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Arbitration Law In India-The Way Forward

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Introduction
Indian commerce has been bubbling with hope and anticipation that the newly elected government will usher in a new era of regulatory reforms and improve the stagnating business environment in the country. True enough, the new ministers have been making all the right noises about creating a lean and efficient administration that will focus on governance rather than government. But it is not difficult to realize that a no-nonsense workaholic PM and well-intentioned ministers are not enough. Several other cogs need to move smoothly to create a healthy business and commerce ecosystem in a democracy. One such critical component of a vigorous economy is an efficient and smooth-functioning judicial system. This is needed so that disputes, particularly commercial disputes, are resolved quickly and in a cost-effective manner instead of disappearing into the black-hole of judicial backlog that the Indian Court system is infamous for.

In an attempt to revolutionarise dispute resolution in India that was stalled by the burgeoning traditional Indian Court system and to give contracting parties greater flexibility in choosing their dispute resolution mechanism, India updated its arbitration law in 1996. This was done by replacing the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 (“1940 Act”) with the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“1996 Act”), which largely adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. The 1996 Act made significant improvements to the existing arbitration regime and has been responsible for the growing popularity of arbitration as the default dispute resolution mechanism in most commercial contracts. While the 1996 Act has been a reasonable effort by the legislature, the judicial interpretation of some of its provisions have made this “alternate” dispute resolution mechanism subject to constant (and often time-consuming) interference by the Courts. This has dulled, to some extent, the sheen and attractiveness of arbitration in India.

The two hallmarks of arbitration, at least, from an aspirational point of view, are: (i) the ability of parties to contractually substitute the regular civil courts with a private tribunal comprising of the parties’ chosen adjudicators whose decision has the force of law; (ii) avoidance of the pitfalls and inconvenience of court litigation including cost, delays, lack of subject matter expertise, inflexible venue, etc.

This Article seeks to identify some of the key drawbacks of the arbitration regime in India and the aspirations this author has from the judiciary, suggests solutions to overcome the same, which could possibly help restore the efficacy of arbitration in India over the coming years. By way of disclaimer, I must also acknowledge that this Article does not propose to be an exhaustive critique of arbitration in India but merely seeks to introduce the mostly common issues that are plaguing the Indian arbitration regime.

1. Refusal to uphold the binding nature arbitration agreements

Arbitration, simply put, is the voluntary submission of a present or future dispute by parties to a private tribunal (as opposed to a civil court) consisting of persons chosen either by the parties themselves, or through a procedure agreed upon by the parties, for final and binding adjudication. Once parties have agreed to arbitration as the dispute resolution mechanism for their disputes, they are expected to be bound by such agreement and cannot resort to civil courts for adjudication of such disputes.

This defining character of arbitration, i.e., exclusion of courts by agreement of parties, finds resonance in numerous provisions of the Arbitration Act. For example, section 5 of the 1996 Act declares that once parties have entered into an arbitration agreement for arbitration in India, “no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided…”

Section 8 goes one step further. It directs every judicial authority before which an action is brought in a matter that is the subject matter of an arbitration agreement to compulsorily refer the parties to arbitration upon the application any of the parties to the arbitration agreement. The Supreme Court too has viewed Section 8 as a legislative mandate on the Courts that leaves Courts with no discretion or choice in matters where parties have already entered into arbitration agreements. In P. Anand Gajapathi Raju & Ors. vs. P. V. G. Raju (Dead) & Ors1. , the Supreme Court has observed that section 8 is “peremptory” in nature and proceeded to hold as follows:

“It is, therefore, obligatory for the Court to refer the parties to arbitration in terms of their arbitration agreement. Nothing remains to be decided in the original action or the appeal arising therefrom.”

Section 8 further clarifies that “notwithstanding that an application has been made u/s/s. (1) and that the issue is pending before the judicial authority, an arbitration may be commenced or continued and an arbitral award made”. This further reaffirms the emphasis on the primacy given to arbitration. So even if one party initiates proceedings in Court despite entering into an arbitration agreement, the other party would remain entitled to commence arbitration and the arbitral tribunal can proceed to hear the matter even before the Court decides an application for reference to arbitration.

It is also worth noting that section 8 does not apply only to Courts. It applies to all “judicial authorities” before whom a dispute covered by an arbitration agreement is brought. Accordingly, all other authorities performing judicial functions, including tribunals such as the Company Law Board, are intended to be bound by the mandatory language of section 8.

The Scheme of the 1996 Act, and sections 5 and 8 in particular, make it clear that once parties have entered into an arbitration agreement, they will be held to their bargain and the courts will do permit either side to circumvent the arbitration agreement by commencing judicial proceedings instead of arbitration. But this legislative scheme has been somewhat diluted by three sets of decisions of Indian courts that have allowed Courts to retain control over certain kinds of the disputes even in the face of an arbitration agreement.

1.1. Multiple parties and multiple causes of action

In Sukanya Holdings (P) Ltd. vs. Jayesh H Pandya and Anr.2 , the Supreme Court held that:

…there is no provision in the Act that when the subject matter of the suit includes subject matter of the arbitration agreement as well as other disputes, the matter is required to be referred to arbitration. There is also no provision for splitting the cause or parties and referring the subject matter of the suit to the arbitrators…

…In our view, it would be difficult to give an interpretation to section 8 under which bifurcation of the cause of action that is to say the subject matter of the suit or in some cases bifurcation of the suit between parties who are parties to the arbitration agreement and others is possible. This would be laying down a totally new procedure not contemplated under the Act.

By the above ruling, the Supreme Court has created two exceptions to the mandate of section 8. According to the Apex Court, a judicial authority was not required to refer parties to arbitration u/s. 8 when: (i) the claim involves multiple parties, some of whom are not party to the arbitration agreement, or (ii) if only some, but not all of the disputes among the parties are covered by the arbitration agreement.

It is submitted that this case creates an unnecessary exception to the mandate of compulsory arbitration u/s. 8. First, the decision proceeds on the basis that when multiple claims are involved among the same parties, they must necessarily be pursued by way of a single composite legal proceeding. This, however, is not mandated by the either the 1996 Act or the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). In fact, Order I, Rule 3 of the CPC only permits (but does not require) a plaintiff to join several disputes or causes of action or sue several defendants in the same Suit. Moreover, Order I, Rule 6 of the CPC actually permits the Court to split up a composite suit if the joinder of the multiple causes of action would “embarrass or delay the trial” or “is otherwise inconvenient”.

Secondly, the decision is prone to misuse by parties  that wish to back out of an arbitration agreement. For instance, two contracting parties having several transactions with each other may very often have several disputes and claims against each other, only some of which are covered by an arbitration agreement. A party who is keen on escaping the rigors of arbitration can do so quite easily by merely raising claims that are not covered by the arbitration agreement. Since the Court will not examine the merits of the substantive dispute at the initial stage of determining whether or not the matter should be referred to arbitration, a party can escape arbitration by raising even a frivolous claim that falls outside the scope of the arbitration agreement. Similarly, a person can also avoid an arbitration agreement by cheekily raising claims against other persons who are not party to the arbitration agreement. In fact, a person need not even raise an actual claim against such third parties. He can implead them in the Suit as “proper” parties so long as they have some reasonable connection with the subject matter of the Suit.

1.2.    Matters covered by special laws
It is reasonably well settled across most jurisdictions that a dispute affecting rights in rem (i.e., matters affecting the world at large) cannot be the subject matter of arbitration. So matters involving criminal offences, winding-up of companies or suits for foreclosure of a mortgage are generally considered as matters in which the public at large has an interest and are therefore non-arbitrable. The Supreme Court, however, has extended this logic to certain cases that involve nothing more than the personal rights of the disputing parties and has allowed Courts to interfere even when parties have consensually submitted certain disputes to arbitration.

In Natraj Studios (P) Ltd. vs. Navrang Studios3 and Mansukhlal Dhanraj Jain vs. Eknath Vithal Ogale4, the Supreme Court held that all matters falling within the ju- risdiction of the Small Causes Courts, including disputes between a landlord and tenant and matters between a licensor and licensee relating to recovery of possession, could not be the subject matter of arbitration. The Su- preme Court reasoned that in so far as landlord-tenant and licensor-licensee disputes are concerned, the Small Causes Court was vested with the exclusive jurisdiction to try such cases under the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882.

Although the above two cases were decided before the 1996 Act came into force, their dicta continues to be followed by the Bombay High Court5. As a result, even when a landlord-tenant or a licensor-licensee enter into  a written agreement to refer all disputes between themselves, including disputes relating to recovery of possession, to arbitration, either party can avoid the arbitration agreement by claiming that the Small Causes Court has exclusive jurisdiction to try such matters.

Presumably, this reasoning can be extended to all matters where designated courts and tribunals have been vested with jurisdiction try certain specific type of cases. In fact, in several cases, the Company Law Board has also taken a similar view and assumed jurisdiction over shareholder disputes even when there was an arbitration clause between the shareholders. For instance, in the case of Rajendra Kumar Tekriwal vs. Unique Construction Pvt. Ltd.6, the Company Law Board held as follows:

“…the test to determine as to whether the matter in a petition u/s. 397 & 398 is to be relegated to arbitration or not, one has to examine whether the allegations  of oppression/mismanagement contained therein can be adjudicated without reference to the terms of the arbitration agreement. In the present case, this Board can examine the allegations purely on the basis of the Articles. If it can be, then the question of referring the matter to arbitration does not arise even if assuming that there is an arbitration agreement and the agreement covers the same matter. In the present case though there is arbitration agreement, the matter relates to oppression and mismanagement directly relating to the rights of or benefit to shareholders in their capacity as members of the company arising out of the provisions of the Act, Articles or on equitable grounds. Assuming that the matters are covered under the arbitration agreement yet, since the same is covered under the Articles also, this Board can determine the allegations only with reference to the Articles and without recourse to the arbitration agreement.”

This line of reasoning, it submitted, not only dilutes one of the objectives of the 1996 Act, viz. to reduce the burden on the judicial system, but also flies in the face of the plain language of section 8. There is nothing in the 1996 Act which suggests that merely because a dispute falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of a special Court or Tribunal, such dispute is incapable of being determined by arbitration. On the contrary, section 8 deliberately uses the words “judicial authority” instead of “civil court”. A reasonable interpretation of section 8, especially in light of the object of the 1996 Act, would suggest that the legislature deliberately used the wider term “judicial authority” to ensure that the section 8 covers all judicial bodies, including special Courts and Tribunals such as Small Causes Court and Company Law Board.

1.3.    Fraud and other complicated matters
The third set of cases, which has further diluted the sanctity of a binding arbitration agreement between the parties, are the decisions where the Court has held that an arbitral tribunal is not equipped to deal with matters involving complicated questions of fact or law or disputes where an allegation of fraud is has been made.

Under the old arbitration law7, the Court was not bound to refer parties to arbitration even when parties had entered into an arbitration agreement. The Court could, for “sufficient reason”, refuse to relegate parties to arbitration and instead decide the dispute itself. But the language of section 8 of the 1996 Act, as explained above, is mandatory and leaves the Court with no discretion.

Despite the clear difference between the provisions of the two legislations, the Madras High Court, in the case of Oomor Sait HG vs. Asiam Sait8, has taken the view that even under the 1996 Act, the Court continues to retain the “time-tested” power of deciding whether or not to refer the dispute before the Arbitrator.

The Supreme Court, in the case of N. Radhakrishnan vs. Maestro Engineers & Ors.9 has upheld this view and held that when there are serious allegations of fraud or malpractices or manipulation of finances such matters cannot be properly dealt with by an Arbitrator. Such issues should, “for the furtherance of justice”, be tried in a court of law which would be “more competent and have the means to decide such a complicated matter…”. This reasoning has been followed in several subsequent cases.

It is submitted that this is an artificial exception that has been carved out despite there being no legislative backing for it under the 1996 Act. In fact, it appears to be a hangover from the early days of judicial mistrust of arbitration when the Courts felt that arbitration, as a means of adjudication, was rife with short-comings10. But this exception creates to the rule that an arbitration agreement is binding on the parties and the Court, creates a virtual black-hole. A party who does not wish to submit to arbitration can  do so by merely raising an allegation of fraud and claiming that such an issue cannot be adjudicated upon by an arbitrator. Unless the Supreme Court changes its view, it would be difficult for any civil Court or High Court take a different view and they would find themselves compelled to ignore the arbitration agreement in every matter where there is an allegation, howsoever far-fetched of fraud.

2.    Pre-arbitration litigation
The other problem plaguing the arbitration regime in India is the lengthy and expensive pre-arbitration litigation that is required when one party (usually the party disputing the claim) refuses to participate in the arbitration process. U/s. 11 of the 1996 Act, if parties to an arbitration are unable to agree on the arbitrators or if one party refuses to participate in the appointment of an arbitrator, then the Chief Justice of the relevant High Court (or his designate) is empowered to appoint the arbitrator.

A plain reading of the section suggests an innocuous procedure whereby designated Judge will perform a routine task of merely naming an arbitrator and relegate the parties to the arbitration by such a court appointed arbitrator. The Supreme Court, however, in the landmark case of SBP has held that the Chief Justice’s power u/s. 11 is not an administrative task that can be carried out summarily but is matter far more exhaustive. The Court has defined the role of the Chief Justice u/s. 11 as follows:

“Obviously, he has to decide his own jurisdiction in the sense, whether the party making the motion has approached the right High Court. He has to decide whether there is an arbitration agreement, as defined in the Act and whether the person who has made the request before him, is a party to such an agreement. It is necessary to indicate that he can also decide the question whether the claim was a dead one; or a long barred claim that was sought to be resurrected and whether the parties have concluded the transaction by recording satisfaction of their mutual rights and obligations or by receiving the final payment without objection. It may not be possible at that stage, to decide whether a live claim made, is one which comes within the purview of the arbitration clause. It will be appro- priate to leave that question to be decided by the arbitral tribunal on taking evidence, along with the mer- its of the claims involved in the arbitration. The Chief Justice has to decide whether the applicant has satisfied the conditions for appointing an arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Act. For the purpose of taking a decision on these aspects, the Chief Justice can either proceed on the basis of affidavits and the documents produced or take such evidence or get such evidence recorded, as may be necessary.”

As a result of the above interpretation given by the Supreme Court, appointment of an arbitrator is by no means a straightforward process. A person who seeks appointment of an arbitrator, is first required to prove through affidavits and detailed arguments the following: (i) existence of a validly executed arbitration agreement; (ii) that the claim is a long dead one; (iii) that there has been no accord or satisfaction. This entails filing of detailed pleadings and exhaustive oral arguments and it could be several months before the High Court makes a decision and appoints an arbitrator. Even if the High Court chooses to exercise its power in favour of arbitration and appoints an arbitrator, this appointment can be challenged by way of a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.

CONCLUSION
The 1996 Act, as it stands today, is a reasonable effort at promoting arbitration. But the manner in which several of its provisions, especially section 8 and section 11, have come to be interpreted by the Courts, somewhat takes away from this effort. It is submitted that as a result of the colour given to these provisions if the 1996 Act by the various rulings of the Supreme Court, the hallmarks of arbitration, viz. mutual agreement to avoid courts, and expeditious decision making, continue to remain aspirational and serious re-thinking is required, preferably judicially, to correct this dichotomy.

The Supreme Court has in the past two years started taking a more liberal view of arbitration and has been less eager to assume control of matters when parties have agreed to exclude the jurisdiction of Indian courts. In the case of BALCO vs. Kaiser Aluminium12 the Supreme Court boldly overruled its long criticised decision in Bhatia International13 and held that Indian Courts have no role to play when the seat of arbitration is outside of India, even if parties or the property in dispute is in India. Furthermore, in World Sport Group vs. MSM Satellite (Singapore) Pte. Ltd.14, the Supreme Court has rejected the contention that an arbitral tribunal is incompetent to deal with allegations of fraud. But since this was a matter relating to an arbitration taking place outside of India, it does not apply to arbitrations held in India, which continue to be governed by the law laid down by the Supreme Court in N. Radhakrishnan’s15 case.

Both these decisions suggest that the Supreme Court has recognised that a strong push is required from the judiciary to correct the gap that exists between the legislative intent and judicial interpretation of Indian arbitration law. It is hoped that the Court continues this trend over the next few years and smoothens out the remaining creases, including the ones highlighted in this Article, by relooking at the law laid down in some of its previous decisions. !

Reinventing India A Youth Perspective

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Abstract
Mumbai, 8th June 2014: “Mumbai Metro: East meets West in 21 minutes flat!”

No, you read it right. It was 8th June 2014 and not 8th June 2004. Why people are so excited over something that they should have had at least 10 years ago, befuddles me! Mumbai generates 5% of India’s GDP, but our infrastructure system is in shambles! Roads are potholed, traffic situation is pathetic, trains, buses are unimaginably overcrowded and people spit, shit and litter anywhere, without a care! We have to bribe through our noses to get our work done and we are still struggling to get decent internet connectivity. Above all, every once in five years we are prepared to get attacked by terrorists. We may be an alpha world city, but it is shameful that we are lagging far, far behind our western counterparts. And what’s true for Mumbai, is truer for India.

At 24, me and my generation have become responsible for the future of our country. We have our sights on the global leadership throne, but we have inherited an onerous, corrupt kingdom. Well, since we are intent on becoming world pioneers, we have set out to reform our own nation first; we are going to cleanse it, bring it up-to-date and then lead it.

We have already taken our first steps towards this goal by bringing to power a government that takes our lofty aspirations seriously and is committed to help us achieve it. Together we shall take India to the heights billions before us have dreamt of! And now to war! A war for upliftment of the poor and the illiterate! A war for saving the dignity of our nation! A war against the mediocrities that have far too long plagued our country!

We shall evolve, leaders.

“Achche Din Aane Wale Hain.”

The entire country is gushing over this one statement of divine prophecy. Mere five words have made the stock markets go tipsy. Some are saying that this is the start of a new era for India! This is all very endearing except for the one single problem that I have: Why aren’t the achche din here already?

Our country makes me mad. The oldest civilization in the world and we are still a developing nation! 5,000 years of history that we are proud of, but a shameful present and a stumbling future! 30 crore Indians are illiterate. That is the entire population of the United States of America! 15 crore are poor. That is more than Japan’s entire population. And by the way, the international poverty line is Rs. 90 per day. Which means that when I sponsor dinner to my friends, I spend more in one hour than what my poor brother earns in a month! It is 2014, and India has not been able feed, clothe and house all her citizens. In a completely unrelated story, India has the 6th highest number of billionaires!

While we are talking about citizens, let us take a few questions from the people of my generation.

“Why do I feel scared of getting out of my house alone at 10 in the night even if I stay in the capital of the largest democracy in the world?” asks a 22 year old Delhi resident, Aditi.

“What is electricity? Is it a toy? I have never seen it!” says 8 year old Shivappa who resides in a small village called Makki in Karnataka.

“Why do I have to pay chai-pani everytime I have to get my file removed in the Income Tax Office?” asks 20 year old Rajesh, a budding CA hailing from Patna.

All these questions, my predecessors have left unanswered! And now it is upto me to answer them.

At 24, I have come to a stark realisation that the future of our country has fallen squarely on my and my generation’s shoulders. And we have inherited an outdated, bureaucratic and debauched state from our predecessors. The present government, like each of its forerunners, has promised the sky; but then again, has there ever been a dearth of promises in our land? Where the previous one’s have consistently and cumulatively floundered is backing up those promises with tangible efforts.

The onus therefore to make amends rests completely and unequivocally with my generation. It is now our responsibility to ameliorate the past, augment the present and accelerate the future. And thankfully, all is not lost. Our country still retains the proverbial silver lining in the form of educated and motivated young population, large domestic demand base and high savings rate. Fortunately, these are the exact things we could not have worked without.

Global leaders at everything. That’s what we aim to become. Be it trade or sports or education or technology. We want to edify the next Einstein, build the next Burj Khalifa and grubstake the next Google. We want to outdo China at the Olympics and end tiger poaching. We want to be the next startup hub, the next global tourism hub and the next healthcare hub. We want LTE connectivity in each village and a dream job for each citizen. We want be at the top, of the top.

Naysayers shall complain that we are being immature, materialistic and we don’t know what the realities and the difficulties are. No offence sir, but we don’t care. Yes, it is a steep, treacherous road. It is going to be a dogfight and we know it. But we don’t just dare to dream, we dare to live our dreams. Frankly, it is not just our dream. Billions before us had the same vision. But we shall be the torchbearers to an advanced Indian state!

Chris Gardener, the motivational American entrepreneur wrote that “if you don’t take the necessary steps to make them happen, dreams are just mirages that mess with your head!”. We have already taken the first steps towards achieving our dream! Over 2 crore first timers, 18 and 19 year olds, a record participation, voted for the rehabilitation and reform of the Indian economy. We voted for CHANGE. We voted for a government with a track record of fulfilling promises. And believe you me, we require this government to make good on some pretty big promises.

Our first mandate to this government is that they need to very clearly understand that they are a government to my generation. We are an impatient bunch of people. We have an attention span of 140 characters or lesser, so we’d be grateful if you make your point quickly. We are practical and result oriented. We value guidance, but we value quantifiable efforts more; what we don’t value is futile vote bank politics and bureaucratic processes. We are motivated to achieve our goal and we require you to be equitable enablers so that we can partner in making India the global superpower it should be!

To play out your role of being facilitators of growth, progress and development, we have a four point agenda where the government needs to immediately ring in definitive reforms. Special focus needs to be given to rural areas – where most our country’s resources reside.

Infrastructure
While we may live in a modern day society, our infrastructure is severely medieval. How else would it be possible that almost 25% of our population lives without electricty! Why is agriculture still dependent on natural rainfall and animal resources? The infrastructure sector is the backbone of all investments into our country, therefore it is critical that this sector gets the much needed shot in the arm.

Transportation, energy, telecommunication, education and healthcare are amongst the most vital sectors requiring impetus. All the villages have to be connected by a network of roadways, railways and basic amenities like electricity and water. Innovative automation, especially in the agriculture industry, e.g. computer controlled ploughing or schemes like ‘e-Choupal’ which empower the farmers needs to be introduced. The new government has to reduce bureaucracy and usher adequacy, accessability and reliability to strengthen investor confidence.

Education
Education system today, is down in the dumps. It is unequipped, outdated and ridiculously inadequate. Just to give a perspective, children born today shall retire in the year 2080! Is it even distantly possible for us to provide them with the skills to survive and thrive that long? Al- ready today, there is a sharp disconnect between the educated skills and employable skills.
The need of the hour is to reengineer our education curriculum so as to embed employability into courses and forge stronger links between business and academia. Teacher education system has to be rebuilt, grounds up. Partnering with foreign institutions offering specialisation programmes shall upgrade the Indian education system to global standards. It is imperative for the new govern- ment to increase spending on education to 5% of GDP.

CORRUPTION
With the parallel economy running at $ 700 billion per year or 40% of our GDP, corruption is the biggest reason for inequitable wealth distribution in our country. It is literally killing our nation. Unfortunately, the canker doesn’t stop at illicit monetary transactions. Our biggest cause of worry is the corruption of moral and ethical values.

The new government has to put an end to corruption. Immediately. Permanently. Stringent anti-corruption framework and comprehensive education to impart discipline consistent with a national code of conduct for good citizenship shall act as strong deterrents to corruption. Policy makers may implement the Nordic model of governance which practically eradicated corruption in some developed Scandinavian countries. But most of all, Indian citizens need to realise that corruption can only be completely evicted from within, not without.

ECONOMY AND GOVERNANCE

Our economy is dithering due to high levels of inflation, instable currency and the alarming levels of fiscal deficit. The zooming stock markets are nothing but a heightned sense of exuberance, the fundamentals beneath the dizzy heights are yet to improve. Also, with only 3% of the entire population paying taxes, the government has to take some hard calls to increase public revenues, improve economic factors and bring sanity back to the land.

Softer issues like casteism, communal disharmony, gender inequality and rampant crime are still affecting our society Despite living in the 21st century it is deplorable that a woman is raped every 20 minutes in India. We, as a society, are self-conceited megalomaniacs. Freedom of expression is trampled on regularly and intolerance is  an instinct embedded deep within the Indian psyche. It has become necessary now to attack this malaise from  a national platform. Women empowerment has to be a agenda item. Implementation of radical and stringent penal practices has become a necessity. Governance has to be redefined to mean Minimum government, Maximum governance!

HOW CAN CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS HELP?

While as a member of Young India I am responsible to contribute towards India’s growth and progress, being a qualified chartered accountant makes me doubly account- able to achieve my generation’s goal for India. Our qualification gives us the skills and the access to almost any industry we choose. It charges us with the responsibility of being ombudsmen to our society to ensure enhanced transparency and accountability. But how do we dispose these responsibilities? What measures do we take to en- sure that CAs are at the forefront of all professionals?

Contributing towards rural and semi urban development Growing investment in agriculture, relocation of manufac- turing base to tier II and tier III cities and acceptance of the concept of inclusive growth shall generate consider- able requirement of financial administration, risk manage- ment, tax planning, accountancy, legal advice and better governance in rural and semi urban areas. The time is ripe for CAs to increasingly set up proprietorships and partnership firms here. We can assist the local panchay- ats in areas of governance, taxation and finance planning. One more area of contribution may be compliance to the latest Corporate Social Responsibility provisions, where- by companies shall be able to uplift rural and backtroden areas.

CONTRIBUTING TOWARDS GLOBALISATION

According to a United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) survey in 2012, India is the second most important foreign direct investment (FDI) destination for transnational corporations after China. Further, the new government’s focus on improving strategic ties with key foreign powers and its determination to simplify the investment process shall propel FDIs in our country.

There is therefore, a burgeoning requirement of CAs in the areas of double taxation avoidance, transfer pricing and corporate laws. IFRS, sustainability reporting, UK Bribery Act and SOX are also becoming a compliance necessity for Indian multinational conglomerates. Specialising in these areas shall help us better align with these requirements and supplement the global India case.

CONTRIBUTING TOWARDS AUTOMATION

Technology is slowly permeating and disrupting every sphere of business. The risk landscape of various sectors like banking, insurance, capital markets, telecommunication, etc. has undergone a paradigm shift with increased dependence on internet and technology. Also, with the proliferation of Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) solutions, organisations today have lesser control over data integrity, privacy and reliability. There is an urgent need for CAs to enhance their risk management expertise by equipping themselves with skills necessary for identification, assessment and mitigation of IT risks.

CONTRIBUTING TOWARDS CEASING CORRUPTION IN INDIA

Being CAs we are always precariously treading the thin line between tax evasion and tax planning. Similarly, cor- porations today are always trying new ways to ‘improve’ their financial statements. It is imperative therefore, that we ensure real compliance with various provisions of the taxation laws and reporting standards, that we steadfastly uphold our ethical values and moral standards and ensure that we neither allow nor abet any act of malfeasance.

Public and government sector have recently been riddled with scams like 2G and Commonwealth. CAs have to ensure transparency, by making the government accountable towards the country and its citizens for the utilisationof citizens funds through exhaustive public audits.

CONTRIBUTING TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP

Our nation is becoming increasingly entrepreneurial. There has been a huge spurt in the number of startups in the recent years and the trend is going to be an up- swing. With a huge demand for support areas like market research, venture funding, financial modeling or business value chain implementation, CAs have to hone the skills they already have to be at the forefront of this bull wave!

THE NEED TO REINVENT OURSELVES

It is evident that there is a lot of opportunity for us, CAs,to make our mark in India’s next decade of advancement. However, it is now inevitable that we reinvent who we are! Whether in practice or industry, we can no longer solely remain financial stakeholders of companies. We have to become business stakeholders!

It’s going to be an uphill task, history and tradition are against us, but it can be achieved. What we need is a catharsis! A step back to realign our interests with those of our nation. We need to innovate some of the core elements of our present day qualification so as to make it more attuned to the present day scenario. For instance,
•    The current curriculum and the examination pattern needs to be revisited. Inputs should be drawn from industry, practices and international institutes so that the curriculum ensures employability and equips our students to have an equal standing with their global counterparts. Special attention should be awarded to cross functional training since today, MBAs, cost accountants, financial analysts, etc. have started replacing CAs, even in core areas like finance and taxation.

•    Is an audit firm oriented articleship the only option for practical training? Why can’t students gain industrial training for the entirety of their tenure from some of the top companies of India? We need to realize that the students have two diets of careers to choose from, practice firms and industry. It is imperative that a solution is derived for the blinkered audit based training approach.

•    Partnering with foreign institutions has become the need of the hour. With CA students opting for multiple degrees, the institute should ensure that the skills developed by the CA institute are not put to waste. Collaboration, not competition is the way forward. Also, with multiple professional degrees, what matters is that CAs continually update themselves in their area of work and remain relevant. However, it is doubtful whether the present CPE norms ensure continuous education. A bitter pill that needs to be swallowed and worked upon.

•    Most importantly, the ICAI needs to ensure that it remains strongly in control of the central elements of our profession – accountancy, taxation and audit. It needs to retain relevance by producing quality CAs, and work against becoming an exam conducting body generating dignified accountants!

It is imperative therefore, that CAs allineate themselves to the big picture. This nation is now in the hands of a new generation, our generation. Fearless and unafraid, we are the custodians of India’s advanced future. The revolution has already begun. And we will emerge victorious. We shall evolve, leaders!

Achche din are here!

Gazing through the crystal ball

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My Country
Every third person in an Indian city today is a youth. In about seven years, the median individual in India will be 29 years, very likely a city-dweller, making it the youngest country in the world. India is set to experience a dynamic transformation as the population burden of the past turns into a demographic dividend, but the benefits will be tempered with social and spatial inequalities.

The requirements of a younger nation differ radically from aging countries like Japan or even China, for that matter. By 2020, India is set to become the world’s youngest country with 64% of its population in the working age group. A UN HABITAT report states that while income levels in cities may appear to be higher, the cost of living is also constantly increasing, resulting in shrinking savings, inadequate access to health care and lack of quality education.

And so, I believe that our young, growing country demands a progressive, result-oriented transformation-and a nation that can cater to theaspiration and temperament of the young population. India 10 years from now will be more intelligent, more informed, less tolerant of incompetence and regressive practices. I believe that we are growing more aware as a nation.

I believe that a decade from now, we will be a more transparent, and accountable nation-where change and progress will get more apparent. I don’t believe that a radical transformation would be required-but stable, steady and sustainable growth is more desirable and will perhaps, be delivered.

Dr. APJ Abdul Kalam’s book, 2020 – A Vision for the New Millennium, examines in depth the weakness and the strength of India, as a nation, and offers a vision of how India can emerge to be among the world’s first four economic powers by 2020. This is a goal post that we can all agree, is desirable and on everyone’s agenda.

However, I believe that there is another critical component to development in the country. Inclusive growth and a green economy are the government’s guiding principles for its development agenda. Sustainability-economic, environmental and social can provide a balanced approach to the development of the nation.

The UN Environment Programme’s Green Economy Report demonstrates that green economies are a new engine of growth, generate decent jobs and are vital to eliminating persistent poverty.

And so, while I hope for a stable and progressive country in the decade to come, I also hope that our economic social and environmental goals will align with sustainable ideals.

My Profession

As a Sustainability and Green Building Consultant, I am currently part of some of the most topical conversations with regard to environment, renewable energy, energy efficiency, technology etc. Sustainable solutions mean meeting our lifestyle and existential requirements in a manner which is harmonious with the environment and does not jeopardise the future of our existence on this planet.

Sustainability is no longer a buzzword but reflects an indispensability as our survival depends on it. India, aspiring to be an opinion leader and increasingly emerging as one, especially in the aftermath of the recession, needs to be at the vanguard of this movement and lead from the front.
Indians have realised the importance of making their residences compatible with environment, and regulators have also become active. If environmental activists continue to be as vociferous as they are now, I would like to believe that Consulting on Green building will probably have ended-I am going to have to find something else to do! It will be passé, as projects will be designed to be more efficient through inherent design, effective resource consumption and innovative technologies.

I would like to believe that the profession of a sustainability consultants will disintegrate into creating impactful policy level decisions to ensure sustainable growth in the country-regardless of the sector-agriculture, healthcare, real estate etc. I would also like to believe that sustainability consultants can use their experience to think as innovators to solve solutions of environmental degradation- in all fields.

Expectations
Transparency. Responsibility. Accountability. These are the expectations from our government.

We as citizens, understand that we are stakeholders in the issues pertaining to the country’s development and growth. We would like to understand our responsibility and the manner in which progressive policy formulation is done. There needs to be transperancy in this regard.

For this to happen, I believe that governments need to respect and understand the role of sustainability, for growth and superior long term returns. As US President, John F. Kennedy once said, “There are risks and costs to a program of action. But they are far less than the long-range risks of comfortable inaction.”

Organised action toward sustainable growth with measurable outcomes is expected. For example: strategies to manage resources like water, and energy must be measured and regulated in a responsible manner. Corruption with regard to regulation of other natural resources must be stopped. Education at large, and an emphasis on sustainability will allow ups to be equipped for future needs and requirements. Progressive policies on agriculture and even urban farming to mitigate long-term environmental risks and hazards is key. Furthermore, policies that require us to measure, monitor and regulate carbon emissions at large, across all industries and domestic sectors is critical.

The Indian private sector, known for its resilience and entrepreneurship, is ideally placed to lead this movement and the government’s policies in this regard, although not adequate as of now, are at least encouraging and reflect the right intentions. A combination of entrepreneurship and adequate policies has the potential of making India a role model for many to follow and emerge as a true super power, as only a high GDP growth rate is not the sole criterion in today’s scenario to be considered a superpower.

Most importantly, I believe that sustainability needs to be a way of life for it to become a reality. Our present state of excesses and skewed development is against the very grain of sustainable development. It needs to be community driven to not only provide everyone an incentive to be a part of the movement but also ensure equitable distribution of resources. The focus on rural areas is inevitable as two-thirds of the country lives in villages and small towns. They need to be made a part of the movement and made to see the benefits of the same before they are bitten by the ‘so-called development’ bug. The lifestyle and culture of an average person in such areas is conducive to this movement and all these attributes can be dove-tailed to fulfill the needs of Indians in a sustainable manner.

After all, as explained in a quote from Lakota, “We do not inherit the Earth from our ancestors; We borrow it from our children.”

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Imagining India From The Eyes Of Young Professionals

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On 16th May 2014, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
emerged victorious under the leadership of its prime ministerial
candidate, Mr. Narendra Modi. The BJP won an astounding 282 seats. Not
since 1984, had a single party single-handedly crossed the 272 mark
required to form a central government in Delhi. Moreover, the BJP and
its alliance partners that form the National Democratic Alliance (NDA)
won a grand total of 336 of the 543 seats. This general election to the
Lok Sabha was rightly billed as the biggest election in the history of
the world’s largest democracy and was keenly followed by the entire
world.

On 26th May 2014, Mr. Modi was sworn in as the 15th Prime
Minister of India. The first steps of the new government have been
positive thus far and irrespective of one’s views on Mr. Modi, there is
an undeniable feeling of optimism about the country and excitement for
the good times to come or as goes the BJP’s election campaign song,
“acchhe din aane wale hain”. One of the key reasons for the victory was
the effective use of social media and the strong focus on development
and good governance in its campaign which allowed the party to reach the
youth in a way never done before. The “Abki baar Modi sarkar” as well
as similar messages flooding the social media space in the months
leading to the election were specifically designed to attract the youth.
Not surprising given that almost 65% of the Indian population is below
the age of 35 today, with India having the largest youth population.
This youth-centric campaign that made development a key agenda also
played a crucial role in India registering its highest ever voter
turnout of 66.4%. The mandate was clear: Focus on the youth to shape
India’s future.

Acknowledging the fact that the future of India
is inextricably linked to the future development of India’s youth, the
Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society has, in the special issue to its
prestigious Bombay Chartered Accountant Journal, chosen the
theme“Imagining India from the eyes of young professionals”.

A
common question in job interviews is: “Where do you see yourself in the
next 10 years?” While most of us have chartered a path of where we want
our careers to be after 10 years, not many of us have thought, “Where do
I see my country in the next 10 years?” Admittedly, I too was one of
them and therefore, thank the Society for giving me this opportunity to
stop thinking from a micro level perspective and start thinking on a
macro level. Coming to the question at hand, I for one, like millions of
my fellow young professionals, am very optimistic.

I am sure
that a decade from now, India will be a super power, economically as
well as intellectually. It is no secret that this country is brimming
with talent. Millions of hard working and supremely talented people
proudly call this country their home. Yes, it has been hit hard by scams
in the recent past and many foreign investors have lost their
confidence in the economy. However, as the perennial optimist Harvey
Dent says in the movie, The Dark Knight, “The night is the darkest just
before dawn!” One can only hope that India has turned the page on one of
the darkest periods in its post-independence period and the dawn is
just around the corner.

It is only a matter of time before the
investor confidence is reposed in the Indian economy with the new
government hinting at steps to do the same by having a clearer tax
system and negating the element of uncertainty in the taxes that the
foreign investors are wary of today. Numerous foreigners awaited with
bated breath, the results of the recently concluded Indian elections as
though their future plans as well as their existing plans to invest in
the country depended upon it. Agreed, that it is not much to go on.
However, this has provided the new government a platform to give a
confidence boost to these potential investors and welcome them with open
arms.

A decade from now, we will see the economy being opened up
and moving towards becoming a free-market economy with minimum
regulation required. With trade flowing across the country, flowing
freely from all over the world, one would also see the strengthening of
economic ties with economies, such as China and Japan, allowing India to
position itself at the top for free trade with some of the largest
global players.

Such free trade would also result in an increase
in employment. The Prime Minister has already stated that inclusive
growth is the goal of the new government. Further, the Food Security
Bill and the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme,
if properly implemented, could drive the way towards eradication of
poverty. Creating employment would result in more disposable income in
the hands of more Indians, leading to an increase in demand for consumer
products. Further, the increase in disposable income in the hands of
the middle class Education reforms especially in rural India can spur
the improvement of the quality of education. It is only with quality
education that one hope to make India an economic power house. The first
67 years of the country’s independence have witnessed a high occurrence
of brain drain, especially in the information technology sector with
the Satya Nadellas and Rajeev Suris heading top corporations of the
world. However, the next decade consisting of free-market and a booming
economy would witness a reversal of the brain drain, where Indians
working abroad would return to India for better professional
opportunities and to serve their country. This phenomena has already
started with various foreign companies setting up businesses in India
and asking Indian employees already working abroad to return and work
from these Indian subsidiaries and branches in the initial stage.
Subsequently, one would witness many start ups beginning their journey
in the country and soon we would have our very own Silicon Valley. This
would be supported by the advancement of infrastructure and technology
in the country.

A recent tweet from the Prime Minister has
suggested that infrastructure does not only mean highways but also optic
fiber networks or ‘information highways’. A recent study shows that
India is currently 3rd in the world in terms of number of users of
internet! It is only a matter of time that it would have the highest
number of users in the world.

In terms of infrastructure, one
would also witness the improvement in the infrastructure in the country
in the coming decade with the Golden Quadrilateral (highway network of
roads) and the railways connecting every corner of the country.

In
respect of the chartered accountancy profession, I am of the firm
belief that we are in for exciting times ahead during the next decade.
With the three main laws, relating to the Companies Act, the Income Tax
Act and the Goods and Service Tax, undergoing an overhaul, it is back to
the drawing board for most of us in the profession.

Firstly, the
next decade would see chartered accountants moving away from the
traditional areas of practice such as audit and tax and towards
unexplored territory such as investment advisory, valuations, mergers
and acquisition advisory, transfer pricing, corporate law advisory,
securities law advisory, foreign exchange law advisory, management
consultancy etc. This in turn would lead to more opportunities being
available especially in unchartered areas. Further, with laws undergoing
major changes, clients would look up to the chartered accountants to
guide them for compliance with these new laws. One would therefore, see a
shift of focus from the attestation function to an advisory function.

Further, the Companies Act requires appointment of independent directors in case of certain companies. Who better than chartered accountants to be appointed as independent directors. It is common knowledge that a chartered accountant knows the business of his client, right from the efficiency in operations, accounting, finance and taxation aspects.

The free-market approach of the government leading to the increase in inbound investments would lead to an in- crease in the demand for chartered accountants as the foreign investors would not have knowledge of the laws applicable in India.

Secondly, the next decade would also see the rise in super-specialisation in the case of chartered accountants. The free-flowing trade and investment in India resulting in increase in the demand for chartered accountants would lead to higher occurrences of complex transactions and would require an expert in the field to understand such transactions. This would lead to chartered accountants specialising in certain fields thereby creating a niche. A ‘jack of all trades but king of none’ chartered accountant may not be able to survive in a highly competitive environment and therefore, eventually everyone will move towards super-specialisation. Super-specialisation would also lead to a higher bargaining power for the purposes of fees.

At the same time, many clients would prefer going to a one-stop shop i.e., a CA firm which would provide all the services that would be required by the client. This would lead to multiple chartered accountants or firms providing services in different niche areas merging or combining into one and working together and therefore providing various super-specialised services under one umbrella.

Thirdly, another major area where the chartered accountants will flourish in the next decade would be in assistance in policy making. This election has made one realise that there are many chartered accountants who have an interest in playing an active role in society. Chartered accountants would play an active role in the policy making of the government and would be instrumental in guiding the government on various economic as well as social aspects of governance.

The government is expected to give weightage to the suggestions and recommendations of the chartered accountant community as more often than not, a chartered accountant knows the ground reality about the implementation of the law , and therefore the best judge in formation of various economic policies.

Fourthly, another change in the profession in the next decade would be the realisation of the importance of communication and presentation skills. This would help the members of the profession to position themselves better in the market.

Finally, with the advancement of technology, borders between countries are slowly fading and the world is becoming one large global village. This has also resulted in the work moving towards a virtual world with diminishing requirement for a personal interaction. A chartered accountant of the future would have a far greater reach in terms of providing services due to this advancement of technology and would enable growth.

Only time will tell whether the India that I have imagined and the state of the profession that I have dreamt about will become a reality. However, one does feel extremely optimistic about these exciting and game-changing days ahead and a chartered accountant of the future would most certainly have a big role to play in society.

About our young authors of the special issue

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Sameer Pandit
Advocate

A law graduate from the National Law School of India University Bangalore, he completed his Masters at Harvard in 2011. He worked with an international law firm, Clifford Chance, at their London and Singapore offices and he is currently serving as a Senior associate with Wadia & Ghandy Solicitors. His area of specialisation is dispute resolution.

CA. Mahesh Nayak
Qualified as a Chartered accountant in 2011 and is currently with Contractor Nayak & Kishnadwala. He specialises in advisory services in the areas of FEMAand international tax.

CA. Pranav Vaidya
A chartered accountant with an advanced diploma in management accountancy as an additional qualification. He is currently with the Essar group as manager group assurance and cost control. Reviewed large capital investments made by the Essar Group into diversified sectors like Steel, Power, Oil, Shipping, Projects. His main areas of focus are project conceptualisation, planning execution, project management and post completion project appraisal.

Ms. Nazneen Ichhaporia
Advocate

A partner in ANB Legal, a prominent law firm, Nazneen is a corporate commercial lawyer with a focus on private equity and venture capital investments, acquisitions, joint ventures and business restructuring. She has expertise in matters relating to cross border investments, infrastructure, project finance, external commercial borrowings, franchising and intellectual property rights.

Ms. Priya Vakil
Architect

She is the managing and founding partner Ed en. She has done a specialisation in sustainable environmental design from the Architectural Association in London, UK. She has worked on creating innovative services related to green building certification, energy audits and design services related to the environment – like façade and landscape design. She is the winner of the exemplary performance award from Griha at the National Conference on Green Design.

Dr. Parth Mehta

A student with a bright academic career, he passed matriculation with flying colours. Extremely passionate about his career in the medical field. He qualified as a doctor in 2014. During this period, he was the recipient of the JRD Tata foundation scholarship. Currently, he is undergoing internship at Sion Hospital.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 145 dated 18th June, 2014

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Notification No. FEMA.307/2014-RB dated 26th May, 2014
Annual Return on Foreign Liabilities and Assets Reporting by Indian Companies – Revised format

This circular states that RBI has amended the FLA Return. The new return and FAQ for filling up the same have been uploaded on the RBI website – www.rbi.org.in.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 144 dated 16th June, 2014

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Know Your Customer (KYC) norms/Anti-Money Laundering (AML) standards/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT)/Obligation of Authorised Persons under Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002 – Amendment to section 13(2) – Cross Border Inward Remittance under Money Transfer Service Scheme

This circular requires Authorised Persons, who are Indian Agents under MTSS, to nominate a Director on their Board as “designated Director” to ensure compliance with the obligations under the Prevention of Money Laundering (Amendment) Act, 2012.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 142 dated June 12, 2014

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Notification No.FEMA.295/2014-RB dated 24th February, 2014

Transfer of assets of Liaison Office (LO)/Branch Office (BO)/Project Office (PO) of a foreign entity either to its Wholly Owned Subsidiary (WOS)/Joint Venture (JV)/Others in India–Delegation of powers to AD Banks

Presently, banks can, subject to submission of prescribed closure documents, allow closure of the accounts of LO/ BO and repatriate the surplus balances.

This circular now permits banks to allow transfer of assets of LO/BO/PO, subject to compliance with the following stipulations by the concerned LO/BO/PO: –

1. T he LO/BO must have complied with the operational guidelines such as (i) submission of AAC (up to the current financial year) at regular annual intervals with copies endorsed to DGIT (International Taxation), (ii) obtained PAN from IT Authorities and (iii) got registered with ROC under Companies Act 1956. The PO must have complied with the guidelines regarding initial reporting requirements and submission of CA certified annual report indicating project status.

2. They must submit a certificate from their Statutory Auditors furnishing details of assets to be transferred indicating their date of acquisition, original price, depreciation till date, present book value or WDV value and sale consideration to be obtained. The Statutory Auditor must also confirm that the assets were not re-valued after their initial acquisition. The sale consideration must not be more than the book value in each case.

3. T he assets must have been acquired by the LO/BO/ PO from inward remittances and no intangible assets such as goodwill, pre-operative expenses must be included. Also, no revenue expenses must be capitalized and transferred to JV/WOS.

4. A ll applicable taxes must have been paid before the transfer of assets.

5. T ransfer of assets is permitted only when the foreign entity intends to close their LO/BO/PO operations in India.

6. A mounts received as a result of such transfer of assets can be credited to the bank account of the LO/ BO/PO as a permissible credit.

Banks have to submit the documents for scrutiny by their own auditors and RBI auditors. A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 143 dated 16th June, 2014Know Your Customer (KYC) norms/Anti-Money Laundering (AML) standards/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT)/Obligation of Authorised Persons under Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002 – Amendment to section 13(2) – Money Changing Activities

This circular requires Authorised Persons to nominate a Director on their Board as “designated Director” to ensure compliance with the obligations under the Prevention of Money Laundering (Amendment) Act, 2012.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 141 dated 6th June, 2014

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Notification No. FEMA. 305/2014-RB dated 22nd May, 2014 Pledge of shares for business purposes in favour of NBFCs

Presently, a non-resident can pledge shares held by him in and Indian Company in favour of a bank in India to secure the credit facilities being extended to the Indian Company for bonafide business purposes.

This circular permits banks to allow pledge of equity shares of an Indian Company held by non-resident investor/s in favour of a NBFC – whether listed or not, to secure the credit facilities extended to the Indian Company for bonafide business purposes/operations, subject to compliance with the conditions indicated below: –

(a) Only the equity shares listed on a recognized stock exchange/s in India can be pledged in favour of the NBFC.
(b) In case of invocation of pledge, transfer of shares must be in accordance with the credit concentration norm.
(c) (i) Bank can obtain a board resolution ‘ex ante’, passed by the Board of Directors of the Indian Company, that the loan proceeds received consequent to pledge of shares will be utilised by it for the declared purpose. (ii) Bank can also obtain a certificate ‘ex post’, from the statutory auditor of Indian Company, that the loan proceeds received consequent to pledge of shares, have been utilised by the investee company for the declared purpose.
(d) Indian company has to follow the relevant SEBI disclosure norms, as applicable.
(e) Credit concentration norms cannot be breached by the NBFC under any circumstances. If there is a breach on invocation of pledge, the shares must be sold and the breach must be rectified within a period of 30 days from the date of invocation of pledge.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 140 dated 6th June, 2014

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Notification No. FEMA. 304/2014-RB dated 22nd May, 2014

Foreign investment in India – participation by registered FPIs, SEBI registered long term investors and NRIs in non-convertible/redeemable preference shares or debentures of Indian companies

Presently, FII/FPI, QFI and long term investors registered with SEBI can invest in corporate debt up to $ 51 billion. Also, an Indian company can issue non-convertible/redeemable preference shares or debentures to non-resident shareholders, including the depositories that act as trustees for the ADR/GDR holders by way of distribution as bonus from its general reserves under a Scheme of Arrangement approved by a Court in India.

This circular permits: –

– FII, QFI, FPI and long term investors registered with SEBI – Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs), Multilateral Agencies, Pension/Insurance/Endowment Funds, foreign Central Banks to invest on repatriation basis; and

– NR I to invest both on repatriation and non-repatriation basis in non-convertible/redeemable preference shares or debentures issued by an Indian company in terms of A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 84 dated 6th January, 2014 and listed on recognised stock exchanges in India, within the overall limit of $ 51 billion earmarked for corporate debt.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 139 dated 5th June, 2014 Press Note No.2 (2014 Series) issued by the DIPP dated 4th February, 2014

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Notification No. FEMA. 301/2014-RB dated 4th April, 2014

Foreign investment in the Insurance Sector – Amendment to the Foreign Direct Investment Scheme This circular states that in terms of and subject to the conditions mentioned in Press Note 2 (2014 Series) FII / FPI and NRI can invest within the overall limit of 26% permitted for FDI in Insurance sector under the Automatic Route.

The amended paragraph 6.2.17.7 of FDI policy is as under: – Paragraph 6.2.17.7 of the ‘Consolidated FD1 Policy, effective from 5th April, 2013’, is replaced by the following:

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 138 dated 3rd June, 2014

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Liberalised Remittance Scheme (LR S) for resident individuals-Increase in the limit from $ 75,000 to $ 125,000

Presently, under the LRS an individual resident in India can remit up to $ 75,000 or its equivalent per financial year for any permitted current or capital account transaction or a combination of both.

This circular has increased the said limit from $ 75,000 per financial year to $ 125,000 per financial year. As a result, an individual resident in India can remit up to $ 125,000 or its equivalent per financial year for any permitted current or capital account transaction or a combination of both. However, remittance under the scheme cannot be made for any prohibited or illegal activities such as margin trading, lottery, etc.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 136 dated 28th May, 2014

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Notification No. FEMA 10A/2014-RB dated 21st March, 2014

Crystallisation of Inoperative Foreign Currency Deposits

Notification No. 10A and this circular require banks to crystallize and convert credit balances in any inoperative foreign currency denominated deposit into Indian Rupee as under: –

1. In case a foreign currency denominated deposit with a fixed maturity date remains inoperative for a period of three years from the date of its maturity, than at the end of the 3rd year, the bank has to convert the balances lying in the foreign currency denominated deposit into Indian Rupee at the exchange rate prevailing as on that date. Thereafter, the depositor will be entitled to claim either the said Indian Rupee proceeds and interest thereon, if any, or the foreign currency equivalent (calculated at the rate prevalent as on the date of payment) of the Indian Rupee proceeds of the original deposit and interest, if any, on such Indian Rupee proceeds.

2. In case of foreign currency denominated deposit with no fixed maturity period, if the deposit remains inoperative for a period of three years (debit of bank charges not to be reckoned as operation), the bank must, after giving three months’ notice to the depositor at his last known address as available with the bank, convert the deposit from the foreign currency in which it is denominated to Indian Rupee at the end of the notice period at the prevailing exchange rate. Thereafter, the depositor will be entitled to claim either the said Indian Rupee proceeds and interest thereon, if any, or the foreign currency equivalent (calculated at the rate prevalent as on the date of payment) of the Indian Rupee proceeds of the original deposit and interest, if any, on such Indian Rupee proceeds.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 135 dated 21st May, 2014

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Risk Management and Inter Bank Dealings

Presently, resident importers can book contracts to hedge the currency risk of their probable exposures, based on past performance, for an amount which is higher of the following: –
a) U p to 25% of the average of the previous three financial years’ import turnover; or
b) Previous year’s actual import turnover.

This circular has increase the limit of 25% to 50%. As a result, resident importers can book contracts to hedge the currency risk of their probable exposures, based on past performance, for an amount which is higher of the following: –
a) U p to 50% of the average of the previous three financial years’ import turnover; or
b) Previous year’s actual import turnover.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 133 dated 21st May1, 2014

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Import of Gold by Nominated Banks/Agencies/ Entities

This circular permits with immediate effect: –
A. Star Trading Houses/Premier Trading Houses (STH/ PTH) that are registered as nominated agencies by the Director General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) to import gold under 20:80 scheme. The conditions are: –
i) STH/PTH must have imported gold prior to the introduction of the 20:80 scheme. STH/PTH have to get this import verified by the Department of Customs at any port where they have imported gold consignment in the past.
ii) The first lot of gold under this scheme will be based on the highest monthly import during any of the last 24 months prior to the RBI’s notification dated 14th August, 2013, subject to a maximum of 2,000 kgs.
iii) STH/PTH can import the eligible quantity from any port.
iv) ATH /PTH must submit the import plan, port-wise and quantity-wise, to the concerned Customs office, where the verification of the figures of past performance was done.
v) STH/PTH importers will have to comply with the overall discipline of exporting 20% of each imported consignment before the next consignment is imported.

B. N ominated banks to give Gold Metal Loans (GML) to domestic jewellery manufacturers from the eligible domestic import quota of 80% to the extent of GML outstanding in their books as on 31st March, 2013.

Annexed to this circular is the revised working example of the operations of 20:80 scheme based on the changes announced in this circular.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 132 dated 21st May, 2014 Export of Goods – Long Term Export Advances

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Presently, an exporter has to obtain prior permission of RBI for receipt of advance where the export agreement provides for shipment of goods extending beyond the period of one year from the date of receipt of advance payment. Also, banks have been authorised to permit exporters to receive advance payment for export of goods which can take more than one year to manufacture and ship if the ‘export agreement’ provides for the same.

This circular authorises banks to permit exporters who have a minimum of 3 years satisfactory track record to receive long term export advance up to a maximum tenor of 10 years. This advance has to be utilised for execution of long term supply contracts for export of goods and is subject to the following conditions: –

a) Firm irrevocable supply orders should be in place. The contract with the overseas party / buyer must be vetted and it must clearly specify the nature, amount and delivery timelines of products over the years and penalty in case of nonperformance or contract cancellation. Also, product pricing must be in consonance with prevailing international prices.
b) The company should have the capacity, systems and processes in place to ensure that the orders over the duration of the said tenure can actually be executed.
c) The company must not have come under the adverse notice of Enforcement Directorate or any such regulatory agency or must not be caution listed.
d) Such advances must be adjusted through future exports.
e) The rate of interest payable on such advance, if any, must not exceed LlBOR plus 200 basis points.
f) Documents must be routed through one bank only.
g) Bank have to ensure compliance with AML/KYC guidelines and also undertake due diligence of the overseas buyer to ensure that it has good stand-in/soundtrack record.
h) Such export advances must not be used to liquidate Rupee loans, which are classified as NPA as per the RBI asset classification norms.
i) Double financing for working capital for execution of export orders must be avoided.
j) Receipt of advance of $ 100 million or more must be immediately reported to the Trade Division, Foreign Exchange Department, RBI, Central Office, 5th Floor, Amar Building, Mumbai under copy to the concerned Regional Office of RBI as per the format given in Annex – I to this circular.

Banks, if required, can issue bank guarantee (BG)/Stand by Letter of Credit (SBLC) for export performance, subject to the following guidelines:
a) Issuance of BG/SBLC, being a non-funded exposure, must be rigorously evaluated as any other credit proposal and such facility must be extended only for guaranteeing export performance.
b) BG/SBLC must be issued for a term not exceeding two years at a time and further rollover of not more than two years at a time is permitted, and is subject to satisfaction of relative export performance as per the contract.
c) BG/SBLC must cover only the advance on reducing balance basis.
d) BG/SBLC issued from India in favour of overseas buyer cannot be discounted by the overseas branch / subsidiary of bank in India.
e) Banks must duly evaluate and monitor the progress made by the exporter on utilisation of the advance and submit an Annual Progress Report to the Trade Division, Foreign Exchange Department, RBI, Central Office, 5th Floor, Amar Building, Mumbai under copy to the concerned Regional Office of RBI in format given in Annex – II to this circular within a month from the close of each financial year.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 131 dated 19th May, 2014Notification No. FEMA.299/2014-RB dated 24th March, 2014

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Overseas Direct Investments – Limited Liability Partnership (LL P) as Indian Party

This circular states that a Limited Liability Partnership (LLP), registered under the Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008 (6 of 2009), has been notified as an “Indian Party” under Clause (k) of Regulation 2 of Notification No. FEMA.120/RB-2004 dated 7th July, 2004. As a result, with effect from 7th May, 2014, an LLP is permitted to undertake financial commitment to / on behalf of a JV / WOS abroad.

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Postal ballot, e-voting and meetings – Bombay High Court rules on the 2013 Act

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Background and scope of the decision
Barely
have some provisions of the Companies Act, 2013, (“the 2013 Act”) come
into force that one provision has already come under scrutiny of a High
Court (In Re Godrej Industries Limited, dated 8th May, 2014). The
context, and quite possibly the scope and binding nature of the
decision, is in regard to schemes of amalgamation. However, even if one
takes the statements of the Court as observations, they do need
consideration in a wider context.

Some related issues have also
been discussed by the Court. Some aspects have been ruled on, some
issues have been flagged for further information or debate and some
issues would be considered later for ruling.

The issues raised
relate to certain important measures under the law that help wider
shareholder participation in decision making, viz., postal ballot and
e-voting. Postal ballot has been in place for several years now and the
2013 Act has extended its reach and nature. Further, yet another similar
measure suited to the digital age, e-voting, has been mandated with
even wider scope. Indeed, e-voting is now required with immediate effect
and applies to all matters except a specified few. Before we go
further, let us recapitulate what these two concepts are.

Postal Ballot and e-voting
Postal
ballot was introduced by the Companies (Amendment) Act, 2000 through a
new section 192A. The section, along with Rules made pursuant thereto,
provided for voting by post in respect of specified matters. The Company
would send voting papers to shareholders by post. The ballots received
from shareholders would be reviewed by a scrutineer who would report on
the votes. The law mandated that certain specified matters should be
decided only by postal ballot. Further, the Company could also use, at
its option, the postal ballot method for any other matters except
certain specified matters (e.g., approval of accounts, etc.) that could
be approved only at a shareholders’ meeting. For matters approved by
postal ballot, a further shareholders meeting was not required.

The
2013 Act extended this concept further to e-voting. E-voting is
mandatory for listed companies and other companies having at least one
thousand shareholders. In e-voting, the shareholders can exercise their
votes electronically through internet in the prescribed manner. The
advantage was that, like postal ballot, the shareholder need not attend a
shareholders meeting but instead vote through the internet. However, in case of e-voting, unlike postal ballot, the meeting would still have to take place.
Thus, those who have not voted through e-voting could participate and
cast their votes at the meeting. As the law stands, those who have
already cast their votes through e-voting would not in the normal course
participate again at the meeting. Further, since the law provides that
the e-voting ends 3 days prior to the meeting, e-voting at the meeting
was not possible.

The law requires that all matters, except a
specified few, should require facility of e-voting. Since this provision
has come into force immediately, all forthcoming annual general
meetings in 2014 would have to provide for e-voting. Considering that
the court decision being discussed herein mandates certain changes to
the e-voting procedure, it has important and immediate relevance.

Court decision – context and issues
The
matter before the Court was a scheme of amalgamation. Such schemes
require meetings of shareholders/creditors in a manner as directed by
the Court. The counsel for the amalgamating companies prayed to the
court that the resolutions be allowed to be passed by postal ballot
instead of meetings being called for that purpose. Here, it may be added
that while this article focuses on the provisions of the 2013 Act, the
amended Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement providing for corporate
governance requirements also mandates for e-voting. Thus, this decision
will apply to such requirement too.

The Court examined the
concept of postal ballot, e-voting and related issues. In particular,
the Court examined the very concept and purpose of meetings and whether
postal ballot/e-voting that essentially eliminate or substantially
reduce the requirement of holding meetings went against the spirit of
shareholder democracy and participation. These and related issues were
discussed by the Court.

Whether new rules have come into force?

A
transitional issue raised by the Court was whether the new Rules
relating to e-voting etc. have come into force. The Court noted that
while the Rules were signed by the concerned authority and also posted
on the website, the prescribed and time tested procedure of publishing
them in the official gazette was not, as per the information available
to the Court, carried out. Hence, the question was whether the rules
were indeed in force. Since numerous rules were prescribed at the same
time, this concern applies to all.

However, it appears that the
department has duly released the gazetted notifications. Hence, this
issue raised by the Court ought not to remain a cause of concern for
current validity of the provisions.

Whether postal ballot/e-voting has benefits

The
Court explained the nature and purpose of such methods of voting. It
noted that considering the fact that many meetings were held at far off
places and for other reasons, shareholders could not attend, participate
and vote at such meetings. Thus, postal ballot and e-voting would help
shareholders at least participate in the voting. Hence, these methods
were laudable.

Whether postal ballot/e-voting can substitute shareholders’ meetings?
This
is the fundamental issue that the Court raised. It noted that voting by
such methods eliminated substantially the need of shareholders meetings
and interaction essential for shareholder democracy. Postal ballot
totally eliminated even the requirement of such meetings. E-voting would
result in lower shareholder participation since shareholders who have
already voted would not attend. The Court therefore expressed a view
that, firstly, that holding of shareholders’ meetings was a must. In the
matter before it, it had discretion whether or not to allow voting by
postal ballot that would eliminate the need of a meeting. The Court thus
rejected such request.

The Court observed, :-
“We must remember that at the heart of corporate governance lies transparency and a well-established principle of indoor democracy that gives shareholders qualified, yet definite and vital rights in matters relating to the functioning of the company in which they hold equity. Principal among these, to my mind, is not merely a right to vote on any particular item of business, so much as the right to use the vote as an expression of an informed decision. That necessarily means that the shareholder has an inalienable right to ask questions, seek clarifications and receive responses before he decides which way he will vote. It may often happen that a shareholder is undecided on any particular item of business. At a meeting of shareholders, he may, on hearing a fellow shareholder who raises a question, or on hearing an explanation from a director, finally make up his mind. In other cases, he may hold strong views and may desire to convince others of his convictions. This may be in relation to matters that are not immediately obvious to the shareholder merely on receipt of written information or a notice. The right to persuade and the right to be persuaded are, as I see it, of vital importance. In an effort for greater inclusiveness, these rights cannot be altogether defenestrated. To say, therefore, that no meeting is required and that the shareholder must cast his vote only on the basis of the information that has been send to him by post or email seems to me to be completely contrary to the legislative intent and spirit to the express terms of the SEBI circular and amended Listing Agreement’s Clauses 35B and 49.” (emphasis here, and elsewhere in this article, is supplied)

The Court also noted that apart from merely deciding on whether to vote for and against, a meeting could even modify the agenda, if the discussion led to a conclusion that such changes are necessary.

WHETHER e-VOTING SHOULD BE ALLOWED AT THE MEETING ALSO ?
The Court then considered how to combine the advantage of remote voting such as through postal ballot/e-voting and the benefits of discussions at a meeting. The Court stated that e-voting was a good concept. However, it explained the nature and need of shareholder participation and stated that even those who had already cast their votes through e-voting should be allowed to participate in the meeting since they would be able to explain their views on the matters. Considering that they had already voted, the question of their voting again would not arise. The rest of the shareholders who are present at the meeting should be allowed to vote by e-voting. In view of this, the e-voting would have to be extended till the date of the meeting. Thus, the requirement under law to conclude the e-voting three days prior to the meeting would not hold good.It observed:

“Electronic voting is a method by which the votes  cast by a large number of shareholders could be more accurately ascertained. That does not mean that electronic voting cannot be permitted at the meeting itself. A shareholder at a remote location and a shareholder at a meeting will both be required to use the same portal to cast their votes. This necessitates a single integrated electronic system for voting. This is technologically feasible and, indeed, essential. It cannot be that at the meeting that there be no voting or poll, and that electronic votes or postal ballots cast earlier would be determinative. Those who vote by postal ballot or by electronic voting cannot, of course, be permitted to vote again at a meeting. But they also cannot be restrained from attending that meeting. A shareholder may hold strong views. He may vote by postal ballot or electronic means and then attend the meeting to persuade others. Other shareholders may be undecided and may prefer to attend the meeting. Greater inclusiveness demands the provision of greater facilities, not less; and certainly not the apparent giving of one ‘facility’ while taking away a right. There is no reason why members attending a meeting should not be allowed to use a bank of computers to digitally cast their votes just as they might do if they were voting from a remote location.

20.    There is also a question about the determination of electronic votes cast. The rules seem to indicate that electronic voting must stop three days before the meeting. The Chairman of the meeting  is to be given a tally of the electronic votes cast and the decision on any item of business is supposed to have been passed or not passed only on the basis of these electronic votes. Ex-facie, this is an untenable mechanism. If, as I have said, electronic voting is not limited to voting from a remote location but must also include electronic voting at the meeting in addition to postal ballots received, then it is a sum total of all these votes that must be taken into account.

21.    This means that while a meeting must be held, provision must also be made for electronic voting at the meeting by those shareholders who desire it. Every shareholder being given that option of exercising their votes by postal ballot or by electronic voting, the latter being either from a remote location or at the meeting itself.”

Thus, the Court held that in case of e-voting/postal ballot, a meeting must be held and at such meeting, the shareholders who have not voted should be given an opportunity to vote. Further, those who have voted could also be present and participate and persuade others.

WHETHER POSTAL BALLOT WITHOUT MEETINGS SHOULD BE ALLOWED?

The Court questioned the law which said that if a matter is decided by postal ballot, a meeting for considering such matter is not required. The Court felt that this interfered with a fundamental concept of having a meeting of the shareholders to discuss on an issue. It noted that apart from the matters mandatorily required to be decided by postal ballot, except a specified few, all the rest could also be at the option of the company be decided by postal ballot. It stated that this matter required further consideration before an appropriate bench of the Court and concerned parties may be given a hearing to express their views. It observed:

“On  a  prima  facie  view  that  the  elimination   of all shareholder participation at an actual meeting is anathema to some of the most vital of shareholders’ rights, it is strongly recommended that till this issue is fully heard and decided, no authority or any company should insist upon such a postal-ballot-only meeting to the exclusion of an actual meeting. Since this is evidently a matter of some importance, the Company Registrar is directed to make a submission and obtain necessary directions on the administrative side to have the matter placed before an appropriate Bench.”

CONCLUSION
It may be emphasised that the decision arose out of a petition for approval of a Scheme of amalgamation and hence the observations arguably have a limited scope and  context.  In  any  case,  except  for  limited matters, the Court has not given final  decision.  Nevertheless, the decision would need consideration for forthcoming shareholders meetings and e-voting. Further, one would have to note what are the further developments when this matter is finally heard and the larger issue of postal ballot and e-voting is decided.

Part D: Ethics & Governance

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M.J. Akbar Writes:
For BJP, the central message of 2014 has two principle elements: a credible promise to lift India’s economy out of the doldrums of paralysis; and the assurance that t will be an inclusive force that reaches out to all segments of the nation. This is the necessary evolution from popularity to governance. Popularity is possible from negative factors, like rage against an existing establishment; but governance is fashioned by a positive agenda. You are elected by most of the people; you rule for all the people.

Governance now comes with an adjective: stable. Non- BJP fronts have collapsed before construction. And when stand-alone Arvind Kejriwal threatens to send journalists to jail, and denies his remarks despite video evidence, then he has lost composure because he is losing support.

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Part A Orders of the Supreme & CIC

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Sections 2 (f) and 6 of the RTI Act:

Petitioner
filed an application u/s. 6 of the RTI Act before the Administrative
Officer-cum-Assistant State Public Information Officer (respondent no.1)
seeking information to the queries mentioned therein. The said
application was rejected by the PIO. An appeal against the said order
was dismissed by the First Appellate Authority. Second Appeal against
the said order was also dismissed by the Andhra Pradesh State
Information Commission vide order dated 20-11-2007. The petitioner
challenged the said order before the High Court. The Writ Petition had
been dismissed by the High Court on the grounds that the information
sought by the petitioner cannot be asked for under the RT I Act. Thus,
the application was not maintainable. More so, the judicial officers are
protected by the Judicial Officers’ Protection Act, 1850 (hereinafter
called the “Act 1850”). Hence, this petition.

Mr. V. Kanagaraj
learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that
right to information is a fundamental right of every citizen. The RT I
Act does not provide for any special protection to udges. The petitioner
has the right to know the reasons as to how Respondent no. 4 (the
Appellate Court) has decided his appeal in a particular manner.
Therefore, the application filed by the petitioner was maintainable.
Rejection of the application by Respondent no. 1 and Appellate
Authorities rendered the petitioner remediless. Petitioner vide
application dated 15-11-2006 had asked as under what circumstances
Respondent no. 4 ignored the written arguments and additional written
arguments, as the ignorance of the same was tantamount to judicial
dishonesty.

It was noted that the petitioner has not challenged
the order passed by Respondent no. 4. Instead, he had filed the
application u/s. 6 of RT I Act to know why and for what reasons
Respondent no. 4 had come to a particular conclusion which was against
the petitioner. The nature of the questions posed in the application
were to the effect why and for what reason Respondent no. 4 omitted to
examine certain documents and why he came to such a conclusion.

The
definition of ‘information’ u/s. 2(f) of the RTI Act shows that an
applicant u/s. 6 of the RT I Act can get any information which is
already in existence and accessible to the public authority under law.
Of course, under the RT I Act an applicant is entitled to get a copy of
the opinions, advices, circulars, orders etc., but he cannot ask for any
information as to why such opinions, advices, circulars, orders etc.
have been passed especially in matters pertaining to judicial decisions.
A judge speaks through his judgments or orders passed by him. If any
party feels aggrieved by the order/judgment passed by a judge, the
remedy available to such a party is either to challenge the same by way
of appeal or by revision or any other legally permissible mode. No
litigant can be allowed to seek information as to why and for what
reasons the judge had come to a particular decision or conclusion. A
judge is not bound to explain later on for what reasons he had come to
such a conclusion.

Moreover, in the instant case, the petitioner
submitted his application u/s. 6 of the RT I Act before the
Administrative Officer-cum-Assistant State Public Information Officer
seeking information in respect of the questions raised in his
application. However, the Public Information officer is not suppose to
have any material which is not before him; or any information he could
have obtained under the law. Under section 6 of RT I Act, an applicant
is entitled to get only such information which can be accessed by the
“public authority” under any other law for the time being in force. The
answers sought by the petitioner in the application could not have been
with the public authority nor could he have had access to this
information and Respondent no. 4 was not obliged to give any reasons as
to why he had taken such a decision in the matter which was before him. A
judge cannot be expected to give reasons other than those that have
been enumerated in the judgment or order. The application filed by the
petitioner before public authority is per se illegal and unwarranted. A
judicial officer is entitled to get protection and the object of the
same is not to protect malicious or corrupt judges, but to protect the
public from the dangers to which the administration of justice would be
exposed if the concerned judicial officers were subject to inquiry as to
malice, or to litigation with those whom their decisions might offend.
If anything is done contrary to this, it would certainly affect the
independence of the judiciary. A judge should be free to make
independent decisions.

The Supreme Court held that as the
petitioner has misused the provisions of the RT I Act, the High Court
had rightly dismissed the writ petition.

[Khanapuram Gandaiah vs. Administrative Officer & Ors: SLP (civil) No. 34868 of 2009.]

Section 8 (1) (j)
Vide RT I dated 17-05-2012 the appellant had sought information on 7 points.

PIO vide letter dated 12-06-2012 denied information stating that the same is exempt u/s. 8 (1) (e) (g) and (j) of the RT I Act.

First
Appellate Authority (FAA) vide order dated 06- 08-2012 provided Place
of birth as per service records sought at query no. 4 and other details
as sought at query no 5 and 6.

Remaining information was denied stating that the same is personal information and exempted u/s. 8 (1) (j) of the RT I Act.

Aggrieved
with the decision of FAA, the appellant filed second appeal to Central
Information Commission on 21-08-2012 citing that Shri Ajit Kumar has
submitted fake caste certificate for seeking appointment.

CIC
vide order dated 27-12-2012 dismissed the appeal stating that personal
Information can be disclosed only in the larger public interest and
appellant has not established any such interest.

The appellant
filed Writ Petition No. W P 080 of 2013 in the High Court of Calcutta
(Circuit Bench at Port Blair). The Honorable High Court remitted the
matter to CIC with directions to decide the appeal afresh.

To
decide the matter under the application, the Chief Information
Commissioner constituted a 3 member bench of following Commissioners A)
Shri Rajiv Mathur B) Shri Basant Seth C ) Smt Manjula Prasher.

The
appellant submitted that Shri Ajit Kumar (third party) has obtained
appointment under reserve category by submitting false caste
certificate. On being asked by the Commission as to the evidence he has
to prove the same, he replied that he has information from official
sources.

Shri Ajit Kumar, the third party, submitted that he is
recruited under general category and had not submitted any caste
certificate to his employer. He also submitted that the appellant had
been harassing him and none of his personal information should not be
provided to him.

The CPIO submitted that Shri Ajit Kumar is
appointed under general category and no caste certificate has been
submitted by him. A notice was sent to Shri R. Ajit Kumar under
provisions of section 11(1) of RT I Act. In his response he objected to
furnishing any personal information related to him and also stated that
there is threat to him. PIO also stated that the appellant is habitual
information seeker and filed RTIs against many employees and
blackmailing them.

Ms. Tamali Biswas, advocate on behalf of
public authority, stated that the fact of employment of Shri R. Ajit
Kumar under unreserved category and non-availability of caste
certificate was brought to the notice of Hon’ble High Court also.

The appellant has submitted that decision may be taken on the basis of documents/records and justice be delivered in true spirit as per orders of the Hon’ble High Court of Calcutta (Circuit Bench At Port Blair).

Shri R. Ajit Kumar submitted that his appointment was under Unreserved Category and the appellant is seeking information to harass him .The appellant has a criminal background and is involved in a forgery case and the issue is sub judice. He has requested that his personal information should not be provided to the appellant.

The public authority has submitted that the appellant is  a retired employee of their yard and was involved in two criminal cases for forgery. He is misusing the RTI Act against NSRY and its employees. Shri Ajit Kumar was appointed under Unreserved Category and copy of recruitment letter is enclosed with the submissions. A notice was sent to third party by them who responded stating that it is an unwarranted invasion of privacy and perpetuation of biased campaign of maligning his professional image as well as disturbing the personal peace and also seems to be an act of personal vendetta.

DECISION
•    “The Commission observes that Shri R. Ajit Kumar has been appointed under unreserved category, hence the plea of getting employment by submitting forged caste certificate does not have any merit and the contention that disclosure sought is in public interest fails”.

•    “In Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, Volume 4 (IV Edition),‘Public Interest’ is defined as: “ a matter of public or general interest does not mean that which is interesting as gratifying curiosity or love of information or amusement but that in which a class of community have a pecuniary interest, or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected.”

•    “The appellant has made mere conjectures and surmises and not able to give any cogent and sound evidence to prove the element of ‘Public Interest.’

•    Commission quoted the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its decision dated 13-12-2012 in the case of Bihar Public Service Commission vs. Saiyed Hussain Abbas Rizwi & Anr:

23.    The expression ‘public interest’ has to be understood in its true connotation so as to give complete meaning to the relevant provisions of the Act.

The expression ‘public interest’ must be viewed in its strict sense with all its exceptions so as to justify denial of a statutory exemption in terms of the Act. In its common parlance, the expression ‘public interest’, like ‘public purpose’, is not capable of any precise definition. It does not have a rigid meaning, is elastic and takes its colour from the statute in which it occurs, the concept varying with time and state of society and its needs. [State of Bihar vs. Kameshwar Singh (AIR 1952 SC 252)]. It also means the general welfare of the public that warrants recommendation and protection; something in which the public as a whole has a stake [Black’s Law Dictionary (Eighth Edition)].

24.    The satisfaction has to be arrived at by the authorities objectively and the consequences of such disclosure have to be weighed with regard to circumstances of a given case. The decision has to be based on objective satisfaction recorded for ensuring that larger public interest outweighs unwarranted invasion of privacy or other factors stated in the provision.

Certain matters, particularly in relation to appointment, are required to be dealt with great confidentiality. The information may come to knowledge of the authority as a result of disclosure by others who give that information in confidence and with complete faith, integrity and fidelity. Secrecy of such information shall be maintained, thus, bringing it within the ambit of fiduciary capacity. Similarly, there may be cases where the disclosure has no relation- ship to any public activity or interest or it may even cause unwarranted invasion of privacy of the individual. All these protections have to be given their due implementation as they spring from statutory exemptions. It is not a decision simpliciter between private interest and public interest. It is a matter where a constitutional protection is available to a person with regard to the right to privacy. Thus, the public interest has to be construed while keeping in mind the balance factor between right to privacy and right to information with the purpose sought to be achieved and the purpose that would be served in the larger public interest, particularly when both these rights emerge from the constitutional values under the Constitution of India.”

•    The Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in its judgement dated 05-02-2014 (Shail Sahni vs. Sanjeev Kumar & Others ) have observed:

“… This Court is also of the view that misuse of the RTI Act has to be appropriately dealt with, otherwise the public would lose faith and confidence in this “Sunshine Act”. A beneficial Statute, when made a tool for mischief and abuse must be checked in accordance with law…”

•    Keeping in view above, the Commission held that the information sought by the appellant is personal information of Shri R Ajit Kumar and protected from disclosure U/S 8 (1) (j) of RTI Act as no larger public interest is established.

[Ch. Rama Krishna Rao vs. Naval Ship Yard, Port Blair, (Third Party: Shri R. Ajit Kumar) Decided by the full bench on 05-05-2014. File No. CIC/LS/A/2012/002430/RM.]

Sale of Goods Act, 1930

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Synopsis
This Article examines certain important element of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, an old Act which is very relevant even today for matters connected with trade and commerce. The Act also has use while interpreting certain other statutes.

Introduction
Trade is often said to be one of key drivers of an economy. The importance of trade can be gauged from the fact that the western world was constantly asking India to open its doors to foreign investment in retail trading. When trade is such a vital constituent of a country’s economy it is essential that we understand the laws governing trade. The sale of goods in India is governed by the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 (“the Act”). While the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 applies to the transfer of immovable property, the Sale of Goods Act applies to the sale of certain movable property, being goods. This Act was earlier a part of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. However, in 1930 it was felt that there is a need for a separate dedicated legislation and hence, a separate Act was carved out. Let us examine some of the key facets of this Act.

Goods
The pivot of the Act is the definition of the term “goods”. If a particular property cannot be termed as goods then the Act does not apply to the same. This definition is also relevant since certain other Acts also refer to this definition, since what constitutes goods is often relevant for several issues.

Goods are defined under the Act to mean every kind of movable property. It includes stock and shares, growing crops, grass and things attached to or forming part of the land which are agreed to be severed before sale or under the contract of sale. However, actionable claims and money are not goods. Thus, the definition is very wide to include all types of movable property other than what is expressly excluded. According to the General Clauses Act, 1897, things attached to or forming part of the land are treated as immovable property. However, the Sale of Goods Act states if they have been agreed to be severed before or under the Contract of sale, then they become goods. Since the definition revolves around movable property it also becomes essential to understand what constitutes movable and what is immovable property. Sale of immovable property is governed by the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and this Act applies to the sale of movable property.

The following three landmark decisions of the Supreme Court dealing with what is immovable property are very relevant:

(A) T he Supreme Court in Sirpur Paper Mills (1998) 1 SCC 400 while examining whether or not a paper plant was an immovable property, held that the whole purpose behind attaching the machine to a concrete base was to prevent wobbling of the machine and to secure maximum operational efficiency and also for safety. It further held that paper-making machine was saleable as such by simply removing the machinery from its base. Hence, the machinery assembled and erected at its factory site was not an immovable property because it was not something attached to the earth like a building or a tree. The test laid down was, whether the machine can be sold in the market. Just because the plant and machinery is fixed in the earth for better functioning, it would not automatically become an immovable property.

(B) Further, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Duncan’s Industries Limited vs. State Of U. P. (2000) 1 SCC 633, dealing with a fertiliser plant, is also relevant in determining what is movable and what is immovable. In this case, the Supreme Court distinguished the Sirpur’s case and held that whether a machinery which is embedded in the earth is a movable property or an immovable property, depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Primarily, the court will have to take into consideration the intention of the party when it decided to embed the machinery: the key question is, whether such embedment was intended to be temporary or permanent ? If the machineries which have been embedded in the earth permanently with a view to utilising the same as a plant, e.g., to operate a fertilizer plant, and the same was not embedded to be dismantled and removed for the purpose of sale as a machinery at any point of time, then it should be treated as an immovable property. It was held that it could be said that the plant and machinery could have been transferred by delivery of possession on any date prior to the date of conveyance of the title to the land.

(C) In the case of Triveni Engineering & Indus. Ltd., 2000 (120) ELT 273 (SC), the Court held that a mono vertical crystalliser, which had to be assembled, erected and attached to the earth by a foundation at the site of the sugar factory was not capable of being sold as it is, without anything more. Hence, the plant was not a movable property.

The Central Board of Excise and Customs has, under the Central Excise Act 1944, after considering several Supreme Court decisions (including those mentioned above), clarified that:

(A) if items assembled or erected at site and attached by foundation to the earth cannot be dismantled without substantial damages to components and thus cannot be reassembled, then the items would not be considered as movables.

(B) If any goods installed at site (e.g., paper-making machine) are capable of being sold or shifted as such after removal from the base and without dismantling into its components/parts, the goods would be considered to be movable. If the goods, though capable of being sold or shifted without dismantling, are actually dismantled into their components/parts for ease of transportation etc., they will not cease to be movable merely because they are transported in dismantled condition.

In the context of sales tax, the Supreme Court in the case of Tata Consultancy Services Ltd vs. State of AP (2005) 1 SCC 308, has held that software, even though intangible, is goods.

Shares and stock are expressly included in the definition of goods. The Companies Act also states that shares in a company shall be movable property. However, a debenture does not constitute movable property as held by the Supreme Court in the case of RD Goyal vs. Reliance Industries Ltd, (2003) 1 SCC 81.

Actionable claims are governed by section 130 of the Transfer of Property Act and are hence, outside the purview of this Act.

The goods may be existing or future goods which would come into the seller’s possession. If however, the goods are specific, i.e., are identified when the agreement is made and they perish thereafter, the agreement becomes void. However, they must perish due to no fault of the seller or buyer.

Sale
The next vital cog in the wheel is the definition of “sale”. Section 4 of the Act defines a contract of sale of goods as:

(a) A contract. Thus, all the elements of a valid contract as laid down in the Indian Contract Act, 1872 must be fulfilled.
(b) In which there is a seller, i.e., a person who sells or agrees to sell goods;
(b) H e transfers or agrees to transfer property in goods;
(c) The transfer is to a buyer, i.e., a person who sells or agrees to buy goods; and
(d) The transfer is for a price.

Thus, the pre-requisite of a sale is the transfer of movable property being goods. This view has also been expressed in State of Madras vs. Gannon Dunkerley & Co., (1959) SCR 379 – “sale of goods …. is a nomen juris, its essential ingredients being an agreement to sell movables for a price and property passing therein pursuant to that agreement.” Halsbury defines a sale as “the transfer by mutual consent of the ownership of a thing from one person to another for a money price.”

The contract may be absolute or conditional. If property in goods is transferred from seller to buyer,  then such    a contract becomes a sale. However, if property is transferred in future or is conditional, then such a contract is termed as an agreement to sell. Eventually, when the conditions are fulfilled or the time period elapses, an agreement to sell becomes a sale. The principles of a sale have been succinctly summed up by the Apex Court in the case of State of Tamil Nadu vs. Sri Srinivasa Sales Circulation, (1996) 10 SCC 648 as follows:

“…in order to constitute a sale under the Sale of Goods Act, it is essential to establish that there is an agreement between the parties for transfer of title    to the goods and that such agreement should be supported by money consideration and as a result of the transactions the goods. article or the property must actually pass to the purchaser. It is settled law that the expression “sale” under the Sales Tax Act has to be understood with reference to the definition of “sale of goods” under the Sale of Goods Act. But if the title of the goods passes without any contract between the parties, express or implied, there is no sale. Similarly if the consideration of the transfer is not money, but some other valuable consideration, it may amount to exchange or barter but not a sale in the strict sense of the law..”

The most vital part of the definition is that the title of goods must pass from the seller to the buyer.

PRICE
A sale of goods under the Act is always for a price, i.e., for a money consideration. A price is an essential element of a contract of sale of goods. If there is no price there   is no contract. This is also an essential ingredient under the Contract Law. Hence, a sale of goods as understood under the Act cannot be for a barter or for any non- monetary consideration. Such a transaction  would  be an exchange and not a sale. This is a very important fundamental distinction which is relevant even for several fiscal statutes. The Transfer of Property Act defines an exchange on the other hand, to mean a mutual transfer of the ownership of one thing for the ownership of another thing and neither thing nor both thing being money only. As opposed to a sale transaction, the fundamental difference is the absence of money as consideration. The distinction between a sale and an exchange transaction has been very succinctly brought out by three Supreme Court decisions under the Income-tax Act, CIT vs. Ramakrishna Pillai (R.R.), 66 ITR 725 (SC); CIT vs. Motors and General Stores (P.) Ltd., 66 ITR 692 (SC); CIT vs. B. M. Kharwar 72 ITR 603 (SC). Recently, the Bombay High Court in Bharat Bijlee Ltd. [TS-270-HC-2014(BOM)], distinguished a slump exchange from a slump sale and held that a slump exchange does not entail capital gains tax.

The price may be either fixed by the contract or left to the negotiation of the parties or may be fixed as agreed upon. However, in the absence of the above, the buyer must pay a reasonable price. What is a reasonable price depends upon the facts of each case. In some cases, the price determination is to be decided by the valuation of  a third party. If such third party cannot fix the value, then agreement is avoided.

TRANSFER OF PROPERTY IN GOODS
When the property in the goods is transferred from the seller to the buyer is the most important effect of a contract for sale of goods.

Unascertained Goods: If the goods are unascertained, then property passes only when they are ascertained. E.g., the seller agrees to sell 50 kgs. of rice but at that time he has 250 kgs. in his warehouse. No property passes to buyer until the seller identifies and appropriates 50 kgs. of rice towards this agreement. Thus, there must be a clear-cut identification as to which goods out of the generic mass are towards satisfaction of the contract.

Where there is a contract for the sale of unascertained / future goods by description and goods of that description and in a deliverable state are unconditionally appropriated to the contract the property in the goods passes to the buyer. Such assent may be expressed or implied, and may be given either before or after the appropriation      is made. Thus, an appropriation must be made by the seller or the buyer and only then would the property in such unascertained goods pass to the buyer. Further, the appropriation of unascertained goods must be unconditional. Till property passes there is no sale.

E.g., in Emperor vs. Kuverji Kavasji, 1941 43 BLR 95, a merchant agreed to sell 20 litres of liquor out of a cask containing 100 litres. It was held that until the 20 litres are separated or bottled, the property does not pass to the buyer.

The Supreme Court in the cases of New India Sugar Mills Ltd vs. CST, 1963 AIR 1207, CST vs. Husenali Adamji & Co., 1959 AIR 887, M/s. Carona Sahu Ltd vs. State, 1966 AIR SC 1153 has held that in case of sale of unascertained goods, no property is transferred to the buyer unless and until the goods are ascertained and there is unconditional appropriation of the goods in a deliverable state.

Ascertained Goods: However, if they are ascertained / specific, then property passes in accordance with the contract, i.e., when the parties want it to pass. In this respect, section 2(2) of the Act is also relevant. It defines the term delivery to mean a “voluntary transfer of possession from one person to another”. Thus, delivery of goods is one of the ways in which possession can be transferred.

Section 30 of the Act provides that a seller need not have actual physical possession of the goods sold. It is enough that he has control over the goods by making over a document of title to the goods. Possession of documents of title enable the holder of document to transfer the goods. Section 30 does not require the seller to be in actual physical possession of goods – Pramatha Nath Talukdar vs. Maharaja P M Tagore, AIR 1966 Cal 405. This view has also been laid down in Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd Edition Vol. 34 @ p.84 and in the English case of Nicholson vs. Harper, (1895) 2 Ch. D. 415. Unless a different intention arises from the contract, the following three rules have been laid down under the Act to determine the intention of the parties as to when the property passes to the buyer:

(a)    When contract is for sale of specific goods in a deliverable state, property passes to buyer when contract is made, irrespective of whether time of payment or delivery is postponed.
(b)    However, when under a contract for specific goods and the seller has to do something to the goods for putting them in a deliverable state, then property passes only when such thing is done and the buyer is given notice of the same. E.g., a 2nd hand car dealer agrees to sell a car but it needs certain repairs before it can run properly. Property passes only once the repairs are done and the buyer is intimated about the same.
(c)    When contract is for sale of specific goods in a deliverable state but seller has to weigh, measure, test or do some act for ascertaining the price, the property passes to buyer when such act is done and buyer is given notice of the same. E.g., a seller sells cotton at a price per ton. To ascertain the price, he needs to weigh the cotton. Till such act is done, property does not pass.

It is essential to determine when property passes because if there is any damage or loss to the goods then the same would be borne by the seller in cases where property has not yet passed to the buyer. The Act provides that unless the contract provides otherwise, the goods remain at the seller’s risk till property passes to the buyer. However, where the property has passed risk passes to the buyer even if the delivery has not yet been made. E.g., a seller sells a certain vase to a buyer but both payment and delivery are postponed till the next day. Before delivery can be effected, the vase breaks due to mishandling. The loss is to the buyer’s account since property of specific goods in a deliverable state under an unconditional contract passes immediately even if delivery is postponed. But when delivery is delayed due to the fault of any one party, the risk of loss is to his account.

NEMO DAT QUAD NON HABET
‘No one can give a better title than what he himself has’ is the meaning of the above Latin maxim. Thus, a sale by a person who is not the legal owner of the goods does not give any title to the buyer. The actual owner can recover possession of the goods from the buyer without compensating him. However, if the seller has authority  of the owner; he is an authorised mercantile agent (e.g., broker, factor); he is a joint owner, etc., then he can give a good title to the buyer.  Whether the buyer can raise   a plea of being a bona fide purchaser without notice is   a matter which depends upon the facts of each case – Sumitra Debi Jalan vs. Satya Narayan Prahladka, AIR 1965 Cal 355.

CONDITIONS AND WARRANTIES
A contract of sale may come with conditions and warranties as to the quality, fitness, title, etc. of the goods. A condition is a stipulation essential to the main purpose of the contract. If breached, the contract may be repudiated. A warranty on the other hand is collateral to the main purpose and a breach of the same gives rise to a claim for damages but not a right to repudiate the contract. Thus, sale of soft drinks with pesticides is a breach of a condition, i.e., it is fit for human consumption. However, sale of soft drinks in glass bottles instead of plastic bottles, as contracted, is a breach of a warranty. The former entitles the buyer to cancel the contract while under the latter the buyer can sue for damages.    It may not be always a cut and dried situation as to whether a stipulation is a condition or a warranty and the determination of the same depends upon the contract  as a whole. Even a Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) carries conditions and warranties from the seller as to the shares. Breach of material conditions can lead to cancellation of the SPA.

CAVEAT EMPTOR; QUI IGNORARE NON DEBUIT QUOD JUS ALIENUM EMIT
Let a purchaser beware; who ought not to be ignorant that he is purchasing the rights of another – buyer beware of what you buy for the seller has no obligation to caution you is the meaning of this maxim. Section16 of the Act lays down that subject to this Act and any other law in force, there is no implied condition or warranty as to the fitness or quality of the goods sold by a seller. This is a statutory recognition of the above maxim. The Supreme Court in Commissioner of Customs (Preventive) vs. M/s. Aafloat Textiles (I) P. Ltd. has explained the maxim as follows:

“….Caveat emptor means “Let the purchaser beware.” It is one of the settled maxims, applying to a purchaser who is bound by actual as well as constructive knowledge of any defect in the thing purchased, which is obvious, or which might have been known by proper diligence.

21.    “Caveat emptor does not mean either in law or in Latin that the buyer must take chances. It means that the buyer must take care.” (See Wallis vs. Russell (1902) 21 R 585, 615).

22.    “Caveat emptor is the ordinary rule in contract. A vendor is under no duty to communicate the existence even of latent defects in his wares unless by act or implication  he represents such defects not to exist.” (See William R. Anson, Principles of the Law of Contract 245 (Arthur L. Corbin Ed.3d. Am. ed.1919) Applying the maxim, it was held that it is the bounden duty of the purchaser to make all such necessary enquiries and to ascertain all the facts relating to the property to be purchased prior to committing in any manner.

23.    Caveat emptor, qui ignorare non debuit quod jus alienum emit. A maxim meaning “Let a purchaser beware; who ought not to be  ignorant  that  he  is  purchasing  the rights of another. Hob. 99; Broom; Co., Litl. 102 a: 3 Taunt. 439.

24.    As the maxim applies, with certain specific restrictions, not only to the quality of, but also to the title to, land which is sold, the purchaser is generally bound to view the land and to enquire after and inspect the title- deeds; at his peril if he does not.

25.    Upon a sale of goods the general rule with regard   to their nature or quality is caveat emptor, so that in the absence of fraud, the buyer has no remedy against the seller for any defect in the goods not covered by some condition or warranty, expressed or implied. It is beyond all doubt that, by the general rules of law there is no warranty of quality arising from the bare contract of sale of goods, and that where there has been no fraud, a buyer who has not obtained an express warranty, takes all risk of defect in the goods, unless there are circumstances beyond the mere fact of sale from which a warranty may be implied. (Bottomley vs. Bannister, [1932] 1 KB 458 : Ward v. Hobbs, 4 App Cas 13}. (Latin for Lawyers) 14

26.    No one ought in ignorance to buy that which is the right of another. The buyer according to the maxim has  to be cautious, as the risk is his and not that of the seller.

27.    Whether the buyer had made any enquiry as to the genuineness of the license within his special knowledge. He has to establish that he made enquiry and took requisite precautions to find out about the genuineness of the SIL* which he was purchasing. If he has not done that consequences have to follow.”

* SIL = Special Import Licence

However, the Law also provides for the following statutory exceptions to this Rule:

(a)    Where the buyer makes known to the seller that he requires goods for a particular purpose, then goods must meet such purpose.  In  Eternit  Everest  Ltd.  vs. Abraham, AIR 2003 Ker 273, it was held that corrugated asbestos sheets are mainly used for roofing of buildings for protecting the building from sun and rain and it is not being used for a variety of purposes. The leakproof of the asbestos sheet is the essential quality of the sheets and only if it is leakproof, it can be said to be fit for the purpose for which it is purchased.

(b)    Where goods are bought by description from a seller who deals in goods of that description, then there is an implied condition as to the merchantable quality  of the goods. In Agha Mirza Nasarali Khoyee & Co. vs. Gordon Woodroffe & Co., AIR 1937 Mad 40 it was held that goods are treated as being of merchantable quality if they are of such quality that any defects which a buyer of ordinary diligence and experience would have detected by due diligence in the use of  all ordinary and usual means (what is due diligence, depending upon the circumstances).

(c)    An implied warranty or condition as to quality or fitness for a purpose may be annexed by the usage of trade.

CONCLUSION
This is a very important mercantile Law which is relevant for commercial matters. It is essential for businesses to keep in mind the provisions of this Act while entering into contracts for sale and purchase of goods.

Will – Succession – Clause offending rule against perpetuity is invalid – Indian Succession Act, 1925, section 114.

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Asis Mitra vs. Sibani Dutta & Ors AIR 2014 Calcutta 126

In 1900, Baikuntha Nath Dutta had founded a “thakurbari.” He installed this deity and started worship. By his will dated 30-07-1916 various properties of the testator were dedicated to the above deity. Shebaits were appointed. Clause 5 of the Will dealt with the devolution of Shebaitship.

Many years had passed since the making of this dedication. The main question that was posed before the court was whether the stipulation in the Will and in the Codicil that Shebaitship would vest only in sons of the Shebaits was valid or not.

The issue in this case was in regard to the rule against perpetuity. The rule applied equally to transfer of property inter vivos as it did to transmission of property by succession. In this case those rules regarding transmission of property by succession were relevant. The owner of a property, while bequeathing it, could not postpone the vesting of the absolute legal and beneficial ownership thereof indefinitely. He could not fetter the powers of alienation, indefinitely.
Hence, if A is disposing of his property by Will or by creation of a trust, he cannot hold up its absolute vesting in some other person, for an uncertain period. Neither can he tie this person’s hands regarding alienation for an uncertain time.

If there was any further postponing of absolute legal and beneficial ownership of the property, the bequest or settlement was void as it violated the rule against perpetuity. The law against perpetuity did not favour, as observed earlier, tying up of property without its vesting, for an indefinite period of time.

The Indian Succession Act, 1925, section 114 enacts as follows:

“114. Rule against perpetuity. – No bequest is valid whereby the vesting of the thing bequeathed may be delayed beyond the life-time of one or more persons living at the testator’s death and the minority of some person who shall be in existence at the expiration of that period, and to whom, if he attains full age, the thing bequeathed is to belong.”

Hence, the Clause in the will devolving Shebaitship only on grandson and on death of grand sons to their sons violates the rule against perpetuity.

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Precedent – Doctrine of per incuriam and sub silentio – Constitution of India – Article 141

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Triveni Engineering & Industries Ltd vs. The State of Karnataka & Ors AIR 2014 Karnataka 75

The doctrines of per incuriam and sub silentio operate as exceptions to the rule of precedent. Incuriam literally means carelessness. In practice, per incuriam means per ignorantium. Doctrines of per incuriam and sub silentio have been taken recourse to by the courts for relieving from injustice perpetrated by unjust precedents. A decision which is not express and is not founded on reasons or consideration of the issue, could not be deemed to be a law declared having binding effect as is contemplated under Article 141 of the Constitution.

The doctrine of per incuriam has no application in a case to ignore the principle laid down after analysing the relevant provisions of law by a co-ordinate bench. The doctrine of per incuriam is resorted to when decisions are rendered without reference to statutory prescriptions or other binding authorities.

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Month – Month does not mean 30 days – Computation of six months period, Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, section 138.

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Rameshchandra Ambalal Joshi vs. State of Gujarat & Anr. AIR 2014 SCC 1554

While hearing on SLP against an order passed by the High Court in context of a complaint filed u/s. 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 the court was required to consider the meaning of term ‘months’.

Proviso (a) to section 138 provides that the cheque should be presented within six months from the date on which it is drawn. Word month has been defined u/s. 3(35) of General Clauses Act to mean a month reckoned as per British calendar. Period of six months cannot therefore be calculated on 30 days basis.

As regards computation of six months period section 9 of General Clauses Act has to be pressed in service proviso (a) to section 138 of the Act uses the expression “Six months from the date on which it is drawn.” Once the word “from” is used for the purpose of commencement of time, in view of section 9 of the General Clauses Act, the day on which the cheque is drawn has to be excluded and the last day within which such act needs to be done is to be included. In other words, six months period stipulated in section 138 would expire on day prior to the date in the corresponding month and in case no such day falls, the last day of the immediate previous month. For calculating period of six months for cheque drawn on 31-12-2005 the first day, i.e., 31-12-2005 has to be excluded and the period of six months will be reckoned from the next day i.e. from 01-01-2006; meaning thereby that according to the British calendar, the period of six months will expire at the end of the 30th day of June, 2006.

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Hindu Law – Devolution of property of male dying intestate: Hindu Succession Act, 1956, sections 8 and 10:

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Narinder Singh Rao vs. Air Vice Marshal Mahinder Singh Rao & Ors. (2013) 9 SCC 425

Rao
Gajraj Singh and his wife Sumitra Devi were occupiers of the suit
property. The property had been constructed somewhere in 1935 and as per
the municipal record, it belonged to Rao Gajraj Singh. A document was
executed by Rao Gajraj Singh to the effect that upon death of himself or
his wife, the suit property would be inherited by the survivor. The
said writing was attested by Rao Devender Singh, the son of Rao Gajraj
Singh’s real sister.

Rao Gajraj Singh expired on 29th March, 1981
and thereafter Sumitra Devi, who had eight children, started residing
at Ranchi with the Appellant. Somewhere in 1980s, Sumitra Devi had
constructed some shops in the suit premises and the said shops were
given on rent.

On 1st June, 1989, Sumitra Devi executed a Will
whereby she bequeathed the suit property to one of her sons, namely,
Narinder Singh Rao (the present Appellant and original Defendant No. 1)
and she expired on 6th June, 1989.

After the death of Sumitra
Devi, her four children, one of them being the present Respondent No. 1,
filed a suit for declaration claiming their right in the suit property.
Subsequently, the plaint was amended so as to make it a suit for
partition. According to the case of the said children, the Will was not
genuine and therefore, the said Will could not have been acted upon and
as Sumitra Devi was survived by eight children, the suit property would
be inherited by all the children. Thus, each child had a 1/8th share in
the suit property.

Even after the death of Rao Gajraj Singh, the
suit property continued to remain in his name because nobody had got the
property mutated in the names of his heirs/legal representatives after
his death. Upon the death of Rao Gajraj Singh, no mutation entry was
made in the Municipal Corporation records to show as to who had
inherited the property in question and the said property continued to
remain in the name of late Rao Gajraj Singh.

By virtue of the
Will executed by Sumitra Devi, whereby the property had been bequeathed
to the present Appellant, the Appellant claims complete ownership over
the suit property.

The Hon’ble Court observed that so far as
inheritance of the suit property by the present Appellant in pursuance
of the Will dated 1st June, 1989 executed by Sumitra Devi is concerned,
the Will was validly executed by Sumitra Devi, which had been attested
by two witnesses, one being an advocate and another being a medical
practitioner.

The next question which was to be considered by the
High Court was with regard to the ownership right of the suit property.
The property was in the name of Rao Gajraj Singh and no evidence of
whatsoever type was adduced to the effect that the property originally
belonged to Sumitra Devi. Thus, the findings that the suit property
belonged to Rao Gajraj Singh cannot be disturbed. As Rao Gajraj Singh
died intestate and was the owner of the property at the time of his
death, the suit property should have been inherited by his widow, namely
Sumitra Devi and his eight children in equal share, as per the
provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. In that view of the
matter, the High Court arrived at the conclusion that the suit property
would be inherited by all the nine heirs, i.e., Sumitra Devi and her
eight children and therefore, Sumitra Devi had inherited only 1/9th of
the right and interest in the suit property whereas 1/9th of the right
and interest in the suit property belonged to each child of Rao Gajraj
Singh.

Though the Will executed by Sumitra Devi has been treated
as a validly executed Will, Sumitra Devi, who had only 1/9th of the
right and interest in the suit property, could not have bequeathed more
than her interest in the suit property. If Sumitra Devi was not a
full-fledged owner of the suit property, she could not have bequeathed
the entire suit property to the present Appellant, Narinder Singh Rao,
who has claimed the entire property by virtue of the Will executed by
Sumitra Devi. At the most Sumitra Devi could have bequeathed her
interest in the property which was to the extent of 1/9th share in the
said property. So the High Court rightly came to the conclusion that the
1/9th share in the suit property belonging to Sumitra Devi would be
inherited by the present Appellant – Narinder Singh Rao by virtue of the
Will executed by her. In addition to his own right and interest in the
suit property to the extent of 1/9th share, which the present Appellant
had inherited from his father. Thus the present Appellant would get
1/9th share in the suit property as he also inherited the share of his
mother Sumitra Devi whereas all other children of Rao Gajraj Singh would
get 1/9th share each in the suit property. Thus, the present Appellant
would be having 2/9th share in the suit property

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Minor – Sale of Minors property – By father (Natural Guardian) – Without prior permission of Court – Voidable at instance of minor. Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act 1956, section. 8 (2):

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Rameshwar Lal & Ors vs. Jai Prakash & Ors AIR 2014 Rajasthan 72.

The present Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 – (original plaintiffs) had filed a suit for cancellation of sale deed and for possession of the suit property against the appellants and respondent No. 4 Bhagwan Lal (their father) with the averments that the plaintiffs had purchased the suit property by a registered sale deed dated 01-02-1974 from Suresh Chandra for a sum of Rs. 26,000. The defendant Nos.1 to 3 were tenants in the said house and a sum of Rs.1,000/- were deposited with Suresh Chandra as earnest money.

The rent deed has been executed by the eldest brother in favour of Suresh Chandra, which has been handed over to the plaintiffs by Suresh Chandra on the date of sale. By notice dated 06-02-1974, Suresh Chandra had informed defendant No.1 (i.e., tenants) by a registered notice that he has sold the house to the plaintiffs and therefore, the rent be paid to them and the deposit of Rs.1,000/- had also been transferred to them. The defendants admit them to be owners of the house and one months rent was sent by money order and therefore, based on attornment, the defendant Nos. 1 to 3 have become plaintiffs tenants. On 23-06-1974, the plaintiff No.1 became major and plaintiff No. 2 was still a minor. The suit property was required by the plaintiffs reasonably and bonafidely. However, the respondent No. 4, their father sold the suit house to the defendant Nos. 1 to 3 for a sum of Rs. 28,000/- on 15-06-1974 and has executed a sale deed and therefore, the defendants do not treat them as landlord which is incorrect. The defendant No. 4 had not obtained permission u/s. 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act,1956 (the Act) from the competent court and therefore, the sale deed was illegal and void and the plaintiffs are entitled for getting the same cancelled. The plaintiff was becoming a major eight days after the date of sale and therefore, the defendant No. 4 had no reason to sale the same to the defendant Nos. 1 to 3; the defendant No. 4 had no requirement as guardian of the money; as the defendants are plaintiffs tenants, they are entitled for possession and therefore, the suit be decreed and the sale deed dated 15-06-1974 be cancelled and possession of the suit house alongwith the due rent be decreed.

Once the property is owned by a minor, the provisions of section 8 of the Act are attracted. While s/s. (1) confers power on a natural guardian of a Hindu minor to do all acts which are necessary or reasonable and proper for the benefit of the minor or for the realisation, protection or benefit of the minors estate. The guardian can in no case bind the minor by a personal covenant, however, the said power is subject to the other provisions of section 8.

S/s. (2) provides for such conditions/restrictions, which inter alia mandates that a natural guardian shall not, without the previous permission of the court mortgage, charge, transfer by sale, gift, exchange or otherwise any part of the immovable property of the minor and s/s. (3) provides that any disposal of immovable property by a natural guardian in contravention of s/s. (1) and (2) is voidable at the instance of minor or any person claiming under him. Even the grant of permission by the court is circumscribed by s/s. (4), wherein except in case of necessity or for an evident advantage to the minor such permission cannot be granted.

Though, s/s. (1) permits a natural guardian to do all acts necessary for the benefit of minor and for benefit of minors estate, but the same is subject to other provisions of section and s/s. (2) clearly provides that without previous permission of the court transfer by sale of immovable property shall not be made by the guardian and any sale in contravention of s/s. (2) is voidable at the instance of the minor. The said s/s. (2) does not admit of any exception, whereby for any condition the minors estate could be transferred by the natural guardian without previous permission of the court.

It is for the minor, on attaining majority, not to question the transfer which is in contravention of s/s. (2) of section 8, but if he decides to question the same, the same is voidable at his instance. In the present case, the Plaintiff No.1 has on attaining majority chosen to question the transfer made by the defendant No.4 Bhagwan Lal, his father in favour of the defendant Nos. 1 to 3 (tenants) without seeking previous permission from the Court and therefore, the same was rightly declared void by the trial court.

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Auditing outsourced services – Auditors’ predicament

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Cost optimisation – the genesis of outsourcing
Many enterprises operate more efficiently and profitably by outsourcing certain functions to other organisations that have the personnel, expertise or infrastructure to accomplish these tasks. The past several years have seen rapid growth in outsourcing of various business functions to service organisations. This growth has been fueled by a number of factors, including economic recession, pressure to improve operational costs, an increasingly virtual workforce and lack of internal resources to support a process or function. Traditionally the term ‘outsourcing services’ would elicit reference to services such as book keeping, payroll processing, clearing house services, mortgage services and medical claims processing amongst others. However, with advancement of information technology, the outsourcing space has witnessed emergence of a plethora services such as Software as a Service (SaaS), Application Service Providers (ASP), Cloud Computing, Credit Card Processing platforms, Internet Service Providers (ISP), Data Centers, Tax processing etc.

How is an outsourced function relevant to audit?
In some cases the outsourced work generates information that is included in the outsourcer’s financial statements. Consider the example of a claims processor (third party administrator (TPA)) who processes claims for an insurance company. When the claims processing function is outsourced to a TPA, health plan customers are instructed to submit their claims directly to the TPA, which processes the claims based on rules established by the insurance company, such as rules related to eligibility and the amount to be paid against each claim. The claims processor provides the insurers with data, such as the cost of claims processed during a period, and this information flows through to the insurance company’s financial statements i.e., the expense claims and the related liability. Even though this information is generated by the claims processor, the insurance company is responsible for the accuracy of that information because the same is included in its financial statements.

For the auditors of the insurance company, the responsibility for auditing the information generated by the claims processor is the same as it would have been for auditing other financial statement information generated by the insurance company itself. The auditors must find a way to obtain evidence that supports the assertions in the insurers’ financial statements that include or are affected by the information generated by the claims processor. Under auditing parlance, the claim processor is termed as a ‘service organisation’, the insurance company would be a ‘user organisation’ whereas the auditor of the user organisation would be called as ‘user auditor’.

Auditors’ Responsibilities under SA 402
SA 402 – ‘Audit Considerations Relating to an Entity Using a Service Organisation’ expands on the factors that an auditor needs to bear in mind while auditing the financial statements of an entity that outsources functions that affect its financial statements. Services provided by a service organisation are relevant to the audit of a user entity’s financial statements when those services, and the controls over them, are part of the user entity’s information system, including related business processes, relevant to financial reporting.

In some cases, management of a user entity is able to monitor the quality of the data it receives from a service organisation by establishing controls to prevent, or detect and correct, misstatements in its financial statements resulting from errors in the data received from a service organisation. This would be the case if the user entity initiates and records the transactions it submits to the service organisation for processing. A good example of such services are payroll processing services.

In other cases, the user entity relies on the service organisation to initiate, execute and record the transactions. Consider for example where a user entity that grants an investment manager the authority to purchase and sell investments on its behalf based on written guidelines provided by the user entity.

Even though such controls are located and operating at the service organisation, they are relevant to the user entity’s internal control over financial reporting because they are designed to prevent, or detect and correct, errors in the information provided to user entities. The question is whether the auditor of a user organisation is required to test these controls and if yes, what approach would enable the user auditor to obtain sufficient information that such controls are designed and are operating effectively. Testing of controls at a service organisation.

SA 402 requires that where a user entity establishes controls over the services provided by a service organisation, the user auditor should test those controls which impact financial reporting to evaluate whether the same are operating effectively. Where the user auditor is satisfied that such controls at the user entity are operating effectively, he is not required to test controls established by the service organisation in relation to the services outsourced by the user entity. This may usually be the case where the process is less complex and the transaction volume is not substantial, for e.g., payroll processing for a small/medium sized enterprise.

Where the services provided by a service organisation involve highly automated processing, a user entity may not be able to implement effective controls over the transactions processed by the service organisation and may need to rely on the controls at the service organisation. From the user auditor’s perspective, he may be unable to obtain sufficient evidence by performing substantive procedures alone at the user entity. In such cases, the user auditor shall obtain an understanding through one or more of the following procedures:

a) O btaining a Type 1 or Type 2 report, if available

b) Contacting the service organisation, through the user entity, to obtain specific information

c) Visiting the service organisation and performing procedures that will provide the necessary information about the relevant controls at the service organisation; or

d) U sing another auditor to perform procedures that will provide the necessary information about the relevant controls at the service organisation.

A Type I report is a report by the service auditor on the design of the controls whereas a Type II report is a report on the design and operating effectiveness of controls at the service organisation.

The following case study highlights the procedures that a user auditor would perform to obtain sufficient evidence for risk assessment in relation to the services performed by a service organisation.

Case Study

World Wanderers Private Limited (WWPL) a wholly owned Indian subsidiary of World Wanderers Inc. USA (WWI) is an online travel company offering outbound and inbound travel services. WWI commenced operations in India in June 20X0. In order to rationalise the operating costs, the parent company, WWI outsourced the accounting for accounts payable function for all its subsidiaries including WWPL to Rapidex Accounting Services (RAS), an outsourcing firm based out of Philippines. The processing of accounts payable for WWPL happened at RAS whereas the general ledger was maintained by WWPL in India. WWI and all its subsidiaries used a globally renowned ERP system called ‘Apex’. Access to the Apex accounts payable module was provided by WWI to RAS. RAS used Apex for its other clients as well.

Under the accounts payable process, raising of purchase orders in Apex and approval of receipt of goods and services against these purchase orders was performed by authorised staff of WWPL. RAS accounts payable team was responsible for invoice and payment processing, reconciliations, journal posting in Apex and vendor helpdesk services. WWPL maintained a documentation imaging database called OMNI to which the designated accounts personnel from RAS accounts were given access. Scanned images of the invoices duly authorized by WWPL would be uploaded on OMNI. WWPL would provide a list of scanned images of specimen signatures of WWPL staff who were authorised to approve invoices. A designated team leader (TL) authorised by RAS would need to match the signatures on the invoices with the specimen provided and where these matched, the invoices were to be processed in Apex. A quality check was performed by RAS QC team on a test check basis.

Apex generated details of payments to be released to vendors based on due date which were compared    by RAS accounts payable team with the payment authorisation received from personnel of WWPL. The request was then uploaded on the bank’s website by RAS Team Leader and payments released after sign off by WWPL. The contractual terms agreed by WWI with RAS included the requirement of RAS furnishing a Type 2 report on a calendar year basis for all the subsidiaries by an independent firm of IT auditors.

RAS engaged a service auditor ABC & Co. (‘ABC’) a firm based in Philippines to provide his opinion on the design and effectiveness of controls over the accounts payable function. The period of coverage was from 1st January 20X0 to 31st December 20X0. The significant controls tested by ABC inter alia included the following critical controls:

a.    Controls provide reasonable assurance that invoices posted by RAS are authorised and accurate.

b.    Controls provide reasonable assurance that only authorised payments are processed accurately by RAS.

c.    Controls provide reasonable assurance that RAS IT resources used to provide services to WWPL are restricted to authorised personnel only.

ABC provided a Type 2 report stating that all controls related to accounts payable process were designed and operated effectively, other than the following controls:

•    For 3 out of 25 samples, the verification of the payments uploaded on bank website by RAS was done using the ID of a resigned Team Leader of RAS.

•    For 1 out of 25 samples, the verification of payment uploaded on the bank website was done using an ID which could not be associated with any of the Team Leaders of RAS assigned to WWPL.

•    For 2 out of 25 samples, the evidence for verification by the TL on the bank website was not available.

ABC & Co. qualified their opinion on the above count.

WWPL had also outsourced its tax planning and processing function to XYZ & Co. (‘XYZ’),  an  Indian firm of chartered accountants. XYZ was responsible for filing of all statutory returns such as Service tax returns, withholding tax returns, and income-tax returns as well as providing assistance in tax assessments.

The accounting period for WWPL ended on 31st March 20X1. M/s.PQR & Associates (‘PQR’) were appointed as auditors of WWPL.

Let us now examine what procedures would  PQR  would need to perform to ensure compliance with the requirements of SA 402:

1.    PQR may need to enquire whether WWPL has maintained independent detailed records or documentation of invoices processed and payments made by RAS on its behalf. It could be possible that no independent records could be maintained by WWPL on account of costs and operational efficiency.

2.    Auditors generally have broad rights of access established by legislation. PQR would need to obtain an understanding of the legislation applicable in Philippines to determine whether appropriate access rights can be obtained to RAS systems. PQR could consider requesting WWPL to incorporate rights of access in the contractual arrangements between  the WWPL and RAS. PQR may need to consider Inspecting records and documents held by RAS.

3.    PQR may need to obtain evidence as to the adequacy of controls operated by RAS over the completeness and integrity of WWPL’s accounts payable data for which RAS is responsible.

4.    If independent records of accounts payable are being maintained by WWPL, PQR could consider obtaining confirmations of balances and transactions from RAS for corroborating WWPL’s records. This may constitute reliable evidence confirming existence of transactions and balances.

5.    Given the significant volume of payments, performing substantive procedures or testing of operating effectiveness of controls at WWPL by PQR would not be sufficient. It would be imperative that the design and operative effectiveness of controls over processing of invoices as well as payments which occurred at RAS were tested by PQR.

6.    As ABC is a firm based out of Philippines and assuming that ABC is not registered with ICAI, PQR would need to evaluate the professional competence of ABC, its independence from WWPL and the adequacy of the standards under which ABC has issued the Type 2 Report. PQR may need to make enquiries about ABC to ABC’s professional organization and enquire whether ABC is subject to regulatory oversight.

7.    (a) If PQR is satisfied as to the professional competence of ABC, PQR could use ABC to perform procedures on the WWPL on its behalf such as testing of controls at RAS (other than those covered by the Type 2 Report) or substantive testing on WWPL financial statement transactions and balances maintained by RAS.

(b)    Alternatively, PQR could use another auditor to perform test of controls or substantive procedures at RAS on its behalf. The results of such procedures performed could be used by PQR to support its audit opinion. In such a case, it would be essential for ABC and PQR to agree to the form of and access to audit documentation.

(c)    PQR may visit RAS to perform tests of relevant controls if RAS agrees to it.

8.    As far as reliance on Type 2 Report is concerned, the controls tested by ABC and the results thereof would need to be evaluated by PQR to determine whether these support PQR’s risk assessment. In the present case it is pertinent to note that:

(a)    The period covered by the Type 2 report is until 31st December 20X0 whereas the period under audit ended on 31st March 20X1. PQR would need to discuss with WWPL or where permissible with RAS whether there were any significant changes to the relevant controls at WWPL outside of the period covered by ABC’s Type 2 report. PQR could consider extending tests of controls over the remaining period or testing  WWPL’s  monitoring of controls. PQR may also review current documentation of such controls as provided by RAS

(b)    PQR would need to evaluate the scope of work performed by ABC, i.e., the controls tested, the appropriateness of the sample sizes and whether there were significant changes to the relevant controls beyond the period covered by the Type 2 Report.

(c)    The service was designed with the assumption that WWPL user will have controls in place for authorizing invoices before they are sent to RAS for processing. Other control to consider would be whether an updated list of signatories authorized to approve invoices was sent by WWPL to RAS. PQR would need to consider whether such complementary controls at WWPL were relevant to the service provided to WWPL.

(d)    Merely because ABC had issued a qualified opinion does not imply that  ABC’s  report  will  not be useful for the audit of WWPL’s financial statements in assessing the risks of material misstatement. Subject to considerations explained in paragraph 7(a) above, the exceptions giving rise to the qualified opinion in ABC’s report should be considered in PQR’s assessment of the testing of controls performed by ABC.

(e)    The exceptions pertained  to  inconsistency  in  the login IDs used by RAS team to process transactions on Apex. PQR would need to evaluate how these exceptions impacted the overall control environment around accounts payable processing, any remedial was taken post  31  December  20X0 and whether alternative checks were available to prevent or detect and correct errors in misstatement.

(f)    The involvement of ABC or another auditor does not alter PQR’s responsibility to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence as a basis for forming his opinion. PQR would not be in a position to make a reference to ABC’s report as a basis for PQR’s opinion on WWPL’s financial statements. However, if PQR were to modify its opinion based on ABC’s opinion, then PQR could refer to the ABC’s report in its own audit opinion with prior consent of ABC.

9.    As regards tax processing services performed by XYZ, a report on controls at XYZ may not be available and visiting XYZ may be the most effective procedure for PQR to gain an understanding of controls XYZ   as there is likely to be direct interaction of WWPL’s management with XYZ.

The above is an illustrative inventory of procedures that SA 402 mandates auditors to perform. The procedures may be customised to meet the requirements of an actual scenario.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Increasingly, enterprises are outsourcing their business functions to achieve cost  efficiencies.  The  rise  of cloud computing has played a key role in the number    of businesses that outsource functions to service organisations. Cloud computing providers offer user entities access to applications, data storage, and numerous other computing functions on a pay-as-you- go basis. Controls at a service organisation that are related not only to user entities’ internal control over financial reporting but also to other critical aspects such as data privacy of customers and other stakeholders have gained prominence. User entity would continue to remain responsible for such data though the same resides with the service organisation.

SA 402 provides useful guidance to auditors to understand the nature and significance of services provided by service organisations and to  design  and  perform  procedures to respond to risk of material misstatements related thereto.

Gaps in GAAP— Component accounting under Schedule II

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Schedule II to the Companies Act, 2013 is
applicable from 1 April 2014. Notes to Schedule II, among other matters,
state as below:

“Useful life specified in Part C of the
Schedule is for whole of the asset. Where cost of a part of the asset is
significant to total cost of the asset and useful life of that part is
different from the useful life of the remaining asset, useful life of
that significant part shall be determined separately.”

An illustrative example is given below.

Some key issues are discussed in this article.

How does a company go about conducting this exercise?
Schedule
II requires separate depreciation only for parts of an item of tangible
fixed asset having (i) significant cost, and (ii) different useful
lives from remaining parts of the asset. In many cases, such
determination may be straight forward. For example, an IT company, which
has only computers as fixed assets, may be able to determine with
little analysis that there are no significant components requiring
separate depreciation. Similarly, for an airline company, it may be
clear that engine has different useful life vis-à-vis remainder of the
aircraft. In many other cases, identification of components requiring
separate depreciation may involve complex analysis.

The company
first splits the fixed asset into various identifiable parts to the
extent possible. The identified parts are then grouped together if they
have the same or similar useful life. There is no need to identify and
depreciate insignificant parts as separate components; rather, they can
be combined together in the remainder of the asset or with the principal
asset.

Identification of significant parts is a matter of
judgment and decided on case-to-case basis. Identification of separate
parts of an asset and determination of their useful life is not merely
an accounting exercise; rather, it involves technical expertise. Hence,
it may be necessary to involve technical experts to determine the parts
of an asset.

How does one judge materiality in the context of identification of components?
A
company needs to identify only material/significant components
separately for depreciation. Materiality is a matter of management/audit
judgment and needs to be decided on the facts of each case. Normally, a
component having original cost equal to or less than 5% of the original
cost of complete asset may not be material. However, a component having
original cost equal to 25% of the original cost of complete asset may
be material. In addition, a company also needs to consider impact on
retained earnings, current year profit or loss and future profit or loss
(say, when part will be replaced) to decide materiality. If a component
may have material impact from either perspective, the said component
will be material and require separate identification.

In many
cases, identification of material components may involve complex
judgment, particularly, for assessing impact on future P&L. Also
what may not be material in a particular period could become material in
later years, and vice versa.

Auditors will have to modify
their audit opinion for a company that does not follow component
accounting, the impact of which is likely to be material in the context
of the overall results or financial position
of that company.
In the case of a company that has a manufacturing facility and is asset
intensive, component accounting is likely to be material, not only
because of depreciation impact, but also the way replacement costs are
accounted for.

How is depreciation computed for components vis-avis the requirements of Schedule II?

Each
significant component of the asset having useful life, which is
different from the useful life of the remaining asset, is depreciated
separately. Though component accounting is mandatory, its application should be restricted only to material items.
If the useful life of the component is lower than the useful life of
the principal asset as per Schedule II, such lower useful should be
used. On the other hand, if the useful life of the component is higher
than the useful life of the principal asset as per Schedule II, the
company has a choice of using either the higher or lower useful life.
However, higher useful life for a component can be used only when
management intends to use the component even after expiry of useful life
for the principal asset.

To illustrate, assume that the useful
life of an asset as envisaged under the Schedule II is 10 years. The
management has also estimated that the useful life of the principal
asset is 10 years. If a component of the asset has useful life of 8
years, AS 6 requires the company to depreciate the component using eight
year life only. However, if the component has 12 year life, the company
has an option to either depreciate the component using either 10 year
life as prescribed in the Schedule II or over its estimated useful life
of 12 years, with appropriate justification. However, in this case 12
years life for the component can be used only when management intends to
use the component even after expiry of useful life for the principal
asset.

How are replacement costs accounted for?
The
application of component accounting will cause significant change in
measurement of depreciation and accounting for replacement costs.
Currently, companies need to expense replacement costs in the year of
incurrence. Under component accounting, companies will capitalize these
costs as a separate component of the asset, with consequent expensing of
net carrying value of the replaced component. If it is not practicable
for a company to determine carrying amount of the replaced component, it
may use the cost of the replacement as an indication of what the cost
of the replaced part was at the time it was acquired or constructed.

Even
under the component accounting, a company does not recognise in the
carrying amount of an item of fixed asset the costs of the day-to-day
servicing of the item. These costs are expensed in the statement of
profit and loss as incurred.

How are major inspection/overhaul expenses accounted for when component accounting is applied?

Under
Indian GAAP, no specific guidance is available on component accounting,
particularly, major inspection/ overhaul accounting. In the absence of
guidance, the following two options are likely. A company can select
either of two options for accounting of major inspection/ overhaul. The
option selected should be applied consistently.

Option 1
Though
AS 10 Accounting for Fixed Assets or any other pronouncement under
Indian GAAP does not comprehensively deal with component accounting,
Ind-AS 16 Property, Plant and Equipment contains comprehensive guidance
on the matter. Under component accounting as envisaged in Ind-AS 16,
major inspection/overhaul is treated as a separate part of the asset,
regardless of whether any physical parts of the asset are replaced.
Hence, one option is to apply Ind-AS 16 guidance by analogy. The
application of this approach is explained below.

When a company
purchases a new asset, it is received after major inspected/ overhaul by
the manufacturer. Hence, major inspection/ overhaul is identified
separately even at the time of purchase of new asset. The cost of such
major inspection/ overhaul is depreciated separately over the period
till next major inspection/overhaul.

Upon next major inspection/overhaul, the costs of new major inspection/ overhaul are added to the asset’s cost and any amount remaining from the previous inspection/ overhaul is derecognized. There is no issue in application of this principle, if the company has identified major inspection/ overhaul at the time of original purchase. However, sometimes, it may so happen that the cost of the previous inspection/overhaul was not identified (and considered a separate part) when the asset was originally acquired or constructed (this may not necessarily be an error but a change in an estimate). This process of recognition and derecognition should take place even in such cases.

If   the   element   relating   to   the   inspection/overhaul had  previously  been  identified,  it  would  have  been depreciated between that time and the current overhaul. However, if it had not previously been identified, the recognition and derecognition principles still apply. In such a case, the company uses estimated cost of a future similar inspection/overhaul to be used as an indication of the cost of the existing inspection/overhaul component to be derecognized after considering the depreciation impact.

OPTION 2

It may be argued that under AS 10 approach, all repair expenditure (including major inspection/overhaul) need to be charged to P&L as incurred. Though schedule II mandates component accounting, it does not state that application of component accounting is based on Ind-AS 16 principles. Hence, AS 10 applies for repair expenditure (including major inspection/overhaul).

Under this option, the application of component accounting is restricted only to physical parts. Neither on initial recognition nor subsequently, the compa- ny identifies major inspection/overhaul as separate component. Rather, any expense on major inspection/ overhaul is charged to P&L as incurred.

What are the presentation/disclosure requirements when component accounting is followed?
Component accounting is relevant for purposes such as depreciation and accounting for replacement cost. Companies are not required to disclose components separate- ly in the financial statements or notes thereto. Rather, the company discloses the asset with all its components as one line item.

With regard to disclosure of useful life/depreciation rates, Schedule II has prescribed depreciation rates only for principal asset and no separate rates are prescribed for its components. Also, schedule II requires disclosure of justification if a company uses higher/lower life than what is prescribed in Schedule II. To comply with these require- ments, the following principles are used:

(i)    A company discloses useful life/depreciation rate used for the principal asset separately. If this life/rate is higher/ lower than life prescribed in schedule II, justification for the difference is disclosed in the financial statements.
(ii)    There is no need to disclose useful lives or depreciation rates used for each component (other than principal asset) separately. It will be sufficient compliance, if disclosure is given as a range by presenting the highest and lowest amount. It may not be sufficient to present the average of the useful lives or depreciation rates used in that class of components.

What are the transitional provisions with respect to componentisation?

Component accounting is applicable from 1st April, 2014. It is required to be applied to the entire block of assets existing as at that date. It cannot be restricted to only new assets acquired after 1st April, 2014. Since companies may not have previously identified components separately, they may use estimated cost of a future similar replacements/ inspection/ overhaul as an indication of to determine their current carrying amount.

AS 10 gives companies an option to follow component accounting; it does not mandate the same. In contrast, component accounting is mandatory under the Schedule
II.    Considering this, transitional provisions of Schedule II can be used to adjust the impact of component accounting. If a component has zero remaining useful life on   the date of Schedule II becoming effective, i.e., 1st April 2014, its carrying amount, after retaining any residual value, will be charged to the opening balance of retained earnings. The consequent impact with respect to deferred taxes should also be adjusted to retained earnings. The carrying amount of other components, i.e., components whose remaining useful life is not nil on 1st April 2014, is depreciated over their remaining useful life.

In the case of listed companies do companies have to comply with component accounting in the quarterly results provided under Clause 41?

Listed companies having 31st March year-end need to apply component accounting for quarter ended 30th June, 2014. It may be possible that certain companies have not completed the process of identifying components by due date for publishing its results for quarter ended 30th June, 2014. In such a case, the auditors should make materiality assessment particularly considering that there is no need to publish balance sheet on a quarterly basis. In many cases, it may be clear that application of component ac- counting may not have impacted results for the quarter materially. If so, the auditor should document its basis for materiality assessment in the work papers. As already indicated elsewhere in this article, for most asset intensive companies, the impact on current or future results or financial position will most likely be material because of depreciation and accounting for replacement costs.

[2014] 148 ITD 129 (Mumbai – Trib.) Johnson & Johnson Ltd vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax A.Y. 2002-03 Order dated- 28th August 2013

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Section 92C
A. Where the assessee entered into a royalty payment agreement with its AE and made the payment of the same after taking approval from the RBI, then the payment of the said royalty made by the assessee in such circumstances is to be allowed and it cannot be said that the RBI’s approval cannot be considered as an arm’s length benchmark.
B. When taxes on royalty paid is to be borne by the assessee, on account of a commercial arrangement, the said taxes borne by the assessee should not be questioned while calculating arm’s length price.

Facts I:
The assessee, ‘J&J India’, had entered into international transactions with its AE, ‘J&J US’. It had paid the brand name royalty and the trademark royalty net of taxes at the rate of 1% of net sales to ‘J&J US’ for the use of brands and trademarks as per the terms of the brand usage agreement and also paid technical know-how royalty at the rate of 2% to ‘J&J US’ for the technical/marketing know-how provided to the assessee as per the terms of the know-how agreement entered into between the assessee and ‘J&J US’.

The assessee adopted the Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM) for determining the arm’s length price (ALP) of its international transactions.

TPO made the following disallowances
1. A s per the agreement entered into by the assessee with ‘J&J US’, the assessee was not required to bear the tax liability of ‘J&J US’ arising out of payment of trademark/brand name royalty. Thus, the taxes borne by the assessee on the trademark/brand name royalty paid to ‘J&J US’ was disallowed by the TPO.

2. T he TPO was of the opinion that royalty on sales of traded finished goods was already part of the brand royalty and no royalty was required to be paid for the traded products and hence disallowed the same.

3. T he TPO restricted the technical know-how royalty paid at the rate of 2% to 1%.

4. T he TPO disallowed corresponding taxes and Research & Development Cess on technical knowhow royalty.

On appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the disallowance of taxes paid by assessee on payment of trademark/ brand name royalty to ‘J&J US’ whereas deleted the other disallowance made by the TPO.

The cross appeals by the assessee and the Revenue were directed against the order of the Ld. CIT(A). Also on second appeal, the assessee submitted that the royalty payments had been approved by RBI.

Held I:

1 T axes paid by assessee on trademark/brand name royalty
The application made by the assessee to RBI for brand usage agreement specifically mentions that the royalty is to be remitted net of taxes. Further, the approval was received from the RBI to remit the royalty on brand usage by the assessee at the rate of 1% net of taxes. Considering the brand usage agreement vis-à-vis the approval granted by RBI, it can be safely inferred that the taxes were liability of the assessee under the terms of agreement. The assessee has entered into a commercial arrangement with ‘J&J US’ and it has been so arranged that the payment of taxes have to be borne by the assessee being a commercial arrangement, the same should not be questioned while calculating arm’s length price. Considering the entire facts in totality in the light of the brand usage agreement and the approval of the RBI, the findings of the CIT(A) is set aside and the AO is directed to delete the addition of the said taxes paid by assessee on trademark/brand name royalty.

2. Royalty payment on sales of traded finished goods

It is already held that the agreements between the assessee and ‘J&J USA’ for payment of royalty have to be considered in the light of the approval of the RBI. There is no substance in the findings of the TPO that there is no need for paying royalty on sales of traded finished goods. There is also no force in the findings of the TPO that this royalty is deemed to be included in the Brand royalty. Therefore, findings of the Ld. CIT(A) were not interfered with.

[The contention of the assessee before CIT(A), on the basis of which CIT(A) had deleted the addition made by TPO of royalty on sales of traded finished goods, was as follows-

Even if the products under consideration are old that does not debar the assessee from paying the royalty now. It was further contended that the assessee continues to get new products from time to time and also gets updates on existing products. The assessee pointed out that the allegation of the TPO that the royalty is covered by Brand Royalty does not hold any water as there is no co-relation between the two. It was claimed that Brand Royalty is paid for the use of the brand names owned by ‘J&J USA’ whereas the royalty for sales of traded finished goods is paid, apart from manufacturing rights; on the know how relating to sale, distribution and marketing. Therefore, it is incorrect to say that this royalty is included in brand royalty.]

3. T echnical know-how royalty

It is already held that the payment of royalty has to be considered in the light of the agreement between the assessee and ‘J&J USA’, for the same reasons. There is no reason to interfere with the findings of the CIT(A).

4. Corresponding taxes and research and development (R&D) cess on technical know-how royalty
The Ld. CIT(A) has confirmed the decision of the TPO holding that withholding tax and R&D Cess can be allowed only to the extent they are payable on allowable royalty. As it is already held elsewhere that royalty payments have been approved by the RBI and therefore, deserves to be allowed. Accordingly as the payments have been made in the light of the agreement with J&J US and as per the approval/guidelines of the RBI, there is no reason to disallow the tax and R&D Cess paid on technical royalty, and accordingly the AO is directed to delete the addition made on this account.

Section 92C read with Section 37(1)
Where, the assessee, who carries on a business finds that it is commercially expedient to incur certain expenditure directly or indirectly, it would be open to such an assessee to do so notwithstanding the fact that a formal deed does not precede the incurring of such expenditure.

Facts II:
The assessee had entered into a brand usage royalty agreement with its AE on 14-03-2002.

The TPO had held that the brand usage royalty paid by assessee was at arm’s length price.

However, the CIT(A) disallowed the brand royalty paid during the period 01-07-2001 to 14-03-2002 on the ground that there was no agreement in place during the said period indicating the intention to pay royalty with effect from 01-07-2001.

On appeal before the Tribunal, it was mentioned that the assessee had submitted a draft agreement alongwith the application to RBI on 10.8.2001 and thus the royalty was paid as per the guidelines issued by the RBI,

Held II:
The agreement for payment of brand usage royalty was entered into only on 14-03-2002. However, at the same time, the CIT(A) has erred in ignoring the copy of draft brand usage royalty agreement which was submitted by the assessee alongwith application to the RBI on 10-08-2001. The assessee received approval from the RBI on 20-11- 2001 and after receiving the approval from the RBI, the assessee entered into brand usage royalty agreement with ‘J&J US’ by which it was agreed to pay the royalty from 01-07-2001. The date being the same, as agreed in the draft agreement filed with the application made to the RBI, therefore, the observations made by the CIT(A) that there was no tacit agreement does not hold any water.

Assuming, yet not accepting, that there was no agreement, the payments made having regard to the commercial expediency need not necessarily have their origin in contractual obligations. If the assessee, which carries on a business finds that it is commercially expedient to incur certain expenditure directly or indirectly, it would be open to such an assessee to do so notwithstanding the fact that a formal deed does not precede the incurring of such expenditure.

Considering the facts in totality there is no merit in the enhancement made by the CIT(A). The findings of the CIT(A) are set aside. The AO is directed to delete the addition made by the CIT(A).

2014 (34) STR 546 (All.) Indian Coffee Workers’ Society Ltd. vs. CCE & ST., Allahabad

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Whether supply of food, edibles and beverages to persons within a canteen provided by the company would attract service tax as outdoor catering services? Held – Yes.

Facts:
Appellant entered into agreements for running and maintenance of an administrative building canteen. Appellant supplied food, edibles and beverages to the individual customers in accordance with the rate specified in the agreement. Appellant was provided a place for running the canteen by the Company. Department had contended that Appellant was providing “Outdoor catering services.”

Held:
The High Court held that supplier was an outdoor caterer by plain and literal construction of the provisions and definition, which included service provided by the caterer at a place other than his own. Once, the services of an outdoor caterer was provided to another person, its chargeability gets attracted, irrespective of extent of its consumption by the person who have engaged such service. The charge of tax in the cases of VAT was distinct from the charge of tax for service tax. VAT was paid on the sale of goods involved in the supply of food and beverages by the assessee would not exclude his liability for the payment of service tax in respect of taxable service was provided as an outdoor caterer.

levitra

TS-367-ITAT-2014(Mum) IATA BSP India vs. DDIT A.Y: NA Dated: 11-06-2014

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Restricted scope of India – USA and India-Portugal DTAA, can be read into the India-France DTAA; Services which does not satisfy ‘make available’ condition do not trigger FTS taxation under India-France DTAA.

Facts:
The Taxpayer is a Branch office (BO) of a Canadian Company (CCo) which is the trade association for the world’s airlines. The BO was established as per the permission of Reserve bank of India for the purpose of undertaking certain commercial activities on no profit basis.

CCo, entered into an agreement through its administrative office in Geneva, with French Company (FCo) for developing certain system (BSP Link). BSP Link enabled the manual operations such as issue of debit notes/credit notes, issue of refund, billing statement and all the information relating to tickets to be carried out electronically for agents as well as airlines which participated in the BSP link to provide information in relation to the booking of tickets and facilitate billing for the tickets.

The BSP link services were provided to the agents and airlines operating in India for which invoices were initially raised by FCo on Geneva Office of CCo which in turn raised the invoices on BO.
BO made an application u/s. 195(2) to the Tax Authority, to make payments to its Geneva office without withholding taxes at source on the ground that no services were being rendered by the Geneva Office. Further it was contended that no tax was deductible on such payments as the branch office and its head office are not separate entities as per the Income-tax Act.

However, the Tax authority contended that, in substance the transactions involved the payments on account of BSP link services provided by FCo in France and as the said services were technical in nature taxes are required to be withheld under the India – France DTAA .

On Appeal, the First Appellate Authority held that the fee for services is not taxable by virtue of MFN clause of the DTAA which incorporates ‘make available’ condition in India France DTAA .

Aggrieved, the Tax Authority appealed to the Tribunal.

Held:
India-France DTAA protocol contained the MFN clause, by virtue of which if India enters into a DTAA or protocol post 01-09-1989 under which it limits its right to tax FTS to a rate lower or scope more restricted than the rate or scope prevalent in the India-France DTAA , the same rate and scope would also apply to India-France DTAA .

India entered into a DTAA with USA and Portugal post 01- 09-1989. The India-USA DTAA and India-Portugal DTAA have provided a narrower scope for taxation of FTS by inserting a ‘make available’ condition.

Thus the restricted scope of India – USA and India-Portugal DTAA , can be read into the India-France DTAA . As there was nothing to show that the BSP Link services make available any technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how, or processes, it does not trigger FTS taxation under the India-France DTAA .

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TS-285-AAR-2014 Steria (India) Limited A.Y: NA Dated: 02-05-2014

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Restriction in the Most Favoured Nations (MFN) Clause of the India-France DTAA is in relation to rates of taxes, the “make available” condition, as available in the India-UK DTAA, is not included within its purview.

Facts:
The Applicant, a public company in India (ICo), was engaged in providing information technology driven services. ICo entered into a management service agreement with Steria France (FCO), a resident of France, for various management services, such as general management, corporate communications, internal audit, finance-related services etc., with a view to rationalise and standardise the business conducted by ICo in India in accordance with international best practices.

FCO provided services offshore through electronic media (telephone, fax, email etc.) and no personnel visited India for provision of the services.

As per the France DTAA fees for technical services (FTS) is defined to mean consideration for any technical, managerial or consultancy services. Though “FTS” is broadly defined in the France DTAA, vide the Protocol to the France DTAA , an Indian resident making a payment to a French resident may apply the MFN Clause to, inter alia, take privilege of a more restricted scope of source taxation or rate of tax present in any subsequent DTAA entered into force by India with an OECD member. As per the France DTAA , FTS was taxable at 20% on gross basis.

Pursuant to the MFN Clause, a Notification1 (France Notification) was issued by the GOI giving effect to the MFN clause which provided for a lower rate of taxation viz., 10%. The France Notification makes no reference to the restricted scope of meaning of FTS.

In a similar notification, in the context of the India-Netherlands DTAA, the MFN benefit has been provided with respect to lower rate, as well as the narrow scope of FTS definition i.e., incorporating ‘make available’ condition.

ICo relied on the India-UK DTAA to import the ‘make available’ condition for taxation of FTS. ICO contended that on an application of the MFN Clause in the Protocol to the France DTAA, the narrower scope of the definition of FTS, as available in the India-UK DTAA , may be applied. Accordingly, since the services do not make available technical knowledge, experience, skill etc., the services rendered should not be regarded as taxable in India.

The Tax Authority, on the other hand, contended that the services are FTS in nature and the ‘make available’ concept is not applicable. In any case, technical knowledge, skill etc., are made available through employee interaction and, hence, the same is taxable in India.

Held:
A Protocol cannot be treated at par with provisions contained in a DTAA itself, though it is an integral part of the DTAA .

The restriction in the MFN clause of the France DTAA is in relation to rates of taxes and the “make available” Clause cannot be read into the Protocol.

Furthermore, the France Notification issued pursuant to the Protocol giving effect to the MFN Clause provides only for a reduced rate of tax and does not include anything about the ‘make available’ clause. Had the intention been so, the same would have been mentioned in the France Notification, comparable to what has been done in the India-Netherlands DTAA . The changes in the France DTAA on the basis of the Protocol were given effect by the France Notification only.

The ‘make available’ Clause cannot be imported in the DTAA to change the complexion of the DTAA provision. A Protocol or Memorandum of Association can be made use of for interpreting the provisions of a DTAA but it is not correct to import words, phrases or clauses not available into a DTAA on the basis of DTAA s with other countries. At the most, India is under obligation, as per the terms of the Protocol, to limit its tax rate or scope as was done in the France Notification, but such type of an action was not within the purview of the AAR.

Since the services rendered by FCo were technical services under the Indian Tax Laws, as also under the France DTAA , the payments fell within the purview of FTS and, hence, were chargeable to tax in India and, accordingly, taxes are required to be withheld.

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Professional Services vis-à-vis works contract

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Introduction
The issue about nature of transaction as to whether it is sale, service or works contract, is always debatable. This is because there are no pre-set guidelines about deciding the nature of transaction, as to whether sale, service or works contract. There are a number of judgments from various forums but still the issue has remained unresolved.

Constitutional amendment
By the 46th amendment, works contract transactions were made taxable under sales tax by insertion of Clause (29A) in Article 366 of the Constitution of India. Thereafter, the issue of deciding the nature of transaction has become much more complicated. Prior to above amendment, there were normally two types of transactions, i.e., normal sale or works contract. Since works contract was not taxable, no further demarcation used to be made. After the amendment, works contract transactions are taxable. However, all the transactions involving goods cannot become taxable works contract transactions under sales tax laws. In other words, if it can be substantiated that if in a transaction, goods are used, but such use of goods is only incidental to providing service and that the said use is not as sale of material itself, then the transaction can be classified as a transaction for rending service, not liable to tax under the sales tax laws. Therefore, after the amendment, in addition to classifying the transaction as works contract, the further classification can be made as taxable works contract under sales tax laws and non taxable transaction (involving use of goods), but which can be termed as service transaction.

Case study
Reference can be made to the judgment in case of Dr. Hemendra Surana vs. State of Rajasthan (90 STC 251)(Raj). In this case the appellant, a doctor by profession, took an X-ray of the patient and gave his report with an X-ray film. The transaction was treated as works contract by sales tax authorities, whereas the Hon. High Court held that it is not a works contract. It was held as ‘service transaction’ implying that transfer of X-ray film is incidental to professional services.

In the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. (145 STC 91), the Hon’ble Supreme Court discussed about deciding nature of sale vis-à-vis works contract, service transaction. The relevant observations are in para 46 which are reproduced below.

“46.. The reason why these services do not involve a sale for the purposes of Entry 54 of List II is, as we see it, for reasons ultimately attributable to the principles enunciated in Gannon Dunkerley’s case [1958] 9 STC 353 (SC), namely, if there is an instrument of contract which may be composite in form in any case other than the exceptions in Article 366(29A), unless the transaction in truth represents two distinct and separate contracts and is discernible as such, then the State would not have the power to separate the agreement to sell from the agreement to render service, and impose tax on the sale. The test therefore for composite contracts other than those mentioned in Article 366(29A) continues to be—did the parties have in mind or intend separate rights arising out of the sale of goods. If there was no such intention there is no sale even if the contract could be disintegrated. The test for deciding whether a contract falls into one category or the other is as to what is “the substance of the contract”. We will, for the want of a better phrase, call this the dominant nature test.”

In light of above, one can look into the intention of parties, the scope of work and decide the nature of transaction. The ‘dominant nature test’ was evolved by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the BSNL judgement.

Judgment of Larger Bench in case of M/s Kone Elevators (71 VST 1)
In this case, the Hon’ble Larger Bench (5 judges) of the Supreme Court has discussed about nature of transaction of installation of lift. The judgment is by majority of four judges to one judge. The minority judgment has confirmed the original judgment that supply and installation of the lift is ‘sale’.

However, the majority judgment of four judges has held that the lift installation transaction is a ‘works contract.’ Therefore, the binding judgment will be of the majority and transaction of installation of lift will be considered as ‘works contract.’

The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in this judgment, has discussed the entire historical background of works contract transaction. And after making observations about the legal position, the Hon’ble Supreme Court turned to facts of the case.

As per the larger bench, in case of lift, the lift comes into existence on installation. Therefore, the Larger Bench has considered service part as also equally important and hence lift installation transaction is held to be a composite transaction of sale and service, i.e., works contract. This position is clear from the paragraph reproduced below.

“63. Considered on the touchstone of the aforesaid two Constitution Bench decisions, we are of the convinced opinion that the principles stated in Larsen and Toubro (supra) as reproduced by us hereinabove, do correctly enunciate the legal position. Therefore, “the dominant nature test” or “overwhelming component test” or “the degree of labour and service test”are really not applicable. If the contract is a composite one which falls under the definition of works contracts as engrafted under clause (29A)(b) of Article 366 of the Constitution, the incidental part as regards labour and service pales into total insignificance for the purpose of determining the nature of the contract.

64.    Coming back to Kone Elevators (supra), it is perceivable that the three-Judge Bench has referred to the statutory provisions of the 1957 Act and thereafter referred to the decision in Hindustan Shipyard Ltd. (supra), and has further taken note of the customers’ obligation to do the civil construction and the time schedule for delivery and thereafter proceeded to state about the major component facet and how the skill and labour employed for converting the main components into the end product was only incidental and arrived at the conclusion that it was a contract for sale. The principal logic applied, i.e., the incidental facet of labour and service, according to us, is not correct. It may be noted here that in all the cases that have been brought before us, there is a composite contract for the purchase and installation of the lift. The price quoted is a composite one for both. As has been held by the High Court of Bombay in Otis Elevator (supra), various technical aspects go into the installation of the lift. There has to be a safety device. In certain States, it is controlled by the legislative enactment and the rules. In certain States, it is not, but the fact remains that a lift is installed on certain norms and parameters keeping in view numerous factors. The installation requires considerable skill and experience. The labour and service element is obvious. What has been taken note of in Kone Elevators (supra) is that the company had brochures for various types of lifts and one is required to place order, regard being had to the building, and also make certain preparatory work. But it is not in dispute that the preparatory work has to be done taking into consideration as to how the lift is going to be attached to the building. The nature of the contracts clearly exposit that they are contracts for supply and installation of the lift where labour and service element is involved. Individually manufactured goods such as lift car, motors, ropes, rails, etc., are the components of the lift which are eventually installed at the site for the lift to operate in the building. In constitutional terms, it is transfer either in goods or some other form. In fact, after the goods are assembled and installed with skill and labour at the site, it becomes a permanent fixture of the building. Involvement of the skill has been elaborately dealt with by the High Court of Bombay in Otis Elevator (supra) and the factual position is undisputable and irrespective of whether installation  is regulated by statutory law or not, the result would be the same. We may hasten to add that this position is stated in respect of a composite contract which requires the contractor to install a lift in a building. It is necessary to state here that if there are two contracts, namely, purchase of the components of the lift from a dealer, it would be a contract for sale and similarly, if separate contract is entered into for installation, that would be a contract for labour and service. But, a pregnant one, once there is a composite contract for supply and installation, it has to be treated as a works contract, for it is not a sale of goods/chattel simpliciter. It is not chattel sold as chattel or, for that matter, a chattel being attached to another chattel. Therefore, it would not be appropriate to term it as a contract for sale on the bedrock that the components are brought to the site, i.e., building, and prepared for delivery. The conclusion, as has been reached in Kone Elevators (supra), is based on the bedrock of incidental service for delivery. It would not be legally correct to make such a distinction in respect of lift, for the contract itself profoundly speaks of obligation to supply goods and materials as well as installation of the lift which obviously conveys performance of labour and  service.  Hence,  the fundamental characteristics of works contract are satisfied. Thus analysed, we conclude and hold that the decision rendered in Kone Elevators (supra) does not correctly lay down the law and it is, accordingly, overruled.”

It can be seen that, ultimately the Hon’ble Supreme Court has decided the issue on the factual position.

OUTCOME
As per above judgment, the dominant nature test etc.,
are irrelevant. It appears that the basic nature of the transaction is required to be seen and if it is works contract then the dominant nature test or overwhelming component test etc., are not relevant. Thus, one is again in a dilemma about deciding nature of taxable works contract transaction vis-à-vis service transaction, where some materials may be involved.

By virtue of BSNL decision, dominant nature test could have been applied. In fact, in this case the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that doctors, lawyers cannot be liable to tax as the basic nature of transaction is rendering service, though some goods may be involved and transferred. In the judgment of Kone Elevators, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that the dominant nature test is not relevant. Thus, someone may take a view that the doctors and lawyers can also be liable, as the service nature of transaction is not relevant.

This will be an extreme view, which cannot be justified. Though, the dominant nature test is not relevant, still the issue will arise whether services of doctors and lawyers can be considered to be works contract. We have to look into the basic nature of transaction to decide whether it is a works contract? But as discussed, the position has become more fluid and the issue of above nature may crop up. In fact, this is the guidance expected from the judicial pronouncements from the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In any case, in light of direct observations of the Supreme Court in case of BSNL, it can be said that, the services of doctors and lawyers are still out of purview of sales tax laws.

In fact in recent judgment in case of International Hospital Pvt. Ltd. (71 VST 139)(All), the Hon. Allahabad High Court has held that use of stents and valves in heart procedure of patient at hospital is not works contract. However, there can be contrary judgment and the situation will remain uncertain. In above judgment of the Hon. Allahabad High Court itself, there is reporting of contrary judgment of the Kerala High Court in case of Aswini Hospital Pvt. Ltd. (51 NTN 29)(Ker), wherein the hospital is held as liable to works contract tax.

CONCLUSION

In case of International Hospital Pvt. Ltd., the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kone Elevators, i.e., (71 VST 1) was not available. Therefore, one may be tempted to say that the above judgment may require reconsideration in light of above judgment in case of Kone Elevators. However, it appears that the judgment in case of International Hospital Pvt. Ltd., will still hold good as the same is based on basic nature of transaction and will be saved even by judgment of Kone Elevators. In the future, reconfirmation of above judgment of the Allahabad High Court will certainly helpful in deciding correct nature of transaction, more particularly the service transaction where some material is involved in the rending of service.

TAXABILITY OF TAKE AWAYS AND HOME DELIVERIES

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Background
Service tax levy on Air Conditioned Restaurants (with license to serve liquor) [“ACR”) was introduced, w.e.f. 01-05-2011, with an abatement of 70%. The said levy has been continued under negative list based taxation of services introduced w.e.f. 01-07-2012, with few minor changes in the scope and rate of abatement.

However, the scope of ACR Services, was substantially expanded w.e.f. 01-04-2013, whereby the condition of license to serve liquor was done away with. Far reaching implications of the amendment were discussed in April, 2013 issue of BCAJ. In this feature, the contentious of issue of taxability in case of take aways / home deliveries in regard to which inconsistent practices are being followed, is discussed.

Constitutional Validity of the levy
The constitutional validity of service tax levy on ACR was challenged before various Courts in the country. The Kerala High Court in the case of Kerala Classified Hotels and Resorts Association & others (2013) 31 STR 257 (KER) had held the levy constitutionally invalid. However, the Bombay High Court in India Hotels and Restaurant Association & Others vs. UOI (2014 – TIOL – 498 – HC – Mum – ST) and the Chhattisgarh High Court in Hotel East Park & Another vs. UOI (2014 – TIOL – 758 – HC – CHHATTISGRAH – ST) have upheld the constitutional validity of the levy.

Relevant Statutory Provisions
Section 65 B (44) of the Finance Act, 1994, as amended (Act)

“Service” means any activity carried out by a person for another for consideration, and includes a declared service, but shall not include –

(a) an activity which constitutes merely, –

i) A transfer of title in goods or immovable property, by way of sale, gift or in any other manner; or

ii) Such transfer, delivery or supply of any goods which is deemed to be a sale within the meaning of Clause (29A) of article 366 of the Constitution; or

iii) A transaction in money or actionable claim.

(b) A provision of service by an employee to the employer in the course of or in relation to his employment;

(c) Fees taken in any Court or Tribunal established under any law for the time being in force.

………………….

Declared Services (section 66E of the Act)

The following shall constitute declared services, namely
…………

(i) Service portion in an activity wherein goods, being food or any other article of human consumption or any drink (whether or not intoxicating) is supplied in any manner as a part of the activity.

Article 366 (29A) (f) of the Constitution of India
Sale includes –

“Supply, by way of or as a part of any service or in any other manner whatsoever, of goods, being food or any other article for human consumption or any drink (whether or not intoxicating), where such supply or service is for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration.”

Mega Exemption Notification No. 25/2012 – ST dated 20-06-2012 (as amended)

Entry No. 19

Services provided in relation to serving of food or beverages by a restaurant, eating joint or a mess, other than those having facility of air conditioning or central air heating in any part of the establishment, at any time during the year.

Relevant Extracts from CBEC – Education Guide dated 20-06-2012

Para 8.4

Valuation of service portion involved in supply of food or any other article of human consumption or any drink in a restaurant or as outdoor catering.

In terms of article 366(29A) of the Constitution of India supply of any goods, being food or any other article of human consumption or any drink (whether or not intoxicating) in any manner as part of a service for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration is deemed to be a sale of such goods. Such a service therefore cannot be treated as service to the extent of the value of goods so supplied. The remaining portion however constitutes a service. It is a well settled position of law, declared by the Supreme Court in BSNL‘s case [2006(2)STR161(SC)], that such a contract involving service along with supply of such goods can be dissected into a contract of sale of goods and contract of provision of service. Since normally such an activity is in the nature of composite activity, difficulty arises in determining the value of the service portion. In order to ensure transparency and standardization in the manner of determination of the value of such service provided in a restaurant or as outdoor catering a new Rule 2C has been inserted in the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 116 2011, amended by the amendment Rules of 2012. This manner of valuation is explained in the points below.

Para 8.4.1 Are services provided by any kind of restaurant, big or small, covered by the manner of valuation provided in Rule 2C of the Valuation Rules?

Yes. Although services provided by any kind of restaurant would be valued in the manner provided in Rule 2C, it may be borne in mind that the following category of restaurants are exempted –

• Services provided in relation to serving of food or beverages by a restaurant, eating joint or a mess, other than those having the facility of air-conditioning or central air heating in any part of the establishment, at any time during the year, ……………..

• Below the threshold exemption.

Departmental Clarifications
Circular D.O.F NO. 334/3/2011 – TRU dated 28-02-2011 (Relevant extracts) Para 1.4

The new levy is directed at services provided by highend restaurant that are air-conditioned and have license to serve liquor. Such restaurants provide conditions and ambience in a manner that service provided may assume predominance over the food in many situations. It should not be confused with mere sale of goods at any eating house, where such services are materially absent or so minimal that it will be difficult to establish that any service in any meaningful way is being provided.

Para 1.6

The levy is intended to be confined to the value of services contained in the composite contract and shall not cover either the meal portion in the composite contract or mere sale of food by way of pick-up or home delivery, as also goods sold at MRP…………….

Circular No. 173/8/2013 dated 07-10-2013 (relevant extracts)

Taxability – Supply of food at outlets, take aways, delivery etc.
Various restaurants, hotels or coffee shops sell food items, beverages, ready-to-drink products, including food pre-packaged at their outlets. The arrangement may be sale at outlet for consumption within the premises or sale over the counter or sale of MRP products.

The scope of declared list entry (i) of section 66E of the Act is very wide and covers service portion of an activity of supply of food or any article of human consumption or any drinks in any manner. Hence, service tax will be payable whenever supply of food involves any service element and the transaction is not merely a “transfer of title” in goods. The issue which requires consideration is whether supply of food items and beverages is a transaction of

merely “transfer of title” in goods or involves any service element as part of supply of goods and beverages. As regards the determination of what is ‘sales’ under article 366(29A) of the Constitution of India, various judicial rulings have evolved a law to the following effect:

• the predominant transaction is a ‘sale’ or ‘service’ must be determined from the facts of each case;

• where supply is made in a restaurant and if the customer has the right to take away the food or dispose it off at his discretion, it may qualify as ‘sale’ and providing of services in this situation would be incidental;
•    further, in relation to “over the counter” sales, it may qualify as sale of goods, as the services are not significant.

Though the above evolution of law is before the introduction of negative list based taxation of services, the same would be relevant, to determine what constitutes ‘sale’ as contemplated in the exclusion clause in the definition of ‘service’. [section 65 B(44) of the Act] under the negative list regime.
The CBEC circulars issued at the time of introduction of levy as reproduced earlier, have clarified that mere sale of food by way of pick-up or home delivery as well as goods sold at MRP will not attract service tax. Though these circulars were issued in the context of “ACR Services” the principle contained therein would be relevant under the negative list based regime. Further, as ‘sale’ is covered under the exclusion clause in the definition of ‘service’, there can be no levy of service tax as “Declared Services”.

•    Whether the service tax is attracted even where the air-conditioning facility has operated for a part of the year or in any part of establishment. In particular, cases where A/c is not installed in the restaurant area where food is supplied for consumption by a customer but in Manager’s cabin or a Cold Storage area in a kitchen which is a part of the restaurant establishment.

•    Whether self–service or pick up or home delivery/ supply of food or beverages, ice cream/food served outside the area of restaurant/eating joints or mess having facility or air–conditioning etc. will come under the purview of service tax or not?

In terms of Clause (i) of section 66E of the Act, service portion in an activity wherein goods, being food or other articles of human consumption or any drink (whether or not intoxicating) is supplied in any manner as a part of the activity is a declared service.

Further, Entry No. 19 of the Notification No. 25/2012- S.T. dated 20-06-2012 as amended vide Notification No.3/2013–ST dated 01-03-2013 (w.e.f. 01-04-2013), has exempted services provided in relation to serving of food or beverages by a restaurant, eating joint or a mess, other than those having the facility of air-conditioning or central air–heating in any part of the establishment, at any time during the year.

?    According to one school of thinking:

•    In light of the Exemption Notification No. 25/2012– S.T. (as amended) the specific exclusion of the premises which have or had air–conditioning facility in any part of the establishment (including Manager’s cabin or Cold Storage area in a restaurant) at any time during the year, it would appear that, exemption may not be available

•    The service tax has been levied on the activity    of supply of goods etc. in any manner and the exemption has been granted to the services provided in relation to serving of food or beverages by a restaurant, eating joint or a mess, other than those having the facility of air-conditioning or central air-heating in any part of the establishment, at any time during the year. The exemption, is based on the condition of the restaurant, eating joint or the mess as to whether or not they are    or were having air-conditioning or central air– heating facility in any part of their establishment, at any time during the year. It is not based on the manner in which food, etc. is supplied. Therefore, it is appears that service tax could be leviable    on the food etc., supplied by a restaurant, eating joint or a mess if they have or had the facility of air-conditioning or central air-heating in any part of their establishment during any part of the year irrespective of the fact whether the food is served, outside the restaurant premises, delivered or taken away.

?    According to a second school of thinking :

•    Based on settled principles of harmonious & rational interpretation laid down from time to time, in order to attract service tax under ACR Services, it would appear that A/c /air heating facility should exist in the restaurant area where food is supplied.

•    In cases where, food is prepared by an A/c outlet, restaurant etc. and the customers have an option to consume food/beverages etc., within the premises of such A/c outlet, restaurant etc., supply of food may get covered under entry (i) of section 66E of the Act and hence become liable to service tax.

However, in cases where no particular place is provided by the A/c outlet, restaurant etc. where such food/beverage can be consumed, the activities could be considered as being in the nature of sale of goods and hence may not attract service tax.

•    In cases where, A/c outlets, restaurants sell goods  on MRP basis (like coffee packets, cold drinks etc.),  it would be a good case to hold that goods supplied under MRP are mere sale of goods and do not involve any service element so as to attract service tax.

•    In cases where, food items are supplied by A/c Outlets/Restaurants as take aways or home delivery, the activities can be regarded as being in the nature of sale of goods and hence would not attract service tax.

CONCLUSION:
It would reasonably appear that, second set of contentions reflects a better view. CBEC clarifications in the context of ACR services reinforce the same. However, considering the scenario that at a practical level  in  many  cases take aways & home deliveries are being subjected to service tax by owners of A/c outlets, restaurants etc. as a conservative measure to avoid prospect of tax liability at a future date, the matter needs to be appropriately clarified by the CBEC so as to reduce burden at the end Consumer.

LSG Sky Chef (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT In the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal “A” Bench, Mumbai Before I. P. Bansal, (JM) and Sanjay Arora, (AM) I.T.A. No. 4828/Mum/2012 Assessment Year: 2009-10. Decided on 27-03-2014 Counsel for Assessee/Revenue: M. M. Golvala & Amey Wagle/M. L. Perumal

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Section 203AA – Assessee cannot be denied credit for TDS merely because the same were not reflected in Form 26AS when TDS certificates in original were filed.

Facts:
The issue before the Tribunal was about the short credit of the tax deducted at source. In its return of income the assessee had claimed credit for TDS of Rs. 92.52 lakh. However, the AO allowed the credit of Rs. 67.99 lakh only and no credit was allowed for the balanced sum of Rs. 24.53 lakh, as the same was not reflected in Form No. 26AS despite furnishing of the TDS certificates in original by the assessee.

Held:
According to the Tribunal, the burden of proving as to why the said Form does not reflect the details of the entire tax deducted at source for and on behalf of a deductee cannot be placed on an assessee-deductee. The assessee, by furnishing the TDS certificate/s bearing the full details of the tax deducted at source, credit for which is being claimed, has discharged the primary onus on it toward claiming credit in its respect. He, accordingly, cannot be burdened any further in the matter. The Revenue is fully entitled to conduct proper verification in the matter and satisfy itself with regard to the veracity of the assessee’s claim/s, but cannot deny the assessee credit in respect of TDS without specifying any infirmity in its claim/s. Form 26AS is a statement generated at the end of the Revenue, and the assessee cannot be in any manner held responsible for any discrepancy therein or for the non-matching of TDS reflected therein with the assessee’s claim/s. The tribunal further observed that the plea that the deductor may have specified a wrong TAN, so that the TDS may stand reflected in the account of another deductee, is no reason or ground for not allowing credit for the TDS in the hands of the proper deductee. The onus for the purpose lies squarely at the door of the Revenue. Accordingly, the A.O. was directed to allow the assessee credit for the impugned shortfall.

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ACIT vs. Jayendra P. Jhaveri In the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal Mumbai Benches “J”, Mumbai Before P M Jagtap (A. M.) & Sanjay Garg(J. M.) ITA Nos.2141 to 2144 /Mum/2012 Asst.Year 2003-04. Decided on 20th February 2014 Counsel for Revenue / Assessee: S. D. Srivastava / Dharmesh Shah

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Section 153A – Re-assessments made by the AO without any incriminating material found during the search action u/s. 132 not valid.

Facts:
A search and seizure operation was carried out in the case of the assessee on 14-08-2008 u/s. 132 of the Income- tax Act. Pursuant thereto, the AO issued notice u/s. 153A to the assessee to file the return of income for six years subsequent to the search. In response to the notice, the assessee filed return of income before the AO. The AO, thereafter, issued notice u/s. 143(2) and 142(1). The assessee submitted before the AO that books of account and other details were destroyed in the flood in the year 2005 and, therefore, the same could not be produced. Since the assessee failed to produce the books of accounts, the AO passed the order u/s. 144 r.w.s. 153A. On the basis of net profit ratio of certain other persons who were engaged in a similar business as that of the assessee, the AO made the additions to the total income of the assessee. The CIT(A) upheld the action of the AO. However, he directed the AO to re-compute the net profit of the assessee by adopting the net profit of 0.14%. The revenue appealed against the action of the CIT(A) in directing the AO to rework the net profit of the assessee at the lower rate of 0.14% as against the 0.99% estimated by the AO. Whereas the assessee has filed the cross objections against the action of the CIT(A) in upholding of assessment proceedings made by the AO u/s. 153A. Before the Tribunal, the assessee contended that since no incriminating material was found during the search and seizure operation, the re-assessment made by the AO u/s. 153 A was not valid. He has further submitted that since the limitation period for issuing notice u/s. 143(2) had already been expired and as such the assessments in relation to above mentioned assessment years had attained finality. The contention of the revenue was that the absence of the books of accounts, itself, was the incriminating evidence against the assessee necessitating initiation of assessment proceedings u/s. 153A.

Held:
The tribunal noted that in the present case the return was processed u/s. 143(1) and the same had attained finality due to the expiry of limitation period of 12 months from the end of the month in which the return was filed. Further, no incriminating material was found from the premises of the assessee during the search u/s. 132. In view of the same and the decisions of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Jai Steel (India) vs. ACIT (2013) 259 CTR 281, the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Gopal Lal Badruka vs. DCIT, 346 ITR 106 and of the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Chetan Dass Lachman Dass [2012] 211 Taxmann 61, the Tribunal observed that when no incriminating evidence was found during the search, it was not open to the AO to make re-assessment of concluded assessment in the garb of invoking the provisions of section 153A. According to it the contention of the revenue that since no books of account were found during the search action that itself was the incriminating material against the assessee had no force of law. Inference of concealment of income cannot be made just on mere assumptions, presumptions or suspicion. Relying on the Tribunal decision in the case of Jitendra Kumar Jain vs. DCIT (ITA Nos. 5951- 5953/M/2011 decided on 16-01-2014) it held that that such an assumption cannot be said to be having any value of evidence in eyes of law and even the assessee cannot be called to disapprove such type of assumptions and presumptions based on mere suspicions. It observed that it is not open to the revenue to rely on the weakness of the evidence produced by the assessee to make any adverse presumption or conclusion of his indulging in any illegal activity, without being there any direct or even circumstantial evidence on record against him.

In view thereof, the Tribunal held that the reassessments made by the AO u/s. 153A, without any incriminating material being found during the search action conducted u/s. 132, were not in accordance with law and the same were set aside.

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(2014) 102 DTR 151 (Mum) 3i Infotech Ltd. vs. ACIT A.Y. 2003-04 Dated : 21-08-2013

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Compensation for termination of agreement for providing back office support services is regarded as capital receipt.

FACTS:
The assessee has been providing back-office services to ICICI bank in respect of retail lending business of ICICI Bank comprising of housing loans, auto loans, credit cards etc., for providing such services the assessee had put in place adequate resources in terms of office space, software, IT infrastructure, manpower sources with technical skill, managerial and other skills required to handle such activity.

With a view to exercise control over the activities and to reduce cost, the bank has decided to carry on the activities independently. On termination of the agreement, the assessee received Rs. 15 crore from the bank as compensation for loss of business/future earning/transfer of knowledge. The assesssee claimed that it has given up one source of income completely for which compensation has been received. Such compensation is towards loss of business order and towards loss of one source of income which has affected the profit-making structure of the assessee and the same is accordingly a capital receipt.

The AO did not accept such claim of the assessee and considered the said amount as revenue receipt. The main basis on which the AO has held this issue against the assessee is that there is no transfer of any asset or business expertise or IPR or such item which is normally transferred when such type of business is transferred by one entity to another. Another ground on which the AO rejected the claim of the assessee was that there is no clause in the agreement which restrain or restrict the assessee from continuing the aforementioned activities and the assessee is free to carry on such activities, if it so desired. Further, it was also contended that the abovementioned activities of the assessee were continued in respect of subsequent period also and there was no loss of business or one source of income. Thus, it was argued by the Revenue that there was no absolute erosion of such source.

HELD:
It was a case where the compensation has been received by the assessee on losing its rights to receive income in respect of services rendered by the assessee to the bank. In the facts and circumstances of the case it is a loss of source of income to the assessee and compensation has been determined on the basis of said loss. According to arguments of the learned Departmental Representative, the assessee company has not given up its entire activity of rendering back office services as the assessee has been earning income from such activity even after termination of such agreement. Therefore. it is the case of the learned Departmental Representative that the amount received by the assessee should be considered as income in the nature of revenue. However, such argument of the learned Departmental Representative does not find support from the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Oberoi Hotel (P) Ltd. vs. CIT 236 ITR 903 (SC) and Kettlewell Bullen & Co. Ltd. vs. CIT 53 ITR 261 (SC). It has been observed that it is irrelevant that the assessee continued similar activity with the remaining agencies. So, the relevant criteria to decide such issue is that whether or not the assessee has lost one of its sources of income. In the present case, the assessee has lost its source of income with respect to  its agreement entered into by it with the bank. It is also the case of the assessee that it has never rendered such services to any other person right from the inception and there is no material on record to contradict such argument of the assessee. Therefore in view of the facts it was held that the compensation received by the assessee was in the nature of capital receipt.

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2014-TIOL-270-ITAT-AHD Gujrat Carbon & Industries Ltd. vs. ACIT ITA No. 3231/Ahd/2010 Assessment Years: 2003-04. Date of Order: 13-09-2013

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Section 37 – Expenditure incurred on foreign education of Mr. Goenka, the whole time director, under authority of a resolution passed pursuant to which an agreement between the assessee and Mr. Goenka, is a business expenditure which is allowable.

Facts:
The assessee had debited a sum of Rs. 33,95,589 to its P & L Account towards expenditure on foreign education of its whole-time director. In the course of assessment proceedings, in response to the show cause issued by the Assessing Officer asking the assessee to justify the allowability of this expenditure, the assessee submitted that it had sponsored MBA studies of whole-time director Sri Goenka and that expenditure was incurred to improve the management and profitability of the assessee company. The AO noted that there was no policy of company of sponsoring studies of employees. He also noted that Mr. Goenka was appointed as director on 29- 04-2002 and board resolution was passed on 24-07-2002 for his studies abroad and he resigned from the company on 18-10-2003 and was later reappointed. He noted that Sri Goenka is son of G. P. Goenka, chairman of the company. He disallowed the expenditure on the ground that it is a personal expenditure.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who held that the assessee’s claim of improvement of business efficiency is contingent upon his completing MBA abroad and possibly meaningfully contribution to the appellant company thereafter. He held that since the business purpose is contingent, remote and in the realm of unforeseen and at least two steps away from the incurring of the expenditure, the same is not allowable.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that there is no dispute that the expenditure has been incurred as per resolution passed at the meeting of the Board of Directors of the assessee and that pursuant to the resolution passed, an agreement was entered between the assessee and Sri Goenka, according to which he will work for two years after his return from USA. It also noted that this agreement was acted upon and that the facts of the case are covered by the ratio fo the decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Ras Information Technology Pvt. Ltd. (12 taxman 58)(Kar). It also noted that a similar view has been Ahmedabad Bench of ITAT in the case of Mazda Ltd. in ITA No. 3190/Ahd/2008. The Tribunal held that the expenses incurred by the assessee company on foreign education of whole-time director be treated as a business expenditure of the assessee and be allowed as a deduction.

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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2014-TIOL-237-ITAT-DEL Vijaya Bank vs. ITO ITA No. 2672 to 2674/Del/2013 Assessment Years: 2007-08 to 2009-10. Date of Order: 14-03-2014

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S/s. 197A(1A), 201, 201(1A) – Delay in filing declarations with the jurisdictional CIT does not attract provisions of section 201 and such assessee cannot be held to be an assessee in default u/s. 201(1A).

Facts:
Survey was conducted on Gurgaon Branch of the assessee, a nationalised bank. In the course of the survey, it was found that the said branch of the assessee had short deducted tax at source in some cases and in some cases, it had not deducted tax at source. It was the case of the bank that it had obtained Form No. 15G and Form No. 15H but had not filed the same with the CIT. The Assessing Officer (AO) rejected the contentions of the assessee and determined the tax payable u/s. 201 at Rs. 3,59,950 and interest payable thereon u/s. 201(1A) at Rs. 1,61,955.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had mentioned in a letter dated 16-02-2010 filed with ITO(TDS) that it is submitting Forms 15G/15H alongwith a request to condone the delay. The Tribunal held that unless it is proved that Form No. 15G and 15H were not in fact submitted by loan creditors, the assessee cannot be blamed because at the time of paying interest to loan creditors, the assessee payer, has per force to rely upon the declarations filed by the loan creditors and the assessee was not expected to embark upon an inquiry as to whether the loan creditors really and in truth have no taxable income on which tax is payable. If such kind of duty is cash upon the assessee payer, that would be putting an impossible burden on the assessee.

The Tribunal following the decision of the Mumbai Bench in the case of Vipin P. Mehta vs. ITO (11 Taxmann.com 342)(Mum) held that if the assessee has delayed the filing of declaration with the office of the jurisdictional CIT, within the time limit specified in the Act, that is a distinct omission or default for which penalty is prescribed. Merely because there was a failure on the part of the assessee bank to submit these declarations to the jurisdictional Commissioner within time, it cannot be held that the assessee did not have declarations with him at the time when the assessee Bank paid interest to the payees.

The Tribunal allowed all the three appeals filed by the assessee.

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2014-TIOL-225-ITAT-PUNE DCIT vs. The Nashik Merchant Co-operative Bank Ltd. ITA No. 950/PN/2013 Assessment Years: 2009-10. Date of Order: 30-04-2014

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S/s. 37, 43B – Premium paid in excess of the face value of investments, classified under HT M category, which has been amortised over a period till maturity is allowable as revenue expenditure since the claim is as per RBI guidelines and CBDT has also directed to allow the said premium.

Amount paid as contribution to the Education Fund of State Government, as per guidelines of Commission of Cooperative Department is allowable as deduction.

Facts I:
The assessee, a co-operative bank, had debited a sum of Rs. 3,73,600 to its Profit & Loss Account under the head Investment Premium Amortization Account. This amount represented premium on securities which were to be held to maturity (HTM). The assessee submitted that since these securities were to be HTM the premium is required to be amortised over the period remaining to maturity. The Assessing Officer (AO) rejected this contention and disallowed the sum of Rs. 3,73,600.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who allowed the appeal.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held I:
The Tribunal noted that the Master Circular on Investment by Primary (Urban) Co-operative Banks issued by RBI required the premium to be amortised over the period remaining to maturity. It also noted that CBDT has in instruction no. 17 of 2008 dated 26-11-2008 has made a reference to the RBI guidelines and has stated that the latest guidelines of the RBI may be referred to for allowing such claims. It also noted that the Mumbai Bench has in the case of ACIT vs. Bank of Rajasthan Ltd. (2011-TIOL-35-ITAT -MUM) following the said circular of CBDT held that the premium paid in excess of face value of investments is allowable as revenue expenditure.

Following the said circular, instruction and guidelines issued by the CBDT and the RBI the Tribunal held that amortisation of premium paid on government securities is allowable expenditure.

Facts II:
The assessee had debited to its P & L Account and claimed as deduction, a sum of Rs. 10,60,882 which was paid as contribution to Education Fund. This amount represented the contribution made by assessee as a multi-state co-operative society to central government. The AO disallowed this sum of Rs. 10,60,882.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who allowed the appeal.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held II:
The Tribunal noted that the contribution was paid by the assessee as per the guidelines of the Commission of Co-operative Department. The contribution made is mandatory on the part of every co-operative bank in the state of Maharashtra. Since the bank had to work under the control of the Commissioner of Co-operation, Maharashtra, the order issued by the Commissioner was obligatory on the bank. The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had rightly held the contribution paid by bank to be a business expenditure wholly exclusively incurred for the purpose of business and accordingly, allowable u/s. 37(1) of the Act. This ground of appeal of the revenue was dismissed by the Tribunal.

The appeal filed by revenue was dismissed

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Recovery of tax: Attachment: Section 281: A. Y. 2005-06: Transfer of property during pendency of assessment proceedings: TRO has no power to declare sale deed void: Appropriate proceedings to be taken in civil court:

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Dr. Manoj Kabra vs. ITO; 364 ITR 541 (All):

The petitioner purchased a property by means of a registered sale deed on 25-09-2007 from A when the assessment of A for the A. Y. 2005-06 was in process. The assessment resulted in certain demand. On 03-01-2008, the Assessing Officer of A issued a notice u/s. 281 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 to the petitioner to show cause why the sale deed executed by the seller in favour of the petitioner should not be treated as a void document. The petitioner’s objection was overruled by the Assessing Officer holding that there was inadequate consideration for the transfer of the property by the seller in favour of the petitioner and, therefore, the conveyance was a void document.

On a writ petition challenging the said order of the Assessing Officer, the Allahabad High Court held as under:

“i) The Legislature does not intend to confer any exclusive power or jurisdiction upon the Income-tax Authority to decide any question arising u/s. 281 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The section does not prescribe any adjudicatory machinery for deciding any question which may arise u/s. 281 and in order to declare a transfer as fraudulent u/s. 281, an appropriate proceeding in accordance with law is required to be taken u/s. 53 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

ii) The Income-tax Officer, in order to declare the transfer void u/s. 281 and being in the possession of the creditor, is required to file a suit for declaration to the effect that the transaction of transfer is void u/s. 281.

iii) The Income-tax Officer had exceeded his jurisdiction in adjudicating the matter u/s. 281. He had no jurisdiction to declare the sale deed as void. Consequently, the order cannot be sustained and was quashed.”

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Income: Capital or revenue receipt: Subsidy: A. Y. 1997-98: If the subsidy is to enable the assessee to run the business more profitably then the receipt is on revenue account: If the subsidy is to enable the assessee to set up a new unit then the receipt would be on capital account:

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CIT vs. Kirloskar Oil Engines Ltd.; 364 ITR 88 (Bom):

The assessee was engaged in manufacturing of internal combustion engines of three horse power. The assessee received subsidy from the State Government of Rs. 20 lakh as incentive to set up a new unit. The assesee treated the same as capital receipt. The Assessing Officer held that it is the revenue receipt and added it to the total income. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s appeal and deleted the addition.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The character of a receipt in the hands of the assessee has to be determined with respect to the purpose for which the subsidy is given. The purpose test has to be applied. The point of time at which the subsidy is given is not relevant. The source is immaterial. The form of subsidy is immaterial. The main condition and with which the court should be concerned is that the incentive must be utilised by the assessee to set up a new unit or for substantial expansion of the existing unit.

ii) If the object of the subsidy scheme is to enable the assessee to run the business more profitably the receipt is on revenue account. On the other hand, if the object of the assistance under the subsidy scheme is to enable the assessee to set up a new unit, the receipt of subsidy would be on the capital account.

iii) Once the undisputed facts pointed towards the object and that being to enable the assessee to set up a new unit then the receipt was a capital receipt.”

Editor’s Note: The decision is for A.Y. 1997-98. The impact of Explanation 10 to section 43(i) inserted w.e.f. 01-04-1999 needs to be considered.

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Income: Deemed dividend: Section 2(22)(e): A. Y. 2007-08: Where assessee, a builder and managing director of a company in which he was holding 63 % shares, received a construction contract from said company, in view of fact that assessee executed said contract in normal course of his business as builder, advance received in connection with construction work could not be taxed in assessee’s hands as ‘deemed dividend’ u/s. 2(22)(e):

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CIT vs. Madurai Chettiyar Karthikeyan; (2014) 45 taxmann.com 274 (Mad)

The assessee is the proprietor of Shri Vekkaliamman Builders and Promoters and he also happens to be the Managing Director of Southern Academy of Maritime Studies Private Limited, in which he holds share of 63%. For the A. Y. 2007-08, the Assessing Officer added a sum of Rs.87,57,297/- to the assessee’s income u/s. 2(22) (e) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 as deemed dividend, rejecting the assessee’s contention that the company awarded construction contract to the assessee’s proprietary concern after completing with the procedures of the Companies Act. The Assessing Officer rejected the contention of the assessee that it being a normal business transaction, the amount received as advance for the purpose of executing the construction work, it would not fall within the scope of ”loans and advances” u/s. 2(22)(e) of the Act. CIT(A) agreed with the assessee that he was rendering services to his client M/s. Southern Academy Maritime Studies P. Ltd. by constructing building; that the advance money received was towards construction of the building for the said private limited company and that the trade advance was in the nature of money given for the specific purpose of constructing the building for the private limited company and hence the payment could not be treated as deemed dividend falling within the ambit of section 2(22)(e) of the Act. Thus, the Commissioner allowed the assessee’s appeal. The Tribunal, confirmed the view of the Commissioner.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Going by the undisputed fact that the Revenue had not disputed the fact that the assessee had executed work for the company in the nature of construction of buildings and the said transaction being in the nature of a simple business transaction, we do not find any justifiable ground to bring the case of the assessee within the definition of deemed dividend u/s. 2(22) (e) of the Act. In the circumstances, we reject the Revenue’s case at the admission stage itself.

ii) In the result, the Tax Case (Appeal) is dismissed.”

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Educational institution: Exemption u/s. 10(23C) (vi): A. Y. 2008-09 onwards: Body conducting public examinations is educational institution u/s. 10(23C)(vi): Increase in the fees for generating surplus would not by itself exclude the petitioner from the ambit of section 10(23C) (vi): Generation of profit or surplus by an organisation cannot be construed to mean that the purpose of the organisation is generation of profit/surplus.

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Council for the Indian School, Certificate Examinations vs. DGIT; (2014) 364 ITR 508 (Del): (2014) 45 taxmann. com 400 (Delhi): The petitioner is a body conducting public examinations under the Delhi School Education Act, 1973.

The Petitioner had applied for the approval u/s. 10(23C)(vi) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for AY 1999-2000 to 2001-02 to CBDT. The CBDT, by order dated 31-10-2006, rejected the Petitioner’s application holding that the Petitioner was not an educational institution but was an examination body which conducts examinations for ICSC and ISC and therefore, could not be granted the exemption as an educational institution u/s. 10(23C)(vi) of the Act. The Petitioner’s applications for approval u/s. 10(23C)(vi) of the Act for A.Y. 2002-03 to 2004-05 and 2005-06 to 2007- 08 were not disposed of. The application for approval u/s. 10(23C)(vi) of the Act, for the AY 2008-09 to 2010-11, was dismissed by the DGIT on the ground that the Petitioner is not an educational institution but an examination body conducting examinations for ISCE and ISC.

The petitioner filed a writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 4716/2010 which was allowed by the Delhi High Court. The Court held that the petitioner is an educational institution as contemplated u/s. 10(23C)(vi) of the Act and the matter was remanded to the respondent to pass an order in accordance with law.

Subsequently, the DGIT passed order dated 07-06-2012, declining to grant the approval u/s. 10(23C)(vi) of the Act, inter alia, on the ground that the petitioner had failed to justify its claim that it did not exist for the purposes of profit. The respondent further held that the petitioner had conducted its affairs in a systematic manner to earn profits and the same were diverted in a clandestine manner. The Respondent further noticed that the Auditor had in its report, in respect of the Balance sheet of the petitioner relevant for the Financial Year 2008-09 (AY 2009-10), pointed out that there were lapses while awarding the contract to M/s. Ratan J. Batliboi – Architects Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “RJB-APL”) for installing IT enabled services and was thus unable to form an opinion on whether the accounts showed a true and fair view.

The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the petitioner challenging the said order and held as under:

“i) The nature of the activity carried on by an entity would be the predominant factor to determine whether the purpose of the organisation is charitable.

ii) It is not necessary that a charitable activity entails giving or providing a service and receiving nothing in return. Collection of a charge for providing education would, nonetheless, be charitable provided, the funds collected are also utilised for the preservation of the charitable organisation or for furtherance of its objects.

iii) If the surpluses have been generated for the purposes of modernising the activities and building of the necessary infrastructure to serve the object of the organisation, it would be erroneous to construe that the generation of surpluses have in any manner negated or diluted the object of the organisation.

iv) In the instant case, the petitioner has been existing solely for educational purposes. Generation of profit and its distribution is not the object of the petitioner society. The fact, that surpluses have been generated in order to build the infrastructure for modernising the operation, is clearly in the nature of furthering the objects of the society rather than diluting them.

v) Generation of profit or surplus by an organisation cannot be construed to mean that the purpose of the organisation is generation of profit/surplus, as long as the surpluses generated are accumulated/utilised only for educational purposes. The same would not disable the petitioner from claiming exemption u/s. 10(23C) (vi) of the Act.

vi) Merely because the institution awarded the computerisation contract in a non-transparent manner doesn’t mean that funds have not been applied for objects of the society

vii) T he contract entered into for computerisation may not be the best decision from the standpoint of the Prescribed Authority and perhaps in the opinion of the Prescribed Authority, the petitioner society may have ended up paying more than the value of services received. But the same cannot be read to mean that the resources of the petitioner have been deployed for purposes other than for its objects.

viii) Since the assessee by its nature of activity is otherwise entitled to exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi) of the Act, the same is liable to be granted by the respondent for future years subject to conditions as contained in the third proviso to section 10(23C) of the Act.”

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Educational institution: Exemption u/s. 10(23C) (vi): CBDT Circular No. 7 of 2010: Approval granted after 13-07-2006 shall continue till it is cancelled: Approval for period upto A. Y. 2007-08 granted on 20-12-2007 operates for subsequent years also: Application for continuation of approval and rejection of the said application has no effect in law:

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The Sunbeam Academy Educational Society vs. CCIT (All); W. P. No. 1502 of 2009 dated 21/05/2014: 2014-TIOL-HC-ALL-IT:

The assessee society was running educational institutions and was granted approval for exemption u/s. 10(23C) (vi) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for the period up to A. Y. 2007-08. The last approval for the A. Ys. 2005-06 to 2007-08 was granted by order dated 20-12-2007. On 25- 03-2008 the assessee made an application for extension of approval u/s. 10(23C)(vi) for the A. Ys. 2008-09 to 2010-2011. By his order dated 17-03-2009, the Chief Commissioner rejected the application.

Being aggrieved, the assessee filed writ petition challenging the order. The assessee brought to the notice of the High Court, CBDT Circular No. 7 of 2010 dated 27-10-2010 clarifying that the approval granted after 13-07-2006 shall continue to operate till it is withdrawn and the assessee is not required to file an application for continuation of the approval.

The Allahabad High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“i) The application dated 25-03-2008 filed by the petitioner for extension of the approval u/s. 10(23C) (vi) for the A. Ys. 2008-09 to 2010-11 was a redundant application. There was no requirement to apply for extension of the approval inasmuch as the approval in the case of the petitioner was granted after 01-12- 2006 on 20-12-2007. The approval so granted by the Chief Commissioner, by an order dated 20-12-2007, was a one-time affair, which was to continue till it was withdrawn under the proviso as extracted.

ii) Consequently, the impugned order dated 17-03-2009 was otiose having no effect in law. The impugned order only rejects the application for extension of the approval for the A. Ys. 2008- 09 to 2010-11. The original order of approval dated 20-12-2007 still continues to remain in force inspite of the rejection of the petitioner’s application by the impugned order dated 17-03-2009.

iii) The approval granted by the Chief Commissioner dated 20-12-2007 being a one-time affair continues to remain in force till it is withdrawn.”

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Cash credit: Charitable trust: S/s. 11 and 68: A. Y. 2001-02: Exemption u/s. 11: Donations disclosed as income: Not to be added as cash credit:

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CIT vs. Uttaranchal Welfare Society; 364 ITR 398 (All):

The assessee is a charitable society eligible for exemption u/s. 11 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. For the A. Y. 2001-02, the Assessing Officer made an addition of Rs. 96,50,000/- being the donations received from different persons on the ground that the donations were not genuine. The Tribunal deleted the addition and held that section 68 is not applicable to the facts of the case and since the assessee had disclosed donations of Rs. 96,50,000/- in its income and expenditure account and all the receipts, other than corpus donations, were declared as income in the hands of the assessee, there was full disclosure of the income by the assessee.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The Tribunal was justified in treating the donations as voluntary and deleting the addition of Rs. 96,50,000/- made by the Assessing Officer u/s. 68 in allowing the exemption u/s. 11 of the Act.”

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Business expenditure: Disallowance u/s. 14A: 1961: A. Y. 2009-10: Where assessee did not earn any exempt income in the relevant year the provisions of section 14A are not applicable and disallowance u/s. 14A could not be made:

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CIT vs. Cortech Energy (P) Ltd.; (2014) 45 taxmann.com 116 (Guj):

Held:

In the absence of dividend (i.e., exempt) income the provisions of section 14A of the Act is not applicable and accordingly, there can be no disallowance u/s. 14A of the Act.

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Business expenditure: Revenue or capital: Section 37: Corporate club membership fees paid by the assessee is revenue expenditure: Deduction allowable as business expenditure:

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CIT vs. M/s. Jindal Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. (Bom): ITA No. 1567 of 2011 dated 18-03-2014:

The Assessing Officer disallowed the club expenditure of Rs. 16,15,934/- treating the same as capital expenditure. The Tribunal allowed the claim and deleted the addition.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) T he Tribunal has held by relying on the documents and record produced by the respondent assessee that the club membership is a corporate membership. The company has obtained the membership in this case for its directors and to promote the business interests of the company and as they would get in touch and come in contact with business personalities. In such circumstances, following the order passed by this court in the case of Otis Elevator Company (India) Ltd. vs. CIT; 195 ITR 682 (Bom), the Tribunal has reversed the finding and conclusion of the Assessing Officer and the CIT(A).

ii) Such finding of fact and consistent with the material produced therefore does not merit any interference in our jurisdiction u/s. 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The appeal is therefore dismissed.”

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Business expenditure: Disallowance u/s. 14A: Where assessee did not earn any exempt income in the relevant year the provisions of section 14A are not applicable and disallowance u/s. 14A could not be made:

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CIT vs. M/s. Shivam Motors (P) Ltd.(All); ITA No. 88 of 2014 dated 05-05-2014: A. Y. 2008-09):

Held:
In the absence of dividend (i.e., exempt income) the provisions of section 14A of the Act is not applicable and accordingly, there can be no disallowance u/s. 14A of the Act.

levitra

Search and seizure – Block assessment – Assessment of third person – For the purpose of section 158BD of the Act a satisfaction note is sine qua non and must be prepared by the assessing officer before he transmits the records to the other assessing officer who has jurisdiction over such other person. The satisfaction note could be prepared at either of the following stages: (a) at the time of or along with the initiation of proceedings against the searched person u/s. 158BC of the Act;

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CIT vs. Calcutta Knitwears
(2014) 362 ITR 673 (SC)

A search operation u/s. 132 of the Act was carried out in two premises of the Bhatia Group, namely, M/s. Swastik Trading Company and M/s. Kavita International Company on 05-02-2003 and certain incriminating documents pertaining to the respondent assessee firm engaged in manufacturing hosiery goods in the name and style of M/s. Calcutta Knitwears were traced in the said search.

After completion of the investigation by the investigating agency and handing over of the documents to the assessing authority, the assessing authority had completed the block assessments in the case of Bhatia Group. Since certain other documents did not pertain to the person searched u/s. 132 of the Act, the assessing authority thought it fit to transmit those documents, which according to him, pertain to the “undisclosed income” on account of investment element and profit element of the assessee firm and require to be assessed u/s. 158BC read with section 158BD of the Act to another assessing authority in whose jurisdiction the assessments could be completed. In doing so, the assessing authority had recorded his satisfaction note dated 15-07-2005.

The jurisdictional assessing authority for the respondentassessee had issued the show cause notice u/s. 158BD for the block period 01-04-1996 to 05-02-2003, dated 10- 02-2006 to the assessee inter alia directing the assessee to show cause as to why should the proceedings u/s. 158BC not be completed. After receipt of the said notice, the assessee firm had filed its return u/s. 158BD for the said block period declaring its total income as Nil and further filed its reply to the said notice challenging the validity of the said notice u/s. 158BD, dated 08-03-2006. The assessee had taken the stand that the notice issued to the assessee is (a) in violation of the provisions of section 158BD as the conditions precedent have not been complied with by the assessing officer and (b) beyond the period of limitation as provided for u/s. 158BE read with section 158BD and therefore, no action could be initiated against the assessee and accordingly, requested the assessing officer to drop the proceedings.

The assessing authority, after due consideration of the reply filed to the show cause notice, had rejected the aforesaid stand of the assessee and assessed the undisclosed income as Rs. 21,76,916/- (Rs.16,05,744/- (unexplained investment) and Rs. 5,71,172/- (profit element)) by order dated 08-02-2008. The assessing officer was of the view that section 158BE of the Act did not provide for any limitation for issuance of notice and completion of the assessment proceedings u/s.158BD of the Act and therefore a notice could be issued even after completion of the proceedings of the searched person u/s. 158BC of the Act.

Disturbed by the orders passed by the assessing officer, the assessee firm had carried the matter in appeal before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeal- II) (for short ‘the CIT(A)’. The CIT(A), while rejecting the stand of the assessee in respect of validity of notice issued u/s. 158BD, had partly allowed the appeal filed by the assessee firm and deleted the additions made by the assessing officer in its assessments, by his order dated 27-08-2008.

The Revenue had carried the matter further by filing appeal before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (for short ‘the Tribunal’) and the assessee has filed cross objections therein. The Tribunal, after hearing the parties to the lis, had rejected the appeal of the Revenue and observed that recording of satisfaction by the assessing officer as contemplated u/s. 158BD was on a date subsequent to the framing of assessment u/s. 158BC in case of the searched person, that is, beyond the period prescribed u/s. 158BE(1)(b) and thereby the notice issued u/s. 158BD was belated and consequently the assumption of jurisdiction by the assessing authority in the impugned block assessment would be invalid.

Aggrieved by the order so passed by the Tribunal, the Revenue had carried the matter in appeal u/s. 260A of the Act before the High Court. The High Court, by its impugned judgment and order dated 20-07-2010, had rejected the Revenue’s appeal and confirmed the order passed by the Tribunal.

On appeal, the Supreme Court observed that section 158BD of the Act is a machinery provision and inserted in the statute book for the purpose of carrying out assessments of a person other than the searched person u/s. 132 or 132A of the Act. U/s. 158BD of the Act, if an officer is satisfied that there exists any undisclosed income which may belong to a other person other than the searched person u/s. 132 or 132A of the Act, after recording such satisfaction, may transmit the records/ documents/chits/papers etc., to the assessing officer having jurisdiction over such other person. After receipt of the aforesaid satisfaction and upon examination of the said other documents relating to such other person, the jurisdictional assessing officer may proceed to issue a notice for the purpose of completion of the assessments u/s. 158BD of the Act, the other provisions of XIV-B shall apply.

The opening words of section 158BD of the Act are that the assessing officer must be satisfied that “undisclosed income” belongs to any other person other than the person with respect to whom a search was made u/s.132 of the Act or a requisition of books were made u/s. 132A of the Act and thereafter, transmit the records for assessment of such other person. Therefore, according to the Supreme Court the short question that fell for its consideration and decision was at what stage of the proceedings should the satisfaction note be prepared by the assessing officer: Whether at the time of initiating proceedings u/s. 158BC for the completion of the assessments of the searched person u/s. 132 and 132A of the Act or during the course of the assessment proceedings u/s. 158BC of the Act or after completion of the proceedings u/s. 158BC of the Act.

The Supreme Court noted that the Tribunal and the High Court were of the opinion that it could only be prepared by the assessing officer during the course of the assessment proceedings u/s. 158BC of the Act and not after the completion of the said proceedings. The Courts below had relied upon the limitation period provided in section 158BE(2)(b) of the Act in respect of the assessment proceedings initiated u/s. 158BD, i.e., two years from the end of the month in which the notice under Chapter XIV-B was served on such other person in respect of search initiated or books of account or other documents or any assets are requisitioned on or after 01-01-1997.

The Supreme Court held that before initiating proceedings u/s. 158BD of the Act, the assessing officer who has initiated proceedings for completion of the assessments u/s. 158BC of the Act should be satisfied that there is an undisclosed income which has been traced out when a person was searched u/s. 132 or the books of accounts were requisitioned u/s. 132A of the Act. U/s. 158BD the existence of cogent and demonstrative material is germane to the assessing officers’ satisfaction in concluding that the seized documents belong to a person other than the searched person is necessary for initiation of action u/s. 158BD. The bare reading of the provision indicated that the satisfaction note could be prepared by the assessing officer either at the time of initiating proceedings for completion of assessment of a searched person u/s. 158BC of the Act or during the stage of the assessment proceedings. According to the Supreme  Court,  it  did not mean that after completion of the assessment, the assessing officer could not prepare the satisfaction note to the effect that there exists income belonging to any person other than the searched person in respect of whom a search was made u/s. 132 or requisition of books of accounts were made u/s. 132A of the Act. The language of the provision is clear and unambiguous. The legislature has not imposed any embargo on the assessing officer in respect of the stage of proceedings during which the satisfaction is to be reached and recorded in respect of the person other than the searched person.

Further, section 158BE(2)(b) only provides for the period of limitation for completion of block assessment u/s. 158BD in case of the person other than the searched person as two years from the end of the month in which the notice under this Chapter was served on such other person in respect of search carried on after 01-01-1997. According to the Supreme Court, the said section does neither provides for nor imposes any restrictions or conditions on the period of limitation for preparation of the satisfaction note u/s. 158BD and consequent issuance of notice to the other person.

In the result, the Supreme Court held that for the purpose of section 158BD of the Act a satisfaction note is sine qua non and must be prepared by the assessing officer before he transmits the records to the other assessing officer who has jurisdiction over such other person. The satisfaction note could be prepared at either of the following stages: (a) at the time of or along with the initiation of proceedings against the searched person u/s. 158BC of the Act; (b) along with the assessment proceedings u/s. 158BC of the Act; and (c) immediately after the assessment proceedings are completed u/s. 158BC of the Act of the searched person.

‘Additional Depreciation’ where assets used for less than 180 days

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Issue for Consideration
An assessee, in addition to the claim of the depreciation, is entitled to a claim of depreciation u/s. 32(1)(iia) (‘additional depreciation’), on purchase of new plant and machinery and installation thereof, at the rate of 20% of the actual cost of such plant and machinery that is used by the assessee in his business of manufacture or production of articles or things.

Under the second proviso to section 32(1), the depreciation allowed to an assessee is reduced to 50% of the depreciation otherwise allowable, in cases where the asset is put to use for less than 180 days in a year.

Depreciation remaining to be absorbed is carried forward to the following year and is allowed to be set off against the income of such year in accordance with the provisions of section 32(2) of the Income-tax Act.

An interesting issue has arisen, in the context of the above provisions, specifically for additional depreciation, in cases where the new plant and machinery is used for less than 180 days. The issue is about whether, in the circumstances narrated above, an assessee has the right to set off the balance 50% of additional depreciation in the year subsequent to the year of purchase and installation of new plant and machinery. While the Delhi, Mumbai and Cochin benches of tribunal have held that the balance additional depreciation can be set-off in the subsequent year, the Chennai bench of tribunal has taken a contrary view, leading us to take notice of this controversy.

Cosmo Films Ltd .’s case
The issue first came up for consideration in the case of DCIT vs. Cosmo Films Ltd., 13 ITR(T) 340 (Delhi), involving the disallowance of arrears of additional depreciation of Rs. 3,34,78,825 and negating an alternate claim for deduction of additional depreciation for assessment year 2004-05.

The assessee company had purchased new plant and machinery during the financial year 2002-03 which were eligible for additional depreciation. They were put to use in that year for less than 182 days. The company had claimed additional depreciation at 50% of the total additional depreciation for assessment year 20003-04 and the balance 50% for the assessment year 2004-05. The claim of the company was disallowed by the AO for assessment year 2004-05 and his action was confirmed by the Commissioner(Appeals).

In the appeal to the Tribunal, the assessee reiterated that, as per the provisions of section 32(1)(iia), the assessee was entitled for a further sum of depreciation equal to 15% of the actual cost of new plant and machinery acquired during the year and installed; that the assessee had been granted a statutory right by provisions of section 32(1) (iia) to claim a further sum equal to 15% of the actual cost in the year of acquisition; that it had claimed additional depreciation during the year which pertained to the additions to the fixed assets during the preceding previous year; the said additions were made during the second half of the financial year 2002-03 relevant to Assessment Year 2003-04 and the additional depreciation was claimed only for 50% of the eligible additional depreciation otherwise available on all the additions made after 30th September, 2002 on account of the second proviso to section 32(1) (ii). Hence, the same was being claimed during the assessment year 2004-05 as it was the balance of the additional depreciation.

The company further explained that the expression “shall be allowed” made it clear that the assessee was entitled to claim an overall deduction equivalent to 15 % of the actual cost of the said additions to the plant and machinery. It contended that the second proviso to section 32(1)(ii) restricted the allowance to 50% in cases where the assets were used for less than 180 days based on the period of usage and such a restriction could not have abrogated the statutory right provided to the assessee by section 32 (1)(iia). It claimed that nowhere in the Act it was prohibited that remaining balance of additional depreciation on the assets added after 30th September, should not be allowed and the second proviso to section 32(1)(ii) could not overlook the one time allowance, which was a statutory right earned in the year of acquisition; had there been intention to restrict the one time allowance to 50%, then it could have been provided in the proviso to clause (iia), as provided in respect of the second hand machines and those used in office, etc. or in respect of office appliances or road transport vehicles.

It was pointed out that the scope of the additional depreciation u/s. 32(1)(iia) introduced by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2002 w.e.f. 01-04-2003 was explained by Circular No. 8 of 2002 dated 27-08-2002 reported in 258 ITR (St.) 13 as being ‘a deduction of a further sum’ as depreciation. Therefore what was proposed to be allowed was depreciation simplicitor though it was called as additional depreciation. Therefore, any balance of the amount of additional sum of depreciation was to be considered to be available for being carried forward and set off in terms of s/s. (2) of section 32 of the Act which provided that where, in the assessment of the assessee, full effect could not be given to any allowance u/s/s. (1) of section 32 in any previous year, then the allowance should be added to the amount of allowance for depreciation for the following previous year and deemed to be part of that allowance, or if there was no such allowance for that previous year, then it would be deemed to be the allowance for that previous year, and so on for the succeeding previous year.

The company, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bajaj Tempo Ltd. vs. CIT 196 ITR 188, claimed that a provision for promoting economic growth had to be interpreted liberally and that additional depreciation, being an incentive provision, had to be construed so as to advance the objective of the provision and not to frustrate it. The additional depreciation as provided in Clause (iia) of s/s. (1) of section 32 was a one time benefit whereas the normal depreciation was a year to year feature.;If the benefit was restricted only to 50% then it would be against the basic intention to provide incentive for encouraging industrialisation, which would be unfair, unequitable and unjust. There was no restriction provided in law which restricted the carry forward of the additional sum of depreciation which was a one time affair available to assessee on the new machinery and plant. It was also pleaded that what was expressly granted as an incentive could not be denied through a pejorative interpretation of second proviso to section 32(1)(ii), when such provision by itself did not bar consideration of the balance u/s. 32(2) of the Income-tax Act. Alternatively, it was pleaded that the provisions of section 32(1)(iia) did not stipulate any condition of put to use. Therefore, full deduction was allowable in the year of purchase itself and had to be allowed in full in the assessment year 2003-04, itself.

In reply, the Revenue submitted that the full additional depreciation could be allowed as per section 32(1) (iia) only when the assets were put to use for more than 180 days in the year of acquisition; that the additional depreciation on the assets which were put to use by the assessee for less than 180 days was restricted to 50% of the amount by the second proviso to section 32(1)(ii); that there could not be any carried forward additional depreciation to be allowed in subsequent year; and that compliance of the condition to put to use, in the year of claim, was necessary for allowing any type of depreciation.
On hearing both the sides the tribunal observed and held as under;

•    Additional depreciation was introduced for promoting investment in industrial sector.

•    The intention was clarified by the Finance Minister, the Memorandum explaining the provisions and the Circular explaining the amendments.

•    The provision contained in section 32(1)(iia) wherever desired had placed restriction on the allowance of additional depreciation.

•    The said provision did not contain any restriction on allowance of the unabsorbed additional depreciation in the subsequent year.

•    The intention was not to deny the benefit to the assesses who had acquired or installed new machinery or plant. The second proviso to section 32(1)(ii) restricted the allowance only to 50% where the assets had been acquired and put to use for a period less than 180 days in the year of acquisition which restriction was only on the basis of period of use. There was no restriction that balance of one time incentive in the form of additional sum of depreciation should not be available in the subsequent year.

•    Section 32(2) provided for a carry forward and set off of unabsorbed depreciation. The additional benefit in the form of additional allowance u/s. 32 (1)(iia) was a one time benefit to encourage industrialisation and in view of the decision in the case of Bajaj Tempo Ltd. (supra), the provisions related to it had to be constructed reasonably, liberally and purposively to make the provision meaningful while granting the additional allowance.

•    The assessee deserved to get the benefit in full when there was no restriction in the statute to deny the benefit of balance of 50% when the new plant and machinery were acquired and used for less than 180 days.

•    One time benefit extended to assessee had been earned in the year of acquisition of new plant and machinery. It has been calculated at 15% but restricted to 50% only on account of period of usage of these plant and machinery in the year of acquisition.

•    The expression “shall be allowed” confirmed that the assessee had earned the benefit as soon as he had purchased the new plant and machinery in full but was restricted to 50% in that particular year on account of period of usage. Such restriction could not divest the statutory right.

•    The extra depreciation allowable u/s. 32(1)(iia) was an extra incentive which had been earned and calculated in the year of acquisition but restricted for that year to 50% on account of usage. The incentive so earned must be made available in the subsequent year.

BRAKES INDIA LTD.’S CASE

The issue had again come up for consideration before the Chennai Tribunal in the case of Brakes India Ltd. DCIT(LTU), 144 ITD 0403.

In this case, the assessee company contested the disallowance of additional depreciation of Rs. 4,91,39,749 by the AO and confirmed by the Commissioner (Appeals), which was the balance of its claim carried forward from the preceding assessment year. The company had claimed additional depreciation for machinery newly added by it during the preceding assessment year 2006-

7.    Since the machinery were used for a period less than 180 days in the preceding assessment year, the assessee had to restrict its claim to 50% of the normal rate of additional depreciation allowed under the Act. However, for the subsequent assessment year 2007-08, the company claimed carry forward of the balance 50% of the additional depreciation. The AO was of the opinion that additional depreciation could be allowed only for new assets added during the year and since the claim of the assessee related to additions to assets made in the preceding assessment year, it could not be allowed. In other words, as per Assessing Officer, residual additional depreciation from earlier year could not be allowed for carry forward to a subsequent year. The Commissioner (Appeals) confirmed the action of the AO following the decision of the tribunal for the preceding assessment year in the company’s own case, wherein the Tribunal had confirmed the disallowance of such a claim.

In appeal before the Tribunal, the company supported its claim on several grounds on the lines of the contentions raised by it before the tribunal for assessment year 2006-07 (copy of unreported decision not available) besides contending that section 32(1 )(iia) was amended with effect from 01-04-2006. and under the amended provision, the only condition for the claim was installation of the asset on which additional depreciation was claimed and that such additional depreciation was statutorily allowable, once assets were installed.

The Tribunal noted and held as under;

•    The first requirement for being eligible for a claim of additional depreciation was that the claim should be for a new machinery or plant. A machinery was new only when it was first put to use. Once it was used, it was no longer a new machinery.

•    Admittedly, the machinery, on which carry forward additional depreciation had been claimed, was already used in the preceding assessment year, though for a period of less than 180 days.

•    Therefore, for the impugned assessment year, it was no more a new machinery or plant. Once it was not a new machinery or plant, allowance u/s. 32(1 ) (iia) could not be allowed to it.

•    Additional depreciation itself was only for a new machinery or plant. Carry forward of any deficit of additional depreciation which, as per the assessee, arose on account of use for a period of less than 180 days in the preceding year, if allowed, would not be an allowance for a new machinery or plant.

•    A look at the second proviso to section 32(1)(iia) clearly showed that it restricted a claim of depreciation to 50% of the amount otherwise allowable, when assets were put to use for a period of less than 180 days, irrespective of whether such claim was for normal depreciation or additional depreciation.

•    The intention of the Legislature was to give such additional depreciation for the year in which assets were put to use and not for any succeeding year.

•    There was nothing in the statute which allowed carry forward of such depreciation. There could not be any presumption that unless it was specifically denied, carry forward had to be allowed. What could be carried forward and set off had been specifically mentioned in the Act.

•    The Tribunal in the assessee’s own case in I.T.A. No. 1069/Mds/2010 dated 6th January, 2012, at para 15, held as under:-

“15. We have considered the rival submissions. A perusal of the provisions of section 32 as applicable for the relevant assessment year clearly shows that additional depreciation is allowable on the plant and machinery only for the year in which the capacity expansion has taken place, which has resulted in the substantial increase in the installed capacity. In the assessee’s case, this took place in the assessment year 2005-06 and the assessee has also claimed the additional depreciation during that year and the same has also been allowed. Each assessment year is separate and independent assessment year. The provisions of section 32 of the Act do not provide for carry forward of the residual additional depreciation, if any. In the circumstances, the finding of the learned CIT(A) on this issue is on a right footing and does not call for any interference. Consequently, ground No.1 of the assessee’s appeal stands dismissed.”

The tribunal upheld the orders of the AO and the Commissioner (Appeals) and held that the Commissioner (Appeals) was justified in following the view taken by co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal for the preceding assessment year.

OBSERVATIONS

Section 32(1)(iia) was inserted by Finance (No. 2) Act, 2002 with effect from 01-04-2003. The Finance Minister, in his budget speech, stated that the provision for additional depreciation was introduced to provide incentives for fresh investment in industrial sector and that the clause was intended to give impetus to new investment in setting up a new industrial unit or for cases where the installed capacity of existing units is expanded by at least 25%. The section provided, initially, for additional depreciation at the rate of fifteen percent in respect of the new plant and machinery acquired and installed after 31st March, 2002. These provisions were substituted by the Finance (No. 2) Act of 2004 w.e.f. 01-04-2005 and in its present addition provides for additional depreciation at the rate of twenty percent in respect of the new plant and machinery acquired and installed after 31st March, 2005 by an assessee engaged in the business of manufacture or production of any article or thing. The benefit of additional depreciation is not allowed in respect of the second hand assets, assets installed in office or residence or guest-house, ship, aircraft, vehicles, etc.

The view that an assessee is entitled to claim the deduction for the balance additional depreciation in the succeeding year has been upheld by the Cochin Tribunal in the case of Apollo Tyres Ltd., 45 taxmann.com 337, the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of MITC Rolling Mills (P) Ltd., ITA No. 2789/M/2012 dated 13.05.2013 and again by the Delhi Tribunal in the case of SIL Investments, 54 SOT 54. The Chennai bench of the Tribunal however held that the claim for additional depreciation was not allowable every year but only in the year of the installation of the new asset, CRI Pumps, 58 SOT 154. It is therefore clear that but for the lone decision of the Chennai bench in Brakes India Ltd’s case, the overwhelming view is in favour of the allowance of the balance depreciation in the subsequent years.

The original provision for grant of additional depreciation, operating during the period 01-04-2003 to 31-03-2005, contained a very specific provision in the form of first Proviso, to allow a deduction in a previous year in which the new industrial undertaking began to manufacture or produce any article or thing. A specific reference was therefore made to the previous year in which the deduction was allowed. Significantly, under the new provision, no such restriction based on the year is retained, and this again confirms that the new provision effective from A.Y 2006-07, has no limitation concerning the year or years of claim.

The controversy boils down to insignificance when the Revenue realises that the assessee in no case, over a period of life of the asset, can claim a deduction on account of the depreciation as well as the additional depreciation higher than the actual cost of the asset. It perhaps needs to appreciate that there is no loss of revenue at all over a period of time, confirming the fact that the attempts of the Revenue are misdirected when it is contesting the claim of the assessee for the allowance of the balance additional depreciation.

It is true that Clause (iia) of section 32(1) does not contain any restriction or prohibition for claiming the balance additional depreciation in the subsequent year. At the same time, it is also true that the said clause does not expressly provide for such a claim. There neither is an enabling provision nor a disabling provision. In the circumstances a view favourable to the assessee is preferable, more so when the proviso to the said Clause lists several exclusions, and none of them limit the right of an assessee to claim additional deprecation in full nor deny the right of carry forward of the balance amount.

The provision admittedly has been directed towards encouraging industrialisation by allowing additional benefit for acquisition and installation of new plant and machinery. The incentive is aimed to boost new investments in preferred direction. A construction which frustrates the basic purpose of the provision should be avoided in preference of a pragmatic view.

The Finance Minister in his budget speech and the Finance Bill in the Memorandum and the CBDT in its Circular have amplified that the grant of additional depreciation is for incentivising the promotion of capital goods industry. In the circumstances, it is in the fitness of the scheme that the Revenue Department rises to supplement the intentions of the legislature, instead of frustrating the same. It is a settled position in law that an incentive provision should be liberally construed in favour of grant of the deduction. (see Bajaj Tempo Ltd., 196 ITR 188 (SC)). Even otherwise, an interpretation favourable to the assessee should be adopted in cases where two views are possible, Vegetable Products Ltd. 88 ITR 192 (SC), and for the case under consideration, surely two views are possible, as is confirmed by the conflicting decisions of the tribunal on the subject.

In our opinion, the issue under consideration has moved in a narrow compass and in the process, the larger controversy has remained to be addressed, which is, whether there ever was a need to restrict the claim of additional deprecation to 50%, of the eligible amount under the second proviso, in cases where the new asset in question was used for less than 180 days. Had this aspect been addressed by the concerned parties, the understanding of the issue on hand would have been more clear.

Our understanding of the larger issue is as under:

•    The claim for regular depreciation is made possible vide clauses (i) and (ii) of s/s. (1) of section 32 of the Act.
•    The quantum of regular depreciation, so allowed, has been circumscribed to 50% of the deprecation, otherwise allowable, by virtue of the second proviso to the said provision contained in clauses (i) and (ii) of s/s. (1) of section 32 of the Act.

•    The claim for additional depreciation is allowed under a separate Clause namely, Clause (iia) of section 32(1) of the Act, which Clause is otherwise independent of clauses (i) and (ii) above, though it does refer to clause (iia), and therefore, the claim for additional depreciation is independent of the said restrictive second proviso that has application only to the regular depreciation claim made under the said Clauses (i) and (ii).

•    The limitation contained in the said second proviso to Clauses (i) and (ii) should have no application to clause (iia) while claiming additional depreciation.

•    Clause(iia) operates in an altogether different field than that of Clauses (i) and (ii).

•    The claim for additional deprecation therefore shall be allowed in full in the first year itself, irrespective of the number of days of use and should be set off against the income of the year and importantly, to the extent not so set-off, should be carried forward to the subsequent year for being set off against the income for the succeeding year as per the provisions of s/s. (2) of section 32 of the Act.

In our respectful opinion, the additional depreciation is investment based, while the regular depreciation is period based and both are unrelated to each other. For a valid claim of additional depreciation, it is sufficient to establish that new assets are acquired and installed, and once that is proved, the claim has not to be restricted on account of use of such asset for a period of less than 180 days. The additional depreciation, in full, should be allowed, where possible, in the first year itself, and the balance, where remaining to be absorbed, should be carried forward to the succeeding year and should be allowed to be set off against the income of that year.

Future of India –Youth’s perspective

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It gives me great pleasure to place in your hands this special issue of the journal. With this issue I have completed one year as the editor of this prestigious publication. Over the past few years, as a part of its Founding Day celebrations, the Society releases a special issue which, apart from the regular features, contains contributions from authors on a specific topic.

As an editor, I felt that it would be appropriate to explain the thought process behind selection of the topic for this special issue. India has just witnessed an election and a consequent change in the government. The people of this country believe that with new government in the saddle, their dreams will be fulfilled. There is a virtually universal acceptance of the fact that the youth have been the greatest contributors to installing the new government in power.

While everyone accepts that the youth are responsible for the change, are they being given their due? In the media, whether it be print or electronic, one finds that wise men with grey hair (I belong to that community) are expounding their ideas on how the country should be run and what actions one needs to take. Speakers and authors never forget to mention that all that they have suggested is necessary to make this country to be a better place to live in for its youth. The question is do the goals of those in power, the drivers of the government and the economy match with those of the young citizens of this country? Is there a goal synchronisation? I felt that rather than preaching to the next generation as to what was appropriate for them, it would be wiser to hear their aspirations and read about their dreams.

Apart from this factor, I think it is time that we seriously lend our ears to what the new generation has to say. This generation is born in the era of globalisation. They do not carry the ‘burden of a glorious past.’ I am saying this because one often finds at various fora, speakers reminding the audience of what we have achieved in the past. What is lost sight of is, while no one denies the history, the youth are living in the present and their eyes are filled with dreams for the future. It is important that we understand their expectations and also how they believe these can be met. Whenever one talks of finding solutions to the problems that face the country, one tends to look at what actions have been taken in the past and rely on precedent. I think that there needs to be a major shift in approach. The world is no longer linear and the past track record is of limited value to what the future holds in store. As Stephen Covey, a management guru, has said, “One cannot walk into the future looking over ones shoulder. If one does so one is sure to stumble.”The Society has been, in the past year, led by an enthusiastic President, Naushad Panjwani. One of his endeavours was to encourage participation of younger professionals in the affairs of the Society. We felt that this special issue contributed by young professionals would be a fitting finale to his term.

If this country is to change for the better, the drivers will be India’s youth. We professionals have a great role to play. We should be playing the role of catalysts of change. We, therefore, requested professionals to contribute to the special issue and to express their thoughts on how they felt what India would be a decade from now, how they looked at their own profession, and what they felt that needed to change in this country. In keeping with the traditions of the journal, we merely indicated our intent and gave a total free hand to these under 35 professionals to speak their mind. Two chartered accountants, Mahesh Nayak and Pranav Vaidya; two advocates, Ms. Nazneen Ichhaporia and Mr. Sameer Pandit; a doctor, Dr. Parth Mehta, and an architect, Ms. Priya Vakil, have contributed to this issue. I am grateful to all of them for having spared their valuable time.

I hope the readers will find the issue interesting.

levitra

The Jailor

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A prisoner was sentenced to 100 lashes every day for a robbery he committed. As the jailor rose to beat him up, he shouted, “Who the hell are you to beat me? I didn’t rob anything from you. Bring the man whom I robbed and he has the right to beat me up.”

What would be the fate of the robber’s plea? Would the jailor not punish him? Certainly not. In fact, in all probability, he would get angry and beat him more.

But then, there is a point in the prisoner’s argument. Who gave the right to the jailor to beat the prisoner? Morally, the person whom the prisoner robbed should have the right to beat him up. But in the real world things do not happen like that.

So the moot question is – “Who gave the right to the jailor to beat the prisoner?” The answer in the story is simple – The Court. The Court decided on who the criminal was and the gave the jailor the right to punish him.

So can the prisoner question the jailor? No. It would not help him and on the contrary, he may be in more trouble for questioning the jailor. What is the solution then? The only solution is to be calm and quiet and let the jailor do his duty. Perhaps repeatedly beating him up and observing the silence of the prisoner, someday, the jailor may think, he seems innocent and he may stop the sentence. Perhaps he may not.

The above short story is all about our life. We are the prisoners. There is a system somewhere – HIS COURT and HE sends the jailor in our life in one form or the other. Everyone who gives pain to us in life is the jailor. We might not have done anything wrong with them, but still they give us pain. Because they have been sent by the system to punish us. We must have done something wrong to someone and HIS COURT has sent some jailor to give us pain. We have to silently bear the pain. We do not have the right to question – why is he giving pain or what wrong did we commit? We must have done somewhere something wrong, that the jailor was sent to us.

The one who ignores us, the one who abuses us, the one who takes away our wealth, the one who cheats us – are all jailors. We may wonder – this was the person whom I helped a lot, but he is cheating us now… but he is just a jailor.

Everything in life is predetermined and everything happens for good. Be calm and observe the beauty of life. See a jailor in everyone who illtreats you, and you will observe a tremendous feeling of peace. Stop making calculations in life, more so for money. We will get what we deserve and what we do not truly deserve, some jailor will come and take away. Have the satisfaction of helping someone-don’t even seek ‘thank you.’ It has been rightly said:

‘Thy right is to work only,
Never to its fruits,
Let fruits not be the motive of your action,
Let there be no attachment to results.
*( Based on the book ‘ The Jailor’ by Acharya Vijay
Abhayshekhar Suri)

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Appeal before Tribunal: Rectification of mistake: Section 254(2): A. Y. 1996-97: Application for rectification: Period of limitation commences from the date of receipt of the order and not the date of the order:

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Peterplast Synthetics P. Ltd. vs. ACIT; 364 ITR 16 (Guj):

The assessee had received the order of the Tribunal dated 20-02-2007 on 19-11-2008. The assessee made an application for rectification u/s. 254(2) of the Incometax Act, 1961 on 09-05-2012. The Tribunal dismissed the application on the ground that the same is barred by limitation u/s. 254(2) as the application has been made beyond the period of four years from the date of the order.

The Gujarat High Court allowed a writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i) Section 254(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is in two parts. Under the first part, the Tribunal may, at any time, within four years from the date of the order, rectify any mistake apparent from the record and amend any order passed by it under s/s. (1).

ii) Under the second part, the reference is to the amendment of the order when the mistake is brought to its notice by the assessee or the Assessing Officer. The statute has conferred the right in favour of the assessee or even the Revenue to prefer a rectification application within a period of four years and, therefore, even if a rectification application/ miscellaneous application is submitted on the last day of completion of four years from the date of receipt of the order, which is sought to be rectified, it is required to be decided on merits and in such a situation the assessee is not required to give any explanation for the period between the actual date of receipt of the order, which is sought to be rectified and the date on which the miscellaneous application is submitted.

iii) The order of the Tribunal sought to be rectified was received by the assessee on 19-11-2007. The assessee preferred the application on 09-05-2012. The application was not barred by limitation.”

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 55, dated 29- 4-2011 —Foreign Investments in India by SEBI-registered FIIs in other securities.

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Presently, FII can investment up to US $ 15 billion in corporate debt and an additional US $ 5 billion in bonds with a residual maturity of over five years, issued by Indian companies which are in the infrastructure sector, where ‘infrastructure’ is defined in terms of the extant guidelines on External Commercial Borrowings (ECB).

This Circular has increased the FII investment limit in listed non-convertible debentures/bonds, with a residual maturity of five years and above, and issued by Indian companies in the infrastructure sector, where ‘infrastructure’ is defined in terms of the extant ECB guidelines, by an additional limit of US $ 20 billion i.e., from the existing limit of US $ 5 billion to US $ 25 billion. As a result, the total limit available to FII for investment in listed non-convertible debentures/bonds would be US $ 40 billion with a sub-limit of US $ 25 billion for investment in listed non-convertible debentures/ bonds issued by corporates in the infrastructure sector. This investment by FII in listed non-convertible debentures/bonds would have a minimum lock-in period of three years. However, FIIs are allowed to trade amongst themselves during the lock-in period.

Further, it has also been decided to allow SEBI registered FII to invest in unlisted non-convertible debentures/bonds issued by corporates in the infrastructure sector, subject to the terms and conditions mentioned above.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 54, dated 29-4-2011 — Issue of Irrevocable Payment Commitment (IOCs) to Stock Exchanges on behalf of Mutual Funds (MFs) and Foreign Institutional Investors (FIIs).

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Presently, no fund-based/non-fund-based facilities are permitted to FII.

This Circular permits Custodian Banks, subject to RBI regulations and instructions on banks’ exposure to capital markets, to issue Irrevocable Payment Commitments (IPC) in favour of Stock Exchanges/ Clearing Corporations of Stock Exchanges on behalf of their FII clients for purchase of shares under the Portfolio Investment Scheme.

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PLEDGE OF SHARES — DIFFICULTIES UNDER THE TAKEOVER REGULATIONS

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Borrowing against security of equity shares particularly by Promoters of listed companies is common. Security of the Promoters’ shares is often also given even for the borrowings of the listed company. Security of equity shares for certain reasons is often found preferable even to more substantial assets like land, buildings, etc. Listing and dematerialisation of shares has to some extent made this even easier, particularly with certain special provisions in law relating to pledge, etc. of shares.

However, the Takeover Regulations, made with a different object in mind, created serious consequences in the process of creation of the pledge, its invocation and when the shares are retransferred if the loans are eventually repaid.

This problem arises if the holdings of the borrower/ lender at any stage increase by more than prescribed percentage. For example, if the lender enforces the security and acquires the shares that result in his holding crossing, say, 15%, he is required to make an open offer. If the borrower is required to reacquire the shares from the lender on repayment of the loan and if this triggers the requirements of the Takeover Regulations, then again, the issue of open offer arises. The Regulations further contain restrictions on transfer of the shares till the open offer is complete and this delays the re-transfer of shares. It may be recollected that the open offer requirements would mean that a further 20% of the shares are to be acquired from the public. Even the very act of pledge of shares, if it involves transfer of shares in the name of the lender, may create similar complications, except where it is covered by a specific exception.

Earlier, in case of paper shares, it was not uncommon for the lender to get the shares transferred in its name to get total control over the shares. In other cases, blank transfer documents were lodged. However, in case of such blank transfers, the limited validity of the transfer documents created a problem. The system of dematerialisa-tion, however, resolved this problem to a substantial extent. As will be explained later, the security of the shares is recorded by the depository itself in a legally recognised manner and for practically an unlimited period of time.

A recent decision of the Securities Appellate Tribunal (‘SAT’) dealt in fair detail with the implications of the Takeover Regulations to a case where shares were retransferred to the pledger after the loan was repaid. This is in the case of Liquid Holdings Private Limited v. SEBI, (Appeal No. 83 of 2010, dated 11th March 2011).

The facts of that case are fairly simple (and simplified further here to bring focus on a few essential issues). Promoters of a listed company gave security to a lender against a loan given by the lender to a listed group company (‘the Company’). The security was given in the manner specified under the Depositories Act whereby the pledge against the shares is recorded in the demat account containing such shares.

The Company defaulted in repayment of the loan. The lender enforced the pledge and got the shares transferred to its name. However, after some time, the loan was fully repaid and the shares were reacquired from the lender. Because of such acquisition, however, the holding of the Promoters increased by such a percentage that would require the making of an open offer. The question was whether such an open offer was warranted when the Promoters merely re-acquired the shares.

The Takeover Regulations require an open offer to be made when shares are acquired whereby certain specified limits are crossed. This may be when the shareholding crosses 15% or when it crosses so-called creeping acquisition limits, etc. There are more situations when the open offer requirements are attracted. However, there is a special feature of these provisions. And that is that there is no netting off of purchase and sales. This can be explained as follows.

Say, a person holds 14% and acquires another 4% shares in a listed company. He is required to make an open offer. Now, let us say he sells 5% shares whereby his holding reduces to 13% but again buys 5% whereby he is back at 18%. Still, he is required to make an open offer when he crosses the milestone of 15% again. This point though a fundamental feature of the Regulations right from their formulation in 1997, is often forgotten or otherwise not appreciated.

So, this provision hits a borrower who is required for some reason to give up his shares because of his default. When he is able to raise the finance and he re-acquires the shares, he has to make an open offer. This is despite the fact that the control over the Company would not have changed at all.

It is worth emphasising that the ‘creeping acquisition limits’ of 5% would sound very low in context of a re-acquisition of shares from a lender after a default.

The expensive consequences of open offer hardly need emphasis. The acquirer is required to acquire another 20% shares from the public.

Interestingly, the banks and financial institutions are given exemption from the open offer requirements if they acquire shares, as pledgees. However, strangely, there is no reverse exemption if the shares are reacquired if the default is cured and even if the reacquisition is from the banks/financial institutions. Further, the exemption is given only to banks/financial institutions and not to other parties who may be lenders.

Normally, a pledge does not amount to transfer of shares even under the mechanism provided under the depositories regulations. It is a mere recording of a charge that disables the pledger from selling the shares, but does not make the pledgee the acquirer or owner of the shares. It is only if the pledge is exercised and the shares transferred in its name that the pledgee lender can be said to have acquired the shares. Though not stated in express terms, the intention seems to be that this acquisition by banks/financial institutions of shares on account of exercise of pledge is exempted from open offer requirements.

The provisions of Regulation 58 of the SEBI Depositories Regulations lay down the procedure for recording of the pledge in respect of the shares being held in the name of the pledger. The said Regulation also facilitates easy invocation of the pledge in accordance with the pledge document whereby the shares would be transferred from such account to the pledgee.

In the present case, the lender had invoked the pledge and transferred the shares in its name. Later on, the borrower could arrange for the funds and thus the shares were re-acquired by the Promoters. However, in this process, the open offer requirements were triggered since they acquired in excess of what is permitted without requiring an open offer.

Since the acquisition was made without making an open offer, SEBI levied a penalty on the acquirers. On appeal, SAT confirmed the penalty and did not agree to the argument of the Promoters on the facts that the re-acquisition of shares after invocation of the pledge did not trigger the open offer requirement. Thus, it confirmed that the acquirers had indeed violated the Takeover Regulations and the penalty levied was justified in law.

The following are some extracts of the decision that are relevant.

The Promoters argued that “the object of transferring the shares in the names of the banks was only to provide a certain comfort level to them so that they feel confident that they would be able to recover the amount without going back to the pledgers if and when a default in payment occurs.”. Thus, there was no real transfer or re-transfer. The SAT, however, did not accept this argument and held as follows.

First, they explained the nature of the pledge as under the new scheme of depositories as follows:

“The pledges were created and recorded in the records of the depository and the pledgors and the pledgees were informed of the entry of creation of the pledges through their participants. As long as the shares remained under pledge, the pledgors (the appellants) were their beneficial owners and the only effect of the pledge was that the shares under pledge could not be transferred any further or dealt with in the market without the concurrence of the pledgees i.e., the banks. The pledge by itself did not bring about any change in the beneficial ownership of the shares pledged and there was no question of the provisions of the takeover code being attracted.”

Then it explained what happened when the pledge was invoked. Thereby they also explained why the lenders were not required to make an open offer.

“It was somewhere in the year 2004 that default was committed in the repayment of the loans as a result whereof the banks invoked the pledges and got the shares transferred from the demat accounts of the appellants (pledgers) to their own demat accounts. On such invocation, the depository cancelled the entry of pledge in its records and registered the banks as beneficial owners of the shares in its records and made the necessary amendments therein. The depository then immediately informed the participants of the pledgers and the pledgees of the change and the participants also recorded the necessary changes in their records. Upon the banks being recorded as beneficial owners of the shares in the records of the depository, they became members of the target company and they acquired not only the shares but also the voting rights attached thereto. But for the exemption granted to them under Regulation 3(1)(f)(iv) of the takeover code, they would have been required to comply with the provisions of Regulation 11(1) by making a public announcement to acquire further shares of the target company as envisaged therein.”

And the third and final stage of the chain of events took place when the borrower settled the loan and the shares got retransferred to the Promoters. The consequences of this were explained as follows:

“The shares acquired by the banks ceased to be the security for the loans as the banks had become the beneficial owners thereof. In December 2007, Morpen paid the entire loan amounts to the banks and settled the loan accounts. It was then that the banks issued a ‘no dues certificate’ to Morepen, the principal borrower and simultaneously executed DIS requiring their participants to debit their accounts and transfer the shares in the names of the appellants. Accordingly, the shares got transferred from the demat accounts of the banks to the demat accounts of the appellants in the records of the depository. On this transfer being made by the banks, the appellants acquired the shares and became their beneficial owners as their names were entered in the records of the depository.”

Hence, since the shares were actually re-acquired, the requirements of disclosure as well as open offer were attracted. The SAT observed as follows:

“Admittedly, the shares which the appellants acquired in December 2007 were in excess of the threshold limit(s) prescribed by Regulation 11(1) of the takeover code and, therefore, the said regulation got triggered. The appellants were required to come out with a public announcement to acquire further shares of the target company as envisaged in this Regulation. This was not done. Not only this, the appellants having acquired the shares from the banks were also required to make the necessary disclosures in terms of Regulation 7 of the take-over code to the target company and the stock exchanges where the shares were listed. This, too, was not done. We are, therefore, satisfied that the provisions of Regulations 7 and 11(1) stood violated and the adjudicating officer was right in recording a finding to this effect.”

The final argument of the appellants that the legal effect of the transaction was that there was no real transfer of shares to the lender was also rejected. It was held that the title did transfer to the lender on the shares and there was a retransfer too.

Thus, SAT upheld the penalty for not making the open offer.

To conclude, to a fair extent, clarity has been obtained on the implications of the Takeover Regulations when shares are transferred on invocation of pledge and shares are retransferred on satisfaction of the default. At the time of invocation of pledge, if the pledgee is a bank/financial institution, the transfer would not attract the open offer requirements of the Regulations. Further, where shares are retransferred, the retransfer would attract the open offer requirements.

A possible way out of this is to apply to the Take-over Panel for exemption for such re-acquisition. However, it would be up to the discretion of the Panel whether or not to recommend such exemption and of SEBI to finally grant it.

However, the decision obviously does not cover many other situations of pledge and their consequences. Pledge of shares that are not dematerialised may remain an issue, though the above decision should apply if the shares are transferred in the name of the lender. The exemption on transfer on invocation of pledge is not available if the lender is not a bank/financial institution. The general unfairness of the consequences of such reacquisition is apparent and it is clear that the law needs a change to provide for exemption with clear conditions to avoid misuse.

PART D: RTI & SUCCESS STORIES

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Mr. Rohit Mehta
I am very grateful to the BCAS RTI Clinic for providing me the correct advice as regards the manner in which the RTI application/appeal is to be filed. Based on the advice provided I had filed the requisite applications/ appeals with the relevant authorities.

I am a co-owner of a building of which the ground floor was let out to tenants. The said tenants had carried out unauthorised and illegal construction without our permission. Various complaints were filed with the concerned authorities but there was no response. As suggested by one of my colleagues I visited the RTI Clinic operated by your esteemed society at New Marine Lines. I discussed the problem with Mr. A. K. Asher who advised me to file applications under the RTI Act with the various BMC Wards, the manner in which I should go and collect general information in respect of rules and regulations pertaining to construction of loft/mezzanine floor, etc. He also advised me that under the RTI Act it is possible for a citizen to make inspection of files and demand copies of inspection reports. Accordingly I applied for copies of inspection reports and other documents.

Being aggrieved by the incomplete and evasive replies given by the PIOs, first appeals were filed after due consultation. I was directed to take up the matter with the Building & Factory Departments, ‘D’ Ward office. Finally the Assistant Engineer (B & F) ‘D’ ward directed the tenant to restore the unauthorised work i.e., convert the mezzanine floor to loft within seven days from the date of the said letter. Further, a showcause notice u/s. 351 of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act has been issued to the tenant as to why the unauthorised work should not be pulled down.

I would like to sincerely thank BCAS-RTI Clinic and Mr. A. K. Asher for providing me all the assistance and support in relation to the above matter.

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PART B:

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  •    RTI
    Logo

The Central Government has designed RTI Logo and has released it on DoPT web and other sites.

  •  CBI is exempted from RTI

An unfortunate news came in the second week of June that the Central Government has notified u/s.24 read with the Second Schedule that the RTI Act shall not apply to Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). S/s. (2) of section 24 permits the Central Government to amend the Second Schedule and it is now amended to include CBI. The Notification is reproduced hereunder:

It is learnt that the Madras High Court has issued notice to the Government of India on exempting CBI. Many in the country are of the opinion that CBI cannot be classified as it does not deal either with ‘intelligence’ or ‘security’ issues, the only two conditions that can make a government department exempt under RTI.
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Development Agrement

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Introduction A popular mode of developing property, especially in Mumbai, is by way of an Agreement granting Development Rights, popularly known as ‘Development Agreement’ or a ‘DA’. Instead of the land-owner executing a conveyance in favour of the builder, he enters into a DA with a developer. Thus, the landowner remains the owner of the land but he gives permission to the developer to enter upon the land and develop it. Since this is a very important way of doing business in the real estate sector, we must familiarise ourselves with this instrument.

Meaning
In the case of a DA, the owner of the land grants development rights to a builder/developer. The roles and responsibilities of the developer include the following:

(a) To obtain the necessary permissions and to be responsible for the concept, design and planning of the project.

(b) To appoint architects, engineers, various contractors and other professional personnel required for the project, and be responsible for the control, management and co-ordination of the project.

(c) To construct the building(s), infrastructure and facilities as per the sanctioned plans.

(d) To market and sell the flats/offices.

(e) To form a society/association of flat purchasers.

(f) Generally to be responsible for the construction management, contract management, material management and overall management and supervision of the project.

Along with a DA, the owner also executes a Power of Attorney in favour of the developer to enable him to carry out the above acts.

Consideration
The consideration of a DA may involve the following:

(a) Lump sum

In consideration for the above rights, the owner is given a lump sum consideration.

(b) Area sharing

In some cases, the owner decides to split the constructed area with the builder, instead of getting the monetary consideration. For example, a DA may provide that the owner would get 49% of the flats, free of cost, as a consideration for granting the DA and the builder would be entitled to the balance 51% of the flats. The builder may also agree to market the flats of the land-owner since the land-owner may not have the necessary infrastructure and expertise for the same. The entire revenue from the sale of the owner’s flats would belong to him.

(c) Revenue sharing For various reasons, the land-owner and the developer may agree that the consideration for grant of the development rights would not be a fixed sum of money. The consideration payable by the developer to the land-owner for the development rights may consist of two components as follows:

(i) certain minimum amount, plus

(ii) a percentage(s) of the revenue received from the development and sale of the property.

Thus, in this arrangement the land-owner takes on a major risk of the property not being sold or being delayed, but also has the potential of maximising his income. For instance, there may be a revenue sharing arrangement of 40: 60 between the owner and the developer. Hence, for every Rupee realised from the sale or lease of the flats/offices, the owner would earn 40% of the same.

(d) Profit sharing arrangement In several cases, the owner and the builder enter into a profit sharing arrangement, which is quite similar to that under a partnership. An issue in such a case would be, whether the arrangement is one of a Development Rights Agreement or is a partnership? The income-tax and stamp duty consequences on the owner and the developer would vary depending upon the nature of the arrangement. In this arrangement the land-owner takes on the maximum risk coupled with the potential of the maximum returns.

However, it must be noted that a mere profit sharing arrangement does not make it a partnership. Section 6 of the Indian Partnership Act is relevant for this purpose. It provides that the sharing of profits or of gross returns arising from property by persons holding a joint or common interest in the property does not by itself make such persons partners. In the case of Vijaya Traders, 218 ITR 83 (Mad.), a partnership was entered into between two persons, wherein one partner S contributed land, while the other was solely responsible for construction and finance. S was immune to all losses and was given a guaranteed return as her share of profits. The other partner who was the managing partner was to bear all losses. The Court held that the relationship was similar to the Explanation 1 to section 6 of the Partnership Act and there were good reasons to think that the property assigned to the firm were accepted on the terms of the guaranteed return out of the profits of the firm and she was immune to all losses. The relationship between them was close to that of lessee and lessor and almost constituted a relationship of licensee and licensor and was not a valid partnership.

At the same time, though mere sharing of profit does not automatically make it a partnership, profit sharing is an essential ingredient of partnership. In addition to profit sharing, mutual agency is also a key condition of a partnership. Each partner is an agent of the firm and of the other partners. The business must be carried on by all or any partner on behalf of all. What would constitute a mutual agency is a question of fact. The Supreme Court decisions in the cases of K. D. Kamath & Co., 82 ITR 680 (SC) and M. P. Davis, 35 ITR 803 (SC) are relevant in this respect.

The Bombay High Court in the case of Sanjay Kanubhai Patel, 2004 (6) Bom C.R. 94 had an occasion to directly deal with the issue of whether a DA which provided for profit sharing was a partnership? The Court after reviewing the Development Rights Agreement, held that it is settled law that in order to constitute a valid partnership, three ingredients are essential. There must be a valid agreement between the parties, it must be to share profits of the business and the business must be carried on by all or any of them acting for all. The third ingredient relates to the existence of mutual agency between the concerned parties inter se. The Court held that merely because an agreement provided for profit sharing, it would not constitute a partnership in the absence of mutual agency.

Transfer of Property Act Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act provides that where a person contracts to transfer for consideration any immovable property by writing and the transferee has, in part performance of the same contract, taken possession of the property or a part thereof, and he is willing to perform his part of the obligations under the contract, then even though a formal transfer has not yet been executed, it would be treated as a part performance of the contract and the transferor cannot claim any right in respect of the property. However, rights endowed by the contract can be enforced by the transferor. A DA is an example of a contract of part performance.

It is important to note that after the amendment by the Registration and Other Related Laws (Amendment) Act, 2001, any contract for part performance shall not be effective unless it is registered with the Sub-Registrar of Assurances. Earlier, section 53A provided that such contracts did not have to be registered.

Section 53A is a shield and not a sword and can be used only to defend the transferee’s possession — Bishwabani P. Ltd. v. Santosh Datta, (1980) 1 SCC 185. Further, it is important that the transferee (the developer in case of a DA) is willing to perform his part of the contract. If he fails to do so, then he cannot claim recourse u/s.53A — J. Wadhwa v. Chakraborty, (1989) 1 SCC 76.

Stamp duty on a DA 


Very few States expressly provide for a levy of stamp duty on a development agreement. Maharashtra, Gujarat and Karnataka are a few instances of such States. Under the Bombay Stamp Act, 1958, any agreement under which a promoter, developer, etc., is given authority for constructing or developing a property or selling/transferring (in any manner whatsoever) any immovable property is exigible to stamp duty. The Stamp Acts of most States do not contain an express provision for levying stamp duty on a DA. They are generally stamped as agreements not otherwise provided for, e.g., Rs.100.

Till a few years back, such agreements in Maharashtra attracted duty under the provisions of Article 5(g-a) of Schedule-I @ 1% of the market value of the property. However, now the ad valorem rate of duty has been increased to rates applicable to a conveyance, e.g., 5% in Mumbai. Thus, as far as stamp duty is concerned now a DA is at par with a conveyance. The market value of the immovable property should be found out from the Stamp Duty Ready Reckoner.

When a power of attorney is given to a promoter or a developer for constructing or developing a property or selling/transferring (in any manner what-soever) any immovable property, it is chargeable with duty. If stamp duty has already been paid under Article 48(g) dealing with a power of attorney in respect of the same property, then stamp duty on a Development Agreement would only be Rs.100. Article 48 levies duty on different types of powers of attorney. A power of attorney, if authorising the holder to sell an immovable property or if given to a promoter/developer for constructing/developing or selling/transferring immovable property, attracts duty as on a conveyance on the fair market value of the property. Till a few years ago, this also attracted duty @ 1%. However, if duty is paid under Article 5(g-a) on the Development Agreement, then duty under Article 48 shall only be Rs.100.

Owner’s Taxation

The consideration received by the land owner would normally be taxable as capital gains in his hands. A variety of High Court and Tribunal decisions have dealt with this issue. The most prominent decision in this respect is the Bombay High Court’s decision in the case of Chaturbhuj Dwarkadas Kapadia, 260 ITR 491 (Bom.) — which has laid down the conditions necessary to attract section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act and hence, be treated as a transfer for the owner: (1) there should be a contract for consideration; (2) it should be in writing; (3) it should be signed by the transferor; (4) it should pertain to immovable property; (5) the transferee should have taken possession of the property, and (6) the transferee should be ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. It further held that if under the Development Agreement a limited power of attorney is intended to be given to the developer and even if the actual power of attorney is not given, then the date of such Development Agreement would be relevant to decide the date of transfer u/s.2(47)(v) read with section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. For this purpose, the date of the actual possession or the date on which substantial payments are made would not be relevant.

Other important decisions in this respect, include, Avtar Singh, 270 ITR 92 (MP); Zuari Estate Develop-ment & Investment Co. P. Ltd., 271 ITR 269 (Bom.) Asian Distributors Ltd., 119 Taxmann 171 (Mum.); ICI India Ltd., 80 ITD 58 (Cal.); Tej Pratap Singh, 127 ITD 303 (Delhi).

In view of the above decisions, it is very important to draft the DA very carefully and to properly structure the transaction regarding granting of licence, power of attorney and the possession of the property. In this connection, it may be noted that the Supreme Court in the case of Vimal Lalchand Mutha, 248 ITR 6 (SC) has held that interpretation of an agreement involves a question of law.

In Meera Somasekaran, (2010) 4 ITR (Trib) 271 (Chennai) and Arif Akhatar Hussain v. ITO, (ITAT- Mumbai) ITA No. 541/Mum./2010,
it was held that section 50C would even apply to a development agreement. Thus, if the land is held as a capital asset by the owner, then section 50C would apply. It was held that the transfer of development rights amounts to a transfer of land or building and therefore section 50C is applicable, since u/s.2(47)(v) the giving of possession in part performance of a contract as per section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act is deemed to be a ‘transfer’. The fact that the assessee’s name stands in the property records is immaterial. Once the land-owner received the sale consideration and parted with possession of the property under the DA, section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act was attracted and hence, it was a transfer under the Income-tax Act.

One of the ancillary issues which arises is that whether Transferrable Development Rights (TDRs) arising by virtue of the Development Control Regulations for Greater Mumbai, 1991 or on account of society redevelopment is liable to tax? A spate of judgments, such as Jethalal D. Mehta v. DCIT, 2 SOT 422 (Mum.), have held that since TDRs qualifying for equivalent Floor Space Index (FSI) have no cost of acquisition and so sale thereof does not give rise to taxable capital gains. Other relevant decisions in this respect include, Maheshwar Prakash 2 CHS Ltd., 24 SOT 366 (Mum.), New Shailaja CHS Limited, (ITA No. 512/Mum./2007) (Mum.), Om Shanti Co-op. Hsg. Soc. Ltd., [ITA No. 2550/Mum./2008] (Mum.), Lotia Court Co-op. Hsg. Soc. Ltd., [ITA No. 5096/ Mum./2008] (Mum).

Auditor’s duty

The Auditor should enquire of the auditee, in case the auditee is dealing in property which is under a DA, whether the covenants of the DA, etc. have been duly complied. In case of any doubts, he may ask for a legal opinion. This is all the more relevant in case the client is a real estate developer. Non-compliance with this could have serious repercussions for the developer.

By broadening his peripheral knowledge, the Auditor can make intelligent enquiries and thereby add value to his services. He can caution the auditee of likely unpleasant consequences which might arise. It needs to be repeated and noted that the audit is basically under the relevant law applicable to an entity and an Auditor is not an expert on all laws relevant to business operations of an entity. All that is required of him is exercise of ‘due care’.

Transfer of title occurs only with execution and registration of document — Possession in part — Performance of contract does not confer any title to buyer — Transfer of Property Act, 1882, section 53A, 55.

Transfer of title occurs only with execution and registration of document — Possession in part — Performance of contract does not confer any title to buyer — Transfer of Property Act, 1882, section 53A, 55.

Limitation — Setting aside ex parte order — CPC 0.9 R.13

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[K. Surekha Reddy v. Chandraiah, AIR 2011 (NOC) 192 AP] The appellant filed application to set aside the ex parte decree pleading that she was not even served with summons in the suit. The respondent, on the other hand, pleaded that not only summons were served upon the appellant, but also an advocate was engaged by her. The Trial Court dismissed the application on two grounds, viz., (a) that no application was filed for condonation of delay, and (b) that the record discloses that the appellant engaged an advocate in the suit, and thereafter remained ex parte.

The Court observed that so far as the first ground is concerned, though the limitation for filing an application under Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C., is 30 days, from the date on which the ex parte decree was passed, a different approach becomes necessary, in case the defendant, who suffered the ex parte decree did not have any knowledge of the ex parte decree. In this regard, a distinction needs to be maintained between the defendant who entered appearance in the suit, but was set ex parte, before the ex parte decree came to be passed, on the one hand; and the one, who was not served with the summons at all, and accordingly was not aware of the ex parte decree.

In the first category of cases, the limitation for filing application starts from the date of ex parte decree. The reason is that, once the defendant is served with summons, or has entered appearance, he is supposed to be in the knowledge of the development, that takes place in the suit.

In the second category of cases, the Court cannot impute knowledge to him, as regards any step, including the passing of ex parte decree. If it is established that a defendant was not served with summons at all, before the ex parte decree was passed, the limitation starts from the date of knowledge of the ex parte decree, and not from the date of the decree. In the instant case, if the appellant proves that she was not served with summons at all, the date of order becomes irrelevant.

As regards the second ground, it needs to be seen that the Trial Court proceeded on the assumption that the appellant was served with summons and engaged an advocate also. When a specific plea was raised by the appellant herein, that she was neither served with notice, nor did she engage an advocate at all, the Trial Court was under obligation to verify the record, and come to a definite conclusion.

If vakalat is filed, the Court does not even have to verify whether summons were served, or not. It proceeded on the assumption that the appellant had engaged an advocate.

Nowadays, it is not uncommon that plaintiffs, who are smart enough, resort to arrange for filing vakalats on behalf of the defendants also, with the object of misleading the Court, and obtain an ex parte decree. The Trial Court can verify the record and arrive at proper conclusions. Hence, the plea is allowed, and the order is set aside. The matter is remanded to the Trial Court for fresh consideration and disposal.

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Gift by Muslim — Unregistered gift deed cannot be recognised — Section 123 of Transfer of Property Act.

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[Mayana Saheb Khan v. Mayana Gulab Jan & Ors., AIR 2011 (NOC) 97 AP] The 1st respondent is the wife of late Raheem Khan. Raheem Khan died on 24-6-1997 leaving behind him certain items of movable and immovable properties. The appellant, one of the son filed a suit in the Court against the respondents (being wife, sisters and other sons) for partition and separate possession of the assets left by late Raheem Khan. He claimed his share in those properties in the capacity of sharer of the properties of the deceased. The respondent (wife of deceased) however pleaded that her husband had gifted items 1 and 2 of the suit schedule in her favour and as such, they are not available for partition. The trial Court dismissed the suit. The appellant’s appeal was also dismissed.

In the second appeal the Court observed that the only question for consideration in this case was as to whether a gift said to have been made by a Muslim, which in turn was evidenced through a written document, could be recognised in law, unless the document is registered.

The Court further observed that neither the relationship was disputed, nor the fact that the deceased left behind him, the suit schedule items, was denied. The only dispute was about items 1 and 2 of the suit schedule, in respect of which the 1st respondent claimed gift in her favour. She did not plead ignorance about the document, nor did she plead loss of the same. Therefore, the case of the 1st respondent was to stand or fall, on the proof or otherwise of the gift.

The first respondent did not file the gift khararu-nama. The record discloses that an effort was in fact made by the 1st respondent to make the said document as a part of the record, but when the Court raised an objection as to the stamp duty, the document remained inadmissible, and no efforts were made by the first respondent to rectify the same. Even if it was assumed that the document was part of the record and the deficiency as to stamp duty was rectified, it was still inadmissible. The reason is that it was not registered.

It is a settled principle of law that it is the prerogative of a Muslim, to effect gift of immovable properties without even executing a written document, much less registering the same. Oral gift in respect of such persons is permissible. Where however, the gift is said to have been made through a written document, it is required to conform with section 123 of the Act. It was held that a document which evidences a gift, though made by a Muslim, cannot be acted upon, unless it accords with section 123 of the Act. In the instant case, the document was admittedly unregistered and as such, the gift pleaded by the 1st respondent could not have been accepted at all. The Trial Court and the lower Appellate Court committed serious error of law in recognising the gift pleaded by the 1st respondent.

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Contempt of Court — Malicious imputation against Judicial Officer — Apology not accepted — Contempt of Court Act, section 6.

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[High Court on its own motion v. Dnyandev Tulshiram Jadhav and State of Maharashtra, 2011 Vol 113(2) Bom. L.R. 1145]

In this case there was unfounded malicious attack on the character of a Judicial Officer, by a party who had been directed to pay maintenance allowance to the wife and minor child. The contemner and other co-accused were acquitted by the Judicial Magistrate, Shri U. T. Pol, in the matter of offence punishable u/s. 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. A Criminal Misc. Application was filed by the wife of the contemner, which was decided on 23rd April, 2007 by the same Magistrate wherein the present contemner was directed to pay costs of the said litigation. The contemner wrote an open letter dated 5th August, 2009 to the Chief Justice of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay and a copy thereof was sent to the President of India for taking action against the Judicial Officer. The imputations cast against the Judicial Officer by the contemner were per se malicious and scandalous.

In the contempt proceeding the contemner had given unconditional apology by way of filing reply affidavit. The Court observed that in view of per se mala fide attitude spelt out from the conduct of the contemner, inasmuch as he wrote the offending letter making wild, malicious and reckless allegations against the Judicial Officer, the apology was not acceptable.

It was a deliberate act on the part of the contemner to scandalise the Judicial Officer and to bring Courts or Judicial system into contempt, disrepute, disrespect and to lower its authority and offend its dignity. In other words, the conduct of the contemner is far more than causing the defamation simplicitor or aspersions against a particular judge. It was a fit case for inflicting appropriate punishment upon the contemner.

The Court relied on the Apex Court decision in the case of M. R. Parashar v. Dr. Farooq Abdullah, AIR 1984 SC 615 wherein it was observed that the Judges cannot defend themselves. They need due protection of law from unfounded attacks on their character. Law of Contempt is one of such laws.

The court pointed out that judiciary has no forum from which it could defend itself. The Legislature can act in defence of itself from the floor of the House. It enjoys privileges which are beyond the reach of law. The executive is all powerful and has ample resources and media at its command to explain its actions and, if need be, to counter-attack. Those, who attack the judiciary must remember that they are attacking an institution which is indispensable for the survival of the rule of law but which has no means of defending itself.

The sword of justice is in the hands of Goodess of Justice, not in the hands of mortal Judges. Therefore, Judges must receive the due protection of law from unfounded attacks on their character.

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Compensation — For violation of human rights during the search and seizure operation conducted by Income-tax Department.

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[Bihar Human Rights Commission (www.itatonline .com)] The applicant Rajendra Singh has approached the Commission complaining of violation of his human rights in course of the search and seizure operations conducted by officials of the Income-tax Department in his residential premises from 8-9-2010 to 10-9-2010. The grievance of the applicant is that he belongs to the minority Sikh community. He is earning his livelihood by doing timber business in the name and style of M/s. Bhargo Saw Mill at Mithapur in the town of Patna. On 8-9-2010 the authorities of the Income-tax Department came to his house and closed the main gate which is the only point of ingress and egress. They took the mobile phones of the applicant and others and did not allow them to contact any person outside during the course of the raid. They did not allow them to cook the food. They misbehaved and abused members of the family including the female inmates. They smoked with impunity; they also threw cigarette butts and empty packets of cigarettes on the images of Sikh Gurus and the Golden Temple, which hurt their religious feelings. They did not even allow them to go to the toilet. The applicant sent for his lawyer and he was made to leave the place. They also in the course of the raid held out threats of punitive action.

Notice was issued to the Chief Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar who referred it to the Director General of Income-tax (Inv.) as the search and seizure operations were conducted by the Investigation Wing of the Department.

The Commission observed that it was the admitted position that the search and seizure operations commenced at 9.30 a.m. on 8-9-2010 and concluded at 9.20 p.m. on 10-9-2010. The grievance of the applicant was that he was continuously interrogated during this period for more than 30 hours. The operations having admittedly commenced at 9.30 a.m. on 8-9-2010 it was clear that question was being asked at about 10 p.m. on 9-9-2010.

The fact that question no. 15 was asked at about 10 p.m. or question no. 31 was asked at 3.30 a.m. on 10-9-2010 cannot be the basis to conclude that the interrogation took place for a few hours. The statement u/s. 132 of the Income-tax Act was the result of sustained interrogation which in the instant case apparently commenced from the morning of 9-9-2010. And even if anyone were to visualise the sequence of events liberally in favour of the Income-tax Department, there was no basis for taking the view that the interrogation/recording of statement was with breaks/intervals.

The Commission was of the view that the members of the raiding party may take their own time to conclude the search and seizure operations but such operations must be carried out keeping in view the basic human rights of the individual. They have no right to cause physical and mental torture to him. If the officer-in-charge of the interrogation/recording of statements wanted to continue with the process he should have stopped the same at the proper time and resumed it next morning. But continuing the process without any break or interval at odd hours up to 3.30 a.m., forcing the applicant and/ or his family members to remain awake when it was time to sleep was a torturous act which cannot be countenanced in a civilised society. It was violative of their rights relating to dignity of the individual and therefore violative of human rights. Even diehard criminal offenders have certain human rights which cannot be taken away. The applicant’s position was not worse than that.

In the opinion of the Commission, the Income-tax Department should ensure that the search and seizure operations at large in future are carried out without violating one’s basic human rights.

The Commission was prima facie satisfied that there had been violation of the applicant’s human rights by the concerned officials of the Incometax Department while continuing the search and seizure operations for which he was entitled to be monetarily compensated.

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Vide Notification dated 3rd June 2011, the MCA has issued the Companies (Cost Accounting Records) Rules, 2011. They will apply to every company which is engaged in the production, processing, manufacturing, or mining activities and wherein,

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? the aggregate value of net worth as on the last date of the immediately preceding financial year exceeds five crore rupees;

? or wherein the aggregate value of the turnover made by the company from sale or supply of all products or activities during the immediately preceding financial year exceeds twenty crore rupees;

? or wherein the company’s equity or debt securities are listed or are in the process of listing on any stock exchange, whether in India or outside India. Cost records need to be maintained for all units and branches thereof in respect of each of its financial year commencing on or after the 1st April, 2011.

For further information:

http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/notification/pdf/ Common_Record_Rules_03jun11.pdf

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Vide Circular No. 37/2011, dated 7th June, 2011, the Ministry has mandated the following companies to financial statements in XBRL form only from the year 2010-11

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(1) All listed companies of India and their Indian subsidiaries

(2) All companies having a paid up capital of Rs. 5 cores and above

(3) All companies having a turnover of Rs.100 crores and above. Further all the above companies as above whose balance sheets are adopted at AGM’s held before 30-9-2011 are permitted to file up to 30-9-2011 without additional filing fees but those that hold the meeting in September 2011, will file within 30 days from date of adoption in the AGM.

For further information:

http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/Circular_37-2011 _07jun2011.pdf

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In order to give an opportunity for fast track exit to a defunct company i.e., for getting its name struck off from the Register of Companies, the MCA has decided to modify the existing route through e-form 61 and has prescribed the guidelines for ‘Fast-Track Exit mode’ for such defunct companies, vide General Circular No. 36/2011, dated 7th June 2011. The Guidelines will be implemented with effect from 3 July 2011.

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For further information:

http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/Circular_36-2011 _07jun2011.pdf

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Vide Circular No. 35/2011, dated 6th June 2011, the MCA has issued clarification to the General Circulars No. 27/2011 and 28/2011, dated 20-5-2011, with regard to participation by shareholders or Directors in meetings held under the Companies Act, 1956, through electronic mode. In respect of shareholders’ meetings to be held during financial year 2011-12, video conferencing facility for shareholders is optional. Thereafter, it is mandatory for all listed companies.

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http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/Circular_35-2011 _06jun2011.pdf

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Vide General Circular No. 33/2011, dated 1st June 2011, the Ministry has notified various forms that would be accepted by the ROC of defaulting companies — that is companies which have not filed their annual forms but are filing only event based forms

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For further information:
http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/Circular_33-2011 _01jun2011.pdf

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Vide Circular No. 32/2011, dated 31st May 2011, the Ministry has decided that w.e.f. 12th June 2011 all DIN-1 and DIN-4 applications will be signed by practising Chartered Accountants, Company Secretaries or Cost Accountants, who will verify the particulars given in the applications. To avoid duplicate DINs all existing DIN holders require to submit their PAN details by filing DIN-4 e-form by 30th September, failing which their DIN will be disabled and be liable for heavy penalty.

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For further information:
http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/Circular_32-2011 _31may2011.pdf

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Vide Ciruclar No. 32/2011, dated 31st May 2011, the Ministry has issued clarifications u/s. 616 (C) the Companies Act, 1956 pertaining to depreciation for the purpose of declaration of dividend u/s. 205 in case of Companies engaged in the generation or supply of electricity

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For further information:

http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/Circular_32-2011 _31may2011.pdf

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Vide Circular No. 30A/2011, dated 26th May 2011, the MCA has clarified that Limited Liability Partnership (LLP)’s of Chartered Accountants will not be treated as body corporate for the limited purpose of section 226(3) of the Companies Act.

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For further information: http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/Circular_30A- 2011_26may2011.pdf

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 70, dated 9-6-2011 — Remittance of assets by foreign nationals — Opening of NRO Accounts.

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Presently, foreign nationals employed in India are eligible to maintain resident accounts with banks in India. On their leaving the country they are required to close their resident accounts with banks in India and transfer the balances to their accounts abroad.

This Circular permits these foreign nationals, subject to certain terms and conditions, to redesignate their resident accounts with banks in India as NRO account on leaving the country. Only bona fide dues of the account holder, when he/ she was resident in India, can be deposited in the NRO account. Debits to the account should only be for the purpose of repatriation of funds to the overseas account of the account holder under the US $ 1 million per financial year scheme and after payment of appropriate taxes.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 69, dated 27-5-2011 — Overseas Direct Investment — Liberalisation/Rationalisation.

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This Circular has liberalised/rationalised the regulations relating to Overseas Direct Investment as under:

(1) Performance Guarantees issued by the Indian Party:

Presently, ‘financial commitment’ of the Indian Party includes contribution to the capital of the overseas Joint Venture (JV)/Wholly-Owned Subsidiary (WOS), loan granted to the JV/WOS and 100% of guarantees issued to or on behalf of the JV/WOS.

This Circular provides that only 50% of the amount of performance guarantee will be reckoned for the purpose of computing financial commitment to its JV/WOS overseas, within the 400% of the net worth of the Indian Party as on the date of the last audited balance sheet. Further, the time specified for the completion of the contract may be considered as the validity period of the related performance guarantee.

In cases where invocation of the performance guarantee breaches the ceiling for the financial exposure of 400% of the net worth of the Indian Party, the Indian Party will have to obtain prior approval of RBI before remitting funds from India, on account of such invocation.

(2) Restructuring of the balance sheet of the overseas entity involving write-off of capital and receivables:

Presently, there is no provision for restructuring of the balance sheet of the overseas JV/WOS not involving winding up of the entity or divestment of the stake by the Indian Party.

This Circular provides that Indian promoters who have set up WOS abroad or have at least 51% stake in an overseas JV, can write off capital (equity/preference shares) or other receivables, such as, loans, royalty, technical know-how fees and management fees in respect of the JV/WOS, even while such JV/WOS continue to function as under:

(i) Listed Indian companies are permitted to write off capital and other receivables up to 25% of the equity investment in the JV/WOS under the Automatic Route; and

(ii) Unlisted companies are permitted to write off capital and other receivables up to 25% of the equity investment in the JV/WOS under the Approval Route.

The write-off/restructuring have to be reported to the Reserve Bank through the designated AD bank within 30 days of write-off/restructuring. The Indian Party must submit the following documents along with the applications for write-off/restructuring to the bank under the automatic as well as the approval routes:

(a) A certified copy of the balance sheet showing the loss in the overseas WOS/JV set up by the Indian Party; and

(b) Projections for the next five years indicating benefit accruing to the Indian company consequent to such write off/restructuring.

(3) Disinvestment by the Indian Parties of their stake in an overseas JV/WOS involving write-off:

Presently, all disinvestments involving ‘write-off’, i.e., where the amount repatriated on disinvestment is less than the amount of original investment, need prior approval of RBI. However, in the following cases disinvestment is permitted under the automatic route, subject to the following conditions:

(i) In cases where the JV/WOS is listed in the overseas stock exchange;

(ii) In cases where the Indian promoter company is listed on a stock exchange in India and has a net worth of not less than Rs.100 crore; and

(iii) Where the Indian promoter company is an unlisted company and the investment in the overseas venture does not exceed US $ 10 million.

This Circular: (i) Has expanded the list of corporates eligible for disinvestment under the automatic route. As a result, listed Indian promoter companies with net worth of less than Rs.100 crore and investment in an overseas JV/WOS not exceeding US $ 10 million, can now go for disinvestment under the automatic route. They are however, required to report the disinvestment to RBI through their designated bank within 30 days from the date of disinvestment.

(ii) Clarifies that disinvestment, in case of eligible corporates, under the automatic route will also include cases where the amount repatriated after disinvestment is less than the original amount invested.

(4) Issue of guarantee by an Indian Party to step down subsidiary of JV/WOS under general permission:

Presently, Indian Parties are permitted to issue corporate guarantees only on behalf of their first level step-down operating JV/WOS set up by their JV/WOS operating as a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) under the automatic route, subject to the condition that the financial commitment of the Indian Party is within the extant limit for overseas direct investment.

This Circular provides that:

(i) Indian Party may extend corporate guarantee on behalf of the first generation step-down operating company under the automatic route, within the prevailing limit for overseas direct investment, irrespective of whether the direct subsidiary is an operating company or an SPV.

(ii) Indian Party may issue corporate guarantee on behalf of second generation or subsequent level step-down operating subsidiaries under the approval route, provided the Indian Party directly or indirectly holds 51% or more stake in the overseas subsidiary for which such guarantee is intended to be issued.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 68, dated 20-5-2011 — Hedging IPO flows by Foreign Institutional Investors (FIIs) under the ASBA mechanism.

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Presently, FIIs are allowed to hedge currency risk on the market value of their entire investment in equity and/or debt in India as on a particular date using forward foreign exchange contracts with rupee as one of the currencies and foreign currency — INR options.

This Circular permits FII to, in addition to the above, hedge risk related to transient capital flows in respect of their applications to Initial Public Offers (IPO) under the Application Supported by Blocked Amount (ASBA) mechanism, subject to the following:

(i) FII can undertake foreign currency — rupee swaps only for hedging the flows relating to the IPO under the ASBA mechanism.

(ii) Amount of the swap should not exceed the amount proposed to be invested in the IPO.

(iii) Tenor of the swap should not exceed 30 days.

(iv) Contracts, once cancelled, cannot be rebooked. (v) No rollovers will be permitted under this scheme.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 67, dated 20-5-2011 — Forward cover for Foreign Institutional Investors — Rebooking of cancelled contracts.

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Presently, Foreign Institutional Investors (FII) are permitted to cancel and rebook up to 2% of the market value of the portfolio as at the beginning of the financial year.

This Circular has increased this limit from 2% to 10% with immediate effect. As a result, FII can now cancel and rebook up to 10% of the market value of the portfolio as at the beginning of the financial year.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 60, dated 16-5-2011 — Comprehensive Guidelines on Over-the-Counter (OTC) Foreign Exchange Derivatives and Hedging of Commodity Price and Freight Risks.

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This Circular has changed the eligibility criteria for users of Over-the-Counter (OTC) cost reduction structures and option strategies.

Presently, listed companies or unlisted companies with a minimum net worth of Rs.100 crore, subject to certain conditions, are eligible to use OTC structures/strategies.

As per the new criteria, listed companies and their subsidiaries/JV/associates having common treasury and consolidated balance sheet or unlisted companies with a minimum net worth of Rs.200 crore, subject to certain conditions, are eligible to use OTC structures/strategies.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 58, dated 2-5-2011 — Opening of Escrow Accounts for FDI transactions.

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Presently, banks can open Escrow account and Special account on behalf of non-resident corporates only for acquisition/transfer of shares/convertible debentures of an Indian company through open offers/delisting/exit offers, subject to compliance with the relevant SEBI [Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers (SAST)] Regulations, 1997 and other applicable SEBI regulations.

This Circular permits, banks to open and maintain, without prior approval of the Reserve Bank, non-interest bearing Escrow accounts in Indian Rupees in India on behalf of residents and/or non-residents, towards payment of share purchase consideration and/or provide Escrow facilities for keeping securities to facilitate FDI transactions. Similarly, permission has been granted to SEBI authorised Depository Participants, to open and maintain, without prior approval of the Reserve Bank, Escrow accounts for securities.

These facilities will be applicable for both issue of fresh shares to the non- residents as well as transfer of shares from/to the non-residents and is subject to the terms and conditions given in the Annex to this Circular.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 57, dated 2-5-2011 — Pledge of shares for business purpose.

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Presently, banks can convey ‘no objection’ to resident eligible borrowers, subject to certain conditions, for pledge of shares held by the promoters, in accordance with the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) policy, in the borrowing company/domestic associate company of the borrowing company as security for the ECB. Pledge of shares in respect of all other FDI-related transactions requires prior permission of RBI.

This Circular has given powers to banks to permit pledge of shares of an Indian company held by non-resident investor(s) in accordance with the FDI policy in the following cases, subject to compliance with the conditions indicated below:

(i) Shares of an Indian company held by the non-resident investor can be pledged in favour of an Indian bank in India to secure the credit facilities being extended to the resident investee company for bona fide business purposes subject to the following conditions:

(a) In case of invocation of pledge, transfer of shares should be in accordance with the FDI policy in vogue at the time of creation of pledge;

(b) Submission of a declaration/annual certificate from the statutory auditor of the investee company that the loan proceeds will be/have been utilised for the declared purpose;

(c) The Indian company has to follow the relevant SEBI disclosure norms; and

(d) Pledge of shares in favour of the lender (bank) would be subject to compliance with the section 19 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949.

(ii) Shares of the Indian company held by the non-resident investor can be pledged in favour of an overseas bank to secure the credit facilities being extended to the non-resident investor/nonresident promoter of the Indian company or its overseas group company, subject to the following conditions:

(a) Loan is availed of only from an overseas bank;

(b) Loan is utilised for genuine business purposes overseas and not for any investments either directly or indirectly in India;

(c) Overseas investment should not result in any capital inflow into India;

(d) In case of invocation of pledge, transfer should be in accordance with the FDI policy in vogue at the time of creation of pledge; and

(e) Submission of a declaration/annual certificate from a Chartered Accountant/Certified Public Accountant of the non-resident borrower that the loan proceeds will be/have been utilised for the declared purpose.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 56, dated 29-4- 2011 — Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 — Advance remittance for import of goods — Liberalisation.

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Presently, banks in India are required to obtain an unconditional, irrevocable stand-by Letter of Credit (LC) or a guarantee from an international bank of repute situated outside India or a guarantee of an AD Category-I bank in India, if a guarantee is issued by them against the counterguarantee of an international bank of repute situated outside India, for an advance remittance exceeding US $ 100,000 or its equivalent.

This Circular has increased this limit of US $ 100,000 to US $ 200,000 or its equivalent, with immediate effect for importers. However, in the case of a Public Sector Company or a Department/ Undertaking of Central/State Governments special permission from the Ministry of Finance, Government of India, for advance remittances exceeding US $ 100,000 or its equivalent where the requirement of bank guarantee is to be specifically waived.

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(2011) 52 DTR (Mumbai) (Trib.) 295 Sri Adhikari Brothers Television Networks Ltd. v. ACIT A.Y.: 2000-01. Dated: 22-9-2010

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Section 32 — Amount paid for purchase of shares as well as for construction contribution which entitled the assessee to obtain, use and occupy the premises eligible for depreciation.

Facts:
The assessee made payment to M/s. Westwind Realtors (P) Ltd. (WRPL) towards purchase of shares amounting to Rs.2,76,92,000 and construction contribution amounting to Rs.1,67,55,000 totalling to Rs.4,44,47,000. Depreciation was claimed on such amount. On being called upon to justify the claim of depreciation, the assessee stated that such shares were purchased with a view to become owner of floor area, basement parking and terrace of building called Oberoi Chambers from WRPL.

The AO noted that as per copies of agreement the assessee had purchased only shares in the possession of some shareholders. Since the building was stockin- trade in the hands of WRPL, the AO held that the same could not form part of block of the assessee’s assets. He, therefore, disallowed depreciation on the same.

The assessee argued before the learned CIT(A) that in the regular assessment of WRPL, the acquisition of shares by the assessee had been treated as sale of the premises by WRPL and in its support the balance sheet of WRPL as on 31st March, 2000 was also filed. The CIT(A) held that the payment of Rs.2.76 crore could not be considered as part payment for acquisition of premises. He, therefore, granted depreciation on Rs.1.67 crore representing contribution towards construction. Both the sides were in appeal against their respective stands.

Held:
There is a definite scheme floated by the company under which premises have been divided into various classes such as Class A, Class B, Class C or Class D or Class E. In order to be eligible for obtaining, occupying and using the property in a specific class, it is incumbent upon the member to purchase requisite number of shares and also deposit nonrefundable construction contribution again of the requisite amount.

On going through various clauses of articles of association it becomes apparent that on becoming member by purchasing requisite number of shares and making non-refundable construction contribution, the member becomes entitled to hold, use and occupy the definite premises. Further such shares are transferable and when there is transfer of shares, the rights and benefits of the transferor stand transferred in favour of the transferee.

By holding the requisite number of shares and giving construction contribution, the assessee got the right to obtain, use and occupy the premises. The situation is somewhat akin to that of a co-operative housing society which is legal owner of building and the members get right to use and occupy the premises by virtue of their shareholding in the society. Even though the assessee is not a registered owner of the premises but it has got all such rights which enable others to be excluded from the ownership of the property. WRPL treated the acquisition of shares by the assessee and other members as sale consideration of its premises.

Both the payments are directed towards acquiring one composite right. As such it is not possible to view these two payments separately and consider the construction contribution as part of block of assets leaving aside the consideration for shares. By making total payment of Rs.4.44 crore, the assessee became entitled to obtain, use and occupy the requisite premises and hence became owner of the premises for the purpose of section 32(1).

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(2011) 52 DTR (Del.) (Trib.) 14 DCIT v. Select Holiday Resorts (P) Ltd. A.Ys.: 2004-05 & 2005-06. Dated: 23-12-2010

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Section 79 is not applicable if there is no change in control and management, even if there is change in more than 51% of share holding due to merger of two companies.

Facts:
The assessee had claimed set-off of brought forward loss and unabsorbed depreciation of Rs. 5,99,88,612. The AO noted that there has been major change in the shareholding pattern due to merger of M/s. Indrama Investment (P) Ltd. (IIPL) with the assesseecompany.

The issued share capital of the assessee-company was Rs.15 crore. Out of the share capital of Rs.15 crore, the share capital worth Rs.14.70 crore was held by IIPL. After the merger the share capital of the assessee company became Rs.6 crore. Shareholding of IIPL had been cancelled pursuant to the merger. As a result of merger more than 51% of the share capital which was held earlier by IIPL was reduced to nil. The AO held that the above change in the shareholding pattern had resulted in violation of conditions laid down in section 79 of the Income-tax Act for allowability of set-off of carried forward business loss.

In the present case it may be noted that IIPL was holding 98% of the shares of the appellant-company. On the other hand 100 per cent shares of IIPL were held by four persons of the family who were having the control and management of the IIPL as well as of the appellant-company. Because of the merger of IIPL into the appellant-company, the former came to an end, as a result of which the shares of amalgamated company were allotted to the shareholders of IIPL.

Thus, it is clear that there is no change in the management of the company which remained with the same family (set of persons) which was earlier exercising control. The assessee submitted a list of directors on the board of the two companies prior to the merger as well as the directors on the board of merged company. It remained in the same hands. Thus, the learned CIT(A) is correct in holding that the change in more than 51% was due to merger in two companies. There was no change in control and management. The CBDT vide Circular No. 528 clarified that set-off of brought forward losses will not be denied where change in shareholding takes place due to death of any shareholder. The case of the present merger is akin to death of shareholder. In the case death of a living person the shares held by him get transferred to his legal heirs. Similarly when existence of a company is legally finished, the benefit of assets held by it (including shares of other company) will pass on to its shareholders. Therefore, the provision of section 79 were not applicable in the facts of the present case.

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(2011) 128 ITD 275 (Mum.) Piem Hotel Ltd. v. Dy. CIT A.Y. 2004-05. Dated: 13-8-2010

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Non-examination and non-verification by AO regarding allowability of depreciation on intangible assets does not mean that order passed by AO is erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of Revenue.

Facts:
The assessee acquired licence/approval for operating hotel business and included the amount paid in respect of the same under the head goodwill forming part of block of assets under the head intangible assets. While completing original assessment u/s.143(3), the AO had raised queries about claim of depreciation on goodwill and asked the assessee to provide details of the same with detailed working. The assessee provided all the necessary details along with the working of depreciation on intangible assets to the AO. On being satisfied, the AO allowed the claim of depreciation on intangible assets, but failed to discuss it in the assessment order. However, the CIT issued notice u/s.263 on the ground that the AO has not obtained bifurcation and details of assets on which depreciation was claimed. The CIT held that the AO has failed to apply his mind in determining whether these licences/approvals bring into existence any new asset/or not.

Held:
Licence/approval can be said to be intangible assets as defined in Clause (b) to explanation 3 to section 32(1)(ii). In the order of the AO, claim of depreciation on goodwill was not discussed even though the AO had examined the detailed explanation presented before him. The same claim was allowed in earlier year also.

Held that the AO’s decision of not rejecting the claim, after having an opportunity to peruse the detailed submission, cannot by itself imply that there was no application of mind.

It is well-settled law that when two views are possible and the AO has taken one view, then his order cannot be subjected to revisions, merely because other view is also possible.

Therefore view taken by the AO was a possible view in allowing depreciation and cannot be held to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue.

Therefore, order passed by the CIT u/s.263 was to be quashed.

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(2011) 128 ITD 81 (Cochin) V. K. Natesan v. Dy. CIT (TM) Third Member A.Y.: 2004-05. Dated: 14-7-2010

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Section 263 is invoked when order is erroneous and prejudicial to interest of Revenue. It’s well-settled provision of law that where there are two views possible, the view adopted by AO cannot be held to be erroneous. The Commissioner cannot invoke provision of section 263 merely because AO kept in abeyance penalty proceedings till the dispute of appeal.

Facts:
Assessment was completed u/s.143(3) and shortterm capital gain of Rs.13,99,528 (undisclosed income) was added to the returned income of assessee for non-production of evidence. Assessee filed appeal to the CIT(A) and ITAT. Both authorities confirmed the addition. The assessee filed appeal before the High Court. Penalty proceeding were initiated u/s.271(1)(c) in the order itself; but order imposing penalty was not passed by the AO as the assessee preferred appeal before the High Court. The AO kept penalty proceeding in abeyance till the matter was decided by the High Court. However, the CIT, set aside the order of the AO u/s.263 on the ground of it being erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue.

Both the members (i.e., judicial members and accountant members) upheld jurisdictional powers of the CIT u/s.263 but, they differed on merits of the case. Hence, a reference was made to the Third Member to determine whether the AO was justified in relying on section 275(1A) for keeping in abeyance the penalty proceedings.

Held:
The order is prejudicial to interest of the Revenue only when lawful revenue due to the state is not/ realised. Mere keeping in abeyance of penalty proceeding by the AO till the matter is decided in the High Court/Supreme Court cannot be treated as prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue.

Provisions of section 275(1A), state the course of action when quantum appeal is pending. Therefore, when two views are possible, view adopted by the AO can not be held to be erroneous. Held that the order making revision u/s.263 should be quashed.

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Shipping business of non-residents: Section 172 of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Y. 1987-88: Tug towing ship which could not sail by itself: No carriage of goods: Section 172 not applicable.

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[CIT v. Oceanic Shipping Service of M. T. Suhail, 334 ITR 132 (Guj.)] A merchant vessel came to an Indian port for discharging cargo. While at the Indian port it developed engine trouble and hence it had to be towed away. It entered into an agreement with the assessee, a non-resident for towing away the ship. The agreement was made outside India and payment was also made outside India. The assessee received US $ 1,00,000 as towing charges. The Assessing Officer held that the towing charges was assessable u/s.172 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal held that section 172 was not applicable. On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under: “(i) Section 172 requires in the first instance that a ship should belong to or be chartered by a non-resident; secondly, the ship should carry passengers, livestock, mail or goods; and thirdly, such cargo of passengers, etc., should be shipped at a port in India. (ii) The provision stipulates a ship which carries passengers, livestock, mail or goods. Therefore, the term ‘goods’ has to take colour from the preceding words/terms and one cannot visualise either passengers or livestock or mail being towed away and they have to be carried by a ship aboard a ship. Thus, goods also have to be carried by ship aboard a ship. (iii) The term ‘goods’ as used in the provision has to be understood in ordinary commercial parlance and usage, i.e., as articles or things which can be bought and sold. A vessel which due to mechanical fault that it has developed, cannot propel itself on its own, does not become ‘goods’ for the purpose of being carried by a ship for the purpose of trade. Therefore, it cannot be stated that a tug, though a vessel/ship for a limited purpose, carries goods when it pulls a ship by way of tow. (iv) The Tribunal was right in law in holding that the provisions of section 172 were not applicable and hence tax was not leviable u/s. 172(2) in respect of US $ 1,00,000 received by the assessee for towing away the merchant vessel.”

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TDS: Disallowance of business expenditure: Sections 40(a)(ia) and 194C of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Y. 2006-07: Assessee-firm engaged in transportation business, secured contracts with oil companies for carriage of LPG, executed the contracts through its partners retaining 3% commission as charges: Sections 194C and 40(a)(ia) not applicable.

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[CIT v. Grewal Bros., 240 CTR 325 (P&H)]

The assessee, a partnership firm, was engaged in the business of transport. It entered into contracts with oil companies for carriage of LPG. From the payment made to it, the companies deducted tax. The assessee firm passed on the transportation work to its partners and made the payment received from the said companies to its partners after deducting 3% commission as charges for the firm having secured the contract. The Assessing Officer held that in giving the contract of transportation by the firm to the partners there was a sub-contract and the firm was liable to deduct TDS [u/s.194C(2)] out of the payment made to the partners. Since the tax was not deducted at source on payments made to the partners, the Assessing Officer disallowed the amounts paid by the firm to the partners resulting in addition to the income. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal accepted the assessee’s plea and deleted the addition.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and Haryana High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) No doubt the firm and the partners may be separate entities for income-tax and it may be permissible for a firm to give a contract to its partners and deduct tax from the payment made as per section 194C, it has to be determined in the facts and circumstances of each case whether there was any separate sub-contract or the firm merely acted as agent as pleaded in the present case.

(ii) The case of the assessee is that it was the partners who were executing transportation contract by using their trucks and payment from the companies was routed through the firm as agent. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal accepted this plea on facts.

(iii) Once this plea was upheld, it cannot be held that there was a separate contract between the firm and the partners in which case the firm was required to deduct tax from the payment made to its partners u/s.194C.

(iv) The view taken by the Tribunal is consistent with the view taken by the Himachal Pradesh High Court in CIT v. Ambuja Darla Kashlog Mangu Transport Co-operative Society, 227 CTR 299 (HP) and the judgment of this Court in CIT v. United Rice Land Ltd., 217 CTR 332 (P&H).

(v) The matter being covered by earlier judgment of this Court, no substantial question of law arises.”

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Search and seizure: Interest u/s.132B(4) of Income-tax Act, 1961: Period for which interest is payable on seized amount: Search assessment resulting in no additional tax liability: Interest payable up to the date of refund and not up to the date of the assessment order.

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[Mohit Singh v. ACIT, 241 CTR 244 (Delhi)]

In the course of search u/s.132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on 11-9-2003, an amount of Rs.17 lakhs was seized. Block assessment order for the block period 1998-99 to 2003-04 was passed on 23-3-2006 which resulted in no additional tax liability. The seized amount of Rs.17 lakhs was paid on 15-4-2008. Thereafter on 16-5-2008, interest amount of Rs.1,91,704 was paid covering the period from 7-5-2004 to 23- 3-2006. No interest was paid for the period from 23-3-2006 to 15-4-2008 i.e. date of refund.

On a writ petition filed by the assessee the Delhi High Court directed the Revenue to pay the interest at the rate of 7.5% for the period from 23-4-2006 to 15-4-2008 i.e., the date of the refund.

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Loss return: Carry forward of unabsorbed depreciation: Section 32(2), section 80 and section 139(3) of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Ys. 2000-01 and 2001-02: Section 80 and section 139(3) apply to business loss and not to unabsorbed depreciation covered by section 32(2): Period of limitation for filing loss return not applicable.

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[CIT v. Govind Nagar Sugar Ltd., 334 ITR 13 (Del.)]

For the A.Y. 2001-02, the assessee filed loss return belatedly on 31-3-2003. The AO computed the loss at Rs.6,03,14,560, but did not allow the assessee to carry forward the loss including the depreciation by relying on the provisions of sections 80 and 139(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal allowed the carry forward of the depreciation of the relevant year and also of the A.Y. 2000-01.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) Sections 80 and 139(3) of the Act apply to business losses and not to unabsorbed depreciation which was exclusively governed by section 32(2) of the Act. That being so, the period of limitation for filing loss return as provided u/s.139(1) would not be applicable for carrying forward of unabsorbed depreciation and investment allowance.

(ii) U/s.32(2), unabsorbed depreciation of a year becomes part of depreciation of subsequent year by legal fiction and when it becomes part of the current years depreciation it was liable to be set off against any other income, irrespective of whether the earlier years return was filed in time or not.”

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Capital gain: Exemption u/s.54E of Incometax Act, 1961: A.Y. 2007-08: Long-term capital gain on transfer of depreciable asset: Investment of net consideration in Capital Gains Deposit Account Scheme: Assessee entitled to exemption u/s.54F.

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[CIT v. Rajiv Shukla, 334 ITR 138 (Del.)]

In the A.Y. 2007-08, the assessee had long-term capital gain on transter of depreciable assets. The assessee invested the net capital gain in the Capital Gains Deposit Account Scheme and calimed exemption u/s.54F of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The AO disallowed the claim on the ground that the capital gain arising from transfer of a depreciable asset shall be deemed to be capital gain arising from transfer of a short-term capital asset. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under: “The income earned by the assessee on sale of depreciable asset was to be treated as long-term capital gain, entitling him to the benefit of section 54F.”

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Business expenditure: Deduction only on actual payment: Section 43B of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Y. 1989-90: Excise duty paid in advance: Assessee entitled to deduction: AO not right in holding that deduction allowable only on removal of goods from factory.

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[CIT v. Modipon Ltd., 334 ITR 106 (Del.)]

For A.Y. 1989-90, the assessee had claimed a deduction of Rs.14,71,387 as business expenditure on account of excise duty paid in advance. Reliance was placed on section 43B of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim holding that the deduction can be claimed only on removal of goods from the factory. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) With regard to the deduction of Rs.14,71,387 on account of excise duty paid in advance as business expenditure, the procedure envisaged for payment of excise duty envisages such duty to be deposited in advance with the treasury before the goods were removed from the factory premises. The duty, thus, already stood deposited in the accounts of the assessee maintained with the treasury and the amount, thus stood paid to the State.

(ii) The submission of the Department that it was only on removal of goods that the amount credited to the personal ledger account could be claimed as deductible u/s.43B of the Act, could not be accepted.”

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Appeal to Commissioner: Tax recovery by auction sale of property: Income-tax Act, 1961 Sch. II, RR. 63, 65 and 86: TRO confirming sale in recovery proceedings: Order confirming sale is not conclusive: Appeal is maintainable: Period of limitation runs from the date of knowledge of the order.

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[Vijay Kumar Ruia v. CIT, 334 ITR 38 (All.)]

A property belonging to one I was sold by auction on 22-3-1988 by the TRO for recovery of tax dues. The auction was confirmed by the TRO by order dated 25- 4-1988 and certificate of sale was issued in favour of the auction purchaser on the same day. The executor of the will of I preferred an appeal before the Commissioner purporting to be u/r. 86 of Schedule II to the Income-tax Act, 1961. The appeal was dismissed as not maintainable and being barred by time.

The Allahabad High Court allowed the writ petition challenging the order of the Commissioner and held as under:

“(i) An appeal u/r. 86 lies against the original order of the TRO, provided such an order was not conclusive in nature. The relief claimed in the appeal was to cancel and set aside the sale of property. Rule 63 did not contemplate the order of confirmation of sale to be conclusive order. The appeal was maintainable.

(ii) The intention was to challenge the order of sale confirmation and the order issuing the sale certificate. What was intended to be challenged was the sale of the immovable property also and not only the sale certificate. Mere mentioning of a wrong provision in appeal would not take away the statutory right of the petitioner, if the appeal was otherwise provided under the statute and was maintainable.

(iii) The limitation for filing appeal u/r. 86(2) was 30 days from the date of the order. The petitioner acquired the knowledge of the auction sale, the order of sale confirmation and issuance of sale certificate for the first time on 18-8-1988. The appeal was filed on 19-9-1988, within limitation from the date of knowledge.

(iv) If the party aggrieved was not made aware of the order it could not be expected to take recourse to the remedy available against it. Therefore, the fundamental principle was that the party whose rights were affected by an order must have the knowledge of the order. Thus, the appeal was within limitation both from the date of knowledge of the order and its service.”

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Reassessment: Section 147 and section 148 of Income-tax Act, 1961: Reopening of assessment on reason to believe that certain items of income have escaped assessment: Finding in reassessment proceedings that such items of income have not escaped assessment: Reassessment proceedings not valid: AO cannot assess any other income.

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[Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. v. CIT (Del.), ITA No. 148 of 2008 dated 3-6-2011]

The assessee-company was engaged in the business of manufacturing and trading of pharmaceutical products. For the relevant year, the assessee filed the return of income on 31-10-1994, which was processed u/s.143(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Subsequently, a notice u/s.148 was issued on 23-1- 1998 for the reason that the items viz., club fees, gifts and presents and provision for leave encashment have escaped assessment. In reassessment proceedings the assessee explained that there is no escapement of income on account of these items and the explanation was accepted by the Assessing Officer. Accordingly, no addition was made on that count. However, the Assessing Officer reduced the claim for deduction u/s.80HHC and u/s.80I of the Act. The assessee challenged the validity of the assessment order and the additions. The Tribunal upheld the reassessment and the additions.

On appeal by the assessee, the Delhi High Court followed the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Jet Airways; 331 ITR 236 (Bom.), allowed the appeal and held as under:

“(i) Though Explanation 3 to section 147 inserted by the Finance Act, 2009 w.e.f. 1-4-1989 permits the Assessing Officer to assess or reassess income which has escaped assessment even if the recorded reasons have not been recorded with regard to such items, it is essential that the items in respect of which the reasons had been recorded are assessed.

(ii) If the Assessing Officer accepts that the items for which reasons are recorded have not escaped assessment, it means he had no “reason to believe that income has escaped assessment” and the issue of the notice becomes invalid. If so, he has no jurisdiction to assess any other income.”

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Business expenditure: Revenue or capital: A.Y. 2002-03: Assessee in business of manufacture of steel wire rods, etc.: Paid Rs. 45,21,000 to Mahanagar Gas Ltd. towards CNG connection: Is revenue expenditure.

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[CIT v. TATA SSL Ltd. (Bom.), ITA No. 1321 of 2010 dated 8-6-2011] The assessee, a public limited company, was engaged in the business of manufacturing steel wire rods, wires, CR sheets and profiles. In the relevant year i.e., A.Y. 2002-03, the assessee had paid Rs. 45,21,000 to Mahanagar Gas Ltd. towards CNG connection. The assessee claimed the expenditure as revenue expenditure. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim. The Assessing Officer held that expenditure is capital in nature on the ground that the payment was made as capital contribution towards the cost of acquiring service meter, twin steam regulator, meter regulating station and cost of pipelines up to meter regulating station and that the payment was made before commencement of the gas supply. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim. The Tribunal held that by paying the impugned amount to Mahanagar Gas Ltd., the assessee did not acquire any right or control over the gas facility. The Tribunal held that the facilities served the sole purpose of supplying the gas to the assessee’s work and, therefore, it was an integral part of profitearning process and facilitated in carrying on the assessee’s business more efficiently without giving any enduring benefit to the assessee.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) In the present case, the finding recorded by the Tribunal is that the assets remained the property of Mahanagar Gas Ltd. and that the sole object of payment was to get gas to facilitate the manufacturing activity carried on by the assessee.

(ii) In these circumstances, in our opinion, no fault can be found with the decision of the Tribunal.”

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Interest-tax — Supreme Court — Matter remanded for determining the questions that arose in accordance with the law.

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[Motor and General Finance Ltd. v. CIT, (2011) 334 ITR 33 (SC)] The assessee, a non-banking financial company registered with R.B.I., was engaged in the business of hirepurchase and leasing. In the return of income, 1961 it showed the following components of income:

Rs.
(A) Lease charges 40,86,85,186
(B) Hire-purchase charges 32,64,89,358
(C) Bill discounting charges 1,91,48,614

The assessee did not, however, file any return of interest under the Interest-tax Act, 1974 (for short ‘1974 Act’). The Assessing Officer served a letter on the assessee asking the assessee to explain the reasons for not filing the Interest-tax return for the A.Y. 1995-96. A reply was filed by the assessee requesting the Assessing Officer to withdraw his letter, as the assessee claimed that it was not liable to file returns under the 1974 Act. On 31st March, 2005, a notice u/s. 10 of the 1974 Act was served on the assessee calling upon it to file its return of interest. According to the Assessing Officer, the interest chargeable to tax had escaped assessment. According to the Assessing Officer, on a perusal of the income-tax return of the assessee for the A.Y. 1995-96, it was found that the assessee was engaged in financial activities; that it had income from net hire-purchase charges, lease charges and bill discounting charges as indicated hereinabove. Since the assessee did not file the required return of chargeable interest the Assessing Officer assessed the chargeable interest by way of best judgment assessment u/s. 8(3) of the 1974 Act. The total interest chargeable, according to the Assessing Officer, was Rs.75,43,23,158. One of the issues which arose for determination was whether the transactions undertaken by the assessee were in the nature of hire-purchase and not in the nature of financing transactions. According to the assessee, there is a dichotomy between financing transactions and hire-purchase transactions. According to the assessee, its principal business was of leasing. For the aforestated reasons, the assessee contended that it was not covered by the definition of ‘financial company’ u/s. 2(5B) of the 1974 Act. On examination of the facts of the case and looking into all the parameters, including the parameter of the principal business, such as turnover, capital employed, etc., it was held by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) that the assessee carried on hire-purchase business activity and bill discounting activity as the principal business and, therefore, the assessee constituted a ‘credit institution’ as defined u/s. 2(5A) of the 1974 Act and was, therefore, taxable under the 1974 Act. However, after coming to the conclusion that the reopening of the proceedings was valid and that the assessee constituted a credit institution, the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) went into the merits of the case and came to the conclusion that the transactions entered into by the assessee were not financing transactions, as the ownership of the vehicle in each case remained with the assessee; that the hirer did not approach the assessee after purchasing the vehicles; that the vehicle stood purchased by the assessee and let out to the hirer for use on payment of charges. Consequently, the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) held that the hire-purchase transactions of the assessee were not financing transactions or loan transactions and, therefore, the Assessing Officer, was not justified in bringing to tax hire-purchase charges of Rs.32,64,89,358. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), however, held that the Assessing Officer was justified in treating receipts from bill discounting charges of Rs.1,91,48,614 as ‘chargeable interest’ under the 1974 Act. Lastly the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) held that the lease transaction undertaken by the assessee and the lease charges received by it did not fall within the ambit of section 2(7) of the 1974 Act because the Department had accepted the case of the assessee that it remained the owner of the leased assets for all times to come and, therefore, it was not open for the Department to say that charges received for leasing the vehicles are financial charges exigible to the Interest-tax Act, 1974. Consequently, the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) came to the conclusion that the Assessing Officer had erred in bringing to tax lease rental charges of Rs.40,86,85,186 as chargeable interest under the 1974 Act.

Aggrieved by the decision of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) the assessee as well as the Department went in appeal(s) to the Tribunal which held that the Department was justified in confirming the validity of action u/s. 10 of the 1974 Act. On the question as to whether the assessee was a ‘financial company’ as defined u/s. 2(5B), it was held that the assessee was not a finance company and therefore it did not fall within the definition of ‘credit institution’ as envisaged in section 2(5A) of the 1974 Act and, therefore, it fell outside the purview of the 1974 Act. That, bill discounting charges was taxable under the 1974 Act. That the plea of the assessee that such charges were not covered by the definition of the word ‘interest’ was not acceptable. Consequently, the appeals filed by the assessee were partly allowed. In the Department’s counter-appeal the Tribunal held on examination of the transaction in question that the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) was right in holding that the hire-purchase agreement in the present case was not a financing transaction. Similarly, on examining the lease transaction undertaken by the assessee, the Tribunal held that the asset owned by the lessor was given to the lessee for use only and therefore the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) was fully justified in holding that the receipt on account of lease charges was not taxable as finance charges or interest under the 1974 Act.

Aggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal, the Department carried the matter in appeal to the Delhi High Court u/s. 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The appeal was allowed by the High Court, it was held by the High Court that the Tribunal had erred in holding that for deciding the principal business of a taxable entity under the 1974 Act only the receipt from business is the criteria and the other parameters such as turnover, capital employed, the head count of persons employed, etc. were not relevant. Accordingly, the Tribunal’s decision stood set aside. The High Court also remitted the case to the Assessing Officer saying that it was not clear from the material produced before the Court as to whether the lease agreements entered into by the assessee were financial lease or operational leases or both.

Aggrieved by the decision of the High Court, the assessee went to the Supreme Court by way of civil appeals. The Supreme Court was of the view that the High Court had not examined whether the transaction entered into by the assessee constituted financial transactions so as to attract the provisions of the 1974 Act. The Supreme Court noted that the Commissioner of Income Tax had examined the nature of the transactions entered into by the assessee and the three components of the receipt of the assessee under 1974 Act. According to the Supreme Court the main question which arose for determination in this case was whether the receipt from lease charges, from net hire-purchase charges and bill discounting charges could be taxed under the 1974 Act. This was apart from the question as to whether the assessee which was a non-banking financial company was a credit institution u/s. 2(5A) of the 1974 Act. The Supreme Court was of the view that the matter needed reconsideration and hence set aside the judgment of the High Court with a direction to decide the matter in accordance with law.

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The power of parliament to make law with respect to extra-teritorial aspects or causes — Part iI

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G. V. K. Industries Ltd. & Anr. v. ITO & Anr. — 228 ITR 564 (A.P.):

3.1 Brief facts in the above case were: main object of the company was to generate and sell electricity for which purpose it was constructing a power generation station designed to operate using natural gas as fuel near Rajahmundry in the State of Andhra Pradesh. For the purpose of raising funds for the said project, GVK Inds. Ltd. (Company) needed expert services of qualified and experienced professionals who could prepare a scheme for raising finance and tie-up the required loan. For this purpose, the Company had entered into an agreement with a non-resident company (NRC), namely, ABB-Project and Trade Finance (International) Ltd. Zurich, Switzerland. Under the agreement, the NRC was to act as financial advisor and render requisite services for a success fee. Accordingly, the NRC rendered professional services from Zurich by correspondence as to how to execute documents for sanction of loan by the financial institutions within and outside India on the basis of which the Company approached such institutions and obtained the requisite loan. For a successful rendering of services, the NRC sent an invoice to the Company for payment of success fee amounting to US$.17.15 lakh (Rs.5.4 crores). For the purpose of remittance of this amount, the Company approached the ITO for issuing NOC for remitting the amount without TDS u/s. 195 without any success. The Company also approached the CIT, u/s. 264, who ultimately took the view that the NOC can be issued only after making TDS and payment thereof to the Government. This was challenged by the Company before the Andhra Pradesh High Court.

3.2 After considering various contentions raised on behalf of the Company and various judgments of the Apex Court as well as High Courts and after considering the scope of the services/work undertaken by the NRC, the Court took the view that a ‘business connection’ between the Company and NRC has not been established. Hence what remains to be considered is whether the amount of success fee can be treated as FTS u/s. 9(1)(vii)(b). In this context, it was contended on behalf of the Company that the NRC merely rendered advice in connection with procurement of loan which does not amount to rendering technical or consultancy services and hence, amount in question is not FTS. The Revenue had taken a view that the success fee is FTS as the services rendered by the NRC fall within the ambit of both managerial and consultancy services as contemplated in the definition of FTS given in Explanation to section 9(1)(vii) (b) considering the scope of the services/work of the NRC, the Court took the view that the advice given to procure loan to strengthen finance would be as much a technical or consultancy service as it would be with regard to management, generation of power or plant and machinery. Accordingly, the Court held that the success fees in question fall within the ambit of section 9(1)(vii). In fact, it appears that this was not seriously disputed by the counsel appearing for the Company, but the main argument seems to be that if that is so, then, provisions would be unconstitutional for want of legislative competence. For this, reliance was placed on the commentary given in the book (i.e., Law of Income Tax and Practice) written by the learned authors Kanga and Palkhivala.

3.3 Dealing with the above-referred issue raised on behalf of the Company, the Court stated that having regard to the present liberalisation policy, it is for the Government to take steps to have clause (vii)(b) of section 9(1) either replaced or amended so as to make income by way of FTS chargeable only when territorial nexus exists. After making this observation, the Court upheld the validity of the provisions mainly relying the judgment of the same Court as well as of the Apex Court in the case of ECIL (referred to in para 2 in Part-1).

G. V. K. Industries Ltd. & Anr. v. ITO & Anr. — 332 ITR 130 (SC):

4.1 The judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the above case came up for consideration before the Apex Court at the instance of the Company (i.e., assessee). Considering the importance of the issue involving validity of section 9(1)(vii)(b), the matter was finally referred to the Constitutional Bench. For the purpose of deciding the issue, the Court noted that the High Court having held that section 9(1)(i) did not apply in the facts of the case of the Company, nevertheless upheld the applicability of section 9(1) (vii)(b) and also upheld the validity of the said provisions mainly relying on the judgment of three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in the case of ECIL.

4.2 For the purpose of dealing with the issue, the Court noted that the Apex Court in the case of ECIL conclusively determined that clauses (1) and (2) of Article 245, read together, imposed requirement that laws made by the Parliament should bear a nexus with India and ask that the Constitution Bench be constituted to consider whether the ingredients of section 9(1)(vii)(b) indicate such a nexus. In the course of proceedings before the Constitution Bench, the Company (i.e., GVK Inds. Ltd.) withdrew its challenge to the constitutional validity of section 9(1)(vii)(b) and elected to proceed only on the factual matrix as to the applicability of the said section. However, the learned Attorney General (A.G.), appearing on behalf of the respondent, pressed upon the Bench to reconsider the decision of the three-Judge Bench in the case of ECIL. Considering the constitutional importance of the issue, the Court agreed to consider the validity of the requirement of relationship to or nexus with the territory of India as a limitation on the powers of the Parliament to enact laws pursuant to Article 245(1).

4.3 For the purpose of deciding the above issue, the Court noted that the central constitutional theme before the Court relate to whether the Parliament’s powers to legislate, pursuant to Article 245, include legislative competence with respect to aspects or causes that occurred, arise, or exist or may be expected to do so, outside the territory of India. For this purpose, the Court noted that there are two divergent and dichotomous views on this. First one arises from a rigid reading of the ratio in the case of ECIL which suggests that the Parliament’s powers to legislate, incorporate only competence to enact laws with respect to aspects or causes that occur, or exist, solely within India. In this context, the Court further observed as follows (page 133):

“….A slightly weaker form of the foregoing strict territorial nexus restriction would be that the Parliament’s competence to legislate with respect to extra-territorial aspects or causes would be constitutionally permissible if and only if they have or are expected to have significant or sufficient impact on or effect in or consequence for India. An even weaker form of the territorial nexus restriction would be that as long as some impact or nexus with India is established or expected, then the Parliament would be empowered to enact legislation with respect to such extra-territorial aspects or causes. The polar opposite of the territorial nexus theory, which emerges also as logical consequence of the propositions of the learned Attorney General, specifies that the Parliament has inherent powers to legislate ‘for’ any territory, including territories beyond India, and that no Court in India may question or invalidate such laws on the ground that they are extra-territorial laws. Such a position incorporates the views that the Parliament may enact legislation even with respect to extra-territorial aspects or causes that have impact on, effect in or consequence for India, any part of it, its inhabitants or Indians, their interest, welfare, or security, and further that the purpose of such legislation need not in any manner or form be intended to benefit India.”

4.4 After noting the above-referred divergent views, the Court framed the following two questions for the decision of the Constitutional Bench (pages 133/134):

“(1)    Is the Parliament constitutionally restricted from enacting legislation with respect to extra-territorial aspects or causes that do not have, nor expected to have any, direct or indirect, tangible or intangible impact(s) on, or effect(s) in, or con-sequences for: (a) the territory of India, or any part of India; or (b) the interests of, welfare of, well-being of, or security of inhabitants of India, and Indians?

(2)    Does the Parliament have the powers to legislate ‘for’ any territory, other than the territory of India or any part of it?

4.5    Before proceeding to decide the questions framed, the Court noted the provisions of Article 245 of Constitution, which fall in part XI of Chapter 1 under the head ‘Extent of laws made by the Parliament and by the Legislatures of the States’. The Court also stated that many expressions and phrases that are used contextually in the flow of language, involving words such as ‘interest’, ‘benefit’, ‘welfare’, ‘security’ and the like in order to satisfy the purpose of laws and their consequences, can have range to meanings. The Court then, for the purpose of the judgment, decided to set forth the following range of meanings for such expressions and phrases (pages 134/135):

‘aspects or causes’, ‘aspects and causes’:

“events, things, phenomena (howsoever common place they may be), resources, actions or transactions, and the like, in the social, political, economic, cultural, biological, environmental or physical spheres, that occur, arise, exist or may be expected to do so, naturally or on account of some human agency.”

‘extra-territorial aspects or causes’:

“aspects or causes that occur, arise, or exist, or may be expected to do so, outside the territory of India.”

‘nexus with India’, ‘impact on India’, ‘effect in India’, ‘effect on India’, ‘consequence for India’ or ‘impact on or nexus with India’:

“any impact(s) on, or effect(s) in, or consequences for, or expected impact(s) on, or effect(s) in, or consequence(s) for: (a) the territory of India, or any part of India; or (b) the interests of, welfare of, well being of, or security of inhabitants of India, and Indians in general, that arise on account of aspects or causes.”

‘benefit to India’ or ‘for the benefit of India’, ‘to the benefit of India’, ‘in the benefit of India’ or ‘to benefit India’ or ‘the interests of India’, ‘welfare of India’, ‘well-being of India’, etc.:

“protection of and/or enhancement of the interest or, welfare of, well-being of, or the security of India (i.e., the whole territory of India), or any part of it, its inhabitants and Indians.”

4.6 Dealing with the ratio of the judgment in the case of ECIL, the Court stated as under (pages 136/137):

“The requirement of nexus with the territory of India was first explicitly articulated in the decision by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in ECIL. The implication of the nexus requirement is that a law that is enacted by the Parliament, whose ‘objects’ or ‘provocations’ do not arise within the territory of India, would be unconstitutional. The words ‘object’ and ‘provocation’, and their plural forms, may be conceived as having been used in ECIL as synonyms for the words ‘aspects’ and ‘cause’, and their plural forms, as used in this judgment.”

4.6.1 The Court further noted that in the case of ECIL, while dealing with the validity of section 9(1) (vii)(b) of the Act and interpreting the provisions of Article 245(1) and (2), the Court, in that case, drew the distinction between the phrases ‘make laws’ and ‘extraterritorial operation’ — i.e., the acts and functions of making laws versus the acts and functions of effectuating a law already made. The Court also noted the conclusion of the Court in that case that the operation of the law can extend to persons, things and acts outside the territory of India. However, the principle enunciated in that case does not address the question as to whether a Parliament may enact a law ‘for’ a territory outside boundaries of India. The Court then observed as follows (page 138):

“….To enact laws ‘for’ a foreign territory could be conceived of in two forms. The first form would be, where the laws so enacted, would deal with or be in respect of extra-territorial aspects or causes, and the laws would seek to control, modulate or transform or in some manner direct the executive of the legislating State to act upon such extra-territorial aspects or causes because: (a) such extra-territorial aspects or causes have some impact on or nexus with or to India; and (b) such laws are intended to benefit India. The second form would be when the extra-territorial aspects do not have, and neither are expected to have, any nexus whatsoever with India, and the purpose of such legislation would serve no purpose or goal that would be beneficial to India.”

4.6.2 The Court then further noted that in the case of ECIL, it was concluded that the Parliament does not have the powers to mark laws that bear no relationship to or nexus with India. The obvious questions that arises from this is: “what kind of nexus?” According to the Court, in this context, the words used in that case (referred to in para 2.5.2 in Part-1) are instructive both as to principle and also the reasoning. The Court then opined that the distinction drawn in that case between ‘make laws ‘ and ‘operation of laws’ is a valid one and leads to a correct assessment of relationship between clauses (1) & (2) of Article 245.

4.6.3 Concluding on the possible effect of the rigid reading of the judgment of in the case ECIL, the Court stated as under (page 139):

“We are, in this matter, concerned with what the implications might be, due to use of the words ‘provocation’, ‘object’, ‘in’ and ‘within’ in connection with the Parliament’s legislative powers regarding ‘the whole or any part of the territory of India’, on the understanding as to what aspect and/or causes the Parliament may legitimately take into consideration in exercise of its legislative powers. A particularly narrow reading or understanding of the words used could lead to a strict territorial nexus requirement wherein the Parliament may only make laws with respect to objects or provocations — or alternately, in terms of the words we have used ‘aspect and causes’ — that occur, arise or exist or may be expected to occur, arise or exist, solely within the territory of India, notwithstanding the fact that many extra-territorial objects or provocations may have an impact or nexus with India. Two other forms of the foregoing territorial nexus theory, with weaker nexus requirements, but differing as to the applicable tests for a finding of nexus, have been noted earlier.

4.7 Having noted the implications of the judgment in case of ECIL and the issue arising therefrom, and the impact thereof on the powers of the Parliament to enact a law with respect to ‘extra-territorial aspects or causes’, the Court also noted that learned A.G. appeared to be concerned by the fact that the narrow reach of Article 245 in the context of the ratio in the case of ECIL would significantly incapacitate the Parliament, which is charged with the responsibility of legislating for the entire nation, in dealing with extra-territorial aspects or causes that have an impact on or nexus with India. The Court also noted the following propositions made by the learned A.G. with respect to the meaning, purport and ambit of Article 245 (pages 139/140), which, it seems, the Court found as moving to another extreme:

“(1)    There is a clear distinction between a Sovereign Legislature and a Subordinate Legislature.
(2)    It cannot be disputed that a Sovereign Legislature has full power to make extra-territorial laws.

(3)    The fact that it may not do so or that it will exercise restraint in this behalf arises not from a Constitutional limitation on its powers but from a consideration of applicability.

(4)    It does not detract from its inherent rights to make extra-territorial laws.

(5)    In any case, the domestic courts of the country cannot set aside the legislation passed by a Sovereign Legislature on the ground that it has extra-territorial effect or that it would offend some principle of international law.

(6)    The theory of nexus was evolved essentially from Australia to rebut a challenge to income-tax laws on the ground of extra-territoriality.

(7)    The principle of nexus was urged as a matter of construction to show that the law in fact was not extra-territorial because it has a nexus with the territory of the legislating State.

(8)    The theory of nexus and the necessity to show the nexus arose with regard to State Legislature under the Constitution since the power to make extra-territorial laws is reserved only for the Parliament.”

4.7.1 According to the Court, the main propositions are that the Parliament is a ‘Sovereign Legislature’ and that such a ‘Sovereign Legislature’ has full power to make extra-territorial laws. The Court, then, stated that this can be analysed in two ways. The first aspect of this is: the phrase ‘full power to make extra-territorial laws’ would implicate the competence to legislate with respect to extra-territorial aspects or causes that have an impact on or nexus with India, wherein the State machinery is directed to achieve the goals of such legislation by exerting the force on such extra-territorial aspects or causes to modulate, change, transform or eliminate their effects. The second aspect of this is: such powers would also extend to legislate with respect to the extra-territorial aspects or causes that do not have any impact on or nexus with India. The Court then noted that according to the learned A.G., both these forms of powers are within the legislative competence of the Parliament. The Court then assumed that the learned A.G. did not mean that the Parliament would have powers to enact extra-territorial laws with respect to foreign territories that are devoid of justice i.e., they serve no benefits to the denizens of such foreign territories. Considering historical background of establishment of India as a nation, the Court, in this context, observed as under (page 141):

“To the extent that extra-territorial laws enacted have to be beneficial to the denizens of another territory, three implications arise. The first one is when such laws do benefit the foreign territory, and benefit India too. The second one is that they benefit the denizens of that foreign territory, but do not adversely affect India’s interest. The third one would be when such extra-territorial laws benefit the denizens of the foreign territory, but are damaging to the interest of India. We take it that the learned Attorney General has proposed that all three possibilities are within constitutionally permissible limits of legislative powers and competence of the Parliament.”

4.7.2 The Court then also noted the propositions of the learned A.G. that the Courts do not have power to declare the extra-territorial laws enacted by the Parliament invalid on the grounds that they have an ‘extra-territorial effect’ whether such laws are with respect to extra-territorial aspects or causes that have any impact on or nexus with India, or that do not in any manner or form work to, or intended to be or hew to the benefit of India or that might even be detrimental to India. The Court then noted the far-reaching implications of this proposition including the one that the judiciary also has been stripped of its essential role even where such extra-territorial laws may be damaging to the interests of India.

4.8 For the purpose of considering the propositions made by the learned A.G., the Court referred to relevant principles of constitutional interpretation. In this context, the Court noted that under the scheme of Constitution the sphere of actions and extent of powers exercisable by various organs are specified. Such institutional arrangements made under the constitution are legal, inter alia, in the sense that they are susceptible to judicial review with regard to determination of vires of any of the actions of the organs of the State. The actions of such organisation are also judiciable, in appropriate cases, where the values or the scheme of the constitution may have been transgressed. The Court then dealt with the guiding principles for interpretation in the process of such review, the powers of the Parliament to amend the Constitution and also noted that such amending powers do not extend to the basic structure of the Constitution. The Court also referred to relevant principles of interpretation in this context and the methods to be adopted for the same.

4.9 The Court then proceeded to analyse the provisions of Article 245 and stated that under the clause

(1), the Parliament is empowered to enact a law ‘for’ the whole or any part of the territory of India. The word that links subject, ‘the whole or any part of the territory in India’, with the phrase that grants the legislative powers to the Parliament is ‘for’. After noting the range of meanings of the word ‘for’, the Court observed as under (page 146):

“Consequently, the range of senses in which the word ‘for’ is ordinarily used would suggest that, pursuant to clause (1) of Article 245, the Parliament is empowered to enact those laws that are in the interest of, to the benefit of, in defence of, in support or favour of, suitable or appropriate to, in respect of or with reference to ‘the whole or any part of the territory of India.”

4.9.1 The Court then noted that the problem with the manner in which Article 245 has been explained in the case of ECIL relates to the use of the word ‘provocation’, and ‘object’ as the principal qualifiers of laws and then specifying that they need to arise ‘in’ or ‘within’ India. Considering the effect of this, the Court took the view as under (page 147):

“Consequently, the ratio of ECIL could wrongly be read to mean that both the ‘provocations’ and ‘objects’ — in terms of independent aspects or causes in the world of the law enacted by the Parliament, pursuant to Article 245, must arise solely ‘in’ or ‘within’ the territory of India. Such a narrowing the ambit of clause (1) of Article 245 would arise by substituting ‘in’ or ‘within’, as prepositions, in the place of ‘for’ in the text of Article 245. The word ‘in’, used as a preposition, has a much narrower meaning, expressing inclusion or position within the limits of space, time or circumstances, than the word ‘for’. The consequence of such a substitution would be that the Parliament could be deemed to not have the powers to enact laws with respect to extra-territorial aspects or causes, even though such aspects or causes may be expected to have an impact on or nexus with India, and laws with respect to such aspects or causes would be beneficial to India.”

4.9.2 The Court then noted that the view that a nation/state must be concerned only with respect to persons, property events, etc. within it’s own territory emerged in the era when external aspects and causes were thought to be only of marginal significance, if at all. The Court also noted the earlier versions of sovereignty emerged in the context of global position and lesser interdependence of the nations at the relevant time. Having noted the earlier scenario, the Court stated that on account of scientific and technological developments, the magnitude of cross border travel and transactions has tremendously increased. Moreover, existence of economic, business, social and political organisations that operate across borders, implies that their activities, even though conducted in one territory, may have an impact on or in another territory. Global criminal and terror network are also example of how things and activities in a territory outside one’s own borders would affect interests, welfare, well being and security within. The Court then stated that within the international law, the principles of strict territorial jurisdiction have been relaxed, in the light of greater inter dependencies and other relevant reasons. At the same time, no State attempts to exercise any jurisdiction over matters, persons, or things with which it has absolutely no concern. After noting this position with regard to international law concerning power of making law with regard to extra-territory aspects and causes, the Court held as under (page 149):

“Because of interdependencies and the fact that many extra-territorial aspects or causes have an impact on or nexus with the territory of the nation/ state, it would be impossible to conceive legislative powers and competence of national parliaments as being limited only to aspects or causes that arise, occur or exist or may be expected to do so, within the territory of its own nation-state. Our Constitution has to be necessarily understood as imposing affirmative obligations on all the organs of the State to protect the interest, welfare and security of India. Consequently, we have to understand that the Parliament has been constituted, and empowered to, and that its core role would be to, enact laws that serve such purposes. Hence even those extra-territorial aspects or causes, provided they have a nexus with India, should be deemed to be within the domain of legislative competence of the Parliament, except to the extent the Constitution itself specifies otherwise.”

4.10 The Court then dealt with the extreme view canvassed by the learned A.G. that the Parliament is empowered to enact a law in respect of extra-territorial aspects or causes that have no nexus with India, and further more could such laws be bereft of any benefit to India? While rejecting such a proposition, the Court stated as under (pages 149/150):

“The word ‘for’ again provides the clue. To legislate for a territory implies being responsible for the welfare of the people inhabiting that territory, deriving the powers to legislate from the same people, and acting in a capacity of trust. In that sense the Parliament belongs only to India and its chief and sole responsibility is to act as the Parliament of India and of no other territory, nation or people. There are two related limitations that flow from this. The first one is with regard to the necessity, and the absolute base line condition, that all powers vested in any organ of the State, including the Parliament, may only be exercised for the benefit of India. All of its energies and focus ought to only be directed to that end. It may be the case that an external aspect or cause, or welfare of the people elsewhere may also benefit the people of India. The laws enacted by the Parliament may enhance the welfare of people in other territories too; nevertheless, the fundamental condition remains: that the benefit to or of India remain the central and primary purpose, That being the case, the logical corollary, and hence the second limitation that flows therefrom, would be that an exercise of legislative powers by the Parliament with regard to extra-territorial aspects or causes that do not have any, or may be expected not to have nexus with India, transgresses the first condition. Consequently, we must hold that the Parliament’s powers to enact legislation, pursuant to clause (1) of Article 245 may not extend to those extra-territorial aspects or causes that have no impact on or nexus with India.”

4.10.1 The Court further explained reasons for taking the above view and drew support from sources such as Directive Principle of State Policy, etc. The Court then stated that it is important to draw a clear distinction between the acts and functions of making laws and acts and functions of operating laws. Making laws implies the acts to changing or enacting laws.

The phrase ‘operation of law’, in its ordinary sense, means effectuation or implementation of the laws. The acts and functions of implementing laws already made fall within the domain of the executives. The essential nature of the act of invalidating a law is different from both the act of making a law, and act of operating a law. Invalidation of laws falls exclusively within the functions of the judiciary, and occurs after examination of vires of a particular of law.

4.11 Dealing with the powers of judiciary to invalidate a law, the Court stated that the only organ of State which may invalidate the law is judiciary and the provisions of Article 245(2) should be read to mean that it reduces the general and inherent. powers of the judiciary to declare a law ultra vires only to the extent of that one ground of invalidation. Explaining the effect of this provision, the Court stated as under (page 154):

“Clause (2) of Article 245 acts as an exception, of a particular and a limited kind, to the inherent poser of the judiciary to invalidate, if ultra vires, any of the laws made by any organ of the State. Generally, an exception can logically be read as only operating within the ambit of the clause to which it is an exception. It acts upon the main limb of the article — the more general clause — but the more general clause in turn acts upon it The relationship is mutually synergistic in engendering the meaning. In this case, clause (2) of Article 245 carves out a specific exception that law made by the Parliament, pursuant to clause (1) of Article 245, for the whole or any part of the territory of India may not be invalidated on the ground that such law may need to be operated extra-territorially. Nothing more. The power of judiciary to invalidate laws that are ultra vires flows from its essential functions, Constitutional structure, values and scheme, and indeed to ensure that the powers vested in the organs of the State are not being transgressed, and they are being used to realise a public purpose that subserves the general welfare of the people. It is one of the essential defences of the people in a constitutional democracy.”

4.12 Referring to various decisions, cited and relied on by the learned A.G. in support of his propositions, the Court stated that in none of these cases, the issue under consideration has been dealt with. The Court also noted that having gone through those decisions, none stand for the proposition that the powers of the Parliament are unfettered and the Parliament possesses a capacity to make laws that have no connection whatsoever with India. Having noted this factual position, the Court also dealt with some of the decisions.

4.13 Before answering the questions framed, the Court also decided to share its thoughts on some important concerns such as claims of supremacy or sovereignty for various organs to act in a manner that is essentially unchecked and uncontrolled. In this context, the Court also explained the misconception of the sovereignty and of power, and predilections to oust judicial scrutiny even at the minimum level, such as examination of the vires of the legislation or other type of state actions.

4.14 Finally, while answering the first question framed, the Court held as under (page 166):

“(1)    Is the Parliament constitutionally restricted from enacting legislation with respect to extra-territorial aspects or causes that do not have, nor expected to have any, direct or indirect, tangible or intangible impact(s) on or effect(s) in or con-sequences for: (a) the territory of India, or any part of India; or (b) the interests of, welfare of, well-being of, or security of inhabitants of India, and Indians?

Answer to the above would be yes …..”

4.14.1 Explaining the effect of the above answer, the Court further held as under (page 166):

“However, the Parliament may exercise its legislative powers with respect to extra-territorial aspects or causes, -events, things, phenomena (howsoever commonplace they may be), resources, actions or transactions, and the like, that occur, arise, or exist or may be expected to do so, naturally or on account of some human agency, in the social, political, economic, cultural, biological, environmental, or physical spheres outside the territory of India, and seek to control, modulate, mitigate or transform the effects of such extra-territorial aspects or causes, or in appropriate cases, eliminate or engender such extra-territorial aspects or causes only when such extra-territorial aspects or causes have, or are expected to have, some impact on, or effect in, or consequences for: (a) the territory of India, or any part of India; or (b) the interests of, welfare of, well-being of, or security of inhabitants of India, and Indians.”

4.14.2 While answering the second question framed (referred to in para 4.4 above), the Court also held that the Parliament does not have power to legislate ‘for’ any territory, other than the territory of India or any part of it.

4.15 After taking the above view, the Court has sent back the matter of GVK Inds. Ltd. (referred to in para 3 above) to the Division Bench for its decision in the light of judgment of the Constitution Bench.

Conclusion:

5.1 In the above case, the Constitution Bench has laid down the criteria to test the validity of the laws enacted by the Parliament or any provisions of such laws. Therefore, any law enacted by the Parliament (including tax laws) would be governed by the same.

5.2 The Court has held that the Parliament is constitutionally restricted from enacting legislation with respect to extra-territorial aspects or causes that do not have, nor expected to have any, direct or indirect, tangible or intangible impact(s) on or effect(s) in or consequences for: (a) the territory of India, or any part of India; or (b) the interests of, welfare of, well-being of, or security of inhabitants of India, and Indians. The Court has also held that any law enacted by the Parliament with respect to extra-territorial aspects or causes that have no impact on or nexus with India would be ultra vires as that would be law made “for” a foreign territory.

5.3 The Court also held that in all other respects (other than referred to in para 5.2 above), the Parliament has a power to enact a law with respect of extra-territorial aspects or causes and such power is not subject to test of ‘sufficiency’ or ‘significance’ or in any other manner requiring a pre-determined degree of strength. For this purpose, all that is required is that the connection to India be real or expected to be real, and not illusory or fanciful.

5.4 On the basis of the tests and principles laid down by the Apex Court in the above case, any issue arising under the IT Act relating to validity of any provision, will have to be decided. Accordingly, challenge if any, to the validity of the provisions of section 9(1)(vii)(b) will have to be tested on that basis.

5.5 Considering the meanings ascribed to various expressions, such as ‘aspects or causes’ ‘extra territorial aspects’, etc. (referred to in para 4.5 above), the scope of inclusion within the legislative competence is substantially wider and of such exclusion is much narrower. In this context, by and large, the Parliament has the power to enact any law in national interest with regard to extra territorial aspects or causes, once there in real connection thereof with India.

5.6 It seems that validity of the retrospective introduction/substitution (w.e.f. 1-4-1976) of Explanation to section 9(1) by the Finance Act, 2010 (referred to in para 1.5 in Part-1) may need to be separately considered.

Cost of acquisition in case of Property of Ex-Rulers

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Issue for consideration : Prior to independence,
India had a large number of native states, each having a separate Ruler.
Many of these ex-rulers owned substantial number of properties even
today, which were part of their princely possessions inherited by them
from their forefathers who had acquired such properties by way of
conquest or by way of jagir (grant).

The Supreme Court in the
case of CIT v. B. C. Srinivasa Setty, 128 ITR 294, held that no capital
gains tax is payable by an assessee where it was not possible to compute
the capital gains u/s.48 of the Act. It held that capital gains could
not be computed in cases where the cost of acquisition could not be
conceived at all. Of course, this position of law has been slightly
altered by the insertion of section 55(2)(a), which provides that the
cost of certain assets shall be deemed to be nil in cases of the assets
specified therein. Sale of such specified assets, though not having any
cost of acquisition, is now subjected to capital gains tax by virtue of
this amendment. Section 55(2)(a) however does not include such property
of ex-rulers.

The question has arisen before the courts as to
whether such property of ex-rulers acquired by their forefathers by way
of conquest or by way of jagir has no cost of acquisition, and the gains
arising on sale of such property is not subject to capital gains tax,
or whether such property has a cost of acquisition and the gains thereon
is subject to capital gains tax on sale. While the Madhya Pradesh,
Madras, and Gujarat High Courts have taken the view that the sale of
such property would not be subject to capital gains tax, the Full Bench
of the Punjab and Haryana High Court has recently taken a contrary view
that the provisions relating to capital gains tax do apply to such
properties. The decision, though rendered in the context of an ex-ruler,
has far-reaching implications inasmuch as it seeks to chart a new
course of thinking by relying on the provisions of section 55(3) for
bringing to tax gains arising even in cases not covered by section
55(2).

Lokendra Singhji’s case : The issue first came up before
the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of CIT v. H.H. Maharaja Sahib
Shri Lokendra Singhji, 162 ITR 93.

In this case, the assessee
was the ex-ruler of the erstwhile State of Ratlam, which was founded by
Maharaja Ratansinghji. A jagir of the entire state of Ratlam was
conferred on Ratansinghji in the 17th century by Emperor Shahjahan for
his daring feat of killing a mad elephant with a dagger. The assessee
sold certain land and building within the compound of Shri Ranjit Vilas
Palace, Ratlam during the relevant year, which property was a part of
the estate received as jagir, and which had been inherited by the
assessee in his capacity as the ruler.

The assessee initially
included the capital gains (loss) on sale of the property in his tax
return, by claiming the fair market value of the land and building on
1st January 1954 as the substituted cost of acquisition. The Assessing
Officer computed the assessment by taking such fair market value as on
1st January 1954 at a lower figure, which figure was slightly enhanced
by the Commissioner (Appeals).

Before the Tribunal, for the 1st
time the assessee raised an additional ground claiming that there was no
cost of acquisition of the asset and as such there could be no capital
gains as a result of the transfer of the property. The Tribunal admitted
the additional ground and came to the conclusion that no capital gains
arose as a result of the sale of the land and building.

Before
the Madhya Pradesh High Court, on behalf of the Revenue, it was argued
that the Tribunal was not justified in holding that no capital gains
arose, and that the main controversy was whether the sale proceeds of
the property were in the nature of capital receipts and whether such
receipts attracted the provisions of section 45. It was argued that as
the assessee had received the property by way of inheritance and himself
opted for substitution of the cost of the capital asset as on 1st
January 1954, the Tribunal was not right in concluding that there being
no cost of acquisition of the property to the initial owner, there was
no question of capital gains.

On behalf of the assessee, it was
submitted that though the property was a capital asset, there was no
gains because the forefathers of the assessee were not required to pay
any cost in terms of money for acquiring the property, given the history
of Ratlam State. It was argued that in the absence of any cost of
acquisition, no liability to capital gains could be fastened on the
assessee, though he might have accepted the valuation as on 1st January
1954 and had disclosed the capital loss in his return of income.
Reliance was placed on the decisions of the Bombay High Court in the
case of CIT v. Home Industries and Co., 107 ITR 609, of the Madhya
Pradesh High Court in CIT v. Jaswantlal Dayabhai, 114 ITR 798, and of
the Supreme Court in CIT v. B. C. Srinivasa Setty, 128 ITR 294, all of
which decisions were rendered in the context of goodwill, for the
proposition that the charging section and the computation provisions
together constituted an integrated code, and where the computation
provisions could not apply at all, such a case was not intended to fall
within the charging section. Reliance was also placed on the decisions
of the Delhi High Court in the case of Bawa Shiv Charan Singh v. CIT,
149 ITR 29, and the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. Mrs.
Shirinbai P. Pundole, 129 ITR 448 in the context of tenancy rights.

The
Madhya Pradesh High Court noted that though none of the cases cited by
the assessee related to the sale of an immovable property as was the
case before it, but the gist of all these decisions was that if there
was no cost of acquisition, then the gains on sale would not attract the
provisions of capital gains. According to the Madhya Pradesh High
Court, the liability to capital gains tax would arise in respect of only
those capital assets in the acquisition of which the element of cost
was either actually present or was capable of being reckoned and not in
respect of those assets in acquisition of which the element of cost was
altogether inconceivable, as in the case before it.

The Madhya
Pradesh High Court observed that a case where a person acquired some
property by way of gift or reward (for instance, jagirs from a ruler)
and the property passed on by inheritance to succeeding generations, and
was sold for a valuable consideration, because the initial owner had
not acquired it at some cost in terms of money, it would not attract
capital gains tax in such a transaction of sale, there being no gains
that could be computed as such. The Madhya Pradesh High Court therefore
held that the gains on sale of the property would not attract capital
gains tax.

This view taken by the Court in this case was
followed subsequently by the Court in the case of CIT v. Pushparaj
Singh, 232 ITR 754 (shares/securities transferred to the assessee by the
government as a moral gesture), by the Gujarat High Court in the case
of CIT v. Manoharsinhji P. Jadeja, 281 ITR 19 (property acquired by
forefathers by conquest), and by the Madras High Court in the case of
CIT v. H.H. Sri Raja Rajagopala Thondaiman, 282 ITR 126. The Punjab and
Haryana High Court also took a similar view in the case of CIT v. Amrik
Singh, 299 ITR 14, in the context of ownership acquired by the assessee
by Court’s sanction in terms of section 3 of the Punjab Occupancy
Tenants (Vesting of Proprietary Rights) Act, 1952.

Raja
Malwinder Singh’s case :

The issue again recently came up before the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of CIT v. Raja Malwinder Singh, 334 ITR 48.    In this case the assessee was an ex-ruler of the Pepsu State, which state was acquired under an instrument of annexation. Certain plots of land which were part of that state were sold. The assessee claimed that since the cost of acquisition could not be ascertained, capital gains tax was not attracted.

The Assessing Officer assessed the capital gains by taking the cost of acquisition equal to the market value as on 1st January 1954/1964. The Commissioner (Appeals) rejected the assessee’s appeal and the contention that cost of acquisition was incapable of ascertainment, but the Tribunal reversed the decision, following the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of B. C. Srinivasa Setty (supra). The Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court prima facie differed with the view taken by the same court in the case of Amrik Singh (supra), and therefore referred the matter to a large Bench.

On behalf of the Revenue, before the Full Bench, a distinction was sought to be drawn between the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of B. C. Srinivasa Setty (supra) and the case before the Court, on the ground that in a newly started business the value of goodwill was not ascertainable, whereas in the case of acquisition of land, the same was either acquired at some cost or without cost, and under the scheme of the Act, there could be no situation where the cost was incapable of ascertainment.

The Punjab and Haryana High Court noted that in the case before it, the assessee acquired the property by succession from the previous owner. It also noted that according to the assessee, the cost of acquisition by the previous owner could not be ascertained and had failed to exercise the option of adopting the market value on the date of acquisition or the cost of the previous owner. Therefore, according to the Court, the only option available to the Assessing Officer was to compute capital gains by taking the cost of asset to be the fair market value on the specified date (1st January 1954/1964, as the case may be).

According to the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, even in a case where the cost of acquisition could not be ascertained, section 55(3) statutorily prescribed the cost to be equal to the market value on the date of acquisition. Therefore, capital gains was not excluded even on the plea that value of the asset in respect of which capital gains was to be charged was incapable of ascertainment.

The Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court therefore held that the view taken by it earlier in Amrik Singh’s case was not correct, being against the statutory scheme. The Court also held that the view taken by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Lokendra Singhji’s case (supra) could not be accepted, as it did not give effect to the mandate of section 55(3), which provided for a situation where the value of the asset acquired could not be ascertained. According to the court, if the market value of an asset on the date of its acquisition could be ascertained, the cost of acquisition had to be taken to be equal to that, and if the value could not be so ascertained, the cost had to be equal to the market value on a specified date (for example, 1-4-1964 or 1-4-1981) at the option of the assessee. The Court observed that it was not the case of the assessee that the land had no market value on the date of its acquisition.

The Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court therefore held that once an asset had a market value, on the date of its acquisition, capital gains tax would be attracted by taking the cost of acquisition to be fair market value as on the specified date or at the option of the assessee, the market value on the date of acquisition where no cost was incurred. The Court accordingly held that the gains made on sale of the property of the ex-ruler was subject to capital gains tax.

Observations:

Computation of capital gains is possible where all of the following information is available :

  •     Date of acquisition,

  •     Cost of acquisition,

  •     Mode and manner of acquisition,

  •     Date of transfer,

  •     Consideration for transfer, and

  •     Mode and manner of transfer.

These requirements are sought to be taken care of by provisions of section 45(2) to (6), section 46 to 49, 50 and section 55(1) to (3) and section 2(42A). Further, the decision of the Supreme Court provides for the course of action, to be adopted, where the cost of acquisition and the date of acquisition are not known or cannot be determined. One dimension however, i.e., the mode and the manner of acquisition remains unexplored where no information is available about the mode of acquisition of the previous owner who had acquired the asset by any of the modes not specified by section 49(1). On a harmonious reading of the provisions of Chapter IVE, it appears that the capital gains cannot be brought to tax where the information in relation to any of the above referred dimensions is not available.

The Supreme Court in the case of B. C. Srinivasa Setty, 128 ITR 294 was concerned with the taxability of the receipts on transfer of goodwill. The Court in the context of the said case observed and held as under :

  •     It was impossible to predicate the moment of the birth of goodwill and there can be no account in value of the factors producing goodwill. No business possessed goodwill from the start which generated on carrying on of business and augmented with the passage of time.

  •     The charging section 45 and the computation provisions of section 48 together constituted an integrated code.

  •     All transactions encompassed by section 45 must fall under the governance of its computation provisions. A transaction that cannot satisfy the test of computation must be regarded as never intended to be covered by section 45.

  •     Section 48 contemplated an asset in the acquisition of which it was possible to envisage a cost, an asset which possessed the inherent quality of being available on the expenditure of money to a person seeking to acquire it.

  •     The date of acquisition of an asset was a material factor in applying the computation provisions and for goodwill, it was not pos-sible to ascertain such date.

  •     Taxing the goodwill amounted to taxing the capital value of the asset and not the profits or gains.

The Supreme Court in the above-referred case observed that what was contemplated for taxation was the gains of an asset in the acquisition of which it was possible to envisage a cost; the asset in question should be one which possessed the inherent quality of being available on the expenditure of money to a person seeking to acquire it. Importantly, it observed that it was immaterial that although the asset belonged to such a class it might have been acquired without the payment of money, in which case section 49 would determine the cost of acquisition for the
purposes of section 48. This finding is heavily relied by the taxpayers to canvass that the Court implied that an asset for which no payment is made and which is not covered by section 49 is outside the scope of section 48.

The Court on a reference to section 50 and section 55(2) as also section 49 gathered that section 48 dealt with an asset that was capable of being acquired at cost; these provisions indicated that section 48 excluded such assets for which no cost element could be identified or envisaged and the goodwill was one such asset.

Significantly the Court observed that it was impossible to determine the cost of acquisition of goodwill even in the hands of the previous owner who had transferred the same in one of the modes specified in section 49(1). It also held that section 55(3) could not be invoked in such a case, because the date of acquisition of the previous owner re-mained unknown. In cases where the cost of an asset cannot be conceived at all, it appears that the fair market value as prescribed by section 55(3) cannot be adopted even where the date of acquisition of the previous owner is known. Whether the cost of acquisition is ascertainable or not should be examined from the standpoint of the assessee or the previous owner, as the case may be and in doing so, due importance should be given to the mode of acquisition by the assessee. An asset may be the one which is capable of being acquired at cost and may have a fair market value, but in the context of the assessee, it may not be possible to conceive any cost for him on account of his mode of acquisition.

The observation, findings and the ratio of the decision in the said Srinivasa Setty’s case when applied to the issue under consideration, the following things emerge:

  •     It is essential to determine the cost of acqui-sition in the hands of previous owner where the asset was acquired in any of the modes specified in section 49(1). If such cost to the previous owner cannot be determined, there will be no liability to Capital Gains tax. It is impossible to determine the cost of acquisition of goodwill having regard to the nature of asset.

  •     S/s. 55(3) cannot be invoked in cases where the date of acquisition by the previous owner remains unknown.

The asset i.e., the immovable property, in the facts of the cases under consideration, is an asset that was originally acquired by the forefathers of the transferor on conquest and/or ascension. The assessee transferor acquired the asset by inheritance. In computing the capital gains of the transferor, it was essential to adopt the cost of the previous owner and also determine the date of acquisition of the previous owner. It is an admitted fact that the immediate previous owner of the asset did not incur any cost of acquisition. In such cases, by virtue of the Explanation to section 49(1), one was required to travel back in time to reach such an owner who had last acquired it by a mode of acquisition other than that, that is referred in clause (i) to (iv) of section 49(1). Following the mandate provided by the said Explanation, it was essential to find out the cost of acquisition of the persons from whom the asset was acquired by the forefathers of the assessee, on conquest. Admittedly this was not possible for scores of reasons and therefore the cost to the assessee could not have been ascertained by resorting to the provisions of section 49(1) for computing the capital gains. Accordingly, while it was possible to ascertain the date of acquisition and the period of holding of the asset, the cost of acquisition of such asset remains to be determined as it is unknown and therefore the capital gains could not be computed and be brought to tax in the facts of the case. Further, no cost could have been envisaged in the cases ‘of conquest and/ or ascension. Similarly, where the property was acquired by conquest in a war, it cannot be said that the cost incurred on the war is the cost of acquisition of the property. Therefore, in all such cases of property of ex-rulers, one cannot envisage a cost of acquisition at all, and it is not merely a case of difficulty of determination or ascertainment of cost of acquisition.

One has to at the same time examine whether the conclusion reached in the above paragraph meets the test provided by section 55(3) of the Act. The Full Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court has heavily relied on the provisions of section 55(3) for the purposes of overruling the decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court. The said section 55(3) reads as : “where the cost for which the previous owner acquired the property cannot be ascertained, the cost of acquisition to the previous owner means the fair market value on the date on which the capital asset became the property of the previous owner”. Ordinarily, an assessee is required to ascertain his cost only and not of the previous owner unless where section 49(1) apply. From a reading of section 55(3), it is clear that the provision applies only in cases where an assessee is required to ascertain the cost of the previous owner which requirement arises only in cases where the asset is acquired by any of the modes specified in section 49(1) and not otherwise. Section 55(3) appears to take care of situations where the cost of previous owner can-not be ascertained.

On insertion of the said Explanation to section 49(1) w.e.f. 1-4-1965 by the Finance Act, 1965, an assessee is required to adopt that cost of acquisition which was the cost of the previous owner in time who had last acquired the asset under a mode other than the one specified in section 49(1). It appears that the said Explanation is specifically inserted to take care of the situations where it is difficult to ascertain the cost of the previous owner. It requires an assessee to travel back in time and adopt the cost of that owner, previous in time, who last acquired it by any of the mode not specified in section 49(1). It appears that the provisions of section 55(3) are rendered redundant on introduction of the said Explanation. The attention of the Full Bench of the Court was perhaps not invited to the presence of the said Explanation. Had that been done, the Court might not have relied solely on the provisions of section 55(3) for reaching the conclusion derived by it.

The said Explanation has the effect of defining the term ‘previous owner of the property’ to mean the last previous owner of the capital asset who acquired it by a mode of acquisition other than that referred to in section 49(1). The notes to clauses and the memorandum explaining the provi-sion of the Finance Bill, 1965 reported in 55 ITR 131 explain the objective behind the introduction of the said Explanation to section 49(1). Please also see Circular No. 31, dated 21-9-1962 and Circular No. 3-P, dated 11-10-1965.

The Supreme Court on page 301 specifically held that having regard to the nature of the asset, it was impossible to determine the cost of acquisition even of the previous owner for the purposes of section 49(1). It also held that section 55(3) could not be invoked because the date of acquisition by the previous owner remained unknown. It is relevant to note that the Court in that case was concerned with A.Y. 1966-67 and the said Explanation was inserted w.e.f. 1-4-1965. Even assuming that the provision of section 55(3) continues to be relevant, it may be difficult to substitute the fair market value prevailing on the date of conquest or ascension on account of the fact that the asset is acquired on conquest and due to the manner of acquisition of the asset no cost can be envisaged for acquisition of such an asset.

It is relevant to note that presently section 55(2) provides for adopting the cost of acquisition of certain specified assets, including the goodwill at Nil. It provides for cases of the goodwill, tenancy rights, loom hours, stage carriage permits, trade mark or a brand name associated with the business, no-compete rights, right to manufacture, etc. On a closer reading, it is seen that the assets specified for are the ones which are not acquired on a given day for a cost and whose value has been generated over a period of time on regular efforts made over a period. The cost of such an asset including the cost of the regular efforts cannot be identified and quantified. The said section does not provide for such a fiction in cases of the assets acquired on conquest and/or ascension. In the circumstances, it is fair for the assessee to contend that the capital gains in his case cannot be computed as the cost of an asset so acquired could not be taken to be Nil. Wherever the government has intended no cost assets to be subjected to capital gains tax, such assets have been specifically included in the provisions of section 55(2)(a). The very fact that such property of ex-rulers has not been included in this section over the years in spite of so many courts taking the view that the sale of such property is not subject to capital gains tax, clearly indicates that the intention is not to tax such sale proceeds. It is intriguing to note that the Revenue in the past has not relied on section 55(3) while defending the cases of tenancy rights and goodwill. The better view therefore is that such property of an ex-ruler acquired by way of conquest or grant by his ancestors does not have any cost of acquisition, and the capital gains on sale of such property is not subject to tax.

The Direct Tax Code, proposed to be introduced from Financial Year 2012-13, provides that the cost of acquisition will be taken as Nil in all cases where the asset is acquired for no cost in any of the modes for which the cost of the previous owner is not permitted to be adopted.

Neither section 49 nor section 55(3) shall apply in cases where no cost is paid for an asset by the assessee, and the asset is acquired by him by any of the modes not specified by section 49, inas- much as there is no previous owner. Even if there is one, his cost would be ascertainable and therefore section 55(3) does not apply in his case and that section 49(1) cannot apply as the asset is not acquired by any of the modes specified therein.

FAMILY BUSINESSES

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Kongo Gumi Co. a Japanese Family company established in 578 AD was the oldest family business until it was taken over in 2007. It was managed by the family for 40 generations. Kongo Gumi’s ability to survive for over 1,400 years as a family business is a subject of study to all those interested in family businesses.

World over family businesses play an important role’ from mom-and-pop shop to large listed entities that are controlled by families. At times, the business is managed by the family itself while in some cases the family only controls the policy while the actual day-to-day running is through professional managers.

A family business has certain distinct advantages. A family can take a long-term view while deciding the policy and taking business decisions. If properly managed and controlled, it has a great potential to grow and prosper. Yet few family businesses survive more than two generations. This is due to the fact that family businesses face some unique challenges and problems. Inability to raise sufficient capital without diluting the shareholding (that being sacrosanct to many families), unwillingness to professionalise even the operating management, egos of the family members, complacency in the subsequent generations, unwillingness of the older generation to pass on the baton at the right time and other succession issues cause demise of many successful family businesses. It is also a fact that due to lack of corporate governance, family businesses often lack credibility.

Traditionally, businesses in India have been managed by families. Hindu Undivided Family was for many generations an accepted entity for carrying on business. There was a well-established (though not the best) system to decide the succession issue – who would be the Karta. Even today, a very large portion of the Indian business is controlled by business families. This includes large listed companies such as Reliance, Tata Group, Godrej, Mahindra and Mahindra to name a few. It also includes a very large number of small and medium-sized companies. Products of even some of the small and medium-sized companies have been household names e.g. Bedekar pickles, Tortoise Brand Mosquito oils, Nirlep Non-Stick Cookware, Sumeet Kitchen Appliances, Vicco Turmeric Cream and Toothpowder.

The Indian economy has opened up substantially and businesses are facing global competition, reservations and protection for small-scale industries are fast disappearing. Even larger businesses which indirectly got protection due to licence and permit regime are facing the heat of the competition. With nuclear families, there are lesser family members to manage the business. At the same time, due to shift in culture, more family members want to be in the forefront irrespective of their capacity to run the business. In the male dominated society of India, daughters are increasingly demanding their fair share in the ownership and management of the family businesses. This also leads to dissatisfaction and disputes within the family causing destruction of flourishing business.

It is necessary to take a hard look at family businesses and understand their problems. Enlightened business families should be encouraged to ask themselves some relevant questions. This will only help the family businesses to formulate their mission and values, develop a business strategy, define their ownership structure, business structure and governance structure. These issues are common to all family businesses, whether large or small.

Most practising chartered accountants as well as those in industry render service to family businesses. Considering the importance of Family Businesses, we bring this Special Issue with four articles on family businesses – `In Defence of Family Companies’ by Mr. Balan Wasudeo, the founder of NeoCFO, `Family Managed Companies in a Globalising Economy’ by Dr. V. L. Mote, a distinguished retired professor from IIM Ahmedabad, `Succession Issues in Family-Run Companies’ by our own Dr. P. P. Shah, Chartered Accountant and `A Journey from a Family-owned to a Professionally Managed Listed Company’ by Mr. Arjun S. Handa, an entrepreneur. We hope you find these articles interesting.

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THE SECRET OF SUCCESS

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Many times we wonder why success eludes us. The success we seek may be monetary or name and fame or professional or in personal life or may be the highest: viz. realisation of God. However, few realise that the seed of success is really the deepest desire of our heart. Whatever is this deepest desire in that we shall be successful. If the deepest desire of our heart is material success or money, we will get money. If it is the ‘name and fame’, we will achieve ‘name and fame’. If it is God we desire, sooner or later we will reach God. Once we are possessed by a deep and intense desire, the desire will manifest in our thoughts and actions and then success is only a matter of time. Once this happens, the universe will provide conducive surroundings for our success. On the spiritual path, this intense desire makes a Guru appear before the aspirant to lead him to the realisation of God. The whole universe has come into existence by manifestation of God’s will, and we being a small spark of God will have the same potential to manifest the object of our will.

Every person has some deep desire whether he knows it or not. The key is to know what that ‘deep desire’ is and then manifest that desire in our personality and actions. However, intense desire is not enough to achieve and attain, it has to be backed by action — dedicated action. Desire motivates us to set a goal and ceaselessly work to achieve it. Know for sure that if our deepest desire is one and we pursue some other goal, we may have limited success but the success will not be phenomenal. So to know the thing one really wants in life is very important and whether we know it or not today, life will go on taking shape in that direction and one day, we will know it. To know our deepest desire and consciously pursue the same with patience and perseverance shall advance us rapidly in achieving our goal.

How can one know what is his or her deepest desire? It requires some amount of purity and a lot of concentration of mind. If one sits regularly in meditation and daily spends some time with oneself in solitude, one day one shall know what is it that one ‘deeply desires’.

Pursuing our deepest desire determines our destiny. Hence, having the right desire is cardinal. If money for money’s sake is what we want, money will come but with its negative aspects. This is what we are witnessing today. The same is true for name and fame. Desire is the seed, Karma or action is the plant and it will bear fruit according to the quality of the desire and the action. So one needs to be wise in choosing the right desire and also the right means to fulfil the desire. Fortunate are those who know what they desire because they shall get it. But most fortunate are those who have the right desire in their heart and know it. The choice of desire is relevant to achieving a satisfying success.

Ultimately, what everyone desires is happiness and tries to find the same in various objects like money, name and fame, etc. However, true happiness can be only found in God. All other desires should be a stepping stone to realise God. The key is: Don’t get attached to stepping stones. In reality, every one of us is on the spiritual path and knowingly or unknowingly desires only God. Let us always remember that life after all is a series of small awakening steps till we realise God — that is — self realisation.

Ultimately every pursuit is for happiness and the objective is to know where our real happiness lies and ceaselessly strive for the same. I would conclude by quoting Swami Vivekananda: “Take up one idea, make that one idea your life — think of it, dream of it, live on that idea, let the brain, muscles, nerves, every part of your body be full of that idea and just leave every other idea alone. This is the way to success.”

“He is the wisest who seeks God. He is the most successful who has found God.”

— Paramhansa Yogananda

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A Journey from a Family-owned to a Professionally Managed Listed Company

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From a small-sized family-owned company to becoming a large professionally managed public listed company in the pharmaceutical industry, the journey was not an easy one for us. The Company leadership had to confront many challenges from time to time for the transition from an entrepreneur-driven company to a professionally managed company. The leadership had to undergo significant changes in terms of roles, orientation, business strategy, organisational culture, governance, systems, decisionmaking, structures and overall way of working.

The Company incorporated in 1999. It started as a trading company with the seed capital raised from within the family. At that time, it was entirely family-owned and run. Within a few months, stepping on the dream of being a global company since beginning, the first international office was inaugurated. Also parallely, the first manufacturing facility with three production lines was set up in India. In a short span of two years the sterile manufacturing facility received an important certification and the Company also touched an important revenue landmark. This brought immense confidence to us and gave us a direction towards the upward journey. Integrity, implementation, excellence, innovation and patient satisfaction became our values.

In 2003, the Company received approvals from regulatory authorities from various other developing countries. The global growth strategy also permitted the Company to apply in various developed markets. Still, the organisation’s size was small and structure was not very much in order, hence most of the functions were directly managed by the family members. Managing an international set-up for a family-run company was obviously placing a great deal of pressure on the top management. The time had come for us to transit to the next orbit. Today we have market a presence in 76 countries and this has been achieved by decentralising the organisation and creating various presidents, business heads, division heads, and managers.

When I stepped into the MD’s role, I first focussed on new product development and streamlining of manufacturing and operations of the Company. We brought advanced technology equipments and automated machines to add up to manufacturing capacity and to enhance productivity. We established management systems and processes and review mechanisms across organisation which were to become base for advanced transition later.

In 2006, one of the largest international private equity funds invested in our Company. The introduction of this private equity fund in the Company was a crucial point in the transition of our Company towards professional management. We inducted independent directors to improve our corporate governance and to attain the highest standards of corporate governance. Improving the corporate governance helped us in maximising the long-term value for all stakeholders of the Company, including shareholders, employees, customers, society, etc. Our corporate governance philosophy and practice consists of the following facets:

To make timely disclosures and adopt transparent policies
To show greater responsibility and fairness in dealings with all
To demonstrate the highest level of accountability towards employees
To conduct our business in an ethical manner.

We introduced more robust systems like SAP and centralised inventory system. On one hand, where the business was flourishing in terms of back-end, on the other, the front-end needed further focus to match with the market demands and be at the edge with the competition. Hence, as MD I took charge of Businesses (Sales and Marketing) and focussed more on visiting countries, meeting people, getting market insights and devising international marketing strategies. We established a great market presence across various regulated markets as well as emerging markets. USFDA approval for sterile injectable manufacturing facility was one of the greatest milestones which opened a new scope for expansion of the business. The Company also focussed on enhancing visibility in the market in terms of participation in conferences and competing in awards and came out with flying colours. We received several awards. We also ramped up effective management of back-end and front-end as per demand of time-witnessed manifold growth in business, presence across countries, thousand-plus registrations across.

Looking at the volume and growth of the company, it became quintessential to streamline and professionalise the organisation structure. We developed the second-level and third-level management cadre and assigned functional accountability to non-family members who needed to independently handle their teams. Delegation of responsibility and giving authority to the second level helped improve the organisation and also develop a better workforce. We maintained inherent cultural values, focussed on people policies and practices which later helped the Company achieve recognition as one of ‘the Best Places to Work for in India’ and #1 Healthcare Company to work for.

The Company started to work on its dream of going public, following a culture of continuously upgrading best practices in corporate governance and management quality. The Company shifted gears and prepared itself in all aspects to take this big move. In 2010, the Company became a listed company. This was the next big thing for us and has put us in a completely different bracket. Through the IPO, the Company raised proceeds which it has already started investing in augmentation of manufacturing capabilities. Listing brings with it greater responsibility and greater external scrutiny but also puts your company on a higher pedestal.

Throughout, the journey, the Company made sure that its growth does not get hampered in bringing about a professional management approach. We always believed in ourselves and will continue to do so, thereby removing every hurdle that comes on the way. The underlying mantra behind the success story is ‘dream big and work hard’. As we look back on these 12 years, we have transitioned from a family-run and owned company to a professionally-run company to a PE-funded company and finally to a family-owned listed company. The road has been long and arduous but very satisfying and fulfilling. We have miles to go before we sleep but we believe in one motto which has been our mantra through the years:

“The world changes view, if you change yourself”.

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