Month: May
PAN mandatory for allotment of DIN and existing DIN holders to furnish their PAN.
For complete text of the Notification visit: http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/Circular_11-2011 _7apr2011.pdf
Transportation of goods from outside India to destination outside India exempted — Notification No. 08/2011, dated 1-3-2011.
Insurance under Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojna exempted — Notification No. 07/2011, dated 1-3-2011.
Works Contract services for Rajiv Awass Yojna and JNURM — Notification No. 06/2011, dated 1-3-2011.
NBFCs not to be partners in partnership firms
IFRS developments.
Visit the IASB website for a list of the illustrative examples and the IFRS Taxonomy 2011 guide.
The IFRS Foundation has announced that it will publish supplementary tags for the IFRS Taxonomy that reflect disclosures that are commonly reported by entities in their IFRS financial statements.
Clarification regarding easy-exit schemes.
For complete text of the Notification visit:
http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/Circular_12- 2011_7apr2011.pdf
Readers View
It is always a pleasure reading BCAJ which is full of new views and findings.
In the April issue I read the decision in the case of Frontier Offshore on page 35 of the Journal. The conclusion drawn is that withholding tax as per section 44BB does not lead to any violation of section 40(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act. Reading of the judgment leads to opposite view, what I feel.
It is requested to please look into it and give feedback as to the correct finding. Please take this in a positive manner with no intention to counter the view of the Journal.
Authors’ response
The decision of Frontier Offshore which is digested in April 2011 issue (ITA Appeal No. 200/ Mds/2009) at page 35 has concluded that provisions of section 40(a)(i) are not applicable when the payer has deducted tax at source after taking into account presumptive computation provisions of section 44BB.
It is true that at para 7, the ITAT has rejected the contention of the taxpayer that section 40(a)(i) is not applicable to the cases of short deduction and are restricted only to the cases of absolute failure. Please note that this was only the alternative argument of the taxpayer. The ITAT has accepted the primary argument of the taxpayer to the effect that section 40(a)(i) is not applicable to the cases where TDS has been deducted after taking into account presumptive tax provision.
Also, as is clarified in the gist appearing in April 2011 issue, the earlier decision of the Madras Tribunal in the case of the same taxpayer was decided against and after elaborate discussion, the ITAT has explained as to why after the SC decision in GE India’s case, the earlier decision was no longer a good law. The ITAT has gone to the extent of observing that perpetuating error is not a heroic deed, but to correct the mistake at the right opportunity is wisdom.
Trust we have been able to satisfactorily explain the concern of the reader.
Sir,
This is with the reference to media reports to the effect that the Income-tax Department has granted tax refunds of Rs.78,000 crores to about 85 lakh assessees during the year 2010-11 and that during the first half of April, 2011, the IT Department refunded Rs.6,183 crores to 8,23,101 assessees and all the remaining refunds shall be settled during the remainder part of April, 2011. The CBDT Chairman has stated that the IT Refunds in 2010- 11 are about 70% higher than Rs.50,000 crores made in the previous year and that despite making such huge refunds, the direct tax collection will be in the range of Rs.4.5 lakh crores. The Tax Department needs to be sincerely complimented for expeditiously making such huge refunds which constitute about 20% of net collection and making life easier for the taxpayers.
To reduce such huge workload, the Tax Department needs to analyse what is causing such huge tax refunds; causing huge blockage of capital. Is it on account of excess advance tax paid or excess tax deducted at source? Or is it due to refund of tax pursuant to Appellate proceedings?
My own guess is that vast majority of such huge refunds is due to excess TDS deducted due to very low threshold limits prescribed under various TDS provisions. Now due to operation of section 206AA, most taxpayers/income-earners have obtained PAN. Therefore, there is an urgent need to revisit various TDS threshold limits and increase them substantially so that claims of refunds can go down significantly. The Department also needs to study and adopt Withholding Tax (TDS) practices followed in advanced western countries. Further, the Department need to liberalise self-declaration provisions as it is very difficult, time-consuming, inefficient and costly affair to obtain a Nil or Low TDS Certificate from the Tax Department u/s.197 of the Act.
A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 52, dated 6-4-2011 — A.P. (FL/RL Series) Circular No. 14 — Anti-Money Laundering (AML) standards/ Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) Standards — Cross Border Inward Remittance under Money Transfer Service Scheme.
FCRA Act 2010 comes into force
A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 53, dated 7-4-2011 — Overseas forex trading through electronic/internet trading portals.
This Circular advices banks to exercise due caution and be extra vigilant in respect of remittances under scheme so as to avoid payments towards margin money for online foreign exchange trading transactions as these derivative transactions can only be undertaken by persons resident in India based on the presence of an underlying price risk exposure.
Further, any person resident in India collecting and effecting/remitting such payments directly/indirectly outside India would make himself/herself liable to be proceeded against with for contravention of FEMA, 1999 besides being liable for violation of regulations relating to Know Your Customer (KYC) norms/Anti Money Laundering (AML) standards.
A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 51, dated 6-4-2011 — A.P. (FL/RL Series) Circular No. 13 — Anti-Money Laundering (AML) standards/ Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) Standards — Money-changing activities.
A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 50, dated 6-4-2011 — A.P. (FL/RL Series) Circular No. 12 — Know Your Customer (KYC) norms/ Anti-Money Laundering (AML) standards/ Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT)/Obligation of Authorised Persons under Prevention of Money Laundering Act, (PMLA), 2002, as amended by Prevention of Money Laundering (Amendment) Act, 2009 — Cross-Border Inward Remittance under Money Transfer Service Scheme.
(a) Jurisdictions subject to FATF call on its members and other jurisdictions to apply countermeasures to protect the international financial system from the ongoing and substantial money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/FT) risks emanating from the jurisdiction: Iran
(b) Jurisdictions with strategic AML/CFT deficiencies that have not committed to an action plan developed with the FATF to address key deficiencies as of October 2010. The FATF calls on its members to consider the risks arising from the deficiencies associated with each jurisdiction: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).
This Circular advices banks to take into account risks arising from the deficiencies in AML/CFT regime of these countries, while entering into business relationships and transactions with persons (including legal persons and other financial institutions) from or in these countries/jurisdictions.
This Circular advices banks to take into account risks arising from the deficiencies in AML/CFT regime of these countries, while entering into business relationships and transactions with persons (including legal persons and other financial institutions) from or in these countries/jurisdictions.
A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 49, dated 6-4-2011 — A.P. (FL/RL Series) Circular No. 11 — Know Your Customer (KYC) norms/ Anti-Money Laundering (AML) standards/ Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT)/Obligation of Authorised Persons under Prevention of Money Laundering Act, (PMLA), 2002, as amended by Prevention of Money Laundering (Amendment) Act, 2009 — Money-changing activities.
(a) Jurisdictions subject to FATF call on its members and other jurisdictions to apply countermeasures to protect the international financial system from the ongoing and substantial money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/ FT) risks emanating from the jurisdiction: Iran
(b) Jurisdictions with strategic AML/CFT deficiencies that have not committed to an action plan developed with the FATF to address key deficiencies as of October 2010. The FATF calls on its members to consider the risks arising from the deficiencies associated with each jurisdiction: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).
This Circular advices banks to take into account risks arising from the deficiencies in AML/CFT regime of these countries, while entering into business relationships and transactions with persons (including legal persons and other financial institutions) from or in these countries/jurisdictions.
A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 48, dated 5-4-2011 — Acquisition of credit/debit card transactions in India by overseas banks — payment for airline tickets.
This Circular clarifies that this practice adopted by foreign airlines is not in conformity with the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 and foreign airlines are advised to immediately discontinue the same.
Government of India, Ministry of Commerce & Industry Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion (FC Section) — F. No. 5(1)/2011-FC, dated 31-3-2011 — Circular 1 of 2011 — Consolidated FDI Policy.
(i) Pricing of convertible instruments:
Instead of specifying the price of convertible instruments upfront, companies will now have the option of prescribing a conversion formula, subject to FEMA/SEBI guidelines on pricing.
(ii) Inclusion of fresh items for issue of shares against non-cash considerations:
The existing policy provides for conversion of only ECB/lump-sum fee/Royalty into equity. This Circular now permits issue of equity, under the Government Route (Approval Route), in the following cases, subject to specific conditions:
(a) Import of capital goods/machinery/equipment (including second-hand machinery)
(b) Pre-operative/pre-incorporation expenses (including payments of rent, etc.)
(iii) Removal of the condition of prior approval in case of existing joint ventures/technical collaborations in the ‘same field’:
With a view to attract fresh investment and technology inflows into the country and to also reduce the levels of Government intervention in the commercial sphere the Government has decided to abolish this condition of obtaining prior approval in case of existing joint ventures/technical collaborations in the same field.
(iv) Guidelines relating to down-stream investments:
The guidelines have been comprehensively simplified and rationalised. Companies will now been classified into only two categories — ‘companies owned or controlled by foreign investors’ and ‘companies owned and controlled by Indian residents’. The earlier categorisation of ‘investing companies’, ‘operating companies’ and ‘investingcum- operating companies’ has been done away with.
(v) Development of seeds:
In the agriculture sector, FDI will now be permitted in the development and production of seeds and planting material, without the stipulation of having to do so under ‘controlled conditions’.
A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 47, dated 31-2-2011 — Export of goods and software — Realisation and repatriation of export proceeds — Liberalisation.
This Circular has relaxed the six months’ rule for a further period up to 30th September, 2011, subject to review. Hence, export proceeds in respect of export of goods and software (except in cases of exports from units in SEZ or exports to exporters’ own warehouses outside India) up to 30th September, 2011 can be realised and repatriated within twelve months from the date of export.
However, there is no change in the provisions in regard to period of realisation and repatriation to India of the full export value of goods or software exported by a unit situated in a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) as well as exports made to exporters’ own warehouses outside India.
Interbank foreign currency transaction exempted — Notification No. 27/2011, dated 31-3-2011.
Units located in SEZs to get benefit — Notification No. 17/2011, dated 1-3-2011.
25% abatement for transportation of coastal goods — Notification No. 16/2011, dated 1-3-2011.
Interest on delayed payment of service tax hiked to 18%. — Notification No. 14/2011, dated 1-3-2011.
Notification No. 10/2011 & 11/2011, dated 1-3-2011.
Notification No. 09/2011, dated 1-3-2011.
IS IT FAIR TO EXTEND PRESUMPTIVE TAXATION TO ALL BUSINESSES ?
Considering this situation, the law of the land is sought to be kept simplified to a certain extent. Every law provides some relief to the illiterate and poor class of entrepreneurs, helping them to abide by the law without being subjected to its complexity.
In the Income-tax Act, 1961, there are sections such as section 44AD/AF/AE/B/BB, etc. which are commonly known as Presumptive Tax Provisions. They mainly cover a certain class of entrepreneurs such as contractors in civil construction, small retailers, transporters, etc. The main intention of these provisions is to tax businesses on a certain percentage of their turnover or receipts. This percentage specified is normally an industrywise approved profitability norm. The relief provided by these sections is in the form of non-maintenance of books of accounts and no further verifications or questioning through cumbersome scrutiny procedures. In short, the taxpayers enjoy’s his peace of mind. However, a provision of compulsory Tax Audit u/s 44AB needs to be complied with, if the profit declared by such specified business organisation is below the prescribed percentage. This provision is aimed at preventing misuse of the relief provided by the Act. In my sixteen years of practice, I have seen many genuine cases where the actual profit earned is below the specified percentage, but due to the threat of harassment through scrutiny procedures, businessmen have adopted the prescribed percentage and have declared higher profits and paid tax on the unreal income. I have also come across a few cases wherein the lack of awareness of law has led to non-conduct of audit and consequently payment of penalty due to noncompliance.
A similar situation may be faced by many in the near future, due to modification in the sections relating to presumptive tax i.e., sections 44AD/AE etc. becoming effective from A.Y. 2011-12. Due to the amendments, section 44AD is now applicable not only to contractors in civil construction businesses but also to all ‘eligible’ business organisations. The definition of ‘eligible business’ as given in the section includes all business organisations run by individuals, HUFs and firms. Therefore, these modifications have a very widespread impact. Further, it is also rather unfair that the rate of 8% net profit has been prescribed across the board, irrespective of the nature of assessess. A majority of such businessman would be small retail traders. For them the rate hitherto was only 5%. The net profit is now suddenly perceived to be 8%! Further, it might so happen that cost of compliance may even exceed the tax liability and on the top of it, the fear of scrutiny!
The positive side is that all small businessmen having a turnover or gross receipts below Rs.60 lakh can seek shelter u/s. 44AD and after declaring 8% profit, can get rid of complicated accounting and audit requirements and threatening scrutiny proceedings. However, on the flipside, due to the effect of the modified section 44AB, all such eligible businesses declaring a profit below 8% will have to maintain their books of account and get them duly audited, besides filing their return of income. Earlier a small organisation having turnover below Rs.40 lakh and not belonging to a specified class under presumptive tax sections, was completely out of the purview of section 44AB and the audit of such organisations was not mandatory under the provisions of the Act.
To make the law fair — percentage of profit should be trade/industry or businesswise based on survey of reasonable sample of the business, rather than ad hoc percentage of 8%. However, if 8% is based on survey carried on by the CBDT, then in the interest of fairness and transparency, the same needs to be disclosed.
Organiser of business exhibition exempted for organising exhibition abroad — Notification No. 05/2011, dated 1-3-2011.
Air travel service tax enhanced for domestic and international passengers — Notification No. 04/2011, dated 1-3-2011.
Service tax rules amended — Notification No. 03/2011, dated 1-3-2011.
1. Applicable rate of service tax should be the rate applicable at the time when the services are deemed to have been provided.
2. Service tax shall be payable upon deemed provision of services.
3.
When an invoice has been issued or a payment is received for a service
which is not subsequently provided, the service provider can take credit
of service tax paid earlier, provided the amount has been refunded to
the payer.
4. Maximum amount admissible for adjustment of excess
service tax under Rule 6(4B)(iii) has been increased from Rs.1 lac to
Rs.2 lac.
5. Self-assessed amount of service tax, if not paid,
shall be recovered along with interest as per the provisions of section
87 of the Finance Act, 1994.
6. Composition rate applicable in
relation to purchase or sale of foreign currency including money
changing has been reduced from 0.25% to 0.10%.
Service tax Valuation Rules amended — Notification 02/2011, dated 1-3-2011.
Erection, Commissioning & Construction Works Contract — CENVAT credit restricted to 40% when tax paid on the full value — Notification No. 01/2011, dated 1-3-2011.
Adjustment of Refund of F.Y 2010-11 to F.Y 2011-12 up to Rs.1 lakh — Trade Circular 6T of 2011, dated 15-4-2011.
Grant of Refunds against Bank Guarantee — Trade Circular 5T of 2011, dated 11-4-2011.
VALUATION OF CUSTOMER-RELATED INTANGIBLE ASSETS
Identification of customer-related intangible
assets
- Examples
- Definition
- Basis of identification
- Additional highlights
Valuation of customer-related intangible
assets
Comparison with Ind-AS
Conclusion
Identification:
Examples
FASB ASC 805 under US GAAP and IFRS-3 (January 2008) under IFRS, give the following examples of customer-related intangible assets:
Before we start, it is imperative to know that selfgenerated intangibles (including goodwill) are not allowed to be recognised under any accounting guidance. The identification and the valuation of these intangibles would arise only in the case of an acquisition, resulting in a business combination where the acquirer would be required to allocate the value paid for the target to, inter alia, intangible assets by way of a purchase price allocation process. Hence, in the discussion below we would constantly talk about an acquirer-target relationship.
Definitions:
Customer contracts and the related customer relationships:
Standard: When an entity establishes relationships with its customers through contracts, customer relationships arise from these contractual rights. Customer contracts refer to signed contracts as at the date of the valuation.
Customer contracts are signed contracts by the target as at the valuation date. On account of the acquisition, the acquirer will get the benefit of these contracts and hence it is an intangible for the acquirer. Related to these contracts would be their associated relationships and the acquirer will also get the benefit of these contractual relationships. ?
Non-contractual customer relationships:
Standard: A customer relationship acquired in a business combination that does not arise from a contract may nevertheless be identifiable because the relationship is separable.
There would be few instances in practical life where relationships are contractual. Most of the times relationships are non-contractual and though the benefits are not guaranteed, a trend can be observed wherein the same customers continue to give business repeatedly. This recall value is what is measured and termed as no contractual customer relationships.
Customer lists:
Standard: A customer list consists of information about customers, such as their names and contact information. A customer list also may be in the form of a database that includes other information about the customers, such as their order histories and demographic information. Databases are collections of information, often stored in electronic form. A database that includes original works of authorship may be entitled to copyright protection.
Customer lists (all type of information) depending on the industry can open more avenues for business by adding new customers and hence would add value to the acquirer.
Order or production backlog:
Standard: An order or a production backlog arises from contracts such as purchase or sales orders and therefore is considered a contractual right.
Order or production backlog refers to the unexecuted orders as at the valuation date. The only difference between customer contracts and order or production backlog is that in customer contracts the work on the contracts has not started, while in order or production backlog, the work on the contracts has not been completed.
Basis of identification:
Additional highlights: Customer contracts and the related customer relationships:
(i) It is an intangible and will meet the contractuallegal criterion even if confidentiality or other contractual terms prohibit the sale or transfer of a contract separately from the acquiree.
(ii) A customer contract and the related customer relationship may represent two distinct intangible assets.
(iii) Both the useful lives and the pattern in which the economic benefits of the two assets are consumed may differ.
(iv) A customer relationship related to the customer contract exists between an entity and its customer if
(a) the entity has information about the customer and has regular contact with the customer, and
(b) the customer has the ability to make direct contact with the entity.
(v) Customer relationships related to the customer contracts meet the contractual-legal criterion if an entity has a practice of establishing contracts with its customers, regardless of whether a contract exists at the acquisition date.
(vi) Customer relationships related to the customer contracts also may arise through means other than contracts, such as through regular contact by sales or service representatives. Consequently, if an entity has relationships with its customers through these types of contracts, these customer relationships also arise from contractual rights and therefore meet the contractual-legal criterion.
(vii) Customer contracts can also be a contract-based intangible asset. If the terms of a contract give rise to a liability (for example, if the terms of an operating lease or customer contract are unfavourable relative to market terms), the acquirer recognises it as a liability assumed in the business combination.
Non-contractual customer relationships:
Exchange transactions for the same asset or a similar asset that indicate that other entities have sold or otherwise transferred a particular type of no contractual customer relationship would provide evidence that the no contractual customer relationship is separable. For example, relationships with depositors are frequently exchanged with the related deposits and therefore meet the criteria for recognition as an intangible asset separately from goodwill.
Customer lists:
(i) A customer list generally does not arise from contractual or other legal rights. However, customer lists are frequently leased or exchanged. Therefore, a customer list acquired in a business combination normally meets the separability criterion. For example, customer and subscriber lists are frequently licensed and thus meet the separability criterion.
(ii) Whether customer lists have characteristics different from other customer lists, the fact that customer lists are frequently licensed generally means that the acquired customer lists meet the separability criterion.
(iii) However, a customer list acquired in a business combination would not meet the separability criterion if the terms of confidentiality or other agreements prohibit an entity from selling, leasing, or otherwise exchanging information about its customers.
(iv) A database acqui
LIMITS ON SEBI’S POWERS — another decision of SAT
For example, there is a term commonly used in securities laws — ‘person associated with securities markets’ — this term almost gives an omnibus power to cover any person directly or indirectly connected with securities markets. Investors, auditors and even independent directors have been held to be ‘persons associated with securities markets’ and thus action has been taken against them for alleged wrongs. It is important to highlight this since there are many persons such as insiders, acquirers which have been specifically defined in securities laws — who can be acted against only if it is first demonstrated that they do fall within the definition.
This impression is further supported by the areas in which SEBI can issue directions. These terms are also of wide import — for example:
Directions can be issued for purposes such as ‘in the interests of investors’ or ‘orderly development of securities markets’.
A clause in the SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices Relating to Securities Market), Regulations, 2003 reads that “no person shall directly or indirectly buy, sell or otherwise deal in securities in a fraudulent manner”.
‘Power to issue Directions’ — this term is capable of a fairly wide interpretation.
‘Power to punish’ may mean penalty, suspension or cancellation of registration, debarring a person from dealing in securities for a specified period.
Provision prohibiting indulging in ‘fraudulent or an unfair trade practice in securities’. There are numerous acts/omissions specifically listed which are deemed to be fraudulent or unfair trade practices. It is often found in actual cases that several of these provisions in the law are thrown at the alleged culprit and even the final order usually lists a long list of provisions that are said to have been violated by a single act/omission.
However, a well-settled principle of law is that the crime and punishment both have to be well defined and the person who is supposed to obey the law also has to be specified. This principle is obviously applicable even to securities laws and thus one occasionally sees decisions that strike down an order of SEBI on this ground. The recent decision of the Securities Appellate Tribunal (‘SAT’) in the case of G. M. Bosu & Co. Private Limited v. SEBI and others, (Appeal No. 183 of 2010, dated 15th February 2011) is worth reviewing in this context.
The facts of the case show a long series of steps a defrauded investor had to take to get back her money. Simplifying the facts a little, it appears that an investor was defrauded by a person who sold her shares in the open market by taking her signature on some forms. These signatures were taken on the pretext that they were required incidental to transfer of shares from her deceased husband’s name to her name. Such person, who was an ex-employee of a depository participant, then allegedly sold the shares in the market and thus defrauded the investor. On a police complaint being made, he confessed his guilt and agreed to compensate the investor. However, he died without compensating her. The investor then initiated a long legal battle in which the essential argument was that she should be compensated by the depository. The legal basis for this was a provision in Regulation 32 (though amended later on) of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Depositories and Participants) Regulations, 1996 which requires that the depository should ensure that payment has been received by the investor before the shares are transferred to a third party.
It is worth mentioning here that the investor had to petition multiple authorities multiple times including finally facing, albeit indirectly, the SAT. Suffice it is to state that SEBI investigated the matter and held the depository participant concerned (DP) (which was the appellant here) responsible for the lapse in non-complying with the said Regulation 32. It ordered the DP to credit the account of the investor with the 100 shares with all benefits accrued on the shares (incidentally, the 100 shares had become 1500 shares by then). This direction was issued by SEBI exercising powers under sections 11 and 11B of the SEBI Act.
The DP went in appeal to the SAT pointing out that SEBI did not have any powers to direct the DP to give such compensation to the investor u/s. 11B of the Act. It pointed out that Regulation 64 of the SEBI Depositories Regulations clearly stated that in case if a depository participant who “contravenes any of the provisions of the Act, the Depositories Act, the bye-laws, agreements and these regulations . . . . shall be dealt with in the manner provided under Chapter V of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Intermediaries) Regulations, 2008”. In other words, it was argued that action could only be taken under the said SEBI (Intermediaries) Regulations, 2008 and resorting to section 11B and requiring payment of compensation by way of credit of the shares to the account of the investor was not in accordance with the law.
The SAT noted:
Firstly, the obligation of complying with Regulation 64 was on the depository and not on the depository participant.
Secondly, even assuming that there was a violation by the DP, the provisions of Regulation 64 and thereby the provisions of the SEBI (Intermediaries) Regulations should have been followed in taking action against the DP. This is what the SAT observed:
“Assuming (though not holding) that there was such a violation, Regulation 64 of the regulations requires that the depository or a participant who contravenes any provision of the regulations “shall be dealt with in the manner provided under Chapter V of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Intermediaries) Regulations, 2008.” The word ‘manner’ means that the procedure laid down in Chapter V of the intermediaries regulations shall have to be followed. Regulations 24 to 30 in that chapter provide the detailed manner/procedure according to which the delinquents are to be dealt with. These provisions envisage a two-stage inquiry before taking any action against the delinquent. A designated authority is required to be appointed which shall issue a show-cause notice to the delinquent and after holding an inquiry, a report shall be submitted. The report will then be considered by the designated member after issuing a notice to the delinquent who will also be furnished with a copy of the report. It is only then that the designated member can take any one or more of the actions referred to in Regulation 27 of the intermediaries regulations keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case. Admittedly, this procedure has not been followed and neither the appellant nor the depository were dealt with in the manner prescribed in Chapter V of the intermediaries regulations. Instead, directions have been issued u/s. 11B of the Act to compensate respondent 3.”
Finally, the question was whether the powers u/s. 11B were wide enough to order such a compensation being made by the DP. The SAT observed as follows:
“It is true that the powers of the Board u/s. 11B are wide enough to issue directions to any intermediary or person associated with the securities market but such powers are to be exercised only to protect the interests of investors in securities or for orderly development of securities market and to preserve its integrity. These directions cannot be punitive in nature and cannot be issued to pun
PART C: Information on & Arround
Says Mr. Eknath Khadse (BJP leader):
‘Gathering information about the Pawars was a difficult task. However, we used the RTI Act to search the data of air-travel of Mr. Pawar and his family members on Balwa’s air craft’ from the Pune air traffic control. Through RTI application it was gathered that Balwa’s plane was used by Pawar on several occasions and on one trip, besides BCC president Shashank Manohar and his wife, the Balwas accompanied Pawar and his family to Dubai. Khadse has also reportedly dug up facts to prove that Supriya, along with her husband Sadanand and DB Realty, was the promoter of a technology park near Pune set up on an illegally procured land.
Disclosure of personal properties by CIC:
In a major step to introduce greater transparency and accountability, the six Central Information Commissioners now have declared details of their properties on the Commission’s Website.
The Commissioners draw a salary of Rs. 90,000 p.m. Following are the brief summary of declarations made:
S. Mishra : Land, property worth Rs. 1.5cr.
D. Sandhu : Agriculture land worth Rs. 81,000,
2 houses worth Rs. 5.5cr.
S. Singh : house, flat worth Rs. 66.5 lakh.
S. Gandhi : Flat worth Rs. 80,000 (cost at
time of purchase), plus shares,
mutual funds and bank deposits.
A. Dixit : Flat, cottage worth Rs. 51 lakh.
M. L. Sharma : Property worth Rs. 4.50 lakh.
Selection procedure of for appointment of Chief of Trai:.
The selection procedure of the chairman of telecom regulator Trai, including all the details of the selection committee meeting, should be made public, the Central Information Commission (CIC) has held. The panel rejected the plea of the cabinet secretariat that the information was personal in nature and cannot be given u/s. 8(1)(j) of the Right to Information Act, which prohibits disclosure of such details.
“We fail to understand how the desired information could be classified as personal information at all … The information sought in these cases is far from personal. Selection and appointment to certain posts in the government are part of the administrative decision-making process and must be placed in the public domain as soon as possible in order to ensure transparency,” Chief Information Commissioner Satyananda Mishra said. He directed the secretariat to allow the RTI applicant the inspection of the entire file related to the selection of the Trai chairman.
BMC’s functioning :
We all know that it takes months, sometimes years to get projects and files cleared from Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation (BMC) babus. However, if you have the right connections, then your work could be done in a single day. In 2008 the BMC displayed exemplary promptness and granted permissions in a single day for construction of 13 additional floors on a building in Dadar. Interestingly, all clearances were granted to the builder and the area of a reserved public playground was reduced to make way for the building.
The issue came to light when residents procured documents under the Right to Information (RTI) Act. They learnt how BMC’s Building Proposal Department allowed developers, Finetone Realtors Pvt. Ltd. to construct 13 additional floors on the plush 20-storey Garden Court building in Dadar. Arun Sapkal, a Dadar resident and RTI activist said, “It’s shocking how the BMC first granted permission and later issued stop notice to the builder after the construction was over?” However, developers Ramakant Jadhav of Finetone Realtors Pvt. Ltd. said, “ we have all the necessary permissions in place as per the DCR rules for construction of the building and the playground. We have kept the reservations as allowed by the BMC.”
Information on ITR thru RTI:
Manoj Kumar Saini made an RTI application to get information on income tax-return (ITR) of his father-in-law Mr Munna Lal Saini, CIC Deepak Sandhu ruled:
The I-T returns of individuals do not enjoy ‘absolute ban’ from disclosure CIC has held, while directing the I-T department to provide details of the total income of a person to his son-in-law who is facing a dowry case. We direct the CPIO to provide information pertaining to the taxable income of Munna Lal Saini, father-in-law of the appellant,” Information Commissioner Deepak Sandhu said. The case relates to RTI application filed by Manoj Kumar Saini, who sought to know income of his father-in-law Munna Lal Saini from the I-T as he needed it to buttress his arguments in a dowry case filed against him.
Maharashtra State Information Commission’s Annual Report for the year 2010 is out, just now only in Marathi. Some brief statistics:
RTI applications filed : 5.49 lakh
Appeals received : 19,483
Appeals disposed : 17,266
Complaint received : 4,592
Complaint disposed : 3,911
Public Information Officers penalised : 523
Total penalties : Rs 34.38 lakh
Department action against PIOs : 602
PART B: The RTI Act , 2005
PENDENCY
Taking note of the increasing pendency of appeals/ complaints in the Commission over the last few years and realising the need for their expeditious disposal, the Commission hereby resolves that each single bench of the Commission shall take urgent steps to maximise its disposal without comprising the quality thereof, as a general rule, each single bench will endeavour to finally decide about 3200 appeals/complaints per year.
Application of the provisions of the RTI-Act to the entities under the Public Private Partnership (PPP Arrangement)
Chief CIC has exchanged letters with the Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission, India on the subject of PPP Arrangement. Extracts from the same:
Satyananda Mishra, CIC on 04.01.2011 writes:
A PPP entity should be deemed to be a public authority u/s. 2(h) for the purpose of the RTI Act.
All Projects which are handed over to a PPP entity for building, operating or maintaining the land, even if not any other resources, given by the Government, forms a vital component of the project and, to that extent, can be deemed to substantial financing.
However, due to a lack of clarity on this at various levels and, especially since the RTI Act does not expressly refer to such bodies while defining the public authorities, a lot of confusion persists and such entities have, by and large, remained outside the purview of the RTI Act.
This Commission is of the view that time has come to clarify the role and responsibility of the PPP entity for implementing the RTI Act in order to bring in greater transparency in implementation of such projects.
Letter then suggest how the coverage is to be implemented and once carried out, a lot of confusion in this regard will go and the citizens will have access to vital information regarding the projects which affect their lives. Needless to say, this will also greatly improve the accountability of such entities to both the Government and the public at large.
In reply, Montek Singh Ahluwalia vide letter dated 14.03.2011 states:
In the Press Note issued, we recognise that the powers of the Information Commission are laid down in the RTI Act. It is for the Commission to exercise these powers in their best judgment. It may not be appropriate to expand or reduce the jurisdiction of the Information Commissions through a contractual arrangement in the concession agreements. However, we have referred the matter to the Department of Legal Affairs for advice and I will revert to you on receiving their advice.
The Commission discussed above referred letter at its meeting of 22-03-2011 and recorded as under:
The Commission discussed the letter of the Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission on application of RTI Act to the entities under the PPP. The CIC decided to wait for two months for the Planning Commission to send a copy of response of Department of Legal Affairs on this issue as referred to in the letter of the Deputy Chairman dated 14-03-2011.
It is now reported in ET of 26 April that MoF objects to plan Panel’s role in social PPPs and says that they fall in its domain. Matter has been referred to the cabinet secretariat seeking its intervention on the matter.
I hope that PPP arrangements come in the domain of RTI whoever may be in charge of the same at Government level.
Bombay Public Trusts Act
Trusts are governed by the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 (‘the Act’).
Under the Act, the Charity Commissioner is in charge of public trusts.
The State of Gujarat also has a law similar to the Bombay Public Trust
Act.
The Charity Commissioner has powers of supervision,
regulation and control of public trusts. All public trusts must register
under the Act with the Charity Commissioner. It should be remembered
that all public trusts are trusts, but all trusts need not be public
trusts. The Act does not apply to section 25 companies which are created
under the Companies Act, 1956. The Bombay Chartered Accountants’
Society is an instance of a public trust registered under this Act.
Definitions:
A
public trust is defined to mean an express or constructive trust for
either public or charitable purpose or both and includes a temple, a
math, a wakf, church, synagogue, agiary or any other religious or
charitable endowment and a society formed either for religious or
charitable purposes or both and registered under the Societies
Registration Act, 1860.
The word ‘trust’ is not defined under
the Act and hence, one needs to refer to the definition under the Indian
Trusts Act, 1882. Section 3 of the said Act defines a ‘trust’ as an
obligation annexed to the ownership of property and arising out of a
confidence reposed in and accepted by the owner or declared and accepted
by him for the benefit of another or of another and the owner. A public
trust must be for the public at large or some significant portion of
the public. However, the number of beneficiaries must be a fluctuating
body. It is the extensiveness of object which affords some indication of
the public nature of the trust — Prakash Chandra v. Subodh Chandra, AIR
1937 Cal. 67. A trust cannot be held to be for charitable purpose if it
is not for public benefit. Thus, private charitable trusts are not
governed by this Act. The term public purpose is not capable of any
strict definition and depends upon the facts and circumstances of each
case. No rigid rules can be applied to define the same — State of Bombay
v. S. R. Nanji, AIR 1956 SC 294.
The Supreme Court in
Radhakanta Deb v. Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa,
AIR 1981 SC 798, the Court held that “the cardinal point to be decided
is whether it was the intention of the founder that specified
individuals are to have the right of worship at the shrine, or the
general public or any specified portion thereof.” Thereafter, the Court
observed that the mere fact that members of the public are allowed to
worship by itself would not make an endowment a public, unless it is
proved that the members of the public had a right to worship in the
temple.
The Supreme Court formulated four tests as providing
sufficient guidelines to determine on the facts of each case whether an
endowment is of a private or of a public nature. The four tests are as
follows:
(a) Whether the use of the temple by members of the public is of right;
(b)
Whether the control and management vests either in a large body of
persons or within the members of the public and the founder does not
retain any control over the management;
(c) Whether the dedication
of the properties is made by the founder who retain the control and
management and whether control and management of the temple is also
retained by him; and
(d) Where the evidence shows that the founder
of the endowment did not make any stipulation for offerings or
contributions to be made by the members of the public to the temple,
this would be an important intrinsic circumstance to indicate the
private nature of the endowment.
Charitable purpose is defined u/s. 9 of the Act to include:
(a) relief of poverty or distress
(b) education
(c) medical relief
(d)
provision for facilities for recreation or other leisure-time
occupation (including assistance for such provision), if the facilities
are provided in the interest of social welfare and public benefit, and
(e)
the advancement of any other object of general public utility, but does
not include a purpose which relates exclusively to religious teaching
or worship.
Hence, a trust for both religious and charitable
purposes is feasible under the Bombay Public Trust Act, although the
same is not recognised u/s. 11 of the Income-tax Act (if created after
1-4-1961).
The term ‘public’ does not mean the humanity as a
whole, but some indefinite class of persons, a crosssection of the
community — CIT v. Radhaswami Satsang Sabha, 25 ITR 472 (All). Charity
need not benefit the entire mankind but should at least benefit an
ascertainable section of the community — Hazarat Pirmahomed Sahah Sahib
Roza Committee, 63 ITR 490 (SC). The trustees can decide on such
charitable purpose as they deem fit — Smith v. Massey, (1960) ILR 30
Bom. 500. A trust does not become invalid if the discretion of selecting
the charitable purpose is left to the trustees and they are free to
apply the fund in such manner and at such time and to such charities as
they deem fit — Sardar Bahadur Indra Singh Trust, AIR 1956 Cal. 164.
Registration:
Section 18 of the Act and the Bombay Public Trust Rules lay down the procedure for registration of a trust as follows:
(a) Apply to the Deputy Charity Commissioner of the region in Schedule II within three months of creation of the trust.
(b)
The application must contain the names and details of the trustees, the
trust, list of movable and immovable properties along with their
approximate market values, etc. A copy of the trust deed should also be
annexed. A memorandum must also be sent, which must contain the
prescribed particulars relating to the immovable property of the trust.
Schedule IIA to the Rules contains the format for the same. Section 22C
of the Act also provides for particulars of the memorandum.
On
receipt of the application, the Deputy Commissioner would make an
inquiry u/s.19 for ascertaining whether there exists a public trust and
whether the trust falls within its jurisdiction. The principles of
natural justice must be followed in this inquiry process. On completion
of the inquiry, the Deputy Commissioner shall record his findings with
reasons as to the matters inquired by him and may make an order for the
payment of the registration fee. The Charity Commissioner shall maintain
a Register containing all details of the trust.
Investment of trust money:
The
funds of the trust which cannot be deployed for the purposes of the
trust shall be deposited either with a bank or invested in designated
public securities. Public securities means those issued by the
Central/State Government/Railways/Local Authorities, etc.
The
money may also be invested in the first mortgage of immovable property
if the property is not leasehold for a term of years, i.e., the lease
must be indefinite, and secondly, the value of the property must exceed
the mortgage money by one-half times. Thus, if the value of the property
is Rs.1.50 crores, the investment permissible in the first mortgage is
Rs.1 crore.
Purchase of an immovable property as an investment
of trust funds would also require the permission of the Charity
Commissioner. If the property is purchased without its permission, then
the trustees would become liable for penalty for contravention of the
Act. However, the transaction is not void ab initio. This is contrary to
the provisions for sale of an immovable property. Any sale transaction
without the Commissioner’s permission is void ab initio.
Trustees
cannot borrow money for the purpose of or on behalf of
The basics of cloud computing Part 2
The previous write-up on this topic was intended to be an eye-opener on this subject. This one briefly discusses certain important aspects about cloud computing. This would include key terminology and the some offerings.
Background:
Cloud computing, as explained in the previous issue, is a model for enabling convenient, ondemand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction. By providing on demand access to a shared pool of computing resources in a selfservice, dynamically scaled and metered manner, cloud computing offers compelling advantages in speed, agility and efficiency.
Moving on, one needs to appreciate that, currently, cloud computing is at an early stage of its life-cycle, and cloud computing as we know it, is the evolution and convergence of several trends. In order to benefit from the fast evolving model, one needs to understand certain important aspects and key terminology being used in the context of cloud computing.
Commonly used models of cloud computing:
The first in the order of things is for the readers to understand the different (common) cloud computing models available in the market. The models currently in vogue are:
- Private clouds
- Public clouds
- Community clouds
- Hybrid clouds
Private clouds:
These refer to clouds for exclusive use by a single organisation. Such clouds are typically controlled, managed and hosted in private data centers. However, this not a hard and fast rule, there are exceptions wherein the private cloud is for the exclusive use by one organisation, but the hosting and operation of the private clouds is outsourced to a third party service provider.
Public clouds:
These refer to clouds which are leased out for use by multiple organisations (tenants) on a shared basis. These clouds are hosted and managed by a third party service provider. These are fairly common and serve small and medium enterprises. Examples would be Microsoft 365, Google docs.
Community clouds:
These refer to clouds for use by a group of related organisations who wish to make use of a common cloud computing environment. For example, a community might consist of the different branches of the military, all the universities in a given region, or all the suppliers to a large manufacturer. To cite an example: Large Hadron Collider1. (Look this up on the Internet, you may find the facts and dynamics hard to believe.)
Hybrid clouds:
These refer to situations when a single organisation adopts both private and public clouds for a single application, in order to take advantage of the benefits of both. For example, in a ‘cloudbursting’ scenario, an organisation might run the steady-state workload of an application on a private cloud, but when a spike in workload occurs, such as at the end of the financial quarter or during the holiday season, they can burst out to use computing capacity from a public cloud, then return those resources to the public pool when they are no longer needed. (Somebody please wake up the Tax Department, please use this on due dates.)
Of the above, private clouds and public clouds are the most commonly seen and implemented.
Advantages:
While the advantages such as efficiency, availability, scalability and fast deployment are common to both public as well as private clouds, there are certain advantages which would be unique either to public clouds or to private clouds. Some of these are: Some benefits are unique to public cloud computing:
- Low upfront costs — Public clouds are faster and cheaper to get started, hence providing the users with the advantage of a low-cost barrier to entry. There is no need to procure, instal and configure hardware.
- Economies of scale — Large public clouds enjoy economies of scale in terms of equipment purchasing power and management efficiencies, and some may pass a portion of the savings onto customers.
- Simpler to manage — Public clouds do not require IT to manage and administer, update, patch, etc. Users rely on the public cloud service provider instead of the IT department.
- Operating expense — Public clouds are paid out of the operating expense budget, often times by the users’ line of business, not the IT department. Capital expense is avoided, which can be an advantage in some organisations.
Some benefits are unique to private cloud computing:
- Greater control of security, compliance and quality of service — Private clouds enable IT to maintain control of security (prevent data loss, protect privacy), compliance (data handling policies, data retention, audit, regulations governing data location), and quality of service (since private clouds can optimise networks in ways that public clouds do not allow).
- Easier integration — Applications running in private clouds are easier to integrate with other in-house applications, such as identity management systems.
- Lower total costs — Private clouds may be cheaper over the long term compared to public clouds, since it is essentially owning versus renting. According to several analyses, the breakeven period is between two and three years.
- Capital expense and operating expense — Private clouds are funded by a combination of capital expense (with depreciation) and operating expense.
Summarising:
To recap, cloud computing is characterised by real, new capabilities such as self-service, auto-scaling and chargeback, but is also based on many established technologies such as grid computing, virtualisation, SOA shared services and large-scale, systems management automation. The top two benefits of cloud computing are speed and cost. Through self-service access to an available pool of computing resources, users can be up and running in minutes instead of weeks or months. Making adjustments to computing capacity is also fast, thanks to elastically scalable grid architecture. And because cloud computing is pay-per-use, operates at high scale and is highly automated, the cost and efficiency of cloud computing is very compelling as well.
In the next write-up:
While cloud computing offers compelling benefits in terms of speed and cost, clouds also present serious concerns around security, compliance, quality of service and fit. There are a number of issues and concerns that are holding some organisations back from rushing to the cloud. The top concern far and away is security. While one can debate the relative security of public clouds versus in-house data centers, the bottom-line is that many organisations are not comfortable entrusting certain sensitive data to public clouds where they do not have full visibility and full control. So some particularly sensitive applications will remain in-house while others may take advantage of public clouds. Another concern is quality of service, since clouds may not be able to fully guarantee service level agreement in terms of performance and availability. A third area of concern is fit, the ability to integrate with in-house systems and adapt SaaS applications to the organisation’s business processes. Organisations are likely adopt a mix of public and private clouds. Some applications will be appropriate for public clouds, while others will say in private clouds, and some will not use either.
Until the next write-up . . . . Cheers!!!!!!
Carve-outs Under IND-AS
The final standards notified by the MCA are substantially similar to the current IFRS standards. However, there are certain changes made to the Ind-AS standards as part of the convergence (rather than adoption) process to suit more appropriately to the Indian environment. These changes can be classified into the following categories:
- Mandatory differences as compared to IFRS
- Removal of accounting policy choices available under IFRS
- Additional accounting policy options provided, which are not in compliance with IFRS requirements
- Certain IFRS guidance to be adopted with separate (deferred) implementation dates.
This article attempts to explain the first category of carve-outs i.e., mandatory differences with IFRS and their impact on the financial statements. We will cover the other categories of carve-outs in our subsequent articles.
Foreign currency convertible bonds (FCCB):
Position under IFRS:
FCCB involve an exchange of a fixed number of shares for a fixed consideration that is denominated in foreign currency. Since the cash flows of the issuer entity in its own functional currency (i.e., in rupees) is variable due to changes in exchange rates, FCCB do not meet the definition of an equity instrument under IFRS. Thus, under IFRS, FCCB are classified as hybrid instruments and are initially split between the conversion option (embedded derivative) and the loan liability.
Conversion option: The conversion option is treated like a derivative and is initially recorded at its fair value. Like all derivatives, the conversion option is subsequently marked-to-market (MTM) at every reporting date and the impact is recognised in the income statement.
Loan liability: The loan liability is initially recorded as the difference between the proceeds and the amount allocated to the conversion option. Interest is thereafter recorded based on imputed interest rates. Further, the loan is adjusted for exchange rate movements that are recognised in the income statement.
Position under Ind-AS:
The Ind-AS has modified the definition of financial liabilities under Ind-AS 32 (vis-à-vis IAS 32) to exclude from its definition, the option to convert the foreign currency denominated borrowings into a fixed number of shares at a fixed exercise price (in any currency). Thus, these instruments will be split initially into the loan liability and the conversion option (as discussed above), but the conversion option will be recognised as equity (as against a derivative under IFRS) and therefore will not remeasured subsequently i.e., no subsequent MTM.
Key implications of the carve-out:
The key implication of this is that the conversion option is not subsequently MTM under Ind-AS, while such MTM is required under IFRS.
Under IFRS, the changes in the fair value of the conversion option may have a significant impact and result in volatility in profits. Further, the impact on the profits for the year is inversely related to the movement in the underlying share price; i.e., if the fair value of the underlying shares rises, MTM of the conversion option would lead to losses to be recognised in the income statement and vice-versa.
Under Ind-AS, since the conversion option is recognised as equity and is not remeasured subsequently, the carve-out eliminates the volatility in profits on account of the changes in the underlying share prices of the company.
Let us understand the impact of the carve-out with the help of an example:
On 1st April 2012, Company A (INR functional currency) issued 10,000 convertible bonds of USD 100 each with a coupon rate of 4% p.a. (interest payable annually in arrears). The total proceeds collected aggregated to USD 1 million. Each USD 100 bond is convertible, at the holder’s discretion, at any time prior to maturity on 31st March 2017, into 1,000 ordinary shares of Rs.10 each. For simplicity, transaction costs and deferred taxes are ignored. The following information on the exchange rate (spot) and fair value of conversion option (option) may be relevant:
Under IFRS, proceeds collected would be required to be split into loan liability and the conversion option. The total proceeds from the issue of USD 1 million aggregates to Rs.45 million based on a conversion rate of USD 1 = Rs.45. On initial recognition, the conversion option would be recognised at its fair value (i.e., Rs.4.5 million or 0.1 million USD) and the remaining proceeds (i.e., Rs.40.5 million or 0.9 million USD) would be recognised as loan liability.
The Company shall compute an effective interest rate based on the loan principal received (i.e., 0.9 million USD), loan principal on maturity (USD 1 million) and payments to be made for interest costs @ 4% p.a. on the loan principal of USD 1 million. The effective interest rate in this case works out to 6.4% p.a. The interest cost p.a. shall be computed based on outstanding loan principal (in foreign currency) and the effective interest rate of 6.4% p.a. converted at average exchange rates during the year. Further, the loan liability shall be translated at exchange rate as at the reporting date, with the exchange differences recognised in the income statement.
The conversion option on initial recognition aggregated to Rs.4.5 million, while the fair value of the conversion option as at the end of the year aggregates to Rs.9.2 million i.e., an increase by Rs.4.7 million. IFRS requires such a change in the fair value of conversion option to be recognised in the income statement.
Let us consider the movements in the carrying values of the conversion option and the loan liability:
Under IFRS
There are three costs recognised in the income statement i.e., interest cost on the loan, the exchange differences on the loan and the MTM gains/losses on the conversion option.
Under Ind-AS, the accounting for the loan liability is same as under IFRS. However, the conversion option is to be recognised as equity. As stated above, for simplicity we have ignored the transaction costs and deferred taxes. On initial recognition, the fair value of the conversion option (i.e., Rs.4.5 million) shall be recognised as equity. As at the end of the first year i.e., 31st March 2013, there is no further adjustment required on account of the fair value movements of the conversion option.
The costs to the company on account of FCCB under Ind-AS will be the interest cost and exchange gains/losses on the loan components of the instrument, with the conversion option not being remeasured for changes in its fair value.
Under Ind-AS
Agreements for sale of real estate (IFRIC 15):
Position under IFRS:
IFRIC 15 focusses on the accounting for revenue recognition by entities that undertake the construction of real estate. IFRIC 15 provides guidance on determining whether revenue from the construction of real estate should be accounted for in accordance with IAS 11 (Construction contract) or IAS 18 (Sale of goods), and the timing of revenue recognition.
IFRIC 15 clarifies that IAS 11 is applied to agreements for the construction of real estate that meet the definitio
Asian Paints (India) Ltd. (31-3-2010)
20. Exceptional items:
(a) Exceptional item of current year includes Rs.5.77 crores being the write-back of provision for diminution in the value of investments in the Company’s wholly-owned subsidiary Asian Paints (International) Limited, Mauritius in consequent to the buyback of 41,00,000 shares at US$ 1 per share by Asian Paints (International) Limited.
(b) Exceptional item of current year includes Rs.19.69 crores being the reversal of provision made towards diminution in the value of investments in the Company’s wholly-owned subsidiary Asian Paints (International) Limited. Mauritius, based on management’s assessment of the fair value of its investments.
(c) Exceptional item of previous year consists of provision of Rs.5.90 crores towards diminution in the value of the Company’s long-term investment in its subsidiary Asian Paints (Bangladesh) Ltd. made through its whollyowned subsidiary Asian Paints (International) Ltd. based on the management’s assessment of the fair value of its investment. Deferred tax asset on the above provision was not recognised.
Tata Communications Ltd. (31-3-2010)
4. In terms of the agreements entered into between Tata Teleservices Ltd. (‘TTSL’), Tata Sons Ltd. (‘TSL’) and NTT DoCoMo, Inc. of Japan (Strategic Partners-SP), TSL gave an option to the Company to sell 36,542,378 equity shares in TTSL to the SP, as part of a secondary sale of 253,163,941 equity shares effected along with a primary issue of 843,879,801 shares by TTSL to the SP. Accordingly, the Company realised Rs.424.22 crores on sale of these shares resulting in a profit of Rs.346.65 crores which has been reflected as an exceptional item in the profit and loss account for the current year.
11. On 27th August, 2008, the Arbitration Tribunal (the ‘Tribunal’) of the International Chamber of Commerce, Hague handed down a final award in the arbitration proceedings brought by Reliance Globalcom Limited (‘Reliance’), formerly known as ‘FLAG Telecom’, against the Company relating to the Flag Europe Asia Cable System. The Tribunal directed the Company to pay Rs.95.60 crores (US$ 21.45 million) (2008: Rs. NIL) as final settlement against US$ 385 million claimed by Reliance. The amount of Rs.95.60 cores has been charged to profit and loss account and has been disclosed as an exception item.
Ramco Industries Ltd. (31-3-2010)
From Notes to Accounts:
Consequent to the decision to exit Plastic Storage Tanks business, the difference between estimated resale value of assets of this division an value reflected in the books has been accounted towards impairment loss in terms of AS-28.
MARICO Ltd. (31-3-2010) (Consolidated Financial Statements)
(13) (a) The exceptional items stated in the Profit and Loss account are as under:

(b) During the year, upon completion of necessary compliances under FEMA regulations, the Company divested its stake in Sundari LLC (Sundari) on 8th June, 2009. Sundari ceased to be subsidiary of the Company from the said date. Accordingly, the financial statements of Sundari have been consolidated with that of Marico Limited for the period from 1st April, 2009 to 8th June, 2009. The net effect of the divestment of Rs.4.05 crores is charged to the Profit and Loss account and reflected as ‘Exceptional item’ (detailed hereunder):

(c) Kaya Ltd., a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Company, had launched the Kaya Life prototype to offer customers holistic weight management solutions and had opened five ‘Kaya Life’ centres in Mumbai and Kaya Middle East FZE, a step-down subsidiary of the Company had also opened one centre in the Middle East during the past three years. While clients had been experiencing effective results on both weight loss and inch loss, the prototype had less than expected progress in building a sustainable business model. Hence, the Management took a strategic decision of closing down the centres in March, 2010. Consequently, the Group has made an aggregate provision of Rs.5.74 crore towards impairment of assets of Rs.2.91 crore and other related estimated liabilities of Rs.2.83 crore towards employees’ termination, lease termination costs, customer refunds and stock written down relating to these centres for the year ended 31st March, 2010. (Refer note 23 below)
Ambuja Cements Ltd. (31-12-2010)
During the current year, the Company has estimated provision for slow and non-moving spares based on age of the inventory. Accordingly, the Company has recognised a provision of Rs.61.03 crores as at 31st December, 2010. The provision based on such parameters applied to spares inventory at the beginning of the year amounting to Rs.46.10 crores has been disclosed as an exceptional item in the profit and loss account.
Registration — Family settlement — Document reciting past events need not be registered — Registration Act, section 17(1) (b), 49.
The petitioner-plaintiff was not allowed to exhibit two documents in a suit, namely, family settlement and a map annexed thereto on the ground that the same were not registered and duly stamped. The petitioner contented that it was not required for a settlement to be registered with the Office of the Registrar as these documents were simply a recitation of past events.
The Court relying on the decision of Roshan Singh v. Zile Singh, AIR 1988 SC 881, held that while an instrument of partition which operates or is intended to operate as a declared volition constituting or severing ownership and causes a change of legal relation to the property divided amongst the parties to it, requires registration u/s. 17(1)(b) of the Act, a writing which merely recites that there has in time past been a partition, is not a declaration of will, but a mere statement of fact, and it does not require registration. The essence of the matter is whether the deed is a part of the partition transaction or contains merely in incidental recital of a previously completed transaction. The use of the past tense does not necessarily indicate that it is merely a recital of a past transaction. It is equally well settled that a mere list of properties allotted at a partition is not an instrument of partition and does not require registration. Section 17(1)(b) lays down that a document for which registration is compulsory should by its own force, operate or purport to operate to create or declare some right in immovable property. Therefore, a mere recital of what has already taken place cannot be held to declare any right and there would be no necessity of registering such a document.
Two propositions therefore flow : Firstly, a partition may be effected orally; but if it is subsequently reduced into a form of a document and that document purports by itself to effect a division and embodies all the terms of bargain, it will be necessary to register it. If it be not registered, section 49 of the Act will prevent its being admitted in evidence. Secondly, evidence of the factum of partition will not be admissible by reason of section 91 of the Evidence Act, 1872. Partition lists which are mere records of a previously completed partition between the parties, will be admitted in evidence even though they are unregistered to prove the fact of partition.
In view of the aforesaid, the Court allowed the writ petition.
Muslim Law — Properties purchased by female exclusively belongs to her and can be divided only between her children — No concept of jointness of nucleus.
The appellant and respondents (1-6) are brothers and sisters and are governed by Hanife School of Muslim Law. The other respondents are sons and daughters of second wife and other relatives. The suit was filed by one of the sisters against the brother and other sisters to get partition with respect to certain properties.
The properties in dispute were recorded in the name of mother Bibi Jainab (first wife). The father of the appellants and defendants had executed one of the properties to his wife in lieu of dawar debt. The Trial Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to get partition. The appeal was filed contending that the Trial Court has wrongly decided the issue considering the principles of Hindu law, where a property is not the absolute property of a female, if the source, from which the property has been purchased, is proved to be of the joint family or by the husband, then it will not be considered to the property of the female. But in the Muslim law, all the properties in the name of muslim lady belong to her, irrespective of source of money, from which it was purchased. The plaintiff is the full-blood sister of the defendants, thus, the plaintiff and the defendants are the legal heirs and successors of their deceased father, Md. Yakub and deceased mother, Jainab Khatoon. The partition suit was filed for preparing of separate ‘takhta’ for the plaintiff after granting a decree of 1/12th share in the properties of her father, Md. Yakub and her mother, Jainab.
The defendant alleged that no property is joint as claimed by the plaintiff. They also claimed that after the death of their parents, the parties have amicably settled their properties and the defendant and the plaintiff was allotted specific share.
The Court referred to certain salient features of Muslim law of succession which distinguish it from modern Hindu law of inheritance, the Muslim law of succession is basically different from the parallel indigenous systems of India. The doctrine of janmswatvavada (right by birth), which constitutes the foundation of the Mitakshara law of succession, is wholly unknown to Muslim law. The law of inheritance in Islam is relatively close to the classical Dayabhaga law, though it differs also from that on several fundamental points. The modern Hindu law of succession as laid down in the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is, however, much different from both the aforesaid classical systems; it has a remarkable proximity, in certain respects, to the Muslim law of inheritance.
Whatever property one inherits (whether from his ancestors or from others) is, at Muslim law, one’s absolute property — whether that person is a man or a woman. In Muslim law, so long as a person is alive, he or she is the absolute owner of his or her property; nobody else (including a son) has any right, whatsoever, in it. It is only when the owner dies and never before that the legal rights of the heirs accrue. There is, therefore, no question of a would-be heir dealing in any way with his future right to inherit.
The Indian legal concepts of ‘joint’ or ‘undivided’ family, ‘coparcenary’, karta, ‘survivorship’, and ‘partition’, etc., have no place in the law of Islam. A father and his son living together do not constitute a ‘joint family’; the father is the master of his property. The same is the position of brothers or others living together.
Unlike the classical Indian law, female sex is no bar to inherit property. No woman is excluded from inheritance only on the basis of sex. Women have, like men, right to inherit property independently, not merely to receive maintenance or hold property ‘in lieu of maintenance’. Moreover, every woman who inherits some property is, like a man, its absolute owner; there is no concept of either streedhan or a woman’s ‘limited estate’ reverting to others upon her death. The same scheme of succession applies whether the deceased was male or a female.
Since all properties in the name of a female belongs to her exclusively and there is no concept of jointness of nucleus or any concept that the property is purchased from joint nucleus of the head of the joint family, hence, all the properties which are exclusively purchased by sale deed by Bibi Jainab in her name can be divided only between her children. Thus, the plaintiff would be granted 1/10th share in the property belonging to Bibi Jainab. A property which was belonging to the father will be divided amongst all the 17 parties in the ratio of 1/17th each and a separate takhta would be carved out.
Anyone willing to bat for the poor?
The second candidate for government largesse is the International Cricket Council (ICC), presided over by Sharad Pawar. The government has just given the ICC’s World Cup tax-free status. The reports say this means a tax saving for ICC of Rs.45 crore, though the figures of revenue (Rs.1,476 crore) and expenditure (Rs.571 crore) suggest a much larger giveaway. It is easy to see why the government has played ball; Mr. Pawar is the leader of a coalition partner, and agriculture minister. Oddly, the sports minister argued against the freebie. So did a note put up by the finance ministry, though the finance minister seems to have batted for the ICC. As happens all too often, the Prime Minister has chosen the path of least resistance.
Now the history of the ICC is that, once cricket became a big-money game some years ago, this London- based body decided that it needed tax shelters. It created a subsidiary for its business operations and housed it in Monaco. But running between London and Monaco was inconvenient, so the ICC told the British treasury that it would re-locate entirely to London if the government offered tax-free status. When the response was a polite ‘No’, the ICC moved to Dubai. Penny-pinching London could learn a thing or two from the generosity that New Delhi shows to the really deserving.
But the most deserving of all is Vijay Mallya, owner of yachts, private jets, vintage cars, a cricket team, an island in the Mediterranean, and homes on every continent, and also two-thirds owner of Kingfisher Airlines. Kingfisher has been so run that it has been losing money, and borrowing up to its gills. The lenders (13 banks led by the government-owned State Bank of India) have now agreed to convert some of the loans into equity — at a share price of Rs.64.48, when the going market rate was Rs.40. That means a loss straightaway of nearly 40% of the loan value — and there are further loans outstanding. Could the lenders have flexed their muscles, since the airline is in no shape to repay loans? Yes. Could they have threatened to buy out the promoters’ 66% shareholding at the going value of Rs.740 crore, and put in new management? Almost certainly, yes. So if Mr. Mallya still has majority control of the airline, it tells you the scale of the government banks’ largesse.
Purge civil aviation of corruption
Opening up the aviation sector made air travel an affordable reality for the Indian middle class. However, oversight of this sector is poor. Each day the safety of thousands of passengers hangs in the balance. If sons and daughters of DGCA officials are able to obtain licences despite dubious flying records, it opens the door to large-scale fraud. Apart from an internal purge of the DGCA itself, it is imperative to undertake a thorough audit of the 40 flying schools in the country. A public DGCA database for result cards of candidates is a good idea. That corruption hasn’t even spared a sensitive industry like aviation, jeopardising the lives of thousands, is a grave concern. Now that the rot lies exposed, civil aviation minister Vayalar Ravi must undertake thorough and rapid action to cleanse the system and bring back credibility to civil aviation.
Tragic state of our Universities — University of Pune’s Institutes run sans approved teachers
A Supreme Court order had asked colleges to have full-time approved principals and teachers in place or face punitive action like a ban on admissions to first year of courses in the 2011- 12 session. Seventy-seven of the 125 colleges have secured court relief against possible action. The university will stop admissions in the 48 other colleges.
At the meeting, senate members raised questions on how exams for students from these colleges were conducted, who assessed their papers and what action the varsity was taking to ban first-year admissions in the 48 colleges.
They also demanded a panel to probe how the local inquiry committees recommended continuation of affiliation for the 125 colleges. Director of UoP’s board of college and university development W. N. Gade and controller of exams S. M. Ahire could not placate the senate, which wanted to know if answer papers were assessed at the colleges lacking approved staff.
Ironically, the university was recently accorded the highest ‘A’ grade by the National Assessment and Accreditation Council. The university’s approval of teaching staff makes students of affiliated colleges eligible for exams. Without approved teachers/principals, a college cannot be an exam centre. Students then take their exams in the nearest college with approved staff. If the college is unable to accommodate more students, it assigns two approved teachers to the college to be ‘custodians’ of the varsity’s exam material, including answer papers.
The norms are ambiguous on who should assess answer papers of colleges lacking approved teachers.
Shunglu Committee Report reveals scale of waste — Don’t bury it
Welfare law delusion — After passing legislation the Court has to prod the executive at every step for years to enforce them
The construction industry is said to be the second largest one after agriculture. It is labour-intensive, employing 20 million and it is estimated that every Rs.1 crore invested on construction project generates employment of 22,000 unskilled man-days and 23,000 skilled or semi-skilled man-days. Recognising its importance, Parliament passed the Building and Other Construction Workers (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1996 and the Building and Other Construction Workers’ Welfare Cess Act, 1996.
The government stated in the preamble that construction works are characterised by their inherent risk to the life and limb of workers. The work is also characterised by its casual nature, temporary relationship between employer and employee, uncertain working hours, lack of basic amenities and inadequacy of welfare facilities. Although the provisions of various labour laws like the Minimum Wages Act, Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act and Inter-State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment & Conditions of Services) Act are applicable to building workers, there was no comprehensive central legislation for this category of workers. The two enactments were aimed to improve matters.
After nearly 15 years, the central and state governments have done little to implement these laws. Ten years after the laws came into force, a public interest petition was moved in the Supreme Court pointing out the non-implementation of the provisions of the Acts (National Campaign for Central Legislation on Construction Labour v. Union of India). The Court passed several orders over the years asking state governments to implement the main provisions of the law. There was little response. Last week, the Court took a tough stand and summoned five top labour officers in the country to be present in the Chief Justice’s Court and explain the lapse.
The dubious honour goes to the Union Labour Secretary, the Director General of Inspection, Government of India, and Labour Secretaries of Nagaland, Meghalaya and Lakshdweep.
The Court stated that many among the 36 states and Union territories have not taken even the initial steps. They have not appointed ‘Registration Officers’ before whom the employers of workers have to register their establishments. They have also ignored their obligation to constitute state welfare boards.
Anna Hazare’s movement combines new and old ideals
While the movement’s leader, Anna Hazare, is a Gandhian, adopting the Mahatma’s method of fasting, many joining him are not satyagrahis shaped by austerity. Several are middle-class Indians, moulded by professionalism, progress and consumption. Many are youth in university or jobs, shaken by what they see, stirred into joining an elderly leader who refers to another leader’s practices, which for many have passed into the realm of cliche. The agitation is strong enough, however, to override these divisions. Corruption, exemplified by a terrible year of scams, is the oil fuelling such coalescing.
However, there’s more. The Indian middle class is not only demanding accountability but dignity in citizenship. This notion has been catalysed by recent cases like Rizwanur Rehman’s and Ruchika Girhotra’s, where regular middle-class lives were crushed by a brutal nexus of political and financial clout. The booing away from Jantar Mantar of Om Prakash Chautala, one of the political shields around Ruchika’s tormentor, police officer S. P. S. Rathore, reflected public anger with precisely this sort of nexus. This reflects growth in ideas about citizenship. Previously, notions of citizenship were limited to a small, well-educated elite. Today, this circle has perforce widened. Media and travel have changed the way people think. Indians are increasingly aware of countries where bribery isn’t normal, where murders get punished even when committed by the powerful. It’s become apparent that globalisation is not just about mobile phones and malls, but lawful, equal societies, an ideal many are now demanding.
The media is their ally. Starting with the Jessica Lal case in 1999, the media began acting as mirror and motor to civil society agitation, transmitting information about unpunished crimes, locations to gather at and modes of protest, like candlelight vigils, email and text campaigns. The Internet also sees massive following for Hazare’s movement. All this gives lie to the notion of middle-class Indians being ‘apathetic’ to politics. Where once frustration existed without cohesiveness, today there are effective means to channel feelings, forums to gather at, ways to debate and discuss. Several ‘ideas of India’ are emerging. Many Indians feel a deeper connection to their country. In that sense, Anna has won the war even as the battle persists.
Lost in Mumbai? Google Transit to the rescue
Users need to visit www.google.com/transit and key in the start and endpoints of their proposed journey. Google then uses algorithms to churn out the best possible routes. The application, which is available in desktop and mobile versions, utilises a database of BEST bus routes as well as the railway routes and schedules on the Western, Central and Harbour lines.
However, this is not the first application that encourages people to use public transport. The BEST runs its own application on www.bestundertaking.com.
Lokpal Bill — Probity: Different yardsticks
1. The Lokpal will have jurisdiction only over the Prime Minister, ministers and MPs
2. The Lokpal will not have suo motu power to initiate inquiry or even receive complaints of corruption directly from the public. The complaints will be forwarded to it by the presiding officer of either House of Parliament
3. It is purely an advisory body and can therefore only give recommendations of the Prime Minister on complaints against ministers and to the presiding officer of either House on complaints against the Prime Minister and MPs
4. Since it has no police powers, the Lokpal cannot register an FIR on any complaint. It can only conduct a preliminary enquiry
5. Anybody found to have lodged a false complaint will be punished summarily by the Lokpal with imprisonment ranging from one year to three years
6. The Lokpal will consist of three members, all of them will be retired judges
7. The committee to select Lokpal members will consist entirely of political dignitaries and its composition is loaded in favour of the ruling party
8. If a complaint against the Prime Minister relates to subjects like security, defence and foreign affairs, the Lokpal is barred from probing those allegations
9. Though a time limit of six months to one year has been prescribed for the Lokpal to conduct its probe, there is no limit for completion of trial, if any
10. Nothing has been provided in law to recover ill-gotten wealth. After serving his sentence, a corrupt person can come out of jail and use that money.
Jan Lokpal Bill (Civil society version):
1. The Lokpal will have jurisdiction over politicians, bureaucrats and judges. The CVC and the entire vigilance machinery of the Centre will be merged into the Lokpal
2. The Lokpal cannot only initiate action on its own, but it can also entertain complaints directly from the public. It will not need reference or permission from any authority
3. After completing its investigation against public servants, the Lokpal can initiate prosecution, order disciplinary proceedings or both
4. With the corruption branch of the CBI merged into it, the Lokpal will be able to register FIRs, conduct investigations under the Criminal Procedure Code and launch prosecution
5. The Lokayukta can only impose financial penalties for complaints found to be false
6. The Lokpal will consist of 10 members and one chairperson, out of which only four are required to have legal background without necessarily having any judicial experience
7. The selection committee will be broad-based as it includes members from judicial background, Chief Election Commissioner, Comptroller and Auditor General, retired Army Generals and outgoing members of the Lokpal
8. There is no such bar on the Lokpal’s powers
9. The Lokpal will have to complete its investigation within one year and the subsequent trail will have to over in another year
10. Loss caused to government due to corruption will be recovered from all those proved guilty. (Source: The Times of India, dated 8-4-2011)
Sport and nation — Given the market for cricket, why tax breaks and cash awards?
The players, their coaches and selectors have all been adequately rewarded not just in kind, but also in cash. In any case, India’s cricket players are the richest among the country’s sportspersons, given the money in the sport, the sponsorships and the advertisement budgets. The glistening diamonds worn by the wives of Indian cricketers, and their fancy cars, tell a tale of adequate recompense. So why did the taxpayer have to shell out more cash, in the form of cash awards from state governments and a tax break from the central government? There are games sportspersons play to win and there are games they play to make money. The Indian Premier League is a money-making enterprise. But a World Cup match is about winning for the country. It is the kind of achievement that finds recompense in the form of a Padma Shri or a Padma Bhushan award.
But tax breaks and cash awards from the government are an unnecessary indulgence. Gujarat’s Chief Minister Narendra Modi has resisted the cash award idea; instead, he has so far restricted himself to giving the Eklavya award. Some of India’s world-class sportspersons deserve financial support given the lack of adequate investment and the absence of a mass market in their respective sports. Cricket is certainly not one of them. The market is doing a good job, and the government, too, has done a good, indeed an excellent, job in ensuring security and safety of the players and the huge audience. Having done the job it must, and that too well, the government need not have tried to ingratiate itself with the players with more cash!
Legal representative — Not legally wedded wife — Right to apply for compensation — Civil Procedure Code, section 2(11).
Seema Bai (since deceased), was dashed by the driver of Marshal Jeep by driving the said vehicle rashly and negligently, due to which she succumbed to the injuries sustained in the said accident.
The Tribunal on a close scrutiny of the evidence led, material placed and submissions made, held that deceased Seema Bai was not legally wedded wife of the appellant; the appellant not being legal representative of the deceased; nor was the appellant dependent upon her, is not entitled to file claim petition u/s. 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, and dismissed the claim petition. The appeal was filed by the appellant claiming compensation for the death of deceased Seema Bai.
The Court observed that the fact that deceased Seema Bai was not legally married wife of the appellant is not in dispute. Admittedly, one Kaushalya Bai is the legally wedded wife residing with the appellant. It was also not in dispute that the appellant was not dependant upon the deceased.
As per section 5(i) of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, a marriage may be solemnised between any two Hindus if neither party has a spouse living at the time of marriage.
U/s. 166 of the MV Act, an application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in Ss.(i) of section 165 may be made where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representative of the deceased.
According to section 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure, ‘legal representative’ means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person, and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued. Almost in similar terms is the definition of legal representative under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, i.e., u/s. 2(1)(g). The term legal representative has not been defined in the Motor Vehicles Act.
The word ‘legal representative’ occurring in section 166 of the MV Act, has the same meaning as defined u/s. 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Now if the same definition of legal representative is applied to the facts and circumstances of the present case, it was crystal clear that the appellant, admittedly was not dependent upon the deceased, is neither a person who in law represents the estate of deceased Seema Bai, nor is a successor in interest of the deceased. Therefore, if the definition of legal representative as provided u/s. 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure is taken in its widest amplitude even then the appellant cannot be termed as a legal representative of the deceased entitled to file claim petition before the Tribunal under the MV Act and thus, the order of the Tribunal was upheld.
Evidence — Tape-recorded conversation — Admissible in evidence.
Parties are wife and husband. The petition for divorce between the parties and other ancillary reliefs was pending trial. The wife, who is the petitioner, is under cross-examination. The husband relies upon certain handwritten diaries of the wife as well as a compact disk (CD) on which conversation between the wife and the husband has been recorded by the husband on certain dates. The husband has produced the transcript of the said conversation. The wife admits the handwriting in her diaries. The parties are at dispute with regard to the taped conversation on the CD. It is contended on behalf of the wife that the taped conversation cannot be relied upon as a document. It is also contended by the wife that the affidavit of documents was not filed and the instrument on which the initial conversation was recorded is not produced. The wife has neither admitted nor denied the conversation. The husband seeks to use it in her cross-examination.
The Court referred to the elementary principle of recording evidence which must be first considered. Evidence consists of examination-in-chief and cross-examination. A party is required to offer for inspection and produce the documents relied upon by him in support of his case. This is required in his examination-in-chief. This contains the oral and documentary evidence.
The Court further observed that the accuracy of the tape-recorded conversation is of utmost importance since the document, which is a CD having tape-recorded conversation, is liable to erasure or mutilation. Thus it would be for the defendant to show that it was the original recording. This could be done by producing the initial record or the original electronic record. This original electronic record, which is primary evidence, is the instrument on which the original conversation is recorded. The defendant has not produced that evidence. The defendant has not shown the mechanical/ electronic process by which the CD was obtained. The defendant has relied upon the CD per se. That, being a copy, is secondary evidence. At the stage at which the CD is sought to be produced (that is in the cross-examination of the plaintiff), the defendant is permitted not to produce the original electronic record. The copy of such record, being the CD, can itself be used for confrontation in the cross-examination. Much will depend upon the answers in the cross-examination by the plaintiff. If however, the defendant desires to set up a specific case, for which the evidence is contained in the CD, he would be required to satisfy the test of accuracy by producing the original electronic record.
It must be mentioned that evidence is to be considered from three aspects; admissibility of evidence, recording of evidence and appreciation of evidence. It is settled law that tape-recorded conversation is admissible in evidence. What must be of importance is how the tape-recorded conversation is to be recorded as evidence and appreciated thereafter. Recording can be in the cross-examination of the other side and/or in the evidence of the recorder himself. The appreciation of evidence would require consideration of the aforesaid three requirements; identification, relevancy and accuracy. It is left to the defendant to pass those tests. If the tests are not passed, the tape-recorded conversation would be of no use in effect ultimately.
The requirement of sealing the recorded conversation would not be applicable in this case. That requirement is of essence in a criminal case where during investigation the conversation of a party is recorded by the investigating officer. He would certainly be required to seal the tape-recorded conversation and keep it in a safe custody so as to play before the Court at the time of the trial. It has nevertheless to be shown to be accurate and untampered with.
Adoption — Validity — Will proved by examination of attesting witness and scribe of Will — Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, section 6 and section 16, Succession Act section 63.
It was the case of the plaintiffs that plaintiff No. 2 who was the daughter of late Arumugha Mudaliar and plaintiff No. 1 was the son of plaintiff No. 2, i.e., grandson of late Arumugha Mudaliar. Arumugha Mudaliar had three children, namely, Mangalam, Saraswathi and Jayasubramanian. Jayasubramanian, the only son had expired in 1982. As the son of late Arumugha Mudaliar had expired, he had adopted Santhilkumar, his grand-son, the son of his daughter Saraswathi and plaintiff No. 1, by executing an adoption deed after doing necessary rituals required to be performed under Hindu Law. Late Arumugha Mudaliar had thereafter executed a registered Will whereby the properties referred along with other properties had been bequeathed and properties referred to in the schedule attached to the plaint had been disposed of in favour of his daughter Saraswathi and his grandson Santhilkumar, i.e., the plaintiffs.
As the defendants i.e., the present appellant and respondent Nos. 3 and 4 were interfering with or were likely to interfere with the possession of the properties referred to, a suit was filed by Saraswathi and her son Santhilkumar who was minor at the relevant time. The said suit was dismissed for the reason that the Trial Court did not believe that Santhilkumar was properly adopted by late Arumugha Mudaliar and the properties which had been bequeathed in the will were ancestral properties and, therefore, late Arumugha Mudaliar did not have absolute right to dispose of the same.
On appeal the Court observed that so far as the adoption of Santhilkumar was concerned, the said adoption had been duly established before the Trial Court. Late Arumugha Mudaliar had followed the rituals required as per the provision of Hindu Law while adopting Santhilkumar as his son. There was sufficient evidence before the Trial Court to establish that Santhilkumar had been validly adopted by late Arumugha Mudaliar. Shri Kandasamy , a witness, had been examined in detail, who had placed on record photographs taken at the time of the ceremony. The said witness had given details about the rituals performed and the persons who were present at the time of the adoption ceremony and the deed of adoption had also been registered. The aforestated facts leave no doubt in mind that the adoption was valid. Even the photographs and negatives of the photographs which had been taken at the time of adoption are forming part of the record. In such a set of circumstances, there was no reason to disbelieve the adoption. Therefore, it was held that Santhilkumar was the legally adopted son of late Arumugha Mudaliar.
So far as execution of the Will was concerned, the said Will had been duly registered. For the purpose of proving the Will, one of the attesting witnesses of the Will, namely, Umar Datta had been examined. In his deposition, he had stated that he was present when the said Will was being written by Kalyanasundaram. The scribe of the Will had also been examined. Thus the Will was proved. The decree of the Trial Court was set aside.
GAPS in GAAP — AS-16 Borrowing costs
(a) interest and commitment charges on bank borrowings and other short-term and long-term borrowings;
(b) amortisation of discounts or premiums relating to borrowings;
(c) amortisation of ancillary costs incurred in connection with the arrangement of borrowings;
(d) finance charges in respect of assets acquired under finance leases or under other similar arrangements; and because the definition of borrowing costs is an inclusive one, numerous interpretative issues arise. For example, would borrowing costs include hedging costs ? Let me explain my point with the help of a simple example using a commonly encountered floating to fixed interest rate swap (IRS).
Example:
Floating to fixed IRS
Company X is constructing a factory and expects it to take 18 months to complete. To finance the construction, on 1st January 2011 the entity takes an eighteen-month, Rs.10,000,000 variable-rated term loan due on 30th June 2012. Interest payment dates and interest rate reset dates occur on 1st January and 1st July until maturity. The principal is due at maturity. Also on 1st January 2011, the entity enters into an eighteen-month IRS with a notional amount of Rs.10,000,000 from which it will receive periodic payments at the floating rate and make periodic payments at a fixed rate of 10% per annum, with settlement and rate reset dates every 30th June and 31st December. The fair value of the swap is zero at inception. During the eighteen-month period, floating interest rates are as follows: 
Under the IRS, Company X receives interest at the market floating rate as above and pays at 10% on the nominal amount of Rs.10,000,000 throughout the period.
At 31st December 2011 the swap has a fair value of Rs.40,000, reflecting the fact that it is now in the money as Company X is expected to receive a net cash inflow of this amount in the period until the instrument is terminated. There are no further changes in interest rates prior to the maturity of the swap. The fair value of the swap declines to zero at 30th June 2012. In this example for sake of simplicity we assume hedge is 100% effective, issue costs are nil and exclude the effect of discounting.
The cash flows incurred by the entity on its borrowing and IRS are as follows:

There are a number of different ways in which Company X could theoretically calculate the borrowing costs eligible for capitalisation, including the following:
(i) The IRS meets the conditions for, and Company X applies, hedge accounting. The finance costs eligible for capitalisation as borrowing costs will be Rs.1,000,000 in the year to 31st December 2011 and Rs.500,000 in the period ended 30th June 2012.
(ii) Company X applies hedge accounting, but chooses to ignore it for the purposes of treating them as borrowing costs. Thus it capitalises Rs.925,000 in the year to 31st December 2011 and Rs.540,000 in the period ended 30th June 2012.
(iii) Company X does not apply hedge accounting. Therefore, it will reflect the fair value of the swap in income in the year ended 31st December 2011, reducing the net finance costs by Rs.40,000 to Rs.960,000 and increasing the finance costs by an equivalent amount in 2012 to Rs.540,000.
(iv) Company X does not apply hedge accounting. However, it considers that it is inappropriate to reflect the fair value of the swap in borrowing costs eligible for capitalisation, so it capitalises costs based on the net cash cost on an accruals accounting basis. In this case this will give the same result as in (i) above.
(v) Company X does not apply hedge accounting and considers only the costs incurred on the borrowing, not the IRS, as eligible for capitalisation. The borrowing costs eligible for capitalisation would be Rs.925,000 in 2011 and Rs.540,000 in 2012.
All the above views have their own arguments for and against, although the preparer will need to consider what method is more appropriate in the circumstances. For example, the following points may be considered by the preparer:
1. The decision to hedge interest cost results in the fixation of interest cost at a fixed level and are directly attributable to the construction of the factory. Therefore, method (ii) may not carry much support.
2. To use method (iv) it is necessary to demonstrate that the derivative financial instrument is directly attributable to the construction of a qualifying asset. In making this assessment it is clearly necessary to consider the term of the derivative and this method may not be practicable if the derivative has a different term to the underlying directly attributable borrowing.
3. In this example, method (v) appears to be inconsistent with the underlying principles of AS-16 — which is that the costs eligible for capitalisation are those costs that could have been avoided if the expenditure on the qualifying asset had not been made — and is not therefore appropriate. However, it may not be possible to demonstrate that specific derivative financial instruments are directly attributable to particular qualifying assets, rather than being used by the entity to manage its interest rate exposure on a more general basis. In such a case, method (v) may be an acceptable treatment. Method (iii) may not be appropriate in any case. Whatever policy is chosen by the entity, it needs to be consistently applied in similar situations.
The bigger issue is: in the era of accounting standards — is this diversity warranted and/or desirable?
DDIT v. Dharti Dredging & Infrastructure Ltd. 9 Taxman.com 327 (Hyd. ITAT) Article 5 of India-Netherlands DTAA; Sections 9, 195 of Income-tax Act A.Ys.: 2000-07 and 2007-08 Dated: 17-9-2010
Facts:
The assessee was an Indian company (‘IndCo’) engaged in the business of marine dredging and port construction. IndCo was awarded contract for dredging of Inner Harbour Channel. For executing the contract, IndCo hired a dipper dredger from a Netherlands company (‘DutchCo’). As per the agreement between IndCo and DutchCo, the dipper dredger was provided to IndCo with two charter coordinators and two operators. During the course of survey by Tax Authority it was found that IndCo had made certain payments to DutchCo for usage of dredger. It had not deducted tax from these payments. Hence, the AO held that the dredger constituted PE and permanent base of business of DutchCo in India. Therefore, the AO passed order u/s. 201 of Income-tax Act levying tax and interest.
Before the Tribunal, IndCo contended that:
- merely because it hired the dredger together with coordinators and operators, it does not mean that the contract was carried out by DutchCo;
- equipment hired from a foreign company cannot be construed as place of business of foreign company and to constitute permanent base of foreign company in India, the foreign company must have PE to control its business activities in India;
- IndCo paid salary, lodging, board, etc. of crew and DutchCo had not incurred any expenditure for the crew which stayed in India for operating the dredger;
- the crew was to work under the directions and instructions of IndCo;
- IndCo executed the work on its own utilising the dredger and no part of the work was done by DutchCo.
- DutchCo had nothing to do with execution of the dredging contract; and
- therefore, dredger cannot be said to constitute PE of DutchCo in India.
The Tax Authority contended that:
- the dredger belonging to DutchCo stayed in Indian territory for sufficiently long period;
- the dredger had living space for stay of crew; it had advanced instruments like computer and communication equipments, which met the essential requirements of office/work place;
- the dredger remained in a particular location; and
hence, DutchCo had a permanent place of business in India and the dredger should be considered as PE of DutchCo.
Held:
As regards PE under Article 5(1):
- Payments made by IndCo to DutchCo were hire charges.
- Hiring of dredger for operations under direction, control and supervision of IndCo cannot be construed as PE of foreign company in India.
- Provision of living space and presence of communication and other equipments, for effective usage at sea cannot be construed as PE.
As regards Article 5(3):
Installation of structure used for more than 183 days would constitute PE if the foreign company was carrying out the contract in India. Since IndCo was carrying out the contract and dredger was used by IndCo and not DutchCo, DutchCo cannot be said to have installed equipment or structure for exploration in India.
ADIT v. M. Fabrikant & Sons Limited Article 5, 7 of India-USA DTAA; Section 9(1)(i) of Income-tax Act A.Ys.: 1999-2000 to 2002-03 and 2003-04 Dated: 28-1-2011
Facts:
The assessee was a company based in the USA (‘USCo’). USCo was engaged in the business of sale of diamonds and diamond jewellery. After obtaining approval of RBI, USCo established a Liaison Office (‘LO’) in India for purchase of diamonds for exports to its Head Office (‘HO’). During the course of survey by the tax authority, the following was noted as business model of USCo and its LO in India:
- Upon receipt of information from HO, LO gets the right quality, size and carats from the supplier.
- The prices are then negotiated, by LO with the supplier, in order to obtain best prices, as per HO’s requirement.
- Unassorted diamonds are received; the parcels are assorted with the help of assorters.
- For getting the right selection and chalking out rejections, the assortment, verification and selection of packets is done by various other employees of LO.
- Once right selection of diamonds are obtained, packed and sealed, they are dispatched to the customs office.
- LO has dedicated employee who takes care that the sealed packets are cleared through the approver and examiner at the customs.
- The supplier prepares the invoice which is directly honoured by HO.
It was also noted that USCo had 76% shareholding in another Indian company and that company purchased rough diamonds, got them processed from others and sold the finished diamonds in open market. About 25% of the total purchases of LO were from this company.
Based on the above activity conducted by LO, the tax authority held that LO constituted PE in India of USCo and computed its income @5% of the value of diamonds imported through LO.
USCo contended that as per clause (b) of Explanation 1 to section 9(1)(i), no income could be deemed to accrue or arise in India through or from operations which were confined to the purchase of goods in India for purposes of export. Reliance, in this regard was placed on Circular Nos. 23, dated 23-7-1969 and 163, dated 29-5-1975.
In appeal, CIT held that LO was not involved in manufacture or production and was not selling diamonds. Also, under India-USA DTAA, LO, which was engaged in the purchasing of goods or merchandise, or for collecting information for the HO, could not be considered as PE in India.
Held:
- The activity profile of LO, namely assorting, quality checking and price negotiation, under instructions and specifications of HO are a part of the purchasing of diamonds for export from India. Such process did not result or bring any physical and qualitative change in the diamonds purchased.
- Selection of right goods and negotiation of prices are an essential part of the purchasing activity.
- The case is squarely covered by Explana-tion (1)(b) to section 9(1)(i) of the Income-tax Act. Further, having regard to Circular No. 23 and Circular No. 163 of the CBDT, no income could accrue or arise in India to USCo by virtue of purchase of goods made for purposes of export.
VNU International B V AAR No. 871 of 2010 Article 13(5) of India-Netherlands DTAA; Sections 139, 195 of Income-tax Act Dated: 28-3-2011
Facts:
The applicant was a company incorporated in, and a tax resident of Netherlands (‘DutchCo’). DutchCo was subsidiary of another Netherlands company. DutchCo held entire capital of an Indian company (‘IndCo1’). IndCo1 entered into a scheme of arrangement with another Indian company (‘IndCo2’) for demerger of one of the divisions of IndCo1 into IndCo2. Subsequently, DutchCo transferred 50% of the shares in IndCo2 to a Switzerland company resulting in substantial capital gains for DutchCo.
DutchCo sought ruling of AAR on the following questions:
- Whether capital gains earned by DutchCo were liable to tax in India under Income-tax Act and India-Netherlands DTAA?
- Whether the transfer would attract transfer pricing provisions under Income-tax Act?
- Whether the purchaser of the shares would be liable to withhold tax u/s. 195 of Incometax Act?
- If capital gains are not taxable in India, whether DutchCo is required to file return of income u/s. 139 of Income-tax Act?
Held:
- In terms of Article 13(5) of India-Netherlands DTAA, capital gains would be taxable only in Netherlands and not in India.
- Since capital gains are not taxable in India, the transfer would not attract transfer pricing provisions under the Income-tax Act.
- The purchaser of the shares would not be liable to withhold tax u/s. 195 of the Incometax Act.
- Under the Income-tax Act, every company is required to file return of its income or loss and a foreign company is also included within the definition of ‘company’. While casting an obligation to file return of income, the Legislature has omitted expression ‘exceeded the maximum amount which is not chargeable to income tax’. In terms of section 5, DutchCo is liable to pay tax in India — though, due to treaty applicability, no tax is actually paid in India, but is only paid in the Netherlands. Once power to tax a particular income exists, it is difficult to claim that there is no obligation to file return of income. The Income-tax Act has specifically provided for exemption from filing of return of income where it is not necessary for non-resident to file return of income. Such exemption is not provided in this case. Hence, DutchCo would be required to file income of return. The AAR also observed:
Apart, it is necessary to have all the facts connected with the question on which the ruling is sought or is proposed to be sought in a wide amplitude by way of a return of income than alone by way of an application seeking advance ruling in Form 34C under IT Rules. Instead of causing inconvenience to the applicant, the process of filing of return would facilitate the applicant in all future interactions with the Income-tax Department.
Improving service delivery time of approval of company’s registration and critical services (Registration in 24 hours)
Now all Registrars of Companies have to first approve the above critical services before attending any other forms. The Ministry would also ensure that all other critical e-forms are also processed within the service delivery parameters as given in the citizen charter.
Companies (Director Identification Number) Amendment Rules, 2011.
Similarly, the DIN 4 is also to be filed electronically.
Refer F. No. 02/01/2011-CL V dated 26th March 2011 and Circular No. 11/2011 dated 7th April 2011.
Prosecution of Directors.
Such directors should not be held liable for any act of omission or commission by the company or by any officers of the company which constitute a breach or violation of any provision of the Companies Act, 1956, and which occurred without their knowledge and without their consent or connivance or where they have acted diligently in the Board process. The Board process includes meeting of any committee of the Board and any information which the director was authorised to receive as a director of the Board as per the decision of the Board.
The Circular also specifies compliances to be verified by the Registrar of Companies before taking penal action against directors.
Also the list of persons who can be treated as Officers in default has been listed for prosecution u/s.209(5), 209(6), 211 and 212 is given.
For the complete text of the Circular visit
http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/Circular_08-2011 _25mar2011.pdf
Delegation u/s. 637 of the Companies Act by the Central Government of its powers and functions under Act — Powers and functions delegated to Registrars of Companies for specified provisions of the Act — Supersession of Notification G.S.R. No. 506(E), dated 24-6-1985.
- Section 21 pertaining to Change of Name of Company.
- Section 25 pertaining to Power to dispense with ‘Limited’ in name of Charitable or Other Company.
- Proviso to Ss.(1) of section 31 pertaining to change in the articles having effect of converting a public company into a private company.
- Ss.(1D) of section 108 relating to extension of period within which instrument of transfer is to be submitted to the company.
- Section 572 relating to change of name of a company seeking registration under Part IX of the Companies Act.
Powers and functions delegated to the Regional Directors for specified provisions of the Act — Supersession of Notification G.S.R. No. 288(E), dated 31-5-1991.
The Central Government vide Notification dated 17-3-2011, F. No. 5/07/2011-CL-V has delegated to the Regional Directors at Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai, Noida and Ahmedabad, the powers and functions of the Central Government under the following provisions of the said Act, namely:
- Section 22 relating to rectification of name of the company.
- Ss.(3), (4), (7) and clause (a) of Ss.(8) of section 224 relating to the appointment, remuneration and removal of auditors in certain cases.
- Proviso to section 297(1) Proviso relating to approval of the Central Government for contracts by a company with certain parties where paid up share capital of the company is not less than Rs. one crore.
- Section 394A pertaining to notice to be given of for applications u/s. 391 for compromise or arrangements with creditors and members and section 394 for reconstruction and amalgamation of companies.
- Section 400 relating to notice to be given of applications under sections 397 and 398 for relief in cases of oppressions and mismanagement.
- Second proviso to Ss.(5) of section 439 and Ss.(6) of the said section relating to applications for winding up.
- Clause (a) of Ss.(1) of section 496 and Clause (a) of Ss.(1) of section 508 relating extension of time for calling general meeting of company and of the creditors of the company by the liquidator at end of each year.
- Ss.(1) of section 551 relating to exemption from filing information as to pending liquidations.
- Clause (b) of Ss.(7) of section 555 and the proviso to clause (a) of Ss.(9) of the said section relating to certain powers regarding unpaid dividends and undistributed assets to be paid into the Companies liquidation Account and claims in respect thereof.
- Provisos to Ss.(1) of section 610 relating to inspection, production and evidence of documents delivered to the Registrar with prospectus; and
- Section 627 relating to production and inspection of books where offences suspected.
EXEMPTION U/S.54F IN CASES WHERE SECTION 50C APPLICABLE
Section 50C provides for substituting the full value of consideration with the value adopted or assessed by the stamp valuation authorities, in computing the capital gains arising on transfer of land or building or both. Where the value of the property assessed or adopted for stamp duty purposes is higher than the sale consideration as specified in the transfer documents, then such higher value is deemed to be the full value of consideration for the purposes of computation of capital gains u/s.48, by virtue of the provisions of section 50C.
Capital gains on sale of an asset other than a residential house, in the hands of an individual or a Hindu Undivided Family, is eligible for an exemption u/s.54F on purchase or construction of a residential house within the specified period, subject to fulfilment of other conditions. The assessee enjoys a complete exemption from tax where the cost of the new asset is equal or more than the net consideration of the asset transferred and he will get a pro-rated exemption where the cost of the new asset is less than the net consideration.
A question has arisen, in the above facts, as to how such exemption u/s.54F is to be computed in a case where the provisions of section 50C apply. Should one take the sale consideration recorded in the documents of transfer, or should one take the stamp duty value as per section 50C, is an issue which is calling our attention.
To illustrate, if a plot of land is sold for Rs.50 lakhs with its stamp duty valuation being Rs.75 lakhs, and if the cost of the new residential house is Rs.50 lakhs, would the entire capital gains be exempt from tax u/s.54F or would only two-thirds of the capital gains be exempt from tax under this section?
While the Lucknow and the Bangalore Benches of the Tribunal have taken a view that for the purposes of computation of exemption u/s.54F, the stamp duty value being the deemed full value of consideration as per section 50C is to be considered, the Jaipur Bench of the Tribunal has held that it is the actual sale consideration recorded in the document of transfer which is to be considered and not the stamp duty value.
Mohd. Shoib’s case:
The issue first came up before the Lucknow Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Mohd. Shoib v. Dy. CIT, 1 ITR (Trib.) 452.
In this case, the assessee sold 7 plots of land, which had been subdivided from a larger plot of land, for a total consideration of Rs.1.47 crore. In respect of 4 plots of land sold for Rs.83 lakh, the consideration was lower than the valuation adopted by the stamp duty valuation authorities, such valuation being Rs.1,00,61,773. The assessee had purchased a residential house out of a part of the total sale consideration, and claimed exemption u/s.54F which was calculated with reference to the consideration recorded in the documents of transfer by ignoring the difference of Rs.17,61,773 between the stamp duty value and the recorded consideration.
The Assessing Officer enhanced the returned capital gains by Rs.17,61,773, by invoking the provisions of section 50C. In appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals), the assessee challenged the applicability of the provisions of section 50C, which was rejected by the Commissioner (Appeals).
In further appeal to the Tribunal, besides challenging the applicability of section 50C, the assessee claimed that once the assessee had reinvested the net consideration in purchasing the new residential house as per section 54F, then no capital gains would remain to be computed for taxation and therefore provisions of section 50C could not be invoked. It was argued that once the exemption was claimed u/s.54F, there was no occasion to charge capital gains and therefore provisions of section 45 could not be invoked as no capital gains could be computed. Reliance was placed on the use of the words ‘save as otherwise provided in section 54, 54B, . .’ in section 45 for the argument that once the charging section failed, substitution of the sale consideration by the stamp duty valuation would not arise. It was further argued that investment in new asset could be made only of real sale consideration, and not of the notional sale consideration. Once there was no real sale consideration, there could not be any capital gains on notional sale consideration.
On behalf of the Department, it was argued that neither section 45 nor section 50C would fail if the assessee had made investment in exempted assets as per section 54, 54F, etc. According to the Department, section 54F only provided the method of computation of capital gains and did not provide exemption from the charging section 45. It was submitted that if an assessee did not invest the full consideration into a new asset, then he would be required to compute the capital gains in the manner laid down in sections 48 by applying the provisions of section 50C, and the exemption from capital gains was available only to the extent of investment made by the assessee in the new asset. Where a part investment was made in the new asset, then capital gains would be charged with respect to the sale consideration not invested. It was argued that the provisions of section 54, 54F, etc. followed the charging section 45, and that the charging section 45 did not follow the exemption provisions. It was submitted that merely because the assessee did not get an opportunity to invest the difference between the notional sale consideration as per section 50C and sale consideration shown by the assessee, the charging of capital gains on the basis of notional sale consideration as per section 50C could not be waived. According to the Department, there were many provisions where a notional income is taxed without giving any occasion to the assessee to make investment out of such notional income and claim deductions under Chapter VIA, etc. It was thus claimed that the charging section could not be made otiose merely because the assessee did not get an opportunity to claim deduction or make investments for claiming deduction in respect of additional income assessed.
While upholding the applicability of section 50C to the facts of the case, the Tribunal observed that section 45 provided a general rule that profits or gains arising from the transfer of a capital asset would be chargeable to income-tax under the head capital gains, except as provided in section 54, 54F, etc. According to the Tribunal while charging capital gains on profits and gains arising from the transfer of a capital asset, one had to see and take into account section 54F, and to the extent provided in section 54F and other similar sections, capital gains would not be chargeable. The moment there was a profit or gain on transfer of a capital asset, capital gains would be chargeable within the meaning of section 45, except and to the extent it was saved by section 54F and like sections.
Analysing the provisions of section 54F, the Tribunal noted that it was not the case that merely because provisions of section 54F were applicable to an assessee, that the entire capital gains would be saved and that no capital gains be chargeable. Saving u/s.54F depended upon investment in new asset of net consideration received by the assessee on sale of old asset. The quantum of net consideration was the result of transfer of the old asset, charge of the capital gain was only on the old asset, and investment in new asset did not and could not nullify or take away the case from the charging section 45. According to the Tribunal, first it was section 45 which came into operation, then it was section 48 which provided computation of capital gains, and thereafter it was section 54F which saved the capital gains to the extent of investment in the new asset.
The Tribunal observed that once section 45 came into operation as a result of transfer of capita
Capital or revenue receipt — Non-competition fee is a capital receipt — Not exigible to tax prior to amendment of Finance Act, 2002.
During the A.Y. 1997-98 the assessee received Rs.50,00,000 from Ranbaxy as non-competition fee. The said amount was paid by Ranbaxy under an agreement dated 31st March, 1997. The assessee was a part of the Guffic group. The assessee had agreed to transfer its trade marks to Ranbaxy and in consideration of such transfer the assessee agreed that it shall not carry on directly or indirectly the business hitherto carried on by it on the terms and conditions appearing in the agreement. The assessee was carrying on the business of manufacturing, selling and distribution of pharmaceutical and medical preparations including products mentioned in the list in schedule A to the agreement. The agreement defined the period, i.e., a period of 20 years commencing from the date of the agreement. The agreement defined the territory as territory of India and rest of the world. In short, the agreement contained prohibitory/ restrictive covenant in consideration of which a non-competition fee of Rs.50 lakh was received by the assessee from Ranbaxy. The agreement further showed that the payment made to the assessee was in consideration of the restrictive covenant undertaken by the assessee for a loss of source of income.
On perusal of the said agreement, the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) while overruling the decision of the Assessing Officer observed that the Assessing Officer had not disputed the fact that Rs.50 lakh received by the assessee from Ranbaxy was towards non-competition fee; that under the said agreement the assessee agreed not to manufacture, itself or through its associate, any of the products enlisted in the schedule to the agreement for 20 years within India and the rest of the world; that the assessee and Ranbaxy were both engaged in the business of pharmaceuticals and to ward off competition in manufacture of certain drugs, Ranbaxy had entered into an agreement with the assessee restricting the assessee from manufacturing the drugs mentioned in the schedule and consequently the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) held that the said sum of Rs.50 lakh received by the assessee from Ranbaxy was a capital receipt not taxable under the Income-tax Act, 1961 during the relevant assessment year. This decision was affirmed by the Tribunal. However, the High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal by placing reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Gillanders Arbuthnot and Co. Ltd. v. CIT, (1964) 53 ITR 283. Against the said decision of the High Court the assessee went to the Supreme Court by way of petition for special leave to appeal.
The Supreme Court held that the position in law was clear and well settled. There is a dichotomy between receipt of compensation by an assessee for the loss of agency and receipt of compensation attributable to the negative/restrictive covenant. The compensation received for the loss of agency is a revenue receipt, whereas the compensation attributable to a negative covenant is a capital receipt. The above dichotomy is clearly spelt out in the judgment of this Court in Gillanders’ case (supra).
The Supreme Court observed that this dichotomy had not been appreciated by the High Court in its impugned judgment. The High Court misinterpreted the judgment of this Court in Gillanders’ case (supra). In the present case, the Department had not impugned the genuineness of the transaction. In the present case, the High Court had erred in interfering with the concurrent finding of the fact recorded by the Commissioner of Incometax (Appeals) and the Tribunal. According to the Supreme Court one more aspect needed to be highlighted. Payment received as non-competition fee under a negative covenant was always treated as a capital receipt prior to the A.Y. 2003-04. It is only vide the Finance Act, 2002 with effect from 1st April, 2003 that the said capital receipt was made taxable [see section 28(va)]. The Finance Act, 2002 itself indicated that during the relevant assessment year compensation received by the assessee under non-compensation agreement was a capital receipt, not taxable under the 1961 Act. It became taxable only with effect from 1st April, 2003. It is well settled that a liability cannot be created retrospectively. In the present case, compensation received under the non-compensation agreement was in the nature of a capital receipt and not a revenue receipt. The said section 28(va) was amendatory and not clarificatory.
For the above reasons, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment of the Karnataka High Court dated 29th October, 2009, and restored the order of the Tribunal. Consequently, the civil appeal filed by the assessee was allowed with no order as to the costs.
DEDUCTIBILITY OF FEES PAID FOR CAPITAL EXPANSION TO BE USED FOR WORKING CAPITAL PURPOSES — AN ANALYSIS, Part I
The Supreme Court in Punjab Industrial Development Corporation Ltd v. CIT, (1997) 225 ITR 792 held that the amount paid to the Registrar of Companies as filing fee for enhancement of capital constitutes capital expenditure. Relying on this decision, the Supreme Court in Brooke Bond India Ltd. v. CIT, (1997) 225 ITR 798 held that expenditure incurred in connection with issuing shares for increasing capital by a company is capital expenditure. Since then one is a witness to these two decisions being mechanically applied by tax authorities as a ground for disallowing any and every expenditure associated with share capital. These include expenses not only directly related but also incidentally connected to capital expansion. The question for consideration is whether any and every expenditure relatable to capital expansion is capital expenditure? Whether the above-mentioned decisions of the Supreme Court are all-pervasive? To put it differently, could there be occasions when these Supreme Court decisions become distinguishable? This write-up discusses one such occasion — in two parts. The first part outlines the law applicable for allowing any expenditure as business expenditure under the head income from business or profession. The second part would cover why the ratio of above-mentioned decisions of the Supreme Court cannot be regarded as all-pervasive as also other connected matters.
Assumed facts:
ABC Limited is a public company (hereinafter referred to as ‘ABCL’ for brevity) engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of pharmaceuticals products. ABCL has presence in various countries across the globe. The success of the business of ABCL is dependent upon marketing of its products. During financial year 2010-11, ABCL undertook certain strategic initiatives (including organisational restructuring) to re-align its business activities for entering into European, African and Asia-pacific countries. The objective was to capture trading opportunities available in such countries. ABCL was thus in need of funds for various business purposes viz., working capital for carrying out business, funds for securing distribution rights, licences, brands.
In view of the above, ABCL engaged the services of a commercial bank (say, XY bank) which assisted it in raising funds through foreign investors. With assistance from XY bank, ABCL managed to raise funds by issuing preference shares to three foreign investors. The funds raised by ABCL were utilised for the above purposes. In consideration of all the services provided, ABCL paid a consolidated fee to XY bank. The question for consideration is whether fees or any portion thereof paid to XY bank would be deductible as business expenditure under the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘Act’ for short hereinafter).
Applicable law — Introduction:
Chapter IV-D contains provisions relating to computation of ‘Profits and gains from business or profession’. Section 28 is the charging section. Section 29 enjoins that profits and gains referred to in section 28 shall be computed in accordance with the provisions contained in sections 30 to 43D. Sections 30 to 36 and 38 outline the law relating to specific deductions. Section 37 deals with expenditure which is general in nature and not covered within sections 30 to 36.
The payment by XY bank would not qualify for deduction under sections 30 to 36. Even section 35D would not have relevance. This is for the reason that the section would apply when expenses are incurred under specified heads prior to incorporation or after incorporation in connection with the extension of the industrial undertaking. The expenses under consideration are not pre-incorporation expenses. No extension of any existing undertaking is involved. Section 35D therefore would not be relevant. The deductibility of the said expenditure under section 37(1) of the Act remains for consideration.
Deductibility under section 37(1):
Section 37(1) of the Act enables a general or residual deduction while computing profits and gains of business or profession. Section 37(1) reads as under: “(1) Any expenditure (not being expenditure of the nature described in sections 30 to 36 and not being in the nature of capital expenditure or personal expenses of the assessee), laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the business or profession shall be allowed in computing the income chargeable under the head ‘Profits and gains of business or profession’.
(Explanation — For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that any expenditure incurred by an assessee for any purpose which is an offence or which is prohibited by law shall not be deemed to have been incurred for the purpose of business or profession and no deduction or allowance shall be made in respect of such expenditure.)
In order to be eligible for an allowance under section 37, the following conditions should be cumulatively satisfied:
(i) The impugned payment must constitute an expenditure;
(ii) The expenditure must not be governed by the provisions of sections 30 to 36;
(iii) The expenditure must not be personal in nature;
(iv) The expenditure must have been laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the business of the assessee; and
(v) The expenditure must not be capital in nature.
(i) The payment must constitute an expenditure:
The first and foremost requirement of section 37 is that there should be an expenditure. The term expenditure is not defined in the Act. The Supreme Court in Indian Molasses Company (P) Ltd. v. CIT, (1959) 37 ITR 66 (SC) defined it in the following manner:
“ ‘Expenditure’ is equal to ‘expense’ and ‘expense’ is money laid out by calculation and intention though in many uses of the word this element may not be present, as when we speak of a joke at another’s expense. But the idea of ‘spending’ in the sense of ‘paying out or away’ money is the primary meaning and it is with that meaning that we are concerned. ‘Expenditure’ is thus what is ‘paid out or away’ and is something which is gone irretrievably.”
A definition to a similar effect is found in section 2(h) of the Expenditure Act, 1957. This definition reads as : “Expenditure : Any sum of money or money’s worth spent or disbursed or for the spending or disbursing of which a liability has been incurred by an assessee. The term includes any amount which, under the provision of the Expenditure Act is required to be included in the taxable expenditure.”
In CIT v. Nainital Bank Ltd., (1966) 62 ITR 638, the Supreme Court held : “In its normal meaning, the expression ‘expenditure’ denotes ‘spending’ or ‘paying out or away’, i.e., something that goes out of the coffers of the assessee. A mere liability to satisfy an obligation by an assessee is undoubtedly not ‘expenditure’ : it is only when he satisfies the obligation by delivery of cash or property or by settlement of accounts, there is expenditure.”
Expenditure for the purposes of section 37 includes amounts which the assessee has actually expended or which the assessee has provided for or laid out in respect of an accrued liability. In the case under discussion, ABCL has paid fees to XY bank as consideration for services. The amount paid to XY bank constitutes ‘expenditure’ for the purpose of section 37(1) of the Act.
(ii) The expenditure must not be governed by the provisions of sections 30 to 36:
As already stated, the payment under discussion viz., fees paid to XY bank is not covered by any of the provisions of sections 30 to 36 of the Act. The payment would also not qualify for deduction under section 35D as the same has not been incurred prior to incorporation of business of ABCL or in connection with extension of the undertaking or setting up a new u
FINANCE ACT, 2011
1.1 The Finance Minister, Shri Pranab Mukherjee, presented the third Budget of UPA-II Government in the Parliament on 28-2-2011. The Finance Act, 2011, has now been passed by both Houses of the Parliament on 24-3-2011, without any discussion. It has received the assent of the President on 8-4- 2011. There are only 35 sections in the Finance Act amending some of the provisions of the Income tax and Wealth tax Act. This year’s amendments in our Direct Tax Laws are very few, probably because the Direct Taxes Code Bill, 2010 (DTC), introduced in the Parliament is under discussion and will replace the existing Income tax Act and Wealth tax Act hopefully from 1-4-2012.
1.2 Part ‘B’ of the Budget Speech deals with proposals relating the Direct Taxes, Excise Duty, Customs Duty and Service tax. In para 139 and 140 of his Budget Speech the Finance Minister has stated as under:
“139. In the formulation of these (tax) proposals, my priorities are directed towards making taxes moderate, payments simple for taxpayers and collection of taxes easy for the tax collector.”
“140. As Government’s policy on direct taxes has been outlined in the DTC which is before the Parliament, I have limited my proposals to initiatives that require urgent attention.”
After presenting his budget proposals, he has concluded his speech as under:
“197. As an emerging economy, with a voice on the global stage, India stands at the threshold of a decade which presents immense possibilities. We must not let the recent strains and tensions hold us back from converting these possibilities into realities. With oneness of heart, let us all build an India, which in not too distant a future, will enter the comity of developed nations.”
1.3 The various important amendments made in the Income tax Act and Wealth tax Act can be briefly stated as under:
(i) Slabs for tax payable by Individuals/HUF/ AoP/ BoI have been revised and the tax burden on these assessees have been reduced to some extent.
(ii) MAT on Corporate Bodies has been marginally raised and surcharge on income of companies is reduced.
(iii) Alternate Minimum Tax (AMT) will be levied on Limited Liability Partnership (LLP).
(iv) Certain exemption and deduction provisions have been relaxed.
(v) Provisions relating to taxation of international transactions have been made more strict.
(vi) Scope of cases which can be referred to the Settlement Commission has been widened.
(vii) Some procedural changes have been made.
1.4 In this article some of the important amendments made in rates of taxes and in some of the provisions of the Income tax and Wealth tax Acts have been discussed.
2. Rates of taxes, surcharge and education cess:
2.1 Rates of Income tax:
(i) For Individuals, HUF, AoP, BoI and Artificial Juridical Persons the threshold limit of basic exemption has been revised upwards for A.Y. 2012-13. Age limit for resident senior citizens has been lowered to 60 years from the present limit of 65 years. Further, a new category of ‘VERY SENIOR CITIZEN’ who is a resident and 80 years and above has been created. The revised tax rates for A.Y. 2012-13 as compared to A.Y. 2011-12 are as under:
(a) Rates in A.Y. 2011-12
(Accounting Year ending 31-3-2011):
Note: There is no surcharge but Education cess at 3% (2 + 1) of tax is payable.
(b) Rates in A.Y. 2012-13 (Accounting Year ending 31-3-2012):

Note: No surcharge is payable but Education cess @ 3% (2 +1) of tax is payable.
(ii) The impact of these changes can be noticed from the following charts.
(a) Tax payable in A.Y. 2011-12 (Accounting Year ending 31-3-2011):
The above tax is to be increased by 3% of tax for Education cess.
(b) Tax payable in A.Y. 2012-13 (Accounting Year ending 31-3-2012):
The above tax is to be increased by 3% of tax for Education cess.
(iii) Other assessees: There are no changes in the rates of taxes so far as other assessees are concerned. Therefore, they will have to pay taxes in A.Y. 2012-13 at the same rates as applicable in A.Y. 2011-12.
(iv) Rate of tax u/s.115JB (MAT): The rate of tax on book profits u/s.115JB i.e., MAT has been increased from 18% in A.Y. 2011-12 to 18.5% in A.Y. 2012-13. This is to be increased by surcharge of 5% of tax if the Book Profit is more than Rs.1 cr. Education cess at 3% of tax is also payable.
(v) Rate of tax on dividends from foreign companies:
A new section 115BBD is inserted for A.Y. 2012- 13. This section provides for concessional rate of tax payable by an Indian company on dividend received by it from any Foreign company in which the Indian company holds 26% or more of the equity capital. The rate of tax on such dividend income will be 15% plus applicable surcharge and education cess. This concessional rate of tax on foreign dividend income is applicable only for one year i.e., dividend received during the year ending 31-3-2012 (A.Y. 2012-13). It is also provided in this section that no expenditure shall be allowed against this dividend income. Therefore, an Indian company which controls a Foreign company by holding 26% or more of equity capital in such a company can consider repatriation of profits accumulated in the foreign company to avail of this concessional rate of tax during the current year before 31-3-2012.
(vi) Rate of Alternate Minimum Tax on LLP (AMT):
Limited Liability Partnership (LLP) will now have to pay Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) at the rate of 18.5% on its gross total income as computed under new section 115JC. No surcharge is payable, but education cess is payable @ 3% of tax. This is discussed in para 8 below.
2.2 Surcharge on Income tax:
(i) No surcharge is payable by non-corporate assessees i.e., Individuals, HUF, Juridical person, AoP, BoI, Firm, LLP, Co-operative Society and Local Authority. In the case of a company, if the total income is more than Rs.1 cr. the surcharge on tax payable in A.Y. 2011-12 is 7.5%. This is now reduced to 5% for A.Y. 2012-13. Similarly, rate of surcharge on tax payable by a company u/s.115JB (MAT) is also reduced to 5% for A.Y. 2012-13 if the Book Profits amount is more than Rs.1 cr. So far as Dividend Distribution and Income Distribution Tax payable u/s.115O and u/s.115R by companies and Mutual Funds is concerned the rate of surcharge on tax is reduced from 7.5% to 5% w.e.f. 1-4-2011.
(ii) In the case of a Foreign company the rate of surcharge on tax is also reduced from 2.5% to 2% w.e.f. A.Y. 2012-13 if the taxable income of such a company is more than Rs.1 cr. Similarly, for deduction of tax at source u/s.195 from the income of a foreign company the Income tax has to be increased by surcharge at the rate of 2% (instead of 2.5%) w.e.f. 1-4-2011 if the income from which tax is deducted at source is more than Rs.1 cr.
(iii) It may be noted that no surcharge on tax is required to be charged on tax deducted at source from payments to resident assessees.
2.3 Education cess:
As in earlier years, Education cess of 3% (including 1% for higher education cess) of Income tax and Surcharge (if applicable) is payable by all assessees (Residents and Non-residents). No Education cess is to be deducted or collected from TDS or TCS from payments to all resident assessees, including companies. However, if the tax is deducted from payments made to (a) Foreign companies, (b) Non- Residents or (c) on Salary payments, Education cess at 3% of tax and surcharge (if applicable) is to be applied.
2.4 TDS on interest:
New s
(2011) 21 STR 546 (Tri.-Chennai) — CCEx., Madurai v. Tata Coffee Ltd.
Facts:
The question to be considered was whether service tax paid on goods transported from factory to port of export is alone eligible for refund or the same also extends to service tax paid on transport of empty containers from yard to factory for stuffing export goods.
Held:
The Notification granting refund contains ‘in relation to transport of export goods’ phrase, which is wide enough to cover service tax paid on transport of empty containers from yard to factory for stuffing export goods.
Income: Salary: Accrual: A.Y. 2005-06: Salary earned by non-resident for services performed on board a ship: Does not accrue in India: Not taxable in India.
The assessee is a non-resident individual. For the A.Y. 2005-06, the Assessing Officer added an amount of Rs.10,00,131, treating the same as income deemed to have been received in India as per section 5(2) (b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The said amount is the salary earned by the assessee for services performed on board a ship outside the shores of India. The Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal deleted the addition.
On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:
“(i) The Revenue does not dispute that the assessee had worked on board a ship and during the relevant period the assessee had stayed outside India for a period of 225 days and the salary that was earned by him was on account of the work discharged by him on board during the said period which is outside the shores of India.
(ii) The criteria of applying the definition of section 5(2)(b) would be such income which is earned in India for the services rendered in India and not otherwise. U/s. 15 even on accrual basis salary income is taxable i.e., it becomes taxable by implication. However, if services are rendered outside India such income would not be taxable in India.
(iii) The number of days worked by the assessee outside India as extracted in the assessment order when taken into consideration it would emerge that assessee was working outside India for a period of 225 days and the income in question earned by assessee has not accrued in India and is not deemed to have accrued in India.”
Export profits: Deduction u/s.80HHC of Incometax Act: A.Y. 1992-93: Interest income assessed as business income: Such income could not be excluded from business profit while calculating deduction u/s.80HHC.
For the A.Y. 1992-93, the assessee-company had declared the interest income as business income. The Assessing Officer assessed the interest income as income from other sources. Accordingly, he excluded the interest income from the business profit while calculating deduction u/s.80HHC of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.
On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:
(i) The Commissioner (Appeals) had held that though the main object of the assesseecompany was to extract iron ore and export the same, yet it was not barred from carrying on activity like the instant one, i.e., business of placing various deposits and earning interest from the same. The activity carried on could be definitely held as business activity and, hence, any income earned therefrom was to be taxed as business income only.
(ii) That showed that the authorities below, on the basis of the evidence on record, had held that the activity carried out by the assessee was a part of its business activity. That conclusion of the fact could not be interfered with by the Court in an appeal u/s.260A.
(iii) In any event, the Revenue had failed to advance any submission to the effect that the said findings of the fact were contrary to the evidence on record or that the same were in any way perverse.
(iv) In the instant case, the authorities below had held that the income from the interest received by the assessee was a part of the business profit and, as such, in view of the judgment in the case of Alfa Laval India Ltd. v. Dy. CIT, (2003) 133 Taxman 740 (Bom.) the same could not be excluded from the business profit while calculating the deduction u/s.80HHC.
Export profit: Deduction u/s.80HHC of Income-tax Act: A.Ys. 1995-96, 1997-98, 1998-99 and 2000-01: Exclusion of mineral oil: Calcined petroleum coke derived from crude petroleum is not mineral oil: Assessee is entitled to deduction.
The assessee was engaged in manufacture and export of calcined petroleum coke. For the relevant years the assessee’s claim for deduction u/s.80HHC of the Income-tax Act was allowed by the Assessing Officer. However, the Commissioner withdrew the allowance by exercising the powers u/s.263 of the Act. The Tribunal upheld the decision of the Commissioner holding that the calcined petroleum coke was a form of mineral oil and in view of Ss.2(b) of section 80HHC, the provision for deduction u/s.80HHC(1) was not applicable to the calcined petroleum coke manufactured by the assessee.
On appeal filed by the assessee, the Bombay High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:
“(i) The expression ‘mineral oil’ is not defined in the Act. The expression ‘minerals’ is used primarily for substances found on the earth or below the land and does not denote a product manufactured from the minerals found on the land or below the land. The word ‘oil’ ordinarily means a substance which is in liquid form and does not include a rock or solid substance or crystallised substance. For a substance to be regarded as mineral oil, it must ordinarily be a substance in liquid form and derived or extracted from the earth or land, from the surface of the earth or from below the earth.
(ii) Although calcined petroleum coke is a product which is derived from crude oil, no trader in the market would call the calcined petroleum coke a crude oil or a mineral oil. In common parlance, nobody would mistake calcined petroleum coke for a crude oil. Though the initial raw material used for manufacture of the calcined petroleum coke is petroleum crude oil extracted from the earth, the product which is manufactured is an entirely different product commercially known and regarded as different from petroleum crude and which is different from that derived by mere distillation of the petroleum crude which is a mineral oil. Calcined petroleum coke cannot be regarded as a mineral only because the original raw material is mineral oil.
(iii) The calcined petroleum coke was not a mineral oil within the meaning of section 80HHC.”
Export profit: Company: MAT: Section 80HHC and section 115JB of Income-tax Act: When income of company is assessed u/s.115JB, assessee is entitled to deduction u/s.80HHC computed in accordance with Ss.(3) and (3A) of section 80HHC: Restriction contained in section 80AB or section 80B(5) cannot be applied and carried forward business loss or depreciation cannot be first set off leaving gross total income nil.
Dealing with the scope of computation of amount deductible u/s.80HHC of the Income-tax Act, 1961, while assessing the income of a company u/s.115JB, the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court has held as under:
“(i) The short question arising for consideration is whether the assessees, whose gross total income after setting of business and depreciation carried forward from previous years is nil, are entitled to deduction u/s.80HHC in the computation of book profits u/s.115JB(2) (iv) of the Act?
(ii) After hearing both the sides and after going through the decisions, particularly that of the Supreme Court [Ajanta Pharma v. CIT; 327 ITR 305 (SC)], we feel that the assessees are entitled to deduction u/s.80HHC computed in accordance with Ss.(3) and (3A) of section 80HHC of the Act because it is expressly so provided under clause (iv) of section 115JB(2) of the Act.
(iii) All what the Supreme Court has held is that the ceiling contained in section 80HHC(1B) is not applicable for the purposes of granting deduction under clause (iv) above in the computation of book profits. However, there is nothing to indicate in the Supreme Court decision that eligible deduction of export profit under clause (iv) above in the computation of book profit can be computed in any other manner other than what is provided in Ss.(3) and (3A) of section 80HHC of the Act. What is clearly stated in clause (iv) is that deduction of export profit in the computation of book profit is the same ‘amount of profit eligible for deduction u/s.80HHC’ computed under clause (a) or clause (b) or clause (c) of Ss.(3) or Ss.(3A) of the said section.
(iv) So much so, computation of export profits has to be done only in accordance with the method provided u/s.80HHC, which is in fact done in the computation of the business profit if the assessment was on the total income computed under the other provisions of the Act. MAT assessment is only an alternative scheme of assessment and what is clear from clause (iv) above is that even in the alternative scheme of assessment u/s.115JB, the assessee is entitled to deduction of export profit u/s.80HHC. In other words, export profits eligible for deduction u/s.80HHC is allowable under both the schemes of assessment. So much so, the assessees are certainly entitled to deduction u/s.80HHC, but it is only by following the method provided under Ss.(3) and (3A) of section 80HHC.
(v) However, by virtue of the above-referred decision of the Supreme Court, we feel the restriction contained in section 80AB or section 80B(5) could not be applied inasmuch as carry forward of business loss or depreciation should not be first set off leaving gross total income nil, which disentitles the assessees for deduction under other provisions of Chapter VIA-C which includes section 80HHC also.
(vi) But the assessees’ contention that export profit has to be computed with reference to the P&L a/c prepared under the Companies Act is equally unacceptable, because there is no such provision in section 80HHC to determine export profit with reference to P&L a/c maintained under the Companies Act.”
Depreciation: Intangible asset: Goodwill: Section 32(1)(ii) of Income-tax Act: A.Y. 2004-05: Purchase of hospital as going concern along with goodwill: Assessee entitled to depreciation on value of goodwill.
The assessee purchased a hospital as a going concern. The value of the goodwill which included the name of the hospital and its logo and trade mark was Rs.2 crores. For the A.Y. 2004-05, the assessee claimed depreciation on the goodwill. The Assessing Officer and the Tribunal disallowed the claim. On appeal by the assessee, the Kerala High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:
“(i) Without resorting to the residuary entry the assessee was entitled to claim depreciation on the name, trade mark and logo under the specific head provided u/s.32(1)
(ii) which covers trade marks and franchise. (ii) Admittedly the hospital was run in the same building, in the same town, in the same name for several years prior to the purchase by the assessee. By transferring the right to use the name of the hospital itself, the previous owner had transferred the goodwill to the assessee and the benefit derived by the assessee was retention of continued trust of the patients who were patients of the previous owners.
(iii) When the goodwill paid was for ensuring retention and continued business in the hospital, it was for acquiring a business and commercial rights and it was comparable with trade mark, franchise, copyright, etc., referred to in the first part of clause (ii) of section 32(1) and so much so, goodwill was covered by the above provision of the Act entitling the assessee for depreciation.”
Business expenditure: Disallowance u/s.40(a) (ia): Section 194C and section 194-I, read with section 40(a)(ia), of Income-tax Act: TDS u/s.194-I: A.Y. 2005-06: Assessee had paid hire charges for having hired millers and rollers, for purpose of carrying out road contract work: Section 194C and section 194-I not applicable: Disallowance of hire charges u/s.40(a)(ia) not justified.
During the relevant assessment year, the assessee had paid hire charges for having hired millers and rollers for the purpose of carrying out road contract work. According to the Revenue, since the hire charges in respect of both, the millers and rollers, hired by the assessee contained a portion of labour charges incurred by the respective owners of the concerned vehicles/machineries towards operation of the respective vehicles/ machineries, it was a composite contract of hiring of vehicles/ machineries along with labour and, consequently, the provisions of section 194C would be applicable. On that basis, the Assessing Officer took the view that out of the total hire charges if 10 per cent was treated as charges paid towards labour element involved and the TDS not having been deducted, as required u/s.40(a)(ia), the whole of the sum was to be disallowed. The Tribunal found that the amount paid by the assessee was only by way of hire charges for the millers and rollers taken on hire and, therefore, the relevant TDS provision applicable had to be only of section 194-I and not 194C and since section 194-I providing for TDS even in respect of machinery/equipment was brought into the Statute Book with effect from 1-6-2007, the assessee had not committed any violation of section 40(a)( ia) during the relevant assessment year, i.e., 2005-06, and accordingly deleted the addition.
On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:
“(i) Hiring of the millers and rollers as a machinery/ equipment was apparently needed for the purpose of carrying out the contract of laying of the road. Both the equipments, viz., millers and rollers, had to be necessarily operated by the owner of the respective machineries/equipments. Therefore, that, by itself, could not be a ground to state that it was a composite contract for supply of labour in the course of hiring of machineries/ equipments. Inasmuch as the millers and rollers had to be necessarily operated and maintained by the respective owners, the engagement of the service of any person for operating those machineries/equipments was purely an incidental one.
(ii) In fact, there was no material evidence or statement of any one to say in definite terms that the supply of such millers and rollers was along with its respective operators. Therefore, in the absence of any such acceptable material, the conclusion of the Assessing Officer in treating the hiring of millers and rollers as one falling under the category of a sub-contract for provision of labour or the conclusion of the Commissioner (Appeals) and holding that at least 10 per cent of the total payment would have been incurred by way of labour chargers by the respective owners, could not be accepted.
(iii) Viewed in that respect, the conclusion of the Tribunal, in having held that the relevant section, which would be applicable to the case on hand in relation to the sum incurred by the assessee by way of hire charges would be section 194-I, was unassailable. Therefore, when indisputably section 194-I came to provide for making the TDS in respect of machinery/equipments only with effect from 1-6-2007 and the relevant assessment year was 2005-06, there was no scope at all to find fault with the assessee for any violation of section 40(a)(ia).”
Appeal to High Court: Section 260A of Income-tax Act: A.Y. 1997-98: Power of High Court: Court has power to consider new question of law not formulated at the time of admission of the appeal.
The assessee had filed an appeal before the High Court u/s.260A of the Income-tax Act. When the appeal was taken up for the final hearing, the assessee sought consideration of an additional question whether reopening of the assessment was maintainable. The Madras High Court allowed the assessee’s request and held as under:
(i) The issue of notice u/s.148 in the case of the assessee was dealt with by the Tribunal in extenso. The issue relating to the validity of reassessment was contested by the parties before the Tribunal.
(ii) Therefore, merely because the question of reassessment was not specifically formulated as a substantial question of law while entertaining the appeal, it could not be held that the question should not be allowed to be agitated by formulating a substantial question of law.
(iii) The assessee was justified to seek for framing the issue of notice as one of the substantial questions of law to be considered.
Nobly Untruthful
• Political and corporate institutions actively try to suppress information from the public. They try to suppress because they believe that if the public knows it will try to change and reform these institutions.
• We have to first understand how our institutions behave before we can come up with programmes to reform them.
• If you want the Indian government to really address corruption then it must become the central issue of the nation.
• Wherever there’s a disclosure, there is a counter smear campaign which is directly proportionate to how impactful is the material in the disclosure.
• Governments, corporations are not scared of Wikileaks having the information, but they are scared of public knowledge.
• Governments have to be pushed and pushed until they see that there is an advantage in giving a proper response.
In India, we have seen the truth in these statements all along and more so in the recent times. Whenever there is a big scam the first reaction of the government is to deny it. Then start a systemic attempt to distract the attention from the central issue. It is surprising that when questioned the spokespersons of the ruling party take pride in talking about the so-called actions that the government has taken against the persons involved. But what is the reality? Has the government taken action on its own? Or is it only under substantial pressure from the public or directive from the judiciary that some action has been taken? Has the action been swift and effective?
Last month, Anna Hazare the RTI activist went on a fast demanding speedy enactment of a comprehensive law like Jan Lokpal Bill to tackle the menace of corruption. The fast motivated a very large number of persons to support the cause. While that was noteworthy, the reaction of the government at every stage left a lot to be desired. Actions of Anna Hazare were referred as blackmail. Initially, the government refused to involve representatives of Civil Society in drafting of Lokpal Bill. Mr. Kapil Sibal stated that to involve the public in preparing the draft of the Lokpal Bill would be undermining the democracy and its institutions. It’s only under public pressure that the government agreed to public participation in drafting the Bill.
But let us not forget this is only the beginning. There are many hurdles at every stage. This was evident by the smear campaign against some of the prominent members of the committee constituted for drafting the Bill.
While one needs to be hopeful, a certain amount of cynicism is also justified. A strong Lokpal is only one of the instruments to move towards corruption free India. It is not an end in itself; it is not a magic wand. The draft presented by the Civil Society also needs to be critically examined. The institution of Lokpal, while having enough powers, must be accountable. Otherwise a well intended legislation will become a tool for harassment.
Julian Assange also mentioned that there are more Indian deposits in Swiss banks than any other nationality. There is no reason to disbelieve him on this. Even on this front the government seems to be doing precious little. The public perception, rather conviction, is that the government is dragging its feet because those who have money stashed it in Swiss bank accounts include big names from amongst politicians and other powerful personalities. While our government is reluctant to act, US and German governments have taken effective and unusual steps to bring back the money and bring offenders to book.
It is ironical that while Prime Minister Manmohan Singh himself is considered as an honest person, the present government presided over by him is regarded as the most corrupt government that independent India has had. But can the Prime Minister avoid the responsibility for what is happening? Is he `Nobly Untruthful’ in the wrong way? It will be a sad day if a person of his eminence has to retire with a tarnished image. On the other hand if the Prime Minister takes firm, swift and effective steps against the guilty in various scams and in the process has to leave the prime ministership, the nation will remember him with gratitude for a long time. Will he show that courage and conviction?
Editor
NAMASKAR TO A BRAVE YOUNG GIRL
She gets a grant to study the tribals working in sugar mills. She goes to a village 20 km from Surat for a first-hand study of the tribal workers. (Do we, urbanites know what real India is? Let us see.)
The villagers do not allow the tribals to live in or near the village. The tribals stay in semi-arid areas away from civilisation. With considerable difficulties in searching and after walking for 4 km, she comes near a settlement. She wants to talk to the workers. But the tribals have a fear and suspicion of the non-tribals. The fear is built over past thousands of years. No tribal is ready to talk with her. Is their fear justified? Let us see.
While the young lady is in the settlement, there is a commotion. A young man — all covered with blood and bruises, carrying a two-year old child in his hands comes to the settlement. He is a tribal. He and his wife worked in a sugar mill as temporary workers. In the evening while they were returning home, some upper-caste goons came on two motor cycles. They beat up the husband mercilessly, threw the child in a cactus fence and kidnapped the wife and went away.
Our young lady enquires : “Why don’t you file a police complaint?” The tribals look at her with contempt and say — “Even the police will beat us.” This is the current state of India, current Gujarat. Now we know.
She returns to Ahmedabad and continues her study in Journalism. She visits a library and falls in love with a young boy.
She gets an internship assignment at a reputed news paper. She writes investigative stories for the paper. She is praised by the editor. Next day the story does not appear in the press because . . . . . someone paid the price (for not printing the news) to the editor.
The young lady, Mittal Patel scraps the idea of being an IAS officer, forgets journalism and decides single-handedly it necessary to fight for the cause of the oppressed nomads. One is reminded of the famous lines from Shri Rabindranath Tagore
spfu Å¡ lpL kzÎpu Lp¡B _p Aph¡, sp¡ A¡¼gp¡ Å_¡ f¡
Our great modern India which is growing rapidly, badly treats 50% of the population — women. If any one has doubts let me remind that recently (March-April, 2011) two chartered accountant ladies have committed suicides due to atrocities of their own families.
Then there are scheduled tribes, scheduled castes and nomads. I do not know the percentage. But may be 45% of the people. Total 72.5% people (50% women and 22.5% underprivileged men) are exposed to the exploitation by the upper-caste men. (These percentages are generalisations. They do not apply to many families. At the same time, outside Mumbai, they do apply to many people.)
The young lady — Mittal (Now Mrs. Patel) has now established Vicharata Samuday Samarthan Manch (Nomadic People’s Support Organisation) (VSSM). She is now working for the most under privileged people of India. Most of the nomadic people have no homes. Hence no ration cards, no election cards, no BPL (Below Poverty Line) cards. They live away from the upper-caste and somehow survive.
They have survived from times, even before Ramayan.
Since they have no voter cards, politicians are not interested in them. Government welfare schemes do not reach them.
Digest of Recent Important Foreign Decisions on Cross- Border Taxation – part one
Federal Court holds non-resident manager of portfolio of Australian shares for non-resident companies liable to tax in Australia:
The Federal Court on 8th September 2010 handed down a decision in Leighton v. FCT, (2010) FCA 1086 that dealt with taxation in Australia of a non-resident manager who was managing a portfolio of Australian shares for two non-resident companies.
Briefly, Mr. Leighton was, during the relevant period, a resident of Monaco and was not a resident of Australia. He was engaged by two companies, who were not tax resident in Australia and were incorporated in the British Virgin Islands and the Bahamas, to manage a portfolio of Australian shares for them and to provide other services incidental to the management services. Mr. Leighton opened a bank account in Australia and engaged a number of Australian brokers and an Australian custodian. The trading instructions were given by Mr. Leighton, on behalf of the two companies, from Monaco. The trading activities generated taxable income during the relevant period.
Non-residents are subject to tax in Australia only on income sourced in Australia. The judgment does not discuss whether the relevant income has a source in Australia and, presumably, assumes that it does.
After considering the facts, the judgment concludes that Mr. Leighton, in acting as a manager, was, during the relevant period, a trustee of a trust for the non-resident companies as beneficiaries. As such, he is liable for tax for the taxable profits under former section 98(3) of the Income Tax Assessment Act, 1936.
2. France: Foreign Tax Credit:
Limitation or denial of FTC following repo transactions on shares — Administrative Supreme Court opinion:
The Administrative Supreme Court has recently disclosed in its annual report an opinion rendered on 31 March 2009 (No. 382545), in answer to a prejudicial question from the French Tax Authorities (FTA). It dealt with the treatment of foreign-sourced dividends, where the distribution is made in between a sale-repurchase transaction on shares (i.e., dividend stripping). The FTA asked the Court to clarify the legal basis on which, for corporate income tax purposes, the use by resident companies of FTC attached to such dividend coupons could be denied or limited. Key elements of the opinion are summarised below.
(a) Clarification on the limitation applicable to the use of foreign tax credits (FTC), the so-called ‘règle du butoir’. Under Art. 220 of the General Tax Code, the use of a FTC by a resident company is limited to the ‘amount of French corporate income tax assessed on the corresponding income’, i.e., the FTC may only be deducted from that portion of French tax which corresponds to the income sourced in that particular foreign country. No provision, however, specifies whether the foreignsource income, used for the computation of the above-mentioned limitation, should be assessed on a net or gross basis.
In respect of foreign-source dividends, the Court’s opinion is that the income should be assessed on a net basis. This rule covers only expenses that (i) are directly related to the foreign-source income, and (ii) do not increase the value of any asset of the resident company. As a result, foreign withholding taxes and collection expenses directly related to the dividend coupon are deductible. Conversely, loan interest related to the purchase of the foreign shares are not. As a result, such expense will not reduce the portion of ‘corresponding income’ which limits the resident company’s entitlement to FTC.
In addition, the Court rejected the FTA’s position that the capital loss incurred on the resale of the shares should be deducted from any related dividend derived in between the purchase-resale transactions. Such capital losses are not expenses directly related to the foreign-sourced income (i.e., the dividend coupon).
(b) Clarification on the application of the ‘beneficial ownership’ clause. The Court opined that the beneficial ownership clause under a tax treaty (i) enables the FTA to deny the application of the reduced withholding tax rates on outbound payments under certain conditions (see TNS:2007-01-30:FR-1), but (ii) does not allow the FTA to deny (or limit) the use of FTC attached to foreign-sourced dividend coupons. Only the domestic general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) set forth by Art. L 64 of the Tax Procedure Code (abus de droit) may authorise, where the related buy-sell transaction is ‘artificial’ and/or ‘seek to benefit from a literal application of legal provisions or decisions in contradiction with the objective set forth by the author of such provisions’, such a denial.
Note: Recently, the Administrative Supreme Court rejected the application of the GAAR to tax motivated buy-sell transactions on shares, insofar as the dividend accrues to a taxpayer who actually bears the risk attached to the status of a shareholder (see Administrative Supreme Court, 7 September 2009, No. 305586 and No. 305596, Axa and Sté Henri Golfard, respectively).
3. Belgium: Fixed base under Article 14:
Treaty between Belgium and Luxembourg — Court of Appeal Ghent decides Belgian-rented dwelling of Luxembourg resident self-employed business trainer constitutes fixed base:
On 20th October 2009, the Court of Appeal Ghent decided a case (recently published) X. v. Tax Administration concerning whether a rented dwelling in Belgium of a Luxembourg resident self-employed business trainer constitutes a fixed base under Art. 14(1) of the Belgium-Luxembourg tax treaty on income and capital of 17 September 1970 (the ‘Treaty’). Details of the case are summarised below.
(a) Facts:
The taxpayer was a resident of Luxembourg, who carried out activities as a self-employed business trainer in Belgium, where he visited Belgian companies. He stayed in a rented dwelling in Brugge, which he used as his contact address. The Belgian Tax Administration regarded the dwelling as a fixed base, but the taxpayer took the opposite view.
(b) Legal background:
Art. 14(1) of the Treaty provides that income derived by a resident of one of the contracting states in respect of professional services or other independent activities of a similar character shall be taxable only in that state, unless he has a fixed base regularly available to him in the other state for the purpose of performing his activities. If he has such a fixed base, the income may be taxed in the other state, but only so much of it as is attributable to that fixed base.
(c) Decision:
The Court followed the view of the Belgian Tax Administration.
The Court observed that the term ‘fixed base’ is neither defined in the Treaty, nor under Belgian domestic law. In addition, the Court considered that the term cannot be interpreted by means of the Commentary to Art. 7 (business profits) of the OECD Model Convention, because under the Treaty more detailed requirements apply for the existence of a permanent establishment than for a fixed base. Therefore, the term ‘fixed base’ has a wider scope.
The Court based its decision that the rented dwelling constitutes a fixed base on the presumption that the taxpayer does a substantial part of his study and preparation work in that dwelling. In this context, the Court held as decisive that the taxpayer has no other place to do his preparatory work and he used the dwelling as his contract address for his clients; moreover:
— the taxpayer receives specialist journals and documentation at, and had purchased office equipment for, that dwelling;
— the Belgian address was stated on his invoices, as a result of which the Court presumed that the administrative formalities wer
(2011) 38 VST 124 (Mad.) Sunder India Limited and others v. Commissioner of Commercial Tax, Ezhilagam, Chennai and others.
Facts :
The petitioners were dealers in paper-based decorative laminated sheets, made of paper, and treated the same as ‘paper-based product’. The Commissioner of Commercial Taxes issued a clarification dated 17th August 2005, that the products were ‘decorative laminates’ and taxable @ 16%. According to the petitioners the rate of tax applicable on such goods was 10%, thus they sought for review of aforesaid clarification. On review, the Commissioner issued a clarification dated 23rd March 2006 and stated that the paper based laminated decorative sheets are taxable @ 10%. The said clarification was issued after taking note of an earlier order of Tamil Nadu Taxation Special Tribunal. However, later on based upon the Supreme Court’s decision in a matter under Central Excise, wherein the impugned product was held as falling under a different tariff entry than that of paper-based product, the Commissioner again issued a clarification, on 30th May 2008, that the impugned product is correctly liable to tax @ 16%. Thus, tax was sought to be levied at such rate for past periods and notices were issued to reopen the completed assessments also. On writ petitions;
Held :
(1) That the Tamil Nadu Taxation Special Tribunal delivered its decision on 12th April, 1996, which was based upon expert opinion received from the Joint Director of Industries regarding nature of product. The finding was accepted by the Department. The entry contained in the Schedule has not undergone any change. Thus, the Circular issued by the Commissioner, relying on the interpretation given by the Supreme Court in respect to Central Excise Tariff, could not be sustained. The Department was not justified in relying on the Circular for reopening assessments.
(2) That the clarification issued by the Commissioner could not be applied retrospectively.
(3) That since the Department was not firm in its view with regard to the percentage of tax, the benefit of doubt should be extended to the dealers.
(4) That the contention of the Department, that the writ petitions challenging the notices to reopen the assessments were premature in nature, could not be sustained. Similarly, the revised orders passed were also bad in law.
(2011) 38 VST 45 (Mad.) State of Tamil Nadu v. A.N.S. Guptha and Sons
Facts :
The respondent was a dealer under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959. An inspection was made by the Enforcement Wing Officer on which day the dealer did not produce manufacturing-cumstock register in the prescribed form. However the dealer produced all his accounts at the time of assessment, wherein he claimed certain items of sale as exempt from tax. To verify the claim with reference to bought note purchases, summons were issued to various sellers, out of which some of the summons were returned unserved with the endorsement ‘no such address’ and on the basis of this the Assessing Authority treated the bought note purchases as bogus and, therefore, the sale of such articles as taxable. The dealer came forward to produce the persons to establish its case, but the Assessing Officer refused to give opportunity for cross-examination to the dealer stating that he could not conduct a Court of law. The assessment orders were passed disallowing the bought note purchases of items exempt to tax and also levied penalty. The first Appellate Authority as well as the Tribunal allowed the appeal of the dealer. On a revision petition by the State;
Held :
(1) That an opportunity should have been given to the dealer and the refusal by the Department vitiated the order of assessment. When finding of facts had categorically been recorded by both the Appellate Authorities in favour of the dealer, there was no reason to interfere with the order of the Tribunal. The question of law sought to be raised by the Department was purely question of facts.
(2) That the Assessing Authority could not simply take into consideration the report of Enforcement Wing and should have decided the matter on the merits, independently unbiased and unaffected by any other subsequent factors. The Assessing Officer had basically committed a mistake in stating that he could not conduct a Court of law. Such an attitude of the Assessing Authority in totally rejecting the contentions of the dealer without applying the basic principles of law was not legal and bad in law.
(2011) 21 STR 605 (Tri.-Mumbai) — Punjab State C & W.C. Ltd. v. Commissioner of S.T., Mumbai.
Facts:
The appellants filed their service tax return for the period April 2003 to September 2003 on 24- 10-2003.
A query received from the Department on 16-1-2004 to explain amount paid by them in the return, was explained by appellants vide letter dated 4-2-2004 and paid the service tax on 22-3-2004. On 4-10-2006, the appellants were issued show-cause notice for payment of service tax for the period 14- 5-2003 to 28-5-2003.
Held:
The Tribunal observed that the duty for the disputed period was paid along with interest on 22-3-2004 and show-cause notice was issued on 4-10-2006 which was beyond the statutory period of one year. The appellants took this ground before the Commissioner (Appeals) but it was not considered. Hence the impugned order was set aside and matter was sent to the Commissioner (Appeals) first to decide the limitation issue, if appellants succeeded on limitation issue, merits were not required to be considered. If limitation issue failed, then the case was to be decided on the basis of merits.
(2011) 21 STR 621 (Tri.-Bang.) — Tata Motors Insurance Services Ltd. v. Commissioner of S.T., Bangalore.
Facts:
A company registered under the category ‘Authorised Service Station’, received commission from finance companies, commission from insurance companies and incentives from its principal for achievement of targets. The appellant-company was engaged in the said activities without intimating the Department about the same and without following statutory formalities including payment of tax, for the period July 2003 to September 2005. The appellant had paid Rs.6,84,254 towards the demand confirmed against them in the year 2005. The Commissioner sent showcause notice and fixed personal hearing at 1600 hrs. on either of three alternate dates viz. 25th January or 29th January or 31st January. The appellant sought adjournment of hearing on 31-1-2007.
The adjournment was rejected and ex parte order was passed.
Held:
The Tribunal observed that giving the choice of three dates is considered as one date for hearing and the appellants could appear before the Commissioner on any one of the dates. Statutorily, the appellants were entitled to request for three adjournments. The appellants sought adjournment of hearing fixed on the last date indicated in the notice which cannot be considered as adjournment of earlier two dates. Denial of personal hearing was violation of its statutory right and also violation of principles of natural justice. Hence the order of the Commissioner was vacated and the case was remanded to the Commissioner.
(2011) 21 STR 626 (Tri.-Bang.) — Kerala State Beverages (Mfg. & Mktg.) Corp. v. CCEx., Trivandrum.
Facts:
The appellant-corporation, an undertaking of the Kerala State Government, had the monopoly of procuring foreign liquor (Indian Made) manufactured in various private distilleries during the period of dispute. The appellant sold these products either through their own outlets or through independent dealers and paid sales tax thereon. Treating as commission income or revenue, service tax was demanded, whereas the appellant contended it as the case of sale and the income earned therefrom as trading profit. The Department was not able to rebut the claim of the appellants that service tax was demanded on the sale consideration.
Held:
The Tribunal observed that it was a prima facie case of purchasing liquor from the distilleries and where there is sale of goods, there can be no levy of service tax on its value. Hence, prima facie, no service tax was leviable on the amount collected. Waiver of pre-deposit and stay of recovery was granted.
(2011) 21 STR 631 (Tri.-Ahmd.) — Jay Dwarkadish Engg. & Electricals Contractor v. CCex., Rajkot.
Facts:
The appellants were engaged in construction service. During the period from April 2007 to September 2007, there was delay of 20 to 47 days in making the payment of service tax. Delayed payment was made with interest. Penalty was imposed on the appellant u/s. 76 of the Finance Act, 1994. Instead of appearing the appellants filed the written representation stating the payment of tax along with interest was made and reliance on the Tribunal decision, in U.B. Engineering Ltd. v. Commissioner, 2010 (20) STR 818 (Tribunal), to support their contention that where an assessee pays service tax with interest and informs the Central Excise Officer, the Central Excise Officer shall not issue a show-cause notice.
Held:
The Tribunal observed that appellants paid the service tax with interest and the Department was informed of the same through ST-3, the provisions of section 73(3) of the Finance Act is applicable and in such cases no show-cause notice need to be issued. Allowing the appeal, the penalty u/s. 76 was held unsustainable.
(2011) 21 STR 603 (Tri.-Chennai) — Ramesh Enterprises v. CCE, Tirunelveli.
Facts:
Original authority passed the order-in-original without offering personal hearing opportunity to the assessee. After observing the principle of natural justice, the Commissioner (Appeals) annulled the order and directed the lower authority to adjudicate afresh. The Department filed an appeal against the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) on the ground that the Commissioner (Appeals) had no power to remand.
Held:
Section 35A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 has not been made applicable to service tax matters u/s. 83 of the Finance Act, 1994. Section 85(4) does not preclude the Commissioner (Appeals) from passing a remand order if he thinks fit. Hence held that since the principle of natural justice was not followed and considering the amount of demand, the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) remanding the case was upheld and appeal of the Department was rejected.
Comment:
The above two judgments are contradictory.
(2011) 21 STR 644 (Tri.-Mumbai) — Positive Packaging Industries Ltd. v. CCEx., Raigad.
Facts:
The original authority rejected the refund claim of the assessee in relation to CHA as well as commission agency. The Commissioner (Appeals) held that rejection of refund claim in relation to CHA and commission agent was not correct and the claim was required to be sanctioned after necessary verification and accordingly remanded the case back. The Revenue was in appeal against the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) on the ground that the Commissioner (Appeals) did not have power to remand.
Held:
It was observed that the law on the point of jurisdiction of the Commissioner (Appeals) on the subject of remand is well settled and it has been held that the Commissioner (Appeals) has no power to remand the matter and he has to decide the matter himself in case of any infirmity in the order passed by the adjudicating authority. It was held that the Commissioner (Appeals) having found that the findings on two issues by original authority were not sustainable, it was necessary for the Commissioner (Appeals) to analyse the materials on record and to arrive at appropriate finding on the claim of the assessee and not to leave the matter for verification by the adjudicating authority. Hence the order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) was set aside and matter was remanded to the Commissioner (Appeals).
(2011) 21 STR 663 (Tri.-Mumbai) — Rajdeep Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. v. CCEx., Aurangabad.
Facts:
The assessee paid excess service tax in the month of October 2007 of Rs.1,00,924. Such excess was adjusted by the assessee against payables for the month of January 2008 and February 2008. Intimation for adjustment of excess payment was filed after 15 days. The Department issued show-cause notice to the assessee for payment of service tax of Rs.1,00,924 for the period January 2008 to February 2008, along with interest and penalty. Lower adjudicating authority confirmed the demand, however the Commissioner (Appeals) dropped the same.
Held:
The Tribunal observed that there was no dispute regarding excess payment of service tax by the assessee in October 2007 and eligibility of the assessee for refund of such excess payment. Also the assessee has intimated, to Range Superintendent, about the adjustment of excess payment but after 15 days and it was only a technical default and there is no short payment of service tax. Upholding the order, the appeal by the Revenue was rejected.
(2011) 21 STR 668 (Tri.-Mumbai) — CBAY Systems (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of CCEx, Mumbai
Facts:
The appellants utilised certain services for export of goods and claimed refund of the service tax on such services under Notification No. 41/2007 S.T. The refund claim was denied on the ground that the appellants were not registered under the category of ‘Business Auxiliary Service’.
Held:
CBEC has issued clarification, in the circular dated 12-3-2009, in regards to the above-mentioned issue stating that Notification No. 41/2007-S.T. provides exemption by way of refund for specified services used for export of goods. Granting refund to exporters, on taxable services that he receives and uses for export do not require verification of registration certificate of the supplier of service. Therefore, refund should be granted in such cases. The procedural violations by the service provider needs to be dealt separately. Accordingly, the denial of refund claim on the ground that the appellants were not registered under the ‘Business Auxiliary Service’ was not sustainable and the appeal was allowed.
(2011) 21 STR 695 (Tri.-Mumbai) — Multi Organics Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Nagpur.
Facts:
The assessee appealed against the denial of CENVAT credit of the service tax paid by their job worker in the common order of the Commissioner (Appeals). However, the said order held the demand to be time-barred and also refrained from imposing penalty u/s. 11AC. This was challenged in the Revenue’s appeal.
Held:
The Tribunal observed that the Department relied on Bombay Dyeing & manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner, [2001 (135) ELT 1392 (Tribunal)] which is contradictory to the decision relied on by the appellants in SPIC (HCD) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Chennai, [2006 (201) ELT 386 (Tri- Chennai)] for granting CENVAT credit for the service tax paid by the job worker. According to one of the well-established tenets of judicial discipline, where there are contradictory decisions of two Coordinate Benches, the later one would prevail. Therefore the view taken in the SPIC (HCD) Ltd. would be appropriate precedent. The assessee’s appeal for CENVAT credit of service tax paid by job worker to be allowed. Consequently, the Revenue’s appeal was dismissed.
2011) 21 STR 589 (Tri.-Del.) — CCEx., Ludhiana v. Mayfair Resorts.
Facts:
The Department was of the view that the amount declared during the course of survey u/s. 133 of Income-tax Act should be treated as receipt for rendition of service. The assessee produced a letter submitted to the income-tax authority which exhibited the date of findings. The letter nowhere stated that the amount was attributable to consideration from provision of service. The Department contended that the disclosure was subject matter of A.Y. 2005-2006 and the same should be considered as consideration for provision of service. The said amount was reflected in the balance sheet as well.
Held:
The matter was in respect of financial year 2004- 2005. The balance sheet did not disclose that the amount was attributable to provision of services. No evidence was produced by the Department. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.
Appellant, a service receiver, liable to tax under reverse charge mechanism, did not pay service tax, but paid the same when the omission was pointed out — Appellant under the impression that there was no need to pay interest — No reply to the letter of appellant regarding payment of service tax — Department initiated proceed-ings by issuing the show-cause notice and even though the appellant paid interest as soon as the show-cause notice was issued, penalties were imposed — Held, for penalty imposed for sup-pressing value of service tax, there was no need for the appellant to resort to suppression since whatever tax was to be paid they were eligible for CENVAT credit — By delaying the payment of service tax, the appellant had to pay interest on the amount which was not available as CENVAT credit — Penalty not invokable.
Rama Multi-Tech Ltd. v. Commissioner of Service Tax, Ahmedabad.
Appellant, a service receiver, liable to tax under reverse charge mechanism, did not pay service tax, but paid the same when the omission was pointed out — Appellant under the impression that there was no need to pay interest — No reply to the letter of appellant regarding payment of service tax — Department initiated proceed-ings by issuing the show-cause notice and even though the appellant paid interest as soon as the show-cause notice was issued, penalties were imposed — Held, for penalty imposed for sup-pressing value of service tax, there was no need for the appellant to resort to suppression since whatever tax was to be paid they were eligible for CENVAT credit — By delaying the payment of service tax, the appellant had to pay interest on the amount which was not available as CENVAT credit — Penalty not invokable.
Facts:
The appellant availed services of Machine Maintenance & Repair from Germany and paid the required amount to the service provider in foreign currency. The appellant did not pay service tax since the service provider did not have their office in India. They paid service tax when the omission was pointed out. The mistake occurred because the payment of service received was to be made by the head office and services were received in factory. The appellant was under the impression that they were not required to pay interest and after payment of service tax they had intimated the department about the same. No reply to this letter was received and the Department initiated proceedings by issuing the show-cause notice and even though the appellant paid the interest as soon as the show-cause notice was issued, penalties were imposed.
Held:
After receiving the intimation from the appellant, the Central Excise Officer should determine the interest payable and communicate to the appellant and if the appellant did not pay the same, they had a period of one year to issue the show-cause notice. Without intimating the appellant that he is liable to pay interest, show cause notice was issued. At least after issuance of show-cause notice when the appellant paid the amount of interest, further proceedings should have been dropped. In respect of penalty, it was held that there was no need for the appellant to resort to suppression since whatever tax was to be paid they were eligible for CENVAT credit and by delaying the payment of service tax, the appellant had to pay interest on the amount which was not available as CENVAT credit; Hence the Tribunal found no justification to sustain penalty.
(2011) TIOL 196 ITAT-Mum. Essem Capital Markets Ltd. v. ITO ITA No. 6814/Mum./2006 and 5349/Mum./2007 A.Ys.: 2003-2004 and 2004-2005 Dated: 25-2-2011
be denied on the ground that the assessee is not the owner of the
property which he undertakes to develop, nor can it be denied on the
ground that the development agreement is not registered — Merely because
the commencement certificate was obtained prior to 1-10-1998, it does
not mean that the assessee has commenced the development and
construction of the project unless the assessee has taken some effective
steps on the site.
Facts:
The assessee entered
into a development agreement with M/s. Jay Jay Construction Co. on
12-10-1998. This development agreement, which was not registered, was in
respect of development right to construct a building ‘C’ on a plot of
land on which two buildings were already constructed (not by the
assessee). For the assessment years under consideration, the assessee
claimed deduction u/s.80IB(10) of the Act in respect of profits derived
from developing and building a housing project viz. ‘Building C’, which
claim was not accepted by the Assessing Officer (AO) on the ground that
the commencement certificate issued by the local authority was not in
the name of the assessee; development agreement was not registered;
commencement certificate was obtained prior to 1-10-1998 and building
‘C’ is not a separate project.
Aggrieved the assessee preferred
an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the order of the AO and also had
an additional objection viz. that the condition regarding the area of
the plot is not fulfilled.
Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.
Held:
The
Tribunal noted that subsequent to the two buildings being constructed
on the said plot, the plan of building ‘C,’ in respect of which the
assessee acquired the development right, was approved by the local
authority. The original plan was approved in 1995, but final approval
was given to the modified plan 10-9-1998 and permission for construction
of the building was finally given on 9-10-1998. The Tribunal also noted
that in the original approved plan/layout building ‘C’ was not shown.
Having observed that the commencement certificate (CC) was in the name
of the original owner since the title of the property was not in the
name of the assessee, the Tribunal held that:
(a) merely because
the commencement certificate is issued in the name of the original
landowner, the assessee cannot be deprived of deduction u/s.80IB(10) as
nowhere it is a mandate of the said provision that the assessee must be
the owner of the property which he undertakes to develop;
(b)
merely because the agreement is not registered, the assessee cannot be
deprived of the deduction u/s.80IB(10) as the assessee has developed
building ‘C’;
(c) merely because the CC was obtained prior to
1-10-1998, that does not mean that the assessee has commenced the
development and commencement of the building ‘C’;
(d) CC was
granted for the first time on 24-2-1995 and hence, building ‘C’ was not
part of the original project. It observed that on the said plot the
owner had constructed building ‘A’ consisting of 95 flats and tenements
and also building ‘B’. Just because the plot of land remained the same,
it cannot be construed that building ‘C’ is a part of the original
housing project;
As regards the objection of the CIT(A) on the
area of plot of land on which the project was constructed, the Tribunal
on facts found that there was no clearcut finding by the AO and CIT(A)
hence it restored the issue to the file of the AO to verify whether the
area of the plot on which the building ‘C’ is constructed is one acre or
not.
The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.
(2011) 21 STR 504 (Tri.-Del.) — Tangence Solutions (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. CCEx., Noida
Facts:
The assessee was denied rebate claim on export of services on the ground that services of group insurance, health policy, medical policy and housekeeping services are not ‘input services’.
The assessee claimed that the term ‘input service’ is very wide and covers all services connected with the business activities. The appellants relied on the Madras Tribunal’s judgment in the case of Sundaram Fasteners Ltd. v. CCE, Chennai, (2010 TIOL 1342) and Tribunal’s decision in the case of CCE, Raipur v. Raipur Rotocast Ltd., (2010 (18) STR 466) for claiming CENVAT credit of service tax paid on group insurance. Moreover, they contended that in accordance with CAS-IV, expenses forming part of cost of providing services, should be considered as eligible ‘input service’.
The Department contended as under:
(i) Evidence was not shown to the effect that the house-keeping services were activities relating to business.
(ii) Group insurance, health policy, personal accident policy, etc. were not required to be provided mandatorily by the appellants and the same were provided as a welfare measure.
(iii) Drawing analogy from CAS-IV is not relevant as CAS-IV deals with valuation of captively consumed goods in manufacturing sector.
Held:
(i) CENVAT credit was allowed on procurement of house-keeping services as these were clearly necessary for rendition of service.
(ii) CENVAT credit on group insurance, health policy, etc. though forms part of cost of services rendered, the same could not be treated as ‘input service’ automatically. Moreover, since the group insurance was a welfare measure in the present case, the same could not be considered as integrally connected with the provision of service and therefore, was held to be ineligible.
(2011) 21 STR 503 (Tri.-Chennai) — Nagappa Motors v. CCEx., Madurai.
Facts:
The assessee provided services under ‘authorised service station’ to various customers of Hero Honda Motors Ltd. The service tax was collected from Hero Honda Motors Ltd. and only 50% of the amount collected was deposited into the Government Treasury. Section 11D of the Central Excise Act was invoked for recovery of amount collected from the manufacturer along with interest and penalty.
Held:
During the period under consideration, section 11D was applicable when the amount was collected from buyers. Since Hero Honda Motors Ltd. was manufacturer and not the buyer of the goods, the appellants were not liable to pay such amount collected. Since amount need not be deposited, interest and penalty was also not leviable.
Comment:
Section 11D was amended through the Finance Act, 2008 and Ss. (1A) has been inserted for plugging such loop-hole in the Central Excise law and therefore, now excess amount received from any person as excise duty needs to be deposited into the Government Treasury.
(2011) 21 STR 500 (Guj.) — CCEx. v. Steel Cast Ltd.
Facts:
The assessee applied for registration under the category of ‘management consultancy services’. However, the adjudicating authority rejected the application and issued a show-cause notice invoking extended period of limitation. Adjudicating order did not record any specific finding as regards suppression of facts and value thereof. The respondents appealed before the Commissioner (Appeals) and contended that the revenue was reflected in the balance sheet and therefore, there was no suppression of facts. However, the Commissioner (Appeals) did not deal with the issue.
On appeal, the Tribunal held that though the services fall under ‘management consultancy services’, the extended period of limitation is not justified in view of bona fide interpretation of law, entertaining belief and due to confusion prevailing during the period under consideration.
Held:
The matter in relation to ‘suppression of facts with intent to evade tax’ was a question of facts which was already answered by the Tribunal in favour of the assessee. Moreover, the Revenue did not put any contrary arguments to findings of Tribunal. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.
(2011) 31 STT-51 (Delhi) — Pearey Lal Bhawan Association v. Satya Developers (P) Ltd.
Facts:
The society, the owner of a building on leasehold land entered into lease deed with the lessee in October 2006 for the premises on the ground floor and also entered into agreement for the maintenance of common services and facilities of the said premises. Service tax was levied from 1-6-2007 on renting of immovable property for business purposes. The narrow issue in the dispute relates to whether service tax is to be borne by the lessee, the levy being an indirect tax which is required to be deposited after collecting from the user of the service. According to the plaintiff-society, by virtue of section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994 read with sections 12A and 12B of the Central Excise Act, the levy is to be borne by the user of the premises or services, whereas according to the lessee-defendant, the contract between the parties provided that the lessee would pay all taxes, charges, ground rent, house tax, easements and other outgoings imposed by the local authority, etc.
Held:
(i) The Court observed that the parties while entering into contract did not visualise that the tax would be levied on lease or rent of immovable property and there was no dispute that the tax was levied after the agreement was entered into. Referring to the Supreme Court in All India Federation of Tax Practitioners v. UOI, (2007) 10 STT 166 dealing with the nature of service tax liability the Court observed that the Apex Court had held that excise duty and customs are consumption-specific duties which do not constitute a charge on the business but on the client. Similarly, the Court also observed that in All India Tax Payers Welfare Association’s case (2008) 5 STT 136 (Mad.), it was observed that according to section 65 of the Finance Act, the provider of service only being an assessee is to collect service tax from the users of service as contemplated under the sections.
(ii) The Court further observed that sections 12A and 12B of the Central Excise Act were made applicable to service tax law vide section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994 to prescribe that the provider of service has the obligation to indicate the quantum of tax and that there is a presumption that incidence of duty is passed on to the buyer. Referring to section 64A of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, the Court observed that the said section visualises and provides for situations where levies of tax are imposed after the contract is entered into.
(iii) In view of this, unless a different intention appears from the contract, in case of imposition or increase of tax subsequent to drawing a contract, the parties shall be entitled to be paid such tax or increase. In the instant case, even in the absence of explicit provision to enable lessor to receive the service tax component, there is sufficient internal indication in the Act through section 83 read with sections 12A and 12B of the Central Excise Act that the levy is an indirect tax cap-able of being collected from the user, the lessee in this case. Thus, the plaintiff was entitled to the amounts claimed from the lessee.
Periodicity for ‘I’ form under CST Act, 1956
Few aspects of periodicity of ‘I’ forms are discussed below:
This form is issued by Special Economic Zone Unit to its supplier when the transaction is inter-State purchase from such supplier. The sales against ‘I’ forms are fully exempt from levy of CST in the hands of suppliers. ‘I’ form is issued as per section 8(8) of the CST Act, 1956. The said section reads as under:
“(8) The provisions of Ss. (6) and (7) shall not apply to any sale of goods made in the course of inter-State trade or commerce unless the dealer selling such goods furnishes to the authority referred to in Ss. (6), a declaration in the prescribed manner on the prescribed form obtained from the authority referred to in Ss. (5), duly filled in and signed by the registered dealer to whom such goods are sold.
Explanation — For the purpose of Ss. (6), the expression ‘special economic zone’ has the meaning assigned to it in clause (iii) to Explanation 2 to the proviso to section 3 of the Central Excise Act, 1944.”
In light of the above provision, the Central Government has prescribed Rule 12(11) in the CST (Registration & Turnover) Rules, 1957. The said Rule is reproduced below for ready reference:
“12(11)The dealer, selling goods in the course of inter-State trade or commerce to a registered dealer under sub-section (6) or under sub-section (8) of section 8 or under subsection (1) of section 5 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 read with section 76A of the Customs Act, 1962 (52 of 1962), shall furnish a declaration for the purposes of Ss. (8) of the said section 8 in Form I duly countersigned and certified by the Authority specified by the Central Government authorising the establishment of the unit in the Special Economic Zone (notified u/s. 76A of the Customs Act, 1962 (52 of 1962) that the sale of goods is for the purpose of establishing a unit in such Zone.”
The relevant part of form ‘I’ is reproduced below for ready reference:
It can be seen that the ‘I’ form can be for sales made against one purchase order of the customer. There is no provision for clubbing more than one purchase order in one ‘I’ form. This position can be compared with Rule 12(1) about issue of ‘C’ forms. The said Rule is reproduced below for ready reference.
“12. (1) The declaration and the certificate referred to in Ss. (4) of section 8 shall be in Forms C and D, respectively; [Provided that Form C in force before the commencement of the Central Sales Tax Registration and Turnover (Amendment) Rules, 1974, or before the commencement of the Central Sales Tax Registration and Turnover (Amendment) Rules, 1976, may also be used up to the 31st December, 5 [1980], with suitable modifications:]
Provided further that a single declaration may cover all transactions of sale, which take place in a quarter of a financial year between the same two dealers.”
It can be seen that under this rule, the sale transactions effected in one quarter can be included in one ‘C’ form. This suggests that although the ‘C’ forms are supposed to be against each sale, however, by giving specific provision, it is provided that the sales transactions in a quarter can be included in one ‘C’ form.
In Rule 12(11) of CST (R & T) Rules, 1957, about ‘I’ form, there is no such provision allowing clubbing of transactions of one quarter in one ‘I’ form. In absence of the same, the natural outcome will be that against each sale, one ‘I’ form will be required. This position also gets confirmed by prescription in body of ‘I’ form. The form itself specifies that all the sale bills against one purchase order can be included in one ‘I’ form. It is a fact that one purchase order is one transaction. There can be more than one delivery in relation to such purchase order and accordingly more than one sale bill also may be prepared. However, it will be considered to be one transaction and therefore the form includes all the sale bills against one purchase order to be included in one ‘I’ form.
Howsoever, there is no facility to include more than one purchase order in one ‘I’ form, though they may be within one quarter. Therefore, the position is for one purchase order one ‘I’ form is required.
It is also a fact that if the declaration forms are not as per the provisions of the Rules, they are considered to be invalid. There are number of judgments wherein it is held that the procedure regarding issue of declaration forms should be strictly followed, lest the forms will be invalid and the claim may not be allowed. Reference can be made to judgment in case of India Agencies (Regd.) v. Additional Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Bangalore, (139 STC 329) (SC). Supreme Court has observed as under:
“(1) The dealer has to strictly follow the procedure and produce the relevant materials required under that Rule. Without producing the specified documents as prescribed thereunder a dealer cannot claim the benefits provided u/s. 8 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.
(2) Section 8(4)(a) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, specifically provides that the provisions of Ss. (1) shall not apply to any sale in the course of inter-state trade or commerce unless the dealer selling the goods furnishes to the prescribed authority in the prescribed manner a declaration duly filled and signed by the registered dealer to whom the goods are sold containing the prescribed particulars in a prescribed form obtained from the prescribed authority.”
Therefore, the legal position appears to be clear that unless the form is as per relevant Rule it will not be valid and will not be allowable. Thus, in respect of ‘I’ forms special care is required to be taken that they are per transaction and not on quarterly basis.