A Hindu Undivided Family was not in existence prior to the Hindu Succession Act coming into force. The Properties in question, inherited by the deceased owner on the demise of his father, would become his persona properties. The son of the deceased owner would not acquire any coparcenary share in the properties till the owner was alive. The suit property would devolve on the son of the deceased in his individual capacity on the death of the owner. Therefore, the claim of the grandson of the deceased for partition of suit properties on the grounds that the same were ancestral, was held not maintainable.
Month: May
Quantitative Easing- An Exit In Three Acts
The second act could start around July 2015. Fed chairperson Janet Yellen has hinted that she may begin to push up the benchmark federal funds rate around that time if the US economic recovery stays on track.
There is a possible third act that nobody in the financial markets seems to be considering. The US central bank has quadrupled its balance sheet since September 2008—from $1 trillion then to $4 trillion now. The explosive growth in the monetary base has not been inflationary, but the return to normal monetary policy should eventually lead the Fed to monetary contraction. Such an endgame will be far more painful than what financial markets are anticipating.
CBI Follies: This Is No Way To Check Crony Capitalism
If the CBI is going to chase officials long after they retire, why will they risk taking quick decisions?
The CBI has now registered ten FIRs against six companies for defaulting on loans from public sector banks. How is loan default a crime? Maybe many loans were given because of political connections, but while that’s undesirable, it isn’t criminal. Even willful default is not criminal – the answer is to seize the assets of the defaulters through court action. If the companies in question gave bribes to obtain loans or debt relief, or if they cooked their books, that is certainly criminal. But it is not clear that the CBI understands these distinctions.
Few analysts think the CBI has enough specialized domain knowledge to tackle financial crime. In the West, financial companies are constantly probed and prosecuted, but this requires high financial expertise that can match the best on Wall Street. By contrast, the CBI’s recent efforts suggest a sad lack of expertise, and even of basic financial understanding.
It must be able to distinguish between bad and criminal decisions, and between mere mistakes and crookery. Fast decision-making requires the use of discretion, short-cutting wooden procedures. To treat every use of discretion as criminal is plain wrong, and a recipe for paralyzing decision-making.
Part of the problem lies in a silly legal provision which says that if a decision benefits any private party, the bureaucrat concerned can be charged with corruption even if there is no evidence that he gained personally. A more stupid provision would be difficult to imagine. Can there be any decision that does not benefit somebody? And if indeed there are some decisions that benefit absolutely nobody, would such decisions be worth taking? The UPA government once drafted legislation to remove this provision but did not follow through.
As long as this clause remains law, the CBI can claim it is legally bound to prosecute virtually any decision-taker. Narendra Modi talks of improving governance if he comes to power. That approach must include an immediate ordinance to delete this stupid clause. Other political parties will surely support the conversion of such an ordinance into law.
Value Every Raindrop
Water management is, then, about society and its ability to build technologies to maximise the use of water and, more importantly, technologies to share water with all. It is for this reason that we must re-learn the water wisdom of the past. In the late 1990s, the Centre for Science and Environment published its book Dying Wisdom: Rise, Fall and Potential of India’s Traditional Water Harvesting Systems, which documented the extraordinary wealth and ingenuity of the country’s people living across different ecological systems to manage water. The systems ranged from ways of harvesting glacier water in the cold deserts to delivering water with precision over long distances through bamboo drip irrigation systems in the north-eastern hills.
The kundi of the hot desert of India incorporates the simplest of technologies for powerful impact. Rain is harvested on an artificially created piece of land, which is sloped towards a well to store precious water. The water maths is equally simple; as little as 100 millimetres of rainwater harvested over one hectare of land will collect one million litres of water in this structure.
On the other hand, in the other regions of the country, people harvested floodwater. In other words, people had learnt to live with an excess of water and with its scarcity. And all the coping used the principle of rainwater harvesting in a country that gets rain for only 100 hours of the 8,760 hours in a year. They knew that all the rain of the year could come in just one cloudburst. The solution was to capture that rain and to use it to recharge groundwater reserves for the remaining year. The answer, ultimately, was to use the land for storing and channelling the rain – over or under the ground, catching water where it falls and when it falls.
This tradition of yesterday has crucial relevance in todays and tomorrows urban India. Today, our cities get their water supply from further 261 (2014) 46-A BCAJ and further away – Delhi gets Ganga water from the Tehridam; Bangalore is building the Cauvery IV project, pumping water 100 kilometres to the city; Chennai’s water will travel 200 km from the Krishna river; Hyderabad from the Manjira, and so on. The point is that the urban-industrial sector’s demand for water is growing by leaps and bounds. But this sector does little to augment its water resources – and does even less to conserve and minimise its use. Worse, because of the abysmal lack of sewage and waste treatment facilities, it degrades scarce water even further. Even so, its water greed is not met. Groundwater levels are declining precipitously in urban areas, since people bore deeper in search of the water that municipalities cannot supply.
In new India, the water imperative is that cities must begin to value their rainfall endowment. This means implementing rainwater harvesting in each house and colony. But it also means learning again about the hundreds of tanks and ponds that built, indeed nourished, the city. Almost every city had a treasure of tanks, which provided it the important flood cushion and allowed it to recharge its groundwater reserves. But urban planners cannot see beyond land. So land for water has never been valued or protected. Today, these water bodies are a shame – encroached, full of sewage, garbage or just filled up and built over. The city forgot it needed water. It forgot its own lifeline.
But the real tragedy is that we have lost knowledge of how to value the raindrop.
The accomplice to crime of corruption is frequently our own indifference.
?Bess Myerson
No one would deny that corruption is a worldwide phenomenon.
However. the issue to be considered is the extent of it – both the amount of money changing hands and the number of citizens directly affected by it, i.e., the extent to which low-level corruption affects ordinary people. It is unfortunate that the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Bill 2013, inspite of the Parliament Standing Committee on Personnel Public Grievances Law and Justice having already submitted its report on the above bill, and presented in Lok and Rajyasabha on 8th February 2014, did not come for passing in the Parliament in its last session. Some of the proposed amendments therein included:
1) Criminalise bribe-giving to the same extent as receiving bribes (In the present Prevention of Corruption Act, 1969 only receiver of bribe is prosecuted.)
2) Expand the scope of offences that will be termed ‘corruption’;
3) Make bribe-taking and bribe-giving in the corporate sector offences; and
4) Provide for procedures to confiscate the ill-gotten gains from corruption even before the completion of the trial.
According to our Constitution, as the last Lok Sabha was dissolved before the passage of this Bill, it is deemed to have lapsed. It has dealt an enormous blow to the anti-corruption movement. However at least the whistleblowers’ Protection bill, to protect those who make public interest disclosures against corruption is passed.
The need for such a legislation has been strongly felt, as a large number of RTI activists have been targeted and killed for probing corruption. Without legislative protection for a whistleblower, the enabling RTI legislation is rendered ineffective and the fight against corruption crippled.
The corruption perception index 2013 released by Transparency International ranks India at the 94th spot on a global list. Releasing the list, Transparency International said that its “Corruption Perceptions Index 2013 offers a warning that the abuse of power, secret dealings and bribery continue to ravage societies around the world”. “The Corruption Perceptions Index 2013 demonstrates that all countries still face the threat of corruption at all levels of the Government, from the issuing of local permits to the enforcement of laws and regulations,” said Huguette Labelle, chair of Transparency International.
“Corruption within the public sector remains one of the world’s biggest challenges,” Transparency International said, “particularly in areas such as political parties, police, and justice systems.”
“It is time to stop those who get away with acts of corruption. The legal loopholes and lack of political will in the Government, facilitate both domestic and crossborder corruption, and call for our intensified efforts to combat the impunity of the corrupt,” Labelle said. On 10th February, CBI Director Ranjit Sinha addressed the 7th Interpol Global Programme on Anti-Corruption, Financial Crime and Asset Recovery for South Asia in Delhi.
He stated that India’s anti-corruption laws must focus on confiscations of ill-gotten wealth. The proposed amendments in the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Bill, 2013 include provisions for procedures to confiscate the ill-gotten gains from corruption even before the completion of the trial. Unfortunately, legislation did not see the light of the day.
The CBI director said that majority of illicit funds that are moved across the border originate from three sources; bribery and corruption, criminal activity and commercial tax evasion. Their movement is facilitated by loopholes in the international financial system.
Criminalisation of Politics – Netas not serious about Electoral Reforms.
Justice Shah told that when the law panel called a meeting of major parties for consultation — just before responding to the Supreme Court on the issue of disqualification of charge-sheeted politicians from contesting elections — Aam Aadmi Party, BJP and Congress stayed away.
“When we held a national level seminar (on February 1) on this subject, all the major parties, including AAP, BJP and Congress did not attend the meet, and neither did they send any representation,” Justice Shah said. “Institutional integrity is important to preserve. Criminals should not be allowed to get elected to assemblies and Parliament as that will weaken these institutions,” he added.
The Law Commission has been entrusted with suggesting electoral reforms by the government. The apex court too, relies on the commission for its suggestion on important issues such as electoral and judicial reforms. The SC had earlier asked the commission to give its opinion on whether politicians against whom charges have been framed by a court for serious offences should be disqualified from contesting elections. The panel had in its opinion strongly backed disqualification of candidates against whom a court has framed charges for serious offences like rape, murder etc. However, the apex court has kept the case sub-judice with an interim order saying trials against lawmakers facing serious charges should be completed in a time-bound period of one year.
“All earlier suggestions made by the Law Commis- sion on electoral reforms remain unimplemented,” Justice Shah said, elaborating how in 1999, the commission had made extensive suggestions, one of which pertained to disqualification of chargesheeted politicians from participating in elections.
“Particularly on decriminalization of politics, the 1999 report had made several suggestions but no government took any action. This is one of the reasons why criminal elements enter politics and tainted money comes into the economy,” Justice Shah said. He also emphasized how these criminal elements have the potential to subvert the judicial process. “These criminal elements have the potential to subvert the judicial process and as a result you can see trials are delayed for several years and that is the reason why the rate of conviction is less,” Shah observed.
“Even after the Lily Thomas judgment of the Supreme Court (which struck down Sec 8(4) of the RP Act disqualifying a convicted MP/MLA from membership of the House) there has been only three disqualifications so far,” he explained, saying how the number of lawmakers facing serious criminal charges are frighteningly high. More than 160 MPs in the last Lok Sabha were those who had serious criminal charges against them.
“Earlier there was unhealthy connection between politicians and underworld. Now these criminals are seeking elections themselves,” the law panel chairman said. Law breakers should not be allowed to become lawmakers, he emphasized.
ICAI News
ICAI had organised placement programme for new Members in the months of February and March, 2014. Details are given on P. 1561 – 1562. Some factures are as under.
• No. of candidates interviewed 2,327
• No. of organisations participated 80
• No. of Interview Teams 136
• No. of Jobs offered 717- Accepted 681
• Highest Salary offered – Domestic posting Rs. 21 lakh P.A. and for International posting Rs. 20.25 lakh P.A
• Average CTC offered Rs. 7.30 lakh P.A. (ii) ICAI Publications (a) Compendium of opinion Vol. XXXII (12-02-2012 to 11-02-2013) (b) Study on Compliance of Financial Reporting Requirements (Vol – II) ( P. 1578 – 1579).
Rotation of Auditors
The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has now notified Companies (Audit and Auditors) Rules, 2014. These Rules have come into force on 01-0402014. Rule 5 provides that the provision for Rotation of Auditors u/s. 139 will apply to only(a) Listed Companies, (b) Unlisted Companies having paid up Share capital of Rs. 10 crore, (c) Private Companies having paid share capital of Rs. 20 crore and (d) Any Public or Private Company, not covered by (a) (b) or (c) above, which has public borrowings from financial institutions, banks or public deposits of Rs. 50 crore or more.
Rule 6 states that the period for which the auditor has held office as an auditor prior to the commencement of the Act (i.e., 01-04-2014) should be taken into account for calculating the period of 5 consecutive years (For the individuals) or 10 consecutive years (For the firm). This will mean that if a CA Firm is an auditor of a company to which the section applies for 10 years or more prior to 01-04-2014, that firm can continue as auditor of that company for grace period of 3 years only. This Rule gives a chart explaining the years for which the auditor can continue as an auditor of the specified company after 01-04-2014.
EAC Opinion
Facts:
A company, during the year 1984-85, was engaged in the construction and operation of the thermal power plant in the State of Odisha. The company had set up two power plants. (Units I and II e.g., Stage 1) as its maiden venture in the district of Jharsuguda known as IB Thermal Power Station and the Units were commercially operated during December, 1994 and June, 1996 respectively. The company is setting up two new power plants (Units III and IV, i.e., Stage 2) at the same location. The company has stated that the power generated from Units I and II is sold to ABC Ltd., a Government of Odisha Undertaking, at a tariff determined as per bulk Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) executed during the year 1996. The company has further stated that for setting up new power plant Units III and IV (new power plant), total estimated capital cost will be met out of 75% long term loans and 25% as equity from the investors. 50% of the power generated from the new power plant is to be sold to ABC Ltd., and balance 50% of power is to be sold to different power purchasers on long term and short term basis. The new power plant will share some of the existing infrastructure facilities originally constructed for Units I and II which are under direct control of the company. The infrastructure facilities will require substantial capital expenditure for renovation, improvement and addition to make them usable in support of construction of the new power plant. Without the above proposed expenditure, the infrastructure facilities may not support the construction of Stage 2.
Query:
In view of the above facts and accounting requirements, the company has sought the opinion of the EAC as to whether the accounting method of additional expenditure incurred for shared infrastructure facilities and calculation of depreciation separately for charging to operation for Stage 1 and expenditure during construction for capitalisation for Stage 2 as well as inclusion in the capital cost of Stage 2 is in consonance with the generally accepted accounting principles and Accounting Standards followed in India.
EAC Opinion:
After considering paragraph 23 of the Accounting Standard (AS) 10, “Accounting for fixed assets”, the Committee is of the view that expenditure on fixed assets subsequent to their installation may be categorised into (i) repairs and (ii) improvements and betterments. Normally, expenditure on repairs, including replacement cost necessary to maintain the previously estimated standard of performance, is expensed in the same period. Similarly, the cost of adopting a fixed asset to a new use or modernisation /renovation of such asset without actually improving the previously estimated standard of performance is also expensed. Expenditures that add new fixed asset units, or that have the effect of improving the previously assessed standard of performance are capitalised.
The Committee notes from the facts of the case that the capital expenditure is being incurred on existing infrastructure facilities which will support the construction as well as operation of new power plant. Further, the expenditure shall increase the future benefits from the existing asset beyond its previously assessed standard of performance and such asset will be used beyond the original useful life assessed for existing power plants. Accordingly, such additional expenditure incurred on common infrastructure facilities for new power plant can be capitalized.
Further, after considering paragraphs 12.2 of AS 10 and paragraphs 9, 23 & 24 of AS 6, the Committee is of the view that it is only an addition or extension which retains a separate identity and is capable of being used after the existing asset is dispose off, is accounted for and depreciated independently on the basis of an estimate of its useful life. However, in the company’s case, such expenditure is not creating any new asset which is separately identifiable but such asset will be used beyond useful life assessed for existing power plant. Accordingly, it should be capitalised with the cost of existing assets.
As regards the inclusion of the depreciation charged on the asset used in the construction activities of the new power plant in the cost of asset(s) capitalised, the Committee is of the view that to the extant the asset is being used for construction activity, depreciation on the asset is a directly attributable cost of bringing the asset to its working condition for its intended use and accordingly, as per paragraph 9.1 of AS 10, it should be capitalised with the cost of asset(s) as per AS 10.
Therefore, the Committee is of the opinion that the accounting treatment of the expenditure incurred on infrastructure facilities and calculation of depreciation separately for charging to the operation for the existing units and expenditure during construction for capitalisation for the new power plant as well as inclusion in the capital cost of new power plant is not inconsonance with the generally accepted accounting principals and Accounting Standards followed in India.
Some Ethical Issues
(i) Issue No.1
Whether the statutory auditors consisting of ten or more members can conduct the branch audits of the same company?
The Council has prescribed certain self regulatory measures in order to ensure a healthy growth of the profession and an equitable flow of professional work among the members. One of the recommendations of this nature is that the branch audits of a company should not be conducted by its statutory auditors consisting of 10 or more members, but should be conducted by the local firms of auditors consisting of less than ten members. This should not be understood to mean any restriction on the right of the statutory auditors to have access over branch accounts conferred under the Companies Act, 1956. This restriction may not apply in the following cases:
(a) where the accounting records of the branches are maintained at the head office of the respective companies; and
(b) where significant operations of an undertaking or a company are carried out at its branch office.
(ii) Issue No.2
What should be the size of signboard for the office?
With regard to the size of the signboard for his office that a Member can put up, it is a matter in which the members should exercise their own discretion and good taste. The size of the signboard should be reasonable. The use of glow signs or lights on large-sized boards as is used by traders or shopkeepers would not be proper. A member can have a name board at the place of his residence with the designation of Chartered Accountant, provided it is a name plate or name board of an individual member and not of the firm.
(iii) Issue No.3
Can a member share profits with the widow of his deceased partner?
When there are two or more partners and one of them dies, the widow of the deceased partner can continue to receive a share of the profit of the firm. A legal representative, say widow of a deceased partner, would be entitled to share the profits only where the partnership agreement contains a provision that on the death of the partner his widow or legal representative would be entitled to such payment by way of sharing of fees or otherwise for the specified period.
The Aayakar Seva Kendra, situated at Ground Floor, Aayakar Bhavan, Mumbai will accept the Dak/Tapal of the charges of Commissioner of Income Tax-I to Commissioner of Income Tax -13 from assesses/their representatives between 10.30 a.m. to 4.00 p.m. (Lunch Time 1.30 to 2.00 p.m.). Copy of the order available at www.bcasonline.org
A Press Note bearing No.402/92/2006-MC dated 17th April, 2014 has been issued by CBDT giving instructions to Assessing Officers, laying down Standard Operating Procedure (‘SOP’) for verification and correction of tax-demand. The taxpayers can get the outstanding tax demand reduced/ deleted by applying for rectification along with documentary evidence of tax/demand already paid. The SOP also makes special provisions for dealing with the tax demand upto Rs. 1,00,000/- in the case of Individuals a<
Intervention application opposing amalgamation – Direct Tax Circular No. 279-Misc.-M-171- 2013-ITJ dated 11th April 2014 –
New tax returns forms notified – Notification no- 24/2014 [S.O. 997(E) dated 1 April, 2014 – Income tax (Fourth amendment) Rules, 2014
a) Every partnership firm is required to file its return of income for A.Y. 2014-15 and in subsequent years electronically.
b) Every political party (if its income exceeds the maximum amount not chargeable to tax) is required to file its return of income for A.Y. 2014-15 and in subsequent years electronically.
c) Every Charitable officer by filing form 10. It is now provided that Form 10 is required to be filed electronically.
Interest expenditure: Section 57(iii): Money borrowed for investing in shares in company owning immovable property: Dividend not received: Interest not disallowable on ground that investment was not made for purpose of earning dividend:
The assessee borrowed money for investment in shares of a company P owning an immovable property the value of which was much higher than the book value. The assessee had not received dividend. The assessee’s claim for deduction of interest on borrowed funds u/s. 57(iii) of the Income-tax Act, was disallowed by the Assessing Officer on the ground that the investment could not be said to have been made for earning dividend. The Tribunal upheld the disallowance.
On appeal by the assessee, the Calcutta High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:
“i) Even though the language of section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is a little wider than that of section 57(iii), that cannot make any difference in the true interpretation of section 57(iii). The language of section 57(iii) is clear and unambiguous and it has to be construed according to its plain natural meaning and merely because a slightly wider phraseology is employed in another section which may take in something more, it does not mean that section 57(iii) should be given a narrow and constricted meaning not warranted by the language of the section and, in fact, contrary to such language.
ii) There was no reason why a proper expenditure should have been disallowed only because the investment was not made for the purpose of earning dividend. There is no finding that the investment was made otherwise than for the purpose of making an income. The Tribunal and the Assessing Officer were wrong in disallowing the expenditure.”
Housing project: Deduction u/s. 80-IB(10): A. Y. 2007-08: Amendment w.e.f. 01/04/2005 requiring certificate of completion of project within four years of approval: Not applicable to projects approved prior to that date: Assessee entitled to deduction:
The assessee, a real estate developer obtained approval for a housing project on 16-03-2005 from the Development Authority. It completed the project in 2008 and by a letter dated 05-11-2008 applied to the Competent Authority for the issue of the completion certificate. The assessee’s claim for deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) was denied inter alia, on the ground that the completion certificate was not obtained within the period of four years as prescribed by the Finance Act, 2004 w.e.f. 01-04-2005. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim for deduction accepting the assessee’s claim that, since the approval was granted to the assessee 16-03-2005 i.e., prior to 01-04-2005, the assessee was not expected to fulfill the conditions which were not on the statute when such approval was granted to the assessee.
On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:
“i) The approval for the project was given by the Development Authority on 16-03-2005. Clearly, the approval related to the period prior to the amendment, which insisted on the issuance of the completion certificate by the end of the four year period, was brought into force. The application of such stringent conditions, which are left to an independent body such as the local authority who is to issue the completion certificate, would have led to not only hardship but absurdity.
ii) As a consequence, the Tribunal was not, therefore, in error of law while holding in favour of the assessee.”
CBDT Circular: Binding on Revenue: S/s. 119 and 143(2): A. Y. 2004-05: Circular prescribing time limit of three months from date of filing of return for issuing notice u/s. 143(2): Return filed on 29-10-2004: Notice u/s. 143(2) issued on 14-07-2005: Not valid
For the A. Y. 2004-05, the assessee had filed return of income on 29-10-2004. The Assessing Officer issued the notice u/s. 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on 14-07-2005. The assessee claimed that the notice u/s. 143(2) was not valid since it has been issued beyond the period of three months of date of filing of the return as prescribed by the CBDT Circulars Nos. 9 and 10. The Tribunal rejected the assessee’s contention and dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee. The Tribunal accepted the contention of the Revenue that the Assessing Officer was competent to issue notice u/s. 143(2) after the expiry of period of three months from the date of filing of the return.
In the appeal by the asessee before the High Court, the Revenue contended that such a notice u/s. 143(2) could have been issued within 12 months from the date of filing of the return and, therefore, the notice was well within time. The Calcutta High Court allowed the assessee’s appeal, reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:
“i) Even assuming that the intention of the CBDT was to restrict the time for selection of the cases for scrutiny to a period of three months, it could not be said that the selection in the case of the assessee was made within the period. The return was filed on 29-10-2004, and the case was selected for scrutiny on 06-07-2005. By any process of reasoning, it was not open to the Tribunal to come to the finding that the Department acted within the four corners of Circular No.s 9 and 10 issued by the CBDT. The Circulars were evidently violated. The Circulars were binding upon the Department u/s. 119.
ii) Even assuming that the circulars were not meant for the purpose of permitting unscrupulous assessees from evading tax, it could not be said that the Department, which is the State, can be permitted to selectively apply the standards set by itself for its own conduct. When the Department has set down a standard for itself, the Department is bound by that standard and cannot act with discrimination. If it does that, the act of the Department is bound to be struck down under Article 14 of the Constitution. In the facts of the case, it was not necessary to decide whether the intention of the CBDT was to restrict the period of issuance of the notice from the date of filing of the return laid down u/s. 143(2).
iii) Thus, the notice u/s. 143(2) was not in legal exercise of jurisdiction.”
Charitable trust: Exemption u/s. 11 : A. Y. 2009-10: Where assessee-trust, failing to use 85 % of income from property, wrote letter conveying department for option available under Clause (2) of Explanation to section 11(1) to allow it to spend surplus amount to next year, no disallowance was to be made merely on ground that declaration was not made in a prescribed manner:
The assessee, a registered public charitable trust, being unable to utilise income from property to extent of 85 % wrote a letter conveying department to exercise option available under Clause (2) of Explanation to section 11(1) for allowing accumulation of income. The Assessing Officer added to the income of assessee on ground that for claiming exemption the assessee had to give declaration in the prescribed form which was not done by the assessee. While exercising option a mistake was committed by the assessee, as the amount was wrongly mentioned to a lower figure, but later on the same was rectified. On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) allowed only that part which was declared by the assessee in original letter before due date and disallowed remaining revised amount by observing that the revision option was not exercised within due date. On cross appeals, the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim and deleted entire amount on ground that the mistake was bona fide and the requirement of exercising option within prescribed time was only directory in nature.
On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:
“i) U/s. 11, a charitable trust unable to utilise its income derived from property held under trust wholly for charitable or religious purposes to the extent of 85 % would have an option either in terms of clause (2) of Explanation to s/s. (1) thereof, or as provided u/s/s. (2). When such an option is covered u/s/s. (2) i.e., the income is sought to be accumulated or set apart for the period prescribed, that the requirement of making a declaration in the prescribed manner arises. In case of an option under Clause (2) of Explanation to s/s. (1), there is no such requirement of making declaration but the requirement is exercising of such option in writing before the expiry of the time allowed u/s/s. (1) of section 139 for furnishing the return of income.
ii) In the present case, the assessee did exercise such option as is apparent from the letter dated 22-09-2009. In such letter, the assessee conveyed to the department that the assessee gave a notice of option exercised by the trust to allow to spend surplus amount of Rs. 59,17,600 that may remain at the end of the previous year ended on 31-03-2009, during the immediately following the previous year, i.e., 2009-10. In the caption, the assessee referred to as the subject-notice of option exercised as required under Clause (2) of Explanation to section 11(1). These things are thus abundantly clear – firstly, that such option was exercised before last date of filing the return, which was 30-09-2009 and secondly, that such option was exercised in terms of clause (2) of Explanation to section 11(1). That was clearly not an option u/s/s. (2) of section 11. The caption of the said communication dated 22-09–00- as well as the contents of the letter make this clear. If that be so, the assessee cannot be precluded from pursuing such option on the ground as was done by the Assessing Officer that no declaration in the prescribed form was made. As we have noticed that such declaration was required only if the assessee’s option was to be covered by the provision of section 11(2).
iii) It is true that in such option exercised on 22/09/2009, the assessee indicated a smaller figure of Rs. 57,17,600 and it was only later that the same was corrected to Rs. 1,05,67,047. However, the Tribunal has taken note of facts on record namely that the option in fact was exercised within the time permitted under the statute. It was a bona fide error to indicate a wrong figure. The intention to avail carry over of the un-spend income to the next year was clear.
iv) The requirement of exercising an option within the time permitted under Clause (2) of Explanation to section 11(1) is directory and not mandatory. Substantial compliance thereof would therefore be sufficient.
v) Even otherwise, without going to the extent of holding such time limit as directory and not mandatory, in the facts of the present case, the Tribunal committed no error in granting the benefit to the assessee for the entire amount since it was a mere oversight or bona fide error in not indicating the correct and full amount for the option under clause (2) of Explanation to section 11(1).”
Business expenditure: Disallowance: TDS: Commission/trade discount: S/s. 40(a)(ia) and 194H: A. Y. 2005-06: Assessee in business of manufacture and trade of pharmaceutical products: Incentive to dealers, distributors, stockists under different schemes: Not commission: Section 194H not applicable: Disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) not proper:
The assessee was engaged in the business of manufacture and trading of pharmaceutical products. The assessee gave incentives to its distributors/dealers/ stockists under different schemes. In the relevant year, i.e. A. Y. 2005-06, the incentive so given of Rs. 70,67,089/- was disallowed by the Assessing Officer u/s. 40(a)(ia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, treating the same as commission, on the ground that the assessee has not deducted tax at source u/s. 194H of the Act. CIT(A) and the Tribunal deleted the addition holding that the payment was not commission and the provisions of sections 194H and 40(a)(ia) were not applicable.
On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:
“i) The assessee had undertaken sales promotion scheme viz., product discount scheme and product campaign under which the assessee had offered an incentive on case to case basis to its stockists/ dealers/agents. An amount of Rs. 70,67,089/- was claimed as deduction towards expenditure incurred under the said sales promotional scheme. The relationship between the assessee and the distributors/ stockists was that of principle to principle and in fact the distributors were the customers of the assessee to whom the sales were effected either directly or through the consignment agent. As the distributors/ stockists were the persons to whom the product was sold, no services were offered to the assessee and what was offered to the distributor was a discount under the product distribution scheme or product campaign scheme to buy the assessee’s products.
ii) The distributors/stockists were not acting on behalf of the assessee and that most of the credit was by way of goods on meeting the sales target, and hence, it could not be said to be a commission payment within the meaning of Explanation (i) to section 194H of the Act. The contention of the Revenue in regard to the application of Explanation (i) below section 194H being applicable to all categories of sales expenditure cannot be accepted. Such reading of Explanation (i) below section 194H would amount to reading the said provision in abstract. The application of the provision is required to be considered to the relevant facts of every case.
iii) We are satisfied that in the facts of the present case that as regards sales promotional expenditure in question, the provisions of Explanation (i) below section 194H of the Act are rightly held to be not applicable as the benefit which is availed by the dealers/ stockists of the assessee is appropriately held to be not a payment of any commission in the concurrent findings as recorded by the CIT(A) and the Tribunal.
iv) We do not find that the appeal gives rise to any substantial question of law. It is accordingly dismissed.”
II. REPORTED:
1. Business Expenditure: Disallowance: Ss. 40(a)(ia), 40A(3) and 194C(2): A. Ys. 2005-06 and 2009-10: ONGC acquiring lands from farmers and others: Land losers forming society for enabling to survive by way of alternate means of plying vehicles on rent to the ONGC: Society receiving amounts from ONGC and distributing to farmers/members: Payments not expended by society and would not come within the meaning of expenditure either u/s. 40(a)(ia) or section 40A(3): No disallowance can be made: ITO vs. Ankleshwar Taluka ONGC and Land Loser Travellers Co-operative Society; A. Y. 2005-06; 362 ITR 87 (Guj): CIT vs. Ankleshwar Taluka ONGC and Land Loser Travellers Co-operative Society; A. Y. 2009-10; 362 ITR 92 (Guj):
ONGC acquired lands in a particular area from farmers and other persons. Land losers formed the assessee society to enable them to earn a source of livelihood by means of plying vehicles on rent to ONGC. The assessee society received the amounts from ONGC on behalf of the members and distributed the same amongst the members. ONGC deducted the tax at source on such payment to the assessee society.
A. Y. 2005-06:
In the A. Y. 2005-06, the assessee society received Rs. 2,57,62,253 and distributed the same to the members. The Assessing Officer was of the view that the society was a sub-contractor and that it ought to have deducted tax at source on payments made to each of the farmers u/s. 194C(2) and disallowed the whole of the amount of Rs. 2,57,62,253/- u/s. 40(a)(ia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. He made a further addition of Rs. 51,47,250/- being 20% of the said amount by way of disallowance u/s. 40A(3) on the ground that the said amount was paid to the members in cash. The Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the addition. He held that there was no element of works contract in terms of the provisions of section 194C in the activities performed by the society and, accordingly, set aside the disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia). He also held that there was no case for disallowance u/s. 40A(3) as no expenditure was incurred by the society in distributing the rentals to the members. The Tribunal concurred with the findings of the Commissioner (Appeals) and dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue.
In appeal before the High Court, the Revenue raised the question of disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) but did not raise the question of disallowance u/s. 40A(3) of the Act. The Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:
“i) In the light of the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal upon appreciation of evidence on record, the reasoning adopted by the Tribunal was just and reasonable.
ii) Thus, it was not possible to state that there was any infirmity in the order of the Tribunal so as to give rise to any question of law, much less, a substantial question of law so as to warrant interference.” A. Y. 2009-10: In this year, the assessee society had received an amount of Rs. 3.79 crore from ONGC and the same was distributed by the assessee society to its members. The Assessing Officer made an addition of 20% of the said amount by way of disallowance u/s. 40A(3) of the Act, on the ground that the assessee had paid these amounts to its members in cash. The Tribunal deleted the addition.
On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:
“The view of the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal that the payments were not expended by the assessee and that, therefore, would not come within the meaning of expenditure (be it based on section 40(a)(ia) or section 40A(3) of the Act) was to be confirmed.”
Income from property held for charitable or religious purposes – A charitable and religious trust which does not benefit any specific religious community would not be covered by section 13(1)(b) of the Act and would be eligible to claim exemption u/s. 11 of the Act.
Aggrieved by the order so passed, the respondent carried the matter by way of an appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal after going through the objects of the respondent-trust came to the conclusion that the respondent was a public religious trust as the objects of the trust were wholly religious in nature and thus, the provisions of section 13(1)(b) which are otherwise applicable, in the case of the charitable trust would not be applicable and therefore, held that the respondent-trust was entitled to claim registration u/se. 12A and 12AA and accordingly, allowed the appeal and set aside the order passed by the Commissioner and further directed the Commissioner of Income-tax to grant registration u/s. 12A read with section 12AA of the Act to all the applicant-trust.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision passed by the Tribunal, the Revenue approached the High Court u/s. 260-A of the Act. The court primarily, was of the view that the decision of the Tribunal was rendered purely on the factual matrix of the case and therefore, it would be improper to disturb the finding of fact so arrived by the Tribunal. Secondly, the court observed that the provisions of section 13(1)(b) would not be applicable to the respondent-trust as the trust was not created or established for the benefit of any particular religious community or caste. Consequently, the court has dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue by judgment and order dated 22-06-2009.
Disturbed by the aforesaid ruling, the Revenue approached the Supreme Court.
According to the Supreme Court, the determination of the nature of trust as wholly religious or wholly charitable or both charitable and religious under the Act was not a question of fact. It was a question which required examination of legal effects of the proven facts and documents, that is, the legal implication of the objects of the respondent-trust as contained in the trust deed. It is only the objects of a trust as declared in the trust deed which would govern its right of exemption u/s. 11 or 12. It is the analysis of these objects in the backdrop of fiscal jurisprudence which would illuminate the purpose behind the creation or establishment of the trust for either religious or charitable or both religious and charitable purpose. The Supreme Court therefore held that the High Court had erred in refusing to interfere with the observations of the Tribunal in respect of the character of the trust.
Having said so, the Supreme Court proceeded to examine the question, whether the Courts below were justified in coming to the conclusion that the respondent-trust was a public religious trust and therefore, outside the purview of section 13(1) (b) and eligible for exemption u/s. 11 of the Act.
The Supreme Court noted that the Tribunal had analysed the objects of the trust in the light of the holy scriptures and the Quran and recorded its satisfaction as follows: “16… The objects of the assessee-trust reproduced above clearly refer to the religion and are supported by reference made to different pages of Holy Quran. The learned Counsel for the assessee referred to the true copies of several pages of Holy Quran written by two of the authors referred to above in which giving of food in days of hunger or orphan is considered as highly religious ceremony. Reference is also made that who will give to the people or poor then Allah will give them in return and, i.e., who will give loan then Allah will give double to them. Likewise, for helping the needy people for religious activities and to carry out religious activities or spend for good, spending wealth in the way of Allah, bestowing mercy, teaching were considered to be highly religious activities. On going through several true pages of Holy Quran written by the authors referred to above, we are satisfied that the learned Counsel for the assessee was justified in contending that all the objects of the assesee-trust are solely religious in nature because each of them refers to religious occasions, religious education or to religious activities. The learned Counsel for the assessee also explained that the words ‘Shariat-e- Mohammadiyah’ means the path shown by prophet Mohammed. Therefore, the objects of Shariat-e- Mohammadiyah are identical with those of ‘Dawate- Hadiyah’. For Dawoodi Bohras, true path shown by the prophet is the one indicated and shown by their living guide Dai-al-Mutlaq of the time who is the living and visible guide for Dawoodi Bohras. It is an undisputed fact that for the people believing in Islam, writings in Quran are words of Allah for them. The directions given in the Holy Quran are considered by the people of Islamic faith as orders from Allah and the people of Islamic faith obey such orders as holy and religious. The learned Counsel for the assessee has been able to demonstrate that all the objects of the assessee-trust, as noted above, came out from the writings in Quran and as such these are the orders for them while observing Islamic faith.”
The Supreme Court observed that unquestionably, objects (c) and (f) which provide for the activities completely religious in nature and restricted to the specific community of the respondent-trust are objects with religious purpose only. However, in respect to the other objects, in our view the fact that the said objects trace their source to the Holy Quran and resolve to abide by the path of godliness shown by Allah would not be sufficient to conclude that the entire purpose and activities of the trust would be purely religious in colour. The objects reflects the intent of the trust as observance of the tenets of Islam, but do not restrict the activities of the trust to religious obligations only and for the benefit of the members of the community. The Privy Council in Re The Tribune, 7 ITR 415 has held that in judging whether a certain purpose is of public benefit or not, the Courts must in general apply the standards of customary law and common opinion amongst the community to which the parties interested belong to. Therefore, it is pertinent to analyse whether the customary law would restrict the charitable disposition of the intended activities in the objects.
The provision of food to the public on religious days of the community as per object (a) and (b), the establishment of Madrasa and organisations for dissemination of religious education under object
(d) and rendering assistance to the needy and poor for religious activities under object (e) would reflect the essence of charity. The objects (a) and
(b) provide for arrangement for nyaz and majlis (lunch and dinner) on the religious occasion of the birth anniversary and Urs Mubarak of Awliya-e- Quiram (SA) and the Saints of the Dawoodji Bohra community and for arrangement of lunch and din- ner on religious occasions and auspicious days of the Dawoodi Bohra community, respectively. Nyaz refers to the food a person makes and offers to others on any particular occasion on the occasion of the death of a saint and Majhlis implies a place of gathering or meeting. The activity of providing for food on certain specific occasions and other religious and auspicious events of the Dawoodi Bohra community do not restrict the benefit to the members of the community. Neither the religious tenets nor the objects as expressed limit the service of food on the said occasions only to the members of the specific community. Thus, the activity of Nyaz performed by the respondent-trust does not delineate a separate class but extends the benefit of free service of food to the public at large irrespective of their religious, caste or sect and thereby qualifies as a charitable purpose which would entail general public utility.
Further, the establishment of the Madrasa or institutions to impart religious education to the masses would qualify as a charitable purpose qualifying under the head of education under the provisions of section 2(15) of the Act. The institutions established to spread religious awareness by means of education though established to promote and further religious thought could not be restricted to religious purposes. The House of Lords in Barralet vs. IR, 54 TC 446, has observed that “the study and dissemination of ethical principles and the cultivation of rational religious sentiment” would fall in the category of educational purposes. The Madrasa as a Mohommedan institution of teaching does not confine instruction to only dissipation of religious teachings but also contributes to the holistic education of an individual. Therefore, it cannot be said the object (d) would embody a restrictive purpose of religious activities only. Similarly, assistance by the respondent-trust to the needy and poor for religious activities would not divest the trust of its altruistic character.
Therefore, the objects of the trust, according to the Supreme Court, exhibited dual tenor of religious and charitable purposes and activities. Section 11 of the Act shelters such trust with composite objects to claim exemption from tax as a religious and charitable trust subject to pro- visions of section 13. The activities of the trust under such object would therefore be entitled to exemption accordingly.
According to the Supreme Court, the second issue which arose for its consideration and decision was, whether the respondent-trust was a charitable and religious trust only for the purposes of a particular community and therefore, not eligible for exemption u/s. 11 of the Act in view of provisions of section 13(1)(b) of the Act.
The Supreme Court held that in the present case, the objects of the respondent-trust were based on religious tenets under the Quran according to the religious faith of Islam. As already noticed, the perusal of the objects and purposes of the respondent-trust clearly demonstrated that the activities of the trust though both charitable and religious were not exclusively meant for a particular religious community. The objects, as explained in the preceding paragraphs, did not channel the benefits to any community if not the Dawoodi Bohra Community and thus, would not fall under the provisions of section 13(1)(b) of the Act.
In that view of the matter, the Supreme Court held that the respondent-trust was a charitable and religious trust which did not benefit any specific religious community and therefore, it could not be held that section 13(1)(b) of the Act would be attracted to the respondent-trust and thereby, it would be eligible to claim exemption u/s. 11 of the Act.
Year of Taxability of Interest on Refund of Tax
Section 244A of the Income Tax Act,
entitles an assessee to receive interest on amount of refund of tax due
to him. For an assessee, following the mercantile system of accounting,
the issue arises on the year of accrual of such interest and taxability
thereon.
The issue being whether such interest is accrued in each year
and hence to be taxed by spreading it over the number of years for which
it is granted or should it be taxed in the year in which it is granted.
This issue had been a subject matter of adjudication before various
courts. Here, the author has analysed various judicial pronouncements in
this regard.
Issue for Consideration:
An assessee is entitled to
receive simple interest, on the amount of refund of tax that becomes due
to him, at the specified rate, for the period commencing from the date
of payment of tax to the date on which the refund is granted, as per the
provisions of section 244A of the Income-tax Act.
Such interest is
usually chargeable to tax under the head “Income From Other Sources” and
is computed in accordance with the method of accounting regularly
employed by the assessee. This interest is taxed in the year of receipt,
in case of an assessee following the cash system of accounting, and in
case of an assessee following the mercantile system of accounting, is
taxed in the year of the accrual of such interest.
The period for which
such interest is granted usually exceeds 12 months. The quantum of
interest also varies in many cases on passing of orders from time to
time, subsequent to the intimation or the first order, ranging from
assessment orders to appellate orders. Again, in many cases, the
assessees are forced to pay taxes towards demands raised in pursuance of
orders that finally do not stand the scrutiny of the appellate
authorities. In all these cases, barring a few cases, the assessee
receives interest only on the final settlement of the disputes
concerning computation of the total income by the highest appellate
authority.
The issue that arises, for consideration, in all such cases
of receipt of interest, is about the year or years of taxation of such
interest, for the period exceeding 12 months, in the hands of the
assessees following the mercantile system of accounting. The issue in a
nutshell is about ascertaining the year of accrual of such interest.
Does such interest, under the mercantile system, accrue from year to
year from the date of payment of tax till the date of the receipt of
such interest or does it accrue only when the refund is ordered by an
authority and interest thereon is granted to the assessee? In the first
case, the interest so received is taxable in more than 1 year, on the
understanding that the interest accrues on a daily basis and is taxable
in more than 1 assessment year while in the later case, it is taxed only
in the year of the passing of an order grating interest.
The courts
have been asked to adjudicate as to whether such interest accrued form
year to year and is therefore to be taxed by spreading it over the
number of years for which it is granted or should it be taxed in the
year in which it is granted. Recently, the Andhra Pradesh High Court has
held that such interest accrued from year to year and for taxation, it
should be spread over the number of years for which interest is granted
dissenting from the decisions of the Kerala, Orissa and Allahabad High
Court.
Smt. K. Devayani Amma’s case
The issue of years of accrual of
interest on refund, granted u/s. 244, was examined by the Kerala High
Court in the case of Smt. K. Devayani Amma vs. DCIT, 328 ITR 10. In that
case, the Court was asked, by the assessee, to decide whether the
Tribunal was justified in holding that interest received by the assessee
on refund was assessable in the assessment year in which such interest
was granted. In that case, the Assessing Officer granted an amount of
interest of Rs. 2,87,537, u/s. 244, on refund of tax computed in
pursuance of the order passed to give effect to an appellate order for
A.Y. 1983-84, that was decided in favour of the assessee. The order of
refund was passed in the previous year relevant to A.Y. 1994-95 and the
refund together with interest was also received in the said year. The
Assessing Officer taxed the entire interest of Rs. 2,87,537 in the A.Y.
1994-95, by treating such interest as the income of A.Y. 1994-95, on the
ground that interest had accrued during that year.
The assessee
however, contested the liability for tax on the entire interest in one
assessment year on the ground that the interest in question accrued from
year to year, from the date of payment of excess tax till the date of
refund. The contention of the assessee was upheld by the CIT(A), but the
Tribunal agreed with the Assessing Officer by holding that the said
interest accrued in A.Y. 1994-95, only, following the decisions in the
case of CIT vs. Sri Popsingh Rice Mill, 212 ITR 385 (Orissa) and J.K.
Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. vs. Addl. CIT, 104 ITR 695 (All.). The
assessee, in the appeal before the High Court, contended that interest
income was assessable on a year to year basis, spread over the period
commencing from the year in which the tax was paid and ending with the
year in which it was refunded together with interest thereon, by relying
on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Rama Bai vs. CIT,
181 ITR 400.
In reply, the standing counsel for the Income-tax
Department submitted that the interest income accrued only on passing of
the order for granting refund. He also submitted that the decision in
Rama Bai’s case (supra) was delivered in respect of an interest received
under the Land Acquisition Act and was not relevant for determining the
year of taxation of interest received under the Income-tax Act. He also
pointed out that the decision in the case of Sri Popsingh Rice Mill
(supra), delivered by the Orissa High Court, had followed the subsequent
decision of the Supreme Court in preference to its decision in Rama
Bai’s case to hold that the interest was taxable in the year of grant
thereon.
The Kerala High Court noted that the decision in Rama Bai’s
case(supra) concerned itself with taxation of interest under the Land
Acquisition Act and was not binding for deciding an issue of taxation of
interest, granted under the Income-tax Act and that the issue therefore
was required to be considered in light of the statutory provisionsof
the Income-tax Act. The court also observed that the law declared by the
Supreme Court was neutralised by the amendments in section 145A(b) and
section 56(viii) by the Finance (no.2) Act, 2009 concerning the year of
taxation of interest received on compensation or enhanced compensation
for compulsory acquisition .
The Kerala High Court found that the
assessee’s eligibility for interest arose only when the effect was given
to the appellate order and till such time the assessee was not entitled
to any refund at all; that the right to interest on refund arose only
when the refund was ordered in favour of the assessee. Accordingly, in
view of the Court, interest accrued only when the assessee was found to
be eligible for refund of the excess tax, based on the revision of the
assessment order. The Court took notice of the fact that not only the
interest was granted during A.Y. 1994-95, but was also paid during the
said assessment year. The assessee’s appeal was dismissed and the order
of the Tribunal was confirmed by the Court by holding that interest on
refund of tax accrued in the year of passing the order granting refund .
M. Jaffersaheb (Decd.)’s case
The issue once again arose recently, before the Andhra Pradesh High Court, in the case of Shri M. Jaffer Saheb (Decd.) vs. CIT, 43 taxmann.com,123. The facts in this case were that for the assessment year 1982-1983, an assessment was completed with substantial additions resulting into a huge demand for payment of taxes. The assessee paid the de- manded tax and thereafter availed the appellate remedies and in that process the appellate tribunal finally passed an order granting substantial relief to the assessee on 16-06-1989. The AO gave effect to the order of the Tribunal by an order dated 18-09- 1989, refunding the excess amount paid along with interest of Rs. 79,950/- for the period 30-10-1985 to 31-08-1989 which was received thereafter. The AO brought to the tax the amount of interest in the assessment year 1990-1991, ignoring the claim of the assessee to spread over the said amount for the assessment years starting with assessment orders 1985-1986 to 1988-1989. The Appellate Commissioner allowed the claim of the assessee and directed that the interest, other than the part pertaining to the assessment year 1990-91, be taxed in the preceding previous years. The Tribunal, on further appeal by the Revenue, reversed the order of the Appellate Commissioner and restored the assessment order passed by the A.O.
At the instance of the assessee, the following two questions of law for the assessment year 1990-1991 were referred to the Andhra Pradesh High Court :
1) “Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, is the Appellate Tribunal correct in law in holding that interest U/S.244(1A) of the Income-tax Act on the refund due accrues on the date when the Appellate Tribunal passed order and did not accrue on any day anterior to the date of the Tribunal order?”
2) “Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal is correct in law; in refusing to accept the contention of the applicant that interest on the refund accrued from the previous year relevant to the assessment year 1982-1983 and interest is chargeable to tax in the respective years for which interest is paid?”
The assessee submitted before the High Court that he was entitled to the refund from the date of payment of the tax till the date of granting of the refund and that such interest accrued on day to day basis on the excess amount paid. He submitted that the entitlement of the interest was a right conferred by the statute that did not depend on the order for the refund being made which was only consequential and in law was required to be made more in the nature of complying with the procedural requirement, but his right to claim interest was a statutory right conferred by the Act and in that view of the matter, it was but fair to spread the interest amount in the respective years in issue. He relied on the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in the case of CIT vs. Hindustan Motors Ltd., 202 ITR 839 for the proposition that “Accrual of interest takes place normally on day to day basis. Where there is no due date fixed for payment of interest, interest accrues on the last day of the previous year. Accrual of interest does not depend upon making up of the accounts.” He also relied on the judgment of the Kerala High Court in the case of Peter John vs. CIT, 157 ITR 711 (Ker)(FB) for the proposition that “Interest is separate from refund. Interest whether statutory or contractual represents profit the creditor might have made if he had used that money or loss he suffered because he had not that use. It is something in addition to the refund (capital amount) though it arises out of it.” He also relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ramabai vs. CIT, 181 ITR 401 (SC).
On the other hand, the Income-tax Department submitted that the right to claim interest by the assessee was dependent on an orders being passed u/s. 240 and section 244 of the Income-tax Act and in that view of the matter, the right to claim interest accrued to the assessee only on the date of consequential order passed pursuant to the order of the Appellate Authority and as such, the interest income was assessable in the assessment year 1990- 1991. Reliance was placed on the judgments of the Orissa, Kerala and Allahabad High Courts in the cases of Commissioner of Income-Tax vs. Sri Popsingh Rice Mill, 212 ITR 385 (Orissa), Smt. K. Devayani Amma vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income-Tax and Another 328 ITR 10 (Ker),)and J.K. Spinning and Weaving Mills Co., vs. Additional Commissioner of Income-Tax, Kanpur104 ITR 695 (Allahabad).
The Andhra Pradesh High Court examined the provisions of sections 237, 240, 244 and 244A for ascertaining the statutory position relating to grant of refund and interest thereon. A close scrutiny of the sections 237 and 240, revealed to the Court that the statutory right was conferred on the assessee to get refund of the excess tax paid and such refund was made available to the asssessee even without his having to make any claim in that behalf in as much as section 244A of the Act entitled the assessee to get interest on the refund amount and such interest was payable from the date of payment of tax or payment of penalty from the date till refund was granted.
It was clear to the High Court, from the statutory provisions as applicable to the relevant assessment years, that there was no requirement of the assessee for making a claim either for refund or for interest. As a matter of fact, the Court noticed that sections 243 and 244, were made inapplicable in respect of any assessment for the assessment year commenc- ing on the first day of April, 1989 or any subsequent assessment years.
On a detailed analysis of the decisions of the various Courts in the cases of Rama Bai vs. CIT, 181 ITR 401 (SC), CIT vs. Sankari Manickyamma 105 ITR 172 (AP).
Mrs. Khorshed Shapoor Chinai vs. ACED 90 ITR 47 (AP), CIT vs. Govindarajulu Chetty (T.N.K.) 165 ITR 231 (SC),T.N.K. Govindarajulu Chetty vs. CIT 87 ITR 22 (Mad.), CIT vs.Dr. Sham Lal Narula, 84 ITR 625 (P&H), and CIT, Mysore vs. V.Sampangiramaiah, 69 ITR 159 (Kar), the court significantly noted that the principle which could be culled out was that once the income had legally accrued to the assessee, i.e., the assessee had acquired a right to receive the same, though its valuation might be postponed to a future date, the determination or quantification of the amount did not postpone the accrual. In other words, if the right had legally accrued to the assessee, then the right should be deemed to have accrued in the relevant year, even though the dispute as to the right was settled in the later year, by the one or the other of the authorities in the hierarchy.
The Andhra Pradesh High Court expressly dissented with the decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of Smt. K. Devayani Amma (supra) by observing that;
• though the Kerala High Court, in the said judge- ment, referred the case of Rama Bai (supra), there was no discussion about the principles that were approved in the judgment of the Supreme Court;
• though the provisions of sections 240 and 244(1A) of the Act were referred to, the Kerala High Court held that interest on refund arose only on passing an order in favour of the assessee;
• the eligibility of interest u/s. 244(1A) of the Act arose on an order of revision of assessment passed pursuant to the appellate order which led to grant of refund of excess tax paid by the assessee;
• the reading of sections 237, 240 and 244(1A) cast a duty on the AO to charge that much of tax which the assessee was liable to pay and mandated the refund of the excess amount along with interest;
• the hierarchy of appeals provided were only to ensure that the tax authorities adhere to strict rules of taxation and the statutory provisions. Even the final order that might be passed by the higher authority in the hierarchy of authorities provided under statue was also an order of assessment only for the simple reason that the final order passed was nothing but a correction of the original assessment order, which was erroneous.
• the opinion expressed by the Kerala High Court that interest u/s. 244(1A) of the Act accrued to the assessee only, when it was granted to the assessee along with the refund order issued u/s. 240 of the Act was not correct, especially, in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court as quoted in the judgment of the Madras High Court in T. N. K. Govindarajulu Chetty’s case (supra).
• The court was unable to accept the judgment of Kerala High Court reported in K. Devayani Amma’s case (supra) on the issue.
The judgment of the Allahabad High Court in J.K. Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. (supra) was found to be distinguishable and not applicable in view of the variance in the statutory scheme contained in the provisions contained in Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, with the statutory scheme under the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the Allahabad High Court had taken into consideration that interest became payable to the assessee only when the assessments for the years in dispute were made which were in fact made in 1956, though the assessments were 1951-1952 and 1952-1953.
The Andhra Pradesh High Court was unable to agree with the reasoning of the judgment of the Orissa High Court in Sri Popsingh Rice Mill case (supra), as the question considered by the Orissa High Court was in relation to section 244 of the Act and not in relation to section 244A of the Act and the Orissa High Court had failed to notice the judgments of the Supreme Court and instead relied on three judgments which were not dealing with interest. Likewise, the other two judgments referred to in the said judgment also were found to be not relevant for the purpose of deciding the issue.
The court accordingly answered the questions referred to it in favour of the assessee and against the revenue by holding that the interest on refund accrued from year to year and was not to be taxed in the year of the order granting refund.
Observations
An assessee, following the mercantile system of accounting, is taxed on his income, including interest income, in the year in which the income accrues or arises. An income, in ordinary circumstances, is said to have been accrued on vesting of a legal right to receive such income irrespective of whether it is received or not. Such accrual, based on a right to receive, is independent of the order of any Court or an authority passed for confirming such right to receive, for the reason that such right to receive arises to a person on the basis of the terms of the agreement or the statutory provisions of any law.
It is an accepted position in law that interest accrues from day to day, in case of a person maintaining books of account and accrues on yearly basis in case of a person not maintaining the books of account. In both the cases, the interest income is spread over number of years and is taxed on year to year basis.
The Supreme Court in E.D. Sassoon Company Ltd. vs. CIT, 26 ITR 51, observed that the computation of the profits, whenever it may take place, cannot possi- bly be allowed to suspend its accrual. The accrual happens irrespective of the quantification of the profits, and is not always linked to computation. For attracting the charge of taxation, what has however got to be determined is whether the income, profits or gains accrued to the assessee; before it can be said to have accrued to him, it is necessary that he must have acquired a right to receive the same or that a right to the income, profits or gains has become vested in him though its valuation may be postponed or its material station depends on some contingency.
The Supreme Court in Rama Bai (supra)’s case was concerned with the taxability of interest received on account of enhanced compensation, where the assessee’s lands were acquired and not being satis- fied with the compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer, the assessee appealed to the higher Courts and finally received enhanced com- pensation along with interest payable u/s. 28 and 34 of the Land Acquisition Act. The said amounts were received in the year 1967 and were sought to be assessed in the year 1968-1969. The assessee claimed that interest was allocable and assessable in different assessment years as it accrued from year to year and only that portion of the interest relating to the period April, 1967 to March, 1968 was assessable for the assessment year 1968-1969. The Tribunal referred the following question to the Supreme Court: “Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the interest received by the assesses as per the City Civil Court’s award for the period commencing from the date of possession till 31st March, 1968, was entirely assessable for the assessment year 1968-1969?” The Supreme Court answered the question in favour of assessee and against the revenue by following its earlier judgment in the case of CIT vs. Govindarajulu Chetty (T.N.K.) 165 ITR 231 (SC) wherein in a short judgment, the Apex Court approved the judgment of the Madras High Court in the case of T. N. K. Govindarajulu Chetty vs. CIT, 87 ITR 22 (Mad.). The Madras High Court held that; “11. In this case the liability to pay interest would arise when the compensation amount due to the assessee had not been paid, in each of the relevant years. Therefore, the accrual of interest has to be spread over the years between the date of acquisition till it was actually paid. We are not in a position to accept the contention of the revenue that …………… basis for assessing the income. When a statute brings to charge certain income, its intention is to enforce the charge at the earliest point of time.”
The Supreme Court has pointed out in Laxmipat Singhania vs. CIT,72 ITR 291, that: “Again, it is not open to the Income-tax Officer, if income has accrued to the assessee, and is liable to be included in the total income of a particular year, to ignore the accrual and thereafter to tax it as income of another year on the basis of receipt.” Similar view was taken by the Panjab & Haryana High Court in the case of CIT vs. Dr. Sham Lal Narula, 84 ITR 625 and by the Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT, Mysore vs. V. Sampangiramaiah, 69 ITR 159 where under the question which was considered was “Whether, on the facts and in the circumstance of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in law in holding that the entire interest amount of Rs. 87,265/- was not assessable in the assessment year 1962-63 and that only the proportionate interest referable to the assessment year 1962-63 was assessable in that year?” The Karnataka High Court answered the question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee and against the revenue.
The right to receive interest u/s. 244A is entirely based on the right to refund u/s. 240 of the Act. Unless an assessee is entitled to a refund of taxes, no right to receive an interest arises in his favour. The key consideration therefore is the right to a refund of excess taxes paid. Whether such a right to refund arises on passing of an order by an Income-tax Authority, for granting a refund, or that such a right arises with payment of taxes and is independent of the order of the authority. The fact that interest u/s. 244A, whenever granted and paid, is paid for the period commencing with the date of payment of tax, apparently conveys that such a right is associated with the payment of excess taxes and only its (interest) payment is deferred to the year of grant by an authority. This prima facie understanding is, further confirmed by the amendments in section 145A(2)(B) and section 56(2)(Viii) of the Act by the Finance (NO.2) Act, 2009, that expressly provide that interest on compensation shall be taxed in the year of receipt only. In other words, in the absence of any provision for taxing the interest income in the year of receipt, interest will be taxed in the year of accrual and when such interest pertains to a period exceeding 12 months, its accrual happens on year to year basis in more than 1 assessment year.
On a conspectus reading of the scheme of refund, contained in Chapter XIX u/s. 237 to 245, it is gathered that the right to refund of excess taxes paid is independent of any requirement to claim such refund. While it is true that an assessee is entitled to a refund of the excess taxes paid, only on satisfaction of the A.O that the taxes paid by him exceeds the amount of tax payable by him, it none the less is independent of any order section 237 does not require an Assessing Officer to pass an order of refund, it rather requires an Assessing Officer to refund the excess taxes. Likewise, section 244A entitles an assessee to simple interest on the amount of refund that becomes due to him.
An assessee is entitled to receive interest u/s. 244A(1) where refund of any amount becomes due to him. The language of section 244A (1) may convey that unless an assessee becomes entitled to a refund, he is not entitled to interest and as a consequence of such an understanding, entitlement to interest is postponed to the time when a refund becomes due to him; no interest therefore accrues to him till such time an order of refund is passed. Such an understanding, we feel, is not supported by the scheme of the Act and in particular by the scheme of the refund and the grant of interest thereon. Under the scheme, the moment an excess tax is paid, the refund thereof becomes due to him and the entitlement to interest runs with the right to receive refund which right arises with payment of taxes, irrespective of an order of refund. This understanding is fortified with the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Jaffersaheb’s case, in as much as the issue therein concerned taxation of interest received u/s. 244A in assessment year 1990-91 and the Court while deciding the issue of the year of taxation, examined the implications of the provisions of section 244A w.r.t to the scheme of refund and applied the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Rama Bai’s case. In our considered view, no material difference exists between the interest that was granted u/s. 244 r.w.s 240 and the one now being granted u/s. 244A r.w.s 240 of the Act as regards the time of entitlement. In conclusion, it is safe to hold that the right to refund and the right to interest thereon are statutory rights which rights arise on payment of excess taxes.
The case for the taxation of interest, received under the Income-tax Act, on the year to year basis, by yearly spread over, is greater as compared to the interest received under the Land Acquisition Act for the reason under the scheme of taxation, an amount of refund becomes due, the moment an assessee pays excess tax which is neither dependent on the claim for refund nor on the order of the authorities. Accordingly the decisions of the courts, holding that the interest under the Land Acquisition Act is taxable on the year to year basis, shall apply with greater force, to the cases of receipt of interest, under the Income-tax Act.
Having so concluded that interest is taxable on year to year basis, an assessee is placed in an unenviable position in a case where an Assessing Officer makes substantial additions to the returned income and demands additional tax instead of granting refund. The issue that is required to be considered is about the liability to pay tax on interest that could be said to have accrued, even though the eligibility to refund and consequent interest thereon depends on the outcome of the appeal filed to contest the aforesaid additions to the returned income. While the assessee may not be asked to make the payment of regular taxes but may be required to pay taxes on the accrued interest, which is included in the assessed income, in the hope that he will suc- ceed in the appeal and will be entitled to refund and interest thereon. Nothing could be more confusing than this in as much as, it leads to an inference that interest on refund accrues, even before the finality of refund itself. This confusion is aptly conveyed by Palkhivala’s words when he states that ‘one of the delights of income tax law is occasional incongruities’. The Bombay High Court noticing the confusion in the case of CIT vs. Abbasbhoy, 195 ITR 28, arising on account of the contrasting decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Govindarajulu Chetty (supra) and the earlier decision in the case of CIT vs. Hindustan Housing , 161 ITR 524, with the hope that the Su- preme Court will resolve the controversy observed that “the incongruity does not end here. Despite the conclusion that interest in such cases accrues from year to year, it is doubtful whether it will be possible to hold the assessee responsible for not disclosing interest income in the past on accrual basis.” Kanga & Palkhivala in the 4th edition of their book titled The Law and Practice of Income tax have commented on the assessee’s obligation to return income, on account of accrued interest, where the refund is in dispute in the following words ,”the assessee can always take a stand that the amount of compensation including enhanced compensation or damages having been determined subsequently, he could not possibly anticipate accrual of interest”. Kindly also see, pg. 1085 of volume 1 of the 10th edition of Sampath Iyengar’s Law of Income Tax.
This unenviable situation may however be remitted by resorting to rectification proceedings u/s. 154 for amending the order where such interest on disputed refund is taxed on accrual basis. Please see Garden Silk Mills Ltd., 221 ITR 861(Guj.)
Rules prescribed under Companies Act 2013:
• Chapter III – The Companies (Prospectus and Allotment of Securities) Rules, 2014.
• Chapter IV – The Companies (Share Capital and Debentures) Rules, 2014.
• Chapter VI – The Companies (Registration of Charges) Rules, 2014.
• Chapter VII – The Companies (Management and Administration) Rules, 2014.
• Chapter VIII – The Companies (Declaration and Payment of Dividend) Rules, 2014.
• Chapter IX – The Companies (Accounts) Rules, 2014.
• Chapter XI – The Companies (Appointment and Qualification of Directors) Rules, 2014.
• Chapter XII – The Companies (Meetings of Board and its Powers) Rules, 2014.
The following Rules under the Companies Act 2013 have been prescribed on 31st March 2014
• Chapter I – The Companies (Specification of definitions details) Rules, 2014.
• Chapter II – The Companies (Incorporation) Rules, 2014.
• Chapter V – The Companies (Acceptance of Deposits) Rules, 2014.
• Chapter X – The Companies (Audit and Auditors) Rules, 2014.
• Chapter XIII- The Companies (Appointment and Remuneration of Managerial Personnel) Rules, 2014.
• Chapter XIV- The Companies (Inspection, Investigation and Inquiry) Rules, 2014.
• Chapter XXII- The Companies (Registration of Foreign Companies) Rules, 2014.
• Chapter XXI -The Companies (Authorised to Registered ) Rules, 2014.
• Chapter XXIV – The Companies (Registration Offices and Fees) Rules, 2014.
• Chapter XXVI – Nidhi Rules, 2014.
• Chapter XXIX – The Companies (Adjudication of Penalties) Rules, 2014.
• Chapter XXIX – The Companies (Miscellaneous) Rules, 2014.
Clarification regarding maintenance of books of accounts and preparation of financial statements:
Fees Table notified
Waiver of fees for all event based filing for April 2014 :
Enabling payment of Stamp Duty and Court fees through MCA site:
Clarification in respect of resolutions u/s. 293 of Companies Act, 1956 wrt to compliance u/s. 180 of Companies Act, 2013:
Central Government notifies 183 additional new sections:
There are total 29 chapters under the Companies Act, 2013. Chapters I and XXIII have been notified but no form is prescribed under these chapters. Following table is the summary of chapter wise nomenclature of forms Act 2014 which come into effect from 1st April 2014.
A ready reckoner Table containing provisions of Companies Act, 2013 as notified up to date and corresponding provisions thereof under Companies Act, 1956 and corresponding provisions of Companies act 1956 which shall remain in force.
Names of Forms for e-filing on the MCA site have been Changed:

Change in Depreciation Rates:
D/o IPP F. No. 5(1)/2014-FC.I dated the 17-04- 2014
The DIPP has announced the yearly FDI Policy Circular. The said Circular is effective from 17th April 2014. This Circular consolidates, subsumes and supersedes all Press Notes/Press Releases/Clarifications/ Circulars issued by DIPP, which were in force as on 16th April, 2014 and reflects the FDI Policy as on 17th April, 2014.
This Circular will remain in force until superseded in totality or in part thereof. Reference to any statute or legislation made in this Circular will include modifications, amendments or re-enactments thereof. This circular is divided into 7 Chapters and contains 11 Annexures.
A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 124 dated 21st April, 2014
Notification No. FEMA. 296/2014-RB dated 3rd March, 2014, vide G.S.R. No. 270(E) dated 7th April 2014
Foreign Direct Investment in Pharmaceuticals sector – clarification
This circular states that, with immediate effect, the ‘non-compete’ clause will not be permitted in the case of FDI in Pharmaceuticals sector, except with FIPB approval. Hence, whenever parties want to incorporate the ‘non-compete’ clause in their agreements FDI will have to be under the Approval Route.
S/s. 43(6), 50 – The term `acquired’ used in section 50 is not synonymous with acquisition of title to the property. Use of asset is not a condition for availing the benefits of section 50. In a case where amounts are paid and registration had been complete, though possession was not received, it can be said that the assessee has acquired the property for the purpose of section 50.
ITAT Mumbai `D’ Bench
Before Rajendra (AM) and Dr. S. T. M. Pavalan (JM)
ITA No. 6886/Mum/2011
Assessment Year : 2008-09.
Decided on: 5th March, 2014.
Counsel for revenue/assessee: Sanjeev Jain/Hiro Rai.
The assessee had, vide agreement dated 05-04-2007, sold business premises, whose stamp duty value was Rs. 48,47,850, for a consideration of Rs. 39,00,000. Depreciation was claimed on the premises sold and they constituted part of block of asset. The assessee had purchased two new galas vide agreements dated 28-03-2008 for Rs. 27,28,462 and Rs. 12,71,538. The building in which the galas were situated were under construction and possession of these galas was not with the assessee as on 31-03-2008.
The Assessing Officer held that since the possession of new galas purchased were not with the assessee as on 31–03-2008, they could not be said to be forming part of block of assets for financial year 2007-08 and therefore when the sale consideration of the property sold is reduced from the block of assets, the block would cease to exist and the sale consideration in excess of the opening written down value would be taxed u/s. 50. Since the stamp duty value was not disputed by the assessee, the AO adopted stamp duty value to be the sale consideration. He charged Rs. 47,69,046 as short term capital gains.
Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who held that a reading of Clause (c) of section 43(6) would reveal that the written down value had to be adjusted by actual cost of any asset falling within the block acquired during the year. The assessee had purchased two galas and the entire amount of Rs. 40 lakh had been paid, registration had been completed, therefore, the assessee had acquired the assets as per section 43(6)(c). The term used in section 50 was “acquired during he previous year”. Referring to the decision of the jurisdictional Tribunal in the case of Orient Cartons Ltd. (60 ITD 87), he held that the use of the asset was not a condition precedent for making an adjustment in block of asset. There was no explicit requirement in the statutory provision to the effect that the new asset should also be used in a business carried on by the assessee and that if there was no business carried on by him, the deduction could not be given. He also held that the word “acquired” in section 50 was of a very amorphous word and the acquisition of the property in that section was not synonymous with acquisition of title to the property. Accordingly, he held that the assessee had acquired the premises within the meaning of section 50 of the Act and therefore was entitled for adjustment of cost of the property with that of WDV of the block of assets for the purposes of capital gains. He allowed the appeal filed by the assessee. Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.
Held:
The Tribunal noted that a similar view had been taken in the case of Lalbhai Kalidas & Co. Ltd. (ITA No. 5832/Mum/2011, AY 2007-08 dated 08-11-2013). Following the said decision, the Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A) on this ground. This ground of appeal of the revenue was dismissed.
2014 (33) STR 704 (Tri- Kolkata) Sen Brothers vs. CCE, Bolapur
Facts:
The appellant provided taxable services of commercial or industrial construction services and manpower recruitment agency service. The appellant was registered under Service Tax and was filing Service Tax returns. Due to the acute shortage of funds, the Appellant could not deposit the Service Tax. The department initiated proceedings for the non-payment of taxes. Later on, the appellant deposited Service Tax along with interest. A show cause notice was issued demanding service tax, interest and penalty u/s. 76.
According to the appellant, when the Service Tax along with interest was deposited before issuance of the show cause notice, then issuance of SCN itself was not warranted and further imposition of penalty u/s. 76 also was not called for in view of section 73(3) of the Finance Act, 1994. The Appellant relied on the decision of the Karnataka High Court in CCE, ST, LTU, Bangalore vs. Adecco Flexione Workforce Solution Ltd. 2012 (26) STR 3 (Kar) for issue of SCN post deposit of service tax with interest and also relied on the decision of the Karnataka High Court in case of Comm. of ST vs. Master Kleen – 2012 (25) STR 439 (Ka.) for non-imposition of penalty u/s. 76 where service tax was deposited with interest and intimation was given to department. In both the cases, the High Court held that if the assessee has paid service tax along with interest before issuance of SCN, the department should not waste its time in issuing SCN.
Held:
The Tribunal relying on the above stated decisions of the High Court held that where Service Tax was deposited along with interest before the issuance of SCN, penalty u/s. 76 was not invokable.
2014 (33) STR 701 (Tri- Ahmd) Patel Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE, Rajkot
Facts:
The Appellant collected toll charges from the users of highways. The department demanded service tax under business auxiliary services on the entire collection of toll. The appellant relied upon the judgement in Intertoll India Consultants (P) Ltd -2011 (24) STR 611 (Tri-Delhi) and contended non-applicability of service tax on toll collections.
Held:
The Tribunal relying upon the above stated decision held that the ratio laid down was squarely applicable to the present case and set aside the demand.
2014 to (33) STR 711 ( Tri-Bang.) Freightlinks International (I) Pvt Ltd vs. CCEC& ST, Cochin
Facts:
The appellant was a steamer agent for a shipping company and also used to book space in the ships belonging to other companies and was collecting ocean freight from customers on behalf of the principal as well as from other shipping companies. The department took the view that service tax should have been paid on the ocean freight and confirmed the demand of service tax. The appellant argued that the lower authorities did not consider their submissions on judicial pronouncement available on the same set of facts in the case of Gudwin Logistics vs. CCE – 2010 (18) STR 348 (Tri-Ahmed), also not offered any explanation on invocation of extended period of limitation and levied penalties without any reasoning.
Held:
The Tribunal observed that the appellant in its written submission and in personal hearing relied upon number of case laws which were not at all considered by the lower authorities in the Order-in-Original. In view of the absence of findings in relation to the applicability of services tax, invocation of extended period of limitation, imposition of penalties, the Tribunal remanded the case to pass a considered and well reasoned order.
2014 (33) STR 696 (Tri-Ahmd.) Essar Projects (India) Ltd. vs. Comm. C. Ex & ST, Rajkot
Facts:
The appellant entered into two contracts with its customer on 24-08-2007. One of the contracts was for supply of equipment and materials (supply contract) and the other one was for the construction/erection/ installation of the plant (construction contract). In addition, the customer also procured imported equipment and materials which were also supplied to the appellant. The department contended that as per Rule 3(1) of the Works Contract (the Composition Scheme for payment of Service Tax) Rules 2007 gross amount for the purpose of payment of Service Tax should include the value of the cost of free supplied material and accordingly service tax demand was issued on the value of free supplied material.
Held:
The Tribunal relying on the clarification issued by the CBEC Circular No. 150/1/2012-ST dated 08-02-2012 held that Rule 3(1) of the Works Contract Rules, 2007 was applicable to contracts entered after 07-07-2009 and not to ongoing contracts and accordingly held that service tax would not be applicable on the value of the free supplied material.
2014 (33) S.T.R. 514 (Tri-Mumbai) Talera Logistics Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Pune-III
Facts:
The appellant’s services to M/s. Ford India Ltd. were considered Clearing and Forwarding Agent’s Services by the department. However, according to the appellant, they were business support services. The spare parts of motor vehicles were kept in the godown of Ford who would manufacture motor vehicles. Further, the computers were provided to the appellant for their day-to-day operations and the appellant was not engaged in arranging transport for receiving or dispatching goods. Since the appellant was under the bonafide belief that their activities did not fall under the Clearing and Forwarding Agent’s Services, the appellant contested invocation of extended period of limitation. Demands were computed on the basis of bills raised and not on the basis of receipt. Since the appellant did not collect service tax, extension of cum duty benefit was pleaded for.
The department in terms of the agreement between the appellant and Ford, the appellant was engaged in receiving service parts, packing, etc., carry out inventory control, to maintain customer relations, to do distribution, handling shipping, documentation and outbound transportation etc. Thus, the activities were essentially in the nature of Clearing and Forwarding Services. Further, since there was no registration at Tamil Nadu and the appellant had centralised registration at Pune, the case was within the jurisdiction of the Pune Commissionerate. Since the appellant had not paid service tax and filed returns, the appellant had suppressed the facts with intention to evade service tax.
Held:
Considering the activities were to receive goods, warehouse the goods, receive and arrange dispatches, maintaining records for delivery etc. and the provisions of law, it was held that the services were Clearing and Forwarding services and not business support services. Further, the delayed registration, non-payment, non-filing of returns and disputing service tax liability at a later date post registration were the core reasons proving suppression of facts and wilful intention to evade tax. Therefore, the extended period of limitation and penalty was held justified. Since all payments were received though belatedly, the delay in receipt would not affect service tax liability except shifting of dates. Since the amounts collected were for various components of services, it could not be considered as inclusive of service tax and therefore even benefit of cum duty was not extended.
2014 (33) S.T.R. 522 (Tri.-Del.) DCM Engineering Products vs. Commissioner. Of C. Ex. & S. T., Chandigarh-II
Facts:
The appellant, a manufacturer of Iron Castings had a factory in a remote area. They provided vehicles to their senior officials to commute between residence and factory. The appellant availed CENVAT Credit of service tax paid on insurance of such vehicles. Taking a view that there is no nexus between such insurance services and manufacturing activity, the department denied CENVAT Credit on insurance services.
Held:
Tribunal observed that the vehicles were used for company’s work as well as for commutation of senior officials and it was not a welfare activity but was an activity related to business and therefore, CENVAT was held admissible.
[2014] 43 taxmann.com 34 (Gujarat) Central Excise vs. Inductotherm India (P.) Ltd.
Facts:
The assessee, manufacturer – exporter claimed CENVAT credit in respect of cargo handling services. The department denied the credit on the ground that, in absence of express mention of such service in the definition Clause in Rule 2(l) of CCR, the same cannot be termed as “input service”. Both the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal held in favour of the assessee. Before the High Court, Revenue contended that cargo handling service cannot be treated as input service since the place of removal cannot be said to be the port of shipment. The question before the High Court was that, whether the input credit of Service Tax paid by the assessee-respondent on the cargo handling service would be admissible and whether the same would fall under the purview of the definition of “input service.”
Held:
The Hon’ble High Court observed that the cargo handling service is rendered on clearance of the final product from the port for the purpose of export. In light of the various decisions rendered in this area, the High Court adopted such interpretation to hold that in case of export of the final product, place of removal would be the port of shipment and not factory gate and therefore, the manufacturer would be entitled to avail the amount claimed towards cargo handling as ‘input service’ under the CENVAT Credit Rules. Considering the expression used in the ‘means’ part of the definition of “input service” in Rule 2(l) of CCR, i.e., it includes services used by the manufacturer directly or indirectly in or in relation to manufacture of the final product and in relation to the clearance of the final product from the place of removal, High Court held that, the definition is very wide in its expression, since number of services used by manufacturer are included in the same, whether used directly or indirectly.
[2014] 43 taxmann.com 257 (Madras) CCE vs. Rajshree Sugars & Chemicals Ltd.
Facts:
The assessee, a manufacturer in sugar was running two units viz. the sugar unit and the distillery unit situated in the same premises adjacent to each other. The assessee had obtained separate registration certificates in respect of both the units, although both units are under one management. The by-products arising on the manufacture of sugar in the sugar unit, namely, molasses was again used by the assessee in the manufacture of Ethyl Alcohol in the distillery unit. The assessee cleared molasses on payment of duty and availed credit of the same for the distillery unit for payment of duty on the dutiable Ethyl Alcohol. Over a period of time, there was huge accumulation of credit in the distillery unit and the same remained unutilised. Thereafter, the assessee requested the department to grant a single registration in respect of both the units and on getting the same, it sought to utilise the unutilised credit in respect of the distillery unit against the duty payable on the manufactured sugar.
The department denied credit on the ground that, there is no provision for transfer of unutilised CENVAT Credit of one registered unit to another registered unit. It further denied the CENVAT benefit on the grounds that credit of duty paid against molasses cannot be utilised for payment of duty paid against sugar since sugar was not manufactured in the distillery unit.
Held:
The High Court observed that, (i) the sugar unit and the distillery unit belonged to the self-same management and they are in the same premises. (ii) the resultant molasses from the manufacture of sugar on which duty was paid and credit was claimed was used by the assessee in the manufacture of denatured Ethyl Alcohol which is a dutiable product. (iii) although in respect of two activities, it had maintained two accounts, yet, it related to the business of the same assessee in respect of two activities, which are interconnected too. In the circumstances the High Court held that, the mere taking of a single registration as against the two registrations, would not imply that there was a merger or amalgamation or transfer to hold that the assessee would not be entitled to any credit adjustment on the duty payable on the sugar manufactured. Both before and after the so called transfer, the same management continued to be in charge of both the units and hence the alleged credit is available. The High court further observed that the credit of duty allowed in respect of any input be utilised towards the payment of duty on any other final product, is available irrespective of whether such inputs have been used actually in the manufacture of such a final product. The only condition is that the inputs should have been received and used in the factory. Hence, the revenues appeal was dismissed.
[2014] 43 taxmann.com 363 (Madras) CST vs. Sangamitra Services Agency
Facts:
The issue before the High Court was, whether various charges towards freight, labour, electricity, telephone etc, which were reimbursed by the principal to the C & F Agent on the basis of actuals, were required to be added to the value of the taxable service in relation to the clearing and forwarding services provided by a C&F agent of the Principal.
On behalf of the respondent, nobody represented the matter. The Revenue contended that, in terms of the provisions of Rule 6(8) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994, the value of taxable service in relation to the services provided by the Clearing and Forwarding Agent to the client for rendering services of the Clearing and Forwarding operations, in any manner, shall be deemed to be the gross amount of remuneration or commission (by whatever name called) paid to such agent by the client, engaging such agent and considering this, the charges collected towards freight, labour, electricity, telephone etc., in connection with the Clearing and Forwarding Services, would form part of the remuneration/commission.
Held
Rejecting the revenue’s contention, the Hon’ble High Court held that the gross amount referred to in Rule 6(8) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 would apply to receipts of such sum, which would bear the character of remuneration or commission in that. In the absence of any material to show the understanding between the Principal and the Client that the commission payable by the principal was all inclusive, it is difficult to hold that the gross amount of remuneration/commission would nevertheless include expenditure incurred by the assessee providing the services; that all incidental charges for running of the business would also form part of the remuneration or commission (by whatever name called). The phrase “by whatever name called” must necessarily have some link or reference with the nature of the receipt of remuneration or commission. Thus, if a receipt is for reimbursing the expenditure incurred for the purpose per se, would not justify that the same had the character of the remuneration or commission.
2014 (33) STR 621 (Guj) Comm. Of C. Ex & Cust. Ahmedabad-III vs. Fine Care Biosystems
Facts:
The department preferred an appeal against an Order of CESTAT dated 14-07-2007 rejecting appeal filed by the department. The issue involved was the demand of refund of Rs. 89,476/- sanctioned by the Tribunal under Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.
The department filed this appeal challenging the order passed by the CESTAT and on 25-02-2010 by way of an order the High Court formulated questions on the issue. The CBEC on 20-10-2010 issued Circular/ Instruction F. No. 390/Misc./163/2010-JC providing for monetary limits in respect of filing of appeals by the department in the Tribunal, High Court and Supreme Court. The said instruction had prescribed monetary limit of Rs. 10 lakh of tax and penalty in case appeal to be preferred by the department to the High Court. The respondent argued that, though the said Instruction was issued after the formulation of questions by the High Court in the present case, the department could not violate the CBEC instructions and since the present case is below prescribed monetary limits, department’s appeal should be dismissed.
Held:
The High Court held that the department was not authorised to prefer an appeal where the same is the below prescribed monetary limit. Though questions were framed in an earlier hearing, the High Court refrained from considering the merits of the case and dismissed the appeal as it was in violation to CBEC instructions.
2014 (33) STR 619 (Uttarakhand) Commissioner of Central Excise, Meerut –I vs. Usha Breco Ltd.
Facts:
The appellant was operating two ropeways at Haridwar at two different places. The appellant was charging fees from pilgrims for the use of the said ropeways. The distance between these two ropeways was about 3.75 kms. For those interested in using the ropeways at both places, the appellant provided transportation from one ropeway to the other by road against consideration of separate fees. The department demanded Service Tax on these fees charges for transporting pilgrims from one place of ropeway to another under “Tour Operator Service.” The appellant contended that the said service was not exigible to tax under ‘Tour Operator service’ and the appellant was not a tour operator. The Tribunal held that the appellant could not be regarded as tour operator as the transportation was not a main business of the appellant.
Held:
Since there was no change in the facts and these were considered by the Tribunal, the High Court declined to interfere and dismissed the appeal filed by the department.
2014 (33) STR 609 (All) A C L Education Centre (P) Ltd vs. UOI
Facts:
The Excise Department had issued intimations on various dates under Rule 5A(2) of STR 1994 calling for certain documents for conducting the EA-2000 audit. The appellant challenged the said intimations on the vires/legality of the said intimations under the ground that the same were contrary to the provisions of section 72 of the Finance Act. The appellant further argued that, the said Rule was arbitrary and it did not provide for details like the period of audit, the qualification and manner in which the said audit will be conducted, no provisions to furnish audit report to the assessee etc. The appellant also brought to the notice of the High Court that, in an identical case, the Delhi High Court in the case of Travelite India vs. UOI WP 3774 of 2013 had passed an interim order to maintain status quo.
Held:
The High Court observed that, section 72A of the Act is applicable when the assessee is not maintaining the books of accounts properly to ascertain the Service Tax liability and to determine the correct tax, the books will have to be examined and if need be, be audited by a qualified Chartered Accountant. Rule 5A only facilitates the provisions of section 72A, as Rule 5A( 2) states that every assessee shall on demand make available records, trial balance, income tax audit report to the audit party and audit will be conducted by the qualified Chartered Accountant/Cost Accountant as deputed by the Deputy Commissioner.
In view of this, it was held that, Rule 5A of STR 1994 is not ultra vires and it is in consonance to section 72A of the Finance Act and accordingly the High Court dismissed the Writ Petitions.
2014 (33) STR 501 (Guj.) Commissioner of C. Ex. & Customs vs. Ultratech Cement Ltd.
Facts:
The respondents, cement manufacturers availed the CENVAT Credit of Service Tax paid on insurance services for the residential colony and of the vehicles specially used for travelling of workers from their colony to the factory. Placing reliance on the decision of the Delhi Tribunal in the case of M/s. Triveni Engg & Industrial Ltd. vs. CCC, Meerut, 2008 (12) S.T.R. 330, the Tribunal had upheld the assessee’s contention that the phrase “activities in relation to business” used in the inclusive part of the definition of input services was wide enough to cover such services.
Held:
The Hon’ble High Court observed the case of Commissioner vs. Gujarat Heavy Chemicals Ltd. 2011 (22) S.T.R. 610 (Guj), wherein the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court had analysed various decisions and had held that if providing residential quarters and security services was voluntary, the activities were not covered within the definition of input services and therefore, the CENVAT Credit was not available. Relying on this, the CENVAT was not allowed as not in relation to business.
Stainless Steel vis-à-vis Rate of Tax Under MVAT Act, 2002
The Commissions of Sales Tax, Maharashtra, has recently issued a Circular bearing No. 11T of 2014 dated 04-04-2014, by which it is informed that the sale of stainless steel wires will be liable to tax as non-declared goods i.e., at 12.5% in residual category, due to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Bansal Wire Industries Ltd. (42 VST 372). The declared goods are covered by entry C-55 of the MVAT Act, 2002. If the goods are so covered, the tax is 5%. However, if they get excluded from above entry, the rate becomes 12.5%. Therefore, it is necessary to see the implication of above judgment and circular.
Background
The facts in this case are that the issue arose under the UP Trade Tax Act, 1948. Originally, the dealer was assessed to tax at 4% on the sale of stainless steel wires on the grounds that it is declared goods. However, the said assessment was revised, so as to levy tax on the sale of stainless steel wires at a higher rate, considering that it is not sale of declared goods.
The Hon’ble Allahabad High Court confirmed the view of the department. Therefore, the issue was raised before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
The question which was referred to the Hon’ble Supreme Court is reproduced in the judgment as under:
“Whether stainless steel wire, a product of the appellant, on a proper reading of section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act along with the qualifying words ’that is to say’ would fall under the category ’tool, alloy and special steels of any of the above categories’ enumerated in entry (ix) of Clause (iv) or under entry (xv) of same Clause (iv)?”
Consideration by Supreme Court
Hon’ble Supreme Court has analysed the position about declared goods. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has reproduced section 14(iv) of the CST Act, 1956 which enumerates declared goods. The said section is reproduced below for ready reference.
“14. Certain goods to be of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce.—It is hereby declared that the following goods are of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce,—
. . .
(iv) iron and steel, that is to say,—
(i) pig iron and cast iron including ingot moulds, bottom, plates, iron scrap, cast iron scrap, runner scrap and iron skull scrap;
(ii) steel semis (ingots, slabs, blooms and billets of all qualities, shapes and sizes);
(iii) skull bars, tin bars, sheet bars, hoe-bars and sleeper bars;
(iv) steel bars (rounds, rods, squares, flats, octagons and hexagons, plain and ribbed or twisted, in coil form as well as straight lengths);
(v) Steel structurals (angels, joists, channels, tees, sheet piling sections, Z sections or any other rolled sections);
(vi) sheets, hoops, stripe and skelp, both black and galvanised, hot and cold rolled, plain and corrugated, in all qualities, in straight lengths and in coil form, as rolled and in riveted condition;
(vii) plates both plain and chequered in all qualities; (viii) discs, rings, forgings, and steel castings;
(ix) tool, alloy and special steels of any of the above categories;
(x) steel melting scrap in all forms including steel skull, turnings and borings;
(xi) steel tubes, both welded and seamless, of all diameters and lengths, including tube fittings;
(xii) tin-plates, both hot dipped and electrolytic and tin-free plates;
(xiii) fish plates bars, bearing plate bars, crossing sleeper bars, fish plates, bearing plates, crossing sleepers and pressed steel sleepers, rails-heavy and light crane rails;
(xiv) wheels, tyres, axles and wheel sets;
(xv) wire rods and wires-rolled, drawn, galvanised, aluminised, tinned or coated such as by copper;
(xvi) defectives, rejects, cuttings or end pieces of any of the above categories.”
The Hon’ble Supreme Court has discussed the back ground of the above entry. The Supreme Court held that each sub-group in above section 14(iv) exhaustively enumerates the kinds of goods covered by each sub-group. In this respect, the Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to its earlier judgment viz; State of Tamil Nadu vs. M/s. Pyare Lal Mehrotra (1976)(1 SCC 834).
The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the stainless steel can be covered by sub-entry (ix) and therefore the items covered by (i) to (viii), if of stainless steel, they can be covered. However, the wires are mentioned in sub-entry (xv) and said entry is separate. The sub-entry (ix) being not applicable to entry (xv), the stainless steel wires cannot be covered by any of the entries in section 14(iv). The reasoning of the the Hon’ble Supreme Court is contained in para-28 of the judgment and further elaborated in para-33. Both paras are reproduced below for ready reference.
“28. The expression “of any of the above categories” appearing in entry Nos.
(ix) and (xvi) of Clause (iv) of section 14 of the Central Act would indicate that they would each be items referred in the preceding items. Therefore, even the expression “of any of the above categories” in entry No. (ix) of Clause (iv) would only relate to steel and alloy produced for any of the materials mentioned in item Nos. (i) to (viii). Thus, “stainless steel wire” produced by the appellant cannot be read into item No. (xv) which reads as “wire rods and wires-rolled, drawn, galvanised, aluminised, tinned or coated such as by copper”.
33. It is thus clear, that the language used in entry No. (ix) is plain and unambiguous and that the items which are mentioned there are “tool, alloy and special steels”. By using the words “of any of the above categories” in entry No. (ix) would refer to entries (i) to (viii) and it cannot and does not refer to entry No. (xv). However, entry (xvi) of Clause (iv) would be included in entry (xvi) particularly within the expression now therein any of the aforesaid categories. Therefore, the specific entry “tool, alloy and special steels” being not applicable to entry (xv), the contention of the counsel for the appellant has to be rejected. It is, therefore, held that the stainless steel wire is not covered within entry (ix) of Clause (iv) of section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act.”
Conclusion
The above referred circular has taken into account above mentioned observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Accordingly, it is clarified that the items made from stainless steel mentioned in subentries (x) to (xv) will not be covered u/s. 14(iv) of CST Act, 1956 i.e., they will not be considered as ‘declared goods’ and will also not be covered by entry-C-55 of the MVAT Act, 2002.Thus, the same are liable to tax at 12.5%. Some of the items affected by the above interpretation are melting scrap, skull, turnings, borings, specified tubes and tube fittings etc., if they are of the stainless steel. The stainless steel pipes will also get excluded from entry C-55 but they will be eligible to be covered by entry C-72 which is regarding pipes of all varieties. Therefore, for stainless steel pipes, the rate will still remain 5%. However, for stainless steel tubes, the rate will be 12.5%.
The judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court is binding. However, an issue still remains about interpretation of the scope of the main heading of section 14(iv) i.e., ‘iron & steel’, whether it covers stainless steel itself? Steel is not qualified by any particular quality. Therefore, it can be argued that the above heading itself covers stainless steel also. This issue is not considered in the above judgment. Therefore, the dealer community will be required to wait till some more light is thrown on the above aspect from none other than the Supreme Court itself in some future judgment. Till then, the law will be guided by the above judgment of the Supreme Court and the circular issued by the Commissioner of Sales Tax of Maharashtra State.
In the circular the position as per the above judg- ment in the case of M/s. Bansal Wire Industries Ltd. (42 VST 372) is sought to be applied from the date of judgment i.e., 26-04-2011. Therefore, dealers will be liable to pay a higher rate from the said date, which may attract an unforeseen liability for the past period from 26-04-2011. In fact, the impact of the above judgment may be from the inception of the section 14(iv) and hence revised rate can apply even prior to 26-04- 2011. However, it is stated in the circular that the matter is referred to government for period prior to 26-04-2011. It is common experience that the dealers have collected tax at 4% and 5% in respective periods, considering the impugned goods as ‘declared goods’. They are also assessed accordingly. Therefore, it is genuinely felt that in spite of the above judgment, the government should give necessary relief by administrative measures or by introducing changes in the entries and should apply the law prospectively i.e., from the current date after giving sufficient time to the dealer com- munity to adjust to new tax rate. In fact, by looking at the importance of goods, the rate should be continued at 5% by introducing new entries as they are getting out of the entry C-55 only because of technical interpretation of the entry. We expect that the government will consider the above situation and grant necessary relief.
Controversy: Interest on Cenvat Credit Wrongly Taken and (or) Utilised
The issue whether interest is leviable at the point of time when the CENVAT Credit is wrongly taken or at the point of utilisation has been a matter of extensive judicial considerations. Further, an important amendment was made in Rule 14 of the CENVAT Rules through Notification dated 17-03-2012. This subject was discussed in the June 2012 issue of the BCAJ in the backdrop of an important ruling of the Karnataka High Court. However, subsequent to the said ruling, divergent views have been expressed by different judicial authorities (in particular recent ruling of CESTAT – Mumbai). Hence, since the issue has become highly controversial, the same is being discussed hereafter in the backdrop of divergent judicial rulings.
Relevant Statutory Provisions
• Rule 14 of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (“CCR”)
” Where the CENVAT Credit has been taken or utilised wrongly or has been erroneously refunded, the same along with the interest shall be recovered from the manufacturer or provider of the output service and the provisions of the sections 11A and 11AB of the Excise Act, or sections 73 and 75 of the Finance Act, shall apply mutatis mutandis for effecting such recoveries.”
[Note – The words “taken or utilised wrongly” have been substituted by the words “taken and utilised wrongly vide Notification No. 18/2012 – CE(NT) dated 17-03-12]
• Rule 4(1) of CCR
“The CENVAT credit in respect of inputs may be taken immediately on receipt of the inputs in factory of the manufacturer or premises of provider of output service………..”
• Rule 4(2) (a) of CCR
“The CENVAT Credit in respect of capital goods …….. at any point of time in a given financial year shall be taken only for an amount not exceeding 50 % of duty paid on such capital goods in the same financial year.“
• Rule 4(7) of CCR
“The CENVAT Credit in respect of input service shall be allowed, on or after the day on which payment is made of the value of input service and service tax paid or payable as indicated in Invoice…………”
Analysis of Credit ‘wrongly’ ‘taken’ / ‘utilised’
To understand the difference (if any) between the terms ‘wrongly’ ‘taken’ and ‘utilised’, the meanings attributed to these words used in Rule 14 of CCR is given hereafter for ready reference :
• ‘Taken’ means “to gain or receive into possession, to seize, to assume ownership” (Black’s Law Dictionary).
• ‘To take’, signifies “to lay hold of, grab, or seize it, to assume ownership etc.” (Advance Law Lexicon – 3rd Edition).
• ‘Utilise’ means “to make practical and effective use of” (Compact Oxford Dictionary Thesaurus).
• ‘Utilise’ means “to make use of, turn to use” (The Chambers Dictionary).
• ‘Wrongful’ – “characterised by unfairness of injustice, contrary to law” (Concise Oxford Dictionary)
• ‘Wrong’ – “any damage or injury, contrary to right, violation of right or of law” (P. Ramanatha Aiyer’s Law Lexicon)
Reversal of CENVAT Credit before Utilization – Settled Position
• In a landmark ruling in Chandrapur Magnet Wires (P) Ltd. vs. CCE (1996) 81 ELT 3 (SC), it has been held by the Supreme Court that, when the MODVAT Credit taken is reversed, it would mean that the MODVAT Credit has not been taken at all. This principle is relevant for the CENVAT Credit as well. Relevant observations of the Supreme Court are reproduced hereafter :
Para 7
In view of the aforesaid clarification by the department, we see no reason why the assessee cannot make a debit entry in the credit account before removal of the exempted final product. If this debit entry is permissible to be made, credit entry for the duties paid on the inputs utilised in manufacture of the final exempted product will stand deleted in the accounts of the assessee. In such a situation, it cannot be said that the assessee has taken credit for the duty paid on the inputs utilised in the manufacture of the final exempted product under Rule 57A. In other words, the claim for exemption of duty on the disputed goods cannot be denied on the plea that the assessee has taken credit of the duty paid on the inputs used in the manufacture of these goods.
The above stated principle laid down by the Supreme Court has been followed in a large number of cases. [For e.g. CCE vs. Ashima Dyecot Ltd. (2008) 232 ELT 580 (GUJ)].
Similarly, the said principle was also asserted by the Hon. Supreme Court in CCE, Mumbai vs. Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd. 2007 (215) ELT 3 (SC) wherein it was held “whenever duty is paid on the input, the assessee is entitled to credit under CENVAT Credit Rules, 2002 however availment of credit takes place later on when the assessee makes adjustments of duty paid on input against duty paid on final product. In the present case, before the account could be debited and before the assessee could avail CENVAT Credit, assessee has reversed CENVAT Credit which would amount to the assessee not taking credit for duty paid on input. Learned counsel submitted that the assessee was free to reverse the credit before utilization of such credit.” This decision was also accepted by the Gujarat High Court in CCE vs. Dynaflex Ltd. 2011 (266) ELT 41 (Guj).
Department clarification
The CBEC had vide Circular No. 897/17/2009 – CX, dated 03-09-2009 has clarified as under:
“The Tribunal decision and the High Court judgment referred to above, was delivered in the context of erstwhile Rule 57 I of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 and that the Supreme Court order under reference is only a decision and not a judgment. Since, the Rule 14 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, is clear and unambiguous in the position that interest would be recoverable when CENVAT Credit is taken or utilised wrongly, it is clarified that the interest shall be recoverable when credit has been wrongly taken, even, if it has not been utilised, in terms of wordings of the present Rule 14.”
It may be noted that erstwhile Rule 57 I of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 did not specifically provide for any interest payment along with reversal of wrongly taken credit while present Rule 14 of CCR provides for payment of interest along with the reversal of wrongly taken credit.
Interest on Credit taken but not utilized – Judicial Views
• In CCE vs. Maruti Udyog Ltd. (2007) 214 ELT 173 (P & H)], the Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana Court agreed with the views of the Hon’ble CESTAT that the assessee was not liable to pay interest as the credit was only taken as entry in the MODVAT record and was in fact not utilised. The SLP filed by the revenue against this order of the Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court was dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court (2007) 214 ELT A 50 (SC) on 10-10-2006.
In the case of Maruti Udyog, the assessee claimed the Modvat credit which was not allowable in the absence of the requisite certificate under Rule 57E of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 being produced within six months but still the assessee claimed the same and credited the amount in RG – 23A Part II. The authorities disallowed the Modvat credit relying upon judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Osram Surya (P) Limited vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Indore (2002) 142 ELT 5 (SC).
The Tribunal, however, had held that the assessee was not liable to pay interest as the credit was only taken as an entry in the Modvat record and was not in fact utilised. The Tribunal held that in absence of utilisation of credit, the assessee was not liable to pay interest.
The P & H High Court held as under :
“Learned Counsel for the appellant is unable to show as to how the interest will be required to be paid when in absence of availment of Modvat Credit in fact, the assessee was not liable to pay any duty. The Tribunal has clearly recorded a finding that the assessee did not avail of the Modvat Credit in fact and had only made an entry.
In view of this factual position, we are unable to hold that any substantial question of law arises”.
• Attention is particularly drawn to the ruling of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Ind – Swift Laboratories Ltd. vs. UOI (2009) 240 ELT 328 (P & H), relevant extracts from which, are reproduced hereafter for reference:
Para 9
• The Scheme of the Act and the CENVAT Credit Rules framed thereunder permit a manufacturer or producer of the final products or a provider of taxable service to take the CENVAT Credit in respect of duty of excise and such other duties as specified. The conditions for allowing the CENVAT Credit are contained in Rule 4 of the Credit Rules contemplating that the CENVAT Credit can be taken immediately on receipt of the inputs in the factory of the manufacturer or in the premises of the provider of output service. Such CENVAT Credit can be utilised in terms of Rule 3(4) of Credit Rules for payment of any duty of excise on any final product and as contemplated in the aforesaid sub-rule. It, thus, transpires that the CENVAT credit is the benefit of duties leviable or paid as specified in Rule 3(1) used in the manufacture of intermedi- ate products etc. In other words, it is a credit of the duties already leviable or paid. Such credit in respect of duties already paid can be adjusted for payment of duties payable under the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. U/s. 11AB of the Act, liability to pay interest arises in respect of any duty of excise has not been levied or paid or has been short levied or short paid or erroneously refunded from the first day of the month in which the duty ought to have been paid. Interest is leviable if duty of excise has not been levied or paid. Interest can be claimed or levied for the reason that there is delay in the payment of duties. The interest is compensatory in nature as the penalty is charge- able separately.
Para 10
• In Pratibha Processors vs. Union of India, 1996
(88) ELT 12 (SC) = (1996) 11 SCC 101, it was held that interest is compensatory in character and is imposed on an assessee who has withheld payment of any tax as and when it is due and payable. Similarly, in Commissioner of Customs vs. Jayathi Krishna & Co. – 2000 (119) ELT 4(SC) (2000) 9 SCC 402, it was held that interest on warehoused goods is merely an accessory to the principal and if the principal is not payable, so is it for interest on it. In view of the aforesaid principle, we are of the opinion that no liability of payment of any excise duty arises when the petitioner availed the CENVAT Credit. The liability to pay duty arises only at the time of utilisation. Even if the CENVAT Credit has been wrongly taken, that does not lead to the levy of interest as a liability of payment of excise duty does not arise with such availment of the CENVAT Credit by an assessee. Therefore, interest is not payable on the amount of the CENVAT credit availed of and not utilised.
Para 11
• Reliance of respondents on Rule 14 of the Credit Rules that interest u/s. 11AB of the Act is payable even if the CENVAT Credit has been taken. In our view, the said Clause has to be read down to mean that where the CENVAT Credit taken and utilised wrongly. Interest cannot be claimed simply for the reason that the CENVAT credit has been wrongly taken as such availment by itself does not create any liability of payment of excise duty. On a conjoint reading of section 11AB of the Act and that of Rules 3 and 4 of the Credit Rules, we hold that interest cannot be claimed from the date of wrong availment of the CENVAT Credit. The interest shall be pay- able from the date the CENVAT Credit is wrongly utilised.
• In an important ruling the Supreme Court, in the case of Ind-Swift Laboratories Ltd. (2011) 265 ELT 3 (S.C.)], set aside the order passed by the Punjab & Haryana High Court (2009) 240 ELT 328 (P & H)] on the question of charging interest on the CENVAT Credit wrongly taken, but not utilised. By interpreting the expressions and words used in the provisions of Rule 14 of CCR, the Supreme Court concluded that interest is payable on the CENVAT Credit wrongly taken even if such Credit has not been utilised.
The issue for consideration is whether an assessee can be made liable to pay interest for taking wrong credit if such credit has not been utilised inasmuch he has not derived any benefit out of his wrong action.
The more important observations of the Supreme Court are reproduced hereafter for ready reference:
“17. Xxxxxxxxxx In our considered opinion, the High Court misread and misinterprets the aforesaid Rule 14 and wrongly read it down without properly appreciating the scope and limitation thereof. A statutory provision is generally read down in order to save the said provision from being declared un- constitutional or illegal. Rule 14 specifically provides that where the CENVAT Credit has been taken or utilised would be recovered from the manufacturer or the provider of the output service. The issue is as to whether the aforesaid word “OR” appear- ing in Rule 14, twice, could be read as “AND” by way of reading it down as has been done by the High Court. If the aforesaid provision is read as a whole we find no reason to read the word “OR” in between the expression ‘taken’ or ‘utilised wrongly’ or has been erroneously refunded’ as the word “AND”. On the happening of any of the three aforesaid circumstances such credit becomes recoverable along with interest.
18. We do not feel that any other harmonious con- struction is required to be given to the aforesaid expression/provision which is clear and unambigu- ous as it exists all by itself. So far as section 11AB is concerned, the same becomes relevant and ap- plicable for the purpose of making recovery of the amount due and payable. Therefore, the High Court erroneously held that interest cannot be claimed from the date of wrong availment of the CENVAT Credit and that it should only be payable from the date when the CENVAT Credit is wrongly utilised. Besides, the rule of reading down is in itself a Rule of harmonious construction in a different name. It is generally utilised to straighten the crudities or ironing out the creases to make a statue workable. This court has repeatedly laid down that in the garb of reading down a provision it is not open to read words and expressions not found in the provision statute and thus venture into a kind of judicial legislation. It is also held by this Court that the Rule of reading down is to be used for the limited purpose of making a particular provision workable and to bring it in harmony with other provisions of the statute.
The interpretation made by the Honorable Supreme Court considering the specific circumstances of a case involving evasion of duty, has been a matter of extensive deliberation by the experts and rightly so inasmuch as, if the same is applied generally, it would mean unsettling the settled law.
• Important judgment of Karnataka High Court in CCE & ST vs. Bill Forge Pvt. Ltd. (2012) 26 STR 204 (KAR) [Bill Forge Case]
? However, observations of the Karnataka High Court in the Bill Forge case are very impor- tant, inasmuch not only has it distinguished facts of the case of UOI vs. Ind-Swift Labo- ratories Ltd. (2011) 265 ELT 3 (SC) but it has made a fine distinction between making an entry in the register and credit being ‘taken’ to drive home the point that interest is pay- able only from the date when duty is legally payable to the Government and the Govern- ment would sustain loss to that extent.
? In the Bill Forge case, the High Court referring to the Apex Court’s judgment in case of UOI vs. Ind-Swift Laboratories Ltd. observed as under:
Para 18
“In fact, in the case before the Apex Court, the assessee received inputs and capital goods from various manufacturers/dealers and availed the CENVAT Credit on the duty paid on such materi- als. The investigations conducted indicated that the assessee had taken the CENVAT Credit on fake invoices. When proceedings were initiated, the assessee filed applications for settlement of proceedings and the entire matter was placed before the Settlement Commission. The Settlement Commission held that a sum of Rs. 5,71,47,148.00 is the duty payable and simple interest at 10% on the CENVAT Credit wrongly availed from the date the duty became payable as per section 11AB of the Act till the date of payment. The Revenue calculated the said interest upto the date of the appropriation of the deposited amount and not upto the date of payment. Therefore, it was contended that inter- est has to be calculated from the date of actual utilisation and not from the date of availment. Therefore, an application was filed for clarification by the assessee. The said application was rejected upholding the earlier order, i.e. interest is payable from the date of duty becoming payable as per section 11AB. Therefore, the Apex Court interfered with the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court and rightly rejected by the Settlement Com- mission as outside the scope and they found fault with the interpretation placed on Rule 14.”
“It is also to be noticed that in the aforesaid Rule, the word ‘avail’ is not used. The words used are ‘taken’ or “utilised wrongly”. Further the said provision makes it clear that the interest shall be recovered in terms of section 11A and 11B of the Act………”
Para 20
From the aforesaid discussion what emerges is that the credit of excise duty in the register maintained for the said purpose is only a book entry. It might be utilised later for payment of excise duty on the excisable product……… Before utilisation of such credit, the entry has been reversed, it amounts to not taking credit.”
para 22
“Therefore interest is payable from that date though in fact by such entry the Revenue is not put to any loss at all. When once the wrong entry was pointed out, being convinced, the assessee has promptly reversed the entry. In other words, he did not take the advantage of wrong entry. He did not take the CENVAT Credit or utilised the CENVAT credit. It is in those circumstances that the Tribunal was justified in holding that, when the assessee has not taken the benefit of the CENVAT Credit, there is no liability to pay interest. Before it can be taken, it had been reversed. In other words, once the entry was reversed, it is as if that the CENVAT credit was not available. Therefore, the said judgment of the Apex Court* has no application to the facts of this case It is only when the assessee had taken the credit, in other words by taking such credit, if he had not paid the duty which is legally due to the Government, the Government would have sustained loss to that extent. Then the liability to pay interest from the date the amount became due arises u/s. 11AB, in order to compensate the Government which was deprived of the duty on the date it became due.”
• The ruling of Karnataka High Court in Bill Forge case, has been followed in large number of subsequent decided cases For e.g.:
? CCE vs. Pearl Insulation Ltd. (2012) 27 STR 337 (KAR)
? CCE vs. Gokuldas Images (P) Ltd. (2012) 28 STR 214 (KAR)
? Sharvathy Conductors Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE (2013) 31 STR 47 (Tri – Bang)
? CCE vs. Sharda Enargy & Minerals Ltd. (2013) 291 ELT 404 (Tri – Del)
? Gary Pharmaceuticals (P) Ltd vs. CCE (2013) 297 ELT 391 (Tri – Del)
? CCE vs. Balrampur Chinni Mills Ltd. (2014) 300 ELT 449 (Tri – Del)
However, in many cases, [For e.g., CCE vs. Kay Bouvei Engineering Pvt. Ltd. (2014) 301 ELT 100 (Tri – Mum- bai)], the Bill Forge case has not been followed and instead, the position held by the Supreme Court in Ind Swift case followed.
Important amendment in Rule 14 of CCR
In a very significant amendment in Rule 14 of CCR, with effect from 17-03-2012, the words CENVAT Credit has been “taken or utilised wrongly” has been substituted by the words “taken and utilised wrongly”.
This amendment strongly reinforces the interpreta- tion placed by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Maruti Udyog & Ind Swift Laboratories and Karnataka High Court in the Bill Forge case to the effect that, no interest can be recovered in cases where the CENVAT Credit has been wrongly taken but not utilised by an assessee.
Recent Tribunal Ruling in Balmer Lawrie & Co. Ltd vs. CCE (2014) 301 ELT 573 (Tri – Mumbai)
This ruling is very important inasmuch as, it not only distinguishes the Karnataka High Court ruling in the Bill Forge case, but it also discusses the applicability of the amendment in Rule 14 of CCR vide Notification dated 17-03-2012.
In this case, the appellant is a manufacturer of lubricating oil availing the Cenvat Credit on various inputs and capital goods as provided for under (CCR). They availed the Cenvat Credit amounting to Rs. 1,61,04,675/- of the CVD paid on imported base oil. The base oil so obtained on which credit was taken, was returned by the appellant to M/s. VCL and M/s. Ultraplus Lube Pvt. Ltd. and the ap- pellant paid excise duty equivalent to the credit taken on such base oil returned. The department was of the view that the taking of credit by the appellant was not permitted under law inasmuch as the goods were not intended for use in the manufacture of excisable goods and, therefore, credit was not admissible under CCR ab initio. Ac- cordingly, a show cause notice dated 02-06-2008 was issued to the appellant proposing to recover the credit taken along with interest thereon under the provisions of Rule 14 of the CCR read with Sec- tion 11A(1) and section 11AB of the Central Excise Act, 1944. It was also proposed to impose penalty on the appellant under Rule 15 of the said Rules read with section 11AC of the said Central Excise Act. The said notice was adjudicated and duty de- mand was confirmed by denying the Central Excise credit of Rs. 1,61,04,675/- and interest on the said credit wrongly taken was also confirmed. A penalty of equivalent amount was also imposed on the ap- pellant under Rule 15 of Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 read with section 11AC of the said Act. In addition, a fine of Rs. 1 crore was imposed on the goods i.e., base oil on the grounds that the same was liable to confiscation and hence, fine is imposable u/s. 34 of the Central Excise Act, 1944.
The Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that inasmuch as the appellant had reversed the credit taken at the time of clearance of the base oil to M/s. VCL and Ultraplus Lube Pvt. Ltd., the question of reversal of credit once again does not arise and, therefore, the demand is not sustainable. It was further pointed out that the appellant had reflected the taking of the Cenvat Credit on base oil received from VCL in their monthly ER-1 returns and, therefore, the department was aware of the fact of taking of Cenvat credit by the appellant and hence no suppression of facts on the part of the appellant could be alleged. It is also argued that the said credit was available in the books of accounts of the appellant during the entire period and the appellant had never utilised the credit. Therefore, the question of liability to pay any interest thereon would not arise at all. Reliance was placed on the decisions of the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in the case of CCE & S.T. vs. Bill Forge Pvt. Ltd. (2012) 26 STR 204 (KAR); CCE vs. Gokaldas Images (P) Ltd. (2012) 28 STR 214 (KAR); & CCE vs. Pearl Insulation Ltd. (2012) 27 STR 337 (KAR.) and the decisions of the Hon’ble High Court of Allahabad in the case of CC & Central Excise, Meerut vs. Rana Sugar Ltd. (2010) 253 ELT 366 (ALL). The Learned Counsel has further contended that Rule 14 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004, was amended vide a Notification No. 18/2012-C.E. (N.T.), dated 17-03-2012 WHEReby the phrase “Cenvat credit has been taken or utilised wrongly” was substituted by the words “Cenvat credit has been taken and utilized wrongly”. Since the words have been substituted, the substitution will have retrospective effect and, therefore, unless the appellant utilises the credit, the question of recovery of Cenvat credit or interest thereon would not arise. Reliance was placed on the decisions of Supreme Court in Indian Tobacco Association (2005) 187 ELT 162 (SC) and W.P.I.L. Ltd. vs. CCE (2005) 181 ELT 359 (SC) in support of this proposition.
The Honorable Tribunal held as under: Para 5.2
The next issue for consideration is whether the appellant is liable to pay any interest on the credit taken. During the period involved, Rule 14 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 provided for the recovery of interest on the Cenvat Credit taken or utilised wrongly under the provisions of the said Rule read with section 11AB of the Central Excise Act, 1944. The issue also came up for consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India vs. Ind – Swift Laboratories Ltd. (2011) 265 ELT 3 (SC) (2012) 25 STR 184 (SC). The question before the Honorable Apex Court was “when interest on irregular credit arises, is it from the date of availing of such credit or from the date of utilisation?” The Hon’ble Apex Court held that Rule 14 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 specifically provides for interest on the Cenvat Credit taken or utilised wrongly or erroneously refunded. Therefore, interest on irregu- lar credit arises from the date of taking of such credit. Accordingly it was held that if the Cenvat Credit taken is irregularly, though not utilised, the liability to pay interest would arise from the date of taking of the credit till the date of reversal of the credit. In view of the above decision by the Hon’ble Apex Court, the ratio of which is applicable to the present case, it becomes evident that the appellant is liable to discharge interest liability on the Cenvat Credit wrongly taken from the date of taking of the Cenvat credit till the date of reversal. The reliance placed by the appellant on the deci- sion of the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in the case of Bill Forge Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and the other decisions will not apply to the facts of the present case. In the case of Bill Forge Pvt. Ltd. (supra) the appellant therein took the credit and also reversed the credit within the same month, i.e., before any liability to pay any duty arose. It was in that con- text the Hon’ble High Court held that if a credit has been taken but reversed before any liability to pay duty arose then no interest liability would accrue. Those are not the facts obtaining in the present case. It is not the case of the appellant that between the date of taking the credit and the date of reversal when the base oil was cleared, liability to pay duty did not arise at all. In fact the clearance has been spread over several months and years. Therefore, the facts of the case before us are clearly distinguishable from the facts involved in Bill Forge Pvt. Ltd. cited (supra) and hence ratio of the said decision would not apply. Since Pearl Insulation Ltd. (supra) and Gokaldas Images (P) Ltd. (supra) also follow the ratio of the Bill Forge Pvt. Ltd they would also not apply to the facts of the present case. As regards the reliance placed in the case of Rana Sugar Ltd. (supra), it is true that the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court had held that if the reversal of credit has been done before its utilisa- tion, demand of interest would not arise. However, the said order was passed much before the decision in Ind-Swift Laboratories Ltd. (supra) by the Hon’ble Apex Court was pronounced. Therefore, the ratio of Ind-Swift Laboratories Ltd. would prevail over all the other decisions of various Courts.
Para 5
As regard the argument advanced by the appellant that since the expression “Cenvat Credit taken or utilised wrongly” had been substituted effective from 17-03-2012 WITH the words “Cenvat Credit taken and utilised wrongly”, the same would have retrospective effect and, therefore, inasmuch as the appellant has not utilised the credit there will not be any liability to interest, this argument is misplaced. Rule 14 of the the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 was amended by a Notification No. 18/2012-C.E. (N.T.), dated 17-O3-2012 and amendment effected in Rule 14 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 read follows:-
“In Rule 14 of the said Rules, with effect from the 17th day of March, 2012,-
a) For the words “taken or utilised wrongly”, the words “taken and utilised wrongly” shall be substituted;
This amendment rule makes it absolute clear that the amendment is with effect from 17-O3-2012 (in- advertently mentioned as 17-03-2004 in the ruling) and not before. In view of the express provisions in the Amendment Rules, the argument of the appellant that amendment being in the nature of substitution would have retrospective effect cannot be accepted. It is a trite law that every statutory provision is prospective only unless it is explicitly provided that it is retrospective in nature and the legislature provides for such retrospective operation. In the present case, no such retrospective view has been provided by the legislature in respect of Notification 18/2012 –C.E. (N.T.), dated 17-03-2012 and, therefore, the argument of the Counsel in this regard and the decisions relied upon in support of the same cannot be accepted.
It appears that, the factual position that appellants claimed credit to which they were not entitled at all, could have had a bearing on the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal.
Conclusion
The Honorable Supreme Court in the Ind – Swift case has unsettled the judicially settled principle under the MODVAT (relevant for CENVAT Credit) that no interest is payable in cases where MODVAT Credit is wrongly taken but not utilised. Possibly, the specific circumstances of the case involving evasion of duty, had a bearing on the conclusion arrived at by the Apex Court.
It would appear that, it was correctly observed by the Honorable Punjab & Haryana High Court in Ind – Swift case that, interest is compensatory in character and is imposed on nonpayment/delayed payable. No liability of payment of any excise duty arises when the CENVAT Credit is availed. The li- ability to pay duty arises only at the time of utilisa- tion. Even if the CENVAT Credit is wrongly taken, that does not lead to levy of interest as liability of payment of excise duty does not arise with such availment of the CENVAT Credit by an assessee. Availment and utilisation of credit cannot be placed at equal footing for the purpose of charging inter- est. Availment of credit is only a book entry and does not result in any gain for the tax payer. The use of the credit results into benefit and that is the time which is relevant for charging interest.
With due respect, the judgment of the Honorable Supreme Court in the Ind – Swift case which has generated extensive judicial controversy, needs a serious reconsideration more particularly to advance the cause of the CENVAT Credit Scheme which is essentially a beneficial piece of legislation. Pending judicial resolvement of the controversy, Government could consider a clarificatory amendment to the effect that the amendment in Rule 14 of CCR vide Notification No 18/ 2012 – CE (NT) dated 17-03-2012 would have retrospective operation.
A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 123 dated 16th April, 2014
Notification No. FEMA. 298 /2014-RB dated 13th March, 2014 c.f. G.S.R. No.190(E) dated 19th March, 2014
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Limited Liability Partnership (LLP)
This
circular permits Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Limited Liability
Partnerships (LLP) that are formed and registered under the Limited
Liability Partnership Act, 2008.
The details scheme, procedure and forms to be used for the same are annexed to this Circular.
Highlights
of the scheme – called Foreign Direct Investment (FDI-LLP) in Limited
Liability Partnerships (LLPs) formed and registered under the Limited
Liability Partnership Act, 2008 – are as under: –
1. Eligible Investors
A
person resident outside India or an entity incorporated outside India
shall be eligible investor for the purpose of FDI in LLP. However, the
following persons shall not be eligible to invest in LLP: –
(i) A citizen/entity of Pakistan and Bangladesh or
(ii) A SEBI registered Foreign Institutional Investor (FII) or
(iii) A SEBI registered Foreign Venture Capital Investor (FVCI) or
(iv) A SEBI registered Qualified Foreign Investor (QFI) or
(v)
A Foreign Portfolio Investor registered in accordance with Securities
and Exchange Board of India (Foreign Portfolio Investors) Regulations,
2014 (RFPI).
2. Eligibility of LLP for accepting foreign Investment
(i)
An LLP, existing or new, operating in sectors / activities where 100%
FDI is allowed under the automatic route of FDI Scheme is eligible to
receive FDI.
(ii) An LLP engaged in the following sectors / activities is not eligible to accept FDI: –
a)
Sectors eligible to accept 100% FDI under automatic route but are
subject to FDI-linked performance related conditions (for example
minimum capitalisation norms applicable to ‘Non-Banking Finance
Companies’ or ‘Development of Townships, Housing, Built-up
infrastructure and Construction-development projects’, etc.); or
b)
Sectors eligible to accept less than 100% FDI under automatic route; or
c) Sectors eligible to accept FDI under Government Approval route; or
d) Agricultural/plantation activity and print media; or
e)
Sectors not eligible to accept FDI i.e. any sector which is prohibited
under the extant FDI policy as well as sectors / activities prohibited
in terms of Regulation 4(b) to Notification No. FEMA 1 / 2000-RB dated
3rd May 2000.
3. Eligible investment
Contribution
to the capital of a LLP would be an eligible investment under the
Scheme. Note: Investment by way of ‘profit share’ will fall under the
category of reinvestment of earnings
4. Entry Route
Any
FDI in a LLP will require prior Government/ FIPB approval. Any form of
foreign investment in an LLP, direct or indirect (regardless of nature
of ‘ownership’ or ‘control’ of an Indian Company) will require
Government/FIPB approval.
5. Pricing
FDI in an
LLP either by way of capital contribution or by way of
acquisition/transfer of ‘profit shares’, will have to be more than or
equal to the fair price as worked out with any valuation norm which is
internationally accepted/adopted as per market practice (hereinafter
referred to as “fair price of capital contribution/profit share of an
LLP”) and a valuation certificate to that effect shall be issued by a
Chartered Accountant or by a practicing Cost Accountant or by an
approved valuer from the panel maintained by the Central Government.
In
case of transfer of capital contribution/profit share from a resident
to a non-resident, the transfer will have to be for a consideration
equal to or more than the fair price of capital contribution/profit
share of an LLP. Further, in case of transfer of capital
contribution/profit share from a non-resident to a resident, the
transfer will have to be for a consideration which is less than or equal
to the fair price of the capital contribution/profit share of an LLP.
6. Mode of payment for an eligible investor
Payment
by an eligible investor towards capital contribution/profit share of
LLP will be allowed only by way of cash consideration to be received: –
i) By way of inward remittance through normal banking channels; or
ii) By debit to NRE/FCNR(B) account of the person concerned.
7. Reporting
(i)
LLP must report to the Regional Office concerned of RBI, through its
bank, at the earliest but not later than 30 days from the date of
receipt of the amount of consideration:
(a) Details of the
receipt of the amount of consideration for capital contribution and
profit shares in Form FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT – LLP (I) together with a
copy/ies of the FIRC/s evidencing the receipt of the remittance
(b) KYC report on the non-resident investor
(c) Valuation certificate (as per paragraph 5 above) as regards pricing.
The Regional Office concerned, will allot a Unique Identification Number (UIN) for the amount reported.
(ii)
The bank in India, receiving the remittance must obtain a KYC report in
respect of the foreign investor from the overseas bank remitting the
amount.
(iii) Disinvestment/transfer of capital contribution or
profit share between a resident and a non-resident (or vice versa) must
be reported within 60 days from the date of receipt of funds in Form
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT – LLP (II).
8. Downstream investment
a)
An Indian company, having foreign investment (direct or indirect,
irrespective of percentage of such foreign investment), will be
permitted to make downstream investment in an LLP only if both, the
company as well as the LLP, are operating in sectors where 100% FDI is
allowed under the automatic route and there are no FDI-linked
performance related conditions. Onus will be on the LLP accepting
investment from the Indian Company registered under the provisions of
the Companies Act, as applicable, to ensure compliance with downstream
investment requirement as stated above.
b) An LLP with FDI under this scheme will not be eligible to make any downstream investments in any entity in India.
9. Other Conditions
(i)
In case, an LLP with FDI, has a body corporate as a designated partner
or nominates an individual to act as a designated partner in accordance
with the provisions of section 7 of the Limited Liability Partnership
Act, 2008, such a body corporate must be a company registered in India
under the provisions of the Companies Act, as applicable and not any
other body, such as an LLP or a Trust. For such LLP, the designated
partner “resident in India”, as defined under the ‘Explanation’ to
Section 7(1) of the Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008, will also
have to satisfy the definition of “person resident in India”, as
prescribed u/s. 2(v)(i) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999.
(ii)
The designated partners will be responsible for compliance with all the
above conditions and also liable for all penalties imposed on the LLP
for their contravention, if any.
(iii) Conversion of a company
with FDI, into an LLP, will be allowed only if the above stipulations
(except the stipulation as regards mode of payment) are met and with the
prior approval of FIPB / Government.
(iv) LLP cannot avail External Commercial Borrowings (ECB).
A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 122 dated 10th April, 2014
This circular states that the present all-in-cost ceiling for ECB, as mentioned below, will continue till 30th June, 2014: –
The all-in-cost ceiling will include arranger fee, upfront fee, management fee, handling / processing charges, out of pocket and legal expenses, if any.
Interpretation of Provisions of section 10(2A) in cases where income of the firm is exempt -Circular No. 8 dated 31st March 2014 [F.No. 173/99/2013-ITA]
CBDT has clarified that ‘total income’ of the firm for s/s. (2A) of section 10 of the Act, includes income which is exempt or deductible under various provisions of the Act. The income of a firm is to be taxed in the hands of the firm only and the same can under no circumstances be taxed in the hands of its partners. Accordingly, the entire profit credited to the partners’ accounts in the firm would be exempt from tax in the hands of such partners, even if the income chargeable to tax becomes NIL in the hands of the firm on account of any exemption or deduction as per the provisions of the Act.
Certification of e-forms under the Companies Act, 1956 by the practising professionals.
http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/Circular_14-2011 _12apr2011.pdf
Provisions regarding Stamp Duty.
Director’s Relatives (Office or Place of Profit) Amendment Rules, 2011.
The notification has also amended Rule 7 of Director’s Relative (Office or Place of Profit) Rules, 2011 and redefined the constitution of Selection Committee for the purpose of appointment of a director to the office or place of profit. Under the amended Rule the Selection Committee shall comprise of:
(1) For listed public companies — independent directors shall constitute the majority and committee ought to have an expert in the respective field from outside the company.
(2) For unlisted public companies — independent directors are not necessary but an expert from outside the company should be part of the committee.
(3) For private limited companies — independent directors and outside experts are not required to be part of the committee.
Thus, even a private company is required to constitute a Selection Committee for appointment of director to an office or place of profit.
For complete text of the Notification visit:
http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/notification/pdf/ Notification2_31mar2011.pdf
Amendment to Companies (Particulars of Employees) Rules, 1975 — Increase in the limits.
For complete text of the Notification visit
http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/notification/pdf/ Notification_31mar2011.pdf
Exposure Draft on XBRL taxonomy for Commercial and Industrial (C&I) entities.
h t t p : / / w w w . m c a . g o v . i n / M i n i s t r y / p d f / MCA_C&I_15apr2011.zip
XBRL filing of balance sheet and profit and loss account
(i) All companies listed in India and their subsidiaries, including overseas subsidiaries.
(ii) All companies having a paid-up capital of Rs. 5 crore and above or a turnover of Rs.100 crore and above.
The financial statements required to be filed in XBRL format will be based on the taxonomy on XBRL developed for the existing Schedule VI and non-converged accounting standards notified under The Companies (Accounting Standards) Rules, 2006. For complete text of the circular visit:
http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/xbrl_31mar2011. pdf
Applicability date of Revised Schedule VI.
http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/notification/pdf/ Notification_28mar2011.pdf
Companies (Central Government’s) General Rules and Forms (Amendment) Rules, 2011 — Amendment in Form 61.
For the complete text of the Circular visit:
http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/notification/pdf/ Notification_26mar2011.pdf
Implementation of enhanced regulatory framework on annual statutory filings.
PAN mandatory for allotment of DIN and existing DIN holders to furnish their PAN.
For complete text of the Notification visit: http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/Circular_11-2011 _7apr2011.pdf
Transportation of goods from outside India to destination outside India exempted — Notification No. 08/2011, dated 1-3-2011.
Insurance under Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojna exempted — Notification No. 07/2011, dated 1-3-2011.
Works Contract services for Rajiv Awass Yojna and JNURM — Notification No. 06/2011, dated 1-3-2011.
NBFCs not to be partners in partnership firms
IFRS developments.
Visit the IASB website for a list of the illustrative examples and the IFRS Taxonomy 2011 guide.
The IFRS Foundation has announced that it will publish supplementary tags for the IFRS Taxonomy that reflect disclosures that are commonly reported by entities in their IFRS financial statements.
Clarification regarding easy-exit schemes.
For complete text of the Notification visit:
http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/Circular_12- 2011_7apr2011.pdf
Readers View
It is always a pleasure reading BCAJ which is full of new views and findings.
In the April issue I read the decision in the case of Frontier Offshore on page 35 of the Journal. The conclusion drawn is that withholding tax as per section 44BB does not lead to any violation of section 40(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act. Reading of the judgment leads to opposite view, what I feel.
It is requested to please look into it and give feedback as to the correct finding. Please take this in a positive manner with no intention to counter the view of the Journal.
Authors’ response
The decision of Frontier Offshore which is digested in April 2011 issue (ITA Appeal No. 200/ Mds/2009) at page 35 has concluded that provisions of section 40(a)(i) are not applicable when the payer has deducted tax at source after taking into account presumptive computation provisions of section 44BB.
It is true that at para 7, the ITAT has rejected the contention of the taxpayer that section 40(a)(i) is not applicable to the cases of short deduction and are restricted only to the cases of absolute failure. Please note that this was only the alternative argument of the taxpayer. The ITAT has accepted the primary argument of the taxpayer to the effect that section 40(a)(i) is not applicable to the cases where TDS has been deducted after taking into account presumptive tax provision.
Also, as is clarified in the gist appearing in April 2011 issue, the earlier decision of the Madras Tribunal in the case of the same taxpayer was decided against and after elaborate discussion, the ITAT has explained as to why after the SC decision in GE India’s case, the earlier decision was no longer a good law. The ITAT has gone to the extent of observing that perpetuating error is not a heroic deed, but to correct the mistake at the right opportunity is wisdom.
Trust we have been able to satisfactorily explain the concern of the reader.
Sir,
This is with the reference to media reports to the effect that the Income-tax Department has granted tax refunds of Rs.78,000 crores to about 85 lakh assessees during the year 2010-11 and that during the first half of April, 2011, the IT Department refunded Rs.6,183 crores to 8,23,101 assessees and all the remaining refunds shall be settled during the remainder part of April, 2011. The CBDT Chairman has stated that the IT Refunds in 2010- 11 are about 70% higher than Rs.50,000 crores made in the previous year and that despite making such huge refunds, the direct tax collection will be in the range of Rs.4.5 lakh crores. The Tax Department needs to be sincerely complimented for expeditiously making such huge refunds which constitute about 20% of net collection and making life easier for the taxpayers.
To reduce such huge workload, the Tax Department needs to analyse what is causing such huge tax refunds; causing huge blockage of capital. Is it on account of excess advance tax paid or excess tax deducted at source? Or is it due to refund of tax pursuant to Appellate proceedings?
My own guess is that vast majority of such huge refunds is due to excess TDS deducted due to very low threshold limits prescribed under various TDS provisions. Now due to operation of section 206AA, most taxpayers/income-earners have obtained PAN. Therefore, there is an urgent need to revisit various TDS threshold limits and increase them substantially so that claims of refunds can go down significantly. The Department also needs to study and adopt Withholding Tax (TDS) practices followed in advanced western countries. Further, the Department need to liberalise self-declaration provisions as it is very difficult, time-consuming, inefficient and costly affair to obtain a Nil or Low TDS Certificate from the Tax Department u/s.197 of the Act.
A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 52, dated 6-4-2011 — A.P. (FL/RL Series) Circular No. 14 — Anti-Money Laundering (AML) standards/ Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) Standards — Cross Border Inward Remittance under Money Transfer Service Scheme.
FCRA Act 2010 comes into force
A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 53, dated 7-4-2011 — Overseas forex trading through electronic/internet trading portals.
This Circular advices banks to exercise due caution and be extra vigilant in respect of remittances under scheme so as to avoid payments towards margin money for online foreign exchange trading transactions as these derivative transactions can only be undertaken by persons resident in India based on the presence of an underlying price risk exposure.
Further, any person resident in India collecting and effecting/remitting such payments directly/indirectly outside India would make himself/herself liable to be proceeded against with for contravention of FEMA, 1999 besides being liable for violation of regulations relating to Know Your Customer (KYC) norms/Anti Money Laundering (AML) standards.
A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 51, dated 6-4-2011 — A.P. (FL/RL Series) Circular No. 13 — Anti-Money Laundering (AML) standards/ Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) Standards — Money-changing activities.
A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 50, dated 6-4-2011 — A.P. (FL/RL Series) Circular No. 12 — Know Your Customer (KYC) norms/ Anti-Money Laundering (AML) standards/ Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT)/Obligation of Authorised Persons under Prevention of Money Laundering Act, (PMLA), 2002, as amended by Prevention of Money Laundering (Amendment) Act, 2009 — Cross-Border Inward Remittance under Money Transfer Service Scheme.
(a) Jurisdictions subject to FATF call on its members and other jurisdictions to apply countermeasures to protect the international financial system from the ongoing and substantial money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/FT) risks emanating from the jurisdiction: Iran
(b) Jurisdictions with strategic AML/CFT deficiencies that have not committed to an action plan developed with the FATF to address key deficiencies as of October 2010. The FATF calls on its members to consider the risks arising from the deficiencies associated with each jurisdiction: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).
This Circular advices banks to take into account risks arising from the deficiencies in AML/CFT regime of these countries, while entering into business relationships and transactions with persons (including legal persons and other financial institutions) from or in these countries/jurisdictions.
This Circular advices banks to take into account risks arising from the deficiencies in AML/CFT regime of these countries, while entering into business relationships and transactions with persons (including legal persons and other financial institutions) from or in these countries/jurisdictions.
A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 49, dated 6-4-2011 — A.P. (FL/RL Series) Circular No. 11 — Know Your Customer (KYC) norms/ Anti-Money Laundering (AML) standards/ Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT)/Obligation of Authorised Persons under Prevention of Money Laundering Act, (PMLA), 2002, as amended by Prevention of Money Laundering (Amendment) Act, 2009 — Money-changing activities.
(a) Jurisdictions subject to FATF call on its members and other jurisdictions to apply countermeasures to protect the international financial system from the ongoing and substantial money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/ FT) risks emanating from the jurisdiction: Iran
(b) Jurisdictions with strategic AML/CFT deficiencies that have not committed to an action plan developed with the FATF to address key deficiencies as of October 2010. The FATF calls on its members to consider the risks arising from the deficiencies associated with each jurisdiction: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).
This Circular advices banks to take into account risks arising from the deficiencies in AML/CFT regime of these countries, while entering into business relationships and transactions with persons (including legal persons and other financial institutions) from or in these countries/jurisdictions.
A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 48, dated 5-4-2011 — Acquisition of credit/debit card transactions in India by overseas banks — payment for airline tickets.
This Circular clarifies that this practice adopted by foreign airlines is not in conformity with the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 and foreign airlines are advised to immediately discontinue the same.
Government of India, Ministry of Commerce & Industry Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion (FC Section) — F. No. 5(1)/2011-FC, dated 31-3-2011 — Circular 1 of 2011 — Consolidated FDI Policy.
(i) Pricing of convertible instruments:
Instead of specifying the price of convertible instruments upfront, companies will now have the option of prescribing a conversion formula, subject to FEMA/SEBI guidelines on pricing.
(ii) Inclusion of fresh items for issue of shares against non-cash considerations:
The existing policy provides for conversion of only ECB/lump-sum fee/Royalty into equity. This Circular now permits issue of equity, under the Government Route (Approval Route), in the following cases, subject to specific conditions:
(a) Import of capital goods/machinery/equipment (including second-hand machinery)
(b) Pre-operative/pre-incorporation expenses (including payments of rent, etc.)
(iii) Removal of the condition of prior approval in case of existing joint ventures/technical collaborations in the ‘same field’:
With a view to attract fresh investment and technology inflows into the country and to also reduce the levels of Government intervention in the commercial sphere the Government has decided to abolish this condition of obtaining prior approval in case of existing joint ventures/technical collaborations in the same field.
(iv) Guidelines relating to down-stream investments:
The guidelines have been comprehensively simplified and rationalised. Companies will now been classified into only two categories — ‘companies owned or controlled by foreign investors’ and ‘companies owned and controlled by Indian residents’. The earlier categorisation of ‘investing companies’, ‘operating companies’ and ‘investingcum- operating companies’ has been done away with.
(v) Development of seeds:
In the agriculture sector, FDI will now be permitted in the development and production of seeds and planting material, without the stipulation of having to do so under ‘controlled conditions’.
A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 47, dated 31-2-2011 — Export of goods and software — Realisation and repatriation of export proceeds — Liberalisation.
This Circular has relaxed the six months’ rule for a further period up to 30th September, 2011, subject to review. Hence, export proceeds in respect of export of goods and software (except in cases of exports from units in SEZ or exports to exporters’ own warehouses outside India) up to 30th September, 2011 can be realised and repatriated within twelve months from the date of export.
However, there is no change in the provisions in regard to period of realisation and repatriation to India of the full export value of goods or software exported by a unit situated in a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) as well as exports made to exporters’ own warehouses outside India.
Interbank foreign currency transaction exempted — Notification No. 27/2011, dated 31-3-2011.
Units located in SEZs to get benefit — Notification No. 17/2011, dated 1-3-2011.
25% abatement for transportation of coastal goods — Notification No. 16/2011, dated 1-3-2011.
Interest on delayed payment of service tax hiked to 18%. — Notification No. 14/2011, dated 1-3-2011.
Notification No. 10/2011 & 11/2011, dated 1-3-2011.
Notification No. 09/2011, dated 1-3-2011.
IS IT FAIR TO EXTEND PRESUMPTIVE TAXATION TO ALL BUSINESSES ?
Considering this situation, the law of the land is sought to be kept simplified to a certain extent. Every law provides some relief to the illiterate and poor class of entrepreneurs, helping them to abide by the law without being subjected to its complexity.
In the Income-tax Act, 1961, there are sections such as section 44AD/AF/AE/B/BB, etc. which are commonly known as Presumptive Tax Provisions. They mainly cover a certain class of entrepreneurs such as contractors in civil construction, small retailers, transporters, etc. The main intention of these provisions is to tax businesses on a certain percentage of their turnover or receipts. This percentage specified is normally an industrywise approved profitability norm. The relief provided by these sections is in the form of non-maintenance of books of accounts and no further verifications or questioning through cumbersome scrutiny procedures. In short, the taxpayers enjoy’s his peace of mind. However, a provision of compulsory Tax Audit u/s 44AB needs to be complied with, if the profit declared by such specified business organisation is below the prescribed percentage. This provision is aimed at preventing misuse of the relief provided by the Act. In my sixteen years of practice, I have seen many genuine cases where the actual profit earned is below the specified percentage, but due to the threat of harassment through scrutiny procedures, businessmen have adopted the prescribed percentage and have declared higher profits and paid tax on the unreal income. I have also come across a few cases wherein the lack of awareness of law has led to non-conduct of audit and consequently payment of penalty due to noncompliance.
A similar situation may be faced by many in the near future, due to modification in the sections relating to presumptive tax i.e., sections 44AD/AE etc. becoming effective from A.Y. 2011-12. Due to the amendments, section 44AD is now applicable not only to contractors in civil construction businesses but also to all ‘eligible’ business organisations. The definition of ‘eligible business’ as given in the section includes all business organisations run by individuals, HUFs and firms. Therefore, these modifications have a very widespread impact. Further, it is also rather unfair that the rate of 8% net profit has been prescribed across the board, irrespective of the nature of assessess. A majority of such businessman would be small retail traders. For them the rate hitherto was only 5%. The net profit is now suddenly perceived to be 8%! Further, it might so happen that cost of compliance may even exceed the tax liability and on the top of it, the fear of scrutiny!
The positive side is that all small businessmen having a turnover or gross receipts below Rs.60 lakh can seek shelter u/s. 44AD and after declaring 8% profit, can get rid of complicated accounting and audit requirements and threatening scrutiny proceedings. However, on the flipside, due to the effect of the modified section 44AB, all such eligible businesses declaring a profit below 8% will have to maintain their books of account and get them duly audited, besides filing their return of income. Earlier a small organisation having turnover below Rs.40 lakh and not belonging to a specified class under presumptive tax sections, was completely out of the purview of section 44AB and the audit of such organisations was not mandatory under the provisions of the Act.
To make the law fair — percentage of profit should be trade/industry or businesswise based on survey of reasonable sample of the business, rather than ad hoc percentage of 8%. However, if 8% is based on survey carried on by the CBDT, then in the interest of fairness and transparency, the same needs to be disclosed.
Organiser of business exhibition exempted for organising exhibition abroad — Notification No. 05/2011, dated 1-3-2011.
Air travel service tax enhanced for domestic and international passengers — Notification No. 04/2011, dated 1-3-2011.
Service tax rules amended — Notification No. 03/2011, dated 1-3-2011.
1. Applicable rate of service tax should be the rate applicable at the time when the services are deemed to have been provided.
2. Service tax shall be payable upon deemed provision of services.
3.
When an invoice has been issued or a payment is received for a service
which is not subsequently provided, the service provider can take credit
of service tax paid earlier, provided the amount has been refunded to
the payer.
4. Maximum amount admissible for adjustment of excess
service tax under Rule 6(4B)(iii) has been increased from Rs.1 lac to
Rs.2 lac.
5. Self-assessed amount of service tax, if not paid,
shall be recovered along with interest as per the provisions of section
87 of the Finance Act, 1994.
6. Composition rate applicable in
relation to purchase or sale of foreign currency including money
changing has been reduced from 0.25% to 0.10%.
Service tax Valuation Rules amended — Notification 02/2011, dated 1-3-2011.
Erection, Commissioning & Construction Works Contract — CENVAT credit restricted to 40% when tax paid on the full value — Notification No. 01/2011, dated 1-3-2011.
Adjustment of Refund of F.Y 2010-11 to F.Y 2011-12 up to Rs.1 lakh — Trade Circular 6T of 2011, dated 15-4-2011.
Grant of Refunds against Bank Guarantee — Trade Circular 5T of 2011, dated 11-4-2011.
VALUATION OF CUSTOMER-RELATED INTANGIBLE ASSETS
Identification of customer-related intangible
assets
- Examples
- Definition
- Basis of identification
- Additional highlights
Valuation of customer-related intangible
assets
Comparison with Ind-AS
Conclusion
Identification:
Examples
FASB ASC 805 under US GAAP and IFRS-3 (January 2008) under IFRS, give the following examples of customer-related intangible assets:
Before we start, it is imperative to know that selfgenerated intangibles (including goodwill) are not allowed to be recognised under any accounting guidance. The identification and the valuation of these intangibles would arise only in the case of an acquisition, resulting in a business combination where the acquirer would be required to allocate the value paid for the target to, inter alia, intangible assets by way of a purchase price allocation process. Hence, in the discussion below we would constantly talk about an acquirer-target relationship.
Definitions:
Customer contracts and the related customer relationships:
Standard: When an entity establishes relationships with its customers through contracts, customer relationships arise from these contractual rights. Customer contracts refer to signed contracts as at the date of the valuation.
Customer contracts are signed contracts by the target as at the valuation date. On account of the acquisition, the acquirer will get the benefit of these contracts and hence it is an intangible for the acquirer. Related to these contracts would be their associated relationships and the acquirer will also get the benefit of these contractual relationships. ?
Non-contractual customer relationships:
Standard: A customer relationship acquired in a business combination that does not arise from a contract may nevertheless be identifiable because the relationship is separable.
There would be few instances in practical life where relationships are contractual. Most of the times relationships are non-contractual and though the benefits are not guaranteed, a trend can be observed wherein the same customers continue to give business repeatedly. This recall value is what is measured and termed as no contractual customer relationships.
Customer lists:
Standard: A customer list consists of information about customers, such as their names and contact information. A customer list also may be in the form of a database that includes other information about the customers, such as their order histories and demographic information. Databases are collections of information, often stored in electronic form. A database that includes original works of authorship may be entitled to copyright protection.
Customer lists (all type of information) depending on the industry can open more avenues for business by adding new customers and hence would add value to the acquirer.
Order or production backlog:
Standard: An order or a production backlog arises from contracts such as purchase or sales orders and therefore is considered a contractual right.
Order or production backlog refers to the unexecuted orders as at the valuation date. The only difference between customer contracts and order or production backlog is that in customer contracts the work on the contracts has not started, while in order or production backlog, the work on the contracts has not been completed.
Basis of identification:
Additional highlights: Customer contracts and the related customer relationships:
(i) It is an intangible and will meet the contractuallegal criterion even if confidentiality or other contractual terms prohibit the sale or transfer of a contract separately from the acquiree.
(ii) A customer contract and the related customer relationship may represent two distinct intangible assets.
(iii) Both the useful lives and the pattern in which the economic benefits of the two assets are consumed may differ.
(iv) A customer relationship related to the customer contract exists between an entity and its customer if
(a) the entity has information about the customer and has regular contact with the customer, and
(b) the customer has the ability to make direct contact with the entity.
(v) Customer relationships related to the customer contracts meet the contractual-legal criterion if an entity has a practice of establishing contracts with its customers, regardless of whether a contract exists at the acquisition date.
(vi) Customer relationships related to the customer contracts also may arise through means other than contracts, such as through regular contact by sales or service representatives. Consequently, if an entity has relationships with its customers through these types of contracts, these customer relationships also arise from contractual rights and therefore meet the contractual-legal criterion.
(vii) Customer contracts can also be a contract-based intangible asset. If the terms of a contract give rise to a liability (for example, if the terms of an operating lease or customer contract are unfavourable relative to market terms), the acquirer recognises it as a liability assumed in the business combination.
Non-contractual customer relationships:
Exchange transactions for the same asset or a similar asset that indicate that other entities have sold or otherwise transferred a particular type of no contractual customer relationship would provide evidence that the no contractual customer relationship is separable. For example, relationships with depositors are frequently exchanged with the related deposits and therefore meet the criteria for recognition as an intangible asset separately from goodwill.
Customer lists:
(i) A customer list generally does not arise from contractual or other legal rights. However, customer lists are frequently leased or exchanged. Therefore, a customer list acquired in a business combination normally meets the separability criterion. For example, customer and subscriber lists are frequently licensed and thus meet the separability criterion.
(ii) Whether customer lists have characteristics different from other customer lists, the fact that customer lists are frequently licensed generally means that the acquired customer lists meet the separability criterion.
(iii) However, a customer list acquired in a business combination would not meet the separability criterion if the terms of confidentiality or other agreements prohibit an entity from selling, leasing, or otherwise exchanging information about its customers.
(iv) A database acqui
LIMITS ON SEBI’S POWERS — another decision of SAT
For example, there is a term commonly used in securities laws — ‘person associated with securities markets’ — this term almost gives an omnibus power to cover any person directly or indirectly connected with securities markets. Investors, auditors and even independent directors have been held to be ‘persons associated with securities markets’ and thus action has been taken against them for alleged wrongs. It is important to highlight this since there are many persons such as insiders, acquirers which have been specifically defined in securities laws — who can be acted against only if it is first demonstrated that they do fall within the definition.
This impression is further supported by the areas in which SEBI can issue directions. These terms are also of wide import — for example:
Directions can be issued for purposes such as ‘in the interests of investors’ or ‘orderly development of securities markets’.
A clause in the SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices Relating to Securities Market), Regulations, 2003 reads that “no person shall directly or indirectly buy, sell or otherwise deal in securities in a fraudulent manner”.
‘Power to issue Directions’ — this term is capable of a fairly wide interpretation.
‘Power to punish’ may mean penalty, suspension or cancellation of registration, debarring a person from dealing in securities for a specified period.
Provision prohibiting indulging in ‘fraudulent or an unfair trade practice in securities’. There are numerous acts/omissions specifically listed which are deemed to be fraudulent or unfair trade practices. It is often found in actual cases that several of these provisions in the law are thrown at the alleged culprit and even the final order usually lists a long list of provisions that are said to have been violated by a single act/omission.
However, a well-settled principle of law is that the crime and punishment both have to be well defined and the person who is supposed to obey the law also has to be specified. This principle is obviously applicable even to securities laws and thus one occasionally sees decisions that strike down an order of SEBI on this ground. The recent decision of the Securities Appellate Tribunal (‘SAT’) in the case of G. M. Bosu & Co. Private Limited v. SEBI and others, (Appeal No. 183 of 2010, dated 15th February 2011) is worth reviewing in this context.
The facts of the case show a long series of steps a defrauded investor had to take to get back her money. Simplifying the facts a little, it appears that an investor was defrauded by a person who sold her shares in the open market by taking her signature on some forms. These signatures were taken on the pretext that they were required incidental to transfer of shares from her deceased husband’s name to her name. Such person, who was an ex-employee of a depository participant, then allegedly sold the shares in the market and thus defrauded the investor. On a police complaint being made, he confessed his guilt and agreed to compensate the investor. However, he died without compensating her. The investor then initiated a long legal battle in which the essential argument was that she should be compensated by the depository. The legal basis for this was a provision in Regulation 32 (though amended later on) of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Depositories and Participants) Regulations, 1996 which requires that the depository should ensure that payment has been received by the investor before the shares are transferred to a third party.
It is worth mentioning here that the investor had to petition multiple authorities multiple times including finally facing, albeit indirectly, the SAT. Suffice it is to state that SEBI investigated the matter and held the depository participant concerned (DP) (which was the appellant here) responsible for the lapse in non-complying with the said Regulation 32. It ordered the DP to credit the account of the investor with the 100 shares with all benefits accrued on the shares (incidentally, the 100 shares had become 1500 shares by then). This direction was issued by SEBI exercising powers under sections 11 and 11B of the SEBI Act.
The DP went in appeal to the SAT pointing out that SEBI did not have any powers to direct the DP to give such compensation to the investor u/s. 11B of the Act. It pointed out that Regulation 64 of the SEBI Depositories Regulations clearly stated that in case if a depository participant who “contravenes any of the provisions of the Act, the Depositories Act, the bye-laws, agreements and these regulations . . . . shall be dealt with in the manner provided under Chapter V of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Intermediaries) Regulations, 2008”. In other words, it was argued that action could only be taken under the said SEBI (Intermediaries) Regulations, 2008 and resorting to section 11B and requiring payment of compensation by way of credit of the shares to the account of the investor was not in accordance with the law.
The SAT noted:
Firstly, the obligation of complying with Regulation 64 was on the depository and not on the depository participant.
Secondly, even assuming that there was a violation by the DP, the provisions of Regulation 64 and thereby the provisions of the SEBI (Intermediaries) Regulations should have been followed in taking action against the DP. This is what the SAT observed:
“Assuming (though not holding) that there was such a violation, Regulation 64 of the regulations requires that the depository or a participant who contravenes any provision of the regulations “shall be dealt with in the manner provided under Chapter V of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Intermediaries) Regulations, 2008.” The word ‘manner’ means that the procedure laid down in Chapter V of the intermediaries regulations shall have to be followed. Regulations 24 to 30 in that chapter provide the detailed manner/procedure according to which the delinquents are to be dealt with. These provisions envisage a two-stage inquiry before taking any action against the delinquent. A designated authority is required to be appointed which shall issue a show-cause notice to the delinquent and after holding an inquiry, a report shall be submitted. The report will then be considered by the designated member after issuing a notice to the delinquent who will also be furnished with a copy of the report. It is only then that the designated member can take any one or more of the actions referred to in Regulation 27 of the intermediaries regulations keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case. Admittedly, this procedure has not been followed and neither the appellant nor the depository were dealt with in the manner prescribed in Chapter V of the intermediaries regulations. Instead, directions have been issued u/s. 11B of the Act to compensate respondent 3.”
Finally, the question was whether the powers u/s. 11B were wide enough to order such a compensation being made by the DP. The SAT observed as follows:
“It is true that the powers of the Board u/s. 11B are wide enough to issue directions to any intermediary or person associated with the securities market but such powers are to be exercised only to protect the interests of investors in securities or for orderly development of securities market and to preserve its integrity. These directions cannot be punitive in nature and cannot be issued to pun
PART C: Information on & Arround
Says Mr. Eknath Khadse (BJP leader):
‘Gathering information about the Pawars was a difficult task. However, we used the RTI Act to search the data of air-travel of Mr. Pawar and his family members on Balwa’s air craft’ from the Pune air traffic control. Through RTI application it was gathered that Balwa’s plane was used by Pawar on several occasions and on one trip, besides BCC president Shashank Manohar and his wife, the Balwas accompanied Pawar and his family to Dubai. Khadse has also reportedly dug up facts to prove that Supriya, along with her husband Sadanand and DB Realty, was the promoter of a technology park near Pune set up on an illegally procured land.
Disclosure of personal properties by CIC:
In a major step to introduce greater transparency and accountability, the six Central Information Commissioners now have declared details of their properties on the Commission’s Website.
The Commissioners draw a salary of Rs. 90,000 p.m. Following are the brief summary of declarations made:
S. Mishra : Land, property worth Rs. 1.5cr.
D. Sandhu : Agriculture land worth Rs. 81,000,
2 houses worth Rs. 5.5cr.
S. Singh : house, flat worth Rs. 66.5 lakh.
S. Gandhi : Flat worth Rs. 80,000 (cost at
time of purchase), plus shares,
mutual funds and bank deposits.
A. Dixit : Flat, cottage worth Rs. 51 lakh.
M. L. Sharma : Property worth Rs. 4.50 lakh.
Selection procedure of for appointment of Chief of Trai:.
The selection procedure of the chairman of telecom regulator Trai, including all the details of the selection committee meeting, should be made public, the Central Information Commission (CIC) has held. The panel rejected the plea of the cabinet secretariat that the information was personal in nature and cannot be given u/s. 8(1)(j) of the Right to Information Act, which prohibits disclosure of such details.
“We fail to understand how the desired information could be classified as personal information at all … The information sought in these cases is far from personal. Selection and appointment to certain posts in the government are part of the administrative decision-making process and must be placed in the public domain as soon as possible in order to ensure transparency,” Chief Information Commissioner Satyananda Mishra said. He directed the secretariat to allow the RTI applicant the inspection of the entire file related to the selection of the Trai chairman.
BMC’s functioning :
We all know that it takes months, sometimes years to get projects and files cleared from Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation (BMC) babus. However, if you have the right connections, then your work could be done in a single day. In 2008 the BMC displayed exemplary promptness and granted permissions in a single day for construction of 13 additional floors on a building in Dadar. Interestingly, all clearances were granted to the builder and the area of a reserved public playground was reduced to make way for the building.
The issue came to light when residents procured documents under the Right to Information (RTI) Act. They learnt how BMC’s Building Proposal Department allowed developers, Finetone Realtors Pvt. Ltd. to construct 13 additional floors on the plush 20-storey Garden Court building in Dadar. Arun Sapkal, a Dadar resident and RTI activist said, “It’s shocking how the BMC first granted permission and later issued stop notice to the builder after the construction was over?” However, developers Ramakant Jadhav of Finetone Realtors Pvt. Ltd. said, “ we have all the necessary permissions in place as per the DCR rules for construction of the building and the playground. We have kept the reservations as allowed by the BMC.”
Information on ITR thru RTI:
Manoj Kumar Saini made an RTI application to get information on income tax-return (ITR) of his father-in-law Mr Munna Lal Saini, CIC Deepak Sandhu ruled:
The I-T returns of individuals do not enjoy ‘absolute ban’ from disclosure CIC has held, while directing the I-T department to provide details of the total income of a person to his son-in-law who is facing a dowry case. We direct the CPIO to provide information pertaining to the taxable income of Munna Lal Saini, father-in-law of the appellant,” Information Commissioner Deepak Sandhu said. The case relates to RTI application filed by Manoj Kumar Saini, who sought to know income of his father-in-law Munna Lal Saini from the I-T as he needed it to buttress his arguments in a dowry case filed against him.
Maharashtra State Information Commission’s Annual Report for the year 2010 is out, just now only in Marathi. Some brief statistics:
RTI applications filed : 5.49 lakh
Appeals received : 19,483
Appeals disposed : 17,266
Complaint received : 4,592
Complaint disposed : 3,911
Public Information Officers penalised : 523
Total penalties : Rs 34.38 lakh
Department action against PIOs : 602
PART B: The RTI Act , 2005
PENDENCY
Taking note of the increasing pendency of appeals/ complaints in the Commission over the last few years and realising the need for their expeditious disposal, the Commission hereby resolves that each single bench of the Commission shall take urgent steps to maximise its disposal without comprising the quality thereof, as a general rule, each single bench will endeavour to finally decide about 3200 appeals/complaints per year.
Application of the provisions of the RTI-Act to the entities under the Public Private Partnership (PPP Arrangement)
Chief CIC has exchanged letters with the Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission, India on the subject of PPP Arrangement. Extracts from the same:
Satyananda Mishra, CIC on 04.01.2011 writes:
A PPP entity should be deemed to be a public authority u/s. 2(h) for the purpose of the RTI Act.
All Projects which are handed over to a PPP entity for building, operating or maintaining the land, even if not any other resources, given by the Government, forms a vital component of the project and, to that extent, can be deemed to substantial financing.
However, due to a lack of clarity on this at various levels and, especially since the RTI Act does not expressly refer to such bodies while defining the public authorities, a lot of confusion persists and such entities have, by and large, remained outside the purview of the RTI Act.
This Commission is of the view that time has come to clarify the role and responsibility of the PPP entity for implementing the RTI Act in order to bring in greater transparency in implementation of such projects.
Letter then suggest how the coverage is to be implemented and once carried out, a lot of confusion in this regard will go and the citizens will have access to vital information regarding the projects which affect their lives. Needless to say, this will also greatly improve the accountability of such entities to both the Government and the public at large.
In reply, Montek Singh Ahluwalia vide letter dated 14.03.2011 states:
In the Press Note issued, we recognise that the powers of the Information Commission are laid down in the RTI Act. It is for the Commission to exercise these powers in their best judgment. It may not be appropriate to expand or reduce the jurisdiction of the Information Commissions through a contractual arrangement in the concession agreements. However, we have referred the matter to the Department of Legal Affairs for advice and I will revert to you on receiving their advice.
The Commission discussed above referred letter at its meeting of 22-03-2011 and recorded as under:
The Commission discussed the letter of the Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission on application of RTI Act to the entities under the PPP. The CIC decided to wait for two months for the Planning Commission to send a copy of response of Department of Legal Affairs on this issue as referred to in the letter of the Deputy Chairman dated 14-03-2011.
It is now reported in ET of 26 April that MoF objects to plan Panel’s role in social PPPs and says that they fall in its domain. Matter has been referred to the cabinet secretariat seeking its intervention on the matter.
I hope that PPP arrangements come in the domain of RTI whoever may be in charge of the same at Government level.
Bombay Public Trusts Act
Trusts are governed by the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 (‘the Act’).
Under the Act, the Charity Commissioner is in charge of public trusts.
The State of Gujarat also has a law similar to the Bombay Public Trust
Act.
The Charity Commissioner has powers of supervision,
regulation and control of public trusts. All public trusts must register
under the Act with the Charity Commissioner. It should be remembered
that all public trusts are trusts, but all trusts need not be public
trusts. The Act does not apply to section 25 companies which are created
under the Companies Act, 1956. The Bombay Chartered Accountants’
Society is an instance of a public trust registered under this Act.
Definitions:
A
public trust is defined to mean an express or constructive trust for
either public or charitable purpose or both and includes a temple, a
math, a wakf, church, synagogue, agiary or any other religious or
charitable endowment and a society formed either for religious or
charitable purposes or both and registered under the Societies
Registration Act, 1860.
The word ‘trust’ is not defined under
the Act and hence, one needs to refer to the definition under the Indian
Trusts Act, 1882. Section 3 of the said Act defines a ‘trust’ as an
obligation annexed to the ownership of property and arising out of a
confidence reposed in and accepted by the owner or declared and accepted
by him for the benefit of another or of another and the owner. A public
trust must be for the public at large or some significant portion of
the public. However, the number of beneficiaries must be a fluctuating
body. It is the extensiveness of object which affords some indication of
the public nature of the trust — Prakash Chandra v. Subodh Chandra, AIR
1937 Cal. 67. A trust cannot be held to be for charitable purpose if it
is not for public benefit. Thus, private charitable trusts are not
governed by this Act. The term public purpose is not capable of any
strict definition and depends upon the facts and circumstances of each
case. No rigid rules can be applied to define the same — State of Bombay
v. S. R. Nanji, AIR 1956 SC 294.
The Supreme Court in
Radhakanta Deb v. Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa,
AIR 1981 SC 798, the Court held that “the cardinal point to be decided
is whether it was the intention of the founder that specified
individuals are to have the right of worship at the shrine, or the
general public or any specified portion thereof.” Thereafter, the Court
observed that the mere fact that members of the public are allowed to
worship by itself would not make an endowment a public, unless it is
proved that the members of the public had a right to worship in the
temple.
The Supreme Court formulated four tests as providing
sufficient guidelines to determine on the facts of each case whether an
endowment is of a private or of a public nature. The four tests are as
follows:
(a) Whether the use of the temple by members of the public is of right;
(b)
Whether the control and management vests either in a large body of
persons or within the members of the public and the founder does not
retain any control over the management;
(c) Whether the dedication
of the properties is made by the founder who retain the control and
management and whether control and management of the temple is also
retained by him; and
(d) Where the evidence shows that the founder
of the endowment did not make any stipulation for offerings or
contributions to be made by the members of the public to the temple,
this would be an important intrinsic circumstance to indicate the
private nature of the endowment.
Charitable purpose is defined u/s. 9 of the Act to include:
(a) relief of poverty or distress
(b) education
(c) medical relief
(d)
provision for facilities for recreation or other leisure-time
occupation (including assistance for such provision), if the facilities
are provided in the interest of social welfare and public benefit, and
(e)
the advancement of any other object of general public utility, but does
not include a purpose which relates exclusively to religious teaching
or worship.
Hence, a trust for both religious and charitable
purposes is feasible under the Bombay Public Trust Act, although the
same is not recognised u/s. 11 of the Income-tax Act (if created after
1-4-1961).
The term ‘public’ does not mean the humanity as a
whole, but some indefinite class of persons, a crosssection of the
community — CIT v. Radhaswami Satsang Sabha, 25 ITR 472 (All). Charity
need not benefit the entire mankind but should at least benefit an
ascertainable section of the community — Hazarat Pirmahomed Sahah Sahib
Roza Committee, 63 ITR 490 (SC). The trustees can decide on such
charitable purpose as they deem fit — Smith v. Massey, (1960) ILR 30
Bom. 500. A trust does not become invalid if the discretion of selecting
the charitable purpose is left to the trustees and they are free to
apply the fund in such manner and at such time and to such charities as
they deem fit — Sardar Bahadur Indra Singh Trust, AIR 1956 Cal. 164.
Registration:
Section 18 of the Act and the Bombay Public Trust Rules lay down the procedure for registration of a trust as follows:
(a) Apply to the Deputy Charity Commissioner of the region in Schedule II within three months of creation of the trust.
(b)
The application must contain the names and details of the trustees, the
trust, list of movable and immovable properties along with their
approximate market values, etc. A copy of the trust deed should also be
annexed. A memorandum must also be sent, which must contain the
prescribed particulars relating to the immovable property of the trust.
Schedule IIA to the Rules contains the format for the same. Section 22C
of the Act also provides for particulars of the memorandum.
On
receipt of the application, the Deputy Commissioner would make an
inquiry u/s.19 for ascertaining whether there exists a public trust and
whether the trust falls within its jurisdiction. The principles of
natural justice must be followed in this inquiry process. On completion
of the inquiry, the Deputy Commissioner shall record his findings with
reasons as to the matters inquired by him and may make an order for the
payment of the registration fee. The Charity Commissioner shall maintain
a Register containing all details of the trust.
Investment of trust money:
The
funds of the trust which cannot be deployed for the purposes of the
trust shall be deposited either with a bank or invested in designated
public securities. Public securities means those issued by the
Central/State Government/Railways/Local Authorities, etc.
The
money may also be invested in the first mortgage of immovable property
if the property is not leasehold for a term of years, i.e., the lease
must be indefinite, and secondly, the value of the property must exceed
the mortgage money by one-half times. Thus, if the value of the property
is Rs.1.50 crores, the investment permissible in the first mortgage is
Rs.1 crore.
Purchase of an immovable property as an investment
of trust funds would also require the permission of the Charity
Commissioner. If the property is purchased without its permission, then
the trustees would become liable for penalty for contravention of the
Act. However, the transaction is not void ab initio. This is contrary to
the provisions for sale of an immovable property. Any sale transaction
without the Commissioner’s permission is void ab initio.
Trustees
cannot borrow money for the purpose of or on behalf of
The basics of cloud computing Part 2
The previous write-up on this topic was intended to be an eye-opener on this subject. This one briefly discusses certain important aspects about cloud computing. This would include key terminology and the some offerings.
Background:
Cloud computing, as explained in the previous issue, is a model for enabling convenient, ondemand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction. By providing on demand access to a shared pool of computing resources in a selfservice, dynamically scaled and metered manner, cloud computing offers compelling advantages in speed, agility and efficiency.
Moving on, one needs to appreciate that, currently, cloud computing is at an early stage of its life-cycle, and cloud computing as we know it, is the evolution and convergence of several trends. In order to benefit from the fast evolving model, one needs to understand certain important aspects and key terminology being used in the context of cloud computing.
Commonly used models of cloud computing:
The first in the order of things is for the readers to understand the different (common) cloud computing models available in the market. The models currently in vogue are:
- Private clouds
- Public clouds
- Community clouds
- Hybrid clouds
Private clouds:
These refer to clouds for exclusive use by a single organisation. Such clouds are typically controlled, managed and hosted in private data centers. However, this not a hard and fast rule, there are exceptions wherein the private cloud is for the exclusive use by one organisation, but the hosting and operation of the private clouds is outsourced to a third party service provider.
Public clouds:
These refer to clouds which are leased out for use by multiple organisations (tenants) on a shared basis. These clouds are hosted and managed by a third party service provider. These are fairly common and serve small and medium enterprises. Examples would be Microsoft 365, Google docs.
Community clouds:
These refer to clouds for use by a group of related organisations who wish to make use of a common cloud computing environment. For example, a community might consist of the different branches of the military, all the universities in a given region, or all the suppliers to a large manufacturer. To cite an example: Large Hadron Collider1. (Look this up on the Internet, you may find the facts and dynamics hard to believe.)
Hybrid clouds:
These refer to situations when a single organisation adopts both private and public clouds for a single application, in order to take advantage of the benefits of both. For example, in a ‘cloudbursting’ scenario, an organisation might run the steady-state workload of an application on a private cloud, but when a spike in workload occurs, such as at the end of the financial quarter or during the holiday season, they can burst out to use computing capacity from a public cloud, then return those resources to the public pool when they are no longer needed. (Somebody please wake up the Tax Department, please use this on due dates.)
Of the above, private clouds and public clouds are the most commonly seen and implemented.
Advantages:
While the advantages such as efficiency, availability, scalability and fast deployment are common to both public as well as private clouds, there are certain advantages which would be unique either to public clouds or to private clouds. Some of these are: Some benefits are unique to public cloud computing:
- Low upfront costs — Public clouds are faster and cheaper to get started, hence providing the users with the advantage of a low-cost barrier to entry. There is no need to procure, instal and configure hardware.
- Economies of scale — Large public clouds enjoy economies of scale in terms of equipment purchasing power and management efficiencies, and some may pass a portion of the savings onto customers.
- Simpler to manage — Public clouds do not require IT to manage and administer, update, patch, etc. Users rely on the public cloud service provider instead of the IT department.
- Operating expense — Public clouds are paid out of the operating expense budget, often times by the users’ line of business, not the IT department. Capital expense is avoided, which can be an advantage in some organisations.
Some benefits are unique to private cloud computing:
- Greater control of security, compliance and quality of service — Private clouds enable IT to maintain control of security (prevent data loss, protect privacy), compliance (data handling policies, data retention, audit, regulations governing data location), and quality of service (since private clouds can optimise networks in ways that public clouds do not allow).
- Easier integration — Applications running in private clouds are easier to integrate with other in-house applications, such as identity management systems.
- Lower total costs — Private clouds may be cheaper over the long term compared to public clouds, since it is essentially owning versus renting. According to several analyses, the breakeven period is between two and three years.
- Capital expense and operating expense — Private clouds are funded by a combination of capital expense (with depreciation) and operating expense.
Summarising:
To recap, cloud computing is characterised by real, new capabilities such as self-service, auto-scaling and chargeback, but is also based on many established technologies such as grid computing, virtualisation, SOA shared services and large-scale, systems management automation. The top two benefits of cloud computing are speed and cost. Through self-service access to an available pool of computing resources, users can be up and running in minutes instead of weeks or months. Making adjustments to computing capacity is also fast, thanks to elastically scalable grid architecture. And because cloud computing is pay-per-use, operates at high scale and is highly automated, the cost and efficiency of cloud computing is very compelling as well.
In the next write-up:
While cloud computing offers compelling benefits in terms of speed and cost, clouds also present serious concerns around security, compliance, quality of service and fit. There are a number of issues and concerns that are holding some organisations back from rushing to the cloud. The top concern far and away is security. While one can debate the relative security of public clouds versus in-house data centers, the bottom-line is that many organisations are not comfortable entrusting certain sensitive data to public clouds where they do not have full visibility and full control. So some particularly sensitive applications will remain in-house while others may take advantage of public clouds. Another concern is quality of service, since clouds may not be able to fully guarantee service level agreement in terms of performance and availability. A third area of concern is fit, the ability to integrate with in-house systems and adapt SaaS applications to the organisation’s business processes. Organisations are likely adopt a mix of public and private clouds. Some applications will be appropriate for public clouds, while others will say in private clouds, and some will not use either.
Until the next write-up . . . . Cheers!!!!!!
Carve-outs Under IND-AS
The final standards notified by the MCA are substantially similar to the current IFRS standards. However, there are certain changes made to the Ind-AS standards as part of the convergence (rather than adoption) process to suit more appropriately to the Indian environment. These changes can be classified into the following categories:
- Mandatory differences as compared to IFRS
- Removal of accounting policy choices available under IFRS
- Additional accounting policy options provided, which are not in compliance with IFRS requirements
- Certain IFRS guidance to be adopted with separate (deferred) implementation dates.
This article attempts to explain the first category of carve-outs i.e., mandatory differences with IFRS and their impact on the financial statements. We will cover the other categories of carve-outs in our subsequent articles.
Foreign currency convertible bonds (FCCB):
Position under IFRS:
FCCB involve an exchange of a fixed number of shares for a fixed consideration that is denominated in foreign currency. Since the cash flows of the issuer entity in its own functional currency (i.e., in rupees) is variable due to changes in exchange rates, FCCB do not meet the definition of an equity instrument under IFRS. Thus, under IFRS, FCCB are classified as hybrid instruments and are initially split between the conversion option (embedded derivative) and the loan liability.
Conversion option: The conversion option is treated like a derivative and is initially recorded at its fair value. Like all derivatives, the conversion option is subsequently marked-to-market (MTM) at every reporting date and the impact is recognised in the income statement.
Loan liability: The loan liability is initially recorded as the difference between the proceeds and the amount allocated to the conversion option. Interest is thereafter recorded based on imputed interest rates. Further, the loan is adjusted for exchange rate movements that are recognised in the income statement.
Position under Ind-AS:
The Ind-AS has modified the definition of financial liabilities under Ind-AS 32 (vis-à-vis IAS 32) to exclude from its definition, the option to convert the foreign currency denominated borrowings into a fixed number of shares at a fixed exercise price (in any currency). Thus, these instruments will be split initially into the loan liability and the conversion option (as discussed above), but the conversion option will be recognised as equity (as against a derivative under IFRS) and therefore will not remeasured subsequently i.e., no subsequent MTM.
Key implications of the carve-out:
The key implication of this is that the conversion option is not subsequently MTM under Ind-AS, while such MTM is required under IFRS.
Under IFRS, the changes in the fair value of the conversion option may have a significant impact and result in volatility in profits. Further, the impact on the profits for the year is inversely related to the movement in the underlying share price; i.e., if the fair value of the underlying shares rises, MTM of the conversion option would lead to losses to be recognised in the income statement and vice-versa.
Under Ind-AS, since the conversion option is recognised as equity and is not remeasured subsequently, the carve-out eliminates the volatility in profits on account of the changes in the underlying share prices of the company.
Let us understand the impact of the carve-out with the help of an example:
On 1st April 2012, Company A (INR functional currency) issued 10,000 convertible bonds of USD 100 each with a coupon rate of 4% p.a. (interest payable annually in arrears). The total proceeds collected aggregated to USD 1 million. Each USD 100 bond is convertible, at the holder’s discretion, at any time prior to maturity on 31st March 2017, into 1,000 ordinary shares of Rs.10 each. For simplicity, transaction costs and deferred taxes are ignored. The following information on the exchange rate (spot) and fair value of conversion option (option) may be relevant:
Under IFRS, proceeds collected would be required to be split into loan liability and the conversion option. The total proceeds from the issue of USD 1 million aggregates to Rs.45 million based on a conversion rate of USD 1 = Rs.45. On initial recognition, the conversion option would be recognised at its fair value (i.e., Rs.4.5 million or 0.1 million USD) and the remaining proceeds (i.e., Rs.40.5 million or 0.9 million USD) would be recognised as loan liability.
The Company shall compute an effective interest rate based on the loan principal received (i.e., 0.9 million USD), loan principal on maturity (USD 1 million) and payments to be made for interest costs @ 4% p.a. on the loan principal of USD 1 million. The effective interest rate in this case works out to 6.4% p.a. The interest cost p.a. shall be computed based on outstanding loan principal (in foreign currency) and the effective interest rate of 6.4% p.a. converted at average exchange rates during the year. Further, the loan liability shall be translated at exchange rate as at the reporting date, with the exchange differences recognised in the income statement.
The conversion option on initial recognition aggregated to Rs.4.5 million, while the fair value of the conversion option as at the end of the year aggregates to Rs.9.2 million i.e., an increase by Rs.4.7 million. IFRS requires such a change in the fair value of conversion option to be recognised in the income statement.
Let us consider the movements in the carrying values of the conversion option and the loan liability:
Under IFRS
There are three costs recognised in the income statement i.e., interest cost on the loan, the exchange differences on the loan and the MTM gains/losses on the conversion option.
Under Ind-AS, the accounting for the loan liability is same as under IFRS. However, the conversion option is to be recognised as equity. As stated above, for simplicity we have ignored the transaction costs and deferred taxes. On initial recognition, the fair value of the conversion option (i.e., Rs.4.5 million) shall be recognised as equity. As at the end of the first year i.e., 31st March 2013, there is no further adjustment required on account of the fair value movements of the conversion option.
The costs to the company on account of FCCB under Ind-AS will be the interest cost and exchange gains/losses on the loan components of the instrument, with the conversion option not being remeasured for changes in its fair value.
Under Ind-AS
Agreements for sale of real estate (IFRIC 15):
Position under IFRS:
IFRIC 15 focusses on the accounting for revenue recognition by entities that undertake the construction of real estate. IFRIC 15 provides guidance on determining whether revenue from the construction of real estate should be accounted for in accordance with IAS 11 (Construction contract) or IAS 18 (Sale of goods), and the timing of revenue recognition.
IFRIC 15 clarifies that IAS 11 is applied to agreements for the construction of real estate that meet the definitio
Asian Paints (India) Ltd. (31-3-2010)
20. Exceptional items:
(a) Exceptional item of current year includes Rs.5.77 crores being the write-back of provision for diminution in the value of investments in the Company’s wholly-owned subsidiary Asian Paints (International) Limited, Mauritius in consequent to the buyback of 41,00,000 shares at US$ 1 per share by Asian Paints (International) Limited.
(b) Exceptional item of current year includes Rs.19.69 crores being the reversal of provision made towards diminution in the value of investments in the Company’s wholly-owned subsidiary Asian Paints (International) Limited. Mauritius, based on management’s assessment of the fair value of its investments.
(c) Exceptional item of previous year consists of provision of Rs.5.90 crores towards diminution in the value of the Company’s long-term investment in its subsidiary Asian Paints (Bangladesh) Ltd. made through its whollyowned subsidiary Asian Paints (International) Ltd. based on the management’s assessment of the fair value of its investment. Deferred tax asset on the above provision was not recognised.
Tata Communications Ltd. (31-3-2010)
4. In terms of the agreements entered into between Tata Teleservices Ltd. (‘TTSL’), Tata Sons Ltd. (‘TSL’) and NTT DoCoMo, Inc. of Japan (Strategic Partners-SP), TSL gave an option to the Company to sell 36,542,378 equity shares in TTSL to the SP, as part of a secondary sale of 253,163,941 equity shares effected along with a primary issue of 843,879,801 shares by TTSL to the SP. Accordingly, the Company realised Rs.424.22 crores on sale of these shares resulting in a profit of Rs.346.65 crores which has been reflected as an exceptional item in the profit and loss account for the current year.
11. On 27th August, 2008, the Arbitration Tribunal (the ‘Tribunal’) of the International Chamber of Commerce, Hague handed down a final award in the arbitration proceedings brought by Reliance Globalcom Limited (‘Reliance’), formerly known as ‘FLAG Telecom’, against the Company relating to the Flag Europe Asia Cable System. The Tribunal directed the Company to pay Rs.95.60 crores (US$ 21.45 million) (2008: Rs. NIL) as final settlement against US$ 385 million claimed by Reliance. The amount of Rs.95.60 cores has been charged to profit and loss account and has been disclosed as an exception item.