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Business expenditure – Capital or revenue – A. Y. 1996-97 – Assessee carrying on business of letting out properties – Payment to tenant for vacating premises – Rental income earned by the assessee is assessed under the head ‘Business’ and the compensation of Rs. 53,50,000/- paid by it for obtaining possession from lessee/tenant so as to earn higher income is an admissible revenue deduction

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Shyam Burlap Company Ltd. vs CIT; 281 CTR 458 (Cal):

The
assessee was the owner of the property and was carrying on the business
of letting out. The assesee had paid compensation of Rs. 53,50,000/- to
obtain possession from the lessee/tenant so as to earn a higher rental
income. For the A. Y. 1996-97, the assessee offered the rental income as
business income and claimed the deduction of compensation of Rs.
53,50,000/- as revenue expenditure. The Assessing Officer and the
Tribunal held that the rental income is assessable as house property
income and disallowed the claim for deduction.

On appeal by the assessee, the Calcutta High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Though in earlier assessment years the assessee had shown rental income as “income from house property”’ however, in this assessment year it has claimed rental income as business income, in view of the object as set out in clause 4 of its Memorandum of association. Since the object in the said memorandum permitted the assessee to carry on business in letting out properties and as 85% of the income of the assessee was by way of deriving rent and lease rentals, the income from rent constituted business income.

ii) Observations of the Tribunal that the assesssee had all along shown the income under the head “income from house property” cannot be a ground for treating the income as business income.

iii) Rental income earned by the assessee was assessable under the head ‘business’ and the compensation of Rs. 53,50,000/- paid by it for obtaining possession from lessee/tenant so as to earn higher income is an admissible revenue deduction.”

Supplier’ Cred it – Whet her de bt or trade payable ?

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Arrangements with respect to payment to suppliers
could vary substantially and may not always be straight-forward. To ease
working capital pressure, companies enter into structured transactions
that involve the supplier and bank/s. These are commonly referred to as
supply-chain finance, supplier finance, reverse factoring and structured
payable transactions. Broadly, the arrangement allows a company to pay
its supplier invoices when due (under the extended terms negotiated with
a supplier) and gives the supplier the option to accelerate collection
through a factoring arrangement. Under the factoring arrangement, the
supplier sells its receivables (i.e., invoices) from the company to the
bank at a discount. The company is then legally obligated to pay the
bank in full (i.e., the amount specified in the original invoice) since
the bank is now the legal owner of the receivables. Such an arrangement
may better enable a supplier to monetize the receivable that has
extended payment terms.

Can a company (buyer of goods and services) continue
to classify the liability related to the supplier’s invoice as a trade
payable or whether it must reclassify the liability as bank debt?

In
evaluating a structured payable arrangement, companies should determine
the classification based on the substance and individual facts and
circumstances, including the following:

What are the roles, responsibilities and relationships of each party (i.e., the company, bank and supplier)?

Is
the company relieved of its original obligation to the supplier and is
now obligated to the bank? However, being obligated to a bank instead of
the supplier does not necessarily mean that the liability is a debt.
One needs to further assess whether the liability to the bank entails a
financing element or it is merely a payment of the liability to the bank
instead of to the supplier.

Have any discounts or rebates been
received by the company that would not have otherwise been received
without the bank’s involvement?

Has the bank extended the date on which payment is due from the company beyond the invoice’s original due date?

The
terms of the structured payable arrangement must be carefully
considered to determine whether the arrangement changes the roles,
responsibilities and relationships of the parties. To continue
classifying the liability as a trade payable, the company must remain
liable to the supplier under the original terms of the invoice, and the
bank must have assumed only the rights to the receivable it purchased.
If the terms of the company’s obligation change as a result of the
structured payable arrangement, that may be an indication that the
economic substance of the liability is more akin to a financing
arrangement.

Under normal circumstances, a factoring arrangement
between a company’s supplier and a bank does not benefit the company.
That’s why it is important to understand whether the company receives
any benefit as a result of the structured payable arrangement. For
example, a bank may purchase a supplier’s receivables in a factoring
arrangement at 95% of its face amount. However, rather than collect the
full amount payable from the company, the bank may require the company
to pay only 98% of that amount. In this case, the company has received a
benefit that it would not have received without the bank’s involvement,
indicating that the liability may be more akin to a financing
arrangement.

If a structured payable arrangement with a bank
allows a company to remit payment to the bank on a date later than the
original due date of the invoice, that may also indicate that the
company has received a benefit that it would not have received without
the bank’s involvement, suggesting the liability may more be more akin
to a financing arrangement.

The analysis should focus on whether
the terms of the payable change as a result of the involvement of the
bank. If the payment terms do not change (i.e., the company must pay the
bank on the original terms of the invoice) the characteristics of the
payable may not have changed and would not reflect a financing. If the
terms of the payable have changed as a result of the bank’s involvement,
the characteristics of the liability have changed and it may no longer
be appropriate to classify the liability as a trade payable.

Other factors that may be considered include:

Is
the supplier’s participation in the structured payable arrangement
optional? If not, the company should evaluate whether the substance of
the transaction is more reflective of a financing.

Do the terms
of the structured payable arrangement preclude the company from
negotiating returns of damaged goods to the supplier?

Is the
company obligated to maintain cash balances or are there credit
facilities or other borrowing arrangements with the bank outside of the
structured payable arrangement that the bank can draw upon in the event
of noncollection of the invoice from the company?

Some
structured payable arrangements require that, as a condition for the
bank to accept an invoice from a supplier (i.e., the receivable) for
factoring, a company must separately promise the bank that it will pay
the invoice regardless of any disputes that might arise over goods that
are damaged or don’t conform with agreed-upon specifications. In the
event of a dispute, a company that agrees to such a condition would need
to seek recourse through other means, such as adjustments on future
purchases. This provision is typical among structured payable
arrangements since it provides greater certainty of payment to the bank.
However, this provision may indicate that the economic substance of the
trade payable has been altered to reflect that of a financing. It is important to consider the substance of any such condition in the context of the company’s normal practices.
For a company that buys enough from a supplier to routinely apply
credits for returns against payments on future invoices, this condition
might not be viewed as a significant change to existing practice.

In
some factoring arrangements, the bank may require that the company
maintain collateral or other credit facilities with the bank. These
requirements aren’t typical in factoring arrangements and may indicate
that the economic substance of the liability has changed to be more akin
to a financing arrangement. For the liability to be considered a trade
payable, the bank generally can collect the amount owed by the company
only through its rights as owner of the receivable it purchased from the
supplier. As can be seen from the above discussion, whether supplychain
finance should be presented as debts or trade payable is a matter of
significant judgement and would depend on the facts and circumstances of
each case.

Below are four simple examples, and the author’s opinion on whether those result in debt or trade payable classification.

1.
The company issues a promissory note to the supplier, agreeing in
writing to pay the supplier a fixed sum at a fixed future date or on
demand by the bank (discounting bank).

2. The company accepts a
bill of exchange and its banker simultaneously issues a bank guarantee
in favour of the supplier, making the bank liable to pay the supplier if
the company fails to honour its commitment on the due date. The bank
guarantee is not invoked at the reporting date. No interest is charged
to the company, and there is no impact on its credit limits.

3. The company buys goods from a supplier and needs to pay for them immediately.  as it does not have the cash, it arranges for a 90 day LC in favour of the supplier.  the supplier discounts the LC and receives payment immediately. the discounting charges/interest for 90 days is borne by the company. the credit limit of the company is utilised.

4. The company has entered into a separate credit limit with the bank wherein the bank will make payment to selected suppliers on company’s behalf.  as per the arrangement, the supplier will invoice the company with a credit period between 180 to 240 days. This is not a normal credit period which is also appropriately reflected    in    the    pricing    of    the    product.        The    bank    will    make    payment to the supplier after deducting discounting charges. At the due date, the company will make the full payment to the bank. The bank has no recourse against the supplier.

It may be noted that to take a proper view more detailed facts will be required, including the exact arrangement terms and the legal requirements/interpretations. on the basis of the limited information and above discussion it appears that the first     two     examples     represent     traditional     factoring     arrangement,    the    arrangement    would    result    in    the    classification    as    “trade    payables.”        In    the    last    two    examples,    the    classification would be more likely a “debt”.

[2015] 53 taxmann.com 102 (Bangalore – Trib.) A. Mohiuddin vs. ADIT A.Ys.:2012-13, Dated: 14.11.2014

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Sections – 195, 201 of the Act – since at the time of payment, the taxpayer was aware about exemption of capital gain in the hands of the non-resident payee, he was not required to withhold tax from payment.

Facts:

During the relevant tax year the taxpayer purchased a house property from a non-resident family member. The non-resident represented to the taxpayer that she had purchased residential house property about four months ago (i.e., within one year as required u/s. 54 of the Act) prior to the date of sale deed and that the consideration paid for the purchase was fully eligible for exemption u/s. 54 of the Act. Therefore, the taxpayer did not withhold tax from the payment.

Accordingly to the taxpayer, it was required to withhold tax u/s. 195(1) of the Act only if income chargeable to tax was embedded in the payment made by him and since no such income was embedded in the payment, he did not deduct tax.

The AO observed that the taxpayer had not followed the mechanism provided in section 195(2) and (3) for withholding lower or nil rate of tax. Accordingly, the AO held taxpayer as ‘assessee in default’ u/s. 201 and raised demand on him.

Held:

The ultimate levy of taxes is dependent upon exemption, deduction, etc. The seller was family member who had represented to the taxpayer at the time of payment of consideration that no tax was payable by her because of exemption u/s. 54.

These facts should be seen in the context of CBDT’s Instruction No. 02/2014, dated 26.02.2014 and particularly paragraph 3 thereof, which indicates that the AO is required to determine the appropriate proportion of sum chargeable to tax u/s. 195 (1) to ascertain the tax in respect of which the deductor should be deemed to be an ‘assessee in default’ u/s. 201.

Since, at the time of payment, the taxpayer was aware of the payment being not subject to tax because of exemption, he was not required to withhold tax.

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[2015] 53 taxmann.com 138 (Mumbai – Trib.) FedEx Express Transportation & Supply Chain Services India (P.) Ltd. vs. DCIT A.Y. 2009-10, Dated: 10.12.2014

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S/s.- 92C of the Act – payments made to third
party on behalf of AE for services provided by third party, which were
fully reimbursed by AE, could not be included in total costs for
determining profit margin for benchmarking ALP.

Facts:
The
taxpayer was an Indian company (“ICo”) and a 100% subsidiary of a
Foreign company (“FCo”). Indian aviation regulatory authority had
granted approval to FCo to operate all cargo air services to and from
India. The taxpayer was engaged in providing customs clearance services
to FCo, which was its AE, relating to high value packages and low value
packages. However, since the taxpayer had license for custom clearing of
only low value packages, it outsourced custom clearance of high value
packages to a third party and coordinated with the third party to
provide services to FCo.

The TPO observed that the payments made
to the third party were not reflected in the profit and loss account
but were routed through the balance sheet. Further, though the taxpayer
had selected Profit Level Indicator based on cost, it had excluded the
payments made to the third party while applying markup on cost. On
examination of the agreement between the taxpayer and the third party,
the TPO deduced that the taxpayer had direct control and monitoring of
day to day activities of third party and according to the TPO, the
taxpayer had not given proper reason for excluding the payments made to
the third party from the cost base for applying markup. Accordingly, the
TPO made adjustment in respect of payments made to third party for
custom clearance of high value packages that were coordinated with third
party.

Held:

The taxpayer did not have license to
provide high value packages custom clearance services and it was merely
coordinating with third party for such services. It was not directly
rendering the services to the AE.

The role of the taxpayer was confined to making payment to the third party.

Mere
monitoring of activities of third party cannot per se lead to the
inference that the taxpayer is directly providing the services to AE.

The
net profit margin realized from the AE was to be computed only with
reference to the costs directly incurred by the taxpayer and it could
not be imputed on the cost incurred by third party which was reimbursed
by the AE because there was no direct cost of such services to the
taxpayer.

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[TS-775-ITAT-2014] [MUM-Trib] Morgan Stanley International Incorporated vs. DIT A.Y.: 2005-06, Dated: 18.12.2014

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Article 12 of India-US DTAA – employees deputed by American company to Indian company for providing support services constituted service PE; salary reimbursed to American company was business profit (and not FIS) from which salary costs were deductible.

Facts:
The taxpayer was a resident of USA and 100% subsidiary of another American company. The primary activity of taxpayer was to provide support services to group companies located in various countries including India. During the relevant tax year, the taxpayer entered into agreement with an Indian group company for providing support services. The taxpayer deputed five employees to its Indian subsidiaries. The employees were to work under the supervision and control of the board of Directors of that Indian companies, were to be accountable to Indian companies and their day-to-day responsibility was to be managed by Indian companies.

The taxpayer paid salaries of the deputed employees and also withheld tax from their salaries u/s. 192 of the Act. The Indian subsidiaries reimbursed the salaries to the taxpayer since the taxpayer had paid them on behalf of the Indian subsidiaries and only for administrative convenience of the Indian subsidiaries. As per the taxpayer, the amount reimbursed was purely salary costs, it did not have any income element and hence, it was not taxable in India. However, on conservative basis, the Indian companies withheld tax @15% under Article 12 of India-USA DTAA from the reimbursed amount.

The tax authority concluded that the taxpayer received consideration for the services provided by the deputed employees and hence, the consideration was taxable as FTS u/s. 9(1)(vii) of the Act and as FIS under Article 12 of India- USA DTAA . CIT(A) upheld the order of the tax authority.

Before the Tribunal, the taxpayer contended as follows.

Amount received from Indian companies was reimbursement of salary costs without any income element and hence, question of taxability whether as FTS or FIS did not arise.

The deputed employees were under direct supervision and control of the Indian subsidiaries and hence, the ‘make available’ condition under India-USA DTAA was not fulfilled.

Even if deputed employees were considered to constitute service PE of the taxpayer, FIS provision would not be applicable. Consequently, relying on decision of the Supreme Court in DIT(IT) vs. Morgan Stanley & Co [2007] 292 ITR 416 (SC), the salary costs would have been deductible from the income, resulting in ‘nil’ income.

The tax authority contended that the business of the taxpayer was to provide support services through deputed employees who were highly qualified personnel having technical skills and experience. Hence, payment qualified as FIS under India-USA DTAA.

Held:

Relying on decision of theDelhi High Court in Centrica India Offshore (P) Ltd vs. CIT, [2014] 364 ITR 336 (Del) and decision of the Supreme Court in DIT(IT) vs. Morgan Stanley & Co [2007] 292 ITR 416 (SC), the Tribunal proceeded on the premise that the deputed employees were ‘real’ employees of the taxpayer who had come to India to render services and therefore, they constituted service PE of the taxpayer.

Once a service PE is created, FIS article will have no application since it excludes profits in connection with PE from its ambit. Hence, income should be taxed as business profits under Article 7.

While in Centrica’s case, Delhi High Court considered Article 12(6) of India-Canada DTAA , which embodies a similar provision, the issue of specific exclusion of PE profits from FIS article was not considered by Delhi High Court and hence, that decision cannot be applied.

For computing the business profits under Article 7, the reimbursement made by Indian companies has to be treated as revenue receipts and salary of the deputed employees paid by the taxpayer has to be allowed as deduction.

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[2015] 53 taxmann.com 1 (Jabalpur – Trib.) Birla Corporation Ltd. vs. ACIT A.Ys.: 2010-11 & 2011-12, Dated: 24.12.2014

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India-Austria DTAA , India-Belgium DTAA , India-
China DTAA , India-Germany DTAA , India- Switzerland DTAA , India-UK
DTAA and India- US DTAA ; section 5(2)(b), 9(1)(vii) the Act – Payments
made to non-resident suppliers of plant for installation/commissioning
services do not create an installation permanent establishment (PE),
since the activities did not exceed the threshold provided in the DTAA
s; FTS being a general Article and PE being a specific Article,
taxability of consideration should be confined to specific PE Article

Facts:
The
taxpayer is an Indian company engaged in manufacture and sale of
cement. During the relevant tax year, the taxpayer made payments to
certain non-resident suppliers for import of plant and machinery. The
suppliers were located in Austria, Belgium, China, Germany, Switzerland
UK and US. The suppliers also provided installation and commissioning
services and their technicians visited India for that purpose. The
taxpayer did not withhold tax in India on the ground that since the
plant and machinery were supplied from outside India, the payments for
the same were not chargeable to tax under the Act. The taxpayer
separately paid installation and commissioning fee and withheld tax @
10% thereon under the Act.

The tax authority concluded that:

the
contract was a “composite contact” or “works contracts”; ? taxpayer
paid the suppliers for supply of plant as well as installation and
commissioning services;

the consideration for provision of
installation and commissioning services was not paid separately but was
embedded in payments for supply of plant;

the taxpayer was
required to approach the tax authority for determination of chargeable
income and withholding tax thereon and in absence of that, was required
to withhold tax on the total payment.

Therefore, the tax
authority treated the taxpayer as “assessee in default” u/s. 195 read
with section 201 of the Act and held that the taxpayer should have
withheld tax @ 42.25% of the gross remittance amounts.

Held:
(i) As regards I. T. Act

Part
of the consideration for purchase of plant that can be attributable to
installation commissioning or assembly of the plant and equipment or any
supervision activity in connection thereto accrues and arises in India.

Hence, it is taxable u/s. 5(2)(b) of the Act since the related
economic activity is performed in India. Because income accrues or
arises in India, one need not look at deeming fiction u/s. 9(1)(vii) of
the Act. It is for that reason that definition of FTS in Explanation 2
to section 9(1)(vii) specifically excludes “consideration for any
construction, assembly. Mining or like project”.

The expression
installation, commissioning or erection of plant and equipment belongs
to the same genus as expression ‘assembly’. Thus, ‘assembly’ is excluded
from the scope of section 9(1)(vii) of the Act.

As regards DTAA

India
has entered into DTAA s with all the seven tax jurisdictions where the
suppliers are located. All these DTAA s provide minimum time threshold
under installation PE clause and the installation and commissioning work
by any supplier did not exceed the minimum time threshold under any of
the DTAA s.

Further, India-Belgium and India-UK DTAA
additionally provide that even when threshold time limit is not
exceeded, installation PE is constituted if the installation/
commissioning charges exceed 10% of the sale value of the plant. This
condition too was not fulfilled.

Accordingly, no installation PE
was constituted and even if a part of the consideration can be
attributed to installation/commissioning activities, it will not be
taxable in terms of Article 7 read with Article 5 of the relevant DTAA .

(iii) As regards FTS/FIS

Installation/commissioning activities are de facto in the nature of technical services.

While
FTS/FI S article dealing with technical services is a general
provision, Article dealing with installation PE is a specific provision.
In Union of India vs. India Fisheries (P) Ltd. [57 ITR 331 (1965)], the
Supreme Court has held that if there is an apparent conflict between
two independent provisions, the special provision must prevail over the
general provision. If, even when PE was not constituted, the income is
considered taxable under FTS Article, it would not only render PE
provisions meaningless but would also be contrary to the spirit of the
commentary on UN Model Convention.

Hence, if there are services
which are covered under a specific PE clause and also under FTS/FIS
provision, the taxability of consideration for such services must be
confined to that specific PE clause.

In case of India-UK and
India-USA DTAA , even if FTS/ FIS article applies, as the ‘make
available’ condition was not satisfied, the payment was not FTS/FIS.
Installation/ commissioning did not involve transfer of technology and
hence, such activities did not satisfy ‘make available’ condition.

As India-Belgium DTAA includes MFN clause, same tax position as India-UK/US DTAA applies.

Article
12(5)(a) of India-Switzerland DTAA specifically excludes “amounts paid
for … … services that are ancillary and subsidiary, as well as
inextricably and essentially linked, to the sale of a property” (i.e.,
plant in this case) from the scope of FIS. Accordingly installation/ commissioning charges were not FIS under India- Switzerland DTAA .

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Digest of recent important foreign decisions on cross border taxation

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In this Article, some of the recent important foreign decisions on cross border taxation are covered.

1. France Participation exemption – Administrative Supreme Court clarifies 5% participation threshold criteria

In a decision (No. 370650) given on 5th November 2014, the Administrative Supreme Court (Conseil d’Etat) ruled that the 5% participation threshold provided for by the French participation exemption regime does not relate to both capital and voting rights of a subsidiary, but only to capital. A parent company which holds at least 5% of the capital, but less than 5% of the voting rights of its subsidiary may therefore benefit from the participation exemption on dividends derived from shares carrying a voting right.

a) Facts: In 2008 and 2009, Sofina, a company resident in Belgium, received dividends from the French company Eurazeo, which were subject to a 15% withholding tax. Sofina held shares representing 5% of the capital of Eurazeo, all of which carried a voting right. However, the shares held by Sofina represented only 3.63% of the voting rights of Eurazeo in 2008 and 4.29% of the voting rights of Eurazeo in 2009. Sofina claimed the repayment of the withholding tax on the basis of the French tax authorities’ guidelines which, following the European Court of Justice decision in Denkavit II (Case C-170/05), provide that where a EU non-resident parent company which fulfils the domestic 5% participation requirement finds it impossible to set off the French withholding tax on dividends derived from its French subsidiary, such dividends shall not be subject to a withholding tax.

b) Issue: Under article 145(1)(b) of the General Tax Code, a company must hold at least 5% of the capital of its subsidiary at the date of payment of the dividends to benefit from the participation exemption. Article 145(6) (b)(ter) provides that the participation exemption shall not apply to dividends derived from shares which do not carry a voting right, unless the parent company holds shares representing at least 5% of both capital and voting rights of its subsidiary. The tax authorities took the view that these provisions imply that, in order to benefit from the participation exemption, a parent company shall hold shares representing at least 5% of the capital and at least 5% of the voting rights of its subsidiary. The firstinstance tribunal (tribunal administratif) dismissed the claim of Sofina, but the Administrative Court of Appeals (cour administrative d’appel) later ruled in favour of the Belgian company. The Conseil d’Etat confirmed the decision of the Administrative Court of Appeals.

c) Decision. The Conseil d’Etat ruled that:

– article 145 of the General Tax Code does not require, for the 5% participation in capital condition to be met, that a voting right be attached to every share held by the parent company, nor that voting rights attached to the shares, if any, be strictly proportionate to the portion of capital such shares represent;

– the fact that, under article 145(6)(b)(ter) of the General Tax Code, dividends derived from shares which do not carry a voting right may not be exempted, unless the parent company holds shares representing at least 5% of both capital and voting rights of its subsidiary, does neither mean nor imply that the application of the participation exemption is limited to parent companies which hold shares representing at least 5% of the capital and 5% of the voting rights of a subsidiary.

Dividends derived from shares carrying a voting right received by a parent company which holds at least 5% of the capital of its subsidiary may therefore be exempted under the French participation exemption, notwithstanding the fact that the shares held by the parent company do not represent 5% of the voting rights of the subsidiary.

2) Canada
Tax Court of Canada holds foreign exchange gains not realised on conversions of convertible debentures

The Tax Court of Canada gave its decision, on 4th November 2014, in the case of Agnico-Eagle Mines Limited vs. The Queen (2014 TCC 324). The taxpayer, Agnico-Eagle Mines Limited (Agnico), a taxable Canadian corporation, issued US-denominated convertible debentures in 2002 at an aggregate price of $ 143,750,000. The issue in the appeal was whether or not Agnico realised foreign exchange gains when the convertible debentures were converted and redeemed for Agnico’s common shares. The tax authorities argued that foreign exchange gains were realised because the conversions and redemption resulted in a repayment of the debt equal to its US dollar principal amount, which had decreased when translated to Canadian dollars. Agnico argued instead that the principal amount of the debt became irrelevant once holders exercised their rights of conversion, as most of them did. It submits that a gain could not have been realised because it borrowed far less than it paid out in Canadian dollar terms (i.e., CAD 228,289,375 borrowed and CAD 280,987,312 paid out, measured by the value of common shares issued to holders).

a) Background: Agnico produces gold. Its shares (Common Shares) were listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX). In 2002, it issued convertible subordinated debentures (Convertible Debentures) at a price of $ 1,000 each, which traded on the TSX. Under the terms of an indenture, interest was payable at 4.5%, the principal amount was $ 1,000 and they were redeemable on or after 15th February 2006 for a redemption price (Redemption Price) equal to the principal amount plus accrued and unpaid interest. Agnico had the option of delivering Common Shares on redemption instead of cash. The holder had the option to convert the debentures for 71.429 Common Shares at any time prior to redemption or maturity. Most of the debentures were converted into Common Shares during 2005 and 2006. Most of the conversions took place after Agnico issued a notice of redemption late in 2005. Most investors availed themselves of the option to convert rather than being subject to the redemption because this yielded a higher number of Common Shares.

The tax authorities determined that Agnico realised deemed capital gains on the conversions and the redemption pursuant to section 39(2) of the Incometax Act. The amounts assessed are the same as if the principal amount had been repaid in cash. This resulted in assessments of deemed capital gains in the amounts of CAD 4,499,360 and CAD 57,676,430 for the 2005 and 2006 taxation years, respectively.

b) Court’s decision: The Court concluded that the consideration received for the issuance of the Common Shares was $ 14 per Common Share or US CAD 1,000 per Convertible Debenture. The Court then determined that the relevant amounts should be translated into Canadian dollars at the spot rates when the amounts “arose”. The date of translation relating to the issuance of the debentures was not in dispute, but the translation date for the amount paid out by Agnico on the conversions. The Court determined that the appropriate date was the date the debentures were issued, in which case there could be no gain. With respect to the redemption, however, the Court held that the terms of the indenture made it clear that the Common Shares issued on redemption are in satisfaction of the redemption price, which became due and payable on the date of redemption. As such, there was a foreign exchange gain on the date of redemption. In conclusion, no foreign exchange gains were realized on the conversions and the tax authorities’ determination of foreign exchange gain on the redemption was upheld.

3) European Union; United Kingdom

ECJ Advocate General’s opinion: Commission vs. United Kingdom (Case C-172/13) – Cross-border loss relief – details

Advocate General Kokott of the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) gave her opinion in the case

Commission vs. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Case C-172/13). Details of the opinion are summarized below.

    Facts: Following the ECJ judgment in Marks & Spencer (Case C-446/03) on cross-border loss relief, the United Kingdom had introduced group relief in regard to foreign group members by amending the Corporate Tax Act with effect from 1st April 2006. In 2007, the Commission raised concern that the United Kingdom breaches freedom of establishment by imposing conditions on cross-border group relief that make it virtually impossible in practice to obtain such relief. After the United Kingdom had failed to comply with the Commission’s request to amend its legislation, the Commission brought an action before the Court.

    Advocate General’s Opinion: The AG opened her assessment by stating that it is necessary to examine whether legislation at hand breaches the freedom of establishment (article 49 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) and article 31 of the EEA Agreement). The AG continued by stating that contested legislation restrict the freedom of establishment because it imposes stricter requirements on claiming the advantages of group relief if a parent company establishes a subsidiary abroad than if it does so in its state of residence. According to the settled ECJ case law, such restriction is justified only if it relates to situations which are not objectively comparable or where there is an overriding reason in the public interest.

Regarding the objective comparability, the AG notes that although the objective comparability test should not be rejected, there is a significant and, to some extent, crucial difference in the situation of a parent company with a resident or a non-resident subsidiary. The AG concluded that difference must therefore be examined as a possible justification for unequal treatment, including a test of the proportionality of the national rules.

Going further, on overriding reason in the public interest, the AG refers to the ECJ decision in the Marks & Spencer case (C-446/03) by stating that this decision created the so-called “Marks & Spencer exception”. Based on that exemption, losses incurred by a non-resident subsidiary can be transferred to the parent company if those losses cannot be taken into account elsewhere, either for present, past or future accounting periods, in which connection the burden of proof lies with the taxpayer and the Member States are entitled to prevent abuse of that exception. The AG continued by noting that the regime created under this exception has proved to be impracticable and as such does not protect the interest of the internal market. According to the AG, its application also constitutes source of legal disputes because of four reasons:

– the possibility of loss relief elsewhere is in terms of fact really precluded only if the subsidiary has ceased to exist in law;

– the case in which the loss cannot by law be taken into account in the state in which the subsidiary is established, the “Marks & Spencer exception” comes into conflict with another line of case law;

the impossibility of loss relief elsewhere can be created arbitrarily by the taxpayer; and

– the parent company’s Member State is obliged, on the basis of the freedom of establishment, only to accord equal treatment which means that it is possible that a notional tax situation over a period of decades has to be investigated retrospectively.

In conclusion of the analysis of the “Marks & Spencer exception”, the AG stated that this exception should be abandoned because of numerous reasons. By abandoning the exception, the contradictions in the ECJ case law would be resolved and clear borders of the fiscal powers of the Member States would be established. As a second argument, the AG stated that this solution is in line with the requirement of legal certainty which provides for law to be clear and its application foreseeable. Finally, the AG concluded that the abandonment of the “Marks & Spencer exception” does not infringe the ability-to-pay principle as the Commission has claimed.

The AG finalised her assessment by stating that even the complete refusal of loss relief for a non-resident subsidiary satisfies the principle of proportionality. Any restriction on cross-border relief in respect of a subsidiary is thus justified by ensuring the cohesion of a tax system or the allocation of the power to impose taxes between Member States.

In the light of the above, the AG proposed that the ECJ should:

–  dismiss the action;

–  order the European Commission to pay the costs; and

– order the Federal Republic of Germany, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Finland to bear their own respective costs.

4) France; United States

Treaty between France and United States – French Administrative Supreme Court rules that participation exemption does not apply to dividends received through a US partnership

In a decision given on 24th November 2014 (No. 363556), the French Administrative Supreme Court (Conseil d’Etat) ruled that dividends received by a French corporation from a US corporation held through a general partnership registered in Delaware may not benefit from the participation exemption, even though such a partnership is transparent for tax purposes under Delaware law. Details of the decision are summarised below.

    Facts: The French corporation Artémis SA held 98.82% of the capital of the general partnership Artemis America, registered in the state of Delaware. This partnership, which did not elect to be treated as a corporation, held more than 10% of the capital of the US corporation Roland. The French corporation Artémis SA received from the partnership Artemis America a EUR 4.7 million share of the dividends distributed by the US corporation Roland to the partnership. Considering that such dividends could benefit from the participation exemption, the French corporation Artémis SA deducted them from its taxable result for year 2002. The French tax authorities, however, contested the deduction of the dividends.

    Issue: Does domestic law, combined with the provision of the France – United States Income and Capital Tax Treaty (1994) (the Treaty) and in particular of article 7(4) of the Treaty, allow the application of the participation exemption on dividends received by a parent company where such dividends are derived from shares held through a transparent US partnership?

Article 7(4) of the Treaty provides that “a partner shall be considered to have realised income or incurred deductions to the extent of his share of the profits or losses of a partnership, as provided in the partnership agreement (…). For this purpose, the character (including source and attribution to a permanent establishment) of any item of income or deduction accruing to a partner shall be determined as if it were realised or incurred by the partner in the same manner as realised or incurred by the partnership.”

    Decision: In accordance with the well-established principle of subsidiarity of tax treaties, the French

Administrative Supreme Court first applied domestic law and then considered whether the Treaty provisions might have an impact on domestic rules.

Domestic law

The Court explained that where the tax treatment of a transaction involves a foreign legal person, one should first determine the type of French legal person to which such foreign legal person is the closest in regard of all the characteristics and of the law ruling the formation and functioning of the foreign legal person. The tax regime which is to be applied to the transaction shall then be determined according to French law.
 

The Court noted that the partnership Artemis America was not treated as a corporation in the US and that, under the law of Delaware, it had a legal personality which was distinct from the one of its partners. Therefore, such a partnership should be viewed as a French partnership (société de personnes) ruled by article 8 of the General Tax Code, even though the partnership Artemis America is transparent for tax purposes under the law of Delaware (while French partnerships are semi-transparent).

Article 145 of the General Tax Code provides that the participation exemption may only apply to companies subject to corporate income tax which hold shares fulfilling certain conditions. The Court ruled that these provisions mean that a French partnership (société de personnes) may not benefit from the participation exemption insofar as it is not subject to corporate income tax, even in the case where its partners are subject to corporate income tax. In addition, the Court ruled that a parent company must have a direct participation in the capital of its subsidiary to benefit from the participation exemption. Therefore, a parent company may not benefit from the participation exemption on dividends derived from shares held through a French partnership.

Insofar as the US partnership Artemis America, which is comparable to a French partnership, stands between the French corporation Artémis SA and the US corporation Roland, the parent corporation Artémis SA is not allowed under domestic law to benefit from the participation exemption on the dividends distributed by the US corporation Roland.

The Treaty

The Court ruled that the purpose of article 7 of the Treaty is to allocate the taxing rights over profits realised by enterprises resident in one of the two contracting states. The only purpose of article 7(4) is to allocate such taxing rights when profits are realised by a US partnership. Pursuant to articles 7 and 10 of the Treaty, dividends distributed by a US corporation to a US partnership, a partner of which is a French corporation, must therefore be seen as dividends distributed to the French partner, thus being taxable in France. However, it does not result from article 7 of the Treaty that such dividends should be seen as dividends directly distributed to the partner for the application of French tax law.

Hence, the Court concluded that the Treaty does not include any provision allowing the French corporation Artémis SA to deduct from its taxable result its share of the dividends distributed by the US corporation Roland to the US partnership Artemis America, and dismissed the taxpayer’s appeal.

5) Finland; Hungary

Supreme Administrative Court: Private pension based on work exercised abroad not income from Finnish sources The Supreme Administrative Court (Korkein hallinto-oikeus, KHO) gave its decision on 6th October 2014 in the case of KHO:2014:146. Details of the decision are summarised below.

    Facts: The taxpayer, A, has moved permanently to Hungary on 23 October 2005 and has been treated as a non-resident of Finland since 1st January 2009. In 2009, A received pension payments from a Finnish pension fund. The pension was based on work done for eight private employers between the years 1972 and 2002.

The first four employments were mainly exercised in Finland, whereas the four latter ones between 1988 and 2002 were exercised abroad.

The tax authorities taxed the pension payments fully whereas the Tax Appeal Board investigated the tax treatment based on each employment and ruled that the part which related to employment exercised abroad was not taxable in Finland. The tax authorities appealed against the ruling which was also upheld by the District Administrative Court of Helsinki.

    Legal background: Section 10 of the Income-tax Law (Tuloverolaki) includes a non-exhaustive list of items of income which are treated as derived from Finland. The list includes pension which is received from a pension insurance taken from Finland.

    Issue: The issue was whether or not the pension paid to the non-resident taxpayer is regarded as income from Finnish sources.

    Decision: The Court upheld the decisions of the Tax Appeal Board and the District Administrative Court and held that the pension income was not income from Finnish sources and not taxable in Finland as it related to work exercised abroad.

The Court acknowledged that it would be in accordance with the wording of the law to treat pension from a Finnish pension fund as income from Finnish sources. The Court, however, looked into the law proposal (HE 62/1991) (the Proposal) which added the pension insurance taken from Finland to the list of items of income which are treated as derived from Finland. The Proposal was explicitly referring only to pensions based on private pension insurances, whereas the tax practice about pensions based on obligatory pension insurances was that such pensions are taxable in Finland only if they were based on work exercised in Finland. This was also established in the unpublished decision of the Supreme Administrative Court (decision No. 3922 from 1990).

The Court emphasised that if the legislator wanted to change the existing practice, the Proposal should have explicitly stated this. Considering the Proposal and the tax practice, there were no grounds to change the interpretation so that pension insurance from Finland would cover obligatory pension insurance. The Court acknowledged that such interpretation may lead to double non-taxation of such pension due to the functioning of a tax treaty, which is likely not the intended effect of tax treaties. Despite this, there were no grounds to change the previous interpretation.

6) Finland; Switzerland

Treaty between Finland and Switzerland – Administrative Court of Helsinki: Licence fee for using group name and logo paid to a Swiss related party not deductible for Finnish company

The Administrative Court of Helsinki (Helsingin hallinto-oikeus) (the Court) gave its decision on 10th October 2014 in the case of 14/1103/4. Details of the decision are summarised below.

    Facts: A Finnish company (FI Co) has belonged to an international group since 1981. FI Co has been using the group’s logo since 1989 and the group’s name has been included in its name since 1995. In 2004, FI Co concluded a contract with a Swiss company (CH Co), which belongs to the same group and holds the rights to the group’s name and logo. Under the contract terms FI Co received the right to use the group’s name and logo in Finland and in return was charged a licence fee for the those rights. During the court proceedings, FI Co emphasised that the licence fee covered also other features of the brand, such as the mission and values of the group.

    Issue: The issue was whether or not the licence fee (royalty) FI Co paid to CH Co was a tax deductible business expense for FI Co.

    Decision: The Court held that the licence fee was not tax deductible for FI Co. The Court referred to section 31 of the Law on Tax Procedure which stipulates on transfer pricing adjustments between related parties and section 7 of the Business Income Tax Law under which all costs and expenses incurred for the purpose of earning, securing, or maintaining the taxpayer’s income are deductible for tax purposes. The Court emphasised that it is crucial whether an independent entity in similar circumstances would be willing to pay for such rights or were they simply benefits which FI Co accrued by belonging to a group.

As a starting point, the Court pointed out that the name and logo as well as the mission and values of the group are common for all entities belonging to the same group and indicate that the entity in question is part of a bigger entity. As such, those are benefits which accrue based on the group relationship without a fee. A fee can, however, be charged provided that the entity paying the fee can show that it has obtained commercial benefits from the contract.

The Court pointed out that FI Co has belonged to the group since 1981, used its logo since 1989 and attached the group name to its own name since 1995, whereas the licence fee was introduced only in 2004. Although these facts on their own are not decisive to deem the licence fee non-deductible, such facts have specific significance when no significant changes in the market position and circumstances have taken place. FI Co has not indicated that there has been a significant change in its market circumstances since 2000.

The Court held that FI Co had failed to show that the increase in its profits resulted from the contract. The benefits FI Co had accrued are benefits obtained based on the group relationship. As such, there were no grounds for CH Co to charge for such benefits and no business reasons for FI Co to pay for them.

Article 9 (associated enterprises) of the 1991 Finland-Switzerland tax treaty was mentioned as an additional legal basis for the decision although the Court did not elaborate more on the treaty aspects.

7) France; Germany

Treaty between France and Germany – French Administrative Supreme Court qualifies income derived from “jouissance” rights as dividend

In a decision (No. 356878) given on 10th October 2014, the French Administrative Supreme Court (Conseil d’Etat) ruled that the income derived from German “jouissance” rights (Genussscheine) within the meaning of German law is to be treated as dividend pursuant to paragraphs 6 and 9 of article 9 of the France – Germany Income and Capital Tax Treaty (1959) (as amended through 2001) (the Treaty).

    Facts: From 2004 to 2006, the French bank Caisse régionale du crédit agricole mutuel du Finistère received an income from securities issued by the German entity Landesbank Sachsen. These securities were denominated as “Genussscheine” in the issuance contract.

Under the contract, the annual income to be received by the French bank amounted to 6.6% of the nominal value of the securities, except:

– where and insofar as the payment of this amount would create or worsen a loss in the debtor’s accounts; or
– where, after a capital reduction resulting from debtor’s losses, the capital has not been built up to its former total nominal value.

The contract also provided that the amounts paid in relation to the “jouissance” rights (Genussscheine) were deductible from the profits of the securities’ issuer.

The income received by the French bank was subject to a 26.375% withholding tax corresponding to the corporate income tax and the solidarity tax due under the German tax legislation.

    Legal background: Article 9 (6) of the Treaty provides that the term “dividends” as used in this article means income from shares, “jouissance” shares or “jouissance” rights, mining shares, founders’ shares or other rights, not being debt claims, participating in profits.

In turn, article 9(9) of the Treaty provides that income referred to in paragraph 6 arising from rights or shares participating in profits (including “jouissance” rights or “jouissance” shares) and, in the case of Germany, income from a sleeping partner (stiller Gesellschafter) from his participation as such, and income from loans participating in profits (partiarisches Darlehen), and income from profit-sharing loans (Gewinnobligationen)) that is deductible in determining the profits of the debtor may be taxed in the contracting state in which it arises, according to the laws of that state.

    Issue: The French bank considered that it was entitled to a French tax credit amounting to the German withholding tax, pursuant to article 20(2)(a)(bb) of the treaty referring to    income    arising    from    rights    participating    in    profits,    that is     deductible     in     determining     the     profits     of     the     debtor    (article 9(9) of the treaty).

However, the french tax authorities took the view that the income derived from “jouissance” rights constituted interest, which is taxable only in the state of which the recipient is a resident (article 10 of the treaty), and refused to grant the tax credit.  The french bank made a claim against this decision. On 5th december 2011, the french administrative Court of appeals (Cour administrative d’appel),    confirming the judgment given by the administrative tribunal (tribunal administratif) on 28th  january 2010, ruled that, in regard to the terms of the issuance contract and especially of its provision    which    defines    “jouissance” rights as debt claims, the income derived from these “jouissance” rights cannot be     qualified     as     dividend     under     article     9(6)     of     the     Treaty.    Consequently, the German withholding tax cannot give rise to a tax credit in france.

In the course of the subsequent proceedings, however, the Conseil d’Etat ruled in favour of the french bank.

d)  Decision: The Conseil d’Etat noted that the following facts were not disputed:
–   the income received by the french bank was derived from “Genussscheine” within the meaning of the German legislation;    and

–   the income derived from “Genussscheine” is expressly mentioned as a dividend in paragraphs 6 and 9 of article 9 of the treaty in its German-language version, which is equally authentic pursuant to the treaty.

The Conseil d’Etat, therefore, concluded that the income received    by    the    French    bank    qualified    as    a    dividend    under    article 9(6) of the treaty.

Note. The case has been referred back to the administrative Court of appeals.

TRANSFER PRICING DOCUMENTATION

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BACKGROUND
The Indian transfer pricing regulations require taxpayers to maintain, on an annual basis, a set of extensive information and documents relating to international transactions undertaken with associated enterprises (AEs) or specified domestic transactions undertaken with related parties. Given that the burden of demonstrating the arm’s length nature of transactions between associated enterprises/ related parties rests with the taxpayer, one of the pivotal constituents of transfer pricing is documentation of the economic and commercial realities of business, methodology used, assumptions, etc. that aided in arriving at the transfer price.

In a world where multinationals are seated across various locations around the globe, with centralised functions, varied operations and complex inter-company transactions, documentation assumes a crucial role for taxpayers. India, with regard to documentation has been no different. Indian revenue authorities, with regards to documentation, have always been stringent, leading to significant litigation for multinational organisations. Rule 10D of the Income Tax Rules, 1962 (the Rules) prescribes detailed information and documentation that has to be maintained by the taxpayer. While some of the requirements are general in nature, others are more specific to the relevant international transactions.

Further, in recent years, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has been concerned with the effectiveness of current transfer pricing documentation guidance. As part of the several initiatives around Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), the OECD has released its action plan on transfer pricing documentation. Action 13 of the BEPS Action Plan relates to re-examination of transfer pricing documentation seeking to enhance transparency to tax administrations, taking into consideration compliance costs for business. Action 13 of the BEPS Action Plan proposes a replacement to ‘Chapter V- Documentation” of the OECD transfer pricing guidelines providing a general guidance on documentation process from the perspective of both the taxpayer and the tax administration and consists of the following three parts:

i) Master file containing information relevant for all Multinational group members;

ii) Local File referring specifically to material transactions of the local taxpayer, and analysis of the same; and

iii) T emplate of country-by-Country report (CBC) illustrating global allocation of profits, taxes paid, and other indicators of economic activity.

REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
Section 92D of the Income-tax Act, 1962 (The Act) read with Rule 10D(1) of the Rules deal with maintenance of prescribed information and documentation by the taxpayer. The said requirement can be broadly segregated into two parts: I. The first part of the Rule lists out mandatory documents/ information that a taxpayer must maintain. The extensive list under this part can be further classified into the following three categories:

Enterprise-wise documents (capturing the ownerships structure, group profile, business overview of the tax payer and the AEs etc.). These documents would typically cover requirements of Rule 10D(1)(a) to (c) of the Rules

Transaction-Specific documents [capturing the nature and terms of contract description of the functions performed, assets employed and risks assumed (popularly known as ‘FAR ’ Analysis) of the each party to the transaction, economic and market analyses etc.] These documents would typically cover requirements of Rule 10D(1)(d) to (h) of the Rules; and

Computation related documents (capturing the methods considered, actual working assumptions, adjustments made to transfer prices, and any other relevant information/data relied on for determining the arm’s length price etc.). These documents would typically cover requirements of Rule 10D(1) (i) to (m) of the Rules.

II. The second part of the Rule provides that adequate documentation be maintained such that it substantiates the information/analysis/studies documented under the first part of the Rule. Such informationcan include government publications, reports, studies, technical publications/ market research studies undertaken by reputable institutions, price publications, relevant agreements, contracts, and correspondence, etc.

While the transfer pricing regulations have laid down the requirement for maintenance of various types of documents, tax payers need to assess and ensure that the extensiveness of each of the above documents/ information should be in sync with the nature, type and complexity of the transaction under scrutiny.

Further, Rule 10D(4) of the Rules require that all the prescribed information and documents maintained by the tax payer to demonstrate the arm’s length nature of the transactions documents and information have to be contemporaneously maintained (to the extent possible) and must be in place by the due date of the tax return filing. E.g.,Companies to whom transfer pricing regulations are applicable are currently required to file their tax returns on or before 30th November following the close of the relevant tax year. The prescribed documents must be maintained for a period of nine years from the end of the relevant tax year, and must be updated annually on an ongoing basis.

As an exception to the above, the Proviso to Rule 10D(4) of the Rules provides that if a transaction continues to have effect over more than one previous year, fresh documentation need not be separately maintained in respect of each year, unless there is a change in nature and terms of the transaction, assumptions made and/ or any other factor that would have a bearing on the transfer price. Given this, it is extremely important for tax payers to scrutinise, on a yearly basis, whether any fresh documentation is required to be maintained for any of the continuing transactions.

Further, there is relaxation provided in case of the taxpayers having aggregate international transactions below the prescribed threshold of Rs. 1 crore and specified domestic transactions below the threshold of Rs. 5 crore from the requirement of maintaining the prescribed documentation. However, even in these cases, it is imperative that the documentation maintained should be adequate to substantiate the arm’s-length price of the international transactions or specified domestic transactions.

The above documentation requirements are also applicable to foreign companies deriving income liable to tax in India.

The regulations entail penal consequences in the event of non-compliance with documentation requirement. Failure to maintain the prescribed information/document/reporting covered transaction/ furnishing incorrect information or document attracts penalty @ 2% of transaction value.

MAINTENANCE OF INFORMATION AND DOCUMENTATION

Typically, taxpayers undertake transfer pricing exercise culminating in a Transfer Pricing Study Report, which can be said to be meeting the information and documentation required to be maintained under law. Further, such Report would also form the basis of obtaining and furnishing the required Accountants’ Certificate (Section 92E of the Act). Such exercise generally involves the following steps: Information gathering

General information

This would include structural, operational /functional set up of the tax payer and the related parties and the group to which they belong to,information in the form of global transfer pricing policy, if any, etc.

Industry details

This would include tax payers’ key competitors’ information, pricing factors, etc.

Financial

Budgets (including process followed and assumptions) and earlier years’ financial statements (including segmental information if available). Further, details of government policies, approvals, any tax exemptions availed and past assessment would be relevant to understand.

Transaction specific

List of transactions with associated enterprises alongwith related commercial parameters, pricing methodology followed details of similar product dealings with third parties (by tax payer and associated enterprises), availability of comparable prices in public domain, etc.

Functional, Asset and Risk Analysis

Typically referred to as the “FAR analysis”, this is the key element to any transfer pricing exercise. It involves identifying functions performed, assets deployed and risks assumed by the parties to the transaction. The exercise entails determining income attribution between entities basis functions performed, assets deployed and risks assumed by the entities to the transaction.

Further, the above analysis facilitates process of determination of the “Most Appropriate Method” (‘MAM’), identifyingthe “tested party” and ultimately leading to economic/comparability analysis [determination of the Arm’s Length Price (‘ALP’)].

Determination of the MAM and the computation of the ALP

These are concluding steps of the transfer pricing exercise with following key elements:

Determination of the MAM for each tested transaction basis prescribed factors.

Identifying the tested party ie. one of the party to the transaction, which is the one that is least complex (functionally), not owning/owning few intangibles and in respect of which data is more reliable.

Having identified the tested party, one needs to undertake the comparability analysis and compute the ALP.

While undertaking the comparability analysis, it is important that right comparables are used. Further, in this regard, wherever required it is necessary to carry out necessary adjustments so as to have more robust comparability analysis.

As    regards    computation    of    the  ALP,    an    important component for the same is use of appropriate “Profit Level Indicator” (‘PLI’). There are no specific guidelines on the choice of PLI under law; hence, giving taxpayers an option. Further, in the context of Resale Price Method or the Cost Plus Method, the PLI usually adopted is gross margin on operating revenue and gross margin (mark up) on operating cost respectively. Under the Transactional Net Margin Method, the PLI depends on the nature of the transaction (ie, revenue or expense) in the hands of the tested party.

The whole of the above process (step wise) would need to be documented in detail with back up information/ details. Such documentation is typically maintained in the form of a Transfer Pricing Study Report from compliance perspective. Taxpayers undertake such studies on a yearly basis as required under law.

    CONCLUSION

Documentation is the most important and essential element of transfer pricing. From taxpayers perspective, documentation is critical to demonstrate compliance/ meeting with the arm’s length principle. From tax department’s perspective, it has the right to call for the documentation for verifying the compliance with the arm’s length principle.

Further, as discussed earlier, documentation has time and again been a matter of discussion/debate across jurisdictions and has been continues evolving process. The recent development at OECD (BEPS initiative discussed earlier) which seeks to replace its earlier guidance on transfer pricing documentation and proposing information to be provided in the master file and the CBC report; it is believed that the tax administrations will have the resources and information required to conduct a detailed analysis and focused audit.

    JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS

There have not been many precedents per se in the context of adequacy of the prescribed information and documentation maintenance requirements.

    In case of Cargill India Pvt. Ltd, the Delhi Tribunal had adopted a practical interpretation of documentation requirements laid u/s. 92D(3) read with Rule 10D of the Rules. The Tribunal had observed as under:

“It is clear from the consideration of Rule 10D and its various sub-rules, that documents and information prescribed under the above rule is voluminous and it would only be in the rarest cases that all the clauses of sub-rules would be attracted.

….

It is, therefore, clear that one or more clauses of Sub-rule (1) are applicable and not all clauses of the Rule in a given case. It would all depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case more particularly the nature of international transaction carried or service involved.”

As it can be seen from the above, the Tribunal noted that all kinds of information mentioned in Rule 10D of the Rules need not be maintained in each and every case. The nature of information that is relevant would vary depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Further, the Tribunal also observed that since the penalty leviable for non-compliance with requirements u/s. 92D(3) of the Act is onerous, its conditions must be strictly met. The notice u/s. 92D(3) of the Act cannot be vague and must require only information prescribed under Rule 10D of the Rules. It must also specify on which particular points the information is required.

Having stated as above, on the other hand, there are various decisions dealing with the importance of documentation in the context of determination of the MAM, selection of tested party and PLI, aggregation of transactions, relevance of FAR analysis, comparability analysis, including manner of identification of comparables, economic and other adjustments carried out so as to undertake meaningful profitability analysis, etc. The underlying principle in each of these precedents has been the need to have adequate and robust documentation, which ultimately assists both, the tax department and the tax payer. Wherever the tax payer has been found to having maintained such information and documentation, it has been able to successfully defend the transfer pricing adopted.

Trade Circular 2T of 2015 – Extension of time for filing VAT Audit Report in Form 704 for year 2013-14 dated 14-01-2015

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Due date for uploading of VAT audit report in Form 704 for the year 2013-14 has been extended from 15-01-2015 to 30-01-2015, and due date to submit the physical copy of the acknowledgement and the statement of submission has been extended to10-02-2015.

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Trade Circular 1T of 2015 – Revised Instructions regarding stay in appeals dated 07-01-2015

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In the Trade Circular, the Commissioner has explained that if an appellant receives some forms after the assessment order is passed then the appellant should produce the list in given format at the time of filing an appeal. The appellate authority will check the declarations as per the list and accordingly fix part payment. Declarations received up to the date of filing appeal will be considered to decide part payment and for granting stay.
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M/S. Cheema Paper Ltd. vs. Commissioner Trade Tax, (2012) 55 VST 473

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Entry Tax- Rate of Tax- Duplex Board- Ordinarily Used As Packing Material-Made out of Paper- Not Covered by Entry “Paper of All Kinds”, section 4 of The Uttar Pradesh Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas Act, 2007

Facts
The dealer company engaged in the manufacture of craft paper and duplex board. The Commercial Tax Tribunal confirmed levy of entry tax on duplex board holding it to be covered by entry relating to “paper of all kind”. The company filed revision petition before the Allahabad High Court against the impugned order of the Commercial Tax Tribunal.

Held
The definition of paper is of wide import which may include anything which is macerated in to pulp, dried and pressed and is used for writing, printing, drawing, decorating, covering wall or for packing purpose. But board whether card board or duplex board are different meant for packing purpose only and not for use as paper, as is understood in common parlance. The duplex board which undoubtedly is a product of paper and is used as packing material would not be paper covered by the entry of “paper of all kind” as contained in notification and liable for entry tax. Accordingly the court allowed the revision petition.

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M/S.Sanjos Paritosh Hospital V. Commercial Tax Officer, Thrissur and Others, (2012) 55 VST 208 (Ker)

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VAT- Dealer- Business- Private Hospitals Selling Medicines and Consumables to Patientsare Dealers and Liable to Pay VAT, S. 2(ix), (xv), (xx), (xliii) and (lii) of The Kerala Value Added Tax Act, 2003

Facts
The Kerala Private Hospital’s Associations, State Committee filed writ petition before the Kerala High Court disputing their liability under the Kerala Value Added tax Act (KVAT ).

Held
A comparative analysis of the provisions contained in the KGST Act which were considered by the court in case of P.R.S. Hospital [2004] 135 STC (ker) and the corresponding provisions of the KVAT Act show that statutory provisions remain the same although the KGST Act is replaced by the KVAT Act. Therefore following earlier judgment of division bench of Kerala High Court in P.R.S. Hospital the court held that the hospitals are carrying on a business and are dealers liable to pay vat on sale of medicines and consumable to patients. The court also upheld the constitutional validity of charging section 6 of the act. Accordingly the writ petition was dismissed.

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2014 (36) STR 1120 (Tri.-Del.) DCM Shriram Consolidated Ltd vs. Commissioner of C. Ex., Jaipur-I

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CENVAT Credit of service tax paid on input services in respect of outdoor catering services for providing canteen facilities to the workers; maintenance of lawns and gardens within the factory as per the requirement of Pollution Control Board; maintenance of cycle stand located in the factory premises; and maintenance of guest house located adjacent to the factory premises is available?

Facts:
The appellants, manufacturer of fertilisers and chemicals availed CENVAT Credit on the following services which was disallowed:
• Outdoor catering services availed for providing canteen facilities to the workers;
• Maintenance of lawns and gardens within the factory as per the requirement of Pollution Control Board;
• Maintenance of cycle stand located in the factory premises; and
• Maintenance of guest house located adjacent to the factory premises.

The Appellants pleaded that canteen services were provided to the workers in view of the requirement under the Factories Act. Similarly, maintenance of lawns and gardens was mandatory requirement under the Pollution Control Board subject to which the permission for running the factory has been granted, maintenance of cycle stand was necessary requirement for the factory workers and the guest house was used by the guests of the company and hence, service tax paid on all these services should be allowed as CENVAT Credit.

Held:
CENVAT Credit in respect of outdoor catering service was admissible in view of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court’s decision in case of CCE, Nagpur vs. Ultratech Cement Ltd. (supra) 2010 (20) S.T.R. 577 as the number of workers in the appellant’s factory was more than 250 and it was mandatory to provide canteen facilities to the factory workers. Maintenance of lawns and gardens was a condition imposed by the Rajasthan Pollution Control Board which was necessary under relevant Acts. Hence, service tax credit in respect of the same was held admissible. Maintenance of cycle stand was necessary requirement and hence, It was also a cenvatable service. Maintenance of guest house, adjacent to the factory premises, was a necessary business requirement as the factory was located outside the City boundaries. Thus, in view of various decisions, maintenance of residential premises was associated with business activities and CENVAT Credit availed by the appellants was held as eligible.

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2014 (36) STR 1089 (Tri.-Del.) Delphi Automotive System P. Ltd. vs. Commissioner Of Cus. & S. T., Noida

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CENVAT credit of service tax paid on management service with respect to honouring, rewarding and entertaining employees and exemployees is allowed.

Facts:
The appellants were manufacturers of motor vehicle parts and AC parts. They took CENVAT Credit in respect of housekeeping and dry cleaning service, event management service for annual function for honouring, rewarding and entertaining employees and ex-employees and legal service. The appellants contended that since CENVAT Credit in respect of taxies for carrying their employees for the event was allowed, CENVAT Credit of service tax in respect of event management service engaged for the same function should be allowed. The appellants relied on Endurance Technologies vs. C.C.E Aurangabad-2013 (32) S.T.R. 95 (Tri.-Mum.) wherein credit in respect of mandap keeper for the annual day function was allowed. Also, the appellants cited the case of Toyata Kirloskar Motor Ltd. vs. CCE, LTU, Bangalore 2011(24) S.T.R. 645 (Kar) where it was held that organising a function cannot be separated from the business of manufacture. The Adjudicating Authority held that these services were not eligible for CENVAT Credit as their products can be manufactured without these services. The Adjudicating Authority also held them guilty of suppression of facts and therefore, imposed penalty and interest.

Held:
Relying on various pronouncements cited by the appellants, it was held that denial of CENVAT credit for cleaning services, legal services and management service was not sustainable. Adjudicating authority erred in holding that mens rea was not an essential factor for imposition of penalty under Rule 15 of the CENAT Credit Rules, 2004 read with section 11AC of Central Excise Act, 1994. With respect to penalty under section 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944, suppression has to be brought out which involves mens rea. Since order-in-original did not bring out as to how the appellants were guilty of willful misstatement or suppression of facts, extended period of limitation was not justifiable and mandatory penalty could not be imposed.

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2014 (36) STR 1052 (Tri.-Mum.) Ashish Construction vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Nagpur

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Payment, after issuance of Show Cause Notice, specifically after a recorded statement of the assessee that he was not liable to pay service tax, should be treated as payment of service tax under protest or compulsion.

Facts:
The appellants availed small scale service provider’s exemption and after number crunching exercise, discharged service tax liability for F. Yrs. 2005-2006 to 2007-2008. The appellants deposited service tax under compulsion against issuance of Show Cause Notice. The appellants put forth various arguments to contend that the appellants were neither liable to pay service tax nor interest and penalties. The respondents alleged that the appellants were ineligible for the small scale service provider’s exemption since the appellants had opted for payment of service Tax.

Held:
Having considered the rival contentions, it was found that as per the statement recorded prior to issuance of Show Cause Notice, the appellants had mentioned that they were not liable to pay service tax. The appellants had paid service tax suo moto only after crossing the threshold exemption limit. Further, the appellants had paid service tax after issue of Show Cause Notice which was not a suo moto payment and the same needs to be treated as paid under protest or compulsion. In view of facts of the case, it was held that the appellants would be entitled to get refund of service tax paid under protest.

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2014 (36) STR 1050 (Tri.–Del.) Commissioner of Central Excise, Ludhiana vs. Bishamber Lal Arora.

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Packing/unpacking by automatic/mechanized process is not covered under cargo handling services.

Proceedings initiated without following classification and valuation discipline, are liable to be set aside.

Facts:
Department issued Show Cause Notice to the Respondent assessee alleging non/short payment of service tax under coal handling and loading, manpower recruitment or supply agency and cleaning services.

The respondents contended that service tax was demanded without specifying categories and taxable values separately. Further, the respondents were merely collecting urea in bags from bagging plants and thereafter, these bags were stacked on the conveyor. The conveyor system then carried the bags to railway wagons or trucks. Accordingly, the services were not in the nature of cargo handling services. The respondents further argued that since the labourers were employed for removal of stones from coal through conveyor systems, these activities did not fall within the ambit of manpower recruitment or supply agency services. The respondents were only cleaning the conveyer belts and the conveyor system for efficient conveyance of goods and therefore, these activities cannot be considered to be cleaning services, leviable to service tax.

Learned Appellate Commissioner held that the respondents were not liable to service tax under following grounds:

The respondents were only engaged in packing and unpacking of bags by automatic/mechanized process and therefore, the services were not covered under cargo handling services.

Cleaning of conveyor system for transport of bags was not covered under cleaning services.

Since the employees were employed by the respondents and they were not the employees of the customer, the services were not manpower recruitment or supply agency services.

Held:
Agreeing to the decision delivered by the learned Appellate Commissioner and having regard to the fact that Show Cause Notice was defective and the proceedings were initiated without applying classification discipline, the appeal was dismissed.

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2015-TIOL-142-CESTAT-MUM Bombay Paints Ltd vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Mumbai- II

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Full credit availed on capital goods in the first year itself instead of 50%, at the most liable for interest, seeking reversal of credit and imposition of penalty is not warranted.

Facts:
The Appellant took 100% credit on capital goods used in manufacture. CENVAT Credit was denied to the extent of 50% and interest and penalty was also imposed.

Held:
Although, CENVAT Credit entitled was 50% in the first year instead of 100%, however the remaining credit of 50% is available in the subsequent year therefore at the most interest for the intervening period can be demanded and demand for duty and penalty was set aside.

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[2015-TIOL-108-CESTAT-MUM] – Matunga Gymkhana, Tahnee Heights Co-op . Hou. Soc. Ltd, Mittal Tower Premises Co-operative Society vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai

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Services to members of club/co-operative housing society is not a service by one to another and is not liable for service tax.

Facts:
The demand of service tax in all these cases is based on the premise that the Appellants are providing “Club & Association” service.

Held:
Relying on the judgments of Ranchi Club vs. Chief Commr. Of C. Ex. & ST, Ranchi 2012 (26) STR 401(Jhar), Sports Club of Gujarat vs. Union of India-2013-TIOL-528- HC-AHM-ST and M/s. Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce & Industry vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Delhi-2014-TIOL-701-CESTAT-DEL701-CESTAT-DEL, where it was held that in view of mutuality and activities of the club there is no service by one to another and thus the levy of service tax is ultra vires, the appeals were allowed.

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[2014]-TIOL-2388-CESTAT-AHM Venketeshwar Filaments Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE & ST, Vapi.

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Any stay order passed by the CESTAT, if it is in force beyond 07-08-2014 it would continue till the disposal of the appeal

Facts:
The Initial stay order passed by the Bench expires on 20- 08-2014

Held:
With the omission of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd proviso in section 35C(2A) vide section 103 of the Finance (2) Act,2014, there is no provision for making any further applications for extension of stay nor has the Tribunal have powers for hearing and disposing the applications from 07-08-2014. However, the initial stay order in force after 07-08-2014 does not lapse.

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[2014]-TIOL-2460-CESTAT-MUM M/s Hindustan Coca Cola Beverages P. Ltd vs. CCE, Nashik

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The outdoor catering service used in relation to business activities and not ‘PRIMARI LY’ meant for personal use or consumption of the employee, is a valid input service.

Facts:
The Appellant has availed CENVAT Credit on outdoor catering services provided to its employees post 01/04/2011 i.e. after the insertion of the clause in the definition of input service excluding services ‘primarily’ for personal use of the employees.

Held:
The word PRIMARILY used by the legislature should be given the due effect. The outdoor catering service is used in relation to business activities for all employees in general and forms a part of cost in relation to manufacture of the final product. It was also observed that since the expenditure did not form part of the salary of the employee as a cost to the company it was not meant for personal use, the credit cannot be denied.

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MindaSai Limited vs. Income Tax Officer ITAT Delhi ‘E’ Bench Before Pramod Kumar AM and A. T. Varkey JM I.T.A. No.: 2974/Del/13 Assessment year: 2009-10. Decided on 09.01.2015 Counsel for Assessee/Revenue: AshwaniTaneja / J P Chandrakar

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(I ) Section 32(2) – Unabsorbed depreciationpertaining to assessment year 2002-03 or before can be set-off after a period of eight years.
(ii) Section 115JB – In the absence of exempt income addition to book profit applying provisions of section 14A cannot be made.

Facts:
Following issues amongst others were raised before the tribunal:

i). Whether the unabsorbed depreciation of Rs 4.39 crore which pertained to the assessment years 1999-2000 and 2000-01, can be set off against business income during the current assessment year;

ii) I n the absence of exempt income whether disallowance u/s. 115JB on the ground that the amount pertained to disallowance u/s.14A, can be made.

The assessee’s claim for set-off against business income of unabsorbed depreciation brought from the assessment year 1999-2000 and 2000-01, aggregating to Rs. 4.39 crore, was rejected by the AO as according to him the unabsorbed depreciation pertaining to the assessment years prior to the assessment year 2002-03 could only be carried forward for eight subsequent assessment years. For the purpose, he relied on a Special Bench decision of the Delhi Tribunal in thecase of DCIT vs. Times Guaranty Limited [(2010) 4 ITR (Trib) 210 MumbaiSB]. On appeal, the CIT(A) upheld the decision of the AO.

Applying the provisions of Clause (f) of Explanation to section 115JB(2) the AO disallowed expense of Rs. 2 lakh u/s. 14A. On appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the order. Before the Tribunal, the assessee contended that since it has not earned any exempt income during the year, the disallowance u/s. 115JB was not called for. While the revenue relied on the orders of the lower authorities and contended that once the assessee has on its own accepted this disallowance, the adjustment u/s. 115JB in respect thereof was only a natural corollary thereto.

Held:
i) Re: Depreciation: The Tribunal referred to the decision of the Gujarat high court in the case of General Motors India Pvt. Ltd. vs. DCIT [(2013) 354 ITR 244(Guj)] and noted its “considered opinion” to the effect that “any unabsorbed depreciation available to an assessee on 1st day of April 2002 will be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of section 32(2) asamended by Finance Act, 2001”. Accordingly, it observed that the legal position is that the restriction of eightyears, which was in force till the law was amended by the Finance Act 2001 w.e.f. 2002-03, does not come into play. Further, relying on the decisions in the cases of Tej International Pvt.Ltd.vs. DCIT[(2000) 69 TTJ 650] and ACIT vs. Aurangabad Holiday Resorts Pvt. Ltd. [(2007) 118 ITD 1], the Tribunal accepted the plea of the assessee.

ii) Re: Disallowance u/s 14A: Relying on the Delhi High Court’s decision in the case of CIT vs. Holcim India Pvt. Ltd. [2014 TIOL 1586 HC DEL IT] wherein it is held that unless there is an exempt income, disallowance u/s. 14 A cannot be invoked, the Tribunal accepted the assessee’s pleas and held that adjustment under Clause (f) of Explanation to section 115JB (2) cannot be made.

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66 SOT 266 (Mumbai – Trib) Tupur Chatterji vs. ACIT Assessment Year : 2018-09. Date of Order: 16.9.2014

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Sections 23(2), 24 –The restriction of Rs 1.50 lakh described in second proviso to section 24 is with reference of the property which is referred to in sub-section (2) of section 23. Restriction of Rs. 1.50 lakh does not apply to a property which is not let out and annual value whereof is not taken as nil nor is it a cumulative amount to be allowed as a deduction.

Facts :
The assessee was the owner of two properties, one of which was a flat in Marble Arch and the other was a flat in Nestle. The flat in Marble Arch was considered as self occupied property and the flat in Nestle was vacant throughout the previous year. The book value of the flat in Nestle was Rs. 57,22,000. This property was acquired by taking loan from bank. Interest of Rs. 3,50,641 was paid.

In respect of this property, the Assessing Officer (AO) considered Rs 4,00,540 (7% of book value of this property i.e. 7% of Rs. 57,22,000) to be its annual value. He restricted the claim for deduction of interest to Rs. 1,40,193 on the ground that the assesse could not be allowed a cumulative deduction more than Rs. 1,50,000 as per second proviso to section 24 of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
According to section 24(b), where the property is acquired, constructed, repaired or renewed or constructed with the borrowed capital than any interest payable on such borrowed capital would be an allowable deduction. The restriction of Rs. 1,50,000 described in second proviso is with reference to the property which is referred to in sub-section (2) of section 23. Section 23(2) would be applicable to a house or part of the house which either is in the occupation of the owner for the purpose of his residence or the same is not actually occupied by the owner for the reason that owing to his employment, business or profession carried on at any other place and he is to reside at that other place in a building not belonging to him and ALV of such property would be taken as nil. Undisputedly, the flat at Bandra falls under the category of property mentioned in section 23(2) fo the Act as AO did not assess the ALV of the said property as income of the assessee. Therefore, provisions of second proviso to section 24 would not be applicable and the case of the assesse would fall within clause (b) of section 24 in which there is no limit for allowability of the interest and the condition is that the said property should inter alia be acquired out of borrowed capital. In respect of the Nestle property the assessee has paid interest of Rs. 3,50,641. Interest deductible from ALV of Nestle property could not be restricted to any amount less than the interest paid by the assesse. The Tribunal directed the AO to give full deduction of interest paid of Rs. 3,50,641.

This ground of appeal filed by the assessee was allowed by the Tribunal.

Compiler’s Note:
It appears that the assessee had interest of Rs. 9,807 in respect of borrowing for flat in Marble Arch and that is why the AO restricted interest on loan for Nestle property to Rs. 1,40,193 (Rs. 1,50,000 – 9,807).

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166 TTJ 627 (Cochin) ITO vs. Beacon Projects (P.) Ltd. Assessment Years: 2012-13 & 2013-14. Date of Order: 8.8.2014

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Sections 2(28A), 194A – Amount paid to intending buyer of flat in excess of amount paid by him is in the nature of interest u/s. 2(28A) liable for TDS u/s. 194A. The fact that the nomenclature of the amount debited to P & L Account was “Excess payment refund” does not change the character of the payment which is in the nature of interest.

Facts :
In the course of survey u/s. 133A, it was found that the assesse has debited in P & L Account of financial year 2011- 12, a sum of Rs. 31,37,341 and a sum of Rs. 43,21,593 in the P & L Account of financial year 2012-13 towards “Excess Payment Refund’’. The nature of this amount was as under –

The assesse received certain payments from customers who initially booked flats by making advance payments plus 1 or 2 installments. Due to various reasons, these customers could not fulfill the payment schedule and requested for a refund. After certain period, the assessee identified new customers and flats were sold at a higher rate than the previous price. After the sale, the assessee returned the payments received from previous customers with a margin, in order to maintain good business relationship. The excess amount paid was debited to ‘Excess Payment Refund’. No tax was deducted at source from such excess payment made.

The Assessing Officer (AO) held that the excess amount paid to customers was interest u/s. 2(28A) and the payment thereof required deduction of tax at source u/s. 194A of the Act. He, accordingly, regarded the assessee as an assessee-in-default.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who held that the provisions of section 194A are not applicable to the transactions undertaken by the assessee. Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The excess payment made to the customers was in the nature of interest paid in respect of amount lying with the assessee. Mere nomenclature in the books of account will not change the character of actual payment which was precisely in the nature of interest as defined u/s. 2(28A) of the Act. Having reproduced the provisions of section 2(28A), the Tribunal observed that it is crystal clear from the plain reading of section 2(28A) of the Act, that money paid in respect of amount borrowed or debt incurred, is interest payable in any manner. The statutory definition given u/s. 2(28A) of the Act regards amounts which may not otherwise be regarded as interest, as interest for the statute. The definition of interest has been carried to the extent that even the amounts payable in transactions where money has not been borrowed and debt has not been incurred, are brought within the scope of its definition, as in the case of service fees paid in respect of a credit facility which has not been utilised.

In the instant case, the amounts were paid in respect of an obligation in respect of purchase of flat through agreement, therefore, no fault can be found on the part of the AO for treating these charges as interest and liable for TDS u/s. 194A of the Act. The mere fact that the assessee did not choose to characterise such payment as interest will not take such payment out of the ambit of definition of ïnterest’’, in so far as payment made by the assessee was in respect of an obligation incurred with earlier flat holder. The assessee has essentially incurred an expenditure and the amount of charges paid was with respect to the amount incurred by the flat agreement-holder and the period for which the money was so utilised by the assessee. The Tribunal reversed the order of CIT(A) and restored that of the AO on this issue.

This ground of appeal of the revenue was decided in favour of the revenue.

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(2014) 112 DTR 265 (Del) Thyssenkrupp Elevators (India) (P) Ltd. vs. ACIT A.Y.: 2003-04 Date of order: 29.08.2014

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Section 32: Maintenance Portfolio (Annual Maintenance Contracts) acquired on slump basis and goodwill represented by excess of consideration over net value of all assets acquired are intangible assets eligible for depreciation u/s. 32(1)(ii)

Facts:
The assessee acquired the running business in terms of ‘undertaking sale agreement’ of the “Elevator Division” of M/s. ECE Industries Ltd. on a slump basis for a value of Rs. 20,32,10,000. Apart from acquiring various other assets of the said business, the assessee has acquired maintenance contracts of 3,578 elevators which was the main source of revenue for the assessee and also maintenance contracts for 1,001 elevators which were under the warranty period and which would start yielding revenue once the warranty period expires. This portfolio of various maintenance contracts was valued at Rs.18,34,74,000 and depreciation u/s. 32 was claimed on it by treating it as an intangible asset. The learned AO while disallowing the claim of assessee for depreciation on ‘maintenance portfolio’ observed that the assessee was following a ‘complete contract method’ and hence, was not eligible to claim depreciation, as there was no income from the said contracts offered to taxation. Aggrieved by the disallowance the assessee preferred an appeal before the CIT (A). The learned CIT (A) observed that , the consideration can be equated to an amount paid to acquire income yielding apparatus which is nothing but capital in nature and cannot be inferred to result into a depreciable intangible assets.
Further, the excess of consideration over the net value of assets amounting to Rs. 1,85,44,612 was separately shown in the balance sheet and was treated to be ‘goodwill’ pertaining to the business. It was this value of goodwill that was claimed by the assessee as eligible for depreciation for the first time directly before the Tribunal based on the apex Court judgement in the case of CIT vs. SMIFS Securities Ltd. (2012) 75 DTR (SC) 417.

Held:
It was held that the aforesaid maintenance contracts were the very backbone of the business of the assessee. The fact that after the specified intangible assets referred to u/s. 32 (1)(ii) the words “business or commercial rights of similar nature” have been additionally used clearly demonstrates that the legislature did not intend to provide for depreciation only in respect of specified intangible assets but also other categories of intangible assets which were neither feasible nor possible to exhaustively enumerate. These annual maintenance contracts which constituted the whole and sole of the “maintenance division” business of the transferor and which was hitherto being carried out by the transferor, without any interruption were transferred under the said undertaking and sale agreement. The aforesaid intangible assets are, therefore, comparable to a licence to carry out the existing business of the transferor. In absence of the aforesaid intangible assets, the assessee would have to commence the business from scratch and go through the gestation period whereas by creating new/fresh business right, the assessee got an up and running business. It would be prudent to note that these AMC’s in terms of value only come next to the value of fixed assets. Thus, it is unambiguously clear from the various clauses of the agreement and documents available on record that the present agreement represents a bundle of rights in the form of commercial rights. Thus, by applying the principle of ejusdem generis, it was held that such AMCs should get covered within the expression “business or commercial rights of similar nature” specified u/s. 32(1)(ii) of the Act and accordingly eligible for depreciation.

Regarding the issue of depreciation on the goodwill, the Honourable ITAT relied upon the decision of CIT vs. SMIFS Securities Ltd. (supra) wherein it was held that excess consideration paid by the assessee over the value of net assets should be considered as goodwill of business. Accordingly, the depreciation on the same was also allowed u/s. 32(1)(ii) by considering it as falling within the expression “business or commercial rights of similar nature”.

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Mutuality Income: A. Y. 2005-06- Transfer fees received by Co-operative Housing Societies from incoming & outgoing members (even in excess of limits) is exempt on the ground of mutuality

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CIT vs. Darbhanga Mansion CHS Ltd (Bom): ITA No. 1474 of 2012 dated 18/12/2014: www.itatonline.org:

The
assessee, a Co-operative Housing Society, received a sum of Rs.
39,68,000 on account of transfer of flat and garage and credited it to
‘general amenities fund’ as well as ‘repair fund’. The assessee claimed
that the said receipt is exempted from tax on the ground of mutuality.
However, the Assessing Officer held that the principles of mutuality
will not apply. However, the CIT(A) and Tribunal allowed the assessee’s
claim by relying on Sind Co-operative Housing Society vs. ITO; 317 ITR
47 (Bom).

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

i)
The very issue and the very question was raised repeatedly in the case
of the assessee society. Repeatedly, the Revenue has failed in
convincing the Tribunal that Sind Co-operative Housing Society will not
cover the Society’s case. The contribution is made to the repair fund or
to the general fund and credited as such. While it may be true that it
is occasioned by transfer of a flat and garage, yet, we do not see how
merely because there was cap or restriction placed on the transfer fees
or the quantum thereof, in this case the principle of mutuality cannot
be applied.

ii) The underlying principle and of a co-operative
movement has been completely overlooked by the Revenue. The Revenue
seems to be of the view that a Co-operative Housing Society makes
profit, if it receives something beyond this amount of Rs. 25,000. There
has to be material brought and which will have a definite bearing on
this issue. If the amount is received on account of transfer of a flat
and which is not restricted to Rs. 25,000/- but much more, then
different consideration may apply. However, in the present case, what
has been argued and vehemently is the amount was received by the Society
when the flat and the garage were transferred. Therefore, it must be
presumed to be nothing but transfer fees. It may have been credited to
the fund and with a view to demonstrate that it is nothing but a
voluntary contribution or donation to the Society, but still it
constitutes its income. However, for rendering such a conclusive finding
there has to be material brought by the Revenue on record. Beyond
urging that it has been received at the time of a transfer of the flat
and credited to such a fund will not be enough to displace the principle
laid down in the decision of Sind Cooperative Housing Society.

iii)
The attempt of the Revenue therefore is nothing but overcoming the
binding judgment of this Court. In the present case, the Commissioner
and the Tribunal both have held that the receipt may have been
occasioned by the transfer but the principle of mutuality will still
apply.

iv) It is a typical relationship between the member of
the Co-operative Society and particularly a Housing Society and the
Society which is a body Corporate and a legal entity by itself that is
forming the basis of the principle laid down by the Division Bench.
Co-operative movement is a socio economic and a moral movement. It has
now been recognised by Article 43A of the Constitution of India. It is
to foster and encourage the spirit of brotherhood and co-operation that
the Government encourages formation of Co-operative Societies. The
members may be owning individually the flats or immovable properties but
enjoying, in common, the amenities, advantages and benefits. The
Society as a legal entity owns the building but the amenities are
provided and that is how the terms “flat” and the “housing society” are
defined in the statute in question. We do not therefore find any reason
to deviate from the principle laid down in Sind Co-operative Housing
Society’s case and which followed a Supreme Court judgment.”

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Interest- Ss. 234A, 234B and 234C- A. Y. 1990- 91- Order levying interest should be specific- Order directing levy of interest as per rules is not sufficient

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CIT vs. Oswal Exports; 369 ITR 630 (T&AP):

If interest is leviable u/s. 234A, 234B or 234C, such levy of interest is mandatory and compensatory in nature but in order to levy interest under these sections, the Assessing Officer is specifically required to mention the specific section of charging interest, failing which, no interest could be levied under those sections.

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Education: Charitable purpose- Exemption u/s. 11-A. Y. 2007-08-Pre-sea and post-sea training for ships and maritime industry-Object of trust educational- Trust entitled to exemption u/s. 11

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DIT vs. Samudra Institute of Meritime Studies Trust; 369 ITR 645 (Bom):

The assessee was a trust established with the purpose of administering and maintaining technical training institutions at various places in India for pre-sea and post-sea training of ships and maritime industry as a public charitable institution for education, that is to provide on board and offshore training and continuing technical education for officers, both on the deck and engine side. The Assessing Officer held that the assessee was not entitled to exemption u/s. 11. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) We are of the opinion that the Tribunal has applied the correct test in concluding that the exemption u/s. 11 of the Act can be availed of by the respondent assessee. The Tribunal in paragraph 9.6 of the impugned order concludes that the assessee is giving training in the above area to seamen. All the courses may not be approved by the Director General of Shipping but that by itself is no ground to hold that the purpose is not charitable.

ii) The exemption u/s. 11 can be claimed and bearing in mind the object of the trust. We are of the opinion that the Tribunal and the CIT(A) have approached the issue correctly and in the light of the definition so also the tests laid down came to a factual conclusion that the respondent is entitled to exemption u/s. 11.

iii) This is not a case where the purpose can be said to run a coaching class or a centre. This is an institution which imparts education in the area of pre-sea and post-sea training to seamen so as to prepare them for all the duties. In such circumstances, we do not find that the concurrent findings of fact are vitiated by error of law apparent on the face of the record or perversity enabling us to entertain this appeal. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.”

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DTAA between India and Denmark-Section 9(1) (vi)-A. Y. 1991-92: Income deemed to accrue or arise in India-Danish company supplying equipment and information regarding installation of such equipment-Consideration received is not royalty-Not assessable in India

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DIT vs. Haldor Topsoe; ; 369 ITR 453 (Bom):

Under an agreement between a Danish company and an Indian company, the Danish company supplied equipment and information regarding installation of such equipment. For the A. Y. 1991-92, the Danish company claimed that its income consequent on the agreement was not taxable in India. The Assessing Officer rejected the claim. The Tribunal accepted the claim and held that the payments were not covered within the expression “royalty” provided u/s. 9(1)(vi) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, which was much wider than the one provided in the DTAA between India and Denmark.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The equipment was supplied to the Indian party for which the Indian party made payment. The contract included stipulations for giving all information so as to guide the Indian party to install the equipment at site and thereafter to use it.

ii) In these circumstances, this was a mixed question and finding of fact had been rendered considering the peculiar facts and circumstances. The finding of fact was a possible one. There was no perversity or error of law apparent on the face of the record. The payments were not assessable in India.”

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Deemed income-Section 41(1)-A. Y. 2003-04- Remission or cessation of liability-Sales tax deferral scheme-Option in subsequent scheme for premature payment of net present value-No remission or cessation of liability of the difference- Difference is not deemed income u/s. 41(1)

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CIT Vs. Sulzer India Ltd.; 369 ITR 717 (Bom):

In the A. Y. 2003-04, the assessee had opted for deferral scheme for payment of sales tax of Rs. 7,52,01,378/- under the deferral 1993 scheme of the Government of Maharashtra. The amount was allowed as deduction treating the option as deemed payment for the purpose of section 43B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 as per the circulars. The assessee also opted for the 2002 scheme for premature payment of net present value and paid an amount of Rs. 3,37,13,393/-. The Assessing Officer added the difference amount of Rs. 4,14,87,985/- as deemed income u/s. 41(1) of the Act. The Tribunal deleted the addition and held that the amount was not taxable u/s. 41(1) of the Act.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The first requirement of section 41(1) is that the allowance or deduction is made in respect of the loss, expenditure or a trading liability incurred by the assessee and the other requirement is that the assessee has subsequently obtained a benefit in respect of such trading liability by way of a remission or cessation thereof. The sales tax collected by the assessee during the relevant year amounting to Rs. 7,52,01,378/- was treated by the State Government as a loan liability payable after 12 years in six annual/equal installments.

ii) Subsequently, pursuant to the amendment made to the fourth proviso to section 38 of the 1959 Act, the assesee accepted the offer of the SICOM paid an amount of Rs. 3,37,13,393/- to the SICOM, which represented the net present value of the future sum as determined and prescribed by the SICOM. The State may have received a higher sum after a period of 12 years and in installments. However, the statutory arrangement and by section 38, fourth proviso did not amount to remission or cessation of the assessee’s liability assuming the liability to be a trading one. Rather that obtains a payment to the State prematurely and in terms of the correct value of the debt due to it. There was no evidence to show that there had been any remission or cessation of the liability by the State Government.

iii) A proper understanding of all this by the Tribunal cannot be termed as perverse. The view taken by it is imminently possible. Appeals are dismissed.”

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Deemed income- Section 41(1)- A. Y. 2004-05- Remission or cessation of liability- Sales tax deferral scheme-Option in subsequent scheme for premature payment of net present value- No remission or cessation of liability of the difference- Difference is not deemed income u/s. 41(1)

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CIT vs. Mcdowell and Co. Ltd.; 369 ITR 684 (Karn):

In the A. Y. 2003-04, the assessee had opted for deferral scheme for payment of sales tax of Rs. 13,78,41,600/- under the deferral 1993 scheme of the Government of Maharashtra. The amount was allowed as deduction in the A. Y. 2003-04 treating the option as deemed payment for the purpose of section 43B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 according to the circulars. In the subsequent year, the assessee opted for the 2002 scheme for premature payment of net present value and paid an amount of Rs. 4,25,79,684/-. In the A. Y. 2004-05, the Assessing Officer added the difference amount of Rs. 9,52,61,916/- as deemed income u/s. 41(1) of the Act. The Tribunal deleted the addition and held that the amount was not taxable u/s. 41(1) of the Act.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) As per the scheme the assessee was allowed to retain the sales tax as determined by the competent authority and pay the tax 15 years thereafter. The tax collected was deemed to have been paid and, therefore, the tax so collected could not be construed as income in the hands of the assessee.

ii) The tax so retained by the assessee was in the nature of a loan given by the Government as an incentive for setting up the industrial unit in a rural area. The loan had to be repaid after 15 years. Again, it is an incentive.

iii) However, by a subsequent scheme, a provision was made for premature payment. When the assessee had the benefit of making the payment after 15 years, if he is making a premature payment, the amount equal to the net present value of the deferred tax was determined at Rs. 4,25,79,684/- and on such payment the entire liability to pay tax/loan stood discharged. Again, it is not a benefit conferred on the assessee. Therefore, section 41(1) of the Act was not attracted.”

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Capital gain-Ss. 45 and 48- A. Y. 2007-08- Gains on sale of TDR received as additional FSI as per the D. C. Regulations has no cost of acquisition and is not chargeable to capital gains tax

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CIT vs. Sambhaji Nagar Coop. Hsg. Society Ltd (Bom); ITA No. 1356 of 2012 dated 11/12/2014: www.itatonline.org:

In this case, the Tribunal held that the gains on sale of TDR received as additional FSI as per D. C. Regulations has no cost of acquisition and accordingly is not chargeable to capital gains tax.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

i) Only an asset which is capable of acquisition at a cost would be included within the provisions pertaining to the head “Capital gains” as opposed to assets in the acquisition of which no cost at all can be conceived. In the present case as well, the situation was that the FSI/ TDR was generated by the plot itself. There was no cost of acquisition, which has been determined and on the basis of which the Assessing Officer could have proceeded to levy and assess the gains derived as capital gains.

ii) It may be that subsection (2) of s. 55 clause (a) having been amended, there is a stipulation with regard to the tenancy rights. In the present case, additional FSI/TDR is generated by change in the D. C. Rules. A specific insertion would therefore be necessary so as to ascertain its cost for computing the capital gains.

iii) Therefore, the Tribunal was in no error in concluding that the TDR which was generated by the plot/property/ land and came to be transferred under a document in favour of the purchaser would not result in the gains being assessed to capital gains.”

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Capital gain- Section 50C- A. Y 2009-10- Full value of consideration- Guideline value-Objection- Computation of capital gain by AO on basis of guideline value without referring to DVO u/s. 50C(2)- AO directed to work out capital gain invoking section 50C(2)

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S. Muthuraja vs. CIT; 369 ITR 423 (Mad)

In the A. Y. 2009-10, the assessee had sold a immovable property for a consideration of Rs. 25,60,000/- as distress sale. For computing the capital gain the Assessing Officer applied section 50C and treated the guideline value of Rs. 39,63,900/- as the full value of consideration. In the objection letter, the assessee specifically pointed out that the sale was more in the nature of a distress sale and requested to take the actual sale consideration for working out capital gain. The Assessing Officer rejected the claim u/s. 50C of the Act. The Tribunal confirmed the order of the Assessing Officer holding that there was nothing on record to show that the assessee had disputed the sale consideration of Rs. 39,63,900/- adopted for the purpose of stamp duty taken as basis under the Act and that the Assessing Officer had not rightly invoked section 50C.

On appeal by the assessee the Madras High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The Assessing Officer’s order showed that having found such an objection, he committed a serious error in not invoking section 50C(2), that the error continued through out before every appellate forum and that there was no justification in the order of the Tribunal for taking the view that there was nothing on record to show that the assessee had disputed the sale consideration of Rs. 39,63,900/- adopted for the purpose of stamp duty for the purpose of working out capital gains.

ii) Hence the matter was restored to the files of the Assessing Officer to work out long-term capital gains by invoking section 50C(2).”

Note: Also see Appadurai Vijayaraghavan vs. JCIT; 369 ITR 486 (Mad)

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Business income or house property income- Ss. 22 and 28- A. Ys. 2005-06 to 2009-10- Rent from letting out buildings with amenities in software technology park is assessable as business income

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CIT vs. Information Technology Park Ltd.; 369 ITR 460 (Karn):

For the A. Ys. 2005-06 to 2009-10, the assessee had claimed that the rent received from letting out buildings along with other amenities in a software technology park as income from business. The Assessing Officer assessed it as income from house property. The Tribunal held that it constituted business income and accepted the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The assessee was engaged in the business of developing, operation and maintaining an industrial park and providing infrastructure facilities to different companies as its business. In view of that the lease rent was assessable as business income.”

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Business expenditure- Disallowance u/s. 40(a) (ia)- Despite stay by High Court, Special Bench verdict In Merilyn Shipping is binding on the ITAT due to judicial discipline

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CIT vs. Janapriya Engineers Syndicate (T & AP); ITA No. 352 of 2014 dated 24/06/2014; www.itatonline.org:

The
Tribunal had to consider whether in view of the Special Bench verdict
in Merilyn Shipping & Transport 146 TTJ 1 (Vizag), a disallowance
u/s 40(a)(ia) could be made in respect of the amounts that have already
been paid during the year and are not “payable” as of 31st March. The
Tribunal held that as the department’s appeal against the said verdict
was pending in the High Court and as the High Court had granted an
interim suspension, the AO should decide the issue after the disposal of
the appeal in the case of Merilyn Shipping by the High Court.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Telangana and Andhra Pradesh High Court held as under:

“We
are of the view that until and unless the decision of the Special Bench
is upset by this Court, it binds smaller Bench and coordinate Bench of
the Tribunal. Under the circumstances, it is not open to the Tribunal to
remand on the ground of pendency on the same issue before this Court,
overlooking and overruling, by necessary implication, the decision of
the Special Bench. We simply say that it is not permissible under quasi
judicial discipline. Under the circumstances, we set aside the impugned
judgment and order, and restore the matter to the file of the Tribunal
which will decide the issue in accordance with law and it would be open
to the Tribunal either to follow the Special Bench decision or not to
follow. If the Special Bench decision is not followed, obviously remedy
lies elsewhere.”

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Advance tax- Short payment- Interest u/s. 234CComputation of interest- A. Y. 2009-10- Interest u/s. 234C was to be calculated based on date of presentation of cheque for payment of tax and not on date of clearing of cheque

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CIT vs. REPCO Home Finance Ltd.;[2015] 53 taxmann. com 47 (Mad):

For the A. Y. 2009-10, the Assessing Officer charged interest u/s. 234C for late payment of advance tax on the basis of date of clearing of the cheque. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal held that the interest has to be charged on the basis of the date of presentation of the cheque and not date of clearing.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The core issue to be considered in this case is whether interest u/s. 234C is to be calculated based on date of clearing of the cheque or date of presentation of the cheque.

ii) The issue raised in this appeal is no longer res integra in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in CIT vs. Ogale Glass Works Ltd. [1954] 25 ITR 529, where it is held that the position is that in one view of the matter an implied agreement under which the cheques were accepted unconditionally as payment and on another view, even if the cheques were taken conditionally, the cheques not having been dishonoured but having been cashed, the payment related back to the dates of the receipt of the cheques and in law that dates of payments were the dates of the delivery of the cheques.

iii) It is not the case of the department that the cheque issued by the assessee was dishonoured. Once the cheque issued by the assessee is encahsed, in the light of the decisions referred (supra), the payment relates back to the date of receipt of the cheque.”

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Trust – Private Discretionary Trust – A discretionary trust is one which gives a beneficiary no right to any part of the income of the trust property, but vests in the trustees a discretionary power to pay him, or apply for his benefit, such part of the income as they think fit. The trustees must exercise their discretion as and when the income becomes available, but if they fail to distribute in due time, the power is not extinguished so that they can distribute later. They have no power to bi<

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CIT vs. Estate of Late HMM Vikramsinhji of Gondal (Civil) Appeal No.2312 of 2007 dated 16-4-2014.

The ex-Ruler of Gondal Shri Vikramsinhji executed three deeds of settlements (trust deeds) in the United States of America on 19th December, 1963 and two deeds in the United Kingdom on 1st January, 1964.

Perusal of the deeds of settlements executed in the U.K. showed that one Mr. Robert Hampton Robertson McGill was designated as the trustee, referred to in the deeds as ‘the Original Trustee’. These trusts were created for the benefit of (a) the Settlor, (b) the children and remoter issue for the time being in existence of the Settlor and (c) any person for the time being in existence who is the wife or widow of the Settlor or the wife or widow or husband or widower of any of them, the children and remoter issue of the Settlor. The trust deeds defined the expression “the Trustees” to mean and include the Original Trustee or the other trustees for the time being appointed in terms of the deeds of settlement.

During his life time, the settlor, Shri Vikramsinhji, was including the whole of the income arising from these trusts in his returns of income. The said income was also included in the two returns filed by his son Jyotendrasinhiji for the assessment year 1970-71. Thereafter, it appears that the assessee – Jyotendrasinhiji took the stand that the income from these trusts is not includible in his income. Jyotendrasinhiji also took the stand that inclusion of the said income in the returns submitted by his father for the assessment years 1964-65 to 1969-70 and by himself for the assessment year 1970-71 was under a mistake.

Jyotendrasinhiji approached the Settlement Commission with an application for settlement relating to income from the U.K. and U.S. trusts. As regards to the U.K. trusts, the Settlement Commission observed as follows:-

“So far as the U.K. trusts are concerned, clause (3) did never come into operation inasmuch as no additional trustees were appointed as contemplated by it. If so, clause (4) sprang into operation whereunder the entire income under the settlements flowed to the settlor during his lifetime and on his death, to his elder son, the appellant herein. In other words, these settlements are in the nature of specific trusts. In any event, the entire income from these trusts was received by the settlor during his lifetime and after the settlor’s death, by the appellant. Therefore, the said income was rightly included in the total income of the settler and the assessee during the respective assessment years.”

The Settlement Commission, accordingly, computed the taxable income of the Settlor under both the sets of trusts – U.S. and U.K. – for the assessment years 1964-65 to 1970-71 (up to the date of the death of the Settlor) as also the income of Jyotendrasinhiji for the assessment years 1970-71 to 1982-83.

The above order of the Settlement Commission reached the Supreme Court in a group of appeals. The Supreme Court, by its judgment dated 2nd April, 1993, Jyotendrasinhji vs. S.I. Tripathi & Others, (1933) Supp. (3) SCC 389, with regard to U.K. trusts did not consider the arguments advanced on behalf of the assessee on merits. The Supreme Court, however, observed that the question urged on behalf of the assessee was academic in the facts and circumstances of the case.

Before the Supreme Court, a group of 17 Appeals came up for hearing, 8 arising from the Income-tax Act, 1961 and 9 arising from the Wealth Tax Act, 1957. Of the 9 Wealth Tax appeals, one appeal related to ‘protective assessment’ for 18 assessment years, i.e, 1970-71 to 1976-77, 1978-79 to1979-80, 1981-82 to 1989-90. The remaining 8 Wealth Tax appeals related to assessment years 1970-71, 1971-72, 1972-73, 1973-74, 1974-75, 1975-76, 1976-77 and 1978-79. In so far as 8 appeals arising from the assessment orders passed under the Income-tax Act, 1961 were concerned, they related to assessment years 1984-85, 1985-86, 1986-87, 1987-88, 1988-89, 1989-90, 1990-91and 1991-92.

From the copies of the returns and balance sheets relating to assessment years 1984-85 to 1991-92, the Supreme Court noted there from that there was an endorsement at the bottom of the statement of funds ending on 31st March of each previous year, ‘Net Income for the year retained.’

The Supreme Court observed that Clause 3 of the deeds of settlement executed in the U.K. left at the discretion of the trustees to disburse benefits to the beneficiaries. The endorsement made in the returns, as noted above, showed that income was retained by the trustees and not disbursed.

The Supreme Court noted that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, while considering Clause 3(2) and Clause 4 of the U.K. Trust Deeds referred to the findings of the Settlement Commission and observed that if the trusts were really intended to be discretionary, the trustees had a duty cast on them to ascertain the relative needs and personal circumstances of all the beneficiaries and to allocate the income of the trusts, among them from time to time, according to the objects of the trusts, however, the tell tale facts bring out the intention of the settlor to treat the trust property as his own. The settlor and after his death his son have been showing the income of foreign trusts in the returns of income filed from time to time. Had the trust deeds been really understood by the trustees and the beneficiaries as discretionary by virtue of the operation of Clause 3, one would have expected the state of affairs to have been different. Consequently, the Tribunal held that due to failure on the part of the Maharaja to appoint discretion exercisers as per clause 3(2), Clause 4 has become operative and the U.K. trusts have to be held to be specific trusts.

The Supreme Court further noted that the High court, however, did not agree with the Tribunal’s view on consideration of the relevant clauses of the U.K. Trust Deeds and various judgments of the Supreme Court as well as some High Courts and held that there were distinguishing features for assessment years under appeal and the previous order of the Settlement Commission and the earlier judgment of this Court. The High Court noted the following distinguishing features, viz., (i) the assessee has not admitted having received the income, (ii) the assessee has not received the said income and (iii) the assessee has not shown as taxable income in the returns of all the years under appeal. Having observed the above distinguishing features, the High Court was also of the view that on interpretation of the relevant clauses of the deeds of settlement executed in the U.K., character of the trusts appears to be discretionary and not specific.

The Supreme Court held that a discretionary trust is one which gives a beneficiary no right to any part of the income of the trust property, but vests in the trustees a discretionary power to pay him, or apply for his benefit, such part of the income as they think fit. The trustees must exercise their discretion as and when the income becomes available, but if they fail to distribute in due time, the power is not extinguished so that they can distribute later. They have no power to bind themselves for the future. The beneficiary thus has no more than a hope that the discretion will be exercised in his favour.

The Supreme Court having regard to the above legal position about the discretionary trust and the fact that the income has been retained and not disbursed to the beneficiaries, held that the view taken by the High Court could not be said to be legally flawed. Merely because the Settlor and after his death, his son did not exercise their power to appoint the discretion exercisers, the character of the subject trusts did not get altered.

In the opinion of Supreme Court the two U.K. trusts continued to be ‘discretionary trust’ for the subject assessment years.

The Supreme Court further held that the above position with regard to the discretionary trust was equally applicable to the controversy in appeals under the Wealth Tax Act. The High Court had taken a correct view that the value of the assets could not be assessed on the estate of the deceased Settlor.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals with no order as to costs.

48TH RESIDENTIAL REFRESHER COURSE (RRC ) OF BOMBAY CHARTERED ACCOUN TANTS SOCIETY (BCAS)

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Venue: Hotel Ananta Spa and Resort, Udaipur Dates: 8th January, 2015 to 11th January, 2015

The Residential Refresher Course is one of the flagship events of the BCAS. This year, the 48th RRC was held at Udaipur aptly called the city of lakes. More than 200 delegates from all over India converted Hotel Ananta for 4 days into a knowledge club. The Resort, nestled between the majestic Aravalli Mountains, dotted with flowering trees visited by birds of bright hues, crisp cool weather and mouth-watering cuisine, was a perfect backdrop for learning and networking.

DAY 1

Group Discussion of Mr. Sunil B. Gabhawalla’s paper titled “Issues in CENVAT Credit and Reverse Charge Mechanism under Service Tax”. The group leaders were Mr. Ganesh Prabhu Balkrishnan, Ms. Manju L. Navandar, Mr. Saurabh P. Shah, Mr. Rajesh R. Shah and Mr. Manmohan Sharma. Case Studies in Directors remuneration, Reimbursement of expenses to consultants, Sponsorships and Live Telecasts, Housekeeping services, Security services and the like, were heatedly discussed and consensus was sought to be reached for the answers in the groups.

This was followed by the Inauguration of the RRC by lighting of the lamp at the hands of chief guest, Dr. Adish C. Aggarwala. He also gave the key note address. Dr. Adish C. Aggarwala is also a Government Counsel in the Supreme Court and Delhi High Court. He was joined on the dais by the Chairman of the Seminar Committee Mr. Rajesh S. Shah, President Mr. Nitin P. Shingala, Vice President Mr. Raman H. Jokhakar along with the two Convenors, Mr. Bharat K. Oza and Mr. Salil B. Lodha.

The first technical session was by Mr. Khusroo Panthaky. He made a brilliant presentation on the topic “Companies Act, 2013- Provisions related to Accounts, Audit & Auditors – Issues and Implementation Challenges”. His presentation was peppered with humour and factual cases. He expressed concern of falling standards of audit and justified the statutory limit of signing 20 audits per signatory, which he advised must be adhered to not only in letter but also in spirit. This session was chaired by Mr. Nitin Shingala, President of the Society

DAY 2

Group Discussion of Mr. Pradip Kapasi’s paper on “Taxation of Some Entity Related Issues (Private Trust, HUF, AOP, Firm, Succession, Company). The group leaders had a tough time touching on all the issues in the paper and moreover, as often the group was divided on their opinions. The group leaders were Mr. Chintan J. Shah, Ms. Meghna Sarang, Mr. Pankaj Agarwal, Mr. Phalgune K. Enukondla, Mr. Sidhartha B.Karani and Mr. Vinod Kumar Jain.

Mr. Sunil Gabhawalla, in the second technical session, gave answers to the posers in his paper on reverse charge mechanism and cenvat credit. He replied to all the queries put to him by the group leaders who had compiled them after the group discussions. This session was chaired by Mr. Udaya V. Satahye, Past President of the Society

Mr. Pradip Kapasi in the third technical session, replied to the queries raised from the group discussion of his paper. In his inimitable style, he expained the complex provisions of Trusts, HUF, AOP, BOI, Business Trusts etc. This session was chaired by Mr. Ameet Patel, Past President of the Society.

The participants visited Nathdwara for Shreenathji Darshan that evening. The excellent arrangements made by BCAS for special Darshan gladdened the hearts of all those who felt they would always remember this 48th RRC for this wonderful experience.

DAY 3

Group Discussion of Mr. Milin Mehta’s paper on “Concept of deemed income and deemed gains -u/s. 56(2) (vii), (viia) and (viib), s. 69, s. 43CA & s. 50C”. The topic was very relevant and generated vibrant discussions in the groups. The Group Leaders were Mr. Bhavin R. Shah, Mr. Bipin K. Karani, Mr. Chetan Dhabalia, Mr. Neelesh Vithalani and Mr. Nimesh K. Chotani.

During the fourth Technical Session, Mr. Bhagirat Merchant presented his paper on ‘Strategic intent on Mergers and Acquisitions’. Being a Past President of the Bombay Stock Exchange, the highlight of his presentation was the

candid analysis of the recent M & A activities. His depth of hands-on knowledge and long standing experience with the Indian capital market made the presentation very interesting and thought provoking. His view that to ensure success in M & A activity, one has to look beyond accounting, legal and financial issues and consider corporate culture was an eye opener to all the participants. This session was chaired by Mr. K. C. Narang, Past President of the Society.

Thereafter, in the fifth technical session, Mr. Milin Mehta replied to all the queries raised by the participants during the group discussions. The paper writer’s exposure and his in-depth analysis made his talk very useful and interesting to the participants. He referred to various court decisions and explained the grey areas to the satisfaction of all. This session was chaired by Mr. Anil J. Sathe, Past President of the Society.

Later, the participants went for a city tour of Udaipur, visiting several places of interest of this heritage city.

In the evening, an entertainment program was organised for the participants. Rajasthani folk artists charmed all the delegates with their great music and breathtaking performances and the delegates were treated to a mouth watering traditional Rajasthani cuisine for dinner.

DAY 4

The final day had the Brain Trust Meeting with two stalwarts, Senior Advocate Mr. Saurabh Soparkar and Mr. Rajan Vora on Critical Income Tax issues including of Domestic and International Taxation. Mr. Ashok K. Dhere, Past President of the Society, chaired this technical session. Both the trustees very ably dealt with all the questions raised. They started by explaining the case study, questions arising, probable answers and court cases that could be relied upon.

They also explained controversies surrounding some issues, conflicting judgments and giving their interpretation of the same. Trustees gave a holistic view of various provisions and willingly shared their knowledge and expertise with the participants.

In the concluding session, the Chairman of the Seminar Committee Mr. Rajesh S. Shah thanked the delegates for their co-operation and active participation. He thanked the paper writers, brain trustees and BCAS staff. He specially thanked the President for his wholehearted support. He also thanked all the Group Leaders whose efforts were one of the key drivers for success of the conference. The Chairman thanked all the agencies especially the Resort management and the staff, for their help and support for the success of this RRC. A few first time participants and out-station participants expressed their thoughts, experience and suggestions about RRC. The President of the Society, Mr. Nitin Shingala thanked everybody for making this RRC memorable. He also thanked Chairman of the Seminar Committee Mr. Rajesh S. Shah and his team for carrying out this herculean task successfully.

Participants departed after lunch to their respective destinations by cherishing the memories of the 48th RRC and with a promise to meet again next year at the 49th RRC.

For more photoghraphs of the 48th RRC, Udaipur, please visit bcasglobal facebook page.

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A Clarion Call for Cohesive Growth, Amity – PM Narendra Modi outlines coherent vision, ambition at ET Global Business Summit

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Narendra Modi has always been good at making speeches to which his audience swoons, but his performance at the Airtel Economic Times Global Business Summit last Friday was a class apart. Eloquence was not the main thing. He dreamed big, envisioning an Indian economy 10 times as large as today’s. He presented a cogent economic philosophy, radiated the confidence that he would be able to execute the strategy flowing from this vision and called upon everyone, particularly businessmen and entrepreneurs, to join a mass movement of development that would embrace everyone and enrich everyone, while the government provides succour to empower the poor and the vulnerable. Most notably, he called for social peace and cohesion, calling them prerequisites of growth, almost as if responding to his critics on this score.

Vaulting Reasonableness on Growth
Modi’s invocation of a $20-trillion Indian economy might sound like ambition gone berserk: the figure is 25 per cent bigger than the world’s biggest economy today, while the Indian economy is less than $2 trillion. But consider: a real growth of 9 per cent, which India had reached comfortably before the crisis, along with inflation of 5 per cent, means a 14 per cent rate of nominal growth. At that pace, the economy would double in five years, quadruple in 10, be eight times as large in 15, and be more than 10 times as large in less than 18 years. At high income levels, economies tend to slow down, but India’s demographic dividend would sustain for two decades more and productivity gains would more than offset inflation differentials with the US. A $20-trillion economy is, thus, quite a reasonable target. But no leader has till now shown the gumption to articulate such vaulting reasonableness, to fire the ambition of the country’s youth.

Modi elaborated, for the first time, what precisely he means by minimum government, maximum governance. The government has no business to be in business, he said, but should do five things: provide public goods, manage externalities — whether negative ones like pollution or positive ones such as the productivity gains from mass education and skilling — control market power of companies, fill information gaps and provide welfare to those on the margins. Technology would enable the government to be competent, non-corrupt and efficient. Digital India would also advance education, healthcare and financial inclusion.

Growth for Jobs, Welfare

The objective of reform is welfare. Some reform would be driven from the top, others from below, through popular adoption of innovation. Both are important. The state can incentivise an additional 20,000 MW of generation capacity, but an equal impact can be made by people willingly saving power. Cleaning the Ganga, Swachh Bharat and a vibrant tourism industry are campaigns that feed into one another, and can succeed only with mass participation that lives out the principle that Small is Beautiful. The state has to abandon its mindset of command and control and empower the people.

Talk is cheap, and walking the talk is the tough part. It is indeed welcome that PM Modi has committed himself to nurturing education and healthcare, uplift of the downtrodden and social cohesion. This would address concerns that his big business orientation would hurt social development and welfare. Most vitally, identifying social peace as a precondition for prosperity offers a foil to the spirit of schism embodied in the words and deeds of the larger Sangh Parivar on whose shoulders Modi rode to Raisina Hill. They have to heed the PM’s call for social cohesion, if India is to attain its potential as an economy and civilisation. The point is to uphold, not vitiate, India’s tradition of unity in diversity.

(Source: The Economic Times, dated 19-01-2015)

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Indian literary classics made accessible

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At a time when there is raucous debate on India’s real and imagined past, a library of rare ancient Indian classics – one going as far back as 3 BCE – has been launched. A philanthropic initiative of Rohan Murty, the literary project is spearheaded by noted Sanskrit scholar Sheldon Pollock and published by the Harvard University Press.

The first set of books ranging from Bulle Shah’s works in Gurmukhi and the Akbarnama in Persian to Surdas’ poetry and Manucharitramu in Telugu was released by eminent economist Amartya Sen. Over the next seven years, the series, named the Murty Classical Library of India, will publish 48 volumes of these classic works, translated from around 14 Indian languages, including Sanskrit and near extinct vernacular forms.

“India has the single most complex and continuous tradition of multi-lingual literature in the world and a lot of it is inaccessible. MCLI will make this literature available in the best possible way for the general reader as well as students and scholars,” said Pollock. These books have the original script as well as an English translation on the facing page.

The library was meant to reiterate the fact that Indians have been storytellers to the world for centuries, and to redefine the idea of a “classic”.

Murty said he represented the general Indian reader who was curious about ancient India but had access to very few literary sources. “What was life like in ancient India? How did people live, die? What was its astronomy, maths, science like? There is so little discussion on any of these in our schools and colleges,” he said. “This literature will hopefully offer an exposure.”

The next set of translations will include Kamba Ramayanam, Ramcharitmanas, Ghalib’s poetry and 6 AD Sanskrit scholar’s work Kiratarjuniya and Bharatchandra’s Annada Mangal. The big plan is to have 500 books on the MCLI shelves.

Among the most riveting is Therigatha, Poems of the First Buddhist Women which is in Pali and composed by theris, the elder Buddhist nuns. They speak in touchingly honest verse of their spiritual struggles.

Murty promises a digital version of the library sometime soon, low cost or even free to access. “As a tech dreamer, I envision an MCLI with a button you can press and read Bulle Shah in Gurmukhi, Devnagari…a day will come when the communal politics of script will be resolved with the click of a button,” said Pollock.

(Source: Times of India – dated 16-01-2015)

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To Make in India, give a break to our tech & talent

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Prime Minister Modi boldly called for ‘Make in India’. The question is: How to Make in India? What will be the roadmap for Make in India? And, how do we go beyond Make in India — to research, design, develop, produce and thus truly ‘Create in India’?

In our opinion, the answer rests on five pillars.
Human Resource: India’s key advantage is its 500 million youth. By 2016, every fourth skilled worker added globally will be an Indian. But it is imperative to ensure employability of this human resource. As many as 82% of our fresh engineers are deemed to be “unemployable”. Unless the quality issue is addressed, Make in India will yield only low-cost, low-return employment for India. Research needs to be promoted to create new skill sets. This would require significantly higher spending on research from the current $36 billion (in terms of purchasing-power parity), less than 1% of GDP. In 2012, China spent $296 billion on R&D (2%) and the US $405 billion (2.7%).

Capital & Incubation: India incubates around 500 startups a year, China over 8,000. With little investor support and the banking system ill-equipped to assess these businesses, startups are like stepchildren in India. This runs against the global trend of funding innovative startups that rely on a few core competencies to invent products, a phenomenon called innovation capitalism.

We have to be ready to let go of old shackles before we realise new dreams. The Make in India campaign needs to plant and nurture homegrown enterprises than merely become an exclusive fishing zone for large MNCs. People should be encouraged to fund the campaign. Indian households hold gold worth $1,160 billion, more than half our GDP. Gold bonds linked to Make in India enterprises could be an option to explore.

Tech Infusion: Technology provides developing economies the ability to leapfrog certain stages of development. Our mobile phone revolution, for instance, leapfrogged the landline stage, growing from a million mobile connections in 1999 to over 700 million by 2013.

We need to build collaborations across nations based on technological abilities. A shining example is the BrahMos (Brahmaputra-Moscow) Cruise Missile co-developed by India and Russia. While India brought its knowledge in developing the targeting mechanism, Russia contributed with the propulsion system. It gave both nations the capability to develop and produce perhaps the best cruise missile system in the world, with a business volume of about $7 billion.

Today, India has world-class ability in IT, communication, pharmaceuticals and space — let us find collaborations for them. What do we need to leapfrog here? The stage of environmental degradation associated with manufacturing. Make in India, Make it Green.

Building the Ecosystem: Large telecom penetration is not good enough. Manufacturing requires infrastructure: it needs roads on which large trucks can run, it needs ports, and it needs a system that operates all this without hassles — and without corruption. As a democracy India is most conducive to breeding new innovations, but is hindered by the lack of proper intellectual property rights. Indians’ contribution to patents filed globally is less than 1%; Chinese account for 32%.

Domestic Consumer Leverage: Our vast consumer base has to be used as an incentive, to create collaborations with foreign companies. The untapped market is in the villages, with 70% of India’s population. Can it be the opportunity to propel Make in India?

Many people question, how can India — with its dreaded red tape and corruption — truly be a manufacturing powerhouse. The answer is perhaps still evolving. However, necessity is the mother of invention. Remember the beryllium diaphragm.

(Source: Extract from an article in the Times of India dated 18-01-2015 by Shri A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, former President of India & Srijan Pal Singh who heads 3-Billion Initiative, an NGO for sustainable development)

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 56 dated 6th January, 2015

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Non-resident guarantee for non-fund based facilities entered between two resident entities

Presently, general permission has been granted to nonresidents to issue guarantee for non-funded facilities such as Letters of Credit/guarantees/Letters of Undertaking (LoU)/Letter of Comfort (LoC) entered between two persons resident in India.

This circular clarifies that resident entities that are subsidiaries of multinational companies can also hedge their foreign currency exposure through permissible derivative contracts entered into with a bank in India on the strength of guarantee issued by its non-resident group entity.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 55 dated 1st January, 2015

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Security for External Commercial Borrowings

This circular now permits banks, after obtaining a NOCfrom the existing lenders in India, to allow creation of charge on immovable assets, movable assets, financial securities and issue of corporate and/or personal guarantees in favour of overseas lender/security trustee, to secure the External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) raised /to be raised by the borrower, if: –

(i) The underlying ECB is in compliance with the ECB guidelines.
(ii) There exists a security clause in the Loan Agreement requiring the ECB borrower to create a charge, in favour of overseas lender/security trustee, on immovable assets/movable assets/financial securities and/ or issuance of corporate and/or personal guarantee.
(iii) T he security must be co-terminating with underlying ECB. Specific conditions in each case are as under: –

(a) Creation of Charge on immovable assets:

i. Such security will be subject to provisions contained in the Foreign Exchange Management (Acquisition and Transfer of Immovable Property in India) Regulations, 2000.
ii. The permission is not be construed as a permission to acquire immovable asset (property) in India, by the overseas lender/security trustee.
iii. In the event of enforcement/invocation of the charge, the immovable asset/property will have to be sold only to a person resident in India and the sale proceeds will be repatriated to liquidate the outstanding ECB. (b) Creation of Charge on Movable Assets The claim of the lender, in case of enforcement / invocation of the charge, is restricted to the outstanding claim against the ECB. Encumbered movable assets can also be taken out of the country.

(c) Creation of Charge over Financial Securities

i. Pledge of shares of the borrowing company held by the promoters as well as in domestic associate companies of the borrower is permitted.
ii. Pledge on other financial securities, viz. bonds and debentures, Government Securities, Government Savings Certificates, deposit receipts of securities and units of the Unit Trust of India or of any mutual funds, standing in the name of ECB borrower/promoter is also be permitted.
iii. Security interest over all current and future loan assets and all current assets including cash and cash equivalents, including Rupee accounts of the borrower with banks in India, standing in the name of the borrower/promoter, can be used as security for ECB.
iv. Rupee accounts of the borrower/promoter can also be in the form of escrow arrangement or debt service reserve account.
iii. In case of invocation of pledge, transfer of financial securities will be in accordance with the FDI/FII policy including provisions relating to sectoral cap and pricing as contained in the Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of Security by a Person Resident outside India) Regulations, 2000.

(d) Issue of Corporate or Personal Guarantee

i. Board Resolution for the issue of corporate guarantee has to be obtained from the company issuing the guarantee.
ii. Specific requests from individuals to issue personal guarantee indicating details of the ECB must be obtained.
iii. This is subject to provisions contained in the Foreign Exchange Management (Guarantees) Regulations, 2000.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 54 dated 29th December , 2014

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Notification No. FEMA .322/2014-RB dated 14th
October, 2014 Overseas Direct Investments by Indian Party –
Rationalisation/Liberalisation

This circular provides as under: –

(i) Creation of charge on shares of JV/WOS/step down subsidiary (SDS) in favour of domestic/overseas lender

Bankscan
now, subject to certain conditions, permit creation of charge/pledge on
the shares of the JV/WOS/ SDS (irrespective of the level) of an Indian
party in favour of a domestic or overseas lender for securing the funded
and/or non-funded facility to be availed of by the Indian party or by
its group companies/sister concerns/associate concerns or by any of its
JV/WOS/SDS (irrespective of the level) under the automatic route.

(ii) Creation of charge on the domestic assets in favour of overseas lenders to the JV/WOS/step down subsidiary

Banks
can now (previously, prior permission of RBI was required for the
same), subject to certain conditions, permit creation of charge (by way
of pledge, hypothecation, mortgage, or otherwise) on the domestic assets
of an Indian party (or its group companies/sister concerns /associate
concerns including the individual promoters/ directors) in favour of an
overseas lender for securing the funded and/or non-funded facility to be
availed of by the JV/WOS/SDS (irrespective of the level) of the Indian
party under the automatic route. However, the domestic assets of the
borrower on which charge is being created must not be securitised and
pledge of shares of an Indian company, if any, must be in compliance
with FEMA provisions /regulations as well as FDI Policy.

(iii) Creation of charge on overseas assets in favour of domestic lender

Banks
can now (previously, prior permission of RBI was required for the
same), subject to certain conditions, permit creation of charge (by way
of hypothecation, mortgage, or otherwise) on the overseas assets
(excluding the shares) of the JV/WOS/SDS (irrespective of the level) of
an Indian party in favour of a domestic lender for securing the funded
and/or non-funded facility to be availed of by the Indian party or by
its group companies/sister concerns /associate concerns or by any of its
overseas JV/WOS/ SDS (irrespective of the level) under the automatic
route. However, the overseas assets of the borrower on which charge is
being created must not be securitised.

Some of the condtions that are applicable to the above 3 cases are: –

i)
The period of charge, if not specified upfront, must be co-terminus
with the period of end use (like loan or other facility) for which
charge has been created.
ii) The loan/facility availed by the
JV/WOS/SDS from the domestic/overseas lender must be utilised only for
its core business activities overseas and not for investing back in
India in any manner whatsoever.
iii) A certificate from the
Statutory Auditors’ of the Indian party, to the effect that the
loan/facility availed by the JV /WOS/SDS has not been utilised for
direct or indirect investments in India, must be obtained and kept by
the designated Bank.

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SEBI Uncovers Massive Tax Evasion In Certain Stock Market Transactions

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Background
SEBI has recently passed
three orders that not only have important implications for securities
markets, but also to the parties under the Income-tax law. These are in
the case of First Financial Services Limited (“First Financial”),
Radford Global Limited (both orders dated 19th December 2014) and Moryo
Industries Limited (dated 4th December 2014). Simply stated, SEBI has
alleged that certain people used the three listed companies to carry out
price manipulation with the objective of creating bogus long term
capital gains so as to evade income-tax. It has also been reported in
Business Standard dated 29th December 2014 that about 100 such companies
are being investigated with the potential amount of such bogus gains to
be about Rs. 20,000 crore. The orders are interim in nature and have
for now debarred the parties from accessing the capital markets and
dealing in securities.

This article discusses the orders and
considers broad tax implications. The allegations and findings in the
three cases are similar and hence only Order in case of First Financial –
has been discussed.

The statements in the orders are
allegations and there are no final findings as of now. However, in this
article, for the sake of simplicity, it has been assumed that the
statements/allegations in such orders are true, though later some of the
challenges that would be faced are highlighted.

Allegations in the orders
SEBI
found a pattern of events in the three companies. To summarise, each of
the three companies made a preferential allotment of shares to select
persons. The shares so allotted were locked in for one year in
accordance with the law relating to such preferential issues. This
period of one year also coincided with the provisions of tax laws that
made gains after such period to be generally exempt from tax. During
this period of one year, SEBI found that the prices of the shares of the
companies on the stock markets were systematically increased by a group
of persons connected with the companies. This increase was by concerted
trading within their group at successively higher prices. The increase
in the price was manifold. For example, SEBI found in First Financial’s
case, the price of the shares increased from Rs. 5 to Rs. 263 in 114
trading days. And further increased to a peak of Rs. 296. The trading
volumes also increased astronomically.

Soon after the lock in
period of one year ended, the preferential allottees started selling the
shares. SEBI found that many of the buyers were linked to the people
who participated in the earlier transactions that helped increase the
price. The allottees made gains that were usually in crores of rupees
for each such allottee.

SEBI noted that while the preferential
allotment were made at a premium, the companies did not have operations
or profitability that would warrant (warranted) such premium.

During
the course of investigation, SEBI attempted to physically trace one of
the companies and its operations. It observed that it could not trace
even its offices at the reported addresses. It also noted that the
companies had stated that the issue of shares under preferential
allotment was for certain stated business purposes. However, the
companies did not use the monies raised for such purposes.

What
is more, in many cases, the amount paid by the preferential allottees
was returned by way of advances directly or indirectly to such
allottees.

SEBI held that there was concerted violation of
several provisions of the SEBI Act and the SEBI (Prohibition of
Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market)
Regulations, 2003. SEBI thus alleged fraud, price manipulation, unfair
practices, etc. by the Company, its promoters, certain named parties and
the allottees.

Based on such findings, it made an interim and
ex-parte Order prohibiting such persons from accessing the securities
markets and also prohibited them from dealing in securities. An
opportunity was given to the parties to present their case before SEBI
within the specified time.

SEBI alleges that object was tax evasion

SEBI
has repeatedly alleged that the object of the chain of acts was evasion
of income-tax. Further, it has referred matter to concerned
authorities. The following statements of SEBI are relevant:-

“From
the above facts and circumstances it can reasonably be inferred that
the preferential allottees acting in concert with First Financial group
have misused the stock exchange system to generate fictitious long term
capital gains (“LTCG”) so as to convert their unaccounted income into
accounted one with no payment of taxes as LTCG is tax exempt. I prima
facie find that the above modus operandi helped the concerned entities
to pay a lower rate of tax on account of LTCG and helped them to show
the source of this income to be from legitimate source i.e. stock
market. “

“I prima facie find that First Financial group and
allottees used securities market system to artificially increase volume
and price of the scrip for making illegal gains to and to convert
ill-gotten gains into genuine one.”

“….while SEBI would investigate into the probable violations of the securities laws, the
matter may also be referred to other law enforcement agencies such as
Income Tax Department, Enforcement Directorate and Financial
Intelligence Unit for necessary action at their end as may be deemed
appropriate by them.”

(emphasis supplied)

Violation of securities laws for tax evasion

While
the objective of the exercise, as SEBI alleges, is tax evasion, the
concern of SEBI arises because this involves abuse of the capital market
for achieving such objects. The following remarks of SEBI make this
clear:-

“I am of the considered view that the schemes, plan,
device and artifice employed in this case, apart from being a possible
case of money laundering or tax evasion which could be seen by the
concerned law enforcement agencies separately, is prima facie also a
fraud in the securities market in as much as it involves manipulative
transactions in securities and misuse of the securities market.
The
manipulation in the traded volume and price of the scrip by a group of
connected entities has the potential to induce gullible and genuine
investors to trade in the scrip and harm them.”

“SEBI strives to
safeguard the interests of a genuine investor in the Indian securities
market. The acts of artificially increasing the price of scrip misleads
investors and the fundamental tenets of market integrity get violated
with impunity due for such acts. Under the facts and circumstances of
this case, I prima facie find that the acts and omissions of First
Financial group and allottees as described above is inimical to the
interests of participants in the securities market. Therefore, allowing
the entities that are prima facie found to be involved in such
fraudulent, unfair and manipulative transactions to continue to operate
in the market would shake the confidence of the investors in the
securities market.”

“Unless prevented, they may use the stock ex-change mechanism in the same manner as discussed hereinabove for the purposes of their dubious plans as prima facie found in this case. In my view, the stock exchange system cannot be permitted to be used for any unlawful/forbidden activities. Considering these facts and the indulgence of a listed company in such a fraudulent scheme, plan, device and artifice as prima facie found in this case, I am convinced that this is a fit case where, pending investigation, effective and expeditious ?preventive and remedial action is required to be taken by way of ad interim exparte in order to protect the interests of investors and preserve the safety and integrity of the market.”

(emphasis supplied)

    Further implications

Much will depend on what further findings are made in the investigations. As of now, while the findings are substantial, many of them are circumstantial. Further, they do not implicate all the parties in the same manner.

The profits made, as per the orders, aggregate to nearly Rs. 650 crore for these three companies. It appears that the sales of the shares took place in the financial year ended 31st March 2013. Thus, it is very likely that the parties would have already filed their income-tax returns and claimed benefit of exemption for the profits such long term capital gains. If the transactions are held to be bo-gus, then not only it is possible that the amounts may be subject to full tax, but there could be levy of interest and penalty. It is possible that there may be prosecution too. Even the parties who are alleged to be indirectly involved in such cases may be acted against for participating in the alleged conspiracy of tax evasion.

However, much will also depend on the final findings not just of SEBI but of the income-tax department. It would also have to be seen what is the final outcome of the proceedings before SEBI. In case some or all of the findings against some or all of the persons are found to be false, these may also have impact on the tax proceedings.

It is likely that there would be prolonged proceedings pursuant to such orders. It is possible that appeals before the Securities Appellate Tribunal and/or the Courts may be made by the parties concerned. There would also be completion of investigation and final orders passed by SEBI. These orders could then be the subject of further appeals.

Presently, SEBI has made certain interim orders of prohibition to the parties concerned. However, SEBI will certainly pass more comprehensive orders after completion of investigation. While one will have to wait and see the nature of the orders passed, the powers of SEBI, as amended and enhanced from time to time, are quite comprehensive and elaborate.

The following are some of the powers that SEBI has:-
Power to debar the parties concerned generally from accessing the capital markets for a specified period of time.

    Power to prohibit the parties concerned from dealing in securities for a specified period of time.
    Power to levy penalty on the parties. This could be upto 3 times the amounts involved.
    It is even conceivable that SEBI may disgorge the amounts of profits made.
    Power to suspend/cancel the registration of intermedi-aries involved.
    Power to prosecute the wrong doers.

It has several other powers too. The various powers of SEBI that have been increased from time-to-time would not only be in full display, but be tested before the courts.

    Conclusion

The findings of SEBI, if found true, can have far reaching effects. The scope of the orders is quite broad and large amounts are involved. At the same time, considering the complexities involved, it is also likely that the proceedings before SEBI and income-tax department could take a long.

Concerns about use of capital markets for tax evasion purposes have been often expressed even before there was concessional treatment of tax of gains. These orders establish that regulatory and investigating agencies are active and effective in implementing the law in the interest of good governance.

Is Bombay a Bay?

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Synopsis This Article examines the recent decisions which have held that parts of Mumbai city are a bay. This has opened up parts of the city for development, since the Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) Rules are less stringent in bay areas.

Introduction
Quick Quiz – Does Bombay (apologies for using the old name) as BOMBAY rhyme with BAY .

Interestingly, while the name tends to suggest that ‘Bombay’ is a bay, it actually is an island. History has it that Bombay originally comprised of seven islands under the Portuguese Rule, which were given in dowry to an English prince on his marriage with a portuguese Princess. One of these 7 islands was Mahim island. Paradoxically, this very island has a central role to play in this discussion on a bay!

A spate of recent decisions of the Bombay High Court have held that parts of the island city are actually bays. While this distinction may seem semantic at first, it has a great repercussion for the city’s developer community. What it does is to open up a goldmine for developers, that too on the waterfront. The Coastal Regulation Zone or CRZ restriction in bays is substantially lower as compared to other places. Let us examine this decision and why environmentalists consider it to be a real bolt from the blue!

CRZ Notification
The Ministry of Environment and Forests has issued the Coastal Regulation Zone Notification to protect coastal lines and regulate activities in these areas. In a country like India, and more so in a city like Mumbai, which has a very long coastal line, regulations dealing with protection of this very valuable natural resource have an important role to play. The Ministry had originally notified the CRZ Guidelines in 1991 vide Notification No. S.O. 114 (E) dated 19th February 1991. These were amended and updated from time to time to arrive at the latest Coastal Regulation Notification 2011 issued on 6th January 2011.

Keeping in mind the special needs of Mumbai, several concessions have been provided to CRZ areas within Mumbai.

According to this Notification, the following areas are declared as CRZ:

(i) the land area from High Tide Line (HTL) to 500 mts on the landward side along the seafront. The term HTL means the line on the land up to which the highest water line reaches during the spring tide and so demarcated. HTL will be demarcated within one year from the date of issue of the 2011 notification.

(ii) the land area between HTL to 100 mts or width of the creek whichever is less on the landward side along the tidal influenced water bodies (i.e, bays, rivers, creeks, etc. that are connected to the sea and are influenced by tides).

The significance of declaring an area as CRZ is that the Notification imposes various restrictions on the setting up and expansion of industries, operations or processes, etc., in such areas. The Notification classifies various areas into CRZ-I, CRZ-II, CRZ-III, CRZ-IV, etc. The severity of the CRZ Regulations goes on decreasing as the classification increases.

Hence, maximum construction is not possible in CRZI while in CRZ-IV, those activities impugning on the sea and tidal influenced water bodies are regulated except for traditional fishing and related activities undertaken by local communities. CRZ-IV area is defined as the water area from the Low Tide Line to 12 nautical miles on the seaward side and the water area of the tidal influenced water body from the mouth of the water body at the sea up to the influence of the tide, which is measured as 5 parts per 1,000 during the driest season of the year.

A bay is defined in common parlance as “a body of water forming an indentation of the shoreline, larger than acove but smaller than a gulf”.

Mahim is a Bay
In the case of Hoary Realty Ltd vs. MCGM, WP No. 2383/2014 Order dated 7th October, 2014, the Bombay High Court faced a peculiar issue of, whether a certain plot of land in Mahim fell within the purview of the CRZ area? The issue was whether Mahim was a bay area?

The developer obtained a Certificate from an Institute of Remote Sensing at Chennai which certified that only 7% of the plot area fell within the CRZ IV area as a bay and the balance was not within the purview of CRZ. This Institute is one of the premier bodies in India in the areas of Remote Sensing, Geographical Information System and Large Scale Mapping. Thus, the Institute certified that Mahim was a bay and not a sea shore.

Hence, according to the developer, since only 7% fell within the 100 meters restriction for a bay, it could construct on the balance 93% of the plot which fell outside CRZ. It also obtained a certificate from the National Hydrographer Office which certified that Mahim is considered as a bay and is so depicted on the Official Navigational Chart of the National Hydrographer Office. Accordingly, the developer prayed for relief to carry on construction on the area not within the purview of CRZ.

The Bombay High Court upheld the classification contended by the developer and held that the area was in Mahim which was indeed a bay. Only 7% of the plot fell within the purview of CRZ IV and hence, for this portion, there was a restriction of 100 meters from the High Tide Line. Had it not been a bay, the restriction would have been 500 meters from the High Tide Line. The High Court also relied on the National Hydrographer’s Chart. The MCGM argued that the New Coastal Zone Management Plan was under preparation and hence, it was not possible to sanction the development. This argument was rejected by the High Court. Finally, the Court directed the Municipal Corporation to issue a clearance certificate based on the Certificate obtained by the developer as to how much was within CRZ.

The Maharashtra Coastal Zone Management Authority preferred a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court against this decision. However, the MCGM’s SLP was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 19th November, 2014. Thus, the High Court’s ruling is binding now on the Maharashtra Coastal Zone Management Authority as well as the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai.

Bhuleshwar and Bandra join the Club
Buoyed by the decision of the above Bombay High Court and the rejection of the SLP, developers have started knocking the doors of the High Court for similar relief in other parts of the city. The Bombay High Court in the case of Marine Drive Hospitality & Realty P Ltd vs. MCZMA, WP No. 3127/2014 Order dated 17th December, 2014 and Om Metals Consortium vs. MCZMA, WP No. 3152/2014 Order dated 18th December, 2014 had an occasion to consider similar issues. The Court held in Orders similar to the one in Hoary, that Bhuleshwar as well as Bandra (West) were bays. It once again held that the water body at Mahim Bay (Bandra reclamation to Prabhadevi) / Back Bay (Governor House to Colaba) was a bay! Accordingly, it allowed construction on the area outside the 100 meters purview, which in the Bhuleshwar case was an area of about 1 lakh sq. feet while in the Bandra case it was a slum redevelopment project of around 6 lakh sq. ft.

Impact of the Rulings
Development within the bay area can be done with a higher FSI of 3 which was till now allowed only for hotels. Now with the Rulings opening up the area for other development also, developers can develop more lucrative residential complexes. Since these projects would be waterfront projects one can do the math and compute the benefits to the developers.

It
may be noted that the ratio of this decision could also be used in other
coastal parts of India, such as, Goa, Gujarat, Karnataka, etc. The Eastern Coast of India could be the biggest beneficiary
since it abuts the “Bay” of Bengal! In short, this decision could be a game
changer for the realty sector. Certain Press Reports indicate that the
Maharashtra Government is planning to request the Ministry of Environment and
Forests to suitably amend the CRZ Notification to deal with this new phenomenon
of construction in bays. Till such time as the Centre amends this
Notification, the High Court Rulings will prevail.

 

  
Conclusion

 

While the pros and cons of these decisions are
being hot-ly debated by developers and environmentalists only time would tell
what impact they have had on the development of Mumbai and other coastal areas.
However, they high-light one important learning ~ don’t judge a book by its
cover! Outward appearances are often deceiving ~ what appears to be a shore
could turn out to be a bay, keeping all environmentalists at bay (pun
intended)!

Precedent – Circulars – Binding on Revenue – Implied overruling – Earlier ruling of smaller Bench held, stands overruled if a subsequent larger bench lays down law to the contrary: Constitution of India Article 141:

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Union of India & Ors vs. Arviva Industries India Ltd & Ors. (2014) 3 SCC 159

The Hon’ble Court held that the circulars issued by the Central Board of Excise and Customs are binding on the Department and the Department cannot be permitted to urge that the circulars issued by the Board are not binding on it. The Court in a series of decisions has held that the circulars issued u/s. 119 of the I.T. Act 1961 and section 37-B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 are binding on the Revenue.

However, a slightly different approach was taken by this Court in Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. vs. CIT (2000) 5 SCC 365 by two learned Judges which runs counter to the earlier decisions. The view taken in Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (supra) being contrary to the subsequent decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in CCE vs. Dhiren Chemical Inds. (2002) 254 ITR 554 / (2002) 2 SCC 127, cannot be taken to be good law. Earlier ruling of Smaller Bench held stands over rule if a subsequent larger bench lays down law to the contrary.

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Legal representatives of deceased – Scope – Corporate body or Collective entity when may claim compensation as legal representative – Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, S/s. 166, 168 and 173:

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Montfort Brothers of St. Gabriel & ANR. vs. United India Insurance Company Ltd. & ANR. (2014) 3 SCC 394

Appellant 1 is a charitable society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1960. It runs various institutions as a constituent unit of Catholic Church. Its members after joining the appellant Society renounce the world and are known as ‘Brothers’. Such ‘Brothers’ sever all relations with their natural families and are bound by the constitution of the Society.

One ‘Brother’ of the Society, namely, Alex Chandy Thomas was a Director-cum-Head master of St. Peter High School and he died in a motor accident. The accident was between a Jeep driven by the deceased and a Maruti Gypsy covered by insurance policy issued by the respondent Insurance Company. At the time of death the deceased was aged 34 years and was drawing monthly salary of Rs. 4,190/-. The claim petition was filed before M.A.C.T., by Appellant No. 2 on being duly authorised by the Appellant No.1 the society. The owner of the Gypsy vehicle stated in his written statement that vehicle was duly insured and hence liability, if any, was upon the Insurance Company.

The respondent-Insurance Company also filed a written statement and thereby raised various objections to the claim. But it was clear from the written statement that it never raised the issue that since the deceased was a ‘Brother’ and therefore without any family or heir, the appellant could not file claim petition for want of locus standi. The issue no.1 regarding maintainability of claim petition was not pressed by the respondents. The Tribunal awarded a compensation of Rs. 2,52,000/- in favour of the claimant and against the opposite parties with a direction to the insurer to deposit Rs. 2,27,000/- with the Tribunal as Rs. 25,000/- had already been deposited as interim compensation. The Tribunal also permitted interest at the rate of 12% per annum, but from the date of judgment passed in MACT case.

Instead of preferring appeal against the order of the Tribunal, the respondent-Company preferred a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the Gauhati High Court and by the impugned order under appeal, the High Court allowed the aforesaid writ petition ex-parte, and held the judgment and order of the learned Tribunal to be invalid and incompetent being in favour of person/persons who according to the High court were not competent to claim compensation under the Motor Vehicle Act.

The Hon’ble Court observed that the issue as to who is a legal representative or its agent is basically an issue of fact and may be decided one way or the other dependent upon the facts of a particular case. But as a legal proposition it is undeniable that a person claiming to be a legal representative has the locus to maintain an application for compensation u/s. 166 of the Act, either directly or through any agent, subject to result of a dispute raised by the other side on this issue.

The Court observed that Tribunal had relied on the decision of FB judgement of Patna High Court in Sudama Devi vs. Jogendra Choudhary AIR 1987 Pat 239 wherein it was held that term `legal representative’ is wide enough to include even “intermeddlers” with the estate of a deceased. Further, the proceeding before Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal being summary in nature, unless there is evidence before Claims Tribunal in support of such pleading that the claimant is not a legal representative and therefore the claim petition is liable to be dismissed as not maintainable, no such plea can be raised at a subsequent stage and that too through a writ petition. Accordingly the order of High Court was set aside.

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Frivolous Litigation – State as a Litigant/party – Expenses to be paid personally by officials concerned:

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Haryana Dairy Development Co-op Federation Ltd. vs. Jagdish Lal; (2014) 3 SCC 156 (SC)

In the instant case, an amount of Rs. 8,724/- was to be paid to the Respondent employee as reimbursement of his medical claim. The Petitioner Haryana Dairy Development Cooperative Federation Limited filed a SLP before Supreme Court. The Court deprecated such practice of the petitioner corporation treating the litigation as a luxury. The corporation must have spent on amount for filing this petition in excess of the amount due to the respondent.

The Law Commission of India in its 155th report has observed that what further aggravates the position is the number of pending litigations relating to trivial matters or petty claims, some of which has been hanging for more than 15 years. It hardly needs mention that in many such cases money spent on litigation is far in excess of the stakes involved.

The court directed that the expenses of the litigation shall be incurred by the Managing Director personally who has signed affidavit in support of the petition and it shall not be taken from the Federation.

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Apology – Disturbing remarks/statement made by counsel for petitioner against Supreme Court Bench – Apology for such statement accepted – Constitution of India, Article 129:

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Manohar Lal Sharma vs. Principal Secretary & Ors. (2014) 3 SCC 172

The matters were posted in view of the following statement of Mr. Prashant Bhushan that appeared in the weekly news magazine Outlook, 18-11-2013 (Vol. LIII, No. 45):

“I can only speculate. The Bench is possible hesitant about taking action against the highest law officer of the Govt. who is appearing before them everyday. Perhaps they are meeting him socially and you do tend to be a little diffident in cases involving such people.”

The above statement was made by Mr. Prashant Bhushan to the question that was put to him – “But why didn’t the court pull him up then? Why was it so indulgent ?

Mr. Prashant Bhushan states that he has the highest regard for the Supreme Court. He also tenders apology for his statement published in the weekly news magazine referred to above. In view of the matter, the court observed that nothing further deserves to be done with regard to this aspect.

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Aligning Human Capital for sustained growth of Professional Service Firms

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One of the least focused functional aspects of
running a professional service firm (“PSF”) is human resources. We call
it human capital within PSF’s. This includes the Partners, the
Principals or Directors, the Senior Managers, the Managers going on to
the associates and interns. This also includes the admin and other
non-billing staff in the PSF.

The challenge has always been to
recognise that PSF’s can grow well and scale up enough only and only if
the human capital is in alignment. This recognition comes to most firms
very late in their life span; sometimes so late that not enough course
corrections can be made. Most good firms that have succeeded and grown
over decades have done a remarkably great job at aligning their human
capital.

It is therefore, required of PSF leaders to understand the dynamics of human capital early in the growth curve of the PSF.

This picture outlines the various stakeholders that draw on an individual’s time:

Let
us analyse the dynamics of human capital engagement for each of the
stakeholders, starting with the PSF’s internal team members – i.e., the
individual himself: 1. The self: Internal teams are the most critical
asset of any PSF. It is all about managing the human capital responsibly
and effectively.

A few questions to ask and examine of each individual team member are:

Who is this professional?
How did he come into being in to our firm?
What are his aspirations?
What
drives him? Is there a conflict in his thought process, his goals and
career aspirations? Will he be a Partner in the firm in a few years? Is
he a good mentor and a team player? Is he a good fit for the firm
currently?

The above are some of the hard questions that a PSF
needs to answer. If the responses to some of the above are not very
encouraging for the firm, then it is clear that the human capital is not
optimally aligned and PSFs have a lot of work to do to bring about an
alignment. The individual within the internal team needs to be
understood, mentored, coached and encouraged to give his or best. His
working style is irrelevant, beyond a point. His weaknesses can be
corrected to a point; but the focus of the PSF should be to “make his
strengths productive” to the firm. It is far more effective to recognise
an individual’s strengths and make it work for him, his team and the
firm, as opposed to trying to constantly correct his weaknesses. Peter
Drucker exhorted this proposition and articulated that people work best
when their strengths are aligned to the needs of the firm. The challenge
for a Partner in the PSF to identify the strengths of his internal team
members and make this happen.

The professional – an individual within a PSF:
It
is incumbent upon the professional to be the best that he can be in the
environs of a PSF. For that to happen, the professional has to learn to
“Manage himself”. Managing oneself is a very critical aspect of
effectiveness and alignment. Unless a professional learns to manage
himself, the team dynamics and client delivery is never going to be
optimum. Managing oneself is all about knowing thy time, assigning
priorities and taking responsibilities for action. A professional is a
manager, akin to an executive in a business, who is required to make
effective decisions, conform to an execution framework, focus on
priorities, have a growth orientation, think with a solution mindset and
multitask between production and management.

The individual has
to have a strong sense of affinity to the society, his family, his
friends, his work colleagues and his clients. It is these interpersonal
relationships and their dynamics, which largely influence the way the
individual conducts himself. Thus, managing oneself is a starting step
in aligning human capital.

2. Teams
Individuals in
PSF’s need to be effective in teams, this would mean being collaborative
in teams, sharing knowledge with the team members, generating a spirit
of camaraderie and sportsmanship and having a congenial disposition on a
day-to-day basis.

Teams get most influenced by team dynamics.
E.g.: If the senior most member in the team cannot set the tone, he will
quickly lose respect. Similarly, someone who is technically brilliant
as a professional will still not be the favourite of the team if he does
not learn to be a go-getter and a real team player. Being technically
brilliant does not mean that they should be intellectually arrogant. In
fact, if these technically brilliant people are also respectful to their
peers and have an intrinsic habit of sharing their knowledge and
expertise, it will go a long way in creating successful future leaders
in their respective firms.

Sharing of ones’ knowledge is
critical to have the team come up to terms with the thought process of
the team leader. This, in other words, assumes that over a period of
time, each professional in the team will get upgraded to a level of
knowledge which will help them converse with their senior team members
and their clients with equal ease. It is also imperative on the team
members themselves to have a constant quest for learning and upgrading
themselves. And, in that they have somebody to look up to in terms of
the team leader, the technically superior member amongst them, who’s
depth of knowledge is a vital resource for the firm to access. The
question then is – Is the congeniality quotient in the team at a level
that permits such free and fair exchange of knowledge? To be in
alignment, PSF’s have to get this rolling, ensure that teams work in a
spirit of sharing and caring, have tremendous respect and affinity to
each and other and for their firm, and truly care for the growth of the
firm and their peers within the firm.

3. Clients
Professionals
have their foremost duty to solving client’s problems and servicing
client efficiency. PSF’s have to create an environment and pursue a
culture where professional respect each and every client and clients
feel that the teams are responsive to their problems and challenges on a
continuous and sustained basis. This needs hard selling of the concept
of “client comes first”.

As the great Mahatma Gandhi eloquently
put it “We exist because of our clients”; “The customer is not an
interruption of our work; he’s the purpose of it”.

Professionals
have to have a mindset of solving problems and challenges of clients.
To be in a continuous frame of mind of being a solution provider needs
reiteration of this tenet and at a deeper level “a connect” with the
client. The Partner concerned does not really have to sell his
expertise; all he needs to do is to engage into a conversation with the
client and understand the client.

This includes the following:
If
you want to win a client’s confidence, give him the chance to talk to
you, person to person, about his needs and his expectations. Make it
easy and comfortable for the clients to share his secrets. In short, if
you really want the client’s business, talk to the client and have a
conversation, make him feel that you are using normal language and not
“corporate speak”. Both parties should engage into a conversation, it
cannot be a monologue.

It’s about a mindset of joint problem
solving, not about trying to win or prevail. Finally, its about allowing
people with different views to learn from each other.

If teams
can achieve this dynamic with their clients and if they work hard at
doing this consistently, the PSF would have created and aligned its
human to create a winning client base.

4. Market

Partners and managers and everybody in between, have to be focused on the markets.

    Where is the profession heading?

    Would our services be relevant, three years from now and seven years from now?

    What do we need to do today to continuously adapt to the marketplace?

    Is there a better way of doing what we do?

What are the trends in the market place that the professional can see and that helps him to think about generating more opportunities for his firm?

What can he do about it? In capital markets, they say that the market is a great leveler; one can extend this to professional service market and say that the market is very discerning and will choose the most appropriate service player for its requirements.

Often, what is perceived is the truth. E.g.: If a lawyer provides very high-end technical solutions, he is perceived to be an expert with a very busy schedule with very little time to spend. This preconception comes because of a perception. Perceptions take long to create but can dissipate very quickly. Thus, a PSF should make sure that what Partners say and do is relevant to his chosen segment of clients and stays that way on a continuous basis. A PSF would than be omnipresent in the Market and would be aligned for faster growth.

    Regulators

Professionals have to be trained to deal with the entire regulatory ecosystem. We have in our day-to-day existence, a need to deal with various set of regulators, authorities, governmental agencies and the likes. This would include the regulator of the profession; Example: the Bar Council for the Lawyers, The Institute of Chartered Accountants for the Accountants etc. This would also include the revenue authorities, the courts, the justice delivery system, the administration in the state and all departments thereto.

The Chambers and associations, who influence policy making, the public representatives who make the laws, and a wide gamut of people who form the servicing (internal) team of these constituents also deal with Regulators constantly. And professionals need to learn to deal with the Chambers and Associations too.

Professionals need to have skill-sets to deal with them differently, as these are not clients. Some of these are watchdogs, some of them are policy makers and the others are policy implementers. The most successful firms have aligned their human capital to a point where a group of professional within the firm deals with each one of them effectively. This needs lots of training and high quality communication skills that work with bureaucrats and a deep understanding of policy formation.

The best firms thrive in such an ecosystem by having specific people earmarked to deal with this breed – the Regulators.

    Peers

PSF’s constantly have a cliental pressure to benchmark themselves with their peers; especially when it comes to the relative size of the firm, the size of the team, the infrastructure, the quality of the delivery, the timeliness and responsiveness and the professional fees/compensation for the engagements.

In this context, the most compared resource is the quality of human capital. That is the biggest differentiator between the good firms and the better and the best firms, as it is partners and managers who are the touch point of the firm and the face of the firm across the ecosystem. The quality of delivery is also a reflection of the level of training, the level of knowledge base, the expertise of the firm and therefore its unique positioning in the marketplace and all of this ties in to the human capital of the firm.

Most successful firms have been growing primarily because relative to their peers, they have done a great job at mentoring their teams.

And most successful firms have been successful because they have been constantly aligning their human capital to the firm’s growth trajectory.

Audit materiality – a precision cast in stone or a subjective variable measure….continued

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In the previous article, we attempted to understand
the concept of materiality as elucidated in SA 320 ‘Materiality in
Planning and Performing an Audit’, and discussed case studies around the
practical application of this concept from a quantitative measurement
viewpoint. In the present article, we will dwell on the qualitative
aspects. We will discuss aspects such as setting of materiality for
specific financial statement captions at amounts lesser than the
materiality level determined for the financial statements taken as a
whole, and consider circumstances when adjustments to materiality
benchmark and revision of materiality is necessary. We will also try to
understand the practical application of these concepts through case
studies.

Evaluating qualitative factors
Evaluating
qualitative factors often requires subjective judgment. While
establishing the overall strategy for the audit, the auditor should
consider whether there are particular significant accounts or
disclosures in the financial statements for which misstatements of
lesser amounts than materiality for the financial statements as a whole
could reasonably be expected to influence the economic decisions of
users taken on the basis of the financial statements. Any such amounts
determined represent lower materiality levels to be considered in
relation to the particular items in the financial statements. For
instance, the magnitude of a misstatement that the auditor considers
material when caused by an illegal act or irregularity may be far lower
than the magnitude of a misstatement caused by an error.

Some of the factors to be considered are:

Whether
accounting standards, laws, or regulations affect users’ expectations
regarding the measurement or disclosure of certain items (for example,
related party transactions and the remuneration of management and those
charged with governance)?

The key disclosures in relation to the
industry or the environment in which the entity operates (for example,
research and development costs for a pharmaceutical company).

Whether
attention is focused on the financial performance of a particular
subsidiary or division that is separately disclosed in the consolidated
financial statements (for example, for a newly acquired business)?

Normalisation
There
may be particular circumstances that cause the materiality benchmark
amount to be at an unusual level for the current period — either
unusually high or unusually low. If so, it may be appropriate and
necessary to normalise the benchmark amount for the current period.
However, if the entity has recurring charges or credits, then
normalising for those items is inappropriate.

Examples of charges that may result in an exceptional decrease in profit before tax from continuing operations may include:
Unusual restructuring charges

Impairment of fixed assets or long-term investments not in the ordinary course of business

Changes in accounting methods/estimates

Examples of credits that may result in an exceptional increase in profit before tax from continuing operations may include:

One-time gains arising from the settlement of legal matters

One-time
gains arising from the sale of a component of a business (where the
ongoing business model of the entity is not focused on acquisitions and
disposals of components).

Use of another benchmark or
normalising the benchmark may also be appropriate if profit before tax
from continuing operations is nominal (i.e., small and close to zero) in
the current period. However, if an entity has a past history of low
earnings from continuing operations in relation to large revenues and
expects to continue generating income at such levels, this may represent
the normal operating results for the entity, and consequently,
normalisation of profit before tax from continuing operations in such
cases may not be appropriate.

Audit documentation needs to
explicitly substantiate as to why the identified benchmark is required
to be normalised and the corroborative factors that caused the
normalisation. It may not be sufficient if the documentation merely
states that the factor causing the normalisation is considered unusual
or exceptional without stating the basis on which such a conclusion was
reached.

Revision in materiality
At times,
particularly where an interim audit is performed before the year-end,
the auditor may need to set materiality for planning purposes based on
the entity’s annualised interim financial statements or financial
statements of one or more prior annual periods. While setting
materiality in such cases, the auditor needs to be cognisant of:

observations
emanating from the audit of the previous period i.e., control
deficiencies previously communicated to those charged with governance,

the effects of major changes in the entity’s circumstances (for example, a significant merger),

the effectiveness of the entity’s internal control,

any
public information about the entity relevant to the evaluation of the
likelihood of material financial statement misstatements,

relevant changes in the economy as a whole or the industry in which the entity operates.

Because
it is not feasible for the auditor to anticipate all situations that
may ultimately influence judgments about materiality in evaluating the
audit findings at the completion of the audit, the auditor’s judgment
about materiality for planning purposes may differ from the judgment
about materiality used while evaluating the audit findings at audit
completion. For example, while performing the audit, the auditor may
become aware of additional quantitative or qualitative factors that were
not initially considered but that could be important to users of the
financial statements and that should be considered in making judgments
about materiality when evaluating audit findings.

If the auditor
concludes that a lower materiality level than that initially determined
is appropriate, the auditor should reconsider the related levels of
tolerable misstatement and appropriateness of the nature, timing, and
extent of further audit procedures. The auditor should consider whether
the overall audit strategy and audit plan needs to be revised if the
nature of identified misstatements and the circumstances of their
occurrence are indicative that other misstatements may exist that, when
aggregated with identified misstatements, could be material. The auditor
should not assume that a misstatement is an isolated occurrence.

If
the aggregate of the misstatements (known and likely) that the auditor
has identified during the course of his audit approaches the set
materiality, it would be prudent for the auditor to evaluate the risk
that the possibly unidentified misstatements together with the
identified misstatements may exceed the materiality level. If in the
auditor’s judgment, such a risk is perceptible, then the nature and
extent of further audit procedures would need to be reconsidered.

Let us consider some case studies to understand the practical application of the above concepts.

Case Study I – Materiality at account balance and qualitative factors

Background

CAB Private Limited (‘CAB’ or ‘the Company’) is a trader of fans and has three streams of revenue. Revenue from sale of high speed ceiling fans comprises 60% of the total revenue, revenue from sale of automatic fans comprises 30% of the total revenue and the balance 10% represents revenue from table fans. High speed ceiling fans are sold entirely to XYZ Private Limited, a company in which one of the directors of CAB has a majority stake. M/s. ABC & Associates are the auditors of the Company and Mr. A is the audit in-charge on the job. The Company is profit making and accordingly Mr. A selected profit before tax as the benchmark for the purpose of materiality. The materiality for the purpose of audit of the financial statements for the year ending 31st March 20X1 as ascertained in the planning stage was set at Rs. 80 million.

The table below sets out the position of sales and debtor balances as on 31 March 20X1:

Account
description

Amount
in Rs.

Revenue from high speed ceiling fans

600 million

Revenue from automatic fans

300 million

Revenue from table fans

100 million

Account
description

Amount in Rs.

Outstanding
for

 

 

more
than 90 days

Debtors –
high speed

250 million

Rs. 60
million

ceiling fans

 

 

 

Debtors – automatic fans

150
million

Rs.

5 million

Debtors – table fans

80
million

Rs.

5 million

As per Company policy, debtors outstanding for more than 90 days are fully provided for. However, for the year ended 31st March 20X0, management has not made any provision for debtors. In light of the concept of materiality evaluate the following:

I)    Considering the fact that there are no other unadjusted misstatements in the financial statements, as an auditor, is the above misstatement material for reporting purposes?

    What will be the situation in case where the outstanding debtors for more than 90 days is nil for Debtors – high speed ceiling fans, Rs. 35 million under Debtors – automatic fans and Rs. 50 million for Debtors under table fan category?

    The Company received share application money from its parent company located overseas in the month of May 20X0 aggregating to $ 1.66 million (Rs. 100 million) against which shares aggregating to $ 1.42 million (Rs. 85 million) were allotted. No allotment or refund has been done for the balance amount till date. For the shares allotted, the Company did not file

Form FC-GPR with the Reserve Bank of India within prescribed timelines. Non-compliance with the above provisions would be reckoned as a contravention under FEMA Act and could attract penal provisions. Let us evaluate what would be the implications of this situation.

    Analysis I

As per SA 320, one or more particular class of transactions, account balances or disclosures may exist for which misstatements of lesser amounts than materiality for the financial statements as a whole could reasonably be expected to influence the economic decisions of users. In such a case, the auditor may consider the account balance or transaction or disclosure as material.

It is pertinent to note that more than 50% of the debtor balance is due from a related party. Further, 60% of the aggregate sales are to related party. Accordingly in the above case even though the aggregate misstatement of Rs. 70 million is below materiality, i.e., Rs. 80 million, Mr. A could consider having a lower threshold as far as debts due from related party are concerned rather than applying the benchmark selected for the financial statements as a whole.

    Analysis II

In the second situation though the account balances individually are below materiality but on aggregate level the total misstatement exceeds the materiality of Rs. 80 million and accordingly, Mr. A needs to consider the said misstatement as material and perform necessary procedures.

    Analysis III

As per the Circular No. RBI/2007-08/213 dated 14th December 2007 issued by the Central Government under Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of Security by a Person Resident outside India) Regulations, 2000, the Company is either required to allot shares within 180 days from the date of receipt of the application money or intimate Reserve Bank of India (‘RBI’) if 180 days have elapsed as on the date of notification.

In the above situation, the Company is in violation of FEMA regulations and accordingly although the un-allotted amount (Rs. 15 million) is below materiality (Rs. 80 million), the auditor will have to consider the same as material information for disclosing the same to the users of the financial statements and consider reporting the same in his report.

Case Study II – Normalisation

Background

FAT Private Limited (‘FAT’ or ‘the Company’) is a gem manufacturing company. The said Company has shut two of its plants in the current year. The financial position for FAT is given below:

 

Rs. in Millions

Financial
statement caption

Amount

Total Assets

500

Total Revenue

1,200

Net Assets

150

Profit before tax

400


This is a first year audit by MTS and Associates and the audit engagement partner has determined that the most appropriate benchmark to use in determining materiality is profit before tax from continuing operations. As shown above, the estimated profit before tax from continuing operations for the period is Rs. 400 million. This amount is net of Rs. 80 million restructuring charge for the closure of entity’s plant. In the light of the concept of materiality, evaluate the following:

I. Whether the auditor should consider profit before tax of Rs. 400 million for the purpose of materiality?

    Now consider a situation where FAT has two divisions where total revenue and profit before tax for Division
A is Rs. 800 million and Rs. 30 million and that for Division B is Rs. 1,200 million and Rs. 400 million respectively. The profit before tax from the Division A has historically been low as compared to Division B.

Since the profit from Division A is very low, the auditors have decided not to consider the same for the purpose of materiality. Evaluate if the approach is appropriate?

    Analysis

    As per SA 320, when the materiality for the financial statements as a whole is determined for a particular entity based on a percentage of profit before tax from continuing operations, circumstances that give rise to an exceptional decrease or increase in such profit may lead the auditor to conclude that the materiality for the financial statements as a whole is more appropriately determined using a normalised profit before tax from continuing operations figure based on past results.

In the current scenario, the current-period profit before tax from continuing operation includes a significant amount that is on account of an unusual transaction and is not a recurring expenditure. Accordingly the audit team needs to normalise the benchmark amount by excluding the restructuring charge from the current-period profit before tax from continuing operations.

    In situation II, although the profits from Division A are low as compared with the profits from Division B, it is not exceptional in nature. The profits have been historically low from Division A and accordingly if the Company expects that the same will be continued, the auditor should consider the profit of Division A for the purpose of calculating the benchmark for materiality.

    Case Study III – Revision in materiality

Financial
position

20X1

20X0

 

Rs. Millions

Rs. Millions

 

 

 

Total Assets

400

250

Total Revenue

1200

1000

Net Assets

50

30

Profit before tax

10

(0.2)


GFT and Associates are the auditors of Small Ltd. (‘the Company’). The following is the financial position of the Company:

Based on financial position given above, the auditor decided to use revenue as the benchmark for the purpose of calculating materiality for 20X1. During the course of audit while performing cut off procedures, the audit team realized that the Company had recognized excess revenue of Rs. 200 million. This amount was substantial comprising approximately 16.66% of the total revenue. Should the audit team revise the materiality?

What would be the answer had there been an under-recognition of revenue by Rs. 200 million, should the auditor revise the materiality?

    Analysis

As per SA 320, the auditor shall revise materiality for the financial statements as a whole in the event of becoming aware of information during the audit that would have caused the auditor to have determined a different amount (or amounts) initially. In the given scenario, as the revenue amount has been revised significantly the auditor would need to revise the materiality amount. As a higher materiality figure was earlier used to scope account balances/transactions for scrutiny, the likelihood of the risk of misstatements remaining undetected may not have been adequately addressed.

On the contrary, in a situation where the revenue recognised was lower by Rs. 200 million and accordingly the materiality calculated was also lower, the auditor may use his professional judgment to evaluate whether it is necessary to revise the materiality.

    Concluding remarks

In conclusion, auditors need to make materiality judgments on every audit which is a difficult process as it requires both qualitative and quantitative aspects to be evaluated. Additionally there is no formal or scientific method to compute materiality. Materiality judgments are crucial for conduct of a successful audit as poor judgments can result in an inappropriate audit opinion or may result in the audit being inefficient or ineffective.

[2014] 52 Taxmann.com 341 (Chhattisgarh) Hotel East Park vs. UOI

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High Court upholds constitutional validity of section restaurant service and catering service u/s. 66E(i) of the Act – Issues direction to State Government to issue clarifications to avoid double taxation.

Facts:
The Petitioners challenged vires of section 66E(i) of the Finance 1994 Act, 1994. In view of Article 366(29A)(f) the service element in serving food and drinks in a restaurant is subsumed in the sale and as sale of food and drinks inside the restaurant is deemed to be sale, the Parliament has no legislative competence to enact the law to tax sale of food and drinks.

Held:
The Court observed that, u/s. 65B(44)(ii) supply of goods that is deemed sale under Article 366(29A) is not included in service and it refused to accept the proposition that there is anything in Article 366(29A)(f) to indicate that the service part is subsumed in the sale of goods and expressed a view that it rather separates sale of food and drinks from service. As regards the Finance Act 1994, it observed that section 65B(44) as well as section 66E(i) only charges service tax on the service part and not on the sale part and held that this would indicate, sale of food has been taken out from the service part. Accordingly, section 66E(i) of the Finance Act,1994 is intra-vires the Constitution. The provisions of Rule 2C of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006, value of food is taken as 60% of the Bill in case of restaurant and 40% of the Bill in case of catering service. It is in this background the High Court recommended that the restaurant and caterer should not charge VAT on the entire bill value, but only upon the residual portion of 60% or as the case may be 40% of the Bill and directed State Government to issue clarification in this regard to ensure that the customers are not unnecessarily doubly taxed over the same amount.

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[2014-TIOL-2305-CESTAT-DEL] M/s RGL Convertors vs. CCE, Delhi-I

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Ignoring judicial discipline and recording conclusions diametrically contrary to judgment of Tribunal is either illustrative of gross incompetence or clear irresponsible conduct and a serious transgression of quasi-judicial norms.

Facts:
Proceedings were initiated against the Appellant alleging removal of exigible goods without payment of duty and transgression of the other provisions of the Central Excise Act, 1994. Various Tribunal decisions were placed on record to prove that the process does not amount to manufacture. However since the Tribunal decision was appealed before the Delhi High Court by Revenue and the same was rejected only on the ground of limitation and not on merits, the commissioner (Appeals) held that the Tribunal decision had not attained finality thus treating the same as unworthy of efficacy, rejected the appeal.

Held:
It is a trite principle that a final order of a Tribunal, enunciating a ratio decidendi, is an operative judgment per se; not contingent on ratification by any higher forum, for its vitality or precedential authority. Such perverse orders further clog the appellate docket of this Tribunal, already burdened with a huge pendency, apart from accentuating the faith deficit of the citizen/ assessee, in departmental adjudication.

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[2015-TIOL-87-CESTAT-AHM] Commissioner of Central Excise and Service Tax, Bhavnagar vs. M/s. Madhvi Procon Pvt. Ltd.

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Service tax paid on advance received, ultimately no service was provided. If no service is provided the amount paid has to be considered as a deposit.

Facts:-
The Appellant received mobilisation advance, they paid service tax under works contract composition scheme. However, the contract was terminated and the advance received was recovered by the customer. The refund application filed was rejected on the ground that it had been filed beyond the limitation period u/s. 11B of the Central Excise Act. On appeal, the first appellate authority allowed the appeal, aggrieved by which the present appeal is filed.

Held:
Once service is not rendered then no service tax is payable, any duty paid by mistake cannot be termed as ‘duty’. The payment made has to be considered as a ‘deposit’ to which provisions of section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 will not be applicable. Similar view was taken in the case of M/s. Barclays Technology Centre India P. Ltd vs. CCE [2015] – TIOL-82-CESTAT-MUM, where it was decided that refund cannot be denied for procedural infraction when service tax was not required to be paid. On slightly different facts, in the case of Jyotsana D Patel vs. CCE, Nagpur [2014] 52 taxmann.com 255 (Mumbai CESTAT), it was also held on similar lines that when the service tax is not required to be paid, the amount paid cannot constitute service tax and thus the provisions of section 11B are not applicable.

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[2014] 52 taxmann.com 297 (Kerala) Palm Fibre (India) P Ltd vs. Union Bank of India.

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High Court holds Rule 2B of Service Tax Determination of Value Rules in respect of foreign exchange conversion services valid vis-àvis 67(1)(i) and 67(4) of Finance Act, 1994 – Explains the rationale of valuation mechanism under Rule 2B.

Facts:
The petitioner alleged that respondent levied service tax with respect to remittances made by foreign buyers in foreign currency, although the petitioner was not liable to pay service tax on the amounts of foreign currency remitted to India. Further, if at all service tax becomes applicable, the same can be only on the gross charges levied by the bank for the services rendered i.e. on commission or conversion charges and cannot be on the whole amount of the foreign remittance as provided in the rules, especially when the prescription for determination of value by the rules is specifically made subject to the provisions of sub-sections (1),(2)&(3) of section 67.

Held:
Examining Explanation 2 to section 65B(44), the Court held that such exemption does not apply to conversion of currency from one form to another, and hence, no exemption can be claimed insofar as the respondentbank converts the foreign remittance to Indian currency. Circular No.163/14/2012 –ST dated 10/07/2012 also does not apply to the services of conversion of money, which is the issue in dispute in this case. What is dealt with in the said circular is the remittance of foreign currency in India from overseas. Remittances and conversion both are distinct events and it is the latter that is a taxable event.

As regards the application of service tax valuation rules, the Court held that the prescription of determination of value for taxable service by rules u/s. 67(4), is not to the exclusion of the previous sub-sections of section 67, but is subject to the provisions of the said section. Sub-clauses (i), (ii) & (iii) of section 67(1) also speak of ascertainment and how the value has to be determined, providing sufficient guidelines to the rule making authority. Although the petitioner is correct, insofar as accepting that he is liable to service tax only on the charges (commission and exchange) levied by the respondent bank, which constitutes consideration in money and thereby gross amount charged in terms of section 67(1)(i), it does not prevent the authorities from examining whether there is consideration in other than money terms, which is not ascertainable, in which event tax will have to be levied as prescribed in the rules.

In the context of Rule 2B of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 the petitioner contended that when the bank purchases the currency at Rs.45/$ and sells the same at a higher amount, the margin would be in terms of money and so long as it is not specifically charged by the bank, that would go beyond the prescription of “gross amount”. The Court however noted that when the bank purchases currency against rupee (which is conversion service) the bank does not receive any consideration in terms of money. The bank could purchase foreign currency as permissible under the various enactments and sell it immediately or later when prices may go up or fall. Therefore, at the time of such purchase i.e. conversion the consideration is unascertainable. This consideration since not crystallised in terms of money is not ascertainable as gross amount charged. It is this unascertainable component which statute permits to be ascertained by section 67(4) read with Rule 2B.

Analysing Rule 2B, the Court noted that the rule does not levy tax on any higher amount received by the bank when selling such foreign currency purchased at a higher price, at a later point; nor is the liability affected if the bank suffers a loss, in selling it for a lesser price at the latter date. The valuation of service is done, as on the date of sale/purchase and with reference to RBI rate, which necessarily presumes that none involved in “money changing” would purchase a particular currency, at a higher rate than RBI prescribed rate. Thus in the example, if RBI reference rate is Rs. 45.50/$, the difference of 50 paise per dollar is the ostensible consideration received by the bank for each dollar.

The Court therefore held that it cannot be said that service tax is charged with reference to the remittances. The entire remittance amount is taken only for valuation purpose and that too units of currency alone and the tax is levied only on that component, which the bank stands to gain by purchasing the currency at a lower rate than the RBI reference rate. Therefore, this prescription of the measure in the rules as sanctioned by the statute is perfectly in consonance with the statutory provisions.

As regards Rule 6(7B) of the Service Tax Rules, the petitioner contended that such option shall be exercised on the total Indian currency converted from foreign currency in a year and therefore maximum service tax liability per year cannot exceed Rs. 6,000/-. Negating the contention, the Court held that such option shall be exercised against every taxable event i.e. for each of the transactions in a year and not on the total Indian currency converted from foreign currency in that year.

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[2014] 52 taxmann.com 132 (Rajasthan) Fashion Suitings (P) Ltd vs. Superintendent, CCE& ST

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The Court initiates contempt proceedings against Superintendent, for issuing demand notice to assessee based on Circular No. No.967/01/2013-CX dated 01/01/2013 operation of which was stayed by the Court.

Facts:
The petitioner in this writ petition questioned the legality and validity of the demand notice issued by the superintendent under the OIO which was subject matter of appeal and stay application before the CESTAT . The stay application was listed before CESTAT but could not be heard and got adjourned either due to non-availability of Bench or for not reaching. The impugned demand notice was issued after 8 months from the date of filing of stay application essentially with reference to Circular No.967/01/2013-CX dated 01/01/2013. It was submitted that, in Mangalam Cement Ltd. vs. Superintendent of Central Excise 2013 (290) ELT 353 (Raj), the said circular was declared non est by the High Court and the respondents were prohibited from making coercive recovery proceedings pursuant to the impugned circular.

Held:
The High Court observed that in the Manglam Cement’s case (supra) vide Final Order dated 01/01/2013, the Court undisputedly held the said circular non-est in so far as it relates to the situation where the appeals with the application had been filed they remained pending for the reasons not attributable to the assesse in any manner. The court got dismayed by the fact that despite such a considered decision, the superintendent, with impunity chose to issue demand notice with reference to very same circular, although the legal position in this regard was concluded more than seven months back and in no uncertain terms. Having regard to the circumstances, the court not only admitted the writ petition staying the operation of the impugned order but also directed to initiate contempt proceedings against the concerned superintendent.

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[2014] 52 Taxmann.com 388 (Mumbai – CESTAT) Bhogavati Janseva Trust vs. CCE, Kolhapur.

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Trust supplying sugarcane to sugar factories through hired contractors/farmers under contract for harvesting and transportation of sugarcane with sugar factories cannot be regarded as providing Manpower Recruitment/ Supply service.

Facts:
In this case, the Tribunal disposed of six appeals the issue involved being common. The appellant entered into an agreement with the factories for harvesting and transportation of sugarcane from the farmer’s field to the sugar factory. The farmers also entered into an agreement with sugar factories for the sale of the same. The appellants engaged contractors for harvesting of sugarcane and transportation thereof by trucks, tractors, head loaders etc. On transportation charges, sugar factories discharged the service tax and therefore the issue in the present case is confined only to the taxability of harvesting charges paid to the appellants. The appellant in turn distributed these charges to the contractors. In some cases besides harvesting charges, certain commission by way of supervision/administration charges was also paid to the appellant. The department contended that the entire consideration received by the appellant was for providing supply of manpower services to the sugar factories.

Held:
The Tribunal held that the appellants are not manpower recruitment agencies as they do not recruit any persons; they also do not supply manpower to the sugar factory. What they have undertaken is harvesting of sugarcane and transportation of the same to the sugar factory. To undertake the work, they have entered into agreements with the contractors who have provided them manpower. In any service activity, manpower is required. This will not make the service supply of manpower. Further, the consideration paid is not on the supply of manpower but on sugarcane supplied on tonnage basis. If an efficient contractor engages less manpower, he will make more profits, while an inefficient contractor engaging more manpower would make less profit. The essential nature of service is harvesting and supply of sugarcane. The Tribunal also held that such activity merits classification under the category of “business auxiliary service”. Accordingly, demand under the category of “manpower supply service” was set aside.

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[2014] 52 taxmann.com 256 (Allahabad) CCE vs. Computer Science Corporation India (P) Ltd.

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Employing expatriate employees of group concerns to work in India and paying their social security benefits to the companies abroad is not liable to tax under Manpower Recruitment/ Supply Service.

Facts:
The assessee, a part of group of companies situated in US, UK and Singapore etc. hired certain expatriate employees overseas. Some employees were transferred from group companies to the assessee in India. A letter of employment was issued to the expatriate employee by the assessee from the date when the employee was transferred to India for duration of the employment in the country.

The social security benefits of the expatriate employees as per Indian laws like PF and under the foreign law was remitted to its group companies The assessee deducted tax at source treating the emoluments paid to the employees as salary and also issued Form 16 and Form 12BA. The adjudicating authority treated the entire arrangement as taxable under manpower supply services u/ss 65(105)(k) of the Act. The Tribunal decided the matter in favor of the assessee.

Held:
Analysing the requirements u/s. 65(105)(k), the High Court held that, the adjudicating authority clearly missed the requirement that the service which is provided must be by a manpower recruitment or supply agency. Moreover, such a service has to be in relation to supply of manpower. In the present case, there was no basis whatsoever to hold that, taxable service involving the recruitment or supply of manpower was provided by a manpower recruitment or supply agency. Therefore the element of taxability would not arise.

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[2014] 52 Taxmann.com 377 (Allahabad) CCE vs. Goverdhan Transformer Udyog (P) Ltd.

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“Maintenance and Repairs Contract” – Agreement & Invoice providing bifurcation of material portion and service portion – Service tax applicable only on service portion.

Facts:
The assessee provided management, maintenance and repairs service for the repair of old and damaged transformers. Whether transformer oil, HV/LV Oil and spare parts which are goods incorporated into the transformers belonging to the customer should be considered for the purpose of quantifying the gross consideration received as constituting the taxable value. The Tribunal decided in favor of the assesse.

Held:
Dismissing the revenues appeal, and relying upon CCE vs. J. P. Transformers [2014] 50 Taxmann.com 31 (All) dealing with the identical factual matrix, affirmed the decision of the Tribunal and held: when the agreement between the assessee and the customer incorporates separately the value of goods and materials from the value of services rendered, service tax cannot be levied on the component of goods or materials. The service tax can be levied only on the value of services rendered.

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[2014] 52 Taxmann.com 339 (Mad) – CCE vs. Suibramania Siva Co-op Sugar Mills Ltd.

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Scope of Exemption to GTA Service – Rs. 750/- per consignee and Rs.1,500/- per consignment explained.

Facts:
The
assessee availed the services of goods transport agency in respect of
transport of sugarcane into the factory and paid service tax on freight
inward that exceeded Rs.1,500/-, but did not pay service tax on the
amount of freight that exceeded Rs. 750/-, but was below Rs.1,500/-. The
department contended that as per Notification No.34/2004-ST dated
03/12/2004, a limit of Rs.1,500/- in the said notification applies only
in respect of multiple consignments whereas in case of individual
consignment, the said limit is only Rs. 750/-. Tribunal decided in favor
of the assessee.

Held:
Explaining the scope of
exemption, the High Court held that as is evident from the reading of
the explanation, individual consignment covered in sub-clause (2) of the
said exemption means all goods transported by goods transport agency
for “a consignee”. In contradistinction to this, fixing of exemption
limit of Rs.1,500/- under subclause (1) is not limited to the
consignment to the individual consignee but it refers to consignments
relatable to more than one consignee. Thus by making two
classifications, the exemption notification limits its operation based
on the consignee, the charges and the consignment. Therefore, where the
goods carried are for the single consignee i.e. assessee alone, the
assessee’s case would fall under sub-clause (2) in which event, when the
gross amount charged exceeded Rs.750/- the tax liability will arise.

It
was also held that the decision of the Tribunal rendered in favor of
the assessee on the ground that individual truck operator did not fall
within the definition of “goods transport agency” relying upon the
decision in the case of Kanaka Durga Agro Oil Products (2009) 22 STT 435
(Bang-Tribunal) was relied upon cannot be upheld.

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Interpretation of Entries and Role of Hon. Tribunal

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Introduction

In the sales tax law, under which entry particular goods fall is always a debatable issue. There is lot of litigation in such matters. Numbers of judgments have been delivered. However, till today there is no finality about the issue.

To avoid such issues of interpretation, legislature sometime prescribe the entry in a more precise manner. For example, under Bombay Sales Tax Act (BST Act), there was an entry “C-I-29”, which reads as under:

“29. Industrial inputs and packing material, as may be specified by the State Government, from time to time, by notification in the Official Gazette.”

The notification issued prescribed various items of goods. The head note of the said notification dated 9.5.2002 was as under:

“No.STA .11.02/CR-99/Taxation-1 dt. 9.5.2002 – In exercise of the powers conferred by entry 29 in Part 1 of Schedule ‘C’ appended to the Bombay Sales Tax Act,1959 (Bom.LI of 1959), the Government of Maharashtra hereby, with effect from10th May,2002, and in suppression of the Government Notification, Finance Department, No.STA .11.01/CR-52/Taxation-1, dated the 14th May, 2001, specifies the following goods, more particularly described in the Schedule appended hereto to be Industrial Inputs and Packing Materials, whether sold under a generic name or and brand name, for the purpose of the said entry 29, namely:-“

Thus, it was made clear that only those goods which are specified in the Notification shall be considered for the purposes of Entry C-1-29. In spite of such a clear mandate that the notified good are “to be” the industrial inputs and packing material, still in one of the cases, Tribunal applied the common parlance meaning at its own imagination and in fact disallowed legitimate claim of the dealer. The reference is to the judgment of Hon. Tribunal in case of Samruddhi Industries Ltd. (Appeal No. 54 of 2004 dt. 28-02-2005).

Issue before Hon. Bombay High Court
Due to the above incorrect decision, the matter was referred to the Hon. Bombay High Court. The Hon. Bombay High Court has dealt with the issue in case of Samruddhi Industries Ltd. (Sales Tax Reference No.20 of 2006 dt. 23-12-2014). The issue was about classification of Ghamelas and other plastic items. They were covered by Central Excise Tariff heading 39.23. This was one of the notified heading in above notification.

However, the claim about coverage in entry C-I-29 was disallowed adopting ground of common parlance meaning.

The Hon. High Court disapproved such approach of the Hon. Tribunal. The Hon. High Court reproduced the observations of the Hon. Supreme Court about guidelines in deciding the classification as under:

“9. At the outset, we must refer to certain principles and which have been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. They guide us in interpreting the entries and the Notifications of this nature. In a recent case reported in AIR 2012 SC 1681, the Commissioner of Central Excise vs. M/s. Wockhardt Life Science Ltd., the Supreme Court reviewed and summarised these principles in the following words:

“30. There is no fixed test for classification of a taxable commodity. This is probably the reason why the `common parlance test’ or the `commercial usage test’ are the most common [see A. Nagaraju Bros. vs. State of A.P., 1994 Supp 20 (3) SCC 122]. Whether a particular article will fall within a particular Tariff heading or not has to be decided on the basis of the tangible material or evidence to determine how such an article is understood in `common parlance’ or in `commercial world’ or in `trade circle’ or in its popular sense meaning. It is they who are concerned with it and it is the sense in which they understand it that constitutes the definitive index of the legislative intention, when the statute was enacted [see D.C.M. vs. State of Rajasthan, (1980) 4 SCC 71 : (AIR1980 SC 1552)]. One of the essential factors for determining whether a product falls within Chapter 30 or not is whether the product is understood as a pharmaceutical product in common parlance [see CCE vs. Shree Baidyanath Ayurved, (2009) 12 SCC 419 : (AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 1090 : 2009 AIR SCW 3788); Commissioner of Central Excise, Delhi vs. Ishaan Research Lab (P) Ltd. (2008) 13 SCC 349]. Further, the quantity of medicament used in a particular product will also not be a relevant factor for, normally, the extent of use of medicinal ingredients is very low because a larger use may be harmful for the human body. [Puma Ayurvedic Herbal (P) Ltd. vs. CEE, Nagpur (2006) 3 SCC 266 : (AIR 2006 SC 1561 : 2006 AIR SCW 1384); State of Goa vs. Colfax Laboratories (2004) 9 SCC 83 : (AIR 2004 SC 45 : 2003 AIR SCW 5578); B.P.L Pharmaceuticals vs. CCE, 1995 Supp (3) SCC1 : (1995 AIR SCW 2509)].

31. However, there cannot be a static parameter for the correct classification of a commodity. This Court in the case of Indian Aluminium Cables Ltd. vs. Union of India, (1985) 3 SCC 284: (AIR 1985 SC 1201), has culled out this principle in the following words:

“13. To sum up the true position, the process of manufacture of a product and the end use to which it is put, cannot necessarily be determinative of the classification of that product under a fiscal schedule like the Central Excise Tariff. What is more important is whether the broad description of the article fits in with the expression used in the Tariff…”

32. Moreover, the functional utility and predominant or primary usage of the commodity which is being classified must be taken into account, apart from the understanding in common parlance [see O.K. Play (India) Ltd. vs. CCE, (2005) 2 SCC 460 : (AIR 2005 SC 1023 : 2005 AIR SCW 865); Alpine Industries vs. CEE, New Delhi (1995) Supp. (3) SCC 1; Sujanil Chemo Industries vs. CEE & Customs (2005) 4 SCC 189 : (2005 AIR SCW 5348); ICPA Health Products (P) Ltd vs. CEE (2004) 4 SCC 481; Puma Ayurvedic Herbal (AIR 2006 SC 1561 : 2006 AIR SCW 1384) (supra); Ishaan Research Lab (P) Ltd.(AIR 2008 SC (Supp) 540 : 2008 AIR SCW 6235) (supra); CCE vs. Uni Products India Ltd., (2009) 9 SCC 295 : (AIR 2009 SC (supp) 2403 : 2009 AIR SCW 6392)].

33. A commodity cannot be classified in a residuary entry, in the presence of a specific entry, even if such specific entry requires the product to be understood in the technical sense [see Akbar Badrudin vs. Collector of Customs, (1990) 2 SCC 203 : (AIR 1990 SC 1579); Commissioner of Customs vs. G.C. Jain, (2011) 12 SCC 713 : (AIR 2011 SC 2262)]. A residuary entry can be taken refuge of only in the absence of a specific entry; that is to say, the latter will always prevail over the former [see CCE vs. Jayant Oil Mills, (1989) 3 SCC 343 : (AIR 1989 SC 1316); HPL Chemicals vs. CCE, (2006) 5 SCC 208 : (2006 AIR SCW 2259); Western India Plywoods vs. Collector of Customs, (2005) 12 SCC 731 : (AIR 2005 SC 4405 : 2005 AIR SCW 5249); CCE vs. Carrier Aircon, (2006) 5 SCC 596 : (2006 AIR SCW 3910)]. In CCE vs. Carrier Aircon, (2006) 5 SCC 596 : (2006 AIR SCW 3910), this Court held:

“14… There are a number of factors which have to be taken into consideration for determining the classification of a product. For the purposes of classification, the relevant factors inter alia are statutory fiscal entry, the basic character, function and use of the goods. When a commodity falls within a tariff entry by virtue of the purpose for which it is put to (sic. produced), the end use to which the product is put to, cannot determine the classification of that product.”

In light of above, the Hon. Bombay High Court observed that the judgment given by the Hon. Tribunal is not correct. The Hon. High Court felt that the Hon. Tribunal should have applied the clear language to decide the issue and accordingly the matter would not have lingered for such a long time. The particular observations of the Hon. Bombay High Court are as under:

“12. A bare reading thereof, therefore would denote as to how the Industrial inputs and packing materials have been described. They have been brought in the single Notification and with this broad and wide description only on the footing that these are not ordinary plastic materials and utilised for household or domestic purpose. Once they are articles for conveyance or packing of goods, of plastics, stoppers lids, caps and other closures, of plastics and specifically excluding the bags of the type which are used for packing of goods at the time of a sale for the convenience of the customer including carrying bags then, there was no occasion for the Tribunal to ignore its plain wording. The description itself is such that the Revenue was aware that the Notifications have been issued and with Reference to the headings or sub-headings under the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. That the Industry requires not just traditional packing materials but of plastics and use of plastic is now extensive that the Notifications came to be issued and worded accordingly. There was never any doubt that these are materials of plastics but for conveyance or packing of goods. That goods are packed in plastic packing material for conveying and during industrial or commercial use is thus apparent. There was no occasion for the Tribunal, therefore to have brushed aside this wide wording and proceeded to hold at the initial stage that each of these are industrial inputs and packing materials. Assuming that foundation to be correct, yet, the Revenue relied upon that the description of the goods and the nature of the advertisement for sale of the goods establishes that all articles and manufactured by the Applicant are household. They are rarely used in the industries. It is unfortunate that at the appellate stage the Tribunal merely endorses such findings of the Commissioner. The Commissioner evolved, and with greatest respect, his own theory. He proceeded to analyse the Notifications and Entries. From his order, it is clear that he was aware of the legal principles. Interpretation of an entry is a question of law and whether particular goods and of a specific dealer would fall within the same or not are matters on which the Department or Revenue may take a view. However, the Tribunal endorsed this opinion of the Commissioner and the argument of the Revenue based thereon, namely, the description of the goods in the advertisement establishes that they are household articles. We are not impressed and in the least by such an approach of the Tribunal. The Court of Appeal has before it, original order and which is completely open for scrutiny. It is on fact and on law. The Tribunal ought not to have been carried away by only the case put up by the Revenue. The Tribunal is comprising of judicial members is expected to analyse the matter in its entirety. They are expected to apply their independent mind and not endorse the opinion of the Commissioner or the authorities under the Bombay Sales Tax Act or statutes analogous thereto. Therefore, to hold that the articles such as Ghamelas might be used in construction, agriculture etc. but they are not industrial inputs or packing materials would exhibit complete ignorance of the commercial word as well. It is for that reason that we emphasised the principles evolved by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. If they would guide us and they were equally binding and ought to have guided the Tribunal when it exercise its initial Appellate jurisdiction. In such circumstances, the plain reading of the entry and as made by the Tribunal in the initial stage while deciding the Appeal to be found in paras 10 to 12 of its order would demonstrate that it is this exercise which thereafter put the Tribunal itself in doubt. It is that doubt which required it to refer the questions to this Court. None would now therefore fault the Tribunal for reading the entry industrial inputs and packing materials properly. The fact that the Industrial inputs and packing materials have been notified throughout under the Notifications and in terms of the heading or sub-headings of these articles and materials under the Central Exercise Tariff Act, 1985 would show that household wares or domestic articles were not intended and rather never intended to be brought in. The exclusionary part of the entry itself will clarify this aspect. The articles of plastics and notified for use of conveying or carrying articles packed in plastic materials would denote that the understanding throughout was to bring in such articles which are used in trade, commerce and Industry. Therefore, on a plain reading of the entry itself the Tribunal should have in the initial stage decided the matter. That it ignored it and then referred the question for this Court’s opinion is clear from the above.

    This resulted in an unavoidable delay. Matters of this nature ought to be finalised expeditiously and in the interest of certainty for both the dealer and the Revenue.”

    Conclusion

Thus, the Hon. High Court expects that the Tribunal to work independently in the interest of both. Hon. High court has reversed the judgment of Hon. Tribunal and allowed the claim of classification under entry C-I-29 in favour of assessee.

MANDATORY PRE-DEPOSIT FOR APPEALS

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Background:
Right of appeal is a creation of statute and is
governed by the conditions prescribed under the law. While justice must
be real as well as apparent, justice must be done to both the parties,
(viz. tax department and the tax payer). It has been repeatedly held by
Courts that right of appeal is a substantive right which ought to be
liberally construed generally.

Section 35F of the Central Excise
Act, 1944 (CEA) [corresponding to section 129E of the Customs Act, 1962
(CA’62) and in case of service tax, the said section 35F read with
section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994 (‘Act’)] provided for pre-deposit,
pending appeal of duty and interest demanded and penalty levied. It
provided for full pre–deposit of entire demand subject to waiver thereof
by the Appellate Tribunal

The Tribunals were flooded with stay
applications for waiver of pre-deposit and orders for default therein,
appeal restoration applications, orders for rejection of said
applications or allowing these applications and consequent legal
proceedings. The matter used to be first heard for stay purposes (and
for restoration, if any) and thereafter, for final disposal. The stay
orders of the Tribunal got further challenged before the High Courts,
thereby creating multitude of litigations. It consumed substantial time
of Tribunals and tax payers as well.

Based on representations by
various forums to address the issue of stay applications and related
litigation work, the Government has introduced provisions of mandatory
pre deposit with effect from August 06, 2014, as a step towards reducing
time of Tribunals and tax payers. The new provisions introduced under
Central Excise are applicable to service tax and customs as well.

Similar
provisions have been existing under several VAT laws in the country.
Though several attempts have been made to challenge the legal validity
of provisions of mandatory pre-deposit pending appeal, it is understood
that none have succeeded.

Considering the implications of the
new provisions, CBEC has issued detailed clarifications vide Circular
No. 984/08/2014 – CX dated 16/09/2014.

The newly introduced
provisions are analyzed and discussed below with appropriate extracts of
CBEC Circular dated 16th September, 2014C-16/9/14.

Relevant Statutory Provisions
Deposit of certain percentage of duty demanded or penalty imposed before filing appeal – (section 35F of CEA)

The Tribunal or the Commissioner (Appeals), as the case may be, shall not entertain any appeal,

under
sub-section (1) of section 35, unless the appellant has deposited seven
and a half percent of the duty demanded or penalty imposed or both, in
pursuance of a decision or an order passed by an officer of Central
Excise lower in rank than the Commissioner of Central Excise;

against
the decision or order referred to in Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of
section 35B, unless the appellant has deposited seven and a half per
cent of the duty demanded or penalty imposed or both, in pursuance of
the decision or order appealed against;

against the decision or
order referred to in Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 35B,
unless the appellant has deposited ten per cent of the duty demanded or
penalty imposed or both, in pursuance of the decision or order appealed
against:

Provided that the amount required to be deposited under this section shall not exceed rupees ten crores:

Provided
further that the provisions of this section shall not apply to the stay
applications and appeals pending before any appellate authority prior
to the commencement of the Finance (No.2) Act, 2014.

Explanation. For the purposes of this section “duty demanded” shall include,—

(i) amount determined u/s. 11D;

(ii) amount of erroneous CENVAT credit taken;

(iii)
amount payable under Rule 6 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2001 or the
CENVAT Credit Rules, 2002 or the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

Interest on delayed refund of amount deposited under the proviso to section 35F.- (section 35FF of CEA

Where
an amount deposited by the appellant u/s. 35F is required to be
refunded consequent upon the order of the appellate authority, there
shall be paid to the appellant interest at such rate, not below 5 % and
not exceeding 36 % per annum as is for the time being fixed by the
Central Government by notification in the official Gazette, on such
amount from the date of payment of amount till, the date of refund of
such amount.

Provided that the amount deposited u/s. 35F, prior
to the commencement of the Finance (No.2) Act, 2014, shall continue to
be governed by the provisions of section 35FF as it stood before the
commencement of the said Act.

Implications of the terminology “shall not entertain appeal” in the amended section 35F of CEA

According
to one school of thought, since the amended section 35F of CEA states
that “Tribunal or Commissioner (Appeals) shall not entertain appeal”,
there is a discretion available with the concerned appellate authority
to admit an appeal without the prescribed mandatory pre-deposit.

In
this regard, attention is invited to a recent Mumbai CESTAT ruling in
M/s. Bhatia Global Trading Ltd. & M/s Asian Natural Resources (I)
Ltd. vs. CC(2014) TIOL – 2637 – CESTAT MUM.

In this case, an
appeal was filed against adjudication orders dated 24/07/2014 and
25/07/2014 after 06/08/2014 without any pre-deposit as required under
the amended section 129 E of the Customs Act, 1962.Reliance was placed
by the appellant on the Supreme Court ruling in CCE vs. A.S. Bava (1978)
2 ELT J333 (SC), wherein it was observed that, right of appeal is a
substantive right and if any pre–deposit is required to be made it would
whittle down the substantive right of appeal. Accordingly, it was
pleaded that the appeal be heard without insisting on any pre-deposit.

The Tribunal held as under :

 A
plain reading of the provisions make it abundantly clear that the
Tribunal or Commissioner (Appeals) shall not entertain any appeal u/s.
128, unless the appellant has made a pre-deposit of 7.5% of the duty in
such cases, where duty and penalty is in dispute and appeal is filed
before Tribunal. Therefore, in terms of amended section 129E with
effect from 06/08/2014, this Tribunal is barred from entertaining any
appeal unless the predeposit as mentioned in section 129E is complied
with. The law is very clear and there is no ambiguity in the matter. In
view of the above, we hold that the appeal is not admissible before this
Tribunal, inasmuch as the appellants have not complied with the
pre-deposit requirements envisaged in section 129E. Accordingly, the
Miscellaneous Applications are dismissed and consequently the appeal
also gets dismissed.

It would appear that post 06/08/2014, payment of mandatory pre-deposit would be necessary for admission of appeal.

Applicability of mandatory pre-deposit provisions to pending matters:

Clarifications issued by CESTAT vide Circular No. 15/CESTAT/General/ 2013-14 dated 14/10/2014 (2014) 308 ELT T 48 & 49.

Relevant extracts of the circular are as under:

“1.
In terms of the amended provisions of the three statutes viz. Customs
Act, 1962, Central Excise Act, 1944 and Finance Act, 1994, the mandatory
deposit of 7.5%/10%, as the case may be, has to be made for filing
appeal before Tribunal. Section 35F of the Central Excise Act reads as:
………
    The above said provisions came into force with effect from 06/08/2014. However, some of the appellants/ consultants/counsels while presenting appeals are expressing reluctance in compliance with the condi-tion of mandatory deposit stipulated under the Act as amended. Some of them have contended that as the Show Cause Notice was issued and demand confirmed earlier to 06/08/2014, the amended provisions are not applicable to their case. Few of them have relied upon judgments of various judicial forums to claim exemption from the mandatory deposit while filing appeal. It is pertinent to mention that no such exemption has been contemplated either in the amended provision of the Act statutes, or even in the clarificatory circular issued by the CBEC on the subject.

    In view of above, DRs/ARs/TOs of all Benches are directed that if no evidence in support of mandatory deposit is produced while filing appeal, such appeals, after providing three opportunities/reminders, be numbered and listed on Fridays before the Court presided by the Senior Member, for appropriate orders.”

    Some Judicial Considerations:

MBG Commodities Pvt. Ltd. vs. CC, CCE & ST (2014)

310 ELT 302 (Tri – Bang)

In this case, adjudication order was passed on 18/03/2014 and First Appeal to the Tribunal was filed on 06/08/2014, after a delay of 42 days. The Tribunal condoned the delay and held as under :

    Pre deposit of 7.5% to be made

    No stay application required

    10 weeks further time given to make pre-deposit since provisions are new.

ITC Infotech Ltd. vs. CC (2014) 310 ELT 304 (Tri – Bang)

The Tribunal held as under

    Post 6/8/14, stay application not required to be filed

    Stay application rejected as in fructuous (Section 35F of CEA.)

Refer para 4 above for recent Mumbai CESTAT ruling

Recovery pending appeal

Relevant extracts from CBEC Circular C- 16/9/14 are as under:

Recovery of the Amounts during the Pendency of Appeal (Para 4)

“Para 4.1

Vide Circular No.967/1/2013 dated 1st January, 2013, Board has issued detailed instructions with regard to recovery of the amount due to the Government during the pendency of stay applications or appeals with the appellate authority. This circular would not apply to cases where appeal is filed after the enactment of the amended section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944 or section 129E of the Customs Act, 1962.

Para 4.2

No coercive measures for the recovery of balance amount i.e., the amount in excess of 7.5% or 10% depos-ited in terms of section 35F of Central Excise Act, 1944 or section 129E of Customs Act, 1962, shall be taken dur-ing the pendency of appeal where the party / assessee shows to the jurisdictional authorities:

    Proof of payment of stipulated amount as pre-deposit of 7.5% / 10%, subject to a limit of Rs.10 crores, as the case may be; and

    The copy of appeal memo filed with the appellate authority.
Para 4.3

Recovery action if any can be initiated only after the dis-posal of the case by the Commissioner (Appeals) / Tribu-nal in favour of the department. For example, if the Tribu-nal decides a case in favour of the department, recovery action for the amount over and above the amount depos-ited under the provisions of section 35F / 129E may be initiated unless the order of the Tribunal is stayed by the High Court/Supreme Court. The recovery, in such cases, would include the interest, at the specified rate, from the date duty became payable, till the date of payment.”

Refer judicial considerations given above.

Quantum of Pre Deposit

    Department clarifications

Relevant extracts from CBEC Circular C – 16/9/14 are as under:

“2. Quantum of pre-deposit in terms of section 35F of Central Excise Act, 1944 and section 129E of the Cus-toms Act, 1962:

Para 2.1

Doubts have been expressed with regard to the amount to be deposited in terms of the amended provisions while filing appeal against the order of Commissioner (Appeals) before the CESTAT. Sub-section (iii) of section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and section 129E of the Customs Act, 1962 stipulate payment of 10% of the duty or penalty payable in pursuance of the decision or order being appealed against i.e. the order of Commissioner (Appeals). It is therefore, clarified that in the event of ap-peal against the order of Commissioner (Appeals) before the Tribunal, 10% is to be paid on the amount of duty demanded or penalty imposed by the Commissioner (Ap-peals). This need not be the same as the amount of duty demanded or penalty imposed in the Order-in-Original in the said case.

Para 2.2

In a case, where penalty alone is in dispute and penalties have been imposed under different provisions of the Act, the pre-deposit would be calculated based on the aggre-gate of all penalties imposed in the order against which appeal is proposed to be filed.

Para 2.3

In case of any short payment or non-payment of the amount stipulated under section 35F of the Central Ex-cise Act, 1944 or section 129E of the Customs Act, 1962, the appeal filed is liable for rejection.”

    Department clarifications (during introduction of Fi-nance Bill, 2014)

Attention is invited to the following clarification issued vide Finance Ministry Circular No. 334/15/2014 – TRU dated 10/07/2014 (Annexure II) :

Legislative Changes

………….

Amendments in the Central Excise Act, 1944

………..

“Para 13

“Section 35F is being substituted with a new section to prescribe a mandatory fixed pre-deposit of 7.5% of the duty demanded or penalty imposed or both for filing appeal with the Commissioner (Appeals) or the Tribunal at the first stage and another 10% of the duty demanded or penalty imposed or both for filing second stage appeal before the Tribunal. The amount of pre-deposit payable would be subject to a ceiling of Rs. 10 crore.”

    2 Stage Appeal – Amount of Pre-deposit

On a perusal of the TRU Clarification dated 10/0720/14 reproduced above and the new provisions as enacted, it appears that in a 2 Stage Appeal, despite detailed clari-fications vide C-16/9/14, lack of clarity continues as to whether an additional pre deposit of 10% is to be made or only the differential pre deposit viz. [10% less 7.5%] is to be made. This needs to be clarified at the earliest to avoid litigations.

    Duty demanded/Interest

 Duty demanded to include “sums collected in name of duty” and CENVAT Credit

For the purposes of new provisions “duty” demanded” shall include, –

    amount determined u/s. 11D
    amount of erroneous CENVAT credit taken

    amount payable under Rule 6 of the CENVAT

Credit Rules, 2001 or the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2002 or the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

It appears that there is no such expression like “duty demanded” in section 35F of CEA. The expression is “duty
in .. dispute”. Nevertheless, going by the principle of purposive interpretation, the disputed duty shall include the amounts listed in Explanation to section 35F of CEA.

    Pre–deposit of interest

Contrary to provisions which existed prior to 06/08/2014, there is no requirement for mandatory pre-deposit of interest. This is very much welcome.

Payments during investigation

Relevant extracts from CBEC Circular C – 16/9/14 are as under:

“Payment made during investigation (para 3)

Para 3.1

Payment made during the course of investigation or audit, prior to the date on which appeal is filed, to the extent of 7.5% or 10%, subject to the limit of Rs 10 crores, can be considered to be deposit made towards fulfillment of stipulation under section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944 or section 129E of the Customs Act, 1962. Any shortfall from the amount stipulated under these sections shall have to be paid before filing of appeal before the ap-pellate authority. As a corollary, amounts paid over and above the amounts stipulated under section 35 F of the Central Excise Act, 1944 or section 129E of the Customs Act, 1962, shall not be treated as deposit under the said sections.

Para 3.2

Since the amount paid during investigation/audit takes the colour of deposit under section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944 or section 129E of the Customs Act, 1962 only when the appeal is filed, the date of filing of appeal shall be deemed to be the date of deposit made in terms of the said sections.

Para 3.3

In case of any short-payment or non-payment of the amount stipulated under section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944 or section 129E of the Customs Act, 1962, the appeal filed by the appellant is liable for rejection.”

    Procedure for pre-deposit – Government clarifications

Relevant extracts from CBEC Circular C – 16/09/2014 are as under:

“Procedure and Manner of making the pre-deposits (Para 6.)

Para 6.1

E-payment facility can be made use of by the appellants, wherever possible.

Para 6.2

A self-attested copy of the document showing satisfactory proof of payment shall be submitted before the appellate authority as proof of payment made in terms of section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944 or section 129E of the Customs Act, 1962.

Para 6.3

Column 7 of EA.1, column 6 of CA.1 and column 6 of ST-4 for filing appeal before Commissioner (Appeals), seek details of the duty/penalty deposited. The same may be used for indicating the deposits made under amended section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944 or section 129E of the Customs Act, 1962.

Para 6.4

The appeal filed before the CESTAT are filed along with the appeal memo in prescribed format (Form EA-3 for Central Excise Appeals and Form CA-3 for the Customs Appeals). Column 14(i) of the said appeal forms seeks information of payment of duty, fine, penalty, interest along with proof of payment (challan). These columns may, therefore, be used for the purpose of indicating the amount of deposit made, which shall be verified by the appellate authority before registering the appeal.
 

Para 6.5

As per existing instructions, a copy of the appeal memo along with proof of deposit made shall be filed with the jurisdictional officers.”

    Refund of Pre–deposit & Interest thereon

    Interest on pre-deposit :

The new section 35FF of CEA provides that where an amount deposited by the appellant u/s. 35F –

    is required to be refunded

    consequent upon the order of the appellate authority, there shall be paid to the appellant –

    interest at the rate of 6% p.a.

    on such amount

    for the date of payment of the amount till the date of refund of such amount

It is further provided that the amount deposited u/s. 35F, prior to 06/08/2014, shall continue to be governed by the provisions of section 35FF as it stood before the com-mencement of the said Act.

    Department clarifications

Relevant extracts from CBEC Circular C – 16/9/14 are as under:

    Refund of pre-deposit para 5) “Para 5.1
Where the appeal is decided in favour of the party / assessee, he shall be entitled to refund of the amount deposited along with the interest at the prescribed rate from the date of making the deposit to the date of re-fund in terms of section 35FF of the Central Excise Act, 1944 or section 129EE of the Customs Act, 1962.

Para 5.2

Pre-deposit for filing appeal is not payment of duty. Hence, refund of pre-deposit need not be subjected to the process of refund of duty under section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 or section 27 of the Customs Act, 1962. Therefore, in all cases where the appel-late authority has decided the matter in favour of the appellant, refund with interest should be paid to the appellant within 15 days of the receipt of the letter of the appellant seeking refund, irrespective of whether order of the appellate authority is proposed to be chal-lenged by the department or not.

Para 5. 3

If the Department contemplates appeal against the order of the Commissioner (A) or the order of CES-TAT, which is in favour of the appellant, refund along with interest would still be payable unless such order is stayed by a competent Appellate Authority.

Para 5.4

In the event of a remand, refund of the pre-deposit shall be payable along with interest.

Para 5.5

In case of partial remand where a portion of the duty is confirmed, it may be ensured that the duty due to the Government on the portion of order in favour of the revenue is collected by adjusting the deposited amount along with interest.

Para 5.6

It is reiterated that refund of pre-deposit made should not be withheld on the ground that department is pro-posing to file an appeal or has filed an appeal against the order granting relief to the party. Jurisdictional Commissioner should ensure that refund of deposit made for hearing the appeal should be paid within the stipulated time of 15 days as per para 5.2 supra.”

    Procedure for refund (para 7)

“Para 7.1

A simple letter from the person who has made such de-posit, requesting for return of the said amount, along with a self-attested xerox copy of the order in appeal or the CESTAT order consequent to which the deposit becomes returnable and attested xerox copy of the document evi-dencing payment of such deposit, addressed to Jurisdic-tional Assistant/Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise and Service Tax or the Assistant/Deputy Commissioner of Customs, as the case may be, would suffice for refund of the amount deposited along with interest at the rate specified.

Para 7.2

Record of deposits made under section 35F of the Cen-tral Excise Act, 1944 or section 129E of the Customs Act, 1962 should be maintained by the Commissionerate so as to facilitate seamless verification of the deposits at the time of processing the refund claims made in case of fa-vourable order from the Appellate Authority.”

    Applicability of unjust enrichment

Section 11 B of CEA has not been amended to specifically provide that provisions of unjust enrichment will not apply to refund of pre-deposit of duty or penalty made as per the amended section 35Fof CEA. There are judgments which have held that provisions of unjust enrichment will apply even to pre-deposits made u/s. 35F of CEA. E.g.:

    UOI vs. Jain Spinners Ltd. (1992) 61 ELT 321 (SC)

    Sahakari  Khand  Udyog  Mandal  Ltd.  vs.  CCE

(2005) 181 ELT 328 (SC)

At the same time, there are other judgments which have held that provisions of unjust enrichment will not apply to pre-deposits made under section 35F of CEA. For e.g.

    Mahavir Aluminium (1999) 114 ELT 371 (SC)

    Suvidhe Ltd. (1999) 82 ELT 177 (Bom).

In order to avoid disputes, it may be advisable to disclose the amount of pre-deposit under the heading “Advances recoverable in cash or kind” in the balance sheet. It would help to substantiate that the incidence of tax/duty has not been passed on to the customers.

    Some issues and concerns

Introduction of mandatory pre-deposit provisions is a wel-come measure. It would save the time of Tribunals and tax payers that was consumed under the earlier regime of stay Petitions and related matters. However, attention is drawn to some issues & concerns:

    It is often noticed that adjudication orders are passed totally ignoring settled judicial rulings (including rulings of the Supreme Court and jurisdictional Courts). Apparently, there is no remedy provided in law, for such situations. In such cases, though a tax payer can approach Higher Courts, at a practical level in order to get the appeal admitted, appellants often would be con-strained to make the mandatory pre- deposit rather than risking the non-admission of appeal or at times the cost of going to High Court is found prohibitive by small and medium enterprises. Besides this, in many a cases, on account of non-accountability, a huge amount of tax is demanded invoking extended period of limitation for which the basis may or may not be legally sound yet the demand is routinely confirmed in the adjudication order. In such cases, it is noticed that mandatory payment of 7.5% causes serious cash flow crisis and at times even survival of business becomes questionable. For these assessees where the issue is one of interpretation of law alone, the mandatory pre-deposit appears savageous and requires serious reconsideration.

    As discussed earlier, even if an appellant succeeds in appeal, on the basis of judicial rulings, provisions of unjust enrichment are invariably applied and refund denied resulting in further litigation.

It is suggested that, CBEC should issue detailed guide-lines preferably through a Board order, to avoid hard-ships to tax payers

    It is appreciative that, in case of success in appeal, in-terest shall be paid to the appellant from the date of payment of the pre-deposit. However, the interest shall be paid only at the rate of 6% P.A.

As all are aware, w.e.f. 01/10/2014 in case of delayed payment of service tax interest is required to be paid at a rate ranging from 18% p.a. to 30% p.a. (for delay beyond 1 year). The disparity in rate of interest to be paid by a tax payer and tax department is unjustified.

It is suggested that in order to promote and encourage fair tax administration practices, parity should be brought in rate of interest at the earliest under all tax laws. This would also help in establishing accountability of the tax department.

National Horticulture Board vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax ITAT Delhi ‘E’ Bench Before Pramod Kumar(A.M.) and A. T. Varkey(J.M.) I.T.A. No.: 4521/Del/12 Assessment year: 2009-10. Decided on 16.01.2015 Counsel for Assessee/Revenue: Ved Jain and Rano Jain/J P Chandrakar

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Section 2(15) –First proviso to Section 2(15) will not apply where the services are rendered for fees but it is only subservient to the charitable objects of the institute and is not in the nature of business itself.

Facts:
The assessee is a society under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and registered u/s. 12A(a). Its objectives include promoting, encouraging and developing horticultural activities in the country. As a part of pursuing its objective, one of the activities that the assessee was involved in was disbursement of subsidy received from the Ministry of Agriculture in respect of qualified horticulture projects. In the course of the assessment proceedings, the AO noticed that the assessee had received a sum of Rs. 2.21 crore on account of cost of application form and the brochure from the subsidy seekers. The AO was of the view that the amounts so received were for services rendered to the customers, which is in the nature of business, commerce and trade, and, therefore, the activities of the assessee cannot be treated as charitable activities of the nature as contemplated by section 2(15). On appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the order of the AO, as according to him,the assessee’s claim was hit by second limb of first proviso to section 2(15).

Before the Tribunal, the revenue relied on the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Andhra Pradesh State Seed Certification Agency vs.Chief Commissioner of Income Tax [(2013) 356 ITR360] and contended that as long as the services are rendered to a business, trade or commerce, irrespective of the motives of the person rendering such services, the services so rendered vitiate the charitable character of the assessee rendering such services.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that there is no dispute as regards the objects of the assessee viz., objects of general public utility, which is also a charitable purpose as per the law; and as confirmed by the lower authorities, the first limb of first proviso to section 2(15) is not attracted on the facts of the case of the assessee. As regards the revenue’s case, that the case is covered under the second limb of first proviso to section 2(15), on the basis that the assessee has rendered services “in relation to trade, commerce or business” for a consideration, the Tribunal relying on the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of GS1 vs. Director General of Income Tax (Exemptions)[(2013) 360 ITR 138], observed that the scope of second limb extends only to such cases in which a business is carried out to feed the charitable activities. For invoking second limb of first proviso to section 2(15), it is sine qua non that the assessee extends services to business, trade or commerce and such services have been extended in the course of business carried on by the assessee. According to it, even in a situation in which an assessee receives a fees or consideration for rendition of a service to the business, trade or commerce, as long as such a service is subservient to the charitable cause and is not in the nature of business itself, the disability under second limb of first proviso to section 2(15) will not come into play. Further, it also noted that in another decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India vs. DGIT (Exemptions) [(2013) 358 ITR 91], the rendition of services by the assessee was viewed in conjunction with the overall objectives of the assesse and once it was seen that those services were not in the nature of trade, commerce or business per se, the mere charging of fees for services so rendered, were held to be sub-servient to the charitable objectives and it was held to have no effect on the overall charitable objects of the assessee.

As regards the case law relied on by the revenue the tribunal preferred to follow the decision of the jurisdictional High Court.

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ANS Law Associates vs. Assistant Commissioner ofIncome Tax ITAT Mumbai ‘A’ Bench Before D. Karunakara Rao (A. M.) and Sanjay Garg (J. M.) ITA No.5181/M/2012 Assessment Year: 2008-09. Decided on 05.12.2014 Counsel for Assessee/Revenue: Kirit N. Mehta / Vivek Batra

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Section 285BA – Additions made solely on the basis of AIR information are not sustainable.

Facts:
The assessee is a registered partnership firm of advocates and solicitors. The AIR information showed that the assessee had received professional/technical fees from various persons aggregating to Rs.1.39 crore, which the AO required the assessee to reconcile. The assessee reconciled major portion of the amount, but could not reconcile the amount of Rs. 4.49 lakh allegedly received from one party viz., Allied Digital Services Ltd. The assessee stated before the AO that it had never received above amount. But the AO did not agree and made the addition of Rs. 4.49 lakh to the income of the assessee. In the appeal before the CIT(A), the assessee submitted bank statements of all its accounts. It was further submitted that only Rs.1 lakh was received during the year under consideration from Allied Digital Services Ltd.and a confirmation from the said party in this respect was also filed. The CIT(A),however, held that since the assessee had failed to reconcile the receipts from Allied Digital Services Ltd., the AO was justified in making the addition. According to him, the confirmation of Rs.1 lakh did not tally with the dates of receipts mentioned in the AIR information.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had received only Rs.1 lakh from Allied Digital Services Ltd., for which there was no reference in the AIR information. Relying on the decision of the Tribunal in the case of DCIT vs. Shree G. Selva Kumar (ITA No.868/Bang/2009 decided on 22.10.10) and in the case of Aarti Raman vs. DCIT (ITA No.245/Bang/2012 decided on 05.10.12), it observed that time and again, it has been held that the additions madesolely on the basis of AIR information are not sustainable in the eyes of the law. If the assessee denies that he is in receipt of income from a particular source, it is for the AO to prove that the assessee has received income as theassessee cannot prove the negative. Accordingly, the matter was restored to the file of the AO.

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Arvind Kanji Chheda vs. ACIT ITAT Mumbai `A’ Bench Before R. C. Sharma (AM) and Sanjay Garg (JM) ITA No. 2295 /Mum/2012 Assessment Year: 2008-09. Decided on: 2nd December, 2014. Counsel for assessee / revenue: Madan Dedia / Rodolph N. D’souza

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Section 73 – Classification of business for the limited purpose of set off of past losses, into speculative and non-speculative is to be done on uniform basis and losses incurred in the same business in earlier assessment years are to be treated as eligible for set off against profit of the same business in the subsequent assessment years. Accordingly, brought forward loses from business of dealing in derivatives, incurred in assessment years prior to AY 2006-07 can be set off against profit of the same business from AY 2006-07 onwards.

Facts: During the previous year relevant to assessment year 2008-09, the assessee earned profit of Rs. 57,45,716 from transactions carried out in derivatives being futures and options. He had brought forward losses, amounting to Rs. 50,64,262, from this activity since AY 2004-05 to AY 2007-08. In the return of income filed, the assessee claimed set off of loss of earlier years incurred on derivative transactions out of profit of transactions of similar nature in the current year. The Assessing Officer (AO) while assessing the total income declined the claim on the plea that brought forward speculation loss cannot be set off against profit of a nonspeculative business in the current year.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :
The Tribunal found that it was undisputed fact that during the year under consideration the assessee had entered into similar transactions as were entered into in the earlier years when the losses were suffered. The loss brought forward from the earlier years and the gain made in the current year is of the same nature. There is no change in the nature of income earned during the current year.

The classification of business for the limited purpose of set off of past losses into speculative and non-speculative is to be done on uniform basis and losses incurred in the same business in earlier assessment years are to be treated as eligible for set off against profit of the same business in the subsequent assessment years. The Tribunal held that for this reason also the assessee deserves to be allowed set off of brought forward losses from business of dealing in derivatives, incurred in assessment years prior to AY 2006-07 against profit of the same business in current assessment year. Thus, speculative losses made on future and option transactions in earlier years are eligible to be allowed to be set off against the business income of future option transactions of current year. The Tribunal also noted that the Mumbai Bench of ITAT in Gajendra Kumar T. Agarwal vs. ITO (2011) 40 (II) ITCL 324 (Mum-Trib) vide order dated 31.5.2011 has held that loss incurred in derivative transactions upto AY 2005-06 can be set off against income from derivative transactions for AY 2006-07. The Tribunal decided the appeal in favor of the assessee.

The appeal filed by assessee was allowed.

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ITA No. 6062 /Mum/2012 Assessment Year: 2008-09. Decided on: 2nd December, 2014. Counsel for assessee/revenue: V. C. Shah/ Vivekanand Prempurna

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Section 271(1)(c) – Reduction of interest income
from expenses / WIP being a debatable issue, penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) is
not leviable notwithstanding that the assessee had not filed an appeal
on quantum addition.

Facts:
During the previous
year relevant to the assessment year 2008-08, the assessee company
received interest income of Rs. 5,99,644. In the return of income filed
by the assessee, this income was reduced from expenses and the net
expenses were carried forward as work-in-progress.

The Assessing
Officer (AO) while assessing the total income treated this sum of Rs.
5,99,644 to be income of the assessee. The assessee accepted the
addition. On the said addition, the AO levied penalty, u/s 271(1)(c),
amounting to Rs. 1,82,289.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

The
Tribunal found that the assessee has disclosed the relevant facts in
the return of income. The fact of not filing further appeal on quantum
addition should not come in the way of deciding the penalty proceedings.
The Tribunal was of the opinion that the issue whether interest income
was rightly set off against the development expenses or was to be
offered as income was a debatable issue. Accordingly, penalty u/s.
271(1)(c) is not sustainable. The Tribunal decided the appeal in favor
of the assessee. The appeal filed by assessee was allowed.

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Neelkanth Township & Construction Pvt. Ltd. vs. ITO ITAT Mumbai `B’ Bench Before D. Karunakara Rao (AM) and Amit Shukla (JM) ITA No. 6062 /Mum/2012 Assessment Year: 2008-09. Decided on: 2nd December, 2014. Counsel for assessee/revenue: V. C. Shah/ Vivekanand Prempurna

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Section 271(1)(c) – Reduction of interest income from expenses / WIP being a debatable issue, penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) is not leviable notwithstanding that the assessee had not filed an appeal on quantum addition.

Facts:
During the previous year relevant to the assessment year 2008-08, the assessee company received interest income of Rs. 5,99,644. In the return of income filed by the assessee, this income was reduced from expenses and the net expenses were carried forward as work-in-progress.

The Assessing Officer (AO) while assessing the total income treated this sum of Rs. 5,99,644 to be income of the assessee. The assessee accepted the addition. On the said addition, the AO levied penalty, u/s 271(1)(c), amounting to Rs. 1,82,289.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

The Tribunal found that the assessee has disclosed the relevant facts in the return of income. The fact of not filing further appeal on quantum addition should not come in the way of deciding the penalty proceedings. The Tribunal was of the opinion that the issue whether interest income was rightly set off against the development expenses or was to be offered as income was a debatable issue. Accordingly, penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) is not sustainable. The Tribunal decided the appeal in favor of the assessee. The appeal filed by assessee was allowed.

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The lakshmanrekhas of life

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I write this editorial, mourning the death of R.K. Laxman, the renowned cartoonist, whose common man, made us smile every morning. His cartoons were loved by all, such was the quality of his art. The lines that he drew can be truly referred to as “LaxmanRekha” in every sense of the term. His comments were hard hitting,caustic and yet retained an almost wry humour. His subtle comments on the inconsistencies in human behavior will always be remembered. He crticised persons of all classes and creed, making his point but never offended any one. He knew exactly where the line between humour and offence was drawn and never crossed it.

If all of us, whether as individuals, citizens, and professionals live our lives within the LaxmanRekha the demons, that lead us astray and come to haunt us, will not be able to do so. Let us take two of our rights, of paramount importance, the right to freedom of expression and the right to practice one’s religion. If all of us tempered our expression and ensured that while we got our point across, we respected the other person’s right as well, most of the problems like banning of films, books would not arise.Similarly, while everyone has the right to practice ones religion, there is a limit to what extent in what manner we can practice it in public. If all of us stayed within limits, we would not need the President of the United States to teach us religious tolerance. I have given a couple of illustrations, but there are many such norms in public life which we need to adhere to. It is all a question of staying within the LaxmanRekha.

There are such boundaries, when we act as professionals as well. We must ensure that we protect interests of our clients after we have understood where in our opinion their interest lies. I have often said this in the past, but our profession is such that we tend to build a very close association with our clients. This association often leads to our taking undue professional risks, and compromising our position. While this so in our role as auditors, as consultants, we must guard against tendering clients advice which falls within a grey area. We must remember that while a concern for our clients is natural, we cannot afford to fall in love with our clients. We must draw a boundary to our association with the clients and ensure that the relationship stays within that line. It is only then that our advice will be dispassionate, and it will be in the interest of both the client andus.

As chartered accountants, our role can be broadly divided into three parts. The first that of an auditor authenticating the accounts of the client, second as his advisor and consultant, and the third of his representative before various authorities. As auditors we must fully understand thatwhile expressing an opinion on client’s accounts, our role is that of an investigator. The law now requires us not merely to remain a traditional watchdog but a canine that barks and warns. However, even while performing that role, we must evaluate everything at face value, and not disbelieve everything that is placed before us. As consultants, we must understand the difference between evasion and avoidance. We must never advise client to evade tax, and ensure that measures and structures that are adopted for avoidance must fall within the four corners of the law. As representatives, we may make or adopt arguments which may sound absolutely ridiculous or border on irrationality, but we must never misrepresent or falsify facts. When we act there are limits within which we must remain, whether those lines are thin or dark.

While all of us are busy professionals, we must not forget that a duty to our families. I have seen that many of us do not draw a line between our offices and homes. We tend to carry our office, home and this disrupts the peace in the family and also affects the happiness of our dear ones. We must learn not to carry our profession beyond the threshold of our homes.We owe a lot to families and our success as professionals depends on their support.We must definitely discharge obligations to our loved ones.

If we have crossed the line or what I have referred to as the LaxmanRekha, in regard to any of our aspects of our life we must introspect. If we need to change some things around us and the change is possible we must make an attempt to carry out those changes. There may be some situations which we cannot change and we must learn to accept this fact. I am reminded of the following famous lines”God give me the courage to change the things that I can, the strength to accept those that I cannot and the wisdom to understand the difference between the two”. Finally, in order to appreciate and remain within the boundaries, which may avoid disasters, we may need to change ourselves, the most difficult task. I will end with the famous utterances of an Urdu poet, which run like this “Aadmi ghar badalta hai, libaas badalta hai, rishte badlta hai, dost badalta hai, lekin khudko nahi badlta. Ghalib bhi yahi galti karta raha. Dhool chehre par thi lekin aina saaf karta raha”.

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Yet Another Mantra for Life

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These lines set me thinking. We are living in a jet age where we talk of expressways and bullet trains. A cursory appraisal of most homes in the early morning or for that matter a look at our traffic manners shall clearly tell you that each one is in a perennial hurry, in a rush to reach somewhere.

What is the reason?
The answer appears to be easy, but to my mind is difficult to fathom. Our parents and forefathers lived a relatively peaceful life, and were no small achievers by any standards.

What then has gone wrong?
Is it the deluge of activities, too many means of communications and of commuting and that too fast? A look at your smartphone and you shall realize – phone calls, SMSs’, WhatsApp, FB updates and the list goes on. Has the list of accomplishments grown bigger for the present generation? I think not.

We have started mistaking activities for accomplishments. We have mistaken frequent connection for deeper/thicker relations. We have mistaken bigger network of friends and acquaintances for stronger relationships.

One of my friends, who seems to have all the time in the world, once told me, “I do not need to know the 2,000 members of the club. I know one member who knows the balance 1999.” And I realised, on thinking over, that he made sense.

An Israeli researcher, Michal Bar-Eli, evaluated hundreds of penalty shootouts and concluded that it would have done good for the goal keeper and his team if the goal keeper had neither moved left nor right, but stood still. We are conditioned to action, when remaining still would be a better choice.

Over the years, I have realised that my grandma had all the time to write a post card and personally place it in the red post box, my mother had all the time in the world to do all the household chores and her children have all excelled in their chosen field of endeavours.

I cannot help but extract the famous poem of the English poet, William H. Davies titled “Leisure” –

“What is this life if, full of care,
We have no time to stand and stare.
No time to stand beneath the boughs
And stare as long as sheep or cows.
No time to see, when woods we pass,
Where squirrels hide their nuts in grass.
No time to see, in broad daylight,
Streams full of stars, like skies at night.
No time to turn at Beauty’s glance,
And watch her feet, how they can dance.
No time to wait till her mouth can
Enrich that smile her eyes began.
A poor life this is if, full of care,
We have no time to stand and stare.”

The position would be different if, for example: – O ne had no back to back appointments and the diary did not look like an attempt in “seconds splitting”.
– I f the lady in the house had engaged in a de-clutter exercise and avoided multitasking.
– I f one possessed clarity of goals. The traveller passing through a village asked the farmer “where does this road go?” “It shall take you wherever you want to go”, the farmer quipped.
– I f one set up do-not-disturb hours. Silence and solitude bring miraculous effects.
– I f one lived in the moment without brooding over the past or worrying about the future. My sagely friend rightly remarked “step aside from the rat race because even if you win, you shall still be a rat.”
– I f one spent time with himself. Somebody rightly exclaimed, “have you ever dialed your own telephone number to realise that it is constantly engaged and therefore providing no opportunity to talk to yourself?”

To sum up, we need to slow down or for that matter stop and sit down. Blaise Pascal made a profound statement when he said “all of humanity/s problems arise from the inability to sit quietly in a room”

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DCIT vs. L & T Infrastructure Finance Co. Ltd. ITAT Mumbai `A’ Bench Before R. C. Sharma (AM) and Sanjay Garg (JM) ITA No. 5329 /Mum/2013 Assessment Year: 2007-08. Decided on: 3rd December, 2014. Counsel for revenue / assessee: Asghar Jain / Heena Doshi

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Sections 35AD, 271(1)(c) – Following the decision of Apex Court in Waterhouse Coopers Pvt. Ltd. vs. CIT (348 ITR 306)(SC), penalty deleted on the ground that that the assessee had committed bonafide error and it was not a case of concealment of income.

Facts:
The assessee company was formed on 18.4.2006. The first return of income was filed for AY 2007-08. In the return of income the assessee had claimed, u/s. 35D, one-fifth of expenditure incurred towards ROC fees for increase in authorised share capital. In the course of assessment proceedings, on being called to explain the claim, the assessee withdrew the claim. The Assessing Officer (AO) thereafter levied penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) holding that the assessee had furnished inaccurate particulars of income.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) and in the course of appellate proceedings contended that since it was the first return of income, the expenditure was erroneously claimed and the fact that expenditure was incurred after commencement of business operations. Upon the same being noticed, the claim was withdrawn. The claim was not willful and was made inadvertently. The CIT(A) observed that the assessee had committed a bonafide error and it was not a case of concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars. Relying on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Waterhouse Coopers Pvt. Ltd. vs. CIT 348 ITR 306 (SC), he deleted the penalty levied by the AO.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to Tribunal.

Held: The Tribunal observed that the assessee had explained that the error committed by it was inadvertent and due to a bonafide mistake. This was not a case for attraction of provisions of section 271(1)(c). The Tribunal agreed with the CIT(A) that the levy of penalty was not justified. The Tribunal upheld the order passed by CIT(A).

The appeal filed by revenue was dismissed.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 81 dated 24th December, 2013

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Notification No. FEMA.287/2013-RB dated 17th September, 2013, vide G.S.R. No. 645(E) dated 20th September, 2013, read with Corrigendum dated 24th October, 2013 vide G.S.R.No.741(E) dated 19th November, 2013

Borrowing and Lending in Rupees – Investments by persons resident outside India in the tax free, secured, redeemable, non-convertible bonds

Presently, a person resident in India who has borrowed in Rupees from a person resident outside India cannot use the said funds for any investment, whether by way of capital or otherwise, in any company or partnership firm or proprietorship concern or any entity, whether incorporated or not, or for relending.

This circular now permits resident entities/companies in India who are authorised to issue tax-free, secured, redeemable, non-convertible bonds in Rupees to persons resident outside India to use such borrowed funds for lending & investment as under: –

(a) For on lending/re-lending to the infrastructure sector; and

(b) For keeping in fixed deposits with banks in India pending utilisation by them for permissible end-uses.

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[2013] 40 taxmann.com 180 (Mumbai – Trib.) Platinum Asset Management Ltd vs. DDIT Asst Year: 2006-07, Dated: 4th December 2013

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Section 115AD of the Act – loss arising to a FII from index derivative transactions, is a capital loss and can be set-off against capital gains from sale of shares.

Facts:
The taxpayer was a Foreign Institutional Investor (“FII”). In respect of its two sub-accounts, the taxpayer had furnished the return of income declaring short-term capital loss. The loss had arisen from index derivative transactions. Hence, the AO concluded that it was a business loss assessable under the head ‘income from business and profession’ and not short-term capital loss as claimed by the taxpayer. The set off was denied as the taxpayer had no PE in India. In appeal, CIT(A) confirmed the order.

The issues before the Tribunal were:

• Whether the loss arising from index derivative transactions was business loss or capital loss? Whether the loss arising from index derivative transaction can be set-off against capital gains arising from sale of shares?

Held:
In terms of section 115AD of the Act, a FII is an ‘investor’ and further, income from transfer of securities is chargeable under the head ‘capital gains’ (long-term or short-term) and not business loss, and eligible for set off against capital gains.

SEBI (FII) Regulations and section 115 AD of the Act show that in case of FIIs the government has not contemplated that the tax authority should distinguish between the securities as those constituting capital asset or shock-in-trade. If a FII receives income in respect of securities or from transfer of securities, such income should be considered only u/s. 115AD(1).

Though in common parlance, shares and debentures are distinct from derivatives, such distinction is obliterated by mentioning the term ‘securities’ as defined in section 2(h) of Securities Contract (Regulation) Act, 19561 .

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Notification No. 1513/CR 150/Taxation 1 dated 24-12-2013

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Notification No. 1513/CR 151/Taxation 1 dated 24- 12-2013

By this Notification No. 1513, sales of wine covered by entry 3A of Schedule D by certain dealers subject to conditions is made exempt with effect from 1st January, 2014.

The other Notifications are also for amending Schedule D.

Refund to Diplomatic Authorities

Notification No. VAT 1513/CR 110/Taxation 1 dated 24-12-2013

By this Notification, the earlier Notification No. Vat.1509/CR-89/Taxation -1 Dated 5th November, 2009 gets amended.

Notification No. 1513/CR 124/Taxation 1 dated 01-01- 2014

By this Notification, the late fee for filing returns for certain class of dealers has been exempted subject to conditions.

Vehicles for handicapped persons

Notification No. 1513/CR 130/Taxation 1 dated 27- 12-2013

By this Notification Entry No. 63 is inserted in Schedule A for motor vehicles having engine capacity up to 200cc adapted or modified for use by handicapped persons reducing rate of tax at Nil. Such vehicle should be certified as “invalid carriage” in the certificate of registration issued under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

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Exemption under Focus Market Scheme (FMS) on export of meat and meat products, cotton and cotton yarn

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Notification No. 17/2013-ST dated 26th December, 2013

Vide this Notification, Notification No. 6/2013-ST dated 18th April, 2013 has been amended by way of adding additional categories like Meat & Meat Product, Cotton & Cotton Yarn in the list of exports not eligible for exemption under Focus Market Scheme duty Credit scrip issued to an exporter by the Regional Authority.

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Supreme Food Industries vs.. State of Kerala [2012] 47 VST 487 (Ker)

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VAT-Sale – Supply of Deep Freezers – By Ice Creame Manufacturing Company To Its Distributors Against Deposit – Up to full value of Cost- To be Adjusted Against Wear and Tear- In Four Equal Annual Instilments – Amounts To Sale – And Liable to Pay Tax – As well As Eligible to Input Tax Credit of Tax Paid on Purchase of Deep Freezers – The Kerala Value Added Tax Act, 2003.

Facts:
The petitioner company is engaged in manufacturing and sale of ice cream made purchase of deep freezers as an incentive and delivered same to the distributors against collection of security deposit almost equal to the value of deep freezers from each distributors. The assessing authority during the assessment for the years 2005-2006 and 2008-2009 treated such delivery of deep freezers as sale and levied tax thereon and did not grant input tax credit of tax paid on purchase of it being capital goods. The appellate authority as well as the Tribunal confirmed the assessment orders. The petitioner company filed revision petition before the Kerala High Court against such assessment orders.

Held :
The High Court rejected contention of the petitioner that there is no sale of deep freezers to the distributors because in fact it is a sale on deferred payment basis and the cost is recovered at 25 % each for the four years from the date of delivery. The transaction is a pure sale but on credit basis against payment in four installments.

As regards claim of input tax credit, the High court held that Deep freezers purchased and delivered are used for storage of ice cream by the distributors, and so much so, were capital goods for them and trading goods for the petitioner, who has purchased and sold the same to the distributors and is eligible to claim input tax credit on purchase thereof. Accordingly, the High Court allowed revision petition partly by directing assessing authority to grant input tax credit as per provisions of the law.

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State of Kerala vs. Yenkay Complex Pvt. Ltd. [2012 ] 47 VST 288 (ker)

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Sales Tax – Rate of Tax – Based on Star Hotels – Given By Tourism Department – Government of India – Special Rate Applies From Date of Approval of Star Granted – And not From 1st Day of Financial Year – Section-5B and Entry 46 of Schedule I of The Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963.

Facts:
The respondent is a resort hotel having three star approvals by Tourism Department of Government India with effect from 11-09-2002. Accordingly, the respondent paid license fee for the period up to 11/09/2002 and from 11-09-2002 paid tax on sale of Cooked Food @ special rate of 8% applicable to star hotels under Entry 46 of Schedule I of The Act.

However, the assessing officer having treated classification of three star hotels from 1st day of April 2002, applied special rate of tax of 8% from that date. The Tribunal allowed the claim of the respondent. The Department filed revision petition before the Kerala High Court against the said judgment of Tribunal.

Held:
Liability for tax on sale of cooked food which is generally served in hotel is fixed under the Statue with reference to the classification of hotels. In fact, only bar attached and star hotels are specifically covered by Entry 46 of Schedule I, attracting special rate of tax of 8 %. Other hotels are covered by section 5B, which provides for collection of license fees. The Tourism Department of Government of India is the agency constituted to declare star status of a hotel. Therefore for the purpose of Entry 46, star hotels mean only those hotels so classified by tourism department of Government of India. Therefore, the respondent is liable to pay tax at special rate of 8 % from 11-09-2002 onwards, when the approval of star was given by the tourism department and for earlier period the respondent is liable to pay license fees u/s. 5B of The Act. Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the revision petition filed by the State and approved the order of Tribunal.

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2013-TIOL-1806-CESTAT-MUM Kumar Beheray Rathi, K K Erectors, Kumar Builder, Kumar Builders vs. CCE, Pune-III

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Builders/Developers are not liable to pay service tax on “one-time maintenance charges” collected from buyers under the category of “Maintenance or Repair Services”.

Facts:
The Appellants were builders/developers of residential flats and various commercial premises and recovered one-time maintenance deposit from each of the customers to whom they sold the flats. The department contended to levy tax on the said amount under the category “Maintenance or Repair Services” along with interest and penalty. The Appellants contended that they were only working as an agent/trustee of the funds of the flat owners and was statutory obligation under Maharashtra Ownership Flats (Regulation of the Promotion of construction, sale, management and transfer) Act, 1963.

Held:
Analysing the agreement, the Hon. Tribunal held that the Appellants were not providing any maintenance or repair service to the buyers of the flats and thus allowed the appeal.

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Section 9(1)(i) of the Act – no income arises to a LO of a non-resident whose activities are confined to sourcing of goods for export.

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Section 9(1)(i) of the Act – no income arises to a LO of a non-resident whose activities are confined to sourcing of goods for export.

Facts:
HKCo was a company incorporated in Hong Kong and a member of an international Group of companies. HKCo acted as a sourcing channel for the entire Group. It sourced products internationally at competitive prices and of quality standard prescribed by the Group and resold goods to the affiliates. HKCo had established a Liaison Office (“LO”) in India for acting as a communication channel between HKCo and apparels manufacturers in India. Indian suppliers raised invoice on HKCo and HKCo, in turn, raised invoice on the buyer entities without any mark up. HKCo charged 5% commission to the buyer on the invoice value. LO also monitored the progress, quality, etc., at the manufacturing facilities and also the time schedule.

The AO concluded that the activities of LO pertained to supply chain management activities of HKCo. Hence, the exclusion in Explanation 1(b) to section 9(1)(i) of the Act did not apply and passed draft assessment order accordingly. Relying on the decision in Columbia Sportswear Company, In re, [2011] 12 taxmann.com 349 (AAR), the DRP accepted the conclusion of the AO and directed him to make the assessment.

Held:
The LO was engaged in (i) identification of the vendors in India; (ii) communication of the requirements with regard to design and specifications to the vendors; (iii) receipt of the prototype from the vendor; (iv) quality check for the products before production of goods; and (v) tracking the production and delivery including forecasting and scheduling of the order.

Considering the activities carried on by the LO of HKCo, the activities squarely fall within the ambit of explanation 1(b) to section 9(1)(i) of the Act. Further, there is no evidence to suggest that LO had indulged in commercial activities. In arriving at the conclusion of non taxability, strong reliance is placed on the decision of the Karnataka High Court in Nike Inc. (34 taxmann. com 170).

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2013-TIOL-1838-CESTAT-MUM Sodexho Pass Services India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai

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Whether Sodexho meal vouchers promote sale of goods/services and are similar to credit/debit cards?

Facts:
The Appellant is in the business of issuing meal/gift coupon vouchers after entering into an agreement with affiliates such as restaurants, eating places, other establishments etc. and issue such coupons to the customers, generally in corporates who in turn would distribute among its employees as fringe benefit. The Appellant received service charges from its affiliates as well as from customers which the department contended to levy tax on and thus issued a show-cause notice on 28-04-2006 which the Commissioner partly confirmed by dropping the demands on amount received from customers. The department and the Appellant both were in appeal against the said order of the said Commissioner.

The department held a view that the assessee promoted the business of the affiliates inasmuch a user/employee had to purchase goods and services from one of the affiliates and cannot use these vouchers in any other establishments or for any other purposes and thus taxable under “Business Auxiliary Services”. The assessee contended that their services were similar to debit/credit cards and therefore, such transactions were covered under “Business Support Service” and thus not-taxable prior to 01-05-2006. Further, they also contended that providing a list of affiliates would not amount to promotion or marketing of affiliates as it was merely a facilitating mechanism.

Held:
Affirming the commissioner’s view and observing the definition of “Business Auxiliary Services” effective from 10-09-2004, the Hon. Tribunal also upholding penalty held that the service charges received from affiliates were taxable and rejected the contentions of the assessee that the same were similar to credit/debit cards.

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[2013] 40 taxmann.com 345 (AAR) Endemol India (P.) Ltd., In re Dated: 6th December 2013

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Section 9(1)(vii) of the Act; Article 12 of India- Netherlands DTAA – while in terms of the Act, the consideration paid for the services was FTS, since the recipient was not enabled to independently apply the technology, knowledge or expertise, the payment was not FTS under India-Netherlands DTAA, which in absence of PE in India, was not taxable in India.

Facts:
The Applicant was an Indian tax resident company and a member of an international group of companies. The Applicant was engaged in the business of providing and distributing television programmes and it mainly produced reality shows and recently, also soap operas. DutchCo was also a member company of the Group. The Applicant entered into Consultancy Agreement with DutchCo under which DutchCo was to provide certain services such as, General Management, International Operations, Legal and Tax Advisory, Controlling and Accounting, Corporate Communications, Human Resources, Corporate Development, Mergers & Acquisitions, etc. These services were provided by DutchCo outside India. According to the Applicant these were administrative services.

The Applicant approached the AAR for its ruling on the following issues.

(i) Whether the payments made by the Applicant to DutchCo for administrative services would be in the nature of FTS under Article 12 of India- Netherlands DTAA?

(ii) If the payments were not FTS, would they be Business Income, which in absence of PE of DutchCo in India, would not be chargeable to tax in India?

(iii) If the payments were not FTS, would they be subject to withholding under section 195 of the Act?

Held:
As regards the Act The services rendered by DutchCo require technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how or processes and hence, cannot be termed merely as administrative and support services as tried to be made out by the Applicant.

As per The consultancy agreement, DutchCo was to render its ‘considerable experience, knowledge and expertise’ and the payments were to be made therefor.

The definition of FTS in Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vii) of the Act, includes managerial, technical or consultancy services. Hence, the consideration paid for the services rendered by DutchCo were covered by the said definition of FTS.

As regards India-Netherlands DTAA

Definition of FTS in Article 12(5) of India-Netherlands DTAA, contains ‘make available’ clause, which would require that the Applicant should be enabled to independently apply the technology, knowledge or expertise. The Applicant merely took assistance of DutchCo in its business activities and there was nothing to suggest that it was enabled to independently apply the technology, knowledge or expertise and thus, ‘make available’ requirement was not satisfied.

DutchCo did not have any PE in India. Hence, the consideration paid for the services rendered was not taxable in India.

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2013-TIOL-1805-CESTAT-DEL M/s Bansal Classes vs. Commissioner of Customs & Excise, Jaipur

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CENVAT credit of catering and photography services for encouraging students succeeded in coaching is inadmissible.

Facts:
The appellant provided commercial training and coaching services and availed input services of catering, photography, tent, maintenance & repair, rent for hiring examination hall and travelling expenses. The department contended to disallow the same and issued a show-cause notice demanding service tax along with interest and penalty.

Held:
Partly allowing the appeal, the Hon. Tribunal disallowed the CENVAT on photography services and catering services held that the said services cannot be said to have received in the course of providing the services as the same were used for encouraging the students who had already succeeded in the coaching.

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2013 (32) STR 577 (Tri.-Kol.) Karamchand Thapar & Bros. (Coal Sales) Ltd. vs. C.S.T., Kolkata.

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Any services in connection with clearing and forwarding operations are covered by the definition of clearing and forwarding agent’s services. Mere inaction is not sufficient but some positive action with intent to evade payment of service tax should be present for invoking extended period of limitation. The burden to prove malafide intention is on the revenue.

Facts:
The appellants were engaged in providing various services relating to movement of goods from collieries to clients at pre-defined destination. The demand with penalty was confirmed by the Commissioner considering the services to be clearing and forwarding agent services. Accordingly, the appeal was made on the following grounds:

• The branches billed from respective locations and they did not opt for centralised registration as there was no centralised accounting system but the accounts were merely consolidated. Therefore, territorial jurisdiction was challengeable. The appellants were engaged in supervision and liaisoning work with respect to loading of coal. Accordingly, they provided business auxiliary services of procurement of goods or services which were inputs for clients except two special clients; namely; for Tamil Nadu State Electricity Board (TNEB) at Paradip Port, the appellants provided composite services of cargo handling services and for Maharashtra State Electricity Board (MSEB), the appellants had a pending at CESTAT, Mumbai.

• Relying on the clarification vide Circular F. No. B43/7/97-TRU dated 11-07-1997 it was contended that their services were not in the nature of clearing and forwarding agent’s services since at no point of time they took custody or possession of coal and the transaction of sale was directly between the purchaser and seller and the destination for delivery was also known to both the parties and the appellants had no role to play in any of the activities of clearing and forwarding.

• In case of Larsen & Toubro Ltd. vs. Commr. Of Central Excise, Chennai 2006 (3) STR 321 (Tri.-LB), the Larger Bench had held that the words ‘directly’, ‘indirectly’ and ‘in any manner’ used in the definition of clearing and forwarding agent should not be read in isolation. Further that the decision of Coal handlers Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE 2004 (171) ELT 191 (Tri.-Kol.) did not apply to them as it was based on Prabhat Zarda Factory (India) Ltd. vs. CCE, Patna 2002 (145) ELT 222 (Tri.) which was specifically overruled by the Larger Bench in Larsen & Toubro Ltd. decision (supra).

• The appellants received service charges from freight financing activity in the form of prepayment of railway freight under separate and independent contract and transport of goods by rail was covered by the service tax net only in the year 2009 and therefore was not subject to service tax.

• The case was barred by limitation as they had a bonafide belief as to non-taxability based on trade notice and legal opinions.

The department contested the appeal on the grounds that the point of jurisdiction was never raised in reply to SCN or before the adjudicating authority. Since it was a mixed question of law as well as facts and the facts were not determined at adjudication level, the appellants were not to be allowed to raise the point directly before Tribunal. In any case, the appellants had centralised accounting system and therefore, the Commissioner at Kolkata had full jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter. Further, the words ‘directly’, ‘indirectly’ and “in any manner” employed made the gamut of definition very wide and it covered all services connected with clearing and forwarding operations.

Held:

The Tribunal observed and held that issue of jurisdiction could be raised at any stage of proceedings. However, since territorial jurisdiction is a mixed question of facts and law, the same should be raised before adjudicating authority to record findings on the facts. However, since the facts were not in dispute and were available on record, the Tribunal taking opportunity to deal with the issue observed that necessary data was provided by the appellants at Kolkata from time to time and consolidated profit and loss account and balance sheet were prepared at Kolkata and held that there was centralised accounting system and the option given for centralised registration was only for administrative convenience and to avoid overlapping of jurisdiction and conflicting views in assessment. Accordingly, it was held that the Commissioner at Kolkata had jurisdiction to decide the matter of all branches of the appellants. Referring Halsbury’s Laws England (Fourth Edn. – Vol. V), the Tribunal observed the scope of forwarding agent and concluded that there was no need to have custody or possession of goods to be a forwarding agent and the person acting as an agent for movement of goods can be regarded as forwarding agent. The Larger Bench in case of Larsen & Toubro (supra), had concurred with the width and amplitude of meaning of ‘directly’, ‘indirectly’ and “in any manner”, laid down in Prabhat Zarda Factory (Pvt.) Ltd.’s case (supra) and only had not agreed to the conclusions arrived at by the Bench of the facts of the relevant case. Therefore, principle laid down in Prabhat Zarda Factory (Pvt.) Ltd.’s case (supra) and followed later in Coal Handler’s case (supra) was absolutely valid. The instant matter being identical to Coal Handler’s case (supra) wherein it was concluded that even indirect services connected with clearing and forwarding operations i.e. services rendered for movement of coal would be clearing and forwarding services. The services mentioned in Circular and Trade Notice were illustrative and therefore, any service satisfying all ingredients of the definition as discussed in the Circular were covered under clearing and forwarding agent’s services. Freight financing was connected with clearing and forwarding operations and hence, should be chargeable to service tax. The amendment in section 73 of the Finance Act, 1994 with effect from 10-09-2004 was significant and accordingly, relying on various decisions, it was held that mere inaction is not sufficient but some positive action with intent to evade payment of service tax should be present for invoking extended period of limitation and the burden to prove malafide intention is on the revenue. In absence of any evidence and reasoning by department and having regard to the facts of the case, it was observed that although the appellants were negligent while merely placing reliance on the Circular or Trade Notice, the receipts were recorded appropriately in the books of accounts and therefore, no attempt of suppression existed and the appellants were bonafide. Accordingly, extended period of limitation was not invokable.

With respect to certain computational issues on TNEB and MSEB contracts, the matter was remanded to the Commissioner with appropriate directions.

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[2014] 41 taxmann.com 207 (AAR) Aircom International Ltd., United Kingdom, In re Dated: 10th January 2014

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Section 245R(2) of the Act – where scrutiny notice u/s. 143(2) of the Act is issued after the date of filing of application before the AAR, bar in section 245R(2) is not attracted.

Facts:
The Applicant was a company incorporated in the UK. The Applicant had a wholly owned subsidiary in India (“ICo”) that was engaged in the business of software, sales and consultancy in the area of tele-communications. The Applicant entered into Management Services Agreement (“MSA”) with ICo. ICo had made certain payments under the MSA to the Applicant.

The Applicant applied to the AAR for its ruling on the assessibility of the payments received from ICo.

While ICo had filed the return of its income before the application was made by the Applicant to the AAR, the AO of ICo had issued the notice u/s. 143(2) of the Act to ICo after the application was filed before the AAR.

Held:
Following the ruling in Hyosung Corporation Korea, In re, [2013] 36 taxmann.com 150 (AAR), the AAR held that mere filing of the return of income does not attract the bar on the admission of the application as provided in section 245R(2) of the Act. The question raised in the application can be considered as pending for adjudication before the tax authority only when issues are referred to in the return and notice u/s 143(2) is issued.

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Amendment in Mega Exemption Notification- Sponsorship of sports events Notification No. 1/2014-ST dated. 10th January, 2014

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Vide this Notification, the scope of Mega Exemption Notification No. 25/2012 dated June 20, 2012 has been widened by inserting the words “or country” in the opening paragraph, in entry 11, in item (a) of the said Notification. With such insertion, the exemption scope of sponsorship of sporting events organied by a national sports federation has been widened by covering teams or individuals representing any Country instead of representing only district, state or zone.

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Instrument – Chargeability to stamp duty – Document executed before Notary – Creating rights in land – Stamp Act, 1899, section 17, 2(14)

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Om Prakash Umar vs. State of U.P. through Secretary Fund & Revenue Dept. U.P. Shashan, Lucknow & Ors ARI 2013 Allahabad 209

A document before the Notary was executed on 14-12- 2009 by one Mr. Mahadeo and others by which they withdrew their rights on the abadi land admeasuring 80 ft. x 70 ft. and transferred them in favour of the petitioner for a consideration of Rs. 50,000/- only. The aforesaid document was written on a stamp paper of Rs. 150/- only. The Additional Commissioner (Stamp) vide order dated 18-04-011 held the above document to be an instrument of conveyance and assessing its market value determined the deficiency in stamp duty and imposed a penalty. The appellate authority affirmed the aforesaid order vide its order dated 25-11-2011.

The above two order dated 25-11-2011 and 18-04-2011 were under challenge by way of writ petition before the Allahabad High Court. The Hon’ble Court observed that section 17 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 provides that all instruments chargeable with duty and executed by any person in the India shall be stamped before or at the time of execution. Therefore, stamp duty on an instrument is payable at the time of execution of the instrument. The moment an instrument is executed stamp duty is payable on it. The validity of its execution or its non-registration has nothing to do with its execution and consequently the payment of stamp duty.

An instrument as defined u/s. 2(14) of the Act includes every document and record by which any right or liability is, or purports to be created, transferred, limited, extended, extinguished or recorded. The above document executed before the Notary, with whatever name it may be called, creates rights in the land in favour of the petitioners, after extinguishing those of Mr. Mahadeo and others therein. It is, therefore, undoubtedly, an instrument as defined u/s. 2(14) of the Act.

In view of the aforesaid facts the aforesaid document dated 14.12.2009 is an ‘instrument’ within the meaning of Section 2(14) of the Act and its execution is not denied, it is chargeable to stamp duty.

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Evidence – Commission of Enquiry – Statements made before commissioner cannot be used as evidence before civil or criminal court – Conclusions based on such statements cannot be used as Evidence:

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SBI through General Manager vs. National Housing Bank & Ors(2013) 180 Comp. Cas 15 (SC)

The National Housing Bank drew a cheque on 3rd January, 1992, for an amount of Rs. 95.39 crore approximately on the Reserve Bank of India in favour of the State Bank of Saurashtra, a subsidiary of the appellant, which later merged with the appellant. Towards the end of April, 1992, the National Housing Bank found that it did not possess any bank receipts or supporting documents or any securities in respect of such transaction and addressed letters to the State Bank of Saurashtra requesting it to make delivery of bank receipts/securities or for return of the amount. The state bank of Saurashtra denied the existence of any “outstanding transaction”. The National Housing Bank filed a suit before the Special Court established under the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in securities) Act, 1992 against (i) the State Bank of Saurashtra, (ii) HM, (iii) 2 employees of HM and (iv) the Custodian appointed u/s. 3(1) of the 1992 Act for recovery of an amount of Rs. 95.39 crore with interest alleging conspiracy, collusion and fraud between the defendants in the suit thereby causing loss to the National Housing Bank. The Special Court passed a decree in favour of the National Housing Bank and against the state bank of Saurashtra. The State Bank of Saurashtra challenged that part of the decree which was against, it and the National Housing Bank challenged that part of the decree of the Special Court directing it to deliver certain amounts to the Custodian:

The Hon’ble Court observed that u/s. 9A(1) of the Act, the Special Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate any matter or claim arising out of a transaction in securities entered into during the period specified in the section in which a notified person is involved in whatever capacity. Therefore, the Special Court was authorised by law to adjudicate the claim of the defendant, HM, without being shackled by the procedural fetters imposed under the code.

Further that though the 1992 Act declares that the Special Court is not bound by the Code of Civil procedure, 1908, it does not relieve the Special Court from the obligation to follow the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The findings of even a statutory commission appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, are not enforceable proprio vigore and the statements made before such commission are expressly made inadmissible in any subsequent proceedings civil or criminal. Therefore, courts are not bound by the conclusions and findings rendered by such commissions. The statements made before such commission cannot be used as evidence before any civil or criminal court. It should logically follow that even the conclusions based on such statements can also not be used as evidence in any court.

The Special Court had based its conclusions on Janakiraman Committee Report and the correspondence between the various parties (whose details are not even specified in the judgment).

The Court observed that the course adopted by the learned Judge of the Special Court of looking into the correspondence between the parties, which even according to the learned Judge had not been proved is not permissible in law. The Special Court Act though declares that the Court is not bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, it does not relieve the Special Court from the obligation to follow the Evidence Act. Further, the learned Judge extensively relied upon the second interim report of the Jankiraman Committee on the ground that the same was tendered by the 1st Defendant.

It is well settled by a long line of judicial authority that the findings of even a statutory Commission appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 are not enforceable proprio vigore as held in Ram Krishna Dalmia vs. Justice S.R. Tendolkar and Ors.: AIR 1958 SC 538 and the statements made before such Commission are expressly made inadmissible in any subsequent proceedings civil or criminal.

In our view, the courts, civil or criminal, are not bound by the report or findings of the Commission of Inquiry as they have to arrive at their own decision on the evidence placed before them in accordance with law.

Therefore, Courts are not bound by the conclusions and findings rendered by such Commissions. The statements made before such Commission cannot be used as evidence before any civil or criminal court. It should logically follow that even the conclusions based on such statements can also not be used as evidence in any Court. Janakiraman Committee is not even a statutory body authorised to collect evidence in the legal sense. It is a body set up by the Governor of Reserve Bank of India obviously in exercise of its administrative functions, The Governor, RBI set up a Committee on 30th April, 1992 to investigate into the possible irregularities in funds management by commercial banks and financial institutions, and in particular, in relation to their dealings in Government securities, public sector bonds and similar instruments. The Committee was required to investigate various aspects of the transactions of SBI and other commercial banks as well as financial institutions in this regard.

The Court dismissed the suit.

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Doctrine of merger – Appeal to Appellate Tribunal – Not applicable when appeal rejected on limitation.

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Raja Mechanical Co.(P) Ltd vs. Commissioner of C. Ex, Delhi – I 2012 (279) ELT 481 (SC)

The facts in nutshell are that the assessee is a manufacturer of dutiable excisable goods. The assessee availed a MODVAT Credit of Rs. 1,47,000/- by filing a declaration dated 30-06-1995 under Rule 57T(1), whereby it declared the receipt of the goods from M/s. DGP Windsor India Ltd. vide invoice dated 18- 06-1995, alongwith the application for condonation of delay, before the adjudicating authority/assessing authority. Accordingly, the adjudicating authority had issued a show cause notice.

As there was a delay in filing the prescribed forms before the assessing authority. Therefore, the assessing authority had rejected the claim of the assessee and accordingly, had directed him for payment of the Excise duty credit availed by the assessee. Aggrieved by that order, the assessee had belatedly filed an appeal before the proper appellate authority. Since there was delay in filing the appeal and since the same was not within the time that the appellate authority could have condoned the delay, accordingly had dismissed the same. It is that order which was questioned before the Tribunal. Before the Tribunal, as we have already noticed, the assessee had requested the Tribunal to first condone the delay and next to decide the appeal on merits, i.e. to decide whether the adjudicating authority was justified in disallowing the benefit of the Modvat credit that was availed by the assessee. The Tribunal had not conceded to the second request made by the assessee and only accepted the findings and conclusions reached by the Commissioner of Appeals, who had rejected the appeal. The assessee’s stand before the Tribunal and before this Court is that the orders passed by the adjudicating authority would merge with the orders passed by the first appellate authority and the Tribunal ought to have considered the appeal filed by the assessee on merits also. In our opinion, the same cannot be accepted. In view of the plethora of decisions of this court, wherein this court has, categorically, observed that if for any reason an appeal is dismissed on the ground of limitation and not on merits, that order would not merge with the orders passed by the first appellate authority.

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Contract of guarantee and contract of indemnity – Difference – section 124 and 126, Contract Act, 1872:

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Punjab National Bank vs. Ram Dutt Sharma & Ors AIR 2013 Allahabad 198

Plaintiffs Sri Ram Dutt Sharma and his wife Smt. Saroj, instituted a Suit, impleading New Bank of India, Sri Chhote Lal Sharma, son of Sri Khacheru Singh and Smt. Saroj, wife of Sri Shiv Charan as defendants. The relief sought in the aforesaid suit was a mandatory injunction directing defendant No. 1 to auction Truck No. UHN 1077, belong to defendant Nos. 2 and 3, and in possession of defendant-Bank towards security/ guarantee against the amount of loan, advanced to defendant Nos. 2 and 3, and realise outstanding dues, before encashing Fixed Deposit Receipts of plaintiffs, lying with defendant-Bank.

The plaintiff’s case was that defendant Nos. 2 and 3 were running a transport business. They purchased a new Truck in 1985. The financial assistance in the aforesaid transaction was tendered by the Bank, advancing a loan of Rs. 1,50,000/-, against which Truck itself was hypothecated. Besides, the plaintiffs’ FDRs of Rs. 10,000/- and Rs. 70,000/- were pledged in security for a period of three years or till repayment of loan amount, whichever is earlier. There appears to be some default towards repayment of loan amount, on the part of defendant Nos. 2 and 3, but defendant No: 1, instead of realising defaulted amount from defendant Nos. 2 and 3, by sale/auction of mortgaged vehicle, proceeded to encash FDRs of plaintiffs lying in security with the bank, hence the suit.

The Hon’ble Court observed that it would be necessary to determine the nature of contract between the plaintiffs and the Bank. The contract between the Bank and respondents 3 and 4 was admittedly that of loaner and loanee. A “contract of guarantee” is defined in Section 126 of I.C. Act, 1872. It says that a “contract of guarantee” is a contract to perform the promise or discharge liability of a third person in case of his default. The person who gives the guarantee is called “surety”, person in respect of whose default the guarantee is given is called the “principal debtor” and the person to whom the guarantee is given is called the “creditor”. In case this Court found that the plaintiffs entered into a contract of guarantee with the Bank in terms of Section 126 of I.C. Act, 1872 the plaintiffs would be “surety”, respondents 3 and 4 would be the “principal debtor”, and the Bank would be “the creditor”. A guarantee, therefore, is an accessory. It is essentially a contract of accessory nature being always ancillary and subsidiary to some other contract or liability on which it is founded without support of which it must fail.

The distinction between the “contract of guarantee” and “contract of indemnity” comes out from the definitions of two. The phrase “contract of indemnity” is defined in Section 124 of I.C. Act, 1872 which states that a contract by which one party promises to save the other from loss caused to him by the conduct of promisor himself or by the conduct of any other person is called “contract of indemnity”. One of the apparent distinctions between two is that a “contract of guarantee” requires concurrence of 3 persons, namely, the principal debtor, surety and the creditor, while “contract of indemnity” is a contract between two parties and promisor enters into such contract with other party. In other words, a person who is party to a contract, if he executes a promise to other party to save him from loss on account of promiser’s conduct or by the conduct of any other person, it, is a “contract of indemnity”, while for the purpose of “contract of guarantee”, it requires presence of three parties at least.

“Surety” is always liable to the extent of precise terms of his commitment and not beyond that. In the case of “contract of guarantee”, section 128 of I.C. Act, 1872 says that the liability of surety is co-extensive with that of principal debtor, unless it is provided otherwise by the contract.

The initial term of guarantee/surety was alleged to be three years or earlier thereto till the entire loan money is paid. The loan agreement was executed in 1985. Mere renewal of FDRs does not mean renewal of contract of guarantee between the surety and creditor. After the expiry of period of contract of guarantee, there was no occasion for the Bank to proceed to retain FDRs of plaintiffs surety as a collateral guarantee against the loan amount. Lower Appellate Court, had rightly read the averments contained in the plaint vis-à-vis the contract between the surety and the creditor that the renewal of FDRs, if matured before payment, were referable to a period prior to 3 years from the date of such contract and not to the extent of period of contract beyond 3 years. To that extent, there was a clear averment that contract was only for three years or earlier thereto when the entire loan amount was paid. The word “earlier” rules out any possibility of a continuing contract of guarantee beyond 3 years.

Collateral security of FDRs was, therefore, available to the bank for a period of 3 years only and not beyond that, unless consented by surety, i.e. plaintiffs. Admittedly, no such consent was obtained by plaintiffs-surety and, on the contrary, the Bank on its own gave extension to the principal debtor in the matter of re-payment of loan amount. The appeal was allowed.

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2013 (32) STR 657 (Tri.-Mum.) WNS Global Services Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of C. ex., Nashik

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Leasing of telecom lines are eligible input services when services are exported electronically.

Prior to 2006, there was no requirement to take input service distributor’s registration.

When data is transmitted electronically, it has to be transferred first to the server of telecom authorities in India and thereafter, it is transmitted to recipient abroad. Though delivery of services is routed through server of telecom authorities in India and is not exported directly, the services are still export of services subject to receipt of payment in convertible foreign exchange.

Facts:
The refund of CENVAT credit was rejected on the grounds that part of CENVAT Credit was distributed by Head Office as input service distributor (ISD) without registration as ISD and that the balance CENVAT credit was disallowed on the ground that services of providing leased telecommunication lines was not eligible input service. Further, the appellants have not directly exported the output services but have routed through telecom authorities located in India and therefore, the definition of export is not satisfied.

The appellants contended that they are eligible for refund as there was no statutory requirement to take ISD registration prior to 2006 and the leased telephone lines were instrumental in exporting output services and therefore, were eligible input services. Even though services were first delivered to telecom authorities in India, it was an essential exercise for processing of data which was required to be transmitted to service recipient abroad for which amount was received in convertible foreign exchange and therefore, the transaction was of export of services only.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that the dedicated lines from office to telecom authorities were essential to export services electronically and therefore, leasing of telecom lines was eligible input service. Prior to 2006, there was no requirement for ISD registration. Accordingly, if input services were used for providing output services, the same would be eligible input services. The view taken by the department, that the output services were not exported since the services were transmitted through telecom service providers in India, was held to be completely irrational. In case of electronic transmission of data, firstly the data has to be transferred to server of telecom authorities in India and thereafter, it is transmitted to abroad service recipient. Since in the present case, the service recipient abroad has received services and payments were made in convertible foreign exchange, the output services were nothing but export of services. However, the appeal was remanded for limited purpose of verification of payments received in convertible foreign exchange at the Head Office situated in other jurisdiction and refund claim was allowed.

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2013 (32) STR 625 (Tri.-Ahmd.) Vishal Enterprises vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Ahmedabad

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Tendering of order manually by handing over the documents to the assessee is valid delivery to the assessee.

Facts:
The order-in-original was passed on 30-12-2010 and the same was served personally before 06-09-2011. The appellants argued that the order-in-original was not served through registered post with acknowledgment due (RPAD) upon the person for whom it was intended. Accordingly, procedure as required u/s. 37C of the Central Excise Act, 1944 was not followed and therefore, the order-inoriginal cannot be deemed to have been received by the appellants before 06-09-2011.

The respondents contested that section 37C of the Central Excise Act, 1944 prescribed two methods namely; tendering the decision or sending the order by registered post with acknowledgement due. Accordingly, department had very well delivered the order personally. The same was also evident from the letter dated 05-09-2011 received from the appellants demanding duplicate copy of the order-in-original since the original order was misplaced during shifting of office.

Held:
Referring to section 37C of the Central Excise Act, 1944, the Tribunal held that tendering of order can be done manually by handing over the documents to the appellants and the requirement is not strictly to be sent through RPAD only. The fact, that the order-in-original was received by the appellants, was accepted by the appellants themselves vide letter dated 05-09-2011 demanding duplicate copy of the order-in-original since the original order was misplaced. The decisions relied upon by the appellants were not applicable to the present case in view of the receipt of original order by the appellants and therefore, the order-in-appeal passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) on limitation was upheld.

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2013 (32) STR 622 (Tri.-Ahmd.) Nirma Ltd. vs. Commissioner of C. Ex. & S. T., Vadodara – I

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CENVAT credit on garden maintenance services, manpower services for garden maintenance was statutory obligation and therefore, is eligible CENVAT credit.

Construction service for compound wall of factory is to demarcate the factory, for completion of the factory and to save goods from pilferage and clandestine removal and therefore, is in relation to manufacture of excisable goods. Therefore, these services are eligible for availment of CENVAT Credit.

Facts:
The appellants took CENVAT credit on pest control services, manpower supply services required for maintaining a garden in factory premises and construction services utilised for making the compound wall of the factory. The appellants were compelled to develop 33% of the factory area to mitigate the effects of emissions around the plant vide permission by Government of India, Ministry of Environment and Forest. Further, to maintain garden, the plant had availed services of maintenance, garden development and manpower supply services for garden maintenance. The appellants relied on the decision of CCE, Bhavnagar vs. Nirma Ltd. 2010 (20) STR 346 (Tri.-Ahmd.) and with respect to construction services for compound wall of the factory, the appellants relied on the decision of CCE, Pune – II vs. Raymond Zambaiti Pvt. Ltd. 2010 (18) STR 734 (Tri.-Mum.).

Held:
Relying on the decisions cited by the appellants, the Tribunal held that services in relation to garden maintenance were to fulfil a statutory obligation and therefore, the same were eligible for CENVAT credit. Further, compound wall was essential to demarcate the factory premises and to save manufactured goods from pilferage and clandestine removal and therefore, the same was for completion of factory and an activity in relation to manufacture of excisable goods. Accordingly, CENVAT credit in respect of all disputed services was allowed.

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2013 (32) STR 610 (Tri.-Ahmd.) AIA Engineering Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Ahmedabad

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New grounds cannot be taken in the revisionary SCN issued by Commissioner.

Facts:
Original adjudicating authority sanctioned refund of terminal handling charges and repo charges. However, Commissioner started proceedings to revise the order issued by the original adjudicating authority and after issuing SCN, refund was held to be sanctioned wrongly vide Commissioner’ order on the ground that the appellants were providing services which were not specified in Notification No. 41/2007-ST dated 06-10-2007. The appellants contested that the SCN issued by the Commissioner for revision u/s. 84 travelled beyond the SCN issued by the original adjudicating authority and therefore, Commissioner’s order was liable to be dropped. However, as per revenue, the Commissioner relied on the same documents as were verified by the original adjudicating authority and reached the conclusion that the services were not specified in the said notification.

Held:
Relying on the decisions of Viacom Electronics (P) Ltd. vs. CCE Vadodara 2002 (145) ELT 563 (Tri.-Mum.), Aero Products vs. CST Bangalore 2011 (22) STR 522 (Tri.-Bang.) and Sands Hotel Pvt. Ltd. vs. CST, Mumbai 2009 (16) STR 329 (Tri.-Mum.), the Tribunal held that new ground cannot be taken in the revisionary SCN. In the present case, the original SCN was based on insufficient documentation for grant of refund, however, the revisionary SCN was on a totally new ground about ineligibility to claim refund and therefore, the appeal was allowed.

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2013 (32) STR 756 (Tri,-Ahmd) Atwood Oceanics Pacific Ltd vs. Comm. of Service Tax, Ahmd.

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Whether activities of drilling, completion or abandonment of exploratory wells would be classifiable under category of “Survey & Exploration of Mineral, Oil & Gas service” Or “Mining of mineral, oil & gas service” Or “Supply of tangible goods service”?

Facts:
The Appellant entered into an agreement for drilling, testing, completion at exploratory wells as per directions of its client. Appellant obtained service tax registration in February, 2009 under the category of “supply of tangible goods service” and started paying service tax. The Revenue entertained a view that Appellant’s activities could be classified under “Survey & Exploration of Min- eral, Oil & Gas service” from November, 2006 to May, 2007 and under “Mining of mineral, oil & gas service” from June, 2007 onwards. After verification of documents by the Respondent, Appellant deposited service tax along with interest for the period June, 2007 onwards. Thereafter, the Revenue demanded service tax for the period 2006 to 2009. The Appellant challenged the demand before the Commissioner (Appeals) and argued that their activities were post-exploration activities and as per CBEC Letter F. No. B2/8/2004-TRU dated 10-09-2004 the activities pertaining to survey and exploration were covered under “Survey & Exploration of mineral, oil & gas service” and not the activities relating to actual exploitation of mineral, oil & gas. The Commissioner (Appeals) dropped the demand pertaining to the period November, 2006 to May, 2007 under “Survey & Exploration service” but confirmed the demand from June 2007 under “Mining of mineral, oil & gas service” and consequently, Appellant as well as Respondent both preferred appeals before the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal held that the activities undertaken had direct nexus with the mining as the activity undertaken is drilling of wells for exploration of minerals, therefore the said activity is classifiable under “Mining Service” from June 2007 onwards. The Tribunal observed that, even if the classification of service as interpreted by the Tribunal is held otherwise owing to the complexities involved, extended period was not applicable and service tax could not be recovered for the period prior to 01-06-2007, as SCN covering the period before June, 2007 was issued in April, 2009. The Tribunal held that the service tax was applicable from June, 2007 onwards under category of “mining service” and thereafter under “supply of tangible goods” service from 16-05-2008 onwards. The Tribunal set aside the penalties on the ground that Appellant’s act of depositing service tax along with interest before issuance of SCN shows Appellant entertained bonafide belief and intent of evasion was absent. Accordingly, the Tribunal rejected Respondent’s appeal while allowing Appellant’s appeal.

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2013 (32) STR 738 (Tri-Del.) CCEx., Chandigarh vs. U. B. Construction (P) Ltd.

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Whether explanation added on 01-07-2010 to section 65 (105) (zzzq) and 65(105) (zzzh) for expanding the scope of construction services are prospective in nature and otherwise?

Facts:
Revenue had challenged the Order passed by the Appellate Authority allowing the appeal of the Appellant which held that construction services rendered to prospective buyers of flat were to be regarded as self–service by the builder for the period upto 30/06/2010 and therefore service tax was not applicable on the amounts received till this date.

Held:
After considering the judgements quoted by the Appellant such as G. S. Promoters vs. UOI -2011 (21) STR 100 (P & H), MCHI vs. UOI-2012 (25) STR 305 (Bom) and after referring to the Board Circular No. 334/4/2010 dated 01-07-2010, Tribunal held as follows:

The Punjab and Haryana High Court rejected the challenge to the constitutional validity of the said explanation in G. S. Promoter’s case. The issue whether the said explanation is retrospective or prospective in nature was not considered nor decided by the High Court whereas the Bombay High Court in MCHI’s case considered the issue whether the said explanation is prospective in nature or otherwise. Bombay High Court held that the said explanation was specifically legislated upon to expand the concept of taxable service as prior to explanation view was taken that a mere agreement to sale does not create any interest in the property and title to the property continues to remain with the builder, no service was provided by the builder, that the service, if any would be in the nature of a service rendered by the builder to himself. The explanation inserted with effect from 01-07-2010 expands the scope of the taxable service to include the service provided by the builder to buyers pursuant to an intended sale of immovable property before, during or after the construction and therefore the provision is expansive of the existing intent and not clarificatory of the same and is consequently prospective. In view hereof, the Tribunal held that since the construction was undertaken for the period before the insertion of the explanation, there is no liability to pay service tax and the Appeal was dismissed.

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[2013] 40 taxmann.com 185 (Delhi HC) Freezair India (P) Ltd. vs. CCE, Delhi

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Whether successor company was liable to be assessed for the liabilities of the predecessor who was a sole proprietor and now the director in the company, under Central Excise Act, 1944? Held, No.

Facts:
The appellant succeeded a sole proprietorship firm M/s. Freezair India (FI) and took over all the assets and liabilities. The proprietor subsequently became the director of the said company. The department issued a show-cause notice including the duties and liabilities in respect of manufacturing and clearing operations effected by M/s. FI on the ground that prior to taking over, the Appellant company was known as M/s. FI situated at the same address and also that the proprietor had become the director. The Tribunal held that the liabilities inherited by the company from the proprietary concern included the liability to be assessed and to pay the duty of excise.

Held:
Holding that the duties and liabilities of the predecessor were not liable to be paid by the appellant, the Hon. High Court observed that a company in law was different from its subscribers of the memorandum and the promoter directors and that its independent existence was of great significance except where lifting of the corporate veil was required against the promoter directors, directors or others in charge and responsible for day to day work of the company, to enforce obligations of the corporate identity and seek performance or penalise the natural person behind the corporate cloak which had no application in the present case. The high court further observed that Rule 230(2) of the Central Excise Rules was also inapplicable since no determination of duty on the predecessor and a finding to invoke and make recovery from the successor was made by the revenue and that there had been no assessment of duty on the predecessor either before or after transfer/take over.

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2013-TIOL-1038-HC-KOL-ST Commissioner of Central Excise, Kolkata vs. M/s Vesuvious India Ltd.

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Whether outward transportation of finished goods from place of removal covered under the definition of “input service” before 01-04-2008? Held, No.

Facts:
The revenue preferred appeal against the order of the CESTAT, Kolkata allowing CENVAT credit of the amount paid towards outward transportation of finished goods from the place of removal upto the point of delivery relying solely on the case of Commissioner of C.E & S.T., LTU, Bangalore vs. ABB Limited in 2011 (23) STR 97 (Kar)

Held:
Diagreeing with the judgment of the Hon. Karnataka High Court in ABB Limited (supra), the Hon. Kolkata High Court allowing the appeal of the department held that the definition of “input service” would not include the expenses with regard to post-manufacturing stage except for the purpose of transportation of goods from one place of removal to another place of removal. They further stated that although a Board circular was issued, it cannot be to amend the rules and thus neither the services rendered to the customer for the purpose of delivering the goods at the destination was covered by the definition of input service prior to 01-04-2008 nor is the same covered after 01-04-2008.

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2013 (32) STR 530 (All.) Commissioner of Cus. & C. Ex. vs. Balaji Tirupati Enterprises

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If goods are deemed to be sold in the execution of works contract, service tax cannot be levied on the same.

Facts:
The substantial questions put forth before Hon’ble High Court were as under:

Whether composite contract of repairs can be

segregated into goods and services portion on the basis of payment of VAT on goods used during repairs?

Whether Notification No. 12/2003-ST dated 20/06/2003 is applicable when bifurcation of cost of various components is available in the contract?

Whether service tax is to be paid on total cost of repair under present composite contract?

Held:

Agreeing with the decision of Tribunal, Hon’ble High Court summarily dismissed the appeal and held that the goods which were deemed to be sold in the execution of works contract shall not be leviable to service tax.

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Film Distribution Rights, Whether Liable to Vat?

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Synopsis The authors continuing their coverage of transactions which have been subject of levy of dual taxation of sales tax and service tax, have in this feature discussed about taxability of film distribution rights in light of recent decision of AGS Entertainment Pvt. Ltd.(Mad.). The authors discuss and concur with the views of the Court that in case of temporary transfer of film distribution rights, what is transferred is only the ‘use of the goods i.e. copyright in films’ and not ‘transfer of right to use goods’, so such transaction shall be subject to service tax and not sales tax.

Introduction

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Association of Leasing and Financial Services Companies vs. Union of India & others (2 SCC 352) has observed as under;

“Today, with the technological advancement, there is a very thin line which divides a sale from service.”

In this scenario, it is very difficult to decide as to which tax will apply to the transaction/s i.e., VAT or Service Tax. One such issue arose in respect of film distribution agreements.

The film producers and distributors were under an impression that on their agreements for distribution of films with distributors, as well as between distributors and sub distributors or with theatre owners etc., they are liable to tax under State Value Added Tax Act.

However, Service Tax department also claimed tax on the said transaction under sub-clause (zzzzt) of clause (105) of section 65 as ‘transferring temporarily’ or ‘permitting the use or enjoyment of, any copyright defined in the Copyright Act,1957, except the rights covered under sub-clause (a) of the clause (1) of section 13 of the said act.’

The film producers and distributors challenged the levy of Service Tax before the Hon’ble Madras High Court. The Hon’ble Madras High Court has now delivered judgment in AGS Entertainment Pvt. Ltd. & Others (Writ Petition no. 29398 of 2010 & others dated 26.6.2013.)

Facts
In the Writ Petition, the Hon’ble Madras High Court has raised following issues for its consideration.

“17. Upon consideration of the rival contentions and averments in the Writ Petitions and counter statement, the following points arise for consideration in these Writ Petitions:-

1. Whether the taxable event provided under Section 65(105)(zzzzt) of the Finance Act, 1994 is covered by Article 366 (29A)(d), which is a “deemed sale of goods”?

2. Whether the Petitioners are right in contending that the levy of service tax on “temporary transfer or permitting the use or enjoyment of copyright“ provided u/s. 65(105)(zzzzt) of the Finance Act, 1994 is covered under Entry 54 of List II and whether it amounts to transgression by Parliament into the exclusive domain of the State Legislature?

3. Whether the Petitioners are right in contending that the copyright is goods and transfer of copyright of cinematograph films is only delivery of goods for consideration and is absolute transfer and no service element is involved?

4. Even assuming that there is an element of service involved in the nature of transaction done by the Petitioners, should the dominant intention of the transaction being transfer of goods has to be only taken into consideration?

5. Whether the Petitioners are right in contending that Parliament has no authority to dissect a composite transaction as in the case of the Petitioners and levy service tax?

6. Whether Section 65(105)(zzzzt) levying service tax on the temporary transfer or permitting the use or enjoyment of copyright is ultra vires the Constitution.”

The Hon’ble Madras High Court referred to a number of judgments about validity of levy of Service Tax and levy of tax on deemed sale by way of ‘transfer of right to use goods’. As stated above, the argument of producers was that their agreements were for transfer of right to use goods and not for rendering services. The argument of the department was that allowing temporary use was falling under the service category.

Judgments referred For arriving to the meaning of sale by way of ‘transfer of right to use goods’, amongst others, the Hon’ble Madras High Court referred to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of 20th Century Finance Corporation Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra (119 STC 182). Hon’ble High Court quoted the following paragraphs from the above judgment:

“26. Next question that arises for consideration is, where is the taxable event on the transfer of the right to use any goods. Article 366(29-A) (d) empowers the State Legislature to enact law imposing sales tax on the transfer of the right to use goods. The various sub-clauses of clause (29-A) of Article 366 permit the imposition of tax thus: sub-clause (a) on transfer of property in goods; sub-clause (b) on transfer of property in goods; sub-clause (c) on delivery of goods; subclause (d) on transfer of the right to use goods; sub-clause (e) on supply of goods; and sub-clause (f) on supply of services. The words and such transfer, delivery or supply … in the latter portion of clause (29-A), therefore, refer to the words transfer, delivery and supply, as applicable, used in the various sub-clauses. ………..

In our view, therefore, on a plain construction of sub-clause (d) of clause (29-A), the taxable event is the transfer of the right to use the goods regardless of when or whether the goods are delivered for use. What is required is that the goods should be in existence so that they may be used. ……….

27. Article 366(29-A)(d) further shows that levy of tax is not on use of goods but on the transfer of the right to use goods. The right to use goods accrues only on account of the transfer of right. In other words, right to use arises only on the transfer of such a right and unless there is transfer of right, the right to use does not arise. Therefore, it is the transfer which is sine qua non for the right to use any goods. If the goods are available, the transfer of the right to use takes place when the contract in respect thereof is executed. As soon as the contract is executed, the right is vested in the lessee. Thus, the situs of taxable event of such a tax would be the transfer which legally transfers the right to use goods. In other words, if the goods are available irrespective of the fact where the goods are located and a written contract is entered into between the parties, the taxable event on such a deemed sale would be the execution of the contract for the transfer of right to use goods. But in case of an oral or implied transfer of the right to use goods it may be effected by the delivery of the goods..”

Thereafter, High Court referred to the scope of section 65(105)(zzzzt) about ‘temporary transfer’ under Service Tax in para -37 as under;

“37. Section 65(105)(zzzzt) seeks to tax viz., “temporary transfer or permitting the use or enjoyment” of copyright which is a service provided by the producer/distributor/exhibitor. Service Tax is a levy not on the “transfer of right to use the goods” as described under Article 366(29A) sub-clause (d); but on the temporary transfer” or “permitting the use or enjoyment” of the copyright as defined under the Copyright Act, 1957. In the case of Sales Tax Act, there would be “transfer of right to use the goods”. Whereas under the Service Tax Act what is levied is temporary transfer/enjoyment of the goods. The pith and substance of both enactments are totally different. “Temporary transfer” or “permitting the use or enjoyment of the copyright” is not within the State’s exclusive power under Entry 54 of List II. Therefore, there is no merit in the contention that the taxable event provided under Section 65(105) (zzzzt) is covered by Article 366(29A)..”

Regarding nature of transaction about transfer of right to use goods, Hon’ble High Court referred to the judgment in case of B.S.N.L. vs. Union of India (2006)(3 SCC 1) and quoted the following paragraphs.

73. No transfer of right to use:- As held by the Supreme Court in the decision of B.S.N.L. vs. Union of India, (2006) 3 SCC 1, to constitute a transaction for the transfer of the right to use the goods the transaction must have the following attributes:

a.    There must be goods available for delivery;

b.    There must be a consensus ad idem as to the identity of the goods;

c.    The transferee should have a legal right to use the goods – consequently all legal conse-quences of such use including any permissions or licenses required therefor should be available to the transferee;

d.    For the period during which the transferee has such legal right, it has to be the exclusion to the transferor – this is the necessary concomitant of the plain language of the statute – viz. a “transfer of the right to use” and not merely a licence to use the goods; e. Having transferred the right to use the goods during the period for which it is to be transferred, the owner cannot again transfer the same rights to others.”

Observations of the High Court about nature of transaction

After referring to various different kinds of agree-ments entered into in the film industry in para-65 & 66, the Hon’ble High Court observed as under;

“65. Even though it was contended that the transaction is between the producer and the distributor and the distributor gets the absolute right over the cinematograph film, in reality, the distributor does not get the absolute rights. The distributor only gets few positive prints or cubes of the picture for the exhibition of the picture in the specified area. In other words, it is a temporary transfer of the copyright or permission to use or enjoyment for the limited period in the specified area. As rightly contended by the respondents, exclusive right of copyright ordinarily vests with the producer of the film. Even in outright assignment, the transfer is not absolute. In the case of a lease, it is for a given period. The levy of tax on any transaction is based on the criterion whether the transfer of right is permanent or temporary. So long as the producer does not fully relinquish his right over the copyright held by him, transfer of the right to use is purely temporary and in those cases, levy of service tax for such transfer of copyright would apply. The Service Provider is the Producer, who is the owner of the Intellectual Property and the service receiver is the person who temporarily gets the right to use the Intellectual Property who is the Distributor and service tax is leviable on such temporary transfer of copyright.

66.    Normally, producer of a movie exploits the film in many ways i.e., assigning copyrights to distributor(s) for exhibition in theatres; or the producer himself exhibits the film by engaging the-atres; exploitation of satellite rights, T.V. channels, audio/video, etc. The right given to the distributor is restricted to exploiting the contents of the film through a film/digital format through exhibition in theatres in a specific area and for specified time. Even though the copyright of the film is assigned to a distributor for a specific area for a limited period, the producer reserves his right to exploit the film in other media. So long as the transaction does not amount to sale or permanent transfer, it is only a temporary transfer of copyright or permit its use by another person for a consideration. The Service Provider is the Producer who owns the copyright of the film and Service receiver is the

Distributor who temporarily owns the copyright of the film for consideration.”

In paras 75 & 83 Hon’ble High Court has held as under;

“75. In our opinion, none of these attributes are present in the agreement between the producer and the distributor and the distributor and the theatre owner. Even while the films were in use by the distributor/exhibitor, the same are under the effective control of the producer. The distributor is not free to make use of the same for other works like satellite rights, T.V. Channels, exploitation of song, audio/video, D.V.D. etc., The distributor can-not make use of the film according to his wishes, but there is only temporary transfer or permission to use or enjoyment for consideration as per the terms of the agreement.”

“83. Considering the nature of various arrange-ments between the producer and the distributor, distributor/subdistributor and theatre owner, we are of the view that there is only temporary transfer or permission to use or enjoyment for consideration on certain terms and conditions in a specified area. Irrespective of the arrangement of rights to the distributor to a specific area for a limited period, the producer retains the original copyrights. The sale of goods can be said to have taken place only when the producer relinquishes his right and title over the goods; but when he keeps grip over the goods transferred for temporary use or enjoyment on certain terms and conditions. When the transactions are not sale or deemed sale, the same cannot be brought under Entry 54 of List II or Entry 92A of List I.”

Conclusion

The Hon’ble High Court analysed the nature of transaction of deemed sale in relation to film distribution. It is held that unless there is case of full assignment of the copy right, whereby a producer does not retain with him any right only then can it be liable to VAT. In other words, unless it is a case of permanent assignment of the film as a whole, no liability can be attracted under MVAT Act, 2002. Today in Maharashtra, the VAT authorities are levying VAT on the film distribution agreements, considering the same as transactions of transfer of right to use goods. In light of above judgment, the said levy can be said to be illegal and unjustified. The judgment of the Hon’ble Madras High Court being under Central Enactment, it is binding on authorities in Maharashtra also. As there is no contrary judgment of the jurisdictional High Court, we hope above precedent will be followed.

Whether Outbound Tours Are Taxable Under Service Tax?

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Synopsis The authors in this feature have highlight the scope of the definition “tour operator” for taxability of outbound tours and evaluated the definition in two parts i.e. operating and arranging tours and planning, scheduling, organizing or arranging such tours. The authors analyse how the principles of apportionment are essential to determine the taxability of several operations in the composite transactions which have some operations in one territory and some in others.

Introduction:

The service of tour operators was introduced as a taxing entry in the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act) with effect from 01-09-1997. ‘Tour’ in section 65(113) of the Act is defined as:

“A journey from one place to another irrespective of the distance between such places”.

The definition of tour operator however underwent amendment thrice of which the last two definitions are reproduced below:

10-09-2004 to 15-05-2008: 65(115) “ “tour operator” means any person engaged in the business of planning, scheduling, organising or arranging tours (which may include arrangements for accommodation, sightseeing or other similar services) by any mode of transport, and includes any person engaged in the business of operating tours in a tourist vehicle covered by a permit granted under the Motor Vehicles Act,1988 (59 of 1988) or the rules made thereunder.”

16-05-2008 to 30-06-2012:

65(115) “ “tour operator” means any person engaged in the business of planning, scheduling, organising or arranging tours (which may include arrangements for accommodation, sightseeing or other similar services) by any mode of transport, and includes any person engaged in the business of operating tours in a tourist vehicle or a contract carriage by whatever name called, covered by a permit, other than a stage carriage permit, granted under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988) or the rules made thereunder.”

Taxable service in relation to this service as contained in section 65(105(n) reads as follows: “

“taxable service” means any service provided or to be provided to any person, by a tour operator in relation to a tour.”

Typically in travel and tourism industry, a bouquet of services is provided to a variety of customers. There are different taxing entries in relation to these services viz. air travel agent, tour operator service, travel agent, rail travel agent etc. Tours are often provided by way of a package also. These packages can be broadly classified into domestic tours, inbound tours and outbound tours. Whereas the first two categories do not pose much debate as service tax is by and large paid by the tour operators for these kind of tours; it is the third category of outbound tours requires examination of relevant legal provisions and analysis thereof as in this case, the service provider viz. the tour operator organizes tours outside the territory of India for tourists from India. The tour is entirely performed outside India and on account of this, the disputes arise as to their taxability. Therefore the questions that require determination are:

• Considering the scope of the definition of “tour operator”, whether “outbound tours” are outside the purview of the taxable service as described in section 65(105)(h) of the Act?

• Whether the provisions of the Act have an extra territorial jurisdiction?

• Whether outbound tours amount to export of service? If the payment for the service is not received in convertible foreign exchange, whether the service is liable for service tax?

2013-TIOL-1907-CESTAT-DEL

Recently, in a set of five appeals filed with the Principal Bench, Delhi-CESTAT reported at 2013-TIOL-1907-CESTAT-DEL, Cox & Kings India Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, New Delhi, the Division Bench comprising of President CESTAT and another technical member had an occasion to analyse the above questions, the discussion of which is summarised below:

In addition to the relevant definitions reproduced above, the Hon. Bench took note of the scope of Chapter V of the Finance Act, 1994 (service tax law or the Act) provided in section 64(1), the charging section 66 and section 66A of the Act and provided due consideration to various circulars issued by the Central Board of Excise and Customs (CBEC or the Board) on outbound tours brought on record by the appellants and/or dealt with in the orders-in-original, enumerated below:

• Madurai Commissionerate issued Trade Notice No.110/97 dated 28-08-1997 based on TRU clarification of 22-08-1997 to the effect that outbound tours would not attract service tax and that in case of composite tours combining tours within India and outside India, service tax will be levied only on services rendered for tours within India provided separate billing in such respect is done. It is to be noted here that the service of tour operator was exempted during 18-07-1998 to 31- 03-2000. So, after its reintroduction, TRU issued Circular No.1/2000 on 27/04/2000 clarifying again that outbound tour would remain outside the ambit of service tax liability.

Note: The original circular of 22-08-1997 was withdrawn vide Circular No.93/04/2007 of 10-05-2007 but Circular No.1/2000 of 27-04-2000 continued to remain.

• Board’s Circular No.36/4/2001-ST clarified that levy of service tax extends to the whole of India except Jammu & Kashmir and that the expression ‘India’ includes territorial waters of India (which would extend upto twelve nautical miles) and that Chapter V has not extended the service tax levy to designated areas in continental shelf and exclusive economic zone of India. Therefore services provided beyond territorial waters of India are not liable for service tax as service tax was not extended to such areas so far.

• Commissioner (Service Tax), CBEC vide his letter dated 12-10-2007 addressed to Commissioner of Service Tax, Delhi (in response to the latter’s inquiry) clarified the subject of levy of service tax on outbound tourism that the Board is of the view that tour operator located in India provides services to recipient located in India for planning, scheduling and organizing in relation to outbound tours. Such services would be taxable under the category of tour operator service as both service provider and service receiver are located in India and the service flows within the country. Accordingly, the place of supply of service is India and hence the service is taxable.

• On a somewhat different footing from the above reply dated 12-10-2007, the Board issued Circular No.117/11/2009 in the context of Haj and Umrah on leviability of service tax on tour operator’s service that Haj and Umrah pilgrimage is for service provided by the Government of Saudi Arabia and tour takes place outside India; that as per Rule 3(1)(ii) of the Export of Services Rules, 2005 (Export Rules), tour operator’s services would be treated as performed outside India if they are partly performed outside India and no service tax is chargeable on such tour undertaken outside India considering this as export provided they fulfil other conditions as provided in the said Export Rules.

The adjudicating authority found that in the ordersin- original, the Board’s clarification vide letter of 12-10-2007 (cited above) was not binding. However, the clarification being consistent with the service tax regime, outbound service was taxable from 10-09-2004. Since the service provider and the receiver are located in India, the service is deemed to be delivered to the recipient-tourist in India. Therefore, the condition of Export Rule is factually not fulfilled and thus the tour operator was not entitled to benefit under the Export Rules and consequently invocation of extended period of limitation, penalty, interest etc. also were confirmed.

In the background of the above dispute, the substantive issues that fell for consideration of the Hon. Bench were;

•    The scope of “tour operator” defined in section
65(115) post its amendment from 10-09-2004 and whether the amendment altered the contours of the expression and to what extent.

•    Whether “outbound tours” fall outside the pur-view of taxable service defined in 65(105)(h) of the Act.

The Tribunal’s observations are summarised as follows:

•    Prior to 10-09-2004 and during 01-09-1997 to 31-03-2000 considering the definitions of tour and tour operator (provided above), the taxable activity was a service provided or to be provided to any person by a person who holds a tourist permit granted under the rules made under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (MV Act) for undertaking a journey from one place to another of any distance. During 01-04-2000 and
09-09-2004, the definition of “tour operator” was expanded to mean that operating of tours viz. activities/services of facilitating a journey by any other person from one place to another in a tourist vehicle covered by a permit under the MV Act or rules made thereunder was a taxable service.

•    On further expansion of the definition of tour operator from 10-09-2004, a person engaged in the business of planning, scheduling, organising or arranging tours (which may include arrangement for accommodation, sightseeing or other similar services) by any mode of transport is a taxable service. The amended definition also has an inclusive clause whereby a person engaged in the business of operating tours in a vehicle covered by a permit granted under the MV Act would come within the fold of “tour operator”. Thus, the first part of the definition does not include the business of operating tours by any mode/all modes of transport. If it was included, in view of the Bench, there was no necessity to incorporate the specific inclusionary part or it would amount to a surplusage and attribution of surplusage in legislative drafting must be avoided. Consequently, the only possible interpretation of the definition would be that where a person is engaged in a composite activity of operating tours as well as planning, scheduling, organising or arranging such tours by any mode of transport other than a tourist vehicle, such activity falls outside the scope of the definition of “tour operator”. However, the activity of “planning, scheduling, organizing or arranging tours” including operating tour in a tourist vehicle covered by the permit under the MV Act falls within the ambit of tour operator as a consequence of the inclusionary clause.

•    In the case under examination, the concerned assessees are engaged in a composite activity of both “planning, scheduling, organising or arranging tours” other than by a tourist vehicle (permitted under the MV Act) and in operating such tours as well. The outbound tours whereby Indian tourists are provided services in relation to tourism outside the Indian territory, no part of the journey would be in a tourist vehicle as defined in the law. The commencement and conclusion of the journey is generally by air-transport and besides scheduling the tour package, operating the tour, fixing probable dates and venues, the itinerary, booking accommodation in hotels abroad, travel arrangements for various destinations, sightseeing, boarding, providing guide, air-ticketing, arranging visa, travel insurance etc. clearly constitute operations of tour in addition to planning, scheduling, organising or arranging tours. The nature of the composite services in relation to outbound tours is thus outside the ambit of the definition “tour operator”. The Bench specifically observed that the nature of composite services provided by the concerned assessee in relation to outbound tours fall clearly outside the first facet of the definition; as amended from 10-09-2004.

•    As regards the issue of extra-territorial reach and operation of the Act, the Tribunal’s view point is summarised below:

In All India Federation of Tax Practitioners vs. UOI 2007 (7) STR (SC), it was clarified interalia that service tax is a value added tax and which is a destination based consumption tax in the sense that it is on the commercial activities and not a charge on business but on the consumer and would logically be leviable only on services provided within the country and that performance based services like tour operators provided services outside India. The Tribunal similarly observed that Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in Home Solutions Retails (India) Ltd. vs. Union of India 2011

(24) STR 129 (Del) reiterated the doctrine that service tax is a levy on the event of service. The Tribunal in detail examined the judgment in Commissioner of Income Tax Bombay vs. Ahmedbhai Umarbhai & Co. (1950) SCR-335 as well as the Supreme Court’s observations in Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries Co. Ltd. vs. Director Of Income Tax, Mumbai 2007 (6) STR 3 (SC) and the judgment in a recent case of G. D. Builders vs. UOI & Others 2013-TIOL-908-HC-DEL. It was observed in each of the judgments viz. Ahmedbhai Umarbhai (supra), Ishikawajima-Harima (supra) that it is essential for determining the taxability of several operations to apply the principle of apportionment to composite transactions which have some operations in one territory and some in others.
To bring home this point, the recent judgment in G. D. Builders vs. UOI & Others (supra) was referred to wherein as a corollary of the said position was followed that a composite contract involving labour and deemed sale of goods could be vivisected to levy service tax on the element of service.

Summarising its conclusion, the Hon. Bench held that qua the text and context of the provisions of the Act, it is clear that service tax is a destination based consumption levy. Taxable event in all events, qua the provisions of the Act and specifically the provisions of section 65 is on the provision of taxable service.  Therefore, when a service is provided and consumed outside the territorial locus of the Act, the consideration thereof would not be exigible to the levy of service tax under the substantive and procedural provisions. The final remarks in para 17(m) are reproduced below:
“(m) On the aforesaid analysis we conclude that the consideration received for operating and arranging outbound tours, even if falling within the scope of the amended definition of “tour operator”; (provided by the assessees and consumed by their tourist customers beyond Indian territory), is not liable to levy and collection of service tax, under provisions of the Act. We hold that provisions of the Act do not have an extra territorial operation. The conclusion and analysis on this issue [Issue No. (b)] is without prejudice to our analysis and conclusion on issue No. (a), that since the assessees had provided a composite service, of operating outbound tours apart from engaging in the business of planning, scheduling, organising or arranging such tours; and by a mode of transport other than in a tourist vehicle, the service falls outside the definitional locus of “tour operator” (vide the analysis on Issue (a), at para 17 supra).” [emphasis supplied].

Nevertheless, the Tribunal noted that whether the outbound tour amounts to export of service and is thus immune to levy service tax under the Export Rules is not decided and is left open or not found necessary in the ruling on the core issue.

Conclusion:

The issue is undoubtedly painstakingly dealt with by the Tribunal. Having allowed the assessee’s appeal, it remains to be seen whether the Revenue accepts the same or further litigates the matter. However, the above would be of little help to tour operators in the scenario post July 01, 2012 i.e. negative list based taxation because under the Place of Provision of Services Rules, 2012 (which have been brought in operation in place of Export Rules and Taxation of Services (Provided from Outside India and Received in India) Rules, 2006), tours performed outside India are considered as provided in taxable territory and therefore liable for service tax.

Certificate of Lower deduction or non-deduction of tax at source under section 197 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 – matter regarding. – INSTRUCTION NO 1/2014, Dated: 15th January, 2014 (reproduced)

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All the Chief Commissioners & Directors General of Income Tax, As per the Citizens Charter the time line prescribed for a decision on application for no deduction of tax or deduction of tax at lower rate is one month. Instances have been brought to the notice of the Board, about considerable delay in issuing the lower/ non deduction certificate u/s. 197 by the jurisdictional Assessing Officers.

2. I am directed to say that the commitment to tax payers as per the Citizens Charter must be scrupulously adhered to by the Assessing Officers and all applications for lower or no deduction of tax at source filed u/s. 197 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 must be disposed of within the stipulated time frame as above.

3. This may be brought to the notice of all officers in the field for compliance. 4. Hindi version will follow. F.No.275/03/2014-IT(B)

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