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Staying In Parents’ House – A Matter of Right?

Introduction

In the usual American/Western way
of life, a son stays with his parents till the age of 16 year and thereafter,
he goes to college in another State after which he lives in his own house.
Living with one’s parents in their home is very rare and unusual. However, in
India the matter is entirely opposite. An Indian son continues to live with his
parents in their home even after becoming a major and in several cases even
after starting a family of his own. Strange as it appears to several
Westerners, this is the usual way of life in India.  However, what happens when the parents want
to evict their adult son from their home? Can they do so or does the son have a
vested right to reside in their house?

The Delhi High Court had an
occasion to consider such an interesting issue in the case of Sachin vs.
Jhabbu Lal, RSA 136/2016.

Facts of the Case

A senior citizen couple were
residing on the ground floor of their two-storied home in Delhi. They had
allowed their married elder son and his wife to live on the 2nd floor
and their married younger son and his wife on the 1st floor.  They did so on account of their natural love
and affection for their sons.

The parents claimed that the
entire house was self-acquired by them out of their own funds. The property
documents, i.e., the General Power of Attorney, the Agreement to Sell, the
Receipt and their Will all were in favour of the father. The sons did not have
any documentary evidence to prove that they were the rightful owners or that
the sons contributed to the purchase of the home.

The parents and their sons could
not get along due to constant quarrels. Matters came to such a headway that the
parents filed police complaints against their sons’ families. They also issued
a public notice disowning their sons and evicting them from their self acquired
property. The parents approached Court for a decree directing them to vacate
the two floors in their possession and also to restrain them from creating any
third party interest in the property.

The sons denied the parents’ claim
that the property was self acquired and also denied their claims of being the
exclusive owners. Their contention was that they have also contributed to the
purchase of the property and construction costs and hence, they should be
regarded as co-owners. Accordingly, the suit for eviction failed.

The Delhi High Court’s Judgment

The Court observed that the sons
were not able to substantiate any evidence to prove that the parents were not
exclusive owners of their property. Further, they have not denied that the
property stands in their father’s name and have not been able to claim any
ownership rights separate from their parents. They could not prove that they
have contributed to the purchase of the property.

The Court held that where the
house is a self acquired house of the parents, a son whether married or
unmarried, has no legal right to live in that house and he can live in that
house only at the mercy of his parents upto such time as his parents allow.
Merely because the parents have allowed him to live in the house so long as his
relations with the parents were cordial, does not mean that the parents have to
bear his burden throughout their life. Since there was no evidence to prove the
sons’ right in the property and on the contrary, there was evidence to prove
that the property was the sole property of the parents, it was clear that the
sons could be evicted by their parents.

This is an important and correct
verdict given by the Delhi High Court. There have been many instances of
children forcing their parents to allow them to reside in homes belonging to
their parents. This decision would come as a shot in the arm for such parents.
However, it must be noted that in case the property is ancestral or cost of
which is contributed by the sons then this decision would have no application.
Of course, what is ancestral is a question of fact and would depend upon the
circumstances of each case. Generally, ancestral property refers to property
belonging to at least 3 generations, i.e., one’s parents and grandparents.
However, it may be noted that in case the parents gift the house to the son
during their lifetime then he becomes the rightful owner and claim right of
ownership over the same.  

Dwelling House

Another ancillary factor to be
borne in mind is the amendment by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 to
the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 in respect to dwelling houses. The erstwhile
section 23 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 
provided that when a Hindu dies without a will, i.e., intestate, and he
has left behind Class I male and female heirs and his property includes a
dwelling house, then the female heirs could not claim a partition of such
dwelling house till such time as the male heirs chose to divide their
respective shares then. However, she was entitled to a right of residence
therein. The erstwhile section carved out an exception that if such female heir
was a daughter, then she was entitled to a right to residence in the
dwelling-house only if she was unmarried or had been deserted / separated from
her husband, or was a widow.  Hence, the
females were dependent on the males  to
claim their right of partition. This provision was intended to ensure that sons
living in their parents’ home were not rendered homeless by a claim for
partition by their sisters. The Supreme Court in Narasimha Murti vs.
Susheelbai, AIR 1996 SC 1826 has defined the expression `dwelling
house’by stating that it is referable to the dwelling house in which the
intestate Hindu was living at the time of his/her death; he/she intended that
his/her children would continue to normally occupy and enjoy it; The intestate
Hindu regarded it as his permanent abode. It further held that section 23 (as
it stood before its deletion in 2005), limited 
the right of the Class-I female heirs of a Hindu who died intestate
while both male and female heirs were entitled to a share in the property left
by the Hindu owner including the dwelling house. It was an exception to the
general partition. So long as the male heir(s) chose not to partition the
dwelling house, the female class-I heir had been denied the right to claim its
partition subject to a further exception, namely, the right to residence
therein by the female class-I heir under specified circumstances. In other
words, the dwelling house remained indivisible. 
But the moment the male heir chose to let out the dwelling house to a
stranger/third party, as a tenant or a licensee, the dwelling house became
partible. Here, the conduct of the male heir was the cause and the entitlement
of the female Class-I heir was the effect and the latter’s claim for partition
got ripened into right as they were to sue for partition of the dwelling house,
whether or not the proviso came into play.

This section has been deleted
altogether with effect from 9th September 2005. Now, a female heir
can ask for a partition of the house property where the coparceners are
residing. Thus, this is another scenario where the sons could be rendered
homeless.

Conclusion

While it was apparent that a son can claim no
vested right in his parents’ self acquired property, this clear cut verdict
helps to clarify matters. Irrespective of his marital status, an adult son
cannot claim that he has a legal right to stay in his parents’ home.

35. Salary – Voluntary retirement – Exemption u/s. 10(10C) – Where assessee who had opted for voluntary retirement under Early Retirement Option Scheme on coming to know and on being advised that pursuant to a decision of Supreme Court would be entitled to exemption u/s. 10(10C) filed a revised return claiming deduction u/s. 10(10C), he would be entitled to exemption even though revised return had been filed beyond period stipulated u/s. 139(5) as default in complying with requirement being due to circumstances beyond control of assessee, Board would be entitled to relax requirement contained in Chapter IV or Chapter VI

S. Sevugan Chettiar vs. Princ. CCIT;
[2016] 76 taxmann.com 156 (Mad):

The petitioner is a retired employee of the
ICICI Bank and was aged 68 years. He was constrained to approach this Court in
terms of the proceedings dated 04/08/2016 issued by the third respondent. The
petitioner, upon retirement, filed his return of income for the relevant year
and the assessment was finalized. Subsequently, the petitioner came to know
that the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of S. Palaniappan vs. I.T.O.
[Civil Appeal No. 4411 of 2010 dated 28/09/2015] held that a person, who has
opted for voluntary retirement under the Early Retirement Option Scheme shall
be entitled to exemption u/s. 10(10C). Following the said decision, the CBDT
issued a circular dated 13/04/2016 stating that the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court be brought to the notice of all officials in the respective
jurisdiction so that relief may be granted to such retirees of the ICICI Bank
under Early Retirement Option Scheme, 2003. The petitioner, on coming to know
of the same, filed a revised return by referring to the said decision and
stating that only after the said decision came to his notice, he had been
advised to file the revised return. However, this has been rejected vide
the impugned proceedings dated 04/08/2016 by the third respondent by referring
to section 139(5) of the Act. In other words, the revised return was refused to
be accepted as it is beyond the time stipulated u/s. 139(5). Assailing the
correctness of the order of the third respondent, the petitioner writ petition
before the Madras High Court.
 

The Madras High Court allowed the writ
petition and held as under:

“i)   After hearing the learned
counsel for the parties and perusing the materials placed on record, this Court
is of the view that the technicality should not stand in the way while giving
effect to the order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The Board also issued
a circular on 13/04/2016 with a view to grant relief to the retirees of the
ICICI Bank under the Early Retirement Option Scheme. Several persons, who had
filed writ petitions before the Madurai Bench of this Court, have been granted
the relief. In fact, in those orders, the Court took into consideration the
decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and granted the relief.

ii)   The circular issued by
CBDT is in exercise of the powers conferred u/s. 119 of the Act. The said
provision deals with instructions to Subordinate Authorities. Sub-section (1)
of section 119 of the Act states that the Board may, from time to time, issue
such orders, instructions and directions to other Income Tax Authorities, as it
may deem fit, for the proper administration of the provisions of the Act and
such Authorities and all other persons employed in the execution of this Act
shall observe and follow such orders, instructions and directions of the Board.
The Proviso carves out certain exceptions, under which circumstances, the Board
will not issue instructions.

iii)   Admittedly, the case,
which was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court related to an individual
employee namely S. Palaniappan, who was also a similarly placed person as that
of the petitioner. Thus, the Board, in its wisdom, while implementing the judgement
in the case of S. Palaniappan, took a decision that such a benefit
should be extended to the similarly placed persons treating them as class of
cases. Therefore, the Board observed that the order should be communicated to
all the Commissioners, so that relief can be granted to such retirees of the
ICICI Bank. Thus, the petitioner cannot be non-suited solely on the ground that
he had filed a revised return well beyond the period stipulated u/s. 139(5) of
the Act.

iv)  It is relevant to point
out that Clause (c) to sub- section (2) of section 119 of the Act states that
the Board may, if it considers it desirable or expedient so to do for avoiding
genuine hardship in any case or class of cases, by general or special order,
relax any requirement contained in any of the provisions contained in Chapter
IV or Chapter VI-A of the Act, which deal with computation of total income and
deductions to be made in computing the total income and such power is
exercisable where the petitioner failed to comply with any requirement
specified in such provision for claiming deduction thereunder, subject to the
conditions that (i) the default is due to circumstances beyond the control of
the assessee and (ii) the assessee has complied with the requirement before the
assessment in relation to previous year, in which, such deduction is claimed.

v)   Thus, if the default in
complying with the requirement was due to circumstances beyond the control of
the assessee, the Board is entitled to exercise its power and relax the
requirement contained in Chapter IV or Chapter VI-A. If such a power is
conferred upon the Board, this Court, while exercising jurisdiction under
Article 226 of The Constitution of India, would also be entitled to consider as
to whether the petitioner’s case would fall within one of the conditions
stipulated u/s. 119(2)(c).

vi)  Considering the hard
facts, the petitioner, being a senior citizen, cannot be denied of the benefit
of exemption u/s. 10(10C) of the Act and the financial benefit that had accrued
to the petitioner, which would be more than a lakh of rupees. Therefore, this
Court is of the view that the third respondent should grant the benefit of
exemption to the petitioner.

vii)  Accordingly, the writ
petition is partly allowed, the impugned order is set aside and the third
respondent is directed to grant the benefit of exemption u/s. 10(10C) of the
Act and refund the appropriate amount to the petitioner, within a period of
three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Considering the
facts and circumstances of the case, the prayer for interest is rejected.”

34. Housing project – Deduction – Sections 40(a)(ia) and 80IB – A. Y. 2006-07 – Disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) cannot be treated separately but is to be added to gross total income eligible for deduction u/s. 80IB(10)

CIT vs. Sunil Vishwambharnath Tiwari; 388
ITR 630 (Bom):

The Assessee was eligible for deduction u/s.
80IB(10) and the same was allowed. In the A. Y. 2006-07, the Assessing Officer
made certain disallowances u/s. 40(a)(ia) of the Act, on account of non
deduction of tax at source and also did not allow deduction u/s. 80IB(10) in
respect of the increased income of the project. The Commissioner (Appeals) and
the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s full claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High
Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)   In view of the scheme of
section 40 deduction of tax at source was not effected by the assessee and
payment to contractors could not be deducted as the expenditure became
inadmissible. The expenditures were added back to the income being eligible
income. This income eligible for deduction in terms of section 80IB(10) only
increased by the figure of disallowed expenditure.

ii)   The Commissioner(Appeals)
had rightly pointed out that the deduction allowable u/s. 80IB(10) of the Act,
was with reference to assessee’s gross total income. Hence disallowance u/s.
40(a)(ia) cannot be treated separately and it got added back to the gross total
income of the asessee.

iii)   Section 40 pointed out
that due to error of the assessee, such expenditure could not be deducted while
computing the income chargeable under the head ”Profit and gains of business or
profession”. That was the only limited effect of the lapse on the part of the
assessee. The Appellate Tribunal had considered these facts and upheld them. No
substantial question of law arose for consideration.”

13. TS-921-ITAT-2016(Ahd)-TP Shell Global Solutions International BV vs. DDIT A.Y.s:2007-08 to 2010-11, Date of Order:17th November 2016

Article 9 of India – Netherlands DTAA – No
bar in Article 9 to address juridical double taxation – Not confined to ALP
adjustment only in hands of domestic entities – Non-availability of relief
under article 9(2) does not negate application of article 9(1)

Facts

The Taxpayer is a company incorporated in
and tax resident of the Netherlands. During the year under consideration,
Taxpayer rendered certain technical services to its associated enterprises
(AEs) in India.The consideration received by the Taxpayer for rendering the
aforesaid services was treated as Fees for technical services (FTS) under
Article 12 of India Netherlands Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) and
thereby, taxed @ 10% on gross basis. During the course of assessment
proceedings, arm’s length price (ALP) in respect of FTS was determined at a
higher level and adjustments under the transfer pricing regulations
wereproposed by the Assessing Officer (AO).

Without disputing mechanics and
quantification of the ALP adjustments, Taxpayer argued that the adjustment was
not justified as additional fees would have been taxed in India in the hands of
Taxpayer @ 10%, whereas the AE in India would have obtained tax shied @ 33.99%
and net effect of adjustment was base erosion of Indian tax. Taxpayer,
therefore,contended that such adjustments are contrary to the scheme of section
92(3) of the Act read with CBDT Circular No. 14 of 2001.

The Taxpayer filed objection before Dispute
resolution panel (DRP). The DRP rejected the objections.

Aggrieved, Taxpayer appealed before the
Tribunal, where theTaxpayer put forth additional claim of treaty protection and
contended that considering the language of Article 9 of India-Netherlands DTAA,
ALP adjustment can only be made in case of juridical double taxation and only
in the hands of domestic enterprise. The Taxpayer further contended that ALP
adjustment was not permissible in its hands under Article 9 of
India-Netherlands DTAA.

Held

(i)   In Instrumentarium
Corporation Ltd. Finland vs. ADIT [(2016) 71 taxmann.com 193 (SB)]
, the
Special Bench (SB) narrowed the scope of application of the “base erosion
theory” in transfer pricing matters. The Taxpayer was an ‘intervener’ in the
said decision and the argument of the Taxpayer on the base erosion was rejected
by SB.

(ii)  As per the wording of
Article 9, there is no bar to address juridical double taxation. As long as the
conditions precedent in Article 9 are attracted, the application of arm’s
length standards come into play.

(iii)  While Article 9(1) is an
enabling provision, TP mechanism under the domestic law is the machinery
provision. Once it is not in dispute that the arm’s length standards are to be
applied as per Article 9, it is only axiomatic that the manner in which arm’s
length standards provided under the domestic law need to be applied.

(iv) The provisions of Article
9(1) are clear and unambiguous and permit ALP adjustment in all situations in
which the arm’s length standards require higher profits in the hands of any
“one of the enterprises, but by reason of those conditions, have not so
accrued” to be “included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed
accordingly”. The AO has no discretion to read this provision as confined to
enabling ALP adjustment in respect of only domestic entities.

(v)  The non-availability of
corresponding adjustment relief under Article 9(2) does not deter application
of Article 9(1). Therefore, the ALP adjustment cannot be negated onthe ground
that no relief against such taxation is granted by the residence state. An
element of double taxation is inherent in respect of taxation of FTS, which is
taxed in both countries under the treaty. However, in such cases also, the
taxation in source country is not dependent on the relief granted by residence
country. Thus, mere increase in quantum of such taxable income in the source
jurisdiction, due to application of arm’s length principle, need not always be
visited with corresponding adjustment under article 9(2) in the residence
jurisdiction.

(vi) It may not be correct to
suggest that there is conflict between Article 9 and domestic transfer pricing
legislation. There is a school of thought that domestic arm’s length principle
goes much beyond tax treaty’s normal rule making scope since this arm’s length
principle governs taxation of an enterprise in general and the tax treaties do
not restrict domestic law in this respect. The profit adjustment mechanism
envisaged in tax treaties do not deal with supra national income determination.
Therefore, the provisions of tax treaties cannot be seen as restricting, or
overriding, domestic law mechanism on transfer pricing aspects.

(vii) The transfer pricing
legislation is an anti-avoidance provision. It cannot be rendered ineffective
on the basis of the limitations in the provisions of Article 9. Section 90(2)
of the Act gives somewhat unqualified superiority to the treaty provisions over
the provisions of the Income Tax Act which contain transfer pricing legislation
as well. It will infringe the neutrality of an anti-abuse law– notwithstanding
whether it is a specific anti-abuse regulation (SAAR) or a general anti-abuse
regulation (GAAR)– if it is considered to apply only to a non-treaty situation
but not to a treaty situation.

New India-Cyprus DTAA, 2016 – An Overview

A)  Background

(i)  India and Cyprus have recently signed a new Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (New DTAA). The New DTAA replaces the earlier India-Cyprus DTAA signed in 1994 (Old DTAA), which has been a subject matter of renegotiation between the Government of India (GoI) and the Government of the Republic of Cyprus (GoC) for some time now. The New DTAA was signed on 18th November 2016 and both the Governments had previously issued press releases announcing the same. The text of the New DTAA was recently published in the Gazette of the GoC. However, the GoI is yet to make an official publication of the New DTAA. The New DTAA is the outcome of prolonged and extensive negotiations between both the countries.

(ii)  Significant provisions of the New DTAA include source country taxation rights on capital gains from shares, subject to grandfathering of shares acquired before 1st April 2017, insertion of Service Permanent Establishment (PE), expanded scope of Dependent Agent PE, revised Article on Fees for Technical Services (FTS) etc. The New DTAA limits source country taxation of Other Income. It also reduces taxation of royalty/FTS at the rate of 10% (as compared to the earlier rate of 15%). Furthermore, a modified version of the exchange of information (EOI) provision has been incorporated, which is in line with existing international standards. An additional Article on “assistance in collection of taxes” has also been introduced in the New DTAA.

(iii) The New DTAA will enter into force once the requisite procedures are completed in both the countries. The old DTAA shall stand terminated upon the New DTAA coming into force.

(iv) The GoI has rescinded the classification of Cyprus as a “Notified Jurisdictional Area” (NJA), retrospectively as from 1st November 2013.

B)  Highlights / Salient Features of the New DTAA

1.  Expanded scope of PE (Article 5)

The New DTAA expands the scope of ‘permanent establishment’, introducing the concept of a ‘service’ permanent establishment. The New DTAA has also specifically includes (i) sales outlets, (ii) warehouses (in relation to a person providing storage facilities for others) and (iii) farms, plantations or other places where agricultural, forestry, plantation or related activities are carried on, within the inclusive definition of ‘permanent establishment’. Further, the New DTAA provides for the creation of a construction permanent establishment if activities carry on for more than 6 months, instead of the earlier requirement that the activities be carried on for more than 12 months.

Insertion of a Service PE:
A new Service PE clause has been introduced whereby furnishing of services, including consultancy services, by an enterprise through employees or other personnel engaged by the enterprise for such purpose, but only where activities of that nature continue (for the same or connected project) within the country for a period or periods aggregating more than 90 days within any 12 month period shall constitute a PE. The above service PE rule is in line with the UN Model Convention 2011 (2011 UN MC), except that the time threshold is lower at 90 days as compared to 183 days in the 2011 UN MC.

The criteria for the constitution of an agency PE has been amended. Accordingly, the person other than an agent of independent status shall constitute an agency PE if:

–   He is acting on behalf of an enterprise and has, and habitually exercises, in a contracting state an authority to conclude contracts in the name of the enterprise;

–   Has no such authority, but habitually maintains in the first-mentioned state a stock of goods or merchandise from which he regularly delivers goods or merchandise on behalf of the enterprise;

–   Habitually secures orders in the first mentioned state, wholly or almost wholly for the enterprise itself.

The above provisions are consistent with most of the Indian DTAAs.

There are a number of other changes in the PE definition which include, inter alia:

a) Lowered threshold for triggering construction/installation/supervisory PE to 6 months from the existing limit of 12 months.

b)  Inclusion of sales outlet, warehouse as fixed PE.

c)  Removal of “delivery” function from the scope of exempted activities.

2.   Profit Attribution / Business Profits (Article 7)

The New DTAA has removed the ‘force of attraction’ rule. Accordingly, the business profits of an enterprise may be taxed in the other state but only so much of them as is attributable to that PE.

No deduction shall be allowed in respect of amounts paid by way of royalties, fees or other similar payments in return for the use of patents, know-how or other rights, or by way of commission or other charges for specific services performed or for management, or, except in the case of banking enterprises, if any, paid (other than reimbursement of actual expenses) by the PE to the head office or any of its other offices, by way of interest on money lent to the PE.

Similarly, no account shall be taken, in the determination of the profits of a PE, of amounts charged by way of royalties, fees or other similar payments in return for the use of patents, know-how or other rights, or by way of commission or other charges for specific services performed or for management, or, except in the case of banking enterprises (other than reimbursement of actual expenses) by the PE to the head office or any of its other offices, by way of interest on moneys lent to the head office of the enterprise or any of its other offices.

This provision is comparable to Article 7(3) of the 2011 UN MC and has been adopted lately by India in most of its DTAAs.

3.   Shipping and Air Transport (Article 8)

The criteria of ‘registration’ and ‘headquarters’ have been removed. Accordingly, profits derived by an enterprise of a contracting state from the operation of ships or aircraft in international traffic shall be taxable only in that state

The term profits for the purpose of shipping and air transport has been amended. Accordingly, profits from the operation of ships or aircraft in international traffic shall include profits derived from the rental of ships or aircraft on a full time (time or voyage basis) or bareboat basis.

Exception is provided for the taxability of profits from the use, maintenance, or rental of containers for the transport of goods or merchandise solely between places within the other contracting state.

The New DTAA provides that interest on funds connected directly with the operation of ships or aircraft in international traffic, shall be regarded as profits derived from the operation of such ships or aircraft, and the provisions of Article 11 (interest) shall not apply in relation to such interest.

    by the enterprise are covered under ‘capital gains’. It shall be taxable only in the contracting state in which the alienator is a resident.

4.   Associated Enterprises (AEs) (Article 9)

The New DTAA aligns with the OECD Model Convention (OECD MC) in relation to the provisions related to AEs. Article 9(2) of the old DTAA has been removed, which provided powers to the competent authority to apply domestic laws which allow to use discretion/estimates for computing liability under Article 9(1) in cases where it is not possible, from the available information, to determine profits attributable to the concerned enterprise.

5.   Dividends (Article 10)

The rate of dividend in source state shall not exceed 10%. The rate of 15% has been removed.

6.   Interest (Article 11)

Tax rate of interest in source state shall not exceed 10% if the beneficial owner of the interest is a resident of the other contracting state.

Following entities are additionally exempt from tax:

– Export-Import Bank of India

–  National Housing Bank

– Any other institution as may be agreed upon from time to time between the competent authorities of the contracting states through the exchange of letters.

7.   Royalties and FTS (Article 12)

Under the New DTAA, royalties and FTS will attract tax withholding at the rate of 10%, as against the rate of 15% provided in existing DTAA. However, the scope of source taxation has been modified as follows:

–  The term FIS has been replaced by the term FTS.

–   The tax rate of royalties and FTS in the source state is reduced to 10% from 15 %.

–  The term royalty has been amended to include payment only.

–  The definition of the term ‘royalty’ has been amended as follows:

‘The term ‘royalties’ means payment of any kind received as a consideration for the use of, or the right to use, any copyright of literary, artistic or scientific work including cinematograph films or films or tapes used for television or radio broadcasting, any patent, trade mark, design or model, plan, secret formula or process, or for the use of, or the right to use, industrial, commercial or scientific equipment, or for information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience. The term ‘royalties’ will not include income for the use of, or the right to use aircrafts and ships.’

–   The term ‘FTS’ has been amended as follows:
‘FTS’ means payments of any kind as consideration for managerial or technical or consultancy services, including the provision of services of technical or other personnel.

Further, the ‘make available’ clause has been removed from the term FTS.

Additionally, Article 12(5) provides that where royalties or FTS do not arise in one of the contracting states, and the royalties relate to the use of, or the right to use, the right or property, or the FTS relate to services performed in one of the contracting states, the royalties or FTS shall be deemed to arise in that contracting state.

8.   Source based taxation of capital gains from shares (Article 13)

Capital gains arising from the transfer of shares are taxable solely in the Resident State of the alienator under the old DTAA. The New DTAA provides taxation rights to the State of residence of the company whose shares are alienated (i.e., Source State).

Additionally, taxation of indirect transfer whereby capital gains from sale of shares of a company, the assets of which consist, directly or indirectly, principally of immovable property in a Contracting State (Source State), would be taxable in the Source State.

However, shares acquired up to 31st March 2017 have been grandfathered from both the above rules on source taxation. The exemption will apply irrespective of the date of subsequent transfer of such shares.

Therefore, the source based taxation under the New DTAA shall only be applicable to capital gains arising from the transfer of investments made on or after 1st April, 2017, and capital gains arising from the transfer of investments made prior to 1st April, 2017 should continue to be taxed only in the jurisdiction in which the taxpayer is a resident.

The aforesaid provisions on direct transfer of shares are similar to the recent amendment under the India-Mauritius DTAA. The India-Mauritius DTAA additionally provides for a transitional relief of 50%, subject to fulfilment of Limitation of Benefit (LOB). Such a provision does not feature in the New DTAA with Cyprus.

The clause relating to alienation of ship and aircraft amended to provide that gains from the alienation of ships or aircraft operated in international traffic or movable property pertaining to the operation of such ships or aircraft shall be taxable only in the contracting state of which the alienator is a resident.

A new clause has been inserted to provide that gains from the alienation of shares of the capital stock of a company, the property of which consists directly or indirectly principally of immovable property situated in a contracting state, may be taxed in that state.

9.   Independent Personal Services (Article 14)

The New DTAA has introduced the rolling period concept i.e. for a period or periods amounting to or exceeding in the aggregate 183 days in any 12 month period commencing or ending in the fiscal year concerned.

10. Dependent Personal Services (Article 15)

The New DTAA has introduced the rolling period concept i.e. the remuneration derived in respect of an employment exercised in the other contracting state shall be taxable in source state only if the recipient is present in the other state for a period or periods not exceeding in the aggregate 183 days in any twelve month period commencing or ending in the fiscal year concerned.

In case the remuneration derived in respect of an employment exercised aboard a ship or aircraft operated in international traffic by an enterprise, the New DTAA has removed the place of effective management criteria. Therefore, the remuneration derived in respect of an employment exercised aboard a ship or aircraft operated in international traffic by an enterprise of a contracting state, shall be taxed in that state.

11. Limited source taxation of “Other Income” (Article 22)

Under the old DTAA, any income not expressly covered by other Articles of the DTAA and arising in a Source State could be taxed in that Source State also. The said provision has been removed in the New DTAA.

The New DTAA listed certain specified income for taxability in source state. Accordingly, if a resident of a contracting state derives income from sources within the other contracting state in the form of lotteries, crossword puzzles, races including horse races, card games and other games of any sort or gambling or betting of any nature whatsoever, such income may be taxed in the other contracting state.

12. Methods for elimination of double taxation (Article 23)

Benefits relating to tax sparing and deemed foreign tax credit (FTC) in respect of dividend, interest, royalty and FTS under the old DTAA have been removed.

13. Non Discrimination (Article 24)

The New DTAA has amended the non-discrimination clause. It provides that nationals of a contracting state shall not be subjected in the other contracting state to any taxation or any requirement connected therewith, which is other or more burdensome than the taxation and connected requirements to which nationals of that other state in the same circumstances, in particular with respect to residence, are or may be subjected. This provision shall also apply to persons who are not residents of one or both of the contracting states.

Interest, royalties and other disbursements paid by an enterprise of a contracting state to a resident of the other contracting state shall, for the purpose of determining the taxable profits of such enterprise, be deductible under the same conditions as if they had been paid to a resident of the first-mentioned state. Similarly, any debts of an enterprise of a contracting state to a resident of the other contracting State shall, for the purpose of determining the taxable capital of such enterprise, be deductible under the same conditions as if they had been contracted to a resident of the first-mentioned State.

14. Tie-breaker rule for determining residency of non-individuals through Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP) (Article 25)

In cases of persons other than individuals who are residents of both India and Cyprus, place of effective management (POEM) rule is applied to determine residency. The New DTAA additionally provides that if POEM cannot be determined then the competent authorities of the Contracting States shall settle the question by mutual agreement within 2 years from the date of invocation of MAP under Article 25.

15. Exchange of Information (Article 26)

The scope of the EOI Article in the New DTAA has been enhanced to align with international standards on transparency and the provision in the OECD MC. The EOI Article extends to information relating to taxes of every kind and description imposed by a State or its political subdivisions or local authorities, to the extent that the same is not contrary to the taxation as per the New DTAA. Furthermore, the information can be used for purposes other than tax, with the prior approval of the authority providing such information.

EOI would also be possible in respect of persons who are not residents of the Contracting State, as long as the information requested is in possession of the concerned State. Specifically, information held by banks or financial institutions can be exchanged under the EOI Article.

16. Assistance in Collection of Taxes (Article 27)

The New DTAA includes an Article on “assistance in collection of taxes” largely in line with the OECD MC. Broadly, this Article enables the revenue claims of one State to be collected through the assistance of the other Contracting State, subject to fulfilment of certain conditions and requirements. Assistance would also involve undertaking measures of conservancy by freezing assets located in the requested State, subject to the laws therein.

Clause 4 of the Protocol clarifies that for the purpose of this Article, a State is not obliged to take measures inconsistent with its laws and policies in respect of collection of its own taxes.

C)  India rescinds notification treating Cyprus as “Notified Jurisdictional Area”

The Government of India (GoI) vide Notification No. 114 of 2016 dated 14th December 2016 (Recent Notification) has rescinded its earlier Notification No. 86 of 2013 dated 1st November 2013 which had notified Cyprus as a Notified Jurisdictional Area (NJA) u/s. 94A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (Act).

On 1st November 2013, the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) invoked the provisions of Section 94A of the Act and notified Cyprus as an NJA owing to inadequate exchange of information by Cyprus tax authorities. On 1st July 2016, GoI issued a press release that negotiation on the revision of India-Cyprus tax treaty (Cyprus Treaty) between both the countries has been completed with –

–   Rights to source based taxation of capital gains and grandfathering of investments made prior to 1st April 2017.

–   India considering the removal of Cyprus from the list of NJAs under the Act retrospectively and initiating necessary procedures.

On 18th November, 2016, GoI issued a press release announcing the signing of the New Cyprus Treaty. Subsequent to this notification, Government of Cyprus released the text of the New Cyrus Treaty. GoI vide its recent notification has rescinded the earlier notification resulting in Cyprus not being a NJA under the Act. The recent notification also states that things done or omitted to be done before such rescission shall be an exception. On 16th December 2016, GoI has issued another press release confirming completion of internal procedures to amend the Cyprus Treaty. In this press release, GoI has also stated that Cyprus’s status as an NJA u/s. 94A of the Act has been rescinded with effect from 1st November 2013.

Impact of the Recent Notification

–   Deeming fiction provided in section 94A to deem Cyprus tax residents or a person located in Cyprus as an associated enterprise and any transactions with them as an international transaction will no longer be applicable.

–   Claim for deduction of any expenditure / allowance arising on account of transactions with Cypriot tax resident or a person located in Cyprus would now be allowable under general provisions of the Act without documentation requirements as per Rule 21AB of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 read with Form 10FC prescribed u/s. 94A of the Act.

–   Consequent to the Recent Notification, any taxable income accruing / arising to a Cypriot tax resident or a person located in Cyprus would now be subject to the withholding tax rates prescribed under the Act or the New DTAA (as and when India notifies the same), whichever is beneficial to the tax payer.

To illustrate, payments made to Cyprus tax residents or persons located in Cyprus would be subject to withholding tax as follows:

–   Royalties / Fees for Technical Services, earlier liable to withholding u/s. 94A at the rate of 30%, would now be liable to withholding at 10% under the Act.

–   Interest income, earlier liable to withholding u/s. 94A at the rate of 30%, would now be liable to withholding at 10% under the Cyprus Treaty or at an applicable lower rate under the Act, whichever is beneficial.

This is a long awaited and significant development between India and Cyprus and resets the tax position for various transactions on par with other jurisdictions.

D)  Impact and Analysis of New India-Cyprus DTAA

1.  Shift towards source based taxation.

By and large, India’s network of 94 tax treaties provide for source and residence based taxation of capital gains arising from the transfer of shares of a company. However some exceptions exist, for example, India’s tax treaties with Singapore, Jordan (provided the transferor is subject to tax in the state of residence), Philippines, Portugal, and Zambia provide for taxation of gains arising from the transfer of shares of a company only in the state of residence of the transferor.

Over the last few years, India has undertaken a concerted effort to revise its tax treaties and has successfully revised its treaties with Indonesia, Thailand, Mauritius and most recently Korea, to provide for source based taxation of capital gains arising from the transfer of shares of a company. The revision of the treaty with Mauritius (one of India’s largest sources of foreign investment) showed the determination of the Indian government to move towards a source based taxation of capital gains regime. The Indian Government is reportedly also in the process of amending its treaty with Singapore along similar lines. The New DTAA with Cyprus marks yet another milestone in this process.

For the time being, residence based taxation of gains arising from the transfer of investments in instruments other than shares e.g., debentures continues. Under India’s tax treaties, with the exception of gains arising from the transfer of (i) immoveable property, (ii) movable property forming part of a permanent establishment and, (iii) ships and aircraft, gains arising from the transfer of any other property are usually taxable only in the state of residence of the transferor. India’s tax treaties with China, USA, UK, Canada and Australia are some notable exceptions, with gains from any transfer of other property being taxable in both the state of source and the state of residence. Conversely, India’s tax treaties with Fiji, Greece and Egypt, provide for taxation of gains from the transfer any other property only in the country of source. The recently amended tax treaties with Mauritius, Korea and Thailand continue to provide for residence based taxation of gains arising from the transfer of “other property”.

Further, in the absence of an enabling treaty provision along the lines of that in the tax treaty with South Africa (Article 13(5) of the India-South Africa tax treaty provides that “Gains derived by a resident of a Contracting State from the sale, exchange or other disposition, directly or indirectly, of shares or similar rights in a company, other than those mentioned in paragraph 4, which is a resident of the other Contracting State, may be taxed in that other State.” ) gains arising from the indirect transfer of Indian shares should continue to be taxable only in the state of residence of the transferor (Article 13(6) of the New DTAA provides that “Gains from the alienation of any property other than that referred to in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, shall be taxable only in the Contracting State of which the alienator is a resident). Based on the ruling of the Andhra Pradesh HC in Sanofi Pasteur Holding SA vs. Dept. of Revenue [2013] 30 taxmann.com 222 (AP) gains arising from the transfer of shares of a Cypriot company whose value is derived substantially from shares of an Indian company should fall within the scope of Article 13(6) and therefore be taxable only in Cyprus.). However, other view is also possible in this regard.

2.  Cyprus as a tax efficient jurisdiction for investing into India

While Mauritius negotiated a better interest withholding rate (7.5%) than the New DTAA currently contains (10%), and, unlike the India-Mauritius tax treaty, the New DTAA does not provide for a transition period [Under the recently notified Protocol amending the India-Mauritius Tax Treaty (set to come into effect from April 1, 2017), gains from the sale of investments made after April 1, 2017 but before March 31, 2019 are subject to taxation in the source country at only 50% of the applicable domestic tax rate. Gains from the sale of investments made prior to March 31, 2017 remain taxable only in Mauritius, but gains from investments made after March 31, 2019 will be taxable in Mauritius and India.] of taxation at reduced rates, the continuation of residence based taxation for gains arising on transfer of instruments other than shares, and Cyprus’ membership of the European Union should serve to return some of the country’s lustre as an efficient jurisdiction for investment into India. De-notification of Cyprus as an NJA may even encourage fresh investments through Cyprus prior to April 1, 2017.

3.  Limitation of Benefits Clause

Interestingly, the New DTAA does not contain a Limitation of Benefits clause (“LOB”). This is contrary to the trend that has arisen in recent years, with India amending / revising many of its tax treaties to include an LOB clause. India has incorporated variations of a LOB clause in its tax treaties with the USA (1990), Singapore (1994 / 2005), Namibia (1999), Armenia (2004), UAE (2007), Iceland (2008), Kuwait (2008), Syria (2009), Luxembourg (2010), Myanmar (2010), Tajikistan (2010), Finland (2011), Mexico (2011), Mozambique (2011), Georgia (2012), Lithuania (2012), Norway (2012), Tanzania (2012), Taiwan (2012), Uzbekistan (2012), Ethiopia (2013), Jordan (2013), Malaysia (2013), Nepal (2013), Romania (2013), UK (2013), Albania (2014), Bhutan (2014), Columbia (2014), Fiji (2014), Latvia (2014), Sri Lanka (2014), Uruguay (2014), Macedonia (2015), Malta (2015), Thailand (2015), Poland (2015), Indonesia (2016), Korea (2016) and Mauritius (2016). In the times to come, it will be exciting to see the interplay between the General Anti-Avoidance Rules (“GAAR”) which are slated to come into effect from April 1, 2017 and the re-negotiated tax treaties (especially the LOB clauses) and the impact on structures and investments. Notably, the Shome Committee report had recommended that where anti-avoidance rules are provided for in a treaty, the GAAR provisions should not apply to override the provisions of the treaty. Interestingly, the LOB clause in the amended Mauritius tax treaty requires a company desirous of claiming benefits to either (i) be listed on a stock exchange in Mauritius or (ii) incur expenditure on operations in its state of residence to a tune of Rs. 2.7 million in the 12 months immediately preceding the date on which the gains arise. This is similar to the language of the LOB clause in the Singapore tax treaty. However, the Singapore LOB clause will cease to be in effect on April 1, 2017, unless the Singapore treaty is amended prior to that date.

E)  Concluding Remarks

The New Cyprus DTAA is similar to the recently amended India-Mauritius DTAA in terms of inclusion of Service PE and source taxation of capital gains, as well as grandfathering relief. However, as compared to the amended India-Mauritius DTAA, there is no transitory concessional relief available (subject to LOB) in respect of gains made on shares acquired post 1st April 2017 but transferred before 31st March 2019.

Some other provisions on PE, FTS, EOI are also consistent with the recent trends in Indian DTAAs. Interestingly, the New DTAA does not contain an LOB provision, contrary to the trend in Indian DTAAs being signed/amended lately.

After Mauritius and Cyprus, renegotiation of the India-Singapore DTAA and the India-Netherlands DTAA is expected to be completed.

Taxpayers will need to evaluate the impact of the New DTAA based on the facts of their specific cases. One may also need to watch how the New DTAA will get impacted by the Multilateral Instrument released by the OECD recently.
The above article provides only an overview of the salient features of the New India-Cyprus DTAA. The reader is advised to go through the detailed provisions of the Treaty minutely.

13. Manish Ajmera vs. ITO ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Mumbai Before Shailendra Kumar Yadav (J. M.) and Rajesh Kumar (A. M.) ITA No.5700/Mum/2013 A.Y.:2010-11. Date of Order: 26th August, 2016 Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: Jayesh Dadia / Chandra Vijay

Section 14 – Income from transfer of shares
and securities taxed under the head short term capital gains based on the Board
circular.

FACTS

The assessee had filed return of income
declaring total income of Rs. 0.68 lakh. The AO in his order passed u/s. 143(3)
assessed at Rs. 83.04 lakh and taxed Rs. 82.36 lakh as business income instead
of as short term capital gains as claimed by the assessee. On appeal, the CIT
(A) confirmed the AO’s order.

HELD

The Tribunal referred to a clarificatory
Circular no. 6/2016 dated 29th February, 2016 wherein the Board had
clarified that where the assessee himself, irrespective of the period of
holding the listed shares and securities, opts to treat them as stock-in-trade,
the income arising from transfer of such shares would be treated as his
business income. Relying on the same, the Tribunal directed  the AO to treat the income in question as short term capital gain instead of as
business income as assessed  by the AO.

12. Y.V. Ramana vs. CIT ITAT Visakhapatnam Bench, Visakhapatnam Before V. Durga Rao (J. M.) and G. Manjunatha (A. M.) I.T.A.No.: 177/Vizag/2015 A.Y.: 2010-11. Date of Order: 9th December 2016 Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: C. Kameswara Rao / G. Guruswamy

Section 2(47) – Mere agreement for transfer
of shares does not cause effective transfer of shares unless it is accompanied
with delivery of share certificate and duly signed and stamped share transfer
form.

FACTS

During the year under appeal, the assessee
had sold 1,33,420 equity shares in Vijay Nirman Company Private Limited (VCPL)
for a consideration of Rs. 199.98 lakh. The transfer was in pursuant to an
investments agreement dated 12-08-2009 between transferee of the shares, VCPL
and its shareholders. The said investment agreement had prescribed certain
terms and conditions of share transfer and completion of statutory formalities
by filing necessary forms under the Companies Act, 1956 with concerned
authorities. As per the said agreement, the assessee received sales
consideration on 10-09-2009 from the transferee of the shares. The assessee
completed share transfer formality on 24-11-2009 by filing valid instrument of
transfer in form no. 7B duly stamped and signed by transferor and transferee
and presented to the company along with share certificates which was endorsed
by the company on 24-11-2009. The assessee invested part of sale consideration
of Rs. 50 lakh in NHAI bonds on 4-5-2010 and claimed exemption u/s 54EC. The
assessee also deposited sum of Rs. 150 lakh on 24-07-2010 in a scheduled bank
under Capital Gain Deposit Scheme (‘the Scheme’) before due date of filing
return of income and proof of which was furnished along with return of income,
and claimed exemption u/s. 54F of the Act. The assessee purchased a house
property on 31-10-2011 out of the amount deposited under the Scheme. The
assessment was completed u/s. 143(3) on 16-01-2013, determining total income as
returned by the assessee.

According to the CIT to claim exemption u/s.
54EC and 54F, the assessee ought to have invested sale consideration within six
months/2 years from the date of receipt of money and not the date of transfer
of shares by signing share transfer form. 
If the period of limitation is computed from the date of receipt of
money, then investments in 54EC and 54F was beyond the time limit specified under
the provisions, accordingly, the assessee was not eligible for exemption.
Accordingly, he held that the order of the AO was erroneous in so far as it is
prejudicial to the interest of the revenue.

According to the assessee, the A.O. had
examined the issue of computation of capital gain towards sale of shares and
exemption claimed u/s. 54EC and 54F of the Act, by specific questionnaire dated
13-12-2012 and 28-12-2012. The assessee had furnished complete details of
shares transfer and proof of investment in 54EC and 54F of the Act. The A.O. having
satisfied with details furnished by the assessee, had chosen to accept
computation of capital gain and hence, the assessment order cannot be termed as
erroneous within the meaning of section 263 of the Act.

According to the revenue, as per the investments
agreement dated 12-08-2009, the transfer got crystallised on the date of
payment of consideration towards transfer of shares by the purchaser to the
seller and subsequent execution of share transfer form and filing such form
with company is only a statutory requirement which is nothing to do with
transfer. It also referred to section 19 of sale of Goods Act, 1930 and
submitted that where there is a contract for the sale of specific or
ascertained goods the property in them is transferred to the buyer at such time
as the parties to the contract intended it to be transferred. The revenue also
referred to CBDT. Circular No. 704, dated 28-04-1995 and argued that in the
case the transactions take place directly between the parties and not through
stock exchanges, the date of contract of sale as declared by the parties shall
be treated as the date of transfer provided it is followed up by actual
delivery of shares and the transfer deeds.

HELD

According to the Tribunal, once, the A.O.
had called for details of the issue which is subject matter of revision
proceedings and the assessee furnished details called for, it is the general
presumption that the A.O. has examined the issue with necessary evidences,
applied his mind and took a possible view of the matter before completion of
assessment. The CIT cannot assume jurisdiction to review the assessment order
by holding the A.O. has conducted inadequate enquiry and also not applied his
mind. Thus, it held that that the assessment order passed by the A.O. is not erroneous
within the meaning of section 263 of the Act.

To examine whether the assessment order is
prejudicial to the interest of revenue – the Tribunal noted that the only
dispute is with regard to date of transfer. The assessee contends that transfer
had taken place on 24-11-2009, when valid instrument of share transfer in form
no. 7B is duly stamped and signed by the both the parties and presented to the
company along with original share certificates. According to the CIT, the
effective transfer took place on 10-09-2009 when sale consideration is passed
on to the seller.

According to the Tribunal, share transfer is
governed by section 108 of the Companies Act, 1956. As per section 108
registration of transfer of shares is possible only if a proper transfer deed
in form no. 7B duly stamped and signed by or on behalf of the transferor and by
or on behalf of the transferee and specifying the name, address and occupation,
if any of the transferee, has been delivered to the company along with share
certificates and endorsed by the Company. In the case of shares of listed
companies, effective transfer would take place when title to share is
transferred from one person to another through demat account in recognised
stock exchange. In the case of shares of unlisted companies, transfer would
take place, only when valid share transfer form in form no. 7B is delivered to
the company and endorsed by the company. Therefore, for effective transfer of
shares, a mere agreement for transfer of shares is not sufficient, unless it is
physically transferred by delivery of share certificate along with duly signed
and stamped share transfer form. The agreement to transfer share can give
enforceable right to the parties, but it cannot be a valid transfer unless it
is followed up by actual delivery of shares. Thus, in the case of the assessee,
the transfer as defined u/s. 2(47) took place on 24.11.2009 and not on the date
of receipt of money from the buyer to the seller, i.e. 0n 10-09-2009. In view
of the same, investments in NHAI bonds on 4-5-2010 and purchase of house
property on 31-10-2011 is well within the period of six months and 2 years from
the date of transfer as specified u/s. 54EC and 54F of the Act, and
accordingly, the assessee is eligible for exemption and thus, there no
prejudice is caused to the revenue from the order of the A.O. within the
meaning of section 263 of the Act. Therefore, it was held that the assessment
order passed by the A.O. u/s. 143(3) is not erroneous in so far as it is
prejudicial to the interest of the revenue.

15. [2016] 75 taxmann.com 270 (Visakhapatnam – Trib.) DCIT vs. Dr. Chalasani Mallikarjuna Rao A.Y.: 2007-08 Date of Order: 21st October, 2016

Section 50C – Provisions of section 50C are
applicable to sale by a registered un-possessory sale-cum-GPA.  

FACTS 

The assessee, a
doctor by profession, filed his return of income for the assessment year 2007-08.
The assessment was completed u/s. 143(3) of the Act. Subsequently, the
assessment was re-opened, after recording reasons, u/s. 148 of the Act. In the
course of re-assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer (AO) noticed that
the assessee has sold a residential house property at Dr.No.32-7- 3A, P.S.
Nagar, Vijayawada for a consideration of Rs. 60 lakh by way of registered
un-possessory sale-cum-GPA vide document no.52/2007. As per the said
document, the market value of the property for the purpose of payment of stamp
duty has been fixed at Rs. 82,04,000/-. However, since the assessee had
computed capital gains by adopting sale consideration of Rs. 60 lakh and
claimed exemption u/s. 54 of the Act towards construction of another
residential house property, the AO asked the assessee to show cause why
provisions of section 50C should not be applied and capital gain computed with
reference to value determined by Stamp Valuation Authorities. In response, the
assessee submitted that the provisions of section 50C of the Act are not
applicable since the assessee has transferred property by way of registered
un-possessory sale-cum-GPA. According to the assessee, the provisions of
section 50C of the Act apply where the property has been transferred by way of
registered sale deed. The AO rejected the contentions of the assessee and
computed capital gains by applying the provisions of section 50C of the Act.

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who held that the provisions of section
50C of the Act have no application when the property has been transferred by
way of un-possessory sale-cum-GPA. He further held that the provisions of
section 50C of the Act are applicable when the property has been transferred
for a consideration which is less than that of the guidelines value payable as
per SRO, then the value as per the SRO has to be adopted on which stamp duty is
payable by the transferor. Since, the impugned property was not registered,
value as per SRO is not applicable. He allowed the appeal

Aggrieved, the
revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD

It is an
admitted fact that the assessee has transferred property by way of registered
sale-cum-GPA has transferred property by way of registered sale-cum-GPA and
that the sale-cum-GPA is registered in the office of the SRO. The stamp duty
authority has determined the market value of the property at Rs. 82,04,000/-
and has collected ad hoc stamp duty of Rs. 50,000/-. The assessee has computed
long-term capital gain by adopting sale consideration of Rs. 60 lakh shown in
the sale deed. The only dispute is that whether the provisions of section 50C
are applicable or not when the property is transferred by sale-cum-GPA. The
Tribunal observed that in this case, the assessee himself has admitted
long-term capital gain on transfer of asset. This clearly shows that the
transfer took place within the meaning of section 2(47)(v) of the Act. The
moment transfer took place within the meaning of section 2(47)(v) the deeming
fiction provided u/s. 50C is applicable, when the sale consideration shown in
the sale deed is less than the market value determined by the stamp duty
authority for the purpose of payment of stamp duty. Since, there is a
difference between consideration shown in the sale deed and the value
determined by the SRO, the deeming provisions of section 50C are clearly
applicable. It observed that it is illogical and improper on the part of the
assessee to say that the transfer within the meaning of section 2(47)(v) takes
place, but the provisions of section 50C are not applicable when the property
has been transferred by way of un-possessory sale-cum-GPA. 

The Tribunal
allowed this ground of appeal filed by the revenue.

14. [2016] 75 taxmann.com 136 (Visakhapatnam – Trib.) B. Subba Rao vs. ACIT A.Ys. : 2004-05 to 2006-07 Date of Order: 8th November, 2016

Sections 139,
153A, 154, 234A – Where a return of income is filed for the first time in response to notice u/s. 153A then interest will be levied u/s. 234A(1)(a) from
the due  date of filing return of income mentioned in section 139 of the Act and not
from the due date of filing return of income mentioned in section 153A of the
Act.

In a case
where interest was leviable u/s. 234A(1) but the AO levied interest u/s.
234A(3), it amounts to non-application of a particular provision of the Act and
is undisputedly a mistake apparent from record, which needs to be rectified
u/s. 154 of the Act.

FACTS 

The assessee,
an individual, derived income from pension and other sources. In connection
with the search of a group of cases of `S’ Limited, search was initiated
against the assessee as well. The Assessing Officer (AO) issued a notice u/s.
153A calling the assessee to file return of income. The assessee, filed his
return of income, for the first time, in response to notice issued u/s.153A.

The AO
completed the assessment u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 153A and levied interest u/s. 234B
of the Act with effect from the due date of filing return of income mentioned
in notice u/s.153A of the Act till the date of filing of the return of income
by the assessee.

Subsequently,
the AO issued a notice to the assessee proposing to rectify the mistake in the
order and proposed to levy interest u/s. 234B of the Act from the from due date
of filing return of income u/s. 139 of the Act till the date of filing of
return of income by the assessee instead of from due date of filing return of
income mentioned in notice u/s. 153A of the Act. The assessee submitted that
the levy of interest is a debatable issue which involves prolonged discussion
and cannot be rectified u/s. 154 of the Act. The AO rejected the contentions of
the assessee and passed an order u/s.154 rectifying the mistake.

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where relying upon the decision of
ITAT, Chennai ‘B’ bench in the case of Dr. V. Jayakumar vs. Asstt. CIT
[2011] 46 SOT 68 (URO)/10 taxmann.com 141
, it was argued that where a
notice is issued u/s 153A to the assessee, requiring filing return of income
specifying the due date in the notice, because of the word used in the section
“the provisions of this Act shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly as
if such return was a return required to be filed u/s. 139”, the due date
referred to in section139 of the Act gets shifted to the date prescribed in the
notice u/s. 153A of the Act.

HELD 

As regards the
legal contention of the assessee viz. that the mistake under consideration
could not be rectified by invoking the provisions of section 154, the Tribunal
held that since the method of computation of interest u/s. 234A is specifically
provided in the Act, there is no ambiguity in the provisions in as much it is
very clear in terms of section 234A(1) and 234A(3). Section 234A(1) deals with
a situation where return is not filed u/s. 139(1) or 139(4) and 234A(3) deals
with a situation where return is filed after determination of income u/s.
143(1) or computation of income u/s. 143(3) or 147. It noted that the AO
applied the provisions of section 234A(3), which is not applicable to this
case. It held that non-application of a particular provision is undisputedly a
mistake apparent from record, which needs to be rectified u/s. 154 of the Act.
It held that the AO has rightly invoked provisions of section 154, to rectify
the levy of interest u/s. 234A.

Once return is
filed in response to notice u/s. 153A, the provisions of section 139
automatically steps in, accordingly, the due date specified in the said section
comes into operation. If the contention of the assessee is accepted, it would
amount to encouraging the non-filing of returns by the taxpayers, who would
take the chance and file returns as and when notice u/s. 148/153A is issued, so
that they can save interest amount on tax payable to the Govt. exchequer for a
period of four or six years as the case may be.

The method of
computation of interest u/s. 234A is specifically provided. There is no
ambiguity in the provisions. Section 234A(1) deals with a situation where
return of income is filed belatedly and also where no return is filed u/s.
139(1) or 139(4) and section 234A(3) deals with a situation where return is
filed u/s. 148/153A after determination of income u/s. 143(1) or computation of
income u/s. 143(3) or 147 of the Act.

The Tribunal
held that when a return is filed for the first time, the provisions of section
234A(1)(a) are applicable and interest is chargeable for the period commencing
on the date immediately following the due date referred u/s. 139 and ending on
the date of furnishing of the return. Since, the assessee has filed return for
the first time u/s. 153A of the Act, the AO rightly charged interest u/s. 234A
from the due date referred in section 139(1) to the date of filing return u/s.
153A of the Act. The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A).

As regards the
reliance by the assessee upon the decision of ITAT, Chennai ‘B’ bench in the
case of Dr. V Jayakumar (supra) it observed that the bench has upheld
the arguments of the assessee without considering the provisions of sections
153A & 234A of the Act in a right perspective.

The Tribunal
dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee.

13. [2016] 161 ITD 217 (Pune Trib.) Quality Industries vs. JCIT A.Y.: 2010-11 Date of Order: 9th September, 2016.

Section 14A – When an assessee, a
partnership firm, earns tax free income and disallowance u/s. 14A (r.w. Rule
8D) is to be computed then interest paid, towards the use of partner’s capital,
by the assessee to the partners is not amenable to section 14A in the hands of
partnership firm.

FACTS

The assessee, a partnership firm, engaged in
the business of manufacturing of chemicals etc., had during the relevant
assessment year earned tax free dividend income from investment in mutual funds
which was claimed as exempt income u/s. 10(35) of the Act.

The AO next observed that investment in
mutual funds was made out of interest bearing funds which included interest
bearing partner’s capital also.

The interest so paid to the partners was
claimed as deduction by the assessee against taxable income.

The AO was thus of the view that assessee
had incurred interest expenses which were attributable to earning aforesaid tax
free dividend income. Thus, he invoked provisions of section 14A of the Act
r.w. Rule 8D and proceeded to disallow estimated interest expenditure incurred
in relation to dividend income so earned.

It was the assessee’s contention that while
computing disallowance u/s.14A, disallowance of proportionate interest
attributable to interest bearing partners’ capital is not permissible. It was
submitted that section 14A covers amount in the nature of ‘expenditure’ and not
all statutory allowances and that interest on partner’s capital is not an
‘expenditure’ per se but is in the nature of a deduction u/s. 40(b) just
as depreciation on business capital asset is an allowance and not expenditure.

The AO, however, discarded the various pleas
of the assessee.

The CIT(A) took
note of the contents of the Balance Sheet of the assessee firm for relevant
assessment year and noted that main source of investment in mutual funds have
come from partner’s capital. The partners had introduced capital in the
partnership firm which bears interest @12% per annum. This being so, the
provisions of section 14A are attracted and expenses incurred in relation to
income which does not form part of total income requires to be disallowed.

He accordingly confirmed the action of the
AO and his working of disallowance under Rule 8D.

Aggrieved by the order of the CIT(A), the
assessee filed appeal before the Tribunal.

HELD

The predominant question that arises is
whether, for the purposes of section 14A of the Act, payment of interest to the
partners by the partnership firm towards use of partner’s capital is in the
nature of ‘expenditure’ or not and consequently, whether interest on partners capital is amenable to
section 14A or not in the hands of partnership firm.

In order to adjudicate this legal issue, we
need to appreciate the nuances of the scheme of the taxation. We note that
prior to amendment of taxation laws from AY 1993-94, the interest charged on
partners capital was not allowed in the hands of partnership firm while it was
simultaneously taxable in the hands of respective partners. An amendment was inter
alia
brought in by the Finance Act 1992 in section 40(b) to enable the firm
to claim deduction of interest outgo payable to partners on their respective
capital subject to some upper limits.

Hence, as per the present scheme of
taxation, partnership firms complying with the statutory requirements and
assessed as such are allowed deduction in respect of interest to partners
subject to the limits and conditions specified in section 40(b) of the Act. In
turn, these items will be taxed in the hands of the partners as business income
u/s. 28(v).

Share of partners in the income of the firm
is exempt from tax u/s. 10(2A). Thus, the share of income from firm is on a
different footing than the interest income which is taxable under the business
income.

The section
28(v) treats the passive income accrued by way of interest as also salary
received by a partner of the firm as a ‘business receipt’ unlike different
treatments given to similar receipts in the hands of entities other than
partners. In this context, we also note that under proviso to section
28(v), the disallowance of such interest is only in reference to section 40(b)
and not section 36 or section 37. Notably, there has been no amendment in the
general law provided under Partnership Act 1932. The amendment to section 40(b)
as referred hereinabove has only altered the mode of taxation. Needless to say,
the Partnership firm is not a separate legal entity under the Partnership Act.
It is not within the purview of the Income-tax Act to change or alter the basic
law governing partnership. Interest or salary paid to partners remains
distribution of business income.

Section 4 of the Indian Partnership Act 1932
defines the terms partnership, partner, firm and firm name as under :

“Partnership” is the relation
between persons, who have agreed to share the profits of a business, carried on
by all or any of the partners acting for all. Persons who have entered into
partnership with one another are called individually ‘Partners’ and
collectively a ‘firm’ and the name under which their business is carried on is
called the ‘firm name.”

Thus, it is clear that firm and partners of
the firm are not separate person under Partnership Act although they are
separate unit of assessment for tax purposes.

It is relevant here to refer to decision in
the case of CIT vs. R.M. Chidambaram Pillai (1977-106 ITR 292) wherein
Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:

“A firm
is not a legal person, even though it has some attributes of personality. In
Income-tax law, a firm is a unit of assessment, by special provisions, but it
is not a full person. Since a contract of employment requires two distinct
persons, viz., the employer and the employee, there cannot be a contract of
service, in strict law, between a firm and one of its partners. Payment of
salary to a partner represents a special share of the profits. Salary paid to a
partner retains the same character of the income of the firm. Accordingly, the
salary paid to a partner by a firm which grows and sells tea, is exempt from
tax, under rule 24 of the Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922, to the extent of 60
per cent thereof, representing agricultural income and is liable to tax only to
the extent of 40 per cent.”

The Hon’ble
Supreme Court has also held in the case of CIT vs. Ramniklal Kothari (1969
-74 ITR 57)
that the business of the firm is business of the partners of
the firm and, hence, salary, interest and profits received by the partner from
the firm is business income and, therefore, expenses incurred by the partners
for the purpose of earning this income from the firm are admissible as
deduction from such share income from the firm in which he is partner.

Thus, the ‘partnership firm’ and partners
have been collectively seen and the distinction between the two has been
blurred in the judicial precedents even for taxation purposes.

Therefore, the relationship between partner
and firm cannot be inferred as that of lender of funds (capital) and borrower
of capital from the partners, and hence, section 36(1)(iii) is not applicable
at all. Section 40(b) is the only section governing deduction towards interest
to partners. To put it differently, in view of section 40(b) of the Act, the
Assessing Officer purportedly has no jurisdiction to apply the test laid down
u/s. 36 of the Act to find out whether the capital was borrowed for the
purposes of business or not.

As per the
scheme of the Act, the interest paid by the firm and claimed as deduction is
simultaneously susceptible to tax in the hands of its respective partners. The
interest paid to partners and simultaneously getting subjected to tax in the
hands of its partners is merely in the nature of contra items in the hands of
the firms and partners. Consequently interest paid to its partners cannot be
treated at par with the other interest payable to outside parties. Thus, in
substance, the revenue is not adversely affected at all by the claim of
interest on capital employed with the firm by the partnership firm and partners
put together. Thus, capital diverted in the mutual funds to generate alleged
tax free income does not lead to any loss in revenue by this action of the
assessee. In view of the inherent mutuality, when the partnership firm and its
partners are seen holistically and in a combined manner with costs towards
interest eliminated in contra, the investment in mutual funds generating  tax free income bears the characteristic of and attributable to its own capital
where no disallowance u/s. 14A read with Rule 8D is warranted. Consequently,
the  plea of the assessee is merited in so far as interest attributable to partners.
However, the interest payable to parties other than partners, would be
subjected to provisions of Rule 8D.
 

Accounting For Loss of Control in Subsidiary

Issue

Consider the following example.
Parent (P) sells wholly owned Subsidiary (S) to Associate (A).  The structure before and after sale is given
below.

In P’s CFS, the carrying amount of
the net assets of S at the date of the sale is INR 10,000.  For simplicity, assume S has no accumulated
balance of OCI. The fair value of S and the selling price is INR 18,000, which
is the consideration received by P in cash. P recognises a profit of INR 8,000
on the sale of S in CFS.

The next step is to determine how
much of this profit of INR 8,000 is required to be eliminated on
consolidation.  Essentially, there are
two approaches, which are explained below.

Ind AS 110 Approach

Paragraph 25 of Ind AS 110 –
Consolidated Financial Statements states as follows: 

If a parent loses control of a
subsidiary, the parent:

a)  Derecognises the assets and
liabilities of the former subsidiary from the consolidated balance sheet.

b)  Recognises any investment
retained in the former subsidiary at its fair value when control is lost and
subsequently accounts for it and for any amounts owed by or to the former
subsidiary in accordance with relevant Ind ASs. That fair value shall be
regarded as the fair value on initial recognition of a financial asset in
accordance with Ind AS 109 or, when appropriate, the cost on initial
recognition of an investment in an associate or joint venture.

c)  Recognises the gain or loss associated
with the loss of control attributable to the former controlling interest.

If P applies the Ind AS 110
approach, then it recognizes the full profit on the sale of S. The amount
included in the carrying amount of A for the sale of S in P’s CFS is INR 4,500
(18,000 x 25%)

Ind AS 28 Approach

Paragraph 28 of Ind AS 28 – Investments
in Associates and Joint Ventures
states as follows:

Gains and losses resulting from
‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’ transactions between an entity (including its
consolidated subsidiaries) and its associate or joint venture are recognised in
the entity’s financial statements only to the extent of unrelated investors’
interests in the associate or joint venture. ‘Upstream’ transactions are, for
example, sales of assets from an associate or a joint venture to the investor.
‘Downstream’ transactions are, for example, sales or contributions of assets
from the investor to its associate or its joint venture. The investor’s share
in the associate’s or joint venture’s gains or losses resulting from these
transactions is eliminated.

If P applies the Ind AS 28
approach, then it eliminates 25% of the profit recognised on the sale of S
against the carrying amount of the investment in A. The amount included in the
carrying amount of A for the sale of S in P’s CFS is INR 2,500 [(18,000 x 25%)
– (8000 x 25%)]

P records the following entries in
its CFS for the transaction and the subsequent elimination

 

Debit

Credit

Cash

Net assets of S

Gain on sale ( P & L)

(To recognise sale of S)

18,000

 

10,000

8,000

Gain on sale (P & L) 8000 x 25%

Investment in associate

(To recognise elimination of 25% of profit on sale of $

2,000

 

2,000

The
amount included in the carrying amount of A for the net assets of S in P’s
consolidated financial statements, after elimination. is INR 2,500 (18,000 x
25% – 2,000). This equals to the carrying amount of the net assets of S in P’s
CFS before the sale, which was INR 2,500 (10,000 x 25%)
.

Author’s view

Both approaches discussed above
are acceptable, as both are supported by the respective standards. 

In September 2014, the IASB issued
amendments to IFRS 10 and IAS 28: Sale or Contribution of Assets between an
Investor and its Associate or Joint Venture.
The amendments address the
conflict between the requirements of IAS 28 and IFRS 10 Consolidated
Financial Statements
regarding non-monetary contributions in exchange for
an interest in an equity-method investee.

The September 2014 amendments are
designed to address this conflict and eliminate the inconsistency; by requiring
different treatments for the sale or contribution of assets that constitute a
business and of those that do not.

When a non-monetary asset that
does not constitute a business as defined in IFRS 3 Business Combinations,
is contributed to an associate or a joint venture in exchange for an equity
interest in that associate or joint venture:

  The
transaction should be accounted for in accordance with IAS28.28, except when
the contribution lacks commercial substance; and

   Unrealised
gains and losses should be eliminated against the investment accounted for
using the equity method and should not be presented as deferred gains or losses
in the entity’s CFS in which investments are accounted for using the equity
method.

The gain or loss resulting from a
downstream transaction involving assets that constitute a business, as defined
in IFRS 3, between an entity and its associate or joint venture is recognised
in full in the investor’s CFS.

However, the IASB identified
several practical challenges with the implementation of the amendments.  Consequently, the IASB has issued a proposal
to defer the effective date of the September 2014 amendments pending
finalisation of a larger research project on the equity method of accounting.

Conclusion

Till such time the IASB takes a final decision,
and is followed up by appropriate amendments in Ind AS’s, both approaches
discussed above with respect to elimination of profits on sale of subsidiary to
the associate are acceptable under Ind AS.

12. [2016] 161 ITD 211 (Ahmedabad Trib. – SMC) Nanubhai Keshavlal Chokshi HUF vs. ITO A.Y.: 2008-09 Date of Order: 1st August, 2016

Section 48 – If an assessee makes payment
to his brother, who was living with him for years, for vacating his house, the
same would be considered as an expenditure incurred for improvement of asset or
title and would be allowed as deduction while computing long term capital gain
arising on sale of said house.

FACTS

During the relevant assessment year, the
assessee had shown income from long term capital gain arising from sale of
house property.

While computing the said capital gains, the
assessee had claimed deduction of certain amount paid by him, to his brother,
for vacating the house.

The AO as well as CIT(A) declined the
deduction on account of the following reasons:

  Municipal
tax bills submitted by assessee showed that assessee was the sole occupant of
the property.

   Valuation
of the property was done before sale of the said property and the valuation
report of the property, dated 22-06-2007, stated that assessee was the sole
occupant of the property.

   Assessee’s
brother had stated in his statement recorded u/s. 133(1) that he was living
with the assessee, not in capacity as a tenant and was not paying any rent, but
was staying in the house as per assessee’s wish and he was not having right
over the property in any capacity.

   As
per the will of assessee’s father dated 12-06-1957, the different properties
were distributed between the assessee and his brother such that both of them
should get an equal amount of properties valuing Rs. 35,000/- each. That shows
that the assessee had exclusive right over the property on which the assessee
claims that his brother was occupying as tenant.

HELD

Section 48 of the Income-tax Act
contemplates mode of computation of capital gains. It provides that income
chargeable under the head “Capital Gains” shall be computed by
deducting from the full value of the consideration the following amounts, viz.
(i) the expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively in connection with such
transfer, and (ii) cost of acquisition of the asset and the cost of any improvement
thereto.

According to the assessee, his brother was
residing in the house owned by him and while selling the house in order to get
vacant possession, payment of certain sum was made by the assessee’s HUF to
assessee’s brother. As far as payment part is concerned, there is no dispute.
The payment was made through account payee cheque. Assessee’s brother has
confirmed receipt of money and has also filed affidavit to this effect.

The question is whether the payment made by
the assessee to his brother is to be considered as expenditure incurred for
improvement of asset or the title.

On an analysis of the record, I find that
the revenue has approached to the controversy in strictly mechanical way.
Whereas in the present appeal, situation was required to be appreciated,
keeping in mind social circumstances and the relationship of the brothers. What
was their settlement while residing together? What was the feeling of the elder
brother towards their younger brother, when they displaced them from a property
where they were residing for more than 24 years?

Had the controversy been appreciated in a
mechanical manner, and if the brother, who was residing in the house refused to
vacate the house, then, what would be the situation before the assessee. The assessee
might have had to file a suit for possession that might be decided against his
brother and his brother’s ejection from the premises, but that would have
consumed time in our judicial process of at least more than ten to fifteen
years. The prospective buyers may not have been available in such
circumstances. Though the assessee’s brother had not been paying any rent, but
he was paying the electricity bills.

Hence, the payment made by the assessee is
held as made for improvement of title of the property and is allowed as
deduction while computing the long term capital gain.

Taxability of Contingent Consideration on Transfer of Capital Asset

Issue for Consideration

Section 45 provides for the charge of tax in respect of
capital gains. It provides that any profits or gains arising from the transfer
of a capital asset shall be chargeable to income-tax under the head “Capital
Gains”, and shall be deemed to be the income of the previous year in which the
transfer took place.Entire capital gains is chargeable to tax in the year of
transfer of the capital asset, irrespective of the year in which the
consideration for the transfer is received.

Section 48 provides for the mode of computation of the
capital gains. It provides that the income chargeable under the head “Capital
gains” shall be computed by deducting from the full value of the consideration
received or accruing as a result of the transfer of the capital asset, the
expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively in connection with such transfer,
and the cost of acquisition and the cost of improvement of the asset.

In many transactions, particularly transactions of
acquisition of a company through acquisition of its shares, it is common that a
certain consideration is paid at the time of transfer of the shares, while an
additional amount  is agreed to be
payable, the payment of which is deferred to a subsequent year or years, and is
dependant upon the happening of certain events, such as achievement of certain
turnover or profitability targets or obtaining of certain business or approvals
in the years subsequent to sale. Such receipt is contingent, in the sense that
it would not be payable if the targets are not achieved or the contemplated
event does not occur. Such payments are commonly referred to as “earn-outs”,
when they are linked to achievement of certain targets.

Given the fact that such payment may or may not be
receivable, the issue has arisen before the courts as to whether such
contingent consideration is chargeable to tax as capital gains in the year of
transfer of the capital asset. While the Delhi High Court has taken the view
that such contingent consideration is chargeable to income tax in the year of
transfer of the shares, the Bombay High Court has taken the view that such
contingent consideration does not accrue in the year of transfer of the shares,
and is therefore not taxable in that year.

Ajay Guliya’s case

The issue first came up before the Delhi High Court in the
case of Ajay Guliya vs. ACIT, 209 Taxman 295.

In this case, the assessee sold 1500 shares held by him
through a share purchase agreement dated 15 February 2006. The total
consideration agreed upon was Rs. 5,750 per share, out of which Rs. 4,000 was
payable on the execution of the share purchase agreement and the balance was
payable over a period of 2 years. The balance amount of Rs. 1750 per share
depended upon the performance of the company, and fulfilment of the specified
parameters. The assessee considered the sale consideration at Rs. 4,000 per share, while computing the capital gains in
his return of income for assessment year 2006-07.

The assessing officer held that the entire income accruing to
the assessee was chargeable as capital gains, and accordingly considered the
entire consideration of Rs. 5,750 per share for computation of capital gains.
The Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the appeal of the assessee, holding that
such part of the consideration which was payable in future did not constitute
income for the relevant assessment year and that the assessee would become
entitled to it only on the fulfilment of certain conditions, which could not be
predicated.

The Tribunal on being asked to examine the applicability of
the decision of the Authority for Advance Ruling held that the ratio of the
advance ruling in the case of Anurag Jain, in re, 277 ITR 1, was not
applicable, as in that case, the payment for consideration of shares was
interlinked with the performance of the assessee employee, and not the company
whose shares were transferred, and the question before the authority was
regarding the taxation of the capital gains and contingent payments under the
head “Salaries”. According to the tribunal, in the case before it, the issue
was one of transfer of shares simpliciter, and the payment of additional
consideration did not depend upon the performance of the assessee. The Tribunal
further noted that there was no provision for cancellation of the agreement in
case of failure to achieve targets. Considering the deeming fiction of section
45(1), the tribunal held that the whole of the consideration accruing or
arising or received in different years was chargeable under the head capital
gains in the year in which the transfer of shares had taken place. The tribunal
therefore held that the entire consideration of Rs. 5,750 per share was
chargeable to capital gains in the relevant year of transfer.

Before the Delhi High Court, on behalf of the assessee,
reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT
vs. B. C. Srinivasa Setty 128 ITR 294
, for the proposition that the
provisions of the charging section, section 45 were not to be read in
isolation, but had to be read along with the computation provision, section 48.
It was argued that the entire consideration of Rs. 5,750 per share was not
payable at one go, and that the parties had specified conditions which would
have to be fulfilled before the balance of Rs. 1,750 per share became payable.
Even though the valuation had been agreed upon, much depended on the
performance of the company whose shares were the subject matter of the sale.
The balance amount of Rs. 1,750 per share could never be said to have arisen or
accrued during the relevant assessment year, as the assessee became entitled to
it only upon fulfilment of these conditions. The assessee could not claim the
balance amount unless the essential prerequisites had been fulfilled. It was
argued that the Supreme Court in Srinivasa Setty’s case, had held that though
section 45 was the charging section and ordinarily acquired primacy, while
section 48 was merely the computation mechanism, at the same time, in order to
arrive at chargeability of taxation, both the sections had to be looked into
and read together.

The Delhi High Court observed that the reasoning of the
tribunal was based upon the fact that capital assets were transferred on a
particular date, i.e., on the execution of the agreement. It noted that there
was no material on record or in the agreement, suggesting that even if the
entire consideration or part thereof was not paid, the title to the shares
would revert to the seller. According to the High Court, the controlling
expression of “transfer” was conclusive as to the true nature of the
transaction. In the opinion of the Court, the fact that the assessee adopted a
mechanism in the agreement that the transferee would defer the payments, would
not in any manner detract from the chargeability when the shares were sold.

Dealing with the argument that the tribunal’s had not dealt
with the deeming fiction about the accrual required by section 48, the High
Court was of the view that the tenor of the tribunal’s order was that the
entire income by way of capital gains was chargeable to tax in the year in
which the transfer took place, as stated in section 45(1). According to the
High Court, merely because the agreement provided for payment of the balance
consideration upon the happening of certain events, it could not be said that
the income had not accrued in the year of transfer.

The Delhi High Court therefore held that the entire
consideration of Rs. 5,750 per share was to be considered in the computation of
capital gains in the year of transfer.

Mrs. Hemal Raju Shete’s case

The issue again recently came up before the Bombay High Court
in the case of CIT vs. Mrs. Hemal Raju Shete 239 Taxman 176.

In this case, the assessee sold shares of a company under an
agreement, along with other shareholders of the company. Under the terms of the
agreement, the initial consideration was Rs. 2.70 crore. There was also a
deferred consideration which was payable over a period of 4 years following the
year of sale, which was linked to the future profits of the company whose
shares were being sold, and which was subject to a cap of Rs. 17.30 crore.

The assessee filed her return of income, computing the
capital gains by taking her share of only the initial consideration of Rs. 2.70
crore. The assessing officer was of the view that under the agreement, the
shareholders were to receive in aggregate, a sum of Rs. 20 crore, and therefore
proceeded to tax the entire amount of Rs. 20 crore in the year of transfer of
the shares in the hands of all the shareholders.

The Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the addition made by the
assessing officer on the ground that it was notional. He observed that the
working of the formula agreed upon by the parties for payment of the additional
consideration could lead, and in fact had led to a situation, where no amount
on account of deferred consideration for the sale of shares was receivable by
the assessee in the immediately succeeding assessment year. There was no
guarantee that this amount of Rs. 20 crore, or for that matter, any amount,
would be received. The amount to be received as deferred consideration was
contingent upon the performance of the company in the succeeding year.
Therefore, according to the Commissioner (Appeals), no part of the deferred
consideration could be brought to tax during the relevant assessment year,
either on receipt basis or on accrual basis.

The Tribunal upheld the findings of the Commissioner
(Appeals), holding that, as there was no certainty of receiving any amount as
deferred consideration, the bringing to tax of the maximum amount of Rs. 20
crore provided as a cap on the consideration, was not tenable. The Tribunal
further held that what had to be brought to tax was the amount which had been
received and/or accrued to the assessee, and not any notional or hypothetical
income.

Before the Bombay High Court, on behalf of the revenue, it
was argued that transfer of capital asset would attract capital gains tax in
terms of section 45(1), and that the amount to be taxed u/s. 45(1) was not
dependent upon the receipt of the consideration. Attention of the court was
drawn to sections 45(1A) and 45(5), which in contrast, brought to tax capital
gains on amounts received. It was therefore submitted that the assessing
officer was justified in bringing to tax the assessee’s share in the entire
amount of Rs. 20 crore, which was referred to in the agreement as the maximum
amount that could be received on the sale of shares of the company by the
shareholders from the purchaser.

The Bombay High Court noted the various clauses in the
agreement in relation to the deferred consideration, and observed that the
formula prescribed in the agreement itself made it clear that the defer
consideration to be received by the assessee in the 4 years was dependent upon
the profits made by the company in each of the years. Thus, if the company did
not make a net profit in terms of the formula for the year under consideration
for payment of deferred consideration, then no amount would be payable to the
assessee as deferred consideration. The court noted that the consideration of
Rs. 20 crore was not an assured consideration to be received by the selling
shareholders. It was only the maximum that could be received. According to the
High Court, this was therefore not a case where any consideration out of Rs. 20
crore or part thereof (other than Rs. 2.70 crore), had been received or had
accrued to the assessee.

The Bombay High Court noted the observations of the Supreme
Court in the case of Morvi Industries Ltd vs. CIT 82 ITR 835, as under:

“The income can be said to
accrue when it becomes due………. The moment the income accrues, the assessee gets
vested right to claim that amount, even though not immediately”

According to the Bombay High Court, in the relevant
assessment year, no right to claim any particular amount of the deferred
consideration got vested in the hands of the assessee. Therefore, the deferred
consideration of Rs. 17.30 crore, which was sought to be taxed by the assessing
officer, was not an amount which had accrued to the assessee. The test of
accrual was whether there was a right to receive the amount, though later, and
whether such right was legally enforceable. The Bombay High Court noted the
observations of the Supreme Court in the case of E. D. Sassoon & Co.
Ltd. 26 ITR 27
:

“it is clear therefore that
income may accrue to an assessee without the actual receipt of the same. If the
assessee acquires a right to receive the income, the income can be said to have
accrued to him, though it may be received later on its being ascertained. The
basic conception is that he must have acquired a right to receive the income.
There must be a debt owed to him by somebody. There must be as is otherwise expressed
debitum in presnti, solvendum in futuro…”

The Bombay High Court noted that the amount which could have
been received as deferred consideration was dependent/contingent upon certain
uncertain events, and therefore it could not be said to have accrued to the
assessee. The Bombay High Court also noted the observations of the Supreme
Court in the case of CIT vs. Shoorji Vallabhdas & Co. 46 ITR 144:

“Income tax is a levy on
income. No doubt, the income tax Act takes into account two points of time at
which liability to tax is attracted, viz., the accrual of its income or its
receipt; but the substance of the matter is income. If income does not result,
there cannot be a tax, even though in bookkeeping, an entry is made about a
hypothetical income, which does not materialise.”

The Bombay High Court also noted the observations of the
Supreme Court in the case of K. P. Varghese vs. ITO 131 ITR 597, to the
effect that one has to read capital gains provision along with computation
provision, and the starting point of the computation was the full value of the
consideration received or accruing. In the case before it, the Bombay High
Court noted that the amount of Rs. 17.30 crore was neither received, nor had it
accrued to the assessee during the relevant assessment year. The Bombay High
Court also stated that it had been informed that for subsequent assessment
years, other than the year in which there was no deferred consideration on
account of the formula, the assessee had offered to tax the amounts which had
been received pertaining to the transfer of shares.

The Bombay High Court also rejected the argument of the
revenue that by not bringing it to tax in the year of transfer on the ground
that it had not accrued during the year, the assessee was seeking to pay tax on
the amount on receipt basis. The High Court observed that accrual would be a
right to receive the amount, and the assessee had not obtained a right to
receive the amount in the relevant year under the agreement.

The Bombay High Court accordingly held that the deferred
consideration of Rs. 17.30 crore could not be brought to tax in the relevant
assessment year, as it had not accrued to the assessee.

Observations

There is not much of a debate possible in cases where the
consideration for transfer is agreed but the payment thereof is deferred. The
facts of Ajay Gulati’s case seemed to suggest that. In that case, a lump sum
consideration was defined and was agreed upon but the payment thereof was
deferred based on happening of the event. The case perhaps could have been
better in cases where the lump sum is not agreed upon at all, but a minimum is
agreed upon, and the additional payment, if any, is made contingent as to
quantum and the time, on the basis of certain deliverables.      

Besides ‘transfer’, the most important thing, for the charge
of capital gains tax, is that there should arise profits and gains on transfer
and it is that profits that has arisen as a result of the transfer that can be
brought to tax. A profit that has not arisen or the one that has yet to arise
may not be termed as having arisen so as to bring it to tax. Another equally
important requirement is that the consideration must have been ‘received or
accrued’ for it to be treated as the ‘full value of consideration’ in terms of
section 48 of the Act. It is only such consideration that can enter in to the
computation of the capital gains. In the case of the additional payments, that
can accrue only on happening of the event and can be received only thereafter.
No right to receive accrues till such time the events happen.

A clause for cancellation may help in minimising the damage
for the assesseee as had been observed by the Delhi high court in Ajay Gulati’s
case. A transfer expressly providing for cancellation, not of the transfer, but
of the right to receive additional compensation, may help the case of the
assessee.

“Full Value of Consideration” is a term that has not been
defined in section 48 of the Act. Its meaning therefore has to be gathered from
a composite reading of the provisions of section 48 of the Act. The term is
accompanied with the words ‘received or accruing’, which words indicate that it
is such a consideration that has been received or has accrued in the least,
failing which it may not enter in to the computation for the time being for the
year of the transfer.

There is a possibility that the additional consideration
would be taxed as income for the independent performance by the transferor in
the subsequent year and be taxed independently in a case where the transferor
is required to perform and deliver certain milestones, subsequent to the
transfer of shares. In such a case, the additional payment accrues to him for
delivering the milestones based on his performance and in such a case the
payment would be construed to be the one for the performance, and not for
transfer of the shares; it would accrue only on performance, and cannot be
taxed in the year of transfer. Please see Anurag Jain’s case (supra).

An alternative to the issue is to read the law in a manner
that permits the taxation of capital gains in different years; ascertained
gains in the year of transfer and the contingent ones only on accrual in the
year thereof and yet better in the year of receipt. It is not impossible to do
so. The charge of section 45 should be so read that it fructifies in two years
instead of one year. There does not seem to be anything that prohibits such a
reading of the law. In taxing the business income, it is usual to come across
cases wherein the additional payments contingent on happenings in future years
are taxed in that year on the ground that they accrue on happening of an event.
It is for this reason that the Bombay high court in Shete’s case has relied
upon the decisions delivered in the context of the real income.

The logic of the Bombay High Court decision does seem
appealing, as a notional income or income, which has not accrued, can never be
taxed under the Income Tax Act. Taxation of such a potential income under the
head “Capital gains” in the year of transfer of the capital asset, merely on
the ground that the charge is linked to the date of transfer, does not seem
justified, where such consideration has not really accrued and there is a
possibility that it may not be recieved.

The peculiar nature of this controversy is on account of the
fact that the charge to capital gains is in the year of transfer, while the
computation is on the basis of accrual or receipt. In the case of earn outs,
there is no accrual in the year of transfer, but in the year of accrual, there
is no transfer of a capital asset.

Therefore, if one follows the Delhi High Court decision, one
may end up paying tax on a notional income which one may never receive. On the
other hand, if one follows the Bombay High Court decision, it may result in a
situation where the deferred consideration is never taxed, as it does not
accrue in the year of transfer, and in the subsequent year when it accrues, the
charge to tax fails on account of the fact there is no transfer of the capital asset.

From the facts of the Bombay High Court decision, it is not
clear as to under which head of income the deferred consideration was offered
to tax in subsequent years when it accrued. However, to a great extent, the
decision of the Bombay High Court may have been influenced by the fact that
such deferred consideration was taxed in subsequent years. Again, the
substantial amount of deferred consideration as against the initial
consideration, and the direct linkage of the formula for determination of
deferred consideration with the profits of the company, may have impacted the
decision of the Bombay High Court.

Therefore, while on principles, the Bombay High Court
decision seems to be the better view of the matter, it is essential that the
law should be amended to bring clarity to the taxation of such deferred
consideration which does not accrue on the transfer of the asset. There are
already specific provisions in the law in the form of section 45(5) in relation
to enhanced compensation received on compulsory acquisition of a capital asset
by the Government, where such enhanced compensation is taxable in the year of
receipt, and is not taxable in the year of transfer of the capital asset.

Pending such amendment to the law, the only option available
to an assessee is to initially offer the capital gains to tax on the basis of
the initial consideration, and subsequently revise the return of income to
reflect the enhanced consideration on account of the deferred consideration as
and when it accrues. Even here, this is not a happy situation, as the time
limit for revision of a return of income under the provisions of section
139(5), is now only one year from the end of the relevant assessment year. If
this time limit has expired, by the time the deferred consideration accrues,
even such a revision would not be possible. Rectification u/s. 154 is yet
another possibility whereunder the additional payment on happening of an event
and on receipt be tagged to the original consideration and be taxed in the year
of transfer.

One therefore hopes that a specific provision is
made to cover such situations of deferred consideration, which are commercially
insisted upon by the purchaser in many transactions. This alone, will put an
end to the litigation on the matter.

Demonetisation – Some Tax Issues

Delegalisation of High Denomination Notes

On 8th November, 2016, the Department of Economic
Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Government of India, issued a notification, SO No
3407(E) [F No 10/03/2016-Cy.I] exercising its powers u/s. 26(2) of the Reserve
Bank of India Act, 1934, notifying that bank notes (currency notes) of the
existing series of the value of Rs.500 and Rs.1,000 (referred to as “the
withdrawn bank notes”) would cease to be legal tender with effect from 9th
November 2016 for transactions other than specified transactions. The
notification also provided a limit for exchange of such notes for any other
denomination notes having legal tender character, and also permitted deposit of
such notes in bank accounts before 30th December 2016, after which
date such notes could be exchanged or deposited at specified offices of Reserve
Bank of India (RBI) or such other facility until a later date as may be
specified by RBI. As announced by the Prime Minister, this date is likely to be
31.3.2017.

Such an action, as stated in the notification, was actuated
by the facts that;

1.  fake currency notes of those denominations
were in circulation,

2.  high denomination notes were used for storage
of unaccounted wealth, and

3.  fake currency was being used for financing
subversive activities, such as drug trafficking and terrorism, causing damage
to the economy and security of the country.

Another Notification No. SO 3408(E) [F No 10/03/2016-Cy.I]
was issued on the same date, notifying that such withdrawn bank notes of Rs.500
and Rs.1,000 would not cease to be legal tender from 9th to 11th
November 2016 (later extended to 24th November 2016 and further
extended to 15th December 2016), in respect of certain transactions.
These transactions include payments to government hospitals and pharmacies in
government hospitals, for purchase of rail, public sector bus or public sector
airline tickets, purchases at consumer co-operative stores and milk booths
operating under Government authorisation, purchase of petrol, diesel and gas at
petrol pumps operating under PSU oil marketing companies, for payments at
crematoria and burial grounds, exchange for legal tender up to Rs.5,000 at
international airports by arriving and departing passengers and exchange by
foreign tourists of foreign exchange or such bank notes up to a value of
Rs.5,000. Some more permissible transactions were added later, such as payment
of electricity bills, payment of court fees, purchase of seeds, etc, and some
of the permissible transactions were modified from time to time. It also
permitted withdrawals from Automated Teller Machines (ATM) within the specified
limits.

On the same date, RBI issued a circular to all banks, specifying
the steps to be taken by them pursuant to such bank notes ceasing to be legal
tender, and giving formats of the request slip for exchange of the withdrawn
bank notes, and for reporting of details of exchanged bank notes. RBI also
issued FAQs on the subject. It has stated, inter alia, as under:

“1. Why is this scheme
introduced?
The incidence of fake Indian currency notes in higher
denomination has increased. For ordinary persons, the fake notes look similar
to genuine notes, even though no security feature has been copied. The fake
notes are used for anti-national and illegal activities. High denomination
notes have been misused by terrorists and for hoarding black money. India
remains a cash based economy hence the circulation of Fake Indian Currency
Notes continues to be a menace. In order to contain the rising incidence of
fake notes and black money, the scheme to withdraw has been introduced.

2. What is this scheme?
The legal tender character of the existing bank notes in denominations of ?500
and ?1000 issued by the Reserve Bank of India till November 8, 2016
(hereinafter referred to as Specified Bank Notes) stands withdrawn. In
consequence thereof these Bank Notes cannot be used for transacting business
and/or store of value for future usage. The Specified Bank Notes can be
exchanged for value at any of the 19 offices of the Reserve Bank of India or at
any of the bank branches of commercial banks/ Regional Rural Banks/
Co-operative banks or at any Head Post Office or Sub-Post Office.”

Given the fact that bank notes of these denominations of
Rs.500 and Rs.1,000 constituted 86% of the value of all bank notes in
circulation in India, withdrawal of these bank notes affected almost every
person in India. Pursuant to such notifications, people rushed to exchange the
withdrawn bank notes and to deposit such withdrawn bank notes in their
accounts, as well as to make withdrawals from their bank accounts to meet their
daily expenses.

On account of such forced exchange and deposit of withdrawn
bank notes, various issues relating to taxation in such cases arose. In
particular, issues arose as to the rate of taxation, whether any penalty was
attracted, whether prosecution could be launched against such person, whether
there would be liability to MAT and interest u/s. 234C of the Act, whether
provisions of the BTPA, PMLA, FEMA were attracted, whether the declarant was
liable to Service tax and VAT, etc. 

Some of these issues get answered and addressed by the
amendments proposed in the Income Tax (Second Amendment) Bill, 2016, including
the Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Yojana, 2016 (PMGKY), introduced in Parliament
on 28th November 2016, and passed by the Lok Sabha on the next date
and received the assent of the President on 15th December,
2016. 

In the statement of objects and reasons annexed to the bill,
it has been stated that changes are being made in the Act to ensure that the
defaulting assessees are subjected to tax at a higher rate and stringent
penalty provision. It further  states
that , in the wake of declaring specified bank notes as not legal tender, there
had been representations and suggestions from experts that instead of allowing
people to find illegal ways of converting their black money into black again,
the government should give them an opportunity to pay taxes with heavy penalty
and allow them to come clean so that not only the government gets additional
revenue for undertaking activities for the welfare of the poor, but also the
remaining part of the declared income legitimately comes into the formal
economy. Thus, money coming from additional revenue as a result of the decision
to ban Rs. 1000 and Rs. 500 notes could be utilised for welfare schemes for the
poor. Therefore, an alternative scheme, namely, the Taxation and Investment
Regime for Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Yojna, 2016 (PMGKY) is introduced.

The amendments and PMGKY, like any other legislation,   give rise to some more issues. The major
issues arising out of demonetisation in taxation keeping in mind the amended
law and PMGKY are sought to be discussed in this article.

The issue of validity of demonetization has been referred to
various courts including the Supreme Court. The courts have refused the request
for staying the operation of the notifications issued for demonetization. The
request for extending the time for deposit has also been refused. The courts in
the time to come would be required to address pertinent issues like validity of
the notification particularly in the context of article 14, 19 and 300A of the
Constitution of India, the vires of section 26(2) of the Reserve Bank of India
Act and the powers of the government to restrict the circulation, exchange and
withdrawals of the high denomination notes.

The demonetisation and the Taxation Laws (Second Amendment)
Act, 2016 raised several issues in taxation arising in the varied
circumstances. One of the possibilities is where the cash is deposited in the
bank out of cash on hand as on 08/11/2016 from known or unknown sources of
income or accumulation. Another is where cash has been deposited out of the
receipts on or after 09/11/2016.

In the latter case, the recipient is required to be a person
authorized to receive high denomination notes as per the notifications on or
after 09/11/2016. This permission to receive has ended on 15/12/2016. No person
is authorized to receive such notes thereafter. The person in possession of
such notes is left with no option but to deposit it with specified entities by
30/12/2016 failing which with the special officer of the RBI by 31/03/2017.

In cases of persons authorised to receive cash on or after
09/11/2016, an explanation about genuineness of receipts will be required to be
furnished with evidence of receipt to the satisfaction of the Assessing
Officer. Failure to do so may result in him being taxed as per the provisions
of amended section115BBE of the Income-tax Act.

A question may arise about the possibility of a person opting
for PMGKY in cases where he is in receipt of the currency without any authority
to do so; apparently there does not seem to be any express or implicit
restriction in PMGKY to prevent him from opting for the scheme irrespective of
his authority to receive high denomination notes, post 08/11/2016. The issue of
his authority or otherwise to receive currency will be resolved under the Reserve Bank of India Act and not under the Income Tax Act.

The earlier case of the deposit of cash out of the receipts
up to 08/11/2016 may be dealt with in any one of the following manners;

   Possession explained out of income of the
year or accumulation over the years

   Opting for PMGKY and declare the same and
regularise possession on payment of tax, surcharge and penalty and deposits

  Includes the same in the total income in
filing the return of income for A.Y. 2017-18 and be taxed as per provisions of
the amended section115BBE of the Income-tax Act.

   Does not include the same in the total
income.

Some of these possibilities are sought to be examined in
greater detail hereafter.

When a person deposits such withdrawn notes into his bank
account, there could be various situations under which this is done. If a
person is maintaining books of account, and after 8th November 2016,
deposits or exchanges withdrawn bank notes equal to or less than the balance in
his cash book as of 8th November 2016, there should be no tax
consequence, as disclosed amounts of cash in hand are being deposited pursuant
to the withdrawal of such notes. Such amount would not be taxable. This view is
supported by the decisions in the cases of Sri Ram Tandon vs. CIT (1961) 42
ITR 689 (All), Gur Prasad Hari Das vs. CIT (1963) 47 ITR 634 (All), Narendra G
Goradia vs. CIT (1998) 234 ITR 571 and Lalchand Bhagat Ambica Ram vs. CIT
(1957) 37 ITR 288 (SC).

In Narendra Goradia’s case, the Bombay High Court held that
where the assessee had sufficient cash balance, there was no requirement of law
to maintain details of receipts of currency notes of various denominations
received by the assessee and failure to furnish detailed particulars of source
of acquisition of high denomination notes could not result in an addition to
the income. A similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Mehta
Parikh & Co vs. CIT 30 ITR 181.

When books of account are not maintained by the depositor,
how does he prove that such cash deposit does not represent his undisclosed
income?

Consider a situation where the aggregate amount deposited in
a bank account is less than Rs. 2.50 lakh. Advertisements have been issued by
the Ministry of Finance, stating that deposits of up to Rs. 2.50 lakh will not
be reported to the Income Tax Department. This has been followed by amendments
to Rule 114B (which relates to compulsory quoting of PAN) and Rule 114E
[furnishing of annual information returns (AIR) in respect of specified
transactions], vide Income Tax (30th Amendment) Rules, 2016,
Notification No. 104/2016, F.No.370142/32/2016-TPL dated 15th November
2016.

Rule 114B, which applied to transactions of deposit of cash
exceeding Rs.50,000 in a bank or post office, has now been extended to deposits
aggregating to more than Rs.2.50 lakh during the period from 9th
November to 30th December 2016. A new requirement of furnishing
details through AIR by banks and post offices has been inserted in rule 114E,
requiring furnishing of details of cash deposits made during the period 9th
November to 30th December 2016, if such cash deposits amount to
Rs.12.50 lakh or more in a current account, or Rs.2.50 lakh or more in any
other account. It therefore appears that banks would not be required to furnish
details where a person deposits less than Rs.2.50 lakh in aggregate in a bank
during the period from 9th November to 30th December
2016. However, if the amount of deposit is Rs.2.50 lakh, there would be a
requirement to report in the AIR.

It needs to be kept in mind that mere non-reporting in the
AIR does not mean that the amount of deposits (though less than Rs.2.50 lakh)
is not taxable. Such deposits may escape taxation in the case of a person who
is not an assessee, and does not file his tax returns. However, if the
depositor is an assessee, who files his tax return, the position would be quite
different. If his income tax return is selected for scrutiny, and such deposits
come to the notice of the assessing officer, the depositor would necessarily
have to explain the source of such cash deposits, as in the case of any other
cash deposits which may otherwise have come to the notice of the assessing
officer. There is no exemption provided from such scrutiny.

Where the aggregate amount of cash deposits in a bank or post
office during the relevant period is Rs.2.50 lakh or more (or Rs.12.50 lakh or
more, as the case may be), such deposits would obviously be reported to the
Income Tax Department through an AIR, which has to be filed by 31st January
2017. The source of such deposits will have to be proven by the depositor, when
called upon to do so by the tax authorities.

The Bombay High Court, in the case of Gopaldas T Agarwal
vs. CIT 113 ITR 447,
in the context of section 69B, has held that the
burden is always on the assessee, if an explanation is asked for by the taxing
authorities or the Tribunal, to indicate the source of acquisition of a
particular asset admittedly owned by the person concerned. It will depend upon
the facts of each case to decide what type of facts will be regarded as
sufficient to discharge such onus.

In Bai Velbai vs. CIT 49 ITR 130, the Supreme Court
considered a case where the assessee received certain amount by encashment of
high denomination notes. The ITO held that only part of the said sum could be
treated as savings of assessee and, therefore, assessed balance as income of
assessee from undisclosed sources. The Supreme Court, while allowing the
appeal, observed:

“Prima facie, the question
whether the amount in question came out of the saving or withdrawals made by
the appellant from her several businesses or was income from undisclosed
sources, would be a question of fact to be determined on a consideration of the
facts and circumstances proved or admitted in the case. A finding of fact does not alter its character as one of fact merely because it is itself an
inference from other basic facts.”

If books of account are not maintained, the following factors
would need to be considered in determining the reasonableness of such amount:

1.  Cash in hand as on 31st March 2016
as declared in the return of income for assessment year 2016-17 (particularly
in Schedule AL or in Balance Sheet details filled in the return).

2.  Cash withdrawals from bank accounts during the
period from 1st April 2016 to 8th November 2016.

3.  Income received in cash during the period from
1st April 2016 to 8th November 2016. It needs to be noted that with
effect from 1st June 2016, the provisions of tax collection at
source u/s. 206C at 1% of the sale consideration are applicable to transactions
where the sale of goods or services in cash exceeds Rs.2,00,000. Besides, with
effect from 1st April 2016, there is a requirement u/s. 114E of
furnishing AIR by any person liable for tax audit u/s. 44AB in respect of
receipt of cash payment exceeding Rs.2,00,000 for sale of goods or services.

4.  Any other cash receipts during the period from
1st April 2016 to 8th November 2016.

5.  Cash deposited in the bank during the period
from 1st April 2016 to 8th November 2016.

6.  Personal and other expenditure in cash of the
person and his family during the period from 1st April 2016 to 8th
November 2016. 

Ideally, a cash flow statement should be prepared to show the
cash in hand with the depositor as at 8th November 2016. Reference
may be made to a decision of the Patna High Court in the case of Manindranath
Dash vs. CIT 27 ITR 522,
where the Court held as under:

“The principle is well
established that if the assessee receives a certain amount in the course of the
accounting year, the burden of proof is upon the assessee to show that the item
of receipt is not of an income nature; and if the assessee fails to prove
positively the source and nature of the amount of the receipt, the revenue
authorities are entitled to draw an inference that the receipt is of an income
nature. The burden of proof in such a case is not upon the department but the
burden of proof is upon the assessee to show by sufficient material that the
item of receipt was not of an income character.

In the instant case it was
admitted that the assessee did not maintain any home chest account. It was
further admitted that he did not produce before the income-tax authorities
materials to show what was the disbursement for the various years. Unless the
assessee showed what the amount of disbursement was for the various years, it
was impossible to arrive at a finding that on the material date that is, on the
19-1-1946 the assessee had in his possession sufficient cash balance
representing the value of high denomination notes which were being encashed. It
was necessary that the assessee should have given further material to indicate
what was the disbursement out of the total income and satisfied the authorities
in that manner that on the material date the cash balance in his hand was not
less than the amount of Rs. 28,000 which was the value of the high denomination
notes. It was clear that the income-tax authorities were right in holding that
the assessee had failed to give sufficient explanation of the source and nature
of the high denomination notes which he encashed.

It was therefore, to be held
that the sum of Rs. 13,000 representing high denomination notes encashed on 19-1-1946, was income liable to income-tax.”

How does the depositor prove the reasonableness of the cash
in hand as of 8th November 2016, where the depositor is covered by
the presumptive tax scheme u/s. 44AD, and therefore does not maintain books of
accounts? In such cases, the assessee would in any case be required to maintain
details of turnover, or may be required to maintain books of account under
other laws, such as indirect tax laws. The reasonableness would have to be
judged by the quantum of the turnover of the depositor, in particular, the
turnover in cash, and other cash expenses of the business. Wherever possible, a
cash flow statement should be prepared to prove the reasonableness of the cash
deposited.

If a person covered by section 44AD wishes to offer income
arising from unaccounted sales to tax, it first needs to be verified whether
his turnover would exceed the limits of section 44AD, after including such
unaccounted sales. If so, then normal computation provisions may apply. If his
turnover, after inclusion of such amount, does not exceed the limit u/s. 44AD,
then 8% of the turnover or the actual income, whichever is higher, needs to be
declared. The cash deposits need to be factored in while computing the actual
income for this purpose.

What would be the position of a housewife, who has saved
money out of money received from her husband for household expenses over the
years, and deposits such savings amount in her bank account? Would such deposit
be taxable? If so, in whose hands would it be taxable – of the housewife or her
husband? In such a case, the reasonableness of the amount would have to be
gauged from the quantum of monthly withdrawals for household cash expenses, and
the reasonableness of the period over which the amount is claimed to have been
served. The taxability, if at all, would have to be considered in the hands of
the husband.

In the case of ITO vs. R S Mathur (1982) 11 Taxman
24
, the Patna bench of the Tribunal considered a case where the value of
high denomination notes encashed by the assessee’s wife, was included by the
ITO in the assessee’s assessment as income from undisclosed sources, rejecting
the explanation given by her that the notes were acquired out of savings
effected out of amounts given by her husband for household expenses. The
Tribunal held that the assessee was placed in high position and he was having
income from salary and interest. If the total earnings were taken into
consideration, the possibilities of saving to the extent of value of high
denomination note might not be ruled out. It therefore confirmed the deletion
of the addition.

If the depositor is unable to prove the reasonableness of the
cash deposited on the basis of the surrounding circumstances, and has not
offered such excess cash deposited as his income in his return of income, the
cash deposited in excess of the reasonable amount is liable to tax as his
income under the provisions of section 69A. Any amount taxed u/s. 69A is
taxable at an effective rate of 77.25% under the provisions of section 115BBE,
without any deduction in respect of any expenditure or allowance or set off of
any loss, as discussed above.

However, one also needs to keep in mind the common sense
approach adopted by the courts in similar cases in the past. The explanation
for such income needs to be credible and reasonable, given the facts and
circumstances. In this connection, a useful reference may be made to the
decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sumati Dayal vs. CIT 214 ITR
801 (SC)
. In that case, the assessee claimed to have won 13 jackpots in
horse races during the year. The first jackpot was won on the first day that
she went to the races. The Supreme Court, while holding that it was possible
that the assessee had purchased the winning tickets in cash from the real
winner, and deciding against the assessee, observed:

“Apparent must be considered
real until it is shown that there are reasons to believe that the apparent is
not the real and that the taxing authorities are entitled to look into the
surrounding circumstances to find out the reality and the matter has to be
considered by applying the test of human probabilities.”

Would there be any other consequences if the amount deposited
is declared as business income of the year? One needs to keep in mind the
applicability of an indirect tax liability in respect of the amount of business
income declared, in the form of VAT, excise duty or service tax, depending on
the nature of business.

In case of a medical professional, one also needs to keep in
mind the requirement of keeping a register of patients. The fees indicated in
such register should match with the fees shown as income. Even for other
professionals, the details of the clients could be called for, for verification
of such details of cash alleged to have been received from clients.

Further, in a situation where the business or professional
income for assessment year 2017-18 is significantly higher than normal, and in
subsequent years, a normal lower income is declared, there is a high risk of a
detailed scrutiny in those subsequent years by the tax authorities to verify
whether the income disclosed in those years is correct or not, or has been
suppressed by the assessee. In particular, businesses or professions with large
cash receipts or large cash expenditures would be at higher risk of adjustments
to declared income in subsequent years.

Deposits out of Past Year’s Income or Additions

There may be cases wherein a person seeks to explain the
deposits in the bank by co-relating the deposits with the income of the past
years or out of the additions made in such years in assessing the total income.
In all such cases, the onus will be on the person depositing the money to
reasonably establish that the money so deposited represented the income of the
past years that had remained in cash and such cash was held in the High
Denomination Notes.

In such cases, the
possibility of a levy of penalty on application of Explanation 2 to section
271(1)(c) and/or section 270A(4) and (5) of the Act and now even section 271AAC
will also have to be considered. This is discussed later in this article. It is
seen that the Income Tax Department has issued notices u/s.133(6) for enquiring
into the source of deposits of the High Denomination Notes and in some cases
have carried out survey action u/s.133A. Many cases of search and seizure
action u/s.132 have also been reported. In all such cases, the issue of penalty
requires to be kept in mind. In ordinary circumstances, concealment or
misreporting is ascertained with reference to the Return of Income unless there
is a presumption running against the assesse. In cases of an enquiry u/s.133(6)
and survey u/s.133A, no such presumption is available for the year of notice or
action and, the liability to penalty will be solely determined with reference
to the income disclosed in the Return of Income. A presumption however, runs
against the assesse in cases of search and seizure u/s.132 by virtue of the
fiction available to the Revenue u/s.270AAB of the Act. To avoid the
application of the fiction and the consequential penalty, the person will have
to establish that the income and the consequential deposit thereof are duly
recorded in the books of account on the date of search.

Taxation of notes seized after 8th November 2016

In a case where withdrawn currency notes are seized by the
tax authorities after 8th November 2016 from an assessee who was in
possession of such notes as on 8th November, 2016 , can the assessee
argue that since such withdrawn currency notes are not legal tender after 8th
November 2016, they are not money or valuable article, and hence not
taxable u/s. 69A?

Support for this argument is sought to be drawn from the
decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT vs. Andhra Pradesh
Yarn Combines (P) Ltd 282 ITR 490.
In this case, the High Court held as
under:

“The expression ‘money’ has
different shades of meaning. In the context of income-tax provisions, it can
only be a currency token, bank notes or other circulating medium in general
use, which has the representative value. Therefore, the currency notes on the
day when they were found to be in possession of the assessee should have had
the representative value, namely, it could be tendered as a money, which has
intrinsic value. In the instant case, the final Fact-finding authority, namely,
the Tribunal, after noticing the ordinance issued by the Central Government,
coupled with the fact of the RBI refusing to exchange the high denomination
notes when they were tendered for exchange, concluded that on the day, when the
assessee was found to be in possession of high denomination notes, they were
only scrap of paper and they could not be used as circulating medium in general
use as the representative value and, therefore, it could not be said that the
assessee was in possession of unexplained money. Therefore, the high
denomination notes which were in possession of the assessee could not be said
as ‘unexplained money’, which the assessee had not disclosed in its return of
income and, therefore, it would not warrant levy of penalty u/s. 271(1)(c).”

However, when one examines the facts of that case, the time
limit for exchanging these withdrawn notes with RBI had expired, and in fact,
RBI had refused to exchange the notes.

So far as the current position is concerned, the withdrawn
currency notes, though ceasing to be legal tender, continue to be legal tender
for the purpose of deposit with banks till 30th December 2016, and
can thereafter be exchanged at notified offices of RBI up to 31st March,
2017. It cannot therefore be said, till 31st March, 2017 that the
withdrawn currency notes are not valuable, since they can be exchanged for
other currency notes up to 31st March, 2017 at the Banks or the
Reserve Bank of India. Therefore, until such time as the option of exchange
exists, such withdrawn currency notes are a valuable thing, though maybe not
money and the provisions of section 69A would apply in cases where it is found
in a search action before 31st March, 2017. The ratio of the
Karnataka High Court decision would apply only after the option of exchange
with RBI or with any other authority ceases to exist. The position however
could be different where the assessee is found to have received such notes on
or after 9th November, 2016 even though he was not authorised to
receive such notes.

Taxation of Receipts of high denomination notes post
08.11.2016

Many businesses have received withdrawn currency notes after
8th November 2016, as consideration for sale of goods or services,
or against payment of their outstanding dues, and subsequently deposited such
currency notes in their bank accounts. Can the businesses claim that the source
of deposit of the withdrawn currency notes was such subsequent sales, and that
therefore there is no undisclosed income?

Certain businesses, such as electricity companies, hospitals,
pharmacies, consumer co-operative stores, etc., were permitted to do so,
by specifically providing in a notification that the specified bank notes would
not cease to be legal tender up to a specified period, to the extent of certain
transactions specified in the notification. Such businesses can therefore
legitimately claim that the source of deposit of the withdrawn currency notes
by them in the bank account is on account of such sales or receipts.

The position is a little more complex when it comes to other
businesses not authorised to receive such currency. Attention is invited to the
demonetization of 1978 where besides providing that high denomination bank
notes of certain denominations would cease to be legal tender with effect from
16th January 1978, section 4 of the High Denomination Bank Notes
(Demonetisation) Act, 1978 specifically provided that, save as otherwise
provided under that Act, no person could, after the 16th day of
January 1978, transfer to the possession of another person or receive into his
possession from another person any high denomination bank note. The current
notification issued by the Ministry of Finance does not have a similar
provision apparently prohibiting transfer or receipt of withdrawn bank notes
after 8th November, 2016 so that such notes cease to be a legal
tender. Instead the notification permits a few persons or businesses to receive
such currency and with that by implication provides that all other persons are
prohibited from receiving such currency.

Given the difference between the provisions of the 1978 law
and the 2016 notification, one view is that there is no prohibition of transfer
or receipt of the currency notes which have ceased to be legal tender, if both
the parties to the transaction are willing to transact in such notes. At best,
the recipient of the withdrawn bank notes can claim that the transaction is
void, since the consideration was illegal. As per this view, a business can
therefore transact in such notes, even after 8th November 2016, and
deposit such notes in its bank account before 30th December 2016.

Given the fact that such notes are no longer legal tender,
use of such notes in settlement of legal obligations is impermissible. This view
also draws support from section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1882. Section 23
of the Indian Contract Act reads as under: “23. What consideration and
objects are lawful, and what not.
The consideration or object of an
agreement is lawful, unless it is forbidden by law; or is of such a nature
that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of any law; or is
fraudulent; or involves or implies, injury to the person or property of
another; or the Court regards it as immoral, or opposed to public policy. In
each of these cases, the consideration or object of an agreement is said to be
unlawful. Every agreement of which the object or consideration is unlawful is
void. 

The consideration of a contract to be settled by exchange of
withdrawn currency notes is opposed to public policy, and the consideration is
therefore unlawful, rendering the agreement as void. Further, under the current
demonetisation, by withdrawal of the currency notes as legal tender,
prohibition on their transfer should be implied. Therefore, one cannot claim
set off of such receipts against the deposit of the withdrawn currency notes.
This is also in accordance with the spirit of the action of withdrawal of the
legal tender status of these currency notes.

As far as the position in the Income-tax Act is concerned, it
is to be appreciated that as per one view discussed above, only a limited
number of persons are authorised to accept the high denomination notes, post
08.11.2016, besides the banks. All other persons are prohibited, expressly or
impliedly, to receive and accept such currencies as a medium of transaction. As
a direct off-shoot of this regulation, a person who has received such a
currency on or after 08.11.2016 is not entitled to deposit such a currency in
the bank. Please see Jayantilal Ratanchand Shah (supra) wherein the Apex
Court has held that the Reserve Bank of India was empowered to refuse to accept
the deposit of such notes. On failure to deposit, such a currency received
after 08.11.2016, loses its value and would have no economic worth. In the
circumstances, the person found in possession of such notes so received cannot
be taxed on the strength of its possession unless such currency is found to be
valuable. Please see the decision in the case of CIT vs. Andhra Pradesh Yarn
Combines (P) Ltd. 282 ITR 490 (Karn.).

Interesting issues may arise in a case of a sale of goods, on
or after 9.11.2016 against demonetised currency where he is not an authorised
person to receive such currency. In such a case, a question arises as to
whether the seller can be construed to have sold goods for no economic
consideration and can accordingly not be taxed on so called sale proceeds. If
so, the question will also then arise whether the purchaser of goods can be
subjected to tax u/s. 56(2)(vii) for having acquired the goods for inadequate
or no consideration, in such a case. The issue is likely to be a subject of
debate.

Trusts

The issue of deposits of High Denomination Notes by a
charitable trust and religious trust also requires consideration. A charitable
trust under the law of section 115BBC is liable to be taxed at the maximum
marginal rate in respect of anonymous donations. Such a trust would be required
to declare the identity of the donors to prevent the donation from being taxed u/s.
115BBC. Even in case of a religious trust, there will be an obligation to
establish that the donation in question was received by the trust on or before
08/11/2016.

In this connection, a decision of the Supreme Court in the
case of Jayantilal Ratanchand Shah vs. Reserve Bank of India, 1997 AIR 370,
in the context of the 1978 demonetisation is relevant. In this case, the
petitioner was the chairman of a society which was running a medical dispensary
at Surat. It was collecting funds to construct a public charitable Hospital,
and for that purpose, it had kept donation boxes at Surat and Bombay. On
demonetisation of 16th January 1978, instructions were given to the
office bearers not to accept any deposit or allow anyone to deposit any high
denomination bank notes in the collection boxes after midnight of 16th
January 1978. The collection box at Bombay was opened on 17th
January 1978, and the high denomination bank notes of Rs. 22.11 lakh found in
that were deposited with State Bank of India for exchange. The collection boxes
at Surat were opened on 20th January 1978, and were found to contain
Rs. 34.76 lakh in high denomination bank notes, which were also deposited with
State Bank of India for exchange.

State Bank of India refused to exchange the notes found in
the collection box at Surat on the ground that the Society had not explained
satisfactorily its failure to open the collection boxes immediately after the
issue of the ordinance, and that it had not been established that the notes had
reached the Society before demonetisation. The Central Government dismissed the
appeal again such rejection, pointing out that in the earlier year, the box
collection was only about Rs. 5,000 per month, and that the appellant had not
been able to prove that even in the past the trust was getting donations in
high denomination notes in the charity boxes and that this was a regular
feature.

The Supreme Court upheld the refusal to exchange the notes,
on the ground that the materials on record showed that the reasons which weighed
with the authorities to refuse payment to the Society in exchange of the high
denomination banknotes were cogent, and that the order was not perverse.

The Prohibition of Benami Transactions Act, 2016

The provisions of the Benami Transactions (Prohibitions)
Amendment Act, 2016 passed, on 10.8.2016, has been made effective from 1.11.
2016. Under this Act, holding of the property in the name of a person other
than the owner is an offence and the property so held is made liable to
confiscation and the owner of the property, in addition, is subjected to a fine
and punishment, too. Similarly, holding of the property in a fictitious name is
subjected to the same fate. This legislation should be a deterrent for the
persons holding properties including bank accounts in the name of a benamidar.
For example, deposits of magnitude in Jan Dhan Yojna Accounts. An exception has
been provided for the properties held in the name of a spouse or children,
amongst a few other exceptions. This law is administered by the Income tax
authorities.

The Government has also issued a press release dated 18th
November 2016, clarifying that such tax evasion activities can be made subject
to income tax and penalty if it is established that the amount deposited in the
account was not of the account holder, but of somebody else. Also, as per the
press release, the person who allows his or her account to be misused for this
purpose can be prosecuted for abetment under the Income Tax Act.

Borrowing from Persons Depositing High Denomination Notes

A person borrowing funds from the person who has deposited
demonetised currency will have to satisfy the conditions of section 68 and the
lender may be required to explain his source of the deposits.

Prevention of Money Laundering Act

Use of any ‘proceeds of crime’, for depositing high
denomination notes, will expose a person to the stringent provisions of the
Prevention of Money Laundering Act. This Act covers various offences under 28
different statutes including economic laws like SEBI and SCRA. Any money
received in violation of the provisions of these enactments may be treated as
the ‘proceeds of crime’ and will be subjected to confiscation and fine and
imprisonment for the offender. Any person indulging in conversion of the
prohibited currency may be considered to have committed an offence under the
Indian Penal Code and may be held to be in possession of the proceeds of crime
and may attract punishment under the PMLA.

Non Resident and FATCA

Like other tax payers, a non-resident in possession of the
demonetised currency shall be eligible for depositing the same in the bank
account subject of course to the compliance of the provisions of FEMA. Such a
deposit may be required to be reported by the bank under FATCA.

Case of non- deposit of High Denomination Notes

A person not depositing the demonetised currency by the
prescribed date shall lose the money forever as his holding shall cease to have
any market value.

Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Yojana, 2016

The Finance Act 2016 has been amended by the Taxation Laws
(Second Amendment) Act, 2016, by the insertion of Chapter IX-A and sections
199A to 199R, containing the Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Yojana, 2016 (PMGKY or
‘Scheme’) which scheme has come into force from 17th December 2016. The Money
Bill introduced on 28/11/2016 received the President’s assent on 15th
December 2016. In pursuance of the scheme, the Rules titled the Taxation and
Investment Regime For Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Scheme Rules, 2016 have been
notified on 16/12/2016 under S.O. No. 4059(E) .

The scheme seeks to provide Taxation and Investment Regime
for PMGKY and introduce Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Deposit Scheme (PMGKDS). A
statement dated 26/11/2016 by the Finance Minister explains the objects and
reasons behind introduction of scheme. It records that the scheme is introduced
on receipt of representations and suggestions from expert for stopping illegal
conversion of High Denomination Notes and to provide an opportunity to the tax
evaders to come clean on payment of taxes and to generate additional revenue
for government to be  utilised for
welfare activities and also for the use of funds in formal economy. The funds
to be deposited under PMGKDS are to be utilised for programmes of irrigation,
housing, toilets, infrastructure, primary education, health, livelihood,
justice and equity for poor.

The scheme is a code by itself and overrides the provisions
of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and any Finance Act. It shall come into force from
the date notified by the Central Government and shall remain in force till such
time is repealed by an Act of Parliament. It provides for filing of a
declaration by a person, latest by a date to be notified by the Central
Government (31st March 2017), with the principal commissioner or
commissioner authorised to receive declaration under the notification issued by
the Central Government. The declaration is to be in the prescribed form and is
to be verified in the manner prescribed and signed by the person in accordance
with section 140 of the Income-tax Act. The rules prescribe the Form for
declaration (Form 1), besides for revision of the declaration, issue of a
certificate by the Commissioner (Form 2) and other related things.

Section 199B defines the terms Declarant, Income-tax Act, and
PMGKDS. The term not defined shall take meaning from the Income-tax Act, 1961.
To opt for the scheme is optional and is at the discretion of the person and is
not mandatory for a person to be covered by it. However, a person opting for
the scheme is assured of certain immunities. Any person, whether an individual
or not resident or not, is entitled to make a declaration under the
scheme. 

Under the scheme, a person can make a declaration as per
section 199C in respect of any income chargeable to tax for AY 2017-18 or an
earlier year, in the form of cash or deposit in an account with a specified
entity (which includes a bank, RBI, post office and any other notified entity).
Such income would be taxed without any deduction, allowance or set off of loss.
The tax payable would be 30% of the undisclosed income, plus a surcharge of 33%
of the tax, the total being 39.99% as per section 199D. Further, a penalty of
10% of the undisclosed income as per section 199E would be payable, the
effective payment of tax, surcharge and penalty being 49.9%. No education cess
would be payable. Such tax, surcharge and penalty is to be paid before filing
the declaration as per section 199H and is not refundable in terms of section
199K. Neither ‘income’ nor ‘undisclosed income’ is defined under Chapter IX-A.
While declaration is for income, charge of tax, etc is on undisclosed income.
Proof of payment is to be filed along with the declaration. Any failure to pay
tax, etc as prescribed would result in declaration to be treated as void and
shall be deemed never to have been filed as per section 199M. There is no provision for part payment, at present.

The scheme vide section199F requires making of a deposit of
25% of the undisclosed income as per section 199H declared in the Pradhan
Mantri Garib Kalyan Deposit Scheme, 2016, before making the declaration. The
deposit would be interest-free, and would be for a period of 4 years before
refund. If one takes the opportunity loss of interest on such deposit at 8% per
annum, the effective loss of interest on a pre-tax basis would be 8% of the
declared income over the period of 4 years, but would be about 5.2% on a
post-tax basis. This raises the effective cost under the scheme to 55.1%, as
against 77.25% payable otherwise under the Act. The scheme is therefore an
effective alternative to disclosure as income in the tax return of AY 2017-18.

Section 199-I provides that the amount of undisclosed income
declared in accordance with the scheme shall not be included in the total
income of the declarant for any assessment year under the Income-tax Act.
Further, section 199L provides that nothing contained in the declaration shall
be admissible in evidence against the declarant for the purpose of any
proceeding under any Act, other than the specified Acts in respect of which a
declaration cannot be made, even if such Act has a provision to the contrary.

A declaration in terms of section 199-O, cannot be made by a
person in respect of whom an order of detention has been made under COFEPOSA,
or by any person notified u/s. 3 of the Special Court (Trial of Offences
Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992. A declaration cannot be made
in relation to prosecution for any offence punishable under chapter IX or
chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code, the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances Act, 1985, the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, the Prohibition of Benami Property
Transactions Act, 1988 and the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. It
cannot be made in relation to any undisclosed foreign income and asset
chargeable to tax under the Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income and Assets)
and Imposition of Tax Act, 2015. Unlike under IDS, there is no prohibition on
making of a declaration for any year for which an assessment or reassessment
notice has been issued or in which a survey or search has taken place.

A declarant as per section 199J is not entitled to seek
reopening of any assessment or reassessment or to claim any set off or relief
in any appeal, reference or other proceeding in relation to any such assessment
or reassessment in respect of the undisclosed income which is declared under
the scheme. The tax, surcharge and penalty paid under the scheme is not refundable, section 199K.

Where a declaration has been made by misrepresentation or
suppression of facts or without payment of tax, surcharge or penalty, or
without making the deposit in the deposit scheme as required, such declaration
as per section 199M is void and is deemed never to have been made under the
scheme.

Section 199-I provides that the amount of undisclosed income,
declared in accordance with section 199C, shall not be included in the total
income of declarant for any assessment year under the Income-tax Act. The
income so declared is eligible for being excluded from the total income for any
assessment year. The immunity here is restricted to the total income of the
declarant and, unless otherwise clarified, will not extend to third parties.
This view is further confirmed by the express provisions of section 199P which
for the removal of doubts clarifies that nothing contained in the scheme shall
be constructed as conferring any benefit, concession or immunity on any person
other than the person making the declaration. The language of section 199-I is
clear enough to support the view that the income declared under PMGKY cannot be
included in the book profit for the purposes of levy of the minimum alternative
tax u/s. 115JB of the Income-tax Act, since such book profit is deemed to be
the total income. The language also supports the view that no penalty can be
levied or a prosecution can be launched under the Income Tax Act simply on the
basis of the income declared under the PMGKY. The provisions of sections 199D
and 199E specifically overrides the provisions of the Income-tax Act and also
of any Finance Act. No express provisions, as under the IDS, 2016, are
contained in PMGKY for conferring specific immunity from penalty or prosecution
under the Income-tax Act.

Another important immunity is provided vide section 199L
which expressly provides that anything contained in the declaration shall be
inadmissible in evidence against the declarant for the purpose of any
proceeding under any Act other than those listed in section 199-O. This is a
wide and sweeping immunity and shall help the declarant in keeping a safe
distance from any declaration based liability under any of the indirect tax
laws and also the civil laws. Denial of immunity for the statutes mentioned in
section 199-O is for the reason that the persons or the offences covered
therein are in any case made ineligible for making declaration of undisclosed
income under the scheme. Section 199L further confirms the understanding that
no penalty can be levied or prosecution be launched on the basis of the
declaration, alone.

A care has been taken u/s.199N to ensure the specific
application of sections 119, 138,159 to 180A and 189 of the Income Tax Act to
the declaration made under the scheme. This provision enables the continuity of
the proceedings by the subordinate authorities besides facilitating the making
and filing of declaration in specified cases of fiduciary relationships and
discontinued and dissolved entities. Application of section 138 shall enable
the authorities to restrict the sharing of information in their possession,
unless it is found to be in the public interest to do so.

The Central Government has been empowered vide section 199Q
to pass any order for removing the difficulty within a period of 2 years
provided such order is placed before each house of the Parliament.
Simultaneously the Board is empowered to make rules, by notification, for
carrying out the provisions of the scheme including for providing the form and
manner and verification of the declaration. Such rules when made are required
to be placed before each house of Parliament, while it is in session, for a
total period of 30 days.

The PMGKY contains many provisions similar to the Income
Disclosure Scheme, 2016 (IDS). There however are some important differences
between the PMGKY and IDS, some of which are listed here under:

  An income or undisclosed income is not
defined under the PMGKY while under IDS it was specifically defined to include,
a) Income not declared in an return of income filed u/s. 139, b) An income not
included in the return of income furnished, c) An income that has escaped assessment

  The aggregate rate of tax plus surcharge and
penalty is 49.9% under PMGKY against the aggregate of 45% under the IDS

   The surcharge under the PMGKY is to be used
for the Kalyan of Garib while under the IDS, it is to be used for Kissan Kalyan

   The penalty under PMGKY is levied on the
basis of undisclosed income while under the IDS it was levied on the basis of
tax excluding surcharge

   Under the PMGKY an interest free deposit of
25% or more of undisclosed income is required to be made for a period of 4
years from the date of deposit while IDS did not contain any such provision

  Under PMGKY the payment of taxes, etc is to
be made before filing the declaration, while under IDS such payment can be made
in 3 installments ending with 30.09.2017

  Under PMGKY a declaration is rendered void in
cases of misrepresentation or suppression of facts while under IDS only
declaration by misrepresentation are rendered void

   Under PMGKY a declaration made without
payment of tax, etc is void while under IDS the payment was to be made only on
demand by the Commissioner

   Under PMGKY no specific immunities have been
conferred from levy of wealth tax, application of Benami Transaction Provisions
Act and penalty and prosecution under the Income Tax Act and the Wealth Tax Act
while IDS contains specific provisions to such effect

   Under PMGKY a declaration is not possible in
cases of prosecution under the prohibition of Benami Property Transaction Act,
1988 and Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 while under the IDS there is
no such provision to prevent a person making a declaration for prosecution
under said Acts

  A person in receipt of any notices u/s.
143(2) or 142(1) or 148 or 153A of the Income Tax Act as also a person in
respect of whom a search or survey is carried out or requisition has been made
is not prohibited from making a declaration while under the IDS such a person
was prohibited from making a declaration

   Under PMGKY a declaration is not admissible
as evidence under any Act other than a few specified Acts while under IDS such
a declaration is not admissible as evidence for imposition of a penalty and
prosecution under the Income-tax Act and Wealth Tax Act.

Given the similarity of the provisions to IDS, 2016 the
clarifications issued from time to time under IDS, to the extent that the
language is similar or identical, can perhaps be utilised for understanding
PMGKY as well.

While a declaration can be made only after commencement of
the scheme and the rules and forms have been notified, a declaration can be
made for any deposits or any cash for any assessment year up to assessment year
2017-18. Therefore, even in respect of cash deposits made before or after 8 November,
but prior to the scheme coming into force, a declaration can be made under the
scheme. 

A reading of the statement of objects and reasons leads a
reader to believe that the scheme has been introduced for the purposes of
giving an opportunity, to come clean, to persons who are in possession of the
high denomination notes, for which they do not have any satisfactory
explanation, at a cost which is higher than the cost of the regular tax.

The use of the terms ‘a declaration in respect of any
income, in the form of cash or deposit in an account maintained by a person
with a specified entity chargeable to tax’
in section 199C, where read in
the context of the statement of objects and reasons, means that it is such cash
or deposit held in the high denomination notes that qualifies for the
declaration under the scheme. The language of section 199C, though not
restricting the scope of a declaration to the high denomination notes, has to
be read in a manner that supports the objects and the reasons for introduction
of the PMGKY. Form no.1 and the contents thereon also supports this view. The
form prescribes for the declaration of the amount of cash and deposits with
specified entities. Even the Notification dt.19.12.2016 issued by the RBI
enabling the person to pay tax, etc. and make deposit under the scheme
by use of the high denomination notes, also supports this view. The other view
is that the meaning and the scope of above captioned words,  used in section 199C(1), should not be restricted
to the high denomination notes in as much as the language is clear and
unambiguous so as to include any cash or deposit of any denomination including
of the new currency. This view is further confirmed by the express provisions
of section 199C(1) which enables a declaration of income for any assessment
year commencing on or before 1st April,2017. Obviously, a person
making a declaration for A.Y.2016-17 or earlier years cannot be holding the
declared income in cash since then and that too in the form of the high
denomination notes.

The language of section 199C makes it difficult for a
declarant wishing to come clean by declaring an unaccounted income which had
been used for payment of any expenditure, etc made at any time prior to the
date of commencement of the scheme; the payments might have been made in the
high denomination notes even after 08.11.2016 to authorised persons; even to
unauthorised persons, out of the unaccounted income held in the high
denomination note after 08.11.2016 and the declarant wishes to make a
declaration thereon irrespective of the legality of such payment. The question
also arises about the eligibility of the unauthorised recipient to declare cash
under the scheme and about the value of such cash.

In many a case of undisclosed income received up to
08.11.2016 in cash or by deposit, it is likely that such unaccounted income has
been utilised in acquiring some other asset or in advancing loan and is
therefore not in the form of cash or deposits as on the date of commencement of
the scheme.

The eligibility of such a person to make a declaration under
the scheme becomes contentious and debatable. This difficulty is further
confirmed by a reading of Form 1 which has no space for any such investments
and instead requires the declarant to specify the amount of cash and the
deposits, only. The above difficulties concerning the most important aspect of
declaration i.e. the scope of 
undisclosed income, is best resolved by the Government of India by issue
of appropriate clarification at the earliest.  

Section 115BBE and Amendment

Provisions and Scope

Section 115BBE was introduced by the Finance Act, 2012 w.e.f.
01.04.2013 and applied to assessment year 2013-14 and onwards. It was further
amended by the Finance Act, 2016. The section provided that;

   in computing the total income of a person,
the income referred to in sections 68, 69, 69A, 69B, 69C and 69D (‘specified
income’) no deduction shall be allowed,

   no set-off of loss shall be allowed against
the specified income,

   the specified income so included in the total
income shall be taxed at the rate of thirty per cent, and

  surcharge and the education cess, where
payable, shall be paid at the rate prescribed in the Finance Act of the
respective year.

No separate provisions were made for levy of penalty for the
specified income that are taxed at the rates prescribed u/s.115BBE of the Act.
Accordingly, penalty for concealment, etc where leviable, was leviable as per
section 271(1)(c) or section 270A, as the case may be. Likewise, no separate
provisions for prosecution were specifically prescribed for the specified
income and the provisions for initiating prosecution in regular course were
invoked, where applicable.

The provision did not enable an assessee to voluntarily
include the specified income in filing the return of income and pay tax
thereon.

A view has been prevailing for sometime, which view got
momentum in the wake of demonetisation, holding that an assessee can include an
amount in his total income without specifying the source of income or even the
head of income and voluntarily pay tax thereon; no penalty for concealment, etc
can be levied u/s. 270A of the Act; the provisions for prosecution were
inadequate for prosecuting such a person; such amount when included in the
return of income cannot be assessed u/s.68 to 69D of the Act and as such cannot
be taxed at the rates prescribed u/s.115BBE of the Act.

This view found a great favour with the tax experts during
the period commencing 9th November, 2016, post demonetization. It
is/was believed that any assessee, relying on the view, can deposit the
demonetized currency and offer the amount as his income in filing the return of
income for the assessment year 2017-18 without attracting any penalty and/or
prosecution.

It appears that the Government could not but concur with the
view. Realizing the lacuna in the law, it has amended the provisions of section
115 BBE and simultaneously introduced section 271AAC w.e.f. 1st April,
2017, vide enactment of the Taxation Laws (Second Amendment) Act, 2016 which
received the assent of the President of India on 15th December,
2016. The objects and reasons for amending section 115BBE are found in the
paragraph 2 of the Statement dt. 26th November, 2016 issued by Arun
Jaitley at the time of introducing the Bill. It reads as under; “concerns have
been raised that some of the existing provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961
could possibly be used for concealing black money. It is, therefore, important
that, the Government amends the Act to plug these loopholes as early as
possible so as to prevent misuse of the provisions. The Taxation Laws (Second
Amendment) Bill, 2016, proposes to make some changes in the Act to ensure that
defaulting assessees are subjected to tax at a higher rate and stringent
penalty provisions.”

The    amendment      has 
the effect of substituting sub-section (1) of section 115BBE w.e.f
01.04.2016 and has application to A.Y 2017-18 and onwards. It inter alia ropes in, in its sweep, the
transactions from 1st April, 2016 to 14th December, 2016
and therefore has a retroactive if not retrospective effect.

The implication of amendment is that;

   it applies to any assessee, resident or
otherwise,

   it applies to assessment year 2017-18 and
onwards,

   it enables an assessee to reflect the
specified income in filing the return of income,

   it seeks to tax the specified income at the
rate of sixty per cent and included and reflected in the return of income
furnished u/s.139.

Simultaneously, section 2(9) of Chapter II of the Finance
Act, 2016 has been amended by inserting the Seventh proviso to provide for a
levy of surcharge at the rate of twenty five per cent of tax u/s.115BBE in
payment of advance tax. Education cess at the rate of three per cent will
continue to be levied.

The provision for taxing income at a flat rate, where it is
so assessed by the A.O as per sections 68 to 69D, are retained with the change
that the rates of tax would be sixty percent instead of thirty percent. No
deduction shall be allowed in computing such income and no set-off of loss will
be permissible in view of the provision of sub-section (2) of section 115BBE,
which are retained. No change is made in these provisions.

The amended section 115BBE, read with the Finance Act 2016 as
amended, now provides that, where an assessee, includes the specified income by
reflecting it in his return of income furnished u/s. 139, tax shall be payable
at 60% of such income, plus a surcharge of 25% of such tax (15% of income). The
effective tax rate, including 3% education cess, would therefore be 77.25%

The amendment of section 115BBE is neither restricted to the
high denomination notes nor to A.Y. 2017-18, only. It applies to even that part
of financial year 2016-17 consisting of the period during 01/04/2016 to
14/12/2016. It applies not only to deposits of withdrawn notes on or after
09.11.2016 but any such deposits during the current year, which an assessee has
no explanation for, and to all incomes covered by sections 68, 69, 69A, etc.
Therefore, the new rates of tax, surcharge and penalty would apply to items
such as loans treated as undisclosed cash credits, unexplained jewellery, etc.,
for assessment years 2017-18 and subsequent years.

The provision is wide enough to include a return of income
furnished u/s. 139(1), 139(3), 139(4), 139(4A), 139(4B), 139(4C) and 139(5). A
belated or a revised return can also enable an assessee to reflect the
specified income in his return of income. The option to reflect the specified
income in filing the return of income shall not be available in cases where
return is furnished in response to notice u/s. 142, or 148 or 153A of the Act.

In case the amount is not offered to tax in the return of
income, but the amount is added u/s. 68, 69A, etc by the Assessing Officer,
besides the tax, surcharge and cess of 77.25%, a penalty, at the rate of 10% of
the tax payable u/s. 115BBE(1)(i), would also be payable under the newly
inserted section 271AAC.

To include the specified income in total income is at the
discretion of the assessee. It is not mandatory for an assessee to do so and
pay tax voluntarily on such income. He may not do so where he is of a belief
that he will be able to explain to the satisfaction of the A.O that a
particular credit, money, investment, etc. does not represent any income.

Obviously, these provisions can apply only if the deposit is
in the nature of income, which is chargeable to tax. In other words, all such
deposits are not taxable. It is clear that such deposits can be regarded as
income only under certain circumstances.

Penalty u/s. 271AAC

Section 271AAC has been introduced simultaneously to provide for a levy of penalty at the rate of ten percent of the tax payable u/s.115BBE. The new section provides that;

  income referred to in sections 68 to 69D
shall be liable to penalty on its determination as income,

   penalty will be levied at the rate of ten
percent of the tax payable u/s.115BBE,

  levy of penalty is at the discretion of the
A.O,

  provisions of section 271AAC are applicable
for assessment year 2017-18, onwards,

   the provisions override any provisions of the
Act other than the provisions of section 271AAB which deal with the levy of
penalty in search cases,

  no penalty shall be levied u/s.270A in cases
where a penalty is levied u/s.271AAC,

  provision of section 274 shall apply
requiring the A.O.to follow the procedure prescribed therein,

  provision of section 275 shall apply
requiring the A.O to pass an order of penalty within the prescribed time,

–    importantly no penalty shall be levied where
an assessee has reflected the specified income in the return of income
furnished u/s.139 and has paid taxes on such income as per section 115BBE, on
or before the end of the relevant year,

   provisions of section 273B are not
specifically made applicable to the case of an income assessed as per section
115BBE. The said section provides that no penalty shall be imposable on a
person where he proves that there was a reasonable cause for the failure for
which the penalty is sought to be levied. In view of the fact that the levy of
penalty u/s. 271AAC is discretionary, it appears that no penalty will be levied
in the presence of a reasonable cause, and

   an assessee would not have the benefit of
waiver u/s. 270AA or 273A of the Income-tax Act.

Would the amount of such penalty be 6% of such income, or
7.725% of such income? The view that the amount of penalty would be 6%, draws
support from the fact that the reference in section 271AAC is to a specific
clause of the Act, namely section 115BBE(1)(a) where the rate of tax provided
for is flat 60%. Effective outgoing would be 83.25% in this case. The other
view is based on the fact that the term “tax” has been defined in section 2(43)
to mean tax chargeable under the provisions of the Act. Section 2 of the
Finance Act increases the amount of tax by a surcharge (which includes a cess),
but the nature of the entire amount remains a tax. Under this view, the tax
payable u/s. 115BBE(1)(i) is 77.25%, and therefore the penalty would be 10% of
this rate. Outgoing would be 84.97% in this case.

In the context of demonetisation, the applicability of the
above discussed provisions of section 115BBE and section 271AAC requires
consideration. As noted, the Government has introduced the provisions with the
object of plugging the loophole used for concealing black money and to prevent
misuse of the existing provisions. With this object in mind, an alternative has
been provided to the assesses to come clean, in cases where a declaration has
not been filed under PMGKY, by including the cash or deposits in the total
income and pay tax thereon by 31.03.2017 and reflect such income in furnishing
the return of income u/s. 139 of the Act.

The amended section 115BBE r.w.s. 271AAC surely provides a
way for the holders of unexplained high denomination notes to come clean
without penalty and prosecution on payment of taxes. No deposits are to be made
for any period as is required under the PMGKDS.

Strangely, any person is entitled to opt for being taxed as
per section 115BBE irrespective of the legality or otherwise of the source of
his income. Any of the persons, otherwise considered to be ineligible for
filing a declaration under the BMA 2015, IDS 2016 or PMGKY, 2016 can claim to
be taxed u/s. 115BBE without any limitation as to the nature and source of his
income. Again, the right to opt for section 115BBE is not limited by any
inquiry or investigation or the resulting detection, other than the one in
consequence of a search action u/s. 132 of the Act.

In many cases, one might find the rate of taxation u/s.
115BBE to be beneficial even where one were to take into consideration the
penalty u/s. 271AAC. The maximum rate together would be 84.97% and the minimum
would be 77.25%. Now in an ordinary case, this rate can be 102% of the income
(34% tax, etc plus 68% penalty) involving cases of misreporting otherwise
liable to a penalty at the rate of 200% of the tax sought to be evaded. This
surely is providing for a beneficial treatment to persons being taxed as per
section 115BBE.

Not all income is taxable u/s. 68 to Section 69D

If the value of such notes deposited exceeds the cash in hand
as per books of account as of 8th November 2016, the difference
would be taxable as the income of the depositor. If the depositor on his own
offers the income to tax as his income, would tax be payable thereon at the
rate specified under the amended section 115BBE? Section 115BBE applies when
provisions of sections 68, 69, 69A, 69B, 69C or 69D are applicable.

If an assessee offers such amount to tax in his return of
income and pays tax thereon at normal rates of tax, but is unable to explain
the source of such income to the satisfaction of the assessing officer, can an
assessing officer invoke the provisions of section 68 or 69A read with section
115BBE, and levy the tax on such amount at the flat rate of 60% plus applicable
surcharge and cess? Do the provisions of section 68 or 69A, which deem certain
amounts to be income of the assessee, apply to amounts which have already been
disclosed as income of the assessee?

It needs to be emphasized that provisions of section 68 to
section 69D are apparently invoked in cases where an assessee is unable to
explain the source of a particular receipt, money, investment, expenditure, etc
or part thereof to the satisfaction of the Assessing Officer. These provisions
have no application in cases where an assessee has been able to explain the
source of his receipt, etc. and in such cases the income reflected in filing
the return of income shall not be taxed at 77.25% of such income.

Sections 68 and 69A create certain deeming fictions, whereby
certain amounts which are not considered as income by the assessee, are deemed
to be income of the assessee. A deeming fiction of income cannot apply to an
item which is already treated as income by the assessee himself. The question
of deeming an item to be income can only arise if the item is not otherwise an
income.

The Delhi High Court, in the case of DIT(E) vs. Keshav
Social and Charitable Foundation (2005) 278 ITR 152,
considered a situation
where the assessee, a charitable trust, had disclosed donations received by it
as its income, and claimed exemption u/s. 11. The Assessing Officer, on finding
that the assessee was unable to satisfactorily explain the donations and the
donors were fictitious persons, held that the assessee had tried to introduce
unaccounted money in its books by way of donations and, therefore, the amount
was to be treated as cash credit u/s. 68. The Delhi High Court held that
section 68 did not apply, as the assessee had disclosed such donations as its
income.

This view is also supported by the income tax return forms,
where Schedule SI – Income Chargeable to Tax at Special Rates, does not include
section 1115BBE, though it includes section 115BB. In addition, a useful
reference may be made to Schedule OS, Entry 1(d) and Guidance (iii) thereto and
Instruction 7(ii)(29) appended to the Return of Income.

In our considered opinion, the language of the amended
provision of section 115BBE does not cover the case of a person declaring his
income voluntarily for explaining a deposit or cash on hand. The legislature,
for taxing a voluntarily declared income, is required to amend the provisions
of sections 68 to 69D so as to cover any income for which a satisfactory
explanation as to its source is not furnished by the assessee. It is only on
inclusion of such an income that the provisions of section 115BBE, can be made
applicable for taxing such income at the rate of 77.25%; till such time the
provisions of section 68 to section 69D are not amended, the issue in our
humble opinion would remain at the most debatable.

Other Important aspects

One needs to examine the following where an assessee includes
an income, otherwise unexplained, in filing his return of income and pays tax
as per section 115BBE of the Act.

   Whether the specified income so offered for
tax as per section 115BBE will be accepted by the A.O. without any inquiry and
additions for the year or for any other year,

   Whether any penalty be levied for tax on
additions,

   Whether the person offering such income be
prosecuted under the Income-tax Act,

   Whether there is any immunity from sharing
information with other authorities,

  Whether there is any immunity from
applicability of provision of other laws including indirect tax laws,

   Whether there is any saving from
applicability of the MAT, and

   Whether a person can include the specified
income in the return of income even inquiry and investigation.

Estimation And Assumption; A person in cases where
income is offered under Return of Income voluntary offering to be covered by
amended section 115BBE for A.Y. 2017-18 onwards depositing the high
denomination notes should pass appropriate accounting entries in the book of
accounts maintained by him besides making appropriate noting in the bank slips.
Entries supporting the income, received in high denomination notes, would be
independent of the entries supporting the deposit of such high denomination
notes in the bank. In cases where these entries are found to be false, the
Assessing Officer would be entitled to reject the books of account and estimate
the income, on application of s.145 of the Act. Such a possibility is not
altogether ruled out. Even in cases where a person is unable to explain the
source of income or produce satisfactory evidences in support thereof, there
may be a possibility of estimation of income for preceding previous years.
Please see Anantharam Veerasinghaiah 123 ITR 457 (SC) wherein the Court
held that “There can be no escape from the proposition that the secret
profits or undisclosed income of an assessee earned in an earlier assessment
year may constitute a fund, even though concealed, from which the assessee may
draw subsequently for meeting expenditure or introducing amounts in his account
books. But it is quite another thing to say that any part of that fund must
necessarily be regarded as the source of unexplained expenditure incurred or of
cash credits recorded during a subsequent assessment year. The mere
availability of such a fund cannot, in all cases, imply that the assessee has
not earned further secret profits during the relevant assessment year. Neither
law nor human experience guarantees that an assessee who has been dishonest in
one assessment year is bound to be honest in a subsequent assessment year. It
is a matter for consideration by the taxing authority in each case whether the
unexplained cash deficits and the cash credits can be reasonably attributed to
a pre-existing fund of concealed profits or they are reasonably explained by
reference to concealed income earned in that very year. In each case, the true
nature of the cash deficit and the cash credit must be ascertained from an
overall consideration of the particular facts and circumstances of the case.
Evidence may exist to show that reliance cannot be placed completely on the
availability of a previously earned undisclosed income. A number of
circumstances of vital significance may point to the conclusion that the cash
deficit or cash credit cannot reasonably be related to the amount covered by
the intangible addition but must be regarded as pointing to the receipt of
undisclosed income earned during the assessment year under consideration. It is
open in to the revenue to rely on all the circumstances pointing to that
conclusion”.

Can an assessing officer question the year of taxability of
the income, and seek to tax the income in earlier years, on the ground that
based on the past years’ tax returns, it was impossible for the depositor to
have earned such a large amount within the short period of 7 months from 1st
April to 8th November 2016?

In Gordhandas Hargovandas vs. CIT 126 ITR 560, in the
context of section 69A, the Bombay High Court held that section 69A merely
gives statutory recognition to what one may call a commonsense approach. It
does not bring on the statute book any artificial rule of evidence, a presumption
or a legal fiction. It contains an approach which, if applied, to any
particular assessment cannot be regarded as contravening any principle of law
or any rule of evidence. In that case, there was no material on record to show
that the said amounts related to the income of the assessees for any earlier
year or any year other than the year under consideration. If there was no
material on record, then, the High Court held that the amounts which
represented the sale proceeds of the gold must be regarded as the assessee’s
income from undisclosed sources in the years in question, in as much as they
were introduced in the books at the relevant time. 

If the assessing officer contends that the income should not
be wholly added as income for a particular year, and that it should be spread
over or that it should be liable to be considered as income for another year,
the onus will be upon the assessing officer to point out the material or
circumstance which supports the argument. In the absence of any material or
circumstance, the income cannot be treated as the income of another year.

Further, in a situation where the business or professional
income for assessment year 2017-18 is significantly higher than normal, and in
subsequent years, a normal lower income is declared, there is a high risk of a
detailed scrutiny in those subsequent years by the tax authorities to verify
whether the income disclosed in those years is correct or not, or has been
suppressed by the assessee. In particular, businesses or professions with large
cash receipts or large cash expenditures would be at higher risk of adjustments
to declared income in subsequent years.

Penalty; Needless to say that in cases of estimation
of income, the difference between the returned income and the assessed income
may be exposed to the penalty unless it is established that no penalty shall be
levied in as much as neither there was any under reporting of the income by
virtue of clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (6) of section 270A of the Act nor
there was an addition as that could be said to have been made u/s. 68 to 69D
read with section 115BBE so as to attract the penalty under newly introduced
section 271AAC of the Income-tax Act.

In cases wherein a person seeks to explain the deposits in
the bank by co-relating the deposits with the income of the past years or out
of the additions made in such years in assessing the total income, as discussed
earlier, the onus will be on the person depositing the money to reasonably
establish that the money so deposited represented the income of the past years
that had remained in cash and such cash was held in the high denomination
notes.

One will also have to examine the possibility of a levy of
penalty on application of Explanation 2 to section 271(1)(c) and/or section
270A(4) and (5) of the Act. A person, supporting the deposits on the basis of
additions made in the preceding previous years, would be exposed to penalty
under a deeming fiction of Explanation 2 to section 271(1)(c). The Explanation
provides that a penalty would be levied, in the year of addition, once a person
is found have correlated his deposit or investment in any other year with the
additions so made. Of course, no penalty would be levied second time in a case
where a penalty was already levied on the basis of addition made in the
preceding previous year. The provisions of sub-sections (4) and (5) of the
newly inserted section 270A will also have to be kept in mind, which
provisions, if not negotiated out of, may cause avoidable trouble for A.Y
2017-18 or thereafter, as well.

Can penalty be levied for concealment u/s. 270A, in a
situation where the assessee himself has disclosed such income in his return of
income but not u/s. 115 BBE? Penalty u/s. 270A is leviable if there is
under-reporting of income or misreporting of income. Section 270A(2) defines
what is under-reporting of income. A person is considered to have
under-reported his income, inter alia, if the income assessed is greater
than the income determined in the return processed u/s. 143(1)(a), or the
income assessed is greater than the maximum amount not chargeable to tax, in a
case where no return of income has been furnished. Therefore, where an item of
income is included in the return of income, such an item would also be part of
the income determined in the return processed u/s. 143(1)(a). When such item of
income is again assessed as part of the total income in an assessment u/s.
143(3), since the item of income is included in both the intimation u/s.
143(1)(a) as well as in the assessment order u/s. 143(3), it would not result
in a difference between the two incomes. Therefore, in effect, such income
reported in the return of income cannot be regarded as under-reporting of
income.

Section 270A(9) lists out cases of misreporting of income. It
includes, inter alia, misrepresentation or suppression of facts, failure
to record investments in the books of account, recording of any false entry in
the books of account, and failure to record any receipt in books of account
having a bearing on total income. However, sub-section (9) of section 270A
refers to sub-section (8) of the same section. It provides that the cases of
misreporting of income referred to in s/s. (8) shall be the following. If one
examines the provisions of s/s. (8), it provides that where under-reported
income is in consequence of any misreporting thereof by any person, the penalty
shall be equal to 200% of the amount of tax payable on underreported income.
Therefore, for an item to amount to misreporting of income, it has first to be
in the nature of under-reporting of income. It is only then that one can say
that it is a case of misreporting of income. Further, the computation of the
penalty would also fail if there is no under-reported income, since the penalty
is equal to 200% of the amount of tax payable on under-reported income.

From the above, it is clear that no penalty u/s. 270A can be
levied in a situation where the excess amount of withdrawn notes deposited into
a bank account are disclosed in the return of income filed for assessment year
2017-18 unless such amount is assessed to tax as per the provisions of sections
68 to 69 D, in which case the penalty will be leviable u/s. 271AAC, alone.

Prosecution; Doubts have been raised about the
possible application of the provisions of section 276C, section 277, section
277A and section 278 for initiating the prosecution in cases where an income is
included in the total income by filing ROI for A.Y 2017-18 for supporting the
deposit of the high denomination notes. The doubts arise in both the cases;
where return is filed in accordance with the provisions of section 115BBE or
where it is not so filed but in both the cases the income is included in the
total income in filing the return of income.

Section 276C deals with the offense of the willful attempt to
evade any tax, penalty or interest chargeable or imposable under the Act or
where he under reporting of income. This provision is independent of levy of
penalty. An Explanation to section 276C expands the scope of the provision to
cover the cases of a false entry or statement or omission to make an entry
besides causing circumstances for enabling evasion of tax. The person convicted
of offense in such a case is punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term
ranging between 6 months to 7 years depending upon the quantum of evasion of
tax. In addition such a person is liable to a fine of an unspecified amount.
While the scope of the provision is wide so as to it cover a range of cases,
the provisions in our opinion would not be attracted in a case where the
assesse has included an income corresponding to the amount of deposit of High
Denomination Notes in filing the Return of Income in as much as no tax, etc.
could be said to have been evaded by him and in the absence of any evasion, the
provisions including the deeming fiction should fail to apply.

A person consciously making a statement, in any verification
or delivering an account which is false, is punishable u/s.277 for a term
ranging between 6 months to 7 years. In addition such a person is liable to
fine of an unspecified amount. This provision is not specifically made
independent of levy of penalty. The prosecution under clause (i) here (like
section 276C) is based on the quantum of the tax sought to be evaded. Hence in
cases where the assessee has included the income in the Return of Income and
paid tax thereon, there would not be any basis for initiating prosecution.
However, under cl. (ii) of section 277 a prosecution may still be possible for
the reason that the said clause permits the punishment independent of the
quantum of tax sought to be evaded. Needless to say that the burden of proof
for establishing the falsity of the statement, etc. shall always be on the
Revenue.

 Section 277A provides
for prosecuting a person who is found guilty of making an entry or a statement
which is false with the intent to enable other person to evade any tax, etc.
and on being proved guilty is liable for an imprisonment for a term ranging
between 3 months to 2 years. In addition, such a person is liable to fine of an
unspecified amount. This provision, unlike section 276C is not specifically
made independent of levy of penalty. Again the provision of section 277A is
related to the evasion of tax and in the absence of any evasion of tax, etc. in our opinion, the provisions might not apply unless the
Revenue establishes an evasion of tax by the other person.

Unlike section 276C, prosecution u/s. 277, 277A and 278 is
not specifically made without prejudice to levy of penalty. In the
circumstances, it may be possible to contend that a prosecution is not possible
in a case where no penalty is leviable under the Act. Please see the decision
of the Supreme Court in the case of K. C. Builders vs. ACIT, 265 ITR 562
(SC).

Abetting or inducing another person to make an account or a
statement or a declaration, relating to an income chargeable to tax, which is
false is liable for prosecution u/s.278 of the Act. Similarly, abetting a
person to commit an offense of willful evasion of tax, etc. u/s.276C is
also liable for prosecution u/s.278. In both the cases the punishment ranges
for a term of 6 months to 7 years. In addition such a person is liable to fine
of an unspecified amount. This provision, unlike section 276C is not
specifically made independent of levy of penalty. Once again the prosecution
under clause (i) here is based on the quantum of the tax sought to be evaded
and in cases where the assesse has included the income in the Return of Income
and paid tax thereon, in our opinion there would not be any basis for
initiating prosecution. However, under cl. (ii) of section 278 a prosecution
may still be possible for the reason that the said clause permits the
punishment independent of the quantum of tax sought to be evaded. Needless to say
that the burden of proof for establishing the falsity of the statement, etc.
shall always be on the Revenue. Section 138 protects a person for
confidentiality for the information declared in the Return of Income unless it
is in public interest to do so. Obviously, the protection here is not
comparable to the one available under IDS 1 and IDS 2.

Indirect tax laws and confidentiality: No immunity of
any nature is available under any of the other laws, including indirect tax
laws, in respect of the specified income. Neither is any special immunity
available for the confidentiality of the declaration other than the one
available u/s. 138 of the Income-tax Act.

MAT and High Denomination Notes: In case of a company,
the Income declared in the Return of Income for A.Y. 2017-18, representing the
demonetised currency, shall also be a part of the book profit and will be
subjected to MAT u/s. 115JB of the Act.

Enquiry and Investigations before filing Return of Income:
It is seen that the Income-tax Department has issued notices u/s.133(6) for
enquiring into the source of deposits of the High Denomination Notes and in
some cases have carried out survey action u/s.133A. A few cases of search and
seizure action u/s.132 have also been reported. In all such cases, the issue of
penalty u/s. 270A and for section 271AAC requires to be kept in mind. In
ordinary circumstances, concealment or misreporting is ascertained with
reference to the Return of Income unless there is a presumption running against
the assesse. In cases of an enquiry u/s.133(6) and survey u/s.133A, no such
presumption is available for the year of notice or action and, the liability to
penalty will be solely determined with reference to the income disclosed in the
Return of Income.

A presumption however, runs against the assessee
in cases of search and seizure u/s.132 by virtue of the fiction available to
the Revenue u/s. 271AAB of the Act. To avoid the application of the fiction and
the consequential penalty, the person will have to establish that the income
and the consequential deposit
thereof are duly recorded in the books of account on the date of search.

Exports – Write-Off, Netting off Etc

Background

The
Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (“FEMA”) and Rules and Regulations issued
thereunder came in force from 1st June 2000. Since then, over last
16 years, they have undergone several changes.

Beginning
December 2015, RBI is issuing Revised Notifications in substitution of the
original Notifications issued on May 3, 2000. Previously, annually on July 1
RBI was issuing Master Circulars with shelf life of one year. In another
change, from January 1, 2016, most of the Master Circulars have been
discontinued and substituted with Master Directions (except in case of –
Foreign Investment in India, Money Transfer Service Scheme and Risk Management
and Inter-Bank Dealings). Unlike the Master Circulars, the Master Directions
will be updated on an ongoing basis, as and when any new Circular/Notification
is issued.
However, in case of any conflict between the relevant Notification and the
Master Direction, the relevant Notification will prevail.

Concept
and Scope

The
objective of this column is to revisit certain topics on a quarterly, covering
aspects or amendments in Rules or Regulations of FEMA (excluding the procedural
aspects) which may have practical significance for professional brethren. The
issues relating to write-off of export proceeds and some other issues connected
therewith are being discussed to begin with.

Export
of Goods and Services

Vide Notification No. FEMA
23(R)/2015-RB dated January 12, 2016, RBI notified Foreign Exchange Management
(Export of Goods and Services) Regulations, 2015. This Notification repeals and
substitutes Notification No. FEMA 23/2000-RB dated 3rd May 2000 which had
notified Foreign Exchange Management (Export of Goods and Services)
Regulations, 2000.

This
Article discusses the following aspects in the context of exports by domestic
tariff area units (i.e., units other than those located in SEZ).

1.  Reduction
in invoice value.

2.  Extension
of time.

3.  Write-off
of unrealised export bills.

4.  Set-off
of export receivables against import payables.

1.  Reduction in invoice value

a.  On
account of prepayment of usance bills

     Most
of the export transactions are on credit. Thus, the price negotiates also
includes certain credit period. However, sometimes the overseas importer may
desire to discharge purchase consideration before the due date if such
pre-payment is beneficial. The importer and the exporter negotiate the
consideration for such pre-payment. The consideration is generally linked to
the prevailing interest rates and the period and is by way of discount for
pre-payment by reduction in the invoice value.

     Presently,
in case of pre-payment, FEMA permits an Indian exporter to reduce the invoice
value by allowing cash discount equivalent to the interest on the unexpired
period of usance. This discount is to be calculated at the rate of interest
stipulated in the export contract. If such rate is not stipulated in the
contract, prime rate/LIBOR of the currency of invoice is to be applied.

b.  On
account of change of buyer / consignee

     Sometimes,
after the goods are shipped, it may so happen that the original buyer defaults
or does not pay for the goods. Having the goods shipped back to India will
result in substantial expenses.

     In
such case, the exporter may consider selling goods to another buyer. Therefore,
FEMA permits the exporter to transfer the goods to another buyer, whether in
the same country or any other country. Further, knowing the predicament of the
exporter, the new buyer will attempt to negotiate a lower price. Hence, for
change of buyer/consignee in such case, or selling the goods at a lower price,
the exporter is not required to obtain prior permission of RBI if the following
conditions are fulfilled.

i.  The
reduction in value of the invoice due to such change is not more than 25% of
the value of the original invoice.

ii.  The
export proceeds must be realised within 9 months from the date of export to the
original buyer/consignee.

     However,
prior permission of RBI is required if either of the above conditions are not
fulfilled. RBI may grant such permission provided:

i.   Exports
do not relate to export of commodities subject to floor price stipulations;

ii.  Exporter
is not on the exporters’ caution list of the Reserve Bank; and

iii.  Exporter
has surrendered proportionate export incentives availed of, if any.

c.  In
any other case
 

This
category covers cases of exporters who are in the business of export for more
than three years and cases of other exporters.

In
case of exporters who are in the business of export for more than three years,
banks may permit reduction in invoice value without any limit if: –

i.  Export
outstanding (excluding outstanding of exports made to countries facing
externalisation problems in cases where the buyers have made payments in local
currency) do not exceed 5% of the average annual export realisation during the
preceding three financial years.

ii.  Exports
do not relate to export of commodities subject to floor price stipulations.

iii.  Exporter
is not on the exporters’ caution list of the Reserve Bank.

iv. Exporter
has surrendered proportionate export incentives availed of, if any.
 

In
other cases, banks may permit reduction in invoice value if: –

i.   Reduction
does not exceed 25% of the value of invoice.

ii.  Exports
do not relate to export of commodities subject to floor price stipulations.

iii.  Exporter
is not on the exporters’ caution list of the Reserve Bank.

iv. Exporter
has surrendered proportionate export incentives availed of, if any.
 

If
an exporters case is not covered in either of the above situations, prior
permission of RBI needs to be obtained before reducing the value of invoice.

2.  Extension of time

Every
exporter of goods / software / services is required to realise and repatriate
the full value of exports (export proceeds) within nine months from the date of
export. In case of exports made to the exporter’s own warehouse outside India
the export proceeds must be realised within fifteen months from the date of
shipment of goods.

However,
many times it may not be possible to realise and repatriate the export proceeds
within the stipulated time. In such cases, banks are authorised to grant
extension of six months for realisation of export proceeds subject the
following conditions.

i. Export
transactions covered by the invoices are not under investigation by Directorate
of Enforcement/Central Bureau of Investigation or other investigating agencies.

ii.  Banks
are satisfied that the exporter has not been able to realise export proceeds
for reasons beyond his control.

iii.  Exporter
submits a declaration that the export proceeds will be realised during the
extended period.

iv. The
total outstanding of the exporter should not exceed US $ one million or 10% of
the average export realisations during the preceding three financial years,
whichever is higher. However, if the exporter has filed suits abroad against the buyer, extension can be granted by the banks irrespective of the amount
involved / outstanding.
 

If
an exporter’s case is not covered by any of the above situations, then
permission from concerned Regional
Office of RBI has to be obtained for extension of time for realization and
repatriation of export proceeds.

3.  Write-off of unrealised export bills

Some
stakeholders appear to be under an impression that pursuant to liberalisation,
permission of RBI is no longer required for writing off unrealised export
proceeds. In practice, this is not the case. Unrealised export proceeds only
within certain limit can be written off without obtaining prior permission from
RBI, while certain amounts can be written off only after obtaining prior
approval from RBI.

It
is pertinent to know that there are no specific provisions / formats with
respect to export of services that need to be complied with / submitted.
However, the general principles governing export of goods relating to export
realisation, etc. also apply to export of services.

Write-offs
may be full write-offs or partial write-offs. This may be necessary due to
several reasons such as, non-receipt of payment, early receipt of payment,
damage to goods in transit, export of goods of a different quality, etc.

a.  Write-off
due to non-receipt of payment

Sometimes,
it may not be possible for an exporter to realize the amounts due against the
export of goods / software / services. There may be varied reasons for this
non-realisation. In such cases the exporter is forced to write-off the
unrealised amount.

Depending
on the amount to be written off as well as certain other conditions, the
exporter can:

(a) write-off
the unrealised amount without obtaining permission from his bank or from RBI;
or

(b) approach
the bank which handled the relevant export documents and request permission to
write-off the unrealised amount; or

(c) approach
the concerned Regional Office of RBI through the bank which handled the
relevant export documents, for permission to write-off the unrealised amount.

To
qualify for write-off, either self write-off or otherwise: –

i.   The
unrealised amount must be outstanding for more than one year.

ii.  Exporter
must produce satisfactory documentary evidence to prove that he has made all
efforts to realise the unrealised amount.

iii.  Non-realisation
must be for one of the following reasons: –

a)  The overseas buyer is insolvent and a certificate
from the official liquidator indicating that there is no possibility of
recovery of export proceeds is obtained.

b)  The
overseas buyer is not traceable over a reasonably long period of time.

c)  The
goods exported have been auctioned or destroyed by the Port / Customs / Health
authorities in the importing country.

d)  The
unrealised amount represents the balance due in a case settled through the
intervention of the Indian Embassy, Foreign Chamber of Commerce or similar
Organization.

e)  The
unrealised amount represents the undrawn balance of an export bill (not
exceeding 10% of the invoice value) remaining outstanding and is unrealisable
despite all efforts made by the exporter.

f)   The
cost of resorting to legal action is disproportionate to the unrealised amount
of the export bill.

g)  The
exporter even after winning the Court case against the overseas buyer is not
able to execute the Court decree due to reasons beyond his control.

h)  Bills
were drawn for the difference between the letter of credit value and actual
export value or between the provisional and the actual freight charges but the
amounts have remained unrealised consequent on dishonor of the bills by the
overseas buyer and there are no prospects of realisation.

It
may be noted that adequate documentary evidence may be required to be provided
to substantiate the write-off.

Write-off
will not be permitted in the following cases: –

i.   Exports
have been made to countries with externalisation problem i.e. where the
overseas buyer has deposited the value of export in local currency but the
amount has not been allowed to be repatriated by the central banking
authorities of the country.

ii. Export
Declaration Form (EDF) is under investigation by agencies like, Enforcement
Directorate, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, Central Bureau of
Investigation, etc.

iii.  Outstanding
bills which are subject matter of civil / criminal suit.

Limits for write-offs (by self or through bank permission)

 

 

Write-off”
by

Permitted write-off as a

% of the total export proceeds

realised during the

previous calendar year

Self “write-off” by an exporter (Other

than Status Holder Exporter)

5%

Self “write-off” by Status Holder

Exporters

10%

“Write-off” by Bank which handled the

export documents

10%

The limits stated above are
related to total export proceeds realised during the previous calendar year and
are cumulatively available in a year.

Before write-off is possible, the
exporter has to surrender the export incentives, if any, availed in respect of
the amount to be written-off and submit documents evidencing the same to the
bank.

Also, in case of self write-off,
the exporter has to submit to the bank, a Chartered Accountant’s certificate,
containing the following information: –

i.   Amount of export realisation in
the preceding calendar year.

ii.  Amount of write-off already
availed of during the current year, if any.

iii.  Details of the relevant EDF to
be written off.

iv. Details of invoice no., invoice
value, commodity exported, country of export.

v.  Surrender of export benefits, if
any, availed in respect of the amount to be written-off. 

Further, banks are required to
report the write-off of unrealised export proceeds (self-write-off or
otherwise) through EDPMS to RBI.

All cases of a write-off which are
not covered by the above criteria are to be referred to the concerned Regional
Office of RBI for its approval.

b. Write
off in cases of payment of claims by ECGC and private insurance companies
regulated by Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (IRDA)

If though the Indian exporter had
not realised the export proceeds from the overseas buyer, but received the
corresponding amount from either ECGC or from an Insurance company, the bank
which handled the export documents can write-off the unrealised amount (without
any limit) after receiving an application along with supporting documentary
evidence from the exporter.

The surrender of export incentives
will be as provided in the Foreign Trade Policy (FTP). However, the amount so
realised / recovered from ECGC / insurance company by the Indian exporter will
not be treated as export realisation in foreign exchange.

c.  Write-off
relaxation

In case of write-off other than
self-write-off, realisation of export proceeds will not be insisted upon under
any of the Export Promotion Schemes that are covered under FTP if: –

i.  RBI / bank has permitted the
write off on the basis of merits, as per extant guidelines.

ii.  The exporter produces a
certificate from the Foreign Mission of India concerned, about the fact of
non-recovery of export proceeds from the buyer.

In such case the Indian exporter
is not required to surrender the export incentives that have been availed by
him against such exports.

4.  Netting off of export receivables against
import payables

At the outset, ONLY units in SEZs
are permitted to net off export receivables against import payments.

It may be noted that imports and
exports from group entities cannot be internally netted. Netting off can only
be done in cases where import / export is from / to the same entities i.e. the
two parties must be debtors and creditors of each other and not of their other
group entities.

An exporter is permitted to
set-off his export receivable against his import payable subject to the
following: –

i.   Export / import transactions
are not with ACU countries.

ii.  Set-off of export receivables against
import payments are in respect of the same overseas buyer and supplier.

iii.  Consent for set-off has been
obtained from the overseas buyer and seller.

iv. Import is as per the Foreign
Trade Policy.

v.  Invoices / Bills of Lading /
Airway Bills and Exchange Control copies of Bills of Entry for home consumption
have been submitted by the importer to the bank.

vi. Payment for the import is still
outstanding in the books of the importer.

   vii. All the relevant documents have been submitted to the bank which will have to comply with all the regulatory requirements relating to the transactions.

Wide Scope of Insider Trading Regulations & Severity of Punishment for Violation – Recent Orders of SEBI and SAT

Background

A recent series of interesting SEBI orders has highlighted
two aspects of insider trading. One is, how broad the law can be and the types
of transactions and acts/omissions that are covered. The other is, how
stringent the punishment can be. These orders of SEBI have now also been
confirmed by the Securities Appellate Tribunal (“SAT”), with some changes.

Nature of Insider Trading as commonly perceived and the recent
Orders

Insider Trading is commonly seen to be of a particular
nature. There is an insider – who could be a director, officer or even auditor,
etc. who has close relations with the Company. He usually occupies a
position of trust and has access to inside information. Such information, if
made public, would result in the price of the shares going up or down. He can
thus profit from such information. This is deemed to be abuse of such trust and
the regulations that prohibit and prescribe punishment for insider trading.
However, as will be seen from the SEBI orders discussed herein, what may constitute
inside information and thus Insider Trading can be something not envisaged from
this common understanding.

Further, these SEBI orders also show that the punishment for
Insider Trading can be more severe than one may commonly expect. As will be
seen here, though the profits would have been in thousands, the penalty imposed
is in tens of lakhs of rupees and even in crores.

Whether information regarding open offer is inside information

The SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations 2015
(which replaced the earlier 1992 Regulations) consider certain information to
be inside information. If such information is price sensitive and not made
public, then the Regulations require that insiders should not deal on basis of
such information (termed in the Regulations as Unpublished Price Sensitive
Information or “UPSI”). An example of this is receipt of large and profitable
orders by the Company. The head of sales, the Chief Financial Officer, the
Managing Director, etc. who become aware of this development would also
know that once this information is made public, the price of the shares may
rise. The Regulations thus rightly bar them from dealing in the shares of the
Company till such information remains is not shared with public. There can be
more examples of such information – a large dividend payment or bonus issue of
shares is decided on, an acquisition or divestiture of a business is being
considered, etc. However, in each of these cases, the matter concerns
something directly relating to the activities of the Company. When an insider
is entrusted with such confidential and material information, he is duty bound not to make use of it for his profit.

The question that arises is whether even information that
does not directly relate to activities of companies can also be inside
information. If, for example, the Promoters of a Company have entered into an
agreement to sell their shareholding to an acquirer, whether such information
would also be inside information under the Regulations? The peculiar nature of
such information can be seen. The information does not really relate to the
operations of the Company. It is also a proposed transaction by the Promoters
of a company independently of the Company. If the Company is wholly
professionally managed, it is possible that the Company and its officers may
not even come to know, till the last moment, of such agreement. Are the
Promoters duty bound not to trade on basis of such information?

The implications are not far to see. Such an acquisition
would have to result in an open offer from the public by the acquirer under the
SEBI Takeover Regulations. If the open offer price is higher than the current
ruling market price, the public shareholders would profit. However, if the
Promoters, being aware of such deal with the acquirer, acquire the shares from
the market at the ruling price, they may profit from such purchase. The
question is whether such dealing would be Insider Trading under the
Regulations.

SEBI Orders

The Orders dealt with in this article tackle this question
though partly. The Promoters of a listed company had entered into negotiations
with an acquirer whereby they would sell their shares and control over the
Company. The resultant open offer price seems to be, from limited facts given
in the SEBI orders, far higher than the ruling market price. The directors of
the Company were, as per findings of SEBI, aware of such transaction. Yet, they
and certain persons to whom such information was shared by such Directors, made
purchases of the shares from the market at the lower ruling price. Furthermore
they did not inform the stock exchanges promptly at end of board meeting where
such agreement for sale of shares/control was taken up. The resultant public
announcement of open offer was also delayed by a day. SEBI considered these as
violations of the Regulations and levied severe penalties. The Company, its
directors, its Company Secretary, the persons to whom such information was
shared, etc. were all proceeded against. These matters also went in
appeal before SAT. The orders of SEBI for each of these persons and the
decision of the SAT in appeal are discussed below. The decisions of SEBI are
all dated 7th March 2014 and the decision of the Securities
Appellate Tribunal (“SAT”) is dated 30th November 2016. The name of
the Company is Shelter Infra Projects Limited (“the Company”).

When did the UPSI arise?

An important relevant question was, when did the Unpublished
Price Sensitive Information (“UPSI”) arise? It is really from this time that
the insiders are prohibited from dealing in the shares of the Company. Often
developments may be in process. However, there would be a particular stage
after which the development has turned into such definite information that if
made known to the public would materially affect the price of the shares of the
Company. This is also relevant for determining the trading window closure date
too since before UPSI arises, the window should already be closed.

In the present case, the SAT eventually noted that there was
a meeting on 19th June 2009 at which a decision was taken to go
ahead with the agreement of sale of shares/transfer of control. At this
meeting, a decision was also taken to finalise the transaction within a week.
SAT considered this date to be the date when UPSI arose.

Action against the Company Secretary and directors for not
closing trading window

The Regulations, read with Code of Conduct prescribed
thereunder which companies are also required to adopt, provide for closure of
trading window when price sensitive information is expected to be generated.
Thus, for example, during the time when the financial results of the Company
are being compiled, there may be persons in the Company who may have access to
such information. If they deal in the shares of the Company, then it is likely
they would take into account such information and thus enter into trades
favourable to them. The Regulations thus require that the Company should
prohibit trading during such period by specified insiders and such prohibition
is called closure of trading window. The Company Secretary of the Company is
required to notify such closure of trading window.

SEBI initiated action against the Company Secretary and
directors of the Company as the trading window was not closed during the time when
the sale of controlling interest was being decided upon. However, by this time,
the Company Secretary of the Company had passed away. SEBI noted that the
obligation for initiating closure of the trading window under the
Regulations/Code of Conduct was on the Company Secretary. On his death, the
proceedings against him abated. The other directors were also absolved.

On the other hand, a similar action was initiated against the
Company for not closing the trading window and a penalty of Rs. 50 lakh was levied
on it for such default. This penalty was upheld by the SAT on appeal.

Action against directors for dealing in shares of the Company
with (Unpublished Sensitive Information ) UPSI

The SEBI Orders
demonstrated how directors purchased shares while the price sensitive
information regarding proposed takeover was not published. In two cases,
directors were also held to have shared the information with their relatives
who dealt in the shares. The directors were penalised separately for sharing
information and for dealing. Such relatives too were penalised for the dealing.

The Chairman of the
Company and his wife were proceeded against. SEBI made a finding that the
Chairman had not only dealt in the shares himself by purchasing 10,200 shares
but also communicated the UPSI to his wife. The wife in turn also dealt in the
shares by purchasing 5,000 shares. The Chairman, however, died while the
proceedings were in progress and hence the action against him abated. SEBI,
however, levied a penalty of Rs. 1 crore on his wife for her dealing in the
shares. On appeal, SAT, considering the age of the wife and other relevant factors,
reduced the penalty to Rs. 30 lakh.

Another director was held to have shared the information with
a group he was associated with, which group in turn dealt in the shares of the
Company. For sharing such information, SEBI levied a penalty of Rs. 1 crore on
such director. For the persons to whom such UPSI was shared and who dealt in
such shares, a penalty of Rs. 2 crore was levied for such persons put together,
to be payable jointly and severally. Both of such penalties were confirmed by
SAT.

Similarly, a whole time director of the Company was held to
have dealt in the shares of the Company while in possession of UPSI and for
having communicating the UPSI to his son, who, in turn, dealt in the shares of
the Company. The Whole Time Director bought 1,246 shares for Rs. 41310 and sold
the same for Rs. 42151. This also involved violation of the rule of not
entering into opposite transaction within six months of the first transaction.
He was penalised Rs. 30 lakh for communicating UPSI and for dealing in the
shares. His son bought 2000 shares for Rs. 80,824. He was penalised Rs. 20
lakh.

Some such persons argued that they had only purchased shares
but did not sell them and hence did not realise any profits. This argument was
rejected and rightly so. Insider Trading arises when dealing takes place and
that may be merely one side of the transaction – purchase or sale.

Intimating stock exchanges regarding decision of   takeover and making  the public announcement as required by the
Takeover Regulations

It was found by SEBI that while the Company decided at a
meeting to go ahead with the takeover agreement, it did not promptly inform the
stock exchange as required by the Listing Agreement. Indeed, as SEBI pointed
out, the Company did not send the information to stock exchanges at all.

Further, a public announcement was required to be made under
the Takeover Regulations within four working days of having entered into the agreement for sale of shares/control. The
public announcement was made, however, after 5 working days, which incidentally
came to 7 week days.

A penalty of Rs. 50 lakh was levied by SEBI for not
intimating the stock exchange under the Listing Agreement and a further Rs. 50
lakh for not releasing the public announcement in the prescribed time. The
Company argued that the information was provided through the public
announcement in seven days and even otherwise the penalty for delayed information
is Rs. 1 lakh per day. The SAT, however, took a practical view and accepted the
contention that the public announcement also effectively released the required
information. Hence, the delay was limited to seven days. The SAT also applied
the penalty of Rs. 1 lakh per day u/s. 23(a) of the Securities Contracts
(Regulation) Act, 1956, and limited the penalty to Rs. 7 lakh.

Quantum of penalty

The penalties levied, as is seen, are fairly high. The
amounts involved of purchases are barely in thousands or tens of thousands
while the penalty is in tens of lakhs. It needs to be considered whether it is
disproportionate or whether such high penalties are necessary for punishing the
guilty for and also act as deterrent for others in the future. The Adjudicating
Officer of SEBI has not given any detailed working of how the penalty has been
arrived at. However, as can be seen, except where reduced by the SAT on facts,
the penalties have been confirmed.

Conclusion

The decision ought to make companies and
insiders of the sheer breadth of the Insider Trading Regulations. If one
reviews the definition of “insider” under the Regulations, the actual
implications are even broader. An insider includes any person who has received
any unpublished price sensitive information, irrespective of the source. Thus,
while in the decisions discussed in this article, insiders were close to the
Company and thus had access to inside information. Even the other persons
considered here had relations with such insiders. However, even if that were
not so, the Regulations may apply if even a third party had merely received
such information. For example, an outsider/third party who has inside
information that is price-sensitive would be deemed to be an insider and thus
face a bar on dealing on basis of such information.

14. TS-605-ITAT-2016(HYD) Qualcomm India Private Limited vs. ADIT A.Y.s: 2006-07 to 2009-10, Date of Order: 28th October, 2016

Section 9(1)(vi) of the Act – (i) End user
software license package was a copyrighted article, not license to use the
copyright – payment was not royalty – consequently, payment for ‘support
services’ was also not royalty; (ii) Payment was for internet and bandwidth
services provided by service provider – sophisticated equipment installed by
service provider for providing service – service recipient did not have
exclusive right to use such equipment – payment was not royalty

Facts

The Taxpayer was an Indian company providing
software design, development and testing services to its group companies (its
customers) through its various units in India. The Taxpayer charged
consideration at cost plus 15% for such services.

In respect of AYs 2006-07 to 2009-10, the
tax authority had conducted survey u/s.133A of the Act to examine compliance of
TDS provisions by the Taxpayer.

It was noticed that the Taxpayer had made
several foreign remittances for end user software license packages to companies
in USA, UK, Germany, Japan, Singapore, etc. without deducting tax
u/s.195 of the Act. Since the payments were made for purchase of the
copyrighted article, Assessing Officer (AO) characterised the payment as
royalty for use of copyright, both u/s. 9(1)(vi) of the Act as well as under
respective DTAAs.

Taxpayer also made certain remittances
without deduction of tax to an American Company (USCo) for ‘leased circuit
line’. AO held that the payment being for use of scientific or commercial
equipment was taxable under clause (iva) of section 9(1)(vi) of the Act.

On appeal, CIT(A) confirmed AO’s order.
Aggrieved with the order of CIT(A), the Taxpayer filed appeal before Tribunal.

Held

Taxation of copyrighted software

(i)  The Taxpayer had purchased
end user software license packages which provided the Taxpayer with the right
to use the software. The Taxpayer used it for testing working of equipment.
Thus, the Taxpayer used the software as tools of its business.

(ii) Software purchased by the
Taxpayer was a copyrighted article. It could not be construed as license to use
the copyright. This issue was covered by decision of Delhi High Court in PCIT
vs. M. Tech Indian (P) Ltd. (ITA No. 890.2015
dated 19.01.2016). Hence, the
payment could not be termed as royalty.

(iii) Consequently, payment for
‘support services’ also could not be treated as royalty.

Taxation of bandwidth services

(i)  USCo had provided
connectivity facility to the Taxpayer which mainly consists of advanced
connectivity network and access equipment. These were connected through
under-sea cable and further connected by the routers and digital circuits.
Connectivity was for voice and data communication. The equipment was technical,
such as, ‘modem’ and ‘routers’. It was installed only at premises of customers
of the Taxpayer in USA and not in India.

(ii) US Co provided internet or
bandwidth services to its customers globally, including to the Taxpayer, as
standard services. The undersea cables and the routers etc., were part
of the equipment used by USCo for rendering services to its customers globally.
It could not be said that the Taxpayer was given exclusive right to use the equipment.

(iii) This issue was covered by
decisions of Delhi High Court in Asia Satellite Telecommunications Co. Ltd.
(332 ITR 340) and Estel Communications (P) Ltd. (318 ITR 185) and decision of
Tribunal in Infosys Technologies Ltd. (45 SOT 157). Accordingly, payment made
to USCo being for providing internet and bandwidth services, was not in the
nature of royalty. Consequently, the Taxpayer was not required to deduct tax at
source.

Entry Tax on Goods Vis-à-Vis Import of Goods

Introduction

One of the fiscal statutes operative in Maharashtra is
Maharashtra Tax on the Entry of the Goods into Local Areas Act, 2002. The Act
contemplates a levy of Entry Tax when the goods come into Maharashtra from
outside Maharashtra. The tax is leviable only on the goods which are specified
in the Schedule. 

One of the items covered by the schedule is low sulphur fuel
oil. The assessee M/s.Tata Power Company Limited imported above item
from foreign country and used the same in its electricity manufacturing activity.
The department levied Entry tax on the same.    

While the assessee had many contentions, the main argument of
the assessee was that Entry Tax cannot apply to goods imported from outside
India. Its contention was that the tax can apply only if the goods are imported
from outside Maharashtra but from any place within India.

The Tribunal confirmed the levy. Therefore, the matter was
taken to the Hon. Bombay High Court. The Hon. Bombay High Court has decided the
issue vide judgment reported in Tata Power Company Ltd. and
another vs. State of Maharashtra and ors. 95 VST 147 (Bom).
 

The relevant statutory provisions as referred to in the
judgment are reproduced below for quick reference:

“2. Definitions:- (1) In this Act, unless the context
otherwise requires,–

(a) …..

(b) “entry of goods”, with all its grammatical
variations and cognate expressions means entry of goods into a local area from
any place outside the State, for consumption, use or sale therein;

(c) “General Sales Tax Act” means any Sales Tax Law
in force in any State which provides for the levy of taxes on the sale or
purchase of goods generally or on any specified goods expressly mentioned in
that behalf or any class of transactions expressly specified in that behalf;

(d) …..

(e) …..

(f) “import”, with all its grammatical variations
and cognate expressions means bringing or causing to be brought or receiving
any goods into a local area from a place outside the State;” 

“3. Levy of tax:– (1) There shall be levied and collected
a tax on the entry of the goods specified in column (2) of the Schedule, into
any local area for consumption, use or

sale therein, at the rates respectively specified against
each of them in column (3) thereof and different rates may be specified in respect
of different goods or different classes of goods or different categories of
persons in the local area. The tax shall be levied on the value of the goods as
defined in clause (n) of sub-section (1) of section 2. The State Government
may, by notification in the Official Gazette, from time to time, add, modify or
delete the entries in the said Schedule and on such notification being issued,
the Schedule shall stand amended accordingly:”

Important observations about arguments of the Petitioner
as noted by Hon. High Court are as under:

“30. In the additional written submissions, it is urged that
a tax on entry of goods into a local area is patently in violation of Article
301 and no further burden is required to be discharged by the petitioners. When
a tax falls within the inhibition of Article 301 and is not compensatory or
regulatory, then it can be saved only by taking recourse to Article 304. The
requirement thereof is not admittedly satisfied. Further, the impugned levy is
discriminatory. The Act cannot be saved by reading the impugned provisions
thereof together with the MVAT Act. That would not enable this Court to hold
that the same is Constitutional. Additionally it is submitted that if a levy is
held to be non-discriminatory and thus meets Article 304(a), still it must
satisfy the requirements of Article 304(b) as well. For all these reasons, it
is submitted that the impugned levy must be declared as unconstitutional and
ultra vires
the above noted provisions or Articles of the Constitution of
India.

31. In support of his contentions, Mr. Dada has placed
reliance on a number of judgments and which can be taken in the order of his
submissions as follows:

1) Father William Fernandez vs. State of Kerala. 115 STC
591(Ker)

2) Primus Imaging Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Assam. 9 VST 528
(Gauhati)

3) Batliboi & Co. vs. State of Maharashtra. 47 STC 321
(Bom).

Similarly about arguments of State Government, the Hon. High
Court observed as under:

“36. Mr. Sonpal then relied upon the language of the
Maharashtra Entry Tax Act to submit that the legal challenge also has no basis.
He would submit that what this Court is dealing with in the present matter is
an entry tax. That is a subject dealt with by Entry 52 of List II of the VIIth
Schedule to the Constitution of India. Emphasising the language of this entry
Mr. Sonpal would submit that it provides for a tax on the entry of goods into a
local area for consumption, use or sale therein. Mr. Sonpal submits that mere
entry of the goods into a local area is not the taxable event. The taxable
event is entry of the goods into a local area for consumption, use or sale
therein. It is only in that event that liability to pay the tax arises and not
otherwise. The import of goods into the local area is not prohibited. It is their
consumption, use or sale therein which attracts the tax. Mr. Sonpal submits
that the petitioners do not dispute that import simpliciter does not attract
the levy. Accepting Mr. Dada’s contentions would be doing violence to the plain
language of the statute. Once the levy is on the entry of goods specified in
Column (II) of the Schedule to the Maharashtra Entry Tax Act into any local
area for consumption, use or sale therein, then, it is not permissible to
dilute the rigour of the provisions in that behalf. Mr. Sonpal submits that the
three provisos to sub-section (1) of section 3 would clarify that the
rate of tax to be specified by the Government in respect of any commodity shall
not exceed the rate specified for that commodity under the MVAT Act and the tax
payable by the importer under the Maharashtra Entry Tax Act shall be reduced by
the amount of tax paid, if any, under the law relating to general sales tax in
force in the Union Territory or the State in which the goods are purchased by
the importer. Therefore, if the goods attract the above tax in the State in
which they are purchased and thereafter they are imported into a local area,
then, and to that extent, the liability to pay the entry tax is reduced.
Lastly, Mr. Sonpal would submit that no tax is leviable or can be collected on
specified goods entering into a local area for the purpose of such process as
may be prescribed, if after such processing these goods are sent out of the
State. Mr. Sonpal relies upon the explanation to this sub-section and
thereafter sub-sections (2), (3), (4) and (5) of section 3 to submit that there
is no liability to pay entry tax in the event the goods are brought for the
purpose set out in sub-section (5) of section 3. He also relies upon the provisos
to sub-section (5) of section 3 in that regard.”

After noting the arguments as above, the Hon. High Court came
to a conclusion that no distinction can be made for the goods coming from out
of India or from any place within India. In other words, so far as goods are coming
from outside the State of Maharashtra, the entry tax would apply. The Hon. High
Court observed as under about validity of levy on the imported goods. 

“85. Following it and applying it even to cases of octroi or
entry tax, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held conclusively that entry tax is a tax
on the entry of goods into any local area for consumption, use or sale therein.
So long as the levy is of this nature, it is wholly irrelevant as to from where
the goods have been brought. The statute’s provisions must be given their plain
and clear meaning. In other words, if the act of bringing in the goods is
termed as an import and this is also defined, and if the particular act
complained of falls within the definition, then there is no escape from the
levy. It is in this context that we must look at section 3 of the Act which
also has been reproduced by us above. We are not in agreement with Mr. Dada
that only those goods which have been brought within the local area from a
place outside the State of Maharashtra but within the territory of India will
attract the levy and not those goods which enter the local area after being
imported from abroad. The argument of Mr. Dada is that the expression
“outside the State” cannot mean outside the territory of India. We do
not find any support for such an argument. The reported decisions seem to hold
otherwise. Even otherwise, it is difficult to appreciate the implications of
this argument. It would lead to needless complexity and incongruous and
inconsistent results. For instance, if goods are imported into the port of
Mumbai, and used in Mumbai, then, according to Mr. Dada’s formulation, such
goods are not covered by the levy and entry tax is not attracted. But what
might happen if the goods were imported into Kandla, Vishakapatnam or Kolkata,
for instance, and transshipped from there, across other states, and then
brought into Mumbai? Such an entry or bringing in would be, even on Mr. Dada’s
formulation, subject to the levy, for the goods would be brought in from within
the territory of India though from outside the State of Maharashtra. It surely
cannot be suggested that all foreign imports are, by definition, exempt from
the levy of all local entry taxes. What, therefore, Mr. Dada’s argument amounts
to is saying that the local entry tax levy is not attracted where the port of
entry from abroad is within the state itself; but if the port of foreign import
is outside the state, then the entry tax levy is attracted. If this be so, then
it is a self-defeating argument and clearly shows that the mere importation
from abroad is not a reason to deny the levy of the local entry tax. We find
nothing in any judgment or the statute to support the proposition that the
situs of the port of foreign importation within the state furnishes any point
of exemption or escape from the local levy of entry tax.”

Conclusion

There are contrary judgments on the above
subject. Some of the High Courts have held that the entry tax, being
compensatory, can apply if the goods are coming in the State from any place
outside the State but within India and not imported from a foreign country.
However, the above judgment has settled the position so far as Maharashtra is
concerned and the liability will be attracted even for imported goods.

15. TS-896-ITAT-2016(Rjt)-TP WocoMotherson Advanced Rubber Technologies Limited vs. DCIT A.Y.s: 2006-07 to 2011-12, Dated: 29th September, 2016

Section 92CA of the Act – Provision for
technical assistance does not essentially require the technology to be owned by
the service provider for use of technology – AO has to examine as to how much
is the arm’s length consideration for such services – high tax jurisdiction or
low tax jurisdiction is not relevant for the purpose of determination of arm’s
length price – where group is able to reduce tax burden by locating their units
is not a relevant factor under Indian Transfer pricing provisions

Facts

The taxpayer, an Indian entity, was engaged
in manufacture of high quality rubber parts, rubber plastic parts, rubber metal
parts and liquid silicon rubber parts. The Taxpayer had entered into
international transactions with its Associated Enterprises (AEs) (FCo1 in
Sharjah and FCo2 in Germany). FCo2 had granted non-exclusive licence to the
Taxpayer to manufacture, use, exercise or sell the licensed products at NIL
royalty. FCo1 was to provide technical assistance services in relation to the
licensed products. The Taxpayer made payments to FCo1 in relation to the
technical services.

The Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO) objected
that though the Taxpayer paid technical service fees to FCo1, all the
intangibles associated with manufacturing process were owned by FCo2.
Accordingly, TPO conducted TP adjustment in hands of the Taxpayer considering
the FTS paid to FCo1 as NIL. Taxpayer argued that the technical service
agreement with FCo1 was for achieving operational and technical competencies
relating to know-how and technology licensed by FCo2. For rendering technical
assistance, the service provider need not require be the owner of the
technology.

The Taxpayer filed objections before Dispute
resolution panel (DRP). DRP rejected the same on the ground that the services
provided by FCo2 and FCo1 are not distinct; when the same services were
received by the Taxpayer from FCo2 without any consideration, transaction with
FCo2 was an internal CUP (Comparable Uncontrolled Price). Therefore, the
services received from FCo1 should have been benchmarked at NIL.

Aggrieved, the Taxpayer approached the
Tribunal.

Held

(i)   While agreement with FCo2
was for “use of knowhow and inventions”, the agreement with FCo1 was for
“provision for technical assistance required for use of technology”.The nature
of services under the two agreements was distinct even though somewhat
interconnected.

(ii)  Provision for technical
assistance required for use of technology did not require the technology to be
owned by the service provider for use of technology.

(iii)  It is undisputed that
FCo1 had the requisite expertise and skills available for rendition of
technical services. Once the rendition of services is reasonably evidenced, it
cannot be open to the TPO to disregard the same and come to the conclusion that
these services need not have been compensated for or ought to have been
rendered by FCo2 or some
other person.

(iv) In the course of
ascertaining the arm’s length price (ALP), all that the AO has to examine is as
to how much is the consideration that the Taxpayer would have paid for the
services in arm’s length situation, rather than sitting in judgment over
whether the Taxpayer should have incurred these expenses at all.

(v)  Whether or not the person
entering into transaction is in a high tax jurisdiction or low tax jurisdiction
is also not relevant for the purpose of determination of ALP

(vi) The base erosion, which is
sought to be checked by the transfer pricing provisions in India, is the tax
base in India. Indian transfer pricing cannot be, and is not, concerned with
whether entire Group, as a whole, has been able to reduce their tax burden by
locating their units rendering technical services outside Germany.

(vii)  Further,
even if the services rendered, or believed to have been rendered, by FCo2 are
the same as those rendered by FCo1, the same being an intra AE transaction,
cannot be treated as a valid internal CUP. It is only an uncontrolled
transaction, i.e. between the independent enterprises, which can be used as a
benchmark to ascertain ALP. Thus, a transaction between the AEs cannot be
considered as a valid input for application of CUP method. Relied on a rulings
in the cases of Skoda Auto India Ltd. vs. ACIT [(2009) 30 SOT 319 (Pune)] and
ACIT vs. Technimont ICB India Pvt. Ltd. [(2012) 138 ITD TM 23 (Mum)]
.

The End of an Era – A tribute to Narayan Varma

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On 24th of December, an icon of our profession Narayan Varma, Narayanbhai to all of us, breathed his last. I am writing this editorial, a tribute to him saddened by the feeling that he will not be there to correct my mistakes. For the last 30 months, my editorial has passed under his watchful eyes. This time, this piece will reach you without having had the benefit of his critical examination.

Born in 1931, Narayan Varma was a one-man institution. This small piece is inadequate to describe this doyen of the profession, yet to pay my respects, I must make this attempt. He was truly a giant, in every sense of the term, and a gentle one at that.

The words BCAS and Narayan Varma are inseparable. To Narayanbhai, the Society was like his very own child. He was involved in every activity, be it core subjects like taxation, accounting, auditing or offbeat areas like human resources. He was the President of the BCAS in the year 1978 -79. While the Society was very dear to him, he also actively participated in other institutions. He was the President of the Chamber of Tax Consultants (CTC) for the years 1988-1990. While his contribution to the profession was a sterling one, his role as a social activist was equally significant. He made the Right to Information Act, his mission and made it into a movement.

My first interaction with Narayanbhai, was nearly 3 decades ago at a Residential Refresher Course (RRC). I was a young enthusiastic Chartered accountant, participating in group discussions vociferously, in a manner bordering on irreverence. He heard me patiently, and encouraged me to express my views even though they differed from that of the group. During my journey at the Society from a member of various committees to its President, I had the opportunity of sharing many a moment with him. He always came across as a thorough professional, a visionary, but above all, a lovely human being. He was popular with young members and often acted as a bridge between them and seniors. Being young at heart he empathised with the thoughts of youngsters. As a mentor he nurtured a large talent pool, and with his departure we have lost a father figure.

The Journal, the flagship of the Society was very dear to him. He chaired the Journal committee in 1984. He was a member of the Editorial Board from the time it was constituted in 1991. He was the publisher of the Journal for more than two decades. He floated many new ideas. Many features that are popular today in the Journal, were his ideas. Namaskaar, the feature with which the Journal begins today was encouraged by him, the features RTI (Right to Information), Cancerous Corruption were contributed by him. He did not fear failure, and always attempted to tread new paths. He has so many achievements to his credit that if one were to list all of them one would have to possibly devote one entire issue of the Journal for that purpose.

If one were to select three of his qualities which one would do well to inculcate in ones persona, I would choose, pride in the profession he belonged to, his love for innovation and his adherence to democratic principles.

He always made it known to all concerned that this was a profession that did not get the recognition that it deserved. In fact, after he departed I had an occasion to speak to the past president of the ICAI – Mr. T.N. Manoharan. He mentioned that it was Narayanbhai’s idea that all Chartered Accountants should describe themselves with the designation `CA’. He pursued this idea tirelessly with the ICAI, and today it is an accepted designation.

Innovation was his mantra. He always yearned to start something new. Many ventures, such as the Budget Booklet, were popularised by him. He was a visionary and realised that, in the new world chartered accountants would have to think differently, and would have to acquire skills and the mindset which management students had. He was instrumental in structuring a new course for Chartered Accountants in the field of business consultancy jointly with the Jamnalal Bajaj Institute of Management Studies. Many young Chartered Accountants benefitted from this course and their careers reached new heights. These innovations were not limited to the professional sphere. Even in the social field, he preached innovation. He published the RTI Booklet, which helped many citizens. He has been an avowed RTI activist, was a guiding force to the Public Concern for Governance Trust (PCGT), and an inspiration for Dharma Bharati Mission. When he participated in the activities of all these organisations, he came across as a very sensitive person.

The third quality which endeared him to me was that he was a true democrat and respected views of others. I recall a large number of meetings of the Society, the Editorial Board, the Journal Committee when he put across for consideration his innovative ideas. At times those were rejected because his thinking was well ahead of the times. Yet, after his ideas were rejected he willingly went along with the decision of the majority. Despite being a Titan, he took extreme care to ensure that his overpowering personality did not dwarf others.

If we are truly to pay our respects to this great soul, we should try to inculcate in ourselves his sterling qualities. We should follow his ideals, we should not only become good professionals, we should try to become responsible citizens and above all good human beings. If we take steps in that direction, we will have paid homage to him.

LEARNING TO BE HAPPY

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Every one of us wants to be happy. Like the Kings and Queens of fairy tales we want to “Live Happily ever after”. But in reality very few of us are happy and that too never forever. The reason is not far to seek. For being happy, we must know where happiness lies. Without first understanding where happiness lies we go on searching for it in the wrong places and do not find it. We are like that fellow who lost his keys in the house, but was searching for it below a lamp post, as there was more light there! It is very clear that if we want to go to Delhi, we must board a train going to Delhi. Boarding a train going to Chennai, and then running in the corridor of the compartment in the direction of Delhi, will not take us to Delhi.

Happiness is the purpose and the goal of our lives, and yet…. all of us are pursuing a course which will never give happiness and is sure to yield unhappiness.

For being happy, we have to first understand where happiness lies. We believe that it lies in wealth, possessions, power and position in life. We believe that acquiring these will make us happy and we will live happily ever after. We blindly chase these and at the end of the day find that happiness has eluded us. That is because, in the first place, happiness is not in the 3 Ps (Possession, Power, Position), where we were seeking.

I had read this quotation in a booklet called “P.S. I Love You”:

“A newspaper survey asked, “Who are the happiest people?” These were the four winning answers:

A craftsman or artist whistling over a job well done

A child building sand castles

A mother bathing her baby

A doctor who has finished a difficult operation and saved a life.

You will note that money, power and possessions play no part in any of the answers.”

Happiness is certainly not in possessions and power. If it was so, then money, power and possessions should bring us eternal happiness.

Take the case of a person who loves eating “rasgullas”. To him rasgullas embody happiness. If asked to eat them, a first few will certainly result in making him feel great momentarily but after say, the sixth one, he would not enjoy rasgullas anymore. If forced to eat more he would become miserable. Similarly, to a person who enjoys only spicy food, rasgullas will not bring any happiness. Happiness then is not in rasgullas or spicy food! Happiness is also not in material possessions. The same is true of power and position in life. They do not bring happiness. Happiness is not in them. The issue is: Where is Happiness?

It is said that “Happiness is a State of Mind”. So true. A disturbed mind can never be happy. A peaceful mind, a mind at rest can be happy. As children, generally our minds were at rest. Any disturbance also did not last for long. We were neither pursuing possessions nor were we craving for power and prestige. We were content with what we had. The trouble started as we grew older. People around and particularly the media, TV, Newspapers, Bill Boards and hoardings brainwashed us into believing that material things make one happy, hence we started pursuing the wrong dreams. In other words, we boarded the wrong train which has taken us further away from our true destination. If we want to be happy, we have to stop the pursuit of wrong goals, get down from the wrong train, and board the right one. We all would agree that as children we were a lot more happier. Let us then become more like children who do not grieve about the past or worry about the future. Let us learn to live in the present. Let us learn to look at life with wonder-filled eyes. Let us remember those lines of Sahir:

Friend, happiness lies in living in the present and being content with whatever we have.

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 35 dated 10th December, 2015

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Guidelines on trading of Currency Futures and Exchange Traded Currency Options in Recognised Stock Exchanges – Introduction of Cross-Currency Futures and Exchange Traded Option Contracts

Presently, residents and eligible non-residents can trade in US $ – INR, Euro – INR, GBP – INR and Yen JPY – INR currency futures contracts and US $ – INR currency option contract on recognised stock exchanges.

This circular now permits with immediate effect,

1. Residents and FPI to also take positions, within the position limits as prescribed by the exchanges, in,

(a) Cross-currency futures in the currency pairs of EUR-USD, GBP-USD and USD-JPY

(b) E xchange traded cross-currency option contracts in EUR-INR, GBP-INR and JPY-INR in addition to the existing USD-INR option contract.

The above contracts are in addition to the existing contracts that can be undertaken without having to establish underlying exposure.

2. Banks to undertake trading in all permitted exchange traded currency derivatives within their Net Open Position Limit (NOPL) subject to limits stipulated by the exchanges.

Detailed terms and conditions are Annexed to this circular as under: –

Annex I Currency Futures (Reserve Bank) (Amendment) Directions, 2015 Notification No. FMRD. 1/ED(CS)-2015 dated December 10, 2015

Annex II Exchange Traded Currency Options (Reserve Bank) (Amendment) Directions, 2015 Notification No. FMRD. 2 /ED(CS)-2015 dated December 10, 2015

Annex III Position Limits for market participants in the Exchange Traded Currency Derivatives

2015 (40) STR 490 (Tri-Mum.) Trans Engineers India Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE, Pune

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Extended period of Limitation cannot be invoked in second audit when during first audit the issue in question was never raised.

Facts
The assessee took registration in February, 2005 and charged service tax on invoices raised from November, 2004 to February, 2005 only for those clients who agreed to pay service tax. Therefore, charge of suppression was alleged by the department. Show cause notice (SCN) was issued in 2009 invoking extended period of limitation. It was contended that the records were already audited in 2006 by audit section and no objections were raised regarding discharge of entire service tax liability and filing of returns. Therefore, it was argued that extended period of limitation cannot be invoked during second audit.

Held
Appellant had himself discharged short payment on noticing the same and also shown the payment in returns. In the first audit, question of short payment was never raised. Therefore, during second audit, it would not be justified to invoke extended period of limitation since records were already audited once and such short payment was not detected. Accordingly, relying on High Court’s judicial pronouncements, the order was set aside on the grounds of limitation.

Notification No. FEMA 357/2015-RB dated 7th December, 2015

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Foreign Exchange Management (Manner of Receipt and Payment) (Amendment) Regulations, 2015

This Notification has amended the Regulation 5 of Notification No. FEMA 14/2000-RB dated 3rd May, 2000, (Manner of Receipt and Payment), as under: –

After sub-regulation (2)(b) following shall be added at (c), namely: – ‘Any other mode of payment in accordance with the directions issued by the Reserve Bank of India to authorised dealers from time to time.’

Notification No. FEMA 358/2015-RB dated 2nd December, 2015

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Foreign Exchange Management (Borrowing or Lending in Foreign Exchange) (Amendment) Regulations, 2015

This Notification has amended the Regulation 3 of Notification No. FEMA. 120/2000-RB dated May 3, 2000 (Transfer or Issue of Any Foreign Security), as under: –

Amendment of the Schedule I

In Schedule I, after paragraph 3, the following shall be inserted, namely: –

4. Provided that under these Regulations, the Reserve Bank may, in consultation with the Government of India, prescribe for the automatic route, any provision or proviso regarding various parameters listed in paragraphs 1 to 3 above of this Schedule or any other parameter as prescribed by the Reserve Bank and also prescribe the date from which any or all of the existing proviso will cease to exist, in respect of borrowings from overseas, whether in foreign currency or Indian Rupees, such as addition / deletion of borrowers eligible to raise such borrowings, overseas lenders / investors, purposes of such borrowings, change in amount, maturity and all-in-cost, norms regarding security, pre-payment, parking of ECB proceeds, reporting and drawal of loan, refinancing, debt servicing, etc.”

Amendment to the Schedule II

In Schedule II, after paragraph 5, the following shall be inserted, namely: –

6. Provided that under these Regulations, the Reserve Bank may, in consultation with the Government of India, prescribe for the approval route, any provision or proviso regarding various parameters listed in paragraphs 1 to 5 above of this Schedule or any other parameter as prescribed by the Reserve Bank and also prescribe the date from which any or all of the existing provisions will cease to exist, in respect of borrowings from overseas, whether in foreign currency or Indian Rupees, such as addition / deletion of borrowers eligible to raise such borrowings, overseas lenders / investors, purposes of such borrowings, change in amount, maturity and all-in-cost, norms regarding security, pre-payment, parking of ECB proceeds, reporting and drawal of loan, refinancing, debt servicing, etc.”

Notification No. FEMA 359/2015-RB dated 2nd December, 2015

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Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of Any Foreign Security) (Amendment) Regulations, 2015

This Notification has amended the Regulation 21 of Notification No. FEMA. 120/2004-RB dated July 7, 2004 (Transfer or Issue of Any Foreign Security), as under: –

Amendment of the Regulation 21 (2) (ii)

After Regulation 21 (2) (ii), the following proviso shall be inserted, namely: –

“Provided that under these Regulations, the Reserve Bank may, in consultation with the Government of India, change / prescribe for the automatic as well as the approval route of FCCBs, any provision or proviso for issuance of FCCBs”.

Amendment to the Regulation 21 (2) (iii)

After Regulation 21 (2) (iii), the following proviso shall be inserted, namely: –

“Provided that under these Regulations, the Reserve Bank may, in consultation with the Government of India, change / prescribe any provision or proviso for issuance of FCEBs”.

[2015-TIOL-2821-HC-AHM-CUS] Ishratkhan Yusubkhan Parmar vs. Union Of India & 1

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Merely because there is a provision for predeposit for availing appeal opportunity, the same would not enable petitioner to bypass such statutory remedy and approach High Court directly by way of a writ petition.

Facts
Petitioner challenged the Order-in-Original passed by the Joint Commissioner of Customs. It was submitted that provision of mandatory pre-deposit of 7.5% would not apply since the original cause arose before the amendment in section 129E of the Customs Act brought with effect from 06/08/2014. It was also contended that the Commissioner (Appeals) would not accept the appeal without certificate of pre-deposit and filing the appeal would be beyond the condonable period.

Held
The Hon’ble High Court without judging the validity of the contention of whether the amended provision would apply held that merely because there is a provision for pre-deposit for availing appeal would not enable the petitioner to bypass such statutory remedy. Further, it was directed that the appeal and an application for waiver of pre-deposit should be filed before the Commissioner (Appeals) and the same would be entertained.

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 32 dated 30th November, 2015

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External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) Policy – Revised framework

The circular contains the revised framework for External Commercial Borrowings. The framework will be reviewed after one year.

The revised ECB framework, which will apply in totality, comprises of the following three tracks:

Track I: Medium term foreign currency denominated ECB with Minimum Average Maturity (MAM) of 3 / 5 years.

Track II: Long term foreign currency denominated ECB with MAM of 10 years.

Track III: Indian Rupee denominated ECB with MAM of 3 / 5 years.

Involvement of Indian banks and their overseas branches / subsidiaries in relation to ECB to be raised by Indian entities is subject to prudential guidelines issued by RBI. Overseas branches / subsidiaries of Indian banks will not be permitted as lenders under Track II and III.

Entities raising ECB under the present framework can raise the said loans by March 31, 2016 provided the agreement in respect of the loan is already signed by the date the new framework comes into effect.

For raising of ECB under the following carve outs, the borrowers will, however, have time up to March 31, 2016 to sign the loan agreement and obtain the Loan Registration Number (LRN) from the Reserve Bank by this date: –
(i). ECB facility for working capital by airlines companies.
(ii). ECB facility for consistent foreign exchange earners under the USD 10 billion Scheme. (iii). ECB facility for low cost affordable housing projects (low cost affordable housing projects as defined in the extant Foreign Direct Investment policy). 55 The following 3 Forms for ECB have also be been revised and Annexed to this circular as under: –

Form 83 – Annex I
Form ECB – Annex II
Form ECB 2 – Annex III

2015 (40) STR 422 (Bom.) Vodafone India Ltd. vs. CCE, Mumbai-II

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Statutory interpretation by one Bench of High Court is binding on Co-ordinate bench of that very High Court and subsequent Bench cannot hold that particular provision was misinterpreted and re-interpret it again. The only recourse in such case is to refer the matter to Larger Bench. The way forward for appellant/respondent is to appeal before a Superior Court.

Facts
The Appellant engaged in providing of telecommunication services. Availed CENVAT credit on the duty paid on towers (in CKD/SKD form), parts of the towers, shelter/ pre-fabricated buildings purchased by them and used for providing output services. The statutory authorities contended that they were not entitled to avail CENVAT credit as per CCR and the view was upheld by CESTAT . Aggrieved by the order, in the appeal to the High Court, it was contended that the goods are capital goods or alternatively inputs under the said rules, only if any structure is attached permanently to land and cannot exist independently, the same shall be considered as immovable property. An Affidavit was filed with CESTAT providing technical details regarding set up of tower, preparation of civil foundation, erection and its dismantling. If goods have to be fastened to earth to facilitate its use, the goods do not lose the characteristics of ‘goods’. Though in an identical case, this High Court in Bharti Airtel Ltd. 2014 (35) STR 865 (Bom.) had disallowed CENVAT Credit, the case required a review since certain submissions were either not made or not considered in the said case. The respondent submitted that the issue and question of law was squarely covered by this court in case of Bharti Airtel Ltd. (Supra). Therefore, the appeal was meritless.

Held
After analysing the decision in Bharti Airtel’s case, the Hon’ble High Court observed that the said decision squarely applies to the case of the appellant as all the aspects of the subject matter were considered, the very provisions were relied upon and interpreted. Once the very rules relied upon were interpreted by the Division Bench of a Court, judicial discipline demands that this interpretation be followed by the co-ordinate bench of that very Court. It is well settled that interpretation of a statutory provision and equally a mis-interpretation by one Bench of High Court would be binding on the co-ordinated bench of that very High Court. The subsequent Bench cannot say that particular provision was misinterpreted and reinterpret it again. Therefore, the only recourse available to the subsequent Bench is to refer the matter to Larger Bench. In any case, the Court was in full agreement with the decision delivered by the co-ordinate bench and therefore, the disallowance of CENVAT Credit was upheld without referring the matter to larger bench. It was also commented that If the appellant is of the opinion that decision delivered in case of Bharti Airtel Ltd. (supra) was not appropriate, remedy to correct the same would lie before Superior Court above.

[2015] 63 taxmann.com 135 (Guj) Commissioner vs. Reliance Ports & Terminals

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Show Cause Notice is the foundation in the matter of levy and recovery of duty, penalty and interest and therefore demand cannot be confirmed on the grounds which are not raised in the Show Cause Notice.

Facts
The assessee availed CENVAT credit of service tax paid under reverse charge u/s. 66A and also on certain goods. In the Show Cause Notice, the department denied the credit on two grounds viz. (a) service tax paid under section 66A was not allowed by rule 3 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 – [CCR] and (b) Credit availed and utilized before actual installation of the capital goods was irregular. The Tribunal decided the matter in favour of the assessee holding that both the grounds were untenable. Before High Court the Department contended that Tribunal did not decide the eligibility of CENVAT credit in as much as whether the services in dispute would qualify as “input service” or as the case may be qualify as ‘capital goods’ used for providing output service i.e. port services.

Held
The Court held that, the issue as to eligibility of CENVAT credit in terms of utilisation of input services or capital goods for providing output services did not find place in show cause notice. The Court relied upon decisions of Supreme Court in the case of CCE vs. Ballarpur Industries Ltd. [2007] 11 STT 6 and of CCE vs. Gas Authority of India Ltd. 2008 taxmann.com 847, for the proposition that the show cause notice is the foundation in the matter of levy and recovery of duty, penalty and interest. Accordingly, department’s appeal was dismissed for the reason that it sought to challenge the order passed by the Tribunal on grounds which were never subject matter of the show cause notice.

Note: Readers may also refer to decision of Delhi CESTAT in the case of Computer Sciences Corp. India (P) Ltd [2015] 63 taxmann.com 211 [Para 3] where Tribunal has taken similar view that where there is no allegation raised in the show cause notice as to the total amount available as unutilized credit in the account of the appellants, it was not proper for the Commissioner (Appeals) to direct to check and verify or recompute the total credit available as unutilized credit.

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 31 dated 26th November, 2015

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Investment by Foreign Portfolio Investors (FPI) in Corporate Bonds

This circular permits FPI to acquire NCD / bonds, which are under default, either fully or partly, in the repayment of principal on maturity or principal installment in the case of amortising bond provided: –

1. The revised maturity period of such restructured NCD / bonds, is three years or more.

2. The FPI discloses to the Debenture Trustees the terms of their offer to the existing debenture holders / beneficial owners from whom they are acquiring the NCD / bonds.

3. The investment must be within the overall limit prescribed for corporate debt from time to time (currently Rs. 2,443.23 billion).

[2015] 63 taxmann.com 266 (Guj) Ask Me Enterprise vs. UOI

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Benefit of VCES cannot be denied merely because certain payments were made under wrong accounting code as interest and penalty instead of respective service tax code, if rectification is sought from the department and the same is given effect to.

Facts
A departmental audit was conducted for the period 2008-09 to 2011-12 after the introduction of Service Tax Voluntary Compliance Encouragement Scheme, 2013 (VCES) i.e. after 13.05.2013 and in terms of audit para, part payment of service tax liability along with interest and penalties was made. The audit party did not inform the assessee about the VCES and hence only after making such part payments, a declaration was filed by the assesse declaring tax dues in respect of service tax liability computed under the audit.

The authorities were requested to adjust the part payments made as interest and penalty against service tax dues declared under the scheme. Although assessee paid amount equivalent to around 75% of the total tax dues before 31.12.2013, out of the said amount, 30% amount was paid towards interest and penalty which was adjusted by department against service tax dues after 31.12.2013 i.e. on 30.05.2014 on the basis of application of the assessee for correction of accounting codes for substituting the amounts paid as interest and penalty with service tax code.

The designated authority, refused to issue acknowledgment of discharge under form VCES-3 on the ground that the condition prescribed u/s. 107(4) of the Finance Act, 2013 with respect to full payment of tax dues declared under VCES by 31.12.2014 was not fulfilled and also held that erstwhile payment towards interest and penalty cannot be adjusted as they were liable to be recovered u/s. 87 of the Finance Act, 1994 without any immunity.

Held
The High Court observed that, it is not in dispute that amount equivalent to tax dues declared under the scheme was paid before June 2014. It was held that the respondent cannot be permitted to deny the benefit of the scheme by taking shelter of a hyper-technical plea. When a beneficial scheme is introduced the respondent in all fairness should inform about the availability and benefit of the scheme. Accordingly, the payment made was held as made on fulfillment of conditions of the scheme.

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 30 dated 26th November, 2015

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Advance Remittance for Import of aircrafts / helicopters / other aviation related purchases

This circular states that, requisite approval of DGCA only is required for making advance remittance without bank guarantee or an unconditional, irrevocable standby letter of credit up to US $ 50 million for import of aircrafts / helicopters by a company for operating Scheduled or Non-Scheduled Air Transport Services (including Air Taxi Services). Thus, the approval from Ministry of Civil Aviation is no longer required to be obtained.

[2015] 63 taxmann.com 317 (SC) CCE vs. Otto Bilz (India) Pvt. Ltd.

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Where brand name used on the manufactured products is owned by the manufacturer himself, the benefit of small scale exemption cannot be denied.

Facts
The assessee manufactured the products in India under foreign brand name and therefore, the department contended that it is not eligible for benefit of small scale exemption under the excise law.

Held
The Court observed that the foreign company had assigned the trademark in favour of the assessee with a right to use the said trademark in India exclusively. Therefore, the assessee used the trademark in its own right as it owned the trademark and therefore, it cannot be said as use of trademark of ‘another person’ so as to disentitle the benefit of small scale exemption notification.

“Sale within State” – Nexus

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Introduction
There existed prior to the amendment in the CST Act, a controversy about determining the ‘situs’ of sale i.e. the State where the sale has taken place and which is the State eligible to levy tax on such sale? There were situations where on one sale, different States were contemplating levy of tax. The State from where goods moved used to claim tax, the State where actually delivery was given was also claiming tax as well as other States, picking up some connection of sale transaction with their State like, receiving payment, raising of invoice and so on.

This was known as nexus theory.

To avoid such a multiple claim, the CST Act was amended. Section 4 was inserted in the Act to determine the ‘situs’ of sale. Section 4(2) is as under:

“Section 4(2) in the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956
(2) A sale or purchase of goods shall be deemed to take place inside a State, if the goods are within the State—

(a) in the case of specific or ascertained goods, at the time the contract of sale is made; and
(b) in the case of unascertained or future goods, at the time of their appropriation to the contract of sale by the seller or by the buyer, whether assent of the other party is prior or subsequent to such appropriation.

Explanation.- Where there is a single contract of sale or purchase of goods situated at more places than one, the provisions of this sub-section shall apply as if there were separate contracts in respect of the goods at each of such places.”

The attempt was to crystallise the State of sale. It was provided that the sale will be in the State where the goods are ascertained in relation to contract of sale.

Thus, the nexus theory was given go by and only one State in which physically goods are ascertained in relation to contract of sale, is the State in which sale is deemed to have taken place.

Nexus Theory revisited
The issue has now again come up for discussion. Recently, the Hon. Bombay High Court had an occasion to deal with one such issue. The judgment is in the case of M/s. Raj Shipping (W.P.4552 of 2015 and others) dated 19-10-2015.

Facts of THE Case
The short facts of the case before the Hon. Bombay High Court were as under:

“In the additional affidavit, that is filed, the Petitioner states that it is engaged in the business, namely, Bunker Supplies. Bunker supplies mainly consist of supply of petroleum products such as high speed diesel oil (HSD), light diesel oil (LDO) and furnace oil (FO) to various incoming and outgoing vessels within or beyond the port limits of Mumbai Port. These outgoing vessels, to which the supplies are made, are located beyond approximately 1.55 nautical miles from the coast of Mumbai and are anchored in various anchorage points within the territorial waters of the Union of India, off the coast of Maharashtra. It is stated that the outgoing shipping vessel places an inquiry for the required quantity of HSD with the Petitioner. Pursuant to the inquiry made by the customer, the Petitioner gave a quote for their supplies. In many cases, the Petitioner enters into a formal agreement with their customers for the purchase of HSD. At page 86 of the paper book is one of the illustrative copy of such an agreement. Pages 86 to 89 of the paper book read as under….

81) Thus, pursuant to such agreement or an approval of a quote by the customer, the shipping vessel places a purchase order/nomination with the Petitioner for the required quantity and the name of the vessel to which the supplies are to be made. The illustrative copy of the purchase order/nomination is also at page 90 of the paper book. It is on receipt of the purchase order/nomination from the shipping vessel that the Petitioner, in turn, places a purchase order on any of the oil marketing companies such as M/s. Indian Oil Company Limited, M/s. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited, etc. Thereafter, the further documents are prepared, including the shipping bill, and once they are ready, the oil marketing company loads the required quantity of high speed diesel in the tank lorries, which then come to the barge loading point at Mallet Bunder along with the invoice copy of the oil marketing company.

82) The sister concern of the Petitioner owns self propelled barges having large cargo tanks (below deck) ranging from 40 thousand liters (40KL) to 200 thousand liters (200KL). The barges have pumps fitted on them with a flow meter in order to pump out the HSD to the vessel. These are similar to petrol pumps where petrol is sold to the regular customers. At the Mallet Bunder, the HSD supplied by the oil marketing company is decanted into the cargo tanks of the barges owned by the Petitioner. The entire activity of decanting is done under the supervision of a Customs Officer. After taking delivery of the HSD from the oil marketing company, the barges sail to the anchorage point of the nominated vessel.

83) Paras 12 to 15 at pages 82 and 83 of the paper book read as under:

12. After reaching the anchorage point of the nominated vessel, the HSD is pumped out of the barge into the fuel tank or bunker of the nominated vessel. Once the supply is complete, the Master or the Authorised Officer of the vessel acknowledges the receipt of the ordered quantity of HSD on the Bunker Delivery Note (BDN) and the Shipping Bill. An illustrative copy of the Bunker Deliver Note (BDN) duly acknowledged by the officer of the vessel is marked and annexed as Exhibit “7”.

13. The barges go beyond 1.54 Nautical Miles from the base line of the coast of Mumbai to deliver the HSD to the vessels anchored therein, in the territorial waters of the Union of India.

14. After the delivery of the HSD to the nominated vessel is complete, the Petitioner raises an invoice on the shipping line based on the BDN. An illustrative copy of the invoice raised by the Petitioner is marked and annexed as Exhibit “8”. The Petitioner invoices the shipping line for the quantity of HSD actually delivered, along with charges for transportation and hiring of the barge belonging to its sister concern companies. These may be way of a lumpsum rate/KL previously agreed to by the Petitioner or the charges for sale of HSD and transportation may be indicated separately in the invoice.

15) The sister concern of the Petitioner separately charges the Petitioner company for the hire of the barge by the Petitioner company for the purpose of the supplies to be made to various customers. An illustrative copy of a credit note issued by the Petitioner in favour of its sister concern is marked and annexed as Exhibit “9”.”

Arguments of Petitioner
Based on the above facts, the argument of the petitioner was that the sale cannot be said to be in the State of Maharashtra. The territorial water was contended to be not part of the State and hence, the State had no jurisdiction, when sale was taking place in the territorial waters.

Alternatively, it was contended that there could be a tax liability under CST Act but not under MVAT Act. It was also contended that if at all there was a liability in the State, then it would be exempt under the Notification issued u/s.41(4) bearing no.VAT -1505/CR-135/Taxation-1 dated 30-11-2006 wherein sale of motor spirits by retail outlet was exempted from the levy of VAT .

On behalf of Revenue, the arguments were opposed, stating that the State has power to deal with impugned sales.

Hon. Bombay High Court
After considering the facts, contentions & citations from both sides, the Hon. High Court observed as under:

“95) If we apply this principle to the facts and circumstances of the present case, we do not have any hesitation in concluding that it is the goods which have been produced or manufactured or refined by the oil companies and which are drawn from their storage tanks in fixed quantity that are supplied on demand to the Petitioner. The manufacturers as also the refineries are very much within the State of Maharashtra viz. at Mumbai. The Petitioners are at Mumbai. Meaning thereby, their place of business is at Mumbai. It is from that place that the Petitioner requests the oil companies to supply to it the high speed diesel. It is received by the Petitioner from the oil companies at Mumbai. It may be that the Petitioner treats this as a contract on which they paid the sales tax as a component of the price. However, it is that very high speed diesel and supplied to the Petitioner at Mumbai which is carried from Mumbai in furtherance of a contract with parties like M/s. Leighton, which contract is also placed and finalised from Mumbai, through the barges of the Petitioner to the vessels of M/s. Leighton and which may be stationed in the territorial waters. However, Leighton comes in the picture, as have been stated by them, for the purpose of fulfilling a contractual obligation of M/s. ONGC. It is for that obligation to be discharged that they have deployed the vessels. It is these vessels which require the bunker supplies and which supplies are met by the Petitioner. The subject matter of the contract with M/s. Leighton is this high speed diesel or motor spirit which is taken and carried from Mumbai. Therefore, there is sufficient territorial nexus for the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act to apply and to be invoked to the later sale by the Petitioner of the same goods to M/s. Leighton and other entities similarly placed. We do not see how the Petitioner can escape compliance with this legislation and by contending that the contract of M/s. Leighton being a distinct contract, the sale taking place in territorial waters that the sales tax legislation or the VAT legislation of the Maharashtra State would be applicable. Its applicability has to be tested by applying the above principles and particularly the nexus theory. After having found sufficient territorial connection, namely, between the back to back transaction and the taxing authority that we are not in a position to agree with Mr. Sridharan that MVAT Act is inapplicable.”
Thus, the Hon. Bombay High Court observed that tax applicable can be decided on the nexus theory.

With these observations, the Hon. Bombay High Court has remanded the matter back to authorities under State Act for deciding the correction position.

In other words, there is no finality regarding the issue and it is left to the appellate authorities to decide the taxability including under MVAT /CST and exemption u/s 41(4).

Conclusion
There was a great sigh of relief with the enactment of section 4(2) in the CST Act. It was felt that once the sale is established to be out of state (on which state claimed tax) based on physical ascertainment of goods, there was no taxability in such State. Therefore, it was also felt that if sale is proved to be in an area not falling within the State claiming tax, the claim of non taxability in such State would be upheld.

Some of the expectations from above judgment were about State boundaries, the situs of actual event of sale, the fate of sale taking place in territorial waters etc., in clear terms. However, the said issues remain still burning and are left to be decided by the State Authorities. It is possible that though sale is outside State, still, based on nexus theory the State authorities may attempt to levy tax on such transactions.

Dealers/State may be required to go in for a second round of litigation after the issues are dealt with by the State authorities in assessment, appeals etc. Let’s hope for finality at the earliest.

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 29 dated 26th November, 2015

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Import of Goods into India – Evidence of Import

Presently, either of the following documents can be submitted as proof of import of goods into India: – (a) Exchange control copy of the Bill of Entry for home consumption. (b) Exchange control copy of the Bill of Entry for warehousing, in the case of 100% Export Oriented Units (EOU). (c) Customs Assessment Certificate / Postal Appraisal Form as declared by the importer to the Customs Authorities. This circular provides that the following can also be submitted as proof of import of goods into India, in addition to the documents that are considered as proof of import at present: – (a) Ex-Bond Bill of Entry issued by Customs Authorities or by any other similar nomenclature, as evidence for physical import of goods. (b) Courier Bill of Entry.

30% INTEREST ON DELAYE D PAY MENT OF SERVICE TAX:WHETHER FAIR TO TAX PAYERS

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Background
With effect from 01/10/2014, vide Notification No.12/2014– ST dated 11/07/14 issued u/s. 75 of the Finance Act, 1994 (‘Act’), the following rates of interest have been prescribed, for delayed payment of service tax:

The intention of the government behind prescribing higher rates of interest for delayed payment service tax, brought out and as stated in the post budget press interview by the then CBEC Chairperson Ms. J. M. Shanti Sundharam, is under:

“Question
The Budget proposed an increase in the rate of interest from 18 % to 30 % on delay in payment of service tax beyond six months.

Reply
This is for service tax which is collected and not paid by a particular date. The person has used this amount. So, interest will act as a deterrent. It is only simple interest.”

However, the law as amended is not indicative of the government’s intention stated above. Hence, it is the understanding of trade & industry and tax payers generally that abnormally high rates of interest would apply to all cases of delayed payments (including tax demands arising out of actions u/s. 73 of the Act)

Concerns
The principal concerns of the trade & industry and tax payers generally are as under:

Service tax department is empowered under law to initiate actions upto 5 years (including 18 month normal period) for demanding & recovering tax with interest and penalty tax. It is common knowledge that tax litigations usually take a long time to settle (invariably litigation upto CESTAT takes around 5 years and could take upto 15 years if the matter goes upto the Supreme Court) for no fault of the tax payer. In that context, rate of interest of 30% is unjustified, unwarranted and totally unfair to tax payers.

The rate of interest is significantly higher if compared to the prevailing market rate of interest.

The rate of interest is abnormal considering the rates of interest prevalent in other Central Tax Laws / State VAT Laws / VAT GST Laws prevalent worldwide. Details are given at the end of this write up for ready reference.

For delayed payment of tax penal provisions are already existing in the Act, (viz. penalty u/s. 76, power to arrest etc.) Hence, in that context prescribing abnormally high rates of interest for delayed payments is unwarranted.

Further, it is pertinent to note that compared to the abnormally high rates of interest for delayed payment of service tax, the rate of interest payable by the government on refunds payable to a tax payer is only 6% pa. The disparity in rate of interest to be paid by a tax payer and tax department is glaring.

Recommendations
In order to avoid adverse consequences on trade & industry and tax payers generally and to promote & encourage fair tax administration practice considering the imminent introduction of GST regime, the following is suggested:

a) The rate of interest for delayed payment of service tax be restored to 18% pa with immediate effect,

b) As a deterrent, a higher rate of interest of 24% pa may be prescribed in cases where tax is collected but not paid to the government,

c) Parity should be brought in rate of interest payable by a tax payer & tax department at the earliest, under all tax laws. This would also help in establishing accountability of tax department.

(Note: Research inputs from Pradeep S. Shah & Udayan D. Choksi are acknowledged)

M/s. D. A. Sons v. Addl. CCT [2013] 63 VST 111(Karn)

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VAT – Classification of Goods – Sale of Mango Chutney, Mango Garlic Chutney, Mango and Saffron, etc.- Are Processed Fruit and Vegetables.

VAT – Classification of Goods – Exercise Books with Cartoons to be Painted by Children – With Appropriate Colours – Are Printed Books – Exempt from Payment of Tax, Entry 3 of Schedule III and section 4 (1)(b) of The Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003.

FACTS
The appellant trading in edible products and other stationery products, sold Mango Chutney Mango Garlic chutney, Mango and saffron and other processed fruit and vegetables as well as exercise books meant for young children which contain cartoons and the children have to paint it with appropriate colours. The assessing authority held that above paste items sold by the appellant are not processed fruit and vegetables and levied tax under residential entry. As regards sale of exercise books it was not considered as exempt and taxed under entry II of the First Schedule to the Act. The appellate authority allowed the appeal. The Addl. Commissioner of Sales Tax revised the appeal order and restored the assessment order. The appellant filed appeal against revision order passed by the Addl. Commissioner before the Karnataka High Court.

HELD
Entry 3 of the Third Schedule to the Act covers all processed fruit and vegetable including Fruit Jams, Pickle, Fruit Squash, Paste, Fruit Drink and Fruit Juice (whether in sealed container or otherwise). The paste items used in preparation of vegetable items are basically made out of fruit and vegetables and the said paste is processed products.

The view of revisional authority that the above paste items contain other spicy ingredients, which do not constitute fruit or vegetable and therefore, they have to be excluded from the meaning of Processed fruit and vegetables as per entry 3 is an untenable argument. What is required to be seen in a matter like this would be that, in the given items of paste in question, what is the dominant ingredient, and it may be that there would be composition of other ingredients that would be the decisive criteria. In that view, the paste in question would come within the purview of entry 3 of the Third Schedule to the Act.

With regards to exercise books, the High Court held that they are in the nature of exercise books containing cartoons. The young children are expected to colour it with appropriate colour crayons. The purpose of the said exercise books is to inculcate the basic art of painting. Therefore, the said exercise books do constitute printed books to be exempted from the tax.

Accordingly, the High court allowed the appeal.

State of Haryana vs. Glaxo India Ltd. And Another [2013] 63 VST [P&H]

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Sales Tax – Sale of “Feed Supplements” – Covered by the Term “Poultry Feed” – Exempt From Payment of Tax, Entry 53 of Schedule B to The Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973.

FACTS
The respondent Company was assessed for the year 1996-1997 treating sale of “Feed Supplements” tax free covered by the term“poultry feed” falling in entry 53 of Schedule B to the Haryana General Sales Act, 1973. Subsequently the assessment order was revised by holding that sale of one or other constituent of “Poultry Feed” could not be taken as poultry Feed and levied tax. The Tribunal allowed the appeal and restored the assessment order allowing claim of tax free sales. The State filed appeal against thejudgment of Tribunal before The Punjab and Haryana High Court.

HELD
The benefit of exemption is given on the ground that the sale of feed supplements such as protein, salts and minerals, vitamins, antibiotics, etc., would also constitute “Poultry Feed”. The very fact that each of the feed supplements can individually be given to the cattle, shall not exclude such feed from the exemption clause as object of giving exemption to the “poultry Feed” under the Act is to promote sale of “poultry feed/Supplements”. Consequently, the High Court found that no substantial question of law required for consideration by it. Accordingly, the appeals were dismissed by the High Court.

M/S.Christy Raj Hospital vs. State of Kerala [2014] 53MTJ284SC, Civil Appeal No 1119 of 2006, and 975 of 2014, dated 22nd January, 2014.

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Sales Tax – Dealer – Hospital – Activity of Buying and Selling Medicines Through its Pharmacy – May be Business – Direction by VAT Department for Registration Under Sales Tax Law – Writ Petition Dismissed by High Court- Affirmed by SC – With a Permission to Raise All Grounds At The Stage of Assessment, Sections 16 and 17 of The Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963.

FACTS
The Appellant, Trust running a Hospital, had filed Writ Petition before the Kerala High Court challenging the direction given by the Sales Tax Department to obtain registration as dealer under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act. The appellant contended before the High Court that hospitals are not liable to be registered under KGST Act as they werewnot doing any business. The High Court dismissed the writ Petition.

The High Court held that though it is true that doctors of various specialties doing service in hospital by their intellectual skill in the matter of treating the patients by itself may not be a business activity and that is only a profession but various other facilities provided in the hospital cannot be said to be non business activity for example, a clinical laboratory, can independently function outside a hospital and do business. The fact that it is housed in a hospital will not make the service rendered a non-business activity. The activity in the hospital may involve business activities and non- business activities as well.

The appellant filed appeal before the Supreme Court against the judgment of Kerala High Court dismissing Writ Petition.

HELD
The Supreme Court disposed the appeal and affirmed the judgment and order passed by the High Court and granted permission to the appellant to raise all such grounds which are available to it, including certain grounds raised in appeal before SC at the stage of assessment. The assessing authorities were directed to look into those grounds, advert to them and pass a reasoned and speaking order. It was also clarified by SC that it has not examined the constitutional validity or otherwise of ‘Dealer’ as well as ‘Business’.

DIPP – Press Note No. 12 (2015 Series) dated 24th November, 2015

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Review of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) policy on various sectors

This Press Note has made major changes, with immediate effect, to the FDI Policy. Overall there are approximately 24 changes – both major and minor. Some of the important areas where changes have been made are – investment in LLP, real estate sector, defense sector, single brand retail trading, investment in banks.

Clarification w.r.t. Fabrication of Garments Service received by Apparel Exporters

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Circular No. 190/9/2015-ST dated 15.12.2015

Vide this Circular, CBEC has clarified that the services received by apparel exporters from third party for job work involves a process amounting to manufacture or production of goods, and thus would fall under negative list [section 66D (f)] and hence would not attract service tax. However, CBEC has also clarified that only those job works which involve a process on which duties of excise are leviable u/s. 3 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 would be covered under negative list in terms of Section 66D(f) read with section 65B (40) of the Finance Act, 1994 and hence applicability of service tax may be decided on case to case basis depending upon nature of agreement/contract entered into between service provider & service receiver and the service being provided.

Service Tax Payment due date extended – Tamilnadu and Puduchery

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Notification Nos. 26/2015-ST dated 09.12.2015 and 27/2015-ST dated 18.12.2015 Circular No. 184/3/2015-ST dated 03.06.2015

Due date for payment of Service Tax for the month of November 2015 for all Service Tax assessees in the State of Tamil Nadu & in the Union Territory of Puducherry (except Mahe & Yanam) extended.

Suvaprasanna Bhatacharya vs. ACIT ITAT Bench “B” Kolkata Before N. V. Vasudevan, (J. M.) and Waseem Ahmed (A. M.) ITA No.1303/Kol /2010 A. Y. : 2006-07. Date of Order: 06-11-2015 Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: A.K. Tibrewal and Amit Agarwal / Sanjit Kr. Das

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Section 271(1)(c) r.w 274 – For valid initiation of penalty proceedings it is essential that (i) Prima facie, the case may deserve the imposition of penalty should be discernible from the Order passed; and (ii) Notice must specify as to whether the Assessee was guilty of having “furnished inaccurate particulars of income” or of having “concealed particulars of such income”.

Facts
The assessee is a professional artist having created many paintings. For AY 2006-07, the Assessee filed return of income declaring income of Rs.6.73 lakh. During the course of assessment proceeding, the AO found that the assessee had invested the sum of Rs. 68.79 lakh in units of mutual fund out of income from sale of paintings which was not disclosed in his return of income. The AO assessed the income of the assessee at Rs. 80.89 lakh and issued a show cause notice u/s.274. The assessee accepted the order of the AO and paid taxes due thereon. In his reply to Notice u/s. 274, the assessee submitted that the additional income assessed was out of the sale of art which was in the nature of personal effects and hence not a capital asset within the meaning of the definition of the said term u/s.2 (14) (ii). He explained that the paintings were kept for years over because of his aesthetic sense and also it gave him tremendous pleasure and pride of possession. Thus, the paintings were his “personal effects”. The assessee further explained that the sale of paintings was for the purpose of making investments in the units of mutual funds and to earn income from such investments for his livelihood. Therefore, it was contended by him that the incidence of sale cannot be construed as the adventure in the nature of trade. Thus, according to him, income earned out of the sales of paintings, which were nothing but the personal effects, was not taxable and the very basis of addition by the AO was not correct. It was pointed out that in the course of assessment proceedings, the facts were placed before the AO. However, to avoid litigation, the taxes were paid. It was contended that sine the assessment and penalty proceedings are two different proceedings, the Assessee is not precluded from urging the correct position in law during the penalty proceedings. The assessee thus submitted that imposition of penalty was unsustainable.

The above submissions did not find favour with the AO. The AO held that the assessee had deliberately tried to conceal his professional receipt by depositing it in the bank account not disclosed to the department. Such information was found out by the department. He had no option but to disclose it fully as the bank details were already with the department. The mistake was neither due to ignorance nor bona fide. The AO referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dharmendra Textile Processors and others 306 ITR 277 and held that mens rea is not essential for attracting civil liabilities. Accordingly, he levied a penalty of Rs. 71.88 lakh u/s. 271(1)(c). On appeal by the Assessee, the CIT(A) confirmed the order of the AO.

Before the Tribunal, the assessee further submitted that the AO had not recorded his satisfaction in the order of assessment that the assessee is liable to be proceeded against u/s.271(1)(c). Further, the show cause notice issued u/s.274 did not specify as to whether the Assessee was guilty of having “furnished inaccurate particulars of income” or of having “concealed particulars of such income”.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the source of funds for making investments in units of mutual funds was the starting point of enquiry by the AO. It was not in dispute that the source of funds for making such investments was the sale of assessee’s own paintings. Thus, if the painting are considered as “personal effects” then they cannot be regarded as “capital assets” within the meaning of section 2(14)(ii). Consequently, the receipts on sale of paintings would not be chargeable to tax.

Referring to the meaning of the term “personal effects” as per section 2(14)(ii), it noted that by the Finance Act, 2007, the definition of the term “personal effects” was substituted w.e.f. the 1st day of April, 2008 to exclude from its meaning the items of amongst others, drawings and paintings. Thus, till 31st March, 2008, drawing and paintings were considered as “personal effects” and hence, not as capital assets till then.

The Tribunal further noted that the sale of paintings was not done by the assessee as an adventure in the nature of trade. The paintings were kept for years over because of his aesthetic sense. It gave him tremendous pleasure and pride of possession. This aspect had not been disputed by the AO. Therefore, according to the tribunal, the paintings were his “personal effects”. Further, in the statement recorded u/s.131, the assessee had stated that the paintings were made as per creation desire of the assessee. Therefore, it accepted the contention of the assessee that the paintings were his “personal effects” and held that the penalty imposed qua the income from the sale of painting was not sustainable.

As regards the alternate contention of the assessee, the Tribunal agreed with the assessee that the order of assessment nowhere spells out or indicates that the AO was of the view that the assessee was guilty of either concealing particulars of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. The offer to tax of income by the assessee has just been accepted. Relying on the Delhi High Court decision in the case of Ms. Madhushree Gupta vs. Union of India 317 ITR 107, the Tribunal observed that the position of law, both pre and post introduction of section 271(1B) is similar, inasmuch, the AO has to arrive at a prima facie satisfaction during the course of assessment proceedings with regard to the assessee having concealed particulars of income or furnished inaccurate particulars, before he initiates penalty proceedings. Prima facie, the case may deserve the imposition of penalty should be discernible from the Order passed.

As regards the contention of the assessee that the show cause notice u/s.274 which is in a printed form does not strike out as to whether the penalty is sought to be levied for “furnishing inaccurate particulars of income” or “concealing particulars of such income”, the tribunal, relying on the Karnataka High Court decision in the case of CIT & Anr. vs. Manjunatha Cotton and Ginning Factory, 359 ITR 565 agreed that the Notice did not satisfy the requirement of law in as much as that it had not struck out the irrelevant part. Thus the show cause notice u/s. 274 was defective hence, the order imposing penalty was invalid and therefore, the penalty imposed was cancelled.

ITO vs. Superline Construction Pvt. Ltd. ITAT “A” Bench, Mumbai Before Shailendra Kumar Yadav (J. M.) and Rajesh Kumar (A. M.) ITA No. 3645/Mum/2014 A. Y. : 2007-08. Date of Order: 30.11.2015 Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: A. Ramachandran / P. Danial

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Section 68 – In case of receipt of share application money from the alleged bogus shareholders, addition can only be made in the hands of the alleged bogus shareholders and not in the income of the company recipient.

Facts
This appeal, along with six others, by the Revenue is directed against respective orders of the CIT(A) in respect of seven different assessees. Since the appeals involve common issues, the same were heard together and disposed of by the Tribunal, by a consolidated order.

The assessee was a builder and a developer. The assessment was completed u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 147. During the year, the assessee had received share application money to the tune of Rs.85 lakh from eight companies. After completing the assessment, the Assessing Officer received detailed report from the investigation wing alongwith copies of statement recorded from the concerned officials of the company. Based thereon, the assessment was re-opened and an addition of Rs.40 lakh was made on account of bogus share application money received from three different corporate entities, u/s. 68. On appeal, the CIT(A) deleted the addition.

Before the Tribunal, the revenue contended that the CIT(A) erred in deleting the addition without appreciating the fact that addition was made based on specific information provided by Investigation Wing of Income Tax Department. According to it, the investors had issued cheques towards alleged share application money in return of cash. It was submitted that the assessee had failed to discharge the onus cast upon it to prove the credit entries of share application money as required under the statute.

In reply, the assessee contended that it had fully discharged the burden of proof by establishing the identity, creditworthiness and genuineness of the transactions. It produced banking instruments as the documentary evidence and further substantiated the details regarding the investors with the documentary evidences as extracted from the website of the Ministry of Corporate Affairs. Further, the assessee relied on the Supreme court decision in the case of CIT vs. Lovely Exports (Pvt) Ltd., reported in [2008] 216 CTR 195 (SC) and few other tribunal decisions.

Held
The Tribunal noted that on similar issue of receipt of share application money, the Supreme Court had in the case relied on by the assessee, held that such receipt cannot be regarded as the undisclosed income of the assessee company and in case the department has information about the alleged bogus shareholders, then the department should proceed to reopen the individual assessments of the investors. Further, taking into account the facts and circumstances of the case and other decisions of the tribunals on a similar issue, the Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A) and the appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.

[2015] 154 ITD 768 (Mumbai) ITO vs. Structmast Relator (Mumbai) (P.) Ltd. A.Y.: 2009-10 Date of Order: 25th March, 2015.

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Section 24(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 – The interest bearing security deposits partakes the character of borrowed money and the assessee is eligible to claim deduction u/s. 24(b) of the interest paid on the same.

FACTS
During the year under consideration, the assessee, who was engaged in the business of builders and developers, had taken an interest-free loan of Rs. 11 crore from ‘R’ for a short period to purchase an immovable property which was then let out to various tenants. The assessee received deposits from them whereon it had to pay interest at the rate of 6% p.a. These deposits were utilised for the repayment of loan taken from the ‘R’. The assessee claimed deduction of interest u/s. 24(b).

The A.O. disallowed the deduction u/s. 24(b) on the grounds that interest should be payable on capital borrowed or the capital borrowed must be for the purpose of repayment of old loan. He held that the security deposits cannot be termed as capital borrowed for the purpose of repayment of old loan.

CIT(A) holding in favour of assessee stated that such deposits were in fact a kind of loan only, as they bore interest and were utilised for the purpose of repayment of original loan taken for the purchase of house property.

On Revenue’s Appeal-

HELD
It is an undisputed fact that interest at 6% is payable on these refundable deposits under consideration which were taken to repay the original loan. The controversy is whether these deposits can be considered as borrowed money and accordingly whether interest on the same should be allowed u/s 24(b) to the assessee or not.

The word ‘borrow’ as defined in Law Lexicon (2nd edition) means to take or receiving from another person as a loan or on trust money or other article of value with the intention of returning or giving an equivalent for the same. A person can borrow on a negotiated interest with or without security. If the deposits are interest bearing and are to be refunded, then a debt is created on the assessee which it is liable to be discharged in future.

If the deposits had been security deposit simplicitor to cover the damage of the property or lapses on part of the tenant either for non-payment of rent or other charges, then such a deposit cannot be equated with the borrowed money, because then there is no debt on the assessee. However in the given case, it is clear that the intention of taking the deposit is not so.

It was held in favour of the assessee that the moment the security put is accepted on interest, it partakes the character of borrowed money and the assessee is eligible to claim deduction u/s. 24(b) of the interest paid on the same.

[2015] 154 ITD 803 (Chennai) DCIT vs. Ganapathy Media (P.) Ltd. A.Y.: 2009-10 Date of Order: 19th June 2015

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Section 194J of the Income-tax Act, 1961 – The transaction of
acquiring the right to telecast a cinematographic film through satellite
for a period of 99 years is in the nature of purchase of
cinematographic film and not fees paid for technical services and
therefore is not liable to TDS.

FACTS
The assessee
company was in the business of buying and selling rights of the feature
films as a trader for consideration. During the year under
consideration, it was granted rights to telecast films through satellite
for a period of 99 years. The transaction was observed by the AO to be
in the nature of fees paid for technical services and therefore he
disallowed the payment u/s. 40(a)(ia) on the grounds that no TDS u/s.
194J was deducted on the same. The CIT(A) held the transaction to be in
the nature of purchase of cinematographic film by the assessee and
therefore deleted the disallowance made by the AO.

On revenue’s appeal –

HELD
The
issue before the Tribunal was whether the right to telecast the
cinematographic film through satellite is a mere assignment of right or
it is a purchase of the feature film.

The assessee claimed that
it amounted to purchase of films since the satellite right was given to
the assessee for 99 years. However, the Revenue claimed that it is only
an assignment, therefore, the assessee had to deduct tax u/s. 194J of
the Act.

The Tribunal relied on the decision of the Madras High
Court in K. Bhagyalakshmi vs. Dy. CIT [2014] 221 Taxman 225 wherein it
was held the copyright subsists only for a period of 60 years.
Therefore, the right given to the assessee beyond the period of 60 years
has to be treated as sale of the right for cinematographic film. The
order of CIT(A) was upheld and the issue was decided in favour of the
assessee.

Appeal to High Court – Finding of fact arrived at by the Tribunal cannot be set aside without a specific question regarding a perverse finding of fact having been raised before the High Court. Business Expenditure – Legal expenses incurred after the take over of a partnership firm is allowable as a deduction u/s. 37. Depreciation – Plant includes intellectual property rights.

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Mangalore Ganesh Beedi Works v. CIT [2015] 378 ITR 640 (SC)

In 1939, the late Sri S. Raghuram Prabhu started the business of manufacturing beedis. He was later joined the business by Sri Madhav Shenoy as a partner and thus M/s. Mangalore Ganesh Beedi Works (for short “MGBW”) came into existence with effect from February 28, 1940.

The partnership firm was constituted from time to time and its last constitution and partnership deed contained clause 16 relating to the manner in which the affairs of the partnership firm were to be wound up after its dissolution. Clause 16 of the partnership deed reads as follows:

“16. If the partnership is dissolved, the going concern carried on under the name of the firm Mangalore Ganesh Beedi Works and all the trade marks used in course of the said business by the said firm and under which the business of the partnership is carried on shall vest in and belong to the partner who offers and pays or two or more partners who jointly offer and pay the highest price therefore as a single group at a sale to be then held as among the partners shall be entitled to bid. The other partners shall execute and complete in favour of the purchasing partner or partners at his/her or their expense all such deed, instruments and applications and otherwise and him/her name or their names of all the said trade marks and do all such deed, acts and transactions as are incidental or necessary to the said transferee or assignee partner or partners.”

Due to differences between the partners of MGBW, the firm was dissolved on or about December 6, 1987, when the two partners of the firm applied for its winding up by filing Company Petition No.1 of 1988 in the High Court. While entertaining the Company Petition the High Court appointed an official liquidator and eventually, after hearing all the concerned parties, a winding up order was passed on June 14, 1991.

In its order passed on June 14, 1991, the High Court held that the firm is dissolved with effect from December 6, 1987, and directed the sale of its assets as a going concern to the highest bidder amongst the partners.

Pursuant to the order passed by the High Court on June 14, 1991, an auction was conducted in which three of the erstwhile partners forming an association of persons (hereinafter referred to as “AOP-3”) emerged as the highest bidders and their bid of Rs.92 crores for the assets of MGBW was accepted by the official liquidator on or about November 17, 1994. With effect from November 18, 1994, the business of the firm passed on into the hands of AOP-3 but the tangible assets were actually handed over by the official liquidator to AOP-3 on or about January 7, 1995.

MGBW (hereinafter referred to as “the assessee”) filed its return for the assessment year 1995-96 relating to period November 18, 1994, to March 31, 1995, and, subsequently, filed a revised return. Broadly, the assessee claimed a deduction of Rs.12,24,700 as a revenue expenditure permissible u/s. 37 of the Incometax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) towards legal expenses incurred. The assessee also claimed deduction u/ss.35A and section 35AB of the Act towards acquisition of intellectual property rights such as rights over the trade mark, copyright and technical know-how. In the alternative, the assessee claimed depreciation on capitalizing the value of the intellectual property rights by treating them as plant.

The Assessing Officer passed an order on March 30, 1998, rejecting the claim of the assessee under all the three sections mentioned above. Feeling aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) who passed an order on October 15, 1998. The appeal was allowed in part inasmuch as it was held that the assessee was entitled to a deduction towards legal expenses. However, the claim of the assessee regarding deduction or depreciation on the intellectual property rights was rejected by the Commissioner of Income-tax(Appeals).

As a result of the appellate order, the Revenue was aggrieved by the deduction granted to the assessee in respect of legal expenses and so it preferred an appeal before the Tribunal. The assessee was aggrieved by the rejection of its claim in respect of the intellectual property rights and also filed an appeal before the Tribunal.

By an order dated October 19, 2000, the Tribunal allowed the appeal of the assessee while rejecting the appeal of the Revenue.

The High Court set aside the findings of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (for short “the Tribunal”) and restored the order of the Assessing Officer.

The Supreme Court with regards to the claim of deduction of Rs.12,24,700/- as revenue expenditure held that there was a clear finding of fact by the Tribunal that the legal expenses incurred by the assessee were for protecting its business and that the expenses were incurred after November 18, 1994. According to the Supreme Court there was no reason to reverse this finding of fact particularly since nothing had been shown to them to conclude that the finding of fact was perverse in any manner whatsoever. That apart, if the finding of fact arrived at by the Tribunal were to be set aside, a specific question regarding a perverse finding of fact ought to have been framed by the High Court.

The Supreme Court therefore set aside the conclusion arrived at by the High Court on this question and restored the view of the Tribunal.

In so far as the question of granting depreciation on the value of trade marks, copy rights and know how was concerned, the Supreme Court noted that the fundamental basis on which these questions were decided against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue was the finding of the High Court that what was sold by way of auction to the highest bidder was the goodwill of the partnership firm and not the trade marks, copyrights and technical know-how.

According to learned counsel for the Revenue, MGBW was already the owner of the trade marks, copyrights and technical know-how and essentially the rights in the intellectual property might be included in goodwill, but these were not auctioned off but were relinquished in favour of AOP-3.

The Supreme Court observed that the trade marks were given a value since in the beedi industry the trade mark and brand name have a value and the assessee’s product under trade mark “501” had a national and international market. As far as the copyright valuation was concerned, beedis were known not only by the trade mark but also by the depiction on the labels and wrappers and colour combination on the package. The assessee had a copyright on the content of the labels, wrappers and the colour combination on them. Similarly, the know-how had a value since the aroma of beedis differ from one manufacturer to another, depending on the secret formula for mixing and blending tobacco.

The Supreme Court noted that AOP-3 had obtained a separate valuation from the chartered accountant M. R. Ramachandra Variar. In his report dated September 12, 1994, the technical know-how was valued at Rs.36 crore, copyright was valued at Rs.21.6 crore and trade marks were valued at Rs.14.4 crore making a total of Rs.72 crore.

The Supreme Court noted that in the case of M. Ramnath Shenoy (an erstwhile partner of MGBW) the Tribunal had accepted (after a detailed discussion) the contention of the assessee that trade marks, copyrights and technical know-how alone were comprised in the assets of the business and not goodwill. It was also held that when the Revenue alleges that it is goodwill and not trade marks, etc., that is transferred the onus will be on the Revenue to prove it, which it was unable to do. The Tribunal then examined the question whether the sale of these intangible assets would attract capital gains. The question was answered in the negative and it was held that the assets were self-generated and would not attract capital gains. The decision of the Tribunal was accepted by the Revenue and therefore according to the Supreme Court there was no reason why a different conclusion should be arrived at in so far as the assessee was concerned.

The Supreme Court observed that the High Court denied any benefit to the assessee u/ss 35A and 35AB of the Act since it was held that what was auctioned off was only goodwill and no amount was spent by AOP-3 towards acquisition of trade marks, copyrights and know-how. In coming to this conclusion, reliance was placed in the report of the chartered accountants Rao and Swamy who stated that the assets of MGBW were those of a going concern and were valued on the goodwill of the firm and no trade marks, copyrights and know-how were acquired. According to the Supreme Court, the High Court rather speculatively held that the valuation made by the chartered accountant of AOP-3 that is M. R. Ramachandra Variar that the goodwill was split into know-how, copyrights and trade marks only for the purposes of claiming a deduction u/ss 35A and 35AB of the Act and the value of the goodwill was shown as nil and the deduction claimed did not represent the value of the know-how, copyrights and trade marks.

The Supreme Court however left open the question of the applicability of sections 35A and 35AB of the Act for an appropriate case. This was because learned counsel submitted that if the assessee was given the benefit of section 32 read with section 43(3) of the Act (depreciation on plant) as had been done by the Tribunal, the assessee would be quite satisfied. The Supreme Court observed that unfortunately, this alternative aspect of the assessee’s case was not looked into by the High Court. Therefore, according to the Supreme Court now the question to be answered was whether the assessee was entitled to any benefit u/s. 32 of the Act read with section 43(3) thereof for the expenditure incurred on the acquisition of trade marks, copyrights and know-how.

The Supreme Court noted that the definition of “plant” in section 43(3) of the Act was inclusive. A similar definition occurring in section 10(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 was considered in CIT vs. Taj Mahal Hotel wherein it was held that the word “plant” must be given a wide meaning. The Supreme Court held that for the purposes of a large business, control over intellectual property rights such as brand name, trade mark, etc., are absolutely necessary. Moreover, the acquisition of such rights and know-how is acquisition of a capital nature, more particularly in the case of the assessee. Therefore, it could not be doubted that so far as the assessee was concerned, the trade marks, copyrights and know-how acquired by it would come within the definition of “plant” being commercially necessary and essential as understood by those dealing with direct taxes. The Supreme Court noted that section 32, as it stood at the relevant time did not make any distinction between tangible and intangible assets for the purposes of depreciation.

In this context, the Supreme Court observed that by denying that the trade marks were auctioned to the highest bidder, the Revenue is actually seeking to re-write clause 16 of the agreement between the erstwhile partners of MGBW. This clause specifically states that the going concern and all the trademarks used in the course of the said business by the said firm and under which the business of the partnership is carried on shall vest in and belong to the highest bidder. Under the circumstances, it was difficult to appreciate how it could be concluded by the Revenue that the trade marks were not auctioned off and only the goodwill in the erstwhile firm was auctioned off. The Supreme Court restored the order of the Tribunal directing the Assessing Officer to capitalise the value of trade marks, copyrights and technical know-how by treating the same as plant and machinery and to grant depreciation thereon.

Recovery of Tax – Stay of Demand – Subsequent events should be taken into consideration.

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Sidhi Vinayak Metcom Ltd. vs. UOI [2015] 378 ITR 372 (SC)

The assessment in respect of the assessment years 2010-11 and 2011-12 was reopened by the Income-tax Department by issuing notice u/s. 148. Assessments for these years were carried out afresh by the Assessing Officer imposing an additional tax demand of Rs.64 lakhs. The Petitioner had filed appeals against the said order which were pending before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). The Petitioner also moved an application for stay of the demand. On this, application, the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) passed orders granting stay of interest and in respect of the tax amount, the petitioner was permitted to deposit the same in 16 installments. However, the Petitioner committed default in making payment of the very first installment because of which the bank account of the Petitioner was attached. The order was challenged by filing a writ petition in the High Court which was dismissed.

Before the Supreme Court it was pointed out that up to now the Petitioner had paid a sum of Rs.27.7 lakh in all. It was also pointed out by the learned counsel for the Petitioner that the main reason for reopening of the assessment for the aforesaid years by issuance of notice u/s. 148 was certain proceedings under the Central Excise Act. A copy of the decision dated September 16, 2015, paused by the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal was filed before the Supreme Court by way of additional document, revealing that in appeal against the Order-in- Original of the Excise Department, the CESTAT had set aside the said order and remitted the case back to the adjudicating authority for fresh adjudication.

According to the Supreme Court, in view of the aforesaid subsequent event, it would be appropriate if the petitioner approached the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) once again with an application for stay bringing the aforesaid events to the notice of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). The Supreme Court was confidant that the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) would consider the application on its own merits and pass orders thereon within a period of four weeks from the date of filing the application. The Supreme Court disposed the special leave petition accordingly.

TDS – Payment to non-resident – Sections 195 and 201 – A. Y. 2002-03 – Transaction not resulting in liability to tax – Tax not deductible at source – Assessee not in default

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Anusha Investments Ltd. vs. ITO; 378 ITR 621 (Mad):

The assessee had purchased shares from a non-resident company which had resulted in capital loss to the nonresident company. Therefore, the assessee had not deducted tax at source. The Tribunal held that whether or not the non-resident company suffered a loss or gain on the sale of shares, a duty was cast on the assessee to deduct the tax whenever it made payment to the nonresident and that the assessee was not only liable to deduct the tax at source, but it also had to pay the tax so collected to the exchequer.

In appeal by the assessee, the Madras High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“In the present transaction, admittedly, there was no liability to tax. As a result, the question of deducting tax at source and the assessee violating the provisions of section 195 did not arise and, therefore, the assessee could not be treated as an assessee in default.”

Revision – Section 263 – A. Y. 2007-08 – Question whether total income for purposes of section 36(1)(viia)(c) should be computed after allowing deduction u/s. 36(1)(viii) – Two possible views – Debatable issue – Revision u/s. 263 not justified

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CIT vs. Power Finance Corporation Ltd.; 378 ITR 619 (Del):

For the A. Y. 2007-08, the Assessing Officer completed the assessment u/s. 143(3), allowing the deduction u/s. 36(1)(viia)(c) and u/s. 36(1)(viii). The Commissioner exercised the revisional powers u/s. 263 and held that the deduction u/s. 36(1)(viia)(c) should have been computed after allowing deduction u/s. 36(1)(viii). The Tribunal set aside the order of the Commissioner holding that on the question whether the total income for the purpose of section 36(1)(vii)(c) should be computed after allowing the deduction u/s. 36(1)(viii) there were at least two possible views as reflected in the orders of the Delhi and Chennai Benches of the Tribunal. On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) I ndependent of the two decisions, the stand of the Revenue as set out in its memorandum of appeal and that of the assessee that both deductions were independent of each other, gave rise to two further possible interpretations.

ii) The view taken by the Assessing Officer was a possible one and there was no occasion for the Commissioner to have exercised the jurisdiction u/s. 263.”

Presumptive tax – Section 44BBA – A. Y. 1989-90 to 1993-94 – Non-residents – Business of operation of air craft – Section 44BBA is not charging provision, but only a machinery provision – It cannot preclude an assessee from producing books of account to show that in any particular assessment year there is no taxable income – When there is no taxable income, section 44BBA cannot be applied to bring to tax presumptive income constituting 5 per cent of gross receipts

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DIT vs. Royal Jordanian Airlines; [2015] 64 taxmann.com 93 (Delhi):

The assessee-airline was established by the Ministry of Transport of the Kingdom of Jardon. It appointed Jet Air Pvt. Ltd. as its general sales agency in India. The assessee commenced its operations in India, carrying passengers and cargo on international flights from and to India from 1989 onwards. Since commencement of operations in India, assessee had been incurring losses. For relevant years, the assessee filed its return declaring nil income. The Assessing Officer opined that assessee was a foreign company and was liable to pay tax in India in terms of section 44BBA. He thus proceeded to determine income at the rate of 5 per cent of the net sales. The Tribunal upheld the order of Assessing Officer on merits. However, the Tribunal remanded the matter back for recomputation of income u/s. 44BBA.

The Delhi High Court allowed the assessee’s appeal and held as under:

“i) Inasmuch as section 44BBA is not charging provision, but only a machinery provision, it cannot preclude an assessee from producing books of account to show that in any particular assessment year there is no taxable income.

ii) Where there is no income, section 44BBA cannot be applied to bring to tax the presumptive income constituting 5 per cent of the gross receipts in terms of section 44BBA(2). No doubt, for that purpose the assessee has to produce books of account to substantiate that it has incurred losses or that its assessable income is less than its presumptive income, as the case may be.

iii) The Tribunal has noted the factual position regarding the losses incurred by assessee for the relevant years. This has not been disputed by the revenue in its appeal against the aforesaid order. Consequently, the question of assessee being asked to pay tax on presumptive basis u/s. 44BBA for the said year, or the matters being sent to the Assessing Officer for verifying the said facts does not arise.

In the result, assessee’s appeal has to be allowed.”

Penalty – Sections 269T, 271E and 275(1)(c) – A. Y. 2005-06 – Assessment order u/s. 143(3) with direction to initiate penalty proceedings u/s. 271E passed on 28/12/2007 – Penalty order u/s. 271E passed on 20/03/2012 is barred by limitation

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Principal CIT vs. JKD Capital and Finlease Ltd.; 378 ITR 614 (Del):

For the A. Y. 2005-06, the assessment order u/s. 143(3) was passed on 28/12/2007 with a direction to initiate proceedings for penalty u/s. 271E of the Act. A show cause notice initiating penalty proceedings u/s. 271E was issued on 12/03/2012 and a penalty of Rs.17,90,000/- was imposed. The Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the penalty on the ground that, in terms of section 275(1) (c), the penalty order should have been passed on or before 30/06/2008 and therefore, penalty order passed on 20/03/2012, was barred by limitation. The Tribunal confirmed the order of the Commissioner (Appeals).

In appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) There are two distinct periods of limitation for passing a penalty order, and one that expires later will apply. One is the end of the financial year in which the quantum proceedings are completed in the first instance. In the present case, at the level of the Assessing Officer, the quantum proceedings were completed on 28/12/2007. Going by this date, the penalty order could not have been passed later than 31/03/2008. The second possible date was the expiry of six months from the month in which the penalty proceedings were initiated. With the Assessing Officer having initiated the penalty proceedings in December 2007, the last date by which the penalty order could have been passed was 30/06/2008. The later of the two dates was 30/06/2008.

ii) The decision of the Tribunal did not suffer from any legal infirmity.”

Buy Back of Shares by Private and Public unlisted Companies under the Companies Act, 2013

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This artice is intended as a basis for understanding the provisions in brief and does not claim to be a critical analysis of the provisions – Editorial Note.

1. What is Buy Back?

A share of an incorporated company is a property transferable between people entitled to hold the same, by following a set of procedures. Shares are of different types – Equity, Preference, Convertible, quasi debt, having differential voting rights, etc. These shares when issued provide a bundle of rights to the Subscriber, Purchaser or Registered Holder of shares as the case may be. These rights include, right to receive dividend, right to participate in the decision making of the Company to the extent permitted by Law.

Buy back is a term specifically used when shares are repurchased by the issuing Company. Buy back reduces the number of shares outstanding; it increases earnings per share and tends to increase the market value of the remaining shares.

2. What are the statutory provisions related to buy back of shares?

The provision related to buy back were introduced in the Companies Act, 1956 u/s. 77A, 77AA and 77B vide Companies (Amendment) Act, 1999 with retrospective effect from 31-10-1998. These provisions have been incorporated in the Companies Act, 2013 effective from 1st April, 2014 in sections 68, 69 and 70. Apart from the said sections 68 to 70 which provide for pre-conditions, limits, prohibitions and post buy- back compliance, Rule 17 of the Companies (Share Capital and Debentures) Rules 2014 mandates the procedure to be followed to carry out buy-back of shares.

3. What are the broad conditions of the Act on buy-back?

Any company undertaking a buy-back has to have its compliance up-to-date. Mainly such compliance falls in two categories (i) pre-conditions facilitating buy-back and; (ii) conditions on the basis of which buy-back is actually carried out. These conditions are like pre-operative check-up :

(i) pre-conditions facilitating buy-back:

i) Express provision in the Articles of Association of the Company empowering buy-back. It is well known fact that provisions of the Act override the provisions of Memorandum of Association- MoA and Articles of Association-AoA (section 6 of the Companies Act, 2013), but wherever the Act requires a specific provision in the Company’s constitutional document i.e. MoA AoA, it is necessary that the Company’s AOA should contain the same. It is therefore advisable that the Company should check that its AoA contains clear provision for buying back its securities. In the event the buy-back is not authorised by the Articles, steps should be taken to amend the same. A simple provision in the Articles which merely states “the Company may be subject to following requisite procedure of law can buy-back its securities” is sufficient empowerment for the Company to initiate buy-back.

ii) Up-to-date submission of returns with Registrar: The Company should check that all its returns mandatorily required to be filed every year i.e. Annual Accounts, Auditors report with Directors Report and other enclosure and Annual Returns have been submitted. With 100% e-filing of MCA returns, it is easy for the Registrar to check at a click of a mouse about e-filing position of every Company. Therefore, if the Registrar flags this matter as pending, the process of buy-back will be in question.

iii) Strict compliance with the provisions of the Act related to acceptance of deposits and repayment of Loans taken from Bank and Financial Institutions: The Company should ensure that it has adhered to the strict compliance related to acceptance of deposits as envisaged in section 73 to 76 (as applicable) and Companies (Acceptance of Deposits) Rules 2014. Any violation pertaining thereto or any default in respect of payment of interest on deposits or debentures or default in redemption of principal amount or any default in repayment of installment of loan or interest thereon will be termed as violation of the provisions of the Act and such Company will not be allowed to undertake buy-back.

Though the Act provides for prohibition of buy-back by Companies who have defaulted in repayment of loan or interest thereon, it will have to be viewed on a case-to-case basis. In case of a Company availing cash credit and overdraft facility, it is not a term loan or there is no default which can be linked, unless the Company has no turnover or is unable to, in time, convert its debtors into cash.

iv) Compliance with the provisions related to declaration and payment of dividend: The Company undertaking buy-back should ensure that, it has complied with conditions for issue of dividend and has not violated the timeline for issuing dividend payment instruments. In case of a question raised by any shareholder entitled for dividend about non-receipt of dividend, the Company should be in a position to prove beyond doubt that, it has adhered to the procedure u/s. 123 and 127 read with Rules pertaining to declaration and payment of dividend.

v) Adherence to provisions related to Financial Statement as provided in section 129 of the Act: The Company should ensure that provisions related to Financial Statements, disclosure requirements, approval and adoption thereof by the Board and the Members at AGM, disclosure about subsidiary, associate and joint venture Companies as applicable are adhered to, before commencing buy-back.

In our view, adherence to the compliance of this section is possible when a Company maintain its accounts according to standards set by ICAI and that there are no material adverse comments by the Auditors in its report.

vi) Indirect buy-back: The Company undertaking buy-back should not carry out the same though its’ subsidiary and/or through investment Company or group of investment companies.

According to one view, the condition of Company buying-back its shares through its subsidiary is not possible now in view of the provisions of section 19, which prohibits a subsidiary Company from holding shares of its Holding Company.

(ii) Conditions on the basis of which buy-back is actually carried out. After the Company has confirmed that it complies with all pre-conditions empowering itself for undertaking a buy back, the following aspects should be ensured by the Company;

  • Authorisation by the members in the General Meeting by way of special resolution for carrying out buy-back with complete details of shares to be bought back and other aspects as mentioned in Rule 17 of the Cos (Share capital & Debentures) Rules 2014.
  • Shares to be bought back should be fully paid up;
  • No further issue of shares by the Company whether by way of rights issue, preferential issue or bonus shares after getting authorisation for buy-back from members, till the issue process is complete. However, any quasi–debts instrument issued by the Company, which are convertible into equity are exempt from this condition. Thus, conversion by third party on the basis of pre-granted rights is possible.
  • Shares to be bought back can be from:

(i) existing shareholders or security holders on a proportionate basis;
(ii) from open market;
(iii) securities issued under Employee Stock Option Scheme/Plan (ESOS/ESOP) or sweat equity

  • Funding for buy-back can be made from any one or combination of following sources:

a) Free reserves;
b) Balance in securities premium account; or
c) Proceeds of the issue of any shares or other specified securities.

However, the Company cannot issue shares for buying back shares of same type or issue specified securities for buying-back the same type of securities

4. What are the limits on buy-back of shares by the Company?

The Company buying back its shares has two options;

a) Buy-back on the basis of only resolution of the Board:- A buy-back on the basis of Board Resolution can be upto 10% of the paid up capital and free reserves;

b) Buy-back on the basis of Members’ Special resolution : A buy-back on the basis of Members ‘special resolution can be upto 25% of the paid up capital and free reserves.

5. Gist of other terms and conditions for buyback. A Company undertaking a buy-back has to keep in mind the following terms and conditions:

  • Every buy-back authorised by the Members or Board shall be completed within a period of one year from the date of passing the relevant resolution;
  • Once the offer of buy-back is announced to the shareholders, the same cannot be withdrawn;
  • A minimum period of one year should have elapsed from the closure date of previous buyback and date of offer of present buy-back;
  • The debt to equity ratio of a Company post buyback should not be more than 2:1; or such other ratio as may be prescribed by the Govt. for that class of Companies; It is to be noted here that debt includes secured and unsecured debts;
  • If the Company has used its free reserves or securities premium account for funding buyback consideration, then a sum equal to nominal value of the shares so purchased is required to be transferred to the capital redemption reserve account;
  • Company buying back its shares is required to make complete disclosure of information in the Explanatory statement issued to members and is required to follow process and documentation as provided in rule 17 of the Companies (Share Capital and Debentures) Rules 2014;

6. What is Letter of Offer (L of O) and Compliance related thereto?

Letter of Offer is a document which is issued to shareholders disclosing all information about buy-back process, schedule and mandatory information which will help the shareholder to take a decision on exercising his buy-back option. The Company is required to electronically file this document with the RoC in format SH-8, before offer opens for shareholders. The Letter of Offer shall be dispatched to all shareholders immediately after the same is filed with the RoC but not later than 21 days of filing.

7. What are the other obligations on the Part of Company once Letter of Offer is filed with RoC?

Once the Letter of Offer is filed with the Registrar, it is information in the public domain and the Company has to adhere to disclosures made therein to complete the process of buy-back. Broad obligations of the Company are as follows;

(i) Keep open offer for buy-back for minimum period 15 days but not more than 30 days from the date of dispatch of Letter of Offer to shareholders;

(ii) Verification of details of shareholders on the basis of KYC data to be completed by the Company within fifteen days. If Company wishes to communicate the rejection of shares offered, the same should be communicated with 21 days of closure of offer. This also means that in case of pro-rata buy-back the Company is required to communicate to the shareholder accordingly.

(iii) Separate Bank account to be opened for depositing total consideration payable to all shareholders whose offer has been accepted.

8. What is the post buy-back closure compliance?

(i) The Company shall destroy securities certificate/ share certificates for the securities bought back or where the securities are in a dematerialised form, it should place a request through Depository for cancellation for the same. The company should keep record of securities destroyed in Register in form SH-10

(ii) File Return of Buy-back in Form SH-11 along with Certificate signed by 2 Directors confirming compliance with the provisions of Act and Rules pertaining to buy back in Form SH-15

Independent Directors – some issues

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Background

Major amendments in law in recent years have made the status of Independent Directors important, responsible and difficult. Consequently, so has the life of listed companies who are required to appoint such directors. On the other hand, the remuneration of Independent Directors has actually been reduced/limited while simultaneously accompanied with a manifold increase in their role and liabilities.

This issue has been compounded by the fact that, recently, Clause 49, that is part of the Listing Agreement and hence with far limited liability for people who contravene it, has been replaced by the SEBI Listing Regulations effective from December 2015. The result is that several types of punitive actions including penalty, debarment, etc. can be imposed on the Independent Director, the listed company, etc. The liabilities of Independent Director under the new Companies Act, 2013, are also now substantial. If and when provisions under that Act relating to class actions are brought into force, their liability will be even more.

Moreover, and which is the subject matter of this article, the legal provisions relating to them have become more complex. As many of the amendments are relatively recent, difficulties in their implementation come gradually into light. This article discusses some of such issues that are worthy of consideration.

Low remuneration to Independent Directors, which is actually decreased now

Remuneration of Independent Directors can be a sensitive issue and there are some fundamental and conceptual concerns. It is often the company and effectively the promoters who decide their remuneration, though there are certain safeguards. If he is paid too much, then his very independence is at stake. If he is paid too less, then too in a sense he loses his independence since he may lose some motivation. However, instead of creating a constructive mechanism to resolve this issue, the lawmakers have, through the Companies Act, 2013, actually limited his remuneration. He can be paid mainly in two modes. One is in the form of sitting fees (maximum Rs. 1 lakh per meeting) and the other is in the form of commission based on profits. The demands of competence, qualifications and stature makes even the maximum Rs. 1 lakh per meeting limit ridiculously low. One can of course pay remuneration based on profits made, but this makes it difficult for loss making companies. Such losses may be because of business difficulties or because the companies may be in their early/recovery stages. Such companies and their shareholders whose interests Independent Directors also protect are deprived of competent Independent Directors.

Curiously, Independent Directors cannot even be given stock options. This could have been an appropriate way, particularly for loss making companies or those in their early stages. While significant holding by Independent Directors in the company may compromise their independence, as a mode of remuneration, it could have been a good way, with due restrictions.

Significant liability of Independent Directors with a limited and ambiguous exempt clause

The liability of directors and others have increased substantially. This is not only about the increased penalty generally for violation of provisions. There are now substantial and direct provisions that can result in huge penal and other consequences on directors. There are for example, multiple provisions relating to fraud (u/s. 447 of the Companies Act, 2013) and several others that can result in prosecution of, inter alia, directors under a wide variety of circumstances. Perhaps for the first time, a corporate law prescribes minimum and mandatory imprisonment. As discussed earlier, there are provisions for class action which, when brought into effect, can result in direct action by shareholders/depositors against directors. To also reiterate, now that Clause 49 has been replaced by the Listing Regulations, it creates another set of liabilities for directors. There are elaborate Codes under the Companies Act, 2013, and the Listing Regulations (in the regulations corresponding to the earlier Clause 49) that describe what is the role of directors/Independent Directors. In comparison, the rights of Independent Directors are minimal and often vague too, particularly on the individual level. Independent Directors have also been given primary role in important committees like Audit Committee, Nomination/Remuneration Committee, etc.

In principle, thus, they potentially face huge action even though they have limited involvement, limited rights and very limited remuneration.

There is of course a broad exemption provided which is worded similarly in Companies Act, 2013, as well as the Listing Regulations. One of such provision is contained in section 149(12) of the Act. There are similar provisions elsewhere in the Act and the Listing Regulations. The broad intention is that Independent Directors should have liability limited to what they access, discuss, decide, etc. at Board Meetings . They should also be made liable if they do not act diligently. That may sound a good exit clause and perhaps it is to an extent. Having said that, this still exposes them to very significant liability. For example, their liability is not only on resolutions/decisions taken at Board Meetings. Even if they are informed about things, and if they fail to take action, they may be exposed to action.

Cross directorship and independence

The definition of Independent Director throws up many challenges. Ideally and even by the legal definition, the Independent Director is a person who has no or minimal connection with the Promoters, the company, etc. He should have mental and financial independence. However, in practice, there will be several categories of persons whose independence generally may come under question at least in spirit. Take the example of cross directorship. A member of promoter group A may become an Independent Director of a listed company controlled by promoter group B, and vice versa. At times, instead of such one-to-one cross directorship, there may be such cross/circular directorship in a group of companies. It would not be entirely wrong to say that there could be a ‘you-scratch-my-back and I-scratch-yours’ situation.

Annual Meeting of independent directors

Regulation 25(3) and (4) of the SEBI Listing Regulations now require that the Independent Directors should meet once a year and discuss certain specific matters such as performance of non-independent directors, Chairperson, quality/quantity/timelines of flow of information to the Board, etc. Here again, this is a well meaning provision and enables Independent Directors to discuss issues without the, sometimes, intimidating presence of the Promoters, senior management, etc. However, no rights to make any decision have been given to such group. Indeed, it is not even wholly clear whether they can be even paid sitting fees for such a meeting!

Nominee directors – whether independent?

Nominee directors are commonly appointed by lenders/ investors pursuant to loan/investment agreements. Earlier, there were two views on whether a nominee director was independent or not, and also whether they ought to be treated as independent. Now, under the Act as well as the Listing Regulations, such nominee directors are specifically treated as not independent.

In terms of section 149(6), a person who is a nominee director cannot be treated as an Independent Director. A nominee director is defined in the Explanation to 149(7) as follows:-

For the purposes of this section, “nominee director” means a director nominated by any financial institution in pursuance of the provisions of any law for the time being in force, or of any agreement, or appointed by any Government, or any other person to represent its interests.

A question that arises is that under Regulation 24(1) of the Listing Regulations, an independent director of the parent listed company is required to be appointed on the Board of the material subsidiary in India. Will such director be treated as independent director as far as the subsidiary company is concerned? The concern here is whether the independent director can be treated as nominee director of the holding company and thus, in spirit if not the letter of the requirements relating to nominee directors, such person ought not be treated as independent director. However, it appears that, this ought not be so. This is assuming such person otherwise complies with the requirements relating to independent director. Thus, the mere fact that they are also independent director of the holding listed company ought not result in loss of their independence vis-à-vis the subsidiary company.

Whether small shareholders’ director IS an Independent Director?

The requirement relating to small shareholders’ directors as contained in section 151 is drafted in such a way that it is very unlikely that such a director may be appointed.

As in the case of nominee directors, the question remains whether he would be an Independent Director since he is appointed by and thus can be said to represent the small shareholders. However, Rule 7(4) of the Companies (Appointment and Qualification of Directors) Rules 2014 makes it clear that, provided he otherwise does not attract any of the specified disqualifications, he will be treated as an Independent Director.

Woman director and independence

The Act as well as the SEBI Listing Regulations prescribe the requirement of having at least one woman director on the Board for the specified companies. It has been reported that a fairly significant number of companies have not yet appointed Independent Directors.

It is to be noted, however, that the requirement relating to Woman Director does not make it a condition that she shall also be independent. This has of course resulted in many companies having appointed a member of the promoter family as a Woman Director and thus perhaps the intention of such provision may not have been served.

Companies in which there are no Promoters

There are companies in which there are no specified Promoters. It is also possible for a company now to declare itself as not having any specific group of persons as Promoters. Directly or indirectly, many of the significant conditions/disqualifications relating to Independent Directors are dependent on the relations that the director may have with the Promoters. In such a case, unless the directors concerned attract conditions such as having financial relations with the listed company, etc. they would be treated as independent. Indeed, it is very likely that except the executive directors, the remaining directors may thus be independent.

Exited Promoters

Often there are more than one promoter groups in a company. One or more of such groups may desire to be no more associated with the company by selling off all or most of their shareholding and otherwise not being associated with the management and control of the company. It may also happen that even if there may be one Promoter Group, some persons may desire to be excluded from the Promoter Group. Now, the Listing Regulations have a formal procedure for such exclusion. Clearly, such excluded Promoters and persons having any of the specified relations with such excluded Promoters would not be treated as Independent Directors.

Conclusion

The coming years will reveal how well companies and Independent Directors are generally in compliance of the complex requirements and heavy responsibilities. In case of contraventions – technical and substantial, frauds, etc. it will be seen what type of action is taken against Independent Directors. An action that is proportionate to the context of their powers and responsibilities will encourage them to continue but the result may be opposite if strict interpretation and harsh action is taken.

Domestic Violence and Endangered stridhan—sC to the Rescue!

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Introduction

Stridhan is one of the unique features of Hindu Law. It signifies the exclusive property of a Hindu married lady and the Courts, generally, would strive to protect the same at all costs, including from her husband and in-laws. However, what happens when the lady’s marriage has undergone a judicial separation? Further, what happens if she has approached the Courts after the decree of judicial separation? Can she compel her husband and in-laws to return her stridhan in such a scenario? Recently, all these interesting questions were posed before the Supreme Court in the case of Krishna Bhatacharjee vs. Sarathi Choudhury, Cr. Appeal No. 1545 /2015 (hereinafter referred to as “Krishna’s case”). Let us analyse some of these interesting facets through this Article.

Factual Matrix of the Case
In Krishna’s case, on dowry demands not being satisfied, a married lady was driven out of her husband’s home. Ultimately, the couple were granted judicial separation by the Family Court. Thereafter, since the husband stopped paying monthly maintenance, the lady sought help from a Protection Officer, constituted under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, and sought his help for recovery of her stridhan which was yet in her husband’s custody. She also filed a criminal appeal claiming a criminal breach of trust by her husband which was punishable u/s. 405/406 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. All the lower Courts, including the High Court, denied relief to the lady since the claim for stridhan was made after the decree for judicial separation was passed. Further, they held that the criminal plea was time-barred by virtue of section 468 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It was in the light of these facts, that the aggrieved lady approached the Supreme Court and sought relief.

STRIDHAN
First and foremost it becomes important to understand the concept of stridhan. The term is coined from two different Sanskrit words “Stri” (meaning a lady) + “Dhan” (meaning property) = “Stridhan” (meaning a lady’s property). It thus, represents that property of a married lady over which she has exclusive domain. Only she can decide what she wants to do with such property. She can use it, gift it and will it away. The general meaning is the gift she received on marriage, from her parents, her husband, her in-laws, etc. In certain cases, property inherited by a female can also become stridhan. Thus, jewellery, personal belongings, etc., received by her on marriage would form part of her stridhan.
The position of stridhan has been explained by the Supreme Court in Pratibha Rani vs. Suraj Kumar, (1985) 2 SCC 370. The Court held that the position of stridhan of a Hindu married woman is that, she is the absolute owner of such property and can deal with it in any manner she liked. She may spend the whole of it or give it away at her own pleasure by gift or will without any reference to her husband. The entrustment to the husband of her stridhan property was like something which the wife kept in a bank and could withdraw any amount whenever she liked without any hitch or hindrance. The husband had no right or interest in it with the sole exception that in times of extreme distress he could use it. It further held that the husband had no jurisdiction over the stridhan and must return the same as and when demanded by the wife and he could not burden her with the losses of his business by using her stridhan. It was manifest that the husband, being only a custodian of the stridhan of his wife, could not be said to be in joint possession thereof and thus did not acquire a joint interest in the stridhan property.
Again in Smt. Rashmi Kumar vs. Mahesh Kumar Bhada, (1997) 2 SCC 397, the Supreme Court held that stridhan is the exclusive property of the wife on proof that she entrusted the custody over the stridhan to her husband or any other member of the family, there is no need to prove any further special agreement to establish that the property was given to the husband or other member of the family. It was always a question of fact in each case as to how property came to be entrusted to the husband or any other member of the family by the wife when she left the matrimonial home or was driven out therefrom. No absolute or fixed rule of universal application could be laid down in that behalf.
Domestic Violence Act
Next, it becomes essential to understand the important provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (“the 2005 Act”). It is an Act to provide for more effective protection of the rights, guaranteed under the Constitution of India, of those women who are victims of violence of any kind occurring within the family. It provides that if any act of domestic violence has been committed against a women, then she can approach designated Protection Officers to protect her. Hence, it becomes essential to consider as to what constitutes an act of Domestic Violence and who can claim shelter under this Act? Any aggrieved woman under the Act is one who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with an adult male and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by him. A domestic relationship means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage or are family members living together as a joint family. A live-in relationship is also considered as a domestic relationship. In D. Velusamy vs. D. Patchaiammal, (2010) 10 SCC 469, it was held that in the 2005 Act, Parliament has taken notice of a new social phenomenon which has emerged in India, known as livein relationships. According to the Court, a relationship in the nature of marriage was akin to a common law marriage and must satisfy the following conditions:-
(i) T he couple must hold themselves out to society as being akin to spouses.
(ii) T hey must be of a legal age to marry.
(iii) They must be otherwise qualified to enter into a legal marriage, including being unmarried.
(iv) T hey must have voluntarily cohabited and held themselves out to the world as being akin to spouses for a significant period of time.
(v) T he parties must have lived together in a `shared household’
The concept of domestic violence is very important and section 3 of the 2005 Act defines the same as an act committed against the lady, which :
(a) harms or injures or endangers the health, safety, or well being, whether mental or physical, of the lady and includes causing abuse of any nature, physical, verbal, economic abuse, etc.; or
(b) harasses or endangers the lady with a view to coerce her or any other person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any dowry or other property or valuable security; or
(c) otherwise injures or causes harm, whether physical or mental, to the aggrieved person.
Thus, economic abuse is also considered to be an act of domestic violence under the 2005 Act. This term is defined in a wide manner and includes deprivation of all or any economic or financial resources to which she is entitled under any law or custom or which she requires out of necessity including, household necessities, stridhan property, etc.
Various Supreme Court decisions have analysed the provisions of the 2005 Act. For instance, in V. D. Bhanot vs. Savita Bhanot, (2012) 3 SCC 183, it was held that this Act applied even to cases of domestic violence which have taken place before the Act came into force. The same view has been expressed in Saraswathy vs. Babu, (2014) 3 SCC 712.
Judicial Separation a Roadblock?
The question posed before the Supreme Court in Krishna’s case, was whether the decree of judicial separation was a hindrance to a plea for recovery of stridhan under the 2005 Act? Thus, does a lady cease to have recourse to this Act merely because she has obtained a decree of judicial separation. If a divorce is obtained she would not be entitled to relief under the 2005 Act. However, the Court held that the position in the case of a judicial separation was different. Judicial separation lied between a subsisting marriage and a marriage severed by a divorce. It observed that a judicial separation created rights and obligations. It permitted the parties to live apart. There would be no obligation for either party to cohabit with the other. Mutual rights and obligations arising out of a marriage were suspended. However, judicial separation did not severe or dissolve the marriage. It afforded an opportunity for reconciliation and adjustment. Though judicial separation after a certain period may become a ground for divorce, it was not necessary and the parties were not bound to have recourse to that remedy and the parties could live keeping their status as wife and husband till their lifetime. It held after considering various earlier decisions in the cases of Jeet Singh vs. State of U.P., (1993) 1 SCC 325; Hirachand Srinivas Managaonkar vs. Sunanda, (2001) 4 SCC 125; Bai Mani vs. Jayantilal Dahyabhai, AIR 1979 209; Soundarammal vs. Sundara Mahalinga Nadar, AIR 1980 Mad 294, that there was a distinction between a decree for divorce and decree of judicial separation; in divorce, there was a severance of the status and the parties did not remain as husband and wife, whereas in judicial separation, the relationship between husband and wife continued and the legal relationship continued as it had not been snapped.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court in Krishna’s case held that the decree of judicial separation did not act as a deterrent for the lady from claiming relief under the 2005 Act since the relationship of marriage was yet subsisting.
Period of Limitation under Cr. PC applicable?
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 provides for the method and manner in which criminal cases, prosecutions, etc. would be tried in the Courts. The Code also provides for the limitation period after which the Courts would not entertain any prosecutions in respect of offences. The object of enunciating a bar on prosecutions was explained by the Apex Court in its decision in the case of State of Punjab vs. Sarwan Singh AIR 1981 SC 722. The Supreme Court held that the object in putting a time limit on prosecution is clearly to prevent parties from filing of vexatious and belated prosecutions. Section 468 of the Code provides the periods of limitation after the expiry of which a Court shall not take cognizance of an offence. The term “cognizance” may be defined to mean the judicial recognition or the judicial notice of any cause of action. According to the Supreme Court in the case of Darshan Singh Ram Kishan vs. State of Maharashtra, (1971) 2 SCC 654, cognizance takes place at a point when a magistrate first takes judicial notice of an offence.
A question arose as to whether a belated complaint by the aggrieved lady under the 2005 Act for recovering her stridhan was hit by the period of limitation provided u/s. 468 of the Code? Connected with section 468 is the concept of continuing offence u/s. 472 of the Code. Section 472 provides that for a continuing offence, a fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment of the time during which the offence continues. The term continuing offence has not been defined and thus, one must depend upon the language of the Act. In Maya Rani Punj vs. CIT, 157 ITR 330 (SC), the Supreme Court observed that if a duty continued from day to day, then its non-performance from day to day was a continuing wrong. Again, in State of Bihar vs. Deokaran Nenshi, (1972) 2 SCC 890, the Court held that a continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from the one which is committed once and for all. In the case of a continuing offence, there is thus the ingredient of continuance of the offence which is absent in the case of an offence which takes place when an act or omission is committed once and for all.
Based on this discussion, the Supreme Court in Krishna’s case, concluded that the retention of stridhan by the husband or any other family members was a continuing offence. The concept of “continuing offence” got attracted from the date of deprivation of stridhan, for neither the husband nor any other family members had any right over the stridhan and they only remained custodians. Further, as long as the status of the aggrieved lady remained and stridhan remained in the custody of the husband, the wife could always put forth her claim under the 2005 Act. There could be no dispute that wife could file a suit for realisation of the stridhan but that did not debar her from lodging a criminal complaint for criminal breach of trust. Accordingly, it held that the application was not barred by the period of limitation u/s.468 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
Conclusion

Finally, the Supreme Court, in Krishna’s case, held that retention of stridhan by a husband was a continuing offence against which no period of limitation applied for filing a criminal appeal for a criminal breach of trust. Further, a decree for judicial separation was not a bar against claiming relief under the 2005 Act. Thus, she could avail of a dual remedy. The Supreme Court held that a more sensitive approach was expected from the courts in such matters. If relief could not be granted under the 2005 Act then so be it. However, before disposing of any petition for want of maintainability, a thorough discussion was a must. Courts must bear in mind that, under the 2005 Act, it was a hapless and a helpless lady who approached them and that too under compelling circumstances. The 2005 Act being a beneficial Act and one which asserts the rights of women, it must be viewed sensitively to ensure that women are not wrongly deprived of their rights.
Through this very important judgment, the Apex Court has untangled the complex criss-cross web of domestic violence, economic abuse, stridhan, period of limitation under Criminal Procedure Code and judicial separation. The cross currents flowing under each of these concepts have been analysed and dissected to arrive at a considered view.

Strictures against Department – Delay of 22 months in passing order after hearing – No reason for inordinate delay

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S2 Infotech Pvt. Ltd. vs. UOI (2015) (323) E.L.T. 464 (Bom.)(HC)

There was a recovery or demand of Service Tax. A reply to the show cause notice was given by the petitioners on 21/6/2010. On 1/8/2012, a personal hearing was given and concluded on the same date. However, the impugned order was passed after a period of almost 22 months.

The petitioner relied upon a series of circulars issued by the Central Board of Excise and Customs emphasising that the Law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anil Rai vs. State of Bihar, 2009 (233) E.L.T. 13 (S.C.) : 2009 (13) S.T.R. 465 (S.C.) would apply and there should not be any unreasonable delay in passing adjudication order which will be causing difficulties and obstacles in realising Public revenue expeditiously. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has clarified that inordinate, unexplained and negligent delay in pronouncing judgments hampers the exercise of right of appeal. Therefore, the belief, faith and trust of the people in the institution and judiciary is shaken by such delay. This dictum also applies to the quasi judicial adjudication as is contemplated by laws such as Central Excise Act, 1944, Customs Act, 1962 and Finance Act, 1994 as amended from time to time. That is why these circulars were issued.

The court was of the opinion that prima facie there appears to be no explanation for the inordinate delay. The court further observed that even if there is any restructuring and reorganising of the Department of Service Tax and the Commissionerate thereof, there is no reason why such an inordinate delay should occur.

Eventually, all Commissioners must realise that delay in proceedings and passing of orders would be contrary to public interest. They are conferred with powers to determine and adjudicate the demands raised only in a hope that they take steps expeditiously and recover outstanding amount from the defaulters, if any. Hence, sitting on files for months together and sometimes beyond the financial year is, thus, not conducive to the interest of nation’s economy. The trust and faith reposed in them is also then betrayed. If no action is taken against such officers and they are allowed to go scot-free, then, apart from the Revenue getting involved in litigation in higher Courts, Tribunal and others would be encouraged.

Therefore, the Court directed the Chief Commissioner of Service Tax to file a comprehensive affidavit by narrating measures that he proposes to take or has already taken. He shall, then, disclose number of files and matters pending and serially. It should not happen that one who comes to Court, challenges the adverse order only on the ground of delay, the High Court, then, directs that the matter be taken and decided out of turn. The Court observed that the Commissioner has to enlighten us as to how much time would be taken at the end of his Commissionerate to dispose of pending cases.

Evidence – Secondary Evidence – Photocopy of true copy of document – Is inadmissible when existence of Original document is disputed : Evidence Act, 1872, Section 63(2) & (3) & 65

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Brij Mohan vs. State of Rajasthan AIR 2015 (NOC) 1168 (Raj.)

In a case where original documents are not produced at any time, nor any factual foundation has been laid for giving secondary evidence, the secondary evidence relating to contents of a document is inadmissible, until the non-production of the original is accounted for, so as to bring it within one or other of the cases provided for in the section. Secondary evidence must be authenticated by foundational evidence that the alleged copy is, in fact, a true copy of the original. Mere admission of a document in evidences does not amount to its proof. Therefore, the documentary evidence is required to be proved in accordance with law. The court has an obligation to decide the question of admissibility of a document in secondary evidence before making endorsement thereon. Clause 2 of section 63 provides that secondary evidence means the copies made of their original by mechanical process, which in themselves ensure the accuracy of the copy, and copies compared with such copies, which can be termed as secondary evidence. Clause 3 of section 63 of the Indian Evidence Act covers the kind of document which the petitioner sought to produce as secondary evidence.
Illustration (a) refers to photograph of original is secondary evidence of its contents, though the two have not been compared but if it is proved that the thing photographed was the original. Illustration (b) refers to copy compared with copy of a letter made from copying machine as secondary evidence of the contents of letter if it is shown that the copy made by copying machine was made from the original.
Illustration (c) covers a copy transcribed from a copy, but afterwards compared with the original as secondary evidence.

The Hon’ble Court observed that in the instant case, the original document is claimed to be relating to the year 1965, the era when the use of the photocopy machines and photocopier was not in vogue. Besides, it cannot be accepted as secondary evidence because the document, which sought to be produced, is not a photocopy of the original but is a photocopy of the true copy. This is not a true copy of the original, which may have been compared with its original by the attesting authority but is the document, which is claimed to be photocopy of the true copy of its original. Not only the existence of the original of this document is disputed but the attestation of the true copy also has not been ‘proved’. Therefore, the said photocopy of the true copy cannot be said to be admissible as secondary evidence.

Additional Evidence – Appellate court can suo motu receive additional evidence either oral or documentary – For pronouncing a satisfactory judgment: CPC 1908, 0.41 R. 27

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N. Natarajan vs. Executive Officer, Chitalpakkam Town Panchayat, Chennai AIR 2015 (NOC) 1305 (Mad.)(HC).

In the instant case, the fundamental question was whether document granting patta was a true document or a forged document.

The Trial Court had held the same to be a genuine document because the other registers were not produced before it. Only to resolve this issue and the additional issue as to whether the plaintiff had got title to 1000 sq. ft. of land, the truthfulness of the document had to be ascertained and without ascertaining this fact, the Court cannot pronounce a satisfactory judgment. Thus, for pronouncing a satisfactory judgment, the oral evidence of witness and the documentary evidence are absolutely necessary. In the absence of the same, the High Court cannot pronounce a satisfactory judgment. When forgery is alleged, the additional evidence was absolutely required in order to find out the truth.

There is no prohibition for the Court to go into the question of facts, provided the Court is satisfied that the findings of the Courts below were vitiated by non-consideration of relevant evidence or by showing erroneous approach to the matter and findings recorded by the Court below are perverse.

So far as the phrase “to enable it to pronounce judgment” as expressed in Sub-Rule 1(b) of C.P.C. is concerned, the true test is as to whether in the absence of the additional evidence sought to be adduced whether the Court would be in a position to pronounce the judgment from the other materials already available on record or not. If the Court finds that in the absence of the additional evidence sought to be produced (either oral or documentary), the Court could effectively and satisfactorily adjudicate upon the issues so as to pronounce a satisfactory judgment then, the Appellate Court shall not receive additional evidence either oral or documentary.

Additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, can be received by the appellate Court either at the instance of the parties as provided in Sub-Rules (1)(a) and (1)(aa) or suo motu by the Court as provided in Sub-Rule (1)(b) provided any one of the contingencies enumerated in Sub- Rule 1(b) exists impelling the Appellate Court to receive such additional evidence, both oral and documentary. To exercise the power to receive additional evidence under Sub-Rule (1)(b), it is not at all necessary that a party to the appeal should make an application. What is required is the satisfaction of the Appellate Court that the additional evidence is required either for pronouncing the judgment satisfactorily or for any other substantial cause.

Thus, it was held that the court is fully empowered to receive additional evidence at the Second Appeal stage.

Effect given for amalgamation of another large company and integration of accounting policies for accounting of derivative instruments

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48. Pursuant to the Scheme of Arrangement u/s. 391 to 394 of the Companies Act 1956 for amalgamation of erstwhile Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. (RLL) with the Company as sanctioned by the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat and Hon’ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana on March 24, 2015 (effective date) all the assets, liabilities and reserves of RLL were transferred to and vested in the Company with effect from 1st April 2014, the appointed date. RLL along with its subsidiaries and associates was operating as an integrated international pharmaceutical organisation with business encompassing the entire value chain in the production, marketing and distribution of pharmaceutical products. The scheme has accordingly been given effect to in these financial statements.

The amalgamation has been accounted for under the “Pooling of Interest Method” as prescribed under Accounting Standard 14-“Accounting for Amalgamations” (AS 14) issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India and as notified u/s. 133 of the Companies Act 2013 read with Rule 7 of the Companies Accounts Rules 2014. Accordingly and giving effect in compliance of the Scheme of Arrangement all the assets, liabilities and reserves of RLL, now considered a division of the Company, were recorded in the books of the Company at their carrying amounts and the form as at the appointed date in the books of RLL.

On April 10, 2015, in terms of the Scheme of Arrangement 0.80 equity share of Re. 1 each (Number of Shares 334,956,764 including 187,583 Shares held by ESOP trust) of the Company has been allotted to the shareholders of RLL for every 1 share of Rs. 5 each (Number of Shares 418,461,476 including 234,479 shares held by ESOP trust) held by them in the share capital of RLL, after cancellation of 6,967,542 shares of RLL. These shares have been considered for the purpose of calculation of earnings per share appropriately. An amount of Rs. 1,792.4 Million being the excess of the amount recorded as share capital to be issued by the Company over the amount of the share capital of erstwhile RLL has been credited to Capital Reserve.

49. RLL had earlier adopted Accounting Standard (AS) 30 “Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement” and AS 31 “Financial Instruments: Presentation” for accounting of derivative instruments which are outside the scope of Accounting Standard 11 ‘The Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates’ such as forward contracts to hedge highly probable forecast transactions, option contracts, currency swaps, interest rate swaps etc. In order to align with the Company’s policy, derivative instruments are now accounted for in accordance with the announcement issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India dated March 28, 2008. On the principles of prudence as enunciated in Accounting Standard 1 “Disclosure of Accounting Policies” which requires to provide losses in respect of all outstanding derivative instruments at the balance sheet date by marking them to market. Accordingly, the unrealised MTM gain of Rs. 905.4 Million as at April 1, 2014 has been reversed and MTM gain as at March 31, 2015 amounting to Rs. 1,121.0 Million has not been recognised in these financial statements.

50. Out of a MAT credit of Rs. 8,222.7 Million which was written down by the erstwhile RLL during the quarter ended December 31, 2014, an amount of Rs. 7,517.0 Million has been recognised by the Company, on a reassessment by the Management at the year-end, based on convincing evidence that the combined amalgamated entity would pay normal income tax during the specified period and would therefore be able to utilise the MAT credit so recognised. Current tax for the year also includes Rs. 284.7 Million pertaining to earlier years.

Re-adoption of financial statements to give effect to scheme of arrangement

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51. Pursuant to the Scheme of Amalgamation u/s. 391 to 394 of the
Companies Act, 1956 and u/s. 52 of the Companies Act, 2013 for
amalgamation of erstwhile Sun Pharma Global Inc.(Transferor Company)
with the Company, with effect from January 1, 2015 (appointed date), as
sanctioned by the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat, filed with the
Registrar of Companies on August 6, 2015 (effective date), all the
assets, liabilities, reserves and surplus of Transferor Company were
transferred to and vested in the Company without any consideration, on a
going concern basis. Transferor Company is a wholly owned subsidiary of
the company and was engaged in the business activities of strategic and
non-strategic investments and financing mainly to its group subsidiary
or associate companies worldwide. The amalgamation has been accounted
for under the “Pooling of Interest Method” as prescribed under
Accounting Standard 14 – “Accounting for Amalgamations” (AS 14) issued
by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India and as notified u/s.
133 of the Companies Act, 2013 read with Rule 7 of the Companies
Accounts Rules 2014.

The scheme has been given effect to in these
financial statements and accordingly;

(i) The Financial Statements for
the year ended March 31, 2015 which were earlier approved by Board of
Directors on May 29, 2015 and audited by the statutory auditors of the
Company have been revised.

(ii) All the assets, liabilities, reserves
and surplus of Transferor Company were recorded in the books of the
Company at their carrying amounts and in the same form as at the
appointed date. Transferor Company being a wholly owned subsidiary of
the Company neither any shares are required to be issued nor any
consideration is paid. The Equity Share Capital, Preference Share
Capital, Share application money pending allotment and securities
premium account of the Transferor Company and the carrying value of
investment in Equity Shares, Preference Shares and Share application
money of the Transferor Company in the books of the Transferee Company
stands cancelled. Accordingly, the difference of Rs. 6,498.8 Million
between the amount of share capital of the Transferor Company and the
consideration being Nil, after adjusting for the carrying value of
Investments in the books of the Company is credited to Capital Reserve.

From Auditors’ Report Emphasis of Matter

We draw attention to Note 51 to
the standalone financial statements. As referred to in the said Note,
the financial statements of the Company for the year ended 31st March,
2015 were earlier approved by the Board of Directors at their meeting
held on 29th May, 2015 which were subject to revision by the Management
of the Company so as to give effect to the Scheme of Arrangement for
amalgamation of Sun Pharma Global Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary, into
the Company w.e.f 1st January, 2015. Those financial statements were
audited by us and our report dated 29th May, 2015, addressed to the
Members of the Company, expressed an unqualified opinion on those
financial statements and included an Emphasis of Matter paragraph
drawing attention to the foregoing matter. Consequent to the Company
obtaining the required approvals, the aforesaid financial statements are
revised by the Company to give effect to the said Scheme of
Arrangement.

Apart from the foregoing matter and the provision for
proposed dividend, the attached financial statements do not take into
account any events subsequent to the date on which the financial
statements referred to in paragraph 1 above were earlier approved by the
Board of Directors and reported upon by us as aforesaid.

Accounting by Real Estate Companies

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Accounting for real estate construction under Indian GAAP was covered
under the Guidance Note on Accounting for Real Estate Transactions
(Revised 2012). Under Ind AS real estate construction accounting is
specifically scoped into Ind AS 11 Construction Contracts. In this
article, Dolphy D’Souza discusses the similarities and dissimilarities
of accounting between the Guidance Note and Ind AS 11.

Scoping – Ind AS 18 or Ind AS 11?

Under
IFRS, IFRIC Interpretation 15 Agreements for the Construction of Real
Estate deals with accounting of real estate contracts. Determining
whether an agreement for the construction of real estate is within the
scope of IAS 11 (Ind AS 11) Construction Contracts or IAS 18 (Ind AS 18)
Revenue depends on the terms of the agreement and all the surrounding
facts and circumstances. Such a determination requires judgement with
respect to each agreement.

IAS 11 applies when the agreement
meets the definition of a construction contract set out in paragraph 3
of IAS 11: ‘a contract specifically negotiated for the construction of
an asset or a combination of assets …’ An agreement for the construction
of real estate meets the definition of a construction contract when the
buyer is able to specify the major structural elements of the design of
the real estate before construction begins and/or specify major
structural changes once construction is in progress (whether or not it
exercises that ability). Thus, a customer may ask a real estate
contractor to construct a villa (a) on a land owned by the customer and
(b) as per design and specification approved by the customer. The
customer controls the work-in-progress on an ongoing basis, and can
generally sack the contractor (albeit by payment of penalty) and hire a
new contractor. In situations such as this, the contractor will have to
apply IAS 11.

In contrast, an agreement for the construction of
real estate in which buyers have only limited ability to influence the
design of the real estate, e.g. to select a design from a range of
options specified by the entity, or to specify only minor variations to
the basic design, is an agreement for the sale of goods within the scope
of IAS 18. The entity may transfer to the buyer control and the
significant risks and rewards of ownership of the work in progress in
its current state as construction progresses. In this case, if all the
criteria in paragraph 14 of IAS 18 are met continuously as construction
progresses, the entity shall recognise revenue by reference to the stage
of completion using the percentage of completion method. The
requirements of IAS 11 are generally applicable to the recognition of
revenue and the associated expenses for such a transaction. The entity
may transfer to the buyer control and the significant risks and rewards
of ownership of the real estate in its entirety at a single time (e.g.
at completion, upon or after delivery). In this case, the entity shall
recognise revenue only when all the criteria in paragraph 14 of IAS 18
are satisfied. Thus, consider a scenario where a real estate developer
own a piece of land in which it constructs a building with about 100
flats. In this scenario, the risk and rewards are transferred to the 100
customers, when the building construction is complete and the flats are
ultimately delivered to the customers. It is inconceivable that the
risk and rewards are transferred to the 100 customers on an ongoing
basis. If that was the case, each customer would own the work in
progress and have the ability to hire another contractor to construct
his/her individual flat. That is neither legally nor practically
possible, for example, it is not possible that 100 different contractors
representing 100 different customers could possibly complete the
construction of the building.

In the Indian situation,
considering the demand of the real estate developers the standard
setters decided to carve out IFRIC 15. Further, a real estate contract
was specifically scoped in Ind AS 11. In accordance with Ind AS 11
Construction Contracts, the standard would apply to accounting in the
financial statements of contractors including the financial statements
of real estate developers. The definition of construction contracts in
Ind AS 11 also includes agreement of real estate development to provide
services together with construction material in order to perform
contractual obligation to deliver the real estate to the buyer.

Thus,
real estate construction contracts would be accounted for in accordance
with Ind AS 11, like any other construction contract. Therefore, in the
above example, the sale of 100 flats would be treated like a
construction contract to be accounted for using the percentage of
completion method (POCM) rather than accounting for them as sale of
goods, wherein, revenue is recognised when the completed flat is
ultimately delivered to the customer.

The carve in to Ind AS 11
is somewhat nebulously drafted. As per this carve in, Ind AS 11 would
apply to accounting in the financial statements of contractors including
the financial statements of real estate developers. Does that mean Ind
AS 11 would apply to contractors other than real estate contractors
also? For example, it is not absolutely clear, whether Ind AS 11 or Ind
AS 18 would apply to construction of a standard equipment such as a ship
or aircraft or windmill. The author believes that Ind AS 18 should
apply to these items, since the buyer is unable to specify the major
structural elements of the design of the equipment before construction
begins and/ or specify major structural changes once construction is in
progress whether or not it exercises that ability. In other words, the
author believes that the above items should be treated like a sale of
goods. This can also be supported by the intention of the ICAI to allow
construction contract accounting to real estate development only.

Ind AS 11 vs Guidance Note on Accounting for Real Estate Transactions (Revised 2012)

On
account of the diverse practices under Indian GAAP, the ICAI felt it
necessary to issue a revised Guidance Note titled Guidance Note on
Accounting for Real Estate Transactions (Revised 2012) to harmonise the
accounting practices followed by real estate companies in India. Under
Ind AS 11, accounting for real estate development would be accounted for
as a construction contract in accordance with Ind AS 11. An interesting
point to note is that the requirements of Ind AS 11, may or may not be
the same as those contained in the Guidance Note. This section deals
with some critical areas of similarities and differences that exist
between Ind AS 11 and the Guidance Note. Under both Ind AS 11 and the
Guidance Note, completed contract method would be prohibited. However,
there are significant dissimilarities in the way POC method is applied.

Question 1: Is the scope of the Guidance Note and Ind AS 11 the same?

The
revised Guidance Note would apply to any enterprise dealing in real
estate as sellers or developers. The term ‘real estate’ refers to land
as well as buildings and rights in relation thereto. The Guidance Note
provides an illustrative list of transactions which are in scope. The
Guidance Note applies not only to development and sale of residential
and commercial units, row houses, independent houses, with or without an
undivided share in land, but to many other real estate transactions.
These are sale of plots of land with or without any development. The
development may be in the form of common facilities like laying of
roads, drainage lines, water pipelines, electrical lines, sewage tanks,
water storage tanks, club house, landscaping etc. The sale of plots of
land, include long term sale type leases. What is a long term sale type
lease is not defined. Typically a 99 year lease would generally fulfill
the definition of a sale type lease. However, whether a 50 year lease
would be a sale type lease is a matter of conjecture and judgment will
have to be applied. However, the principles that would be used to apply
the judgment are not contained in the Guidance Note. In the author’s
view, conditions that establish whether a lease is a finance lease or
operating lease may serve as a good basis for making that decision. For
example, in the case of a 99 year lease, if the present value of the
minimum lease payments is atleast 90% or higher of the fair value of the
land, it could be construed, subject to other requirements that the
lease in substance is a sale type lease. Another example, which may be
construed as a sale type lease is a 50 year lease of land, where the
ownership is transferred to the lessee at the end of the lease period.
Whether a lease is a sale type lease or not, will have a significant
impact on the accounting. In the case of a lease, the revenue is
recognised over the lease period; whereas in a sale type lease the
revenue is accounted for when the sale type lease is executed.

The
revised Guidance Note also scopes in the acquisition, utilisation and
transfer of development rights, redevelopment of existing buildings and
structures and joint development agreements for real estate activities.

Other
than scoping in joint development agreements, the revised Guidance Note
does not provide any guidance on how to account for such agreements.
Real estate transactions of the nature covered by Accounting Standard
(AS) 10, Accounting for Fixed Assets, Accounting Standard (AS) 12,
Accounting for Government Grants, Accounting Standard (AS) 19, Leases,
and Accounting Standard (AS) 26, Intangible Assets, are outside the
scope of the Guidance Note. For example if a real estate contract was
being constructed for own administrative use, AS-10 principles rather
than this Guidance Note would apply. Similarly short-term leasing of
real estate would be covered by AS-19; however, a long term sale type
lease would be covered under the Guidance Note.

Ind AS 11 would
apply to accounting in the financial statements of contractors including
the financial statements of real estate developers. Under Ind AS 11,
there is no definition of what constitutes a real estate developer or
real estate development. Generally, the guidance in the Guidance Note
with respect to scoping may be used for Ind AS 11 purposes.

Question 2: How are transactions which are in substance delivery of goods accounted for under Ind AS and the Guidance Note?

Requirement under the Guidance Note

In
respect of transactions of real estate which are in substance similar
to delivery of goods, principles enunciated in Accounting Standard (AS)
9, Revenue Recognition, are applied. For example, sale of plots of land
without any development would be covered by the principles of AS-9.
These transactions are treated similar to delivery of goods where the
revenues, costs and profits are recognised when the revenue process is
completed. For recognition of revenue in case of real estate sales, it
is necessary that the conditions specified in paragraph 10 and 11 of
AS-9 are satisfied. Those conditions are enumerated below.

10.
Revenue from sales or service transactions should be recognised when the
requirements as to performance set out in paragraphs 11 ……. are
satisfied, provided that at the time of performance it is not
unreasonable to expect ultimate collection. If at the time of raising of
any claim it is unreasonable to expect ultimate collection, revenue
recognition should be postponed.

11. In a transaction involving
the sale of goods, performance should be regarded as being achieved when
the following conditions have been fulfilled:

i. the seller of
goods has transferred to the buyer the property in the goods for a price
or all significant risks and rewards of ownership have been transferred
to the buyer and the seller retains no effective control of the goods
transferred to a degree usually associated with ownership; and

ii.
no significant uncertainty exists regarding the amount of the
consideration that will be derived from the sale of the goods.

In
accordance with the above, the point of time at which all significant
risks and rewards of ownership can be considered as transferred, is
required to be determined on the basis of the terms and conditions of
the agreement for sale. The completion of the revenue recognition
process is usually identified when the following conditions are
satisfied:

(a) The seller has transferred to the buyer all
significant risks and rewards of ownership and the seller retains no
effective control of the real estate to a degree usually associated with
ownership;

(b) The seller has effectively handed over possession of the real estate unit to the buyer forming part of the transaction;

(c) No significant uncertainty exists regarding the amount of consideration that will be derived from the real estate sales; and

(d) It is not unreasonable to expect ultimate collection of revenue from buyers.

Revenue
from sale of lands or plots without any development is recognised when
the above conditions are satisfied. In the case of sale of developed
plots, where the development activity is significant, these would be
treated as transactions which are in substance construction type
contracts and accounted for accordingly. The Guidance Note does not
elaborate further as to when development activity would be treated as
significant or insignificant. This may have a material impact on revenue
recognition in some cases. Consider an example, where at the end of
reporting period a company sells plots of land, which will entail start
and completion of development activity subsequent to the reporting
period. If the development activity is considered significant, entire
revenue will be recognised in the subsequent reporting period, because
the 25% threshold criterion in the Guidance Note for revenue recognition
under POCM will be met only in the subsequent reporting period. If the
development activity is considered insignificant, revenue on the plot
will be recognised in the current reporting period, and revenue on the
development (to be allocated on market value basis) will be recognised
in the following reporting period. Requirement under Ind AS 18/Ind AS 11
Revenue from sale of lands or plots without any development is
recognised like a sale of goods under Ind AS 18. This is similar to the
requirement in the Guidance Note. In the case of sale of developed
plots, where the development activity is significant, these may be
treated in accordance with the Guidance Note which is to treat them as
construction type contracts. However it is questionable whether the 25%
revenue recognition threshold criterion in the Guidance Note would apply
under Ind AS. The author believes that the 25% threshold in the
Guidance Note is not relevant under Ind AS and entities will have to
apply judgement to assess whether the general revenue recognition
criteria are fulfilled.

Question 3: What are in substance
construction type contracts and how are they accounted for under the
Guidance Note and Ind AS?

Requirement in the Guidance Note

In
the case of real estate transaction which has the same economic
substance as construction contracts, the Guidance Note draws upon the
principles enunciated in Accounting Standard (AS) 7, Construction
Contracts and Accounting Standard (AS) 9, Revenue Recognition. Some
indicators of construction type contracts are:

(a) The duration
of such projects is beyond 12 months and the project commencement date
and project completion date fall into different accounting periods.

(b)
Most features of the project are common to construction contracts,
viz., land development, structural engineering, architectural design,
construction, etc.

(c) While individual units of the project are
contracted to be delivered to different buyers these are interdependent
upon or interrelated to completion of a number of common activities
and/or provision of common amenities.

(d) The construction or development activities form a significant proportion of the project activity.

For
example, construction and sale of units in a residential complex would
be covered by the principles of AS-7 and AS-9. The
construction/development of commercial and residential units has all
features of a construction contract – land development, structural
engineering, architectural design and construction are all present. The
natures of these activities are such that often the date when the
activity is commenced and the date when the activity is completed
usually fall into different accounting periods.

In case of real
estate sales, which are in substance construction type contracts, a two
step approach is followed for accounting purposes. Firstly, it is
assessed whether significant risks and rewards are transferred to the
buyer. The seller usually enters into an agreement for sale with the
buyer at initial stages of construction. This agreement for sale is also
considered to have the effect of transferring all significant risks and
rewards of ownership to the buyer provided the agreement is legally
enforceable and subject to the satisfaction of conditions which signify
transferring of significant risks and rewards even though the legal
title is not transferred or the possession of the real estate is not
given to the buyer. After satisfaction of step one, the second step is
applied, which involves the application of the POCM method. Once the
seller has transferred all the significant risks and rewards to the
buyer, any acts on the real estate performed by the seller are, in
substance, performed on behalf of the buyer in the manner similar to a
contractor. Accordingly, revenue in such cases is recognized by applying
the POCM method on the basis of the broad methodology explained in AS
7, Construction Contracts and detailed in the Guidance Note.

Paragraph
3.3 of the 2012 Guidance Note states as follows: “The point of time at
which all significant risks and rewards of ownership can be considered
as transferred, is required to be determined on the basis of the terms
and conditions of the agreement for sale. In the case of real estate
sales, the seller usually enters into an agreement for sale with the
buyer at initial stages of construction. This agreement for sale is also
considered to have the effect of transferring all significant risks and
rewards of ownership to the buyer provided the agreement is legally
enforceable and subject to the satisfaction of conditions which signify
transferring of significant risks and rewards even though the legal
title is not transferred or the possession of the real estate is not
given to the buyer.”

The 2012 Guidance note contains an
anti-abuse clause to prevent companies from recognising revenue in
certain circumstances. Paragraph 3.4 of the Guidance Note states that
“The application of the methods described above requires a careful
analysis of the elements of the transaction, agreement, understanding
and conduct of the parties to the transaction to determine the economic
substance of the transaction. The economic substance of the transaction
is not influenced or affected by the structure and/or legal form of the
transaction or agreement.” Though this appears to be an anti-abuse
clause the full meaning of this paragraph is not clear and hence,
judgement would be required in many situations.

The anti-abuse
clause was more clearly spelt out in paragraph 9 of the 2006 Guidance
Note which required the nature and extent of continuing involvement of
the seller to be assessed to determine whether the seller retains
effective control. In some cases, real estate may be sold with a degree
of continuing involvement by the seller such that the risks and rewards
of ownership are not transferred; for example, this may happen in the
case of a sale and repurchase agreements which include put and call
options, and agreements whereby the seller guarantees occupancy of the
property for a specified period. The anti-abuse clause in the 2012
Guidance Note is more broadly drafted and some may argue that it
encompasses many other situations. For example, a real estate company
may be precluded from considering real estate sales made to related
parties that are not genuine for the purposes of determining whether it
has satisfied the various threshold limits prescribed in the Guidance
Note for recognising revenue.

Paragraph 4.3 of the 2012 Guidance
Note sets out a very interesting perspective on the linkage between the
transfer of a legal title and the transfer of risks and rewards of
ownership. Paragraph 4.3 states “Where transfer of legal title is a
condition precedent to the buyer taking on the significant risks and
rewards of ownership and accepting significant completion of the
seller’s obligation, revenue should not be recognised till such time
legal title is validly transferred to the buyer”. For example, a real
estate company may have entered into a sale contract with a customer, of
a flat in a building that would take two years to complete. The
customer prefers to register the contract and pay stamp duty after two
years at the time of receiving possession of the flat to postpone the
cash outflow and thereby save on interest. On the other hand, another
customer that is availing a bank loan may have to register the sale
deed, pay stamp duty and obtain legal title immediately on entering into
the contract. In the former case, just because the customer is
obtaining legal title only at the time of possession, should not
preclude revenue recognition in the books of the real estate company. In
many cases, legal title would be deemed to be transferred to the
customer on entering into an agreement for sale, and registration with
the local authority may be seen as a formality that could be completed
at a later date. What is important is the agreement for sale, has to be
legally enforceable. In addition to selling to end users, real estate
companies often sell units to investors. In such cases, real estate
companies should be able to recognise revenue as long as there is a
legally enforceable contract between the real estate company and the
investor and the real estate company has no obligation to buy back the
unit or provide any other form of guarantee.

Requirement under Ind AS 11

The
above guidance may be applied under Ind AS 11, as it may not be
inconsistent with the intention of the ICAI. The Guidance Note applies
to projects where the duration of such projects is beyond 12 months and
the project commencement date and project completion date fall into
different accounting periods. There is no such restriction under Ind AS
11, and even projects below 12 months duration may qualify for
“construction type contracts”.

Question 4: For applying POCM how is “project” defined under Ind AS 11 and the Guidance Note?

Requirement under the Guidance Note

Project
is the smallest group of units/plots/saleable spaces which are linked
with a common set of amenities in such a manner that unless the common
amenities are made available and functional, these units/plots /
saleable spaces cannot be put to their intended effective use. The
definition of a project is very critical under the Guidance Note,
because that determines when the threshold for recognising revenue is
achieved and also the manner in which the POCM is applied. In other
words, the manner in which the project is defined by a company may have a
significant impact on the revenue, cost and profit that is recognised.
If the entire township is considered as a project then it is likely that
the threshold limit for recognising revenue is achieved much later as
compared to when each building in the township is identified as a
project.

Consider an example where two buildings are being
constructed adjacent to each other. Both these buildings would have a
common underground water tank that will supply water to the two
buildings. As either of the building cannot be put to effective use
without the water tank, the project would be the two buildings together
(including the water tank). Consider another example, where each of
those two buildings have their own underground water tank and other
facilities and are not dependant on any common facilities. In this
example, the two buildings would be treated as two different projects.
Consider a third variation to the example, where each of those two
buildings has their own facilities, and the only common facility is a
swimming pool. In this example, judgment would be required, as to how
critical the swimming pool is, to make the buildings ready for their
intended use. If it is concluded that the swimming pool is not critical
to the occupancy of either of those two buildings, then each of those
two buildings would be separate projects. Where it is concluded that the
swimming pool is critical to put the two buildings to its intended
effective use, the two buildings together would constitute a project.

The
definition of the term ‘project’ in the Guidance Note is somewhat
nebulous. Firstly, it is defined as a smallest group of dependant units.
This is followed by the following sentence in the Guidance Note “A
larger venture can be split into smaller projects if the basic
conditions as set out above are fulfilled. For example, a project may
comprise a cluster of towers or each tower can also be designated as a
project. Similarly a complete township can be a project or it can be
broken down into smaller projects.” Once the term ‘project’ is defined
as the smallest group of dependant units, it is not clear why the word
‘can’ is used instead of ‘should’. Does it mean that there is a
limitation on how small a project can be, but no limitation on how big a
project could be? In the example, where two buildings are being
constructed adjacently, and each have their own independent facilities
and are not dependant on common facilities, there is a choice to cut
this as either a project comprising two buildings or two projects
comprising one building each. If this is indeed the case, the manner in
which this choice is exercised is not a matter of an accounting policy
choice but rather a choice that is exercised on a project by project
basis.

Requirement under Ind AS 11

The requirement under
Ind AS 11 with respect to combining or separating contracts for
accounting purposes is irrelevant in the context of accounting for real
estate. For example, under Ind AS 11, two contracts need to be combined
together for accounting purposes if they are negotiated as a single
package; the contracts are so closely interrelated that they are, in
effect, part of a single project with an overall profit margin; and the
contracts are performed concurrently or in a continuous sequence. This
guidance is inapplicable to real estate development as they involve
multiple customers. Therefore the definition of the term “project” under
the Guidance Note may well be applied under Ind AS 11.

Question 5: For applying POCM how is “project cost” defined under Ind AS 11 and the Guidance Note?

Requirement
under the Guidance Note Project cost includes cost of land,
construction costs and borrowing costs. Cost of land may include cost of
land itself or development rights and other related costs such as stamp
duty, registration and brokerage. It also includes rehabilitation
costs. For example, when land is acquired, companies have an obligation
towards rehabilitating the displaced people by providing alternative
property and/or incurring various other social obligations.

Construction
and development costs include costs that are related directly to a
specific project such as cost of designing, labour, material, equipment
hiring or depreciation costs, but would exclude depreciation of idle
plant and equipment. It would include site supervision and site
administration costs and cost of obtaining municipal sanction or
building permissions, but would exclude head office general
administration costs. Construction costs would include expected warranty
costs/provisions, that may be incurred during or post the completion of
the construction. It may be noted that real estate companies were
accounting for warranties in numerous ways. By treating warranties as
any other input cost, this Guidance Note will bring consistency in the
treatment of warranty costs. Costs that may be attributable to a project
activity in general and can be allocated are also included as
construction and development costs; for example, insurance, cost of the
technical, architecture or supervision department, construction or
development overheads, etc. Such costs are allocated using methods that
are systematic and rational and are applied consistently to all costs
having similar characteristics. Construction overheads include costs
such as the preparation and processing of construction personnel
payroll. The allocation is based on the normal level of project
activity, similar to overhead absorption in the case of inventories.
Therefore in periods of low activity, not all of the general
construction overheads would be absorbed on the fewer projects that may
be in progress.

Borrowing costs are capitalized in accordance
with AS-16 Borrowing Costs. The borrowing costs incurred towards
purchase of land forming part of construction of a commercial or
residential project are eligible for capitalisation since it does not
represent an asset in itself, but forms part of the project, which
requires substantial period of time to get ready for its intended use or
sale. However, borrowing costs incurred while land acquired for
building purposes is held without any associated development activity do
not qualify for capitalisation [Para 16 of AS 16]. Interest
capitalisation will be based on utilisation of funds, i.e., on the basis
of actual cash flow, and not on the accrual of liability. Thus,
warranty expenses that are included as project cost would be excluded
for the purposes of borrowing cost capitalisation, unless it involved an
actual cash flow. Sometimes real estate companies have to place
security deposits for the purposes of securing land or development
rights. EAC has opined that borrowing cost on the cash outflow on
security deposit cannot be capitalised, as the security deposit is not
part of the project cost.

Certain costs should not be considered
as part of the project cost, such as selling costs, costs of unconsumed
or uninstalled material delivered at site; and payment made to
sub-contractors in advance of work performed. Payment made to
sub-contractors for work performed will be considered as part of the
project cost. Further, accrual made for work done by sub-contractor will
also be considered as part of the project cost, but will be excluded
for the purposes of borrowing cost capitalisation, unless it results in
actual cash flows.

Requirement under Ind AS 11

The
above requirements of the Guidance Note would generally apply to Ind AS
11 as well. However, there is a significant difference. Under the
Guidance Note, the EAC had opined that borrowing cost on security
deposit paid for securing land cannot be capitalised. Under Ind AS,
security amount paid for land by the contractor is an advance
consideration for land. If the security amount was paid out of borrowed
funds, then borrowing cost should be capitalised provided the
construction on that land is taking place.

Question 6: How is Percentage of completion method (POCM) applied under Ind AS 11 and the Guidance Note?

Requirement under the Guidance Note

POCM
method is applied when the outcome of a real estate project can be
estimated reliably and when all the following conditions are satisfied:

(a) total project revenues can be estimated reliably;

(b) it is probable that the economic benefits associated with the project will flow to the enterprise;

(c)
the project costs to complete the project and the stage of project
completion at the reporting date can be measured reliably; and

(d)
the project costs attributable to the project can be clearly identified
and measured reliably so that actual project costs incurred can be
compared with prior estimates. Further to the above conditions, there is
a rebuttable presumption that the outcome of a real estate project can
be estimated reliably and that revenue should be recognized under the
POCM method only when the following events are completed:

  • All
    critical approvals necessary for commencement of the project have been
    obtained; for example, environmental and other clearances, approval of
    plans, designs, etc., title to land or other rights to development/
    construction and change in land use
  • When the stage
    of completion of the project reaches a reasonable level of development.
    A reasonable level of development is not achieved if the expenditure
    incurred on construction and development costs is less than 25 % of the
    construction and development costs. Such costs would exclude land cost
    but include borrowing costs.
  • Atleast 25% of the saleable project area is secured by contracts or agreements with buyers.
  • Atleast
    10 % of the total revenue as per the agreements of sale or any other
    legally enforceable documents are realised at the reporting date in
    respect of each of the contracts and it is reasonable to expect that the
    parties to such contracts will comply with the payment terms as defined
    in the contracts.

When POCM is applied, project revenue
and project costs associated with the real estate project should be
recognised as revenue and expenses by reference to the stage of
completion of the project activity at the reporting date. For
computation of revenue the stage of completion is arrived at with
reference to the entire project costs incurred including land costs,
borrowing costs and construction and development costs. Interestingly,
land cost is not included to determine whether the threshold for
recognizing revenue is reached. But once the threshold is reached land
cost is included for the purposes of determining the stage of completion
and is included in revenue and costs accordingly. As mentioned earlier,
costs incurred that relate to future activity on the project and
payments made to sub-contractors in advance of work performed under the
sub-contract are excluded and matched with revenues when the activity or
work is performed. The recognition of project revenue by reference to
the stage of completion of the project activity should not at any point
exceed the estimated total revenues from ‘eligible contracts’/other
legally enforceable agreements for sale. ‘Eligible contracts’ means
contracts/ agreements where at least 10% of the contracted amounts have
been realised and there are no outstanding defaults of the payment terms
in such contracts. To illustrate – if there are 10 Agreements of sale
and 10 % of gross amount is realised in case of 8 agreements, revenue
can be recognised with respect to these 8 agreements.

The
Guidance Note does not prohibit other methods of determination of stage
of completion, e.g., surveys of work done, technical estimation, etc.
However, computation of revenue with reference to other methods of
determination of stage of completion should not, in any case, exceed the
revenue computed with reference to the ‘project costs incurred’ method.
When it is probable that total project costs will exceed total eligible
project revenues, the expected loss should be recognised as an expense
immediately. The amount of such a loss is determined irrespective of
commencement of project work; or the stage of completion of project
activity.

The percentage of completion method is applied on a
cumulative basis in each reporting period to the current estimates of
project revenues and project costs. Therefore, the effect of a change in
the estimate of project costs, or the effect of a change in the
estimate of the outcome of a project, is accounted for as a change in
accounting estimate. The changed estimates are used in determination of
the amount of revenue and expenses recognised in the statement of profit
and loss in the period in which the change is made and in subsequent
periods. The changes to estimates include changes arising out of
cancellation of contracts and cases where the property or part thereof
is subsequently earmarked for own use or for rental purposes. In such
cases any revenues attributable to such contracts previously recognized
should be reversed and the costs in relation thereto shall be carried
forward and accounted in accordance with AS 10, Accounting for Fixed
Assets. A contract that was an eligible contract (10% of the contract
value is realised and there are no outstanding defaults) may become an
ineligible contract on subsequent default in payment by the customer.
The Guidance Note does not prescribe any requirements with respect to
the same. However, it appears logical that the guidance contained above
of treating the same as a change in accounting estimate is applied.
Thus, revenue recognized previously is reversed, and the associated
costs are transferred to inventory.

Requirement under Ind AS 11

When
the outcome of a construction contract can be estimated reliably,
contract revenue and contract costs associated with the construction
contract should be recognised as revenue and expenses respectively by
reference to the stage of completion of the contract activity at the
balance sheet date. An expected loss on the construction contract should
be recognised as an expense immediately. In the case of a fixed price
contract, the outcome of a construction contract can be estimated
reliably when all the following conditions are satisfied:

  • total contract revenue can be measured reliably;
  • it is probable that the economic benefits associated with the contract will flow to the enterprise;
  • both
    the contract costs to complete the contract and the stage of contract
    completion at the balance sheet date can be measured reliably; and
  • the
    contract costs attributable to the contract can be clearly identified
    and measured reliably so that actual contract costs incurred can be
    compared with prior estimates. In making a judgment about reliability of
    measurement, the following requirements under the Guidance Note may
    appear consistent with the overall Ind AS framework:
  • All
    critical approvals necessary for commencement of the project have been
    obtained; for example, environmental and other clearances, approval of
    plans, designs, etc., title to land or other rights to development/
    construction and change in land use. However the following requirement
    in the Guidance Note appears inconsistent with the overall Ind AS
    framework:
  • When the stage of completion of the project
    reaches a reasonable level of development. A reasonable level of
    development is not achieved if the expenditure incurred on construction
    and development costs is less than 25 % of the construction and
    development costs. Such costs would exclude land cost but include
    borrowing costs.

This requirement appears inconsistent
with Ind AS because a threshold of 25% for a real estate company that
routinely constructs real estate appears very arbitrary. Real estate
entities therefore should make their own judgment based on the
particular facts and circumstances.

In accordance with the
Guidance Note, a real estate developer will start recognising revenue
from constructiontype contracts only after it satisfies the prescribed
criteria, e.g., the project has reached a reasonable level of
development and minimum 25% of the estimated revenues are secured by
contracts. Apparently, Ind AS 11 does not allow deferral of revenue in
this manner. Rather, it requires a company to start recognising revenue
from a construction contract immediately. In cases where the outcome of
the contract cannot be estimated reliably, the recognition of revenue is
restricted to the extent of costs incurred, which are probable of
recovery.

An interesting question that is often asked is the
treatment of land in a real estate construction contract. Some may argue
that under Ind AS 11 the cost of land does not represent “contract
activity” or “work performed” and therefore is not to be considered in
determining the stage of completion. In addition, when the percentage of
completion is based on physical inspection, no activity will be
measured if land has been acquired but the actual construction has not
yet commenced. In the Guidance Note, land is included as an input cost
and in the application of the POCM method for recognizing revenue, costs
and profits. However, land cost is not included to determine if the 25%
threshold is reached to start applying the POCM method.

Question 7: How are multiple elements accounted for under the Guidance Note and Ind AS 11?

Requirement
under the Guidance Note An enterprise may contract with a buyer to
deliver goods or services in addition to the construction/development of
real estate [e.g. property management services, sale of decorative
fittings (excluding fittings which are an integral part of the unit to
be delivered), rental in lieu of unoccupied premises, etc]. In such
cases, the contract consideration should be split into separately
identifiable components including one for the construction and delivery
of real estate units. For example, a real estate company in addition to
the consideration on the flat, charges for property maintenance services
for a period of two years, after occupancy. Such revenue is accounted
for separately and over the two year period of providing the maintenance
services. The consideration received or receivable for the contract
should be allocated to each component on the basis of the fair market
value of each component. Such a split-up may or may not be available in
the agreements, and even when available may or may not be at fair value.
When the fair market value of all the components is greater than the
total consideration on the contract, the Guidance Note does not specify
how the discount is allocated to the various components. Under the
proposed revenue recognition standard Ind AS 115, the allocation is done
on a proportion of the relative market value.

Requirement under Ind AS 11

The above guidance is generally not inconsistent with the requirements of Ind AS.

Illustration : Guidance Note vs Ind AS

Example under Guidance Note Relevant Details of a project are as below:

Total saleable area 20,000 Square Feet
Land cost Rs. 300.00 lakh
Estimated construction costs Rs. 300.00 lakh
Estimated project costs Rs. 600.00 lakh
Work Completed till the reporting date (includes land cost of Rs. 300 lakh and construction cost of Rs. 60
lakh) – Scenario 1
Rs. 360.00 lakh
Work Completed till the reporting date (includes land cost of Rs. 300 lakh and construction cost of Rs. 90
lakh) – Scenario 2
Rs. 390.00 lakh
Total Area sold till reporting date. 5,000 Square Feet
Total sale consideration as per agreements of sale executed Rs. 200.00 lakh
Amount realised till the end of reporting period Rs. 50.00 lakh
Percentage of work completed
Scenario 1 60% of the total project cost
(including land cost or 20% of construction
cost)
Scenario 1 65% of the total project cost
(including land cost or 30% of construction
cost)
Application of requirements

Scenario 1

At
the end of the reporting period the enterprise will not be able to
recognise any revenue as reasonable level of construction, which is 25%
of the total construction cost, has not been achieved, though 10% of the
agreement amount has been realised. Scenario 2 Apparently, the company
meets all the criteria for revenue recognition from the project. It
therefore recognised revenue arising from the contract using the POCM.
However, revenue recognised should not exceed estimated total revenue
from legally binding contracts. The revenue recognition and profits will
be as under:

Revenue Recognised
(65% of Rs. 200 lakh as per the agreement
of sale)
Rs. 130.00 lakh
Proportionate cost of revenue
(5000 /20000 x 390)
Rs. 97.50 lakh
Income from the Project Rs. 32.50 lakh
Work in progress to be carried forward
(Rs. 390 lakh – Rs. 97.50 lakh)
Rs. 292.50 lakh
Example under Ind AS 11

Analysis of Scenario 1

  • It is questionable
    whether the 25% threshold under
    the Guidance Note for revenue recognition will apply under Ind AS. The
    real estate entity may conclude that the 20% threshold is reasonable and
    thereby start recognising revenue.
  • Even if the real estate
    entity believes that the threshold of revenue recognition has not been
    reached, revenue will have to be recognised. The recognition of revenue
    is restricted to the extent of costs incurred, which are probable of
    recovery. Analysis of Scenario 2
  • Some may argue that under
    Ind AS 11 the cost of land does not represent “contract activity” or
    “work performed” and therefore is not to be considered in determining
    the stage of completion. Therefore percentage completion is not 65% but
    is 30%.

Rs in lakhs
Revenue recognised 30% if Rs 200 lakh 60
Proportionate cost of revenue 30% of (5000/20000 x 600) 45
Profit to be recognised 15
Work in progress (390 – 45) 345

Overall Conclusion

The ICAI should address all the above issues and preferably
come out with a Revised Guidance Note to deal with
Real Estate Accounting under Ind AS.

[2015-TIOL-07-ARA-ST] M/s Emerald Leisures Limited

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Post 01/07/2012, the relationship between club and members should be
considered as provision of service by one person to another. Further
refundable security deposit and notional interest thereon cannot be
exigible to service tax.

Facts
The Applicant is a
resident public limited company engaged in establishing and running an
indoor sports complex and club and proposes membership from prospective
members. A refundable interest free security deposit was proposed to be
collected from the members in a range depending upon the category of
membership. Further the Applicant has shareholders and dividends are
distributed to them.

The issue raised before the Authority is in
relation to whether the relationship between the Applicant and members
of the club could be considered as service by one to another for the
purpose of section 65B(44) of the Finance Act, 1994, accordingly whether
the membership fee, annual fee received from the members be liable for
service tax or will be excluded on the principles of mutuality and
whether refundable security deposit would be exigible to service tax.
The Applicant relied upon various High Court decisions in relation to
clubs and associations holding that principle of mutuality is applicable
and no service tax is leviable. The Revenue submitted that by virtue of
Explanation 3 to the definition of service, an unincorporated
association and the member shall be treated as distinct persons. It was
also argued that the applicant has a profit motive considering their
objects and the fact that dividends are distributed to the members and
thus is purely a business activity and not in the nature of a
conventional members’ club. Therefore, the principles of mutuality have
no relevance.

Held
It was argued by the Applicant
that there is no ‘activity’ undertaken by the Applicant for the members
and there is complete absence of identity between the contributors and
the beneficiaries being one and the same. The Authority observed that
the Applicant carries out the club as business and has shareholders, who
may not be members of the club. Thus the prime objective being profit
motive, the principles of mutuality would not apply. However, in
relation to the second issue, the Authority observed that the security
deposit is towards various facilities and amenities in the club and not
for any services rendered. Moreover it is not in the nature of
consideration as the same would be refunded to members. Further notional
interest on refundable security deposit will also not be liable for
service tax as section 67(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 provides that
service tax is chargeable with reference to value which is the gross
amount charged for the services provided or to be provided. Thus since
the notional interest is not a charge by the Applicant there is no
service. Moreover, it was also stated that the Revenue has not been able
to establish that the notional interest has led to depression or
reduction in value of taxable service.

[2015-TIOL-2315-CESTAT-MUM] M/s Chiplun Nagari Sahakari Patsanstha Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Kolhapur

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Services provided by a co-operative society lub to its own members is not chargeable to service tax.

Facts
The Appellant is a Co-operative Society of members and is engaged in accepting deposits from their members and distributing the said amounts as loan to its own members and is not extending loans to outsiders. In order to process loan applications certain charges are levied from the members incurred for stationery and other expenses. The department contended that these charges are collected in the course of rendering services under the category of Banking and Other Financial services.

Held
The Tribunal, in order to determine the ratio of tax liability on the members of a society relied on the decision of the High Court of Gujarat in the case of Green Environment Services Co-op. Soc. Ltd. [2015 (37) STR 961 (Guj.)] wherein the Court declared “Club and Association” service ultravires to the extent the services are provided by the Club to its members. Accordingly, applying the said ratio the order was set aside and the appeal was allowed.

Salman Khan’s Acquittal – A Strong Argument Against Being Lawful

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There should be enough evidence by now that in India, being rich or well-connected provides a reliable amount of protection against the law. The irony being that such evidence will probably hold up in a court of law. So, Salman Khan’s acquittal by the Bombay High Court on Thursday was not the anomaly . What was the surprise was the trial court’s verdict in May that found him guilty of driving over and killing a homeless man and delivered a five-year jail sentence. No one is asking for a kangaroo court where the procedures of jurisprudence are tossed aside -even in cases that seem watertight.

But in far too many high-profile cases, it is this very procedure that is abused by methods far removed from convincing judicial arguments, thereby making the law look like, to quote a character in Oliver Twist, “a ass”. But in Dickensian India -where someone who could have easily stood in as the victim of Khan’s killer Land Cruiser on September 28, 2002, is today celebrating the movie star’s acquittal -the law is the only thing that everyone, from a powerful parliamentarian to a resident of a jhuggijhompri cluster, should be answering to. That, sadly , isn’t the case in the real world. This particular verdict makes anyone who should be fearful of the law be more fearful of not being well connected as insurance. The fact that the prosecution, the state of Maharashtra, failed to prove the charges “on all counts” makes incompetence and unwillingness equal suspects. The single witness who insisted that Khan was behind the wheel when the incident took place was not considered a “wholly reliable witness” on account of a legal technicality -as well as the fact that he had died eight years ago. The prosecution will appeal against the verdict. All one can do is hope that the holes that the state of Maharashtra inflicted on its own argument, can be repaired by proving something about the acquitted more convincing than his guilt not being proven “beyond reasonable doubt”. Otherwise, this will add to the string of incentives to prepare oneself to -proverbially , of course -get away with murder.

[2015-TIOL-2691-CESTAT-MUM] D S Chavan Engineering Works vs. Commissioner of Central Excise and Customs, Nasik

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The scope of work order indicating a specific job to be undertaken by the Appellant cannot be considered as a supply of manpower.

Facts
The Appellant had contract on a firm rate basis for welding and gas cutting on various locations of NTPC. The department contended that the control is exercised by NTPC and welding machine, electricity and gas required was given by them and the Appellant was required to supply manpower and accordingly liable under “Manpower Recruitment and Supply Agency Service”. Further, a demand was also raised on the cleaning services.

Held
Relying on the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Commissioner of Customs & Central Excise & Service Tax vs. Godavari Khore Cane Transport Company P. Ltd [2015-TIOL-253-HC-MUM-ST], the Tribunal held that work order does not indicate supply only of the manpower, on the contrary, scope of work indicates a specific job of welding and gas cutting to be done. Accordingly the liability under ‘Manpower Recruitment and Supply Agency” is set aside. As regards cleaning services, without contesting service tax along with interest was discharged. Observing a genuine misunderstanding, the Court dropped the penalty by invoking section 80 of the Finance Act, 1994.

GST – Subramaniam panel’s Workable Blueprint

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The Arvind Subramanian panel has done well to recommend a moderate standard goods and services tax (GST) rate of 17-18%, and also scrap the 1% inter-state sales tax. The rate, worked out after excluding real estate, electricity, alcohol and petroleum products, is higher than the 12% GST recommended by the 13th Finance Commission task force, whose model had exempted nothing. GST would eliminate the cascade of multiple taxes that products bear now and allow manufacturers to claim credit for the taxes paid on inputs across the value chain, creating a built-in incentive to pay tax and thus widen the tax base. It is welcome that the panel has pegged the average GST rate at which existing indirect tax revenues, excluding import duties, would be recouped, the so-called revenue neutral rate, at 15-15.5%.

Other rates—lower rates of 2-6% on precious metals, a 12% rate, and the highest rate of 40% for luxury cars, aerated water, tobacco and tobacco products—are fine. Multiple rates are not inimical to GST.

They have worked in the EU where the value-added tax rates vary across member countries. Instead of a composite 40% excise duty on non-merit goods, what would be desirable is a combination of GST at the standard rate and a ‘sin’ tax component not eligible for input tax credit. This will keep the GST chain unbroken while earning extra revenue and discouraging ‘sin’ consumption. It is welcome that the panel wants petroleum, electricity, real estate and alcohol to be included in GST. Subsuming all taxes and keeping exemptions to the minimum, is the way to go.

Scrapping the 1% inter-state sales tax on which the buyer cannot claim input tax credit is rational. This indirectly accepts one Congress condition for cooperating on GST. The panel, however, is not in favour of specifying a cap on the GST rate in the Constitution, another key Congress demand. However, there is a logic to having a cap.

Without a cap, the states can ratchet up the rate using their constitutional right, and defeat the GST reform’s goal of creating an efficient indirect tax structure.

Non-state actors have upstaged the superpowers

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The era of superpower hegemony is over, and that of nonstate actors has arrived. Fourteen years after 9/11, the US has — let’s be blunt — been repeatedly defeated by radical Islam. Look at Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Lebanon, or even Yemen. The US can drop a thousand bombs from a thousand drones, yet cannot dictate outcomes to a hydraheaded monster. The California school shooting showed that the US is unsafe even at home. Paris is the latest European scene of devastation. Radical Islamic thought has effortlessly penetrated national borders and created terrorists within the US and Europe.

At the recent TimesLitfest in New Delhi and Mumbai, many speakers addressed these issues. Many lambasted US military interventions that had created not democracy but anarchy and mass deaths.

Yet, historically, imperial powers alone could end local wars, and thus bring stability in place of anarchy. Superpowers could overthrow regimes they disliked, and install stable, controllable rulers across the world. Pax Britannica, Pax Americana or Pax Sovietica (in Eastern Europe) provided stability, and set rules for property, trade and commerce. This facilitated economic progress, providing handsome dividends for imperial controllers and also lifting living standards for the entire region.

That now looks so 20th century. Earlier, the state was allpowerful and individuals and groups were mostly powerless. But in the 21st century, the internet and social media have empowered non-state actors so much that superpowers can no longer install stable regimes at will. So, intervention now brings anarchy, not stability. This is a totally new development.

The internet and social media can now create and mobilize radical ideologues across the world, and create homegrown fanatics in every country. There is no military defence against these new developments. The ability to spread subversive ideas, once the hallmark of liberation movements, is now the hallmark of radical Islam.

The US easily ousted the Taliban from Afghan cities after 9/11, but could not dislodge it from rural areas. High technology could pulverise conventional armed forces but could not control low-tech rural areas, or stop the Taliban’s spread of ideas and arms, or even stop the Taliban raising funds through local taxes, smuggling and the opium trade. Obama’s military surge in Afghanistan gained ground only temporarily. He ultimately exited tail between legs, leaving the Taliban smiling.

Tech and terror: Islamic radicals use the internet as much as those fighing them, which makes the war more unpredictable.

ISIS is more fanatical than al-Qaida, and has enjoyed tremendous success in Iraq and Syria. Unlike most nonstate actors, ISIS has grabbed considerable territory, but this may be unsustainable. However, even if ISIS gives up most of its territory, it will retain the power to persuade and mobilize through social media and the internet, inspiring an unending succession of alienated Muslims in many countries to become suicide killers.

New forms of communication have enabled non-state actors to spread their tentacles, and to mobilize money and arms, on a scale that even strong states cannot foil. Somali pirates have shown that even commercial hoodlums, seeking millions without a shred of ideology, can defy the greatest naval superpowers. Capturing hostages for ransom has proved an easy way to raise enormous sums that terrorists in earlier times could not dream of.

Hacking and other 21st century tools enable radicals to undercut the most powerful states. One day hackers may steal nuclear secrets, or direct government missiles at targets chosen by terrorists. Leftist anti-imperialists might rejoice at western discomfiture but a wide array of international jihadi literature classifies India too as an enemy, as an imperial tyrant in Kashmir that also kills Muslims in Gujarat and elsewhere. Those celebrating the end of superpower hegemony must understand the consequences. India is at risk, no less than the US or France.

Yet most Indian intellectuals are in denial. They would rather focus on the threat from communal Hinduism at home — which is very real — and dismiss Islamic communalism as a distant threat that mostly affects the West. This is sheer myopia.

How does one meet this threat? Ideally, by creating a sense of universal brotherhood. But radical Islamists are uninterested. They need gain only a few adherents a day to create danger for everybody else. In the absence of 20th century solutions, western states may retreat into fortresses. India may have to follow.

At the Mumbai Litfest, Dileep Padgaokar declared that a tough state had to replace the era of ever-expanding civil liberties. The greatest threat to civil liberty now came from nonstate actors, not the state. This could not be tackled by motherhood, brotherhood and other 20th century virtuous solutions.

Today, diabolical viruses, placed by both state and nonstate actors, sit on every smartphone and computer, monitoring everyone. Radical ideas are buzzing in the airwaves all around us. We face new dangers, and an unprecedented loss of security and privacy. There are no easy answers.

[2015] 63 taxmann.com 231 (New Delhi- CESTAT) Rohan Motors vs. Commissioner Service Tax

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If penalty is imposed u/s. 77(1)(c)(ii) of the Finance Act, 1994 for failure to produce documents called for, the Department has to state specifically which document was called from the appellant.

Facts
Based on information from CERA Auditors, the Range Superintendent issued 5 letters/summons to the assessee, to submit the requisite information. Since no information was submitted the Show cause notice was issued to assessee, inter alia for imposition of penalty u/s. 77(1) of the Act for failure to furnish information/ documents. The assessee, on the other hand contended that, the department asked for repetitive information and that requisite details called for were provided by it, hence penalty u/s. 77 cannot be levied.

Held
The Tribunal noted that as per the adjudicating authority the appellant failed to respond to letters and submit desired information and therefore penalty was imposed u/s. 77(1)(c) of the Act; whereas the first appellate authority found that though information was supplied vide reply letters, it failed to submit documents and thus confirmed the penalty. Based on these contrary observations, the Tribunal expressed a view that the department itself is not sure whether the appellant is guilty of failure to furnish information or failure to produce documents. It held that, if penalty is imposed u/s. 77(1)(c)(ii), the Department has to state specifically which document was called from the appellant. The show cause notice does not specify the document that was called for. Imposition of penalty being in the nature of punishment, it cannot be imposed on flimsy and shaky evidence. It was further observed that, it is not a case where the department was obstructed from conducting a search or that a specific document was withheld resulting in particular revenue implication. Accordingly, it held that, though the appellant failed to reply to few letters, the explanation for failure that the appellant was under bona fide belief that necessary information was given cannot be rejected in toto and therefore imposition of penalty is not justified.

End all corporate tax breaks to give country a break from favouritism

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Should some industries get tax breaks that others don’t? In general, no. The finance ministry has come out with proposals, for public discussion, to abolish several existing tax breaks. This is a building block of the Budget promise of finance minister Arun Jaitley to cut the corporate tax rate within four years from the current 30 per cent to 25 per cent. This aims at matching corporate tax rates in most Asian competitors, removing India’s current disadvantage of high taxation.

Many exemptions were irrational, benefited a few favoured industries with good political connections, violated economic fairness, and deprived the exchequer of huge revenues.

The finance ministry proposes to end all tax breaks linked to profits, investment or specific areas. No longer will industries get tax breaks for locating in a favoured region. Some tax breaks like accelerated depreciation, linked to the amount invested, favored capital-intensive industries over labourintensive ones, terrible priorities in a country needing new jobs. Weighted deductions, which gave tax breaks for favoured types of spending (like R&D in pharmaceuticals), are also on the list for axing.

The new proposal represents a welcome wholesale junking of exemptions. Cherry-picking only some of these would have been an invitation to charges of favouritism and cronyism. Wholesale junking also moves the tax code towards simplicity and transparency , two desperately needed goals.

Some states will groan at losing tax breaks. But any state that provides good investment conditions will always attract investment. Those that don’t, should suffer the consequences. We need competition between the states to provide good infrastruc ture, rapid clearances, and a bribe-free climate.Investment will follow.

Some tax breaks already have a date of expiry , and those will be, quite rightly , honoured. Where no sunset date exists, the tax breaks will expire on March 31, 2017. This sunset date will apply to concessions for infrastructure, special economic zones, and oil production.

Many industrialists will complain that the new proposals go too far. Every government, including neighbouring ones in Asia, gives tax breaks to sectors and activities which it regards as having high priority . Doesn’t India have priorities, too? This rhetorical question will resonate with politicians. Yes, they will want to give some sectors high priority and offer these tax breaks. To some extent, this is inescapable in a democracy . But it can open up Pandora’s Box of endless demands, cronyism and complexity . Almost every industry and region can find one reason or other to demand a tax break.

If, indeed, exceptions are to be made, the guiding principle must be the same driving India towards a 25per cent corporate tax. Tax exemptions, like the corporate tax rate itself, should as far as possible mirror exemptions given by our competitors. Rather than listen to domestic lobbies with fat pockets or political clout, we need an expert committee to objectively identify tax breaks in competing countries that affect our exporters, and so need to be matched. Tax breaks for R&D in pharma are possible candidates for such matching. This will be a crony-free, corruption-free way of identifying a limited number of exemptions clearly linked to international competitiveness, without opening up the floodgates to a zillion demands from cronies.

There is also the matter of timing. If most tax breaks are to go by March 2017, the corporate tax rate should also be cut to 25per cent by that deadline. If the tax cut will come only by 2019, as Jaitley hinted in his Budget speech, the removal of tax breaks may need similar phasing.

Remembering to Hedge – Promises and perils of external commercial borrowing

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The Reserve Bank of India – after consultation with the central government – released an updated set of guidelines applicable to Indian corporate groups’ external commercial borrowing (ECB). The change is a significant liberalisation, in that it considerably lessens the number of restrictions placed on the end-use of funds that companies have borrowed from abroad. The focus of the RBI, according to its statement, was on long-term borrowing, which it said would make “repayments more sustainable and minimise roll-over risks for the borrower.” The list of permissible lenders has also been expanded. It now includes pools of long-term capital such as pension funds, insurance companies and even sovereign wealth funds. Simultaneously with expanding the scope of ECBs, the RBI also acted to effectively narrow the number of Indian companies, which would successively raise ECBs in foreign currency, by cutting the allowable ceiling for borrowing rates above the London Inter-Bank Offered Rate or LIBOR. For foreign currency borrowing with maturity of between three and five years, the permissible rate was cut by 50 basis points (bps) to 300 bps above LIBOR. The permissible spread for longer-term borrowing is correspondingly higher.

The dangers of an ECB debt binge are well known. Indian companies are faced with high interest rates at home, and dollar-denominated foreign rates can look attractive. In the past, corporate groups have funded over-expansion and acquisition sprees through such debt, only to be left stranded when the situation turned adverse. Few Indian companies hedge carefully enough – and, indeed, the market for hedging currency risk beyond a few months may not be deep and liquid enough to be attractive. Nor is such hedging cheap. The RBI clearly thinks that this is more of a problem for short-term debt, in which temporary volatility of the currency can cause crises when large tranches of debt become difficult to roll over or repay. It is, thus, incentivising longer-term debt that could be used by, say, real estate investment trusts to help bail out India’s 38 struggling realty sector. While this logic is certainly sound as far as it goes, there remains the larger question of the future direction of the rupee. If it is significantly overvalued at the moment but nevertheless apparently stable, some companies could take on long-term debt that will grow on their balance sheets when the rupee depreciates to closer to its real value.

The option, of course, is to seek out rupee-denominated debt abroad. Certainly, the government has made significant progress in promoting rupee-denominated “masala bonds”. And as this newspaper has reported, some markets have seen excellent growth in retail bonds with the rupee as the base currency. These have largely been issued so far by offshore institutional lenders, but earlier this year the RBI allowed Indian companies to borrow abroad in rupees too. The guidelines released on Monday put rupee-denominated borrowing on a par with dollar-denominated ECB – and, in fact, made special allowances for non-bank financial corporations and microfinance institutions to raise rupees from abroad. It is to be hoped that Indian companies will recognise that currency risk is best borne by large global financiers and will not be overly tempted by low interest rates and the associated currency risk.

[2015] 63 taxmann.com 20 (Mumbai – CESTAT) Hiranandani Constructions (P) Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Thane-I

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Maintenance Charges collected by builders from prospective buyers for payment of local taxes and other charges would not attract service tax.

Facts
The adjudicating authority held that the maintenance charges recovered from the prospective flat buyers towards management, maintenance or repair service are liable for service tax.

Held

Relying upon decision of Tribunal in the case of Kumar Beheray Rathi vs. CCE [2013-TIOL-1806-CESTAT-MUM] and Goel Nitron Constructions vs. CCE [2015-TIOL-1787- CESTAT-MUM], it was held that no service tax liability arises on the appellant under the category ‘Management, Maintenance or Repair Service’ for the amounts collected by them from the prospective flat owners.

The future of India: Private splendour and public squalor?

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India, and most Indians, are getting wealthier. With a per capita income of $6,000 (PPP), India is now a lower middle-income nation. If our GDP continues to grow at a modest 7% CAGR, millions of Indians will gradually escape poverty and hundreds of millions of us will grow steadily more affluent. The probability of this seems fairly reasonable – not because of the competence of any government — but because of the aspirations, drive and entrepreneurship of millions of Indians, especially young Indians.

But even as we grow wealthier, the quality of life especially in urban India will continue to plummet. I live in Koramangala, Bangalore, the epicenter of India’s entrepreneurial ecosystem, a place brimming with talent and energy .

But it is also brimming with mounds of festering garbage. The stench of sewage permeates the air. A commute to the airport that once took an hour now takes more than two. However, Koramangala’s residents have it good compared to those who live in other suburbs like Whitefield.This story of unlivable cities is repeated across India. Delhi’s residents complain about the barely breathable air and awful traffic. Mumbaikars lament the disappearance of public spaces. Rain has shut Chennai down. As population and consumption rise, we are seeing the degradation of everything public -infrastructure, justice, law and order, healthcare, education -from bad to unbearable.

Our response to this degradation has been privatization by default. Companies create their own worldclass infrastructure. The affluent and growing middleclass retreat behind gated communities and highrise apartments and to a world of privatized education, privatized healthcare, private security and transportation. This retreat has given rise to what we see today: oases of private splendour in an ocean of public squalor. But how sustainable is this? What’s the point in rising affluence if the quality of our life is plummeting? What’s the point in owning more cars or better cars if it takes an hour or more to travel 10km? What’s the point of rising GDP if we can’t breathe our air, if most of our food is contaminated and the judicial system fails to deliver timely justice? As someone remarked about China, what’s the point in growing the pie if the pie is inedible? The ocean of public squalor is beginning to engulf our private cocoons.

It is very easy to get angry and blame “government” for this mess. Our deplorable situation is clearly the failure of successive governments of every political hue at the Center, the state and local level. They have failed to curb corruption and have failed even more miserably to build institutions. Institutions are the foundations of society . Even as our population surged and our economy multiplied, successive governments have allowed key institutions to atrophy; indeed, in many cases, they have been deliberately weakened.Weak institutions -regulatory institutions, institutions of administration, policing, and justice -are the root cause of government’s inability to stem corruption and deliver essential services to citizens.

But much as government is to be blamed, the bigger problem might be our own behaviour. Why is there so much rotting rubbish on the streets of Bangalore? It isn’t primarily because the municipal contractor doesn’t pick up the rubbish every day. It is that residents refuse to segregate garbage the way the law prescribes and most households furtively throw their garbage on the street corner. Why is corruption so rampant? Because fewer and fewer of us see anything wrong in either taking or paying bribes; bribery is simply a transaction cost. How many of us are willing to take the metro or bus to the airport instead of our car? The total refusal on the part of babus, politicians and middle-class citizens to use public services results in the lack of any incentive to improve these.

How many talented executives are willing to give up their lucrative careers for just a few years to help rebuild public institutions or strengthen good NGOs?

How many of us are willing to give up part of a weekend to participate in a community initiative to get rid of garbage, plant trees in our neighbourhood or attend meetings of the resident wel fare association?

How many business leaders are personally engaged in the CSR work of their company to ensure that financial contributions and employee talent are directed towards building institutional capacity? How many of us make the effort to vote in elections instead of seeing it as another holiday?

It is time that we realize that we get the kind of government and society we deserve. To a very large extent, the sorry state of our society is the result of our own indifference. To make a democratic society work, we need to redefine what it means to be a citizen.

Citizenship is not just a birthright, it is also an obligation. A democratic society is fragile and its success demands vigilance, collective action and even sacrifice from its citizens. It took great sacrifice to win our free dom. It will take at least as much leadership and sac rifice to create a functioning society.

Quality of universities determines nation’s fate: Economist Summers

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Faster decision-making is the key to India’s higher growth. American economist Lawrence Summers who was at Mumbai university said India could take inspiration from a slogan pasted on the wall of the Facebook office: “Done is better than perfect”.

Speaking of Facebook COO Sheryl Sandberg, who earlier worked on his team as the chief in staff of treasury, Summers said, ” An attitude that she has now became a slogan at Facebook. It’s up on the wall -`Done is better than perfect.’ “If your government internalised that bit and it just had an idea that decisions had to be made, and we hoped that were made right, but they just had to be made, and there was a substantial acceleration of decision making in every sphere, I think that would make a very big difference for India over time. I guess the other thing that one is stuck by is a variety of kinds of infrastructural improvements in India as well. But in general, faster decision making in presumptial permission, rather than a presumptial prohibition, would go a long way ,” said he.

The President Emeritus and Charles W Eliot professor at Harvard University , former treasury secretary in the Clinton administration was speaking on “Reinventing the university: Reconciling equity and excellence in higher education worldwide”. While topclass universities are a microcosm of what India needs, he believed that the quality of universities determines the ate of a nation.

“The prosperity of nations is tied up with their success of their universities. It is no accident that Silicon Valley is essentially in the same place as Stanford University . It is no accident that the city of Boston is where Harvard University and is also the leading concentration of biomed talent….”

Emphasising that India will not be great without great universities, he said, “I know it is fashionable to argue that prosperity comes from the ground up and it does. But when it is suggested that it so mehow means that prim and secondary education should be a focus to the exclusion of higher education I will suggest that is a grave and enormous error.”

“No matter how universal literacy is, no matt how many people have been taught arithmatic, no matter how healthy all the children are, a society will not move forward without learning the touches of frontiers of what man knows and without being part of the ad venture of pushing those frontiers and that I would suggest is the work of universities.”

A great university he said, must be governed by the right academic culture of openness, have autonomy and a sense of fierce competition.Summers said India could be an export house of education.He said he could not think of a better place than India for Indian students to study .

Have faith in the citizen – Begin administrative reforms by undoing the colonial mindset of babus

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“Just reform the bureaucracy” – this advice to India by GE CEO Jeffrey Immelt is echoed across the world. Why administrative reforms haven’t taken place, best intents notwithstanding, requires a nuanced understanding. Global experience suggests administrative reforms need to be undertaken within the first 100 days of a new government coming to office, else the system takes over the government – the will to change is dwarfed by the logic of continuity.

Nowhere in the world have substantive administrative reforms been successful if not directly supervised by the political leader of the country. Successful administrative reforms are by definition transformational; there are no worthwhile examples of meaningful incremental administrative reforms.

Administrative reforms don’t happen when entrusted to the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy has to be kept at arm’s length and prevailed upon. These are cardinal rules; India is past the expiry date of the first 100 days, but it may still want to sail ahead.

The imperatives for administrative reforms in India are more fundamental than the leaking bucket and dilapidated administrative framework. First, in a historical oversight, India continued with the administrative framework of the British. This system was designed to inhibit the native, chain initiative and enterprise and enable a select few to rule the multitudes. These objectives have been faithfully served by the legacy framework even 68 years after the departure of colonial masters.

Post- the reforms of 1991, the framework designed to control and regulate has become anachronistic in the exercise of freedom, which is intrinsic to the market. As a participant in the global economy, either India rewrites its administrative system to compete with the best investment destinations of the world or perishes, for nothing except competitive advantage matters to the investment community. The way ahead will require a comprehensive roadmap as well as a strategy to pierce the chakravyuha, but a few principles may be useful reference points. At a philosophical level we need to adopt a trust based system with implicit faith in the citizen. Filling forms, providing attested documents, undergoing verification and awaiting decisions by higher ups are all instruments of an alien administration to disempower and dispirit the individual.

Government must take the word of the citizen at face value and devise a system to take care of exceptions without impeding the quest of the rest.

A second beacon for administrative reforms should be ending the dichotomy between government and national interest, again a colonial legacy. Basically government should stop acting in its own interest and should work in national interest which includes the interests of private individuals and the private sector.

The success of Japan, Korea and Singapore came from government deciding that its main role is to support and facilitate enterprise, be it individual or corporate. This is both an issue of mindset/ideology as well as a systemic issue of a very fundamental kind that requires recasting the administrative mould, not simply reshaping the existing one.

Finally, the government and technology intersect needs to be calibrated. Just about all our IT-based systems have merely computerised physical processes with, at best, marginal efficiency and transparency gains.

India is ready to transit from the physical to the virtual world like no other country. The almost ubiquitous access to mobile telephony can connect an individual to a service provider, the electronic bank account can be used to make payment when required and the Aadhaar card authenticates the individual online. Given that all these three components are approaching the one billion mark, such a proposition is neither esoteric nor futuristic – except to a mindset and system steeped in the past.

2015 (40) STR 509 (Tri. –Bang.) Kakinada Seaports Ltd. vs. C.C.E., S.T, & Cus., Visakhapatanam- II

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Order cannot be set aside only on the grounds that the provision is not quoted properly in SCN specifically if the assessee is aware of the provisions of law. Service Tax cannot be demanded from service receiver under RCM if service provider has already discharged the same. CENVAT credit availed on the basis of Challan of service provider may be eligible document for availment of CENVAT Credit if it contains all the requisite details. CENAVT credit cannot be denied on the ground that service provider was eligible for exemption.

Facts
The appellant engaged in providing “other port services” in Kakinada Port were issued Show cause notice (SCN) for the period post negative list of services under Reverse charge mechanism (RCM) for business support services and also with respect to CENVAT credit availed on certain input services. It was contested that during the period under consideration, definition of Business Support Services had to be referred u/s. 65B as against section 65 of the Finance Act, 1994 as provided in SCN. Though there was nothing regarding introduction of negative list of services in SCNs and orders, there was no mention that section 65 ceased to have effect. Since RCM was introduced recently on such services, due to ignorance, service tax was already discharged by service provider in routine manner. Therefore, tax cannot be demanded twice on same transaction. Further CENVAT credit availed on the basis of acknowledgment of service provider was disallowed by department. However, the appellant contended that they had availed CENVAT credit on the basis of challan of service provider which must be considered to be valid document for availing CENVAT Credit. Further, CENVAT credit was denied on certain input services and capital goods were contested by the appellant. CENVAT credit was also denied on the ground that input services were eligible for exemption.

Held
The services were covered under business support services either before or after negative list. Even though specific provision were not quoted, the entire demand cannot be set aside especially in view of the fact that RCM and introduction of negative list were mentioned in SCNs and orders. In the scenario of self-assessment, the assessee would be aware of classification and the fact that the assessee contended that section 65 ceased to be in effect, reveals that the assessee was not prejudiced due to omission of section in SCN. Further since service provider had already discharged service tax, even though not liable, demand of service tax cannot be sustained on service receiver. In this case, as a remedy, penalty may be imposed for contravention of law but no penalties may be imposed for non-payment of service tax. It was held that CENVAT Credit was available on the basis of challan (containing all requisite details) under RCM and therefore, it was considered to be sufficient document for availment of CENVAT credit. CENVAT Credit was also allowed on health services, insurance services, Rent-a-cab services, works contract services in relation to erection and installation activity. It was also held that CENVAT credit cannot be denied on the ground that service provider was eligible for exemption.

India’s Cinderella syndrome

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The Oxford historian, Felipe Fernandez-Armesto, in his large tome titled Millennium: A History of Our last Thousand Years, described India as “the Cinderella civilisation of our millennium: beautiful, gifted, destined for greatness, but relegated to the backstairs by those domineering sisters from Islam and Christendom”. Looking at Arvind Kejriwal’s last-minute desperation to clear Delhi’s air before people choke to death, one can also talk of the country’s Cinderella syndrome: the tendency to not act until the clock is about to strike midnight, and then to rush for solutions. Cinderella lost her slippers in the process, India has lost much more over the decades.

One can think of many examples. There is the Green Revolution itself—the belated move to reform neglected agriculture after the country had suffered twin droughts in the mid-1960s and been forced to depend on food aid to feed itself. There is the 1971 war, for which India was caught unprepared (not the first or last time); Gen. Manekshaw told Indira Gandhi he needed nine months in which to get ready—a period during which the country rushed through with the purchase of all manner of armaments, including second-hand tanks from Soviet satellite countries because nothing else was available. Economic reform, introduced in baby steps through the 1980s, was rushed through only after the country went nearly bankrupt, in 1991. There is also the great haste with which the Commonwealth Games were put together at the last minute (the toilets in the Games Village were being cleaned even as athletes started arriving).

Everyone has known for years that Delhi’s air is unfit to breathe in the winter months. More than a decade ago, the Supreme Court provided temporary relief to the city’s residents when it forced an unwilling Sheila Dikshit to allow only gas-powered engines for public transport (politicians owned the diesel-driven buses and naturally were opposed to change). Now, in a typical Cinderellahour solution, Mr Kejriwal has decided on the odd-even number rule for cars, though the city has had no time to prepare for such a disruptive step. Phase III of the metro system will add 75 per cent to track length and therefore accessability, and more than 50 per cent to daily ridership, but it is a year away from completion. And the idea of bus rapid transit (BRT ) corridors, which would have encouraged people to move from cars to buses in phases, has been given up after a botched trial.

In the absence of these two pressure-relieving transport systems, Mr Kejriwal plans as an emergency step to throw over a thousand additional buses on to the roads. Other possible solutions like encouraging car-pooling (special fast lanes on arterial roads for cars with more than one passenger) have not been tried. So expect initial chaos, plus a traffic police unprepared for the sudden extra work of checking all car numbers. We might well end up with a repeat of the BRT denouement: premature demise of the idea. It does not need great knowledge of human affairs to know that this is not how societies should organise themselves. But we are, it would seem, a Cinderella civilization; we need an 11th-hour crisis before we stir ourselves.

So we have to ask ourselves: is the disastrous drowning of Chennai a result of the Cinderella syndrome, and ditto the Mumbai dunking 10 years ago? What about the Uttarkashi flood? Which part of the country is due next? We take pride in how good we usually (though not always) are at relief measures in a crisis, but what about action to prevent man-made crises—as all these episodes were? Perhaps a civil society organization should draw up a list of the priority issues that need attention but are being ignored—and put a Cinderella clock on each issue to indicate how close we are to midnight. It might help focus the mind.

2015 (40) STR 519 (Tri.-Del.) Mannat Farms vs. CCE & ST, Ghaziabad

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The discretion to condone delay is not a personal discretion of the Appellate Commissioner but is discretion of law and should be exercised appropriately as law requires.

Facts
The appellant preferred an appeal to Commissioner (Appeals) with a delay of 29 days beyond the period of limitation. Since the Commissioner (Appeals) is granted discretionary powers to condone delay upto 30 days, the appellant pleaded to admit the appeal citing the reason that his wife was ill and provided medical certificate to this effect. The Commissioner (Appeals) dismissed the appeal observing that the wife of appellant had no specific role to play in day-to-day affairs of the firm and nothing was brought on record to show that illness of wife had affected the business of the firm.

Held
Having regard to the peculiar facts of the case, condonation of delay should be liberally considered. The discretion to condone delay is not a personal discretion of the Commissioner and the same should be exercised properly as dictates of law require. It was perverse for the Appellate commissioner to hold that care of a spouse and need to attend to her was not a relevant criterion. Accordingly, order was set aside.

Where Art Thou !

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Who was Narayan Varma ! An accomplished Chartered Accountant, a visionary professional and above all a social service oriented human being. Narayan qualified and enrolled as a member of our Institute in 1955. He completed 60 years of practice in 2015 and celebrated the occasion by inviting many of those who articled with him. He was International President of GIANTS, an international social organisation established by his friend Nana Chudasama. Narayan was our President in 1978 and President of Chamber of Tax Consultants in 1988. During his tenure he initiated changes in their functioning. During the last few years he served the society as an RTI activist and authored books on the Right To Information Act. His contribution on the subject in this journal will be missed. Narayan’s contribution to our journal is immeasurable. He was publisher of the journal since for more than two decades. He was editor and the initiator of many features in the Journal – the most notable being Namaskar.

On a personal note, we met at the RRC held at Mahabaleshwar in 1975 where I presented my first paper and started my journey with BCAS. The acquaintance developed into a relationship I have with few. We formed a group of professionals who have met regularly for the last thirty eight years on every Friday. From ten of us with his passing away we are now only three.

In our philosophy during our life we are expected to repay three debts : viz; Dev rin, Guru rin and Pitri rin. Let us see how Narayan repaid these three debts, in a measure very few of us are capable of. Pitri rin was discharged by having progeny and looking after the family. He has two sons who are loving and successful human beings. Narayan and Ursula have reared a loving family. Guru rin has been repaid by training and mentoring many chartered accountants, amongst them there are many who are our members and lastly Dev rin has been repaid by serving society directly and indirectly through the various social organisations.

Hence, where is Narayan ! I believe he is having fun with our Creator.

God Bless his Soul
Adieu
KC

2015 (40) STR 547(Tri. –Delhi) Coca Cola (I) Pvt. Ltd. vs. CST, Delhi

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Best judgment order not sustainable if it is non-speaking, does not disclose reasons and is arbitrary.

Facts
The
adjudicating authorities confirmed demand of service tax on certain
foreign expenditure under reverse charge mechanism (RCM) and also on
certain incomes to be in the form of services liable to service tax.

A
‘Best Judgment Order’ was passed on the basis of documents submitted
vide section 72 of the Finance Act, 1994. Also certain expenses like
renting of immovable property and supply of movable property for use in
India were wrongly construed as income. Further share in the expenses
relating to marketing support were treated as income. On perusal of the
records and correspondence, it appeared that adjudicating authority had
just reproduced the facts and the definitions as given under law and no
speaking order was passed citing reasons for such best judgement
assessment without providing explanations.

Held
Adjudicating
authority merely reproduced assessee’s submissions and there were
hardly any reasons to justify demand. After analysing various paragraphs
of the impugned order which were either a reproduction or irrelevant,
the Tribunal observed that the analysis therein was cryptic and
inadequate to arrive at the findings. The order was completely
non-speaking about the methodology/reasons/grounds adopted for arriving
at ‘Best Judgment’ figures.

In fact, the authority was not even
sure whether it was justified to invoke best judgment assessment in the
present case which was evident from the phrase used in impugned order as
‘In order to safeguard the revenue, I find that section 73 appears to
be inviolable…”This was an arbitrary best judgment assessment and
therefore, was not sustainable quasi-judicially. Appreciating the
observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of M. L. Capoor
(AIR 1974 SC 87), it was held that the adjudicating authority was
conspicuously non-speaking, non-reasoned, arbitrary and cavalier while
passing the impugned order. Accordingly, along with setting aside the
impugned order, costs were imposed on adjudicating authority to be
deposited in Prime Minister’s National Relief Fund.

The Companies (Meetings of Board And Its Powers) Second Amendment Rules, 2015.

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has vide Notification dated 14th December 2015, amended the Companies (Meetings of Board and its Powers) Rules, 2014. They have been notified in the Official Gazette on 15th December 2015.

Rule 6A has been inserted as follows:

‘6A. Omnibus approval for related party transactions on annual basis – All related party transactions shall require approval of the Audit Committee and the Audit Committee may make omnibus approval for related party transactions proposed to be entered into by the company subject to the following conditions, namely:-

(1) The Audit Committee shall, after obtaining approval of the Board of Directors, specify the criteria for making the omnibus approval which shall include the following, namely:-

(a) maximum value of the transactions, in aggregate, which can be allowed under the omnibus route in a year;

(b) the maximum value per transaction which can be allowed;

(c) extent and manner of disclosures to be made to the Audit Committee at the time of seeking omnibus approval;

(d) review, at such intervals as the Audit Committee may deem fit, transaction entered into by the company pursuant to each of omnibus approval made

(e) transactions which cannot be subject to the omnibus approval by the Audit Committee.

(2) The Audit Committee shall consider the following factors while specifying the criteria for making omnibus approval, namely:

(a) repetitiveness of the transactions (in past or in future);

(b) justification for the need of omnibus approval.

It is provided that where the need for related party transaction cannot be foreseen and aforesaid details are not available, Audit Committee may make omnibus approval for such transactions subject to their value not exceeding rupees one crore per transaction.

The omnibus approvals are valid for a period not exceeding 1 financial year and shall require fresh approval after the expiry of such financial year. Omnibus approval is not to be made for transactions of disposing of the undertaking of the company.

Rule 10 which pertains to “Loans to Director etc. u/s. 185” has been omitted.

Rule 15 which pertain to “Contract or arrangement with a related party” where prior approval of the company by a special resolution was required, will now require only an ordinary resolution.

The Companies (Audit And Auditors) Amendment Rules, 2015

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has vide Notification dated 14th December 2015, amended the Companies (Audit and Auditors) Rules, 2014. They have been notified in the Official Gazette on 15th December 2015.

As per the Notification, the Rule 13 now reads :

Rule 13 : Reporting of frauds by auditor and other matters:

(1) If an auditor of a company, in the course of the performance of his duties as statutory auditor, has reason to believe that an offence of fraud, which involves or is expected to involve individually an amount of rupees one crore or above, is being or has been committed against the company by its officers or employees, the auditor shall report the matter to the Central Government. The rule also contains the time period for reporting to the Board or Audit Committee, and to the Central Government in case the auditor fails to get replies or observations. In case of a fraud involving lesser than the amount of Rs. 1 crore, the auditor shall report the matter to Audit Committee constituted u/s. 177 or to the Board immediately but not later than two days of his knowledge of the fraud and he shall report the matter specifying the nature of fraud with description; approximate amount involved and parties involved.

2015 (40) STR 537 (Tri. – Mum.) Osho International Foundation vs. CCE, Pune

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In case there is a change in the view of CBEC regarding taxability, the same shall be applicable from the date when such change took place and was informed to the assessee.

Facts
The appellants provided services relating to meditation, yoga and massage. The department contested the same to be “health and fitness services”. It was contended that the activities of meditation were spiritual in nature. Therefore, the same is not liable to service tax. In 2003, Chief Commissioner, Pune informed CBEC’s view to the appellants that the activities of meditation and yoga would not be taxable. Thereafter, CBEC, on request for clarification by Commissioner, Pune, informed that Service tax was leviable on the said activity. Therefore, even if services are adjudged taxable, tax shall be payable only from the day there is a change in view of the department. However, since the definition of health and fitness centre included meditation specifically, department strongly submitted that the activities were taxable.

Held

Though, the activities of Yoga and Meditation were taxable, since there was a change in view of the highest body of indirect taxes, the same would be applicable only from the date when the change of view took place and informed to the assessee. Therefore, the demand prior to such clarification was set aside.

2015 (40) STR 560 (Tri.–Mum.) Kunal IT Services Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE, Pune-III

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The franchisee may be liable to pay service tax only on the amount paid to him by the franchisor provided the total amount is first received by the franchisor.

Facts
The appellants took-up franchise and provided Commercial Coaching and Training Services. The course fees were collected and deposited in the accounts of Franchisor. Service tax was paid on 80% of fees received from the franchisor. Revenue authorities demanded service tax on full amount of the fees received. It was argued that the amount collected and deposited to Franchisor’s account was not in the nature of consideration. In contrast, Department was of the view that the fees received and was ‘gross amount received’ for provision of services.

Held
Appellant were service provider and students were service receiver. Having regard to section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994, it was observed that the gross value charged for provision of services was only 80% of the fees in view of the peculiar fact that the cheques issued by students were directly drawn in the name of Franchisor. Accordingly, appeal stood allowed.

2015 (40) STR 608 (Tri. –Del.) Tanay Landcon India Pvt Ltd. vs. CCE & ST, Jaipur

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Adjudicating authorities should pass the orders only after considering evidences on record. In case of doubt regarding facts of the case, adjudicating authorities should resort to means to gather the correct facts of the case as against passing order without any basis. It is a misconception that the burden of proof is on assessee in case of allegation by department.

Facts
Show Cause Notice was issued proposing recovery of irregular availment of CENVAT Credit in violation of Rule 6 of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 for failure to maintain separate accounts of CENVAT credit on common inputs used for taxable as well as exempted services. It was submitted that it had only availed credit of inputs and input services used for providing taxable services. Further, Show cause notice (SCN) failed to reveal any basis for the allegation of irregular availment of CENVAT credit. The adjudicating authority completely disregarded the submissions and observed that it is not the duty of the Department to establish that the appellant have not maintained separate records.

Held
The Tribunal held that the adjudication order jumped to the conclusion of irregular availment of Cenvat credit without substantiating it by any material evidence or analysis. Even when the contention was not accepted, the adjudication order mentioned that the appellant did not dispute availment of CENVAT credit on common inputs and input services. In case of doubt by revenue authorities, it ought to have summoned the appellants’ records or should have verified from their premises whether the they had correctly pleaded to have maintained separate records or not. If no summons were issued and there was a failure to inspect records, conclusion regarding non-maintenance of separate accounts was without any basis. It was also held that It is a misconception that the burden of proof is on assessee in case of allegation by department. In the present case, in absence of clear findings regarding non-maintenance of separate accounts by the appellants without any evidence, the inference of failure to maintain separate records is perverse. In order to enable the adjudicating authority to pursue judicial discipline in recording adjudication orders and eschew perversity in adjudication functions, matter was remanded back for fresh adjudication on the basis of observations made in this order.

Section 92B of the Act – Issuance of corporate guarantees to compensate for lack of subsidiary’s core strength to raise bank finance being in the nature of quasi capital or shareholder activity and not provision of service, does not constitute ‘international transaction’.

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Facts

The Taxpayer, an Indian company, was engaged in the business of ink manufacturing. Taxpayer had a subsidiary company in USA (FCo) which manufactured ink for US markets by using material supplied by the Taxpayer. Taxpayer had issued corporate guarantees on behalf of FCo without charging any consideration for the same.

Taxpayer contended that neither these guarantees cost anything to it nor did it recover any charges for the same from FCo. Further, the guarantees were in the nature of quasi capital and not in the nature of any services. Accordingly, no income was required to be imputed.

However, the TPO computed the arm’s length price (ALP) of the corporate guarantee and proceeded to make Transfer Pricing adjustment in the hands of the Taxpayer.

Held

It is elementary that the determination of arm’s length price can only be done in respect of an ‘international transaction’. As per section 92B of the Act, an International transaction means a transaction between two or more associated enterprises (AE) either or both of whom are non-residents, in the nature of purchase, sale or lease of tangible or intangible property, or provision of services, or lending or borrowing money, or any other transaction having a bearing on the profits, income, losses or assets of such enterprises.

Explanation to section 92B provides that the expression “international transaction”, inter-alia, includes capital financing, including any type of long-term or short-term borrowing, lending or guarantee and provision of services. The Explanation is to be read in conjunction with the main provision. A transaction of capital financing and provision of services can be covered only in the residual part of the definition of international transaction, i.e., “any transaction having a bearing on the profits, income, losses or assets of such enterprises”. In other words, the impact on “profit, income, losses or assets” is a sine qua non and it should be on real basis and not on a contingent or hypothetical basis, for a transaction of provision of service and capital financing to fall under the ambit of ‘international transaction’.

Reliance in this regard was placed on Tribunal decision in the case of Bharti Airtel Limited [(2014)(63 SOT 113)]. It is not correct to compare corporate guarantee and bank guarantee. A bank guarantee is a surety that the bank or the financial institution issuing the guarantee provides by committing that banks, will pay off the debts and liabilities incurred by an individual or a business entity in case they are unable to do so. Even when such guarantees are backed by one hundred percent deposits, the bank charges guarantee fee. However, corporate guarantee is issued without any security or underlying assets. There is no recourse available with the guarantor if there is any default. Such guarantees are issued based upon the business needs and group synergies and not based on the risk assessment or underlying asset which generally the banks ask for.

Corporate guarantees can also be a mode of ownership contribution, particularly where a guarantee given compensates for the inadequacies in the financial position of the borrower. There can be number of reasons, including regulatory issues and market conditions in the related jurisdictions, in which such a contribution, by way of a guarantee, would justify to be a more appropriate and preferred mode of contribution vis-a-vis equity contribution. For these reasons, bank guarantees are not comparable with corporate guarantees.

In the facts of the present case, guarantee has been provided to compensate for lack of core strength of the subsidiary for raising the finances from bank. Nothing was brought on record to contradict the same. Therefore the transaction of issuance of corporate guarantee is in the nature of shareholder activity and not provision of service. A transaction which is in the nature of shareholder activity does not amount to “provision of services”. Hence, it is outside the ambit of international transaction. Even if issuance of corporate guarantee is to be treated as ‘provision for service’, such service would need to be re-characterised in tune with commercial reality, as no independent enterprise would issue a guarantee without an underlying security. Reliance for this was placed on the decision of EKL Appliances [(2012) 345 ITR 241 (Del)]

Further, where the issuance of a corporate guarantee does not have a bearing on the profits, income, losses or assets, it does not constitute an international transaction. In the present case, the taxpayer had extended corporate guarantee to FCo. The guarantee did not cost anything to the Taxpayer and the Taxpayer could not have realised money by giving such guarantee to someone else during the course of its normal business. Thus, such arrangement did not impact the profits, income, losses or assets of Taxpayer. Hence, it falls outside the ambit of international transaction u/s. 92B of the Act.

Article 12 of India-Netherlands Double Tax avoidance Agreement (DTAA) – Payment of composite consideration for various interdependent services rendered as part of the basic refinery service package should be apportioned between chargeable technical services and non-chargeable commercial services.

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Facts

Taxpayer, a company incorporated and tax resident of Netherlands, rendered certain services to an Indian Company (ICo), who owned and operated refineries in India. These services contained two parts – basic refinery service package and certain optional services.

As part of the basic services, Taxpayer was required to provide ICo with certain deliverables such as manuals, guidelines, standards, etc., which were developed by the Taxpayer based on its expertise and experience in running refineries. Additionally after referring to the manuals if the employees of ICo required any personal assistance or advice, Taxpayer would render the requisite consultancy services and assistance to ICo.

As part of optional services, Taxpayer, when specifically requested by ICo, was required to provide consultancy services and assistance relating to various commercial or technical aspects of the day to day operations of the refinery.

Taxpayer contended that some part of basic refinery services represented supply of goods in the form of deliverables such as training manuals, guidelines, etc., and consideration for such outright transfer, was not in the nature of fee for technical services (FTS) under the India-Netherlands DTAA .

Further, Taxpayer contended that certain part of basic refinery package which were commercial in nature did not qualify as technical service. In any case, such service did not ‘make available’ any technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how. By virtue of the MFN clause in the India-Netherlands DTAA , the make available condition contained in the India-USA DTAA can be read into India-Netherlands DTAA and since services rendered by Taxpayer did not satisfy the make available condition, it did not fall within the definition of fees for technical services of India-Netherlands DTAA . Taxpayer offered the balance portion as taxable in terms of India-Netherlands DTAA .

However, Tax Authority contended that the payments made by ICo towards basic refinery services was composite payment for holistic technical services and which cannot be split into technical and commercial services. Also, it is not correct to suggest that some part of services satisfy “make available” condition and other part of service does not satisfy “make available” condition. Accordingly, entire consideration should be treated as FTS even under the DTAA . Tax Authority also contended that India-Netherlands DTAA should be interpreted independently without making reference to the MOU between India-USA.

Held

Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clause of India-Netherland DTAA provides that if under any DTAA , India limits its taxation at source on dividends, interest, royalties, or fees for technical services to a rate lower or a scope more restricted than the rate or scope in the India- Netherlands DTAA , the same rate or scope shall apply under the India- Netherlands DTAA also. India-USA DTAA provides a restricted definition of FIS, wherein services can be regarded to fall within the scope of FTS only if the same makes available technical knowledge, skill etc.

By virtue of MFN clause in India- Netherlands DTAA , FTS Article of India-Netherlands DTAA would stand amended in light of the beneficial provisions in India-USA DTAA.

Further, in terms of specific Notification, the MOU between India and USA with reference to Article 12 applies mutatis mutandis to India-Netherlands DTAA .

Certain services rendered as part of the basic refinery services, did not involve any transfer of technology and hence cannot be treated as FTS. Further services in relation to physical delivery of manuals, etc. would also not constitute FTS. The fact that these services or physical deliverables are interlinked with certain technical services does not alter the basic character of these services and physical deliverables.

The mere fact that the overall package is considered as a whole and the services are interlinked cannot be the basis for not apportioning the consideration. The consideration under the composite contract needs to be apportioned between chargeable technical services and non chargeable commercial services.

Framework of Sources of Exchange of Information in Tax Matters – An Overview

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Introduction and Need for Exchange of Information [EoI]

Tackling
offshore tax evasion and tax avoidance and unearthing of unaccounted
money stashed abroad have become a pressing concern for governments all
around the world. The information and/or evidence of such tax
avoidance/evasion and the underlying criminal activity is often located
outside the territorial jurisdiction and thus this menace can be
addressed only through bilateral and multilateral cooperation amongst
tax and other authorities. India has played an important role in
international forums in developing international consensus for such
cooperation as per globally accepted norms and continuous monitoring of
their adoption by every jurisdiction including offshore financial
centres.

Initially, the international norms were to provide
assistance to other countries only on satisfaction of the norms of “dual
criminality”, i.e., in cases of drug trafficking, corruption, terrorist
financing etc. which are criminal activities in both countries.
However, at present the cooperation has extended to cases of tax evasion
and avoidance and countries are obliged to exchange information
requested as per provisions of tax treaties/agreements. The third stage
of cooperation would be automatic exchange of financial account
information without countries having to make requests for the same,
thereby enabling the receiving country to verify whether such accounts
indicate tax evaded money and to take necessary action. Despite a global
consensus on coordinated action to tackle the problem of tax evasion
and tax avoidance, foreign governments, particularly offshore financial
centres, are most unlikely to provide information on the basis of just
letters or on a plea regarding their moral obligations to prevent tax
evasion. Among other factors, parting with information without a legal
basis may be challenged in their own Courts and may be against their own
public policy or public opinion of their citizens. Such information
about money and assets hidden abroad and about undisclosed transactions
entered into overseas, can be obtained only through “legal instruments”
or treaties entered into between India and those countries.

Tax
Treaties, which include, Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements (DTAA s),
Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs), Multilateral Convention on
Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (Multilateral
Convention) and SAARC Limited Multilateral Agreement (SAARC Agreement),
are the legal instruments which provide a legal obligation on a
reciprocal basis for providing various forms of administrative
assistance, including Exchange of Information, Assistance in Collection
of Taxes, Tax Examination Abroad, Joint Audit, Service of Documents etc.
Through one or more of these tax treaties, India has exchange of
information relationships with more than 130 countries/jurisdictions
including well known offshore financial centres and these jurisdictions
are legally committed to provide administrative assistance and are
actually providing the same in cases where requests are made.
Information and other forms of assistance can also be requested through
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLAT s) through Ministry of Home
Affairs, particularly with countries/jurisdictions with which there is
no tax treaty. Information/evidence obtained through MLAT s can also
supplement the information received under tax treaties when a criminal
complaint is made for tax evasion on the basis of information received
under tax treaties. Information can also be obtained through Egmont
Group of Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) which may be further
supplemented by making further requests under tax treaties/ MLAT s.

Despite
the existence of legal instruments for administrative assistance and
the willingness of India’s treaty partners to provide information, these
provisions are still underutilised, largely because tax officials are
not fully aware of the provisions and need guidance for framing
effective requests for information under appropriate legal instruments.
The taxpayers, their advisers and the tax officers may also not be fully
aware of the recent international developments in transparency
including the global adoption of the new standards on automatic exchange
of information, which will bring about a sea-change in India’s ability
to receive and utilize information regarding Indians having financial
accounts in offshore financial centres.

Thus there are nine major sources of EoI of various kinds relating to tax matters, which are summarised below:

1. EoI Article under the Model Conventions on Income and on Capital

2. Tax information Exchange Agreements [TIEAs]

3.
Automatic Exchange of Information [AEoI] under The Multilateral
Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters [CoMAA]
alongwith Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement on Automatic
Exchange of Financial Account Information [MCAA]

4. EoI under
Inter-Governmental Agreement [IGA] and Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)
between India and USA to improve International Tax Compliance and to
implement Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act [FAT CA] of the USA

5. SAARC Limited Multilateral Agreement [SAARC Agreement]

6. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties [MLAT s]

7. The Egmont Group Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs)

8. Joint International Tax Shelter Information & Collaboration – JITSIC

9. EoI under Base Erosion and Profit Shifting [BEPS] Project.

Brief
outline of nine major sources of EoI of various kinds, is as under: In
this article, we aim to introduce to the readers various sources of EoI
amongst various authorities and various countries. Each one of the above
are discussed below in brief:

Sr. No. Source of EOI
Type of EoI and Purpose
1 Article 26 -OECD
Model Convention
EoI under bilateral DTAA framework covering
EoI on request, Spontaneous and Automatic
EoI
2 TIEA TIEA facilitates EoI with countries where comprehensive
DTAA is non-existent to promote
international co-operation in tax matters
3 CoMAA EoI including AEoI in tax matters under the
most comprehensive Multilateral Convention.
AEoI is facilitated by MCAA.
4 IGA-FATCA AEoI on a reciprocal basis under the IGA
signed with USA
5 SAARC Agreement Limited Multilateral Agreement incorporating
EoI amongst 7 SAARC member Countries
6 MLATs EoI and mutual assistance in criminal matters,
inter alia, involving tax evasion
7 Egmont group of
FIUs
International co-operation including EoI against
money laundering and financing of terrorism –
8 JITSIC To enhance collaboration amongst tax administrators
enabling EoI to combat multinational tax
evasion and to counter abusive tax schemes
and tax avoidance structures
9 Action plan 5,12
& 13 – BEPS project
EoI including automatic exchange of countryby-
country reports, spontaneous exchange of
rulings and exchange of mandatory disclosure
regimes
1. Exchange of Information [EoI] Article under the Model Conventions on Income and on Capital

(a)
1928 Model developed by the League of Nations provided for provision of
Information on request and for Automatic EoI relating to Specific
Categories such as Immovable properties etc. In the London and Mexico
draft models of 1946, a Draft Agreement on Administrative Co-operation
was included. Both the Obligation and Form of Information Exchange were
narrowed during the formalisation of OECD Model after World War-II by
removing the obligation for Automatic Exchange of Information. The Draft
OECD Model was first developed in 1963 which contained Article on EoI.
Until 8th Edition released in 2010, Article 26 of the OECD Model
Convention contained the pre-updated version of Article 26. On 17th
July, 2012 Update to Article 26 and its commentary was approved by OECD
Council which extensively revised the commentary on Article 26. There
are three forms of EoI (On Request, Automatic and Spontaneous). Para 9
of the Commentary on Article 26 provides that all three forms of EoI are
covered by the Article.

In the update, in para 2 of Article 26
the following sentence was added: “Notwithstanding the foregoing,
information received by a Contracting State may be used for other
purposes when such information may be used for such other purposes under
the laws of both States and the competent authority of the supplying
State authorises such use.” Many of India’s DTAA s signed before July
2012 have been amended in recent past by way of Protocols to incorporate
the updated EoI Article. Most of the India’s DTAA s signed before July
2012 contain pre-updated Article 26 and DTAA s signed after July 2012
contain updated Article 26. (b) OE CD Model Convention – Text of Article
26 – Exchange of Information Text of the updated Article 26 of the OECD
Model Convention is reproduced below for ready reference: 1. The
competent authorities of the Contracting States shall exchange such
information as is foreseeably relevant for carrying out the provisions
of this Convention or to the administration or enforcement of the
domestic laws concerning taxes of every kind and description imposed on
behalf of the Contracting States, or of their political subdivisions or
local authorities, insofar as the taxation thereunder is not contrary to
the Convention. The exchange of information is not restricted by
Articles 1 and 2. 2. Any information received under paragraph 1 by a
Contracting State shall be treated as secret in the same manner as
information obtained under the domestic laws of that State and shall be
disclosed only to persons or authorities (including courts and
administrative bodies) concerned with the assessment or collection of,
the enforcement or prosecution in respect of, the determination of
appeals in relation to the taxes referred to in paragraph 1, or the
oversight of the above. Such persons or authorities shall use the
information only for such purposes. They may disclose the information in
public court proceedings or in judicial decisions. Notwithstanding the
foregoing, information received by a Contracting State may be used for
other purposes when such information may be used for such other purposes
under the laws of both States and the competent authority of the
supplying State authorises such use. 3. In no case shall the provisions
of paragraphs 1 and 2 be construed so as to impose on a Contracting
State the obligation: a) to carry out administrative measures at
variance with the laws and administrative practice of that or of the
other Contracting State; b) to supply information which is not
obtainable under the laws or in the normal course of the administration
of that or of the other Contracting State; c) to supply information
which would disclose any trade, business, industrial, commercial or
professional secret or trade process, or information the disclosure of
which would be contrary to public policy (ordre public). 4. If
information is requested by a Contracting State in accordance with this
Article, the other Contracting State shall use its information gathering
measures to obtain the requested information, even though that other
State may not need such information for its own tax purposes. The
obligation contained in the preceding sentence is subject to the
limitations of paragraph 3 but in no case shall such limitations be
construed to permit a Contracting State to decline to supply information
solely because it has no domestic interest in such information. 5. In
no case shall the provisions of paragraph 3 be construed to permit a
Contracting State to decline to supply information solely because the
information is held by a bank, other financial institution, nominee or
person acting in an agency or a fiduciary capacity or because it relates
to ownership interests in a person.” 2. Tax information Exchange
Agreements [TIEAs] The Model TIEA was released in April 2002, containing
Two Models of Bilateral Agreements. The Model TIEA covered only EoI on
Request. A large No. of bilateral agreements have been based on Model
TIEA. In June 2015, OECD approved a Model Protocol to the TIEA for the
purpose of allowing Automatic and Spontaneous exchange of information
under a TIEA. India has so far signed 16 TIEAs with countries with whom
India has not signed a Comprehensive DTAA , namely: Argentine, Bahrain,
Belize, Gibralter, Principality of Liechtenstein, Liberia, Macao SAR,
Monaco, Bahamas,

Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey and Maldives.

The Model TIEA contains the following Articles:

Article Article heading
1 Object and Scope of the Agreement
2 Jurisdiction.
3 Taxes Covered
4 Definitions
5 Exchange of Information upon Request
6 Tax Examinations Abroad
7 Possibility of Declining a request
8 Confidentiality
9 Costs
10 Implementation Legislation
11 Language [This article may not be required in Bilateral TIEA.]
12 Implementation Legislation
13 Other international agreements or arrangements [This article may
not be required in Bilateral TIEA.]
14 Mutual Agreement Procedure
15 Depositary’s functions [This article may not be required in Bilateral
TIEA.]
16 Entry into Force
17 Termination

3. The Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters [Co- MAA]

The
CoMAA was developed jointly by the OECD and the Council of Europe in
1988 and amended by Protocol in 2010. The CoMAA was amended to align it
to the international standard on exchange of information on request and
to open it to all countries. The amended Convention was opened for
signature on 1st June 2011.

The CoMAA has now taken an
increasing importance with the G20’s recent call for automatic exchange
of information to become the new international tax standard of exchange
of information.

As of 27-11-2015, 77 countries, including India
have signed the CoMAA and it has been extended to 15 jurisdictions
pursuant to Article 29 of The CoMAA. This represents a wide range of
countries including all G20 countries, all BRICS, almost all OECD
countries, major financial centres and a growing number of developing
countries.

India signed the CoMAA on 26-1-2012 which was notified on 28-8-2012 and which entered into force wef 1-6-2012.

a. Relevance of the CoMAA

  •  Designed
    to facilitate international co-operation among tax authorities to
    improve their ability to tackle tax evasion and avoidance and ensure
    full implementation of their national tax laws, while respecting the
    fundamental rights of taxpayers.
  •  Most comprehensive multilateral instrument available for tax cooperation and exchange of information.
  • Provides for all possible forms of administrative cooperation between states in the assessment and collection of taxes.
  • Co-operation
    includes automatic exchange of information, simultaneous tax
    examinations and international assistance in the collection of tax
    debts.

b.Benefits of the CoMAA

Scope of the Convention is broad: it covers a wide range of taxes and goes beyond exchange of information on request.

  •  Provides
    for other forms of assistance such as: spontaneous exchanges of
    information, simultaneous examinations, performance of tax examinations
    abroad, service of documents, assistance in recovery of tax claims and
    measures of conservancy and automatic exchange of information.
  • Facilitates joint audits.
  • Includes extensive safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the information exchanged.

c. Chapter III Section I – Article 4 to 5 relevant for EoI

The text of the same are given below for ready reference. Article 4 – General Provision

 “1.
The Parties shall exchange any information, in particular as provided
in this section, that is foreseeably relevant for the administration or
enforcement of their domestic laws concerning the taxes covered by this
Convention.

2. Deleted.

3. Any Party may, by a
declaration addressed to one of the Depositaries, indicate that,
according to its internal legislation, its authorities may inform its
resident or national before transmitting information concerning him, in
conformity with Articles 5 and 7.

Article 5 – Exchange of Information on Request

“1.
At the request of the applicant State, the requested State shall
provide the applicant State with any information referred to in Article 4
which concerns particular persons or transactions.

2. If the
information available in the tax files of the requested State is not
sufficient to enable it to comply with the request for information, that
State shall take all relevant measures to provide the applicant State
with the information requested.”

d. The CoMAA and Automatic Exchange of Information

Article
6 of the CoMAA provides for AEoI. It is an ideal instrument to
implement AEoI swiftly and multilaterally. To implement Article 6, an
administrative agreement between the competent authorities of two or
more interested Parties to the Convention is required. It would address
issues such as the procedure to be adopted and the information that will
be exchanged automatically.

Sharing of information with other
law enforcement authorities to counteract corruption, money laundering
and terrorism financing is permissible subject to certain conditions;
information received by a Party may be used for other purposes when

(i) such information may be used for such other purposes under the laws of the supplying Party and
(ii) the competent authority of that Party authorises such use.

e. Main benefits of Automatic Exchange

  • AE
    oI can provide timely information on non-compliance where tax has been
    evaded either on an investment return or the underlying capital sum.
  • Help detect cases of non-compliance even where tax administrations have had no previous indications of non-compliance.
  • Has deterrent effects, increasing voluntary compliance and encouraging taxpayers to report all relevant information.
  • Help
    in educating taxpayers in their reporting obligations, increase tax
    revenues and thus lead to fairness – ensuring that all taxpayers pay
    their fair share of tax in the right place at the right time.
  • Possibility
    to integrate the information received automatically with their own
    systems such that income tax returns can be prefilled.

f. Chapter III Section I – Article 6 to 10 relevant for AEoI

The text of the same are given below for ready reference. Article 6 – Automatic Exchange of Information

“With
respect to categories of cases and in accordance with procedures which
they shall determine by mutual agreement, two or more Parties shall
automatically exchange the information referred to in Article 4.”

Article 7 – Spontaneous Exchange of Information

“1.
A Party shall, without prior request, forward to another Party
information of which it has knowledge in the following circumstances:

a. the first-mentioned Party has grounds for supposing that there may be a loss of tax in the other Party;
b.
a person liable to tax obtains a reduction in or an exemption from tax
in the first mentioned Party which would give rise to an increase in tax
or to liability to tax in the other Party;
c. business dealings
between a person liable to tax in a Party and a person liable to tax in
another Party are conducted through one or more countries in such a way
that a saving in tax may result in one or the other Party or in both;
d.
a Party has grounds for supposing that a saving of tax may result from
artificial transfers of profits within groups of enterprises;
e.
information forwarded to the first-mentioned Party by the other Party
has enabled information to be obtained which may be relevant in
assessing liability to tax in the latter Party.

2. Each Party
shall take such measures and implement such procedures as are necessary
to ensure that information described in paragraph 1 will be made
available for transmission to another Party.”

Article 8 – Simultaneous Tax Examinations

“1.
At the request of one of them, two or more Parties shall consult
together for the purposes of determining cases and procedures for
simultaneous tax examinations. Each Party involved shall decide whether
or not it wishes to participate in a particular simultaneous tax
examination. 2. For the purposes of this Convention, a simultaneous tax
examination means an arrangement between two or more Parties to examine
simultaneously, each in its own territory, the tax affairs of a person
or persons in which they have a common or related interest, with a view
to exchanging any relevant information which they so obtain.”

Article 9 – Tax Examinations Abroad

“1.
At the request of the competent authority of the applicant State, the
competent authority of the requested State may allow representatives of
the competent authority of the applicant State to be present at the
appropriate part of a tax examination in the requested State.

2.
If the request is acceded to, the competent authority of the requested
State shall, as soon as possible, notify the competent authority of the
applicant State about the time and place of the examination, the
authority or official designated to carry out the examination and the
procedures and conditions required by the requested State for the
conduct of the examination. All decisions with respect to the conduct of
the tax examination shall be made by the requested State.

3. A
Party may inform one of the Depositaries of its intention not to accept,
as a general rule, such requests as are referred to in paragraph 1.
Such a declaration may be made or withdrawn at any time.”

Article 10 – Conflicting Information

“If
a Party receives from another Party information about a person’s tax
affairs which appears to it to conflict with information in its
possession, it shall so advise the Party which has provided the
information.”

g. Confidentiality of Information Exchanged under Co- MAA and Protection of taxpayers’ rights

  • The CoMAA has strict rules to protect the confidentiality of the information exchanged.
  • Provides
    that information shall be treated as secret and protected in the
    receiving State in the same manner as information obtained under its
    domestic laws.
  • If personal data are provided, the Party
    receiving them shall treat them in compliance not only with its own
    domestic law, but also with the safeguards that may be required to
    ensure data protection under the domestic law of the supplying Party.

h. Articles of Model CoMAA

The outline of the contents of the Model CoMAA is as under:

i. Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account information in Tax Matters [Standard]

For facilitating the AEoI amongst various countries, OECD has developed a Standard. The Standard sets out

Chapter/Section/
Article
Chapter / Section/ Article heading
Chapter I Scope of the convention
1 Object of the convention and persons covered
2 Taxes Covered
Chapter II General Definitions
3 Definitions
Chapter III Forms of Assistance
Section I Exchange of Information
4 General Provision
5 Exchange of Information on Request
6 Automatic Exchange of Information
7 Spontaneous Exchange of Information
8 Simultaneous Tax Examinations
9 Tax Examinations Abroad
10 Conflicting Information
Section II Assistance in Recovery
11 Recovery of Tax Claims
12 Measures of Conservancy
13 Documents accompanying the Request
14 Time Limits
15 Priority
16 Deferral of Payment
Section III Service of Documents
17 Service of Documents
Chapter IV Provisions relating to all forms of assistance
18 Information to be provided by the Applicant State
19 Deleted
20 Response to the Request for Assistance
21 Protection of Persons and Limits to the Obligation to provide
Assistance
22 Secrecy
23 Proceedings
Chapter V Special Provisions
24 Implementation of the convention
25 Language
26 Costs
Chapter VI Final Provisions
27 Other international agreements or arrangements
28 Signature and entry into force of the convention
29 Territorial application of the convention
30 Reservations
31 Denunciation
32 Depositaries and their functions
the financial account information to be exchanged, the financial
institutions & intermediaries that need to report, the different
types of accounts and taxpayers covered, as well as common due diligence
procedures to be followed by the financial institutions &
intermediaries. It consists of two components: (I) the CRS, which
contains the reporting and due diligence rules to be imposed on
financial institutions; and(II) the Model Competent Authority Agreement
[Model CAA], which contains the detailed rules on the exchange of
information.

The full version of the Standard, as approved by
the Council of the OECD on 15 July 2014, also includes the Commentaries
on the Model CAA and the CRS, and following seven annexes to the
Standard:

1. M ultilateral Model CAA;
2. N onreciprocal Model CAA;
3. CRS schema and user guide;
4. Example questionnaire with respect to confidentiality and data safeguards;
5. Wider Approach to the CRS;
6. Declaration on Automatic Exchange of Information in Tax Matters; and
7. Recommendation on the Standard.

j. Confidentiality of the Information Exchanged

The
Standard contains specific rules on the confidentiality of the
information exchanged and the underlying international legal exchange
instruments already contain safeguards in this regard.

  • Where the Standard is not met (whether in law or in practice), countries will not exchange information automatically.
  • To
    facilitate the decision making by Global Forum members as to which
    jurisdictions they will automatically exchange information with, the
    Global Forum AEOI Group is undertaking high level assessments of the
    confidentiality and data safeguards of jurisdictions committed to AEOI.
    Centralising this work in the Global Forum will further assist
    jurisdictions in speedily implementing AEOI, by reducing the need for
    each jurisdiction to conduct its own assessment of the information
    security practices of each of the many jurisdictions committed to
    implementing AEOI. The process is now underway with the first batch of
    around 50 assessments due to be finalised by the end of 2015 and the
    assessments with respect to the remaining committed jurisdictions due to
    be finalised by mid-2016.

k. Implementation of Standard at domestic level

  • No particular timelines in the Standard.
  • Implementation at co-ordinated timelines would bring benefits for both business and governments.
  • Over
    95 jurisdictions have already publicly committed to implement the
    Standard, either through the signing of the Multilateral Competent
    Authority Agreement, the G20 or the Global Forum commitment process,
    with first exchanges of information to occur in 2017 or 2018.

 l. Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement on Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information [MCAA]

The Agreement contains 8 sections and 6 Annexes as follows:

Section Section heading
1 Definitions
2 Exchange of Information with respect to Reportable Accounts
3 Time and Manner of Exchange of Information
4 Collaboration on Compliance and Enforcement
5 Confidentiality and Data Safeguards
6 Consultations and Amendments
7 Term of Agreement
7 Co-ordinating Body Secretariat
Annex Annex heading
A List of Non-reciprocal Jurisdictions
B Transmission Methods
C Specified Data Safeguards
D Confidentiality Questionnaire
E Competent Authorities for which this is an Agreement in effect
F Intended Exchange Dates

4. EoI under IGA re FATCA

FATCA is a USA law which seeks
to facilitate flow of financial information. FAT CA requires Indian
banks to reveal account information of persons connected to the USA.
Indian financial institutions in India, i.e. an insurance company, bank,
or mutual fund, would be required to report all FAT CA-related
information to Indian governmental agencies, which would then report
these information to Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Indian Financial
Institutions must report account numbers, balances, names, addresses,
and U.S. identification numbers. There is punitive 30% withholding tax
on any financial institution that fails to report.

India signed a
Model 1 (reciprocal) IGA with the U.S which is notified vide
Notification No. 77/2015 dated 30- 9-2015. For effective implementation
of FAT CA, Rules 115G to 115H has been notified vide Notification no.
62/2015 dated 7-8-2015. The IGA would require Indian financial
institutions to report information on U.S. account holders to India’s
CBDT, which would then share the information with the U.S. IRS. The
agreement would provide the IRS, access to details of all offshore
accounts and assets beyond a threshold limit held by American citizens
in India, while a reciprocal arrangement would be offered for Indian tax
authorities as well.

a. Articles of India-USA IGA
The contents of the Agreement are as follows:

Article Article heading
1 Definitions
2 Obligations to obtain and Exchange Information with respect
to Reportable Accounts
3 Time and Manner of Exchange of Information
4 Application of FATCA to Indian Financial Institutions
5 Collaboration on Compliance and Enforcement
6 Mutual commitment to continue to enhance the effectiveness
of Information Exchange and Transparency
7 Consistency in the application of FATCA to Partner Jurisdictions
8 Consultations and Amendments
9 Annexes
10 Term of Agreement
Annex Annex heading
I Due Diligence obligations for identifying and reporting on U.S.
Reportable Accounts and on payments to certain nonparticipating
financial institutions
II List of Entities treated as exempt beneficial owners or
deemed-compliant FFIs and accounts excluded from the
definition of Financial Accounts

Memorandum of Understanding [MoU]
b. Main differences between the Standard and FATCA

  • The Standard consists of a fully reciprocal automatic exchange system from which US specificities have been removed.
  • It is based on residence and unlike FAT CA does not refer to citizenship.
  • Terms,
    concepts and approaches have been standardised allowing countries to
    use the system without having to negotiate individual annexes.
  • Unlike
    FAT CA, the Standard does not provide for thresholds for pre-existing
    individual accounts, but it includes a residence address test building
    on the EU Savings Directive.
  • It also provides for a simplified indicia search for such accounts.
  • It
    has special rules dealing with certain investment entities where they
    are based in jurisdictions that do not participate in automatic exchange
    under the Standard. 5. SAARC Limited Multilateral Agreement SAARC
    Limited Multilateral Agreement (SAARC Agreement) is a multilateral
    agreement amongst SAARC countries and has been in force since 1st April,
    2011. It has provisions for a wide range of administrative assistance
    including EoI on a reciprocal basis. SAARC comprises of 7 countries i.e.
    Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The
    text of Article 5 of the SAARC Agreement, relating to EoI is given
    below for ready reference.

“Article 5 – Exchange of Information

1.
The Competent Authorities of the Member States shall exchange such
information, including documents and public documents or certified
copies thereof, as is necessary for carrying out the provisions of this
Agreement or of the domestic laws of the Member States concerning taxes
covered by this agreement insofar as the taxation thereunder is not
contrary to the Agreement. Any information received by a Member State
shall be treated as secret in the same manner as information obtained
under the domestic laws of that Member State and shall be disclosed only
to persons or authorities (including courts and administrative bodies)
concerned with the assessment or collection of, the enforcement or
prosecution in respect of, or the determination of appeals in relation
to the taxes covered by the agreement. Such persons or authorities shall
use the information only for such purposes. They may disclose the
information in public court proceedings or in judicial decisions.

2. In no case shall the provisions of paragraph 1 be construed so as to impose on a Member State the obligation:
(a)
to carry out administrative measures at variance with the laws and
administrative practices of that or of the other Member State;
(b)
to supply information, including documents and public documents or
certified copies thereof, which are not obtainable under the laws or in
the normal course of the administration of that or of the other Member
State;
(c) to supply information which would disclose any trade,
business, industrial, commercial or professional secret or trade
process, or information, the disclosure of which would be contrary to
public policy (ordre public).”

6. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties [MLATs]

The MLAT s are legal instruments through which the Contracting States agree to provide each other with the

widest measures of mutual legal assistance in criminal
matters emanating out of proceedings under direct taxes
and not for other tax enquiries. India has a MLAT with 39
countries enabling assistance from countries with which
there is no tax treaty such as Hong Kong.

The scope of cooperation is different in various MLAT s
but is normally quite wide and may include the following:

  • Provision of information, documents and other records
  • Taking of evidence and obtaining of statements of
    persons
  • Location and identification of persons and objects Execution of requests for search and seizure
  • Measures to locate, restrain and forfeit the proceeds
    and instruments of crime
  • Facilitating the personal appearance of the persons
    giving evidence
  • Service of documents including judicial documents
  • Delivery of property, including lending of exhibits
  • Other assistance consistent with the objects of the
    MLAT which is not inconsistent with the law of the requested
    State (catch all provision).

7. The Egmont Group Financial Intelligence
Units (FIUs)

The Egmont Group is an informal network of FIUs established
with a view to have international cooperation
including information exchange in the fight against
money laundering and financing of terrorism. As on 1st
May, 2015, FIUs of 147 countries are part of the Egmont
Group. The FIUs of the Group exchange information in
accordance with Egmont Principles for Information Exchange
and Operational Guidance for FIUs, which is
available on the Internet.

The tax authorities may request information available
with FIUs of other countries through FIU-IND (the Indian
FIU) using the information exchange mechanism of the
Egmont Group.

MoU between FIU and CBDT

On 20th September, 2013, a Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU) was entered into between FIU and CBDT
in which it has been provided that if CBDT requires information
from a foreign FIU, a request will be made to
FIU-IND in Egmont prescribed proforma in electronic
format and CBDT shall abide by the conditions that may
be imposed by the foreign FIU on the use of information
provided by the foreign FIU.

Clause Clause heading
1 General
2 Exchange of Information
3 Data Protection and Confidentiality

8. Joint International Tax Shelter Information & Collaboration – JITSIC

The
original Joint International Tax Shelter Information Centre was created
in 2004 as a joint revenue authority initiative of Australia, Canada,
the United Kingdom and the United States to counter abusive tax schemes
and tax avoidance structures. Later on, Japan, Germany, South Korea,
France and China joined the JITSIC. The Competent Authorities of these
countries exchange information through the legal instrument of DTAA s
including sharing expertise relating to the identification and
understanding of abusive tax arrangements. Under the JITSIC framework,
the Competent Authorities are able to put the various international
pieces together to examine complex cross border transactions, such as
non-commercial capital and finance arrangements, aggressive transfer
pricing strategies and foreign tax credit generation schemes. Similarly,
structures involving tax havens and trust structures in connection with
high net wealth individuals also came under JITSIC scrutiny.

Recognising
that the information exchanges should not be limited to the original
JITSIC member countries, on a call from G20, the Forum on Tax
Administration A) of the OECD in its 9th Meeting in Dublin on 24th
October, 2014, determined that the composition of JITSIC would be
expanded and remodeled with a greater focus on collaboration. Reflecting
this change, the taskforce was renamed as the Joint International Tax
Shelter Information & Collaboration (still called JITSIC) with an
emphasis on collaboration on information exchange and a de-emphasis on
the need for exchange to occur through central hubs. The JITSIC Network
is open to all FTA members on a voluntary basis and integrates existing
JITSIC cooperation procedures among tax administrators within the larger
FTA network. India has joined the JITSIC Network and Joint Secretary
(FT&TR-I) has been appointed as the Single Point of Contact for
India.

9. EoI under BEPS Project

Base Erosion and
Profit Shifting refers to strategies adopted by taxpayers having
cross-border operations to exploit gaps and mismatches in tax rules of
different jurisdictions which enable them to shift profits outside the
jurisdiction where the economic activities giving rise to profits
areperformed and where value is created. At the request of G20 Finance
Ministers, in July 2013 the OECD, working with G20 countries, launched
an Action Plan on BEPS, identifying 15 specific actions needed in order
to equip governments with the domestic and international instruments to
address this challenge.

A number of recommendations for
combating BEPS envisage enhanced cooperation amongst the tax
administrations and exchange of information as per the provisions of the
existing network of tax treaties, including the following:

a. Automatic Exchange of Country by Country [CbC] Reports – Action 13

Action 13 of the BEPS Action Plan relates to a three-tiered standardised approach to transfer-pricing documentation comprising:

  • a master file of information relating to the global operations of the MNE Group, which will be filed by all MNE group members,
  • a local file referring specifically to material transactions of the local taxpayer, and
  • a
    CbC report of information relating to the global allocation of the MNE
    group’s income and taxes paid, alongwith certain indicators of economic
    activity. While the master file and local file will be filed by the
    taxpayer in the local jurisdiction, the CbC report will be filed in the
    country where the MNE is resident and will be transmitted on an
    automatic basis to the jurisdictions in which the MNE operates through a
    multilateral instrument modelled on the basis of MCAA, maintaining
    confidentiality and data safeguarding standards.

b. Spontaneous Exchange of Rulings – Action 5

Action
5 of the BEPS Project relates to countering harmful tax practices more
effectively taking into account transparency and substance. To address
this, the taxpayer specific rulings related to tax regimes resulting in
BEPS need to be mandatorily exchanged on a spontaneous basis.
Taxpayer-specific rulings for this purpose would include both
pre-transaction, including advance tax rulings or clearances and advance
pricing agreements, and post transaction.

c. Exchange of Mandatory Disclosure Regimes – Action 12 Under

Action
12, modular rules for mandatory disclosure of aggressive or abusive
transactions, arrangements, or structures would be recommended to enable
tax administrators to receive information about tax planning strategies
at an early stage so as to respond quickly to tax risks either through
timely and informed changes to legislation and regulations or through
improved risk assessment and compliance programmes (targeted audits).
Under these rules, the “international tax schemes” would also be
disclosed and the same may be shared by tax administrators using the
mechanism of EoI

This Article gives only a brief overview of the
framework of the Exchange of Information in Tax matters. The subject is
receiving increasing attention of the Governments and Tax
Administrations of various countries. It is very important for the
taxpayers & their advisors to gain an in-depth understanding of the
evolving subject. Therefore, the reader needs to study the relevant
Agreements / MOUs / Protocols / Standards in greater detail.

DTAA – “International traffic” under Art 8 of India-Singapore DTAA – Journey of a vessel between two Indian ports is “international traffic” if the same is part of a larger journey between two foreign ports – It is only when a ship or aircraft is operating ‘solely’ between places in a contracting state that the transport is excluded from scope of “international traffic”

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CIT vs. Taurus Shipping Services; [2015] 64 taxmann. com 64 (Guj):

The
assessee is a company and had acted as an agent of three vessels which
had transported goods from Kandla Port to Visag. The freight beneficiary
was one M/s. Jaldhi Overseas Pte Limited, who claimed benefit of DTAA
between India and Singapore. The vessels had undertaken such freight
transportation during the journey from Singapore elude to Dubai. The
Assessing Officer came to the conclusion that such transportation
between Kandla to Visag cannot be considered as international traffic as
defined in DTAA between India and Singapore. The Tribunal held in
favour of the assessee relying on the decision of the Tribunal in
similar cases.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)
U nder Art 8 of India-Singapore DTAA , the journey of a vessel between
two Indian ports is “international traffic” if the same is part of a
larger journey between two foreign ports. It is only when a ship or
aircraft is operating ‘solely’ between places in a contracting state
that the transport is excluded from scope of “international traffic”.

ii)
It is not the case of the Revenue that the journey being undertaken by
such vessels in question were confined between the two ports in India
either routinely or even in individual isolated case.”

Depreciation – Additional depreciation – Section 32(1)(iia) – A. Y. 2008-09 – Assessee is engaged in the business of FM radio broadcasting, producing, recording, editing and making copies of the radio programme amounts to manufacture/production of article or things – Radio programme produced is “thing” if not an “article” as Dictionary meaning of the word envisages that “thing” could have intangible characteristic – Assessee is entitled to additional depreciation

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CIT vs. Radio Today Broadcasting Ltd.; [2015] 64 taxmann.com 164 (Delhi):

Assessee is engaged in the business of FM radio broadcasting. In the A. Y. 2008-09, the assessee had claimed additional depreciation u/s. 32(1)(iia). AO rejected the Assessee’s contention that the above radio programmes were “the articles or things produced by it”. The AO held that “by no stretch of imagination can ‘production of radio programmes’ be considered as ‘production of article or thing’. The additional depreciation claimed was disallowed. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Radio programme produced is “thing” if not an “article” as Dictionary meaning of the word envisages that “thing” could have intangible characteristic. The production of radio programmes involved the processes of recording, editing and making copies prior to broadcasting.

ii) When the radio programmes is made there comes into existence a ‘thing’ which is intangible, and which can be transmitted and even sold by making copies. ‘manufacture’ could include a combination of processes. In the context of ‘broadcast’ it could encompass the processes of producing, recording, editing and making copies of the radio programme followed by its broadcasting. The activity of broadcasting, in the above context, would necessarily envisage all the above incidental activities which are nevertheless integral to the business of broadcasting.

iii) In that view of the matter, the Assessee can be said to have used the plant and machinery acquired and installed by it after 31st March 2005 for manufacture/ production of an ‘article or thing.’

 iv) Since the Assessee has satisfied the requirements of Section 32 (1) (iia) of the Act, it is entitled to the additional depreciation as claimed by it for the assessment year in question.”

Charitable purpose – Exemption u/s. 11 – Management and development programme and consultancy charges part and parcel of Institute of management studies set up by assessee – No element of business in conducting management courses – Surplus funds applied towards attainment of objects of institute – Income generated from giving various halls and properties – Assesse entitled to exemption u/s. 11

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DIT(E) vs. Shri Vile Parle Kelvani Mandal; 378 ITR 593 (Bom):

The assessee trust set up thirty schools and colleges. The Tribunal held that the management and development programme and consultancy charges were part and parcel of the institute of management studies set up by the assessee. The Tribunal found that the element of business was missing in conducting the management courses and that some surplus was generated which itself was applied towards the attainment of the object of the educational institute and that separate books of account could not be insisted upon. The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to exemption u/s. 11.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The finding of fact arrived at by the Tribunal could not be termed perverse and it was in consonance with the factual aspect regarding the activities of the trust and the object that it was seeking to achieve.

ii) The letting out of halls for marriages, sale and advertisement rights had not been found to be a regular activity undertaken as a part of business. The income was generated from giving various halls and properties of the institution on rental only on Saturdays and Sundays and on public holidays when they are not required for educational activities, and this could not be said to be a business which was not identical to attainment of the objects of the trust. This being merely an incidental activity and the income derived from it having been used for the educational institute and not for any particular person, and separate books of account having been maintained, this income could not be brought to tax.”

Penalty – Concealment of income – Section 271(1) (c): A. Y. 2001-02 – Allowability of deduction pending consideration by High Court in appeal – Admission of appeal makes it clear that addition is debatable – No concealment of income – Penalty could not be imposed

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CIT vs. Ankita Electronics Pvt. Ltd.; 379 ITR 50 (Karn):

The assessee is engaged in the business of computer consumables. Assessee’s quantum appeal was admitted by the High Court and was pending adjudication u/s. 260A . The Tribunal cancelled the penalty imposed by the Assessing Officer u/s. 271(1)(c) on account of the fact that the quantum appeal has been admitted by the High Court.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) In the present case, the details of the claim were provided by the assessee. The question whether or not on such details, deduction could be allowed was still in doubt. Such questions had been admitted for determination by the High Court in the appeal filed by the assessee. The mere admission of the appeal by the High Court on the substantial question of law would make it apparent that the additions made were debatable.

ii) There was no concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income. Penalty could not be imposed u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act.”

Assessment – Sections 143(2), 143(3) and 147 – A. Ys. 2006-07 to 2011-12 – Assessment u/s. 143(3) – Condition precedent – Issue of valid notice u/s. 143(2) – Difference between issue and service of notice – Deeming fiction – Section 292BB not applicable to non-issue of notice

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ACIT vs. Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority; 379 ITR 14 (All): 281 CTR 204 (All):

The assessee challenged the validity of the assessment orders before the Tribunal on the following ground:

“That the order of learned Assessing Officer is void ab initio in so much as no mandatory notice u/s. 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, was issued at any stage of the assessment proceedings.”

The Tribunal allowed the appeals and quashed the assessment orders holding that the mandatory requirement of issuance of a notice u/s. 143(2) was not followed and, therefore, it was incurable and that the defect in the assumption of jurisdiction by the Assessing Officer could not be cured by taking recourse to the deeming fiction u/s. 292BB of the Act.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Since the Assessing Officer failed to issue notice within the specified period u/s. 143(2) of the Act, the Assessing Officer had no jurisdiction to assume jurisdiction u/s. 143(2) of the Act and this defect could not be cured by recourse to the deeming fiction provided u/s. 292BB of the Act.

ii) Consequently, the Tribunal was justified in setting aside the orders of the Assessing Officer.”

Deduction u/s 80-IB(10) – Delay in Receipt of Completion Certificate

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Issue for Consideration
Section 80-IB(10) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 provides for a deduction of 100% of the profits derived from the undertaking of developing and building a housing project approved before 31st March 2008 by a local authority. One of the conditions, contained in clause(a) of s. 80IB(10), subject to which this deduction is granted is that the undertaking has commenced development and construction of the housing project on or after 1st October 1998, and completes such construction:

(i) where the housing project has been approved by the local authority before 1st April 2004, on or before 31st March 2008;

(ii) where the housing project has been approved by the local authority on or after 1st April 2004 but not later than 31st March 2005, within 4 years from the end of the financial year in which the housing project was approved by the local authority;

(iii) where the housing project has been approved by the local authority on or after 1st April 2005, within 5 years from the end of the financial year in which the housing project was approved by the local authority.

The explanation to clause (a) of this sub-section clarifies that the date of completion of construction of the housing project shall be taken to be the date on which the completion certificate in respect of the housing project is issued by the local authority.

Given the fact that there are often delays in issue of the completion certificate by the local authority, the question has arisen before the courts as to whether the benefit of the deduction would be available in a situation where the completion certificate is issued by the local authority beyond the specified time limit, though the actual construction may have been completed within the permissible time-limit. The issue has also arisen as to whether this time limit applies to housing projects whose plans have been approved prior to 1st April 2005, and whether the deduction would be available where the completion certificate has been obtained belatedly, though the housing project has been certified to have been completed within the specified time period.

While the Gujarat and the Delhi High Courts have taken the view that the deduction would be available in cases where completion certificate is not obtained within the prescribed time, the Madhya Pradesh High Court has taken a contrary view and held that the deduction would not be available in such cases.

CHD Developers’ case
The issue came up for consideration before the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. CHD Developers Ltd. 362 ITR 177.

In that case, the assessee, a real estate developer launched a project in Vrindavan, for which it obtained the approval from the Mathura Vrindavan Development Authority on 16th March 2005. It applied for a completion certificate from the authority on 5th November 2008. For assessment year 2007-08, the assessee claimed a deduction u/s. 80-IB(10).

The assessing officer disallowed the claim for deduction u/s. 80-IB(10), on the ground that the completion certificate had not been granted for the project. The Commissioner(Appeals) upheld the order of the assessing officer.

The Tribunal allowed the benefit of the deduction to the assessee on the following grounds:

(i) the approval for the project was granted on 16th March 2005, before the insertion of the time limits for completion of the project u/s. 80-IB(10), which came into effect from 1st April 2005. Prior to insertion of these time limits for completion of the project, the only requirement of time was that the development and construction of the housing project should commence on or after 1st October 1998. Therefore, at the time of sanction of the project, there was no condition for production of completion certificate.

(ii) It is a settled position in law that the law existing at a particular point of time will be applicable unless and until it is specifically made retrospective by the legislature. The insertion of the requirement of completion certificate within a particular time frame was applicable prospectively and not retrospectively. Had the legislature so intended, nothing prevented the legislature from doing so.

(iii) It was evident from the letter filed for request of completion certificate on 5th November 2008 that the construction had been completed and the request was made for grant of completion certificate of phase I. Since the development authority had neither said that the project was not complete, nor completion certificate was issued to the assessee, the project was presumed to be complete as on 5th November 2008.

(iv) if such certificate was not issued to the assessee, the assessee could not be penalised for the act of an authority on which it had no control, in the absence of any variation or allegation.

Reliance was placed by the tribunal on the decision in the case of CIT vs. Anriya Project Management Services (P) Limited 209 Taxman 1 ( Karn.) for the proposition that the amendment was prospective and did not apply to projects approved before 1st April 2005, where the court had held that another amendment made at the same time to section 80-IB(10), inserting the definition of built-up area, was prospective in nature applicable from 1st April 2005, and did not apply to housing projects approved by the local authority prior to that date.

Besides various other decisions of the Tribunal, the Tribunal had also relied upon the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of CIT vs. Tarnetar Corporation 362 ITR 174, in deciding the issue in favour of the assessee.

The Delhi High Court, after considering the decision of the tribunal, noted the decisions of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Anriya Project Management Services (P) Limited (supra), the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs Brahma Associates 333 ITR 289, and the Gujarat High Court in the case of Manan Corpn. vs. Asst CIT 214 Taxman 373, all of which had taken the view that the amendments to section 80-IB(10) , effective 1st April 2005 were prospective in nature, and not retrospective.

The Delhi High Court also considered instruction number 4 of 2009 dated 30th June 2009 issued by the CBDT, where the CBDT had clarified that the deduction u/s. 80- IB(10) could be claimed on a year-to-year basis, where the assessee was showing profit from partial completion of the project in every year, and in case it was later found that the condition of completion of the project within the specified time limit of 4 years had not been satisfied, the deduction granted to the assessee in earlier years should be withdrawn. The Delhi High Court inferred from the said instruction that in the post-amendment period, strict adherence to completion period of 4 years was insisted upon where project completion method was followed, and that the limitation of period did not exist prior to the amendment. If an assessee was following percentage of completion method, it would have got the deduction for the earlier years prior to the amendment, but because it was following completed contract method, and the contract was completed after the amendment, the deduction was being denied to it. According to the Delhi High Court, the amendment could not discriminate against those assessees following project completion method.

The Delhi High Court noted that in the case before it, the approval of project for commencement was given prior to the amendment, which required the obtaining of completion certificate within the end of the 4 year period. It agreed with the Gujarat High Court, that the application of such stringent conditions, which were left to an independent body such as the local authority, which was to issue the completion certificate, would have led to not only hardship, but absurdity. Accordingly, the Delhi High Court held that the assessee was entitled to the deduction, and upheld the decision of the Tribunal.

A similar view was taken by the Gujarat High Court in the case of CIT vs. Tarnetar Corporation (supra). In that case, the assessee had applied and got approval for the housing project from the local authority before 1st April 2004, and therefore, had to complete the project by 31st March 2008. It completed the construction in the year 2006 and applied for completion certificate in February 2006. This application was rejected in July 2006 for technical reasons, and thereafter, after fresh effort, the completion certificate was received on 19th March 2009. In the meanwhile, several residential units were sold and occupied without the necessary permission before the last date for completion of construction, for which the assessee paid a penalty and got such occupation regularised.

The Gujarat High Court held that it was not in doubt that the assessee had completed the construction well before 31st March 2008. It was true that formal completion certificate was not granted by the municipal authority by that date, and that section 80-IB linked the completion of the construction to the completion certificate being granted by the local authority. However, according to the Gujarat High Court, not every condition of the statute could be seen as mandatory. If substantial compliance of the conditions was established on record, the court could take the view that minor deviation therefrom would not vitiate the very purpose for which deduction was being made available. Accordingly, the Gujarat High Court had held that the assessee was entitled to the benefit of the deduction in that case.

A similar view was also taken by the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs. Hindustan Samuh Awas Ltd. 377 ITR 150, holding that mere delay in receipt of completion certificate could not result in denial of the deduction.

Global Reality’s case
The issue came up again recently before the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of CIT vs. Global Reality 379 ITR 107.

In this case, the approval for the housing project was granted by the Municipal Corporation before 31st March 2004. The assessee on completion of the project applied to the Municipal Corporation for completion certificate on 16th January 2008. The Inspector of the Municipal Corporation inspected the site on 27th February 2008. The completion certificate was however issued on 4th May 2010, and the certificate did not mention the date of completion of the project. By a subsequent letter dated 23rd March 2011, the Municipal Corporation clarified that the date of completion of the project was 27th February 2008.

The assessee claimed deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) on the basis that the project was completed before the cutoff date, but this claim was rejected by the assessing officer on the ground that in spite of repeated opportunity given to the assessee during assessment proceedings, the completion certificate obtained before 31st March 2008 was not produced before him, and that on inquiry, in December 2008, the Municipal Corporation had confirmed that completion certificate had not been issued to the assessee till that date, and that the application of the assessee was still being processed. The assessee’s appeal was dismissed by the Commissioner(Appeals), but was allowed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.

Before the High Court, it was argued on behalf of the revenue, that the tribunal had misconstrued the effect of section 80-IB(10)(a), as amended, and that the benefit was available only to specified housing projects, which were completed within the prescribed time. According to the revenue, the express provision introduced in the form of amended clause (a) of section 80-IB(10) must be construed on its own, and not on the logic applicable to other situations mentioned in the same section, where the courts had taken the view that the amended law applied only to projects approved on or after 1st April 2005. The stipulation contained in clause(a) was in the nature of withdrawal of benefit of deduction in respect of projects which had not or could not be completed within the stipulated time. The date of completion of construction had been defined to be the date on which the completion certificate was issued by the local authority. For that, sufficient time had been provided to the developer to complete the project and obtain completion certificate from the local authority well within time.

According to the revenue, in case of housing projects approved before the amendment, they were required to be completed before 31st March 2008, irrespective of the date of approval. In respect of housing projects approved on or after 1st April 2004, they were required to be completed within 4 years from the end of the financial year in which the housing project was approved by the local authority.

It was argued on behalf of the Department that as per clause (ii) of the explanation to section 80-IB(10)(a), compliance of this condition was mandatory. Any other interpretation would result in rewriting the amended provision and render the legislative intent of explicitly providing for the date on which completion certificate was issued by the local authority otiose. The very nature of amended provision in clause (a) showed that it could not be construed as having retrospective effect. Further, developers of housing projects had been treated evenly by giving 4 years time frame from the coming into force of the amendment to complete their projects and for obtaining completion certificate from the local authority with the same time. Any other interpretation would be flawed, as it would result in treating similarly placed persons unequally, as projects approved prior to the amendment would get an unlimited extended period to obtain completion certificate from the local authority to avail of the deduction. By providing an identical cut off period for obtaining completion certificate to similarly placed persons, no hardship whatsoever had been caused.

It was further argued that it was always open to the legislature to provide benefit of deduction to be availed of during a specified period on fulfilment of certain conditions. The 4 years time frame given to the respective class of developers could, by no standards, be said to be asking them to do something which was impossible. Further, it was not a case of withdrawal of benefit or of any vested rights in the concerned assessee, since no developer could claim vested right to continue with the project for an indefinite period. It was argued that the amended provision could neither be termed as amounting to change of any condition already specified nor could it said to be unreasonably harsh or producing absurd results.

On behalf of the assessee, reliance was placed on the Supreme Court decisions in the cases of CIT vs. Veena Developers 227 CTR 297 and CIT vs. Sarkar Builders 375 ITR 392, where the Supreme Court had held that section 80-IB(10) as a whole had prospective application and would not apply to housing projects approved by the local authority before the amendment. It was claimed that in any case, an assessee, who maintained books of accounts on work in progress method, as in the assessee’s case, would not be covered by the condition of obtaining completion certificate before the cut-off date. It was further argued that there was a substantial compliance with the condition, even if the completion certificate issued by the local authority was issued after the cut-off date, since the certificate unambiguously recorded the date of completion of project before the cutoff date. The assessee had no control over the working of the local authority, and once the application for issue of completion certificate had been filed prior to 31st March 2008, but the local authority finally issued the certificate after 1st April 2008, confirming that the project was in fact completed before the cut-off date, the assessee must be granted the benefit of the deduction. Taking a contrary view would result in asking an assessee to do something which was impossible and not within its control. The delay caused by the local authority in processing and issuing the completion certificate could not be the basis of denial of benefit to the assessee. Besides placing reliance on the two Supreme Court decisions, the assessee relied on various other High Court decisions, including those of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Tarnetar Corporation (supra) and of the Delhi High Court in the case of CHD Developers Ltd (supra).

The Madhya Pradesh High Court referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sarkar Builders (supra). It noted that the issue in that case, as well as in the case of Veena Developers, related to non-compliance with the conditions in other clauses of section 80-IB(10), in particular, clause (d), relating to the commercial area not exceeding 5% of the total project area, and not in relation to the conditions in clause (a), which were the subject matter of the appeal before the High Court. In the case of Sarkar Builders, the Supreme Court had noted that all other conditions were fulfilled by the assessee, including the date by which approval was to be given and the date by which the projects were to be completed. The Supreme Court observed that if clause (d) was applied to projects approved prior to the amendment and completed within the specified time, it would result in an absurd situation and would amount to expecting the assessee to do something which was almost impossible. It was on that basis that the Supreme Court held that the provisions such as clause (d) would have prospective application, and would not apply to projects approved prior to the amendment. Since clause (d) was treated as inextricably linked with the approval and construction of the housing project, the assessee could not be called upon to comply with a new condition, which was not in contemplation either of the assessee or even of the legislature, at the time when the housing project was given approval by the local authority.

Further, the Madhya Pradesh high court observed, the Supreme Court noted that if such a condition was held applicable to projects approved prior to the amendment, then an assessee following the project completion method of accounting would not be entitled to the entire deduction claimed in respect of such housing project merely because he offered his profits to tax in assessment year 2005-06 or a subsequent year, while an assessee following the work in progress method of accounting would be entitled to the deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) up to assessment year 2004-05, and would be denied the benefit only from assessment year 2005-06. According to the Supreme Court, it could never have been the intention of the legislature that the deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) available to a particular assessee should be determined on the basis of the method of accounting followed. The Supreme court therefore held that section 80-IB(10)(d) was prospective in nature, and would not apply to projects approved prior to the amendment.

The Madhya Pradesh High Court, then referred to the decisions of the Delhi High Court in the case of CHD Developers and of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Tarnetar Corporation. The court noted that though the Delhi High Court had referred to the prospective applicability of clause (d) of section 80-IB(10), which was dealt with by the Supreme Court in Veena Developers and Sarkar Builders cases, it finally concluded on the basis that the application of a stringent condition, which was left to an independent body, such as a local authority, which was to issue the completion certificate, would result in causing hardship to an assessee and also result in absurdity. The court further noted that the Gujarat High Court had found that the assessee completed the construction well before the last date, and also sold several units which were completed and actually occupied, and it had also applied for the permission to the local authority before that date and the court’s decision was on the basis of the finding recorded by the tribunal that the construction was completed in 2006, and that the application for completion certificate was submitted to the principal authority in February 2006. It was in the context of those facts that the Gujarat High court went on to observe that not every condition of statute can be seen as mandatory and that a substantial compliance of such condition was substantiated, the court can take the view that minor deviation thereof would not vitiate the very purpose for which deduction was being made available. The Madhya Pradesh High Court having noted the above stated facts and the reasons for the decisions by the high courts, expressed its inability to agree with the decisions of the Delhi and Gujarat High Courts.

According to the Madhya Pradesh High Court, the Supreme Court decisions in the case of Veena Developers and Sarkar Builders had to be understood only in the context of a new condition stipulated regarding the built-up area of the project, by way of an amendment through clause (d), with which the assessee could not have complied at all, even though the construction of the housing project was otherwise in full compliance of all conditions set out in the approval given by the municipal authority. In the view of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, clause (a) could not be considered as a condition that was sought to be retrospectively applied, and that too incapable of compliance, since it dealt with the time frame within which the incomplete housing project was expected to be completed to get the benefit of the prescribed deduction.

According to the Madhya Pradesh High Court, it could not be treated as a new condition linked to the approval and construction, or having retrospective effect as such, since it gave at least 4 years timeframe to both class of housing projects, those approved prior to 1st April 2004 or after 1st April 2004. The 4 years period obviously had prospective effect, though limiting the period for completion of the project to avail of the benefit and such period of 4 years could not be said to be unreasonable, harsh, absurd or incapable of compliance.

The Madhya Pradesh High Court was of the view that it was also not a case of withdrawal of vested right of the developer, since no developer could claim vested right to complete the housing project in an indefinite period. The right arising from section 80-IB was coupled with the obligation or duty to complete the project in the specified time frame. If the developer did not complete the housing project within the specified time, it would not receive that benefit. According to the Court, the provision for claiming tax deduction for profits could certainly prescribe reasonable conditions and time frame for completion of the project in larger public interest.

Addressing the argument as to whether the stipulation contained in clause(a) of section 80-IB(10) could be said to be directory, the Madhya Pradesh High Court observed that considering the substantial benefit offered by section 80-IB of 100% of the profits, which was a burden on the public exchequer due to waiver of commensurate revenue, and the purpose underlying the same, the stipulation for obtaining completion certificate from the local authority before the cut-off date must be construed as mandatory. The fact that compliance with this condition was dependent on the manner in which the proposal was processed by the local authority, could not make the provision a directory requirement. According to the Madhya Pradesh High Court, it was a substantive provision mandating issuance or grant of completion certificate by the local authority before the cut-off date, as a precondition to get the benefit of tax deduction. Otherwise, it would be open to an assessee to rely on other circumstances or evidence to plead that the housing project was complete, requiring enquiry into those matters by the tax authorities, in the absence of a completion certificate. According to the High Court, if the argument of substantial compliance were accepted, it would lead to uncertainty about the date of completion of the project, which was the hallmark for availing of the benefit of tax deduction. It was only with this intent, according to the High Court, that the legislature had laid down that the date of completion of construction was taken to be the date on which the completion certificate was issued by the local authority. The Madhya Pradesh High Court observed that to interpret it to include a subsequent certificate issued after the cut-off date would not only result in rewriting of the express provision, but also run contrary to the unambiguous position pronounced in the section and would be against the legislative intent.

According to the Madhya Pradesh High Court, the provision should then have read as “date of completion of construction of the housing project shall be taken to be the date certified by the local authority in that behalf”, irrespective of the date of issuance of such certificate by the local authority. The High Court observed that only if the assessee was able to prove that the completion certificate was in fact issued by the local authority before the cut-off date, but could not be produced by the assessee within the time due to reasons beyond its control, the argument of substantial compliance of the provision could be tested. Any other interpretation would result not only in uncertainty, but the finding regarding the date of completion also would depend upon the subjective satisfaction of the assessing authority and invest wide discretion in that authority, which eventually would lead to litigation. According to the High Court, if the assessee had failed to comply with the condition of obtaining completion certificate from the local authority before the cut-off date, it must bear the consequence thereof of the denial of benefit of tax deduction offered to it.

The Madhya Pradesh High Court therefore held that the issuance of completion certificate after the cut-off date by the local authority, though mentioning the date of completion of the project before the cut-off date, did not fulfil the conditions specified in 80-IB(10)(a) read with explanation (ii), and accordingly the assessee was not entitled to the benefit of the deduction.

Observations
The condition of obtaining the completion certificate within the prescribed time is applicable to all the projects irrespective of the date of commencement of project and, looked at from the said point of view, the issue on hand has wider implications. The ratio of the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, if held to be laying down the correct law on the subject, can have serious ramifications. The courts generally, while dealing with the requirement of obtaining certificates by prescribed dates, have taken a liberal view in favour of assesses in cases where the compliance in principle is shown to have been ensured. On touchstone of this test, it may be fair to demand that the benefit of deduction u/s. 80IB(10) should not be denied in cases where the project has been completed by the prescribed date but the application for certificate has been delayed or the cases where the application has been made within the prescribed time but the certificate is issued after the prescribed date. This position in law can be supported by the ratio of the decisions of the Delhi and Gujarat High Courts, squarely and fairly. In our considered opinion, no issue should revolve around the situation discussed in this paragraph and the assesseee should be conferred with the benefit of deduction in respect of the profits and gains derived from a housing project.

In cases where the project has commenced on or after the amendment, difficulties would arise where the assessee has failed to even complete the project by the prescribed date. In such cases, it may be difficult for the assessee to be the beneficiary of the deduction unless the courts read down the explanation to clause(a) or grant deduction on liberal construction of incentive provisions. It may not be possible otherwise to claim deduction, as the legislature has not only forewarned the assessee but has given sufficient time for completion, unless of course the courts read down the said explanation that stipulates time for completion, independent of the main provision. It may not be appropriate to suggest that the condition providing for obtaining of certificate from a local body is absurd, simply because it is a local body. It may also not be possible for the post amendment projects to be covered by the ratio of the decision in Veena Developers’ case, which dealt with the pre amendment project, and that too a pre amended assessment year. Nor will it be possible to be covered by the ratio of the decision in the case of Sarkar Builders’ case which dealt with the pre amended project and post amendment assessment of such a project. The post amendment projects claiming deduction in post amendment assessment years can be said to be claiming deduction with eyes wide open, and would be expected to comply with the conditions. Seeking a ‘read down’ is the best option for them.

As regards the pre-amendment projects, claiming deduction in the post amendment assessment years’, the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court has added an interesting dimension by separating the condition of clause (a) from the remaining conditions in clauses(b) to (d) of section 80IB(10). Subsequent to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sarkar Builders, it was widely believed that such project would not be subjected to the conditions of the post amendment period. The decision has expressly dissented with the decisions of the Gujarat High Court delivered on similar facts. The Madhya Pradesh High Court has chosen to distinguish the ratio of the Supreme Court decision by restricting the scope of the said decision to clauses (b) to (d). Whether such was the view of the apex court or not, that can be clarified by the court only. In the meanwhile, we hereafter explain how the views of the Gujarat and Delhi High Courts represent a better view.

The whole basis of the Madhya Pradesh High Court order seems to be on the fact that the approval granted is not inextricably linked to the period within which the project construction would be completed. It needs to be kept in mind that the provisions of section 80-IB applied only to large projects, where the project was on the size of a plot of land which had a minimum area of one acre. Obviously, such large projects take a substantial time to complete.

The approval granted by the local authority is of the plans of the project. In most cases, the developer would have planned a phased development of the project, on the basis of which the plans were submitted. If at the point of time of approval of the plans, there was no time limit for completion of the project, a subsequent time limit of 4 years laid down for completion of the project may not suffice to complete the phased development. In such a case, the developer would either need to change the entire plan of the project, so as to ensure completion within the time limit of 4 years, which process would need an amended approval, or would suffer the loss of the deduction u/s. 80-IB in the event of failure to do so. At times, a change of plan may also not be possible on account of the fact that the construction may have been carried out in a particular manner based on the original plan, which does not permit of alteration to reduce the time period of construction.

Therefore, in most cases, the approved plan and the period of construction are inextricably linked to each other, in the same manner as the breakup of the constructed area into commercial area and residential area is linked to the plans approved. Therefore, the ratio of the Supreme Court decisions in Veena Developers and Sarkar Builders applies equally to the period of construction, as it applies to the percentage of commercial area in the project. This commercial aspect does not seem to have been properly appreciated by the Madhya Pradesh High Court.

Secondly, the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that the time limit for issue of the certificate is mandatory, and not directory, on the ground that otherwise an assessing officer would have to make enquiries and use his discretion to find out the correct date of completion. Various decisions of High Courts and the Supreme Court, in the context of different time periods specified under the Income-tax Act, have held that the purpose of laying down a time limit for furnishing of a certificate or audit report is to ensure that the assessing officer is able to complete the assessment on the basis of the certificate or audit report, and that so long as the certificate or audit report is available before the completion of assessment, that would suffice to give the benefit of the deduction or exemption to the assessee, even though the law may have prescribed a time limit for filing of the certificate or audit report, beyond which limit it was actually furnished. In these decisions, it has been invariably held that while the requirement of furnishing of the certificate or audit report is mandatory, the requirement of the time limit within which it has to be furnished is directory. A few such cases where this view has been taken by the Supreme Court is in the cases of CIT vs. Nagpur Hotel Owners Association 247 ITR 201 in the context of application for accumulation u/s. 11(2), CIT vs. G.M. Knitting Industries (P.) Ltd 376 ITR 456 in the context of audit certificate for additional depreciation, CIT vs. AKS Alloys (P.) Ltd. 376 ITR 456 in the context of audit report for deduction u/s. 80-IB, etc.

Therefore, though the obtaining of the certificate should be regarded as mandatory, the time limit for obtaining such certificate should be regarded as directory, particularly so as the actual issue of the certificate is not within the control of the assessee, once he has applied for it within the specified time.

Once the plans had been approved prior to the amendment, and all the conditions then applicable for claim of deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) had been fulfilled, viz. commencement of development of the project on or after 1st October 1998, minimum size of plot of land of one acre, and residential units having a maximum built-up area as specified, the assessee had a right to claim the deduction u/s 80-IB. That was a vested right, which could not have been taken away by a subsequent amendment, adding an additional condition, as rightly held by the Supreme Court in the cases of Veena Developers and Sarkar Builders.

The whole purpose of obtaining the certificate of completion from the local authority was to ensure that the project has been completed within the specified time. This ensured that the objective of the deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) of making residential housing available was fulfilled. So long as the completion of the project before the specified date could be demonstrated, even if it was by a certificate issued on a later date, and so long as that evidence was available at the time of assessment, the benefit of the deduction should be granted to the assessee.

As held by the Supreme Court in the case of Bajaj Tempo Ltd .196 ITR 188, in case of an incentive provision, the law should be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to grant the benefit of the deduction of the assessee, rather than deny it to the assessee on technical grounds, particularly where there is substantial compliance by the assessee. In that case, the Supreme Court observed:

“A provision in a taxing statute granting incentives for promoting growth and development should be construed liberally. Since a provision intended for promoting economic growth has to be interpreted liberally the restriction on it too has to be construed so as to advance the objective of the section and not to frustrate it.”

Therefore, the view taken by the Delhi and Gujarat High Courts, that the belated obtaining of the completion certificate beyond the prescribed time limit in cases where the plans were approved prior to 1st April 2005, is not fatal to the assessee’s claim for deduction u/s. 80- IB, so long as the completion of the housing project is within the prescribed time, seems to be the better view of the matter.

In any case, if a part of the project is completed and certificate of completion has been received for such part in time, the assessee would certainly be entitled to deduction in respect of the part of the project which has been completed, as held by the Gujarat High Court in the case of CIT vs. B. M. and Brothers 42 taxmann.com 24.

Section 263 – An Analysis

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Introduction:
1.1 Section 263 empowers the Commissioner of Income Tax to revise any order passed under the Income-tax Act, 1961, “ the Act” which is erroneous insofar as it is prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. These are special and wide powers conferred upon the Commissioner of Income Tax, to bring to tax any loss of revenue from the orders passed under the Act. At the same time, these are not unfettered powers but are specific and are subject to conditions contained in the section for invoking the jurisdiction. A bare reading of section 263, makes it clear that the prerequisite to exercise of jurisdiction by the CIT suo moto under it is that the order of the ITO is erroneous insofar as it is prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. The CIT has to be satisfied of twin conditions, namely, (i) the order of the AO sought to be revised is erroneous; and (ii) it is prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. If one of them is absent—if the order of the ITO is erroneous but is not prejudicial to the Revenue or if it is not erroneous but is prejudicial to the Revenue—recourse cannot be had to section 263(1) of the Act.

1.2 In the above background, in many cases, the ground of invoking jurisdiction u/s. 263 is found to be non-inquiry or failure to make inquiry by the Assessing Officer that warrants revision of the order passed by the Assessing Officer. The law had been settled that if there is a failure to make enquiry which causes prejudice to the interest of the revenue, the Commissioner gets the jurisdiction to revise the order. By the Finance Act 2015, an amendment has been brought in by adding an Explanation to section 263 providing that an order passed by the Assessing Officer shall be deemed to be erroneous insofar as it is prejudicial to the interests of the revenue, if, in the opinion of the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner, the order is passed without making inquiries or verification which should have been made. The Amendment has raised concerns about the exact implications of the Amendment and the possible interpretations of the Explanation. An attempt is therefore made to analyse the law that prevailed and the ramifications of the Amendment.

2. Failure to make inquiry – Erroneous:
2.1 Whenever the orders passed by the Assessing Officers are found to be cryptic and without any inquiry, thereby accepting the return of income as filed by the assessee, the orders have been held to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of revenue. The Supreme Court in case of Rampyari Devi Sarogi vs. CIT ( 67 ITR 84) and in Smt. Tara Devi Aggarwal vs. CIT ( 88 ITR 323) have upheld the orders u/s. 263 on this ground. In these cases, the assessment record showed lack of inquiry by the Assessing Officers and mere acceptance of the returned income. The Commissioners made independent inquiries to show that the order caused prejudice to the revenue. In these facts, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that passing an order without any inquiry would make the order erroneous.

The Delhi High Court in case of Ghee Vee Enterprises vs. Add CIT ( 99 ITR 375) has given a further dimension to the aspect of ‘failure to make inquiry.’ It held that the position and function of the ITO is very different from that of a civil Court. The statements made in a pleading proved by the minimum amount of evidence may be accepted by a civil Court in the absence of any rebuttal. The civil Court is neutral. It simply gives decision on the basis of the pleading and evidence which comes before it. The ITO is not only an adjudicator but also an investigator. He cannot remain passive in the face of a return which is apparently in order but calls for further inquiry. It is his duty to ascertain the truth of the facts stated in the return when the circumstances of the case are such as to provoke an inquiry. The meaning to be given to the word “erroneous” in section 263 emerges out of this context. It is because it is incumbent on the ITO to further investigate the facts stated in the return when circumstances would make such an inquiry necessary. The word “erroneous” in section 263 includes the failure to make such an inquiry. The order becomes erroneous because such an inquiry has not been made and not because there is anything wrong with the order if all the facts stated therein are assumed to be correct.

It implies that the Assessing Officer is bound to carry out prudent inquiries so as to ascertain and assess the correct income of the assessee. If they are lacking, the order becomes erroneous.

3. Failure to make inquiry – Scope:
The ground of failure to make inquiry would cover different situations. They can be categorised as follows

i. There is a complete failure to make inquiry while passing the order. The entire assessment order is passed summarily. The record does not show any examination or verification of the details furnished. The AO called for the basic details of income returned and accepted the same. The record, order sheet as well as the order is cryptic and silent about the application of mind by the AO. In this situation, the simple ground of non-enquiry by AO is sufficient to make the order erroneous and could warrant action u/s. 263 by CIT.

ii. In a given case, the AO may have completely missed verification of one aspect of income and no facts or details have been called for and furnished by the assesse. This lack of inquiry then results into prejudice to the revenue. In this situation both the error as well as prejudice to revenue is so apparent and glaring which could not have escaped the attention of any prudent Assessing Officer. E.g. the assessee had significant borrowings and at the same time, there are significant non-business advances to sister concerns. The rates of interest are variable. If the AO does not make any inquiry whatsoever about the claim of interest, the order may become erroneous if the facts prima facie indicate prejudice to the revenue.

iii. The AO has made enquiries about the income of the assessee. After applying his own judgment about the inquiries to be carried out, the income was assessed by him. The record is speaking about the inquiries, examination and application of mind by the AO. In such situation, CIT feels that a particular inquiry should have been carried out in a particular manner which has not been done or the AO should have taken particular view about a particular income. On such ground of failure of inquiry, action for revision is invoked. The Bombay High Court in a well- known decision in the case if CIT vs. Gabriel India Ltd. ( 203 ITR 108) has dealt with the situation and explained the law as –An order cannot be termed as erroneous unless it is not in accordance with law. If an ITO acting in accordance with law makes certain assessment, the same cannot be branded as erroneous by the Commissioner simply because according to him the order should have been written more elaborately. This section does not visualise a case of substitution of judgment of the Commissioner for that of the ITO , who passed the order, unless the decision is held to be erroneous. Cases may be visualised where ITO while making an assessment examines the accounts, makes enquiries, applies his mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and determines the income either by accepting the accounts or by making some estimates himself. The Commissioner, on perusal of the records, may be of the opinion that the estimate made by the officer concerned was on the lower side and, left to the Commissioner, he would have estimated the income at a higher figure than the one determined by the ITO . That would not vest the Commissioner with power to re-examine the accounts and determine the income himself at a higher figure. It is because the ITO has exercised the quasi-judicial power vested in him in accordance with law and arrived at a conclusion and such a conclusion cannot be termed to be erroneous simply because the Commissioner does not feel satisfied with the conclusion. It may be said in such a case that in the opinion of the Commissioner the order in question is prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. But that by itself will not be enough to vest the Commissioner with the power of suo moto revision because the first requirement, namely, the order is erroneous, is absent.”

In CIT vs. Honda Siel Power Products Ltd., the Delhi High Court held that while passing an order u/s. 263, the CIT has to examine not only the assessment order, but the entire record of the profits. Since the assessee has no control over the way an assessment order is drafted and since, generally, the issues which are accepted by the AO do not find mention in the assessment order and only those points are taken note of on which the assessee’s explanations are rejected and additions/disallowances are made, the mere absence of the discussion would not mean that the AO had not applied his mind to the said provisions. In this connection, reference is invited to the decisions in CIT vs. Mulchand Bagri (108 CTR 206 Cal.) CIT vs. D P Karai (266 ITR 113 Guj) and Paul Mathews vs. CIT ( 263 ITR 101 Ker).

4. Failure to make inquiry vs. Application of mind:
4.1. In Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd. vs. CIT 243 ITR 83 (SC) the Apex Court considered the scope of the word “erroneous” and held that:

“The provision cannot be invoked to correct each and every type of mistake or error committed by the AO; it is only when an order is erroneous that the section will be attracted. An incorrect assumption of facts or an incorrect application of law will satisfy the requirement of the order being erroneous. In the same category fall orders passed without applying the principles of natural justice or without application of mind. The phrase “prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue” is not an expression of art and is not defined in the Act. Understood in its ordinary meaning, it is of wide import and is not confined to loss of tax. The scheme of the Act is to levy and collect tax in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this task is entrusted to the Revenue. If due to an erroneous order of the ITO , the Revenue is losing tax lawfully payable by a person, it will certainly be prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. The phrase “prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue” has to be read in conjunction with an erroneous order passed by the AO. Every loss of revenue as a consequence of an order of the AO cannot be treated as prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue, for example when an ITO adopted one of the courses permissible in law and it has resulted in loss of revenue, or where two views are possible and the ITO has taken one view with which the CIT does not agree, it cannot be treated as an erroneous order prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue unless the view taken by the ITO is unsustainable in law.”

4.2 The above observations of the Supreme Court highlight the fact that if there is an application of mind by the AO, the order cannot become erroneous. The question has to be decided by evaluating the process of assessment undertaken by the AO. If the assessment has been done after proper application of mind and thereby adopting a permissible course of action, it cannot be said to be erroneous.

5. Prejudice to the Revenue:
5.1 The lack of inquiry making the order erroneous has to be coupled with prejudice to the interest of the revenue. As explained by Bombay High Court in case of Gabriel India Ltd., there must be some prima facie material on record to show that tax which was lawfully exigible has not been imposed or that by the application of the relevant statute on an incorrect or incomplete interpretation a lesser tax than what was just has been imposed. There must be material available on record called for by the Commissioner to satisfy him, prima facie, that the aforesaid two requisites are present. If not, he has no authority to initiate proceedings for revision. Exercise of power of suo moto revision under such circumstances will amount to arbitrary exercise of power.

6. Principles Emerging:
The following principles emerge from the above discussion-

1. Failure to make inquiries coupled with prejudice to revenue makes the order vulnerable for revision u/s. 263 being erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue.

2. For evaluating as to whether inquiry was made or not, the complete record at the time of assessment has to be seen. Absence of discussion in the assessment order is not sufficient to conclude that there has been no noninquiry.

3. The ground of lack of inquiry so as to substitute the judgment of CIT over that of AO is not permissible. If AO has used his judgment and passed the order in accordance with law, CIT cannot substitute his judgment about how a particular assessment has to be done by carrying out enquiries in a particular manner.

4. The powers of revision cannot be invoked to correct each and every mistake but only when the order is erroneous on account of an incorrect assumption of facts or an incorrect application of law or without applying the principles of natural justice or without application of mind or inquiry.

5. Every loss of revenue as a consequence of an order of the AO cannot be treated as prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue, for example when an ITO adopted one of the courses permissible in law and it has resulted in loss of revenue, or where two views are possible and the ITO has taken one view with which the CIT does not agree, it cannot be treated as an erroneous order prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue unless the view taken by the ITO is unsustainable in law.

7. Amendment by Finance Act 2015:

7.1 With effect from 1st June 2015, an Explanation is added to section 263 which provides as under-

“Explanation 2.—For the purposes of this section, it is hereby declared that an order passed by the Assessing Officer shall be deemed to be erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interests of the revenue, if, in the opinion of the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner,—

(a) the order is passed without making inquiries or verification which should have been made;

(b) the order is passed allowing any relief without inquiring into the claim;
(c) the order has not been made in accordance with any order, direction or instruction issued by the Board under section 119; or
(d) the order has not been passed in accordance with any decision which is prejudicial to the assessee, rendered by the jurisdictional High Court or Supreme Court in the case of the assessee or any other person.”

8. Memorandum Explaining the Provisions:
The memorandum explaining the provisions states as under

“Revision of order that is erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interests of revenue

The existing provisions contained in sub-section (1) of section 263 of the Income-tax Act provides that if the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner considers that any order passed by the assessing officer is erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue, he may, after giving the assessee an opportunity of being heard and after making an enquiry pass an order modifying the assessment made by the assessing officer or cancelling the assessment and directing fresh assessment. The interpretation of expression “erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interests of the revenue” has been a contentious one. In order to provide clarity on the issue it is proposed to provide that an order passed by the Assessing Officer shall be deemed to be erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interests of the revenue, if, in the opinion of the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner,—

(a) the order is passed without making inquiries or verification which, should have been made;
(b) the order is passed allowing any relief without inquiring into the claim;
(c) the order has not been made in accordance with any order, direction or instruction issued by the Board under section 119; or
(d) the order has not been passed in accordance with any decision which is prejudicial to the assessee, rendered by the jurisdictional High Court or Supreme Court in the case of the assessee or any other person.”

9. Analysis of the Amendment:
9.1 A plain reading of the above amendment implies that the said Explanation has been added for clarifying the scope of the words ‘erroneous so far as prejudicial to the interest of the revenue.’ The term was not been defined under the Act. But by way of this amendment, the scope of the term has been clarified. While clarifying the position, four different situations have been contemplated so as to call an order to be ‘erroneous so far as prejudicial to the interest of the revenue.’ The provision further creates a fiction as to order being erroneous in so far as prejudicial to the interest of revenue if the Commissioner or Principal Commissioner forms an opinion about the existence of four situations stated therein.

9.2 Considering the phraseology or the words used in the amendment and also considering the fact that the amendment pertains to procedural or machinery provisions, the same is perceived as clarificatory and may apply to pending proceedings. The amendment can also be understood to be a “Declaratory Law” thereby explaining or clarifying the law that prevailed all along. Needless to mention, assessee would like to argue that the amendment is substantive in nature and therefore would operate prospectively. In that situation, the question would become debatable and would be left for the Courts to decide.

9.3 The question arises as to whether it implies a subjective opinion of the Commissioner or Principal Commissioner and having formed such opinion, the jurisdiction u/s. 263 can be invoked without any fetters. The question has relevance to mainly to first situation as well as second situation regarding inquiry not done by AO as it deals with more of a factual or practical situation and may lend unfettered powers to the Commissioner for revising the order. The other two situations mainly consider the incorrect application of law by not applying the relevant circular or judicial decisions. Extending the question further, does the provision mean merely a formality on the part of the Commissioner or Principal Commissioner to form an opinion and invoke the jurisdiction?

9.4 To answer the above question, the scheme of revision provisions under the Act has to be considered. The power of revision is vested with Commissioner which is perceived to be his exclusive jurisdiction to be excercised upon satisfaction of conditions stated therein. The powers can be invoked on his satisfaction arrived after examination of record. The words satisfaction or opinion of Commissioner perceived in section 263 has been explained by Bombay High Court in Gabriel India Ltd. as- “ It is well-settled that when exercise of statutory power is dependent upon the existence of certain objective facts, the authority before exercising such power must have materials on records to satisfy it in that regard. If the action of the authority is challenged before the Court, it would be open to the Courts to examine whether the relevant objective factors were available from the records called for and examined by such authority. Any other view in the matter will amount to giving unbridled and arbitrary power to revising authority to initiate proceedings for revision in every case and start re-examination and fresh enquiries in matters which have already been concluded under the law. It is quasi-judicial power hedged with limitation and has to be exercised subject to the same and within its scope and ambit. So far as calling for the records and examining the same is concerned, undoubtedly it is an administrative act, but on examination, “to consider”, or in other words, to form an opinion that the particular order is erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue, is a quasijudicial act because on this consideration or opinion the whole machinery of reexamination and reconsideration of an order of assessment, which has already been concluded and controversy about which has been set at rest, is again set in motion. It is an important decision and the same cannot be based on the whims or caprice of the revising authority. There must be materials available from records called for by the Commissioner.”

The above principles explained by the Bombay High Court therefore enable us to reach to the conclusion that the formation of opinion cannot be arbitrary and left at the whims of the authority this being a quasi judicial act that would be subjected to judicial review by higher authorities.

9.5 The further question arises about the application of fiction as to whether it allows an interpretation that having formed an opinion about non inquiry the order becomes erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of revenue. The fiction impliedly raises a presumption. It can be seen that the factum of inquiry is always verifiable with reference to record. If after forming an opinion by Commissioner about non inquiry, the record speaks about proper inquiry and application of mind by AO, the presumption should be open for rebuttal. More so since the question of inquiry is a factual aspect. The Explanation therefore can be interpreted to raise a rebuttable presumption. The rebuttal can be made before the higher authorities contesting the validity of action with reference to the actual record. The possibility of rebuttal can also be supported with the power of revision being a quasi judicial act subjected to judicial review.

9.6 The law that prevailed all along with reference to the application of mind by AO or adopting a permissible course of action in law cannot be understood to have been disturbed. Since the Income-tax Act gives exclusive jurisdiction of assessment to the Assessing Officer, the act of assessment is perceived as an independent quasi judicial act. The Commissioner under the provisions of revision could not substitute his judgment over the Assessing Officer about the manner in which the assessment or inquiry or a particular view to be adopted. The said amendment nowhere makes a departure from the above position by the phraseology or the contextual meaning.

9.7 The Explanatory Memorandum with reference to the said amendment refers to the intention behind the said amendment. In view of that, the interpretation of ‘erroneous in so far as prejudicial to the interest of the revenue’ was a contentious issue. In order to provide clarity on the issue, an amendment has been brought in by way of an Explanation. Considering the law explained by Courts with reference to the expression used in the amendment, there does not appear to be any deviation from the principles evolved. It broadly defines the scope of ‘erroneous in so far as prejudicial to the interest of the revenue’ and provides support to the main section. Reading the main provision along with the Explanation, the Scheme of revision with reference to the principles laid down, remains the same.

9.8 In the first situation, the words used are ‘if the order is passed with making inquiries or verification which should have been done’. The expression ‘which should have been done’ suggests an objective test to be applied so as to highlight necessity of making appropriate inquiry for assessing the correct income and absence of which may cause prejudice to the revenue. The condition of ‘prejudice to the interest of the revenue’ also cannot be said to have toned down or understood to have impliedly complied with formation of an opinion.

10. Conclusion:
The amendment by way of an Explanation to section 263 may give rise to extreme interpretations or an impression that the power of revision is at the whims of Commissioner. The Department is likely to adopt such interpretation and use the same causing to revision of the orders passed by the Assessing Officers at the sweet will of the Commissioners. However, considering the law laid down and on proper interpretation of the amendment, such view is unlikely to be supported by higher judicial forums. Let us hope that the judiciary would make a just interpretation and avoid giving unfettered powers to the Commissioner.

TS-683-ITAT-2014(Hyd) Dr. Reddy’s Research Foundation vs. DCIT A.Y: 2002-04, Dated: 12-11-2014

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Section 9(1)(vii) – Pre-clinical research payments held as FTS under the Act as well as India-UK and India-Netherlands DTAA.

Facts:
The Taxpayer, an Indian pharmaceutical research company, was carrying on drug discovery research. Taxpayer discovered a new chemical compound and applied for a patent. The Patent was granted for 20 years. After obtaining the patent, Taxpayer was required to conduct certain pre-clinical research before it could utilise the exclusive marketing rights granted under the Patent. In order to reduce the cost of research and maximise the time available to commercially exploit the patent before its expiry, appropriate parts of research were allocated to companies situated in the UK (UK Co) and Netherlands (N Co) and payments were made to them without withholding tax at source.

The Tax authority concluded that the payments made to UK Co and N Co for pre-clinical studies constituted FTS under the Act as well as under the India-UK and India- Netherlands DTAA . Since the Taxpayer had not withheld tax at source, the Tax Authority passed an order u/s. 201(1) of the Act.

The Taxpayer contended that the payments made to UK Co and N Co were not taxable in India as it did not constitute FTS under the relevant DTAA as the services did not satisfy the make available condition not warranting withholding of taxes. Thus the Taxpayer appealed before the First Appellate Authority against the orders passed by the Tax Authority.

On appeal, the First appellate Authority held that the pre-clinical research satisfies the make available condition and thus constitutes FTS under the relevant DTAA . A reference was made to the agreement between the Taxpayer and UK Co as well as with N Co and observed that the agreements clearly provided that all the intellectual property including rights to patents, which would be generated in the course of clinical research conducted by UK Co and N Co, would belong solely to the Taxpayer. The Taxpayer had complete control over the know-how, experience of the field trials and skills generated in the field trial. The Taxpayer had obtained the services from UK Co and N Co to speed up the “clinical research time” so that the time available for exclusive marketing rights could be maximised. Thus, the services of UK Co and N Co results in transfer of technical know-how and hence will constitute FTS under the relevant DTAA .

Aggrieved, the Taxpayer preferred an appeal before the Tribunal.

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TS-738-ITAT-2014(Pun) M/s Sandvik AB Ltd vs. DDIT A.Y: 2007-08, Dated: 28-11-2014

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Make available condition provided in India- Portugal DTAA can be imported into India- Sweden DTAA by virtue of Most Favoured Nations (MFN) clause; Consequently commercial management services rendered by a Sweden Co not regarded as Fees for Technical services (FTS) under the India – Sweden DTAA as it does not make available technical skills or knowledge.

Facts:
The Taxpayer, a Swedish Company, provided services in the nature of commercial, management, marketing and production services to its Indian subsidiaries (I Co). Further, the Taxpayer did not have a PE in India.

Under the Act, there was no dispute with respect to the legal position that the services do not constitute FTS u/s. 9(1)(vii). However, the Tax Authority contended that the fee received by the Taxpayer is in the nature of FTS under India-Sweden DTAA .

The Taxpayer claimed that the fee received from I Co is not FTS as provided in India-Sweden DTAA . Alternatively, by virtue of the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clause in the protocol to India-Sweden DTAA, the definition of FTS as available in India-Portugal DTAA , which provides for an additional condition of “make available”, can be imported. Tax authority’s contention was upheld by Dispute Resolution Panel.

Aggrieved, the Taxpayer appealed before the Tribunal.

Held:
India-Sweden DTAA incorporates MFN clause, as per which, if under any DTAA , India limits its taxation at source on dividends, interest, royalties, or fees for technical services to a rate lower or a scope more restricted than the rate or scope in the India-Sweden DTAA , the same rate or scope shall apply under the India-Sweden DTAA also. India-Portugal DTAA provides a restricted definition of FTS, wherein services can be regarded to fall within the scope of FTS only if the same makes available technical knowledge, skill etc.

Accordingly, based on the MFN clause and importing the FTS definition from the India-Portugal DTAA, the services rendered by Taxpayer could not be regarded as FTS as the same do not make available technical knowledge/skill to I Co in India.

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(2014) 50 taxmann.com 378 (Cochin) Mathewsons Exports & Imports (P.) Ltd v ACIT A.Y: 2006-07, Dated: 21-10-2014

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Section 9(1)(vi) – Profits derived from hiring of vessels for operation in international traffic taxable as royalty u/s. 9(1)(vi); however, as per beneficial provisions of Article 8 of India-UAE DTAA such profits are not taxable in India.

Facts:
Taxpayer, an Indian Company, engaged in the business of import and export of merchandise goods, obtains goods from various persons for transporting the same to Maldives. For this purpose, Taxpayer hired a fully operational vessel with necessary permits and trained crew from a company incorporated in UAE (F Co) on the basis of a time charter agreement.

The Taxpayer made the payments to F Co without deducting taxes on the basis that the same was not taxable in India under India-UAE DTAA .

The Tax Authority disallowed the payments made to F Co considering that the hire charges paid by the taxpayer to F Co amounted to royalty under the Act as well as the India-UAE DTAA .

Held:
The hired vessel is an instrument/equipment; therefore, the payment made by the assessee for use or right to use such instrument/equipment would fall within the provisions of section 9(1)(vi) of the Act.

In view of section 90 of the Act, it is well settled that if the provisions of the DTAA are more beneficial to the Taxpayer, then they would prevail over the Act.

The India-UAE DTAA has a specific provision for taxation of royalty income (Article 12) and income from shipping business (Article 8). Based on the principle that specific provision overrides general provisions, in respect of shipping business, Article 8 will override Article 12 of the DTAA . Hence, only Article 8 of the DTAA would be applicable in respect of shipping business.

As per Article 8 of the India-UAE DTAA, profit derived by an enterprise of a contracting state from operation of ship in international traffic shall be taxed only in that contracting state. Further, Article 8(2) specifically provides that profit from operation of the ship in international traffic will also include the charter or rental of ships incidental to such transportation. Accordingly, hire charges paid by the taxpayer to F Co are taxable in UAE and not in India. Consequently, the taxpayer was not required to withhold tax from the payments..

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Secondment of Employees – Taxability of Reimbursement of Remuneration in the hands of Overseas Entity

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1. Introduction
In the current global
scenario, the international business entities have extended their
business worldwide and they have made their presence by establishing
their own subsidiaries or group entities with whom they have business
arrangement. These overseas entities depute their technical staff and
human resources in other countries, to support their global business
functions and to ensure quality and consistency in their operations.
Under a classic Secondment agreement, the seconded employees who are
under employment of non-resident overseas entity are deputed or
transferred to subsidiary company in the overseas countries to work for
special assignment which are more technical and managerial in nature.
These seconded employees usually work under direct control and
supervision of the subsidiary entities in their country. Since these
seconded employees belong to the main parent entity, therefore, they
continue to receive their remuneration and salaries with all social
security benefits from the parent entity. Such costs and remuneration
are reimbursed by the subsidiary company to the parent entity. Strictly
speaking on paper they remain the employees of the parent entities but
they are under direct supervision and control of subsidiary entity,
where their day to day activities are managed and governed by them and
so much so they can be removed by them. Once the terms of secondment is
over, they revert back to their overseas entity. In a way, subsidiary
entity is the economic employer of the seconded employee who ultimately
bears the salary cost and exercise control over their work.

Generally,
it is contended that reimbursement of cost cannot be treated as payment
for Fees for Technical Services [FTS] or Fees for Included Services
[FIS], unless there is an explicit agreement between the parties that
technical services would be provided through these employees. The
deputation of employees is mainly for the benefit of the subsidiary
company to smoothly and efficiently conduct the business. However, such a
reimbursement of salary cost by the subsidiary entity has been matter
of huge controversy, as to what is the nature of such payment, whether
it is ‘fee for included services’ or not. Other related controversy is
that, on the basis of duration of the stay of seconded/deputed employees
in the host countries, whether the non-resident parent entity
constitute the service PE in the host country or not. Let us know
discuss the meaning the words ‘Secondment’ or ‘Deputation’.

2. Meaning of the words ‘Deputation’ or ‘Secondment’

Deputation
as per Concise Oxford Dictionary is “a group of people who undertake a
mission on behalf of a larger group”. Whereas Secondment as per Concise
Oxford Dictionary is “temporarily transfer (a worker) to another
position.”

Dictionary meanings of ‘deputation’ and ‘secondment’
are different. However, in common practice, both these terms are used
interchangeably.

The term secondment in common parlance means
that the employee remains an employee of his existing employer but by
virtue of some agreement between the employer and the third person, the
employee has to perform the duties for the benefit of such third person.

With globalisation, mobility of employees has become an
integral part of business enterprise. For various commercial reasons,
employment contracts are often concluded by the legal entity
incorporated in the country where the employee is domiciled at the time
of his appointment. However, this formal contract with the employee is
not intended to restrict the employee from seeking global opportunities.
If the employment is required to be exercised in another country, the
employee makes available his capacity to work to the entity or
establishment in the other country (“host country”). While doing so, the
employee retains a lien on the formal employment contract. This
arrangement of facilitating the global mobility of employees is called
“secondment”.

The entity or establishment in host country
becomes the economic employer, since it bears the responsibility or risk
for the result produced by the employee rendering the service. The
remuneration in relation to services of the employee in the host country
may be disbursed and borne by the entity in the host country.
Alternatively, the remuneration may be disbursed to the employee by the
formal employer and claimed as a reimbursement from the entity in the
host country. In some cases, an overriding fee is also charged from the
entity in the host country to cover the administrative efforts involved
in disbursing salary.

3. Decisions in the case of Centrica India Offshore (P.) Ltd.

3.1
In the case of Centrica India Offshore (P.) Ltd. [CIOPL], [2012] 19
taxmann.com 214 (AAR), the following questions were raised before the
AAR:
(a) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances, of the case
the amount paid or payable by the applicant to the overseas entities
under the terms of Secondment Agreement is in the nature of income
accrued to the overseas entities? (b) If the answer to question no. 1
above is in the affirmative, whether the tax is liable to be deducted at
source by the applicant under the provision of section 195 of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 [the Act]?

The AAR held that the payment by the applicant under the agreement is not FTS but would be income accruing to overseas entities in view of the existence of a service PE in India and on question No. 2, held that tax is liable to be deducted at source u/s. 195 of the Act.

3.2 Against the ruling of the AAR, CIOPL filed a writ petition and the Delhi High Court in its judgment Centrica India Offshore (P.) Ltd. vs CIT, [2014] 44 taxmann.com 300 (Delhi) held that the reimbursement of salaries to the oversea entity is liable to tax as FTS/FIS and also Service PE exists in India.

3.3
A gainst the decision of the Delhi High Court, CIOPL filed a Special
Leave Petition [SPL] in the Supreme Court, which has been dismissed by
the SC. Centrica India Offshore (P.) Ltd. vs CIT [2014] 51 taxmann.com 386 (SC).

3.4 Effect of Rejection of SLP in Limine (at the threshold) by Supreme Court:

a)    in Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. vs. State of Bihar [1987] 167 ITR 897; [1986] 4 SCC 146; AIR 1986 SC 1780, the Supreme Court held that “the dismissal of a special leave petition in limine by a non-speaking order does not jus- tify any inference that, by necessary implication, the contentions raised in the special leave petition on the merits of the case have been rejected by the Supreme Court. it has been further held that the effect of a non-speaking order of dismissal of a special leave petition without anything more indicating the grounds or reasons of its dismissal must, by necessary implication, be taken to be that the Supreme Court had decided only that it was not a fit case where special leave should be granted”.
b)    the above case has also been referred by the Supreme Court in case of Employees’ Wel- fare Association vs. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 334; [1989] 4 SCC 187.
c)    in V. M. Salgaocar and Brothers Pvt. Ltd. vs. CIT [2000] 243 ITR 383, the Supreme Court held that “when a special leave petition is dismissed this court does not comment on the correctness or otherwise of the order from which leave to appeal is sought. But what the court means is that it does not consider it to be a fit case for exercise of its jurisdiction under article 136 of the Constitution.”
d)    thus, the fact that SLP is rejected by the apex Court, especially in limine without assigning any reasons, does not signify that it has ap- proved the judgment of the delhi high Court.
e)    therefore, the decision of delhi high Court in the case of Centrica cannot be held as final on the issue of “Secondment”.

4.    Concept of ‘Economic or real employer vs Legal employer’

In the context of determination of taxability of reimbursement of such remuneration i the hands of the parent entity, determination of the real employer is very important. In case of Secondment payments, it is very crucial to understand the concept of ‘Economic or real employer vs Legal employer’.

A legal employer appoints someone and, therefore, has the  right  to  terminate  the  employment.  the  economic employer, on the other hand, enjoys the fruits of the labour, possesses the authority to inspect and control and bears the risks and results of the work performed by the employee.  The  place  of  employment  or  work  would also be that directed by the economic employer. The  economic employer may not have the legal right to terminate the employment altogether, it would possess the right to terminate the contractual arrangement, i.e. the secondment  agreement.  The  payment  of  salary  of  the seconded employee is charged to/reimbursed by the economic employer.

In this respect, the following points need to be borne in mind:
a)    the  concept  of  deputation  or  secondment  proceeds on the presumption that the seconded employees will continue to retain employment only with the parent entity.  if they ought to join the indian establishment,  it becomes a regular employment and the concept of deputation and a corresponding relationship with an economic employer would not arise.
b)    the principle ‘legal employer vs. economic employer’ has gained acceptance and recognition. the legal employer would continue to possess the right to terminate the employment, whereas the economic employer will be possessed only with the right to terminate the services.
c)    an entity becomes an economic employer if it has  the right to supervise and control over the seconded employees and the employees in turn discharge their duties and responsibilities under the instruction of the economic employer.
d)    the decisive test appears to be ‘ control and supervision’ and not ‘ right of termination’.

Thus, if on the facts of a case and considering the tests laid down above, the entity in the host country is held to be the ‘economic or real employer’, then the question of existence of Service PE or characterisation of payment as ftS, may not arise.

5.    Relevant commentary of the OECD Model Convention, 2014 on Article 15

The following paragraphs of the oeCd commentary on article 15 are pertinent for determination of the issues relating to secondment of employees:

“8.1 It may be difficult, in certain cases, to determine whether the services rendered in a State by an individual resident of another State, and provided to an enterprise of the first State (or that has a permanent establishment in that State), constitute employment services, to which article 15 applies, or services rendered by a separate enterprise, to which article 7 applies or, more generally, whether the exception applies. While the Commentary previously dealt with cases where arrangements were structured for the main purpose of obtaining the benefits of the exception of paragraph 2 of article 15, it was found that similar issues could arise in many other cases that did not involve tax- motivated transactions and the Commentary was amended to provide a more comprehensive discussion of these questions.

8.4 In many States, however, various legislative or jurisprudential rules and criteria (e.g. substance over form rules) have been developed for the purpose of distinguishing cases where services rendered by an individual to an enterprise should be considered to be rendered in an employment relationship (contract of service) from cases where such services should be considered to be rendered under a contract for the provision of services between two separate enterprises (contract for  services).  That  distinction  keeps  its  importance when applying the provisions of article 15, in particular those of subparagraphs 2 b) and c). Subject to the limit described in paragraph 8.11 and unless the context of a particular convention requires otherwise, it is a matter of domestic law of the State of source to determine whether services rendered by an individual in that State are provided in an employment relationship and that determination will govern how that State applies the Convention.

8.11    The conclusion that, under domestic law, a formal contractual relationship should be disregarded must, however, be arrived at on the basis of objective criteria. For instance, a State could not argue that services are deemed, under its domestic law, to constitute employment services where, under the relevant facts and circumstances, it clearly appears that these services are rendered under a contract for the provision of services concluded between two separate enterprises. The relief provided under paragraph 2 of article 15 would be rendered meaningless if States were allowed to deem services to constitute employment services in cases where there is clearly no employment relationship or to deny the quality of employer to an enterprise carried on by a non-resident where it is clear that that enterprise provides services, through its own personnel, to an enterprise car- ried on by a resident. Conversely, where services rendered by an individual may properly be regarded by a State as rendered in an employment relationship rather than as under a contract for services concluded between two enterprises, that State should logically also consider that the individual is not carrying on the business of the enterprise that constitutes that individual’s formal employer; this could be relevant, for example, for purposes of determining whether that enterprise has a permanent establishment at the place where the individual performs his activities.

8.13    The nature of the services rendered by the individual will be an important factor since it is logical to assume that an employee provides services which are an integral part of the business activities carried on by his employer. It will therefore be important to determine whether the services rendered by the individual constitute an integral part of the business of the enterprise to which these services  are  provided.  For  that  purpose,  a  key consideration will be which enterprise bears the responsibility or risk for the results produced by the individual’s work.

8.14    Where a comparison of the nature of the services rendered by the individual with the business activities carried on by his formal employer and by the enterprise to which the services are provided points to an employment relationship that is different from the formal contractual relationship, the following additional factors may be relevant to determine whether this is really the case:
•    who has the authority to instruct the individ- ual regarding the manner in which the work has to be performed;
•    who controls and has responsibility for the place at which the work is performed;
•    the remuneration of the individual is directly charged by the formal employer to the enterprise to which the services are provided (see para- graph 8.15 below);
•    who puts the tools and materials necessary for the work at the individual’s disposal;
•    who determines the number and qualifications of the individuals performing the work;
•    who has the right to select the individual who will perform the work and to terminate the contractual arrangements entered into with that individual for that purpose;
•    who has the right to impose disciplinary sanctions related to the work of that individual;
•    who determines the holidays and work schedule of that individual.”

8.15    Where an individual who is formally an employee of one enterprise provides services  to another enterprise, the financial arrangements made between the two enterprises will clearly be relevant, although not necessarily conclusive, for the purposes of determining whether the remuneration of the individual is directly charged by the formal employer to the enterprise to which the services are provided.

For  instance,  if  the  fees  charged  by  the  enterprise that formally employs the individual represent the remuneration, employment benefits and other employment costs of that individual for the services that he provided to the other enterprise, with no profit element or with a profit element that is computed as a percentage of that remuneration, benefits and other employment costs, this would be indicative that the remuneration of the individual is directly charged by the formal employer to the enterprise to which the services  are provided. That should not be considered to be the case, however, if the fee charged for the services bears no relationship to the remuneration of the individual or if that remuneration is only one of many factors taken into account in the fee charged for what  is really a contract for services (e.g. where     a consulting firm charges a client on the basis   of an hourly fee for the time spent by one of its employee to perform a particular contract and that fee takes account of the various costs of the enterprise), provided that this is in conformity with the arm’s length principle if the two enter- prises are associated. it is important to note, however, that the question of whether the remuneration of the individual is directly charged by the formal employer to the enterprise to which the services are provided  is only one of the subsidiary factors that are relevant in determining whether services rendered by that individual may properly be regarded by a State as rendered in an employment relationship rather than as under a contract for services concluded between two enterprises.”

In our view, the above tests/criteria laid down by the OECD, though in the context of article 15, are very relevant for determination of the issues relating to taxability of the reimbursement of remuneration of seconded employees  in  the  hands  of  the  overseas  entity  as  FTS  or whether such seconded employees constitute PE of the overseas entity in india. The above commentary has not been considered by various judicial authorities in india as would appear from various reported decision on the topic.

6.    Whether such payment constitute mere ‘reimbursement of Expenses’ and not FTS/FIS

Reimbursement of salaries to overseas entities in respect of secondment, is normally without mark up and hence claimed to be not liable to tax as the same does not involve any element of income. What constitutes ‘reimbursement’ is a very ticklish issue and there are a number of cases, where based on the facts and circumstances, payments have been held to be ‘reimbursement’.

For the proposition that such a reimbursement of salary of the seconded employees is not taxable as fiS, there is a catena of decisions, which are as under:

a)    Temasek Holdings vs. DCIT, (2013) 27 itr (trib) 125 (mum) = 2013-tii-163-itat-mum-intL
b)    ITO vs. AON Specialist Services Private Limited 2014-tii-78-itat-BanG-intL
c)    DIT vs. HCL Infosystems Ltd (2005) 274 ITR 261 (delhi) upheld itat decision in the case of HCL Info- systems Ltd. vs. DCIT -2002 76 ttj 505).
d)    CIT vs. Karlstorz Endoscopy India Pvt. Ltd. 2010-tii- 135-itat-deL-intL
e)    Abbey Business Services India Pvt. Limited vs. DCIT (2012)  53  Sot  401  (Bang)  =  2012-tii-145-itat-BanG-intL
f)    ACIT vs. CMS (India) Operations and Maintenance Co. Pvt. Ltd (2012) 135 itd 386 (Chennai)
g)    ITO vs. Ariba Technologies (India) Pvt. Ltd. 2012-tii-68-itat-BanG-intL
h)    idS Software Solutions (india) Pvt. Ltd (2009) 122 ttj 410;  2009-tii-22-itat-BanG-intL
i)    Cholamandalam mS General insurance Co. Ltd (2009) 309 itr 356 (aar); 2009-tii-02-ara-intL
j)    DDIT vs. Tekmark Global Solutions LLC (2010) 38 Sot 7 (mum) = 2010-tii-50-itat-mum-intL.
k)    Fertilisers and Chemicals Travancore Ltd. vs. CIT – (2002) 255 itr 449 (Ker), (2002) 174 Ctr 257 (Ker)
l)    Dolphin Drilling Ltd. vs. ACIT – (2009) 29 Sot 612 (del), (2009) 121 ttj 433 (del)
m)    United Hotels Ltd. vs. ITO – (2005) 2 Sot 267 (del), (2005) 93 ttj 822 (del)
n)    ADIT vs. Mark & Spencer Reliance India (P.) Ltd. – [2013] 38 taxmann.com 190 (mum)
o)   XYZ – (2000) 242 itr 208 (aar), (1999) 156 Ctr 583 (aar)
p)   Centrica india offshore Pvt. Ltd. – (2012) 206 taxman 545 (aar) (2012) 249 Ctr 11 (aar)

In the following cases the reimbursement of salaries of seconded employees have been held to be FTS/ FIS:
a.    at&S  india  Pvt.  Ltd.  –  (2006)  287  itr  421  (aar), (2006) 206 Ctr 315 (aar)
b.    Verizon data Services india Pvt. Ltd. (2011) 337 itr 192 (aar), (2011) 241 Ctr 393 (aar)
c.    flores  Gunther  vs  ito  –  (1987)  22  itd  504  (hyd), (1987) 29 ttj 392 (hyd)
d.    Tekniskil (Sendirian) Berhad vs. CIT – (1996) 222 itr 551 (aar), (1996) 135 Ctr 292 (aar)
e.    XYZ Ltd. – 2012-TII-14-ARA-INTL
f.    JC Bamford investments rochester vs. ddit – [2014] 47 taxmann.com 283 (delhi – trib.)
g.    Centrica india offshore (P.) Ltd. vs Cit, [2014] 44 tax- mann.com 300 (delhi)

7.    Whether the such payment claimed to be not-tax- able on the doctrine ‘Diversion of income by Overriding Title’

At times, it is also argued that payment is not the income of the overseas entities on account of the doctrine of ‘diversion of income by overriding title’.

In this regard, in the case of Centrica India Offshore (P.) Ltd. vs. CIT (supra), [2014], the Delhi High Court, rejecting the argument of the assessee held as under:

40. The final issue concerns the ‘diversion of income by overriding title’. here, CioP argues that the payment made to the overseas entity is not income that accrues to the overseas entity, but rather, money that it is obligated to pass on to the secondees. in other words, this money is overridden by the obligation to pay the secondees, and thus, is not ‘income’. This is insubstantial for two reasons. One, in view of the above findings that:
(a) the payment is not in the nature of reimbursement, but rather, payment for services rendered, (b) the employment relationship between the overseas entities and CiOP-from which the former’s independent obligation to pay the secondees arises – continues to hold, no obligation to use money arising from the payment by CIOP to pay the secondees arises. the  overseas  entities’  obligation  to  pay  the  secondees arises under a separate agreement, based on independent conditions, in relation to CIOP’s obligation to pay the overseas entity. assuming the agreement between CIOP and the overseas entity envisaged a certain payment for provision of services (and not styled as reimbursement). Surely, no argument could be made that such payment is affected by the doctrine of diversion of income by overriding title. if that be the case, then, as held above, the fact that the payment under the secondment agreement is styled as reimbursement, and limited on facts to that, without any additional charge for the service, cannot be hit by that doctrine either. The money paid by CIOP to the overseas entity accrues to the overseas entity, which may or may not apply it for payment to the secondees, based on its contractual relationship with them. This, at the very least, is independent of the relationship and payment between CiOP and the overseas entity.”

8.    Whether such ‘Secondment’ constitutes ‘Service PE’ in india

The  moot  question  which  arises  for  consideration  is whether such secondment of the employees could lead to establishment of the Service Pe in india.

Such an establishment of Service Pe under these circum- stances have been dealt by the hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Morgan Stanley & Co. (2007) 292 ITR 416 (SC).  the SC held that the employees of overseas entities to the indian entity constitutes service Pe in india. The relevant finding of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in this regard is as under:

“15. As regards the question of deputation, we are of the view that an employee of MSCo when deputed to MSAS does not become an employee of MSAS. A deputationist has a lien on his employment with MSCo. As long as the lien remains with the MSCo the said company retains control over the deputationist’s terms and employment. The concept of a service PE finds place in the U. N. Convention. It is constituted if the multinational enterprise renders services through its employees in India provided the services are rendered for a specified period. In this case, it extends to two years on the request of MSAS. It is important to note that where the activities of the multinational enterprise entails it being responsible for the work of deputationists and the employees continue to be on the payroll of “the multinational enterprise or they continue to have their lien on their jobs with the multinational enterprise, a service PE can emerge. Applying the above tests to the facts of this case we find that on request/requisition from MSAS the applicant deputes its staff. The request comes from MSAS depending upon its requirement. Generally, occasions do arise when MSAS needs the expertise of the staff of MSCo. In such circumstances, generally, MSAS makes a request to MSCo. A deputationist under such circumstances is expected to be experienced in bank- ing and finance.  On completion of his tenure he  is repatriated to his parent job. He retains his lien when he comes to India. He lends his experience to MSAS in India as an employee of MSCo as he re- tains his lien and in that sense there is a service PE (MSAS) under Article 5(2}(1). We find no infirmity in the ruling of the ARR on this aspect. In the above situation, MSCo is rendering services through its employees to MSAS. Therefore, the Department is right in its contention that under the above situation there exists a Service PE in India (MSAS). Accordingly, the civil appeal filed by the Department stands partly allowed. “

In Centrica india Offshore (P.) Ltd. [CIOPL], [2012] 19 taxmann.com 214 (AAR), the AAR held as follows:

“29. …. We have found in this case that the employees continue to be the employees of the overseas entities and their employer continues to be the overseas entity concerned.  the  employees  are  rendering  services  for their employer in india by working for a specified pe- riod for a subsidiary or associate enterprise of their employer. We are of the view that this will give rise to a service Pe within the meaning of art.5 of the india-uK treaty, falling under article 5.2(k) thereof.”

In Morgan Stanley International Incorporated vs. DDIT, 2014-TII-186-ITAT-Mum-Intl, [mSii] the mumbai itat after considering the decision of SC in morgan Stanley’s case and the decision of the delhi high Court in CioPL’s case, held as follows:

“Thus, from the aforesaid decision it is amply clear that such deputed employees if continued to be on pay rolls of overseas entities or they continue to have their lien with jobs with overseas entities and are rendering their services in india, Service Pe will emerge.  This concept and the ratio has been strongly upheld by the hon’ble delhi high Court also. We therefore, hold that the seconded employees or deputationist working in india for the indian entity will constitute a Service PE in india.”

In addition, in the following cases of secondment also, it has been held that Service PE is constituted in India:

1.    [2014] 47 taxmann.com 283 (delhi – trib.) – JC Bam- ford Investments Rochester vs. DDIT IT

2.    [2014] 43 taxmann.com 343 (delhi – trib.) – DDIT IT vs. .C Bamford Excavators Ltd.

9.    implications of Service PE – Application of Article 12 vs Article 7

The mumbai itat in the case of Morgan Stanley inter- national incorporated (supra), in this regard after proper consideration of provisions of the article 12(6) of the India-USA DTAA, held as under:

“14. If we accept this concept that, by virtue of deputing seconded employees in india, the assessee has established a Service PE, then whether such a payment made by indian entity to the assessee, (even though it is reimbursement of salary cost), would be taxable under article 12(6) of india –US DTAA.
…….
Para 6 of article 12 makes it amply clear that tax- ability of ‘royalty’ and ‘fees for included services’ shall not apply, if the resident of the contracting state (uSa) carries on the business in other con- tracting states (india) in which FIS arises through Pe situated therein, then in such case the provisions of article 7 i. e., “Business Profits” shall apply.  In other words, if there is a PE, then royalty or FIS cannot be taxed under article 12, albeit only under article 7 of the dtaa. It is an undisputed fact in this case, that DTAA benefit has been availed by the assessee and therefore, treaty benefit has to be given to the assessee for granting relief. Now, if the taxability of such payment has to be examined and determined on the basis of computation of business profit under Article 7, then the salary paid by the assessee would amount to cost to the assessee, which is to be allowed as deduction while computing the business profit of the Pe in india. in our opinion, if logical conclusion of the decision of the hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of morgan Stanley & Co (supra) and the decision of the hon’ble delhi high Court in the case of Centrica india offshore (P.) Ltd. (supra) is to be arrived at, then the seconded employees will constitute Service Pe of the assessee in india and in that case any payment received on account of rendering of service of such employees will have to be governed under article 7 as per unequivocal terms of para 6 of article 12. Thus, the ratio laid down in the decision of hon’ble delhi high Court, will not help the case of the revenue, in any manner because under the concept of PE, FIS cannot be taxed under article 12, but only as a business profit under Article 7. It is very interesting to note that, similar provision is also embodied in the india-Canada DTAA in para 6 of Article 12, but this issue was neither raised or brought to the notice before the Hon’ble Delhi High Court nor it was contested by either parties. There is inherent contradiction in this concept, as in most of the treaties, exclusionary clause like Article 12(6) has been embodied, which makes the issue of taxability of FTS of FIS in such cases as non applicable and have to be viewed from the angle of Article 7. Thus, the decision of the hon’ble delhi high Court and all other decisions relied upon by the revenue will not apply in the case of the assessee, as nowhere the concept of para 6 of article 12 have been taken into account for determining the taxability of such a payment under the provisions of treaty. Thus, in our conclusion, the payment made by the indian entity to the assessee on account of reimbursement of salary cost of the seconded employees will have to be seen and examined under Article 7 only, that is, while computing the profits under Article 7, payment received by the assessee is to be treated as revenue receipt and any cost incurred has to be allowed as deduction because salary is a cost to the assessee which is to be allowed. Accordingly, the AO is directed to compute the payment strictly under terms of Article 7 and not under Article 12 of the DTAA. in view of the aforesaid finding, the grounds raised by the assessee is treated as allowed.”

Thus, as per mumbai itat in MSII’s case, on application of article 7 in cases of Service Pe, the salaries of the seconded employees reimbursed to the overseas entity, would not be taxable in india as taxation of the Service Pe under article 7 would be on ‘net’ basis and the amount of salaries reimbursed by the indian entity would be allowable as deduction, leading to nil income of overseas entity in india.

Assuming some adjustment or addition of mark up on account of transfer pricing, the net impact would be restricted to taxation of the mark up amount.

Even if it is held that the nature of payment is that of fees for technical services, still the taxability thereof would be on net basis under section 44DA of the act, as the same would be effectively connected to a Service PE in india.

10.    Implications of the absence of ‘Service PE’ clause in a Treaty

It is pertinent to note that the conclusion reached by the mumbai itat in mSii’s case, is in the context of india-uSa dtaa, which has a ‘Service PE’ clause in article 5 relating to Permanent establishment. Similarly, in case of 37 more dtaas signed by india, there is Service PE clause in article 5.

A question arises for consideration is, whether in case of countries with which india has a dtaa but not hav- ing a ‘Service Pe Clause’ in the article 5 of the DTAA, whether such secondment payment, would still be not taxable either as ‘reimbursement of expenses’ or as not falling within definition of the ‘FTS’ [due to absence of the words ‘managerial’ or the phrase ‘including through the provision of services of technical or other personnel’] of given in the respective DTAA.

It is interesting to note that so far such no such case has come up for consideration before any judicial authority and therefore, no judicial guidance is available on this issue.

11.    Implications in case of payment to entity in case of non-treaty country

In case of non-treaty countries, the provisions of the income-tax act, 1961 would be applicable and the taxability of such reimbursement of salaries of the seconded employees, would be decided accordingly. No judicial guidance is available on this issue also.

12.    Summation
However, the fundamental issue  which  requires  proper consideration is where services rendered by seconded employee to an indian entity should be considered to be rendered in an employment relationship (contract of service) or such services should be considered to be rendered under a contract for the provision of services between two separate enterprises (contract for services). In our view, on proper appreciation and application of the oeCd Commentary on article 15 quoted above, in deciding the taxability of reimbursement of remuneration and costs of the seconded employees in the hands of the overseas entity, the entire controversy on the issue can be amicably settled in favour of the tax- payer as the entire remuneration has already borne taxation in india in the hands of the employee and such an interpretation would avoid double taxation of the same payment.

The “Other Method” – A Flexible Recourse?

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Background
Transfer pricing provisions in section 92 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’) prescribe that the arm’s length price (‘ALP’) of international/specified domestic transactions between associated enterprises (‘AEs’) needs to be determined having regard to the ALP, by applying any of the following methods:

– Price-based methods: Comparable Uncontrolled Price (‘CUP’) Method
– Profit-based methods: Resale Price Method (‘RPM’), Cost Plus Method (‘CPM’), Profit Split Method (‘PSM’) and Transactional Net Margin Method (‘TNMM’)
– A ny other prescribed methods

 The provisions of the Act prescribe the choice of the most appropriate method having regard to the nature of the transaction, availability of relevant information, possibility of making reliable adjustments, etc., and do not prescribe a hierarchy or preference for any method. Given the concern that it is not possible to obtain reliable comparable financial data in the public domain, in the case of a number of transactions between associated enterprises (including inter-alia, unique transactions, where the determination of independent third party comparables is a major challenge), the OECD member countries as well as non-member OECD countries needed to have recourse to a more “flexible” method, which in essence establishes a better standard of arm’s length transfer prices between associated enterprises, given its purposive application.

Internationally, Para 2.9 of the OECD Guidelines permitted the use of the “other method” and states that the taxpayers retain the freedom to apply methods not described in the guidelines to establish prices provided those prices satisfy the arm’s length principle. Furthermore, it also states the following:

– Such other methods should however not be used in substitution for OECD-recognised methods where the latter are more appropriate to the facts and circumstances of the case.

– In cases where other methods are used, their selection should be supported by an explanation of why the other recognised methods were rejected and the reason why the other method was regarded as more appropriate.

– Taxpayers should maintain and be prepared to provide documentation regarding how their transfer prices were established

The US Regulations also approve the use of so-called unspecified methods and discuss some parameters and situations where the unspecified method could be applied. The same are listed below:

– The unspecified method should provide information on the prices or profits that the controlled taxpayer could have realised by choosing a realistic alternative to the controlled transaction

– The unspecified method will not be applied unless it provides the most reliable measure of an arm’s length result under the principles of the best method rule. Therefore, a method that relies on internal data rather than uncontrolled comparables will have reduced reliability.

Probably taking cue from the above, the Central Board of Direct taxes (CBDT) prescribed the use of the “sixth method”/“the other method” for the purposes of comparison under the Indian transfer pricing regulations, in notification no. 18/2012 issued on 23rd May 2012.

2. Deconstructing the statutory provisions – Rule 10AB

The CBDT prescribed the use of the “other method” by introducing Rule 10AB of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 which reads as under:

“ Other method of determination of arm’s length price:

10AB. For the purposes of clause (f) of sub-section (1) of section 92C, the other method for determination of the arm’s length price in relation to an international transaction or specified domestic transaction shall be any method which takes into account the price which has been charged or paid, or would have been charged or paid, for the same or similar uncontrolled transactions, with or between non-associated enterprises, under similar circumstances, considering all relevant facts.”

The authors have identified some frequently asked questions in respect of the various nuances considering the application of the “other method” and laid down points for consideration below:

3. Application of the Other Method
In view of the above analysis of Rule 10AB, the use of the sixth method in benchmarking certain unique transactions (especially considering the amendments to the definition of international transactions u/s. 92B of the Act and the introduction of specified domestic transactions u/s. 92BA of the Act) in a few illustrative cases can be considered as under:

Conclusion
The Other Method is undoubtedly a flexible recourse for taxpayers to consider and apply various plausible comparability indicators/alternatives other than the ones prescribed under the statute, in order to compare controlled transactions (whether or not unique) with associated enterprises. Furthermore, the intention of the Tribunals as regards the application of the Other Method with retrospective effect (given its curative intent) and supporting its “purposive interpretation” to cover the expanded definition of “price” is positively appreciated, however, there may be consequent challenges, by the Revenue Authorities, to the application of the other method, especially in cases where ad hoc attributions or allocations are made to the profits/incomes of Indian taxpayers. In the absence of uncontrolled comparables, the Revenue Authorities could argue that the application of the Other Method as the most appropriate method accords a flexibility to use their own “formula based mechanism” of allocation of prices/profits, as opposed to the transfer pricing methodology selected by taxpayers. Accordingly, taxpayers would be required to consider all these aspects and maintain the right level of documentation to substantiate their claims.

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