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Notification 11/2015 dated 08.04.2015 Benefits linked to Service Export from India Scheme (SEIS) under FTP 2015-2020)

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This Notification provides exemption to taxable services provided or agreed to be provided against Service Exports from India Scheme [SEIS] duty credit scrip issued to an exporter by the Regional Authority in accordance with paragraph 3.10 read with paragraph 3.08 of the Foreign Trade Policy.

The exemption can be availed if following conditions are complied:
1. T he duty credit in the said scrip is issued to a service provider located in India against export of notified services listed in Appendix 3D of Appendices and Aayat Niryat Forms of Foreign Trade Policy 2015-2020;

2. T he imports and exports are undertaken through the seaports, airports or through the inland container depots or through the land customs stations as mentioned in the Table 2 annexed to the Notification No. 16/2015- CUS (N.T.) dated 01.04.2015 or a Special Economic Zone notified u/s. 4 of the Special Economic Zones Act, 2005 (28 of 2005):

Provided that the Commissioner of Customs may within the jurisdiction, by special order, or by a Public Notice, and subject to such conditions as may be specified by him, permit import and export through any other sea-port, airport, inland container depot or through any land customs station.

3. Accordingly, the person claiming exemption benefit should be registered with the customs authorities and should provide services in the taxable territory.

4. The benefit of the scrip would be given after taking into consideration the benefit already availed under Notification 25/2012.

5. T he holder of the scrip presents the scrip debited by the said Customs Authority within thirty days to the said Officer, along with an undertaking addressed to the said Officer, that in case of any service tax short debited in the scrip, he shall pay such service tax along with applicable interest, based on which the officer shall verify and validate.

6. T he said holder of the scrip shall be entitled to avail drawback or CENVAT credit of the service tax so paid by way of debiting the duty scrip duly validated by the said Officer.

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Notification 10/2015 dated 08.04.2015 Benefits linked to Merchandise Export from India Scheme (MEIS) under FTP 2015-2020

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This Notification provides exemption to taxable services provided or agreed to be provided against Merchandise Exports from India Scheme [MEIS] duty credit scrip issued to an exporter by the Regional Authority in accordance with paragraph 3.04 read with paragraph 3.05 of the Foreign Trade Policy.

The exemption can be availed if following conditions are complied:

1. T he duty credit in the said scrip is issued against –
a. exports of notified goods or products to notified markets as listed in Appendix 3B of Appendices and Aayat Niryat Forms of Foreign Trade Policy 2015-2020 ;
b. exports of notified goods or products transacted through e-commerce platform as listed in Appendix 3C of Appendices and Aayat Niryat Forms of Foreign Trade Policy 2015-2020. In such cases the maximum free on board value, for calculation of duty credit amount, shall not exceed Rs. 25,000 per consignment.

2. The export categories or sectors specified in paragraph 3.06 of the Foreign Trade Policy and listed in Table annexed to Notification 24/2012 – CUS (N.T.) dated 08.04.2015 shall not be counted for calculation of export performance or for computation of entitlement under the Scheme.

3. T he imports and exports are undertaken through the seaports, airports or through the inland container depots or through the land customs stations as mentioned in the Table 2 annexed to the Notification 16/2015- CUS (N.T.) dated 01.04.2015 or a Special Economic Zone notified under section 4 of the Special Economic Zones Act, 2005 (28 of 2005)

4. Accordingly, the person claiming exemption benefit should be registered with the customs authorities and should provide services in the taxable territory.

5. The benefit of the script would be given after taking into consideration the benefit already availed under Notification 24/2012.

6. T he holder of the scrip presents the scrip debited by the said Customs Authority within thirty days to the said Officer, along with an undertaking addressed to the said Officer, that in case of any service tax short debited in the scrip, he shall pay such service tax along with applicable interest, based on which the officer shall verify and validate.

7. T he said holder of the scrip, shall be entitled to avail drawback or CENVAT credit of the service tax so paid by way of debiting the duty scrip duly validated by the said Officer.

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[2015] (37) STR 377] (Tri.-Mumbai) GTL Infrastructure Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai

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CENVAT credit is admissible on towers and cabins used as Passive Telecom Infrastructure for providing output service.

Facts:
Appellant is engaged in creating “Passive Telecom Infrastructure” to be used by Cellular Telecom Operators to provide their “Cellular Telephony Services” and the operations and maintenance thereof, taxable under business auxiliary services. Department objected to availment of CENVAT credit on the parts of Towers, Cabins etc. used for providing Passive Telecom Infrastructure.

Held:

The Tribunal observed that Rule 2(k)(ii) of the CENVAT Credit Rules,2004 is relevant as the Appellant id providing output service and Rule 2(k)(i) of the CENVAT Credit Rules,2004 and the Explanation-2 to the said rule are not relevant as it deals with manufacturing. The Appellant is providing a Business Auxiliary service to the cellular operators by creating a passive infrastructure for the transmission of signals and by virtue of Rule 2(k)(i) which allows CENVAT credit on all goods, except petrol and motor vehicles, used for providing any output service, the CENVAT credit is allowed.

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[2015] 55 taxmann.com 73 (Ahmedabad – CESTAT) –Commissioner of Central Excise, Customs and Service Tax, Rajkot vs. Reliance Ports and Terminals Ltd.

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Utilisation of CENVAT credit on capital goods is allowed to the extent of 50% in financial year of receipt and balance in subsequent financial year, even if capital goods are pending installation.

Facts:
Assessee was a provider of port services and availed credit of duty paid on capital goods during the period F.Y. 2006-07 and 2007-08. Department denied CENVAT credit on the grounds that capital goods were not installed. Department also disputed CENVAT credit of service tax paid by assessee under reverse charge on the ground that service tax paid u/s. 66A of the Act is not specified under Rule 3 of CCR,2004. Adjudicating Authority decided in favour of the assessee. Aggrieved department filed the appeal before the Tribunal.

Held:

The Tribunal held that as per para 8 of CBEC Circular No. B-4/7/2000 TRU dated 03/04/2000 in the case of capital goods, the CENVAT rules do not provide installation of capital goods as a pre-requisite for taking CENVAT credit. The credit can be taken as and when the capital goods are received in the factory. The Tribunal also observed that, in terms of CBEC Circular No. 267/26/2006-CX-8 dated 28-04-2006, condition of installation for availing CENVAT credit on capital goods was effective till 09- 09-2004 and not thereafter. Relying upon the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of CCE vs. Ispat Industries Ltd. 2012 (275) ELT 79 (Bom) which held that, when the capital goods are lying in the factory for installation and process of erection is being carried out, the requirement that the goods were in the possession and use of the manufacturer in the year in which the balance credit was availed of can be said to have been fulfilled. Thus the credit on capital goods was allowed in the financial year of receipt and balance in subsequent financial year. As regards dispute on CENVAT credit of service tax paid under reverse charge, it was held that due to retrospective amendment under sub rule (1) of Rule 3 of the Finance Act, 2011 service tax paid u/s. 66A was eligible for credit from 18/04/2006. Revenue’s appeal was dismissed accordingly.

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Gift – Immovable property – Donor had reserved the right to enjoy the property during her life time did not affect the validity of the gift deed. – Transfer of Property Act, Section 122 & 123, 126.

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Renikuntla Rajamma (Dead) by LR vs. K. Sarwanamma; (2014) 9 SCC 445.

The appellant, a Hindu woman, executed a registered gift deed in respect of an immovable property in favour of the respondent reserving to herself the right to retain possession and to receive rents of the property during her lifetime. The gift was accepted by the respondent. But subsequently the appellant revoked the gift deed by a revocation deed. The respondent filed a suit assailing the revocation deed and seeking a declaration that the same was invalid and void ab initio. The trial court found that the appellant defendant had failed to prove that the gift deed set up by the respondent plaintiff was vitiated by fraud or undue influence or that it was a sham or nominal document. The gift, according to the trial court, had been validly made and accepted by the respondent plaintiff, hence, was irrevocable in nature. It was also held that since the appellant donor had taken no steps to assail the gift made by her for more than 12 years, the same was voluntary in nature and free from any undue influence, misrepresentation or suspicion. The fact that the appellant donor had reserved the right to enjoy the property during her lifetime did not affect the validity of the deed. Accordingly, the suit was decreed. The first appellate court and the High Court in second appeal concurred with the findings of the trial court.

The Hon’ble Court observed that sections 124 to 129 deal with matters like gift of existing and future property, gift made to several persons of whom one does not accept, suspension and revocation of a gift, and onerous gifts including effect of non-acceptance by the donee of any obligation arising thereunder. Section 123 calearly provides that a gift of immovable property can be made by a registered instrument signed by or on behalf of the donor and attested by at least two witnesses. When read with section 122 of the Act, a gift made by a registered instrument duly signed by or on behalf of the donor and attested by at least two witnesses is valid, if the same is accepted by or on behalf of the donee. That such acceptance must be given during the life time of the donor and while he is still capable of giving is evident from a plain reading of section 122 of the Act. A conjoint reading of sections 122 and 123 of the Act makes it abundantly clear that “transfer of possession” of the property covered by the registered instrument of the gift duly signed by the donor and attested as required is not a sine qua non for the making of a valid gift under the provisions of Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

The Court further observed that section 123 of the T.P. Act is in two parts. The first part deals with gifts of immovable property while the second part deals with gifts of movable property. Insofar as the gifts of immovable property are concerned, ssection 123 makes transfer by a registered instrument mandatory. This is evident from the use of word “transfer must be effected” used by Parliament in so far as immovable property is concerned. In contradistinction to that requirement the second part of section 123 dealing with gifts of movable property, simply requires that gift of movable property may be effected either by a registered instrument signed as aforesaid or “by delivery”. The difference in the two provisions lies in the fact that in so far as the transfer of movable property by way of gift is concerned the same can be effected by a registered instrument or by delivery. Such transfer in the case of immovable property no doubt requires a registered instrument but the provision does not make delivery of possession of the immovable property gifted as an additional requirement for the gift to be valid and effective. If the intention of the legislature was to make delivery of possession of the property gifted also as a condition precedent for a valid gift, the provision could and indeed would have specifically said so. Absence of any such requirement can only lead to the conclusion that delivery of possession is not an essential prerequisite for the making of a valid gift in the case of immovable property.

In the present case, the execution of registered gift deed and its attestation by two witnesses is not in dispute. It has also been concurrently held that the donee had accepted the gift. The recitals in the gift deed also prove transfer of absolute title in the gifted property from the donor to the donee. What is retained is only the right to use the property during the lifetime of the donor which does not in any way affect the transfer of ownership in favour of the donee by the donor.

There is indeed no provision in law that ownership in property cannot be gifted without transfer of possession of such property. As noticed earlier, section 123 does not make the delivery of possession of the gifted property essential for validity of a gift.

The High Court was in that view perfectly justified in refusing to interfere with the decree passed in favour of the donee. The appeal was hereby dismissed.

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Co-operative Society- Right of Membership- Society has the right to refuse membership.

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Bandra Owners Court Co-op. Housing Society Ltd. vs. The Divisional Jt. Reg. of Co-op. Societies Mumbai, W.P. No. 1011/2010, dated 3/2/1015 (Bom.)(HC).

The Petitioner-Society is a Tenant Cooperative Society, as contemplated under Rule 10 of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Rules, 1961. The Respondent No. 5 applied for the transfer of shares and suit flat from the name of Respondent Nos. 3 and 4th members of the Petitioner Society on 24th January 2004. Respondent No. 3 was the Director of Respondent No. 5 and also the Secretary of Petitioner Society. The Society refused the said transfer for want of sufficient stamp and registration. The Society never accepted the payment on behalf of Respondent No. 5, and even through Respondent Nos. 3 and 4, and communicated their inability to transfer the suit flat. The Application filed by Respondent No. 5, was therefore rejected and the flat remained, so also the membership, in the name of Respondent Nos. 3 and 4. The Society returned the amount paid to it. Respondent Nos. 6 and 7, on 15th August 2008, filed an Application for transfer of the suit flat and shares from Respondent No. 5 to them. On 26th August 2008, the same was rejected as Respondent No. 5 was not the owner of the suit flat in the above background. Respondent Nos. 6 and 7, therefore, invoked section 23(1) of MCS Act, 1960 before the Deputy Registrar of Cooperative Societies on 13th April, 2009. The Registrar directed that they be admitted as members in respect of the suit shares and the suit flat. The Petitioner Society therefore, preferred a Revision Application and challenged the above order. Respondent No.1 the Divisional Joint Registrar by impugned order dated 15th December 2009, rejected the Revision Application, therefore, the Writ Petition was filed by the Society.

The Hon’ble Court observed that the MCS Act and Rules made there under makes provisions for members and membership and various classes of the same and the procedure to be followed for getting such membership. Mere filing of Application for getting membership is not sufficient. The Society is governed and run by the byelaws, which is basic requirement to consider to grant and/or refuse such membership. Normally, the Society, needs to grant membership if all other requisite elements and/or qualifications are satisfied. Even for rejection, the Society must give sufficient reason and/or must show the grounds for such refusal of admission. In the present case, for the above stated case, the Society refused to accept the membership Application.

The basic scheme and procedure so prescribed under the MCS Act referring to “Member”/”Membership”. Section 2(19)(a) provides the concept of “member”. The concept “deemed member” as provided in sections 22(2) and 23 is not defined. Section 22(2) deals with the members who became members and section 23 provides a procedure for open membership. For deciding the membership issue, the aspect of restriction on transfer or charge of share or interest, as contemplated u/s. 29 is also relevant, so also to maintain the register of members as contemplated u/s. 38 of the MCS Act. Rule 38 of the byelaws provides that the Society needs to follow the byelaws, which binds the Society, as well as, its members. Rule 19 deals with the conditions before admission for the membership. This also provides the detailed procedure to be followed by all the parties. Rule 24 deals with the procedure for transfer of shares, as no transfer of shares shall be effective unless the condition so provided under the Rules and the Act are fulfilled.

Thus for transfer of membership and/or shares, the concerned parties need to follow the various procedure and the supporting material and documents. The Society needs to apply its mind to the law, as well as, the related record before granting and/or refusing admission. The statutory Authorities are also under obligation to consider this, if the Society refused the membership and/or any challenge is made to grant such admission. These, are essential elements before considering the rival case, as well as, the contentions at every stage of admission of members and/or granting membership.

Merely because someone has claimed membership, a Society is not under obligation to grant the same. The lawful occupation, their rights, title and interest in the property, permissible transfer of shares and/or property and/or interest as per the byelaws and all related aspects, just cannot be overlooked by the concerned parties, including the Society, as well as, the Registrar/Authorities.

The Society having refused to grant admission with reasoned order, the interference by the Respondent Authority in the present facts and circumstances of the case and specifically by not giving the reasons in support of their reversal order as contemplated and by overlooking the provisions and procedures of the orders passed by the Authorities are unsustainable, therefore, required to be interfered with.

Thus, the Hon’ble Court held that the fact that Respondent Nos. 6 and 7 have purchased the property and are in occupation of the same since 2008; their entitlement based upon the said transaction and/or related agreements need to be reconsidered in accordance with law by the concerned Authorities afresh, by giving full opportunity to all the parties concerned. Further, the jurisdiction of Registrar u/s. 23, though nowhere contemplated to determine the validity and/or legality of the documents, which are executed in favour of the parties, but still the basic elements as contemplated under the scheme and the provisions as referred above, right from the byelaws of the Society, need to be looked into before granting and/ or refusing membership. The serious issue of validity and/ or legality of the documents may be the matter of trial and/ or inquiry before the appropriate forum, but that itself is not sufficient to deny the membership, if all requirements are prima facie satisfied.

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Advocate – Relationship between the Advocate and the client depends upon the trust between the parties – When the client wants to engage another Counsel, the earlier Lawyer has got no option, except to recuse himself from the case – Advocates Act section 30.

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S. Diwakar vs. Dy. Registrar, High Court of Madras, Chennai & Anr AIR 2015 (NOC) 300 (Mad.). The appellant is a Party-in-Person and practising Advocate.

The appellant was the counsel for the 2nd respondent in a matter before the Magistrate Court. The 2nd respondent for the reasons known to him substituted the appellant with some other counsel. The subsequent counsel had filed his vakalatanama in the matter. The appellant sent a letter to the 2nd Respondent stating that his action is against the rule of law. The said letter was followed by filing Writ Petition before the High Court. The appellant submitted that his fundamental right to practice as a Lawyer has been infringed. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate ought not to have noted the change of vakalath filed without following the required procedure.

The Hon’ble Court observed that during the proceedings, a vakalath had been filed on behalf of the second respondent by another Advocate. Admittedly, the consent of the appellant had not been obtained.

The relationship between the Advocate and the client is strictly professional. It depends upon the trust between the parties. The legal profession is not only a service but also a calling. Therefore, when the client wants to engage another counsel, the earlier Lawyer has got no option, except to recuse himself from the case. Acting as a Lawyer to a client is different from any other disputes inter se including the payment of fees etc.

The Court further observed that the any fundamental right of the appellant has not been infringed. It is not as if the appellant has been debarred from doing his profession. It is purely a personal dispute between the appellant on the one hand and the second respondent on the other hand. It is not the case of the appellant that the vakalatanama has not been signed by the second respondent. On the contrary, it is the case of the appellant that the learned X Metropolitan Magistrate, ought to have conducted an enquiry as the change of vakalatanama has been filed without obtaining his consent. Assuming, that the permission of the court is required that aspect, at the best, can be termed as a procedural one. The duty of the Magistrate is to conduct the case before him and not to resolve the inter se between the Lawyer and the party. The Petition was accordingly dismissed.

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Basics of Board Evaluation

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Introduction
In a typical public
company, the ownership and control are separated and the shareholders
extensively rely on the Board of Directors to represent their interests.
Whilst the Board of Directors is not running the company on a day-today
basis, which is the responsibility of the management, its involvement
in the form of timely decisions, guidance, direction and oversight plays
a key role in the effective functioning of the company. The way in
which the Board discharges its duties would go a long way in defining
the governance model of the company. These aspects underscore the fact
that the Board must, in addition to reviewing the performance of the
organisation and the management, also review its own performance to make
sure they are doing their duty diligently and effectively. Behavioural
psychologists and organisational learning experts agree that people and
organisations cannot learn without feedback. No matter how good a Board
is, it is bound to get better if it is reviewed intelligently. In view
of the importance attached to the Board, the Indian Companies Act, 2013
requires the evaluation of the performance of the board to add value to
the stakeholders and corporates.

Legal Requirement
The
Companies Act, 2013 has recognised the long felt need for having a
structured process for evaluation of the performance of the Board of
Directors. Section 178(2) of the Companies Act, 2013 mandates that the
Nomination and Remuneration Committee constituted by the Board shall
carry out an evaluation of the performance of every Director. In
addition, the Code for Independent Directors mandates that the
Independent Directors of a Company shall hold at least one meeting, in
which the performance of the non-independent directors and the Board as a
whole, shall be reviewed. Further, the quality, quantity and timeliness
of the flow of information between the Management and the Board shall
be evaluated. The performance of the independent directors shall also be
done by the entire Board excluding the director being evaluated. Based
on such evaluation, the Board’s report shall contain a statement
indicating the manner of evaluation and the conclusions thereof.

Evaluation Process
Typically,
the performance evaluation of the Board would be on the basis of a
benchmark which could be decided upfront and used for the purpose of
this exercise. The evaluation can also be carried out on specific
matters relating to each committee and those which would apply only at a
Board level as well.

With respect to the evaluation of the
individual directors, the performance evaluation could be done on the
basis of the following macro aspects:

-Allocated Roles and Responsibilities
-Strategic Thinking
-Risk Management
-Core Governance and Compliance Management
-Independence & Ethics
-Corporate Culture
-Compliance with the Code of Conduct of Directors
-Industry/Entity Knowledge
-Talent Management
-Leadership Style
-Unbiased Approach
-Effectiveness of Decision Making
-Entity Performance

In addition, the following specific aspects could also be considered for performance evaluation:

-Attendance and contribution to the meetings
-Application of financial/technical/legal/treasury/other expertise on specific matters
-Quality of debate
-Extent of communications with executive management
-Relationship with other Board members
-Personal eminence and the reputation
-Quality of the feedback provided to the management

The
Act does not stipulate the timing or the period for evaluation of the
Board. Hence, a company could either decide to do the evaluation on an
annual basis similar to the policy followed for its employees or deal
with it by having any other review period on a systematic basis. Each
company needs to assess the specific aspects applicable to it and then
consider the frequency/ periodicity of the evaluation. The review could
be done at a pre-determined frequency or could be performed on an “as
needed” basis. The “as needed” approach may work in situations where the
Board has a clear policy on the triggers that would prompt an
evaluation. However, in situations where such guidelines are not
available, then it is possible that the need for performance evaluation
may be overlooked. Performing the evaluation on an annual basis is the
most common frequency as this in line with the annual planning cycle
and, therefore, useful in adapting the performance expectations with the
strategic needs of the organisation. However, a predictable frequency
could result in the evaluation becoming mundane and routine.

On
an overall level, the performance evaluation should be an ongoing
process and not just an annual event. One of the best practices is to
devise other mechanisms in addition to the annual review to ensure
ongoing performance improvement. Irrespective of the period chosen, the
same may be followed in letter and spirit and on a consistent basis.

Attributes
of a Successful Governance Oversight Model Identifying an appropriate
governance oversight model is the basic starting point for having a
robust evaluation platform. All the subsequent activities will be driven
by this. In general, a successful governance oversight model should
encompass the following attributes:

-Competence – skills required for the Board to effectively execute its responsibilities
-Understands corporate governance and its application to Board structure, operations, processes, and procedures
-Understands the organisation, its businesses, and underlying drivers
-Has relevant, recent experience in the industry, adjacent industries and markets, or competitors
-Has knowledge of the interests and priorities of stakeholders
-Process – processes required for the Board to both understand and properly oversee the activities of the entity
-Understands the risks inherent in the organization’s governance programmes
-Selects qualified, independent Board members, aligning overall Board composition with the organization’s strategy
-Establishes and periodically reaffirms Board leadership
-Establishes and ensures compliance with Board operating principles and governance policies
-Designs and implements a committee structure that complements and enhances the work of the Board
-Assesses and continually improves the Board, its leaders, and committees
-Engages with stakeholders
-Oversees public disclosures related to Board operations
-Information – information required by the Board adequate to support effective oversight and decision making
-Receives verbal and/or written feedback and development plans resulting from periodic assessments
-Receives Board governance documents and related tools (e.g., Board calendars, planning tools) for review and improvement
-Receives thought leadership or continuing education related to Board governance developments
-Behaviour – Board’s behaviour to support and reinforce strong oversight
-Displays ownership and commitment to governance excellence and continuous improvement
-Creates a culture of collaboration, engagement, and healthy tension among Board members
-Holds Board members accountable for their behaviour.

Techniques of Evaluation
The
evaluation can be done by using qualitative techniques such as
interviews, feedbacks, etc. or through quantitative techniques such as
surveys, scorecards, questionnaires etc. A typical questionnaire/
scorecard would cover the aspects indicated under “what will be
evaluated?” and in particular the following aspects:

Composition and Quality
-Understanding the business and risks
-Process and procedures
–    Oversight of the financial reporting process and internal controls
–    assessing related party transactions
–    understanding competitive landscape
–    understanding risks relating to management override, including significant judgements, assumptions and estimates.
–    fair compensation.
–    Communication with employees, vendors and customers
–    adequacy and effectiveness of Board initiated/ monitored mechanisms such as Code of Conduct, Whistle Blower Policy, PTR, CSR Policy, etc.
–    oversight of the audit function
–    ethics and compliance
–    monitoring activities
–    Strategy effectiveness
–    management relationship
–    Succession Planning & training.

Further,   this   could   be   done   through   face   to   face discussions, telephonic conversations, e-mails, web based scoring modules etc. Irrespective of the evaluation technique used, due care should be taken in documenting the process and the conclusions reached.

The next step in the process is to decide who will perform the evaluation – whether internally (by the nomination and remuneration Committee) or using specialist consultants or external experts. the decision regarding the same will need to be taken after considering the following factors:
–    autonomy of the Board
–    Board Culture and dynamics
–    Confidentiality
–    Perception of Bias
–    need for transparency and objectivity
–    Skills and experience of Performing evaluations
–    time and Cost.

The  general  process  to  be  followed  could  be  to  obtain the self-evaluation from the individual directors about the individual and also about the Board which forms the basis for an independent evaluation by the designated person/ committee/authority.

Evaluation Feedback
The  feedback  to  the  Board  could  be  provided  not  only by the members of the Board, but to make it more transparent and comprehensive, the participant base could be extended to cover the internal and external stakeholders  as  well.  Typically,  the  internal  participants who could be consulted for obtaining the feedback on the performance of the Board could be the CEO and other key managerial personnel who interact with the Board on various matters. Similarly, the external participants could range from the shareholders, key customers & suppliers, internal & external auditors. Whilst the internal participant could provide a more specific feedback, the external participants could provide a general feedback about the company/culture which would reflect the performance of the Board.

The  Board  should  agree  upfront  the  required  actions that it can take to improve governance. the performance assessment of the Board would typically be discussed by the Board collectively. With respect to the performance assessment of the individual director, generally the same will be discussed by the Chairman of the Board with the concerned member/director. The practice of releasing the summary of the results of the Board’s performance to the entire organisation is also considered as one of the best practices in connection with the Board evaluation process worldwide.

Whilst section 134 (3)(o) of the Companies act, 2013 requires only a statement indicating the manner in which the formal annual evaluation has been made by the Board of its own performance and that of its committees and individual directors and the results of the individual evaluation, distribution of the results of the evaluation to stakeholders would be decided by each company based on various factors including the governance model followed, expectations, complexities, culture etc. Irrespective of the method adopted and the regulatory provisions, the Board should keep in mind that the process of performance evaluation, providing the required feedback and the extent of sharing such feedback with others would reflect its commitment to the entire governance process!

Conclusion
Performance evaluation is very important for the Board for not only in meeting the regulatory requirement but also in setting the right tone at the top. This is one of the key mechanisms for the Board to demonstrate its commitment to continuing improvement. It would be a great value multiplier tool for the company, directors and all those stakeholders who will be impacted by the functioning of the company.

When the Board recognises the importance of this process and attributes sanctity and importance to this process, and implements it with all vigour, this would help in building a sound corporate structure which can avert governance failures. Whilst the process is new to india, the experience gained in implementation would help Indian corporates in fine-tuning it on a continuous basis.

To Consolidate or not to Consolidate

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Introduction
Section 129(3) of the Companies Act, 2013, requires a company having one or more subsidiaries, to prepare consolidated financial statements (CFS), in addition to separate financial statements. The second proviso to this section states that the Central Government may provide for the consolidation of accounts of companies in such manner as may be prescribed.

Rule 6 in the Companies Accounts Rules deal with manner of consolidation of accounts. The rule states that “The consolidation of financial statements of the company shall be made in accordance with the provisions of Schedule III of the Act and the applicable accounting standards.”

The MCA has recently amended the Company Accounts Rules whereby a new proviso has been added in the Rule 6. The proviso states that “Provided also that nothing in this rule shall apply in respect of consolidation of financial statement by a company having subsidiary or subsidiaries incorporated outside India only for the financial year commencing on or after 1st April 2014.”

Question 1
Whether the above proviso exempts companies from preparing CFS or the exemption relates only to manner of preparing CFS?

Author’s View
The exemption relates only to the manner of preparing CFS and not the preparation of CFS itself. To support this view, the following two arguments can be made:

• The requirement to prepare CFS is arising from the Companies Act 2013. Rule 6 deals only with the manner of preparing CFS, i.e., preparation of CFS as per notified AS and Schedule III. Hence, the exemption relates only to the manner of preparation of CFS. Thus, a company covered under the above proviso can prepare CFS as per any acceptable framework, say, IFRS, instead of CFS as per notified accounting standards/Schedule III. A company covered under the proviso can also prepare CFS as per any other GAAP (other than Ind AS where the dates are those prescribed by the roadmap) say, US GAAP for filing with the Registrar of Companies (ROC). But if the company also needs to comply with the listing agreement requirements, they permit either Indian GAAP or IASB IFRS.

• Hence, for a listed company, in order to meet both ROC requirements and listing requirements, the option is either Indian GAAP or IASB IFRS (for one year). However, a company cannot avoid preparing CFS.

• Presently, there are few companies who are currently preparing IASB IFRS CFS as per the option given in the listing agreement. If these companies are required to prepare Indian GAAP CFS for year ended March 2015, they will have to transit from IASB IFRS to Indian GAAP for March 2015. In March 2016, these companies will move to Ind AS (i.e., IFRS converged standards) once Ind AS become voluntarily applicable for financial years beginning on or after 1st April 2015. It is understood that the MCA has added this proviso in the rules to avoid this flip flop.

Question 2
Whether the exemption discussed above is available for companies which have overseas subsidiaries only or a company having both Indian and foreign subsidiaries can also use this exemption?

Author’s View
The proviso is based on companies having one or more overseas subsidiaries. It does not matter whether a company has Indian subsidiary or not. In other words, this proviso can be used both by companies having (a) only foreign subsidiary/ies and (b) companies having both Indian and foreign subsidiary/ies.

Question 3
Whether the exemption is available only for one year or it will be available going forward also?

Author’s View
The proviso uses the words “only for the financial year commencing on or after 1st April 2014.” Hence, this exemption is available only for one year, for example financial year ending 31st March 2015 or 31st December 2015.

Question 4
Section 129(3) of the 2013 Act requires that a company having one or more subsidiaries will, in addition to separate financial statements (SFS), prepare CFS. Hence, all companies, including non-listed and private companies, having subsidiaries need to prepare CFS. Whether the comparative numbers need to be given in the first set of CFS presented by an existing group?

Author’s View
Schedule III states that except for the first financial statements prepared by a company after incorporation, presentation of comparative amounts is mandatory. In contrast, transitional provisions to AS 21 exempt presentation of comparative numbers in the first set of CFS prepared even by an existing group.

One view is that there is no conflict between transitional provisions of AS 21 and Schedule III. AS 21 gives one exemption that is not allowed under the Schedule III. Hence, presentation of comparative numbers is mandatory in the first set of CFS prepared by an existing company. This interpretation is taken on the basis that when there are two legislations; one of which imposes a more stringent requirement, the stringent requirement would apply.

The other view is that Schedule III is clear that in case of any conflict between Accounting Standards and Schedule III, Accounting Standards will prevail over the Schedule III. Hence, exemption given under AS 21 can be availed by an existing group which prepares CFS for the first time. In other words, an existing Group preparing CFS for the first time need not give comparative information in their first CFS prepared under AS 21.

Both the views appear acceptable.

Question 5
Consider that a non-listed company is preparing CFS in accordance with AS 21 for the first time. It has acquired one or more subsidiaries several years back. Is the company required to go back at the date of acquisition of investment for calculating goodwill/ capital reserve on acquisition?

Authors view
Goodwill/ capital reserve arising on acquisition of subsidiary should be calculated with reference to the date of acquisition of investment in subsidiary. Thus, determining goodwill for an acquisition that took place many years ago may be very challenging. The transitional provisions to AS 21 exempt a company, which is preparing CFS for the first time, from presenting comparative information. There is no exemption from the requirement to determine goodwill/ capital reserve. Hence, any goodwill/ capital reserve arising on acquisition should be determined at the acquisition date.

Let us assume that a company has acquired a subsidiary more than 10 years back, which should have resulted in goodwill arising on the acquisition. Under Indian GAAP, a company is allowed to amortise goodwill over its useful life, say, 5 to 10 years. Alternatively, the company may only test the goodwill for impairment. In this case, the company may argue that in the past, it has amortised goodwill over its useful life, say, 5 to 10 years. Consequent to amortisation, the net carrying value of goodwill on the date of first preparation of CFS is zero. The corresponding impact of goodwill amortisation has gone into profit or loss of the earlier periods and impacts the cumulative retained earnings at the date of first preparation of CFS. The application of this view obviates the need to go back in history for computing goodwill arising on acquisition. However, it impacts the amount of retained earnings and net worth on the transition date. If a company does not wish to have such impact and desires to disclose goodwill amount, it needs to go back in the history for calculating goodwill/ capital reserve arising on acquisition.

In the case of acquisitions made in recent history, say, in past 3-4 years, it may not be possible to take a view that the goodwill is fully amortised. In this case, the company will need to go back in history to determine goodwill arising on acquisition. The amount of goodwill reflected in the first CFS will depend on the company’s policy for goodwill amortisation with respect to past years.

To ensure that goodwill is not carried at amount higher than its recoverable amount, the company will have to test if goodwill is impaired at the transition date in accordance with AS 28 Impairment of Assets.

[2015] 54 taxmann.com 377 (Ahmedabad – Trib.) ITO vs. Heubach Colour Pvt. Ltd A.Y: 2007-08, Dated: 23.01.2015

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Sections 9(1)(vi), 195 – Outright purchase of know-how is not “royalty” under the Act

Facts:
The Taxpayer an Indian Company, engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of colour pigments and fine chemicals, purchased a particular line of business of a foreign company (NR Co) and certain payments were made towards knowhow.

The Taxpayer contended that the payments made to NR Co. were for outright purchase of capital assets.However, the Tax Authority contended that payments made by the Taxpayer were Royalty u/s. 9(1)(vi) of the Act, therefore treated the Taxpayer as assessee-in-default for failure to withhold taxes u/s. 195.

Held:
The agreement between the Taxpayer and NR Co indicates that the taxpayer had purchased knowhow, trademarks and goodwill from NR Co.

NR Co was the owner of manufacturing processes, formulae, trade secrets, technology, analytical techniques, testing procedures, processes and all documents and literature pertaining to manufacturing. NR Co sold, assigned conveyed and transferred to Taxpayer its entire right, title, interest and ownership in such rights. Thus, NR Co ceased to have right, title, interest and ownership in such rights from the date of transfer.
The Delhi High Court in the case of Asia Satellite Telecommunications Co. Ltd. (332 ITR 340) observed that royalty refers to transfer of “rights in respect of property” and not transfer of “right in the property”. The two transactions are distinct and have different legal effects. In the first category, the rights are purchased which enable use of those rights by the purchaser, while in the second category, no purchase is involved, only right to use has been granted.

The definition of term ‘royalty’ in respect of the copyright, literary, artistic or scientific work, patent, invention, process, etc. does not extend to outright purchase of right to use an asset.

Since nothing was brought on record by the tax authority to show that the payment was not for the purchase of technical knowhow, they were not in the nature of royalty.

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[2015] 54 taxmann.com 300 (Mumbai-Trib.) Mckinsey Business Consultants Sole Partner LLC vs. DDIT (IT) A.Y: 2011-12, Dated: 13.02.2015

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Article 3, 17 of India – Greece DTAA – Where DTAA does not have a specific article on FTS the services would be taxable as business profits and not as other income under the DTAA.

Facts:

The Taxpayer, a company incorporated in Greece entered into a transaction of providing certain services to an Indian branch of one of its associate entity. The Taxpayer did not offer to tax income received in respect of such services in India. The Taxpayer was of the view that income for services would fall under business income article of the DTAA . In absence of a PE in India, such business profits would not be liable to tax in India.

However, the Tax Authority contended that the services were in the nature of FTS under S. 9(1)(vi) of the Act as well as the DTAA .

On appeal before the dispute resolution panel (DRP), it was held that if DTAA is silent on certain source of income the same should be taxable as per the provisions of the Act. Aggrieved the taxpayer appealed before the Tribunal.

Held:
A bare reading of Article 17 (other income article) of India- Greece DTAA indicates that it deals with residual items of income which are not covered by any of the articles of the DTAA .

However, in this case the assessee has earned income by rendering the services in the course of its business and therefore, it is nothing but business profit which is covered under business profits article viz, Article 3 of the treaty. Admittedly the assessee does not have PE in India and hence, as per the express provision of Article 3 of the DTAA, business profit cannot be taxed in India.

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TS-70-ITAT-2015 (Del) Qualcomm incorporated vs. ADIT A.Y: 2005-09, Dated: 20.02.2015

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Section 9(1)(vi) – Royalty paid by one NR to another NR would be
taxable in India if it is paid in respect of patents used for the
purpose of carrying on business in India or for earning any income from a
source in India. On facts and in the context of CDMA technology , where
it can be shown that royalty is paid for license used in manufacturing
products specific to India, such license may be treated as used in
carrying on business in India.

Facts:
The
Taxpayer, a company incorporated in the US, was engaged in the business
of designing, developing, manufacturing and marketing digital wireless
communication products and services based on “Code Division Multiple
Access” (CDMA) technology. The Taxpayer owned certain patents pertaining
to CDMA technology.

The Taxpayer granted a non-transferable and
non-exclusive, worldwide patent licence to NR Original Equipment
manufacturers (OEMs) outside India to manufacture and sell CDMA
handsets/ infrastructure equipment (CDMA products).

For
exploitation of patent license, OEMs were required to pay a
non-refundable licence fee and an on-going royalty based on sale of CDMA
products. Royalties were to be computed as a percentage of the selling
price of the products manufactured by the OEMs. As per the agreement
between the taxpayer and OEM, royalty would become due as and when the
CDMA product was invoiced, shipped, sold, leased or put to use,
whichever was earlier.

OEMs manufactured CDMA products outside
India and sold them to telecom operators/service providers (SP)
worldwide, including India.

The issue before the Tribunal was
whether the royalty paid by NR OEMs to the Taxpayer (relating to
handsets /equipment sold/ used by OEMs in India) were taxable in India.
In other words, whether the royalty payment will be taxable in the
jurisdiction where the handsets/equipment are manufactured or in the
jurisdiction where they are used.

Held:
Under the Act

The
determining factor in royalty taxation is the place where the
intellectual property (IP) is used. i.e., the emphasis is on the situs
of use of the IP.

In connection with the patents, the event
triggering taxation is (i) granting of a right, licence or sub licence
in a patent, or (ii) sharing of information concerning use or working of
a patent. It is thus taxation of income of the person owning the
patents and it is taxation in the jurisdiction of end use of patents.

The emphasis is on the “situs of use” of the patent rather than “situs of the entity” making payment for the royalty.

If
a patent is used in a manufacturing process, royalty taxation should be
in the jurisdiction where manufacturing takes place. However, where
patent is used by the end consumer and the manufacturing is only a
conduit for collection of royalty for use from the end customer, it
should be taxable in end use jurisdiction.

As per the royalty
source rule u/s. 9(1)(vi), the situs is in India if the usage of patent
is for the purpose of (i) carrying on business or profession in India
(first limb) or (ii) earning income from a source in India (second
limb).

On carrying on a business or profession in India

Carrying
on business wholly in India or exclusively in India is not a sine qua
non for attracting taxability u/s. 9(1) (vi)(c). Even when business is
partly carried out in India but the royalties are payable in respect of
such part of the business as is carried on in India, it would be taxable
in India.

When an entity has a PE in a jurisdiction it would
imply that such an entity is carrying on business in the jurisdiction in
which such PE is situated.

Where the core manufacturing
activity with respect to CDMA products is carried out in one
jurisdiction but the sales and marketing activity in respect of the same
product is carried out in another jurisdiction (India), it cannot be
said that the business is not carried on in that other jurisdiction
(India).

Thus even where OEM do not manufacture CDMA products in
India, but makes India-specific products and carries out a part of his
business operation in India, it would be sufficient for section
9(1)(vii) to apply.

The principle that sale to customers in
India would amount to business with India and not business in India (as
observed in earlier ruling of ITAT ) would hold good only where there
was no material to suggest that any activity is carried on in India.
Thus by analogy even where NR has some operations in India, it can be
said to carry on business in India.

Thus, whether or not the OEMs carried on business in India would depend on two questions;

-Whether the CDMA handsets were made India specific and
-Whether OEM, as a part of his business, was carrying on any operations in India.

The
Andhra Pradesh High court (HC) in the case of Asifuddin [(2005)
Criminal Law Journal 4314 AP] had examined the working of the CDMA
technology and concluded that CDMA handsets are service provider
specific. However, it was argued by the Taxpayer that the CDMA handsets
sold in India were not service provider specific.

The issue was
remanded back to Tax Authority for a fresh examination on the aspects of
whether the OEMs made India specific products, whether OEMs had PE in
India.

On earning income from a source in India
The
expression ‘for the purpose of making or earning any income from any
source in India’ not only involves active earnings such as a business in
India but also a passive earning by exploiting an asset (both tangible
and intangible) in India.

The taxation of royalties for use of a
patented technology will have the situs where the technology is used.
Accordingly, when the royalty is for use of a technology in
manufacturing, it is to be taxed at the situs of manufacturing the
product, and, when the royalty is for use of technology in functioning
of the product so manufactured, it is to be taxed at the situs of use.

In
the present case, taxpayer owns the patent and royalty is for use of
patented technology, while the point of its collection, as a measure of
convenience and in consonance with the industry practice, is from
manufacturer when the patented product is put into use by sale.

Whether
or not patents are used in the manufacturing of the handset or for the
use of the patented technology embedded in the CDMA handsets is a highly
technical aspect requiring opinion of technical expert. The matter was
remitted back to Tax Authority for further examination.

Under the DTAA   

Article
12(7)(b) of the India-USA DTAA provides that royalty shall arise in
India if it relates to the use of or the right to use the right or
property in India.

Patents can be said to be used in India only
when royalty is paid for the use of patents in CDMA products sold in
India and not for the use of CDMA technology for the manufacture of CDMA
products outside India.

The Tribunal abstained from ruling on
Article 12(7)(b) as this issue was remanded back for consideration based
on opinion of technical expert.

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TS-147-ITAT-2015 (PAN) ACIT vs. Ajit Ramakant Phatarpekar and Neelam Ajit Phatarpekar A.Y: 2010-11, Dated: 16.03.2015

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Section 9 –For withholding of tax, law prevailing at the time of payment is applicable; hence, retrospective amendment does not create withholding default

Facts:
The Taxpayer, an Indian resident, made payments to nonresident (NR) parties for monitoring, supervision of discharged cargo, undertaking draft survey, joint sampling of such discharged cargo, photographs, sample preparation, sealing of samples, analysis of grade etc. The services were rendered outside India by the NR.

The Taxpayer did not withhold tax on payments made to NR in the belief that payments made to NR did not constitute FTS under the Act and further that income from services rendered outside India did not accrue or arise in India as NR did not have a Permanent establishment (PE) in India and services were rendered outside India.

Tax Authority contended that by virtue of retrospective amendment to Explanation to section. 9, income of NR is deemed to accrue or arise in India irrespective of whether NR has a place of business in India or whether services are rendered in India. Hence, such income is taxable in India under the Act.

Held:
The Tribunal did not analyse the nature of payments made by the Taxpayer and held that once the payment is in the nature of Fee for technical services (FTS), Explanation to section 9 becomes applicable. Explanation to section 9 introduced by the Finance Act, 2010 (retrospectively with effect from 1st June 1976) provides that FTS will be deemed to accrue and arise in India whether or not NR has residence or place of business or business connection in India or the NR has rendered services in India.

It is undisputed that NR does not have a place of business or business connection in India and neither does NR render services in India. Thus, income from services to Taxpayer accrues or arises outside India. However, by virtue of Explanation to section 9, the same is regarded as deemed to accrue or arise in India.

In the present facts, payments were made by the Taxpayer before the retrospective amendment to Explanation to section 9. Thus at the time of payment, there was no provision under the Act, deeming FTS to accrue or arise in India and hence, the Taxpayer was not liable to withhold taxes on payments made to NR. The Tribunal held that the law prevailing at the time of payment has to be kept in mind. Since at the time of payments, income was not regarded as accruing or arising in India, there was no need to withhold taxes at the time of making payments.

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Some US Tax Issues concerning NRIS/US Citizens Part II

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In our previous article, an attempt was made to answer some basic issues pertaining to the US tax laws related to Non-resident Indians1 (NRIs) including Indian expatriates working in the US or those who are the US Citizens or Green Card holders who are not tax residents of the USA and brief discussion on enactment of FATCA and its impact, Residential Status in the US, Exempt Income in the US, FBAR (FinCEN Reporting) and Form 8938 reporting. To take a step further, this article2 attempts to throw light on taxation of passive income (such as Capital Gains, Dividend and rental income). In order to elucidate issues clearly, they are discussed in a Questions- Answers format.

Introduction
In the USA, complying with the tax laws can be very challenging as the same is fraught with complications. Indian Citizens who have moved to the US for employment or for better prospects and in the process have become residents of the US or Green Card Holders should understand the nuances of local tax laws very carefully and start strictly complying with the same from day one. Non compliance or non awareness of taxability of certain income in US can be a very costly affair, as the US has one of most stringent laws with respect to interest and penalty provisions for non compliance.

If you are a tax resident (even if a non citizen i.e. resident alien) in the US, then you are taxed on your worldwide income, just as in case of a Citizen of the USA. In other words, you are taxed on your worldwide income in US2 during the period u you are tax resident of the USA. In the US, the income is basically categorized in two types of Income i.e.,

Trade or business income or
Passive Income (Capital Gains, Dividends, Rental Income etc.) In this article, we would discuss the nuances regarding the taxability of passive income of the US tax residents from outside the USA (i.e., from India) both in the US and India. We would also touch upon the taxability (in both jurisdictions) of passive income arising to Indian Residents from the US.

Capital Gains from Sale of Immovable Property situated in India

1. How capital assets are defined for “Resident Alien”3 in the US and how their cost is determined? Whether a “Resident alien” in US is required to declare his capital assets located in India?

Capital Assets in the US are defined to mean almost everything one owns and uses, for personal or investment purposes. Examples include a home, personal-use items like household furnishings, car and stocks or bonds held as investments.

The US IRS (Internal Revenue Service) uses the term “Basis of Assets” for the cost. Basis is the amount of investment in asset for tax purposes. The basis is the amount one pays for it in cash, debt obligations, and other property or services. It includes sales tax and other expenses connected with the purchase. For stocks or bonds, basis is the purchase price plus any additional costs such as commissions and recording or transfer fees. Basis is increased to incorporate cost of improvements and decreased to consider depreciation, non dividend distribution on stock/stock splits etc.

“Resident Alien” in the US is required to report capital assets wherever located while filing his tax return in Form 8938 or FBAR as may be applicable. Thus, it can be seen that the definition of “Capital Asset” under the US tax law is quite similar to the Indian tax laws.

2. What are the provisions pertaining to Long term capital gains on sale of Immovable properties located in India and pertaining to the US resident alien?

In India, sale of Immovable property is considered as long term, if it is sold 3 years after its date of acquisition. Long Term Capital Gains from immovable property situated in India is taxed @ 20% plus 3% Education Cess + Surcharge, as may be applicable. However, as per the US Tax law, the time period for computing “Long term asset” is one year. In US, the tax rate on Long term Capital Gains depends upon the ordinary income tax bracket of an individual.

3. Can a NRI (Who is Resident Alien in the USA) claim exemption in India of Capital gains earned from sale of Immovable Property situated in India?

Section 54 to 54F of the Income-tax Act, 1961 contains provisions regarding exemptions/relief from Long Term Capital Gains in India. These exemptions/reliefs are subject to fulfillment of certain conditions. Exemptions are available if capital gain earned is invested in a residential house situated in India or some specified bonds in India. These sections restrict the exemption to an individual and HUF. The exemption is not dependent on the residential status or citizenship of the seller/assessee. Thus a NRI residing outside India can claim exemption [as per provisions of section 54 to section 54F] in respect of the sale proceeds/capital gains arising from transfer of a long term capital asset.

Further as per section 54 and 54F, capital gains are exempted if NRI invests in a new house property. As per the recent Amendment in the Income Tax Law4, the location of the new house property should be in India.

4. H ow Capital Gains earned in India by a NRI (who is a “Resident Alien” of US) are taxed in USA? Can he claim tax exemption in the US for the property sold in India?

Capital Gains arising in India in the hands of a NRI, who is a Resident tax Alien in the US, will be computed in the US as per the US tax laws, irrespective of the tax treatment that gains suffered in India. As per the US tax laws, Long term Capital Gains on sale of a main home, is exempted up to $ 2,50,000/5- subject to certain conditions. Exemption of $ 250,000/6 – for sale of a property depends on the ownership requirement and use requirement.

However, when the US resident alien files his tax return in the US, he/she has to take into account the difference in the time period for calculating long term capital gain, the exemption available as per the tax laws of US and treat his Indian capital gains as per the time period specified in the US law.

NRI can claim a foreign tax credit in his/her US tax return as per India – USA DTAA .

To elucidate the matters more clearly, let us consider an example (it will be not possible to cover and analyse all types of situations that may arise in real life situations) which is given below in Q 5.

5. Mr. Rich, a NRI and “US Resident Alien” owns a house in New York, USA (being his Main Home) and a Flat in Mumbai. He sells the Flat in Mumbai for Rs. 75 lakh and earns Rs. 55 lakh as Long term Capital Gains. Can he invest Rs. 50 lakh in REC/NHAI Bonds u/s. 54EC? What would be implications under the US Tax Law? What are the Implications under India – US DTAA?

As per the India US DTAA , Capital Gains are taxed in India as well as USA in accordance with the provisions of the respective domestic tax laws. Therefore, the capital gains arising from the sale of flat in Mumbai would be taxable in India.

As explained above a NRI residing outside India can claim exemption under section 54 to section 54F of the Incometax Act, 1961. Thus, out of the capital gains arising from transfer of a flat i.e. long term capital asset the investment under 54EC is permissible.

Mr. Rich being a US resident will pay taxes on Capital Gains of Rs. 55 lakh as per the US Law. As his house in New York is the “main home” (satisfies the ownership and the user requirement of the main home), he will be not able to take the benefit of the exclusion provided as per the US Laws for the Mumbai Flat7 . Though, as per India – US DTAA he would be allowed credit for the taxes paid in India against the taxes payable in US.

6.    What are the provisions relating to Capital gains arising from shares, debentures and Bonds in India? Can a NRI claim exemption from Capital gains u/s. 10(38) of the Income-tax Act earned from sale of equity shares of Indian Companies?

Taxability in india
Profits and gains earned on sale of any shares, debentures, mutual funds and other securities are taxed under the head of “Capital Gains” under the income-tax act, 1961.

Gains on shares, debt or balanced schemes of mutual funds, are defined as Long term capital Gain if the same are held for more than 12 months.

Short  term  Capital  Gains  on  sale  of  shares  or  mutual funds which are debt oriented are taxed at normal rate of tax along with other taxable income. However, Short term Capital Gains on sale of equity shares or units of an equity oriented fund on which STT is paid, is taxed at the rate of 15% plus 3% education cess plus curcharge as may be applicable.

Long term Capital Gains (LTCG) from sale of equity shares or unit of equity oriented mutual fund listed in india on which Stt is paid, is exempt u/s. 10(38) for both residents and non-residents.  However,  LTCG  from  unlisted  securities shall  be  taxed  at  10%.  LTCG  on  Listed  Securities  on which Stt is not paid is taxed @ 10% without indexation, whereas taxed @ 20% with indexation plus 3% education cess plus curcharge as may be applicable.

7.    How Capital gains earned in India by a NRI, who is a US Resident Alien, are taxed in USA?

Taxability in the USA

In  the  US,  the  tax  rates  on  Long  term  and  Short  term Capital Gain will depend on tax brackets of the ordinary income of an individual. Given below is the table of various

Tax rates applicable8 to an individual depending upon his/ her tax bracket:-

tax Brackets
for a
Single individual

ordinary
income tax rate

long term capital Gain rate

Short term capital
Gain
rate

$0 – $9075

10%

0%

10%

$9076 – $36900

15%

0%

15%

$36901 – $89350

25%

15%

25%

$89351 – $186350

28%

15%

28%

$186351 – $405100

33%

15%

33%

$405101 – $406750

35%

15%

35%

$406751 & Above

39.6%

20%

39.6%

Let us consider one more example to understand the impact under both tax laws:-

Mr. Rich, a NRI and US Resident Alien, owns Rs. 10 crore worth of shares of listed Indian Companies. he sells all the shares and earns long term Capital gains of Rs. 5 crore and Short Term Capital gains of Rs. 1 crore. What are the implications under India and US Tax law? Whether such Capital gains would be taxable in the US? Can Mr. Rich claim tax credit in US of taxes paid in india?

Implications as per Income-Tax Act, 1961
As per section 5 of the income-tax act, any income arising in india will be taxable in india. however, Long term Capital Gains on sale of equity Shares is exempt u/s. 10(38) of the act. Though, Short term Capital Gains arising from sale of equity shares would be taxable at the rate of 15% (plus 3% education Cess and applicable surcharge) u/s. 111a of the act. Hence in the given example, Mr. rich would be exempt from tax on Long term Capital Gains but would be taxed at 15% (plus 3% education Cess and applicable Surcharge) on Short term Capital Gains.

    Implications under US Tax Laws:-

Mr. rich would be taxed on his worldwide income in the uS and hence, he would be taxed on the Capital Gains arising in india. however, as per article 25 of india – US DTAA, he can avail foreign tax credit of the taxes paid in india against the uS taxes.

Long term  Capital  Gains  and  Short term  Capital  Gains arising on sale of shares will be taxable as per the tax brackets  of  Mr.  Rich.  even  though  Long  term  Capital Gains from sale of equity are exempt from tax in india, such gains will be taxable in the US. Short term Capital Gains are taxed in the US as per the ordinary income tax rates, whereas the Long term capital gains are taxed at a concessional rate depending upon the ordinary income tax bracket. The table of tax rates for both short term and long term capital gains is given above for reference.

Taxation of Dividend Income
8.    What are the implications under Indian and US Tax laws for a US Resident receiving Dividends from indian Companies?

In india, the recipient of dividends is not liable to pay any tax on dividend received/accrued as the company distributing the dividend is liable to pay dividend distribution tax at the rate of 15% plus surcharge and education Cess. Thus, a US tax resident receiving dividends from the indian company which has paid dividend distribution tax is not subjected to tax in india. However, such dividend would be taxed in US as per the normal income tax rates.

 Taxation of Rental Income
9.    Mr. Rich, a NRI, residing in the US. he has given his residential house in India on rent. What will be the implications of the rental income received by Mr. Rich under the US tax law?

Rental income received by mr. rich will be taxed both in india and uS. article 6 of the india – uS dtaa provides that rent from immovable property (real property) may be taxed in the country where it is situated. thus, mr. rich has to pay tax on rental income in india as the property is situated in india and he has to pay tax in the uS also, being taxed on worldwide income. the major difference in india and uS is that in india mr. rich would get a standard deduction of 30% whereas in uS taxation only actual expenses incurred would  be  deducted  from  such  rental  income.  following deductions will be allowed against such income:

–    mortgage Property taxes
–    insurance
–    utilities
–    depreciation – allowed for building; any furnishings; appliances (except land).
However, the taxes paid in india would be available as foreign tax Credit under indian – US DTAA.

    Taxation of Interest
10.    how is interest income of a NRI (who is resident alien in USA) taxed in India and US?

As per the india – US dtaa, the right of taxing interest primarily lies with the Country of residence of the person earning it. However, article 11 does give right of taxation to the source country but the maximum rate at which it can get taxed is capped at 15%. 9

Taxation of Income of Non-resident Aliens (i.e. Indian residents) in US

So far we have discussed taxability of nris settled in USA who (mostly regarded as resident alien or uS Citizen) have sources of income in india. Let us now turn to a situation where indian tax residents have sources of income in USA.

11.    A resident Indian sells an immovable property in US (acquired 2 years ago) and earns a capital gain of $15,000/-. What would be implications under the US Tax law and the Indian IT Act? What is the India – US Tax Treaty implications on the same?

In the given case, since the property was held for two years, the capital gains would be treated as Long term Capital Gains in the US. The net capital gain is normally taxed at the appropriate10  graduated tax rates. however, if withholding tax is applicable, then tax is deducted by the purchaser at the rate of 10% of the gross sale proceeds. Resident Indian would therefore be required to file income tax return in the US and pay appropriate capital gains tax, subject to exemption of $ 2,50,000/-, if gains arise on sale of main home. In certain cases, subject to certain filings and fulfillment of conditions withholding of tax can be avoided.

Resident Indian while filing his income tax return in India would have to treat such capital gains as short term capital gains as the period of holding is less than three years. however, as per the india – US DTAA, resident indian will be able to claim the foreign tax credit for the taxes paid in the US while filing his tax return in India.

12.    A resident Indian has earned Capital gains on sale of a foreign property (long term capital asset) which was held for more than three years, Will he be able to claim capital gains exemption as per the IT Act by investing in a residential house in india or NHAI bonds in india?

A resident indian can avail exemption u/s. 54eC and 54f upon fulfillment of certain conditions if the investment made from transfer of a long term capital asset. The exemption is available irrespective of the fact that the capital asset is situated outside india.

13.    What are the implications under Indian and US Tax laws for an Indian Resident receiving Dividends from US Companies?

In the US, dividends are considered as part of passive income. Generally, tax at the rate of 30% or lower treaty rate (i.e. 25% as per india – US DTAA) is withheld by a uS Corporation on the dividends distributed to a non-resident.

In india, such dividends would be taxed in the following manner

(i)    If dividend is received by an indian Company from its Wholly owned subsidiary in uS, then it is taxed @15%; and
(ii)    In all other cases, at the applicable tax rate.

The tax withheld by the US Corporation would be available as foreign tax credit against the tax payable in india.

14.    What will be the implications under the US tax law for the rental income received by Indian resident from renting of property in US?

As per the US Laws, tax rates depends on whether a non- resident alien is able to choose to treat all income from real property as effectively/not effectively connected with a trade or business.

If the rental income is in connection with any trade or business in USA, then the tax would be levied on a graduated applicable tax rates, otherwise tax would withheld @ 30% on gross rental. The taxpayer i.e. an indian resident has to make appropriate declaration by exercising choice at the time of filing his tax return.

Epilogue
The US tax law is a complex subject. one cannot possibly cover all aspects in a short write-up. The intention of few FAQs mentioned herein above is to highlight some of the nuances of US & indian tax laws on passive income in india pertaining to nris in the USA (resident alien or uS Citizen) & passive income in the uSa of indian tax residents.


Mah. Amendment Act No. XVII of 2015

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Maharashtra Act No. XVII of 2015 published in the Maharashtra Government Gazette on 18.4.2015 after having received assent of the Governor.

Few important amendments in MVAT are as follows:-

• Definition of “Purchase price” and “sale price” amended to exclude Service Tax if separately collected.

• Late Fee for delayed return filed before thirty days reduced to Rs.1,000/- from Rs.2,000/-.

• Application u/s.23(11) for cancellation of assessment order also provided for order passed u/s. 23(5). • Dates for working of interest for filing annual revised return provided.

• Schedule Entry C-4 amended to include embroidery thread in category of sewing thread with effect from 1.4.2005.

• Notification under Schedule Entry C-54 amended to include white butter in relation to “Desi Loni” with effect from 1.4.2005.

• Schedule Entry C-91 amended so that spices shall include spices in all forms of varieties and mixtures of any of the spices with effect from 1.4.2005.

Amendment in Professional Tax Act :

Female Employee getting salary less than Rs. 10,000/- per month : Employee Professional Tax will be Nil.

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Amendments to Schedule ‘A’ and ‘C’ of MVAT Act VAT 1515/CR 39(1)/Taxation-1 dated 27.3.2015

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By this Notification, Schedule A & C are amended with effect from 1.4.2015.

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[2015] 37 STR 963 (Ker.) E. M. Mani Constructions Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commr. Of C. Ex., Cus. & S.T., Cochin

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Stay Order should be passed only after hearing the appellant and considering the merits put forth.

Facts:
During the hearing of stay application, the learned counsel for the appellant was not present and adjournment was requested. However, the Tribunal proceeded with the hearing and passed a stay order with the condition of payment of entire service tax with interest along with 50% penalty. Subsequently, the modification application of the appellant also was rejected. Therefore, the present appeal is filed.

Held:
Since the Counsel for the appellant did not remain present, the order was passed without hearing the appellant. Further, while the order rejecting modification application, the Tribunal focused on its limit on jurisdiction in review applications. Therefore, both the orders were passed without having regard to the merits of the case. Accordingly, in view of the above and having regard to the huge quantum of service tax demand ordered to be deposited, the matter was remanded for fresh hearing and stay order.

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Lease vis-à-vis Service, Supremacy

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Introduction There are a number of transactions in the commercial world which are to be executed by the doer with use of various equipments and instruments. There may also be such situations where the doer may be working for one specific customer for a sufficiently long period of time. Under above circumstances a question arises whether such transaction is for providing services or it is to be treated as ‘deemed sale’ by way of “transfer of right to use goods” i.e. lease transaction, which can be made liable under Sales Tax Laws.

By now there are a number of judgments and it can be said that the situation is very fluid in as much as there are contradictory judgments including from the Hon’ble High Courts.

Quippo Oil and Infrastructure vs. State of Tripura (77 VST 547) (Trip)

This is one of the latest judgments from the High Court of Tripura deciding on the controversy as referred to above. There were a number of petitions, but the facts as noted by the Hon. High Court in one of the cases, can be referred to as under:

The petitioner companies in this case entered into a contract with the ONGC for digging directional wells. As per the petitioners, digging directional wells has many components including Drilling Rig, Logging Services, Cementing, Mud Engineering, Directional Drilling etc. Directional drilling is one of the components of digging a directional well. According to the petitioners they have entered into a service contract providing service of directional drilling, and therefore, they are paying service tax to the Central Government. The petitioners contend that the contract does not amount to sale and no VAT can be levied on the same.

Based on above facts, the Hon. High Court has discussed the issue at length. The rival submissions are noted by the Hon. High Court by observing as under:

“The case of the State is that since a tax on the sale or purchase of goods includes in terms of sub-clause (d) of Article 366(29A) tax on the transfer of the right to use any goods for any purpose the petitioners are liable to pay value added tax on such transfer of right to use goods. The contention of the petitioners is that they have entered into a service contract and only the Union can levy tax on services and not the State. The petitioners have also urged that they are paying service tax to the Central Government under the provisions of law and since they are paying service tax, if there is conflict between the Central Law and the State Act the Tripura Value Added Tax Act must necessarily give way to the provisions which provide for imposition of service tax in the Finance Act of 1994.”

The Hon. High Court has referred to a number of citations, and, after full discussion arrived at the following conclusion:

“[33] As has been held by the Apex Court either a transaction shall be exigible to sales tax/VAT or it shall be exigible to service tax. Both the taxes are mutually exclusive. Whereas sales tax and value added tax can be levied on sales and deemed sales only by the State, it is only the Central Government which can levy service tax. No person can be directed to pay both sales tax and service tax on the same transaction. The intention of the parties is clearly to treat the agreement as a service agreement and not a transfer of right to use of goods. We are also clearly of the view that it is impossible from the terms of the contract to divide the contract into two portions and since the petitioners have paid service tax they cannot be also asked to pay value added tax. As held by the Delhi High Court in Commissioner, VAT , Trade and Taxes Department vrs. International Travel House Ltd. (supra), if there is a conflict between the Central law and the State Act then the Central law must prevail. The petitioners cannot be burdened with two different taxes for the same transaction.

[34] After carefully going through the contracts we are of the view that the contracts are mainly for hiring of services. There may be a very small element of transfer of right to use goods but according to us the pre-dominant portion of the contract relates to hiring of services and not to transfer of right to use the goods. We are aware that the dominant nature test is not to be used in composite contracts falling within the ambit of Article 366(29A) but from the reading of the contract it is more than apparent that the intention of the parties was to treat the contract as a contract for hiring of services. Moreover, it is impossible to divide the contract into two separate portions. Every element of the digging directional wells and Mobile Drilling Rig service contains a major element of provisions of services. In such an eventuality it is virtually impossible to divide the contract. It is not possible to work out the value of the right to use goods transferred under the contract. In cases, where the contracts are easily divisible or where the parties have by agreement clearly indicated what is value of the service part and what is value of the transfer of right to use goods part, the contract may be divided. We are in agreement with the Delhi High Court that when the contract cannot be divided with exactitude then the Central Law must prevail.

[35] Parties have also been paying service tax and if the State is allowed to tax any portion of the value of the contract then there has to be a proportionate refund of the service tax to that extent. This cannot be done without hearing the Union of India. If there is any dispute between the State or the Union of India then they must resolve it between themselves. The petitioners or the ONGC cannot be made liable to pay both the taxes for the same transaction.

[36] In view of the above discussion, we are clearly of the view that in all the cases the transactions do not amount to sale within the meaning of the TVAT Act, 2004. Therefore, all the writ petitions have to be allowed. The State is not entitled to levy any sales tax or Value Added Tax on the transactions in question. It is, therefore, directed that the amount of tax, already deducted and received by the State shall be refunded to the petitioners along with statutory interest latest by 28th February, 2015. In case the amount is not refunded by that date then the State shall be liable to pay interest @12% per annum with effect from 1st January, 2015.”

Conclusion
The above judgment is one of the determinative judgments which is very clear in its verdict. The laws laid down by the Hon. High court will certainly be guiding law for time to come. The businesses, at present, are very much under pressure due to an attempt by both the authorities to levy Service tax as well as VAT . The nature of transaction is to be decided by its dominant nature and if it is for providing services, then even if some element of leasing of instrument etc. is involved, it cannot be enforced by State Authorities. The Service Tax should prevail over Sales Tax/VAT . We expect that taking note of the above judgment, the sales tax department will not ask to pay sales tax where Service Tax is already paid as well as if at all the transaction attracts sales tax then the departments will make adjustment of payment inter-se and not ask the dealer to discharge double tax. This will be a real relief to the dealers.

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Drilling Rigs on Time Charter – A Service of Hiring of Tangible Goods?

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In a recently reported Tribunal decision in the case of Great Ship (India) Ltd. vs. CST, Mumbai 2015 (37) STR 533 (Tri.-Mum), the issue posed before the Hon. Tribunal was to examine primarily whether a contract entered into for charter hire of drilling unit (including carrying out drilling activity), by the appellant therein, an Indian company with ONGC, involved dispute relating to taxability under mining of mineral, oil or gas service as defined in section 65(105)(zzzy) of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act) or liable as Supply Of Tangible Goods service (SOTG) as defined under sub-clause (zzzzj) of the said section 65(105) of the Act. Considering that along with the drilling rigs brought in by the appellant, their significant number of personnel carried out actual drilling operations, the appellant contended that the contract is one of drilling service liable as mining service as defined under service tax law whereas according to the revenue, the core object of the agreement was to provide equipment (tangible goods) on hire to attract service tax u/s. 65(105)(zzzzj) of the Finance Act, 1994. According to the appellant, they provided drilling service with the use of the drilling equipment obtained by them on hire from a Singapore company on bareboat charter basis and under the contract with ONGC, they were required to carry out drilling operations after securing permit and licenses for operation of drilling by its own crew of various skills like engineers, technicians etc., totalling to about 45 persons and hence the activity was carried out to produce the output service required by their customer. They also contended that they were fully responsible for the job as a whole and therefore they controlled, directed and supervised drilling operations and did not transfer possession of the equipment so as to merit classification as SOTG. The issue pertained to the period 07-07-2009 to 27-02-2010. Therefore, alternatively and incidentally, it was also contended on behalf of the appellant that prior to the date of 27-02-2010, service tax did not extend to the area in which the drilling services were carried out as India did not include installations, structures and vessels in the Continental Shelf and Exclusive Economy Zones of India. However, for the analysis and discussion herein below, the aspect of territorial jurisdiction is kept aside as the same is not relevant. The appellant also put forth the fact of their paying service tax under mining service for the subsequent period viz. 01-04-2010 onwards and filed ST-3 Returns to such effect and thus contended that their classification was accepted by the department.

As against this claim, the revenue’s submission was that the issue involved was covered by the Hon. Bombay High Court’s decision in Indian National Shipowners Association (INSA) 2009 (14) STR 289 (Bom). The High Court examined the scope of SOTG service in the context of supply of offshore vessels to carry out various jobs like anchor handling, towing of vessels, supply of rigs or platform, diving or safety support, crane support etc., in designated or non-designated areas. The question before the High Court in the case of INSA (supra) was whether various independent services provided by the members of the association were in the nature of mining services defined under entry (zzzy) or the later entry (zzzzj) defining SOTG in section 65(105) of the Act. Since these activities were independently carried out by various and separate vendors, it was held that the services are liable to be classified as SOTG, when the right of possession and effective control of goods was not transferred as they did not carry out mining activity.

Statutory provisions:
For facilitating easy reference, both the relevant definitions of section 65(105) of the Act are reproduced below:

[zzzy]:

“Taxable service means any service provided or to be provided to any person, by any other person in relation to mining of mineral, oil or gas”.

{zzzzj}:

“Taxable service means any service provided or to be provided to any person, by any other person in relation to supply of tangible goods including machinery, equipment and appliances for use, without transferring right of possession and effective control of such machinery, equipment and appliances.”

Scope of the contract:
The Tribunal on detailed examination of the contract between the parties inter alia found that the contract:

Was for a firm period of three years from the commencement date.

The compensation was based on per day of operation and only slightly lower compensation was payable (about 95%) even for a non-operation day. Similarly, even for the day when rigs were moved from one location to another, the lower rate of about 95% of the daily rate was still applicable to non-operation day.
The scope included provision of complete drilling rig and equipment as per technical specification.
Provision of capable and experienced rig crew.
The appellant was fully responsible for mobilisation of personnel, equipment and material and their safety.
Loss or damage to the drilling unit was on account of the appellant.
For undertaking any drilling, the appellant was entitled to additional charges.
Training the crew also was appellant’s responsibility.

The Tribunal on examining the definition of SOTG found that only two conditions were required to be covered by SOTG service viz. there should be supply of tangible goods and there should not be any transfer of right of possession and effective control. Whereas, the appellant’s contention that they did not transfer possession and control to ONGC was not relevant to determine liability under the category of SOTG.

Perusal of the ingredients of the contract in the light of the legal provisions, the Tribunal observed that the equipment and crew were of the appellant and therefore possession and effective control was of the appellant and the consideration was also expressed on per day basis. Thus, all the elements put together showed that there was no transfer of right or possession by the appellant to ONGC and therefore appellant’s contention that they should have transferred possession of goods to come within the scope of the taxing entry of SOTG was not tenable. On examining Bombay High Court’s decision in Indian National Shipowners Association (supra), the Tribunal concluded that the appellant’s service merited classification as SOTG. In support of its decision, the Tribunal also relied on the decisions of:

Atwood Oceanic Pacific Ltd. vs. Commissioner 2013 (32)STR 756 (Tribunal Ahmd)
Shipping Corporation of India 2014 (33 STR 552 (Tri.- Mum)
Srinivasa Transports 2014 (34) STR 765 (Tri.-Bang)

The Tribunal on concluding also noted that even on assuming that service was a composite service consisting of mining service and SOTG, the essential character of the service was SOTG service since 95% of the consideration was attributed for supply of tangible goods.

While analysing the above decision of the hon. tribunal, the fact of the matter to be noted is that the limited issue before the Bench was to examine and classify the activity under one or the other classification as the dispute raised in the show cause notice was in relation to classification. Similarly, when the hon. Bombay  high  Court  examined  the  case of INSA (supra), the trigger point for filing writ petition on behalf of members of the Shipowners’ association was that various offshore support vessels, construction barges, tugs etc., were provided by members for exploration operations on  time  charter  basis. This  summarily  may  be  described as  marine  logistics  services. The  revenue  initiated  action to recover service tax on the said activity under the entry  of mining service under the above sub-clause (zzzy). Vide this entry actually all the activities relating to mining were consolidated  by  the  finance act,  2007.  The  category  of SotG was introduced later from 16th may 2008. Therefore, in the case of INSA (supra) to put an end to dispute relating to taxability under the entry of mining service, the argument was advanced that the later entry of SOTG was the relevant classification. However, the scope of this taxing entry in (zzzzy) or taxability under the entry was per se not examined vis-à-vis a contract for hiring of equipment in detail  as there  did not arise such question before the high Court.   As a matter of fact, the decisions relied upon above by the tribunal in Great Ship (india) Ltd. (supra) viz. Shipping Corporation (supra), atwood oceanic (supra) etc., also, the dispute involved was limited to different classifications vis- à-vis SOTG and/or fact prior to the date of introduction of SOTG the service was not taxable.

Are Most Hiring Contracts Not of “Deemed sale”?:

On closely perusing the scope of the entry of SOTG one may find that only those hiring or leasing contracts would be covered by the scope of this entry whereunder, there is no transfer of right of possession and effective control over the equipment provided on hire. hiring contracts where such right is transferred are liable as “deemed  sale”  under  the  Vat  laws  of  the  States.  To examine whether a contract contains transfer of such right to use the goods or not, a test is laid down in the benchmark decision of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. vs. UOI 2006 (2) STR 161 (SC) which provides direction in the matter and which is also followed by various high Courts as listed below:

?    There must be goods available for delivery.
?    There must be consensus ad idem as to the identity of the goods.
?    The transferee should have legal right to use the goods
– consequently all legal consequences of such use including any permission or licenses required therefore should be available to the transferee.
?    For  the  period  during  which  the  transferee  has  such legal right, it has to be the exclusion of the transferor. This is the necessary concomitant of the plain language of the statute viz. a “transfer of the right to use” and not merely a license to use the goods.
?    Having transferred the right to use the goods during the period for which it is to be transferred, the owner cannot again transfer the same rights to others.

If all the above ingredients are present, the contract is one of “deemed sale” in terms of article 366(29A) of the Constitution and exigible to Vat and therefore cannot be held as SOTG service. It may be noted at this point that under the negative list based taxation applicable from 01-07-2012, the said service of SOTG is included in the list of “declared Services” in section 66e of the act in clause (F) as “transfer of goods by way of hiring, leasing, licensing or in any such manner without transfer of right to use such goods”. While explaining the negative list based provisions, the Government in the education Guide dated 20-06-2012 has referred to the above test and has cited a few illustrations with reference to some judgments to advance its own interpretation. (readers may refer para 6.6.1 and 6.6.2 of the said education Guide). The said test referred above was followed interalia in another important decision of the andhra high Court in G. S. Lamba & Sons vs. State of Andhra Pradesh 2012-TIOL-49-HC-AP-CT involving contract of hiring of commercial vehicles and the aspect of transfer of right to use has been exhaustively analysed (refer BCAJ november 2012 issue under hiring of goods: declared Service or deemed Sale). An extract of a few important observations made in the said decision of G. S. Lamba (supra) is provided below:

“The right to use goods arises only on the transfer of such right to use goods and that the transfer of right is the sine quo non for the right to use any goods”.

“Effective control does not mean physical control and even if the manner, method, modalities and time are decided by the lessee, it would be general control over goods”.

“Article 366(29A) would show that the tax (i.e. VAT in the instant case) is not on the delivery of goods used but on the transfer of the right to use goods regardless of when and whether goods are delivered for use. This is subject to the condition that goods are in existence for use.”

“The entire use in the property in goods is to be exclusively utilized for a period under contract by lessee.”

Similar decision has also been pronounced by the Gauhati high Court in Deepaknath vs. ONGC (2010) 31 VST 337 (GAU) and Orissa High Court in K. C. Behra vs. State of Orissa (1991) 83 STC 325 (Orissa). On going through the terms of contract in the instant case of Great Ship (india) Ltd. (supra), one may find that the contract satisfies the test laid down by the Apex Court in BSNL’s case (supra) and conforms with all the observations made by andhra high Court in G. S. Lamba’s case (supra). Yet, paradoxically, the contract is subjected to service tax.

Conclusion:
There may exist several conflicting decisions for a common situation. Similarly, view of professionals also may differ. yet the test laid down by BSNL seems a decisive factor for the  situation  discussed  above.  Following  principles  laid down thereunder, the above contract does not appear to be a contract for service at all. However, since this aspect was  not  presented  before  the  tribunal  for  the  reasons best known to the appellant, the contract seemingly of “deemed sale” is held as service of supply of tangible goods liable for service tax. Entire service sector and professionals eagerly await the arrival of GST legislation in the hope of bringing an end to the battle between the aspect of ‘sale’ and ‘service’ in a transaction.

Income computation and Disclosure Standards notified: Notification No. 33/2015 F.No. 134/48/2010 – TPl, dated 31 March 2015

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Income computation and Disclosure Standards notified: Notification No. 33/2015 F.No. 134/48/2010 – TPl, dated 31 March 2015

CBDT has notified income computation and disclosure standards applicable to all assessees following the mercantile system of accounting, for computing income chargeable to income-tax under the following heads:

(i) “Profit and gains of business or profession”
(ii) “Income from other sources”.

The Notification is effective from April 1, 2015 and will apply to Assessment Year 2016-17 and subsequent Assessment Years.

17. Roll back of Advance Pricing Agreements (APA): Notification no. 23/2015 dated 14.3.15 and Notification no. 33/2015 dated 1.4.2015

The Board vide Income tax (Third Amendment) Rules, 2015 had issued rules for roll back of application of APA as well as APA vide Rule 10 MA. These Rules allow retrospective application for roll back up to four years.

The dates prescribed in the said rules has been amended vide Income tax (Fourth Amendment) Rules, 2015. Currently, an application filed before 31 March 2015 can be rolled back by filing prescribed Form 3CEDA along with additional fee before 30 June 2015 or the date of entering the APA whichever is earlier. Similar provisions apply for APAs’ entered before 31 March 2015.

18. No capital gain arises on roll over of Mutual Funds under Fixed Maturity Plans as per SEBI norms – Circular No. 6 dated 9 April 2015

19. Amendment in Rule 114 to provide procedure for application of PAN/Tax deduction Account No./Tax collection Account No. for company not registered under the Companies Act, 2013, Certain additional documents (like Aadhar card, election card etc.) permitted as proof of date of birth in case of individuals – Income tax (Fifth Amendment) Rules 2015 – Notification no. 38/2015 dated 10 April 2015

20. Rule 2BB amended to increase amount of Transport allowance for blind or handicap employee from Rs. 1600/- to Rs. 3200/- and for other employees from Rs. 800/- to Rs. 1600/- per month – Income tax (Sixth Amendment) Rules 2015 – Notification no. 39/2015 dated 13 April 2015

21. New tax returns forms notified – Notification no- 41/2015 [S.O. 1014(E) dated 15 April , 2015 – Income tax (Seventh amendment) Rules, 2015

New forms SAHAJ (ITR-1), ITR-2, SUGAM (ITR-4S) and ITR-V” have been notified. Further Rule 12 has been amended with effect from 1 April, 2015

22. Chargeability of Interest on Self-Assessment tax under the Wealth tax Act, 1957 – Circular no. 5 dated 9 April 2015

As notified for income tax purposes, the Board now clarifies that no interest u/s. 17B will be charged on self assessment tax paid before the due date of filing the return, while computing the tax liability under the Wealth tax Act for delay in filing the return of net wealth.

23. CBDT Instructions on claim of treaty benefits by FIIs – File :F.No.500/36/2015-FTD-1 dated 24 April 2015 (reproduced hereunder)

It has come to the notice of the Board that several Foreign Institutional Investors receiving income from transactions in secrutities claim such income as exempt from tax under the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act)’, by availing benefit provided in the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements (‘DTAAs’) signed between India and their respective countries of residence.

Since the issue involved in such cases is limited, such claims should be decided expeditiously. Accordingly it has been decided that in all cases of Foreigh Institutional Investors seeking treaty benefits under the provisions of respective DTAAs, the decision may be taken within one month from the date such claim is filed.

This may be brought to the notice of all concerned with strict compliance.

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Jupiter Construction Services Ltd. vs. DCIT ITAT Ahmedabad `A’ Bench Before Pramod Kumar (AM) and S. S. Godara (JM) ITA No. 2850 and 2144/Ahd/11 Assessment Year: 1995-96 and 1996-97. Decided on: 24th April, 2015. Counsel for assessee / revenue: Tushar P. Hemani / Subhash Bains

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Section 255(4) – At the time of giving effect to the majority view, it normally is not open to the Tribunal to go beyond the exercise of giving effect to the majority views, howsoever mechanical it may seem. Even if the Third Member’s verdict is shown to be “unsustainable in law and in complete disregard to binding judicial precedents”, Division Bench has no choice but to give effect to it.

Facts:
There was a different of opinion between the members of Division Bench while deciding the appeal of the assessee relating to levy of penalty. The difference was referred to the Third Member who agreed with the Accountant Member and confirmed the levy of penalty.

At the stage of Division Bench giving effect to the order of the Third Member, the assessee claimed that the order of the Third Member could not be given effect to as it was unsustainable and in complete disregard to binding judicial precedents. The assessee claimed that the matter of whether effect could be given to such an order was required to be referred to a Special Bench.

Held:
Post the decision of the jurisdictional High Court in the case of CIT vs. Vallabhdas Vithaldas 56 taxmann.com 300 (Guj) the legal position is that the decisions of the division benches bind the single member bench, even when such a single member bench is a third member bench.

A larger bench decision binds the bench of a lesser strength because of the plurality in the decision making process and because of the collective application of mind. What three minds do together, even when the result is not unanimous, is treated as intellectually superior to what two minds do together, and, by the same logic, what two minds do together is considered to be intellectually superior to what a single mind does alone. Let us not forget that the dissenting judicial views on the division benches as also the views of the third member are from the same level in the judicial hierarchy and, therefore, the views of the third member cannot have any edge over views of the other members. Of course, when division benches itself also have conflicting views on the issues on which members of the division benches differ or when majority view is not possible as a result of a single member bench, such as in a situation in which one of the dissenting members has not stated his views on an aspect which is crucial and on which the other member has expressed his views, it is possible to constitute third member benches of more than one members. That precisely could be the reason as to why even while nominating the Third Member u/s. 255(4), the Hon’ble President of this Tribunal has the power of referring the case “for hearing on such point or points (of difference) by one or more of the other members of the Appellate Tribunal”. Viewed from this perspective, and as held by Hon’ble Jurisdictional high Court, the Third Member is bound by the decisions rendered by the benches of greater strength. That is the legal position so far as at least the jurisdiction of the Gujarat High Court is concerned post Vallabhdas Vithaldas (supra) decision, but, even as we hold so, we are alive to the fact that the Hon’ble Delhi High Court had, in the case of P. C. Puri vs. CIT 151 ITR 584 (Del), expressed a contrary view on this issue which held the field till we had the benefit of guidance from the Hon’ble jurisidictional High Court. The approach adopted by the learned Third member was quite in consonance with the legal position so prevailing at that point of time.

At the time of giving effect to the majority view, it cannot normally be open ot the Tribunal to go beyond the exercise of giving effect to the majority views, howsoever mechanical it may seem. In the case of dissenting situations on the division bench, the process of judicial adjudication is complete when the third member, nominated by the Hon’ble President, resolves the impasse by expressing his views and thus enabling a majority view on the point or points of difference. What then remains for the division bench is simply identifying the majority view and dispose of the appeal on the basis of the majority views. In the course of this exercise, it is, in our humble understanding, not open to the division bench to revisit the adjudication process and start examining the legal issues.

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ACIT vs. Ramila Pravin Shah ITAT Mumbai `D’ Bench Before B. R. Baskaran (AM) and Sanjay Garg (JM) ITA No. 5246 /Mum/2013 Assessment Year: 2010-11. Decided on: 5th March, 2015. Counsel for revenue / assessee: Love Kumar / Bhupendra Shah

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Section 69C – The fact that suppliers name appears in the list of havala dealers of sales tax departments and assessee is unable to produce them does not mean that purchases are bogus if the payment is through banking channels and the GP ratio becomes abnormally high. Statement by third parties cannot be concluded adversely in isolation without corroborating evidences against appellant specially when AO had not offered cross examination to the appellant.

Facts:
In the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer (AO) noticed that the assessee has made purchases from certain parties whose names appeared in the list of parties provided by the sales-tax department who allegedly provide accommodation entries. The AO considered statements taken by the sales-tax department from some of the parties. The Inspector deputed to serve notices to these parties reported that these parties were not available at the given address.

The AO asked the assessee to submit delivery challans and stock register to prove the movement of stock and also to produce these parties. The assessee failed to furnish the details called for. Placing reliance on the statements given by these parties before the sales-tax authorities the AO took the view that purchases to the tune of Rs. 28.08 lakh have to be treated as unexplained expenditure. He added this amount to the total income of the assessee u/s. 69C of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A). The CIT(A) in his order noted that the jurisdictional High Court in the case of Nikunj Exim Enterprise Pvt. Ltd (ITA No. 5604 of 2010) has held that once sales are accepted, the purchases cannot be treated as ingenuine in those cases where the appellant had submitted all details of purchases and payments were made by cheques, merely because the sellers/suppliers could not be produced before the AO by the assessee.

He mentioned that he has also gone through the judgment in the case of Balaji Textile Industries (P) Ltd. vs. ITO 49 ITD 177 (Bom) which was made as long back as 1994 and which still holds good.

He took into consideration the G.P. Ratio/G.P. Margin of the assessee in the previous assessment year as well as subsequent assessment year and observed that if the addition made by the AO is accepted, then the GP ratio of the assessee during the previous year will become abnormally high and therefore, that is not acceptable because the onus is on the AO by bringing adequate material on record to prove that such a high GP ratio exists in the nature of business carried on by the assessee.

He further observed that it has to be appreciated that (i) payments were made through banking channel and by cheque; (ii) notices coming back does not mean those parties are bogus, they are just denying their business to avoid sales tax/VAT , etc, (iii) statement by third parties cannot be concluded adversely in isolation and without corroborating evidences against appellant; (iv) no cross examination has been offered by AO to the appellant to cross examine the relevant parties (who are deemed to be witness or approver being used by AO against the appellant) whose name appear in the website ww.mahavat. gov.in and (v) failure to produce parties cannot be treated adversely against the appellant.

He held that considering the facts and the binding judicial pronouncements of the jurisdictional ITAT Mumbai Bench as well as Mumbai High Court and other legal precedents the addition made by the AO cannot be sustained.

Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had properly analysed the facts prevailing in the instant case. It extracted the relevant portion of the order of the CIT(A) and held that it did not find any infirmity in the same.

The appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.

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Heranba Industries Ltd. vs. DCIT ITAT Mumbai `H’ Bench Before R. C. Sharma (AM) and Sanjay Garg (JM) ITA No. 2292 /Mum/2013 Assessment Year: 2009-10. Decided on: 8th April, 2015. Counsel for assessee / revenue: Rashmikant C. Modi / Jeetendra Kumar

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Section 271(1)(c) – If surrender is on the condition of no penalty and assessment is based only on surrender and not on evidence, penalty cannot be levied. The fact that surrender of income was made after issuance of a questionnaire does not mean that it was not voluntary.

Facts:
The assessee company was engaged in manufacture of pesticides, herbicides and formulations. It filed its return of income for assessment year 2009-10 returning therein a total income of Rs.1.49 crore. In the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer (AO) noticed that during the previous year under consideration, the assessee had received share application money of Rs. 89.50 lakh. He asked the assessee to furnish details with supporting evidences. In response, the assessee expressed its inability to provide the necessary details and stated that in order to buy peace, it agreed to offer the share application money of Rs. 89.50 lakh as its income.

The AO added Rs. 89.50 lakh to the assessee’s income u/s. 69A and also levied penalty u/s. 271(1)(c).

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the assessee, at the very first instance, surrendered share application money with a request not to initiate any penalty proceedings. Except for the surrender, there was neither any detection nor any information in the possession of the department. There was no malafide intention on the part of the assessee and the AO had not brought any evidence on record to prove that there was concealment. No additional material was discovered to prove that there was concealment. The AO did not point out or refer to any evidence to show that the amount of share capital received by the assessee was bogus. It was not even the case of the revenue that material was found at the assessee’s premises to indicate that share application money received was an arranged affair to accommodate assessee’s unaccounted money.

The Tribunal noted that the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Suresh Chandra Mittal 251 ITR 9 (SC) has observed that where assessee has surrendered the income after persistence queries by the AO and where revised return has been regularised by the Revenue, explanation of the assessee that he has declared additional income to buy peace of mind and to come out of vexed litigation could be treated as bonafide, accordingly levy of penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) was held to be not justified.

The Tribunal held that in the absence of any material on record to suggest that share application money was bogus or untrue, the fact that the surrender was after issue of notice u/s. 143(2) could not lead to the inference that it was not voluntary.

The amount was included in the total income only on the basis of the surrender by the assessee. It held that in these circumstances it cannot be held that there was any concealment. When no concealment was ever detected by the AO, no penalty was imposable. Furnishing of inaccurate particulars was simply a mistake and not a deliberate attempt to evade tax. The Tribunal did not find any merit in the levy of penalty u/s. 271(1)(c).

The appeal filed by the assessee was dismissed.

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DCIT vs. Aanjaneya Life Care Ltd. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal “A” Bench, Mumbai Before D. Manmohan (V. P.) and Sanjay Arora (A. M.) ITA Nos. 6440&6441/Mum/2013 Assessment Years: 2010-11 & 2011-12. Decided on 25.03.2015 Counsel for Revenue / Assessee: Asghar Zain / Harshavardhana Datar

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Section 221(1) – Penalty for delay in payment of self-assessment tax deleted on account of financial crunch faced by the assessee.

Facts:
Due to financial crunch the assessee was not able to pay the self-assessment tax within the stipulated period. However, according to the AO, the assessee could not prove its contention with cogent and relevant material. Further, he observed that substantial funds were diverted to related concerns. He therefore levied penalty u/s. 221(1) of the Act. On appeal, the CIT(A) allowed the appeal of the assessee and deleted the penalty imposed.

Held:
According to the Tribunal, the Revenue was unable to show that the assessee had sufficient cash/bank balance so as to meet the tax demand. Secondly, it also could not show if any funds were diverted for non-business purposes at the relevant point of time so as to say that an artificial financial scarcity was created by the assessee. In view of the same the tribunal accepted the contention of the assessee and upheld the order of the CIT(A).

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Dy. Director of Income Tax vs. Serum Institute of India Limited Income Tax Appellate Tribunal Pune Bench “B”, Pune Before G.S. Pannu (A. M.) and Sushma Chowla (J. M.) ITA Nos. 1601 to 1604/PN/2014 Assessment Year: 2011-12. Decided on 30-03-2015 Counsel for Revenue / Revenue: B. C. Malakar / Rajan Vora

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Section 206AA read with section 90(2) – Rate of deduction of tax at source where nonresidents do not have PAN – Held that the beneficial provisions of DTAAs override the provisions of section 206AA and tax to be deducted at the lower rate as prescribed in DTAA.

Facts:
The assessee company was engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of vaccines. In the course of its business activities, assessee made payments to non-residents on account of interest, royalty and fee for technical services. The assessee deducted tax at source on such payment in accordance with the tax rates provided in the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements (DTA – As) with the respective countries. It was noted by the AO that in case of some of the non-residents, the recipients did not have Permanent Account Numbers (PANs). As a consequence, Revenue treated such payments, as cases of ‘short deduction’ of tax in terms of the provisions of section 206AA which require that the tax shall be deductible at the rate specified in the relevant provisions of the Act or at the rates in force or at the rate of 20%. On appeal, the CIT(A) held that where the DTAA s provide for a tax rate lower than that prescribed in 206AA , the provisions of the DTAA s shall prevail and the provisions of section 206AA would not be applicable. Therefore, he deleted the tax demand raised by the Revenue relatable to the difference between 20% and the actual tax rate provided by the DTAA s.

Before the Tribunal, the Revenue contended that section 206AA would override section 90(2) and therefore, the tax deduction was liable to be made @ 20% in absence of furnishing of PANs by the recipient non-residents.

Held:
The Tribunal, relying on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Azadi Bachao Andolan and Others vs. UOI, (2003) 263 ITR 706, CIT vs. Eli Lily & Co. (2009) 312 ITR 225 and the case of GE India Technology Centre Pvt. Ltd. vs. CIT (2010) 327 ITR 456 upheld the order of the CIT(A) and held that where the tax had been deducted on the strength of the beneficial provisions of DTAAs, the provisions of section 206AA cannot be invoked by the AO having regard to the overriding nature of the provisions of section 90(2).

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2015-TIOL-408-ITAT-DEL ITO vs. JKD Capital & Finlease Ltd. ITA No. 5443/Del/2013 Assessment Year : 2005-06. Date of Order: 27.3.2015

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Section 269SS, 271E, 275(1)(c) – Cases of levy of penalty u/s. 271E are covered by section 271(1)(c) and accordingly orders passed u/s. 271E will be barred by limitation on expiry of the financial year in which the proceedings in the course of which action for the imposition of penalty has been initiated, are completed, or six months from the end of the month in which penalty proceedings are initiated, whichever period expires later.

Facts:
In the case of the assessee, proceedings for levy of penalty u/s. 271E were initiated in assessment order dated 28th December, 2007. Aggrieved by the assessment order the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) on various grounds. The appeal filed by the assessee was dismissed by the CIT(A). Upon dismissal of the appeal filed by the assessee, the Assessing Officer (AO) referred the matter regarding levy of penalty u/s. 271E to the Ad ditional Commissioner. The Additional Commissioner passed an order levying penalty u/s. 271E on 20th March, 2012.

Aggrieved by the levy of penalty, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who quashed the order levying the penalty on the ground that it is barred by limitation.

Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the Delhi High Court has in the case of CIT vs. Worldwide Township Projects Ltd. 269 CTR 444 (Del) held that section 275(1)(c) will apply to cases of penalty for violation of section 269SS. The Tribunal held that the date on which CIT(A) had passed order in quantum proceedings had no relevance as it did not have any bearing on the issue of penalty. The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had rightly held that the penalty order passed by the AO was barred by limitation as the penalty order was passed beyond six months from the end of the month in which penalty proceedings were initiated in the month of December 2007 and penalty order was thus required to be passed in before 30th June, 2008 whereas the penalty order was passed on 20th March, 2012.

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2015-TIOL-419-ITAT-AHM Dashrathbhai V.Patel vs. DCIT MA No. 174/Ahd/2014 arising out of CO No. 177/Ahd/2009 Block Period : 1.4.1989 to 16.11.1999. Date of Order: 23.1.2015

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Section 254 – Decision of the Tribunal which is contrary to the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court gives rise to a mistake apparent which is required to be rectified.

Facts :
In the case of the assessee, the assessment of undisclosed income was completed and the amount of tax payable was computed @ 67.2% i.e. applying the rate of 60% plus surcharge thereon @ 12% as per proviso to section 113.

In the course of appellate proceedings before CIT(A), the assessee took an additional ground and contended that the proviso to section 113 was introduced by the Finance Act, 2002. Till 31st May, 2002 section 113 did not have a proviso levying surcharge on income-tax. The assessee contended that the proviso is prospective and does not apply to his case where search was carried on 16.11.1999. Accordingly, the assessee is not liable to pay surcharge levied by proviso to section 113. Reliance was placed on the Special Bench decision in the case of Merit Enterprises vs. DCIT 101 ITD 1 (Hyd)(SB). The CIT(A) decided the case against the assessee by following the decision of Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Suresh N. Gupta 297 ITR 322 (SC) wherein it held that the proviso was clarificatory and curative in nature. The assessee did mention that in the case of CIT vs. Vatika Township (P) Ltd. 314 ITR 338 (SC) the issue had been referred by the Division Bench to the Larger Bench of the Supreme Court.

Before the Tribunal, while arguing the Cross Objection filed by the assessee, it was pointed out that the issue has been referred to the Larger Bench of the Supreme Court. However, the Tribunal following the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Suresh N. Gupta (supra) decided the issue against the assessee.

Subsequently, the Larger Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Vatika Township (P.) Ltd. 49 taxman. com 249(SC) reversed the decision of the Division Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Suresh N. Gupta and held that the proviso was prospective and not clarificatory. The assessee filed Miscellaneous Application requesting the Tribunal to correct the view taken while deciding the Cross Objection by relying on a Supreme Court decision decided after the Cross Objection was decided.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the order of the Supreme Court in the case of Vatika Township (P.) Ltd. (supra) was pronounced after the decision of the Tribunal. However, it observed that the order of the Supreme Court laid down the law of the land as it existed since the inception of the enactment. It noted that the Supreme Court has in the case of Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange 305 ITR 227 (SC) held that even a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court is binding on the Tribunal and if the decision of the Tribunal is contrary to the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court such decision of the Tribunal gives rise to a mistake apparent which needs to be rectified.

The Tribunal allowed the application filed by the assessee.

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2015-TIOL-416-ITAT-DEL ITO vs. Bhupendra Singh Monga ITA No. 3031/Del/2013 Assessment Years: 2007-08. Date of Order: 30.3.2015

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Section 268A, CBDT Instruction No. 5 of 2014 – Instruction No. 5 of 2014 dated 10.7.2014 fixing monetary limit for not filing the appeal to the Tribunal at Rs. 4,00,000 is applicable even to pending cases i.e. cases where appeal was filed before issuance of this instruction.

Facts :
While assessing the total income of the assessee, an individual, the Assessing Officer (AO) held that the assessee had not properly explained the source of cash deposits. He, accordingly, made certain additions on account of cash deposits.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal. The tax effect of the appeal filed was less than Rs. 4,00,000. The appeal was filed on 15.5.2013. Vide CBDT Instruction No. 5 of 2014 the threshold limit for filing appeal to Tribunal was fixed at Rs. 4,00,000. The Bench noticed that the Revenue ought not to have filed the appeal since the tax effect was less than Rs. 4,00,000. The DR argued that the appeal was filed before issuance of Instruction No. 5 of 2014, and therefore, the said instruction is not applicable to the present case.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that section 268A has been inserted by the Finance Act, 2008 with retrospective effect from 1.4.1999. It also noticed that CBDT has vide Instruction No. 5 of 2014 fixed the threshold of tax effect for filing appeal by the Revenue to the Tribunal to be Rs. 4,00,000. Accordingly, it held that the circular is applicable for pending cases also and therefore, the Revenue should not have filed the appeal before the Tribunal. It fortified its decision by the following decisions of the Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court:

1 CIT vs. Oscar Laboratories P. Ltd. (2010) 324 ITR 115 (P & H)
2 CIT vs. Abinash Gupta (2010) 327 ITR 619 (P & H)
3 CIT vs. Varindera Construction Co. (2011) 331 ITR 449 (P & H)(FB)

It also noted that the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Delhi Race Club Ltd. in ITA No. 128/2008, order dated 3.3.2011 has following its earlier order dated 2.8.2010 in ITA No. 179/1991 in the case of CIT Delhi-III vs. M/s P.S.Jain & Co. held that such circular would also be applicable to pending cases.

The appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.

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[2015] 152 ITD 533 (Jaipur) Asst. DIT (International taxation) vs. Sumit Gupta. A.Y. 2006-07 Order dated- 28th August 2014.

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Section 9, read with section 195 and Article 7 of DTAA between India and USA

Income cannot be said to have deemed to accrue or arise in India when the assessee pays commission to non-resident for the services rendered outside India and the non-resident does not have a permanent establishment in India. Consequently, section 195 is not attracted and so the assessee is not liable to deduct TDS from the said payment.

FACTS
The assessee exported granite to USA and paid commission on export sales made to a US company but it did not deduct tax u/s. 195.

The Assessing Officer held that the sales commission was the income of the payee which accrued or arose in India on the ground that such remittances were covered under the expression fee for technical services’ as defined u/s. 9(1)(vii)(b). He thus held that the assessee was liable deduct tax u/s. 195 and he was in default u/s. 201(1) for tax and interest.

On Appeal, CIT (Appeals) held that commission does not fall under managerial, technical or consultation services and therefore, no income could be deemed to have accrued or arisen to the non-resident so as to attract provisions of withholding tax u/s. 195.

On Appeal-

HELD THAT
The order of CIT(A) was to be upheld as the non-resident recipients of commission rendered services outside India and claimed it as business income and had no permanent establishment in India. Thus, provisions of section 9 and section 195 were not attracted.

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Reference- High Court- Question of Law- The legal inferences that should be drawn on the primary facts is eminently a question of law.

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Premier Breweries Ltd vs. CIT (2015) 372 ITR 180 (SC)

Business Expenditure – The High Court rightly reversed the order of the Tribunal allowing the claim of deduction of commission paid to agents to co-ordinate with the retailers and State Corporation which were exclusive wholesalers of alcoholic beverages based on primary facts.

The appellants were engaged in the manufacture and sale of beer and other alcoholic beverages. Certain States like Kerala and Tamil Nadu had established marketing corporations which were the exclusive wholesalers of alcoholic beverages for the concerned State whereby all manufactures had to compulsorily sell their products to the State Corporations which, in turn, would sell the liquor so purchased, to the retailers. It was pleaded by the appellants that manufacturers of beverages containing alcohol had to engage services of agents who would co-ordinate with the retailers and State Corporations to ensure continuous flow/supply of goods to the ultimate consumers. And on that ground they sought deduction u/s. 37 of the Act.

The claim made by the assessee in the facts noted above was disallowed by the Assessing Officer. The said order of the Assessing Officer was confirmed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). The assessee had moved the learned Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench against the aforesaid orders. The learned Tribunal took the view that the assessee was entitled to claim for deduction. The said view of the learned Tribunal was reversed by the High Court in the Reference made to it u/s. 256(2) of the Act.

Before the Supreme Court, three propositions were advanced on behalf of the appellants. The first was whether the High Court could have reframed the questions after the conclusion of the arguments and that too without giving an opportunity to the assessee. The answer to the above question, according to the appellant, was to be found in M. Janardhana Rao vs. Joint CIT (237 ITR 50) wherein the Supreme Court had held that questions of law arising in an appeal u/s. 260A of the Act must be framed at the time of admission and should not be formulated after conclusion of the arguments.

The second issue raised was the jurisdiction of the High Court to set aside the order of the Tribunal in the exercise of its reference jurisdiction. According to the appellants, the point was no longer res integra having been settled in C.P. Sarathy Mudaliar vs. CIT (62 ITR 576) wherein the Supreme Court had taken the view that setting aside the order of the Tribunal in exercise of the reference jurisdiction of the High Court was inappropriate. It had been observed that while hearing a reference under the Income-tax Act, the High Court exercises advisory jurisdiction and does not sit in appeal over the judgment of the Tribunal. It had been further held that the High Court had no power to set aside the order of the Tribunal even if it is of the view that the conclusion recorded by the Tribunal is not correct.

The third question that had been posed for an answer before the Supreme Court was with regard to the correctness of the manner of exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court in the present case, namely, that the evidence on record had been re-appreciated by the High Court with a view to ascertain if the conclusions recorded by the Tribunal were correct. Reliance had been placed on paragraph 16 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Sudarshan Silks and Sarees vs. CIT (300 ITR 205, 213).

The Supreme Court noted that in the present case, the High Court while hearing the reference made u/s. 256(2) of the Act had set aside the order of the Tribunal. The Supreme Court held that undoubtedly, in the exercise of its reference jurisdiction the High Court was not right in setting aside the order of the Tribunal. The Supreme Court, however, on reading the ultimate paragraph of the order of the High Court found that the error was one of form and not of substance inasmuch as the question arising in the reference had been specifically answered in the following manner: “We, therefore, set aside the order of the Tribunal and uphold that of the Commissioner (Appeals) and answer the questions in favour of the Revenue by holding that the assessee had not discharged the burden that it is entitled to deductions under section 37 of the Income-tax Act. Reference is answered accordingly.”

The Supreme Court observed that a reading of the questions initially framed and subsequently reframed showed that what was done by the High Court was to retain three out of twelve questions, as initially framed, while discarding the rest. Some of the questions discarded by the High Court were actually more proximate to the questions of perversity of the findings of fact recorded by the learned Tribunal, than the questions retained. The Supreme Court held that from a reading of the order of the High Court it was clear that the High Court examined the entitlement of the appellant assessee to deduction/ disallowance by accepting the agreements executed by the assessee with the commission agents; the affidavits filed by C. Janakiraman and Shri A. N. Ramachandra Nayar, husbands of the two lady partners of R.J. Associates and also the payments made by the assessee to R.J. Associates as well as to Golden Enterprises. The question that was posed by the High Court was whether acceptance of the agreements, affidavits and proof of payment would debar the assessing authority to go into the question whether the expenses claimed would still be allowable u/s. 37 of the Act. This was a question which the High Court held was required to be answered in the facts of each case in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. vs. CIT (No.1) (63 ITR 57) and Lachminarayan Madan Lal vs. CIT (86 ITR 439, 446). The High Court had noted the following observations in Lachminarayan (supra):

“The mere existence of an agreement between the assessee and its selling agents or payment of certain amounts as commission, assuming there was such payment, does not bind the Income-tax Officer to hold that the payment was made exclusively and wholly for the purpose of the assessee’s business. Although there might be such an agreement in existence and the payments might have been made. It is still open to the Incometax Officer to consider the relevant facts and determine for himself whether the commission said to have been paid to the selling agents or any part thereof is properly deductible under section 37 of the Act.”

The   Supreme   Court   held   that   there   were   certain Government circulars which regulated, if not prohibited, liaisoning with the government corporations by the manufacturers for the purpose of obtaining supply orders. The true effect of the Government circulars along with the agreements between the assessee and the commission agents and the details of payments made by the assessee to the commission agents as well as the affidavits filed by the husbands of the partners of M/s. R.J. Associates were considered by the High Court. The statement of the managing director of tamil nadu State marketing  Corporation  Ltd.  (taSmaC  Ltd.),  to  whom summons were issued u/s. 131 of the Act, to the effect that M/s. Golden Enterprises had not done any liaisoning work  with  taSmaC  Ltd.  was  also  taken  into  account. the basis of the doubts regarding the very existence of R. J. Associates, as entertained by the Assessing Officer, was also weighed by the high Court to determine the entitlement of the assessee for deduction u/s. 37 of the act. In performing the said exercise the high Court did not disturb or reverse the primary facts as found by the learned tribunal. Rather, the exercise performed was one of the correct legal inferences that should be drawn on the facts already recorded by learned tribunal. The questions reframed were to the said effect. the legal inference that should be drawn from the primary facts, as consistently held by the Supreme Court, was eminently a question of law. No question of perversity was required to be framed or gone into to answer the issues arising. the questions relatable to perversity were consciously discarded by the High Court. The Supreme Court, therefore, could not find any fault with the questions reframed by the high Court or the answers provided.

Recovery of tax – Stay application – A. Y. 2011-12 – Authority to prima facie consider merits and balance of convenience and irreparable injury – Authority to record reasons and then conclude whether stay should be granted and if so on what condition – No examination and no consideration – Order rejecting stay is not valid –

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Hitech Outsourcing Services vs. ITO; 372 ITR 582 (Guj):

For the A. Y. 2011-12, the assessee challenged the assessment order filing appeal before Commissioner (Appeals) The assessee also filed stay application which was initially granted on the condition that the assessee furnished a bank guarantee but subsequently, as the bank guarantee was not furnished, the application was dismissed.

The assessee filed a writ petition challenging the dismissal order. The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“The Revenue had not been able to show any reasons which had weighed the authority for passing the order. When the question of grant of stay against any demand of tax is to be considered, the authority may be required to prima facie consider the merits and balance of convenience and also irreparable injury. These had neither been examined nor considered. The authority was required to record the reasons and then reach an ultimate conclusion as to whether the stay should be granted and if so on what condition. In the absence of any reasons, the order rejecting the stay application could not be sustained.”

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Penalty – Sections 271D, 271E and 273B – A. Ys. 1996-97 to 1998-99 – Loan or deposit in cash exceeding prescribed limit – Payments from partners in cash – Firm and partner are not different entities – Penalty cannot be imposed u/s. 271D –

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CIT vs. Muthoot Financiers; 371 ITR 408 (Del): (2015) 55 taxmann.com 202 (Del):

The
assessee firm was involved in the business of banking. The Assessing
Officer found that the firm had accepted payments firm the partners,
during the relevant years corresponding to the A. Ys. 1996-97 to 1998-99
in cash. The Assessing Officer imposed penalty u/s. 271D of the
Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal held that the advances made to the
firm by its partners could not be regarded as loans advanced to the
firms and deleted the penalty.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)
The transaction effected could not partake the colour of loan or
deposit and neither section 269SS nor section 271D of the Act would come
into play.

ii) It was an undisputed fact that the money was
brought in by the partners of the assessee firm. The source of money had
also not been doubted by the Revenue. The transactions are bonafide and
not aimed at avoiding any tax liability.

iii) The
creditworthiness of the partners and the genuineness of the transactions
coupled with the relationship between the “two persons” and two
different legal interpretations put forward could constitute a
reasonable cause in a given case for not invoking section 271D and
section 271E of the Act. Section 273B of the Act would come to the aid
and help the assessee. Penalty could not be levied.”

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[2015] 55 Taxmann.com 111 (Mumbai – CESTAT) Deshmukh Services vs. CCE & ST.

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Multi-piece packing of soaps on job work basis amounts to deemed manufacture and hence cannot be taxed under Business Auxiliary Services – Matter remitted back to pass a reasoned order and also to consider the effect of Exemption Notification qua intermediate production processes.

Facts:
The appellant undertook job work activities in the nature of mixing of soap bits provided by the supplier company and returning the same in 50 kg. or bigger bags as per company’s instruction and multi-piece packing for which they received consideration. The department contended and confirmed the demand considering the activities as business auxiliary service.

Held:

The Tribunal observed that as per section 2(f)(iii) of the CE Act, 1944 ‘manufacture’ includes any process which in relation to the goods specified in the 3rd Schedule involves packing or re-packing of such goods in a unit container or labeling or re-labeling of containers including the declaration or alteration of retail sale price on it or adoption of any other treatment to the goods to render the products marketable to the consumer and soaps were covered under Serial No. 40 of the said 3rd Schedule. Therefore, multi-piece packaging would fall under the category of “packing or re-packing of goods” and would be an activity of ‘manufacture’. The department’s contention that soap is already in packed condition and hence manufacture is said to be completed was not accepted by the Tribunal on the ground that, multi-piece packaging is done on the soaps already packed and therefore, it would amount to repacking and accordingly the activity would be covered under the definition of ‘manufacture’ u/s. 2(f)(iii). It was further held that if the soap noodles are sold as such after mixing and packing/re-packing, then the activity undertaken by the appellant would amount to ‘manufacture’. On the other hand, if they are not sold as such, but are subject to further processes, since the goods are moved under Rule 4(5)(a) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 it will be an intermediary process in the course of manufacture of soaps and since such movements are permitted without payment of excise duty, the question of levy of service tax would not arise at all in terms of Notification No.8/2005-ST dated 01/03/2005. However, since there was no finding in the order except that the appellant did not contest the duty, the matter was remitted back to give specific finding as to why the activity of the appellant did not amount to manufacture and if it does not amount to manufacture, why benefit of Notification No. 8/2005-S.T. cannot be extended.

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[2015] 55 taxmann.com 245 (Mumbai – CESTAT) – Malhotra Distributors Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE

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Where the assessee merely procures purchase orders based on prices determined by the principal and does not deal with goods at all, his services would be that of commission agent and not of clearing and forwarding agent.

Facts:
The Appellant received commission from manufacturer of goods for rendering assistance in the marketing of goods, by obtaining orders and also ensuring that the goods are sold at the terms and discounts specified by the manufacturer. The Appellant contended that the activities are taxable under Clearing and Forwarding services.

Held:

The Tribunal observed that in terms of agreement between the parties, the Appellant has to only procure the orders from the stockists and forward them to manufacturers and ensure that the goods are sold at the terms and discounts specified in writing by the manufacturer. For the services so rendered, commission at prescribed percentage on the net sale value was receivable. Therefore, having regard to the terms of agreement and relying upon various cases including Larsen & Toubro Ltd. [2006] 4 STT 231 (New Delhi) the Tribunal held that the Appellant did not deal with the goods at all as is expected in the case of clearing & forwarding Agent and he was liable for service tax as commission agent.

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[2015] 55 taxmann.com 526 (Mumbai CESTAT) Behr India Ltd. vs. CCE, Pune.

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Purchase of goods from vendor and exporting the same to customer abroad at a markup value constitutes trading activity on principalto- principal basis and cannot be regarded as supply of goods on behalf of principal for commission, even if markup is stated in the books as commission.

Facts:
The Appellant purchased goods from vendor in India and sold the same to its principal foreign entity abroad at a markup of 3% of the purchase price. The goods were shipped abroad directly by the vendor, however invoices for the same were made on Indian entity and VAT was discharged on the same. The Appellant raised export invoice on the foreign entity and received the export proceeds from their foreign principal as evidenced from the bank realisation certificate and the proceeds were credited to the Appellant’s accounts. However, in the books of accounts the markup in the transaction was reflected as ”commission income”. Department contended that markup of 3% shown as commission is liable to service tax under Business Auxiliary Services provided to Indian vendor.

Held:

After going through the purchase order and sales invoice issued by the Indian vendor and observing that VAT liability was discharged and also noting that the Appellant has issued export invoice to foreign entity and also realised proceeds, the Tribunal held that transaction is that of purchase and sale of goods on principal-to-principal basis and not as agent of anybody else.

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[2015] 55 taxmann.com 72 ( New Delhi – CESTAT)- Rako Mercantile Traders vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Lucknow

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CENVAT credit of inputs lying in store “as such” and “in-process goods” – Loss by fire – CENVAT credit on in-process goods not to be reversed.

Facts:

Appellants, manufacturers of excisable goods availed CENVAT credit of duty on inputs. Fire occurred in factory and finished goods, stock in process and raw material got destroyed. Department denied CENVAT credit on inputs which were in stock and in process since these goods were not used in the manufacture of dutiable final products and that fire occurred due to negligence on part of assessee.

Held:

The Revenue’s explanation that fire has occurred on account of negligence on the part of assessee was not appreciated by the Tribunal inasmuch as nobody invites fire. Inputs which were issued from inputs store section to be used in manufacture of final products are eligible for CENVAT credit and no reversal is required. As regards to the inputs lying in store, relying upon Panacea Biotech Ltd. vs. CCE 2013 (297) ELT 587 (Tri-Del), the Tribunal held that mere receipt of the inputs will not entitle the assessee to avail the credit, when such inputs are destroyed “as such” in the store section itself. Thus, credit in respect of inputs in process was allowed whereas those stock in stores was not allowed.

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[2015] 55 Taxamnn.com 69 (Mumbai – CESTAT) Crest Premedia Solutions (P) Ltd. vs. CCE

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When substantive conditions of the Rebate Notification are fulfilled by the assessee, rebate claim cannot be denied merely for not filing the declaration in time, if the contents of the declaration are such that they can be verified from the records maintained.

Facts:
The appellant regularly filed refund claims under Rule 5 of CENVAT Credit Rules in terms of unutilised credit on input services, used in the output services which were exported. For the disputed period, it did not claim the refund but filed a rebate claim in terms of Notification No.12/2005-ST dated 19/04/2005. A declaration required in terms of the said notification was filed much after the date of export along with condonation of delay for late filing. The rebate claim was rejected on the ground that the declaration was to be filed prior to expiry of one year from the date of export of services.

Held:
The Tribunal held that it is undisputed that conditions prescribed in the said notification have been followed in the present case. However, the procedure was not followed to the extent that declaration was filed after the export of service. It was noted that the contents of the declaration are not such, as cannot be verified from the records maintained. Further, records such as invoice on which input tax credit is availed and records indicating export of services will not reveal any information which is not verifiable later. Having regard to the same and after satisfying itself that the assessee has not claimed CENVAT credit under Rule 5 and the said notification simultaneously, held that the contravention of not following the procedure of filing the declaration is indeed a procedural formality, for contravention of which substantial justice cannot be denied. Accordingly rebate was sanctioned and appeal was allowed.

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[2015] 55 taxmann.com 4 (New Delhi – CESTAT) – Commissioner of Central Excise, Chandigarh vs. Parabolic Drugs Ltd.

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MS Pipes/Channels/Angles, Grinders, Bars, Structures, Plates, Shapes and Sections used in manufacture of technical structures of Capital Goods are eligible for credit as “capital goods”.

Facts:
Assessee manufactured capital goods wherein the MS pipes, channels, angles, grinders and bars were used. The Assessee took CENVAT credit on the said items on the premise that certain goods are “capital goods” and certain goods are used as ‘inputs’ for capital goods. Department denied the credit on the ground that these goods are not capital goods and cannot be regarded as inputs as the same were used for construction of the structures and fixtures. The Commissioner (Appeals) decided in favour of the Assessee, aggrieved by which the revenue filed the appeal.

Held:
The Tribunal affirming the Commissioner (Appeals) Order held that it is not disputed that items hereinabove were used by the Assessee in manufacturing of capital goods and hence CENVAT credit cannot be denied. Relying upon CCE vs. India Cements Ltd. 2014 (305) ELT 558 (Mad HC), it was also observed that the Commissioner (Appeals) has given a finding regarding actual use of the impugned goods in the factory premises of the appellant in technical structures of machines/machinery which are capital goods, based on details of their description and actual photographs submitted by the Assessee. Thus, Revenue’s appeal was dismissed.

[Note: In Rajasthan Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. 2010 (255) ELT 481 (SC), applying the “user test” the Court held that, CENVAT credit of items used for manufacture of product which is used as integral part (i.e. component) of the capital goods are also regarded as capital goods. However in Vandana Global Ltd. 2010 (253) ELT 440 (Tri-LB) it was held that the foundations and supporting structures can neither be considered as capital goods nor as part or accessory to capital goods. Hence, the items used in fabrication of such supporting structures cannot be regarded as inputs used for manufacture of capital goods. Further relying upon Maruti Suzuki Ltd. 2009 (240) ELT 641 (SC), the Tribunal held that, in the absence of nexus such items cannot be regarded as inputs for final product. However subsequently, the Madras High Court in the case of India Cements Ltd. 2012 (285) ELT 341 held that CENVAT credit is available. Relying on this judgment, the Tribunal in the case of A.P.P. Mills Ltd. case 2013 (291) ELT 585 (Tri-Bang) disapproved Vandana Global (supra). Recently, the Calcutta High Court in stay matter in the case of Suryla Alloy Industries Ltd. vs. UOI 2014(305) ELT 47 (Cal) taking note of the same has granted waiver of pre-deposit to the Assessee. However, with effect from 07/07/2009, ‘inputs’ does not include cement, angles, channels, Centrally Twisted Deform bar (CTD) or Thermo Mechanically Treated Bar (TMT) and other items used for construction of factory shed, building or laying of foundation or making of structures for support of capital goods and with effect from 01/03/2011 any goods used for laying of foundation or making of structures for support of capital goods have been excluded from definition of input].

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2015] 55 taxmann.com 274 (Bangalore- CESTAT)-Shirdi Sai Electricals Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Customs & Service Tax, Bangalore

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Facts:
Appellant, a registered ser Stay – In the absence of any indication, mere use of the expression,
“inclusive of taxes” in the contract does not mean that tax is
collected from customer.
vice provider of Management, Maintenance or Repair Service and Erection, Commissioning and Installation service discharged service tax on service portion of contract. The department demanded service tax on the entire contracted value including value of material, as the rates collected as per the contract were inclusive of all taxes. During adjudication Appellant relied upon Notification No. 45/2010 ST and Notification No.12/2003-ST to contend that, service of distribution of electricity was exempt upto 21-06-2010 and that value of material is not to be added in computation of service tax. Copies of VAT paid documents were duly submitted to justify that service tax is not applicable on the value of material. However, on the single ground of non-disclosure of material value in the ST-3 returns the authority contended that service tax is to be paid on the entire contracted value.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that the rates collected in the contract were inclusive of all taxes and there was nothing in the said contract to suggest that service tax was separately charged by the appellant from their customers. It was held that, the expression “inclusive of taxes” only means that there would be no further rise in the value of the contracts in case any demand stands raised against the service provider by the Revenue. In absence of any indication that service tax stands collected by the appellant from their customers, the above observation of the adjudicating authority cannot be appreciated. As regards, non-inclusion of value of material in discharging service tax, the Tribunal observed that Contract Value clearly reflected value of material and service separately and that copies of the VAT documents showing that VAT stands paid by them in respect of such materials is also on record. It was further held that mere non-mention of the Notification in the ST-3 Returns, does not give a reason to deny the benefit of the same, without otherwise examining the applicability of Notification in question. Since the Notification was applicable, unconditional stay granted.

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[2015-TIOL-538-CESTAT-MUM] Kirloskar Pneumatic Co. Ltd vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Pune-III.

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Reimbursable expenditure shall not form part of the value of the taxable service.

Facts:
Employees of Appellant incurred travel expenses while providing output service. Invoices issued separately indicated service charges and actual charges for travelling and due service tax was discharged on the service charges. Show Cause Notices were issued demanding service tax on the travelling expenses on the ground that as per section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994, gross amount which is charged for rendering of services which includes travelling expenses should be the value for the purpose of service tax.

Held:

Relying on the decision of the co-ordinate bench of the Tribunal in the case of Reliance Industries Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excises, Rajkot [2008-TIOL- 1106-CESTAT-AHM] which is upheld by the apex Court held that the reimbursable expenditure shall not form part of the value of the taxable service.

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[2015-TIOL-667-CESTAT-DEL] M/s. Nidhi Metal Auto Components Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Delhi-IV.

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Allegations made on the basis of statements given by the manufacturer/dealer/supplier of goods without investigation at the end of the Assessee not sustainable.

Facts:
Inquiries were conducted at the end of various manufacturers and dealers, who submitted that they had issued invoices without delivery of goods. Show Cause Notices were issued denying CENVAT credit as merely invoices were issued. The Appellant contended that they had received the goods through tractor trolley along with invoices which were used in the manufacture of final products and payments were made through account payee cheques. It was submitted that no cross examination was granted and the statements did not name the Appellant.

Held:
It is impractical to require the Appellant to go behind the records maintained by the dealer/manufacturer. No investigation has been conducted, moreover there is no discrepancy in the invoices issued and all payments are made through account payee cheques and therefore the appeal is allowed.

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[2015-TIOL-576-CESTAT-KOL] M/s AI Champdany Industries Ltd., M/s. Murlidhar Ratanlal Exports Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Kolkatta-IV

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Pre-deposit mandatory even in respect of orders passed prior to 06-08-2014 and appeals filed thereafter.

Facts:
The Appeals have been filed after 06-08-2014 against the orders passed prior to the amendment to section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944 without making any pre-deposit.

Held:
In terms of the amended provisions of section 35F, the Tribunal is barred from entertaining any appeal unless pre-deposit as mentioned in section 35F is complied with accordingly the appeals are not maintainable and are dismissed.

Note: Readers may note a recent CONTRARY decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of M/s. Muthoot Finance Ltd. [2015-TIOL-632-HC-Kerala-ST] reported in BCAJ-April 2015 issue and the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of M/s. K. Rama Mohanarao & Co [2015-TIOL-511-HC-APCX].

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2015-TIOL-739-HC-AP-ST] Commissioner of Customs, Central Excise and Service Tax vs. M/s Hyundai Motor India Engineering (P) Ltd.

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Relevant date for filing the refund claim under Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 is the date of receipt of payment and not the date when the services were provided.

Facts:
Appellant is a 100% export oriented unit (EOU) engaged in export of computer software and Information Technology enabled services. The refund claims filed were rejected by the lower authorities on the ground that the relevant date for calculating the time limit for grant of refund was the date of rendering services and thus the claims were time barred. However, the learned CESTAT accepted the refund claim and the revenue is in appeal.

Held:
The Hon’ble High Court relying on the decision of the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of CCE Pune-I vs. Eaton Industries P. Ltd 2011(22) S.T.R. 223 [2011-TIOL-166- CESTAT-MUM] held that the relevant date for calculating the time limit for grant of refund would be the date of receipt of consideration and not the date of services provided.

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[2015] 37 STR 976 (Mad.) Shri Shanmugar Service vs. Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals), Madurai

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Though order of pre-deposit is complied belatedly but for the reason not attributable to gross negligence of the appellant, the appeal may be restored.

Facts:
The appellant paid full pre-deposit belatedly because of fault of former advocate and complied with payment of pre-deposit order belatedly and approached the Tribunal for restoration of appeals. Relying on various judicial pronouncements, the Tribunal dismissed the application on the grounds that it did not have power to entertain appeal in absence of compliance of pre-deposit order. In order to observe substantial justice, the High Court considered the present appeal.

Held:
Hon’ble High Court observed that the reason for non-compliance of order was attributable to the fault of the former advocate and the appellant was pursuing matter diligently from adjudication stage. Therefore, in view of appellant’s bonafides, though order of pre-deposit was complied belatedly, the appeal was allowed and the original appeal was restored before Tribunal to decide the case on merits.

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[2015] 37 STR 970 (Guj.) Sanjayraj Hotels And Resorts Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India

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CESTAT not to reject the application for condonation of delay without giving opportunity of being heard on merits specially when the petitioner shows sufficient cause for delay in filing appeal.

Facts:
The petitioners filed appeal before CESTAT with an application for condonation of delay of 175 days mentioning the reason for delay. The Tribunal rejected the application on the ground that they had not replied to Show Cause Notice nor did the petitioner’s representative participate in adjudication proceedings. When first appeal was filed, there was a delay of 15 days which showed that they had taken issue lightly. In second appeal, there was a delay of 175 days and the affidavit filed with application for condonation of delay was not sworn by the Director or authorised representative and therefore, the application for condonation of delay was rejected. Accordingly, present petition is filed.

Held:
The petitioners had shown sufficient cause for belated filing of appeal and should have been granted an opportunity to present their case on merits before CESTAT . Therefore, it was held that the Tribunal had committed an error. Accordingly, the present petition was allowed along with direction to CESTAT to decide the matter in accordance with law and on merits.

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[2015] 37 STR 967 (AP) Rites Ltd. vs. Commissioner Of C. Ex. & Cus., Service tax

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Once it is proved that service tax is not passed on to the customer, refund shall be granted. Departmental Officials shall provide appropriate advice to Government Organisations.

Facts:
The petitioner, a Government of India undertaking made payment of service tax on a non-taxable service inadvertently. Refund claim filed was partly disallowed as it was time barred and partly allowed on the condition of submission of proof to the effect that the liability was not passed on to the consumer.

It was contended that since it is a Government undertaking, the provisions of time limit u/s. 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 need not be applied.

The respondents contended that though the activity was not covered under service tax net, vide Circular dated 18- 12-2002, the activity was leviable to service tax. Further, since requisite documentary proof was not submitted and the claim was barred by limitation, the petitioner was not entitled to refund.

Held:
The departmental officials shall differentiate between the ordinary assessee and Government of India undertaking and not pass orders mechanically. When it was asserted that the liability was not passed on to the customer, department could have verified the said fact.

The Circular relied upon by the respondents was already withdrawn by CBEC vide Circular dated 13-05-2004 and they did not act bonafide to the extent that no reference of such withdrawal was made.

Accordingly, the writ petition was allowed and the respondents were directed to refund the amount with interest within four weeks from the date of this decision failing which, the official shall be personally held responsible for contempt of Court.

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Non-resident -Taxability in India – Royalty – Section 9(1)(vi) – Income from supply of software embedded in hardware equipment or otherwise to customers in India – Does not amount to royalty –

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CIT vs. Alcatel Lucent Canada; 372 ITR 476 (Del):

The assessee, a non-resident, manufactured, traded in and supplied equipment and services for global system for mobile cellular radio. The assessee supplied hardware and software to various entities in India. The software licensed by the assessee embodied the process required to control and manage the specific set of activities involved in the business use of the customers. The software also made available the process to its customers, who used it to carryout their business activities. The Assessing Officer held that the consideration for supply of the software amounted to royalty u/s. 9(1)(vi) of the Incometax Act, 1961. The Tribunal held that the payment did not constitute royalty and, therefore, section 9(1)(vi) was not attracted and for the same reasons, article 13(3) of the DTAA s between India and France, Canada, Germany, China were not attracted.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The income of the assessee from supply of software embedded in the hardware equipment or otherwise to customers in India did not amount to royalty u/s. 9(1)(vi).”

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Income – Accrual of – A. Y. 1996-97 – Mercantile system – Civil construction – Sums retained for payment after expiry of defect free period – Right to receive amount contingent upon there being no defects – Accrual only on receipt of amount after defect free period –

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CIT vs. Shankar Constructions; 271 ITR 320(T&AP):

The assessee is a civil contractor. The contract provided for deduction of 7.5% of each bill. Out of this, 5% was payable on successful completion of the work and the balance 2.5% after the expiry of the defect-free period. For the A. Y. 1996-97 the assessee did not include the amount representing 2.5% of the bills. The Assessing Officer held that since the assessee was following the mercantile system of accounting, the amount of 2.5% of the bills could be said to have accrued to it, along with the amount paid under the bills and was liable to be treated as income for that year. The Tribunal held in favour of the assessee.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Telangana and Andhra Pradesh High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The right to receive the amount was contingent upon there not being any defects in the work, during the stipulated period. It was then, and only then, that the amount could be said to have accrued to the assessee.”

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Constitutional validity – Amendment made in section 80-IB(9) by adding an Explanation was not clarificatory, declaratory, curative or made “small repair” in the Act – On the contrary, it takes away the accrued and vested right of the Petitioner which had matured after the judgments of ITAT. Therefore, the Explanation added by the Finance (No.2) Act 2009 was a substantive law – Explanation added to section 80-IB(9) by the Finance (No.2) Act, of 2009 is clearly unconstitutional, violative of Arti<

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Niko Resources Ltd. vs. UOI: [2015] 55 taxmann.com 455 (Guj):

The
Petitioner is a foreign company based in Canada and has set up a
project office in India with the permission of Reserve Bank of India.
The Petitioner has been claiming benefit of deduction of 100% of the
profits and gains from the production of mineral oil and natural gas
u/s. 80-IB(9) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, as it stood prior to the
amendment by the Finance (No.2) Act 2009. In these proceedings, the
constitutional validity of the amendment to sub-section (9) of section
80-IB and Explanation added to it under the Act by the Finance (No.2)
Act, 2009, has been challenged.

The disputed question was as to
whether the benefits of tax holiday of seven years was available on each
undertaking which has now been taken away by the amendment made in
section 80-IB(9) by adding on Explanation that provides that all blocks
licensed under a single contract shall be treated as a single
undertaking.

The Gujarat High Court held as under:

“i)
Arbitrarily, the 100% tax deduction benefit could not be withdrawn by
the Finance Minister or the legislature by amending section 80-IB(9) of
the Act retrospectively from an anterior date.

ii) The amendment
in such cases where already tax benefit had accrued and vested in the
assessee could not be taken away by giving retrospective amendment to
section 80-IB(9) which is nothing but a substantive provision inserted
by amendment and it can only operate prospectively and not
retrospectively.

iii) Explanation added to section 80-IB(9) by
Finance (No.2) Act, of 2009 is clearly unconstitutional, violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution of India and is liable to be struck
down.”

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 121 dated 10th April, 2014

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Trade Credits for Imports into India – Review of all-in-cost ceiling

This circular states that the present all-in-cost ceiling for trade credits, as mentioned below, will continue till 30th June, 2014: –

The all-in-cost ceiling will include arranger fee, upfront fee, management fee, handling / processing charges, out of pocket and legal expenses, if any.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 120 dated 10th April, 2014

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Rupee Drawing Arrangement – ‘Direct to Account’ Facility

This circular, subject to certain terms and conditions, now permits banks (called Partner Banks) in India to credit the proceeds of foreign inward remittances received under Rupee Drawing Arrangement (RDA) directly to the KYC compliant beneficiary bank accounts through electronic mode, such as, NEFT, IMPS, etc.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 119 dated 7th April, 2014

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Foreign investment in India in Government Securities

Presently, resident individuals are allowed to book foreign exchange forward contracts, without production of underlying documents, up to a limit of US $ 100,000 on self-declaration basis, to hedge/ manage their actual/anticipated foreign exchange exposures.

This circular now permits all resident individuals, firms and companies, to book foreign exchange forward contracts, up to US $ 250,000 on the basis of a simple declaration (as per format annexed to this Circular) without any requirement of further documentation, to hedge/manage their actual or anticipated foreign exchange exposures.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 118 dated 7th April, 2014

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Foreign investment in India in Government Securities

Presently, FII, QFI, long term investors and FPI, registered with SEBI, can invest in Government securities including T-Bills (sub-limit of US $ 5.50 billion) and dated Government Securities (sub-limit of US $ 10 billion) within the overall limit of US $ 30 billion.

This circular provides that FII, QFI, long term investors and FPI, registered with SEBI, can now invest in Government dated securities having residual maturity of 1 year and above and existing investments in T-bills and Government dated securities of less than 1 year residual maturity will be allowed to taper off on maturity/sale.

The revised position is as under: –

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 117 dated 4th April, 2014

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Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (FEMA) Foreign Exchange (Compounding Proceedings) Rules, 2000 (the Rules) – Compounding of Contraventions under FEMA, 1999 This circular has expanded the list of offences that can be compounded by Regional Offices of RBI. The expanded list is as under: –

 

The Regional offices at Panaji and Kochi can compound the above offences provided the amount involved is less than Rs. 10,000,000. All other Regional Offices can compound the above offences without any monetary limit.

For compounding of any other offence application will have to be made, as is the present procedure, to Cell for Effective Implementation of FEMA (CEFA), Foreign Exchange Department, 5th floor, Amar Building, Sir P. M. Road, Fort, Mumbai 400001.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 115 dated 28th March, 2014

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Merchanting Trade Transactions – Revised guidelines

This circular contains the revised guidelines with respect to Merchanting Trade Transactions. These guidelines will apply to merchanting trade transactions initiated after 17th January, 2014.

Merchanting traders must be genuine traders of goods and not mere financial intermediaries. Confirmed orders have to be received by them from the overseas buyers. Handling bank must satisfy themselves about the capabilities of the merchanting trader to perform the obligations under the order. The overall merchanting trade must result in reasonable profits to the merchanting trader.

The highlights of the said guidelines are as under: –

i) For a trade to be classified as merchanting trade the following conditions must be satisfied: –

a. Goods acquired must not enter the Domestic Tariff Area; and

b. The state of the goods must not undergo any transformation.

ii) Goods involved in the merchanting trade transactions (transaction) must be those that are permitted for exports / imports under the prevailing Foreign Trade Policy (FTP) of India, as on the date of shipment and all the rules, regulations and directions applicable to exports (except Export Declaration Form) and imports (except Bill of Entry), are complied with for the export leg and import leg respectively.

iii) The bank handling the transaction must be satisfied with the bonafides of the transactions.

iv) Both the legs of the transaction must be routed through the same bank.

v) The entire transaction must be completed within an overall period of nine months and there must not be any foreign exchange outlay beyond four months.

vi) The commencement date would be the date of shipment/export leg receipt/import leg payment, whichever is first. The completion date would be the date of shipment/export leg receipt/import leg payment, whichever is the last.

vii) Short-term credit either by way of suppliers’ credit or buyers’ credit will be available for merchanting trade transactions, to the extent not backed by advance remittance for the export lag, including the discounting of export leg LC by a bank, as in the case of import transactions.

viii) In case advance against the export leg is received by the merchanting trader, the bank must ensure that the same is earmarked for making payment for the respective import leg.

ix) Merchanting traders can make advance payment for the import leg on demand made by the overseas seller. In case where inward remittance from the overseas buyer is not received before the outward remittance to the overseas supplier, the bank can provide credit facility based on commercial judgement. However, where the advance payment for the import leg is more than US $ 200,000 per transaction, than advance must be given against bank guarantee/LC from an international bank of repute except in cases and to the extent where payment for export leg has been received in advance.

x) Letter of credit to the supplier is permitted against confirmed export order keeping in view the outlay involved and provided the completion of the transaction will happen within nine months.

xi) Payment for the import leg can also be made out of the balances in Exchange Earners Foreign Currency Account (EEFC) of the merchant trader.

xii) The handling bank must ensure one-to-one matching in case of each transaction and report defaults in any leg by the traders to the concerned Regional Office of RBI, on half yearly basis in the format as annexed to the circular, within 15 days from the close of each half year, i.e. June and December.

xiii) The names of defaulting merchanting traders, where outstandings reach 5% of their annual export earnings, will be caution-listed.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 114 dated 27th March, 2014

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Risk Management and Inter Bank Dealings

Presently, exporters are allowed to hedge currency risk on the basis of a declaration of exposure up to an eligible limit which is the average of the last 3 financial years’ (April to March) actual export turnover or last year’s actual export turnover, whichever is higher. Similarly, importers are allowed to hedge up to an eligible limit which is 25% of the average of the last three financial years’ actual import turnover or last year’s actual import turnover, whichever is higher. All forward contracts booked under this facility by both exporters and importers have to be on fully deliverable basis. In case of cancellation, exchange gain, if any, cannot be passed on to the exporter/importer by the bank.

This circular provides that, exporters/importers will now be entitled to the gains/losses resulting from the cancellation of up to 75% of the contracts booked within the eligible limit (as mentioned above). Contracts booked in excess of 75% of the eligible limit will be on deliverable basis and cannot be cancelled. Hence, in the event of cancellation the exporter/ importer will have to bear the loss but will not be entitled to receive the gain.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 113 dated 26th March, 2014

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External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) for Civil Aviation Sector

Presently, airlines Companies, subject to certain terms and conditions, could avail ECB for working capital up to 31st December, 2013. This circular now permits airlines Companies to raise ECB for working capital up to 31st March, 2015.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 112 dated 25th March, 2014

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Notification No. FEMA.297/2014-RB dated 13th March 2014 – G.S.R. No. 189(E) dated 19th March 19, 2014

Foreign Portfolio Investor – investment under Portfolio Investment Scheme, Government and Corporate debt

The present scheme in respect of Portfolio Investment in India by FII & QFI has been replaced by a new scheme called the Foreign Portfolio Investment Scheme.

Important features of the said new scheme are as under: –

a. Portfolio investor registered in accordance with SEBI guidelines will now be called ‘Registered Foreign Portfolio Investor (RFPI)’. All existing portfolio investor classes, namely, FII and QFI registered with SEBI will be subsumed under RFPI. b. RFPI may purchase and sell shares and convertible debentures of Indian company through registered broker on recognized stock exchanges in India as well as purchases shares and convertible debentures which are offered to public in terms of relevant SEBI guidelines / regulations.

c. RFPI may sell shares or convertible debentures so acquired:

a) In open offer in accordance with the SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 2011; or

b) In an open offer in accordance with the SEBI (Delisting of Equity shares) Regulations, 2009; or

c) Through buyback of shares by a listed Indian company in accordance with the SEBI (Buyback of securities) Regulations, 1998. d. RFPI may also acquire shares or convertible debentures: –

a) In any bid for, or acquisition of, securities in response to an offer for disinvestment of shares made by the Central Government or any State Government; or

b) In any transaction in securities pursuant to an agreement entered into with merchant banker in the process of market making or subscribing to unsubscribed portion of the issue in accordance with Chapter XB of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2009.

e. Subject to applicable composite sectoral cap under FDI policy, RFPI investment will as under: –

a) The individual investment limits for RFPI will be below 10% of the total paid-up equity capital or 10% of the paid-up value of each series of convertible debentures issued by an Indian company; and

b) The aggregate investment limits for RFPI will be below 24% of the total paid-up equity capital or 24% of the paid-up value of each series of convertible debentures issued by an Indian company.

f. RFPI can open a Special Non-Resident Rupee (SNRR) account and a foreign currency account with a bank in India to transfer amounts from foreign currency account to SNRR account at the prevailing market rate for making genuine investments in securities. The bank can transfer repatriable proceeds (after payment of applicable taxes) from SNRR account to foreign currency account.

g. RFPI can invest in government securities and corporate debt subject to limits specified by the RBI and SEBI from time to time.

h. All investments by RFPI will be subject to the SEBI (FPI) Regulations 2014, as modified by SEBI /Government of India from time to time.

i. RFPI can trade in all exchange traded derivative contracts on the stock exchanges in India subject to the position limits as specified by SEBI from time to time.

j. RFPI can offer cash or foreign sovereign securities with AAA rating or corporate bonds or domestic Government Securities, as collateral to the recognized Stock Exchanges for their transactions in the cash as well as derivative segment of the market.

Any FII that holds a valid certificate of registration from SEBI will be deemed to be a RFPI till the expiry of the block of three years for which fees have been paid as per the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Foreign Institutional Investors) Regulations, 1995.

A QFI can continue to buy, sell or otherwise deal in securities subject to the SEBI (FPI) Regulations, 2014 for a period of one year from the date of commencement of these regulations, or until he obtains a certificate of registration as foreign portfolio investor, whichever is earlier.

All investments made by a FII/QFI in accordance with the regulations prior to registration as RFPI shall continue to be valid and taken into account for computation of aggregate limit.

A RFPI is required to report transactions to RBI as is presently being reported by FII in LEC Form.

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Is It Fair Not To Exclude Personal Payments By Individuals/Hindu Undivided Families (for Any of Its Members) from TDS?

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Introduction:

Provisions of Tax
Deduction at Source (TDS) contained in Chapter XVII-A of Income-tax Act,
1961 (“the Act”) impose a heavy burden on tax payers, especially
businessmen. Readers are aware of highly damaging consequences of
defaults in respect of contraventions of these provisions – viz. section
201, 40(a)(i), 40a(ia), 271-C, 272A, 276 B and so on. Having regard to
the complications in implementation and the harsh consequences of
default, law-makers in their wisdom have generally kept the common man
viz. individuals and Hindu Undivided Families (HUF) out of the
obligation to deduct tax. However, under certain circumstances, even
individuals and HUF’s are required to comply with these provisions.
These situations are:-

(a) payments of salaries

(b) payment to non-residents ; and

(c) if the individual/HUF’s business or profession was subject to tax audit u/s. 44AB under turnover criterion.

The unfairness:

Obligation
in respect of payment to non-residents is to some extent reasonable
since it entails the outflow of money from the country.

The Act
in certain sections also provides exception so that an individual/HUF,
though otherwise liable to deduct tax is not required to do so on
payments for personal purposes. Thus, s/s. (4) of section 194.C (payment
to contractors) exempts payments made exclusively for personal purpose.
(e.g., repairs/painting of the businessman’s residential house). So
also, the 3rd proviso to s/s. (1) of section 194.J (payments to
professionals) grants similar exemption. Hence, payments to lawyers,
architects, doctors for personal purposes by businessman will not
attract TDS provisions.

As against this, no such exemption is provided in respect of the following payments:-

Section 192 – Salaries (say salary payable to personal attendant for a patient/disabled person)

Section 194A- Interest other than interest on securities (say interest on housing loan taken from friends, relatives, etc.).

Section 194H- Commission or brokerage (say brokerage on sale/purchase of house/car/other assets) Section

194I – Rent for residential house, or rent for personal car/other assets.

There
appears to be no logical reason for such discrimination. Due to such
inconsistencies, the study and implementation of law also becomes
difficult.

Suggestion:

Similar exceptions should be provided in aforesaid sections as well.

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Political Contributions by Companies-Delhi High Court Reminds Us of the Wide Prohibitory Law

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Contributions from companies with more than 50% “foreign” holding prohibited

The Delhi High Court decision in the case of Association for Democratic Reforms vs. UOI ([2014] 43 Taxmann.com 443 (Del.)) is both a reminder and an eye opener, of certain very widely framed provisions of law originally of FERA times that continue to have impact. It is very timely too in this election season when many companies have given electoral contributions. Even more so considering the fact that the new section 182 of the Companies Act, 2013, has permitted a higher electoral contribution of 7.50% of profits as compared to 5% under the 1956 Act.

The Court has held that political parties/election candidates cannot accept foreign contributions – i.e., electoral contributions from an Indian company with more than 50% foreign holding, as so defined. The definition of what constitutes “foreign contribution” is so wide that it may bring numerous Indian listed and unlisted companies in its net. In short, acceptance of political contributions from certain Indian companies, whose number could be quite large, has been confirmed to be in violation of the law.

The decision deals with several issues, some of which arise out of defense offered by the political parties/Central Government who were the respondents. However, this article focusses on the core and important issue, which is, whether electoral contributions can be accepted by political parties from companies registered and operating in India but which have more than 50% foreign holding.

Misleading reports about the nature of decision and contribution from “foreign sources”

It is important to go into some details of certain facts of this case because several newspaper reports gave either incorrect facts or were misleading. The impression created was that contributions from “foreign sources” were received and these were held to be prohibited, without explaining how wide the term foreign sources was under the law. Foreign sources, as will be seen later, is defined in a wider manner than the literal meaning of the term suggests.

Some reports even said that a foreign company – Vedanta – gave the contributions. This, apart from being factually incorrect, again conveys that the decision has limited application. The impression conveyed is that it applies only to the rare situation when a political party accepts contributions from a foreign company.

Facts of the case

Here are, summarised and simplified, the facts as stated and the law as per the decision. Vedanta Resources plc is a company incorporated in England and Wales. It held majority/controlling stake in two companies registered in India – Sterlite Industries Limited and Sesa Goa Limited. Sterlite and Sesa Goa made electoral contributions to certain political parties. The question before the Court was whether the parties that accepted contributions violated the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 1976 (FCRA).

FCRA 1976 vs. FCRA 2010

At this juncture, it is important to note the law that the Court was concerned with was the FCRA 1976. The Court emphasised this and noted that the FCRA 1976 was replaced by the FCRA 2010. However, it can be seen that, on this aspect, the FCRA 2010 provisions are substantially similar to the FCRA 1976. Hence, I submit that the ratio of the Court’s decision ought to apply for the FCRA 2010 too.

What is “foreign contributions”?

The FCRA prohibits acceptance of “foreign contributions” by political parties/candidates. However, as was common with the laws introduced in the late 60s and mid 70s, they were very broadly framed and this led to a fairly complex definition, with one definition leading one to refer to another. The term “foreign contribution” is defined to mean receipt of certain things such as money, etc. from a “foreign source”. The term “foreign source” is defined to mean several entities including a “foreign company” and certain specified Indian companies. It is the definition of these two terms and, for the purposes of this article, the latter one with which we are concerned.

Contributions received from the following companies are also treated as contribution from “foreign sources”:-

“(vi) a company within the meaning of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), if more than one-half of the nominal value of its share capital is held, either singly or in the aggregate, by one or more of the following, namely,

(a) the government of a foreign country or territory,

(b) the citizens of a foreign country or territory,

(c) the corporations incorporated in a foreign country or territory,

(d) the trusts, societies or other associations of individuals (whether incorporated or not), formed or registered in a foreign country or territory,”

It can be seen from the definition given above that the foreign sources includes a company registered in India in which more than 50% shares are held by certain specified foreign parties such as foreign corporations, foreign citizens, foreign trusts/societies, etc.

It was an undisputed fact that Sterlite and Sesa Goa were both (i) companies under the Companies Act, 1956 and (ii) more than one-half of their capital was held by Vedanta, a corporation incorporated in a foreign country. Hence, the inevitable conclusion was that the contributions received from Sterlite/ Sesa Goa was a contribution from a foreign source. The FCRA specifically prohibited the acceptance of foreign contributions.

Curiously, it was also noted that Anil Aggarwal, an Indian citizen, held more than 50% capital in Vedanta. Thus, in a sense, the ultimate holder was an Indian citizen. However, since the FCRA did not make any relaxation for such companies, the Court held that the FCRA prohibition applied.

Decision of court

The Court held that there was a violation of the FCRA. It finally observed, summarising the facts, law and ratio:

“72. It is not disputed by the respondents that more than one-half of the nominal value of the share-capital of Sterlite and Sesa is held by Vedanta. It has already been held by us in the preceding paragraph that Vedanta is a corporation incorporated in a foreign country or territory within the meaning of Section 2(e) (vi)(c) of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 1976. Therefore, this leads to the irresistible conclusion that the present case is also squarely covered under Section 2(e)(vi)(c) of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 1976.

73. For the reasons extensively highlighted in the preceding paragraphs, we have no hesitation in arriving at the view that prima-facie the acts of the respondents inter-se, as highlighted in the present petition, clearly fall foul of the ban imposed under the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 1976 as the donations accepted by the political parties from Sterlite and Sesa accrue from “Foreign Sources” within the meaning of law.”

The Court also directed the Central Government to inquire whether contributions from other similar placed companies have been received and take necessary action within six months. It stated:

“The second direction would concern the donations made to political parties by not only Sterlite and Sesa but other similarly situated companies/corporations. Respondents No.1 and 2 would relook and re- appraise the receipts of the political parties and would identify foreign contributions received by foreign sources as per law declared by us hereinabove and would take action as contemplated by law. The two directions shall be complied within a period of six months from date of receipt of certified copy of the present decision.”

FCRA 2010

The  provisions  of  the  FCRA  2010  are  substantially similar to those of the FCRA 1976, even though the phrasing  and  structure  is  a  little  different.  Political parties  continue  to  face  total  prohibition  from  ac- cepting “foreign contribution”. Foreign contribution continues to mean receipt of specified things from “foreign sources”. And, “foreign sources” continue to include companies in which the specified foreign entities  hold  more  than  50%  of  the  capital.  These specified  foreign  entities  include  foreign  corporations, foreign citizens, foreign trusts, etc. Thus, acceptance of such foreign contributions by political parties/candidates will continue to be a violation of law, as  the Delhi High Court has  confirmed.

Companies in which specified foreign persons hold more than  50%

The  implications  of  these  provisions/decisions  are very wide. There are numerous companies in India that  have  such  foreign  holding  of  more  than  50% of  their  capital.  There  are  subsidiaries  of  foreign companies in India. There are also companies that have  more  than  50%  FDI.  So  are  companies  that have more than 50% holdings by FII/PE/non-citizens. All such companies, private, public as well as listed companies  with  a  wide  public  shareholding  would be thus covered.  The contributions accepted from them in the past and future would be under a cloud.

Contribution through Electoral Trusts

A recent variant of making electoral contribution   is through Electoral Trusts. One advantage of such trusts is that such Trusts can pool donations from various sources/entities. Thereafter, the Electoral Trust, run usually by public spirited individuals, decide which party/candidate should get and how much of the amount collected. In such a case, the receiving political party may not know who is the ultimate donor from the pool and whether it is a foreign source or not. It is submitted that the wide definitions of terms used will result in the law being still violated if the contributors are such companies. In such a situation, the responsibility would lie on the Electoral Trust to ensure that the contributions received by it are not from a foreign source.

Responsibility of the contributing Company

The  FCRA  places  the  primary  responsibility  of complying  with  the  law  on  the  receiving  political party/election candidate. As is apparent, it may be difficult  for  it  to  verify  whether  the  contributing company  has  more  than  50%  foreign  holding  and they may ask the company to confirm/certify. Even otherwise, the question is whether the contributing company  would  be  violating  the  law  if  they  gave such contributions. While the law principally applies to  the  receiving  entity  and  certain  intermediaries in  the  process,  the  way  the  law  has  been  broadly framed, it is possible that depending on the facts, the officers of the company may be held liable. For example,  the  law  also  holds  that  anyone  “assisting”  any  political  party  in  accepting  such  foreign contribution as  liable  to  punishment.

Conclusion
The fear of the foreign hand – the driving force behind this law as originally framed – is relevant today too. However, in these changed times, con- tinuing such a blanket prohibition does not seem  to make sense.

A Government that we can trust!

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By the time this issue reaches you, the elections of 2014 will be in their last phase and all of us will be waiting for the results, on 16th May. Over the past few months we have witnessed vitriolic campaigns, run by all the political parties. As in the past, emotive issues have been raised, though speeches have also been laced with the promise of development. While this election had many similarities with elections of the past, in some ways it was distinct and different. There was a large contingent of first-time voters, social media played a significant role, and there was the presence of a party which at least promised to represent the “Aam Aadmi.” These factors cumulatively may make a difference in the outcome.

Whichever government assumes power, (and one hopes that we will have a stable one), will have to meet the rising aspirations of the people. What should citizens expect from the new government? What we need is a government that “governs” and people feel that they are governed. To put it in one line we want a government in which the people of this country can place their trust.

When will such trust be created? That can happen when the government acts fairly, transparently and is accountable for its actions. These are the basic minimum attributes of governance, which have seen a steep fall in the last decade. How unfair is the administrative arm of the government will be apparent from the scathing comment of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in the Bharti Airtel’s case. The Tribunal observed “….If an action of the assessing officer is so blatantly unreasonable that such seasoned senior officers well versed with functioning of judicial forums, as the learned departmental representatives are, cannot even go through the convincing motions of defending the same before us, such unreasonable conduct of the assessing officer deserves to be scrutinised seriously. At a time when evolving societal pressures demand a greater degree of accountability in governance also, it does no good to the judicial institutions to watch such situations as helpless spectators. If it is indeed a case of frivolous addition, someone should be accountable for the resulting undue hardship to the taxpayer, rather than being allowed to walk away with a subtle, though easily discernible admission to the effect that, yes it was a frivolous addition ……. The paragraph aptly describes the conduct of the government. Those who do business expect the government of the day to act equitably, fairly. While no one denies the right of a sovereign country to collect tax, would it be wrong for businesses beyond Indian shores to expect that we will have a fair, stable and consistent tax regime?

The actions must not only be fair but they must be transparent. Let us take the legislative process as an example. The Direct Tax Code Bill, brought in with fanfare, has been hanging fire for over 4 years. Innumerable man-hours have been invested (or wasted?) in the stupendous effort of understanding, analysing the Bill and its versions to make representations thereon. After all these efforts, one feels frustrated if one does not know the outcome/response to the representation. Having received representations/suggestions, reasons as to why some of them are not accepted are never made public. While one appreciates that it is the government’s prerogative to legislate, it is equally important that the stakeholders for whom the legislation is made participate in the process and truly feel a part of it.

 Accountability is the most significant parameter of good governance. One can give innumerable illustrations of how citizens feel slighted when there is no politician or bureaucrat who takes responsibility for their actions. In the past, in our country taking responsibility for actions of one’s juniors was the norm. Such politicians/bureaucrats are now a forgotten breed, the South Korean premiere being an exception. Let us take the recent case of the deletion of a huge number of voters from the electoral rolls, with Maharashtra witnessing this problem on a very large scale. It is possible that the election commission with its limited machinery acted in an absolute bona fide manner. The problem possibly was on account of software glitches, callous data entry or equally careless data verification. Whatever be the reason, the right of franchise of an Indian citizen was lost. It may be virtually impossible to redress the same but the person responsible must be held accountable. It is only if this happens that events like this will not recur.

To ensure that the government of the day acts equitably, fairly transparently and to hold it accountable we must have a robust, consistent and responsive judicial system. We must see that justice is delivered and delivered quickly. Justice delayed is justice denied may sound a clichéd phrase, but it is true. We cannot have the situation where after more than a decade, a trial of a simple hit and run case of an eminent actor has to restart on account of a legal lacuna. Such delay virtually negates the value of any justice that may be delivered. The government that assumes office will have to address these problems, on a war footing.

Finally, if we are going to ensure that democracy survives and flourishes in our country , we the citizens and particularly the educated class will have to do their might. In the words of Alexander Woolcott, “I am tired of hearing it said that democracy doesn’t work. Of course it doesn’t work. We’re supposed to work it!” So, my fellow citizens, put your shoulder to the wheel of democracy and make it run!

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Sexual Harassment Act-II

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Synopsis

With the increasing number in women employment, their security is of paramount importance. The codification of the Sexual Harassment Act – II (‘The Act’) is a much-awaited development and a significant step towards creating awareness on the issue of workplace sexual harassment and ensuring women a safe and healthy work environment.

The author in this article has explained the key provisions of the Act, like applicability for employers to constitute an Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) to address sexual harassment complaints made by women workers, applicability of the Legal Compliance Committee where the ICC is not required, the manner in which the inquiry process is to be carried out by the ICC, etc.

Internal Complaints Committee

Every employer of a workplace, employing 10 or more workers must constitute an Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) to which aggrieved women employees can complain. Thus, if a workplace has less than 10 workers then it need not have an ICC. Note that it refers to 10 workers not 10 female workers. Hence, even if only 1 employee is a lady and the other 9 are males, an ICC is required. Further, the reference is to “workers” and not “employees”. The term workers has not been defined under the Act but one may presume it to be at par with the term “employee”. The Act is silent as to what happens when a workplace employs no women.

The constitution of the ICC should be as follows:

(a) A workplace must have an ICC for each office if the offices/administrative units are located at different places or at a divisional level.

(b) The ICC must have a minimum of 4 members of which at least half should be women.

• The Presiding Officer must always be a women employed at a Senior Level at the workplace. Hence, she must always be an internal senior employee. In case there is no senior level women employee then she can be nominated from any other workplace belonging to the same employer.

What happens if the employer has only 1 workplace and that has only 1 female employee who is not a senior level employee? Who then would be the Presiding Officer? Take a case of an office which has a receptionist as its only lady employee. Would she be the Presiding Officer even though she may be a junior level employee?

• Minimum 2 employees preferably committed to the cause of women/experience in social work or who have legal knowledge. Thus, these 2 members could be male or female.

• One external member from an NGO committed to the cause of women/familiar with issues relating to sexual harassment. Such person must have an expertise on issues relating to sexual harassment and may include a social worker with minimum 5 years’ experience with these issues or a person familiar with labour, service, civil or criminal law. Several organisations have nominated a Lady Lawyer or a Lady NGO worker with experience in this field. This person must always be an external person, i.e., not employed by the workplace. She could be a Consultant/Lawyer to the organisation also but not on its payroll.

• The employee members of the ICC should be replaced by new faces every 3 years.

Local Complaints Committee

For every District, a District Officer would be appointed under the Act. The District Magistrate/ Collector/Deputy Collector could act as such District Officer. Such District Officer would constitute a Local Complaints Committee (LCC) under the Act. The LCC would act as the redressal forum for all organisations not required to constitute an ICC, e.g., those which have less than 10 workers.

Complaint by Aggrieved Woman

Any aggrieved woman can lodge a written complaint of sexual harassment at a workplace with the ICC or the LCC as the case may be. The complaint must be lodged within 3 months from the incident or within 3 months from the last incident in case of a series of incidents. Hence, a stop gap has been provided for lodging the complaint. The Committee can provide a further 3 months’ extension for special cases. The complaint must be filed in 6 copies along with supporting documents and details of the witnesses, if any. The woman may chose to file a complaint under the IPC or any such Law with a Police Station. The Act does not take away this right of a lady.

The first response of the ICC/LCC before initiating an inquiry can be to propose a settlement between the respondent and the aggrieved woman through a conciliation process. However, the offer for such settlement must come from the aggrieved woman alone. Further, a monetary settlement cannot be made as the basis for the conciliation. A settlement would conclude the inquiry process under the Act.

One question which begs attention is must the respondent be a male only? If one reads the Act and the Rules, the definition of the respondent is only a person against whom a complaint is lodged. However, at several places the Rules refer to the preposition “he” for the respondent which tends to suggest that it must be a male alone. But there is no conclusive answer to this question. A similar position exists under the IPC. Recently, the Bombay High Court has raised a question “Can a woman be accused of outraging the modesty of another woman ..?”

Inquiry Process

If a settlement has not been reached/proposed, the Committee would make a thorough inquiry into the complaint against the respondent in the following manner:

(a) Forward a copy of the complaint to the respondent within 7 working days.

(b) Respondent to file his reply within 10 working days of the receipt of complaint by him.

(c) Committee to make a detailed inquiry as per the principles of natural justice. The inquiry must consider all facets. At least 3 members, including the Presiding Officer of the Committee must be present. It must complete its inquiry within 90 days.

(d) Where the Committee feels that there is a prima facie case for a criminal complaint, then it shall forward the same to the police for action under the IPC. Section 354 of the IPC deals with punishment for assault on a woman with an intent to outrage her modesty.

(e) No lawyer can represent either party before the Committee.

(f) During the inquiry the Committee may recommend that the employer transfers the aggrieved women, grants her leave up to 3 months or grants her any other relief. Other relief may include recommendations on restraining the respondent from reporting on the work performance of the aggrieved woman or supervising her academic activity in the case of an educational institution. Thus, the idea is to prevent victimisation as a result of the complaint.

(g) Based on its inquiry, the Committee must arrive at a finding whether or not the respondent is guilty. Accordingly, in cases where they feel that the allegation has been proved, the Committee must recommend to the employer or the District Officer to take action for sexual misconduct. The actions prescribed include:

• Writing a written apology
• Warning/reprimand/censure
• Withholding of promotion/increments • Termination of Service
• Undergoing Counseling sessions
• Carrying out community service – this is probably the first time that we are seeing community service as a means of reprimand. This is very common in the USA.

The Committee may also recommend to deduct such sum from his remuneration to be paid to the aggrieved woman. While determining the sum they will consider the mental suffering of the woman, loss in her career due to the incident, medical expenses incurred on physical/psychiatric treatment; respondent’s financial status.

(h)    The entire process from complaint to action, in- cluding the names and identity of the aggrieved woman, respondent, witnesses, are to be kept confidential from the public, press, media, etc. Even an RTI Query cannot be filed in respect of the same since the Act overrides the Right to Information Act, 2005. The penalty for making such information public is Rs. 5,000. However, justice meted out can be disclosed without revealing the names and identity of the aggrieved woman, respondent, witnesses, etc.

(i)    Either party may prefer an Appeal against the Committee’s Order before the Appellate Authority notified under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946.

Annual Report by ICC

Every ICC must prepare an Annual Report on their committee’s functioning and submit the same to the employer and the District Officer. It must be prepared every calendar year and should include the following:

(a)    Number of complaints received in that year

(b)    Number of complaints disposed off during that
year

(c)    Number of cases pending for more than 90 days

(d)    Number of workshops/awareness programmes
organised

(e)    Nature of action taken by the employer/District Officer.

Duties of Employer

Every employer has been given certain duties and obligations under the Act:

(a)    provide a safe working environment at the workplace and safety from the persons coming into contact at the workplace;

(b)    display at any prominent place in the workplace, the penal consequences of sexual harassments and the order constituting, the ICC;

(c)    organise workshops and awareness programmes at regular intervals for sensitising the employees with the provisions of the Act and orientation programmes for the members of the ICC- this   is an important role which employers can play. They must educate the employees as to what constitutes harassment and the consequences of the same. A standard operating policy or a manual would be very helpful and each and every employee (whether junior or senior) should be educated on the same. External help from Lawyers/NGOs may also be taken for this purpose.  It would be useful to lay down illustrations of real life situations which may be construed as harassment. Some organisations are implementing etiquette/gender sensitisation workshops/role play situations. HR Heads have a very important role to play in this respect.

(d)    provide necessary facilities to the ICC/LCC for dealing with the complaint and conducting an inquiry;

(e)    assist in securing the attendance of the respondent and the witnesses before the Committee;

(f)    make available such information to the Committee as it may require for a complaint;

(g)    provide assistance to the woman if she so chooses to file a complaint in relation to the offence under the IPC;

(h)    cause to initiate action, under the IPC against the perpetrator, or if the aggrieved woman so desires, where the perpetrator is not an em- ployee, in the workplace at which the incident of sexual harassment took place;

(i)    treat sexual harassment as a misconduct under the service rules and initiate action for such misconduct;

(j)    monitor the timely submission of the Annual Reports by the ICC and include in the same the number of case filed and their disposal. If no report is to be filed by an ICC then he must intimate this number to the District Officer.

Penalty on Employer

The employer would be penalised for his failing to comply with the provisions of the Act:

(a)    If he does not constitute an ICC although re- quired to do so;

(b)    Does not take action against a respondent on the basis of the recommendation of the ICC’s inquiry;

(c)    Contravenes any provisions of the Act.

The  first  penalty  is  a  fine  of  up  to  Rs.  50,000.  For a  second  conviction  of  the  same  offence,  he  shall be liable to twice the punishment meted out during the  first  offence.  Further,  it  could  also  lead  to  the cancellation  of  his  trade  licence/approval/registration  required  for  carrying  on  his  business.  Thus,  a repeat offence carries a very serious consequence.

Dwelling Place / House

The Act has one more interesting facet. It even applies to a dwelling place or a house. The definition of a workplace includes a dwelling place or a house. The employer is defined to include a person or a household who employs or benefits from the employment of a domestic worker. The worker could be for any time, for any nature of work, etc. Further, a domestic worker has been defined as a woman who is employed to do household work for remuneration (in cash/kind) whether directly or through a placement agency. She could  be temporary or permanent, part-time or full-time but excludes any member of the employer’s family. Interestingly, an employee is defined to include one who works without remuneration but a domestic worker must be one who works for a remuneration. In relation to a house, an aggrieved woman must be one who is employed at such house. Thus, in case of a workplace (which is not a house), any lady can allege harassment whether or not she is an employee. However, in case of a dwelling house, she must be an employee of that house. Hence, there are two major differences between a house as compared to a workplace other than a house.

All the provisions discussed above would apply even to a dwelling place/house which means that if a house employs 10 or more domestic workers/ servants (male or female) then it would have to constitute an ICC headed by a senior level lady servant and include one external NGO worker/ lawyer. So, if a household has a maid servant and 9 other male servants, drivers, cooks, gardeners, etc., it would have to form an ICC. One wonders whether domestic workers would be in a position to head and handle such an ICC? Is it feasible to ask them to conduct an inquiry, prepare reports and follow principles of natural justice?

Where the ICC/LCC feels that there is a prima facie case of sexual harassment against a domestic worker, then it shall forward the same to the police for action under the IPC.

False Complaints

One fear of this Act is that it could be misused and could go way of section 498A of the IPC (anti-dowry law which has been misused in some cases). Harsh penal provisions have been laid down as a deterrent for false complaints. In case of a false/malicious complaint by a lady, the ICC/LCC can take action against such complainant. The punishment could be on the same lines as that on the respondent    in case of a sexual harassment.

Conclusion

Let us hope that this Act achieves the true objectives for which it was enacted and does not end up becoming just another tick-the-box/compliance list. Men would be well advised to remember Shake- speare’s Henry IV, Part I: “The better part of Valour, is Discretion; in the which better part, I have saved my life”. Think before you act or repent in leisure.

PART D: GOOD GOVERNANCE

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Quote from Shashi Tharoor, Minister of State for Human Resources Development:

“The RTI ACT has changed Governance in the country, yet UPA is given no credit for it.”

Quote From Arindam Chaudhari:

“Good governance is Narendra Modi’s promise. Good governance is surety not about pointing fingers randomly at others! It is about walking the talk. And here is a man who has walked the talk for 12 years and more, and shown how to win hearts and make a progressive State with good governance.”

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Right to Information – School run by Society– Society covered under the Act. : Right to Information Act, 2005.

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Shahada Taluka Co-op. Education Society vs. Kalyan Sajan Patil 2014 (301) E.L.T. 234 (Bom.)(HC)

It is the case of the petitioner, Shahada Taluka Co-operative Education Society Limited, that the said society has been registered under the provisions of the Cooperative Societies Act in the year 1952 i.e., prior to coming into existence in the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act and the said registration is continued inadvertently and later on in the year 1955, it came to be registered under the provisions of the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950.

It is the case of the petitioner society that on 16.03.2011, the respondent No.1 herein submitted an application seeking information under the Right to Information Act, 2005 before the petitioner society in the capacity of Chairman of the Shahada Taluka Co-operative Education Society.

It is the contention of the petitioner society that, as the petitioner society is registered under the Societies Registration Act and under the Bombay Public Trust Act, as per the Right to Information Act the petitioner society does not fall under the definition of “public authority”, and hence the petitioner society is not duty bound to supply information sought by the respondent No.1.

The Court observed that it was not in dispute that the schools run by the petitioner society are receiving grant in aid from the State Government. The distinction which is sought to be made by the counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner is the Chairman of the Shahada Taluka Cooperative Education Society and the information sought is in respect of the affairs of the society and not about the school which is receiving grant in aid directly in the account of the Head Master, and therefore, the petitioner is not obliged to give information sought for. It clearly appears that the Shahada Taluka Cooperative Education Society is established for imparting education. The sole purpose of forming such society is for establishing school and imparting education.

Therefore, the distinction which is tried to be made by the petitioner, as aforementioned, needs no consideration. Though the Information Officer is appointed, the petitioner, when called upon to furnish the information, is bound to supply the same to the respondent No.1.

By way of impugned order, only direction is issued to the petitioner to furnish the information as sought by the respondent no.1 within 15 days. Acceptance of the interpretation of the arguments of the petitioner that information sought is in respect of affairs of the society and not in respect of the school receiving grant in aid, would defeat the object of introducing the Right to Information Act, 2005. The Right to Information Act, 2005 has been introduced with laudable object and said cannot be defeated by accepting narrow interpretation as canvassed by the petitioner.

In that view of the matter, the contention of the petitioner was not accepted.

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Registration – Document not compulsorily registrable: Registration Act, 1908.

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Brahaman Swarnkar Samaj, Pali & Others vs. Medh Kshatriya, Swarnkar Samaj Vikas Samiti, Pali & Another AIR 2014 Raj. 37

The respondent No.1 – plaintiff filed a suit for cancellation of a trust deed, getting it declared void and for permanent injunction against the petitioner-defendants, inter alia, seeking relief for cancellation of the trust deed registered on 31- 05-1997 by the defendant Samaj and permanent injunction in the nature of non-interference in the right of the plaintiff to worship in the temples, which were subject matter of the trust deed. The suit was, inter alia, founded on an agreement dated 15-07-1968 said to have been executed qua the temples between the parties.

The said document dated 15-07-1968 was filed and the same was sought to be exhibited in evidence; petitioner No.1 filed the application, inter alia, with the averments that as in the document dated 15-07-1968, there is a version relating to the property being joint, the same is undervalued and requires registration u/s. 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 and as the document has been undervalued and is unregistered, the same cannot be led in evidence and cannot be marked as an exhibit; it was prayed that it be held that the document was inadmissible.

The Court observed that a bare reading of the document dated 15-07-1968 reveals that the parties therein have termed the same as writing between two temples and further goes on to state that the said both temples have been joint from the beginning and the same would remain so in future also.

The contents of said document, which start with an indication that both the temples are joint merely indicate the existing state of affairs, as on the date of executing the document, recites the status from before the execution of the document and as to what was to continue in future. As per the said document, the property i.e., the temples in question were joint from the beginning and would continue to remain so, does not bring into existence any new state of affairs different from what was existing. The document thereafter merely goes on to indicate that none of the two Samaj would claim exclusive possession and both would be entitled to spend money on the said temples, but would not claim reimbursement of the same.

For a document to be compulsorily registrable u/s. 17(1)(b) of the Act of 1908, it is necessary that the same should purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest to or in the immovable property. So far as the creation of any right, title or interest as submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners is concerned, in view of the clear language of the document, which indicates a pre-existing right, it cannot be said that any right was ‘created’ by the said document in favour of any of the parties.

In so far as the ‘declaration’ as envisaged by section 17(1)(b) of the Act of 1908 is concerned, as the word ‘declare’ has been placed alongwith create, limit or extinguish and the said words imply a definite change of legal relation to the property by an expression of will embodied in the document referred to, the said word ‘declare’ has to be read ejusdem generis with the words create, assign or limit. For a document to fall within the ambit of 17(1)(b) of the Act of 1908 on its declaration, it must imply a declaration of will and not a mere statement of fact, as there is a clear distinction between a mere recital of a fact and something which in itself create a title.

Therefore, the document in question is not compulsorily registrable under provisions of section 17(1)(b) of the Act of 1908.

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Negligence-Torts–Medical Practitioner– Liability to pay damages-It does not Transcend into criminal liability as to make him liable – Section 338 of the Indian Penal Code, (1860).

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Dr. P.B. Desai vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. AIR 2014 SC 795

In the instant case, a patient suffering from cancer was examined by the appellant, a renowned surgeon who advised an ‘Exploratory Laparotomy (Surgery)’, in order to ascertain whether the patient’s uterus could be removed in order to stop vaginal bleeding. The main allegation against the appellant was that he did not take personal care and attention by performing the operation himself. On the contrary, he did not ever bother to even remain present when another doctor started the surgical procedure and opened the abdomen. Moreover, when the other doctor, on opening of the abdomen, found that cancer was at a very advanced stage and it would not be possible to proceed because there was fluid and intestines were plastered, he called the appellant for advice. Even then the appellant did not examine the patient minutely. Instead, after seeing her from the entrance of the operating room, he advised him to close the abdomen. So such so, even after the formation of the fistula and the pathetic condition of the patient, the appellant never bothered to examine or look after her. It was thus alleged that the aforesaid acts of omission and commission amounted to professional misconduct as well as an offence punishable u/s. 338 of the I.P.C. Since there was no overt act on the part of the appellant, as the surgical procedure was performed by another doctor, the charge of abetment u/s. 109 of I.P.C. was also leveled against the appellant. Held, the decision of the appellant advising Exploratory Laparotomy was not an act of negligence, much less wanton negligence, and under the circumstances it was a plausible view which an expert like the appellant could have taken, keeping in view the deteriorating and worsening health of the patient. As a consequence, opening of the abdomen and performing the surgery cannot be treated as causing grievous hurt. It could have been only if the doctors would have faltered and acted in a rash and gross negligent manner in performing that procedure. At the same time, his act of omission, in not doing the surgery himself and remaining absent from the scene and neglecting the patient, even thereafter, when she was suffering the consequences of fistula, is an act of negligence and is definitely worthy of blame (though that is not the part of criminal charge). However, the omission is not of a kind which will give rise to criminal liability. No doubt, he did not do it himself, but it is not the case of the prosecution that another doctor did not do it deftly either. It is because of the condition of the patient, the surgery could not be completed, as on the opening of the abdomen, other complications were revealed. This would have happened in any case, irrespective of whether the abdomen was opened by another doctor or by the appellant himself. The appellant’s omission in not rendering complete and undivided legally owed duty to the patient and not performing the procedure himself has not made any difference. It was not the cause of the patient’s death which was undoubtedly because of the acute chronic cancer condition. The negligent conduct in the nature of omission of the appellant is not so gross as to entail criminal liability on the appellant u/s. 338 of the I.P.C. Thus, though the conduct of the appellant constituted not only professional misconduct for which adequate penalty has been meted out to him by the Medical Council, and the negligence on his part also amounts to actionable wrong in tort, it does not transcend into a criminal liability, and in no case makes him liable for offence u/s. 338, I.P.C. as the ingredients of that provision have not been satisfied.

If the patient has suffered because of negligent act/omission of the doctor, it undoubtedly gives the right to the patient to sue the doctor for damages. This would be a civil liability of the doctor under the law of tort/contract.

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Market Value – Sale Deed-Stamp Duty-Circle rate by itself does not provide true market value of property: Stamp Act, 1899.

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Amit Kumar Tyagi & Another vs. State of U.P. & Others AIR 2014 All 40

The issue raised in the petition was that the authorities have determined market value of the property by enhancing it by 25% without giving any reason.

The instrument was executed and registered on 13-08-2010 in respect of the house’s total area of 252.42 sq. mtrs. The proceedings u/s. 47-A(iv) of Indian Stamp Act, 1899 were initiated pursuant to a spot inspection made by the Additional District Magistrate, Finance and Revenue, Ghaziabad and his report dated 20-10-2010, stated that the value set forth in the instrument appears to be less than the minimum residential circle rate prescribed by the Collector and, therefore, the proceedings for determining market value should be initiated.

The same officer, who submitted the inspection report dated 20-10-2010 and at whose instance the proceedings were initiated, took upon himself to consider the matter finally u/s. 47-A(4) and passed order dated 23-02-2011. He held that 25% should be added to the circle rate prescribed at the relevant point of time and accordingly thereto, the market value of the property comes to Rs. 68,47,060/-, whereupon the the stamp duty payable is Rs. 4,79,300/- and since only Rs. 3,91,000/- has been paid, therefore, there was a deficiency of stamp of Rs. 88,300/-.

It is contended that on the one hand, the Assistant Collector suggested that the stamp duty was to be paid according to the prescribed circle rate/ market value of the commercial land, but while passing the impugned order he has increased the value by 25% from the circle rate for which no reason has been assigned at all. On this ground, the petitioners challenged the order.

The Hon’ble Court observed that it goes without saying that proceedings u/s. 47-A(4) can be initiated only when there exists a ground that the correct market value has not been set forth in the instrument. The determination of market value does not depend on the fancy, imagination and conjectures of the Collector or any other competent authority.

The Court further observed that under the provisions of the Act, 1899 stamp duty is payable on the market value of the property in transacted by the sale deed. It is also true that the market value does not mean the circle rate itself but it is only a guiding factor. The Collector has to determine the market value taking into account various factors. In the case in hand, the Additional Collector has simply referred to the circle rate and in a mechanical way, passed the impugned order enhancing the circle rate by 25%.

U/s. 47-A of the Act, the obligation is on the Collector to find out the correct market value of the property which is alleged to have not been mentioned in the instrument. For the purpose of determining the market value, no machinery is provided in statutory provisions. However, a procedure has now been provided vide U.P. Stamp (Valuation of Property) Rules, 1997 (hereinafter referred to as the “1997 Rules”) in accordance whereto the Collector would determine the market value.

The term “market value” has not been defined under the Act. However, there are some precedents laying down certain guidelines as to how and in what manner a market value would be determined. The consensus is that the market value of any property is the price which the property would fetch or would have fetched if sold in the open market, if sold by a willing seller, unaffected by the special need of a particular purchaser. It is interesting to note that the Act provides first for the determination of minimum value of the property and further says that if the market value of the property set forth in the instrument is less than the minimum value determined under the Act, then before registering the instrument the registering authority shall refer the instrument to Collector for determination of the market value of the property and the proper duty payable thereon. Therefore, a market value of the property in all cases cannot be said to be higher than the minimum value determined under the rules by the concerned authority, inasmuch as, it is only a kind of guideline provided to the authorities for the purpose of considering as to whether the proper stamp duty is being paid by setting forth the true market value of the property in question in the instrument. The entire object of legislature in the various provisions of the Act is to require the parties concerned to set forth the correct market value of the property at which the transaction has taken place so that appropriate duty in accordance with the Act is paid by them. The various provisions with respect to the minimum value etc. are only in aid and assistance of the authorities to find out the true amount of consideration on which the parties have entered into transaction so that the correct duty is collected therefrom.

It is thus clear that the circle rate by itself does not provide a true market value of the property, which is the subject matter of the instrument. It is only a guiding factor. In the present case, interestingly, the proceedings were initiated on the assumption that the stamp duty has not been paid according to the prevailing circle rate/market value treating the market value at par with the circle rate, but when the impugned order has been passed instead of confining to the circle rate, the Additional Collector has gone on to increase the value by 25% further to the prescribed circle rate and in doing so he has not given any reason. The proceedings in question show a complete nonapplication of mind on the part of the authorities. Such proceedings are nothing but amounting to a sheer harassment of public at large and in particular, the person who actually suffers due to such whimsical order passed by the authorities. A serious statutory duty has been cast upon the respondents but instead of doing justice with their statutory requirement, the authorities are passing unmindful, arbitrary orders, whereby not only the large public is being harassed but it also results in burdening the Courts though such litigation otherwise could have been avoided. The petition was allowed.

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Corporate Social Responsibility – Companies Act, 2013:

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A Paradigm Shift in Corporate Moral Responsibility (or Inner Transformation for Corporates)

Since the time provisions relating to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) have been announced, it is the most heated topics under discussion in the corporate world. It is, however not a totally new concept in India as the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) had ordered 100 largest companies listed on BSE and NSE to disclose their CSR activities and the amount spent on CSR. It is also to be noted that in parliament also, CSR was one of the most debated issues. The reasons for this may be political, but the fact that the issue caught the attention of our elected members indicates its significance.

Despite the problems that will be discussed in the following paragraphs the, initiative taken by the government is to be appreciated and we hope that the proper implementation of the same benefits the public at large. As the name suggests, CSR is a corporate’s responsibility and initiative towards upliftment of society and social welfare. In India, we look to the government and public authorities when it comes to spending towards social welfare. Internationally it is an accepted practice, but India is the first country to introduce statutory provisions with respect to CSR.

The Ministry of Corporate Affairs through the Companies Act 2013 (‘the Act’) has prescribed the provisions of CSR. Section 135 of the Act prescribes the basic provisions for the applicability and other requirements. CSR Rules 2014 contain the procedural part. Schedule VII to the Act prescribes list of activities on which amount can be spent to comply with the provisions of CSR. :

• Effective date

On 27th February 2014, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) has notified section 135, Schedule VII of the Act and Companies (Corporate Social Responsibility Policy) Rules, 2014 (‘Rules’). As per the notification, CSR provisions will be effective from 1st April 2014.

• Applicability

Every company including its holding or subsidiary, and a foreign company having branch/project office in India, which fulfills any of the following criteria in any of the financial years will have to comply with the provisions of CSR.

Further, every company which does not meet the criteria for three consecutive financial years is not required to (a) constitute a CSR Committee and (b) comply with the CSR provisions till such time it meets the below criteria. Criteria are as under:

1. Net worth of Rs. 500 crore or more, or
2. Turnover of Rs. 1,000 crore or more, or
3. Net profit of Rs. 5 crore or more

‘Net profit’ is defined in the CSR Rules as tabulated below

B – For a Foreign company

‘Net profit’ for a foreign company means the net profit as per profit and loss account prepared in terms of Clause (a) of s/s. (1) of section 381 read with section 198 of the Companies Act, 2013.

Issues which may have to be clarified by MCA

• For the purpose of deciding the applicability of CSR provision, the net profit after tax would be considered. Net profit as per financials would normally be understood as profit after tax.

• Since only profit of overseas branch is mentioned, in our view, loss of overseas branch will not be added for determining net profit criteria.

• According to Section 135, the criteria for applicability of CSR are to be applied to each company. However, as per CSR Rules, it could be interpreted that if CSR is applicable to parent company then it would automatically apply to its subsidiary or vice versa even though those entities do not meet the criteria.

• For reducing the dividend received from Indian companies from Net profit, practical difficulty will arise in determining whether such companies are complying with the provisions of section 135 or not.

• CSR Contribution

Company covered under the CSR provisions will have to spend, in every financial year, at least 2% of ‘average net profits’ of last 3 financial years on CSR activities. In the event such a company fails to spend such amounts in pursuance to its CSR Policy, the Board is required to provide reasons for not spending the specified amounts in the Board’s annual report. The ‘average net profit’ shall be calculated in accordance with section 198 [i.e., calculation of net profit prescribed for the purpose of determining the maximum managerial remuneration]

Issue which may have to be clarified by MCA

Since ‘average net profit’ is to be computed as per section 198, the definition of ‘net profit’ as given in the CSR rules will not apply i.e., profit of overseas branch and dividend from other companies in India complying with CSR provisions will not be reduced for calculation of ‘average net profit’.

• Schedule VII of the Companies Act, 2013

CSR policy relates to activities to be undertaken by the Company as specified in Schedule VII to the Act and the expenditure thereon, excluding activities undertaken in pursuance of normal course of business of the Company. Following CSR activities are specified in Schedule VII.

1. Eradicating hunger, poverty and malnutrition, promoting preventive health care and sanitation and making available safe drinking water;

2. Promotion of education, including special education and employment enhancing vocational skills especially among children, women, elderly, and the differently abled and livelihood enhancement projects;

3. Promoting gender equality, empowering women, setting up homes and hostels for women and orphans; setting up old age homes, day care centres and such other facilities for senior citizens and measures for reducing inequalities faced by socially and economically backward groups;

4. Ensuring environmental sustainability, ecological balance, protection of flora and fauna, animal welfare, agroforestry, conservation of natural resources & maintaining quality of soil, air & water;

5. Protection of national heritage, art and culture including restoration of buildings and sites of historical importance and works of art; setting up public libraries; promotion and development of traditional arts and handicrafts;

6. Measures for the benefit of armed forces veterans, war widows and their dependents;

7. Training to promote sports [rural, nationally recognised sports, Paralympic & Olympic sports];

8. Contribution to the Prime Minister’s National Relief Fund or any other fund set up by the Central Government for socio-economic development and relief and welfare of the Schedule Castes, the Schedule Tribes, other backward classes, minorities and women;

9. Contribution or funds provided to technology incubators located within academic institutions which are approved by the Central Government;

10. Rural development projects.

• CSR Committee and the Board of Directors

1. The companies shall constitute a CSR Committee consisting of 3 or more directors including at least 1 independent director. However, unlisted public company or a private company or foreign company shall have its CSR Committee without independent director. A private company having only two directors on its Board shall constitute its CSR Committee with two such directors.

2. The key role of the CSR Committee is to formulate and recommend CSR policy to the Board of Directors, recommend the amount of expenditure to be incurred on the CSR and monitor the Corporate Social Responsibility Policy of the company.

3.    The Board of Directors shall approve the CSR policy after considering recommendations from CSR Committee and disclose contents in Directors Report forming part of the annual report and also place it on the company’s website. Further, the Board shall ensure that the activities as are included in CSR Policy of the company are under- taken by the company.

4.    The Company shall give preference to the local area and areas around it where it operates for spending the amount earmarked for CSR.

5.    The format for the annual report on CSR activi- ties to be included in the Board’s report is also given. This has to be certified by the Director and Chairman of CSR Committee. In case of foreign company, the authorised representative resident in India shall also certify.

•    Other key points as per the CSR Rules

1.    CSR expenditure includes all expenditure including contribution to corpus, or on projects or programs relating to CSR activities approved by the Board on the recommendation of its CSR Committee, but does not include any expenditure on an item not in conformity with Schedule VII of the Act.

2.    A company may carry out CSR activities, through registered trust or society or a company estab- lished by the company or its holding or subsidiary or associate company. The following 2 CONditions are prescribed

a.    If trust, society, or company is not established by the company, etc., it shall have an established track record of 3 years in undertaking CSR activities.

b.    Company has specified the project or programmes to be undertaken through these entities, the mo- dalities of utilisation of funds on such projects and programmes and the monitoring and reporting mechanism.

3.    A company may also collaborate with other companies for undertaking CSR activities in such a manner that the CSR Committees of respective companies are in a position to report separately on such activities.

4.    The CSR expenditure has to be only on projects/ programmes undertaken in India only.

5.    CSR projects or programmes that benefit only employees of the company or their families is not considered as CSR activities.

6.    Companies may build CSR capacities of their own personnel as well as those of their Implementing agencies through Institutions with established track records of at least 3 financial years but such expenditure shall not exceed five percent of total CSR expenditure of the company in one financial year.

7.    Contribution to any political parties directly or indirectly is not considered as CSR activity.

8.    The CSR policy of the company shall specify that the surplus arising out of the CSR activities shall not form part of the business profit of the com- pany.

•    Substantial changes compared to draft rules:

Significant changes in final rules/schedule has been made as compared to the draft CSR rules and Schedule VII. Notably amongst them are as under:

(i)    removal of 3 year block period concept,

(ii)    hitherto programs integrating business models with social and environmental priorities and processes in order to create shared value was covered,

(iii)    restricting expenses on personnel engaged in CSR to not more than 5% of CSR spend,

(iv)    removing contribution to fund set up by State Government for socio economic development and relief and welfare of the SC/ST/BC, minorities and women,

(v)    restricting the health care initiative to prevention

(vi)    expanding the applicability of Section 135 to Foreign Companies having branch/project office in India (though section 135 only refers to Companies (which as per definition will include companies incorporated in India only),

(vii)    removing the enabling clause in Schedule VII for notifying any other activities as part of CSR and substituting business social projects with rural social project.

•    Conclusion

There is no clarity on tax treatment of amount spent on CSR. In the draft CSR rules it was specified that tax treatment will be in accordance with the Income Tax Act as may be notified by CBDT. However in the Rules notified, this para is removed. Clarity is also required in respect of accounting treatment for the unspent amount on CSR especially in view of expert advisory  opinion  issued  by  ICAI  in  June  2013  which opined  that  provision  may  not  be  required  where there is no present obligation.

Key challenges for corporates would be where they are already spending money on the general welfare of the employees per se like housing, education, medical facilities etc. and now they will also have to spend on CSR as spending on employee welfare is not covered. So for such corporates this will be an additional financial outflow. To conclude, in India CSR would be successful only if it is implemented   in its true spirit. It should be noted that there are  no penal consequences for not spending on CSR in a particular year, however there is an indirect pressure on corporates to spend on CSR. We hope that CSR results in overall development of the society and general public at large and CSR becomes the game changer in terms of transforming India from  a developing country to a developed nation.

ACCEPTANCE OF DEPOSITS BY COMPANIES

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1. Companies Act, 2013

The Companies Act, 2013 (Act) has been in vogue since August, 2013. Out of 470 sections, 98 sections have been notified since 12th September, 2013. Recently, vide notification dated 26th March,2014, 183 sections have been notified and they are in force from April 01,2014. Thus in all today 281 sections are in operation. The Ministry of Corporate Affairs have notified the Rules in matters covered by the sections which are in force and these Rules have come into force on 01-04-2014. This Act and Rules replace the Companies Act, 1956 (old Act) and the Rules made there under.

2. Acceptance of Deposits:
Chapter V of the Act, deals with Acceptance of Deposits by companies. It contains four sections viz. sections 73 to 76. Of which, section 73, 74(1) and 76 are operative from1st April,2014. The Companies (Acceptance of Deposits) Rules, 2014 (Rules) have also been notified and they have come into force on 01-04-2014. These Rules are framed in consultation with RBI. It may be noted that these sections and the Rules apply to Public and Private Companies.

3. Deposit:
Section 2(31) of the Act, defines “deposit” which includes any receipt of money by way of deposit or loan or in any other form by a company, but does not include such categories of amount received as provided in Rule 2(1)(c).

4. Exempted Deposits:
As per Rule 2(1)(c) the following amounts received by a company are not to be considered as Deposits under the above provisions.

(i) Receipt from the Central Government, or a State Government, (including from any other source whose repayment is guaranteed by the Central Government or a State Government), from a local authority , or from a statutory authority constituted under an Act of Parliament or a State Legislature;

(ii) Receipt from foreign Governments, foreign or international banks, multilateral financial institutions, foreign Governments owned development financial institutions, foreign export credit agencies, foreign collaborators, foreign bodies corporate and foreign citizens, foreign authorities or persons resident outside India subject to the provisions of FEMA Act and rules and regulations made there under;

(iii) Any loan or facility from any banking company, from a banking institution notified by the Central Government u/s. 51 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, or a notified Co-operative Bank.

(iv) Any loan or financial assistance from any Public Financial Institutions notified by the Central Government;

(v) Any amount received against issue of commercial paper or any other instruments issued in accordance with the guidelines or notification issued by RBI;

(vi) Intercorporate Deposits;

(vii) Any amount received and held pursuant to an offer made in accordance with the provisions of the Act towards subscription to any securities, including share application money or advance towards allotment of securities pending allotment, so long as such amount is appropriated only against the amount due on allotment of the securities applied for. It is also provided that such allotment should be made within 60 days of receipt or refunded within 15 days on the expiry of 60 days. Adjustment for any other purpose shall not be considered as refund. It may be noted that there was no such time limit for allotment of securities under the old Companies Act or Rules. The above time limit will apply to amounts received before 01-04-2014 and outstanding as on that date;

(viii) Receipt from a person who, at the time of the receipt of the amount, was a director of the company. He should give a declaration that he has deposited the amount out of his own funds. It may be noted that under the Old Act in the case of Private Companies, exemption was given to relative of a Director and to a Member of the Company. This exemption is now withdrawn;

(ix) Any amount raised by issue of secured bonds or debentures or bonds or debentures compulsorily convertible into shares of the company within five years. It may be noted that under the Old Act there was no such time limit for conversion of debentures within 5 years;

(x) Any amount received from an employee of the company not exceeding his annual salary under a contract of employment with the company in the nature of non-interest bearing security deposits. Under the Old Act there was no limit about the amount of Security Deposit;

(xi) Any non-interest bearing amount received or held in trust;

(xii) Any amount received in the course of, or for the purposes of, the business of the company,-

(a) as an advance for the supply of goods or provision of services accounted for in any manner whatsoever provided that such advance is appropriated against supply of goods or provision of services within a period of 365 five days. There was no such limit of 365 days under the Old Act.

(b) as advance, against consideration for sale of any property;

(c) as security deposit for the performance of the contract for supply of goods or provision of services;

(d) as advance received under long term projects for supply of capital goods.

(xiii) Any amount brought in by the promoters of the company by way of unsecured loan in pursuance of the stipulation of any lending financial institution or a bank subject to specified conditions.

5. Prohibition on Acceptance of Deposits from Public

(i) Section 73(1) provides that no company shall invite, accept or renew any deposit under this Act from the public except in the manner provided under this chapter.

(ii) Section 73(2) provides that a company may accept deposits from its members, subject to passing of a resolution in General Meeting, on such terms and conditions including the provision of security, if any, or the repayment of such deposits with interest as may be agreed upon between the company and its members on fulfillment of the following conditions:

(a) Issuance of a circular to its members including therein a statement showing the financial position of the company, the credit rating obtained, the total number of depositors and the amount due towards deposits in respect of any previous deposits accepted by the company and such other particulars in form DPT-1 pursuant to Rule 4.

(b) Filing a copy of the circular alongwith such statement with the ROC within 30 days before the date of issue of the circular.

(c) Depositing such sum which shall not be less than 15% of the amount of its deposits maturing during a financial year and the financial year next following and kept in a scheduled bank in a separate bank account to be called as “Deposit Repayment Reserve Account”. This reserve can be used for repayment of deposits only u/s. 73(5).

(d) providing such Deposit Insurance in such manner and to such extent as stated in Rule 5.

(e) Certifying that the company has not committed any default in the repayment of deposits accepted either before or after the commencement of this Act or payment of interest on such deposits ; and

(f) In the case of secured Deposits, the company should provide for the due repayment of the amount of deposit or the interest thereon including the creation of such charge on the property or assets of the company. The manner in which the security is to be created is stated in Rule 6. In the case of secured deposits, the company will have to appoint Trustees for Depositors as provided in Rule 7.

If in any case a company does not secure the deposits or secures such deposits partially, then, the deposits shall be termed as “unsecured deposits” and shall be so quoted in every circular, form, advertisement or in any document related in invitation or acceptance of deposits.

(iii)    Section 73(3) provides that every deposit ac- cepted by a company shall be repaid with interest in accordance with the terms and conditions of the agreement with the depositors.

(iv)    Section 73 (4) provides that if a  company fails to repay the deposit or part thereof or any interest thereon, the depositor concerned may apply to the Tribunal as provided in that section.

6.    Acceptance of Deposit from public by certain companies (eligible companies)

(i)    Section 76(1) provides that, a public company, having networth of Rs. 100/- crore or more or turn over of Rs. 500/- crore or more may accept deposits from public on the condition that the prior consent of the company in general meeting by a special resolution has been obtained and the said resolution has been filed with the ROC before making any invitation to the public for acceptance of deposit. Such company is defined as an ‘eligible company’ as per Rule 2 (1)(e) of  the  Rules. The said rule provides that an ‘eligible company’ which is accepting deposits u/s. 180 (1)( (c ) may accept deposits by means of an ordinary resolution, if the amount to be borrowed together with amount already borrowed does not exceed aggregate of paid up capital plus free reserve.

(ii)    Every such company accepting deposit shall be required to obtain rating (including its networth, liquidity and ability to pay its deposits on due date) from a recognised credit rating agency and the company should inform the public, the rating given to the company at the time of invitation of deposits from the public which ensures adequate safety and the rating shall be obtained for every year during the tenure of deposits;

(iii)    Further, in the case of a company accepting secured deposits from the public it shall, within thirty days of such acceptance, create a charge on its assets of an amount not less than the amount of deposits accepted in favour of the deposit holders in accordance with the Rule 6 of the Rules.

(iv)    Such eligible Company has also to comply with procedure listed in Para 5(II) above.

7.    Repayment of deposits, accepted before com- mencement of 2013 Act

(i)    Section 74(1) provides that in the case of any deposit accepted by a company before 01-04-2014, if the amount of such deposit or part thereof or any interest due thereon remains unpaid on the above date or becomes due at any time thereafter the company shall

(a)    file, within a period of 3 months from 01- 04-2014 or from the date on which such pay- ments are due, with the ROC a statement of all the deposits accepted by the company and sums remaining unpaid on the above date with the interest payable thereon alongwith the arrangement made for such repayment in form DPT-4, pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules.

(b)    repay within 1 year i.e., by 31-03-2015 or from the date on which such repayments are due, whichever is earlier.

8.    Manner and extent of deposit insurance:

As stated above, Rule 5(1) provides that every com- pany  referred  to  in  Para  5  and  6  above  shall  enter into  a  contract  for  providing  deposit  insurance  at least  thirty  days  before  the  issue  of  circular  or  advertisement or   at least thirty days before the date of renewal, as the case may be. Further, it clarifies that  amount  as  specified  in  the  deposit  insurance contract  shall  be  deemed  to  be  amount  in  respect of both principal amount and interest due thereon.

Rule  5(2)  provides  that  the  deposit  insurance  contract shall specifically  provide that in case the company defaults  in repayment of  principal amount  and interest thereon,   the depositor shall be entitled to the repayment of principal amount of deposits and interest thereon by the insurer upto the aggregate monetary  ceiling  as  specified  in  the  contract.  In case of   any deposit and interest not exceeding Rs. 20,000, the deposit insurance contract shall provide for payment of   the full amount of the deposit and in case  of any deposit and interest thereon in excess of  Rs.  20,000,  the  deposit  insurance  contract  shall provide  for payment of an amount not less than Rs. 20,000  for  each  depositor.  Rule  5(3)  provides  that the insurance premium for such deposit insurance shall be paid by the company.

9.    Limit & Terms and  Conditions of acceptance of deposits by companies:

Rule 3 of the Rules provides for limits and other terms of deposits as under:

(i)    No company referred to in section 73(2) and eligible company shall accept or renew any deposit, whether secured or unsecured, which is repayable on demand or upon receiving a notice within a period of less than 6 months or more than 36 months from the date of acceptance or renewal of such deposit:

However, that company may, for the purpose of meeting any of its short term requirements of funds, accept or renew such deposits for repayment earlier than 6 months from the date of deposit or renewal subject to the conditions that-

(a)    such deposit shall not exceed 10% of the aggregate of the paid up share capital and free reserves of the company, and

(b)    such deposits are repayable not earlier than  3 months from the date of such deposits or renewal thereof.

(ii)    No company referred to in section 73(2) shall accept or  renew any deposit from its members, if the amount of such deposits together with the amount of other deposits outstanding as on the date of acceptance or renewal of such deposits exceeds 25% of the aggregate of the paid up share capital and free reserves of the company. For this purpose paid up share capital shall include preference share capital also.

(iii)    No eligible company shall accept or renew-

(a)    any deposit from its members, if the amount of such deposit together with the amount of deposits outstanding as on the date of acceptance or renewal of such deposits from members exceeds 10% of the aggregate of the paid-up share capital  and free reserves  of the company;

(b)    In the case of deposits from others, if the amount of such deposit together with the amount  of  such  other  deposits,   other  than the  deposit referred to Clause (a),  outstanding  on  the  date  of  acceptance   or  renewal exceed 25% of aggregate  of the paid-up share capital and  free  reserves  of  the  company.

(c)    In other words, an eligible company can accept deposits upto 35% of paid up share capital (including preference share capital) and free reserves subject to the sub-limit of 10% from members.

(iv)    No Government company eligible to accept deposit u/s. 76 shall accept or renew any deposit if the amount of such deposit together with the amount of other deposits outstanding as on the date of acceptance or renewal exceeds 35% of the aggregate of its paid-up share capital and free reserves of the company.

(v)    No company referred to in section 73(2) or any eligible company shall invite or accept or renew any deposit in any form carrying a rate of interest or pay brokerage thereon at the rate exceeding the maximum rate of interest or brokerage as prescribed by RBI for acceptance of deposits by NBFC.

For this purpose, it is provided that the person who is  authorised,  in  writing,  by  a   company  to  solicit deposits on its behalf and through whom deposits are  procured  shall only be entitled to the brokerage and payment of brokerage to any other person for procuring deposits shall be deemed to be in violation of this rule. It may be noted that Para 4 (7) of NBFC Acceptance of Public Deposits (Reserve Bank) Directions, 1998, that no NBFC shall pay more than 12.5%P.A. interest on public deposits.  Similarly,  Para 4(8) provides that the rate of Brokerage/Commission to brokers shall not exceed 2% of the deposit collected. Brokers  can  be  paid  actual  expenses  incurred  for this purpose but the same shall not exceed 0.5% of the  deposit so collected.

(vi)    The company shall not reserve to itself either directly or indirectly right to alter, to prejudice or disadvantage of the depositor any of the terms and conditions of the deposit, deposit trust deed and deposit insurance contract after circular or circular in the form of advertisement is issued and deposits are accepted.

(vii)    Deposits may be accepted in joint names, not exceeding 3, with or without any of the Clauses viz.“jointly”  “Either or Survivor” “Anyone or Survivor”.

10.    Application mandatory

As per Rule 10 of the Rules , no company shall accept, or renew any deposit, whether  secured or unsecured, unless an application, in such form   as specified by the company, is submitted by the intending depositor for the acceptance of such deposit. The form of application referred to above shall contain a declaration by the intending de- positor to the effect that the deposit is not being made out of any money borrowed by him from any other person.

11.    Furnishing of deposit receipts to depositors:

Rule  12  of  the  Rules  mandate  that  every  company shall,  on  the  acceptance  or  renewal  of  a  deposit, furnish  to  the  depositor  or  his  agent,  a  receipt for the amount received by the company, within a period of 21   days from the date of receipt of money or  realisation of  cheque or  date of  renewal.

The receipt referred to above shall be signed by  an officer of the company duly authorised by the Board in this behalf and shall state the date of deposit, the name and address of the depositor, the amount received by the company as deposit, the rate of interest payable thereon and the date on which the deposit is repayable.

12.    Maintenance of liquid assets and creation of deposit repayment reserve account:

As per Rule 13 of the Rules, every company referred to in section 73(2) and every eligible company shall, on  or  before  30th  April  of  each  year,  deposit  the sum  not  less  than  15%  as  specified  in  Para  5  (ii)  (c) above  with  any  scheduled  bank  and  the  amount so deposited shall not   be utilised for any purpose other  than   for  the  repayment of  deposits:

Further, it also mandates that the amount remaining deposited  shall  not  at  any  time  fall  below  15  %   of the  amount  of  deposits  maturing,  until  the  end  of the current financial year and the next financial year.

13.    Registers of deposits:

As per Rule 14 of the Rules, every company accepting deposits shall maintain at its registered office one or more separate registers for deposits accepted  or renewed, in which there shall be entered separately in the case of each depositor the particulars as listed in Rule 14.

The entries specified in this Rule shall be made within 7 days from the date of issuance of the receipt duly authenticated by a director or secretary of the company or by any other officer authorised by the Board for this purpose. The register referred to above shall be preserved in good order for a period of not less than eight years from the financial year in which the latest entry is made in the register.

14.    Premature repayment of deposits:

(i)    Rule 15 of the Rules provides that, if a company makes a repayment of deposits, on the request of the depositor, after the expiry of a period of six months from the date of such deposit but before the expiry of the period for which such deposit was accepted, the rate of interest payable on such deposit shall be reduced by 1 % from the rate which the company would have paid had the deposit been accepted for the period for which such deposit had actually run and the company shall not pay interest at any rate higher than the rate so reduced:

(ii)    However, nothing contained in this rule shall apply to the repayment of any deposit before the expiry of the period for which such deposit was accepted by the company, if such repayment is made solely for the purpose of (a) complying with the provisions of Rule 3; or (b) providing  war risk  or other related benefits to the personnel of the naval, military or air forces or to their families, on  an application made by the associations or societies formed by such personnel, during the period of emergency declared under Article 352 of the Constitution:

(iii)    If a company referred to in section 73(2) or any eligible company permits a depositor to renew his deposit, before the expiry of the period for which such deposit was accepted by the company, for availing of a higher rate of interest, the company shall pay interest to such depositor at the higher rate if such deposit is renewed in accordance with the other provisions of these rules and for a period longer than the unexpired period of the deposit.

(iv)    Further, the Rule provides, where the period for which the   deposit had run contains any part   of a year then, if such part is less than 6 months,     it shall be excluded and if such part is 6 months or more, it shall be reckoned as 1 year.

15.    Return of deposits to be filed with the Registrar:

Rule 16 of the Rules requires that the company shall on or before 30th June, every year, file with the ROC a return in Form DPT-3 along with the prescribed fee and furnish the information contained therein as on 31st March, of that year duly audited by the auditor of the company.

16.    Penal rate of interest:

Rule 17 of the Rules provides that every company shall pay a penal rate of interest of 18 % per annum for the overdue period in case of deposits, whether secured or unsecured, matured and claimed but remaining unpaid.

17.    Penalty of Default

Sections 74(2), 74(3) and 75 of the Act, which have not yet been brought into force, provide as under.

(i)    If the company fail to repay any existing deposit or interest due to depositors within the time allowed u/s. 74, the following penalties can be levied.

(a)    The company shall be punishable with minimum fine of Rs. 1 crore which may be extend to Rs. 10 crore. This will be over and above the amount of Deposit and interest in respect which default is made for repayment.

(b)    Every defaulting Officer shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extent to 7 years or with minimum fine of Rs. 25 lakh which may extend to Rs. 2 Crore or with both.

(ii)    It may be noted that in both the above cases, the amount of minimum fine has no relationship with the amount in respect of which the  default  in repayment of deposit or interest is made. It may so happen that the default may be in respect of deposit of Rs. 25 lakh, against which minimum fine payable by the company is Rs. 1 crore. To this extent, the above provision is very harsh.

(iii)    If it is found that there is default in repayment of outstanding Deposit or  interest u/s. 74  and it  is proved that such Deposit was accepted by the Company with intent to defraud the depositors or that the same was accepted for fraudulent purpose, every defaulting officer shall be personally responsible for any loss or damage that is incurred by the depositor. It may be noted that this penal action is without prejudice to the penalty leviable u/s. 74(3) as stated in (i) above. Further, the defaulting Officer will also be punishable u/s. 447 which provides for the following penalties.

(a)    Imprisonment for minimum period of 6 months which may extend to 10 years.

(b)    If the fraud involves Public interest, the mini- mum imprisonment can be for 3 years.

(c)    Minimum fine will be of amount involved in the fraud which may extend to 3 times the amount involved in the fraud.

(iv)    Rule 21 of the Rules provides that if any com- pany referred to in section 73(2) or any eligible company inviting deposits or any other person contravenes any provision of these rules for which no punishment is provided in the Act, the company and every officer of the company who is in default shall be punishable with fine which may extend to Rs. 25,000 and where the contravention is a continuing one, with a further fine which may extend to Rs. 500 for every day after the first day during which the contravention continues.

18.    To Sum Up:

The above provisions for acceptance of deposits by Companies are very stringent as compared to the provisions under the Old Act. Considering these requirements, it will be difficult for some companies to comply with these provisions and will have to find alternate source of funds. In particular these provisions are very harsh for private companies as exemption for deposits or loans taken from members has now been withdrawn. The exemption is now given to deposits or loans from directors only. Under the Old Act exemption was given to deposits or loans from relatives of directors of private companies. This is not given under the New Act.

It is true that these provisions are made in the New Act in view of the fact that the Government has noticed in recent years that some Companies are defaulting in refunding the amount of deposits and interest on the due dates. Hence, such stringent provisions can be justified in the interest of persons who invest their hard earned monies in such public deposits. The provisions for Deposit Insurance, Credit Rating, Creation of Deposit Repayment Reserve Account, Creation of Security, appointment of Trustees for secured deposits etc. are provisions made to safeguard the interest of small depositors. However, it appears that there is no justification to rope in Private Companies which get deposit or loan from their members or their relatives.

Moreover, the penal provisions under which minimum fine can be levied for  default in  repayment of deposits or interest on due date are very harsh. The said fine can be levied on the Company and defaulting officer irrespective of the amount of the deposit and interest in respect of which default may occur.

Related Party Transactions – A Potential for Abuse?

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While auditing related party transactions, an auditor is usually confronted with questions such as:

“Why should auditing related party transactions be any different from like transactions that are entered into with unrelated parties?”

“How does one ensure completeness of identification of all related party relationships and transactions with such parties?”

“How does an auditor deal with situations where the related party is the only source of supply of goods or services for an enterprise?

Related party transactions can be legitimate and value-enhancing for a corporation but they can also serve as a vehicle for illegitimate expropriation of corporate value by management or controlling shareholders. Related party transactions do not merely pose the potential harm of direct expropriation of value from minority investors, but they also reinforce negative perception of the country’s capital markets as a whole, and lead to a general discounting of equity markets.

Generally, related party transactions are not regarded as mechanisms for fraud, and their presence need not indicate fraudulent financial reporting. It is important for the auditor to understand the benign nature of most related party transactions, the differentiating features between benign and fraudulent transactions, and the importance of evaluating a company’s related party transactions in light of its broader corporate governance structure. However, at the same time, the auditor should not discount the fact that, related party relationships may present a greater opportunity for collusion, concealment or manipulation.

Enterprises establish a matrix of related party entities/ structures for tax efficiencies, compliance with regulatory requirements, ring fencing promoter interests, protecting intellectual property rights, providing common services etc. At times, related parties may be the only source of supply of goods and services. It is imperative that management designs, implements and maintains adequate controls over related party relationships and transactions so that these are identified and appropriately accounted for and disclosed in accordance with the reporting framework. In their oversight role, those charged with governance are required to monitor how management discharges its responsibility for such controls.

Standard on Auditing (SA) 550 Revised – Related Parties deals with the auditor’s responsibilities regarding related party relationships and transactions when performing an audit of financial statements.

As per the standard, the objectives of the auditor are:

a) Irrespective of whether the applicable financial reporting framework establishes related party requirements, to obtain an understanding of related party relationships and transactions sufficient to be able:

i. To recognise fraud risk factors, if any, arising from related party relationships and transactions that are relevant to the identification and assessment of the risks of material misstatement due to fraud; and

ii. To conclude whether the financial statements, insofar as they are affected by those relationships and transactions:

– Achieve a true and fair presentation (for fair presentation frameworks); or

– Are not misleading (for compliance frameworks); and

(b) In addition, where the applicable financial reporting framework establishes related party requirements, to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence about whether related party relationships and transactions have been appropriately identified, accounted for and disclosed in the financial statements in accordance with the framework.

Now, let us understand the application of SA 550 considering the following two case studies.

Case study I- Fraudulent financial reporting

ABC limited (‘ABC’) was engaged in the business of selling electronic items to retail, individual customers. The Company operates through retail outlets across the country and recognises revenue on sale to the retail customer on transfer of ownership of the goods. During the financial year ended 31st March 20X0, the Company entered into an arrangement with XYZ Limited (‘XYZ’) to sell goods and the Company recognised revenue on delivery of goods at the premises of XYZ. XYZ would in turn sell goods to retail customers. XYZ is an entity in which a whole time director of ABC owns 51% of the share capital. XYZ would fall within the definition of related party as per Accounting Standard 18-Related Parties (AS-18) as a key managerial personnel of ABC is able to exercise significant influence over XYZ. Sales made to XYZ constitute 15% of ABC’s total sales for the year. Initially, the auditor’s procedures were restricted to verification of documents such as delivery challans and sales invoices and ensuring that appropriate disclosures have been made as per the requirements of the AS- 18. Further, management asserted that related party transactions were conducted on terms equivalent to those prevailing in an arm’s length transaction.

The facts that were not discovered by the audit team were as follows:

• The risks of ownership were not transferred from ABC Limited to XYZ Limited on delivery of goods as XYZ was required to pay ABC only on further sale of goods and collection of money from XYZ’s end customers.

• Further, XYZ had an unlimited right to unilaterally return unsold goods back to ABC.

• The prices at which the goods were sold to XYZ were substantially higher prices than those charged to other customers.

• ABC limited also had a retail outlet in close proximity of XYZ Limited.

• The auditor should have obtained sufficient appropriate audit evidence supporting management’s representation that the transactions with XYZ were at arm’s length.

This above facts came to light when the internal auditors identified that XYZ had returned goods in the subsequent financial year and such returns constituted a significant value and volume of sales pertaining to earlier periods.

Analysis with respect to SA 550

Auditors’ Responsibilities

1 Identification and assessment of risk of material misstatement associated with related party transactions

Historically, the Company had not entered into any such transactions with any related/unrelated party as the Company’s ordinary business constituted selling of goods to individual end-customers. The Company already had an outlet in close proximity of XYZ. The sales were undertaken at prices higher than those with normal customers. Hence, this transaction should have been considered as a significant related party transaction giving rise to significant risk of fraud while performing risk assessment procedures.

2. Response to the risk of material misstatement

– The auditor should have then appropriately responded to the identified risk by performing the following procedures:

a. Inspecting the underlying contract with XYZ and evaluating –

i. The business rationale (or lack thereof) of the transaction which may suggest the same has been entered into to engage in fraudulent financial reporting.

ii. Consistency of the terms of transactions with management’s representation

b. Obtaining evidence that the transactions have been appropriately discussed and approved.

c. Where applicable, reading the financial statements of the related party or other relevant financial information, if available, for evidence of accounting of transactions in the accounting records of related party.

d. Confirming the purpose, specific terms or amounts of the transactions with the related parties. (This procedure will be less effective where the auditor judges that the Company is likely to influence the response of the related party)

3.  Communication to those charged with governance:
   
The auditor in the above case would need to promptly communicate to those charged with governance to arrive at a common understanding of the issues involved and the expected resolution. The auditor would also need to communicate the impact on the financial statements and any resultant impact on the auditor’s report.

4.  Independent Auditor’s report:
    The auditor would need consider the requirement to appropriately modify the main report considering the materiality of amounts involved. Further, the auditor would also have to appropriately modify the reporting relating to paragraph 4(xxi) of the Companies (Auditor’s Report) Order, 2003 (‘CARO’) report.

We would now evaluate another case study which involves a complex structure of related party transactions.

Case Study 2
Mr. P and Mrs. P, well-known fashion designers, incorporated ABC Ltd. in April 20X0 as a 100% export oriented company to be engaged in the business of manufacturing and export of garments. The initial capital contribution was Rs. 5 crore. Given their expertise, the couple were able to attract investment from other individual shareholders of Rs. 45 crore. The shareholding pattern of ABC comprised of promoter shareholding of 51% held by Mr. P and Mrs. P whereas the balance 49% was held by other non-related shareholders. The shareholder agreement with individual shareholders mandated appointment of 3 independent directors. This appointment was made with the objective of protecting the interests of the minority shareholders.

During the year 20X1, ABC Ltd. incorporated XYZ Ltd (‘XYZ’), a subsidiary in the United States of America (US) with 60% shareholding by ABC and the balance 40% held by Mr. P and Mrs. P. ABC entered into an exclusive arrangement with XYZ by virtue of which the entire production of ABC was to be sold to XYZ. The agreement stipulated that given the commitment to buy-out the entire production, the sales consideration to be paid by XYZ to ABC for goods purchased should be just sufficient for ABC to earn a margin of 10% on cost of goods sold. This arrangement was approved by all the directors (including the 3 independent directors) in the board meeting held on 1st April 20X1. The arrangement was also approved in an extra ordinary general meeting held on 15th April
20X1 wherein only Mr. P and Mrs. P were present as shareholders.

XYZ in turn sold the goods purchased from ABC at a margin of 5% to M/s. PQR & Co., a partnership firm formed by Mr. P and Mrs. P in the US.  M/s. PQR & Co. sold the goods in the retail market in the US at a margin of 40% of its cost. Against the aggregate purchases of Rs. 30 crore made by XYZ from ABC during the years 20X1-20X4, payments made by XYZ to ABC aggregated to only Rs. 10 crore. The balance payment of Rs. 20 crore could not be made by XYZ pending collection from PQR. The chief accountant at XYZ provided a confirmation to ABC for the year-end balance. PQR & Co. too provided a balance confirmation to XYZ for the amount due. The financial statements of ABC and XYZ have been audited by M/s. DEF & Associates (‘DEF’) since incorporation. Let us examine the factors which the auditors of ABC Ltd. would need to be cognizant of to comply with the requirements of SA 550

1.  While assessing the risk of material misstatement, the auditors would need to assess the isk associated with related party transactions as significant risk given the existence of a related party with dominant influence–Mr. P and Mrs. P were significant shareholders in ABC and XYZ.

2.  The auditors would need to understand the controls established by ABC and XYZ for identifying, accounting and disclosing related party relationships. DEF were the auditors for both ABC and XYZ. Assuming that Mr. P and Mrs. P would have disclosed their interest in the partnership firm, M/s. PQR & Co. in the notice of disclosure, DEF as auditors would need to ensure that the sales made by XYZ to PQR were disclosed as related party transactions in the financial statements of XYZ.

3.  The terms of the contract between ABC and XYZ were authorised by the board as well as by the shareholders by an ordinary resolution. Authorisation and approval alone, however, may not be sufficient in concluding whether risks of material misstatement due to fraud are absent  because authorisation and approval could have been ineffective, given that ABC was subject to the dominant influence of a related party.

4.  Given that the related party transaction involved a clear conflict of interest, the auditors of ABC would need to consider whether the independent directors had appropriately challenged the business rationale of the contract, for  e.g., by seeking advice from external professional advisors.

5.  The contract was approved by way of an ordinary resolution passed by Mr. P and Mrs. P in their capacity as shareholders. DEF would need to consider whether the contract should have been approved by members (other than Mr.P and Mrs.P) who were not interested in the contract and whether all facts were made available to these members to enable decision -making.

6.  DEF would need to evaluate the business rationale of the contract from the perspective of the related parties, XYZ and PQR to better understand the economic reality of the transaction. The subsidiary XYZ was used as a conduit to transfer goods to PQR at a price far lower than the market price so as to benefit the dominant shareholders. DEF would need to evaluate whether the transactions between the related parties were at arms’ length and complied with the benchmarking norms as per local transfer pricing regulations. Another important aspect was the disparity in the margins earned by PQR on the re-sale of goods to retail customers as against the margin earned by XYZ on
sale of goods to PQR. DEF in their capacity as auditors of PQR would need to be cognizant of this aspect in their risk assessment for related party transactions.

7.  In view of the non-collection of the amounts due from PQR, the ability of XYZ to settle the receivable of Rs. 20 crore was significantly impacted. The mere fact that XYZ had provided a confirmation of the balance due to ABC would not be sufficient evidence in support of the recoverability of the amount due. The auditor would need to evaluate the realisability of receivables in the books of ABC.

Concluding remarks

Considering that a large number of frauds in the corporate world involve related parties, governments and standard setting bodies have adopted stronger and proactive standards and laws to provide for guidance and monitoring of companies and auditors for accounting, disclosures and validation requirements of related party transactions.The Companies Act, 2013 has widened the scope of coverage in terms of the definition of related party and the nature of transactions covered and at the same time mandated approval of such transactions by the audit committee/board of directors/shareholders as applicable. The tax laws have also been amended to cover transactions with specified domestic related parties in addition to cross border transactions with overseas affiliates and has made it obligatory on the tax payer to substantiate that such transactions are at arms’ length.  With sweeping changes in legislation, the auditor would need to exercise heightened professional skepticism in identification of related party transactions, related risk of material misstatement (including fraud risk) and design adequate procedures to ensure compliance with the financial reporting and legal framework.

GapS in gaap ? Consolidated Financial Statements

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Section 129(3) of the 2013 Act requires that a company having one or more subsidiaries will, in addition to Separate Financial Statements (SFS), prepare Consolidated Financial Statements (CFS). Hence, the 2013 Act requires all companies, including non-listed and private companies, having subsidiaries to prepare CFS.

The 2013 Act also provides the following:

(a) CFS will be prepared in the same form and manner as SFS of the parent company.

(b) The Central Government may provide for the consolidation of accounts of companies in such manner as may be prescribed.

(c) The requirements concerning preparation, adoption and audit of SFS will, mutatis mutandis, apply to CFS.

(d) An explanation to the section dealing with the preparation of CFS states that “for the purposes of this sub-section, the word subsidiary includes associate company and joint venture.”

While there is no change in section 129(3), Rule 6 under the Companies (Accounts) Rules, 2014 deals with the “Manner of consolidation of accounts.” It states that the consolidation of the financial statements of a company will be done in accordance with the provisions of Schedule III to the 2013 Act and the applicable accounting standards. The proviso to this rule states as below:

“Provided that in case of a company covered under s/s. (3) of section 129 which is not required to prepare consolidated financial statements under the Accounting Standards, it shall be sufficient if the company complies with provisions on consolidated financial statements provided in Schedule III of the Act.”

Given below is an overview of key requirements under the Schedule III concerning CFS:

(a) Where a company is required to prepare CFS, it will, mutatis mutandis, follow the requirements of this Schedule as applicable to a company in the preparation of the balance sheet and statement of profit and loss.

(b) In CFS, the following will be disclosed by way of additional information:

(i) In respect of each subsidiary, associate and joint venture, % of net assets as % of consolidated net assets.

(ii) In respect of each subsidiary, associate and joint venture, % share in profit or loss as % of consolidated profit or loss. Disclosures at (i) and (ii) are further sub-categorised into Indian and foreign subsidiaries, associates and joint ventures.

(iii) For minority interest in all subsidiaries, % of net assets and % share as in profit or loss as % of consolidated net assets and consolidated profit or loss, separately.

(c) All subsidiaries, associates and joint ventures (both Indian or foreign) will be covered under CFS.

(d) A company will disclose the list of subsidiaries, associates or joint ventures which have not been consolidated along with the reasons of nonconsolidation.

Practical issues and perspectives

AS 21 does not mandate a company to present CFS. Rather, it merely states that if a company presents CFS for complying with the requirements of any statute or otherwise, it should prepare and present CFS in accordance with AS 21. Keeping this in view and proviso to the Rule 6, can a company having subsidiary take a view that it need not prepare CFS?

This question is not relevant to listed companies, since the listing agreement requires listed companies with subsidiaries to prepare CFS. This question is therefore relevant from the perspective of a non-listed company.

Some argue that because neither AS 21 nor Schedule III mandates preparation of CFS, the rules have the effect of not requiring a CFS. Instead, a company should present a statement containing information, such as share in profit/ loss and net assets of each subsidiary, associate and joint ventures, as additional information in the Annual Report. In this view, the rules would override the 2013 Act. If it was indeed the intention not to require CFS, then it appears inconsistent with the requirement to present a statement containing information such as share in profit/loss and net assets of each of the component in the group.

Others argue that the requirement to prepare CFS is arising from the 2013 Act and the rules/ accounting standards cannot change that requirement. The proviso given in the rules is to deal with specific exemptions in AS 21 from consolidating certain subsidiaries which operate under severe long-term restrictions or are acquired and held exclusively with a view to its subsequent disposal in the near future. If this was indeed the intention, then the proviso appears to be poorly drafted, because the exemption should not have been for preparing CFS, but from excluding certain subsidiaries in the CFS.

In our view, this is an area where the MCA/ ICAI need to provide guidance/ clarification. Until such guidance/ clarifications are provided, the author’s preferred approach is to read the “proviso” mentioned above in a manner that rules do not override the 2013 Act. Hence, all companies having one or more subsidiary need to prepare CFS.

The subsequent issues are discussed on the assumption that the preferred view, i.e., all companies having one or more subsidiary need to prepare CFS, is finally accepted. If this is not the case, the views on subsequent issues may change.

IFRS exempts non-listed intermediate holding companies from preparing CFS if certain conditions are fulfilled. Is there any such exemption under the 2013 Act read with the rules?

Attention is invited to discussion on the previous issue regarding need to prepare CFS. As mentioned earlier, the preferred view is that all companies having one or more subsidiary need to prepare CFS. Under this view, there is no exemption for non-listed intermediate holding companies from preparing CFS. Hence, it requires all companies having one or more subsidiaries to prepare CFS.

Currently, the listing agreement permits companies to prepare and submit consolidated financial results/ financial statements in compliance with IFRS as issued by the IASB. For a company taking this option, there is no requirement to prepare CFS under Indian GAAP. Will this position continue under the 2013 Act?

Attention is invited to discussion on the earlier issue regarding the requirement to prepare CFS. As mentioned earlier, the preferred view is that CFS is required for all companies having one or more subsidiary. The rules are clear that consolidation of financial statements will be done in accordance with the provisions of Schedule III to the 2013 Act and the applicable accounting standards. Hence, the companies will have to mandatorily prepare Indian GAAP CFS, and may choose either to continue preparing IFRS CFS as additional information or discontinue preparing them.

An explanation to section 129(3) of the 2013 Act states that “for the purpose of this sub-section, the word subsidiary includes associate company and joint venture.” The meaning of this explanation is not clear. Does it mean that a company will need to prepare CFS even if it does not have any subsidiary but has an associate or joint venture?

The following two views seem possible on this matter:

(a) One view is that under the notified AS, the application of equity method/ proportionate consolidation to associate/joint ventures is required only when a company has subsidiaries and prepares CFS. Moreover, the rules clarify that CFS need to be prepared as per applicable accounting standards. Hence, the proponents of this view argue that that a company is not required to prepare CFS if it does not have a subsidiary but has an associate or joint venture.

b)The second view is that the above explanation requires associates/ joint ventures to be treated at par with subsidiary for deciding whether CFS needs to be prepared. Moreover, the 2013 Act decides the need to prepare CFS and the rules are relevant only for the manner of consolidating entities identified as subsidiaries, associates and joint ventures. Hence, CFS is prepared when the company has an associate or joint venture, even though it does not have any subsidiary. The associate and joint venture are accounted for using the equity/proportionate consolidation method in the CFS.

We understand that the MCA/ ICAI may provide an appropriate guidance on this issue in the due course. Until such guidance is provided from the author’s perspective, the second view appears to be more logical reading of the explanation. Hence, the preference is to apply the second view.

Section 129(4) read with Schedule III to the Act suggests that disclosure requirements of Schedule III,  mutatis mutandis, apply in the preparation of CFS. In contrast, explanation to paragraph 6 of AS 21 exempts disclosure of statutory information in the CFS. Will this exemption continue under the 2013 Act?

A company will need to give all disclosures required by Schedule III to the 2013 Act, including statutory information, in the CFS. To support this view, it may be argued that AS 21 (explanation to paragraph 6) had given exemption from disclosure of statutory information because the 1956 Companies Act did not require CFS. With the enactment of the 2013 Act, this position is likely to change. Also, the exemption in AS 21 is optional and therefore this should not be seen as a conflict between AS 21 and Schedule III. In other words, the statutory information required by Schedule III for SFS will also apply to CFS.

The disclosures given in the CFS will include information for parent, all subsidiaries (including foreign subsidiaries) and proportionate share for joint ventures. For associates accounted using equity method, disclosures will not apply. This ensures consistency with the manner in which investments in subsidiaries, joint ventures and associates are treated in CFS.

There would be some practical issues in implementing the above requirement. For example,
(a)  It is not clear as to how a company will give disclosures such as import, export, earnings and expenditure in foreign currency, for foreign subsidiaries and joint ventures. Let us assume that an Indian company has US subsidiary that buys and sells goods in USD. From CFS perspective, should the purchase/sale in US be treated as import/export of goods? Should such purchase/sale be presented as foreign currency earning/expenditure?

(b) How should a company deal with intra-group foreign currency denominated transactions which may get eliminated on consolidation? Let us assume that there are sale/purchase transactions between the Indian parent and its overseas subsidiaries, which get eliminated on consolidation. Will these transactions require disclosure as export/ import in the CFS?
    
The ICAI should provide appropriate guidance on these practical issues. Until such guidance is provided by the ICAI, differing views are possible on this this matter. To help resolving this issue, one may argue that the MCA has mandated these disclosures to be included in the financial statements to present information regarding imports/exports made and foreign currency earned/spent by Indian companies. In the absence of specific guidance, the preference is to use the said objective as a guiding principle to decide the disclosures required.
Assume that the 2013 Act requires even non-listed and private groups to prepare CFS. Under this assumption, the following two issues need to be considered:

(a) The date from which the requirement concerning preparation of CFS will apply. Particularly, is it mandatory for non-listed/ private groups to prepare CFS for the year-ended 31st March 2014?
(b) Whether the comparative numbers need to be given in the first set of CFS presented by an existing group?

(a)  Based on the General Circular No. 8/2014 dated 4th April 2014, non-listed/private groups need to prepare CFS only for financial year beginning on or after 1st April 2014.
(b) Regarding the second issue, Schedule III states that except for the first financial statements prepared by a company after incorporation, presentation of comparative amounts is mandatory. In contrast, transitional provisions to AS 21 exempt presentation of comparative numbers in the first set of CFS prepared even by an existing group.

  One may argue that there is no conflict between transitional provisions of AS and Schedule III. Rather, AS 21 gives an exemption which is not allowed under the Schedule III. Hence, presentation of comparative numbers will be mandatory in the first set of CFS prepared by an existing company.

TS-76-ITAT-2014(Del) Bharti Airtel vs. ACIT A.Y: 2008-2009, Dated: 11-03-2014

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10. TS-76-ITAT-2014(Del) Bharti Airtel vs. ACIT A.Y: 2008-2009, Dated: 11-03-2014

Section 92 – Notwithstanding the amendment to the ITA, issuance of corporate guarantee that does not have a bearing on the profits or losses or assets of enterprise does not amount to “international transaction” for transfer pricing provisions.

Facts:
The Taxpayer is an Indian company engaged in the provision of telecommunication services. The Taxpayer had during the financial year issued a corporate guarantee on behalf of its associated enterprise (AE) and also contributed to the share capital in its foreign subsidiaries.

With respect to the corporate guarantee issued by the Taxpayer on behalf of its AE guaranteeing the repayment of a working capital facility advanced by a bank, the Taxpayer contended that it had not incurred any costs or expenses on account of issue of such guarantee and the guarantee was issued as a part of the shareholder activity. Accordingly, there was no requirement to charge a guarantee fee under the TP provisions.

The Taxpayer, however, in its TP documentation study determined an arm’s length (AL) guarantee fee and offered this income to tax.

During the Transfer Pricing Audit, the Tax Authority observed that by issuing the corporate guarantee, the AE’s credit rating benefited from association to the Taxpayer and the Taxpayer, was therefore, required to receive AL consideration and accordingly estimated the AL fee and a TP adjustment was made with respect to the differential guarantee fee.

For the contribution to the share capital of its foreign subsidiaries, the Taxpayer did not benchmark the said transaction as the payments were in the nature of capital contributions. However, during the course of the audit proceedings, the Tax Authority noted there was a significant delay in the allotment of shares to the Taxpayer and treated the contributions as interest free loans for the period between the date of payment and the date on which shares were actually allotted and imputed an AL interest on the amounts deemed as an interest free loan.

The issue before the Tribunal was whether a corporate guarantee issued without a charge is to be considered as “international transaction” and whether transfer pricing provisions apply to such transaction. Further the Tribunal was required to decide on whether the share application money can be treated as interest free loan to AE’s

Held:
On issue of corporate guarantee to its AE

Reviewing the definition of the term “international transaction”, the Tribunal held that in order for the transaction to be an “international transaction” subject to TP, the transaction should be such as to have a bearing on profits, income, losses or assets of such enterprise.

Accordingly, the Tribunal held that a corporate guarantee issued without a charge is outside the ambit of ‘international transaction’ and transfer pricing provisions do not apply to such arrangements, even after the amendment introduced by the Finance Act, 2012.

On Capital contribution to AEs

The Tribunal held that the characterisation of the payment made by the Taxpayer to its AEs as capital contribution was not in dispute and were in the nature of payments for share application money.

The Tribunal noted there was no provision enabling deeming fiction under the Indian transfer pricing regulations to regard share application money as interest free loan.

Further, the Tribunal observed there is no finding about what is the reasonable and permissible time period for allotment of shares. Even if one was to assume there was an unreasonable delay in the allotment of shares, the capital contribution could have, at best, been treated as an interest free loan only for such period of “inordinate delay” and not the entire period from the date of making the payment to date of allotment of shares.

This aspect of the matter is determined by the relevant statute, which is different than that of an interest free loan on a commercial basis between the share applicant and the company to which the capital contribution is being made.

Since the Tax Authority did not bring any evidence on the payment of interest to an unrelated share applicant for the period between making the share application payment and allotment of shares, the Tribunal held it was unreasonable and inappropriate to treat the transaction as partly in the nature of an interest free loan to the AE.

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S-179-ITAT-2014(Mum) Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. vs. ADIT A.Ys: 2005-2009, Dated: 21-03-2014

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9. S-179-ITAT-2014(Mum) Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. vs. ADIT A.Ys: 2005-2009, Dated: 21-03-2014

Premises of Indian subsidiary used by parent company to perform core sales activities constitutes fixed place PE for the parent company in India.

The employees of Indian subsidiary securing orders on behalf of the parent company constitutes dependent agent PE for the parent company.

Facts 1:
The Taxpayer, a company incorporated in China, was engaged in supplying telecommunications network equipment. The Taxpayer had not filed any return of income in India.

Taxpayer had a wholly owned subsidiary in India (ICo). A survey was undertaken by the Tax Authorities at the ICo’s premises. On the basis of the documents found at the time of survey, the Tax Authority concluded that the Taxpayer has a PE in India and the income that has accrued from the supply of telecommunications network equipment during the previous year is taxable in India.

Held 1:
The Tribunal observed that the business of the Taxpayer was carried on India through the active involvement of the employees of the ICo. The employees of the ICo and the Taxpayer had jointly prepared bidding contracts, as well as negotiated and concluded the contract on behalf of the Taxpayer with its Indian customers from ICo’s premises.

Since the premises of the ICo was used to carry out core selling activities of the Taxpayer, the Taxpayer had a fixed place PE in India in the form of office premises of the ICo.

The employees of the ICo were part of the sales team of the Taxpayer, who habitually secured orders in India wholly or almost wholly for the Taxpayer in India. Further, the ICo was economically and financially dependent on the Taxpayer. Thus the ICo also created a Dependent Agency PE as per the India- China DTAA as well as a business connection as per the ITA for the Taxpayer in India

Software embedded in equipment necessary for the operation and control of the equipment does not constitute Royalty

Facts 2:
The Taxpayer was engaged in the supply of telecommunications network equipment. The Tax Authority artificially allocated the revenue from such supply between the Hardware and Software, although there was one consolidated price for the supply.

In respect of the Hardware portion, the Tax Authority computed the operating profits and allocated a part of it to the PE in India. In respect of the Software portion, the Tax Authority contended that it amounted to Royalty as per the India-China DTAA.

The Taxpayer contended that there was no separate supply of software and the software was embedded with the hardware/equipment. Thus, the entire receipt must be taxed as Business Income. Reference in this regard was made to the Delhi High court decision in the case of Ericsson A.B. (2012)(204 Taxman 192) and Nokia Networks OY (2013)(212 Taxman 68).

Held 2:
From the agreement with the Indian customers it is clear that the Software is a set of programmes embedded in the equipment and is necessary for control, operation and performance of the equipment.

The buyers were granted non-exclusive, nontransferable and non-sub-licensable licence to use the software. No ownership rights or interests are transferred to the buyer.

Hence following the decision in the case of Ericsson A.B (supra) it was held that the entire income is to be taxed as business income in India.

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TS-179-ITAT-2014(Mum) Viacom 18 Media Pvt. Ltd vs. ADIT A.Y: 2009-2012, Dated: 28-03-2014

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8. TS-179-ITAT-2014(Mum) Viacom 18 Media Pvt. Ltd vs. ADIT A.Y: 2009-2012, Dated: 28-03-2014

Section 9(1)(vi): As the term “process” is not defined under the DTAA, in terms of Article 3(2) of DTAA, it will have the same meaning as provided under the ITA; payments made for the transponder service amounts to “royalty” as per the India-USA DTAA.

Facts:
The Taxpayer, an Indian Company, was engaged in broadcasting television channels from India, marketing of advertising airtime on these channels, distribution of the channels, marketing and distribution of films through its film division ‘Studio 18’ and production of program content/television software.

The Taxpayer had entered into an agreement with an US Company (US Co) for availing 24 hour satellite signal reception and retransmission service (‘transponder service’). In consideration of the transponder service, the Taxpayer was required to pay transponder service fee (‘fee’)

Relying on the Delhi High court’s decision in the case of Asia Satellite communications Co. Ltd. (332 ITR 340), the Taxpayer contended that the payments made to US Co. were not taxable under the ITA. Further reference was made to the decision in the case of WNS North America (152 TTJ 145) and Siemens Aktiengesellschaft (310 ITR 320) to contend that the retrospective amendment in the ITA will not affect the benefit available under the DTAA and since the payments are not in the nature of Royalty and fee for included service (FIS) under the India-USA DTAA they are not taxable in India in the absence of a permanent establishment (PE), accordingly approached the Tax Authority requesting Nil withholding order for such payments.

The Tax Authority contended that the payments are taxable as royalty in light of amended provisions of 9(1)(vi) of the ITA and also under Article 12 of the India-USA DTAA and consequently subject to tax withholding.

On Appeal, the First Appellate Authority upheld the Tax Authority’s contention. Aggrieved, the taxpayer appealed to the Tribunal.

Held:
It is well settled that the Taxpayer will be governed either by the provisions of DTAA or the ITA, whichever is more beneficial.

The term “Royalty” is defined in the DTAA, therefore, any amendment in the definition of “Royalty” adversely affecting a Taxpayer covered by the DTAA would be inconsequential due to the protection of the DTAA.

Article 3(2) of the India-US DTAA provides that a term not defined in the DTAA, shall, unless the context requires otherwise, have the meaning which it has under the laws of the contracting state. The term “process” is not defined in the DTAA. Therefore, the meaning of such term under the ITA has to be applied.

However, Explanation 6 was inserted to clarify the meaning of the term “process” in the context of transmission by satellite and it does not in any way modify the definition of the term “royalty”. Thus this amendment cannot be considered as overriding the DTAA.

The use of transponder by the Taxpayer for telecasting/broadcasting the programme involves the transmission by the satellite (including uplinking, amplification, conversion for downlinking of signals) and hence falls within the definition of the term “Process” as per Explanation 6 of section 9(1)(vi). This meaning will also be applicable for interpreting the term “process” existing in the DTAA in terms of Article 3(2). Hence, the payments made for use/ right to use of process would fall in the ambit of the expression “royalty” as per the DTAA as well as the provisions of the ITA.

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TS-161-ITAT-2014(Del) JC Bamford Excavators Limited. vs. DDIT A.Y: 2006-2007, Dated: 14-03-2014

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7. TS-161-ITAT-2014(Del) JC Bamford Excavators Limited. vs. DDIT A.Y: 2006-2007, Dated: 14-03-2014

Consideration for the use of IPRs includes occasional onsite support. Such visitors perform stewardship activities and do not give rise to service PE.

Employees of parent company visiting the premises of an Indian Company for quality inspection to ensure that the licensed products meet the global quality standards perform stewardship activities and do not trigger service PE. Performance of technical services by employees on behalf of the Taxpayer results in a Service PE for the Taxpayer as per India-UK DTAA.

Effective connection is to be seen between the PE and the “contract, right or property” from which royalty or FTS arise.

Facts:
The Taxpayer, a UK company, was engaged in the business of manufacture, assembly, research, design and sale of material-handling equipment. The Taxpayer entered into a Technology Transfer Agreement (TTA) with its wholly-owned Indian subsidiary (ICo).

As per the terms of the TTA, the Taxpayer was required to perform the following activities for a consideration:

• Grant license to manufacture, permit the ICo to use know-how, trademark, inventions and any confidential information (IPRs) belonging to the Taxpayer.

• Provide technical assistance to the ICo’s personnel through its technical consultants to enable the licensed products to be manufactured as per the quality standards.

• Conduct random testing and inspection of licensed products manufactured by the ICo to ascertain if they meet the quality standards. For this purpose, employees of the Taxpayer occasionally visited the premises of the ICo.

For the technical assistance as stated under the TTA, the Taxpayer deputed eight employees to work with the ICo. The cost of such employees was recovered from the ICo. Such personnel occupied key managerial positions and were engaged in managing overall operations of the ICo.

The Tax Authority contended that the employees deputed for more than 90 days constituted a Service PE and the payments from the ICO being effectively connected to the PE need to be considered as business profits under the DTAA.

However, the Taxpayer contended that it did not have a PE in India as:

• Occasional visits of the Taxpayer’s employees for inspection and quality check were an integral part of royalty. Hence, the entire consideration for IPR under the TTA (embedded with the cost of occasional visit of employees) was taxable as royalty/fees for technical services (FTS) under Article 13 of the DTAA, as well as ITA.

• Personnel deputed under the IPAA ceased to be employees of the Taxpayer and they became the employees of the ICo. Accordingly, the presence of such personnel did not constitute a PE of the Taxpayer in India and reimbursement of salary of such employees under the IPAA was not taxable in India.

On appeal, the CIT(A) upheld the position adopted by the Taxpayer. Aggrieved, the Tax Authority filed an appeal with the Tribunal.

Held:
On constitution of Service PE

Based on the facts, the following factors supported the view that the assignees continued to be the employees of the Taxpayer:

• Assignment of employees to the ICo was pursuant to the license of IPRs to the ICo, for which, the Taxpayer committed to provide technical assistance to the ICo from time to time at the ICo’s request and subject to the availability of specialists or engineers.

• No employment contract between the ICo and the Assignees/appointment letter/terms and conditions of deputation were placed on record before the Tribunal.

• Assignees retained lien on their employment with the Taxpayer such that, after completion of assignment, the Assignees would resume employment with the Taxpayer at a level no less favourable than that which they left prior to the deputation.

• Agreements clearly mentioned that the Assignees would be subject to the rules and regulations of the ICo but would not be considered as employees of the ICo.

• The Taxpayer had full responsibility to remunerate the Assignees. Recovery of cost from the ICo is nothing but consideration for supply of the Assignees.

• The Assignees have no legal recourse to the ICo for any grievances or disciplinary actions.

It is quite natural that persons deputed with the ICo for a consideration will work under the direction of the ICo and could not have worked for the benefit of the Taxpayer. Since all the conditions of Service PE were satisfied, it was held that Taxpayer constituted a Service PE on account of assignees.

On account of service integral to a royalty arrangement under the TTA, the Tribunal held that occasional visitors undertook activities in India in terms of the obligation integral to the TTA i.e., testing and inspections, which were carried out to ensure that the licensed products adhered to the global standards of quality. Such activities were required by and in the interest of the Taxpayer and it amounted to stewardship activities which cannot be considered for constituting a PE in India. Reliance in this regard was placed on the SC decision in the case of Morgan Stanley (supra).

On Taxability under Article 7 on business profits visà- vis Article 13 on royalty and FTS

Consideration for granting the IPRs in relation to the technical know-how, patent rights and confidential information for the manufacture and sale of licensed products falls within the scope of royalty as defined under the DTAA, as well as the ITA.

Consideration received for the provision of services of personnel was for the application/enjoyment of IPRs and it qualified as FTS under the DTAA, as well as the ITA.

Effectively connected with PE

In terms of the DTAA, where a right or property or contract for which the royalty or FTS is paid is effectively connected with a PE through which the beneficial owner of the income carries on business in the source state, (i.e., India in the present case), then such royalty/FTS would be taxed as “business profits” under Article 7 and Article 13 on royalty and FTS would cease to apply.

For applicability of Article 7, effective connection should exist between the PE on the one hand and right, property or contract on the other, and not royalties or FTS flowing from such right, property or contract.

The words “effectively connected” are akin to “really connected”. In the context of royalties, it is in the nature of something more than the mere possession of the property or right by the PE but equal to or a little less than the legal ownership of such property or right. But, in no case, remote connection between the PE and property or right can be categorised as effectively connected.

It is of significance to note that an effective connection is required to be seen between the PE and the “contract” from which such fees resulted and not such FTS per se. The mere fact that such fee is effectively connected with the PE is not sufficient to bring the amount within the purview of business profits.

Taxation of various streams

For the different set of considerations, it was concluded:

• For royalty income from IPRs embedded with the salary of Occasional Visitors:

Royalty income cannot be said to be effectively connected with Service PE and the same would be taxable as Royalty on gross basis under the DTAA, as well as the ITA..

• For Service PE:

Service PE is represented by the Assignees deputed to the ICo. Thus, the contract, by virtue of which the Assignees were sent to India, is effectively connected with the Service PE and FTS arising out of such contract would be taxable as business profits under Article 7 of the DTAA.

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TS-150-ITAT-2014(Mum) Antwerp Diamond Bank NV vs ADIT A.Y: 2004-2005, Dated: 14.03.2014

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6. TS-150-ITAT-2014(Mum) Antwerp Diamond Bank NV vs ADIT A.Y: 2004-2005, Dated: 14.03.2014

On facts, payments made by Indian Branch office
for accessing the software installed in the server belonging to the head
office is in the nature of reimbursement of expenses and not royalty
under the India-Belgium Double Taxation avoidance agreement (DTAA).
Definition of Royalty as widened in Income-tax Act (ITA) is not relevant
for the purpose of DTAA.

Facts:
The Taxpayer, a tax resident of Belgium, was operating in India through a Branch office (BO).

The
Taxpayer (HO) acquired a banking application software named as
“Flexcube” (Software) from an Indian software company. The software was
installed in the server at Belgium and was apparently used for banking
purposes by the HO all over the world. The said software license was
also amended to allow the Indian BO to use it by making it accessible
through a server located in Belgium.

The cost to get data processed was reimbursed by the BO, on a pro-rata basis to the HO.

The
Tax Authority disallowed the above payment on the basis that the
payment constituted ‘royalty’ on which no taxes were withheld at source.

The Taxpayer submitted that:

• The payment was in the nature of reimbursement;

Also, it did not satisfy the requirement of payment made for ‘use of’
or ‘right to use’ any copyright for it to be treated as ‘royalty’ under
the India – Belgium DTAA.

On appeal, the CIT(A) agreed with the
Taxpayer and held that the data processing cost paid by the Indian BO
does not amount to ‘royalty’.

Aggrieved, the Tax Authority appealed before the Tribunal.

Held:
The
BO sends data to the HO for getting it processed as per the requirement
of banking operations. As per the terms of the agreement between the HO
and the third party, the HO has non-transferable rights to use software
and the HO cannot assign, sub-license or otherwise transfer the
software. The HO allocates expenditure of the I.T. resources on a
pro-rata basis.

Insofar as the BO is concerned, it is only
reimbursing the cost of processing of its business data to the HO, which
has been allocated to it on a pro-rata basis. Such reimbursement does
not fall within the ambit of the definition of “royalty” under the DTAA.

In
the present case, the payment made by the BO is not for ‘use of’ or
‘right to use’ software. The BO does not have any independent right to
use or control over the main frame of the computer software installed in
Belgium. To qualify as ‘royalty’ under the DTAA, the payment should be
qua the use or the right to use the software exclusively by the BO. The
BO should have exclusive and independent use or right to use the
software and for such usage, payment should be made.

It is also
not the case of the Tax Authority that the HO has provided any copyright
of the software or copyrighted article developed by the HO for the
exclusive use of the BO for which the BO is making royalty payment along
with a mark-up exclusively for royalty.

The definition of
‘royalty’ under the DTAA is exhaustive and not inclusive. Therefore, it
has to be given the meaning as contained in the DTAA itself and the
widened definition of royalty after its retroactive amendment by the
Finance Act 2012 should not be looked into.

Reimbursement of
data processing cost to the HO does not fall within the ambit of
definition of ‘royalty’ under the DTAA and accordingly, there is no tax
withholding obligation for the BO.

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Transfer Pricing Regulations for Financial Transactions

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Cross Border Financial Transactions such as intercompany loans and guarantees between Associated Enterprises have received prominent attention worldwide due to implications under the Transfer Pricing Regulations. Several issues arise in respect of benchmarking and documentation of such transactions. Divergent rulings by Tribunals on these issues have caused further complications. This article attempts to throw light on Indian Regulations, Judicial Rulings and some of the international practices in this arena. This Article is written in Questions and Answers format for elucidating relevant provisions/law more succinctly.

Q.1 Which types of financial transactions are covered by the Transfer Pricing Regulations?

A.1 Most common Financial Transactions (FTs) undertaken between Associated Enterprises (AEs) are in the nature of loans and guarantees, as such the scope of discussion in this Article is restricted to Transfer Pricing Regulations (TPRs) pertaining to such transactions. Other types of FTs such as “Cash Pooling” and “Factoring Arrangements” etc. are not discussed in this Article.

Transfer Pricing Regulations world over primarily seek to cover inter-company loans and/or guarantees. Focus on other types of FTs under TPRs is limited.

Q.2 What are OECD’s views on loans to AEs?

A.2 There is no specific guidance in OECD’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines regarding FTs. However, OECD implicitly guides to apply the relevant method in determining the “arm’s length rate of interest” on inter-company loans. Therefore, one needs to look at the jurisdictional transfer pricing rules, if any, in determining the arm’s length rate of interest on intercompany loans between AEs.

Q.3 What are the provisions under the UN Transfer Pricing Guidelines?

A.3 The Department of Economic & Social Affairs of the United Nations has published a “Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for Developing Nations” (Manual) in 2013. The object of this Manual is to provide clearer guidance on the policy and administrative aspects of transfer pricing analysis by developing countries. The Manual is addressed at countries seeking to apply “arm’s length standard” to transfer pricing issues. Since India has adopted the “arm’s length” principle in its Transfer Pricing regime, the Manual would provide a useful guide.

While the Manual provides a practical guidance on issues faced by developing countries, it has its inherent limitations, in that it represents views of the authors and members of the Sub-committee entrusted with the task of preparing it. Chapter 10 of the Manual represents an outline of particular country’s administrative practices as described in detail by representatives from those countries. Commenting on the practices followed by Indian Transfer Pricing Administration (ITPA), the Manual states (Paragraph 10.4.10 on page 405) that the following practices are followed by the ITPA in determination of the arm’s length pricing of inter-company loans:

  • Examination of the loan agreement;
  • Comparison of terms and conditions of loan agreement;
  • Determination of credit rating of lender and borrower;
  • dentification of comparable third party loan agreement;
  • Suitable adjustments to enhance comparability

The ITPA prefers to apply the Prime Lending Rate (PLR) of Indian banks for outbound loans (i.e., loans advanced by an Indian Company to its overseas AEs), on the premise that loans are advanced from India in Indian currency which are subsequently converted into foreign currency. This stand is formally accepted and incorporated into the Safe Harbour Rule which provides for acceptable interest rates based on Prime Lending Rates of Indian Banks.

However, the above stand of the Tax Department has been challenged by tax payer and the Tribunal has ruled in favour of the tax payers. (Refer answer to question no. 6 infra).

Q.4 What are the provisions under the Income-tax Act, 1961?

A.4 Explanation to section 92B has been retrospectively amended vide Finance Act 2012 to bring FTs under TPRs in India. Accordingly, the following Clause has been added to the definition of the term “International Transaction”:

“Explanation—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that—

(i) the expression “international transaction” shall include—

(c) Capital financing, including any type of longterm or short-term borrowing, lending or guarantee, purchase or sale of marketable securities or any type of advance, payments or deferred payment or receivable or any other debt arising during the course of business;

From the above explanation, it is clear that loans and guarantees between AEs are covered under the TPRs of India retrospectively w.e.f. 1st April 2002.

Safe Harbor Provisions as applicable to loan transactions [Notified on 18th Sept. 2013 applicable for Five Assessment Years beginning from AY 2013-14]




Q.5 Under what circumstances interest free loan can be justified?

A.5 Interest free loans prima facie are not at arm’s length as normally a lender would not give any interest free loans to a stranger. However, the lender may justify such loan to its AE on considerations other than interest. For example, if the interest free loan is in the nature of quasi capital, then it can be justified.

In April 2002, the Central Government constituted an Expert Group to recommend transfer pricing guidelines for companies for pricing their products in connection with the transactions with related parties and transactions between different segments of the same company. The Group submitted its Report in August 2002. It generally recommended arm’s length principle except in following cases:

“Exceptions to arm’s length transfer price

In exceptional cases, the company may decide to use a non-arm’s length transfer price provided:

• the Board of Directors as well as the audit committee of the Board are satisfied for reasons to be recorded in writing that it is in the interest of the company to do so, and
• the use of a non-arm’s length transfer price, the reasons therefore, and the profit impact thereof are disclosed in the annual report

Remarks: Examples of such exceptional cases could be a company giving an interest free loan to a loss making subsidiary or a company accepting the offer of a controlling shareholder to work as the CEO on a nominal salary.”

However, the same Report identifies “Borrowing or lending on an interest-free basis or at a rate of interest significantly above or below market rates prevailing at the time of the transaction” as one of the undesirable corporate practices related to transfer pricing.

In nutshell, interest free loans may be justified in following circumstances:

• When loan has more of an equity substance than loan i.e. it is in the nature of Quasi Capital.

The Australian Taxation Office in its Discussion Paper on “Intra-group Finance Guarantees & Loans Application of Australia’s Transfer Pricing and Thin Capitalization Rules –June 2008” (paragraph 58 on page 15 of the Paper) has opined that to the extent that the debt funding performs the role of an equity contribution it would seem appropriate that portion of the debt funding be regarded as quasi equity and that it be costed on an interestfree basis, consistent with its purpose and effect. This is in line with the OECD view that the cost of funding a company’s participation is a ‘shareholder activity’ and that it would not justify a charge to the borrowing company.

On  the  peculiar  facts  of  the  case,  (where  loan was  converted  into  equity  upon  receipt  of  RBI approval)  the  Tribunal,  in  case  of  Micro  Inks  Ltd. vs.  ACIT  [2013]  36  taxmann.com  50,  held  that  the loan  provided  was  in  the  nature  of  quasi  capital. One  of  the  interesting  observations  made  by  the Tribunal  was  regarding  consideration  of  the  com- mercial  business  consideration  between  AEs.  The Tribunal  held  that  sustainability  of  business  of  the step  down  subsidiary  in  USA  was  crucial  to  the Indian company (who advanced loan to it) in view of  the  fact  that  the  Indian  company  has  substan- tial  business  transactions  with  it  and  therefore  it would  not  be  appropriate  to  equate  the  relations between  AEs  to  that  of  a  lender  and  a  borrower.

The  above  observations  are  significant  as  in  ear- lier  in  case  of  VVF  Ltd.  [2010]  TII  4  ITAT,  the Mumbai Tribunal held that commercial expediency to  be  irrelevant  as  the  impact  of  any  such  inter- relationship  should  be  neutralised  by  arm’s  length treatment.  Further,  in  the  case  of  Perot  Systems TSI India Ltd. [2010] 130 TTJ 685, the Delhi Tribunal had refused to accept the contention of the as- sessee that the outbound loan  was  quasi  capital in nature on the grounds that no lender  would  lend money to new company or the intention of  the lender company was to earn dividends  and  not interest.

  •  Loan is in the nature of a Hybrid Instrument.

The loan may be structured in the form of con- vertible debentures or bonds where there may not be any interest or very low interest for the initial period and may be converted into equity at a later date. This may be resorted by a parent company   to give sufficient time to its subsidiary to make profit without much financial burden.

Every case of thin capitalisation may not be to avoid tax. Sometimes, host countries regulations justify low equity and high debt especially when companies do not want to compromise on liquid- ity. Moreover, loans require less documentation, highly flexible in their repayment and lending in- stitutions also take them at par with equity when they are from AEs.

Q.6If interest has to be charged on inter-company loans, how does one bench mark it? Who shall be the tested party – the borrower or the lender?

Also elucidate on Separate/Standalone Entity Approach vs. Group Entity/On-lending Approach

A.6    Indian Transfer Pricing Regulations do not have special rules (except in case of Safe Harbor Rules) or guidance on benchmarking loan transactions between AEs. However, one needs to apply general provisions of transfer pricing regulations while determining arm’s length interest rate on loans between AEs.

Consider a case where an Indian Company “A” has advanced loan to its wholly owned subsidiary “B” in UAE. While undertaking the benchmarking analysis to determine arm’s length rate of interest, often a dilemma arises as to whether one should look at the rate at which “B” would have  been  able  to  borrow  in UAE market or the rate at which ‘A” would have earned interest, had it advanced loan to    a non-related party. Normally, Indian Entity is used as a tested  party and also it being the assessee under the Indian Transfer Pricing Regulations, benchmarking of in- terest charged is done from Indian Entity’s point   of view. In the given example, what company “A” would have earned had it given a loan to non AE would be relevant. For determining income of “A” in an arm’s length scenario, sources of funds  of “A” i.e., cost of funds (i.e. whether it is back to back loan or out of internal accruals), foreign ex- change risks, risk of default, availability of internal or external CUP etc. would be relevant.

As stated earlier, in such a scenario, Indian Transfer Pricing Administration would prefer to apply Prime Lending Rate of the Company  A’s  bank  in  India  as an external CUP as loan would be advanced  from India in Indian currency rather than LIBOR or EURIBOR. The idea seems to arrive at opportunity cost of earning, i.e., if Company “A” would have advanced similar loan to Company “B” in India, what would have been the rate of interest?

On  similar  facts,  in  case  of  Bharti  Airtel  Ltd.  vs. ACIT  [2014]  43  taxmann.com  150  (Del.  Trib.),  the assessee  contended  that  the  loans  were  given  in foreign  currencies  and  in  the  international  market where  the  bank  lending  rates  are  based  on  LIBOR rates. Hence, the LIBOR rate should be considered for determining the arm’s length interest rate. The Tribunal  upheld  the  contentions  of  the  assessee.

In case of M/s. Siva Industries & Holdings Ltd. vs. ACIT [(I.T.A. No. 2148/Mds/2010) paragraph 11], the Chennai Tribunal held that “Once the transaction between the assessee and the Associated Enter- prise is in foreign currency and the transaction is   an international transaction, then the transaction would have to be looked upon by applying the commercial principles in regard to international transaction. If this is so, then the domestic prime lending rate would have no applicability and the international rate fixed being LIBOR would come into play. In the circumstances, we are of the view that it LIBOR rate which has to be considered while determining the arm’s length interest rate in respect of the transaction between the assessee and the Associated Enterprises”.

Thus, one has to benchmark the Indian entity and find out what interest it would have earned, had it advanced loan to an independent entity operating in same circumstances, located in the same market and on similar terms and conditions. In the process one also needs to benchmark the borrower based on the separate entity approach taking into account the circumstances in which it operates.

General Rules of Transfer Pricing Analysis suggest that one needs to arrive at arm’s  length  inter-  est rate as if Company “B” is an independent/ standalone entity. Here one needs to examine various factors such as terms and tenor of loan, guarantee offered, nature of interest rate such as fixed vs. floating, the overall financial market in UAE, credit rating of “B”, nature of loan instru- ment i.e., whether pure loan or hybrid instrument with conversion option etc. Thus if “A” were to lend to any  other  independent  entity  operating  in UAE with similar terms and conditions, then what it would have earned or if there is any  other comparable data already available in public domain then that may be used.

In real life situations company “B” would be able  to borrow at LIBOR linked rate. Therefore, the starting point of benchmarking analysis would be LIBOR which may further be fine tuned consider- ing various factors other discussed above.

Thus, one may conclude that while arriving at the arm’s length interest rate especially in case of outbound loans from India, one may take LIBOR/ EURIBOR, as the case may be, as base rate and make adjustments to arrive at arm’s length interest rate taking into account facts  and circumstances in the country in which the borrower AE operates.

It may however be noted that the Safe Harbor Rules in India does  not  support  above  view  and it requires Indian entity to apply the interest rate based on the Base Rate of State Bank of India . (Refer answer to Q.4 supra). It may also be noted that Safe Harbor Rules prescribes “acceptable price/ range of margins and/or rate of interest” without determining arm’s length price,  margin or interest. More often than not, unilateral Safe Harbor Rule results in litigation in the opposite country as the acceptable range in one country would  lead  to loss of revenue  in the other country.

Group Entity or On-lending Approach
Another approach which is followed  is  known as Group Entity or On-lending Approach. In this case, the taxpayer has a central treasury which raises loan at the group level and then allocates funds to various subsidiaries. In this case,  there  will not be a separate evaluation of subsidiary’s borrowing capacity or credit rating as the loan is advanced at the group level and therefore implic- itly subsidiary assumes the same credit  rating  as its parent. This approach makes sense in real life commercial/financial world.

However, the standalone entity approach is widely practiced as it supports arm’s length standard. Even OECD prefers this approach.

Australian Transfer Pricing Rules
The  Australian  Transfer  Pricing  Rules  have  been comprehensively amended for the first time in past 30  years  vide  Tax  Laws  Amendment  (Countering Tax  Avoidance  and  Multinational  Profit  Shifting) Act  2013.

The  new  rules  are  applicable  for  income  year  on or  after  1st  July  2013.  The  new  rules  provide  for independent/standalone  party  approach.  Australia also has Thin Capitalisation Rules in place. The new rules provide that in order to determine the arm’s length  conditions  between  two  AEs  on  the  same footing  as  they  may  exist  between  two  indepen- dent enterprises, one may need to consider issues such as whether independent entities operating in comparable  circumstances  would  have  advanced loans  with  the  same  or  similar  characteristics, provided  various  forms  of  credit  support,  sought to  refinance  at  a  different  market  interest  rate, issued  shares  or  paid  dividends.

In short, the taxpayers need to:

•    Assess if the quantum of debt meets arm’s length conditions.

•    Consider if the capital structure (debt/equity mix) is arm’s length.

•    Re-consider the interest rate with regard to fac- tors such as the impact of the rate on profits    of the company, and whether or not the rate     is adjusted as the parent company’s cost of funds changes.

Q.7 Are there any judicial precedents in India  on  the above issue?

A.7So far decisions on the issue of inter-company loans have come from Tribunals only. Ratios laid down by various decisions are as follows:



Other Relevant Decisions:

•    Tata Autocomp Systems Ltd. vs. ACIT [2012] 21 taxmann.com 6 (Mum.)
•    Aurinpro Solutions Ltd. vs. ADCIT [2013] 33 taxa- mann.com 187 (Mum.)
•    Mascon Global Ltd. vs. DCIT ITA No. 2205/
MDS/2010
•    Four Soft Limited vs. DCIT – TS-518-ITAT-201 (Hyd)
•    DCIT vs. Tech Mahindra Ltd. [2011] 12 taxmann. com 132(MUM.)
•    Aithent Technologies (P.) Ltd. vs. ITO [2012] 17 taxmann.com 59 (Del)
•    Mahindra & Mahindra vs. DCIT – TS-408-ITAT- MUM-2012
•    Cotton Naturals (I) (P.) Ltd. vs. DCIT [2013] 32 taxmann.com 219 (Del-Trib)
•    Hinduja Global Solutions Ltd. vs. ADCIT – TS-147- ITAT-MUM-2013
•    ITO vs. Maharishi Solar Technology Pvt. Ltd. TS- 306-ITAT-2012-DEL

for outbound loans. At  times  benchmarking of inbound transactions is more crucial than outbound as it results in base erosion, interest being deductible expense.

Though  India  does  not  have  Thin  Capitalisation Regulations  in  place,  it  has  robust  Foreign  Ex- change  Laws  which  regulates  borrowing  from overseas.  Borrowing  from  overseas  shareholder requires  minimum  25  %  of  shareholding.  There  are several  restrictions  for  use  of  borrowed  money as  well  as  the  sectors  which  can  borrow.  For example  only  real  sector  (i.e.  industrial  sector), infrastructure  sector  and  certain  service  sectors such  as  software,  hospital  and  hotel  are  allowed to  borrow  from  overseas.  Borrowing  for  general corporate  purpose  or  for  working  capital  require- ment  is  practically  banned.

The biggest benchmarking or safe harbor limit (so to say) is contained in “all-in-cost borrowing limit” prescribed under the Foreign Exchange Manage- ment Act, 1999 (FEMA). Since RBI does not allow payment of interest beyond this limit, generally payment of interest at the rate  prescribed  by RBI should be considered as arm’s length. One may draw support for this contention from  the  fact that the Indian Safe Harbor Rules prescribes the acceptable limit of minimum interest to be charged for loans advanced by Indian entity  (i.e. for outbound loans) but does not prescribe limit
 
From the above case laws, it is apparent that different tribunals have taken divergent views. Transfer pricing cases being  more  facts  based,  it is difficult to arrive at standard conclusion and perhaps that is why transfer pricing analysis is regarded as an “art” and not a “science”.

However, Tribunals have upheld application of LIBOR rate for determination of arm’s length inter- est rate in contradiction of Indian Transfer Pricing Administration’s stand of applying PLR of Indian Banks. It would be interesting to see how this jurisprudence develops further at higher forums.

Inbound Loans

Q.8 What are the provisions applicable to inbound loans?

A.8    The same transfer pricing rules and regula- tions apply to inbound loans as are applicable or maximum interest that may be allowed as deduction on inbound loans.

Present limits of all-in-cost borrowing under External Commercial Borrowing (ECB)  route  are  as follows:

Average Maturity Period

All-in-cost
over 6 month LIBOR*

Three years and up to five years

350 bps

More than five years

500 bps

* for the respective currency of borrowing or applicable
benchmark

All-in-cost limit includes rate of interest, other fees and expenses in foreign currency except commit- ment fee, pre-payment fee, and fees payable in Indian Rupees.

Maharashtra Ordinance No. VII OF 2014 dated 03-03-2014

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The Government of Maharashtra has promulgated this Ordinance whereby in case of builders and developers the limitation for making an order of assessment for any of the periods which expires on 31-03-2014 has been extended up to 30-09-2015.

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Supreme Court Judgment in the case of Bansal Wire Industries

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Trade Circular 11T of 2014 dated 04-04-2014

As per the Supreme Court judgment ‘Stainless Steel Wire’ is not declared goods taxable @5%, but it is taxable as the residual entry.

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Extension of date for filing Audit Report in Form 704 for 2012-13 by developers

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Trade Circular 9T of 2014 dated 29-03-2014 In case of developers (other than those opting for composition scheme), if Mvat audit report for the period 2012-13 is filed by 10th May, 2014, it is decided administratively not to levy penalty u/s. 61(2) of the MVAT Act.

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Submission of Annexures with/as part of returns for the periods starting from 1st April 2014

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Trade Circular 9T of 2014 dated 25-03-2014

From 01-04-2014 onwards with every MVAT return, whether monthly, quarterly or half yearly, Annexure J1 & J2, that is buyer-wise sales and supplier-wise purchase will have to be filed.

For a composition dealer required to file Annexure J2 –supplier wise purchase, this requirement is over and above annual Annexure J1 & J2 and Form 704

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State of Tamil Nadu vs. M/S. Mahaveer Chemical Industries, [2012] 49 VST 200 (Mad)

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Central Sales Tax – Subsequent Sale By Transfer of Document of Title To Goods – Transporters Giving Delivery of Goods To Buyers As Per Instruction of Dealer – Not a Continuation of Inter-State Sale–S/s. 3(b) and 6(2) Of The Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.

FACTS
The assessee, a dealer in chemicals having office at Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu, had purchased liquid/gaseous chemicals from M/s. Cochin Refineries Limited Ernakulum, Kerala. The said goods were further sold to the dealers either in Coimbatore or to the dealers out side the state of Tamil Nadu and claimed exemption from payment of tax u/s. 6(2) of the CST Act, 1956 by producing the required E-1 and Form C. The assessing authority rejected the claim after noticing the fact that after taking delivery from the transporters, the assessee had issued from XX delivery notes to transport chemicals in same tankers to the end users within and outside the state of Tamil Nadu. The Tribunal allowed the claim and the department filed revision petition before the Madras High Court.

HELD
As per section 3(b) of the CST Act, 1956 all subsequent inter-State sales effeted by transfer of document of title to the goods also qualified to be inter-state sales. However, when there is a break in the movement and it comes to an end, the exemption u/s. 6(2) of the Act is no longer available to claim benefit of second inter-state sale. Such subsequent inter-state sale could be made between two dealers residing in the same street provided that there is a sale by transfer of document of title to the goods while they are in transit from one state to another. The burden of proof is on the assessee. The Court further held that in the present case, the journey of goods started from Cochin to Coimbatore and there was no obligation on the part of carrier to transport the goods further to any place beyond Coimbatore. Thus, the subsequent arrangement that the assessee had with the transporter to carry the goods to another place for a different person however did not make the movement a continuation of the original inter-state sale. Once the movement of goods terminated at Coimbatore, on the doctrine of constructive delivery, the authorities rightly rejected the assessee’s claim of exemption u/s. 6(2) of the CST Act. Accordingly, the High Court allowed revision petition filed by the department and set aside the judgment of the Tribunal.

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M/S.Shree Shyam Enterprises vs. Joint Commissioner, Sales Tax, Bally Circle And Others, [2012] 49 VST 177 (WBTT)

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Value Added Tax – Input Tax Credit – Tax Invoice Purchase of Goods Under Auction – Sale Release Order Issued By Vendor Containing Prescribed Particulars – Disallowance of Claim For Want of Tax Invoice – Not Correct, Section 21 of The West Bengal Value Added Tax Act, 2003 and R. 91 (7) Of The West Bengal Value Added Tax Rules, 2005

FACTS
The assessee dealer purchased goods from M/s. South Eastern Railway on auction after paying due tax to it. The vendor issued sale release order containing particulars, i.e., date of sale, sale order number and date, name and address of selling dealer, full description of goods sold, quantity or number of goods sold, value of the goods sold, rate and amount of tax charged. The dealer claimed input tax credit in returns. The department rejected the claim for want of proper tax invoice and did not consider the sale release order as tax invoice. The dealer filed application u/s. 8 of The West Bengal Taxation Tribunal Act, 1987 against the rejection of claim of input tax credit.

HELD
The vendor issued sale release order containing all the particulars required under sub-Rule (7) of Rule 91. The documents having contained all the particulars, as required in sub-rule (7) of rule 91 of the VAT Rules, 2005, the Sale Release Order ought to have been equated with and treated at par with the Tax Invoice. The appeal was allowed and assessing authority was directed to allow the claim on verification of documents, treating the sale release order as tax invoice.

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M/S. IFB Industries Ltd. vs. State of Kerala, [2012] 49 VST SC 1.

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Sales Tax – Turnover of Sales – Trade Discount – Given Subsequently – By Credit Notes – Deductible, Section 2 (xxvii) of The Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 and R 9(a) of The Kerala General Sales Tax Rules, 1963.

FACTS
The appellant Company is a manufacturer of home appliances. The company as a part of Sales Promotion Scheme allowed discount to its dealers on achieving pre-set sale targets subsequent to issue of sales invoices by way of credit notes. The Company claimed deduction of such trade discount from turnover of sales. The assessing authority principally accepted the claim but there was a dispute in the computation thereof. The matter was disputed up to the High Court. The Kerala High Court held that discount in question was not a trade discount at all and it was not eligible for deduction in terms of Rule 9(a) of the Rules. The appellant company filed appeal before the SC.

HELD
The definition of the term “turnover” contained in section 2(xxvii) read with Explanation (2)(ii) to it recognises discounts other than cash discounts and provides that those other discounts like the cash discount shall not be included in the turnover. Further, Rule 9(a) stipulates that the accounts should show that the purchaser has paid only the sum originally charged less discount. There is nothing in Rule 9(a) to read it in a restrictive manner to mean that a discount in order to qualify for exemption under its provisions must be shown in the invoice itself. Accordingly, the SC allowed the appeal and remanded the matter back to the assessing authority to pass fresh orders in light of the judgment of the SC.

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[2014] 43 taxmann.com 172 (Mumbai – CESTAT) – Hiranandani Constructions (P.) Ltd vs. CCE

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Stay – Whether charges collected by the Promoter developer from flat buyers in terms of provisions of Section 5 of the Maharashtra Ownership of Flats (Regulation) Act, 1963 are liable to service tax under ‘Management, maintenance and repair services’ – Held, prima facie – No.

The appellant was engaged in the construction of residential complex and collected certain amounts as the development and maintenance fees from the flat buyers before handing over to them possession of the flats. Such sum was collected by it as a promoter to discharge payments towards outgoing expenses including any municipal local taxes, property tax, water charges, electric charges, revenue assessment or interest or any mandatory charges under the provisions of section 5 of the Maharashtra Ownership of Flats (Regulation) Act, 1963. The Appellant was under obligation to return the balance amount, if any, after debiting the expenses, while handing over the possession. The department considered the a ctivity as taxable under the category of “management, maintenance and repair services”. The Tribunal after perusing the provisions of section 5 of the Maharashtra Ownership of Flats (Regulation) Act, 1963, held that the Appellant has made out a strong case in their favour and accordingly unconditional waiver and stay for recovery was granted.

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[2014] 43 taxmann.com 41 (Mumbai – CESTAT) – Maharashtra State Co-op. Bank Ltd vs. CCE

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Pre-deposit waiver – Whether lease rental received from letting of property acquired from defaulting borrower under the provisions of SARFAESI Act is liable to service tax as renting of immovable property service or is regarded as recovery of outstanding loan? Held, since the appellent is the lessor, it is liable to Service Tax.

Facts:
The appellant is a co-operative bank rendering banking and financial services. It took possession of the Borrower’s factories’ plant and machinery in terms of section 13(4)(a) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, for the default in repayment of loan. Thereafter, the bank leased out the factory and received lease rent from lessee which it adjusted against the loan amount. As per the terms of the lease agreement, the lessee was required to maintain the plant and machinery in good condition at the lessee’s own cost and accordingly the lessee incurred certain expenditure. The department was of the view that the Appellant-bank is liable to discharge service tax liability not only on the amounts received towards rent for the lease of the factories but also on the expenditure incurred by the lessees towards maintenance and repair on the grounds that such activities are undertaken by the lessees on behalf and on account of the appellant.

The appellant contended that the action of letting of the factories cannot be construed as renting of immovable property per se but should be considered as recovery of outstanding loans. As regards, maintenance expenses incurred by the lessee, it submitted that, this cost has been incurred by the lessees and the service provider is the person who actually undertook the maintenance and repair services and not the bank, therefore the appellant is not rendering any service towards management, maintenance or repair.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that, in the lease rental agreements, the appellant is treated as a lessor and therefore, lease rentals received by bank are prima facie liable to service tax. As regards the maintenance and repair costs incurred by the lessee, the Tribunal expressed a prima facie view that the Appellant is not the service provider and there is no liability on the appellant in respect of those transactions. Considering the fact that, the appellant had already discharged entire liability of rental income under protest, the waiver from pre-deposit of balance taxes was granted by the Tribunal.

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[2014] 43 taxmann.com 259 (Ahmedabad – CESTAT) – SOS Enterprise vs. CCE&ST

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Whether, a service provider can be directed to pay differential service tax if the recipient of his service is found to have claimed credit in excess of that paid by the service provider? Held, no.

Facts:
The Appellant provided services as direct selling agent to its principal and raised invoices on the principal for such services. In a proceeding against the principal, on verification of records, it was found that, the principal has taken the CENVAT Credit more than service tax actually paid by the Appellant. On this ground demand was confirmed against the Appellant to the extent of excess CENVAT Credit and penalties were imposed. The Appellant explained that the differences arise because the Appellant paid the service tax on “receipt basis”, whereas the Principal may have taken the CENVAT Credit on the basis of invoice.

Held:
The Tribunal held that, if the department has to make out an offence case against the appellant, it is the responsibility of the department to show that the appellant had received the amount but did not pay the service tax. In the absence of any evidence to show that the Appellant has not paid the tax on the amount received and in the absence of specific allegation in the show cause notice or in the findings of the lower authorities, requirement of pre-deposit of taxes was waived.

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[2014] 43 taxmann.com 42 (New Delhi – CESTAT) Balaji Tirupati Enterprises vs. CCE

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Whether a contract of maintenance can be held as divisible if material portion and service portion is separately mentioned in the Contract between the parties? Held, yes.

Facts:
In this case, the issue before the Tribunal was that in terms of works contract of repair of transformers, whether the goods deemed to be sold in the execution of works contract were liable for Service Tax.

Held:
The Tribunal on the perusal of the Works Order executed by the Appellant with the power supply authorities categorically observed that, both parties to the contract were conscious of the terms which involved both sales and service. The composition of the goods used for repair contract of transformer is patently clear. Tribunal relied upon the decision in the case of CCE vs. Kailash Transformers [Final Order No. ST/A/402/12-Cus, dated 23-05-2012] in which the Tribunal assigned weightage to the manner how the parties operated with the understanding of sale of goods as well as service provided to effectuate the contract. Accordingly it was held that the Finance Act, 1994 is not a Commodity Taxation Law. As a result of which the goods which were deemed to be sold in the execution of works contract shall not enter into the purview of the levy of the Service Tax.

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Section 194H – Provisions of section 194H apply when the payments are made to the agents or credited to the agent’s accounts, whichever is earlier, and not when the payment is credited to the provision account.

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5. DCIT vs. Telco Construction Equipment Co. Ltd.
ITAT  Bangalore `C’ Bench
Before P. Madhavi Devi (JM) and Jason P. Boaz (AM)
ITA No. 478/Bang/2012
Assessment Year : 2007-08.                                      
Decided on:   7th March, 2014.
Counsel for revenue/assessee: Priscilla Singsit/S. Anantha.

Section 194H – Provisions of section 194H apply when the payments are made to the agents or credited to the agent’s accounts, whichever is earlier, and not when the payment is credited to the provision account.

Facts:

The assessee-company was carrying on the business of manufacturing, purchase and sale of excavators, loaders, cranes, dumpers and spare parts etc. For the relevant assessment year, the assessee filed its return of income declaring income of Rs. 282,44,84,066/-. In the course of the assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer (AO) observed that the assessee has debited a sum of Rs. 14,84,26,424 as sales commission, out of which a sum of Rs. 6,46,11,000/- relates to the provision made towards commission. The assessee was asked to explain as to how the provision has been made and on what basis it is worked out and as to why no TDS was made from this amount. The assessee explained that the provision was made on the basis of sales made during the year from different sales offices of the company and on the basis of communication received from these offices regarding commission payable on such sales. As to why no TDS was made from this amount, it was clarified that no TDS was made from the provision but as and when the commission payments were made in the subsequent year, TDS was made and remitted to the Government account.

The AO disallowed a sum of Rs. 6,46,11,000 u/s. 40(a) (ia) since according to him the provisions of section 194H were applicable and the assessee failed to comply with the same. Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal to CIT(A) who relying on the decision of the jurisdictional High Court in the case of ACIT vs. Motor Industries Co. (249 ITR 141) held that the amount credited by the assessee is only a provision and not actual payment of commission to the party and till the amounts are credited to the respective party’s account, it cannot be said that the same have become finally quantified and hence, the provisions of section 194H are not attracted. Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

 The amount credited by the assessee is to the provision account and not to the respective agent’s accounts. Therefore, it is clear that the assessee has not made any payment to the agents. The provisions of section 194H would apply when the payments are made to the agents or credited to the agent’s accounts, whichever is earlier, and not when the payment is credited to the provision account. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for assessee, the agents would get vested right to receive the commission only when they fulfill the obligations under the agreement for commission. We find that the CIT(A) has properly appreciated the issue before deleting the addition made by the AO. In view of the same, we do not see any reason to interfere with the finding of the CIT(A) on this issue. This ground of appeal of the revenue was dismissed.

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S/s. 143(2), 292B, 292BB – Where a revised return filed is treated as non-est since the original return was not filed within due date mentioned in section 139(1), the period of issue of notice u/s. 143(2) needs to be computed with reference to date of filing original return of income. Notice issued u/s. 143(2) beyond the period stated in the proviso to section 143(2)(ii) does not fall within the term `any mistake, defect or omission’ stated in section 292B. The provisions of section 292BB canno<

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4. Amiti Software vs. ITO
ITAT  Bangalore `A’ Bench
Before N. V. Vasudevan (JM) and Jason P. Boaz (AM)
ITA No. 540/Bang/2012
A.Y.: 2008-09.  Decided on: 7th February, 2014.
Counsel for assessee / revenue: H. N. Khincha / Bijoy Kumar Panda  

S/s. 143(2), 292B, 292BB – Where a revised return filed is treated as non-est since the original return was not filed within due date mentioned in section 139(1), the period of issue of notice u/s. 143(2) needs to be computed with reference to date of filing original return of income. Notice issued u/s. 143(2) beyond the period stated in the  proviso  to section 143(2)(ii) does not fall within the term `any mistake, defect or omission’ stated in section 292B.  The provisions of section 292BB cannot extend to a case where the question of limitation is raised on admitted factual position in a given case.


Facts:

For the assessment year 2008-09, the assessee filed the original return of income on 01- 10-2008 declaring a total loss of Rs. 16,15,127 and also claiming deduction u/s. 10A amounting to Rs. 1,54,83,511. The assessee computed tax payable under MAT u/s. 115JB. The return of income was processed on 27.8.2009 and it resulted in a demand of Rs. 2,05,710. The return filed was beyond the due date prescribed u/s. 139(1).

The assessee filed a revised return on 30.9.2009 in which business income was stated to be Rs. Nil after claiming exemption of Rs. 1,53,83,511 u/s. 10B. Since the original return was filed beyond the due date, the AO treated the revised return to be non-est. A notice dated 19-08-2010 was issued by the AO and served on the assessee. There was no dispute that this was the only notice issued and served and the assessee did not dispute having received this notice.

Since the original return was filed beyond due date mentioned in section 139(1), the AO in view of the provisions of proviso to section 10A(1A) of the Act, denied the deduction claimed u/s. 10A of the Act. He completed the assessment assessing the total income under the normal provisions of the Act and not u/s. 115JB. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) where it was contended that the assessment be annulled since the notice u/s. 143(2) was issued beyond the time limit mentioned in proviso to 143(2) (ii). The CIT(A) did not agree, since the assessee had attended the hearings and participated in the assessment proceedings. Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

The admitted factual position is that the notice u/s. 143(2) of the Act dated 09-08-2010 was admittedly beyond the period of six months from the end of the financial year in which the return of income was filed by the assessee, as laid down in proviso to section 143(2)(ii) of the Act. It is also not in dispute that this is the only 143(2) notice issued by the AO. The order of assessment is very clear on this aspect. The law is by now well settled that issuance of a notice u/s. 143(2) of the Act within the statutory time limit is mandatory and it is not a procedural requirement which is inconsequential. Reference may be made to the decision of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of Alpine Electronics Asia Pvt. Ltd. vs. DGIT, 341 ITR 247 (Del), CIT vs. Vardhana Estates Pvt. Ltd., 287 ITR 368 and ACIT vs. Hotel Blumoon, 321 ITR 362 (SC). The contrary view expressed by the Hon’ble Madras High Court, in our view, cannot be followed as the decisions relied on by the ld. counsel for the assessee of the Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court and Allahabad High Court also took the view that non issuance of notice u/s. 143(2) of the Act renders assessment order invalid. Admittedly, notice u/s. 143(2) of the Act not having been served on the assessee within the period contemplated under law, the order of assessment has to be held to be invalid and annulled.

As far as section 292B is concerned, we do not think that the notice issued by the AO u/s. 143(2) of the Act in the present case will fall within any mistake, defect or omission which is in substance and effect in conformity with or according to the intent and purpose of this Act. The requirement of giving of the notice cannot be dispensed with by taking recourse to the provisions of section 292B of the Act. As far as provisions of section 292BB is concerned, as laid down in the decisions of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Manish Prakash Gupta (supra) & Parikalpana Estate Development (P) Ltd. (supra) and Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Cebong India Ltd. (supra), the provisions of section 292BB cannot be applied in a case where admittedly no notice u/s. 143(2) had been issued within the time limit prescribed in law.

We may also clarify that the dispute in the present case is not with regard to issue and service of notice u/s. 143(2) of the Act, as admittedly there was only one notice u/s. 143(2) dated 19-08-2010 issued and served on the assessee before completion of the assessment proceedings.The question is as to, whether the said notice was issued and served within the time contemplated u/s. 143(2) of the Act. The provisions of section 292BB lay down the presumption in a given case. It cannot be equated to a conclusive proof. The presumption is rebuttable. The provisions of section 292BB cannot extend to a case where the question of limitation is raised on admitted factual position in a given case. We therefore hold that the provisions of section 292BB of the Act will not be applicable to the present case.

The appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.

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Section 54EC –Term ‘month’ used in the provisions does not mean 30 days but it means ‘calendar month’ therefore investments made before the end of the calendar months eligible for deduction.

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3. Alkaben B. Patel vs. Income Tax Officer
In the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal Special
Bench, Ahmedabad
Before G.C. Gupta V. P.), Mukul Kr. Shrawat
(J. M.) and N.S. Saini (A. M.)
ITA No.1973/Ahd/2012
Asst. Year 2009-10.  Decided on 25/03/2014
Counsel for Assessee / Revenue:  U.S. Bhati / P.L. Kureel and O.P. Vaishnav

Section 54EC –Term ‘month’ used in the provisions does not mean 30 days but it means ‘calendar month’ therefore investments made before the end of the calendar months eligible for deduction.

Issue:

The issue before the Tribunal was – whether for the purpose of section 54EC the period of investment of six months should be reckoned after the date of transfer or from the end of the month in which transfer of capital asset took place? The assessee had earned Long Term Capital Gain on sale of a flat. She invested the gain earned in purchase of NHAI bonds and claimed deduction u/s. 54 EC. The sale of flat took place on 10th of June, 2008 and the bonds were purchased on 17th of December, 2008.According to the AO, the assessee was required to invest the capital gain in the specified asset within a period of six months from the date of thetransfer i.e. 10th of December 2008, and that requirement was not complied with by the assessee; hence, not eligible for the deduction u/s. 54EC of IT Act. The contention of the assessee was that since the application for the purchase ofthose bonds was tendered in the bank on 8th December, 2008,which was within the period of six months from the date of the transfer of the Long Term Capital Asset, the assesseewas eligible for the deduction u/s. 54EC.

Alternatively, the assessee’s contention was that up to the endof the month of December 2008, the said investment waseligible for the deduction. According to the AO as well as the CIT(A), the assessee was unable to establish that the impugned application for investment in NHAI bond was actually tendered on 8th of December, 2008. They were also not convinced with the alternate contention of the assessee.

Before the Tribunal, the revenue justified the orders of the lower authorities and contended that the Income-tax Act and the Income-tax Rules have used two types of phraseology in respect of the computation of period for the purpose of prescribing a limitation. The first type of wordings used is “not exceeding 6 months from the date on which application is made” or “anytime within a period of 6 months after the date of suchtransfer”. These words are used in section 54EC and section 281 B as well as in Rule 10K(2) and Rule 11AA(6). The second type of wordings used are “6 months/4months/1 month from the end of the month” in which a particular order is made/received/application is received. This wording is found in section 275 and section 154(8) aswell as in Rule 6DDA(5). It was emphasised that the wordings are unambiguous and the intention of the legislation is apparent that wherever the end of the month is to be calculated then the intention is made clear in the statute itself. Otherwise as per the language, a particular date is to be taken into account for the purpose of calculation of days/ months. It was therefore pleaded that in a situation when the intention of the legislation is clear, then there is no necessity to take the help of “General Clauses Act,1897” as suggested by the assessee. Further, it was pleaded that in section 54EC, the limitation of period for an investment has beenprescribed as “at any time within a period of 6 months from thedate of such transfer”. In ordinary sense, a ‘month’ is a period from a specified date in a month to the date numerically corresponding to the date in the following months, less one. For example, if a particular date is 10th June, 2008, one month shall be up to 9th July, 2008. Therefore, the term”month” has been used in section 54EC in an ordinary sense and the same should not exceed more than 30 days.The wordings of the section should not be replaced by any other wordings. Therefore, in the said example, one month cannot be extended up to 31st July, 2008. If that would have been the intention of the legislation, then certainly these words ought to have been prescribed in the provisions of section 54EC of the Act.

The revenue also relied on the following decisions:
 • Dhanraj Singh Choudhary vs. Nathulal Vishwakarma 16 taxmann.com249 (SC);
• Chironjilal Sharma HUF vs. UOI,(unreported decision of the Supreme Court);
• Jethmal Faujimal Soni vs. ITAT231 CTR332(Bom.);
• Kumarpal Amrutlal Doshi vs. DCIT (Appeal) (ITA No, 1523Mum/2010, order dated 09.02.2011);
• Shree Ram Engg. & Mfg Industries vs. ACIT (ITANo. 3226& 3227/Ahd/2011);
 • Hindustan Unilever Ltd. vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax [191 Taxman 119 (Bom.)];
• S. Lakha Singh Bahra Charitable Trust [15Taxmann. com 97(Asr)].

Held:

The Tribunal noted the argument of the revenue thatsince the statute has prescribed the limitation of six months, the words viz.,“at any time within a period of six months” must not be replaced by the words “at any time within a period of end of six months”. However, according to the tribunal, the incentive provision is to be examined by “purposive construction of statute” or “constructive interpretation of statute” which is neither “liberal interpretation of statute” nor a ‘literal interpretation of statute’. It further added that, it is the true intention of the enactment, which is required to be considered by a court of law.

To resolve the controversy i.e., whether the intention of the legislator was to compute six calendar months or to compute 180 days,the tribunal relied on a decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Munnalal Shri Kishan Mainpuri, 167 ITR 415 where the Court while answering the dispute in respect of law of limitation held that, there is nothing in the context of section 256(2) to warrant the conclusion that the word ‘month’ in it refers to a period of 30 days. Therefore, it was held by the Apex court that reference to six months in section 256(2) is to six calendar months and not 180 days. Similarly, it was noted that in the case of Tamal Lahiri vs. Kumar P. N. Tagore, 1978 AIR 1811/1979 SCC (1) 75, the Apex court opined while interpreting section 533 of Bangalore Municipal Act, 1932 the expression six months in the said section means sixcalendar months and not 180 days.

The Tribunal also noted that in a few more sections of the Income-tax Act, the legislature had not used the terms “Month” but has used the number of days to prescribe a specific period e.g. first proviso to section 254(2A) where it is provided that the Tribunal may pass an order granting stay but for a period not exceeding 180 days.This according to the Tribunal was an important distinction made in the statute while prescribing the limitation period. Therefore, the tribunal concluded that in the absence of any definition of the word ‘month’ in the Act, the definition of General Clauses Act 1897 shall be applicable. Accordingly, the tribunal held that the investment in question qualifies for the deduction u/s. 54EC.

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Section 80-IB – Assessee engaged in development of Geographical Information System software, claimed deduction u/s. 80IB –AO and CIT(A) denied deduction u/s. 80IB holding that the assessee was not engaged in the manufacture or production of any article– Tribunal held that the software came into existence after carrying on several processes and was transferred only on completion of the said processes. When transfer of property is an ongoing process at each stage of work, then it will amount to p<

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9. [2013] 146 ITD 641 (Ahmedabad – Trib.)
Bhavin Arun Shah. v. ITO
A.Y. 2003-04
Order dated- 28th June 2013

Section 80-IB – Assessee engaged in development of Geographical Information System software, claimed deduction u/s. 80IB –AO and CIT(A) denied deduction u/s. 80IB holding that the assessee was not engaged in the manufacture or production of any article– Tribunal held that the software came into existence after carrying on several processes and was transferred only on completion of the said processes. When transfer of property is an ongoing process at each stage of work, then it will amount to provision for services. The fact that software is produced on a platform not owned by the assessee is irrelevant, when what is being transferred by the assessee is not the platform but the end product and hence assessee was held eligible for deduction u/s. 80-IB.


Facts:

The assessee was engaged in the business of development of Geographical Information System (GIS) software for municipality. And it was undisputed fact that the assessee was engaged in the business of development of customised software on job work basis. The process of development of GIS software involved collection of maps in paper form from municipality. The maps were then digitised by the assessee and also demographic features, geographical features and other infrastructure available in particular areas were incorporated. The maps so prepared were then integrated into software solution to attach further attribute, information and to provide reports and analytical options to the municipalities. The assessee had claimed deduction u/s 80-IB in respect of his business income.

The Assessing Officer had disallowed claim of deduction u/s. 80-IB on the ground that the customised software developed by the assessee was not manufacture of articles or things. The CIT (A) had upheld the order of the Assessing Officer. The Tribunal, relying on decision of Supreme Court in case of CIT vs. Oracle Software India Ltd., (2010) 320 ITR 546, had held that if a process renders a software usable for which it is otherwise not fit then the said process can be termed as manufacture. However, Tribunal was also of the opinion that if one party engages another party to create an item of property that the first party will own from the moment of its creation, then no property will have been acquired by the first party from the other and the transaction should be characterised as the provision of services. However, in case of customised software when the originally developed software is owned by the developer and not by the receiver of such software prior to its transmission then the consideration paid by the receiver is towards the software and not towards the intellectual skills employed by the software developer and in such cases the developer can be held as engaged in manufacture of a customised software and thereby be entitled to deduction u/s. 80IB. Hence Tribunal remitted the matter to the Assessing Officer to show the point of time at which the client of the assessee acquired property in the software, developed by the assessee.

The Assessing Officer, in remand proceedings, expressed the view that since basic area maps were the material on the basis of which the software was developed, and since basic area maps always belonged to the client, it was a case of provision of services. The Commissioner (Appeals) also confirmed the view of the Assessing Officer. Aggrieved, the assessee filed appeal before Tribunal again.

Held:

On demonstration of this software in court, it was noticed that what was produced by the assessee was not a mere compilation of map simplictitor but a much value added product that produced a variety of information which was big help in efficient administration of the municipal work.

The software, came into existence after carrying on several processes, and it was only on completion of these processes, the property in the product could be transferred to the client and the mere fact that one of the inputs was owned by the client itself, did not mean that the property in the product never belonged to the assessee. The transfer of property was therefore not an ongoing process at each stage of work as it is in the case of a provision of services and therefore assessee was held eligible for deduction u/s. 80-IB.

The Tribunal also held that, though the basic inputs (area maps) were given by the client, i.e. the municipality itself, but the product was much more than the compilation of the input and the fact that was being produced, was on a platform (basic inputs) not owned by the assessee, was irrelevant, inasmuch as what was being transferred by the assessee was not the platform but the end product.

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Section 5(2): Salary received by a non-resident from a foreign employer for rendering services outside India, is not taxable in India merely because said salary was credited to NRE bank account of the assessee in India.

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8. (2014) 101 DTR 79 (Agra)
Arvind Singh Chauhan vs. ITO
A.Ys.: 2008-09 & 2009-10   Dated: 14-02-2014

Section 5(2): Salary received by a non-resident from a foreign employer for rendering services outside India, is not taxable in India merely because said salary was credited to NRE bank account of the assessee in India.

Facts:

The assessee, an individual, was in employment of a Singapore Company (ESM-S) and worked on merchant vessels and tankers plying on international routes. The assessee’s stay in India in the relevant previous year, was less than 182 days, and so the residential status of the assessee is ‘non-resident’. In the income tax return filed by the assessee, the salary received from ESM-S was not offered to tax on the grounds that his salary income was accruing and arising outside India. As for the salary income being credited to the bank account in India, the assessee’s contention was that the salary income deposited in the bank account in India, directly from the bank account of the company outside India. Thus, it was outside the ambit of section 5(2). However, the Assessing Officer was of the view that the assessee’s explanation could not be accepted for several reasons. One of the reasons is that since the appointment letter was issued by a foreign employer’s agent in India, it is to be deemed that the salary income accrued in India. The Assessing Officer further took note of the fact that the salary cheques were credited to the assessee’s account with HSBC Bank in Mumbai. Hence, the salary of Rs. 13,34,884 received from ESM-S was brought to tax in the hands of the assessee.

Held:

The above issue is analysed in two parts as follows:

1. Whether issuance of an appointment letter gives the assessee the right to receive salary?

 Once it is not in dispute that the assessee qualifies to be treated as a ‘non-resident’ u/s. 6, as is the undisputed position in this case, the scope of taxable income in the hands of the assessee is restricted to section 5(2), Therefore, it is only when at least one of the two conditions u/s. 5(2) is fulfilled that the income of a non-resident can be brought to tax in India. In the present case, the services are rendered outside India as crew on merchant vessels and tankers plying on international routes. A salary is compensation for the services rendered by an employee and, therefore, situs of its accrual is the situs of services, for which salary paid, being rendered. It is wholly incorrect to assume that an employee gets the right to receive the salary just by getting the appointment letter. An employee has to render the services to get a right to receive the salary and unless these services are rendered, no such right accrues to the employee. Undoubtedly, if an assessee acquires a right to receive an income, the income is said to have accrued to him even though it may be received later on, it’s being ascertained, but this proposition will be relevant only when the assessee gets a right to receive the income, and, in the present case, the assessee gets his right to receive salary income when he renders the services and not when he simply receives the appointment letter. Thus, the receipt of an appointment letter cannot be the sole basis for deciding situs of accrual of salary.

2. Whether salary amount remitted to bank account in India attracts taxability u/s 5(2)(a)?

The law is trite that the ‘receipt’ of income, for this purpose, refers to the first occasion when the assessee gets the money in his own control – real or constructive. What is material is the receipt of income in its character as income, and not what happens subsequently once the income, in its character as such is received by the assessee or his agent; an income cannot be received twice or on multiple occasions. As the bank statement of the assessee clearly reveals these are US dollar denominated receipts from the foreign employer and credited to non-resident external account maintained by the assessee with HSBC, Mumbai. The assessee was in lawful right to receive these monies, as an employee, at the place of employment, i.e. at the location of its foreign employer, and it is a matter of convenience that the monies were thereafter transferred in India. The connotation of an income having been received and an amount having being received are qualitatively different. The salary amount is received in India in this case but the salary income is received outside India. Thus, when the salary has accrued outside India, and thereafter, by an arrangement, the salary is remitted to India and made available to the employee, it will not constitute as receipt of salary in India by the assessee so as to trigger taxability u/s. 5(2)(a).

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Section 40A(3) – In a case where liability for an expense is incurred in one year and the payment thereof is made in a subsequent year, the law applicable in the year in which the liability was incurred would be applicable and not the law applicable in the year in which the payment is made.

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7. 149 TTJ 205 (Ahm)
Tushar A. Sanghvi (HUF) vs. ITO
ITA No. 1901/Ahd/2011
Assessment Years: 2008-09.  
Date of Order: 09-02-2012

Section 40A(3) – In a case where liability for an expense is incurred in one year and the payment thereof is made in a subsequent year, the law applicable in the year in which the liability was incurred would be applicable and not the law applicable in the year in which the payment is made.

Facts :

In the course of the assessment proceedings for the assessment year 2007-08, the Assessing Officer noticed that the assessee had shown creditors’ outstanding at Rs. 1,95,17,664 as on 31-03-2007. He asked the assessee to give details of payments made to the said outstanding creditors in the subsequent years. Upon receiving the details from the assessee, the AO made enquiries with the concerned banks where the cheques issued by the assessee were presented for clearance. From the replies furnished by the bank, the AO noticed that the cheques issued in the name of the creditors M/s. Bhavi Enterprises, M/s. Patel Traders and M/s. Jayraj Traders were deposited in some other persons accounts. Cheques of amounts aggregating to Rs. 62,10,000 issued in favour of M/s. Bhavi Enterprises were deposited in accounts of another person. Cheques of amounts aggregating to Rs. 12,10,000 issued in favour of Patel Traders were deposited in accounts of other persons. The AO called upon the assessee to give details as to in which assessment year expenses have been claimed on account of the above creditors. The assessee expressed inability to furnish the reply. The AO concluded that the payments were made otherwise than by account payee cheques and accordingly Rs. 62,10,000 is required to be treated as income in the assessment year 2008-09 and Rs. 12,10,000 is required to be treated as income in the assessment year 2010-11. He reopened the assessment for the assessment year 2008-09 u/s. 147 of the Act. The assessee vide its reply informed the AO that the above mentioned parties were mediators who were entitled only to commission which is evident from the sample copy of the bill. Without prejudice, it was submitted that the purchases were made in the year 2004 and as the transactions related to the said year only 20% of the disallowance should be made of the amounts paid otherwise, than by account payee cheques or drafts as per provisions applicable in that assessment year. The AO added Rs. 62,10,000 to the total income of the assessee for assessment year 2008-09. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal found that there is no dispute about the facts. It noted that the expenses were incurred in the assessment year 2004-05 and the payment was made in the assessment year 2008- 09 by crossed cheques. It then noted the provisions of section 40A(3) as applicable in assessment year 2004-05 and also as applicable in assessment year 2008-09. It held as under: When we go through the provisions applicable in assessment year 2004-05 and assessment year 2008-09, we find that there are three major differences;

(i) The first difference is that, as per the provisions of the assessment year 2004-05, the assessee is required to make payment by way of crossed cheque/crossed bank draft whereas as per the provisions of assessment year 2008-09, the assessee is required to make payment by way of a/c. payee cheque/a/c payee bank draft;

(ii) The second difference is this, that as per the provisions applicable in assessment year 2004-05, the disallowance was to be made to the extent of 20% of payments made in contravention to the prescribed mode whereas, as per the provisions applicable in the assessment year 2008-09, such disallowance is to the extent of 100% of such payment in contravention to the prescribed mode;

(iii) The third difference is with regard to payment in a subsequent year in contravention to the prescribed mode. As per the provisions applicable in the assessment year 2004- 05, the disallowance was to be made in the relevant year in which the expenditure was incurred whereas as per the provisions of assessment year 2008-09, addition is to be made in the year in which payment in contravention to the prescribed mode was made by the assessee irrespective of the fact as to whether the expenditure was incurred in an earlier year. Now, the question to be decided by us, is as to whether if an expenditure incurred in the assessment year 2004-05 for which payment is made in the assessment year 2008-09, provision of section 40A(3) applicable in assessment year 2004-05 is required to be applied or the provisions in assessment year 2008-09 being the year of payment, are to be applied. The A O has applied the provisions of section 40A(3) as amended w.e.f. 01-04-2008, because the payments were made by the assessee in the assessment year 2008-09 and the claim of the assessee before us is this, that since the expenses were incurred in the assessment year 2004-05, such expenses are to be subjected to the provisions applicable in assessment year 2004-05.

The Tribunal noted that the decision of the Tribunal in the case of Anand Kumar Rawatram Joshi (supra) is under similar facts with small difference that in that case, the expenses were incurred in assessment year 2007-08 and the payments were made in assessment year 2008-09. It noted that in the said case the Tribunal has in para 8 held that if the liability is incurred up to 2007-08 but the payment made is in a subsequent year i.e., in the assessment year 2008-09 or any subsequent year, the provisions of section 40A(3) as applicable in that year in which the liability was incurred should be applied, as per which, if the assessee does not make payment for such a liability in a sum exceeding Rs. 20,000/- by an a/c payee cheque drawn on a bank or by an a/c payee bank draft, the allowances originally made shall be deemed having wrongly been made and the assessment order of that year in which liability was incurred should be rectified as per the provisions of section 154 and for the purpose of reckoning the limitation period of four years, it shall be reckoned from the end of the assessment year following the previous year in which the payment was so made.

The Tribunal held that the present issue is squarely covered in favour of the assessee by this Tribunal decision rendered in the case of Anand Kumar Rawatram Joshi (supra). Applying the ratio of the said decision, if the provisions of section 40A(3) as applicable in the assessment year 2004-05 are applied, no addition in the present year is justified and no disallowance can be made in the assessment year 2004-05 also because as per the provision of section 40A(3) as applicable in the assessment year 2004-05, the payments are required to be made by a crossed cheque/crossed bank draft and the assessee has made the payment by way of crossed cheque and, therefore, no disallowance is called for in the present case as per the provisions of section 40A(3) applicable for the assessment year 2004-05. The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

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Section 54F – Since assessee had entered into a registered agreement within time period prescribed u/s. 54F, he was entitled to claim exemption even in respect of amounts paid at the time of booking which was more than one year prior to the date of transfer. New house vests in the assessee by registered deed and not by availing of housing loan or payment of booking amount.

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6. 62 SOT 59 (Bang)
Gopilal Laddha vs. ACIT
ITA No. 1356/Bang/2012
Assessment Years: 2009-10.          
Date of Order: 31-10-2013

Section 54F – Since assessee had entered into a registered agreement within time period prescribed u/s. 54F, he was entitled to claim exemption even in respect of amounts paid at the time of booking which was more than one year prior to the date of transfer. New house vests in the assessee by registered deed and not by availing of housing loan or payment of booking amount.

Facts:

During the previous year relevant to assessment year 2009-10, land belonging to the assessee was acquired by the Karnataka Industrial Development Board for Bangalore Metro Rail Corporation and the assessee received compensation of Rs. 84,61,701 on 21-07-2008. The assessee acquired a residential flat at Bangalore for Rs. 50,98,720 by registered sale deed dated 11-09-2008. He, accordingly, claimed exemption of Rs. 46,11,166 u/s. 54F of the Act.

In the course of assessment proceedings the Assessing Officer (AO) noticed that the said flat whose cost was considered for claiming exemption u/s. 54F of the Act was booked on 19-01-2006 and the assessee had taken a loan of Rs. 40 lakh from Syndicate Bank which was sanctioned on 24-05-2006 for investment in purchase of the said flat. Thus, the AO noticed that the amount of Rs. 44,70,852 was paid by 31-03-2007 i.e., more than one year prior to acquisition of the new asset. The AO was also of the view that since the assessee invested Rs. 40 lakh out of the Housing Loan from Syndicate Bank in the purchase of the new asset and therefore only Rs. 6,23,433 qualified for exemption. He accordingly, worked out the exemption u/s. 54F at Rs. 6,23,433 and allowed Rs. 6,23,433 instead of Rs. 46,11,166 as claimed.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), who dismissed the appeal by holding that the assessee is not eligible for exemption u/s. 54F as claimed.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

The Tribunal noted that the AO had restricted the claim for exemption for the reason that though the flat was purchased by registered deed dated 11-09-2008, the booking was made on 09-01-2006 and a housing loan of Rs. 40 lakh was taken from Syndicate Bank on 24-05-2006 which was invested in the said property before 31-03-2007.

The Tribunal did not agree with the view of the authorities below that both these investments amounting to Rs. 44,70,852 being made more than one year prior to the date of receipt of compensation of Rs. 84,61,701 for asset, on 21-07-2008, the assessee would not be eligible for exemption u/s. 54F of the Act. The Tribunal was of the view that the amounts paid by the assessee on booking of the asset on 09- 01-2006 and the housing loan of Rs. 40 lakh availed from Syndicate Bank for investment in the purchase thereof have not vested the assessee with the ownership of the new asset. The assessee has been vested with the ownership of the new asset only by virtue of the Registered Sale Deed dated 11-09- 2008. It held that the authorities below have erred in restricting the exemption u/s. 54F of the Act to Rs. 6,23,433. It held that the assessee is entitled to exemption of Rs 46,11,166 as claimed by it.

This ground of appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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S/s. 54B, 54F – Assessee is not entitled to claim exemption under s/s. 54B/54F in respect of investments made in the name of major married daughters. The term `assessee’ used in section 54B/54F cannot be extended to mean the major married daughters.

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5. 160 TTJ 236 (Vishaka)
Ganta Vijaya Lakshmi vs. ITO
ITA No. 253/Viz/2012
Assessment Years: 2008-09.   
Date of Order: 22-07-2013

S/s. 54B, 54F – Assessee is not entitled to claim exemption under s/s. 54B/54F in respect of investments made in the name of major married daughters. The term `assessee’ used in section 54B/54F cannot be extended to mean the major married daughters.

Facts:

During the previous year relevant to the assessment year 2008-09, the assessee transferred wet agricultural land for a consideration of Rs. 1,41,12,000. The assessee purchased an agricultural land, for a consideration of Rs. 52 lakh, in the name of her younger daughter and a residential house in the name of her eldest daughter for a consideration of Rs. 58 lakh. The long term capital gain arising on such transfer was claimed to be exempt under s/s. 54B/54F on the grounds that the investment made in the names of two daughters qualifies for exemption under s/s. 54B/54F. The assessee claimed that she has entered into “Possession purchase agreements” with her two daughters to comply with the provisions of s/s. 54B/54F. It was also contended that the daughters should be considered as her benamidars.

The Assessing Officer (AO) denied the exemption claimed by the assessee on the ground that the properties purchased were not registered in the name of the assessee. The claim of “benami” was rejected by the AO on the grounds that the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act provides exemption to the property purchased in the name of unmarried daughters only. He also refused to recognise both the “possession purchase agreements” as they were unregistered documents and did not transfer the properties. Tribunal news Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

The decision of the jurisdictional High Court in the case of Late Mir Gulam Ali Khan vs. CIT 56 CTR 144 (AP) was rendered on typical facts of the case before the Court viz. that the assessee in that case entered into an agreement for purchasing a residential property and had also paid earnest money in furtherance of the same. Unfortunately, he passed away before the completion of the purchase transaction. Hence, the legal representative of the assessee completed the purchase of property. Thus, in effect, the new house property was not purchased in the name of the assessee, who sold the old property. Since the said legal representative of the assessee is liable to be assessed in respect of the capital gain on the property sold by his father, he claimed the cost of new property as deduction u/s. 54 of the Act. Thus, the facts prevailing in the case of Late Mir Gulam Ali Khan are peculiar and further, u/s. 159 of the Act, the legal representative is treated as assessee in respect of liability of the deceased person. The liberal view taken by the High Court in that case cannot be stretched in each and every case, where the property was not purchased in the name of the assessee who sold the property. It held that the assessee in the present case cannot derive support from this decision.

In respect of the other decisions relied upon, on behalf of the assessee, the Tribunal noted that in all those cases, the new property was either purchased in joint names i.e., in the names of the assessee and others, or it was purchased in the names of spouse or minor daughter. The Tribunal held that in its view the Courts have considered the investments made in the name of wife or minor daughter as an investment made by the assessee himself for the reason that there was no real intention to provide consideration for the benefit of wife/minor daughter alone.

In the instant case, undisputedly, the investments have been made in the names of the married daughters and apparently both of them are also majors. Thus, it is not a case of joint ownership along with the assessee. Both the daughters of the assessee shall have every right over the property purchased in their respective names. Thus, it cannot be said that the intention of purchasing the properties was not to give benefit to them. The assessee claims that she has entered into purchase possession agreement with her two daughters. However, we tend to agree with the view of the learned CIT(A) that the said agreement does not actually effect transfer of assets to the name of the assessee. Further, as pointed out by the AO, the said agreements have been entered only to show some compliance with the provisions of section 54B/54F of the Act.

The appeal filed by assessee was dismissed.

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Valuation of closing stock: Section 145: A. Y. 2006-07: Land purchased by assessee in dispute before civil court: Adverse impact on market value of land: Assessee reduced value of closing stock and adopted the same in the subsequent years accepted by Revenue. Addition on account of under valuation of closing stock not proper: CIT vs. Satish Estate P. Ltd; 361 ITR 451 (P&H):

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The assessee had purchased a land in respect of which one A had filed a suit against the assessee on 11-03-2006. This dispute had an adverse impact on the market value of the land. The assessee valued the land at Rs. 75 lakh below the cost price and accordingly reduced the value of the closing stock as on 31-03-2006. The Assessing Officer made an addition of Rs. 75 lakh on the ground of undervaluation of closing stock. Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the addition holding that the assessee had not changed the method of valuing the closing stock. The Tribunal found that the Revenue did not challenge the value of the opening stock of the land in the subsequent assessment year while passing the assessment order u/s. 143(3) and accepted the valuation. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue. On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and Haryana High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) A civil suit was filed by A in which the assessee was impleaded as a party. There was an interim order passed by the trial court which was affirmed by the Court as well. Thus, the assessee was justified in reducing the valuation of the closing stock.

ii) The assessee had reduced the closing stock and the same was taken as opening stock in A. Y. 2007-08 which was accepted by the Assessing Officer while framing the assessment u/s. 143(3). Thus no loss to Revenue had been caused.

iii) In view of the above, no substantial question of law arises. Consequently the appeal stands dismissed.”

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Recovery of tax: Power of TRO u/s. 281: Petitioner had purchased a property from one ‘M’ on 17-05-1995: TRO having found that ‘M’ inspite of several demand notices issued during years 1989 to 1994 had not paid income tax dues passed an order u/s. 281 declaring above sale transaction as void: TRO had no power u/s. 281 to declare sale transaction as void:

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Karsanbhai Gandabhai Patel vs. TRO; [2014] 43 taxmann. com 415 (Guj):

The petitioner purchased a property from one ‘M’ on 17-05-1995. ‘M’ had defaulted in making payment of income tax dues for various assessment years. The Assessing Officer issued several demand notices on ‘M’ during the years 1989 to 1994 for recovery of the unpaid taxes. However, ‘M’ had not paid such taxes. Thereupon the Tax Recovery Officer (TRO) attached the above property by issuing an order dated 22-05-1995. Thereafter, he passed an order dated 08- 11-1995 u/s. 281 declaring the above sale transaction as void. He passed the order without any notice to the petitioner. Later on 03-02-2004, he wrote to ‘M’ indicating that the department would proceed with the auction sale of the property under attachment to recover the dues of ‘M’. The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the petitioner and held as under:

“i) Section 281 provides certain transfers to be void. S/s. (1) thereof provides that where, during the pendency of any proceedings under the Act or after the completion thereof, but before the service of notice under rule 2 of the Second Schedule, any assessee creates a charge on, or parts with the possession (by way of sale, mortgage, gift, exchange or any other mode of transfer) of, any of his assets in favour of any other person, such charge or transfer shall be void as against any claim in respect of any tax or any other sum payable by the assessee as a result of completion of the said proceedings or otherwise. Proviso to s/s. (1), however, provides that such charge or transfer shall not be void if made for adequate consideration and without notice of pendency of such proceedings or without notice of such tax or other sum payable by the assessee or with the permission of the Assessing Officer.

ii) It can thus be seen that, even if the transaction creating a charge or parting of possession has been entered into by the assessee during the pendency of any proceedings under the Act or after completion thereof, the eventuality of such charge or transfer being declared void can be avoided provided one of the two conditions contained in the proviso is satisfied. Under such circumstances, the transferee can demonstrate that the transaction had taken place with the previous permission of the Assessing Officer or that the same was entered into for adequate consideration and without notice of pendency of such proceedings or without notice of such tax or other sum payable by the assessee.

iii) This element of the transaction being with adequate consideration and without notice would equally apply to the assessee as well as the transferee. In a given case, it may even be open for the assessee to establish that the transaction was for adequate consideration without notice. In a given case, even if the assessee had notice of the pendency or the outstanding tax or sum payable, the transferee can still take shelter of the transactions having been entered into by him for adequate consideration and without notice.

 iv) It is, therefore, that the Courts have read into this provision the requirement of hearing the transferee also. Quite apart from this, Courts have taken a view that s/s. (1) of section 281 only provides for the eventuality of the transaction hit by the said provision as being void. It does not create any machinery for the revenue authorities to entertain dispute and declare the transaction to be void for which purpose, only a civil suit would lie.

v) The Bombay High Court in the case of Gangadhar Vishwanath Ranade (No. 2) vs. T.R.O. [1989] 177 ITR 176 held that u/s. 281, the TRO has no power to declare a transfer as void. This decision of the Bombay High Court was carried in appeal before the Supreme Court. The Apex Court in TRO vs. Gangadhar Vishwanath Ranade [1998] 234 ITR 188/100 Taxman 236 confirmed the view of the Bombay High Court.

vi) The issue involved in the instant case is squarely covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Gangadhar Vishwanath Ranade (supra). Therefore, the order passed by the Tax Recovery Officer u/s. 281 was liable to be set aside.”

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Recovery of tax: Liability of directors: Section 179: A. Y. 1998-99: Debts Recovery Tribunal directing recovery of bank’s dues by sale of properties of company: Balance due to bank supplied by directors from their personal resources: Directors agreeing to forgo their loans to company in order to have its name struck of register of companies: Facts establishing that non-recovery of tax due from company not attributable to gross neglect, misfeasance or breach of duty on part of directors: Recover<

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(2014) 43 taxmann.com 288 (Guj):

The petitioners were directors of a private company. On 24-06-2002, the Assessing Officer issued notices to the directors u/s. 179(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for recovery of the tax dues of the company of Rs. 7,53,649/- in respect of the A. Y. 1998-99. Being not satisfied by the reply given by the directors, the Assessing Officer passed order u/s. 179 for recovery of the tax dues from the directors. The Commissioner dismissed the revision petition made u/s. 264 of the Act.

The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the directors and held as under:

“i) The company had run into losses. The company had substantial dues towards the bank from which it had taken loan. Certain properties were also mortgaged to the bank. To realise its dues, the bank filed a petition before the Debt Recovery Tribunal where the parties agreed to settle the total dues for Rs. 25 lakh. The properties of the company were valued at Rs. 18 lakh. The balances was supplied by the directors from their personal resources. Additionally, in order to strike the name of the company off the register of companies, the directors agreed to forgo their loans to the company which were in excess of Rs. 16 lakh.

ii) When such facts were established, the Assessing Officer ought to have held that the petitioners had succeeded in establishing that non-recovery of the tax dues of the company could not be attributed to gross neglect, misfeasance or breach of duty on the part of the directors in relation to the affairs of the company.

iii) The assets of the company may not have been mortgaged to the bank. Nevertheless, the Debts Recovery Tribunal held the bank entitled to recover the suit dues by sale of hypothecated machinery and movables and by sale of immovable property. This would not bring the action of the petitioners within the expression of gross neglect, misfeasance or breach of duty on their part.

iv) The contention of the counsel of the Revenue that the petitioners should have offered the properties for recovery of the Department was not tenable. The orders passed by the Income Tax Officer and the Commissioner were to be quashed.”

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Reassessment: Change of opinion: S/s. 147 and 148: A. Y. 2005-06: AO completed original assessment u/s. 143(3) on 24-12-2007: Subsequently issued notice u/s. 148 on basis of investigation report dated 13-03-2006 received from investigation wing: Reasons to believe did not state that investigation report was not with Assessing Officer when he completed original assessment: Attempt to reopen assessment was result of a change of opinion: Reopening not valid

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Rasalika Trading & Investment Co. (P.) Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT; [2014] 43 taxmann.com 371 (Delhi):

The assessee, an investment and security business company, had raised additional capital and offered shares at a premium of Rs. 90 per share during the previous year relevant to the A. Y. 2005-06. The Assessing Officer completed the assessment of the assessee for the A. Y. 2005-06 u/s. 143(3) on 24-12-2007. Subsequently the Assessing Officer issued notice u/s. 148 on the basis of the investigation report dated 13- 03-2006 received from the DIT (Investigation), New Delhi. The said report indicated that the assessee was amongst the beneficiaries of bogus accommodation entries. The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i) It is evident from the aforesaid that the reassessment proceedings were initiated by the impugned notice which expressly and plainly states that ‘reasons to believe’ are based upon the materials contained in the investigation report of 13-03-2006. The notice itself does not spell out that the report was not on the record when the original assessment was completed on 24-12-2007, nor did the revenue even suggest so in the counter affidavit filed in the proceedings. It is only in a subsequently filed additional affidavit that the position is sought to be clarified. Clearly, the High Court refrains from making such an enquiry at a time when the Assessing Officer has, in the first instance, failed to spell out clearly in section 148 notice itself that such report was not on record. In other words ‘the reasons to believe’ do not state even in one sentence that the investigation report was not with the Assessing Officer when he completed the assessment.

ii) The material on record in fact suggests otherwise. The nature of the queries put to assessee and the replies and confirmation furnished to the Assessing Officer in the course of the regular assessment clarify that what excited the suspicion was indeed gone into by the Assessing Officer himself while framing the assessment u/s. 143(3).

iii) Such being the case the Court has no doubt that the impugned notice, in the circumstances of the case, is based upon stale information which was available at the time of the original assessment and in fact appears to have been used by the Assessing Officer at the relevant time, i.e., during the completion of proceedings u/s. 143(3).

iv) Therefore, the attempt to reopen the proceedings u/ss 147 and 148 is really the result of a change of opinion. Consequently, the impugned notice and all proceedings further thereto are beyond the authority of law and were liable to be quashed.”

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