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[2013] 145 ITD 491(Mumbai- Trib.) Capital International Emerging Markets Fund vs. DDIT(IT) A.Y. 2007-08 Order dated- 10-07-2013

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i. Capital Loss from share swapping is allowed.

Facts:
Assessee-company, a Foreign Institutional Investor, was engaged in business of share trading.

The assessee received shares in ratio of 1 : 16 shares held by it in a company. This resulted in long term capital loss. AO disallowed the assessee’s claim of long term capital loss, on swap transaction. When the matter was referred to DRP, it was held that no sound reason was furnished by the assessee to explain as to why it entered in an exchange transaction that resulted in huge loss, that no prudent businessman would enter in to such a transaction, that swap ratio of shares transacted was not done by the competent authority i.e. a merchant banker.

Held:
Swapping of shares was approved by an agency of Govt. of India i.e. FIPB and it had approved the ratio of shares to be swapped. In these circumstances to challenge the prudence of the transaction was not proper. Even if the transaction was not approved by the Sovereign and it was carried out by the assessee in normal course of its business, the Ld AO/DRP could not question the prudence of the transaction. Genuiuness of a transaction can be definitely a subject of scrutiny by revenue authorities, but to decide the prudence of a transaction is prerogative of the assessee. A decision as to whether to do / not to do business or to carry out/not to carry out a certain transaction is to be taken by a businessman. If it is proved that a transaction had taken place, then resultant profit or loss has to be assessed as per the tax statutes. Therefore by casting doubt about the prudence of the transaction, members of the DRP had stepped in to an exclusive discretionary zone of a businessman and it is not permissible.

ii. Set off of short term capital loss subject to STT allowed against short term capital gain not subjected to STT

Facts:
Assessee has claimed set off of short-term capital loss subjected to Securities Transaction Tax(STT) against the short-term capital gains that was not subjected to STT. The AO held that as both the transactions were subject to different rates of tax, the set off of loss is not correct. He held that in order to set off the short term capital loss, there should be short term capital loss and short term capital gain on computation made u/s. 48 to 55. The assessee was entitled to have the amount of such short term capital loss set off against the short term capital gain, if any, as arrived under a similar computation made for the assessment year under consideration.

Held:
The phrase “under similar computation made” refers to computation of income, the provisions for which are contained u/ss. 45 to 55A of the Act. The matter of computation of income was a subject which came anterior to the application of rate of tax which are contained in section 110 to 115BBC. Therefore, merely because the two sets of transactions are liable for different rate of tax, it cannot be said that income from these transactions does not arise from similar computation made as computation in both the cases has to be made in similar manner under the same provisions. The Tribunal therefore, held that short term capital loss arising from STT paid transactions can be set off against short term capital gain arising from non SIT transactions.

Note: Readers may also read following decisions of Mumbai Tribunal:

• DWS India Equity Fund [IT Appeal No. 5055 (Mum.) of 2010]

• First State Investments (Hong Kong) Ltd. vs. ADIT [2009] 33 SOT 26 (Mum)

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Natural justice – Bias – Judicial conduct– No one can act in judicial capacity if his previous conduct gives ground for believing that he cannot act with an open mind or impartially

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Narinder Singh Arora vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) 2012 (283) ELT 481 (SC)

The Appellant had filed a complaint against the Respondents. Subsequently, the charges were framed against the Respondents u/s. 498A, 304B read with section 34 and Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code by Shri. Prithvi Raj, learned Additional District & Sessions Judge dated 15-05-1995. Thereafter, the case was listed before Shri. S.N. Dhingra, Additional Sessions Judge for the trial, however, the learned Judge had recused from hearing the matter for personal reasons vide Order dated 25-09-2000.

Accordingly, the case was withdrawn from the Court of Shri. S.N. Dhingra, Additional Sessions Judge and transferred to the Court of Shri. S.M. Chopra, Additional Sessions Judge vide the Order dated 29-09- 2000 of the Sessions Judge. Eventually the accused Respondents were tried and acquitted vide judgment and Order dated 22-03-2003 passed by Ms. Manju Goel, Additional Sessions Judge. Being aggrieved by the judgment and Order, the Appellant preferred a revision petition before the High Court. The same was dismissed vide impugned final judgment and Order dated 01-09-2010 passed by learned Judge, Shri. Justice S.N. Dhingra.

The Court observed that it is apparent that the fact of earlier recusal of the case at the trial by learned Shri Justice S.N. Dhingra himself, was not brought to his notice in the revision petition before the High Court by either of the parties to the case. Therefore, Shri Justice S.N. Dhingra, owing to inadvertence regarding his earlier recusal, has dismissed the revision petition by the impugned judgment. In our opinion, the impugned judgment, passed by Shri Justice S.N. Dhigra subsequent to his recusal at trial stage for personal reasons, is against the principle of natural justice and fair trial. It is well settled law that a person who tries a cause should be able to deal with the matter placed before him objectively, fairly and impartially. No one can act in a judicial capacity if his previous conduct gives ground for believing that he cannot act with an open mind or impartially. The broad principle evolved by this Court is that a person, trying a cause, must not only act fairly but must be able to act above suspicion of unfairness and bias.

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[2013] 145 ITD 111 (Hyderabad – Trib.) SKS Micro Finance Ltd. vs. DCIT A.Y. 2006-07 & 2008-09 Order dated- 21-06-2013

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Section 32 – Assessee acquired entire business of ‘S’ – Depreciation claimed by assessee on acquisition of rights of clients of ‘S’ contending that consideration paid towards transfer of clients was an intangible asset eligible for depreciation – AO and CIT(A) disallowed the claim holding that the right acquired was not an intangible asset – Tribunal held that by acquiring the customer base the assessee has acquired business and commercial rights of similar nature and hence eligible for depreciation.

Facts:
The assessee was engaged in the business of Micro Financial Lending Services through small joint liability groups and direct micro loans. The assessee entered into memorandum of understanding (MOU) with ‘S’, another company which was also engaged in the business of micro finance and acquired the entire business of ‘S’. This also included the acquisition of rights over more than 1.10 lakhs existing clients of ‘S’. The assessee claimed depreciation on the amount contending that the consideration paid to ‘S’ towards transfer of clients was for an intangible asset eligible for depreciation. It was contended that the customers were a source of assured economic benefits over the next 5 years and in that process, the assessee capitalised the cost in the books and amortised the cost over a period of 5 years.

The AO disallowed depreciation holding that the intangible asset claimed to have been acquired by the assessee does not come under any of the identified assets appearing in the depreciation schedule (intangible asset) i.e. know-how, patents, copy rights, trade marks, licenses, franchises or any other business or commercial rights of similar nature. The AO held that as the assessee had acquired part of the already existing business of ‘S’, the said asset had not been created during the course of business of the assessee and hence cannot be considered to be a business or commercial rights of similar nature.

The CIT (A) held that the customer base acquired by the assessee cannot be considered a licence or business or commercial right of similar nature as it does not relate to any intellectual property whereas section 32(1)(ii) contemplate depreciation in respect of those licenses or rights which relate to intellectual property.CIT(A) relied on decision of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in case of CIT vs. Techno Shares & Stocks Ltd. [2009] 184 Taxman 103.

Held:
The customer base acquired by the assessee has provided an impetus to the business of the assessee as the customers acquired are with proven track record since they have already been trained, motivated, credit checked and risk filtered. They are source of assured economic benefit to the assessee and certainly are tools of the trade which facilitates the assessee to carry on the business smoothly and effectively. Therefore, by acquiring the customer base the assessee has acquired business and commercial rights of similar nature.

The Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of Areva T & D India Ltd. ([2012] 345 ITR 421) while interpreting the term “business or commercial rights of similar nature” has held that the fact that after the specified intangible assets the words “business or commercial rights of similar nature” have been additionally used, clearly demonstrates that the Legislature did not intend to provide for depreciation only in respect of specified intangible assets but also to other categories of intangible assets. In the circumstances, the nature of “business or commercial rights” cannot be restricted to only know-how, patents, trade marks, copyrights, licences or franchisees. All these fall in the genus of intangible assets that form part of the tool of trade of an assessee facilitating smooth carrying on of the business.

The CIT(A) while coming to his conclusion had relied upon the decision of the Bombay High Court in case of CIT vs. Techno Shares & Stock Ltd. wherein the High Court while considering the issue of transfer of membership card of Bombay Stock Exchange has held that it does not Constitute an intangible asset. However, this decision of the High Court has been reversed by the Supreme Court in the case of Techno Shares and Stocks Ltd. vs. CIT [2010] 327 ITR 323. The SC has held that intangible assets owned by the assessee and used for the business purpose which enables the assessee to access the market and has an economic and money value is a “licence” or “akin to a licence” which is one of the items falling in section 32(1) (ii) of the Act.

Based on all the above decisions, it was held that the specified intangible assets acquired under slump sale agreement were in the nature of “business or commercial rights of similar nature” specified in section 32(1)(ii) of the Act and were accordingly eligible for depreciation under that section.

Readers may also read Mumbai Tribunal decision in case of India Capital Markets (P.) Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT [2013] 29 taxmann.com 304/56 SOT 32 (Mum.)

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2013-TIOL-802-ITAT-AHD Kulgam Holdings Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT ITA No. 1259/Ahd/2006 Assessment Years: 2002-03. Date of Order: 21.06.2013

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S/s. 28, 45 – For the purpose of deciding whether the Deep Discount Bond is a short term capital asset or a long term capital asset the holding period has to commence from the date of allotment of the DDB and not from the date of its listing on the National Stock Exchange.

Income does not accrue on a day to day or year to year basis on Optionally Fully Convertible Premium Notes where the terms of the issue provide that the holder of OFCPN could only in the last quarter of the 5th year decide to convert or not to convert the OFCPN into equity shares and in the event of his deciding not to convert the OFCPN into equity shares becomes entitled to Face value being a sum greater than issue price.

Facts I:

On 18-03-2002, the assessee sold 330 Deep Discount Bonds (DDBs) Series A of Nirma Ltd. of Rs. 330 lakh for a consideration of Rs. 4,02,92,630. The DDBs were allotted to the assessee vide letter of allotment dated 28-07-2000. The debenture trust deed was dated 27-04-2001 and certificate of holding to the assessee was issued on 10-05-2001. These DDBs were made available for dematerialisation on 24-09- 2001 and were listed in NSE on 20-09-2001.

The surplus arising on sale of DDBs was returned by the assessee as long term capital gain and benefit of section 54EC was claimed.

The Assessing Officer held that for deciding whether the DDBs are long term capital asset or short term capital asset the holding period should commence from the date of listing of the DDBs on NSE and not from the date of allotment as was the case of the assessee. He, accordingly, considered the gain to be short term capital gain and denied the benefit of section 54EC of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held I :
The Tribunal observed that in the case of Karsanbhai K. Patel (HUF) (ITA No. 1042/Ahd/2006 dated 09-10- 2009; assessment year 2002-03) the Tribunal was considering an identical issue on identical facts. In the said case, the Tribunal held that the period of holding has to be counted from the date of allotment. Following the ratio of the said decision, the Tribunal held that the holding period be counted from the date of allotment. If the holding period was counted from the date of allotment, in the present case, the gain arising on transfer of DDBs would be long term capital gain and the assessee would be entitled to claim benefit of section 54EC. The Tribunal decided the issue in favor of the assessee.

Fact II:

The assessee held Optionally Fully Convertible Preference Notes (OFCPN) of Nirma Industries Ltd. which were acquired by the assessee on 25- 03-2002 i.e. after the date of issue of CBDT Circular No. 2 dated 15-02-2002. The assessee was following mercantile system of accounting.

The OFCPN were of the face value of Rs. 33,750 and were issued for Rs. 25,000. The Tenure was five years from the date of allotment. The terms of the issue provided that the investor had an option to put the OFCPN in the last quarter of 5th year. The investor also had an option to convert each of the OFCPN at the end of 5th year from the date of allotment into 2,500 equity shares of Rs. 10 each at par but no interest would be payable till maturity. If the assessee opts for conversion, it would get 2,500 equity shares of Rs. 10 each at par in lieu of one OFCPN of issue price of Rs. 25,000 and the assessee will not get any monetary gain in the form of interest or otherwise and only if the assessee does not exercise this option then the assessee will get Rs. 33,750 after the expiry of the period of 5 years from the date of allotment.

In view of the terms of the issue, the assessee was of the view that no interest accrued on day to day basis or on year to year basis. However, the Assessing Officer (AO) made an addition of Rs. 47,812 to the total income of the assessee on account of notional accrued interest on OFCPN.

This issue was raised as an additional ground and was admitted. The Tribunal observed that since this issue was not raised before the lower authorities normally it would be restored to the file of the CIT(A) or the AO but since a legal issue had to be decided as to whether as per the terms of the OFCPN of Nirma Industries Ltd., it can be said that any income is accruing on year to year basis or not and since the terms of the issue were before the Tribunal and also before the authorities below the Tribunal decided to decide the issue rather than restore it back to the file of the lower authorities.

Held II:

The Tribunal noted that, as per the terms of issue, in the initial 4 years, the assessee is not eligible to decide as to whether he is going to exercise the option of convertibility or not and such option is to be exercised only in the last quarter of the 5th year and the assessee will get shares at the end of the period of 5 years and no interest as such is payable till maturity even if the assessee does not opt for conversion. If the assessee does not opt for conversion into equity shares he will get Rs. 33,750 for each OFCPN after the expiry of period of 5 years from the date of allotment. The debentures are transferable during the period of 5 years and company is also eligible to purchase debentures at discount, at par or at premium in the open market or otherwise. Hence, in the earlier period also, if the assessee is not opting for conversion in the equity shares, the assessee can sell the debentures in the open market or to the issuer company and it is quite natural that in the open market, such debentures will command such price which will include offer price plus proportionate accretion on account of difference in the issue price and the face value which can be considered as interest although no such nomenclature is given for accretion in the issue details.

The Tribunal held that the issue details suggest that no income is guaranteed to the assessee even after 5 years period from the date of allotment if the assessee opts for conversion and the assessee will get the income being difference between the face value and the issue price only if such option of conversion is not exercised by the assessee which he can exercise only in the last quarter of 5th year. There was an argument forwarded by the learned DR that before the last quarter of the 5th year, the assessee has an option to sell these OFCPNs because these OFCPNs are transferable and in that situation, the assessee will get at least issue price plus proportionate accretion till date of transfer over and above the issue price. This may be correct but in our considered opinion, even in the light of these facts, it cannot be said that any income is accruing to the assessee on day to day or year to year basis. The OFCPN may be held by the assessee as investment or trading item. If the assessee is holding OFCPN as a trading item and till the same is sold by the assessee, it has to be considered by the assessee as closing stock which has to be valued at the cost or market price whichever is lower and in that situation, even if the market price is more than the cost price i.e. issue price, then also this income is not taxed till the sale takes place. Although, if the market price goes down below the cost price i.e. issue price then in that situation, the assessee can claim loss to that extent by valuing the closing stock of OFCPN at market price but in case the market price is more than the cost price, no income is accruing to the assessee till the same is sold.

In another situation, where the assessee is holding these OFCPNs as investment then also, the income if any in respect of such capital asset is taxable only as capital gain and that too after the capital asset in question is transferred by the assessee. Till the actual transfer takes place, neither any income is taxable in the hands of the assessee even if the market value of the asset has gone up nor any loss is allowable to the assessee even if market value of the asset has gone down. It is not the case of the AO that the assessee has sold or transferred these OFCPNs in the present year. In the absence of this, it cannot be said that any income has accrued to the assessee even if it is accepted that the market value of these OFCPNs till the last date of the present year is more than cost price i.e. issue price which can be issue price plus proportionate accretion and the difference between the face value and issue price.

We have already discussed that the nature of OFCPN is not that of a fixed deposit and it is also not of the nature of DDB because of convertibility option and uncertainty about receipt of any extra amount over and above the issue price. Even on conversion, shares are to be allotted at par and not at premium i.e. face value.
Considering all these facts, we hold that in the facts of the present case, it cannot be said that any income has accrued to the assessee on account of these OFCPNs of Nirma Industries Ltd. because no sale has taken place and there is no guaranteed income to the assessee even after 5 years in case the assessee opts for conversion into shares at par.

The Tribunal allowed this ground of appeal of the assessee.

2013-TIOL-885-ITAT-MUM Citicorp Finance (India) Ltd. vs. Addl. CIT ITA No. 8532/Mum/2011 Assessment Years: 2007-08. Date of Order: 13-09-2013

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Form 26AS – Department is required to give credit for TDS once valid TDS certificate had been produced or even where deductor has not issued TDS certificates on the basis of evidence produced by the assessee regarding deduction of tax at source and on the basis of indemnity bond.

Facts:
For assessment year 2007-08 the assessee claimed total credit for TDS of Rs. 21,51,63,912 – claim of Rs 16,52,09,344 was made in the original return and further claim of Rs 1,42,71,296 was made in revised return filed on 13-04-2009 and a claim of Rs. 3,56,83,272 was made vide letter, dated 28-12-2010, filed in the assessment proceedings. The Assessing Officer (AO) granted credit of TDS only to the tune of Rs. 11,89,60,393. The AO did not grant credit claimed because of discrepancy with respect to credit shown in Form No. 26AS.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who directed the assessee to furnish all TDS certificates in original before the AO and directed the AO to verify the claim of credit of TDS and to allow TDS as per original challans available on record or as per details of such TDS available on computer system of the department.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it was contended that credit of TDS has to be given on the basis of TDS certificates and in case TDS certificates are not available, on the basis of details and evidence furnished by the assessee regarding deduction of tax at source. Reliance was placed on the decision of Bombay High Court in the case of Yashpal Sawhney vs. ACIT (293 ITR 593). Reference was also made to the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Court on its own Motion vs. CIT (352 ITR 273).

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the credit of TDS has been denied to the assessee on the ground that the claim for TDS was not reflected in computer generated Form No. 26AS. It observed that the difficulty faced by the tax payer in the matter of credit of TDS had been considered by the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay in the case of Yashpal Sawhney vs. DCIT (supra) in which it has been held that even if the deductor had not issued TDS certificate, the claim of the assessee has to be considered on the basis of evidence produced for deduction of tax at source as the revenue was empowered to recover the tax from the person responsible if he had not deducted tax at source or after deducting failed to deposit with Central Government. The Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in case of Court on its Own Motion v. CIT (supra) have also directed the department to ensure that credit is given to the assessee, where deductor had failed to upload the correct details in Form 26AS on the basis of evidence produced before the department. Therefore, the department is required to give credit for TDS once valid TDS certificate had been produced or even where the deductor had not issued TDS certificates on the basis of evidence produced by the assessee regarding deduction of tax at source and on the basis of indemnity bond.

The Tribunal modified the order passed by the CIT(A) on this issue and directed the AO to proceed in the manner discussed above to give credit of tax deducted at source to the assessee.

This ground of appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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2013-TIOL-959-ITAT-DEL ITO vs. Tirupati Cylinders Ltd. ITA No. 5084/Del/2012 Assessment Years: 2004-05. Date of Order: 28.06.2013

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S/s. 148, 151, 292B – U/s. 151 approval for issue of notice u/s. 148 has to be granted only by the Joint Commissioner or the Additional Commissioner. If the approval is not granted by the Joint Commissioner or the Additional Commissioner but is instead granted/taken from the Commissioner of Income-tax then notice for reassessment issued u/s. 148 would not be valid and assessment done pursuant to such notice would be liable to be quashed.

Facts:
For the assessment year 2004-05, the assessee filed a return declaring income of 31-08-2004. The return was processed u/s. 143(1) of the Act. Subsequently a notice was issued u/s. 148 of the Act. In response to this notice, the assessee filed a letter asking the Assessing Officer (AO) to treat the return filed u/s. 139 to be a return in response to the said notice. In an order passed u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 147 of the Act, the AO made an addition of Rs. 10 lakh u/s. 68. In the order passed u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 147 the AO mentioned that no notice u/s. 143(2) of the Act was served to the assessee within the statutory time limit during the original assessment proceedings. In the reassessment proceedings, the AO had mentioned that as a matter of precaution permission of CIT was obtained.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who held that the reassessment to be null and void, since it was not in accordance with the provisions of the Act.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the Delhi High Court has in the case of CIT vs. SPL’s Siddhartha Ltd. (345 ITR 223)(Del) held that u/s. 151 of the Act it was only the Joint Commissioner or the Additional Commissioner who could grant the approval of the issue of notice u/s. 148 of the Act. The court has further held that if the approval was not granted by the Joint Commissioner or the Additional Commissioner and instead taken from Commissioner of Income-tax, then the same was not an irregularity curable u/s. 292B of the Act and consequently notice issued u/s. 148 was not valid.

Following this decision of the Delhi High Court, the Tribunal decided the issue in favor of the assessee and held that the reopening of assessment was not in accordance with law and was liable to be quashed.

The appeal filed by revenue was dismissed.

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Recovery of tax: Reduction of period for payment: Section 220(1) proviso: A. Y. 2010-11: Budget deficit of Income Tax Department is not a ground for reduction of period:

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Amul Research and Development Association vs. ITO; 359 ITR 549 (Guj):

The assessee is a charitable trust which enjoyed exemption u/s. 11 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. For the A. Y. 2010-11 exemption u/s. 11 was denied by an order u/s. 143(3) of the Act and a demand of Rs. 1,41,07,755/- was raised. A period of seven days was granted instead of statutory period of 30 days from the date of service of the notice as prescribed u/s. 220 of the Act. Assessee preferred an appeal and also filed stay application before Commissioner(Appeals). In the mean time, the Assessing Officer recovered a sum of Rs. 1,39,70,275/- from the bank account of the assessee on 28th March, 2013.

The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee, set aside the demand notice dated 13/03/2013, with a formal direction to the Revenue to refund the amount of Rs. 1,39,70,275/- by way of a cheque to be issued in favour of the assessee within two weeks and held as under:

“i) S/s. (1) of section 220 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, any amount otherwise than by way of advance tax, specified as payable in a notice of demand to be issued u/s. 156 of the Act, needs to be paid within 30 days of the service of the notice. However, the proviso to section 220(1) of the Act gives discretionary powers to the Assessing officer to reduce such period.

ii) Two conditions are required to be fulfilled before the Assessing officer resorts to this exception of the statutory period of 30 days. Firstly, he must have a reason to believe that the grant of the full period of 30 days would be detrimental to the interest of the Revenue and, secondly, prior permission of the Joint Commissioner requires to be obtained. The words “reason to believe” must have the same flavor as one finds in the case of exercise of powers by a reasonable man acting in good faith, with objectivity and neutrality based on material on record or exhibited in the order itself. The prior permission of the superior officer is to ensure that the powers are not exercised arbitrarily and there is a safeguard of a higher officer applying his mind independently to the issue in question when such belief is communicated by the Assessing Officer.

iii) If the demand is not likely to be defeated by any “abuse of process by the assessee”, belief cannot be sustained on the ground that availing of the full period would be detrimental to the interest of the Revenue.

iv) The reason given for reduction of the period for payment of taxes was that in the assessee’s place of assessment there was a budget deficit in the Income-tax Department. It was the budget deficit which was the very basis for making such a formation of belief. Another reason given was that the assessee had a rich cash flow and if the period of 30 days was reduced, the budget deficit would be met and the target set by the Department would be achieved.

v) The reasoning was contrary to the very object of introducing the proviso for giving discretion to the Assessing Officer. It clearly and unequivocally indicated that the Assessing Officer had completely misread the provision and his belief was neither of a reasonable man nor at all based on a rational connection with the conclusion of reduction of the period on account of it being detrimental to the Revenue.

vi) While issuing notice to the bank u/s. 226(3) of the Act for making payment, a notice has also to be given to the assessee which in this case was on the very day when the notice was issued to the bank. No opportunity had been given to the assessee for meeting such a notice issued to the bank. The sizeable amount of Rs. 1.39 crore had been withdrawn and deposited in the account of the Revenue on the very same day. Notice was an illusory and empty formality. This arbitrary exercise of withdrawal of amount from bank also required interference.

vii) Moreover, when the very action of the Assessing Officer was held to be contrary to the provisions of the law, the assessee’s not resorting to note (3) of the demand notice u/s. 156 of the Act or its having resorted to an alternative remedy was not bar to the court exercising the writ jurisdiction.”

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Cash credits: Section 68: A. Y. 1989-90: Meaning of “any sum”: No explanation regarding particular amount: Addition of sum in excess of such particular amount is not permissible u/s. 68:

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D. C. Rastogi vs. CIT; 359 ITR 513 (Del):

For the A. Y. 1989-90 the assessee could not satisfactorily explain cash entry to the tune of Rs. 15,17,060/-. The Assessing Officer was of the opinion that even the profits returned were not truly disclosed as were other sources of income. He, therefore, proceeded to reject the accounts and complete the assessment on an estimate basis. Accordingly, the Assessing Officer made an addition of Rs. 25 lakh over and above the specific amount of Rs. 15,17,060/-. The Commissioner (Appeals) reduced the estimation to Rs. 17 lakh. This was upheld by the Tribunal.

The Delhi High Court allowed the assessee’s appeal and held as under:

“i) In the case of section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, there cannot be any estimate even if for the rest of the accounts, such an exercise is validly undertaken. This is for the simple reason that the expression “any sum” refers to any specific amount and nothing more.

ii) U/s. 68 any amount other than one found credited in the account books of the assessee could not be estimated and charged to tax.”

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Capital gain: Business profits vs. Capital gains: S/s. 45, r.w.s. 28(i): A. Y. 2006-07: Conversion of stock-in-trade (shares) into investment in 2002 and 2004: Sale of such shares in relevant year: Profit is capital gain and not business income:

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Yatish Trading Co. (P.) Ltd. vs. CIT; 359 ITR 320 (Bom):

218 Taxman 316 (Bom): The assessee was engaged in the business of investments and also dealing in shares and securities. In the A. Y. 2006-07, the assessee declared income under the heads ‘profits and gains of profession’ and also under the head ‘capital gains’. The Assessing Officer noted that a part of the capital gains declared was in respect of transfer of shares/securities which were held by the assessee originally as stock-intrade as a dealer in shares/securities which were converted into investment by the assessee on 1st April, 2002 and 1st October, 2004. He held that the short term and long term gains arising out of the sale of shares which were held originally as stock in trade and converted into investments was to be treated as business income. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim. The Tribunal held that it is not in dispute that the conversion of its stock in trade into investment was accepted by the Department in A. Ys. 2003-04 and 2005-06. It is also not in dispute that the shares which were sold and gains from such sales were offered under the head capital gains from the date of conversion from stock in trade into investments and prior thereto as business profits. Further in its books of account the assessee showed the shares on which tax is levied under the head capital gain as investments. Further the fact that the assessee was trading in the shares would not estop the assessee from dealing in shares as investment and offer the gain for tax under the head capital gains. Thus, it is open to the trader to hold shares as stock in trade as well as investments.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Once the finding of fact is recorded that the shares sold were held by assessee as investments, the gains arising out of the sale of investment were to be assessed under the head capital gains and not under the head business profits.

ii) In view of the above, we see no question of law arises for our consideration. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.”

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Capital gain: Exemption u/s. 54F: A. Y. 2009- 10: Construction of new house commenced before the sale of ‘original asset’: Denial of exemption u/s. 54F not proper:

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CIT vs. Bharti Mishra; [2014] 41 taxmann.com 50 (Delhi):

The assessee, an individual, had sold shares and thereafter the sale proceeds of Rs. 54,86,965/- were invested in construction of house property. Exemption was claimed u/s. 54F of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer rejected the claim on the ground that the construction of the house had commenced before the date of sale of shares. The Tribunal allowed the claim of the assessee.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Section 54F(1) if read carefully states that the assessee being an individual or Hindu Undivided Family, who had earned capital gains from transfer of any long-term capital asset not being a residential house could claim benefit under the said section provided, any one of the following three conditions were satisfied; (i) the assessee had within a period of one year before the sale, purchased a residential house; (ii) within two years after the date of transfer of the original capital asset, purchased a residential house and (iii) within a period of three years after the date of sale of the original asset, constructed a residential house.

ii) For the satisfaction of the third condition, it is not stipulated or indicated in the section that the construction must begin after the date of sale of the original/old asset. There is no condition or reason for ambiguity and confusion which requires moderation or reading the words of the said s/s. in a different manner.

iii) Section 54F is a beneficial provision and is applicable to an assessee when the old capital asset is replaced by a new capital asset in form of a residential house. Once an assessee falls within the ambit of a beneficial provision, then the said provision should be liberally interpreted.

iv) In view of the aforesaid position, we do not find any merit in the present appeal and the same is dismissed.”

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Business expenditure: TDS: Disallowance: Royalty: Section 9(1) Expl. (2), 194J and 40(a)(ia): A. Y. 2009-10: Consideration for perpetual transfer for 99 yrs of copyrights in film is not “royalty”:

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Mrs. K. Bhagyalakshmi vs. Dy. CIT; 2013] 40 taxmann. com 350 (Mad):

The assessee is a person carrying on business in the purchase and sale of Telugu films. For the A. Y. 2009-10, the Assessing Officer, made a disallowance of Rs.7,16,15,000/- for non-deduction of TDS u/s. 194J of the Income-tax Act,1961 by invoking section 40(a) (ia) of the Act on the ground that the purchase of film rights fell under the term “Royalty” and that the agreement entered into between the assessee with respect to purchase of film rights was termed as an assignment agreement and the assignee of the satellite rights and the person who transferred such rights was the assignor and such rights were given for a period of 99 years. Therefore, the Assessing Officer held that it is not a sale but a mere grant of satellite right in the movie produced by the assignor and the payments made for transfer of such rights fall within the meaning of “Royalty”. The CIT(A) allowed the assessee’s appeal and held that the payments made by the assessee could not be termed as ‘Royalty’ as they are not covered by Explanation 2 to Clause (vi) of section 9(1) of the Act and the payment were covered by section 28 of the Act as trading expenses and there was no scope for invoking section 40(a)(ia) of the Act and therefore the CIT(A) held that the payments for acquiring of the film rights were not exigible for deduction of Tax at Source u/s. 194J of the Act as they did not qualify as ‘Royalty’. The Tribunal reversed the decision of the CIT(A) and upheld the disallowance.

On appeal by the assessee, the Madras High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) We have seen the various conditions contained in the sample transfer deed and there is a transfer of copy right in favour of the assessee. Though the agreement speaks of perpetual transfer for a period of 99 years, in terms of section 26 of the Copy Right Act, 1957, in the case of cinematographic film, copy right shall subsist until 60 years from the beginning of the calendar year next following the year in which the film is published. Therefore, the agreement in the case on hand, is beyond the period of 60 years, for which the copy right would be valid, the document could only be treated as one of sale.

ii) We have no hesitation to hold that the findings of the First Appellate Authority was perfectly justified in holding that the transfer in favour of the assessee as sale and therefore, excluded from the definition of “Royalty” as defined under clause (v) to Explanation (2) of section 9(1) of the Act.

iii) In the result, the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal shall stand set aside and the Tax Case(Appeal) is allowed.”

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Business expenditure: Capital or revenue: A. Ys. 1994-95 to 2004-05: Media cost paid for the import of a master copy of Oracle Software used for duplication and licensing is an expenditure of a revenue nature and as such is an allowable deduction:

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Oracle India (P.) Ltd. vs. CIT; [2013] 39 taxmann.com 150 (Delhi):

The Appellant company is a subsidiary of Oracle Corporation USA. The Appellant company entered into a licence agreement with its parent/holding company under which the Appellant was granted non-exclusive non-assignable right and authority to duplicate on appropriate carrier media software products or other products and sub-licence the same to third parties in India. The holding company retained the ownership of the copyright. For the relevant years the Assessing Officer disallowed the claim for deduction of the royalty paid to the holding company treating the same as capital expenditure. The Tribunal upheld the disallowance.

The Delhi Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal, allowed the assessee’s appeal and held that the expenditure was of revenue nature and as such an allowable deduction.

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Assessee in default: TDS: S/s. 194B and 201: A. Ys. 2001-02 and 2002-03: Non-deduction of TDS from lottery winnings in kind: Assessee not in default: Not liable u/s. 201:

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CIT vs. Hindustan Lever Ltd.; 264 CTR 93 (Kar):

The assessee company was engaged in manufacture and sale of certain consumer products. Under its sales promotion scheme the purchasers were entitled to prizes as indicated on the coupons inserted in the packs/containers of their products. The prizes were Santro car, Maruti car, gold chains, gold coins, gold tablas, silver coins, emblems etc. The total amount of prizes distributed valued at Rs. 6,51,238/- for A. Y. 2001-02 and Rs. 54,73,643 for A. Y. 2002- 03. The Assessing Officer held that what has been paid by the assessee as prize in kind is a lottery on which tax was deductible u/s. 194B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and treated the assessee as an assessee in default on the ground that the assessee neither deducted the tax nor ensured payment thereof before the winnings were released. Accordingly, the Assessing Officer raised a demand of Rs. 3,78, 550/- for the A. Y. 2001-02 and Rs. 17,73,902/- for A. Y. 2002-03 u/ss. 201(1) and 201(1A). The Tribunal cancelled the demand and held that there was no obligation on the assessee to deduct tax at source in respect of prizes paid in kind and in absence of any such obligation no proceedings u/s. 201 could be taken against the assessee.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) From the plain reading of the proviso to section 194B, it is clear that it does not provide for deduction of tax at source where the winnings are wholly in kind and it simply puts a responsibility to ensure payment of tax, where winnings are wholly in kind. In the present case, admittedly the winnings were wholly in kind.

ii) The combined reading of sections 194B and 201 would show that if any such person fails to “deduct” the whole or any part of the tax or after deducting, fails to pay the tax as required by or under this Act, without prejudice to any other consequences, which he may incur, be deemed to be an assessee in default in respect of the tax. In other words, the provisions contained in these sections do not cast any duty/responsibility to deduct the tax at source where the winnings are wholly in kind. If the winnings are wholly in kind, as a matter of fact, there cannot be any deduction of tax at source.

iii) The proceedings against the person u/s. 201, such as the assessee in the present case, who fails to ensure payment of tax, as contemplated by proviso to section 194B, before releasing the winnings, are not maintainable or the proceedings against such person are without jurisdiction.”

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Assessee in default: TDS: S/s. 192, 201(1) and 201(1A) : A. Y. 1992-93: Short deduction on account of bona fide belief: Assessee not in default: Not liable u/s. 201(1) and 201(1A):

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CIT vs. ITC Ltd.; 263 CTR 241 (All):

Assessee believed that conveyance allowance is exempt and accordingly computed TDS u/s. 192 excluding conveyance allowance. The Assessing Officer treated the assessee as assessee in default and raised demand u/s. 201(1) and also levied interest u/s. 201(1A). The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s appeal and cancelled the demand.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“Assessee was under bona fide belief that the conveyance allowance was exempt u/s. 10(14) and tax was not deductible at source and therefore assessee could not be treated as assessee in default for charging interest u/s. 201(1A) of the Act.”

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Export – Deduction u/s. 80HHC – DEPB credit – Matter remanded to the Assessing Officer in accordance with the law laid down in Topman Exports.

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The assessee was a manufacturer-exporter. For the assessment year 2003-04, the assessee filed return of income on 28th November, 2003, showing a total income of Rs. 1,79,80,000. The assessee also claimed deduction u/s. 80HHC of the Act. The claim of the assessee for such deduction included consideration of Rs. 1,54,67,000 upon transfer of the DEPB credit. The Assessing Officer was of the opinion that 90 % of such sum had to be excluded for the purpose of deduction u/s. 80HHC of the Act. He framed the assessment accordingly.

The assessee approached the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), who confirmed the decision of the Assessing Officer, holding that the entire amount received by the assessee towards consideration on transfer of the DEPB credits would be covered u/s. 28(iiid) of the Act. Ninety per cent of the such amount, therefore, had to be excluded for the purpose of working out of the deduction u/s. 80HHC of the Act. The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) observed that the treatment to the DEPB amount should be the same as that of duty draw back. In other words, the entire amount of the DEPB credit would be covered under section 28(iiid) of the Act. The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) was of the opinion that the cost of acquiring the DEPB credit to the assessee was nil.

The assessee carried the issue in appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal in the detailed judgment considered various aspects including the interpretation of various clauses of section 28, and in particular, clause (iiid) of section 28 and its co-relation to section 80HHC of the Act. The Tribunal was of the opinion that the face value of the DEPB would be the cost of its acquisition by the assessee. If the assessee sold such DEPB credit at a price higher than the face value, the difference would be the profit of the assessee which would be covered u/s. 28(iiid) of the Act. It is only this element which to the extent of 90 per cent be excluded for the purpose of working out section 80HHC deduction. The Tribunal also referred to Explanation (baa) to section 80HHC, by virtue of which, 90 % of the income referred to in section 28(iiid) of the Act is to be excluded from the total turnover of the assessee for the purpose of working out section 80HHC deduction.

The Revenue carried the matter to the High Court, which on combined reading of the Government of India policy providing for the DEPB benefits, the decision of the Bombay High Court in Kalpataru Colours and Chemicals (2010) 328 ITR 451 (Bom.) and the apex court, in Liberty India vs. CIT (2009) 317 ITR 218 (SC) concluded that the face value of the DEPB credit cannot be taken to be its cost of acquision in the hands of the assessee-exporter.

According to the High Court, the Tribunal committed an error in coming to the conclusion that on transfer of the DEPB credit by an assessee only the amount in excess of the face value therefore would form part of profit as envisaged in clause (iiid) of section 28.

Before the Supreme Court, the learned Additional Solicitor General for the Revenue, fairly submited that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Topman Exports vs. CIT [2012] 342 ITR 49 (SC), the civil appeal deserved to be allowed and the matter should be sent back to the Assessing Officer.

The Supreme Court for the reasons given in Topman Exports (supra) set aside the judgement and order of the Gujarat High Court and directed the Assessing Officer to compute the deduction u/s. 80HHC of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in the light of the observations made by it in Topman Exports.

Note: A similar decision was delivered by the Supreme Court in the case of Global Agra Products vs. ITO (2014) 360 ITR 117 (SC)

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MAT – A Conundrum unsolved..

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Synopsis

Minimum Alternate Tax (‘MAT’) was introduced as an alternative mode of tax with an intent to maintain minimum quantum of tax to be paid by the assessee – company which made profits but offered little or negligible income to tax by virtue of various deductions. While the methodology for computing MAT appears simple , the same has been under the subject matter of controversy due to interpretation of terms contained in section 115JB.

In the following article, the authors have analysed the treatment of a provision for the purposes of MAT and brought out the various dimensions of the issue.

1. Introduction

The era of MAT began as an ‘alternative mode’ of tax. With the efflux of time, the MAT regime has actually left us with no ‘alternative’ but to ‘tax’. Its objective is well known; although the text and content is vexed which often keeps the tax doyens perplexed. This complex provision has thrown out innumerable issues from its Pandora box. In this article, we have attempted to address one such issue through a case study.

2. Case Study

X Limited is an Indian company which acquired 1,00,000 equity shares of Y Limited for a consideration of Rs. 60 crore. In Year 1, X Limited created a “Provision for investment loss” amounting to Rs. 16 crore [by debiting the profit and loss account]. Cost of investment in the balance sheet was reduced to the extent of the provision (ie, Rs. 16 crore). The net loss as per the profit and loss account was Rs. 17 crore.

While computing the book profit under the provisions of section 115JB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (“the Act”), the Provision for investment loss (i.e. Rs 16 crore) was “added back” to net the loss as per the profit and loss account. The book loss (u/s. 115JB) for Year 1 was accordingly computed at Rs. 1 crore. The loss computed under the regular provisions of the Act was Rs. 50 lakh. The loss computed under regular provisions being lower than the book loss, the return of income for Year 1 was filed with the loss of Rs. 50 lakh.

Subsequently, in Year 2, X Limited sold the 100,000 equity shares in Y Limited for Rs. 68 crore. The sale resulted in a gain of Rs. 8 crore. X Limited recognised this gain as “Profit on sale of investment” in the Profit and loss account along with reversal of Provision for investment loss (pertaining to shares sold during the year) amounting to Rs. 16 crore. Cumulatively, profit on sale of investment recognised in financial statements added up to Rs. 24 crore [ie, 8 crore + 16 crore]. The company paid tax under the provisions of MAT (section 115JB) amounting to Rs. 2 crore [after reducing Rs. 16 crore from the net profit].

In this background, the write-up discusses the appropriateness of the MAT computation carried out by X Limited.

3. Case Analysis

MAT – General principles

Minimum Alternate Tax (“MAT”) computed u/s. 115JB is an alternative regime of taxation. The section provides for an alternate, nay an additional mechanism, of ‘computing the tax liability’ of an assessee apart from the normal computation. A comparison is made between tax payable under the normal provisions of the Act and the tax payable on “book profit”. The higher of the tax payable from out of the two computations would have to be discharged by the assessee company.

S/s. (1) to section 115JB requires a tax (at 18.5%) on book-profit to be compared with income-tax payable on the total income as computed under the Act. Section 115JB is an alternative tax mechanism. This is evident from the section heading which reads – “Special provision for payment of tax by certain companies”. It is thus a special provision for payment of tax. The intent of section 115JB is to maintain the minimum quantum of tax (at 18.5% on book profit) that an assessee-company should be liable to pay. If the tax u/s. 115JB is higher, the “book-profit” is deemed to constitute the total income of the Company.

‘Book Profit’ is defined in Explanation 1 to section 115JB. It is defined to mean the net profit as shown in the profit and loss account prepared as per s/s. (2) to section 115JB as reduced or increased by certain sums specified in the section. S/s. (2) requires the profit and loss account to be prepared in accordance with Parts II & III of Schedule VI of the Companies Act, 1956. In arriving at the net profit, therefore, the principles outlined in Parts II & III of schedule VI of the Companies Act, 1956, shall be followed [Apollo Tyres Ltd (2002) 255 ITR 273(SC) and CIT vs. HCL Comnet Systems & Services Ltd. (2008) 305 ITR 409 (SC)].

Explanation 1 outlines a process of additions and deletions of certain sums to the ‘net profit’ disclosed in the Profit and loss account. Judicial precedents indicate that these adjustments are exhaustive. No other adjustments apart from those outlined in the explanation can be made to the ‘net profit’ to arrive at the “book profit”.

Characteristics of book-profit

S/s. (1) to section 115JB envisages a comparison of taxes. If the tax on book profit is higher than the tax payable under the normal provisions of the Act, then, (i) such book-profit would be deemed to be the total income and (ii) the tax payable shall be the tax on book profit (at 18.5%). A two-fold deeming fiction is envisaged. The total income under the normal provisions is replaced with book profit and the tax payable under the normal provisions paves way for ‘tax on book-profit’. Thus, s/s. (1) visualises a 3 step-approach:

(i) The book profit should be an outcome of the computation envisaged in Explanation 1 wherein, net profit as per the profit and loss account is adjusted by the adjustments specified therein;

(ii) Tax on such book profit should exceed the tax on income under the normal provisions; and

(iii) On satisfaction of the twin characteristics above, the book profit is deemed as the total income and the tax on book profit shall be the tax payable by the assessee.

Step ‘(iii)’ is a natural consequence of steps ‘(i)’ & ‘(ii)’. S/s. (1) of section 115JB is operative only when steps (i) and (ii) result in step (iii). In other words, in the absence of book profit or if tax on income under the normal provisions exceeds or is equal to the tax on the book profit, the deeming fiction in step (iii) is not to be invoked. If step (i) and (ii) do not culminate in step (iii), the computation in step (i) [book profit computation] becomes relevant only for step (ii) [comparison] and not step (iii). This is because, the computation of total income under normal provisions is sustained and the occasion of its replacement by book profit does not occur/ arise.

In case the computation [of book profit] under step (i) results in a negative number (or book loss, step (ii) becomes inapplicable or irrelevant. The comparison envisaged in step (ii) is between ‘tax on total income’ and ‘18.5% on book profit’. A negative book profit will invariably result in tax on total income under the normal provisions not being lower than tax on book profits. This can be explained by looking at the twin possibilities below:

Case 1 – Positive total income and book loss

In the above case, tax on total income under the normal provisions (being a positive number) exceeds the “tax payable” on the negative book profit (or book loss) and consequently results in tax on total income under the normal provisions being higher than 18.5% of book profit. Accordingly, section 115JB(1) is not satisfied.

Case 2 – Nil total income and book loss

Particulars

Amount (Rs)

 

 

Total income under the normal provisions

Nil

 

 

Tax on total income (@ 30%) – (A)

0

 

 

Book loss

(20)

 

 

18.5% on book loss – (B)

(3)

 

 

Tax payable by the
assessee (Higher of A and B)

0

 

 

In the above case, tax on total income (being nil) exceeds the negative tax on the book profit (or book loss) and consequently results in tax on total income being higher than 18.5% of book profit. Accordingly, section 115JB(1) is not satisfied.
In both the situations, “tax” on total income un-der the normal provisions would exceed 18.5% on book loss (or negative book profit). It is a trite to state that ‘total income ’ could either be ‘positive’ or ‘nil’.There cannot be negative total income. Consequently, there cannot be a ‘tax in negative’. For section 115JB to operate, ‘18.5% of book profit’ should be higher than such tax. Even if ‘18.5% on book loss’ is taken to be ‘nil’ in both the aforesaid examples, tax on total income under the normal provisions would not be lower which is the primary condition for section 115JB to be invoked.

Creation of provision for investment loss

In the given case study, X Limited created ‘Provi-sion for investment loss’ which was added back (or adjusted) while computing the book profit u/s. 115JB. The company had filed its return of income in Year 1 with loss (computed under normal provisions of the Act) amounting to Rs. 50 lakh. This loss was lower than the book loss (u/s. 115JB) for Year 1 which was Rs. 1 crore.

Being a book loss, there was no occasion to compute ‘tax on book profit’. Comparison of taxes u/s/s. (1) was not possible. The total income and tax payable could not be deemed as ‘book profit’ and ‘tax on book profit’ respectively for Year 1. Accordingly, operation of section 115JB was not triggered. For Year 1, the ‘Provision for investment loss’ was added back (or adjusted) while computing the “book profit” u/s. 115JB. The net result of the computation was a loss.

The appropriateness of this treatment (i.e, adding back of the provision) can be examined by traversing through the various adjustments housed in Explanation 1. These adjustments can be bisected into ‘upward adjustments’ and ‘downward adjustments’ which increase and decrease the net profit respectively. The opening portion of the Explanation 1 reads – “For the purposes of this section, “book profit” means the net profit as shown in the profit and loss account for the relevant previous year prepared u/s/s. (2), as increased by…”.

The phrase used is ‘net profit’. The expression ‘net profit’ and ‘net loss’ are not synonymous and can-not be used interchangeably. One could argue that the Explanation 1 visualises only a ‘net profit’ and not a ‘net loss’. In other words, the adjustments contemplated under Explanation 1 are not operative where the net result of operation is a loss. This is because the threshold condition to ignite section 115JB, viz. ‘net profit’, is not satisfied.

Further, the opening portion of the Explanation 1 deals with ‘increase’ of ‘net profit’ by certain adjustments. The second portion which deals with downward adjustments deals with reduction of the net profit by certain adjustments. The phrase used therein is “reduced by”. Thus, the law envisages an ‘increase’ and ‘decrease’ of net profits. The legislature has not employed the phrase “adjusted by”. The phrases used in the Explanation 1 have specific connotations. They cannot be understood in any modified manner. This aspect is important because an adjustment which ‘increases’ a ‘net profit’ would arithmetically ‘decrease’ if the start point were to be a ‘net loss’. This opposite numerical consequence indicates that the adjustments in the first portion have to necessarily result in an increase in the base figure and the ones in the latter portion should cause a reduction. Accordingly, the law visualises only ‘net profit’ to be the start point or base figure [and not ‘net loss’].

In the present case study, the net loss as per Profit and loss account in the Year 1 was Rs. 17 crore. Existence of net loss thus excludes X Limited from the clutches of section 115JB. Accordingly, it could be argued that there was no need to carry out any computation u/s. 115JB.

Alternative view

If one were to adopt the aforesaid position [that MAT is operative only on ‘net profit’], then all loss making companies would be excluded from the gamut of MAT computation. Such interpretation, although may be literally correct, would defy the objective of MAT computation. This could encourage the practice of ‘skewing of profits’ or ‘window dressing’ of financial statements.

Having accepted that loss making companies are also subject to MAT provisions (like in the present case), one needs to understand whether the book profit computation carried out by X Limited for Year 1 is in accordance with Explanation 1.

Two adjustments which could be relevant in the present context are clause (c) and (i) of the first part of the Explanation 1. These clauses read as under:

(c)    the amount or amounts set aside to provisions made for meeting liabilities, other than ascertained liabilities

……

(i)    the amount or amounts set aside as provision for diminution in the value of any asset

As per clause (c) of Explanation 1, any provision for liability other than ‘ascertained liability’ is to be added to the net profit in order to arrive at the book profit for the purpose of section 115JB. A liability may be capable of being estimated with reasonable certainty though the actual quantification may not be possible. Even though estimation is involved, it would amount to a provision for ascertained liability. The intention of the legislature in inserting clause (c) is to possibly prohibit provision for contingent liability helping in reduction of the book profit. A provision for loss on investment should not be regarded as provision for meeting unascertained liability.

Prior to insertion of clause (i), there was no express provision which dealt with provision for diminution in the value of asset. It amply clarified by the Apex Court in the case of CIT vs. HCL Comnet Systems & Services Ltd. (2008) 305 ITR 409 (SC) that clause
(c)    does not deal with diminution in value of as-sets. The Court observed (although the decision was in the context of provision for doubtful debts) that a provision for doubtful debts is to cover up the probable diminution in value of asset (debtors) and is not provision for a liability. Thus, provision for diminution in value of assets cannot be equated with provision for liabilities. Consequently, clause (c) in Explanation 1 cannot be applied in cases where a diminution in value of investments is contemplated.

Subsequently, clause (i) in second part under Explanation 1 was inserted by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009, with retrospective effect from 01-04-2001. Acknowledging that clause (c) was not suitable to rope in provision for loss in the value of assets, clause (i) was inserted to achieve this objective. Clause (i) statutorily affirms the Apex Court decision that provision for diminution in value of assets is different from provision for liabilities.

Clause (i) employs the expression “provision for diminution in the value of any asset”. Both clause (c) and

(i)    use the term ‘provision’. This is possibly because a provision need not necessarily be for a liability and it could also be for diminution in the value of assets or for loss of an asset. This is discernible from the definitions/ description given in the ICAI literature and Company Law provisions. The word “provision” has not been defined in the Act. The Guidance Note on “Terms Used in Financial Statements” issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India defines the term ‘provision’ as under:

“an amount written off or retained by way of providing for depreciation or diminution in value of assets or retained by way of providing for any known liability, the amount of which can-not be determined with substantial accuracy.”

Paragraph 7(1) of Part III of old Schedule VI to the Companies Act, 1956
defines the term ‘provision’ as under:

“the expression ‘provision’ shall, subject to sub-clause (2) of this clause, mean any amount written off or retained by way of providing for depreciation, renewals or diminution in value of assets or retained by way of providing for any known liability of which the amount cannot be determined with substantial accuracy.”

From the above, one can discern that a provision need not necessarily be for a liability. It can also be provision for depreciation or diminution in value of assets. The Mumbai Tribunal in the case of ITO vs. TCFC Finance Limited (ITA No.1299/Mum/2009) held that provision for diminution in the value of investment has to be added for computing book profit, regardless of the fact whether or not any balance value of the asset remains. The Tribunal also defined the meaning of the term “diminution” in the following manner:

“In common parlance the word “diminution” indicates the state of reduction. The Shorter Oxford Dictionary gives the meaning of the word “diminution” as “the action of making or becoming less; reduction “. Accordingly, any provision made for diminution in the value of any asset, is to be added for computing book profit under the provisions of section 115JB”

In the present case-study, the provision was created against loss due to decrease in the realisable value of investment (i.e, shares in Y Limited). It signifies preparedness for a dip in the value of the asset (Y Limited shares). The provision for investment loss after the amendment to the statute would be covered within the precincts of clause (i).

Reversal of provision for investment loss in Year 2

In the present case study, X Limited sold 100,000 equity shares in Y Limited in Year 2 for a gain of Rs. 8 crore. The company reversed the provision for investment loss amounting to Rs. 16 crore. Conse-quently, Rs. 16 crore was included in net profits while computing the MAT liability. After reducing Rs. 16 crore from the net profit, the company discharged its tax liability under MAT.

There is no dispute around inclusion of Rs. 8 crore in the book profit [being gain from the sale of shares]. The question is whether while computing book prof-its under MAT, reversal of “Provision for investment loss” was to be ‘retained’ or ‘reduced’ from the net profits in ascertaining tax on book profit.

As already detailed, Explanation 1 outlines the computation of book profit involving certain additions and deletions (or adjustments) to the ‘net profit’. The start point of such computation is ‘Net Profit as shown in the Profit & Loss Account’. The adjustments contemplated in the definition include ones which increase such net profit (‘Upward Adjustments’) and items which reduce the net profit (‘Downward Adjustments’). One such ‘Downward Adjustment’ is amount withdrawn from any Reserve or Provision, if any such amount is credited to the Profit & Loss Account and had been instrumental in increasing the book profit for any earlier year. Clause (i) of the second part of Explanation 1 which houses this adjustment, reads as under:

(i)    the amount withdrawn from any reserve or provision (excluding a reserve created before the 1st day of April, 1997 otherwise than by way of a debit to the profit and loss account), if any such amount is credited to the profit and loss account:


Provided that where this section is applicable to an assessee in any previous year, the amount withdrawn from reserves created or provisions made in a previous year relevant to the assessment year commencing on or after the 1st day of April, 1997 shall not be reduced from the book profit unless the book profit of such year has been increased by those reserves or provisions (out of which the said amount was withdrawn) under this Explanation or Explanation below the second proviso to section 115JA, as the case may be;

Clause (i) read with the proviso appended to it mandates reduction of net profits by the amount withdrawn from any reserves/provisions if – (a) it is credited to the profit and loss account and (b) the book profit u/s. 115JA / 115JB for year in which such provision was created had been increased by the amount of such provision. In other words, reduction as per Clause (i) is permissible only on satisfaction of twin conditions. Firstly, the amount withdrawn is credited to profit and loss account and secondly at the time of ‘creation’ of reserve, the ‘Book Profit’ had been increased by the amount of the said with-drawal. This was the mandate of the Apex Court in the case of Indo Rama Synthetics (I) Limited vs. CIT (2011) 330 ITR 363 (SC). The ruling advocates a strict reading of the downward adjustment for withdrawal from reserve. The Supreme Court held that if the reserves created are not referable to the profit and loss account and the amount had not gone to increase the book value at the time of creation of the reserve; the question of deducting the amount (transferred from such reserve) from the net profit does not arise at all. The Apex Court held that the objective of clauses (i) to (vii) is to find out the true and real working result of the assessee company.

In the present case, X Limited had credited the re-versal of provision for investment loss to its profit and loss account in Year 2. The reversal of the pro-vision to the profit and loss account satisfies the first condition referred to above. On this, there is no dispute. The doubt is regarding the compliance of the second condition. X Limited has excluded such reversal while computing the MAT liability. To enable such exclusion, the said reversal (of provi-sion) should have ‘decreased’ the book losses in the year of its creation (i.e, Year 1). A reduction of book loss has the same effect as increase in book profit. Accordingly, the second condition is satisfied. The question is whether the said treatment is tenable? Can increase in book profits (in the year of creation) to the extent of provision created by itself, satisfy the stipulated condition? Does such increase necessarily have to culminate in tax being payable under the MAT regime? Should an increase in book profit (on creation of provision) necessarily be accompanied with a tax liability u/s. 115JB?

The answer to this issue has both ‘for’ as well as ‘against’ view points. The analysis would not be complete, unless both the possible views are captured. The following paragraphs discuss these viewpoints:

View I – Increase in book profits should result in payment of tax under MAT

As per this view -point, the increase in book profit should result in tax liability under the MAT provisions. If such increase does not culminate in tax being payable u/s. 115JB, then the reversal of such provision should not be reduced while computing the book profit.

In this regard, it may be relevant to peruse circular no.550 issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes explaining amendments to Income-tax Act vide Finance Act, 1989. The relevant portion of the same is as under:

“Amendment of the provisions relating to levy of minimum tax on ‘book profits’ of certain companies

24.4 Further, under the existing provisions certain adjustments are made to the net profit as shown in the profit and loss account. One such adjustment stipulates that the net profit is to be reduced by the amount withdrawn from reserves or provisions, if any, such amount is credited to the profit and loss account. Some companies have taken advantage of this provision by reducing their net profit by the amount withdrawn from the reserve created or provision made in the same year itself, though the reserve when created had not gone to increase the book profits. Such adjustments lead to unintended lowering of profits and consequently the quantum of tax payable gets reduced. By amending section 115J with a view to counteract such a tax avoidance device, it has been provided that the “book prof-its” will be allowed to be reduced by the amount withdrawn from reserves or provisions only in two situations, namely :—

(i)    if the reserves have been created or provisions have been made in a previous year relevant to the assessment year commencing before 1st April, 1988; or

(ii)    if the reserves have been created or provisions have been made in a previous year relevant to the assessment year commencing on or after 1st April, 1988 and have gone to increase the book profits in any year when the provisions of section 115J of the Income-tax Act were applicable.” (emphasis supplied)

The Circular clarifies that clause (i) is an anti-abuse provision. It was introduced to prohibit unintended lowering of profits and consequent reduction of tax payable. The intent was to induce parity in tax treatment in the year of creation and withdrawal of reserves. The objective is to plug-in tax leakage. The emphasis is on the payment of correct quantum of tax. The amendment seeks to impact the tax liability under MAT and not the mere arithmetic adjustment of book profit. In this background, it may be pertinent to observe the closing portion of the above quoted circular. It is clarified that the amount withdrawn from reserves or provisions is deductible in MAT computation only if (a) the reserves have been created or provisions have been made for the year on or after 1st April, 1988 and (b) have gone to increase the book profits in any year when the provisions of section 115J of the Income-tax Act were applicable. Twin conditions are visualised by the circular. The first relates to year of creation being on or after 01-04-1998 and the second mandates that the book profits should have been increased in the year in which section 115J is applicable. The latter condition thus requires not only enhancement of book profit but such increment has to occur in the year in which section 115J is applicable. MAT is “applicable” when the final discharge of tax happens under the regime of section 115J. The phrase “is applicable” has to be read in such context. Otherwise, it would have no meaning, as section 115J being a part of the statute would in any way be “applicable” to any company. The circular issued in the context of section 115J should also be applicable to section 115JB purposes, as in substance, the provisions are the same (More on ‘applicability’ of section 115JB later).

The latter condition of book profit enhancement accordingly has to occur in the year in which section 115JB is applicable. Section 115JB is an alternate tax regime. It is applicable only when the tax on book profits exceeds the tax on total income. If the tax on book profits does not ‘exceed’ tax on total income, section 115JB is not applicable.

To conclude, amount withdrawn from reserves or provisions is deductible in MAT computation only if (a) provisions have been made for the year on or after 01-04-1988; (b) such amount has gone to increase the book profit in the year in which taxes were payable under MAT regime (or section 115JB).

This view is supported by the Hyderabad tribunal in Vista Pharmaceuticals Ltd vs. DCIT (2012) 6 TaxCorp (A.T.) 27449 (Hyd). The issue before the tribunal was with regard to direction of the CIT to consider the interest waived to be included in the computation of book profit under section 115JB. The facts of the case were that the assessee computed its book profit u/s. 115JB at ‘nil’ after reducing the amount of interest waived by bank on the ground that it is the amount withdrawn from provision for interest to financial institutions debited to Profit and Loss account in earlier year now credited. The tribunal held as under:

“In the case of the present assessee, the amount withdrawn from reserve or provision i.e., waiver of interest cannot be considered as part of book profit since it was never allowed in the computation of book profit of the company in any of the earlier years since the company never had any book profit being sick industrial undertaking…….

It is also an admitted fact that in the earlier years there is no computation of book profit ex con-sequentia, there was no assessment with regard to computation of book profit u/s. 115JB of the Act. It was held in the case of Narayanan Chettiar Industries vs. ITO (277 ITR 426) that in respect of remission of liability no addition can be made un-less an allowance or deduction is allowed to the assessee in the previous year. Further in the case of Rayala Corporation Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT, 33 DTR 249, wherein it was held that returns for earlier years have been found defective by the Assessing Officer and declared to be nonest, as the assessee had failed to rectify the defect in spite of notice issued u/s. 139(9) of the Act, deduction of interest claimed in such returns cannot be deemed to have been allowed and, therefore, interest waived by bank cannot be charged u/s. 41(1) of the Act.

6.    Taking the clue from the above judgments, similarly, unless the provision created by the assessee towards interest liability is allowed as a deduction while computing the book profit u/s. 115JB, when the assessee writes back the same to the Profit and Loss A/c, then it should be considered for determining the book profit. It is nobody’s case that interest liability has been allowed as deduction in earlier years. In other words, an allowance or deduction has been made in earlier years in respect of interest liability while computing the book profit and writing back the same could be added to the book profit. A reading of clause (i) to Explanation 1 to section 115JB(2) gives the above meaning.” (emphasis supplied)

The Hyderabad Tribunal ruled that unless the provision increased the “book profit” in an earlier year, the write back of such provision should continue to be considered for determining the “book profit”. The Tribunal departed from the literal reading of clause (i) and the proviso therein. The clause (and the proviso) stipulates the increase in book profit in the year of creation of provision/reserve. The “increase” is not an exercise in vacuum but one which results in attraction and enhancement of book profit tax. The Tribunal opted to place reliance on the rationale in circular no.550.

In the present case, while computing book profit u/s. 115JB for Year 1, X Limited had decreased the net loss by the provision of Rs. 16 crore made for diminution in the value of investment. In Year 2, the company reversed Rs. 16 crore out of the above referred provision for investment loss.

The provision for investment loss was “added back” while computing book profit (in Year 1). However, there was no net profit as per Profit and loss account in that year. As already explained, in the absence of net profit, it could be argued that section 115JB is not applicable. Tax was also not discharged in that year u/s. 115JB. In effect, there is no addition of provision for diminution in value of investment allowance. Applying the principles of the circular and the Hyderabad Tribunal, X Limited has not suffered tax under MAT on creation of provision for investment loss. Consequently, reversal of such provision would continue to be included in book profits computation. Once section 115JB is not applicable in the year of creation of reserve, reversal of such provision cannot be excluded from book profit computation.

Further, the provision for diminution in value of investments did not result in any additional tax liability under the MAT computation. On the contrary, such provision has decreased/reduced income while computing the total income under the normal provisions of the Act. It is an ‘erosion of capital’ which resulted in a loss. Such loss was claimed as a charge against income chargeable to tax. Subsequently, these investments were sold at a price over and above the original cost of investments/ shares. To clarify:

X Limited purchased shares at Rs. 6,000.  A provision for diminution was created to the extent of Rs. 1,600.  This reduced the value of shares to  Rs. 4,400. On sale of shares at Rs. 6,800, X Limited made a capital gain of Rs. 2,400 [i.e, 6,800-4,400].  This gain of Rs. 2,400 consists of Rs. 800 (being its gain over and above the original cost of the asset) and Rs. 1,600 (being proceeds over and above the revised/ reduced cost of the asset). By creating a provision for Rs. 1,600, X Limited acknowledged and recognised that the value of investment had been eroded or vanished to such extent. Any   consideration exceeding the reduced value but not exceeding the actual cost would amount to ‘recoupment of loss’. It is a refurbishment of losses which were claimed as a charge against the profits in the earlier years.  Such refurbishment (of losses) would amount to income (in the year of reversal of provision).

Accordingly, one possible view is that reversal of provision for diminution in value of investment cannot be excluded under Clause (i) of the second part of Explanation 1 while computing book profits.

View II – Increase in book profits need not result in payment of tax under MAT

Literal interpretation
Clause (i) is permissible only on satisfaction of twin conditions – (i) amount withdrawn is credited to profit and loss account and (ii) at the time of ‘creation’ of reserve, the ‘Book Profit’ was increased by the amount of the said withdrawal. The mandate of the law is clear and unambiguous. Modern judicial approach to interpretation of statutes is often driven by literal rule. Laws and regulations are the intentions of legislators captured in words. Every statute must be read according to the natural construction of its words. The words of a statute are to be understood in their natural and ordinary grammatical sense. The aspect of allowance or deduction discussed by the Hyderabad Tribunal is deviation from the literal reading of the law. Nothing prevented the legislature to lay down law to this effect.  

View-I could result in absurd results Even otherwise, View I appears to revolve around whether the adjustment of provision for investment loss in the year of creation results in a positive book profits.  It could never be the intent of the law to discriminate between companies which have only a nominal value of book profits (post set-off of provision for investment loss) with those companies where the net loss is not completely wiped off by the provision for investment loss in the computation. This can be understood through the below explained illustration:

Particulars

Company A

Company B

 

 

 

Net loss as per Profit and loss

(10,000)

(10,000)

account for Year 1

 

 

 

 

 

Add: Provision for investment

10,100

9,900

loss

 

 

 

 

 

Book
profit/ (Loss)

100

(100)

If the aforesaid provision was reversed in Year 2, Company B would not be able to claim reduction in that year (if View I were to be followed). On the contrary, Company A which has a nominal book profit of Rs. 100 may be allowed reduction of pro-vision reversal in Year 2 (although one could argue that only proportionate reduction will be allowed). Such interpretation would result in unintended consequence.

View I results in tax on capital

In the present case study, consideration received on sale of shares (by X Limited) was over and above the historical or original cost of such shares. The differential between such sale consideration and original cost is a gain and has to be necessarily offered to tax. There is no dispute on this aspect. One could argue that consideration to the extent of reversal of provision is ‘capital’ in nature. This is because, such consideration (i.e, to the extent of reversal of provision) refills the vacuum created by provision. Levying a tax on such consideration would amount to a ‘tax on capital’. In essence, it would culminate in higher effective rate of tax on capital gains. The philosophy of MAT taxation was to provide for an alternate tax regime and not double taxation. A denial of reduction from book profit would compel the taxpayer to pay taxes on income which he never earned.

Section 115JB – wider applicability

Circular no. 550 clarified that the amount withdrawn from reserves or provisions is deductible in MAT computation only if (a) the reserves have been created or provisions have been made for the year on or after 1st April, 1988 and (b) have gone to increase the book profits in any year when the provisions of section 115J of the Income-tax Act were applicable. The latter condition thus requires not only enhancement of book profits but such increment has to occur in the year in which section 115J is applicable.

S/s. (1) to section 115JB deals with the ‘applicability’ of the provision. It is applicable to every “company”. If 18.5% of book profit of such company exceeds tax on its total income then, such amount (i.e, 18.5%) would be the tax payable and book profit would be the total income. Thus, section 115JB is applicable to every company but the liability to pay tax is only in case of certain companies. The ‘certain companies’ are those which are liable to tax under MAT. This is supported by the section heading which reads – “Special provision for payment of tax by certain companies”. Section 115JB deals thus deals with payment of tax ‘by certain companies’. In other words, section 115JB is ap-plicable to all companies but renders only ‘certain companies’[whose tax under MAT exceeds normal tax computation] as liable to tax u/s. 115JB.

Applying this proposition in the present case, section 115JB was applicable to X Limited in Year 1 [although there was a book loss]. The provision for investment loss was “added back” while computing book profits for that year. The adjustment resulted in a reduction of loss. A “reduction of loss” is effectively the same as “increase in profits”. Accordingly, reversal of such provision in Year 2 should be excluded from while computing book profits for the year.

One may, in this connection, refer to the decision of the Kolkata Tribunal in the case of Stone India Limited vs. Department of Income-tax [ITA Nos. 1254/ Kol/2010]. The Tribunal in this case had an occasion to deal with treatment of “Provision for diminution in value of investment” for the purposes of book profits u/s. 115JB. In this case, the assessee debited its Profit and Loss A/c for the year ended 31.03.2001 with certain provision for diminution in the value of investment. In computation of book profit u/s. 115JB of the Act the said provision for diminution in the value of investment was not added back to the book profit. Subsequently, out of the said provision, the assessee wrote back certain amount in the accounts for the year ended 31-03-2006. The question was whether the reversal of provision for diminution in the value of investment was deductible in computation of book profit for AY 2006-07. The Court observed –

“It is also observed that clause (i) of Explanation to section 115JB of the Act says that the amount withdrawn from any reserves or provisions created on or after 01- 04-1997, which are credited to the profit and loss account, shall not be reduced from the book profits, unless the books profits were increased by the amount transferred to such reserves or provisions in the year of creation of such reserves (out of which the said amount was withdrawn). In this case, provision for diminution in the value of investment Rs. 7,05,73,000/ – was created in the financial year 2000-01 relevant to assessment year 2001-02 but book loss of the said year was not appreciated by the said amount in the computation filed u/s. 115JB along with the return. As there is a loss of Rs. 30,008/- prior to providing of prior year adjustment and diminution in the value of investment, no addition has been made u/s. 115JB by the assessee in the assessment year 2001-02 on account of diminution in the value of investment….. and the

exceptional item on account of diminution in the value of investment has not been adjusted while computing the book profit u/s. 115JB. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the observation of the Ld. CIT(A)was not justified in directing the assessee…” (emphasis supplied)

In the aforesaid case, provision for investment loss was not added back to the net loss while computing the book profits. The same had been reversed in subsequent year. In the year of provision, there was a net loss. The assessee did not carry out any adjustment. The Tribunal therefore ruled that reversal cannot be reduced from the book profits. The basis or rationale for such decision is that the book profits were not adjusted or appreciated by the provision created.

The Tribunal appears to have laid emphasis on the ‘adjustment or appreciation’ of book profits. The conclusion of the tribunal was driven by the non-adjustment of book profits in the initial year. Applying the ratio of the Tribunal ruling, it appears that if an adjustment of “book profit” had been made in the year of creation of the reserve, it would suffice to exclude the reversal of provisions while computing book profit for a subsequent year.

4.    To conclude

X Limited had a net loss as per Profit and loss ac-count for Year 1. A view could be taken that MAT computation is not applicable in the year of loss and no adjustment contemplated u/s. 115JB is required. A better view would be that MAT provisions are applicable even in the year of loss and accordingly, adjustment of adding back provision for diminution in the value of investment in the Year 1 was appropriate.

As regards, exclusion of reversal of provision from book profit computation in Year 2, there are two views possible. View II appears to be appropriate and therefore reversal of provision should be excluded while computing book profits for Year 2.

5.    Fall out of view-ii

In the present case, there was a provision created for diminution in investment amounting to Rs. 16 crore in Year 1. Such provision reduced the profits (or increased the losses) for the year. Subsequently, in Year 2, such provision was reversed and credited to Profit and loss account. Such credit ‘enhanced’ the profits for the year. While computing book profit for MAT purposes, X Limited reduced such reversal of provision. Thereby ‘enhancement of profit’ was nullified. By this, MAT liability was reduced.

Due to the provision entry in Year 1, the brought forward loss of Year 2 was increased. This enhanced loss translated into an ‘(increased) deduction’ from book profits while computing MAT liability for Year 2.

This is due to a ‘downward’ adjustment as per clause
(iii)    of Explanation 1 to section 115JB which reads –
“the amount of loss brought forward or unabsorbed depreciation, whichever is less as per books of ac-count.” In this adjustment, the amount of brought forward losses (or business loss) is compared with unabsorbed depreciation loss; lower of the two is reduced in the book profits computation. The brought forward losses are to be adopted from the books of account. Consequently, an expense/ charge in the earlier years enhances the brought forward losses of the current year.

To sum-up, if View-II were to be adopted, X Lim-ited would avail dual benefit by – (i) reducing the book profits by amount of reversal in provision for diminution in value of investment and (ii) availing accelerated losses (depreciation or business loss whichever is less).

Spirituality in Worldly Life

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Generally, people believe that worldly life and spiritual life are two contradictory matters poles apart from each other. It is a common belief that spiritual living is not possible for a normal person leading a worldly life and worldly life inhibits one from leading a spiritual life. But this is a wrong belief. Spirituality is not something which one gets only by living in a cave or a dense forest. One can lead a spiritual life by remaining in the material world also. It is a mistake to believe that spiritual living is something which is reserved for only ascetics or monks who have renounced the world. Spirituality is science of the sciences and this world is an ideal laboratory for its practical application.

Unfortunately, most people ignore spirituality in their day to day living. In their opinion, whatever little charity or worship they do, is also a thing to be kept separate from their material life. The separation of the spirituality from our daily life is the root cause of diminishing values and erosion of ethical standards in society. Anarchy, corruption, war, disharmony, absence of law and order, tyranny, materialism, selfishness and consumerism are rampant today and due to our failure to synthesise the material life with spirituality. The world and the society is nothing but a group of individuals. When an individual lives his or her life bereft of spirituality, many vices like anger, violence, fear, hatred, greed, selfishness, envy, and enmity breed in him. Individual vices collectively surface on the stage called society and becomes the cause of society’s downfall. If we want to transform the world, establish high standards of ethics and remove vices from society, then we shall have to start with the inner transformation of the individual and only spirituality has the power of transforming that an individual.

Man is by nature self-centered and is interested in only those acts which benefit him. Even from this angle spirituality should be adopted by every individual because it is in the self interest and of immense benefit to persons who adopt it.

Every person is in pursuit of happiness and tries to find it in material wealth, fame and power. This erroneous pursuit for happiness ultimately robs him of peace and happiness and gives restlessness and pain. Many times, these material possessions become the cause of unhappiness.

This physical world is governed by some subtle universal and natural laws established by the Supreme Power whom we call God. Not having the awareness and understanding of these laws, man tries to seek happiness in their breach. These subtle laws are unchanging and autonomous. These laws are:-

1. As you sow, so you reap.
2. You receive what you give.
3. The fruit of the action is according to the intention behind it.
4. What you do unto others shall be done unto you.
5. Every action has a reaction.
6. Every sin shall be punished and every good deed shall be rewarded.

Everyone has heard of the simple laws described above. However, what is important is living these laws. Our universe is governed by these laws but we do not understand this due to our shortsightedness and impatience. Today, we find many persons achieving material success by unethical and dishonest ways. This results in our not believing in the importance of purity of means for material success.

In fact, one gets peace and joy only by living in harmony with these laws. Every material success can be attained by living according to these subtle laws. Spiritual living means practicing ethics and values and living in harmony with the voice of our conscience.

A question naturally arises to us – what about our life hitherto lived in disharmony with these laws? Let us accept that man is imperfect. It is natural for him to commit mistakes. The issue is, is there no respite for the mistakes committed? The answer is “better late than never”. These laws are meant for aspiring us to move towards perfection from imperfection and not to punish us.

I would like to end by quoting Swami Vivekananda, who always advocated practice more than theory. He has said, “Hindu religion does not consist in struggles and attempts to believe in certain doctrine or dogma, but in realising; not in believing, but in being and becoming.”

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Penalty – Concealment of Income-Voluntary disclosures do not release the assessee from the mischief of penal proceedings.

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Mak Data P. Ltd., vs. CIT (2013) 358 ITR 593 (SC)

Penalty – Concealment of Income – The Assessing Officer during the assessment proceedings, is not required to record his satisfaction for initiation of penalty proceeding in a particular manner.

The appellant-assessee filed his return of income for the assessement year 2004-05 on 27th October, 2004, declaring an income of Rs. 16,17,040 along with tax audit report. The case was selected for scrutiny and notices were issued u/s. 143(2) and 142(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

During the course of the assessment proceedings, it was noticed by the Assessing Officer that certain documents comprising share application forms, bank statements, memorandum of association of companies, affidavits, copies of income-tax returns and assessment orders and blank share transfer deeds duly signed had been impounded. These documents had been found in the course of survey proceedings u/s. 133A conducted on 16th December, 2003, in the case of M/s. Marketing Services (a sister concern of the assessee). The Assessing Officer then proceeded to seek information from the assessee and issued a show-cause notice dated 26th October, 2006. By the showcause notice, the Assessing Officer sought specific information regarding the documents pertaining to share applications found in the course of survey, particularly, blank transfer deeds signed by persons, who has applied for the shares. Reply to the show-cause notice was filed on 22nd November, 2006, in which the assessee made an offer to surrender a sum of Rs. 40.74 lakh with a view to avoid litigation and buy peace and to make an amicable settlement of the dispute. Following were the words used by the assessee :

“The offer of surrender is by way of voluntary disclosure and without admitting any concealment whatsoever or any intention to conceal, and subject to non-initiation of penalty proceedings and prosecution”

The Assessing Officer after verifying the details and calculation of the share application money accepted by the company completed the assessment on 29th December, 2006 and a sum of Rs. 40,74,000 was brought to tax, as “income from other sources” and the total income was assessed at Rs. 57,56,700.

The Department initiated penalty proceedings for concealment of income and not furnishing true particulars of its income u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act. During the course of the hearing, the assessee contended that penalty proceedings are not maintainable on the ground that the Assessing Officer has not recorded his satisfaction to the effect that there has been concealment of income/furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income by the assessee and that the surrender of income was a conditional surrender before any investigation in the matter. The Assessing Officer did not accept those contentions and imposed a penalty of Rs. 14,61,547 u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act. The assessee challenged that the order before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), which was dismissed.

The assessee filed as appeal before the Income-tax Appellant Tribunal, Delhi. The Tribunal recorded the following findings:

“The assessee’s letter dated November 22, 2006, clearly mentions that the offer of the surrender is without admitting any concealment whatsoever or any intention to conceal.”

The Tribunal took the view that the amount of Rs. 40,74,000 was surrendered to settle the dispute with the Department and since the assessee, for one reason or the other, agreed or surrendered certain amounts for assessment, the imposition of penalty solely on the basis of the assessee’s surrender could not be sustained. The Tribunal, therefore, allowed the appeal and set aside the penalty order.

The Revenue took up the matter in appeal before the High Court. The High Court accepted the plea of the Revenue that there was absolutely no explanation by the assessee for the concealed income of Rs. 40,74,000. The High Court took the view that in the absence of any explanation in respect of the surrendered income, the first part of clause (A) of Explanation 1 was attracted.

On appeal to the Supreme Court by the assessee, the Supreme Court fully concurred with the view of the High Court that the Tribunal has not properly understood or appreciated the scope of Explanation 1 to section 271(1)(c) of the Act.

According to the Supreme Court, the Assessing Officer should not be carried away by the plea of the assessee like “voluntary disclosure”, “buy peace”, “avoid litigation”, “amicable settlement”, etc., to explain away its conduct. The question is whether the assessee has offered any explanation for concealment of particulars of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. The Explanation to section 271(1) raises a presumption of concealment, when a difference is noticed by the Assessing Officer, between reported and assessed income. The burden is then on the assessee to show otherwise, by cogent and reliable evidence., that income was not concealed or inaccurate particulars were not furnished. When the initial onus placed by the explanation, has been discharged by him, the onus shifts on the Revenue to show that the amount in question constituted the income and not otherwise.

The assessee has only stated that he had surrendered the additional sum of Rs. 40,74,000 with a view to avoid litigation, buy peace and to channelise the energy and resources towards productive work and to make amicable settlement with the Income-tax Department. The statute does not recognise those types of defences under Explanation 1 to section 271(1)(c) of the Act. It is a trite law that the voluntary disclosures do not release the appellant assessee from the mischief of penal proceedings. The law does not provide that when an assessee makes a voluntary disclosure of his concealed income, he had to be absolved from penalty.

The Supreme Court was of the view that the surrender of income in this case was not voluntary in the sense that the offer of surrender was made in view of detection made by the Assessing Officer in a survey conducted 0n the sister concern of the assessee. In that situation, it could not be said that the surrender of income was voluntary. The Assessing Officer during the course of assessment proceedings has noticed that certain documents comprising share application, forms, bank statements, memorandum of association of companies, affidavits, copies of income-tax returns and assessment orders and blank share transfer deeds duly signed, had been impounded in the course of survey proceedings u/s. 133A conducted on 16th December, 2003, in the case of a sister concern of the assessee. The survey was conducted more than 10 months before the assessee filed its return of income. Had it been the intention of the assessee to make full and true disclosure of its income, it would have filed return declaring an income inclusive of the amount which was surrendered later during the course of the assessment proceedings. Consequently, it was clear that the assessee had no intention to declare its true income. It is the statutory duty of the assessee to record all its transactions in the books of account, to explain the source of payments made by it and to declare its true income in the return of income filed by it from year to year. In the opinion of the Supreme Court, the Assessing Officer, had recorded a categorical finding that he was satisfied that the assessee had concealed true particulars of income and was liable for penalty proceedings u/s. 271 read with section 274 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

According to the Supreme Court, the Assessing Officer has to satisfy whether the penalty proceedings be initiated or not during the course of the assessment proceedings and the Assessing Officer is not required to record his satisfaction in a particular manner or reduce it into writing.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 83 dated 3rd January, 2014

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Overseas Direct Investments – Rollover of Guarantees

This circular provides that renewal/rollover of an existing/original guarantee, which is part of the total financial commitment of the Indian Party will not be not to treated/reckoned as a fresh financial commitment, if: –

(a) The existing/original guarantee was issued in terms of the then extant/prevailing FEMA guidelines.

(b) There is no change in the end use of the guarantee, i.e. the facilities availed by the JV/WOS/Step Down Subsidiary.

(c) There is no change in any of the terms & conditions, including the amount of the guarantee except the validity period. The rolled over guarantee has to be reported as fresh financial commitment in Part II of Form ODI. If the Indian party is under investigation by any investigation/enforcement agency or regulatory body, the concerned agency/body must be kept informed about the rollover.

If the above conditions are not met, the Indian party has to obtain, through the designated AD bank, prior approval of RBI for rollover/renewal of the existing guarantee.

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ITO vs. Theekathir Press ITAT Chennai `B’ Bench Before Dr. O. K. Narayanan (VP) and V. Durga Rao (JM) ITA No. 2076/Mds/2012 A.Y.: 2009-10. Decided on: 18th September, 2013. Counsel for revenue/assessee: Guru Bhashyam/J. Prabhakar

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Section 40(a)(ia)– Since there is a judicial controversy on whether section 40(a)(ia) applies to amounts that have already been “paid” or it is confined to amounts “payable” at the end of the year, the rule of judicial precedence demands that the view favorable to the assessee must be adopted.

Facts:
The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim of certain expenditure u/s. 40(a)(ia) on the ground that the tax has not been deducted at source. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) who allowed the appeal by stating that the amounts `payable’ only attract disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) and the amounts already paid would not attract the provisions of section 40(a) (ia).

Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it relied on three decisions of Calcutta High Court and Gujarat High Court which have held that the law stated by the Special Bench in Merilyn Shipping & Transports vs. Addl CIT is not acceptable.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the judgment of the Allahabad High Court is in favour of the assessee but the orders of the Calcutta High Court and the Gujarat High Court are against the assessee. It held that in such circumstances, the rule of judicial precedence demands that the view favourable to the assessee must be adopted, as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Vegetable Products Ltd. 88 ITR 192 (SC). In view of the fundamental rule declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the Tribunal following the judgment of the Allahabad High Court, which is in favor of the assessee, held that the disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) applies only to those amounts which are `payable’ and not to those amounts which are `paid’.

The appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.

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XBRL Assurance

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Last couple of years have witnessed an increased pace of adoption of XBRL as a standard for digital financial reporting across the world. Various regulators and government bodies are increasingly implementing XBRL for regulatory filings viz. The Securities Exchange Commission of USA, Her Majesty Revenues & Customs of UK, The Canadian Securities Administrators of Canada, FSA of Japan, and The Securities Regulatory Commission of China, etc. The Ministry of Corporate Affairs of India has also mandated submission of financial statements by selected companies in XBRL format.

The anticipated growth of XBRL use and its potential to replace traditional financial statements and electronic version of such financial statements in HTML or PDF format raises important assurance issues related to the information in ‘XBRL Instance Documents.’ Many companies that are currently providing their information using XBRL are doing so with limited quality assurance due to a lack of guidance on the best practices and limited auditor involvement. This poses a significant threat to the reliability and quality of XBRL-tagged financial data.

Auditors currently attest to the material accuracy of the financial statements using generally accepted principles of accounting (GAAP) as the criteria against which the financial statements prepared by the management are evaluated. Attestation on the financial statements does not apply to the current process of creating XBRL Instances, and it is not clear what criteria would be used by the auditors or others as they provide assurance services in XBRL environment. In contrast to a traditional financial audit, the subject-matter in an XBRL assurance engagement would be on the XBRL ‘documents,’ which are computer-readable files created in the tagging process.

There is a misconception that tagging of information in XBRL is similar to converting a Word document into PDF file and that tagged XBRL data is as accurate as the underlying information in the source documents from which it has been created and hence Assurance on XBRL Instance is like the original to a zerox copy being certified. This is an inappropriate analogy, because the process of tagging involves judgment and there is potential for intentional or unintentional errors that could result in inaccurate, incomplete, and/or misleading information. This is a problem because it is the XBRL-tagged data that will ultimately be consumed and used for decision-making purpose. Therefore, completeness, accuracy or consistency of the XBRL-tagged data is of paramount importance.

Potential risk in XBRL instances

XBRL instance documents provide financial data for a company for a particular reporting period along with comparative financial data for previous reporting period. The potential errors in an XBRL instance document which contribute risk in XBRL instance document in an open taxonomy (where taxonomy extensions are allowed) or closed taxonomy (where taxonomy extensions are not allowed) environment could be as under:

  • Information on Identity of reporting entity could be wrong or might have changed from previous year. It will make the retrieval and comparison of financial data more difficult for the users.

  • Nature of financial data could be wrong e.g., audited or unaudited, budged or actual, revised or re-grouped or re-casted, etc. It will make the comparison of financial data difficult.

  • Information on reporting period could be wrong e.g., an XBRL instance document with a reporting period of Q 3 2011 erroneously puts the reporting period as Q 3 2001. ? Currency could be wrong e.g., an XBRL instance document filed in India with all monetary values in US Dollars will make the task of comparison difficult. Of course the comparison can be done after converting all monetary values in Indian Rupees, but then there is a risk involved in the currency conversion.

  • Precision or scaling in monetary values contained in an XBRL instance document could lead to inaccurate data not suitable for comparison and analysis purposes e.g., Turnover of Rs.1,65,85,987 will be rounded off to Rs.2 crores if the precision measure taken in XBRL Instance document is ‘Rs. in Crores.’

  • Segment information could be wrong or might have changed from previous year. It can make the segment comparison difficult for the user.

  • Technical reference information in XBRL Instance document can point at wrong taxonomy which will make it difficult to compare with other XBRL filings.

  • XBRL validation is a pre-requisite for the regulators and users of XBRL data. They can’t commence using XBRL data unless XBRL Instance document passes the validation test.

  • Base reference information could be wrong e.g., pointing to XBRL taxonomy on computer’s hard disk instead of official XBRL taxonomy.

  • Selection of wrong tags for reporting financial data in XBRL instance document will not only make the XBRL data inaccurate, but will also make it less usable.

  • Reporting wrong data in XBRL instance document even though the tag selection is right, will make the XBRL data inaccurate and less reliable.

  • Failing to mark-up a concept will lead to some vital information missing in XBRL instance document.

  • Closed taxonomy risks mainly consist of integrity and accuracy of data. Since, taxonomy extensions are not allowed in a closed taxonomy, the filer needs to tag the financial data with the residuary tag which could lead to wrong conclusions e.g., if a filer doesn’t find any suitable tag for a line item in his Profit & Loss Account, he needs to tag it with ‘Other Income’ or ‘Other Expenditure’. The filer could also use a wrong version of taxonomy for XBRL instance generation.

Open taxonomy risks mainly relate to creation of a new taxonomy element (taxonomy extension). The filer could create a duplicate element for a concept that already has an element in the base taxonomy or could create an inappropriate or misleading taxonomy element. The taxonomy extension may not comply with the rules of XML and XBRL. The filer could use prohibited name in taxonomy extension.

Evaluating the quality of XBRL formatted information

The quality of XBRL files is an important concern to the users of these files. The errors in XBRL files will have varying consequences based on the potential errors that could occur while preparing XBRL files; the following four principles and criteria have been developed for assessment of quality of XBRL files:

Completeness
All required information and data as defined by the entity’s reporting environment is formatted in the XBRL Instance document and is complete in all respect.

Mapping

The elements viz. line items, domain members and axis selected in the XBRL file are consistent with the associated concepts in the source documents.

Accuracy
The amount, date and other attributes e.g., monetary units are consistent with the source documents.

Structure

XBRL files are structured in accordance with the requirements of the entity’s reporting requirements.

Approach to XBRL assurance
Srivastava & Kogan had presented a conceptual framework of assertion for XBRL instance documents for XBRL filings at SEC.

The auditor needs to carry out Agreed Upon Procedures (AUP) and report his findings on the followings:

  • Whether the XBRL instance document has captured all the facts and data of the financial statement in traditional format or not?

  • Whether the XBRL instance document contains any fact or data which is not present in the financial statement in traditional format or not?

  •     Whether all the element values and attribute values (context, unit, etc.) in XBRL instance document correctly represent the data in the financial statement in traditional format or not?

  •     Whether the XBRL instance document complies with all XML syntax rules or not?

  •     Whether the XBRL instance document complies with all rules of XBRL and referenced XBRL taxonomies or not?

  •     Whether the XBRL tagging in the instance document properly represents the fact/data in the financial statement in traditional format or not?

  •     Whether the XBRL instance document references correct version and industry specific taxonomy or not?

  •     Whether the taxonomy extensions created and used in the XBRL instance document comply will all rules of XML and XBRL or not?

  •    Whether the new elements in the XBRL taxonomy are not duplicate or misleading or not?

  •     Whether the Linkbases used in the XBRL taxonomy extensions are appropriate or not?

Control Tests and Substantive Tests
Control Tests and Substantive Tests need to be designed and applied to mitigate the risks in XBRL instance documents.


Control tests

The Auditors are familiar with internal controls over the accounting processes. However, in the case of assurance over XBRL instance document, internal controls over XBRL tagging process need to be checked. The control tests need to be applied on:

(i)    the effectiveness of the XBRL tool that has been used to generate XBRL instance document; and
(ii)    the effectiveness of the validation tool

Substantive tests

In traditional audit sampling, the auditor is expected to specify either tolerable error or tolerable deviation rate and a desired reliability in order to determine a sample size sufficient to meet the audit objectives. However, in the case of audit of an XBRL instance document, since the objective of sampling is to determine whether tagging process has resulted in a material misstatement; an attribute sampling approach would not be appropriate. One can imagine a situation where a single wrong tagging results in a material misstatement or where numerous wrong tagging aggregates to an immaterial amount of error.

Materiality

The current auditing processes for examining and reporting on financial statements are designed to ascertain that, ‘taken as a whole’, the financial statements are free from any material misstatement and present a ‘true and fair view’ of the state of affairs of any company. The concept of materiality in the context of traditional audit of financial statements refers to the probable impact on the judgment of a reasonable person of an omission or misstatement in financial statement. In conjunction with auditors risk assessment, materiality’s role in planning a financial statement audit is to determine the allocation of audit efforts and in the opinion formation phase of the audit to evaluate the implications of the audit evidence on the financial statements ‘taken as a whole’. However, in case of XBRL, where a single inappropriate or mis-leading tag could result in the XBRL document ‘taken as a whole’ being materially misstated, the concept of materiality can’t be applied the way it is being applied to the audit of traditional financial statements.

In audit of XBRL instance document, two kinds of materiality need to be considered:

(i)    Materiality for the entire financial statement; and
(ii)    Materiality for each line item in the XBRL instance document.

Since the materiality concept used in the audit of financial statement is at the aggregate level, the implied materiality in the XBRL instance document is also at the aggregate level. However, since users of XBRL data are going to use each line item separately in their decisions, they will perceive each line item to be accurate in isolation. This would lead to erroneous decisions.

Conclusion

The focal point of XBRL assurance is the evaluation of the accuracy and validity of the XBRL tags applied to the line items in the financial statement of the company. In order to perform these evaluation, the auditors need to have the knowledge of what constitutes an error in XBRL instance document, what is the potential risk in XBRL instance document, how control tests and substantive tests should be applied in XBRL environment, and how materiality should be conceived and applied to XBRL instance document.

References
1.    Bovee, M., A. Kogan, K. Nelson, R. Srivastava, M. Vasarhelyi. 2005. Financial Reporting and Auditing Agent with Net Knowl-edge (FRAANK) and extensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) Journal of Information Systems, Vol. 19. No. 1
2.    Boritz, J. E. and W. G. No. 2007. Auditing an XBRL Instance Document: The Case of United Technologies Corporation

3.    Plumee & Plumee (2008) Assurance on XBRL for Financial Reporting

4.    AICPA — Proposed Principles & Criteria for XBRL Formatted Information

5.    Rajendra P. Srivastava & Alexander Kogan (2008) — Assur-ance on XBRL Instance Document: A Conceptual Framework of Assertions

6.    AICPA — Performing Agreed Upon Procedures Engagements That Address The Completeness, Accuracy or Consistency of XBRL Tagged Data
7.    ICAEW  —  Draft  Technical  Release  for  Performing Agreed Upon Procedures Engagements That Address XBRL Tagged Data Included Within Financial Statements Prepared in An iXBRL Format.

Delmas France v. ADIT ITA No 9001/Mum./2010 Article 5(5)/(6), 7 of India France DTAA Dated: 11-1-2012 Present for the appellant: F. V. Irani Present for the Department: Malthi Sridharan

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Under India-France DTAA as long as it is shown that the transactions between the agent and the principal are made under arm’s-length conditions, the agent would be treated as that of independent status even if he deals exclusively for one principal.

The ‘profit neutrality’ theory on account of arm’s-length remuneration to a dependent agent PE (DAPE) may not always hold good as the dependent agent (DA) may not be compensated for entrepreneurial risks that may arise to the principal.

Facts:
Taxpayer, a French company (FCO), is engaged in the business of operation of ships in international traffic.

FCO carried on operations in India through agents who handled the work at most of the Indian ports. The agents were responsible for all clearances from Government departments.

The Tax Department held that as business of FCO was carried out through a fixed place by an agent in India, wherein the agent was to maintain the office for the principal duly equipped, it could be said that FCO had PE in India. The Tax Department attributed 10% of the gross receipts from India to agency PE.

FCO contended that it did not have a PE in India under the DTAA, hence its business profits could not be taxed in India. In any case, due to arm’slength principal, there was no attribution of profit.

Held:
As the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP) upheld the AO’s contention, appeal was preferred to ITAT. ITAT accepted contentions of FCO and held that FCO did neither have basic rule PE, nor agency PE. On Basic PE rule

The Agency PE rule specifically overrides the Basic PE rule.

The very business model of business of FCO being carried out through an agent is such that it does not ordinarily admit the possibility of a PE under the Basic PE rule.

In case of Airlines Rotables Ltd.2, UK it was observed that the following three criteria are embedded in the definition of the Basic PE rule:

  • Physical criterion i.e., existence of a physical location.

  • Subjective criterion i.e., right to use that place.

  • Functionality criterion i.e., carrying out of business through that place.

In the agency business model, the above three parameters are not satisfied. Under such a model, the business of the foreign enterprise is carried out by the agent, and the principal does not have the powers, as a matter of right to use the agent’s place for carrying out its business, nor does it have the right of disposal of that place.

On DAPE
The France DTAA in Article 5(5) and Article 5(6) contains the scope of the DAPE. Article 5(5) provides the situations in which business being carried on through a DA creates a PE.

Under Article 5(6) of India-France DTAA even when an agent is wholly or almost wholly dependent on the foreign enterprise, it would still be treated as an independent agent, if the transactions are at arm’s length.

The sine qua non for constituting a DAPE under the France DTAA is the finding that the transaction is not carried out at arm’s length. No such finding was given by the Tax Department.

In absence of findings by the Tax Department or the DRP, FCO does not have a PE in India.

On profit attribution

One of the issues raised was about tax neutrality for the taxpayer even assuming there is emergence of PE. The ITAT ruled that the issue is academic in the facts of the case as DAPE did not exist. ITAT did however caution that the tax neutrality theory (i.e., once the agent is paid at arm’s length no further attribution can be made to PE) on account of existence of DAPE may not always hold good, as the DA may not be compensated for the risks that may arise to the principal.

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Sepco Electric Power Construction Corporation AAR No. 1011 of 2010 Section 245Q(1), 245R(2), 197 of Income-tax Act Dated: 25-8-2011 and 15-11-2011 Present for the appellant: N. Venkataraman, Satish Agarwal Present for the Department: Sanjay Kumar, Dipi Agarwal

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AAR application is not maintainable when applicant has already filed return of income under ITA and/or assessment/reassessment proceedings are pending before the Income-tax Authorities.

Pendency of a proceeding u/s.195 or 197 of the Act, or even a final order under any of these sections, cannot invalidate an application for advance ruling being entertained.

Facts:
Applicant, a tax resident of China (FCO), entered into an offshore supply contract with an Indian company (ICO) in 2006.

FCO filed an application before the AAR on 18 November 2010 on the issue of taxability of the amounts received/receivable by it under the offshore supply contract.

As on the date of filing the application, status in respect of the years covered by the application was as under:

  • Order u/s.197 of the Act was subject to revision proceedings;

  • Issuance of assessment notices in response to returns filed;

  • Issuance of reassessment notice

The Tax Department raised a preliminary objection regarding the admissibility of the application u/s.245R(2) on the ground that for each of the years proceedings are pending.

FCO contended that the application was maintainable and mere filing return before approaching the AAR would not mean that the question raised in the application is already pending before the Tax Department. Reliance was also placed on the ‘Hand Book’ on Advance Rulings.

Held:

AAR rejected FCO’s contentions and held that the bar u/s.245R(2) would operate for the following reasons:

Mere pendency of a proceeding u/s.195 or 197 of the Act, or even an order under any of the sections, would not invalidate an application for advance ruling being entertained. However, where a return of income is furnished and the proceedings for assessment are going on, all the claims raised by the taxpayer are before the tax authority for consideration and decision.

It cannot be said that the issue of taxability of one of the items of income returned has not arisen or not pending before the Tax Authority merely because the same has not been raised in general or specific questionnaire issued by the Tax Authority to the applicant. There is no restriction on the power of the Tax Authority to inquire.

Proviso to section 245R(2) of the Act creates a specific bar on the jurisdiction of the AAR to give a ruling once it is found that there subsists pendency of proceedings. In the circumstances, the application is liable to be rejected.

The ‘Hand Book’ on Advance ruling relied on by FCO itself provides that it should not be construed as an exhaustive statement of law. Even otherwise, what is stated in the ‘Hand Book’ cannot control the rendering of a decision with reference to the relevant provisions under the ITA.

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ADIT v. Warner Brother Pictures Inc ITA No. 3160/Mum./2010 Section 5, 9(1)(vi) of ITA, Article 12(2) of India US DTAA Dated: 30-12-2011 Present for the assessee: Jitendra Yadav DR Present for the Department: W. Hasan

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Consideration received by non-resident taxpayer from Indian company, for granting exclusive rights of distribution of cinematographic films, not taxable as royalty u/s.9(1)(vi).

Business income of foreign company not taxable in absence of a PE in India.

Agency PE cannot be created by an Indian company acting independently.

Facts
Taxpayer, a non-resident company (FCO) of USA, is engaged in production and distribution of films.

FCO entered into an agreement with an Indian company (ICO) to grant exclusive rights of distribution of cinematographic films to ICO. The agreements were signed outside India. ICO had no right to broadcast films on TV or radio and it was an admitted fact that the consideration was for distribution of films. The payment was also made to FCO outside India.

According to FCO, the income was not taxable in India, as the payment was specifically excluded from royalty definition of ITA and once income was not taxable in terms of specific source rule of royalty taxation, the amount was not chargeable u/s.9(1)(i) of the Act.

The contentions were rejected by the Tax Department. Aggrieved by the order of CIT(A), Tax Department further appealed to ITAT.

Held:
ITAT accepted FCO’s contentions and concurred with the CIT(A)’s order for the following reasons:

The definition of royalty u/s.9(1)(vi) excludes payment received for sale, distribution and exhibition of cinematographic films. Hence amount received by FCO cannot be considered as royalty under ITA.

When there is a special source rule dealing with a specific type of income, such provision would exclude applicability of general provision dealing with the income accruing or arising out of any business connection in India.

Consideration received by FCO is also not taxable as business income, as FCO does not have business connection in India. Even if FCO has business connection, profits only to the extent attributable to PE can be taxed in India. However, since FCO does not have PE in India, such income will not be liable to tax in India.

ICO, to whom the licence was granted by virtue of agreement, cannot be considered as Agency PE as it is not exclusively dealing for FCO, but also for other non-residents.

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Nuclear Power Corporation of India AAR No. 1011 of 2010 Section 245R(2), 195 of Income-tax Act Dated: 21-12-2011 Present for the appellant: S. E. Dastur, Sr. Advocate, Nitesh Joshi, Advocate Present for the Department: None

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When tax proceedings are pending against payee, the admission of application is barred by limitation of pendency of proceedings. Advance Ruling is not just applicant-specific, but also transaction-specific and binds payee as also the payer.

Determination of payee’s taxability is a primary question and not incidental while determining withholding obligation of payer u/s.195.

Facts:
The applicant, an Indian public sector company (ICO), entered into various offshore supply and service contracts with a company incorporated in Russia (FCO), for setting up a power plant in India.

In terms of the contract between ICO and FCO, it was agreed that FCO had primary obligation to pay taxes in India and ICO was required to reimburse the same. Effectively, tax obligation in respect of FCO’s income was on ICO.

For the purpose of TDS obligation, ICo had contended that the income from onshore service contract alone was taxable in India and the income from offshore supply contract was not taxable in India.

The AAR, before considering ICO’s application, raised primary question of whether the application filed by ICO was maintainable having regard to the bar imposed u/s.245R(2) (i), wherein AAR is precluded from ruling on a question, which is already pending before any Income-tax Authority, Appellate Tribunal or any Court.

Held:
AAR rejected ICO’s contention and held:

AAR ruling is binding not only on the applicant (payer), but also for the transaction for which the ruling is sought.

An AAR ruling is sought by ICO in relation to a transaction between resident and non-resident and not in terms of the other provisions of ITA which could have entitled ICO to claim tax implications of its own. This ruling is in relation to ‘transaction’ and, hence, pendency of proceedings in the case of any party to the transaction would operate as a bar against the other in approaching AAR.

Reliance was placed on Foster’s ruling1 wherein it was held that if a proceeding in respect of a transaction to which the applicant (as a payee) was a party, was pending before the Tax Authority in the case of the other party (payer) to the transaction, the application would be barred for the reason that the question posed before the Tax Authority and the AAR would be the same.

Withholding tax provisions under ITA obligate a payer to withhold tax on every payment to a non-resident, provided the same is chargeable to tax in India. Thus, the liability of the payee to pay tax on the payment received is not a question that is incidental to the issue of whether the payer is bound to withhold tax; this question is primary and not incidental.

As the issue of whether the payment made under the transaction was taxable under the ITA was already pending before the Tax Authority in the case of FCO before ICO approached the AAR, the application was not maintainable.

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Tax Implications of Liaison Office in India

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The activities of liaisoning per se should not result in any tax implication in India. However, when such activities cross the threshold of liaisoning, they would constitute Permanent Establishment and proportionate profits attributable to its activities in India may be subjected to tax. Several cases by Tribunals, Courts and AAR have been decided and in this Article, various aspects concerning taxability of liaison offices have been dealt with.

1.0 Introduction

1.1 Meaning of the term ‘Liaison’

The dictionary (Collins Thesaurus) meanings of the term ‘liaison’ are: ‘communication, connection, contact, go-between, hook-up, interchange, intermediary’.

A ‘Liaison Office’ (LO) is a representative office set up primarily to explore and understand the business and investment climate. Such office is not permitted to undertake any commercial/trading/industrial activity, directly or indirectly, and is required to maintain itself out of inward remittances received from the parent company through normal banking channels.

1.2 Meaning of the term ‘Liaison Office’ as per FEMA

Clause 2(e) of the Notification No. FEMA 22/2000-RB, dated 3rd May 2000 pertaining to Foreign Exchange Management (Establishment in India of Branch or Office or other Place of Business) Regulations, 2000 defines ‘Liaison Office’ as under:

“ ‘Liaison Office’ means a place of business to act as a channel of communication between the Principal place of business or Head Office by whatever name called and entities in India but which does not undertake any commercial/trading/industrial activity, directly or indirectly, and maintains itself out of inward remittances received from abroad through normal banking channel.”

Schedule II of the said Notification lists activities which are permitted to a Liaison Office in India as follows:

(i) Representing in India the parent company/group companies;

(ii) Promoting export import from/to India;

(iii) Promoting technical/financial collaborations between parent/group companies and companies in India;

 (iv) Acting as a communication channel between the parent company and Indian companies.

Thus, in essence, a ‘Liaison Office’ (LO) is nothing but a representative office of the non-resident entity in India, whose activities are confined to dissemination of information, facilitate/promote trade and/or to act as a communication channel between group companies and Indian companies. A liaison office is not supposed to undertake activities which cross the threshold of doing business in India, such as raising invoice, effecting delivery of goods, conclusion of contracts, etc. But when such activities are carried on, they may result in tax incidence.

2.0 Taxability of Liaison Office under the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961


Section 5 read with section 9 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the ‘Act’) provides that income of a non-resident is taxed in India when the same is received or is deemed to be received or accrues/arises or is deemed to accrue/arise in India. Section 9(1) lists the situations under which income of a non-resident is deemed to accrue or arise in India.

The ambit of clause (i) of section 9(1) is wide enough to cover “all income accruing or arising, whether directly or indirectly, through or from any business connection in India or through or from any property in India, or through or from any asset or source of income in India, or through the transfer of a capital asset situate in India”.

Of all the different incidences of income covered by section 9(1)(i) above, the following are most relevant for our discussion:

— Income arising through “business connection in India”; and
— Income arising through any source of income in India.

Certain activities of an LO would not attract any tax liability in view of the specific exemptions provided u/s.9, which are as follows:

9(1)(i) Expl. 1. (b) : Activities which are confined to the purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export; Expl. 2 : Activities which do not qualify the test of ‘Business Connection’ (This explanation defines ‘Business Connection’ on the lines of ‘Agency PE’ under Tax Treaty Provisions).

2.1 Business Connection (BC)

The most celebrated CBDT Circular No. 23 of 1969 (since withdrawn w.e.f. 22-10-2009) had explained the concept of ‘Business Connection’ in depth. Even though the Circular stands withdrawn, the principles enunciated therein still hold good. The Circular clarifies that “the expression ‘business connection’ limits of no precise definition. The import and connotation of this expression has been explained by the Supreme Court in their judgment in CIT v. R. D. Aggarwal and Co. and Another, (56 ITR 20). The question whether a nonresident has a ‘business connection’ in India from or through which income, profits or gains can be said to accrue or arise to him within the meaning of section 9 of the Act has to be determined on the facts of each case. However, some illustrative instances of a non-resident having business connection in India, are given below:

(a) Maintaining a branch office in India for the purchase or sale of goods or transacting other business.

(b) Appointing an agent in India for the systematic and regular purchase of raw materials or other commodities, or for sale of the non-resident’s goods, or for other business purposes.

(c) Erecting a factory in India where the raw produce purchased locally is worked into a form suitable for export abroad.

(d) Forming a local subsidiary company to sell the products of the non-resident parent company.

(e) Having financial association between a resident and a non-resident company.”

The Circular further states that wherever the transactions are on a principal-to-principal basis, as well as on arm’s-length basis, between a subsidiary and a parent company, the same cannot result into BC. In other words, the concept of BC carves out an exception in respect of transactions between the principal and independent agent.

The Apex Court in the case of R. D. Aggarwal and Co. held that the expression ‘Business Connection’ means something more than a business, that it pre-supposes an element of continuity between the business of the non-resident and the activity in the taxable territory, though a sporadic or isolated transaction may not be construed as such, for the connection may take several forms, like carrying on a part of the main business or activity incidental to the non-resident through an agent or it may merely be a relation between the business of the non-resident and the activity in the taxable territory which facilitates or assists in the carrying on of that business. Applying this test in the case of Western Union Financial Services Inc., (2007) 291 ITR (A.T.) 176, wherein the assessee (Western Union) was engaged in the business of transfer of monies in India from abroad through various agents (including Department of Post, NBFCs, banks, travel agents, etc.), the Delhi Tribunal held that there exists BC in India.

The Supreme Court in the case of Anglo-French Textile Co. Ltd. v. CIT, (1953) 23 ITR 101 (SC), held that where there was a continuity of business relationship between the person in India, who helps to make the profits and the person outside India who receives the profits, BC exists.

In the case of GVK Industries Ltd. v. CIT, (1997) 228 ITR 564 (AP), the Andhra Pradesh High Court enumerated the following principles in respect of BC after examining various case laws:

(i) “Whether there is a business connection between an Indian company and a non-resident (company) is a mixed question of fact and law which has to be determined on the facts and circumstances of each case;

(ii)    the expression ‘business connection’ is too wide to admit any precise definition; however, it has some well-known attributes;

(iii)    the essence of ‘business connection’ is the existence of close, real, intimate relationship and commonness of interest between the Non-Resident Company (NRC) and the Indian person;

(iv)    where there is control of management or finances or substantial holding of equity shares or sharing of profits by the NRC with the Indian person, the requirement of principle (iii) is ful-filled;

(v)    to constitute ‘business connection’, there must be continuity of activity or operation of the NRC with the Indian party and a stray or isolated transaction is not enough to establish a business connection.”

From the above legal analysis it is clear that if the activities of an LO are such that they constitute BC, there would be incidence of tax in India. However, if the activities of the LO are confined to purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export [as per section 9(1) (i) Expl. 1(b)], then there will be no tax incidence in India. Let us examine, under what circumstances, activities of the LOs were held to be covered by the exclusion of section 9.

2.2    Activities confined to purchases from India for the purpose of exports

Cases in favour of assessee
2.2.1 In a number of decisions, viz. Angel Garments Ltd., [287 ITR 341 AAR; (2006) 157 Taxman 195 (AAR)], Gutal Trading Est., [278 ITR 63 (AAR)], Ikea Trading (Hong Kong) Ltd., [2008 TIOL 23 (AAR); (2009) 308 ITR 0422 (AAR)], and DDIT v. Nike Inc., [2009 TIOL 143 (Bang. ITAT)], ADIT (IT) v. Fabrikant & Sons Ltd., (2011 TII 46 ITAT-Mum.-Intl.), it has been held that where the activities of the Liaison Office in India are confined to purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export, the income therefrom cannot be brought to tax in India.

Cases against assessee
2.2.2 The Delhi Tribunal made interesting observations in case of Linmark International (Hong Kong) Ltd., [2011 TII 05 ITAT-Del-Intl], wherein it held that the purchase exclusion [section 9(1)(i) Expl. 1(b)] only scales down the extent of incomes that are deemed to accrue or arise in India. Such a limitation cannot be read into the provision which deals with income that accrues or arises in India. In this case it was found that the Indian LO was doing substantial business activities on behalf of a BVI company which was a non-functional entity. The Tribunal placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in the case of Performing Rights Society Ltd. & Another v. CIT & Others wherein it was held that, where income has actually accrued in India, there is no requirement to further examine whether the income is covered by the provision that deems income to accrue or arise in India.

2.2.3 In case of Columbia Sportswear Company, (2011) 337 ITR 0407 (AAR) (applicant), on the facts of the case, the AAR held that there was a Business Connection, observing that “in the matter of manufacturing of products as per design, quality and in implementing policy, the liaison office is actually doing the work of the applicant. The activities of the liaison office are not confined to India. It also facilitates the doing of business by the applicant with entities in Egypt and Bangladesh. A person in the business of designing, manufacturing and selling cannot be taken to earn a profit only by sale of goods”.

Two interesting observations made by AAR in the case of Columbia Sportswear are:

(i)    All activities (including purchase) other than actual sale cannot be divorced from the business of manufacture; and
(ii)    If the activities of the Indian LO supports businesses in other countries as well (in the present case it was Egypt and Bangladesh), then it cannot be stated that the operations of the applicant in India are confined to the purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export.

2.2.4 Nokia Networks OY, Finland (NOY), [No. 2005 TIOL 103 ITAT Del-SB; 95 ITD 269 (SB) (Del. Tribunal)], is a tax resident of Finland. NOY had a liaison office (‘LO’) in India. Further, NOY had a 100% subsidiary in India by name Nokia India (P) Ltd. (NPL). NOY entered into an agreement with an Indian Company for supply of telecom equipment (hardware with software embedded therein). NPL, the Indian subsidiary of NOY, entered into an agreement for installation of the said equipment supplied by NOY.

It was held that NOY had a Business Connection under the Act, not because NOY had liaison office in India, but because it had its own subsidiary (NPL) in India and there was intimate business connection based on facts. There was a service agreement and a technical support agreement between NOY and NPL and other Indian Cos. which support the NOY’s activity of supplying telecom equipments. NPL having a live link with NOY, was held to be the business connection in India.

2.3    Activities in addition to or incidental to purchases
Many a time, activities of LOs extend beyond merely purchases. In such a scenario, can the assessee take shelter under the exclusion of section 9(1)(i) Expl. 1(b)? By and large, the Tribunals/AAR/Courts have held that if other activities are incidental to the activity of purchases for the purpose of exports, then there will not be any incidence of deemed income u/s.9 of the Act.

The table below shows what kind of activities were held to be incidental to purchases and which were not so:
 

Sr.

Nature of activities

Whether held as deemed income u/s.9(1) of
the

Case Law

No.

 

Act?

 

 

 

 

 

1

Training of the employees of

No

DDI
v. NIKE Inc

 

the manufacturers (to ensure

 

(Indian
Liaison Office)

 

quality) who supplied goods

 

2009 TIOL 143 ITAT-Bang.

 

to the affiliates of the LO.

 

 

 

 

 

 

2

Negotiation of prices, assort-

 

ADIT
v. Fabricant & Sons Ltd.

 

ment of diamonds.

No

(2011 TII 46 ITAT-Mum.-Intl)

 

 

 

 

3

Material management, mer-

Yes. It was held that in the matter of
manufac-

Columbia
Sportswear

 

chandising, production man-

turing of products as per design, quality
and in

Company

 

agement, quality control and

implementing policy, the liaison office is
actually

(2011) 337 ITR 0407 (AAR)

 

administration support consti-

doing the work of the applicant.

 

 

tuting teams from finance,

 

 

 

human resources and infor-

 

 

 

mation systems.

 

 

 

 

 

 

4

Facilitation by the liaison of-

Yes. As activities were not confined to India,
the

Columbia
Sportswear

 

fice in doing business with

exclusion provided in section 9(1)(i) Expl.
1(b) will

Company

 

entities in Egypt and Bangla-

not be applicable.

(2011) 337 ITR 0407 (AAR)

 

desh.

 

 

 

 

 

 

5

Indian office rendering sup-

Yes & No

Aramco
Overseas Company BV

 

port services to the non-

The AAR held that to the extent Indian
Office

(AAR No. 825 of 2009)

 

resident parent company and

engaged in purchases for its non-resident
principal

2010 TIOL 14 ARA-IT

 

its group company.

there is no income u/s.9(1). But income is
attribut-

 

 

 

able to the activities of the Indian Office
for the

 

 

 

group company as the applicant failed to
establish

 

 

 

that the Indian Office worked as an agent of
the

 

 

 

group company.

 

 

 

 

 


3.0    Taxability of Liaison Office under the provisions of DTAA

Under Article 5 of the DTAA if the activities of an LO are considered to be PE in India, then under Article 7, the income of the non-resident attributable to such PE in India would be liable to tax in India.

Article 5 of the UN and OECD Model Conventions deals with the definition of a Permanent Establishment (PE). Paragraph 4 of Article 5 contains a list of exclusions i.e., activities, which will not constitute a PE.

The following activities are not regarded as PE:

(a)    the use of facilities solely for the purpose of storage, display, of goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise;

(b)    the maintenance of a stock of goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise solely for the purpose of storage, display;

(c)    the maintenance of a stock of goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise solely for the purpose of processing by another enterprise;

(d)    the maintenance of a fixed place of business solely for the purpose of purchasing good or merchandise or of collecting information, for the enterprise;

(e)    the maintenance of a fixed place of business solely for the purpose of carrying on, for the enterprise, any other activity of a preparatory or auxiliary nature;

(f)    the maintenance of a fixed place of business solely for any combination of activities, men-tioned in sub-paragraphs (a) to (e), provided that the overall activity of the fixed place of business resulting from this combination is of a preparatory or auxiliary nature.

It may be noted that in respect of activities mentioned in paragraph (a) and (b) above, the scope of the OECD Model Convention is wider than UN MC in that “the use of facilities or the maintenance of stock of goods or merchandise for the purpose of delivery” would not constitute a PE. In the case of UN MC, delivery of goods or merchandise would constitute PE.

The OECD Model Commentary makes it clear that a fundamental feature of these activities is that they are all of a preparatory or auxiliary nature.

3.1    Meaning of preparatory or auxiliary services

Paragraph 4 of Article 5 on PE, in both the MCs, list activities which are excluded from the definition of PE. Besides specific exclusions (e.g., maintenance of stock of goods, facilities used for storage, display, fixed place of business solely for the purpose of purchasing goods or collecting information, etc.), clauses (e) and (f) of the said paragraph provide that the maintenance of a fixed place of business would not result in PE, if the activities of the enterprise are of a preparatory or auxiliary in nature. However, which of the activities would constitute of preparatory or auxiliary in nature and which would not, is difficult to determine at times for the reason that it would also depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.

The main and indeed, the decisive criterion would be whether or not the activity of the fixed place of business by itself forms an essential and significant part of the activity of the enterprise, as a whole. If the activities of the fixed place are identical with the general purpose and object of its parent, then such activities cannot be regarded as preparatory or auxiliary in nature, e.g., the parent company is engaged in the business of supply of auto components and its fixed base, too, is the engaged in supply of auto components, then such activity of PE cannot be regarded as of auxiliary or preparatory in nature.

It would be worth noting that preparatory or auxiliary activities, which are exclusively for the enterprise by itself, would not result in PE. “If the same are rendered for a consideration and for third parties, then they may constitute the enterprise’s main object and the corresponding facilities may well be PE.” (Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions — M. No. 116 a — page 321)

The AAR in the case of UAE Exchange ascertained the nature of activities carried on by Indian liaison office by interpreting the term ‘auxiliary’ as used in common English usage, meaning, “helping, assisting or supporting the main activity.”

The Special Bench of the Delhi Tribunal in case of Motorola Inc. v. DCIT, Non-Resident Circle, 95 ITD 269 (Delhi Tribunal), held that the activities carried on by the employees of Motorola, Sweden, through the office of its Indian subsidiary were of preparatory or auxiliary in nature. These activities were carried on prior to commencement of business in India. Activities included such as market survey, industry analysis, economy evaluation, furnishing of product information, ensuring distributorship and their warranty obligations, ensuring technical presentations to potential users, development of market opportunities, providing services and support information, procurement of raw materials for Motorola, accounting and finance services, etc. for a period of one year.

If the activities of the LO are confined to preparatory or auxiliary, then it would not result in PE. Fundamentally, as per FEMA provisions LOs are not supposed to cross the threshold of preparatory or auxiliary activities as they are barred from carrying on any activities of commercial or industrial in nature. They are supposed to restrict themselves to the activities of liaisoning, dissemination of information, export promotion, etc. etc. However, in actual practice when it is found that LOs have crossed this limit, they have been held to be PE in India.

3.2  Can LO be regarded as PE?

Let us examine the various case laws on this aspect:

Cases where it was held not to be PE

3.2.1 In IAC v. Mitsui and Co. Ltd., (1991) 39 ITD 59, Special Bench, ITAT Delhi, has held that the LO cannot be regarded as a PE and a similar view was taken by the Delhi Bench in BKI/Ham V. O. F. v. Additional CIT, (2001) 70 TTJ 480.

3.2.2 In the case of Western Union Financial Services Inc. the Delhi Tribunal held that since the assessee did not have an outlet of its own in India, there was no fixed place of business and therefore there is no PE. It further held that installation of software, use of credit cards or display of names of the Principal by its agents in India does not give rise to a PE.

3.2.3 In the case of K. T. Corporation v. DIT, [23 DTR 361 (AAR) (2009) 180 Taxman 395 (Bom.)], the AAR held that as per provisions of Article 5(4)(d) [Article 5(4)(d) of the India-Korea Tax Treaty reported at 165 ITR (St). 191], collecting information for an enterprise by an LO located abroad is considered an auxiliary activity, unless the collecting of information is the primary purpose of the enterprise. Accordingly, preparation of reports dealing with India’s market scenario in mobile as well as broadband segments, etc., which were in the nature of ‘aid’ or ‘support’ of the main activities, were held to be preparatory and auxiliary activities. While holding on to the facts stated by the applicant that there is no PE, the AAR added a caveat that if the activities of the LO are enlarged beyond the parameters fixed by RBI or if the Department lays its hands on any concrete materials which substantially impact on the veracity of the applicant’s version of facts, it is open for the Department to take appropriate steps under law. Even though the last observations by the AAR were not warranted, it shows that activities of LO are always under close radar of the Income-tax Department.

Cases where it was held to be a PE

3.2.4 In the case of Nokia Networks OY (NOY) (supra) its subsidiary was held to be a PE in India because Nokia virtually projected itself in India through Nokia India Private Ltd. (NPL), as NOY was able to monitor its activities in India through NPL.

3.2.5 The AAR in the UAE Exchange Centre LLC, (2004) 268 ITR 09, held that the Indian LO is the PE of the UAE Enterprise. On the facts of the case, the AAR held that an activity of printing cheques/drafts in India and dispatching the same to the addresses of the beneficiaries by the Indian LO could not be said to be of an auxiliary nature.

3.2.6 In case of Columbia Sportswear Company, (2011) 337 ITR 0407 (AAR), the AAR held that “if an establishment satisfies provisions of Article 5.1 of a DTAA which defines a PE to mean a fixed place of business through which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried on, there is no need to go into the question whether the establishment cannot be brought within the inclusive part of the definition in sub-article 2. Once the definition in Article 5.1 is satisfied, the only inquiry to be undertaken is to see whether it is one of those establishments excluded by sub-article 3”. The AAR held that the LO constituted a fixed place of business within the meaning of Article 5.1 of the India-US DTAA and considering the nature of activities of the LO, it held that the LO would constitute PE in India. The AAR observed that the LO was practically involved in all the activities connected with the business of the applicant, except the actual sale of the products outside the country.

3.2.7 The Karnataka High Court in case of Jebon Corporation India, [2011 TII 15 HC-Kar-Intl], on the facts of the case held that the LO was carrying on the commercial activities of procuring purchase orders, identifying the buyers, negotiating and agreeing on the price, ensuring material dispatch to the customers, following up payments from customers and also offering after sales support. Consequently, the High Court held that the Indian LO is a PE under Article 5 of the India-Korea tax treaty. Some of the interesting observations made by the High Court are as follows :

(i)    The mere fact that buyers placed orders and made payments directly to HO and the HO directly sent goods to the buyers is not sufficient to establish that there is no PE;

(ii)    When the facts clearly showed that the LO was engaged in trading activity and therefore entering into business transactions/contracts, the mere fact of them being not signed by the LO would not absolve it of liability;

(iii)    Just because RBI did not take any action against the LO for carrying on the alleged commercial activities, would not render the findings, recorded by the Income-tax Authorities under the Act, as erroneous or illegal.

4.0    Conclusion
The activities of LOs are under Income-tax Department’s scanner for quite some time now. Even though RBI permits restricted activities for the LO, in actual practice, it has been found that some LOs are crossing the threshold of liaisoning and carries on full-fledged business activities in India.

RBI generally, relies on the CA certificate about the nature of activities carried on by LOs in India. Thus, a CA certifying that LO’s activities are confined to what is permitted by RBI assumes colossal responsibility. In case of Jebon Corporation (where it was found that the LO was engaged in the trading activity), the Karnataka High Court observed that the facts revealed on investigation will be forwarded to the RBI for appropriate action in accordance with law. In the light of these developments, we, CAs, need to be more vigilant and careful in issuing certificates about the activities of LOs. The clients should be advised to convert their LO in to a branch/subsidiary, if so warranted, as undertaking non-permitted activities would result in penal consequences, in a addition to tax implications, in India.

Refund to exporters on specified services used for export of goods — Notification No. 52/2011-ST, dated 30-12-2011.

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This Notification supersedes Notification No. 17/2009- ST, dated 6th July, 2009 w.e.f. 3-1-2012. Vide this Notification exemption has been granted to specified taxable services received by an exporter of goods and used for export of goods, subject to the conditions and procedure laid down in the said Notification.

The exemption shall be claimed either on the basis of rates specified in the Schedule to the Notification or on the basis of documents. The procedure for claiming refund under both the options has been prescribed.

The exemption by way of refund shall be available only where no CENVAT credit of service tax paid on the specified taxable services used for export of the said goods has been taken under the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

The exemption shall not be available to a Unit or Developer of a Special Economic Zone.

Where any refund of service tax paid on specified taxable service utilised for export of said goods has been allowed to an exporter, but the sale proceeds in respect of export of goods are not received by or on behalf of the exporter, in India, within the period allowed by the RBI including any extension of such period, such refund shall be deemed never to have been allowed and recovered, as if it is a recovery of service tax erroneously refunded.

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Deferment of Levy on Service provided by Government Railways — Notification No. 49/2011, 50/2011 & 51/2011-ST, all dated 30-12-2011.

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Vide above Notifications levy of service tax on taxable services provided by Government Railways to any person in relation to transport of goods by rail [Section 65(105)(zzzp)] has been deferred the to 1st April, 2012.
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Clarification on levy of Service Tax on distributors/ sub-distributors of films and exhibitors of movie — Circular No. 148/17/2011-ST, dated 13-12-2011.

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The Central Government in the light of recent changes in the law and CBEC Circular No. 109/03/2009, dated 23-2-2009 has clarified the taxability of profit/ revenue-sharing arrangement in case of distribution of films and exhibition of movies in the following manner: 1. Where the arrangement between the distributor/sub-distributor/area distributor and the movie exhibitor/theatre-owner in exhibiting the film produced by the producer (the original copyright holder) is on principal-to-principal basis, service tax liability would be as under:

(a) If the movie is exhibited by the theatre-owner or exhibitor on his account — i.e., the copyrights are temporarily transferred — Service tax would be levied under copyright service to be provided by distributor or sub-distributor or area distributor or producer, etc., as the case may be.

(b) If the movie is exhibited on behalf of distributor or sub-distributor or area distributor or producer, etc. i.e., no copyrights are temporarily transferred — Service tax would be levied under business support service/renting of immovable property service, as the case may be, to be provided by theatre owner or exhibitor.

2. Where the arrangement between the distributor/ sub-distributor/area distributor and the movie exhibitor/theatre-owner is on unincorporated partnership/ joint collaboration basis, services provided by each of the persons i.e., the ‘new entity’/theatreowner or exhibitor/distributor or sub-distributor or area distributor or producer, etc. as the case may be, would be liable to service tax based on the nature of transaction under applicable service head.

It is further clarified that the arrangements mentioned in this Circular will apply mutatis mutandis to similar situations across all the services taxable under the Finance Act, 1994.

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MVAT Rules amended — Notification No. VAT-1511/CR-138/Taxation-l, dated 5-12-2011.

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By this Notification, MVAT Rules, 2005 have been amended on the following aspects to be effective from 1-4-2012:

(i) Deemed dealer

Deemed dealers whose tax liability during the previous year was Rs.1 crore or less subject to permission of joint commissioner were filing yearly return. Now they will be required to upload returns on six-monthly basis within 30 days from the end of the six-monthly period and required to furnish details for the entire year in Annexure J1, J2 that is party-wise sales & purchases and Annexure C & D that is TDS Certificates received and issued, within 90 days from the end of the financial year along with 2nd half-yearly return.

(ii) Dealers not covered under Mvat Audit

Dealers not covered under Mvat audit are now required to furnish annual details in Annexure JI & J2 that is party-wise sales & purchase and Annexure G, H & I that is for declaration forms received and not received along with last monthly, quarterly or six-monthly returns within 90 days from the end of the financial year. These details are also required to be furnished for the first year of registration and last year, that is, year in which RC is cancelled where Mvat audit is not applicable.

All the dealers covered under these amendments will be required to make payment of tax within 21 days in case of monthly or quarterly returns and within 30 days in case dealers are required to file returns on half-yearly basis.

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Electronic payment under the Professional Act, 1975 — Trade Circular 1 of 2012, dated 11-1-2012.

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From 1st January, 2012 Professional Tax Registration certificate holder and professional tax enrolment certificate holder can make the payment of professional tax electronically, at their option. For making payment on website of the Department PTRC holder should first get enrolled for professional tax e-services, no such requirement for PTEC payment. Detailed instructions are given in the Circular.

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Acounting of Foreign Currency Fluctuations

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This case study is to consider the appropriate accounting of forex fluctuations arising from the various transactions in USD and Euros and the forward contracts entered into by a company and the auditors verification process for the same.

Facts
Force India Ltd. (FIL) is a public company having two divisions:

(a) Manufacturing Division where high-tech products are manufactured for the IT sector. This division has two plants employing more than 500 employees. Exports constitute more than 50% earnings for this division. Most of the manufacturing equipment required for the two plants are imported;

(b) ITES Division where medical transcription and medical billing services are rendered. This division is spread over three locations and employs more than 700 employees. The entire billing of this division (on monthly basis) is to customers located outside India and in most cases, there are long-term contracts entered into with these customers.

Transactions of imports/exports of the manufacturing division are predominantly denominated in USD, whereas for the ITES division entirely denominated in Euros.

In view of the multi-currency exposure, the recent volatility in the exchange rates and since the CFO of FIL had a deep understanding of the forex markets, FIL has entered into the following contracts:

(i) Forward contracts for USD for the net exposure of the manufacturing division for the next 18 months. These contracts mature on a monthly basis and have no co-relation to the payments to be made for imports or export realisations.

(ii) Forward contracts for Euros for the receivables of the ITES division (including projected receivables for future billings). These contracts mature on a monthly basis.

(iii) Contracts at the MCX for USD.

FIL closes its financial statements on 31st December every year. As at 31st December 2011, the following information is available:

(a) Net realised and unrealised loss on forward contracts in USD Rs.15 lakh and Rs.160 lakh respectively;

(b) Net realised and unrealised loss of forward contracts in Euros Rs.5 lakh and Rs.75 lakh, respectively;

(c) MTM loss on open contracts at the MCX Rs.20 lakh.

Discuss the treatment of the aforesaid losses as well as the foreign currency exposures for receivables/ payables of FIL in the financial statements for the year 2011.

Discussion and solution

1. An entity can have exposure to foreign currency fluctuations in the following situations:

(a) Long-term or short-term forex loans taken for acquisition of fixed assets — whether from India or outside India;

(b) For sales/purchases in forex;

(c) On forward contracts entered into by the entity for hedging its exposure to forex fluctuations;

(d) On forward contracts entered into for speculative purposes.

2. In the given case, the company has exposure to foreign currency fluctuations on account of the following:

(a) Sales from manufacturing division and services rendered from ITES division;

(b) Imports of equipment for the manufacturing division;

(c) Forward contracts entered into in USD for the manufacturing division;

(d) Forward contracts entered into in Euros for the ITES division;

(e) Contracts entered into at MCX.

3. In each of the above cases, the company has realised gains/losses during the year 2011 as well as unrealised or mark-to-market (MTM) losses as at 31st December 2011.

4. Accounting treatment of forex exposures is primarily determined by the following:

(a) Accounting Standard (AS) 11 ‘The Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates’ as notified by the Companies (Accounting Standards) Rules, 2006;

(b) Amendments thereto by Notifications issued in March 2009, May 2011 and December 2011;

(c) Announcement by ICAI in March 2008 on ‘Accounting for Derivatives’.

(d) Accounting Standard 30 ‘Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement’ issued by ICAI. Though AS-30 is not yet notified under the Companies (Accounting Standards) Rules, 2006, the same can be voluntarily adopted so far as it does not conflict with any other notified accounting standard or any existing regulatory and statutory requirement.

5. The amendments to AS-11 as referred to in 4(b) above relate to accounting for forex fluctuations for loans (other than short-term) in foreign currency for acquisition fixed assets. In the given case study, there are no such loans obtained by FIL and hence these amendments are not applicable.

6. Monetary items are defined by para 7.11 of AS-11 as ‘money held and assets and liabilities to be received or paid in fixed or determinable amounts of money’. In the given case, debtors arising from export sales as well as rendering of services and creditors arising from imports would be monetary items since they would be received or paid in fixed or determinable amounts of money.

7. As per para 13 of AS-11, ‘exchange differences arising on the settlement of monetary items or on reporting an enterprise’s monetary items at rates different from those at which they were initially recorded during the period, or reported in previous financial statements, should be recognised as income or as expenses in the period in which they arise’.

8. The above-referred para 13 of AS-11 would be applicable to foreign currency fluctuations as referred to in para 2(a) and 2(b) in the case above. All exchange differences on settlement of these items or on restatement at the year-end would thus need to be transferred to the statement of profit and loss.

9. Accounting treatment for forward contracts in foreign currency entered into by an entity is to be done as per paras 36 and 37 of AS-11. The said paras are as under:

“36. An enterprise may enter into a forward exchange contract or another financial instrument that is in substance a forward exchange contract, which is not intended for trading or speculation purposes, to establish the amount of the reporting currency required or available at the settlement date of a transaction. The premium or discount arising at the inception of such a forward exchange contract should be amortised as expense or income over the life of the contract. Exchange differences on such a contract should be recognised in the statement of profit and loss in the reporting period in which the exchange rates change. Any profit or loss arising on cancellation or renewal of such a forward exchange contract should be recognised as income or as expense for the period.

37. The risks associated with changes in exchange rates may be mitigated by entering into forward exchange contracts. Any premium or discount arising at the inception of a forward exchange contract is accounted for separately from the exchange differences on the forward exchange contract. The premium or discount that arises on entering into the contract is measured by the difference between the exchange rate at the date of the inception of the forward exchange contract and the forward rate specified in the contract. Exchange difference on a forward exchange contract is the difference between (a) the foreign currency amount of the contract translated at the exchange rate at the reporting date, or the settlement date where the transaction is settled during the reporting period, and (b) the same foreign currency amount translated at the latter of the date of inception of the forward exchange contract and the last reporting date.”

10.    As can be seen from the above, paras 36 and  37 of AS-11 prescribe the treatment for forward contracts which are backed by transactions as on the settlement date. In case, however, an entity has entered into contracts which are intended for trading or speculation, these paras would not be applicable. Thus, in all cases where paras 36 and 37 are applicable, the realised and/or unrealised profits/losses on such contracts would need to be recognised in the statement of profit and loss.

11.    Paras 38 and 39 of AS-11 further state as under:

“38. A gain or loss on a forward exchange contract to which paragraph 36 does not apply should be computed by multiplying the foreign currency amount of the forward exchange contract by the difference between the forward rate available at the reporting date for the remaining maturity of the contract and the contracted forward rate (or the forward rate last used to measure a gain or loss on that contract for an earlier period). The gain or loss so computed should be recognised in the statement of profit and loss for the period. The premium or discount on the forward exchange contract is not recognised separately.

39.    In recording a forward exchange contract intended for trading or speculation purposes, the premium or discount on the contract is ignored and at each balance sheet date, the value of the contract is marked to its current market value and the gain or loss on the contract is recognised.”

12.    As can be seen from the above, paras 38 and 39 of AS-11 prescribe the treatment for forward contracts which are intended for trading or speculation purpose. Thus, in all cases where paras 38 and 39 are applicable, the gain/loss computed in terms of these paras would need to be recognised in the statement of profit and loss.

13.    Besides contracts covered by paras 36, 37, 38 and 39 of AS-11, there could be other forward con-tracts which a company may enter into to hedge the foreign currency risk of a firm commitment or a highly probable forecast transaction. Accounting treatment for such contracts is not covered by AS-11 since these are neither backed by actual transactions, nor intended for trading or speculation.

14.    Accounting of such contracts which are entered into to hedge the foreign currency risk of a firm commitment or a highly probable forecast transaction would be covered by the ICAI announcement of March 2008. The said announcement lays down 2 options which can be followed by a company to account for such contracts. The 2 options are:

(a)    The mark-to-market (MTM) loss in case of such transactions should be provided for in the statement of profit and loss following the principle of prudence as enunciated in AS-1 ‘Disclosure of Accounting Policies’ — the gains arising on MTM, however, need not be provided;
(b)    Adopt AS-30 on a voluntary basis. Paras 80 to 113 of AS-30 provide for recognition and measurement of forward contracts intended for hedging and which are not covered by AS-11. These paras provide that in case the forward contracts fall within the definition of an ‘effective hedge’ within the meaning of AS-30, the MTM gains/losses on such contracts can be transferred to a ‘Hedging Reserve Account’ and carried forward in the balance sheet rather than recognise them in the statement of profit and loss account. To qualify as an ‘effective hedge’, however, there has to be close relationship between the date of maturity of the forward contract and the realisation of the underlying ‘hedged item’ i.e., the export receivables. There are also stringent documentation requirements laid down by AS-30 to prove the effectiveness of a hedge. On settlement or cancellation of these contracts, the eventual gains/losses would need to be transferred to the statement of profit and loss account.

15.    The ICAI announcement also mentions that in case one of the above 2 options is not followed and there is a MTM loss as at the year-end on such contracts, appropriate disclosures should be made by the auditor in his report. Since the announcement only mentions ‘appropriate disclosures’, such disclosures may not amount to a qualification in the report of the auditors.

16.    In the given case, in the situation mentioned in para 2(c) above, the company has entered into contracts to cover its exposure in USD for exports of goods and import of equipment. As per the information available, these contracts do not have any co-relation with the receivables/payables, but they are backed by actual transactions of exports/imports since these are entered into in respect of the net exposure of the manufacturing division. In such a case, the accounting treatment would need to be as per paras 36 and 37 of AS-11 (as discussed in paras 9 and 10 above). Thus, the realised as well as unrealised losses on such contracts would need to be accounted for in the statement of profit and loss.

17.    In the given case, in the situation mentioned in para 2(d) above, the company has entered into contracts to cover its exposure in Euros for exports of services. As per the information available, some of these contracts are backed by actual export receivables, but the remaining contracts are to cover future exports of services. Since these contracts mature on a monthly basis, there seems to be a co-relation between the receivables (as in most cases of export of ITES services the billings are on regular pre-determined intervals).

18.    The accounting treatment for contracts which are backed by receivables would be covered by para 36/37 of AS-11 and would be as discussed in para 16 above. However, in case of contracts which are for future billings, these would be in the nature of hedge for the foreign currency risk of a firm commitment or a highly probable forecast transaction. These would be accounted as per the ICAI announcement (as discussed in paras 14 and 15 above). Thus, FIL would have an option to either provide the MTM loss on such contracts or adopt AS-30 and transfer the loss to a ‘Hedging Reserve’.

19.    In the given case, in the situation mentioned in para 2(e) above, the company has entered into contracts at the MCX for USD. These contracts, though apparently, entered into for trading or speculative purposes, in this case, seem to be entered into for hedging the forex exposures of FIL. If the contracts were entered into for trading or specula-tive purposes, the accounting treatment would be as per paras 38/39 of AS-11. However the contracts seem to be backed by actual transactions of exports/imports. In such a case, the accounting treatment would be as per paras 36/37 of AS-11. In either case, the realised as well the unrealised (or MTM) losses would need to be transferred to the statement of profit and loss.

20.    The duty of the statutory auditor in the above case would be as under:

(a)    For situations in 2(a) and 2(b) above, verification whether appropriate closing rates are considered for determining the forex fluctuations and whether the same are accounted in the statement of profit and loss;

(b)    For situation mentioned in 2(c) above, verification of open forward contracts in USD and whether the same are clearly backed by actual transactions of exports/imports on a net basis;

(c)    For situation mentioned in 2(d) above:

(i)    Verification and adequate documentation whether AS-11 or AS-30 would be applicable to the forward contracts entered into;

(ii)    verification of open forward contracts in Euros and whether they constitute an ‘effective hedge’ vis-à-vis the receivables/ future receivables as envisaged by AS-30 and whether the company had adequate internal documentation at the time of entering into these contracts so as to constitute an ‘effective hedge’;

(d)    For situation mentioned in 2(e) above, verification of whether the contracts entered into at MCX were towards hedging of open exposures in USD or whether these were for trading or speculation;

(e)    Adequate audit documentation for all the above with reasoning and supporting to be kept as part of audit working papers.

Editor’s Note:
The case study is based on the case studies presented by the author at the Residential Refresher Course of BCA.

TDS: Assessee in default: Section 195(2). A.Y. 1987-88: Assessee entered into technical assistance agreement with a Japanese company: The assessee was granted no objection certificate u/s.195(2) permitting it to make payments without deduction of tax at source: The assessee could not be treated as assessee in default for not deducting tax at source.

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[CIT v. Swaraj Mazda Ltd., 245 CTR 521 (P&H)]

The assessee entered into a technical assistance agreement with a Japanese company. The assessee had filed an application u/s.195(2) and the requisite no objection certificate was granted permitting nondeduction of tax at source. However, the Assessing Officer held that the payments attracted provisions for deduction of tax at source and treated the assessee as assessee in default u/s.201(1) of the Act, for not deducting tax at source. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and Haryana High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) The Tribunal has recorded a clear finding that the certificate granted u/s.195(2) was never cancelled u/s.195(4), in absence of which the assessee was not required to deduct tax at source and could not be treated as assessee in default. On the said finding, no question of law has been claimed or referred.

(ii) If the assessee was not required to deduct tax at source and could not be declared as assessee in default, question of whether the payment was in nature of fee for technical services or in nature of reimbursement for expenses incurred or whether DTAA overrides the provisions of the Act, need not be gone into.”

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Reassessment: Sections 147 and 148, 1961: In spite of repeated request reasons for reopening not furnished to assessee before completion of assessment: Reassessment not valid.

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[CIT v. Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd., 340 ITR 66 (Bom.)]

In this case the assessment was reopened u/s.147. The assessee had requested for the reasons recorded, but the same were not furnished till the passing of the reassessment order. Following the judgment in the case of CIT v. Fomento Resorts and Hotels Ltd., (Bom.); ITA No. 71 of 2006, dated 27-11- 2006, the Tribunal held that though the reopening of the assessment is within three years from the end of the relevant assessment year, since the reasons recorded for reopening the assessment were not furnished to the assessee till the completion of the assessment, the reassessment order cannot be upheld.

The Bombay High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue and observed that the special leave petition filed by the Revenue against the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Fomento Resorts and Hotels Ltd. has been dismissed by the Apex Court.

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Principle of mutuality: Club: A.Y. 2003-04: Principle of mutuality applies to interest on fixed deposits, dividend, income from Government securities and profit on sale of investments.

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[CIT v. Delhi Gymkhana Club Ltd., 339 ITR 525 (Del.)]

The assessee-club was granted exemption from paying income-tax on the income from its members on the basis of the principle of mutuality. On the same basis the assessee also claimed exemption in respect of income from fixed deposits, dividend, income from Government securities and profit on sale of investment. The Assessing Officer did not allow the claim. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim and held that the principle of mutuality would apply even on these incomes.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“We are of the opinion that the aforesaid finding of the Tribunal is correct on facts and in law, which does not call for any interference.”

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Educational institution: Section 10(23C)(vi): A.Y. 2010-11: Petitioner-society was engaged in teaching all forms of music and dance with no profit motive: Run like a school or educational institution in a systematic manner: Not recognised by any university or Board: Is eligible for exemption u/s.10 (23C)(vi).

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[Delhi Music Society v. DGIT, 17 Taxman.com 49 (Delhi)]
The petitioner-society was established in 1953 with the aim and object of teaching music and dancing in all its forms. It was allotted government land and was claiming tax exemption u/s.10(22) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. During the financial year 2008- 09, gross receipts of the petitioner exceeded Rs.1 crore and thus, it had to comply with the condition prescribed in section 10(23C)(vi), as to procurement of approval from the prescribed authority, to continue enjoying the tax exemption. Accordingly, the petitioners moved an application before the prescribed authority, i.e., DG (Exemption) for approval. The prescribed authority rejected the claim for exemption on ground that it did not satisfy criteria of being an ‘educational institution’. As per prescribed authority the petitioner was not awarding any degree or certificate and was merely imparting coaching/training in India as per norms of foreign colleges; that it was not an institution recognised by the UGC or by any board constituted by government for imparting formal education in the field of western music. The prescribed authority observed that the petitioner could not be distinguished from any coaching or training institute preparing the students for appearing in any examination for obtaining a formal degree by a formally recognised institution. The prescribed authority, therefore, held that the petitioner was not entitled to be characterised as an ‘educational institution’ within the meaning of section 10(23C)(vi).

The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee-society and held as under:

“(i) The Supreme Court in the case of Sole Trustee, Loka Sikshana Trust v. CIT, (1975) 101 ITR 234 interpreted the word ‘education’ in section 2(15) and held that the word has been used to denote systematic instruction, schooling or training given to the young in preparation for the work of life and it also connotes the whole course of scholastic instruction which a person has received. It has further been observed that the word also connotes the process of training and development of knowledge, skill, mind and character of students by normal schooling.

(ii) It is seen that the petitioner is being run like any school or educational institution in a systematic manner with regular classes, vacations, attendance requirements, enforcement of discipline and so on. These provisions in the rules and regulations satisfy the condition laid down in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sole Trustee, Loka Sikshana Trust (supra). It cannot be doubted that having regard to the manner in which the petitioner runs the music school, that there is imparting of systematic instruction, schooling or training given to the students so that they attain proficiency in the field of their choice — vocal or instrumental in western classical music.

(iii) The Calcutta High Court in CIT v. Doon Foundation, (1985) 154 ITR 208/22 Taxman 9 has observed that section 10(22) does not impose a condition that an educational institution to be eligible for exemption thereunder should be affiliated to any university or any board. As per the High Court, so long as the income is derived from an education institution existing solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of profit, such income is entitled to exemption u/s.10(22). This judgment takes care of the objection of the prescribed authority that the petitioner is not affiliated to, or recognised by any university or board in India and that it merely awards certificates or grades which are issued by the Trinity College and Royal School of Music, London. Since section 10(23C)(vi) also uses the same language as section 10(22), the same principle should govern the interpretation of that provision also.

(iv) The Supreme Court in S. Azeez Basha v. Union of India, AIR 1968 SC 662 has considered the nature of an educational institution. It was held by the Supreme Court that there is a good deal in common between educational institutions which are not universities and those which are universities in the sense that both teach students and both have teachers for the purpose. It was further observed by the Supreme Court that what distinguishes a university from any other educational institution is that a university grants degrees of its own, whereas other educational institutions cannot. These observations of the Supreme Court support the stand of the petitioner that the fact that it does not conduct its own examination or awards degrees of its own is not decisive of the question whether it is an educational institution or not. It also lends support to the petitioner’s stand before the prescribed authority that it is not a mere coaching centre preparing students for competitive examinations.

(v) For the above reasons, it is held that the petitioner meets the requirements of an educational institution within the meaning of section 10(23)(c)(vi).

(vi) Accordingly, the impugned order passed by the prescribed authority is quashed. The prescribed authority will now deal with the asses-see’s application for approval afresh in accordance with law. The writ petition is accordingly allowed.”

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Deduction u/s.10A/10B: FTZ: A.Y. 2007-08: Assessee received pure gold from a nonresident, converted same into jewellery and exported it to said non-resident: Activity amounted to ‘manufacture or production’ which qualified for deduction u/s.10A/10B.

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[CIT v. Lovlesh Jain, 204 Taxman 134 (Del.); 16 Taxman. com 366 (Del.)]

The assessee had received pure gold supplied by ‘R’ Jewellery, Dubai, and the same after conversion into jewellery was ‘exported’ by the assessee to ‘R’ Jewellery, Dubai. In the meantime ‘R’, Jewellery Dubai continued to remain the legal owner of the gold and had not sold the gold to the assessee. The assessee was paid conversion charges or production/ manufacturing charges for converting the gold into jewellery. The Assessing Officer held that the assessee was not manufacturing ornaments/ jewellery and was not an exporter as he was paid making charges for the job work/services for making ornaments as per specification of third parties. Accordingly, the AO held that the assessee was not entitled to deduction u/s.10A. The Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim for deduction.

On appeal by the Revenue, Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) Section 10A/10B is applicable when an undertaking manufactures, or is engaged in production of articles or things. The term ‘production’ has a larger magnitude and is more expansive and liberal than the term ‘manufacture’.

(ii) In the present case, manufacture as well as production of goods, articles or things is covered u/s.10A/10B. The activity for converting gold bricks, biscuit or bars, into jewellery amounts to ‘production or manufacture’ of a new article and, therefore, qualifies for deduction u/s.10A/10B.

(iii) Case of the Revenue is that the assessee had not exported jewellery as the assessee was not owner of the imported gold or the exported jewellery and was paid making charges. Thus, the income earned does not qualify for deduction u/s.10A/10B.

(iv) The expressions/terms, ‘importer’ and ‘exporter’ are wide and not restricted to the owner of the goods at a particular point of time. Owner is treated as the importer/ exporter but a person who holds himself out as an importer or exporter is also an importer or exporter. The activity undertaken i.e., export/import is important and the person involved and associated with the said activity is important/relevant, mere ownership is not the sole criteria to determine whether a person is an importer or exporter. Further the expression ‘exported’ or ‘imported’ goods has reference to the nature of the goods as in the case of expressions ‘import’ or ‘export’ and not a person/owner.

(v) In the present case, the standard gold was imported into India and then converted into jewellery or ornaments and was sent out of India i.e., jewellery and ornaments were exported. When the import was made, the assessee was shown as a consignee and an importer and when the export was made the assessee was shown as a consignor i.e., the exporter. The assessee complied with the various formalities, when the standard gold was imported and then again when the jewellery/ornaments were exported. The assessee was in actual physical possession of the gold when it remained in India and would have been liable in case of loss, etc. The concept of and the term ‘ownership’, has various jurisprudential connotations. For all practical purposes, the assessee was in possession of gold and had a right, dominance and dominion over it. They were liable to pay Customs duty, etc. in case export was not made. Keeping in view the nature of transactions in question, it is not possible to hold that the assessee did not ‘export’ the jewellery/ornaments and that the transactions in question cannot be regarded as export for the purpose of section 10A/10B. Thus, when the assessee had exported the ornaments, it was exporting articles or things. The assessee were exporters or had exported articles/things as understood in common parlance.

(vi) Section 10A does not apply to export income earned by an assessee from merely trading the goods and postulates that the assessee must be an undertaking, which manufactures or produces articles or things, which are exported.

(vii) This condition in the present case is satisfied. Accordingly, the contention raised by the Revenue fails and has to be rejected. Appeals are accordingly dismissed.”

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CIT(A): Power to issue directions against third party: Sections 153C and 251(1)(c) of Income-tax Act, 1961: In the matter of lis between the assessee and the Revenue before it, it is not open to the CIT(A) to proceed to determine the rights or liabilities of a third party, who is not before it.

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[CIT v. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, 245 CTR 591 (All.)]

The assessee, a charitable institution transferred development cess to Mandi Parishad and claimed deduction of the said amount. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim for deduction. The CIT(A) allowed the assessee’s claim and held that the payment treated as expenditure or application by the assessee shall be treated as business receipt by Mandi Parishad and directed the Assessing Officer to make a reference to the Assessing Officer of Mandi Parishad to take remedial measures, if necessary, in the relevant assessment years to tax the relevant receipts in the hands of the Mandi Parishad. The Tribunal held as under:

“The learned CIT(A) while referring to the cases of Mandi Parishads had not afforded any opportunity to the said assessees and it is also noticed that the learned CIT(A) made these observations in spite of the fact that no such material relating to Mandi Parishads was available to him. In our opinion, these observations of the learned CIT(A) are unnecessary, because the facts of the case which is pending for adjudication are only to be considered. However, in the instant case, neither the material relating to other issues was available to the learned CIT(A) nor opportunity of being heard was given to the said assessee whose cases have been referred by the learned CIT(A). We, therefore, modify the order of the learned CIT(A) to this extent that the impugned observations made by him are unwarranted in the case of present assessees.”

On appeal by the Revenue the Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) It is not open to another quasi-judicial authority of limited jurisdiction, in the matter of lis between the assessee and Revenue before it to proceed to determine the rights or liabilities of the third party, who is not before it, in the assessment of the assessee.

(ii) The CIT(A) had no jurisdiction to direct the Assessing Officer to make a reference to the Assessing Officer of Mandi Parishad, to whom the assessee used to pay cess and claim it as deduction, to take a remedial action and, if necessary, to tax the receipts in the hands of Mandi Parishad.”

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Capital gain: Exemption: Sections 54 and 139(1), (4): A.Y. 2006-07: Condition precedent: Profit to be used for purchase of residential property or deposited in specified account before due date for furnishing return: Due date can be u/s.139(4).

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[CIT v. Ms. Jagriti Aggarwal, 339 ITR 610 (P&H); 245 CTR 629 (P&H)]

The assessee had sold a house property on 13-1-2006 and had purchased another house property on 2-1- 2007. The Assessing Officer disallowed the assessee’s claim for deduction u/s.54 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 holding that the assessee failed to deposit the amount in the capital gains account scheme and also failed to purchase house property before the due date for filing the return of income. The Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the assessee’s claim and held that the assessee had complied with the provisions of section 54 as she had purchased the new residential property on 2-1-2007 i.e., before the due date u/s.139(4) of the Act. The Tribunal affirmed the order of the Commissioner (Appeals).

On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and Haryana High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) The sale of the asset had taken place on 13- 1-2006, falling in the previous year 2006-07, the return could be filed before the end of the relevant A.Y. 2007-08 i.e., 31-3-2007. Thus, s.s(4) of section 139 provides the extended period of limitation as an exception to s.s(1) of section 139 of the Act.

(ii) S.s (4) was in relation to the time allowed to an assessee u/ss.(1) to file the return. Therefore, such provision is not an independent provision, but relates to the time contemplated u/ss.(1) of section 139. Therefore, s.s(4) had to be read along with s.s(1).

(iii) Therefore, due date for furnishing return of income according to section 139(1) of the Act was subject to the extended period provided u/ss.(4) of section 139 of the Act.”

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Business expenditure: Capital or revenue: A.Y. 2003-04: Assessee stopped manufacturing and continued trading: Severance cost paid to employees is revenue expenditure.

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[CIT v. KJS India P. Ltd., 340 ITR 380 (Del.)]

The assessee-company was manufacturing soft drinks. In the A.Y. 2003-04, the assessee-company stopped manufacturing soft drinks as it was found to be non-profitable. Many employees who were directly in the manufacturing activity were laid off and severance cost of these employees of Rs. 93,91,706 was paid. The assessee’s claim for deduction of this amount was disallowed by the Assessing Officer holding that it is capital in nature. The Tribunal found that apart from manufacturing soft drinks, the assessee was also trading in soft drinks. The Tribunal held that suspension of one of the activities did not amount to closure of business and allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“Since the assessee had been doing other business activity also, namely, ‘trading’, it could not be said that the assessee had closed its business with the suspension of manufacturing soft drinks. The expenditure was deductible.”

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Reassessment — Assessee allowed to raise all contentions on merits in the reassessment proceedings

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The assessment for the A.Y. 2000-01 was re-opened after the expiry of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year for the reason that though in the tax audit report an amount of Rs.107.70 lakh had been shown u/s.41 of the Act, only Rs.9.23 lakh on account of provision for warranties no longer required was written back under the head ‘Other sources of Income’ leaving a balance of Rs.98.46 lakh resulting in escapement of income. The other reason for reopening was that though dividend income of Rs.188.73 lakh was earned which was exempt u/s.10(33), no disallowance was made of the expenses related to purchase/sale of the investment.

In fact the balance amount of Rs.98.46 lakh was added back under different heads, but was not separately indicated and in its objection the assessee did not take this specific plea. It only stated that Rs.1,07,69,936 was added back/credited to the profit and loss account and one item of Rs.9,23,471 was reflected on the credit side of the profit and loss account. As regards, disallowance of expenses incurred for earning tax-free income it was contended that section 14A was introduced in the statute by the Finance Act, 2001, with retrospective effect from April 1, 1962 and the return was filed on 30-11-2000 and therefore it was not obligatory to make a disallowance and there was no failure on the part of the assessee in disclosing fully and truly the material facts in respect of the expenditure incurred for earning the tax-free income. The assessee also relied upon the proviso to section 14A which prohibited reopening of assessment for any assessment year beginning on or before 1-4-2001.

On a writ challenging the notice issued u/s.148 for want of jurisdiction, the Delhi High Court noted that in reply to the notice issued u/s.154 of the Act the assessee had given the full break-up and specific details with regard to credit/adjustment of Rs.98.46 lakh into profit and loss account and hence it found some merit in the contention of the assessee. However, it did not dwell further on this aspect since the notice was sustainable on the ground of section 14A. According to the High Court the proviso to section 14A only barred the reassessment/rectification and not the original assessment on the basis of retrospective amendment. Since the Assessing Officer had failed to apply section 14A when he passed the original assessment order, it had prima facie resulted in escapement of income. According to the High Court there was an omission and failure on the part of the assessee to point out the expenses incurred relatable to tax-free/exempt income which prima facie have been claimed as a deduction in the income and expenditure account and hence there was omission and failure on the part of the petition to disclose fully and truly the material facts.

On an appeal, the Supreme Court held that in its view the reopening of the assessment was fully justified on the facts and circumstances of the case. However, on merits of the case, it would be open to the assessee to raise all contention with regard to the amount of Rs.98.46 lakh being offered for tax as well as its contention on section 14A of the Act.

[Honda Siel Power Products Ltd. v. Dy. CIT and Others, (2012) 340 ITR 53 (SC)]

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Eligibility of Contractual workers for inclusion in Number of Workers

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Issue for consideration

Section 80I(2)(iv) (effective up to 31-3-1991) of the One finds that similar language and expression has been used under the Act of 1922 and has been continued to be used by the Legislature even under the provisions of the 1961 Act while stipulating one of the conditions for the ‘tax holiday’. For ready reference, the language and expressions as used in different provisions over the period are tabulated below:

Comparison of incentive provisions where employment of workers is mandated.


Section

Language
and Expression used

 

 

15C(2)(iii) of the

Employs ten or more workers in manufacturing process carried on with
the aid

1922 Act

of power, or employs twenty or more workers in a manufacturing
process carried on

 

without the aid of power.

 

 

84(2)(iv)
of the

It
employs ten or more workers in a manufacturing process carried on with the

1961 Act

aid of power, or employs twenty or more workers in a manufacturing
process carried

 

on without the aid of power.

 

 

80J(4)(iv)
of the

In
a case where the industrial undertaking manufactures or produces articles,
the

1961 Act

undertaking employs ten or more workers in a manufacturing process
carried on with

 

the of power, or employs twenty or more workers in manufacturing
process carried

 

on without the aid of power.

 

 

80HH(2)(iv)
of the

It
employs ten or more workers in a manufacturing process carried on with the

1961 Act

aid of power, or employs twenty or more workers in a manufacturing
process carried

 

on without the aid of power.

 

 

80I(2)(iv)/

In
a case where the industrial undertaking manufactures or produces articles,
the

80IB(2)(iv) of the

undertaking employs ten or more workers in a manufacturing process
carried on

1961 Act

with the of power, or employs twenty or more workers in manufacturing
process

 

carried on without the aid of power.

 

 

10BA(2)(e) of the

It employs twenty or more workers during the previous year in the
process of

1961 Act

manufacture or production.

 

 

Income-tax Act, 1961, analogous to present section 80IB(2)(iv) of the Act, requires employment of certain number of workers by the new industrial undertaking as one of the conditions for the undertaking to qualify for the ‘tax holiday’. The industrial undertaking should employ ten or more workers in a manufacturing process where the manufacture or production of articles or things takes place with the aid of power or employ twenty or more workers in a manufacturing process if manufacture or production is undertaken without the aid of power.

It appears that one of the aims and objects of the Legislature under the scheme of ‘tax holidays’ over the period is to generate employment in the country.

The language and expression as used in the aforesaid sections have been subject of the judicial interpretation by Courts on different counts viz., the determination of period for which the aforesaid condition needs to be satisfied in a financial year, interpretation of the expression ‘employs’, meaning of the word ‘workers’, etc.

The controversy, sought to be discussed here, revolves around the issue whether the contractual workers or the workers supplied by a contractor for manufacture or production of articles or things could be treated as ‘workers’ employed by the assessee undertaking for the purpose of deduction u/s.80IB/u/s.80I of the Act.

The Bombay High Court recently had an occasion to deal with the aforesaid issue under consideration, wherein the High Court held that it was immaterial as to whether the workers were directly employed or employed by hiring them from a contractor. What was relevant was the employment of ten or more workers and not the mode and the manner in which the said workers were employed. In deciding the issue, the Bombay High Court dissented with the findings that were given on the subject by the Allahabad High Court.

Jyoti Plastic’s case The issue came up recently before the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. M/s. Jyoti Plastic Works Private Limited, [339ITR 491 (Bom)]

Jyoti Plastic Works Private Limited (‘Jyoti Plastic’) was engaged in the manufacture of plastic parts which were excisable and had claimed deduction u/s.80IB of the Act. In the reassessment proceedings, the AO disallowed the deduction u/s.80IB of the Act for the following two reasons:

(1) Jyoti Plastic was not a manufacturer, as the goods were manufactured at the factory premises of the job worker; and

(2) The total number of permanent employees employed in the factory were less than ten and thereby the condition as required u/s.80IB (2)(iv) was not satisfied.

The first Appellate Authority and the Mumbai Tribunal allowed the claim of Jyoti Plastic and the Revenue, being aggrieved, carried the issue to the Bombay High Court. As regard the first issue, the Court held in favour of Jyoti Plastic. With respect to the second issue, the Court, in the absence of the meaning of the word ‘worker’ under the Act, referred to the following external aids of construction to determine the meaning of the word ‘worker’:

(1) Black Law Dictionary — ‘worker’ means a person employed to do work for another;

(2)    Section 2(L) of the Factories Act, 1948 — ‘worker’ is a person employed directly or by or through any agency (including a contractor) with or without the knowledge of the principal employer, whether for remuneration or not, in any manufacturing process, or in any other kind or work incidental to or connected with the manufacturing process.

The Court further relied on its earlier judgment in the case of CIT v. Sawyer’s Asia Limited (122 ITR 259) (Bom.), wherein the Court while considering the provisions of section 84(2)(iv) of the Act had observed that the word ‘workers’ should also include ‘casual workers’.

The Revenue relied on the following decisions of the Allahabad High Court to submit otherwise :

(1)    R and P Exports v. CIT, (279 ITR 536); and

(2)    Venus Auto Private Limited v. CIT, 321 ITR 504.

The Bombay High Court distinguished the decision of the Allahabad High Court in the R and P Exports’ case on the ground that the Tribunal in the case before the Bombay High Court had recorded a specific finding of fact that the agreement between Jyoti Plastic and the contractor was a ‘contract of service’ and not ‘contract for service’, whereby the contractual workers were under direct control and supervision of Jyoti Plastic as against the facts which were to the contrary in the case of R and P Exports (supra).

With regard to the decision of Venus Auto Private Limited (supra), the Court acknowledged that the facts in the said case were similar to the facts of the case before the Court; it dissented with the ratio of the decision in the said case and chose to rely on its own decision in the case of Sawyer’s Asia Limited (supra).

The Court finally concluded that since the agreement with the contractor was a ‘contract of service’ i.e., of employer-employee relationship and just because it differed with terms of contract of service with regular employees, that could not be a ground to deny the deduction u/s.80IB of the Act. In other words, so long as the agreement between the parties was a ‘contract of service’ and not ‘contract for service’, it would satisfy the condition prescribed u/s.80IB(2)(iv) of the Act.

Venus Auto’s case

The issue had come up earlier before the Allahabad High Court in the case of Venus Auto Private Limited v. CIT, (321 ITR 504).

Venus Auto Private Limited (‘Venus Auto’) was engaged in the manu-facturing activity of the scooter seat and claimed deduction u/s.80HH and u/s.80I of the Act. In the assessment and appellate proceedings up to the Tribunal stage, Venus Auto’s claim for deduction was rejected on the ground that the condition u/s.80I(2) (iv) of workers employed was not satisfied as the workers employed through the contractor were not to be treated as the workers employed in the industrial undertaking.

On appeal by Venus Auto before the High Court, the Allahabad High Court observed that the word ‘employment’ meant employment of workers by Venus Auto. There should be a relationship of employer and employee between the workers and Venus Auto. The Court observed that with regard to the contractual employees, there was no such employer-employee relationship between Venus Auto and the contractual employees; such relationship existed between the contractor and the contractual employees. The Court on facts and in law distinguished the reliance of Venus Auto on the following decisions:

(1)    Aditya V. Birla v. CBDT, (170 ITR 137) (SC);
(2)    CIT v. K. G. Yediyurappa, (152 ITR 152) (Kar.);
and
(3)    CIT v. V. B. Narania & Co., (252 ITR 884) (Guj.)

Further, the Court observed that vide word ‘it employs’, the Legislature sought to limit the relationship between employer and employee only i.e., between Venus Auto and the workers and therefore, it would not include the workers employed by the contractor.

Observations

‘Tax holidays’ have been provided from time to time vide various sections, viz., section 15C of the Act of 1922 section 84, section 80J, section 80HH, section 80I, section 80IA and section 80IB of the Act of 1961. The intention of the Legislature has been all along to encourage the setting up of new industrial undertakings with a view to expanding industries, employment opportunities and production of goods. The Courts have acknowledged the intention of the Legislature in introducing the said deduction/exemption/relief provisions of the Act and have held that such provisions should be interpreted liberally and reasonably and they should be so construed as to effectuate the object of the Legislature and not to defeat it.

The purpose of ‘tax holiday’ provisions has been apparently to provide tax incentives to stimulate the industry and manufacture of articles, resulting in more employment and economic gain for the country. The element of ‘number of workers to be employed’ being consistently present in all the ‘tax holiday’ provisions justifies the intention of the Legislature to promote and create employment opportunities in the country, thereby reducing unemployment.

In the case of CIT v. P. R. Alagappan, (173 ITR 522) (Mad.), the Court for the purpose of section 80J (4) of the Act explained that a ‘worker’ was a person who worked relying on the definition of ‘worker’ in the Factories Act.

The Court approved of the reference to the definition of ‘worker’ under the Factories Act and also observed that the expression ‘employs’ contemplated ‘contract of service’.

The Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT v. K. G. Yediruppa & Co., (152 ITR 152) in context of section 80HH(2)(iv) of the Act has held that in absence of definition of the word ‘worker’, the ordinary meaning of the word ‘worker’ meant casual, permanent or temporary workers.

Similarly, in the case of CIT v. Sawyer’s Asia Ltd. (supra), the Bombay High Court for the purpose of deduction u/s.84(2)(iv), observed as under:

“………The undertaking is not required to have ten or more regular workers and it may be said to have satisfied that requirement if the aggregate actual number of workers engaged in the manufacturing process, both regular and normal, is ten in number……….If it chooses to have less than 10 regular workers on its muster roll, it runs the risk of not satisfying the requirement on such days on which the necessary number of casual workers is not available.”

The Court also considered even persons employed on casual basis as eligible to be ‘workers’ for the purpose of satisfaction of condition u/s.84(2)(iv) of the Act.

Similarly, in the case of CIT v. V. B. Narania & Co., (252 ITR 884), the Gujarat High Court, in context of provisions of section 80HH(2)(iv) and section 80J(2) (iv), held by relying on the decision of Apex Court in the case of Harish Chandra Bajpai v. Triloki Singh, (AIR 1957 SC 444), that a contract of employment may be in respect of either piece work or time work. It held that the real test of deciding whether the contract was one of employment or not was to find whether the agreement was for the personal labour of the person engaged, and if that was so, the contract was one of employment and the rest of the facts were immaterial like, whether the work was time work or piece work, or whether the employee did the whole of the work himself, or whether he obtained the assistance of other persons also for the work.

In interpretation of the analogous provisions to sec-tion 80IB(2)(iv)/section 80I(2)(iv) the Courts have interpreted the word ‘worker’ to also include ‘casual and temporary workers’ and the expression ‘employ’ has been interpreted to mean a contract of service, where the requirement of personal labour of the person employed is of importance as against whether the employee is in normal employment of the undertaking or otherwise. The stress is upon the substance of the arrangement rather than its legal form.

Looking from the perspective of intention of the Legislature in creating employment and supported by the above-referred decisions, the better view appears to be that the casual and contractual workers employed directly or through the contractor are to be treated as the ‘workers’ for the purposes of the ‘tax holiday’. The decision in the case of Venus Auto (supra) may require reconsideration.

Legitimacy of Reference to OECD Commentary for Interpretation of Income Tax Act and DTAs

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Recently, in the case of Gracemac Corporation and Others v. ADIT, (47 DTR 65) (Del.) (Tri.), the appellant had relied on the Commentary of OECD Model Tax Convention (‘the OECD Commentary’) in order to differentiate between ‘copyright’ and ‘copyrighted article’ for interpretation of the term ‘royalty’ in respect of computer software. The Tribunal rejected the reliance on the OECD Commentary after referring to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of CIT v. P.V.A.L. Kulandagan Chettiar, (137 Taxman 460) for the following reasons:

  • The phrase ‘copyrighted article’ is not used under the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’) or in the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements (‘DTAA’) or even under the Copyright Act, 1957; and

  • As held by the Apex Court in the aforesaid decision, OECD Commentary is not a safe or acceptable guide or aid for interpretation of provisions of the Act or DTAAs between India and other countries.

The Tribunal concluded that royalty in respect of computer software has to be decided on the basis of provisions of the Act or relevant DTAA under consideration.

On the other hand, the Delhi High Court recently in the case of Asia Satellite Telecommunications Co. Ltd. v. DIT and vice versa, (332 ITR 340) upheld the reliance on OECD Commentary while interpreting the definition of ‘royalty’ in respect of leasing out transponder capacity on a satellite. The Court held that the technical terms used in DTAA are the same which appear in section 9(1)(vi) and for better understanding of the terms, OECD Commentary can always be relied upon. The Court relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of UOI and Anr v. Azadi Bachao Andolan & Anr., (263 ITR 706) and other catena of decisions1 to emphasise that the international accepted meaning and interpretation placed on identical or similar terms employed in various DTAAs should be followed by the Courts in India when it comes to construing similar terms occurring in the Act.

On a combined reading of the findings of the aforesaid decisions, one may reconcile that for better understanding of the terms used in the Act or DTAAs, one may refer to the OECD Commentary provided and subject to:

  • The technical terms as sought for interpretation are ambiguous; and

  • Technical terms as used in the Act or DTAAs are identical or similar to terms employed in OECD Commentary.

The true significance however, lies in the practical implementation of the aforesaid principle while interpreting the provisions of the Act and DTAAs, which may be subject to criticisms or limitations similar to reliance on English decisions and other international decisions and/or statutes. In addition, India not as a ‘Member’ of OECD but as ‘Observer’ has expressed its position/views on the Articles of OECD Model Convention and its commentary thereon, which has been published in the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 2010 (version dated 22 July 2010). The position is presented qua the Articles under the Tax Convention as regard to its disagreement with the Text of the Article or disagreement with an interpretation given in the commentary in relation to the Article. It would be further necessary to highlight that while nations like Indonesia and China, (non-OECD economies like India) have expressly clarified that in the course of negotiations with other countries, they will not be bound by their stated positions in the OECD Commentary; India has not expressly clarified as such. Therefore, one may suggest that India may be bound by its stated positions in respect of the OECD Commentary in its course of negotiation and interpretations of DTAAs with other countries.

In the backdrop of the aforesaid discussion, it may then be necessary to consider the legitimacy in relying on OECD Commentary for interpretation of provisions of the Act and DTAAs entered into by India with other countries.

Reliance on OECD Commentary in interpreting provisions of the Act

Reference to English and other International decisions for interpretation and construction of the provisions of the Act have been subject of concern and criticism, time and again by the Courts2 since the provisions of the Act are not in pari materia with the provisions of the other statues, as well as the fundamental concepts and the principles on which the provisions are incorporated under the Act are different vis-à-vis the other statues. The provisions of the Act though may at times appear to be similar to the provisions of OECD Tax Convention, on deeper scrutiny may reveal differences not only in the wording but also in the meaning of a particular expression which has been acquired in the context of the development of law in those countries. Reliance on OECD Commentary in interpreting the provisions of the Act may therefore be subject to similar criticisms and concerns.

OECD is a 31 Member country organisation where the respective governments work together to address the economic, social and environmental challenges of globalisation. The OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital was designed and developed by the member countries as a means to settle on a uniform basis the most common problems that arise in the field of International juridical double taxation. India while negotiating its tax treaties maintains a balance and follows either OECD Model or UN Model on Tax Convention or a mix of the two. So, the provisions and terms as used in the Act may not confirm to the same language, interpretation and meanings as used in the DTAAs by India with other countries. Observations have been made by various Courts in catena of decisions3 with respect to various provisions of the Act as being wider/narrower in scope to the analogous provisions of DTAAs.

One may therefore say that the provisions of the Act should be construed on their own terms without drawing any analogy of the OECD Commentary, subject to principles as drawn above.

Reliance on OECD Commentary in interpreting provisions of DTAAs

Though, India is not a signatory to Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘VCLT’), but the judicial forums4 in India have acknowledged its importance in interpreting the provisions of DTAAs and have observed as under:

“The DTAAs are international agreements entered into between States. The conclusion and interpretation of such convention is governed by public international law, and particularly, by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969. The rules of interpretation contained in the Vienna Convention, being customary international law also apply to the interpretation of tax treaties. . . . .”

The principles governing the interpretation of tax treaties can be broadly summed up as follows:

(i) A tax treaty is an agreement and not a taxing statute, even though it is an agreement about how taxes are to be imposed.

(ii) The principles adopted in the interpretation of statutory legislation are not applicable in interpretation of treaties.

(iii) A tax treaty is to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning given to the treaty in the context and in the light of its objects and purpose.

(iv) A tax treaty is required to be interpreted as a whole, which essentially implies that the provisions of the treaty are required to be construed in harmony with each other.

(v) The words employed in the tax treaties not being those of a regular Parliamentary draughtsman, the words need not examined in precise grammatical sense or in literal sense. Even departure from plain meaning of the language is permissible whenever context so requires, to avoid the absurdities and to interpret the treaty ut res magis valeat quam pereat i.e., in such a manner as to make it workable rather than redundant.

(vi)    A literal or legalistic meaning must be avoided when the basic object of the treaty might be defeated or frustrated insofar as particular items under consideration are concerned.

(vii)    Words are to be understood with reference to the subject-matter, i.e., verba accopoenda sunt secundum subjectum materiam.

(viii)    When a tax treaty does not define a term employed in it, and if the context of the treaty so requires, the terms can be given a meaning different from its meaning in the domestic law. The meaning of the undefined terms in a tax treaty should be determined by reference to all of the relevant information and the context.

The rules of interpretation in VCLT can be found in Article 31 to 33 of the Convention. Article 32 of the Convention provides recourse to supplementary means of interpretation, which in turn should confirm to the broad principles of Article 31 as summarised above. According to Article 32 of VCLT, the ‘supplementary means of interpretation’ include the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion. The word ‘include’ indicates that the rule is not exhaustive and there may be other supplementary means of interpretation. One such means is provided by the commentaries appended to the OECD Model Tax Convention. To the extent, the provisions of DTAAs are similar to OECD Model Convention, the OECD commentaries may become relevant to interpretation of DTAAs.

The Kolkata Tribunal in the case of Graphite India Ltd. v. DCIT, (86 ITD 384) while deciding whether the services rendered by an American Consultant to an Indian Company are covered under the Article 15, being in the nature of professional services or under Article 12, being in the nature of Fees for Technical services, observed as under as regard to interpretation of OECD and UN Model Commentaries:

“17. The aforesaid interpretation is clearly in harmony with the OECD and UN Model Conventions’ official commentaries, ………….. Andhra Pradesh High Court has, in the case CIT v. Visakhapatnam Port Trust, (1984) 38 CTR (AP) 1: (1983) 144 ITR 146 (AP), referred to OECD commentaries on the technical expressions and the clauses in the model conventions, and referred to, with approval, Lord Radcliffe’s observations in Ostime v. Australian Mutual Provident Society, (1960) AC 459, 480: (1960) 39 ITR 210, 219 (HL), which have described the language employed in these documents as the ‘international tax language’. In view of the observations of Andhra Pradesh High Court, in Visakhapatnam Port Trust’s case (supra), these model conventions and commentaries thereon constitute international tax language and the meanings assigned by such literature to various technical terms should be given due weightage. In our considered view, the views expressed by these bodies, which have made immense contribution towards development of standardisation of tax treaties between various countries, constitute ‘contemporanea expositio’ inasmuch as the meanings indicated by various expressions in tax treaties can be inferred as the meanings normally understood in, to use the words employed by Lord Radcliffe, ‘international tax language’ developed by bodies like OECD and UN.”

As discussed earlier, India by giving its stance on the text of the Article of OECD Model Tax Convention and commentaries thereon has helped in confirming an interpretation, in resolving ambiguities and obscurities and in displacing interpretation which appears absurd or unreasonable from India’s point of view. India’s position qua the text of the Articles and commentaries thereon as stated in the OECD Model Tax Convention — July 2010 version under the chapter ‘Non -OECD Economies’ positions on the OECD Model Tax Convention’ is tabulated below:

Relevant
Article

 

OECD
— India’s position

 

 

Text
of the Article

 

Commentary
of the Article

 

 

 

 

 

Article 1 – Persons
covered

No disagreement5

 

Disagreement6

Article 2 – Taxes
Covered

No disagreement

 

No disagreement

Article 3 – General
Definitions

Reservations7

 

No disagreement

Article 4 – Resident

Reservations

 

Disagreement

Article 5 – Permanent
Establishment

Reservations

 

Disagreement

Article 6 – Income
from Immovable Property

Reservations

 

No disagreement

Article 7 – Business
Profits (position after 22-7-2010)

Reservation and

 

Disagreement

 

 

disagreement

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Article 7 – Business
Profits (position before 22-7-2010)

Reservations

 

Disagreement

Article 8 – Shipping,
Inland Waterways Transport and

 

 

 

Air Transport

Reservations

 

Reservations

Article 9 –
Associated Enterprises

No disagreement

 

No disagreement

Article 10 –
Dividends

Reservations

 

Disagreement

Article 11 – Interest

Reservations

 

Disagreement and
Reservations

Article 12 – Royalties

Reservations

 

Disagreement and Reservations

Article 13 – Capital
Gains

Reservations

 

No disagreement

Article 14 –
Independent Personal Services

Article and
commentary thereon has been deleted by OECD

Article 15 – Income
from Employment

Reservations

 

Disagreement

Article 16 – Director’s
Fees

No disagreement

 

No disagreement

Article 17 – Artists
and Sportsmen

Reservations

 

No disagreement

Article 18 – Pensions

No disagreement

 

No disagreement

Article 19 –
Government Service

No disagreement

 

Disagreement

Article 20 – Students

Reservations

 

No disagreement

Article 21 – Other
Income

Reservations

 

No disagreement

Article 22 – Taxation
of Capital

Reservations

 

No disagreement

Article 23A –
Exemption Method

Reservations

 

No disagreement

Article 23B – Credit
Method

 

 

 

 

Article 24 – Non
Discrimination

Reservations

 

Reservations

Article 25 – Mutual
Agreement Procedure

No disagreement

 

Disagreement

Article 26 – Exchange
of Information

Reservations

 

No disagreement

Article 27 –
Assistance in the Collection of Taxes

 

 

 

Article 28 – Members
of Diplomatic Missions and

There are no disagreements which India has
raised as regard to Text

Consular Posts

Article 29 – Territorial Extension

of the Article and
Commentary thereon.

Article 30 – Entry
into Force

 

 

 

Article 31 –
Termination

 

 

 

However, a question that arises is whether the position by India with respect to provisions of OECD Model Tax Convention is binding on taxpayers, tax authorities and more so, on the judicial forums of India.

To begin with, it is necessary to find the statutory force or lack of it, under which India has provided its position to the OECD Model Tax Convention, since its nature will determine the legitimacy of reference to OECD Commentary for interpreting the provisions of DTAAs.

After considering the OECD Commentary — ‘Non-OECD Economies’ Positions on the OECD Model Tax Convention’ Chapter, one understands that these are official statements made by Government of India as regard its interpretation of the Tax Convention. The clarifications or comments provided to OECD are not issued as a rule u/s.295, Circular or order u/s.119 of the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961. A pos-sible conclusion which can then be drawn is that even though such clarification may not be binding on taxpayers, they shall have high persuasive value considering contemporary official statements made by the Government of India on the subject of interpretation.

One also needs to consider whether these official statements can be considered as an aid for construction of the DTAAs entered into by India and which are based on OECD Model Tax Convention.

The aforesaid explanations received from the Indian Government could be considered as an aid for construction, which is in accordance with the Latin Maxim Contemporanea expositio. The Indian Courts8 have time and again held that Contemporaneous Exposition by the administrators entrusted with the task of executing the statute is extremely significant in interpretation of the statutory instruments. The rule of contemporanea expositio provides that “administrative construction (i.e., contemporaneous construction placed by administrative or executive officers) generally should be clearly wrong before it is over-turned; such a construction commonly referred to as practical construction, although non-controlling, is nevertheless entitled to considerable weight, it is highly persuasive.” [Crawford on Statutory Construction, 1940 Ed, as in K. P. Varghese (supra)]. However, generally, such expositions from the administrators are subject to the following limitations:

  •     The plain and unambiguous language of the statutory instruments shall hold

good against such expositions; and

  •     Such expositions even though binding on the Income-tax Department, are not binding on the Tribunal and Courts.

Therefore, based on the aforesaid discussion and doctrine of Contemporanea exposition, one may hold that provisions of DTAAs could be construed based on the explanation as received from the Indian Government on the OECD Model Tax Convention, provided the said exposition adheres to the broad principles of Article 31 of the VCLT, even though the applicability of VCLT to India may be a question in itself.

So, besides, decisions delivered by the various Indian judicial forums interpreting the provisions of DTAAs, one can now rely on India’s position on the Articles of the OECD Model Tax Convention and commentary thereon.

Lastly, the relevant extracts of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of UOI v. Azadi Bachao Andolan and Anr. (supra) as regard to interpretation of DTAAs are reproduced below:

“………… Interpretation of Treaties

96.    The principles adopted in interpretation of treaties are not the same as those in interpretation of statutory legislation. While commenting on the interpretation of a treaty imported into a municipal law, Francis Bennion observes:

“With indirect enactment, instead of the substantive legislation taking the well-known form of an Act of Parliament, it has the form of a treaty. In other words the form and language found suitable for embodying an international Agreement become, at the stroke of a pen, also the form and language of a municipal legislative instrument. It is rather like saying that by Act of Parliament, a woman shall be a man. Inconveniences may ensue. One inconvenience is that the interpreter is likely to be required to cope with disorganised composition instead of precision drafting. The drafting of treaties is notoriously sloppy, usually for very good reason. To get Agreement, politic uncertainty is called for.

…… This echoes the optimistic dictum of Lord Widgery CJ that the words “are to be given their general meaning, general to lawyer and layman alike… the meaning of the diplomat rather than the lawyer.” [Francis Bennion, Statutory Interpretation, p. 461 (Butterworths) 1992 (2nd Ed.)]

An important principle which needs to be kept in mind in the interpretation of the provisions of an international treaty, including one for double taxation relief, is that treaties are negotiated and entered into at a political level and have several considerations as their bases. Commenting on this aspect of the matter, David R. Davis in Principles of International Double Taxation Relief, p. 4 (London Sweet & Maxwell, 1985), points out that the main function of a Double Taxation Avoidance Treaty should be seen in the context of aiding commercial relations between treaty partners and as being essentially a bargain between two treaty countries as to the division of tax revenues between them in respect of income falling to be taxed in both jurisdictions”

On a more practical front, one finds that since the publication of India’s position on OECD Model Tax Convention, the Courts have not acknowledged much, the said publication as an aid for construction in interpreting the provisions of DTAAs. The taxpayers could however look forward to taking re-course to the India’s position on OECD Commentary as an aid for construction, for the favourable interpretations with respect to provisions of DTAA.

Commodity Markets

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Introduction

Strange as it may sound, the Indian commodity markets are older than the securities markets, however, very little is known about these markets to the common man. The various commodity markets in India clocked a turnover of over Rs.92 trillion for the period ended April to December 2011. Commodity markets have various components, such as bullion, metals, grains, energy, oil and oilseeds, petrochemicals, pulses, spices, plantation products, etc. and span over 100 commodities. In the recent past, gold and silver have given excellent returns and that is why now there is a sustained interest in the commodity markets. Let us take a bird’seye view of the regulatory aspect of this market, the types of contracts which can be executed, the tax treatment of these contracts, etc.

Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act

One more strange fact, for such a large market, there is only one statute — the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952 (FCRA). As compared to this, the securities market has a plethora of regulations which one needs to deal with. Bills for amending the FCRA have lapsed twice. A third attempt is being made to amend the Act.

The FCRA regulates the forward contracts in commodities. As the name suggests, it does not apply to spot delivery contracts. It is somewhat similar in nature to Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956.

Forward Market Commission

The FCRA amongst other aspects, provides for the establishment of a regulator for the forward markets, known as the Forward Market Commission of India (FMC). The FMC has been established u/s.3 of the FCRA. The FMC is a statutory body and functions under the administrative control of the Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food & Public Distribution, Department of Consumer Affairs, Government of India. Its role may be equated with that of the SEBI in the securities market, although, the FMC does not have as wide powers as SEBI. The Bill for amending the FCRA would give more powers to the FMC and make it an autonomous body, like the SEBI.

Types of contracts
Under the FCRA there can be two types of contracts in commodities:

(a) Ready Delivery Contracts — Contracts where delivery and payment must take place immediately or within a maximum period of 11 days. These are similar to the spot delivery contracts which one comes across under the SCRA. If a commodity contract is settled by cash or by an offsetting contract and as a result of that the actual tendering of goods is dispensed with, then it is not an Ready Delivery Contract. These contracts are outside the purview of the Forward Markets’ Commission. The Amendment Bill seeks to increase the duration from 11 to 30 days.

(b) Forward Contracts — These are contracts for the delivery of goods and are not a Ready Delivery Contract. The FMC regulates these Contracts. Commodity derivatives are also a type of Forward Contract. Thus, a contract which is settled by cash or by an offsetting contract and as a result the actual tendering of goods is dispensed with becomes a Forward Contract.

Forward Contracts can be of three types:

(a) Specific Delivery Contract — It is a Forward Contract which provides for the actual delivery of specific qualities of goods. The delivery must take place during a specified future period at a price fixed/to be fixed. Further, the names of the buyer and seller must be mentioned in the contract. The Amendment Bill proposes to add that such contracts must also be actually performed by actual delivery.

Specific Delivery Contracts cannot be settled by paying the difference in cash or by an offsetting contract. They can be executed on an off-market basis also. Specific delivery contracts are contracts entered into for actual transactions in the commodity and the terms of contract may be tailored to suit the needs of the parties as against the standardised terms found in futures contracts.

Specific Delivery Contracts, in turn, can be of two types — Non-Transferable (NTSDC) and Transferable (TSDC). Non-transferable are those contracts which are only between a defined buyer and a seller and cannot be transferred by either party, whereas ‘transferable contracts’ may be transferred from one person to another till the actual maturity of the contract or delivery date.

(b) Forward contracts other than specific delivery contracts are what are generally known as ‘Futures Contracts’, though the Act does not specifically define the term futures contracts. Such contracts can be performed either:

  • by delivery of goods and payment thereof or by entering into offsetting contracts and payment; OR

  • by cash settlement, i.e., receipt of amount based on the difference between the rate of entering into contract and the rate of offsetting contract.

Thus, the main difference between Specific Delivery Contracts and Futures is that while Specific Delivery Contracts must be performed by delivery, futures can be cash settled also. Futures contracts are usually standardised contracts where the quantity, quality, date of maturity, place of delivery are all standardised and the parties to the contract only decide on the price and the number of units to be traded. Futures contracts must necessarily be entered into through the Commodity Exchanges.

(c) Option Agreements —

The Amendment Act proposes to add a third category — options in commodities. This would mean an agreement for the purchase or sale of a right to buy and/or sell goods in future and includes a put and call in goods. These must be entered into through the Commodity Exchanges.

Commodity exchanges

The FCRA also provides for recognised associations for the regulation and control of forward contracts or options in goods. These associations are popularly known as commodity exchanges.

Currently, permanent recognition has been granted to three national-level multi-commodity exchanges, Multi-commodity Exchange of India Limited (MCX), National Commodity and Derivatives Exchange Limited (NCDEX), and National Multi-commodity Exchange of India Limited (NMCE) Ahmedabad. These national commodity exchanges have permission for conducting forward/futures trading activities in all commodities, to which section 15 of the FCRA is applicable.

Members of commodity exchanges are commodity brokers.

Trading in forward contracts

U/s.15 of the FCRA, forward contracts can be entered into only between members of, through members of or with members of a recognised commodity exchange. Futures trading can be conducted in any commodity subject to the approval/recognition of the Government of India. Further, it must be in accordance with the bye-laws of the commodity exchange. Any forward contract entered into in contravention of the byelaws is illegal.

Nothing contained in section 15 applies to Specific Delivery Contracts, whether transferable or non-transferable. However, the Central Government is empowered u/s.18(3) to notify such classes of Specific Delivery Contracts to which the provisions of section 15 would also apply.

Regulation of commodity brokers

Trade from India by commodity brokers on foreign commodity exchanges requires prior approval of FMC. Trading without the approval is illegal and persons entering into such contract are punishable under the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952. The FMC has, in the past, suspended brokers found to be indulging in futures trading on online foreign commodity exchanges.

Commodity brokers cannot provide advisory services to clients for investment in commodities futures contract. Portfolio advisory services, portfolio management services and other services are not permissible in the Commodity Derivative Markets. The FMC has not formulated any guidelines for investment advisory services by any entity and hence, these activities are not permitted to the brokers.

Client Code Modification (CCM) facility is an important issue which the FMC strictly regulates. The CCM facility is permitted only for carrying out corrections of genuine punching errors during the specified time of the trading day. The penalty for CCM is 1% of the value of trade in respect of which the client code has been modified. The penalty is 2% of the value of trade in respect of which client code has been modified if it is more than 5% of the trading done by the Member during that day. A minimum penalty of Rs.25,000 is levied for client code modifications irrespective of the value of trade. Commodity Exchanges are however authorised to waive the above penalty in cases of genuine punching errors.

Trading in overseas commodities exchanges and setting up joint ventures/wholly-owned subsidiaries abroad for trading in overseas commodity exchanges is reckoned as financial services activity under the FEMA Regulations and requires prior clearance from the FMC. Any investment in a JV/WOS for such a purpose would have to comply with the requirements for overseas direct investment in a financial service as specified under Rule 7 r.w. Rule 6 of the FEMA Notification No. 120/2004.

FDI in commodity brokerages

Neither the Consolidated FDI Policy issued vide Circular 2/2011, nor the Regulations issued under the FEMA, 1999 contain any specific provision for foreign direct investment in a commodity brokerage. Hence, any FDI in a commodity brokerage would require prior FIPB approval. The FIPB has given approvals to several such FDI proposals.

However, it may be noted that the RBI does not permit foreign banks to invest in commodity brokerages, whether directly or indirectly. Hence, any proposal for FDI by a foreign bank in a commodity broker would not be permissible. It is for this reason that the takeovers of IL&FS Investmart by HSBC and Geojit Securities by BNPI were held up by the RBI till such time as the commodity broking arms were hived-off/restructured. FDI in commodity exchanges is allowed up to 49% (FDI & FII). Investment by Registered FIIs under the Portfolio Investment Scheme (PIS) is limited to 23% and investment under the FDI Scheme is limited to 26%.

Taxation of commodity contracts

Taxation of commodity derivative contracts is one of the issues facing investors and traders in commodities. The first question to be considered is whether the assessee is an investor or a trader and hence, whether his gain is taxable as capital gains or as business income. The various tests, judgments, controversies, etc., which one comes across while dealing with this issue in the case of securities would be applicable even to commodities.

Secondly, in the cases where they constitute a business, the question arises whether they constitute a speculative business. Section 43(5) of the Income-tax Act grants a specific exemption to derivatives traded on stock exchanges. However, there is no specific exemption for contracts traded on commodity exchanges. Hence, one would have to ascertain whether a commodity contract falls under any of the other exemptions specified u/s.43(5).

Further, the losses from speculative commodity businesses can only be set off against speculative commodity businesses. They cannot be set off against profits from delivery based commodity transactions or capital gains or profits from security derivatives transactions.

Stamp duty on contract notes

Stamp Duty on commodity transactions is a State subject and the duty incidence would depend upon the location of the broker’s office which issues the contract note. For instance, under the Bombay Stamp Act, 1958, the State of Maharashtra levies a duty @ 0.005% of the value of the contract for the purchase or sale of any commodity, such as cotton, bullion, spices, oil seeds, spices, etc. Similarly, any electronic or physical contract note issued by a commodity broker, whether delivery based or non-delivery based attracts a duty @ 0.005%.

Maharashtra levies one of the highest incidences of stamp duty on commodity broker notes. Earlier, such contracts were charged with minimum duty of Rs.100 per document.

Section 10B of the Bombay Stamp Act, provides that it is the responsibility of the commodity exchange to collect the stamp duty due on brokers’ notes by deducting the same from the brokers account at the time of settlement of such transactions.

Penalties under FCRA

Any violation of the FCRA is a criminal offence inviting imprisonment and/or a fine. The Bill proposes to make the penalties for violating the FCRA more stringent, for example, violation of some of the provisions would carry imprisonment up to one year and/or a fine ranging from Rs.25000 to Rs.25 lakh. The Bill also seeks to introduce penalties for insider trading similar to what is found under the SEBI Act.


Auditor’s responsibility

Just as a compliance audit of stock brokers requires a knowledge of the securities markets, an audit of commodity brokers requires knowledge of the commodity markets on the part of the auditor. This would include a knowledge of the various applicable Regulations, relevant Exchange Circulars, Compliance Forms, etc.

An auditor of a market intermediary should be well-versed with the important laws in this respect which affect the functioning and the existence of the entity. For instance, in case of the intermediaries, non-compliance with the regulations could result in cancellation of the registration certificate and this would affect the very substratum of the entity.

By broadening his peripheral knowledge, the Auditor can make intelligent enquiries and thereby add value to his services. He can caution the auditee of likely unpleasant consequences which might arise as a result of improperly stamped or unregistered mortgage deeds. It needs to be repeated and noted that the audit is basically under the relevant law applicable to an entity and an auditor is not an expert on all laws relevant to business operations of an entity. All that is required of him is exercise of ‘due care’.

Transfer of property — Adverse possession — Transfer of Proper for Act section 53A

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[ M. Gopal & Anr. v. K. Jangareddy & Ors., AIR 2011 (Andhra Pradesh) 185]
The original owner of the suit property (the defendant No. 1) with a view to sell away the land, had put it to private auction in which the second defendant was the highest bidder. On the same day the plaintiff offered to purchase the said land for which the both defendants agreed and an unregistered sale deed was executed.

The plaintiff’s version was that he had been in continuous possession of the schedule lands having been put in possession of the same under the private sale deed and has been raising seasonal crops. Thus, he asserts that after his purchase, he has been in possession of the schedule lands and the said fact is known to each and every body in and around the village, including the defendants. He also pleaded that by continuously remaining in possession and upon asserting his title to the knowledge of the defendants he perfected the title to the schedule property by adverse possession.

The defendants No. 3 and 4 alleged that the sale deed are sham and bogus documents and the property was coparcenery property, therefore the defendant No. 1 could not have sold the same.

The issue that arose was whether the plaintiff was entitled to protect his possession under law on the ground that since he remained in possession of the property for more than the period of 12 years and that he had perfected his title by adverse possession.

The Court observed that person who obtained the possession of the property under executory terms of contract of sale, cannot ask for declaration of his title on the ground that he remained in possession of the property for more than 12 years period and contending that his possession is adverse to the real owner. The Apex Court in Achal Reddi v. Ramakrishna Reddiar & Ors., AIR 1990 SC 553 held that possession of a purchaser is under a contract of sale, his possession cannot be adverse and he cannot set up the plea of adverse possession. Therefore, the Trial Court erred in declaring the title of the plaintiff holding that he perfected his title to the schedule mentioned property by adverse possession against the defendants.

However, by virtue of the doctrine of part performance embodied in section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, the plaintiff can protect his possession from defendants 1 and 2 who sold the property to him under the simple sale deed, so also he can protect his possession from defendants 3 and 4 who had the knowledge of the earlier sale transaction in his favour under a sale deed. Further it is true that section 53A only operates as a bar against the defendants in the present case from enforcing any rights against the plaintiff other than those which were provided under simple sale deed. Although the section does not confer title on the person who took possession of the property in part performance of the contract, the law is now well settled that when all conditions of the section are satisfied as in the present case, the possession of the person must be protected by the Court whether he comes as a plaintiff or defendant. The only embargo is that section 53A cannot be taken in aid by the transferee to establish his right as owner of the property. But the transferee can protect his possession having recourse to section 53A, either by instituting a suit for injunction as a plaintiff or by defending the suit filed by the transferor or subsequent purchasers as a defendant. It is also well settled that the transferee can very well file a suit for injunction to protect his possession even though his remedy to file a suit for specific performance of contract is barred by limitation.

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Part performance of Contract — Conditions — The Limitation Act does not extinguish the defence, it only bars the remedy — Section 53A does not confer a title on transferee in possession — Transfer of Property Act, section 53A.

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[ Rajpal & Anr. v. Harswaroop, AIR 2011 (Del.) 203]

The suit of the plaintiff seeking possession of the suit property had been dismissed. The case of the plaintiff was that the defendants had entered into an agreement to sell dated 13-11-1992 with the father of the plaintiff, namely, Sh. Mangat Ram for the purchase of the aforenoted suit property; total consideration was Rs.2,80,000; a sum of Rs.1,05,000 was paid to Sh. Mangat Ram; the defendants agreed to pay the balance consideration on or before 13-9-1993. The balance amount was not paid. The defendants requested Sh. Mangat Ram to cancel the agreement; the defendants had agreed to vacate the property within three to four months. Sh. Mangat Ram expired on 21-4-1997. In spite of requests of the plaintiff to the defendant to vacate the suit property as also the legal notice dated 22-12-2001, the defendants failed to adhere to the said request. Thereafter the suit seeking possession of the suit shop as also damages at the rate of Rs.5,000 per month was claimed. The defendant took defence of part performance of contract u/s.53.

The Court observed that the conditions necessary for making out the defence of part performance to an action in ejectment by the owner are:

(a) That the transferor has contracted to transfer for consideration any immoveable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty;

(b) That the transferee has in part performance of the contract take possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee, being already in possession continues in possession in part performance of the contract;

(c) That the transferee has done some act in furtherance of the contract; and

(d) That the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract.

The provision does not confer a title on the transferee in possession; it only imposes a statutory bar on the transferor. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that an agreement to sell dated 13-11-1992 had been executed by Mangat Ram (the father of the plaintiff) qua the disputed shop in favour of the defendant.

The essential ingredients of the doctrine of part performance had been made out entitling the defendant to seek shelter and protection under this statutory provision. Admittedly in terms of the agreement the defendant was put in possession of the suit shop. The defendant had been given possession of the suit shop; it has also been proved on record that a sum of Rs.2,15,000 had been paid by the defendant to the plaintiff in part performance of the contract; he was also ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and in fact his case was that the balance consideration had also been paid by him to the plaintiff. The case of the plaintiff on the other hand was that this amount had been returned back and a sum of Rs.80,000 had been paid. This document was rightly disbelieved; it did not even bear the signatures of Mangat Ram. In view of agreement to which there was no denial the defendanttransferee is entitled to protect his possession over the suit property taken in part performance of the contract even if the period of limitation to bring a suit for specific performance has expired. The Limitation Act does not extinguish the defence; it only bars the remedy.

Limitation — Date of judgment or date of communication of order.

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[ Prontos Steerings Ltd. v. Commissioner of C. Ex — Chandigarh-I, 2011 (274) ELT 218 (Trib.) (Del.)]

The dispute in the present case was in regards to refund claim, the relevant date for computing limitation period should be counted from the date of order of the Commissioner (Appeals), which was dispatched on 10-1-2007 and received on 27-1-2007 by the assessee or the limitation period will start from the date of communication of order.

The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the order of the Asst. Commissioners observing that as per the records, the order had been handed over to the postal authority at GPO on 10-1-2007 and, hence, the same has to be taken as the date of dispatch and the words ‘date of the order’ in clause (ec) of the Explanation (B) to section 11B of Central Excise Act mean the date of dispatch and not the date of communication of the order.

On appeal, the Delhi Tribunal observed that the limitation period prescribed u/s.11B for filing the refund claim is one year from the relevant date. Unlike the judgments of the Courts or Tribunal which are either dictated in the open Court or are pronounced in the open Court and thus the date of the pronouncement and the date of communication to the affected parties are the same, in case of adjudication of any dispute by the Departmental adjudicating authorities or the Commissioner (Appeals), the judgments are not pronounced or dictated in presence of the parties but are sent by post and, thus, there would be a time gap between the date on which the order has been signed, the date of dispatch and the date on which the order is received by the assessee. The point of dispute, thus, in the case was as to whether the words ‘date of such judgment, decree order or direction’ used in clause (ec) of explanation (B) to section 11B refer to the date of signing of the order or date of dispatch order or the date of actual communication of the order to the assessee. It is clear that when some order of Court or an authority affects as assessee, the limitation would start from the date on which the order was communicated to the assessee or the date on which it was pronounced or published so that the party affected by it has reasonable opportunity of knowing the passing of such order and what it contains. The Apex Court in the case of CCE v. M. M. Rubber Co., 1991 (SS) ELT 289 (SC) held that the limitation period would start from the date of the communication of the order and not the date of signing of the order or the date of dispatch and as such with regard to the order passed by the Dept. adjudicating authority or the Commissioner (Appeals) the words ‘date of judgment’ have to be interpreted as the date of communication of the order. Thus, the refund claim was within time and the impugned order rejecting the same as time-barred, was not sustainable.

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Evidence — Proof of execution of document — Will — Evidence Act, section 68.

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[Alok Kumar Mallick v. Janardan Mahadani & Anr., AIR 2011 Jharkhand 146]

The appellants’ application for grant of letter of administration had been dismissed on the ground that the Will had not been proved, therefore the same could not be looked into.

On appeal it was observed by the High Court that a will is required to be attested by two witnesses. Section 68 of the Evidence Act lays down the procedure for proof of a document, which is required by law to be attested. Section 68 of the Evidence Act reads as follows:

“Proof of execution of document required by law to be attested.
If a document is required by law to be attested, it shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive, and subject to the process of the Court and capable of giving evidence.”

Thus in view of the aforesaid provision, if a Will (which is required under the law to be attested by witness) is not proved by adducing evidence of attesting witness, the same cannot be looked into evidence, unless the appellant shows that the said attesting witnesses are not alive and/or not capable to give evidence. In the instant case, both attesting witnesses of the Will were alive. Under the said circumstance, it was held that the Will had not been proved in accordance with law and therefore the same cannot be looked into.

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Revenue Recognition by Real Estate Developers — An Important carve-out in Ind-AS

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Revenue recognition for real estate developers is one of the most critical carve-outs considered by standard-setters when framing Ind-AS, in accordance with the plan to converge with IFRS. Ind AS requires real estate developers to recognise revenue on a percentage completion method in accordance with ‘construction contract’ accounting principles, as against IFRS, which would require accounting on completion similar to ‘sale of goods’ in most cases depending on the contracts with customers. Further, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) on 13th December 2011 issued an exposure draft of the Guidance Note (GN) on Recognition of Revenue by Real Estate Developers. This GN seeks to supersede the existing GN of ICAI of June 2006. Currently, the accounting practices followed by real estate companies for revenue recognition are very diverse and this GN seeks to align the current practices by giving bright-lines for determining the eligibility of real estate transactions for revenue recognition.

The GN should be applied to all transactions in real estate commencing or entered into on or after 1st April 2012. The GN also gives an early adoption option, provided that it is applied to all transactions commencing on or were entered into on or after the earlier adoption date.

This GN mandates the application of POC method [as defined in Accounting Standard (AS) 7, Construction Contracts] in respect of real estate transactions where the economic substance is similar to construction-type contracts. It gives the following indicators for determining if the economic substance of the transactions is similar to construction type contracts:

(a) The period of such projects is in excess of 12 months and the project commencement date and project completion date fall into different accounting periods.

(b) Most features of the project are common to construction-type contracts, viz., land development, structural engineering, architectural design, construction, etc.

(c) While individual units of the project are contracted to be delivered to different buyers these are interdependent upon or interrelated to completion of a number of common activities and/or provision of common amenities.

(d) The construction or development activities form a significant proportion of the project activity.

The GN also specifies that the POC method is applied only when all the following conditions are fulfilled:

(a) All critical approvals necessary for commencement of the project have been obtained;

(b) When the stage of completion reaches a reasonable level of development. Rebuttable presumption — reasonable level is not achieved if the expenditure incurred on project costs is less than 25% of the construction and development costs;

(c) At least 25% of the estimated project revenues are secured by contracts or agreements with buyers; and

(d) At least 10% of the total revenue as per the agreements of sale or any other legally enforceable documents are realised at the reporting date.

Therefore, companies need to assess the eligibility of individual project based on the above parameters at each reporting period before any revenue can be recognised from them. Unless and until all the above conditions are met, revenue cannot be recognised from a project. In the calculation of stage of completion of 25% for point (b) above, only actual construction costs can be included and other costs (i.e., cost of land and development rights and borrowing costs) are excluded. Hence, the GN focusses on actual physical construction activities rather than costs. However, this calculation of stage of completion is only for determining if the project is an eligible project for revenue recognition. Once it is determined that a particular project is an eligible project, revenue can be recognised based on a POC calculation that is different from the calculation done for deciding eligibility. Put differently, revenue recognition can be based on a higher POC, calculated by taking total actual costs including cost of land and development rights. While this is not explicitly mentioned in the GN it is coming out from the illustration appended to the GN.

The GN also puts an additional overall restriction on recognition of revenue when there are outstanding defaults in payment by customers. It says that the recognition of revenue by reference to POC should not at any point exceed the estimated total revenue from eligible contracts. Eligible contracts for this purpose are those meeting the above four POC criteria plus where there are no outstanding defaults of the payment terms. The GN does not define ‘outstanding default’ and hence, a question arises if the ‘outstanding default’ to be determined as at the period ends only or post balance sheet payments should also be considered? For example, there was a default in payment by a customer before the period end, but the customer has paid and regularised the account post the period end before the financial statements approved. It is not clear from the GN whether this will be considered as an ‘outstanding default’ as at the period end.

Example
ABC Limited is in the business of real estate development and sale. On 1st April 2010, ABC started a project to construct and sell 100 flats of 1,000 sq.ft. each. Cost of construction, including directly attributable costs is Rs.3,000 per sq.ft. Cost of land and development right is Rs.30 crore. Actual figures for the year ended 31st March 2011 are given in Table 1:

 

Rs. in crores

Sales — 30 flats at
an average sales price of Rs.7,000 per sq.ft.

21.00

Collection from
customers — 40%

8.40

Actual construction
costs, including direct and indirect overheads

15.00

Total revised
estimated balance costs to complete

17.00

POC for determining
if the project is eligible for revenue recognition (actual construction

 

costs/total estimated
construction costs)

46.88%

 

 

POC for recognition
of revenue (cost of land and development rights + actual construction

 

costs/Total revised
estimated costs including land and development costs)

72.58%

 

 

Since the project meets all revenue recognition preconditions as per the GN (i.e., actual construction costs exceed 25% of the total estimated construction costs, 25% of the total revenue secured by sale con-tracts and 10% collection), revenue can be recognised from the project for the year ended 31st March 2011. The Table 2 shows the calculation of revenue, costs and work in progress to be recognised in the financial statements for the year ended 31st March 2011:

 

Rs. in crores

Revenue to be
recognised

 

(30 x 7,000 x 1,000 x
72.58%)

15.24

 

 

Project costs [(30 +
15) x 30,000

 

sq.ft./100,000
sq.ft.)]

13.50

 

 

Work in progress (30
+ 15 – 13.50)

31.50

 

 

In case there were defaults in payment by 10 flat holders out of the total 30, the additional computation shown in Table 3 is to be done to determine if the revenue recognition of Rs.15.24 crore is appropriate.

 

Rs. in crores

Revenue to be
recognised

 

(as above)

15.24

 

 

Estimated total
revenue from

 

eligible contracts

 

(20 flats x 1,000
sq.ft. x Rs.7,000

 

per sq.ft.)

14.00

 

 

Work in progress (30 + 15 – 13.50)

31.50

 

 

Since the revenue as per the POC workings of Rs.15.24 crore is higher than the estimated total revenue from eligible contracts of Rs.14 crore, revenue recognition should be restricted to Rs.14 crore and correspondingly cost of projects to be recognised in the profit and loss should also be adjusted.

This guidance note will enhance consistency in the accounting practices of real estate developers and in particular the application of the percentage completion method. This however remains a very important ‘carve-out’ and will have a significant impact on companies who wish to prepare and report their financial statements under IFRS.

Editor’s Note: It is understood that the Guidance Note on Recognition of Revenue by Real Estate Developers has been finalised and is expected to be issued shortly.

Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. (31-3-2011)

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From Significant Accounting Policies

Depreciation
At erection/project sites: The cost of roads, bridges and culverts is fully amortised over the tenure of the contract, while sheds, railway sidings, electrical installations and other similar enabling works (other than purely temporary erections, wooden structures) are so depreciated after retaining 10% as residual value.

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Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (31-3-2011)

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From Significant Accounting Policies

Depreciation
Expenditure on items like electricity transmission lines, railway sidings, roads, culverts, etc. the ownership of which is not with the company are charged off to revenue in the year of incurrence of such expenditure.

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Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (31-3-2011)

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From Significant Accounting Policies

Fixed assets

Expenditure incurred generally during construction period of projects on assets like electricity transmission lines, roads, culverts, etc. the ownership of which is not with the company are charged to revenue in the accounting period of incurrence of such expenditure.

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Ambuja Cement Ltd. (31-12-2010)

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From Significant Accounting Policies

Depreciation
The cost of fixed assets, constructed by the company, but ownership of which belongs to government/local authorities, is amortised at the rate of depreciation specified in Schedule XIV to the Companies Act, 1956.

Expenditure on power lines, ownership of which belongs to the State Electricity Boards, is amortised over the period as permitted in the Electricity Supply Act, 1948.

Expenditure on marine structures, ownership of which belongs to the Maritime Boards, is amortised over the period of agreement.

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ACC Ltd. (31-12-2010)

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From Significant Accounting Policies

Depreciation
Capital assets whose ownership does not vest in the company have been depreciated over the period of five years.

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Tata Steel Ltd. (31-3-2011)

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From Significant Accounting Policies

Depreciation
Capital assets whose ownership does not vest in the company is depreciated over their estimated useful life or five years, whichever is less.

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Ultratech Cement Ltd. (31-3-2011)

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From Significant Accounting Policies

Depreciation
Assets not owned by the company are amortised over a period of five years or the period specified in the agreement.

From Fixed Assets Schedule
Fixed assets includes assets costing Rs.238.63 crores (Previous year Rs.150.94 crores) not owned by the company.

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NHPC Ltd. (31-3-2011)

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From Significant Accounting Policies

Fixed assets

Capital expenditure on assets where neither the land nor the asset is owned by the company is reflected as a distinct item in capital work in progress till the period of completion and thereafter in the fixed assets.

Depreciation
Capital expenditure referred to in Policy 2.3 is amortised over a period of five years from the year in which the first unit of project concerned comes into commercial operation and thereafter from the year in which the relevant asset becomes available for use.

From Notes to Accounts
During the year the company has received the opinion from the Expert Advisory Committee of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (EAC of ICAI) and as per opinion of EAC, expenditure incurred for creation of assets not within the control of company should be charged to Profit & Loss account in the year of incurrence itself. The company has represented to the EAC of ICAI that such expenditure, being essential for setting up of a hydro project, should be allowed to be capitalised. Pending receipt of further opinion/communication from the EAC, the accounting treatment as per existing accounting practices/ policies has been continued.

From Auditor’s Report
Further to our comments in the Annexure referred to in Para 3 above, without qualifying our report, we draw attention to (a) ……., (b) ……. and (c) Note No. 12 (Schedule 24 — Notes to Accounts) regarding having referred the issue of capitalisation of expenditure incurred for creation of assets (enabling assets) not within the control of the company, to Expert Advisory Committee of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India.

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NTPC Ltd. (31-3-2011)

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From Significant Accounting Policies

Fixed assets
Capital expenditure on assets not owned by the company is reflected as a distinct item in Capital Work-in-Progress till the period of completion and thereafter in the Fixed Assets.

Depreciation
Capital expenditure on assets not owned by the company is amortised over a period of four years from the month in which the first unit of project concerned comes into commercial operation and thereafter from the month in which the relevant asset becomes available for use. However, similar expenditure for community development is charged off to revenue.

From Notes to Accounts
During the year the company has received an opinion from the Expert Advisory Committee of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India on accounting treatment of capital expenditure on assets not owned by the company wherein it was opined that such expenditure are to the charged to the statement of Profit & Loss Account as and when incurred. The company has represented that such expenditure being essential for setting up of a project, the same be accounted in line with the existing accounting practice and sought a review. Pending receipt of communication regarding the review, existing treatment has been continued as per existing accounting policy.

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(2011) 131 ITD 263 DCIT v. Jindal Equipment Leasing & Consultancy Services Ltd. A.Y.: 2003-04. Dated: 25-2-2011

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Section 48 — The full value of consideration as contemplated in section 48 of the Act does not have any reference to the market value, but only to the consideration referred to in the sale deeds or other supporting evidences as the sale price of the assets which have been transferred.

Facts:
The assessee-company sold shares held in Nalwa Sponge Iron Ltd. (NSIL) to three persons at Rs.12 per share. The book value of shares was estimated to be Rs.254.40 at the time of sale. The AO took the view that the sale of shares was a device to pass on undue monetary benefit to the persons, who according to the AO were related persons. Based on that the AO recomputed capital gain by adopting the fair market value of the shares which was Rs.254.50. He thus made additions of Rs.6,06,27,500 as undisclosed sale consideration. On appeal to the CIT(A) by the assessee, it was held that the AO can’t alter the computation of capital gain without any evidence.

The Department filed appeal against the order of the CIT(A).

Held:

Section 48 contemplates ascertainment of ‘full value of consideration received or accruing as a result of the transfer of capital asset’. The word received means actually received and word accruing means the debt created in favour of the assessee as a result of transfer. In any case, both the terms are used as actual and not estimated amounts. The erstwhile provision does not contain words ‘fair market value’, thus addition made to sale consideration by the AO is not in accordance with the section 48 of the Act.

As regards the objection raised by the AO regarding related party, there was no evidence to prove that transferees were related to the directors of the company. However in any case transferees could not be said to be related to the company as company does not have any corporeal existence.

Hence it was held that the transactions were conducted with independent parties.

Also it is commonly accepted law that the onus to prove otherwise than the fact lies on the person who alleges. In the instant case even though the transaction had taken place at values far less than the arm’s-length price, in absence of any evidence purporting receipt of more consideration than stated, computation of capital gain made by the assessee cannot be altered by the AO.

In order to show that the transaction was colourable device intended to evade tax, the Revenue must prove understatement of consideration. They should have basic material and evidence in its hand. In the instant case, the AO relied upon hypothetical sale price without any evidence, which does not prove that there is more consideration passed than what is disclosed.

Held that as there was no evidence on record that transferees were related to directors of the assessee-company and that the assessee had received amount more than stated consideration, computation of capital gain can be made only on the basis of consideration actually received.

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(2012) TIOL 44 ITAT-Mum. Mithalal N. Sisodia HUF v. ITO A.Y.: 2005-06. Dated: 5-8-2011

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Section 271(1)(c) — Penalty cannot be levied in respect of amount surrendered by the assessee unless the AO proves that bogus LTCG was being declared to claim benefit of either exemption or lower rate of tax.

Facts:
The assessee HUF in its return of income declared long-term capital gains on sale of shares. The assessee claimed that it had purchased a flat and therefore LTCG was exempt u/s.54F of the Act. The LTCG arose on sale of 6000 shares of a company known as Poonam Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (P). The shares had been purchased by the assessee on 8-4-2003 for a sum of Rs.14,320 through V. K. Singhania, a stock-broker in Calcutta. The purchase price was claimed to have been paid in cash. The shares were sold in 3 tranches in August, Sept and Nov 2004 for a total consideration of Rs.17,87,450. The shares were claimed to have been sold through Shyamlala Sultania, stock-broker in Calcutta. The delivery of shares was received and given via Demat account of the assessee. In the course of assessment proceedings, the AO with a view to verify the transactions of purchase and sale of shares wrote a letter to P which was returned unserved with a remark ‘Not Known’. The broker through whom the shares were claimed to have been sold stated that the assessee was not his client and during the previous year he had not done any transactions in shares of P. The Calcutta Stock Exchange confirmed that M/s. V. K. Singhania had not done any transaction in scrip P in the physical form in the online trading system of Calcutta Stock Exchange.

The AO, in the course of assessment proceedings, examined the assessee u/s.131 and recorded statement of the Karta of the assessee. In the statement it was stated that the shares were purchased and sold on the advice of one Mr. R who was resident of Mumbai. Upon being confronted with the materials collected by the AO, he stated that he had purchased and sold shares and had nothing more to say. He then sought adjournment and before the next date of hearing filed a letter surrendering the amount of exemption claimed on the ground that due to his age he cannot go to Calcutta to verify the details, he has not concealed any income nor filed wrong particulars, but with a view to buy peace and avoid litigation the surrender was being made by revising return of income (though time for filing revised return u/s.139(5) had expired) and taxes were paid. The AO made a reference to investigation conducted by Investigation Wing of the Department and pointed modus operandi followed by various persons claiming LTCG. The AO held that the assessee had brought into his accounts unaccounted money and paid less tax by claiming the sum brought in the books as LTCG.

Subsequently, the AO levied penalty on the ground that the assessee had concealed particulars of income and only when investigation was carried out the assessee surrendered the amount and offered the sale proceeds of shares as Income from Other Sources.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the order of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted the sequence of events and observed that the assessee had shown the shares in its balance sheet as on 31-3-2004 and the same was accepted by the Revenue. It also noted that the shares were transferred to the Demat account of the assessee. Sale consideration was received by banking channels. The Tribunal observed that the enquiry by the AO from the Calcutta Stock Exchange that the transaction was not done through the Exchange cannot be taken as basis to conclude that the transactions of sale of shares was not genuine. It observed that denial of Shyamlal Sultania, through whom shares were sold is a circumstance going against the assessee. The Tribunal held that from the sequence of events it cannot be said with certainity that the claim made by the assessee was bogus. It noted that the surrender was made to buy peace and avoid litigation. It was because of his inability to go to Calcutta, due to old age, to collect necessary evidence that the surrender was made. The AO had not brought on record any independent material to show that the assessee was part of any investigation referred to in the assessment order. The Tribunal held that imposition of penalty would depend on facts and circumstances of the case. On the present facts, the Tribunal held that the explanation offered by the assessee was bona fide. The Tribunal directed that the penalty imposed be deleted.

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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(2012) TIOL 25 ITAT-Bang.-SB Nandi Steels Ltd. v. ACIT A.Y.: 2003-04. Dated: 9-12-2011

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Section 72 — Capital gains arising on sale of land and building used for business purposes cannot be set off against brought forward business loss.

Facts:
The assessee-company was engaged in the business of manufacture/production of iron and steel. In the proceedings u/s.143(3) r.w.s. 148 the Assessing Officer (AO), relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Killick Nixon & Co. v. CIT, (66 ITR 714) (SC), held that the brought forward business loss and unabsorbed depreciation cannot be set off against income from capital gains arising on sale of land and building used for the purposes of the business. He noted that the SC has in the said case held that only income which is earned by carrying on business is entitled to be set off. Accordingly, he denied the set-off of gains arising on sale of land and building which were computed under the head ‘Capital Gains’ against brought forward business loss.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the order of the AO. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Before the Division Bench, the assessee relied upon the decision of the Bangalore Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Steelcon Industries (P) Ltd. v. ITO, ITA No. 571 (Bang.) 1989, A.Y. 1985-86, order dated 27-12- 2004) wherein the issue was decided in favour of the assessee by following the decisions of the SC in the cases of CIT v. Cocanada Radhaswami Bank, (55 ITR 17) (SC) and CIT v. Chugandas & Co., (55 ITR 17) (SC). The Division Bench noticed that there is another judgment of the SC in the case of CIT v. Express Newspapers Ltd., (53 ITR 250) wherein the SC held that capital gains are connected with the capital assets of the business and therefore, it cannot make them the profit of the business and cannot be set off against the brought forward business loss. This decision of the SC was not considered by the Tribunal in the case of Steelcon Industries (P) Ltd (supra) and therefore, the Division Bench felt that the decision in the case of Steelcon Industries (P) Ltd. (supra) requires reconsideration by a Special Bench. The President constituted a Special Bench for disposal of the following two grounds of the appeal filed by the assessee —

“(1) That the learned CIT(A) erred in law and on facts that the appellant is not entitled to set off carry forward business loss of Rs.39,99,652 against the long-term capital gain arising on sale of land used for the purpose of business.

(2) That the authorities below ought to have appreciated that there is no cessation of business and the appellant is entitled to set off the carry forward business loss.”

Held:
Section 72 permits carry forward of business loss to subsequent assessment years and allows it to be set off against profits & gains, if any, of any business or profession carried on by the assessee and assessable for the relevant assessment year. The term ‘profits and gains of business or profession’ means income earned out of business carried on by the assessee and not any income which is in some way connected to the business carried on by the assessee.

SB did not agree with the contention of the assessee that the assets sold by the assessee were business assets. It held that these were un-disputedly capital assets and capital receipts are not taxable, nor are the capital payments deductible from the income of the assessee. The capital is to be used for the purpose of carrying on the business of the assessee and it shall remain in the business of the assessee till it is either converted into stock-in-trade or is disposed of. The income earned by the assessee by carrying on the business by use of stock-in-trade only is the business income of the assessee.

SB held that the decision of the SC in Express Newspapers Ltd. (supra) is squarely applicable to the facts of the present case and that the Coordinate Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Steelcon Industries Pvt. Ltd. (supra) has wrongly placed reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court in the cases of United Commercial Bank Ltd. and M/s. Cocanada Radhaswami Bank Ltd. It held that the gains arising on sale of land and building were not eligible for set-off against the brought forward business loss u/s.72.

These grounds of appeal filed by the assessee were decided against the assessee.

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(2011) 142 TTJ 358 (Hyd.) Four Soft Ltd. v. Dy. CIT A.Y.: 2006-07. Dated: 9-9-2011

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Section 92B and 92C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Corporate guarantee provided by the assessee company does not fall within the definition of international transaction and, therefore, no TP adjustment is required in respect of corporate guarantee transaction undertaken by the assesseecompany.

Facts:
The assessee-company had provided corporate guarantee to ICICI Bank UK on behalf of its subsidiary. The TPO held that guarantee is an obligation and if the principal debtor falls to honour the obligation, the guarantor is liable for the same and, hence, the TPO determined a commission @ 3.75% as the ALP under the CUP method on the basis of the commission charged by the ICICI Bank as benchmark.

Held:
The Tribunal held that no TP adjustment is required in respect of corporate guarantee transaction done by the assessee-company. The Tribunal noted as under:

(1) The TP legislation provides for computation of income from international transaction as per section 92B.

(2) The corporate guarantee provided by the assessee-company does not fall within the definition of international transaction.

(3) The TP legislation does not stipulate any guidelines in respect of guarantee transactions.

(4) In the absence of any charging provision, the lower authorities are not correct in bringing aforesaid transaction in the TP study. The corporate guarantee is very much incidental to the business of the assessee and hence, the same cannot be compared to a bank guarantee transaction of the bank or financial institution.

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(2011) 142 TTJ 252 (Visakha) Dredging Corporation of India Ltd. v. ACIT A.Ys.: 2006-07 to 2008-09. Dated: 25-7-2011

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Section 234D r.w.s. 2(40) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Reassessment made u/s.147 after completion of assessment u/s.143(3) cannot be termed as regular assessment and, consequently, interest u/s.234D is not chargeable in such reassessment.

Facts:
The assessee was given refund while processing the return u/s.143(1) and further refund was given after assessment u/s.143(3). In reassessment proceedings u/s.147, the refund amount got reduced and, therefore, the excess refund given earlier became collectible from the assessee. The Assessing Officer levied interest u/s.234D on such excess refund amount. The learned CIT(A) held that the interest u/s.234D is not chargeable in the hands of the company in reassessment proceedings.

Held:
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)’s order. The Tribunal noted as under:

(1) On a plain reading of section 234D, it is noticed that the interest u/s.234D is leviable only if the refund granted to the assessee u/s.143(1) of the Act becomes collectible in the order passed under regular assessment.

(2) As per section 2(40) read with Explanation to section 234D, ‘regular assessment’ is defined to mean assessment order passed u/s.143(3) or u/s.144 or where the assessment has been made for the first time u/s.147 or u/s.153A. Thus, reassessment proceedings u/s.147 after completion of the assessment u/s.143(3) is excluded from the purview of ‘regular assessment’.

(3) Such exhaustive definition of ‘regular assessment’ when considered in the light of the fact that in the appellant-company’s case the assessment u/s.147 has been made not for the first time, but after the completion of an assessment u/s.143(3), the same cannot be termed as regular assessment and, consequently, the provisions of section 234D cannot apply in the appellantcompany’s case.

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(2011) 142 TTJ 86 (Pune) Drilbits International (P.) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT A.Y.: 2006-07. Dated: 23-8-2011

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(a) Section 32(1)(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Unit acquired at slump price — Amount allocated towards trademark, brand name, logo, etc. and technical know-how by approved valuer is capital expenditure eligible for depreciation claim.

(b) Section 92C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 read with Rules 10B(1)(a), 10B(1)(c) and 10B(1)(e) of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 — Transfer pricing — Most appropriate method for computing arm’s-length price — Rates charged to the third parties in the domestic market cannot be compared with the rates charged to AE in the export market — There are various factors which affect the pricing of the product in the domestic market vis-à-vis the export market — Hence the CPM method is not appropriate method for determining the ALP — CUP or TNMM was the most appropriate method for determining ALP.

Facts:
(a) Depreciation u/s.32(1)(iii)

The assessee acquired the unit of G on slump-sales basis consisting of all its assets which included intellectual property rights such as designs, drawings, manufacturing processes and technical know-how for a consideration of Rs.17.01 crore. The registered valuer valued the knowhow acquired at Rs.2.41 crore and royalty payable for use of brand name, trademark, logo, etc. at Rs.2.67 crore. The Assessing Officer disallowed depreciation on the same on the basis that as per agreement, the assessee has not purchased any know-how from G and the assessee is entitled to use trademark, logo and brand name of G free of cost for a period of three years.

Held:
The Tribunal, relying on the decisions in the following cases, allowed the assessee’s claim:

(a) Amway India Enterprises v. Dy. CIT, (2008) 114 TTJ 476 (Del.) (SB)/(2008) 4 DTR (Del.) (SB) (Trib.) 1/(2008) 111 ITD 112 (Del.) (SB)

(b) Hindustan Coca Cola Beverages (P.) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT, (2010) 43 DTR (Del.) 416

The Tribunal noted as under:

(1) It is an undisputed fact that the assessee has paid the agreed consideration of Rs. 17.01 crore as a lump-sum amount to purchase the unit in its entirety i.e., the unit consisting of items like trademark, logo and brand name, designs, drawings, manufacturing processes and technical know-how.

(2) Simply because, in the agreement to purchase, it is mentioned that the use of all items like trademark, logo and brand name is allowed to the assessee for three years by G free of cost, it does not mean that there is no value for these items. The agreement between the seller and the purchaser does not put restriction on the right of the purchaser to record the asset at its fair value in its books.

(3) The apportionment of the lump-sum amount amongst the various assets and rights has to be made and which has been done in the present case as per the valuer’s report. The approved valuer has valued the know-how acquired at Rs.2.41 crore and royalty payable for use of brand name, trademark and logo at Rs.2.67 crore.

(4) The Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Amway India (supra) has held that if the software is useable/used for more than two years, it is a capital expenditure and if it is for less than two years, it is revenue expenditure. Thus, following the ratio laid down therein, since the assessee had purchased the use of brand name, trademark, logo for three years and similarly, the intellectual property right such as design, drawings, manufacturing processes and technical know-how in respect of the products manufactured by the unit was acquired, the expenditure incurred in this regard as valued by the approved valuer is capital expenditure on which the claim of depreciation was allowable.

Facts:
(b) Computation of ALP

During the year, the assessee-company sold goods to its associate enterprises (AEs). Initially, while filing the return of income, the assessee had adopted the comparable uncontrolled price method (CUP) for determining the arm’s-length price (ALP) in respect of exports transactions undertaken with the AE. Thereafter, in the proceedings before the learned TPO, the assessee contended that even as per transactional net margin method (TNMM), the transactions of export of goods are at ALP. The revised Form No. 3CEB was filed and details of the company selected as comparable were furnished. The learned TPO did not agree with the submissions of the assessee and held that the CUP method and TNMM are not applicable for determining the ALP. The learned TPO has considered the gross margin earned by the assessee in the export segment visà- vis gross margin earned in the domestic segment. Accordingly, he has held that the gross margin in the domestic segment is much higher than the margin earned in the export segment and, hence, he made an addition of Rs.58.54 lakh.

Held:
The Tribunal held that the TPO was not justified in adopting CPM and in comparing the gross margin in export segment vis-à-vis gross margin in domestic segment of the assessee without appreciating that the CUP or TNMM was the most proper method for determining the ALP. The TPO was directed to accept the claim of the assessee regarding the ALP based on TNMM which method has been accepted in the succeeding year.

The Tribunal noted as under:

(1) Rates charged to the third parties in the domestic market cannot be compared with the rates charged to AE in the export market. There are various factors which affect the pricing of the product in the domestic market vis-à-vis the export market and, therefore, the price cannot be compared. The assessee has to bear substantial marketing cost in the domestic segment, there is no bad debt risk in respect of the sales made to the AE and no product liability risk. Besides, it is also a material aspect that the assessee has to bear product liability risks like retention money, bank guarantee, warranty, etc. in the domestic segment, but such risks are not to be borne in the export segment. Due to these factors, the assessee has to charge higher rates in the domestic segment and, therefore, comparison of the rates of the products in the domestic segment and the export segment is not justified.

(2) For the A.Y. 2007-08, the assessee has adopted TNMM for determining the ALP and the TPO has accepted the same. There is substance in the alternative submissions of the authorised representative that TNMM can also be accepted during the year for determining the ALP.

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Merger — Review of High Court Order — SLP against the same dismissed by SC — No Review possible — Constitution of India Act, 136 and 226.

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[ Sri Ambal Mills P. Ltd. v. Commissioner of C. Ex. Coimbatore, 2011 (274) ELT 186 (Mad.)]

The applicant filed a review petition seeking to review the order passed by a Division Bench of the High Court. Against the said order SLP was preferred to the Apex Court, but the same was dismissed by SC. Subsequently, review of the order of High Court was sought.

The Court while dismissing the review petition held that it is not possible to review the order of the High Court which has been confirmed by the SC. The review petition was not maintainable.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 66, dated 13-1- 2012 — (I) Scheme for Investment by Qualified Foreign Investors in equity shares — (II) Scheme for Investment by Qualified Foreign Investors in Rupee Denominated Units of Domestic Mutual Funds — Revision.

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(I) Scheme for Investment by Qualified Foreign Investors (QFI) in equity shares

This Circular permits QFI (non-resident investors, other than SEBI-registered FII and SEBI-registered FVCI, who meet the KYC requirements of SEBI), from jurisdictions which are FATF compliant and with which SEBI has signed MOUs under the IOSCO framework, to purchase on repatriation basis equity shares of Indian companies, subject the following terms and conditions. Some of the important terms and conditions are:

(i) QFI can invest through SEBI-registered Depository Participants (DP) only:

(a) In equity shares of listed Indian companies through recognised brokers on recognised stock exchanges in India

(b) In equity shares of Indian companies which are offered to public in India in terms of the relevant and applicable SEBI guidelines/regulations.

(ii) QFI can also acquire equity shares by way of rights shares, bonus shares or equity shares on account of stock split/consolidation or equity shares on account of amalgamation, demerger or such corporate actions.

(iii) QFI are allowed to sell the equity shares so acquired by way of sale:

(a) Through recognised brokers on recognised stock exchanges in India; or

(b) In an open offer in accordance with the SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 2011; or

(c) In an open offer in accordance with the SEBI (Delisting of Securities) Guidelines, 2009; or

(d) Through buyback of shares by a listed Indian company in accordance with the SEBI (Buyback) Regulations, 1998.

(iv) A separate single rupee pool bank account must be maintained by the DP with an AD Category-I bank in India for QFI investments under this scheme.

(v) The individual and aggregate investment limits for the QFI will be 5% and 10%, respectively of the paid-up capital of an Indian company. These limits shall be over and above the FII and NRI investment ceilings prescribed under the Portfolio Investment Scheme for foreign investment in India. However, wherever there are composite sectoral caps under the extant FDI policy, these limits for QFI investment in equity shares shall also be within such overall FDI sectoral caps.

(vi) QFI can remit foreign inward remittance through normal banking channel in any permitted currency (freely convertible) directly into single rupee pool bank account of the DP maintained with AD Category-I bank. Similarly, sale proceeds/dividends of equity shares will also be received in this single rupee pool bank account of the DP and must be repatriated to the designated overseas bank account of the QFI within five working days (including the date of credit of funds to the single rupee pool bank account by way of sale of equity shares) of having been received in the single rupee pool bank account of the DP, provided it is not reinvested within this period of five days.

(vii) Pricing of all eligible transactions and investment in all eligible instruments by QFI must be in accordance with the relevant and applicable SEBI guidelines only.

(II) Scheme for Investment by Qualified Foreign Investors in Rupee Denominated Units of Domestic Mutual Funds

This Circular has modified the Scheme for QFI investment in rupee denominated units of Domestic Mutual Funds under the Direct Route as follows:

1. The time period for which funds (by way of foreign inward remittance as well as by way of credit of redemption proceeds of the units of Domestic Mutual Funds) can be kept in the single rupee pool bank account of the DP under the scheme is five working days (including the day of credit of funds received).

2. Similarly, dividend received by QFI in the single rupee pool bank account must be remitted to the designated overseas bank accounts of the QFI within five working days (including the day of credit of such funds to the single rupee pool bank account). Dividend so received can be also utilised by the QFI, within these five working days, for fresh purchases of units of Domestic Mutual Funds under this scheme.

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(2012) 65 DTR (Mum.) (Trib.) 104 Ramesh R. Shah v. ACIT A.Y.: 2005-06. Dated: 29-07-2011

Revised return u/s.139(5) — When original return made u/s.139(1) declaring positive income, claim for carry forward of long-term capital loss made in revised return u/s.139(5) is allowable.

Facts:

The assessee had filed original return of income u/s.139(1) declaring total income of Rs.94.09 lakhs. Subsequently, the assessee filed a revised return claiming long-term capital loss of Rs.1.82 crore and the said loss was claimed to be carried forward u/s.74. The AO denied carry forward of such loss on the ground that as per section 80, loss not determined in return u/s.139(3) cannot be allowed to be carried forward and set off u/s.74. The learned CIT also confirmed the order of the AO observing that carry forward of loss returned for the first time in revised return of income is not eligible for carry forward to the next assessment year as per provisions of section 80.

Held:

In the present case, the assessee filed the original return u/s.139(1) in which the positive income is determined and subsequently even revised return filed declared positive income as the assessee could not set off the long-term capital loss on the sale of shares. He claimed the same to be carried forward.

As per the provisions of section 139(5) in both the situations where the assessee has filed the return of positive income as well as return of loss at the first instance as per the time-limit prescribed and subsequently, files the revised return then the revised return is treated as valid return. Hence once the assessee declares positive income in original return filed u/s.139(1), but subsequently finds some mistake or wrong statement and files revised return declaring loss, then he cannot be deprived of the benefit of carry forward of such loss.

A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 65, dated 12-1-2012 — Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 — Export of Goods and Services — Forwarders Cargo Receipt.

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Presently, banks are permitted to accept Forwarder’s Cargo Receipts (FCR) issued by IATA-approved agents, in lieu of bill of lading, for negotiation/collection of shipping documents, in respect of export transactions backed by letters of credit, only if:

1. the relative letter of credit specifically provides for negotiation of FCR in lieu of bill of lading and

2. the relative sale contract with the overseas buyer provides that FCR can be accepted in lieu of bill of lading as a shipping document.

This Circular has relaxed the above conditions, and provides that:

1. Banks can accept FCR issued by IATA-approved agents, in lieu of bill of lading, for negotiation/ collection of shipping documents, in respect of export transactions backed by letters of credit, if the relative letter of credit specifically provides for negotiation of this document in lieu of bill of lading even if the relative sale contract with the overseas buyer does not provide for acceptance of FCR as a shipping document, in lieu of bill of lading.

2. Banks can, at their discretion, also accept FCR issued by shipping companies of repute/IATAapproved agents (in lieu of bill of lading), for purchase/ discount/collection of shipping documents even in cases, where export transactions are not backed by letters of credit, provided the ‘relative sale contract’ with overseas buyer provides for acceptance of FCR as a shipping document in lieu of bill of lading.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 64, dated 5-1-2012 — External Commercial Borrowings (ECB).

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Presently, ECB limit for eligible borrowers under the Automatic Route, for permissible end-uses, is US $ 750 million or its equivalent

This Circular makes the following changes in ECB guidelines:

1. The revised average maturity guidelines under the Automatic Route are as follows:

(a) ECB up to US $ 20 million or equivalent in a financial year with minimum average maturity of three years; and

(b) ECB above US $ 20 million and up to US $ 750 million or equivalent with minimum average maturity of five years.

2. Requirement of average maturity period, prepayment and call/put options for additional amount of ECB of US $ 250 million [i.e., US $ 750 million minus US $ 500 million (earlier limit)] has been dispensed with.

3. Eligible borrowers under the Automatic Route can raise Foreign Currency Convertible Bonds (FCCB) up to US $ 750 million or equivalent per financial year for permissible end-uses.

4. Corporates in specified service sectors, viz. hotel, hospital and software, can raise FCCB up to US $ 200 million or equivalent for permissible end-uses during a financial year subject to the condition that the proceeds of the ECB should not be used for acquisition of land.

5. As a result of enhancement in the ECB limits under the Automatic Route, from US $ 500 million to US $ 750 million, ECB/FCCB availed of for the purpose of refinancing the existing outstanding FCCB will be reckoned as part of the limit of USD 750 million available under the Automatic Route.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 63, dated 29-12-2011 — External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) denominated in Indian Rupees (INR) — Hedging facilities for non-resident entities

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Presently, certain eligible borrowers are permitted to avail of ECB in Indian Rupees. This Circular permits non-resident lenders to hedge their currency risk in respect of ECB denominated in Indian Rupees. Hedge using any of the following products is permitted:

1. Forward foreign exchange contracts with Rupee as one of the currencies.

2. Foreign currency-INR options.

3. Foreign currency-INR swaps.

Detailed guidelines in this respect are annexed to this Circular.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 60, dated 22-12- 2011 — Know Your Customer (KYC) norms/ Anti-Money Laundering (AML) standards/ Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) Obligation of Authorised Persons under Prevention of Money Laundering Act, (PMLA), 2002, as amended by Prevention of Money Laundering (Amendment) Act, 2009 — Money changing activities.

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This Circular has amended instructions related to documents that can be considered as proof of identity and proof of address from foreign tourists.
Customer Identification Procedure

Features to be verified and documents that may be obtained from customers:

Extant
guidelines

 

 

Revised
guidelines

 

 

 

 

 

 

Features

Documents

Features

Documents

 

 

 

 

 

 

Transactions
with

 

 

Transactions
with

 

 

individuals

(i)

Passport

individuals

 

 

  Legal 
name  and  any

— Legal name and any
other

(i)

Passport

other names used

(ii)

PAN card

names used

(ii)

PAN card

 

 

 

(iii)

Voter’s Identity Card

 

(iii)

Voter’s identity card

 

(iv)

Driving licence

 

(iv)

Driving licence

 

(v)

Identity card (subject

 

(v)

Identity card (sub-

 

 

to the AP’s satisfac-

 

 

ject to the AP’s

 

 

tion)

 

 

satisfaction)

 

(vi)

Letter from a recogn-

 

(vi)

Letter from a recog-

 

 

ised public authority
or

 

 

nised public author-

 

 

public servant
verifying

 

 

ity or public servant

 

 

the identity and resi-

 

 

verifying the
identity

 

 

dence of the customer

 

 

and residence of the

 

 

to the satisfaction
of

 

 

customer to the sat-

 

 

the AP.

 

 

isfaction of the AP.

— Correct permanent ad-

(i)

Telephone bill

— Correct permanent ad-

(i)

Telephone bill

dress

(ii)

Bank account state-

dress

(ii)

Bank account

 

 

 

 

ment

 

 

statement

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Extant
guidelines

 

 

Revised
guidelines

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Features

Documents

Features

Documents

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(iii)

Letter from any rec-

 

(iii)

Letter from any rec-

 

 

ognised public
author-

 

 

ognised public
author-

 

 

ity

 

 

ity

 

 

 

(iv)

Electricity bill

 

(iv)

Electricity bill

 

 

 

(v)

Ration card

 

(v)

Ration card

 

 

 

(vi)

Letter from employer

 

 

 

 

 

(vi)

Letter from employer

 

 

(subject to satisfaction

 

 

(subject to satisfaction

 

 

of the AP). (Any one
of

 

 

 

 

the documents, which

 

 

of the AP). (Any one of

 

 

 

 

 

 

provides customer in-

 

 

the documents, which

 

 

formation to the
satis-

 

 

provides customer in-

 

 

faction of the AP
will

 

 

formation to the satis-

 

 

suffice).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

faction of the AP will

 

Note: In case of foreign

 

 

suffice.)

 

 

 

 

tourists, copies of
passport

 

 

 

 

containing
identification par-

 

 

 

 

ticulars and address,
may be

 

 

 

 

accepted as
documentary

 

 

 

 

proof for both
identification

 

 

 

 

as well as address.
Further,

 

 

 

 

a copy of the visa of
non-

 

 

 

 

residents, duly
stamped by

 

 

 

 

Indian Immigration
authori-

 

 

 

 

ties may also be
obtained

 

 

 

 

and kept on record.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 59, dated 19-12-2011 — External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) for Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs) and Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) — Engaged in micro finance activities under Automatic Route.

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This Circular permits:

1. increased limit up to which Non-Government Organisations (NGO) can borrow funds from overseas lender by way of External Commercial Borrowings (ECB), under the Automatic Route, from US $ 5 million or its equivalent to US $ 10 million or equivalent during a financial year for permitted end-uses.

2. the following Micro Finance Institutions (MFI) to borrow funds from overseas lender by way of External Commercial Borrowings (ECB), under the Automatic Route, up to US $ 10 million or equivalent during a financial year for permitted end-uses from recognised lenders.

Eligible borrowers:

1. MFI registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860.
2. MFI registered under Indian Trust Act, 1882.
3. MFI registered either under the conventional state-level cooperative acts, the national level multi-state cooperative legislation or under the new state-level mutually-aided cooperative acts (MACS Act) and not being a co-operative bank.
4. Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFC) categorised as ‘Non-Banking Financial Company-Micro Finance Institutions’ (NBFC-MFI).
5. Companies registered u/s.25 of the Companies Act, 1956 and involved in micro finance activity.

Recognised lenders:
1. In case of NBFC-MFI — Multilateral institutions, such as IFC, ADB, etc./regional financial institutions/ international banks/foreign equity holders and overseas organisations.
2. In case of companies registered u/s.25 of the Companies Act, 1956 and involved in micro finance activity — International banks, multilateral financial institutions, export credit agencies, foreign equity holders, overseas organisations and individuals.
3. In case of other MFIs — International banks, multilateral financial institutions, export credit agencies, overseas organisations and individuals.

Permitted end-use — Lending to self-help groups or for micro-credit or for bona fide micro finance activity including capacity building.

credit agencies, overseas organisations and individuals. Permitted end-use — Lending to self-help groups or for micro-credit or for bona fide micro finance activity including capacity building.

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SEBI’S ACTIONS AGAINST PROFESSIONALS — AN UPDATE

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It is interesting to increasingly see several adverse actions being taken by SEBI, specifically against professionals such as Chartered Accountants and Company Secretaries. It is one thing where the adverse action is for violating the law by carrying out or conniving in certain practices such as insider trading, price manipulation, etc. where professionals are not dealt with specially and separately on account of their qualifications. But it becomes an area of interesting development in law when specific action is taken against professionals on account of the position they occupy in the company, say as CFOs, company secretary/compliance officers. Another category of such actions is in case of professionals who act as independent directors, particularly as member/chairman of audit committees. And, finally, it is even more so noteworthy when practising professionals are acted against when they are acting as such, as in the case of auditors.

While this is nothing new, recent times have seen increasing number of such cases. As will be discussed later, this aspect has been discussed in individual cases earlier here, but it was felt that it is worth having an update and review of the happenings thereafter.

However, let us first make a preliminary overview of the matter before going to specific cases.

Nature of violations and actions against professionals
Professionals like chartered accountants, company secretaries and even lawyers have a special relation and status with listed companies. The simplest case of violation/wrong-doing by such persons is where such professionals are found to have actively indulged in illegal practices such as insider trading, price manipulation, etc. Though their special position in the listed company may place them in a fiduciary position with access to such information or with special knowledge and skills to carry out such acts, such practices do not necessarily set professionals apart or treat them differently beyond a point. Such illegal acts can be committed by anyone and an analogy is of, say, a robbery. Hence, they have no cause for grievance if they are punished like anyone else. Indeed, such acts are rightly viewed relatively more seriously when committed by professionals than by others. After all, generally, such professionals not only have more information in a fiduciary capacity, but they ought to know the law and its consequences.

The other case is where a professional occupies a statutory or contractual position within a company — that is — where his rights and obligations are either statutorily recognised or contractual with the company and thus he is required to perform certain duties. And if he fails to do so, direct action against him could be taken. These are positions like that of the CFO or company secretary/compliance officer. Analogous to this is also the position of independent directors that many such professionals occupy, more so when they are part of the audit committee either as member or chairman.

Finally, there are external professionals such as auditors and action is often sought to be taken against them for certain acts or omissions while performing their duties.

This subject was broached upon at least twice earlier in this column. In the December 2010 issue, we considered the Bombay High Court decision in the Price Waterhouse/Satyam case, where the court considered whether auditors can be acted against directly by SEBI. In April 2011, we discussed a SEBI decision where independent directors/audit committee members were specifically acted against. Before taking a few recent examples, these earlier decisions are being briefly summarised here.

Bombay High Court’s decision in Satyam auditors’ case
The Bombay High Court’s decision was a milestone in at least two aspects. Firstly, it held that auditors can be investigated by SEBI to decide if they have duly performed their duties as auditors of the listed company or not. It held this matter is not within the sole and exclusive province of the ICAI. Secondly, if it is found by SEBI that they have connived with the management in carrying out accounting/ auditing manipulations, then SEBI can act itself against the auditor without reference to ICAI. The point in law to be particularly noted is that the Court held that auditors were persons ‘associated with the capital markets’, a common term of securities law. The importance of this point lies in the fact that this gives SEBI direct jurisdiction over auditors since many provisions of securities laws use this term for various purposes and effects. Moreover, I would even venture to propose that once independent auditors are so held to be persons associated with the capital markets, professionals even more closely associated with or employed by the company are clearly covered. However, the Court has also observed:

“In a given case, if ultimately it is found that there was only some omission without any mens rea or connivance with anyone in any manner, naturally on the basis of such evidence the SEBI cannot give any further directions.”

A question arises is would mere knowledge of a wrong-doing make a person liable? While much would depend on facts on this untested issue, a professional knowing of a wrong-doing in his area of duties would obviously place a higher onus of obligation and liability.

SEBI decision against Independent Directors/Audit Committee members

SEBI’s decision discussed in the April 2011 issue (SEBI Order No. WTM/MSS/ID2/92/2011, dated March 11, 2011) also held that if independent directors/audit committee members participated in accounting manipulation or other illegal practices, they too can be acted against directly by SEBI.

Some recent developments
Now let us consider some recent cases to have an update.

In the Satyam alleged scam that readers are well aware of, there was a finding that a merger of a large sister company with Satyam was proposed. As per the Code of Conduct under the SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations 1992, during such period while it is proposed (as determined in the prescribed manner), the trading window should be closed and this should be duly announced. This would prohibit specified officers, etc. from dealing in the shares of the company. This was not done and it appeared that many officers did sell the shares apparently on the basis of this pricesensitive information. Under the Code of Conduct, it is the compliance officer who is responsible for the implementation of the provisions of the Code under the supervision of the Board of Directors. When asked by a show-cause notice, the compliance officer inter alia replied that he was required by the chairman not to announce the closure of the trading window. Further, he said that he needed approval from the Board of Directors to go ahead with the announcement of the same. SEBI did not accept this reply and held the compliance officer liable for non-compliance of the Code. It observed:

“The Noticee has contended that since there was no direction from the Board of Directors of SCSL to close the trading window, the same was not closed by the Noticee. I observe that the Noticee is the compliance officer of SCSL responsible for closing the trading window whenever issues specified in clause 3.2-3 of Code and other similar issues are under consideration. Matters like consideration of accounts, declaration of dividend, bonus, acquisition of entities, etc. are put up as proposals before the Board. From the proposal stage itself, such information becomes price sensitive and remains so till decision thereon is disseminated to the public. As the proposal is not in public domain, it is imperative on the compliance officer to close the trading window so that insiders and connected persons do not take advantage of such information. In case any internal approvals are required, he may take them, but ensure that the trading window is closed on time. As compliance officer, he cannot raise the defence that internal approvals were not available. Such contention, if accepted, would render the concept of appointment of compliance officer meaningless and is therefore not acceptable.”

Accordingly, a penalty of Rs.5 lakh was levied on the compliance officer for the same.

Some observations can be made. This is a case where the compliance officer had a direct responsibility under law to carry out certain duties, albeit under the overall supervision of the Board. Several other persons are similarly given duties in one or the other manner under securities laws — for example — Independent directors and members of committees formed under Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement have certain obligations. The CFO is also required to also sign a statement regarding compliance of laws, absence of frauds, etc. under such Clause 49. In fact, it is likely that the duties of the CFO, compliance officer, independent directors, members of audit committee, auditors, etc. will increase by such provisions under securities laws as well as amendments/ re-enactment of the Companies Act. Thus, direct action by SEBI may be possible against them for failure in performing their duties.

The next recent example is decisions of SEBI in the last week of December 2011 where in the context of alleged manipulations in an IPO, interim orders were issued not only against the company but many other persons including independent directors, audit committee members, manager (finance), etc. The nature of directions varied, but it included directions prohibiting the persons from buying, selling or dealing in any securities. An example of this is the decision in the case of Bharatiya Global Infomedia Limited (dated 28th December 2011) where it was alleged that there were false and misleading disclosures in the red herring prospectus, misuse of issue proceeds, and other lapses in connection with the IPO. The company was debarred from raising further capital from the securities markets, till further directions and its directors including independent directors and members of the audit committee as also the manager (finance) were prohibited from buying, selling or dealing in securities markets in any manner, till further directions. Another example is the SEBI decision in Tijaria Polypipes Limited of 28th December 2011 where similar directions were given to the company, its directors including independent directors, its finance manager and company secretary and several other entities/ persons.

There are newspaper reports that Mahindra Satyam has initiated action against its erstwhile directors, auditors, etc. for damages. Though this seems to be a generic action, the outcome of this suit will be interesting.

Thus, it appears that over a period of time, there will be more instances of action taken against professionals, whether auditors, CFOs, company secretary/ compliance officers, independent directors, audit committee members, etc. A debate is required on this issue from various angles.

The issue is: Do the Indian circumstances demand a separate and special uniquely tailored set of legal provisions so as not only to ensure proper fixing of blame and responsibility, but also to provide for due powers? In India, almost as a rule, listed companies are promoter-dominated not only in terms of shareholding, but in terms of overall and day-to-day management control. The concepts of independent directors, audit committee, etc. are arguably western concepts where there exists a very diffused shareholding pattern and there is a need of placing an independent Board including its chief executive to ensure that matters such as remuneration, etc. are approved by such independent directors. There, the senior executives as CFOs also in contrast have independent powers. In In-dia, however, the domination of shareholding and management control of the promoters makes a significant difference. There is of course no excuse or defence for a person who actively connives in wrong-doings. However, as the case of Satyam’s company secretary shows, the reality is that it is an illusion that such professionals operate with the level of freedom that the law assumes they have. And apart from freedom, even the real scope of work, powers and information of such professionals may be limited and often it may be ad hoc. There is a case for holding a person from the promoter group primarily and specifically liable and responsible for compliances under law, though he may take external or internal professional advice on technical matters. In this case, in my view, the company secretary should have resigned if (as he states) he was not a party to non-compliance and, depending upon the stage at which the non-compliance had reached, should have reported the same too.

Another example of such mismatched powers and responsibilities is the widely-worded CEO/CFO certification under Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement. It is required that they certify, inter alia, that the financial statements do not contain any materially untrue statement, that there have not been any fraudulent or illegal transactions, etc. In
a typical promoter-dominated company, it is not only unrealistic, but even a mismatch of powers/ freedom and duties/liabilities to expect that such persons accept such wide responsibility.

In absence of clearer powers and obligations of professionals, uncertainty may continue to prevail. It is possible that many professionals may not be willing to come forward and help SEBI and the securities markets and take responsibilities that SEBI would like them to bear without such clarity in law.

It’s good to have money and the things that money can buy, but it’s good, too, to check up once in a while and make sure that you haven’t lost the things that money can’t buy.

— George Horace Lorimer

TDS: Payment to sub-contractors: Section 194C: Union of truck operators procuring contracts for its members: No sub-contracts: Tax not deductible at source.

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[CIT v. Truck Operators Union, 339 ITR 532 (P&H)]
The assessee was a truck operators’ union. It procured contracts for its members. The Assessing Officer made an addition of Rs.6,30,32,453 by way of disallowance u/s.40(a)(ia) holding that such payment to the members required deduction of tax u/s.194C of the Act which was not done. The Tribunal deleted the addition and held as under:

“The assessee-union had been formed by truck operators in order to obtain bigger contracts through it. It was of course entitled to booking charges received, which constituted its main income and the main function of the assessee was to arrange contracts from different agencies for its member operators which were factually and collectively formed by such members. The freight received from the parties concerned belonged to the member truck operators by whose trucks the contracts were performed and as such, the same was disbursed to none else but them. The assessee-union did not give any sub-contract to its members as alleged by the Assessing Officer.”

On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and Haryana High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“When the union was acting only in the representative capacity and there was no separate contract between the union and its members for performance of the work as required for applicability of section 194C(2) of the Act, section 40(a)(ia) of the Act was not applicable.”

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TDS: Sections 194C and 194I of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Y. 2007-08: Assessee engaged in transportation of building materials: Payment to contractors for hiring dumpers: Not rent for machinery or equipment but payment for works contract: Section 194C applicable and not Section 194I.

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[CIT v. Shree Mahalaxmi Transport Co., 339 ITR 484 (Guj.)]

The assessee was engaged in the transportation of building materials, etc. In the A.Y. 2007-08, the assessee paid Rs.1,18,29,647 as rent for hiring dumpers and deducted tax at source at the rate of 1.12%. as applicable u/s.194C of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer held that the payment was governed by section 194-I and accordingly passed order u/s.201(1) holding the assessee to be in default and levied interest u/s.201(1A) of the Act. The Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal held that the assessee was not in default and that the levy of interest was not justified.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) The assessee had given contracts to the parties for the transportation of goods and had not taken machinery and equipment on rent. The Commissioner (Appeal) was justified in holding that the transactions being in the nature of contracts for shifting of goods from one place to another wood be covered as works contracts, thereby attracting the provisions of section 194C of the Act. Since the assessee had given sub-contracts for transportation of goods and not for the renting out of machinery or equipment, such payments could not be termed as rent paid for the use of machinery and the provisions of section 194-I of the Act would not be applicable.

(ii) The Tribunal was, therefore, justified in upholding the order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals).”

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(2011) 40 VST 81 (AP) Tirupati Chemicals v. Dy. Commercial Tax Officer and Others, and ABC Constructions v. Commercial Tax Officer, Vijay Wada

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Advance Ruling — Binding on applicant as well as on others — Provisions not arbitrary — Not unconstitutional — Sections 32(2), 33(1)(c), 47(d) and 67(4) of Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005 and rr. 17(4) and 66 of Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Rules, 2005.

Facts:
The petitioners filed two separate writ petitions before the AP High Court challenging the constitutional validity of section 67(4) of the Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005 providing for binding effect of order passed by the Advance Ruling Authority (ARA), on the applicant, in respect of goods and/or transactions for which the clarification is sought and also binding on to all the officers other than the Commissioner.

According to petitioners the order of ARA was not binding on other dealers.

Held:
(1) U/s.67(4), the order of the ARA is binding on the applicant who sought clarification, in respect of the goods and transactions in relation to which it was sought and it is binding on all the officers other than the Commissioner. If the order of the ARA is to bind only the applicant and not to other dealers, in respect of goods or transactions in relation to which clarification was sought, then clauses (i) and (ii) of the said sub-sections would overlap , thereby rendering either clause (i) or (ii) inapposite surplusage.

(2) It is true that such ruling would bind other dealers who had not sought a clarification, without their being heard by ARA. That, by itself, would not necessitate the Court reading words ‘the applicant’ in to clause (ii) of section 67(4). It is no doubt harsh that the ruling of the ARA would bind other dealers. This however is matter essentially for the Legislature.

(3) Section 67(4)(iii) makes it clear that the order of the ARA would not bind the STAT, or Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction u/s.34 of the Act.

(4) The remedy of an appeal is provided under the Act u/s.33(1)(c) of the Act to other dealers in whose case the orders are passed following the order of the ARA.

Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the writ and upheld the constitutional validity of provisions of section 67(4) of the Act.

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(2011) 24 STR 723 (Tri.-Del.) — Moon Network Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Kanpur.

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Appellant a multi-system cable operator provided cable services, whether liable as broadcasting service — Appellant’s balance sheet disclosed higher figure of sales for imposing tax — Revenue of the opinion that appellant is liable to pay service tax on the balance sheet figure — Appellant disagrees — Tax liability was discharged on receipt basis — Appellant’s plea partly allowed — Adjudicating Authority directed to re-compute tax liability.

Facts:
The appellant was a multi-system cable operator providing cable services. An order for payment of service tax was issued to the appellant since the figures seized from their records and the figures submitted by them did not reconcile. However, the appellant contended that service tax was computed on receipts basis for the period when services were taxable viz. 9-7-2004 till 31-7-2005. The appellant, further contended that their services did not fall under the category of broadcasting service, and hence it was not liable for service tax for the impugned period. The Department alleged that according to Prasar Bharti Law, cable operators providing transmission service provided broadcasting service.

Held:
The impugned service provided by the appellant fell under the taxable category of ‘Broadcasting Service’ after withdrawal of Notification No. 8/2001-ST and service tax was leviable for the period 9-7-2004 to 31-7-2005. Direction issued to adjudicating authority to re-compute the liability accordingly. No mala fide intention of the appellant, hence penalty was waived. Only penalty for delay in payment of service tax to be imposed.

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(2011) 24 STR 721 (Tri.-Mumbai.) — Commissioner of Central Excise, Kolhapur v. Helios Food Additives Pvt. Ltd.

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A show-cause notice proposing demand of service tax and interest thereon sent by Asst. Commissioner, Ratnagiri to the assessee — Service provided by the assessee in Mumbai — Registered office also situated in Mumbai — Commissioner in whose territorial jurisdiction registered office of the service provider is located, has jurisdiction over them.

Facts:
The assessee along with manufacture of the food products in the district of Ratnagiri was also engaged in providing taxable services of renting of immovable property in Mumbai. The service tax on the same was not paid. The show-cause notice demanding service tax of Rs.2,62,032 and interest and penalties thereon was issued to the assessee by the Assistant Commissioner at Ratnagiri. The assessee’s Mumbai office had separate registration with the service tax authorities much prior to the issuance of the show-cause notice. Hence, taking into account the judgment in the case of C.C.E., C. & S.T., BBSR-II v. Ores India (P) Ltd., (2008) 12 STR 513 (Tri.), they contended that the proceedings initiated by the Assistant Commissioner at Ratnagiri are unsustainable.

Held:
It was held that the order confirming the demand of service tax and interest and penalty, etc. could not be sustained in law as held by the lower Appellate Authority as the adjudication authority at Ratnagiri had no jurisdiction over the Mumbai office of the Noticee.

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Vodafone – Wrong Number

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Although I have tried to desist from doing so, I believe it is almost obligatory for the editor of the BCAJ, to make at least a noticeable reference to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Vodafone. The decision is undoubtedly a landmark event in the annals of Indian income-tax jurisprudence. But the comments/opinions/presentations that many of us have been subject to in the aftermath of the judgment are arguably an overdose. In the last two weeks, my inbox has been flooded with no less than 100 emails claiming to be “exclusive expert comments”, “in-depth review” or “executive summaries” of the decision. Over the last nearly 30 years of my practice, I cannot remember a single tax judgment that received so much publicity in the wider media. There have been numerous landmark rulings in various areas of tax law that are routinely cited as precedents and have undoubtedly left indelible marks on tax jurisprudence. I wonder if they were in any way less important than the Vodafone judgment. Or was the tag line of “Rs. 11,000 crores” that made Vodafone a more appetizing news item? Or is the amplified hype only an inevitable consequence of the diffused internet-based communication network that we live amidst today? The ruling is hailed as a victory for India’s independent judiciary. One wonders what would have been the reaction had the verdict gone against Vodafone!

On a more serious note, the Supreme Court, while delivering the judgment, carried out a broad review of precedents – it considered the principle laid down in Westminster’s case, visited the ghosts of Ramsay and spirit of McDowell, discussed the decision in Dawson and took in to account the freedom given to Mauritius companies by the decision in Azadi Bachao. To put it in a nutshell, it ultimately held that if the transaction is genuine and for business purposes then sale of shares by a non-resident in a foreign company having downstream subsidiaries, which in turn hold shares in an Indian company that has business in India, does not result in capital gain which can be considered to have accrued or deemed to have accrued in India.

Interestingly, while deciding the above issue, the Court developed a possibly new concept of ‘puppet subsidiary’. The Court held that “where the subsidiary’s executive directors’ competences are transferred to other persons/bodies or where the subsidiary’s executive directors’ decision making has become fully subordinate to the Holding Company with the consequence that the subsidiary’s executive directors are no more than puppets then the turning point in respect of the subsidiary’s place of residence comes about.”

While this concept of ‘puppet subsidiary’ certainly needs further consideration, it would be interesting to see how the assessing officers react. Many of us may recall that for several years after the decision in McDowell nearly every assessment order while making addition drew support from the decision and held that the assessee had resorted to a ‘colourable device’ or subterfuge or that the transaction was ‘sham’. One wonders whether after the decision in Vodafone, assessing officers will start viewing every subsidiary as a puppet of its holding company.

The majority judgement delivered by the honourable Chief Justice Kapadia did not decide the issue whether a non-resident having no tax presence in India is required to deduct tax at source u/s 195.

Over the next few months tax professionals will be busy analysing the Vodafone decision, digesting what is meant by ‘look at’ test, doctrine of ‘look through’, doctrine of ‘economic substance’, ‘dissecting approach’, ‘investment to participate’ and ‘purposive interpretation’ approach.

The reaction of the Government has been understandably muted. May be it is considering whether to play the oft-used trump card – ‘amend the law’. Or maybe politicians are far too busy with the election campaigns in Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Uttarakhand, Goa and Manipur, whose proceedings have been, arguably, at least as interesting as the Vodafone judgement.

While many states are going to polls, so are various cities and towns in Maharashtra. Elections to the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM) will be held on 16th February 2012. MCGM is the richest municipal Corporation in the country with a budget of possibly more than that of a small state. The corporators that we elect have great influence in governance of this city which has many problems – bad roads, pollution of every kind, corruption – the list is long. We deserve better governance. Just as it is our right to expect good governance from the corporators, it is also our duty to cast vote in the forthcoming elections. So do cast your vote.

This issue has interesting articles and features dealing with the current issues – reference to OECD Commentary for interpretation, XBRL, accounting of foreign currency fluctuations and SEBI’s action against professionals.

We take this opportunity to congratulate the doyen of our profession Mr. Y. H. Malegam on his being conferred Padma Shri.

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Does God Reside in the Self or in the Temple?

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“Why do you go to a temple?” asked my friend plainly and I responded saying, “I go to see God and have His Darshan obviously.” My friend asked me again “How did you see Him there?” I replied, “I saw Him in the consecrated idol”. But how can an idol be God? my friend persisted. I got the point he was driving at. My visiting the temple proved two things, namely, that: (i) I believe in God and (ii) His presence in the temple in the form of idol which I worship. These were my beliefs which I had no occasion to test up to now.

Being born and brought up in a family in which worship of God is a daily routine, there cannot be any doubt in my mind about God or His presence, nor had I any occasion to test my faith about His presence in the temple.

Once an enlightened priest explained that the purpose of a temple is to provide a serene atmosphere to the tired soul such that it experiences peace, getting rid of negative emotions in the process. All great masters agree on one thing and that is ‘God is One and Indivisible’ which entity is nothing but perpetual universal energy. Modern science accepts that in the ultimate analysis, the foundation of the Universe and its multifarious manifestation is nothing but primordial energy which, being omnipresent, omniscient and omnipotent, can assume any shape or form at will, temple idol not excluded. So when an idol is consecrated in the Sanctum Sanctorum, the universal energy gets worshipped and when thousands of people direct their thought and attention towards that idol, it gets infused and enlivened. And consequently, we generally experience the divine spark of energy in the serene atmosphere of temples.

Well, this is one of the arguments in favour of idol worship and I am, of course, aware that there are other view points as well.

But as I grew up and saw the gross abuse of temples by vested interests, my faith in God residing therein got eroded somewhat. Today, we are witness to all sorts of degrading activity in and around temples. For example, special or VIP Darshan for a certain class of people, modes of pooja linked to the amount of Dakshina, etc. etc. leading to the conclusion that temples have become money-spinning resorts, plain and simple.

If God does not reside in temple, where can I find Him? Here, I am reminded of the following poem by Gurudev Rabindranath Tagore:

Go not to the temple to put flowers

upon the feet of God;
First fill your own house
with fragrance of love.

Go not to the temple to light

the candles before the altar of God;
First remove the darkness
of sin from your heart.

Go not to the temple to bow down
your head in prayer;
First learn to bow in humility
before your fellowmen.

Go not to the temple to pray

on bended knees;
First bend down to lift
someone who is downtrodden.

Go not to the temple to ask

forgiveness for your sins;
First forgive from your heart
those who have sinned against you.

When I assimilated the pith of this poem I realised in that I don’t have to visit a temple at all to see God, as He is omnipresent, omniscient and omnipotent. At the same time, I have nothing against those who go to the temple.

Today, I do believe that regardless of the presence of God in the temple precincts, He resides in the core of my being. Faith moves. Faith nestles and blends/merges with the surging, bubbling, energy abounding the Universe, call it Nature, Truth, God or whatever you please.

So be it!

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Public Search of Trademarks database can be done through MCA21 portal.

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MCA has joined up service with the Trademark Department and an online facility for searching the trademark database before applying for name availability is provided. The link ‘Public Search of Trademark’ is available on the MCA21 portal and it needs to be verified before applying for a company name to verify that the name is not subjected to any trademark or pending for trademark registration. The Trademark verification can also be accessed on http://124.124.193.245/tmrpublicsearch/ frmmain.aspx

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Companies Bill, 2011 and corrigenda can be accessed on MCA website.

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The Companies Bill as was presented in the Parliament can be accessed on the MCA site. The corrigenda to the Companies Bill, 2011 can be accessed on http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/Corrigenda_ The_Companies_Bill_2011.pdf

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Clarifications for Video Conferencing at General Body Meetings and E-voting.

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has vide General Circular No. 72/2011, dated 27-12-2011 issued clarifica- tion to Circular No. 35/2011 regarding the participation by shareholders or Directors in Meetings under the Companies Act, 1956 through electronic mode, whereby, it is decided that the requirement for holding shareholders’ meetings through video conferencing will be optional for listed companies for the year as well as subsequent years to 2011-12.

In case of e-voting at General Body Meetings, now, any agency can provide the electronic platform for e-voting after obtaining a certificate from Standardisation Testing and Quality Certification (STQC) Directorate, Department of Information Technology, Ministry of Communication and IT, Government of India, New Delhi. Full Circular can be accessed on http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/General_Circular_ No_72_2011.pdf

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Amendments to the Companies Accounting Standards Rules 2006.

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has made amendments to the Companies Accounting Standards Rules, 2006, called the Companies (Accounting Standards) (Second Amendment) Rules, 2011 vide a Notification F.NO. 17/133/2008-CLV, dated 29-12-2011. Accounting Standard (AS) 11 has been amended by insertion of Clause 46A pertaining to the effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates. The same can be accessed on http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/notification/pdf/ Para_46A_Rules_GSR_914E_2011.pdf

Vide another Notification dated the same day, the Ministry has clarified that the same would be applicable for accounting periods commencing on or after 7th December 2006 and ending on or before 31st March 2020.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 67, dated 13-1- 2012 — Foreign investment in Single Brand Retail Trading — Amendment to the Foreign Investment (FDI) Scheme. Press Note No. 1 (2012 Series), dated 10-1-2012.

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Presently, FDI in retail trade is permitted up to 51%, subject to conditions specified under paragraph 6.2.16.4 of ‘Circular 2 of 2011 — Consolidated FDI Policy’.

The said paragraph 6.2.16.4 of ‘Circular 2 of 2011 — Consolidated FDI Policy’ has been replaced as under:

 

6.2.16.4

 Single Brand product retail trading

100%

 

Government

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

         
     

(1)    Foreign Investment in Single Brand product retail trading is aimed at attracting investments in produc    tion and marketing, improving the availability of such goods for the consumer, encouraging increased   sourcing of goods from India, and enhancing competitiveness of Indian enterprises through access to   global designs, technologies and management practices.

(2)    FDI in Single Brand product retail trading would be subject to the following conditions:
 
(a)  Products to be sold should be of a ‘Single Brand’ only.


 

 

 

 

 

(b)        Products
should be sold under the same brand internationally i.e., products should be
sold under the same brand in one or more countries other than India.

 

(c)        ‘Single
Brand’ product-retail trading would cover only products which are branded
during manufacturing.

 

(d)       The
foreign investor should be the owner of the brand.

 

(e)        In
respect of proposals involving FDI beyond 51%, mandatory sourcing of at least
30% of the value of products sold would have to be done from Indian ‘small
industries/village and cottage industries, artisans and craftsmen’. ‘Small
industries’ would be defined as industries which have a total invest-ment in
plant & machinery not exceeding US $ 1.00 million. This valuation refers
to the value at the time of installation, without providing for depreciation.
Further, if at any point in time, this valuation is exceeded, the industry
shall not qualify as a ‘small industry’ for this purpose. The compliance of
this condition will be ensured through self-certification by the company, to
be subsequently checked, by statutory auditors, from the duly certified
accounts, which the company will be required to maintain.

 

(3)        Application
seeking permission of the Government for FDI in retail trade of ‘Single
Brand’ products would be made to the Secretariat for Industrial Assistance
(SIA) in the Department of Industrial Policy & Pro-motion. The
application would specifically indicate the product/product categories which
are proposed to be sold under a ‘Single Brand’. Any addition to the product/product
categories to be sold under ‘Single Brand’ would require a fresh approval of
the Government.

 

(4)        Applications
would be processed in the Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion, to
determine whether the products proposed to be sold satisfy the notified
guidelines, before being considered by the FIPB for Government approval.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(2011) 24 STR 719 (Tri.-Del.) — BSNL v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Chandigarh.

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Appellant is a public sector unit — Adjusted the excess tax paid in a previous period against current liability — This treatment was opposed to —Appellant’s plea held invalid — However appellant’s plea was accepted in the light of amended rules and the fact that the appellant is a PSU.

Facts:
The appellant is a public sector unit which adjusted the excess payment of service tax against the tax liability of a subsequent period. The appellant held a view that this adjustment was allowable as per the provisions of Rule 6 of the Service Tax Rules, 1994. As per the said Rule 6, excess payment of service tax can be adjusted against future liability on a pro-rata basis, but only under specific conditions mentioned therein.

Held:
Though the appellant’s plea for adjustment was held invalid, it was found that subsequently the Service Tax Rules were amended. As per the amended rules the appellant could adjust his excess payment.

However, the amended rules were not in force during the material time and therefore did not apply to the case at hand. But considering the spirit of the amended rules and the fact that the appellant was a public sector unit, a lenient view was taken and the adjustment was allowed fully.

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(2011) 24 STR 717 (Tri.-Del.) — Commissioner of Central Excise, Allahabad v. A.P.S.M. Study Centre.

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The assessee provided commercial training and coaching service — The service taxable w.e.f. 1-7-2003 — Respondent received consideration towards services to be provided after 1-7-2003 — Show-cause notice for the period April to September 2003 issued on 20-7-2006 after extensive communications of the respondent with the department — Held, the demand was barred by limitation.

Facts:
The assessee provided commercial training and coaching services. The appeal was filed in relation to the fees received by the respondent during April, May and June, 2003 for the period after 1-7-2003, when the service was brought under the tax net. Show-cause notice was issued to the respondent on 20-7-2006 for the period April-September 2003. The Revenue claimed that the assessee suppressed facts since they had not disclosed the amount of consideration received prior to 1-7-2003 and also not filed ST-3 return for the relevant period.

Held:

It was held that the longer period could not be invoked on the grounds that an audit was conducted in 2004 and also, there was extensive communication with the Department, but a show-cause notice was issued only on 20-7-2006. Hence the demand was barred by limitation and the Revenue’s appeal was rejected.

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(2011) 24 STR 705 (Tri.-Del.) Commissioner of Central Excise, Ludhiana v. Municipal Council.

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A show-cause notice for non-payment of service tax on renting of property and open ground; as Mandap Keeper services — Show-cause notice failed to divulge the nature of such receipts i.e., whether any official, social or business functions performed on the immovable property, so as to make the property mandap — Finding no substance in the show-cause notice — Stay application and appeal dismissed.

Facts:
The appellant received a sum of Rs.4,26,000 for letting out of land and open ground for the period 12-2-2003 to March, 2005 and receipt of Rs.6,000 each for the financial years 2005-06 and 2006-07 and Rs.93,000 for the financial year 2007-08 upon which no service tax was paid.

Held:
However, since the notice issued failed to bring out the nature of the receipt and the nature of functions performed over rented immovable property, the show-cause notice was rendered unjustified and hence, the stay application and the appeal were dismissed.

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(2011) 24 STR 702 (Tri.-Chennai) — K. K. Academy Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Service Tax, Chennai.

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Demand made involved three issues (i) coaching given to the students held to be recreational activity (ii) Abacus training imparted to teachers would either get employed or could opt for self-employment held in the nature of vocational training (iii) with respect to franchisee services the demand was confirmed after adjustment and penalty accordingly reduced.

Facts:
The appellants hold franchisee for ‘Abacus’ training which is an ancient Chinese tool to solve arithmetical calculations with speed and accuracy without calculator. They are engaged in imparting such training to students as well as teachers who could be either employed by them or had an option for self-employment after such training and to train students at various centres run by themselves. They also receive amounts towards granting franchise for imparting training through Abacus. For all the three revenues, service tax was demanded.

The appellant contended that the training imparted to the students could not be taxed under the category ‘Commercial Training or Coaching Services’ for it was recreational in nature as held by the Bangalore Bench in Fast Arithmetic v. Asst. Comm. of Central Excise & ST, (2010) 17 STR 158. Also, no service tax was payable for training which is recreational in nature vide Notifications Nos. 9/2003 and 24/2004. Similarly, the above Notifications also exempted such vocational training provided to teachers.

Held:
In terms of the Notifications and case cited above the demand with respect to training given to students and teachers was set aside along with the penalty.

On the other hand the amount received towards franchisee services was held liable to service tax. The appellant did not dispute this and had paid service tax on the franchise fee received. The penalty stood reduced only to the extent of delayed payment towards franchise fee and the cost was waived.

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(2011) 24 STR 662 (Tri.-Bang.) — Sri Bhagavathy Traders v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Cochin.

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Valuation — Whether amount incurred by a service provider as reimbursements is to be included in the assessable value — Conflicting views of the Tribunal — Matter referred to Larger Bench to settle the issue.

Facts:
The appellant, a ‘Clearing and Forwarding Agent’, during the period 2003-04 to 2005-06 did not charge service tax on the reimbursable receipts, such as transportation charges, loading and unloading charges, rent, salary to staff, electricity, courier charges, stationery charges, etc. According to the adjudicating authority, such charges were liable for service tax and were includible in the gross amount of value of service. The appellant submitted a series of Tribunal decisions wherein it was held that the gross value for the discharge of service tax liability would not include reimbursement charges. The Revenue relied upon a contrary decision in the case of M/s. Naresh Kumar & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Service Tax, Kolkata, (2008) 11 STR 578 (Tri.).

Held:
It was previously held in various cases that service tax is restricted to amounts received by the assessee for carrying C&F only and other charges such as loading, unloading should be excluded. Similarly, it was also proposed that transportation expense collected by such an agent was not liable to tax along with the actual expenses such as labour, freight, telephone, electricity reimbursed by the principal. However, in the case referred by the Revenue (cited above), it was concluded that those expenses which are indispensable and inevitable for providing such services and which would essentially make value addition to the services be liable to service tax. Since there were two different stands taken by the Co-ordinate Benches, it was decided to refer the matter to the Larger Bench.

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Are Builders/Developers Construction Service Providers

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Background:

Service tax on commercial or industrial service was introduced in 2004 and that on residential complex was introduced in 2005 in the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act). Later in the year 2007, under the entry of `Execution of works contract service’, specifically construction contracts of new commercial or industrial buildings and new residential complex during the execution of works contract chargeable as sale of goods were made liable for service tax. The scope of these entries covered contractors providing construction services.

The Finance Act, 2010 with effect from July 01, 2010 inserted explanation in clause (zzq) and in clause (zzzh) of section 65(105) of the Act dealing with these construction services. By these explanations, a legal fiction is created and a builder is deemed to be a service provider of construction service to the prospective buyer of the immovable property or a unit thereof and thus liable for service tax. The explanation to become applicable has two pre-requisites:

  • Construction of a new building or a complex must be intended for sale wholly or partly by a builder or his authorised person either before, during or after construction; and

  • A sum must be received from or on behalf of prospective buyer by the builder before the grant of completion certificate by a competent authority under the applicable law.

Challenging the service tax imposed on the builders on the ground that between the builder and a buyer there is no provision of service, writ petition filed in the Bombay High Court by the Maharashtra Chamber of Housing Industry (MCHI) & Others (Writ Petition No.1456 of 2010) and similar petitions filed by various builders were dismissed.

Brief analysis of the decision:
The petitioners urged that title to the building under construction vests in the builder. On completion of construction, a final transfer of title takes place, there is no event of provision of service. Thus, the tax is directly on the transfer of land and buildings, which falls within the legislative power of the States under Entry 49 of List II to the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. The builders also challenged the levy made under the new entry in section 65(105) (zzzzu) of the Act dealing with preferential location of the property or an extra advantage accorded on a payment over and above the basic sale price of the property sold. This was also challenged on the ground that it is a tax on land per se, because it is a tax on location and there is no voluntary act of rendering service.

The Revenue urged that the explanation does not tax transfer of property at all. The tax is on construction service, but it is triggered when there is intent to sell and some payment is received. These are incidents but do not form the subject-matter of the tax. Further, there is no tax imposed when the duly constructed property is sold after receiving completion certificate.

The Hon. High Court observed that it had the task to examine the object of taxation or the taxable event to determine whether the tax in its true nature is a tax on land and buildings. Incidence of the tax is not relevant to construing the subject-matter of tax and it is distinct from the taxable event; it identifies, as it were, the person on whom the burden of tax would fall. As regards the explanation, it observed that intent to sell whether before, during or after construction is the touchstone of the deeming definition of the service of the builder to the buyer. The explanation expanded the scope materially to include deemed service provided by builders to buyers. According to the Court, an explanation could be of different genres and the Legislature is not prevented to enact an explanation which is not clarificatory but expansive. In this frame of reference, reliance was placed on the Supreme Court decisions, Dattatraya Govind Mahajan v. The State of Maharashtra (AIR 1977 SC 915) and an earlier decision in Hira Ratan Lal v. The Sales Tax Officer (AIR 1973 SC 1034).

To address the issue of challenge of legislative competence of the levy, the Court in its order has discussed inter alia the following decisions of the Supreme Court almost on identical lines as it discussed the issue of legislative competence in relation to renting of immovable property service in Retailers Association of India v. Union of India (Writ Petition 2238 of 2010 & connected petition decided on 21/08/2011 – Refer BCAJ – October 2011 Issue – Service Tax feature):

  • Sudhir Chandra Nawn v. Wealth Tax Officer – AIR 1969 SC 59

  • Second Gift Tax Officer, Mangalore v. D.H. Nazareth – AIR 1970-SC 999

  • Union of India v. H. S. Dhillon AIR 1972 SC 1061

  • India Cement Limited v. State of Tamilnadu AIR 1990 SC 85

  • State of Bihar v. Indian Aluminium Company AIR 1997 SC 3592

The Court stated that principles emerging from the Supreme Court decisions were that in order to be a tax on land and buildings, it must be directly imposed on land and buildings as units, whereas one imposed on a particular use of land or building or an activity in connection therewith or arrangement in relation therewith or a tax on income arising therefrom or a tax on transaction of a transmission of title to or a transfer of land and building is not a tax on land and buildings. In the instant case, the charge of tax is on rendering of taxable services. The taxable event is rendering of a service which falls within the description set out in sub-clauses (zzq), (zzzh) and (zzzzu) of the Act. The Legislature has imposed levy on the activity involving provision of service by a builder to the buyer in the course of the execution of a contract involving intended sale of immovable property. The charge is not on land and buildings as a unit and it is not on general ownership of land. The activity rendered on land does not make the tax a tax on land. A service rendered in relation to land does not alter the character of the levy.

The explanation bringing in two fictions of a deemed service and deemed service provider is not ultra vires the provisions of sections 67 and 68 of the Finance Act, 1994. Such submission by the petitioners lacked substance. Further, builders following the practice of levying charges under diverse heading including preferred location involved value addition and a service before obtaining a completion certificate. If no charge is levied for a preferential location or development, no service tax is attracted. Therefore there is no vagueness and uncertainty and there is no excessive delegation. Accordingly, finding no merits and no other submission other than the recorded being urged, the petitions were dismissed.

The question therefore arises is whether the observation made in Magus Construction P. Ltd. v. UOI in 2008 (11) STR 225 (Gau) stands completely negated by the deeming fiction? The Guwahati High Court in this case held that when a builder or a promoter undertakes construction activity for its own self, in the absence of relationship of “service provider”, and “service recipient” the question of providing taxable service to any person does not arise at all. Advance made by a prospective buyer is against consideration of sale of flat or building and not for the purpose of obtaining any service. Now in the scenario, it remains to be seen whether filing an appeal to the Supreme Court would bring a change in the situation or the above decision has decided the fate of the builders.

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DTAA between India and Georgia notified — Notification 4/2012, dated 6-1-2012.

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DTTA between India and Georgia shall be given effect from 1st April, 2012
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Central Processing of Returns Scheme, 2011 and related amendments/clarifications in relevant sections of the Act — Notification No. 2/2012 and Notification No. 3/2012, dated 4-1-2012.

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The CBDT has notified the aforementioned scheme which lays down the procedure for E-filing of the returns of income either digitally signed or not, filing of ITR V in the latter case, receipt and acknowledgement of such returns, procedure for filing revised return of income, cases wherein the returns would be considered invalid or defective and the remedy thereof, processing of the returns filed and rectification procedure for the same, adjustment of refund against the arrears of demand outstanding as per the records of the CPC, service of notice or communication, appellate proceedings, etc.
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Guidelines for Notification of affordable housing project u/s.35AD — Notification No. 1/2012, dated 2-1-2012.

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The Board vide the Income-tax (First Amendment) Rules, 2012 has Rule 11-0A prescribing guidelines for approval of affordable housing projects u/s.35AD. This includes Form No. 3CN in which the application needs to be made to Member (IT), Central Board of Direct Taxes, the manner in which the form would be approved and the objections/defects if any would be treated, the circumstances under which the application would be rejected, etc. It also lays down the conditions for eligibility of such projects. Conditions are as under:

  • The project shall have prior sanction of the competent authority empowered under the Scheme of Affordable Housing in Partnership framed by the Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation, Government of India.

  • Date of commencement of the project should be on or after 1st April 2011 and date of completion should be within five years from the end of financial year in which the above authorities have sanctioned it.

  • The plot of land should not be less than one acre.

  • Of the total allocable rentable area of the project, affordable housing units for Economically Weaker Section (EWS), Lower Income Group (LIG) and Middle Income Group (MIG) should be as prescribed in the Rule.

Separate books need to be maintained for the project. Also the various terms like date of commencement, housing unit, etc. have been defined in the said rules.

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SRL Ranbaxy Ltd. v. Addl. CIT ITAT ‘G’ Bench, Delhi Before A. D. Jain (JM) and Shamim Yahya (AM) ITA Nos. 434/Del./2011 A.Y.: 2006-07. Decided on: 16-12-2011 Counsel for assessee/revenue: Ajay Vohra & Rohit Garg/Gajanand Meena

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Section 194H — Existence of principal-agency relationship is a sine qua non for invoking section 194H. Amount of discount retained by the collection centres is not ‘commission’ paid by the assessee to the collection centres and consequently section 194H does not apply to such amounts. Since assessee has not paid any amounts to the collection centres, provisions of section 194H could, not have been met.

Facts:
The assessee entered into non-exclusive agreements with domestic and international collection centres comprising of hospitals, nursing homes, clinics and other laboratories/entrepreneurs also. In accordance with the said agreements, the collection centres collected samples from patients/ customers seeking various laboratory testing services. The collection centres had their own premises, infrastructure, staff and necessary licences/ approvals. The collection centres acted as authorised collector for collecting samples and availed of the professional services of the assessee with respect to testing of samples and issue of necessary reports. The assessee charged a discounted price to the collection centres. The price to be charged by the collection centres to its patients/customers was fixed by them and not by the assessee. The assessee raised an invoice on the collection centre which was paid by the collection centre after deduction of TDS u/s.194J. The payment made by the collection centres to the assessee was not dependent on the collection centres receiving the payment from its patients/customers. The amount of discount given to collection centres was not claimed by the assessee as expenditure, but the amount charged to collection centres was shown as its income. The collection centres had flexibility and freedom to choose the laboratory to which samples should be sent for testing, unless the patient/ customer mandated that it be sent to the assessee.

While assessing the total income of the assessee u/s.143(3), the Assessing Officer (AO) held that a sum of Rs.16,80,66,667 being discount offered by the assessee to collection centres was liable for deduction of TDS u/s.194H/194C and since tax was not deducted at source, he disallowed this sum u/s.40(a)(ia).

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who restricted the disallowance from Rs.16,80,66,627 to Rs.11,78,24,030 but affirmed the disallowance, in principle, holding that the relationship between the assessee and the collection centres was that of principal and agent attracting the provisions of section 194H of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

The element of agency is necessarily to be there in cases of all the services or transactions contemplated by section 194H. Where the dealing between the parties is not on a principal to agent basis, section 194H does not get attracted. The Tribunal held that the relationship between the assessee and the collection centres was not on a ‘principal & agent’ basis because (a) the centres issued their own bill to the customer/patient, collected the fees and issued the receipt; (b) the rates charged by the centres from its customers were not decided by the assessee; (c) there was no privity of contract between the assessee and the patients; (d) the amounts were not collected by the centres on behalf of the assessee; (e) the set-ups of the collection centres was entirely different from that of the assessee; (f) the collection centres were not under an obligation to forward the samples for testing only to the assessee, but could forward them to other laboratories as well unless mandated by the patients/customers; (g) the expenditure of the collection centres did not show any interlacing with that of the assessee and also the staff of the two was distinct and separate; (h) the collection centres had no authority to bind the assessee in any form.

Further, the disallowance u/s.40(a)(ia) r.w.s. 194H can be made only in respect of expenditure in the nature of commission paid/credited to the account of the recipient, or to any other account. In the present case, the assessee received the amount of the invoice raised, net of discount, from the collection centres. The Tribunal held that this discount, indisputably, cannot, in any manner, be said to be expenditure incurred by the assessee and so, section 40(a)(ia) of the Act is not attracted.

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed by the Tribunal.

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DCIT v. Tide Water Oil Co. (India) Ltd. ITAT ‘A’ Bench, Kolkata Before Mahavir Singh (JM) and C. D. Rao (AM) ITA No. 2051/Kol./2010 A.Y.: 2003-04. Decided on: 20-1-2012 Counsel for revenue/assessee: D. R. Sindhal/A. K. Tulsiyan

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Section 80IB, Form No. 10CCB — By filing Form No. 10CCB in the course of reassessment proceedings (which form was not filed with the return of income, nor was it filed in the course of assessment proceedings) the assessee is not making any fresh claim for deduction u/s.80IB but merely furnishing the documents to substantiate its claim made during the course of assessment and even reassessment proceedings.

Facts:
For A.Y. 2003-04, the assessee filed its return of income by due date mentioned in section 139(3) of the Act. In the return of income filed the assessee claimed deduction u/s.80IB. The Assessing Officer (AO) assessed the total income u/s.143(3) to be Rs.7,31,51,920 as against returned income of Rs.5,16,02,964 by restricting deduction u/s.80IB on allocation of corporate expenses proportionately over all units. Subsequently, the AO noticed that the assessee had not filed audit report in Form No. 10CCB, hence is not eligible for deduction u/s.80IB and due to that the income has escaped assessment. The AO initiated proceedings u/s.147 r.w.s. 148 of the Act.

In the course of reassessment proceedings the assessee filed Form No. 10CCB and claimed that nonfiling of Form No. 10CCB is only a technical default and since original Form No. 10CCB was filed along with return of income u/s.148, technical default is removed and deduction u/s.80IB should be allowed. The AO noticed that the due date of filing return of income u/s.139(3) was 30-11-2003 and the assessment u/s.143(3) was completed on 31-3-2006, but the audit report filed along with return u/s.148 was dated 23-2-2007 and also balance sheet of Silvasa Unit, in respect of which deduction u/s.80IB was claimed, was audited on 23-2-2007, whereas the P & L Account of Silvasa unit was audited on 16-10- 2003. He held that there was severe non-compliance on the part of the assessee. He, accordingly, denied claim for deduction u/s.80IB. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A).

The CIT(A) confirmed the jurisdiction, but he allowed the claim of the assessee u/s.80IB by holidng that submission of audit report in Form No. 10CCB is directory in nature and it is not mandatory and that submission of audit report even during reassessment proceedings is sufficient compliance u/s.80IB of the Act. The assessee did not challenge the decision of the CIT(A) confirming jurisdiction. Therefore, the assumption of jurisdiction became final.

Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the AO while framing assessment u/s.143(3) of the Act, originally, accepted the claim of deduction u/s.80IB of the Act despite the fact that there was no audit report in Form No. 10CCB i.e., that means that the AO was also under bona fide belief that the assessee is entitled to deduction u/s.80IB of the Act and he allowed the same. It was subsequently that he noticed that the assessee had not filed the audit report along with return of income, nor had it filed the same during the course of assessment proceedings. He, accordingly, recorded reasons and re-opened the assessment.

The Tribunal held that the assessee is not making any fresh claim for deduction u/s.80IB of the Act, but merely furnishing the documents to substantiate its claim made during the course of assessment and even reassessment proceedings. The Tribunal held that there is no infirmity in allowing the claim of deduction even though the assessee has filed audit report in Form No. 10CCB during the course of reassessment proceedings. It upheld the order of the CIT(A).

The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue.

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Rachna S. Talreja v. DCIT ITAT ‘D’ Bench, Mumbai Before J. Sudhakar Reddy (AM) and V. Durga Rao (JM) ITA No. 2139/Mum./2010 A.Y.: 2006-07. Decided on: 28-12-2011 Counsel for assessee/revenue : G. P. Mehta/ C. G. K. Nair

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Section 143 — Assessment — Assessee during the course of assessment proceedings filed revised computation of income and claimed additional deduction — Whether AO justified in refusing to consider the revised income and insisting that only by filing revised return u/s.139(5) the additional deduction can be claimed — Held, No.

Facts:
The assessee had filed her return of income on 31-10-2006 declaring income of Rs.11.05 lakh. Subsequently, during the course of assessment proceedings, the assessee filed revised computation of income by claiming deduction on account of interest of Rs.2.1 lakh paid to a bank. The AO did not consider the revised computation of income filed by the assessee on the ground that there was no provision in the Act to file a revised computation of income. According to him, the assessee should file revised return of income as per section 139(5). On appeal, the CIT(A), relying on the Supreme Court decision in the case of Goetz India Ltd. (284 ITR 323) upheld the AO’s order.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that a similar issue had arisen before the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Pradeep Kumar Harlalkar v. ACIT, (47 SOT 204) wherein the Tribunal following the decision in the case of Goetz India Ltd. observed that ‘power of the Appellate Authority to entertain claim in question was still there . . . . .’. In view thereof the Tribunal admitted the claim made by the assessee and restored the matter to the file of the AO with a direction to consider the revised computation of income filed by the assessee and decide the issue afresh.

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Baba Amarnath Educational Society v. CIT ACE Educational & Charitable Society v. CIT ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Chandigarh Before Sushma Chowla (JM) and Mehar Singh (AM) ITA Nos. 825 & 826/Chd./2011 Decided on: 29-12-2011 Counsel for assessees/revenue : P. N. Arora/ Jaishree Sharma

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Section 12A read with section 2(15) — Registration of charitable institution — Assessees engaged in educational activities — One of the objects permitted assessee to export computer and other similar activities — The said object was never acted upon by the assessee — Whether the CIT justified in rejecting registration application of the trust — Held, No.

Facts:
In the present two appeals, since the facts of the cases as well as the grounds of appeal were identical, the Tribunal decided to dispose of the same by a consolidated order.

The assessee-trusts were established primarily to promote education. The assessees’ application for registration u/s.12A was rejected by the CIT on the ground that their one of the object clauses provided for promotion of export of computers hardware/ software, telecommunication, internet, e-commerce and allied services. For the purpose the CIT relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Yogi Raj Charities Trust v. CIT, (103 ITR 777) and of East India Industries (Madras) Pvt. Ltd. (65 ITR 611).

Held:
From the detailed list of activities carried out by the two assessees, the Tribunal noted that they have carried out activities pertaining to achieving their charitable objects viz., imparting education. The object clause, which was objected to by the CIT and the ground on which the registration was rejected was never acted upon and it remained on paper. According to it, single inoperative object cannot eclipse the whole range of other charitable objects and actual conduct of charitable activities. According to it, it was not the letter or language of one single object clause which is conclusive, but it was the activity of the appellants, which was more relevant. Further, it observed that the first proviso to section 2(15) was not applicable to the first three objects enumerated in the definition. The said proviso only restricts the scope of the expression ‘ advancement of any other object of general public utility’. The proposition was also supported by the Board Circular No. 11/2008, dated 19-12-2008 which inter alia states “where the purpose of a trust or institution is relief of the poor, education or medical relief, it will constitute charitable purpose, even if it incidentally involves the carrying on of commercial activities”.

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Hansraj Mathuradas v. ITO ITAT ‘H’ Bench, Mumbai Before R. V. Easwar (President) and P. M. Jagtap (AM) ITA No. 2397/Mum./2010 A.Y.: 2006-07. Decided on: 16-9-2011 Counsel for assessee/revenue : Mehul Shah/ A. G. Nayak

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Section 37(1) — Business expenditure — Whether the expenditure, which are subjected to FBT, can part thereof be disallowed on the ground that the same are not for the purpose of the business — Held, No.

Facts:
The assessee is a partnership firm engaged in the business of providing services as insurance surveyor and loss assessor. In one of the grounds before the Tribunal, the assesse had challenged disallowance made by the AO and confirmed by the CIT (Appeals), conveyance and telephone expenses of Rs.4,818 and Rs.17,224 out of Rs. 24,088 and Rs.86,120, respectively. In the absence of any record maintained by the assessee in the form of log book or call register to establish that the said expenses were wholly and exclusively for the purpose of its business, the same were disallowed by the AO to the extent of 20%.

Held:
The Tribunal referred to the CBDT Circular No. 8/2005, dated 29-8-2005 and opined that once fringe benefit tax is levied on expenses incurred, it follows that the same are treated as fringe benefits provided by the assessee as employer to its employees and the same have to be appropriately allowed as expenses incurred wholly and exclusively incurred by the assessee for the purpose of its business.

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Lokpal Bill: A bitter pill for political parties.

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It is for the 545 members of Lok Sabha to decide on the Bill. It is not being done in undue haste . . . What were political leaders doing sitting on Anna Hazare’s platform?

— Pranab Mukherjee

Minority reservation and 50% quota are unconstitutional . . . . it will be struck down by the courts on the very first day. Do you want such a legislation?

— Sushma Swaraj

Making the PM accountable to Lokpal is against the soul of the Constitution. No official will take a decision. Won’t the Lokpal machinery blackmail the Government?

— Mulayam Singh Yadav

It’s wrong to bring ex-MPs under the law . . . even Anna did not ask for this. He will consider us slaves and threaten us with dharnas in front of our houses.

— Lalu Prasad

Why are we so scared of an ex-bureaucrat, an excop and somebody who is pretending to be another father of the nation?

— Gurudas Dasgupta

(Source: The Times of India, dated 23-12-2011) (Comments: Why do our politicians of all hues dread scrutiny of their decisions and actions by a strong Lokpal. Daal mein kuch kaala zaroor hai!)

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