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[2015-TIOL-1184-CESTAT-MUM] Alfa Laval (India) Ltd. Employees Co-operative Consumers Society vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Pune-I

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A cooperative society of members being employees of a company engaged in preparation and serving of food to the employees are a provider of catering service.

Facts:
Appellant is a co-operative society of employees of a company and is engaged in making food and serving the same to its members being the employees of the company. All the items required for preparation of food, utensils, space, water and electricity is provided by the company and the payments for the expenses incurred were received from the company. Revenue contended that the services qualify under the category of “Outdoor Catering services”

Held:
The Tribunal stated that it is undisputed that the Appellant is a separate entity in the eyes of law and is engaging persons for preparation and serving food though in the premises of their client being the company. Further, the agreement with the company specified rendering of specialized services for their employees. Hence, the contention that the services are provided by them to their own employees is not correct as they are under a contractual obligation to provide catering services to the company and accordingly the appeal is rejected.

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[2015-TIOL-1182-CESTAT-MUM] State Bank of India vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Nashik

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Since Rule 5(1) of the valuation rule is already struck down, order placing reliance on the same is liable to be set aside.

Facts:
The Appellant collects from their customers the amounts paid by them towards postage charges, courier charges etc. The Revenue is of the opinion that these charges are collected in course of rendering “Banking and Financial Services”.

Held:
Relying on the decision in the case of Intercontinental Consultants & Technocrats P. Ltd. [2013] (29) STR 9 (Del) wherein Rule 5(1) of the Valuation Rule, 2006 had been struck down by the Hon’ble Delhi High Court. The Tribunal held that since the provisions on which reliance has been placed have been struck down, the order is unsustainable and is liable to be set aside.

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[2015-TIOL-1065-CESTAT-MUM] Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd vs. Commissioner of Central Excise

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Services relating to residential colony of
employees and the clubs are welfare activities having no nexus with the
business of manufacturing of final product.

Facts:
The
Appellant has a residential colony and club room attached to its
manufacturing unit. CENVAT Credit is availed on service tax paid on
security service provided at the colony, repairs of mixer used in the
canteen, civil work done at the colony, furniture/wooden partition for
VIP rooms and telephone lines installed at the residence of officer/club
rooms.

Held:
Relying on the decision in the case of
Manikgarh Cement [2010-TIOL-720-HC-MUM] and para 34 of the decision in
the case of Ultra Tech Cement Ltd. – 2010-TIOL-745- HC-MUM-ST, the
Tribunal held that services which are integrally connected with the
manufacture of final product are eligible input services. Residential
colony and club are welfare activities for the staff and have no nexus
with the business of manufacturing the final product and therefore are
not allowable. However, considering the disputes on the issue and the
different interpretations, penalty u/s. 11AC of the Central Excise Act,
1944 read with Rule 15(2) of CENVAT Credit Rules,2004 was set aside.

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[2015-TIOL-956-CESTAT-MUM] Sun-Area Real Estate Pvt. Ltd vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai-i

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In view of the FEMA notifications issued by RB I, payment received in
Indian rupees is deemed to be convertible foreign exchange.

Facts:
The
Appellant received Indian rupees against export of services. The
Commissioner (Appeals) rejected the refund claims filed on the ground
that payment is not received in convertible foreign exchange. Further,
the second issue involved is whether the security and air travel
services can be considered as input service for providing output
service.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that when a
person receives in India payment in rupees from the account of a bank
situated in any country outside India maintained with an authorised
dealer, the payment in rupees shall be deemed to have repatriated the
realised foreign exchange in India as per Regulation 3 made u/s. 47 of
the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999. Further, FIRCs were produced
which are statutorily provided in the case of receipt or remittance of
foreign exchange specifically certifying that the payment is in
convertible foreign exchange. Further, relying on the decision of J.B.
Boda and Company Private Ltd., vs. Central Board of Direct Taxes AIR
1997SC 1543, the refund claims were sanctioned. In respect of input
services the Tribunal noted that they had direct nexus with the output
services and are considered eligible input services.

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[2015-TIOL-1093-CESTAT-MUM] Maneesh Export(eou), Satish J. Khalap, Vinay R. Sapte vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Belapur

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Date of Show Cause Notice and period involved is not
relevant-substituted section 35F will be applicable to all the appeals
filed after the commencement of the Finance Act, 2014.

Facts:
The
Appellants did not deposit 7.5% of the duty confirmed as per amended
section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1994 with effect from 06/08/2014.
The question before the Tribunal was relating to maintainability of the
appeals.

Held:
The Hon’ble Tribunal while dismissing
the case of the Appellants noted the decision of Hossein Kasam Dada
(India) Ltd. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh 1983 (13) ELT 1277 (SC) and
observed that the pre-existing right of appeal is not destroyed by the
amendment if the amendment is not made retrospective by express words or
necessary intendment. The said decision was distinguished to state that
the second proviso of section 35F of the Central Excise Act,1944 makes
it very clear that the amended provisions would not apply to the stay
applications and appeals pending before any appellate authority prior to
the commencement of the Finance (No.2) Act, 2014 which in turn would
imply that in respect of the stay applications and appeals filed before
any appellate authority after the commencement of the Finance (No. 2)
Act, 2014 the new provisions will apply irrespective of the date when
the order-in-original/order-in-appeal or the show Cause Notice was
issued or the period of dispute thus making the amendment retrospective
to which the principles laid down by Hossein Kasam Dada(supra) do not
apply as it dealt with an amendment that is prospective in nature.
Further the decision in the case of K. Rama Mohana Rao
[2015-TIOL-511-HC-AP-CX] was also disregarded by stating that the order
was an interim order and no final judgement has been taken by the
Hon’ble High Court and further the decision of the Kerala High Court in
the case of A.M. Motors [2015-TIOL-1069-HC-Kerala-ST] was also
disregarded. A similar decision as reported was also expressed in the
case of Shri Nand Kishore Sharma vs. CC [2015-TIOL-1190-CESTAT-MUM]

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Reducing vulnerabilities crucial for emerging economies: RBI Governor Rajan

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Emerging economies like India have to work towards reducing vulnerabilities in their economies, said Reserve Bank of India (RBI) Governor Raghuram Rajan.

Lower interest rates and tax incentives can boost investments, he said, but consumer demand holds the key for economic growth.

“Emerging economies have to work to reduce vulnerabilities in their economies, to get to the point where, like Australia or Canada, they can allow exchange rate flexibility to do much of the adjustment for them to capital inflows,” said Rajan in his speech to the Economic Club of New York.

However, it takes time to develop the required institutions. In the meantime, the difficulty for emerging markets in absorbing large amounts of capital quickly and in a stable way should be seen as a constraint, much like the zero lower bound, rather than something that can be altered quickly, said the RBI governor. Due to this, he said, even while resisting the temptation of absorbing flows, emerging markets will look for safety nets. In the past, India has been attracting large foreign flows in domestic markets.

“We also need better international safety nets. And each one of us has to work hard in our own countries to develop a consensus for free trade, open markets, and responsible global citizenry. If we can achieve all this even as the recent economic events make us more parochial and inward-looking, we will truly have set the stage for the strong sustainable growth we all desperately need,” Rajan said.

Rajan also nudged international organisations like the International Monetary Fund to re-examine the “rules of the game” for a responsible policy. “No matter what a central bank’s domestic mandate, international responsibilities should not be ignored. The IMF should analyse each new unconventional monetary policy (including sustained unidirectional exchange rate intervention), and based on their effects and the agreed rules of the game, declare them in- or out-of-bound,” he added.

According to Rajan, the current non-system in international monetary policy is a source of substantial risk, both to sustainable growth and to the financial sector. “It is not an industrial country problem, nor an emerging market problem, it is a problem of collective action. We are being pushed towards competitive monetary easing and musical crises.” There is a need for stronger well-capitalised multilateral institutions with widespread legitimacy, some of which can provide patient capital and others that can monitor new rules of the game, said Rajan. The governor said industrial countries should export to emerging markets as a way to bolster growth. This is because they have done so in the past, too.

(Source: Article by Mr. Raghuram Rajan, RBI Governor, in ‘Business Standard’ dated 19-05-2015.)

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Bad asset blues -Government cannot continue to ignore non-performing assets.

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Last week, Reserve Bank of India Governor Raghuram Rajan indicated that the non-performing asset (NPA) problems of the Indian banking system were far from over. While widely perceived to be the case, the governor’s acknowledgement of the problem brings it on to centre stage as a potential crisis. Even as the economy is showing some signs of recovery, the capacity of the banking system to support the process should raise serious questions. A recent report by CRISIL lays out the magnitude of the problem. It estimates that gross NPAs will rise by almost 20 per cent to Rs 4 lakh crore during the current fiscal year. As a ratio to total assets, they will increase by about 20 basis points to 4.5 per cent. The report also estimates that “weak” assets, which include NPAs as well as some proportion of restructured assets, will come in at Rs 5.3 lakh crore during the year, about six per cent of total assets. Overall, it presents a rather gloomy picture of the state of the country’s banking system, aggravated by the fact that these negative trends are expected to prevail in a generally improving macroeconomic environment. Within the sector, public sector banks are generally worse off than private sector ones.

There is little mystery about why the problem is so acute. The primary cause of bad assets is the massive burden of infrastructure projects that are stalled and, therefore, unable to service their due obligations to banks. While the government has expressed good intentions about improving conditions in the sector, it has yet to implement any meaningful strategy. Unless a concerted effort is made to revive activity in these projects, so that banks can look for exit opportunities, the problem is not likely to go away. While carrying the burden, banks are, quite logically, constrained from taking on any additional risk, which means that they are reluctant to lend to even their conventional customer segments. The steady deceleration in bank credit is a pointer to this constraint and, as indicated above, poses a significant risk to any revival in economic growth.

There are no easy solutions to this problem. Re-capitalising banks has been proposed and may be part of a composite approach, but by itself it really only means throwing good money after bad. More and more capital will be consumed by provisioning against bad assets rather than by credit expansion. The pressure is compounded by the mandate to achieve Basel-III capital adequacy benchmarks over the next four years. Not only will internal accruals be woefully inadequate, external investors will be extremely wary of providing funds to banks whose asset portfolio will remain fragile for some time to come. A strategic response to the problem needs to be in two phases. The first phase will involve the unloading of a significant chunk of the bad assets in infrastructure from the books of banks on to a special purpose vehicle – a “bad bank” as some call it. The second phase can then focus on re-capitalising public sector banks, with a combination of public and private funds. Given the government’s decision to be selective in channelling funds to banks based on financial health, this may also require consolidation. Time is of essence.

(Source: Editorial in the ‘Business Standard’ dated 18-05-2015).

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Technological disruption – How to ride out the apocalypse – IT services firms are facing fatal disruption. They need to be utterly committed to the shift.

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Kodak. Digital Equipment. Sun Microsystems. Nokia. Blackberry. These are but a small sample of once-great companies devastated by technological disruption. Even mighty Microsoft and Intel are struggling to reinvent themselves and stay relevant in a phone-first world. There are vital lessons in these stories for India’s vaunted IT services companies.

It is easy — and wrong — to assume that the companies that get disrupted were poorly managed. Disruptive changes are like big storms. They build up slowly and then break with terrifying ferocity.

So it’s quite easy to spot the brewing disruption. Take Kodak. Kodak developed the world’s first digital camera in 1975. It held all the most important patents pertaining to digital imaging. It realised the potential impact digital photography would have on its enormously lucrative film franchise. In 2005, Kodak was the leader in digital cameras. But they failed to ride the tiger and eventually failed.

The story is similar with Nokia, which launched one of the world’s first smartphones, the N Series Communicator in 1995, but understood too late that with the iPhone, the game shifted from devices to competition between ecosystems. These companies had market leadership, enormous resources, most of the technology and many smart managers. They saw the approaching disruption, yet failed to cross the chasm.

One factor why companies find it hard to navigate industry disruptions is complacence, even arrogance. When a company is sitting on billions of dollars of cash, fat margins and a good market share, it’s hard to create a sense of urgency in the organisation and with its shareholders.

Another factor is the ‘gravitational pull’ of the current or legacy business. The need to deliver quarterly earnings, serve existing customers, maintain profit margins, manage the many daily operational challenges, all consume the majority of resources and senior management attention. Too little focus goes towards embracing the brewing disruption.

A third reason is the fear of cannibalisation. The new model is, at least initially, much less profitable than the current business and so there is a big fear of margin dilution.

Microsoft’s cloud services, for instance, have nowhere near the profitability of its old Windows and Office businesses. However, some margin is much better than zero margin.

The new business model usually requires a very different mindset and new capabilities. In the IT services business, for example, success requires the ability to hold a proactive conversation with CEOs and CXOs about the digital transformation of their business, rather than simply responding to project requests for proposals (RFPs) issued by the IT department. Building these capabilities is nontrivial and time-consuming. Finally, there is governance. Though the boards of good companies are populated by accomplished leaders, few boards have independent directors with a visceral grasp of the magnitude of impending changes. It is all too easy then to remain focused on revenue growth and earnings per share until it’s too late.

One obvious sign of this is to look at how the CEO is compensated. All too often, it is based on the financial performance of the legacy business rather than the momentum of the future business model.

Until, of course, it is too late. India’s extraordinary IT services companies face just such a transition today. What can be done? First and foremost, strategic transformation must be the top priority of the boards of companies facing disruption. Strategy cannot simply be left to the CEO and management.

It has to be a collaborative endeavour. Second, make it clear that the CEO’s top priority is the strategic transformation, not merely delivering the quarter and align compensation accordingly.

Third, realise that there are two kinds of risk: the risk of omission, or doing nothing versus the risk of commission, or trying something different. The risk of commission is better than doing nothing and the urgency and consequences of failure are such that there should be no half-measures.

A significant reason why Kodak and others failed is because their responses to disruption were halfhearted or anaemic. This won’t work. To succeed, companies have to be ‘all-in’ or utterly committed to the shift.

This may mean making significant acquisitions, or bringing in very different talent, even though these moves have major risk and can blow up too. In nature, it is not the strongest species that survive, nor the most intelligent, but the ones most adaptable to change.

(Source: Article by Mr Ravi Venkatesan in ‘The Economic Times’ dated 19-05-2015. The writer is a member of the board of Infosys and former chairman, Microsoft India)

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Optimism – Choose: Mud or the stars?

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Optimism is not a deep, complicated philosophy or a school of thought. It is more a matter of our general attitude to life. We find that some people always look at the bright side of things while there are some others who always see the bad, dark side of things. To an optimist, every cloud has a silver lining. A pessimist, on the other hand, misses the silver lining and sees only the cloud.
Frederick Langbridge sums it up, “Two men look out through the same bars: one sees the mud, and one the stars”. One Sunday morning, when William Dean Howells and Mark Twain came out of the church, it started raining heavily. “Do you think it will stop?” asked Howells. “It always has,” replied Twain. An optimist hopes for the best. Optimism nurtures two things most: hope and cheerfulness. Alexander regarded hope as the greatest possession of mankind. He held that if you destroy ‘hope’, you destroy ‘future’. Hope strengthens will to survive calamities, so that we never give way to despair. It helps us count our blessings, and hope persistently goads us to ‘go on’. It is rightly said that “an optimist sees an opportunity in every calamity; a pessimist sees a calamity in every opportunity”.

An optimist reacts to situations differently. He thinks and acts in a positive manner. Urdu poet Asar Lakhnavi wrote, when I do not succeed in achieving my aim, I think of attaining it through a different approach, and so I try again.

(Source: Editorial by Niti Paul Mehta in ‘The Economic Times’ dated 22.05.2015).

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Gold Monetisation Scheme – Needs more polish

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On paper, the draft gold monetisation scheme has something for everyone. It also looks like being an improvement over the existing gold deposit scheme. For individuals, the entry barrier has been reduced to 30 grammes of gold instead of the existing 500 grammes. Also, banks are free to decide on the interest rate, which is good for competition as well as depositors. And like the earlier scheme, there may not be any income or capital gains tax. Banks, which did not see much return on investment and therefore only sporadically promoted the 1999 scheme, have been allowed numerous options this time round. They can sell gold to raise foreign currency that can be used to lend to exporters and importers, convert it into coins and sell it, or lend it to jewellers. And if the Reserve Bank of India agrees, banks can use gold as part of their cash reserve ratio and statutory liquidity ratio requirements.

Indian households and temple trusts may hold as much as 22,000 tonnes of gold. So, for the government, even if the scheme’s success rate is less than 1 per cent, or 100- 200 tonnes annually in the next few years, the import bill can go down by 10 to 20 per cent, according to Nomura. India imported 967 tonnes of gold in 2014-15 and the import bill was $34.4 billion.

If the scheme succeeds, it will address both domestic demand and investment demand. The main benefit for jewellers and consequently, to customers will be the fall in the price of gold as the recycling of domestic gold will be without any import duty – currently at 10 per cent. The government has been under pressure from industry for some time to bring down the import duty.

So far, so good. But several problems may arise. For one, despite reduction of the minimum limit, individuals would be worried that if they pledge a significant amount of gold with banks, the income-tax department may want to know the source of that gold. Experts feel that the government should clarify the amount that can be pledged without income-tax scrutiny and possible harassment. Another big hindrance will be the tax on conversion of physical gold into the gold deposit scheme. That is, if the gold was bought at Rs 1,000 per 10 gramme and converted into a gold deposit scheme at Rs 25,000 per 10 grammes, there will be a capital gains tax of 20 per cent with indexation. If the date of acquiring is not known, April 1, 1984 will be used as the base year. Experts believe that the tax should only be imposed when gold is being sold and not when it is being converted like it is done in case of other asset classes like property or debt. To attract domestic gold, the government will have to address some of these issues if it has to avoid the fate of the 1999 gold deposit scheme – which attracted only 15 tonnes in the past 16 years.

(Source: Editorial in ‘Business Standard’ dated 21-05- 2015).

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Win hearts and minds

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The art of persuading by winning hearts is about connecting people emotionally to your idea or position. In any persuasive dialogue, you need to connect with others to some degree. This approach is highly effective in circumstances such as introducing a new idea and trying to pique interest; gaining support for a decision already been made; raising the bar on performance or commitment; leading a team struggling with discord or conflict; aligning with creative colleagues, like those in design or marketing.

The best method of persuasion in these circumstances is to connect with people on a very personal level. This is often referred to as a ‘hook’. Use vivid descriptions and metaphors to draw others into your vision. Share personal stories and experiences to demonstrate that what you’re suggesting is the right choice. Make sure you highlight what’s in it for them personally if they adopt your perspective or make a change.

What fears can you address to build trust and cultivate a feeling of safety in supporting your position? What motivations can you tap into to create alignment? Where can you find common ground to unite viewpoints? You are at your most convincing when you first appeal to the perspective, fear or motivation of your audience. Your goal in winning hearts is to make whatever you have to say matter on a personal level.…

The science of persuasion lies in winning minds with logical, well-articulated positioning and analysis in favour of your idea. To win minds, you have to do your homework. You certainly need a logical argument to support your perspective. Start by describing a situation everyone can agree is worth discussing, including both what it is and why it warrants attention.

(Extracts from “Focus on Winning Either Hearts or Minds” by Ms Lisa Lai in The Economic Times dated 22-05- 2015.)

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Ethics in Media: A Depressing Scenario

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`We are the Establishment`
This is how Vineet Jain replied to a question in an interview. Vineet is one of the Jain brothers, who own Bennet Coleman & Company, which controls the Times of India Media Group comprising of Newspapers, TV Channels, FM Radio Stations, Websites etc. The question was asked to Vineet Jain by `The New Yorker’ a prestigious weekly magazine published from USA. The magazine had published a story titled `Citizen Jain` in which this interview appeared. The title was synonymous with a famous Hollywood movie of yesteryears called `Citizen Kane`. The movie was based on the life of William Randolph Hearst, a newspaper tycoon (in those times there was no MEDIA) whose influence and power spread across US polity, society & economy. Orson Welles depicted the role of Hearst and was acclaimed for this performance.

The `New Yorker` cover story was titled `Citizen Jain`, to indicate that Jain brothers are wielding similar influence in India. The reply of Vineet Jain to interviewer’s question showed that the Jain Brothers also realise the power that they have and their willingness to use it whenever they want and for whatever purpose they need to use it.

How enormous this POWER is and how the ESTABLISHMENT flaunts it and uses it to crystallise the public opinion in whichever way it wants, can just be gauged by taking a cursory look at the events of the past 3-4 years.

And thereby hangs the tale of ETHICS IN MEDIA
Let us just take the example of agitation of `India Against Corruption’ for setting up LOKPAL. The agitation was led by Anna Hazare in which the present Chief Minister of Delhi, Arvind Kejriwal, his present political rival and BJP candidate for Chief Minister’s post during Delhi election Kiran Bedi, Prashant Bhushan & Yogendra Yadav were leading participants. The fast by Anna Hazare on the Ramlila grounds in New Delhi and the agitation lasted for nearly eight days. The Media—particularly News Channels—gave a saturation coverage to this agitation. The economics of Media demands a certain percentage of advertisement per hour of telecast. This mandates that for any half hour slot of telecast, there should be at least 12-15 minutes of advertisements. In fact, this rule is so mandatory that many important news programmes are cut short for telecasting advertisements. In spite of this, we would find that during those days of Anna Hazare’s agitation, the News Channels deliberately gave up about 600 crores of advertisement revenue by giving coverage to Hazare’s agitation without a advertisement break. Most of the News Channels, barring one or two, are in complete financial mess. In such a dire financial situation, how could these channels afford to lose so much revenue? The answer is that the Media companies which telecast these channels were promised that their loss would be compensated. Who could have given such a promise? The parties who were thinking of getting political benefit from the agitation and were aware of the power of Media to influence public opinion. How could a political party muster such a huge financial resource is a question which would naturally arise. Again, the answer would be that ties–or to use the cliché ‘nexus’—that have bonded together the political parties and corporate as well as other financial lobbies over a period of the last few decades. Of course, all these details are in the realm of speculation as nobody would be ready to provide upfront details about Media groups’ real financial dealing other than the statutory requirements. Still the fact remains that during Anna Hazare’s agitation, all the News Channels gave a saturation coverage without advertisement breaks and willingly gave up revenue.

Immediately after this agitation there were a series of exposes by almost all News Channels, major Newspapers as well as News magazines about various scams and the focus of the coverage was generally one sided. It depicted the then UPA government as a villain and branded most of the prominent ministers in the government as mired in corruption and nepotism without being factually objective. That created a general impression across the society that the government is anti-people and is not really interested in protecting as well as furthering the interests of common people and national interests. This helped the opposition to crystallise the public opinion against the then government. The campaign during 2014 Lok Sabha elections showed the reliance of political parties on Media and their attempts of using the Media as a tool to influence the public opinion. The latest example is that of various scandals about ministers in Central and Maharashtra as well as some other state governments. All of a sudden in second half of June all these scams are getting surfaced in the Media. Why this is happening and how could this have happened are the questions and if we try to find out the answers of these questions by relating this present scenario with the events during UPA period, it will lead us to the conclusion that these SCAMS are coming under the Media glare due to a definite design. The designer who may have sketched the design seems to be a section of influential corporate lobby which perceives that the present political set up has not been really beneficial for them. The scenario before May 2014 was crafted by the corporate and other business and commercial interest coming together with a firm view that the then government was detrimental to their interests and should not be allowed to come again to power. These lobbies funded the Media campaign before and during the 2014 Lok Sabha elections.

The same process of using Media to corner the present political set up seems to have been initiated. Otherwise, the sudden spurt of scams being revealed does not have any logical explanation.

All the above examples indicate the POWER of the ESTABLISHMENT and how this ESTABLISHMENT can become a tool in the hands of moneybags to be used in whatever way they want to influence the public opinion or to tarnish any ones image and credibility. How this POWER of the ESTABLISHMENT can destroy the careers and reputations of prominent people was displayed when transcripts of Radia Tapes were published

In such a scenario, business interests have dominated the functioning of Media groups rather than any Ethical framework. In a classical definition, PRESS is the FOURTH PILLAR of Democracy. All other three pillars of Democracy do not have any connection with BUSINESS. Though the PRESS has been termed as a FOURTH PILLAR, it is primarily a business venture. This uniqueness of PRESS (and now MEDIA) bestows on it a huge responsibility to perform the ideal role assigned to it. This puts a burden on PRESS to perform its function ethically. As per these ideals, newspapers (and Media in contemporary times) should be a watchdog to protect people’s interests, rights and freedoms. It should act objectively without any fear and favour and should not show any bias or inclination towards any particular group, section or community. Objectivity and adherence to truth should be the only guiding factor for any journalist working in print, electronic or web Media. Of course, these ideals are easy to preach and very hard to observe.

Evolution of the press
This would become clear as we look back on the evolution of PRESS in India. The evolution of Indian Press had a background of Freedom Struggle. Most of the regional languages as well as English Newspapers (barring newspapers such as Times of India or Statesman, which were owned by British) of those times were the vehicles of nationalist propaganda and their main objective was to project nationalistic viewpoint. Therefore, they had less `NEWS` and more `VIEWS`. The Newspapers really began to evolve as an INDUSTRY after Independence. The competition increased. So revenue earning became much more important. This could happen only  with  more advertisement. If a product is to be advertised in a particular Newspaper, then the producer would obviously be interested in finding out the readership profile of the Newspaper to gauge whether that section of people would be in a position to buy his product. If the readership profile does not match with the profile of the product, then advertising in that particular newspaper will be of no use for the producer. As the competition increased, there was a scramble to corner the advertisement revenue. This tilted the balance in favour of advertiser. This was the point at which the editorial control over the Newspapers started loosening and Advertising and Marketing departments became much more dominant. The advertiser started dictating terms and initiating process to demand the change in readership profile so as to suit the needs of    a particular product. For example, if any Newspaper wanted an advertisement from FMCG company then it was asked to prove that the readership has a economic capacity to purchase such products. If the Newspaper had no compatible readership profile and still it asked for the advertisement, then the company started demanding that it should change the readership profile by publishing news items liked and usually read by the consumers who are likely to purchase those products. So step by step, the `CONTENTS` of the Newspapers started getting managed by the Advertisement & Marketing departments on the cue given by the advertising agencies. This slide back acquired much speed after the 1991 economic liberalisation an opening up of various sectors of economy. New technology came into the industry. The Newspaper and magazines became much more colourful, sleek and glitzy. Then, satellite TV made its entry. Later on followed by News Channels. Now PRESS became MEDIA. The leading Media group like the Times of India declared itself as an ENTERTAINMENT GROUP. MEDIA became much more a business than a FOURTH PILLAR of DEMOCRACY.

The Paid News controversy which rocked the Media world was inevitable in such a scenario. Since a long time, political parties used to influence reporters and other journalistic staff to get a favourable news coverage. In the race to garner more and more revenue—in short to make more money—the owners of Newspapers decided to strike a deal with political parties themselves. That is how the NEWS became PAID.

Ethical FPAMEWORK
And in such a situation, it is no surprise that the Ethical Framework in the functioning of any MEDIA GROUP has been put on back burner. This framework has not been demolished, but it is very rarely followed and only invoked when a gross indecent and sensational reportage is published or telecast. The readership and viewership numbers dominate the discourse about Media now a days. TRP reigns supreme in electronic Media and to increase TRP ratings day by day the News  Channels are becoming more and more sensational and predatory. Obviously it has become much more easier for Corporate and Financial moneybags to influence the Media discourse with a carrot of easy finance as well  as  increase  in TRP ratings.

Still there are a number of enterprising and intrepid journalists, in both print and electronic Media, who are inspired by the ideals and who adhere to the ethical framework.  Unfortunately  the  space  in  the  Media  for such journalists is shrinking day by day,  as  the work culture gets  degraded  by  unethical  influences of money and muscle power  and  the  reluctance  of the ESTABLISHMENT to step in to clean up. In fact many a times the ESTABLISHMENT itself encourages these influences and allows them a free rein. The recent events of attack on Journalists in Uttar Pradesh an  Madhya  Pradesh  are  indicators  of  this  trend.   Of course, it must not be overlooked that access potential of a journalist and disproportionate influence wielded by even a small district Newspaper or a Video Channel encourages many unwanted elements in this profession, whose main aim is earning money be using blackmailing technique.

A statutory body like the Press Council of India or professional set up like Editors Guild have now become redundant institutions. They do not have any legal teeth and they can only admonish a recalcitrant Media group or an individual or a group of Journalists. Therefore, these institutions are not taken seriously. The electronic Media has set up an Ombudsman. But his observations and orders on complaints made are more than often overlooked. The associations or organisations of working journalists are prone to be more active on the issues of pecuniary and other benefits rather than about issues of ethical functioning.

Conclusion
Overall it  is  a  depressing  scenario  and  therein  lies  a danger to the freedom of Media. The sensational, predatory, unethical functioning is creating revulsion across the society against  the  Media.  This  has  started impinging on the credibility of the Media. This opens up a space for the powers that be to step and introduce some measures to curb the freedom in the name of putting an end to sensationalism of the Media. To guard against this danger, Media professionals must proactively initiate a process for internal discussion and debate to evolve a mechanism for enforcing ethical functioning. A collective action may be able to convince or at least force the ESTABLISHMENT to step in and help the professionals to rein in the predatory and sensational tendencies.

ETHICS IN ARCHITECTURAL PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE

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Preamble
We, the Indians, inherit various scriptures that
were transcended from generations, from father to son. We have naturally
cultivated our lifestyle conducive to the best practices required to
keep our body, mind and soul in a fit and fine mode. The philosophy we
adopted was in four Universal Brahma Sentences.

In every
profession, there are Rules and Regulations which each and every
professional is bound to abide by while performing his duties.
Architects are not taught, but are made aware of the subject. The idea
is that freedom of expression should not be stifled but should be given a
free hand. Each and every individual is encouraged to create his own
unique design which would really influence culture.

It is said
that Doctors’ mistakes are buried below the earth and Architects’
mistakes are for the world to see. The test of a good Architectural
design is that it needs to be functional and aesthetically appealing.

What is architecture?
As
architects, we are expected constantly to dwell upon the creative
aspect of design. Since architecture is not mathematics, designs cannot
be judged as right or wrong. What matters is the context, concept and
shape which then decides whether design is functional or wonderful or
awesome.

Architecture is basically the Art and Science of
designing spaces and providing services to multifunctional activities
for all human beings. This is the only discipline which encompasses the
major fields of human endeavour: Humanity, Science, Art, and Technology.

Architecture is the matrix of human civilisation, an authentic
measure of the social status and an evocative expression of ethos of an
era. When conserved it is a heritage and when ruined it becomes
archeology. Architecture has generated specialisation. City planning,
landscape and interior architecture, retro fitting of buildings,
architectural conservation, construction management have also lately
emerged as specialisation. Each of these compliments and supports each
other.

Architectural Design essentially is a product of an
individual mind but realised through association of experts from allied
fields who contribute in the process of construction with mutual respect
and understanding and work, assuring high quality of end product.

Regulation of the profession
The
practice of architectural profession is regulated by the Architects
Act, 1972 and Regulations framed there under. The Council of
Architecture has prescribed the conditions of engagement and scale of
charges under the Architects (Professional Conduct) Regulations, 1989.
The documents prescribed, stipulate the parameters within which the
architect is required to function. These define the responsibilities,
the scope of work and services and also prescribe the mandatory minimum
scale of professional charges with a view to make the client fully aware
of the architect. The professional services required by the client may
not be comprehensive in scope in all cases and accordingly, clear understanding between the two must be arrived at. The
Council of Architecture has prescribed the conditions of engagement
based on general practices to all registered architects and such
architects who have specialised in areas such as Structural Design,
Urban Design, City Planning, Landscape Architecture, Interior
Architecture and Architectural Conservation.

Scope of Services
Generally,
architects are required to provide following services, and these
services are called comprehensive services. However, client can also opt
for partial services as per mutual agreement.

a. Taking Client’s instructions and preparation of design in brief.
b. Site evaluation, analysis and impact of existing/or proposed development on its immediate environs.
c. Design and site development.
d. Structural design.
e. Sanitary, plumbing, drainage, water supply and sewerage design.
f. Electrical, electronics, communication systems and design.
g. Heating, ventilation and air conditioning design (HVAC) and other mechanical systems.
h. Elevators, escalators etc.
i. Fire detection, fire protection and security systems etc.
j. Periodic inspection and evaluation of construction work.

The
Architect shall, after taking instructions from the client, render the
following services as described below in various stages:

Stage 1: Concept Design
Take
instructions of client to ascertain the requirements and study the
environs. Prepare report, conceptual design and submit to the client for
approval.

Stage 2: Preliminary Design and Drawings
Modification of conceptual design.

Stage 3: Drawings for Clients and Obtaining Statutory Approvals
Prepare drawings for clients and obtaining statutory approvals from Competent Authorities, if required.

Stage 4: Working Drawings and Tender Documents
Prepare
working drawings and tender documents which cover the mode of
measurements, method of payments, quality control procedures on
materials and works and other conditions of contract.

Stage 5: Appointment of Contractors
Invite, receive and analyse tenders. Also advise the client on appointment of contractor.

Stage 6: Construction
Prepare and issue working drawings and details for proper execution of works during construction.

Approve samples of various elements and components.

Check and approve shop drawings submitted by contractor/ vendors.

Visit
site periodically at intervals agreed mutually, to inspect and evaluate
the construction works. Clarify decisions, interpret
drawings/specifications, attend meetings to ensure that the project
progresses generally in accordance with the conditions of contract and
also to keep the client informed and render advice on actions, if
required.

In order to ensure that the work at site progresses in
accordance with conditions of contract, the day to day supervision will
be carried out by a construction manager (clerk of works/site
supervisor/or construction management agency in case of large and
complex project), who shall work under guidance and direction of the
Architect and shall be appointed and paid by Client. Issue Certificate
of Virtual Completion.

Stage 7: Completion
Prepare
and submit completion reports and drawings for the project as required
and assist the client in obtaining “Completion/Occupation Certificate”
from Statutory authorities, wherever required.

Other aspects
include schedule of payment of professional fees based on stage-wise
completion of contract, documentation and communication charges and
reimbursable expenses.

Architects are supposed to work as per the conditions of engagement, scope of work as well as scale of charges.

Professional Conduct and selfregulation
Further, Council of Architecture in exercise of the powers conferred by the Architects Act, 1972 (Act No. 20 of 1972),read with clause (i) of sub
section (2) of section 45 with approval of the central government, made
the Architects (Professional Conduct) Regulation, 1989 to promote the
standard of professional conduct and self – discipline required of an
Architect, as detailed below:

(1) Every architect, either in
practice or employment, subject to the provisions of the Central Civil
Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 or any other similar rules applicable to
an architect shall:

(i) Ensure that his professional activities
do not conflict with his general responsibility to contribute to the
quality of the environment and future welfare of society,

(ii)    Apply his skill to the creative, responsible and economic development of his country,

(iii)    Provide professional services of a high standard, to the best of his ability,

(iv)    If in private practice, inform his client of the conditions of engagement and scale of charges and  agree that these conditions shall be on the basis of the appointment,

(v)    Not   sub   –   commission   to   another   architect or architects the work for which he has been commissioned without prior agreement of his client,

(vi)    Not give or take discount, commissions, gift or other inducements for the introduction of clients or of work,

(vii)    Act with fairness and impartiality when administering a building contract.

(viii)    Maintain a high standard of integrity,

(ix)    Promote the advancement of Architecture, standards of Architectural education, research, training and practice,
(x)    Conduct himself in a manner which is not derogatory to his professional character, nor likely to lessen the confidence of the public in the profession, nor bring Architects into disrepute,

(xi)    Compete fairly with other Architects,

(xii)    Observe and uphold the Council’s conditions of engagement and scale of charges,
(xiii)    Not supplant or attempt to supplant another Architect,

(xiv)    Not to prepare designs in competition with other Architects for a client without payment or for reduced fee (except in a competition conducted in accordance with the Architectural competition guidelines approved by the Council),

(xv)    Not attempt to obtain, offer to undertake or accept a commission for which he knows another Architect has been selected or employed until he has evidence that the selection, employment or agreement has been terminated and he has given the previous Architect written notice that he is so doing, provided that in the preliminary stages of work, the Client may consult, in order to select the architect, as many architects as he wants, provided he makes payment of charges to each of the architects so consulted,

(xvi)    Comply with Council’s guidelines for architectural competitions and inform the Council of his appointment as assessor for an architectural competition,

(xvii)    When working in other countries, observe the requirements of codes of conduct applicable to the place where he is working,

(xviii)    Not have or take as partner in his firm any person who is disqualified for registration  by  reason  of  the fact that his name has been removed from the Register under section 29 or 30 of the Architects Act 1972,

(xix)    Provide their employees with suitable working environment, compensate them fairly and facilitate their professional development,
(xx)    Recognise and respect the professional contribution of his employees,

(xxi)    Provide their associates with suitable working environment, compensate them fairly and facilitate their professional development,

(xxii)    Recognise and respect the professional contribution of his associates,

(xxiii)    Recognise and respect the professional contribution of the consultants,

(xxiv)    Enter into agreement with them defining their scope of work, responsibilities, functions, fees and mode of payment,

(xxv)    Shall not advertise his professional services nor shall he allow his name to be included in advertisement or to be used for publicity purpose except for certain prescribed situations

(2)    In a partnership firm of architects, every partner shall ensure that such partnership firm complies with the provisions of sub–regulation (1).

In view of above, we are supposed to adopt best practices in architecture, based on guidelines prepared by the Council of Architecture.

Ethical values in our profession
In my practice of the profession, I have faced some ethical and moral challenges on a number of occasions. I am narrating some of those situations

1)    I was working with one of the leading Architectural Consulting firm during my tenure of service from 1993 to 2002. During the service, I was elevated from Assistant Architect to a very responsible post and was responsible for each & every aspect of decision-making with respect to approvals to occupation certificates.

I was handling almost 30 projects at a time. Of course that was peak time for us in real estate during 1995 – 1999.

It had so happened that in one of our projects some documents were missing, rather, with regard to certain assertions, there was a misrepresentation by the client himself. We were shocked to know that the client had made a blunder. My employer was about to tender his resignation as architect. I was of the opinion that we should not tender our resignation at this stage, and I insisted that the client disclose the correct facts. Not doing so would be shirking our social responsibility. He agreed with my views. We pursued the matter with our client and got him to place on record the valid correct document which was necessary and then proceeded with further work.

If we had ignored the misrepresentation, it would have benefitted the client. If we had taken the decision of resigning from the project, we would have lost trust of the officers of the corporation. We chose the ethical path.
2)    In one of the projects, I was appointed as an architect. Due to large size of land parcel, a layout was required to be approved. However, it was pointed out by the client that the same had already been submitted by another architect in the past. The client also provided the so called Xerox copy of his letter, which I did not believe to be a proper copy and therefore I did not certify the same.

The case came up for hearing in front of municipal officers and I was shocked to know that the previous Architect had not even given his resignation. On knowing that, despite the fact that my effort would go unrewarded I did not continue the project as an architect and was also saved because I had not certified that purported letter of resignation of the previous architect.

    Architect’s professional liability
Professionals are required to discharge their obligations and commitments diligently and befitting with quality and standards of service. The Council of  Architecture  being the regulator of Architectural Education and Profession throughout the country formulates guidelines on architect’s liability.

“Architects Professional Liability” has been approved by Council of Architecture at its 40th meeting.

  •     Professional Duties of Architect

1.    service:
The relationship between the architect and the client is that of a service provider and recipient. The professional services rendered by the architect are pursuant to the conditions of engagement and scale of charges entered into between the architect and the client.

  •     Competence: An architect being a professional shall possess the required knowledge and skill, proficiency and competence for discharging his professional duties and functions.

  •     Duty of Care: It means duty to exercise utmost skill and care.

  •    Duties: The duties that  are  required  to be performed  by an architect for various  types  of  projects  have been prescribed by Council of Architecture under the Conditions of Engagement and Scale of Charges for respective areas in the field of architecture.

2.    Professional Conduct:
An architect shall comply with the standards of professional conduct and etiquette and a Code of Ethics set out in clauses
(i)    To (xxv),read with exceptions covered by sub-clauses (a) to (h) of sub- regulation (1) of Regulation 2 of the Architects (Professional Conduct) Regulations, 1989. Violation of any of the provisions of sub-regulation (1) shall constitute a Professional misconduct.

3.    Duties and responsibilities of clients/ owners and occupants:

The client/owner shall discharge all his obligations connected with the project and engagement of the architect in accordance with the Conditions of Agreement as agreed upon. Further, the client (s)/owner (s) and Occupant(s), upon completion of the building shall maintain it properly to safeguard and preserve the longevity of the building.

4.    professional negligence:

4.1    Negligence: “Negligence” of an architect means failure to take reasonable degree of care in the course of his engagement for rendering professional services.

4.2    Deficient service:

4.2.1    “Deficiency”, as defined under section 2(1)(g) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 means any fault, imperfection, shortcoming or inadequacy in the quality, nature of performance which is required  to be maintained by or under any law for the time being in force or has been undertaken to be performed by a person in pursuance of a contract or otherwise in relation to any service.

4.2.2    An Architect is required to observe and uphold the Council’s  Conditions  of  Engagement  and   Scale of Charges while rendering architectural service/ services that is/are necessary for discharge of his duties and functions for the project for which he has been engaged, amount to deficient service.

a)    Use of Building for the purpose other than for which it has been designed.

b)    Any changes/modifications to the building carried out by the owner(s)/occupant (s) without the consent or approval of the Architect who designed and/or supervised the construction of the building.

c)    Any changes / alterations / modifications carried out by consulting another architect without the knowledge and consent of erstwhile architect or without obtaining No Objection Certificate of the building.

d)    Illegal / unauthorised changes / alterations / renovations / modifications carried out by the owner
(s) / occupant (s).

e)    Any compromise with the safety norms by the owner(s)/occupants(s).

f)    Distress due to leakage from terrace, toilet, water logging within the vicinity of the building and that would affect the strength /stability of the structure or general wellbeing.

g)    Lack of periodical maintenance or inadequate maintenance by owner(s)/occupant(s).

h)    Damages caused due to any reasons arising out of specialised consultant’s deficient services with regard to design and supervision of the work entrusted to them, who were appointed /engaged in consultation with the client.

i)    Damages caused to the building for the reasons beyond the control of the architects.

5.    Professional Negligence and Deficiency in services -professional Misconduct

If any person is aggrieved by the professional negligence and/or deficiency in services provided by  the  architect,  the matter shall be referred to the Council of Architecture under Rule 35 of the Council of Architecture Rules,  1973 to adjudicate whether the architect is guilty of professional misconduct or not.

6.    Professional Liabilities

6.1    Indemnity Insurance: The architect is required to indemnify the client against losses and damages incurred by the client through the acts of the Architect and shall take out and maintain a Professional Indemnity Insurance Policy, as may be mutually agreed between the  architect  and  the  client,  with a Nationalized Insurance Company or any other recognized Insurance Company by paying the requisite premium.

Maintenance of record: The  architect  is  required to maintain all records related to the project for a minimum period of 4 years after the issuance of Certificate of Virtual Completion.
6.3    Duration: – The architect’s liability shall be limited to  a maximum period of three years after the building is handed over to / occupied by the owner, whichever is earlier.

7.    Nature of liability:
An architect is liable for the negligent act which he committed in the performance of his duties. The action against an architect can be initiated by the client on satisfying the following conditions:

(a)    There must exist a duty to take care, which is owed by an architect to his clients.
(b)    There must be failure on the part of an architect to attain that standard of care prescribed by law, thereby committed breach of such duty.
(c)    The client must have suffered damage due to such breach of duty.

Disciplinary Action under The Architect Act, 1972
:
If an architect is found guilty of professional misconduct, he is liable for disciplinary action by the Council of Architecture under section 30 of the Architects Act, 1972, Civil and Criminal action in the Courts of Law.

The disciplinary action taken by the Council of Architect against the architect who has been found guilty of professional misconduct does not absolve him of his liabilities under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, if any.

Some of the relevant laws include The Law of Torts, The Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and The Indian Penal Code, 1860 etc.

Case Studies
Prof. Madhav Deobhakta in his book “Architectural Practice in India” illustrated some cases:

1)    Not taking action on their own about area of plot:
There were 13 complaints lodged by civic authorities against Architects in Mumbai. These related to certifying larger area of Land than the actual area. The disciplinary committee after investigations reported that 4 out of 13 be called before the Council. These 4 Architects admitted that they had not surveyed the lands in question; but relied upon the area certificates obtained by their clients. When questioned, they admitted that the area shown in the certificates was much more than the actual area. Further, these four Architects admitted that they did not take any steps to re-survey the plots from City Survey Office.

Council reprimanded these four architects for failure to take action on their own while discharging their professional duties.

2)    Wrong certification of condition of Building: The Architect was requested by one of the tenants to give a report on the condition of the building for a court matter. He reported that the condition of the building was sound. At the time of joint inspection under Court’s order, he admitted that the condition of the building was not sound. When questioned at the time of the appearance before the Bar of the Council, he said when he inspected the building at time of making report it was in sound condition; but the owner was responsible for its sudden deterioration.

Council after considering all facts came to the conclusion that the architect did not act in a responsible manner and decided to reprimand him for professional misconduct.

Conclusion:
The main purpose of the Architects Act, 1972 is to protect the general public from unqualified persons working as architects and to ensure the professional conduct of the practicing Architects.

There are cases of action taken against and for Architects. By and large, professional ethics are generally observed by Architects who work with integrity, responsibility and trust as they consider their profession as the first priority in life.

While regulations are indeed necessary, one has to be ethical in spirit and not only in letter. In life one has to set the ethical bar high enough. It is only then that one can lead life with the head held high!

[2015-TIOL-1085-CESTAT-MUM] Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai-ii vs. Syntel Sterling Bestshores Solutions Pvt. Ltd

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Input services without which the quality and efficiency of output services exported cannot be achieved are eligible for refund.

Facts:
The
Respondent is a BPO rendering services to the clients based abroad. A
refund claim was filed in respect of service tax paid on rent-a-cab
service, telephone service and rent. Adjudicating authority denied the
claim. On appeal, the first appellate authority allowed the refund
claim, aggrieved by which revenue is in appeal.

Held:
The
Tribunal relied upon the CBEC’s Circular No. 120/01/2010-ST dated
19/01/2010 which specifically provides that essential services used by
Call Centres for provision of their output service would qualify as
input services eligible for taking CENVAT credit as well as refund. It
further held that the expression ‘used in’ in the CENVAT Credit Rules
should be interpreted in a harmonious manner and accordingly as the
input services disallowed were essential to provide quality output
services, the refund should be granted.

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2015 (38) STR 673 (Del.) Delhi Transport Corporation vs. CST

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A service provider is statutorily liable to pay service tax even
though based on contractual arrangement, service tax liability can be
recovered from the service receiver. Though liability can be transferred
to third party, revenue cannot be asked to recover the same from third
party or asked to wait till its recovery

Facts:
The
Appellants provided space to various contractors/ advertisers for
display of advertisement. The terms of contract clearly stated that the
contractors were responsible for paying tax to the concerned authorities
in addition to the license fees payable to them. The department issued
various letters followed by a Show Cause Notice to the Appellants for
discharge of service tax liability on such sale of space for
advertisement along with penalties. The Appellants argued that they were
autonomous body of Delhi Government and they had no intention to evade
service tax. Inadvertently, they did not obtain registration. As per
contractual arrangement, all the contractors paid service tax which was
duly deposited except 2 of the contractors. In spite of directions of
High Court u/s. 9 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, these 2
contractors did not abide the contract. Accordingly, they were intending
to institute contempt proceedings. The department invoked extended
period of limitation on the grounds of suppression of facts. It was
argued that they were under a bonafide belief that liability was
transferred to contractors in view of the Agreements. However, the
argument of bonafide belief was rejected by CESTAT on the grounds that
the Appellants should have taken efforts to find out who was liable to
pay service tax and there was no ambiguity in provisions of service tax
law.

Held:
The Hon’ble High Court observed that
though service tax burden can be transferred by way of contractual
arrangement, statutorily service provider is required to discharge
service tax liability and the assessee cannot ask revenue to recover tax
dues from a third party or wait till recovery of such tax dues from a
third party. In view of the orders under Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996, the Appellants can recover service tax paid. However, these
orders would not affect recovery by department from the Appellants.
Accordingly, service tax liability with interest and penalties were
confirmed. Though the Appellants took a stand to discharge service tax
liability only after receipt thereof from contractors, there were no
malafide intentions. Further, in absence of support of facts and also in
view of poor financial position, penalty u/s. 78 of the Finance Act,
1994 was waived vide section 80 of the Finance Act, 1994.

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2015 (38) STR 458 (All.)Daurala Sugar Works vs. UOI

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Department cannot take any action on the basis of an advisory notice merely asking the assessee to pay service tax to avoid penal consequences.

Facts:
Department issued an advisory notice, which stated that the petitioner should pay service tax to avoid penal consequences. The legality of such advisory notice was questioned in this Writ Petition. The revenue also stated that the notice was merely advisory and if authority wishes to take any action, they can issue a Show Cause Notice.

Held:
There was no need to make any observation since no Show Cause Notice was issued. Accordingly, the writ Petition was disposed off.

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2015] 57 taxmann.com 72 (Bom H C) – Commissioner of Central Excise, Goa vs. Hindustan Coca Cola Beverages (P) Ltd.

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CENVAT – Definition of “input service” post 01- 04-2011 – Service tax paid on mobile phones which are used by employees/staff of manufacturer are eligible as input service credit.

Facts:
The Assessee availed CENVAT credit of service tax paid on mobile phones used by its employees/ staff. Department relied upon CENVAT credit circular dated 20th June 2003 and denied the credit. Assessee argued that input services were not defined in Service Tax Credit Rules, 2002 and so circular not applicable under CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

Held:
The High Court held that ‘saving’ provision as per Rule 16 of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 provides that circulars prior to these rules shall be applicable only if they are consistent with it. Since, “input services” was not defined in Service Tax Credit Rules, 2002; it cannot be said that there is any corresponding Rule in Rules of 2004 which can be said to have been saved. The High Court further held that, as per definition of “Input Services” in Rule 2(l) of CCR, any expenditure incurred in manufacturing activity would be entitled for credit facility. It is undisputed that mobile phones are in connection with manufacturing process of the respondent. Thus CENVAT credit would be allowed thereby rejecting the appeal.

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[2015] 57 taxmann.com 402 (SC)-Coal Handlers (P) Ltd vs. Commissioner of Central Excise Range Kolkata-I

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Supervising and liaisoning with coal companies and railways for verification of material as per requirement of cement companies cannot be termed as a clearing and forwarding agent’s service as they are not connected with clearing and forwarding operations.

Facts:
The assessee is providing services to various cement companies under agency agreement for following up allotment of coal rakes by railways, expediting and supervising loading and labeling of rail wagons, drawing samples of coal loaded on wagons, paying freight to railways and dispatching rail receipts to cement companies. Department contended that the said services amount to Clearing and Forwarding Agent’s Service. The Tribunal decided against the assessee relying upon the decision of Prabhat Zarda Factory (India) Ltd [2002 taxmann.com 1307 (CEGAT – Kolkata)].

Held:
The Supreme Court observed that Prabhat Zarda’s case relied upon by the Tribunal has been overruled by the Larger Bench of the Tribunal in Larsen & Toubro Ltd.’s case 2006 (3) STR 321 (Tri- LB) and that, department has accepted the decision of Larger Bench and did not file appeal against the same. The Court also considered definition of “clearing and forwarding agent” under erstwhile section 65(25) of the Finance Act, 1994 and also dictionary meaning of the word forwarding agent and its characteristics and held that in order to qualify as a C&F Agent, such a person is to be found to be engaged in providing any service connected with “clearing and forwarding operations”. Of course, once it is found that such a person is providing the services which are connected with the “clearing and forwarding operations”, then whether such services are provided directly or indirectly would be of no significance and such a person would be covered by the definition.

As regards what constitutes “clearing and forwarding operations”, the Court held that, it would cover those activities which pertain to clearing of the goods and thereafter forwarding those goods to a particular destination, at the instance and on the directions of the principal. In the context of present appeals it would essentially include getting the coal cleared as an agent on behalf of the principal from the supplier of the coal (i.e. collieries) and thereafter dispatching/ forwarding the said coal to different destinations as per the instructions of the principal. In the process, it may include warehousing of the goods so cleared, receiving dispatch orders from the principal, arranging dispatch of the goods as per the instructions of the principal by engaging transport on his own or through the transporters of the principal, maintaining records of the receipt and dispatch of the goods and the stock available on the warehouses and preparing invoices on behalf of the principal.

Having explained the scope of clearing and forwarding operations, the Apex Court held that, that assessee did not play a role of getting coal cleared from collieries. Movement of coal is under contract of sale between coal company and cement companies. Even the coal is loaded on to the railway wagons by the coal company. There is no occasion for cement companies to instruct the appellant to dispatch/forward the goods to a particular destination which is already fixed as per the contract between the coal company and the cement companies. The railway rakes are placed by the coal company for the said destinations. The appellant does not even undertake any loading operation as the primary job, as per the contract, is of supervising and liasoning with the coal company as well as the railways to see that the material required by cement companies is loaded as per the schedule. At no stage the custody of the coal is taken by the appellant or transportation of the coal, as forwarders, is arranged by them. In these circumstances, Apex Court held that, the services would not qualify as C&F Agent within the meaning of section 65(25) of the Finance Act, 1994.

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Builders’ plight continues

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Introduction Whether builders and developers are works contractors, under sales tax/VAT laws, has chequered history. In the late 1980s when works contract was introduced, there were determination orders passed by the learned Commissioner of Sales Tax, determining that builders were not liable to sales tax (works contract) when they were selling premises to prospective buyers. After the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of K. Raheja (141 STC 168), the Sales Tax Department of Maharashtra took a view that builders were also ‘works contractors’ and liable to tax accordingly. The above position was challenged by preferring writ petitions in the Hon’ble Bombay The High Court. Hon’ble Bombay High Court decided the issue vide judgment in MCHI (51 VST 168) and held that in certain circumstances the builders were also works contractors. This decision was challenged before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, along with other matters, decided that the above issue, vide its judgment in case of Larsen & Toubro and others (65 VST 1). In above judgment, the Hon’ble Larger Bench of the Supreme Court confirmed the judgment of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court that builders and developers were works contractors. However, while deciding the issues before it, the Hon’ble Supreme Court also observed that the contract starts from the date of agreement with the prospective buyer and the completed portion prior to the date of such agreement would amount to sale of immovable property, thus such portion could be subjected to sales tax/VAT. Supreme Court also advised for necessary changes in the provisions. ? Amendments made in Rules vide notification dtd. 29.01.2014 To comply with the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in above judgment, Government of Maharashtra amended the rules particularly rule 58(1A) was amended, and, further rules 58(1B) and 58(1C) were inserted. The sum and substance of above amendments was that if the dealer (builder/ developer) claimed deduction for cost of land, it should be allowed as per ready reckoner rate of the concerned land and if higher deduction is claimed, it should be supported by determination of value of land by Department of Town Planning & Valuation. Similarly, for deduction towards constructed portion prior to date of agreement, the rules 58(1B) & (1C) provided a table about stages for deduction and also cast an obligation to support the construction of the said portion by certificate from Local or Planning Authority. For sake of brevity the above rules are not discussed elaborately here.

Fresh Writ Petition challenging the validity of the above rules

Confederation of Real Estates Developers’ Association of India – Maharashtra & others filed writ petition in the Bombay High Court. The said writ petitions are decided vide Writ Petition no. 4520 of 2014 & others dated 30.4.2015. The challenges were to the above rules. The challenges as recorded by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court are reproduced below: –

“5. Grounds of challenge are that the impugned notification and the trade circulars are in express conflict with the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of “Larsen and Toubro Limited vs. State of Karnataka and Another” (2014) 1 SCC 708 and other pronouncements of this High Court and the Supreme Court. It is being submitted that amended Rule 58 fails to arrive at true and correct value of goods at the time of incorporation in the works contract and tends to indirectly tax immovable property and along with goods. Though Rule 58 (1A) makes allowance for deduction of cost of land, it compels determination in accordance with guidelines appended to Annual Statement of Rates, prepared under the provisions of Bombay Stamp (Determination of True Market Value of Property) Rules, 1995 (Hereinafter referred to as Bombay TMV Rules, 1995), as would be applicable on 1st January of calendar year in which agreement of sale is to be registered, and as such, profit relatable to transfer of land would not be deductible from the total contract value. The Amended Rule 58 (1A) of the MVAT Rules also does not give allowance to deductions on account of consideration for acquisition of FSI/TDR, payments towards eviction of tenants, clearance of encroachment on land. While Rule 58 (1) (h) permits deduction of profit relatable to supply of labour and service, amended rule does not provide for profit relatable to third element, namely, the land and the object of taxing of value of goods at the time of incorporation, as such, gets blurred. Trade Circular dated 21st February, 2014 restricts options to only one from the four methods given and no other option such as, ‘cost plus gross profit’ is admissible. Various other arguments have been advanced to contend that the Rule is deficient to provide for many things involved. Arguments are also advanced contending that Trade Circulars tend to be ambiguous and do not clarify many issues while they purport to answer the questions. According to the petitioners cost plus gross profit method is viable and practicable.

6. The petitioners further contend that Rule 58 (1B) of the MVAT Rules, seeks to enact a wide and arbitrary categorisation. Stage wise percentage provided under rule 58 (1B) has no basis, either for stage or for percentage of construction. According to them, percentage of material on which taxes are sought to be levied is on higher side and it is unfair and unconstitutional. The percentage prescribed is not in tune with ground realities and technical considerations. According to the petitioners, though prescription of table has been modelled on recommendations of Public Works Department, the same is insufficient and would not be applicable to the cases of developers. There is huge difference in the contracts with the Public Works Department and the nature of work of the developer, viz., Public Works Department contract provides for escalation, which is not the case with the developer. It is further contended that presumptions underlying the table under rule 58 (1B) that work is done on site as per stage given, yet it would not necessarily represent the way construction is carried out, in stages and in the sequences, for, it may be combination of various stages or activities may be simultaneous and as such, the table would not be able to give correct determination of value of work done at the time of entering into an agreement.”

There were elaborate arguments, which were considered by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court. Assuming that there may be some chances that valuation of goods may not be correct or some portion of immovable property may get taxed, the overall view of the Hon’ble High Court is that the rules are for uniformity and hence cannot be said to be invalid or unconstitutional. The Hon’ble High Court recorded its reasons, amongst others in following words:- “62. This Court is to consider validity of provisions valuing taxable goods for the purpose of charging duty. While enacting a measure to serve as a standard as levy, the legislation may not contour it along with the lines which spell out the character of the levy itself. Viewed from this standpoint, it is not possible to accept the contention that because the levy of MVAT is a levy on transfer of goods in a works contract, the value of goods must be limited to cost plus profit. The broader based standard may be adopted and would be within authority and power of legislation. A standard which maintains a nexus with the essential character of the levy can be regarded as a valid basis for assessing the measure of levy.

63.    There is further consideration that the value shall be arrived at, assessed and ascertained  on the modality  as has been referred to under Rule 58 (1) (1A)and (1B) of the MVAT Rules. The value is a measure of tax and Rule 58 provides for determination of value of goods to be arrived at after deductions therefrom, referred under the rules/formulae. Values and items as referred to  under Rule 58 (1), 58 (1A) and 58 (1B) are criteria for computing value of subject of tax at various stages as have been referred to under the Rules. Table under Rule 58 (1B) specifies the stages and value at the stages. The computation of value is to be done in accordance with the terms of the same. It is intended to determine value of goods and provides basis for determining such value.

The value has to be ascertained and determined in such a manner as is prescribed and shall be value of the subject of tax for the purpose of charging MVAT. The legislature, while enacting amended rules, did not intend to create a scheme materially different from the one in the previous rule 58 (1A) of the MVAT Rules. The object and purpose remained the same and so did original principle at the core of the scheme, and has been made more flexible and wider.

64.    The first essential characteristic of MVAT is it is a tax on transfer of property in goods, secondly, uniformity of incidence is also a characteristic of the tax and thirdly the collection of tax. MVAT can be imposed on assessable value determined with reference to transfer of goods at the stage as referred to in the table. It is legislature’s power to legislate in respect of the basis for determining the measure of tax. The computation being made strictly in accordance with the express provisions under the rules, there is no warrant for confining the value as sought to be submitted by the assessee. It is open for the legislature to adopt any basis for determining the value of a taxable article. The measure for assessing the levy need not correspond completely to the nature of levy, and no fault can be found with the measure so long as it bears nexus with the charge. ……

67. The amended provisions define a measure of  charge and the standard adopted by the legislature for determining value which may require/press for broader base than that on which the charging proceeds. By now, it is well settled that stage of collection need not in point of time synchronise with the transfer of property in goods
for as is being a long standing position that in our country levy has status of constitutional concept while the point of collection is to be located where the statute declares it. Taking into account this, the valuation of tax being made at the stages is a convenient mode for point of collection. It would not be necessarily confused with the nature of tax. Rule 58 (1B) envisages a method of valuation of   tax at the stages as have been referred to under the Table for collection of the same. In order to overcome various difficulties, to have the value of taxable articles for the purpose of MVAT, the legislature or its delegate has prescribed table giving stages for the purpose of computation of value of subject of tax. This appears to have been provided in order to have uniformity and to avoid vagaries, disparity or inconvenience from case to case. The same has been incorporated after deliberation and consultation with concerned departments and would not be liable to be termed as arbitrary.”

Conclusion

Ultimately, the Hon’ble High Court has rejected the writ petitions. Therefore, the builders and developers will be required to follow the rules 58(1A), (1B) & (1C) as they are. There are chances that due to their inability to bring required certificates, there will be higher taxation. Though such taxation is on consonance with the above judgment, there would be certainly injustice to the builders and developers, who were otherwise also in the doldrums and also further burdened by way of interest, etc. The legislature should devising a practical/convenient procedure for certifying /supporting the deductions claimed. Till then, the plight of builders would continue.

Preimus Investment and Finance Ltd. vs. DCIT ITAT, Mum-C Bench Before I. P. Bansal (J. M.) & Rajendra (A. M.) ITA No 4879/Mum/2012 Assessment Year-2006-07. Decided on 13-05- 2015 Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: Dr. K. Shivaram, & Ajay R. Singh / Premanand J.

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Section 37(1) – Business expenditure – Merely because the application for registration as NBFC is rejected by RB I the business carried on does not become illegal and expenditure incurred is allowable as deduction.

Facts:
Assessee-company was engaged in the business of leasing, financing and trading. Its application for registration to Reserve Bank of India to register it as NBFC was rejected as its net owned funds were below the prescribed minimum level. According to the AO the assessee was not authorised to carry on business of financing and thus the business carried on by the assessee was prohibited under the law. Therefore, he held that the interest income earned by the assessee cannot be said to be arising from business activity and he taxed the same as income from other sources. Further, various expenditure claimed by the assessee was also disallowed on the ground that the RBI had not recognised the assessee as NBFC and the claim for set-off of brought forward losses and unabsorbed depreciation was also denied. The first appellate authority, on appeal upheld the order of the AO.

Held:
According to the Tribunal permission/denial by the RBI to register an assessee as NBFC does not decide the issue of carrying on of business or make the business illegal. If the assessee had violated any provisions of law under the RBI Act, it would be penalised by the appropriate authority. But that does not mean that the systematic organized activity carried on by the assessee for earning profit would not be treated as business. The Tribunal further noted that in the scrutiny assessment in the earlier years, the AO had assessed the interest income as business income and had allowed all the expenditure related with the business activity. According to the Tribunal, the rule of consistency demanded that for deviating from the stand taken from the earlier years, the AO should bring on record the distinguishing feature of that particular year. The Tribunal found that the AO or the first appellate authority in their orders had not mentioned as to how the facts of the case were different from the facts in the earlier or subsequent years. As regards disallowance of other expenditure like audit fee, professional fee, general expenses, etc., the tribunal, relying on the decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Rampur Timber & Turnery Co. Ltd. (129 ITR 58), held that since the assessee is a corporate entity, even if it is not carrying on any business activity it has to incur some expenditure to keep up its corporate entity. Therefore, the expenditure incurred by it has to be allowed. Accordingly, it was held that the interest income earned by the assessee has to be taxed under the head business income and all the expenses related with it have to be allowed.

As far as the disallowance of carry-forward of loss and depreciation was concerned, the Tribunal relied on the decision of the Delhi high court in the case of Lavish Apartment Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT (23 taxmann.com 414) and held that the assessee was entitled to claim set-off.

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[2015] 153 ITD 613 (Pune) ITO, Ward 1(3), Jalna vs. MSEB Employees Coop Credit Society Ltd. A.Y. 2008-09 Date of Order – July 18th , 2014

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Section 80P, read with section 154 – Where the assessee had not claimed a deduction in its return, which was rightfully available to him, the assessing officer is obliged, required to assist such an assessee by ensuring that only legitimate taxes are determined as collectible. Assessing officer cannot deny benefit of section 80P, even though the said claim is not made in the income tax return.

FACTS
The assessee, a Credit Co-operative Society, duly registered under Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, had filed its return of income without claiming deduction u/s. 80P(2)(a)(i). The return of income was processed u/s. 143(1) and accepted.

Subsequently, the assessee filed an application u/s. 154 requesting the Assessing Officer to allow deduction u/s. 80P(2)(a)(i). The Assessing officer rejected the application and denied the claim.

On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) on the point of rectification observed that due to technical difficulties in preparing the return in “Tax Base Software”, small clerical errors had led to incorrect filing of return. Further, due to errors in programming of the said software, although the deduction was not allowed in the e-return resulting into tax demand, the acknowledgement of e-return generated by the software resulted into Nil demand as the deduction was allowed. Therefore, the said mistake was rectifiable u/s. 154 by the Assessing Officer and while allowing the assessee’s claim, Commissioner (Appeals) held that even on merit, the assessee society was eligible for deduction u/s. 80P(2)(a)(i).

On departments appeal.

HELD
It is settled law that correct income of the assessee is to be assessed as per provisions of Income-tax Act, 1961, inspite of higher income incorrectly declared by the assessee in the return of income. If an assessee, under a mistaken belief, , misconception or on account of being not properly instructed returns higher income, the concerned authority is obliged, required to assist such an assessee by ensuring that only legitimate taxes are determined as collectible. If particular levy is not permissible, the tax cannot be collected. In view of above, the Commisioner (Appeals) was justified in holding that such a mistake is rectifiable u/s. 154 and the assessee society is eligible for deduction u/s. 80P(2)(a)(i) on merit as well.

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[2015] 152 ITD 181 (Chandigarh) DCIT vs. Vikas Sharma A.Y. 2006-07 and A.Y. 2010-11 Date of Order – 19th June 2014.

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Section 194C read with section 40(a)(ia) – The freight payments made by the assessee for hired tankers, which are to be supplied to different customers, are made in capacity of agent on behalf of the principal and hence assessee is not liable to deduct tax on such freight payments made.

FACTS
The assessee had entered into contract with different parties to supply tankers which were being hired from time to time, against which freight payments were made by the assessee.

The assessee’s case was that no TDS was required to be deducted from the freight expenses as all 15-I and 15-J forms regarding the same had been duly submitted to the department.

The AO found certain discrepancies in 15-I and 15-J forms and made addition for failure to deduct TDS under the provisions of section 194C and consequently, made disallowance as per section 40(a)(ia).

It was held by the CIT-(A) that the provisions of section 194C were not applicable to the instant case as the assessee had only hired the trucks from time to time and deleted the additions made u/s. 40(a)(ia).

On appeal by Revenue

HELD THAT
It may be noted that the said Form 15-I and 15-J are to be filed before the prescribed authority, i.e., the Commissioner and not the Assessing Officer. In the instant case, the said forms were filed before the prescribed authority and within the prescribed time and no defect was pointed out by the said authority. In the absence of the same, there is no merit in the observation of the Assessing Officer that there are discrepancies in Form 15-I and 15-J.

Further, the assessee had entered into contract with several parties on whose behalf it was arranging the truck from time to time and the expenditure was booked as freight payment against which freight income was received by the assessee. Hence the assessee is not liable for tax deduction at source u/s. 194C as the amounts paid by the assessee were on behalf of the principal on whose behalf it was arranging the said tankers.

The assessee was making payment for carriage of goods and there was admittedly no oral or written agreement between the assessee and transporters and in the absence of the same, there is no merit in the order of the Assessing Officer in holding that the provisions of section 194C had been violated. In the absence of the same no disallowance is warranted u/s. 40(a)(ia). The order of the CIT-(A) is upheld.

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Search and seizure – Block assessment – Sections 158BC and 158BD – B. P. 1/04/1988 to 03/05/1998 – Police recovering cash from possession of three persons – Persons stating cash belonging to assessee who in reply stated that cash belongs to firm – No search warrant or requisition in name of assessee or the firm – No asset requisitioned from assessee – No notice could be issued in the name of assessee – Block assessment against assessee not valid

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CIT vs. Anil Kumar Chada; 374 ITR 10 (All):

On 2nd May, 1998, the police recovered a sum of Rs. 17 lakh from the possession of three persons. On interrogation, they stated that the money belonged to the assessee who in reply to the query by the police stated that the cash belonged to the firm, C. When the matter was referred to the Income Tax Department, it issued a notice u/s. 158BC in the name of the assessee for the block period 1 st April, 1988, to 3rd May, 1998, and made an assessment of undisclosed income of Rs. 18,11,700/- in the hands of the assessee. The Tribunal cancelled the assessment holding that since no search warrant was issued u/s. 132 in the name of the assessee, no notice could be issued in the name of the assessee u/s. 158BC.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) There was no search warrant in the name of the assessee nor were assets requisitioned from the assessee. Therefore, the provisions of section 158BC were not applicable. Further, no warrant or requisition was issued either in the name of the firm or the assessee.

ii) The order of the Tribunal did not call for interference.”

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Refund – Self-assessment tax – Interest – Sections 140A, 244A(1)(a),(b) and 264 – A. Y. 1994-95 – Excess amount paid as tax on self-assessment – Interest payable from date of payment to date of refund of the amount

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Stock Holding Corporation of India Ltd vs. CIT; 373 ITR 282 (Bom):

For the A. Y. 1994-95, the Assessing Officer did not pay interest u/s. 244A in respect of the excess amount paid by the petitioner as self assessment tax. The petitioner’s application u/s. 264 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was rejected by the Commissioner.

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the petitioner and held as under:

“i) The requirement to pay interest arises whenever an amount is refunded to the assessee as it is a kind of compensation for use and retention of money collected by the Revenue.

ii) Circular No. 549 dated 31/10/1989, makes it clear that if refund is out of any tax other than out of advance tax or tax deducted at source, interest shall be payable from the date of payment of tax till the date of grant of refund. The circular even remotely did not suggest that interest is not payable by the Department on self-assessment tax.

iii) The tax paid on self-assessment would fall u/s. 244A(1)(b). The provisions of section 244A(1)(b) very clearly mandate that the Revenue would pay interest on the amount refunded for the period commencing from the date payment of tax is made to the Revenue up to the date when refund is granted by the Revenue. Thus, the submission that the interest is payable not from the date of payment but from the date of demand notice u/s. 156 could not be accepted as otherwise the legislation would have so provided in section 244A(1)(b), rather than having provided from the date of payment of the tax. Therefore, the interest was payable u/s. 244A(1)(b) on the refund of excess amount paid as tax on self-assessment u/s. 140A.”

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Non-resident: Section 6(1)(a) – A. Ys. 2007-08 and 2008-09: Assessee will not lose non-resident status due to forced stay in India due to invalid impounding of passport

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CIT vs. Suresh Nanda; [2015] 57 taxmann.com 448 (Delhi):

In the relevant years, the assessee was forced to stay in India for more than 182 days in a previous year due to impounding of passport. Such impounding was found by courts to be wrongful. The assessee was fighting court cases to get his passport released so that he could travel outside India to maintain his NRI status. If such forced stay was excluded then the assessee’s stay in India was less than 182 days and his status would have been that of non-resident. The assessee claimed that such forced stay should be excluded and the asessee should be treated as non-resident. The Assessing Officer rejected the claim and treated the assessee as resident. The Tribunal held that the assessee continued to enjoy the status of nonresident and, thus, not amenable to be held accountable under the Income-tax Act for income not earned here.

In appeal by the Revenue, the following question was raised:

“Whether the ITAT was correct in taking the view that the period for which the assessee was in India involuntarily on account of his passport having been impounded is not to be counted for purposes of section 6(1)(a) of the Income -tax Act so as to hold him entitled to be a non-resident?”

The Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Where assessee was forced to stay in India for more than 182 days in a previous year due to impounding of passport found by courts to be wrongful and he was fighting court cases to get passport released so that he could travel outside India to maintain his NRI status, the period of such forced/unwilling stay in India cannot be counted for determining his residential status u/s 6. If assessee’s stay in India without counting such forced stay is for less than 182 days, he retains his NRI status for tax purposes.

ii) We must, however, add a caveat here. The conclusion reached by us on the facts and in the circumstances of the case at hand cannot be treated as a thumb rule to the effect that each period of involuntary stay must invariably be excluded from computation for purposes of Section 6(1)(a) of Income-tax Act. The view taken by us in the case of assessee here is in the peculiar facts and circumstances wherein he was inhibited from travelling out of India on account of such action of the law enforcement agencies as was found to be wholly unjustified. Here, it is important to notice that the passport impounding order was invalidated as without authority of law. The finding on whether in a given case an assessee’s claim to extended stay being involuntary, has to be fact dependent. For purposes of section 6(1)(a), each case will have to be examined on its own merits in the light of facts and circumstances leading to “involuntary” stay, if any, in India.”

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Housing project – Deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) – A. Y. 2007-08 – Condition precedent – Plot must have minimum area of one acre – Composite housing scheme consisting of six blocks in area exceeding one acre – Housing project approved under Development Control Rules – Separate plan permits were obtained for six blocks is not a ground for denial of deduction – Assessee entitled to deduction

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CIT vs. Voora Property Developers P. Ltd.; 373 ITR 317 (Mad):

For the A. Y. 2007-08, in the assessment order u/s. 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Assessing Officer had allowed the assessee’s claim for deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) in respect of the housing project consisting of six blocks in a area exceeding one acre. The Commissioner set aside the assessment order u/s. 263 for reconsidering the claim for deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) of the Act holding that the assessee had developed six separate projects in one single piece of land measuring 1.065 acres and the assessee did not fulfill the essential condition of the minimum area of one acre for a single project as laid down u/s. 80-IB(10). Accordingly, the Assessing Officer disallowed the claim for deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) of the Act. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) There was no dispute in the approval granted by the CMDA in respect of the composite housing scheme. When the Legislature introduced 100% deduction it was known that the local authorities could approve a housing project to the extent permitted under the Development Control Rules. When the project fulfilled the criteria for being approved as a housing project, the deduction could not be denied u/s. 80-IB(10) merely because the assessee had obtained a separate plan permit for six blocks.

ii) If the conditions specified u/s. 80-IB are satisfied, then deduction is allowable on the entire project. Since the project was approved in accordance with the Development Control Rules, the assessee would be entitled to 100% deduction on the entire project approved by the local authority.

iii) The assessee constructed six blocks in a land measuring one acre and 6.5 cents which admittedly exceeded the required area specified in clause (a) of section 80-IB(10), viz., one acre. Therefore, the assesee was entitled to the deduction.”

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Export profit – Supporting manufacturer – Deduction u/s. 80HHC – A. Y. 2003-04 – Condition precedent – Not necessary that exporter should have earned profit – Requisite certificate filed during assessment proceedings – Assessee, supporting manufacturer is entitled to deduction u/s. 80HHC

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80HHCCIT vs. Shamanur Kallappa & Sons; 373 ITR 373 (Karn)

The assessee exported rice to Cambodia through State Trading Corporation of India as a supporting manufacturer and claimed deduction u/s. 80HHC of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim on the ground that the State Trading Corporation had declared loss. The Tribunal allowed the asessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) In order to attract the provisions of section 80HHC(1A), the supporting manufacturer sells the goods or merchandise to the export house or trading house. The export house or trading house has to issue a certificate under the proviso to subsection (1) of section 80HHC of the Act. If these two conditions are fulfilled, the supporting manufacturer is entitled to the deduction as contemplated u/s. 80HHC of the Act to the extent as mentioned in section 80HHC(1A) of the Act. It is immaterial whether in the process, the export house or trading house sells the goods to any foreign country or earns profit or realises any foreign exchange.

ii) In order to attract section 80HHC(1A) of the Act, after purchase of goods or merchandise from the supporting manufacturer, the goods have to be exported out of India. Once such export is established, a certificate under the proviso to subsection (1) is issued by the export house or trading house and when they do not claim the benefit u/s. 80HHC, the assessee would be entitled to the benefit of deduction as prescribed u/s. 80HHC(1A).

iii) The assessee was entitled to deduction u/s. 80HHC. The Tribunal was justified in granting the relief to the assessee upon the certificate produced in the course of the proceedings.”

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Capital gain – Exemption u/s. 54 – A. Y. 2007-08 – Investment of net consideration in purchase of a residential house – Acquisition of plot and substantial domain over new house – Requirement for claiming exemption complied with – Assessee entitled to exemption –

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CIT vs. Smt. G. Venkata Laxmi; 373 ITR 572 (T&AP):

The assessee sold a property and sale proceeds were used for construction of a new building. The Tribunal found that the assessee invested the entire net consideration within the stipulated period and in fact had even constructed the major portion of the residential property except some finishing, making it fit for occupation. The Tribunal held that as the assessee had acquired substantial domain over the new house and had made substantial payment towards cost of land and construction, within the period specified u/s. 54 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 the assessee could be said to have complied with the requirements for claiming the exemption u/s. 54. Accordingly, the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim for exemption u/s. 54 of the Act.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Telangana and Andhra Pradesh High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) In order to get the benefit of section 54 of the Act, it does not appear that in case of purchase of property with sale proceeds it has to be reconed within three years, in case of construction of new building utilizing sale proceeds, the construction has to be completed within a period of three years of the sale. In this case, the question of registration of document does not arise and it is a question of investment in construction of the new building.

ii) When it was found on the facts that the construction was completed within three years of sale of the property, the benefit would automatically follow. Hence we dismiss the appeal.”

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“Ethics” isn’t music for the entertainment world

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Introduction
I have spent 20 years in the music industry.
People often envy me thinking that I am lucky to have my hobby as my
profession. In comparison, the field of Chartered Accountancy appears
rather bland. Hence,I was pleasantly surprised when the editor of the
BCA Journal asked me to write about Ethics in my profession. Chartered
Accountancy is a highly regulated profession with challenging entrance
tests and a grueling curriculum. In music, the classical art-forms
(dance & music) are very demanding with hours of training and riyaz
required to get perfection. However, entry into film-music is open to
any and every person who has basic music skills. Due to the explosion of
the electronic media, anything related to films has glamour attached to
it. Untrained wannabes come to Mumbai to try their luck in the music
world equipped with just a dream in their eyes. The stakes are high and
musicmaking is big business. There are often compromises with ethical
standards.The only regulator is one’s conscience and moral values. The
number of people who stand up for ethics is a minority. Being an
‘entertainment professional’, here’s my attempt to analyse the ethical
scenario prevailing in the field of Hindi film-music.

Hindi Film Music
The
Hindi mainstream film music industry has come of age over the last 70
years. It is now a professional set up. My mother tells me that in her
times, singing for films was looked down upon. Today, we have
enthusiastic parents sending their children to train in music as well as
to compete on television. Music training schools are today big
business. There are institutes training students in every field,vocal,
instrumental, Hindustani classical, Carnatic, Westernmusic, staff
notations, sound recording, playback recording techniques etc.
Technology has undergone a transformation and with the commercial stakes
very high, the pressures to succeed at any cost often lead to ethical
compromises. From Naushad to Rehman and Rafi to Sonu the parameters of
excellence have remained high. However the audience’s thoughtless
acceptance of anything that the media promotes, often results in ethical
compromises and a deterioration of standards.

There was Naushad
sahab who tirelessly advocated Indian classical music and would insist
on purity. Today, plagiarism is rampant. One finds popular foreign songs
being copied brazenly note to note. It is often the producers who force
the composers to do this. Certain highly successful music directors
have been exposed on the internet with the list of songs they have
copied along with their source.

Many talented singers these days
approach commercially successful composers with their demo songs. These
are often their own compositions. The singer is forced to release the
song under the composer’s credits.

An inspiring exception is A.
K. Rehman who has taken Hindi music to a world platform completely on
his terms and merit. Rehman is known to keep music rights with himself.
He makes sure his music is not misused by producers. If Rehman
collaborates with say Sukhwinder, the latter is given due credit. Other
talented composers like Shankar Mahadevan strive to make soulful songs.

Creation of monopolies and monopolistic situations
In
the yesteryears, one has heard stories of attempts by established
singers to monopolise the singing scene. Today, the market has opened up
with several singers aggressively marketing their skills. However there
are still instances of producers getting songs dubbed by established
singers even though they have been competently sung by lesser known
artistes.

Awareness of rights
In the era gone by,
artistes, and particularly singers were not aware of their rights. They
performed for the love of art, and were seldom concerned with commercial
aspects of their profession. The term intellectual property rights, was
unknown to them. Today, there is much awareness about royalties and
copyrights with artistes, composers, lyricists actively campaigning for
their rights, and zealously protecting them. Associations like the
Indian performing rights society regulate the use of their songs in
public places, radio, TV channels, live shows etc.

Falling standards in quality of lyrics
In
the 50s and 60s film music saw the poetic quality of lyrics scaling
great heights. There was Saahir who wrote sensitive, philosophical songs
like ‘yeh mehlon yeh takhton yeh taajon ki duniya’, ‘allah tero naam’,
‘aye meri zohrajabeen tu abhi tak hai haseen” and ‘laga chunri mein
daag’. Pt Narendra Sharma wrote chaste Hindi songs like ‘jyoti kalash
zhalke’, ‘satyam shivam sundaram’. Bharat Vyas wrote Nature poetry like
‘yeh koun chitrakar hai’ and kuhukuhu bole koyaliya. Kavi Pradeep penned
patriotic poetry like ‘aao bachhon tumhe sikhaye’,’aye mere vatan ke
logon’. Gulzar wrote aesthetic, songs with high literary value like ‘iss
mode se jaate hain’, ‘humko manki shakti dena’,’tujhse naraz nahin
zindagi’.

The new millennium saw the nation gyrating to
nonsensical lyrics and those with sexual innuendos. One could cite
several such examples but the content is so offensive that I would
rather not smudge the pages of a professional journal with such trash.
The point is that it is the ethical responsibility of producers and
lyricists not to stoop to such levels for commercial success.

People
believe that double meaning lyrics in the garb of ‘folk’, sex object
portrayal of women, and puerile nursery rhyme like songs fetch instant
success. So ethics and values are trashed. Once I was asked to sing a
‘laavni’ with double entendre. I fired the hell out of the guy and made
him change the lyrics.

I think lyrics are the fabric of any
song. They reflect an ideology and thought process. An ethical lyricist
is one who would uphold secular, humanist, socialist and feminist
values. I notice that earlier most films had atleast one spiritual song.
Now it is the norm to have atleast one ‘item’ song.

Commitment to quality and standing by what one believes in
As
far as I am concerned, I come from a classical music grooming and a
literary background at home. I am committed to singing meaningful lyrics
and intellectually stimulating melodies. In my live shows I select
songs that have meaningful poetry and raag based tunes that have scope
for gaayki.

I find that in mainstream songs, the requirement for
gaayki has waned. Tunes and lyrics are often juvenile. I feel committed
to writing and composing deeper, meaningful stuff. This too is a form
of ethics I feel.

I have composed about 50 tracks for the
YouTube devotional channel Rajshrisoul. Each composition displays a
commitment to the music I believe in. Hence both in my recordings and
live shows I standby what I believe is quality.

In my live shows
I am often under pressure to sing “fast”, “dancing numbers”. I do not
encourage this. As I believe I am not a DJ. Unless I stand up for my
beliefs, I will be made to dance to any tune.

Short and quick is not necessarily good / Technology cannot replace the original
Over the years, the ‘mehfil’ culture has eroded. Attention span of listeners has shortened. For the youth music is equal to something you dance to. Lyrics, gaayki, melody has no significance. This has led to monotonous tunes, repetitive lyrics, and same interlude music pieces. Today music is in the pubs and less in mehfils. The ‘gaayki’ in film music has been muted and the requirement for trained vocals is redundant. ‘Anyone’ including actors themselves sing songs. Added to this technical innovations enable voices to be tuned. The earlier face of film music had intricate gaayki, every stanza different tune etc. In my recordings I make it a point to retake my lines if not in perfect sur. I discourage enthusiastic recordists who say ’we will tune the notes using the Antares software’. I feel it is unethical to let technology modulate your performance. Your audiences pay to hear you perform and your rendition and not the skill of the software programmer or technician. I must give my best and not leave it to a machine.

Women   and   Their   Exploitation In live music shows, you often see background dancer girls. Unless it is a pure classical dance form, women are portrayed as subordinate,exploitative. Attention is to the body and not the soul. I find such actions totally unethical. Hence I am particular that the role of women in whatever I produce represents talent, soul  expression  rather  than body.

I have faced situations where I have refused to sing in live shows with loud noisy orchestration and where organisers are interested in suggesting what outfit I should wear.

I have often lost out on recordings due to the patriarchal equation. Even to this day most music directors are male. Being single and fairly attractive I often encountered men pursuing me for all the wrong reasons. The fixation with males is immense. Recently, while recording an aarti there was a line “baanjhan ko putra deyt nirdhan ko chhaya “.  I insisted on changing it to the earlier version, ”bannjhan ko garbh deyt” as I believe that it perpetuates the Indian patriarchial mentality that insists on the male child and kills the girl child. Once I gave a successful composer my demo audio. He kept calling me up asking to meet over a ‘cup of coffee’ for almost a month. When I finally did meet him, I was shocked to see that he had simply not listened to my recording even once. I was just a pretty woman  for him. Ever since then I politely refuse ‘coffee invites” for ethical reasons. Things have changed for the better now with singers having personal managers and talent management agencies to represent them. These shield mischief makers from the artist.

But these experiences got me thinking and I stumbled upon Meerabai.

When I started translating Meera, it dawned on me that she’s a big star! Her songs are sung a good 500 years after her time. We remember Meera like a fragrant flower. Not as a sexy body. I realised that every woman needs to assert her soul identity. If every woman who steps out for a career, especially in the glamour industry, sends out strong signals of “My talent is my sole identity’, this power game will become redundant. I yearn for the day women would be able to express themselves uninhibitedly and not be guilty for it.

Respect The Performers and give Them Their Due
The music industry all over the world has been plagued by piracy. Today music is available free on the internet. The days of cd sales are declining as cds can be instantly copied. Hardly any non-film music albums are made. Only film music (backed by massive publicity budgets) sells in the form of caller ringtones, number of hits and ads on YouTube.

I do know of some highly ethical people who will only buy original DVDsand recordingsoftware. But by and large people buy pirated Windows, Nuendo/Cubase/Protools recording software. Most rip music from youtube.

Let Children be Children, Do Not Corrupt Them With The ways of The Commercial World.

Television talent shows are the in thing today. TV channels rake in the big bucks by aggressive marketing techniques. Amongst these are sob stories, dramatic behind the scene stories, emotional appeals and children. Channels woo viewers with little champs, junior idols etc. I am the first ever winner of a talent show in the history of Indian TV, to have got a film playback break. I won the Hindi Saregama in 1995. I remember there was an immensely talented 7 year old Pushparani from Assam who sang Lata songs to perfection. She vanished. There was ten year old Prashant too. I remember Prashant’s mother doing the rounds of music directors for the big break. It never came. Prashant works in a bank in Mira Road today, bitter about fading into oblivion. Once someone introduced me to a flamboyantly dressed little boy from Marathi saregama. He was most offended because I did not know of him. I vividly remember children crying on camera when they lost out to competition. Viewers cried too. Channels sold their emotions and made money. Often there is manipulation in who is to win. Is this really what children should go through? Children are superb mimics. Hence they copy and replicate what they hear. That is what the channels cash in on. Two years down the line public memory fades and no one remembers these children and their two month fame. They go through the pain of rejection and dejection. The channels make further money through live shows with these children.

I feel children competing on TV must be stopped on ethical grounds as it amounts to child labour. Why don’t we have child nurses, doctors, CAs engineers? If they can sing, they can practice too. It is unethical to make children work. Children should take training in classical music, polish their skills, enjoy childhood and then get professional as adults.

Conclusion
I am aware that the above close circuit view of ethics in my profession can have counter views. Every person’s experience differs and nothing is black and white.  Where one sets the ethical bar is one’s own choice.        I would set it at just within practical reach though aiming to pitch higher.

Business expenditure – Section 37 – A. Y. 2009-10 – Business of selling mobile hand sets and other electronic items and accessories – Advertisement expenditure – Expenditure is revenue in nature – AO not justified in treating it as differed revenue expenditure

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CIT vs. Spice Distribution Ltd.: 374 ITR 30 (Del):

The assessee
was trading in mobile hand sets, other electronic items and accessories.
For the purpose of business it had incurred expenditure of Rs.11,51,40,004 on advertisement. The Assessing Officer treated the
expenditure as deffered revenue expenditure and allowed 25% thereof
observing that the balance amount would be allowed in the next three
years. The Tribunal allowed the full claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)
In the previous assessment year 2008-09 the Tribunal in the case of the
assessee allowed the advertisement expenditure as the expenditure of
revenue in nature. No information was available whether the Revenue has
preferred an appeal against the findings recorded by the Tribunal in the
assessee’s case for the A.Y. 2008-09. The reasoning given by the
Tribunal deserved affirmation.

ii) The Tribunal had rightly held
that the Assessing Officer could not treat the revenue expenditure as
deferred revenue expenditure because the Act itself does not have any
concept of differed revenue expenditure. Even otherwise, advertisement
expenditure normally is and should be treated as revenue in nature
because advertisements do not have long lasting effect and once the
advertisements stop, the effect thereof on the general public and
customer would diminish and vanish soon thereafter. Advertisement
expense is a day-to-day expense incurred for running the business and
improving sales.

iii) Keeping in view the nature and character
of the assessee’s business, every year expenditure has to be incurred to
make and keep the public informed and remain in the limelight. It is an
expenditure of trading nature. Therefore, the order of the Tribunal did
not call for interference.”

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Agricultural Income-tax – Legislative Powers – Retrospective Legislation – The Legislature has powers to render the judicial decision in a case ineffective by enacting a valid law on a topic within the legislative field which fundamentally alters or change the character of legislation retrospectively. The changed or altered conditions are such that the previous decision would not have been rendered by the court if those conditions had existed at the time of declaring the law as invalid.

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Asst. Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax & Ors. vs. Netley “B” Estate and Ors. [2015] 372 ITR 590 (SC)

Before the Supreme Court the issue in a batch of appeals was whether the assessment of agricultural income received by a firm after it was dissolved in so far as the income of the firm pertained to actual cash receipts after the firm was dissolved but relating to income earned prior to dissolution.

The Supreme Court noted that in L.P. Cardoza vs. Agricultural ITO [1997] 227 ITR 421 (Karn.), the question involved was as to whether a dissolved firm could be assessed to agricultural income-tax after the date of its dissolution in respect of income received for supply of goods made by the firm prior to its dissolution. This question arose in the light of section 26(4) and section 27 as they then stood, that is, as they stood in 1987.

The Karnataka High Court had held that there was nothing in section 26(4), as it then stood or section 27, to indicate that where the firm is dissolved and income is received after dissolution in respect of agricultural produce supplied by the firm before dissolution, the firm itself could be assessed in the year of receipt of income notwithstanding its dissolution.

Faced with this decision of the Karnataka High Court, the Legislature amended section 26(4) retrospectively, that is, with effect from, 1st April, 1975. The amended provision as follows:

“26. (4) Where any business through which agricultural income is received by a company, firm or association of persons is discontinued or any such firm or association is dissolved in any year, any sum received after the discontinuance or dissolution shall be deemed to be income of the recipient and charged to tax accordingly in the year of receipt, if such would have been included in the total income of the person who carried on the business had such sum been received before such discontinuance or dissolution.

Explanation – For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that where before the discontinuance of such business or dissolution of a firm or association hitherto assessed as a firm or association, or as the case may be, on the company, the crop is harvested and disposed of, but full payment has not been received for such crop, or the crop is harvested and not disposed of, the income from such crop shall, notwithstanding the discontinuance or dissolution be deemed to be the income of the company, firm or association for the year or years in which it is received or receivable and the firm or association shall be deemed to be in existence, for such year or years and such income shall be assessed as the income of the company, firm or association according to the method of accounting regulatory employed by it immediately before such discontinuance or dissolution.”

The said amendment was the subject matter of challenge before a learned single judge of the Karnataka High Court. The single judge repelled the challenge basically on the ground that the Explanation only clarified the main provision and, therefore, did not go beyond the main provision. Equally, since the Legislature has the right to amend both prospectively and retrospectively, all that was done in the present case was an exercise of the legislative power retrospectively and, therefore, no question arose of any discrimination on this count. The single judge, therefore, dismissed the writ petitions before him.

In appeal before the Division Bench, the Division Bench set out all the aforesaid provisions and ultimately found, following the judgment in D. Cawasji & Co. vs. State of Mysore [1984] (Suppl.) SCC 490/ 150 ITR 648, that the Amending Act of 1997 suffered from the vice that was found in Cawasji’s case, namely, that it interfered directly with the judgment of the High Court and would, therefore, have to be struck down as unconstitutional on this score alone. This the Division Bench found because, according to the Division Bench, in the Statement of Objects and Reasons for the 1997 amendment, it was held that the object of the amendment was to undo the judgment of the High Court of Karnataka in Cardoza’s case.

The Supreme Court was thus concerned with the validity of Explanation added retrospectively to section 26(4) of the Karnataka Agricultural Income-tax Act (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”).

The Supreme Court noticed that in the amended section 26(4), two changes were made. Whereas in the original provision, no express reference was made to companies or association of persons, and no reference whatsoever was made to a dissolved firm, both were added. By the Explanation, which is for the removal of doubts, he Legislature declared that where before dissolution of a firm, full payment was not received in respect of income that has been earned pre-dissolution, then notwithstanding such dissolution, the said income would be deemed to be the income of the firm in the year in which it was received or receivable and the firm would be deemed to be in existence for such year for the purposes of assessment. By this amendment, the basis of the law as it stood when Cardoza’s case was decided had been changed.

The Supreme Court held that all that had been done in the present case was to remove the basis of the law as it stood in 1987 which was interpreted in Cardoza’s case as leading to a particular result. All that the Legislature has done in the present case is to say that with effect from 1st April, 1975, dissolved firms will by legal fiction, continue to be assessed, for the purposes of levy and collection of agricultural income-tax, in so far as they receive income post-dissolution but relating to transactions pre-dissolution. In no manner has the Legislature in the present case sought to directly nullify the judgment in Cardoza’s case. All that had happened was that the legal foundation on which the Cardoza’s case was built was retrospectively removed, something which was well within the legislative competence of the Legislature.

The Supreme Court further held that the judicial decision in Cardoza’s case had been rendered ineffective by enacting a valid law on a topic within the legislative field which fundamentally alters or change the character of legislation retrospectively. The changed or altered conditions are such that the previous decision would not have been rendered by the court if those conditions had existed at the time of declaring the law as invalid. The Legislature had not directly overruled the decision of any court but has only rendered, as has been stated above, such decision ineffective by removing the basis on which the decision was arrived at.

The Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court, and allowed the appeals.

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Exemption – Educational Institution – When a surplus is ploughed back for educational purposes, the educational institution exists solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of profit.

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Queen’s Educational Society vs. CIT [2015] 372 ITR 699 (SC)

The
Appellant filed its return for the assessment years 2000-01 and 2001-02
showing a net surplus of Rs.6,58,862 and Rs.7,82,632, respectively.
Since the appellant was established with the sole object of imparting
education, it claimed exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iiiad) of the Income-tax
Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer, vide his order dated 20th February, 2003, rejected the exemption claimed by the appellant. The Commissioner
of Income-tax (Appeals) by his order dated 28th March, 2003, allowed the
appellant’s appeal, and the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Delhi, by
its judgment dated 7th July, 2006, passed an order dismissing the appeal
preferred by the Revenue.

The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal while granting exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iiiad) recorded the following reasons:

“During
the years relevant for the assessment year 200-01 and 2001-02, the
excess of income over expenditure stood at Rs.6,58,862 and Rs.7,82,632,
respectively. It was also noticed that the appellant society had made
investments in fixed assets including building at Rs.9,52,010 in the
financial year 1999-2000 and Rs.8,47,742 in the financial year 2000-01
relevant for the assessment years 2000- 01 and 2001-02, respectively.
Thus, if the amount of investment into fixed assets such as building,
furniture and fixture, etc., were also kept in view, there was hardly
any surplus left. The assessee-society is undoubtedly engaged in
imparting education and has to maintain a teaching and non-teaching
staff and has to pay for their salaries and other incidental expenses.
It, therefore, becomes necessary to charge certain fees from the
students for meeting all these expenses. The charging of fee is
incidental to the prominent objective of the trust, i.e., imparting
education. The trust was initially running the school in a rented
building and the surplus, i.e., the excess of the receipts over
expenditure in the year under appear (and in the earlier years) has
enabled the appellant to acquire its own property, acquire computers,
library books sports equipment, etc., for the benefit of the students.
And more importantly the members of the society have not utilised any
part of the surplus for their own benefit. The Assessing Officer wrongly
interpreted the resultant surplus as the main objective of the assessee
trust. As held above, profit is only incidental to the main object of
spreading education. If there is no surplus out of the difference
between receipts and outgoings, the trust will not be able to achieve
the objectives. Any education institution cannot be run in rented
premises for all the times and without necessary equipment and without
paying to the staff engaged in imparting education. The assessee is not
getting any financial aid/assistance from the Government or other
philanthropic agency and, therefore, to achieve the objective, it has to
raise its own funds. But such surplus would not come within the ambit
of denying exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iiiad) of the Act.”

In a
reference to the High Court u/s. 260A of the Income-tax Act, the High
Court, vide the impugned judgment set aside the judgment of the
Incometax Appellate Tribunal and affirmed the order of the Assessing
Officer.

The Uttarakhand High Court held: “Thus, in view of the
established fact relating to earn profit, we do not agree with the
reasoning given by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal for granting
exemption.”

On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the High
Court did not apply its mind independently. The High Court copied one
paragraph from the Supreme Court judgment in Aditanar Educational
Institution vs. Addl CIT (1997) 224 ITR 310 (SC), followed by a
paragraph of faulty reasoning by the Assessing Officer and the said
faulty reasoning of the Assessing Officer had been wrongly said to be
the law laid down by the apex court. The High Court had erred by quoting
a non-existent passage from the said judgment

Further, the High Court had erred quoting a portion of a property tax judgment in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Children Book Trust and Safdarjung Enclave Educational Society vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (1992) 3 SCC390, which expressly stated that ruling arising out of the Income-tax Act would not be applicable. It also went on to further quote from a portion of the said property tax judgment which was rendered in the context of whether an educational society is supported wholly or in part by voluntary contributions, something which was completely foreign to section 10(23C)(iiiad).

According to the Supreme Court, the final conclusion that if a surplus is made by an educational society and ploughed back to construct its own premises would fall foul of section 10(23C) is to ignore the language of the section and to ignore tests laid down in the Surat Art Silk Cloth’s case (121 ITR1), Aditanar’s case (supra) and the American Hotel and Lodging’s case (301 ITR 86).

The Supreme Court held that when a surplus is ploughed back for educational purposes, the educational institution exist solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of profit.

The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the Uttarakhand High Court holding that the reasoning of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (set aside by the High Court) was more in consonance with the law laid down by it.

The Supreme Court approved the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Pinegrove International Charitable Trust (327 ITR 73), Delhi High Court in St. Lawrence Educational Society vs. CIT (353 ITR 320) and Bombay High Court in Tolani education Society (351 ITR 184).

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Upfront payment of interest on debentures in one year – the year of deductibility – Part II

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3  As mentioned in Part I of this write-up (BCAI-June, 2015), the Bombay
High Court rejected the claim of the assessee for deduction of upfront
payment of interest on debenture in the first year itself and instead,
accepted the action of the AO in spreading over the deduction over the
five years, being the life of the debentures. For this purpose, the High
Court relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Madras Industrial
Investments case (referred to in para 1.4 of the Part I of the write-up)
wherein the Court had upheld the spread over of deduction of borrowing
cost of debentures on the ground that there is a continuing benefit to
the business of the company during the tenure of the debentures. While
deciding the issue against the assessee, the Bombay High Court took the
view that although ordinarily revenue expenditure incurred for the
purpose of business must be allowed in its entirety in the year in which
it is incurred but, in the present case, the fact justifies the AO to
spread over the deduction during the life of the debentures as allowing
the expenditure in the first year itself gives a distorted picture of
the profit of that year when the funds collected through the issue of
debentures give a continuing benefit to the business of the assessee
over the entire period of the debentures. For this, the High Court
applied the ‘Matching Concept’ referred to in para 2.8 of Part I of the
write-up. While doing so, the High Court did not accept the contention
of the assessee that this amounts to re-writing of the terms of issue of
debenture. For this, the High Court largely relied on the accounting
treatment of the expenditure given by the assessee in its accounts and
also rejected the contention of the assessee that good accounting is not
necessarily correct law.

Taparia Tools Ltd. vs. Jcit – 276 ctr 1 (sc)

4.1
The judgment of the Bombay High Court in the above case came-up for
consideration before the Apex Court for its decision at the instance of
the assessee and accordingly, the issue referred to in para 1.3 of Part I
of the write-up came-up before the Apex Court for its consideration.
Before the Apex Court, three assessment years [1996-97 to 1998-99]
involving identical issue had come-up for decision.

4.2
Referring to the details of the appeals involving identical issue for
the assessment year 1996-97, the Court stated that the question of law
which has arisen for consideration is whether the liability of the
assessee to pay the interest upfront to the debenture holders is
allowable as deduction in the first year itself or it has to be spread
over a period of five years, during the life of the debentures?

4.3
For the purpose of deciding the issue, the Court noted the relevant
facts [as mentioned in paras 2.1 to 2.3 of Part I of the write-up] and
also noted that the assessee was unsuccessful in appeal before the
Bombay High court. The Court noted that the view taken by the Tribunal
as well the High Court was that for theentire amount paid by the
assessee in the particular assessment year, full deduction is not
available and this deduction is spread over a period of five years.
Thus, the question is as to whether deduction of the entire amount of
interest paid should be allowed in the first year itself or the stence
of the Revenue need to be affirmed.

4.4 For the purpose of deciding the issue at hand, the Court referred to the following relevant factual position [page 7]:

“As
pointed out above, the assessee maintains its accounts on mercantile
basis. Further, the entire amount for which deduction was claimed was,
in fact, actually paid to the debenture-holder as upfront interest
payment. It is also a matter of record that this amount became payable
to the debenture-holder in accordance with the terms and conditions of
the non-convertible debenture issue floated by the assessee, on the
exercise of option by the aforesaid debenture-holders, which occurred in
the respective assessment years in which deduction of this expenditure
was claimed.”

4.5 The Court then noted the provisions of section 36(1)(iii) of the Act and explainedthe effect thereof as under [page 8]:

“…………It
is clear that as per the aforesaid provision any amount on account of
interest paid becomes an admissible deduction u/s.36 if the interest was
paid on the capital borrowed by the assessee and this borrowing was for
the purpose of business or profession. There is no quarrel, in the
present case, that the money raised on account of issuance of the
debentures would be capital borrowed and the debentures were issued for
the purpose of the business of the assessee. In such a scenario when the
interest was actually incurred by the assessee, which follows the
mercantile system of accounting, on the application of this statutory
provision, on incurring of such interest, the assessee would be entitled
to deduction of full amount in the assessment year in which it is paid.
While examining the allowability of deduction of this nature, the AO is
to consider the genuineness of business borrowing and that the
borrowing was for the purpose of business and not an illusionary and
colourabale transaction. Once the genuineness is proved and the interest
is paid on the borrowing, it is not within the powers of the AO to
disallow the deduction either on the ground that rate of interest is
unreasonably high or that the assessee had himself charged a lower rate
of interest on the monies which he lent………………….”

4.6 While
dealing with the principle of deduction of such expenditure, the Court
noted that the AO did not dispute that the expenditure on account of
interest was genuinely incurred. It is also not in dispute that the
amount of interest was actually paid in the relevant year. Since the
assessee was following mercantile system of accounting, the amount of
interest could be claimed as deduction even if it was not actually paid
but simply incurred. While staggering and spreading the interest over a
period of five years, the AO was mainly persuaded by two reasons viz.,
(i) the term of debenture was five years; and (ii) the assessee had
itself given this very treatment in the books of account (i.e.,
spreading it over a period of five years in its final accounts by not
debiting the entire amount in the first year to the P&L account).
The Court also noted that the High Court has based its reasoning on the
second aspect and applied the principle of ‘Matching Concept’ to support
its conclusion.

4.7 Dealing with the first reason adopted by
the AO i.e., the debentures were issued for the period of five years,
the Court took the view that this is clearly not tenable. For this, the
Court stated as under [page 9]:
“………….While taking this view, the AO clearly erred as he ignored by ignoring the terms on which debentures were issued. As noted above, there were two methods of payment of interest stipulated in the debenture issued. Debenture- holder was entitled to receive periodical interest after every half year @ 18% per annum for five years, or else, the debenture-holder could opt for upfront payment of Rs. 55 per debenture towards interest as one-time payment. By allowing only 1/5th of the upfront payment actually incurred, though the entire amount of interest is actually incurred in the very first year, the AO, in fact, treated both the methods of payment at par, which was clearly unsustainable. By doing so, the AO, in fact, tampered with the terms of issue, which was beyond his domain. It is obvious that on exercise of the option of upfront payment of interest by the subscriber in the very first year, the asessee paid that amount in terms of the debenture issue and by doing so he was simply discharging the interest liability in that year thereby saving the recurring liability of interest for the remaining life of the debentures because for the remaining period the assessee was not required to pay interest on the borrowed amount.”

4.8    Having dealt with the first reason on which the  AO based his order, the Court proceeded to consider the second reason of the AO and stated that whether the assessee was estopped from claiming deduction for the entire interest paid in the same year merely because it had spread over this interest in its books of account over a period of five years. The Court then noted, in brief, the contentions raised on behalf of the assessee in this context (which are broadly on the line raised before the High Court). In substance, on behalf of the assessee, it was contended that the accounting treatment in the books of account is not relevant for the purpose of  determining  the  deductibility of an expenditure and thathas to be decided in accordance with the provisions of the Act when the claim is made by the assessee on that basis and for that purpose, terms of issue of debentures are relevant. For this, the assessee had relied on the provisions of section 36(1)(iii) of the Act. The Court noted that the High Court has dealt with this provision and explained implications thereof in following words [page 10]:

“……The term ‘interest’ has been defined u/s. 2(28A) of the Act.  Briefly,  interest  payment  is an expense u/s. 36(1)(iii). Interest on monies borrowed for business purposes is an expenditure in  a  business  [see  M.L.M.  Muthiah  Chettiar    & Ors. vs. CIT (1959) 35 ITR 339 (Mad)]. For claiming deduction under s. 36(1)(iii), the following conditions are required to be satisfied viz. the capital must have been borrowed; it must have been borrowed for business purpose and the interest must be paid. The word ‘paid’ is defined in section 43(2). It means payment in accordance with the method followed by the  assessee.  In  the present case, therefore, the word ‘paid’ in section 36(1)(iii) should be construed to mean paid in accordance with the method of accounting followed by the assessee i.e. Mercantile System of accounting… ”

4.8.1    The Court then stated that notwithstanding the aforesaid implications of the provisions of section 36(1)(iii) noted by the High Court, the High Court chose to decline the whole deduction in the year of payment and thereby, affirmed the orders of lower authorities by invoking the  ‘Matching  Concept’. In the opinion of the High Court, this ‘Matching Concept’ is required to be done on accrual basis and in High Court’s view, in this case, payment of Rs. 55 per debenture towards interest made by the assessee pertained to five years, and thus, this interest of five years was paid in the first year. The Court then opined that it is here that the High Court has gone wrong and this approach resulted in wrong application of ‘Matching Concept’. In this context the Court further opined as under [pages 10 & 11]:

“… However, in the second mode of payment of interest, which was at the option of the debenture- holder, interest was payable upfront, which means insofar as interest liability is concerned, that was discharged in the first year of the issue itself. By this, the assessee had benefited by making payment of lesser amount of interest in comparison with the interest which was payable under the first mode over a period of five years.   We are, therefore,   of the opinion that in order to be entitled to have deduction of this amount, the only aspect which needed examination was as to whether provisions of section 36(1)(iii) r/w section 43(2) of the Act were satisfied or not. Once these are satisfied, there is no question of denying the benefit of entire deduction in the year in which such an amount was actually paid or incurred.”

4.8.2    The Court then dealt with the issue of deferred revenue expenditure  and  stated  as  under  [page 11]:

“The High Court has also observed that it was a case of deferred interest option. Here again, we do not agree with the High Court. It has been explained in various judgments that there is no concept of deferred revenue expenditure in the Act except under specified sections, i.e. where amortisation is specifically provided, such as section 35D of the Act.”

4.8.3    Dealing with the facts of the assessee’s case, the Court then stated that the moment second option was exercised by the debenture-holder to receive the upfront payment, liability of the assessee to make the payment in that very year has arisen and this liability was to pay interest @ Rs. 55 per debenture. To support this position, the Court noted the following passage from the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Bharat Earth Movers [245ITR 428]:

“The law is settled: if a business liability has definitely arisen in the accounting year, the deduction should be allowed although the liability may have to be quantified and discharged at a future date. What should be certain is the incurring of the liability. It should also be capable of being estimated with reasonable certainty though the actual quantification may not be possible. If these requirements are satisfied the liability is not a contingent one. The liability is in praesentithough it will be discharged at a future date. It does not make any difference if the future date on which the liability shall have to be discharged is not certain.”

4.1.1.1    Having referred to the above passage, the Court stated that the present case is even on a stronger footage in as much as not only the liability had arisen in the relevant year, it was even quantified and discharged as well in that very year.

4.1.2    The Court then dealt with the effect of Madras Industrial Investments case (supra) and stated that, in that case, the Court categorically  held that the general principle is to allow the revenue expenditure incurred for business purposes  in  the same year in which it is incurred. However, some exceptional cases can justify  spreading  the expenditure and claim it over a period of ensuing years. In that case, the assessee wanted spreading the expenditure over a period of time and had justified the same. By raising money through the said debentures, the assessee could utilise the said amount and secure the benefit over number of years. On this basis, the Court found that the assessee could be allowed to spread over the expenditure over a period of five years, at the end of which the debentures were to be redeemed.

4.1.2.1    After referring to the relevant  passage  from  the judgment in the case of Madras Industrial Investments case (supra), the Court observed as under [pages12 &13]:

“Thus, the first thing which is to be noticed is that though the entire expenditure was incurred in that year, it was the assessee who wanted the spread over. The Court was conscious of the principle that normally revenue expenditure is to be allowed in the same year in which it is incurred, but at the instance of the assessee, who wanted spreading over, the Court agreed to allow the  assessee  that benefit when it was found that there was a continuing benefit to the business of the company over the entire period.”

4.8.4.2    Explaining the effect of the above judgment, the Court further stated as under [page 13]:

“What follows from the above is that normally the ordinary rule is to be applied, namely, revenue expenditure incurred in a particular year is to be allowed in that year. Thus, if the assessee claims that expenditure in that year, the IT Department cannot deny the same. However, in those cases where the assessee himself wants to spread the expenditure over a period of ensuing  years,  it can be allowed only if the principle of ‘Matching Concept’ is satisfied, which upto now has been restricted to the cases of debentures.”

4.8.5    Having  explained  the  effect  of  the  judgment  in the case of Madras Industrial Investments  case  (supra),  the  Court  dealt  with  the  case   of the assessee and stated that,  in  this  case, the assessee did not want spread over of this expenditure and it had claimed the entire interest paid upfront as deductible expenditure in the same year in its return of income. When this course of action was permissible in law to the assessee, merely because a different treatment was given  in the books of account cannot be a factor which would deprive the assessee from claiming the entire expenditure as a deduction. This Court has repeatedly held that entries in the books of account are not determinative or conclusive and the matter is to be examined in the context of the provisions contained in the Act. Having referred to this settled position, the Court, finally, held as under [page 13]: “At the most, an inference can be drawn that by showing this expenditure in a spread over manner in the books of accounts, the assessee had initially intended to make such an option. However, it abandoned the same before reaching the crucial stage, inasmuch as, in the IT return filed by the assessee, it chose to claim the entire expenditure in the year in which it was spent/ paid by invoking the provisions of section 36(1)(iii) of the Act. Once a return in that manner was filed, the AO was bound to carry out the assessment by applying the provisions of that Act and not to go beyond the said return. There is no estoppel against the statute and the Act enables and entitles the assessee to claim the entire expenditure in the manner it is claimed.”

4.9    Based on the above,the Court concluded that the High Court and the authorities below did not law down correct position in law. The assessee would be entitled to a deduction of the entire interest expenditure in the year in which the amount was actually paid. As such, the appeals of the assessee were allowed.

Conclusion
5.1    (i) From the above judgment of the Apex Court,   it is clear that the upfront payment of interest on debenture in one year is eligible for deduction u/s. 36(1)(iii) in that year itself whenliability to pay the same is incurred in that year.

(ii)    In such cases, if the assessee has spread over the interest expenditure in accounts and if the claim of deduction is made on that basis on the ground that there is a continuing benefit to the business, he can choose to do so.

(iii)    As such, in mercantile system of accounting, in such cases, the assessee has an option either to claim deduction in the year in which the liability to pay interest is incurred or to spread over the same during the life of the debentures.

5.2    In the above case, in the context of the mercantile system of accounting, the Apex Court has reiterated following settled positions under the Act:-

(i)    Ordinarily the revenue expenditure  incurred for the purpose of the business of the assessee  is eligible for deduction in its entirety in the same year in which it is incurred.

(ii)    In the absence of any specific  provision  in the Act, deductible revenue expenditure cannot be treated as deferred revenue expenditure and on that basis, the deduction of such expenditure cannot be spread over.

(iii)    The claim of deduction of any expenditure should be examined on the basis of the relevant provisions contained in the Act and in that context, the accounting treatment given by the assessee in the books of account is irrelevant.

(iv)    The conditions to be satisfied for claiming deduction of interest on capital borrowed u/s. 36(1)
(iii) [refer para 4.5]. This should be subject to other specific provisions contained in the proviso and Explanation to section 36(1)(iii).

5.3    (i) Section 145(2) has been amended by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2014 from assessment year 2015-16. Under these amended provisions, the Central Government is authorised to notify Income Computation and Disclosure Standards (ICDS) to be followed by the any class of assessees or in respect of any class of income.

(ii)    Under these provisions, the Government has notified 10 ICDS by notification dated 31st March, 2015 [applicable from assessment year 2016-17]. ICDS-IX deals with the borrowing costs. The impact of this should now also be borne in mind.It is also worth noting that every ICDS specifically provides that in case of conflict between the provisions of the Act and the ICDS, the provisions of the Act shall prevail to that extent.

(iii)    Arguably, even in post ICDS era, this judgment should continue to hold good. At the same time, in all probability, the Revenue is likely to contest this position. As such, on this position,which is settled by the Apex Court after nearly two decades, fresh round of litigation is likely to start. Instead, if the Government does not wish to accept this position, although it would be unfair as well as improper   as the Court, in this case, has only re-iterated the settled position, it can consider to make appropriate amendment.

(iv)    Similar could be the impact of most of the ICDS as, almost all the major assessees, for the purpose of maintenance of books of account, will have to follow either the accounting standards [including Ind AS] prescribed under the Companies Act, 2013 or the accounting standards issued by the ICAI [Statutory AS]. At macro level, the Government is showing it’s preparedness to address all genuine concerns of the business community on tax issues. But, unfortunately, at micro level, things are not encouraging. Need of the hour is to provide clarity at the micro level and encourage change of mind- set in the tax administration. The ICDS will certainly not make it easy for doing business in India. This will lead to further uncertainty in determination of annual tax liability.

(v)    In our view, there is absolutely no need to keep suchelaborate ICDS for the purpose of computation of income. In a good tax system, there should be minimum possible gap between the accounting profit and the taxable profit. The ICDS have gone completely against this basic canon   of taxation. The ICDS will only widen this gap. A common thread noticed in the ICDS is an attempt to accelerate the taxation either by advancing the taxation of income before it is recorded in accounts or by postponing the deduction of expenses/ losses recognised in the books of account based on well settled accounting principles. As such, for tax purpose also, the Revenue Department should have accepted the commercial profit determined in accordance with the Statutory AS and in cases of disagreement, if any, on treatment of some items, the Government could have amended few provisions in the Act itself. In fact, effectively, this was the recommendation of the earlier Committee formed in the year 2002 in it’s report submitted in November, 2003. This could have achieved the object of ICDS,provided certainty and also relieved the business community from the unwarranted huge compliance burden. Statutory ASsare mandatory for maintenanceof books of account for most of the assessees. Effectively, under ICDS regime, the assessees will have to maintain either one more set of books of account or detailed records for the purpose of reconciling the commercial profit with the taxable income. In this process, we are almost assured of new era of litigation in this respect for atleast two more decades, if not more. It is difficult to believe that the Revenue Department is unaware of this ground reality. BCAS had made elaborate representation explaining why ICDS should not be introduced, but no impact.
(vi)    In view of the notification of the ICDS, the damage has  already  been  done.  Best  way  is to withdraw the same. But this  is  doubtful  as  the Government will not have courage to do so. Therefore, now, only the extent of this damage can be restricted. For this, the only one action is required and that is to restrict the applicability of ICDS only to corporate entities which are mandatorily required to followInd-AS. This will be also in line with the object of ICDS as the idea of prescription of ICDS had originatedonly on account of requirement of introduction of Ind AS. This will restrict the impact of ICDS to largecorporate assesseesand  will  also help to mitigate the hardships of the smaller and medium size assessees, who lack requisite competence and infrastructure needed for such compliance. This will substantially save the nation from the potential long term protected litigation on the issues which are not worth litigating. There are many other constructive and better things to do  to build the nation. We may also mention that if the ICDS continue to apply to all assessees, the profession may benefit but the nation will not. The Government has to make a choice.

Interest u/s. 244A on Refund of Self Assessment Tax

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Issue for Consideration
Section 244A(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 provides for payment of interest on refunds due to the assessee. It provides that, in addition to the amount of refund, the assessee is entitled to simple interest at the rate of ½% for every month or part of a month,in cases where refund is out of any tax paid u/s. 115WJ or tax collected at source u/s. 206C or paid by way of advance tax or treated as paid u/s. 199, for the period commencing from the first day of April of the assessment year to the date on which the refund is granted. In any other case, including the case of a refund of self assessment tax (not being the case where refund is less than 10% of the tax determined), the interest is payable, vide clause(b) of section 244A(1), at the same rate, for every month or part of a month, for the period commencing from the date of payment of the tax or penalty to the date on which the refund is granted.

An Explanation to clause (b) defines the term “date of payment of tax or penalty” to mean the date on and from which the amount of tax or penalty specified in the notice of demand issued u/s. 156 is paid in excess of such demand.

The sub-section reads as under:

244A. Interest on Refunds – (1) Where refund of any amount becomes due to the assessee under this Act, he shall, subject to the provisions of this section, be entitled to receive, in addition to the said amount, simple interest thereon calculated in the following manner, namely :—

(a) where the refund is out of any tax paid under section 115WJ or collected at source under section 206C or paid by way of advance tax or treated as paid under section 199, during the financial year immediately preceding the assessment year, such interest shall be calculated at the rate of one-half per cent for every month or part of a month comprised in the period from the 1st day of April of the assessment year to the date on which the refund is granted:

Provided that no interest shall be payable if the amount of refund is less than ten per cent of the tax as determined under sub-section (1) of section 115WE or sub-section (1) of section 143 or on regular assessment;

(b) in any other case, such interest shall be calculated at the rate of one-half per cent for every month or part of a month comprised in the period or periods from the date or, as the case may be, dates of payment of the tax or penalty to the date on which the refund is granted.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this clause, “date of payment of tax or penalty” means the date on and from which the amount of tax or penalty specified in the notice of demand issued under section 156 is paid in excess of such demand.

The issue has arisen before the courts as to whether any interest is payable u/s. 244A on self-assessment tax paid by the assessee, where such self-assessment tax or a part thereof becomes refundable to the assessee. The questions that arose in addressing the issue on hand were; Can the payment of a self-assessment tax be treated as the payment made in pursuance of a notice and that too in excess of the amount that is specified in the notice of demand u/s. 156? Can such a payment be considered as a payment referred to under clause(a)of section 244A? Does the Explanation to clause(b) have the effect of reducing the scope of clause(b) to payments made in pursuance of demand or not? Whether the generality of clause(b) is otherwise not restricted by explanation to clause(b)?

While the Bombay, Delhi, Madras, Karnataka and Punjab & Haryana High Courts have taken a view that the assessee is entitled to interest u/s. 244A on such refund of self-assessment tax, the Delhi High Court has recently taken a contrary view, holding that no interest is payable u/s. 244A on self-assessment tax refunded to the assessee.

Stock Holding Corporation’s Case
The issue recently came up
before the Bombay High Court in the case of Stock Holding Corporation of
India Ltd vs. N. C. Tewari, CIT & Others, 373 ITR 282.

In
this case, the assessee paid a self-assessment tax of Rs. 2.60 crore in
August 1994 for assessment year 1994-95. In December 1996, the
assessment was completed u/s. 143(3), raising a demand of Rs. 1.76
crore. This demand was partly adjusted against the refund due of Rs.
1.53 crore for another assessment year. The Commissioner(Appeals), on
appeal, granted substantial relief to the assessee in appeal against the
assessment order. While giving effect to the order of the
Commissioner(Appeals) in October 1998, the assessee was granted a refund
of Rs. 2 crore, consisting of tax of Rs. 1.53 crore and Rs. 18.24 lakh
aggregating to Rs. 1.7124 crore and interest of Rs. 29 lakh being
interest on refund of Rs. 1.53 crore. However, no interest was granted
on Rs. 18.24 lakh for the period from the date of payment of tax on
self-assessment till the date of refund.

The assessee filed a
revision application to the Commissioner of Income-tax u/s. 264, seeking
a total interest of Rs. 42.87 lakh, u/s. 244A, consisting of Rs. 33.75
lakh payable on a refund of Rs. 1.53 crore (being the demand adjusted
against refund of another year) and Rs. 9.12 lakh on refund of tax of
Rs. 18.24 lakh (being the tax paid on self-assessment). The Commissioner
partly allowed the revision petition, directing the payment of interest
on Rs. 1.53 crore, but rejecting the claim for interest on refund of
tax paid on self-assessment of Rs. 18.24 lakh. A writ petition was filed
before the Bombay High Court challenging this order.

Before the
Bombay High Court, on behalf of the assessee, it was argued that the
issue of grant of interest was no longer in dispute in view of the
Supreme Court decision in the case of Union of India vs. Tata Chemicals
Ltd. 363 ITR 658. It was claimed that refund of any amount due under the
Act to the assesse would entitle the assessee to receive the refund
along with interest. While clause (a) of section 244A(1) governed
refunds of advance tax and tax deducted at source, clause (b) would
govern all other refunds, including tax paid on self-assessment.
Reliance was placed on the CBDT circular number 549 dated 30th October
1989, 182 ITR (St) 1. It was argued that the explanation to section
244A(1)(b) would have no application to the case, as no amount had been
paid in excess of the demand specified u/s. 156.

On behalf of
the revenue, it was argued that the amount paid on self-assessment was
not tax payable in pursuance of a notice of demand. It was contended
that as per the computation of income filed by the assessee, a refund of
Rs. 47.15 lakh only was claimed and consequently, the assessee was
entitled to only refund of the tax, and not to interest thereon. It was
claimed that the decision in Tata Chemicals (supra) was not applicable
to the case before the court, as in that case, the assessee had claimed
interest on refund of amount of TDS that was deducted in excess of tax
that it was liable to deduct in view of an order passed by the
authorities under the Act. Alternatively, it was argued that if at all
any interest was to be allowed to the assessee, it would only be from
the date on which the notice u/s. 156 was issued to the assessee, which
was the date of the assessment order.

The Bombay High Court noted that it was clear that the amount paid by the assessee as self-assessment tax was not covered by clause (a) of section 244A(1), since it was neither a payment of advance tax, nor a tax deducted at source. Thus, it would fall under clause (b), a residuary clause governing refunds of amounts not falling under clause (a). It rejected the revenue’s contention that such tax would not fall under clause (b), because of non- applicability of the said clause. According to the High Court, such a contention was opposed to the meaning  of the provision even on a bare reading of the said clause(b). According to the court, if a tax paid was not covered by clause (a), it fell within clause (b), which was a residuary clause.

The Bombay High Court also observed that the contention of the revenue was otherwise negatived by the CBDT circular number 549 (supra), which clarified, in relation  to the provisions of section 244A, that if the refund was out of any tax, other than advance tax or tax deducted  at source or penalty, interest was payable for the period starting from the date of payment of such tax or penalty and ending on the date of the grant of the refund. The court observed that nowhere did the CBDT even remotely suggest that interest was not payable by the Income-  tax Department on refund of the self-assessment tax. According to the court, the amount paid u/s. 140A on self- assessment was an amount payable as and by way of tax, to meet the likely shortfall in the taxes.

Addressing the arguments of the revenue that no interest at all was payable unless the amount had been paid as tax in pursuance of a notice of demand, and that section 244A did not cover the cases where the payment was gratuitous, as was in the case of the assessee, who sought an interest of Rs. 47 lakh after paying tax on self- assessment of Rs. 2.60 crore, the court observed that
(a)    section 244A(1) commenced with the words “when refund of any amount became due to the assessee under this Act…”, and that (b) clause (b) commenced with the words “in any other case…….” and those words clearly provided that refund of any amount that became due to any assessee under the Act would entitle the assessee to interest u/s. 244A.

In any case, the Court noted , the amount on which the refund was being claimed was originally paid as self- assessment tax u/s. 140A and even the assessing officer in passing the assessment order, had accepted the entire amount paid as self-assessment tax as a payment of tax. In addition, the court observed that when any refund became due to an assessee out of tax paid, it became so only after holding that it was not the tax payable in the first instance. The Bombay High Court therefore rejected the revenue’s contention that the amount of tax paid on self-assessment was not a ‘tax’, and that interest could not be granted on refund of such amounts which were not ‘taxes’.

Addressing the revenue’s argument that the decision of the Supreme Court in Tata Chemicals (supra) was not applicable to the facts of the case before it, the Bombay High Court, analysing the observations of the Supreme Court, observed that it was clear that the requirement to pay interest arose whenever an amount was refunded to an assessee as it was a kind of compensation for use and retention of the money collected by the revenue. The only distinction being made in the facts of the case before it, and those before the Supreme Court was that the amount paid as tax on self-assessment was paid voluntarily, while in the case before the Supreme Court, the tax was deducted at a higher rate in view of the order passed by an authority under the Act. The court observed that there was no distinction between the two, as, when an assessee paid tax either as advance tax or on self- assessment, it was paid to discharge an obligation under the Act and a non-compliance  visited an assessee with a penalty just as non-compliance of orders passed by authorities under the Act would. Thus, according to the court, there was no voluntary payment of tax on self- assessment as was contended by the revenue.

The Bombay High Court then addressed the argument  of the revenue that in view of the explanation to section 244A(1)(b), eligibility thereunder arose only when the amounts were paid consequent to a notice issued u/s. 156. The court noted that the same submission advanced by the revenue before the Supreme Court in the case of Tata Chemicals (supra) had been rejected in that case by the Tribunal, the High Court as well as the Supreme Court.

Rejecting the argument of the revenue that the payment of interest, in any case, should be for the period that commenced from the date of notice u/s. 156, the Bombay High Court observed that; the Supreme Court in Tata Chemicals (supra), held that theExplanation applied only where payment of tax was made pursuant to notice u/s. 156; the payment in the instant case had not been made pursuant to any notice of demand, but was made prior to the filing of the return of income and was in accordance with section 140A; the provisions of section 244A(1)
(b)    required the revenue to pay interest on the amount refunded for the period commencing from the date the payment of tax was made to the revenue, up to the date when refund was granted by the revenue.

The Bombay High Court drew support from the decisions of the Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT vs. Vijaya Bank  338 ITR 489 and of the Delhi High Court in CIT  vs. Sutlej Industries Ltd 325 ITR 331, where, in identical circumstances, it was held that interest u/s 244A was payable from the date of payment of the tax on self- assessment to the date of refund of the amounts. The Court therefore held that interest u/s. 244A was payable on refund of excess self-assessment tax paid by the assessee.

A similar view, that interest was payable under section 244A on refund of self-assessment tax, has also been taken by the Madras High Court in the case of CIT vs. Cholamandalam Investment & Finance Co Ltd 294 ITR 438, and the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of CIT vs. Punjab Chemical & Crop Protection Ltd. 231 Taxman 312.

Engineers India’s case

The issue again recently came up before the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Engineers India Ltd 373 ITR 377.

In this case, the assessee filed its return of income for assessment year 2006-07 in November 2006. It filed a revised return disclosing a higher income in November 2008. During the course of assessment proceedings, a disallowance of Rs. 69 lakh was made u/s. 14A read with rule 8D. An appeal was filed against such disallowance to the Commissioner(Appeals), and during the course of hearing before the Commissioner (Appeals), the issue of the assessing officer not having allowed interest u/s. 244A was raised by the assessee. The Commissioner(Appeals) allowed the assessee’s claim for interest u/s. 244A, following the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Cholamandalam Investment and Finance Company Ltd (supra).

In appeal before the Tribunal by the revenue, the tribunal upheld the order of the Commissioner(Appeals), as regards admissibility of interest on the excess self- assessment tax paid.

In the further appeal before the Delhi High Court by the revenue, the revenue argued that interest was payable to the assessee only if it was so provided under the statute. Reliance was placed on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Sandvik Asia Ltd vs. CIT 280 ITR 643, CIT vs. Gujarat Fluoro Chemicals  358 ITR 291  and Tata Chemicals (supra). On behalf of the assessee, reliance was placed on the decisions of the Delhi High Court in the case of Sutlej Industries (supra), and of    the Bombay High Court in the case of Stock Holding Corporation of India (supra).

The Delhi High Court noted that in Sandvik Asia’s case, the issue for consideration by the Supreme Court was as to whether the assessee was entitled to be compensated by the revenue for delay in payment of the amount due to the assessee. Since there was an inordinate delay    in that case on the part of the revenue in refunding the amount, the Supreme Court held that the assessee was entitled to be adequately compensated by way of interest for the delay in payment of the amount “lawfully due to the assessee which are withheld wrongly and contrary to the law”.

The Delhi High Court noted the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Cholamandalam Investment (supra), and observed that the argument in that case revolved around the question as to whether interest would be admissible under clause (a) or clause (b) of section 244A(1), in the context of the distinction on account of the additional requirement in clause (a) that the amount refundable must be more than 10% of the tax determined. The Madras High Court held that the refund was governed by clause (b) and was therefore not subject to that restriction.

The Delhi High Court, then noted the decision of its own court in the case of Sutlej Industries (supra), where the question of law related to whether clause (b) of section 244A(1) excluded the payment of interest on refund of self-assessment tax. It noted that in Sutlej Industries’ case, the assessee had paid self-assessment tax u/s. 140A, in addition to TDS and advance tax.

The Delhi High Court, then noted the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Gujarat Fluoro Chemicals (supra) where a bench of two judges doubted the correctness of the decision in the case of Sandvik asia(supra), and referred the matter for consideration and authoritative pronouncement to a larger bench. It noted the observations of the larger bench of the Supreme Court, which clarified that only interest provided for under the statute may be claimed by an assessee from the revenue, and no other interest on such statutory interest.

The Delhi High Court, then noted the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Tata Chemicals (supra), which was a case of whether the deductor of TDS is  also entitled to interest on refund of excess deduction or erroneous deduction of tax at source under section 195.

The Delhi High Court, then analysed  the  decision  of the Bombay High Court in the case of Stock Holding Corporation of India (supra), which was in the context   of an issue similar to that before the Delhi High Court. According to the Delhi High Court, the Bombay High Court did not take note of the clarification given by the Supreme Court in the case of Gujarat Fluoro Chemicals(supra).

The Delhi High Court analysed the provisions relating to payment of advance tax, filing of returns and payment   of self-assessment  tax. It observed,  on  analysis,  that  it was clear from the bare reading of these provisions that whether for purposes of computing  the  advance tax liability or for calculation of self-assessment tax, the assessee was given the liberty to make the estimation of his own accord. The revenue expected proper declaration on the basis of which the liability would be eventually determined, since after all, the necessary information or data was available first to the assessee. It observed that the liability of the revenue to pay interest u/s. 244A on refund of excess amount paid towards the income tax by the assessee required to be examined in the above light.

The court observed that the provisions relating to advance tax in respect of fringe benefits u/s. 115WJ, credit for tax deducted u/s. 199, credit for tax collected at source under section 206C and liability for advance tax u//s 207 had no connection with the liability to pay self-assessment tax and therefore clause (a) of section 244A(1) would not apply to refund out of the amount paid as self-assessment tax. On the other hand, clause (b) was a residuary clause which opened with the expression “in any other case”, and naturally therefore, the liability of the revenue towards interest on refund from out of amount paid as self-assessment tax would fall under this clause.

It noted that under clause (b), the beginning point for purposes of calculating the liability of the revenue towards interest on the amount being refunded was prescribed as the date of payment of tax (penalty). This expression, as defined in the explanation appended to the clause, was indicative of the date of payment of the amount specified in the demand notice u/s. 156. According to the Delhi High Court therefore, the legislation made it clear that for the rest of the clause, the amount paid by the assessee (from which refund was to be made) must have been deposited pursuant to a demand notice issued by the assessing authority. The clause (b) would therefore not apply, by virtue of the Explanation, in case the excess amount being refunded had been paid by the assessee otherwise than in compliance with demand notice or voluntarily. According to the Delhi High Court, this was the import and effect of the Explanation if the language employed thereof was read, understood and construed in its natural and ordinary sense. Since the words used were clear, plain and unambiguous, according to the Delhi High Court, there was no scope for beneficial construction, since it would lead to re-legislation, which was impermissible.

According to the Delhi High Court, the observations of the Supreme Court in Sandvik Asia’s case (supra) must be understood in the light of clarification given in the case  of Gujarat Fluoro Chemicals (supra), and there was no liability on the revenue to pay tax on refund beyond the liability created by the statutory provisions. In the case of Tata Chemicals (supra), the Delhi High Court noted that the collection of the tax through the deductor was found to be illegal, thus giving rise to the liability to pay interest on the refunded amount.

The Delhi High Court therefore,concluded that there could not be a general rule that whenever a refund of income tax paid in excess was to be made, the revenue must necessarily pay interest on the refunded amount. The letter and spirit of the law on the subject, according to the Delhi High Court was that the party which committed the error in proper calculation (or delay in proper assessment) must bear the burden. If the excess amount was paid due to erroneous assessment by the revenue, having exacted such burden wrongfully and inequitably on the assessee and having retained the excess amount thus received, the reimbursement must be accompanied by payment of interest at the statutorily prescribed rate. Conversely, if the assessee was to be blamed for the miscalculation (or for delay, or for want of claim of refund), the revenue did not owe any interest, even if the excess payment of tax was liable to be refunded.

The Delhi High Court therefore expressed its inability    to subscribe to follow the view taken by its own Division Bench in the case of Sutlej Industries (supra). In doing so, it observed that in that case, even otherwise, the question had been examined in the facts and circumstances indicative of high-pitched assessment made by the revenue and the refund of the self-assessment tax resulting from a claim to such effect being made by the assessee in the return. It noted that in the case before it, the revenue had not made the excessive assessment so as to impel the deposit of self-assessment tax in excess, and that the assessee did not make a claim for refund in the return, but that such claim appeared to have been made later.

It also declined to follow the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Cholamandalam Investment (supra), for the same reasons and since, in the view of the Delhi High Court, the proposition of law on the subject was expounded in too broad terms in that case. The Delhi High Court observed that as clarified by the Supreme Court in Gujarat Fluoro Chemicals, there was no general principle of liking the revenue to pay interest on all sum so wrongfully retained. It observed that it was trite that a fiscal statute is to be construed strictly, and the claim of interest on refund of income tax had to be pegged only on the statutory clauses.

In the absence of explanation as to how the assessee erred in calculation of self-assessment tax, and there being no allegation that such excess deposit was pursuant to demand by the revenue, the Delhi High Court therefore held that the claim for interest on excess payment voluntary paid could not be sustained.

Observations
Use of the citizen’s money, whether paid voluntarily or otherwise, by the Government, not representing any liability, should be compensated is an acceptable principle of law and when not provided for specifically, should be read in to the law as has been held by the apex court. Therefore, the case for the interest on refund of an tax , including that of the tax paid on self assessment, is on a sound footing in cases where it has been held back for no fault of the tax payer. This understanding is independent of the provisions of section 244A, which provisions, in our opinion, further strengthens the case for interest.

It is true that the case of interest under consideration is not covered by clause(a) of section 244A(1). Whether the case is however, covered by clause(b) or not is a question that requires to be examined and answered for arriving at the correct view. The additional question that is required to be addressed is whether the Explanation to the clause has the effect of limiting the scope of the clause or not. Obviously, on a bare reading of the clause, it is clear that refund of any tax, other than advance  tax or tax deducted at source or penalty, entitles an assessee to interest u/s. 244A. The clause later on provides that the interest shall be payable for the period starting from the date of payment of such tax or penalty and ending on the date of the grant of the refund. Explanation to the clause defines the term from ‘the date of payment of tax or penalty’ and while doing so it links tax payments to those paid in pursuance of a notice of demand. It is this restriction that has emboldened the revenue to take a stand that no interest is payable on refund of tax paid on self assessment.

Usually an Explanation does not limit the scope of the provision and when it seeks to do so, a question arises over its ability to do so. In the context, it is clear that the intention of the legislature is to grant interest on ‘any refund’ and therefore the Explanation should be interpreted to provide also for the cases where the tax is paid in pursuance of the notice of demand and in addition to provide for the period for which the interest in such cases is to be paid. In our opinion, this is the only way the Explanation can be interpreted considering the clear and unambiguous language of the main provision contained in clause(b). Alternatively, the Explanation could be said to have been inserted only to provide for the period for which interest is to be paid and in that case there would be a tacit acceptance of the fact that   the case under consideration for interest on refund of self assessment tax surely falls under clause(b). Any limitation restricting the period through an Explanation, would be construed as an unauthorised limitation and would therefore have to be read down, especially in a case where the interest is otherwise payable for the moneys withheld by the Government.

The Delhi High Court, in the past, in Sutlej Industries case, had ruled in favour of the assessee when it held that an assessee was entitled to interest u/s. 244A on refund of taxes paid on account of self assessment tax. Instead of following the said decision that was delivered on similar facts, the Delhi High Court distinguished it in Engineers India’s case, which we with respect believe was under an error of facts. An error was committed when It assumed that the payment of self-assessment tax was on account of demand by the revenue, in the case of Sutlej Industries. This erroneous assumption led the court to believe that such payment was on regular assessment, and not on self-assessment and .therefore, the payment was pursuant to a notice of demand u/s. 156, on refund of which there was no doubt that interest was payable u/s. 244A. It is evident from the facts of the case of Sutlej Industries, that the payment of the self-assessment tax was prior to filing of the return of income. The Court, in Engineers India’s case, was therefore not justified in trying to differentiate the ratio of the decision of its  own  division  bench  in the earlier case of Sutlej Industries and in not following that decision.

Judicial propriety and discipline required that in case the division bench in Engineers India’s case disagreed with the earlier decision in Sutlej Industries case, it should have referred the earlier decision to a larger bench of the court, and not taken a different view from that taken by a division bench of the same court in the earlier decision.

The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Tata Chemicals was rendered after its decision in the case of Gujarat Fluoro Chemicals. Both these decisions contained important observations of the apex court which are very relevant in the context. We are sure that had these observations of the apex court been pressed in service before the court, the decision in Engineers India ‘s case would have been different. The following observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Tata Chemicals (supra) are relevant in this regard (underlined for emphasis):

The refund becomes due when tax deducted at source, advance tax paid, self assessment tax paid and tax paid on regular assessment exceeds tax chargeable for the year as a  result of an order passed in appeal or other proceedings under the Act. When refund is of any advance tax (including tax deducted/collected at source), interest is payable for the period starting from the first day of the assessment year to the date of grant of refund. No interest is, however, payable if the excess payment is less than 10 percent of tax determined u/s. 143(1) or on regular assessment. No interest is payable for the period for which the proceedings resulting in the refund are delayed for the reasons attributable to the assessee (wholly or partly). The rate of interest and entitlement to interest on excess tax are determined by the statutory provisions of the Act. Interest payment is a statutory obligation and non- discretionary in nature to the assessee. In tune with the aforesaid general principle, section 244A is drafted and enacted.

‘A “tax refund” is a refund of taxes when the tax liability is less than the tax paid. As per the old section an assessee was entitled for payment of interest on the amount of taxes refunded pursuant to an order passed under the Act, including the order passed in an appeal. In the present fact scenario, the deductor/assessee had paid taxes pursuant to a special order passed by the assessing officer/ Income Tax Officer. In the appeal filed against the said order the assessee has succeeded and a direction is issued by the appellate authority to refund the tax paid. The amount paid by the resident/ deductor was retained by the Government till a direction was issued by the appellate authority to refund the same. When the said amount is refunded it should carry interest in the matter of course. As held by the Courts while awarding interest, it is a kind of compensation of use and retention of the money collected unauthorizedly by the Department. When the collection is illegal, there is corresponding obligation on the revenue to refund such amount with interest  in as much as they have retained and enjoyed the money deposited. Even the Department has understood the object behind insertion of section 244A, as that, an assessee is entitled to payment of interest for money remaining with the Government which would be refunded. There is no reason to restrict the same to an assessee only without extending the similar benefit to a resident/ deductor who has deducted tax at source and deposited the same before remitting the amount payable to a non-resident/ foreign company.

Providing for payment of interest in case of refund of amounts paid as tax or deemed tax or advance tax is a method now statutorily adopted by fiscal legislation to ensure that the aforesaid amount of tax which has been duly paid in prescribed time and provisions in that behalf form part of the recovery machinery provided in a taxing Statute. Refund due and payable to the assessee is debt-owed and payable by the Revenue. The Government, there being no express statutory provision for payment of interest on the refund of excess amount/tax collected by the Revenue, cannot shrug off its apparent obligation to reimburse the deductors lawful monies with the accrued interest for the period of undue retention of such monies. The State having received the money without right, and having retained  and  used it, is bound to make the party good, just as an individual would be under like circumstances. The obligation to refund money received and retained without right implies and carries with it the right to interest. Whenever money has been received by a party which ex aequo et bono ought to be refunded, the right to interest follows, as a matter of course.

The view that interest is payable under clause (b) of section 244A(1) only where tax is paid pursuant to a notice  of  demand  u/s.  156,  based  on  interpretation of the Explanation to clause (b) is clearly contradictory  to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of   Tata   Chemicals   (supra),   where   the    Supreme Court held as under:

In the present case, it is not in doubt that the payment of tax made by resident/ depositor is in excess and the department chooses to  refund the excess payment of tax to the depositor. We have held the interest requires to be paid on such refunds. The catechise is from what date interest is payable, since the present case does not fall either under clause (a) or (b) of section 244A of the Act. In the absence of an express provision  as contained in clause (a), it cannot be said that the interest is payable from the  1st  of April  of the assessment year. Simultaneously, since  the said payment is not made pursuant to a notice issued u/s. 156 of the Act, Explanation to clause (b) has no application. In such cases, as the opening words of clause (b) specifically referred to “as in any other case”, the interest is payable from the date of payment of tax. The sequel of our discussion is the resident/deductor is entitled not only the refund of tax deposited under Section 195(2) of the Act, but has to be refunded with interest from the date of payment of such tax.

The view, that the language of section 244A is clear and unambiguous, and that the CBDT circular therefore need not be referred to for its interpretation, also does not seem to be justified, given the contrary view on the issue taken by several High Courts (including by the Division Bench of the Dellhi court in Sutlej Industries case ) in the matter. It is a well-established  principle  that  circulars  issued by the CBDT are binding on the assessing officer, and therefore an assessing officer cannot take a view contrary to that expressed by the CBDT to deny the benefit to an assessee. CBDT circular number 549 of 1989 clarifies as under:

“11.4 The provisions of the new section 244A are as under:—

(i)    Sub-section (1) provides that where in pursuance of any order passed under this Act, refund of any amount becomes due to the assessee then—

(a)    if the refund is out of any advance tax paid or tax deducted at source during the  financial year immediately preceding the assessment year, interest shall be payable for the period starting from the 1st April of the assessment year and on the date of grant of the refund. No interest shall, however, be payable, if the amount of refund is less than 10 per cent of the tax determined on regular assessment;
(b)    if the refund is out of any tax, other than advance tax or tax deducted at source or penalty, interest shall be payable for the period starting from the date of payment of such tax or penalty and ending on the date of the grant of the refund. (Refer to example III in para 11.8).”

Very often, taxpayers apprehend that there could be litigation on certain claims for deduction made in the return of income, and prefer to pay a slightly higher amount of tax so that they do not end up paying interest in case  the claim is denied. This cannot be said to be a voluntary payment, since it is on account of the excessive tendency towards litigation of the tax department in recent times.

The facts in Engineer India’s case seem to indicate that it was only the claim for interest u/s. 244A which was made in appeal proceedings and not the claim of refund for the first time as seems to be believed by the court.   In any case, a payment of tax whenever made, cannot be considered to be a voluntary payment, as a rule.     No taxpayer would voluntarily want to pay higher taxes than he is likely to be liable to ultimately pay, given the difficulties in obtaining refunds from the tax department and the low rate of interest paid on refunds.

Therefore, the view taken by the Bombay, Madras, Karnataka, and Punjab and Haryana High Courts, and the Delhi High Court in the case of Sutlej Industries, to the effect that interest is payable u/s. 244A on refund of self-assessment tax paid by an assessee, seems to be the better view of the matter.

Raise the Ethical Bar high enough!

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There is a constant feeling in Society that Ethics, values morals are on the decline. This is a feeling that is as old as the hills. We would have heard our forefathers lament the loss of morality; we do so every day, and possibly generations of the future will do so as well. Are then things really that bad? Do we live in a world, where each person is at the other’s throat, would rob him without fear of reprimand? I do not think so. If this were so, civilisation as we understand it today, would have possibly ceased to exist long ago.

There is however certainly a cause for concern. Until a few decades ago, whenever we were in a dilemma as to whether what we were doing was right or wrong, there was guidance available at close quarters. At home, it was in the form of parents or elders, in public life it was in the form of social leaders who were virtually moral light houses, and when we stepped out in the world to earn our bread, there were our peers who set standards of excellence.

It seems to be that over a time we have stopped accepting moral authority of individuals, without question and seem to test it constantly. We now have children in the family questioning their parents as to whether there actions are morally right or wrong. Similar questions are being asked of social leaders as well as seniors in the profession. While this is good in a way, it gives rise to certain challenges.

Another aspect is that ethical values also undergo a change, and what was right or acceptable at a particular point of time no longer remains so. Similarly, an act for which one was castigated in the past would be perfectly acceptable now. Nothing is right or wrong in absolute terms and every action is to be judged in a frame of reference.

There are two aspects of ethical or moral behaviour that are particularly worrying. There seems to be willingness to compromise morality, and qualities like truth and honesty for achieving material gains. Such compromises are made very quickly, and without the inner turmoil which is expected when a moral value is sacrificed. Another issue is the tendency to accept extremely low standards. While in an examination for passing, a benchmark of 35% is fine you cannot have 35% truth, honesty or integrity, it must be absolute. I do appreciate that this is difficult, but I think it is not impossible. When we start accepting these low standards in any profession, we do so at our own peril.

Finally, ethical values are something which must be ingrained and become a part of oneself. Yes, in order to ensure correct behaviour, in private, public and professional life, we do require laws, rules and regulations. However, their acceptance has to come from within and not without. I was amused when, travelling in a cab, a relative of mine, at red signal asked the driver to check whether there was a policeman at the corner and then proceed. This would mean that a law is broken only when one gets caught and not otherwise. This is a totally incorrect attitude.

The Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society has always strived to encourage the spread of values in public life in general and the profession of accountancy in particular. The Bombay Chartered Accountant Journal is the flagship of the Society. Over the past few years, a special issue is released on the occasion of the founding day of the Society on 6th July. The special issue contains a few articles on a particular theme, in addition to the normal features. We selected “Ethics “as a subject for this year’s special issue.

We requested individuals from different professions to express their views on the state of ethics in general, and the moral challenges faced in the profession to which they belonged. We gave them an absolutely free hand in that regard. I am grateful for the contributions.

This issue contains articles from our very own K. C. Narang, Somasekhar Sundaresan – an Advocate, Prakash Bal – a Journalist, Sanjeevani Bhelande – a singer, and Dilip Deshmukh – an Architect. I have had the benefit of reading the articles before they reach you. Narang saheb’s article sets the tone, by putting the topic in its perspective; Mr. Bal laments the depressing scenario in the media, Ms. Bhelande’s commitment to ethics shines through her piece while we are informed of regulations similar to our own in the architectural field by Mr. Dilip Deshmukh.

Mr Somasekhar Sundaresan describes the obligations cast on an advocate to defend the accused. When I read his piece, I was reminded of the treatment of advocates who defended persons who in the eyes of Society were “criminals“. It is sad that we tend to sit in judgment as to whether the actions of a person are correct or otherwise without giving him an opportunity to explain himself and be adequately assisted in that endeavour.

I cannot resist the temptation of reproducing the words of Thomas Erskine, the great advocate who was dismissed from the post of attorney general because he accepted the brief of a revolutionary. These words appear elsewhere in the issue. Thomas Erskine said “From the moment that any advocate can be permitted to say that he will or will not stand between the Crown and the subject arraigned in court where he daily sits to practice, from that moment the liberties of England are at an end. If the advocate refuses to defend from what he may think of the charge or of the defence he assumes the character of the Judge, nay he assumes it before the hour of judgment and in proportion to his rank and reputation puts the heavy influence of perhaps a mistaken opinion into the scale against the accused in whose favour the benevolent principles of English law make all assumptions, and which commands the very Judge to be his Counsel “.

I hope the issue will make interesting reading.

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COMING OUT OF DIFFICULTY

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On the voyage of life, there is a smooth sailing. The vehicle one drives is under optimum control. The roads and the overall environment are providing excellent path and all expected convenience. One feels that this is the gala time of life. One’s own movement to get ahead on the voyage could be a part of a Race, but when the inner feel of God’s touch is there, it is Grace. The feel of happiness becomes the way of life. One feels the fragrance of the spring of life and virtually walks on the petals of roses.

Uncertainty and change is the unavoidable and immortal truth of life. As an inevitable part of life journey, all of a sudden, an unforeseen speedbreaker breaks down one’s vehicle. An unimagined situation happens which is so difficult for one to digest. Sudden unexpected storm shatters the beauty of one’s spring of life. It could be loss of a near and dear one, unthinkable betrayal or anything completely never thought of or an unfavourable situation.

People try to console you, try to help you out to get over that difficulty. But as it is rightly said, “No one can save us or No one may, if one doesn’t have the willingness to walk on the path on one’s OWN”. People can help only to re-balance your vehicle, but to cross over the speedbreaker; one has to start the vehicle again to move on in life’s journey.

In tough times, one may get upset with God. One may start losing the Faith in the Infinite Intelligence. But all that one needs, to get over the difficulty is to develop a positive approach towards it, to align oneself with the logic of Infinity. When God solves your problems, you get faith in his abilities but when God doesn’t solve your problems, it means he has faith in your abilities. Pain and sufferings come to awaken one’s greatest Self, to make one understand the perfect lyrics of lifesong and ultimately to make one strive to become a better and a stronger person.

God’s magnificient effluence is the panacea for many tough times. One gets closer to God, one’s OWN SELF, during the difficulties. The Inner power and utmost faith in God keeps one alive. One lets the difficulty feel that it’s difficult to stay here. Through the tough times, He/She attains more serenity and divineness. One feels that I need to be happy with my luck and that let one feel lucky. At the end, one who experiences and gets over difficulties are the chosen and closest to God. Remember, God’s wish and human efforts together can conquer any fault in one’s stars.

After all, pain and sufferings PURIFY THE SOUL. One would never strive to find out a SOLUTION unless and until one has not encountered the PROBLEM. In the same way, when in tough times nothing seems workable to make one PEACEFUL and CALM as far as sensory world is concerned. It expands the horizons of one’s intellect and mind to SEE THE WORLD WHICH IS TRANSCENDENTAL, THE PEACE AND HAPPINESS which is IMMORTAL. One clearly GETS IN one’s consciousness, the UNBREAKABLE and IMMORTAL LAWS of INFINITY OF INFINITIES to UNDERSTAND where did one get OUT of TRACK OF THE UNIVERSE and WHY all things turned out in A WAY one NEVER EVER EXPECTED. One starts understanding CHRONICLeS of TOUGH TIMES. Ultimately, the QUEST converts into the COMPLETE AWAKENING OF ONE’S WISDOM like A THOUSAND-PETALLED LOTUS HAS OPENED UP IN ITS FULLEST BEAUTY. Everything starts unfolding its TRUE NATURE INCLUDING ONE’S OWN. One perceives the PURPOSE of LIFE. It knocks upon the doors of HEART which had ALREADY been closed because of PAIN, opens it UP and lets the vital essence of ONE’S TRUE NATURE of COMPASSION, SELFLESSNESS, FREEDOM, HAPPINESS and PEACEFULNESS flow NATURALLY.

It becomes the FIRST STEP on the JOURNEY from IMPERFECTION to PERFECTION, from EGO to SELF and FROM ISOLATION to UNITY, from IGNORANCE to KNOWLEDGE, from CONSCIENCE to CONCIOUSNESS, from SUBJECTIVITY to OBJECTIVITY, from SELFISHNESS to SELFLESSNESS and ULTIMATELY BOUNDNESS to FREEDOM.

As it is rightly said by LORD BUDDHA, “SUFFERINGS lead to HAPPINESS”. So Let us ACKNOWLEDGE SUFFERINGS. LET it BE FELT to its END. Let TOUGH TIMES GET US CLOSER TO GOD.

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Business expenditure – Section 37 – A. Y. 2005- 06- Premium on keyman insurance on partners paid by firm – Premium is deductible

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CIT vs. Agarwal Enterprises; 374 ITR 240 (Bom):

The assessee
partnership firm had taken keyman insurance policies on its partners.
For the A.Y. 2005-06, the Assessing Officer disallowed the claim for
deduction of premium on such policies. The Tribunal allowed the claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i)
Keyman insurance is a life insurance taken by a person on the life of
another person who is or was the employee of the first mentioned person
or is or was connected in any manner whatsoever with the business of the
first mentioned person.

(ii) The record indicated that the firm
comprised of two partners. It was dealing in securities and shares. A
keyman insurance policy was obtained for the benefit of the firm
inasmuch as the firm’s business would be adversely affected, in the
event, one of the partners met with any untimely death. The premium on
the insurance was deductible.”

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TS-211-ITAT-2014(Mum) Renoir Consulting limited vs. DIT A.Y: 1997-1998 and 1999-2000 Dated: 11-04-2014

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On the facts, premises of the client or the hotel where the employees stayed could be regarded as a fixed place permanent establishment (PE) through which the business of the Taxpayer was carried on.

Facts:
The Taxpayer (FCo) is a non-resident company registered in Mauritius. It entered into a contract with an Indian Company (ICo) for rendering services in relation to planning and implementing Performance Index Programme which would help in improving the management performance of ICO, by improving the work methods/services and providing efficient management control.

FCo deputed its employees comprising consultants and principal consultants to India. The duration of the contract was 50 weeks and it required 874 man days of consultants and 81 days of principal consultants’ time to be spent in India. There was no office available for these personnel to work in India.
FCo contended that the hotel rooms/accommodation used by its employees were only for stay, i.e., for residence and were not used as an office. Hence, it did not have any place of business in India.

It was also argued that employees in India were only carrying out preparatory and auxiliary services by only gathering and collating the data and transmitting the same to FCo and they worked as per directions of the Board of directors situated in Mauritius. Thus, the place of management of FCo was situated in Mauritius where the entire decision-making powers were located.

The Tax Authority contended that the hotel rooms where the FCo’s employees stayed in India from where they carried out their activities in India must be regarded as a Fixed Place PE of FCo in India and the income received from ICo should thus be taxed in India.

The finding of the Tax Authority was upheld by the First Appellate Authority. Aggrieved by the order of the First Appellate Authority on this issue, FCo appealed to the Tribunal.

Held
The right to use a fixed place of business may be owned, rented or otherwise acquired in any other manner. Further, a right which is not legal in its nature may, therefore, be of no adverse consequence. In the instant case, whether the hotel rooms could be legally or contractually used for business purposes was not ascertained. Even if such use was proscribed, but was factually used, it could be considered as a PE.

Also, in the present case there is no doubt that the use of hotel rooms and ICo’s premises is only for business purposes.

The modus operandi used by FCo for executing ICo’s contract clearly shows that it required extensive execution, continuous interaction with ICo and a detailed study followed by actual implementation in India. All this required FCo’s presence in India.

The claim of FCo that work performed in India was merely preparatory or auxiliary was incorrect and was inconsistent with facts where principal consultants came to India on frequent visits.

Further, the Fixed Place of business is not confined to a place where the top management of the company is located.

The contention that there is no Fixed Place because the personnel are operating from different places is without merit. The personnel are required to operate from different places due to the nature and requirement of the contract and is similar to a situation of a salesman.

It is for the FCo, to specify as to how and from where it has performed its work. If the employees have not performed their work from ICo’s premises, then there has to be some other place from where they had performed their activities during the time period that spans over 874 man-days for the consultants and 81 days for the principal consultants. One cannot perform activities in vacuum.

Thus, the fact that some place is at the disposal of the FCo or its employees during the entire period of their stay in India is manifest and eminent and follows from the work nature/profile and the modus operandi followed. Thus, the FCo had a Fixed Place PE in India.

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TS-327-ITAT-2014(Pun) Shaan Marine Services Private Limited vs. DIT A.Y: 2012-13 Dated: 27-05-2014

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“Effective management” of one-man shipping Company is situated in Cyprus as it is registered and headquartered in Cyprus; shipping income from transportation of cargo is not taxable in India as per India-Cyprus DTAA.

Facts:
Article 8 of the Cyprus DTAA governs taxation of income from shipping business and it provides that profits derived by an enterprise, registered and having headquarters (i.e., effective management) in Cyprus, from the operation of ships in international traffic shall be taxable only in Cyprus.

Place of effective management has been defined by OECD Model convention as the place where key management and commercial decisions that are necessary for the conduct of entity’s business as a whole are in substance made.

Ship Co, a company registered in and a tax resident of Cyprus, was engaged in the shipping business. Ship Co was a one-member company having no employees or a big office establishment as most of its work was outsourced to other entities. Ship Co was contracted by a client in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to transport cargo from India to UAE. Ship Co chartered a ship from another company (Charter Co) for this purpose.

Ship Co engaged the Taxpayer, an Indian company (ICO), as its agent for handling, loading and other operations, obtaining necessary clearances from the court, customs, income tax, immigration etc., in India. It was argued on behalf of the taxpayer that as a business practice, Ship Co carried out its major business activities through outsourcing. Hence, the factor that there were no employees in India should not be given undue importance.

ICo, in the capacity of agent, filed the return of income (ROI) of Ship Co in India and declared NIL income relying upon Article 8 of the Cyprus DTAA which provides taxation right only to Cyprus.

The Tax Authority did not accept the above claim and contended that Ship Co was merely interposed as a charterer to conduct business on behalf of Charter Co and to take benefit of the Cyprus DTAA and the Tax Residency Certificate (TRC) furnished by Ship Co alone cannot be sufficient to conclude that the place of effective management was in Cyprus.

The First Appellate Authority also ruled against Ship Co and accordingly filed an appeal before the Tribunal.

Held:
All the documents indicate that Ship Co played a definite role in transporting cargo from India to the UAE.

• The UAE client has made a contract with Ship Co to transport cargo.
• The bill of lading is in the name of Ship Co and recognises it as the ship charterer.
• Ship Co’s annual report records all profits/revenues from the shipping business.

The Tax Authority has attempted to rewrite contracts, which is not permissible. It cannot be said that Ship Co was merely a “paper company” and did not play any role in transporting cargo.

If the Tax Authority’s contention is accepted that Ship Co is merely interposed to take benefit of the Cyprus DTAA by Charter Co, then, the freight income should be taxable in the hands of Charter Co and such income cannot be taxed in the hands of ICo who is the agent of Ship Co.

Ship Co did not have any establishment outside of Cyprus and, hence, its “effective management” is situated in Cyprus only.

Accordingly, Ship Co is entitled to benefits of the Cyprus DTAA and income of Ship Co from transportation of cargo is not taxable in India under the Cyprus DTAA .

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TS-343-ITAT-2014(Del) Karan Thapar vs. ACIT A.Ys: 2000-2001, 2002-2004, 2006-07, 2009-10 Dated: 09-05-2014

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Family pension received from the UK employer of deceased wife is duly covered under Article 23(3) of the India – UK DTAA; the phrase ‘may be taxed’ means that the income can be taxed only in source state.

Facts:
Taxpayer’s (Mr. A), wife was employed by a UK Co. On her demise, UK Co decided to pay family pension to Mr A as per UK Co’s family pension scheme. The family pension was to be paid to Mr. A until his death.

The Tax Authority contended that the family pension received by Mr. A was taxable in India under Article 23(1) of the DTAA between India and UK.

On Appeal the First Appellate Authority held that the family pension is not taxable in India in view of Article 23(3) of the India-UK DTAA which provided that the same ‘may be taxed’ in source state and hence country of residence had no right of taxation. Aggrieved the Tax Authority appealed before the Tribunal.

Held:
“Pension” is received from the ex-employer by the employee in his lifetime while “family pension” is received by the spouse or family members or legal dependent of the deceased employee from the employer of that deceased employee.

Article 20 of India-UK DTAA has no relevance in case of family pension which is generally received by the spouse or family members or legal dependent.

Article 23(1) of India-UK DTAA stipulates that the items of income beneficially owned by the residents of a contracting state (India) wherever arising shall be taxed in the resident state (India).

Article 23(2) is neither related to pension nor related to family pension. Article 23(3) covers items of income which are not included in the forgoing articles and arising in a contracting state (UK) “may be taxed in that other state”. The expression “may be taxed in that other state” mentioned in Article 23(3) authorises only the source state to tax such income and by necessary implication, the state of residence is precluded from taxing such income, especially when the tax has been deducted by the UK as source state.

Taxation by both residence as well as source state would render the object of double tax avoidance agreement infructuous and the provisions stipulated in the Indo-UK DTAA would be otiose.

Reliance was placed on Delhi ITAT decision in the case of Mideast India Ltd. (28 SOT 395) and Mumbai ITAT decision in the case of Ms. Pooja Bhatt (26 SOT 574).

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TS-317-ITAT-2014(Hyd) Pirelli Cavi E Sistemi vs. ACIT A.Y: 2000-2001, Dated: 28-05-2014

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Income from offshore supplies is taxable in India only to the extent of the profits attributable to the operations in India.

Facts:
The Taxpayer, an Italian Co (FCo), entered into three separate contracts with an Indian Co (ICo) for offshore supply, onshore supply and onsite services in relation to setting up a fiber optic system in India.

FCo obtained requisite permission for execution of onshore supply and service contract and for setting up a project office in India.

FCo filed its return of income and offered to tax income from the contracts relating to onshore supplies and services contract while maintaining that the income from offshore supplies was not taxable in India as the same was concluded outside India.

The Tax Authority contended that the three contracts are to be treated as a single composite contract and the offshore supplies are also taxable in India.

On Appeal, the First Appellate Authority held that the offshore supplies was taxable in India, because the activities relating to signing of the contract, installation and training of employees of ICo was undertaken by the project office in India.

Held:
There is no dispute with reference to the fact that income from the offshore contract is taxable only to the extent of profits attributable to the operations in India which are clearly defined in the Act as well as the DTAA between India and Italy. This position does not change even if all the three contracts signed by the parent company are treated to be single or composite contract.

The project office was set up after the contract for offshore supplies was entered into and hence there is no corelation between the signing of the contract in India and the Project office. Consequently, no income accrues or arises to the PE in India due to signing of contract in India.

The offshore contract was merely for supply of cables and not for providing the service of installation and hence no part of the income can be attributable to the PE in India.

Further training provided to ICo’s employees was claimed to be incidental to the offshore supplies though a separate amount was charged for such training from ICo. Alternatively, even if training fee needs to be considered as part of Project office, the training work was outsourced and fee paid for outsourcing was more than the amount received from ICo for such training. Hence, no income was earned by FCo in this regard.

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M/S. Glaxo Smithkline Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs. State of Kerala, [2012] 50 VST 486 (Ker)

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Sales Tax- Goods Return – Return of Medicines Sold by Retailer on Expiry- Beyond Prescribed Period of Three Months-Not Allowed-It is Not Unfructified Sale, Rule.9(1)(b) of The Kerala General Sales Tax Rules, 1963.

Facts
The petitioner company, the manufacturer of medicines, sold medicines in the State of Kerala to retailers through distributors. As per trade practice followed by all manufacturers, the company took back from the retailers through distributors, the unsold medicines after its expiry and destroyed by the company later. During the assessment for the period 2001-02 and 2002-03, the company claimed deduction from turnover of sales for such return of goods as goods return. The assessing authority disallowed the claim of goods return being beyond prescribed period of three months from the date of sale as provided in Rule 9(1)(b) of The Kerala General sales Tax Rules, 1963. The disallowance was also confirmed by the Tribunal. The Company filed revision petition filed before the Kerala High Court against the decision of tribunal.

Held
The Kerala Sales Tax Act or Rules do not provide any specific provision for grant of refund or adjustment of tax paid in respect of sale of medicines which have lost potency at the hands of dealer and which have been collected and destroyed by the manufacturer company. The only provision for deduction under the Rule is deduction for sales return within the prescribed period of three months from the date of sale. Since the goods are not returned within the prescribed periodthe deduction for sales return is not permissible.

The High Court also did not accept the alternate plea of the company that the transaction should be treated as unfructified sales. However, the High Court felt that this is a genuine problem of the medicines dealers which State has to address. In the result the revision petition filed by the company was dismissed.

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Bhattacharjee Pharmaceuticals & Co. Ltd. And Another v. ACST, Corporate Division, Kolkata, [2012] 50 VST 435 (WBTT)

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VAT- Rate of Tax- Drugs and Medicine- Medicated Toothpaste – Taxable as Drugs And Medicines, Entry 25A of Schedule C of The West Bengal Value Added Tax Act, 2003.

Facts
The applicant company was a distributor and consignment agent of different pharmaceutical companies. The company had sold Thermoseal, R.A. Thermoseal and Hexigel, a medicated toothpaste and paid 4% tax applicable to drugs and medicines covered by entry 25A of Schedule C of the WB VAT Act. The department did not accepted the classification of above goods as drugs and medicine and levied tax at 12.5% applicable to general good. The company filed application before the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal assailing the assessment order passed by the assessing authority levying 12.5% tax on sale of above items.

Held
The item drug is not defined under the WB VAT Act. It is defined in section 3(b) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. The disputed items are drugs used for prevention of any diseases or disorder in human teeth. Under the West Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1994 there was a separate entry for toothpaste, but under the vat act there is no such separate entry for tooth paste. In the event of deletion of special entry, all the items of special entry come under the purview of general entry from the date of deletion of special entry. Under the West Bengal Sales Tax Act, entry 24 covered drugs and medicines and entry 54 covered toothpaste (whether medicated or not) along with other items. Under the WB VAT Act, there is no such entry like toothpaste. As a result, the medicated toothpaste shall come under purview of drugs and medicines covered by entry 25A of Schedule C liable to 4% tax and non medicated toothpaste shall be covered by the Schedule CA liable to tax at 12.5%. The Tribunal accordingly allowed the application filed by the company.

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2014 34 STR 418 (Tri-Chennai) International Clearing & Shipping Agency P. Ltd vs. CST Chennai

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Whether clarificatory Circular of CBEC can be applied retrospectively? Held, Yes.

Facts:
Appellant provided Custom House Agent (CHA) services. Service tax was demanded on certain reimbursements incurred by the Appellant. Appellant prayed that as per CBEC Circular, though issued for the period subsequent to the period in dispute, certain expenditure would be excludible for the value of taxable services on the satisfaction of certain conditions. Accordingly, in view of the said Circular, service tax demand should be NIL.

Held:
The Tribunal after observing the CBEC Circular to be clarificatory in nature, held that Circular can be applied retrospectively since it only clarifies the provisions of law already in existence. Accordingly, the order was set aside and remitted back for fresh determination.

Note-The Readers may note here that the Supreme Court in Suchitra Components Ltd. vs. CCE Guntur 2007 (208) ELT 321 (SC) held that a beneficial circular has to be applied retrospectively while an oppressive circular has to be applied prospectively.

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2014 (34) S.T.R. 437 (Tri-Del) Bechtel India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Delhi

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Whether for the purpose of claim of refund, export of services is completed on the date of export of services or the date of receipt of convertible foreign exchange? Held, Date of receipt.

Facts:
The appellants, Consulting Engineer export services under the provisions of the Export of Services Rules, 2005. The appellants filed applications for refund of service tax on input services used from July, 2005 to September, 2005 during various dates vide Notification No. 5/2006-ST dated 1st March, 2006. The claim was rejected on the ground that it was not filed in accordance with section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and that Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, dealing with refund of service tax, was made applicable to service providers only with effect from 14th March, 2006.

Held:
Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944, prescribes relevant date for refund of export as the date of export. Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 read with Notification No. 5/2006-ST dated 1st March, 2006 provides for refund of service tax, provided the output service is exported and payment is received in convertible foreign exchange. Having regard to the Export of Services Rules, 2005, export of services is completed only when amount is received in convertible foreign exchange and therefore, relevant date u/s.11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944, to be considered would be the date when payment was received. In the present case, since all refund applications were filed within one year from the date of receipt of convertible foreign exchange, the claim was held not to be time barred.

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[2014] 45 taxmann.com 107 (New Delhi – CESTAT) – CCE vs. Amarjit Aggarwal & Co.

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Whether benefit of small scale service provider’s exemption notification is applicable, if value of services after deducting sales portion is below threshold exemption limit – Held – Yes.

Facts:
In this case, Show Cause Notice was issued to assessee holding that services provided by it were classifiable as “maintenance & repairs service” upto 15-06-2005 and thereafter under “cleaning services.” The assessee preferred appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) who held that, services provided by the assesse are in the nature of works contract and accordingly gave relief to the assessee. Revenue preferred appeal before the Tribunal.

Held
The Tribunal observed that the work order relied upon by department for the purpose of issue of Show Cause Notice gives an impression of execution of works contract. The contract was a lump sum contract and it also exhibits that there was an element of sale of goods being incorporated in different services dealt by the contract. The Tribunal also observed that, there was a specific plea recorded in the adjudication order from the assesse that once the value of goods sold is excluded from the value of works contract, the value of taxable service rendered would be below Rs. 4 lakh for the financial year 2005-07 and the Respondent would be eligible for exemption for small service providers under Notification No. 6/2005-S.T. On this ground, it was held that the appeal was filed without considering the basic plea of the Respondent, a small service provider and accordingly dismissed the same.

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2014 (34) STR 383 (Tri.-Chennai) Marine Container Services (South) P. Ltd. vs. CCE (ST) Tirunveli.

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Whether margins earned by a steamer agent by booking space on shipping line through another steamer agent is exigible to service tax under “Steamer Agent Service” service? Held, Prima facie, No – Stay granted.

Facts:
Appellant was steamer agent of a particular shipping line and was paying service tax on the services rendered to the said shipping line. Appellant also billed to certain customers who approached them for booking space on a different shipping line. Appellant arranged the booking through another steamer agent and charged its customers extra amount over and above that was paid to another steamer agent. Service tax was demanded on the said margin under “Steamer Agent Service.”

Held:
The Tribunal held that in absence of any evidence that services were provided to shipping lines and payment was received from shipping lines, service tax demand cannot be sustained under “Steamer Agent Service” and accordingly, allowed the stay applications.

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2014 (34) STR 353 (Tri-Delhi) Satake Engineering P. Ltd. vs. CCEx, ST, Delhi

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Whether failure of adjudicating authority to consider and refer to the decisions of judiciary relied on by the Appellant, is a ground for quashing the Order of adjudicating authority? Held – Yes.

Facts:
Appellant was registered under Business Auxiliary service (BAS), Management Maintenance & Repairs service (MMRS) and Erection & Commissioning service. Appellant had filed an appeal against an Order of adjudicating authority confirming SCN wherein service tax demand was raised under the first two categories on the services rendered to its foreign associate companies/ subsidiaries.

The Appellant filed an exhaustive reply on various grounds and relied on various judgements which included the full bench judgement of the Delhi Tribunal on the similar facts and urged that in terms of the Export of Services Rules, the service provided by the Appellant was not liable for service tax. Adjudicating authority while confirming the demand had though adverted to some of the decisions relied by Appellant, did not consider the full bench judgement of the Delhi Tribunal and no analysis was made to any judgement relied by the Appellant.

Held:
• An Adjudicating authority, even though is a departmental officer, while performing judicial function must, bring minimum standards of fairness, neutrality and professionalism in discharge of his function. A judicial function requires a neutral appreciation of facts, due and conscious reference to the material on records, careful and precise statement of competing contentions and precedents, if any, relied upon by either party, analysis of relevant facts and applicable provisions of law.
• An order which fails to adhere to the basic principle of discipline is a non-speaking order. Quashing the order, the matter was rendered for fresh determination.
• The Tribunal directed the Respondent to pay Rs.10,000/- to Appellant for unnecessarily burdening the Appellant with litigation.

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[2014] 45 taxmann.com 188 (Bombay) CST vs. SGS India (P) Ltd.

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Whether Technical Inspection and Certification/ Technical testing and Analysis service provided prior to 16-08-2005 (the date of introduction of Export of Services Rules, 2005) are treated as export, if all activities are performed by Indian service provider in India, but a mere report is sent to a client located abroad and consideration is received in convertible foreign exchange? Held – Yes.

Facts:
The respondent provided Technical Inspection and Certification Agency Service and Technical Testing and Analysis Agency Service at different places in India in respect of goods imported by their customers located abroad. For such services, the respondent received consideration in convertible foreign exchange. The dispute pertains to the period 01-07-2003 to 19-11-2003 (i.e., prior to issue of Notification No.21/03-ST dated 20-11-2003 exempting all taxable services specified u/s. 65(105) of the Finance Act provided to any person in respect of which payment was received in India in convertible foreign exchange). The demand was confirmed on the ground that, services provided by the respondent were performed in India though test reports thereof were sent outside India and therefore Circular dated 25-04-2003 clarifying service tax on export of service was not applicable. The Tribunal decided in favour of the Assessee.

Before the High Court, Revenue contended that, in the present case, the exporter is in India. The importer is abroad. The respondent renders services by testing the samples in India. The certification after such testing is in India. The origin of the goods is in India. Hence, the assesse is not entitled to exemption.

The Respondent contended that, value of services is taxable u/s. 66 of the Finance Act only if the taxable event occurs in India, i.e., only if the place of provision of service is in India. It was further submitted that, although there was no provision in the statute which laid down the place of provision of services, there were clear administrative guidelines to the effect that service tax will not be applicable if services are consumed outside India. It is submitted that in the absence of any statute or judicial pronouncement to the contrary, such administrative guidelines should be considered to be the applicable legal position in this regard. For this, respondent relied upon Circular dated 25-04-2003 and the FM’s Speech, emphasising that service tax being location-based or destination-based consumption tax, transaction was outside the purview of service tax net.

Held
The High Court noted that the Tribunal has observed that although the tests are conducted in India, certificates have been forwarded to the clients abroad. It is in such circumstances the Tribunal concluded that the facts in the case of CST vs. B.A. Research India Ltd. [2010] 25 STT 110 (Ahd. – CESTAT) which was followed by the Tribunal’s single member in the case of KSH International (P.) Ltd. vs. CCE [2010] 25 STT 307 (Mum. – CESTAT) are identical. The High Court further observed that, since the delivery of the report to the foreign client was considered to be an essential part of the service that the demand of service tax was set aside. It was held that, paragraph 4 of the April 2003 Circular has clarified the taxability of secondary services which are used by primary service provider for the export of services, and in these circumstances, the Tribunal has not committed any error in holding that the services provided by the respondent were not taxable. Since the benefit of the services accrued to the foreign clients outside India, it was termed as “export of service.” The High Court empathetically held that the Tribunal merely applied the principal laid down by Apex Court in the case of All India Federation of Tax Practitioner’s case to facts and circumstances of this case. In that case Apex Court was of the view that, service tax is a value added tax which in turn is destination based consumption tax. The Hon’ble Bombay High Court therefore held that, if the emphasis is on consumption of service then the order passed by the Tribunal does not raise any substantial question of law.
The High Court therefore dismissed the appeal on the ground that no substantial question of law arises and appeal is devoid of any merits.

Note: Readers may note that, this case pertains to period where Export of Service Rules, 2005 were not in place. In case of B.A. Research India Ltd.’s case (supra), the Tribunal decided the matter in the light of Rule 3(1)(ii) of the Export of Service Rules, 2005 and held that, delivery of the report is an essential part of their service and the service is not complete till they deliver the report. Further as reports were delivered to the clients outside India, it amounts to taxable service partly performed outside India. w.e.f. 01-07-2012, under the Place Of Provision Rules, 2012, place of provisions of such service shall be the place where performance on goods takes place. Further, Rule 7 of POPS Rules has done away with the benefit conferred by Rule 3 (1)(ii) of the Export Rules, and hence decision of B.A. Research would not be applicable w.e.f. 01-07-2012. The facts of this case may be distinguished from Goa Shipyard Ltd.’s case [2014] 45 taxmann.com 285 (GOI) wherein facts did not record any requirement for submission of report by the service provider abroad to the service receiver in India. On the contrary it provided that service receiver’s officers were to visit service provider’s facility abroad for witnessing the test carried out by the foreign entity. Accordingly, it was held that, no part of the service was performed by foreign service provider in India.

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[2014] 45 taxmann.com 377 (Uttarakhand) Valley Hotel & Resorts vs. CCT.

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Whether the State has right to levy VAT on 40% of the bill amount, if the said portion is treated as service portion liable to service tax under the Service Tax laws? Held – No.

The revisionist provides lodging and boarding facilities and restaurant service to its customers. On 06-06-2012, the Government of India, Ministry of Finance issued a notification amending the service tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 by virtue of which 40% of the billed value to the customer, for supply of food or any other article of human consumption or any drink in restaurant, was made liable to service tax. Thereafter, the revisionist moved an application u/s. 57 of the VAT Act, 2005, requesting not to charge VAT on 40% billed amount to the customer, as the same has already suffered service tax. The said application was rejected by the Commissioner, Commercial Tax, against which appeal was filed before the Commercial Tax Tribunal. The same was also dismissed. Aggrieved thereby, the present revision was filed.

The High Court held that Value Added Tax can be imposed on sale of goods and not on service, since service can be taxed only by service tax law. It further held that, the authority competent to impose service tax has also assumed competence to declare what is service and that the State has not challenged the same. Therefore, where element of service (i.e., 40% of the bill amount) has been so declared and brought under the service tax, no value added tax can be imposed thereon.

The High Court therefore set aside the order of the Tribunal and CCT later was directed to pass order afresh.

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[2014] 45 taxmann.com 215 (Uttarakhand) R.V. Man Power Solution vs. CCE

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Whether, order u/s. 87 freezing bank accounts of the assesse can be passed pending adjudication against him? Held – No.

Facts
The petitioner was served with Show Cause Notice dated 27-11-2012 alleging liability to pay huge demand of service tax and file a reply within 30 days. The assessee replied to the said SCN vide letters dated 04-01-2013 and 11-02-2013 which were pending adjudication. Without deciding the matter finally and without calling for any hearing, the respondent authority issued order dated 06-02-2013 directing the bank to freeze the accounts of the petitioner, invoking power u/s. 87 Clause (b) of the Finance Act, 1994. The petitioner challenged legality of this order passed u/s. 87 of the Finance Act, 1994.

On behalf of the Revenue, it was contended that, the petitioner is merely trustee to hold the amount and this amount is due and payable by him, therefore, adjudication, so to say, is a mere formality as the amount has already been adjudged by the respondent. It was further contended that, even provisional adjudication is good enough to invoke the provision of section 87 of the Finance Act.

Held
The High Court held that, the amount mentioned in the Show Cause Notice is merely a demand and not even the tentative adjudication. Referring to section 87 (b) of the Finance Act, it held that, any amount payable referred in that section means such amount adjudged after hearing the Noticee and the provision of section 87 is one of the methods of recovery of the amount due and payable after adjudication is done. It further held that, from the language of Clause (b), it can be said that there is no power to freeze the bank account. At the most, if it is applied, the money can be claimed from the bank itself. Such claim can be made only when the final adjudication has been done after quantifying the amount due and payable by the assessee. The High Court therefore set aside the impugned order holding the same as not sustainable in the eyes of law.

However, in the interest of justice, the petitioner was directed to file reply within 15 days and the assessing authority was directed to decide the matter in four weeks. Further, order restraining the petitioner from transferring, alienating, disposing of the fixed asset and properties save in usual course of business till the final adjudication is completed, was also passed by the High Court.

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[2014] 45 taxmann.com 217 (Allahabad) – Bhagwati Security Services (Regd.) vs. UOI, BSNL

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Whether service receiver is liable to remit service tax to service provider, even in the absence of Clause to that effect in the agreement? Held – Yes

Facts
Petitioners entered into agreement with respondent No. 2, i.e., BSNL for providing security service. Subsequently, service tax was demanded from the petitioner which was deposited by the petitioner. The petitioner applied before respondent No. 2 for reimbursement of the service tax, which request was denied by the respondent No. 2 on the ground that the reimbursement of the service tax was not contemplated in the service agreement.

Held
High Court held that, service tax is statutory liability which is required to be collected by the service provider from the person to whom service is provided, and thereafter to be deposited with the Government treasury within the prescribed time.Thus, essentially the statute is being imposing the tax upon the person to whom service is being provided, and the service provider is merely a collecting agency. The High Court therefore directed BSNL to make reimbursement of service tax to the petitioner without further delay.

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[2014] 45 taxmann.com 541 (Madras) CCE vs. Strategic Engineering (P.) Ltd.

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Whether mere taking of CENVAT credit facility
without actually using it, would carry interest as well as penalty prior
to 17-03-2012? Held – No.

Facts
The respondent was
a manufacturer of fibre glass and some other products. During the
relevant period (prior to amendment in Rule 14 of CCR w.e.f.17-03-2012),
the respondent took CENVAT credit facilities erroneously and also
reversed the same before utilisation.The question of law raised before
the High Court was, whether a mere taking of CENVAT credit facility
without actually using it, would carry interest as well as penalty?

The
Department relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of in
Union of India vs. Ind-Swift Laboratories Ltd. [2011] 30 STT 461/9
taxmann.com 282 (SC), wherein the Apex Court had held that, the mere
taking of credit would also entail interest and penalty.

Held
The
High Court observed that the said decision of the Apex Court was
subsequently considered in CCE & ST vs. Bill Forge (P.) Ltd. 2012
(26) STR 204 (Kar). The High Court also observed that, Rule 14 of the
CENVAT Credit Rules has been subsequently amended, wherein the
expression “taken or utilised” was substituted by “taken and utilised.”
Relying upon Bill Forge decision (supra), the High Court held that,
since the subsequent amendment has cleared all doubts existed earlier in
respect of Rule 14 of the said Rules, it is clear that, the mere taking
itself would not compel the assessee to pay interest as well as
penalty.

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2014 (34) STR 327 (Ker.) Union of India vs. Kasaragod District Parallel College Association

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Is activity of teaching by non-affiliated colleges taxable under “commercial training or coaching service”? Held – No.

Facts:
Association of Parallel Colleges filed a writ petition challenging constitutional validity of levy of service tax treating parallel colleges as “commercial training and coaching centres.” The learned Single Judge had held that provisions of the Act authorising levy of service tax on Parallel Colleges was arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of The Constitution of India, also that there was no difference between regular colleges and Parallel Colleges. It was also clarified that the judgment was rendered on peculiar facts of the case which was applicable only to the petitioners and the section was not declared as unconstitutional. Service tax officials, herein the appellants, filed writ petition challenging the Judgment. The Revenue relied on various Apex Court Judgments deciding that the Court has a very limited power to intervene in such economical matters. The Revenue also tried to distinguish between regular colleges and parallel colleges.

Held:
It was observed that the section 65(27) of the Finance Act, 1994 defining commercial and coaching centre had 2 limbs, the inclusion part and the exclusion part. Exclusion was given only to such establishments which issue any certificate recognised by any law. It was observed that none of the regular colleges or parallel colleges were issuing any certificate/s. It was also observed that the object of the provisions of sections 65(26) and 65(27) of the Finance Act, 1994 was to prepare students for obtaining certificate recognised by law. Hence, interpretation of provision in consonance with the object was not violative of the Statute. Students, being economically and intellectually weak, were opting for Parallel Colleges and levy of service tax will ultimately fall on such students. On the other hand, an exemption was provided to affiliated colleges which was discriminatory and thus, violating Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Though the section was not held to be unconstitutional, the colleges appearing before the Court were held to be not liable to pay service tax.

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President’s Page – Readers Respond

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We have had the privilege of going through the ‘President’s Page’ before it is published in the journal.

This year, the year of Naushad Panjwani’s ‘President’s Page’, amazed us with the style and contents thereof. The write-ups were extremely relevant and well put together, especially the last one of June, 2014. In regard to the ‘President’s Page,’ many readers have sent in words of appreciation. It is not possible to publish all of them. As a farewell to him, we are publishing a few responses.

We, at the editorial board, have always welcomed feedback whatever its nature. We welcome the bouquets but are prepared to receive the brickbats as well.

We hope this will encourage readers to respond to the journal.

Anil Sathe                                                                                                Narayan Varma Editor                                                                                                               Publisher

September 2013
You have echoed our thoughts and what generally a common literate Indian feels these days. We don’t feel any special on 15th August every year. But as you rightly said, we are no less patriotic even. However, the general political scenario has brought this apathy towards the nation and its governing people. And there seem to be no ray of hope in the near future for a desired change. But there is another side! There are our youth, our young generation, our young intelligent Indian minds residing abroad and in India who certainly have a different view of the things, of the national problems. The need of the hour is somebody to lead this revolution. The intelligent, good, conscientious people are doing wonders where they are standing. The ‘do good’ effect has to be consolidated and brought forward/in front, so that the others could be inspired. Let us do our bit and hope to build a nation. Thanks for reminding.

— Shubha Gupta


OCTOBER 2013

That was a lovely message. I would like to add that these days, sorry is less accepted. It is better to be safe than sorry, since in certain circumstances, sorry may or may not fetch forgiveness. Also, where deadlines are to be met, it is ‘do or die’ or ‘perform to meet deadline or pay interest and penalty and sometimes may attract even prosecution.” We need to look into such drastic laws and give better justice by giving the defendant a chance to get waiver of penalty and prosecution. We are heading for non compassionate and inhuman treatment. Can the BCAS do something to reverse the harsh impact of changes in laws?

— Gracy Mendes

NOVEMBER 2013
All together a new way of looking into age old issues – very interesting. The thought process was developing in a very intriguing but positive manner. But the end was sort of very pessimistic, doomed. You suggested a solution which you yourself have ruled out. Can we not find a shrewed way out using some ‘chanayak niti’? Being a leader, there should be a more concrete end to the discussion. The questions should not be left hanging I suppose… may be encouraged for further debate! That’s my view

— Shubha Gupta

JANUARY 2014, February 2014
Liked your message as President of BCAS. Your thoughts penned are aligned well with your love for Hindi movies. I do agree that it has been a utter chaos in last three years as far as policymaking is concerned. However, an appeal to our countrymen and especially the young voting class that you mentioned, to keep virtues and values of Indian Culture in mind disguise of rational thinking. I may not be as good as you, but the best way to express myself in form of a hindi movie sher from a ghazal from the movie Umrao Jaan:

“Maana ke doston ko nahin dosti ka paas
Lekin yeh kya keg air ka ehsaan lijiye
Wishing you all the success.”
— Prakash Udeshi

MARCH 2014
A positive note. I am sure, over time, new dishes will surface from A. P. and Telangana to add to your list of favourites. And before the bifurcation takes effect sometime in June, let BCAS host a programme which will include a united A. P. meal. If required, my daughter who is possibly a foodie like you, will assist you in organising such a dinner .

— Puloma/Dushyant Dalal

APRIL 2014
You have given a beautiful and inspiring article to students appearing for the exams. My son is appearing for the CA Final and there is lot of stress and anxiety. This article comes at a right time and will provide a tonic for him. We all have gone through the same phase and now know the value of it. Thanks again.

— Sudhir Avhad

MAY 2014
Naushad, in the current dispensation, I am with the SC. When the Parliament does not function (since the Bofors days), executive has no regard for law and the PM is dysfunctional for a decade, SC’s activism is justified. People are happy with Sahara developments. Our top judicial brains are defending him without answering from where he got the money to repay and how can one repay 20K without recording in the books?

All the cream of our society has made India a ‘Banana republic.’ They now fear only the SC; they don’t fear God!

— Tarunkumar Singhal


JUNE 2014

An excellent piece to be read by every citizen of this country. Beautiful parting speech. Words fail to compliment you. Wish you good luck

— K. Sankaranarayanan

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TAXATION PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS

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TAXATION
PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS
A Compendium
Author: Dr. Parthsarathi Shome
Publisher: LexisNexis
Price Rs. 1,495.00

All of us as Chartered Accountants are busy with the interpretation and application of Revenue Legislations. We do not normally make a contribution in the Legislative Tax Policy and Planning, except at the time of presenting the pre-budget or post-budget memorandum. Dr. Parthsarathi Shome’s latest book, however, takes us even a step prior to Revenue Legislation and the thought process behind Taxation Policy and Planning.

Dr. Shome has rich experience as an internationally acclaimed Research Scholar in the Fiscal Policy and planning and during his illustrious career spanning four decades, has made several research studies and given presentations at various international forums. The present book is a selective compendium of his work in the field. As a result, what we come across in the book is a progressively changing thought on Fiscal Legislation.

Divided into seven main chapters, the book starts with an overview of Taxation system from earliest days of Ramayana and Mahabharata, and later on, Kautilya. The early economic principles from Mahabharata and Ramayana depict the social responsibility of the King. One finds that even after many centuries, these principles are even valid today. Dr. Shome in his research has touched upon these principles, of course with changing trends.

In the later chapters, he has analysed in depth the incidence and distribution effects of Taxation, efficiency effects of Taxation, an overview of VAT , GST and customs duty. In the entire analysis, GST appears to be the darling of the policy makers and scholars and Dr. Shome is no exception. In the process, he has also touched upon some innovative schemes of taxation such as Financial Transaction Taxes, Global Carbon Tax, cash flow tax, asset base of tax popularly known at many places as MAT , the much criticised and later on jettisoned from our country, the Fringe Benefit Tax etc. He has examined these innovative measures both from the point of view of policy framing and administration. Before the general elections in our country early this year, there was a talk of abolishing all taxes and in its place imposition of only one Banking Transaction Tax. A theoretical analysis of the said measure of taxation also finds a place in his book. He has of course not forgotten the problems of small and medium size taxpayers from both the sides.

The book also contains the country’s and regional experiences in the process and his analysis mainly concentrates on Latin America and Asia, because of the traditional tag of developing and underdeveloping economies in these regions.

The last chapter of his book is devoted to the exclusive study of Tax Administration, concentrating on the process of a discussion on countering tax evasion, including the famous, tedious TDS. The use of information technology in tax management and administration also finds a place towards the end, but it is touched on the surface. Perhaps, in his next compendium, Dr. Shome may be making a reference to Tax Administrative Reform Commission, which he is chairing at the moment. As we all know, the Government of India had set up the TAR C in August, 2013. In its first report, TARC has suggested radical changes in tax administration. The key suggestion, if implemented in its true spirit, the taxpayer may be treated as a valued customer. Such a radical change will require a drastic change in attitude. The ingrained attitude of arrogance on the part of revenue officials needs to be deeply buried.

Dr. Shome has made a very valid and valuable reference to Spengler’s Contemporary hypothesis, which is reproduced below because of its importance, “ Increasing political stimulation of man’s wants beyond his capacity to supply them has generated forms of disorders. Wants generated by political means are bound to outstrip a community’s economic capacity to satisfy such wants and hence must give rise to increasing frustration of man’s expectations. This ascendance of political over economic want-generation, together with the disorder, which comes in its wake, may be numbered among the progeny of the two Pelopennesian wars which sundered the world of European civilisation and polity between 1914 and 1945.” (p 7).

In today’s world, the people’s Kings have taken the places of hereditary Kings. A continuous aspiration to become the people’s King is reflected by a group known as the political party. Politics, therefore, demands a continuous show of moon to the public at large, thereby increasing the actual and perceived wants in geometrical proportion. This necessitates a need for continuous higher tax collection since it is a main source of revenue for governance. This relationship of economics of tax policy and planning and political necessity for faster and increased collection through such a policy has given rise to political dominance over economic principles. This has given rise to complex economic policies for generating tax revenue.

Although the book avoids reference to political overtones, it describes in detail various complex and multiple models of Source vs. Residence, DTAA issues, Transfer pricing, base for taxation whether expenditure or income, final destination points of taxation. The policy and planning is therefore truly complex. Dr. Shome has through his writing skills tried hard to soften the complexity. Since it is a compendium, there is repetition at some points because the thoughts have been expressed at various times and various places, but in the context of the book it appears to be unavoidable.

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The Menace of Corruption

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“I got used to it by not getting used to it.” said Thomas Mann. This in a nutshell sums up our approach to corruption.

India suffered losses of Rs. 36,400 crores due to corruption in the 12 months preceding September, 2013, says a survey by EY (Ernst and Young) and FICCI, excluding large corruption scandals – 2G, CWG etc.

Chetan Bhagat mentions five areas towards which the new Government’s effort should be focused. One of them is Corruption. He says, “Go after corruption. It bothers Indians and needs to be fixed. However at present it also churns the wheels of our economic system. Draconian measures or finger pointing will solve nothing. It might bring the country to a halt. You don’t solve a blood contamination disease by cutting of the arteries of the heart. You make the blood pure again, one small transfusion at a time.”

To combat the cancer, we require chemotherapy which is given in small doses and is calibrated. To overcome the menace of this national termite which has rendered us hollow; we need to have clear thinking and appropriate strategy.

Corruption is of two types: meat eating and grass eating. The meat-eating corruption is almost always collusive and one transaction is enough to last a couple of generations. It is silent, stealthy and insidious!

Unaccountable wealth or better known as black money, (attained by illegal means and/or remaining outside the purview of the tax laws), remains within the calculated comfort of its owner. This includes money generated through arms deals, gun running, smuggling, drugs and narcotics, illicit trade, real estate transactions et al; and is major contributors to the tax havens abroad

Grass-eating corruption extorts millions of our countrymen in their day to day activities. Obtaining a post-mortem report, death certificate, donation in cash for admissions to school, caste verification certificate, lodging of FIRs, pre-condition for recruitment in govt. jobs at subordinate cutting edge levels levels etc. etc. This is extortionist in nature and is demanded when one is under already duress. This form of corruption is petty in scale and alienates the belief of lay public in the government . Anna Hazare lead the movement “India Against Corruption” that later significantly contributed to the electoral decimation of the Congress led UPA government.

The NDA government shall have to tackle the grass-eating variety through massive education of public opinion to say NO to corruption of this form. Every school, college and other training/professional institutions should be giving lessons inculcating values. Though a long exercise, but can give credible and sustainable results in couple of years. Incidentally the Honk Kong government faced the same menace and they started working through schools and in couple of years, the change became manifest to the relief of suffering populace. It had a tremendous impact on the states effort to combat the menace.

Manoje Nath – a former Director–General of Police, Bihar, brilliantly sums up people’s response to the menace by saying that the response of people at large is even more ambiguous because it is rooted in the fact that they are themselves “half victims, half accomplice, like everyone.” People’s lack of combativeness, venom and extraordinary passivity stems from the fact that they tend to be comfortable with the idea that corruption is an inescapable fact of governance and political morality. Nath explains;

“The ambiguity in the public attitude towards ill-gotten money is the result of our peculiar situation. Our economy is half white and half black, half over-ground and half underground. We condemn black money but deal in it, nevertheless. Under our very eyes, criminals and gangsters acquire wealth, then political power, then more wealth and with it acceptability and social esteem. Political banditry as a mode of creation of surplus value has long been accepted as a legitimate vocation. To displace the awareness of these contradictions, we have devised various overt and covert strategies to acknowledge and accommodate the criminality within our midst. Lawyers, chartered accountants, investment advisors, honestly work for the legitimization of dishonest earnings by politicians, government officials, corporate CEOs, etc. Dirty money courses through our formal and informal financial system in different ways, with different consequences. We do not seek to know hard enough about the offshore funds being routed in our economy for fear of discovering their actual provenance. We are so enamoured, even over awed with power and manipulation that we tend to ignore what David Bell calls “the economic fulcrum underneath.”

The decision to constitute a Special Investigation Team, under the chairmanship of Justice M. B. Shah, to investigate the cases of black money stashed away in foreign banks, will prove to be an acid test for the new government. It calls for a equally strong political will to fight this ever growing threat to national economy.

To combat crime, we need to have two pronged strategy: prevention and detection. Many a crime are prevented when the preponderance of probability lies in that these would become manifest at any given moment. A reasonable certainty of apprehension and conviction deters criminals. Crime swells when there is an assurance that it would not be easily detected and that in the unlikely event of getting so detected, the law as it exists, could be subverted first at the level of cognizance and subsequently during investigation, prosecution and/or adjudication. Organized crime syndicates prosper on this philosophy.

“Ideas spur crimes. A psychological, people-oriented counter strategy and approach while it is certainly not a panacea, empowers the individual citizen who ceases to ask what is there in the state system for him and instead begins to introspect on what he can do for the society/ state system given his new found status as a stakeholder,” says Prateep Phillip.

The power syndrome is that when we do not share power, the power have-nots hate us with a passion, when we share power through such a power sharing mechanism we are loved with an equal passion.

Corruption permeates at the top and it becomes a corporate activity. We shall have to put upright and competent officers at the top – selected on merit – and mind you we have plenty of them. All such officials have now been marginalised and wasted in non-sensitive departments/ assignments.

Clearly laid out policies with irreducible minimum discretion, with the help of technology to take speedy decisions, will go a long way to cut on avoidable delays, famous breeding grounds of corruption.

Creation and existence of a credible mechanism where information can be received and is welcomed, with privacy of the informer kept in absolute secrecy, will make the masses feel participants in unearthing diverse forms of unaccounted/illicit wealth. All such information leading to successful prosecution may be rewarded with tempting percentage of such money unearthed. The RT I Act has significantly contributed to lifting of veil of confidentiality from public records maintained by the government. It’s time we take a call whether we should continue to maintain confidentiality of income and assets of all those who seem to be living in a life style disproportionate to their know sources irrespective whether they are public servants or not.

Hoederer’s admonition to Hugo (who refuses to “dirty” his hands) in Jean Paul Sartre’s play Dirty Hands would induce a curious sense of déjà vu in those of us who have tried to take a stand against the contemporary wisdom:

“You cling so tightly to your purity, my lad! How terrified you are of sullying your hands.
Well, go ahead then, stay pure! What good will it do, and why even bother coming here among us? Purity
is a concept of fakirs and
friars. But you, the intellectuals, the bourgeois anarchists, you invoke
purity as your rationalisation for doing nothing. Do nothing, don’t move, and wrap your arms tight around
your body, put on your gloves. As
for myself, my hands are dirty. I have plunged my arms up to the elbows in
excrement and blood. And what else should one do? Do you suppose that it is
possible to govern innocently?”

Towards a healthy India

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“Ache din aane waale hai”

Well,
that’s what I believe anyway. India used to be known as the ‘sone ki
chidiya’ – the Golden Bird, but that sadly is a thing of the past.
Corrupt officials, ineffective governance, ridiculous policies (both
foreign and national) and high level yes-men, have rendered this once
great nation, a laughing stock not only to the world, but also to its
very own residents. Having such a massive population, second only to
China, should have helped propel us forward, but it has been more of a
burden, dragging us behind. Restlessness and discontent was strife
against the current regime. A huge shake-up of the government, from top
to bottom, was massively required. And that is exactly what has
happened. A wave of change has swept over our country bringing with it
billions of hopes and expectations. And it is we, the youth, who stand
at the centre of this change.

Ten years from now, I see India as a
global superpower. I see us as a country at the pinnacle of
development, be it the economy, education, infrastructure or even the
health care sector. Yes, the health care sector! And this is where, as a
medical intern at Sion Hospital, I would like to give my not-so-expert
opinion.

According to me, the health care sector is one of the
most neglected fields in our country. And that, for a country with a
population exceeding a billion, is simply unacceptable. There is a lack
of availability of even the most basic of medical supplies, at the
primary health care level. For example, when I was doing my rural
rotation, the health centre I was posted at did not even have stock of
isosorbide dinitrate (simply called nitrate), a basic drug which is
critically important in the emergency management of myocardial
infarction, commonly known as a heart attack. Lack of such basic
supplies will hinder even the best doctor’s attempts at treating his
patients. The WHO guidelines dictate that there should be at least one
doctor for a population of 1,000 people. But the sad reality is that
this ratio currently stands at around 1:2,000 in our country. This
prevents people from availing even the most basic facilities, especially
at the primary level.

However, these problems are not just
limited to the rural level. They are also prevalent in the urban areas,
specifically the government-run hospitals. Most of these hospitals are
severely understaffed. Doctors are unable to give their complete
attention to every single patient, which results in them not getting the
appropriate medical treatment. Most of these hospitals are grossly
mismanaged, which results in the patient not getting timely, and in
certain cases, lifesaving medical care.

But it is not only the
patients who suffer. Doctors are in fact, the major victims of this poor
management of the health care sector. The ‘resident’ doctors, i.e., the
postgraduate student, are probably the ones who are the most affected.
These doctors are the ones who practically run the whole hospital. Along
with that, they have to battle a host of other problems such as
inhumane working hours (most of them don’t sleep more then 30-35 hours a
week), poor and unhygienic living conditions which predispose them to
various illnesses such as tuberculosis, abysmally low salaries, and
handling aggressive patients and their relatives, each of whom demand
the best treatment for themselves. Even after treating the patient to
the best of their abilities, there is always that nagging fear of
getting beaten up even if one miniscule thing goes wrong. In the private
set-up, although there are no problems of staffing or overcrowding as
such, it is the huge cost of treatment which acts as a deterrent, which
pushes people towards the public hospitals.

All these issues are
correctable, if the government shows the required desire, understanding
and dedication. The most obvious solution would be to increase the
number of doctors at all public hospitals. This increase should not only
be at the senior level, but should start from the grass roots, at the
undergraduate level. The number of seats at both UG (Undergraduate) and
PG (Postgraduate) level should be increased, which would results in an
increase in doctors at all levels. As of now, there are approximately
20,000 PG seats in government-run medical colleges throughout India.
This is totally inexcusable for a country with such a massive
population. Establishing new medical colleges and hospitals would go a
long way in providing better health services. It would reduce the
workload on already overburdened doctors. The aim of the government
should be to have at least a 100 new, tertiary hospitals in India in the
next 10 years. This would make a massive difference in ensuring quality
health care.The government must take steps to ensure better, sanitary
living conditions for resident doctors. Offering attractive
remunerations and financial packages would draw more doctors to take up
jobs at government hospitals. Another crucial decision should be to
increase the strength of the para-medical staff at all hospitals. These
include the nurses, ward boys, technicians etc. These people play a
critical role in the day to day efficient running of a hospital, without
whom, things would just come to a grinding halt. There should also be
an increased focus on infrastructure and basic facilities. For tertiary
health centres such as the big hospitals, providing them with the latest
technology, modern equipments and the best lab facilities, would go a
long way in enabling them to provide the best medical care that they
possibly can. For example, there are currently many hospital across
india which do not even have a CT scan! Primary health care as a whole
has been grossly neglected and steps must be taken to ensure that such
centers have access to basic, life-saving medications as well as simple
investigative equipment like x-ray machines. Our aim should not be to
provide medical care on par with the Western countries, but to provide
better care than them, simply because we have the resources to do so.

I
have a very limited knowledge of the budget and the constraints faced,
but I do know that expenses on health care were cut down by 10% for the
2014-15 budget. The most obvious solution would be increase the
allocation, and the subsequent expenditure, on health care. However, if
that is not possible, judicious and carefully planned use of the
resources should be made. There should be increased focus on certain
areas which require them the most, such as the primary health care
sector. Conducting increased number of health camps, with the assistance
of NGOs, would go a long way in tackling health problems in rural
areas. Special departments should be set up within the health ministry,
each given their exclusive objectives and asked specifically to focus on
them.

Ten years down the line, I would like to see every person, whether rich or poor, have the opportunity to access the best medical care and facilities. I would like to see India at the forefront of health care services. An India, where peo- ple from abroad come to access OUR health services, not the other way around. An India where our doctors get the respect and facilities they deserve, and are not vulnerable to the very diseases they are supposed to treat. An India where basic medicines are available throughout, such that not one single person should die from simple, preventable diseases like tuberculosis or malaria. All in all, I would like to see India achieve its tremendous potential, become the country that we know we can, and command awe and respect from the rest of the world. Bold claims maybe, but I firmly believe, with the current government in place, all of this is eminently achievable with the required will and hard work.

In the words of Martin Luther King Jr.,”I have a  dream…”

“My INDIA”…. A Decade From Now….

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“Saare Jahan Se Acha Hindustan Hamara…………..”

These words unite millions of proud Indians. India, a nation of many religions, languages, customs and beliefs, may have its perils, but in them also lie its myriad opportunities. As we tap the means of realising any such opportunity, we have to realise that the land on which we tread is sacred. Criticism is no way to revere it.

Back from the time of the Indus Valley civilization, till the end of the British Era, Indians as one people have not shared the same destiny, although we may have come close to it during the times of the great emperors Ashoka and Akbar. Sharing destiny entails sharing responsibility. The ‘Indian Dream’ is a million acts of private daring put together and in many of us the dreams of 1947 passed down the generations are still alive. Somewhere deep down in the heart of every Indian is the hope of one day seeing India restored to its former glory.

The areas in which India lags behind today in core competence are agriculture and food processing , education, healthcare, information and communication technology, providing quality infrastructure, creating a culture of self reliance for critical technologies, minimising the rural – urban divide, improving our attitude and approach towards women and emphasis on national security.1 There is little dispute as to what needs to be done; the debate remains over the means to achieve and sustain such core competence.

‘Development’ in India is a term that is loosely used and followed and includes anything that constitutes a new stage in a changing situation. There is always a tendency to view development as an accumulation of capital instead of including factors like the emulation and assimilation of knowledge2. Whereas in practice, it is actually a multi-dimensional term, that is a composite of the degree of economic and social growth. One of the major challenges that India faces today is to ensure that the governance is matching pace with and is responsive to the needs of the people. In this regard, the records of the many governments, both in the state and at the centre, have been murky at best. In order to succeed, one of the essential features that any government today will need to imbibe is transparency in governance. Embracing a policy of transparency would go a long way in restoring the faith of the people which has been steadily diminishing down the years. Well formulated and sound policies which are not bogged down with provisions having retrospective applicability, which are not regressive policies, and not based on knee-jerk reactions and which are efficiently implemented, would surely go a long mile in boosting the development of India.

We take pride today in saying that we are one of the world’s fastest growing economies and one of the largest economies. Even post the financial crisis of 2009 the Indian economy has maintained a positive outlook. The large population base provides enough market demand to sustain industry and make the country attractive from an investment perspective.

“Innovation is the specific instrument of entrepreneurship. The act that endows resources with a new capacity to create wealth.”- Peter Drucker.

Indians are shining across fields all around the globe and yet our present international rank is low with respect to the ease of doing business and innovation. The government needs to invoke the entrepreneurial spirit of Indians by placing emphasis on new knowledge and innovation and framing a national policy for entrepreneurs.

India has a high ratio of shadow economy entrepreneurs to legitimate business.3 At present, they are beyond the purview of the government and hence belligerently flout labour laws as also various other laws and do not pay taxes. Should the government adopt policies that would encourage formalising such businesses, their transactions would result in a substantial amount accruing to the exchequer and improve social security for the entire nation. Further, the formalisation of these entrepreneurs is incumbent to ensure that they innovate, accumulate capital and invest in the economy for promoting economic growth.

What has troubled industry and investors alike has been the lack of consistency in the role and policy making, the exercise of discretion by the government and the lack of clarity regarding the rationale behind the rules apart from of course, their enforcement.

Despite the limitations imposed, we do possess an impressive array of basic laws that are equipped to tackle most situations. In many instances we have not updated or upgraded them to match the progress of time.5 However, there are also certain laws that are completely archaic and have not been amended to cover present business realities, or even practicality, thereby creating an environment of uncertainty and confusion.

For example land acquisition has been a very touchy subject in India. The availability of land for implementing various projects is a key aspect of development and is considered a stable means of investment. The land acquisitions in India were governed by the archaic Land Acquisition Act of 1894 which was expropriatory and conferred the state with wide powers that affected a person’s right over his property.6 There have been many well documented instances where the acquisition of land under the Act was not consistent with the concept of the Indian welfare state.

Sharing destinies is different from sharing backgrounds. What works for one state may not work for the other, and this may be true from region to region. Innovation and adapting of policies to suit the needs of each region would need a healthy stand adopted by the state governments in the case of land acquisition. For example in Gujarat, a state that has large tracts of non agricultural land8; has instituted an industry friendly process of land acquisition which is governed by the GIDC, a statutory corporation responsible for the acquisition of industrial estates.9 Any industry that was interested in setting up shop in Gujarat could approach the corporation for an allotment of land.10 The corporation has instituted a fair and transparent mechanism for the compensation of farmers and has given the state a competitive edge over the others with respect to attracting investments. A similar role has been played by the nodal agency in Karnataka through the creation of land banks through acquisition in anticipation of industrial demand.

“See no advantage of new clocks. They run no faster than the ones made 100 years ago.” Henry Ford.

Apart from laws affecting business, there have also been instances where social laws are drafted without giving much (or in some cases, any) thought to its consequenc- es. An apt example would be the Bombay Prevention of Begging Act, 1959 which was extended also to the Union Territory of Delhi. Under this act, a person found begging upon being found ‘guilty could be detained in a certified institution for a period of one year.11  When challenged   in the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi, it was held that such statute completely failed to take into account the various aspects of begging.12 The court observed that a person could have taken up begging due to any of the following factors (i) The person may be lazy and would not want  to work, (ii) the person could be an alcoholic or a drug- addict, whose only thought was financing the next drink or dose,(iii) the person could also be exploited by gangs that thrived on the earnings of beggars, or (iv) he could be a destitute, starving and helpless person. Professional beg- gars as mentioned in the first category would certainly be the persons the act was trying to target. Whereas persons mentioned in second category would actually require help in a deaddiction centre. A person who is at the mercy  of a gang would need to be extricated from the clutches of such people. The last category of persons mentioned were persons who were genuinely helpless, who only begged to survive; to remain alive. Fairness and justice is the core of any law and policy introduced. No rule can apply to an entire population uniformly. Formation of sound law in keeping with this basic principle is the key to good governance.

“Any man who reads too much and uses his own brains too little, falls into the lazy habit of thinking”
– Albert Einstein.

Apart from a sound domestic legal framework, promulgation of laws and enforcement of policies formulated with regard to international business also play   a pivotal role in our country’s progress. Policies framed on ‘elite’ economics but disregarding practicality are dangerous to say the least. What is even more dangerous is that the people who frame them believe it is for the good. Whatever harm evil may do, the harm done by ‘good’ is most harmful.

“In International Commerce , India is an ancient country”
– Virchand Gandhi

Foreign Direct Investment in India has always been a contentious issue. The governments post 1991 have been following a policy of allowing FDI, yet restricting the quantum of investment allowed in each sector. In the ‘50s, India had an open door FDI policy, since Pandit Nehru was of the opinion that foreign capital was necessary to facilitate progress. The rules were so progressive that investors outside India were given the freedom to repatriate all profits. The discontinuation of this policy occurred in the late 60’s due to the increase of state control in the manufacturing and services sectors.13 Post this era it was all downhill for foreign investors, with the enactment of FERA14 .

In June 1991, the Government of India had to face the ignominy of pawning 67 tons of gold to foreign banks to shore up its meagre foreign exchange reserves. This exercise was necessitated by the demand for the dollar emanating from within the country. Fast forward two decades we can see that the reserves have reached over USD 300 billion and we have instances of the country buying over 200 tonnes of gold from the IMF (International Monetary Fund) to boost its reserves.15 This turnaround can be attributed to the Government’s decision circa 1991 to pursue an active policy of attracting foreign investment by creating a liberalised policy framework. Having said that, one has to balance social responsibility with economics. Economists framing policies may have education from a MIT, Havard or Stanford, however, they may lack real time assessment, which would likely result in a theoretically sound legal framework which completely fails to address the ground realities and the practical issues faced.

To illustrate further, let’s recollect the policy for FDI in retail, which has been debated endlessly. In India retailers are largely the entrepreneurs who set up small shops, convenience stores in an unorganised manner. Instead of supporting human spirit and will, the influx of foreign multi brand retail chains is likely to wipe out the young businessman. The promise of lower rates of inflation and food prices, improvements in warehousing and distribution, which appear to be the factors that influenced the allowance of FDI in retail, may not necessarily prove accurate or worthwhile. The advent of foreign retail chains in Thailand and Malaysia should serve as a cautionary tale, regarding the plight of local retailers.

Globalisation is another phenomenon that India has had to face over the past few decades. This is the process  of international integration in the fields of economics, fi- nance, trade, and communications. The policy makers in our country have to realise that blindly minimising trade restrictions and opening up the country to foreign investments may not be very opportune for developing country like ours.

Right to aspire for dignity and distinction is the prerogative of every citizen in a democracy.

On the social front, the labour laws in India have been categorised by many quarters as being pro- workmen. The need for far reaching reforms in such sector has been evidenced long back, as they16 create inflexibility in the labour market, which has been linked to a reduction in the growth potential of the economy. Such laws are nu- merous and ambiguous, that it is debateable whether they promote litigation or resolve disputes We as a nation could loose a lot in terms of its comparative advantage of labour abundance where such laws are inflexible to such a large extent. Certain reforms suggested are usage of contract labour in non core activities and enactment of a single legislation that combines the present legislations to form a comprehensive code governing and regulating the labour sector. Such need is even more apparent as witnessed recently during the construction projects undertaken for the Commonwealth Games, where there were denials of minimum wages, overtime and weekly holidays by contractors.17

Education is not preparation for life; education is life itself
– John Dewey.

The most important social obligation of education is still, very sadly a basic necessity denied to millions. One of the flagship programmes of the previous government was the provision for free and compulsory education for children between the age of six and fourteen18 and also envisaged the setting up of schools in every neighbourhood for the completion of elementary education. In a large country like India, even a small measure can have enormous impact if implemented across the country. Accordingly, a positive obligation was created on the State and a negative obligation on private educational institutions with respect to providing education. A bright feature of this programme was social inclusiveness, i.e., including minority institutions, so as to achieve the object of creating heterogeneous schools and classrooms. The inclusion of disadvantaged groups would mean that classrooms would not be the sole province of the privileged. Education for an effective policy has to focus on empowering the students by imparting knowledge and not merely teaching curriculum. It of course would not help if the students were not being imparted the skills necessary for their livelihood and survival. Nothing short of a cultural revolution is needed to empower our teachers and change the education system..

With the core issue of education, lies the deep connection to how one should treat our female citizens. The significance of Parvati, Sita & Shakti would have not been required to be separately imparted if only one learnt from childhood to respect women as an integral part of life.

‘Wherever laws end, tyranny begins’19 .

The judiciary is a body which ideally should be steeped in values and ethics. Its functions inter alia are to administer justice, to ensure that the rule of law is in place and to promote the observance and attainment of human rights.20 The common law based judicial system has failed to certain extent to keep pace with the tide of litigations that have been thrust upon it. In many cases, the judiciary had to act as a crusader of societal change. The courts today, despite the criticism, have been identified as the guardians of the constitutional promise of social and economic growth and have to conduct reforms to keep up with the march of time. The strength of various courts should be increased while maintaining quality of justice. The tenures/ retirement ages for judges should be increased to allow judges to cope with the humungous workload. With respect to the procedural laws, changes have to be made to the cumbersome and onerous aspects. Justice is not meant to be denied by delay. Of course people do take advantage of the system, but a gradual change in attitudes and procedures will surely go a long way in achieving a judicial dependency that is today lacking among the common man.

India, to realise its true potential and achieve what it can, has a long way to go. The journey has, I believe already begun a while ago, but is not at the pace it is capable    of treading. My India has to be just like yours, where we wake up to a land which provides for all and not just cater to the interests of a selective few. So let us not only as a theory but in practice too try and put our individual needs after that of our country and imbibe a spirit of togetherness. A spirit which unites us, takes us at a swift pace   to where we deserve and more importantly shapes our destinies, together as a nation.

Arbitration Law In India-The Way Forward

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Introduction
Indian commerce has been bubbling with hope and anticipation that the newly elected government will usher in a new era of regulatory reforms and improve the stagnating business environment in the country. True enough, the new ministers have been making all the right noises about creating a lean and efficient administration that will focus on governance rather than government. But it is not difficult to realize that a no-nonsense workaholic PM and well-intentioned ministers are not enough. Several other cogs need to move smoothly to create a healthy business and commerce ecosystem in a democracy. One such critical component of a vigorous economy is an efficient and smooth-functioning judicial system. This is needed so that disputes, particularly commercial disputes, are resolved quickly and in a cost-effective manner instead of disappearing into the black-hole of judicial backlog that the Indian Court system is infamous for.

In an attempt to revolutionarise dispute resolution in India that was stalled by the burgeoning traditional Indian Court system and to give contracting parties greater flexibility in choosing their dispute resolution mechanism, India updated its arbitration law in 1996. This was done by replacing the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 (“1940 Act”) with the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“1996 Act”), which largely adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. The 1996 Act made significant improvements to the existing arbitration regime and has been responsible for the growing popularity of arbitration as the default dispute resolution mechanism in most commercial contracts. While the 1996 Act has been a reasonable effort by the legislature, the judicial interpretation of some of its provisions have made this “alternate” dispute resolution mechanism subject to constant (and often time-consuming) interference by the Courts. This has dulled, to some extent, the sheen and attractiveness of arbitration in India.

The two hallmarks of arbitration, at least, from an aspirational point of view, are: (i) the ability of parties to contractually substitute the regular civil courts with a private tribunal comprising of the parties’ chosen adjudicators whose decision has the force of law; (ii) avoidance of the pitfalls and inconvenience of court litigation including cost, delays, lack of subject matter expertise, inflexible venue, etc.

This Article seeks to identify some of the key drawbacks of the arbitration regime in India and the aspirations this author has from the judiciary, suggests solutions to overcome the same, which could possibly help restore the efficacy of arbitration in India over the coming years. By way of disclaimer, I must also acknowledge that this Article does not propose to be an exhaustive critique of arbitration in India but merely seeks to introduce the mostly common issues that are plaguing the Indian arbitration regime.

1. Refusal to uphold the binding nature arbitration agreements

Arbitration, simply put, is the voluntary submission of a present or future dispute by parties to a private tribunal (as opposed to a civil court) consisting of persons chosen either by the parties themselves, or through a procedure agreed upon by the parties, for final and binding adjudication. Once parties have agreed to arbitration as the dispute resolution mechanism for their disputes, they are expected to be bound by such agreement and cannot resort to civil courts for adjudication of such disputes.

This defining character of arbitration, i.e., exclusion of courts by agreement of parties, finds resonance in numerous provisions of the Arbitration Act. For example, section 5 of the 1996 Act declares that once parties have entered into an arbitration agreement for arbitration in India, “no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided…”

Section 8 goes one step further. It directs every judicial authority before which an action is brought in a matter that is the subject matter of an arbitration agreement to compulsorily refer the parties to arbitration upon the application any of the parties to the arbitration agreement. The Supreme Court too has viewed Section 8 as a legislative mandate on the Courts that leaves Courts with no discretion or choice in matters where parties have already entered into arbitration agreements. In P. Anand Gajapathi Raju & Ors. vs. P. V. G. Raju (Dead) & Ors1. , the Supreme Court has observed that section 8 is “peremptory” in nature and proceeded to hold as follows:

“It is, therefore, obligatory for the Court to refer the parties to arbitration in terms of their arbitration agreement. Nothing remains to be decided in the original action or the appeal arising therefrom.”

Section 8 further clarifies that “notwithstanding that an application has been made u/s/s. (1) and that the issue is pending before the judicial authority, an arbitration may be commenced or continued and an arbitral award made”. This further reaffirms the emphasis on the primacy given to arbitration. So even if one party initiates proceedings in Court despite entering into an arbitration agreement, the other party would remain entitled to commence arbitration and the arbitral tribunal can proceed to hear the matter even before the Court decides an application for reference to arbitration.

It is also worth noting that section 8 does not apply only to Courts. It applies to all “judicial authorities” before whom a dispute covered by an arbitration agreement is brought. Accordingly, all other authorities performing judicial functions, including tribunals such as the Company Law Board, are intended to be bound by the mandatory language of section 8.

The Scheme of the 1996 Act, and sections 5 and 8 in particular, make it clear that once parties have entered into an arbitration agreement, they will be held to their bargain and the courts will do permit either side to circumvent the arbitration agreement by commencing judicial proceedings instead of arbitration. But this legislative scheme has been somewhat diluted by three sets of decisions of Indian courts that have allowed Courts to retain control over certain kinds of the disputes even in the face of an arbitration agreement.

1.1. Multiple parties and multiple causes of action

In Sukanya Holdings (P) Ltd. vs. Jayesh H Pandya and Anr.2 , the Supreme Court held that:

…there is no provision in the Act that when the subject matter of the suit includes subject matter of the arbitration agreement as well as other disputes, the matter is required to be referred to arbitration. There is also no provision for splitting the cause or parties and referring the subject matter of the suit to the arbitrators…

…In our view, it would be difficult to give an interpretation to section 8 under which bifurcation of the cause of action that is to say the subject matter of the suit or in some cases bifurcation of the suit between parties who are parties to the arbitration agreement and others is possible. This would be laying down a totally new procedure not contemplated under the Act.

By the above ruling, the Supreme Court has created two exceptions to the mandate of section 8. According to the Apex Court, a judicial authority was not required to refer parties to arbitration u/s. 8 when: (i) the claim involves multiple parties, some of whom are not party to the arbitration agreement, or (ii) if only some, but not all of the disputes among the parties are covered by the arbitration agreement.

It is submitted that this case creates an unnecessary exception to the mandate of compulsory arbitration u/s. 8. First, the decision proceeds on the basis that when multiple claims are involved among the same parties, they must necessarily be pursued by way of a single composite legal proceeding. This, however, is not mandated by the either the 1996 Act or the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). In fact, Order I, Rule 3 of the CPC only permits (but does not require) a plaintiff to join several disputes or causes of action or sue several defendants in the same Suit. Moreover, Order I, Rule 6 of the CPC actually permits the Court to split up a composite suit if the joinder of the multiple causes of action would “embarrass or delay the trial” or “is otherwise inconvenient”.

Secondly, the decision is prone to misuse by parties  that wish to back out of an arbitration agreement. For instance, two contracting parties having several transactions with each other may very often have several disputes and claims against each other, only some of which are covered by an arbitration agreement. A party who is keen on escaping the rigors of arbitration can do so quite easily by merely raising claims that are not covered by the arbitration agreement. Since the Court will not examine the merits of the substantive dispute at the initial stage of determining whether or not the matter should be referred to arbitration, a party can escape arbitration by raising even a frivolous claim that falls outside the scope of the arbitration agreement. Similarly, a person can also avoid an arbitration agreement by cheekily raising claims against other persons who are not party to the arbitration agreement. In fact, a person need not even raise an actual claim against such third parties. He can implead them in the Suit as “proper” parties so long as they have some reasonable connection with the subject matter of the Suit.

1.2.    Matters covered by special laws
It is reasonably well settled across most jurisdictions that a dispute affecting rights in rem (i.e., matters affecting the world at large) cannot be the subject matter of arbitration. So matters involving criminal offences, winding-up of companies or suits for foreclosure of a mortgage are generally considered as matters in which the public at large has an interest and are therefore non-arbitrable. The Supreme Court, however, has extended this logic to certain cases that involve nothing more than the personal rights of the disputing parties and has allowed Courts to interfere even when parties have consensually submitted certain disputes to arbitration.

In Natraj Studios (P) Ltd. vs. Navrang Studios3 and Mansukhlal Dhanraj Jain vs. Eknath Vithal Ogale4, the Supreme Court held that all matters falling within the ju- risdiction of the Small Causes Courts, including disputes between a landlord and tenant and matters between a licensor and licensee relating to recovery of possession, could not be the subject matter of arbitration. The Su- preme Court reasoned that in so far as landlord-tenant and licensor-licensee disputes are concerned, the Small Causes Court was vested with the exclusive jurisdiction to try such cases under the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882.

Although the above two cases were decided before the 1996 Act came into force, their dicta continues to be followed by the Bombay High Court5. As a result, even when a landlord-tenant or a licensor-licensee enter into  a written agreement to refer all disputes between themselves, including disputes relating to recovery of possession, to arbitration, either party can avoid the arbitration agreement by claiming that the Small Causes Court has exclusive jurisdiction to try such matters.

Presumably, this reasoning can be extended to all matters where designated courts and tribunals have been vested with jurisdiction try certain specific type of cases. In fact, in several cases, the Company Law Board has also taken a similar view and assumed jurisdiction over shareholder disputes even when there was an arbitration clause between the shareholders. For instance, in the case of Rajendra Kumar Tekriwal vs. Unique Construction Pvt. Ltd.6, the Company Law Board held as follows:

“…the test to determine as to whether the matter in a petition u/s. 397 & 398 is to be relegated to arbitration or not, one has to examine whether the allegations  of oppression/mismanagement contained therein can be adjudicated without reference to the terms of the arbitration agreement. In the present case, this Board can examine the allegations purely on the basis of the Articles. If it can be, then the question of referring the matter to arbitration does not arise even if assuming that there is an arbitration agreement and the agreement covers the same matter. In the present case though there is arbitration agreement, the matter relates to oppression and mismanagement directly relating to the rights of or benefit to shareholders in their capacity as members of the company arising out of the provisions of the Act, Articles or on equitable grounds. Assuming that the matters are covered under the arbitration agreement yet, since the same is covered under the Articles also, this Board can determine the allegations only with reference to the Articles and without recourse to the arbitration agreement.”

This line of reasoning, it submitted, not only dilutes one of the objectives of the 1996 Act, viz. to reduce the burden on the judicial system, but also flies in the face of the plain language of section 8. There is nothing in the 1996 Act which suggests that merely because a dispute falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of a special Court or Tribunal, such dispute is incapable of being determined by arbitration. On the contrary, section 8 deliberately uses the words “judicial authority” instead of “civil court”. A reasonable interpretation of section 8, especially in light of the object of the 1996 Act, would suggest that the legislature deliberately used the wider term “judicial authority” to ensure that the section 8 covers all judicial bodies, including special Courts and Tribunals such as Small Causes Court and Company Law Board.

1.3.    Fraud and other complicated matters
The third set of cases, which has further diluted the sanctity of a binding arbitration agreement between the parties, are the decisions where the Court has held that an arbitral tribunal is not equipped to deal with matters involving complicated questions of fact or law or disputes where an allegation of fraud is has been made.

Under the old arbitration law7, the Court was not bound to refer parties to arbitration even when parties had entered into an arbitration agreement. The Court could, for “sufficient reason”, refuse to relegate parties to arbitration and instead decide the dispute itself. But the language of section 8 of the 1996 Act, as explained above, is mandatory and leaves the Court with no discretion.

Despite the clear difference between the provisions of the two legislations, the Madras High Court, in the case of Oomor Sait HG vs. Asiam Sait8, has taken the view that even under the 1996 Act, the Court continues to retain the “time-tested” power of deciding whether or not to refer the dispute before the Arbitrator.

The Supreme Court, in the case of N. Radhakrishnan vs. Maestro Engineers & Ors.9 has upheld this view and held that when there are serious allegations of fraud or malpractices or manipulation of finances such matters cannot be properly dealt with by an Arbitrator. Such issues should, “for the furtherance of justice”, be tried in a court of law which would be “more competent and have the means to decide such a complicated matter…”. This reasoning has been followed in several subsequent cases.

It is submitted that this is an artificial exception that has been carved out despite there being no legislative backing for it under the 1996 Act. In fact, it appears to be a hangover from the early days of judicial mistrust of arbitration when the Courts felt that arbitration, as a means of adjudication, was rife with short-comings10. But this exception creates to the rule that an arbitration agreement is binding on the parties and the Court, creates a virtual black-hole. A party who does not wish to submit to arbitration can  do so by merely raising an allegation of fraud and claiming that such an issue cannot be adjudicated upon by an arbitrator. Unless the Supreme Court changes its view, it would be difficult for any civil Court or High Court take a different view and they would find themselves compelled to ignore the arbitration agreement in every matter where there is an allegation, howsoever far-fetched of fraud.

2.    Pre-arbitration litigation
The other problem plaguing the arbitration regime in India is the lengthy and expensive pre-arbitration litigation that is required when one party (usually the party disputing the claim) refuses to participate in the arbitration process. U/s. 11 of the 1996 Act, if parties to an arbitration are unable to agree on the arbitrators or if one party refuses to participate in the appointment of an arbitrator, then the Chief Justice of the relevant High Court (or his designate) is empowered to appoint the arbitrator.

A plain reading of the section suggests an innocuous procedure whereby designated Judge will perform a routine task of merely naming an arbitrator and relegate the parties to the arbitration by such a court appointed arbitrator. The Supreme Court, however, in the landmark case of SBP has held that the Chief Justice’s power u/s. 11 is not an administrative task that can be carried out summarily but is matter far more exhaustive. The Court has defined the role of the Chief Justice u/s. 11 as follows:

“Obviously, he has to decide his own jurisdiction in the sense, whether the party making the motion has approached the right High Court. He has to decide whether there is an arbitration agreement, as defined in the Act and whether the person who has made the request before him, is a party to such an agreement. It is necessary to indicate that he can also decide the question whether the claim was a dead one; or a long barred claim that was sought to be resurrected and whether the parties have concluded the transaction by recording satisfaction of their mutual rights and obligations or by receiving the final payment without objection. It may not be possible at that stage, to decide whether a live claim made, is one which comes within the purview of the arbitration clause. It will be appro- priate to leave that question to be decided by the arbitral tribunal on taking evidence, along with the mer- its of the claims involved in the arbitration. The Chief Justice has to decide whether the applicant has satisfied the conditions for appointing an arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Act. For the purpose of taking a decision on these aspects, the Chief Justice can either proceed on the basis of affidavits and the documents produced or take such evidence or get such evidence recorded, as may be necessary.”

As a result of the above interpretation given by the Supreme Court, appointment of an arbitrator is by no means a straightforward process. A person who seeks appointment of an arbitrator, is first required to prove through affidavits and detailed arguments the following: (i) existence of a validly executed arbitration agreement; (ii) that the claim is a long dead one; (iii) that there has been no accord or satisfaction. This entails filing of detailed pleadings and exhaustive oral arguments and it could be several months before the High Court makes a decision and appoints an arbitrator. Even if the High Court chooses to exercise its power in favour of arbitration and appoints an arbitrator, this appointment can be challenged by way of a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.

CONCLUSION
The 1996 Act, as it stands today, is a reasonable effort at promoting arbitration. But the manner in which several of its provisions, especially section 8 and section 11, have come to be interpreted by the Courts, somewhat takes away from this effort. It is submitted that as a result of the colour given to these provisions if the 1996 Act by the various rulings of the Supreme Court, the hallmarks of arbitration, viz. mutual agreement to avoid courts, and expeditious decision making, continue to remain aspirational and serious re-thinking is required, preferably judicially, to correct this dichotomy.

The Supreme Court has in the past two years started taking a more liberal view of arbitration and has been less eager to assume control of matters when parties have agreed to exclude the jurisdiction of Indian courts. In the case of BALCO vs. Kaiser Aluminium12 the Supreme Court boldly overruled its long criticised decision in Bhatia International13 and held that Indian Courts have no role to play when the seat of arbitration is outside of India, even if parties or the property in dispute is in India. Furthermore, in World Sport Group vs. MSM Satellite (Singapore) Pte. Ltd.14, the Supreme Court has rejected the contention that an arbitral tribunal is incompetent to deal with allegations of fraud. But since this was a matter relating to an arbitration taking place outside of India, it does not apply to arbitrations held in India, which continue to be governed by the law laid down by the Supreme Court in N. Radhakrishnan’s15 case.

Both these decisions suggest that the Supreme Court has recognised that a strong push is required from the judiciary to correct the gap that exists between the legislative intent and judicial interpretation of Indian arbitration law. It is hoped that the Court continues this trend over the next few years and smoothens out the remaining creases, including the ones highlighted in this Article, by relooking at the law laid down in some of its previous decisions. !

Reinventing India A Youth Perspective

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Abstract
Mumbai, 8th June 2014: “Mumbai Metro: East meets West in 21 minutes flat!”

No, you read it right. It was 8th June 2014 and not 8th June 2004. Why people are so excited over something that they should have had at least 10 years ago, befuddles me! Mumbai generates 5% of India’s GDP, but our infrastructure system is in shambles! Roads are potholed, traffic situation is pathetic, trains, buses are unimaginably overcrowded and people spit, shit and litter anywhere, without a care! We have to bribe through our noses to get our work done and we are still struggling to get decent internet connectivity. Above all, every once in five years we are prepared to get attacked by terrorists. We may be an alpha world city, but it is shameful that we are lagging far, far behind our western counterparts. And what’s true for Mumbai, is truer for India.

At 24, me and my generation have become responsible for the future of our country. We have our sights on the global leadership throne, but we have inherited an onerous, corrupt kingdom. Well, since we are intent on becoming world pioneers, we have set out to reform our own nation first; we are going to cleanse it, bring it up-to-date and then lead it.

We have already taken our first steps towards this goal by bringing to power a government that takes our lofty aspirations seriously and is committed to help us achieve it. Together we shall take India to the heights billions before us have dreamt of! And now to war! A war for upliftment of the poor and the illiterate! A war for saving the dignity of our nation! A war against the mediocrities that have far too long plagued our country!

We shall evolve, leaders.

“Achche Din Aane Wale Hain.”

The entire country is gushing over this one statement of divine prophecy. Mere five words have made the stock markets go tipsy. Some are saying that this is the start of a new era for India! This is all very endearing except for the one single problem that I have: Why aren’t the achche din here already?

Our country makes me mad. The oldest civilization in the world and we are still a developing nation! 5,000 years of history that we are proud of, but a shameful present and a stumbling future! 30 crore Indians are illiterate. That is the entire population of the United States of America! 15 crore are poor. That is more than Japan’s entire population. And by the way, the international poverty line is Rs. 90 per day. Which means that when I sponsor dinner to my friends, I spend more in one hour than what my poor brother earns in a month! It is 2014, and India has not been able feed, clothe and house all her citizens. In a completely unrelated story, India has the 6th highest number of billionaires!

While we are talking about citizens, let us take a few questions from the people of my generation.

“Why do I feel scared of getting out of my house alone at 10 in the night even if I stay in the capital of the largest democracy in the world?” asks a 22 year old Delhi resident, Aditi.

“What is electricity? Is it a toy? I have never seen it!” says 8 year old Shivappa who resides in a small village called Makki in Karnataka.

“Why do I have to pay chai-pani everytime I have to get my file removed in the Income Tax Office?” asks 20 year old Rajesh, a budding CA hailing from Patna.

All these questions, my predecessors have left unanswered! And now it is upto me to answer them.

At 24, I have come to a stark realisation that the future of our country has fallen squarely on my and my generation’s shoulders. And we have inherited an outdated, bureaucratic and debauched state from our predecessors. The present government, like each of its forerunners, has promised the sky; but then again, has there ever been a dearth of promises in our land? Where the previous one’s have consistently and cumulatively floundered is backing up those promises with tangible efforts.

The onus therefore to make amends rests completely and unequivocally with my generation. It is now our responsibility to ameliorate the past, augment the present and accelerate the future. And thankfully, all is not lost. Our country still retains the proverbial silver lining in the form of educated and motivated young population, large domestic demand base and high savings rate. Fortunately, these are the exact things we could not have worked without.

Global leaders at everything. That’s what we aim to become. Be it trade or sports or education or technology. We want to edify the next Einstein, build the next Burj Khalifa and grubstake the next Google. We want to outdo China at the Olympics and end tiger poaching. We want to be the next startup hub, the next global tourism hub and the next healthcare hub. We want LTE connectivity in each village and a dream job for each citizen. We want be at the top, of the top.

Naysayers shall complain that we are being immature, materialistic and we don’t know what the realities and the difficulties are. No offence sir, but we don’t care. Yes, it is a steep, treacherous road. It is going to be a dogfight and we know it. But we don’t just dare to dream, we dare to live our dreams. Frankly, it is not just our dream. Billions before us had the same vision. But we shall be the torchbearers to an advanced Indian state!

Chris Gardener, the motivational American entrepreneur wrote that “if you don’t take the necessary steps to make them happen, dreams are just mirages that mess with your head!”. We have already taken the first steps towards achieving our dream! Over 2 crore first timers, 18 and 19 year olds, a record participation, voted for the rehabilitation and reform of the Indian economy. We voted for CHANGE. We voted for a government with a track record of fulfilling promises. And believe you me, we require this government to make good on some pretty big promises.

Our first mandate to this government is that they need to very clearly understand that they are a government to my generation. We are an impatient bunch of people. We have an attention span of 140 characters or lesser, so we’d be grateful if you make your point quickly. We are practical and result oriented. We value guidance, but we value quantifiable efforts more; what we don’t value is futile vote bank politics and bureaucratic processes. We are motivated to achieve our goal and we require you to be equitable enablers so that we can partner in making India the global superpower it should be!

To play out your role of being facilitators of growth, progress and development, we have a four point agenda where the government needs to immediately ring in definitive reforms. Special focus needs to be given to rural areas – where most our country’s resources reside.

Infrastructure
While we may live in a modern day society, our infrastructure is severely medieval. How else would it be possible that almost 25% of our population lives without electricty! Why is agriculture still dependent on natural rainfall and animal resources? The infrastructure sector is the backbone of all investments into our country, therefore it is critical that this sector gets the much needed shot in the arm.

Transportation, energy, telecommunication, education and healthcare are amongst the most vital sectors requiring impetus. All the villages have to be connected by a network of roadways, railways and basic amenities like electricity and water. Innovative automation, especially in the agriculture industry, e.g. computer controlled ploughing or schemes like ‘e-Choupal’ which empower the farmers needs to be introduced. The new government has to reduce bureaucracy and usher adequacy, accessability and reliability to strengthen investor confidence.

Education
Education system today, is down in the dumps. It is unequipped, outdated and ridiculously inadequate. Just to give a perspective, children born today shall retire in the year 2080! Is it even distantly possible for us to provide them with the skills to survive and thrive that long? Al- ready today, there is a sharp disconnect between the educated skills and employable skills.
The need of the hour is to reengineer our education curriculum so as to embed employability into courses and forge stronger links between business and academia. Teacher education system has to be rebuilt, grounds up. Partnering with foreign institutions offering specialisation programmes shall upgrade the Indian education system to global standards. It is imperative for the new govern- ment to increase spending on education to 5% of GDP.

CORRUPTION
With the parallel economy running at $ 700 billion per year or 40% of our GDP, corruption is the biggest reason for inequitable wealth distribution in our country. It is literally killing our nation. Unfortunately, the canker doesn’t stop at illicit monetary transactions. Our biggest cause of worry is the corruption of moral and ethical values.

The new government has to put an end to corruption. Immediately. Permanently. Stringent anti-corruption framework and comprehensive education to impart discipline consistent with a national code of conduct for good citizenship shall act as strong deterrents to corruption. Policy makers may implement the Nordic model of governance which practically eradicated corruption in some developed Scandinavian countries. But most of all, Indian citizens need to realise that corruption can only be completely evicted from within, not without.

ECONOMY AND GOVERNANCE

Our economy is dithering due to high levels of inflation, instable currency and the alarming levels of fiscal deficit. The zooming stock markets are nothing but a heightned sense of exuberance, the fundamentals beneath the dizzy heights are yet to improve. Also, with only 3% of the entire population paying taxes, the government has to take some hard calls to increase public revenues, improve economic factors and bring sanity back to the land.

Softer issues like casteism, communal disharmony, gender inequality and rampant crime are still affecting our society Despite living in the 21st century it is deplorable that a woman is raped every 20 minutes in India. We, as a society, are self-conceited megalomaniacs. Freedom of expression is trampled on regularly and intolerance is  an instinct embedded deep within the Indian psyche. It has become necessary now to attack this malaise from  a national platform. Women empowerment has to be a agenda item. Implementation of radical and stringent penal practices has become a necessity. Governance has to be redefined to mean Minimum government, Maximum governance!

HOW CAN CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS HELP?

While as a member of Young India I am responsible to contribute towards India’s growth and progress, being a qualified chartered accountant makes me doubly account- able to achieve my generation’s goal for India. Our qualification gives us the skills and the access to almost any industry we choose. It charges us with the responsibility of being ombudsmen to our society to ensure enhanced transparency and accountability. But how do we dispose these responsibilities? What measures do we take to en- sure that CAs are at the forefront of all professionals?

Contributing towards rural and semi urban development Growing investment in agriculture, relocation of manufac- turing base to tier II and tier III cities and acceptance of the concept of inclusive growth shall generate consider- able requirement of financial administration, risk manage- ment, tax planning, accountancy, legal advice and better governance in rural and semi urban areas. The time is ripe for CAs to increasingly set up proprietorships and partnership firms here. We can assist the local panchay- ats in areas of governance, taxation and finance planning. One more area of contribution may be compliance to the latest Corporate Social Responsibility provisions, where- by companies shall be able to uplift rural and backtroden areas.

CONTRIBUTING TOWARDS GLOBALISATION

According to a United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) survey in 2012, India is the second most important foreign direct investment (FDI) destination for transnational corporations after China. Further, the new government’s focus on improving strategic ties with key foreign powers and its determination to simplify the investment process shall propel FDIs in our country.

There is therefore, a burgeoning requirement of CAs in the areas of double taxation avoidance, transfer pricing and corporate laws. IFRS, sustainability reporting, UK Bribery Act and SOX are also becoming a compliance necessity for Indian multinational conglomerates. Specialising in these areas shall help us better align with these requirements and supplement the global India case.

CONTRIBUTING TOWARDS AUTOMATION

Technology is slowly permeating and disrupting every sphere of business. The risk landscape of various sectors like banking, insurance, capital markets, telecommunication, etc. has undergone a paradigm shift with increased dependence on internet and technology. Also, with the proliferation of Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) solutions, organisations today have lesser control over data integrity, privacy and reliability. There is an urgent need for CAs to enhance their risk management expertise by equipping themselves with skills necessary for identification, assessment and mitigation of IT risks.

CONTRIBUTING TOWARDS CEASING CORRUPTION IN INDIA

Being CAs we are always precariously treading the thin line between tax evasion and tax planning. Similarly, cor- porations today are always trying new ways to ‘improve’ their financial statements. It is imperative therefore, that we ensure real compliance with various provisions of the taxation laws and reporting standards, that we steadfastly uphold our ethical values and moral standards and ensure that we neither allow nor abet any act of malfeasance.

Public and government sector have recently been riddled with scams like 2G and Commonwealth. CAs have to ensure transparency, by making the government accountable towards the country and its citizens for the utilisationof citizens funds through exhaustive public audits.

CONTRIBUTING TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP

Our nation is becoming increasingly entrepreneurial. There has been a huge spurt in the number of startups in the recent years and the trend is going to be an up- swing. With a huge demand for support areas like market research, venture funding, financial modeling or business value chain implementation, CAs have to hone the skills they already have to be at the forefront of this bull wave!

THE NEED TO REINVENT OURSELVES

It is evident that there is a lot of opportunity for us, CAs,to make our mark in India’s next decade of advancement. However, it is now inevitable that we reinvent who we are! Whether in practice or industry, we can no longer solely remain financial stakeholders of companies. We have to become business stakeholders!

It’s going to be an uphill task, history and tradition are against us, but it can be achieved. What we need is a catharsis! A step back to realign our interests with those of our nation. We need to innovate some of the core elements of our present day qualification so as to make it more attuned to the present day scenario. For instance,
•    The current curriculum and the examination pattern needs to be revisited. Inputs should be drawn from industry, practices and international institutes so that the curriculum ensures employability and equips our students to have an equal standing with their global counterparts. Special attention should be awarded to cross functional training since today, MBAs, cost accountants, financial analysts, etc. have started replacing CAs, even in core areas like finance and taxation.

•    Is an audit firm oriented articleship the only option for practical training? Why can’t students gain industrial training for the entirety of their tenure from some of the top companies of India? We need to realize that the students have two diets of careers to choose from, practice firms and industry. It is imperative that a solution is derived for the blinkered audit based training approach.

•    Partnering with foreign institutions has become the need of the hour. With CA students opting for multiple degrees, the institute should ensure that the skills developed by the CA institute are not put to waste. Collaboration, not competition is the way forward. Also, with multiple professional degrees, what matters is that CAs continually update themselves in their area of work and remain relevant. However, it is doubtful whether the present CPE norms ensure continuous education. A bitter pill that needs to be swallowed and worked upon.

•    Most importantly, the ICAI needs to ensure that it remains strongly in control of the central elements of our profession – accountancy, taxation and audit. It needs to retain relevance by producing quality CAs, and work against becoming an exam conducting body generating dignified accountants!

It is imperative therefore, that CAs allineate themselves to the big picture. This nation is now in the hands of a new generation, our generation. Fearless and unafraid, we are the custodians of India’s advanced future. The revolution has already begun. And we will emerge victorious. We shall evolve, leaders!

Achche din are here!

Gazing through the crystal ball

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My Country
Every third person in an Indian city today is a youth. In about seven years, the median individual in India will be 29 years, very likely a city-dweller, making it the youngest country in the world. India is set to experience a dynamic transformation as the population burden of the past turns into a demographic dividend, but the benefits will be tempered with social and spatial inequalities.

The requirements of a younger nation differ radically from aging countries like Japan or even China, for that matter. By 2020, India is set to become the world’s youngest country with 64% of its population in the working age group. A UN HABITAT report states that while income levels in cities may appear to be higher, the cost of living is also constantly increasing, resulting in shrinking savings, inadequate access to health care and lack of quality education.

And so, I believe that our young, growing country demands a progressive, result-oriented transformation-and a nation that can cater to theaspiration and temperament of the young population. India 10 years from now will be more intelligent, more informed, less tolerant of incompetence and regressive practices. I believe that we are growing more aware as a nation.

I believe that a decade from now, we will be a more transparent, and accountable nation-where change and progress will get more apparent. I don’t believe that a radical transformation would be required-but stable, steady and sustainable growth is more desirable and will perhaps, be delivered.

Dr. APJ Abdul Kalam’s book, 2020 – A Vision for the New Millennium, examines in depth the weakness and the strength of India, as a nation, and offers a vision of how India can emerge to be among the world’s first four economic powers by 2020. This is a goal post that we can all agree, is desirable and on everyone’s agenda.

However, I believe that there is another critical component to development in the country. Inclusive growth and a green economy are the government’s guiding principles for its development agenda. Sustainability-economic, environmental and social can provide a balanced approach to the development of the nation.

The UN Environment Programme’s Green Economy Report demonstrates that green economies are a new engine of growth, generate decent jobs and are vital to eliminating persistent poverty.

And so, while I hope for a stable and progressive country in the decade to come, I also hope that our economic social and environmental goals will align with sustainable ideals.

My Profession

As a Sustainability and Green Building Consultant, I am currently part of some of the most topical conversations with regard to environment, renewable energy, energy efficiency, technology etc. Sustainable solutions mean meeting our lifestyle and existential requirements in a manner which is harmonious with the environment and does not jeopardise the future of our existence on this planet.

Sustainability is no longer a buzzword but reflects an indispensability as our survival depends on it. India, aspiring to be an opinion leader and increasingly emerging as one, especially in the aftermath of the recession, needs to be at the vanguard of this movement and lead from the front.
Indians have realised the importance of making their residences compatible with environment, and regulators have also become active. If environmental activists continue to be as vociferous as they are now, I would like to believe that Consulting on Green building will probably have ended-I am going to have to find something else to do! It will be passé, as projects will be designed to be more efficient through inherent design, effective resource consumption and innovative technologies.

I would like to believe that the profession of a sustainability consultants will disintegrate into creating impactful policy level decisions to ensure sustainable growth in the country-regardless of the sector-agriculture, healthcare, real estate etc. I would also like to believe that sustainability consultants can use their experience to think as innovators to solve solutions of environmental degradation- in all fields.

Expectations
Transparency. Responsibility. Accountability. These are the expectations from our government.

We as citizens, understand that we are stakeholders in the issues pertaining to the country’s development and growth. We would like to understand our responsibility and the manner in which progressive policy formulation is done. There needs to be transperancy in this regard.

For this to happen, I believe that governments need to respect and understand the role of sustainability, for growth and superior long term returns. As US President, John F. Kennedy once said, “There are risks and costs to a program of action. But they are far less than the long-range risks of comfortable inaction.”

Organised action toward sustainable growth with measurable outcomes is expected. For example: strategies to manage resources like water, and energy must be measured and regulated in a responsible manner. Corruption with regard to regulation of other natural resources must be stopped. Education at large, and an emphasis on sustainability will allow ups to be equipped for future needs and requirements. Progressive policies on agriculture and even urban farming to mitigate long-term environmental risks and hazards is key. Furthermore, policies that require us to measure, monitor and regulate carbon emissions at large, across all industries and domestic sectors is critical.

The Indian private sector, known for its resilience and entrepreneurship, is ideally placed to lead this movement and the government’s policies in this regard, although not adequate as of now, are at least encouraging and reflect the right intentions. A combination of entrepreneurship and adequate policies has the potential of making India a role model for many to follow and emerge as a true super power, as only a high GDP growth rate is not the sole criterion in today’s scenario to be considered a superpower.

Most importantly, I believe that sustainability needs to be a way of life for it to become a reality. Our present state of excesses and skewed development is against the very grain of sustainable development. It needs to be community driven to not only provide everyone an incentive to be a part of the movement but also ensure equitable distribution of resources. The focus on rural areas is inevitable as two-thirds of the country lives in villages and small towns. They need to be made a part of the movement and made to see the benefits of the same before they are bitten by the ‘so-called development’ bug. The lifestyle and culture of an average person in such areas is conducive to this movement and all these attributes can be dove-tailed to fulfill the needs of Indians in a sustainable manner.

After all, as explained in a quote from Lakota, “We do not inherit the Earth from our ancestors; We borrow it from our children.”

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Imagining India From The Eyes Of Young Professionals

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On 16th May 2014, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
emerged victorious under the leadership of its prime ministerial
candidate, Mr. Narendra Modi. The BJP won an astounding 282 seats. Not
since 1984, had a single party single-handedly crossed the 272 mark
required to form a central government in Delhi. Moreover, the BJP and
its alliance partners that form the National Democratic Alliance (NDA)
won a grand total of 336 of the 543 seats. This general election to the
Lok Sabha was rightly billed as the biggest election in the history of
the world’s largest democracy and was keenly followed by the entire
world.

On 26th May 2014, Mr. Modi was sworn in as the 15th Prime
Minister of India. The first steps of the new government have been
positive thus far and irrespective of one’s views on Mr. Modi, there is
an undeniable feeling of optimism about the country and excitement for
the good times to come or as goes the BJP’s election campaign song,
“acchhe din aane wale hain”. One of the key reasons for the victory was
the effective use of social media and the strong focus on development
and good governance in its campaign which allowed the party to reach the
youth in a way never done before. The “Abki baar Modi sarkar” as well
as similar messages flooding the social media space in the months
leading to the election were specifically designed to attract the youth.
Not surprising given that almost 65% of the Indian population is below
the age of 35 today, with India having the largest youth population.
This youth-centric campaign that made development a key agenda also
played a crucial role in India registering its highest ever voter
turnout of 66.4%. The mandate was clear: Focus on the youth to shape
India’s future.

Acknowledging the fact that the future of India
is inextricably linked to the future development of India’s youth, the
Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society has, in the special issue to its
prestigious Bombay Chartered Accountant Journal, chosen the
theme“Imagining India from the eyes of young professionals”.

A
common question in job interviews is: “Where do you see yourself in the
next 10 years?” While most of us have chartered a path of where we want
our careers to be after 10 years, not many of us have thought, “Where do
I see my country in the next 10 years?” Admittedly, I too was one of
them and therefore, thank the Society for giving me this opportunity to
stop thinking from a micro level perspective and start thinking on a
macro level. Coming to the question at hand, I for one, like millions of
my fellow young professionals, am very optimistic.

I am sure
that a decade from now, India will be a super power, economically as
well as intellectually. It is no secret that this country is brimming
with talent. Millions of hard working and supremely talented people
proudly call this country their home. Yes, it has been hit hard by scams
in the recent past and many foreign investors have lost their
confidence in the economy. However, as the perennial optimist Harvey
Dent says in the movie, The Dark Knight, “The night is the darkest just
before dawn!” One can only hope that India has turned the page on one of
the darkest periods in its post-independence period and the dawn is
just around the corner.

It is only a matter of time before the
investor confidence is reposed in the Indian economy with the new
government hinting at steps to do the same by having a clearer tax
system and negating the element of uncertainty in the taxes that the
foreign investors are wary of today. Numerous foreigners awaited with
bated breath, the results of the recently concluded Indian elections as
though their future plans as well as their existing plans to invest in
the country depended upon it. Agreed, that it is not much to go on.
However, this has provided the new government a platform to give a
confidence boost to these potential investors and welcome them with open
arms.

A decade from now, we will see the economy being opened up
and moving towards becoming a free-market economy with minimum
regulation required. With trade flowing across the country, flowing
freely from all over the world, one would also see the strengthening of
economic ties with economies, such as China and Japan, allowing India to
position itself at the top for free trade with some of the largest
global players.

Such free trade would also result in an increase
in employment. The Prime Minister has already stated that inclusive
growth is the goal of the new government. Further, the Food Security
Bill and the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme,
if properly implemented, could drive the way towards eradication of
poverty. Creating employment would result in more disposable income in
the hands of more Indians, leading to an increase in demand for consumer
products. Further, the increase in disposable income in the hands of
the middle class Education reforms especially in rural India can spur
the improvement of the quality of education. It is only with quality
education that one hope to make India an economic power house. The first
67 years of the country’s independence have witnessed a high occurrence
of brain drain, especially in the information technology sector with
the Satya Nadellas and Rajeev Suris heading top corporations of the
world. However, the next decade consisting of free-market and a booming
economy would witness a reversal of the brain drain, where Indians
working abroad would return to India for better professional
opportunities and to serve their country. This phenomena has already
started with various foreign companies setting up businesses in India
and asking Indian employees already working abroad to return and work
from these Indian subsidiaries and branches in the initial stage.
Subsequently, one would witness many start ups beginning their journey
in the country and soon we would have our very own Silicon Valley. This
would be supported by the advancement of infrastructure and technology
in the country.

A recent tweet from the Prime Minister has
suggested that infrastructure does not only mean highways but also optic
fiber networks or ‘information highways’. A recent study shows that
India is currently 3rd in the world in terms of number of users of
internet! It is only a matter of time that it would have the highest
number of users in the world.

In terms of infrastructure, one
would also witness the improvement in the infrastructure in the country
in the coming decade with the Golden Quadrilateral (highway network of
roads) and the railways connecting every corner of the country.

In
respect of the chartered accountancy profession, I am of the firm
belief that we are in for exciting times ahead during the next decade.
With the three main laws, relating to the Companies Act, the Income Tax
Act and the Goods and Service Tax, undergoing an overhaul, it is back to
the drawing board for most of us in the profession.

Firstly, the
next decade would see chartered accountants moving away from the
traditional areas of practice such as audit and tax and towards
unexplored territory such as investment advisory, valuations, mergers
and acquisition advisory, transfer pricing, corporate law advisory,
securities law advisory, foreign exchange law advisory, management
consultancy etc. This in turn would lead to more opportunities being
available especially in unchartered areas. Further, with laws undergoing
major changes, clients would look up to the chartered accountants to
guide them for compliance with these new laws. One would therefore, see a
shift of focus from the attestation function to an advisory function.

Further, the Companies Act requires appointment of independent directors in case of certain companies. Who better than chartered accountants to be appointed as independent directors. It is common knowledge that a chartered accountant knows the business of his client, right from the efficiency in operations, accounting, finance and taxation aspects.

The free-market approach of the government leading to the increase in inbound investments would lead to an in- crease in the demand for chartered accountants as the foreign investors would not have knowledge of the laws applicable in India.

Secondly, the next decade would also see the rise in super-specialisation in the case of chartered accountants. The free-flowing trade and investment in India resulting in increase in the demand for chartered accountants would lead to higher occurrences of complex transactions and would require an expert in the field to understand such transactions. This would lead to chartered accountants specialising in certain fields thereby creating a niche. A ‘jack of all trades but king of none’ chartered accountant may not be able to survive in a highly competitive environment and therefore, eventually everyone will move towards super-specialisation. Super-specialisation would also lead to a higher bargaining power for the purposes of fees.

At the same time, many clients would prefer going to a one-stop shop i.e., a CA firm which would provide all the services that would be required by the client. This would lead to multiple chartered accountants or firms providing services in different niche areas merging or combining into one and working together and therefore providing various super-specialised services under one umbrella.

Thirdly, another major area where the chartered accountants will flourish in the next decade would be in assistance in policy making. This election has made one realise that there are many chartered accountants who have an interest in playing an active role in society. Chartered accountants would play an active role in the policy making of the government and would be instrumental in guiding the government on various economic as well as social aspects of governance.

The government is expected to give weightage to the suggestions and recommendations of the chartered accountant community as more often than not, a chartered accountant knows the ground reality about the implementation of the law , and therefore the best judge in formation of various economic policies.

Fourthly, another change in the profession in the next decade would be the realisation of the importance of communication and presentation skills. This would help the members of the profession to position themselves better in the market.

Finally, with the advancement of technology, borders between countries are slowly fading and the world is becoming one large global village. This has also resulted in the work moving towards a virtual world with diminishing requirement for a personal interaction. A chartered accountant of the future would have a far greater reach in terms of providing services due to this advancement of technology and would enable growth.

Only time will tell whether the India that I have imagined and the state of the profession that I have dreamt about will become a reality. However, one does feel extremely optimistic about these exciting and game-changing days ahead and a chartered accountant of the future would most certainly have a big role to play in society.

About our young authors of the special issue

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Sameer Pandit
Advocate

A law graduate from the National Law School of India University Bangalore, he completed his Masters at Harvard in 2011. He worked with an international law firm, Clifford Chance, at their London and Singapore offices and he is currently serving as a Senior associate with Wadia & Ghandy Solicitors. His area of specialisation is dispute resolution.

CA. Mahesh Nayak
Qualified as a Chartered accountant in 2011 and is currently with Contractor Nayak & Kishnadwala. He specialises in advisory services in the areas of FEMAand international tax.

CA. Pranav Vaidya
A chartered accountant with an advanced diploma in management accountancy as an additional qualification. He is currently with the Essar group as manager group assurance and cost control. Reviewed large capital investments made by the Essar Group into diversified sectors like Steel, Power, Oil, Shipping, Projects. His main areas of focus are project conceptualisation, planning execution, project management and post completion project appraisal.

Ms. Nazneen Ichhaporia
Advocate

A partner in ANB Legal, a prominent law firm, Nazneen is a corporate commercial lawyer with a focus on private equity and venture capital investments, acquisitions, joint ventures and business restructuring. She has expertise in matters relating to cross border investments, infrastructure, project finance, external commercial borrowings, franchising and intellectual property rights.

Ms. Priya Vakil
Architect

She is the managing and founding partner Ed en. She has done a specialisation in sustainable environmental design from the Architectural Association in London, UK. She has worked on creating innovative services related to green building certification, energy audits and design services related to the environment – like façade and landscape design. She is the winner of the exemplary performance award from Griha at the National Conference on Green Design.

Dr. Parth Mehta

A student with a bright academic career, he passed matriculation with flying colours. Extremely passionate about his career in the medical field. He qualified as a doctor in 2014. During this period, he was the recipient of the JRD Tata foundation scholarship. Currently, he is undergoing internship at Sion Hospital.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 145 dated 18th June, 2014

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Notification No. FEMA.307/2014-RB dated 26th May, 2014
Annual Return on Foreign Liabilities and Assets Reporting by Indian Companies – Revised format

This circular states that RBI has amended the FLA Return. The new return and FAQ for filling up the same have been uploaded on the RBI website – www.rbi.org.in.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 144 dated 16th June, 2014

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Know Your Customer (KYC) norms/Anti-Money Laundering (AML) standards/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT)/Obligation of Authorised Persons under Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002 – Amendment to section 13(2) – Cross Border Inward Remittance under Money Transfer Service Scheme

This circular requires Authorised Persons, who are Indian Agents under MTSS, to nominate a Director on their Board as “designated Director” to ensure compliance with the obligations under the Prevention of Money Laundering (Amendment) Act, 2012.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 142 dated June 12, 2014

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Notification No.FEMA.295/2014-RB dated 24th February, 2014

Transfer of assets of Liaison Office (LO)/Branch Office (BO)/Project Office (PO) of a foreign entity either to its Wholly Owned Subsidiary (WOS)/Joint Venture (JV)/Others in India–Delegation of powers to AD Banks

Presently, banks can, subject to submission of prescribed closure documents, allow closure of the accounts of LO/ BO and repatriate the surplus balances.

This circular now permits banks to allow transfer of assets of LO/BO/PO, subject to compliance with the following stipulations by the concerned LO/BO/PO: –

1. T he LO/BO must have complied with the operational guidelines such as (i) submission of AAC (up to the current financial year) at regular annual intervals with copies endorsed to DGIT (International Taxation), (ii) obtained PAN from IT Authorities and (iii) got registered with ROC under Companies Act 1956. The PO must have complied with the guidelines regarding initial reporting requirements and submission of CA certified annual report indicating project status.

2. They must submit a certificate from their Statutory Auditors furnishing details of assets to be transferred indicating their date of acquisition, original price, depreciation till date, present book value or WDV value and sale consideration to be obtained. The Statutory Auditor must also confirm that the assets were not re-valued after their initial acquisition. The sale consideration must not be more than the book value in each case.

3. T he assets must have been acquired by the LO/BO/ PO from inward remittances and no intangible assets such as goodwill, pre-operative expenses must be included. Also, no revenue expenses must be capitalized and transferred to JV/WOS.

4. A ll applicable taxes must have been paid before the transfer of assets.

5. T ransfer of assets is permitted only when the foreign entity intends to close their LO/BO/PO operations in India.

6. A mounts received as a result of such transfer of assets can be credited to the bank account of the LO/ BO/PO as a permissible credit.

Banks have to submit the documents for scrutiny by their own auditors and RBI auditors. A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 143 dated 16th June, 2014Know Your Customer (KYC) norms/Anti-Money Laundering (AML) standards/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT)/Obligation of Authorised Persons under Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002 – Amendment to section 13(2) – Money Changing Activities

This circular requires Authorised Persons to nominate a Director on their Board as “designated Director” to ensure compliance with the obligations under the Prevention of Money Laundering (Amendment) Act, 2012.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 141 dated 6th June, 2014

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Notification No. FEMA. 305/2014-RB dated 22nd May, 2014 Pledge of shares for business purposes in favour of NBFCs

Presently, a non-resident can pledge shares held by him in and Indian Company in favour of a bank in India to secure the credit facilities being extended to the Indian Company for bonafide business purposes.

This circular permits banks to allow pledge of equity shares of an Indian Company held by non-resident investor/s in favour of a NBFC – whether listed or not, to secure the credit facilities extended to the Indian Company for bonafide business purposes/operations, subject to compliance with the conditions indicated below: –

(a) Only the equity shares listed on a recognized stock exchange/s in India can be pledged in favour of the NBFC.
(b) In case of invocation of pledge, transfer of shares must be in accordance with the credit concentration norm.
(c) (i) Bank can obtain a board resolution ‘ex ante’, passed by the Board of Directors of the Indian Company, that the loan proceeds received consequent to pledge of shares will be utilised by it for the declared purpose. (ii) Bank can also obtain a certificate ‘ex post’, from the statutory auditor of Indian Company, that the loan proceeds received consequent to pledge of shares, have been utilised by the investee company for the declared purpose.
(d) Indian company has to follow the relevant SEBI disclosure norms, as applicable.
(e) Credit concentration norms cannot be breached by the NBFC under any circumstances. If there is a breach on invocation of pledge, the shares must be sold and the breach must be rectified within a period of 30 days from the date of invocation of pledge.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 140 dated 6th June, 2014

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Notification No. FEMA. 304/2014-RB dated 22nd May, 2014

Foreign investment in India – participation by registered FPIs, SEBI registered long term investors and NRIs in non-convertible/redeemable preference shares or debentures of Indian companies

Presently, FII/FPI, QFI and long term investors registered with SEBI can invest in corporate debt up to $ 51 billion. Also, an Indian company can issue non-convertible/redeemable preference shares or debentures to non-resident shareholders, including the depositories that act as trustees for the ADR/GDR holders by way of distribution as bonus from its general reserves under a Scheme of Arrangement approved by a Court in India.

This circular permits: –

– FII, QFI, FPI and long term investors registered with SEBI – Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs), Multilateral Agencies, Pension/Insurance/Endowment Funds, foreign Central Banks to invest on repatriation basis; and

– NR I to invest both on repatriation and non-repatriation basis in non-convertible/redeemable preference shares or debentures issued by an Indian company in terms of A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 84 dated 6th January, 2014 and listed on recognised stock exchanges in India, within the overall limit of $ 51 billion earmarked for corporate debt.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 139 dated 5th June, 2014 Press Note No.2 (2014 Series) issued by the DIPP dated 4th February, 2014

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Notification No. FEMA. 301/2014-RB dated 4th April, 2014

Foreign investment in the Insurance Sector – Amendment to the Foreign Direct Investment Scheme This circular states that in terms of and subject to the conditions mentioned in Press Note 2 (2014 Series) FII / FPI and NRI can invest within the overall limit of 26% permitted for FDI in Insurance sector under the Automatic Route.

The amended paragraph 6.2.17.7 of FDI policy is as under: – Paragraph 6.2.17.7 of the ‘Consolidated FD1 Policy, effective from 5th April, 2013’, is replaced by the following:

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 138 dated 3rd June, 2014

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Liberalised Remittance Scheme (LR S) for resident individuals-Increase in the limit from $ 75,000 to $ 125,000

Presently, under the LRS an individual resident in India can remit up to $ 75,000 or its equivalent per financial year for any permitted current or capital account transaction or a combination of both.

This circular has increased the said limit from $ 75,000 per financial year to $ 125,000 per financial year. As a result, an individual resident in India can remit up to $ 125,000 or its equivalent per financial year for any permitted current or capital account transaction or a combination of both. However, remittance under the scheme cannot be made for any prohibited or illegal activities such as margin trading, lottery, etc.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 136 dated 28th May, 2014

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Notification No. FEMA 10A/2014-RB dated 21st March, 2014

Crystallisation of Inoperative Foreign Currency Deposits

Notification No. 10A and this circular require banks to crystallize and convert credit balances in any inoperative foreign currency denominated deposit into Indian Rupee as under: –

1. In case a foreign currency denominated deposit with a fixed maturity date remains inoperative for a period of three years from the date of its maturity, than at the end of the 3rd year, the bank has to convert the balances lying in the foreign currency denominated deposit into Indian Rupee at the exchange rate prevailing as on that date. Thereafter, the depositor will be entitled to claim either the said Indian Rupee proceeds and interest thereon, if any, or the foreign currency equivalent (calculated at the rate prevalent as on the date of payment) of the Indian Rupee proceeds of the original deposit and interest, if any, on such Indian Rupee proceeds.

2. In case of foreign currency denominated deposit with no fixed maturity period, if the deposit remains inoperative for a period of three years (debit of bank charges not to be reckoned as operation), the bank must, after giving three months’ notice to the depositor at his last known address as available with the bank, convert the deposit from the foreign currency in which it is denominated to Indian Rupee at the end of the notice period at the prevailing exchange rate. Thereafter, the depositor will be entitled to claim either the said Indian Rupee proceeds and interest thereon, if any, or the foreign currency equivalent (calculated at the rate prevalent as on the date of payment) of the Indian Rupee proceeds of the original deposit and interest, if any, on such Indian Rupee proceeds.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 135 dated 21st May, 2014

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Risk Management and Inter Bank Dealings

Presently, resident importers can book contracts to hedge the currency risk of their probable exposures, based on past performance, for an amount which is higher of the following: –
a) U p to 25% of the average of the previous three financial years’ import turnover; or
b) Previous year’s actual import turnover.

This circular has increase the limit of 25% to 50%. As a result, resident importers can book contracts to hedge the currency risk of their probable exposures, based on past performance, for an amount which is higher of the following: –
a) U p to 50% of the average of the previous three financial years’ import turnover; or
b) Previous year’s actual import turnover.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 133 dated 21st May1, 2014

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Import of Gold by Nominated Banks/Agencies/ Entities

This circular permits with immediate effect: –
A. Star Trading Houses/Premier Trading Houses (STH/ PTH) that are registered as nominated agencies by the Director General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) to import gold under 20:80 scheme. The conditions are: –
i) STH/PTH must have imported gold prior to the introduction of the 20:80 scheme. STH/PTH have to get this import verified by the Department of Customs at any port where they have imported gold consignment in the past.
ii) The first lot of gold under this scheme will be based on the highest monthly import during any of the last 24 months prior to the RBI’s notification dated 14th August, 2013, subject to a maximum of 2,000 kgs.
iii) STH/PTH can import the eligible quantity from any port.
iv) ATH /PTH must submit the import plan, port-wise and quantity-wise, to the concerned Customs office, where the verification of the figures of past performance was done.
v) STH/PTH importers will have to comply with the overall discipline of exporting 20% of each imported consignment before the next consignment is imported.

B. N ominated banks to give Gold Metal Loans (GML) to domestic jewellery manufacturers from the eligible domestic import quota of 80% to the extent of GML outstanding in their books as on 31st March, 2013.

Annexed to this circular is the revised working example of the operations of 20:80 scheme based on the changes announced in this circular.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 132 dated 21st May, 2014 Export of Goods – Long Term Export Advances

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Presently, an exporter has to obtain prior permission of RBI for receipt of advance where the export agreement provides for shipment of goods extending beyond the period of one year from the date of receipt of advance payment. Also, banks have been authorised to permit exporters to receive advance payment for export of goods which can take more than one year to manufacture and ship if the ‘export agreement’ provides for the same.

This circular authorises banks to permit exporters who have a minimum of 3 years satisfactory track record to receive long term export advance up to a maximum tenor of 10 years. This advance has to be utilised for execution of long term supply contracts for export of goods and is subject to the following conditions: –

a) Firm irrevocable supply orders should be in place. The contract with the overseas party / buyer must be vetted and it must clearly specify the nature, amount and delivery timelines of products over the years and penalty in case of nonperformance or contract cancellation. Also, product pricing must be in consonance with prevailing international prices.
b) The company should have the capacity, systems and processes in place to ensure that the orders over the duration of the said tenure can actually be executed.
c) The company must not have come under the adverse notice of Enforcement Directorate or any such regulatory agency or must not be caution listed.
d) Such advances must be adjusted through future exports.
e) The rate of interest payable on such advance, if any, must not exceed LlBOR plus 200 basis points.
f) Documents must be routed through one bank only.
g) Bank have to ensure compliance with AML/KYC guidelines and also undertake due diligence of the overseas buyer to ensure that it has good stand-in/soundtrack record.
h) Such export advances must not be used to liquidate Rupee loans, which are classified as NPA as per the RBI asset classification norms.
i) Double financing for working capital for execution of export orders must be avoided.
j) Receipt of advance of $ 100 million or more must be immediately reported to the Trade Division, Foreign Exchange Department, RBI, Central Office, 5th Floor, Amar Building, Mumbai under copy to the concerned Regional Office of RBI as per the format given in Annex – I to this circular.

Banks, if required, can issue bank guarantee (BG)/Stand by Letter of Credit (SBLC) for export performance, subject to the following guidelines:
a) Issuance of BG/SBLC, being a non-funded exposure, must be rigorously evaluated as any other credit proposal and such facility must be extended only for guaranteeing export performance.
b) BG/SBLC must be issued for a term not exceeding two years at a time and further rollover of not more than two years at a time is permitted, and is subject to satisfaction of relative export performance as per the contract.
c) BG/SBLC must cover only the advance on reducing balance basis.
d) BG/SBLC issued from India in favour of overseas buyer cannot be discounted by the overseas branch / subsidiary of bank in India.
e) Banks must duly evaluate and monitor the progress made by the exporter on utilisation of the advance and submit an Annual Progress Report to the Trade Division, Foreign Exchange Department, RBI, Central Office, 5th Floor, Amar Building, Mumbai under copy to the concerned Regional Office of RBI in format given in Annex – II to this circular within a month from the close of each financial year.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 131 dated 19th May, 2014Notification No. FEMA.299/2014-RB dated 24th March, 2014

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Overseas Direct Investments – Limited Liability Partnership (LL P) as Indian Party

This circular states that a Limited Liability Partnership (LLP), registered under the Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008 (6 of 2009), has been notified as an “Indian Party” under Clause (k) of Regulation 2 of Notification No. FEMA.120/RB-2004 dated 7th July, 2004. As a result, with effect from 7th May, 2014, an LLP is permitted to undertake financial commitment to / on behalf of a JV / WOS abroad.

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Postal ballot, e-voting and meetings – Bombay High Court rules on the 2013 Act

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Background and scope of the decision
Barely
have some provisions of the Companies Act, 2013, (“the 2013 Act”) come
into force that one provision has already come under scrutiny of a High
Court (In Re Godrej Industries Limited, dated 8th May, 2014). The
context, and quite possibly the scope and binding nature of the
decision, is in regard to schemes of amalgamation. However, even if one
takes the statements of the Court as observations, they do need
consideration in a wider context.

Some related issues have also
been discussed by the Court. Some aspects have been ruled on, some
issues have been flagged for further information or debate and some
issues would be considered later for ruling.

The issues raised
relate to certain important measures under the law that help wider
shareholder participation in decision making, viz., postal ballot and
e-voting. Postal ballot has been in place for several years now and the
2013 Act has extended its reach and nature. Further, yet another similar
measure suited to the digital age, e-voting, has been mandated with
even wider scope. Indeed, e-voting is now required with immediate effect
and applies to all matters except a specified few. Before we go
further, let us recapitulate what these two concepts are.

Postal Ballot and e-voting
Postal
ballot was introduced by the Companies (Amendment) Act, 2000 through a
new section 192A. The section, along with Rules made pursuant thereto,
provided for voting by post in respect of specified matters. The Company
would send voting papers to shareholders by post. The ballots received
from shareholders would be reviewed by a scrutineer who would report on
the votes. The law mandated that certain specified matters should be
decided only by postal ballot. Further, the Company could also use, at
its option, the postal ballot method for any other matters except
certain specified matters (e.g., approval of accounts, etc.) that could
be approved only at a shareholders’ meeting. For matters approved by
postal ballot, a further shareholders meeting was not required.

The
2013 Act extended this concept further to e-voting. E-voting is
mandatory for listed companies and other companies having at least one
thousand shareholders. In e-voting, the shareholders can exercise their
votes electronically through internet in the prescribed manner. The
advantage was that, like postal ballot, the shareholder need not attend a
shareholders meeting but instead vote through the internet. However, in case of e-voting, unlike postal ballot, the meeting would still have to take place.
Thus, those who have not voted through e-voting could participate and
cast their votes at the meeting. As the law stands, those who have
already cast their votes through e-voting would not in the normal course
participate again at the meeting. Further, since the law provides that
the e-voting ends 3 days prior to the meeting, e-voting at the meeting
was not possible.

The law requires that all matters, except a
specified few, should require facility of e-voting. Since this provision
has come into force immediately, all forthcoming annual general
meetings in 2014 would have to provide for e-voting. Considering that
the court decision being discussed herein mandates certain changes to
the e-voting procedure, it has important and immediate relevance.

Court decision – context and issues
The
matter before the Court was a scheme of amalgamation. Such schemes
require meetings of shareholders/creditors in a manner as directed by
the Court. The counsel for the amalgamating companies prayed to the
court that the resolutions be allowed to be passed by postal ballot
instead of meetings being called for that purpose. Here, it may be added
that while this article focuses on the provisions of the 2013 Act, the
amended Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement providing for corporate
governance requirements also mandates for e-voting. Thus, this decision
will apply to such requirement too.

The Court examined the
concept of postal ballot, e-voting and related issues. In particular,
the Court examined the very concept and purpose of meetings and whether
postal ballot/e-voting that essentially eliminate or substantially
reduce the requirement of holding meetings went against the spirit of
shareholder democracy and participation. These and related issues were
discussed by the Court.

Whether new rules have come into force?

A
transitional issue raised by the Court was whether the new Rules
relating to e-voting etc. have come into force. The Court noted that
while the Rules were signed by the concerned authority and also posted
on the website, the prescribed and time tested procedure of publishing
them in the official gazette was not, as per the information available
to the Court, carried out. Hence, the question was whether the rules
were indeed in force. Since numerous rules were prescribed at the same
time, this concern applies to all.

However, it appears that the
department has duly released the gazetted notifications. Hence, this
issue raised by the Court ought not to remain a cause of concern for
current validity of the provisions.

Whether postal ballot/e-voting has benefits

The
Court explained the nature and purpose of such methods of voting. It
noted that considering the fact that many meetings were held at far off
places and for other reasons, shareholders could not attend, participate
and vote at such meetings. Thus, postal ballot and e-voting would help
shareholders at least participate in the voting. Hence, these methods
were laudable.

Whether postal ballot/e-voting can substitute shareholders’ meetings?
This
is the fundamental issue that the Court raised. It noted that voting by
such methods eliminated substantially the need of shareholders meetings
and interaction essential for shareholder democracy. Postal ballot
totally eliminated even the requirement of such meetings. E-voting would
result in lower shareholder participation since shareholders who have
already voted would not attend. The Court therefore expressed a view
that, firstly, that holding of shareholders’ meetings was a must. In the
matter before it, it had discretion whether or not to allow voting by
postal ballot that would eliminate the need of a meeting. The Court thus
rejected such request.

The Court observed, :-
“We must remember that at the heart of corporate governance lies transparency and a well-established principle of indoor democracy that gives shareholders qualified, yet definite and vital rights in matters relating to the functioning of the company in which they hold equity. Principal among these, to my mind, is not merely a right to vote on any particular item of business, so much as the right to use the vote as an expression of an informed decision. That necessarily means that the shareholder has an inalienable right to ask questions, seek clarifications and receive responses before he decides which way he will vote. It may often happen that a shareholder is undecided on any particular item of business. At a meeting of shareholders, he may, on hearing a fellow shareholder who raises a question, or on hearing an explanation from a director, finally make up his mind. In other cases, he may hold strong views and may desire to convince others of his convictions. This may be in relation to matters that are not immediately obvious to the shareholder merely on receipt of written information or a notice. The right to persuade and the right to be persuaded are, as I see it, of vital importance. In an effort for greater inclusiveness, these rights cannot be altogether defenestrated. To say, therefore, that no meeting is required and that the shareholder must cast his vote only on the basis of the information that has been send to him by post or email seems to me to be completely contrary to the legislative intent and spirit to the express terms of the SEBI circular and amended Listing Agreement’s Clauses 35B and 49.” (emphasis here, and elsewhere in this article, is supplied)

The Court also noted that apart from merely deciding on whether to vote for and against, a meeting could even modify the agenda, if the discussion led to a conclusion that such changes are necessary.

WHETHER e-VOTING SHOULD BE ALLOWED AT THE MEETING ALSO ?
The Court then considered how to combine the advantage of remote voting such as through postal ballot/e-voting and the benefits of discussions at a meeting. The Court stated that e-voting was a good concept. However, it explained the nature and need of shareholder participation and stated that even those who had already cast their votes through e-voting should be allowed to participate in the meeting since they would be able to explain their views on the matters. Considering that they had already voted, the question of their voting again would not arise. The rest of the shareholders who are present at the meeting should be allowed to vote by e-voting. In view of this, the e-voting would have to be extended till the date of the meeting. Thus, the requirement under law to conclude the e-voting three days prior to the meeting would not hold good.It observed:

“Electronic voting is a method by which the votes  cast by a large number of shareholders could be more accurately ascertained. That does not mean that electronic voting cannot be permitted at the meeting itself. A shareholder at a remote location and a shareholder at a meeting will both be required to use the same portal to cast their votes. This necessitates a single integrated electronic system for voting. This is technologically feasible and, indeed, essential. It cannot be that at the meeting that there be no voting or poll, and that electronic votes or postal ballots cast earlier would be determinative. Those who vote by postal ballot or by electronic voting cannot, of course, be permitted to vote again at a meeting. But they also cannot be restrained from attending that meeting. A shareholder may hold strong views. He may vote by postal ballot or electronic means and then attend the meeting to persuade others. Other shareholders may be undecided and may prefer to attend the meeting. Greater inclusiveness demands the provision of greater facilities, not less; and certainly not the apparent giving of one ‘facility’ while taking away a right. There is no reason why members attending a meeting should not be allowed to use a bank of computers to digitally cast their votes just as they might do if they were voting from a remote location.

20.    There is also a question about the determination of electronic votes cast. The rules seem to indicate that electronic voting must stop three days before the meeting. The Chairman of the meeting  is to be given a tally of the electronic votes cast and the decision on any item of business is supposed to have been passed or not passed only on the basis of these electronic votes. Ex-facie, this is an untenable mechanism. If, as I have said, electronic voting is not limited to voting from a remote location but must also include electronic voting at the meeting in addition to postal ballots received, then it is a sum total of all these votes that must be taken into account.

21.    This means that while a meeting must be held, provision must also be made for electronic voting at the meeting by those shareholders who desire it. Every shareholder being given that option of exercising their votes by postal ballot or by electronic voting, the latter being either from a remote location or at the meeting itself.”

Thus, the Court held that in case of e-voting/postal ballot, a meeting must be held and at such meeting, the shareholders who have not voted should be given an opportunity to vote. Further, those who have voted could also be present and participate and persuade others.

WHETHER POSTAL BALLOT WITHOUT MEETINGS SHOULD BE ALLOWED?

The Court questioned the law which said that if a matter is decided by postal ballot, a meeting for considering such matter is not required. The Court felt that this interfered with a fundamental concept of having a meeting of the shareholders to discuss on an issue. It noted that apart from the matters mandatorily required to be decided by postal ballot, except a specified few, all the rest could also be at the option of the company be decided by postal ballot. It stated that this matter required further consideration before an appropriate bench of the Court and concerned parties may be given a hearing to express their views. It observed:

“On  a  prima  facie  view  that  the  elimination   of all shareholder participation at an actual meeting is anathema to some of the most vital of shareholders’ rights, it is strongly recommended that till this issue is fully heard and decided, no authority or any company should insist upon such a postal-ballot-only meeting to the exclusion of an actual meeting. Since this is evidently a matter of some importance, the Company Registrar is directed to make a submission and obtain necessary directions on the administrative side to have the matter placed before an appropriate Bench.”

CONCLUSION
It may be emphasised that the decision arose out of a petition for approval of a Scheme of amalgamation and hence the observations arguably have a limited scope and  context.  In  any  case,  except  for  limited matters, the Court has not given final  decision.  Nevertheless, the decision would need consideration for forthcoming shareholders meetings and e-voting. Further, one would have to note what are the further developments when this matter is finally heard and the larger issue of postal ballot and e-voting is decided.

Part D: Ethics & Governance

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M.J. Akbar Writes:
For BJP, the central message of 2014 has two principle elements: a credible promise to lift India’s economy out of the doldrums of paralysis; and the assurance that t will be an inclusive force that reaches out to all segments of the nation. This is the necessary evolution from popularity to governance. Popularity is possible from negative factors, like rage against an existing establishment; but governance is fashioned by a positive agenda. You are elected by most of the people; you rule for all the people.

Governance now comes with an adjective: stable. Non- BJP fronts have collapsed before construction. And when stand-alone Arvind Kejriwal threatens to send journalists to jail, and denies his remarks despite video evidence, then he has lost composure because he is losing support.

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Part A Orders of the Supreme & CIC

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Sections 2 (f) and 6 of the RTI Act:

Petitioner
filed an application u/s. 6 of the RTI Act before the Administrative
Officer-cum-Assistant State Public Information Officer (respondent no.1)
seeking information to the queries mentioned therein. The said
application was rejected by the PIO. An appeal against the said order
was dismissed by the First Appellate Authority. Second Appeal against
the said order was also dismissed by the Andhra Pradesh State
Information Commission vide order dated 20-11-2007. The petitioner
challenged the said order before the High Court. The Writ Petition had
been dismissed by the High Court on the grounds that the information
sought by the petitioner cannot be asked for under the RT I Act. Thus,
the application was not maintainable. More so, the judicial officers are
protected by the Judicial Officers’ Protection Act, 1850 (hereinafter
called the “Act 1850”). Hence, this petition.

Mr. V. Kanagaraj
learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that
right to information is a fundamental right of every citizen. The RT I
Act does not provide for any special protection to udges. The petitioner
has the right to know the reasons as to how Respondent no. 4 (the
Appellate Court) has decided his appeal in a particular manner.
Therefore, the application filed by the petitioner was maintainable.
Rejection of the application by Respondent no. 1 and Appellate
Authorities rendered the petitioner remediless. Petitioner vide
application dated 15-11-2006 had asked as under what circumstances
Respondent no. 4 ignored the written arguments and additional written
arguments, as the ignorance of the same was tantamount to judicial
dishonesty.

It was noted that the petitioner has not challenged
the order passed by Respondent no. 4. Instead, he had filed the
application u/s. 6 of RT I Act to know why and for what reasons
Respondent no. 4 had come to a particular conclusion which was against
the petitioner. The nature of the questions posed in the application
were to the effect why and for what reason Respondent no. 4 omitted to
examine certain documents and why he came to such a conclusion.

The
definition of ‘information’ u/s. 2(f) of the RTI Act shows that an
applicant u/s. 6 of the RT I Act can get any information which is
already in existence and accessible to the public authority under law.
Of course, under the RT I Act an applicant is entitled to get a copy of
the opinions, advices, circulars, orders etc., but he cannot ask for any
information as to why such opinions, advices, circulars, orders etc.
have been passed especially in matters pertaining to judicial decisions.
A judge speaks through his judgments or orders passed by him. If any
party feels aggrieved by the order/judgment passed by a judge, the
remedy available to such a party is either to challenge the same by way
of appeal or by revision or any other legally permissible mode. No
litigant can be allowed to seek information as to why and for what
reasons the judge had come to a particular decision or conclusion. A
judge is not bound to explain later on for what reasons he had come to
such a conclusion.

Moreover, in the instant case, the petitioner
submitted his application u/s. 6 of the RT I Act before the
Administrative Officer-cum-Assistant State Public Information Officer
seeking information in respect of the questions raised in his
application. However, the Public Information officer is not suppose to
have any material which is not before him; or any information he could
have obtained under the law. Under section 6 of RT I Act, an applicant
is entitled to get only such information which can be accessed by the
“public authority” under any other law for the time being in force. The
answers sought by the petitioner in the application could not have been
with the public authority nor could he have had access to this
information and Respondent no. 4 was not obliged to give any reasons as
to why he had taken such a decision in the matter which was before him. A
judge cannot be expected to give reasons other than those that have
been enumerated in the judgment or order. The application filed by the
petitioner before public authority is per se illegal and unwarranted. A
judicial officer is entitled to get protection and the object of the
same is not to protect malicious or corrupt judges, but to protect the
public from the dangers to which the administration of justice would be
exposed if the concerned judicial officers were subject to inquiry as to
malice, or to litigation with those whom their decisions might offend.
If anything is done contrary to this, it would certainly affect the
independence of the judiciary. A judge should be free to make
independent decisions.

The Supreme Court held that as the
petitioner has misused the provisions of the RT I Act, the High Court
had rightly dismissed the writ petition.

[Khanapuram Gandaiah vs. Administrative Officer & Ors: SLP (civil) No. 34868 of 2009.]

Section 8 (1) (j)
Vide RT I dated 17-05-2012 the appellant had sought information on 7 points.

PIO vide letter dated 12-06-2012 denied information stating that the same is exempt u/s. 8 (1) (e) (g) and (j) of the RT I Act.

First
Appellate Authority (FAA) vide order dated 06- 08-2012 provided Place
of birth as per service records sought at query no. 4 and other details
as sought at query no 5 and 6.

Remaining information was denied stating that the same is personal information and exempted u/s. 8 (1) (j) of the RT I Act.

Aggrieved
with the decision of FAA, the appellant filed second appeal to Central
Information Commission on 21-08-2012 citing that Shri Ajit Kumar has
submitted fake caste certificate for seeking appointment.

CIC
vide order dated 27-12-2012 dismissed the appeal stating that personal
Information can be disclosed only in the larger public interest and
appellant has not established any such interest.

The appellant
filed Writ Petition No. W P 080 of 2013 in the High Court of Calcutta
(Circuit Bench at Port Blair). The Honorable High Court remitted the
matter to CIC with directions to decide the appeal afresh.

To
decide the matter under the application, the Chief Information
Commissioner constituted a 3 member bench of following Commissioners A)
Shri Rajiv Mathur B) Shri Basant Seth C ) Smt Manjula Prasher.

The
appellant submitted that Shri Ajit Kumar (third party) has obtained
appointment under reserve category by submitting false caste
certificate. On being asked by the Commission as to the evidence he has
to prove the same, he replied that he has information from official
sources.

Shri Ajit Kumar, the third party, submitted that he is
recruited under general category and had not submitted any caste
certificate to his employer. He also submitted that the appellant had
been harassing him and none of his personal information should not be
provided to him.

The CPIO submitted that Shri Ajit Kumar is
appointed under general category and no caste certificate has been
submitted by him. A notice was sent to Shri R. Ajit Kumar under
provisions of section 11(1) of RT I Act. In his response he objected to
furnishing any personal information related to him and also stated that
there is threat to him. PIO also stated that the appellant is habitual
information seeker and filed RTIs against many employees and
blackmailing them.

Ms. Tamali Biswas, advocate on behalf of
public authority, stated that the fact of employment of Shri R. Ajit
Kumar under unreserved category and non-availability of caste
certificate was brought to the notice of Hon’ble High Court also.

The appellant has submitted that decision may be taken on the basis of documents/records and justice be delivered in true spirit as per orders of the Hon’ble High Court of Calcutta (Circuit Bench At Port Blair).

Shri R. Ajit Kumar submitted that his appointment was under Unreserved Category and the appellant is seeking information to harass him .The appellant has a criminal background and is involved in a forgery case and the issue is sub judice. He has requested that his personal information should not be provided to the appellant.

The public authority has submitted that the appellant is  a retired employee of their yard and was involved in two criminal cases for forgery. He is misusing the RTI Act against NSRY and its employees. Shri Ajit Kumar was appointed under Unreserved Category and copy of recruitment letter is enclosed with the submissions. A notice was sent to third party by them who responded stating that it is an unwarranted invasion of privacy and perpetuation of biased campaign of maligning his professional image as well as disturbing the personal peace and also seems to be an act of personal vendetta.

DECISION
•    “The Commission observes that Shri R. Ajit Kumar has been appointed under unreserved category, hence the plea of getting employment by submitting forged caste certificate does not have any merit and the contention that disclosure sought is in public interest fails”.

•    “In Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, Volume 4 (IV Edition),‘Public Interest’ is defined as: “ a matter of public or general interest does not mean that which is interesting as gratifying curiosity or love of information or amusement but that in which a class of community have a pecuniary interest, or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected.”

•    “The appellant has made mere conjectures and surmises and not able to give any cogent and sound evidence to prove the element of ‘Public Interest.’

•    Commission quoted the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its decision dated 13-12-2012 in the case of Bihar Public Service Commission vs. Saiyed Hussain Abbas Rizwi & Anr:

23.    The expression ‘public interest’ has to be understood in its true connotation so as to give complete meaning to the relevant provisions of the Act.

The expression ‘public interest’ must be viewed in its strict sense with all its exceptions so as to justify denial of a statutory exemption in terms of the Act. In its common parlance, the expression ‘public interest’, like ‘public purpose’, is not capable of any precise definition. It does not have a rigid meaning, is elastic and takes its colour from the statute in which it occurs, the concept varying with time and state of society and its needs. [State of Bihar vs. Kameshwar Singh (AIR 1952 SC 252)]. It also means the general welfare of the public that warrants recommendation and protection; something in which the public as a whole has a stake [Black’s Law Dictionary (Eighth Edition)].

24.    The satisfaction has to be arrived at by the authorities objectively and the consequences of such disclosure have to be weighed with regard to circumstances of a given case. The decision has to be based on objective satisfaction recorded for ensuring that larger public interest outweighs unwarranted invasion of privacy or other factors stated in the provision.

Certain matters, particularly in relation to appointment, are required to be dealt with great confidentiality. The information may come to knowledge of the authority as a result of disclosure by others who give that information in confidence and with complete faith, integrity and fidelity. Secrecy of such information shall be maintained, thus, bringing it within the ambit of fiduciary capacity. Similarly, there may be cases where the disclosure has no relation- ship to any public activity or interest or it may even cause unwarranted invasion of privacy of the individual. All these protections have to be given their due implementation as they spring from statutory exemptions. It is not a decision simpliciter between private interest and public interest. It is a matter where a constitutional protection is available to a person with regard to the right to privacy. Thus, the public interest has to be construed while keeping in mind the balance factor between right to privacy and right to information with the purpose sought to be achieved and the purpose that would be served in the larger public interest, particularly when both these rights emerge from the constitutional values under the Constitution of India.”

•    The Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in its judgement dated 05-02-2014 (Shail Sahni vs. Sanjeev Kumar & Others ) have observed:

“… This Court is also of the view that misuse of the RTI Act has to be appropriately dealt with, otherwise the public would lose faith and confidence in this “Sunshine Act”. A beneficial Statute, when made a tool for mischief and abuse must be checked in accordance with law…”

•    Keeping in view above, the Commission held that the information sought by the appellant is personal information of Shri R Ajit Kumar and protected from disclosure U/S 8 (1) (j) of RTI Act as no larger public interest is established.

[Ch. Rama Krishna Rao vs. Naval Ship Yard, Port Blair, (Third Party: Shri R. Ajit Kumar) Decided by the full bench on 05-05-2014. File No. CIC/LS/A/2012/002430/RM.]

Sale of Goods Act, 1930

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Synopsis
This Article examines certain important element of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, an old Act which is very relevant even today for matters connected with trade and commerce. The Act also has use while interpreting certain other statutes.

Introduction
Trade is often said to be one of key drivers of an economy. The importance of trade can be gauged from the fact that the western world was constantly asking India to open its doors to foreign investment in retail trading. When trade is such a vital constituent of a country’s economy it is essential that we understand the laws governing trade. The sale of goods in India is governed by the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 (“the Act”). While the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 applies to the transfer of immovable property, the Sale of Goods Act applies to the sale of certain movable property, being goods. This Act was earlier a part of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. However, in 1930 it was felt that there is a need for a separate dedicated legislation and hence, a separate Act was carved out. Let us examine some of the key facets of this Act.

Goods
The pivot of the Act is the definition of the term “goods”. If a particular property cannot be termed as goods then the Act does not apply to the same. This definition is also relevant since certain other Acts also refer to this definition, since what constitutes goods is often relevant for several issues.

Goods are defined under the Act to mean every kind of movable property. It includes stock and shares, growing crops, grass and things attached to or forming part of the land which are agreed to be severed before sale or under the contract of sale. However, actionable claims and money are not goods. Thus, the definition is very wide to include all types of movable property other than what is expressly excluded. According to the General Clauses Act, 1897, things attached to or forming part of the land are treated as immovable property. However, the Sale of Goods Act states if they have been agreed to be severed before or under the Contract of sale, then they become goods. Since the definition revolves around movable property it also becomes essential to understand what constitutes movable and what is immovable property. Sale of immovable property is governed by the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and this Act applies to the sale of movable property.

The following three landmark decisions of the Supreme Court dealing with what is immovable property are very relevant:

(A) T he Supreme Court in Sirpur Paper Mills (1998) 1 SCC 400 while examining whether or not a paper plant was an immovable property, held that the whole purpose behind attaching the machine to a concrete base was to prevent wobbling of the machine and to secure maximum operational efficiency and also for safety. It further held that paper-making machine was saleable as such by simply removing the machinery from its base. Hence, the machinery assembled and erected at its factory site was not an immovable property because it was not something attached to the earth like a building or a tree. The test laid down was, whether the machine can be sold in the market. Just because the plant and machinery is fixed in the earth for better functioning, it would not automatically become an immovable property.

(B) Further, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Duncan’s Industries Limited vs. State Of U. P. (2000) 1 SCC 633, dealing with a fertiliser plant, is also relevant in determining what is movable and what is immovable. In this case, the Supreme Court distinguished the Sirpur’s case and held that whether a machinery which is embedded in the earth is a movable property or an immovable property, depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Primarily, the court will have to take into consideration the intention of the party when it decided to embed the machinery: the key question is, whether such embedment was intended to be temporary or permanent ? If the machineries which have been embedded in the earth permanently with a view to utilising the same as a plant, e.g., to operate a fertilizer plant, and the same was not embedded to be dismantled and removed for the purpose of sale as a machinery at any point of time, then it should be treated as an immovable property. It was held that it could be said that the plant and machinery could have been transferred by delivery of possession on any date prior to the date of conveyance of the title to the land.

(C) In the case of Triveni Engineering & Indus. Ltd., 2000 (120) ELT 273 (SC), the Court held that a mono vertical crystalliser, which had to be assembled, erected and attached to the earth by a foundation at the site of the sugar factory was not capable of being sold as it is, without anything more. Hence, the plant was not a movable property.

The Central Board of Excise and Customs has, under the Central Excise Act 1944, after considering several Supreme Court decisions (including those mentioned above), clarified that:

(A) if items assembled or erected at site and attached by foundation to the earth cannot be dismantled without substantial damages to components and thus cannot be reassembled, then the items would not be considered as movables.

(B) If any goods installed at site (e.g., paper-making machine) are capable of being sold or shifted as such after removal from the base and without dismantling into its components/parts, the goods would be considered to be movable. If the goods, though capable of being sold or shifted without dismantling, are actually dismantled into their components/parts for ease of transportation etc., they will not cease to be movable merely because they are transported in dismantled condition.

In the context of sales tax, the Supreme Court in the case of Tata Consultancy Services Ltd vs. State of AP (2005) 1 SCC 308, has held that software, even though intangible, is goods.

Shares and stock are expressly included in the definition of goods. The Companies Act also states that shares in a company shall be movable property. However, a debenture does not constitute movable property as held by the Supreme Court in the case of RD Goyal vs. Reliance Industries Ltd, (2003) 1 SCC 81.

Actionable claims are governed by section 130 of the Transfer of Property Act and are hence, outside the purview of this Act.

The goods may be existing or future goods which would come into the seller’s possession. If however, the goods are specific, i.e., are identified when the agreement is made and they perish thereafter, the agreement becomes void. However, they must perish due to no fault of the seller or buyer.

Sale
The next vital cog in the wheel is the definition of “sale”. Section 4 of the Act defines a contract of sale of goods as:

(a) A contract. Thus, all the elements of a valid contract as laid down in the Indian Contract Act, 1872 must be fulfilled.
(b) In which there is a seller, i.e., a person who sells or agrees to sell goods;
(b) H e transfers or agrees to transfer property in goods;
(c) The transfer is to a buyer, i.e., a person who sells or agrees to buy goods; and
(d) The transfer is for a price.

Thus, the pre-requisite of a sale is the transfer of movable property being goods. This view has also been expressed in State of Madras vs. Gannon Dunkerley & Co., (1959) SCR 379 – “sale of goods …. is a nomen juris, its essential ingredients being an agreement to sell movables for a price and property passing therein pursuant to that agreement.” Halsbury defines a sale as “the transfer by mutual consent of the ownership of a thing from one person to another for a money price.”

The contract may be absolute or conditional. If property in goods is transferred from seller to buyer,  then such    a contract becomes a sale. However, if property is transferred in future or is conditional, then such a contract is termed as an agreement to sell. Eventually, when the conditions are fulfilled or the time period elapses, an agreement to sell becomes a sale. The principles of a sale have been succinctly summed up by the Apex Court in the case of State of Tamil Nadu vs. Sri Srinivasa Sales Circulation, (1996) 10 SCC 648 as follows:

“…in order to constitute a sale under the Sale of Goods Act, it is essential to establish that there is an agreement between the parties for transfer of title    to the goods and that such agreement should be supported by money consideration and as a result of the transactions the goods. article or the property must actually pass to the purchaser. It is settled law that the expression “sale” under the Sales Tax Act has to be understood with reference to the definition of “sale of goods” under the Sale of Goods Act. But if the title of the goods passes without any contract between the parties, express or implied, there is no sale. Similarly if the consideration of the transfer is not money, but some other valuable consideration, it may amount to exchange or barter but not a sale in the strict sense of the law..”

The most vital part of the definition is that the title of goods must pass from the seller to the buyer.

PRICE
A sale of goods under the Act is always for a price, i.e., for a money consideration. A price is an essential element of a contract of sale of goods. If there is no price there   is no contract. This is also an essential ingredient under the Contract Law. Hence, a sale of goods as understood under the Act cannot be for a barter or for any non- monetary consideration. Such a transaction  would  be an exchange and not a sale. This is a very important fundamental distinction which is relevant even for several fiscal statutes. The Transfer of Property Act defines an exchange on the other hand, to mean a mutual transfer of the ownership of one thing for the ownership of another thing and neither thing nor both thing being money only. As opposed to a sale transaction, the fundamental difference is the absence of money as consideration. The distinction between a sale and an exchange transaction has been very succinctly brought out by three Supreme Court decisions under the Income-tax Act, CIT vs. Ramakrishna Pillai (R.R.), 66 ITR 725 (SC); CIT vs. Motors and General Stores (P.) Ltd., 66 ITR 692 (SC); CIT vs. B. M. Kharwar 72 ITR 603 (SC). Recently, the Bombay High Court in Bharat Bijlee Ltd. [TS-270-HC-2014(BOM)], distinguished a slump exchange from a slump sale and held that a slump exchange does not entail capital gains tax.

The price may be either fixed by the contract or left to the negotiation of the parties or may be fixed as agreed upon. However, in the absence of the above, the buyer must pay a reasonable price. What is a reasonable price depends upon the facts of each case. In some cases, the price determination is to be decided by the valuation of  a third party. If such third party cannot fix the value, then agreement is avoided.

TRANSFER OF PROPERTY IN GOODS
When the property in the goods is transferred from the seller to the buyer is the most important effect of a contract for sale of goods.

Unascertained Goods: If the goods are unascertained, then property passes only when they are ascertained. E.g., the seller agrees to sell 50 kgs. of rice but at that time he has 250 kgs. in his warehouse. No property passes to buyer until the seller identifies and appropriates 50 kgs. of rice towards this agreement. Thus, there must be a clear-cut identification as to which goods out of the generic mass are towards satisfaction of the contract.

Where there is a contract for the sale of unascertained / future goods by description and goods of that description and in a deliverable state are unconditionally appropriated to the contract the property in the goods passes to the buyer. Such assent may be expressed or implied, and may be given either before or after the appropriation      is made. Thus, an appropriation must be made by the seller or the buyer and only then would the property in such unascertained goods pass to the buyer. Further, the appropriation of unascertained goods must be unconditional. Till property passes there is no sale.

E.g., in Emperor vs. Kuverji Kavasji, 1941 43 BLR 95, a merchant agreed to sell 20 litres of liquor out of a cask containing 100 litres. It was held that until the 20 litres are separated or bottled, the property does not pass to the buyer.

The Supreme Court in the cases of New India Sugar Mills Ltd vs. CST, 1963 AIR 1207, CST vs. Husenali Adamji & Co., 1959 AIR 887, M/s. Carona Sahu Ltd vs. State, 1966 AIR SC 1153 has held that in case of sale of unascertained goods, no property is transferred to the buyer unless and until the goods are ascertained and there is unconditional appropriation of the goods in a deliverable state.

Ascertained Goods: However, if they are ascertained / specific, then property passes in accordance with the contract, i.e., when the parties want it to pass. In this respect, section 2(2) of the Act is also relevant. It defines the term delivery to mean a “voluntary transfer of possession from one person to another”. Thus, delivery of goods is one of the ways in which possession can be transferred.

Section 30 of the Act provides that a seller need not have actual physical possession of the goods sold. It is enough that he has control over the goods by making over a document of title to the goods. Possession of documents of title enable the holder of document to transfer the goods. Section 30 does not require the seller to be in actual physical possession of goods – Pramatha Nath Talukdar vs. Maharaja P M Tagore, AIR 1966 Cal 405. This view has also been laid down in Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd Edition Vol. 34 @ p.84 and in the English case of Nicholson vs. Harper, (1895) 2 Ch. D. 415. Unless a different intention arises from the contract, the following three rules have been laid down under the Act to determine the intention of the parties as to when the property passes to the buyer:

(a)    When contract is for sale of specific goods in a deliverable state, property passes to buyer when contract is made, irrespective of whether time of payment or delivery is postponed.
(b)    However, when under a contract for specific goods and the seller has to do something to the goods for putting them in a deliverable state, then property passes only when such thing is done and the buyer is given notice of the same. E.g., a 2nd hand car dealer agrees to sell a car but it needs certain repairs before it can run properly. Property passes only once the repairs are done and the buyer is intimated about the same.
(c)    When contract is for sale of specific goods in a deliverable state but seller has to weigh, measure, test or do some act for ascertaining the price, the property passes to buyer when such act is done and buyer is given notice of the same. E.g., a seller sells cotton at a price per ton. To ascertain the price, he needs to weigh the cotton. Till such act is done, property does not pass.

It is essential to determine when property passes because if there is any damage or loss to the goods then the same would be borne by the seller in cases where property has not yet passed to the buyer. The Act provides that unless the contract provides otherwise, the goods remain at the seller’s risk till property passes to the buyer. However, where the property has passed risk passes to the buyer even if the delivery has not yet been made. E.g., a seller sells a certain vase to a buyer but both payment and delivery are postponed till the next day. Before delivery can be effected, the vase breaks due to mishandling. The loss is to the buyer’s account since property of specific goods in a deliverable state under an unconditional contract passes immediately even if delivery is postponed. But when delivery is delayed due to the fault of any one party, the risk of loss is to his account.

NEMO DAT QUAD NON HABET
‘No one can give a better title than what he himself has’ is the meaning of the above Latin maxim. Thus, a sale by a person who is not the legal owner of the goods does not give any title to the buyer. The actual owner can recover possession of the goods from the buyer without compensating him. However, if the seller has authority  of the owner; he is an authorised mercantile agent (e.g., broker, factor); he is a joint owner, etc., then he can give a good title to the buyer.  Whether the buyer can raise   a plea of being a bona fide purchaser without notice is   a matter which depends upon the facts of each case – Sumitra Debi Jalan vs. Satya Narayan Prahladka, AIR 1965 Cal 355.

CONDITIONS AND WARRANTIES
A contract of sale may come with conditions and warranties as to the quality, fitness, title, etc. of the goods. A condition is a stipulation essential to the main purpose of the contract. If breached, the contract may be repudiated. A warranty on the other hand is collateral to the main purpose and a breach of the same gives rise to a claim for damages but not a right to repudiate the contract. Thus, sale of soft drinks with pesticides is a breach of a condition, i.e., it is fit for human consumption. However, sale of soft drinks in glass bottles instead of plastic bottles, as contracted, is a breach of a warranty. The former entitles the buyer to cancel the contract while under the latter the buyer can sue for damages.    It may not be always a cut and dried situation as to whether a stipulation is a condition or a warranty and the determination of the same depends upon the contract  as a whole. Even a Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) carries conditions and warranties from the seller as to the shares. Breach of material conditions can lead to cancellation of the SPA.

CAVEAT EMPTOR; QUI IGNORARE NON DEBUIT QUOD JUS ALIENUM EMIT
Let a purchaser beware; who ought not to be ignorant that he is purchasing the rights of another – buyer beware of what you buy for the seller has no obligation to caution you is the meaning of this maxim. Section16 of the Act lays down that subject to this Act and any other law in force, there is no implied condition or warranty as to the fitness or quality of the goods sold by a seller. This is a statutory recognition of the above maxim. The Supreme Court in Commissioner of Customs (Preventive) vs. M/s. Aafloat Textiles (I) P. Ltd. has explained the maxim as follows:

“….Caveat emptor means “Let the purchaser beware.” It is one of the settled maxims, applying to a purchaser who is bound by actual as well as constructive knowledge of any defect in the thing purchased, which is obvious, or which might have been known by proper diligence.

21.    “Caveat emptor does not mean either in law or in Latin that the buyer must take chances. It means that the buyer must take care.” (See Wallis vs. Russell (1902) 21 R 585, 615).

22.    “Caveat emptor is the ordinary rule in contract. A vendor is under no duty to communicate the existence even of latent defects in his wares unless by act or implication  he represents such defects not to exist.” (See William R. Anson, Principles of the Law of Contract 245 (Arthur L. Corbin Ed.3d. Am. ed.1919) Applying the maxim, it was held that it is the bounden duty of the purchaser to make all such necessary enquiries and to ascertain all the facts relating to the property to be purchased prior to committing in any manner.

23.    Caveat emptor, qui ignorare non debuit quod jus alienum emit. A maxim meaning “Let a purchaser beware; who ought not to be  ignorant  that  he  is  purchasing  the rights of another. Hob. 99; Broom; Co., Litl. 102 a: 3 Taunt. 439.

24.    As the maxim applies, with certain specific restrictions, not only to the quality of, but also to the title to, land which is sold, the purchaser is generally bound to view the land and to enquire after and inspect the title- deeds; at his peril if he does not.

25.    Upon a sale of goods the general rule with regard   to their nature or quality is caveat emptor, so that in the absence of fraud, the buyer has no remedy against the seller for any defect in the goods not covered by some condition or warranty, expressed or implied. It is beyond all doubt that, by the general rules of law there is no warranty of quality arising from the bare contract of sale of goods, and that where there has been no fraud, a buyer who has not obtained an express warranty, takes all risk of defect in the goods, unless there are circumstances beyond the mere fact of sale from which a warranty may be implied. (Bottomley vs. Bannister, [1932] 1 KB 458 : Ward v. Hobbs, 4 App Cas 13}. (Latin for Lawyers) 14

26.    No one ought in ignorance to buy that which is the right of another. The buyer according to the maxim has  to be cautious, as the risk is his and not that of the seller.

27.    Whether the buyer had made any enquiry as to the genuineness of the license within his special knowledge. He has to establish that he made enquiry and took requisite precautions to find out about the genuineness of the SIL* which he was purchasing. If he has not done that consequences have to follow.”

* SIL = Special Import Licence

However, the Law also provides for the following statutory exceptions to this Rule:

(a)    Where the buyer makes known to the seller that he requires goods for a particular purpose, then goods must meet such purpose.  In  Eternit  Everest  Ltd.  vs. Abraham, AIR 2003 Ker 273, it was held that corrugated asbestos sheets are mainly used for roofing of buildings for protecting the building from sun and rain and it is not being used for a variety of purposes. The leakproof of the asbestos sheet is the essential quality of the sheets and only if it is leakproof, it can be said to be fit for the purpose for which it is purchased.

(b)    Where goods are bought by description from a seller who deals in goods of that description, then there is an implied condition as to the merchantable quality  of the goods. In Agha Mirza Nasarali Khoyee & Co. vs. Gordon Woodroffe & Co., AIR 1937 Mad 40 it was held that goods are treated as being of merchantable quality if they are of such quality that any defects which a buyer of ordinary diligence and experience would have detected by due diligence in the use of  all ordinary and usual means (what is due diligence, depending upon the circumstances).

(c)    An implied warranty or condition as to quality or fitness for a purpose may be annexed by the usage of trade.

CONCLUSION
This is a very important mercantile Law which is relevant for commercial matters. It is essential for businesses to keep in mind the provisions of this Act while entering into contracts for sale and purchase of goods.

Will – Succession – Clause offending rule against perpetuity is invalid – Indian Succession Act, 1925, section 114.

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Asis Mitra vs. Sibani Dutta & Ors AIR 2014 Calcutta 126

In 1900, Baikuntha Nath Dutta had founded a “thakurbari.” He installed this deity and started worship. By his will dated 30-07-1916 various properties of the testator were dedicated to the above deity. Shebaits were appointed. Clause 5 of the Will dealt with the devolution of Shebaitship.

Many years had passed since the making of this dedication. The main question that was posed before the court was whether the stipulation in the Will and in the Codicil that Shebaitship would vest only in sons of the Shebaits was valid or not.

The issue in this case was in regard to the rule against perpetuity. The rule applied equally to transfer of property inter vivos as it did to transmission of property by succession. In this case those rules regarding transmission of property by succession were relevant. The owner of a property, while bequeathing it, could not postpone the vesting of the absolute legal and beneficial ownership thereof indefinitely. He could not fetter the powers of alienation, indefinitely.
Hence, if A is disposing of his property by Will or by creation of a trust, he cannot hold up its absolute vesting in some other person, for an uncertain period. Neither can he tie this person’s hands regarding alienation for an uncertain time.

If there was any further postponing of absolute legal and beneficial ownership of the property, the bequest or settlement was void as it violated the rule against perpetuity. The law against perpetuity did not favour, as observed earlier, tying up of property without its vesting, for an indefinite period of time.

The Indian Succession Act, 1925, section 114 enacts as follows:

“114. Rule against perpetuity. – No bequest is valid whereby the vesting of the thing bequeathed may be delayed beyond the life-time of one or more persons living at the testator’s death and the minority of some person who shall be in existence at the expiration of that period, and to whom, if he attains full age, the thing bequeathed is to belong.”

Hence, the Clause in the will devolving Shebaitship only on grandson and on death of grand sons to their sons violates the rule against perpetuity.

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Precedent – Doctrine of per incuriam and sub silentio – Constitution of India – Article 141

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Triveni Engineering & Industries Ltd vs. The State of Karnataka & Ors AIR 2014 Karnataka 75

The doctrines of per incuriam and sub silentio operate as exceptions to the rule of precedent. Incuriam literally means carelessness. In practice, per incuriam means per ignorantium. Doctrines of per incuriam and sub silentio have been taken recourse to by the courts for relieving from injustice perpetrated by unjust precedents. A decision which is not express and is not founded on reasons or consideration of the issue, could not be deemed to be a law declared having binding effect as is contemplated under Article 141 of the Constitution.

The doctrine of per incuriam has no application in a case to ignore the principle laid down after analysing the relevant provisions of law by a co-ordinate bench. The doctrine of per incuriam is resorted to when decisions are rendered without reference to statutory prescriptions or other binding authorities.

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Month – Month does not mean 30 days – Computation of six months period, Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, section 138.

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Rameshchandra Ambalal Joshi vs. State of Gujarat & Anr. AIR 2014 SCC 1554

While hearing on SLP against an order passed by the High Court in context of a complaint filed u/s. 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 the court was required to consider the meaning of term ‘months’.

Proviso (a) to section 138 provides that the cheque should be presented within six months from the date on which it is drawn. Word month has been defined u/s. 3(35) of General Clauses Act to mean a month reckoned as per British calendar. Period of six months cannot therefore be calculated on 30 days basis.

As regards computation of six months period section 9 of General Clauses Act has to be pressed in service proviso (a) to section 138 of the Act uses the expression “Six months from the date on which it is drawn.” Once the word “from” is used for the purpose of commencement of time, in view of section 9 of the General Clauses Act, the day on which the cheque is drawn has to be excluded and the last day within which such act needs to be done is to be included. In other words, six months period stipulated in section 138 would expire on day prior to the date in the corresponding month and in case no such day falls, the last day of the immediate previous month. For calculating period of six months for cheque drawn on 31-12-2005 the first day, i.e., 31-12-2005 has to be excluded and the period of six months will be reckoned from the next day i.e. from 01-01-2006; meaning thereby that according to the British calendar, the period of six months will expire at the end of the 30th day of June, 2006.

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Hindu Law – Devolution of property of male dying intestate: Hindu Succession Act, 1956, sections 8 and 10:

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Narinder Singh Rao vs. Air Vice Marshal Mahinder Singh Rao & Ors. (2013) 9 SCC 425

Rao
Gajraj Singh and his wife Sumitra Devi were occupiers of the suit
property. The property had been constructed somewhere in 1935 and as per
the municipal record, it belonged to Rao Gajraj Singh. A document was
executed by Rao Gajraj Singh to the effect that upon death of himself or
his wife, the suit property would be inherited by the survivor. The
said writing was attested by Rao Devender Singh, the son of Rao Gajraj
Singh’s real sister.

Rao Gajraj Singh expired on 29th March, 1981
and thereafter Sumitra Devi, who had eight children, started residing
at Ranchi with the Appellant. Somewhere in 1980s, Sumitra Devi had
constructed some shops in the suit premises and the said shops were
given on rent.

On 1st June, 1989, Sumitra Devi executed a Will
whereby she bequeathed the suit property to one of her sons, namely,
Narinder Singh Rao (the present Appellant and original Defendant No. 1)
and she expired on 6th June, 1989.

After the death of Sumitra
Devi, her four children, one of them being the present Respondent No. 1,
filed a suit for declaration claiming their right in the suit property.
Subsequently, the plaint was amended so as to make it a suit for
partition. According to the case of the said children, the Will was not
genuine and therefore, the said Will could not have been acted upon and
as Sumitra Devi was survived by eight children, the suit property would
be inherited by all the children. Thus, each child had a 1/8th share in
the suit property.

Even after the death of Rao Gajraj Singh, the
suit property continued to remain in his name because nobody had got the
property mutated in the names of his heirs/legal representatives after
his death. Upon the death of Rao Gajraj Singh, no mutation entry was
made in the Municipal Corporation records to show as to who had
inherited the property in question and the said property continued to
remain in the name of late Rao Gajraj Singh.

By virtue of the
Will executed by Sumitra Devi, whereby the property had been bequeathed
to the present Appellant, the Appellant claims complete ownership over
the suit property.

The Hon’ble Court observed that so far as
inheritance of the suit property by the present Appellant in pursuance
of the Will dated 1st June, 1989 executed by Sumitra Devi is concerned,
the Will was validly executed by Sumitra Devi, which had been attested
by two witnesses, one being an advocate and another being a medical
practitioner.

The next question which was to be considered by the
High Court was with regard to the ownership right of the suit property.
The property was in the name of Rao Gajraj Singh and no evidence of
whatsoever type was adduced to the effect that the property originally
belonged to Sumitra Devi. Thus, the findings that the suit property
belonged to Rao Gajraj Singh cannot be disturbed. As Rao Gajraj Singh
died intestate and was the owner of the property at the time of his
death, the suit property should have been inherited by his widow, namely
Sumitra Devi and his eight children in equal share, as per the
provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. In that view of the
matter, the High Court arrived at the conclusion that the suit property
would be inherited by all the nine heirs, i.e., Sumitra Devi and her
eight children and therefore, Sumitra Devi had inherited only 1/9th of
the right and interest in the suit property whereas 1/9th of the right
and interest in the suit property belonged to each child of Rao Gajraj
Singh.

Though the Will executed by Sumitra Devi has been treated
as a validly executed Will, Sumitra Devi, who had only 1/9th of the
right and interest in the suit property, could not have bequeathed more
than her interest in the suit property. If Sumitra Devi was not a
full-fledged owner of the suit property, she could not have bequeathed
the entire suit property to the present Appellant, Narinder Singh Rao,
who has claimed the entire property by virtue of the Will executed by
Sumitra Devi. At the most Sumitra Devi could have bequeathed her
interest in the property which was to the extent of 1/9th share in the
said property. So the High Court rightly came to the conclusion that the
1/9th share in the suit property belonging to Sumitra Devi would be
inherited by the present Appellant – Narinder Singh Rao by virtue of the
Will executed by her. In addition to his own right and interest in the
suit property to the extent of 1/9th share, which the present Appellant
had inherited from his father. Thus the present Appellant would get
1/9th share in the suit property as he also inherited the share of his
mother Sumitra Devi whereas all other children of Rao Gajraj Singh would
get 1/9th share each in the suit property. Thus, the present Appellant
would be having 2/9th share in the suit property

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Minor – Sale of Minors property – By father (Natural Guardian) – Without prior permission of Court – Voidable at instance of minor. Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act 1956, section. 8 (2):

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Rameshwar Lal & Ors vs. Jai Prakash & Ors AIR 2014 Rajasthan 72.

The present Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 – (original plaintiffs) had filed a suit for cancellation of sale deed and for possession of the suit property against the appellants and respondent No. 4 Bhagwan Lal (their father) with the averments that the plaintiffs had purchased the suit property by a registered sale deed dated 01-02-1974 from Suresh Chandra for a sum of Rs. 26,000. The defendant Nos.1 to 3 were tenants in the said house and a sum of Rs.1,000/- were deposited with Suresh Chandra as earnest money.

The rent deed has been executed by the eldest brother in favour of Suresh Chandra, which has been handed over to the plaintiffs by Suresh Chandra on the date of sale. By notice dated 06-02-1974, Suresh Chandra had informed defendant No.1 (i.e., tenants) by a registered notice that he has sold the house to the plaintiffs and therefore, the rent be paid to them and the deposit of Rs.1,000/- had also been transferred to them. The defendants admit them to be owners of the house and one months rent was sent by money order and therefore, based on attornment, the defendant Nos. 1 to 3 have become plaintiffs tenants. On 23-06-1974, the plaintiff No.1 became major and plaintiff No. 2 was still a minor. The suit property was required by the plaintiffs reasonably and bonafidely. However, the respondent No. 4, their father sold the suit house to the defendant Nos. 1 to 3 for a sum of Rs. 28,000/- on 15-06-1974 and has executed a sale deed and therefore, the defendants do not treat them as landlord which is incorrect. The defendant No. 4 had not obtained permission u/s. 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act,1956 (the Act) from the competent court and therefore, the sale deed was illegal and void and the plaintiffs are entitled for getting the same cancelled. The plaintiff was becoming a major eight days after the date of sale and therefore, the defendant No. 4 had no reason to sale the same to the defendant Nos. 1 to 3; the defendant No. 4 had no requirement as guardian of the money; as the defendants are plaintiffs tenants, they are entitled for possession and therefore, the suit be decreed and the sale deed dated 15-06-1974 be cancelled and possession of the suit house alongwith the due rent be decreed.

Once the property is owned by a minor, the provisions of section 8 of the Act are attracted. While s/s. (1) confers power on a natural guardian of a Hindu minor to do all acts which are necessary or reasonable and proper for the benefit of the minor or for the realisation, protection or benefit of the minors estate. The guardian can in no case bind the minor by a personal covenant, however, the said power is subject to the other provisions of section 8.

S/s. (2) provides for such conditions/restrictions, which inter alia mandates that a natural guardian shall not, without the previous permission of the court mortgage, charge, transfer by sale, gift, exchange or otherwise any part of the immovable property of the minor and s/s. (3) provides that any disposal of immovable property by a natural guardian in contravention of s/s. (1) and (2) is voidable at the instance of minor or any person claiming under him. Even the grant of permission by the court is circumscribed by s/s. (4), wherein except in case of necessity or for an evident advantage to the minor such permission cannot be granted.

Though, s/s. (1) permits a natural guardian to do all acts necessary for the benefit of minor and for benefit of minors estate, but the same is subject to other provisions of section and s/s. (2) clearly provides that without previous permission of the court transfer by sale of immovable property shall not be made by the guardian and any sale in contravention of s/s. (2) is voidable at the instance of the minor. The said s/s. (2) does not admit of any exception, whereby for any condition the minors estate could be transferred by the natural guardian without previous permission of the court.

It is for the minor, on attaining majority, not to question the transfer which is in contravention of s/s. (2) of section 8, but if he decides to question the same, the same is voidable at his instance. In the present case, the Plaintiff No.1 has on attaining majority chosen to question the transfer made by the defendant No.4 Bhagwan Lal, his father in favour of the defendant Nos. 1 to 3 (tenants) without seeking previous permission from the Court and therefore, the same was rightly declared void by the trial court.

levitra

Auditing outsourced services – Auditors’ predicament

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Cost optimisation – the genesis of outsourcing
Many enterprises operate more efficiently and profitably by outsourcing certain functions to other organisations that have the personnel, expertise or infrastructure to accomplish these tasks. The past several years have seen rapid growth in outsourcing of various business functions to service organisations. This growth has been fueled by a number of factors, including economic recession, pressure to improve operational costs, an increasingly virtual workforce and lack of internal resources to support a process or function. Traditionally the term ‘outsourcing services’ would elicit reference to services such as book keeping, payroll processing, clearing house services, mortgage services and medical claims processing amongst others. However, with advancement of information technology, the outsourcing space has witnessed emergence of a plethora services such as Software as a Service (SaaS), Application Service Providers (ASP), Cloud Computing, Credit Card Processing platforms, Internet Service Providers (ISP), Data Centers, Tax processing etc.

How is an outsourced function relevant to audit?
In some cases the outsourced work generates information that is included in the outsourcer’s financial statements. Consider the example of a claims processor (third party administrator (TPA)) who processes claims for an insurance company. When the claims processing function is outsourced to a TPA, health plan customers are instructed to submit their claims directly to the TPA, which processes the claims based on rules established by the insurance company, such as rules related to eligibility and the amount to be paid against each claim. The claims processor provides the insurers with data, such as the cost of claims processed during a period, and this information flows through to the insurance company’s financial statements i.e., the expense claims and the related liability. Even though this information is generated by the claims processor, the insurance company is responsible for the accuracy of that information because the same is included in its financial statements.

For the auditors of the insurance company, the responsibility for auditing the information generated by the claims processor is the same as it would have been for auditing other financial statement information generated by the insurance company itself. The auditors must find a way to obtain evidence that supports the assertions in the insurers’ financial statements that include or are affected by the information generated by the claims processor. Under auditing parlance, the claim processor is termed as a ‘service organisation’, the insurance company would be a ‘user organisation’ whereas the auditor of the user organisation would be called as ‘user auditor’.

Auditors’ Responsibilities under SA 402
SA 402 – ‘Audit Considerations Relating to an Entity Using a Service Organisation’ expands on the factors that an auditor needs to bear in mind while auditing the financial statements of an entity that outsources functions that affect its financial statements. Services provided by a service organisation are relevant to the audit of a user entity’s financial statements when those services, and the controls over them, are part of the user entity’s information system, including related business processes, relevant to financial reporting.

In some cases, management of a user entity is able to monitor the quality of the data it receives from a service organisation by establishing controls to prevent, or detect and correct, misstatements in its financial statements resulting from errors in the data received from a service organisation. This would be the case if the user entity initiates and records the transactions it submits to the service organisation for processing. A good example of such services are payroll processing services.

In other cases, the user entity relies on the service organisation to initiate, execute and record the transactions. Consider for example where a user entity that grants an investment manager the authority to purchase and sell investments on its behalf based on written guidelines provided by the user entity.

Even though such controls are located and operating at the service organisation, they are relevant to the user entity’s internal control over financial reporting because they are designed to prevent, or detect and correct, errors in the information provided to user entities. The question is whether the auditor of a user organisation is required to test these controls and if yes, what approach would enable the user auditor to obtain sufficient information that such controls are designed and are operating effectively. Testing of controls at a service organisation.

SA 402 requires that where a user entity establishes controls over the services provided by a service organisation, the user auditor should test those controls which impact financial reporting to evaluate whether the same are operating effectively. Where the user auditor is satisfied that such controls at the user entity are operating effectively, he is not required to test controls established by the service organisation in relation to the services outsourced by the user entity. This may usually be the case where the process is less complex and the transaction volume is not substantial, for e.g., payroll processing for a small/medium sized enterprise.

Where the services provided by a service organisation involve highly automated processing, a user entity may not be able to implement effective controls over the transactions processed by the service organisation and may need to rely on the controls at the service organisation. From the user auditor’s perspective, he may be unable to obtain sufficient evidence by performing substantive procedures alone at the user entity. In such cases, the user auditor shall obtain an understanding through one or more of the following procedures:

a) O btaining a Type 1 or Type 2 report, if available

b) Contacting the service organisation, through the user entity, to obtain specific information

c) Visiting the service organisation and performing procedures that will provide the necessary information about the relevant controls at the service organisation; or

d) U sing another auditor to perform procedures that will provide the necessary information about the relevant controls at the service organisation.

A Type I report is a report by the service auditor on the design of the controls whereas a Type II report is a report on the design and operating effectiveness of controls at the service organisation.

The following case study highlights the procedures that a user auditor would perform to obtain sufficient evidence for risk assessment in relation to the services performed by a service organisation.

Case Study

World Wanderers Private Limited (WWPL) a wholly owned Indian subsidiary of World Wanderers Inc. USA (WWI) is an online travel company offering outbound and inbound travel services. WWI commenced operations in India in June 20X0. In order to rationalise the operating costs, the parent company, WWI outsourced the accounting for accounts payable function for all its subsidiaries including WWPL to Rapidex Accounting Services (RAS), an outsourcing firm based out of Philippines. The processing of accounts payable for WWPL happened at RAS whereas the general ledger was maintained by WWPL in India. WWI and all its subsidiaries used a globally renowned ERP system called ‘Apex’. Access to the Apex accounts payable module was provided by WWI to RAS. RAS used Apex for its other clients as well.

Under the accounts payable process, raising of purchase orders in Apex and approval of receipt of goods and services against these purchase orders was performed by authorised staff of WWPL. RAS accounts payable team was responsible for invoice and payment processing, reconciliations, journal posting in Apex and vendor helpdesk services. WWPL maintained a documentation imaging database called OMNI to which the designated accounts personnel from RAS accounts were given access. Scanned images of the invoices duly authorized by WWPL would be uploaded on OMNI. WWPL would provide a list of scanned images of specimen signatures of WWPL staff who were authorised to approve invoices. A designated team leader (TL) authorised by RAS would need to match the signatures on the invoices with the specimen provided and where these matched, the invoices were to be processed in Apex. A quality check was performed by RAS QC team on a test check basis.

Apex generated details of payments to be released to vendors based on due date which were compared    by RAS accounts payable team with the payment authorisation received from personnel of WWPL. The request was then uploaded on the bank’s website by RAS Team Leader and payments released after sign off by WWPL. The contractual terms agreed by WWI with RAS included the requirement of RAS furnishing a Type 2 report on a calendar year basis for all the subsidiaries by an independent firm of IT auditors.

RAS engaged a service auditor ABC & Co. (‘ABC’) a firm based in Philippines to provide his opinion on the design and effectiveness of controls over the accounts payable function. The period of coverage was from 1st January 20X0 to 31st December 20X0. The significant controls tested by ABC inter alia included the following critical controls:

a.    Controls provide reasonable assurance that invoices posted by RAS are authorised and accurate.

b.    Controls provide reasonable assurance that only authorised payments are processed accurately by RAS.

c.    Controls provide reasonable assurance that RAS IT resources used to provide services to WWPL are restricted to authorised personnel only.

ABC provided a Type 2 report stating that all controls related to accounts payable process were designed and operated effectively, other than the following controls:

•    For 3 out of 25 samples, the verification of the payments uploaded on bank website by RAS was done using the ID of a resigned Team Leader of RAS.

•    For 1 out of 25 samples, the verification of payment uploaded on the bank website was done using an ID which could not be associated with any of the Team Leaders of RAS assigned to WWPL.

•    For 2 out of 25 samples, the evidence for verification by the TL on the bank website was not available.

ABC & Co. qualified their opinion on the above count.

WWPL had also outsourced its tax planning and processing function to XYZ & Co. (‘XYZ’),  an  Indian firm of chartered accountants. XYZ was responsible for filing of all statutory returns such as Service tax returns, withholding tax returns, and income-tax returns as well as providing assistance in tax assessments.

The accounting period for WWPL ended on 31st March 20X1. M/s.PQR & Associates (‘PQR’) were appointed as auditors of WWPL.

Let us now examine what procedures would  PQR  would need to perform to ensure compliance with the requirements of SA 402:

1.    PQR may need to enquire whether WWPL has maintained independent detailed records or documentation of invoices processed and payments made by RAS on its behalf. It could be possible that no independent records could be maintained by WWPL on account of costs and operational efficiency.

2.    Auditors generally have broad rights of access established by legislation. PQR would need to obtain an understanding of the legislation applicable in Philippines to determine whether appropriate access rights can be obtained to RAS systems. PQR could consider requesting WWPL to incorporate rights of access in the contractual arrangements between  the WWPL and RAS. PQR may need to consider Inspecting records and documents held by RAS.

3.    PQR may need to obtain evidence as to the adequacy of controls operated by RAS over the completeness and integrity of WWPL’s accounts payable data for which RAS is responsible.

4.    If independent records of accounts payable are being maintained by WWPL, PQR could consider obtaining confirmations of balances and transactions from RAS for corroborating WWPL’s records. This may constitute reliable evidence confirming existence of transactions and balances.

5.    Given the significant volume of payments, performing substantive procedures or testing of operating effectiveness of controls at WWPL by PQR would not be sufficient. It would be imperative that the design and operative effectiveness of controls over processing of invoices as well as payments which occurred at RAS were tested by PQR.

6.    As ABC is a firm based out of Philippines and assuming that ABC is not registered with ICAI, PQR would need to evaluate the professional competence of ABC, its independence from WWPL and the adequacy of the standards under which ABC has issued the Type 2 Report. PQR may need to make enquiries about ABC to ABC’s professional organization and enquire whether ABC is subject to regulatory oversight.

7.    (a) If PQR is satisfied as to the professional competence of ABC, PQR could use ABC to perform procedures on the WWPL on its behalf such as testing of controls at RAS (other than those covered by the Type 2 Report) or substantive testing on WWPL financial statement transactions and balances maintained by RAS.

(b)    Alternatively, PQR could use another auditor to perform test of controls or substantive procedures at RAS on its behalf. The results of such procedures performed could be used by PQR to support its audit opinion. In such a case, it would be essential for ABC and PQR to agree to the form of and access to audit documentation.

(c)    PQR may visit RAS to perform tests of relevant controls if RAS agrees to it.

8.    As far as reliance on Type 2 Report is concerned, the controls tested by ABC and the results thereof would need to be evaluated by PQR to determine whether these support PQR’s risk assessment. In the present case it is pertinent to note that:

(a)    The period covered by the Type 2 report is until 31st December 20X0 whereas the period under audit ended on 31st March 20X1. PQR would need to discuss with WWPL or where permissible with RAS whether there were any significant changes to the relevant controls at WWPL outside of the period covered by ABC’s Type 2 report. PQR could consider extending tests of controls over the remaining period or testing  WWPL’s  monitoring of controls. PQR may also review current documentation of such controls as provided by RAS

(b)    PQR would need to evaluate the scope of work performed by ABC, i.e., the controls tested, the appropriateness of the sample sizes and whether there were significant changes to the relevant controls beyond the period covered by the Type 2 Report.

(c)    The service was designed with the assumption that WWPL user will have controls in place for authorizing invoices before they are sent to RAS for processing. Other control to consider would be whether an updated list of signatories authorized to approve invoices was sent by WWPL to RAS. PQR would need to consider whether such complementary controls at WWPL were relevant to the service provided to WWPL.

(d)    Merely because ABC had issued a qualified opinion does not imply that  ABC’s  report  will  not be useful for the audit of WWPL’s financial statements in assessing the risks of material misstatement. Subject to considerations explained in paragraph 7(a) above, the exceptions giving rise to the qualified opinion in ABC’s report should be considered in PQR’s assessment of the testing of controls performed by ABC.

(e)    The exceptions pertained  to  inconsistency  in  the login IDs used by RAS team to process transactions on Apex. PQR would need to evaluate how these exceptions impacted the overall control environment around accounts payable processing, any remedial was taken post  31  December  20X0 and whether alternative checks were available to prevent or detect and correct errors in misstatement.

(f)    The involvement of ABC or another auditor does not alter PQR’s responsibility to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence as a basis for forming his opinion. PQR would not be in a position to make a reference to ABC’s report as a basis for PQR’s opinion on WWPL’s financial statements. However, if PQR were to modify its opinion based on ABC’s opinion, then PQR could refer to the ABC’s report in its own audit opinion with prior consent of ABC.

9.    As regards tax processing services performed by XYZ, a report on controls at XYZ may not be available and visiting XYZ may be the most effective procedure for PQR to gain an understanding of controls XYZ   as there is likely to be direct interaction of WWPL’s management with XYZ.

The above is an illustrative inventory of procedures that SA 402 mandates auditors to perform. The procedures may be customised to meet the requirements of an actual scenario.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Increasingly, enterprises are outsourcing their business functions to achieve cost  efficiencies.  The  rise  of cloud computing has played a key role in the number    of businesses that outsource functions to service organisations. Cloud computing providers offer user entities access to applications, data storage, and numerous other computing functions on a pay-as-you- go basis. Controls at a service organisation that are related not only to user entities’ internal control over financial reporting but also to other critical aspects such as data privacy of customers and other stakeholders have gained prominence. User entity would continue to remain responsible for such data though the same resides with the service organisation.

SA 402 provides useful guidance to auditors to understand the nature and significance of services provided by service organisations and to  design  and  perform  procedures to respond to risk of material misstatements related thereto.

Gaps in GAAP— Component accounting under Schedule II

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Schedule II to the Companies Act, 2013 is
applicable from 1 April 2014. Notes to Schedule II, among other matters,
state as below:

“Useful life specified in Part C of the
Schedule is for whole of the asset. Where cost of a part of the asset is
significant to total cost of the asset and useful life of that part is
different from the useful life of the remaining asset, useful life of
that significant part shall be determined separately.”

An illustrative example is given below.

Some key issues are discussed in this article.

How does a company go about conducting this exercise?
Schedule
II requires separate depreciation only for parts of an item of tangible
fixed asset having (i) significant cost, and (ii) different useful
lives from remaining parts of the asset. In many cases, such
determination may be straight forward. For example, an IT company, which
has only computers as fixed assets, may be able to determine with
little analysis that there are no significant components requiring
separate depreciation. Similarly, for an airline company, it may be
clear that engine has different useful life vis-à-vis remainder of the
aircraft. In many other cases, identification of components requiring
separate depreciation may involve complex analysis.

The company
first splits the fixed asset into various identifiable parts to the
extent possible. The identified parts are then grouped together if they
have the same or similar useful life. There is no need to identify and
depreciate insignificant parts as separate components; rather, they can
be combined together in the remainder of the asset or with the principal
asset.

Identification of significant parts is a matter of
judgment and decided on case-to-case basis. Identification of separate
parts of an asset and determination of their useful life is not merely
an accounting exercise; rather, it involves technical expertise. Hence,
it may be necessary to involve technical experts to determine the parts
of an asset.

How does one judge materiality in the context of identification of components?
A
company needs to identify only material/significant components
separately for depreciation. Materiality is a matter of management/audit
judgment and needs to be decided on the facts of each case. Normally, a
component having original cost equal to or less than 5% of the original
cost of complete asset may not be material. However, a component having
original cost equal to 25% of the original cost of complete asset may
be material. In addition, a company also needs to consider impact on
retained earnings, current year profit or loss and future profit or loss
(say, when part will be replaced) to decide materiality. If a component
may have material impact from either perspective, the said component
will be material and require separate identification.

In many
cases, identification of material components may involve complex
judgment, particularly, for assessing impact on future P&L. Also
what may not be material in a particular period could become material in
later years, and vice versa.

Auditors will have to modify
their audit opinion for a company that does not follow component
accounting, the impact of which is likely to be material in the context
of the overall results or financial position
of that company.
In the case of a company that has a manufacturing facility and is asset
intensive, component accounting is likely to be material, not only
because of depreciation impact, but also the way replacement costs are
accounted for.

How is depreciation computed for components vis-avis the requirements of Schedule II?

Each
significant component of the asset having useful life, which is
different from the useful life of the remaining asset, is depreciated
separately. Though component accounting is mandatory, its application should be restricted only to material items.
If the useful life of the component is lower than the useful life of
the principal asset as per Schedule II, such lower useful should be
used. On the other hand, if the useful life of the component is higher
than the useful life of the principal asset as per Schedule II, the
company has a choice of using either the higher or lower useful life.
However, higher useful life for a component can be used only when
management intends to use the component even after expiry of useful life
for the principal asset.

To illustrate, assume that the useful
life of an asset as envisaged under the Schedule II is 10 years. The
management has also estimated that the useful life of the principal
asset is 10 years. If a component of the asset has useful life of 8
years, AS 6 requires the company to depreciate the component using eight
year life only. However, if the component has 12 year life, the company
has an option to either depreciate the component using either 10 year
life as prescribed in the Schedule II or over its estimated useful life
of 12 years, with appropriate justification. However, in this case 12
years life for the component can be used only when management intends to
use the component even after expiry of useful life for the principal
asset.

How are replacement costs accounted for?
The
application of component accounting will cause significant change in
measurement of depreciation and accounting for replacement costs.
Currently, companies need to expense replacement costs in the year of
incurrence. Under component accounting, companies will capitalize these
costs as a separate component of the asset, with consequent expensing of
net carrying value of the replaced component. If it is not practicable
for a company to determine carrying amount of the replaced component, it
may use the cost of the replacement as an indication of what the cost
of the replaced part was at the time it was acquired or constructed.

Even
under the component accounting, a company does not recognise in the
carrying amount of an item of fixed asset the costs of the day-to-day
servicing of the item. These costs are expensed in the statement of
profit and loss as incurred.

How are major inspection/overhaul expenses accounted for when component accounting is applied?

Under
Indian GAAP, no specific guidance is available on component accounting,
particularly, major inspection/ overhaul accounting. In the absence of
guidance, the following two options are likely. A company can select
either of two options for accounting of major inspection/ overhaul. The
option selected should be applied consistently.

Option 1
Though
AS 10 Accounting for Fixed Assets or any other pronouncement under
Indian GAAP does not comprehensively deal with component accounting,
Ind-AS 16 Property, Plant and Equipment contains comprehensive guidance
on the matter. Under component accounting as envisaged in Ind-AS 16,
major inspection/overhaul is treated as a separate part of the asset,
regardless of whether any physical parts of the asset are replaced.
Hence, one option is to apply Ind-AS 16 guidance by analogy. The
application of this approach is explained below.

When a company
purchases a new asset, it is received after major inspected/ overhaul by
the manufacturer. Hence, major inspection/ overhaul is identified
separately even at the time of purchase of new asset. The cost of such
major inspection/ overhaul is depreciated separately over the period
till next major inspection/overhaul.

Upon next major inspection/overhaul, the costs of new major inspection/ overhaul are added to the asset’s cost and any amount remaining from the previous inspection/ overhaul is derecognized. There is no issue in application of this principle, if the company has identified major inspection/ overhaul at the time of original purchase. However, sometimes, it may so happen that the cost of the previous inspection/overhaul was not identified (and considered a separate part) when the asset was originally acquired or constructed (this may not necessarily be an error but a change in an estimate). This process of recognition and derecognition should take place even in such cases.

If   the   element   relating   to   the   inspection/overhaul had  previously  been  identified,  it  would  have  been depreciated between that time and the current overhaul. However, if it had not previously been identified, the recognition and derecognition principles still apply. In such a case, the company uses estimated cost of a future similar inspection/overhaul to be used as an indication of the cost of the existing inspection/overhaul component to be derecognized after considering the depreciation impact.

OPTION 2

It may be argued that under AS 10 approach, all repair expenditure (including major inspection/overhaul) need to be charged to P&L as incurred. Though schedule II mandates component accounting, it does not state that application of component accounting is based on Ind-AS 16 principles. Hence, AS 10 applies for repair expenditure (including major inspection/overhaul).

Under this option, the application of component accounting is restricted only to physical parts. Neither on initial recognition nor subsequently, the compa- ny identifies major inspection/overhaul as separate component. Rather, any expense on major inspection/ overhaul is charged to P&L as incurred.

What are the presentation/disclosure requirements when component accounting is followed?
Component accounting is relevant for purposes such as depreciation and accounting for replacement cost. Companies are not required to disclose components separate- ly in the financial statements or notes thereto. Rather, the company discloses the asset with all its components as one line item.

With regard to disclosure of useful life/depreciation rates, Schedule II has prescribed depreciation rates only for principal asset and no separate rates are prescribed for its components. Also, schedule II requires disclosure of justification if a company uses higher/lower life than what is prescribed in Schedule II. To comply with these require- ments, the following principles are used:

(i)    A company discloses useful life/depreciation rate used for the principal asset separately. If this life/rate is higher/ lower than life prescribed in schedule II, justification for the difference is disclosed in the financial statements.
(ii)    There is no need to disclose useful lives or depreciation rates used for each component (other than principal asset) separately. It will be sufficient compliance, if disclosure is given as a range by presenting the highest and lowest amount. It may not be sufficient to present the average of the useful lives or depreciation rates used in that class of components.

What are the transitional provisions with respect to componentisation?

Component accounting is applicable from 1st April, 2014. It is required to be applied to the entire block of assets existing as at that date. It cannot be restricted to only new assets acquired after 1st April, 2014. Since companies may not have previously identified components separately, they may use estimated cost of a future similar replacements/ inspection/ overhaul as an indication of to determine their current carrying amount.

AS 10 gives companies an option to follow component accounting; it does not mandate the same. In contrast, component accounting is mandatory under the Schedule
II.    Considering this, transitional provisions of Schedule II can be used to adjust the impact of component accounting. If a component has zero remaining useful life on   the date of Schedule II becoming effective, i.e., 1st April 2014, its carrying amount, after retaining any residual value, will be charged to the opening balance of retained earnings. The consequent impact with respect to deferred taxes should also be adjusted to retained earnings. The carrying amount of other components, i.e., components whose remaining useful life is not nil on 1st April 2014, is depreciated over their remaining useful life.

In the case of listed companies do companies have to comply with component accounting in the quarterly results provided under Clause 41?

Listed companies having 31st March year-end need to apply component accounting for quarter ended 30th June, 2014. It may be possible that certain companies have not completed the process of identifying components by due date for publishing its results for quarter ended 30th June, 2014. In such a case, the auditors should make materiality assessment particularly considering that there is no need to publish balance sheet on a quarterly basis. In many cases, it may be clear that application of component ac- counting may not have impacted results for the quarter materially. If so, the auditor should document its basis for materiality assessment in the work papers. As already indicated elsewhere in this article, for most asset intensive companies, the impact on current or future results or financial position will most likely be material because of depreciation and accounting for replacement costs.

[2014] 148 ITD 129 (Mumbai – Trib.) Johnson & Johnson Ltd vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax A.Y. 2002-03 Order dated- 28th August 2013

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Section 92C
A. Where the assessee entered into a royalty payment agreement with its AE and made the payment of the same after taking approval from the RBI, then the payment of the said royalty made by the assessee in such circumstances is to be allowed and it cannot be said that the RBI’s approval cannot be considered as an arm’s length benchmark.
B. When taxes on royalty paid is to be borne by the assessee, on account of a commercial arrangement, the said taxes borne by the assessee should not be questioned while calculating arm’s length price.

Facts I:
The assessee, ‘J&J India’, had entered into international transactions with its AE, ‘J&J US’. It had paid the brand name royalty and the trademark royalty net of taxes at the rate of 1% of net sales to ‘J&J US’ for the use of brands and trademarks as per the terms of the brand usage agreement and also paid technical know-how royalty at the rate of 2% to ‘J&J US’ for the technical/marketing know-how provided to the assessee as per the terms of the know-how agreement entered into between the assessee and ‘J&J US’.

The assessee adopted the Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM) for determining the arm’s length price (ALP) of its international transactions.

TPO made the following disallowances
1. A s per the agreement entered into by the assessee with ‘J&J US’, the assessee was not required to bear the tax liability of ‘J&J US’ arising out of payment of trademark/brand name royalty. Thus, the taxes borne by the assessee on the trademark/brand name royalty paid to ‘J&J US’ was disallowed by the TPO.

2. T he TPO was of the opinion that royalty on sales of traded finished goods was already part of the brand royalty and no royalty was required to be paid for the traded products and hence disallowed the same.

3. T he TPO restricted the technical know-how royalty paid at the rate of 2% to 1%.

4. T he TPO disallowed corresponding taxes and Research & Development Cess on technical knowhow royalty.

On appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the disallowance of taxes paid by assessee on payment of trademark/ brand name royalty to ‘J&J US’ whereas deleted the other disallowance made by the TPO.

The cross appeals by the assessee and the Revenue were directed against the order of the Ld. CIT(A). Also on second appeal, the assessee submitted that the royalty payments had been approved by RBI.

Held I:

1 T axes paid by assessee on trademark/brand name royalty
The application made by the assessee to RBI for brand usage agreement specifically mentions that the royalty is to be remitted net of taxes. Further, the approval was received from the RBI to remit the royalty on brand usage by the assessee at the rate of 1% net of taxes. Considering the brand usage agreement vis-à-vis the approval granted by RBI, it can be safely inferred that the taxes were liability of the assessee under the terms of agreement. The assessee has entered into a commercial arrangement with ‘J&J US’ and it has been so arranged that the payment of taxes have to be borne by the assessee being a commercial arrangement, the same should not be questioned while calculating arm’s length price. Considering the entire facts in totality in the light of the brand usage agreement and the approval of the RBI, the findings of the CIT(A) is set aside and the AO is directed to delete the addition of the said taxes paid by assessee on trademark/brand name royalty.

2. Royalty payment on sales of traded finished goods

It is already held that the agreements between the assessee and ‘J&J USA’ for payment of royalty have to be considered in the light of the approval of the RBI. There is no substance in the findings of the TPO that there is no need for paying royalty on sales of traded finished goods. There is also no force in the findings of the TPO that this royalty is deemed to be included in the Brand royalty. Therefore, findings of the Ld. CIT(A) were not interfered with.

[The contention of the assessee before CIT(A), on the basis of which CIT(A) had deleted the addition made by TPO of royalty on sales of traded finished goods, was as follows-

Even if the products under consideration are old that does not debar the assessee from paying the royalty now. It was further contended that the assessee continues to get new products from time to time and also gets updates on existing products. The assessee pointed out that the allegation of the TPO that the royalty is covered by Brand Royalty does not hold any water as there is no co-relation between the two. It was claimed that Brand Royalty is paid for the use of the brand names owned by ‘J&J USA’ whereas the royalty for sales of traded finished goods is paid, apart from manufacturing rights; on the know how relating to sale, distribution and marketing. Therefore, it is incorrect to say that this royalty is included in brand royalty.]

3. T echnical know-how royalty

It is already held that the payment of royalty has to be considered in the light of the agreement between the assessee and ‘J&J USA’, for the same reasons. There is no reason to interfere with the findings of the CIT(A).

4. Corresponding taxes and research and development (R&D) cess on technical know-how royalty
The Ld. CIT(A) has confirmed the decision of the TPO holding that withholding tax and R&D Cess can be allowed only to the extent they are payable on allowable royalty. As it is already held elsewhere that royalty payments have been approved by the RBI and therefore, deserves to be allowed. Accordingly as the payments have been made in the light of the agreement with J&J US and as per the approval/guidelines of the RBI, there is no reason to disallow the tax and R&D Cess paid on technical royalty, and accordingly the AO is directed to delete the addition made on this account.

Section 92C read with Section 37(1)
Where, the assessee, who carries on a business finds that it is commercially expedient to incur certain expenditure directly or indirectly, it would be open to such an assessee to do so notwithstanding the fact that a formal deed does not precede the incurring of such expenditure.

Facts II:
The assessee had entered into a brand usage royalty agreement with its AE on 14-03-2002.

The TPO had held that the brand usage royalty paid by assessee was at arm’s length price.

However, the CIT(A) disallowed the brand royalty paid during the period 01-07-2001 to 14-03-2002 on the ground that there was no agreement in place during the said period indicating the intention to pay royalty with effect from 01-07-2001.

On appeal before the Tribunal, it was mentioned that the assessee had submitted a draft agreement alongwith the application to RBI on 10.8.2001 and thus the royalty was paid as per the guidelines issued by the RBI,

Held II:
The agreement for payment of brand usage royalty was entered into only on 14-03-2002. However, at the same time, the CIT(A) has erred in ignoring the copy of draft brand usage royalty agreement which was submitted by the assessee alongwith application to the RBI on 10-08-2001. The assessee received approval from the RBI on 20-11- 2001 and after receiving the approval from the RBI, the assessee entered into brand usage royalty agreement with ‘J&J US’ by which it was agreed to pay the royalty from 01-07-2001. The date being the same, as agreed in the draft agreement filed with the application made to the RBI, therefore, the observations made by the CIT(A) that there was no tacit agreement does not hold any water.

Assuming, yet not accepting, that there was no agreement, the payments made having regard to the commercial expediency need not necessarily have their origin in contractual obligations. If the assessee, which carries on a business finds that it is commercially expedient to incur certain expenditure directly or indirectly, it would be open to such an assessee to do so notwithstanding the fact that a formal deed does not precede the incurring of such expenditure.

Considering the facts in totality there is no merit in the enhancement made by the CIT(A). The findings of the CIT(A) are set aside. The AO is directed to delete the addition made by the CIT(A).

2014 (34) STR 546 (All.) Indian Coffee Workers’ Society Ltd. vs. CCE & ST., Allahabad

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Whether supply of food, edibles and beverages to persons within a canteen provided by the company would attract service tax as outdoor catering services? Held – Yes.

Facts:
Appellant entered into agreements for running and maintenance of an administrative building canteen. Appellant supplied food, edibles and beverages to the individual customers in accordance with the rate specified in the agreement. Appellant was provided a place for running the canteen by the Company. Department had contended that Appellant was providing “Outdoor catering services.”

Held:
The High Court held that supplier was an outdoor caterer by plain and literal construction of the provisions and definition, which included service provided by the caterer at a place other than his own. Once, the services of an outdoor caterer was provided to another person, its chargeability gets attracted, irrespective of extent of its consumption by the person who have engaged such service. The charge of tax in the cases of VAT was distinct from the charge of tax for service tax. VAT was paid on the sale of goods involved in the supply of food and beverages by the assessee would not exclude his liability for the payment of service tax in respect of taxable service was provided as an outdoor caterer.

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TS-367-ITAT-2014(Mum) IATA BSP India vs. DDIT A.Y: NA Dated: 11-06-2014

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Restricted scope of India – USA and India-Portugal DTAA, can be read into the India-France DTAA; Services which does not satisfy ‘make available’ condition do not trigger FTS taxation under India-France DTAA.

Facts:
The Taxpayer is a Branch office (BO) of a Canadian Company (CCo) which is the trade association for the world’s airlines. The BO was established as per the permission of Reserve bank of India for the purpose of undertaking certain commercial activities on no profit basis.

CCo, entered into an agreement through its administrative office in Geneva, with French Company (FCo) for developing certain system (BSP Link). BSP Link enabled the manual operations such as issue of debit notes/credit notes, issue of refund, billing statement and all the information relating to tickets to be carried out electronically for agents as well as airlines which participated in the BSP link to provide information in relation to the booking of tickets and facilitate billing for the tickets.

The BSP link services were provided to the agents and airlines operating in India for which invoices were initially raised by FCo on Geneva Office of CCo which in turn raised the invoices on BO.
BO made an application u/s. 195(2) to the Tax Authority, to make payments to its Geneva office without withholding taxes at source on the ground that no services were being rendered by the Geneva Office. Further it was contended that no tax was deductible on such payments as the branch office and its head office are not separate entities as per the Income-tax Act.

However, the Tax authority contended that, in substance the transactions involved the payments on account of BSP link services provided by FCo in France and as the said services were technical in nature taxes are required to be withheld under the India – France DTAA .

On Appeal, the First Appellate Authority held that the fee for services is not taxable by virtue of MFN clause of the DTAA which incorporates ‘make available’ condition in India France DTAA .

Aggrieved, the Tax Authority appealed to the Tribunal.

Held:
India-France DTAA protocol contained the MFN clause, by virtue of which if India enters into a DTAA or protocol post 01-09-1989 under which it limits its right to tax FTS to a rate lower or scope more restricted than the rate or scope prevalent in the India-France DTAA , the same rate and scope would also apply to India-France DTAA .

India entered into a DTAA with USA and Portugal post 01- 09-1989. The India-USA DTAA and India-Portugal DTAA have provided a narrower scope for taxation of FTS by inserting a ‘make available’ condition.

Thus the restricted scope of India – USA and India-Portugal DTAA , can be read into the India-France DTAA . As there was nothing to show that the BSP Link services make available any technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how, or processes, it does not trigger FTS taxation under the India-France DTAA .

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TS-285-AAR-2014 Steria (India) Limited A.Y: NA Dated: 02-05-2014

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Restriction in the Most Favoured Nations (MFN) Clause of the India-France DTAA is in relation to rates of taxes, the “make available” condition, as available in the India-UK DTAA, is not included within its purview.

Facts:
The Applicant, a public company in India (ICo), was engaged in providing information technology driven services. ICo entered into a management service agreement with Steria France (FCO), a resident of France, for various management services, such as general management, corporate communications, internal audit, finance-related services etc., with a view to rationalise and standardise the business conducted by ICo in India in accordance with international best practices.

FCO provided services offshore through electronic media (telephone, fax, email etc.) and no personnel visited India for provision of the services.

As per the France DTAA fees for technical services (FTS) is defined to mean consideration for any technical, managerial or consultancy services. Though “FTS” is broadly defined in the France DTAA, vide the Protocol to the France DTAA , an Indian resident making a payment to a French resident may apply the MFN Clause to, inter alia, take privilege of a more restricted scope of source taxation or rate of tax present in any subsequent DTAA entered into force by India with an OECD member. As per the France DTAA , FTS was taxable at 20% on gross basis.

Pursuant to the MFN Clause, a Notification1 (France Notification) was issued by the GOI giving effect to the MFN clause which provided for a lower rate of taxation viz., 10%. The France Notification makes no reference to the restricted scope of meaning of FTS.

In a similar notification, in the context of the India-Netherlands DTAA, the MFN benefit has been provided with respect to lower rate, as well as the narrow scope of FTS definition i.e., incorporating ‘make available’ condition.

ICo relied on the India-UK DTAA to import the ‘make available’ condition for taxation of FTS. ICO contended that on an application of the MFN Clause in the Protocol to the France DTAA, the narrower scope of the definition of FTS, as available in the India-UK DTAA , may be applied. Accordingly, since the services do not make available technical knowledge, experience, skill etc., the services rendered should not be regarded as taxable in India.

The Tax Authority, on the other hand, contended that the services are FTS in nature and the ‘make available’ concept is not applicable. In any case, technical knowledge, skill etc., are made available through employee interaction and, hence, the same is taxable in India.

Held:
A Protocol cannot be treated at par with provisions contained in a DTAA itself, though it is an integral part of the DTAA .

The restriction in the MFN clause of the France DTAA is in relation to rates of taxes and the “make available” Clause cannot be read into the Protocol.

Furthermore, the France Notification issued pursuant to the Protocol giving effect to the MFN Clause provides only for a reduced rate of tax and does not include anything about the ‘make available’ clause. Had the intention been so, the same would have been mentioned in the France Notification, comparable to what has been done in the India-Netherlands DTAA . The changes in the France DTAA on the basis of the Protocol were given effect by the France Notification only.

The ‘make available’ Clause cannot be imported in the DTAA to change the complexion of the DTAA provision. A Protocol or Memorandum of Association can be made use of for interpreting the provisions of a DTAA but it is not correct to import words, phrases or clauses not available into a DTAA on the basis of DTAA s with other countries. At the most, India is under obligation, as per the terms of the Protocol, to limit its tax rate or scope as was done in the France Notification, but such type of an action was not within the purview of the AAR.

Since the services rendered by FCo were technical services under the Indian Tax Laws, as also under the France DTAA , the payments fell within the purview of FTS and, hence, were chargeable to tax in India and, accordingly, taxes are required to be withheld.

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Professional Services vis-à-vis works contract

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Introduction
The issue about nature of transaction as to whether it is sale, service or works contract, is always debatable. This is because there are no pre-set guidelines about deciding the nature of transaction, as to whether sale, service or works contract. There are a number of judgments from various forums but still the issue has remained unresolved.

Constitutional amendment
By the 46th amendment, works contract transactions were made taxable under sales tax by insertion of Clause (29A) in Article 366 of the Constitution of India. Thereafter, the issue of deciding the nature of transaction has become much more complicated. Prior to above amendment, there were normally two types of transactions, i.e., normal sale or works contract. Since works contract was not taxable, no further demarcation used to be made. After the amendment, works contract transactions are taxable. However, all the transactions involving goods cannot become taxable works contract transactions under sales tax laws. In other words, if it can be substantiated that if in a transaction, goods are used, but such use of goods is only incidental to providing service and that the said use is not as sale of material itself, then the transaction can be classified as a transaction for rending service, not liable to tax under the sales tax laws. Therefore, after the amendment, in addition to classifying the transaction as works contract, the further classification can be made as taxable works contract under sales tax laws and non taxable transaction (involving use of goods), but which can be termed as service transaction.

Case study
Reference can be made to the judgment in case of Dr. Hemendra Surana vs. State of Rajasthan (90 STC 251)(Raj). In this case the appellant, a doctor by profession, took an X-ray of the patient and gave his report with an X-ray film. The transaction was treated as works contract by sales tax authorities, whereas the Hon. High Court held that it is not a works contract. It was held as ‘service transaction’ implying that transfer of X-ray film is incidental to professional services.

In the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. (145 STC 91), the Hon’ble Supreme Court discussed about deciding nature of sale vis-à-vis works contract, service transaction. The relevant observations are in para 46 which are reproduced below.

“46.. The reason why these services do not involve a sale for the purposes of Entry 54 of List II is, as we see it, for reasons ultimately attributable to the principles enunciated in Gannon Dunkerley’s case [1958] 9 STC 353 (SC), namely, if there is an instrument of contract which may be composite in form in any case other than the exceptions in Article 366(29A), unless the transaction in truth represents two distinct and separate contracts and is discernible as such, then the State would not have the power to separate the agreement to sell from the agreement to render service, and impose tax on the sale. The test therefore for composite contracts other than those mentioned in Article 366(29A) continues to be—did the parties have in mind or intend separate rights arising out of the sale of goods. If there was no such intention there is no sale even if the contract could be disintegrated. The test for deciding whether a contract falls into one category or the other is as to what is “the substance of the contract”. We will, for the want of a better phrase, call this the dominant nature test.”

In light of above, one can look into the intention of parties, the scope of work and decide the nature of transaction. The ‘dominant nature test’ was evolved by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the BSNL judgement.

Judgment of Larger Bench in case of M/s Kone Elevators (71 VST 1)
In this case, the Hon’ble Larger Bench (5 judges) of the Supreme Court has discussed about nature of transaction of installation of lift. The judgment is by majority of four judges to one judge. The minority judgment has confirmed the original judgment that supply and installation of the lift is ‘sale’.

However, the majority judgment of four judges has held that the lift installation transaction is a ‘works contract.’ Therefore, the binding judgment will be of the majority and transaction of installation of lift will be considered as ‘works contract.’

The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in this judgment, has discussed the entire historical background of works contract transaction. And after making observations about the legal position, the Hon’ble Supreme Court turned to facts of the case.

As per the larger bench, in case of lift, the lift comes into existence on installation. Therefore, the Larger Bench has considered service part as also equally important and hence lift installation transaction is held to be a composite transaction of sale and service, i.e., works contract. This position is clear from the paragraph reproduced below.

“63. Considered on the touchstone of the aforesaid two Constitution Bench decisions, we are of the convinced opinion that the principles stated in Larsen and Toubro (supra) as reproduced by us hereinabove, do correctly enunciate the legal position. Therefore, “the dominant nature test” or “overwhelming component test” or “the degree of labour and service test”are really not applicable. If the contract is a composite one which falls under the definition of works contracts as engrafted under clause (29A)(b) of Article 366 of the Constitution, the incidental part as regards labour and service pales into total insignificance for the purpose of determining the nature of the contract.

64.    Coming back to Kone Elevators (supra), it is perceivable that the three-Judge Bench has referred to the statutory provisions of the 1957 Act and thereafter referred to the decision in Hindustan Shipyard Ltd. (supra), and has further taken note of the customers’ obligation to do the civil construction and the time schedule for delivery and thereafter proceeded to state about the major component facet and how the skill and labour employed for converting the main components into the end product was only incidental and arrived at the conclusion that it was a contract for sale. The principal logic applied, i.e., the incidental facet of labour and service, according to us, is not correct. It may be noted here that in all the cases that have been brought before us, there is a composite contract for the purchase and installation of the lift. The price quoted is a composite one for both. As has been held by the High Court of Bombay in Otis Elevator (supra), various technical aspects go into the installation of the lift. There has to be a safety device. In certain States, it is controlled by the legislative enactment and the rules. In certain States, it is not, but the fact remains that a lift is installed on certain norms and parameters keeping in view numerous factors. The installation requires considerable skill and experience. The labour and service element is obvious. What has been taken note of in Kone Elevators (supra) is that the company had brochures for various types of lifts and one is required to place order, regard being had to the building, and also make certain preparatory work. But it is not in dispute that the preparatory work has to be done taking into consideration as to how the lift is going to be attached to the building. The nature of the contracts clearly exposit that they are contracts for supply and installation of the lift where labour and service element is involved. Individually manufactured goods such as lift car, motors, ropes, rails, etc., are the components of the lift which are eventually installed at the site for the lift to operate in the building. In constitutional terms, it is transfer either in goods or some other form. In fact, after the goods are assembled and installed with skill and labour at the site, it becomes a permanent fixture of the building. Involvement of the skill has been elaborately dealt with by the High Court of Bombay in Otis Elevator (supra) and the factual position is undisputable and irrespective of whether installation  is regulated by statutory law or not, the result would be the same. We may hasten to add that this position is stated in respect of a composite contract which requires the contractor to install a lift in a building. It is necessary to state here that if there are two contracts, namely, purchase of the components of the lift from a dealer, it would be a contract for sale and similarly, if separate contract is entered into for installation, that would be a contract for labour and service. But, a pregnant one, once there is a composite contract for supply and installation, it has to be treated as a works contract, for it is not a sale of goods/chattel simpliciter. It is not chattel sold as chattel or, for that matter, a chattel being attached to another chattel. Therefore, it would not be appropriate to term it as a contract for sale on the bedrock that the components are brought to the site, i.e., building, and prepared for delivery. The conclusion, as has been reached in Kone Elevators (supra), is based on the bedrock of incidental service for delivery. It would not be legally correct to make such a distinction in respect of lift, for the contract itself profoundly speaks of obligation to supply goods and materials as well as installation of the lift which obviously conveys performance of labour and  service.  Hence,  the fundamental characteristics of works contract are satisfied. Thus analysed, we conclude and hold that the decision rendered in Kone Elevators (supra) does not correctly lay down the law and it is, accordingly, overruled.”

It can be seen that, ultimately the Hon’ble Supreme Court has decided the issue on the factual position.

OUTCOME
As per above judgment, the dominant nature test etc.,
are irrelevant. It appears that the basic nature of the transaction is required to be seen and if it is works contract then the dominant nature test or overwhelming component test etc., are not relevant. Thus, one is again in a dilemma about deciding nature of taxable works contract transaction vis-à-vis service transaction, where some materials may be involved.

By virtue of BSNL decision, dominant nature test could have been applied. In fact, in this case the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that doctors, lawyers cannot be liable to tax as the basic nature of transaction is rendering service, though some goods may be involved and transferred. In the judgment of Kone Elevators, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that the dominant nature test is not relevant. Thus, someone may take a view that the doctors and lawyers can also be liable, as the service nature of transaction is not relevant.

This will be an extreme view, which cannot be justified. Though, the dominant nature test is not relevant, still the issue will arise whether services of doctors and lawyers can be considered to be works contract. We have to look into the basic nature of transaction to decide whether it is a works contract? But as discussed, the position has become more fluid and the issue of above nature may crop up. In fact, this is the guidance expected from the judicial pronouncements from the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In any case, in light of direct observations of the Supreme Court in case of BSNL, it can be said that, the services of doctors and lawyers are still out of purview of sales tax laws.

In fact in recent judgment in case of International Hospital Pvt. Ltd. (71 VST 139)(All), the Hon. Allahabad High Court has held that use of stents and valves in heart procedure of patient at hospital is not works contract. However, there can be contrary judgment and the situation will remain uncertain. In above judgment of the Hon. Allahabad High Court itself, there is reporting of contrary judgment of the Kerala High Court in case of Aswini Hospital Pvt. Ltd. (51 NTN 29)(Ker), wherein the hospital is held as liable to works contract tax.

CONCLUSION

In case of International Hospital Pvt. Ltd., the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kone Elevators, i.e., (71 VST 1) was not available. Therefore, one may be tempted to say that the above judgment may require reconsideration in light of above judgment in case of Kone Elevators. However, it appears that the judgment in case of International Hospital Pvt. Ltd., will still hold good as the same is based on basic nature of transaction and will be saved even by judgment of Kone Elevators. In the future, reconfirmation of above judgment of the Allahabad High Court will certainly helpful in deciding correct nature of transaction, more particularly the service transaction where some material is involved in the rending of service.

TAXABILITY OF TAKE AWAYS AND HOME DELIVERIES

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Background
Service tax levy on Air Conditioned Restaurants (with license to serve liquor) [“ACR”) was introduced, w.e.f. 01-05-2011, with an abatement of 70%. The said levy has been continued under negative list based taxation of services introduced w.e.f. 01-07-2012, with few minor changes in the scope and rate of abatement.

However, the scope of ACR Services, was substantially expanded w.e.f. 01-04-2013, whereby the condition of license to serve liquor was done away with. Far reaching implications of the amendment were discussed in April, 2013 issue of BCAJ. In this feature, the contentious of issue of taxability in case of take aways / home deliveries in regard to which inconsistent practices are being followed, is discussed.

Constitutional Validity of the levy
The constitutional validity of service tax levy on ACR was challenged before various Courts in the country. The Kerala High Court in the case of Kerala Classified Hotels and Resorts Association & others (2013) 31 STR 257 (KER) had held the levy constitutionally invalid. However, the Bombay High Court in India Hotels and Restaurant Association & Others vs. UOI (2014 – TIOL – 498 – HC – Mum – ST) and the Chhattisgarh High Court in Hotel East Park & Another vs. UOI (2014 – TIOL – 758 – HC – CHHATTISGRAH – ST) have upheld the constitutional validity of the levy.

Relevant Statutory Provisions
Section 65 B (44) of the Finance Act, 1994, as amended (Act)

“Service” means any activity carried out by a person for another for consideration, and includes a declared service, but shall not include –

(a) an activity which constitutes merely, –

i) A transfer of title in goods or immovable property, by way of sale, gift or in any other manner; or

ii) Such transfer, delivery or supply of any goods which is deemed to be a sale within the meaning of Clause (29A) of article 366 of the Constitution; or

iii) A transaction in money or actionable claim.

(b) A provision of service by an employee to the employer in the course of or in relation to his employment;

(c) Fees taken in any Court or Tribunal established under any law for the time being in force.

………………….

Declared Services (section 66E of the Act)

The following shall constitute declared services, namely
…………

(i) Service portion in an activity wherein goods, being food or any other article of human consumption or any drink (whether or not intoxicating) is supplied in any manner as a part of the activity.

Article 366 (29A) (f) of the Constitution of India
Sale includes –

“Supply, by way of or as a part of any service or in any other manner whatsoever, of goods, being food or any other article for human consumption or any drink (whether or not intoxicating), where such supply or service is for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration.”

Mega Exemption Notification No. 25/2012 – ST dated 20-06-2012 (as amended)

Entry No. 19

Services provided in relation to serving of food or beverages by a restaurant, eating joint or a mess, other than those having facility of air conditioning or central air heating in any part of the establishment, at any time during the year.

Relevant Extracts from CBEC – Education Guide dated 20-06-2012

Para 8.4

Valuation of service portion involved in supply of food or any other article of human consumption or any drink in a restaurant or as outdoor catering.

In terms of article 366(29A) of the Constitution of India supply of any goods, being food or any other article of human consumption or any drink (whether or not intoxicating) in any manner as part of a service for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration is deemed to be a sale of such goods. Such a service therefore cannot be treated as service to the extent of the value of goods so supplied. The remaining portion however constitutes a service. It is a well settled position of law, declared by the Supreme Court in BSNL‘s case [2006(2)STR161(SC)], that such a contract involving service along with supply of such goods can be dissected into a contract of sale of goods and contract of provision of service. Since normally such an activity is in the nature of composite activity, difficulty arises in determining the value of the service portion. In order to ensure transparency and standardization in the manner of determination of the value of such service provided in a restaurant or as outdoor catering a new Rule 2C has been inserted in the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 116 2011, amended by the amendment Rules of 2012. This manner of valuation is explained in the points below.

Para 8.4.1 Are services provided by any kind of restaurant, big or small, covered by the manner of valuation provided in Rule 2C of the Valuation Rules?

Yes. Although services provided by any kind of restaurant would be valued in the manner provided in Rule 2C, it may be borne in mind that the following category of restaurants are exempted –

• Services provided in relation to serving of food or beverages by a restaurant, eating joint or a mess, other than those having the facility of air-conditioning or central air heating in any part of the establishment, at any time during the year, ……………..

• Below the threshold exemption.

Departmental Clarifications
Circular D.O.F NO. 334/3/2011 – TRU dated 28-02-2011 (Relevant extracts) Para 1.4

The new levy is directed at services provided by highend restaurant that are air-conditioned and have license to serve liquor. Such restaurants provide conditions and ambience in a manner that service provided may assume predominance over the food in many situations. It should not be confused with mere sale of goods at any eating house, where such services are materially absent or so minimal that it will be difficult to establish that any service in any meaningful way is being provided.

Para 1.6

The levy is intended to be confined to the value of services contained in the composite contract and shall not cover either the meal portion in the composite contract or mere sale of food by way of pick-up or home delivery, as also goods sold at MRP…………….

Circular No. 173/8/2013 dated 07-10-2013 (relevant extracts)

Taxability – Supply of food at outlets, take aways, delivery etc.
Various restaurants, hotels or coffee shops sell food items, beverages, ready-to-drink products, including food pre-packaged at their outlets. The arrangement may be sale at outlet for consumption within the premises or sale over the counter or sale of MRP products.

The scope of declared list entry (i) of section 66E of the Act is very wide and covers service portion of an activity of supply of food or any article of human consumption or any drinks in any manner. Hence, service tax will be payable whenever supply of food involves any service element and the transaction is not merely a “transfer of title” in goods. The issue which requires consideration is whether supply of food items and beverages is a transaction of

merely “transfer of title” in goods or involves any service element as part of supply of goods and beverages. As regards the determination of what is ‘sales’ under article 366(29A) of the Constitution of India, various judicial rulings have evolved a law to the following effect:

• the predominant transaction is a ‘sale’ or ‘service’ must be determined from the facts of each case;

• where supply is made in a restaurant and if the customer has the right to take away the food or dispose it off at his discretion, it may qualify as ‘sale’ and providing of services in this situation would be incidental;
•    further, in relation to “over the counter” sales, it may qualify as sale of goods, as the services are not significant.

Though the above evolution of law is before the introduction of negative list based taxation of services, the same would be relevant, to determine what constitutes ‘sale’ as contemplated in the exclusion clause in the definition of ‘service’. [section 65 B(44) of the Act] under the negative list regime.
The CBEC circulars issued at the time of introduction of levy as reproduced earlier, have clarified that mere sale of food by way of pick-up or home delivery as well as goods sold at MRP will not attract service tax. Though these circulars were issued in the context of “ACR Services” the principle contained therein would be relevant under the negative list based regime. Further, as ‘sale’ is covered under the exclusion clause in the definition of ‘service’, there can be no levy of service tax as “Declared Services”.

•    Whether the service tax is attracted even where the air-conditioning facility has operated for a part of the year or in any part of establishment. In particular, cases where A/c is not installed in the restaurant area where food is supplied for consumption by a customer but in Manager’s cabin or a Cold Storage area in a kitchen which is a part of the restaurant establishment.

•    Whether self–service or pick up or home delivery/ supply of food or beverages, ice cream/food served outside the area of restaurant/eating joints or mess having facility or air–conditioning etc. will come under the purview of service tax or not?

In terms of Clause (i) of section 66E of the Act, service portion in an activity wherein goods, being food or other articles of human consumption or any drink (whether or not intoxicating) is supplied in any manner as a part of the activity is a declared service.

Further, Entry No. 19 of the Notification No. 25/2012- S.T. dated 20-06-2012 as amended vide Notification No.3/2013–ST dated 01-03-2013 (w.e.f. 01-04-2013), has exempted services provided in relation to serving of food or beverages by a restaurant, eating joint or a mess, other than those having the facility of air-conditioning or central air–heating in any part of the establishment, at any time during the year.

?    According to one school of thinking:

•    In light of the Exemption Notification No. 25/2012– S.T. (as amended) the specific exclusion of the premises which have or had air–conditioning facility in any part of the establishment (including Manager’s cabin or Cold Storage area in a restaurant) at any time during the year, it would appear that, exemption may not be available

•    The service tax has been levied on the activity    of supply of goods etc. in any manner and the exemption has been granted to the services provided in relation to serving of food or beverages by a restaurant, eating joint or a mess, other than those having the facility of air-conditioning or central air-heating in any part of the establishment, at any time during the year. The exemption, is based on the condition of the restaurant, eating joint or the mess as to whether or not they are    or were having air-conditioning or central air– heating facility in any part of their establishment, at any time during the year. It is not based on the manner in which food, etc. is supplied. Therefore, it is appears that service tax could be leviable    on the food etc., supplied by a restaurant, eating joint or a mess if they have or had the facility of air-conditioning or central air-heating in any part of their establishment during any part of the year irrespective of the fact whether the food is served, outside the restaurant premises, delivered or taken away.

?    According to a second school of thinking :

•    Based on settled principles of harmonious & rational interpretation laid down from time to time, in order to attract service tax under ACR Services, it would appear that A/c /air heating facility should exist in the restaurant area where food is supplied.

•    In cases where, food is prepared by an A/c outlet, restaurant etc. and the customers have an option to consume food/beverages etc., within the premises of such A/c outlet, restaurant etc., supply of food may get covered under entry (i) of section 66E of the Act and hence become liable to service tax.

However, in cases where no particular place is provided by the A/c outlet, restaurant etc. where such food/beverage can be consumed, the activities could be considered as being in the nature of sale of goods and hence may not attract service tax.

•    In cases where, A/c outlets, restaurants sell goods  on MRP basis (like coffee packets, cold drinks etc.),  it would be a good case to hold that goods supplied under MRP are mere sale of goods and do not involve any service element so as to attract service tax.

•    In cases where, food items are supplied by A/c Outlets/Restaurants as take aways or home delivery, the activities can be regarded as being in the nature of sale of goods and hence would not attract service tax.

CONCLUSION:
It would reasonably appear that, second set of contentions reflects a better view. CBEC clarifications in the context of ACR services reinforce the same. However, considering the scenario that at a practical level  in  many  cases take aways & home deliveries are being subjected to service tax by owners of A/c outlets, restaurants etc. as a conservative measure to avoid prospect of tax liability at a future date, the matter needs to be appropriately clarified by the CBEC so as to reduce burden at the end Consumer.

LSG Sky Chef (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT In the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal “A” Bench, Mumbai Before I. P. Bansal, (JM) and Sanjay Arora, (AM) I.T.A. No. 4828/Mum/2012 Assessment Year: 2009-10. Decided on 27-03-2014 Counsel for Assessee/Revenue: M. M. Golvala & Amey Wagle/M. L. Perumal

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Section 203AA – Assessee cannot be denied credit for TDS merely because the same were not reflected in Form 26AS when TDS certificates in original were filed.

Facts:
The issue before the Tribunal was about the short credit of the tax deducted at source. In its return of income the assessee had claimed credit for TDS of Rs. 92.52 lakh. However, the AO allowed the credit of Rs. 67.99 lakh only and no credit was allowed for the balanced sum of Rs. 24.53 lakh, as the same was not reflected in Form No. 26AS despite furnishing of the TDS certificates in original by the assessee.

Held:
According to the Tribunal, the burden of proving as to why the said Form does not reflect the details of the entire tax deducted at source for and on behalf of a deductee cannot be placed on an assessee-deductee. The assessee, by furnishing the TDS certificate/s bearing the full details of the tax deducted at source, credit for which is being claimed, has discharged the primary onus on it toward claiming credit in its respect. He, accordingly, cannot be burdened any further in the matter. The Revenue is fully entitled to conduct proper verification in the matter and satisfy itself with regard to the veracity of the assessee’s claim/s, but cannot deny the assessee credit in respect of TDS without specifying any infirmity in its claim/s. Form 26AS is a statement generated at the end of the Revenue, and the assessee cannot be in any manner held responsible for any discrepancy therein or for the non-matching of TDS reflected therein with the assessee’s claim/s. The tribunal further observed that the plea that the deductor may have specified a wrong TAN, so that the TDS may stand reflected in the account of another deductee, is no reason or ground for not allowing credit for the TDS in the hands of the proper deductee. The onus for the purpose lies squarely at the door of the Revenue. Accordingly, the A.O. was directed to allow the assessee credit for the impugned shortfall.

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ACIT vs. Jayendra P. Jhaveri In the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal Mumbai Benches “J”, Mumbai Before P M Jagtap (A. M.) & Sanjay Garg(J. M.) ITA Nos.2141 to 2144 /Mum/2012 Asst.Year 2003-04. Decided on 20th February 2014 Counsel for Revenue / Assessee: S. D. Srivastava / Dharmesh Shah

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Section 153A – Re-assessments made by the AO without any incriminating material found during the search action u/s. 132 not valid.

Facts:
A search and seizure operation was carried out in the case of the assessee on 14-08-2008 u/s. 132 of the Income- tax Act. Pursuant thereto, the AO issued notice u/s. 153A to the assessee to file the return of income for six years subsequent to the search. In response to the notice, the assessee filed return of income before the AO. The AO, thereafter, issued notice u/s. 143(2) and 142(1). The assessee submitted before the AO that books of account and other details were destroyed in the flood in the year 2005 and, therefore, the same could not be produced. Since the assessee failed to produce the books of accounts, the AO passed the order u/s. 144 r.w.s. 153A. On the basis of net profit ratio of certain other persons who were engaged in a similar business as that of the assessee, the AO made the additions to the total income of the assessee. The CIT(A) upheld the action of the AO. However, he directed the AO to re-compute the net profit of the assessee by adopting the net profit of 0.14%. The revenue appealed against the action of the CIT(A) in directing the AO to rework the net profit of the assessee at the lower rate of 0.14% as against the 0.99% estimated by the AO. Whereas the assessee has filed the cross objections against the action of the CIT(A) in upholding of assessment proceedings made by the AO u/s. 153A. Before the Tribunal, the assessee contended that since no incriminating material was found during the search and seizure operation, the re-assessment made by the AO u/s. 153 A was not valid. He has further submitted that since the limitation period for issuing notice u/s. 143(2) had already been expired and as such the assessments in relation to above mentioned assessment years had attained finality. The contention of the revenue was that the absence of the books of accounts, itself, was the incriminating evidence against the assessee necessitating initiation of assessment proceedings u/s. 153A.

Held:
The tribunal noted that in the present case the return was processed u/s. 143(1) and the same had attained finality due to the expiry of limitation period of 12 months from the end of the month in which the return was filed. Further, no incriminating material was found from the premises of the assessee during the search u/s. 132. In view of the same and the decisions of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Jai Steel (India) vs. ACIT (2013) 259 CTR 281, the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Gopal Lal Badruka vs. DCIT, 346 ITR 106 and of the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Chetan Dass Lachman Dass [2012] 211 Taxmann 61, the Tribunal observed that when no incriminating evidence was found during the search, it was not open to the AO to make re-assessment of concluded assessment in the garb of invoking the provisions of section 153A. According to it the contention of the revenue that since no books of account were found during the search action that itself was the incriminating material against the assessee had no force of law. Inference of concealment of income cannot be made just on mere assumptions, presumptions or suspicion. Relying on the Tribunal decision in the case of Jitendra Kumar Jain vs. DCIT (ITA Nos. 5951- 5953/M/2011 decided on 16-01-2014) it held that that such an assumption cannot be said to be having any value of evidence in eyes of law and even the assessee cannot be called to disapprove such type of assumptions and presumptions based on mere suspicions. It observed that it is not open to the revenue to rely on the weakness of the evidence produced by the assessee to make any adverse presumption or conclusion of his indulging in any illegal activity, without being there any direct or even circumstantial evidence on record against him.

In view thereof, the Tribunal held that the reassessments made by the AO u/s. 153A, without any incriminating material being found during the search action conducted u/s. 132, were not in accordance with law and the same were set aside.

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(2014) 102 DTR 151 (Mum) 3i Infotech Ltd. vs. ACIT A.Y. 2003-04 Dated : 21-08-2013

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Compensation for termination of agreement for providing back office support services is regarded as capital receipt.

FACTS:
The assessee has been providing back-office services to ICICI bank in respect of retail lending business of ICICI Bank comprising of housing loans, auto loans, credit cards etc., for providing such services the assessee had put in place adequate resources in terms of office space, software, IT infrastructure, manpower sources with technical skill, managerial and other skills required to handle such activity.

With a view to exercise control over the activities and to reduce cost, the bank has decided to carry on the activities independently. On termination of the agreement, the assessee received Rs. 15 crore from the bank as compensation for loss of business/future earning/transfer of knowledge. The assesssee claimed that it has given up one source of income completely for which compensation has been received. Such compensation is towards loss of business order and towards loss of one source of income which has affected the profit-making structure of the assessee and the same is accordingly a capital receipt.

The AO did not accept such claim of the assessee and considered the said amount as revenue receipt. The main basis on which the AO has held this issue against the assessee is that there is no transfer of any asset or business expertise or IPR or such item which is normally transferred when such type of business is transferred by one entity to another. Another ground on which the AO rejected the claim of the assessee was that there is no clause in the agreement which restrain or restrict the assessee from continuing the aforementioned activities and the assessee is free to carry on such activities, if it so desired. Further, it was also contended that the abovementioned activities of the assessee were continued in respect of subsequent period also and there was no loss of business or one source of income. Thus, it was argued by the Revenue that there was no absolute erosion of such source.

HELD:
It was a case where the compensation has been received by the assessee on losing its rights to receive income in respect of services rendered by the assessee to the bank. In the facts and circumstances of the case it is a loss of source of income to the assessee and compensation has been determined on the basis of said loss. According to arguments of the learned Departmental Representative, the assessee company has not given up its entire activity of rendering back office services as the assessee has been earning income from such activity even after termination of such agreement. Therefore. it is the case of the learned Departmental Representative that the amount received by the assessee should be considered as income in the nature of revenue. However, such argument of the learned Departmental Representative does not find support from the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Oberoi Hotel (P) Ltd. vs. CIT 236 ITR 903 (SC) and Kettlewell Bullen & Co. Ltd. vs. CIT 53 ITR 261 (SC). It has been observed that it is irrelevant that the assessee continued similar activity with the remaining agencies. So, the relevant criteria to decide such issue is that whether or not the assessee has lost one of its sources of income. In the present case, the assessee has lost its source of income with respect to  its agreement entered into by it with the bank. It is also the case of the assessee that it has never rendered such services to any other person right from the inception and there is no material on record to contradict such argument of the assessee. Therefore in view of the facts it was held that the compensation received by the assessee was in the nature of capital receipt.

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2014-TIOL-270-ITAT-AHD Gujrat Carbon & Industries Ltd. vs. ACIT ITA No. 3231/Ahd/2010 Assessment Years: 2003-04. Date of Order: 13-09-2013

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Section 37 – Expenditure incurred on foreign education of Mr. Goenka, the whole time director, under authority of a resolution passed pursuant to which an agreement between the assessee and Mr. Goenka, is a business expenditure which is allowable.

Facts:
The assessee had debited a sum of Rs. 33,95,589 to its P & L Account towards expenditure on foreign education of its whole-time director. In the course of assessment proceedings, in response to the show cause issued by the Assessing Officer asking the assessee to justify the allowability of this expenditure, the assessee submitted that it had sponsored MBA studies of whole-time director Sri Goenka and that expenditure was incurred to improve the management and profitability of the assessee company. The AO noted that there was no policy of company of sponsoring studies of employees. He also noted that Mr. Goenka was appointed as director on 29- 04-2002 and board resolution was passed on 24-07-2002 for his studies abroad and he resigned from the company on 18-10-2003 and was later reappointed. He noted that Sri Goenka is son of G. P. Goenka, chairman of the company. He disallowed the expenditure on the ground that it is a personal expenditure.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who held that the assessee’s claim of improvement of business efficiency is contingent upon his completing MBA abroad and possibly meaningfully contribution to the appellant company thereafter. He held that since the business purpose is contingent, remote and in the realm of unforeseen and at least two steps away from the incurring of the expenditure, the same is not allowable.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that there is no dispute that the expenditure has been incurred as per resolution passed at the meeting of the Board of Directors of the assessee and that pursuant to the resolution passed, an agreement was entered between the assessee and Sri Goenka, according to which he will work for two years after his return from USA. It also noted that this agreement was acted upon and that the facts of the case are covered by the ratio fo the decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Ras Information Technology Pvt. Ltd. (12 taxman 58)(Kar). It also noted that a similar view has been Ahmedabad Bench of ITAT in the case of Mazda Ltd. in ITA No. 3190/Ahd/2008. The Tribunal held that the expenses incurred by the assessee company on foreign education of whole-time director be treated as a business expenditure of the assessee and be allowed as a deduction.

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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2014-TIOL-237-ITAT-DEL Vijaya Bank vs. ITO ITA No. 2672 to 2674/Del/2013 Assessment Years: 2007-08 to 2009-10. Date of Order: 14-03-2014

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S/s. 197A(1A), 201, 201(1A) – Delay in filing declarations with the jurisdictional CIT does not attract provisions of section 201 and such assessee cannot be held to be an assessee in default u/s. 201(1A).

Facts:
Survey was conducted on Gurgaon Branch of the assessee, a nationalised bank. In the course of the survey, it was found that the said branch of the assessee had short deducted tax at source in some cases and in some cases, it had not deducted tax at source. It was the case of the bank that it had obtained Form No. 15G and Form No. 15H but had not filed the same with the CIT. The Assessing Officer (AO) rejected the contentions of the assessee and determined the tax payable u/s. 201 at Rs. 3,59,950 and interest payable thereon u/s. 201(1A) at Rs. 1,61,955.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had mentioned in a letter dated 16-02-2010 filed with ITO(TDS) that it is submitting Forms 15G/15H alongwith a request to condone the delay. The Tribunal held that unless it is proved that Form No. 15G and 15H were not in fact submitted by loan creditors, the assessee cannot be blamed because at the time of paying interest to loan creditors, the assessee payer, has per force to rely upon the declarations filed by the loan creditors and the assessee was not expected to embark upon an inquiry as to whether the loan creditors really and in truth have no taxable income on which tax is payable. If such kind of duty is cash upon the assessee payer, that would be putting an impossible burden on the assessee.

The Tribunal following the decision of the Mumbai Bench in the case of Vipin P. Mehta vs. ITO (11 Taxmann.com 342)(Mum) held that if the assessee has delayed the filing of declaration with the office of the jurisdictional CIT, within the time limit specified in the Act, that is a distinct omission or default for which penalty is prescribed. Merely because there was a failure on the part of the assessee bank to submit these declarations to the jurisdictional Commissioner within time, it cannot be held that the assessee did not have declarations with him at the time when the assessee Bank paid interest to the payees.

The Tribunal allowed all the three appeals filed by the assessee.

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2014-TIOL-225-ITAT-PUNE DCIT vs. The Nashik Merchant Co-operative Bank Ltd. ITA No. 950/PN/2013 Assessment Years: 2009-10. Date of Order: 30-04-2014

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S/s. 37, 43B – Premium paid in excess of the face value of investments, classified under HT M category, which has been amortised over a period till maturity is allowable as revenue expenditure since the claim is as per RBI guidelines and CBDT has also directed to allow the said premium.

Amount paid as contribution to the Education Fund of State Government, as per guidelines of Commission of Cooperative Department is allowable as deduction.

Facts I:
The assessee, a co-operative bank, had debited a sum of Rs. 3,73,600 to its Profit & Loss Account under the head Investment Premium Amortization Account. This amount represented premium on securities which were to be held to maturity (HTM). The assessee submitted that since these securities were to be HTM the premium is required to be amortised over the period remaining to maturity. The Assessing Officer (AO) rejected this contention and disallowed the sum of Rs. 3,73,600.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who allowed the appeal.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held I:
The Tribunal noted that the Master Circular on Investment by Primary (Urban) Co-operative Banks issued by RBI required the premium to be amortised over the period remaining to maturity. It also noted that CBDT has in instruction no. 17 of 2008 dated 26-11-2008 has made a reference to the RBI guidelines and has stated that the latest guidelines of the RBI may be referred to for allowing such claims. It also noted that the Mumbai Bench has in the case of ACIT vs. Bank of Rajasthan Ltd. (2011-TIOL-35-ITAT -MUM) following the said circular of CBDT held that the premium paid in excess of face value of investments is allowable as revenue expenditure.

Following the said circular, instruction and guidelines issued by the CBDT and the RBI the Tribunal held that amortisation of premium paid on government securities is allowable expenditure.

Facts II:
The assessee had debited to its P & L Account and claimed as deduction, a sum of Rs. 10,60,882 which was paid as contribution to Education Fund. This amount represented the contribution made by assessee as a multi-state co-operative society to central government. The AO disallowed this sum of Rs. 10,60,882.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who allowed the appeal.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held II:
The Tribunal noted that the contribution was paid by the assessee as per the guidelines of the Commission of Co-operative Department. The contribution made is mandatory on the part of every co-operative bank in the state of Maharashtra. Since the bank had to work under the control of the Commissioner of Co-operation, Maharashtra, the order issued by the Commissioner was obligatory on the bank. The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had rightly held the contribution paid by bank to be a business expenditure wholly exclusively incurred for the purpose of business and accordingly, allowable u/s. 37(1) of the Act. This ground of appeal of the revenue was dismissed by the Tribunal.

The appeal filed by revenue was dismissed

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Recovery of tax: Attachment: Section 281: A. Y. 2005-06: Transfer of property during pendency of assessment proceedings: TRO has no power to declare sale deed void: Appropriate proceedings to be taken in civil court:

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Dr. Manoj Kabra vs. ITO; 364 ITR 541 (All):

The petitioner purchased a property by means of a registered sale deed on 25-09-2007 from A when the assessment of A for the A. Y. 2005-06 was in process. The assessment resulted in certain demand. On 03-01-2008, the Assessing Officer of A issued a notice u/s. 281 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 to the petitioner to show cause why the sale deed executed by the seller in favour of the petitioner should not be treated as a void document. The petitioner’s objection was overruled by the Assessing Officer holding that there was inadequate consideration for the transfer of the property by the seller in favour of the petitioner and, therefore, the conveyance was a void document.

On a writ petition challenging the said order of the Assessing Officer, the Allahabad High Court held as under:

“i) The Legislature does not intend to confer any exclusive power or jurisdiction upon the Income-tax Authority to decide any question arising u/s. 281 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The section does not prescribe any adjudicatory machinery for deciding any question which may arise u/s. 281 and in order to declare a transfer as fraudulent u/s. 281, an appropriate proceeding in accordance with law is required to be taken u/s. 53 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

ii) The Income-tax Officer, in order to declare the transfer void u/s. 281 and being in the possession of the creditor, is required to file a suit for declaration to the effect that the transaction of transfer is void u/s. 281.

iii) The Income-tax Officer had exceeded his jurisdiction in adjudicating the matter u/s. 281. He had no jurisdiction to declare the sale deed as void. Consequently, the order cannot be sustained and was quashed.”

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