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Is Bombay a Bay?

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Synopsis This Article examines the recent decisions which have held that parts of Mumbai city are a bay. This has opened up parts of the city for development, since the Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) Rules are less stringent in bay areas.

Introduction
Quick Quiz – Does Bombay (apologies for using the old name) as BOMBAY rhyme with BAY .

Interestingly, while the name tends to suggest that ‘Bombay’ is a bay, it actually is an island. History has it that Bombay originally comprised of seven islands under the Portuguese Rule, which were given in dowry to an English prince on his marriage with a portuguese Princess. One of these 7 islands was Mahim island. Paradoxically, this very island has a central role to play in this discussion on a bay!

A spate of recent decisions of the Bombay High Court have held that parts of the island city are actually bays. While this distinction may seem semantic at first, it has a great repercussion for the city’s developer community. What it does is to open up a goldmine for developers, that too on the waterfront. The Coastal Regulation Zone or CRZ restriction in bays is substantially lower as compared to other places. Let us examine this decision and why environmentalists consider it to be a real bolt from the blue!

CRZ Notification
The Ministry of Environment and Forests has issued the Coastal Regulation Zone Notification to protect coastal lines and regulate activities in these areas. In a country like India, and more so in a city like Mumbai, which has a very long coastal line, regulations dealing with protection of this very valuable natural resource have an important role to play. The Ministry had originally notified the CRZ Guidelines in 1991 vide Notification No. S.O. 114 (E) dated 19th February 1991. These were amended and updated from time to time to arrive at the latest Coastal Regulation Notification 2011 issued on 6th January 2011.

Keeping in mind the special needs of Mumbai, several concessions have been provided to CRZ areas within Mumbai.

According to this Notification, the following areas are declared as CRZ:

(i) the land area from High Tide Line (HTL) to 500 mts on the landward side along the seafront. The term HTL means the line on the land up to which the highest water line reaches during the spring tide and so demarcated. HTL will be demarcated within one year from the date of issue of the 2011 notification.

(ii) the land area between HTL to 100 mts or width of the creek whichever is less on the landward side along the tidal influenced water bodies (i.e, bays, rivers, creeks, etc. that are connected to the sea and are influenced by tides).

The significance of declaring an area as CRZ is that the Notification imposes various restrictions on the setting up and expansion of industries, operations or processes, etc., in such areas. The Notification classifies various areas into CRZ-I, CRZ-II, CRZ-III, CRZ-IV, etc. The severity of the CRZ Regulations goes on decreasing as the classification increases.

Hence, maximum construction is not possible in CRZI while in CRZ-IV, those activities impugning on the sea and tidal influenced water bodies are regulated except for traditional fishing and related activities undertaken by local communities. CRZ-IV area is defined as the water area from the Low Tide Line to 12 nautical miles on the seaward side and the water area of the tidal influenced water body from the mouth of the water body at the sea up to the influence of the tide, which is measured as 5 parts per 1,000 during the driest season of the year.

A bay is defined in common parlance as “a body of water forming an indentation of the shoreline, larger than acove but smaller than a gulf”.

Mahim is a Bay
In the case of Hoary Realty Ltd vs. MCGM, WP No. 2383/2014 Order dated 7th October, 2014, the Bombay High Court faced a peculiar issue of, whether a certain plot of land in Mahim fell within the purview of the CRZ area? The issue was whether Mahim was a bay area?

The developer obtained a Certificate from an Institute of Remote Sensing at Chennai which certified that only 7% of the plot area fell within the CRZ IV area as a bay and the balance was not within the purview of CRZ. This Institute is one of the premier bodies in India in the areas of Remote Sensing, Geographical Information System and Large Scale Mapping. Thus, the Institute certified that Mahim was a bay and not a sea shore.

Hence, according to the developer, since only 7% fell within the 100 meters restriction for a bay, it could construct on the balance 93% of the plot which fell outside CRZ. It also obtained a certificate from the National Hydrographer Office which certified that Mahim is considered as a bay and is so depicted on the Official Navigational Chart of the National Hydrographer Office. Accordingly, the developer prayed for relief to carry on construction on the area not within the purview of CRZ.

The Bombay High Court upheld the classification contended by the developer and held that the area was in Mahim which was indeed a bay. Only 7% of the plot fell within the purview of CRZ IV and hence, for this portion, there was a restriction of 100 meters from the High Tide Line. Had it not been a bay, the restriction would have been 500 meters from the High Tide Line. The High Court also relied on the National Hydrographer’s Chart. The MCGM argued that the New Coastal Zone Management Plan was under preparation and hence, it was not possible to sanction the development. This argument was rejected by the High Court. Finally, the Court directed the Municipal Corporation to issue a clearance certificate based on the Certificate obtained by the developer as to how much was within CRZ.

The Maharashtra Coastal Zone Management Authority preferred a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court against this decision. However, the MCGM’s SLP was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 19th November, 2014. Thus, the High Court’s ruling is binding now on the Maharashtra Coastal Zone Management Authority as well as the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai.

Bhuleshwar and Bandra join the Club
Buoyed by the decision of the above Bombay High Court and the rejection of the SLP, developers have started knocking the doors of the High Court for similar relief in other parts of the city. The Bombay High Court in the case of Marine Drive Hospitality & Realty P Ltd vs. MCZMA, WP No. 3127/2014 Order dated 17th December, 2014 and Om Metals Consortium vs. MCZMA, WP No. 3152/2014 Order dated 18th December, 2014 had an occasion to consider similar issues. The Court held in Orders similar to the one in Hoary, that Bhuleshwar as well as Bandra (West) were bays. It once again held that the water body at Mahim Bay (Bandra reclamation to Prabhadevi) / Back Bay (Governor House to Colaba) was a bay! Accordingly, it allowed construction on the area outside the 100 meters purview, which in the Bhuleshwar case was an area of about 1 lakh sq. feet while in the Bandra case it was a slum redevelopment project of around 6 lakh sq. ft.

Impact of the Rulings
Development within the bay area can be done with a higher FSI of 3 which was till now allowed only for hotels. Now with the Rulings opening up the area for other development also, developers can develop more lucrative residential complexes. Since these projects would be waterfront projects one can do the math and compute the benefits to the developers.

It
may be noted that the ratio of this decision could also be used in other
coastal parts of India, such as, Goa, Gujarat, Karnataka, etc. The Eastern Coast of India could be the biggest beneficiary
since it abuts the “Bay” of Bengal! In short, this decision could be a game
changer for the realty sector. Certain Press Reports indicate that the
Maharashtra Government is planning to request the Ministry of Environment and
Forests to suitably amend the CRZ Notification to deal with this new phenomenon
of construction in bays. Till such time as the Centre amends this
Notification, the High Court Rulings will prevail.

 

  
Conclusion

 

While the pros and cons of these decisions are
being hot-ly debated by developers and environmentalists only time would tell
what impact they have had on the development of Mumbai and other coastal areas.
However, they high-light one important learning ~ don’t judge a book by its
cover! Outward appearances are often deceiving ~ what appears to be a shore
could turn out to be a bay, keeping all environmentalists at bay (pun
intended)!

Precedent – Circulars – Binding on Revenue – Implied overruling – Earlier ruling of smaller Bench held, stands overruled if a subsequent larger bench lays down law to the contrary: Constitution of India Article 141:

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Union of India & Ors vs. Arviva Industries India Ltd & Ors. (2014) 3 SCC 159

The Hon’ble Court held that the circulars issued by the Central Board of Excise and Customs are binding on the Department and the Department cannot be permitted to urge that the circulars issued by the Board are not binding on it. The Court in a series of decisions has held that the circulars issued u/s. 119 of the I.T. Act 1961 and section 37-B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 are binding on the Revenue.

However, a slightly different approach was taken by this Court in Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. vs. CIT (2000) 5 SCC 365 by two learned Judges which runs counter to the earlier decisions. The view taken in Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (supra) being contrary to the subsequent decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in CCE vs. Dhiren Chemical Inds. (2002) 254 ITR 554 / (2002) 2 SCC 127, cannot be taken to be good law. Earlier ruling of Smaller Bench held stands over rule if a subsequent larger bench lays down law to the contrary.

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Legal representatives of deceased – Scope – Corporate body or Collective entity when may claim compensation as legal representative – Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, S/s. 166, 168 and 173:

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Montfort Brothers of St. Gabriel & ANR. vs. United India Insurance Company Ltd. & ANR. (2014) 3 SCC 394

Appellant 1 is a charitable society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1960. It runs various institutions as a constituent unit of Catholic Church. Its members after joining the appellant Society renounce the world and are known as ‘Brothers’. Such ‘Brothers’ sever all relations with their natural families and are bound by the constitution of the Society.

One ‘Brother’ of the Society, namely, Alex Chandy Thomas was a Director-cum-Head master of St. Peter High School and he died in a motor accident. The accident was between a Jeep driven by the deceased and a Maruti Gypsy covered by insurance policy issued by the respondent Insurance Company. At the time of death the deceased was aged 34 years and was drawing monthly salary of Rs. 4,190/-. The claim petition was filed before M.A.C.T., by Appellant No. 2 on being duly authorised by the Appellant No.1 the society. The owner of the Gypsy vehicle stated in his written statement that vehicle was duly insured and hence liability, if any, was upon the Insurance Company.

The respondent-Insurance Company also filed a written statement and thereby raised various objections to the claim. But it was clear from the written statement that it never raised the issue that since the deceased was a ‘Brother’ and therefore without any family or heir, the appellant could not file claim petition for want of locus standi. The issue no.1 regarding maintainability of claim petition was not pressed by the respondents. The Tribunal awarded a compensation of Rs. 2,52,000/- in favour of the claimant and against the opposite parties with a direction to the insurer to deposit Rs. 2,27,000/- with the Tribunal as Rs. 25,000/- had already been deposited as interim compensation. The Tribunal also permitted interest at the rate of 12% per annum, but from the date of judgment passed in MACT case.

Instead of preferring appeal against the order of the Tribunal, the respondent-Company preferred a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the Gauhati High Court and by the impugned order under appeal, the High Court allowed the aforesaid writ petition ex-parte, and held the judgment and order of the learned Tribunal to be invalid and incompetent being in favour of person/persons who according to the High court were not competent to claim compensation under the Motor Vehicle Act.

The Hon’ble Court observed that the issue as to who is a legal representative or its agent is basically an issue of fact and may be decided one way or the other dependent upon the facts of a particular case. But as a legal proposition it is undeniable that a person claiming to be a legal representative has the locus to maintain an application for compensation u/s. 166 of the Act, either directly or through any agent, subject to result of a dispute raised by the other side on this issue.

The Court observed that Tribunal had relied on the decision of FB judgement of Patna High Court in Sudama Devi vs. Jogendra Choudhary AIR 1987 Pat 239 wherein it was held that term `legal representative’ is wide enough to include even “intermeddlers” with the estate of a deceased. Further, the proceeding before Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal being summary in nature, unless there is evidence before Claims Tribunal in support of such pleading that the claimant is not a legal representative and therefore the claim petition is liable to be dismissed as not maintainable, no such plea can be raised at a subsequent stage and that too through a writ petition. Accordingly the order of High Court was set aside.

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Frivolous Litigation – State as a Litigant/party – Expenses to be paid personally by officials concerned:

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Haryana Dairy Development Co-op Federation Ltd. vs. Jagdish Lal; (2014) 3 SCC 156 (SC)

In the instant case, an amount of Rs. 8,724/- was to be paid to the Respondent employee as reimbursement of his medical claim. The Petitioner Haryana Dairy Development Cooperative Federation Limited filed a SLP before Supreme Court. The Court deprecated such practice of the petitioner corporation treating the litigation as a luxury. The corporation must have spent on amount for filing this petition in excess of the amount due to the respondent.

The Law Commission of India in its 155th report has observed that what further aggravates the position is the number of pending litigations relating to trivial matters or petty claims, some of which has been hanging for more than 15 years. It hardly needs mention that in many such cases money spent on litigation is far in excess of the stakes involved.

The court directed that the expenses of the litigation shall be incurred by the Managing Director personally who has signed affidavit in support of the petition and it shall not be taken from the Federation.

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Apology – Disturbing remarks/statement made by counsel for petitioner against Supreme Court Bench – Apology for such statement accepted – Constitution of India, Article 129:

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Manohar Lal Sharma vs. Principal Secretary & Ors. (2014) 3 SCC 172

The matters were posted in view of the following statement of Mr. Prashant Bhushan that appeared in the weekly news magazine Outlook, 18-11-2013 (Vol. LIII, No. 45):

“I can only speculate. The Bench is possible hesitant about taking action against the highest law officer of the Govt. who is appearing before them everyday. Perhaps they are meeting him socially and you do tend to be a little diffident in cases involving such people.”

The above statement was made by Mr. Prashant Bhushan to the question that was put to him – “But why didn’t the court pull him up then? Why was it so indulgent ?

Mr. Prashant Bhushan states that he has the highest regard for the Supreme Court. He also tenders apology for his statement published in the weekly news magazine referred to above. In view of the matter, the court observed that nothing further deserves to be done with regard to this aspect.

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Aligning Human Capital for sustained growth of Professional Service Firms

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One of the least focused functional aspects of
running a professional service firm (“PSF”) is human resources. We call
it human capital within PSF’s. This includes the Partners, the
Principals or Directors, the Senior Managers, the Managers going on to
the associates and interns. This also includes the admin and other
non-billing staff in the PSF.

The challenge has always been to
recognise that PSF’s can grow well and scale up enough only and only if
the human capital is in alignment. This recognition comes to most firms
very late in their life span; sometimes so late that not enough course
corrections can be made. Most good firms that have succeeded and grown
over decades have done a remarkably great job at aligning their human
capital.

It is therefore, required of PSF leaders to understand the dynamics of human capital early in the growth curve of the PSF.

This picture outlines the various stakeholders that draw on an individual’s time:

Let
us analyse the dynamics of human capital engagement for each of the
stakeholders, starting with the PSF’s internal team members – i.e., the
individual himself: 1. The self: Internal teams are the most critical
asset of any PSF. It is all about managing the human capital responsibly
and effectively.

A few questions to ask and examine of each individual team member are:

Who is this professional?
How did he come into being in to our firm?
What are his aspirations?
What
drives him? Is there a conflict in his thought process, his goals and
career aspirations? Will he be a Partner in the firm in a few years? Is
he a good mentor and a team player? Is he a good fit for the firm
currently?

The above are some of the hard questions that a PSF
needs to answer. If the responses to some of the above are not very
encouraging for the firm, then it is clear that the human capital is not
optimally aligned and PSFs have a lot of work to do to bring about an
alignment. The individual within the internal team needs to be
understood, mentored, coached and encouraged to give his or best. His
working style is irrelevant, beyond a point. His weaknesses can be
corrected to a point; but the focus of the PSF should be to “make his
strengths productive” to the firm. It is far more effective to recognise
an individual’s strengths and make it work for him, his team and the
firm, as opposed to trying to constantly correct his weaknesses. Peter
Drucker exhorted this proposition and articulated that people work best
when their strengths are aligned to the needs of the firm. The challenge
for a Partner in the PSF to identify the strengths of his internal team
members and make this happen.

The professional – an individual within a PSF:
It
is incumbent upon the professional to be the best that he can be in the
environs of a PSF. For that to happen, the professional has to learn to
“Manage himself”. Managing oneself is a very critical aspect of
effectiveness and alignment. Unless a professional learns to manage
himself, the team dynamics and client delivery is never going to be
optimum. Managing oneself is all about knowing thy time, assigning
priorities and taking responsibilities for action. A professional is a
manager, akin to an executive in a business, who is required to make
effective decisions, conform to an execution framework, focus on
priorities, have a growth orientation, think with a solution mindset and
multitask between production and management.

The individual has
to have a strong sense of affinity to the society, his family, his
friends, his work colleagues and his clients. It is these interpersonal
relationships and their dynamics, which largely influence the way the
individual conducts himself. Thus, managing oneself is a starting step
in aligning human capital.

2. Teams
Individuals in
PSF’s need to be effective in teams, this would mean being collaborative
in teams, sharing knowledge with the team members, generating a spirit
of camaraderie and sportsmanship and having a congenial disposition on a
day-to-day basis.

Teams get most influenced by team dynamics.
E.g.: If the senior most member in the team cannot set the tone, he will
quickly lose respect. Similarly, someone who is technically brilliant
as a professional will still not be the favourite of the team if he does
not learn to be a go-getter and a real team player. Being technically
brilliant does not mean that they should be intellectually arrogant. In
fact, if these technically brilliant people are also respectful to their
peers and have an intrinsic habit of sharing their knowledge and
expertise, it will go a long way in creating successful future leaders
in their respective firms.

Sharing of ones’ knowledge is
critical to have the team come up to terms with the thought process of
the team leader. This, in other words, assumes that over a period of
time, each professional in the team will get upgraded to a level of
knowledge which will help them converse with their senior team members
and their clients with equal ease. It is also imperative on the team
members themselves to have a constant quest for learning and upgrading
themselves. And, in that they have somebody to look up to in terms of
the team leader, the technically superior member amongst them, who’s
depth of knowledge is a vital resource for the firm to access. The
question then is – Is the congeniality quotient in the team at a level
that permits such free and fair exchange of knowledge? To be in
alignment, PSF’s have to get this rolling, ensure that teams work in a
spirit of sharing and caring, have tremendous respect and affinity to
each and other and for their firm, and truly care for the growth of the
firm and their peers within the firm.

3. Clients
Professionals
have their foremost duty to solving client’s problems and servicing
client efficiency. PSF’s have to create an environment and pursue a
culture where professional respect each and every client and clients
feel that the teams are responsive to their problems and challenges on a
continuous and sustained basis. This needs hard selling of the concept
of “client comes first”.

As the great Mahatma Gandhi eloquently
put it “We exist because of our clients”; “The customer is not an
interruption of our work; he’s the purpose of it”.

Professionals
have to have a mindset of solving problems and challenges of clients.
To be in a continuous frame of mind of being a solution provider needs
reiteration of this tenet and at a deeper level “a connect” with the
client. The Partner concerned does not really have to sell his
expertise; all he needs to do is to engage into a conversation with the
client and understand the client.

This includes the following:
If
you want to win a client’s confidence, give him the chance to talk to
you, person to person, about his needs and his expectations. Make it
easy and comfortable for the clients to share his secrets. In short, if
you really want the client’s business, talk to the client and have a
conversation, make him feel that you are using normal language and not
“corporate speak”. Both parties should engage into a conversation, it
cannot be a monologue.

It’s about a mindset of joint problem
solving, not about trying to win or prevail. Finally, its about allowing
people with different views to learn from each other.

If teams
can achieve this dynamic with their clients and if they work hard at
doing this consistently, the PSF would have created and aligned its
human to create a winning client base.

4. Market

Partners and managers and everybody in between, have to be focused on the markets.

    Where is the profession heading?

    Would our services be relevant, three years from now and seven years from now?

    What do we need to do today to continuously adapt to the marketplace?

    Is there a better way of doing what we do?

What are the trends in the market place that the professional can see and that helps him to think about generating more opportunities for his firm?

What can he do about it? In capital markets, they say that the market is a great leveler; one can extend this to professional service market and say that the market is very discerning and will choose the most appropriate service player for its requirements.

Often, what is perceived is the truth. E.g.: If a lawyer provides very high-end technical solutions, he is perceived to be an expert with a very busy schedule with very little time to spend. This preconception comes because of a perception. Perceptions take long to create but can dissipate very quickly. Thus, a PSF should make sure that what Partners say and do is relevant to his chosen segment of clients and stays that way on a continuous basis. A PSF would than be omnipresent in the Market and would be aligned for faster growth.

    Regulators

Professionals have to be trained to deal with the entire regulatory ecosystem. We have in our day-to-day existence, a need to deal with various set of regulators, authorities, governmental agencies and the likes. This would include the regulator of the profession; Example: the Bar Council for the Lawyers, The Institute of Chartered Accountants for the Accountants etc. This would also include the revenue authorities, the courts, the justice delivery system, the administration in the state and all departments thereto.

The Chambers and associations, who influence policy making, the public representatives who make the laws, and a wide gamut of people who form the servicing (internal) team of these constituents also deal with Regulators constantly. And professionals need to learn to deal with the Chambers and Associations too.

Professionals need to have skill-sets to deal with them differently, as these are not clients. Some of these are watchdogs, some of them are policy makers and the others are policy implementers. The most successful firms have aligned their human capital to a point where a group of professional within the firm deals with each one of them effectively. This needs lots of training and high quality communication skills that work with bureaucrats and a deep understanding of policy formation.

The best firms thrive in such an ecosystem by having specific people earmarked to deal with this breed – the Regulators.

    Peers

PSF’s constantly have a cliental pressure to benchmark themselves with their peers; especially when it comes to the relative size of the firm, the size of the team, the infrastructure, the quality of the delivery, the timeliness and responsiveness and the professional fees/compensation for the engagements.

In this context, the most compared resource is the quality of human capital. That is the biggest differentiator between the good firms and the better and the best firms, as it is partners and managers who are the touch point of the firm and the face of the firm across the ecosystem. The quality of delivery is also a reflection of the level of training, the level of knowledge base, the expertise of the firm and therefore its unique positioning in the marketplace and all of this ties in to the human capital of the firm.

Most successful firms have been growing primarily because relative to their peers, they have done a great job at mentoring their teams.

And most successful firms have been successful because they have been constantly aligning their human capital to the firm’s growth trajectory.

TDS: DTAA between India and UAE- Capital gains arising to resident of UAE from sale of Government securities in India is not taxable in India- No obligation to deduct tax at source-

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DIT vs. ICICI Bank Ltd.; 370 ITR 17 (Bom):

The respondent-bank had allowed certain residents of UAE to open account in India with it, depositing in their accounts monies which were the income derived from sale of Government securities by them. The C. A.s certified that the capital gains had arisen to the concerned person on account of sale proceeds of Government securities and such gains being exempt under article 13 of the DTAA between India and UAE, no tax was liable to be deducted at source. The Assessing Officer held that the account holder or the constituent having earned the income from the sale of securities in India, that income had not been remitted from India to UAE and the bank was liable to deduct tax at source. The Tribunal accepted the assessee’s claim and held that there was no tax liability on the income by way of gains from sale proceeds of Government securities in India by the residents of UAE and accordingly, there is no liability to deduct tax at source.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“In view of the concurrent findings that there was no liability to tax on the capital gains arising to the individual constituent/investor on the transaction in the Government treasury bills undertaken through the bank, the bank was not obliged to deduct tax at source.”

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Speculative transaction- Section 43(5)- Stock and share broker- Hedging transactions- Loss due to price of shares continuing to rise- Not speculative loss- Transaction within the ambit of exception- Not disallowable-

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Maud Tea and Seed Co. Ltd. vs. CIT; 370 ITR 603 (Cal):

The assessee, a stock and share broker, entered in to three transactions of sale and purchase of shares for the purpose of hedging. It suffered loss of Rs. 14.82 lakh by reason of price of shares continuing to rise. The assessee claimed that the transaction is not a speculative transaction as it came within the exception provided for. The Revenue held that the loss of Rs. 14.82 lakh incurred by the assessee fell outside the purview of proviso (b) to section 43(5), because the market price of ACC shares continued to rise and there was no adverse price fluctuation. This was upheld by the Tribunal.

On appeal by the assessee, the Calcutta High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The undisputed facts in the case contained the ingredients of hedging. The result of those transactions, however, was a gain in the holding of shares by the assessee. By incurring a loss in the sum of Rs. 14.82 lakh, the value of the holding of the assessee in the shares in that period increased. Therefore, when ultimately the assessee sold those shares at an even greater value, it was denied the wind fall profit it would have made if it had not hedged at all. The loss was allowable.”

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[2014] 51 taxmann.com 450 (Madras) Commissioner of Central Excise, Salem vs. K.M.B. Granites (P.) Ltd

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Scope of GTA service – Held, “commercial concern” includes individual truck operator.

Facts: The appellant (manufacturer) availed GTA services for transporting its inward as well as outward transportation of goods. Revenue demanded tax under ‘GTA ’ service under reverse charge mechanism as per Rule 2(1)(d) (v) of Service Tax Rules, 1994. Appellant contended that services were availed from individual transport operators and not from GTA . Tribunal decided the matter in favour of the appellant following the judgments of the Bangalore Tribunal in cases of Lakshminarayana Mining Co. vs. CST [2010] 24 STT 61 and CCE & C vs. Kanaka Durga Agro Oil Products (P.) Ltd. [2009] 22 STT 435. Aggrieved by the Tribunal’s decision, revenue filed an appeal before the High Court.

Held:
The Hon’ble High Court relying upon its own decision in the case of CCE vs. Salem Co-Operative Sugar Mills Ltd. 2014 (35) STR (450) (Mad) held that individual operator would also be covered within the meaning of expression ‘commercial concern’ as appeared u/s. 65(50b) of Finance Act.

Note: While deciding this case, the High Court appears to be under the impression that the Lakshminarayana Mining Co.’s (supra) and Kanaka Durga Agro’s case (supra) relied upon by the Tribunal dealt with the issue as to whether individual can be regarded as commercial concern or not? In Kanaka Durga’s case, the issue before the Tribunal was not whether individual is covered within the meaning of “commercial concern” but whether GTA includes individual truck operators/owners or on the agents thereof. It was submitted before the Tribunal that the aspect of agency being absent when a truck owner or operator gives a truck without an agent being go-between, there can be no tax. From the definition of the GTA and also the clarification given by the Finance Minister in the budget speech, Tribunal held that individual truck owners and operators are not covered within scope of section 65(50b). Kanaka Durga’s decision was followed in Lakshminarayana Mining Co.’s case which was also affirmed by the Karnataka HC in i.

In Salem Co-Operative Sugar Mills Ltd. (supra) case, Tribunal relied upon Kanaka Durga Agro Oil Products Pvt. Ltd.’ s case and remanded the matter back to adjudicating authority to verify whether services are received from individual owners. When Salem’s case came up before the Madras High Court in 2014 (35) STR 450 (Mad), the High Court neither overruled nor distinguished Kanaka Durga Agro & Lakshminarayana Mining (supra). Hence, to that extent it appears that reliance on Salem’s case for the purpose of present matter is misplaced.

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[2014] 36 STR 492 (Bom.) Dimensions Logistics Services Pvt. Ltd. vs. CST. Mumbai – II

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Recovery of destination charges for services provided by foreign-service provider for clearance of goods is liable to service tax under clearing & forwarding agent’s service. Freight margin earned from freight forwarding activity may not be exigible to service tax under clearing and forwarding services. Early hearing granted.

Facts:
The appellant registered under clearing & forwarding agent’s services was audited. The department found difference in the amounts captured in the ST-3 returns and the financials. The appellant did not provide reconciliation of the difference before the adjudicating authority but before the Tribunal reconciled it and submitted that the said difference was on account of (a) margin of freight on account of freight forwarding activity and (b) recovery of destination charges from its clients for service provided by foreign-service providers. The Tribunal considering the submissions of the appellant directed pre-deposit of Rs.40,57,603/- against which the appeal was made to the High Court. The appellant’s counsel submitted that freight margin was not exigible to service tax under the clearing & forwarding agent’s service and relied on the case of CCE, Panchkula vs. Kulcip Medicines Pvt. Ltd. 2009 (14) STR 608 (P & H). Recovery of destination charges is also not liable for service tax as service was provided outside India and therefore covered under Rule 3(ii) of the Import of Service Rules.

Held:
The Tribunal had found substance in the arguments of the appellant’s counsel and therefore scaled down the tax liability and further in respect of destination charges even though the Tribunal rendered a prima facie finding against the Appellant. The Hon. Court found this aspect arguable and therefore directed a pre-deposit of Rs. 20 lakh in cash and directed the Tribunal to hear the appeal in accordance with law and uninfluenced by any earlier observations.

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[2015] 55 taxmann.com 73 (Ahmedabad – CESTAT) –Commissioner of Central Excise, Customs and Service Tax, Rajkot vs. Reliance Ports and Terminals Ltd.

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Utilisation of CENVAT credit on capital goods is allowed to the extent of 50% in financial year of receipt and balance in subsequent financial year, even if capital goods are pending installation.

Facts:
Assessee was a provider of port services and availed credit of duty paid on capital goods during the period F.Y. 2006-07 and 2007-08. Department denied CENVAT credit on the grounds that capital goods were not installed. Department also disputed CENVAT credit of service tax paid by assessee under reverse charge on the ground that service tax paid u/s. 66A of the Act is not specified under Rule 3 of CCR,2004. Adjudicating Authority decided in favour of the assessee. Aggrieved department filed the appeal before the Tribunal.

Held:

The Tribunal held that as per para 8 of CBEC Circular No. B-4/7/2000 TRU dated 03/04/2000 in the case of capital goods, the CENVAT rules do not provide installation of capital goods as a pre-requisite for taking CENVAT credit. The credit can be taken as and when the capital goods are received in the factory. The Tribunal also observed that, in terms of CBEC Circular No. 267/26/2006-CX-8 dated 28-04-2006, condition of installation for availing CENVAT credit on capital goods was effective till 09- 09-2004 and not thereafter. Relying upon the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of CCE vs. Ispat Industries Ltd. 2012 (275) ELT 79 (Bom) which held that, when the capital goods are lying in the factory for installation and process of erection is being carried out, the requirement that the goods were in the possession and use of the manufacturer in the year in which the balance credit was availed of can be said to have been fulfilled. Thus the credit on capital goods was allowed in the financial year of receipt and balance in subsequent financial year. As regards dispute on CENVAT credit of service tax paid under reverse charge, it was held that due to retrospective amendment under sub rule (1) of Rule 3 of the Finance Act, 2011 service tax paid u/s. 66A was eligible for credit from 18/04/2006. Revenue’s appeal was dismissed accordingly.

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[2014] 51 taxmann.com 365 (Kerala) Union of India vs. Kerala Bar Hotels Association, Cochin

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Constitutional Validity – “restaurant service” and “short term accommodation service” – Held, section 65(105)(zzzzv) & (zzzzw), respectively are ultra vires the Constitution.

Facts:
The department filed appeal against judgment of the single judge in case of [2013] 35 taxmann.com 568 (Ker) Kerala Classified Hotels & Resorts Association vs. UOI in which (i) levy of service tax on restaurants; and (ii) levy of service tax on renting of hotels was held as unconstitutional as it was challenged that the Union is incompetent to levy service tax on “Restaurant Service” [65(105)(zzzzv)] and “short-term accommodation service” [65(105)(zzzzw)].

Held:
The High Court observed in regard to the restaurant service that prior to 46th Constitutional amendment in relation to supply of food and beverages in a restaurant, the law was that the whole transaction is a service and therefore, the same would not come within the scope of “sale of goods”, for the purpose of imposition and levy of tax by the States. However, as a result of amendment in Article 366 (29A) (f), supply of goods, by way of service or otherwise, being food and other articles of human consumption, were deemed to be sale of those goods by the person making the transfer or supply to whom such transfer or supply is made. Relying upon decision in the case of K. Damodarasamy Naidu & Bros. vs. State of Tamil Nadu [2000] 117 STC 1, the High Court held that by virtue of the Constitution (Forty Sixth Amendment) Act, supply of food and beverages in a restaurant was also deemed to be a sale, conferring authority on the States to tax on the whole consideration received by the person making the supply of food and beverages. In other words, in view of the aforesaid constitutional amendment, it cannot be said that there is any service involved in the supply of food and other articles of human consumption in a restaurant. The High Court therefore affirmed the decision of the single bench. The High Court distinguished the decision of Tamil Nadu Kalyana Mandapam Assn. vs. Union of India [2006] 4 STT 308 (SC), on the ground that, it dealt with the variety of services extended by such mandap keepers to their customers and does not deal with the supply of food in a restaurant. The supply of food and other consumables in a restaurant cannot be equated with the services rendered by a mandap keeper in relation to the use of mandaps and also the services, if any, rendered by him as a caterer. The High Court did not agree with the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Indian Hotels & Restaurant Association vs. Union of India [2014] 44 taxmann.com 455 (Bom.).

As regards service tax on short-term accommodation service, the High Court after analysing the provisions of Kerala Tax on Luxuries Act and following the decision of the Supreme Court in case of [2005] 2 SCC 515 Godfrey Phillips India Ltd. vs. State of U.P. held that the matter covered by section 65 (105)(zzzzw) is a matter enumerated in Entry 62 of List II of Seventh Schedule and the States alone have the legislative competence to enact any law imposing tax on the said matter and therefore cannot be liable to service tax.

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ITAT- Miscellaneous application- S/s. 254(2) and 260A- A. Y. 2007-08- Pendency of an appeal filed in the High Court u/s. 260A is no bar to the maintainability of a MA filed u/s. 254(2)- R. W. Promotions P. Ltd vs. ITAT (Bom)

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W. P. No. 2238 of 2014 dated 08/04/2015: www.itatonline. org

For the A. Y. 2007-08, the assessee had filed an appeal u/s .260A to the High Court against the order of the Tribunal. During the pendency of the appeal, the assessee filed a miscellaneous application (MA) before the Tribunal u/s. 254(2) to request it to rectify certain mistakes apparent from the record. The Tribunal dismissed the miscellaneous application on the ground that “judicial propriety does not allow the assessee to seek efficacious remedy simultaneously before two authorities and in particular where the issue is seized by a higher judicial forum, even if pending admission”.

On a Writ Petition filed by the assessee to challenge the order of the Tribunal dismissing the MA, the Bombay High Court allowed the petition and held as under:

“i) The least that can be said about the understanding of the legal provision by the Tribunal is that it is ex facie incorrect and erroneous. Merely because the assessee has challenged the order of the Tribunal in an Appeal u/s. 260A of the Incometax Act, 1961 before the High Court does not mean that the power under s/s. (2) of section 254 cannot be invoked either by the assessee or by the revenue/ Assessing Officer. Such a power enables the Tribunal to rectify any mistake apparent from the record and make amendments.

ii) That in a given case would not only save precious judicial time of the Tribunal but even of the higher Court. Only when the assessee or the Assessing Officer calls upon the Tribunal to undertake an exercise which is not permissible within the meaning of s/s. (2) of section 254 that the Tribunal can rely on the principle of judicial propriety or its reluctance or refusal to take upon itself the powers of the higher Court of Appeal. We can understand if the Tribunal had passed an order after considering the application made by the petitioner-assessee on its merits and in accordance with law.

iii) However, the refusal of the Tribunal to go ahead and reject the application only on the ground that the petitioner-assessee has invoked the appellate powers of higher Court cannot be sustained. That is contrary to the plain language of the two statutory provisions and which have been brought to our notice. Nothing contrary having been pointed out and such a view of the Tribunal may affect and prejudicially the interest of the revenue that all the more we cannot sustain the impugned order. The Writ Petition is allowed. The petitioner’s misc. application seeking to invoke the powers under s/s. (2) of section 254 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 shall now be heard by the Tribunal and it shall be decided in accordance with law.”

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Gift – Immovable property – Donor had reserved the right to enjoy the property during her life time did not affect the validity of the gift deed. – Transfer of Property Act, Section 122 & 123, 126.

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Renikuntla Rajamma (Dead) by LR vs. K. Sarwanamma; (2014) 9 SCC 445.

The appellant, a Hindu woman, executed a registered gift deed in respect of an immovable property in favour of the respondent reserving to herself the right to retain possession and to receive rents of the property during her lifetime. The gift was accepted by the respondent. But subsequently the appellant revoked the gift deed by a revocation deed. The respondent filed a suit assailing the revocation deed and seeking a declaration that the same was invalid and void ab initio. The trial court found that the appellant defendant had failed to prove that the gift deed set up by the respondent plaintiff was vitiated by fraud or undue influence or that it was a sham or nominal document. The gift, according to the trial court, had been validly made and accepted by the respondent plaintiff, hence, was irrevocable in nature. It was also held that since the appellant donor had taken no steps to assail the gift made by her for more than 12 years, the same was voluntary in nature and free from any undue influence, misrepresentation or suspicion. The fact that the appellant donor had reserved the right to enjoy the property during her lifetime did not affect the validity of the deed. Accordingly, the suit was decreed. The first appellate court and the High Court in second appeal concurred with the findings of the trial court.

The Hon’ble Court observed that sections 124 to 129 deal with matters like gift of existing and future property, gift made to several persons of whom one does not accept, suspension and revocation of a gift, and onerous gifts including effect of non-acceptance by the donee of any obligation arising thereunder. Section 123 calearly provides that a gift of immovable property can be made by a registered instrument signed by or on behalf of the donor and attested by at least two witnesses. When read with section 122 of the Act, a gift made by a registered instrument duly signed by or on behalf of the donor and attested by at least two witnesses is valid, if the same is accepted by or on behalf of the donee. That such acceptance must be given during the life time of the donor and while he is still capable of giving is evident from a plain reading of section 122 of the Act. A conjoint reading of sections 122 and 123 of the Act makes it abundantly clear that “transfer of possession” of the property covered by the registered instrument of the gift duly signed by the donor and attested as required is not a sine qua non for the making of a valid gift under the provisions of Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

The Court further observed that section 123 of the T.P. Act is in two parts. The first part deals with gifts of immovable property while the second part deals with gifts of movable property. Insofar as the gifts of immovable property are concerned, ssection 123 makes transfer by a registered instrument mandatory. This is evident from the use of word “transfer must be effected” used by Parliament in so far as immovable property is concerned. In contradistinction to that requirement the second part of section 123 dealing with gifts of movable property, simply requires that gift of movable property may be effected either by a registered instrument signed as aforesaid or “by delivery”. The difference in the two provisions lies in the fact that in so far as the transfer of movable property by way of gift is concerned the same can be effected by a registered instrument or by delivery. Such transfer in the case of immovable property no doubt requires a registered instrument but the provision does not make delivery of possession of the immovable property gifted as an additional requirement for the gift to be valid and effective. If the intention of the legislature was to make delivery of possession of the property gifted also as a condition precedent for a valid gift, the provision could and indeed would have specifically said so. Absence of any such requirement can only lead to the conclusion that delivery of possession is not an essential prerequisite for the making of a valid gift in the case of immovable property.

In the present case, the execution of registered gift deed and its attestation by two witnesses is not in dispute. It has also been concurrently held that the donee had accepted the gift. The recitals in the gift deed also prove transfer of absolute title in the gifted property from the donor to the donee. What is retained is only the right to use the property during the lifetime of the donor which does not in any way affect the transfer of ownership in favour of the donee by the donor.

There is indeed no provision in law that ownership in property cannot be gifted without transfer of possession of such property. As noticed earlier, section 123 does not make the delivery of possession of the gifted property essential for validity of a gift.

The High Court was in that view perfectly justified in refusing to interfere with the decree passed in favour of the donee. The appeal was hereby dismissed.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 40 dated 21st November, 2014

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Release of Foreign Exchange for Haj/Umrah pilgrimage

This circular permits persons going on Haj/Umrah pilgrimage to carry the entire BTQ entitlement in cash/up to the cash limit specified by the Haj Committee of India.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 39 dated 21st November, 2014

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External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) Policy – Parking of ECB proceeds

Presently, persons who have availed ECB have to immediately bring into India, for credit to their Rupee accounts with banks in India, ECB proceeds meant for Rupee expenditure in India for permitted end uses.

This circular permits a person who has availed ECB to park ECB proceeds (both under the automatic and approval routes) in term deposits with a bank in India for a maximum period of six months, subject to the under mentioned terms and conditions, pending utilisation for permitted end uses.

i. The applicable guidelines with respect to eligible borrower, recognised lender, average maturity period, all-incost, permitted end uses, etc. have been complied with.
ii. No charge in any form can be created on such term deposits i.e. to say that the term deposits should be kept unencumbered during their currency.

iii. Such term deposits must be exclusively in the name of the borrower.

iv. Such term deposits must be available for liquidation as and when required.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 38 dated 20th November, 2014

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Notification No. FEMA.321/2014-RB dated 26th September, 2014 Acquisition/Transfer of Immovable property – Payment of taxes

This circular clarifies that all transactions involving acquisition of immovable property in India by NRI/PIO/Non- Residents are subject to the applicable tax laws in India.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 37 dated 20th November, 2014

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Export of Goods/Software/Services – Period of Realisation and Repatriation of Export Proceeds – For exporters including Units in SEZs, Status Holder Exporters, EOUs, Units in EHTPs, STPs and BTPs

This circular states that all exporters, including Units in SEZ, Status Holder Exporters, EOU, Units in EHTP, STP & BTP, must uniformly realize and repatriate export proceeds with respect to export of goods/services/software within a period of 9 months from the date of export. However, in the case of exports made to warehouses established outside India, the period for realisation and repatriaton of export proceeds will continue to be 15 months from the date of export.

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SEBI Regulations 2014 on Share Based Benefits – important changes over the ESOPs Guidelines

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Background
SEBI has notified the SEBI
(Share Based Employee Benefits) Regulations 2014 (“the Regulations”) on
28th October 2014. They replace the SEBI (Employee Stock Option Scheme
and Employee Stock Purchase Scheme) Guidelines, 1999 (“the Guidelines”).
The Regulations come into force from that date. However, a transition
period has been given for certain specific matters as also generally to
bring all existing Schemes in conformity with the new Regulations.

The
new Regulations, though they have many amendments, are in many ways
similar in structure with the earlier Guidelines. However, the
Regulations now have far wider reach in three major aspects. Firstly,
they now specifically also cover share-based benefits such as Stock
Appreciation Rights. This is also made clear by the title of the
Regulations that now refers to generically sharebased employee benefits
other than stock options in place of Stock Options and Stock Purchase
schemes. Secondly, instead of providing specifically for how stock
options and share purchase schemes should be accounted for, the
Regulations essentially provide that the accounting shall be carried out
as per the Guidance Note/Accounting Standards of the Institute of
Chartered Accountants of India.

Thirdly, now, the Regulations
specifically provide for dealing in shares by schemes for employees
other than Schemes for stock options/share purchase. The earlier
Guidelines were more or less silent on this. As will be seen later, it
was found that many such schemes dealt in shares of the Company. The
concern was whether these were misused for various purposes. Now the
Regulations specifically recognise and permit, subject to conditions and
restrictions, purchase and otherwise dealing in shares of the Company.

Finally, the change in the legal status of the law from Guidelines to Regulations also has important implications.

These are discussed in detail hereafter.

Eligible employees
The
definition of employees has been modified. Employees of associate
companies (as defined in section 2(6) of the Companies Act, 2013) are
also eligible to such Schemes. Independent Directors are now
specifically ineligible. The conditions under which nominee directors of
institutions may be eligible have been made more elaborate.

Regulations specifically cover SARs
The
Guidelines did cover a form of Stock Appreciation Rights (SARs) but
this was indirect, and of a particular form only. They focused more on
stock option and share purchase schemes. Now, the Regulations provide
specifically for Schemes of SARs.

SARs provide for rights for
being paid for appreciation in the price of the shares. An employee
would thus be given a right to be paid for the increase in the value of
the shares from the date when the right was granted to the date when he
choses to exercise the SAR. The Regulations provide that he can choose
to be paid for the appreciation either in the form of cash or shares.

The
erstwhile Guidelines too did provide for cashless exercise of stock
options. This involved allotment of shares which would be handed over to
a stockbroker. The stock broker would then sell the shares. Of the sale
proceeds, the exercise price would be retained by the Company and the
appreciation paid to the employee.

The Regulations provide for
payment of appreciation directly by the Company without allotting any
shares. However, such appreciation can also be paid in the form of
shares.

The other features of SARs are similar to stock option/
share purchase schemes. There has to be a waiting period of one year
before exercise of the SARs.

General Employee Benefits Scheme (GEBS) and Retirement Benefit Schemes (RBS)
Two
new categories of Schemes have been now specifically covered. However,
such schemes are covered only if they deal or are intended to deal in
the shares of the company that they are required to comply with the
Regulations.

Such Schemes shall not hold more than 10% of their
assets as per the last audited balance sheet in the form of shares of
the Company. For this purpose, the book value or market value or fair
value of the assets is considered, whichever is the lowest.

To which Schemes are the Regulations applicable?
The
Guidelines applied to schemes set up by companies for issue of stock
options and share purchase. It was not clear whether other schemes that
also dealt in shares were also covered. It was seen that there were
Schemes that were for the benefit of the Company but were not apparently
controlled by the Company or its Promoters but also dealt in the shares
of the Company. Under what circumstances would such Schemes be
regulated? The Regulations now have specific provisions to deal with
this.

Firstly, they apply to Schemes of stock options, share
purchase, SARs, general employee benefits schemes and retirement benefit
schemes. Such Schemes should involve dealing in the shares of the
Company, directly or indirectly. Further, the Scheme should have a link
with the Company in any of the following ways:-

(i) the Scheme is set up by the Company or any other company in its group (the term group is widely defined); or
(ii) the Scheme is funded or guaranteed by the Company or any other company in its group; or
(iii) the Scheme is controlled or managed by the Company or any other company in its group.

The
Company of course needs to be a listed company. Thus, companies would
be free to set up Schemes for benefit of employees and the employees
themselves are free to set up such Schemes without being regulated by
SEBI. However, if they deal in the shares of the Company and are
connected with the company in any of the specified manner, then they
will need to comply with the provisions.

Dealing in shares by share based benefits Schemes
As
stated earlier, it was observed by SEBI that several Schemes were set
up apparently for the benefit of employees but dealt in the shares of
the company. They apparently were not connected with the company. They
held shares of the Company that were often acquired from the secondary
market. There were legitimate concerns that the object of such Schemes
was more to carry out illegitimate objects such as surreptitious holding
shares on behalf of the Promoters, carry out insider trading or price
manipulation, give market support to price at time of fall, etc. This
was of even more concern when funds of the Company were directly or
indirectly used.

SEBI did issue certain directions to require
control this aspect. However, it seems that it was also realised that
there may be legitimate reasons why certain Schemes may be required to
hold shares of the Company. The Regulations now provide for more
transparency and clarity. Such Schemes are now allowed to deal in shares
subject to certain restrictions and disclosures.Existing Schemes
holding shares are also required to comply after completion of a
transition period.

In case it is desired that share acquisition
be carried out through secondary acquisition or gift of shares, then
such Schemes should be administered through a Trust. There are certain
restrictions over appointment of Trustees to such Trusts. Further, in
such cases, specific and separate approval of the shareholders by way of
a special resolution is required to set up such Schemes.

SEBI lays down limits upto which the trusts administering such Schemes may hold shares. Stock options, share purchase and Sars may not hold shares more than 5% of the share capital of the Company in the year prior to which approval of the shareholders is obtained (as expanded by bonus/rights issues made later). For general benefits and retirement benefits Schemes, the maximum holding is 2%. however, all such Schemes put together cannot hold more than 5% shares. Such limits will not apply in case of gift of shares by the Promoters or other shareholders or where these are acquired by way of a fresh issue of shares.

The   yearly   cap   on   acquisition   of   shares   through secondary market by the trust is set at 2% of the paid up share capital as at the end of the preceding financial year.

In any case, the number of shares acquired through secondary market purchases cannot exceed the grant  of benefits in the form of stock options/share purchase/ Sars. If there are such excess holdings, they will need   to be appropriated within a reasonable period but not beyond the end of the following financial year. There is also generally a lock in period of six months, except for certain specified manner of disposal.

The trustees  of  such trusts  are  prohibited  from  voting on such shares. This will ensure that such shares are not acquired for supplementing the voting power of the Promoters/management.

Further,  the  holding  by  such trusts  will  not  be  counted as part of public holding. Companies would thus be required to maintain the minimum public holding as required by law.

Approval   of   Shareholders Broadly, the requirement of approval of shareholders for such Schemes remain the same as under the Guidelines, i.e., approval should be by way of a special resolution. However, separate approval shall be obtained in certain cases such as permitting acquisition of shares from the secondary market, grant of options etc. to employees of subsidiary/holding/associate companies, etc.

Accounting for stock options, etc.
Accounting for discount on issue of stock options, etc. has always  been  a  controversial  issue. the  Guidelines  had provided in fair detail how such discount should be computed and accounted. Companies were required to follow such accounting as a pre-condition for issue of stock options, etc. at a price they chose to determine. However,   it was seen that the accounting provisions were not very detailed particularly to cover the wide variety of such schemes in practice. Further, the accounting method created areas of potential difference between what was recommended by accounting bodies. The Regulations have now simplified the provisions. The accounting for such schemes shall be as per the Guidance note of ICAI or accounting Standards as may be prescribed by from time to time by the ICAI.

The  Guidance  note  of  the  ICAI  on accounting  for  employee Share Based payments covers such accounting requirements.

Transition Period
Companies that have existing Schemes are required to comply with the regulations within one year. Trusts holding shares in excess of the limits specified in the Regulations are required to bring down the holding in five years.

Regulations vs. Guidelines
The erstwhile Guidelines had, at best, dubious sanctity as an enforceable law. Several earlier important provisions relating to securities markets were in the form of Guidelines. It was uncertain to a large extent whether they could be enforced, whether acts/omissions in violation of law could make the transactions void and above all, whether SEBI could initiate adverse measures in the form of adverse directions, penalties and prosecutions against the parties.

As will be discussed later, it appeared that certain Schemes involved dealing in shares and it was felt that these dealing in shares were for purposes other than purely for benefit of employees. It may have been difficult to enforce the Guidelines or punish any violations in such cases.

Issue of the regulations cures these defects. Thus, this is an important change of the provisions relating to share-based benefits.

This  trend  of  changing  Guidelines  into  regulations  is seen in other areas as well and it is expected soon for the provisions in regard to corporate governance.

Conclusion
The  regulations,  while  not  overhauling  the  provisions relating to share-based benefits substantially, do make important changes, remove certain possibilities for abuse align the provisions with the new Companies act, 2013.

Part D: Ethics & Governance & Accountability

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Good Governance Day:
The government has announced that it will celebrate former Prime Minister Vajpayee’s birthday on 25th December as ‘Sushasan Diwas’ or ‘Good Governance Day’.

HRD Ministry is keen to celebrate 25th December as good governance day to mark the birthdays of A. B. Vajpayee and Madan Mohan Malaviya.

• Promise of Better Governance:
The fact that BJP regime is in power because of the promises they have made to provide better governance is a good sign for it puts pressure on the system to make a visible difference. The Modi government has embarked on an ambitious project – the attempt is to move from a mental model of governance being about dispensing resources to one that actively seeks outcomes, but this needs an ability to convert programmes into measurable and repeatable actions on the ground. This will need a dramatic overhaul of the administrative infrastructures, and its understanding of the nature of power. It might be relatively easier to ring in the big changes, but the real challenge might lie in the everyday experience of governance. Boring, predictable governance is the need of the hour but to deliver that what we need are sweeping administrative reforms. Other more glamorous reforms will be rendered meaningless without fixing the nuts and bolts of governance.

[Santosh Desai in the Times of India dated December 15]

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Co-operative Society- Right of Membership- Society has the right to refuse membership.

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Bandra Owners Court Co-op. Housing Society Ltd. vs. The Divisional Jt. Reg. of Co-op. Societies Mumbai, W.P. No. 1011/2010, dated 3/2/1015 (Bom.)(HC).

The Petitioner-Society is a Tenant Cooperative Society, as contemplated under Rule 10 of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Rules, 1961. The Respondent No. 5 applied for the transfer of shares and suit flat from the name of Respondent Nos. 3 and 4th members of the Petitioner Society on 24th January 2004. Respondent No. 3 was the Director of Respondent No. 5 and also the Secretary of Petitioner Society. The Society refused the said transfer for want of sufficient stamp and registration. The Society never accepted the payment on behalf of Respondent No. 5, and even through Respondent Nos. 3 and 4, and communicated their inability to transfer the suit flat. The Application filed by Respondent No. 5, was therefore rejected and the flat remained, so also the membership, in the name of Respondent Nos. 3 and 4. The Society returned the amount paid to it. Respondent Nos. 6 and 7, on 15th August 2008, filed an Application for transfer of the suit flat and shares from Respondent No. 5 to them. On 26th August 2008, the same was rejected as Respondent No. 5 was not the owner of the suit flat in the above background. Respondent Nos. 6 and 7, therefore, invoked section 23(1) of MCS Act, 1960 before the Deputy Registrar of Cooperative Societies on 13th April, 2009. The Registrar directed that they be admitted as members in respect of the suit shares and the suit flat. The Petitioner Society therefore, preferred a Revision Application and challenged the above order. Respondent No.1 the Divisional Joint Registrar by impugned order dated 15th December 2009, rejected the Revision Application, therefore, the Writ Petition was filed by the Society.

The Hon’ble Court observed that the MCS Act and Rules made there under makes provisions for members and membership and various classes of the same and the procedure to be followed for getting such membership. Mere filing of Application for getting membership is not sufficient. The Society is governed and run by the byelaws, which is basic requirement to consider to grant and/or refuse such membership. Normally, the Society, needs to grant membership if all other requisite elements and/or qualifications are satisfied. Even for rejection, the Society must give sufficient reason and/or must show the grounds for such refusal of admission. In the present case, for the above stated case, the Society refused to accept the membership Application.

The basic scheme and procedure so prescribed under the MCS Act referring to “Member”/”Membership”. Section 2(19)(a) provides the concept of “member”. The concept “deemed member” as provided in sections 22(2) and 23 is not defined. Section 22(2) deals with the members who became members and section 23 provides a procedure for open membership. For deciding the membership issue, the aspect of restriction on transfer or charge of share or interest, as contemplated u/s. 29 is also relevant, so also to maintain the register of members as contemplated u/s. 38 of the MCS Act. Rule 38 of the byelaws provides that the Society needs to follow the byelaws, which binds the Society, as well as, its members. Rule 19 deals with the conditions before admission for the membership. This also provides the detailed procedure to be followed by all the parties. Rule 24 deals with the procedure for transfer of shares, as no transfer of shares shall be effective unless the condition so provided under the Rules and the Act are fulfilled.

Thus for transfer of membership and/or shares, the concerned parties need to follow the various procedure and the supporting material and documents. The Society needs to apply its mind to the law, as well as, the related record before granting and/or refusing admission. The statutory Authorities are also under obligation to consider this, if the Society refused the membership and/or any challenge is made to grant such admission. These, are essential elements before considering the rival case, as well as, the contentions at every stage of admission of members and/or granting membership.

Merely because someone has claimed membership, a Society is not under obligation to grant the same. The lawful occupation, their rights, title and interest in the property, permissible transfer of shares and/or property and/or interest as per the byelaws and all related aspects, just cannot be overlooked by the concerned parties, including the Society, as well as, the Registrar/Authorities.

The Society having refused to grant admission with reasoned order, the interference by the Respondent Authority in the present facts and circumstances of the case and specifically by not giving the reasons in support of their reversal order as contemplated and by overlooking the provisions and procedures of the orders passed by the Authorities are unsustainable, therefore, required to be interfered with.

Thus, the Hon’ble Court held that the fact that Respondent Nos. 6 and 7 have purchased the property and are in occupation of the same since 2008; their entitlement based upon the said transaction and/or related agreements need to be reconsidered in accordance with law by the concerned Authorities afresh, by giving full opportunity to all the parties concerned. Further, the jurisdiction of Registrar u/s. 23, though nowhere contemplated to determine the validity and/or legality of the documents, which are executed in favour of the parties, but still the basic elements as contemplated under the scheme and the provisions as referred above, right from the byelaws of the Society, need to be looked into before granting and/ or refusing membership. The serious issue of validity and/ or legality of the documents may be the matter of trial and/ or inquiry before the appropriate forum, but that itself is not sufficient to deny the membership, if all requirements are prima facie satisfied.

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Advocate – Relationship between the Advocate and the client depends upon the trust between the parties – When the client wants to engage another Counsel, the earlier Lawyer has got no option, except to recuse himself from the case – Advocates Act section 30.

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S. Diwakar vs. Dy. Registrar, High Court of Madras, Chennai & Anr AIR 2015 (NOC) 300 (Mad.). The appellant is a Party-in-Person and practising Advocate.

The appellant was the counsel for the 2nd respondent in a matter before the Magistrate Court. The 2nd respondent for the reasons known to him substituted the appellant with some other counsel. The subsequent counsel had filed his vakalatanama in the matter. The appellant sent a letter to the 2nd Respondent stating that his action is against the rule of law. The said letter was followed by filing Writ Petition before the High Court. The appellant submitted that his fundamental right to practice as a Lawyer has been infringed. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate ought not to have noted the change of vakalath filed without following the required procedure.

The Hon’ble Court observed that during the proceedings, a vakalath had been filed on behalf of the second respondent by another Advocate. Admittedly, the consent of the appellant had not been obtained.

The relationship between the Advocate and the client is strictly professional. It depends upon the trust between the parties. The legal profession is not only a service but also a calling. Therefore, when the client wants to engage another counsel, the earlier Lawyer has got no option, except to recuse himself from the case. Acting as a Lawyer to a client is different from any other disputes inter se including the payment of fees etc.

The Court further observed that the any fundamental right of the appellant has not been infringed. It is not as if the appellant has been debarred from doing his profession. It is purely a personal dispute between the appellant on the one hand and the second respondent on the other hand. It is not the case of the appellant that the vakalatanama has not been signed by the second respondent. On the contrary, it is the case of the appellant that the learned X Metropolitan Magistrate, ought to have conducted an enquiry as the change of vakalatanama has been filed without obtaining his consent. Assuming, that the permission of the court is required that aspect, at the best, can be termed as a procedural one. The duty of the Magistrate is to conduct the case before him and not to resolve the inter se between the Lawyer and the party. The Petition was accordingly dismissed.

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Basics of Board Evaluation

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Introduction
In a typical public
company, the ownership and control are separated and the shareholders
extensively rely on the Board of Directors to represent their interests.
Whilst the Board of Directors is not running the company on a day-today
basis, which is the responsibility of the management, its involvement
in the form of timely decisions, guidance, direction and oversight plays
a key role in the effective functioning of the company. The way in
which the Board discharges its duties would go a long way in defining
the governance model of the company. These aspects underscore the fact
that the Board must, in addition to reviewing the performance of the
organisation and the management, also review its own performance to make
sure they are doing their duty diligently and effectively. Behavioural
psychologists and organisational learning experts agree that people and
organisations cannot learn without feedback. No matter how good a Board
is, it is bound to get better if it is reviewed intelligently. In view
of the importance attached to the Board, the Indian Companies Act, 2013
requires the evaluation of the performance of the board to add value to
the stakeholders and corporates.

Legal Requirement
The
Companies Act, 2013 has recognised the long felt need for having a
structured process for evaluation of the performance of the Board of
Directors. Section 178(2) of the Companies Act, 2013 mandates that the
Nomination and Remuneration Committee constituted by the Board shall
carry out an evaluation of the performance of every Director. In
addition, the Code for Independent Directors mandates that the
Independent Directors of a Company shall hold at least one meeting, in
which the performance of the non-independent directors and the Board as a
whole, shall be reviewed. Further, the quality, quantity and timeliness
of the flow of information between the Management and the Board shall
be evaluated. The performance of the independent directors shall also be
done by the entire Board excluding the director being evaluated. Based
on such evaluation, the Board’s report shall contain a statement
indicating the manner of evaluation and the conclusions thereof.

Evaluation Process
Typically,
the performance evaluation of the Board would be on the basis of a
benchmark which could be decided upfront and used for the purpose of
this exercise. The evaluation can also be carried out on specific
matters relating to each committee and those which would apply only at a
Board level as well.

With respect to the evaluation of the
individual directors, the performance evaluation could be done on the
basis of the following macro aspects:

-Allocated Roles and Responsibilities
-Strategic Thinking
-Risk Management
-Core Governance and Compliance Management
-Independence & Ethics
-Corporate Culture
-Compliance with the Code of Conduct of Directors
-Industry/Entity Knowledge
-Talent Management
-Leadership Style
-Unbiased Approach
-Effectiveness of Decision Making
-Entity Performance

In addition, the following specific aspects could also be considered for performance evaluation:

-Attendance and contribution to the meetings
-Application of financial/technical/legal/treasury/other expertise on specific matters
-Quality of debate
-Extent of communications with executive management
-Relationship with other Board members
-Personal eminence and the reputation
-Quality of the feedback provided to the management

The
Act does not stipulate the timing or the period for evaluation of the
Board. Hence, a company could either decide to do the evaluation on an
annual basis similar to the policy followed for its employees or deal
with it by having any other review period on a systematic basis. Each
company needs to assess the specific aspects applicable to it and then
consider the frequency/ periodicity of the evaluation. The review could
be done at a pre-determined frequency or could be performed on an “as
needed” basis. The “as needed” approach may work in situations where the
Board has a clear policy on the triggers that would prompt an
evaluation. However, in situations where such guidelines are not
available, then it is possible that the need for performance evaluation
may be overlooked. Performing the evaluation on an annual basis is the
most common frequency as this in line with the annual planning cycle
and, therefore, useful in adapting the performance expectations with the
strategic needs of the organisation. However, a predictable frequency
could result in the evaluation becoming mundane and routine.

On
an overall level, the performance evaluation should be an ongoing
process and not just an annual event. One of the best practices is to
devise other mechanisms in addition to the annual review to ensure
ongoing performance improvement. Irrespective of the period chosen, the
same may be followed in letter and spirit and on a consistent basis.

Attributes
of a Successful Governance Oversight Model Identifying an appropriate
governance oversight model is the basic starting point for having a
robust evaluation platform. All the subsequent activities will be driven
by this. In general, a successful governance oversight model should
encompass the following attributes:

-Competence – skills required for the Board to effectively execute its responsibilities
-Understands corporate governance and its application to Board structure, operations, processes, and procedures
-Understands the organisation, its businesses, and underlying drivers
-Has relevant, recent experience in the industry, adjacent industries and markets, or competitors
-Has knowledge of the interests and priorities of stakeholders
-Process – processes required for the Board to both understand and properly oversee the activities of the entity
-Understands the risks inherent in the organization’s governance programmes
-Selects qualified, independent Board members, aligning overall Board composition with the organization’s strategy
-Establishes and periodically reaffirms Board leadership
-Establishes and ensures compliance with Board operating principles and governance policies
-Designs and implements a committee structure that complements and enhances the work of the Board
-Assesses and continually improves the Board, its leaders, and committees
-Engages with stakeholders
-Oversees public disclosures related to Board operations
-Information – information required by the Board adequate to support effective oversight and decision making
-Receives verbal and/or written feedback and development plans resulting from periodic assessments
-Receives Board governance documents and related tools (e.g., Board calendars, planning tools) for review and improvement
-Receives thought leadership or continuing education related to Board governance developments
-Behaviour – Board’s behaviour to support and reinforce strong oversight
-Displays ownership and commitment to governance excellence and continuous improvement
-Creates a culture of collaboration, engagement, and healthy tension among Board members
-Holds Board members accountable for their behaviour.

Techniques of Evaluation
The
evaluation can be done by using qualitative techniques such as
interviews, feedbacks, etc. or through quantitative techniques such as
surveys, scorecards, questionnaires etc. A typical questionnaire/
scorecard would cover the aspects indicated under “what will be
evaluated?” and in particular the following aspects:

Composition and Quality
-Understanding the business and risks
-Process and procedures
–    Oversight of the financial reporting process and internal controls
–    assessing related party transactions
–    understanding competitive landscape
–    understanding risks relating to management override, including significant judgements, assumptions and estimates.
–    fair compensation.
–    Communication with employees, vendors and customers
–    adequacy and effectiveness of Board initiated/ monitored mechanisms such as Code of Conduct, Whistle Blower Policy, PTR, CSR Policy, etc.
–    oversight of the audit function
–    ethics and compliance
–    monitoring activities
–    Strategy effectiveness
–    management relationship
–    Succession Planning & training.

Further,   this   could   be   done   through   face   to   face discussions, telephonic conversations, e-mails, web based scoring modules etc. Irrespective of the evaluation technique used, due care should be taken in documenting the process and the conclusions reached.

The next step in the process is to decide who will perform the evaluation – whether internally (by the nomination and remuneration Committee) or using specialist consultants or external experts. the decision regarding the same will need to be taken after considering the following factors:
–    autonomy of the Board
–    Board Culture and dynamics
–    Confidentiality
–    Perception of Bias
–    need for transparency and objectivity
–    Skills and experience of Performing evaluations
–    time and Cost.

The  general  process  to  be  followed  could  be  to  obtain the self-evaluation from the individual directors about the individual and also about the Board which forms the basis for an independent evaluation by the designated person/ committee/authority.

Evaluation Feedback
The  feedback  to  the  Board  could  be  provided  not  only by the members of the Board, but to make it more transparent and comprehensive, the participant base could be extended to cover the internal and external stakeholders  as  well.  Typically,  the  internal  participants who could be consulted for obtaining the feedback on the performance of the Board could be the CEO and other key managerial personnel who interact with the Board on various matters. Similarly, the external participants could range from the shareholders, key customers & suppliers, internal & external auditors. Whilst the internal participant could provide a more specific feedback, the external participants could provide a general feedback about the company/culture which would reflect the performance of the Board.

The  Board  should  agree  upfront  the  required  actions that it can take to improve governance. the performance assessment of the Board would typically be discussed by the Board collectively. With respect to the performance assessment of the individual director, generally the same will be discussed by the Chairman of the Board with the concerned member/director. The practice of releasing the summary of the results of the Board’s performance to the entire organisation is also considered as one of the best practices in connection with the Board evaluation process worldwide.

Whilst section 134 (3)(o) of the Companies act, 2013 requires only a statement indicating the manner in which the formal annual evaluation has been made by the Board of its own performance and that of its committees and individual directors and the results of the individual evaluation, distribution of the results of the evaluation to stakeholders would be decided by each company based on various factors including the governance model followed, expectations, complexities, culture etc. Irrespective of the method adopted and the regulatory provisions, the Board should keep in mind that the process of performance evaluation, providing the required feedback and the extent of sharing such feedback with others would reflect its commitment to the entire governance process!

Conclusion
Performance evaluation is very important for the Board for not only in meeting the regulatory requirement but also in setting the right tone at the top. This is one of the key mechanisms for the Board to demonstrate its commitment to continuing improvement. It would be a great value multiplier tool for the company, directors and all those stakeholders who will be impacted by the functioning of the company.

When the Board recognises the importance of this process and attributes sanctity and importance to this process, and implements it with all vigour, this would help in building a sound corporate structure which can avert governance failures. Whilst the process is new to india, the experience gained in implementation would help Indian corporates in fine-tuning it on a continuous basis.

To Consolidate or not to Consolidate

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Introduction
Section 129(3) of the Companies Act, 2013, requires a company having one or more subsidiaries, to prepare consolidated financial statements (CFS), in addition to separate financial statements. The second proviso to this section states that the Central Government may provide for the consolidation of accounts of companies in such manner as may be prescribed.

Rule 6 in the Companies Accounts Rules deal with manner of consolidation of accounts. The rule states that “The consolidation of financial statements of the company shall be made in accordance with the provisions of Schedule III of the Act and the applicable accounting standards.”

The MCA has recently amended the Company Accounts Rules whereby a new proviso has been added in the Rule 6. The proviso states that “Provided also that nothing in this rule shall apply in respect of consolidation of financial statement by a company having subsidiary or subsidiaries incorporated outside India only for the financial year commencing on or after 1st April 2014.”

Question 1
Whether the above proviso exempts companies from preparing CFS or the exemption relates only to manner of preparing CFS?

Author’s View
The exemption relates only to the manner of preparing CFS and not the preparation of CFS itself. To support this view, the following two arguments can be made:

• The requirement to prepare CFS is arising from the Companies Act 2013. Rule 6 deals only with the manner of preparing CFS, i.e., preparation of CFS as per notified AS and Schedule III. Hence, the exemption relates only to the manner of preparation of CFS. Thus, a company covered under the above proviso can prepare CFS as per any acceptable framework, say, IFRS, instead of CFS as per notified accounting standards/Schedule III. A company covered under the proviso can also prepare CFS as per any other GAAP (other than Ind AS where the dates are those prescribed by the roadmap) say, US GAAP for filing with the Registrar of Companies (ROC). But if the company also needs to comply with the listing agreement requirements, they permit either Indian GAAP or IASB IFRS.

• Hence, for a listed company, in order to meet both ROC requirements and listing requirements, the option is either Indian GAAP or IASB IFRS (for one year). However, a company cannot avoid preparing CFS.

• Presently, there are few companies who are currently preparing IASB IFRS CFS as per the option given in the listing agreement. If these companies are required to prepare Indian GAAP CFS for year ended March 2015, they will have to transit from IASB IFRS to Indian GAAP for March 2015. In March 2016, these companies will move to Ind AS (i.e., IFRS converged standards) once Ind AS become voluntarily applicable for financial years beginning on or after 1st April 2015. It is understood that the MCA has added this proviso in the rules to avoid this flip flop.

Question 2
Whether the exemption discussed above is available for companies which have overseas subsidiaries only or a company having both Indian and foreign subsidiaries can also use this exemption?

Author’s View
The proviso is based on companies having one or more overseas subsidiaries. It does not matter whether a company has Indian subsidiary or not. In other words, this proviso can be used both by companies having (a) only foreign subsidiary/ies and (b) companies having both Indian and foreign subsidiary/ies.

Question 3
Whether the exemption is available only for one year or it will be available going forward also?

Author’s View
The proviso uses the words “only for the financial year commencing on or after 1st April 2014.” Hence, this exemption is available only for one year, for example financial year ending 31st March 2015 or 31st December 2015.

Question 4
Section 129(3) of the 2013 Act requires that a company having one or more subsidiaries will, in addition to separate financial statements (SFS), prepare CFS. Hence, all companies, including non-listed and private companies, having subsidiaries need to prepare CFS. Whether the comparative numbers need to be given in the first set of CFS presented by an existing group?

Author’s View
Schedule III states that except for the first financial statements prepared by a company after incorporation, presentation of comparative amounts is mandatory. In contrast, transitional provisions to AS 21 exempt presentation of comparative numbers in the first set of CFS prepared even by an existing group.

One view is that there is no conflict between transitional provisions of AS 21 and Schedule III. AS 21 gives one exemption that is not allowed under the Schedule III. Hence, presentation of comparative numbers is mandatory in the first set of CFS prepared by an existing company. This interpretation is taken on the basis that when there are two legislations; one of which imposes a more stringent requirement, the stringent requirement would apply.

The other view is that Schedule III is clear that in case of any conflict between Accounting Standards and Schedule III, Accounting Standards will prevail over the Schedule III. Hence, exemption given under AS 21 can be availed by an existing group which prepares CFS for the first time. In other words, an existing Group preparing CFS for the first time need not give comparative information in their first CFS prepared under AS 21.

Both the views appear acceptable.

Question 5
Consider that a non-listed company is preparing CFS in accordance with AS 21 for the first time. It has acquired one or more subsidiaries several years back. Is the company required to go back at the date of acquisition of investment for calculating goodwill/ capital reserve on acquisition?

Authors view
Goodwill/ capital reserve arising on acquisition of subsidiary should be calculated with reference to the date of acquisition of investment in subsidiary. Thus, determining goodwill for an acquisition that took place many years ago may be very challenging. The transitional provisions to AS 21 exempt a company, which is preparing CFS for the first time, from presenting comparative information. There is no exemption from the requirement to determine goodwill/ capital reserve. Hence, any goodwill/ capital reserve arising on acquisition should be determined at the acquisition date.

Let us assume that a company has acquired a subsidiary more than 10 years back, which should have resulted in goodwill arising on the acquisition. Under Indian GAAP, a company is allowed to amortise goodwill over its useful life, say, 5 to 10 years. Alternatively, the company may only test the goodwill for impairment. In this case, the company may argue that in the past, it has amortised goodwill over its useful life, say, 5 to 10 years. Consequent to amortisation, the net carrying value of goodwill on the date of first preparation of CFS is zero. The corresponding impact of goodwill amortisation has gone into profit or loss of the earlier periods and impacts the cumulative retained earnings at the date of first preparation of CFS. The application of this view obviates the need to go back in history for computing goodwill arising on acquisition. However, it impacts the amount of retained earnings and net worth on the transition date. If a company does not wish to have such impact and desires to disclose goodwill amount, it needs to go back in the history for calculating goodwill/ capital reserve arising on acquisition.

In the case of acquisitions made in recent history, say, in past 3-4 years, it may not be possible to take a view that the goodwill is fully amortised. In this case, the company will need to go back in history to determine goodwill arising on acquisition. The amount of goodwill reflected in the first CFS will depend on the company’s policy for goodwill amortisation with respect to past years.

To ensure that goodwill is not carried at amount higher than its recoverable amount, the company will have to test if goodwill is impaired at the transition date in accordance with AS 28 Impairment of Assets.

[2015] 54 taxmann.com 377 (Ahmedabad – Trib.) ITO vs. Heubach Colour Pvt. Ltd A.Y: 2007-08, Dated: 23.01.2015

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Sections 9(1)(vi), 195 – Outright purchase of know-how is not “royalty” under the Act

Facts:
The Taxpayer an Indian Company, engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of colour pigments and fine chemicals, purchased a particular line of business of a foreign company (NR Co) and certain payments were made towards knowhow.

The Taxpayer contended that the payments made to NR Co. were for outright purchase of capital assets.However, the Tax Authority contended that payments made by the Taxpayer were Royalty u/s. 9(1)(vi) of the Act, therefore treated the Taxpayer as assessee-in-default for failure to withhold taxes u/s. 195.

Held:
The agreement between the Taxpayer and NR Co indicates that the taxpayer had purchased knowhow, trademarks and goodwill from NR Co.

NR Co was the owner of manufacturing processes, formulae, trade secrets, technology, analytical techniques, testing procedures, processes and all documents and literature pertaining to manufacturing. NR Co sold, assigned conveyed and transferred to Taxpayer its entire right, title, interest and ownership in such rights. Thus, NR Co ceased to have right, title, interest and ownership in such rights from the date of transfer.
The Delhi High Court in the case of Asia Satellite Telecommunications Co. Ltd. (332 ITR 340) observed that royalty refers to transfer of “rights in respect of property” and not transfer of “right in the property”. The two transactions are distinct and have different legal effects. In the first category, the rights are purchased which enable use of those rights by the purchaser, while in the second category, no purchase is involved, only right to use has been granted.

The definition of term ‘royalty’ in respect of the copyright, literary, artistic or scientific work, patent, invention, process, etc. does not extend to outright purchase of right to use an asset.

Since nothing was brought on record by the tax authority to show that the payment was not for the purchase of technical knowhow, they were not in the nature of royalty.

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[2015] 54 taxmann.com 300 (Mumbai-Trib.) Mckinsey Business Consultants Sole Partner LLC vs. DDIT (IT) A.Y: 2011-12, Dated: 13.02.2015

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Article 3, 17 of India – Greece DTAA – Where DTAA does not have a specific article on FTS the services would be taxable as business profits and not as other income under the DTAA.

Facts:

The Taxpayer, a company incorporated in Greece entered into a transaction of providing certain services to an Indian branch of one of its associate entity. The Taxpayer did not offer to tax income received in respect of such services in India. The Taxpayer was of the view that income for services would fall under business income article of the DTAA . In absence of a PE in India, such business profits would not be liable to tax in India.

However, the Tax Authority contended that the services were in the nature of FTS under S. 9(1)(vi) of the Act as well as the DTAA .

On appeal before the dispute resolution panel (DRP), it was held that if DTAA is silent on certain source of income the same should be taxable as per the provisions of the Act. Aggrieved the taxpayer appealed before the Tribunal.

Held:
A bare reading of Article 17 (other income article) of India- Greece DTAA indicates that it deals with residual items of income which are not covered by any of the articles of the DTAA .

However, in this case the assessee has earned income by rendering the services in the course of its business and therefore, it is nothing but business profit which is covered under business profits article viz, Article 3 of the treaty. Admittedly the assessee does not have PE in India and hence, as per the express provision of Article 3 of the DTAA, business profit cannot be taxed in India.

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TS-70-ITAT-2015 (Del) Qualcomm incorporated vs. ADIT A.Y: 2005-09, Dated: 20.02.2015

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Section 9(1)(vi) – Royalty paid by one NR to another NR would be
taxable in India if it is paid in respect of patents used for the
purpose of carrying on business in India or for earning any income from a
source in India. On facts and in the context of CDMA technology , where
it can be shown that royalty is paid for license used in manufacturing
products specific to India, such license may be treated as used in
carrying on business in India.

Facts:
The
Taxpayer, a company incorporated in the US, was engaged in the business
of designing, developing, manufacturing and marketing digital wireless
communication products and services based on “Code Division Multiple
Access” (CDMA) technology. The Taxpayer owned certain patents pertaining
to CDMA technology.

The Taxpayer granted a non-transferable and
non-exclusive, worldwide patent licence to NR Original Equipment
manufacturers (OEMs) outside India to manufacture and sell CDMA
handsets/ infrastructure equipment (CDMA products).

For
exploitation of patent license, OEMs were required to pay a
non-refundable licence fee and an on-going royalty based on sale of CDMA
products. Royalties were to be computed as a percentage of the selling
price of the products manufactured by the OEMs. As per the agreement
between the taxpayer and OEM, royalty would become due as and when the
CDMA product was invoiced, shipped, sold, leased or put to use,
whichever was earlier.

OEMs manufactured CDMA products outside
India and sold them to telecom operators/service providers (SP)
worldwide, including India.

The issue before the Tribunal was
whether the royalty paid by NR OEMs to the Taxpayer (relating to
handsets /equipment sold/ used by OEMs in India) were taxable in India.
In other words, whether the royalty payment will be taxable in the
jurisdiction where the handsets/equipment are manufactured or in the
jurisdiction where they are used.

Held:
Under the Act

The
determining factor in royalty taxation is the place where the
intellectual property (IP) is used. i.e., the emphasis is on the situs
of use of the IP.

In connection with the patents, the event
triggering taxation is (i) granting of a right, licence or sub licence
in a patent, or (ii) sharing of information concerning use or working of
a patent. It is thus taxation of income of the person owning the
patents and it is taxation in the jurisdiction of end use of patents.

The emphasis is on the “situs of use” of the patent rather than “situs of the entity” making payment for the royalty.

If
a patent is used in a manufacturing process, royalty taxation should be
in the jurisdiction where manufacturing takes place. However, where
patent is used by the end consumer and the manufacturing is only a
conduit for collection of royalty for use from the end customer, it
should be taxable in end use jurisdiction.

As per the royalty
source rule u/s. 9(1)(vi), the situs is in India if the usage of patent
is for the purpose of (i) carrying on business or profession in India
(first limb) or (ii) earning income from a source in India (second
limb).

On carrying on a business or profession in India

Carrying
on business wholly in India or exclusively in India is not a sine qua
non for attracting taxability u/s. 9(1) (vi)(c). Even when business is
partly carried out in India but the royalties are payable in respect of
such part of the business as is carried on in India, it would be taxable
in India.

When an entity has a PE in a jurisdiction it would
imply that such an entity is carrying on business in the jurisdiction in
which such PE is situated.

Where the core manufacturing
activity with respect to CDMA products is carried out in one
jurisdiction but the sales and marketing activity in respect of the same
product is carried out in another jurisdiction (India), it cannot be
said that the business is not carried on in that other jurisdiction
(India).

Thus even where OEM do not manufacture CDMA products in
India, but makes India-specific products and carries out a part of his
business operation in India, it would be sufficient for section
9(1)(vii) to apply.

The principle that sale to customers in
India would amount to business with India and not business in India (as
observed in earlier ruling of ITAT ) would hold good only where there
was no material to suggest that any activity is carried on in India.
Thus by analogy even where NR has some operations in India, it can be
said to carry on business in India.

Thus, whether or not the OEMs carried on business in India would depend on two questions;

-Whether the CDMA handsets were made India specific and
-Whether OEM, as a part of his business, was carrying on any operations in India.

The
Andhra Pradesh High court (HC) in the case of Asifuddin [(2005)
Criminal Law Journal 4314 AP] had examined the working of the CDMA
technology and concluded that CDMA handsets are service provider
specific. However, it was argued by the Taxpayer that the CDMA handsets
sold in India were not service provider specific.

The issue was
remanded back to Tax Authority for a fresh examination on the aspects of
whether the OEMs made India specific products, whether OEMs had PE in
India.

On earning income from a source in India
The
expression ‘for the purpose of making or earning any income from any
source in India’ not only involves active earnings such as a business in
India but also a passive earning by exploiting an asset (both tangible
and intangible) in India.

The taxation of royalties for use of a
patented technology will have the situs where the technology is used.
Accordingly, when the royalty is for use of a technology in
manufacturing, it is to be taxed at the situs of manufacturing the
product, and, when the royalty is for use of technology in functioning
of the product so manufactured, it is to be taxed at the situs of use.

In
the present case, taxpayer owns the patent and royalty is for use of
patented technology, while the point of its collection, as a measure of
convenience and in consonance with the industry practice, is from
manufacturer when the patented product is put into use by sale.

Whether
or not patents are used in the manufacturing of the handset or for the
use of the patented technology embedded in the CDMA handsets is a highly
technical aspect requiring opinion of technical expert. The matter was
remitted back to Tax Authority for further examination.

Under the DTAA   

Article
12(7)(b) of the India-USA DTAA provides that royalty shall arise in
India if it relates to the use of or the right to use the right or
property in India.

Patents can be said to be used in India only
when royalty is paid for the use of patents in CDMA products sold in
India and not for the use of CDMA technology for the manufacture of CDMA
products outside India.

The Tribunal abstained from ruling on
Article 12(7)(b) as this issue was remanded back for consideration based
on opinion of technical expert.

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TS-147-ITAT-2015 (PAN) ACIT vs. Ajit Ramakant Phatarpekar and Neelam Ajit Phatarpekar A.Y: 2010-11, Dated: 16.03.2015

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Section 9 –For withholding of tax, law prevailing at the time of payment is applicable; hence, retrospective amendment does not create withholding default

Facts:
The Taxpayer, an Indian resident, made payments to nonresident (NR) parties for monitoring, supervision of discharged cargo, undertaking draft survey, joint sampling of such discharged cargo, photographs, sample preparation, sealing of samples, analysis of grade etc. The services were rendered outside India by the NR.

The Taxpayer did not withhold tax on payments made to NR in the belief that payments made to NR did not constitute FTS under the Act and further that income from services rendered outside India did not accrue or arise in India as NR did not have a Permanent establishment (PE) in India and services were rendered outside India.

Tax Authority contended that by virtue of retrospective amendment to Explanation to section. 9, income of NR is deemed to accrue or arise in India irrespective of whether NR has a place of business in India or whether services are rendered in India. Hence, such income is taxable in India under the Act.

Held:
The Tribunal did not analyse the nature of payments made by the Taxpayer and held that once the payment is in the nature of Fee for technical services (FTS), Explanation to section 9 becomes applicable. Explanation to section 9 introduced by the Finance Act, 2010 (retrospectively with effect from 1st June 1976) provides that FTS will be deemed to accrue and arise in India whether or not NR has residence or place of business or business connection in India or the NR has rendered services in India.

It is undisputed that NR does not have a place of business or business connection in India and neither does NR render services in India. Thus, income from services to Taxpayer accrues or arises outside India. However, by virtue of Explanation to section 9, the same is regarded as deemed to accrue or arise in India.

In the present facts, payments were made by the Taxpayer before the retrospective amendment to Explanation to section 9. Thus at the time of payment, there was no provision under the Act, deeming FTS to accrue or arise in India and hence, the Taxpayer was not liable to withhold taxes on payments made to NR. The Tribunal held that the law prevailing at the time of payment has to be kept in mind. Since at the time of payments, income was not regarded as accruing or arising in India, there was no need to withhold taxes at the time of making payments.

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Some US Tax Issues concerning NRIS/US Citizens Part II

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In our previous article, an attempt was made to answer some basic issues pertaining to the US tax laws related to Non-resident Indians1 (NRIs) including Indian expatriates working in the US or those who are the US Citizens or Green Card holders who are not tax residents of the USA and brief discussion on enactment of FATCA and its impact, Residential Status in the US, Exempt Income in the US, FBAR (FinCEN Reporting) and Form 8938 reporting. To take a step further, this article2 attempts to throw light on taxation of passive income (such as Capital Gains, Dividend and rental income). In order to elucidate issues clearly, they are discussed in a Questions- Answers format.

Introduction
In the USA, complying with the tax laws can be very challenging as the same is fraught with complications. Indian Citizens who have moved to the US for employment or for better prospects and in the process have become residents of the US or Green Card Holders should understand the nuances of local tax laws very carefully and start strictly complying with the same from day one. Non compliance or non awareness of taxability of certain income in US can be a very costly affair, as the US has one of most stringent laws with respect to interest and penalty provisions for non compliance.

If you are a tax resident (even if a non citizen i.e. resident alien) in the US, then you are taxed on your worldwide income, just as in case of a Citizen of the USA. In other words, you are taxed on your worldwide income in US2 during the period u you are tax resident of the USA. In the US, the income is basically categorized in two types of Income i.e.,

Trade or business income or
Passive Income (Capital Gains, Dividends, Rental Income etc.) In this article, we would discuss the nuances regarding the taxability of passive income of the US tax residents from outside the USA (i.e., from India) both in the US and India. We would also touch upon the taxability (in both jurisdictions) of passive income arising to Indian Residents from the US.

Capital Gains from Sale of Immovable Property situated in India

1. How capital assets are defined for “Resident Alien”3 in the US and how their cost is determined? Whether a “Resident alien” in US is required to declare his capital assets located in India?

Capital Assets in the US are defined to mean almost everything one owns and uses, for personal or investment purposes. Examples include a home, personal-use items like household furnishings, car and stocks or bonds held as investments.

The US IRS (Internal Revenue Service) uses the term “Basis of Assets” for the cost. Basis is the amount of investment in asset for tax purposes. The basis is the amount one pays for it in cash, debt obligations, and other property or services. It includes sales tax and other expenses connected with the purchase. For stocks or bonds, basis is the purchase price plus any additional costs such as commissions and recording or transfer fees. Basis is increased to incorporate cost of improvements and decreased to consider depreciation, non dividend distribution on stock/stock splits etc.

“Resident Alien” in the US is required to report capital assets wherever located while filing his tax return in Form 8938 or FBAR as may be applicable. Thus, it can be seen that the definition of “Capital Asset” under the US tax law is quite similar to the Indian tax laws.

2. What are the provisions pertaining to Long term capital gains on sale of Immovable properties located in India and pertaining to the US resident alien?

In India, sale of Immovable property is considered as long term, if it is sold 3 years after its date of acquisition. Long Term Capital Gains from immovable property situated in India is taxed @ 20% plus 3% Education Cess + Surcharge, as may be applicable. However, as per the US Tax law, the time period for computing “Long term asset” is one year. In US, the tax rate on Long term Capital Gains depends upon the ordinary income tax bracket of an individual.

3. Can a NRI (Who is Resident Alien in the USA) claim exemption in India of Capital gains earned from sale of Immovable Property situated in India?

Section 54 to 54F of the Income-tax Act, 1961 contains provisions regarding exemptions/relief from Long Term Capital Gains in India. These exemptions/reliefs are subject to fulfillment of certain conditions. Exemptions are available if capital gain earned is invested in a residential house situated in India or some specified bonds in India. These sections restrict the exemption to an individual and HUF. The exemption is not dependent on the residential status or citizenship of the seller/assessee. Thus a NRI residing outside India can claim exemption [as per provisions of section 54 to section 54F] in respect of the sale proceeds/capital gains arising from transfer of a long term capital asset.

Further as per section 54 and 54F, capital gains are exempted if NRI invests in a new house property. As per the recent Amendment in the Income Tax Law4, the location of the new house property should be in India.

4. H ow Capital Gains earned in India by a NRI (who is a “Resident Alien” of US) are taxed in USA? Can he claim tax exemption in the US for the property sold in India?

Capital Gains arising in India in the hands of a NRI, who is a Resident tax Alien in the US, will be computed in the US as per the US tax laws, irrespective of the tax treatment that gains suffered in India. As per the US tax laws, Long term Capital Gains on sale of a main home, is exempted up to $ 2,50,000/5- subject to certain conditions. Exemption of $ 250,000/6 – for sale of a property depends on the ownership requirement and use requirement.

However, when the US resident alien files his tax return in the US, he/she has to take into account the difference in the time period for calculating long term capital gain, the exemption available as per the tax laws of US and treat his Indian capital gains as per the time period specified in the US law.

NRI can claim a foreign tax credit in his/her US tax return as per India – USA DTAA .

To elucidate the matters more clearly, let us consider an example (it will be not possible to cover and analyse all types of situations that may arise in real life situations) which is given below in Q 5.

5. Mr. Rich, a NRI and “US Resident Alien” owns a house in New York, USA (being his Main Home) and a Flat in Mumbai. He sells the Flat in Mumbai for Rs. 75 lakh and earns Rs. 55 lakh as Long term Capital Gains. Can he invest Rs. 50 lakh in REC/NHAI Bonds u/s. 54EC? What would be implications under the US Tax Law? What are the Implications under India – US DTAA?

As per the India US DTAA , Capital Gains are taxed in India as well as USA in accordance with the provisions of the respective domestic tax laws. Therefore, the capital gains arising from the sale of flat in Mumbai would be taxable in India.

As explained above a NRI residing outside India can claim exemption under section 54 to section 54F of the Incometax Act, 1961. Thus, out of the capital gains arising from transfer of a flat i.e. long term capital asset the investment under 54EC is permissible.

Mr. Rich being a US resident will pay taxes on Capital Gains of Rs. 55 lakh as per the US Law. As his house in New York is the “main home” (satisfies the ownership and the user requirement of the main home), he will be not able to take the benefit of the exclusion provided as per the US Laws for the Mumbai Flat7 . Though, as per India – US DTAA he would be allowed credit for the taxes paid in India against the taxes payable in US.

6.    What are the provisions relating to Capital gains arising from shares, debentures and Bonds in India? Can a NRI claim exemption from Capital gains u/s. 10(38) of the Income-tax Act earned from sale of equity shares of Indian Companies?

Taxability in india
Profits and gains earned on sale of any shares, debentures, mutual funds and other securities are taxed under the head of “Capital Gains” under the income-tax act, 1961.

Gains on shares, debt or balanced schemes of mutual funds, are defined as Long term capital Gain if the same are held for more than 12 months.

Short  term  Capital  Gains  on  sale  of  shares  or  mutual funds which are debt oriented are taxed at normal rate of tax along with other taxable income. However, Short term Capital Gains on sale of equity shares or units of an equity oriented fund on which STT is paid, is taxed at the rate of 15% plus 3% education cess plus curcharge as may be applicable.

Long term Capital Gains (LTCG) from sale of equity shares or unit of equity oriented mutual fund listed in india on which Stt is paid, is exempt u/s. 10(38) for both residents and non-residents.  However,  LTCG  from  unlisted  securities shall  be  taxed  at  10%.  LTCG  on  Listed  Securities  on which Stt is not paid is taxed @ 10% without indexation, whereas taxed @ 20% with indexation plus 3% education cess plus curcharge as may be applicable.

7.    How Capital gains earned in India by a NRI, who is a US Resident Alien, are taxed in USA?

Taxability in the USA

In  the  US,  the  tax  rates  on  Long  term  and  Short  term Capital Gain will depend on tax brackets of the ordinary income of an individual. Given below is the table of various

Tax rates applicable8 to an individual depending upon his/ her tax bracket:-

tax Brackets
for a
Single individual

ordinary
income tax rate

long term capital Gain rate

Short term capital
Gain
rate

$0 – $9075

10%

0%

10%

$9076 – $36900

15%

0%

15%

$36901 – $89350

25%

15%

25%

$89351 – $186350

28%

15%

28%

$186351 – $405100

33%

15%

33%

$405101 – $406750

35%

15%

35%

$406751 & Above

39.6%

20%

39.6%

Let us consider one more example to understand the impact under both tax laws:-

Mr. Rich, a NRI and US Resident Alien, owns Rs. 10 crore worth of shares of listed Indian Companies. he sells all the shares and earns long term Capital gains of Rs. 5 crore and Short Term Capital gains of Rs. 1 crore. What are the implications under India and US Tax law? Whether such Capital gains would be taxable in the US? Can Mr. Rich claim tax credit in US of taxes paid in india?

Implications as per Income-Tax Act, 1961
As per section 5 of the income-tax act, any income arising in india will be taxable in india. however, Long term Capital Gains on sale of equity Shares is exempt u/s. 10(38) of the act. Though, Short term Capital Gains arising from sale of equity shares would be taxable at the rate of 15% (plus 3% education Cess and applicable surcharge) u/s. 111a of the act. Hence in the given example, Mr. rich would be exempt from tax on Long term Capital Gains but would be taxed at 15% (plus 3% education Cess and applicable Surcharge) on Short term Capital Gains.

    Implications under US Tax Laws:-

Mr. rich would be taxed on his worldwide income in the uS and hence, he would be taxed on the Capital Gains arising in india. however, as per article 25 of india – US DTAA, he can avail foreign tax credit of the taxes paid in india against the uS taxes.

Long term  Capital  Gains  and  Short term  Capital  Gains arising on sale of shares will be taxable as per the tax brackets  of  Mr.  Rich.  even  though  Long  term  Capital Gains from sale of equity are exempt from tax in india, such gains will be taxable in the US. Short term Capital Gains are taxed in the US as per the ordinary income tax rates, whereas the Long term capital gains are taxed at a concessional rate depending upon the ordinary income tax bracket. The table of tax rates for both short term and long term capital gains is given above for reference.

Taxation of Dividend Income
8.    What are the implications under Indian and US Tax laws for a US Resident receiving Dividends from indian Companies?

In india, the recipient of dividends is not liable to pay any tax on dividend received/accrued as the company distributing the dividend is liable to pay dividend distribution tax at the rate of 15% plus surcharge and education Cess. Thus, a US tax resident receiving dividends from the indian company which has paid dividend distribution tax is not subjected to tax in india. However, such dividend would be taxed in US as per the normal income tax rates.

 Taxation of Rental Income
9.    Mr. Rich, a NRI, residing in the US. he has given his residential house in India on rent. What will be the implications of the rental income received by Mr. Rich under the US tax law?

Rental income received by mr. rich will be taxed both in india and uS. article 6 of the india – uS dtaa provides that rent from immovable property (real property) may be taxed in the country where it is situated. thus, mr. rich has to pay tax on rental income in india as the property is situated in india and he has to pay tax in the uS also, being taxed on worldwide income. the major difference in india and uS is that in india mr. rich would get a standard deduction of 30% whereas in uS taxation only actual expenses incurred would  be  deducted  from  such  rental  income.  following deductions will be allowed against such income:

–    mortgage Property taxes
–    insurance
–    utilities
–    depreciation – allowed for building; any furnishings; appliances (except land).
However, the taxes paid in india would be available as foreign tax Credit under indian – US DTAA.

    Taxation of Interest
10.    how is interest income of a NRI (who is resident alien in USA) taxed in India and US?

As per the india – US dtaa, the right of taxing interest primarily lies with the Country of residence of the person earning it. However, article 11 does give right of taxation to the source country but the maximum rate at which it can get taxed is capped at 15%. 9

Taxation of Income of Non-resident Aliens (i.e. Indian residents) in US

So far we have discussed taxability of nris settled in USA who (mostly regarded as resident alien or uS Citizen) have sources of income in india. Let us now turn to a situation where indian tax residents have sources of income in USA.

11.    A resident Indian sells an immovable property in US (acquired 2 years ago) and earns a capital gain of $15,000/-. What would be implications under the US Tax law and the Indian IT Act? What is the India – US Tax Treaty implications on the same?

In the given case, since the property was held for two years, the capital gains would be treated as Long term Capital Gains in the US. The net capital gain is normally taxed at the appropriate10  graduated tax rates. however, if withholding tax is applicable, then tax is deducted by the purchaser at the rate of 10% of the gross sale proceeds. Resident Indian would therefore be required to file income tax return in the US and pay appropriate capital gains tax, subject to exemption of $ 2,50,000/-, if gains arise on sale of main home. In certain cases, subject to certain filings and fulfillment of conditions withholding of tax can be avoided.

Resident Indian while filing his income tax return in India would have to treat such capital gains as short term capital gains as the period of holding is less than three years. however, as per the india – US DTAA, resident indian will be able to claim the foreign tax credit for the taxes paid in the US while filing his tax return in India.

12.    A resident Indian has earned Capital gains on sale of a foreign property (long term capital asset) which was held for more than three years, Will he be able to claim capital gains exemption as per the IT Act by investing in a residential house in india or NHAI bonds in india?

A resident indian can avail exemption u/s. 54eC and 54f upon fulfillment of certain conditions if the investment made from transfer of a long term capital asset. The exemption is available irrespective of the fact that the capital asset is situated outside india.

13.    What are the implications under Indian and US Tax laws for an Indian Resident receiving Dividends from US Companies?

In the US, dividends are considered as part of passive income. Generally, tax at the rate of 30% or lower treaty rate (i.e. 25% as per india – US DTAA) is withheld by a uS Corporation on the dividends distributed to a non-resident.

In india, such dividends would be taxed in the following manner

(i)    If dividend is received by an indian Company from its Wholly owned subsidiary in uS, then it is taxed @15%; and
(ii)    In all other cases, at the applicable tax rate.

The tax withheld by the US Corporation would be available as foreign tax credit against the tax payable in india.

14.    What will be the implications under the US tax law for the rental income received by Indian resident from renting of property in US?

As per the US Laws, tax rates depends on whether a non- resident alien is able to choose to treat all income from real property as effectively/not effectively connected with a trade or business.

If the rental income is in connection with any trade or business in USA, then the tax would be levied on a graduated applicable tax rates, otherwise tax would withheld @ 30% on gross rental. The taxpayer i.e. an indian resident has to make appropriate declaration by exercising choice at the time of filing his tax return.

Epilogue
The US tax law is a complex subject. one cannot possibly cover all aspects in a short write-up. The intention of few FAQs mentioned herein above is to highlight some of the nuances of US & indian tax laws on passive income in india pertaining to nris in the USA (resident alien or uS Citizen) & passive income in the uSa of indian tax residents.


Mah. Amendment Act No. XVII of 2015

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Maharashtra Act No. XVII of 2015 published in the Maharashtra Government Gazette on 18.4.2015 after having received assent of the Governor.

Few important amendments in MVAT are as follows:-

• Definition of “Purchase price” and “sale price” amended to exclude Service Tax if separately collected.

• Late Fee for delayed return filed before thirty days reduced to Rs.1,000/- from Rs.2,000/-.

• Application u/s.23(11) for cancellation of assessment order also provided for order passed u/s. 23(5). • Dates for working of interest for filing annual revised return provided.

• Schedule Entry C-4 amended to include embroidery thread in category of sewing thread with effect from 1.4.2005.

• Notification under Schedule Entry C-54 amended to include white butter in relation to “Desi Loni” with effect from 1.4.2005.

• Schedule Entry C-91 amended so that spices shall include spices in all forms of varieties and mixtures of any of the spices with effect from 1.4.2005.

Amendment in Professional Tax Act :

Female Employee getting salary less than Rs. 10,000/- per month : Employee Professional Tax will be Nil.

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Amendments to Schedule ‘A’ and ‘C’ of MVAT Act VAT 1515/CR 39(1)/Taxation-1 dated 27.3.2015

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By this Notification, Schedule A & C are amended with effect from 1.4.2015.

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Changes in Mega Exemption list of services

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Notification No. 6/2015- Service tax- dated 01 03 2015 Following new exemptions are included in under notification no. 25/2012-ST :

(1) Hitherto, any service provided by way of transportation of a patient to and from a clinical establishment by a clinical establishment is exempt from Service Tax. The scope of this exemption is being widened to include all ambulance services.
(2) L ife insurance service provided by way of Varishtha Pension Bima Yojna is being exempted.
(3) Service provided by a Common Effluent Treatment Plant operator for treatment of effluent is being exempted.
(4) Service by way of pre-conditioning, pre-cooling, ripening, waxing, retail packing, labeling of fruits and vegetables is being exempted.
(5) Service provided by way of admission to a museum, zoo, national park, wild life sanctuary and a tiger reserve is being exempted.
(6) Service provided by way of exhibition of movie by the exhibitor (theatre owner) to the distributor or an association of persons consisting of such exhibitor as one of it’s members is being exempted.

(7) Service by way of (i) right to admission to exhibition of film, circus, dance or theatrical performances including drama, or ballet; (ii) recognized sporting event; and (iii) admission to other events where the consideration for admission is up to 500 shall be exempt from the date to be notified in this regard. F ollowing exemptions are withdrawn (or restricted) from Notification No. 25/2012-ST :

(1) Exemption presently available on specified services of construction, repair, maintenance, renovation or alteration service provided to the government, local authority, or governmental authority ( vide S. No. 12 of the Notification No. 25/12-ST ) shall be limited only to,-
(a) a historical monument, archaeological site or remains of national importance, archeological excavation or antiquity;
(b) canal, dam or other irrigation work; and
(c) pipeline, conduit or plant for (i) water supply (ii) water treatment, or (iii) sewerage treatment or disposal.

Exemption to other services presently covered under S. No. 12 of Notification No. 25/12-ST is being withdrawn.

(2) E xemption to construction, erection, commissioning or installation of original works pertaining to an airport or port is being withdrawn.

(3) E xemption to Services provided by a performing artist in folk or classical art form of (i) music, or (ii) dance, or (iii) theatre, has been restricted only to such cases where amount charged is not exceeding Rs. 1,00,000/- for a performance except performance provided by such artist as a brand ambassador.

(4) E xemption to transportation of food stuff by rail, or vessels or road will be limited to food grains including rice and pulses, flour, milk and salt.

(5) E xemption to Services of carrying out of intermediate production process of alcoholic liquor for human consumption on job work basis is withdrawn.

(6) E xemption is being withdrawn on the following service,-
(a) Departmentally run public telephone;
(b) Guaranteed public telephone operating only local calls;
(c) Service by way of making telephone calls from free telephone at airport and hospital where no bill is issued.

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Changes in Service Tax Rules, 1994 Notification No. 5/2015-Service Tax- dated 01 03 2015

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By this Notification, Service Tax Rules, 1994 have been amended with respect to the following matters :

(1) In respect of any service provided under aggregator model, the aggregator, or any of his representative offices located in India, is being made liable to pay service tax, if the service is so provided using the brand name of the aggregator in any manner. If an aggregator does not have any presence, including that by way of a representative, in such a case any agent appointed by the aggregator shall pay the tax on behalf of the aggregator. In this regard appropriate amendments have been made in Rule 2 of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 and Notification No. 30/2012 dated 20.06.2012. This change comes into effect immediately i.e., w.e.f. 1st March, 2015.

(2) Presently, services provided by Government or a local authority, excluding certain services specified under clause (a) of section 66D, are covered by the Negative List. The term ‘support’ has been omitted from the Clause (E) providing for liability of service receiver to pay Service tax under Reverse Charge in relation to support services provided or agreed to be provided by Government or Local authority.

(3) Exemptions are being withdrawn on the following services:
(a) service provided by a mutual fund agent to a mutual fund or assets management company,
(b) distributor to a mutual fund or AMC,
(c) selling or marketing agent of lottery ticket to a distributor.

Service Tax on these services shall be levied on reverse charge basis.

(4) In respect of certain services like money changing service, service provided by air travel agent, insurance service and service provided by lottery distributor and selling agent, the service provider has been allowed to pay service tax at an alternative rate subject to the conditions as prescribed under rule 6 (7), 6(7A), 6(7B) and 6(7C) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994.

Consequent to the upward revision in Service tax rate, the composition rate is proposed to be revised proportionately on specified services, namely,

Air Travel Agent: From “0.6%” and “1.2 %”, to “0.7 per cent.” and “1.4 per cent of basic fares in the case of domestic bookings and international bookings respectively.

Life insurance service: From “3%” and “1.5%”, to “3.5%” of the premium charged from policy holder in the first year and “1.75% in the subsequent year”.

These amendments shall come into effect as and when the revised Service Tax rate comes into effect.

(5) New Rule 4C has been inserted and Rule 5 has been amended to include provision for issuing digitally signed invoices along with the option of maintenance of records in electronic form and their authentication by means of digital signatures. It is further provided that the conditions and procedure in this regard shall be specified by the CBEC.

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Exemption to service for Transport of Goods by Road to a land customs Notification No. 4/2015-Service Tax- dated 01 03 2015

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Transport agency service provided for transport of export goods by road from the place of removal to an inland container depot, a container freight station, a port or airport is exempt from Service Tax vide notification No. 31/2012-ST dated 20.6.2012. Scope of this exemption is being widened to exempt such services when provided for transport of export goods by road from the place of removal to a land customs station (LCS) with effect from 1st April 2015.

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Notification No. 42/2012-ST dated.29.6.2012 rescinded Notification No. 3/2015- Service Tax- dated 1st March, 2015

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Existing exemption, vide Notification No. 42/2012-ST dated 29.6.2012, to the service provided by a commission agent located outside India to an exporter located in India is being rescinded with immediate effect.

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A few suggestions for your kind consideration in the Maharashtra StateBudget 2015-16 and necessary changes in Sales Tax Laws

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7th March 2015

Shri Sudhir Mungantiwar
Hon’ble Finance Minister,
Government of Maharashtra,
Mantralaya, Mumbai.

Respected Sir,

Subject: A few suggestions for your kind consideration in the Maharashtra State
Budget 2015-16 and necessary changes in Sales Tax Laws

Sir, we the people of Maharashtra are eagerly awaiting to listen to your Budget Speech, which you are ready to deliver in a few days from now. We understand that we are too late to make any suggestions at this stage, but there are a few matters on which we would like to draw your kind attention.

All these matters may be very much petty and sundry but are of great concern to the tax payers. Your kind attention in such matters will certainly provide much needed relief to small and medium level businesses. Some of these suggestions would be helpful in smooth and straight administration of tax collection and at the same time remove undue fear amongst the traders and small tax payers.

We may mention here that as we could not get an opportunity to meet you personally, we have narrowed down our suggestions, in this memorandum, to a bare minimum and only those which are most urgent. For other suggestions and further discussion in these matters, may we request your good selves to kindly grant us an appointment on which day we shall meet you personally and discuss various aspects concerning protection of revenue of the Government and mitigating difficulties faced by small and medium tax payers.

Thanking you.
Yours faithfully
Bombay Charte red Accountants ‘ Societ y
Nitin Shingala

President

Govind G. Goyal
Chairman
Indirect Taxes & Allied Laws Committee

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M/S. Sujata Painters, Appeal No. 18 of 2013, decided on 9th March, 2015 by MSTT.

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VAT- Sale Price- Works Contract-Collection of Service Tax- Does Not Form Part of Sales Price, section 2 (25) of The Maharashtra Value Added Tax, Act, 2002.

Facts
The appellant was engaged in business of execution of works contract of powder coating raised bill to the customer by charging vat on 80% of total contract value by deducting 20% amount prescribed in rule 58 for labour and services and also charged service tax @ 12.36% on 40 % of total contract value. He applied to the Commissioner of Sales Tax for determination of disputed question u/s. 56 of the act whether amount collected by way of service tax forms part of sale price. The Commissioner of Sales Tax held that the amount collected by way of service tax forms part of sales price. The appellant filed appeal, against the said order of Commissioner, before The Maharashtra Sales Tax Tribunal.

Held
Service tax is leviable on service value. It has no relation to the goods. It is independently leviable on value of services under the Finance Act. So on a plain reading of inclusive part of the definition of “sales price” u/s. 2 (25) of the Act, the service tax could not form part of sale price. The service tax and vat are mutually exclusive. Therefore by no stretch of imagination service tax would be a part of sale price. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed and levy of vat on service tax amount was set aside and deleted.

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HP India Sales P. Ltd vs. State of Assam and Others, [2012] 56 VST 472 ( Gauhati)

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VAT- Entry in Schedule-Rate of Tax- Sale of
Inkjet Cartridges and Tonor Cartridges – Falls Under Parts and
Accessories of Computer System and Peripherals –Taxable at 4%, Entry 4
of Part B of Sch. II , The Assam Value Added Tax Act, 2003

Facts
The
petitioner company was engaged in the business of IT products, sold
“inkjet cartridges and toner cartridges” and paid tax @ 4% being covered
by entry 4 of part B of Schedule II of the act relating to parts and
accessories of items listed in serial nos. 1, 2 and 3 which includes
Computer Systems and Peripherals respectively. The vat authority in
three different assessment years levied higher rate of tax of 12.5%
being covered by residual entry which was confirmed by the appellate
authority. The petitioner company filed writ petition before the Gauhati
High Court against the impugned order.

Held
The
items in question are integral part of printer which undisputedly is
covered by entry 3. Principle laid down by SC about interpretation of
“accessory” also lends support to the contention of the assessee.

The
High Court accordingly allowed the writ petition filed by the
petitioner company and allowed the revision of assessment orders
accordingly.

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Release vs. Gift

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Synopsis
Is there a difference between an instrument of release and a gift? Do the legal implications, tax and stamp duty consequences change depending on the phraseology used to describe the instrument? This Article examines some such issues in relation to immovable property transactions.

Introduction
“A Rose by any Other Name Smells as Sweet!” Could the above Shakespearean proverb be applied also to a transfer of property by a release or a gift? The answer is yes and no! A release and a gift are both species of transfers of property. However, there is a difference in law between the two. While the ultimate implication of both is that property is transferred (normally without consideration) but the law treats treats the two on a different footing. Let us look at the key differences and some similarities between the two.

Gift
A Gift is a specie of transfer of property with which almost all individuals, especially in India, are familiar. It is, from time immemorial, one of the most famous (and often infamous) modes of transferring movable as well as immovable property. The revenue and the legislation often frown upon the concept of gifts. The amendments in section 56(2) of the Income tax Act are testimony to this.

The Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which deals, mainly, with immovable property and also contains some provisions dealing with movable property, defines the term “Gift”. The Act also lays down some substantive and procedural provisions for constituting a valid gift. This Act defines a gift as a transfer of certain existing movable or immovable property made voluntarily and without consideration, by one person, called the Donor to another, called the Donee, and accepted by or on behalf of the Donee. The important characteristics of a Gift are:

(a) Gift is one of the modes of transfer of property.
(b) A gift can be of immovable or movable property.
(c) T he gift must be voluntary, i.e., without any coercion, fraud, undue influence.
(d) I t must be without any consideration from the Donee to the Donor.
(e) A person cannot make a Gift to himself, there must be a Donor and a Donee.
(f) T he Gift must be accepted by the Donee during the Donee’s lifetime.
(g) I t could be conditional.

Gift of an immovable property must be by way of a Gift Deed in writing which is executed by the Donor and the Deed must be registered under the Registration Act. Further, it must be attested by two or more witnesses. Thus, any gift of immovable property which is not registered would be invalid. Gifts requiring registration are subjected to stamp duty which is levied on the value of the property gifted.

Release
While we are all too familiar with the concept of gift, let us understand what is meant by a release. A release is much larger than a gift and could take various forms. For instance, if a release is made for consideration it would be tantamount to a conveyance while if it was made without consideration it would amount to a gift. What then is a release? Simply put, a release means renunciation of right in property by one co-owner in favour of another co-owner. Thus, the essential ingredient of a release is that both the transferor and transferee must be existing co-owners in the property. In a release the transferee would never be a stranger but would always be one who has an existing right in the property. Hence, a release can never be for the entire property but would always be for a portion thereof. To illustrate, A and B are equal co-owners in a in a flat. A relinquishes his share to B. This can be achieved by a release deed. If in this case, A charges any consideration from B then it could also be termed as a conveyance while if it is without consideration that it can also be termed as a gift.

A release of a share in an immovable property in excess of Rs. 100 requires that the instrument is registered.

Practical experience shows that sometimes a release deed is executed (and accepted by the Registrar) even in cases where the transferee has no interest in the property. In such cases, a gift deed or a conveyance is a better alternative. However, in law, a release deed can transfer title to one who before the transfer had no interest in the property – Kuppuswamy Chettiar vs. A.S. P. A. Arumugam Chettiar 1967 AIR 1395 (SC), although in such cases, the duty would be as on a conveyance or a gift deed.

Stamp Duty
Since Gifts/Release Deeds of immovable property require registration, they would also require to be duly stamped.

The Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958, applicable in the State of Maharashtra defines an “instrument of gift” to include, in a case where the gift is not in writing, any instrument recording whether by way of declaration or otherwise the making or acceptance of such oral gift. The gift could be of movable or immovable property. The term gift has not been defined and hence, one has to refer to the definition given u/s. 122 of the Transfer of Property Act”.

An instrument of gift not being a Settlement or a Will or a transfer attracts duty under Artice 34 of Schedule-I. A gift deed attracts duty at the same rate as applicable to a Conveyance (under Article 25) on the market value of the property which is the subject matter of the gift. Thus, in case of immovable property, the rates vary depending upon the type of immovable property, (i.e., whether it is a land, building, a flat in co-operative society), and the location (relevant in case of land and building). The maximum rate for immovable property is 5% of the Reckoner Value. Further, any gift of property to a family member (i.e., a spouse, sibling, lineal ascendant/descendant ) of the donor, shall attract duty @ 2% or as specified above, whichever is less.

On the other hand, under the Maharashtra Stamp Act, a release deed attracts duty on an Instrument of Release whereby a person renounces a claim upon other person or property as follows: If the release is of an ancestral property in favour of certain specified relatives ~Rs. 200

Every other Case ~ Same duty as on a conveyance as on the market value of the share, interest or part renounced.

The Bombay High Court, in the case of Asha Krishnalal Bajaj, 2001(2) Bom CR (PB) 629 held that a Release Deed is not a conveyance and only attracts stamp duty as on a release deed. In the case of Shailesh Harilal Poonatar, 2004 (4) All MR 479, the Bombay High Court held that a release deed without consideration under which one co-owner released his share in favour of another in respect of a property received under a will, was not a conveyance. Accordingly, it was liable to be stamped not as a conveyance but as a release deed.

To plug this loophole, in 2005, the duty in the State of Maharashtra was increased on such instruments to Rs. 5 for every Rs. 500 of market value of the property. The 2006 Amendment Act has once again made an amendment in Maharashtra to provide that if the release is in respect of ancestral property and is executed by or in favour of the renouncer’s spouse, siblings, parents, children, grandchildren of predeceased son, or the legal heirs of these relatives, then the stamp duty would only be Rs. 200. In case of any other Release Deed, the duty is equal to a conveyance. Thus, for immovable properties, it would be @ 5% on the market value of the property. What is an ancestral property becomes an important issue.

The   Punjab   &   haryana   high   Court   in   the   case   of Harendar Singh vs. State, (2008) 3 PLR 183 (P&H) has held that property received by a mother from her sons is not ancestral in nature. in another decision of the Punjab and haryana high Court, it has been held that property inherited by a hindu male from his father, grandfather or great grandfather is ancestral for him–Hardial Singh vs. Nahar Singh AIR 2010 (NOC) 1087 (P&H).

In Laxmikant vs. Collector and Assistant Superintendent of Stamps, Ahmedabad AIR (1976) Guj 158, it was held that a release postulates that the claim is renounced in favour of a person, who has got some right in the property. Release also connotes that the person releasing his right does not retain any ownership right over it. Where the property was thrown in the common hotch-pot with the result that while before the said property was thrown, the person throwing the property was the sole owner, after it is so thrown, he remains a joint owner. Therefore, retention of joint ownership, and the fact that the other members of the family had, previous to the throwing of the property in the joint stock of the family, no right in the property, conclusively showed that the transaction did not amount to a release.

Stamp Duty as on a Gift or a release – which to pay?
Having looked at the provisions pertaining to gift deed and release deed, the essential question is which to consider for paying stamp duty? if the property may be called “an- cestral” and is in favour of defined relatives, the obvious answer is release deed since in that case, the duty is only Rs. 200! The definition of conveyance under the Maharashtra Stamp act states that any instrument whereby a co-owner transfers his interest to another co-owner would be a conveyance. hence, in such cases the instrument would not be a release deed but would be a conveyance. however, if no consideration is charged then it would not be a conveyance and the moot point would be should it be considered as a gift? if one sees the wordings used in the Stamp Act, it defines a release deed only as one “where a person renounces a claim upon another or against any specified property”. Would instruments which are in the nature of a gift deed or a conveyance deed also fall under this definition of a release deed is the question? The cur- rent practice suggests that the answer is “yes”.

In Chief Controlling Revenue Authority vs. Rustom Nussewanji Patel, AIR 1968 Mad. 159 (FB), the Court observed that in order to determine whether a document is a release deed or conveyance, the nomenclature or the language used is not decisive. What is decisive is the actual character of the transaction and the precise nature of the rights created by means of the instrument. In rustoms case, the essential ingredients of release were present, there was already a legal right in the property vested in the releasee and the release operated to enlarge that right into an absolute title for the entire property, insofor as the parties were concerned.

A recent decision of the delhi high Court in the case of Srichand Badlani vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, AIR 2014 539 (Del), the contention is that in order to qualify as a relinquishment deed, the document must purport to relinquish share of the relinquishor in favour of all the other co-owners of the property and, if the relinquishment is   in favour of only one of the two co-owners, it has to be treated as a Gift deed, the property having been inherited from a common ancestor. It further held that one of the co-owners can relinquish his share in a co-owned property in favour of one or more of the co-owners. The document executed by him in this regard would continue to be a relinquishment deed irrespective of whether the relinquishment is in favour of one or all the remaining co- owners of the property. there is no basis in law for the proposition that if the relinquishment deed is executed in favour of one of the co-owners, it would be treated as a Gift deed. the law of stamp duty treats relinquishment deed and Gift deed as separate documents, chargeable with different stamp duties. it is not necessary that in order  to  qualify  as  a  relinquishment  deed  the  document must purport to relinquish the share of the relinquisher in favour of all the remaining co- owners of the property. Even if the relinquishment is in favour of one of the co- owners it would qualify as a relinquishment deed. more- over, it is immaterial as to what the relationship between the co- owners of the property. So long as relinquishment is in favour of one of the co-owners, the relationship between the relinquisher and the relinquishee is wholly immaterial and of no consequence at all. The law permits one of the co-owners even if they are not related to each other to relinquish his share in favour of other co-owner.

In Manjulaben Amrutlal vs. CCRA, 1994 GLR 1779 (FB) two sons executed a release in favour of their par- ents for their joint family property. it was held that it was difficult to hold that the parents of the applicants did not have any right, title and interest or share in the property for which deed was executed. The document clearly recit- ed that it was no claim release deed. it also recited in the deed that house was purchased by the mother as their guardian. executants and parents were residing jointly and that they were maintained by their parents. It is also stated that by the said deed whatever right and share they had in the house was released in favour of their mother and father. hence, by the impugned deed the executants had renounced their claim against the house which was purchased by their mother in their names. the property was originally purchased in the name of minors. It was treated by the parents at the most as joint hindu family property, as stated by them. Once it was a joint hindu family property, all the members of the h.u.f. would have share in the said property. In the deed itself it was mentioned that the executants (sons) were maintained by the parents. There was no reason to hold that the property was not belonging to the h.u.f. of executants and their parents. Once it is held that the property belonged to an HUF , then there was no difficulty in holding that the deed executed by the applicants was a release deed and not a gift deed.

Taxation
Section 56(2)(vii) of the income-tax act taxes certain gifts received by an individual or an huf from unrelated sources. hence, such gifts are taxed as income from other Sources in the hands of the donee. A receipt under a release deed without consideration would also be cov- ered by the same provision. thus,  whether under a gift or a release deed, specified receipts without consideration would be taxable u/s. 56(2)(vii).

An acquisition for consideration of a share in a house property from one co-owner by another co-owner under a release deed tantamounts to a purchase for the purposes of exemption u/s. 54 of the income-tax act. This was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. TN Aravinda Reddy, 120 ITR 46 (SC). It held that a release was a transfer of the releasor’s share for a consideration to the releasee who purchased the share of the releaser and was thus, entitled to relief u/s. 54.

Conclusion
The structuring of an instrument is an important element. Drafting should pay heed to the Law and Language both. While a document drafted in a particular manner and form may yield the desired results it may not always have the desired consequences!

Stamp valuation – Market value – Property purchased in Company Court auction – Sale deed executed in their favour by official liquidator – Registration authorities cannot question the sale deed on ground of undervaluation. Stamp Act, 1899, section 47-A.

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The Inspector General of Registration, Chennai and Ors vs. K.P. Kadar Hussain. AIR 2014 Madras 230.

The Respondents purchased the property in an auction, which was held by this Court, after paper publication on 08-03-2012. The said sale was confirmed by this Court and the Court directed the Official Liquidator to execute a sale deed in favour of the Respondents after receiving entire sale consideration.

The Respondents contended that it was not open to the appellants to take a stand that since the guideline value of the properties were increased only in the month of April 2012 and therefore, the Respondents are liable to pay the amount on that basis.

The Respondents vehemently submitted that the law is a well settled in regard to the purchase of property in a Court Auction and the authorities cannot refer the document demanding higher stamp duty unless a fraudulent attempt on the part of parties to document to evade payment of stamp duty is manifest.

When the Respondents had purchased the properties in question by way of sale deeds executed by the official liquidator for the sale value mentioned in the sale deeds, the said value cannot be questioned by appellants at a later point of time merely on the premise that the sale value mentioned in the sale deeds purchased by the respondents cannot be termed as `market value’.

The court observed that section 47A has no application whatsoever, in sofar as the respondents, purchasers of properties in company court auction because of the prime reason that there is no room for entertaining any doubt that there was any under valuation in regard to the sale deeds executed by the official liquidator.

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Right to fly National Flag – Fundamental Right of Citizen – Mandamus would not lie against authority to act in contravention of provisions of statute: Constitution of India.

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H. R. Vishwanath vs. Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka and Ors. AIR 2014 Karnataka 163

The writ petition was filed asking for a mandamus against the Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka, not to allow Sri Ravivarma Kumar, Advocate General, High Court of Karnataka, 2nd respondent herein, to hoist the Indian National Flag at the Office of Advocate General, High Court of Karnataka i.e., parallel to the Advocates’ Association, Bangalore and to ensure enough solidarity, unity and integrity of the Advocates’ Association and for a mandamus to the 2nd respondent, to participate in the Flag hoisting ceremony of the Advocates’ Association, on the eve of Independence Day.

According to the petitioner, respondent violated the established norm of celebration of Independency Day and Republic Day, by the Advocates’ Association. He submitted that a parallel function was being organised by the 2nd respondent, since, a Circular has been issued to all the Law Officers of the Government, to participate in the function, wherein, he would hoist the National Flag. Petitioner submitted that the 2nd respondent by hoisting the National Flag, by organising a separate function, rather than participating in the Flag hoisting ceremony of the Advocates’ Association, has destroyed the unity and integrity of the Association.

The question that arose for consideration is, whether a mandamus can lie against the 1st respondent, not to allow the hoisting of Indian National Flag.

The Court held that the Right to fly the National Flag freely with respect and dignity is a fundamental right of a citizen within the meaning of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India, subject to reasonable restrictions under clause (2) of Article 19 of the Constitution of India.

The Court observed that order that a writ of mandamus may be issued, there must be a legal right with the party asking for the writ to compel the performance of some statutory duty cast upon the authorities.

Thus, it is clear, that for issue of a writ of mandamus, there must be a legal right with the petitioner, to compel the performance of statutory duty cast upon the 1st respondent. The petitioner was not able to show that there was any statute or rule having the force of law which cast a duty on respondent No.1, not to allow respondent No. 2, hoist the National Flag near the Office of the Advocate General and to ensure his participation in the Flag hoisting ceremony organised by the 3rd respondent, as the President of the Advocates’ Association.

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Precedent – Binding nature of order of Tribunal – Strictures against Commissioner (Appeals): Section 35G of Central Excise Act 1944.

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CCE, Chennai – IV vs. Fenner India Ltd. 2014 (307) ELT 516 (Mad.)

The facts were that the first respondent/assessee is engaged in the manufacturing of Oil Seals. On account of fire accident on 05-05-2006 in the ‘post cutting area’ of the factory, the work in progress stocks were burnt and rendered unfit for usage, which was informed to the department in writing on the same day. It was further stated that the assessee had availed Cenvat credit on the raw materials, which were to be used for production of Oil Seals. A show cause notice dated 28-12-2006 was issued calling upon the assessee to explain as to why the Cenvat credit availed on raw materials, which were destroyed in fire should not be reversed. The assessee by referring to Rule 2(k)(i) of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 submitted its reply. The Assessee relied on the Tribunal decision in the case of Commissioner of Central Excise, Chennai III vs. Indchem Electronics reported 2003 (151) ELT 393 (Trib. Chennai). The Original Authority, rejected the assessee’s plea and directed the assessee to reverse the Cenvat credit availed.

The assessee preferred appeal before the Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals). The First Appellate Authority held that the assessee is liable to reverse the credit on inputs contained in the work-in-progress, which were destroyed in fire, by placing reliance on the decision of the Tribunal, in the case of M/s. Tambraparani Coatings vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Pondicherry: 2006 (193) E.L.T. 80 (Tri.-Chen.)]. As regards the order of the Tribunal in the case of Indchem Electronics, the First Appellate Authority held that the Special Leave Petition filed by the Department as against the said order was dismissed by a non-speaking order and therefore that would not be binding. On the above ground, the appeal came to be rejected.

Aggrieved by the said order, the assessee preferred a further appeal to the CESTAT . The Tribunal after considering the case of the assessee and taking note of the facts held that there is no dispute with regard to the destruction of the goods, when manufacturing work is in progress, and therefore the assessee need not reverse the Cenvat credit availed. The Tribunal by placing reliance on the decision of Indchem Electronics (cited supra) allowed the assessee’s appeal.

On appeal, the Court held that stand taken by the Commissioner (Appeals) is wholly unsustainable and quite contrary to the settled legal position. It is to be noted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while dismissing the assessee appeal has assigned reasons. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the Appellate Tribunal in its impugned order had held that Modvat/Cenvat credit cannot be denied on inputs destroyed in the fire accident when the fact that the inputs were actually issued and thereafter destroyed in fire accident, which fact is not disputed by the Department. Therefore, it cannot be stated that it is a non-speaking order. In any event the Commissioner orders are subject to scrutiny by the Tribunal and he is bound by the order passed by the Tribunal and it is wholly untenable on the part of the Commissioner to contend that the decision of the Tribunal would not bind the Commissioner. Therefore, the finding of the Commissioner to that extent is absolutely perverse.

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Gift – Muslim Law – Immovable property – Conditions curtailing its use or disposal are to be treated as void. Transfer of property Act section 123

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V. Seeramachandra Avadhani (D) by L.Rs vs. Shaik Abdul Rahim and Anr. AIR 2014 SC 3464

Sheikh Hussein was married to Banu Bibi. During the subsistence of his matrimonial ties, Sheikh Hussein executed a gift deed on 26-04-1952, whereby a “tiled house” with open space was gifted in favour of his wife Banu Bibi. Banu Bibi enjoyed the immovable property gifted to her, during the lifetime of her husband Sheikh Hussein. Sheikh Hussein died in 1966. Even after the demise of Sheikh Hussein, Banu Bibi continued to exclusively enjoy the said immovable property. On 02- 05-197802- 05-1978, Banu Bibi sold the gifted immovable property, to V. Sreeramachandra Avadhani. The vendee V. Sreeramachandra Avadhani is the Appellant before the Court (through his legal representatives).

Banu Bibi died on 17-02-1989. On her demise, the Respondents before this Court-Shaik Abdul Rahim and Shaik Abdul Gaffoor issued a legal notice to the vendee. Through the legal notice, they staked a claim on the abovementioned gifted immovable property. In the notice, the Respondents asserted, firstly, that Banu Bibi had only a life interest in the gifted immovable property; and secondly, the Respondents being the legal representatives of Sheikh Hussein (who had gifted the immovable property to Banu Bibi) came to be vested with the right and title over the gifted immovable property, after the demise of Banu Bibi.

In the suit, the Respondents sought a declaration of title, over the “tiled house” with open space, gifted by Sheikh Hussein to his wife Banu Bibi.

The Court observed that the parameters for gifts (under Mohammedan Law) are clear and well defined. Gifts pertaining to the corpus of the property are absolute. Where a gift of corpus seeks to impose a limit, in point of time (as a life interest), the condition is void. Likewise, all other conditions, in a gift of the corpus are impermissible. In other words, the gift of the corpus has to be unconditional. Conditions are however permissible, if the gift is merely of a usufruct. Therefore, the gift of a usufruct can validly impose a limit, in point of time (as an interest, restricted to the life of the donee).

Having concluded that the donor Sheikh Hussein through the gift deed dated 26-04-1952, had transferred the corpus of the immovable property to his wife Banu Bibi, it is natural to conclude that the gift deed executed in favour of Banu Bibi, was valid.

The conditions depicted in the gift deed, that the donee would not have any right to gift or sell the gifted property, or that the donee would be precluded from alienating the gifted immovable property during her life time, are void.

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Family – Definition – Is exhaustive and not illustrative : Stamp Act 1899 Sch. I, Art. 58(a) Explanation

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T. Muthu Balu vs. The Inspector General of Registration Chennai & Anr. AIR 2014 Madras 240

The
petitioner executed a Settlement Deed, in respect of certain items of
properties mentioned in the schedule to a document, in favour of his
great-grand daughter S. Sugirtha, dated 11-11-2011, the same was on the
file of the Sub-Registrar, Madurai, the 2nd respondent herein. The
petitioner claimed exemption from payment of normal Stamp Duty stating
that the settlement is between persons coming under the term “Family”
mentioned in Article 58(a) of Schedule-I to the Indian Stamp Act, 1899.
However, the 2nd respondent did not release the document and insisted on
payment of normal stamp duty on the ground that the registration fee in
the instant case would not be covered under Article 58(a), in view of
Explanation to Article 58(a) of Schedule-I of the Indian Stamp Act.

The
Hon’ble Court observed that the word “family” as defined in the
Explanation to Article 58(a) of Schedule I, appended to the Stamp Act,
would mean only such of those persons mentioned in the Explanation. The
definition to the word “family” is exhaustive and not illustrative and
it is applicable only to such of those persons indicated therein and it
will not extend to other persons who do not form part of the definition
“family”. The interpretation of the word “means” in the Explanation will
be specific to the members of the family mentioned therein.

The
definition cannot give an extended or expanded meaning to the word
“grand child” to include “great grand child” also. It is for the state
government to include great grandchild and other remote lineal
descendants, as members of the family, it they chose to, for the purpose
of extending the benefit of the concessional stamp duty applicable to
settlement within the members of the family.

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Audit materiality – a precision cast in stone or a subjective variable measure?

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Material information means information that
matters, whether it is important or is essential. In accounting
parlance, it relates to information that should be recognised, measured
or disclosed in accordance with the requirements of a financial
reporting framework. In measuring or disclosing accounting information,
emphasis is on the needs of known or perceived users of the financial
statements.

In auditing, materiality refers to the largest
threshold of uncorrected errors, misstatements, or erroneous disclosures
or omissions that could exist in the financial statements and yet are
not misleading. Misstatements including omissions, are material if they,
individually or in aggregate, could reasonably be expected to influence
the economic decisions of users of the financial statements. The users
are considered as a group of users of the financial statements rather
than as individual users.

SA 320 – ‘Materiality in Planning and
Performing an Audit’ provides guiding principles to auditors on
consideration of materiality in audit of financial statements.

The
determination of materiality is a matter of professional judgment. In
determining the materiality of an item, the auditor considers not only
the item’s nature and amount relative to the financial statements, but
also the needs of the users of such financial statements. Materiality
has a pervasive effect in a financial statement audit. Materiality also
has significant implications for audit efficiency. In current times,
given the scale and volume of operations of enterprises, complexities in
business and supporting IT systems, plethora of regulatory compliances
etc., it is imperative for an auditor to be meticulous in determining
materiality for addressing the risk of material misstatements in an
effective and efficient manner.

Materiality is one of the most
important considerations in planning the audit approach-identifying
significant accounts/disclosures and determining the extent, nature and
timing of audit procedures. While determining materiality at the
planning stage, it may not be possible for the auditor to anticipate all
of the factors that will ultimately influence the materiality judgment
in the evaluation of audit results at the completion of the audit. These
factors must be considered as and when they arise, and therefore
materiality needs to be evaluated throughout the course of the audit and
revised if deemed appropriate.

In planning an audit, the
auditor would ordinarily assess materiality at the overall financial
statement level, because the auditor’s opinion extends to the financial
statements taken as a whole. However, in certain circumstances, for an
entity, it is possible that misstatement of a particular significant
account balance or disclosure could impact or influence the decisions of
the users of the financial statements for that entity. In such cases,
the auditor would need to determine materiality for that account or
disclosure at an amount which is less than the materiality for the
financial statements as a whole. For instance, in enterprises where
financial statements include large provisions with a high degree of
estimation uncertainty, the existence of such provisions may influence
user’s assessment of materiality for such provisions, for example
provisions for insurance claims in an insurance company, oil rig
decommissioning costs in the case of an oil company etc.

In
computing materiality for the financial statements as a whole, the
auditor needs to evaluate an appropriate benchmark to be used. The
benchmark could be profit (loss) before tax from continuing operations,
total assets, or total revenues. Materiality is determined based on the
amount of the benchmark selected. Some of the factors which need to be
considered while determining the amount/percentage of the benchmark are:

Debt arrangements – whether limited debt or publicly traded debt, existence of loan covenants sensitive to operating results.

Business
environment – whether entity operates in a stable or volatile business
environment, business operates in a regulated or non-regulated industry,
business sustainability, complexity of business operations/processes,
product portfolio, few or many external users of the entity’s financial
statements etc

As one can envisage, evaluation of the factors
stated above requires judgment and there can be no scientific formula to
arrive at the percentage to be applied to the benchmark to determine
materiality. SA 320 does not specify a range of percentages that could
be applied to the benchmark as this is left to the auditor’s judgment,
ideally the one selected by the auditor should be the benchmark that
most represents the needs of the users of the financial statements. The
commonly applied ranges are given below:

It
is pertinent to note that materiality is not a mere quantitative
measure. A misstatement that is quantitatively immaterial may be
qualitatively material. Qualitative factors often require subjective
judgment and evaluation in light of other information that may not be
readily available to the auditor.

While selecting account
balances for testing, one cannot assume on a generic basis that account
balances which fall below the materiality determined for the financial
statements as a whole should be scoped out from audit. The auditor
should be wary of the risk that accounts with seemingly immaterial
balances may contain understatements that when aggregated would exceed
the overall materiality, i.e., aggregation risk. To address the
aggregation risk, auditors usually discount (hair-cut) the overall
materiality by 25% or more. Such an adjustment is not a mere calculation
but is driven by factors such as:

Weak or strong Internal control environment at the entity.
Entity with a history of material weaknesses and/or a number of control deficiencies.
High turnover of senior management.
Entity with a history of large or numerous misstatements in previous audits.
Entity with more complex accounting issues and significant estimates.
Entity that operates in a number of locations etc.

Let
us consider some case studies to understand practical application of
the concept of audit materiality from a quantitative measurement
viewpoint.

Case study I – Size and nature

Background
XYZ
Ltd. is a company engaged in the business of dairy products with its
head office in Mumbai. The Company caters to customers in Pune, Mumbai,
Ahmedabad and Surat through its factories in Mumbai and Ahmedabad.

The
turnover and net profit after tax of the company for FY 20X0-X1 (April
20X0-March 20X1) was Rs. 1,456 million and Rs. 305 million respectively.
The net assets of the Company as at 31st March 20X1 aggregated Rs.
13,570 million.

During the financial year 20X0-X1,
1. ZED Ltd., a distributor for Surat region who owed the Company Rs. 0.6 million was declared bankrupt.

2.
HUD Products Ltd., a supplier to whom the Company had paid Rs. 45
million as an advance for future supplies as per the terms of
arrangement had been facing cash crunch and has discontinued its
operations from June 20X0. The Company has not received any supplies
since April 20X1.

3. T he company has decided to curtail its
operations in Ahmedabad which has traditionally been a major source of
revenue for the Company in the past however on account of increase in
competition the Company is unable to sustain its market share. The
Company already commenced the process of dismantling one of the plants
in the month of March 20X1.

As an auditor which of the above events will be material for the Company?

Analysis

As per SA 320, judgments about materiality are made in the light of surrounding circumstances, and are affected by the size or nature of a misstatement, or a combination of both.

In the above scenarios, the default of Rs. 0.6 million by ZED Ltd. is immaterial for a Company with a huge turnover of Rs. 1,456 million. Thus, based on the size of the Company. the auditor would consider the said transaction as not material to be reported.

On the contrary, amount of advance given to HUD Products Ltd. of Rs. 45 million, which is considered doubtful of recoverability would be material to the financial statements as omission of the same could influence the decisions of the users of financial statements. Also, delay in supplies would affect the production schedule of the Company which would also impact sales adversely. Therefore this event would be considered as material.

Similarly, the Company’s decision of curtailing its Ahmedabad’s operations should be disclosed in the financial statements as it is by its nature material to understanding the entity’s scope of operations in the future.

Case study II – Selection of benchmark

Background

TED Private Limited (TED) is in the business of providing courier services. TED is located in Mumbai. It has a subsidiary LED Private Limited (LED), located in Delhi. TED was established in 2001 and its subsidiary was established in 2012. TED is a well established company in the market and is profit making since the year 2005. However, LED being recently established has lower profits and in fact profit has been volatile in nature during the past three years. The financial position for TED and LED given below:

XET & Associates (‘XET’) were appointed as auditors for the year 2014 for TED and its subsidiary LED. Ram Bhave, Audit Manager at XET selected profit before tax as the benchmark for the purpose of calculating the materiality of TED. Since LED had earned higher profit in 2014 as compared to the previous year, Ram selected profit before tax as an appropriate benchmark for the subsidiary as well. In the light of SA 320, evaluate:

a) Whether Ram did the right selection of the benchmark for the purpose of determining audit materiality for both the entities?

b) Also evaluate whether the materiality for LED will be the same if LED was financed solely by debt rather than equity?

c) Would the situation be different in case LED received revenue from TED on a markup of 10% on its expenses?

Analysis (a)

According to SA 320, determining materiality involves the exercise of professional judgment. Factors that may affect the identification of an appropriate benchmark include the following:

  •     Whether there are items on which would be subject to specific focus by the users of the financial statements of the entity in question?

  •     The nature of the entity, the stage at which the entity is in its life cycle, and the industry and economic environment in which the entity operates.

  •     The entity’s ownership structure and the way it is financed.

  •     The relative volatility of the benchmark.

Profit before tax from continuing operations is often used for profit-oriented entity. However when profit before tax from continuing operations is volatile, other benchmarks may be more appropriate, such as total revenue or gross profit.

In the above case, based on financial position for past three years, it is evident that TED is a profit-oriented company and accordingly the profit before tax is an appropriate benchmark taken by the auditor for the purpose of calculating the materiality.

Analysis (b)

Ram selected profit before tax as benchmark for calculating materiality for LED however the company has yet to fully establish its operations and accordingly the profit before tax is volatile in nature. In such a case, based on the relative volatility, Ram must select gross measures like total revenue as the benchmark for calculating the materiality.

Analysis (c)

In case if LED is financed solely by debt, users may lay more emphasis on assets and claims (such as charges/ mortgages/encumbrances or like) on them rather than on the entity’s earnings. In this situation, Ram could consider either net assets or total assets as the benchmark for calculating the materiality.

Analysis (d)

If LED were to earn revenue from TED at a constant markup of 10% on its aggregate expenditure, it would not be appropriate to take profit before tax or revenue as the benchmark as revenue and profits would fluctuate every year in proportion to the expense and may not be considered as the right measure to reflect the financial performance of the entity. In such a scenario, Ram may choose to use total expenses or net assets or total assets as benchmark for purpose of determining materiality.

The above case studies elucidate the quantitative aspects of materiality. In the next article, we shall discuss case studies revolving around other aspects of SA 320 such as qualitative factors, normalisation, materiality at account balance and revision of materiality.

Closing remarks

Materiality is one of the factors that affects the auditor’s judgment about the sufficiency of audit evidence. One may generalise that lower the materiality level, the greater would be the quantum of evidence needed. At the same time, auditing standards do not establish an absolute level or a percentage or a mathematical formula which is universally applicable. The elements an auditor uses to determine the benchmark are based on his experience and on numerous other factors some of which were elucidated in this article. As a judgmental concept, however, materiality is susceptible to subjectivity.

Ind -AS Carve Out – Recognition of bargain purchase gain and common control transactions

Recognition of bargain purchase gain
IFRS
3 requires bargain purchase gain arising on business combination to be
recognised in profit or loss. However, a careful analysis is required to
determine whether a gain truly exists. Ind-AS 103 (draft) requires the
same to be recognised in other comprehensive income (OCI) and
accumulated in equity as capital reserve. However, if there is no clear
evidence for the underlying reason for classification of the business
combination as a bargain purchase, then the gain should be recognised
directly in the equity as capital reserve. Ind-AS’s are still in draft
stage and a final version may be available even before this article is
published.

Technical perspective
Arguments against this carve out are as follows:

(a)
An economic gain is inherent in a bargain purchase. At the acquisition
date, the acquirer is better off by the amount by which the fair value
of the acquired business exceeds the fair value of the consideration
paid. In concept, the acquirer should recognise this gain in its profit
or loss.

(b) We appreciate that appearance of a bargain
purchase, particularly, without any evidence of the underlying reasons,
will raise concerns about the existence of measurement errors. IFRS 3
have addressed these concerns by requiring the acquirer to review
procedures used to measure the amounts to be recognised at the
acquisition date. Moreover, concerns regarding measurement
errors/potential abuse may not be sufficient reason to reject
technically correct accounting treatment.

(c) The application of
Ind-AS carve-out implies that whilst an entity recognises bargain
purchase gain directly in OCI, it will recognise depreciation,
amortisation or impairment of assets acquired in profit or loss for the
subsequent periods based on the fair valuation of the assets taken over.
This creates a mismatch between items recognised in profit or loss and
those recognized in OCI. Also, it may adversely impact divided paying
capacity of companies.

To avoid such mismatches and to protect
their future profit or loss/distributable reserves, certain entities may
attempt to notionally reduce the fair value of the assets acquired and
avoid bargain purchase gain scenario. The ICAI has made this carve-out
to avoid potential abuse; however, it may actually end up doing the
reverse.

(d) Concerns about abuse resulting from gain
recognition may be exaggerated. Our experience and interactions with
financial analysts and other users suggest that they give little weight,
if any, to one-time or unusual gains, such as those resulting from a
bargain purchase transaction. In addition, we believe that entities
would have a disincentive to overstate assets acquired or understate
liabilities assumed in a business combination because that generally
results in higher post-combination expenses, i.e., when the assets are
used or become impaired or liabilities are re-measured or settled.

We
believe that Ind-AS 103 should require bargain purchase gain arising on
business combination to be recognised in profit or loss both for
acquisition of subsidiaries and associates. In any case, we do not
believe that this is a major issue, and making a carve-out for this
matter seems unwarranted.

Accounting for common control transactions
IFRS
3 excludes from its scope business combinations of entities under
common control and provides no further guidance on how common control
transactions are accounted for. Based on prevailing practices, an entity
may account for such combination by applying either the acquisition
method (in accordance with IFRS 3) or the pooling of interests method.
The selected accounting policy is applied consistently. However, where
an entity selects the acquisition method of accounting, the transaction
must have substance from the perspective of the reporting entity.

Ind-AS
103 requires business combinations under common control to be
mandatorily accounted using the pooling method. The application of this
method requires the following:

(i) The assets and liabilities of the combining entities are reflected at their carrying amounts.
(ii)
No adjustments are made to reflect fair values, or recognise any new
assets or liabilities. The only adjustments that are made are to
harmonize the accounting policies.
(iii) The financial information
in the financial statements in respect of prior periods have to be
restated as if the combination had occurred from the beginning of the
earliest period presented in the financial statements, irrespective of
the actual date of the combination.
(iv) Ind-AS 103 originally
hosted on the MCA website required that excess of the amount recorded as
share capital issued plus any additional consideration in form of cash
or other assets given by the transferee entity over the amount of share
capital of the transferor company is recognised as goodwill.

However,
an exposure draft of amendment to Ind-AS 103 proposes that any
difference between the consideration paid and share capital of the
transferor should be transferred to separate component of equity, viz.,
“Common Control Transaction Capital Reserve.” Ind-AS’s are still in
draft stage and a final version may be available even before this
article is published.

Though there is no IFRS standard that
deals with common control transactions, global practice is to account
them using the pooling method; and in case where the common control
transaction has substance acquisition accounting is permitted.

Technical perspective
IFRS
does not deal with the pooling method. However, it was dealt with in
the erstwhile IAS 22 Business Combinations. Both US and UK GAAP also
provide guidance on the pooling method. Interestingly, neither of these
standards nor AS 14 Accounting for Amalgamations under Indian GAAP allow
any new goodwill to be recognized in the pooling method. Any excess
consideration paid to the erstwhile shareholders of the transferee is a
transaction between the shareholders and reflected directly in the
equity. Thus, goodwill accounting required by original Ind- AS 103 was
contrary to the basic principle of the pooling method. Hence, we agree
that the change proposed in the ED reflects better application of the
pooling method. Despite the proposed correction, we have the following
concerns on accounting for common control business combination
prescribed in Ind-AS 103.

(a) I n our view, it is not
appropriate to mandate the pooling method for all common control
business combinations. In practice, many groups enter into these
transactions as part of their IPO plans. Post IPO, there will be
significant non-controlling interest in the combined entity. In such
cases, companies typically prefer applying the acquisition method to the
common control business combination. However, it may not be possible
under Ind-AS 103.

(b) T he pooling method as discussed in Ind-AS
103 is applicable only to accounting for common control business
combinations. It is not applicable to accounting for transfer between
common control entities of assets/ liabilities not constituting
business.

(c) Whilst Ind-AS 103 requires common control business
combinations to be accounted for using the pooling method, it is not
clear whether the same principles also apply to acquisition of an
associate/ joint venture from an entity under common control.

Our preferred view is that at this juncture, the ICAI should not address common control business combination accounting     in     Ind-AS    103.    Rather,     there     is     sufficient    global precedence to rely upon. however, this approach is not suitable for the long term.  it may be noted that the IASB is developing a separate  IFRS for common control transactions. the ICAI should work with the IASB on the     proposed     IFRS     to     address     India     specific     concerns.      Alternatively, the  ICAI should develop a temporary  
standard, but ensure that the same is in line with current global practice.

Growing concerns with financial statement

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The past few decades have seen frauds related to financial statements increase dramatically, both in terms of numbers and the size of the losses. This has resulted in turmoil in the capital markets, loss in shareholder value, and in some cases, companies filing for bankruptcy. Fraudulent financial statements affect shareholders, lenders, creditors, and employees. Although the regulators (under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002 and new Companies Act, 2013) have done significantly to improve corporate governance standards in an effort to deter fraud; financial statement fraud continues to remain a serious concern for investors and other capital markets stakeholders.

According to the ACFE’s “Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and Abuse, 2014”, it is estimated that only 9 % of cases involved financial statement fraud, but those cases had the highest financial impact, representing a median loss of $ 1 million.

What is financial statement fraud?
Financial statement fraud is deliberate misrepresentation, misstatement or omission of financial statement data for the purpose of misleading the reviewer and creating a false impression of an organisation’s financial strength.

The key causes of this increasing problem could be executive incentives such as stock option benefits, bonuses or justification for increased salaries; stock market expectations which provided rewards for shortterm behaviour; greed by investment banks, commercial banks and investors etc.

Such frauds can take different forms, but there are several methods commonly used by perpetrators. These include creating fictitious revenues, timing differences, concealed liabilities or expenses, improper disclosure, related party transactions, and improper asset valuations. From an accounting perspective, revenues, profits, or assets are typically overstated, while losses, expenses, or liabilities are understated in the books of accounts.

Some common approaches to project a false but improved appearance of financials include:

Overstatement or falsification of revenues is the most common fraud, wherein the perpetrator creates fictitious revenue or customers, records future sales in the current period, reports increased revenue without equally rising cash flow or records sales that never occurred.

Understatement of expenses or liabilities by shrinking the company’s debt on paper. This makes the company appear more profitable, while the fraudster records expenses as assets or even fails to record them at all. Additional ways to manipulate financial statements include leaving special purpose entities or subsidiaries off a parent company’s books or failing to report certain obligations as liabilities.

Improper asset valuation exaggerates company assets to deceive investors or to siphon funds for personal gains. It can involve improperly valuing inventory, investments, fixed assets or accounts receivable. It may also involve creating fictitious receivables, not writing down obsolete inventory on the company’s balance sheet, manipulating the estimates of an asset’s useful life and overstating the residual value.

Related party transactions; fraudulent transactions with the parent company and its subsidiaries and the ability to influence the policies of the other parties.

Warning bells
Red flags around financial statements are indicators of a possible fraud scenario and these warning signs should be addressed immediately. While they may not ascertain the actual occurrence of a fraud, they show that the company may be prone to fraudulent activities. Red flags are never sure signs but indicate that the organisation should ask for reasonable answers.

Warning signs related to financial statement fraud can be categorised into four broad categories:

(i) Tone at the top: aggressive style of management and over ambitious targets by the top management may lead to fraudulent activities at various levels. Concentration of powers in the hands of one or two individuals or an autocratic style of leadership also may lead to fraudulent activities.
(ii) Processes drawback: Lack of supervision and monitoring, lack of segregation of duties and excessive use of journal entries may motivate fraudsters as it opens up multiple avenues to manipulate the books of accounts.
(iii) Systems limitations: lack of system controls, manual (legacy) and disintegrated systems are easy to penetrate and could be manipulated by fraudsters.
(iv) Attitude of employees: Employees with mediocre calibre, ignorant mind-set, little responsibility and no willingness to question the management can create problems in preparing the financial statements.

There are certain indicators that organisations can analyse to proactively identify fraud risks.

Revenue
• A spike in the revenue during the month/ quarter/ year closing without any collections.
 • Sales made to fake agents or customers or to small proprietary or partnership firms.
• Increase in debts being substantially higher than revenue growth.

Expenses
• Preference given to a single vendor after receiving quotations from other vendors or contract given to vendors that are relatively unknown in the industry or are fictitious. In case of machinery, purchasing it from agents rather than other OEMs.
• Significant variation in the volume/ value of provision for expenses.
• Large unexplained JV or partnership.
• Consistent advances paid to certain parties whereas some creditors payments are delayed.

Cash and bank balances
• High cash withdrawals or deposits without necessary approvals.
• Large payments issued to certain contractors or vendors.
• Absence of physical bank statements.
• Transfer of large round amounts within different bank accounts.

Accounting records
• Large number of journal entries passed in books of accounts.
• Low end accounting software without audit trail mechanism.
• Large number of backdated entries.

If enough warning signs are in place, the next step will be to perform procedures that will help assess the actual occurrence of fraud. Exposing a fraudulent financial statement can be challenging–irrespective of the company size. Maryam Hussain, an investigator at EY, in her book titled “Corporate Fraud: the Human Factor”, states that every instance of fraud and corruption leaves a trail which is visible but often unseen until it is too late. Perpetrators typically take special care to conceal their wrongdoings in an elaborate fashion.

Sometimes the fraud is buried in a series of complex transactions; other times it can be found in a single transaction recorded in the accounting records. Detection can be accomplished with appropriate forensic procedures that include analysis of financial records, public documents, background checks, interviews with suspects and laboratory analysis of physical and electronic evidence.

Although listed above are common schemes used to commit financial statement fraud, it is imperative to be aware that it is not an exhaustive list. There are many ways to commit fraudulent or unethical activities. No matter what method is used, the fraudster typically tends to either overstate revenues, profits, or assets or understate losses, expenses, or liabilities.

Financial statement fraud is expensive, seemingly common in and typically involves one or more senior executives in the company. To conclude, the impact of such a fraud can be devastating to the organisation’s reputation among stakeholders and business ecosystem as a whole.

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TS-719-ITAT-2014(Chennai) ITO vs. M/s F.L Smidth Ltd. A.Y: 2004-05, Dated: 01-09-2014

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Section 9(1)(vi) – Payment for shrink wrap software license reimbursed under a cost sharing arrangement is “royalty” under the Income Tax Act (Act); on facts, India-Denmark Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) is not applicable as the Denmark Company was not beneficial owner but merely an agent of the software license provider.

Facts:
Taxpayer, an Indian company, was engaged in the business of consulting engineers and architects. A group concern of the Taxpayer based in Denmark (DCo) executed cost sharing agreements (CSA) with all its group concerns, including the Taxpayer, for sharing the cost of various software licenses such as the standardised Microsoft office software application. This was procured from M/s Microsoft Corporation USA (Microsoft) by way of a global indent.

In terms of the cost sharing formula in CSA, DCo raised an invoice on the Taxpayer for the proportionate cost of the software. During the relevant tax year, the Taxpayer made payment to DCo against the said invoice, without deducting tax at source u/s. 195 of the Act on the premise that the said payment represented merely reimbursement/ recharge of cost without any income component. Further, since payment was towards standardised copyrighted article, there was royalty element involved.

The Tax Authority was of the view that the impugned payment was for acquisition of a software license and hence, was in the nature of royalty taxable u/s. 9(1)(vi) of the Act. Rejecting the contention that there was no income element in the reimbursements the Tax Authority opined that DCo was acting as a distributor/agent of Microsoft and hence tax was required to be withheld on such taxable payment.

On appeal by the Taxpayer, the First Appellate Authority held that the payment under consideration was for a readymade off-the-shelf software for in-house use without authority to commercially exploit the same and hence, the payment was not in the nature of royalty. Rather, being a copyrighted programme, it was in the nature of sale of ‘goods’.

Aggrieved, the Tax Authority preferred an appeal before the Tribunal.

Held:

Under the Act
Granting of a license is included as a right in the definition of royalty under Explanation 2(i) and 2(v) to section 9(1)(vi) of the Act. This would also include license to use ‘shrink wrap software’, irrespective of the medium or mode of acquiring the licenced right. Hence, the fact that the licensed software was ‘shrink wrap software’ would not impact royalty taxation.

The ratio laid down by the Karnataka High Court in case of Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd.1 and Synopsis International Old Ltd.2 squarely applied to the case under consideration.

The decisions relied on by the Taxpayer stand distinguished since they were in the context of transaction undertaken on ‘principal to principal’ basis. In the present fact pattern, DCo acted as an agent of Microsoft US.

Delhi HC ruling in case of Ericsson AB and the Mumbai Tribunal ruling in case of ACIT vs. Sonata Information Tech. Ltd. did not pertain solely to ‘license’ transactions and hence are not applicable in the present issue. Further, the Supreme Court (SC) ruling in case of Tata Consultancy Services was not in the context of the Act and hence cannot be applied.

Invoice raised specifically quoted only licence and right of usage embedded therein. Therefore, the payment under consideration for acquiring a shrink wrap software licence from Microsoft answers the definition of royalty u/s. 9(1)(vi) of the Act, and is therefore liable to withholding tax in India.

CSA is immaterial in determining the character of transaction. Cost sharing formula or any other method is only an internal arrangement. Such arrangement does not impact the characterisation of an underlying transaction which is to be determined based on facts of the case and statutory provisions.

The exclusionary provision u/s. 9(1)(vi)(b) of the Act, dealing with payment for business or source of income outside India, is not applicable since the royalty payment made to DCo is for the purpose of business of the Taxpayer in India.

Under India-Denmark DTAA
DCo was only placing indent for all its group concerns for appropriate internal arrangement and convenience. Hence, DCo merely acted as an agent of Microsoft which is the beneficial owner of the payment under consideration. Since the beneficial owner is not a resident of Denmark, the benefit of treaty is not available under para 5 of Article 13.

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TS-660-ITAT-2014(DEL) Consulting Engineering Corporation vs. JDIT A.Y: 2003-05, Dated: 31-10-2014

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Articles 5 and 7 of India-USA DTAA – Branch engaged in preparation of drawings, designs and structural calculations by engaging highly technical and skilled professionals, which constitutes the core business of head office (HO), triggers PE of the HO in India.

Facts:
The Taxpayer, a US Company, has a branch in India (branch). The Indian branch provided engineering design and consultancy services to its HO, i.e, the Taxpayer. As part of these services, the branch prepared drawings and designs and also structural calculations by engaging highly technical and skilled professionals. For these services the branch was reimbursed at cost plus margin. The Tax Authority contended that the presence of Taxpayer in the form of fixed assets, number of employees etc., in India indicates that the activities carried out by the branch constituted main business of the Taxpayer and the cost reimbursed by the Taxpayer to the branch was not at arm’s length. Thus, the Taxpayer has a PE in India as per India-USA DTAA and the income attributable to the operation carried out by the PE shall be taxable in terms of Article 7 of the India US DTAA .

The Taxpayer contended that the activities of the branch were in the nature of preparatory and auxiliary services and hence the branch does not constitute a PE of the Taxpayer in India. Consequently, no income can be assessed in terms of Article 7 of the India-US DTAA .

Held:
The Branch was engaged in preparation of drawings, designs and doing structural calculations which require high technical and managerial skills. The branch was also doing research and development work for the Taxpayer which was the core business of the Taxpayer and the same cannot be considered to be of preparatory or auxiliary character. Accordingly, in terms of Article 5 of India-USA DTAA , the branch constituted PE of the Taxpayer in India.

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[2015] 37 STR 963 (Ker.) E. M. Mani Constructions Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commr. Of C. Ex., Cus. & S.T., Cochin

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Stay Order should be passed only after hearing the appellant and considering the merits put forth.

Facts:
During the hearing of stay application, the learned counsel for the appellant was not present and adjournment was requested. However, the Tribunal proceeded with the hearing and passed a stay order with the condition of payment of entire service tax with interest along with 50% penalty. Subsequently, the modification application of the appellant also was rejected. Therefore, the present appeal is filed.

Held:
Since the Counsel for the appellant did not remain present, the order was passed without hearing the appellant. Further, while the order rejecting modification application, the Tribunal focused on its limit on jurisdiction in review applications. Therefore, both the orders were passed without having regard to the merits of the case. Accordingly, in view of the above and having regard to the huge quantum of service tax demand ordered to be deposited, the matter was remanded for fresh hearing and stay order.

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Lease vis-à-vis Service, Supremacy

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Introduction There are a number of transactions in the commercial world which are to be executed by the doer with use of various equipments and instruments. There may also be such situations where the doer may be working for one specific customer for a sufficiently long period of time. Under above circumstances a question arises whether such transaction is for providing services or it is to be treated as ‘deemed sale’ by way of “transfer of right to use goods” i.e. lease transaction, which can be made liable under Sales Tax Laws.

By now there are a number of judgments and it can be said that the situation is very fluid in as much as there are contradictory judgments including from the Hon’ble High Courts.

Quippo Oil and Infrastructure vs. State of Tripura (77 VST 547) (Trip)

This is one of the latest judgments from the High Court of Tripura deciding on the controversy as referred to above. There were a number of petitions, but the facts as noted by the Hon. High Court in one of the cases, can be referred to as under:

The petitioner companies in this case entered into a contract with the ONGC for digging directional wells. As per the petitioners, digging directional wells has many components including Drilling Rig, Logging Services, Cementing, Mud Engineering, Directional Drilling etc. Directional drilling is one of the components of digging a directional well. According to the petitioners they have entered into a service contract providing service of directional drilling, and therefore, they are paying service tax to the Central Government. The petitioners contend that the contract does not amount to sale and no VAT can be levied on the same.

Based on above facts, the Hon. High Court has discussed the issue at length. The rival submissions are noted by the Hon. High Court by observing as under:

“The case of the State is that since a tax on the sale or purchase of goods includes in terms of sub-clause (d) of Article 366(29A) tax on the transfer of the right to use any goods for any purpose the petitioners are liable to pay value added tax on such transfer of right to use goods. The contention of the petitioners is that they have entered into a service contract and only the Union can levy tax on services and not the State. The petitioners have also urged that they are paying service tax to the Central Government under the provisions of law and since they are paying service tax, if there is conflict between the Central Law and the State Act the Tripura Value Added Tax Act must necessarily give way to the provisions which provide for imposition of service tax in the Finance Act of 1994.”

The Hon. High Court has referred to a number of citations, and, after full discussion arrived at the following conclusion:

“[33] As has been held by the Apex Court either a transaction shall be exigible to sales tax/VAT or it shall be exigible to service tax. Both the taxes are mutually exclusive. Whereas sales tax and value added tax can be levied on sales and deemed sales only by the State, it is only the Central Government which can levy service tax. No person can be directed to pay both sales tax and service tax on the same transaction. The intention of the parties is clearly to treat the agreement as a service agreement and not a transfer of right to use of goods. We are also clearly of the view that it is impossible from the terms of the contract to divide the contract into two portions and since the petitioners have paid service tax they cannot be also asked to pay value added tax. As held by the Delhi High Court in Commissioner, VAT , Trade and Taxes Department vrs. International Travel House Ltd. (supra), if there is a conflict between the Central law and the State Act then the Central law must prevail. The petitioners cannot be burdened with two different taxes for the same transaction.

[34] After carefully going through the contracts we are of the view that the contracts are mainly for hiring of services. There may be a very small element of transfer of right to use goods but according to us the pre-dominant portion of the contract relates to hiring of services and not to transfer of right to use the goods. We are aware that the dominant nature test is not to be used in composite contracts falling within the ambit of Article 366(29A) but from the reading of the contract it is more than apparent that the intention of the parties was to treat the contract as a contract for hiring of services. Moreover, it is impossible to divide the contract into two separate portions. Every element of the digging directional wells and Mobile Drilling Rig service contains a major element of provisions of services. In such an eventuality it is virtually impossible to divide the contract. It is not possible to work out the value of the right to use goods transferred under the contract. In cases, where the contracts are easily divisible or where the parties have by agreement clearly indicated what is value of the service part and what is value of the transfer of right to use goods part, the contract may be divided. We are in agreement with the Delhi High Court that when the contract cannot be divided with exactitude then the Central Law must prevail.

[35] Parties have also been paying service tax and if the State is allowed to tax any portion of the value of the contract then there has to be a proportionate refund of the service tax to that extent. This cannot be done without hearing the Union of India. If there is any dispute between the State or the Union of India then they must resolve it between themselves. The petitioners or the ONGC cannot be made liable to pay both the taxes for the same transaction.

[36] In view of the above discussion, we are clearly of the view that in all the cases the transactions do not amount to sale within the meaning of the TVAT Act, 2004. Therefore, all the writ petitions have to be allowed. The State is not entitled to levy any sales tax or Value Added Tax on the transactions in question. It is, therefore, directed that the amount of tax, already deducted and received by the State shall be refunded to the petitioners along with statutory interest latest by 28th February, 2015. In case the amount is not refunded by that date then the State shall be liable to pay interest @12% per annum with effect from 1st January, 2015.”

Conclusion
The above judgment is one of the determinative judgments which is very clear in its verdict. The laws laid down by the Hon. High court will certainly be guiding law for time to come. The businesses, at present, are very much under pressure due to an attempt by both the authorities to levy Service tax as well as VAT . The nature of transaction is to be decided by its dominant nature and if it is for providing services, then even if some element of leasing of instrument etc. is involved, it cannot be enforced by State Authorities. The Service Tax should prevail over Sales Tax/VAT . We expect that taking note of the above judgment, the sales tax department will not ask to pay sales tax where Service Tax is already paid as well as if at all the transaction attracts sales tax then the departments will make adjustment of payment inter-se and not ask the dealer to discharge double tax. This will be a real relief to the dealers.

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Drilling Rigs on Time Charter – A Service of Hiring of Tangible Goods?

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In a recently reported Tribunal decision in the case of Great Ship (India) Ltd. vs. CST, Mumbai 2015 (37) STR 533 (Tri.-Mum), the issue posed before the Hon. Tribunal was to examine primarily whether a contract entered into for charter hire of drilling unit (including carrying out drilling activity), by the appellant therein, an Indian company with ONGC, involved dispute relating to taxability under mining of mineral, oil or gas service as defined in section 65(105)(zzzy) of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act) or liable as Supply Of Tangible Goods service (SOTG) as defined under sub-clause (zzzzj) of the said section 65(105) of the Act. Considering that along with the drilling rigs brought in by the appellant, their significant number of personnel carried out actual drilling operations, the appellant contended that the contract is one of drilling service liable as mining service as defined under service tax law whereas according to the revenue, the core object of the agreement was to provide equipment (tangible goods) on hire to attract service tax u/s. 65(105)(zzzzj) of the Finance Act, 1994. According to the appellant, they provided drilling service with the use of the drilling equipment obtained by them on hire from a Singapore company on bareboat charter basis and under the contract with ONGC, they were required to carry out drilling operations after securing permit and licenses for operation of drilling by its own crew of various skills like engineers, technicians etc., totalling to about 45 persons and hence the activity was carried out to produce the output service required by their customer. They also contended that they were fully responsible for the job as a whole and therefore they controlled, directed and supervised drilling operations and did not transfer possession of the equipment so as to merit classification as SOTG. The issue pertained to the period 07-07-2009 to 27-02-2010. Therefore, alternatively and incidentally, it was also contended on behalf of the appellant that prior to the date of 27-02-2010, service tax did not extend to the area in which the drilling services were carried out as India did not include installations, structures and vessels in the Continental Shelf and Exclusive Economy Zones of India. However, for the analysis and discussion herein below, the aspect of territorial jurisdiction is kept aside as the same is not relevant. The appellant also put forth the fact of their paying service tax under mining service for the subsequent period viz. 01-04-2010 onwards and filed ST-3 Returns to such effect and thus contended that their classification was accepted by the department.

As against this claim, the revenue’s submission was that the issue involved was covered by the Hon. Bombay High Court’s decision in Indian National Shipowners Association (INSA) 2009 (14) STR 289 (Bom). The High Court examined the scope of SOTG service in the context of supply of offshore vessels to carry out various jobs like anchor handling, towing of vessels, supply of rigs or platform, diving or safety support, crane support etc., in designated or non-designated areas. The question before the High Court in the case of INSA (supra) was whether various independent services provided by the members of the association were in the nature of mining services defined under entry (zzzy) or the later entry (zzzzj) defining SOTG in section 65(105) of the Act. Since these activities were independently carried out by various and separate vendors, it was held that the services are liable to be classified as SOTG, when the right of possession and effective control of goods was not transferred as they did not carry out mining activity.

Statutory provisions:
For facilitating easy reference, both the relevant definitions of section 65(105) of the Act are reproduced below:

[zzzy]:

“Taxable service means any service provided or to be provided to any person, by any other person in relation to mining of mineral, oil or gas”.

{zzzzj}:

“Taxable service means any service provided or to be provided to any person, by any other person in relation to supply of tangible goods including machinery, equipment and appliances for use, without transferring right of possession and effective control of such machinery, equipment and appliances.”

Scope of the contract:
The Tribunal on detailed examination of the contract between the parties inter alia found that the contract:

Was for a firm period of three years from the commencement date.

The compensation was based on per day of operation and only slightly lower compensation was payable (about 95%) even for a non-operation day. Similarly, even for the day when rigs were moved from one location to another, the lower rate of about 95% of the daily rate was still applicable to non-operation day.
The scope included provision of complete drilling rig and equipment as per technical specification.
Provision of capable and experienced rig crew.
The appellant was fully responsible for mobilisation of personnel, equipment and material and their safety.
Loss or damage to the drilling unit was on account of the appellant.
For undertaking any drilling, the appellant was entitled to additional charges.
Training the crew also was appellant’s responsibility.

The Tribunal on examining the definition of SOTG found that only two conditions were required to be covered by SOTG service viz. there should be supply of tangible goods and there should not be any transfer of right of possession and effective control. Whereas, the appellant’s contention that they did not transfer possession and control to ONGC was not relevant to determine liability under the category of SOTG.

Perusal of the ingredients of the contract in the light of the legal provisions, the Tribunal observed that the equipment and crew were of the appellant and therefore possession and effective control was of the appellant and the consideration was also expressed on per day basis. Thus, all the elements put together showed that there was no transfer of right or possession by the appellant to ONGC and therefore appellant’s contention that they should have transferred possession of goods to come within the scope of the taxing entry of SOTG was not tenable. On examining Bombay High Court’s decision in Indian National Shipowners Association (supra), the Tribunal concluded that the appellant’s service merited classification as SOTG. In support of its decision, the Tribunal also relied on the decisions of:

Atwood Oceanic Pacific Ltd. vs. Commissioner 2013 (32)STR 756 (Tribunal Ahmd)
Shipping Corporation of India 2014 (33 STR 552 (Tri.- Mum)
Srinivasa Transports 2014 (34) STR 765 (Tri.-Bang)

The Tribunal on concluding also noted that even on assuming that service was a composite service consisting of mining service and SOTG, the essential character of the service was SOTG service since 95% of the consideration was attributed for supply of tangible goods.

While analysing the above decision of the hon. tribunal, the fact of the matter to be noted is that the limited issue before the Bench was to examine and classify the activity under one or the other classification as the dispute raised in the show cause notice was in relation to classification. Similarly, when the hon. Bombay  high  Court  examined  the  case of INSA (supra), the trigger point for filing writ petition on behalf of members of the Shipowners’ association was that various offshore support vessels, construction barges, tugs etc., were provided by members for exploration operations on  time  charter  basis. This  summarily  may  be  described as  marine  logistics  services. The  revenue  initiated  action to recover service tax on the said activity under the entry  of mining service under the above sub-clause (zzzy). Vide this entry actually all the activities relating to mining were consolidated  by  the  finance act,  2007.  The  category  of SotG was introduced later from 16th may 2008. Therefore, in the case of INSA (supra) to put an end to dispute relating to taxability under the entry of mining service, the argument was advanced that the later entry of SOTG was the relevant classification. However, the scope of this taxing entry in (zzzzy) or taxability under the entry was per se not examined vis-à-vis a contract for hiring of equipment in detail  as there  did not arise such question before the high Court.   As a matter of fact, the decisions relied upon above by the tribunal in Great Ship (india) Ltd. (supra) viz. Shipping Corporation (supra), atwood oceanic (supra) etc., also, the dispute involved was limited to different classifications vis- à-vis SOTG and/or fact prior to the date of introduction of SOTG the service was not taxable.

Are Most Hiring Contracts Not of “Deemed sale”?:

On closely perusing the scope of the entry of SOTG one may find that only those hiring or leasing contracts would be covered by the scope of this entry whereunder, there is no transfer of right of possession and effective control over the equipment provided on hire. hiring contracts where such right is transferred are liable as “deemed  sale”  under  the  Vat  laws  of  the  States.  To examine whether a contract contains transfer of such right to use the goods or not, a test is laid down in the benchmark decision of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. vs. UOI 2006 (2) STR 161 (SC) which provides direction in the matter and which is also followed by various high Courts as listed below:

?    There must be goods available for delivery.
?    There must be consensus ad idem as to the identity of the goods.
?    The transferee should have legal right to use the goods
– consequently all legal consequences of such use including any permission or licenses required therefore should be available to the transferee.
?    For  the  period  during  which  the  transferee  has  such legal right, it has to be the exclusion of the transferor. This is the necessary concomitant of the plain language of the statute viz. a “transfer of the right to use” and not merely a license to use the goods.
?    Having transferred the right to use the goods during the period for which it is to be transferred, the owner cannot again transfer the same rights to others.

If all the above ingredients are present, the contract is one of “deemed sale” in terms of article 366(29A) of the Constitution and exigible to Vat and therefore cannot be held as SOTG service. It may be noted at this point that under the negative list based taxation applicable from 01-07-2012, the said service of SOTG is included in the list of “declared Services” in section 66e of the act in clause (F) as “transfer of goods by way of hiring, leasing, licensing or in any such manner without transfer of right to use such goods”. While explaining the negative list based provisions, the Government in the education Guide dated 20-06-2012 has referred to the above test and has cited a few illustrations with reference to some judgments to advance its own interpretation. (readers may refer para 6.6.1 and 6.6.2 of the said education Guide). The said test referred above was followed interalia in another important decision of the andhra high Court in G. S. Lamba & Sons vs. State of Andhra Pradesh 2012-TIOL-49-HC-AP-CT involving contract of hiring of commercial vehicles and the aspect of transfer of right to use has been exhaustively analysed (refer BCAJ november 2012 issue under hiring of goods: declared Service or deemed Sale). An extract of a few important observations made in the said decision of G. S. Lamba (supra) is provided below:

“The right to use goods arises only on the transfer of such right to use goods and that the transfer of right is the sine quo non for the right to use any goods”.

“Effective control does not mean physical control and even if the manner, method, modalities and time are decided by the lessee, it would be general control over goods”.

“Article 366(29A) would show that the tax (i.e. VAT in the instant case) is not on the delivery of goods used but on the transfer of the right to use goods regardless of when and whether goods are delivered for use. This is subject to the condition that goods are in existence for use.”

“The entire use in the property in goods is to be exclusively utilized for a period under contract by lessee.”

Similar decision has also been pronounced by the Gauhati high Court in Deepaknath vs. ONGC (2010) 31 VST 337 (GAU) and Orissa High Court in K. C. Behra vs. State of Orissa (1991) 83 STC 325 (Orissa). On going through the terms of contract in the instant case of Great Ship (india) Ltd. (supra), one may find that the contract satisfies the test laid down by the Apex Court in BSNL’s case (supra) and conforms with all the observations made by andhra high Court in G. S. Lamba’s case (supra). Yet, paradoxically, the contract is subjected to service tax.

Conclusion:
There may exist several conflicting decisions for a common situation. Similarly, view of professionals also may differ. yet the test laid down by BSNL seems a decisive factor for the  situation  discussed  above.  Following  principles  laid down thereunder, the above contract does not appear to be a contract for service at all. However, since this aspect was  not  presented  before  the  tribunal  for  the  reasons best known to the appellant, the contract seemingly of “deemed sale” is held as service of supply of tangible goods liable for service tax. Entire service sector and professionals eagerly await the arrival of GST legislation in the hope of bringing an end to the battle between the aspect of ‘sale’ and ‘service’ in a transaction.

Income computation and Disclosure Standards notified: Notification No. 33/2015 F.No. 134/48/2010 – TPl, dated 31 March 2015

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Income computation and Disclosure Standards notified: Notification No. 33/2015 F.No. 134/48/2010 – TPl, dated 31 March 2015

CBDT has notified income computation and disclosure standards applicable to all assessees following the mercantile system of accounting, for computing income chargeable to income-tax under the following heads:

(i) “Profit and gains of business or profession”
(ii) “Income from other sources”.

The Notification is effective from April 1, 2015 and will apply to Assessment Year 2016-17 and subsequent Assessment Years.

17. Roll back of Advance Pricing Agreements (APA): Notification no. 23/2015 dated 14.3.15 and Notification no. 33/2015 dated 1.4.2015

The Board vide Income tax (Third Amendment) Rules, 2015 had issued rules for roll back of application of APA as well as APA vide Rule 10 MA. These Rules allow retrospective application for roll back up to four years.

The dates prescribed in the said rules has been amended vide Income tax (Fourth Amendment) Rules, 2015. Currently, an application filed before 31 March 2015 can be rolled back by filing prescribed Form 3CEDA along with additional fee before 30 June 2015 or the date of entering the APA whichever is earlier. Similar provisions apply for APAs’ entered before 31 March 2015.

18. No capital gain arises on roll over of Mutual Funds under Fixed Maturity Plans as per SEBI norms – Circular No. 6 dated 9 April 2015

19. Amendment in Rule 114 to provide procedure for application of PAN/Tax deduction Account No./Tax collection Account No. for company not registered under the Companies Act, 2013, Certain additional documents (like Aadhar card, election card etc.) permitted as proof of date of birth in case of individuals – Income tax (Fifth Amendment) Rules 2015 – Notification no. 38/2015 dated 10 April 2015

20. Rule 2BB amended to increase amount of Transport allowance for blind or handicap employee from Rs. 1600/- to Rs. 3200/- and for other employees from Rs. 800/- to Rs. 1600/- per month – Income tax (Sixth Amendment) Rules 2015 – Notification no. 39/2015 dated 13 April 2015

21. New tax returns forms notified – Notification no- 41/2015 [S.O. 1014(E) dated 15 April , 2015 – Income tax (Seventh amendment) Rules, 2015

New forms SAHAJ (ITR-1), ITR-2, SUGAM (ITR-4S) and ITR-V” have been notified. Further Rule 12 has been amended with effect from 1 April, 2015

22. Chargeability of Interest on Self-Assessment tax under the Wealth tax Act, 1957 – Circular no. 5 dated 9 April 2015

As notified for income tax purposes, the Board now clarifies that no interest u/s. 17B will be charged on self assessment tax paid before the due date of filing the return, while computing the tax liability under the Wealth tax Act for delay in filing the return of net wealth.

23. CBDT Instructions on claim of treaty benefits by FIIs – File :F.No.500/36/2015-FTD-1 dated 24 April 2015 (reproduced hereunder)

It has come to the notice of the Board that several Foreign Institutional Investors receiving income from transactions in secrutities claim such income as exempt from tax under the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act)’, by availing benefit provided in the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements (‘DTAAs’) signed between India and their respective countries of residence.

Since the issue involved in such cases is limited, such claims should be decided expeditiously. Accordingly it has been decided that in all cases of Foreigh Institutional Investors seeking treaty benefits under the provisions of respective DTAAs, the decision may be taken within one month from the date such claim is filed.

This may be brought to the notice of all concerned with strict compliance.

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Jupiter Construction Services Ltd. vs. DCIT ITAT Ahmedabad `A’ Bench Before Pramod Kumar (AM) and S. S. Godara (JM) ITA No. 2850 and 2144/Ahd/11 Assessment Year: 1995-96 and 1996-97. Decided on: 24th April, 2015. Counsel for assessee / revenue: Tushar P. Hemani / Subhash Bains

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Section 255(4) – At the time of giving effect to the majority view, it normally is not open to the Tribunal to go beyond the exercise of giving effect to the majority views, howsoever mechanical it may seem. Even if the Third Member’s verdict is shown to be “unsustainable in law and in complete disregard to binding judicial precedents”, Division Bench has no choice but to give effect to it.

Facts:
There was a different of opinion between the members of Division Bench while deciding the appeal of the assessee relating to levy of penalty. The difference was referred to the Third Member who agreed with the Accountant Member and confirmed the levy of penalty.

At the stage of Division Bench giving effect to the order of the Third Member, the assessee claimed that the order of the Third Member could not be given effect to as it was unsustainable and in complete disregard to binding judicial precedents. The assessee claimed that the matter of whether effect could be given to such an order was required to be referred to a Special Bench.

Held:
Post the decision of the jurisdictional High Court in the case of CIT vs. Vallabhdas Vithaldas 56 taxmann.com 300 (Guj) the legal position is that the decisions of the division benches bind the single member bench, even when such a single member bench is a third member bench.

A larger bench decision binds the bench of a lesser strength because of the plurality in the decision making process and because of the collective application of mind. What three minds do together, even when the result is not unanimous, is treated as intellectually superior to what two minds do together, and, by the same logic, what two minds do together is considered to be intellectually superior to what a single mind does alone. Let us not forget that the dissenting judicial views on the division benches as also the views of the third member are from the same level in the judicial hierarchy and, therefore, the views of the third member cannot have any edge over views of the other members. Of course, when division benches itself also have conflicting views on the issues on which members of the division benches differ or when majority view is not possible as a result of a single member bench, such as in a situation in which one of the dissenting members has not stated his views on an aspect which is crucial and on which the other member has expressed his views, it is possible to constitute third member benches of more than one members. That precisely could be the reason as to why even while nominating the Third Member u/s. 255(4), the Hon’ble President of this Tribunal has the power of referring the case “for hearing on such point or points (of difference) by one or more of the other members of the Appellate Tribunal”. Viewed from this perspective, and as held by Hon’ble Jurisdictional high Court, the Third Member is bound by the decisions rendered by the benches of greater strength. That is the legal position so far as at least the jurisdiction of the Gujarat High Court is concerned post Vallabhdas Vithaldas (supra) decision, but, even as we hold so, we are alive to the fact that the Hon’ble Delhi High Court had, in the case of P. C. Puri vs. CIT 151 ITR 584 (Del), expressed a contrary view on this issue which held the field till we had the benefit of guidance from the Hon’ble jurisidictional High Court. The approach adopted by the learned Third member was quite in consonance with the legal position so prevailing at that point of time.

At the time of giving effect to the majority view, it cannot normally be open ot the Tribunal to go beyond the exercise of giving effect to the majority views, howsoever mechanical it may seem. In the case of dissenting situations on the division bench, the process of judicial adjudication is complete when the third member, nominated by the Hon’ble President, resolves the impasse by expressing his views and thus enabling a majority view on the point or points of difference. What then remains for the division bench is simply identifying the majority view and dispose of the appeal on the basis of the majority views. In the course of this exercise, it is, in our humble understanding, not open to the division bench to revisit the adjudication process and start examining the legal issues.

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ACIT vs. Ramila Pravin Shah ITAT Mumbai `D’ Bench Before B. R. Baskaran (AM) and Sanjay Garg (JM) ITA No. 5246 /Mum/2013 Assessment Year: 2010-11. Decided on: 5th March, 2015. Counsel for revenue / assessee: Love Kumar / Bhupendra Shah

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Section 69C – The fact that suppliers name appears in the list of havala dealers of sales tax departments and assessee is unable to produce them does not mean that purchases are bogus if the payment is through banking channels and the GP ratio becomes abnormally high. Statement by third parties cannot be concluded adversely in isolation without corroborating evidences against appellant specially when AO had not offered cross examination to the appellant.

Facts:
In the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer (AO) noticed that the assessee has made purchases from certain parties whose names appeared in the list of parties provided by the sales-tax department who allegedly provide accommodation entries. The AO considered statements taken by the sales-tax department from some of the parties. The Inspector deputed to serve notices to these parties reported that these parties were not available at the given address.

The AO asked the assessee to submit delivery challans and stock register to prove the movement of stock and also to produce these parties. The assessee failed to furnish the details called for. Placing reliance on the statements given by these parties before the sales-tax authorities the AO took the view that purchases to the tune of Rs. 28.08 lakh have to be treated as unexplained expenditure. He added this amount to the total income of the assessee u/s. 69C of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A). The CIT(A) in his order noted that the jurisdictional High Court in the case of Nikunj Exim Enterprise Pvt. Ltd (ITA No. 5604 of 2010) has held that once sales are accepted, the purchases cannot be treated as ingenuine in those cases where the appellant had submitted all details of purchases and payments were made by cheques, merely because the sellers/suppliers could not be produced before the AO by the assessee.

He mentioned that he has also gone through the judgment in the case of Balaji Textile Industries (P) Ltd. vs. ITO 49 ITD 177 (Bom) which was made as long back as 1994 and which still holds good.

He took into consideration the G.P. Ratio/G.P. Margin of the assessee in the previous assessment year as well as subsequent assessment year and observed that if the addition made by the AO is accepted, then the GP ratio of the assessee during the previous year will become abnormally high and therefore, that is not acceptable because the onus is on the AO by bringing adequate material on record to prove that such a high GP ratio exists in the nature of business carried on by the assessee.

He further observed that it has to be appreciated that (i) payments were made through banking channel and by cheque; (ii) notices coming back does not mean those parties are bogus, they are just denying their business to avoid sales tax/VAT , etc, (iii) statement by third parties cannot be concluded adversely in isolation and without corroborating evidences against appellant; (iv) no cross examination has been offered by AO to the appellant to cross examine the relevant parties (who are deemed to be witness or approver being used by AO against the appellant) whose name appear in the website ww.mahavat. gov.in and (v) failure to produce parties cannot be treated adversely against the appellant.

He held that considering the facts and the binding judicial pronouncements of the jurisdictional ITAT Mumbai Bench as well as Mumbai High Court and other legal precedents the addition made by the AO cannot be sustained.

Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had properly analysed the facts prevailing in the instant case. It extracted the relevant portion of the order of the CIT(A) and held that it did not find any infirmity in the same.

The appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.

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Heranba Industries Ltd. vs. DCIT ITAT Mumbai `H’ Bench Before R. C. Sharma (AM) and Sanjay Garg (JM) ITA No. 2292 /Mum/2013 Assessment Year: 2009-10. Decided on: 8th April, 2015. Counsel for assessee / revenue: Rashmikant C. Modi / Jeetendra Kumar

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Section 271(1)(c) – If surrender is on the condition of no penalty and assessment is based only on surrender and not on evidence, penalty cannot be levied. The fact that surrender of income was made after issuance of a questionnaire does not mean that it was not voluntary.

Facts:
The assessee company was engaged in manufacture of pesticides, herbicides and formulations. It filed its return of income for assessment year 2009-10 returning therein a total income of Rs.1.49 crore. In the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer (AO) noticed that during the previous year under consideration, the assessee had received share application money of Rs. 89.50 lakh. He asked the assessee to furnish details with supporting evidences. In response, the assessee expressed its inability to provide the necessary details and stated that in order to buy peace, it agreed to offer the share application money of Rs. 89.50 lakh as its income.

The AO added Rs. 89.50 lakh to the assessee’s income u/s. 69A and also levied penalty u/s. 271(1)(c).

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the assessee, at the very first instance, surrendered share application money with a request not to initiate any penalty proceedings. Except for the surrender, there was neither any detection nor any information in the possession of the department. There was no malafide intention on the part of the assessee and the AO had not brought any evidence on record to prove that there was concealment. No additional material was discovered to prove that there was concealment. The AO did not point out or refer to any evidence to show that the amount of share capital received by the assessee was bogus. It was not even the case of the revenue that material was found at the assessee’s premises to indicate that share application money received was an arranged affair to accommodate assessee’s unaccounted money.

The Tribunal noted that the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Suresh Chandra Mittal 251 ITR 9 (SC) has observed that where assessee has surrendered the income after persistence queries by the AO and where revised return has been regularised by the Revenue, explanation of the assessee that he has declared additional income to buy peace of mind and to come out of vexed litigation could be treated as bonafide, accordingly levy of penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) was held to be not justified.

The Tribunal held that in the absence of any material on record to suggest that share application money was bogus or untrue, the fact that the surrender was after issue of notice u/s. 143(2) could not lead to the inference that it was not voluntary.

The amount was included in the total income only on the basis of the surrender by the assessee. It held that in these circumstances it cannot be held that there was any concealment. When no concealment was ever detected by the AO, no penalty was imposable. Furnishing of inaccurate particulars was simply a mistake and not a deliberate attempt to evade tax. The Tribunal did not find any merit in the levy of penalty u/s. 271(1)(c).

The appeal filed by the assessee was dismissed.

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DCIT vs. Aanjaneya Life Care Ltd. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal “A” Bench, Mumbai Before D. Manmohan (V. P.) and Sanjay Arora (A. M.) ITA Nos. 6440&6441/Mum/2013 Assessment Years: 2010-11 & 2011-12. Decided on 25.03.2015 Counsel for Revenue / Assessee: Asghar Zain / Harshavardhana Datar

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Section 221(1) – Penalty for delay in payment of self-assessment tax deleted on account of financial crunch faced by the assessee.

Facts:
Due to financial crunch the assessee was not able to pay the self-assessment tax within the stipulated period. However, according to the AO, the assessee could not prove its contention with cogent and relevant material. Further, he observed that substantial funds were diverted to related concerns. He therefore levied penalty u/s. 221(1) of the Act. On appeal, the CIT(A) allowed the appeal of the assessee and deleted the penalty imposed.

Held:
According to the Tribunal, the Revenue was unable to show that the assessee had sufficient cash/bank balance so as to meet the tax demand. Secondly, it also could not show if any funds were diverted for non-business purposes at the relevant point of time so as to say that an artificial financial scarcity was created by the assessee. In view of the same the tribunal accepted the contention of the assessee and upheld the order of the CIT(A).

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Dy. Director of Income Tax vs. Serum Institute of India Limited Income Tax Appellate Tribunal Pune Bench “B”, Pune Before G.S. Pannu (A. M.) and Sushma Chowla (J. M.) ITA Nos. 1601 to 1604/PN/2014 Assessment Year: 2011-12. Decided on 30-03-2015 Counsel for Revenue / Revenue: B. C. Malakar / Rajan Vora

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Section 206AA read with section 90(2) – Rate of deduction of tax at source where nonresidents do not have PAN – Held that the beneficial provisions of DTAAs override the provisions of section 206AA and tax to be deducted at the lower rate as prescribed in DTAA.

Facts:
The assessee company was engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of vaccines. In the course of its business activities, assessee made payments to non-residents on account of interest, royalty and fee for technical services. The assessee deducted tax at source on such payment in accordance with the tax rates provided in the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements (DTA – As) with the respective countries. It was noted by the AO that in case of some of the non-residents, the recipients did not have Permanent Account Numbers (PANs). As a consequence, Revenue treated such payments, as cases of ‘short deduction’ of tax in terms of the provisions of section 206AA which require that the tax shall be deductible at the rate specified in the relevant provisions of the Act or at the rates in force or at the rate of 20%. On appeal, the CIT(A) held that where the DTAA s provide for a tax rate lower than that prescribed in 206AA , the provisions of the DTAA s shall prevail and the provisions of section 206AA would not be applicable. Therefore, he deleted the tax demand raised by the Revenue relatable to the difference between 20% and the actual tax rate provided by the DTAA s.

Before the Tribunal, the Revenue contended that section 206AA would override section 90(2) and therefore, the tax deduction was liable to be made @ 20% in absence of furnishing of PANs by the recipient non-residents.

Held:
The Tribunal, relying on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Azadi Bachao Andolan and Others vs. UOI, (2003) 263 ITR 706, CIT vs. Eli Lily & Co. (2009) 312 ITR 225 and the case of GE India Technology Centre Pvt. Ltd. vs. CIT (2010) 327 ITR 456 upheld the order of the CIT(A) and held that where the tax had been deducted on the strength of the beneficial provisions of DTAAs, the provisions of section 206AA cannot be invoked by the AO having regard to the overriding nature of the provisions of section 90(2).

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2015-TIOL-408-ITAT-DEL ITO vs. JKD Capital & Finlease Ltd. ITA No. 5443/Del/2013 Assessment Year : 2005-06. Date of Order: 27.3.2015

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Section 269SS, 271E, 275(1)(c) – Cases of levy of penalty u/s. 271E are covered by section 271(1)(c) and accordingly orders passed u/s. 271E will be barred by limitation on expiry of the financial year in which the proceedings in the course of which action for the imposition of penalty has been initiated, are completed, or six months from the end of the month in which penalty proceedings are initiated, whichever period expires later.

Facts:
In the case of the assessee, proceedings for levy of penalty u/s. 271E were initiated in assessment order dated 28th December, 2007. Aggrieved by the assessment order the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) on various grounds. The appeal filed by the assessee was dismissed by the CIT(A). Upon dismissal of the appeal filed by the assessee, the Assessing Officer (AO) referred the matter regarding levy of penalty u/s. 271E to the Ad ditional Commissioner. The Additional Commissioner passed an order levying penalty u/s. 271E on 20th March, 2012.

Aggrieved by the levy of penalty, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who quashed the order levying the penalty on the ground that it is barred by limitation.

Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the Delhi High Court has in the case of CIT vs. Worldwide Township Projects Ltd. 269 CTR 444 (Del) held that section 275(1)(c) will apply to cases of penalty for violation of section 269SS. The Tribunal held that the date on which CIT(A) had passed order in quantum proceedings had no relevance as it did not have any bearing on the issue of penalty. The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had rightly held that the penalty order passed by the AO was barred by limitation as the penalty order was passed beyond six months from the end of the month in which penalty proceedings were initiated in the month of December 2007 and penalty order was thus required to be passed in before 30th June, 2008 whereas the penalty order was passed on 20th March, 2012.

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2015-TIOL-419-ITAT-AHM Dashrathbhai V.Patel vs. DCIT MA No. 174/Ahd/2014 arising out of CO No. 177/Ahd/2009 Block Period : 1.4.1989 to 16.11.1999. Date of Order: 23.1.2015

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Section 254 – Decision of the Tribunal which is contrary to the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court gives rise to a mistake apparent which is required to be rectified.

Facts :
In the case of the assessee, the assessment of undisclosed income was completed and the amount of tax payable was computed @ 67.2% i.e. applying the rate of 60% plus surcharge thereon @ 12% as per proviso to section 113.

In the course of appellate proceedings before CIT(A), the assessee took an additional ground and contended that the proviso to section 113 was introduced by the Finance Act, 2002. Till 31st May, 2002 section 113 did not have a proviso levying surcharge on income-tax. The assessee contended that the proviso is prospective and does not apply to his case where search was carried on 16.11.1999. Accordingly, the assessee is not liable to pay surcharge levied by proviso to section 113. Reliance was placed on the Special Bench decision in the case of Merit Enterprises vs. DCIT 101 ITD 1 (Hyd)(SB). The CIT(A) decided the case against the assessee by following the decision of Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Suresh N. Gupta 297 ITR 322 (SC) wherein it held that the proviso was clarificatory and curative in nature. The assessee did mention that in the case of CIT vs. Vatika Township (P) Ltd. 314 ITR 338 (SC) the issue had been referred by the Division Bench to the Larger Bench of the Supreme Court.

Before the Tribunal, while arguing the Cross Objection filed by the assessee, it was pointed out that the issue has been referred to the Larger Bench of the Supreme Court. However, the Tribunal following the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Suresh N. Gupta (supra) decided the issue against the assessee.

Subsequently, the Larger Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Vatika Township (P.) Ltd. 49 taxman. com 249(SC) reversed the decision of the Division Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Suresh N. Gupta and held that the proviso was prospective and not clarificatory. The assessee filed Miscellaneous Application requesting the Tribunal to correct the view taken while deciding the Cross Objection by relying on a Supreme Court decision decided after the Cross Objection was decided.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the order of the Supreme Court in the case of Vatika Township (P.) Ltd. (supra) was pronounced after the decision of the Tribunal. However, it observed that the order of the Supreme Court laid down the law of the land as it existed since the inception of the enactment. It noted that the Supreme Court has in the case of Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange 305 ITR 227 (SC) held that even a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court is binding on the Tribunal and if the decision of the Tribunal is contrary to the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court such decision of the Tribunal gives rise to a mistake apparent which needs to be rectified.

The Tribunal allowed the application filed by the assessee.

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2015-TIOL-416-ITAT-DEL ITO vs. Bhupendra Singh Monga ITA No. 3031/Del/2013 Assessment Years: 2007-08. Date of Order: 30.3.2015

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Section 268A, CBDT Instruction No. 5 of 2014 – Instruction No. 5 of 2014 dated 10.7.2014 fixing monetary limit for not filing the appeal to the Tribunal at Rs. 4,00,000 is applicable even to pending cases i.e. cases where appeal was filed before issuance of this instruction.

Facts :
While assessing the total income of the assessee, an individual, the Assessing Officer (AO) held that the assessee had not properly explained the source of cash deposits. He, accordingly, made certain additions on account of cash deposits.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal. The tax effect of the appeal filed was less than Rs. 4,00,000. The appeal was filed on 15.5.2013. Vide CBDT Instruction No. 5 of 2014 the threshold limit for filing appeal to Tribunal was fixed at Rs. 4,00,000. The Bench noticed that the Revenue ought not to have filed the appeal since the tax effect was less than Rs. 4,00,000. The DR argued that the appeal was filed before issuance of Instruction No. 5 of 2014, and therefore, the said instruction is not applicable to the present case.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that section 268A has been inserted by the Finance Act, 2008 with retrospective effect from 1.4.1999. It also noticed that CBDT has vide Instruction No. 5 of 2014 fixed the threshold of tax effect for filing appeal by the Revenue to the Tribunal to be Rs. 4,00,000. Accordingly, it held that the circular is applicable for pending cases also and therefore, the Revenue should not have filed the appeal before the Tribunal. It fortified its decision by the following decisions of the Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court:

1 CIT vs. Oscar Laboratories P. Ltd. (2010) 324 ITR 115 (P & H)
2 CIT vs. Abinash Gupta (2010) 327 ITR 619 (P & H)
3 CIT vs. Varindera Construction Co. (2011) 331 ITR 449 (P & H)(FB)

It also noted that the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Delhi Race Club Ltd. in ITA No. 128/2008, order dated 3.3.2011 has following its earlier order dated 2.8.2010 in ITA No. 179/1991 in the case of CIT Delhi-III vs. M/s P.S.Jain & Co. held that such circular would also be applicable to pending cases.

The appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.

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[2015] 152 ITD 533 (Jaipur) Asst. DIT (International taxation) vs. Sumit Gupta. A.Y. 2006-07 Order dated- 28th August 2014.

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Section 9, read with section 195 and Article 7 of DTAA between India and USA

Income cannot be said to have deemed to accrue or arise in India when the assessee pays commission to non-resident for the services rendered outside India and the non-resident does not have a permanent establishment in India. Consequently, section 195 is not attracted and so the assessee is not liable to deduct TDS from the said payment.

FACTS
The assessee exported granite to USA and paid commission on export sales made to a US company but it did not deduct tax u/s. 195.

The Assessing Officer held that the sales commission was the income of the payee which accrued or arose in India on the ground that such remittances were covered under the expression fee for technical services’ as defined u/s. 9(1)(vii)(b). He thus held that the assessee was liable deduct tax u/s. 195 and he was in default u/s. 201(1) for tax and interest.

On Appeal, CIT (Appeals) held that commission does not fall under managerial, technical or consultation services and therefore, no income could be deemed to have accrued or arisen to the non-resident so as to attract provisions of withholding tax u/s. 195.

On Appeal-

HELD THAT
The order of CIT(A) was to be upheld as the non-resident recipients of commission rendered services outside India and claimed it as business income and had no permanent establishment in India. Thus, provisions of section 9 and section 195 were not attracted.

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Reference- High Court- Question of Law- The legal inferences that should be drawn on the primary facts is eminently a question of law.

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Premier Breweries Ltd vs. CIT (2015) 372 ITR 180 (SC)

Business Expenditure – The High Court rightly reversed the order of the Tribunal allowing the claim of deduction of commission paid to agents to co-ordinate with the retailers and State Corporation which were exclusive wholesalers of alcoholic beverages based on primary facts.

The appellants were engaged in the manufacture and sale of beer and other alcoholic beverages. Certain States like Kerala and Tamil Nadu had established marketing corporations which were the exclusive wholesalers of alcoholic beverages for the concerned State whereby all manufactures had to compulsorily sell their products to the State Corporations which, in turn, would sell the liquor so purchased, to the retailers. It was pleaded by the appellants that manufacturers of beverages containing alcohol had to engage services of agents who would co-ordinate with the retailers and State Corporations to ensure continuous flow/supply of goods to the ultimate consumers. And on that ground they sought deduction u/s. 37 of the Act.

The claim made by the assessee in the facts noted above was disallowed by the Assessing Officer. The said order of the Assessing Officer was confirmed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). The assessee had moved the learned Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench against the aforesaid orders. The learned Tribunal took the view that the assessee was entitled to claim for deduction. The said view of the learned Tribunal was reversed by the High Court in the Reference made to it u/s. 256(2) of the Act.

Before the Supreme Court, three propositions were advanced on behalf of the appellants. The first was whether the High Court could have reframed the questions after the conclusion of the arguments and that too without giving an opportunity to the assessee. The answer to the above question, according to the appellant, was to be found in M. Janardhana Rao vs. Joint CIT (237 ITR 50) wherein the Supreme Court had held that questions of law arising in an appeal u/s. 260A of the Act must be framed at the time of admission and should not be formulated after conclusion of the arguments.

The second issue raised was the jurisdiction of the High Court to set aside the order of the Tribunal in the exercise of its reference jurisdiction. According to the appellants, the point was no longer res integra having been settled in C.P. Sarathy Mudaliar vs. CIT (62 ITR 576) wherein the Supreme Court had taken the view that setting aside the order of the Tribunal in exercise of the reference jurisdiction of the High Court was inappropriate. It had been observed that while hearing a reference under the Income-tax Act, the High Court exercises advisory jurisdiction and does not sit in appeal over the judgment of the Tribunal. It had been further held that the High Court had no power to set aside the order of the Tribunal even if it is of the view that the conclusion recorded by the Tribunal is not correct.

The third question that had been posed for an answer before the Supreme Court was with regard to the correctness of the manner of exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court in the present case, namely, that the evidence on record had been re-appreciated by the High Court with a view to ascertain if the conclusions recorded by the Tribunal were correct. Reliance had been placed on paragraph 16 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Sudarshan Silks and Sarees vs. CIT (300 ITR 205, 213).

The Supreme Court noted that in the present case, the High Court while hearing the reference made u/s. 256(2) of the Act had set aside the order of the Tribunal. The Supreme Court held that undoubtedly, in the exercise of its reference jurisdiction the High Court was not right in setting aside the order of the Tribunal. The Supreme Court, however, on reading the ultimate paragraph of the order of the High Court found that the error was one of form and not of substance inasmuch as the question arising in the reference had been specifically answered in the following manner: “We, therefore, set aside the order of the Tribunal and uphold that of the Commissioner (Appeals) and answer the questions in favour of the Revenue by holding that the assessee had not discharged the burden that it is entitled to deductions under section 37 of the Income-tax Act. Reference is answered accordingly.”

The Supreme Court observed that a reading of the questions initially framed and subsequently reframed showed that what was done by the High Court was to retain three out of twelve questions, as initially framed, while discarding the rest. Some of the questions discarded by the High Court were actually more proximate to the questions of perversity of the findings of fact recorded by the learned Tribunal, than the questions retained. The Supreme Court held that from a reading of the order of the High Court it was clear that the High Court examined the entitlement of the appellant assessee to deduction/ disallowance by accepting the agreements executed by the assessee with the commission agents; the affidavits filed by C. Janakiraman and Shri A. N. Ramachandra Nayar, husbands of the two lady partners of R.J. Associates and also the payments made by the assessee to R.J. Associates as well as to Golden Enterprises. The question that was posed by the High Court was whether acceptance of the agreements, affidavits and proof of payment would debar the assessing authority to go into the question whether the expenses claimed would still be allowable u/s. 37 of the Act. This was a question which the High Court held was required to be answered in the facts of each case in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. vs. CIT (No.1) (63 ITR 57) and Lachminarayan Madan Lal vs. CIT (86 ITR 439, 446). The High Court had noted the following observations in Lachminarayan (supra):

“The mere existence of an agreement between the assessee and its selling agents or payment of certain amounts as commission, assuming there was such payment, does not bind the Income-tax Officer to hold that the payment was made exclusively and wholly for the purpose of the assessee’s business. Although there might be such an agreement in existence and the payments might have been made. It is still open to the Incometax Officer to consider the relevant facts and determine for himself whether the commission said to have been paid to the selling agents or any part thereof is properly deductible under section 37 of the Act.”

The   Supreme   Court   held   that   there   were   certain Government circulars which regulated, if not prohibited, liaisoning with the government corporations by the manufacturers for the purpose of obtaining supply orders. The true effect of the Government circulars along with the agreements between the assessee and the commission agents and the details of payments made by the assessee to the commission agents as well as the affidavits filed by the husbands of the partners of M/s. R.J. Associates were considered by the High Court. The statement of the managing director of tamil nadu State marketing  Corporation  Ltd.  (taSmaC  Ltd.),  to  whom summons were issued u/s. 131 of the Act, to the effect that M/s. Golden Enterprises had not done any liaisoning work  with  taSmaC  Ltd.  was  also  taken  into  account. the basis of the doubts regarding the very existence of R. J. Associates, as entertained by the Assessing Officer, was also weighed by the high Court to determine the entitlement of the assessee for deduction u/s. 37 of the act. In performing the said exercise the high Court did not disturb or reverse the primary facts as found by the learned tribunal. Rather, the exercise performed was one of the correct legal inferences that should be drawn on the facts already recorded by learned tribunal. The questions reframed were to the said effect. the legal inference that should be drawn from the primary facts, as consistently held by the Supreme Court, was eminently a question of law. No question of perversity was required to be framed or gone into to answer the issues arising. the questions relatable to perversity were consciously discarded by the High Court. The Supreme Court, therefore, could not find any fault with the questions reframed by the high Court or the answers provided.

Recovery of tax – Stay application – A. Y. 2011-12 – Authority to prima facie consider merits and balance of convenience and irreparable injury – Authority to record reasons and then conclude whether stay should be granted and if so on what condition – No examination and no consideration – Order rejecting stay is not valid –

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Hitech Outsourcing Services vs. ITO; 372 ITR 582 (Guj):

For the A. Y. 2011-12, the assessee challenged the assessment order filing appeal before Commissioner (Appeals) The assessee also filed stay application which was initially granted on the condition that the assessee furnished a bank guarantee but subsequently, as the bank guarantee was not furnished, the application was dismissed.

The assessee filed a writ petition challenging the dismissal order. The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“The Revenue had not been able to show any reasons which had weighed the authority for passing the order. When the question of grant of stay against any demand of tax is to be considered, the authority may be required to prima facie consider the merits and balance of convenience and also irreparable injury. These had neither been examined nor considered. The authority was required to record the reasons and then reach an ultimate conclusion as to whether the stay should be granted and if so on what condition. In the absence of any reasons, the order rejecting the stay application could not be sustained.”

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Penalty – Sections 271D, 271E and 273B – A. Ys. 1996-97 to 1998-99 – Loan or deposit in cash exceeding prescribed limit – Payments from partners in cash – Firm and partner are not different entities – Penalty cannot be imposed u/s. 271D –

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CIT vs. Muthoot Financiers; 371 ITR 408 (Del): (2015) 55 taxmann.com 202 (Del):

The
assessee firm was involved in the business of banking. The Assessing
Officer found that the firm had accepted payments firm the partners,
during the relevant years corresponding to the A. Ys. 1996-97 to 1998-99
in cash. The Assessing Officer imposed penalty u/s. 271D of the
Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal held that the advances made to the
firm by its partners could not be regarded as loans advanced to the
firms and deleted the penalty.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)
The transaction effected could not partake the colour of loan or
deposit and neither section 269SS nor section 271D of the Act would come
into play.

ii) It was an undisputed fact that the money was
brought in by the partners of the assessee firm. The source of money had
also not been doubted by the Revenue. The transactions are bonafide and
not aimed at avoiding any tax liability.

iii) The
creditworthiness of the partners and the genuineness of the transactions
coupled with the relationship between the “two persons” and two
different legal interpretations put forward could constitute a
reasonable cause in a given case for not invoking section 271D and
section 271E of the Act. Section 273B of the Act would come to the aid
and help the assessee. Penalty could not be levied.”

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[2015] 55 Taxmann.com 111 (Mumbai – CESTAT) Deshmukh Services vs. CCE & ST.

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Multi-piece packing of soaps on job work basis amounts to deemed manufacture and hence cannot be taxed under Business Auxiliary Services – Matter remitted back to pass a reasoned order and also to consider the effect of Exemption Notification qua intermediate production processes.

Facts:
The appellant undertook job work activities in the nature of mixing of soap bits provided by the supplier company and returning the same in 50 kg. or bigger bags as per company’s instruction and multi-piece packing for which they received consideration. The department contended and confirmed the demand considering the activities as business auxiliary service.

Held:

The Tribunal observed that as per section 2(f)(iii) of the CE Act, 1944 ‘manufacture’ includes any process which in relation to the goods specified in the 3rd Schedule involves packing or re-packing of such goods in a unit container or labeling or re-labeling of containers including the declaration or alteration of retail sale price on it or adoption of any other treatment to the goods to render the products marketable to the consumer and soaps were covered under Serial No. 40 of the said 3rd Schedule. Therefore, multi-piece packaging would fall under the category of “packing or re-packing of goods” and would be an activity of ‘manufacture’. The department’s contention that soap is already in packed condition and hence manufacture is said to be completed was not accepted by the Tribunal on the ground that, multi-piece packaging is done on the soaps already packed and therefore, it would amount to repacking and accordingly the activity would be covered under the definition of ‘manufacture’ u/s. 2(f)(iii). It was further held that if the soap noodles are sold as such after mixing and packing/re-packing, then the activity undertaken by the appellant would amount to ‘manufacture’. On the other hand, if they are not sold as such, but are subject to further processes, since the goods are moved under Rule 4(5)(a) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 it will be an intermediary process in the course of manufacture of soaps and since such movements are permitted without payment of excise duty, the question of levy of service tax would not arise at all in terms of Notification No.8/2005-ST dated 01/03/2005. However, since there was no finding in the order except that the appellant did not contest the duty, the matter was remitted back to give specific finding as to why the activity of the appellant did not amount to manufacture and if it does not amount to manufacture, why benefit of Notification No. 8/2005-S.T. cannot be extended.

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[2015] 55 taxmann.com 245 (Mumbai – CESTAT) – Malhotra Distributors Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE

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Where the assessee merely procures purchase orders based on prices determined by the principal and does not deal with goods at all, his services would be that of commission agent and not of clearing and forwarding agent.

Facts:
The Appellant received commission from manufacturer of goods for rendering assistance in the marketing of goods, by obtaining orders and also ensuring that the goods are sold at the terms and discounts specified by the manufacturer. The Appellant contended that the activities are taxable under Clearing and Forwarding services.

Held:

The Tribunal observed that in terms of agreement between the parties, the Appellant has to only procure the orders from the stockists and forward them to manufacturers and ensure that the goods are sold at the terms and discounts specified in writing by the manufacturer. For the services so rendered, commission at prescribed percentage on the net sale value was receivable. Therefore, having regard to the terms of agreement and relying upon various cases including Larsen & Toubro Ltd. [2006] 4 STT 231 (New Delhi) the Tribunal held that the Appellant did not deal with the goods at all as is expected in the case of clearing & forwarding Agent and he was liable for service tax as commission agent.

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[2015] 55 taxmann.com 526 (Mumbai CESTAT) Behr India Ltd. vs. CCE, Pune.

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Purchase of goods from vendor and exporting the same to customer abroad at a markup value constitutes trading activity on principalto- principal basis and cannot be regarded as supply of goods on behalf of principal for commission, even if markup is stated in the books as commission.

Facts:
The Appellant purchased goods from vendor in India and sold the same to its principal foreign entity abroad at a markup of 3% of the purchase price. The goods were shipped abroad directly by the vendor, however invoices for the same were made on Indian entity and VAT was discharged on the same. The Appellant raised export invoice on the foreign entity and received the export proceeds from their foreign principal as evidenced from the bank realisation certificate and the proceeds were credited to the Appellant’s accounts. However, in the books of accounts the markup in the transaction was reflected as ”commission income”. Department contended that markup of 3% shown as commission is liable to service tax under Business Auxiliary Services provided to Indian vendor.

Held:

After going through the purchase order and sales invoice issued by the Indian vendor and observing that VAT liability was discharged and also noting that the Appellant has issued export invoice to foreign entity and also realised proceeds, the Tribunal held that transaction is that of purchase and sale of goods on principal-to-principal basis and not as agent of anybody else.

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[2015] 55 taxmann.com 72 ( New Delhi – CESTAT)- Rako Mercantile Traders vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Lucknow

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CENVAT credit of inputs lying in store “as such” and “in-process goods” – Loss by fire – CENVAT credit on in-process goods not to be reversed.

Facts:

Appellants, manufacturers of excisable goods availed CENVAT credit of duty on inputs. Fire occurred in factory and finished goods, stock in process and raw material got destroyed. Department denied CENVAT credit on inputs which were in stock and in process since these goods were not used in the manufacture of dutiable final products and that fire occurred due to negligence on part of assessee.

Held:

The Revenue’s explanation that fire has occurred on account of negligence on the part of assessee was not appreciated by the Tribunal inasmuch as nobody invites fire. Inputs which were issued from inputs store section to be used in manufacture of final products are eligible for CENVAT credit and no reversal is required. As regards to the inputs lying in store, relying upon Panacea Biotech Ltd. vs. CCE 2013 (297) ELT 587 (Tri-Del), the Tribunal held that mere receipt of the inputs will not entitle the assessee to avail the credit, when such inputs are destroyed “as such” in the store section itself. Thus, credit in respect of inputs in process was allowed whereas those stock in stores was not allowed.

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[2015] 55 Taxamnn.com 69 (Mumbai – CESTAT) Crest Premedia Solutions (P) Ltd. vs. CCE

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When substantive conditions of the Rebate Notification are fulfilled by the assessee, rebate claim cannot be denied merely for not filing the declaration in time, if the contents of the declaration are such that they can be verified from the records maintained.

Facts:
The appellant regularly filed refund claims under Rule 5 of CENVAT Credit Rules in terms of unutilised credit on input services, used in the output services which were exported. For the disputed period, it did not claim the refund but filed a rebate claim in terms of Notification No.12/2005-ST dated 19/04/2005. A declaration required in terms of the said notification was filed much after the date of export along with condonation of delay for late filing. The rebate claim was rejected on the ground that the declaration was to be filed prior to expiry of one year from the date of export of services.

Held:
The Tribunal held that it is undisputed that conditions prescribed in the said notification have been followed in the present case. However, the procedure was not followed to the extent that declaration was filed after the export of service. It was noted that the contents of the declaration are not such, as cannot be verified from the records maintained. Further, records such as invoice on which input tax credit is availed and records indicating export of services will not reveal any information which is not verifiable later. Having regard to the same and after satisfying itself that the assessee has not claimed CENVAT credit under Rule 5 and the said notification simultaneously, held that the contravention of not following the procedure of filing the declaration is indeed a procedural formality, for contravention of which substantial justice cannot be denied. Accordingly rebate was sanctioned and appeal was allowed.

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[2015] 55 taxmann.com 4 (New Delhi – CESTAT) – Commissioner of Central Excise, Chandigarh vs. Parabolic Drugs Ltd.

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MS Pipes/Channels/Angles, Grinders, Bars, Structures, Plates, Shapes and Sections used in manufacture of technical structures of Capital Goods are eligible for credit as “capital goods”.

Facts:
Assessee manufactured capital goods wherein the MS pipes, channels, angles, grinders and bars were used. The Assessee took CENVAT credit on the said items on the premise that certain goods are “capital goods” and certain goods are used as ‘inputs’ for capital goods. Department denied the credit on the ground that these goods are not capital goods and cannot be regarded as inputs as the same were used for construction of the structures and fixtures. The Commissioner (Appeals) decided in favour of the Assessee, aggrieved by which the revenue filed the appeal.

Held:
The Tribunal affirming the Commissioner (Appeals) Order held that it is not disputed that items hereinabove were used by the Assessee in manufacturing of capital goods and hence CENVAT credit cannot be denied. Relying upon CCE vs. India Cements Ltd. 2014 (305) ELT 558 (Mad HC), it was also observed that the Commissioner (Appeals) has given a finding regarding actual use of the impugned goods in the factory premises of the appellant in technical structures of machines/machinery which are capital goods, based on details of their description and actual photographs submitted by the Assessee. Thus, Revenue’s appeal was dismissed.

[Note: In Rajasthan Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. 2010 (255) ELT 481 (SC), applying the “user test” the Court held that, CENVAT credit of items used for manufacture of product which is used as integral part (i.e. component) of the capital goods are also regarded as capital goods. However in Vandana Global Ltd. 2010 (253) ELT 440 (Tri-LB) it was held that the foundations and supporting structures can neither be considered as capital goods nor as part or accessory to capital goods. Hence, the items used in fabrication of such supporting structures cannot be regarded as inputs used for manufacture of capital goods. Further relying upon Maruti Suzuki Ltd. 2009 (240) ELT 641 (SC), the Tribunal held that, in the absence of nexus such items cannot be regarded as inputs for final product. However subsequently, the Madras High Court in the case of India Cements Ltd. 2012 (285) ELT 341 held that CENVAT credit is available. Relying on this judgment, the Tribunal in the case of A.P.P. Mills Ltd. case 2013 (291) ELT 585 (Tri-Bang) disapproved Vandana Global (supra). Recently, the Calcutta High Court in stay matter in the case of Suryla Alloy Industries Ltd. vs. UOI 2014(305) ELT 47 (Cal) taking note of the same has granted waiver of pre-deposit to the Assessee. However, with effect from 07/07/2009, ‘inputs’ does not include cement, angles, channels, Centrally Twisted Deform bar (CTD) or Thermo Mechanically Treated Bar (TMT) and other items used for construction of factory shed, building or laying of foundation or making of structures for support of capital goods and with effect from 01/03/2011 any goods used for laying of foundation or making of structures for support of capital goods have been excluded from definition of input].

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2015] 55 taxmann.com 274 (Bangalore- CESTAT)-Shirdi Sai Electricals Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Customs & Service Tax, Bangalore

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Facts:
Appellant, a registered ser Stay – In the absence of any indication, mere use of the expression,
“inclusive of taxes” in the contract does not mean that tax is
collected from customer.
vice provider of Management, Maintenance or Repair Service and Erection, Commissioning and Installation service discharged service tax on service portion of contract. The department demanded service tax on the entire contracted value including value of material, as the rates collected as per the contract were inclusive of all taxes. During adjudication Appellant relied upon Notification No. 45/2010 ST and Notification No.12/2003-ST to contend that, service of distribution of electricity was exempt upto 21-06-2010 and that value of material is not to be added in computation of service tax. Copies of VAT paid documents were duly submitted to justify that service tax is not applicable on the value of material. However, on the single ground of non-disclosure of material value in the ST-3 returns the authority contended that service tax is to be paid on the entire contracted value.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that the rates collected in the contract were inclusive of all taxes and there was nothing in the said contract to suggest that service tax was separately charged by the appellant from their customers. It was held that, the expression “inclusive of taxes” only means that there would be no further rise in the value of the contracts in case any demand stands raised against the service provider by the Revenue. In absence of any indication that service tax stands collected by the appellant from their customers, the above observation of the adjudicating authority cannot be appreciated. As regards, non-inclusion of value of material in discharging service tax, the Tribunal observed that Contract Value clearly reflected value of material and service separately and that copies of the VAT documents showing that VAT stands paid by them in respect of such materials is also on record. It was further held that mere non-mention of the Notification in the ST-3 Returns, does not give a reason to deny the benefit of the same, without otherwise examining the applicability of Notification in question. Since the Notification was applicable, unconditional stay granted.

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[2015-TIOL-538-CESTAT-MUM] Kirloskar Pneumatic Co. Ltd vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Pune-III.

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Reimbursable expenditure shall not form part of the value of the taxable service.

Facts:
Employees of Appellant incurred travel expenses while providing output service. Invoices issued separately indicated service charges and actual charges for travelling and due service tax was discharged on the service charges. Show Cause Notices were issued demanding service tax on the travelling expenses on the ground that as per section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994, gross amount which is charged for rendering of services which includes travelling expenses should be the value for the purpose of service tax.

Held:

Relying on the decision of the co-ordinate bench of the Tribunal in the case of Reliance Industries Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excises, Rajkot [2008-TIOL- 1106-CESTAT-AHM] which is upheld by the apex Court held that the reimbursable expenditure shall not form part of the value of the taxable service.

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[2015-TIOL-667-CESTAT-DEL] M/s. Nidhi Metal Auto Components Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Delhi-IV.

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Allegations made on the basis of statements given by the manufacturer/dealer/supplier of goods without investigation at the end of the Assessee not sustainable.

Facts:
Inquiries were conducted at the end of various manufacturers and dealers, who submitted that they had issued invoices without delivery of goods. Show Cause Notices were issued denying CENVAT credit as merely invoices were issued. The Appellant contended that they had received the goods through tractor trolley along with invoices which were used in the manufacture of final products and payments were made through account payee cheques. It was submitted that no cross examination was granted and the statements did not name the Appellant.

Held:
It is impractical to require the Appellant to go behind the records maintained by the dealer/manufacturer. No investigation has been conducted, moreover there is no discrepancy in the invoices issued and all payments are made through account payee cheques and therefore the appeal is allowed.

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[2015-TIOL-576-CESTAT-KOL] M/s AI Champdany Industries Ltd., M/s. Murlidhar Ratanlal Exports Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Kolkatta-IV

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Pre-deposit mandatory even in respect of orders passed prior to 06-08-2014 and appeals filed thereafter.

Facts:
The Appeals have been filed after 06-08-2014 against the orders passed prior to the amendment to section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944 without making any pre-deposit.

Held:
In terms of the amended provisions of section 35F, the Tribunal is barred from entertaining any appeal unless pre-deposit as mentioned in section 35F is complied with accordingly the appeals are not maintainable and are dismissed.

Note: Readers may note a recent CONTRARY decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of M/s. Muthoot Finance Ltd. [2015-TIOL-632-HC-Kerala-ST] reported in BCAJ-April 2015 issue and the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of M/s. K. Rama Mohanarao & Co [2015-TIOL-511-HC-APCX].

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2015-TIOL-739-HC-AP-ST] Commissioner of Customs, Central Excise and Service Tax vs. M/s Hyundai Motor India Engineering (P) Ltd.

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Relevant date for filing the refund claim under Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 is the date of receipt of payment and not the date when the services were provided.

Facts:
Appellant is a 100% export oriented unit (EOU) engaged in export of computer software and Information Technology enabled services. The refund claims filed were rejected by the lower authorities on the ground that the relevant date for calculating the time limit for grant of refund was the date of rendering services and thus the claims were time barred. However, the learned CESTAT accepted the refund claim and the revenue is in appeal.

Held:
The Hon’ble High Court relying on the decision of the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of CCE Pune-I vs. Eaton Industries P. Ltd 2011(22) S.T.R. 223 [2011-TIOL-166- CESTAT-MUM] held that the relevant date for calculating the time limit for grant of refund would be the date of receipt of consideration and not the date of services provided.

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[2015] 37 STR 976 (Mad.) Shri Shanmugar Service vs. Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals), Madurai

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Though order of pre-deposit is complied belatedly but for the reason not attributable to gross negligence of the appellant, the appeal may be restored.

Facts:
The appellant paid full pre-deposit belatedly because of fault of former advocate and complied with payment of pre-deposit order belatedly and approached the Tribunal for restoration of appeals. Relying on various judicial pronouncements, the Tribunal dismissed the application on the grounds that it did not have power to entertain appeal in absence of compliance of pre-deposit order. In order to observe substantial justice, the High Court considered the present appeal.

Held:
Hon’ble High Court observed that the reason for non-compliance of order was attributable to the fault of the former advocate and the appellant was pursuing matter diligently from adjudication stage. Therefore, in view of appellant’s bonafides, though order of pre-deposit was complied belatedly, the appeal was allowed and the original appeal was restored before Tribunal to decide the case on merits.

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[2015] 37 STR 970 (Guj.) Sanjayraj Hotels And Resorts Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India

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CESTAT not to reject the application for condonation of delay without giving opportunity of being heard on merits specially when the petitioner shows sufficient cause for delay in filing appeal.

Facts:
The petitioners filed appeal before CESTAT with an application for condonation of delay of 175 days mentioning the reason for delay. The Tribunal rejected the application on the ground that they had not replied to Show Cause Notice nor did the petitioner’s representative participate in adjudication proceedings. When first appeal was filed, there was a delay of 15 days which showed that they had taken issue lightly. In second appeal, there was a delay of 175 days and the affidavit filed with application for condonation of delay was not sworn by the Director or authorised representative and therefore, the application for condonation of delay was rejected. Accordingly, present petition is filed.

Held:
The petitioners had shown sufficient cause for belated filing of appeal and should have been granted an opportunity to present their case on merits before CESTAT . Therefore, it was held that the Tribunal had committed an error. Accordingly, the present petition was allowed along with direction to CESTAT to decide the matter in accordance with law and on merits.

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[2015] 37 STR 967 (AP) Rites Ltd. vs. Commissioner Of C. Ex. & Cus., Service tax

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Once it is proved that service tax is not passed on to the customer, refund shall be granted. Departmental Officials shall provide appropriate advice to Government Organisations.

Facts:
The petitioner, a Government of India undertaking made payment of service tax on a non-taxable service inadvertently. Refund claim filed was partly disallowed as it was time barred and partly allowed on the condition of submission of proof to the effect that the liability was not passed on to the consumer.

It was contended that since it is a Government undertaking, the provisions of time limit u/s. 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 need not be applied.

The respondents contended that though the activity was not covered under service tax net, vide Circular dated 18- 12-2002, the activity was leviable to service tax. Further, since requisite documentary proof was not submitted and the claim was barred by limitation, the petitioner was not entitled to refund.

Held:
The departmental officials shall differentiate between the ordinary assessee and Government of India undertaking and not pass orders mechanically. When it was asserted that the liability was not passed on to the customer, department could have verified the said fact.

The Circular relied upon by the respondents was already withdrawn by CBEC vide Circular dated 13-05-2004 and they did not act bonafide to the extent that no reference of such withdrawal was made.

Accordingly, the writ petition was allowed and the respondents were directed to refund the amount with interest within four weeks from the date of this decision failing which, the official shall be personally held responsible for contempt of Court.

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Non-resident -Taxability in India – Royalty – Section 9(1)(vi) – Income from supply of software embedded in hardware equipment or otherwise to customers in India – Does not amount to royalty –

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CIT vs. Alcatel Lucent Canada; 372 ITR 476 (Del):

The assessee, a non-resident, manufactured, traded in and supplied equipment and services for global system for mobile cellular radio. The assessee supplied hardware and software to various entities in India. The software licensed by the assessee embodied the process required to control and manage the specific set of activities involved in the business use of the customers. The software also made available the process to its customers, who used it to carryout their business activities. The Assessing Officer held that the consideration for supply of the software amounted to royalty u/s. 9(1)(vi) of the Incometax Act, 1961. The Tribunal held that the payment did not constitute royalty and, therefore, section 9(1)(vi) was not attracted and for the same reasons, article 13(3) of the DTAA s between India and France, Canada, Germany, China were not attracted.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The income of the assessee from supply of software embedded in the hardware equipment or otherwise to customers in India did not amount to royalty u/s. 9(1)(vi).”

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Income – Accrual of – A. Y. 1996-97 – Mercantile system – Civil construction – Sums retained for payment after expiry of defect free period – Right to receive amount contingent upon there being no defects – Accrual only on receipt of amount after defect free period –

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CIT vs. Shankar Constructions; 271 ITR 320(T&AP):

The assessee is a civil contractor. The contract provided for deduction of 7.5% of each bill. Out of this, 5% was payable on successful completion of the work and the balance 2.5% after the expiry of the defect-free period. For the A. Y. 1996-97 the assessee did not include the amount representing 2.5% of the bills. The Assessing Officer held that since the assessee was following the mercantile system of accounting, the amount of 2.5% of the bills could be said to have accrued to it, along with the amount paid under the bills and was liable to be treated as income for that year. The Tribunal held in favour of the assessee.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Telangana and Andhra Pradesh High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The right to receive the amount was contingent upon there not being any defects in the work, during the stipulated period. It was then, and only then, that the amount could be said to have accrued to the assessee.”

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SEBI ORDERS ON TAX LAUN DERING – More orders and updates

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Background

In an article in this column earlier published in the February 2015 issue of this Journal, recent orders of SEBI debarring hundreds of persons from dealing in securities were discussed. It was alleged in these orders that trades were carried out for the purposes of making illegitimate long term capital gains (LTCG) using the stock market which would be exempt from tax. In other words, the allegation was that massive tax evasion has been carried out by indulging in price manipulation and related activities.

Soon thereafter, there have been two more Orders of SEBI (Mishka Finance, dated 17th April 2015 and Pine Animation, dated 8th May 2015) of similar nature. The earlier article referred to orders of SEBI in the case of First Financial Services Limited (“First Financial”), Radford Global Limited (both orders dated 19th December 2014) and Moryo Industries Limited (dated 4th December 2014).

The amounts continue to be large with alleged tax evasion as LTCG as high as Rs. 87 crore in case of a single individual. The price increase reflected in such profits is nearly 8300% over a period of less than two years.

There are related developments too, which will also be discussed. Apparently, on the basis of guidance by SEBI, the Bombay Stock Exchange suspended 22 companies from trading ostensibly on the ground that these companies too had certain similar suspicious features. One of the companies, however, appealed to the Securities Appellate Tribunal which reversed the SEBI’s order. It appears that now the matter is before the Supreme Court. Some parties raised a grievance that only because the second holder in their demat account was debarred, their demat account has also been frozen.

In light of these and a few other factors, an update is in order.

Review of the Orders
A quick review of what the earlier and latest orders involved is given hereafter, though for a detailed discussion the preceding article of February 2015 can be referred to. SEBI made observations as follows that were common in most companies. SEBI found that there were certain companies that had very low activities and revenues/ profits/losses. They made preferential allotment of shares that was many times its existing paid up capital to a large number of persons. The allotment price was not, according to SEBI, justified by the fundamental of such companies. There were off market transfer of existing shares held by the Promoters. The shares were subdivided and/ or bonus shares issued. The share capital thus underwent a massive expansion in terms of total paid up capital and number of shares.

Following this, the share price was allegedly increased by manipulation by entities related/connected to the Promoters. In a short period of time, the price increased many times. In case of Mishka, the increase in price was more than 60 times the cost of the shares/preferential issue price. In case of Pine, such increase was 85 times.

The persons who acquired shares off market and those who were allotted shares by way of preferential allotment sold the shares at such high price. The shares were allegedly purchased by persons connected with the Promoters. Thus, SEBI alleged that the shares went back to the same group from whom shares were acquired. Since there was a gap of more than one year between the date of purchase and sale (also because of lock in period in case of preferential allotment of shares), the gains were long term capital gains and thus exempt from tax. SEBI alleged that this whole exercise was undertaken to generate such bogus LTCG using the stock market.

SEBI referred the matter, inter alia, to income-tax authorities. It also debarred the Company, its Promoters, the persons who had acquired the shares and the persons who gave the exit route to such persons, from accessing the capital markets and also dealing in the stock markets. The demat accounts of such persons were also frozen.

22 companies have already been identified by the BSE and their trading suspended though in one case, SAT has reversed the order of suspension. However, the matter appears to be in appeal before the Supreme Court now.

Debarring other companies? – directions of BSE and decision of SAT

The issue already involves hundreds of persons facing such a bar and hundreds of crores of allegedly bogus LTCG. From press reports, the total amount of such allegedly bogus LTCG may be Rs. 20,000 crore taking into account further companies being investigated. Thus, it is likely that more such orders involving other companies may be released soon.

The Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) suspended trading of twenty-two other companies with effect from 7th January 2015 by a notice dated 1st January 2015. One of the companies, viz., 52 Weeks Entertainment Ltd. (formerly known as Shantanu Sheorey Aquakult Ltd.), appealed to SAT against this suspension. It is interesting to study this decision though it relates to the facts of one of the twentytwo companies.

The original notice of BSE did not give any reason for the suspension, nor had it given any opportunity to the companies to be heard. SAT directed BSE to give hearing and record decision, which BSE did on 12th January 2015. The SAT Order contains certain details relating to this company which are given below and then proceeds to set aside the Order of BSE, alongwith certain directions.

The company was suspended from 2001 to 2012 on account of non-payment of listing fees, NSDL charges, etc. The company decided to revive its operations in 2012. The company made three preferential allotment of shares in 2013/2014 after taking due approval from BSE as required by law. The aggregate preferential allotment was of 3,07,55,000 shares, and it appears that this took the share capital from 41,25,000 to 3,48,80,000 shares (i.e., by about 8.50 times). The public holding post the preferential issue was about 91%.

The suspension was made, BSE stated, on account of directions given by SEBI in its meeting with stock exchanges. SEBI gave certain parameters to identify companies for this purpose. These were (a) non-existence of the company at the address mentioned (b) making of preferential allotment with or without stock split and following end of lock in period, rise in volumes in trading and exit of the preferential allottees (c) company having weak financials which did not warrant the rise in price. The company disputed the order giving several reasons. It stated that the company did exist at the address given. It pointed out the existence of a representative there who had offered the BSE representative who had visited there to talk to the concerned person on phone.

The company had many upcoming operations/projects. Though some of the preferential allottees were also such allottees in case of Radford/Moryo orders, this cannot be a ground for suspension of trading. After hearing representatives of SEBI and BSE, SAT , vide its order dated 13th March 2015, set aside the order (the two members gave their reasons separately, and in following paragraphs, reasons given by Presiding Officer, Justice J. P. Devadhar are given).
It was noted that in other cases, SEBI had found market manipulation, etc. and passed formal orders while it had passed no such orders in the present case. it also noted that even the existence of the three parameters specified by SEBI were not established. BSE suspended trading “… even though there is not an iota of evidence to show that the appellant-company or its promoters/ directors have directly or indirectly indulged in market manipulation.” (per justice devadhar). SAT also noted that the price had risen from Rs. 2.67 to Rs. 149 but still, assuming there was market manipulation, no action was taken against the manipulators but trading in the company suspended instead. Justice devadhar observed that “…it is not open to SEBI to direct the Stock exchanges to suspend the trading in the securities of the companies if they satisfy certain parameters fixed by SEBI which have no bearing whatsoever with the alleged market manipulation.”

Justice  devadhar  further  stated  that,  “..the  fact  that some of those preferential shareholders have allegedly indulged in market manipulation cannot be a ground to consider that all preferential shareholders are market manipulators.”

The SEBI order was set aside. However, directions were also given that the Promoters of the company shall not buy/sell/deal in the securities of the company till 30th june 2015. further, SEBI/BSE could suspend the trading in the securities of the company and restrain the promoters/directors/preferential allottees if prima facie evidence of manipulation by them is found.

It appears that an appeal has been filed against the order of  SAT before  the  Supreme  Court  for  this  matter  of  52 Weeks entertainment Limited.

Debarment of Joint Account Holders
There  was  another  interesting  decision  of  SEBI.  It  appears that SEBI has frozen the accounts of certain persons named in its orders. However, in some cases, those accounts where such persons were second holders were also frozen. the result of this was that even though the first holder may not be a person who has been debarred, simply having a debarred person as a second holder resulted in such account getting frozen. this happened in the case of ms. Sachi agrawal and Ms. Sneha Agrawal. Their parents were debarred from dealing in securities in the matter of moryo industries Limited. However, though each of them had a separate demat account, such account was also frozen because their mother, Ms. Neeli Agrawal, who was second holder, had been debarred by an order. They prayed to SEBI claiming that the securities in such account belonged to them exclusively. They also provided several documents including certificates of Chartered accountant in support of their contention. However, SEBI was not satisfied. It held that in view of section 2(1)(a) of the Depositories Act, joint holders were joint beneficial owners. Taking a view that “…it is likely that the aforesaid beneficiary demat accounts would be used by Ms. Neeli agarwal for sale or purchase of securities thereby defeating the purpose of the interim order and ongoing investigation”, it refused to unfreeze the account.

Conclusion
The facts in such cases are clearly prima facie of serious concern. however, it is also seen that orders have been passed by SeBi till now against 5 companies, their Promoters and hundreds of shareholders. They have been debarred indefinitely from accessing the capital markets and dealing in securities. The orders are ad-interim and eXparte. It appears, from the statements of  SEBI itself, that it could be a long period before which the final orders would be passed. Trading in 22 other companies has been suspended by BSE, of which in one matter, SAT has reversed the matter and now the matter is before the Supreme Court. It also is seen that SEBI has  not yet given opportunity to most of the persons involved to present their case. In some cases, prima facie, it is submitted that orders are arbitrary and may cause injustice to people who are not involved in the alleged manipulation, etc. also, a common order has been passed against all persons even though the orders themselves describe substantially different alleged roles played by different groups.

Interesting question arises: Can SEBI question the eventual motive of a person trading on stock exchange? Can SEBI, purely on suspicion that the transaction is with an intent to avoid/evade tax, of financing, etc., take action against such persons? Parties may have many reasons for dealing through the stock exchange, not all of which would involve violations of Securities Laws. it appears from past decisions that what was relevant was whether price manipulation was involved.

The next few months, and eventually perhaps at least a couple of years will be interesting to watch. Apart from SEBI passing orders in case of several other companies, it is also likely that there will be appeals to SAT and Supreme Court. There will also be objections raised by parties before SEBI itself who will be obliged to confirm or modify the directions in individual cases. More importantly, these cases may also help clarify the role of SEBI in matters where there may be avoidance or violation of other laws such as income-tax.

It will also be interesting to watch how the income-tax department, with whom the information about such transactions has been shared by SeBi, deals with such transactions. More particularly, whether it disallows outright the claims of the parties to exemption leaving them exposed to interest, penalties and even prosecution. Some cases relate to AY 2013-14/2014-15, the returns for which have already been filed while other cases related to AY 2015- 16 for which there is time to file returns.

From the legal and other perspectives, the coming years will result in interesting developments which will be worth closely watching.

Part A Article of CIC

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Following is the article written by Shri Shailesh Gandhi – Former Central Information Commissioner, similar to what appeared in Times of India on 19.05.2015.

The RTI Act Present Status
The RTI Act has caught the imagination of people and the way it has spread is being appreciated and admired around the world. A great change has come in India in the last decade in the power equation between the sovereign citizens of the country and those in power. This change is just beginning and if we can sustain and strengthen it, our defective elective democracy could metamorphose into a truly participatory democracy within the next one or two decades. We have just begun this journey towards a meaningful Swaraj. I believe media-visual, print and social, and RTI have all been a fortunate heady mix. They have the potential of actualizing the promise of democracy. However there are also signs of regressive forces which could stymie these promises.

I am going to refer to the two biggest dangers to RTI :

1. Most established Institutions are unhappy with RTI . When the power equation changes between those with power and the ordinary citizen, resistance is to be expected.

Everyone in power generally feels transparency is good for others, whereas they should be left to work effectively. It is implied that transparency is a hindrance to good governance. We have travelled some distance away from the statement made by a seven judge bench by Supreme Court of India in S. P. Gupta vs. President of India & Ors. (AIR 1982 SC 149). “There can be little doubt that exposure to public gaze and scrutiny is one of the surest means of achieving a clean and healthy administration. It has been truly said that an open government is clean government and a powerful safeguard against political and administrative aberration and inefficiency”.

The former Prime Minister, harried by the uncovering of various scams by RTI , said at the Central Information Commission’s convention in October 2012: “There are concerns about frivolous and vexatious use of the Act in demanding information the disclosure of which cannot possibly serve any public purpose.” The present Prime Minister has taken a pre-emptive action by not appointing a Chief Information Commissioner at all to render it dysfunctional. The bureaucracy is also hardening its stand and in most cases has realised that the Commissioners are not really committed to transparency. This coupled with the long wait at the Commissions and the stinginess of the Commissions in imposing penalties is slowly making it difficult to get sensitive information which could aid citizens to expose structural shortcomings or corruption. A former Chief Justice of India said in April 2012, “The RTI Act is a good law but there has to be a limit to it.” I am amazed at the suggestion that there should be a limit to RTI . The limit has been laid down in the law by Parliament in terms of exemptions. Any interpretation beyond what is written in the law will be a violation of Citizen’s fundamental right to information.

2. A greater danger comes from the selection of Information Commissioners as a part of political patronage. Most have no predilection for transparency or work. Their orders are often biased against transparency and in many places a huge backlog is being built up as a consequence of their inability to cope. Consequently a law which seeks to ensure giving information to citizens in 30 days on pain of penalty gets stuck for over a year at the Commissions. Most of these Commissioners do not work to deliver results in a time bound manner and lose all moral authority to penalise PIOs who do not work in a time bound manner. Commissioners are slowly working less and less. In the Central Information Commission six Commissioners had disposed 22351 cases in 2011, whereas in 2014 seven Commissioners disposed only 16006 cases! Whereas civil society and media are rightly critical of the government for not appointing the balance four Commissioners, at the current rate of disposal eleven Commissioners will not dispose over 25000 cases a year. In 2014 CIC received 31000 cases and presently has a pendency of over 38000 cases. It is evident that at this languorous pace of working RTI will slowly become like the Consumer Act, mainly in existence for the Commissioners. Citizens must wake out of their slumber and focus on getting commissioners who will dispose over 6000 cases each year and give clear signals that they will not tolerate tardiness from Public Information Officers or Commissioners.

Eternal Vigilance is the price for democracy. We have a very useful tool to make our democracy meaningful and effective. It will work and grow if we struggle to ensure its health. We need to put pressure on various institutions so that they restrain from constricting our right, ensure a transparent process of selection for Commissioners and adequate disposal of cases at the Commissions. If we are lazy this right will also putrefy.

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IS IT FAIR TO CHARGE LATE FEES U/S. 234 E FOR DELAY IN FILING RETURN FOR TDS U/S. 194 IA?

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Introduction
Readers are aware that the Finance Act, 2012 introduced section 234E in the Income-tax Act, 1961 with effect from 01/07/2012. It requires payment of a late fee of Rs. 200/- per day for delay in submission of TDS returns. This is in addition to the interest payable on belated payment of TDS. Although, the late fee is restricted to the amount of TDS, it is very unfair. In fact, it has become a nightmare to small tax-deductors. The Hon’ble Bombay High court has upheld its constitutional validity of the provision in the case of Mr. Rashmikant Kundalia and another vs. Union of India and others (Writ Petition No.771 of 2014)

Unfairness
Section 194 IA was inserted by the Finance Act, 2013 w.e.f. 01/06/2013. It requires any person, being a transferee, responsible for paying to a resident transferor any sum by way of consideration exceeding Rs.50 lakh to deduct 1% as income tax thereon.

For any other type of TDS viz. u/s. 192, 194C, 194J etc. (collectively referred as other TDS) one need to have TAN but for the purpose of TDS u/s. 194IA, it is to be paid on PAN of deductor.

In case of other TDS, payment of TDS is to be made on or beforethe 7th of next month and TDS returns are to be filed at least 15 days after the end of the quarter. Therefore, there is a breathing time between payment of tax and filing of TDS return.

However, in case of 194IA, there is no separate return as such. The return is embedded in the challan itself. And there lies the problem.

As all are aware, the late fee u/s. 234 E has created havoc across the board. The Hon’ble Bombay High Court has upheld the constitutional validity of the section. Many deductors were not aware of this draconian fee applicable to TDS u/s. 194 IA.

In case of the other TDS, if the payment is delayed by, say a month, but before the due date of filing return, he will be liable to pay only the interest but not the late fee once the TDS return is filed in time.

However, if there is a delay in payment of TDS u/s. 194 IA, one has to pay interest as well as late fee u/s. 234E. Thus, the levy of late fees become automatic and results in double jeopardy.

It may be noted that instances for average individual paying for an immovable property maybe once or twice in his lifetime. The provision of TDS u/s. 194 IA is applicable to every transaction exceeding Rs. 50 lakh irrespective of the fact whether deductor is educated or uneducated, salaried or pensioner, housewife or senior citizen. It is improper to expect everyone to be well aware of the stringent provisions and deadlines just because the consideration exceeds Rs. 50 lakh.

Rather, it is pertinent to note that individuals and HUFs whose turnover of previous year has not exceeded the limit prescribed u/s. 44AB are exempt from the TDS provisions u/s. 194C, 194 J, 194 I, etc. There is no sound logic in thrusting such onerous burden u/s. 194IA on a layperson.

Suggestion
Ideally, section 234E itself deserves to be omitted from the Act. There was already a penalty of Rs. 100/- per day in terms of section 272A which in itself is on higher side. In any case, late fee should not be levied on individuals and HUFs in respect of delay in complying with section 194IA.

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Stamp Act – Change is the Only Constant!

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Introduction
Heraclitus, a Greek Philosopher stated that “Change is the Only Constant in Life”. Lawmakers in India also follow this maxim, especially when it comes to Fiscal Statutes. The Stamp Act is no exception. Every year, the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 (“the Act”) is tweaked throwing up a mixed bag of changes – some good, some bad and some ugly! The Maharashtra Stamp (Amendment) Act, 2015 has made some substantial changes to the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958. Let us consider the impact of these changes on the way instruments are executed in the State of Maharashtra.

Multiple Documents for a Lease
Where multiple documents are executed for a lease transaction, the Act now provides that only the principal document would be exigible with the duty as on a lease. All other instruments would be chargeable with a duty of only Rs. 100. This would avoid double taxation. Earlier this facility was only available for four transactions ~ sale, mortgage, development agreement and settlement.

Ensuring Stamp Duty Payment
Certain State Government Departments, Institutions of Local Self-Government, Semi-Government Organisations, Banks, Non-Banking Institutions, etc., which have been notified by the State Government shall ensure that proper stamp duty is paid on certain unregistered documents which would also be notified. This is to ensure better compliance with the Stamp Act in respect of unregistered documents which may escape payment of stamp duty. The Notification would be eagerly awaited. This would also place an additional burden upon banks / NBFCs. One wonders whether they are capable of determining whether or not an instrument is adequately stamped? Can one expect an officer of a bank or an NBFC to exercise a quasi-judicial function?

Penalty Doubled
Under the Act, if any instrument is inadequately /not stamped, then it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose, e.g., in a Civil Court. Such instruments are admissible in evidence on payment of the requisite amount of duty and a penalty @ 2% per month on the deficient amount of duty calculated from the date of execution. Earlier, the maximum penalty could not exceed twice the amount of duty involved. The maximum penalty now cannot exceed four times the amount of shortfall in duty involved. That is a 200% increase in the ceiling limit – an amazing strike rate even by Twenty20 standards! One would have to be extremely careful and exercise caution while executing instruments so that there is no hefty penalty later on.

Claim for Refund Extended
A claim for refund of stamp duty on an instrument which has not been executed due to refusal of any party to the instrument must be filed within 6 months from the date of the instrument. However, a concession has now been provided in case of a registered agreement to sell an immovable property which has been cancelled by a registered cancellation deed before taking possession of the property. In respect of such an agreement to sell, the application for refund of stamp duty can be now made within 6 months from the date of registration of the cancellation deed.

Amendments in Schedule – I to the Act
Schedule-I to the Act provides for various Articles which lay down the stamp duty applicable on different instruments. Section 3 provides that an instrument shall be stamped as per the rates / amount specified in Schedule-I. Hence, it becomes very essential to ascertain the rate specified in Schedule-I. The 2015 Amendment Act has made several changes to this Schedule-I, let us analyse some key changes:




Conclusion
In recent times, the Stamp Law has become very important and dynamic. Businesses and advisors would be well advised to pay heed to this Act and keep pace with the changes or else they could face unpleasant consequences.

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Notary – Recognition of notarial acts – Document executed and authenticated before Notary Public of Singapore – Document cannot be judicially recognised: Evidence Act section 85, Notaries Act, section 14.

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In the Matter of Rei Agro Ltd. & Ors. AIR 2015 Calcutta 54 (HC)

In a winding up petition, the counsel representing the petitioners produced a document which purported to be a Power of attorney issued by UBS AG dated 5th November, 2014, signed by two persons, namely, Celine Teo and Pram Kurniawan, described as Executive Directors. The Power of attorney had been notarised by one Yang Yung Chong, whose seal indicated that he/she was a notary public of Singapore.

A question, therefore, arose as to whether the Court can recognise a notarial act which took place before a notary public at Singapore.

The Court observed that the answer to this question was clearly provided u/s. 14 of the Notaries Act, 1952. So far as section 85 of the Indian Evidence Act was concerned, it provided that the Court shall presume that every document purporting to be a Power of attorney, and to have been executed before, and authenticated by a Notary Public, or any Court, Judge, Magistrate, Indian Consul or Vice- Consul, or representative of the Central Government, was so executed and authenticated. However, it must be held that to the extent it dwells upon presumption as to Powers of attorney, executed and authenticated by a Notary Public, the provision of section 85 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, cannot be read in isolation to the specific provision as contained u/s. 14 of the Notaries Act, 1952, insofar as notarial acts done by foreign notaries are concerned. For an Indian Court to recognise a notarial act done by a notary public at Singapore, it is imperative for the Central Government to issue a notification u/s. 14 of the Notaries Act, 1952, declaring that the notarial acts lawfully done by notaries in Singapore shall be recognised within India for all purposes, or as the case may be, for such limited purposes as may be specified in the notification. In other words, unilateral recognition by an Indian Court of a notarial act done by a foreign notary is impermissible in the absence of reciprocity of recognition as contemplated u/s. 14 of the Notaries Act, 1952. The reason is, if it is otherwise, the sanctity of the sovereign power being exercised by an Indian Court will be compromised.

Since there is clearly no such notification of the Central Government in the Official Gazette granting recognition to the notarial acts done by the notary public of Singapore, the Court held that it is unable to take any judicial recognition of the document which has been handed over before the Court by the counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners.

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Constitutional validity – Amendment made in section 80-IB(9) by adding an Explanation was not clarificatory, declaratory, curative or made “small repair” in the Act – On the contrary, it takes away the accrued and vested right of the Petitioner which had matured after the judgments of ITAT. Therefore, the Explanation added by the Finance (No.2) Act 2009 was a substantive law – Explanation added to section 80-IB(9) by the Finance (No.2) Act, of 2009 is clearly unconstitutional, violative of Arti<

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Niko Resources Ltd. vs. UOI: [2015] 55 taxmann.com 455 (Guj):

The
Petitioner is a foreign company based in Canada and has set up a
project office in India with the permission of Reserve Bank of India.
The Petitioner has been claiming benefit of deduction of 100% of the
profits and gains from the production of mineral oil and natural gas
u/s. 80-IB(9) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, as it stood prior to the
amendment by the Finance (No.2) Act 2009. In these proceedings, the
constitutional validity of the amendment to sub-section (9) of section
80-IB and Explanation added to it under the Act by the Finance (No.2)
Act, 2009, has been challenged.

The disputed question was as to
whether the benefits of tax holiday of seven years was available on each
undertaking which has now been taken away by the amendment made in
section 80-IB(9) by adding on Explanation that provides that all blocks
licensed under a single contract shall be treated as a single
undertaking.

The Gujarat High Court held as under:

“i)
Arbitrarily, the 100% tax deduction benefit could not be withdrawn by
the Finance Minister or the legislature by amending section 80-IB(9) of
the Act retrospectively from an anterior date.

ii) The amendment
in such cases where already tax benefit had accrued and vested in the
assessee could not be taken away by giving retrospective amendment to
section 80-IB(9) which is nothing but a substantive provision inserted
by amendment and it can only operate prospectively and not
retrospectively.

iii) Explanation added to section 80-IB(9) by
Finance (No.2) Act, of 2009 is clearly unconstitutional, violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution of India and is liable to be struck
down.”

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Hindu Law – Joint family property – Wife is entitled to share in property alongwith her husband – Wife cannot demand for partition, unlike daughter

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Thabagouda Satteppa Umarani vs. Satteppa AIR 2015 (NOC) 435 (Kar)(HC)

The Petitioner contended that as per the position of law the mother cannot demand a partition but, in the suit filed for partition among the co-parceners, she is entitled to a share, independent of her husband.

The court observed that the wife may be a member of a joint Hindu Family, but by virtue of being a member in the joint Hindu Family, she cannot get any share, right, title or interest in the joint Hindu Family property which that family owns. A wife cannot demand for partition, unlike a daughter. She would get a share only if partition is demanded by her husband or sons and the property is actually partitioned. The claim by a wife during lifetime of the husband in the share and interest which he has as a co-parcener in his Hindu Undivided Family is wholly premature and completely misconceived. This position of law is that though the wife is entitled to interest i.e. share, it is to be along with her husband. Any such decision being taken by the Courts, earmarking separate share for herself and one share in that of her husband’s cannot in any way be recognised.

To clarify this position, here it is to be noted that coparcener refers to a male issue i.e. may be a father or a son. The wives of co-owners do not get any interest by virtue of their marriage. It is only a Hindu widow who gets the interest of her husband in the co-parcenary or in the joint family property upon the death of her husband. That interest enables her to claim maintenance and residence. Only a widow can demand partition of the interest which her deceased husband would have been entitled to. Consequently, a wife has no share, right, title or interest in the Hindu Undivided Family in which her husband is a co-parcener with his brothers, father or sons and after the amendment of section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 2005, with his sisters and daughters also. The wife,may be a member of a joint Hindu Family, but by virtue of being a member in the joint Hindu Family, she cannot get any share, right, title or interest in the joint Hindu Family property which that family owns. A wife cannot demand for partition unlike a daughter. She would get a share only if partition is demanded by her husband or sons and the property is actually partitioned. The claim by a wife during lifetime of the husband in the share and interest which he has as a co-parcener in his Hindu Undivided Family is wholly premature and completely misconceived.

This position clarifies that though the wife is entitled to interest i.e., share, it is to be along with her husband.

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M/S. Plastic Processors vs. State of Tamil Nadu [2013] 58 VST 86 (Mad)

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Sales Tax-Penalty – Concealment- Claim of High Seas Sale Disallowed-Levy of Penalty- Not Justified, section 16(2) of The Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959.

Facts
The assessee while filing the original returns had claimed exemption in respect of certain high- seas sales and the same was disallowed and a penalty was levied u/s. 16(2) of the Act. Against the said order of the assessing authority; the assessee filed an appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner confirmed the order of the assessing authority, against which the assessee filed a further appeal before the Tribunal and the Tribunal while confirming the orders of both the authorities, reduced the penalty to 50 per cent by holding that there is willful nondisclosure u/s. 16(2) by the assessee. The assessee filed a revision petition before the Madras High Court against the impugned order of the Tribunal.

Held
The law is well-settled that once the sale is shown in the bill of lading and an exemption claimed that will not amount to willful non-disclosure by the assessee. It is not even the case of the assessing authority that there was willful non-disclosure u/s. 16(2) of the Act. The act is quasi-criminal in nature and there must be willful nondisclosure on the part of the assessee for the purpose of imposing the penalty. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the petition filed by the assessee.

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M/S. F. K. M. Steels and Ors.vs. Assistant Commissioner (CT) [2013 ] 58 VST 58 (Mad)

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VAT- Cancellation Of Registration Certificate- No Power to Cancel From Retrospective Effect- section 39(15) of The Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax Act, 2006

Facts

The sales tax registrations of the petitioners, under the Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax Act, 2006, had been cancelled retrospectively by the impugned orders of the respondent, dated June 29, 2010, without giving an opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioners, contrary to clause (15) of section 39 of the Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax Act, 2006. The Dealers filed a writ petition before the Madras High Court against the impugned order.

Held
In view of the averments made on behalf of the petitioners as well as the respondent, and on a perusal of the records available, that the registrations of the petitioners had been cancelled by the impugned orders of the respondent, without giving an opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioners, as provided under clause (15) of section 39 of the Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax Act, 2006. Further, nothing has been shown on behalf of the respondent to substantiate the claim that the respondent has the authority or power to cancel the registration, retrospectively. In such circumstances, the impugned orders of the respondent were set aside by the Court. The High Court issued direction that it would be open to the respondent to serve notices on the petitioners, at the addresses furnished by the petitioners in their writ petitions, asking the petitioners to show cause as to why the registrations of the petitioners should not be cancelled. On receipt of such notices, the petitioners shall file its objections, if any, along with the relevant documents. On receipt of such objections, the respondent shall consider the same and pass appropriate orders thereon, on merits and in accordance with law, after giving an opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioners. Accordingly, the writ petitions were disposed.

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M/S. Harsh Jewelers vs. Commercial Tax Officer, [2013] 57 VST 538 ( AP)

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VAT- Input Tax Credit- Purchase From Registered Dealer-Selling Dealer Did Not Disclose Sales in His Return- Not a Ground For Denial Of Input Tax Credit, section 13(1) of The Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005

Facts
The petitioner purchased goods from the registered dealer and claimed input tax credit. Subsequently the registration certificate of the selling dealer was cancelled after the date of sale by him to the purchasing dealer but he did not disclose the turnover in his returns. The vat department disallowed the input tax credit claimed by the petitioner on the impugned purchases on the ground that the turnover of sales is not declared by selling dealer in his returns and raised ademand . The petitioner filed a writ petition before the Andhra Pradesh High Court against the said assessment order.

Held
Section 13(1) of the Act entails input tax credit to the VAT dealer for the tax charged in respect of all purchases of taxable goods, made by that dealer during the tax period. It is not disputed that the registration of the selling dealer was cancelled after the transaction in question occurred. The failure on the part of the selling dealer to file returns or remit the tax component of the sale made to the petitioner dealer cannot per se be a ground for denial of input tax credit. Accordingly, the High Court quashed the order of assessment and it was made open to the vat department to pass revised order if there be material on the basis of which the input tax credit can be denied except on the ground that the selling dealer, despite being a registered dealer on the relevant date, did not remit the tax. The writ petition was allowed by the High Court.

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[2015-TIOL-830-CESTAT-MUM] Idea Cellular Ltd vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai.

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Outdoor Catering Service which is used in or in relation to rendering of output service is eligible as CENVAT Credit prior to 01/04/2011. 50

Facts:
The Appellant is denied CENVAT Credit of service tax paid on Outdoor Catering Service. The decision of Ultra Tech Cement [2010 (20) STR 577 (Bom)] was relied upon by the Appellant for allowing the CENVAT Credit. The Adjudication Authority stated that the facts in Ultra Tech Cement (supra) were distinguishable as it dealt with a factory employing 250 workers and the present case was of a service provider.

Held:
Input service has been defined under Rule 2(l) of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 and at the relevant time included within the scope any service which was used in or in relation to the rendering of output service. The ratio of Ultra Tech Cement (supra) squarely applicable to the facts of the case and the appeal is allowed.

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2015 (38) S.T.R. 77 (Tri.-Ahmd.) Commissioner of Central Excise & Service Tax, Bhavnagar vs. HK Dave Ltd.

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The amount paid during investigation takes colour of ‘deposit’. Therefore, there is no time limit for refund of such amount.

Facts:
The respondents paid an amount during the course of investigation. Since they had won the case on merits, a refund claim was filed. Revenue argued that since the claim was filed after 1 year from the date of CESTAT’s order, it was time barred vide section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Held:
It was held that the amount was paid during investigation and not at the time of rendering of services, thus amount paid by the respondents cannot be termed as ‘duty’ but it was a ‘deposit’. Therefore, bar contained in section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 was not applicable. The action of the Respondent contesting issue on merits constituted a case of ‘deemed protest’ and no time limit will be applicable as per the Second Proviso to section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944. Therefore, the appeal filed by revenue was rejected

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2015 (38) S.T.R. 69 (Tri.-Del.) Maosaji Caterers vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Raipur-I

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If the appellant had bona fide belief regarding non-taxability and paid Service tax with interest immediately on initiation of investigation, penalty u/s. 78 of Finance Act, 1994 shall not be levied.

Facts:
The appellants were engaged in providing canteen services at the premises of a company, servicing food to their employees. They failed to pay service tax under outdoor caterer’s services. Department conducted an investigation and the demand of service tax with interest and penalties was confirmed against them. It was argued that they were under a bona fide belief that the activity undertaken did not fall under outdoor catering and therefore, they had not collected service tax. Entire Service tax along with interest was paid as soon as investigation was initiated.

The respondents contested that the activity was that of outdoor catering services they had not even taken registration. Therefore, penalties were rightly imposed on them.

Held:
The appellant’s contention that there should be a special occasion for availing catering services was not acceptable. Therefore, the activity undertaken fall under Outdoor Catering service. The Tribunal observed that there was a bona fide belief that the services were not taxable and the tax was paid immediately on initiation of investigation. Therefore, the penalty u/s. 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 was set aside.

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2015 (38) S.T.R. 73 (Tri. – Mumbai) C.K.P. Mandal vs. Commissioner Of Service Tax, Mumbai-II

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If the amount paid is not a ‘duty’ or “service tax”, no time limit applies for the refund of such amount collected without the authority of law.

Facts:
The appellants were charitable trust. They received donations from caterers and decorators for permitting them to use the halls. Service tax was demanded by department on donations. Ultimately, the Hon’ble High Court upheld that donations were not leviable to service tax. Therefore, refund claims were filed out of which one was sanctioned and another was rejected on the grounds of time-bar.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that for the sanctioned claim, interest has to be paid for delayed refund. For the rejected claim it was held that the time-bar u/s. 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 will apply only if the demand has been made or amount has been paid as ‘duty’ under the law. In the present case, no such demand was made under law. Hence, refund claim was allowed along with appropriate interest as payable under the law.

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2015 (38) STR 44 (Tri.-Mumbai) Commissioner of ST vs. Sure-Prep (India) Pvt. Ltd.

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In case of export of services, CENVAT Credit refund shall be granted even in absence of Service tax registration If the case is remanded back and if the matter is old and the assessee is suffering for none of their faults, request can be made to Tribunal for giving direction for early disposal of the case.

Facts:
The respondents were exporting 100% of its services and had filed a refund claim under Notification 05/2006-CE (NT) dated 14.03.2006. However, they had no service tax registration while receiving, using and exporting the input services. The appellants contested that the lower authorities did not look into the question of limitation and Commissioner (Appeals) did not verify the nexus of input services with the output services.

It was argued that 100% of its services were exported and all records established that input services were used for exporting services.

Held:
As per the said Notification, the service provider had to submit an application indicating the registered premises from which services were exported. Relying on the decision of mPortal India Wireless Solutions Pvt. Ltd. 2012 (27) SR 134 (Kar.), the Tribunal held that it was just a procedural formality in order to claim refund and it was not a substantial condition for grant of refund.

The adjudicating authority had made a bland statement that input services were not used to provide output services without any support and logic which shows its non-application of mind. In view of Hon’ble Bombay High Court’s decision in case of Ultratech Cement Ltd. 2010 (260) ELT 369 (Bom.), it was held that all input services were used for providing export services.

The case was remanded back for the limited purpose of verification that input services were used for providing export services, the department was directed to decide the case within 3 months from the receipt of order.

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[2015] 54 (37) STR 151 (Tri.-Bang.) –Infosys Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Bangalore.

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Is CENVAT credit admissible on employee’s group health insurance and construction and other services used for setting-up global training center, hostel and gym situated therein? Services of data link and communication charges classifiable under ‘Tele Communication Services’ received from foreign service providers not taxable as the provider does not have a license under Indian Telegraph Act. Services tax under reverse charge mechanism not applicable in respect of services received from overseas subcontractors by the overseas branches of the appellant when the services are also utilised abroad as payments made from export earnings only.

Facts:-
The appellant took CENVAT credit of group health insurance obtained for their employees, construction services used for setting-up of global training center & various services used for hostel and gym lying within the center during the period prior to 01/04/2011 and subsequently. Further, services were received from outside the territory of India relating to communication and data link. Their overseas branches undertook several projects relating to software development etc. which were entrusted to overseas sub-contractors. The payments to the subcontractors were done by appellant through their EFFC account in foreign currency. Department sought to demand service tax on ineligible CENVAT credits and under reverse charge mechanism on services received by overseas branches and data link charges etc.

Held:-
Relying upon the decision of Commissioner of CE vs. Micro Labs Ltd. 2011 (270) ELT 156 (Kar.-High Court) and Commissioner of CE v. Stanzen Toyotestu India (P) Ltd. 2011 (23) STR 444 (Kar.), the Tribunal held that, CENVAT credit is admissible in respect of insurance coverage of employees alone. However, if policy covers person other than employees and no contribution is required from the employees towards such coverage then such credit shall have to be proportionately reversed, to such extent.

In respect of construction services, it was argued that Appellant was rendering commercial training and coaching service and the center was used for the said purpose on which service tax was paid. The Tribunal, relying on the decision of CE vs. Sai Sahmita Storages (P) Ltd. 2011 (23) STR 341 (AP) and noting the fact that upto 01/04/2011 setting up of premises of output service provider was eligible for credit, allowed the same. However, subsequent to 01-04-2011, only services used in respect of modernisation, renovation, repairs of premises from where service is provided would be admissible. Further, in respect of hostel and gym, it was claimed that such facilities to employees is necessary as the center was situated far away from city. It was held that both cannot be considered as premises from where service is provided, as contemplated by definition of input service and hence CENVAT credit is inadmissible.

In respect of, demand of service tax under reverse charge mechanism, appellant relied upon Board’s circular issued in F. No. 137/21/2011-ST dated 19-12-2011 and referred observations made on same issue in the case of their own sister company M/s. Infosys BPO Ltd. wherein, demand was dropped. Tribunal held that service is classifiable under “Telecommunication Service” and such services are taxable only when the same is provided by a person having license under the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885.

In respect of reverse charge mechanism, it was stated that, the foreign branches of the appellants received the services abroad and the same was consumed abroad and thus, section 66A has no application. In view of the revenue, the services were received from the sub-contractors through their overseas branches and payments for such services were made by the appellant. The Tribunal placed reliance upon KPIT Cummins Infosystems Ltd. vs. CCE, Pune-I 2014 (33) STR 105 (Tri.-Mum) and affirmed that, payment made to sub-contractors from EFFC account shows that, payment was made from export earnings only and demand was dropped on account of absence of any evidence to show such receipt of service in India.

Further, since the issue relates to interpretation of legal provisions, the demand beyond normal period and penalties were set side.

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44. [2015-TIOL-1239-HC-P&H-ST] Ajay Kumar Gupta vs. CESTAT and Another.

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Service Tax deposited on a non-taxable service u/s. 73A(2) of the Finance Act with delay, penalty u/ss. 76 and 78 not leviable.

Facts:
The Appellant collected service tax on a non-taxable service and had deposited the tax with delay without the payment of interest. Show Cause Notice was issued proposing levy of interest and penalty u/ss. 76, 77 and 78 of the Finance Act, 1994. The First Appellate Authority held that since the amount collected was not chargeable, penalty u/s. 76 and 78 was set aside. Aggrieved thereby, Revenue appealed before the Tribunal. While allowing the Revenue’s appeal, the Tribunal noted that since the tax was collected and the same was deposited only on the insistence of Revenue, it was a case of willful suppression and interest and penalty u/ss. 75 and 78 was restored leading to the present appeal.

Held:

The Hon’ble High Court noted that service tax was not leviable u/s. 68 of the Finance Act and the liability was only to deposit tax u/s. 73A(2) of the Finance Act which was done after delay. Thus as service was not taxable, penalty u/s. 78 was not invocable.

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[2015-Tiol-1067-hc-mad-st] M/s Sree Annapoorna Hospitality Services Pvt Ltd vs. The commissioner of Customs Central Excise and Service Tax

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Petitioner is bound to pay 7.5% of the total service tax demanded at the time of filing the appeal before the CESTAT.

Facts:
The petitioner filed a writ petition challenging the order of the Adjudicating Authority regarding admissibility of the benefit of Notification 12/2003-ST.

Held:
The Hon’ble High Court held that the disputed questions could be raised before the CESTAT as the petitioner has a remedy of filing an appeal and is bound to pay 7.5% of the total service tax demanded for filing the appeal which cannot be reduced by this court.

Note: Readers may also note a recent decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Premier Polyspin Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India [2015-TIOL-1265-AHM-CX] holding that pre-deposit is mandatory. Further, it is important to note a CONTRARY decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of A. M. Motors vs. UOI [2015-TIOL-1069-HC-Kerala-ST] where the Hon’ble High Court has held that pre-deposit of 7.5% is not mandatory when the case commenced prior to the introduction of the amendment of 2014. Similarly, reference can also be made to the Kerala High Court decision in the case of M/s Muthoot Finance Ltd .[2015-TIOL-632-HC-Kerala-ST] reported in the BCAJ April issue and decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of M/s K. Rama Mohanarao & Co. [2015-TIOL-511-HC-APCX]. Further, in Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd vs. State of MP 1983 (13) ELT 1277 (SC), it was held that for the purpose of the accrual of the right of appeal the critical and relevant date is the date of initiation of proceedings and not the decision itself.

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[2015]-TIOL-566-HC-MUM [Commissioner of Central Excise vs. Paper Products Ltd].

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A clear rethink is necessary when blindly some ratio of a Judgment of the Apex Court and dehors the factual position is relied upon to file frivolous Appeals.

Facts:

Assessee was a manufacturer and was availing CENVAT credit on inputs and capital goods used in or in relation to the manufacture of final product. The department issued a show cause notice contending that the activity did not amount to manufacture relying on a decision of the Apex Court and the claim to CENVAT credit was ineligible. The Tribunal allowed the appeal of the Assesse and the department is in appeal.

Held:
The Hon’ble High Court held that the decision of the Apex Court is clearly distinguishable which exercise has already been done by the Tribunal and thus the appeal is dismissed as devoid of any merits.

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