowable while computing income offered during survey

FACTS

The assessee firm was a part of Shri Lavjibhai Daliya and Shri Jayantibhai Babaria group on whom search action was carried out on 17th July, 2012. In the course of the survey action, a partner of the assessee offered additional unaccounted income of Rs. 8,00,54,000. In the course of assessment proceedings, the A.O. noticed that the assessee has debited expenditure of Rs. 8 lakh from the income disclosed in the survey. In support of the claim, the assessee, in the course of assessment proceedings, submitted that the assessee is engaged only in the business of building construction and developing residential and other housing projects. No other activities or investments are carried out or undertaken by the assessee firm. The disclosure was made towards on-money in the business of real estate. The professional fee of Rs. 8 lakh was paid to their legal consultant. The A.O. treated the additional income declared in the survey as deemed income of the assessee u/s 68 and disallowed professional fees. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the A.O. The aggrieved assessee then preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD


The Tribunal observed that the narrow dispute is whether the assessee can claim expenses of professional fees against additional unaccounted income disclosed during the survey. The Tribunal noted that while making disclosure of Rs. 8 crores, the partners gave the bifurcation of undisclosed income. In the statement there is no averment that the assessee will not claim any expense. The assessee had not undertaken any other activities except the development of flats and construction of various housing projects. On similar facts, in the case of DCIT vs. Suyog Corporation [ITA No. 568/Ahd/2012] the Tribunal confirmed the order of the CIT(A) allowing expenses against on-money to the assessee who was also engaged in similar business activities. A similar view was taken in the case of DCIT vs. Jamnadas Muljibhai [(2006) 99 TTJ 197 (Rajkot)] by treating on-money as business receipt of the assessee.

The Tribunal, considering the decisions of the co-ordinate benches and also the fact that professional fees were paid to the firm of consultants after deducting TDS, held that there is no justification in disallowing such expenses.

Explanation 2 to section 37(1) is prospective w.e.f. A.Y. 2015-16

3 National Building Construction Corporation Ltd. vs. Addl. CIT [TS-815-ITAT-2021 (Del)] A.Y.: 2014-15; Date of order: 11th August, 2021 Section: Explanation 2 to section 37(1)

Explanation 2 to section 37(1) is prospective w.e.f. A.Y. 2015-16

FACTS

The assessee in its return of income claimed deduction of Rs. 5,72,32,442 incurred on account of expenses on corporate social responsibility (CSR). It was submitted before the A.O. that CSR expenses were incurred for the purpose of projecting its business and said the expenditure was incurred in accordance with the guidelines of the Ministry of Heavy Industry and Public Enterprises. It was also submitted that the expenses have enhanced the brand image of the company, which in turn has had a positive long-term impact on the business of the assessee.The A.O. held Explanation 2 to section 37(1) to be clarificatory and consequently disallowed the claim of the CSR expenses of Rs. 5,72,32,442.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the A.O. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD


The Tribunal noted that the co-ordinate bench of the Tribunal has in the case of Addl. CIT vs. Rites Limited [ITA Nos. 6447 and 6448/Del/2017; A.Y. 2013-14] held that Explanation 2 to section 37(1) is prospective in nature and applies w.e.f. A.Y. 2015-16. It also noted that the expenses have been incurred on the direction of the relevant Ministry / Government of India and neither the A.O. nor the D.R. have rebutted the contention of the assessee that expenses have been incurred for enhancing the brand image of the company which are wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business of the assessee – but both the authorities have disallowed the expenses on the ground that Explanation 2 is clarificatory and retrospective in nature.The Tribunal, following the decision of the co-ordinate bench, held that Explanation 2 is prospective in nature and accordingly CSR expenses incurred in the year under consideration cannot be disallowed by invoking Explanation 2 to section 37(1).

This ground of appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

Claim for deduction of interest u/s 24(b) is allowable even though assessee had not got possession of the house property

2 Abeezar Faizullabhoy vs. CIT(A) [TS-859-ITAT-2021 (Mum)] A.Y.: 2015-16; Date of order: 1st September, 2021 Section 24

Claim for deduction of interest u/s 24(b) is allowable even though assessee had not got possession of the house property

FACTS

The assessee purchased a residential house vide a registered agreement dated 20th September, 2009 for a consideration of Rs. 1,60,89,250. For acquiring the property, the assessee took a loan on which interest of Rs. 2,69,842 was paid by him during the year under consideration. In the return of income the assessee claimed deduction of Rs. 2,00,000 u/s 24(b) which was declined by the A.O. on the ground that the assessee had not taken possession of the property in question.Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the A.O. Still aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD


The Tribunal on perusal of section 24(b) held that for claiming deduction of interest u/s 24(b) there is neither any such precondition nor an eligibility criterion prescribed that the assessee should have taken possession of the property purchased or acquired by him. The first and second provisos to section 24(b) only contemplate an innate upper limit of the amount of deduction qua properties referred to in section 23(2). These provisos by no means jeopardise the entitlement of the assessee to claim deduction of interest payable by him on capital borrowed for the purposes mentioned in the section, provided the property does not fall within the realm of section 23(2).

The view of the CIT(A), viz., that in the absence of any control / domain over the property in question the assessee would not be in receipt of any income from the same, therefore, the fact that allowing deduction u/s 24(b) qua the said property would be beyond comprehension was held by the Tribunal to be absolutely misconceived and divorced of any force of law. It held that the logic given by the CIT(A) for declining the claim for deduction militates against the mandate of sections 22 to 24.

The Tribunal further held that determination of annual value is dependent on the ‘ownership’ of the property, irrespective of the fact of whether or not the assessee has taken possession. As per the plain literal interpretation of section 24(b), there is no bar on an assessee to claim deduction of interest payable on a loan taken for purchasing a residential property, although the possession of the same might not have been vested with him.

The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and directed the A.O. to allow the assessee’s claim for deduction of Rs. 2 lakh u/s 24(b).

Reassessment made merely on the basis of AIR information was quashed as having been made on invalid assumption of jurisdiction

1 Tapan Chakraborty vs. ITO [TS-644-ITAT-2021 (Kol)] A.Y.: 2009-10; Date of order: 7th July, 2021 Section: 147

Reassessment made merely on the basis of AIR information was quashed as having been made on invalid assumption of jurisdiction

FACTS

For the A.Y. 2009-10, the assessee, a transport contractor, filed his return of income declaring a total income of Rs. 1,85,199 u/s 44AE. Reassessment proceedings were commenced on the basis of AIR information that the assessee has deposited a sum of Rs. 10,64,200 in his savings account which deposit was held by the Revenue to be cash credit u/s 68.

In the reasons recorded, the A.O. noticed that the assessee has declared business income of Rs. 1,85,199 and has a savings bank account with Oriental Bank of Commerce, perusal of the bank statement whereof shows a deposit of Rs. 10,64,200 to be in cash out of the total deposits of Rs. 16,11,720.

According to the A.O., the assessee failed to substantiate the cash deposit with any supporting evidence and hence concluded the amounts to be cash credit u/s 68.

HELD


Quietus of the completed assessments can be disturbed only when there is information or evidence / material regarding undisclosed income or the A.O. has information in his possession showing escapement of income. The statutory mandate is that the A.O. must record ‘reason to believe’ the escapement of income. The Tribunal observed that if adverse information may trigger ‘reason to suspect’, then the A.O. has to make reasonable inquiry and collect material which would make him believe that there is in fact an escapement of income. ‘Reason’ is the link between the information and the conclusion. ‘Reason to believe’ postulates a foundation based on information and a belief based on a reason. After a foundation based on information is made, there must still be some reason which should warrant the holding of a belief that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. The Tribunal noted that the Supreme Court in M/s Ganga Saran & Sons (P) Ltd. vs. 130 ITR 1 (SC) has held that the expression ‘reason to believe’ occurring in section 147 is stronger than the expression ‘is satisfied’ and such requirement has to be met by the A.O. before he usurps the jurisdiction to reopen an assessment. The Tribunal held that the A.O. did not meet the conditions precedent in the reasons recorded by him and therefore, assumption of jurisdiction by the A.O. to reopen is invalid and consequently reopening was held to be bad in law and was quashed.

DIGITAL WORKPLACE: FINDING THE RIGHT BALANCE

INTRODUCTION
In our previous article we discussed the Digital Workplace, its advantages and how the world is moving towards the ‘New Normal’. In India, we usually adjust to adversities very well and when the situation demanded, we quickly moved to the Work From Home (WFH) / Remote Working scenario. Now, as the restrictions on travel are being lifted, we will be back to working from the office. Many seniors with whom we have interacted told us that the remote working model was a temporary solution when there were restrictions, but it won’t work out in future. These statements have been further affirmed by The Future of Work Study 2021, released by LinkedIn. It said that one in three Indian professionals has burnt out, stressed due to remote working.

Remote working started with a bang and saw people preparing Dalgona coffee and playing various online games! But once travel curbs started to get relaxed, everyone started going back to office and people started explaining the benefits of working from the office! However, reality has started hitting us again. Those who are travelling daily are missing the WFH scenario, because it was not the WFH that was bad but it was the lack of a system to manage WFH that was telling. That was obviously because WFH started unexpectedly and everyone had to quickly adjust to so many things – statutory as well as internal processes.

When offices resumed, all the backlog started piling up. For example, audit documentation has become a bit more difficult considering that some data is available in physical mode and some in soft copies; employees have started realising the importance of WFH with the extra time they have to spend travelling daily to work; the additional expense they have to incur daily to reach office; having to eat lunch from a box and so on. Employers have also realised that giving people the WFH option saves a lot of infrastructure cost and the overheads have reduced significantly.

IMPORTANCE OF HAVING AN OFFICE

Despite all the benefits of remote working, the companies and firms prefer working from office because it used to be a set process before the pandemic, and that’s the only way all of us have worked since we started working. People are explaining the benefits of having an office at length and they are correct in many ways. Having an office in itself is a luxury. Many of us have spent years before getting into our dream office and many are still burning the midnight oil to ensure that they have an office which ensures smooth functioning of work as well as other features. However, as we are aware, physical offices also have their own limitations and with the growth of technology it will be foolish to ignore all the added advantages available at our disposal to make the Traditional Office more effective.

Through this article, we are trying to emphasise how having a Digital Workplace ready simultaneously (though we continue with physical offices) will help not only the employers, but also the employees, and what a Digital Workplace can offer with the help of technology. Let us look at some practical scenarios:

Scenario 1: Flexibility corresponding to savings in time, effort and money


Your office is located in the southern part of a metro city. Your employee has his residence in the north and visits the office in the morning; he has an important client meeting in the afternoon in the north. He travels to the client’s office for the meeting and gets done by early evening. In such a case, if you are not prepared with a Digital Workplace option for him, he will have to again travel back to the office in the south. This will impact him in multiple ways: stress of commuting back and then going back home in the evening, the time and effort wasted due to such travelling. Correspondingly, the overheads spent on such to and fro travel and the per hour cost that you will have to bear considering that the employee will lose two hours travelling during office hours – perhaps this may pinch you to give it (the DW) a serious thought.

If we prepare ourselves by having a Digital Workplace, the employees can lead a stress-free life and also save on time, effort and money.

Scenario 2: Telephone and zoom meetings correspond to savings in time and money
Your client has requested you to arrange a meeting to discuss some plan. The client’s office is in some other part of the city. To kick-start it, you have an initial face-to-face meeting with the client. However, as we know, this generally doesn’t stop at one meeting. You may have to catch up quite a number of times to ensure a smooth assignment. The client is prepared for some Zoom or virtual meetings, considering that you will be charging the reimbursements to the client.

Imagine a situation where you have not kept yourself ready with virtual meetings in terms of having some virtual presentation tools (like Prezi) or a dashboard which manages each stage of the assignment and discussion (like Trello). The meeting may not be as impactful as it would have been in physical mode. At this juncture, you are also in a state where you cannot refuse a client a Virtual Meeting. Also, a Virtual Meeting means you can attend more than one meeting in a limited time as the time saved from travelling can accommodate more such meetings.

The scenario emphasises how we cannot ignore a face-to-face meeting when it is absolutely required, but we also need to have a Digital Workplace ready to handle such situations. Needless to say, this will also help save a lot on time and money that you would have otherwise spent on every physical meeting.

Scenario 3: Work from office contaminating situations when employees need social breaks
We live in a very social country. Often, we have social functions to attend or have guests visiting our homes and whom we have to attend to. Let’s say your employee has a social function to attend at 4 pm for an hour. In case you have made physical presence at the office mandatory, the employee will have to request you for leave or a half day off (merely for an hour’s function). This will not only impact your work plan for the day but will also affect the employee’s leave balance and salary.

Alternatively, if you are ready with a Digital Workplace for such a specific situation, you can have your employee work from home till 4 pm, attend the one-hour function and then return back to work. This will not only make the employee stress-free from commuting, but also save his half-day leave. On the other hand, you would not have to compromise for the day or half day’s work.

Scenario 4: ‘Workation’ corresponding to employee welfare
This may not please everyone. But remember, ‘All work and no play, makes Jack a dull boy’. We have a scenario where your employees have been planning a vacation for a very long time. But the stress of being present physically in office is not letting them do so. This is impacting their mental health and productivity, as a break is a start to a more efficient environment.

If you have a Digital Workplace ready, you can, in certain situations, allow your employees to go on a ‘workation’. Though they might have to keep working on the vacation, but at least the change in location and atmosphere would give them space to breathe. This will not only contribute to better efficiency but also contribute to employee’s welfare and mental health management.

Scenario 5: Documents storage and security corresponding to threat of data loss
Having files and documents was a mandate earlier. However, with the Information Technology Act coming into force, we have seen a major shift in digital modes of data and document storage. We still see people comfortable with physical files, invoices and other documents, but imagine a situation where some natural disasters occur (we have often seen files getting damaged in floods, fires, etc.). If not damage, there is also a fear of unauthorised access to files in office lockers / cupboards. There are chances of data getting lost or compromised.

A Digital Workplace has the capability to store our data on cloud and also restrict the access. You can forget your fear of losing data or compromising it. Even if you prefer to have physical files, there is absolutely no harm in storing the data on the cloud. Even if a fire breaks out or there are floods and your files are damaged, you will still be able to have access to your files on the cloud. Additionally, with the data restriction option, you may ignore your fear of data getting leaked due to unauthorised access.

Scenario 6: Hiring / retaining best talent
How many times have we seen the woman who is taking care of an entire office and working diligently, having to leave not for professional but for personal reasons such as getting married to someone who is staying in another city, or whose family has moved to another city? In these cases, we are left with no choice but to bid adieu to the hardworking talent. Now, imagine having an active Digital Workplace system where you can accommodate the work of a dedicated employee on a remote basis and she can continue working on existing clients without having to actually leave the office. Since she has already been part of the system, adjusting to a remote system may not be that challenging, and you can retain the right talent instead of finding another one and teach / train her from scratch. A similar scenario is possible even when you have to hire an employee from a different State or location. In fact, the Digital Workplace enables your company to open multiple offices without actually having a physical presence at all these locations.

Hence, it is important to find the right balance
Physical offices are much like face-to-face (F2F) conversations. They can never be replaced with technology because no technology can replace the comfort of F2F conversations. However, technology has changed the way we communicate and the entire communication system has evolved. While F2F communication is still the key, gradually phone calls and now even messages and WhatsApp are added to the communication skills. We cannot imagine a person with good communication skills not being able to communicate via these new systems. So much so, that now WhatsApp groups are becoming an official communication channel and most of the decisions of firms, corporates, etc., are taken on WhatsApp and people meet very rarely except when issues are complex in nature, or it is a periodic meeting.

On the same lines, we do not believe that having an actual physical office where employees can work will be replaced anytime soon with a complete remote office. But looking at the way technology has changed everything, having a Digital Workplace today is as important as having a website used to be at the start of this century. As per The Future of Work Study 2021 released by LinkedIn, as many as 86% of respondents think that hybrid work will have a positive impact on their work-life balance. It will help them spend equal time on their personal and professional goals / lives.

To conclude, we feel that the choice is ours: either resist the change until it becomes mandatory and then accept it; in doing so, we could lag behind the world. Or simply embrace the change and start looking at the endless possibilities that technology can offer to maximise the advantage we have at our disposal and get the first mover’s advantage. While a physical workplace can help you stay, a Digital Workplace will help you grow.

 

CARO 2020 SERIES: NEW CLAUSES AND MODIFICATIONS LOANS & ADVANCES, GUARANTEES & INVESTMENTS

(This is the third article in the CARO 2020 series that started in June, 2021)

BACKGROUND

Investments, loans and advances and guarantees play an important role in commercial dealings and also expose companies to greater risk due to the possibilities of defaults which in turn can have an impact on the financial position and solvency of companies. The Companies Act, 2013 (‘the Act’) has laid down stringent provisions to regulate the same, especially in respect of non-financial companies. Although the earlier versions of CARO dealt with specific aspects thereof, CARO 2020 has substantially enhanced the reporting requirements.

SCOPE OF REPORTING

The scope of reporting can be analysed under the following clauses:

 
*Not discussed further

CLAUSE-WISE ANALYSIS OF ENHANCED REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

Applicable Transactions [Clause 3(iii) and Clause 3(iii)(a)]:
• The scope has been enhanced to cover investments made, guarantee or security provided and advances granted in the nature of loans in addition to loans granted (‘specified investments and loan transactions’).

• The reporting is extended to all parties and not just those covered in the register maintained u/s 189 of the Act.

• The reporting is required only if the above transactions have been entered into ‘during the year’.

Transactions not Prejudicial [Clause 3(iii)(b)]:
• The scope has been enhanced to cover investments made, guarantees provided, security given and also advances in the nature of loans and guarantee provided, in addition to loans.

• Replacement of the word ‘such’ by ‘all’ means that this clause applies to all loans / advances granted during the year.

Servicing of Loans [Clause 3(iii)(c)]:
The scope has been enhanced to cover advances in the nature of loans in addition to loans.

PRACTICAL CHALLENGES IN REPORTING
The reporting requirements outlined above entail certain practical challenges, which are discussed below, in respect of the new Clauses as well as those where there are enhanced reporting requirements:

Applicable Transactions [Clause 3(iii)]:
a. There is significant widening in the scope of reporting of financial transactions undertaken with all classes of entities. Further, the reporting is applicable to all companies, except for the exemption provided to companies whose principal business is to give loans.
b. Clauses 3(iii)(a) and (e) dealing with aggregation of specified investments and loans transactions and evergreening of loans would not apply to companies which are primarily engaged in lending activities.

Aggregation of Specified Transactions [Clause 3(iii)(a)]:
a. Identifying subsidiaries: Since this Clause requires separately aggregating and reporting loans and advances in the nature of loans to subsidiaries, joint ventures and associates, the identification thereof is of paramount importance. The Guidance Note has clarified that these terms should be interpreted in accordance with the provisions of the Act which could be different, in certain cases, from what is defined in the Accounting Standards in the case of subsidiaries which is examined as under:

Section 2(87) of the Act defines ‘subsidiary company’ or ‘subsidiary’ in relation to any other company, and means a company in which the holding company – (i) controls the composition of the Board of Directors; or(ii) exercises or controls more than one-half of the total voting power either on its own or together with one or more of its subsidiary companies. Thus, the Act emphasises on legal control which is similar to what is considered for the purpose of Accounting Standard 21 (AS 21) Consolidated Financial Statements for companies adopting Indian GAAP. The concept of control and, therefore, subsidiary relationship under Ind AS 110, is much broader. Existence of factors such as de facto control, potential voting rights, control through de facto agents, power to enforce certain decisions, etc., have to be considered, which are not considered for the purpose of section 2(87). Hence, for companies adopting Ind AS there could be differences between what is disclosed in the accounts and what is required to be reported under this Clause, which would need to be reconciled to ensure completeness of reporting. The auditors of Ind AS companies will need to take utmost care about this distinction while dealing with this Clause.

b. Tracking of transactions entered into and settled in the same year: This Clause requires reporting the aggregate of specific transactions entered during the year even if the same are settled during the year. This may provide challenges to ensure completeness of the transactions where the volumes are substantial and the auditor would in such cases have to test the design as well as operating effectiveness of the internal controls and undertake test-checking of the transactions. A specific representation should also be obtained that all such transactions which have been squared off / settled during the year have been considered in the details provided by the management.

c. Identifying advances in the nature of loans: This is by far the most far-reaching change since what constitutes ‘advance is in the nature of a loan’ would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and involve significant judgements which would need to be exercised by the auditors based on their past experience and the understanding of the business. The following guiding principles may be kept in mind; however, these are not to be considered as exhaustive:

  •  An advance against a purchase order, in accordance with the normal trade practice, would not be an advance in the nature of a loan.
  •  An advance given for an amount which is far in excess of the value of an order, or for a period which is far in excess of the period for which such advances are usually extended as per the normal trade practice, then such an advance may be in the nature of a loan to the extent of such excess.
  •  When a trade practice does not exist, a useful guide would be to consider the period of time required by the supplier for the execution of the order, based on the time between the purchase of the raw material and the delivery of the finished product. Any advance which exceeds this period would normally be an advance in the nature of a loan unless there is evidence to the contrary.
  •  A stipulation regarding interest may normally be an indication that the advance is in the nature of a loan but this by itself is not conclusive and there may also be advances which are not in the nature of a loan and which carry interest.

It is imperative that the auditor not only scrutinises all advances given but also old outstanding advances where further amounts are given during the year to ensure their propriety and reasonableness for the purposes of reporting under this Clause as well as under Clause 3(iii)(c) discussed later.

Specified investments and loans transactions are not prejudicial [Clause 3(iii)(b)]:
a. The auditor will have to evaluate design and test the operating effectiveness of controls over specified transactions as these could be highly subjective. For example, valuation based on which investments in unlisted securities are made specifically into equity. Also, the auditor will have to comment upon commitments made in the earlier years but the transaction is entered into during the reporting period.

b. Whether investments are prejudicial: The auditors will have to use their judgement judiciously while reporting under this Clause. They will have to evaluate adherence to the processes and controls discussed above at the time of making the investment and not evaluate based on hindsight, specifically for investments in unlisted securities. The auditor will consider the company’s financial position, its leverage, purpose of making the investment, valuation based on which the investment is made, if the valuation is based on third party valuation report, whether the investee is a related party and specifically if it is controlled by promoters, related party / employee of promoter, compliance with SA 620 Using the Work of Auditor’s Expert, compliance with regulations, etc., to determine whether investments are prejudicial to the company’s interest.

c. Transactions with entities which are consolidated: In many cases, companies infuse additional funds in subsidiaries / joint ventures / associates or other entities which are their strategic investments and which have financial difficulties, or to meet their financial commitments. Such infusion per se would not be construed as prejudicial to their interest, unless it is proved that it is not for genuine business purposes or not in accordance with the company’s policies or with the applicable legal and regulatory guidelines. Hence, each specified investment and loan transaction would need careful assessment by the auditor.

d. Transactions undertaken by NBFCs: Since NBFCs are also covered for reporting under this Clause, this would present a specific challenge since it is their business to undertake specified investments and loans transactions and hence such transactions are likely to be voluminous. In such instances, the auditor would need to ensure that all applicable and reportable transactions are undertaken in accordance with the guidelines issued by the RBI which would inter alia include the Board-approved policies for loans and investments as well as for risk assessment and other processes relating thereto laid down by the company since any material and significant deviation could result in transactions which are prejudicial to the company’s interest.

Hence, for reporting under this Clause apart from deviations in any specific significant transaction, any general non-compliance which is material would also need to be reported.

e. Salary and other similar advances to employees: In case of companies which have a policy of granting salary, festival, medical and similar advances, the same would be construed as advances and not advances in the nature of loans. However, the auditor should review the policy in respect thereof and in case of any material transaction, specifically with related parties who are employees or key managerial persons, which are not in accordance with the policy, or which may be considered as advances in the nature of loans, as the same may be required to be reported.

Servicing of Loans [Clause 3(iii)(c)]:
a. Transaction in the form of advances in the nature of loans:
Due to the reasons discussed under Clause 3(iii)(a) earlier, the auditors would have to use their judgement to identify whether servicing thereof is regular, or else they would need to indicate separately the names of such parties individually together with the amounts and the extent of delay. Further, in case no repayment term is specified, the auditor will have to report such fact.

b. Restructuring transactions undertaken by NBFCs: NBFCs undertake restructuring of loans and advances due to various reasons in accordance with RBI guidelines, including in terms of the Covid-19 Regulatory Package. This may result in a moratorium on repayments or conversion of overdue interest into funded interest term loans. In such cases, since the originally stipulated terms are not adhered to, it would need to be reported under this Clause.

As per the Guidance Note, the name of each entity which is not regular in repayment of principal and payment of interest needs to be disclosed separately. This may be a challenge to NBFCs in view of large number of delays and / or restructuring, specifically during Covid times. The better option in such cases would be to consolidate such entities into various logical buckets for the purpose of reporting under this Clause.

Evergreening of Loans and Advances [Clause 3(iii)(e)]:
Amendment of Disclosures in the Auditors Report

Before proceeding further, it is relevant to note that whilst reporting under this Clause the auditor would have to keep in mind the amendment in the Companies (Audit and Auditors) Amendment Rules, 2021 whereby the following additional matters need to be covered in their main audit report with effect from the financial year 2021-22:

(i) ‘Whether the management has represented that, to the best of its knowledge and belief, other than as disclosed in the notes to the accounts, no funds have been advanced or loaned or invested (either from borrowed funds or share premium or any other sources or kind of funds) by the company to or in any other person(s) or entity(ies), including foreign entities (“Intermediaries”), with the understanding, whether recorded in writing or otherwise, that the Intermediary shall, whether directly or indirectly, lend or invest in other persons or entities identified in any manner whatsoever by or on behalf of the company (“Ultimate Beneficiaries”) or provide any guarantee, security or the like on behalf of the Ultimate Beneficiaries’;

(ii) ‘Whether the management has represented that, to the best of its knowledge and belief, other than as disclosed in the notes to the accounts, no funds have been received by the company from any person(s) or entity(ies), including foreign entities (“Funding Parties”), with the understanding, whether recorded in writing or otherwise, that the company shall, whether directly or indirectly, lend or invest in other persons or entities identified in any manner whatsoever by or on behalf of the Funding Party (“Ultimate Beneficiaries”) or provide any guarantee, security or the like on behalf of the Ultimate Beneficiaries’;

(iii) ‘Based on such audit procedures that the auditors have considered reasonable and appropriate in the circumstances, nothing has come to their notice that has caused them to believe that the representations under (i) and (ii) above contain any material misstatement’.

Keeping in mind the above reporting requirements and certain other matters, the following are some of the practical challenges that could arise in reporting under this Clause:

a. Identification of Ultimate Beneficiaries: Consequent to the above disclosures made in the financial statements, auditors need to check the details of those disclosures and check all such transactions with the respective documents and other correspondence to identify whether any such transaction gets covered for reporting under this Clause. In this regard, the auditors should also take a representation from the management.
b. Transactions within group entities / related parties: In case of complex group structures, it would be difficult to establish a clear audit trail for the transactions, thus making it difficult to identify any such transaction.
c. Determining the Total Loans and Advances in the nature of loans (‘the denominator’): This Clause requires reporting of the percentage of such transactions to the aggregate value of loans and advances in the nature of loans. However, determining the denominator could pose challenges especially for advances in the nature of loans for the reasons discussed earlier. Accordingly, it is imperative for the auditors to reconcile the denominator, especially for advances in the nature of loans with the financial statements to ensure completeness.
d. The auditor will also need to track loans which have fallen due for repayment up to the balance sheet date and which have been renewed / extended / settled post-balance sheet date but before the date of the audit report, as the same is required to be reported under this Clause during the year as well as the following year.
e. Finally, the RBI in the Master Circular dated 1st July, 2014 on Prudential Norms on Income Recognition, Asset Classification and Provisioning Pertaining to Advances, has reiterated that the basic objective of restructuring of loans by banks was to preserve the economic value of the borrower units and not evergreening of problem accounts. Borrower Accounts should be taken up for restructuring by the banks if the financial viability is established and there is a reasonable certainty of repayment from the borrower, as per the terms of the restructuring package and looking into their cash flows of and assessing the viability of the projects / activity financed. Accordingly, the auditors should be vigilant with regard to all restructuring proposals requested for by the borrowers.

Demand Loans [Clause 3(iii)(f)]:
Additional Disclosures under amended Schedule III:

While reporting under this Clause, the auditor will have to keep in the mind the amended Schedule III disclosures which are as under:

Following disclosures shall
be made where loans or advances in the nature of loans are granted to promoters,
directors, KMPs and the related parties (as defined under the Companies Act,
2013),
either severally or jointly with any other person that are:

(a) repayable on demand
or

(b) without specifying
any terms or period of repayment

Type of
borrower

Amount
of loan or advance in the nature of loan outstanding

Percentage
to the total Loans and Advances in the nature of loans

Promoters

 

 

Directors

 

 

KMPs

 

 

Related Parties

 

 

 

Keeping in mind the above reporting requirements, the following are some of the practical challenges that could arise in reporting under this Clause:

a. Identification of Promoters: Promoter has not been defined under the Order. However, the amended Schedule III states that ‘Promoter’ will be as defined under the Companies Act, 2013. Although a few promoters could be traced to those named in the prospectus or identified in the annual return, the auditor will have to rely on secretarial and other records and / or management representation to determine those who have control over the affairs of the company directly or indirectly, whether as director or shareholder or otherwise or in accordance with whose advice, directions, or instructions the Board is accustomed to act upon, to be considered as promoters. In case there are no such persons, then also a specific representation should be obtained.

b. Identification of Related Parties (subsidiaries): Similar considerations as discussed earlier for reporting under Clause 3(iii)(a) would be relevant for reporting under this Clause. In this context, the auditor would need to reconcile the disclosures under this Clause with what is disclosed in the financial statements (for companies adopting Ind AS) as well as in terms of the disclosures under Schedule III as specified above, to ensure completeness.

c. Transactions undertaken by NBFCs: Since there is no specific exemption granted to NBFCs, the auditor should consider the specific guidelines issued by the RBI for granting of demand and call loans, which are summarised hereunder:
• The Board of Directors of every applicable NBFC granting / intending to grant demand / call loans shall frame a policy for the same.
• Such policy shall stipulate the following:

(i) A cut-off date within which the repayment of demand or call loan shall be demanded or called up;
(ii) The sanctioning authority shall record specific reasons in writing at the time of sanctioning demand or call loan, if the cut-off date for demanding or calling up such loan is stipulated beyond a period of one year from the date of sanction;
(iii) The rate of interest which shall be payable on such loans;
(iv) Interest on such loans, as stipulated, shall be payable either at monthly or quarterly rests;
(v) The sanctioning authority shall record specific reasons in writing at the time of sanctioning demand or call loan, if no interest is stipulated or a moratorium is granted for any period;
(vi) A cut-off date, for review of performance of the loan, not exceeding six months commencing from the date of sanction;
(vii) Such demand or call loans shall not be renewed unless the periodical review has shown satisfactory compliance with the terms of the sanction.

In case the auditor has identified any deviation, he may consider reporting the same under this Clause or cross-reference the same to the disclosures made in the financial statements depending upon the materiality of the transaction.

d. Determining the Total Loans and Advances in the nature of loans (‘the denominator’): This Clause requires reporting of the percentage of such transactions to the aggregate value of loans and advances in the nature of loans. However, determining advances in the nature of loans could pose a challenge, for the reasons discussed earlier.

Impact on the Audit Opinion:
Whilst reporting on these Clauses, the auditors may come across several situations wherein they may need to report exceptions / deviations. In each of these cases they would need to carefully evaluate the impact of the same on the audit opinion by exercising their professional judgement to determine the materiality and relevance of the same to the users of the financial statements. These are broadly examined hereunder:

Nature
of Exception / Deviation

Possible
Impact on the Audit Report / Opinion

The company has not maintained records to
identify and compile data required for reporting under Clause 3(iii)(a)

Reporting on
Internal Financial controls over Financial Reporting

Investments made, guarantees provided,
security given and the terms and conditions of the grant of all loans and
advances in the nature of loans and guarantees are prejudicial to the
company’s interest, there may be implications on the main audit report due to
non-compliance with the following SAs:

Consideration of laws and regulations (SA
250)

Fraud (SA 240)

Related party transactions (SA 550)

Modified
opinion under SA 706

Loans and advances on the basis of security
have not been properly secured and the terms thereof are prejudicial to the
interests of the company

Disclosure in the audit
report u/s 143(1) of the Act

If the auditor concludes that there are
loans or advances in the nature of loan granted which have fallen due during
the year have been renewed or extended or fresh loans granted to settle the overdues
of existing loans given to the same parties, there may be implications on the
main audit report, such as consideration of fraud risk factors as per SA 240

Modified
opinion under SA 706

If the auditor concludes that the company
has granted loans or advances in the nature of loans either repayable on
demand or without specifying any terms or period of repayment, there may be
implications on the main audit report due to non-compliance with the
following SAs:

Consideration of laws and regulations (SA
250)

Fraud (SA 240)

Related party transactions (SA 550)

Modified
opinion under SA 706

In such cases, it is imperative that the Board’s Report contains explanations / comments on every reservation / adverse comment in the audit report as per section 134(3)(f) of the Companies Act, 2013 and that there is no factual inconsistency between the two.

CONCLUSION


The above changes have cast onerous reporting responsibilities on the auditor for various critical aspects of movement of funds as under:
• Evaluating design and operating effectiveness of internal controls around specified investment and loan transactions, whether with related parties or otherwise, including layering and round-tripping of funds, etc., if any.
• Detailed analysis of financing transactions, including advances in the nature of loans.
• Identifying sticky specified transactions and reporting.
Accordingly, it needs to be seen whether an audit remains an audit or becomes more of an investigative exercise requiring greater forensic skills!

 

GOING CONCERN ASSESSMENT BY MANAGEMENT

(This article is the first of a two-part series on Going Concern)
The concept of going concern is understood as the ability of an entity to continue in the foreseeable future and is also one of the assumptions which management needs to make for the preparation of its general-purpose financial statements as per the requirement of Ind AS 1 Presentation of Financial Statements as also fundamental accounting assumptions prescribed in AS 1 Disclosure of Accounting Policies.

Ind AS 1 states that an entity shall prepare its financial statements on a going concern basis unless management either intends to liquidate the entity or to cease trading, or has no realistic alternative but to do so. However, to prepare its financial statements on a going concern basis, the management first needs to assess the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern.

The above requirement of Ind AS 1 acts as a trigger for performing going concern assessment by management through ascertaining whether the existing events and conditions are favourable enough to justify the going concern assumption for the preparation of its financial statements. When the use of the going concern basis of accounting is appropriate, assets and liabilities are recorded on the basis that the entity will be able to realise its assets and discharge its liabilities in the normal course of business.

The going concern assessment and reporting thereof require a high degree of professional judgement and has become more relevant and complex in the present Covid-19 pandemic, that has created greater economic uncertainty and due to which many organisations are seeing downturns in their revenue, profitability and cash flows.

 

This article attempts to explain

a) how management should do the going concern assessment by highlighting the events or conditions that may cast significant doubt on the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern and the evidence that management should consider to conclude the assessment, in case any such events or conditions are identified; and

b) scenarios that require disclosures in the financial statements.

 Preparers of financial statements, those charged with governance, users of the financial statements and their auditors may find this article helpful in understanding the concept of going concern and implications when the entity has a doubt about its ability to continue as a going concern.

 
Evaluation of going concern assessment by the auditor and reporting considerations in the audit report will be covered in the second part of this article.

 

GOING CONCERN ASSESSMENT UNDERSTANDING

Before initiating a going concern assessment, one must first understand how the going concern assessment needs to be performed, i.e., what kind of events and conditions should be considered, what should be the period covered for making this assessment, and how to assess such events and conditions once identified, to conclude.

 
Ind AS 1 outlines the principle for performing the going concern assessment but does not provide an explicit guidance to address all the above questions; it states that the management should consider all available information about the future, which is at least, but not limited to, twelve months from the end of the reporting period and the degree of consideration depends on the facts in each case. For example, when:

 

Scenario

Assessment

The entity has a history of profitable operations and ready
access to financial resources

The entity may reach a conclusion that the going concern basis
of accounting is appropriate without detailed analysis, unless there are any
other indicators to the contrary

Other cases

Management may need to consider a wide range of factors relating
to:

 

(continued)

• current and expected profitability,

• debt repayment schedules, and


potential sources of replacement financing

before it can satisfy itself that the going concern basis is
appropriate

Considering limited guidance in Ind AS 1, management can draw reference from SA 570 (Revised) Going Concern, which illustrates events or conditions much in detail and, if they existed, may cast significant doubt on the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern.

 

Apart from the guidance given in SA 570, reference can also be drawn from some of the following recent industry-specific events and conditions:

 

Industry

Particulars

Examples

Telecom

• Supreme Court judgment on telecom license fees

• Vodafone Idea Limited for the year ended 31st
March, 2021;

Aviation, Hospitality, Automobile, Logistics, Retail, etc.

• Covid-19 pandemic

• SpiceJet Limited for the year ended 31st March,
2021;

• The Indian Hotels Limited for the year ended 31st
March, 2021;

• Future Retail Limited for the year ended 31st
March, 2020;

• Allcargo Logistics for the year ended 31st March,
2020

Real estate

• Significant inventory due to economic slowdown

• Delayed completion of projects due to Covid-19 pandemic

• Jaypee Infratech Limited for the year ended 31st
March, 2021;

• Peninsula Land Limited for the year ended 31st
March, 2021;

Automobile

• Amendments in government policies, and restrictions on using
specific technology

• Supreme Court judgment for banning BS3 and BS4 vehicles;

• Government policies with respect to electronic vehicles that
may adversely affect the present product line;

Banking

• Significant NPAs

• Yes Bank Limited for the year ended 31st March,
2020

Mining and Chemicals

• Restrictions imposed due to environmental issues

Vedanta’s subsidiary Sterlite Copper Smelter Plant shutdown

 

EVIDENCE TO ASSESS THE EVENTS AND CONDITIONS

Once the events and conditions are identified, management needs to assess the financial implications of these events and conditions to conclude the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern. Given herein below are examples of some of the evidence that management should consider while performing going concern assessment:

 

  •   Cash flow projections that show an ability to pay debts as and when they fall due after factoring realistic assumptions in the current market conditions;

  •   If current conditions deteriorate further, detailed business plans covering the period under consideration;

  •   Entity’s ability to obtain new funding upon the maturity of existing funding arrangements;

  •   Evidence that debt covenants have been assessed and any risk of breaching them has been managed, such that they do not provide significant risk;

  •   Ability to obtain a ‘financial support letter’ from the parent company for the next twelve months from the date of the latest balance sheet. However, a mere ‘Support Letter’ or ‘Comfort Letter’ will generally not constitute sufficient evidence to conclude on the appropriateness of going concern basis of accounting, unless the subsidiary’s operations are entirely dependent on the parent;

  •   Financial ratios like current ratio, debt-service coverage ratios, etc., indicating inadequate profit or liquidity position of the company;

  •   Covid-19 specific considerations1:

 

  1.  Whether the entity is operating in a sector which is highly impacted,

2.  Whether the entity has plans and ability to restructure its debt obligations if required to ensure short-term solvency,

3. Assessing the financial health of key / critical suppliers and customers and their impact on the entity’s operations,

4. Government policies and measures in the countries in which the company operates,

5. Changes in the entity’s access to capital, impacted by measures taken by regulators (industry and / or financial) or banks,

6. The entity’s ability to prepare timely financial statements or other required information / filings, including delays in receiving financial data from operations in other countries, or material investees for consolidated financial statement,

7. The ability of the business model to operate under current Covid-19 restrictions and whether the business model will be sustainable post-Covid.

 
Although all the above illustrative events, conditions and evidences give a fair idea to address the what and how questions, yet going concern assessment requires a significant management judgement while concluding in the real-world situation, and with the pandemic in place, concluding going concern assessment has become more challenging.

 
Ind AS 1 though do not provide detailed guidance on the going concern assessment, but it does make management’s job a little easy by requiring adequate disclosures of the events and conditions identified, the assumption used, and judgement made to conclude the going concern assessment.

 
The principle is to give clear visibility to the readers of the financial statements so that they can make their own interpretations with the help of the disclosures. Also, these disclosures are of greater relevance in the present economic environment where the regulators like Securities and Exchange Board of India, Ministry of Corporate Affairs, European Securities and Markets Authority, Securities and Exchange Commission, etc., have placed significant focus on the going concern of the entities.

 
DISCLOSURE IN THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

The Table below summarises the broad category of scenarios and their disclosure requirement in the financial statements as per the requirement of Ind AS 12:

 

Scenario

Basis of preparation

Disclosure for material uncertainties

Disclosure for management assumptions

Events or conditions challenging going
concern do not exist

Going concern

Not applicable

Not applicable

Events or conditions challenging

Going concern

None

Significant management assumptions

(continued)

going concern exist but no material uncertainty concluded after
considering mitigating actions (e.g., strong turnaround strategy of
management that has started showing sufficient evidence of success, including
identifying feasible alternative sources of financing)

 

 

(continued)

and judgement

Significant doubts about going concern but
mitigating actions judged sufficient to make going concern appropriate.

Material uncertainties about going concern remain
after considering mitigating actions (e.g., considerable uncertainty about
the outcome of the management’s turnaround strategy to address the reduced
demand and to renew or replace funding)

Going concern

Material uncertainties

Significant management assumptions and judgement

Entity intends to liquidate or to cease trading, or no realistic
alternative but to do so

Alternate basis

(Not going concern)

Specific disclosure on why the entity should not be regarded as
a going concern

 

Further, section 134(5) of the Companies Act, 2013 also requires the Board of Directors to comment on the going concern assumption for the preparation of financial statements, as part of the Directors’ responsibility statement.

 
Similar to the Ind AS 1, AS 1 does not provide any such disclosure guidance on the material uncertainty and requires specific disclosure only in case the entity has intentions or requirement to liquidate or curtail materially the scale of its operation, and as a result of which the financial statement needs to be prepared on an alternate basis.

 Let us take an example to see the application of the above scenarios:

 
Illustration

Company A  is in the hotel business and known for its luxury hotels across the globe. The company is successfully serving its customers and running its operations for several decades. However, the Covid-19 pandemic and resultant global lockdown had a severe adverse effect on its operations.

 
Some of the key points reflecting the current financial position and business of the company are as under:

 
(a) There was no sale in the first nine months of the current financial year due to the lockdown and there was minimal sale in the remaining three months due to the Government advisory of lifting the lockdown in a few of the cities where the company has its properties;

(b) The company has significant borrowings, a portion of which is due for payment in the next financial year; the company has not defaulted in any of its borrowings so far. The management is in discussion with bankers to increase the moratorium period for a few of its term loans;

(c) The company has not retrenched its work force; however, a pay cut of 25% has been made by the management considering the present cash flow position;

(d) Management is expecting to incur a significant cost for ensuring continuous sanitization of its properties globally;

(e) Management at present is focusing on its restaurant business by introducing home delivery services. It has also introduced catering services for organisations that are covered under essential services, such as hospitals, pharmaceutical companies, manufacturing units of essentials commodities, etc.;

(f) Governments in various countries are imposing lockdowns on an intermittent basis considering the number of Covid-19 cases, and at present there is no visibility about how long the pandemic will continue.

 
ANALYSIS

In the given scenario it is evident that the pandemic is the event that cast significant doubt on the company’s ability to continue as a going concern and hence a detailed assessment is required to be performed to conclude on the going concern assumption.

Let us see the step-by-step approach that management needs to take to perform the assessment.

Step 1: Identification of events and conditions

In the present case, the pandemic is the identified event that has resulted in a significant deficiency in the regular cash flow of the company and thus created a question about how it will realise its assets and honour its liabilities in the foreseeable future.

 Step 2: Assessing the evidence to evaluate going concern

Under this step, management needs to assess the following points to conclude the going concern assessment:

(a) Cash flow projection from operations, i.e., with the present situation, how much cash flow the company will be able to generate from its operations in the next 12 months and whether it will be sufficient to meet its contractual obligations. In order to do the said projection, the management needs to make certain assumptions like:

  •  sales volume from restaurant business due to new home delivery and from catering services introduced by the management;

  •  transportation cost for home delivery;

  •  expenditure to develop a digital platform for placing online orders;

  •  estimate of sales from the room rent for properties where the lockdown is removed;

  •  estimate of additional cost that needs to be incurred to ensure sanitization;

  •  advertising cost for the new initiatives taken by the management;

  •  other operational costs;

  •  Recoverability slippages in the receivables; and

  •  Probability of getting additional credit period from the creditors.

 

The management also needs to be conscious that the above assumptions and projections should be based on the expected future trends and limited reliance should be placed on the historical performance and data. Given hereinbelow are the examples of evidence that management should consider to estimate the future trends:

  •  consider research reports of analysts and third parties on the hotel industry,

  •   data from World Health Organization or local institutions explaining the expected progression of the Covid-19 outbreak in the countries, and

  •   data from government agencies about the severity and estimated duration of the economic downturn in the country and the actions that government may take to mitigate the effects.

 

(b) Quantum of borrowings that are due in the next 12 months, and status of extending moratorium period with banks;

(c) Probability of getting additional borrowings from banks for working capital management;

(d) Additional capital infusion that can be done by the promoters;

(e) Losses due to assets like investments, that are measured at fair value through profit and loss;

(f) Any other contractual liabilities, like derivative contracts that are due for settlement in the next twelve months.

 

Step 3: Preparation of financial statements and disclosures

Based on the outcome of the assessment performed in Step 2, management may need to conclude on two aspects:

– whether the material uncertainty exists, and if yes, then

– whether going concern assumption holds good.

 
In the given scenario, if the company is able to get additional funding from the promoter group or banks to run its operations for at least the next twelve months, then the management may conclude that the material uncertainty does not exist and hence the going concern assumption holds good. Accordingly, management needs to prepare the financial statements on going concern basis and adequate disclosure will be made with respect to judgement made by the management to mitigate the material uncertainties.

 
On the other hand, if the company is unable to obtain additional or sufficient funding from the promoter group or banks and it has to depend on the materialisation of its present business plan and drawing additional credit period from the creditors and bankers, then it may conclude that the material uncertainty does exist and it may or may not be mitigated. Accordingly, management might prepare financial statements on going concern basis along with adequate disclosures with respect to material uncertainties, management turnaround plan and significant judgement and assumptions taken for concluding going concern assumption.

 
However, in rare circumstances, the management may also decide that the going concern assumption does not hold good. This may happen if the management believes that the bankers and creditors will not provide any extension for the payment of their contractual dues and the present business plan will not generate adequate cash flows to meet its contractual obligations in their entirety, when due, and to run its day-to-day operations.

 
In that case, management needs to use an alternative basis of accounting for the preparation of its financial statements, e.g., liquidation basis, and the disclosure of that fact and the reason thereof needs to be disclosed in the financial statements.

 

TO SUMMARISE

The presence of Covid-19 has created economic instability across industries and has made the going concern assessment more critical and challenging. However, this challenge can be countered effectively if management do the identification and assessment of all the possible events and conditions that may cast significant doubt on the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern, in the light of the available guidance on financial reporting, and support their conclusion with sufficient appropriate evidence.

 
Once the management is done with its going concern assessment, the second step will be the evaluation of the going concern assessment by the auditors and reporting thereof in the auditors’ report.

 
The said aspect of going concern will be covered in the second part of this article that will touch upon the various factors that an auditor should consider while evaluating the going concern assessment performed by the management, disclosure in the financial statements based on the outcome of the evaluation, and reporting considerations under various scenarios in the auditors’ report.

 

References

Readers should also refer to the Annual Reports as referenced above in different industries to gain a practical understanding of the disclosures required to be made in the financial statements under various scenarios.

MLI SERIES ARTICLE 13: ARTIFICIAL AVOIDANCE OF PE THROUGH SPECIFIC ACTIVITY EXEMPTION

INTRODUCTION TO ARTICLE 5(4) OF THE TAX TREATY (PRE-MLI)
In respect of business income [other than fees for technical services (FTS) and royalties], a foreign company would be subject to tax in India (i.e., the Source State) when it constitutes a business connection or a permanent establishment (PE) in India. When a PE / business connection is constituted, a foreign company is subjected to tax on income deemed to have accrued in India on a net level / deemed profit basis.

Provisions of PE are typically included under Article 5 of a tax treaty. While Article 5(1) to Article 5(3) provides for what constitutes a PE, Article 5(4) provides for a list of activities that do not constitute a PE, even if such activities are undertaken from a fixed place of business in the Source Country (generally known as ‘preparatory and auxiliary exemption’). At the same time, the OECD Commentary (2017) enlists a number of business activities which are treated as exceptions to the general definition of the term PE and which when carried on through fixed places of business, are not sufficient to constitute a PE.

In the above context, a question arises: Does ‘business connection’ include preparatory / auxiliary exemption? The term business connection is not defined under the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the Act) and is interpreted by placing reliance on judicial precedents (key reference provided by the Apex Court in the case of R.D. Aggarwal). Thus, ‘business connection’ draws meaning from the definitions pronounced by judicial precedents, and it may include carrying on a part of the main business, or merely a relation between the business of the foreign company and the activity in India which assists in carrying on the business of the foreign company. Thus, although not explicit, the term business connection includes preparatory and auxiliary activities (POA) when read with ‘contributes directly or indirectly to the earnings of the non-resident from its business’1.

This article aims at providing the effect of MLI (Article 13) on Article 5(4) where activities that do not constitute PE as per Article 5(4) will constitute a PE under MLI Article 13 if certain conditions are satisfied. Thus, Article 13 is a game-changer. In simple words, where in substance cohesive business activities of a foreign enterprise are broken down or fragmented to fit the definition of the exempted activities of erstwhile Article 5(4), they may no longer be able to escape PE status and therefore taxation. This will impact many multinational companies and hence is pertinent to note.

RATIONALE BEHIND THE MLI AMENDMENT
Nature of preparatory and auxiliary activities
Article 5(4) enlists a number of business activities which do not constitute a PE, even if the activities are carried out through a fixed place or office. These activities are generally termed as preparatory and auxiliary in nature2. Para 58 of the OECD Commentary (2017) provides that such a place of business may well contribute to the productivity of the enterprise, but the services it performs are so remote from the actual realisation of profits that it is difficult to allocate any profit to the fixed place of business in question.

The Table below classifies the negative list of Article 5(4):

As per the earlier OECD
Model Convention, 2014

As per BEPS Action Plan
(AP) 7

(Para 78 of the OECD
Commentary, 2017)

Notwithstanding the
preceding provisions of this Article, the

the term ‘permanent
establishment’ shall be deemed not to include:

a) the use of facilities
solely for the purpose of storage, display or delivery of goods or
merchandise belonging to the enterprise;

b) the maintenance of a
stock of goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise solely for the
purpose of storage, display or delivery;

c) the maintenance of a
stock of goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise solely for the
purpose of processing by another enterprise;

d) the maintenance of a
fixed place of business solely for the purpose of purchasing goods or
merchandise or of collecting information, for the enterprise;

e) the maintenance of a
fixed place of business solely for the purpose of carrying on, for the
enterprise, any activity not listed in
sub-paragraphs a) to d), provided that this activity has a preparatory or
auxiliary character;

f) the maintenance of a fixed
place of business solely for any combination of activities mentioned in
sub-paragraphs a) to e), provided that the overall activity of the fixed
place of business resulting from this combination is of a preparatory or
auxiliary character

Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this
Article, the term  ‘permanent establishment’ shall be deemed not to
include:

a) the use of facilities
solely for the purpose of storage, display or delivery of goods or
merchandise belonging to the enterprise;

b) the maintenance of a
stock of goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise solely for the
purpose of storage, display or delivery;

c) the maintenance of a
stock of goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise solely for the
purpose of processing by another enterprise;

d) the maintenance of a
fixed place of business solely for the purpose of purchasing goods or
merchandise or of collecting information, for the enterprise;

e) the maintenance of a
fixed place of business solely for the purpose of carrying on, for the
enterprise, any other activity of a
preparatory or auxiliary character;

f) the maintenance of a
fixed place of business solely for any combination of activities mentioned in
sub-paragraphs a) to e), provided that the overall activity of the fixed place
of business resulting from this combination is of a preparatory or auxiliary
character,

provided
that such activity or, in the case of sub-paragraph f), the overall activity
of the fixed place of business is of a preparatory or auxiliary character

* Highlighted part is amended under BEPS AP 7

As can be observed from the above, initially, OECD was of the view that the enlisted negative activities from Article 5(4)(a) to Article 5(4)(d) of the OECD Model Convention, 2014 would apply automatically to exclude the constitution of a PE, more so considering the erstwhile business models. For example, a non-resident company maintains warehouse facilities solely for the purpose of storage of its goods in the Source State. The delivery of goods would be undertaken through an independent third party in the logistic business. Under the erstwhile PE provisions, the foreign company is not required to substantiate that this activity is auxiliary in nature as the application of Article 5(4)(a) of the OECD Model Convention is automatic. Only Article 5(4)(e) and Article 5(4)(f) subject the specified activities to be of a ‘preparatory and auxiliary character’. In the above example, if a non-resident company maintains a warehouse for storage of finished goods [Article 5(4)(a)] and maintains an office for procurement activities, Article 5(4)(d) and Article 5(4)(f) would apply and the ‘overall activity of the fixed place of business resulting from this combination’ should be of a preparatory or auxiliary character to be exempted from constitution of a PE. In reality, the multinational enterprises (MNEs) have benefited from the automatic application of the enlisted negative activities by ensuring that their fixed place of business solely carries on the enlisted negative activity [Article 5(4)(a) to Article 5(4)(d)].

The Executive Summary of the BEPS Action Report No. 7 (at point 10) states that ‘depending on the circumstances, activities previously considered to be merely preparatory or auxiliary in nature may nowadays correspond to core business activities. In order to ensure that profits derived from core activities performed in a country can be taxed in that country, Article 5(4) is modified to ensure that each of the exceptions included therein is restricted to activities that are otherwise of a “preparatory or auxiliary” character… BEPS concerns related to Article 5(4) also arise from what is typically referred to as the “fragmentation of activities”. Given the ease with which multinational enterprises (MNEs) may alter their structures to obtain tax advantages, it is important to clarify that it is not possible to avoid PE status by fragmenting a cohesive operating business into several small operations in order to argue that each part is merely engaged in preparatory or auxiliary activities that benefit from the exceptions of Article 5(4). The anti-fragmentation rule proposed in [this report] will address these BEPS concerns.’

In order to understand the above in detail, let us consider the following examples:

– The above example includes a company operating an online shop in Country A and selling goods to customers in Country B through a website.
– For delivery and storage of goods, the company maintains a warehouse in Country B.
– Erstwhile Article 5(4) included an exception wherein maintenance of a fixed place in India solely for the purpose of storage and delivery would not constitute a PE. This was based on the principle that such activities are considered as preparatory and auxiliary in the entire scheme of business operations.
– However, with the advancement of internet, the manner in which businesses are operated has evolved. Given this, since most of the business operations of the company are undertaken online, maintenance of a warehouse in Country B for storage and delivery may no longer be considered as preparatory and auxiliary in nature but the core activity. This therefore makes the exceptions provided under Article 5(4) redundant.
– BEPS AP 7 / MLI Article 13 seek to address the above challenges and amend the PE provisions to be in line with the advanced business model.

Anti-fragmentation: Splitting for creating preparatory and auxiliary activities
Earlier, the determination of PE and the enlisted negative activities was considered vis-à-vis the said enterprise which carried on such activities, and not that of the group companies assessed in totality
. The aggregation of ‘places of business’ carried on by other members of the group companies was specifically denied by the OECD Commentary (2014). So, the MNEs fragmented their business operations into various activities among different places and different related enterprises, with a view to fall within the negative list and avoid the existence of a PE in the Source State. For example, large multinationals can fragment their operations into smaller businesses (such as entity A storing goods, entity B delivering goods and entity C providing sales support activities), thereby arguing that each business part is just preparatory and auxiliary in nature.

MLI Article 13 provides for amendment in the PE provisions to avoid such situations by aggregating the activities provided by group companies in the Source State to determine whether or not a PE is constituted. The following examples can help in understanding fragmentation of activities by foreign companies:

Example 1:

Thus, in the above example F Co. has fragmented its business activities in Country B by incorporating two separate entities undertaking (i) warehouse and storage functions, and (ii) support services.

Example 2:

And in the above example, R Co. has fragmented its business activities in Country B by incorporating various entities undertaking (a) procurement functions, (b) bonded warehouse, (c) distribution centre, (d) processing department, etc. This sets a clear example of fragmentation of activities which, if considered individually, will qualify for the preparatory and auxiliary exemption.

MLI ARTICLE 13

Paragraph 1 of MLI Article 13
‘A Party may choose to apply paragraph 2 (Option A) or paragraph 3 (Option B) or to apply neither Option’.

The member State may choose to apply paragraph 2 of Article 13 (Option A) or paragraph 3 of Article 13 (Option B) or not to apply any option. Under Option A, the specific activities mentioned in the tax treaties will not constitute a PE, insofar as the activities of the PE are preparatory and auxiliary in nature. In other words, the activities of a PE, even if aligned with sub-paragraphs (a) to (f) of Article 5(4), will only be exempt from being a PE if the overall conduct of the activities is preparatory and auxiliary in nature. A majority of the member States have agreed to this view.

Further, under Option B, paragraph 78 of the OECD Commentary (2017) provides that ‘some Member States consider that some of the activities referred to in Article 5(4) are intrinsically preparatory and auxiliary and, in order to provide greater certainty for both tax administrations and taxpayers, take the view that these activities should not be subject to the condition that they be of a preparatory or auxiliary character, and that concern about inappropriate use of the specific activity exemptions can be addressed through anti-fragmentation rules’. This option allows the member States to continue to use the existing language; however, at the same time they have agreed that an enterprise cannot fragment a cohesive business operation into smaller business operations in order to call it preparatory and auxiliary.

Paragraphs 2 & 3 of MLI Article 13
Article 5(4) of the OECD Model Tax Convention (2017) is modified to provide for Option A or Option B. Both the options preserve the specific variant of listed activities under each Covered Tax Agreement (CTA). It does not replace the list of exempt activities in the current CTAs with the above BEPS AP 7-suggested Article 5(4). Hence, in order to accommodate the model version and the existing version, Article 13 of the MLI provides for the following:
• Option A – provides additional condition that the specific activity exemption would apply only if the listed activities are of preliminary or auxiliary nature (POA) (remains explicit);
• Option B – provides automatic exemption to listed activities, irrespective of the same being POA in nature (i.e., remains explicit);
• If member states decide to not choose any option: the provisions of Article 5(4) as existing under the CTAs will remain in force (i.e., remain implicit).

Option A

Option B

Notwithstanding the
provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement that define the term ‘permanent
establishment’, the term

Notwithstanding the provisions of a Covered Tax
Agreement that define the term ‘permanent establishment’, the term

(continued)

 

‘permanent establishment’
shall be deemed not to include:

 

(a) The activities
specifically listed in the Covered Tax Agreement (prior to modification by
this Convention) as activities deemed not to constitute a permanent
establishment, whether or not that exception from permanent establishment
status is contingent on the activity being of a preparatory or auxiliary
character;

 

(b) The maintenance of a
fixed place of business solely for the purpose of carrying on, for the
enterprise, any activity not described in sub-paragraph a);

 

(c) The maintenance of a
fixed place of business solely for any combination of activities mentioned in
sub-paragraphs a) and b),

provided that such activity
or, in the case of sub-paragraph c), the overall activity of the fixed place
of business, is of a preparatory or auxiliary character

(continued)

 

‘permanent establishment’
shall be deemed not to include:

 

(a) The activities
specifically listed in the Covered Tax Agreement (prior to modification by
this Convention) as activities deemed not to constitute a permanent
establishment, whether or not that exception from permanent establishment
status is contingent on the activity being of a preparatory or auxiliary
character, except to the extent that the relevant provision of the Covered
Tax Agreement provides explicitly that a specific activity shall be deemed
not to constitute a permanent establishment provided that the activity is of
a preparatory or auxiliary character;

 

(b) The maintenance of a
fixed place of business solely for the purpose of carrying on, for the
enterprise, any activity not described in sub-paragraph a), provided that
this activity is of a preparatory or auxiliary character;

 

(c) The maintenance of a
fixed place of business solely for any combination of activities mentioned in
sub-paragraphs a) and b), provided that the overall activity of the fixed
place of business resulting from this combination is of a preparatory or
auxiliary character

An alternative rule is designed for those countries that are of the opinion that the examples stated under Article 5(4)(a) to Article 5(4)(d) of the OECD Model (2014) should always be deemed as not creating a PE, without the need to further go into the deliberation of whether or not they meet the general preparatory and auxiliary nature standard.

Paragraph 4 of MLI Article 13
Article 13(4) of the MLI relates to the anti-fragmentation rule wherein, irrespective of the above options (i.e., Option A or Option B or none), the member States will have another option to implement the anti-fragmentation rule. The objective is to avoid fragmentation of activities between closely-related parties so as to fall within the scope of preparatory and auxiliary character, and thereby avoid constituting a PE in the Source State. It provides as under:

‘Para 4. A provision of a Covered Tax Agreement (as it may be modified by paragraph 2 or 3) that lists specific activities deemed not to constitute a permanent establishment shall not apply to a fixed place of business that is used or maintained by an enterprise if the same enterprise or a closely related enterprise carries on business activities at the same place or at another place in the same Contracting Jurisdiction and:
a) that place or other place constitutes a permanent establishment for the enterprise or the closely related enterprise under the provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement defining a permanent establishment; or
b) the overall activity resulting from the combination of the activities carried on by the two enterprises at the same place, or by the same enterprise or closely related enterprises at the two places, is not of a preparatory or auxiliary character,
provided that the business activities carried on by the two enterprises at the same place, or by the same enterprise or closely related enterprises at the two places, constitute complementary functions that are part of a cohesive business operation.’

Accordingly, clause 4.1 is inserted to Article 5(4) of the OECD Model Convention and its commentary is provided in paragraphs 79 to 81 of the OECD Commentary (2017). Under Article 13(4) of the MLI (above), the scope for specific activity exemption is not available where there is at least one of the places where these activities are exercised (and) must constitute a PE or, if that is not the case, the overall activity resulting from the combination of the relevant activities must go beyond what is merely preparatory or auxiliary. Until now, the PE status remained embedded per se to its place of business through which the business activities were carried on. But now, the different places of business in the Source State would be combined and if at least one of the places constitutes a PE, then all places of business would constitute a PE for the enterprise as well as for its closely related enterprises carrying on activities in the said Source State. Accordingly, the profits attributable to the PE would be subject to tax in India.

BEPS AP 7 had made application of the anti-fragmentation rule mandatory for those opting for Option B, but the MLI has changed its applicability from mandatory to optional for all three options (including Option B).
India has opted for option A, i.e., wherein PE exemption to listed activities under Article 5(4) shall be subject to activities being preparatory-auxiliary in nature, whereas for the anti-fragmentation rule India is silent, indicating that this rule will be applicable if there is no reservation from the other contracting State in the CTA. It must be noted that in paragraph 51 of the Positions on Article 5, India states that it does not agree with the interpretation given in paragraph 74 because it considers that even when the anti-fragmentation provision is not applicable, an enterprise cannot fragment a cohesive operating business into several smaller operations in order to argue that each is merely engaged in a preparatory or auxiliary activity.

Understanding ‘complementary functions’ and ‘cohesive business operations’
In order to determine the preparatory and auxiliary character, the activity carried on would be compared with the main and core business of the enterprise. Further, based on Article 14 of the MLI, the activity so carried on would be combined with other activities that constitute ‘complementary functions’ that are part of a cohesive business carried on by the same enterprise or closely related enterprises in the same state. Neither MLI nor the OECD Commentary defines the terms ‘complementary functions’ and ‘cohesive business’. However, both these terms cannot be interpreted independently but together as a ‘part of’ the whole. Further, it refers to complementary functions, rather than complementary products or complementary business, etc., indicating interconnected (or closely connected) functions, or intertwined, or interdependent functions, with respect to technology, or value-added functions, or the nature of their ultimate purpose or use.

Paragraph 7 of the OECD Report on ‘Additional Guidance on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments’, BEPS AP 7, dated March, 2018, provides that ‘the anti-fragmentation rule recommended in the Report on Action 7 (at paragraph 39) is contained in the new paragraph 4.1 of Article 5. It prevents paragraph 4 from providing an exception from PE status for activities that might be viewed in isolation as preparatory or auxiliary in nature but that constitute part of a larger set of business activities conducted in the source country by the enterprise (whether alone or with a closely related enterprise) if the combined activities constitute complementary functions that are part of a cohesive business operation’.

Attribution of profits to PE
Paragraph 8 of the OECD Report on ‘Additional Guidance on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments’, BEPS AP 7, dated March, 2018, provides that Article 5(4.1) is applicable in two types of cases. First, it applies where the non-resident enterprise or a closely related enterprise already has a PE in the source country, and the activities in question constitute complementary functions that are part of a cohesive business operation. A determination will need to be made as to whether the activities of the enterprises give rise to one or more PEs in the source country under Article 5(4.1). The profits attributed to the PEs and subject to source taxation are the profits derived from the combined activities constituting complementary functions that are part of a cohesive business operation. This is considering the profits each one of them would have derived, if they were a separate and independent enterprise performing its corresponding activities, taking into account, in particular, the potential effect on those profits of the level of integration of these activities. Examples of this type of fact pattern are contained in new paragraph 30.43 of the revised Commentary (at point 40-41 of the Report on AP 7).

Paragraph 9 of the OECD Report on ‘Additional Guidance on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments’, BEPS AP 7, dated March 2018, provides that the second type of case to which Article 5(4.1) applies is a case where there is no pre-existing PE but the combination of activities in the source country by the non-resident enterprise and closely related non-resident enterprises results in a cohesive business operation that is not merely preparatory or auxiliary in nature. In such a case, a determination will need to be made as to whether the activities of the enterprises give rise to one or more PEs in the source country under Article 5(4.1). The profits attributable to each PE so arising are those that would have been derived from the profits made by each activity of the cohesive business operation as carried on by the PE, if it were a separate and independent enterprise, performing the corresponding activities taking into account, in particular, the potential effect on those profits of the level of integration of these activities.

Understanding ‘preparatory and auxiliary character’
Paragraph 60 of the OECD Commentary (2017) provides that an activity that has a preparatory character is one that is carried on in contemplation of what constitutes an essential and significant part of the activity of the enterprise as a whole. It is usually carried on for a relatively short period, which, depending on the circumstance, could be carried on for a longer duration. Auxiliary activity supports the essential and significant part of the activity. In absolute terms, auxiliary activities would not require significant proportion of the assets or employees, when compared with the total assets or employees of the enterprise.

Further, Paragraph 61 of the OECD Commentary (2017) provides that the activity purported to be covered under the specified activity exemptions ought to be carried on for the enterprise itself. If the activity is undertaken on behalf of the other enterprises at the same fixed place of business, the said activity would not be exempt from the PE status in the garb of Article 5(4) of the applicable tax treaty. The OECD Commentary (2017) provides an example that if an enterprise that maintained an office for the advertising of its own products or services, which was also engaged in advertising on behalf of other enterprises at that location, would be regarded as a PE of the enterprise.

Understanding ‘closely related enterprises’
Article 15 of the MLI defines the term ‘Closely Related Enterprises’ (CRE). The concept of CRE is distinguished from the concept of ‘Associated Enterprises’ of Article 9 of the OECD Model Convention. It is important to note that the term ‘control’ is not defined therein. Further, the member States that have made reservations to Article 12-14 of the MLI can opt out of Article 15.

‘Article 15 – Definition of a Person Closely Related to an Enterprise
1. For the purposes of the provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement that are modified by paragraph 2 of Article 12 (Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment Status through Commissionnaire Arrangements and Similar Strategies), paragraph 4 of Article 13 (Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment Status through the Specific Activity Exemptions), or paragraph 1 of Article 14 (Splitting-up of Contracts), a person is closely related to an enterprise if, based on all the relevant facts and circumstances, one has control of the other or both are under the control of the same persons or enterprises. In any case, a person shall be considered to be closely related to an enterprise if one possesses directly or indirectly more than 50 per cent of the beneficial interest in the other (or, in the case of a company, more than 50 per cent of the aggregate vote and value of the company’s shares or of the beneficial equity interest in the company) or if another person possesses directly or indirectly more than 50 per cent of the beneficial interest (or, in the case of a company, more than 50 per cent of the aggregate vote and value of the company’s shares or of the beneficial equity interest in the company) in the person and the enterprise.
2. A party that has made the reservations described in paragraph 4 of Article 12 (Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment Status through Commissionnaire Arrangements and Similar Strategies), sub-paragraph a) or c) of paragraph 6 of Article 13 (Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment Status through the Specific Activity Exemptions), and sub-paragraph a) of paragraph 3 of Article 14 (Splitting-up of Contracts) may reserve the right for the entirety of this Article not to apply to the Covered Tax Agreements to which those reservations apply.’

India has adopted Article 15 of the MLI. However, India has reserved its right to not include the words ‘to which it is closely related’ in Article 5(6) of the OECD Model Convention (2017). For instance, India has not reserved the right to paragraph 4 of Article 13 of the MLI, which means that it has accepted to bring the anti-fragmentation rule to the existing tax treaties. Again, this can only be confirmed if the other contracting state doesn’t create reservation to paragraph 4 of Article 13.

Paragraph 5 to 8 of MLI Article 13
Paragraph 5 contains compatibility clauses which describe the relationship between Article 13(2) through (4) and provisions of CTA. Paragraph 6 contains reservation rights of the member States, indicating that the provisions addressing the concerns of BEPS AP 7 are not required in order to meet a minimum standard test. The member State may reserve the right for the entirety of Article 13 of MLI not to apply to its CTAs.

Paragraph 7 requires that parties that opted for Option A or Option B to notify the depository of the Option so selected. Paragraph 180 of the Explanatory Statement further confirms that ‘An Option would apply to a provision only where all Contracting Jurisdictions have chosen to apply the same Option and have made such a notification with respect to that provision’. For example, if a contracting State chooses Option A while the other chooses Option B, the asymmetrical decisions conclude in the non-application of the provision in its entirety. This is illustrated in paragraph 7 of Article 13, which states that ‘an Option shall apply with respect to a provision of a CTA only where all Contracting Jurisdictions have chosen to apply the same Option and have made such a notification’. Accordingly, India has selected and notified Option A. Unless the other contracting State selects Option A, the tax treaty will remain unchanged.

Paragraph 8 requires each party that has not opted out of applying Paragraph 4 (anti-fragmentation rule) or for the entirety of Article 13, to notify the depository of each of its CTAs that includes specific activity exemptions. Paragraph 181 of the Explanatory Statement further confirms that ‘Paragraph 4 will apply to a provision of a CTA only where all Contracting Jurisdictions have made such a notification with respect to that provision pursuant to either paragraph 7 or paragraph 8.’

The extract of Article 13(5) to Article 13(8) is provided below:

‘Para 5. a) Paragraph 2 or 3 shall apply in place of the relevant parts of provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement that list specific activities that are deemed not to constitute a permanent establishment even if the activity is carried on through a fixed place of business (or provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement that operate in a comparable manner).
b) Paragraph 4 shall apply to provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement (as they may be modified by paragraph 2 or 3) that list specific activities that are deemed not to constitute a permanent establishment even if the activity is carried on through a fixed place of business (or provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement that operate in a comparable manner).
Para 6. A Party may reserve the right: a) for the entirety of this Article not to apply to its Covered Tax Agreements; b) for paragraph 2 not to apply to its Covered Tax Agreements that explicitly state that a list of specific activities shall be deemed not to constitute a permanent establishment only if each of the activities is of a preparatory or auxiliary character; c) for paragraph 4 not to apply to its Covered Tax Agreements.
Para 7. Each party that chooses to apply an Option under paragraph 1 shall notify the Depository of its choice of Option. Such notification shall also include the list of its Covered Tax Agreements which contain a provision described in sub-paragraph a) of paragraph 5, as well as the article and paragraph number of each such provision. An Option shall apply with respect to a provision of a Covered Tax Agreement only where all Contracting Jurisdictions have chosen to apply the same Option and have made such a notification with respect to that provision.
Para 8. Each party that has not made a reservation described in sub-paragraph a) or c) of paragraph 6 and does not choose to apply an Option under paragraph 1 shall notify the Depository of whether each of its Covered Tax Agreements contains a provision described in sub-paragraph b) of paragraph 5, as well as the article and paragraph number of each such provision. Paragraph 4 shall apply with respect to a provision of a Covered Tax Agreement only where all Contracting Jurisdictions have made a notification with respect to that provision under this paragraph or paragraph 7.’

India context: Impact analysis of key India tax treaties:

India’s notification

Particulars of Article 13

Australia

UK

Singapore

France

Netherlands

Notified Option A, i.e., India’s tax treaties will be modified
with the language of Article 13(2)

Specific activity exemption

Notified Option A paragraph 13(2) modified India-Australia
Treaty Article 5(4)

Not selected Option A or B, Treaty remains the same

Notified Option B, the Treaty remains unchanged

Notified Option B, the Treaty remains unchanged

Notified Option A, paragraph 13(2) modified India-Australia
Treaty Article 5(4)

Remained silent to reserve Article 13(4), i.e., the provisions
will apply to the existing tax treaties

Anti- fragmentation rule

Notified paragraph 13(4), Treaty changes

Notified paragraph 13(4), Treaty changes

Reservation to Article 13(4) – No change in
the Treaty

Remained silent – Treaty changes

Notified paragraph 13(4), Treaty changes

CONCLUSION
The specific activity exemption provisions are important from the point of view of the relief they provide to non-resident entities who have only incidental activities in India. Hence, one needs to be careful while applying these provisions to a particular case. The amendment provided in Article 13 of the MLI is largely impacting industries such as e-commerce / EPC / consumer, wherein foreign companies have typically been taking exemptions from PE pursuant to the negative list / anti-fragmenting activities in India. However, on account of amendments made by Article 13, it is imperative for all foreign companies to revisit their existing PE positions.

LATENT ISSUES UNDER GST LAW ON INTERCEPTION, DETENTION, INSPECTION & CONFISCATION OF GOODS IN TRANSIT

It is a settled principle of law that the statutory power to levy tax includes all powers to prevent the evasion of such tax. The power to intercept the goods conveyance in transit and to detain, or seize, or confiscate the goods in the eventuality of evasion of tax, and the power to levy penalty, or fine, or forfeiture of goods, is meant to check tax evasion and is intended to operate as a deterrent against tax evaders and is therefore ancillary or incidental to the power to levy tax. The GST Law is an economic legislation which encompasses the fiscal transactions and activities, therefore it is essential to specifically and explicitly empower through plenary legislation the officers engaged in its administration with certain powers like inspection, search, seizure, confiscation, etc., to protect the interest of the Revenue.

Chapters XIV and XIX of the CGST Act, 2017 enumerate the governing statutory provisions as regards inspection, search, seizure and arrest from section 67 to 72, and offences and penalties from section 122 to 138, respectively. Section 68 of Chapter XIV more particularly provides for the requirement of certain documents including E-way bill to be carried by the person in charge of the conveyance while the goods are in movement. Further, Chapters XVI and XVIII of the CGST Rules, 2017 contain Rules as regards E-way bills from Rule 138 to 138E and Rules as regards demand and recovery from Rule 142 to 161. In addition, in order to regulate the activities related to road checks, interception, inspection, detention, etc., of the goods during their movement and also to keep a watch on the potential tax evasion at a micro level, CBIC has for the very first time exercised its executive powers u/s 168(1) and issued a Circular which could also be termed as Master Circular No. 41/15/2018 dated 13th April, 2018 with subsequent follow-up updates and amendments in Circular 49/23/2018 dated 21st June, 2018, 64/38/2018 dated 14th September, 2018 and 88/07/2019 dated 1st February, 2019. Hence, it can be stated that the entire set of provisions and procedures concerning road checks, inspection, etc., of goods in movement is intertwined and contained in the Act, Rules and Circulars as referred above.

However, it may be noted that the said Master Circular 41/2018 of CBIC issued u/s 168(1) was per se required only for the purpose of providing further clarification and guidance to the department officers as enablers in the implementation of the Act and Rules but it is baffling to note that this Circular actually muscled its way into matters beyond its statutory competence by providing substantive provisions and procedures as regards road checks, detention, inspection, etc., and so it is ‘required’ to be adhered to not only by the tax department but also by taxpayers.

In the context of goods in transit on a conveyance, the powers as regards interception, detention, inspection and confiscation are intrusive and invasive in nature and therefore it is incumbent on the part of officers to wield these powers with extreme care and caution with strict adherence to statutory provisions, rules and internal circulars as the improper exercise of such powers could lead to contravention of provisions of the very statute they are governed by and may also result in the violation of Articles 301 or 265, or 14, or 19(1)(g), as the case may be, of the Constitution of India.

Through this article, the author has endeavoured to decipher some of the latent legal issues in the gamut of provisions of the GST law as relevant in the chain of activities right from the stage of interception of conveyance and ending with the eventual confiscation of the goods / conveyance.

1) POWER OF INTERCEPTION OF CONVEYANCE U/S 68(3)

Although the heading of section 68 of the CGST Act, 2017 suggests that it is in relation to inspection of goods in movement, however, this section as a whole does not substantively deal with all the operating aspects in relation to the entire process which inter alia includes the fixation of powers of interception of the conveyance on the officers and also powers of performing subsequent detention by the officers if the situation so warrants in accordance with the law. The section as it reads provides for the need of carrying of E-way bill subject to threshold and also other documents like tax invoice, bill of supply, delivery challan, etc., along with the goods while they are in movement and also casts a duty on the person in charge of the conveyance to co-operate and produce the prescribed documents before the officer for verification and to allow the officer to inspect the goods. Although the requirement on the part of the person in charge of the conveyance is to stop the conveyance on interception and to co-operate with the officer as has been clearly spelt out in sub-clause 3, it is, however, bereft of any specific and explicit authority or power being conferred on the officer concerned to actually wield this power for interception and subsequently perform detention for the reasons explained below. The following is the extract of this section:

i) 68. Inspection of goods in movement.
(1) The Government may require the person in charge of a conveyance carrying any consignment of goods of value exceeding such amount as may be specified to carry with him such documents and such devices as may be prescribed.
(2) The details of documents required to be carried under sub-section (1) shall be validated in such manner as may be prescribed.
(3) Where any conveyance referred to in sub-section (1) is intercepted by the proper officer at any place, he may require the person in charge of the said conveyance to produce the documents prescribed under the said sub-section and devices for verification and the said person shall be liable to produce the documents and devices and also allow the inspection of goods.

The expression ‘is intercepted by the proper officer’ is used in sub-clause 3 in the past tense which pre-supposes that the proper officer is already in possession of the necessary authority or power to intercept the conveyance and perform inspection. However, it is imperative to note that the statute as it stands today does not in any explicit, clear or specific words confer any such power or authority on the proper officer for interception of conveyance and inspection of goods. The anti-evasion tax provisions of an intrusive character of any fiscal legislation would generally confer express powers in clear and explicit terms on the specific officers to perform specific functions without leaving any room for ambiguity or doubt as regards the jurisdiction of such officers to perform those functions. For instance, section 106 of the Customs Act, 1962, power to stop and search conveyances, where the powers of the proper officer are clearly delineated to stop the conveyance during the movement and perform a search of the same. Also, as per section 67 of the CGST Act, 2017, the power of inspection, search and seizure is clearly and specifically conferred on a proper officer not below the rank of Joint Commissioner either to exercise those powers or to authorise any other officer to exercise those powers. Hence, it may be stated that any action taken or purported to be taken by Revenue under GST Law without proper statutory jurisdiction would fall foul of the GST Law and would not be sustained on challenge in a court of law. The provisions of the tax statutes are subject to strict construction by the courts in the light of what is clearly expressed; it cannot imply or presume anything which is not expressed, or it cannot look into the purpose or object of the Legislature while construing the provisions.

One possible argument could be that the proper officer having the power of inspection, search and seizure u/s 67 would also have power of interception u/s 68(3); however, this argument may sound far-fetched as section 67 is qua a specific taxable person or any person on the plank of articulation of reason to believe by the proper officer where no such pre-conditions are required to be fulfilled by the proper officer for interception as per section 68(3). With the evolution of time and with the development of jurisprudence on this law, this haze should also be cleared. Be that as it may, the expression ‘is intercepted by the proper officer’ does not seem to confer or assign any express or specific power of interception on the officer but it only seems to make an assumption or presumption about the currency of such powers. In the absence of any such powers being conferred through any other provisions, applying the strict principle of construction it may be construed that the powers of interception by the officer are completely absent in section 68(3).

In contrast, it is ironic to observe that Rule 138B(1) of the CGST Rules, 2017 by which the Commissioner or an officer empowered by him in this behalf, may delegate the authority of interception and inspection on to other proper officers. As pointed out in the previous paragraph, in the absence of specific and explicit powers having been conferred on the Commissioner or proper officer in the statute to perform the interception, detention, etc., it is difficult to comprehend how through the route of Rule 138B(1) (which is a delegated legislation) one can delegate or assign, and such powers could be delegated by the Commissioner or authorised officer to other subordinate officers. If some rules are to be framed, such rules must necessarily inherit the powers from its plenary legislation; however, this is not true here.

Be that as it may, in order to delegate powers by the Commissioner or other authorised officer, specific statutory provisions are already present u/s 5(2) or u/s 5(3) of the CGST Act, 2017. Where the specific mode of delegation of powers by the Commissioner has been already provided under plenary statutory legislation, there is no reason whatsoever for the Government to also use the route of issuing Rule 138B(1) to perform the very same delegation by the Commissioner which may render the said Rule otiose or infructuous. Further, through Circular No. 3/3/2017-GST issued u/s 2(91) and 5(3) dated 5th July, 2017, the Commissioner has already delegated the said powers of interception and u/s 68(3) to the ‘Inspector of Central Tax’. It is beyond comprehension how the Commissioner could delegate the power of interception when he himself does not possess that power under the statute. As rule 138B(1) is not in congruity with the overall scheme of the GST Law, it should be rendered otiose / meaningless.

2) POWER OF INSPECTION OF GOODS U/S 68(3)

The expression ‘and also allow the inspection of goods’ as used in sub-clause 3 of section 68 (Supra) is to be construed from the perspective of the person in charge of the conveyance who is required to render co-operation and allow the proper officer to perform inspection of the goods after the same are intercepted and detained. However, this provision again does not, in clear, specific and explicit words or expressions empower the proper officer to perform the activity of inspection of goods in transit. In contrast, this sub-clause gives power to the proper officer only to verify the prescribed documents under Rule 138A and the RFID device but does not in any way confer any power on the proper officer to inspect the goods in the conveyance. Again, applying the same analogy from the earlier discussion in the context of interception discussed above, the function of inspection also is of an intrusive nature where the properties of the citizens could be subjected to verification, causing prejudice; therefore, the officer concerned should have specific, explicit, unambiguous and clear power to perform the inspection of the goods in the conveyance. Without specific and explicit powers conferred on the proper officer under the statute for conducting inspection of goods in the conveyance, the delegated legislation has overstretched itself and framed Rule 138B(3) which is pari materia with Rule 138C and purports to provide that the powers of inspection of documents, conveyance and goods are residing with the proper officer and to also follow certain reporting requirements in Form EWB-03 on the GST Portal. Hence, these Rules operate contrary to the provisions of the statute and should be rendered otiose / meaningless.

Apart from the absence of the power of inspection of goods with the proper officer, section 68 is also silent on providing the machinery provisions as regards the time and manner in which the inspection of goods is to be conducted; nor does this section delegate powers to the Government to prescribe necessary enabling rules. In a way, although the Legislature may not have intended so, this provision is seemingly an open-ended ambiguous section without a clear path having been laid down as regards conferment of powers on officers to conduct inspection of goods, not providing for machinery procedures to be followed for inspection and to deal with other related collateral matters. It is imperative for the Legislature to be mindful of the eventuality wherein in the absence of clearly laying down through statute or rules the powers for inspection of goods and concomitant procedures as required to be followed, the mobile squad officers of the Government who are currently in operation may run amok causing unwarranted harassment to genuine taxpayers in the guise of Departmental Circulars, orders or instructions which are anyway not binding on the taxpayers.

Further, after the order of inspection being issued in MOV-02, the time and manner of conducting inspection of the goods in the conveyance is done completely in adherence with the said Circular and where after the completion of the inspection, Form MOV-04 is issued to the taxpayer giving quantitative details of the physical inspection. As there are no Rules prescribed for the inspection of the detained goods, in reality it has been left to the total prerogative and discretion of the Government to define the modus operandi to be followed for physical verification of goods detained via issue of Circulars.

3) VALIDITY OF CIRCULAR 41/2018 AND MOV FORMS
Before adverting to the validity of Circular 41/2018 and MOV Forms covered in the same Circular, it is imperative to read section 168(1) of the CGST Act, 2017 which is as follows:

168. Power to issue instructions or directions.
(1) The Board may, if it considers it necessary or expedient so to do for the purpose of uniformity in the implementation of this Act, issue such orders, instructions or directions to the central tax officers as it may deem fit, and thereupon all such officers and all other persons employed in the implementation of this Act shall observe and follow such orders, instructions or directions.

From the above extract of the provision, two analogies can be drawn:

a) The Circulars are issued by Government only for the purpose of ensuring that there is uniformity of procedure in the implementation of the Act across the country. So the Circulars are a natural concomitant of the existing Act or Rules framed under the Act and therefore the Circulars could not be issued in isolation or independent of the Act or Rules, but they are issued in extension of the existing Act and Rules which are under the domain of control of the Legislature. Further, the Circulars are issued only as supplementary documents and only to provide guidance / aid on the interpretation of certain provisions to be used by the executive wing of the Government responsible for the implementation of provisions of the Act and Rules to avoid the possibility of officers of field formations across the country taking different views on the very same provisions of the statute. Therefore, the Government cannot issue Circulars to prescribe new procedures, processes, methods, forms, applications, etc., not originally envisaged or contemplated in the statute or rules prescribed thereunder which would metaphorically mean ‘placing the cart before the horse’. Even when some provisions are missing in the Act or Rules, maybe for bona fide reasons, the Government even in such situations cannot usurp power u/s 168(1) and seek to fill those identified gaps by issuing Circulars not warranted by powers granted under this section. Wherefore the Government could not perforce enter into the shoes of the Legislature to make the laws through the route of Circulars as has happened in the case of this Circular 41/2018.

b) The officers and all other persons employed in the implementation of the law are required to observe and follow such Circulars, and not the taxpayers. Hence it can be inferred from the text of the provision that these Circulars are only meant to be followed by the internal staff of the tax Department administering the law and are in no way binding on the taxpayers, unless such a Circular has the effect of providing certain benefits or relaxations to the taxpayers. Therefore, the power of issuing Circulars under this section could not have been used by the Government as carte blanche to hold the taxpayers responsible or subject to any obligations under the Circular.

As the GST Law stands today, the Legislature virtually does not exercise any control on procedural matters related to verification of goods in transit which would include powers of officers qua procedures for interception, detention of goods, inspection of goods, post-inspection release of goods, confiscation of goods and adjudication of matters of contravention of provisions of the Act or Rules. The power of laying down the entire gamut of procedures right from the stage of interception of conveyance to eventual confiscation of goods has been completely usurped by the Government and is being controlled through CBIC Circular 41/2018 issued in conjunction with subsequent updated Circulars. Although by enactment of sections 68, 129, 130 and notification of rules 138, 138A, 138B, 138C and 138D the Legislature had retained with itself a few aspects related to these provisions, ironically, a substantial part of the procedures contained in Circular 41/2018 were not contemplated under the provisions of section 168 as explained above. The true fact or practical reality is that all the officers of the tax Department have been following these Circulars in the matter of interception, inspection, etc. That apart, the real tyranny is that even the taxpayers who are not bound by Circulars have been obliged to comply with certain requirements as contained in this Circular, like providing undertakings, signing, etc., in the MOV Forms as specified in the said Circular.

Coming to the various MOV Forms which are as specified in Circular 41/2018, in a metaphorical sense this Circular is the genus and all the MOV Forms coming out from it are its species. As for the justifications as discussed above, if the Circular is held bad in law and it is trumped, as a natural concomitant all the related MOV Forms would also fall. It is through these MOV Forms that the tax Department is bringing accountability and ownership on the part of the taxpayers by furnishing and taking necessary acknowledgements / signatures on these Forms which may become criminating evidence against the taxpayers in any subsequent legal proceedings. It is relevant to advert to section 160(2) of the CGST Act, 2017 where the taxpayer has been disabled or forbidden to assail the validity of the MOV Forms that he has received, or to raise any negative contentions or objections on them, upon which he has subsequently acted and participated in the adjudication process. So it may be imperative for taxpayers to raise objections or raise a dispute on the validity of MOV Forms or claims contained in the said Forms at the earliest opportunity on the ground that these MOV Forms are issued by exercising extra-legislative actions or filing a dispute on the contents of these Forms.

In terms of section 166 of the CGST Act, 2017, every notification, rule, regulation issued or made by the Government is required to be laid on the table of the House for 30 days for the purpose of examination, BUT no such requirement is envisaged for Circulars or Forms issued under Circulars for ensuring accountability as the overarching principle for issuing Circulars is only to regulate and enable the internal administration function of the Government. Specifying these MOV Forms through the route of Circulars can be depicted as an attempt to usurp power by the Government. As long as these MOV Forms do not create any obligation or liability on the persons or taxpayers who are the external parties to the Government, the validity of these forms cannot be called in question, as such forms are issued only to convey certain information without warranting any action from the recipients.

As already indicated earlier, strict interpretation or construction is applied to tax laws and as per the cardinal rule of law that we are governed under, the same level of moral rectitude is sought from the tax Department as it is sought from the taxpayers. The MOV Forms contained in Circular 41/2018, in the author’s view, do not hold any legal ground and are liable to be set aside. Recently, the Sales Tax Bar Association, Delhi has, under Article 226 of the Constitution, challenged before the Delhi High Court the statutory validity of these MOV Forms and prayed that the Court set these aside. It appears as though this is the first time someone has challenged the validity of the MOV Forms. The matter is pending disposal.

Be that as it may, as regards the Circular 41/2018 the procedures as specified in it have pain areas being encountered on a day-to-day basis by the taxpayers which result in undue harassment to them and loss of intrinsic value of the goods being detained or confiscated for an inordinate time. These are as follows:

a) Although section 68(1) read with Rule 138A requires the person in charge of the conveyance to only carry certain definite documents, in reality the conveyances are intercepted and unwarranted documents are sought to be produced for verification by the mobile squad and also unwarranted objections or infirmities in the documents are raised by the mobile squad.

b) The expression ‘prima facie, no discrepancies are found’ as mentioned in para (b) of Circular 41/2018 is a very broad and latent expression and the same could be subject to different interpretations in identical situations by officers of the Department. The basic purpose of the Circular is to clarify and clear the ambiguities if there are any; however, not expounding such ambiguous expressions quoted above and contained in the same Circular itself, would work contrary to the very purpose of the Circulars issued.

c) The expression ‘or where proper officer intends to undertake an inspection’ as mentioned in para (d) of Circular 41/2018 is again so loosely worded as to give full liberty to the officers concerned to decide whether or not to undertake an inspection. There are no fetters attached or conditions precedent defined for arriving at or having an intention to undertake inspection. The undertaking of inspection is of an intrusive character and the same should be ideally undertaken only based on hard evidence indicating tax evasion and not merely on conjecture, surmises, assumptions and presumptions of the officer concerned.

4) POWER OF DETENTION AND CONFISCATION U/S 129 AND U/S 130:
Just like the issue of officers without statutory powers intercepting and inspecting as discussed above, even the powers for detention and subsequent confiscation if required by officers are not contained in the plenary GST legislation, that is, the CGST Act, 2017. Although sections 129 and 130 do make references to proper officers, but these references are restricted only for the limited purpose of adjudication of the demand by following the principle of natural justice on the proposed action of either detention or confiscation, a decision about which has already been made by the officer concerned based on the per se formation of opinion as per Circular 41/2018. Sections 129 and 130 also serve for the quantification of amounts payable by the taxpayers and to perform other incidental procedures qua the proposed detention or confiscation.

Based on the outcome of physical inspection of the goods by the officers as reported in MOV-04, in case any discrepancy is found or where the proper officer opines that any contravention of the Act or Rules is committed by the taxpayer, then u/s 129 the goods and conveyance are detained or seized by issuing MOV-06 – the order of detention along with MOV-07 – SCN with DRC-01 notified electronically.

Thereafter, the adjudication procedures would follow in accordance with Rule 142 and also in accordance with instructions contained in the Circular 41/2018 along with certain specific MOV Forms in manual mode as specified in the Circular. Therefore, the said Rule 142 on its own does not prescribe the entire adjudication procedure that is required to be followed but the entire process has been unnecessarily parted between Rule 142 and the manual MOV Forms specified in the said Circular which would only increase the compliance burden as well as complexity in compliance by the taxpayers not envisaged by the Central Government.

To issue Form MOV-06 – SCN for detention, or MOV-10 – SCN for confiscation [as per para (l) of Circular 41/2018], very wide carte blanche powers are conferred on the officers to initiate either or both these proceedings. Para (f) of the same Circular empowering the officer to initiate detention proceedings adverts to the expressions ‘Where the proper officer is of the opinion that the goods and conveyance need to be detained under section 129’ or para (l) empowering the officer to initiate confiscation proceedings, adverts to the expressions ‘Where the proper officer is of the opinion that such movement of goods is being effected to evade payment of tax, he may directly invoke Section 130’. In both these cases, the said empowerments are bereft of any guideline or threshold or condition precedent or sine qua non for the formation of such adverse opinion by the officer having the effect of initiating proceedings u/s 129 or 130 for detention or confiscation of goods, respectively. These wide powers qua the formation of opinion by the officers as referred to in the above-referred paras appear to be an attempt of the Government to have a parallel law through administrative Circulars which should go to the root of questioning the sanctity and the very purpose and meaning of the Circulars and why they are issued. This Circular does not seek to instil any checks and balances on the wide discretionary actions of the officers as contemplated in the Circular to hold them accountable, especially where such wide discretionary powers on the opinion formation are likely to trigger proceedings of detention or confiscation of the goods u/s 129 or 130, respectively.

It is pertinent to note that the invocation of detention u/s 129 and confiscation u/s 130 do not happen automatically but are a natural consequence of formation of adverse opinion by the officer under the highlighted paras of the said Circular.

To sum up the issue, Circular 41/2018 ought to have been used only to clarify and help in implementation of substantial or procedural provisions of the Act / Rules, but in actual fact it has taken primacy and it is purportedly operating like a plenary Act in the matter of detention and confiscation of goods, and sections 129 and 130 of the Act are virtually reduced to a machinery provision, or merely as a referencing placeholder for quantification of the amount of tax, penalty, fine, etc.

5) OTHER ISSUES

a) Whether sections 129 and 130 operate coterminous with each other?
Subject to section 118 of the Finance Act, 2021 not yet notified, both the said sections 129 and 130 are mutually exclusive, independent and operate in separate spheres for the simple reason that both start with the non-obstante clause at the beginning with the expression ‘Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act’. The High Court of Gujarat had occasion to deal with several petitions in a group matter in Synergy Fertichem Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Gujarat (order dated 23rd December, 2019), where the confiscation proceedings u/s 130 were initiated without concluding the existing on-going adjudication proceedings u/s 129. The Court held that both the sections 129 and 130 are not coterminous with each other, and hence are independent, in the following words:

‘(i) Section 129 of the Act talks about detention, seizure and release of goods and conveyances in transit. On the other hand, section 130 talks about confiscation of goods or conveyance and levy of tax, penalty and fine thereof. Although both the sections start with a non-obstante clause, yet, the harmonious reading of the two sections, keeping in mind the object and purpose behind the enactment thereof, would indicate that they are independent of each other. Section 130 of the Act, which provides for confiscation of the goods or conveyance, is not, in any manner, dependent or subject to section 129 of the Act. Both the sections are mutually exclusive.’

b) Detention on the ground of rate of tax, classification, etc.

An officer intercepting goods in transit cannot go into the unwarranted issues of valuation, classification of goods, rate of tax and so on and cannot high-handedly detain the goods for more than a few hours (up to six hours). However, the officer should collect relevant data during such short detention and transmit the same to the jurisdictional proper officer for initiating necessary assessment proceedings in relation to that supply by the taxpayer. Again, in Synergy Fertichem Pvt. Ltd. (Supra), the Gujarat High Court held as under:

‘160. We are in full agreement with the aforesaid enunciation of law laid down by the Kerala High Court. Thus, in a case of a bona fide dispute with regard to the classification between the transporter of the goods and the Squad Officer, the Squad Officer may intercept the goods, detain them for the purpose of preparing the relevant papers for effective transmission to the jurisdictional Assessing Officer. It is not open to the Squad Officer to detain the goods beyond a reasonable period. The process can, at best, take a few hours. It goes without saying that the person, who is in charge of transportation, will have to necessarily co-operate with the Squad Officer for preparing the relevant papers. [See Jeyyam Global Foods (P) Ltd. vs. Union of India & Ors., (2019) 64 GSTR 129 (Mad).]

CONCLUSION


In the author’s view, the formation of opinion as contained in Circular 41/2018 which is so critical, foundational and is of a substantive character, has the effect of affecting the rights or liabilities or obligations of the parties qua interception, detention, inspection or confiscation by their very intrusive or invasive nature; though meant to arrest tax evasions, these should never have formed part of the Rules and Circulars. Instead, these provisions which seek to check tax evasion incidents should have ideally been part of the plenary legislation espousing the principles of natural justice, equity, good conscience and fairness, analogous to instances of section 67 in the matter of inspection, search and seizure, or section 69 in the matter of arrest which have been couched in the CGST Act, 2017. However, the present form of operation of the provisions via enforcement of the said Circular seems to suggest that there is a complete abdication of power by the Legislature to the Executive to deal with matters in relation to interception, inspection, detention and confiscation of goods in movement. One hopes this Circular and MOV Forms which are at present in challenge before the Delhi High Court are struck down by the Court and such transgressions of the law by the Executive are discouraged and trumped down to set an example for the future and for assisting the cardinal principle of the rule of law to prevail.

EMPOWERING INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS

BACKGROUND
The concept of Independent Directors (IDs) had emerged from the need to have a certain number of Directors on the Board who would think and act independently and to bring a healthy balance between the interests of the promoters and those of other stakeholders, including minority and small shareholders. IDs are an important component in the overall framework of corporate governance.

SEBI has, over the years, strengthened the institution of IDs through the recommendations of various committees. But despite several measures, concerns about the efficacy of IDs have continued. To further strengthen the overall framework of IDs for equity listed entities, the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 (‘Listing Regulations’) have been amended with effect from 1st January, 2022. The Listing Regulations have further been amended to specifically empower the IDs of ‘high value debt listed entity1’ which would apply on a ‘comply or explain’ basis until 31st March, 2023, and on a mandatory basis thereafter. This article seeks to provide an overview of the key aspects emanating from these amendments and the key considerations for the companies and the governance professionals.

DEFINITION OF AN ID

Regulation 16 of the Listing Regulations sets out certain objective conditions for determination of the independence of an ID. These conditions include areas of pecuniary relationship of self and of relatives with the listed entity, its promoter, or directors, etc. SEBI observed that scope exits to further strengthen the criteria for independence of IDs and harmonisation of certain requirements under the Listing Regulations, e.g., a cooling-off period while assessing the eligibility conditions for an ID. Further, an ID is also defined u/s 149 of the 2013 Act which provides that relatives of a proposed ID cannot have any pecuniary relationship including the pecuniary relationships as prescribed therein. The existing Listing Regulations do not provide a list of such pecuniary relationships. Hence, the definition of an ID under the 2013 Act and under the Listing Regulations is different.

To address the above concerns, especially harmonisation of requirements, SEBI has amended the Listing Regulations and has also inserted additional criteria as follows:

  •  Regulation 16(1)(b)(iv) of the Listing Regulations provides that a proposed ID, apart from receiving Director’s remuneration, should not have / had any material pecuniary relationship with the prescribed entities, including the listed entity, its holding and subsidiaries during the two immediately preceding financial years or during the current financial year. Regulation 16(1)(b)(iv) of the Listing Regulations has been amended to extend the cooling-off period to three immediately preceding financial years. Let us consider the following example to better understand the amendment:

Ms Z is proposed to be appointed as an ID in Company XYZ in F.Y. 2021-2022. She noticed that in January, 2019 she had had a material pecuniary relationship (other than remuneration) with Company XYZ. As per the existing provisions, Ms Z could have been appointed as an ID as the relationship existed prior to the cooling-off period of two years. However, since the cooling-off has been extended to three years, she cannot be appointed as an ID.

  • Section 149(6)(d) of the 2013 Act provides that a person cannot be appointed as an ID whose relatives have pecuniary relationships / transactions with the listed entity, its holding, subsidiary or associate company or their promoters, or directors including holding any security of or interest and being indebted (in excess of the prescribed amount) during the immediately preceding two financial years or during the current financial year. Regulation 16(1)(b)(v) of the Listing Regulations does not prescribe a list of the pecuniary relationships similar to that provided under the 2013 Act but simply states that the relatives of such proposed ID should not have / had pecuniary relationship during the two immediately preceding financial years or during the current financial year in excess of the prescribed amount.

The list of pecuniary relationships as provided u/s 149(6)(d) of the 2013 Act has been incorporated in Regulation 16(1)(b)(v) of the Listing Regulations – with certain modifications; e.g., the period for determining pecuniary relationship is stated as three immediately preceding financial years (under the 2013 Act – two immediately preceding financial years), and the lower threshold (as per existing norms) for determining pecuniary relationship of relatives has been retained. Let’s understand these key differences with the help of the following examples:

– While assessing his eligibility conditions, Mr. Y noticed that one of his relative owes Rs. 60 lakhs to the Holding Company of the Company ABC. Company ABC is proposing to appoint Mr. Y as an ID in F.Y. 2021-2022. Mr. Y considered that the pecuniary relationships are permitted to the extent of the following:

Under the 2013 Act

Rs.

 

Under the Listing
Regulations (lower of following)

Rs.

2% or more of gross turnover / income

90 lakhs

 

2% or more of gross turnover / income

90 lakhs

 

Another threshold

50 lakhs

In the above situation the balance outstanding from the relatives is within the permissible limits under the 2013 Act. However, the outstanding is in excess of the limit prescribed under the Listing Regulations. Hence, Mr. Y cannot be appointed as an ID.

– Mr. X is assessing the eligibility conditions for his proposed appointment as an ID in Company DEF in March, 2022. He noticed that during F.Y. 2018-2019 one of his relatives held equity shares of the Company whose face value exceeded the permissible limit prescribed under the 2013 Act and the Listing Regulations. A cooling-off period of two years and three years, respectively, has been prescribed under the 2013 Act and the Listing Regulations. Accordingly, in this case even though the requirement of the two-year cooling period under the 2013 Act is met, Mr. X cannot be appointed as an ID because his relative had held securities during the three-year cooling period prescribed under the Listing Regulations.

  • Regulation 16(1)(b)(vi) of the Listing Regulations provides that a proposed ID is a person who (neither himself nor whose relatives) holds or has held the position of a key managerial personnel or is or has been an employee of the listed entity or its holding, subsidiary or associate company in any of the three financial years immediately preceding the financial year in which he is proposed to be appointed. The amended Regulation 16(1)(b)(vi) of the Listing Regulations extends the restriction to employment in any promoter group company. However, the proviso to the Regulation further provides that the cooling-off period will not apply to relatives in employment of the stated entities, provided that they do not hold the position of a key managerial personnel. Accordingly, where relatives of a person holds employment (other than the position of a key managerial personnel) in the listed entity, its holding, subsidiary, or associate company or any company belonging to the promoter group of the listed entity in the preceding three financial years, such person can be appointed as an ID. The following example illustrates the amendment for better understanding:

While assessing her eligibility conditions, Ms Q noticed that her spouse is the Managing Director in a promoter group company of Company LMQ which is proposing her appointment as an ID in February, 2022. Since a relative of the proposed ID holds the position of a key managerial personnel in a promoter group company, Ms Q cannot be appointed as an ID in Company LMQ. If her spouse held an employment (other than the position of a key managerial personnel) such as Sales Executive, she can be appointed as an ID pursuant to the relaxation as per the proviso to Regulation 16(1)(b)(vi) stated above.

  • Regulation 16(1)(b)(viii) of the Listing Regulations provides that ID is a person who is not a non-independent director of another company on the Board of which any non-independent director of the listed entity is an ID. An explanation has now been inserted to provide that a ‘high value debt listed entity’ which is a body corporate that has been mandated to constitute its board of directors in a specific manner as per the law under which it is established, the non-executive directors on its Board would be treated as IDs. Similar requirement has also been prescribed for ‘high value debt listed entity’ which is a Trust.

• Pursuant to the amendment, the
Listing Regulation now provides a uniform cooling period of three years
across all eligibility conditions. Such a uniform cooling-off period strikes
a healthy balance of having a reasonable cooling-off period while also
upholding the independence of the proposed ID.

 

• It might be also noted that the
above amendments would require the listed entity to obtain revised
declaration of independence from the IDs since Regulation 25(8) of the
Listing Regulations requires IDs to provide such declaration whenever there
is any change in the circumstances which may affect the status as an ID.
Consequently, as required by Regulation 25(9), the Board of Directors would
be required to take on record such a declaration after undertaking due
assessment.

ENHANCING TRANSPARENCY IN THE ROLE OF THE NRC

At present, Regulation 19(1)(c) of the Listing Regulations provides that the Nomination and Remuneration Committee (NRC) should comprise of at least 50% of IDs and for listed companies having outstanding superior rights equity shares 2/3rd of the NRC should comprise of IDs. SEBI felt that there is a need to strengthen the composition of IDs in the NRC in order to reduce dependence on the promoters. Accordingly, Regulation 19(1)(c) was amended to provide that ‘at least 2/3rd’ of the Directors in the NRC of all listed companies (including listed companies having outstanding superior rights equity shares) should comprise of IDs. Let’s understand this amendment though the following example:

The NRC of Company DEF comprises six members – with equal representation by IDs and other Directors. Company DEF does not have outstanding superior rights equity shares. Hence the representation of IDs should be increased from the existing three to four IDs – so that 2/3rd of the NRC comprises IDs pursuant to the revised norms as stated above.

Clause A to Part D to Schedule II of the Listing Regulations provides that the role of the NRC includes formulation of the criteria for determining qualifications and positive attributes of a Director. Notwithstanding such requirements, SEBI was of the view that there is a lack of transparency in the process followed by NRCs. Therefore, a need exists to prescribe disclosures for selection of candidates for the post of an ID. These disclosures are expected to increase the transparency in the functioning of NRCs and would also be good from the governance perspective. SEBI accordingly introduced Clause 1A in Part D to Schedule II of the Listing Regulations to provide that:

  •     For every appointment of an ID, the NRC should evaluate the balance of skills, knowledge and experience on the Board of Directors;
  •     On the basis of such evaluation, the NRC should prepare a description of the role and capabilities of an ID. The person recommended to the Board for appointment should have the capabilities identified in such description;
  •     The NRC has the option of using the services of external agencies to consider candidates from a wide range of backgrounds (having due regard to diversity) and consider the time commitments of the candidates.

SEBI also introduced Regulation 36(f) in the Listing Regulations to provide that the shareholders’ notice should include the disclosures regarding the skills and capabilities required for the role and the manner in which the proposed person meets such requirements.

Further, amendments were made to Regulation 36(d) to provide that the shareholders’ notice for appointment of a new Director or reappointment of a Director should include the names of listed entities from which the person has resigned in the past three years.

• The Listing Regulations has
increased the number of IDs required in the NRC. Therefore, in case the NRC
of a listed entity does not meet the revised requirement, the NRC should be
reconstituted.

 

• The revised role of the NRC establishes
additional processes for appointment of an ID. As per the amended Schedule II
the NRC will be required to consider candidates from a wide range of
backgrounds. The databank of IDs as established under the 2013 Act might act
as a good reference point for selecting potential candidates.

COMPOSITION OF THE AUDIT COMMITTEE

The Listing Regulations cast specific responsibilities on the Audit Committee to review financial information, scrutinise inter-corporate loans and investments and the valuation of undertakings and assets of the listed entity, etc. At present, Regulation 18(1)(b) of the Listing Regulations provides that 2/3rd of the members of the Audit Committee should comprise of IDs, and for listed companies having outstanding superior rights equity shares the Audit Committee should comprise only of IDs. SEBI has amended this Regulation to provide that the Audit Committee of listed companies (which do not have outstanding superior rights equity shares) should comprise ‘at least 2/3rd of IDs’ instead of the existing composition of ‘2/3rd of IDs’. The amendment in the provision
relating to the constitution of the Audit Committee prescribes for a ‘minimum requirement’ of 2/3rd of the Committee to be comprised of IDs, thus allowing companies to appoint more IDs as members of the Committee. This amendment may not necessitate reconstitution of the Audit Committee.

For example, the Audit Committee of Company PQR comprises six members – four IDs and two other Directors. Company PQR does not have outstanding superior rights equity shares. So it can continue with the present composition of the Audit Committee as it has the minimum number of IDs in the Audit Committee as per the revised Regulations. Since the revised Regulations prescribe the minimum composition, Company PQR may choose to appoint a higher number of IDs on the Audit Committee.

Regulation 23(2) of the Listing Regulations provides that all related party transactions require prior approval of the Audit Committee. SEBI felt a need to further enhance the scrutiny around related party transactions. Accordingly, a proviso was added to Regulation 23(2) which provides that only those members of the Audit Committee who are IDs should approve related party transactions.

As per the revised norms, only those
members of the Audit Committee who are IDs can approve related party
transactions. There may be transactions which have either been approved prior
to the effective date of the amendment, or there might be modifications to
the terms and conditions of existing related party transactions, thereby
requiring approval of the Audit Committee. Listed entities would need to
assess whether these transactions would require
approval of the Audit Committee as per the
amended provisions.

APPOINTMENT, REAPPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL OF IDS

Appointment of an ID is made through an ordinary resolution in a general meeting of a company as provided u/s 152(2) of the 2013 Act. However, reappointment of an ID requires the passing of a special resolution by the company. SEBI felt that the present framework of appointment of IDs may be influenced by the promoters – in recommending the name of IDs and in the approval process by virtue of their shareholding. This may hinder the independence of IDs and undermine their ability to differ from the promoter, especially in cases where the interests of the promoter and of the minority shareholders are not aligned. Additionally, considering that the role of IDs includes protecting the interests of minority shareholders, there is a need for minority shareholders to have a greater say in the appointment / reappointment process of IDs.

Accordingly, to give more say to the minority shareholders in the simplest manner possible, SEBI introduced Regulation 25(2A) in the Listing Regulations to extend the requirement to obtain shareholders’ approval through a special resolution for appointment and removal of an ID. Thus, as per the revised requirements, the appointment, reappointment or removal of an ID should be subject to the approval of shareholders by way of a special resolution.

APPROVAL OF SHAREHOLDERS WITHIN A STIPULATED TIMEFRAME

As per the current practice, companies appoint IDs as additional directors, subject to approval of the shareholders at the next general meeting. It is, therefore, possible that a person gets appointed as an additional ID just after an Annual General Meeting and then serves on the Board of Directors, without shareholder approval, till the next Annual General Meeting. SEBI also observed that there have been cases in the past where the shareholders have rejected the appointment of IDs even while these IDs had served on the Board for a few months. Hence, SEBI felt that reduction / elimination of the time gap may give more say to the shareholders in the appointment process. Further, in order to bring consistency and ease of compliance, SEBI felt that such a time frame may also be applied to approval of appointment of all Directors including IDs, Executive Directors, Non-Executive Directors, etc.

Accordingly, Regulation 17(1C) was introduced in the Listing Regulations to provide that approval of shareholders for appointment of any person (including that arising due to casual vacancy) on the Board of Directors should be taken at the next general meeting or within three months from the date of appointment, whichever is earlier.

The revised norms require a listed
company to obtain shareholders’ approval at the next general meeting or
within three months from the date of appointment of the ID, whichever is
earlier. An issue arises where a person has been appointed as an ID (say in
November, 2021) but the shareholder approval is pending. The next general
meeting is expected to be held in September, 2022. One might argue that in
this case the shareholders’ approval should be obtained within three months
from the effective date of the amendments, i.e., by 31st March,
2022. However, under this approach the time gap between approval by the Board
and shareholders’ approval would exceed the time period prescribed under the
Listing Regulations. An authoritative clarification would be required from
SEBI to address these situations.

INSURANCE FOR IDS

The top 500 listed entities by market capitalisation are required under Regulation 25(10) of the Listing Regulations to undertake Directors and Officers insurance (‘D and O insurance’) for all IDs of such quantum and for such risks as may be determined by their Board of Directors. SEBI considered that due to increased expectation from IDs and the heightened regulatory scrutiny, adequate protection under a proper D and O insurance policy will help IDs perform their duties more effectively. Thus, the requirement of mandatory D and O insurance should be extended to a wider group of listed entities. Accordingly, SEBI has decided that with effect from 1st January, 2022 the requirement of undertaking D and O Insurance would be extended to the top 1,000 companies by market capitalisation.

The Listing Regulations were further amended to provide that a ‘high value debt listed entity’ should undertake D and O insurance for all its IDs for such sum assured and for such risks as may be determined by its Board of Directors.

COOLING OFF PERIOD – TRANSITION OF AN ID TO AN EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

The current provisions as prescribed under Schedule III (Part A)(A)(7B)(i) require the resigning ID (within seven days of resignation) to disclose to the stock exchanges detailed reasons for the resignation along with a confirmation that there are no other material reasons for resignation other than those already provided. SEBI observed that IDs often resign for reasons such as preoccupation, other commitments or personal reasons, and then join the Boards of other companies. There is, therefore, a need to further strengthen the regulations around the resignation of IDs.

Hence, Schedule III was amended to provide for disclosure of the resignation letter of an ID along with the names of listed entities in which the resigning Director holds Directorships, indicating the category of Directorship and membership of Board committees, if any. It may be noted that the new requirement to disclose the entire resignation letter is only an extension of the existing requirements which require disclosure of detailed reasons for resignation along with a confirmation as aforesaid.

SEBI also observed cases where IDs have resigned and have then joined the same company as Executive Directors. While there may be valid reasons for transition from an ID to an Executive Director, such instances where an ID knows that he / she may move to a larger role in the company in the near future may practically lead to a compromise in independence. SEBI felt that a cooling-off period should be prescribed to reduce potential impairments to an ID’s impartiality in decision-making in instances where an ID knows that he / she may move to a larger role in certain companies in the near future.

Thus, Regulation 25(11) was introduced in the Listing Regulations to provide that an ID who has resigned from a listed entity cannot be appointed as an Executive / Whole-time Director on the Board of the listed entity, its holding, subsidiary or associate company or on the Board of a company belonging to its promoter group, unless a period of one year has elapsed from the date of resignation as an ID.

The amended Regulation provides a
cooling-off period of one year in case of resignation by an ID. However, such
cooling-off period has not been prescribed where the ID is appointed as an
Executive
Director post expiry of his
term as an ID.

TIME-PERIOD FOR FILLING UP CASUAL VACANCY OF IDS

As per Regulation 25(6) of the Listing Regulations, an ID who resigns or is removed should be replaced by a new ID at the earliest but not later than the immediate next meeting of the Board of Directors, or three months from the date of such vacancy, whichever is later. However, the time limit for filling of a casual vacancy prescribed under the 2013 Act [Schedule IV (VI)(2)] is different, i.e., three months from the date of resignation / removal. In order to avoid inconsistency, SEBI has modified Regulation 25(6) of the Listing Regulations to align the time limits prescribed under the 2013 Act.

THE WAY FORWARD

 

• Listed companies might encounter
implementation challenges emanating from these amendments – some of them have
been highlighted above. Hence it is important that the listed companies
should engage with governance professionals, including auditors, to iron out
these challenges.

 

• Apart from the above amendments, SEBI
in its Board Meeting held on 29th June, 2021 had also decided to
make a reference to the Ministry of Corporate Affairs for giving greater
flexibility to companies while deciding the remuneration for all Directors
(including IDs), which may include profit-linked commissions, sitting fees,
ESOPs, etc., within the overall prescribed limit specified under the 2013
Act. At present, ESOPs to IDs are prohibited under the Listing Regulations
and the 2013 Act. Accordingly, the implementation of the SEBI decision would
require modifications to the Listing Regulations and also to the 2013 Act.
Any positive development on this aspect would enable listed companies to
attract and / or retain talented IDs.
 

TLA 2021 – A DIGNIFIED EXIT FROM A SELF-SPLASHED MESS: AN ANALYSIS OF REVERSAL OF RETROSPECTIVE AMENDMENT

INTRODUCTION
The infamous amendment to section 9(1)(i) by the Finance Act, 2012 with retrospective effect, dealing with the taxation of indirect transfers, had invited serious opprobrium in international fora and caused a serious dent in the image of India as an attractive investment destination.

Now, the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 2021 [TLA, 2021] has nullified the retrospective nature of the original amendment. The ‘Statement of Objects and Reasons’ to The Taxation Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2021 candidly highlighted the ill-effects of the retrospective amendment.

BACKGROUND

In order to understand the purpose behind the latest amendment, it is necessary to draw the readers’ attention to the series of events that took place prior to the amendment.

It all started in the year 2007 in the landmark case of Vodafone International which entered the Indian telecom market by acquiring the telecom business of Hutchinson India. Vodafone International, a Dutch-based Vodafone entity, acquired indirect control in Hutchison Essar Limited (HEL), an Indian company, from a Cayman Islands-based company, viz., Hutchison Telecommunications International Limited (HTIL). It did this by acquiring a single share in CGP Investment (CGP), another Cayman Islands company, from HTIL in February, 2007. CGP held various Mauritian companies, which in turn held a majority stake in HEL.

In September, 2007 the Revenue authorities issued a show cause notice to Vodafone International for failure to withhold tax on the amount paid for acquiring the said stake as they believed that HTIL was liable for capital gains it earned from the transfer of the share of CGP, as CGP indirectly held a stake in HEL. Vodafone International was also sought to be treated as a ‘representative assessee’ u/s 163 and a capital gains tax demand of Rs. 12,000 crores was sought to be recovered from Vodafone International.

But Vodafone International claimed that the Indian Revenue authorities had no jurisdiction over the transaction as the transfer of shares had taken place outside India between two companies incorporated outside India and the subject of the transfer was shares, the situs of which was also outside India. The matter was litigated up to the Supreme Court which, in 2012, in the landmark judgment in Vodafone International Holdings B.V. vs. Union of India1, absolved Vodafone of the liability of payment of Rs. 12,000 crores as capital gains tax in the transaction between it and HTIL.

The Court held that the Indian Revenue authorities did not have jurisdiction to impose tax on an offshore transaction between two non-resident companies wherein controlling interest in a resident company was acquired by the non-resident company.

But the Indian Government believed that the verdict of the Supreme Court was inconsistent with the legislative intent as they believed that India, in its sovereign taxing powers, was empowered to tax such indirect transfers of assets located in India. Thus, an amendment was brought about by the Finance Act, 2012 with retrospective effect, to clarify that gains arising from the sale of shares of a foreign company are taxable in India if such a share, directly or indirectly, derives its value substantially from the assets located in India. Section 119 of the Finance Act, 2012 also provided for validation of demand, etc., under the Income-tax Act, 1961 for cases relating to indirect transfer of Indian assets.

_______________________________________________________________________________
1          [2012]
341 ITR 1 (SC)

Pursuant to this amendment, an income tax demand has been raised in 17 cases which include the prominent cases of Vodafone and Cairn Energy. It is believed that the total estimated demand in these 17 cases totals up to an enormous sum of Rs. 1.10 lakh crores2.

In the ‘Statement of Objects and Reasons’ to The Taxation Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2021 it has been noted that in two out of these 17 cases, assessments are pending due to a stay granted by the High Court.

The ‘Statement of Objects and Reasons’ to The Taxation Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2021, observes that in four cases, arbitration under the Bilateral Investment Protection Treaty (BIT) with the United Kingdom and the Netherlands had been invoked against the demands. Of these four cases, in two, Vodafone and Cairn Energy, the result of arbitration has been against the Income-tax Department.

In the case of Vodafone, the Singapore seat of the Permanent Court of Arbitration of The Hague ruled that India’s imposition of a tax liability on Vodafone, as well as interest and penalties, breached an investment treaty agreement between India and the Netherlands3. The Arbitral Tribunal held that the imposition of the asserted liability notwithstanding, the Supreme Court judgment is in breach of the guarantee of fair and equitable treatment laid down in Article 4(1) of the BIT between India and the Netherlands. The Arbitral Tribunal directed India to reimburse the legal costs of approximately INR 850 million to Vodafone.

The said arbitral award was challenged by the Indian Government in Singapore because according to it taxation is not a part of the BIT and it falls under the sovereign power of India.

Similarly, in the case of Cairn Energy, a Scottish firm, the Permanent Court of Arbitration having its legal seat in the Netherlands, in December, 2020 awarded it $1.2 billion (over Rs. 8,800 crores) plus costs and interest which totalled $1.725 million (Rs. 12,600 crores) as of December, 20204. The Tribunal held that India had failed to comply with its obligations under the India-UK BIT. India appealed against the said award in a court in The Hague, Netherlands.

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2   https://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/us-court-sets-timelines-for-cairn-india-legal-case-121082700964_1.html

3   https://wap.business-standard.com/article-amp/economy-policy/govt-to-amend-income-tax-act-to-nullify-retrospective-tax-demands-121080501146_1.html

4              https://wap.business-standard.com/article-amp/economy-policy/govt-to-amend-income-tax-act-to-nullify-retrospective-tax-demands-121080501146_1.html

Meanwhile, Cairn moved courts in nine jurisdictions, namely, the US, the UK, the Netherlands, Canada, France, Singapore, Japan, the UAE and Cayman Islands, to get the international arbitration tribunal award registered and recognised. Cairn also threatened seizure of the Indian Government’s assets in these jurisdictions in case India did not return the value of the shares seized and sold, dividend confiscated and tax refund held back to adjust a Rs. 10,247-crore tax demand raised using the retrospective legislation.

In June, 2021, the Tribunal Judiciaire de Paris, a French court, allowed Cairn’s application to freeze 20 residential real estate assets owned by the Indian Government. The properties directed to be frozen are worth approximately $23 million, a fraction of the Arbitral Award5. Cairn also filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, seeking to make Air India liable for the Arbitral Award that was awarded to it. The lawsuit argued that the carrier as a state-owned company, being an alter-ego of the State, is legally indistinct from the State itself and was bound to discharge the duties of the State (India).

Thereafter, Cairn made a plea before the U.S. Court to make Air India deposit money under the apprehension that New Delhi may sell the airline by the time the decision seeking seizure of the national carrier’s aircraft is pronounced by the U.S. Court6. Despite the toughening stand taken both by Cairn and India before the U.S. Court, it has come to light that discussions are taking place between the officials of Cairn and the Income-tax Department whereby Cairn is hopeful of an amicable settlement in light of the recent amendment to the provisions of Explanation 5 to section 9(1)(i) vide TLA, 2021. The CEO of Cairn has also given a statement accepting the Government’s offer to settle the disputes and accept the refund of Rs. 7,900 crores and has also stated that the shareholders are in agreement with accepting the offer and moving on7.

And recently, on 13th September, 2021, Cairn and Air India jointly asked the New York Federal Court to stay further proceedings in Cairn’s lawsuit targeting Air India for enforcement of the $1.2 billion arbitral award awarded to Cairn by the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague in light of the amendment vide TLA, 2021. Both the parties requested for stay of any further proceedings in the matter till 31st October, 2021 and requested for new dates in November, 2021 by stating that the stay of proceedings would give them additional time to evaluate the effects and the implications of the TLA, 20218.

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5   https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/business-laws/needed-framework-for-enforcement-of-investment-treaty-arbitration/article36302023.ece

6   https://www.livemint.com/companies/news/cairn-ups-ante-in-us-court-in-its-fight-against-india-on-tax-11630(news-item
dated 05.09.2021)

7   https://www.telegraphindia.com/business/cairn-energy-accepts-modi-governments-offer-to-refund-rs-7900-crore/cid/1829799
(news-item dated 07.09.2021)

Union Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman, while indicating that the Government would appeal the Arbitral Award rendered in favour of Cairn Energy, also stated that ‘We have made our position clear on retrospective taxation. We have repeated it in 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2019, 2020, till now. I don’t see any lack of clarity’, indicating the current Government’s stand of not raising any new demands on the basis of the retrospective amendment made vide the Finance Act, 20129.

TLA, 2021

Considering the adverse impact that the retrospective legislation had on the image of India in the International fora and in order to promote faster economic growth and employment, the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2021 was proposed by the Ministry of Finance.

The said Bill was introduced by the Ministry of Finance in the Lok Sabha on 5th August, 2021 and was passed by the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha on 6th August, 2021 and 9th August, 2021, respectively. Thereafter, the TLA, 2021 received the assent of the President of India on 13th August, 2021.

As per the said Act, the following amendments have been made to Explanation 5 to section 9(1)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961:

A. Vide the newly-inserted 4th proviso to Explanation 5 to section 9(1)(i), it has been provided that nothing contained in Explanation 5 shall apply to:

i. an assessment or reassessment to be made under sections 143, 144, 147,153A or 153C; or
ii. an order to be passed enhancing the assessment or reducing a refund already made or otherwise increasing the liability of the assessee u/s 154; or
iii. an order to be passed deeming a person to be an assessee in default under sub-section (1) of section 201,

in respect of income accruing or arising through or from the transfer of an asset or a capital asset situate in India in consequence of the transfer of a share or interest in a company or entity registered or incorporated outside India made before the 28th day of May, 2012.

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8   https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/cairn-energy-air-india-seek-stay-on-new-york-court-proceedings/articleshow/86227073.cms
(news-item dated 15.09.2021)

9   https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/1-4-billion-cairn-arbitration-award-finance-minister-says-its-her-duty-to-appeal/articleshow/81348282.cms

B. Vide the newly-inserted 5th proviso to Explanation 5 to section 9(1)(i), it has been provided that where:

i. an assessment or reassessment has been made under sections 143, 144, 147,153A or 153C; or
ii. an order has been passed enhancing the assessment or reducing a refund already made or otherwise increasing the liability of the assessee u/s 154; or
iii. an order has been passed deeming a person to be an assessee in default under sub-section (1) of section 201; or
iv. an order has been passed imposing a penalty under Chapter XXI or u/s 221,

in respect of income accruing or arising through or from the transfer of an asset or a capital asset situate in India in consequence of the transfer of a share or interest in a company or entity registered or incorporated outside India made before the 28th day of May, 2012 and the person in whose case such assessment or reassessment or order has been passed or made, as the case may be, fulfils the specified conditions, then, such assessment or reassessment or order, to the extent it relates to the said income, shall be deemed never to have been passed or made, as the case may be.

C. Vide the newly-inserted 6th proviso to Explanation 5 to section 9(1)(i), it has been provided that where any amount becomes refundable to the person referred to in the 5th proviso as a consequence of him fulfilling the specified conditions, then, such amount shall be refunded to him, but no interest u/s 244A shall be paid on that amount.

Vide the Explanation inserted below the newly-inserted 6th proviso, the conditions to be satisfied for the purposes of the 5th and 6th provisos have been provided. To paraphrase, the following conditions have been provided:

• where the said person has filed any appeal before an appellate forum or a writ petition before the High Court or the Supreme Court against any order in respect of the said income, he shall either withdraw or submit an undertaking to withdraw such appeal or writ petition, in such form and manner as may be prescribed;
• where the said person has initiated any proceeding for arbitration, conciliation or mediation, or has given any notice thereof under any law for the time being in force or under any agreement entered into by India with any other country or territory outside India, whether for protection of investment or otherwise, he shall either withdraw or shall submit an undertaking to withdraw the claim, if any, in such proceedings or notice, in such form and manner as may be prescribed;
• the said person shall furnish an undertaking, in such form and manner as may be prescribed, waiving his right, whether direct or indirect, to seek or pursue any remedy or any claim in relation to the said income which may otherwise be available to him under any law for the time being in force, in equity, under any statute or under any agreement entered into by India with any country or territory outside India, whether for protection of investment or otherwise; and
• such other conditions as may be prescribed.

Necessary amendments have also been effected to section 119 of the Finance Act, 2012 which provided for validation of demand, etc., under the Income-tax Act, 1961 for cases relating to indirect transfer of Indian assets.

From the above amendments, one may clearly observe that a two-tier amendment has been made.

The first tier of amendment, consistent with the position of the Government not to levy or raise any new demands in light of the retrospective amendment vide the Finance Act, 2012, makes a necessary provision to that effect so as to provide that no tax demand shall be raised in future on the basis of retrospective amendment vide the Finance Act, 2012 for any offshore indirect transfer of Indian assets if the transaction is undertaken before 28th May, 2012 (i.e., the date on which the Finance Bill, 2012 received the assent of the President). It would be pertinent to note that in various instances, in the case of retrospective amendments, the law has expressly provided for provisions to ensure that past concluded assessments are not disturbed. In this regard, a useful reference may be made to the proviso to section 14A(1), section 92C(2B) and section 92CA(2C). Thus, the first tier of amendment made vide the newly-inserted 4th proviso is in line with the said provisions and provides protection in respect of transfers made prior to 28th May, 2012 from any fresh proceedings. It is rather wider than the said provisions, as it also provides protection from proceedings under sections 153A, 153C and 201(1).

As regards the second tier of amendment, it provides for nullification of assessments already made in respect of indirect transfer of Indian assets made before 28th May, 2012 (as validated by section 119 of the Finance Act, 2012) on fulfilment of certain conditions as specified.

Pursuant to such amendments, the CBDT has published the draft rules for implementing the amendments made by the TLA, 2021 on 28th August, 2021 inviting comments from all stakeholders latest by 4th September, 2021. Vide the said draft, CBDT has proposed to insert Rule 11UE along with Forms 1 to 4 which specify the conditions to be fulfilled and the process to be followed to give to the amendment made by the TLA, 2021.

The said rules provide for furnishing various undertakings including irrevocable withdrawal, discontinuance or an undertaking not to pursue any appeal / application / petition / proceedings. It is also required to forgo any awards received by it by virtue of any such related orders.

IMPACT OF TLA, 2021

The newly-inserted 5th proviso deals with nullification of assessment or reassessment. However, it does not deal with nullification of any demand raised or any interest levied u/s 234B or interest levied u/s 220(6) [which may have been levied due to non-payment of demand]. Thus, the question that would arise is whether nullification of assessment or reassessment would also lead to nullification of demands of tax and consequential interests. It may be noted that as per the legal jurisprudence that has evolved, ‘assessment’ has been held to be the entire process commencing from filing of return to passing of an assessment order and raising of consequential demand. Thus, when the ‘assessment’ is nullified, it would indicate that the demands along with interest would also get nullified. It may also be noted that the Supreme Court in ITO vs. Seghu Buchiah Setty [1964] 52 ITR 538 has held that there must be a valid order of assessment on which a notice of demand may be founded. Consequentially, when the assessment or reassessment to the extent it relates to income accruing or arising from indirect transfers is deemed to have never been made, the consequential demand and interest would also not survive.

It would be pertinent to note that by virtue of the amendment, the purchaser or payer who was liable to deduct tax at source by virtue of section 195 in respect of capital gains accruing to a non-resident assessee by virtue of indirect transfer under Explanations 5 to 7 to section 9(1)(i), can no longer be treated as an assessee-in-default u/s 201(1) if such purchaser or payer fulfils the conditions specified. However, it would be pertinent to note that the issue of treating a person as an assessee-in-default for non-deduction of tax at source in respect of past transactions in light of retrospective amendments, is no longer res integra in light of the decision in Engineering Analysis Centre of Excellence Private Limited vs. CIT [2021] 432 ITR 471 (SC)/[2021] 125 taxmann.com 42 (SC), wherein it has been held that a person mentioned in section 195 of the Income-tax Act cannot be expected to do the impossible, namely, to apply retrospective provision at a time when such provisions were not actually and factually in the statute. Thus, from the payers’ point of view, the amendment nullifying its liability as an assessee-in-default u/s 201(1) is not of much relevance in light of the judgment in Engineering Analysis (Supra). As a result of the same, even if the deductors / payers who have been held to be in default choose not to comply with the conditions mentioned in the Explanation to the newly-inserted 5th and 6th provisos, the litigation continuing in the normal course as provided in the Income-tax Act would result in favourable verdicts for them in light of the judgment in Engineering Analysis (Supra). A deductor / payer may therefore not choose the option of the 5th proviso which requires him to forgo interest on refund. He would rather stay in the normal stream where he has more than a reasonable chance of success and in such event he need not forgo interest.

In certain cases, assessment may have been made by the Department on the purchasers or payers u/s 161 read with sections 160 and 163 in their capacity as agents (representative assessees) of the non-residents in respect of the income accruing or arising in respect of indirect transfers under Explanations 5 to 7 to section 9(1)(i) [for instance, the case of Vodafone]. In such case, the assessments made on such agents would be nullified if the conditions specified therein are satisfied.

It may be noted that clause (iii) of the newly-inserted 5th proviso to Explanation 5 to section 9(1)(i) only deals with an order deeming a person to be an assessee in default u/s 201(1) and does not deal with the case of deductors / payers in whose case disallowance u/s 40(a)(i) is made. It may also be noted that nullification of an order u/s 201(1) does not automatically absolve a person of the disallowance u/s 40(a)(i). However, the same may not be of much significance, given that the payment made towards acquisition of shares of a foreign company is not ordinarily claimed as revenue expenditure in respect of which a disallowance u/s 40(a)(i) may be made.

It may be possible that in certain cases, in order to put an end to litigation, the said person as specified in the newly-inserted 5th proviso may have made an application under the Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020 and duly paid the amount as specified in the Form No. 3 issued by the designated authority u/s 5(1) of the said Act. Section 7 of the said Act provides that any amount paid in pursuance of a declaration made u/s 4 shall not be refundable under any circumstances. It may be noted that as per the later part of the newly-inserted 5th proviso to Explanation 5 to section 9(1)(i), the assessment or reassessment or order, to the extent it relates to the income in respect of income accruing or arising through or from the transfer of an asset or a capital asset situate in India in consequence of the transfer of a share or interest in a company or entity registered or incorporated outside India made before the 28th day of May, 2012, shall be deemed never to have been passed or made. When the assessment or reassessment or order to the extent it relates to the said income is deemed never to have been passed or made, the question of the same being ‘disputed tax’ u/s 2(j) of the Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020 does not arise as the very demand ceases to exist in the eyes of law. In such circumstances, it cannot lie in the mouth of the Revenue to refuse the grant of refund of the amount paid as specified in the Form No. 3 issued by the designated authority u/s 5(1) of the said Act. If a sum is paid outside the aforesaid Act, the bar of refund should not apply to such payment as held in Hemalatha Gargya vs. CIT [2003] 259 ITR 1 (SC).

The newly-inserted 6th proviso to Explanation 5 to section 9(1)(i) provides that where any amount becomes refundable to the person referred to in the 5th proviso as a consequence of him fulfilling the specified conditions, then such amount shall be refunded to him, but no interest u/s 244A shall be paid on that amount. The said proviso appears to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as it is discriminatory and arbitrary. It may be noted that though taxing statutes being fiscal legislations enjoy a greater presumption towards the constitutionality of the same, the same must nevertheless satisfy the tests of Article 14 of the Constitution in order to save them from the vice of unconstitutionality. The newly-inserted 6th proviso may be discriminatory on the following three fronts:

a) There appears to be a clear discrimination between persons referred to in the 4th and 5th provisos. It may be noted that as regards the persons referred to in the 4th proviso, no new assessment would be made in respect of indirect transfers which have taken place prior to 28th May, 2012. Thus, no prejudice would be caused to them. However, in respect of persons referred to in the 5th proviso, who have already been assessed and recoveries may have been made from them, such recoveries are refundable without interest u/s 244A. While persons covered in the 4th proviso would not have parted with any funds and hence are justifiably not entitled to any compensatory interest, the persons covered in the 5th proviso having parted with funds are justifiably entitled to compensatory interest. These two categories of persons are in unequal situations but are treated equally insofar as non-payment of compensatory interest is concerned. This causes discrimination.

b) There also appears to be discrimination between persons to whom a sum is refundable on account of any other provision of the IT Act and persons to whom a sum is refundable under the newly-inserted 5th and 6th provisos. In case of the former, interest u/s 244A being a normal incident of refund would automatically accrue as held by the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Tata Chemicals Ltd. [2014] 363 ITR 658 (SC). However, as regards the persons referred to in the 5th proviso, they would not be entitled to any refund despite there being a wrongful retention of sums by the Revenue in light of a non-existent demand.

c) The third type of discrimination occurs between persons who have effected indirect transfers but action is time-barred at the time when the TLA, 2021 was enacted and the persons referred to in the newly-inserted 5th and 6th provisos. As per section 149(1)(b) (as amended vide the Finance Act, 2021), the maximum time limit available to issue notice u/s 148 is ten years from the end of the relevant assessment year. Without going into the applicability of the said clause, it may be noted that even if the Department were to reopen past concluded assessments or assess any person in connection with income accruing or arising as a result of indirect transfer, it could at the maximum have done so in respect of A.Y. 2011-12 and for A.Y. 2012-13 (in respect of transfers concluded prior to 28th May, 2012 due to bar under the newly-inserted 4th proviso). Thus, in respect of transfers which have taken place prior to A.Y. 2011-12, no action under sections 147 and 148 would lie. However, in respect of persons who fall under the 5th and 6th provisos (which would include the above cases under sections 147 and 148), no interest on refund would accrue u/s 244A, leaving them in a position worse off than those who have escaped any action due to non-availability of any recourse under the provisions of the IT Act to the Department.

Thus, the validity and constitutionality of the 6th proviso being discriminatory on the above three counts may be subjected to challenge as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

It may be noted that the Draft Rule 11UE(3)(b)(I), in addition to furnishing of undertaking by the declarant, also requires furnishing of declaration by any of the interested parties which, as per Part K and Part L of the Form 1, refers to all the holding companies in the entire chain of holding as defined under the Companies Act, 2013 of the declarant, and all persons whose interest may be directly or indirectly affected by the undertaking in Form 1. Though Explanation (iv) to the newly-inserted 5th and 6th provisos is wide enough to empower the Board to prescribe any other conditions, such power does not extend to imposing conditions on persons other than the declarant assessee. Thus, the draft Rule 11UE(3)(b)(I)(ii) requiring such undertaking from interested third parties, if enacted without any change, may be subjected to challenge on the basis of being contrary to the provisions of the Act.

CONCLUSION


TLA, 2021 is a landmark step by the Indian Legislature in bringing about certainty in tax matters and restoring the faith of foreign investors in India as an attractive investment destination. It provides a great opportunity for various Multinational Groups or Companies who have been subjected to endless litigation to settle their disputes once and for all. It would enable them to receive refunds of huge amounts deposited with the Income-tax Department at various stages of litigation, thereby having a positive impact on their working capital situation.

CONSULTATION – CONCLUSION – CONSPIRACY

We live in a free society yet this editorial is written differently. You see, a newly-formed regulator (let’s call it NFR) brought out a paper with a view to seek comments. The NFR is funded by taxpayer money, the paper is in the public domain, the purpose of the paper is ‘consultation’ with stakeholders and the paper carries no proprietary inventions, secrets or exclusive material. Yet, the NFR has posted a notice on the report stating that no part of its report can be ‘reproduced’ or ‘circulated’ without its permission except for the purpose of making comments on that paper (that it is seeking or to NFR). So how should one deliberate the matter the paper seeks comments on, if one is forbidden from quoting it?

Often such ‘consultation’ is ‘conclusion’ in disguise. Papers like these are a spectacle of ‘superfluousness’ wrapped as ‘engagement’ (in case you didn’t know it, this is a typical Babucracy tactic where Delhi officials call for deliberations on a ‘pre-concluded’ agenda and the meeting is just for ‘due process’).

Take another trait: the paper doesn’t reveal what it will do with the comments! Place them in the public domain? What weightage will they have? Will they complete the ‘research’ and include responses as part of it? Well, a public body must at least demonstrate transparency, integrity and objectivity to the public. By publishing the comments from a wider audience of stakeholders, duly ‘appraised’ by an independent third party, will only add to their reliability, especially when these are meant for the purpose of policy!

Let’s look at the paper per se. The paper claims to give ‘research’ data. In the same breath, it qualifies the integrity of key data points by stating that there could be errors in that data which forms the basis of the NFR’s conclusions. For example, it states that about 1.8 lakh companies paid no audit fees for their audits; it also declares that this data could be erroneous and yet it says that payment of audit fees is a burden on ease of doing business! Could this be cognitive dissonance (confirmation bias)? The source data could be entirely wrong (in Form AOC 4 companies could have put several expenses including audit fees under one category rather than giving a break-up) which makes the paper’s conclusions absurd. A plain reasonableness test with meagre application of mind informs us that so many audits can’t be free! A slight effort to test this preposterous assumption with actual financials, even on a test basis, would have cured this fallacy.

Friends, the paper is a string of inaccuracies, false equivalences, cherry picking, baseless opinions and aspersions which show that it is casual and rather malicious.

Irrespective of the quality of the paper, should one ask a moot question: whether audit is not required for certain companies and jump to a Yes-No conclusion? In my view we cannot answer it till we can look at more data, do surveys and see what is achieved by audits for each type of entity depending on stakeholders’ needs, and the consequences of audit exemption. This, to be truly and honestly done, needs a wider discussion and not a paper from a regulator who has no ground level experience, no skin in the game and who is not even mandated.

Audit does a number of things for a wide spectrum of entities and more particularly SMEs and audited financials form the basis of several certificates and filings for various stakeholders. It’s a known fact that an audit adds value to SME entities in a real sense if they so desire. The NFR thinks the sole reason for audit is public interest.

Now let’s approach ease of doing business – as ‘ease of financial reporting and audit’ the NFR paper is cheesy: 1. No comments are carried about the numerous thresholds / exemptions for audit reporting – CARO, ICFR, Ind AS – AS, SMC, OPC. The Paper cherry-picks only one of these limits (the highest) and that too without assigning any reason. 2. Audit follows accounting and reporting; however, there are no comments about application of say Schedule III and other filings applicable to smaller companies. 3. No new ideas such as a Small Companies Act, 202X not just SME SA which has been talked about for years! 4. The paper lacks original ideas and conceals its lack of creativity with examples from the EU and the USA – from whom India is far away and much different. 5. The NFR paper gives references to state laws of the US and the EU, but no comparison with Indian parallels to see whether our business environments are even comparable. 6. It determines causality of low MCA filings by companies to lack of accounting professionals with them but without any reason or facts when filings could be arduous for small businesses. 7. It calls Rs. 50 crores as low turnover (NFR budget is less than that). 8. Says, banks do not rely on GPFS (I don’t know of a banker that doesn’t ask for GPFS before any conversation at all). 9. The NFR paper calculates imaginary standard audit costs and applies them to companies to make a point that is false and deceptive: audit costs are between 0.5% to 58% of PBT across various sizes of companies! It goes on to state that good quality audit will require an estimated standard COST of Rs. 1.50 lakhs (0.03%) to about Rs. 8 lakhs (0.16%) for companies with below Rs. 50 crores turnover. Fact: HPCL (a global Fortune 500 company with turnover of Rs. 2.98 lakh crores) in 2019-20 paid 0.000024% (Rs. 72 lakhs) as audit fees. By the NFR paper’s logic, the audit quality must be abysmal!

The paper is full of outlandish assumptions, fantasy, callousness, disregard for facts and bias.

While the reader should make her own judgement, let me leave you with the grand crescendo: about 3,500 out of six lakh active companies deserve audit as they fall within the Rs. 250-crore net worth benchmark.

I don’t even feel it is necessary to look at the effects of putting into practice what the paper construes. Why should NFR, which has never dirtied its hands in a real audit situation (and today auditors audit a market cap of $255 trillion plus the value of unlisted entities), give its brash verdict on audits and auditors? One can only extend the ‘logic’ and ‘verbiage’ of the NFR paper to infer that the amount paid for preparing this paper must be NIL since it cannot boast of any quality at all. As the title of this Editorial suggests, the reader can choose how much of this paper is about consultation, how much about conclusion and how much conspiracy!

Raman Jokhakar
Editor

 

TEACHERS’ DAY

The Fifth day of September is observed every year as Teachers’ Day to mark the birth anniversary of Dr. Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan, the second President of India. He was a teacher (professor) and a great scholar of Indian Philosophy. ‘Palli’ means language. He knew many languages and he wrote treatises on Indian Philosophy, the Bhagavad Geeta, etc., which were acclaimed the world over.

In India, Ashadha Poornima (full moon) is observed as ‘Guru Poornima’ as a mark of respect to ‘Gurus’ or mentors. This is in honour of Maharshi Vyasa, the renowned sage. It falls sometime in the month of July every year. Let me take this opportunity to explain a few important and interesting thoughts on the Guru-shishya (teacher and student) relationship.

 (Shikshak) – We think that shikshak means one who teaches. However, interestingly, in the Sanskrit dictionary the first meaning of the word ‘Shikshak’ is ‘learner, student’. The root Shiksh (verb) means to learn. The second meaning is ‘teacher’.

– We think  (Acharya) means a teacher. However, the concept behind the word Acharya is he who teaches through ‘Aacharan’ (conduct). His conduct should be exemplary and worth emulating.

 (Acharya Devo Bhava) –  We think that this means a Guru is God. However, actually it means ‘you be the believer that Acharya is God and act accordingly’. It is a ‘command’ and not merely a statement. The same is the case with Matru Devo Bhava (mother) and Pitru Devo Bhava (father).

Teaching through example – There is an interesting quote, ‘Example is not the BEST way of teaching. It is the ONLY way of teaching.’ I feel the test of your having understood a concept is to be able to tell it with an example.

Good teacher – A good teacher is not the one who instantly solves all doubts of the student; but the one who teaches how to learn. He should develop among the students two main qualities – ‘Having a feel or judgement of the situation and ability to take decisions’.

 (Sadguru) – Literally, it means a good or righteous teacher. This term is generally used only in the field of spiritualism (Adhyatma).

The seven qualities of a good teacher are – (knowledge), (agility), (character), (art of explaining), (review), (sensitivity) and (pleasantness)(seven qualities).

 (Improper disciple) – Certain Stotras (prayers) and Mantras are not to be taught to an improper pupil. If one does it, one will be a sinner.

The ultimate test – There is one more beautiful and great thought. Ordinarily, one should always have a desire to succeed. However, your teaching should be so complete and whole-hearted that against two persons, one should always welcome a defeat – your son and your student.

—  This means that your son and student should become capable of surpassing you. This is the real test of a good teacher.

Friends, this is a very vast subject. Let us offer our ‘Namaskaars’ to such ideal ‘gurus’ or mentors.

SOME INTERESTING FREE WINDOWS 10 APPS & DOWNLOADS

We have all been using Windows 10 for many years now. However, there are some hidden, little-known apps and some free third-party apps which can make our productivity soar in multiple ways. Here are a few of them which you can use in your day-to-day work life.

STICKY NOTES
We have all used Sticky Notes some time or other at the workplace. Windows 10 offers you digital Sticky Notes right on your desktop. Just press the Windows Key and type Sticky Notes and you will be presented with the Sticky Notes app. You may create as many Sticky Notes as you desire and paste them at your desired locations on your desktop. You can format the Sticky Notes, add pictures, create bulleted lists and assign some basic colours to your Sticky Notes based on your preferences and categorisation of each or a group of Notes.

If you are using a Microsoft Launcher on your Android phone, you will be able to sync the Notes to your phone automatically and effortlessly.

This is a very simple tool to boost your productivity and comes in-built with Windows 10. Try it and use it – it is free, right on your desktop.

NIGHT LIGHT SETTINGS
All computer monitors emanate light which hits our eyes all the time. Prolonged usage could tire our eyes. Besides, after sunset, the blue light emanating from the monitor could even affect our eyes adversely. Windows 10 allows us to change our display settings to reduce the strain on our eyes.

On any blank area of the desktop, right-click with your mouse and then select Display Settings. In the Find a Setting box on the top left, just type Night Light and select the item displayed for Night Light. The Night Light Settings will be displayed. Here, you can turn Night Light on or off manually. You may also select the strength or intensity of the light when the Night Light is on, based on your comfort level.

If you wish to automate the process, you could set the time when Night Light comes on and when it would be turned off. Further, if you switch on your location settings for Windows, the system will automatically turn it on at Sunset and turn it off at Sunrise.

Pretty cool and comfy!

EVERYTHING
This is a very simple and extremely fast utility which allows you to search all areas on your computer in a jiffy.

Very often, we just remember the name of the file, but just can’t remember where it is buried in the plethora of folders and multiple sub-folders on our hard disk. For all you know, it may be lying on the external drive of our computer or even on a data card, inserted into our computer. Sometimes, we may not even remember the file name accurately, but we may just remember that it is a document file or an image file.

Windows 10 provides native search across the entire ecosystem. But if you have ever tried it, it can be very tardy and time-consuming, especially if you have a large hard disk with multiple levels of folders.

This is where Everything steps in. Once you download and install it, just enter the name or part name of the file you are searching and you will be amazed at the speed of the results. You can even search for part of the file name or for a type of file in combination with its name. The Advanced Search option allows you to specify matching case, any or all words in the file name and much more.

From the list of files displayed, you may double-click any file to open it.

You can download Everything from https://www.voidtools.com/. Try it once, you will never use Windows Search ever again.

FILE-CONVERTER
There are loads of file converters available online. Zamzar.com is one of the popular options which allows you to convert files from one format to another. For using the online file converter, you must upload your file to their servers and then specify to which format you wish to convert the file. It takes a few seconds to perform the conversion and you can then download the file back to your computer when it is ready. Since this involves uploading your file to their server, many times users are worried about the privacy of their data.

Enter File-Converter – a very simple and light utility that will change the way you convert files on a day-to-day basis. Just head to https://file-converter.org and download and install the file converter. Don’t worry if you don’t see anything on your screen yet. Once installed, go to any folder and right-click on the file which you wish to convert. You will see the File-Converter option in your context menu. When you hover over it, you will be able to see the types of files to which you can convert your original file. For example, if you right-click on a pdf file, it will show you the option to convert it to a png file! Just click on your option and the conversion begins. It’s as simple as that. No need to upload any files or install any more programmes.

You also have the option to configure the pre-sets and set your choices, and the conversions are instant and free. You may choose to convert multiple files at once and either retain or delete the original files after conversion.

You may find some limitations in case of certain types of files or files which have very complex formatting, but for a major part of daily usage, this is a very sleek, swift and light utility.

So now, open up Windows and let your productivity soar by using these tips on a daily basis. Good luck!

ACCREDITED INVESTORS – A NEW AVENUE FOR RAISING FINANCE

SEBI has, at its Board meeting of 29th June, 2021, taken some baby steps to introduce and recognise a new category of investors – the Accredited Investors (‘AIs’) who are persons of high net worth / income. This has been followed up by amendments to the respective SEBI regulations on 3rd August, 2021. These changes should open up a new and wide channel of raising finance from informed and capable investors, particularly in areas where the present regulations are too restrictive.

This is not a new concept internationally. Many countries such as the USA, Canada, Singapore and even China have provisions for such a category of persons who are deemed to be well aware, if not sophisticated, and also having sufficient net worth so as to be able to bear losses in risky investments. Many rules are relaxed for such persons and issuers / intermediaries are able to issue complex, high risk / high return products to such persons at terms that are mutually agreed rather than statutorily prescribed. Thus, on the one hand, entities that cannot otherwise raise finance without crossing many hurdles can now raise finance more easily from such persons, on the other hand, such persons have wider avenues of investments to aim for higher returns at risks which they understand and can even manage.

In other words, AIs are expected to be sophisticated high net worth investors who do not need elaborate hand-holding by the regulator. They can evaluate complex, high risk / high return products / services and negotiate terms flexibly to protect their interests.

COMPLEX SEBI REGULATIONS AIMED AT THE NAÏVE AND UNSOPHISTICATED INVESTOR

SEBI’s regulations generally are models of micro-management. Having seen small investors repeatedly suffering in their investments, and perhaps also considering the reality of Indian markets, the rules in capital markets tend to bend towards elaborate controls. Parties generally cannot, even by mutual agreement, waive the many requirements of law enacted for the protection of investors.

A portfolio manager, for example, cannot accept a client with less than Rs. 50 lakhs of investment even if the client is well informed / capable. He also cannot invest more than 25% of the portfolio in unlisted securities under discretionary management, even if the client is agreeable to this. Similarly, Alternative Investment Funds have restrictions which cannot be avoided. Investment Advisers, too, face a very elaborate set of rules which govern almost every aspect of their business, including even the fees that they can charge. Thus, even if an informed client is willing to pay higher fees to get expert advice, the investment adviser is limited by the regulations.

The result of all this is that needy issuers are starved of funds and well-informed investors deprived of avenues with the potential of higher returns.

CONSULTATION PAPER ISSUED IN FEBRUARY, 2021

SEBI had initiated this process in February, 2021 by issuing a consultation paper proposing a framework for AIs and seeking public comments. This has now been finalised and amendments accordingly made to the regulations relating to Alternative Investment Funds, Portfolio Managers and Investment Advisers.

Who would be recognised as Accredited Investors?
As per the new framework, a person can obtain a certificate as an AI on the basis of net worth / assets or income, or a combination of the two. For example, an individual / HUF / family trust can be an AI if its annual income is at least Rs. 2 crores or net worth is at least Rs. 7.50 crores, with at least half of it in financial assets. Or it can be a combination of at least Rs. 1 crore annual income and net worth of Rs. 5 crores (with at least half in financial assets).

For other trusts, a net asset worth of at least Rs. 50 crores can qualify them as AIs. For corporates, too, a net worth of Rs. 50 crores is necessary. A partnership firm would be eligible if each partner is individually eligible. Similar parameters are provided for non-residents such as non-resident Indians, family trusts / other trusts, corporates, etc. Government departments, development agencies and Qualified Institutional Buyers, etc., would be AIs without any such minimum requirements.

Interestingly, a further category of AIs has been specified, viz., Large Value Accredited Investors. This would apply in case of Portfolio Managers and would be persons who have agreed to invest at least Rs. 10 crores.

A strange aspect is that, unlike some countries in the West, SEBI has not permitted educated / experienced investors to qualify as AIs. Indeed, having qualification or experience is not deemed to be even relevant! Thus, for example, Chartered Accountants or even CFAs, though trained to be well-versed with finance, cannot only by virtue of the fact of being qualified and competent, be recognised as AIs. They can act as advisers to AIs, but not be AIs themselves, unless they have the minimum size of assets / income.

Further, again unlike many western countries, merely having a minimum income / net worth is not enough. A formal certification as an AI is needed from certain bodies recognised for this purpose. A fee would have to be paid to them for grant of such a certificate. Curiously, although the details have not been notified, it appears from the Consultation Paper that the certificate is likely to be valid only for one year at a time and will have to be renewed annually.

The Consultation Paper had proposed yet another strange condition. Persons who desire to provide financial products / advice to AIs would not only need to obtain a copy of such a certificate from the AIs, but will also need to additionally approach the certifying agency and reconfirm with them. This would be a needless additional hurdle. Hopefully, the process may actually end up being simpler with such confirmation being quickly provided online on an automated basis after due verification by the certifying agency. However, it would be best that this requirement is not mandated when the further details are notified.

Nature of relaxations from regulations available for transactions with AIs
While ideally, an informed and capable investor should not face any hurdles in his decision-making power for making investments, even if the provisions are meant for protection, there will not be total relaxation. Instead, perhaps with the intention of testing the waters and going in gradually, SEBI has given partial relaxation from the regulations. In fact, the relaxations as proposed are few and far between. The minimum investment required, the terms on which contracts of providing services can be made, the fees that can be charged, the extent to which investments in unlisted securities can be made, etc., are some relaxations proposed.

The amendments are primarily made in the SEBI regulations governing Alternative Investment Funds, Portfolio Managers and Investment Advisers. The Consultation Paper / SEBI Board meeting has talked of amendments to other regulations, too, and it is possible that more changes may be made in the near future.

BENEFITS OF THE NEW CONCEPT
The new scheme can be expected to benefit intermediaries, investors and indeed the market. They would have more freedom to enter into arrangements and investments with risks and complexities that they are comfortable with. It should also result in availability of far more funds, from many more persons and by many more issuers. Today, many such investments simply cannot take place because of protective legal requirements. There would also be more flexibility for the parties involved. The amendments also create a sub-category of AIs called Large Value Accredited Investors, as also a separate category of fund called Large Value Fund for Accredited Investors. These would enable further flexibility to larger investors who expectedly can undertake more informed risks.

Can an AI opt out of the scheme either generally or on a case-to-case basis?
There are a few other concerns. Even if a person is an AI, he may not always want to waive the regulatory protection. He may have more than the prescribed size of net worth, etc. However, in certain cases, he may prefer not to invest as an AI. It seems that there is no bar on him from opting out.

However, care would have to be taken in the paperwork / agreements to ensure that there is no inadvertent waiver. It is common, however, that investors end up signing on the dotted line on long documents containing fine print. This is even more important considering that the benchmark for being an AI is only financial and not knowledge / qualifications.

An interesting issue would still remain as to whether, in case of disputes, his being an AI could be used against him and he be assumed to be an informed and sophisticated investor.
Whether SEBI would be available as arbiter in case of disputes / malpractices?

The intention clearly is that parties should be able to negotiate their own terms and formulate such structures, even if complex and high risk, as they are comfortable with. The regulations that otherwise provide for mandatory detailed terms would not apply. The question then would be what would be the role of SEBI in case of disputes between AIs and issuers / intermediaries? In particular, whether SEBI would still be available as arbiter in case of malpractices? Or will the parties have to approach civil courts which are expensive and time-consuming? One hopes that at least in case of frauds, manipulations, gross negligence and the like, recourse to SEBI would still be available as SEBI continues to be an expert and generally swift-footed regulator.

CONCLUSION


Despite some concerns, the amendments are still a major reform in the capital markets. Considering that the relaxations are generally partial, the level of complexity may actually increase. One can now only wait and see how the experience turns out to be over the years and how SEBI deals with the issues that would arise.
(You can also refer to the Article on Accredited Investors on Page 31 of BCAJ,  August, 2021) 

CRYPTOCURRENCIES: TRAPPED IN A LEGAL LABYRINTH (Part – 3)

Over the last two months, this Feature has examined the legal background surrounding cryptocurrencies and FEMA provisions in relation to Virtual Currencies (VCs). In this, the concluding part, we take up the tax issues pertaining to this exciting new asset class

LEGALITY STILL IN DOUBT
The legality of VCs in India continues to be a question mark. As recently as on 10th August, 2021, the Minister of State for Finance gave a written reply in the Rajya Sabha stating that the Government does not consider cryptocurrencies legal tender or coin and will take all measures to eliminate use of these crypto-assets in financing illegitimate activities or as part of the payment system. The Government will also explore the use of blockchain technology proactively for ushering in a digital economy. He added that a high-level Inter-Ministerial Committee (IMC) constituted under the Chairmanship of the Secretary (Economic Affairs) to study the issues related to VCs and propose specific actions to be taken, had recommended in its report that all private cryptocurrencies, except any cryptocurrency issued by the State, be prohibited in India. The Government would take a decision on the recommendations of the IMC and the legislative proposal, if any, would be introduced in the Parliament.

Coupled with this is the action taken by the Enforcement Directorate against a crypto exchange in India on the grounds of money-laundering. The accusation was that the exchange was facilitating some Chinese betting apps which converted their Indian earnings into VCs and then transferred the same to digital wallets based in the Cayman Islands.

In spite of the above regulatory heat, the popularity of VCs and crypto exchanges is growing by the day and a crypto exchange has now even entered the Unicorn club!

However, in the midst of the regulatory hullabaloo and the hype over VCs, one must not lose sight of the fact that at the end of the day tax must be paid on all earnings from VCs. The Income-tax Act is not concerned with the legality of a trade. In CIT vs. S.C. Kothari [1972] 4 SCC 402 it was observed that: ‘…If the business is illegal, neither the profits earned nor the losses incurred would be enforceable in law. But that does not take the profits out of the taxing statute.’

Again, in CIT vs. K. Thangamani [2009] 309 ITR 15 (Mad), the Madras High Court held that the income-tax authorities are not concerned about the manner or means of acquiring income. The income might have been earned illegally or by resorting to unlawful means. But any illegality associated with the earning has no bearing on its taxability. The assessee, having acquired income by unethical means or by resorting to acts forbidden by law, cannot be heard to say that the State cannot be a party to such sharing of ill-gotten wealth. Allowing such income to escape the tax net would be nothing but a premium or reward to a person for doing an illegal trade. In the event of taxing the income of only those who had acquired the same in a legal manner, the tendency of those who acquire income by illegal means would increase. It is not possible for the Income-tax authorities to act like the police to prevent the commission of unlawful acts, but it is possible for the tax machinery to tax such income.

The Finance Ministry in reply to a question raised in the Rajya Sabha has stated that irrespective of the nature of business, the extant statutory provisions on the scope of total income for taxation as per section 5 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 envisage that total income shall include all income from whatever source derived, the legality of income thus being of no consequence. The gains arising from the transfer of cryptocurrencies / assets is liable to tax under a head of income, depending upon the nature of holding of the same. It further stated that no data is maintained on cryptocurrency earnings of Indians as there is no provision in the Income-tax return to capture data on earnings arising from cryptocurrencies / assets.

Accordingly, irrespective of whether a crypto trade is legal or illegal, we need to examine its taxability. Let us briefly analyse the same. At the outset, it may be noted that since this is an evolving subject, there is no settled view and hence an attempt has been made to present all the possible views.

TAXABILITY OF TRADERS IN VCs
Whether a particular asset is a capital asset or a stock-in-trade has been one of the burning issues under the Income-tax Act. Section 2(14) defines the term ‘capital asset’ to mean property of any kind held by an assessee, whether or not connected with his business or profession, but it does not include any stock-in-trade. Hence, a stock-in-trade of any nature, whether securities, land or VCs, would be outside the purview of a capital asset.

People who trade in VCs, i.e., frequently buy and sell cryptos, are as much traders in VCs as a person dealing in shares and securities. The usual tests laid down to distinguish a trader from an investor would apply even in the case of VCs. Hence, tests such as intention at the time of purchase, frequency of trades, quantum, regularity, accounting treatment, amount of stock held on hand, whether purchase and sale take place in quick succession, whether borrowed funds have been used for the purchase, etc., are all relevant tests to help determine whether a person is a dealer / trader in VCs or an investor. The ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in CIT vs. Associated Industrial Development Company (P) Ltd. 82 ITR 586 (SC) in the context of securities would be equally relevant even in the case of VCs. The Court held that whether a particular holding is by way of investment or forms part of the stock-in-trade is a matter which is within the knowledge of the assessee who holds the asset and it should, in normal circumstances, be in a position to produce evidence from its records as to whether it has maintained any distinction between those shares which are its stock-in-trade and those which are held by way of investment.

The CBDT Circular No. 4/2007, dated 15th June, 2007 and Circular No. 6/2016 dated 29th February, 2016, issued in the context of taxability of gains on sale of securities would assist in determining the issue even for VCs.

If a person is a trader in VCs, then any gain made by him would be taxable as business income. The purchase price of the VCs would be allowed as a deduction even if the Government / RBI takes a stand that trading in VCs is illegal.

One school of thought also suggests that since there is no actual delivery involved in the case of VCs, transactions in VCs should be treated as a speculative transaction u/s 43(5). But it would be incorrect to say that delivery is not given in case of VCs because they are credited to a digital wallet. Delivery need not always be physical and could even be constructive or symbolic and should be seen in the context of the goods in question. However, this could become a litigious issue. For example, shares in dematerialised format are credited to a demat account and not physically delivered. Similarly, mutual fund units only appear in a statement.

Section 43(5) states that any commodity in which a contract for the purchase / sale is settled otherwise than by an actual delivery or transfer of the commodity, would be treated as a speculative transaction. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Internet and Mobile Association of India vs. Reserve Bank of India, WP(C) No. 528/2018, order dated 4th March, 2020 (SC) has held that it was not possible to accept the contention that VCs were just goods / commodities and could never be regarded as real money! Thus, while the Court has not come to a definite conclusion, the fact that VCs are commodities has been upheld by the Apex Court. In such a scenario, could the trading in VCs be treated as a speculative business? If so, then the losses from this business can only be set off against speculative gains u/s 73 of the Act, and the losses to the extent not set off can be carried forward only for four assessment years. Yet another school of thought suggests that the profits from trading in VCs should be taxed as Income from Other Sources.

TAXABILITY OF INVESTORS IN VCs
For investors in VCs, the gains would be taxable as capital gains. Depending upon whether the VC in question has been held for a period of more than or less than three years, the VCs would be treated as long-term capital assets or short-term capital assets. Long-term capital gains would be eligible for indexation and would be taxed @ 20% + surcharge + cess. Short-term capital gains, on the other hand, would be taxed as per the regular slab rate applicable to the investor. It must be pointed out that the special concessional tax rates of 10% with grandfathering of the cost for long-term gains in case of listed shares and 15% in the case of short-term gains on listed shares, do not apply to gains on VCs. Any long-term capital gain made on the sale of VCs can be saved by an Individual / HUF by reinvesting the net sale consideration in the purchase / construction of a new house property u/s 54F.

Receiving VCs as payment for goods / services
If a business receives payment for the goods / services sold by it in the form of VCs, then it would be treated as a barter exchange and the fair market value of the VCs received would be treated as the consideration received for the sale / supply. The cost of goods sold / services rendered would be deducted from this consideration and the gains would be taxable as business income.

Payment for mining
One buzzword associated with VCs is ‘mining’. A ‘VC miner’ is like the miner in the coal / gold / ore mine who, through his arduous labour, comes up with a prized catch. A Bitcoin miner is one who solves complex, cryptic math puzzles on the Bitcoin network and makes the network secure by validating the transactions which take place on it. While it is difficult to explain this concept, suffice it to say that miners help in improving the transaction network of VCs. And a miner receives payment in the form of VCs! Now how would this transaction be taxed is the question.

A good way to look at this would be that the miner is actually providing a service by carrying out the mining. Hence, the income from the same should be taxed as his business income. The cost of power, depreciation on IT equipment, maintenance, etc., would all be deductible expenses incurred to earn this income. The fair market value of the VCs received by the miner would be treated as the consideration for the service and the difference would be taxed as his business income. The Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs is also considering levying GST on mining activities on the ground that these constitute a service. Alternatively, if it is not a business income, it may be taxed as Income from Other Sources.

A more aggressive view is that income from mining consists of capital gains arising from a self-generated asset. This could be used for amateurs who are into VC mining as opposed to miners who carry on the activity as an occupation. Here, applying the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in CIT vs. B.C. Srinivasa Shetty [1981] 128 ITR 294 (SC), a view is taken that since the cost of acquisition of such a self-generated capital asset cannot be determined and that since section 55(2) has not prescribed the cost of acquisition / improvement of the same to be Nil, the income cannot be taxed. It is likely that the Tax Department would contest this view.

Gift of VCs
What would be the tax treatment if a person gifts VCs to another person? A gift of specified property is taxable u/s 56(2)(x) in the hands of the recipient except in the exempt cases. However, the gift must be of property as defined in the Explanation to section 56(2)(x). Property is defined to mean any sum of money, immovable property, shares and securities, jewellery / bullion, art / sculptures and archaeological collections. The Government of India has constantly taken a stand (as explained above) that VCs are not money / legal currency in India. And that VCs are not shares and securities. Thus, VCs are not property as understood u/s 56(2)(x). Accordingly, it stands to reason that the provisions of section 56(2)(x) cannot apply in the hands of a donee who gets a gift of VCs.

Disclosure in Income-tax returns
Any individual / HUF who has annual total income exceeding Rs. 50 lakhs needs to file Schedule AL on Assets and Liabilities in his Income-tax return.

The assets required to be reported in this Schedule include immovable assets (land and building), financial assets, viz., bank deposits, shares and securities, insurance policies, loans and advances given, cash in hand, movable assets, viz., jewellery, bullion, vehicles, yachts, boats, aircraft, etc. Hence, it is an inclusive definition of the term assets. If a person owns VCs, it stands to reason that the same should also be included in the asset disclosures under Schedule AL. The cost price of the VC needs to be disclosed under this Schedule. For a resident who holds VCs credited to an overseas digital wallet / held with a foreign crypto exchange during the previous year, even if he has duly reported them in Schedule FA (foreign assets), he is required to report such foreign assets again in Schedule AL, if applicable.

However, for a non-resident or ‘resident but not ordinarily resident’, only the details of VCs located in India are to be mentioned. It would be interesting to note in the case of VCs how the situs of the asset would be determined.

Another Schedule to be considered is Schedule FA on foreign assets. A resident in India is required to furnish details of any foreign asset held by him in Schedule FA. This Schedule need not be filled up by a ‘not ordinarily resident’ or a ‘non-resident’. The details of all foreign assets or accounts in respect of which a resident is a beneficial owner, a beneficiary or the legal owner, is required to be mandatorily disclosed in the Schedule FA. Tables A1 to G of Schedule FA deal with the disclosures of various foreign assets and comprise of foreign depository accounts – foreign custodian accounts, foreign equity and debt interest, foreign cash value insurance contract or annuity contract, financial interest in any entity outside India, any immovable property outside India, any other capital assets outside India, any other account located outside India in which the resident is a signing authority, etc. The CBDT has not offered any guidance on how foreign VCs should be disclosed. However, in the absence of any clarity the same may be disclosed under either of the following two Tables of Schedule FA:

• Table D – Any other capital assets outside India
• Table E – Any other account located outside India in which the resident assessee is a signing authority (which is not reported in Tables A1 to D).

In Table D, the value of total investment at cost of any other capital asset held at any time during the accounting period and the nature and amount of income derived from the capital asset during the accounting period is required to be disclosed after converting the same into Indian currency. Further, the amount of income which is chargeable to tax in India, out of the foreign source income, should also be specified at column (9). The relevant Schedule of the ITR where income has been offered to tax should be mentioned at columns (10) and (11). The instructions state that for the purposes of disclosure in Table D, capital assets include any other financial asset which is not reported in Table B, but shall not include stock-in-trade and business assets which are included in the balance sheet. Hence, VCs held as stock-in-trade by traders would not be included in this Table.

In Table E, the value of peak balance or total investment at cost, in respect of the accounts in which the assessee has a signing authority, during the accounting period is required to be disclosed after converting the same into Indian currency. Only those foreign accounts which have not been reported in Table A1 to Table D of the Schedule should be reported in Table E.

One school of thought tends to suggest that in the absence of any specific guidance on disclosure under Schedule FA, VCs need not be disclosed. This would be playing with fire. The Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income and Assets) Act, 2015 levies a penalty of Rs. 10 lakhs for non- / improper disclosures in Schedule FA. Hence, it would be better to err on the safe side and disclose the foreign VCs held.

It should be remembered that even though there is a question mark under FEMA over whether the Liberalised Remittance Scheme can be used for buying foreign VCs, disclosures under Schedule FA should nevertheless be made. Income-tax disclosures and taxation are not dependent upon the permissibility or otherwise of a transaction!

CONCLUSION
The world of cryptocurrencies is of high reward but carries high regulatory risk. This is due to the fact that there are a lot of uncertainties and unknown factors coupled with the apparently hostile attitude of the RBI and the Government towards VCs. People transacting in them should do so with full knowledge of the underlying issues that could arise. The famous Latin maxim ‘Caveat Emptor’ or ‘Buyer Beware’ squarely applies to all transactions involving virtual currencies!

(Concluded)  

CURRENT VS. NON-CURRENT CLASSIFICATION WHEN LOAN IS RESCHEDULED OR REFINANCED

This article deals with current vs. non-current classification where a loan is refinanced or the loan repayment is rescheduled subsequent to the reporting date but before the financial statements are approved for issue.

 QUERY

Entity Ze has a five-year bank loan that was outstanding at 31st March, 20X1, the reporting date. At the reporting date, the loan had already completed a term of four years and six months. Therefore, at 31st March, 20X1, the loan was repayable before 30th September, 20X1. On 30th June, 20X1, Entity Ze approved the financial statements for issue. However, after 31st March, 20X1 but before 30th June, 20X1, it signed an agreement with the bank to refinance the loan for another five years. The entity did not have discretion to refinance the loan at the reporting date. It was agreed between the bank and the entity post-31st March, 20X1 but before the financial statements were approved for issue. Entity Ze wants to classify this as a non-current liability. Is that an acceptable position?
 

RESPONSE

No. This is not an acceptable position. At 31st March, 20X1, Entity Ze should present the loan as current liability instead of as non-current liability.

References of the Standard

The following paragraphs of Ind AS 1 Presentation of Financial Statements are relevant:

 

69 An entity shall classify a liability as current when:

(a) it expects to settle the liability in its normal operating cycle;

(b) it holds the liability primarily for the purpose of trading;

(c) the liability is due to be settled within twelve months after the reporting period; or

(d) it does not have an unconditional right to defer settlement of the liability for at least twelve months after the reporting period (see paragraph 73). Terms of a liability that could, at the option of the counter-party, result in its settlement by the issue of equity instruments do not affect its classification.

An entity shall classify all other liabilities as non-current.

 

72 An entity classifies its financial liabilities as current when they are due to be settled within twelve months after the reporting period, even if:

a. the original term was for a period longer than twelve months, and

b. an agreement to refinance, or to reschedule payments, on a long-term basis is completed after the reporting period and before the financial statements are approved for issue.
 

73 If an entity expects, and has the discretion, to refinance or roll over an obligation for at least twelve months after the reporting period under an existing loan facility, it classifies the obligation as non-current, even if it would otherwise be due within a shorter period. However, when refinancing or rolling over the obligation is not at the discretion of the entity (for example, there is no arrangement for refinancing), the entity does not consider the potential to refinance the obligation and classifies the obligation as current.

 

74 Where there is a breach of a material provision of a long-term loan arrangement on or before the end of the reporting period with the effect that the liability becomes payable on demand on the reporting date, the entity does not classify the liability as current, if the lender agreed, after the reporting period and before the approval of the financial statements for issue, not to demand payment as a consequence of the breach.

 

75 However, an entity classifies the liability as non-current if the lender agreed by the end of the reporting period to provide a period of grace ending at least twelve months after the reporting period, within which the entity can rectify the breach and during which the lender cannot demand immediate repayment.

ANALYSIS

Paragraph 69 contains provisions relating to when a financial liability is presented as current. Paragraph 74 contains more of an exception to paragraph 69.

 

Paragraphs 74 and 75 of Ind AS 1 contain provisions relating to curing of a breach of a material provision of a loan. As per paragraph 74, a loan is presented as non-current if a breach of a material provision relating to a loan is cured after the end of the reporting period, but before the financial statements are approved for issue, such that the loan is no longer current.

 

As per paragraph 75, if the lender provides a grace period ending at least twelve months after the reporting period, within which a breach can be rectified, the loan is treated as non-current.

 

The fact pattern that is being dealt with is not relating to the curing of a breach. It is related to extension of the loan term that is otherwise current at the reporting date. With regard to this fact pattern, it is paragraphs 72 and 73 that apply rather than paragraphs 74 and 75. As per paragraph 72, the entity classifies its financial liabilities as current when they are due to be settled within twelve months after the reporting period, even if the original term was for a period longer than twelve months, and an agreement to refinance the loan on a long-term basis is completed after the reporting period and before the financial statements are approved for issue. Paragraph 73 confirms that if an entity did not have the refinancing or rescheduling rights prior to the reporting date, any refinancing or rescheduling agreement on a long-term basis post the reporting date but before the financial statements are approved for issue, the loan would not qualify as a non-current liability at the reporting date.

CONCLUSION

On the basis of the above, at 31st March, 20X1, Entity Ze should present the loan as current liability instead of as non-current liability. Post the reporting period, and after the loan is rescheduled or refinanced on a long-term basis, Entity Ze would present them as non-current.  

Revision u/s 263 – Inquiry conducted by the A.O. – Inadequacy in conduct of inquiry – Revision bad in law

10 Principal Commissioner of Income Tax vs. M/s Brahma Centre Development Pvt. Ltd. [Income Tax Appeal No. 116 & 118 of 2021; Date of order: 5th July, 2021 (Delhi High Court)] [Arising from ITA Nos. 4341/Del/2019 and 4342/Del/2019; A.Ys.: 2012-2013 and 2013-2014]

Revision u/s 263 – Inquiry conducted by the A.O. – Inadequacy in conduct of inquiry – Revision bad in law

The PCIT vide his orders dated 28th March, 2019, interfered with the assessment orders dated 31st January, 2017 and 27th September, 2017 passed by the A.O. concerning the respondent / assessee pertaining to A.Ys. 2012-13 and 2013-14, respectively.

The PCIT had interfered with the original assessment orders because of a view held by him that interest earned by the assessee against fixed deposits was adjusted, i.e., deducted from the value of the inventory and not credited to the Profit & Loss account. The PCIT noted that the tax auditor, in the report filed in Form 3CD, had observed that interest earned on fixed deposits pertained to ‘other income’ and had not been credited to the P&L account. The interest earned on fixed deposits in A.Y. 2012-13 was Rs. 9,47,04,585, whereas in A.Y. 2013-14 it was Rs. 4,32,91,517.

Consequently, after the PCIT had issued two separate show cause notices to the assessee concerning the aforementioned A.Ys. dated 20th February, 2019 and had received replies against the same, he proceeded to pass two separate orders of even date, i.e., 28th March, 2019 concerning A.Ys. 2012-13 and 2013-14. The PCIT interfered with the orders of assessment on the ground that they had been passed without making any inquiries as to whether the interest earned by the assessee had any nexus with the real estate project the construction of which was undertaken by the assessee. Thus, according to the PCIT, the assessment orders were ‘erroneous’ insofar as they were prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. In the appeals preferred before the Tribunal by the assessee, the view held by the PCIT was reversed. Thus, the Revenue approached the High Court by way of the instant appeals.

The High Court observed that it is not in dispute that the assessee was engaged, inter alia, in the business of promotion, construction and development of commercial projects. It is also not in dispute that the assessee had undertaken construction / development of a project allotted to it by the Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation (‘HSIIDC’). It was observed that on 11th August, 2016, the Chartered Accountants of the assessee, i.e., BSR and Co. LLP, filed their response to certain queries raised by the A.O. at a hearing held before him on 9th August, 2016 concerning A.Y. 2013-14. One of the queries raised concerned the exclusion of interest received on fixed deposits from the category / head ‘income from other sources’. Likewise, in response to a notice dated 14th September, 2017 issued by the A.O. under sections 154 and 155 in respect of A.Y. 2012-13, a reply was submitted by the assessee on 12th October, 2017. In the notice dated 14th September, 2017, inter alia, it was brought to the attention of the assessee that audit scrutiny had, amongst others, raised objections regarding the interest earned on fixed deposits in A.Y. 2012-13 which was not credited to the P&L account and had been deducted from the value of inventory. The assessee had filed an appropriate reply.

The Court observed that having regard to the aforesaid documents, it cannot be said that the inquiry or verification was not carried out by the A.O. The Tribunal has recorded findings of fact concerning the inquiry made by the A.O.

The fact that the A.O. has not given reasons in the assessment order is not indicative, always, of whether or not he has applied his mind. Therefore, scrutiny of the record is necessary and while scrutinising the record the Court has to keep in mind the difference between lack of inquiry and perceived inadequacy in inquiry. Inadequacy in conduct of inquiry cannot be the reason based on which powers u/s 263 can be invoked to interdict an assessment order. If an Income-tax Officer acting in accordance with law makes a certain assessment, the same cannot be branded as erroneous by the Commissioner simply because, according to him, the order should have been written more elaborately.

The Income-tax Officer had made inquiries in regard to the nature of the expenditure incurred by the assessee. The assessee had given a detailed explanation in that regard by a letter in writing. All these are part of the record of the case. Evidently, the claim was allowed by the Income-tax Officer on being satisfied with the explanation of the assessee. Such decision of the Income-tax Officer cannot be held to be ‘erroneous’ simply because in his order he did not offer an elaborate discussion in that regard. The A.O., having received a response to his query about the adjustment of interest in the A.Y.s concerned, against inventory, concluded that there was a nexus between the receipt of funds from investors located abroad and the real estate project, which upon being invested generated interest. Thus, it cannot be said that the conclusion arrived at by the A.O., that such adjustment was permissible in law, was erroneous.

The Court observed that in the instant cases, it was not as if the funds were surplus and therefore invested in a fixed deposit. The funds were received for the real estate project and while awaiting their deployment, they were invested in a fixed deposit which generated interest.

Furthermore, the Court observed that it need not examine whether Clauses (a) and (b) of Explanation 2 appended to section 263 could have been applied to the A.Y.s in question since, on facts, it has been found by the Tribunal that an inquiry was, indeed, conducted by the A.O.

Thus, for the reasons stated, the Revenue appeals are dismissed.

Direct tax Vivad se Vishwas – Appellant – Communication of assessment order – Order must be served in accordance with section 282 of the Act – Time limit to file appeal had not expired as petitioner had not received the assessment order

9 Ashok G. Jhaveri vs. Union of India & Others [Writ petition No. 722 of 2021; Date of order: 28th July, 2021 (Bombay High Court)]

Direct tax Vivad se Vishwas – Appellant – Communication of assessment order – Order must be served in accordance with section 282 of the Act – Time limit to file appeal had not expired as petitioner had not received the assessment order

The petitioner had filed a return of income for A.Y. 2012-13 in March, 2013, declaring a total income of Rs. 7,02,170. The respondent issued a notice u/s 148 reopening the assessment for the said A.Y. 2012-13 in March, 2019.

According to the petitioner, he received a notice u/s 274 r/w/s 271 (1)(c) on 25th December, 2019 via e-mail and the said notice was also uploaded on his e-filing portal account. He had responded to the same through the e-filing portal on 23rd January, 2020, pointing out that he had not received the assessment order u/s 143(3) r/w/s 147, nor had the same been uploaded on the e-filing portal and therefore he was unable to reply to the show cause notice.

The petitioner had requested the respondent to send the assessment order to the address mentioned in his letter dated 29th January, 2020 filed on 3rd February, 2020. The petitioner was issued a letter by respondent No. 4, referring to the outstanding demand and directed to pay 20% of the outstanding demand amount. The petitioner once again, by an on-line response dated 8th February, 2020, communicated that the assessment order has not been received at his end; neither was the order uploaded on the e-filing portal nor was it served with the Notice of Demand u/s 156.

In the meantime, the Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020 (‘DTVSV Act, 2020’) came into force under a Notification dated 17th March, 2020 to help settle matters in respect of disputed tax. The petitioner once again approached the respondents to issue the assessment order. He received the assessment order on 15th December, 2020 – which had been passed on 22nd December, 2019.

Now, u/s 2(1)(a)(ii) of the DTVSV Act, the term ‘appellant’ is defined as being an assessee in whose case the assessment order is passed by the A.O. and the time limit to file an appeal against such order has not expired on 31st January, 2020. The petitioner had opted for the DTVSV scheme by filing an application on 23rd December, 2020 in Forms 1 and 2 of the DTVSV Act and Rules thereunder. However, the status of the application filed by him under the DTVSV scheme showed that the application had been rejected for the reason that he had not filed any appeal against the order in respect of which he wished to avail benefit (an assessee has to file an appeal on or before 31st January, 2020) and since the appeal had not been filed, it did not fulfil the criteria prescribed under the DTVSV Act.

According to the petitioner, while the time limit to file appeal is 30 days from the date of communication of notice of demand u/s 249(2)(b), the benefit of the scheme under the DTVSV Act, 2020 would be available to him as the time limit to file an appeal had not expired because he had not received the assessment order despite repeated requests.

The respondents contended that the petitioner had been given an intimation letter through the e-proceedings on 22nd December, 2019 and, thus, it has to be presumed that the assessment order has been issued and served. It was submitted that the petitioner’s claim of non-receipt of assessment order through the on-line filing portal is difficult to be appreciated as there is no such grievance by any other assessee. Ordinarily, the assessment order is sent alongside. As such, non-receipt of assessment order through on-line filing portal is not probable; therefore, it cannot be said that the order was not issued to the assessee.

On verification, the respondents informed the Court that it does not appear that attachment of assessment order had accompanied the intimation.

In this context, the Court referred to section 282 which refers to service of notice. On perusal of the same, the Court observed that it is clear that the service of an order ought to have been made by delivering or transmitting a copy thereof in the manner contained in section 282, which admittedly had not been done until 15th December, 2020.

The Court observed that this was a peculiar case where the assessment order of 22nd December, 2019 had not been served upon the petitioner till he obtained a copy on 15th December, 2020 and as can be seen from the aforesaid discussion, the petitioner was handicapped from lodging an appeal before the specified date, i.e., 31st January, 2020 for no fault of his. In the circumstances, it would emerge that the petitioner would be able to avail benefit of the term ‘appellant’ under section 2(1)(a)(ii) of the DTVSV Act.

The Court also noted that in Circular No. 9 of 2020 dated 22nd April, 2020 in its reply to Question Nos. 1 and 23, it has been stated that where any order has been passed under the Act and the time limit to file an appeal has not expired on 31st January, 2020, then the assessee can very well opt for the said scheme. The purpose and object behind bringing in the DTVSV Act is to provide resolution of disputed tax matters and to put an end to litigation and unlock revenue detained under litigation.

The respondents were directed to consider the petitioner’s application in accordance with the provisions of the DTVSV Act and Rules. The petition was allowed.

Writ – Notice u/s 148 – Writ petition against notice – Court holding notice invalid – Directions could not be issued once reassessment held to be without jurisdiction

50 T. Stanes and Company Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT [2021] 435 ITR 539 (Mad) A.Ys.: 2010-11, 2011-12; Date of order: 9th October, 2020 Ss. 147, 148 of ITA, 1961; and Art. 226 of Constitution of India

Writ – Notice u/s 148 – Writ petition against notice – Court holding notice invalid – Directions could not be issued once reassessment held to be without jurisdiction

Writ petitions were filed by the assessee contending that the notices issued u/s 148 to reopen the assessment u/s 147 for the A.Ys. 2010-11 and 2011-12 were without jurisdiction being based on change of opinion. The single judge held that the reassessment was without jurisdiction but observed that the A.O. could proceed on other grounds.

The Division Bench of the Madras High Court allowed the appeals filed by the assessee and held as under:

‘The findings rendered by the single judge and his order to the extent of holding that the reassessment proceedings u/s 147 were without jurisdiction, were to be confirmed but his directions / observations were set aside. Having held that the reassessment proceedings were without jurisdiction, to make any further observation / direction was not sustainable.’

Special deduction u/s 80JJAA – Employment of new employees – Return of income – Delay in filing revised return claiming benefit u/s 80JJAA – Submission of audit report along with return – Substantive benefit cannot be denied on ground of procedural formality – Assessee entitled to benefit u/s 80JJAA

49 Craftsman Automation P. Ltd. vs. CIT [2021] 435 ITR 558 (Mad) A.Y.: 2004-05; Date of order: 6th February, 2020 Ss. 80JJAA, 139(5), 264 of ITA, 1961

Special deduction u/s 80JJAA – Employment of new employees – Return of income – Delay in filing revised return claiming benefit u/s 80JJAA – Submission of audit report along with return – Substantive benefit cannot be denied on ground of procedural formality – Assessee entitled to benefit u/s 80JJAA

The assessee was entitled to deduction u/s 80JJAA. For the A.Y. 2004-05, the assessee had not claimed deduction u/s 80JJAA in the return of income. The assessee filed a revised return making a claim for deduction u/s 80JJAA and claimed refund. The A.O. refused to act on the revised return.

The Commissioner rejected the revision application u/s 264 on the grounds that according to sub-section (2) of section 80JJAA, deduction could not be allowed unless the assessee furnished with the return of income the report of the accountant, as defined in the Explanation below sub-section (2) of section 288 giving such particulars, and that the revised return was filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed u/s 139(5). The assessee filed this writ petition and challenged the order u/s 264. The Madras High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

‘i) If an assessee is entitled to a benefit, a technical failure on the part of the assessee to claim the benefit in time should not come in the way of grant of the substantial benefit that was otherwise available under the Income-tax Act, 1961 but for such technical failure. The legislative intent is not to whittle down or deny benefits which are legitimately available to an assessee. The A.O. is duty-bound to extend substantive benefits which are available and arrive at just tax to be paid.

ii) The failure to file a return within the period u/s 139 for the purpose of claiming benefit of deduction u/s 80JJAA was a procedural formality. The assessee was entitled to benefit u/s 80JJAA.

iii) Denial of substantive benefit could not be justified. It was precisely for dealing with such situations that powers had been vested with superior officers like the Commissioner u/s 264. The Commissioner ought to have allowed the revision application filed by the assessee u/s 264 and the assessee was entitled to partial relief.

Accordingly, the order of the Commissioner was set aside and the Assistant Commissioner directed to pass appropriate orders on the merits ignoring the delay on the part of the assessee in filing the revised return u/s 139(5) and failure to furnish the audit report.’

GOVERNMENT INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS

INTRODUCTION
Infrastructure development is one of the stated priorities of the Government. While it is primarily the responsibility of the Government to ensure speedy infrastructure development and provide access to such infrastructure to the citizens at minimal possible cost, over a period of time participation of the private sector has been solicited through the Public Private Partnership (PPP) model.

For example, under the Build Operate & Transfer (BOT) model, the Government or its designated agencies and the successful bidder enter into an agreement termed as ‘Concession Agreement’ wherein the Government / its designated agency agree to grant a concession to private sector infrastructure companies who in legal parlance are known as ‘concessionaires’. The grant of such a concession permits the concessionaire to build the infrastructure (as may be agreed), operate it over a period of time and ultimately transfer it back to the Government. There is a nominal fee which is generally payable by the infrastructure company for such a right granted by the Government / its designated agency. This charging of fee by the Government / its designated agency indicates that the concessionaire is the service recipient in the current case and the Government / its designated agency assumes the role of a service provider.

Under this model, the revenue for the infrastructure company could be in different forms. The most common method of revenue generation for it is the grant of the right to collect usage charges. This right is granted to the infrastructure company for the contract period. The second model which is also very common is the annuity model wherein the Government / its designated agencies agree to make a fixed periodic payment to the concessionaire, while the collection of usage charges is done by the Government / designated agency themselves. There is also a third revenue model, commonly known as the hybrid annuity model, where collection of usage charges for a certain period is with the concessionaire and after that period the Government / designated agencies collect the usage charges themselves and pay a lump sum annuity to the concessionaire.

The above models of infrastructure development are in stark contrast with other traditional models in which the private sector contractor is expected to construct the infrastructure as a contractor and receives a pre-defined consideration.

Such different models result in diverse GST consequences both on the levy of tax on the development efforts as well as the claim of input tax credit (ITC). Further, the receipt of usage charges during the O&M period also has different GST consequences. This article deals with some of the GST issues arising in such infrastructure development projects.

GST IMPLICATIONS ON BOT PROJECTS

While analysing the GST implications on a Government project, the first step is to understand the nature of the project. Let us see this with the help of a standard project under the BOT model where the infrastructure company enters into a ‘concession agreement’ with the Government / designated agency. Generally, the agreements are worded in such a manner as to state that the Government / designated agency has agreed to ‘grant a concession’ to the concessionaire, i.e., the infrastructure company, for which the latter has to pay a nominal consideration (generally, Rs. 1). In such cases, it is apparent that it is the infrastructure company which receives the supply and the Government / designated agency which actually makes the supply. While the tax implications would be immaterial in view of the nominal consideration, the legal issues could be identified as under:

• Whether the supply by Government / designated agency would qualify as supply of goods or services?
While an intangible property is treated as goods, in view of the decision in the case of Tata Consultancy Services vs. State of AP [2004 (178) ELT 22 (SC)], it needs to satisfy the tests of utility, capability of being bought and sold and, lastly, capability of being transmitted, transferred, delivered, stored, possessed, etc. While undoubtedly in the current case the rights would have been granted to the concessionaire, such rights would be lacking the characteristics referred to in the TCS case. In such a situation, it would be more appropriate to treat the rights granted as service rather than goods.

• If supply of services, whether the recipient would be liable to pay GST under RCM?
Once it is concluded that the supply is that of service and the service provider is the Government / designated agency, the provisions of reverse charge would get triggered and there would be a liability to pay GST under reverse charge mechanism. Of course, the recipient can claim exemption if the value of service does not exceed Rs. 5,000 as provided for vide Entry 9 of Notification No. 12/2017-CT (Rate) dated 28th June, 2017.

GST implications on core revenue
Let us now discuss the GST implications on the core revenue, i.e., usage charges collected by the concessionaire. Under the BOT model, there are different ways in which the concessionaire receives the said revenue, namely:
• Standard Model – Collection of usage charges,
• Annuity Model – Periodic payment from the Government / designated agencies,
• Hybrid Model – Collection of usage charges plus periodic annuity payment from the Government / designated agencies.

The tax implication on the first model is very simple as one merely needs to analyse the tax implications on the collection charges, which may vary depending on the nature of the collection charges. For example,
• collection of usage charges in respect of access to road is exempted by Entry 23 of Notification No. 12/2017-CT (Rate);
• services provided by way of transportation of passengers through rail (other than first class / an air-conditioned coach), including metro rails, is exempted vide Entry 17;
• services provided by way of transportation of passengers through rail by way of first class / an air-conditioned coach is liable to GST @ 5%;
• services of transportation of goods by rail is liable to GST @ 12% except in case where Indian Railways itself undertakes the transportation, in which case the same is liable to GST @ 5%;
• in case of ports (air / sea), there is no exemption and therefore charges collected from such users are liable to GST @ 18%.

The controversy revolves around the annuity model for roads. An annuity is a periodic payment made by the Government / designated agency to the concessionaire. Under this model, the collection of toll / usage charges is undertaken by the Government / designated agency and the concessionaire has no role to play in the same. There is a controversy around taxability of such annuity payments. This is because in case of such agreements the transaction structure takes a shift and even the concessionaire becomes a service provider, to the extent that he has constructed the infrastructure for which he has received the annuity payments from the Government / designated agencies. In that context, the annuity payments become liable to GST @ 12%. This has also been clarified by the recent CBIC Circular 150/06/2021-GST dated 7th June, 2021 wherein the Board has clarified that the said exemption will not apply to annuity paid for construction of roads. However, the said Circular apparently makes Entry 23A of Notification No. 12/2017-CT (Rate) which exempts service by way of access to a road or a bridge on payment of annuity, irrelevant. The said exemption Entry was introduced after discussions at the GST Council meeting held on 13th October, 2017 which read as under:

‘Agenda item 13(iv): Issue of Annuity being given in Place of Toll Charges to Developers of Public Infrastructure – exemption thereon
61. Introducing this Agenda item, the Joint Secretary (TRU-II), C.B.E. & C. stated that while toll is a payment made by the users of road to concessionaires for usage of roads, annuity is an amount paid by the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) to concessionaires for construction of roads in order that the concessionaire did not charge toll for access to a road or a bridge. In other words, annuity is a consideration for the service provided by concessionaires to NHAI. He stated that construction of roads was now subject to tax at the rate of 12% and due to this, there was free flow of input tax credit from EPC (Engineering, Procurement and Construction) contractor to the concessionaires and thereafter to NHAI. He stated that as a result, tax at the rate of 12% leviable on the service of road construction provided by concessionaire to NHAI would be paid partly from the input tax credit available with them. He stated that the Council may take a view for grant of exemption to annuity paid by NHAI / State Highways Construction Authority to concessionaires during construction of roads. He added that access to a road or bridge on payment of toll was already exempt from tax. The Hon’ble Minister from Haryana suggested to also cover under this provision annuity paid by State-owned Corporations. After discussion, the Council decided to treat annuity at par with toll and to exempt from tax, service by way of access to a road or bridge on payment of annuity.’

Interestingly, before the above clarification from the CBIC, the issue was dealt with by the AAAR in the case of Nagaur Mukundgarh Highways Private Limited [2019 (23) GSTL 214 (AAAR-GST)]. In this case, the AAAR held that annuity paid during the construction phase would be liable to GST under SAC 9954, while annuity paid during the O&M phase would be exempted under SAC 9967. However, the said ruling seems to be on a weak footing mainly because there is nothing in the concession agreements which states that the annuity paid post completion of work is towards the O&M phase only and not towards the construction activity. Therefore, appropriating annuity paid during the O&M phase towards the toll charges seems to be improper.

A proper clarification on this issue would certainly be forthcoming since the amounts mentioned in such contracts are generally inclusive of GST and if ultimately it is held that GST is indeed payable on the annuity component, the entire financials for the project would be impacted since it would have a 12% GST impact, of course with corresponding benefit. But it should be kept in mind that in case of long-term projects, if a position has been initially taken that the annuity was not liable for GST, corresponding ITC would not have been taken and the same would now be time-barred. Therefore, the GST credit may be available only prospectively and the benefit may not be substantial to that effect.

INPUT TAX CREDIT IMPLICATIONS
This now takes us to the next aspect of ITC. To understand the ITC-related implications, it may be important to put down the chronology of events:
• The concessionaire receives services from the Government / designated agency;
• The concessionaire undertakes the development of infrastructure activity, which entails paying GST on various inward supplies;
• The revenue is earned by collecting usage charges from the users.

It is imperative to note that in most of the cases, the infrastructure so developed is an immovable property, such as roads, airports, seaports, metro rail, etc. Therefore, the issue remains whether ITC can at all be claimed in view of section 17(5)(c)/(d) of the CGST Act, 2017 which restricts claim of ITC on account of goods or services (including works contract services) received for construction of an immovable property on own account. Of course, the said restriction applies only if the cost incurred towards the same is capitalised in the books of accounts.

This opens up an important dimension from the accounting perspective. It should be noted that the concessionaire is not the owner of the infrastructure project and therefore the amounts are not capitalised in the books of accounts as Fixed Assets, but rather treated as intangible asset / Financial Asset, which is amortised over a period of time as per the guidelines laid down by the relevant Ind AS. If one takes an aggressive view, the restriction u/s 17(5) may be circumvented and make such concessionaire eligible for ITC.

Secondly, in the case of Safari Retreats Private Limited vs. CC of GST [2019 (25) GSTL 341 (Ori)], the provisions of section 17(5)(d) have been ultra vires the provisions of the object of the Act and it has been held that ITC should be allowed on receipt of goods or services used in the construction of an immovable property which is used for providing an output service. However, it needs to be kept in mind that the Revenue appeal against this order is currently pending before the Supreme Court.

The above discussion would be relevant only in case of projects for airport / seaport where the usage charges to be collected from the users are taxable. However, in case of road projects / metro rail projects there is an exemption from tax on collection of charges and, therefore, even otherwise the claim of credit would be hit by section 17(2) of the CGST Act, 2017 and therefore ITC may not be eligible.

GST IMPLICATIONS ON OTHER GOVERNMENT PROJECTS
In case of projects not under the PPP model, where the contract is given to the infrastructure company for a fixed consideration, the GST implications would be of a different level. This is because Entry 3 of Notification No. 11/2017-CT (Rate) prescribes a lower effective GST rate of 5% / 12% on specific services. However, the said concession is subject to satisfaction of conditions such as:

To whom have the services been supplied?
The entries require that the service should be provided either to the Central Government, State Government, Union Territory, Local Authority, Government Authority or Government Entity.

What constitutes Government Authority / Government Entity has been defined in the Notification itself as under:

Government
Authority

Government
Entity

[(ix) ‘Governmental Authority’ means an
authority or a board or any other body, –

 

(i) set up by an Act of Parliament or a
State Legislature; or

 

(ii) established by any Government,

 

with 90% or more participation by way of
equity or control, to carry out any function entrusted to a Municipality
under Article 243W of the Constitution or to a Panchayat under Article 243G
of the Constitution

(x) ‘Government Entity’ means an authority
or a board or any other body including a society, trust, corporation,

 

(i) set up by an Act of Parliament or State
Legislature; or

 

(ii) established by any Government,

 

with 90% or more participation by way of
equity or control, to carry out a function entrusted by the Central
Government, State Government, Union Territory or a Local Authority.]

From the above, it is apparent that the only distinction between Government Authority and Government Entity is that the former carries out functions entrusted to any Municipality under Article 243W or a Panchayat under Article 243G, while the later carries out any function entrusted to it by the Government.

Nature of service
The next aspect that needs to be looked into is the nature of supply being made. Clauses (iii) and (vi) provide that composite supply of works contract supplied to Central Government, State Government, Union Territory, a Local Authority, a Governmental Authority or a Government Entity by way of construction, erection, commissioning, installation, completion, fitting out, repair, maintenance, renovation, or alteration of, should be considered as eligible for the lower tax rate.

The above highlighted portion is relevant. It requires that the supply should be a composite supply of works contract. This indicates that the supply has to be in relation to an immovable property, owing to the fact that the definition of the term ‘works contract’ applies specifically to immovable property under GST. This aspect was recently dealt with by the AAR in the case of Nexustar Lighting Project Private Limited [2021 (47) GSTL 272] wherein the Authority held that a contract for installation of streetlights did not qualify as a works contract and therefore benefit of lower tax rate was not available.

Service in relation to
The next aspect that needs analysis is whether or not the services are provided in relation to the following:

Under Entry 3 (iii)
(a) a historical monument, archaeological site or remains of national importance, archaeological excavation, or antiquity specified under the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958 (24 of 1958);
(b) canal, dam or other irrigation works;
(c) pipeline, conduit or plant for (i) water supply, (ii) water treatment, or (iii) sewerage treatment or disposal.

Under Entry 3 (vi)
(a) a civil structure or any other original works meant predominantly for use other than for commerce, industry, or any other business or profession;
(b) a structure meant predominantly for use as (i) an educational, (ii) a clinical, or (iii) an art or cultural establishment; or
(c) a residential complex predominantly meant for self-use or the use of their employees or other persons specified in paragraph 3 of the Schedule-III of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.
[Explanation. – For the purposes of this item, the term ‘business’ shall not include any activity or transaction undertaken by the Central Government, a State Government or any Local Authority in which they are engaged as public authorities.]

Under Entry 3 (vii):
Composite supply of works contract involving predominantly earth work, that is constituting 75% of the value of works contract.

Care should be taken specifically while dealing with Entry 3 (vi)(a) where the interpretation of the phrase ‘for use other than for commerce, industry, or any other business or profession’ has created substantial confusion. For example, in the context of works contract services provided in relation to electricity generation plants, the AAR has on multiple occasions held that the activities carried out by electricity generating / distribution companies cannot be treated as ‘for use other than for commerce, industry, or any other business or profession’. One may refer to the recent decisions of the AAAR in the cases of R.S. Development & Constructions Private Limited [2021 (48) GSTL 162 (AAAR – Kar)], Manipal Energy & Infratech Private Limited [2020 (40) GSLT 237 (AAAR – Kar)], etc.

Entry (vii) provides for levy of GST @ 5%. However, the condition is that the service involved should be a composite supply of works contract involving predominantly earth work that is constituting 75% of the value of the works contract. While the term ‘earth work’ has not been defined under the GST law, the same was analysed by the AAAR in the case of Soma Mohite Joint Venture [2020 (041) GSTL 0667 (AAAR – GST – Mah)] wherein the Appellate Authority held that earth work includes both excavation and fortification. Therefore, so long as earth work constitutes more than 75% of the value of a works contract, the benefit of a lower tax rate should be available. However, for such benefit care should be taken to ensure that the contract specifically mentions the consideration for such activity separately. If the break-up is not available, the benefit of the lower rate may be denied.

Common condition
A common condition for Entries (iii) and (vi) when the services are provided to a Government Entity is that the said Government Entity should have procured the said services in relation to a work entrusted to it by the Central Government, State Government, Union Territory or Local Authority, as the case may be.

In Shri Hari Engineers & Contractors [2020 (38) GSTL 396 (AAR – GST – Guj)], the AAR had denied the benefit of lower tax rate for the reason that the Railtel Corporation of India Limited, which had issued the contract, was not entrusted to carry out the said activity by the Central Government / State Government / Union Territory or Local Authority.

Therefore, while concluding classification under Entry 3 (iii) or Entry 3 (vi), fulfilment of this condition should be looked into and documentary evidence to support the same should be obtained.

Extension of benefit to sub-contractors
Vide Entries 3 (ix) and 3 (x), the benefit of lower tax rate is also extended to sub-contractors who make composite supply of works contract to the main contractor. However, it is imperative to note that this benefit applies only for works contract services and not stand-alone services and the same would be liable to GST @ 18%.

Exemption
In addition to lower effective tax rate, certain services supplied to Government have been exempted vide Notification No. 12/2017-CT (Rate). The same is tabulated in the following Table:

Entry

Nature
of supply

Supply
relating to

Service
provided to

3

Pure services (excluding works contract
services or other composite supplies involving supply of any goods)

Any activity in relation to a function
entrusted to a Panchayat under Article 243G / to a Municipality under
Article 243W of the Constitution

Central Government, State Government, Union
Territory, Local Authority, a Governmental Authority or a Government Entity

3A

Composite supply of goods or services
(goods not being more than 25% of the value of the composite supply)

Any activity in relation to a function
entrusted to a Panchayat under Article 243G / to a Municipality under
Article 243W of the Constitution

Central Government, State Government, Union
Territory, Local Authority, a Governmental Authority or a Government Entity

What constitutes ‘pure services’ has not been defined under GST. However, by nomenclature, it seems that supply which does not have any element of supply of goods involved in it would be treated as pure service, for example, consultancy service. This view finds support from the decision of the AAR in the case of R.R. Enterprises [2021 (47) GSTL 309 (AAR – GST – Har)] wherein the Authority held that since only manpower supply services were to be provided by the applicant and since no supply of goods is involved, such services qualify as pure services.

The important aspect which needs to be looked into while dealing with exemption entries is that the services provided should be in relation to a function which has been entrusted to a Municipality under Article 243W or Panchayat under Article 243G. However, the service need not be provided directly to the Municipality or Panchayat. It may be provided to the Central Government / State Government / Government Authority / Government Entity.

The only caveat is that the service should be provided in relation to an activity specified in Article 243W / Article 243G. Whether a particular activity is covered under Article 243G / 243W or not has been dealt with by the AAR on multiple occasions.

In the case of Lokenath Builders [2021 (46) GSTL 205 (AAR – GST – WB)], it was held that waste disposal services by engaging garbage-lifting vehicles and other cleaning equipment without any supply of goods would be a pure service and an activity covered under Entry 6 of the 12th Schedule and therefore eligible for exemption.

In MSV International Inc. [2021 (49) GSTL 171 (AAR – GST – Har)], while the Authority held that the services provided in relation to construction of State / district highways was a pure service, the same would still not be eligible for exemption benefit since the construction of State / district highways was not an activity entrusted to a Municipality under Article 243W / Panchayat under Article 243G of the Constitution.

Similarly, the exemption benefit was denied by the AAR for services provided to National Institute of Technology, an institute of higher education, which was not covered under Article 243W / 243G of the Constitution. (Refer National Institute of Technology [2021 (47) GSTL 314 (AAR – GST – Har)].

In Janaki Suhshikshit Berojgar Nagrik Seva Sansthan Amravati [2021 (46) GSTL 277 (AAR – GST – MH)], the AAR denied the benefit of exemption to service of supply of manpower to Government Medical College. The conclusion of the Authority was that supply of manpower was not covered under either the 11th or the 12th Schedule.

In the view of the authors, the above ruling does not represent the correct position of law. Entry 6 of the 12th Schedule, public health, is the responsibility of the Municipality and therefore it is bound to make necessary arrangements to deliver the same to the citizens. Any service provided by a vendor towards the said activity can therefore be said to be in relation to a function entrusted to the Municipality under Article 243W of the Constitution and therefore eligible for exemption.

There are some other examples of service which can also be eligible for the exemption, such as:
• advertisements placed in the newspapers creating awareness by the Municipal Corporation would be eligible for exemption since activities in relation to public health awareness are among the activities entrusted to the Municipality under Article 243W;
• services provided in relation to collection of parking charges on behalf of the Municipality are covered under Entry 17 of the 12th Schedule of the Constitution and therefore should be eligible for exemption.

The above discussion clearly brings out the need to analyse the tax position of any project at the tendering stage itself. This is because in case of Government projects usually the contract value is treated as inclusive of GST and the contractor has to bill accordingly. If during the tendering process the company bids assuming eligibility for exemption / lower GST rate and ultimately it turns out that the supply was taxable at the normal rate, the implications would be catastrophic.

ARBITRATION CLAIMS
An important part of Government projects (which is also present in private transactions) are the arbitration clauses in the agreements. At times, due to contractual disputes, the parties to a contract may opt for arbitration and reconciliation and there can be flow of money (both ways) depending on the outcome of the project.

While determining taxability of arbitration claims, a detailed reading of the arbitration award is very relevant. For example, in the case of BOT arrangements discussed above, there is a clause for payment of grant to the concessionaire. If there is a delay in payment of grants, the concessionaire may seek compensation and can go for arbitration on the said issue. If the arbitration award is on account of such a dispute, it may not be taxable since the grant itself was not taxable in the first place.

However, if the arbitration award is for a contractual dispute, for example, the contractor lodges a claim of Rs. 2 crores on the client for work done, while the client approves the claim only to the extent of Rs. 1.75 crores – in such cases, the contractor has an option to resort to arbitration for the disputed amount and if the arbitration is in his favour, he would be entitled to receive the differential amount along with costs as may be granted by the arbitration award. In such a case, a more appropriate position would be to say that the differential amount received is towards a supply and therefore liable to GST.

Arbitration claims – rollover from pre-GST regime
In the case of arbitration awards, it has to be kept in mind that the outcome period of the dispute under arbitration is very long. It is possible that arbitration claims for work done during the pre-GST regime get concluded under the GST regime. This will lead to substantial challenges for the contractors for the following reasons, especially in cases where the dispute is on account of quantification of work done:
• Under the pre-GST regime, services to Government were exempted or were taxable at a substantially lower rate (post abatement). Similarly, even under the VAT regime, the applicable tax rate for works contract was on the lower side, say 5% / 8%.
• The work for the said service would have been completed under the pre-GST regime. However, it is seen that the tax on the said amount is not discharged as the claim is not approved by the client and it has been an industry practice to pay tax on such amounts only when the matter reaches finality.
• The issue that arises is whether the tax on such arbitration awards would be payable under the pre-GST laws, i.e., VAT / Service tax, or as per the provisions of the CGST / SGST Acts? The answer to this question would be relevant since under the pre-GST regime the effective tax rate would have been lower as compared to the effective GST rate which is 12% for supplies to Government.

To deal with the above situation, let us refer to section 142(11) of the CGST Act, 2017 which provides that to the extent tax was leviable under the erstwhile VAT Acts or under Chapter V of the Finance Act, 1994, no tax would be leviable under the CGST Act, 2017. It is imperative to note that in case of such roll-over arbitration disputes, the work is already completed before the claim is lodged. It is mere quantification of the work which takes place upon resolution of the dispute and, therefore, it can be said that the tax was actually leviable under the VAT Acts / Finance Act, 1994 itself when the activity was actually carried out and hence a view can be taken that no GST is leviable on such arbitration awards.

Arbitration claims – in the nature of liquidated damages
The next point of discussion would be arbitration claims where the award is in the nature of liquidated damages. Liquidated damages are dealt with under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 within sections 73 and 74. Section 73 states that ‘when a contract has been broken, the aggrieved party is entitled to get compensation or any loss or damages which has been inflicted to him / her naturally during the usual course of breach of contract or about which the parties to the contract had prior knowledge when they entered the contract.’

Similarly, section 74 states that ‘when a contract has been broken, and if a sum is named in the contract as the amount to be paid for such breach, or if the contract contains any other stipulation by way of penalty, the party complaining of the breach is entitled, whether or not actual damage or loss is proved to have been caused thereby, to receive from the party who has broken the contract reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount so named or, as the case may be, the penalty stipulated for’.

Therefore, when an arbitration award is on account of breach of contractual terms, which results in grant of damages to either party, the same would not constitute consideration under the Contract Law and therefore there cannot be any liability towards GST on the same.

TDS DEDUCTION & ASSOCIATED CHALLENGES
Section 51 of the CGST Act, 2017 obligates Government / designated agencies to deduct TDS on payments made for taxable supply of goods or services, or both, received by them.

Unfortunately, as a universal rule TDS is deducted on all payments, including on grants, arbitration awards, etc., without actually analysing whether or not the said payment is towards receipt of taxable supply of goods or services, or both. This results in difficulty for the concessionaire / contractor. This is because if they would have taken a position that they have not made any supply / the supply made by them is exempt, the TDS provisions would not have got triggered. If in such cases also TDS is deducted and if they accept the same, it is likely that the Department may challenge their claim stating that their clients themselves treat the supply as taxable supply, leaving such concessionaires / contractors in a Catch-22 situation.

Of late, it has also been seen that the tax authorities have been issuing notices based on mismatch between the credits reported in GSTR7 by the tax deductors vis-a-vis the liability reported by the contractors. It is imperative to note that there will generally be a time gap between disclosure of liability by the supplier and deduction of tax by the deductor. This is because the supplier would pay the tax when he issues the invoice to the deductor-client. However, such invoice goes through the approval
process which generally consumes time and before the invoice is accounted by the deductor-client and TDS is deducted.

It is therefore advisable that before any TDS credit is claimed, the same be reconciled with the month in which the corresponding liability was discharged and, preferably, if the client has deducted TDS in advance (on provisional basis), such credit should be kept deferred and claimed only when the actual invoice is issued by the contractor and the corresponding liability discharged.

CONCLUSION
The general perception in the industry is that doing business with the Government is a profitable venture. But there are many complications and confusions which make such businesses quite risky. It is always advisable for taxpayers to be very careful while taking a position on a transaction with Government as the tax would generally have to be paid out of one’s own pocket, thus having a severe impact on the overall profitability of the venture.

Recovery of tax – Set-off of refund – Stay of demand – Pending appeal against assessment order for A.Y. 2013-14 – Set-off of demand of A.Y. 2013-14 against refund of A.Ys. 2014-15 to 2016-17 – Effect of circulars, instructions and guidelines issued by CBDT – Excess amount recovered over and above according to such circulars, instructions and guidelines to be refunded with interest – A.O. restrained from recovering balance tax due till disposal of pending appeal

48 Vrinda Sharad Bal vs. ITO [2021] 435 ITR 129 (Bom) A.Ys.: 2012-13 to 2019-20; Date of order: 25th March, 2021 Ss. 220(6), 237, 244A, 245 of ITA, 1961

Recovery of tax – Set-off of refund – Stay of demand – Pending appeal against assessment order for A.Y. 2013-14 – Set-off of demand of A.Y. 2013-14 against refund of A.Ys. 2014-15 to 2016-17 – Effect of circulars, instructions and guidelines issued by CBDT – Excess amount recovered over and above according to such circulars, instructions and guidelines to be refunded with interest – A.O. restrained from recovering balance tax due till disposal of pending appeal

The assessee was a developer. For the A.Y. 2013-14, a demand notice was issued, that during the pendency of his appeal against the assessment order an amount of Rs. 1,38,34,925 was collected by the Department adjusting the refunds pertaining to the A.Ys. 2014-15, 2015-16 and 2016-17. On an application for stay of recovery of demand, the A.O. passed an order of stay for the recovery of balance of tax due for the A.Y. 2013-14, reserving the right to adjust the refund that arose against the demand.

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

‘i) The Centralised Processing of Return of Income Scheme, 2011 was introduced under Notification dated 4th January, 2012 ([2012] 340 ITR (St.) 45] in exercise of the powers u/s 143(1A) with a view to process a return of income expeditiously. Clause 10 of the scheme states that set-off of refund arising from the processing of return against tax remaining payable will be done by using details of the outstanding demand as uploaded on to the system by the A.O. Sub-section 143(1B) provides that for the purpose of giving effect to the scheme made under sub-section (1A), a notification with respect to application or non-application of any provisions relating to processing of the return may be issued. Having regard to the context of sections 143(1A) and 143(1B), it does not appear that clause 10 under the scheme is intended to be read out of the context isolatedly (sic). The scheme pursuant to section 143(1A) will have to be taken into account along with the other provisions of the Act and would take within its fold instructions issued by the CBDT from time to time. It does not appear that the clause is in derogation of operation of the provisions and instructions or would render the provisions and the instructions insignificant and redundant. Clause 10 will have to be read in the context of the provisions in the Act governing refund and orders, circulars, instructions issued from time to time.

ii) Set-off of refund under the clause is to be done by using details of the Income-tax demand against the person uploaded on to the system. The exercise of power to have set-off or adjustment of refund is regulated by legislative provisions and instructions. The details referred to in the clause would have to correspond to the provisions and instructions operating. Function under the clause would be circumscribed by them and it would be incongruous to consider that uploading referred to in clause 10 would mean all refunds arising are liable to be adjusted against the tax demands irrespective of orders thereon by the authorities and / or subsisting instructions and the provisions applicable.

iii) The amount recovered from the assessee over and above the amount as per instructions, memoranda, circulars towards demand of tax for the A.Y. 2013-14 pending in appeal would be returned to the assessee with interest and the refund of amounts over and above the amount as per circulars, instructions and guidelines issued by the CBDT may not be adjusted towards tax demand for the A.Y. 2013-14 till disposal of the appeal. Having regard to the instructions, circulars and memoranda issued from time to time, which were not disputed by the Department, it would be expedient that the A.O. refrained from recovering tax dues demanded for the A.Y. 2013-14 and a restraint was called for.’

Penalty – Concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars – Method of accounting – Claim of deduction in return filed in response to notice u/s 153A in accordance with change in accounting method and prevailing law – New claim made because of change in accounting policy – Not a case of concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars – Findings of fact – Tribunal justified in upholding order of Commissioner (Appeals) that penalty was not imposable

47 Principal CIT vs. Taneja Developers and Infrastructure Ltd. [2021] 435 ITR 122 (Del) A.Y.: 2007-08; Date of order: 24th March, 2021 Ss. 132, 145, 153A, 271(1)(c) of ITA, 1961

Penalty – Concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars – Method of accounting – Claim of deduction in return filed in response to notice u/s 153A in accordance with change in accounting method and prevailing law – New claim made because of change in accounting policy – Not a case of concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars – Findings of fact – Tribunal justified in upholding order of Commissioner (Appeals) that penalty was not imposable

The search in the TP group led to the proceedings u/s 153A against the assessee for the A.Y. 2007-08. The assessee filed a fresh return in which a cumulative expenditure comprising interest paid on borrowings, brokerage and other expenses was claimed on an accrual basis. The A.O. found that such expenses were not claimed in the original return filed by the assessee u/s 139 and disallowed the claim in his order u/s 153A / 143(3). The Commissioner (Appeals) sustained the addition made by the A.O. Thereafter, the A.O. initiated penalty proceedings and levied penalty u/s 271(1)(c). Before the Tribunal, the assessee gave up its challenge to the disallowance of its claimed expenses by the A.O. and accordingly, the disallowance of the expenses ordered by the A.O. and sustained by the Commissioner (Appeals) remained.

The Commissioner (Appeals) set aside the penalty order passed by the A.O. The Tribunal held that the assessee had made a fresh claim in its return filed u/s 153A of the proportionate expenditure, which was originally claimed, partly in the original return and the balance in the return u/s 153A, that such balance was already shown in the project expenditure for that year at the close of the year which was carried forward in the next year as opening project work-in-progress, that therefore, in the subsequent year it was also claimed as expenditure and that there was no infirmity in the order of the A.O. with respect to that finding. However, the Tribunal rejected the Department’s appeal with respect to the levy of penalty.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

‘i) Where the basic facts were disclosed or where a new claim was made because of a change in the accounting policy, albeit in a fresh return, and given up because the law, as declared, did not permit such a claim, in such circumstances initiation of penalty proceedings u/s 271(1)(c) against the assessee was not mandated in law. The assessee had brought about a change in the accounting policy vis-a-vis borrowings, brokerage and other expenses in line with Accounting Standard 7 which permitted the assessee to make a new claim for deduction of such expenses, on an accrual basis, in the A.Y. 2007-08. However, the assessee had, in its original return, claimed deduction of a portion of such expenses based on an accounting policy (i. e., a percentage of completion method) which was prevalent at that point in time. Those facts were in the knowledge of the Department and such expenses which were sought to be claimed, on an accrual basis, constituted a fresh claim which was embedded in the fresh return filed u/s 153A.

ii) In the quantum appeal, the assessee had given up its claim of the expenses, for the reason that it was a new claim which was sought to be incorporated in the fresh return, which was made on an accrual basis as the assessment was completed and the fresh return filed by the assessee, pursuant to the proceedings taken out u/s 132 read with section 153A, did not give the assessee the leeway to sustain such claim, since no incriminating material was found during the search. The assessment for the A.Y. 2007-08 stood completed before the search. The assessee had neither concealed the particulars of its income nor furnished inaccurate particulars of income which were the prerequisites for imposition of penalty.

The conclusion reached by the Tribunal that the penalty imposed by the A.O. was correctly cancelled by the Commissioner (Appeals) need not be interfered with. No question of law arose.’

Export – Exemption u/s 10B – Scope – Meaning of ‘computer software’ – Engineering and design included in computer software – Assessee engaged in export of customised electronic data relating to engineering and design – Entitled to exemption u/s 10B

46 Marmon Food and Beverage Technologies India (P) Ltd. vs. ITO [2021] 435 ITR 327 (Karn) A.Y.: 2009-10; Date of order: 9th April, 2021 S. 10B of ITA, 1961

Export – Exemption u/s 10B – Scope – Meaning of ‘computer software’ – Engineering and design included in computer software – Assessee engaged in export of customised electronic data relating to engineering and design – Entitled to exemption u/s 10B

The assesse (appellant) is a 100% export-oriented undertaking engaged in the business of export of customised electronic data according to the requirements of its customers. The requirement is received in electronic format and it is again delivered in electronic format pertaining to various activities in the field of engineering and design. For the A.Y. 2009-10 the assessee filed its return of income declaring ‘Nil’ income after claiming deduction of Rs. 1,80,27,563 u/s 10B. The A.O. denied the claim for deduction u/s10B.

The Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal upheld the decision of the A.O.

The Karnataka High Court allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and held as under:

‘i) Under section 10B, newly-established 100% export-oriented undertakings are entitled to 100% deduction of export profits. Prior to its substitution, section 10B has been operative from 1st April, 1989. With a view to enlarging the scope of the tax holiday to 100% export-oriented undertakings approved by the prescribed authority, an Explanation for the term “produce” had been inserted in section 10B to include production of computer programmes by the Finance Act, 1994.

ii) A tax holiday was given to certain assessees importing and exporting electronic data and as it was a new subject under the Act, the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) was empowered to notify certain services of customised electronic data or any products or services to mean “computer software” eligible for deduction. The CBDT, in exercise of powers conferred under Explanation 2(i)(b) to section 10B, has notified certain information technology-enabled products or services by Notification dated 26th September, 2000 ([2000] 245 ITR (St.) 102]. The Notification… is a clarificatory Circular and it has been issued in exercise of the powers conferred under Explanation 2(i)(b) to section 10B of the Income-tax Act. The CBDT has notified certain services of customised electronic data or products or services to mean the computer software eligible for deduction. The intention of the Notification was not to constrain or restrict, but to enable the Board to include several services or products within the ambit of the provisions of section 10B and this is precisely what has been done by the Board.

iii) The term “computer software” means: (a) a set of instructions expressed in words, codes, schemes or in any other form capable of causing a computer to perform a particular task or achieve a particular result; (b) a sequence of instructions written to perform a specified task for a computer. The same programme in its human-readable source code form, from which executable programmes are derived, enables a programmer to study and develop its algorithms; (c) a set of ordered instructions that enable a computer to carry out a specific task; (d) written programmes or procedures or rules and associated documentation pertaining to the operation of a computer system. Engineering and design finds place in the CBDT Notification dated 26th September, 2000. The Act nowhere provides for a definition of “engineering and design” and the requirement for availing of the benefit of deduction as reflected from section 10B read with the Notification… is fulfilled when the assessee has finally developed a computer programme only. Under section 10B no certificate is required under any regulatory authority.

It is a settled proposition of law that a co-ordinate bench of the Tribunal is required to follow the earlier decisions and in case there is a difference of opinion, the matter may be referred to a larger bench.

From the documents on record, it could be safely gathered that the assessee was engaged in the activity of engineering designs, redesigns, testing, modifying, prototyping and validation of concept. The assessee was also engaged in the activity of providing manufacturing support and computer-aided design support to its group companies. The assessee captured the resultant research of the activity in a customised data both in computer-aided design and other software platforms and for the purposes of carrying (out) these activities, the assessee employed engineers and other technical staff for various research projects undertaken by them. The assessee exported the software data. The activities carried out by the assessee like analysing or duplicating the reported problems, developing and building, testing products, carrying out tests, design and development had to be treated as falling within the scope of section 10B with or without the aid of section 10BB. Thus, the assessee was certainly eligible for deduction u/s 10B.

Another important aspect of the case was that in respect of the eligibility of claim of deduction u/s 10B, in respect of the same assessee it had been accepted by the Department for the A.Ys. 2006-07 to 2008-09. The assessee was entitled to the deduction u/s 10B for the A.Y. 2009-10.’

Business expenditure – Clearing and forwarding business – Payment of speed money to port labourers through gang leaders to expedite completion of work – Acceptance of books of accounts and payments supported by documentary evidence – Payment of speed money accepted as trade practice – Restriction of disallowance on the ground vouchers for cash payments were self-made – Unjustified

45 Ganesh Shipping Agency vs. ACIT [2021] 435 ITR 143 (Karn) A.Ys.: 2007-08 to 2009-10; Date of order: 6th February, 2021 S. 37 of ITA, 1961

Business expenditure – Clearing and forwarding business – Payment of speed money to port labourers through gang leaders to expedite completion of work – Acceptance of books of accounts and payments supported by documentary evidence – Payment of speed money accepted as trade practice – Restriction of disallowance on the ground vouchers for cash payments were self-made – Unjustified

The assessee was a firm which carried on business as a clearing and forwarding and steamer agent. For the A.Ys. 2007-08, 2008-09 and 2009-10, the A.O. disallowed, u/s 37, 20% of the expenses incurred by the assessee as speed money which was paid to the workers for speedy completion of their work on the grounds that (a) the assessee produced self-made cash vouchers for the cash payments to each gang leader, (b) the identity of the gang leader was not verifiable, and (c) the recipients were not the assessee’s employees.

The Commissioner (Appeals) restricted the disallowance to 10% which was confirmed by the Tribunal.

The Karnataka High Court allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and held as under:

‘i) The authorities had accepted the books of accounts produced by the assessee. The A.O., in his order, had admitted that the payment of speed money was a trade practice which was followed by the assessee and similar business concerns functioning for speedy completion of their work. However, the disallowance of 20% of the expenses was made solely on the ground that the assessee had produced self-made cash vouchers and the finding had been affirmed by the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal.

ii) However, the books of accounts had not been doubted by any of the authorities. The Tribunal was not justified in sustaining the disallowance of expenses at 10% of the expenses paid to port workers as incentive by the assessee in relation to the A.Ys. 2007-08, 2008-09 and 2009-10.

iii) In the result, the impugned order of the Tribunal dated 29th May, 2015 insofar as it contains the findings to the extent of disallowance of 10% of the expenses incurred by the assessee in relation to the A.Ys. 2007-08, 2008-09 and 2009-10 is hereby quashed. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed.’

Assessment – Limitation – Computation of period of limitation – Exclusion of time taken to comply with direction of Court – Meaning of ‘direction’ in section 153(3) – Court remitting matter to A.O. asking him to give assessee opportunity to be heard – Not a direction within meaning of section 153(3) – No exclusion of any time in computing limitation

44 Principal CIT vs. Tally India Pvt. Ltd. [2021] 434 ITR 137 (Karn) A.Y.: 2008-09; Date of order: 6th April, 2021 S. 153 of ITA, 1961

Assessment – Limitation – Computation of period of limitation – Exclusion of time taken to comply with direction of Court – Meaning of ‘direction’ in section 153(3) – Court remitting matter to A.O. asking him to give assessee opportunity to be heard – Not a direction within meaning of section 153(3) – No exclusion of any time in computing limitation

For the A.Y. 2008-09, the case of the assessee was referred to the Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO) for computation of the arm’s length price u/s 92C. The Court by an order restrained the TPO from proceeding to pass a draft assessment order for a period up to 7th March, 2012, i.e., approximately three months. The writ petition was disposed of by the Court by order dated 7th March, 2012 remitting the matter to the A.O. and directing the assessee to appear before the A.O. on 21st March, 2012. The TPO, by an order dated 13th June, 2012 after affording an opportunity to the assessee, passed a draft order of assessment on 5th July, 2012 and forwarded it to the assessee on 11th July, 2012. The assessee filed objections before the Dispute Resolution Panel which passed an order on 22nd April, 2013. The A.O. passed a final order on 31st May, 2013.

The Tribunal held that the draft assessment was completed by the A.O. on 5th July, 2012, beyond the period of limitation.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

‘i) Section 153 lays down the period of limitation for assessment. Section 153(3) states that in computing the period of limitation, the time taken to comply with a direction of the court is to be excluded. Section 153(3)(ii) applies to cases where any direction is issued either by the appellate authority, revisional authority or any other authority to decide an issue. The Supreme Court in Rajinder Nath vs. CIT and ITO vs. Murlidhar Bhagwan Das has held that a finding given in an appeal, revision or reference arising out of an assessment must be a finding necessary for disposal of a particular case. Similarly, a direction must be an expressed direction necessary for disposal of the case before the authority or court and must also be a direction which the authority or court is empowered to give while deciding a case before it. A direction issued to remit the matter and asking the assessee to appear before the A.O. on a particular date does not amount to either issuing a direction or finding within the meaning of section 153(3)(ii).

ii) It was evident that the order dated 7th March, 2012 passed by the Court neither contained any finding nor any direction. The Tribunal was right in holding that the draft assessment was completed by the A.O. on 5th July, 2012, which was beyond the period of limitation.’

Appeal to Appellate Tribunal – Appeal to Commissioner (A) – Powers of Commissioner (A) – Commissioner (A) can call for and examine fresh material – Power of Tribunal to remand matter – Power must be exercised judiciously – A.O. rejecting claim for deduction – Commissioner (A) considering fresh documents and allowing deduction – Tribunal not justified in remanding matter to A.O.

43 International Tractors Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT(LTU) [2021] 435 ITR 85 (Del) A.Y.: 2007-08; Date of order: 7th April, 2021 Ss. 80JJAA, 250(4) of ITA, 1961

Appeal to Appellate Tribunal – Appeal to Commissioner (A) – Powers of Commissioner (A) – Commissioner (A) can call for and examine fresh material – Power of Tribunal to remand matter – Power must be exercised judiciously – A.O. rejecting claim for deduction – Commissioner (A) considering fresh documents and allowing deduction – Tribunal not justified in remanding matter to A.O.

In the return filed for the A.Y. 2007-08, the assessee had failed to claim the deductions both u/s 80JJAA and qua prior period expenses. The deduction u/s 80JJAA was at Rs. 1,07,33,164 and the prior period expenses were quantified at Rs. 51,21,024. These deductions were claimed by the assessee before the A.O. by way of a communication dated 14th December, 2009 filed with him. This statement, admittedly, was accompanied by a Chartered Accountant’s report in the prescribed form (i.e., form 10DA). Furthermore, the details concerning prior period expenses were also provided by the assessee. The A.O., however, declined to entertain the two deductions claimed by the assessee.

The Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the appeal of the assessee. The Tribunal remanded the matter to the A.O.

On appeal by the assessee, the Delhi High Court set aside the order of the Tribunal and held as under:

‘If a claim is otherwise sustainable in law, the appellate authorities are empowered to entertain it. The Commissioner (Appeals) in the exercise of his powers u/s 250(4) is entitled to call for production of documents or material to satisfy himself as to whether or not the deductions claimed were sustainable and viable in law.

Insofar as the deduction claimed u/s 80JJAA was concerned, the Commissioner (Appeals) not only had before him the Chartered Accountant’s report in the prescribed form, i.e., form 10DA, but also examined the details concerning the new regular workmen, numbering 543, produced before him. In this context, the Commissioner (Appeals) examined the details concerning the dates when the workmen had joined the service, the period during which they had worked, relatable to the assessment year at issue, as also the details concerning the bank accounts in which remuneration was remitted. Based on this material, the Commissioner (Appeals) concluded that the deduction u/s 80JJAA was correctly claimed by the assessee. Likewise, insofar as prior period expenses were concerned, out of a total amount of Rs. 51,21,024 claimed by the assessee, a sum of Rs. 24,78,391 was not allowed for the reason that withholding tax had not been deducted by the assessee. The assessee had disclosed the same in its communication dated 14th December, 2009 placed before the A.O.

All that the Tribunal was required to examine was whether the Commissioner (Appeals) had scrupulously verified the material placed before him before allowing the deductions claimed by the assessee. The Tribunal, however, instead of examining this aspect of the matter, observed, incorrectly, that because an opportunity was not given to the A.O. to examine the material, the matter needed to be remanded to the A.O. for a fresh verification. The judgment of the Tribunal deserved to be set aside. The fresh claims made by the assessee, as allowed by the Commissioner (Appeals), were to be sustained.’

Article 4 of India-Mauritius DTAA – Re-domiciliation of company by itself cannot lead to denial of treaty in the country of re-domiciliation

5 ADIT vs. Asia Today Limited [(2021) 127 taxmann.com 774 (Mum-Trib)] ITA Nos.: 4628-4629/Mum/2006 A.Ys.: 2000-01 and 2001-02; Date of order: 30th July, 2021

Article 4 of India-Mauritius DTAA – Re-domiciliation of company by itself cannot lead to denial of treaty in the country of re-domiciliation

FACTS
The assessee was a company incorporated in 1991 as an international business company in the British Virgin Islands (BVI). It re-domiciled to Mauritius on 29th June, 1998 when the Registrar of Companies issued a Certificate of Incorporation stating that ‘…on and from 29th day of June, 1998, incorporated by continuation as a private company limited by shares’ and that ‘this certificate will be effective from the date of de-registration in BVI’. Simultaneously, the BVI issued a certificate stating ‘The Registrar of Companies of the British Virgin Islands hereby certifies that ________, an international business company incorporated under section 3 of the International Business Companies Act of the law of British Virgin Islands, has discontinued its operations in the British Virgin Islands on 30th June, 1998’.

For the first time, the tax authority contended before the Tribunal that since the assessee was a BVI company, it did not qualify for benefit under the India-Mauritius DTAA. The assessee objected to this contention of the tax authorities.

HELD
On re-domiciliation

Corporate re-domiciliation is a process through which a corporate entity moves its domicile (or place of incorporation) from one jurisdiction to another while at the same time retaining its legal identity.

On re-domiciliation, a corporate entity is de-registered from one jurisdiction and ceases to exist there but simultaneously comes into existence in another jurisdiction.

In the offshore world re-domiciliation of a corporate entity is a fact of life.

While re-domiciliation of a corporate entity may trigger detailed examination per se, DTAA benefits cannot be denied merely because of re-domiciliation.

On facts of the case
The assessee had re-domiciled more than two decades ago. During this period, the tax authority had granted benefit under the India-Mauritius DTAA without raising any question. Hence, the issue was merely academic in nature.

Note: The decision primarily dealt with adjudication of the PE in India of the assessee and attribution of profit to dependent agent. The issue of denial of DTAA benefit on the issue of re-domiciliation was agitated by the tax authority for the first time before the Tribunal. However, only this issue is compiled because it was agitated by tax authority for the first time.

Provisions of section 68 would not apply in case where shares are allotted in lieu of self-generated goodwill wherein there is no movement of actual sum of money

39 ITO vs. Zexus Air Services (P) Ltd. [(2021) 88 ITR(T) 1 (Del-Trib)] IT Appeal No. 2608 (Del) of 2018 A.Y.: 2014-15; Date of order: 23rd April, 2021

Provisions of section 68 would not apply in case where shares are allotted in lieu of self-generated goodwill wherein there is no movement of actual sum of money

FACTS
The assessee company wanted to establish itself in the aviation industry for which an aviation license from the Ministry of Civil Aviation was required. A precondition for procuring this license was that the company must have authorised share capital of at least Rs. 20 crores. One of the directors of the assessee company who had expertise and experience of the industry, helped it to procure the said aviation license. The assessee company allotted shares of Rs. 20 crores to this director by recognising the efforts made by him in the form of ‘goodwill’. Accordingly, Rs. 20 crores was credited to the share capital and a corresponding debit entry was made in the form of self-generated ‘goodwill’. There was no actual flow of money and this was merely a book entry. Documents filed by the assessee company before the ROC in relation to increase in the authorised capital also mentioned that the said shares were allotted in lieu of the ‘blessings and efforts’ of the said director.

But the A.O. held that the assessee company could not substantiate the basis or provide any evidence to justify the value of the goodwill. It was contended that the company had adopted a colourable device to evade taxes. Accordingly, an addition of Rs. 20 crores u/s 68 was made.

The assessee company argued that the provisions of section 68 would not apply in the present facts of the case because there was no actual movement of money and hence it was a tax-neutral transaction. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Maruti Insurance Distribution Services Ltd. vs. CIT [2014] 47 taxmann.com 140 (Delhi) wherein it was held that it was the decision of the businessmen to decide and value its goodwill. Concurring with this contention, the CIT(A) deleted the addition made u/s 68.

HELD
It was an undisputed fact that there was no actual receipt of any money by the assessee company; and when the cash did not pass at any stage and when the respective parties did not receive cash nor did they pay any cash, there was no real credit of cash in the cash book and, therefore, the provisions of section 68 would not be attracted. Reliance was placed on the following decisions:

a) ITO vs. V.R. Global Energy (P) Ltd. [2020] 407 ITR 145 (Madras High Court), and
b) ACIT vs. Suren Goel [ITA No. 1767 (Delhi) of 2011].

Reference was also made to the decision in the case of ACIT vs. Mahendra Kumar Agrawal [2012] 23 taxmann.com 285 (Jaipur-Trib) wherein it was held that the term ‘any sum’ used in section 68 cannot be taken as parallel to ‘any entry’.

An identical matter had come up before the Kolkata Tribunal in the case of ITO vs. Anand Enterprises Ltd. [ITA No. 1614 (Kol) of 2016] wherein, referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Shri H.H. Rama Varma vs. CIT 187 ITR 308 (SC), the Tribunal held that the term ‘any sum’ means ‘sum of money’; accordingly, in the absence of any cash / monetary inflow, addition u/s 68 cannot be made.

Section 2(47) r/w/s 50C – If there is a gap between the date of execution of sale agreement and the sale deed and if the guidance value changes, the guidance value as on the date of agreement has to be considered as the full consideration

38 Prakash Chand Bethala vs. Dy. CIT [(2021) 88 ITR(T) 290 (Bang-Trib)] IT Appeal No. 999 (Bang) of 2019 A.Y.: 2007-08; Date of order: 28th January, 2021

Section 2(47) r/w/s 50C – If there is a gap between the date of execution of sale agreement and the sale deed and if the guidance value changes, the guidance value as on the date of agreement has to be considered as the full consideration

FACTS
The assessee was an HUF that had acquired a property by participating in a BDA auction. The agreement for acquisition of the property took place on 24th July, 1984 and the assessee had acquired possession on 29th August, 1984.

One R.K. Sipani (RKS) acquired the aforesaid property from the assessee through M/s K. Prakashchand Bethala Properties Pvt. Ltd. (KPCBBL) through an oral agreement in the month of September, 1989 for the consideration of Rs. 9.80 lakhs. The assessee gave the possession of the property to RKS on 24th October, 1989. Thereafter, on 8th March, 1993, an unregistered sale agreement was made between the assessee and RKS to bring clarity on the aforementioned transaction. Then, on 9th March, 2007, a sale deed was executed in which the aforesaid site was sold to M/s Suraj Properties (a proprietary concern of RKS’s wife) for the consideration of Rs. 9.80 lakhs.

The A.O. noticed that the guidance value of the property as per the executed sale deed on 9th March, 2007 was Rs. 2.77 crores and the sale consideration was less than the guidance value; thus, the provisions of section 50C were attracted. On appeal, the CIT(A) also confirmed the action of the A.O. Aggrieved by the order, the assessee filed an appeal before the Tribunal.

HELD
The question before the Tribunal was what could be the full value of such consideration, i.e., whether the value on which the stamp duty was paid at the time of the sale deed or the value declared in the sale agreement.

The Tribunal observed that the assessee had entered into the sale agreement on 8th March, 1993 and a major portion of the agreed consideration had been received by the assessee through account payee cheque and possession of the property was also handed over to RKS on 24th October, 1989. There is no dispute regarding these facts. The only action pending was actual registration of the sale deed.

The Tribunal observed that section 50C(1) provides that if there is a gap between the date of execution of the sale agreement and the sale deed and if the guidance value changes, the guidance value as on the date of the agreement has to be considered as the full consideration of the capital asset. In the present case,
1) the enforceable agreement was entered into on 8th March, 1993 by payment of a major portion of the sale consideration,
2) the possession of the property had already been handed over on 24th October, 1989,
3) only the formal sale deed was executed on 9th March, 2007.

Therefore, the Tribunal held that the transfer had taken place vide the sale agreement dated 8th March, 1993 and full value of consideration for the purpose of computing long-term capital gain in the hands of the assessee has to be adopted only on the basis of the guidance value of the property as on the date of the sale agreement, i.e., 8th March, 1993, and not on the date of the sale deed of 9th March, 2007. Accordingly, there was no applicability of section 50C in the year 2007-08.

Business income – Proviso to S. 43CA(1) and the subsequent amendment thereto relates back to the date on which the said section was made effective, i.e., 1st April, 2014

37 Stalwart Impex Pvt. Ltd. vs. ITO [(2021) TS-615-ITAT-2021 (Mum)] A.Y.: 2016-17; Date of order: 2nd July, 2021 Section 43CA

Business income – Proviso to S. 43CA(1) and the subsequent amendment thereto relates back to the date on which the said section was made effective, i.e., 1st April, 2014

FACTS
During the previous year relevant to the assessment year under consideration, the assessee, engaged in the construction of commercial and residential housing projects, sold flats to various buyers. In respect of three flats the A.O. held that the stamp duty value (SDV) is more than their agreement value. The total agreement value of the said three flats was Rs. 97,11,500 whereas their SDV was Rs. 1,09,83,000. Upon an objection being raised by the assessee, the A.O. made a reference to the Department Valuation Officer (DVO) for determining the market value of the said flats. The DVO determined the market value of the three flats to be Rs. 1,03,93,000. However, before receipt of the report of the DVO, the A.O. made the addition of the difference between the SDV and the agreement value of the said three flats, i.e., Rs. 12,71,500, u/s 43CA.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the A.O. The assessee then preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal observed that the difference between the agreement value and the value determined by the DVO is approximately 7%. On behalf of the assessee it was contended that since the difference is less than 10%, no addition should be made. The Tribunal noted that a similar issue had come up before the Tribunal in the case of Radhika Sales Corporation vs. Addl. CIT [ITA No. 1474/Pune/2016, A.Y. 2011-12, order dated 16th November, 2018 and the Tribunal while deciding the issue deleted the addition made and observed that ‘since difference between the value declared by the assessee and the value determined by the DVO is less than 10%, no addition in respect of long-term capital gain is warranted.’ The Tribunal observed that while the said decision was rendered in the context of section 50C and the addition in the instant case is u/s 43CA, both the provisions are pari materia and therefore the decision rendered u/s 50C would hold good for interpreting section 43CA as well. The Tribunal held that where the difference between the sale consideration declared by the assessee and the SDV of an asset (other than capital asset), being land or building, or both, is less than 10%, no addition u/s 43CA is warranted.

The Tribunal observed that the Finance Act, 2018 inserted a proviso to section 43CA(1) providing 5% tolerance limit in variation between declared sale consideration vis-à-vis SDV for making no addition. A similar proviso was inserted by the Finance Act, 2018 to section 50C(1). The said tolerance band was enhanced from 5% to 10% by the Finance Act, 2020 w.e.f. 1st April, 2021. The Tribunal in the case of Maria Fernandes Cheryl vs. ITO (International Taxation) 123 taxmann.com 252 (Mum) after considering various decisions and the CBDT Circular No. 8 of 2018 dated 26th December, 2018 held that the amendment is retrospective in nature and relates back to the date of insertion of the statutory section to the Act.

The Tribunal held that both sections are similarly worded except that both the sections have application on different sets of assessees. The proviso has been inserted and subsequently the tolerance band limit has been enhanced to mitigate the hardship of genuine transactions in the real estate sector. Considering the reasoning given for insertion of the proviso and exposition by the Tribunal for retrospective application of the same, the Tribunal held that the proviso to section 43CA(1) and the subsequent amendment thereto relates back to the date on which the said section was made effective, i.e., 1st April, 2014.

The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

Business Expenditure – Swap charges paid to convert a floating rate loan to a fixed rate loan are allowable as deduction – Since interest was allowed when loan carried floating rate the character of transaction does not change by swapping from floating to fixed rate

36 Owens-Corning (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. ITO [(2021) TS-517_ITAT-2021 (Mum)] A.Y.: 2003-04; Date of order: 25th June, 2021 Section 37

Business Expenditure – Swap charges paid to convert a floating rate loan to a fixed rate loan are allowable as deduction – Since interest was allowed when loan carried floating rate the character of transaction does not change by swapping from floating to fixed rate

FACTS
The assessee company availed a loan from a US bank on floating rate of interest. During the previous year relevant to the assessment year under consideration, the assessee chose to convert the said loan carrying floating rate of interest into fixed rate of interest. The assessee was asked to pay certain swap charges for the said conversion from floating to fixed rate. The swap charges liability had been duly incurred by the assessee during the year. The assessee characterised the swap charges as being in the nature of interest.

But the A.O. while assessing the total income disallowed the swap charges claimed on the ground that the said expenditure is capital in nature.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who held that the assessee converting the loan from floating rate of interest to fixed rate of interest has derived enduring benefit and hence the expenditure incurred by the assessee falls in the capital field warranting capitalisation thereon and hence cannot be allowed u/s 37(1).

HELD
The Tribunal noted the calculation of swap charges and observed that the swap charges incurred by the assessee for conversion from floating to fixed rate of interest would necessarily partake the character of interest. The interest paid by the assessee when the loan was in floating rate was duly allowed by the A.O. Hence, the character of the transaction does not change pursuant to this swap from floating to fixed rate. The utilisation of the loan for the purposes of business has not been disputed, hence there is no question of disallowance of any interest whatever the nomenclature, interest or swap charges. The nomenclature of the transaction is absolutely irrelevant to the substance of the transaction.

The Tribunal, following the decision of the Jurisdictional High Court in the case of CIT vs. D. Chetan & Co. 390 ITR 36 (Bom) held that the assessee is entitled to deduction of swap charges. This ground of appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

DEDUCTION OF MAINTENANCE CHARGES IN COMPUTING INCOME FROM HOUSE PROPERTY

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Section 22 of the Income-tax Act creates a charge over the annual value of the house property being a building or lands appurtenant to the building of which the assessee is the owner and which has not been used for the purpose of any business or profession carried on by the assessee. The annual value of the house property is required to be computed in the manner laid down in section 23. It deems the sum for which the property might reasonably be expected to be let from year to year as its annual value subject to the exception where the property is let, in which case the amount of rent received or receivable is considered to be its annual value if it is higher. Section 24 provides for the deductions which can be claimed in computing the Income from House Property, namely, (i) a sum equal to 30% of the annual value (referred to as ‘standard deduction’), and (ii) interest payable on capital borrowed for acquisition, construction, repairs, etc., of the property subject to further conditions as provided in clause (b).

Quite often, an issue arises as to whether the assessee can claim a deduction of expenses like maintenance charges, etc., which it had to incur in relation to the property which is let out while computing its annual value for the purposes of section 23. The fact that the annual value is required to be computed on the basis of rent received or receivable in case of let-out property and no specific deduction has been provided for any expenses other than interest u/s 24, makes the issue more complex. Numerous decisions are available dealing with this issue in the context of different kind of expenses, such as maintenance charges, brokerage, non-occupancy charges, etc. For the purpose of this article, we have analysed two decisions of the Mumbai bench of the Tribunal taking contrary views in relation to deductibility of maintenance charges while computing annual value u/s 23.

SHARMILA TAGORE’S CASE
The issue had earlier come up for consideration of the Mumbai bench of the Tribunal in the case of Sharmila Tagore vs. JCIT (2005) 93 TTJ 483.

In this case, for the assessment year 1997-98, the assessee had claimed deduction for the maintenance charges of Rs. 48,785 and non-occupancy charges of Rs. 1,17,832 levied by the society from the total rent received of Rs. 3,95,000 while computing her income under the head Income from House Property. The A.O. disallowed the claim for deduction of both the payments on the ground that the expenses were not listed for allowance in section 24. On appeal, the disallowance made by the A.O. was confirmed by the Commissioner (Appeals).

The Tribunal, on appeal by the assessee, held that the maintenance charges have to be deducted while determining the annual letting value of the property u/s 23 following the ratio of the decisions in the cases of –
• Bombay Oil Industries Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT [2002] 82 ITD 626 (Mum),
• Neelam Cables Mfg. Co. vs. Asstt. CIT [1997] 63 ITD 1 (Del),
• Lekh Raj Channa vs. ITO [1990] 37 TTJ (Del) 297,
• Blue Mellow Investment & Finance (P) Ltd. [IT Appeal No. 1757 (Bom), dated 6th May, 1993].

The claim of the assessee for the deduction of maintenance charges while computing the annual value on the basis of rent received was upheld by the Tribunal. As regards the non-occupancy charges, the Tribunal noted that the expenditure had to be incurred for letting out the property. Therefore, while estimating the annual letting value of the property, which was the sum for which the property might reasonably be expected to be let from year to year, the non-occupancy charges could not be ignored and should be deducted from the annual value. Thus, the Tribunal directed the A.O. to re-compute the annual value after reducing the maintenance charges as well as non-occupancy charges from the rent received.

In the case of Neelam Cables Mfg. Co. (Supra), the assessee had claimed deduction for building repairs and security service charges. Insofar as building repair charges were concerned, the Tribunal held that no separate deduction could be allowed in respect of repairs as the assessee was already allowed the deduction of 1/6th for repairs as provided in section 24 (as it was prevailing at that time). However, in respect of security service charges, the Tribunal held that the charges would be deductible while computing the annual value u/s 23, though no such deduction was specifically provided for in section 24. Since the gross rent received by the assessee should be considered as inclusive of security service charges, the Tribunal held that such charges which were paid in respect of letting out of the property should be deducted while determining the annual value.

In the case of Lekh Raj Channa (Supra), the Tribunal allowed the deduction of salaries paid to persons for the maintenance of the building, security of the building and attending to the requirements of the tenants while computing the annual letting value.

The Tribunal in the case of Bombay Oil Industries Ltd. (Supra), following the above referred decisions of the Delhi bench and in the case of Blue Mellow Investment & Finance (P) Ltd. (Supra), had held that the expenditure by way of municipal taxes, maintenance of the building, security, common electricity charges, upkeep of lifts, water pump, fire-fighting equipment, staff salary and wages, etc., should be taken into account while arriving at the annual letting value u/s 23.

A similar view has been taken in the following cases about deductibility of expenses, mainly maintenance charges, while arriving at the annual letting value of the let-out property –
• Realty Finance & Leasing (P) Ltd. vs. ITO [2006] 5 SOT 348 (Mum),
• J.B. Patel & Co. vs. DCIT [2009] 118 ITD 556 (Ahm),
• ITO vs. Farouque D. Vevania [2008] 26 SOT 556 (Mum),
• ACIT vs. Sunil Kumar Agarwal (2011) 139 TTJ 49 (UO),
• Asha Ashar vs. ITO [2017] 81 taxmann.com 441 (Mum-Trib),
• Neela Exports Pvt. Ltd. vs. ITO (ITA No. 2829/Mum/2011 dated 27th February, 2013),
• Krishna N. Bhojwani vs. ACIT (ITA No. 1463/Mum/2012 dated 3rd July, 2017),
• Saif Ali Khan vs. CIT (ITA No. 1653/Mum/2009 dated 23rd June, 2011).

ROCKCASTLE PROPERTY (P) LTD.’S CASE
The issue again came up for consideration recently before the Mumbai bench of the Tribunal in the case of Rockcastle Property (P) Ltd. vs. ITO [2021] 127 taxmann.com 381.

In this case, for the assessment year 2012-13, the assessee had earned rental income from a commercial property which was situated in a condominium. The assessee credited an amount of Rs. 91.42 lakhs as rental income in its Profit & Loss account as against gross receipts of Rs. 93.65 lakhs after deducting Rs. 2.23 lakhs paid towards the ‘society maintenance charges’. The A.O. held that the charges were not allowable as a deduction since the assessee was already allowed deduction of 30% u/s 24(a). The CIT(A) confirmed the disallowance by relying upon several decisions, including the decisions of the Delhi High Court in the case of H.G. Gupta & Sons, 149 ITR 253 and of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Aravali Engineers P. Ltd. 200 Taxman 81.

On appeal to the Tribunal, it was contended on behalf of the assessee that under the terms of letting out, the assessee was required to bear the expenses on society maintenance and the gross rent received by the assessee included the society maintenance charges that were paid by the assessee. Therefore, in computing the annual value, the amount of rent which actually came to the hands of the owner should alone be taken into consideration in view of the provisions of section 23(1)(b) that provide for adoption of the ‘actual rent received or receivable by the owner’. Reliance was also placed on various decisions of the Tribunal taking a view that such maintenance charges should be deducted while computing the annual letting value of the let-out property. As against this, the Revenue submitted that the assessee’s claim was not admissible as per the statutory provisions.

The Tribunal perused the Leave & License agreement and noted that the payment of municipal taxes and other outgoings was the liability of the assessee. Any increase was also to be borne by the assessee. The licensee was required to pay a fixed monthly lump sum to the assessee as license fees irrespective of the assessee’s outgoings. On the above findings, the Tribunal noted that it was incorrect for the assessee to plead that the actual rent received by the assessee was net of ‘society maintenance charges’ as per the terms of the agreement.

The Tribunal further noted that section 23 provided for deduction of only specified items, i.e., taxes paid to the local authority and the amount of rent which could not be realised by the assessee, from the ‘actual rent received or receivable’. No other deductions were permissible. Allowing any other deduction would amount to distortion of the statutory provisions and such a view could not be countenanced. It observed that accepting the plea that the rent which actually went into the hands of the assessee was only to be considered, would enable the assessee to claim any expenditure from rent actually received or receivable which was not the intention of the Legislature.

As far as the decision of the co-ordinate bench in the case of Sharmila Tagore (Supra) was concerned, the Tribunal relied upon its earlier decision in the case of Township Real Estate Developers (India) (P) Ltd. vs. ACIT [2012] 21 taxmann.com 63 (Mum) wherein it was held that –
• the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of H.G. Gupta & Sons (Supra) had not been considered in the Sharmila Tagore case;
• the decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Aravali Engineers (P) Ltd. (Supra) was the latest decision on the subject that held that the deduction was not allowable.

Apart from the cases of Rockcastle Property (P) Ltd. (Supra) and Township Real Estate Developers (India) (P) Ltd. (Supra), a similar view has been taken in the following cases whereby the expenses in the nature of maintenance of the property have not been allowed to be reduced from the gross amount of the rent for the purpose of determining the annual value of the property –
Sterling & Wilson Property Developers Pvt. Ltd. vs. ITO (ITA No. 1085/Mum/2015 dated 11th November, 2016),
• Ranjeet D. Vaswani vs. ACIT [2017] 81 taxmann.com 259 (Mum-Trib), and
• ITO vs. Barodawala Properties Ltd. (2002) 83 ITD 467 (Mum).

OBSERVATIONS
What is chargeable to tax in the case of house property is its ‘annual value’ after reducing the same by the deductions allowed u/s 24. The annual value is required to be determined in accordance with the provisions of section 23. Sub-section (1) of section 23 which is relevant for the purpose of the subject matter of controversy reads as under –

For the purposes of section 22, the annual value of any property shall be deemed to be –
(a) the sum for which the property might reasonably be expected to let from year to year; or
(b) where the property or any part of the property is let and the actual rent received or receivable by the owner in respect thereof is in excess of the sum referred to in clause (a), the amount so received or receivable; or
(c) where the property or any part of the property is let and was vacant during the whole or any part of the previous year and owing to such vacancy the actual rent received or receivable by the owner in respect thereof is less than the sum referred to in clause (a), the amount so received or receivable:
Provided that the taxes levied by any local authority in respect of the property shall be deducted (irrespective of the previous year in which the liability to pay such taxes was incurred by the owner according to the method of accounting regularly employed by him) in determining the annual value of the property of that previous year in which such taxes are actually paid by him.
Explanation. – For the purposes of clause (b) or clause (c) of this sub-section, the amount of actual rent received or receivable by the owner shall not include, subject to such rules as may be made in this behalf, the amount of rent which the owner cannot realise.

The limited issue for consideration, where the property is let, is whether ‘the actual rent received or receivable’ referred to in clause (b) in respect of letting of the property or part thereof can be said to have included the cost of maintaining that property and, if so, whether the actual rent received or receivable can be reduced, by the amount of the cost of maintaining the property, for the purposes of clause (b) of section 23(1).

One possible view of the matter is that the ‘actual rent received or receivable’ should be the amount of consideration which the tenant has agreed to pay for usage of the property and merely because the owner of the property has to incur some expenses in relation to that property, the amount of ‘actual rent received or receivable’ cannot be altered on that basis; the proviso to section 23(1) permits the deduction for taxes levied by the local authority, which is also the obligation of the owner of the property, is indicative of the intent of the Legislature that no other obligations of the owner of the property can be reduced from the amount of actual rent received or receivable; any payment or other than the taxes so specified shall not be deductible from the annual value; section 24 limits the deduction to those payments that have been expressly listed in the said section and any deduction outside the list is not allowable, as has been explained in the Circular No. 14/2001 dated 9th November, 2001 explaining the objective of the amendment of 2001 in section 24 to substitute some eight deductions like cost of repairs, collection charges, insurance premium, annual charge, ground rent, interest, land revenue, etc., with only two, namely, standard deduction and interest; any deduction other than the ones specified by the proviso to section 23(1) and section 24, i.e., municipal taxes, interest and standard deduction, is not permissible.

The other equally possible view is that the amount of ‘actual rent received or receivable’ is dependent on the fact that the let-out property in question necessarily requires the owner to bear the expenses in relation to the property as a condition for letting, expressly or otherwise, and considering this correlation, the amount of ‘actual rent received or receivable’ should be adjusted taking into consideration the cost of maintaining the property or any other such expenses in relation to the property which the owner is required to incur; the express permission to deduct the municipal taxes under the proviso should not be a bar from claiming such other payments and expenses which have the effect of reducing the net annual rent in the hands of the owner and should be allowed to be reduced form the annual value as long as there is no express prohibition in the law to do so; section 24 lists the permissible deductions in computing the income under the head ‘income from house property’ and is unrelated to the determination of annual value and should not have any role in determination thereof; the expenses that go to reduce the annual value should nonetheless be allowed as they remain unaffected by the provisions of section 24.

The obligation of the owner to incur the expenses in question is directly linked to the earning of the income and has the effect of determining the fair rental value. The value shall stand reduced where such obligations are not assumed by the owner. Needless to say, an express agreement by the parties for passing on the obligation to pay such expenses to the tenant and reducing the rent payable would achieve the desired objective without any litigation; this in itself should indicate that the fair rental value is directly linked to the assuming of the obligations by the owner to pay the expenses in question and that such expenses should be reduced from the annual value. The case for deduction is well supported on the principle of diversion of obligation by overriding covenant. The concept has been well explained by the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Sitaldas Tirathdas [(1961) 41 ITR 367] the relevant extract from which is reproduced below –

In our opinion, the true test is whether the amount sought to be deducted, in truth, never reached the assesse as his income. Obligations, no doubt, there are in every case, but it is the nature of the obligation which is the decisive fact. There is a difference between an amount which a person is obliged to apply out of his income and an amount which by the nature of the obligation, cannot be said to be a part of the income of the assesse. Where by the obligation income is diverted before it reaches the assesse, it is deductible; but where the income is required to be applied to discharge an obligation after the income reaches the assessee, the same consequence, in law, does not follow. It is the first kind of payment which can truly be excused and not the second. The second payment is merely an obligation to pay another a portion of one’s own income, which has been received and is since applied. The first is a case where income never reaches the assessee, who even if he were to collect it does so, not as part of his income, but for and on behalf of the person to whom it is payable.

Further reference can also be made to the case of CIT vs. Sunil J. Kinariwala [2003] 259 ITR 10 wherein the Supreme Court has, after referring to various precedents on the subject, explained the concept of diversion of income by overriding title in the following manner:

When a third person becomes entitled to receive the amount under an obligation of an assessee even before he could lay a claim to receive it as his income, there would be diversion of income by overriding title; but when after receipt of the income by the assessee, the same is passed on to a third person in discharge of the obligation of the assessee, it will be a case of application of income by the assessee and not of diversion of income by overriding title.

It is possible to canvass two views when the issue under consideration is examined in light of this principle; it can be said that there is no diversion of income by the owner of the property when he incurs the expenses for maintenance of the property, or it can be held that there is a diversion. The better view is to favour an interpretation that permits the reduction than the one that defeats the claim. It is also possible to support the claim for reduction from annual value on the basis of real income theory.

In the cases of Sharmila Tagore and others, the Tribunal has taken a view that allowed the reduction of maintenance charges from the annual value on the basis that to that extent the amount of rent never reached the owner or the owner was not benefited to that extent.

Capital Gains – Amount received on sale of additional benefit derived by the assessee by way of getting vested with additional FSI on the land and building owned by the assessee is only a windfall gain by operation of law and which had not cost the assessee any money is a capital receipt Book Profits – A particular receipt which is in the capital field cannot be brought to tax u/s 115JB merely on the ground that the assessee has voluntarily offered it in the return of income

35 Batliboi Ltd. vs. ITO [(2021) TS-410-ITAT-2021 (Mum)] A.Y.: 2013-14; Date of order: 21st May, 2021 Sections 4, 45, 115JB

Capital Gains – Amount received on sale of additional benefit derived by the assessee by way of getting vested with additional FSI on the land and building owned by the assessee is only a windfall gain by operation of law and which had not cost the assessee any money is a capital receipt

Book Profits – A particular receipt which is in the capital field cannot be brought to tax u/s 115JB merely on the ground that the assessee has voluntarily offered it in the return of income

FACTS
The assessee company owned land along with super structure which was acquired by it vide a sale deed dated 15th April, 1967. During the financial year relevant to the assessment year under consideration, the assessee company proposed to sell the said land along with its super structure. In the course of negotiations it became aware that post acquisition of land and constructed building, the Development Control Regulations (DCR) in the city of Coimbatore had undergone a change resulting in the company obtaining an additional benefit by way of additional FSI of 0.8.

The company sold the said land along with super structure vide a deed of sale on 23rd January, 2013 for a consideration of Rs. 11,14,00,000. Taking the help of the valuer, Rs. 4,76,25,000 out of this composite consideration was attributed to the additional FSI obtained as a result of the amendment in the DCR. In the return of income filed, the assessee regarded the sum of Rs. 4,76,25,000 received towards additional FSI as a capital receipt. However, while computing the book profit u/s 115JB, the said sum of Rs. 4,76,25,000 was included in the book profit.

The A.O. brought this sum of Rs. 4,76,25,000 to tax as long-term capital gains. This amount was also treated as part of book profits u/s 115JB since it was already offered to tax voluntarily by the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the A.O.

The aggrieved assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it also raised an additional ground, viz., that the sum of Rs. 4,76,25,000 being a capital receipt is not part of the operating results of the assessee and therefore is not includible in computing its book profits u/s 115JB.

HELD
The Tribunal observed that the total sale consideration of Rs. 11,14,00,000 has not been doubted by the Revenue. The break-up of consideration, as done by the assessee, by relying on the independent valuer’s report was also not doubted by the Revenue. The only dispute was whether the said sum of Rs. 4,76,25,000 could be treated as a capital receipt thereby making it non-exigible to tax both under normal provisions as well as in the computation of book profits u/s 115JB.

The Tribunal held that the assessee could not have pre-empted any change in the DCR in the city of Coimbatore at the time of purchase or before sale. Admittedly, no cost was incurred by the assessee for getting such benefit by way of additional FSI. Hence, it could be safely concluded that the additional benefit derived by the assessee by way of additional FSI on the land and building owned by him is only a windfall gain by operation of law and which had not cost him any money. The Tribunal found that the entire issue in dispute is squarely covered by the decision of the Jurisdictional High Court in the case of Kailash Jyoti No. 2 CHS Ltd. and others dated 24th April, 2015. Following this decision, the Tribunal held that the sum of Rs. 4,76,25,000 received by the assessee on the sale of additional FSI is not exigible for long-term capital gains. It directed that the same be excluded under the normal provisions of the Act.

While deciding the additional ground, the Tribunal observed that there is absolutely no dispute that the receipt of Rs. 4,76,25,000 is indeed a capital receipt and the same does not form part of the operational working results of the assessee company. Even according to the Revenue, the said receipt is only inseparable from the land and building and accordingly it only partakes the character of a capital receipt. The Tribunal held that merely because a particular receipt, which is in the capital field, has been offered to tax by the assessee voluntarily in the return of income while computing book profits u/s 115JB it cannot be brought to tax merely on that ground. It is very well settled that there is no estoppel against the statute. It noted that the dispute is covered by the Tribunal in the assessee’s own case in ITA No. 5428/Mum/2015 for A.Y. 2011-12, order dated 17th December, 2021.

Following this decision, the Tribunal held that the sum of Rs. 4,76,25,000 being a capital receipt from its inception is to be excluded while computing book profits u/s 115JB and also on the ground that it does not form part of the operational working results of the company.

The Tribunal allowed both the grounds of appeal filed by the assessee.

Alleged on-money received cannot be taxed in the hands of assessee, a power of attorney holder – Assessee being power of attorney holder, cannot be treated as rightful owner of the income which has arisen on sale of a particular property as his action was only in a representative capacityAlleged on-money received cannot be taxed in the hands of assessee, a power of attorney holder – Assessee being power of attorney holder, cannot be treated as rightful owner of the income which has arisen on sale of a particular property as his action was only in a representative capacity

34 Bankimbhai D. Patel vs. ITO [(2021) TS-403-ITAT-2021 (Ahd)] A.Ys.: 2003-04 and 2004-05; Date of order: 19th May, 2021 Section 4

Alleged on-money received cannot be taxed in the hands of assessee, a power of attorney holder – Assessee being power of attorney holder, cannot be treated as rightful owner of the income which has arisen on sale of a particular property as his action was only in a representative capacity

FACTS
In this case, the original assessment for A.Y. 2003-04 was completed u/s 143(3) r/w/s 147 assessing total income at Rs. 29,86,640 against a returned income of Rs. 47,120. The case of the A.O. was that the assessee was a power of attorney (PoA) holder of certain pieces of land on which construction was done and these were sold. He received on-money and that on-money has not been accounted for by the assessee. The A.O. recorded the statement of one Rasikbhai Patel who confessed that he paid Rs. 8,71,695 but documents were executed only for Rs. 1,32,500. On the basis of this statement, the A.O. harboured the belief that the difference of these two amounts, i.e., Rs. 7,39,195, was collected by way of on-money. He applied this rate to all the plots sold during the year and believed that the assessee has retained on-money which deserves to be assessed in the hands of the assessee. A similar exercise was done for the A.Y. 2004-05.

When the matter reached the Tribunal, it restored the matter back to the file of the A.O. with a direction to find out as to what was the arrangement between the landowners and the PoA holder and who has received the sale consideration; and whether the recipient of sale consideration has offered capital gains; after examining all these aspects and also after finding out what has happened in the hands of the owners, the A.O. should decide the issue afresh and pass necessary orders.

In the set-aside proceedings from which this appeal has arisen, the A.O. made reference to evidence collected in the first round of the assessment proceedings and added the undisclosed and unrecorded income by way of on-money to the total income of the assessee on the ground that the landowners have not filed their return of income for A.Y. 2003-04.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the A.O. The assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal observed that both the authorities have failed to analytically examine the issue as per the direction of the ITAT in the first round. The A.O. was specifically directed to examine the understanding between the landowners and the assessee; whether it has been agreed that the landowners would receive only the amount mentioned in the sale deed. It noted that the A.O. has not recorded the statement of any of the landowners though he was given all the details. He recorded the statement of one of the purchasers in the first round but that is not a relevant evidence as that evidence can be taken for determination of quantum but cannot be used to determine who received that quantum. The Tribunal found the action of the A.O. in holding that since the landowners have not paid capital gains, on-money is to be taxed as income of the assessee to be illogical.

The Tribunal held that the law contemplates that the A.O. has to first determine in whose hand the income has to be assessed and who is the rightful owner. The assessee being a PoA holder, cannot be treated as the rightful owner of the income which has arisen on the sale of a particular property. His action was only in a representative capacity. It observed that it could have appreciated the stand of the A.O. if he had been able to bring on record the terms of agreement between the assessee as well as landowners specifying the distribution of amount between the assessee in his capacity as PoA holder vis-à-vis the actual owner. No such steps were taken in spite of the specific direction of the Tribunal in the first round. Considering all these aspects, the Tribunal held that there is no justification for sustaining addition in both the assessment years in the hands of the assessee. The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

INDIA’S MACRO-ECONOMIC & FINANCIAL PROBLEMS AND SOME MACRO-LEVEL SOLUTIONS

India’s leadership wishes that India be recognised as an economic superpower.

But there is one catch in fulfilling this intent. Can we become an economy that comes in the first five in GDP rankings (although due to our large population, per capita we may still be very low) if we do not really ‘own’ our businesses in financial structures and do not supposedly pay our due share of taxes?

How can there be an entrepreneurial push to an economy when so much of quality time is spent not on expanding business and exploiting opportunities, but on creating ‘suitable business, financial and tax structures’?

Why are Indians considered a model minority culturally overseas when within the country we see examples of businesses defaulting on loans and interest payments with the term ‘wilful defaulter’ being specially coined for them and being accused of ‘tax evasion’?

[Please refer link (as example) – https://wap.business-standard.com/article/companies/around-rs-10-52-trn-corporate-debt-may-default-over-3-years-india-ratings-120030200388_1.html.]

‘Wilful defaulter’ is someone who has the ability to pay but is organising his business with the intent not to pay.

There are two macro-economic and financial problems that India is facing today:
(I) High debt capital gearing, and
(II) Intent of tax evasion (direct and indirect).

(I) High debt capital gearing

A classic case of high capital gearing and borrowings to fund business outcome comes from a major
telecom service provider (source – ‘moneycontrol.com’, standalone financials).

Between the years 2016-17 and 2020-21, this telecom company had these important events:
i)    Increase in equity capital – Rs. 25,130.07 crores;
ii)    Increase in tangible & intangible assets – Rs. 86,637.52 crores;
iii)    Increase in long-term borrowings – Rs. 105,777.67 crores;
iv)    Increase in short-term borrowings – Rs. 39.35 crores;
v)    Losses incurred in this period – Rs. 86,561.43 crores.

One can see that the increase in share capital to fund losses and increase in tangible and intangible assets is much lower than the increase in borrowings. The company has also used operating creditors to fund its business.

In the case of a large Indian entity whose major business is in oil and gas, between the years 2016-17 and 2020-21, the increase in reserves and surplus due to undistributed profits is Rs. 182,980 crores, while the increase in long-term and short-term borrowings is Rs. 92,447 crores. Clearly, there is a good match between increased borrowings and increased profits after tax for the period under review.

‘High Capital Gearing’ in Indian corporates is resulting in a skewed debt to equity ratio. This high debt when not serviced by payments on due dates of interest and principal instalment due, results in the corporate being ultimately called a ‘Non-Performing Asset’ (by bankers as lenders) and the process of recovery of dues starts.

NPAs pose a serious problem for the financial viability of India’s financial lending sector.

(Please see link – https://www.business-standard.com/article/finance/banks-gross-npas-may-rise-to-13-5-by-sept-financial-stability-report-121011200076_1.html.)

NPAs are unfair to the savings class of citizens because they destroy the net worth of banks – very unfairly, the insurance for the individual saving and keeping money in banks is restricted to Rs. 5 lakhs per bank. How this figure of Rs. 5 lakhs has come about is not known. Anybody who has studied Indian middle class savings patterns knows that a very large part of their savings corpus is in bank deposits. More than the borrower being impacted by action against him, the bank customer is hit hard, again very unfairly. Why has the RBI as regulator not thought of protecting the bank depositor by insisting that all deposits should be fully insured for bank default is not known. If the DICGC (Credit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation) which is a 100% subsidiary of RBI does not have the financial muscle to carry the entire risk liability, one can always bring in Indian and overseas insurers for providing the default risk cover.

The issue that needs attention is why do corporates accumulate such high debt (mainly from the banking sector)? The reality is that once the banking sector was opened to private players and long-term funding got opened in foreign exchanges, both the then Development Finance Institutions, ICICI Ltd. and IDBI Ltd., chose to become commercial / retail banks.

As the push for infrastructure came from the Government of India, commercial bankers became financiers of long-term debt (instead of just working capital funding). Bankers who were working capital funding entities started moving into long-term capital funding without truly understanding the implications. The intent of this article is not to comment on fraudulent behaviour or political intervention in sanctioning of loans. That is a different matter and proving of criminal conduct and punishment thereof is outside the scope of this article.

Corporate promoter groups in multiple business types saw an opportunity to draw large debt (facilitated by the financial markets meltdown in 2008 and 2009) and exploited the situation. The absence of the ‘skin in the game’ philosophy resulted in debt being incurred on unmerited and unviable business expansion / extension or new business proposals. In the hope of keeping the engines of growth firing, the banking sector funding went into undependable and unviable projects. Why did banks and financial institutions continue their funding despite ‘High Capital Gearing’ being visible is the question to be asked. The ease of getting borrowings has compounded the problem. Ultimately, the borrower is facilitated and the depositor is ruined!

To be fair, there is no doubt that in many over-leveraged business segments like the realty sector during Covid-19, the business entities have worked towards reducing debt by sale of business, liquidation of assets, etc.

SOLUTION
One part of the solution to avoid ‘High Capital Gearing’ and funding thereof is to have a much better overview of lending proposals and their appraisal at the lenders’ end (banks and financial institutions).

The other part which is systemic in nature is to remove the Income tax shield advantage of interest cost. Any entity has two sources of funds:
1) Shareholders capital – This funding is less popular because returns to shareholders come after corporate or business Income tax.
2) Borrowings – This funding is more popular because interest paid on debt funds is an eligible item of deductible expense, thereby reducing their cost impact for the business.

If a business wishes to give a shareholder dividend of Rs. 1,000 at a corporate income tax rate of 30%, it needs to earn Rs. 1,400+. However, Rs. 1,000 paid as interest on borrowings being eligible for income tax deduction as expense, actually costs Rs. 700 to the business (tax shield Rs. 300).

This business structuring and Income tax differential treatment of interest payment and returns to shareholders post tax, has moved the pendulum unswervingly towards debt from shareholders’ funds. Also, Indian corporate and business management is still very much dependent on family-based promoter groups who clearly would like to keep their exposure to risk at the lowest level. The principle of ‘as little skin in the game’ is followed.

Owing to this family / promoter development in Indian corporates, and maybe because the law is not facilitative enough, we do not have aggressive ‘business control’ wars and that has closed off the option of takeover by a rival if the business is languishing or going down. The IBC comes in much later at the point where insolvency is declared.

This is why in India the promoters’ exposure when business goes down is very low, thanks further to low capital invested. The high risk exposure is taken by the unsecured creditors and debt holders who are the ones taking the ‘haircut’. Hence, we are seeing the way the existing promoter is fighting to retain control of the entity in the Insolvency and Bankruptcy proceedings. Companies languish but don’t die.

(Please see link – https://m.economictimes.com/news/company/corporate-trends/view-india-is-no-country-for-dying-companies/articleshow/85552085.cms.)

Our laws and our infrastructure to ensure timely implementation of laws are often not in sync with one another. This is fully exploited by a defaulting promoter. As the late Mr. Arun Jaitley said, ‘There are sick defaulting companies, but no poor promoters’!

Business Income tax should be based on profit before interest and tax, thereby removing the tax shield that is provided by interest. To compensate for this additional tax outgo, the rate on business income tax should be brought down by about 300 to 500 basis points (3 to 5%). By putting both sources of funds, at the same tax treatment level, the incentive to move towards debt and reduce equity contribution should diminish.

(II) Intent of tax evasion (direct and indirect)
There is no point in repeating ad nauseam that as per Finance Ministry Officials Indians evade both direct and indirect tax. Of course, nobody talks of the fact that agricultural income does not come under Income tax and therefore all international comparisons of percentage of direct taxpayers and percentage of total direct tax collection to total tax collected from individual assessees gets terribly vitiated.

GST has tightened indirect tax compliance to a great extent, but it could still do better on compliance matters. It is one thing to keep saying that Indians are tax-evaders and another to create an environment where tax evasion is not contemplated because it gives very marginal advantage.

SOLUTION
The solution is evident from the problem. There is a need to break the Chinese wall separating the Direct Tax Administration from the Indirect Tax Administration. GST has an issue because it is borne by the end customer who gets no credit on tax and it becomes a cost to him. That is why we have the sales without invoice, the unverified composition dealer sales, etc. Where the income tax payer can take GST credit (CGST, SGST, IGST) totally, he will be quite pleased.

The author is not aware whether fungibility between direct and indirect tax is available in other economies. All economies do have direct and indirect tax payment by the ultimate consumer. However, the Indian situation is different. We need to incentivise the ultimate taxpayer so that tax revenues are buoyant.

Amend the tax laws such that a direct tax payer is permitted GST paid on his personal purchases funded by income (taxable) as a credit. The moment this is done, the customer will insist on getting a proper ‘GST Invoice’. Of course, this GST invoice must have the assessee’s name and PAN #or Aadhaar #. Once the GST invoice is made, the details of a GST dealer will be available. A direct tax payer for the sake of taking GST credits on direct tax liability payable, will file his income tax return, thereby increasing the numbers of income tax returns filers.

Increased GST Returns filings will benefit state governments also in SGST and share of IGST.

It is preferred that agriculture income also comes within the income tax net, although this may have serious political consequences and may need to wait for implementation. Farmers buying agriculture equipment, seeds, fertilisers will be benefited.

In fact, if after full GST deduction the income tax assessee has a tax refund, 40% of that should be given / paid to him as incentive and the other 60% stand cancelled.

Our tax authorities (both direct and indirect) will need to do some original tax thinking. Just stating that Indians evade tax is insulting and does not improve tax compliance. Let them think of a solution that is not very convoluted and cumbersome.

The taxpayer must feel advantaged in filing the direct tax return, The authorities have to integrate direct and indirect tax, since the end customer is paying for the same and is the same person.

The answer to both the above serious problems lies in making the final individual taxpayer the centre of Government and regulatory authorities’ policies. The solution is available, it has to be accepted and implemented.

Of course, there will be serious resistance to the above proposals from the Revenue Ministry and from businesses, for being ‘impractical and unviable’. However, both proposals are of benefit to the individual – whether as bank depositor, shareholder of over-leveraged entities or as taxpayer (direct and indirect tax). The time has come to be different in thinking and implementing policies.

(The author is grateful for the usage of news links which have collaborated his point of view)

IMPLICATIONS OF KEY AMENDMENTS TO COMPANIES ACT, 2013 ON MANAGEMENT AND AUDITORS

The effect of laws and regulations on financial statements varies considerably. Non-compliance with the same may result in fines, litigation or other consequences for the entity that may have a material effect on the financial statements. It is the responsibility of management, with the oversight of those charged with governance, to ensure that operations are conducted in accordance with the provisions of various laws and regulations, including those that determine the reported amounts and disclosures in an entity’s financial statements.

Standards on Auditing (SA) 250, Consideration of Laws and Regulations in an Audit of Financial Statements, deals with the auditor’s responsibility to consider laws and regulations when performing an audit of financial statements. The provisions of some laws or regulations have a direct effect on the financial statements in that they determine the reported amounts and disclosures in an entity’s financial statements, e.g., the Companies Act, 2013 (‘2013 Act’). Other laws and regulations that do not have a direct effect on the determination of the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements, but compliance with which may be fundamental to the operating aspects of the business, to an entity’s ability to continue its business, or to avoid material penalties (e.g., compliance with the terms of an operating license, compliance with regulatory solvency requirements, or compliance with environmental regulations), non-compliance with such laws and regulations may therefore have a material effect on the financial statements. The Code of Ethics issued by the ICAI also includes specific sections on Responding to Non-Compliance of Laws and Regulations (NOCLAR)1 for listed companies. However, the auditor is not responsible for preventing non-compliance and cannot be expected to detect non-compliance with all laws and regulations.

The MCA has issued various amendments to the Companies Act, 2013, including an amendment to Schedule III of the Companies Act, 2013 to increase transparency and to provide additional disclosures in the financial statements, and CARO 2020 to enhance the reporting requirements for auditors. The MCA has also amended the provisions of Rule 11 of the Companies (Audit and Auditors) Rules, 2014 to include additional matters in the Auditor’s Report w.e.f. 1st April, 2021 (except the requirement related to audit trail which is applicable w.e.f. 1st April, 2022).

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1 The ICAI issued an announcement dated 26th July, 2021 and deferred the applicability date of these provisions to 1st April, 2022

This article attempts to provide an overview of the key amendments relating to the definition of listed company, Corporate Social Responsibility and managerial remuneration and related challenges emanating from these amendments and the enhanced role of management and auditors.

I. AMENDMENT TO DEFINITION OF LISTED COMPANY
Section 2(52) of the 2013 Act provides the definition of a listed company. Listed companies under this Act are required to adhere to stricter compliance norms when it comes to filing of annual returns, maintenance of records, appointment of auditors, appointment of independent directors and woman directors, constitution of board committees, etc. This may dis-incentivise (or demotivate) private companies / unlisted public companies from seeking listing of their debt securities even though doing so might be in the interest of the company. Effective 1st April, 20212, the MCA amended section 2(52) of the 2013 Act and Companies (Specification of Definitions Details) Rules, 2014 to exclude the following class of companies from the definition of a listed company:

  •  Public companies which have not listed their equity shares on a recognised stock exchange but have listed:

– Non-convertible debt securities, or
– Non-convertible redeemable preference shares, or
– Both the above categories
issued on private placement basis in terms of the SEBI (Issue and Listing of Debt Securities) Regulations, 2008 / SEBI (Issue and Listing of Non-Convertible Redeemable Preference Shares) Regulations, 2013, respectively.

__________________________________________________________
2 The MCA issued Notification No. G.S.R. 123(E) dated 19th February, 2021 on the
Companies (Specification of Definitions, Details) Second Amendment Rules, 2021
.
  • Private companies which have listed their non-convertible debt securities on private placement basis on a recognised stock exchange in terms of the SEBI (Issue and Listing of Debt Securities) Regulations, 2008.

 

  • Public companies which have not listed their equity shares on a recognised stock exchange but whose equity shares are listed on a stock exchange in a permissible foreign jurisdiction as specified in the sub-section of section 23(3)3 of the 2013 Act.

It may be noted that SEBI has not modified the definition of a listed company. Accordingly, the implications are limited to the provisions prescribed under the 2013 Act. Some of these considerations are discussed below:

Relaxation for companies from compliances under 2013 Act

Listed companies are required to comply with additional stringent requirements under the 2013 Act, e.g., at least 1/3rd of the total number of directors to be independent directors, appointment of one woman director on the board, appointment of an internal auditor and compliance with auditor’s rotation norms. Companies which no longer qualify as listed companies pursuant to the above amendment would not be required to comply with such stringent requirements.

Besides, it is interesting to note that though the intent of the amendment is to provide relaxations for private / public companies, there might be some unintended consequences as well. One such unintended consequence is the debenture redemption norms. Section 71(4) of the 2013 Act read with Rule 18 of the Companies (Share Capital and Debentures) Rules, 2014 prescribes the quantum of debenture redemption reserve and the investment or deposit of sum in respect of debentures maturing during the year ending on the 31st day of March of the next year, unless specifically exempted. It may be noted that in accordance with Rule 18(7)(b)(iii)(B), debenture redemption reserve is not required to be created by listed companies having privately-placed debentures. Pursuant to the amendment, these exemptions may no longer be available; creation of the debenture redemption reserve and investment of sums in respect of debentures might become applicable for listed companies having privately-placed debentures. However, this will be subject to clarification by the MCA or the ICAI.

_____________________________________________________________
3 Such class of public companies may issue such class of securities for the purposes of listing on permitted stock exchanges in permissible foreign jurisdictions or such other jurisdictions, as may be prescribed
Preparation of financial statements under Ind AS by the company
One of the criteria for applicability of Ind AS prescribed under the Companies (Indian Accounting Standards) Rules, 2015 is that companies whose ‘equity or debt securities are listed’ or are in the process of being listed on any stock exchange in India (except for listing on the SME exchange or Innovators Growth Platform), or outside India would be required to prepare financial statements as per Ind AS. Further, these Rules provide that once a company starts following Ind AS, it would be required to follow these for all the subsequent financial statements even if any of the prescribed criteria do not subsequently apply to it. Accordingly, companies which no longer qualify as listed companies but have prepared financial statements under Ind AS, would continue to prepare financial statements in accordance with Ind AS.

Private / public companies listing non-convertible debt securities and / or non-convertible redeemable preference shares on a private placement basis are excluded from the definition of ‘Listed company’ as per the amended definition. One may argue that Ind AS applies to all listed companies. Since these companies are not listed companies as defined under the 2013 Act, such companies would not be required to comply with Ind AS (unless other thresholds are met). A closer look at the aforesaid Rules indicates that Ind AS applies to companies whose ‘equity or debt securities are listed’ – instead of ‘listed company’. Hence, strictly speaking, the other possible view is that private / public companies having listed non-convertible debt securities / non-convertible redeemable preference shares on a private placement basis would need to comply with Ind AS. These companies need to consider GAAP applicable to them and their auditors, while issuing an opinion on true and fair view and compliance with accounting standards u/s 133 of the Act, will need to consider this amendment.

Auditors reporting on Key Audit Matters (KAM)
Auditors are required to report Key Audit Matters in the audit report of a listed entity which has prepared a complete set of general purpose financial statements as required by SA 701, Communicating Key Audit Matters in the Independent Auditor’s Report. KAMs are those matters that, in the auditor’s professional judgement, were of most significance in the audit of the financial statements of the current period. The Standard on Quality Control – 1 and SA 220, Quality Control for an Audit of Financial Statements, define a listed entity as an entity whose shares, stock or debt are quoted or listed on a recognised stock exchange, or are traded under the regulations of a recognised stock exchange or other equivalent body.

Different definitions of ‘Listed company’ under the 2013 Act and SA 220 may raise an applicability issue. One may argue that auditing standards are prescribed u/s 143(10) of the 2013 Act. Accordingly, the question is whether a listed company should be understood uniformly for all purposes under the 2013 Act, including while reporting on KAMs, or the definition of SA 220 be applied while auditing and reporting on the company’s financial statements. The definitions under the 2013 Act are for compliance with the legal requirements under the 2013 Act and do not apply to accounting and auditing matters. Since auditors are responsible to conduct audit in accordance with the SA, the auditor should follow the definition of a listed entity as envisaged in the SAs while reporting on KAMs. Hence, one may argue that auditors of all listed companies (even those not considered as listed companies under the 2013 Act) would continue to report on KAMs as required by SA 701. The MCA and the ICAI may consider clarifying this aspect.

Auditor’s reporting on CARO 2020
The Central Government, in exercise of the powers conferred on it under sub-section (11) of section 143 of the Companies Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), issued the Companies (Auditor’s Report) Order, 2020 on 25th February, 2020. Called CARO 2020 for short, it is applicable for the financial years commencing on or after 1st April, 2021 to a prescribed class of entities including listed companies, public companies and private companies meeting the prescribed thresholds.

One may take a view that CARO 2020 does not prescribe the listing of securities by any company (including a private company) as a criterion for applicability. Hence the change in definition of a listed company may not impact the applicability of CARO. The MCA and the ICAI may consider clarifying this issue. However, reporting on CARO 2020 would continue to apply to all public companies (listed or unlisted).

II. AMENDMENT TO CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (CSR) PROVISIONS
Section 135 of the 2013 Act and the Companies (Corporate Social Responsibility Policy) Rules, 2014 (‘CSR Rules’) prescribe the norms relating to CSR. The MCA has recently overhauled the norms and brought significant changes in implementation of CSR initiatives, introduced new concepts like mandatory impact assessment, and prescribed the manner of dealing with unspent CSR amounts. These amendments were notified on 22nd January, 2021. CARO 2020 has also introduced specific additional reporting requirements for the auditors related to unspent amount under sections 135(5) and 135(6) of the 2013 Act. The revised Schedule III under the 2013 Act has added specific disclosures to be made by companies in respect of CSR spend.

The requirement of audit of CSR activities has not been made mandatory under the 2013 Act. However, various provisions of the Companies (Company Social Responsibilities Policy) Rules, 2014 require the monitoring and reporting mechanism for CSR activities.

Auditor’s responsibilities
Wherever an eligible company undertakes CSR activity itself, the key responsibilities of the auditor are summarised below:
• Auditors should check compliance with section 135 of the 2013 Act and check whether the expenditure has been incurred as per the CSR policy formulated by the company;
• The auditor is also required to check whether the activity / project undertaken is within the purview of Schedule VII of the Act;
• If mere contribution / donation is given for a specified purpose, then whether it is specifically allowed as per Schedule VII of the Act;
• The auditor, while opining on the financial statements, will also be required to check whether separate
disclosure of expenditure on CSR activities has been made as per Schedule III applicable for the financial
year ending 31st March, 2021 and additional disclosures as per revised Schedule III have been made by the company for the financial year commencing on or after 1st April 2021;
• The auditor to check whether the company has recorded a provision as at the balance sheet date to the extent considered necessary in accordance with the provisions of AS 29 / Ind AS 37, Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets, in respect of the unspent amount;
• To check compliance with relevant Standards on Auditing for audit of CSR spend including:
– SA 250 – Consideration of Laws and Regulations in an Audit of Financial Statements;
– SA 720 (Revised) – The Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to Other Information.

Eligible CSR activities in the context of Covid-19
The MCA has issued a Circular dated 30th July, 2021 clarifying that spending of CSR funds for Covid-19 vaccination for persons other than the employees and their families is an eligible CSR activity under Schedule VII of the Companies Act, 2013. Management would need to establish necessary internal controls to track that the spend is made to benefit persons other than employees and their families.

Increased focus on impact creation
The amendments require every company with an average CSR obligation of INR 10 crores or more (in the three immediately preceding F.Y.s) to undertake an impact assessment of their CSR projects having an outlay of INR 1 crore or more and has been completed not less than one year before undertaking the impact study. The assessment should be carried out through an independent agency and the impact assessment reports should be placed before the board and should be annexed to the annual report on CSR.

Enhanced monitoring mechanism
The amendments significantly enhance the monitoring mechanism and require the CSR committee to formulate and recommend an annual action plan in pursuance of its CSR policy to the board of directors. The action plan should include the prescribed matters such as the manner of execution of such projects or programmes, modalities of utilisation of funds and implementation schedules, and the monitoring and reporting mechanism for the projects or programmes.

The board of the company is required to satisfy itself that the funds disbursed have been utilised for the CSR purposes and in the manner as approved by it. It should be certified by the Chief Financial Officer or the person responsible for the financial management of the company.

The amendments have introduced a new format for the annual report on CSR activities to be included in the board’s report of a company for the F.Y. commencing on or after 1st April, 2020. Some of the new disclosures to be made by companies in the annual report include details of impact assessment of CSR projects (if applicable) along with the report and amount spent on impact assessment, details of the amount available for set-off and details of unspent CSR amount for the preceding three F.Y.s, including amount transferred to unspent CSR account and fund specified in Schedule VII of the 2013 Act. In case of creation or acquisition of a capital asset, additional disclosures are prescribed.

The auditor will also be required to read the information included in the annual report as required by SA 720, The Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to Other Information.

Unspent CSR amount – Reporting in CARO 2020
Section 135 prescribes a mandatory spending of 2% of the average net profits made by the company during the three immediately preceding financial years on CSR activities. Earlier, section 135 followed a ‘comply or explain approach’, i.e., the board of directors was required to explain in the Board Report the reason for not spending the minimum CSR amount. Accordingly, no provision for unspent amount was required to be made before the amendment.

The MCA observed that a tenable reason does not expel or extinguish the obligation to spend the stipulated CSR amount4. With this objective in mind, section 135 and the CSR Rules were amended and the ‘comply or explain’ approach was replaced with a ‘comply or pay penalty’ approach. The amended provisions now require the following in respect of ‘unspent amounts’:

• On-going CSR projects [Section 135(6)]: In this case, the company should transfer the unspent amount to a special bank account within a period of 30 days from the end of the financial year. The company should spend such amount within a period of three F.Y.s from the date of such transfer as per its obligation towards the CSR policy. In case it fails to do so, it would be required to transfer the same to a fund specified in Schedule VII of the 2013 Act within a period of 30 days from the date of completion of the third financial year.

Other than on-going projects [Section 135(5)]: When there is no on-going project, the unspent amount should be transferred to a fund specified in Schedule VII of the 2013 Act within a period of six months from the end of the financial year.

Additional reporting requirements for CSR have been introduced in CARO 2020 which require the auditor to report on the above two aspects.

_____________________________________________________________
4 Report of the High-Level Committee on Corporate Social Responsibility, 2018
Subsequent to the amendment, the revised Technical Guide on CSR issued by the ICAI provides that an obligation to transfer the unspent amount to a separate bank account within 30 days of the end of the financial year and eventually any unspent amount out of that to a specified fund, indicates that a provision for liability for the amount representing the extent to which the amount is to be transferred within 30 days of the end of the financial year needs to be recognised in the financial statements.

Implementation challenges
The following implementation challenges will need to be considered and evaluated by both the company and the auditor in this regard:

• The CSR amendments do not link the applicability of the amendments to any financial year. It may be noted that the applicability of this amendment is prospective and therefore provision may be required for shortfall for the F.Y. 2020-21 and onwards.

• Assessment of presentation of unspent amount in the CSR bank account in the financial statements may be critical as such amounts would not be available for any other purpose. Ind AS 7 / AS 3 on Cash Flow Statement requires companies to disclose, together with a commentary by management, the amount of significant cash and cash equivalent balances held by the entity that are not available for use by the entity. Thus, the amounts in the unspent CSR bank account should be disclosed as restricted cash with adequate commentary by the management in the financial statements.

• While preparing quarterly financial information, an issue may arise whether provision for CSR obligation for the entire year should be recognised in the first quarter or the provision for unspent amount should be made at the end of the year. In this regard, the ICAI has clarified that for the unspent amount a legal obligation arises to transfer to specified accounts depending upon the fact whether or not such unspent amount relates to on-going projects. Therefore, liability needs to be recognised for such unspent amount as at the end of the financial year. However, the amount spent during the interim period needs to be charged as expense for the same interim period. It cannot be deferred to the remaining interim periods of the financial year.

The amendments have also prescribed significant penalties, e.g., in case of non-compliance with provisions relating to unspent amount a penalty twice the default amount would be imposed on the company subject to a maximum of INR 1 crore. The auditor will need to evaluate the implications on the audit report in case of non-compliance with the mandatory and stringent CSR provisions.

III. MANAGERIAL REMUNERATION
Section 149(9) of the 2013 Act provides that an independent director may receive remuneration by way of profit-related commission as may be approved by the members. In case of no / inadequate profit, section 197 of the 2013 Act permitted payment of remuneration only to its executive directors or managers.

The MCA has extended the model followed for remuneration to executive directors to non-executive directors (including independent directors) by amending section 149 and section 197, and Schedule V to the 2013 Act. Schedule V now prescribes the following limits for payment of remuneration to each non-executive director (including independent directors):

Where the effective capital
is

Limit of yearly
remuneration payable shall not exceed (INR) in case of other director (i.e.,
other than managerial person)

Negative or less than INR 5 crores

12 lakhs

INR 5 crores and above but less than INR 100 crores

17 lakhs

INR 100 crores and above but less than INR 250 crores

24 lakhs

INR 250 crores and above

24 lakhs plus 0.01% of the
effective capital in excess of INR 250 crores

Remuneration in excess of the above limits may be paid if the resolution passed by the shareholders is a special resolution.

While Schedule V has been amended to include the limits for non-executive directors, Explanation II which provides for computation of effective capital for a managerial person has not been amended. It provides as below:
• Where the appointment of the managerial person is made in the year in which the company has been incorporated, the effective capital shall be calculated as on the date of such appointment;

• In any other case the effective capital shall be calculated as on the last date of the financial year preceding the financial year in which the appointment of the managerial person is made.

In the absence of a specific amendment, one may take the view that similar provisions should be applied for other directors also, i.e., for a non-executive director. The MCA may issue a clarification in this regard.

The above amendment is effective from 18th March, 2021. This means that companies would need to comply with the amended provisions in F.Y. 2020-21 and onwards.

Amendment to remuneration policy
The earlier remuneration policies of the company would not have the flexibility of payment of remuneration in case of no / inadequate profits as payment of remuneration to non-executive directors (including independent directors). Since the amendments now permit payment of remuneration in case of loss / inadequate profits, the remuneration policy of the company would need to be updated so as to comply with these requirements.

Auditor’s reporting
Auditor’s reporting on director’s remuneration in its audit report (under ‘Report on Other Legal and Regulatory Requirement’) will encompass remuneration paid to non-executive directors as well. Since remuneration would be paid to non-executive directors (including independent directors) in case of no / inadequate profits, the auditors would need to verify compliance in this regard.

BOTTOMLINE
The overhaul of the CSR provisions, amendments to the definition of listed company and managerial remuneration highlights the intent of the MCA aimed towards developing a robust and coherent regulatory and policy framework and underlying ecosystem. The primary responsibility of effective implementation of these amendments lies with the management by ensuring their compliance in a timely manner. However, the reporting responsibilities and issuing a true and fair view on the financial statements of the company lies with the auditor. The auditor should keep track of these fast-changing regulations and their consequential implications on the audit report, especially in case there is any non-compliance.

Love what you have. Need what you want. Accept

SPECIAL PURPOSE ACQUISITION COMPANIES – ACCOUNTING AND TAX ISSUES

Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) have become a rage in the United States and some other countries over the past few months. SPACs have a number of unique features – they have a limited shelf-life as they are in business only for a few years, they have no object other than acquiring a target company and they do not have too much in common with other corporates in terms of assets, liabilities, employees, etc. SEBI is considering issuing guidelines on how SPACs should operate in India. This article summarises the accounting and tax issues that SPACs could encounter here.

INTRODUCTION
SPACs. The word does not sound very exciting but it is a phenomenon that is taking stock markets (at least in the USA) by storm. The abbreviation expands as Special Purpose Acquisition Companies but a more street-sounding name is ‘blank cheque companies’. These are companies that are set up with next to nothing and list on the stock exchanges only for the purpose of raising capital for acquisitions. In India, SEBI is planning to come out with a framework on SPACs ostensibly to facilitate Startups to list on the exchanges. SPACs are usually formed by private equity funds or financial institutions, with expertise in a particular industry or business sector, with investment for initial working capital and issue-related expenses.

Private companies would benefit from SPACs as they go on to become listed entities without going through the rigours of an Initial Public Offering (IPO). It is not that SPACs is a new phenomenon – the concept of reverse mergers resembles a SPAC in many respects. SPACs are different from normal companies in that they have only one object – to list on the exchanges with the sole intention of acquiring a target company. One of the main advantages of a SPAC is the fact that it can use forward-looking information in the prospectus – this may not be permitted in a usual IPO.

In case the SPAC is not able to identify and acquire a target company within the set time frame it winds up and the funds are returned to the investors. In case the SPAC identifies a target company and enters into a Business Combination, the shareholders of the SPAC will have the opportunity to redeem their shares and, in many cases, vote on the initial Business Combination transaction. Each SPAC shareholder can either remain a shareholder of the company after the initial Business Combination or redeem and receive its pro rata amount of the funds held in the escrow account.

Investors in a SPAC put in a small amount of money for a stake in the company (usually around 20%). They get allotted shares with a lock-in period of up to a year. They have the option of exiting once the lock-in period is over. SPACs would also have similarities with Cat-1 alternate investment funds (AIF’s) – an angel fund listing on the SME platform.

THREE STAGES
Usually, a SPAC will have three phases with different time frames:

Stage

Activity

Indicative time frame

1

IPO

3 months

2

Search for target company

18 months

3

Close transaction

3 months

Ind AS accounting standards
Since all SPACs have to list on some stock exchange, they would have to follow Ind AS accounting standards as it is mandatory for all listed entities.

Stage 1
In Stage 1, SPACs normally issue different types of financial instruments to the founders / investors such as equity shares, convertible shares or share warrants. Investors would be keen to invest in these instruments since the warrants give them an opportunity to get some more shares in case a target company has been identified. Usually, the IPO price is fixed at par (say Rs. 10) while the exercise price of the warrants is fixed about 15% higher. SPACs are forced to invest at least 85% of their IPO proceeds in an escrow account. Accounting for these instruments would be driven by Ind AS 32 / Ind AS 109. Since the SPAC would not be undertaking any commercial activities at this stage, very few Ind AS standards other than Ind AS 32/109 would need to be applied. Typically, at this stage SPACs do not own too many assets. The nature of the financial instruments issued to the investors would determine the accounting. These instruments could be equity instruments, share warrants that are exercisable, convertible shares or bonds and other instruments that are entirely equity in nature. The type of the instrument would determine whether it would be accounted for as equity share capital, under other equity, or as a separate line item ‘instruments that are entirely equity in nature’.

Stage 2
Once a target company has been identified and the acquisition is formalised, Ind AS 103 Business Combinations would have to be applied. There are seven steps in Business Combination accounting:

1.    Is it an acquisition
2.    Identify the acquirer
3.    Ascertain acquisition date
4.    Recognising and measuring assets acquired, liabilities assumed, and NCI
5.    Measuring consideration
6.    Recognising and measuring Intangible Assets
7.    Post-acquisition measurement and accounting

First step – Is it an acquisition?
An amendment to Ind AS 103 has made the distinction between an asset acquisition and a Business Combination clearer. The main pointers are:

1.    Business must include inputs and substantive processes applied to those inputs which have ability to create output / contribute to ability to create output.
2.    Change in definition of ‘output’ – it now focuses on goods and services provided to customers.
3.    Omission of ability to substitute the missing inputs and processes by the market participants.
4.    Addition of ‘Optional Concentration Test’.

Remaining steps
Once the transaction meets the definition of a Business Combination, the other six steps would need to be followed. These would invariably be: identifying the acquirer, determining the acquisition date, measuring acquisition date fair values, measuring the consideration to be paid, recognising goodwill and deciding on post-combination accounting. Business Combination Accounting permits the recognition of previously unrecognised Intangible Assets – this clause would be important for SPACs since they would invariably look at technology companies that have some Intangible Assets for an acquisition.

GOING CONCERN?
Most SPACS have a limited shelf-life of about two to three years. One of the fundamental principles on which the Framework to Ind AS Standards has been formulated is the principle of Going Concern. An interesting question that arises is whether the management will need to comment on the going concern concept since it is clear that the SPAC will not be a going concern in a few years from the date of listing. Usually, SPACs provide a disclosure on their status in the financial statements. The disclosure given below is from the Form 10K (annual report) of Churchill Capital Corp IV for the year ended 31st December, 2020:

‘Our amended and restated certificate of incorporation provides that we will have until 3rd August, 2022, the date that is 24 months from the closing of the IPO, to complete our initial business combination (the period from the closing of the IPO until 3rd August, 2022, the “completion window”). If we are unable to complete our initial business combination within such period, we will: (1) cease all operations except for the purpose of winding up; (2) as promptly as reasonably possible, but not more than ten business days thereafter, redeem the public shares at a per share price, payable in cash, equal to the aggregate amount then on deposit in the trust account, including interest (net of permitted withdrawals and up to $100,000 of interest to pay dissolution expenses), divided by the number of then outstanding public shares, which redemption will completely extinguish public stockholders’ rights as stockholders (including the right to receive further liquidating distributions, if any), subject to applicable law; and (3) as promptly as reasonably possible following such redemption, subject to the approval of our remaining stockholders and our board of directors, dissolve and liquidate, subject in each case to our obligations under Delaware law to provide for claims of creditors and the requirements of other applicable law. There will be no redemption rights or liquidating distributions with respect to our warrants, which will expire worthless if we fail to complete our initial business combination within the completion window.’

It would appear that a disclosure on the above lines would suffice to satisfy the ability of the entity to continue as a going concern during the limited period of its existence.

CONTINGENT CONSIDERATION
A SPAC merger agreement may include a provision for additional consideration to be transferred to the shareholders of the target company in the future if certain events occur or conditions arise. This additional consideration, commonly referred to as an ‘earn-out’ payment, may be in the form of additional equity interests in the combined company, cash or other assets. If the SPAC is identified as the accounting acquirer and the target company is a business, the earn-out payment may represent contingent consideration in connection with a Business Combination. While such payments may be negotiated as part of the merger, the terms of the arrangement need to be evaluated to determine whether the payment is part of or separate from the Business Combination. In making this evaluation, the SPAC should consider the nature of the arrangement, the reasons for entering into the arrangement and which party receives the primary benefits from the transaction.

If the arrangement is entered into primarily for the benefit of the SPAC or the combined company rather than primarily for the benefit of the target or its former shareholders, the arrangement is likely a separate transaction that should be accounted for separately from the Business Combination. For example, payments are sometimes made to shareholders of the target company who will remain as employees of the combined company after the merger. In this case, the SPAC must carefully evaluate whether the substance of the arrangement is to compensate the former shareholders for future services rather than to provide additional consideration in exchange for the acquired business. If the SPAC determines that an earn-out provision represents consideration transferred for the acquired business, the contingent consideration is recognised at acquisition-date fair value under Ind AS 103. However, earn-out arrangements that represent separate transactions are accounted for under other applicable Ind AS. For example, payments made to former shareholders of the target company that are determined to be compensatory are accounted for as compensation expense for services provided in the post-merger period.

TAX IMPACT
Shareholders
At the time of the Business Combination, shares are usually issued. For shareholders under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1961, issue of shares in any form results in a ‘transfer’ of shares held by the existing shareholders of the Indian target entity. The consideration is received in the form of SPAC shares. Capital gains tax may emerge on the sale / swap of shares of the Indian target company against the shares of SPAC. The taxable capital gains would be the excess of the fair market value over the cost of acquisition in the hands of the selling shareholders. Tax rates vary from 10% to 40% under the Indian tax laws, plus applicable surcharge and cess. Tax rates shall primarily depend upon various factors – inter alia, the mode of transfer, i.e., share swap vs. merger, residential status of shareholders, availability of treaty benefits and the period of holding of the shares.

SPAC
A SPAC is required to comply with the applicable withholding tax obligation at the time of discharge of consideration to non-residents, i.e., whether on account of a merger or swap of shares.

If an Indian target company has unabsorbed tax losses and its shareholder voting rights change by more than 49%, then the unabsorbed tax losses would lapse and it shall not be eligible to carry forward its past tax losses.

Once the shares of the SPAC are listed, it is possible that the tax implications of the indirect transfer rules outlined in section 9(1)(i) would need to be considered. However, this would apply only if the SPAC is a foreign company. [Will SPAC be an Indian or a foreign company?] If it is an Indian company, then its shares are actually located in India only. Where is the question of applying indirect transfer rules? For example, a tax liability would arise if a SPAC derives its substantial value from India (more than 50%) under the Indian indirect transfer rules. Shareholders who hold less than 5% of the voting power or the SPAC’s capital are not subject to Indian indirect transfer implications, provided certain conditions are met. For other shareholders, any transfer of SPAC shares results in Indian indirect transfer implications.

SPONSORS
Typically, a SPAC sponsor converts its Class B shares into Class A shares upon successfully acquiring a target company. Depending upon the date and timing of the Business Combination and the conversion of Class B shares into Class A shares, tax implications under the Indian indirect transfer rules need to be evaluated for the SPAC sponsor.

SPACs would also need to consider the implications of Notification No. 77/2021 dated 7th July, 2021 issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes which clarifies that where the value of net goodwill removed from the block is in excess of the opening written down value as on 1st April, 2020, such excess will now be offered to tax as short-term capital gain.

WOULD SPACs BE A SUCCESS IN INDIA?
The answer to this question would obviously depend on the guidance that SEBI comes up with on SPACs. The Primary Market Advisory Committee of SEBI is deliberating on whether a framework for SPACs should be introduced. The Committee is also looking into any safeguards that should be built into the framework being proposed. From the information available now, SPACs are being set up by hedge funds and private equity investors who plan for a quick exit from their investments in a couple of years. The success of SPACs depends on the existence of companies that are available for a Business Combination. Traditional Indian companies may not be interested in the SPAC route as many would feel that it is too short-term in nature – they are in for the long term. Startups could provide a good source of companies that are SPAC-eligible. India has a large number of Startups but how many of them are worthy of listing remains to be seen. In addition, Indian companies do not have a history of issuing complicated financial instruments which is one of the basic requirements of a SPAC. As things stand today, it would be reasonable to conclude that there will be a few SPAC transactions in India but the concept of SPAC is not going to overly excite everyone at Dalal Street!

MLI SERIES ANALYSIS OF ARTICLES 3, 5 & 11 OF THE MLI

A. ARTICLE 3 – Hybrid mismatch arrangement

Instances of entities treated differently by countries for taxation are commonplace. A partnership is a taxable person under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1961, while in the United Kingdom a partnership has a pass-through status for tax purposes, with its partners being taxed instead. The problems caused by such asymmetric treatment of entities as opaque or transparent for taxation by the Contracting States is well-documented. There have been attempts to regulate the treatment of such entities, notably the 1999 OECD Report on Partnerships and changes made to the Commentary on Article 1 of the OECD Model in 2003. One common problem where Contracting States to a tax treaty treat an entity differently for tax purposes is double non-taxation. Let us take the following example, which illustrates double non-taxation of an entity’s income:

Example 1: T is an entity established in State P. A and B are members of T residing in State R. State P and State S treat the entity as transparent, but State R treats it as a taxable entity. T derives business profits from State S that are not attributable to a permanent establishment in State S.

Figure 1

State S treats entity T as fiscally transparent and recognises the business profits as belonging to members A and B, who are residents of State R. Applying the State R-S Treaty, State S is barred from taxing the business profits without a PE. On the other hand, State R does not flow through the partnership’s income to its partners. Accordingly, State R treats entity T as a non-resident and does not tax the income or tax its partners A and B. The double non-taxation arises because both State R and State S treat the entity differently for taxation. Another problem is that an entity established in State P could have partners / members belonging to third countries (as in Figure 1 above), encouraging treaty shopping.

1.1 Income derived by or through fiscally transparent entities [MLI Article 3(1)]
The Action 2 Report of the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project on Hybrid mismatch arrangements (‘Action 2 Report’) deals with applying tax treaties to hybrid entities, i.e., entities that are not treated as taxpayers by either or both States that have entered into a tax treaty. Common examples of such hybrid entities are partnerships and trusts. The OECD Commentary on Article 1 of the Model (before its 2017 Update) contained several paragraphs describing the treatment given to income derived from fiscally transparent partnerships based on the 1999 Partnership Report.

As per the recommendation in the Action 2 Report, Article 3(1) of the Multilateral Instrument (‘MLI’) inserts a new provision in the Covered Tax Agreements (‘CTA’) which is to ensure that treaties grant benefits only in appropriate cases to the income derived through these entities and further to ensure that these benefits are not granted where neither State treats, under its domestic law, the income of such entities as the income of one of its residents. A similar text has also been inserted as Article 1(2) in the OECD Model (2017 Update).

Article 3(1) reads as under:
For the purposes of a Covered Tax Agreement, income derived by or through an entity or arrangement that is treated as wholly or partly fiscally transparent under the tax law of either Contracting Jurisdiction shall be considered to be income of a resident of a Contracting Jurisdiction but only to the extent that the income is treated, for purposes of taxation by that Contracting Jurisdiction, as the income of a resident of that Contracting Jurisdiction.

The impact of Article 3(1) on a double tax avoidance agreement can be illustrated in the facts of Example 1 above. Unless State R ‘flows through’ the income of the entity T to its partners for taxation and tax the income sourced in State S as income of its residents, State S is not required to exempt or limit its taxation as a Source State while applying the R-S Treaty. State S will also not apply the P-S Treaty since the income belongs to the partners of entity T who are not residents of State P. The Source State is expected to give treaty benefits only to the extent the entity’s income is treated for taxation by the Residence State as the income of its residents. The following example illustrates this:

Example 2: A and B are entity T’s members residing in State P and R, respectively. States R and P treat the entity as transparent, but State S treats it as a taxable entity. A derives interest arising in State S. There is no treaty between State R and State S.

Figure 2

In this example, State S will limit its taxation of interest arising in that State under the P-S Treaty to the extent of the share of A in the profits of P. The income derived from the entity by the other member B will not be considered by State S to belong to a resident of State P and it will not extend the P-S treaty to that portion of income. Since there is no R-S treaty, State S will tax the income derived by member B from the entity as per its domestic law.

The OECD Commentary
As per paragraph 7 of the Commentary on Article 1 in the OECD Model (2017 Update), any income earned by or through an entity or arrangement which is treated as fiscally transparent by either Contracting States will be covered within the scope of Article 1(2) [which is identical to Article 3(1) of the MLI] regardless of the view taken by each Contracting State as to who derives that income for domestic tax purposes, and regardless of whether or not that entity or arrangement has a legal personality or constitutes a person as defined in Article 3(1) of the Convention. It also does not matter where the entity or arrangement is established: the paragraph applies to an entity established in a third State to the extent that, under the domestic tax law of one of the Contracting States, the entity is treated as wholly or partly fiscally transparent, and income of that entity is attributed to a resident of that State. State S is required to limit application of its DTAA only to the extent the other State (State R or State P, as the case may be) would regard the income as belonging to its resident. Thus, when we look at the facts in Example 2 above, the outcome will not change even if the entity T is established in State R (or a third state which has a treaty with State S) so long as that State flows through the income of the entity to a member resident in that State.

In other words, State S applies the P-S Treaty because A is a resident of State P and is taxed on his share of income from entity T and not because the entity is established in that State. Similarly, if a treaty exists between State R and State S, State S shall apply that treaty only to the extent of income which State R regards as income of its resident (B in this case).

However, India has expressed its disagreement with the interpretation contained in paragraph 7 of the Commentary. It considers that Article 1(2) covers within its scope only such income derived by or through entities that are resident of one or both Contracting States. Article 4(1)(b) of the India-USA DTAA (which is not a CTA) is on the lines of Article 3(1) of the MLI. On the other hand, Article 1 of the India-China Treaty (which was amended vide a Protocol in 2018 and not through the MLI) requires the entity or arrangement to be established in either State and to be treated as wholly fiscally transparent under the tax laws of either State for the rule on fiscally transparent entities to apply.

Impact on India’s treaties
India has reserved the application of the entirety of Article 3 of the MLI relating to transparent entities from applying to its CTAs, which means that this Article will not apply to India’s treaties. A probable reason could be that India finds it preferable to bilaterally agree on any enhancement of scope of the provisions relating to transparent partnerships to other fiscally transparent entities only after an examination of its impact bilaterally rather than accept Article 3(1) in the MLI, which would have applied across the board to all its CTAs.

1.2 Income derived from fiscally transparent entities – Elimination of double taxation [MLI Article 3(2)]
Action 6 Report of the BEPS Project on Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances (‘Action 6 Report’) recommends changes to the provisions relating to the elimination of double taxation. Article 3(2) of the MLI is intended to modify the application of the provisions related to methods for eliminating double taxation, such as those found in Articles 23A and 23B of the OECD and UN Model Tax Conventions. Often, such situations arise in respect of income derived from fiscally transparent entities. For this reason, this provision has been inserted in Article 3 of the MLI which deals with transparent entities. Article 3(2) of the MLI reads as follows:

Provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement that require a Contracting Jurisdiction to exempt from income tax or provide a deduction or credit equal to the income tax paid with respect to income derived by a resident of that Contracting Jurisdiction which may be taxed in the other Contracting Jurisdiction according to the provisions of the Covered Tax Agreement shall not apply to the extent that such provisions allow taxation by that other Contracting Jurisdiction solely because the income is also income derived by a resident of that other Contracting Jurisdiction. [emphasis supplied]

The article on eliminating double taxation in a tax treaty obliges the Contracting States to provide relief of double taxation either under exemption or credit method where the other State taxes the income of a resident of the first State in accordance with that treaty. However, there may be cases where each Contracting State taxes the same income as income of one of its residents and where relief of double taxation will necessarily be with respect to tax paid by a different person. For example, an entity is taxed as a resident by one State while it is treated as fiscally transparent, and its members are taxed instead, in the other State, with some members taxed as residents of that other State. Thus, any relief of double taxation will need to take into account the tax that is paid by different taxpayers in the two States.

Action 6 Report notes that, as a matter of principle, Articles 23A and 23B of the OECD Model require a Contracting State to relieve double taxation of its residents only when the other State taxed the relevant income as the Source State or as a State where there is a permanent establishment to which that income is attributable. The Residence State need not relieve any double taxation arising out of taxation imposed by the other State in accordance with the provisions of the relevant Convention solely because the income is also income derived by a resident of that State. In other words, the obligation to extend relief lies only with that State which taxes an income of a person solely because of his residence in that State. Other State which may tax such income because of both source and residence need not extend relief. This will obviate cases of double taxation relief resulting in double non taxation.

The OECD Commentary gives some examples to illustrate the scope of this provision. Some of these examples are discussed here in the context of the India-France DTAA for the reader to relate to them more easily.

Example 3: The partnership P is an Indian resident under Article 4 of the India-France DTAA. In France, the partnership is fiscally transparent and France taxes both partners A and B as they are its residents.

Figure 3

The only reason France may tax P’s profits in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty is that the partners of P are its residents and not because the income arises in France. In this example, France is taxing income of A and B solely on residence whereas India is taxing income of P on both residence and source. Thus, India is not obliged to give credit to P for the French taxes paid by the partners on their share of profit of P. On the other hand, France will be required to provide relief under Articles 23 with respect to the entire income of P as India may tax that income in accordance with the provisions of Article 7. This is even though India taxes the income of P, which is its resident. The Indian taxes paid by P will have to be considered for exemption under Article 23 against French taxes payable by the partners in France.

Example 4: Income from immovable property situated in other State

Figure 4

The facts are the same as in Example 3 except that P earns rent from immovable property in France. In this example, France is taxing income of A and B on residence and source whereas India is taxing income of P solely on residence. Thus, India is obliged to give credit for French taxes paid, which is in accordance with Article 6 of the India-France Treaty even though France taxes the income derived by the partners who are French residents. On the other hand, France is not obliged to give credit for Indian taxes, which are paid only because P is resident in India and not because income is sourced in India. However, both India and France have to give credit to tax paid in third State as per their respective DTAAs with the third State. If there is no DTAA with the third State, credit may be given as per the respective domestic law [viz., section 91 of IT Act]. Both India and France giving FTC is not an aberration as both would have included income from third State in taxing their residents.

Example 5: Interest from a third state

Figure 5

Here, the facts are the same as in Example 3 except that P earns interest arising in a third State. France taxes the interest income in the hands of the partners only because they are French residents. Consequently, India is not obliged to grant credit for French taxes paid by the partners in France. In this case, India is not obliged to give credit for French taxes paid in accordance with the India-France Treaty only because the interest is derived by the partners who are French residents. Also, France is not obliged to give credit for Indian taxes paid in accordance with the Treaty only because P is resident in India and not because income is sourced in India.

The above discussion is also relevant for countries that have opted for the credit method in Option C through Article 5(6) of the MLI since that Option contains text similar to that contained in Article 3(2).

1.3 Right to tax residents preserved for fiscally transparent entities [MLI Article 3(3)]
It is commonly understood that tax treaties are designed to avoid juridical double taxation. However, treaties have been interpreted in a manner to restrict the Resident State from taxing its residents. Article 11 of the MLI contains the so-called ‘savings clause’ whereby a Contracting State shall not be prevented by any treaty provision from taxing its residents. Article 3(3) of the MLI provides for a similar provision for fiscally transparent entities. The saving clause, as introduced by Article 11, is discussed in greater detail elsewhere in this article.

Impact on India’s treaties
Since India has reserved the entirety of Article 3 of the MLI, paragraphs 2 and 3 also do not apply to modify any of India’s CTAs.

B. ARTICLE 5 – Methods of elimination of double taxation
Double non-taxation arises when the Residence State eliminates double taxation through an exemption method with respect to items of income that are not taxed in the Source State. Article 5 of the MLI provides three options that a Contracting Jurisdiction could choose from to prevent double non-taxation, which is one of the main objectives of the BEPS project. These are described below:

2.1 Option A
Article 23A of the OECD Model Convention provides for the exemption method for relieving double taxation. There have been instances of income going untaxed in both States due to the Source State exempting that income by applying the provisions of a tax treaty, while the Resident State also exempts the same. Paragraph 4 of Article 23A of the OECD Model addresses this problem by permitting the Residence State to switch from the exemption method to the credit method where the other State has not taxed that income in accordance with the provisions of the treaty between them.

As explained in the OECD Model (2017) Commentary on Article 23A (paragraph 56.1), the purpose of Article 23A(4) is to avoid double non-taxation as a result of disagreements between the Residence State and the Source State on the facts of a case or the interpretation of the provisions of the Convention. An instance of such double non-taxation could be where the Source State interprets the facts of a case or the provisions of a treaty in such a way that a treaty provision eliminates its right to tax an item of income. At the same time, the Residence State considers that the item may be taxed in the Source State ‘in accordance with the Convention’ which obliges it to exempt such income from tax.

The BEPS Action 2 Report on Hybrid Arrangements recommends that States which apply the exemption method should, at the minimum, include the ‘defensive rule’ contained in Article 23A(4) in the tax treaties where such provisions are absent. As per Option A, the Residence State will not exempt such income but switch to the credit method to relieve double taxation of its residents [MLI-A 5(3)]. For example, Austria and the Netherlands, both of whom adopt the exemption method to relieve double taxation of their residents, have chosen Option A and have notified the relevant article eliminating double taxation present in the respective CTAs with India. The deduction from tax in the Residence State shall be an ordinary credit not exceeding the tax attributable to the income or capital which may be taxed in the other State.

2.2 Option B
One of the instances of base erosion is commonly found under a hybrid mismatch arrangement where payments are deductible under the rules of the payer jurisdiction but not included in the ordinary income of the payee or a related investor in the other jurisdiction. The Action 2 Report recommends introducing domestic rules targeting deduction / no inclusion outcomes (‘D/NI outcomes’). Under this recommended rule, a dividend exemption provided for relief against economic double taxation should not be granted under domestic law to the extent the dividend payment is deductible by the payer.

In a cross-border scenario, several treaties provide an exemption for dividends received from foreign companies with substantial shareholding. To counter D/NI outcome from such treatment, insertion of a provision akin to Article 23A(4) (described above under Option A) provides only a partial solution. Option B found in Article 5(4) of the MLI permits the Residence State of the person receiving the dividend to apply the credit method instead of the exemption method generally followed by it for dividends deductible in the payer State. None of India’s treaty partners has chosen this Option.

2.3 Option C
Action 2 Report also recommends States to not include the exemption method but opt for the credit method in their treaties as a more general solution to the problems of non-taxation resulting from potential abuses of the exemption method. Option C implements this approach wherein the credit method would apply in place of the exemption method provided for in tax treaties. The deduction from tax in the Residence State shall be an ordinary credit not exceeding the tax attributable to the income or capital which may be taxed in the other State.

The text of Option C contains the words in parenthesis, ‘except to the extent that these provisions allow taxation by that other Contracting Jurisdiction solely because the income is also income derived by a resident of that other Contracting Jurisdiction’. These words are similar to the MLI provision in Article 3(2) relating to fiscally transparent entities. The reader can refer to the discussion under Article 3(2) above, which describes the import of these words, which have also been added in Article 23A-Exemption Method and Article 23B-Credit Method in the OECD Model (2017). As per paragraph 11.1 of the Commentary on Articles 23A and 23B, this rule is merely clarificatory. Even in the absence of the phrase, the rule applies based on the current wording of Articles 23A and 23B.

2.4 Asymmetric application
Article 5 of the MLI permits an asymmetric application with the options chosen by each State applying with respect to its residents. For example, India has chosen Option C which applies to the provisions for eliminating double taxation to be followed by India in its treaties for its residents. The provisions in a treaty to eliminate double taxation by the other State are not affected by India’s choice of Option. Similarly, the other State’s choice also does not affect the provision relating to India. For example, the Netherlands has opted for Option A, while the Elimination article in the treaty for India will not get modified as India has not notified the CTA provision.

2.5 Impact of India’s treaties
India’s treaties generally follow the ordinary credit method to eliminate double taxation of its residents barring a few countries where it adopts the exemption method. India has opted for Option C, which will apply in place of the exemption method in the CTAs, where it follows the exemption method. Accordingly, India has notified its CTAs with Bulgaria, Egypt, Greece and the Slovak Republic. Greece and Bulgaria have reserved the application of Article 5 of the MLI, due to which their CTAs with India are not modified. Both India and the Slovak Republic have chosen Option C and both countries have moved from the exemption method in their CTA to the credit method. As for its CTA with Egypt, India’s Option C applies for its residents while Egypt has not selected any option and the exemption method in the CTA continues to apply to its residents. By opting for Option C with the Slovak Republic and Egypt, India has impliedly applied MLI 3(2) which it has otherwise reserved in entirety.

Of the other countries which apply the exemption method to relieve double taxation of their residents in India’s treaties, Austria and the Netherlands have opted for Option A and notified the CTA provisions. Estonia and Luxembourg, too, follow the exemption method for their residents in their CTA with India. Yet, though they have opted for Option A, they have not notified the relevant provisions and the CTAs shall remain unmodified. Presumably, since the India-Luxembourg DTAA already contains provisions of the nature contained in Option A, and under the India-Estonia treaty, Estonia exempts only that income from taxation taxed in India, these jurisdictions have chosen not to avail of the defensive rule provided in the MLI.

C. ARTICLE 11 – Saving of a State’s right to tax its own residents
3.1 Rationale
A double tax treaty is entered into with the object of relieving juridical double taxation. The double taxation is relieved, either by allocating the taxing rights to one of the contracting States to that treaty, or eliminated by the relief provisions through an exemption or credit method. However, treaties have sometimes been interpreted to restrict the Resident State from taxing its residents in some instances.

One example would be to interpret the phrase ‘may be taxed in the source State’ as ‘shall only be taxed in the source State’, thereby denuding the right of the Residence State to tax its resident. Another example is a partnership that is resident of State P with one partner resident of State R. State P taxes the partnership while State R treats the partnership as transparent and taxes the partners.

Figure 6

The partnership P is resident of State P and is entitled to the P-R Treaty, similar to the OECD Model. If the partnership earns royalty income arising in State R, State R is not entitled to tax the same as per Article 12(1) of the OECD Model which allocates the taxing right only to the residence state, State P. Thus, the partner resident in State R could argue, based on the language of Article 12(1), that State R does not have the right to tax him on his share of the royalty income earned by the partnership since the P-R treaty restricts the taxing right of State R.

However, many countries disagree with this interpretation. Article 12 applies to royalties arising in one State and paid to a resident of the other State. When taxing partner B, State R is taxing its resident on income arising in its territory. To clarify that State R is not prevented from taxing its residents, paragraph 6.1 was inserted to the Commentary on Article 1 of the OECD Model, which reads as under:

‘Where a partnership is treated as a resident of a Contracting State, the provisions of the Convention that restrict the other Contracting State’s right to tax the partnership on its income do not apply to restrict that other State’s right to tax the partners who are its own residents on their share of the income of the partnership. Some states may wish to include in their conventions a provision that expressly confirms a Contracting State’s right to tax resident partners on their share of the income of a partnership that is treated as a resident of the other State.’

The BEPS Report on Action 6 – Preventing Treaty Abuse concluded that the above principle reflected in paragraph 6.1 of the Commentary on Article 1 should be more generally applied to prevent interpretations intended to circumvent the application of a Contracting State’s domestic anti-abuse rules. The report recommends that the principle that treaties do not restrict a State’s right to tax its residents (subject to certain exceptions) should be expressly recognised by introducing a new treaty provision. The new provision is based on the so-called ‘saving clause’ usually found in US tax treaties. The object of such a clause is to ‘save’ the right of a Contracting State to tax its residents. In contrast to the savings clause in the US treaties that apply to residents and citizens, the savings clause inserted into the covered tax agreements by Article 11 of the MLI applies only to residents. The savings clause inserted by Article 11 of the MLI plays merely a clarifying role, unlike the substantial role of the US savings clause due to its more extensive scope.

Article 11 of the MLI is aimed at the Residence State and its tax treatment of its residents. This provision does not impact the source taxation of non-residents. There are several exceptions to this principle listed in Article 11 of the MLI where the rights of the Resident State to tax its residents are intended to be restricted:

a) A correlative or a corresponding adjustment [a provision similar to Article 7(3) or 9(2) of the OECD Model] to be granted to a resident of a Contracting State following an initial adjustment made by the other Contracting State in accordance with the relevant treaty on the profits of a permanent establishment of that enterprise or an associated enterprise;
b) Article 19, which may affect how a Contracting State taxes an individual who is resident of that State if that individual derives income in respect of services rendered to the other Contracting State or a political subdivision or local authority thereof;
c) Article 18 which may provide that pensions or other payments made under the social security legislation of the other Contracting State shall be taxable only in that other State;
d) Article 18 which may provide that pensions and similar payments, annuities, alimony payments, or other maintenance payments arising in the other Contracting State shall be taxable only in that other State;
e) Article 20, which may affect how a Contracting State taxes an individual who is a resident of that State if that individual is also a student who meets the conditions of that Article;
f) Article 23, which requires a Contracting State to provide relief of double taxation to its residents with respect to the income that the other State may tax in accordance with the Convention (including profits that are attributable to a permanent establishment situated in the other Contracting State in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 7);
g) Article 24, which protects residents of a Contracting State against certain discriminatory taxation practices by that State (such as rules that discriminate between two persons based on their nationality);
h) Article 25, which allows residents of a Contracting State to request that the competent authority of that State consider cases of taxation not in accordance with the Convention;
i) Article 28, which may affect how a Contracting State taxes an individual who is resident of that State when that individual is a member of the diplomatic mission or consular post of the other Contracting State;
j) Any provision in a treaty which otherwise expressly limits a Contracting State’s right to tax its residents or provides expressly that the Contracting State in which an item of income arises has the exclusive right to tax that item of income.

The last item [at serial (j) above] is a residuary provision that refers to the distributive rules granting the Source State the sole right to tax an item of income. For example, Article 7(1) of the India-Bangladesh DTAA provides that the State where a PE is situated has the sole right to tax the profits attributable to that PE and is not impacted by the savings clause. Treaty provisions expressly limiting the tax rate imposable by a Contracting State on its residents are also covered by the exception to the savings clause. An example of such a provision is contained in Article 12(1) of the Israel-Singapore Treaty which states: ‘Royalties arising in a Contracting State and paid to a resident of the other Contracting State may be taxed in that other State. However, the tax so charged in the other Contracting State shall not exceed 20 per cent of the amount of such royalties.’

3.2 Dual-resident situations
The saving clause in Article 11 of the MLI applies to taxation by a Contracting State of its residents. The meaning of residents flows from Article 4 (dealing with Residence) of the tax treaties and not from the domestic tax law. Thus, where a person is resident in both Contracting States within the meaning of Article 4 of the treaty, the tie-breaker rule in Article 4(2) or (3) will determine the State where that person is resident, and the saving clause shall apply accordingly. The State that loses in the tie-breaker does not benefit from the savings clause to retain taxing right over that person even though he is its resident as per its domestic tax law.

3.3 Application of domestic anti-abuse rules
A savings clause also achieves another objective of preserving anti-abuse provisions by the Resident State like the ‘controlled foreign companies’ (‘CFC’) rules. In a CFC regime, the Resident State taxes its residents on income attributable to their participation in certain foreign entities. It has sometimes been argued, based on a possible interpretation of provisions of the Convention such as paragraph 1 of Article 7 and paragraph 5 of Article 10, that this common feature of CFC legislation conflicted with these provisions. The OECD Model Commentary (2017 Update) on Article 1 in paragraph 81 states that Article 1(3) of the Model (containing the saving clause) confirms that any legislation like the CFC rule that results in a State taxing its residents does not conflict with tax conventions.

3.4 India’s position and impact on India’s treaties
India has not made any reservation for the application of Article 11. Forty-one countries have reserved their application leaving 16 CTAs to be modified by inserting the savings clause. Article 11 of the MLI will have only a limited effect on India’s treaties as India does not have domestic CFC rules and treats partnerships as fiscally opaque. However, it is possible that the interpretation of the courts of the distributive rule ‘may be taxed’ in the Source State as ‘shall be taxed only’ in the Source State, thus preventing the taxation by India of such income of its residents could be impacted.

In CIT vs. R.M. Muthaiah [1993] 202 ITR 508 (Kar), the High Court, interpreting the words ‘may be taxed’ in the context of the India-Malaysia Treaty, held that ‘when a power is specifically recognised as vesting in one, exercise of such a power by other, is to be read, as not available; such a recognition of power with the Malaysian Government would take away the said power from the Indian Government; the Agreement thus operates as a bar on the power of the Indian Government in the instant case.’ The High Court concluded that India could not tax its residents on such income. Article 11 of the MLI could undo the decision to enable India to tax its residents, notwithstanding the said ruling. On the other hand, an alternative interpretation could be that ‘may be taxed’ or ‘shall only be taxed’ are distributive rules in treaties that expressly allocate taxing rights to one or both the Contracting States and are covered by the exception listed in Article 11(1)(j) reproduced above. The saving clause is not targeted at them.

DIGITAL WORKPLACE – WHEN ALL ROADS LEAD TO ROME…

In the previous article we spoke briefly about the ‘Digital Workplace’, its advantages, limitations and so on. ‘Digital Workplaces’ are evolving very quickly; while there are many who feel that these will replace existing physical offices completely, others believe that these will go out of fashion as soon as ‘normalcy’ returns. However, we believe that just like every other technological change, starting from computers to mobile phones, the ‘Digital Workplace’ will not replace the existing way of working but it will co-exist with the existing office environment; however, we will see a digital transformation in the way we work.

Digital transformation is a journey that every firm will have to undertake in its own way with multiple connected intermediary goals, striving, in the end, towards ubiquitous optimisation across processes… and the business ecosystem of a hyper-connected age between people, teams, technologies, various players in ecosystems, etc., is the key to success.

Before talking about the alternatives, we are sure everyone reading this article is aware that a Traditional Office was the basic or primary way that an office existed. A professional wanting to start a business or practice would first look for an ‘Office Place’.

The ‘Office’ had its own advantages and limitations but it was the only way we used to work. Many employees complained about having to get to the office daily, or getting half a day’s wages cut for punching in five minutes late and spending so much critical time travelling to the office. A study by MoveInSync1 found that Indians spend 7% of their day getting to their offices. However, with the outbreak of the pandemic, everything has changed, starting from the perception of individuals to realistic circumstances. Since travelling has not been permitted for the major portions of the years 2020 and 2021, businesses have been left with no option but to switch to digitalisation and to a digital office. In India we call this ‘jugaad’. But the ‘jugaad’ worked! Almost everyone adjusted to the new normal and somehow survived the toughest of times. After the two ‘waves’ that have come and gone and the threat of a third wave looming large, some of the businesses have already restarted and switched back to the traditional office concept. People are taking precautions to the extent possible and are resigned to their fate, but feeling that they do not have any other option, offices are resuming normal work.

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1 https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/jobs/indians-spend-7-of-their-day-getting-totheir- office/articleshow/70954228.cms
But is it true that we do not have any option other than to just move back to our physical offices despite all the inherent dangers? Or can we have better alternatives and take maximum benefit of the learnings from the past and, with the help of technology, find a perfect mixture of physical and digital workplaces to ensure that we do not lose the advantages of a physical office and maximise the available technologies at our disposal?

There are three big limitations of physical or traditional offices:

1. Cost of real estate – Rent, lease, etc.: With the constant rise in the price of real estate and limited supply, the rent in the P&L account is always a significant amount for Indian companies. And some of the well-established businesses which have saved on rent by purchasing office space are now realising that their significant capital is stuck in real estate which is not growing at the same rate as their business. So it is not always wise to invest limited capital in real estate and block it for a long time when as a businessman you can put it to work harder. We have spoken to various professionals from India and received information that the total cost of real estate investment / rent could be between 20 and 40% of the total revenue a firm can generate.

2. Commuting for employees: As stated earlier, in India people spend nearly two hours to reach the office and if that is not already bad, the situation of overcrowded public transport, bad infrastructure and roads, and unrealistic traffic wastes a lot of valuable time of employees in travelling. More often than not, employees going out for a crucial meeting will prefer to leave an hour early instead of risking getting late. However, this leaving early may be good for creating an impression, but the time that it costs can be huge for the overall business. On an average an Indian spent as much as 9% of his time in commuting2 in the pre-lockdown era. Now, due to the lockdown, this cost is only going to be higher.

3. Limitation in hiring: The traditional office works within the four walls of the premise, so many times a company from Chennai or Delhi cannot hire talent from Mumbai or Bangalore unless the employee is willing to relocate; in many cases, companies have to spend extra on relocation expenses, etc.

There are arguments that the above limitations have always existed and these, coupled with other limitations, were always part of the game; companies had come to accept the limitations and functioned without much ado.

So what has changed now? It’s the pandemic which is working either like a blessing in disguise or a ‘rude awakening’ for businesses. Traditional offices may not suddenly go out of fashion, but a shift towards digitalisation which started gradually has taken a huge leap of faith and the pandemic has allowed everyone to adopt the trial and error method as they were assessing the limitations that their businesses were facing due to the ‘Work From Home’ culture. However, while many were struggling during this period, some started thriving and excelled in this new culture. The businesses that understood how technology worked and the best way to utilise the alternatives are now setting the standards for others to follow.

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2 https://www.dnaindia.com/mumbai/report-mmrda-you-spend-84-of-your-income-oncommute- 2715777
What are the alternatives to traditional offices?

While the traditional offices may not go out of fashion completely, businesses are finding different ways to mix and match them with the new alternatives available to maximise the work culture vis a vis the cost. There are many different types of offices that are being set up currently. Let us look at some examples:

1. Shared Offices
2. Work From Home
3. Flexi Offices
4. Co-working Spaces
5. Virtual Office (only for registration)

Shared Offices:
XYZ Associates, a CA firm, has 50 employees. Most of them are on audit and mostly never visit the office. XYZ Ltd. had purchased a large office space earlier. Now, realising that it does not need such a big sitting capacity and that it has already spent so much on infrastructure that it is not feasible to change office, it has decided to share its office spaces in a strategic manner so that the total cost is divided. This used to be the practice earlier, especially with brokers at the BSE or at other places where the cost was too high; but now many professionals have started utilising extra space in their offices with clear demarcations and sub-let it to other businesses to improve the return on the capital invested in their bigger office. If need be, in future they may stop sharing the office space.

Honestly, the shared office concept was there even prior to the pandemic but it was very limited and mostly seen as a way to save on rent; but the way shared offices were used was more in the manner of a traditional office where, after sharing the space, the business will occupy its own space and operate just as a traditional office. Now, with technology the concept of shared offices is evolving where businesses are realising that their need for office space may not be constant and, accordingly, the ‘shared office space’ concept has made a comeback where the same old concept is used in a modern way. But the principle is the same.

Work From Home:
Since the onset of the pandemic, XYZ Associates has been left with only one option – Work From Home. It facilitates employees with all necessary hardware and software (readers may refer to our previous article). The work is done, the client is satisfied and the lockdown rules are also not violated. What else do we need?

One of the most used expressions of 2020 has to be ‘Work From Home’ (WFH). Almost all offices have shifted to this culture. People enjoyed working from home till it lasted as the new dressing sense arrived, attending meetings via mobile phone and computer started saving a lot of time and they started getting more time to spend with family; these have helped many people, but after a point of time many got tired as it was merely a makeshift arrangement. However, some companies do prepare well and have utilised the opportunity diligently to ensure that they shift part of their workforce to WFH at a reduced pay; with the kind of savings employees manage on cost of travelling to having to buy or rent a house in a premium location to avoid travelling, many employees have willingly accepted the offer as it has offered a net advantage to them. WFH, if established well in an organisation with a proper digital workplace with impeccable communications, regular flow of information and processes, can help iron out a lot of limitations in businesses.

Flexi Offices:
XYZ Associates earlier had an office with a seating capacity of 100. During the pandemic it realised that a traditional office is a must for multiple purposes (having a registered address for compliances, holding client meetings and important team meets), but everyone need not visit it daily. The cost of such an office is also too high. So it decided to shift to a smaller space with 30 seats and flexi timings. Now the employees can plan and ‘book’ the office for meetings or visits. This has indeed solved many problems for the firm.

This is a new concept in offices that has been growing in recent years. Offices will have the capacity for a limited number of employees and while it will be used as an office, not everyone would be accommodated at the same time. So while most of the employees can continue to work from home, the ‘Flexi Office’ system permits some of the employees to travel to the office in a predetermined way (by appointment!). It can be used for important meetings or discussions which cannot be done via the online mode or when employees are not able to work from home owing to temporary limitations. Organisations will use different methods to regulate who can travel to office, from making an early ‘booking’ to rotating the staff on fixed days to allow them to access the office. In this system, the organisation does not have fixed desks or places for employees – instead, a desk space / seating area is shared and generally allocated on a FIFO basis. The concept of a ‘Flexi Office’ gives the optimum benefits of the traditional office and also an option for organisations to take advantage of technology to save costs as well as hire talent without geographical limitations.

Co-working Spaces:
Mr. A stays on the outskirts of Mumbai and has a downtown office. In an ideal situation, he would love to work from home to save on travel time and cost. But he has various limitations at home: a small home which may not be ideal for attending calls, it would be difficult to ignore guests that may visit during office hours, as also multiple people working from the same home. Mr. A can’t work from home, but also wants to save on travel time and cost.

On the other hand, the firm XYZ Associates where he works wants to save on office infrastructure cost but is not comfortable with employees working from home. They have seen employees’ family members disturbing them during WFH calls or have experienced wi-fi connections getting lost.

Both XYZ Associates and Mr. A agree to opt for Co-working spaces. They find such a space in an area nearest to the employee which offers a desk, electricity, infrastructure and unlimited high speed wi-fi. This will solve everyone’s problem. While Mr. X will take only ten minutes and spend Rs. 20 daily to travel to such a Co-working space, XYZ Associates will save on office infrastructure. Also, when the company offers Co-working to employees in locations like Bandra-Kurla Complex or Nariman Point in Mumbai, it may cost them as much as Rs. 30,000 to Rs. 50,000 per seat but on the outskirts it may go down to Rs. 5,000 to Rs. 10,000 annually.

Co-working spaces are growing in popularity in India and companies like Innov8, WeWork, Springboard, etc. are already investing big time to provide Co-working spaces. Co-working is basically like a shared office but instead of an organisation deciding rules and managing costs, it is managed by a team of professionals who share their space for a fee. For example, just as we pay rent to a hotel to avail all facilities, Co-working is a ‘hotel’ for our business where we can focus just on work and all the formalities from cleaning the space, arranging for coffee, to collecting your courier, etc., is taken care of by the service provider. Plus, Co-working provides no distraction working along with a virtually office-like experience for employees who are working from home. Many Startups that are offering WFH have also started offering incentives to employees if they prefer to work from any of the Co-working spaces near by. And especially in cities like Mumbai where the houses are small and it’s not possible for all employees to manage working from home without distractions, businesses are benefiting from this new option. Co-working charges a minimum monthly or daily fee and lets individuals work without worrying about the other basic necessities like Internet access or arranging for administrative responsibilities.

One can use Co-working spaces by booking a desk for a single day, a week or a month.

Virtual Office (only for registration):
XYZ Limited started its business asking all employees to work from home. Now, since their turnover has crossed the minimum limit for GST registration they are in trouble as to how to do it without an official place of business. So they have been looking for Virtual Offices that charge a minimum amount and let them rent the office only for documentation purposes. XYZ Limited will now have a registered place of business while the employees can still continue working from home.

Virtual Office as a concept is growing in popularity in India owing to regulatory requirements wherein we still need a physical office address to start a business. A Virtual Office is basically a service in which a business owner can show a place as its address for communication and compliance purposes at minimal cost. This becomes useful in cases where a person wants to work from home but does not have all the documents for office premises, or does not want to show the residential address for business correspondence.

CONCLUSION
Growth is optional, but change is constant. There are many examples in the past when companies which have moved along with the shift in technology have gained significant ground vs. the companies that resisted change. The giants of the retail business have fallen because they did not adapt to eCommerce, while newbies of the market like Flipkart and Zomato are becoming far more valuable as they have shown adaptability.

Through this article we are not saying that traditional offices will be out of fashion immediately but now the time has come when, as things have started moving, the one who is ready to adapt to change will thrive. The Digital Workplace is the future and the only thing that is still not clear is the extent to which it will change our lives. Like the computer revolution of the 1980s or mobile phones earlier in this century, every one of us knew it would be a game-changer but ‘how’ was not clear back then. Similarly, the Digital Workplace is going to be the modern way of working and we can either resist the change and delay it, or accept it with open arms and get ready for the future.

 

WHY INDIA SHOULDN’T JUST AIM TO BE A $5 T ECONOMY

Indians succeed MUCH more in every country compared to India! They are, in fact, a model minority – highly educated, do not seek state support, have the lowest police arrests, blend well culturally and rise to the highest positions in business and profession.

Indians in the US have a per capita income of $55,000 (and average household income of $120,000 surpassing all ethnic groups, including white Americans1). If the same group were in India, the GNP of India will be more than $70 trillion!

India was about 25% of the world’s economy till 18202 when the British arrived. And 130 years later, when they left in 1947, India’s share was 3% (wiping off 2,000 years of growth in one century)! Yet, India was the largest economy in Asia in 1947.

On the other hand, today India’s share of global population is 18% and its share of global economy 7%3, or still 3% in absolute value out of about $100 trillion global GDP. India’s share in global exports was 1.71% in 2019. All of this doesn’t add up and we need to think: What should be India’s share of global economy and exports?

We have to ask: why do Indians not succeed in their own country? How come India is 20% of China when they were both the same in 1980 ($180 bn GDP)? China has more than five times the global trade as India ($800 bn vs. $4.5 tr). India was known for its fabrics for centuries; today Bangladesh has overtaken us in the garment sector and per capita GDP (remember, India had freed Bangladesh just 50 years back). India is the cultural source of nine-tenths of South-East Asian countries, but ASEAN countries have a larger GDP than that of India. Why have countries with bigger disadvantages overtaken India? What is the reason for such a large and long gap between potential and performance when Indians are perhaps as intelligent as anyone else?4

 

1   Economic Times, 29th
January, 2021

2   Read Angus Maddison

3   PPP adjusted

4   Attributed to Kishore
Mehbubani’s talk

I think today India is at its historic best opportunity: absence of Nehruvian economics (from 1950 to 1980 we grew at 3.5% per year; global growth was 4.5%; our population grew at 2.5%; hatred for business reached its peak; per capita income grew at 1%; and by 1980 India was the poorest in Asia). Today, youth is power (34% population between 15 and 24 years of age) and hundred other reasons. Therefore, the next ten years are crucial for the speedy growth of India.

Recent data suggests encouraging trends: UPI (3.2 billion transactions, Rs. 5 tr in transactions in March, 2021 compared to Rs. 2 tr in March, 2019); FastTag (192 m transactions since inception, saving fuel and revenue leakage); 55,000 Startups and expected to reach 100,000 by 2025; 58 Unicorns (employ 1.2 m people); Population (fertility is 2% whereas replacement rate is 2.3%); GST (last nine out of ten months generated more than Rs. 1 lakh crores each month); Software exports ($160 bn); Outsourcing (60% of global outsourcing comes to India); the IT Industry is $210 bn. Just imagine, if a food delivery company can add Rs. 100,000 crores to the market cap what can the index do if 20 such IPOs hit the markets! And this at a time when only about 3.4% people invest in stocks (against 50% in the US and 7% in China).

This is perhaps our best window in time before our population starts ageing in about ten years. Why should we not let the Indian tiger out of the cage – not into the zoo or a circus, but into the wide, wild world of competition. India doesn’t deserve to be JUST a $5 tr economy but much more!

 
Raman Jokhakar
Editor

AS YOU SOW…

One fine morning during the lockdown days, we happened to be listening to a talk which referred to the ‘Karma Account’. As accountancy professionals, we registered the summary as follows:

The rule is Debit for sin and Credit for good deeds. There is also the concept of brought forward of balance in the form of ‘sanskars’ from the previous birth to this one and carry forward from this birth to the next.

Most of us would distinctly recall our elders referring to ‘pichale janam ke sanskar’ (impressions of an earlier life) / ‘pichale janam ka karz’ (debts of an earlier life), etc.

The talk also elucidated the brought forward ‘sanskars’ by referring to child prodigies who, though without training, were manifesting the ‘sanskars’ of their previous birth. In fact, we are always puzzled when we see a scoundrel or a lazy or stupid person rolling in wealth. ‘How can it be?’ is the question that we ask.

A beautiful analogy was provided as an answer to a seemingly difficult riddle. Have you ever been to a flour mill? Sometimes, you see pulses being poured into the hopper at the top but see wheat flour being turned out at the end of the process. And you wonder how this happens, without realising that the wheat that was poured in earlier is now coming out as the white wheat flour. The ground pulses shall appear later. It is only a matter of time.

If this is so, this account of ‘sanskars’ should be kept pure. What will happen if this account is carried forward with inappropriate entries and manipulated transactions resulting from an incorrect living? What will happen in the next birth? Everyone should take care to pass correct entries as a reflection of right knowledge, right faith and right conduct in their present lives so that the balance is either zero (state of bliss) or the balance carried forward is of the nature of credit strengthening our lives in the next birth.

A cursory appraisal of the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad (7th Century BC) at 4.4.5–6 gives us the following:

Now as a man is like this or like that,
according as he acts and according as he behaves, so will he be;
a man of good acts will become good, a man of bad acts, bad;
he becomes pure by pure deeds, bad by bad deeds;

And here they say that a person consists of desires,
and as is his desire, so is his will;
and as is his will, so is his deed;
and whatever deed he does, that he will reap.

The Jain philosophy elaborately provides for the nature and working of Karma as also the pathway to be free of the Karmic Account – released of worldly affairs and into the perfect blissful state, i.e., moksha.

To conclude, we cannot but help recall Kabir who said

Kabir so dhan sanchiye, jo aage ko hoye
sees charaye potli, le jaat na dekhya koye

Kabir, accumulate the wealth that is for the beyond
None has been seen to depart carrying a bag of material wealth.

BOMBAY CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS’ SOCIETY: ANNUAL PLAN 2021-22

72ND ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING AND 73RD FOUNDING DAY

The 72nd Annual General Meeting of the BCAS was held online on Tuesday, 6th July, 2021.

The President, Mr. Suhas Paranjpe,
took the chair and called the meeting to order. All the business as per
the agenda contained in the notice was conducted, including adoption of
accounts and appointment of auditors.

Mr. Mihir Sheth,
Hon. Joint Secretary, announced the results of the election of the
President, the Vice-President, two Honorary Secretaries, the Treasurer
and eight members of the Managing Committee for the year 2021-22.

The ‘Jal Erach Dastur Awards’ for the Best Articles and Features appearing in the BCAS Journal during the year 2020-21 were also presented on the occasion. For Best Article the Award went to Sandeep Parekh and Manal Shah (both Advocates) for their Article PFUTP Regulations – Background, Scope and Implications of 2020 Amendment. The Award for Best Feature went to CA Vinayak Pai for Financial Reporting Dossier.

The July special issue of the BCA Journal was e-released by Mr. Azim Premji. It carried special articles on Effects of the Pandemic on CA Profession (by CA Ninad Karpe and CA Madhukar N. Hiregange), The Economy (by Niranjan Rajadhyaksha), The Human Psyche (by Dr. Bharat Vatwani) in addition to the regular articles and features. Before the conclusion of the AGM, members, including Past Presidents of the BCAS, were invited to share their views and observations about the Society.

The 73rd Founding Day lecture was delivered at the end of the formal proceedings of the AGM. It was an outstanding oration by Mr. Azim Premji, Founder Chairman of WIPRO, who spoke on the topic ‘Professional Excellence and Social Responsibility’. It was attended online by more than 3,392 professionals on Zoom and the YouTube channel of the BCAS.

OUTGOING PRESIDENT’S REPORT

SUHAS PARANJAPE:
You have just witnessed a short video clip presenting the annual
activities for 2021-22 in summarised form. (The annual report has
already been emailed to members.) You must have also noticed that the
clip ended with my favourite song Jai ho! from the popular movie Slumdog
Millionaire.

During the year just gone by, I received many
answers / solutions / feeds to various situations through intuition,
experience, the observations of many Past Presidents, my Chairmen,
Office-Bearers, Managing Committee members and volunteers. They made my
year successful so that today I can say with pride – ‘Jai Ho!’

I acknowledge the virtual presence of Past President P.N. Shah, Dilipbhai Thakkar and other seniors. I offer my namaskaar, adab to all of you for the opportunity given to me to serve you as President of the BCAS. I thank each and every one of you from the bottom of my heart.

I have had a unique privilege and I feel honoured to say that I am the first-ever ‘virtual’ President of the BCAS in
its 72-year history! At the same time, I sincerely hope and pray that I
would be the last one to have registered such an achievement. I don’t
wish to have any competition in this! On a lighter note, if ever the BCAS decides
to make Past Presidents eligible for Presidentship in the future, I
should be given the honour of being the first in the line! All of you
will agree with me, and since this is a recorded meeting, I can take
this as proof of your agreement!

I do not wish to repeat how
challenging the year was and how we converted all ideas into
opportunities and so on. All of you were part of this endeavour. I will
only say that we explored and exploited the power of the BCAS platform and the power of digitalisation to a large extent to create visibility, to reach higher, to perform better.

Right
from the beginning of my tenure, I had decided that I would try to be
like plain, simple and clean (nirmal) water in which one can mix any
colour that would lead to a colourful experience. My role was only to
ensure that the colours are shuddha, satvik, traditional Indian colours
without any chemicals in them. In actual fact, I never had to play the
role of identifying whether the colours are good, genuine or otherwise.
All the colours during the year were original, shuddha and satvik beyond
my imagination. I am happy that I could carry this thought process to a
large extent to my satisfaction and it made my tenure and term really
colourful and glorious. I thank all of you for the same.

There are two or three initiatives that I would like to mention.

First, the BCAS Chowk.
I had heard this subject being discussed in the Managing Committee
meetings many times and for many years. It became my focus area and I
started working on it immediately after taking over as President. There
were many hurdles and roadblocks in the process. The process is very
long and requires a lot of follow-up. As per the Municipal Corporation’s
policy, special permission is required for names to be given for an
organisation. Had there been no Covid lockdowns, we would have had our BCAS Chowk by now. But we are still trying our best and we hope that we will have BCAS Chowk
added to our address in the next few weeks. I must place on record the
one person, other than our Past Presidents, Office-Bearers and
volunteers, who stood by me, none other than the Maharashtra Industry
Minister, Shri Subhash Desaiji. He considered our request
immediately and set out to honour our voluntary organisation that has
existed for 72 years and which is an outstanding achievement. All of us @
BCAS thank him for his support.

A second initiative which I kept as my focus point was to bring more vibrancy and activity to the BCAS Foundation. All the trustees supported us as we formed our Project Management Committee (PMC) under the chairmanship of CA Dr. Mayur Nayak.
We have started joint activities with other NGOs. But we feel that
there is still a long way to go and much more to be done. I thank all
the trustees and PMC members for their active involvement and support.

Last
but not the least, we had a good fellowship and association with sister
organisations such as the IMC, the CTC, our own WIRC, the regional CA
associations of Ahmedabad, Chennai, Bengaluru, Lucknow and Surat – we
had joint programmes, joint representations and so on. It was easier
with our digital base. For BCAS members we did good networking
with publication services for regular discounted publications and with
software vendors to give competitive pricing.

The pandemic taught
us so much – how to work, how to conduct events / programmes, how to be
educated without attending physical seminars and conferences, how to do
audits and render services without visiting our clients’ place – in a
nutshell, how to remain relevant under all circumstances. The show must
go on and with much more force through innovations. Zoom, Meet, Teams,
etc., became our family members, ‘You are on mute, Sir’ became our tag
line! To be positive became negative and stressful, being and remaining
negative became an honour. We of this generation are lucky to have lived
this experience. But the sad part is that the pandemic also taught
families how to face health crises, financial crises and in a few cases,
even to live without their near and dear ones.

Ironically, the
pandemic created a great deal of financial inequality but it treated
every one equally – the rich, the poor, the elderly, the youngsters, and
there was no gender inequality. One thing is certain now, the ‘new
normal’ is now settled and it will be the future – maybe in a hybrid
manner and for which the BCAS should prepare itself, both mentally and technologically.

I congratulate the incoming new team of Abhay, Mihir, Chirag, Anand and Kinjal – it is a great combination of experience, maturity, technical and tech-savvy people to take BCAS forward
and into a new orbit and zoom towards its 75th year in style with new
hope (asha) and inspiration (akanksha) and to greater heights
(unchaiyaan). I wish them all the best with my support and good wishes.
All of you have played your innings for me and now it’s my turn to help
you in whatever way I can. I wish you all the very best.

I can’t thank my family members enough – my mother Shalini, wife Swati and son Aarav, for their support and encouragement. My senior partners Mayurbhai Vora, Bharatbhai Chovatia and their families kept me motivated all along, as did all my other partners, Kinnari, Bhakti, Ronak and Vinit and
all the team members. I thank everyone in my office for their help and
support. Many of my clients-cum-mentors, friends and relatives always
provided me with inputs and appreciation.

Team BCAS has
always been the backbone of all Presidents. I and my Office-Bearers
hardly met any of them during the year. We are aware that Work From Home
is not always easy. It has its advantages and disadvantages, but all of
them worked to the best of their abilities. There is always a scope for
improvement which will enhance the Office-Bearers’ execution and
productivity. We are all time-bound executives. As our long-term
resources, it is our duty and responsibility to keep team BCAS motivated at all times. I wish all of you a good life ahead.

Covid
is still in the air and it will require a huge effort by the Government
machinery to keep it in control. Besides, there is the vaccination
(which is an external support); but if all of us build our own immunity
(an internal strength), I am sure we would be able to tackle this health
challenge. I wish all of you a healthy and happy life.

I
conclude by bowing down to the huge membership of this large
organisation for its support during the year. May I now request incoming
President Abhay to present his annual plan for the year 2021-22.

INCOMING PRESIDENT’S SPEECH

ABHAY MEHTA: Good evening, BCAS family. My colleagues on the virtual dais, Suhas, Vice President Mihirbhai, outgoing Joint Secretary Samir, Joint Secretary Chirag, Incoming Duo – Treasurer Anand and Joint Secretary Kinjal, virtually assembled, respected Past Torchbearers of BCAS, seniors and fellow professionals.

I heartily welcome you all to the AGM.

I am addressing this august gathering due to the honour showered on me to lead the Temple of Knowledge – BCAS as the President in its 73rd Year.

I have a mixed feeling of elation and responsibility at this moment when I am addressing you all.

Elation, because I have been considered worthy to lead BCAS for a year and Responsibility for upholding and carrying forward the rich legacy of BCAS. I am also excited
that I shall have an opportunity to implement some of the initiatives
which I feel will be able to contribute to the development of the
profession thereby enhancing the image of BCAS.

The responsibilities are manifold. First of all, I have to prove my worth during the year to the torchbearers of BCAS who have reposed their confidence in me to lead the Society. Secondly, I have to meet the high standards set by my worthy predecessors. Thirdly, I am conscious of the dynamic changes which our profession is passing through, where an organisation like BCAS has to play the role of catalyst to empower professionals with relevant learnings.

The role of BCAS over
all these years has been transformational and I am conscious of this
role, which has been passed on over all these years by each President to
follow. Here, I shall be guided by the wisdom of my GURU Mahatria Ra,
who has very well said:

The purpose of knowledge
is not to build memory
but to create
understanding and transformation.


At
this juncture, I would like to bow before Lord Shriji Bawa, for
blessing me and making me worthy for the coveted post of President at BCAS.

I also seek the blessings of my parents Late Rashmikant Mehta and Late Kailas Mehta. I am sure wherever they are, they would shower their blessings and would feel proud to see me at the helm of BCAS. In climbing up the ladder of the profession, there is one critic and well-wisher who has played a vital role by taking care of the responsibilities of the family and also on the social front. She is my wife Nipa,
whom I want to thank profusely for being a solid support in my journey
as a professional. She ensured inculcating values and taking care of the
upbringing of our son Udit, who is also a qualified professional.

Before I share my journey at BCAS and my vision for the year, I take this opportunity to summarise the year gone by under the able leadership of Suhas.

The year had started amidst the pandemic, but the zeal of Suhas was like a double vaccinated person in a hurry to serve BCAS with his selfless service. His Theme for the year was ‘Tradition, Transition and Transformation’. He has excellently steered BCAS as per his theme to take it through the process of Transition in a manner which did not lose the values and ethos of Tradition. He stepped on the accelerator and increased the speed of Transition which brought about many Transformational changes in the way BCAS delivered its offerings to its members and the public at large.

Suhas’s approach made me relive the preaching given by my GURU Mahatria Ra,

‘Make
yourself a success magnet. Begin. Take the lantern in your hand, and
you will always have light enough for your next step. One step at a
time… Go… Keep going… Keep growing.’

I felt he ably
applied the above during the time of the pandemic when things were hazy
and the road was not just less travelled but I would say, it was never
travelled.

During the year, we witnessed Lecture Meetings and Panel Discussions on topics as varied as ‘Building a Professional Services Firm’ to ‘Cryptocurrencies’. The Residential Courses in Virtual Avatar were so engrossing that everybody was saying ‘Yeh Dil Maange More’. The meticulous planning and the thought process which went into organising Group Discussions and General Assembly were immaculate. It is for certain that a trend is set, even after restrictions on physical meetings are lifted, there will be a Hybrid Model to be worked out to serve the interest of participants who may not be able to travel to the destination of the event.

Suhas, I was witness to the interest you took in the planning of each event and the way in which you delegated decision-making for each event in the hands of the able teams backed by effective inputs and guidance wherever required from your end. Though the year was only through Virtual Events, you made your presence felt as if you were there with each one of the executing people involved in the events.

I was a silent observer of your management style and I must admit that you have a humane approach to deal with the situations. You remained calm and composed and were never tensed even during the moments of crisis. I can definitely say that my key takeaway while being deputy has been to remain cool in all situations.

Suhas, I convey my best wishes for the future, with confidence that your contribution during my tenure will be equally valuable in taking BCAS to greater heights.

Now, I turn to my exciting journey at BCAS. I was witness to my father’s passion as a BCAS member as he was an avid reader of the BCA Journal and actively participated in the seminars and RRCs. He always encouraged me to become a member of BCAS, which I did in 1994 and immediately started attending RRCs. In those years the RRC was held in the month of April and I used to celebrate my birthday at RRCs for some years.

My participation at the RRCs and seminars was noticed by our Past President Mr. Rajesh Muni and he invited me to join the Core Group in the year 1999-2000. I convey my sincere thanks to Rajeshbhai, for involving me actively at BCAS. I was inducted in the Accounting & Auditing Committee which gave an impetus to my passion in this area of the profession. I was made Convener of this Committee in the year 2003-04 and continued to serve in that capacity for 15 long years. During my journey as Convener of the Accounting & Auditing Committee, I worked under the Chairmanship of not less than six Past Presidents.
The learnings from each one moulded my outlook towards the profession
and assurance area of practice in particular. I would make a special
mention of Himanshu Kishnadwala, under whom I was convener for
the maximum number of years. He has that sense of urgency with an eye
for detailing, which appealed to me and also inspired me to become
meticulous in approach and to be prompt in responding to the issues. I
served during the past two decades on other committees too, but my heart
was always in the field of Auditing and Company Law.

On my birthday in 2017, Narayanji, who was to take charge as President for 2017-18, approached me to be part of his team. Narayanji,
I convey my sincere gratitude to repose confidence in me and inducting
me as an Office-Bearer. I also got fair glimpses of working at BCAS when my partner and dear friend Chetan had been the President in the year 2016-17.

I can vouch for one thing from my experience, that the model of BCAS with Past Presidents as Chairmen to guide the Conveners and the Committees, is so robust that there is perfect grooming of the young talent to be sound not just academically but also administratively.

I owe a lot to BCAS for improving my skills and outlook towards the profession. The culture at BCAS
is such that the seniors make youngsters really comfortable during
exchange of ideas by frankly sharing their knowledge and experience.

After reminiscing my journey at BCAS, I am now eager to share with you my thoughts on the year 2021-22 where I aspire to contribute to the progress of BCAS and the profession at large. This aspiration is with an approach where I would be heavily banking on the collective wisdom and support of all the Committees. I had occasion to convey my thoughts to each committee when we had our first meeting for planning the activities for the year. I am glad that each committee has wholeheartedly supported the Theme which I have for the year and they have commenced planning events encompassing the theme.

I firmly believe in what my GURU has preached on pursuing goals and achieving the same. He says:

The strength with which an idea is pursued
Will magnetise the resources
that are required
for the accomplishment of the idea.

You
may feel, I am referring many a time to my GURU Mahatria Ra. However, I
would at this juncture share that I have developed a lot of positivity
by going through his teachings. I always remind myself to have a
positive approach whenever I face situations of difficulties or crisis
in my professional or personal life. This approach has always provided
me a path since it is calmness which allows a rational thought process.

Let
me now delve into my theme for the year. It is based on the acronym
which is the current flavour for businesses, professionals, capital
markets and economists. However, the same acronym for my theme is for a
different meaning and purpose. Individually, each word in the acronym is
of critical importance to our profession as well as the country as a
whole.

The Theme for the Year is ‘ESG’.
EMPOWERING     SCALING     GLOBALISING

To achieve Empowering, I have identified certain executable initiatives:

  •  I wish that BCAS becomes an enabler of showcasing latest knowledge on the upcoming areas of professional opportunities to the SMPs and Young CAs.
  •  Concerted efforts be made to create a platform for networking amongst members of BCAS from all over India.
  •  My aim is that the public at large should not view CAs merely as Tax Advisors but they should perceive CAs as Business Advisors.
    Towards this shift BCAS shall aim to equip its members and CA community
    with working knowledge on other relevant ancillary laws.

Scaling up of the Professionals at BCAS is planned through the following initiatives:

  •  We have in all ten committees, professionals with experiences in varied fields of profession and business. It is my endeavour to create a platform, where thought leaders from BCAS Core Group and through the contacts of BCAS members be brought on the BCAS Platform to guide SMPs by providing vision for scaling up their offerings. The dissemination of knowledge
    should be such that they can equip themselves for providing services
    which offers professional satisfaction and in turn adds to the efforts
    towards nation building.
  •  BCAS has been a leading professional association and has its reach throughout India. However, there have been barriers to go on its own beyond a certain reach. A concerted effort shall be made to reach out to various local CA chapters from different parts of the country as well as trade and industry bodies of various states. In reaching out, I have requested each committee to become knowledge partners with them, thereby attracting members and also to jointly create advocacy on critical issues to be taken up with the regulators.
  •  The year gone by has provided glimpses of the changes in the profession which are to come, in fact at a rapid pace on account of adoption of technology in all spheres of life. BCAS shall ensure to design seminars, workshops enabling professionals to embrace technology. This will bring accuracy in the execution of services and efficiencies in deliverables.

Indian
businesses are going places and have internationalised their
operations. Our profession is also spreading its wings. To ensure our
members are provided opportunities to explore Globalising their services, I have plans for BCAS to take the following steps:

  •  To organise programmes creating awareness of the professional services which may be offered by members at a global level.
  •  In this virtual world, distances do not matter. We can now be enlightened by speakers of international repute. Efforts shall be to share latest global developments in varied fields of professional interest through such speakers. Also seminars, workshops shall be planned to disseminate knowledge on latest developments which enables members to equip in rendering services at global level.
  •  There would be professional associations similar to BCAS operating in different geographies worldwide. There will be efforts to tie up with few such associations to cross-sell events and publications. Efforts will also be made to understand best practices from such counterparts and bring to our members to enable them to be globally relevant.

These are my thoughts which I will drive through the year. I am of the humble belief that if our team of dedicated Core Group provides their valued inputs on the aspects of this year’s theme, we shall be able to add at least some additional value to the members’ professional capabilities.

I have been part of the Core Group since two decades. There have been many initiatives over the years, which have developed the Brand BCAS. Over these years and lately since I entered the Managing Committee and have been a part of the Office-Bearers, I have observed that there are various pockets of operations within BCAS, which can be further improved.

We have to make conscious efforts not just in a single year of each President. Rather, a concerted and long-drawn process has to be evolved to improve the functionality within BCAS. With this approach in mind, I discussed my thoughts with the incoming Office-Bearers team. As an outcome of the same, I am laying before you all, the Internal Goal-Setting exercise for BCAS, for which I have taken assurance from the Office-Bearers to continue on the same in the years to come.

I have termed this Internal Goal-Setting as LEAP.

This is my Leap of Faith, that the BCAS will attain much greater heights in the years to come by executing the exercise by the name LEAP.

Again, I am tempted to quote my GURU Mahatria Ra:
Highest manifestation of
Human intelligence is
FAITH

LEAP denotes:
• Leadership for BCAS;
• Excellence
at BCAS;
• Accountability
to BCAS members; and
• Professionalism
in BCAS.

I would like to elaborate each in a few words.

Leadership
BCAS is unarguably one of the leading professional associations. To continue and improve its Leadership position and to be of relevance for the profession, BCAS will have to identify and groom future leaders.

Excellence
Excellence will be possible by keeping a close watch on the latest developments in the profession. There has to be continuous exchange of ideas in each committee and frequent meetings to deliberate on such developments. Once there is such alacrity, then it would be easy to identify relevant offerings for the benefit of members and public at large.

During the pandemic, we have realised the power of technology. Now there are no barriers of distance for bringing on board excellent faculty and for attracting participants for professional offerings. BCAS will initiate all the necessary steps to have an edge technologically while offering learning initiatives so as to be considered as an excellent place to imbibe knowledge.

Accountability
I am aware that we have been receiving lots of grievances related to the website functioning, online payments functionalities, delayed responses to the issues raised by members, etc.

There is a thought process to improve experience of members with the BCAS as an organisation. Towards this end, we shall be creating dedicated email ids for various types of grievances to be monitored by a responsible person at BCAS.

At Office-Bearers level, we shall take on responsibility to monitor the replies given and unattended grievances.

We shall develop a feedback mechanism, whereby professionals can send their experiences for the hardships faced in various compliances as well as their viewpoints on topical subjects for the progress of the profession. The collation of such feedback will be sent to the respective committees to deliberate and on quarterly basis the Managing Committee would discuss to give responses to the respective members regarding the BCAS view and action taken at its end.

Professionalism
BCAS is an organisation run by the professionals and for the professionals. It is of paramount importance to have professionalism inculcated in each area of its operations. We are conscious of the fact that BCAS is run by volunteers and hence there is a need to have technology playing
a greater role in seamless execution of its functions. This year while
passing the accounts, the Managing Committee has allocated a substantial sum of Rs. 35 lakhs towards Technology Fund. We shall ensure effective use of the allocation towards a robust database, efficient execution of events and provision of timely information for the members. We shall take steps to have effective training of the manpower so
as to execute their functions in the most efficient manner. This will
also reduce the burden on the young core group members who have to
devote time and effort during the events’ execution.

I know I have projected many things to be carried out during the year, which may be felt difficult to attain. However, I commence my journey as President with a clear conscience, which is truth. The truth is both honesty and integrity. I want to assure each one in the BCAS family, that my efforts to achieve what I have laid before you all will be with honesty and integrity.

With these words, I conclude my speech and I hope that my efforts with your guidance and support will take BCAS to further heights of glory.

Thank you all.

WORK FROM HOME

In my school days, the most boring thing was ‘Homework’. It was a serious hindrance to my playtime. Even during Diwali and Christmas vacations, there used to be homework. I used to curse the teachers and parents and used to wonder who had invented this stupid idea of homework for school children.

After I grew older and saw the homework assignments of my children, I realised that teachers could not do full justice to teaching in class and expected the parents to take care of the deficiencies in their teaching. When parents realised that their ward had not understood what the teachers taught, they would think of tuitions or coaching classes. That added to the misery of the poor school students. So now, even little kids are occupied at least ten hours a day (!), including school time, tuitions, hobby-class and so on. What a torture.

After the school days were over, I heaved a great sigh of relief – relief from ‘homework’. But destiny can be cruel. Corona and the consequent lockdown are the culprits and the ghost of homework has come back to haunt us again, this time in the form of ‘Work From Home!’

When a person physically attended a corporate office, she used to be occupied for a maximum of 12 hours a day, including commuting time. It is a different story that the new work culture makes a corporate employee start working in the evening. This is actually just to ‘show’ his ‘sincerity and dedication’. One of the pretexts is to sit in late to suit the US timings.

But now this ‘Work From Home’ culture has crossed all limits and keeps us ostensibly occupied for 16 hours a day if not more.

I am told that since we are already in the era of regulations, the Government has tabled a Bill called ‘Work From Home Regulations (Restrictions, Liberties and Facilities) Bill, 2021’.

The salient features of the proposed regulations reveal that in addition to the salary, employers shall pay to the employees:

1) Domestic harassment / violence allowance (at the wife’s hands);

2) Allowance for tea, refreshments and meals that they would have got in the office but not now;

3) ‘Voucher allowance’ – the amount which an employee is deprived of for not being able to claim ‘reimbursement’ of un-incurred expenses.

4) Rent allowance – an employee is required to use some space at his residence. The office saves the corresponding expenses on maintenance of office, electricity, etc. So, a proportionate rent allowance would be paid to the employees;
5) Fitness allowance – In physical working, employees could maintain their fitness by commuting in trains, running to catch buses, some walking, etc. But people sitting at home have to specially spend time and money on exercises and fitness.

The Bill also seeks to regulate working hours at home, holidays and so on.

ICAI has demanded that the implementation of this Act be audited by practising CAs. It has also formed a committee to frame a separate Standard on Auditing for this purpose!

Note:

This may seem like fiction, BUT, please note that France has passed a law that there won’t be any obligation on the part of employees to receive / act upon any instructions or directions from employers on their weekly and other holidays. So there!

Suggestions on the Bill are invited from our valued readers.

CRYPTOCURRENCIES: TRAPPED IN THE LABYRINTH OF LEGAL CORRIDORS (Part – 1)

BACKGROUND OF CRYPTOS
All of us must have been reading about Cryptocurrencies / Virtual Currencies (VCs) of late. And I am sure many of us must be wondering what exactly is this strange animal which has taken the world by storm? Every day the business newspapers devote a great deal of space to news about VCs.

A cryptocurrency is basically a virtual currency which is very secure. It is based on a cryptic algorithm / code (hence, the name cryptocurrency) which makes counterfeiting very difficult. The most important part about a VC is that no Government has issued it and hence it is not Fiat Money. It is a privately-issued currency which is entirely digital in nature. There are no paper notes or coins. Everything about it is digital. Further, it is based on blockchain technology, meaning that it is stored over a network of servers. Hence, it becomes difficult to say where exactly it is located. This also makes it very complicated for any Government to regulate VCs. This has been one of the sore points for the Indian Government. The fear that VCs would lead to money-laundering and financing of illegal activities is one of the key concerns associated with cryptocurrencies.

Many people associate cryptos (as they are colloquially known) only with Bitcoins. Yes, Bitcoins were the first cryptos launched in 2009 and remain the most popular, but now there are several other VCs such as Tethers, Litecoins, Binance Coins, Bbqcoins, Dogecoins, Ethereum, etc. At last count, there were about 200 VCs! VCs are bought and sold on crypto exchanges. Several such virtual currency exchanges operate in India, for example, WazirX, CoinDCX. Tesla, the US-based electric vehicle manufacturer, announced that it had bought US $1.5 billion worth of Bitcoins and that it would accept Bitcoins as a means of payment. It is estimated that there are over ten million crypto users in India and over 200 million users worldwide. In spite of such a huge market, it is unfortunate that neither the Indian tax nor the Indian legal system has kept pace with such an important global development.

While dealing with VCs one should also know about Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs). These are units of data stored on a blockchain ledger and certify a digital asset. NFTs are useful in establishing fractional ownership over assets such as digital art, fashion, movies, songs, photos, collectibles, gaming assets, etc. Each NFT has a unique identity which helps establish ownership over the asset. NFTs have even entered the contractual space. For example, in 2019 Spencer Dinwiddie, a basketball player in the US, tokenised his player’s contract with the National Basketball Association, so that several investors could invest in the same. These NFTs could then be traded on a virtual exchange. These tokens carry an interest coupon and the amount raised from the token is given to the person creating the token, e.g., the basketball player. At the end of the maturity period, the token would be redeemed and they may or may not carry a profit-sharing in the revenues earned by the token creator. The payments for buying these tokens can also be made by using cryptocurrencies.

Recently, El Salvador became the first country in the world to legalise cryptocurrencies as legal tender. Thus, residents of El Salvador can pay for goods, services, taxes, etc., using virtual currencies like Bitcoins.

Let us try to analyse cryptocurrencies and understand the fast-changing and confusing regulatory and tax environment surrounding them in India. Since there has been a great deal of flip-flop on this issue, this Feature would cover all the key developments on the subject to clear the fog. There is a great deal of misinformation and ignorance on this front and hence all key regulatory developments have been analysed below, even if they were proposals which never got formalised.

CHEQUERED LEGAL BACKGROUND


Let us start with an examination of the highly chequered background and problematic past which cryptocurrencies have encountered in India.

FM’s 2018 speech
The Finance Minister in his Speech for Budget 2018-19 said that the Government did not consider cryptocurrencies as legal tender or coins and that all measures to eliminate the use of these currencies in financing illegitimate activities or as part of the payment system will be taken by the Government. However, he also said that the Government will explore the use of blockchain technology proactively for ushering in a digital economy.

RBI’s 2018 ban
The RBI had been cautioning people against the use of ‘Decentralised Digital Currency’ or ‘Virtual Currencies’ right since 2013. Ultimately, in April 2018, by a Circular the RBI banned dealing in virtual currencies in view of the risks which the RBI felt were associated with them:

• VCs being in digital form were stored in electronic wallets. Therefore, VC holders were prone to losses arising out of hacking, loss of password, compromise of access credentials, malware attacks, etc. Since VCs are not created by or traded through any authorised central registry or agency, the loss of the e-wallet could result in the permanent loss of the VCs held in them.
• Payments by VCs, such as Bitcoins, took place on a peer-to-peer basis without any authorised central agency which regulated such payments. As such, there was no established framework for recourse to customer problems / disputes / chargebacks, etc.
• There was no underlying or backing of any asset for VCs. As such, their value seemed to be a matter of speculation. Huge volatility in the value of VCs has been noticed in the recent past. Thus, the users are exposed to potential losses on account of such volatility in value.
• It was reported that VCs such as Bitcoins were being traded on exchange platforms set up in various jurisdictions whose legal status was also unclear. Hence, the traders of VCs on such platforms were exposed to legal as well as financial risks.
• The absence of information of counterparties in such peer-to-peer anonymous / pseudonymous systems could subject the users to unintentional breaches of anti-money-laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML / CFT) laws.

In view of the potential financial, operational, legal, customer protection and security-related risks associated with dealing in VCs, the RBI’s Circular stated that entities regulated by the Reserve Bank, e.g., banks, NBFCs, payment gateways, etc., should not deal in VCs or provide services for facilitating any person or entity in dealing with or settling VCs. Such services were defined as including, maintaining accounts, registering, trading, settling, clearing, giving loans against virtual tokens, accepting them as collateral, opening accounts of exchanges dealing with them and transfer / receipt of money in accounts relating to purchase / sale of VCs. This diktat from the RBI came as a body-blow to the fast-expanding cryptocurrency industry in India.

IMC’s 2019 criminalisation sword
In 2019, an Inter-Ministerial Committee (IMC) of the Government presented a Report to the Government recommending a ban on all VCs. It proposed that not only should VCs be banned but any activity connected with them, such as buying / selling / storing VCs should also be banned. Shockingly, the IMC proposed criminalisation of these activities and provided for a fine of up to Rs. 25 crores and / or imprisonment of up to ten years. It categorically held that a VC is not a currency. Fortunately, none of the recommendations of this IMC Report saw the light of day.

Supreme Court’s 2020 boon
This Circular of the RBI came up for challenge before the Apex Court in the case of Internet and Mobile Association of India vs. Reserve Bank of India, WP(C) No. 528/2018, order dated 4th March, 2020 (SC). The ban was challenged by the Internet and Mobile Association of India, an industry body which represented the interests of the online and digital services industry along with a few companies which ran online crypto assets exchange platforms. A three-Judge Bench in a very detailed judgment assayed the RBI Circular. The Court examined three crucial questions.

Question #1: Are VCs currency under Indian laws?
• The Court noted that the word ‘currency’ is defined in section 2(h) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 to include ‘all currency notes, postal notes, postal orders, money orders, cheques, drafts, travellers’ cheques, letters of credit, bills of exchange and promissory notes, credit cards or such other similar instruments as may be notified by the RBI.’ The expression ‘currency notes’ was also defined in FEMA to mean and include cash in the form of coins and banknotes. Again, FEMA defined ‘Indian currency’ to mean currency which was expressed or drawn in Indian rupees. It also observed that the RBI had taken a stand that VCs did not fit into the definition of the expression ‘currency’ under section 2(h) of FEMA, despite the fact that the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in its Report defined virtual currency to mean a ‘digital representation of value that can be digitally traded and functions as (1) a medium of exchange; and / or (2) a unit of account; and / or (3) a store of value, but does not have legal tender status.’ According to this Report, legal tender status is acquired only when it is accepted as a valid and legal offer of payment when tendered to a creditor.

• Neither the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 nor the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007, or the Coinage Act, 2011 defined the words ‘currency’ or ‘money’.

• The Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes (Banning) Act, 1978 defined money to include a cheque, postal order, demand draft, telegraphic transfer or money order.

• Section 65B of the Finance Act, 1994, inserted by way of the Finance Act, 2012, defined ‘money’ to mean ‘legal tender, cheque, promissory note, bill of exchange, letter of credit, draft, pay order, travellers’ cheque, money order, postal or electronic remittance or any other similar instrument, but shall not include any currency that is held for its numismatic value’. This definition was important, for it identified many instruments other than legal tender which could come within the definition of money.

• The Sale of Goods Act, 1930 did not define ‘money’ or ‘currency’ but excluded money from the definition of the word ‘goods’.

• The Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 defined ‘money’ under section 2(75) to mean ‘the Indian legal tender or any foreign currency, cheque, promissory note, bill of exchange, letter of credit, draft, pay order, travellers’ cheque, money order, postal or electronic remittance or any other instrument recognised by RBI, when used as a consideration to settle an obligation or exchange with Indian legal tender of another denomination but shall not include any currency that is held for its numismatic value.’

The Supreme Court ultimately held that nothing prevented the RBI from adopting a short circuit by notifying VCs under the category of ‘other similar instruments’ indicated in section 2(h) of FEMA, 1999 which defined ‘currency’ to mean ‘all currency notes, postal notes, postal orders, money orders, cheques, drafts, travellers’ cheques, letters of credit, bills of exchange and promissory notes, credit cards or such other similar instruments as may be notified by the Reserve Bank.’ Promissory notes, cheques, bills of exchange, etc., were also not exactly currencies but operated as valid discharges (or the creation) of a debt only between two persons or peer-to-peer. Therefore, it held that it was not possible to accept the contention that VCs were just goods / commodities and could never be regarded as real money!

Question #2: Did RBI have power to regulate VCs?
The Apex Court observed that once it was accepted that some institutions accept virtual currencies as valid payments for the purchase of goods and services, there was no escape from the conclusion that the users and traders of virtual currencies carried on an activity that fell squarely within the purview of the Reserve Bank of India. The statutory obligations that the RBI had, as a central bank, were (i) to operate the currency and credit system, (ii) to regulate the financial system, and (iii) to ensure the payment system of the country to be on track, and would compel them naturally to address all issues that are perceived as potential risks to the monetary, currency, payment, credit and financial systems of the country. If an intangible property could act under certain circumstances as money then RBI could definitely take note of it and deal with it. Hence, it was not possible to accept the contention that cryptocurrency was an activity over which RBI had no power statutorily. Hence, the Apex Court held that the RBI has the requisite power to regulate or prohibit an activity of this nature. The contention that the RBI was conferred only with the power to regulate, but not to prohibit, did not appeal to the Court.

The Supreme Court further held that the RBI’s Circular did not impose a total prohibition on the use of or the trading in VCs. It merely directed the entities regulated by the RBI not to provide banking services to those engaged in the trading or facilitating of the trading in VCs. Section 36(1)(a) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 very clearly empowered the RBI to caution or prohibit banking companies against entering into certain types of transactions or class of transactions. The prohibition was not per se against the trading in VCs. It was against banks, with respect to a class of transactions. The fact that the functioning of VCEs automatically got paralysed or crippled because of the impugned Circular was no ground to hold that it was tantamount to a total prohibition.

It observed that so long as those trading in VCs did not wish to convert them into currency in India and so long as the VC enterprises did not seek to collect their service charges or commission in currency through banking channels, they will not be affected by this Circular. Peer-to-peer transactions were still taking place without the involvement of the banking channel. In fact, those actually buying and selling VCs without seeking to convert currency into VCs or vice versa, were not at all affected by the RBI’s Circular. It was only the online platforms which provided a space or medium for the traders to buy and sell VCs that were seriously affected by the Circular, since the commission that they earned by facilitating the trade was required to be converted into fiat currency.

Various regulatory events from 2013 to 2018 showed that RBI had been brooding over the issue for almost five years before taking the extreme step of issuing the Circular. Therefore, the RBI could not be held guilty of non-application of mind. The Apex Court held that if RBI took steps to prevent the gullible public from having an illusion as though VCs may constitute a valid legal tender, the steps so taken were actually taken in good faith. The repeated warnings through press releases from December, 2013 onwards indicated a genuine attempt on the part of the RBI to safeguard the interests of the public. Therefore, the impugned Circular was not vitiated by malice in law and was not a colourable exercise of power.

Thus, the RBI had the power to regulate and prohibit VCs.

Question #3: Was RBI’s Circular excessive and ultra vires?
The Supreme Court then held that citizens who were running online platforms and VC exchanges could certainly claim that the Circular violated Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution which provides a Fundamental Right to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business to all citizens subject to Article 19(6) which enumerated the nature of restriction that could be imposed by the State upon the above right of the citizens. It held that persons who engaged in buying and selling virtual currencies just as a matter of hobby could not take shelter under this Article since what was covered was profession / business. Even people who purchased and sold VCs as their occupation or trade had other ways such as e-Wallets to get around the Circular. It is the VC exchanges which, if disconnected from banking channels, would perish.

The Supreme Court held that the impugned Circular had almost wiped the VC exchanges out of the industrial map of the country, thereby infringing Article 19(1)(g). The position was that VCs were not banned, but the trading in VCs and the functioning of VC exchanges were rendered comatose by the impugned Circular by disconnecting their lifeline, namely, the interface with the regular banking sector. It further held that this had been done (i) despite the RBI not finding anything wrong about the way in which these exchanges functioned, and (ii) despite the fact that VCs were not banned. It was not the case of RBI that any of the entities regulated by it had suffered on account of the provision of banking services to the online platforms running VC exchanges.

Therefore, the Court concluded that the petitioners were entitled to succeed and the impugned RBI Circular was liable to be set aside on the ground of being ultra vires of the Constitution. One of the banks had frozen the account of a VC exchange. The Court gave specific directions to defreeze the account and release its funds. Accordingly, the Supreme Court came to the rescue of Indian VC exchanges.

Along with the above Supreme Court decision, another decision which merits mention is that of the Karnataka High Court in the case of B.V. Harish and Others vs. State of Karnataka (WP No. 18910/2019, order dated 8th February, 2021. In this case, based on the RBI’s Circular, the police had registered an FIR against the directors of a company for running a cryptocurrency exchange and a VC ATM. The Karnataka High Court relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court explained above and quashed the chargesheet and other criminal proceedings.

Recently, the RBI in a Circular to banks and NBFCs has stated that certain entities are yet cautioning their customers against dealing in virtual currencies by making a reference to the RBI Circular dated 6th April, 2018. The RBI has directed that such references to the abovementioned Circular were not in order since it had been set aside by the Supreme Court. However, the RBI has added that banks / entities may continue to carry out customer due diligence processes in line with regulations governing standards for Know Your Customer (KYC), Anti-Money Laundering (AML), Combating of Financing of Terrorism (CFT) and obligations of regulated entities under Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002, in addition to ensuring compliance with relevant provisions under FEMA for overseas remittances.

Finance Minister’s interviews
In February / March, 2021 in reply to questions raised in the Rajya Sabha as to whether the Central Government was planning to issue strict guidelines on cryptocurrency trading and whether the Government was doing anything to curb clandestine trading of VCs, the Finance Minister stated that a high-level Inter-Ministerial Committee (IMC), constituted under the Chairmanship of the Secretary (Economic Affairs) to study the issues related to VCs and propose specific actions to be taken in the matter, had recommended in its report that all private cryptocurrencies, except any cryptocurrency issued by the State, be prohibited in India. The Government would take a decision on the recommendations of the IMC and the legislative proposal, if any, would be introduced in the Parliament following the due process.

Recently, in March, 2021, the Finance Minister has said that the Government was not closing its mind and that they were looking at ways in which experiments could happen in the digital world and cryptocurrencies. She has also stated that ‘From our side, we are very clear that we are not shutting all options. We will allow certain windows for people to do experiments on the blockchain, bitcoins or cryptocurrency… A lot of fintech companies have made a lot of progress on it. We have got several presentations. Much work at the state level is happening and we want to take it in a big way in IFSC or Gift City in Gandhinagar.’

MCA’s 2021 Rules for companies
In March, 2021 the Ministry of Corporate Affairs has mandated all companies to disclose certain additional information in their accounts from 1st April, 2022. One such important information pertains to details of cryptocurrency or virtual currency.

Where the company has traded or invested in cryptocurrency or virtual currency during the financial year, the following details have to be disclosed in its Balance Sheet:
(a) profit or loss on transactions involving the cryptocurrency or virtual currency, (b) amount of currency held as at the reporting date, (c) deposits or advances from any person for the purpose of trading or investing in cryptocurrency / virtual currency.

Similarly, the Profit & Loss Statement of such a company must carry the following additional details:
(i) profit or loss on transactions involving cryptocurrency or virtual currency, (ii) amount of currency held as at the reporting date, and (iii) deposits or advances from any person for the purpose of trading or investing in cryptocurrency or virtual currency.

CRYPTOCURRENCY BILL, 2021
The Government had proposed to table ‘The Cryptocurrency and Regulation of Official Digital Currency Bill, 2021’ during the January to March, 2021 session of the Lok Sabha. However, it was not introduced. The purport of this Bill states that it aims to create a facilitative framework for creation of the official digital currency to be issued by the Reserve Bank of India. The Bill also seeks to prohibit all private cryptocurrencies in India; however, it allows for certain exceptions to promote the underlying technology of cryptocurrency and its uses. It would be interesting to see the contours of this Bill when it is tabled. However, it seems quite clear that the Government is considering introducing its own digital currency to be issued by the RBI. One aspect which is worrying is that it seeks to prohibit all private VCs. Does this mean that the Government would get over the Supreme Court verdict by this law?

(To be continued)

Section 68 – Where purchases were accepted as genuine, addition of credit balance at the end of the year which was entirely out of purchases for the year, could not be made

30 IKEA Trading (India) (P) Ltd. vs. DCIT [2020] 83 ITR(T) 415 (Del-Trib) IT(SS) Appeal Nos. 5568 and 5877 (Del) of 2011 A.Y.: 2004-05; Date of order: 30th June, 2020

Section 68 – Where purchases were accepted as genuine, addition of credit balance at the end of the year which was entirely out of purchases for the year, could not be made

FACTS I
In the course of assessment proceedings, the A.O. asked the assessee to explain certain amounts of sundry creditors. Notices u/s 133(6) were issued, but many of them were not complied with. Consequently, the A.O. made addition for the amount of sundry creditors. On further appeal by the assessee, the Commissioner (Appeals) confirmed the additions only in respect of two parties and deleted the entire balance addition. This was done considering the details filed by the assessee before him. The additions that were sustained were on account of failure of the assessee to furnish account details and relevant pay-out details.

Aggrieved, the assessee as well as Revenue preferred appeals before the ITAT.

HELD I
The Tribunal took into consideration the fact that the A.O. simply added the balance as on 31st March, 2004 without realising that the entire credit balance was out of the purchases made during the year, which were accepted as genuine and no adverse inference was drawn in respect thereof. Further, the assessee had paid all the outstanding amounts in the immediately succeeding years. Therefore, the ITAT allowed the assessee’s appeal and dismissed the Revenue’s ground of appeal. In reaching this conclusion, apart from the facts stated above, it also placed heavy reliance on the decision of the Delhi ITAT Special Bench in the case of Manoj Aggarwal vs. Dy. CIT (2008) 113 ITD 377. The principle upheld in that case was that once a certain amount was accepted as genuine, the same cannot be questioned later on. (The case was in respect of amount offered to tax under a Voluntary Disclosure of Income Scheme, which was credited in the books of accounts as per the requirement of the respective law on the scheme. It was held that once the amount is taxed under the scheme, the same could not be taxed again u/s 68.)

Therefore, by the same rationale, once purchases were accepted as genuine in the instant case, addition of credit balance which was entirely out of purchases for the year could not be made.

Section 40A(2)(b): Where the A.O. had not brought any comparable case to demonstrate that payments made by assessee to directors were excessive / unreasonable, no disallowance could be made

FACTS II
The assessee claimed certain amount expended towards directors’ remuneration. On asking for an explanation in respect of the same, the assessee furnished the details of remuneration paid to the directors and claimed that the same was as per industry norms and was not in excess of either the limits prescribed under the Act, or the industry norms for the particular class of industry. However, the A.O. was of the opinion that the assessee failed to justify the nature of services rendered by the directors so as to command such a huge remuneration. Therefore, the A.O. disallowed a part of the remuneration on the basis that it was excessive.

Before the Commissioner (Appeals), the assessee contended that the A.O. did not give any cogent reasons to justify the disallowance and that he grossly failed to show that such expenditure was excessive and / or unreasonable. Thus, the Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the disallowance made.

The Revenue filed a further appeal before the ITAT.

HELD II
The ITAT observed that the A.O. did not bring any comparable case to demonstrate that the payments made by the assessee were excessive / unreasonable, which is an onus cast upon him by the mandate of section 40A(2)(b).

A further observation was that the payees were also assessed to tax at the same rate of tax. The CBDT Circular No. 6-P dated 6th July, 1968 states that no disallowance is to be made u/s 40A(2) in respect of the payments made to the relatives and sister concerns where there is no attempt to evade tax. Considering the totality of the facts in light of the CBDT Circular (Supra), the ITAT dismissed the ground of appeal raised by the Revenue, thereby allowing the assessee’s claim of remuneration.

EVALUATING AN AGREEMENT – LEASE VS. IN-SUBSTANCE PURCHASE

INTRODUCTION
In some situations, a lease may effectively represent an in-substance purchase. The distinction between a lease and an in-substance purchase may have a significant impact with respect to the accounting, if variable payments are involved as well as with respect to presentation and disclosures. This distinction is critical in the case of aircraft, ships, etc. This article delves into this issue and provides relevant guidance.

FACTS

Consider the following fact pattern:
1. As per local safety legislation, Machine X can be used only for ten years, after which it must be sold to recyclers for scrapping.
2. Ze Co (hereinafter referred to as ‘Lessee’) acquires Machine X on lease for a non-cancellable lease term of ten years from Ed Co (hereinafter referred to as ‘Lessor’).
3. Fixed lease payments are made at the beginning of each year over the lease term. There are no variable lease payments.
4. As per the lease agreement, the Lessee has an option to buy Machine X at INR 1,000 at the end of the tenth year.
5. The legal title of Machine X is transferred to the Lessee at the end of the tenth year, if the Lessee exercises the option to purchase Machine X.
6. The fair value of Machine X if it is to be sold as scrap is likely to be several times more than INR 1,000.
7. The Lessor is not responsible for any malfunctioning of the Machine X during the lease period.

Whether this arrangement would constitute an in-substance purchase or lease from the perspective of the Lessee? How does the Lessor account for such a transaction?

References to Accounting Standards
IFRS 16 Leases provides guidance in the Basis of Conclusion and is reproduced below. It may be noted that Ind AS 116 Leases does not include any Basis of Conclusion, but the Basis of Conclusion under IFRS can be applied as the best available guidance.

IFRS 16 Basis of Conclusion

BC138 The IASB considered whether to include requirements in IFRS 16 to distinguish a lease from the sale or purchase of an asset. The IFRS Interpretations Committee had received questions about whether particular contracts that do not transfer legal title of land should be considered to be a lease or a purchase of the land.

BC139 The IASB decided not to provide requirements in IFRS 16 to distinguish a lease from a sale or purchase of an asset. There was little support from stakeholders for including such requirements. In addition, the IASB observed that:
a. the accounting for leases that are similar to the sale or purchase of the underlying asset would be similar to that for sales and purchases applying the respective requirements of IFRS 15 and IAS 16; and
b. accounting for a transaction depends on the substance of that transaction and not its legal form. Consequently, if a contract grants rights that represent the in-substance purchase of an item of property, plant and equipment, those rights meet the definition of property, plant and equipment in IAS 16 and would be accounted for applying that Standard, regardless of whether legal title transfers. If the contract grants rights that do not represent the in-substance purchase of an item of property, plant and equipment but that meet the definition of a lease, the contract would be accounted for applying IFRS 16.

BC140 IFRS 16 applies to contracts that convey the right to use an underlying asset for a period of time and does not apply to transactions that transfer control of the underlying asset to an entity – such transactions are sales or purchases within the scope of other Standards (for example, IFRS 15 or IAS 16).

ANALYSIS


When assessing the nature of a contract, an entity should consider whether the contract transfers control of the underlying asset itself as opposed to conveying the right to control the use of the underlying asset for a period of time. If so, the transaction is a sale or purchase within the scope of other standards (e.g., Ind AS 115 Revenue from Contracts with Customers or Ind AS 16 Property, Plant and Equipment). Consequently, if a contract grants rights that represent the in-substance purchase of an item of property, plant and equipment, such transaction may need to be presented as the purchase of the underlying asset (regardless of whether legal title transfers) either on deferred terms if entered into directly with the manufacturer or dealer of the asset, or together with the provision of financing if entered into with a financial institution which purchases the underlying asset on the entity’s behalf from a designated supplier.

Ind AS 115.33 defines control of an asset as the ability to direct the use of, and obtain substantially all of the remaining benefits from, the asset. Control includes the ability to prevent other entities from directing the use of, and obtaining the benefits from, an asset. The benefits of an asset are the potential cash flows (inflows or savings in outflows) that can be obtained directly or indirectly. When evaluating whether a customer obtains control of an asset, an entity shall consider any agreement to repurchase the asset (see Ind AS 115.B64–B76). In determining whether an agreement is a sale / purchase agreement or a lease, the appropriate criteria to be used are those shown in Ind AS 115 in relation to the transfer of control.

Additionally, if retaining title of the asset has no substance, there is sympathy to treating the transaction as an in-substance purchase of PP&E (Ind AS 16). However, if there is substance to the title of the asset remaining with the supplier, and ownership is only transferred at the end, Ind AS 116 accounting would be more appropriate as the customer has right-of-use but does not have ownership. If variable lease payments are present in the agreement, the supplier / lessor retains some risk which may point towards lease accounting.

Typically, in land use rights, where the seller retains title and there is no option for the Lessee to purchase the land, the author believes that the title would be critical in evaluating whether the arrangement is a lease or an in-substance purchase of land. For example, in a 99-year lease with no option to purchase the land at the end of the lease term, or option to purchase the land at its then fair value, it is difficult to think someone has sold the land because, even after 99 years that land is very likely to have significant value which will not be ‘kept’ by the buyer. In contrast, lease of LED lights to a retail department store may constitute an in-substance purchase for the store because the value of the LED lights is in its usage, rather than its value at the end of its useful life. So, invariably, it boils down to the assessment of significance of title.

CONCLUSION
In the above fact pattern, the effective utility of Machine X is its usage over ten years, after which it is sold as scrap. There is a purchase option at the end of the lease term that is most likely to be exercised by the Lessee, as the Lessee will stand to benefit from exercising that option. Lastly, it appears that the Lessor retains no risk as there are no variable payments in the arrangement nor is the Lessor responsible for malfunctioning of Machine X. The Lessee retains all the risks and rewards in substance and the absence of legal title during the lease term should not preclude the Lessee from classifying Machine X as an in-substance purchase rather than as a lease.

From the Lessor’s perspective, the arrangement will constitute a sale of Machine X under Ind AS 115 since the control criterion under Ind AS 115.33 would be met in this case. In determining the transaction price of the sale, the Lessor will have to separate the financing component and record the same as financing income over the lease period.

Offences and prosecution – Sections 276C, 277 and 278 – Wilful attempt to evade tax – False verification in return – Abetment of false returns – Condition precedent for application of sections 276C and 277 – Incriminating material or evidence of wilful attempt to evade tax must emanate from assessee – Evidence unearthed during search and survey operations of third persons – No evidence of connection between such material and assessee – Mere denial of allegation will not amount to incriminating evidence – Abetment denotes instigation to file false return – Complaint filed by Director of Income-tax – Not justified – Prosecution not valid

8. (1) Karti P. Chidambaram and (2) Srinidhi Karti Chidambaram vs. Dy. DIT (Investigation) [2021] 431 ITR 261 (Mad) Date of order: 11th December, 2020 A.Ys.: 2014-15 and 2015-16

Offences and prosecution – Sections 276C, 277 and 278 – Wilful attempt to evade tax – False verification in return – Abetment of false returns – Condition precedent for application of sections 276C and 277 – Incriminating material or evidence of wilful attempt to evade tax must emanate from assessee – Evidence unearthed during search and survey operations of third persons – No evidence of connection between such material and assessee – Mere denial of allegation will not amount to incriminating evidence – Abetment denotes instigation to file false return – Complaint filed by Director of Income-tax – Not justified – Prosecution not valid

The assessees were husband and wife. For the A.Y. 2014-15, K filed his return on 29th July, 2014 declaring profit from the sale of immovable property as long-term capital gains. His wife filed her return for the A.Y. 2015-16 and disclosed long-term capital gains. Neither K nor his wife disclosed cash payments received as part of the consideration. These facts came to light in a survey u/s 133A carried out in the case of a company A Ltd. and other entities on 1st December, 2015 by the Income-tax Department and the Enforcement Directorate. In the course of the search several hard disks were retrieved by the Department and the ED. Further search and seizure were also conducted in the case of another company AE Ltd. in the year 2018 and certain notebooks were seized from the cashier of the purchaser company and their statements also recorded. A private complaint was filed by the Deputy Director of the Income-tax Department against K for the offences u/s 276C and 277. Similarly, another complaint was filed against his wife under sections 276C(1), 277 and 278.

After the Court had taken cognizance of the complaint, the assessees filed petitions to discharge them from the prosecution mainly on the ground that the documents alleged to have been seized during the search conducted in the two companies were inadmissible and the alleged cloning of the electronic records was not done by any experts and those documents also were not admissible due to non-compliance with section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Similarly, the person who was said to have given a statement as to the cash transaction had not been examined by the Court while taking cognizance. Hence, without any evidence in this regard there were no materials to proceed against the assessees. It was further submitted that the Deputy Director of the Income-tax Department was not a competent person to file a complaint for the false declaration. Only the A.O. before whom the returns were filed was competent to file any complaint for false returns or evidence. The trial court dismissed the petition.

The Madras High Court allowed the revision petitions filed by the assessees and held as under:

‘i) Section 276C deals with wilful attempt to evade tax. In order to attract the provisions of section 276C the following ingredients must be available: the person (a) wilfully attempts to evade any tax; or (b) wilfully attempts to evade any penalty; or (c) wilfully attempts to evade any interest chargeable or imposable under this Act; or (d) under-reports his income. The Explanation further indicates that the expression “wilfully attempts” employed in the provision is an inclusive one. The Explanation makes it very clear that to maintain the prosecution, the false entry or statement containing the books of accounts or other documents ought to have been in the possession or control of such person and such person should have made any false entry or statement in such books of accounts or other documents or wilfully omitted or caused to be omitted any relevant entry or statement in such books of accounts or other documents, or caused any other circumstance to exist which will have the effect of enabling such person to evade any tax, penalty or interest chargeable or imposable under this Act.

ii) The essential ingredients of the sections make it clear that any statements or incriminating materials either should come from the accused or very strong material unearthed during search or survey is required to maintain prosecution u/s 276C or 277. The very Explanation provided u/s 276C makes it clear that incriminating materials and documents ought to have been seized from the accused. Unless strong materials are seized from the accused or any incriminating statement recorded from the accused, the prosecution has to wait till the finding recorded by the A.O. Reassessment or assessment order has to be passed only based on the materials seized during the search. On such assessment, when the A.O. comes to the conclusion that there is a wilful suppression to evade tax or under-reporting, etc., the complaint is maintainable. Though the offences u/s 276, 277 and 278 are distinct offences and the Deputy Director can launch the prosecution as per section 279, merely because the power was conferred to the Deputy Director to launch a complaint or sanction merely on the basis of some materials said to have been collected from third parties, the prosecution will not be maintainable.

iii) The intention of the Legislature is to prosecute only where concrete materials are unearthed during the search or survey. It is stated in Circular No. 24 of 2019 [2019] 417 ITR (St.) 5 that the prosecution u/s 276C(1) shall be launched only after the confirmation of the order imposing penalty by the Appellate Tribunal. The object of the statute discernible u/s 276 is that to maintain a complaint by the Deputy Director, the material seized or collected during search should unerringly point towards the accused.

iv) All the proceedings before the Income-tax Officer, particularly assessment proceedings, are deemed to be civil proceedings in terms of section 136. When all the proceedings before the A.O. under the Act are deemed to be judicial proceedings and the officer is deemed to be a civil court, if any false declaration or false return is filed before the A.O. such act of the assessee is certainly punishable u/s 193 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. In such a case the fact that the statement given by the assessee during the assessment proceedings was false has to be recorded by the officer concerned. Without such a finding recorded, the prosecution cannot be launched merely on the basis of some statements said to have been recorded from third parties.

v) The Income-tax search proceedings have also been held to be judicial proceedings and such authority is deemed to be a judicial authority within the meaning of sections 193 and 196 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Even the raiding officer is deemed to be a civil court and the proceedings before him are judicial proceedings and if any offence is committed before such authority, the complaint can be lodged only following the procedure u/s 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

vi) The entire reading of the complaint made it clear that the assessees never incriminated themselves in the statements recorded by the raiding officers at any point of time. The search was said to have been carried out in AE Ltd., the so-called purchaser of the property. The complaint was silent about whether the assessee, i. e., the accused, were either directors or had control over the firms. Mere denial of the prosecution version could not by any stretch of imagination be construed as incriminating evidence.

vii) Admittedly, returns were filed before the A.O. by the assessees and the verification was also done by them while filing the returns. Whether such verification was false or not had to be decided by the A.O. before whom such verification was filed. Neither the false return nor any false statement or verification was done before the Deputy Director of Income-tax to invoke section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Prosecution was launched for the alleged offence under sections 276C and 277. There must be material to show that there was wilful attempt to evade tax, penalty, interest or under-report, etc. Merely because search had been conducted and some third parties’ statements were recorded, and further they had also not been examined, and there was no finding recorded by the A.O. as to a wilful attempt to evade tax or filing of false verification, the complaint filed by the Deputy Director was not maintainable.

viii) Showing of ignorance by one of the assessees by maintaining that only her husband was aware of the return… such conduct could not be construed as abetment to attract the offence u/s 278. The prosecution of K and his wife was not sustainable.’

Non-resident – Taxability in India – Royalty – Consideration received for sale of software products under contract with customers in India – Assessee opting to be governed by provisions of DTAA – Meaning of royalty in agreement not amended to correspond with amended definition in Act – Receipts not royalty – Not liable to tax – Section 9(1)(vi), Explanation 4 – Articles 3(2), 13 of DTAA between India and UK

7. CIT (International Taxation) vs. Micro Focus Ltd. [2021] 431 ITR 136 (Del) Date of order: 24th November, 2020 A.Ys.: 2010-11 and 2013-14

Non-resident – Taxability in India – Royalty – Consideration received for sale of software products under contract with customers in India – Assessee opting to be governed by provisions of DTAA – Meaning of royalty in agreement not amended to correspond with amended definition in Act – Receipts not royalty – Not liable to tax – Section 9(1)(vi), Explanation 4 – Articles 3(2), 13 of DTAA between India and UK

The assessee, a company incorporated in the United Kingdom, developed and distributed software products. It sold software products in India either through its distributors or directly to customers. The assessee entered into contracts with its customers on principal-to-principal basis and sale of software licences was concluded outside India (off-shore supplies). For the A.Ys. 2010-11 and 2013-14 the A.O. passed final orders u/s 144C(3) holding that the receipts of income from the sale of software products in India were taxable under the head ‘royalty’ under the provisions of section 9(1)(vi) read with article 13 of the DTAA between India and the United Kingdom and, accordingly, brought the receipts of the assessee as royalty income at 10%.

The Tribunal held that the consideration received by the assessee from various entities on account of sale of software was not royalty within the meaning of article 13 of the DTAA and that there was no corresponding amendment to the definition of the term ‘royalty’ in article 13(3) of the DTAA as carried out in the definition of royalty u/s 9(1)(vi).

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

‘i) The Tribunal did not err in holding that the receipts of the assessee from the sale of software were not taxable as royalty under the DTAA. The payment made by the reseller for the purchase of software for sale in Indian market could not be considered as royalty.

ii) The Tribunal was right in holding that Explanation 4 to section 9(1)(vi) would not apply to the DTAA between India and United Kingdom.

iii) The Tribunal did not err in holding that the receipt of the assessee was not royalty though u/s 14(b)(ii) of the Indian Copyright Act, 1957 selling or giving on commercial rent any copy of computer programme was copyright.’

Income from other sources – Section 56(2)(vii) – Property received without consideration or for consideration less than its fair market value – Scope of section 56(2)(vii) – Bonus shares – Fair market value of bonus shares not normally assessable as income from other sources

6. Principal CIT vs. Dr. Ranjan Pai [2021] 431 ITR 250 (Karn) Date of order: 15th December, 2020 A.Y.: 2012-13


 

Income from other sources – Section 56(2)(vii) – Property received without consideration or for consideration less than its fair market value – Scope of section 56(2)(vii) – Bonus shares – Fair market value of bonus shares not normally assessable as income from other sources

 

The assessee was an individual engaged in the medical profession. For the A.Y. 2012-13, the A.O. found that the assessee had received 1,00,00,000 bonus shares issued by M Ltd. The A.O. invoked section 56(2)(vii) and treated the receipt of bonus shares as income from other sources and assessed the fair market value of the bonus shares as income of the year.

 

The Tribunal held that the provisions of section 56(2)(vii) were not attracted to the fact situation of the case and deleted the addition.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

‘i) A careful scrutiny of section 56(2)(vii) contemplates two contingencies; firstly, where the property is received without consideration, and secondly, where it is received for consideration less than the fair market value. The issue of bonus shares by capitalisation of reserves is merely a reallocation of the company’s funds. There is no inflow of fresh funds or increase in the capital employed, which remains the same. The total funds available with the company remain the same and the issue of bonus shares does not result in any change in respect of the capital structure of the company. In substance, when a shareholder gets bonus shares, the value of the original shares held by him goes down and the market value as well as the intrinsic value of the two shares put together will be the same or nearly the same as per the value of the original share before the issue of bonus shares. Thus, any profit derived by the assessee on account of receipt of bonus shares is adjusted by depreciation in the value of equity shares held by him. Hence, the fair market value of bonus shares is not normally assessable as income from other sources.

 

ii) There was no material on record to infer that bonus shares had been transferred with an intention to evade tax. The provisions of section 56(2)(vii)(c) were not attracted to the fact situation of the case.

 

iii)   In view of the preceding analysis, the substantial question of law framed by a Bench of this Court is answered against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. In the result, we do not find any merit in this appeal, the same fails and is hereby dismissed.’

 

Housing project – Special deduction u/s 80-IB(10) – Condition regarding extent of built-up area – Some flats conforming to condition – Proportionate deduction can be granted

5. CIT vs. S.N. Builders and Developers [2021] 431 ITR 241 (Karn) Date of order: 7th January, 2021 A.Y.: 2009-10


 

Housing project – Special deduction u/s 80-IB(10) – Condition regarding extent of built-up area – Some flats conforming to condition – Proportionate deduction can be granted

 

The assessee was a firm engaged in the development of real estate and construction of apartments. For the A.Y. 2009-10 the assessee claimed deduction u/s 80-IB(10) on the profits determined by applying the percentage completion method. A survey u/s 133A was carried out during which it was found that the built-up area of 26 flats exceeded 1,500 square feet. The A.O. completed the assessment rejecting the claim of the assessee for deduction u/s 80-IB(10).

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) held that derivation of profits based on the percentage completion method by the assessee was correct and the assessee was entitled to proportionate deduction u/s 80-IB(10) in respect of those flats which conformed to the limits prescribed under the relevant provisions of the Act. This was upheld by the Tribunal.

 

On appeal by the evenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

‘i) The Tribunal was correct and the assessee was entitled to the benefit of proportionate deduction u/s 80-IB(10) in respect of flats which conformed to the limits under the relevant provisions of the Act.

 

ii) The Institute of Chartered Accountants has issued a clarification that revised Accounting Standard 7 is not applicable to the enterprises undertaking construction activities. The assessee was right in following the project completion method of accounting in terms of Accounting Standard 9.’

Exempt income – Disallowance u/s 14A – Disallowance of expenditure relating to exempt income – Scope of section 14A and rule 8D – Disallowance cannot exceed non-taxable income

4. Principal CIT vs. Envestor Ventures Ltd. [2021] 431 ITR 221 (Mad) Date of order: 18th January, 2021 A.Y.: 2015-16

Exempt income – Disallowance u/s 14A – Disallowance of expenditure relating to exempt income – Scope of section 14A and rule 8D – Disallowance cannot exceed non-taxable income

Dealing with the scope of section 14A, the Madras High Court held as under:

‘i) The disallowance u/s 14A read with rule 8D of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 of the expenditure incurred to earn exempted income has to be computed in accordance with rule 8D which in essence stipulates that the expenditure directly relatable to the earning of such exempted income can alone be disallowed u/s 14A. The assessing authority has to mandatorily record his satisfaction that the proportionate disallowance of expenditure u/s 14A as made by the assessee is not satisfactory and therefore the same is liable to be rejected for such cogent reasons as specified and, thereafter, the computation method under rule 8D can be invoked to compute the quantum of disallowance. It is well settled that the Rules cannot go beyond the main parent provision. Therefore, what has been provided as computation method in rule 8D cannot go beyond the roof limit of section 14A itself under any circumstances.

ii) The Tribunal was right in restricting the disallowance u/s 14A to the extent of exempt income earned during the previous year relevant to the A.Y. 2015-16.’

Business expenditure – Disallowance u/s 40(a)(i) – Depreciation – Scope of section 40(a)(i) – Depreciation is not an expenditure and is not covered by section 40(a)(i)

3. Principal CIT vs. Tally Solutions Pvt. Ltd. [2021] 430 ITR 527 (Karn) Date of order: 16th December, 2020 A.Y.: 2009-10

Business expenditure – Disallowance u/s 40(a)(i) – Depreciation – Scope of section 40(a)(i) – Depreciation is not an expenditure and is not covered by section 40(a)(i)

The assessee was engaged in the business of software development and sale of software product licences, software maintenance and training in software. For the A.Y. 2009-10, the A.O. disallowed a sum of Rs. 6,70,94,074 in respect of depreciation on intellectual property rights u/s 40(a)(i).

The Commissioner (Appeals) held that there being an irrevocable and unconditional sale of intellectual property and the transfer being absolute, it was an outright purchase of a capital asset and, therefore, section 40(a)(i) could not be invoked. This was confirmed by the Tribunal.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

‘i) From a close scrutiny of section 40(a)(i) it is axiomatic that an amount payable towards interest, royalty, fee for technical services or other sums chargeable under the Act on which tax is deductible at source shall not be deducted while computing the income under the head profits and gains of business or profession where such tax has not been deducted. The expression “amount payable” which is otherwise an allowable deduction refers to expenditure incurred for the purpose of business of the assessee and, therefore, the expenditure is a deductible claim. Thus, section 40 refers to the outgoing amount chargeable under the Act and subject to tax deduction at source under Chapter XVII-B. The deduction u/s 32 is not in respect of an amount paid or payable which is subjected to tax deduction at source, but it is a statutory deduction on an asset which is otherwise eligible for deduction of depreciation.

ii) Section 40(a)(i) and (ia) provides for disallowance only in respect of expenditure, which is revenue in nature, and does not apply to a case of the assessee whose claim is for depreciation which is not in the nature of expenditure but an allowance. Depreciation is not an outgoing expenditure and therefore the provisions of section 40(a)(i) and (ia) are not applicable. Depreciation is a statutory deduction available to the assessee on an asset, which is wholly or partly owned by the assessee and used for business or profession.

iii) The Commissioner (Appeals) had held that the payment had been made by the assessee for an outright purchase of intellectual property rights and not towards royalty. This finding had rightly been affirmed by the Tribunal. The findings recorded by the Commissioner (Appeals) as well as the Tribunal could not be termed perverse. Depreciation was allowable. In any case, the amount could not be disallowed u/s 40(a)(i).’

Business expenditure – Section 37 – Assessee company taking over business of another company – Scheme for voluntary retirement of employees of such company – Amount paid under scheme was for purposes of business – Deductible expenditure

2. CIT vs. G.E. Medical Systems (I) (P) Ltd. [2021] 430 ITR 494 (Karn) Date of order: 18th November, 2020 A.Y.: 2000-01

Business expenditure – Section 37 – Assessee company taking over business of another company – Scheme for voluntary retirement of employees of such company – Amount paid under scheme was for purposes of business – Deductible expenditure

GE was incorporated in Singapore and EI in India. The two companies entered into a joint venture agreement on 9th December, 1993 as a result of which the assessee came into existence with the object of carrying on the business of manufacturing and distribution of X-ray equipment. The agreement also provided that the assessee company would take over certain assets of EI and 184 of its employees. A separate agreement termed ‘equipment sales and employees absorption agreement’ was executed between the assessee and EI. This agreement was part of the share purchase agreement. Under the agreement, the employees were given a choice of continuity of service. The assessee introduced a scheme under which it paid a sum of Rs. 4,33,67,658 as retirement benefit to employees who availed of the benefit of the scheme. The amount paid under the scheme was claimed as a deduction u/s 37. The claim was rejected by the A.O.

The Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal allowed the claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

‘i) The sum was paid as retirement benefit to employees who availed of the benefit of the scheme. Under the scheme, compensation was paid not only for past services but also for the remaining years of service with the company. The employees had also filed a complaint against the assessee under the labour laws and, therefore, the assessee had to offer a scheme to avoid any kind of future problems. The scheme was sanctioned by the Chief Commissioner for the exemption u/s 10(10C) of the Act and it was a contractual obligation and was an ascertained liability.

ii) The genuineness of the scheme was not doubted by any of the authorities, rather it had been approved by the Chief Commissioner. The expenditure incurred by the assessee under the scheme had been incurred solely and exclusively for the purposes of business and was eligible for deduction u/s 37(1).’

Appeal to ITAT – Sections 253, 254 and 254(2) of ITA, 1961 – Ex parte order – Application for recall of order – Limitation – Assessee not served with notice of hearing before Tribunal though change of address intimated by assessee in Form 35 – Rejection of application for recall of order on ground of bar of limitation – Order unsustainable – Ex parte order in appeal and order rejecting application u/s 254(2) quashed and set aside – Matter remanded to Tribunal

1. Pacific Projects Ltd. vs. ACIT [2021] 430 ITR 522 (Del) Date of order: 23rd December, 2020

Appeal to ITAT – Sections 253, 254 and 254(2) of ITA, 1961 – Ex parte order – Application for recall of order – Limitation – Assessee not served with notice of hearing before Tribunal though change of address intimated by assessee in Form 35 – Rejection of application for recall of order on ground of bar of limitation – Order unsustainable – Ex parte order in appeal and order rejecting application u/s 254(2) quashed and set aside – Matter remanded to Tribunal

The assessee filed an application u/s 254(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 before the Tribunal for recall of the ex parte order remanding the matter to the Assessing Officer to decide the matter afresh after examining all the documents, including additional evidence as well as books of accounts, bills and vouchers, etc. The Tribunal held that it had no power to condone the delay in filing the application u/s 254(2) as the assessee had filed the application after six months from the end of the month in which the ex parte order had been passed.

The assessee filed a writ petition and challenged the order of the Tribunal contending that it had changed its address and shifted to new premises and this fact was mentioned in the appeal filed by the assessee in Form 35 against the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner and the assessee was never served in the appeal filed by the Department before the Tribunal. The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

‘i) The course adopted by the Tribunal at the first instance by dismissing the appeal for non-prosecution and then refusing to entertain the application filed by the assessee u/s 254(2) for recall of the order, could not be sustained. The address of the assessee mentioned in the appeal before the Tribunal by the Department was the assessee’s former address and not the new address, which had been mentioned in the appeal filed before the Commissioner (Appeals) in Form 35. The assessee was never served in the appeal filed by the Department before the Tribunal.

ii) The Tribunal had erroneously concluded that the miscellaneous application filed by the assessee was barred by limitation u/s 254(2) inasmuch as the assessee had filed the application within six months of actual receipt of the order. If the assessee had no notice and no knowledge of the order passed by the Tribunal, the limitation period would not start from the date the order was pronounced by the Tribunal. The order dismissing the application filed by the assessee u/s 254(2) was quashed and on the facts the ex parte order whereby the matter was remanded to the Assessing Officer was set aside. The Tribunal is directed to hear and dispose of the appeal on the merits.’

Sections 90 and 91, read with Article 24 of DTAA and section 37 of the Act – FTC cannot be granted in India in absence of tax liability in India – There is no provision in the Act for grant of refund in India of foreign tax paid abroad though non-creditable foreign tax can be claimed as business expenditure

1. [2021] 125 taxmann.com 155 (Mum)(Trib) Bank of India vs. ACIT ITA No.: 869/Mum/2018 Date of order: 4th March, 2021

Sections 90 and 91, read with Article 24 of DTAA and section 37 of the Act – FTC cannot be granted in India in absence of tax liability in India – There is no provision in the Act for grant of refund in India of foreign tax paid abroad though non-creditable foreign tax can be claimed as business expenditure

FACTS

The assessee is an Indian bank having branches globally1. It earns income from branches outside India and also dividend on shares of its foreign associate companies. It paid taxes on income in accordance with the domestic tax laws of the countries in which it earned income. Further, wherever applicable, it had also availed benefit under the DTAA of the respective country. Computation of global income of the assessee in India had resulted in net loss. In its return of income in India, the bank claimed refund of foreign tax paid abroad. Alternatively, it claimed deduction of foreign tax as business expenditure. Since no income tax was payable by the assessee in India, the A.O. denied the claim for refund of foreign tax2. In the appeal, the CIT(A) upheld the order of the A.O.

Being aggrieved, the assessee appealed before the Tribunal. Generally, Article 24 of a DTAA mentions the mechanism to grant foreign tax credit (‘FTC’). However, the language of Article 24 may vary between different DTAAs. The three variants considered by the Tribunal in the present case were the DTAAs with Namibia, the UK and the US. It also relied on the views expressed by several authors and also the decisions of Courts in foreign jurisdictions and reached similar conclusions in respect of all the three variants.

HELD

Refund in India of tax paid abroad
* Article 24(2) of the India-UK DTAA mentions the following conditions in respect of grant of FTC: (a) FTC should be subject to the domestic law of India; (b) Income in respect of which FTC can be given should have been ‘subjected to tax’ in both the jurisdictions, i.e., the UK and India; (c) Only so much of FTC in respect of doubly-taxed income should be given as is proportionate to income chargeable to tax in India.
* Income earned in the UK could not be subjected to tax in India since the assessee did not have taxable income in India due to loss after aggregation of income at an overall level.
* FTC was available only against Indian tax payable on doubly-taxed income. Since no Indian tax was payable in respect of foreign income, there was no doubly-taxed income. Therefore, no FTC was available to the assessee.
* Referring to several commentaries on international tax, the Tribunal concluded that under none of the DTAAs can the FTC for taxes paid in the source jurisdiction exceed the actual income tax payable in the residence jurisdiction in respect of such doubly-taxed income.
* The Tribunal also did not accept the contention of the assessee that there was double jeopardy because foreign income reduced its losses in India which, otherwise, could have been carried forward and set off against future income, and further, credit for FTC for foreign taxes paid on such income was also not granted against future incomes.
* The Tribunal held that such difficulty referred to as ‘double jeopardy’ (i.e., a taxpayer who but for foreign tax income could have enjoyed higher set-off) had not arisen in the current year though it may arise in subsequent years in which the assessee may enjoy restricted set-off. But such eventualities may also be contingent as losses may not effectively be set off within the permissible limit. Besides, FTC rules make the claim of FTC prescriptive and do not contemplate carry-forward of such tax credit to future years. The Tribunal, however, kept the issue open for adjudication in subsequent years. It distinguished the decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Wipro Ltd.3 on the ground that it was applicable only in a situation where the foreign source income was eligible for profit-linked deduction, but the taxpayer had sufficient taxable income against which it could claim FTC of foreign taxes paid on such income. However, the said decision was not an authority for granting refund of foreign taxes by the Indian exchequer. Even otherwise, since it was a ruling by a non-jurisdictional High Court, it may only have a persuasive effect, unlike the binding effect of a jurisdictional High Court.
* Section 91 grants FTC in respect of ‘doubly-taxed income’ arising in a non-treaty country. However, if there was no tax liability in India on account of loss at an overall level, the condition of ‘doubly-taxed income’ was not satisfied.

Business expense deduction for tax paid abroad
* Relying on the jurisdictional High Court decision in the case of Reliance Infrastructure Limited vs. CIT4, the Tribunal granted tax paid as a deduction by way of business expenditure.

Note: The Tribunal dealt with various principles of interpretation of tax treaty and domestic law. Readers may gainfully refer to the decision for detailed reading.

________________________________________________
1    Assessee had branches in several countries, including countries with which India had entered into DTAAs as well as countries with which India had not entered into a DTAA
2    For the relevant year, Rule 128 (Foreign tax credit rules) inserted with effect from 1st April, 2017 was not applicable

Item (c) of the Explanation to section 115JB – Reduction of provision of doubtful debts written-back from book profit allowed, even when in the year when provision was made and the tax was paid under normal provisions of the Act, while computing book profit, the same was not added to book profit

2. BOB Financial Solutions Ltd. vs. DCIT (Mumbai) Mahavir Singh (V.P.) and Manoj Kumar Aggarwal (A.M.) I.T.A. No. 1207/Mum/2019 A.Y.: 2014-15 Date of order: 15th March, 2021 Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: Kishor C. Dalal / Rahul Raman

Item (c) of the Explanation to section 115JB – Reduction of provision of doubtful debts written-back from book profit allowed, even when in the year when provision was made and the tax was paid under normal provisions of the Act, while computing book profit, the same was not added to book profit

FACTS

While computing book profits u/s 115JB, the assessee reduced ‘provision of card receivables written-back’ amounting to Rs. 19.30 crores. According to the A.O., the provision made for card receivable, in earlier years, was not added back to compute book profits, hence, the same cannot be reduced from book profit in the current year. The assessee explained that in the earlier years the same was disallowed while computing total income under the normal provisions of the Act. In those years, the assessee had business losses and, therefore, as advised by its consultant, the book profit was shown as ‘Nil’ without making any adjustment as required u/s 115JB as it had no impact on his tax liability. However, the A.O. disallowed the said reduction of Rs. 19.30 crores from the book profit. The CIT(A), on appeal, confirmed the A.O.’s order.

HELD

The Tribunal noted that a similar issue had arisen before it in the assessee’s own case in A.Y. 2012-13 (ITA No. 4485 & 4297/Mum/2017 order dated 7th May, 2019) which was decided in favour of the assessee. In the said case also, the assessee had book losses and even after adding back the said write-offs, the resultant figure would have still been a negative figure and the assessee would not have any liability to pay tax u/s 115JB. Following the same, the Tribunal held that the assessee was entitled for deduction of write-back while computing book profit u/s 115JB.

DESTRUCTION BY DISTRACTION

As you hold this issue of the BCAJ in your hands, it’s a new F.Y.! Perhaps the most uncertain and traumatic year of our lives is finally behind us. Each one of us has come out stronger. From teamwork to IT infra to client interface – every facet was challenged and most of us would have inoculated our professional practice with greater resilience and therefore become more immune than we were in March, 2020.
Just as the seasons turn, so will this phase pass. Let’s remember these precious words of Maya Angelou: We need Joy as we need air. We need Love as we need water. We need each other as we need the earth we share. The ‘Formula for LIFE’ is that simple.
However, the environment around us puts immense pressure to keep things complex, and sometimes in the name of making them simple! I have realised that if one were to engage in bare minimum socio-economic activity, one will be swamped by the need for keeping timelines, dealing with emails, passwords and OTPs and so much coordination. I looked at my situation for a middle-class SMP practitioner with a typical family size of five to six.
I have perhaps twenty passwords / MPINs / numbers to remember – from banks / credit cards, DPs, to emails, portals (electricity, municipality, mutual funds [MFs], digital magazines, etc.) to social media. Add to that family members’ passwords, especially for older parents. Take the example of CAS (common account statement) – one email ID can be used for only three CASes. So if you have senior parents, children and an HUF, you will need quite a few email IDs and mobile numbers.
Then there is ‘stalking’ by deadlines. If you paid advance tax, then there is the KYC deadline, then a membership fees renewal timeline. And then a mediclaim is due, and then PT. Earlier, Profession Tax (which is nothing short of a nuisance for an income-tax payer and should rather be taken with income tax) could be paid for five years, but it is now allowed only for one year.
And then when I look at my mobile phone I see an incessant stream of SMSes – we are paying your FD interest on ‘ddmmyy’, we have paid your FD interest, we have issued TDS Certificate on the interest paid to you. I recently bought something and I received eight SMSes before the product arrived, telling me all about the order received, removal from the shelf, about to be shipped, just shipped, soon reaching my city and so on.
Then there are OTPs. Even a courier delivery requires an OTP before it parts with it. And for a festival such as Holi I receive a message (SMS and email) from M&M, HDFC to Zandu – whether I had dealt with them for FD or Chyavanprash – they want to wish me for Holi and help me to remember them. (That’s about 10 to 20 vendors x 8 festivals / holidays). While India has reached the Moon and Mars, its DND still doesn’t work!
While many wish to just remind you, there are others who convey that you have missed a timeline. Mumbai PUC sent an SMS minutes before the expiry of the PUC to share the bad news that I will wake up to a day of violating PUC norms.
I guess we are today a sum total of numbers, passwords, OTPs, and timelines to keep. Without them, we are dysfunctional, non-entity, yet they make so much clutter and crowd our time and psyche. One can easily lose something big if one didn’t have a way to deal with them: reading-dealing-deleting, it could be simply overwhelming. Interruptions and distraction today are a form of destruction. Beware, for they are detrimental to deep work.
Wishing you a happy 2021-22!

 

Raman Jokhakar
Editor

MENTAL CANDY VS. MENTAL PROTEIN – A LESSON FROM BRIAN TRACY

What you feed your body decides how healthy it becomes.
What you feed your mind decides how you think and act.

Every time I listen to Brian Tracy, I only learn, I grow. I became a new person.
Don’t feed your brain with mental candy; instead, provide it with mental protein.

THE ELEPHANT ROPE
There is a story about a man who, as he passed some elephants, suddenly stopped, confused, because these enormous creatures were being held by only a small rope tied to their front legs. No chains, no cages. The elephants could break away from their bonds, but they did not.

He saw their trainer nearby and asked why these animals just stood there and did not get away. ‘Well,’ the trainer said, ‘when they are very young and much smaller, we use the same size rope to tie them, and at that age it’s enough to hold them. As they grow up, it conditions them to believe they cannot break away. They believe the rope can still hold them, so they never try to break free.’

It amazed the man. These animals could break free from their bonds, but because they believed they couldn’t, they were stuck right where they were!

How do you know that there is a ‘rope’ and it ties you?
•    When you consider that time is not enough.
•  If you consider all others except yourself as the reason for your problems.
•    If you see negativity around you.
•    If you are short of creativity.
•    If you are not investing in learning.

How to identify these ‘ropes’?
• Write down your current belief systems. Don’t judge. ‘What is that one belief which you think is holding you back from becoming the best version of yourself?’
•    Take feedback.
•    Listen. Don’t respond.
•    Read. Books are an excellent brain-opener.
•    Meditate. Spend time with yourself.

What are these ‘ropes’?
•    Fear of failure.
•    Self-doubt.
•    Prioritising money over time.
•    Allowing others to grip your attention.
•    An ‘I know all’ attitude.

How to break the ‘rope’?

That’s where advice – mental protein vs. mental candy – helps.

Once you feed the suitable protein to your mind, your mind grows and it extends in the right direction.

Mental candy – social media feeds, television, binge-watching, binge-eating, binge-shopping, constantly checking emails, flashy news.

Mental protein – books, e-books, audiobooks, online courses, meditation, physical exercise, adequate sleep, healthy food.

So what’s the sustainable way to feed your mind with mental protein?

Small and consistent efforts.
When I say small, I mean tiny efforts – just 1%.

Suppose you wish to start a reading habit. Target just five pages each day.

Suppose you wish to lose weight. Do short walks, five push-ups each day. Bring continuity. Then leap.
Suppose you wish to take an alternative career path. Start a side hustle instead. Test the waters.

How to end the urge for mental candies?
Once you make the transition from mental candies to mental protein, your brain cells will change. There will be realignment.

Small and consistent efforts will start showing results in a few days. If you make mistakes during this time, don’t be afraid; it’s better to be scared of ‘not’ making mistakes.

Don’t let your mind enter a shell with ‘big’ and ‘daunting’ changes. Such changes give you a ‘kick’ and ‘excitement’ on Day 1, but then the excitement dies its natural death the next day.

It’s not only essential to feed the physical body the suitable protein, but it’s also critical to provide the mind with adequate protein.

BLAST FROM THE PAST

Here is a rare nugget from the archives of veteran Uday Chitale. This photograph was clicked in 1951-52 (about 70 years ago when the BCAS was just three years old!). The occasion was the visit of Mr. J.S. Seidman, the then President of the American Institute of CPAs, when he visited and interacted with members of the BCAS. He is seated third from left, holding a bouquet of flowers.

Those seated in the front row are, from left, N.M. Shah, R.B. Sheth, G.M. Kapadia, C.N. Sanghavi, R.P. Dalal and M.L. Bhatt.

Standing (from left to right), H.S. Banaji, D.L. Bhatt, R.S. Phadke, M.P. Chitale, D.P. Vora, M.H. Contractor, B.D. Jokhakar, S.N. Desai, S.V. Ghatalia, E.C. Pavri, A.S. Thakkar and A.H. Dalal.

IMPACT OF WAIVER OF LOAN ON DEPRECIATION CLAIM

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
When a loan taken for acquiring a depreciable capital asset or a part of the purchase price of such capital asset is waived in a year subsequent to the year of acquisition, an issue that arises with respect to waiver of loan or part of the purchase price is whether the depreciation claimed in the past on that portion of the cost of the asset which represents the waiver of the purchase price, or which had been met from the loan waived, can be added / disallowed u/s 41(1) / 43(6) in the year in which that amount of the loan / purchase price has been waived, and whether the written down value (WDV) of the block of the assets concerned needs to be reworked so as to reduce it by the amount of loan / purchase price waived. The Hyderabad Bench of the Tribunal has held that while section 41(1) would not apply, the depreciation claimed in the past needs to be added as income and the WDV is also required to be reworked in such a case. As against this, the Bengaluru Bench of the Tribunal has held that waiver of loan taken to acquire a depreciable asset does not have any consequences in the year in which the loan has been waived off, insofar as claim of depreciation is concerned.

BINJRAJKA STEEL TUBES LTD.’s CASE

The issue had earlier come up for consideration of the Hyderabad Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Binjrajka Steel Tubes Ltd. vs. ACIT 130 ITD 46.

In this case, the assessee had purchased certain machinery from M/s Tata SSL Ltd. for a total consideration of Rs. 6 crores. Since the machinery supplied was found to be defective, the matter was taken up with the supplier for replacement and after protracted correspondence and a legal battle, the supplier agreed to an out-of-court settlement. As per this settlement, the liability of the assessee which was payable to the supplier to the extent of Rs. 2 crores was waived.

During the previous year relevant to assessment year 2005-06, the assessee gave effect to this settlement in its books of accounts by reducing the cost of machinery by Rs. 2 crores. Consequently, the depreciation for the year had also been adjusted, including withdrawal of excess charged depreciation of earlier years amounting to Rs. 1,19,01,058. While making the assessment, the A.O. added back the amount of Rs. 2 crores as income of the assessee u/s 41(1), and this was confirmed by the CIT(A).

Before the Tribunal, the assessee submitted that the remission of liability of Rs. 2 crores which was written back was not taxable u/s 41(1) because cessation of liability was towards a capital cost of asset and, hence, it was a capital receipt. On the other hand, the Department argued that the assessee had claimed the depreciation on Rs. 6 crores from the year of acquisition of the asset. From the date of inception of the asset, depreciation was allowed by the Department on the block of assets, and when the assessee received any amount as benefit by way of reduction of cost of acquisition, the amount of benefit had to be offered for taxation as per the provisions of section 41(1).

The Tribunal referred to the provisions of section 41(1) and held that it could be invoked only where any allowance or deduction had been made in the assessment for any year in respect of loss, expenditure or trading liability incurred by the assessee, and subsequently, during any previous year, the assessee had obtained any amount or some benefit with respect to such loss, expenditure or trading liability. The benefit of depreciation obtained by the assessee in the earlier years could not be termed as an allowance or expenditure claimed by the assessee in the earlier years. Hence, any recoupment received by the assessee on this count could not be taxed u/s 41(1). Accordingly, the Tribunal rejected the Revenue’s contention that the assessee had obtained the benefit of depreciation in the earlier years as allowance in respect of expenditure incurred by it when it bought the plant and machinery and the Rs. 2 crores liability waived by the supplier of the machinery in the year under consideration was liable to be taxed as deemed income within the purview of section 41(1).

Though the issue raised before the Tribunal was only with regard to the taxability of the amount waived u/s 41(1), it further dealt with the issue of adding back of depreciation which was already claimed on the said amount. For the purpose of dealing with the said issue of disallowance of depreciation which was not raised before it, the Tribunal placed reliance on the decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Steel Containers Ltd. vs. CIT [1978] 112 ITR 995, wherein it was held that when the Tribunal finds that disallowance of a particular expenditure by the authorities below is not proper, it is competent to sustain the whole or part of the disputed disallowance under a different section under which it is properly so disallowable.

On the merits of the issue of disallowance of depreciation, the Tribunal held that depreciation already allowed in past years on the amount which was waived by the supplier under the settlement with the assessee had to be withdrawn and added back in the year under consideration, as otherwise, the assessee would get double benefit which was not justified. Accordingly, the A.O. was directed to add the amount of depreciation claimed in past years on the amount of Rs. 2 crores as income u/s 28(iv) as the value of benefit arising from the business. After reducing the said amount of depreciation granted earlier from the amount of Rs. 2 crores, the Tribunal further directed that the balance amount was to be reduced from the closing WDV of the block of assets, without giving any reasoning or relying on any relevant provision of the Act.

AKZO NOBEL COATINGS INDIA (P) LTD.’s CASE
The issue, thereafter, came up for consideration before the Bengaluru Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Akzo Nobel Coatings India (P) Ltd. vs. DCIT (2017) 139 ITD 612.

In this case, the assessee acquired plant and machinery for its Hoskote plant in April, 1996. Since the assessee could not obtain approval from the RBI for making payment to the supplier, ultimately CEL, UK, one of the group companies, made the payment for the machinery to the suppliers. Thus, the funds for supply of machinery which were originally payable by the assessee to the suppliers became payable by the assessee to CEL, UK. Later, CEL, UK was taken over by Akzo International BV. As a part of the business restructuring and because of the absence of RBI approval for making remittances of monies due for supply of machinery, and taking note of the business exigency, Akzo International BV decided to waive the money payable in respect of supply of machineries to the assessee. Thus, the assessee was the beneficiary of the waiver of loan to the extent of Rs. 13,48,09,000.

This waiver of the loan took place in April, 2000. The benefit as a result of the waiver was shown in the books of accounts of the assessee in the balance sheet as a capital receipt not chargeable to tax. The assessee had claimed depreciation on those machineries from the A.Y. 1997-98 onwards. The fact of waiver of the amount payable by the assessee came to the knowledge of the A.O. in the course of assessment proceedings for the A.Y. 2004-05. Thereafter, action was initiated u/s 148 to reduce the WDV of the relevant block of assets and withdraw the depreciation already granted to the assessee in the past.

According to the A.O., on the waiver of loan by the parent company, the WDV of the plant and machinery had to be reworked by reducing from the opening WDV, the amount of loan which had been waived by the parent company, viz., a sum of Rs. 13,48,09,000. The A.O., accordingly, worked out the depreciation allowable on plant and machinery by reducing the WDV on which depreciation had to be allowed for A.Y. 2001-02. A similar exercise of reworking the amount of the WDV and resultant depreciation thereon was made for the subsequent years as well.

On appeal by the assessee, the CIT(A) took the view that the entire waiver of the loan cannot be reduced from the WDV of the block of assets. He held that the whole of the original cost cannot be reduced from the opening WDV as on 1st April, 2001. This was on the basis that the provisions of section 43(6) did not envisage reduction of cost of assets in the guise of disallowance of depreciation. He, accordingly, directed the A.O. to reduce only the WDV of the assets concerned, i.e., Rs. 4,73,32,812, and not the whole of the original cost. The assessee as well as the Revenue filed appeals before the Tribunal against the order of the CIT(A) giving partial relief.

Before the Tribunal, the assessee contended that only those adjustments which have been provided u/s 43(6)(c) could be made to the WDV of the block of assets. Since no assets were sold, discarded, demolished or destroyed, the amount of loan waived by the supplier of machinery could not be reduced. The assessee relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. [1998] 231 ITR 285, wherein the Supreme Court held that the manner of repayment of loan availed by an assessee for the purchase of an asset on which depreciation is claimed cannot have any impact on allowing depreciation on such assets. It was also submitted that Explanation 10 to section 43(1) would not apply to the present case, because the amount waived by the parent company cannot be said to be the cost of the asset met directly or indirectly by any authority in the form of ‘subsidy or grant or reimbursement’. On the other hand, Revenue pleaded to restore the order of the A.O.

The Tribunal held that the only way by which the WDV on which depreciation is to be allowed as per the provisions of section 32(1)(ii) can be altered is as per the situation referred to in section 43(6)(c)(i), A and B, i.e., increased by the actual cost of any asset falling within that block, acquired during the previous year and reduced by the monies payable in respect of any asset falling within that block, which is sold or discarded or demolished or destroyed during that previous year together with the amount of the scrap value, if any. In the present case, neither was there purchase of the relevant assets during the previous year, nor was there sale, discarding or demolition or destruction of those assets during the previous year. The relevant assets continued to be owned and used by the assessee. Therefore, these provisions could not have been resorted to for the purpose of making adjustments to the WDV of the block as made by the A.O.

Examining the applicability of the provisions of Explanation 10 to section 43(1), which provide for reduction of cost under certain circumstances, the Tribunal held that they would apply only when there was a subsidy or grant or reimbursement. In the present case, there was no subsidy or grant or reimbursement. There was only a waiver of the amounts due for purchase of machinery, which did not fall within the scope of any of the aforesaid expressions used in Explanation 10. Even otherwise, section 43(1) was applicable only in the year of purchase of machinery and in the case before the Tribunal, the purchase of the machinery in question was not in A.Y. 2001-02. Therefore, the actual cost which had already been recognised in the books in the A.Y. prior to A.Y. 2001-02 could not be disturbed in A.Y. 2001-02.

The Tribunal pointed out that there was a lacuna in the law as the assessee on the one hand got the waiver of monies payable on purchase of machinery and claimed such receipt as not taxable because it was a capital receipt. On the other hand, the assessee claimed depreciation on the value of the machinery for which it did not incur any cost. Thus, the assessee was benefited both ways.

As per the law as it prevailed as on date, the Revenue was without any remedy. The only way that the Revenue could remedy the situation was that it had to reopen the assessment for the year in which the asset was acquired and fall back on the provisions of section 43(1), which provided that actual cost means the actual cost of the assets to the assessee. Even this could be done only after the waiver of the loan which was used to acquire machinery. By that time if the assessments for that A.Y. got barred by time, the Revenue was without any remedy. Even the provisions of section 155 did not provide for any remedy to the Revenue in this regard.

The Tribunal also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. (Supra) wherein a view had been taken that repayment of loan borrowed by an assessee for the purpose of acquiring an asset had no relevance to the cost of assets on which depreciation has to be allowed.

OBSERVATIONS


There is a distinction in the facts between the two decisions – in Binjrajka Steel Tubes case (Supra), the waiver was a part of the purchase price itself by the seller of the machinery, while in the Akzo Nobel Coatings case, it was a waiver of the loan extended by a group company. The issue really is whether the cost of the asset can undergo a change in a subsequent year, due to waiver of a part of the purchase price, or a loan taken to acquire the asset, whether such waiver is to be ignored or given effect to, and when and how the effect is to be given for such change in the cost of the asset.

The claim of depreciation is governed by the provisions of section 32. It allows a deduction of an amount to be calculated at prescribed percentage on the WDV of the block of assets. Section 43(6)(c) defines the expression ‘written down value’ with respect to a block of assets and it reads as under:

(6) ‘written down value’ means –
(c) in the case of any block of assets, –
(i) in respect of any previous year relevant to the assessment year commencing on the 1st day of April, 1988, the aggregate of the written down values of all the assets falling within that block of assets at the beginning of the previous year and adjusted, –
(A) by the increase by the actual cost of any asset falling within that block, acquired during the previous year;
(B) by the reduction of the moneys payable in respect of any asset falling within that block, which is sold or discarded or demolished or destroyed during that previous year together with the amount of the scrap value, if any, so, however, that the amount of such reduction does not exceed the written down value as so increased; and…………………..

The WDV of the block of assets is required to be determined only in the manner as provided in section 43(6)(c). Nothing can be added to it and nothing can be reduced from it which has not been provided for in the aforesaid provision. The aforesaid provision leaves no scope for any reduction in the WDV of any block of assets for any reasons other than the sale, discarding, demolition or destruction of the assets falling within that block.

Thus, once the actual cost of any asset has been added to the WDV of the block of assets, no further adjustments have been provided for in the Act to reduce the amount of that actual cost in any later year on the ground that the loan taken to pay that cost or a part of the purchase price has been waived off. In the absence of any such provision under the Act allowing reduction of the WDV of the block of assets on account of waiver of loan taken or part of purchase price for acquiring the assets forming part of that block of assets, no adjustment could have been made for giving effect to the benefits derived by the assessee on account of such a waiver by revising the amount of WDV.

This leads us to the issue whether on account of waiver of the loan from which that asset was acquired it can be said that the ‘actual cost’ of the asset which was added to the WDV of the block of assets has now undergone a change and, therefore, the adjustment is required to be made to give effect to the revised amount of the ‘actual cost’. In this regard, attention is drawn to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. (Supra); the relevant extract from it is reproduced below:

Coming to the question raised, we find it difficult to follow how the manner of repayment of loan can affect the cost of the assets acquired by the assessee. What is the actual cost must depend on the amount paid by the assessee to acquire the asset. The amount may have been borrowed by the assessee, but even if the assessee did not repay the loan, it will not alter the cost of the asset. If the borrower defaults in repayment of a part of the loan, the cost of the asset will not change. What has to be borne in mind is that the cost of an asset and the cost of raising money for purchase of the asset are two different and independent transactions. Even if an asset is purchased with non-repayable subsidy received from the Government, the cost of the asset will be the price paid by the assessee for acquiring the asset. In the instant case, the allegation is that at the time of repayment of loan, there was a fluctuation in the rate of foreign exchange as a result of which the assessee had to repay a much lesser amount than he would have otherwise paid. In our judgment, this is not a factor which can alter the cost incurred by the assessee for purchase of the asset. The assessee may have raised the funds to purchase the asset by borrowing but what the assessee has paid for it is the price of the asset. That price cannot change by any event subsequent to the acquisition of the asset. In our judgment, the manner or mode of repayment of the loan has nothing to do with the cost of an asset acquired by the assessee for the purpose of his business.

Relying on the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, the Kerala High Court in the case of Cochin Co. (P) Ltd. 184 ITR 230 (Supra) while dealing with the same issue of adjustment to the actual cost consequent to waiver of loan, held as under:

The Tribunal has categorically found that Atlanta Corpn. is only a financier and when Atlanta Corpn. wrote off the liability of the assessee, it cannot be said in retrospect that the cost of the assessee to any part of the machinery purchased in 1968 was met by Atlanta Corpn. The Tribunal held that the remission of liability by Atlanta Corpn. long after the liability was incurred, cannot be relied on to hold that Atlanta Corpn. met directly or indirectly part of the cost of the machinery of the assessee purchased as early as 1968. As per section 43(7), if the cost of the asset is met directly or indirectly, at the time of purchase of the machinery, by any other person or authority, to that extent the actual cost of the asset to the assessee will stand reduced. But it is a far cry to state that though at the time of purchase of the machinery, no person met the cost either directly or indirectly, if, long thereafter a debt incurred in that connection is written off, it could be equated to a position that the financier met part of the cost of the asset to the assessee. We are unable to accept the plea that the remission of liability by Atlanta Corpn. can, in any way, be said to be one where the Corpn. met directly or indirectly the cost of the asset to the assessee.

Thus, the ‘actual cost’ of the asset does not undergo any change due to waiver of the loan obtained to acquire that asset. Explanation 10 to section 43(1) has limited applicability when the subsidy, grant or reimbursement is involved. The waiver of loan in no way can be equated with the subsidy, grant or reimbursement.

The next issue then is whether change in cost on account of price difference has any effect. The Supreme Court, in the case of CIT vs. Arvind Mills Ltd. 193 ITR 255, held as under:

‘On strict accountancy principles, the increase or decrease in liability towards the actual cost of an asset arising from exchange fluctuation can be adjusted in the accounts of the earlier year in which the asset was acquired (if necessary, by reopening the said accounts). In that event, the accounts of that earlier year as well as subsequent years will have to be modified to give effect to variations in depreciation allowances consequent on the re-determination of the actual cost. However, though this is a course which is theoretically advisable or precise, its adoption may create a lot of practical difficulties. That is why the Institute of Chartered Accountants gave an option to business people to make a mention of the effect of devaluation by way of a note on the accounts for the earlier year in case the balance sheet in respect thereof has not yet been finalised but actually to give effect to the necessary adjustments in the subsequent years instead of reopening the closed accounts of the earlier year.

So far as depreciation allowance is concerned, under section 32, read with section 43(1) and (6) of the Act, the depreciation is to be allowed on the actual cost of the asset less all depreciation actually allowed in respect thereof in earlier year. Thus, where the cost of the asset subsequently goes up because of devaluation, whatever might have been the position in the earlier year, it is always open to the assessee to insist and for the ITO to agree that the written down value in the year in which the increased liability has arisen should be taken on the basis of the increased cost minus depreciation earlier allowed on the basis of the old cost. The written down value and allowances for subsequent years will be calculated on this footing. In other words, though the depreciation granted earlier will not be disturbed, the assessee will be able to get a higher amount of depreciation in subsequent years on the basis of the revised cost and there will be no problem.
,,,,,,,,,,,,,
To obviate all these doubts and difficulties, section 43A was enacted.
…………………….
We also find it difficult to find substance in the second argument of Shri Salve that sub-section (1) was inserted only to define the year in which the increase or decrease in liability has to be adjusted. It is no doubt true that but for the new section, various kinds of arguments could have been raised regarding the year in which such liability should be adjusted. But, we think, arguments could also have been raised as to whether the actual cost calls for any adjustment at all in such a situation. It could have been contended that the actual cost can only be the original purchase price in the year of acquisition of the asset and that, even if there is any subsequent increase in the liability, it cannot be added to the actual cost at any stage and that, for the purposes of all the statutory allowances, the amount of actual cost once determined would be final and conclusive. Also, section 43A provides for a case in which, as in the present case, the assessee has completely paid for the plant or machinery in foreign currency prior to the date of devaluation but the variation of exchange rate affects the liability of the assessee (as expressed in Indian currency) for repayment of the whole or part of the monies borrowed by him from any person directly or indirectly in any foreign currency specifically for the purposes of acquiring the asset. It is a moot question as to whether in such a case, on general principles, the actual cost of the assessee’s plant or machinery will be the revised liability or the original liability. This is also a situation which is specifically provided for in the section. It may not, therefore, be correct to base arguments on an assumption that the figure of actual cost has necessarily to be modified for purposes of development rebate or depreciation or other allowances and that the only controversy that can arise will be as to the year in which such adjustment has to be made. In our opinion, we need not discuss or express any concluded opinion on either of these issues.’

The Supreme Court has therefore pointed out the situation in the absence of section 43A, which provision applies only to foreign exchange fluctuations. The identical logic would apply to other changes in cost, if such difference in cost is on account of difference in purchase price. In the absence of any specific provision similar to section 43A, any adjustment in cost would not be possible.

Further, the logic applied by the Tribunal in Binjrajka’s case to the effect that write-back of depreciation is a benefit derived by the assessee on waiver of the purchase price, and is therefore taxable u/s 28(iv), does not seem to be justified. A depreciation is only an allowance, and not an expenditure. It is merely an internal book entry to reflect diminution in value of the asset. By writing back depreciation, the assessee cannot be said to have derived any benefit. Further, as held by the Supreme Court in CIT vs. Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. 404 ITR 1, the benefit taxable u/s 28(iv) has to be a non-monetary benefit and a monetary benefit is not covered by section 28(iv). Therefore, the waiver of cost to the extent of excess depreciation allowed cannot be said to result in a perquisite chargeable to tax u/s 28(iv).

It is very clear that the provisions of section 41(1) would not apply in such a situation of waiver of loan or part of purchase price, as has also been accepted by the Tribunal in both the decisions. The provisions of section 28(iv) would also not apply. There is no other provision by which such waiver of a sum of a capital nature can be subjected to tax. The depreciation allowed in the past on the cost is not an expenditure or trading liability, which has been remitted or has ceased. It is the loan amount or the purchase price of the asset which has been remitted or which has ceased. Depreciation cannot be regarded to be a deduction claimed of such purchase price, being a statutory allowance. Therefore, as rightly pointed out by the Bangalore Bench of the Tribunal, there is a lacuna in law, whereby such waiver is not required to be reduced from the cost of acquisition of the asset or from the written down value, nor is there a requirement for addition by way of reversal of depreciation claimed on such waived amount. The only recourse is to the provisions of section 155, within the specified time limit.

The better view of the matter, therefore, seems to be the view taken by the Bengaluru Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Akzo Nobel Coatings India (P) Ltd. (Supra) that neither the depreciation claimed in the past year can be disallowed nor the written down value for the current year can be adjusted in a case where the loan taken to acquire or a part of the purchase price of the depreciable asset has been waived.

Company – Book profits – Computation – Amount disallowed u/s 14A cannot be included

31 Sobha Developers Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT(LTU) [2021] 434 ITR 266 (Karn) A.Y.: 2008-09; Date of order: 1st April, 2021 Ss. 14A and 115JB of ITA, 1961

Company – Book profits – Computation – Amount disallowed u/s 14A cannot be included

This appeal u/s 260A was preferred by the assessee and was admitted by the Karnataka High Court on the following substantial question of law:

‘Whether the Tribunal is justified in law in holding that the indirect expenditure disallowed u/s 14A read with rule 8D(iii) of Rs. 24,64,632 in computing the total income under normal provisions of the Act is to be added to the net profit in computation of book profit for Minimum Alternate Tax purposes u/s 115JB and thereby importing the provisions of section 14A read with rule 8D into the Minimum Alternate Tax provisions on the facts and circumstances of the case?’

The High Court held as under:

‘Sub-section (1) of section 115JB provides the mode of computation of the total income of an assessee-company and tax payable on the assessee u/s 115JB. Sub-section (5) of section 115JB provides that save as otherwise provided in this section, all other provisions of this Act shall apply to every assessee being a company mentioned in this section. The disallowance u/s 14A is a notional disallowance and therefore, by recourse to section 14A, the amount cannot be added back to the book profits under clause (f) of Explanation 1 to section 115JB.’

Section 28(i) – Disallowance of loss made merely on ad interim order of SEBI and in absence of any material to prove that assessee entered into dubious transactions deliberately to show business loss, was liable to be deleted

29 Kundan Rice Mills Ltd. vs. Asst. CIT [2020] 83 ITR(T) 466 (Del-Trib) IT(TP) Appeal No. 853 (Del) of 2020 A.Y.: 2015-16; Date of order: 9th July, 2020

Section 28(i) – Disallowance of loss made merely on ad interim order of SEBI and in absence of any material to prove that assessee entered into dubious transactions deliberately to show business loss, was liable to be deleted

FACTS
The assessee company was engaged inter alia in trading in shares, futures and options. During the year under consideration, it claimed loss on account of trading in stock options. The A.O. found that SEBI had passed an ex parte interim order in the matter of illiquid stock options wherein the name of the assessee company also figured in the list of entities which had entered into non-genuine, fraudulent trades to generate fictitious profits / losses for the purpose of tax evasion / facilitating tax evasion.

However, the assessee explained before the A.O. that (i) it had acted as a bona fide trader as it had been doing in the past and complied with all procedures and requirements of the stock exchange, (ii) at the time of the relevant transactions / trades, the assessee could not have had any idea about any profit or loss in the said transactions, and (iii) the assessee was not connected with the counter-parties in the trade and there was no grievance of any of the investors or BSE. It also claimed that only 4.85% sale transactions allegedly matched with entities named by SEBI. The A.O., however, rejected this submission of the assessee and disallowed loss in trading from stock options. The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the addition made by the A.O. on the basis that since detailed investigation was carried out by SEBI, no separate investigation was required to be done by the A.O. to disallow the bogus losses.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before the ITAT.

HELD
The disallowance of loss made by the A.O. was deleted by the ITAT. In doing so, it observed that:

1. Trading in stock futures and options was done by the assessee regularly since past several years. The transactions were recorded in the books of accounts. The intrinsic value mentioned in the SEBI order was only one of the ways of calculating and there is no set formula / law / rule / circular which defines intrinsic value or prohibits trading below intrinsic value.
2. The A.O., in the assessment order, had observed that in screen-based electronic trading, ideally, it was not possible to choose the counter party for trade. The circuit breaker limits set by SEBI were not applicable to the Futures and Options (F&O) segment.
3. SEBI subsequently directed that there was no need to continue with the directions issued against the assessee company and others (these were the same orders relied upon by the Income-tax authorities). Thus, in principle, the interim order and subsequent orders of the SEBI which were the basis of passing the assessment order in question, were vacated by SEBI itself.
4. The assessee filed complete documentary evidence before the authorities like carrying out transactions through banking channels, fulfilling margin requirements mandated by SEBI, etc. The same were supported by contract notes. There was also no allegation made by BSE against any of the transactions carried out by the assessee company. The A.O. as well
as the Commissioner (Appeals) did not conduct any investigation on the documentary evidences filed by the assessee.
5. Loss on account of similar nature of transactions was incurred in the preceding year, which was not disallowed and hence, the A.O. ought to have followed the principle of consistency.
6. The ad interim order of SEBI was passed without hearing the objections of the assessee and when
those objections were considered, the interim order was diluted by giving permission to the assessee to deal
in the transactions. Since both the orders of SEBI relied upon by the A.O. were vacated by the SEBI, there was no material available with the authorities below so as to conclude that the assessee has entered into any dubious or other transactions deliberately to show business losses.
7. The ad interim order which was passed by SEBI ex parte would not disclose any precedent or ratio which may be binding on the Income-tax Department.

Based on the above observations, the disallowance was finally deleted.

ITAT allows claim of interest – Sets aside CIT(A)’s order arbitrarily restricting interest rate at 12% p.a. – Treats expenditure as allowable u/s 36(1)(iii)

28 Shri Bhavarlal Mangilal Jain [2021] TS-420-ITAT-2021 (Mum)b A.Y.: 2012-13; Date of order: 4th May, 2021 Section 36(1)(iii)

ITAT allows claim of interest – Sets aside CIT(A)’s order arbitrarily restricting interest rate at 12% p.a. – Treats expenditure as allowable u/s 36(1)(iii)

FACTS
The assessee, an individual, had wrongly claimed certain interest expenditure under ‘income from other sources’ which was disallowed by the A.O. during assessment. At the appellate proceedings with the CIT(A), the assessee raised an additional ground that such interest be allowed under the head ‘Profits & Gains of Business / Profession’. The CIT(A) allowed the interest expenditure, but restricted the rate of interest to 12% p.a. The interest paid in excess of 12% was disallowed on the grounds that the rate of interest is higher (the assessee had paid interest ranging from 5% to 24%) than the interest received on Partnership Capital Account. The CIT(A), thus made a disallowance of interest in excess of 12% p.a.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal with the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal observed that the Department had accepted the genuineness of the loan transactions and also the same being for business purposes. Once the expenditure has been accepted to be business expenditure, the interest rate cannot be arbitrarily restricted. In order to disallow interest beyond a certain rate, it has to be shown that such interest was excessive or for extraneous consideration. Based on facts, the Tribunal noted that some of the parties to whom interest was paid at a rate of more than 12% included banks, non-banking financial institutions and some private lenders, and none of these parties was related to the assessee within the provisions of section 40A. Thus, the assessee’s appeal was allowed.

ITAT allows assessee to claim the property cohabited by her as ‘let-out’ – Allows eligible deductions u/s 24 in computation of income under ‘house property’

27 Hima Bindu Putta [2021] TS-428-ITAT-2021 (Hyd) A.Y.: 2009-10; Date of order: 3rd May, 2021 Section 23

ITAT allows assessee to claim the property cohabited by her as ‘let-out’ – Allows eligible deductions u/s 24 in computation of income under ‘house property’

FACTS

The assessee, an individual, filed her return of income declaring loss under the head ‘house property’. She was in ownership of a property which was let-out by her to a company in which her husband was a director-employee. The company in turn provided this property by way of accommodation to her husband, Mr. A, with whom she resided in the property. The assessee treated this property as a let-out property and offered the rental income in her computation. The A.O. treated 50% of the property as let-out and the balance 50% as self-occupied, as the assessee was also residing in the property. Accordingly, he restricted deductions u/s 24 to 50% of the allowable amounts. The CIT(A) dismissed the assessee’s appeal.

Aggrieved, the assessee is in appeal before the Tribunal.

HELD


The Tribunal, relying on the material available on record, found that there was no dispute that the assessee was the owner of the property and she had purchased it with borrowed capital. Further, the property had been let-out to the company and she had offered the rental income in her computation for the relevant assessment year. ‘The assessee is the wife of Mr. A, who was given the property as residential accommodation by the company, and therefore it cannot he held that the assessee herself is occupying the property.’

The Tribunal ruled in favour of the assessee, stating that such income has to be treated as income from ‘house property’ and all eligible deductions including interest on borrowed capital was to be allowed in computing such income.

The assessee’s appeal was thus allowed.

Right to collect toll is an intangible asset which qualifies for depreciation @ 25%

26 BSC C&C Krunali Toll Road Ltd. vs. DCIT TS-381-ITAT-2021 (Del) A.Ys.: 2012-13 & 2013-14; Date of order: 18th May, 2021 Section: 32

Right to collect toll is an intangible asset which qualifies for depreciation @ 25%

FACTS

The assessee company developed a toll road on the Kurla-Kiratpur section in Punjab on BOOT basis. The contract was awarded by the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI). The entire cost of construction was Rs. 441,27,05,614, including a grant of Rs. 43.92 crores from the NHAI. The assessee, in its return of income, claimed depreciation thereon @ 25%. While assessing its total income u/s 143(3), the A.O., following the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in CIT vs. Noida Toll Bridge Co. Ltd. 213 Taxman 333, restricted depreciation on the toll road to 10%.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the A.O.

The assessee then preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it contended that the lower authorities erred in holding that it was the owner of the road. Actually, the assessee had only been given the right to collect toll fee from vehicles entering the road which right could not be equated with ownership. On behalf of the assessee, reliance was placed on the following decisions:

(a) North Karnataka Expressway Ltd. vs. CIT [Appeal No. 499 of 2012]; (b) West Gujarat Expressway Ltd. [ITA Nos. 5904 & 6204/M/2012; order dated 15th April, 2015]; (c) Progressive Construction Ltd. [ITA No. 214/Hyd/2014; order dated 7th November, 2014]; (d) Kalyan Toll Infrastructure Ltd. vs. ACIT [ITA Nos. 201 & 247/Ind/2008; order dated 14th December, 2010]; and (e) Mokama Munger Highway Ltd. vs. ACIT [ITA Nos. 1729, 2145 & 2146/Hyd/2018; order dated
3rd July, 2019].

HELD


The Tribunal noted that there were conflicting decisions rendered by the High Court and the Special Bench of the Tribunal. The Bench then noted the ratio of the decisions of the Tribunal in the case of ACIT vs. West Gujarat Expressway Ltd. (Supra) and also of the Special Bench decision of the Tribunal in ACIT vs. Progressive Construction Ltd. Following the ratio of the decision of the Bombay High Court and also the Special Bench decision, the Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to claim depreciation @ 25%.

Gain received by assessee owing to fluctuation in foreign exchange rates in respect of loan which was given, as also received back in US dollars, by assessee to his cousin in Singapore under Liberalised Remittance Scheme issued by Reserve Bank of India, is a capital receipt not chargeable to tax

25 Aditya Balkrishna Shroff vs. ITO [2021] 127 taxmann.com 343 (Mum-Trib) A.Y.: 2013-14; Date of order: 17th May, 2021 Sections: 2(24), 4, 56

Gain received by assessee owing to fluctuation in foreign exchange rates in respect of loan which was given, as also received back in US dollars, by assessee to his cousin in Singapore under Liberalised Remittance Scheme issued by Reserve Bank of India, is a capital receipt not chargeable to tax

FACTS
In the course of assessment proceedings, the A.O. noticed that as per AIR Information and as per capital account filed by the assessee, he was in receipt of Rs. 1,12,35,326. Upon seeking an explanation, the assessee informed that on 29th March, 2010, he had granted an interest-free loan of US $2,00,000 to his cousin in Singapore. The remittance was made under the Liberalised Remittance Scheme of the RBI. The rate of exchange prevailing on that date was Rs. 45.14. On 24th May, 2012 the assessee received back the said loan of US $2,00,000. The exchange rate on the date of receiving back the loan was Rs. 56.18. Accordingly, the capital account of the assessee was credited with a sum of Rs. 1,12,35,326.

The A.O. was of the view that the difference in amount of Rs. 22,04,568 was of the nature of income. The assessee explained that the loan was given on a personal account to his cousin and was not a business transaction and there was no motive of any economic gain in the transaction. It was done in terms of the Liberalised Remittance Scheme of the RBI inasmuch as it was a permitted transaction and specifically on capital account. It was further explained that the transaction was capital in nature, therefore ‘the gain is in the nature of capital receipt and hence not offered for taxation’.

But these submissions did not impress the A.O. who held that ‘the gain on realisation of loan would partake the character of income under the head “income from other sources”’. Accordingly, he added a sum of Rs. 1,12,35,326 to the total income of the assessee as ‘income from other sources’.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the A.O. The assessee then preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD


The Tribunal held that when a receipt is in the capital field, even if that be a gain, it is in the nature of a capital gain, but then as the definition of income stands u/s 2(24)(vi), only such capital gains can be brought to tax as are permissible to be taxed u/s 45. In other words, a capital gain which is not taxable under the specific provisions of section 45 or which is not specifically included in the definition of income by way of a specific deeming fiction, is outside the ambit of taxable income. All ‘gains’ are not covered by the scope of ‘income’. Take, for example, capital gains. It is not even the case of the authorities below that the capital gains in question are taxable u/s 45. Thus, the reasoning adopted by the A.O. was incorrect.

The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A)’s line of reasoning was no better. While he accepts that the transaction in question was in the capital field, he proceeds to hold that ‘income’ arising out of the loan transaction is required to be treated as ‘interest’ or ‘income from other sources’, but all this was a little premature because he proceeded to decide as to what is the nature of the income or under which head it is to be taxed, without dealing with the foundational plea that the scope of income does not include gains in the capital field. According to the Tribunal, if the transaction was in the capital field, as he accepts, ‘where is the question of a capital receipt being taxed as income unless there is a specific provision of bringing such a capital receipt to tax?’

The Tribunal held that where the loan is in a foreign currency and the amount received back as repayment is exactly the same, there is no question of any interest component at all.

The Tribunal allowed this ground of appeal filed by the assessee.

Amendment made to section 54B by the Finance Act, 2013 w.e.f. 1st April, 2013 making HUFs entitled for claiming benefit u/s 54B is clarificatory

24 Shri Sitaram Pahariya (HUF) vs. ITO [2021] 127 taxmann.com 618 (Agra) A.Y.: 2012-13; Date of order: 31st May, 2021 Section: 54B

Amendment made to section 54B by the Finance Act, 2013 w.e.f. 1st April, 2013 making HUFs entitled for claiming benefit u/s 54B is clarificatory

FACTS
During the previous year relevant to the assessment year under consideration, the assessee HUF sold agricultural land and claimed benefit u/s 54B on subsequent purchase of another plot of land. The A.O., while assessing the total income of the assessee, denied the claim made by the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the denial of claim on the ground that for the assessment year under consideration, section 54B does not apply to HUFs.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal held as under:

(i) the Hindu undivided family was entitled to the benefit of 54B even prior to the insertion of ‘the assessee being an individual or his parent, or a Hindu undivided family’ by the Finance Act, 2013;
(ii) the assessee is a person subjected to tax under the Act, and the person includes the individual as well as the Hindu undivided family. Therefore, the benefit of provisions of 54B cannot be restricted to only individual assessees;
(iii) the Revenue is duty-bound to make out a clear case of debarring the HUF from availing the benefit of section 54F / 54B and the assessee cannot be denied the benefit merely based on its interpretation. If the Revenue wanted to tax the assessee (HUF), then the statute should have provided specifically that the assessee in 54B is only restricted to a living individual and is not applicable to a Hindu undivided family;
(iv) further, the High Court had not considered that individual assessee and HUF can both be used as and when the context so desires and it will not lead to any absurdity. In case the assessee is a Hindu undivided family, the second part of section 54B, i.e., ‘of parents of his’, would not be applicable. Harmonious interpretation is required to be invoked so that the word used in the provisions would not become redundant or otiose;
(v) in case of doubt or confusion, the benefit in respect of taxability or exemption should be given to the assessee rather than to Revenue;
(vi) the Co-ordinate Bench in the matter of Sandeep Bhargava (‘HUF’) [(2020) 117 taxmann.com 677 (Chandigarh-Trib)] has held that an HUF is entitled to claim benefit of section 54B;
(vii) on the facts of the present case, the Tribunal found that the assessee, within two years of the sale of agricultural land, had invested the amount and purchased land in accordance with the requirement of section 54B and was entitled to the benefit of 54B;
(viii) the assessee HUF is entitled to the benefit of section 54B for the assessment year under consideration as the word assessee used in 54B had always included HUF, and further, the amendment brought on by the Finance Act, 2013 in section 54 by inserting ‘the assessee being an individual or his parent, or a Hindu undivided family’ was classificatory in nature and was introduced by the Ministry with a view to extend the benefit to the Hindu undivided family;
(ix) the Hindu undivided family (HUF) has been recognised as a separate tax entity; therefore, before and after the amendment, if the agricultural land which was being used by the HUF for two years prior to the transfer has been transferred by it and it purchases any other agricultural land within two years of such transfer, then it shall be entitled to the benefit of section 54B/54F.

Receipt in the form of share premium cannot be brought to tax as revenue receipt

23 ACIT vs. Covestro India Private Limited (formerly Bayer Sheets India Private Limited) TS-394-ITAT-2021 (Mum) A.Y.: 2011-12; Date of order: 27th April, 2021
Section: 4

Receipt in the form of share premium cannot be brought to tax as revenue receipt

FACTS
The assessee, a private limited company engaged in the business of manufacturing and trading of polycarbonate sheets, articles and high impact polystyrene articles, commenced business operations in the previous year relevant to the assessment year under consideration. For the A.Y. 2011-12, it filed its return of income declaring therein a loss of Rs. 17,39,073.

During the year under consideration, the assesse had issued 7,00,000 equity shares of Rs. 10 each at a premium of Rs. 115.361351 per share. Of the 7,00,000 equity shares issued, 3,57,000 were issued to a foreign company Bayer Material Science for a monetary consideration; 3,08,000 shares were issued to Malibu Plastica Private Limited (‘MPPL’) and 35,000 to Malibu Tech Private Limited (‘MTPL’) for non-monetary consideration, i.e., for purchase of polycarbonate extrusion and thermo-forming sheet material from the said Indian companies.

While assessing the total income of the assessee, the A.O. treated share premium of Rs. 8,07,52,945 (7,00,000 x 115.361351) as taxable u/s 56 on the ground that the assessee sought to justify the issue price of the shares by adopting the DCF method without furnishing business plans and projections to justify the premium; the year of issue of shares was the first year of business of the assessee; and the assessee has utilised the share premium for purposes other than those specified u/s 78 of the Companies Act, 1956; hence, the receipt of share premium partakes the character of revenue receipt taxable as income.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A), who upheld the action of the A.O. The assessee then preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal noted that the addition had been made by the A.O. u/s 56(1) and hence what is to be adjudicated is limited and confined to the fact as to whether receipt of share premium per se could be treated as revenue receipt so as to make it taxable u/s 56(1).

It held that receipt of share premium per se cannot be treated as income or revenue receipt. In order to make a particular receipt taxable within the ambit of section 56(1), the receipt should be in the nature of income as defined in section 2(24). Share premium received by the company admittedly forms part of share capital and shareholders’ funds of the assessee company. When receipt of share capital partakes the character of a capital receipt, the receipt of share premium also partakes the character of capital receipt only. Hence, at the threshold itself, the receipt in the form of share premium cannot be brought to tax as revenue receipt and consequently be treated as income u/s 56(1).

The Tribunal noted that the Co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Credit Suisse Business Analysis (India) (P) Ltd. vs. ACIT [72 taxmann.com 131 (Mum-Trib)] has addressed the very same issue and decided in favour of the assessee. This order was the subject matter of challenge by the Revenue before the High Court and the question of law was not admitted by the High Court on the addition made u/s 56(1). A similar view has been taken by the Tribunal in the case of Green Infra Ltd. vs. ITO [38 taxmann.com 253].

The Tribunal dismissed in limine the observation made by the A.O. in his order that receipt of premium was akin to a gift and hence taxable u/s 56(1). It held that receipt of share capital and share premium is normal in case of a limited company and the same by no stretch of imagination can be equated with a gift. Moreover, a gift can be received only by individuals or HUFs and not by a company.

The Tribunal held that the case of Cornerstone Property Investment Pvt. Ltd. vs. ITO [ITA No. 665/Bang/2017 dated 9th February, 2018], on which reliance was placed by the Revenue, is distinguishable on facts as in that case addition had been made u/s 68 by doubting the genuineness of the parties from whom share premium had been received.

The ground of appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

Where accrual of income takes place but its realisation becomes impossible, such hypothetical income cannot be charged to tax

22 Nutan Warehousing Co. Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT TS-396-ITAT-2021 (Pune) A.Y.: 2013-14: Date of order: 11th May, 2021 Section: 4

Where accrual of income takes place but its realisation becomes impossible, such hypothetical income cannot be charged to tax

FACTS

The assessee company filed its return of income for A.Y. 2013-14 declaring a total income of Rs. 66,41,800. The A.O., in the course of assessment proceedings, observed from 26AS data that the assessee has not shown bank interest amounting to Rs. 26,125 from deposits with The Rupee Co-operative Bank Ltd. He added this sum of Rs. 26,125 to the total income returned.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A). The CIT(A) was of the view that the assessee is following the mercantile system of accounting. Once interest has accrued to the assessee, it becomes chargeable to tax, notwithstanding its non-receipt. He upheld the action of the A.O.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD


The Tribunal observed that the bank had become defunct, no financial transactions were allowed and RBI had banned its transactions. Due to the ban, even the principal amount deposited by the assessee became doubtful of recovery, much less the interest in question that was not received. It noted that the assessee stated before the CIT(A) during the course of the first appellate proceedings in the year 2017 that the interest was not received even till that time.

The Tribunal held that the concept of ‘accrual of income’ needs to be considered in the light of the ‘real income theory’. Where accrual of income takes place but its realisation becomes impossible, such hypothetical income cannot be charged to tax. In the case of the mercantile system of accounting, an accruing income can be charged to tax only when it is likely to be received under the given circumstances. In a case where receipt of income, after its accrual, is marred with complete uncertainty as to its realisation, such an accrual gets deferred to the point of clearing of the clouds of uncertainty over it.

On consideration of the mercantile system of accounting in juxtaposition with the ‘real income theory’, the Tribunal held that the inescapable conclusion which follows is that the interest income of Rs. 26,125 cannot be included in the total income of the assessee for the year under consideration. Such income may be appropriately charged to tax on the regularisation of the operations of the bank, coupled with the possibility of receipt of income in the foreseeable future. For the year under consideration, the interest cannot be charged to tax.

PLEDGE

In the Mahabharat and the Purans, there are many strange but interesting stories. They have some great messages for us because there is very deep thought behind them.

In the Mahabharat war, the Kauravs and Pandavs were in their respective camps one evening. In those days, there were ethics even in wars and they were strictly observed. Battles were fought only between sunrise and sunset. In the evening, there used to be friendly interaction. Even the enemies used to inquire about each other’s health, give condolences for the loss of lives and so on. Not only that, the Pandavs used to go to the Kauravs’ mother Gandhari to seek her blessings by offering ‘Namaskaar’ or ‘Pranaam’ to her and other elders. Such was their culture. There used to be strict ‘cease fire’ in the evening.

However, one evening, quite surprisingly and all of a sudden, an arrow came from the Kauravs’ camp and brushed by Yudhishthir’s ear. Everybody was shocked. Yudhishthir, taken by surprise, said to Arjun, ‘Paarth, how can you remain quiet? Didn’t you see what happened? How can you tolerate it? It means your “Gandeeva” (Arjun’s special bow) is useless!’

Arjuna got furious on hearing this and said to Yudhishthir, ‘I will kill you!’

There was a stunned silence. Arjuna continued, ‘I have taken a pledge that I will kill whosoever insults my “Gandeeva” bow!’ Everyone was taken aback and wondered how the war would proceed without Yudhishthir.

But Shrikrishna came forward and advised Arjun: ‘Paarth, I ask you to curse Yudhishthir, using bad and insulting words.’

Confusion worst confounded! Shrikrishna continued, ‘Using bad words and insulting the Gurus or elderly persons is just like killing them.’

Arjun did accordingly. Everybody thought that the matter was over. But again, Arjun stood up and said, ‘Now, I will have to kill myself.’ The confusion was at its peak.

‘Why?’ everyone asked.

‘Because, I have also taken another pledge – that I will kill any person who insults my beloved elder brother Yudhishthir. I am myself that culprit. So, I need to kill myself.’

Shrikrishna, as usual, had a solution. He stepped forward to salvage the situation and advised Arjun, ‘Paarth, you praise yourself in front of all of us since self-admiration and boasting is nothing but killing oneself!’

Let us all offer our ‘Namaskaar’ to such rich thoughts.

Words are powerful. Words carry deep meaning for those who utter them and also for those to whom they are addressed.

Vachana comes from Vac, the very root of all syllables that is pure consciousness. Therefore, respect for words, upholding promises, choosing the right words become critical for a society to thrive and flourish. India, unfortunately, has the lowest ranking when it comes to upholding contracts today when actually the entire society, rule of law and commerce, everything works on commitment to one’s pledge, to one’s word.  

Sections 153A, 153C search assessments – A statement recorded u/s 132(4) has evidentiary value but cannot justify the additions in the absence of corroborative material – No opportunity to cross-examine the said witness

1. PCIT (Central) – 3 vs. Anand Kumar Jain (HUF) [Income-tax Appeal No. 23 of 2021 and other appeals; order dated 12th February, 2021 (Delhi High Court)]
[Arising from Anand Kumar Jain (HUF) vs. ACIT; ITA No. 5947/Del/2018, ITA No. 4723/Del/2018, ITA No. 5954/Del/2018, ITA No. 5950/Del/2018, ITA No. 5948/Del/2018 and ITA No. 5955/Del/2018, dated 30th July, 2019, Del. ITAT]

Sections 153A, 153C search assessments – A statement recorded u/s 132(4) has evidentiary value but cannot justify the additions in the absence of corroborative material – No opportunity to cross-examine the said witness

The assessee purchased shares of an unlisted private company in 2010. This unlisted company then merged with another unlisted company, M/s Focus Industrial Resources Ltd., and shares of this merged entity were allotted to the assessee. Subsequently, the merged entity allotted further bonus shares and thereafter it was listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange. The assessee sold these shares on the stock exchange in 2014 and earned a huge profit which was claimed as exempt income on account of being long-term capital gain.

A search was conducted u/s 132 on 18th November, 2015 at the premises of the assessee [being Anand Kumar Jain (HUF), its coparceners and relatives] as well as at the premises of one Pradeep Kumar Jindal. During the search, a statement of Pradeep Jindal was recorded on oath u/s 132(4) on the same date, wherein he admitted to providing accommodation entries to Anand Kumar Jain (HUF) and his family members through their Chartered Accountant. The A.O. framed the assessment order detailing the modus operandi as to how cash is provided to the accommodation entry operator in lieu of allotment of shares of a private company. Thereafter, when the matter was carried in appeal before the CIT(A), the findings of the A.O. were affirmed. However, in further appeal before the ITAT the said findings were set aside.

On further appeal before the High Court, the Revenue submitted that the ITAT has erred by holding that the assessee’s premises were not searched and therefore notice u/s 153A could not have been issued. It submitted that the ITAT ignored that the assessment order itself revealed that a common search was conducted at various places on 18th November, 2015 including at the premises of the entry provider and the assessee and thus assessment u/s 153A has been rightly carried out. It further said that the ITAT erred in setting aside the assessment order on the ground that no right of cross-examining Pradeep Jindal was afforded to the assessee. Further, there is no statutory right to cross-examine a person whose statement is relied upon by the A.O. so long as the assessee is provided with the statement and given an opportunity to rebut the statement of the witness. The assessee has been provided with a copy of the statement of Pradeep Jindal and the ITAT has wrongly noted to the contrary.

Furthermore, the assessee has failed to bring in any evidence to dispute the factual position emerging therefrom and has therefore failed to establish any prejudice on account of not getting the opportunity to cross-examine the witness. In view of the statement of Pradeep Jindal, it was incumbent upon the assessee to discharge the onus of proof which had been shifted on him. The Revenue has sufficient material in hand in the nature of the statements recorded during the search and, therefore, the assessee ought to have produced evidence to negate or to contradict the evidence collected by the A.O. during the course of the search and assessment proceeding which followed thereafter. It was also emphasised that the statement recorded u/s 132(4) can be relied upon for any purpose in terms of the language of the Act and thus action u/s 153A was justified.

The Court held that the assessment has been framed u/s 153A consequent to the search action. The scope and ambit of section 153A is well defined. This Court, in CIT vs. Kabul Chawla (2016) 380 ITR 573 concerning the scope of assessment u/s 153A, has laid out and summarised the legal position after taking into account the earlier decisions of this Court as well as the decisions of other High Courts and Tribunals. In the said case, it was held that the existence of incriminating material found during the course of the search is a sine qua non for making additions pursuant to a search and seizure operation. In the event no incriminating material is found during search, no addition could be made in respect of the assessments that had become final. Revenue’s case is hinged on the statement of Pradeep Jindal, which according to them is the incriminating material discovered during the search action. This statement certainly has evidentiary value and relevance as contemplated under the explanation to section 132(4). However, this statement cannot, on a standalone basis, without reference to any other material discovered during search and seizure operations, empower the A.O. to frame the block assessment. This Court in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi vs. Best Infrastructure (India) P. Ltd. [2017] 397 ITR 82 2017 has inter alia held that:

‘38. Fifthly, statements recorded under section 132(4) of the Act do not by themselves constitute incriminating material as has been explained by this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Harjeev Aggarwal (2016) 290 CTR 263.’

Further, the Court noted that the A.O. has used this statement on oath recorded in the course of search conducted in the case of a third party (i.e., search of Pradeep Jindal) for making the additions in the hands of the assessee. As per the mandate of section 153C, if this statement was to be construed as an incriminating material belonging to or pertaining to a person other than the person searched (as referred to in section 153A), then the only legal recourse available to the Department was to proceed in terms of section 153C by handing over the same to the A.O. who has jurisdiction over such person. Here, the assessment has been framed u/s 153A on the basis of alleged incriminating material [being the statement recorded u/s 132(4)]. As noted above, the assessee had no opportunity to cross-examine the said witness, but that apart, the mandatory procedure u/s 153C has not been followed. The Court didn’t find any perversity in the view taken by the ITAT. Accordingly, the appeals, were dismissed.