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18. [2017] 77 taxmann.com 49 (Delhi – Trib.) Gopal Saran Darbari vs. ITO A.Ys.: 2007-08 & 2008-09 Date of Order: 25th October, 2016

Section 54 – Even if an assessee acquires a
new house on credit i.e. the payment for which may be made in future, the
assessee cannot be denied the benefit of deduction u/s. 54.

FACTS 

For AY 2007-08,
the assessee in his return of income filed u/s. 139(1) returned long term
capital gain of Rs. Nil after deduction of Rs. 51,27,000 u/s. 54 of the
Act.  This sum of Rs. 51,27,000 comprised
of Rs. 35,00,000 deposited in Capital Gain Account and Rs. 15,27,000 paid to
Ajay Enterprises, a builder, for booking the flat.  During the course of assessment proceedings,
the Assessing Officer, on examination of receipts issued by the builder,
noticed that the assessee had booked two flats viz. A-907 and C-408 and payment
of Rs. 15,27,000 to the builder comprised of Rs. 5,77,000 for Flat No. A-907
and Rs. 9,50,000 for Flat No. C-408.  The
assessee admitted that the amount of Rs. 9,50,000 invested for flat no. C-408
was wrongly considered u/s. 54.  The
Assessing Officer (AO) worked out capital gain after indexation to be Rs.
49,78,349 and allowed deduction of Rs. 40,77,000 u/s. 54 – comprising of Rs.
35,00,000 deposited in capital gain account and Rs. 5,77,000 paid to builder
for flat A-907.  The AO assessed long
term capital gain to be Rs. 9,01,349.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal
to the CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the Tribunal where it was contended that the assessee has upto 4.12.2008
invested a total sum of Rs. 61,74,683 for purchase of a new house, therefore
there was substantive compliance of section 54 by making required investment in
the new house within the period specified u/s. 54.  For this proposition reliance was placed on
the following decisions –

I)   ITO vs. Smt. Sapana
Dimri [2012] 50 SOT 96 (Delhi)

     ii)  CIT vs. Ms. Jagriti Aggarwal [2011] 339 ITR 610 (P & H)

iii)  Kishore H. Galaiya vs.
ITO [2012] 137 ITD 229 (Mum)

iv) CIT vs. Rajesh Kumar
Jalan [2006] 286 ITR 274 (Gau)

v)  K. S. Ramchandran vs.
ITO [IT Appeal No. 941
(Mds.) of 2011]

HELD 

The Tribunal noted that the assessee had not
surrendered or offered the amount of Rs. 9,50,000 for addition. Before the AO
the assessee stated that the amount of Rs.9.50 lakh should not be considered as
investment u/s. 54.  Even without considering
this amount of Rs. 9.50 lakh, the actual investment by the assessee in purchase
of eligible new house within the specified period of 3 years was more than the
long term capital gain.

Even if an assessee acquires a new house on
credit i.e. the payment for which may be made in future, the assessee cannot be
denied the benefit of deduction u/s. 54 because what is required by sub-clause
(i) is that cost of new house should be equal to or more than the amount of
long term capital gain.

The requirement to invest in a bank account
under the capital gain account scheme is a procedural requirement to ensure
that investment is made in a residential house as claimed in the return of
income. Merely because of technical breach / non-compliance the benefit due to
the assessee by the legislature cannot be denied particularly when there is
substantive compliance made.  Section 54
is a beneficial section and as held by the Apex Court in Bajaj Tempo Ltd.
vs. CIT [1992] 196 ITR 188 (SC)
the provisions of a beneficial section
should be construed liberally.

For the above stated reasons and having
considered the ratio of the decisions relied upon by the assessee, the Tribunal
deleted the addition of Rs. 9,01,349.

The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the
assessee.

14. Kanungo Ferromet Pvt. Ltd vs. Addl. CIT (Mum) Members : Mahavir Singh (JM) and Ramit Kochar (AM) ITA No. 995/Mum/2014 A.Y.: 2005-06. Date of Order: 4th January, 2016. Counsel for assessee / revenue: Rajkumar Singh / Vikash Kumar Agarwal

Section 271E – Penalty u/s. 271E cannot be
levied in a case where repayment is made by an account payee cheque, though in
the name of the director of the company.

FACTS  

During assessment year 2004-05, the assessee
company, in the normal course of its business, advanced a sum of Rs. 15 lakh to
Shri R. Bhaskaran.  The advance was given
for intended business deal by the assessee company which could not materialise
and therefore the said advance payment was returned by Shri R. Bhaskaran, in
the assessment year 2005-06, through account payee cheque in the name of the
Director of the assessee company Shri Om Prakash Kanungo instead of paying it
back directly to the assessee company. 
The assessee company passed a journal entry debiting the loan account of
Shri Om Prakash Kanungo, Director of the company and credited the advance
account of Shri R. Bhaskaran.

The Assessing Officer (AO) held that the
provisions of section 269T are violated since according to him the assessee
company has received the repayment of the sum of Rs. 15 lakh advanced by it to
R. Bhaskaran in cash.  He levied penalty
u/s. 271E of the Act for violation of the provisions of section 269T of the
Act. 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the Tribunal.

HELD  

The repayment is made by account payee
cheque although in the name of one of the directors of the assessee company.
The Tribunal found that there is a reasonable cause rather the payment is
through account payee cheque.  In its
view, there was no violation of provisions of section 269T and consequential
penalty u/s. 271E was without any basis. 

The Tribunal deleted the penalty and allowed
the appeal filed by the assessee.

20. [2017] 77 taxmann.com 153 (Kolkata – Trib.) BMW Industries Ltd. vs. DCIT A.Y.: 2011-12 Date of Order: 2nd December, 2016

Section
80IA  – The expression ‘owned’ referred
to in section 80IA(4)(1)(a) refers to ownership of the enterprise and not the
ownership of the infrastructure facility that is created.

The definition of `Infrastructure
facility’  as mentioned in Explanation to
section 80IA(4)(i) covers any road including toll road.  It need not be coming under expressway or
highway category.

FACTS 

The assessee filed its return of income
showing total income of Rs.20,48,49,810. 
In arriving at the total income the assessee claimed deduction of Rs.
1,49,16,548 u/s. 80IA(4)(i) towards profits derived from developing, operating
and maintaining infrastructure facility. The Assessing Officer (AO) examined
the claim and reduced it by a sum of Rs. 2,78,385 being amount of proportionate
head office expenses allocated by him towards this unit. 

The CIT in
exercise of his powers u/s. 263 was of the view that the order of the AO in so
far as it relates to allowing the claim of the assessee for deduction u/s.
80IA(4)(i) of the Act was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the
revenue.  According to him, the assessee
was merely executing the job of civil construction on the basis of works
contract awarded by Executive Engineer. 
He was also of the view that the roads constructed by the assessee were
not coming under expressway or highway category as mentioned in the Explanation
to the section.  The assessee was not a
developer of an infrastructure facility and was not eligible to claim deduction
u/s. 80IA(4)(i).

HELD

The Tribunal observed that it cannot be said
that the AO failed to deal the specific facts of the case as per law and has
not scrutinised/verified the details in respect of the issues raised in the
show cause notice u/s. 263 of the Act.

The expression “owned” in
sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of sub-section (4) of section 80-IA of the Act
refers to ownership of the enterprise and not the ownership of the
infrastructure facility that is created. The ownership of the enterprise should
be that of a company and not any other person like individual, HUF, Firm etc.
sub-clause (a), clause (i) of sub-section (4) of section 80-IA uses the word
“it” and that denotes the enterprise carrying on the business. The
word “it” cannot be related to the infrastructure facility,
particularly in view of the fact that infrastructure facility includes Rail system,
Highway project, Water treatment system, Irrigation project, a Port, an Airport
or an Inland port which cannot be owned by any one. Even otherwise, the word
“it” is used to denote an enterprise. Therefore, there is no
requirement that the assessee should have been the owner of the infrastructure
facility.

The question as to whether the assessee is
‘developer’ or ‘contractor’ has to be tested in the light of the decisions
rendered on the issue by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of ABG Heavy
Industries (supra) and the order of the Division Bench of ITAT giving
effect to the larger bench (third member) decision in the case of B.T. Patil
& Sons (supra). According to these decisions, what is to be seen is
as to whether the assessee has shouldered out Investment & technical risk
in respect of the work executed and it is liable for liquidated damages if it
failed to fulfill the obligation laid down in the agreement. The liability that
was assumed by the assessee under terms of the contract would be obligations
involving the development of an infrastructure facility. The assessee has also
in its employment technically and administratively qualified team of persons.
If the above conditions are satisfied then it would not be correct to say that
assessee is merely a contractor and not a developer. Without giving adverse
finding on the above tests, the CIT could not conclude that the order of the AO
was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue.

As regards the observation of the CIT that
the roads construed by the Assessee were not coming under expressway or highway
category as mentioned in the Explanation to section 80IA(4)(i) of the Act,
which defines Infrastructure facility for the purpose of claiming deduction
under the aforesaid section the Tribunal held that the definition covers any
road including toll road. It need not be coming under expressway or highway
category.

The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the
assessee.

Declared Goods Vis-à-Vis Steel Structural

Introduction

Classification of goods under particular entry of Fiscal Laws
like VAT is always a debatable issue. Till date there are several judgments
determining classification and also laying down principles of classification.

“Declared good” is given special importance under the Central
Sales Tax Act (CST Act) and State VAT laws. One of the conditions about
taxation of declared goods, under VAT laws, is that the rate should not exceed
prescribed limit i.e., 5% at present.

If goods go out of the category of declared goods, they could
be taxable at a higher rate.    

Iron and Steel

Iron and Steel is one of the items of declared goods. Under
Maharashtra VAT Act (MVAT Act) the entry reads as under:

Entry C-55 under MVAT Act

Entry

Name of Commodity

Rate
of tax

Date of effect

55

Iron and steel, that is to
say,

(i) pig iron, sponge iron
and cast iron including ingots, moulds, bottom plates, iron scrap, cast iron
scrap, runner scrap and iron skull scrap;

(ii) steel semis (ingots,
slabs, blooms and billets of all qualities, shapes and sizes);

(iii) skelp bars, tin bars,
sheet bars, hoe bars and sleeper bars;

(iv) steel bars (rounds,
rods, square flats, octagons and hexagons, plain and ribbed or twisted in
coil form as well as straight lengths).;

(v) steel structurals,
(angles, joints, channels, tees, sheet pilling sections, Z sections or any
other rolled sections);

5%

1.5.2011 to date

The scope of above entry is being decided from time to time.

“Steel Structurals”

This item is covered at sub-entry (v) above. There was debate
about scope of above mentioned sub-entry. 

As per Revenue the scope of ‘steel structural’ is limited up
to items mentioned in bracketed portion. However, as per assessee, steel
structural is a separate item and cannot be controlled by bracket.

The above controversy was resolved recently by Hon. Bombay
High Court in case of Zamil Steel Buildings India Pvt. Ltd. vs. The State of
Maharashtra (MVXA Tax Appeal No.1 of 2016 dated 23.12.2016).

Facts

The facts as narrated in the judgment are as under:

“(b) The Appellant is inter alia a manufacturer of various
structural steel components such as rigid frame columns, rafters, sheets,
angles, etc. in their factory in Pune. The Appellant has been engaged in
the supply of the said structural steel components since 2007. The Appellant
has regularly been filing returns and discharging its liability under the MVAT
Act.

(c) According to the Appellant, these structural steel
components are fabricated/manufactured based on customers’ as well as
geographical requirements etc.

According to the Appellant, these individual components are
then sold to the customers. The customers may subsequently optionally choose to
avail the service of installation and erection by a sister concern of the
Appellant or by a third party. Thus, according to the Appellant, the so-called pre-engineered
buildings only emerge at the site of the customer after erection and after the
completed sale of different components by the Appellant.

(d) Until the year 2011, the Appellant had been collecting
VAT from its customers at the rate of 12.5% on account of RFCs (Rigid Frame
Columns) and Rafters and remitting the same to the revenue. Thereafter,
sometime in 2011, pursuant to a legal opinion obtained by the Appellant, the
Appellant started collecting tax at the rate of 5% and not 12.5% specifically on
rafters and RFCs and started remitting the same to the revenue.

The opinion obtained by the Appellant was based, inter alia,
on a judgment of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Prateek Technocom
vs. State of Rajasthan [(2006) 6 VAT Reporter 9 (Rajasthan)
].
Simultaneously, the Appellant invoked the procedure for determination of
disputed questions (DDQ) under the provisions of the MVAT Act for one of the
products supplied by it i.e. RFCs. The invoice number referred to in the said
DDQ Application (i.e. ZSB-0023/2010-2011 dated 6th April, 2010) describes the
goods sold as “Supply of Pre-Fabricated Building Components (AS PER PACKING
SLIP)”. In turn, the said packing slip describes the commodities sold as “Rigid
Frame Columns and Interior Columns”. Accordingly, under the said DDQ
Application, the Appellant applied to Respondent No.2 to determine as to
whether the RFCs supplied to its customers would fall under Schedule Entry
C-55(v) of the MVAT Act. We must mention here that Schedule Entry C-55(v) attracts
sales tax at the rate of 5%.”

The assessee submitted that the steel structural, (RFC)
though made by welding and not structural as covered by items mentioned in
bracket, is still covered by plain language as given in sub-entry. It was
submitted that the rule of “ejusdem generis” cannot apply on reverse
basis, i.e. prior words cannot be controlled by subsequent words though
subsequent words can be controlled by prior words. It was submitted that the
bracketed items are by way of illustration. Supporting judgments were cited.

On behalf of Revenue, the main plank of argument was that
only items mentioned in bracket will be covered. It was also argued that Iron
and Steel entry intends to cover iron and steel in raw form and not made ups
from iron and steel. Therefore, it was argued that the steel structural in
present case, which is made ups by welding etc., cannot be covered.

The Hon. High Court concurred with the assessee, after giving
elaborate reasoning.

The Hon. High Court held as under:

“27. Looking to these authoritative pronouncements, it is
clear that the utility of a bracket is only as an illustration, explanation or
extra information. It is thus clarificatory. It is not always exhaustive of the
terms outside the bracket. It cannot curtail or limit the scope of the terms
employed outside the bracket. Eventually, no general rule can be laid down. As
held by the Supreme Court, ordinarily, words appearing in brackets are
illustrative and not exhaustive. Therefore, everything would depend upon the
context and purpose with which in an individual statute the words in the
bracket are inserted by the Competent Legislature. Applying these principles,
we are unable to agree with Mr. Sonpal that though the goods of the Appellant
may be “steel structurals”, but if they do not fall within the
description of the terms as set out in the brackets viz. “(angles, joints,
channels, tees, sheet piling sections, Z sections or any other rolled sections
)”,
then they would not be covered either u/s. 14(iv)(v) of CST Act or Schedule
Entry C-55(v) of the MVAT Act. We are unable to agree with Mr. Sonpal that
enumeration of the six items in the bracketed portion are with a specific
purpose of restricting the meaning of the words “steel structurals” preceding
and outside the brackets. In fact, we find that the six items appearing in the
bracketed portion of section 14(iv)(v) of the CST Act and Schedule Entry
C-55(v) of the MVAT Act are clearly not exhaustive, but descriptive of the
words “steel structurals”.”

The High Court further observed as under:

“29. Equally, we are also unable to agree with the argument
of Mr. Sonpal as well as the finding of the MSTT that because the goods sold by
the Appellant are brought into being by a process of welding and not rolling,
the same cannot be classified under Schedule Entry C-55(v) of the MVAT Act. We
find this argument totally without any merit. As mentioned earlier, the items
mentioned in section 14(iv)(v) of the CST Act read with Schedule Entry C-55(v)
of the MVAT Act are goods of special importance in inter-state trade or
commerce. It would be ludicrous to suggest that “steel structurals” that
are manufactured from rolled sections are goods of special importance, whereas
steel structurals” that are brought into being by a welding process are
not goods of special importance. We see nothing in the Statute to make this
distinction. Even otherwise, we find that the authorities below erred in
concluding that even the specific terms namely “angles, joints, channels,
tees, sheet piling sections, Z sections”
should all be “rolled sections”.
As mentioned earlier, section 14(iv)(v) of the CST Act and Schedule Entry
C-55(v) of the MVAT Act deals with “steel structurals (angles, joints,
channels, tees, sheet piling sections, Z sections or any other rolled sections
)”.
According to the authorities below, the words “or any other rolled sections
would apply to all the other items including “steel structurals”. In
other words, according to the Revenue, only rolled steel structurals such as
rolled angles, rolled joists, rolled channels, rolled tees, rolled sheet piling
sections, rolled Z sections or any other rolled sections are covered u/s.
14(iv)(v) of the CST Act and Schedule Entry C-55(v) of the MVAT Act and nothing
else. To put it differently, only goods manufactured by the process of rolling
would be covered under the said provisions. We are unable to agree with this
interpretation for the simple reason that the authorities below have applied
the rule of ‘ejusdem generis’ in reverse. This, and as rightly submitted
by Mr. Sridharan, is impermissible.”

With the above observations the Hon. Bombay High Court
classified the given item, RFC, as steel structural duly covered by entry
C-55(v) as declared goods.

Conclusion

The above judgment not only decides the
controversy but throws light upon various shades of principles of
classification. It will also go a long way to decide scope of entry relating to
Iron and Steel, The wrong impression created so far that the entry for ‘Iron
and Steel’ covers only Iron and steel as raw material has also been clarified. It can include made ups also based on words of the Entry.

19. [2016] 76 taxmann.com 165 (Bangalore – Trib.) S. K. Properties vs. ITO A.Y.: 2007-08 Date of Orderd: 4th November, 2016

Sections
5, 145  – In case of a developer selling
plots, income in respect of sale of plots can be recognised only in the year in
which conveyance deed executed is registered in favour of the buyers and it in
that year that development expenditure incurred as expenditure or expenditure
likely to be incurred on the plot is to be allowed.  This is in consonance with provisions of AS 9
which clearly lays down that matching is required to be done on accrual basis
in respect of income offered to tax. 

FACTS 

The assessee firm, engaged in the business
of development of property, recognised revenue only in the year in which the
plots were sold and conveyance deed registered. It filed its return of income
declaring total income to be Rs. Nil. 
The Assessing Officer (AO), in the course of assessment proceedings was
of the view that revenue should be recognised at every stage of receipt of sale
consideration.  He, therefore, rejected
the method of accounting followed by the assessee and assessed the total income
to be Rs. 2,37,37,172.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the Tribunal where it was contended that revenue in respect of sale of plots
can be recognised only when the risk and rewards and ownership of the plots are
transferred to the buyers till such time the revenue cannot be recognised on
sale of plots.

HELD 

The Tribunal observed that the assessee has
recognised the income in respect of sale of plots by adopting Completed
Contract Method, whereas, the AO is of the view that income should be offered
to tax received on year to year basis based on the stage of receipt of
consideration, irrespective of the fact that the title in the plots have been
passed on to the buyer or not. It also noted that the plots formed part of
stock-in-trade of the assessee firm and are immovable properties.The title in
immovable property can be passed only in terms of the provisions of the
Transfer of Property Act. 

The Tribunal noted the ratio of the decision
of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Wipro Ltd. vs. DCIT [2016] 382
ITR 179 (Kar.)
and held that the provisions of section 2(47) of the Act
have no application to the transactions of stock-in-trade. In this case, the
stock-in-trade is immovable property and the title in immovable property can be
transferred or alienated in accordance with the provisions of the Transfer of
Properties Act. The right, title or interest in the immovable property can be
transferred only by way of registering the conveyance deed executed in this
behalf. Even the Accounting Standard 9 dealing with the recognition of income
also lays down that the income in respect of transfer of immovable property can
be recognised only when the risks, rewards and ownership of the property is
transferred to the buyer.

It held that the matter requires a fresh
examination by the AO in the light of the above position of law. The Tribunal
remanded the matter back to the file of the AO with a direction that the income
in respect of sale of plots can be recognised only in the year in which
conveyance deed executed is registered in favour of the buyers and to allow the
development expenditure incurred as expenditure or the expenditure likely to be
incurred on the plots sold as expenditure. It held that this direction also
goes in line with and is in consonance with the provisions of Accounting
Standard 9 which clearly lays down that matching is required to be done on
accrual basis in respect of the income offered to tax and upheld by Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Taparia Tools Ltd. vs. Jt. CIT [2015] 372 ITR
605 (SC).

Shared Expenditure: Whether Taxable as Service?

Introduction

Taxability of shared expenditure has been a subject of
extensive litigation under service tax for quite some time. It is a common
business practice to share common facilities or outsourced services by group
companies under a common roof. Typically, one company receives the invoice from
outsourced service provider and then the cost is shared by each participating
entity by way of reimbursements generally in proportion of actual usage.
Similarly, sometimes, common expenses like advertisement expense is incurred by
a manufacturer and shared with its dealers as the benefit is derived by both,
the manufacturer and the dealers. In the case of Union of India vs. Mahindra
and Mahindra Ltd. 1989 (43) ET 611 (Cal)
, the High Court observed that the
manufacturer and distributor had mutual interest in maximising sale of its
products. The contract between them was to further this desire and it no way
affected the real nature of transaction which appeared to be of sale on
principal-to-principal basis. However, in the case of Maruti Suzuki India
Ltd. vs. CCE 2008 (23) ELT 566 (Tri.-Del)
, it was held that when the
contract envisages such expenses to be incurred by the dealer and failure to do
so gives a right to the manufacturer to get advertisement done on their own and
recover such expenses from the dealer, such expense incurred by the dealer
would be payment on behalf of manufacturer and requires to be considered
additional consideration for sale and added to the assessable value.

The Mumbai Tribunal in JM Financial Services Ltd. vs. CST
Mumbai-I 2013-TIOL-757-CESTAT-MUM
held to the effect that whether revenue
such as incentive or processing fee or expense like electricity etc., when
shared by the parties on principal-to-principal basis, no service is said to
have been rendered. Also in Reliance ADA Group Pvt. Ltd. vs. CST Mumbai-IV
2016-TIOL-603-CESTAT-MUM,
it was held that when common services are procured
by one company from service providers, that company acts as a manager/trustee
to incur expenses on behalf of participating group companies and then cost
thereof is shared by all the beneficiaries by making reimbursements.These
reimbursements of the cost incurred cannot be regarded as consideration flowing
for taxable service, but it is rather a receipt towards the reimbursement of
cost/expenses in terms of cost sharing agreement with the participating group
companies.Similarly, in case of CST vs. Arvind Mills Ltd. 2014 (35) STR 496
(Guj),
the High Court of Gujarat held that in case of deputation of
employees to subsidiary company, salary and perquisites reimbursed by group
companies, the assessee could not be said to be engaged in providing specified
services to client. Hence, they were not liable for service tax.Identically,
recently in Franco Indian Pharmaceutical (P) Ltd. (2016) 69 taxmann.com 198
(Mumbai-CESTAT),
it was held that services provided to many employees and
respective share in salaries paid by the employer is not taxable as a service
of manpower supply. It was further observed that the position will remain the
same even if appointment letter is not signed jointly and any one company has
hired employees and employees are lent or deputed to other companies.

Recent decision of Supreme Court

Recently, the matter of Gujarat State Fertilizers and
Chemicals Ltd. vs. CCE 2016 (45) STR 489 (SC)
came up for examination of
Supreme Court wherein GSFC had collected incinerating charge from Gujarat Alkalies
& Chemicals (GACL). The service tax department issued a show cause notice
alleging that the said charges are towards storage and warehousing service
provided by GSFC to GACL. The fact of the matter was that both GSFC and GACL
received Hydro Cynic Acid (HCN) from Reliance Industries Ltd. through a common
pipeline which was used by them for manufacturing of their final product and
used by the two companies in 60:40 ratio. Subsequent to the use, incineration
also was required to be undertaken; the expense on this process was shared by
the two in 50:50 ratio. This arrangement was made in terms of an agreement
between GSFC and GACL. The said facts were adequately explained to the service
tax department. However, the contention of GSFC against service tax liability
was not accepted by the adjudicating authority as well as the first and second
Appellate authorities.

The Appellant, GSFC explained that HCN being one of the main
raw materials was received from RIL, Vadodara directly through a pipeline by
gravity from their plant. As per agreement between GSFC and GACL, sodium
cyanide unit, the quantity received in an intermittent hold tank was consumed
in 60:40 ratio. The hold tank existed for sustaining continuous process of both
the plants facilitating smooth operation of suction pumps and specifically
avoiding starvation of pumps which could disturb the process. If there was any
problem at any of the consumers’ end, the supply from RIL would be stopped and
remaining quantity in the tank would be consumed immediately by either of the
plants. Hence storage of HCN did not happen at all. Moreover, the agreement
between the parties clearly provided that though HCN handling and incineration
facilities were installed in GSFC premises, the expenses thereto were to be borne
by both the parties. For incineration, neither GACL paid nor GSFC received any
fee or a charge but shared cost of incineration as per agreement including
those of repair, maintenance or replacement of spare parts and other overheads.
Thus, both GSFC and GACL were equally responsible for storage and consumption
and no one worked for another and the expense was shared in predetermined
proportion. In facts of the case, GSFC contended that in any case, the
arrangement did not involve storage or warehousing service to GACL and
therefore service tax was not attracted.

The revenue at the other end contended that since HCN was
first kept in holding tank and from this it was distributed in 60:40 ratio, the
holding tank would qualify as storage facility. Further, the fact that GSFC
collected incineration charge from GACL, it was correctly held that GSFC
provided service of storage. According to revenue, since there were questions
of fact based on which concurrent findings were reached by authorities, they
should not be interfered with by the Court as the scope of appeal required the
Court to deal with substantial question of law only. 

Considering all the facts and the terms of agreement between
the parties, the Court observed that there was no dispute that joint investment
was made by the parties for creation of common facility. On accepting this
fact, handling and incineration facilities were in the nature of joint venture
between two of them and they simply agreed to share expenditure. The payment
made by GACL was towards its share of expense. In order to attract service
tax, there has to be element of service provided by one person to the other for
which charges for providing service are collected. When this ingredient is
missing in the facts of the case, the question of service tax does not arise.

Conclusion

When the Apex Court has decided in principle that the element
of service does not exist when common expenses are shared by beneficiaries on
principal-to-principal basis, the long drawn litigation should find a
closement. However, considering approach of the revenue for all practical
purposes, it is less likely that at lower levels, raising dispute would stop.

The question in most of the cases did not per
se
involve “classification issue” although different categories of services
were dealt with which mainly included management consultancy, business
auxiliary/support service and manpower supply. The core issue revolved around
whether there exists an element of service when common services are procured or
when there is a pooling of expenses which is later shared by participating
group companies. Under the negative list based taxation of services from July
01, 2012 also, if there is no element of ‘service’ present, the decision should
continue to apply. However, the authorities now under the guise of ‘testing’
negative list based service taxation vis-a-vis the definition of
‘service’ would continue litigation, considering the scenario in the department
of service tax where a majority of demands made in the show cause notices
issued based on facts or legal grounds are routinely confirmed.

37. Appellate Tribunal – Rectification of mistake – Section 254(2) – Mistake can be on part of litigants or his advisors

Binaguri Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT; 389 ITR 648 (Cal):

While assessing the fringe benefit tax, the Assessing Officer
gave the assessee the benefit applicable under rule 8 of the Income-tax Rules
1962. However, invoking section 154, of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter
for the sake of brevity referred to as the “Act”) the Assessing
Officer withdrew the benefit. The Commissioner(Appeals) confirmed the
rectification order. The assessee filed an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal
contending that the Commissioner (Appeals) had erred in holding that Rule 8 had
no applicability while calculating the eligible expenses of a company engaged
in the business of cultivation, manufacture and sale of tea for the purpose of
fringe benefit tax. Based on the Tribunal decisions against the assessee, the
assessee was advised by the advisors not to press the appeal. Accordingly, the
assessee did not press the appeal and the Appellate Tribunal dismissed the
appeal. It was subsequently noticed that the said Tribunal decisions were
reversed by the Calcutta High Court and the issue was decided in favour of the
assessee even before the dismissal order of the Tribunal. Therefore, within two
months of the order of the Tribunal, the assessee applied for restoration of
the appeal u/s. 254(2) of the Act which was rejected by the Tribunal for the
following reasons.

“The learned counsel for
the assessee reiterated the stand of the assessee as contained in the
miscellaneous application. We are of the view that jurisdiction u/s. 254(2) of
the Act can be exercised only to rectify an error apparent on the face of the
record. The contention in the miscellaneous application, even if true, cannot
give rise to any mistake in the order of the Tribunal apparent on the face of
the record. The miscellaneous application, in our view, cannot therefore be entertained
and the same is hereby rejected.”

On appeal by the assessee, the Calcutta High Court allowed
the appeal and held as under:

“i)   Section 254(2) of the Act did not provide
that it had to be a mistake solely on the part of the Appellate Tribunal to
recall an order and that the statutory power could also be exercised in the
case of mistake apparent on the part of the litigants or his advisors.

ii)   Neither the Appellate Tribunal nor the
assessee was aware of the judgment of the jurisdictional High Court. Therefore,
the prayer for leave to withdraw the appeal and the order allowing the prayer
were both based on a mistake. The order of the Tribunal is set aside.

iii) The Tribunal shall hear the appeal on
merits.”

Interest Income of a Credit Society and Deductibility U/S. 80p

Issue for Consideration

Section 80P of the Income-tax Act grants a deduction to an
assessee, being a co-operative society, in respect of such sums that,
inter-alia, includes the whole of the amount of profits and gains of business
attributable to any one or more of such activities which are listed in clauses
(i) to (vii) of clause (a) of sub-section (2). One of the sub-clauses grants a
deduction for a co-operative society engaged in carrying on the business of
banking or providing credit facilities to its members.

The Courts, in the past, have time and again examined the
true meaning of the term ‘attributable’, and have found the same to be of wider
import in contrast to the term ‘derived from’. Based on such interpretation,
the courts have been inclined to include income from activities incidental to
the main business or activity of the assessee, and have held that such incidental
income too was eligible for deduction, inasmuch as such income was profits and
gains attributable to the business.

In the recent past, the Supreme Court, in the case of Totgars
Co-operative Sale Society Ltd., 322 ITR 283
held that income from interest
on deposits with the bank, earned by a credit society, was to be taxed u/s.56
of the Income-tax Act.

The above mentioned decision in Totgars Co-operative Sale
Society’s
case has become a subject matter of controversy leading to
conflicting decisions of the High Courts, whereunder, the Gujarat High Court
followed the said decision, but the Karnataka High Court chose to distinguish
the same on facts, and the Andhra Pradesh High Court held the said decision to
be applicable only to Totgars Co-operative Sale Society Limited. In fact, the
ratio of the said decision and its applicability has also become debatable.

Tumkur Merchants Souharda Credit Cooperative Ltd.’s case

The issue arose in the case of Tumkur Merchants Souharda
Credit Cooperative Ltd. vs. Income-tax officer, 55 taxmann.com 447 (Karnataka).

The assessee, a Cooperative Society registered under the provisions of section
7 of the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959, was engaged in the
activity of carrying on the business of providing credit facilities to its
members. It filed the return of income for the assessment year 2009-10,
declaring a total income of Rs. NIL, after claiming a deduction of
Rs.42,02,079/- under the provisions of section 80P of the Act in respect of its
business income, which, inter alia, included interest from short term
deposits and savings bank accounts aggregating to Rs. 1,77,305.

The assessing authority denied the deduction claimed u/s. 80P
and passed an order of assessment, determining a total income of
Rs.42,02,079/-, as against the declared income of Rs.NIL. Aggrieved by the said
order, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Commissioner of Income Tax
(Appeals) who held that assessee’s interest income earned from short-term
deposits with Allahabad Bank of Rs. 1,55,300/- and savings bank account with
Axis Bank of Rs.22,005/-, totalling to Rs. 1,77,305/- was liable to income tax,
in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Totgars Cooperative
Sale Society Ltd. vs. ITO, 322 ITR 283(SC).

Aggrieved by that part of the order, the assessee preferred
an appeal to the Tribunal, which dismissed the appeal, following the judgment
of the Apex Court in the aforesaid case. Aggrieved by the said order, the
assessee filed the appeal challenging the order passed by the Tribunal
raising the following substantial question of law: ‘”Whether the Tribunal
failed in law to appreciate that the interest earned on short-term deposits
were only investments in the course of activity of providing credit facilities
to members and that the same cannot be considered as investment made for the
purpose of earning interest income and consequently passed a perverse
order?”

The assessee, assailing the impugned order, contended before
the Karnataka High Court, that the interest accrued in a sum of Rs. 1,77,305/-
was from the deposits made by the assessee in a nationalised bank out of the
amounts which was used by the assessee for providing credit facilities to its
members, and therefore the said interest amount was attributable to the credit
facilities provided by the assessee, and formed part of profits and gains of
business. It therefore submitted that the appellate authorities were not
justified in denying the said benefit in terms of sub-section (2) of section
80P of the Act. In support of the contention that the interest income was
eligible for deduction u/s. 80P, it relied on several judgments, and pointed
out that the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment had not laid down any law. In
reply, the Revenue strongly relied on the said judgment of the Supreme Court in
Totgars Co-operative Sale Society Ltd. (supra), and submitted that the
case before the court was covered by the judgment of the Apex Court and no case
for interference was called for.

The Karnataka High Court, on hearing the facts and the rival
contentions, noted the undisputed facts emerging that the assessee was a
co-operative society providing credit facilities to its members, was not
carrying on any other business and that the interest income earned by the
assessee by providing credit facilities to its members was deposited in the
banks for a short duration, which had earned interest in the sum of Rs.
1,77,305/- . 

Analysing the provisions of section 80P, the court found that
the word ‘attributable’ used in the said section was of great importance. It
took note of the fact that the Apex Court had considered the meaning of the
word ‘attributable’ as opposed to ‘derived from’ in the case of Cambay
Electric Supply Industrial Co. Ltd. vs. CIT ,113 ITR 84.
The court found
from the above decision that the word “attributable to” was certainly
wider in import than the expression “derived from”, and whenever the
legislature wanted to give a restricted meaning, they had used the expression
“derived from”. The expression, “attributable to”, being of
wider import, was used by the legislature whenever they intended to gather
receipts from sources other than the actual conduct of the business. 

The court observed that a cooperative society, which was
carrying on the business of providing credit facilities to its members, earned
profits and gains of business by providing credit facilities to its members;
the interest income so derived and the capital, if not immediately required to
be lent to the members, could not be kept idle, and the interest income earned
on depositing such balance in hand was to be treated as attributable to the
profits and gains of the business of providing credit facilities to its members
only; the society was not carrying on any separate business for earning such
interest income; the income so derived was the amount of profits and gains of
business attributable to the activity of carrying on the business of banking or
providing credit facilities to its members by a co-operative society and was
liable to be deducted from the gross total income u/s. 80P of the Act.

The court further observed that the Apex Court in the case of
Totgars Co-operative Sale Society Ltd.(supra), on which reliance was
placed, was dealing with a case where the assessee – cooperative society, apart
from providing credit facilities to the members, was also in the business of
marketing of agricultural produce grown by its members and the sale
consideration received from marketing agricultural produce of its members was retained
in many cases, and the said retained amount which was payable to its members
from whom produce was bought, was invested in a short-term deposit/security;
such an amount which was retained by the assessee – society was a liability and
it was shown in the balance sheet on the liability side; therefore, to that
extent, such interest income could not be said to be attributable either to the
activity mentioned in section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act or u/s. 80P(2)(a)(iii) of
the Act; in the facts of the said case, the Apex Court held that the assessing
officer was right in taxing the interest income u/s. 56 of the Act after making
it clear that they were confining the said judgment to the facts of that case.
It was clear to the Karnataka high court that the Supreme Court in Totgars
Co-operative Sale Society Ltd.(supra)
was not laying down any law.

In the instant case, the court noted that the amount which
was invested in banks to earn interest was not an amount due to any members; it
was not the liability; it was not shown as liability in the accounts and that
the amount which was in the nature of profits and gains, was not immediately
required by the assessee for lending money to the members, as there were no
takers. Therefore, they had deposited the money in a bank so as to earn
interest. The court accordingly held that the said interest income was
attributable to carrying on the business of banking and was liable to be
deducted in terms of section 80P(1) of the Act. The court cited with approval
the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of CIT vs. Andhra
Pradesh State co-operative Bank Ltd.,200 Taxman 220.
               

State Bank Of India (SBI)’s case

The issue again arose in the case of State Bank of India
vs. CIT , 74 taxmann.com 64
before the Gujarat high court. The assessee, a
co-operative society, namely State Bank of India Employees Co-op Credit and
Supply Society Ltd. was registered under the Gujarat Co-operative Societies
Act, 1961 with the object of accepting deposits from salaried persons of the
State Bank of India, Gujarat region, with a view to encourage thrift and
providing credit facility to them. It had launched various deposit schemes such
as Term Deposit, Recurring Deposit, Aid to Your Family Scheme, Members Retiring
Benefit Fund etc., and at the same time, was advancing loans to the
members, such as consumer goods loan, car-vehicle loan, food grain loan and
general purposes loan, etc. It had filed its return of income for
assessment year 2009-10 and 2010-11, declaring total income at Rs. Nil, after
claiming deduction u/s. 80P of the Income-tax Act, 1961 of Rs.29,69,444/- and
Rs.43,64,828/-.respectively.

The matter was taken up in
scrutiny by the Assessing Officer who called for various details, including
justification regarding claim of deduction u/s. 80P of the Act vide notice
u/s. 142(1). The society submitted its replies, narrating the nature of
activities carried out by it, and details of claim of deduction u/s. 80P with
copy of bye-laws, and the Assessing Officer framed assessment u/s. 143(3) of
the Act accepting the claim.

Subsequently, the Commissioner of Income Tax invoked powers
u/s. 263 of the Act, proposing to revise the above order on the ground that
interest income of Rs.16,14,579/- for assessment year 2009-10 and of
Rs.32,83,410/- from the State Bank of India for assessment year 2010-11 was not
exempt u/s. 80P(2)(d) of the Act. In response, the assessee contended that the
interest income was business income, and was exempt u/s. 80P(2)(a)(i) of the
Act. The Commissioner of Income Tax did not find the explanation satisfactory,
on the ground that interest income was not business income, so as to be exempt
u/s. 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act. Hence, the assessment order was held to be
erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue.

Being aggrieved, the appellant carried the matter in appeal
before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, which held that interest income
earned from members on grant of credit did not have nexus with the interest
earned on deposits made with SBI, and could not be said to be the one arising
from business of providing credit facility to its members, by drawing support
from the decision of the Supreme Court in Totgars Co-operative Sales Society
Ltd. vs. ITO 322 ITR 283(SC) .

The assessee being aggrieved, raised substantial questions of
law in appeal for consideration of the Gujarat High Court, which included ;

‘(1)     Whether on the facts and in the
circumstances of the case, ………… ?

(2)      Whether on the facts and in the
circumstances of the case, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in
holding that interest income of Rs……………. on deposits placed with State Bank of
India was not exempt under section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income Tax Act, 1961?

On behalf of the society, it was submitted that the assessee
was a co-operative society formed by the employees of the State Bank of India,
Gujarat Circle, under the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961 in the
category of Employees’ Co-operative Credit Society for the purpose of
encouragement of savings and providing credit facilities to the members of the
Society; it was not engaged in any other activity except giving credit
facilities to its members, who were employees of State Bank of India, and that
the income generated by the assessee was mainly on account of differential rate
of amount of deposits received from the members and the amount of loans given
to the members; the income generated was only from the contributions received
from the members and it did not deal in any way with any person other than the
members; the employer deducted the contribution from the salary of the
employees and the collective contribution received was remitted to the assessee
society, generally on the first of every month, while the loans were given to
the employees on a fixed day of the month (around 15th of the month)
and not every day, and during the intervening period, the idle money collected
by the assessee was deposited with the State Bank of India for the purpose of
earning interest; as and when the amount was required, the deposits with the
State Bank of India are liquidated and utilised for the purposes of the
assessee.

In the above stated facts, it was pleaded that the deposit of
amount with State Bank of India was during the course of business and was part
of the activities of the assessee society and could not be seen in isolation.
It was submitted that the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Totgars
Co-operative Sales Society Limited (supra)
would not be applicable to the
facts of the present case, inasmuch as to apply the said decision, the
necessary facts had to be on record, and that there was no strait-jacket
formula that the above decision would be applicable. Reliance was placed upon
the decision of the Karnataka High Court in Tumkur Merchants Souharda Credit
Cooperative Ltd. vs. ITO, 55 taxmann.com 447,
wherein the court had held
that the word “attributable to” was certainly wider in import than
the expression “derived from” and whenever the legislature used the
expression ‘attributable ‘ they intended to gather receipts from sources other
than the actual conduct of business. Reliance was also placed upon the decision
of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Guttigedarara Credit Co-operative
Society Ltd. vs. ITO, 377 ITR 464
wherein the above view has been
reiterated. Reliance was also placed upon the decision of the Patna High Court
in the case of Bihar State Housing Co operative Federation Ltd. vs. CIT, 315
ITR 286
wherein the court was dealing with the question as to whether on
the facts and in the circumstances of that case, the Tribunal was correct in
holding that the sum of Rs.15,98,590/- received by way of interest on bank
deposit was not ancillary and incidental to carrying on the business of
providing credit facilities to its members and as such, exempt u/s.
80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. It was submitted that the above
decisions would be squarely applicable to the facts of the present case, as the
factual background in which the said decisions were rendered were similar to
the present case.

It was contended that insofar as the interest earned from
deposits was concerned, section 80P(2)(a)(i) did not make any difference nor
was it possible to read any limitation having regard to the language of the
said provision and every income “attributable to any one or more of such
activities” should be deducted from the gross total income. It was
highlighted that one had to bear in mind the object with which the provision
was introduced, viz. to encourage and promote growth of co-operative sector in
the economic life of the country and in pursuance of the declared policy of the
Government. Reference was made to bye-law 7 of the Bye-laws of the appellant
society to point out that the interest income was a part of the corpus of the
society, and when the corpus was invested, the decision of the Supreme Court in
the case of Totgars Co-operative Sales Society Ltd. (supra) would not be
applicable. It was submitted that the interest income was incidental to the
main activity of the appellant of providing credit facility and that in the
above decision of the Supreme Court, the word ‘incidental’ had not come up for
consideration. In conclusion, it was submitted that the appeals deserved to be
allowed by answering the questions in favour of the assessee and against the
revenue.

Opposing the appeals, it was contended by the Revenue that it
was only the interest received from members towards credit facilities extended
to them that would fall within the ambit of the expression profits and gains of
business attributable to the activities of the appellant; interest from bank on
surplus did not have any direct or proximate connection with the activities of
the society , and hence, it would not be entitled to the benefit of section
80P(2) of the Act in respect of such income.

It was submitted that in case of a credit co-operative
society, it was the income derived from such activity that was exempt.
Adverting to the facts of the present case, it was submitted that the decision
of the Supreme Court in the case of Totgars Co-operative Sales Society Ltd. (supra)
was squarely applicable. It was submitted that section 80P of the Act was based
upon the concept of mutuality, and accordingly exempted any income derived by
the society from its members. As the interest earned from the funds deposited
with the banks lacked the degree of proximity between the appellant and its
members, it could not be categorised as an activity in the pursuit of its
objectives, so as to fall within the ambit of section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act.

Reference was made to the decision of the Karnataka High
Court in the case of Totgars Co-operative Sale Society Ltd. (supra), to
point out the nature of the dispute involved in that case. It was submitted
that, in that case, the court was concerned with two activities of the assessee
society: (i) to provide credit facility to its members, and (ii) to market the
agricultural produce of its members. It was submitted that the findings
recorded by the Supreme Court were also in connection with the two activities
and, therefore, to say that the Supreme Court was only concerned with the
surplus of marketing produce was not correct. It was submitted that the
observation regarding the judgment being confined to the facts of that case was
because the assessee was not in the banking business, and all the earlier
decisions in this regard were relating to banking business. It was submitted
that the decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Tumkur
Merchants Souharda Credit Cooperative Ltd.
(supra) was based upon an
incorrect reading of the above decision of the Supreme Court.

The Gujarat High Court, on hearing the parties to the appeal,
noted that the short question that arose for consideration in these appeals was
as to whether the appellant was entitled to claim deduction u/s. 80P(2)(a)(i)
of the Act in respect of the interest earned on the deposits placed with the
State Bank of India. For the purpose of appreciating the controversy in issue,
it extensively referred to the records of the case and appreciated the
contesting views of the parties before the lower authorities. The court also
examined the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Totgars
Co-operative Sale Society Ltd.
(supra), and supplied emphasis where
felt necessary.

Expressing its opinion, the court stated that in case of a
society engaged in providing credit facilities to its members, income from
investments made in banks did not fall in any of the categories mentioned u/s.
80P(2)(a) of the Act; in the case of Totgars Co-operative Sale Society
(supra),
the court was dealing with two kinds of activities: interest
income earned from the amount retained from the amount payable to the members
from whom produce was bought and which was invested in short-term
deposits/securities, and the interest derived from the surplus funds that the
assessee therein invested in short-term deposits with the Government
securities. The Gujarat High Court opined that the above decision was not
restricted only to the investments made out of the retained amount which was
payable to its members, but was also in respect of funds not immediately
required for business purposes. For the above reasons, the Gujarat High Court
did not agree with the view taken by the Karnataka High Court in Tumkur
Merchants Souharda Credit Cooperative Ltd.
(supra) to the effect
that the decision of the Supreme Court in Totgars Co-operative Sale Society
(supra)
was restricted to the sale consideration received from marketing
agricultural produce of its members, which was retained in many cases and
invested in short term deposit/security, and that the said decision was
confined to the facts of the said case and did not lay down any law.

Relying on the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in Totgars
Co-operative Sale Society
(supra), the Gujarat High court held that
in case of a society engaged in providing credit facilities to its members,
income from investments made in banks did not fall within any of the categories
mentioned in section 80P(2)(a) of the Act. In the end, the court did not find
any infirmity in the order passed by the Tribunal warranting interference, and
accordingly held that the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in
holding that interest income of Rs.16,14,579/- and Rs.32,83,410/-respectively
on deposits placed with State Bank of India was not exempt u/s. 80P(2)(a)(i) of
the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Observations

An assessee, a co-operative society engaged in providing
credit facilities to its members, is entitled to deduction for the whole of the
amount of profits and gains of business attributable to such activity. As per
section 80P(2), in the case of a co-operative society engaged in carrying on
the business of providing credit facilities to its members, what is deductible
is the whole of the amount of profits and gains of business attributable to any
one or more such activities.

A co-operative society which is carrying on the business of
providing credit facilities to its members, earns profits and gains from
business by providing such facilities to its members. The interest income so
earned from members, if not immediately required to be lent to the members,
cannot be kept idle. On deposit of such income in a bank so as to earn
interest, such interest income enhances the capital available for the credit to
its members, besides reducing the cost of interest to members. Such interest so
received from bank has the business nexus, in as much as the source thereof is
the business income, and should be treated as attributable to the profits or
gains of the business of providing credit facilities to its members only, more
so where such deposit with the bank is for short period and further so where
the bye-laws or the enactment require the society to employ funds. The income
so derived is the profits or gains of business that is attributable to the
activity of carrying on the business of providing credit facilities to its
members by a co-operative society and should be eligible for being deducted
from the gross total income u/s. 80P of the Act.

Money is stock-in-trade or circulating capital for a credit
society and its normal business is to deal in money and credit. It cannot be
said that the business of such a society consists only in receiving
contribution from its members. Depositing money with banks or such other societies,
as are mentioned in the objects, in a manner that it may be readily available
to meet the demand of its members, if and when it arises, is a legitimate mode
of carrying on of its business.

The interest received by a credit society on bank deposits,
in any case, is ancillary and incidental to carrying on the business of
providing credit facilities to its members, and as such, is deductible under
the provisions of section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act. The nature of credit
business, conducted out of the funds of the employees, clearly creates a
situation where surplus funds are available, which are deposited in a bank,
interest is earned thereon. The placement of such funds, being incidental and
ancillary to carrying on business of providing credit facilities to its
members, and  by reason of section
80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act, the same should be eligible for deduction. 

The business of a credit society essentially consists of
dealing with money and credit. Members put their money in the society at a
small rate of interest. In order to meet their demands, as and when they arise,
the society has always to keep sufficient cash or easily realisable securities.
That is a normal step in the carrying on of the business; in other words, that
is an act done in what is truly the carrying on or carrying out of a business.

It is a normal mode of carrying on credit business to invest
moneys in a manner that they are readily available and that is just as much a
part of the mode of conducting a business as receiving contributions or lending
moneys; that is how the circulating capital is employed and that is the normal
course of business of a credit society. The moneys laid out in the form of
deposits with the bank would not cease to be a part of the circulating capital
of the credit society nor would the deposits cease to form part of its
business. The returns flowing from the deposits would form part of its profits
from its business. In a commercial sense, the managers of the society owe it to
the society to make investments which earn them interest, instead of letting
moneys lie idle. It cannot be said that the funds which were not lent to
borrowers but were laid out in the form of deposits in another bank, to add to
the profit instead of lying idle, necessarily ceased to be a part of the
stock-in-trade of the society, or that the interest arising therefrom did not
form part of its business profits. 

As regards the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Totgars
Co-operative Sales Society Ltd. (supra),
the court, in the facts of that
case, had observed that it was dealing with a case where the assessee –
co-operative society, apart from providing credit facilities to the members,
was also in the business of marketing of agricultural produce grown by its
members; the sale consideration received from marketing agricultural produce of
its members was retained in many cases; the said retained amount which was
payable to its members from whom produce was bought, was invested in a
short-term deposit/security; such an amount which was retained by the assessee
– society was a liability and it was shown in the Balance Sheet on the
liability side. In the above facts, the Supreme Court held that therefore, to
that extent, such interest income could not be said to be attributable either
to the activity mentioned in section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act or u/s.
80P(2)(a)(iii) of the Act. In the facts of the said case, the Supreme Court
held that the Assessing Officer was right in taxing the interest income u/s. 56
of the Act. The court further made it clear that it was confining the said
judgment to the facts of the said case and, therefore, was not laying down any
law.

The Supreme Court in that Totgars’ case has held that
interest on such investments, could not fall within the meaning of the expression
“profits and gains of business” and that such interest income could
not be said to be attributable to the activities of the society, namely,
carrying on the business of providing credit facilities to its members or
marketing of agricultural produce of its members. The court held that when the
assessee society provides credit facilities to its members, it earns interest
income and the interest which accrued on funds not immediately required by the
assessee for its business purposes and which had been invested in specified
securities as “investment” were ineligible for deduction u/s.
80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act.

It is true that the apex court, in the case of Totgars
Co-operative Sale Society Ltd.
(supra), dealt with a case where the
assessee – co-operative society was also providing credit facilities to the
members besides marketing of agricultural produce grown by its members. On the
available facts, it appears that, in that case, the interest income from bank
was received from the sale consideration received from marketing agricultural
produce of its members, which was retained by the society in many cases before
the same was finally handed over to the members. The said retained amount which
was payable to its members from whom produce was bought, was invested in a
short-term deposit/security. Such an amount which was retained by the assessee
– society was a liability and it was shown in the balance sheet on the
liability side. Relying on such facts found by the Supreme Court, the Karnataka
High Court sought to distinguish the said decision and held that it was not
applicable to the facts of the case before it. Significantly, the Apex court
itself qualified its decision by observing that the decision was confined to
the facts of the said case . In the circumstances, it may be fair to not apply
the ratio of the said decision to the facts of any other case, unless the facts
therein are found to be identical, and are established  to have been considered by the Apex court.

It is most relevant to note that the Apex court in Totgars’
case had no occasion to consider the decisions delivered by the highest
court regularly on the subject, holding that the interest income of a
co-operative bank from its investments with banks or government securities was
eligible for deduction u/s. 80P of the Act. We are of the opinion that had they
been brought to the notice of the court, the decision could have been
different. Another factor that requires that the application of the decision of
the court shall be restricted to Totgars’ case only, is that the court, at no
place, was required to consider whether the income in question could be
considered to be attributable to profits and gains of business or not. The
court was rather concerned about whether the income would be treated as
“profits and gains of business” or from other sources. Again, had the court
been persuaded to consider the language of section 80P and the meaning of the
term “attributable”, we are sure the decision could have been different.

It is also true that this culling of the fact by the
Karnataka High court, from the Supreme court’s decision in Totgar’s
case, has been later on found to be not representing the full facts by the
Gujarat high court by examining the order of the high court passed in Totgars’
case. While that may be the case, it is at the same time important to take into
consideration the fact that the Andhra Pradesh High Court, like the Karnataka
High Court, has also held that the interest income is attributable to carrying
on the main business of banking, and therefore it was eligible for deduction
u/s. 80P(1) of the Act. [Andhra Pradesh State Co-operative Bank Ltd.,200
Taxman 220
]. The Andhra Pradesh High Court, while deciding the issue in
favour of the assessee society, did consider the decision of the Apex court in
Totgars’ case. In the circumstances, it may be that the Karnataka High Court
erred in deciding the issue on hand by distinguishing the facts of its case
with that of the facts in Totgar’s case. However the decision could not have
been different once it was appreciated that the income in question was
attributable to the profits and gains of business.

There appears to be merit in the conclusion of the Karnataka
and Andhra Pradesh High Courts, which have based their decisions by following
the ratio of the oft followed decision of the Apex court in Cambay’s case,
dealing with the true meaning of the word ‘attributable’ used in chapter VI-A.
The Apex Court had an occasion to consider the meaning of the word
‘attributable’ in the case of Cambay Electric Supply Industrial Co. Ltd. vs.
CIT 113 ITR 84
as under:

‘As regards the aspect
emerging from the expression “attributable to” occurring in the
phrase “profits and gains attributable to the business of the specified
industry (here generation and distribution of electricity) on which the learned
Solicitor-General relied, it will be pertinent to observe that the legislature,
has deliberately used the expression “attributable to” and not the
expression “derived from”. It cannot be disputed that the expression
“attributable to” is certainly wider in import than the expression
“derived from”. Had the expression “derived from” been
used, it could have with some force been contended that a balancing charge
arising from the sale of old machinery and buildings cannot be regarded as
profits and gains derived from the conduct of the business of generation and
distribution of electricity. In this connection, it may be pointed out that
whenever the legislature wanted to give a restricted meaning in the manner
suggested by the learned Solicitor-General, it has used the expression
”derived from”, as, for instance, in section-80J. In our view, since the
expression of wider import, namely, “attributable to”, has been used, the
legislature intended to cover receipts from sources other than the actual
conduct of the business
of generation and distribution of electricity.’

The word “attributable to” is certainly wider in
import than the expression “derived from”. Whenever the legislature
wanted to give a restricted meaning, they have used the expression
“derived from”. The expression “attributable to” being of
wider import, the said expression is used by the legislature whenever they
intended to gather receipts from sources other than the actual conduct of the
business.

The Apex Court, in various decisions, has consistently held
the view that interest income on investments made by the banks was attributable
to the profits and gains of business and was eligible for deduction u/s. 80P of
the Act. [Karnataka State Co-operative Apex Bank, 252 ITR 194 (SC),
Mehsana District, Central Co-operative Bank Ltd., 251 ITR 522 (SC), Nawanshahar
Central Co-operative Bank Ltd.289
ITR 6 (SC), Bombay State Co-operative
Bank Ltd. 70 ITR 86 (SC)
(para 16), Bangalore Distt. Co-op. Central Bank
Ltd.
233 ITR 282 (SC), Ponni Sugars & Chemicals Ltd. 306 ITR 392
(SC), Ramanathapuram District Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. 255 ITR 423
(SC), Nawanshahar Central Co-operative Bank Ltd.,349 ITR 689 (SC)].
These decisions are an authority for the proposition that, even though the
investment made does not form part of its main activity, stock in trade or working
capital, still the interest income therefrom would qualify for exemption u/s.
80P of the Income-tax Act.

The Apex court in Nawanshahar Central Cooperative Bank
Ltd.’s case (supra), observed as under. “this Court has consistently held
that investments made by a banking concern are part of the business of banking.
The income arising from such investments would, therefore, be attributable to
the business of bank falling under the head “Profits and gains of
business” and thus deductible under section 80-P(2)(a)( i) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961. This has been so held in Bihar State Coop. Bank Ltd. 39
ITR 114 (SC). Karnataka State Coop. Apex Bank, 259 ITR 144 and Ramanathapuram
Distt. Coop. Central Bank Ltd.255 ITR 423(SC).The principle in these cases
would also cover a situation where a cooperative bank carrying on the business
of banking is statutorily required to place a part of its funds in approved
securities.”

Attention is also invited to clause (b) of sub-section 2 of
section 80P, which clause while providing for deduction for certain primary
societies provides for a deduction in respect of “the whole of the amount of
profits and gains of such business” as against “the whole of the amount of
profits and gains of business attributable to any one or more of such
activities”
covered by clause (a) of sub-section 2 of section 80P. A
bare reading of the contrasting provisions clearly shows that scope of clause
(a) is wider than clause (b), plainly on account of the insertion of the terms
‘attributable and activities’. These terms cannot be treated as redundant and
should be given the appropriate meaning.

It is well-settled that a provision for
deduction or tax relief should be interpreted liberally in favour of the
assessee. Such a provision should be construed as to fully achieve the object
of the legislature and not to defeat it. [South Arcot District Cooperative
Marketing Society Ltd.116 ITR 117 (SC), Bajaj Tempo Ltd.196 ITR 188 (SC) and
N.C. Budharaja & Co., 70 Taxman 312(SC).]
Liberally interpreting sub-section
2(a)( i) of section 80P of the Act, the conclusion in favour of the assessee
appears to be a better conclusion.

Stable Vs. Dynamic Tax Laws – Strike The Right Balance!

8th November 2016 could be a day to remember in India’s
history. On that day, the Prime Minister announced demonetisation of 86% of the
national currency, the stated objectives being the drive against terrorism,
corruption, fake currency and tax evasion. How many of these objectives will be
achieved time alone will tell. I had in my earlier editorial pointed out that
demonetisation was a bold decision and for the sheer enormity thereof the Prime
Minister deserved to be lauded. At that time, many had felt that as far as the
drive against tax evasion was concerned demonetisation was only one small step,
and had to be followed up by other actions.

Tax evasion is a malady from which most developing nations
suffer and India is no exception. An insignificant number of citizens
(approximately 2 %) pay taxes, the reason for the same being evasion and not
avoidance. These actions have been taken by the government. We have now,
Chapter X-A, in regard to general anti-avoidance rules (GAAR), the amendment to
section 6 in regard to the tax residence of foreign companies by the invoking
of the Place of Effective Management (POEM) Rules, a strong legislation like
the recently amended being Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, and
the recent amendments to sections 115BBE and 271AAB and the insertion of
section 271AAC in the Income-tax Act 1961. These will be effective from assessment
year 2017-18, except the GAAR the provisions of which will take effect for
assessment year 2018-19.

While the object of the government in using the Prohibition
of Benami Property Transactions Act as well as the provisions of the Income-tax
Act to which I have made a reference, cannot be faulted one really wonders as
to whether the government has the wherewithal to administer all these changes
fairly and effectively. This is because, the ability as well as the mindset of
those on the ground have not undergone much change in the last few decades.
Once these provisions start being implemented, the result would be a
substantial increase in litigation. All economists are unanimous in their view
that for a developing economy to continue on its progress path, stability and
fair implementation of tax laws play a very important role. In the past, there
have been a number of instances where interpretation placed on tax laws by the
Apex Court has been overturned by legislative amendments, in many cases
retrospectively. The Vodafone case is an example of the same. While no one can
challenge the right of the State to make all the amendments to laws that it
desires, it owes to both its own citizens as well as those who invest in the
country, a reasonably stable tax regime on the basis of which their affairs can
be planned.

Coming to using these changes in law to punish those who have
already evaded law and prevent evasion in future, it is necessary to have an
administration, which is competent, fair and humane. Lack of it is the cause
for concern. For example, let us consider the Prohibition of Benami Property
Transactions Act, which has become effective from November, 2016. Undoubtedly,
in principle it is appropriate that the administration of this law has been
entrusted to the Income Tax Department, since tax evasion is one of the prime
purposes of keeping a property Benami. However, the consequence of a property
being treated as the benami in terms of the Act is confiscation. As the law
stands today, the `Initiating Officer’, the Approving Authority for this purpose is below
the rank of Commissioner. Once an approval to the initiation process is given,
the property can be attached. While this is certainly a step anterior to actual
confiscation, it can have very serious consequences as far as the person
against whom the action is initiated is concerned. Those of us, who practice on
the ground, are conscious of how such approvals are granted in a casual and
routine manner. Thereafter once a panel (Adjudicating Authority) constituted
under the statute accepts that the property is benami, it is liable for
confiscation, such confiscation being subject to an appeal before the Tribunal.
While one wholeheartedly agrees that the law had to have the requisite teeth,
what needs to be guarded against is that they should bite the person for whom
they are meant and not maul an innocent person.

Let us then consider the amendment to 115BBE. This was
possibly a reaction to opinions reported in various media that if, demonetised
currency was deposited in the bank account and declared as income in the return
of income for the assessment year 2017-18, one would get away with paying 30%
tax. Therefore the provision was amended to take effect from assessment year
2017-18, providing a much higher rate of tax. The amendment however ought to
have been made effective only for either a specific period or the intent could
have been more specifically provided for. Now with the provision as it stands
it, is likely to be used in situations and against persons for whom it was not
intended.

This government in the past has been accused of tax
terrorism. One would still believe that the intentions of the government are
laudable but those in power must apprise themselves of the realities and
difficulties on the ground. What one certainly wants is not inertia in tax laws
but stability and fair implementation. Laws must necessarily change to ensure
that the war against corruption and tax evasion is won. They must therefore be
stable yet dynamic; the challenge is to strike the right balance. The
government must appreciate that all things cannot be changed overnight and the
situation on the ground will require patient acceptance for some time. I would
therefore like to end with the popular four lines

O
Lord, give me the courage –

To
change the things that I can change

The
willingness to accept those that I cannot –

And
the wisdom to understand the difference
between the two.

I only
hope that the Lord grant the powers that
be this wisdom.

Spiritual Pursuit, Professional Growth And Material Prosperity – Can They Co-Exist?

One often gets confused about professional growth and material
prosperity. Professional growth and material prosperity are not the same.
Professional growth comes from values, reputation and satisfaction of
meaningful contribution to clients’ lives and nation building; whereas,
material prosperity could be achieved dehors of professional growth,
e.g. even an uneducated person can be a multi-millionaire. A good professional
is one who lives a value based life and is spiritually inclined. So what is the
connection between a profession and spirituality?

People think that in order for one to be materially prosperous, one
needs to compromise on values. However, the fact is that for being materially
well off, one need not be spiritually bankrupt. Spiritual pursuit, professional
growth and material prosperity can co-exist. In fact it is often found that the
growth of professional practice is in direct proportion to one’s growth in
spirituality. And material prosperity is in direct proportion of professional
growth.

Let me share with you my understanding of spirituality in a different
perspective and its relevance to professional growth and material prosperity:

(i)   Living in ‘Now’

      Spirituality is not something different
from our day to day living. Doing our daily chores with utmost concentration or
awareness is nothing but a state of being spiritual.

      It reminds me of a story. A young disciple
comes for knowledge to a Zen Master. Days and months pass without any sermon or
teachings from the Master. Finally one day the youngster asks his Master, when
will his teaching start? Master turned to him and smiled, it already started
the day you entered this monastery. Haven’t you observed how I live? At that
time, the disciple realised that every act of the Master was meticulous. He was
hundred per cent present in that moment. He was actually living in “Now”.

      When one decides to bring this awareness
in the profession, the speed of one’s professional growth increases.

(ii)  Work is Worship

      Work’s reward is in work itself. I have
observed that whenever I get satisfaction of my preparations for any seminar to
be addressed by me, the same is well received by the participants. My reward is
earned when I derive joy on completion of preparation and successful delivery
of the lecture. Spirituality is nothing but doing one’s work diligently, as an
offering to Lord. When one does one’s work with good emotions at heart, the
work becomes worship.

      I am reminded of a beautiful story.

      Once upon a time, three masons were
working on a site. A passerby asked the first one, hey what are you doing? He
said “don’t you see, I am laying bricks”; He asked the same question to the
second mason, he replied, “I am constructing a wall”. When he asked the third
person, he said “I am building a temple”. All three were right in their
answers, but the third person was working with divine emotions and therefore
can be termed as spiritual.

(iii) Sharing is Divine

      One of the insecurities people have in
professional life is that of competition. However, we all know that knowledge
when shared gets doubled, one with the giver and the second with the receiver.
Knowledge, unlike products remains with the giver and enriches the receiver
also. In fact, the more we share, more we enrich ourselves. The same thing
applies to our clients as well. The more we educate them; more they respect and
love us.
 

(iv) Trust and Integrity are supreme

      For any professional, trust and integrity
are of paramount importance. People entrust work only if they believe in the
integrity of the professional and have a trust in his abilities and intentions
to deliver. Both these qualities come naturally to a professional who pursues a
spiritual path. Whenever a client comes to know about your spiritual pursuits,
his trust and belief in your integrity increases.

      Non-indulgence in corrupt practices and
other core values are highly appreciated and respected by clients.

(v)  Discipline is Divine

      One of the most appreciated traits of a
professional is discipline. Delivering on time and as promised is well
appreciated. We must always strive to produce more than what we consume and
give more than what we take. When we give more than what we take, we often land
up receiving more than what we expected. This would certainly happen, may not
always be in material terms, but invariably in terms of love, respect and
appreciation.
 

(vi) We are all connected

      We are not human beings having a spiritual
experience; we are spiritual beings having a human experience. In that sense we
are all connected. When we connect with our customers or clients from this
perspective, we strike a bond of love, trust and friendship which leads to
professional growth.

From the above it is clear that spirituality always helps you in your
professional growth.

Does that mean that spirituality never hinders professional growth?

The answer to the above question is both “yes” and “no”. It all depends
on how one defines professional growth. If one equates the professional growth
with material prosperity alone, then in the short term it may be possible that
you earn less or have to pay more taxes if you walk on the path of
spirituality. However, in the long run, one who follows spirituality,
experiences faster professional growth as he would be at peace with himself and
therefore can express himself or shine in his profession.

It may happen that as one progresses on the path of spirituality, one
finds the futility of this material world and professional achievements. At
that time one may consciously decide to go slow in the professional dimension
as one would not like to trade one’s permanent happiness with the temporal one.

Epilogue

Treading on the path of spirituality along with professional goals is
not easy. There are many temptations on the way. At times the system may force
you for indulgence in wrong practices, at times client wants you to do so and
at times you may simply be lured with the quantum of benefit. Here I am
reminded of one beautiful Gujarati bhajan, whose first line is as follows:

“Hari no marag che surano, nahi kayar nu kaam..”

Meaning – the path to God is for the brave and courageous and not for
cowards.

Once we decide to walk on the path of spirituality, “we must be ever
ready to fight against all low tendencies and false values within and without
us and to live honestly the noble sacrifice and service.”

At the end of the day you will find that spirituality leads to
professional growth, which in turn would bring you prosperity – both material
and spiritual.

17. [2016] 161 ITD 546 (Chennai Trib.) DCIT vs. Suthanther Assumtha A.Y.: 2010-11 Date of Order: 9th September, 2016.

Section 32, Appendix I to Rule 5 and
Circular No. 652, dated 14-6-1993: An assessee is entitled for higher
depreciation on pay loaders, dozers and water tankers used by it in its
business of transportation of goods on hire.

FACTS

The assessee was engaged in the business of
transportation and had claimed higher rate of depreciation @ 30% on pay
loaders, dozers and water tankers.

During the relevant assessment year, the
main part of assessee’s transportation business was done for M/s Anand
Transport.

The Assessing Officer (AO) studied the
agreement entered by the assessee with 
Anand Transport and found that assessee had to supply pay loaders for
hatch work, loading material into trucks from wharf, transporting to designated
stock yard by trucks, stacking at stock yard, loading from stock yard into
trucks, carting from stock yard to railway siding and loading of goods into
railway wagon.

According to AO, vehicles which were used in
the business of running them on hire were entitled for higher depreciation.

As per the AO, the cranes and pay loaders
were used by the assessee for his own business of transportation and there was
no hiring of vehicles. Hence AO disallowed higher rate of depreciation.

According to the CIT(A), there was an
element of ‘hiring’ in the business activities of the assessee and hence
directed the AO to allow depreciation @ 30%.

On appeal by the revenue before the
Tribunal:

HELD

There is no dispute that the assessee was
engaged in the business of transportation of coal and iron ore.

Part III(3)(ii) of Appendix I to the Income
Tax Rules allows higher rate of depreciation @ 30% to following category of
Machinery and Plant –

‘Motor buses, motor lorries and motor taxis
used in a business of running them on hire’.

By virtue of Circular No. 652, dated
14-6-1993, higher rate of depreciation @ 30% mentioned in Part III(3)(ii) of
Appendix to the Income Tax Rules would get an extended meaning than what
literally follows on their reading.

As per Circular No. 652 (supra), an
assessee shall be entitled to higher rate of depreciation @ 30% on motor
vehicles used by it in its business of transporting of goods on hire.

In our opinion, the agreement entered by the
assessee with M/s Anand Transport clearly shows that its duty was to transport
the goods provided by Anand Transport from one place to another. We cannot say
that element of ‘hiring’ was absent.

Hence, we do not find any reason to
interfere with the order of the CIT(A) and the assessee would be eligible for
higher rate of depreciation on the vehicles used by it in its business of
transportation of goods on hire.

Note – Reliance
had been placed on Bombay High Court in the case of SC Thakur & Bros.
[2010] 322 ITR 463 and JCIT vs. Avinash Transport in ITA No. 1909/Kol/2012

dated 13.8.2015

15. Tribunal jurisdiction u/s. 254(2) of the Act – Once a matter is disposed off by the Tribunal it would be functus officio – It can only exercise limited jurisdiction to rectify its order – No clarification can be sought

CIT vs. Shri Suresh G. Wadhwa. [
Income tax Appeal no. 904 of 2014 dt : 05/12/2016 (Bombay High Court)].

[Shri Suresh G. Wadhwa vs. JCIT,. [ MA
NO. 387/MUM/2013 Arising out of ITA No 6395/MUM/2010; Bench : I ; dated
04/12/2013 ; A Y: 2009-10. Mum. ITAT ]

The Tribunal passed an order dated 2nd
August, 2013 u/s. 254(1) of the Act relating to the AY : 2009-10. The AO was
not interpreting/understanding the said order correctly. In the above view, the
assessee filed an application u/s. 254(2) of the Act seeking clarification of
the order dated 2nd August, 2013, so as to explain its correct
meaning. By the impugned order, the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s
miscellaneous application seeking a clarification of its order dated 2nd
August, 2013. The Tribunal in the impugned order dated 4th December,
2013 records that under the garb of clarification of an order, a party’s right
to interpret the Tribunal’s order cannot be pre-empted. If the parties are
aggrieved by the interpretation of the Tribunal’s order by the lower
authorities, it would only be fair to challenge the same in an appropriate
proceedings. Notwithstanding the above, the Tribunal allowed the application by
the impugned order clarifying its earlier order dated 2nd August,
2013. This the Tribunal did by holding that though such an application for
clarification may not strictly fall u/s. 254(2) of the Act, yet such an
application would be entertained in exercise of its inherent powers and in
support relied upon the Apex Court order in
Honda Siel Power
Products Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, 295 ITR 466.

The Revenue preferred appeal before
the High Court against the order of the Tribunal passed u/s. 254(2) of the Act.
The Court observed that the Tribunal after passing an order u/s. 254(1) of the
Act has became functus officio in respect of the proceedings which led
to the final order dated 2nd August, 2013 passed in respect of AY :
2009-10. The Tribunal’s powers are for rectification are specifically set out
in section 254(2) of the Act. There is no provision in the Act enabling the
Tribunal to clarify its order after it has became functus officio particularly
when the clarification is not in respect of clerical/typographical errors which
have crept into the order. The Tribunal has no powers of Review. It cannot in
the garb of clarifying its order already passed u/s. 254(1) of the Act, seek to
review the same. The issue is of jurisdiction of the Tribunal to entertain such
an application for clarification. Undoubtedly, an inherent power of procedural
review is available with every Tribunal but not of substantive review. Procedural
review would be cases where the procedure/process of adjudicating the dispute
is not followed, to illustrate an order passed ex parte or when no
notice of hearing is received by party, etc. i.e. the process of
arriving at justice is vitiated. (
Grindlays Bank Ltd. vs.
Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal, 1980 (suppl.) SCC 420
). Seeking clarification and/or amplification of an order
already passed without it falling within the parameters of an rectification
application, would lead to chaos and uncertainty. No order of the Tribunal
would then be final, as it would always be subject to clarification. Once the
Tribunal has passed an order u/s. 254(1) of the Act, it becomes functus
officio
and loses jurisdiction over the lis. It is axiomatic that
once a matter is disposed of by the Tribunal/Court, it would be functus
officio
. The Tribunal can only exercise limited jurisdiction as provided in
section 254(2) of the Act, to rectify its order in view of apparent error on
record or in case of procedural issues leading to an order passed u/s. 254(1)
of the Act. Thus, the Tribunal ought not to have entertained such an application on the part of the assessee.

The reliance placed upon
the decision of the Apex Court in Honda Siel Power Products Ltd. (supra)
is inappropriate. In the facts of that case, a binding decision of a coordinate
bench was cited before the Tribunal during the hearing of the appeal and the
same was not considered in the order of the Tribunal. It was in the above
context, that the Tribunal had allowed the application for rectification made
by the party. However, it was reversed by the High Court. On further appeal,
the Apex Court restored the order of the Tribunal. It held that the Tribunal
allowed the application applied u/s. 254(2) of the Act for rectification as a
binding order cited during the hearing before the Tribunal was not considered
in the impugned order of the Tribunal. In fact, this would be a case of
procedural review as held by the Apex Court in Grindlays Bank (supra)
and also fall within the scope of section 254(2) of the Act. It must be noted
that the Apex Court in Honda Siel Power Product Ltd. (supra) did not
exercise inherent powers in the facts before it, but allowed the application
u/s. 254(2) of the Act. Therefore, the reliance of Honda Siel Power Product
Ltd. (supra)
is misplaced.

The impugned order dated 4th
December, 2013 was quashed and set aside.

14. Reopening of assessment – No reason to believe that the income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment – reopening notice was bad in law. Section 148

CIT vs. Devkumar Haresh
Vaidya. [ Income tax Appeal no 750 of 2014, dt : 05/12/2016 (Bombay High
Court)].

[Devkumar Haresh Vaidya
(IT) vs. ACIT . [ITA No. 7325/MUM/2012; Bench : J ; AY 2007-08 dt: d 31/07/2013
; Mum. ITAT ]

The Assessee filed its ROI
for  AY 2007-08 declaring a total income
of Rs. 24.69 lakh. The same was accepted u/s. 143(1) of the Act. Thereafter,
the AO received information from the Deputy Director of Income Tax
(Investigation), Surat that property situated at New Delhi (said property) was
sold on 23rd August, 2006 for a total consideration of Rs.148.93
crore by the 12 family members, including the assessee and the assessees’s
share in the said amount was Rs.6.21 crore. Consequently, a notice u/s. 148 of
the Act was issued seeking to reopen the assessment for AY: 2007-08. The reason
for reopening the assessment was that said property had been sold to one
Mineral Management Services (I) Ltd. Thus, the sale was assessable to tax in
the A.Y. 2007-08 as it was so assessed in the hands of Mineral Management
Services (I) Ltd. in that year.

The assessee challenged
the notice pointing out that he had offered to tax the entire consideration of
Rs.6.21 crore (Rs. 4 crore in his hands and Rs.2.21 crore as a part of his late
father’s income was offered to tax) in the earlier A.Y. 2006-07. Moreover, he
had also claimed the benefit of section 54EC of the Act in A.Y. 2006-07. This
was accepted by the AO in scrutiny proceedings u/s. 143(3) of the Act. It was
pointed out that the said property was a family property in which his mother
(Devhuti Vaidya) had undivided and indeterminate rights/share in the said
property. Therefore, though the assessee and his family members did not have
possession of the said property, they had filed caveat objecting the
grant of probate to the Will of the assessee’s maternal grand father Mr.
Anantrai Pattani in favour of his maternal uncle Mr. Kumar Pattani. In the
above view, as a part of the settlement arrived at between the assessee and his
family members with his uncle Mr. Kumar Pattani, an Agreement for Sale dated 25th
October, 2005 by which the assessee sold his rights in the said property to one
M/s. Duce Property and Services Pvt. Ltd. and withdrew his objections to grant
of probate to Mr. Kumar Pattani. All this in consideration of  Rs.12 crore (as a
family) and Rs.4 crore as a part thereof being for the transfer of his interest
/ right in the immovable property was also received in A.Y. 2006-07.

All the above facts were
examined by the AO while passing the assessment order for the A.Y. 2006-07 and
held that the assessee had sold his rights/share in the immovable property and
sought benefit of the investment made of the sales proceeds u/s. 54EC of the
Act. It was also pointed out that as is evident from the reasons for reopening
the assessment that the amendment made in section 54EC of the Act effective
from A.Y. 2007-08 which would restrict the benefit of that provision to Rs.50
lakh had triggered the reopening notice.

This was evident from the
following observations recorded in the reasons, which reads as under :“ In
view of above amendment, if the assessee would have shown the capital gain
correctly in the A.Y. 2007-08, then she would not have been eligible for
deduction of more than Rs.50 lakhs even if she would have complied with the
time limit provision of the section 54EC.”

However, the AO by order
passed u/s. 143(3) r/w section 147 of the Act, did not accept the assessee’s
objections. Consequently, the AO brought to tax an amount of Rs.6.21 crore on
the above account. (Rs.4 crore being the assessee’s share and Rs.2.21 crore
being his share in his late father Mr. Haresh Vaidya’s interest, who had
expired in the meantime.).

On appeal, the CIT(A) also
dismissed the assessee’s appeal.

On further appeal, the
Tribunal held that the AO could not have any reason to believe that income
chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. In particular, it held that the
assessee had offered capital gains to tax in the AY 2006-07 and the same was
accepted after examination / consideration while passing an order u/s. 143(3)
of the Act. Thus, the AO having already assessed the income arising on sale of
rights in the said property as evidenced by the Agreement for Sale dated 25th
August, 2005 and letter dated 17th October, 2005 evidencing the
family arrangement coupled with having received the consideration in the
Assessment Year 2005-06 which was also offered to tax in that year could not
have had any reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped
assessment. The impugned order also records the fact that there were disputes
amongst the legal heirs of late Mr. Anantrai Pattani including pending probate
proceedings before the High Court. The dispute between the assessee and his
uncle Mr. Kumar Pattani stood settled on the basis of offer made by the uncle
in his letter dated 17th October, 2005 to the assessee and his
family members to give up their rights in respect of the said property
(including not contesting the probate petition) on his uncle paying a sum of
Rs.12 crore in the aggregate. 

Further, the fact that the
communication received from the Deputy Director of Income Tax (Investigation),
Surat which was the material for issuing the impugned notice, also seems to
indicate that the entire exercise was only for denying the benefit of section
54EC of the Act in view of the amendment thereto with effect from AY 2007-08.
The Tribunal held that reopening notice was bad in law.

The Hon. High Court held
that once the assessee has offered the capital gains to tax on the basis of the
Agreement for Sale dated 25th October, 2005 read with the letter
dated 17th October, 2005 and the receipt of consideration for sale
of his interest in said property and accepted on due examination u/s. 143(3) of
the Act, the AO could not have had any reason to believe that income chargeable
to tax has escaped assessment. In fact, this is a case of change of opinion,
inasmuch as for the A.Y. 2006-07, the AO in scrutiny proceedings accepted that
the transaction qua the respondent is taxable in A.Y. 2006-07 and now
seeks to tax it in A.Y. 2007-08.

The report received from
the DDIT (Inv), Surat essentially seeks to deny the exemption u/s. 54EC of the
Act in view of the amendment thereto. When the capital gains has been offered
to tax in earlier assessment year and accepted by the Revenue in scrutiny
proceedings, then a mere change in law in the subject assessment year with
regard to extent of exemption will not give any reason to believe that income
chargeable to tax in the subject assessment year had escaped assessment.
Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.

13. Rectification – Retrospective Amendment u/s. 115JB – Rectification made by the A.O on the issue in the order passed u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 254 of the Act- Such mistake, if any, was in the order originally passed by the A.O. u/s. 143(3) of the Act – Not permissible: u/s. 154 of the Act

CIT vs. Weizmann Ltd. [
Income tax Appeal no 1020 of 2014 dt : 09/12/2016 (Bombay High Court)].

[M/s Weizmann Ltd.,vs.
ACIT. [ITA No. 768 /MUM/2012; Bench : G ; date:31/10/2013 ; A Y: 2001- 2002.
(MUM) ITAT ]

On 27th February,
2004, the assessment order was passed u/s. 143(3) for the subject assessment
year. The assessing officer accepted the assessee’s claim of book profits u/s.
115JB. The book profits as claimed was after allowing of amounts set aside as
provisions for diminution in the value of assets. The assessee being aggrieved
by the assessment order on certain other issues had preferred an appeal to the
appellate authority and carried its grievance up to the Tribunal. On 29th August,
2007, the Tribunal restored some of the issues by which the assessee was
aggrieved to the Assessing Officer. It is relevant to note that the issue of
allowing of amounts set aside as provision for diminution of the value of
assets was not an issue which was restored to the Assessing Officer for
readjudication.

Consequent to the above,
the Assessing Officer passed an order dated 30th December, 2008 u/s.
143(3) r.w.s 254 of the Act giving effect to the order dated 29th
August, 2007 of the Tribunal.

The Finance (No.2) Act of
2009 amended section 115JB of the Act with retrospective effect from 1st April,
2001. The amendment inter alia added to Explanation I to section 115JB
of the Act, clause (i) providing that for purposes of computing that the book
profits thereunder, the profit shown in the profit and loss account is to be
increased by the amounts set aside as provision for diminution in the value of
assets.

In view of the above amendment the A.O. by
order dated 19th August, 2010 u/s. 154 rectified its order dated 30th
December, 2008 and made addition of Rs. 1,28,60,000/- to the book profit
of the assessee on account of provision for diminution in the value of
investment relying on the amendment made in the provisions of section 115JB
that with retrospective effect on 1-4-2001.

The assessee challenged
the order passed by the A.O. u/s. 154 of the Act by preferring an appeal before
the CIT(A) disputing the addition of Rs. 1,28,60,000/- made by the A.O. to the
book profit on account of provision for diminution in the value of investment.
The ld. CIT(A) did not find merit in the said appeal of the assessee and
dismissed the same.

The assessee preferred an
appeal before the Tribunal. The assessee submitted that the order u/s. 143(3)
r.w.s. 254 of the Act, was passed by the A.O. as per the specific directions
given by the Tribunal while restoring only the limited issues to the file of
the A.O. He submitted that the issue relating to the allowability of provision
for diminution in the value of investment was not before the Tribunal and since
the same was not restored by the Tribunal to the file of the A.O., the
consideration of the same was beyond the scope of order passed by the A.O. u/s
143(3) r.w.s. 254 of the Act. He relied on the decision of Hon’ble Bombay
High Court in the case of CIT vs. Sakseria Cotton Mills Ltd. (1980) 124 ITR 570.

The Tribunal held that it
cannot be said that there was any mistake in the order of the A.O. passed u/s
143(3) r.w.s. 254 of the Act on 30-12-2008 in allowing the deduction on account
of provision for diminution in the value of investment calling for any
rectification u/s. 154 of the Act. Such mistake, if any, was in the order originally
passed by the A.O. u/s. 143(3) of the Act on 27-2-2004 and not in the order
passed on 30-12-2008. The rectification made by the A.O. on this issue to the
order passed u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 254 of the Act by an order dated 19-8-2010
passed u/s. 154 of the Act thus was not permissible. The Tribunal, therefore,
directed the A.O. to delete the addition made by way of rectification order
u/s. 154 of the Act.

The Revenue preferred an
appeal before the High Court. The High Court held that the issue stands concluded
by the decision of this Court in Sakseria Cotton Mills Ltd. (supra) in
favour of the assessee. The distinction sought to be made by the Revenue on the
basis of the amendment to section 115JB of the Act in 2009 with retrospective
effect from 2001 does not address the fundamental issue of non merger of the
order dated 27th February, 2004 with the order dated 30th December,
2008. Therefore, any rectification of the order dated 27th February,
2004 is required to be done within 4 years from 27th February, 2004
as provided u/s. 154 of the Act. It is not disputed before us that issue of the
provisions made for diminution in value of assets which is sought to be
rectified is an issue which was never the subject matter of consideration in
the order dated 30th December, 2008 passed u/s. 143(3) r/w section
254 of the Act. Therefore, in these circumstances, it could not be rectified
u/s. 154 of the Act. In the above view, the revenue appeal was dismissed.

45. Speculative transaction – Business loss – A. Y. 2009-10 – Hedging transactions entered into to cover variation in foreign exchange rate – Impact on business of import and export of diamond – Transactions entered only in regular course of business activity – Not speculative transactions

CIT vs. D. Chetan and Co.; 390 ITR 36 (Bom):

The Assessee was engaged in the business of import and export
of diamonds. For the A. Y. 2009-10, the assessee explained that the amount of
Rs. 78.10 lakhs claimed as loss was on account of hedging transactions entered
into to safeguard variation in exchange rates affecting its transact5ions of
import and export. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim on the ground
that it was a notional loss of a contingent liability debited to the profit and
loss account. The Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal allowed the
assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)   The Tribunal concluded that the transaction
entered into by the assessee was not in the nature of speculative activities.
Further, the hedging transactions were entered into so as to cover variation in
foreign exchange rate which would impact its business of import and export of
diamonds. These concurrent findings of fact were not shown to be perverse in
any manner.

ii)   The Assessing Officer in the assessment order
did not find that the transaction entered into by the assessee was speculative
in nature. At no point of time did the department challenge the assertion of
the assessee that the activity of entering into forward contract was in the
regular course of its business only to safeguard against the loss on account of
foreign exchange variation. The Department never contended that the transaction
was speculative but only disallowed on the ground that it was notional.

iii)   Thus, it was to be concluded that the
transactions entered were only in regular course of business and not speculative.
Therefore, no substantial question of law arose.”

44. Salary – Perquisite – Fringe Benefit Tax – Sections 17 and 115WA of the Act – Once the employer is taxed on the fringe benefits same cannot be taxed as perquisite in hands of employee

Kamlesh K. Singhal vs. CIT; 389 ITR 247 (Guj):

The assessee was employed in ONGC. For the A. Y. 2007-08, the
Assessing Officer issued notice u/s. 148 of the Act, on the ground that his
employer had reimbursed the conveyance maintenance and repair expenditure and
uniform allowance to the assessee but the employer had neither reflected it in
the salary certificate issued nor had deducted the tax at source on those
amounts. Pursuant to the notice, he passed an order u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 147
levying 20% and 100% tax respectively, on the fringe benefits and made
additions to the assessee’s income accordingly. The assessee filed a revision
petition contending that it would amount to double taxation as his employer had
paid fringe benefits tax u/s. 115WA. The Commissioner rejected the petition.

The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the
assessee and held as under:

“i)   Once a certain benefit was held to be a
fringe benefit and the employer was taxed accordingly under Chapter XII-H of
the Act, the same benefit could not be included in the income of the
assessee-employee treating it as a perquisite.

ii)   The disallowance of 20% of the reimbursed
conveyance and repair expenses and 100% of the uniform allowance made by the
assessing Officer was reversed. The Assessing Officer was to pass a
consequential order accordingly. The order passed by the Commissioner was
unsustainable.”

43. Income – Accrual – A. Ys. 2005-06 to 2007-08 – Assessee obtaining contract – Work shared by assessee with another person – Amount received for work shared proportionate to work – Amount received by assessee and such other person shown separately – No evidence of sub-contract – Amount received by other person cannot be added to assessee’s income

CIT vs. G. Balraj; 390 ITR 50 (Karn):

The assessee was a PWD contractor and according to the
assessee, he had entered into an agreement with B Construction, whereby a
particular percentage of the income of the contract was to be shared in a
particular proportion. The assessee had shown his income to the extent of the
amount received by it. However, in the assessment proceedings, the Assessing
Officer finding that as tax was deducted at source from the total amount of the
contract(received by the assessee as well as by B Construction), brought the
entire amount under the contract to tax in the assessee’s hands. The Tribunal
deleted the addition.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)   There was enough material to show that the
amount received from the contract was directly shared by the assessee and B
Construction in accordance with their proportionate share and that it was not a
case where the money/the amount realised from the contract was apportioned as
the income of the assessee and thereafter, a portion of it or a major portion
was paid by the assessee to B Construction. When after receipt of the contract
amount, the shares were identified and taken by both the parties of the joint
venture, it could not be treated as sub-contract.

ii)  There
was no material brought by the Revenue to show that there was any contract
entered into by the assessee to assign the work to B Construction as
sub-contractor. Further, when the respective share was received by the
assessee, it had been shown as the income by the assessee in the return of
income. Similarly, for the respective share of B Construction it had shown its
income of the amount received by it. Under these circumstances, the findings of
the Tribunal that it was a joint venture between the assessee and B
Construction was not contrary to the material or based on conjectures or
surmises.”

42. Educational institution – Exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi) of the Act – A. Y. 2014-15 – Application for approval can be filed before end of financial year and further information if needed can be sought from assessee – Application filed in the financial year rejected on the ground that it was filed prematurely – Not justified

Shri Guru Ram Dass Ji Education Trust vs. CCIT; 389 ITR
423 (P&H):

The assessee-trust was running educational institutions.
Since its receipts exceeded Rs. 1 crore in the F. Y. 2013-14, it made an
application for approval u/s. 10(23C)(vi) of the Act for the A. Y. 2014-15 onwards. The application was rejected on the
ground that the assessee had prematurely filed the application and that it
could only have been filed after the expiry of the F. Y. 2013-14 and before
September 30, 2014.

The Punjab and Haryana High Court allowed the writ petition
filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i)   The fourteenth proviso to section
10(23C) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 states that an application under the
section can be filed on or before 30th September of the relevant assessment
year, from which the exemption is sought. The proviso simply gives an outer
date for making an application and does not say that the application is to be
made between 1st April and 30th September of the
assessment year. If an application is filed prior to 1st April of
the relevant assessment year and after filing thereof, any further information
is still needed by the Department, before taking a final decision thereon, that
information can be sought from the applicant.

ii)   A trust might know or have reason to believe
prior to 1st April that its receipts were likely to exceed Rs. 1
crore. There was no reason why such an institution ought not to be permitted to
make the application even before the 1st day April of the relevant
year.

iii)   All the accounts for the year ending March
31, 2014, when asked for, were duly provided by the assessee much before the
passing of the order. Further, note 1(a) and note 3 to Form 56D clearly
indicated that the application could be filed even prior to 1st
April of the relevant assessment year, from which the exemption was sought.

iv)   The
Chief Commissioner was directed to consider the application filed by the
assessee for the grant of exemption u/s. 10(23C) of the Act, on the merits.”

41. Charitable purpose – Charitable trust – Exemption u/s. 11 of the Act – A. Y. 2008-09 – Expenditure incurred in excess of income from accumulated funds – Trust entitled to exemption

CIT vs. Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti; 390 ITR 59 (Raj):

The assessee, a charitable trust, incurred expenditure for
charitable purposes during the previous year relevant to the A. Y. 2008-09 in
excess of the income derived during the relevant period. The excess expenditure
was incurred by transferring the fund from interest bearing public deposit
account to non-interest bearing public deposit account. The Assessing Officer
held that the excess expenditure having been incurred from charity
fund/accumulated fund of earlier years, the assessee was nor entitled to
exemption u/s. 11(1)(a) of the Act – and accordingly, assessed the income as
the taxable income. The Tribunal held that the assessee was entitled to
exemption u/s. 11 of the Act.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Rajasthan High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)   When the income of a trust is used or put to
use to meet the expenses incurred for religious or charitable purposes, it is
applied for charitable or religious purposes. The application of the income for
charitable or religious purposes takes place in the year in which the income is
adjusted to meet the expense incurred for charitable or religious purposes.

ii)   In other words, even if the expenses for
charitable or religious purposes have been incurred in an earlier year and the
expenses are adjusted against the income of a subsequent year, the income of
that year can be said to have been applied for charitable or religious purposes
in the year in which the expenses were incurred for charitable and religious
purposes had been adjusted.

iii)   The Tribunal holding the assessee entitled to
claim exemption u/s. 11(1)(a) of the Act during the relevant assessment year
was justified.”

40. Capital gain – Exemption u/s. 54EC of the Act – A. Y. 2008 -09 – Investment in specified bonds from the amounts received as an advance is eligible for section 54EC deduction – The fact that the investment is made prior to the transfer of the asset is irrelevant

CIT vs. Subhash Vinayak Supnekar (Bom); ITA No. 1009 of
2014 dated 14/12/2016; (www.itatonline.org)

An Agreement to Sale for the subject property was entered
into on 21st February, 2006. The final sale took place under a Sale
Deed dated 5th April, 2007. The assessee invested an amount of Rs.50
lakh from the advance received under the Agreement to Sale in the Rural Electrification
Corporation Ltd. bonds on 2nd February, 2007. The Assessing Officer
as well as the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) held that the assessee is
not entitled to the benefit of section 54EC of the Act, as the amounts were
invested in the bonds prior to the sale of the subject property on 5th
April, 2007. The Tribunal allowed the claim of the assessee by following the
decision of its coordinate bench in Bhikulal Chandak HUF vs. Income Tax
Officer 126 TTJ 545
wherein it has been held that where an assessee makes
investment in bonds as required u/s. 54EC of the Act on receipt of advance as
per the Agreement to Sale, then the assessee is entitled to claim the benefit
of Section 54EC of the Act.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and as under:

“i)   The short question is whether an amount
received on sale of a capital asset as an advance on the basis of Agreement to
Sale and the same being invested in specified bonds before the final sale,
would entitle the assessee to the benefit of Section 54EC of the Act.

ii)   The Sale Deed dated 5th April, 2007
records in clause (d) thereof the fact that the Agreement to Sale had been
entered into on 21st February, 2006 in respect of the subject
property and the amounts being received by the vendor (respondent assessee)
under that Agreement to Sale. Thus, these amounts when received as advance
under an Agreement to Sale of a capital asset are invested in specified bonds
the benefit of Section 54EC of the Act is available. In the above view, the
Tribunal holds that the facts of the present case are similar to the facts
before the Tribunal in Bhikulal Chandak HUF (supra). The Revenue does
not dispute the same before us. Moreover, on almost identical facts, this Court
in Parveen P. Bharucha vs. DCIT, 348 ITR 325, held that the earnest
money received on sale of asset, when invested in specified bonds u/s. 54EC, is
entitled to the benefit of section 54EC. This was in the context of reopening
of an assessment and reliance was placed upon CBDT Circular No. 359 dated 10th
May, 1983 in the context of section 54E.

iii)   The Revenue had preferred an appeal against
the order of the Tribunal in Bhikulal Chandak HUF (supra) to this Court
(Nagpur Bench) being Income Tax Appeal No.68 of 2009. This Court by an order
dated 22nd August, 2010 refused to entertain the Revenue’s above
appeal from the decision of the Tribunal in Bhikulal Chandak HUF (supra).
In the above view, the question as proposed for our consideration in the
present facts does not give rise to any substantial question of law.”

39. Capital gain – Exemption u/s. 54 of the Act – A.Y. 2003-04 – Sale of residential property on 04/02/2003 – Agreement to purchase another residential property on 08/09/2003 and invested the capital gain within specified time – Assessee entitled to exemption u/s. 54 even if there is delay in completing the transaction

CIT vs. Mrs. Shakuntala Devi; 389 ITR 366 (Karn):

The assessee sold a flat
in Mumbai for a total consideration of Rs. 1,71,00,000/- on 04/02/2003 and the
consequent capital gain was Rs. 1,44,68,032/-. The assessee entered into an
agreement for purchase of the another residential property on 08/09/2003 for a
consideration of Rs. 3,25,00,000/- and invested the capital gain for the same.
The assessee’s claim for exemption u/s. 54 for the A. Y. 2003-04 was rejected
by the Assessing Officer on the ground that the transaction has not been
concluded, no registration of the sale deed has taken place and the balance
consideration was yet to be paid. The Tribunal held that the assessee is
entitled to exemption u/s. 54 of the Act.  

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)   The Tribunal had rightly held that the date
of purchase was to be taken as the basis for reconing the period of two years
prescribed u/s. 54 of the Act extending the benefit following therefrom.

ii)   In the instant case the consideration paid by
the assessee under the memorandum of understanding dated 08/09/2003 would fully
cover the consideration of capital gains portion for being eligible to claim
exemption u/s. 54 of the Act.”

38. Business expenditure – Interest on borrowed capital – Section 36(1)(iii) of the Act – A. Y. 1989-90 – Advance of loans at lower rate of interest to subsidiary concerns in financial difficulty for business purposes – Commercial expediency- Assessee entitled to deduction

Hindalco Co. vs. CIT; 389 ITR 430 (All):

The assessee paid interest at the rate of 16% on its
borrowings from the bank. The Assessing Officer found that the assessee had
advanced loans to its subsidiary companies at a lower rate of interest, 6% or
12%. He determined the rate of interest at 12%, as the rate at which loans were
advanced to the sister concerns and disallowed the difference between the
interest at market rate and the rate at which loans were advanced to sister
companies u/s. 36(1)(iii) of the Act. The Tribunal upheld the disallowance.

On appeal by the assessee, the Allahabad High Court reversed
the decision of the Tribunal and held as follows:

“i)   The financial condition of the assessee’s
sister concerns was not good and to help them run smoothly, the assessee
advanced them loans at a lower rate of interest. Both sister concerns were
subsidiaries of the assessee and there was nothing per se adverse.

ii)   For the welfare and proper functioning of the
sister concerns, the assessee had decided to advance loans so that ultimately
they could function properly, and the assessee being the holding company would
also benefit. Therefore, the loans advanced to its sister concerns were for
commercial expediency and the assessee was entitled to the deduction of
interest u/s. 36(1)(iii) of the Act.”

A Report

Golden Jubilee Residential Refresher Course (GJRRC) of
Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society (BCAS) was held
at ITC Rajputana Palace Hotel, Jaipur from 19th January
2017 to 22nd January 2017. In all, 278 members from 40
cities of India participated to witness this Golden Event.

On the First day, CA. Chetan Shah, President BCAS
welcomed the participants of GJRRC. He introduced CA.
Pinakin Desai, Past President of BCAS who enriched
many members with his profound knowledge and has
presented 28 papers in RRCs. He acknowledged the
efforts of Seminar Committee for raising number of
participants from 225 to 270 to accommodate maximum
members. He highlighted the VISION of the Society to
make optimum use of technology and innovation to reach
out to members across India. He also informed that BCAS
has been selected to impart training on GST with NACEN,
as an “Accredited Training Partner” to the Government of
India.

CA. U day Sathaye, Chairman Seminar Committee
welcomed everybody and explained the importance of
RRCs. He compared RRC to a Guru. He acknowledged
contribution of Paper writers, Group Leaders and Members
in making RRCs a success and highlighted the relationship
that has been developed over many years particularly with
participants from cities other than Mumbai. He appreciated
the response from outstation members which is increasing
every year. He also shared his thoughts about CA. Pinakin
Desai’s contribution in RRCs.

CA. Pinakin Desai, Past President of BCAS inaugurated
GJRRC. He mentioned that in the past, Group Discussion
alone used to expose what is happening around. Now
the scenario has changed. There is a change in subjects,
method of Auditing and Complex Laws are in force. It has
become a necessity that professionals must be techno
savvy. Tax department is tightening the controls, resulting
in the task of professionals becoming difficult. Compliance
of tax laws is becoming burdensome. He concluded with
a clear message that there is a need to be updated on
every front in profession including technology.

The first technical session was chaired by CA. M ayur
Nayak, Past President of BCAS. CA. T. P. Ostwal
answered issues raised by members during Group
Discussion on his paper titled Case Studies on R ecent
Developments and Issues in Cross border Taxation.

In his inimitable style covering day to day issues in the fields
of Equalization Levy, Transfer Pricing, Indirect Transfers,
Residential Status, Place of Effective Management and
Taxability of the Overseas Dividends in the hands of the
Indian shareholders, he dealt with the questions raised
in the case studies along with issues communicated by
group leaders and provided solutions to the problems.

On the Second day, 20th January, 2nd technical session
was chaired by CA. R aman Jokhakar, Past President of
BCAS. CA. H imanshu Kishnadwala presented paper
titled Ind-AS Implementation Issues.

The speaker after initially giving a background on
applicability of IndAS in India and carve-outs from IFRS,
dealt with some issues on IndAS implementation faced
by Phase I companies. He also covered the notification
issued by MCA for companies not covered under IndAS
and who need to follow the ‘upgraded’ standards from 1st
April 2016 onwards.

The Third technical session was chaired by CA. Ashok
Dhere, Past President of BCAS. CA. Pinakin Desai
answered issues raised by members during Group
Discussion on his paper titled Significant Recent
Controversies/Developments under the Income Tax Act –
Case Studies.

The paper writer in his inimitable style explained the various
nuances in interpretation of tax laws. The case studies
were extremely relevant in everyday practice, and the
presentation was extremely useful to all the participants.
In all, the paper as well as the lucid explanations of the
paper writer, was a rich and rewarding experience for the
delegates.

In the evening, all participants visited Chokhi Dhani,
a theme village resort in the outskirts of Jaipur city.
Everybody enjoyed the activities in Chokhi Dhani followed
by sumptuous and tasty Rajasthani dinner. It was really a
memorable evening.

On the Third day, 21st January, the fourth technical session
was chaired by CA. Govind Goyal, Past President of
BCAS. CA. M adhukar H iregange presented paper titled
Role & R esponsibilities of CAs in GST Regime.

He enlightened the participants on the opportunities
available to the chartered accountants in the pre and
post implementation of GST, in the fields like Operational
Consultancy, Network Support and Infrastructure,
Accounting, Compliance, Transitional Support including
Audits/Assurance areas. He felt that Chartered
Accountants are in a better position to assess the impact
of GST on their clients. He enlightened the members
as regards various efforts and initiatives taken by ICAI
by contributing in the law making process. He said this
is a Golden Opportunity for professionals by tracking
development at Industry level and creating awareness by
advising their clients.

The Fifth technical session was chaired by CA. Anil
Sathe, Past President of BCAS. CA. Saurabh Soparkar
answered issues raised by members during Group
Discussion on his paper titled Re-opening and R evision
of Assessments.

The learned speaker, through various case studies,
explained that while the assessment was a concept that
was not new to tax practitioners, it had attained significant
importance in the last decade. He mentioned that earlier,
assessments were the norm and reassessments were
an exception. However in the recent past, the Income
tax Department embarked on reassessments in a large
number of cases, either on account of the scrutiny being
inadequate at the time of assessment or on account of
receipt of information, post-assessment. Judicial forums,
particularly the high Courts and the apex court, looked at
reassessments very seriously and unless the threshold
conditions were satisfied, did not permit the Department
to have a second innings. The Speaker mesmerised
the audience with his command over the subject. His
analysis of the various judicial pronouncements was also
extremely useful.

Golden Jubilee Function

On 21st evening, everyone was waiting eagerly for the
special celebration of the Golden Jubilee RRC. The
function was organised in a different way this year as
compared to similar evening functions at the RRCs in
the past. CA. Nandita Parekh & CA. Ameet Patel, past
president of the BCAS jointly compered the event. They
began by welcoming the Chief Guest Mr. T. N. M anoharan,
Past President of ICAI and Guest of H onour M r. Nilesh
Vikamsey, V ice President of ICAI. Both the guests
addressed the gathering. Mr Manoharan spoke about
his experiences at the past RRCs and he also spoke
about the special qualities of the RRCs organised by the
BCAS. He also spoke about the role played by bodies like
BCAS in the development of the CA profession. Mr Nilesh
Vikamsey too complimented the BCAS on the golden
jubilee of the RRC. He spoke about the recent initiatives
taken by the ICAI for its members. He also cautioned the
delegates about the threat of disruption that technology is
likely to cause amongst the professionals in the country.
He also gave examples of how the ICAI has quickly
responded to the expectations from the Government on
various fronts. Both the guests set the right tone for a
memorable celebration of the GJRRC.

Thereafter, the past chairmen of the Seminar Committee –
CA. Pranay M arfatia, CA. Govind Goyal & CA. R ajesh
S. Shah were felicitated for their contribution to the
RRC. The delegates also remembered the contribution
of Nayan Parikh, another past chairman who could not
remain present on account of health reasons. Rajeev
Shah, convenor of the committee was felicitated for being
a convenor of the committee for 10 years. Vice President
of the Society CA. Narayan Pasari presented his views.

CA. U day Sathaye, Chairman, Seminar Committee was
then felicitated for his contribution in all RRCs. He has
been chairman for 10 RRCs including GJRRC which is the
highest number of chairmanship of Seminar Committee.
He mentioned that the members of the Seminar
Committee take each RRC as a separate programme with
a mission and challenge. He elaborated that the success
of RRCs is achieved with effective Team Management,
Planning, Assessment of Risk, Crisis Management and
Negotiation skills. He gave many examples from earlier
RRCs where members of the Seminar Committee have
overcome various difficulties to provide comfort to the
participants. He acknowledged valuable support of all
previous chairmen of seminar committee namely Late
CA. Shailesh Kapadia, CA. Nayan Parikh, CA. Pranay
Marfatia, CA. Govind Goyal and CA. Rajesh Shah. All
of them had always provided guidance and had actively
participated in all RRCs. He also highlighted the changing face of RRC over last 30 years
in terms of Group Discussion,
Participation of Members
etc. He concluded his views
on a positive note that this
wonderful relationship will
continue with the support of
the members attending RRCs
in future.

Thereafter, several members
were called upon to share their
experiences of the past RRCs.
Some who had come for the
first time also spoke about
their experience of the GJRRC.

The event was made all the more memorable by an Army
Band which marched into the hall in full splendour and
performed some tunes which were enjoyed by all. The
delegates were awed by the ceremonial band.

The event was interspersed with humour and wit and all
the delegates had an enjoyable time.

This celebration function was very ably hosted by CA.
Nandita Parekh and CA. Ameet Patel, Past President of
BCAS.

The finale of the GJRRC was the Panel Discussion on
last day i.e. 22nd January. This was the first time that such
a session was held at the RRC. The experiment was
highly successful. The session was chaired by CA. T.
N. M anoharan. The panelists were CA. Pradip Kapasi,
Past President of BCAS, CA. Gautam Doshi, Past
Chairman of WIRC of ICAI, CA. Dinesh Kanabar and
CA. Sunil Gabhawalla, Joint Secretary of BCAS. The
discussion was moderated by CA. Shariq Contractor,
Past President of BCAS and CA. Jayant Gokhale, Past
Central Council member of ICAI.

The panelists discussed five case studies which covered a
wide range of topics. The large number of issues from the
field of Accounting, Direct Tax, Indirect Tax, International
Tax, FEMA, Stamp Duty etc. were covered extensively by
the panelists.

In the concluding session, CA. U day Sathaye, Chairman
Seminar Committee and CA. Chetan Shah, President
BCAS thanked everybody for making GJRRC a great
success. GJRRC concluded with a commitment to meet
again next year.

SEBI’s Guidance Note On Board Evaluation – Much Needed Road Map

Background

The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) has issued
a Guidance Note on Board Evaluation on 5th January 2017. While not
intended to act as interpretation of the law, it serves as a great and much
needed road map for implementation of several provisions in the Companies Act,
2013, and SEBI Regulations on corporate governance. Auditors have guidance from
the Institute of Chartered Accountants in respect of several areas of their
work and increasingly Company Secretaries have from their alma mater.
However, the Board of Directors and individual directors generally find their
role, obligations and even liabilities having increased manifold but yet do not
have detailed formal guidance as to how they are to carry on their work. This
knowledge gap is felt even more, since most directors may not be well
conversant with the law.

The Guidance Note, to reiterate, does not have a binding
effect. However, I submit that diligent compliance in letter and spirit can be
a good defence in case of action against independent directors by regulators.
Such action can be expected to be manifold considering that corporate governance
is now a law with severe consequences for violations. Indeed, it is possible, I
submit, as also elaborated later, that gross non-compliance of this Guidance
Note could lead to a presumption of violation.

Overview

Requirements of corporate governance earlier were mainly in
the erstwhile Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement. However, now, they are part
of the statutes and indeed they are not only elaborate and detailed but
overlapping too. They are now contained in the Companies Act, 2013 (“the Act”),
and the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations 2015
(“the Regulations”).

On the subject matter of the Guidance Note, there are
requirements on how the Board, its Committees and its members would be
evaluated, selected, recommended for removal, etc. The requirements of
corporate governance in this sense are intended to be self-regulating. The law
lays down that such evaluation should take place, who should carry out such
evaluation and what should be disclosed in respect of such evaluation. However,
the manner in which the evaluation should be carried out has not been specified
leaving a gap which companies may fill in different ways, some more elaborately
and in detail and some summarily or even perfunctorily. The Guidance Note is
intended to fill this gap to help companies and their boards to carry out this
function.

Requirements of law relating to board evaluation

The law prescribes categories of companies to which the
requirements apply. Some important provisions in such law in relation to Board
evaluation, functions of Board, Committees are as follows:-

1. There has
to be a Nomination and Remuneration Committee. It is this Committee that
carries out functions relating to setting up criteria for selection &
evaluation of Board/Directors and related matters.

2.
Independent Directors are also expected to carry out certain evaluation of the
Board, of non-independent directors, the Chairperson, etc. The
Independent Directors, in turn, are evaluated by the Board as a whole, excluding
the director being evaluated.

3.
Generally, detailed functions of Board are laid down including the manner in
which it will function.

However, as is seen above, the law lays down the basic
structure of who shall perform and what functions shall they perform. How they
should perform is left largely unsaid. The Guidance Note provides these
details.

Aspects covered by the Guidance Note

The Guidance Note covers the following aspects

Subject of Evaluation i.e. who is to be evaluated. This
includes the Board as a collective unit, various Committees, independent
directors, executive/non-executive directors, the Chairman and senior
management.

Process of Evaluation including laying down of objectives
and criteria to be adopted for evaluation of different persons.
Depending
on who is to be evaluated, the criteria differs. Thus, the Chairman may be
judged, inter alia, on his leadership qualities. The Board be may judged on how
it performs its strategic functions, how diverse it is in terms of
experience/seniority, cross functional expertise, gender, etc., whether
it allows all members to freely participate, etc. The Independent
Directors would also be evaluated in terms of their distinguishing functions.

Feedback to the persons being evaluated; While the
evaluation may give some clear finding about suitability for continuation or
unsuitability (and hence removal), more often the evaluation may highlight
areas for improvement. Feedback to such persons is helpful.

Action Plan based on the results of the evaluation
process;
Post evaluation, a plan would have to be suggested to fill in the
deficiencies observed by training, etc.

Disclosure to stakeholders on various aspects;
This can be critical as evaluation would not only have to be done but seen to
have been done. The law requires that the policy relating to some of the
evaluation parameters should be disclosed in the Board’s Report. However, it
would be up to the Company whether or not the actual results of the evaluation
are disclosed, the action taken on the evaluation, etc. and the Guidance
Note keeps this discretionary.

Frequency of Board Evaluation; The law requires that
the board evaluation has to be done once in a year. The Guidance Note suggests
that this should be a continuous process in terms of regular feedback.

Responsibility of Board Evaluation: As stated earlier,
depending on who is to be evaluated, the person who carries out this evaluation
changes. Obviously, there cannot be self-evaluation as a rule. Indeed, the
person being evaluated is required to be absent when he or she is being
evaluated. There also ought not also be conflict of interest generally. The
Guidance Note places higher emphasis on the Chairman in terms of steering the
process of Board evaluation generally.

Review of the entire evaluation process periodically.
The evaluation process itself needs to be evaluated from time to time! The
manner in which the evaluation is carried out thus requires a periodic review
and improvement.

Internal vs. External evaluation:- Evaluation can be
internal with each group evaluating the other. Internal evaluation has
advantage of familiarity and close observation over extended periods of time.
However, there may be concerns here whether this can result in mutual back-scratching
or even otherwise whether the evaluation is sufficiently
well-informed/professional. External evaluators may not only bring objectivity
but also professionalism as well as experiences from other evaluations.

Evaluation of Committees

The Committees are required to be evaluated in terms of their
constitution, the functions assigned to it, its actual functioning, its
effectiveness in terms of its objectives, etc.

Detailed guide to board functioning

The Guidance Note talks in great detail about the evaluation
of the Board. While this is meant to be a guide to evaluate it, it by itself
serves also as good guidance on how a Board should function. The Guidance Note
throws detailed light on several aspects such as agenda to be circulated
including how early and how detailed, the manner in which discussions take
place and how they are recorded, the role the Board should really play such as
formulating strategy, relation with the CEO and senior management, what role it
should play in risk management, etc. Thus, while serving as a benchmark for
evaluation, it also actually serves as a road map of actual functioning of the
Board.

Consequences of
non-evaluation/non-following of the Guidance Note

The Guidance Note and the covering circular to it of SEBI
clearly specifies that it is intended to provide guidance and is not to be
interpreted as a law.
However, consider some consequences of
non-compliance relating
to these matters. For example, section 178
(which deals with constitution and role of Nomination and Remuneration
Committee and other matters) has a sub-section (8) that states that in case of
non-compliance, the company is punishable with fine. Further, officers in
default may be punishable with imprisonment upto a year or fine or both. This
may sound fairly serious for a provision relating to corporate governance.
Non-compliance with the SEBI Regulations too has consequences in terms of
penalty and prosecution. SEBI also has powers, and indeed has in the past
applied these powers, to debar persons and has other wide powers too.

It may also happen that wrongdoing in various forms may be
found in a Company. In such an event, the role of every board member would be
examined minutely. If provisions relating to board, directors, etc.
evaluation are not observed, adverse consequences may follow on those who have
defaulted. In such a situation, question will arise whether these provisions
were duly complied with in terms of law.

It is obvious then that the Guidance Note should be taken
seriously.
Even if not meant to be a law, it may be a good preliminary
defence of non-compliance if the provisions of the Guidance Note are observed.
Gross non-compliance could be prima facie evidence of violation of the
provisions.

For example, section 178(2) of the Act provides that “the
Nomination and Remuneration Committee…shall carry out evaluation of every
director’s performance”. In context of the Guidance Note, it may not be
sufficient to show that some evaluation was carried out. The evaluation
itself may be questioned if the provisions of the Guidance Note were not
followed and otherwise it was not found to be sufficiently
detailed.
Following the Guidance Note may help meet the preliminary onus.

Conclusion

There is criticism, which is valid to an extent, that many
western practices of corporate governance may not have direct application in
India where there is dominant position of Promoters both in terms of large
shareholding and board control. However, even in this context, it is recognised
that corporate governance serves a very valuable purpose. Hence, it is now
implemented not as a voluntary code but as mandatory and comprehensive law. The
liability of the Board, directors generally and, in particular, Independent
Directors, key managerial personnel, is ever increasing. Guidance is thus
needed not just on how they should perform but also, in case of any wrong doing
found, how will their actions – which are often subjective and circumstances
based – be judged.

The Guidance Note serves a good purpose in this.
It will not be surprising if more Guidance Notes will be released in the future
for functioning of other pillars of corporate governance. For example, the role
of the Audit Committee is very important, almost next to the Board itself. A
Guidance Note on how SEBI expects it to function would be helpful as an active
guidance as also a benchmark for defence when things go wrong.

Gratuitous Possession of Property

Introduction

Consider a case of a person who
was in need of a house to stay and some close relative of his helped him by
allowing him to stay gratuitously in his spare house. This person continues
staying in this house for a significantly long period of time due to the
goodwill gesture extended to him by his relative. Since possession is often
considered to be nine-tenths of the law
, can he now claim that by virtue of
such a long period of possession, he has acquired a legal right in the property
and hence, he also has a title to the property? Strange as this proposition may
sound, this is a reality which several people are experiencing.

The Delhi High Court had an
occasion to consider a somewhat analogous issue in the case of Sachin vs.
Jhabbu Lal, RSA 136/2016
(analysed in detail in this Feature in the
BCAJ of January 2017
). In that case, the Delhi High Court held that in
respect of a self acquired house of the parents, a son had no legal right to
live in that house and he could live in that house only at the mercy of his
parents up to such time as his parents allow. Merely because the parents have
allowed him to live in the house so long as his relations with the parents were
cordial, does not mean that the parents have to bear his burden throughout
their life.

However, would the position be on
a different footing if a close relative was allowed to stay in a house for a
fairly long period of time out of sympathy, natural love and affection? This
was the issue deliberated by the Supreme Court in the case of Behram Tejani
vs. Azeem Jagani, CA 150/2017 (SC).

Facts of the Case

A person named Mohammed Ali Tejani
(“the deceased”) died, leaving behind a will. Prior to his death, he had a
fractional ownership in various immovable properties, flats in Mumbai. One such
property was a residential flat. The deceased resided in this flat with his
wife and his family members. After his death, his wife and his daughter’s son
(‘grandson’) continued to reside in this flat.

Under his will, the deceased
bequeathed his fractional ownership in all his immovable properties, including
the abovementioned residential flat, to his 4 brothers in equal proportion. He
did not provide for any life interest benefit or carve out any interest in this
flat for his wife or his grandson. The will was sought to be probated.

The grandson prayed before the
Bombay City Civil Court for a temporary injunction restraining the
beneficiaries under the will from dispossessing him and his grandmother from
the aforesaid flat since they were in use and possession of the same.

In reply to this, his 4 grand
uncles, i.e., the deceased’s brothers (also the beneficiaries named by the
deceased under his will) stated that the wife of the deceased was merely
allowed to use and occupy the suit premises by the defendants out of love and
sympathy without any fees or compensation; that the suit premises belonged to
them as co-owners since the testator had bequeathed his right, title and
interest in the building to them. They further stated that nonetheless, out of
sympathy, close blood relationship and out of love and affection, the
deceased’s wife had been allowed to use the suit premises. Further, since she
has no right, title or interest in the suit premises she could have no right to
permit any other person much less her grandson to interfere with the ownership
right of the co-owners. Accordingly, they opposed the grant of any interim
relief to the grandson.

The Bombay City Civil Court
dismissed the injunction prayer of the grandson. It held that the deceased’s
wife herself had no right in this premises. Only on a sympathetic ground she
was allowed to occupy the premises. In such facts, when the grandson came
before the Court claiming equitable relief like injunction, he had to prima
facie
show some rights to claim the relief. If protection was asked for,
one must clearly seek ascertaining his legal rights. He merely claimed that he
was residing with his grandmother and if she herself did not have a right in
the property, then an injunction type of a protection could not be granted in
favour of the grandson.

On appeal, the Bombay High Court
overruled the verdict of the City Civil Court and upheld the grant of a
temporary injunction. It held that legal right of possession alone cannot be
the basis unless it is adjudicated, for overlooking the “settled possession”.
While deciding the possession right the City Civil Court had actually given a
finding against the maternal grandmother and decided that even she had no right
to occupy the premises and therefore, there was no question of permitting her
grandson to reside therein. The concept of “settled possession” could not be
equated with in all matters-“legal possession”. It depended upon the facts and
circumstances of a case.

It further held that the lower
Court proceeded on a wrong footing of law that the possession can be granted
only to the person who has a legal right to occupy the premises and no one
else. It felt that the law must take its due course with a foundation to
dispossess the person in possession of the premises only after a due trial. In
view of the same, it was inclined to observe that the order passed by the City
Civil Judge was against the settled principle of law with regard to the
possession of the property. It was however, made clear that the High Court was
only dealing with the protection of the possession of the premises and not the
ownership and/or title of the maternal grandmother of the plaintiff.

Accordingly, the beneficiaries
under the will of the deceased appealed to the Supreme Court.

Supreme Court’s Verdict

The Apex Court analysed the will
and observed that the will bequeathed the entire interest of the deceased in
the immovable properties in favour of his brothers. Neither the deceased’s wife
nor the grandson had any interest in these properties. She did not have any
right qua the premises in question but was permitted to occupy merely
out of love and affection. The status of the grandmother was thus of a
gratuitous licensee and that of her grandson was purely of a relative staying
with such a gratuitous licensee.

The Court referred to its earlier
decision in the case of Rame Gowda (Dead) by LRS. vs. M. Varadappa
Naidu(Dead), 2004(1) SCC 769
. In that decision, the Supreme Court dealt
with the issue of settled possession by a person. It referred to Salmond on
Jurisprudence which held “that few relationships are as vital to man as that
of possession, and we may expect any system of law, however primitive, to
provide rules for its protection. . . . . . . Law must provide for the
safeguarding of possession….. Legal remedies thus appointed for the protection
of possession even against ownership are called possessory, while those
available for the protection of ownership itself may be distinguished as
proprietary.”

It also analysed its decision in Lallu
Yeshwant Singh (dead) vs. Rao Jagdish Singh, (1968) 2 SCR 203
where it
was held that the Law respects possession even if there is no title to support
it. It will not permit any person to take the law in his own hands and to
dispossess a person in actual possession without having recourse to a court. No
person can be allowed to become a judge in his own cause. Next, in Nair
Service Society Ltd. vs. K.C. Alexander, (1968) 3 SCR 163,
the Apex
Court held that a person in possession of land assumed character of an owner
and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good
title against all the world but the rightful owner. When the facts disclosed no
title in either party, possession alone decided. The court quoted Loft’s maxim ‘Possessio
contra omnes valet praeter eur cui ius sit possessionis (
He that hath
possession hath right against all but him that hath the very right)‘ and
said, “A defendant in such a case must show in himself or his predecessor
a valid legal title, or probably a possession prior to the plaintiff’s and thus
be able to raise a presumption prior in time”.    

The Court thus held that it was
clear that so far as the Indian law was concerned, the person in peaceful
possession was entitled to retain his possession and in order to protect such
possession, he may even use reasonable force to keep out a trespasser. A
rightful owner who had been wrongfully dispossessed of land may retake
possession if he could do so peacefully and without the use of unreasonable
force. If the trespasser was in settled possession of the property belonging to
the rightful owner, the rightful owner shall have to take recourse to law; he
cannot take the law in his own hands and evict the trespasser or interfere with
his possession. The law will come to the aid of a person in peaceful and
settled possession by injuncting even a rightful owner from using force or
taking law in his own hands, and also by restoring him in possession even from
the rightful owner (of course subject to the law of limitation), if the latter
has dispossessed the prior possessor by use of force. It is the settled
possession or effective possession of a person without title which would
entitle him to protect his possession even as against the true owner. The
concept of settled possession and the right of the possessor to protect his
possession against the owner had come to be settled by a catena of
decisions, such as, Munshi Ram and Ors. vs. Delhi Administration,(1968) 2
SCR 455;Puran Singh and Ors. vs. The State of Punjab (1975) 4 SCC 518 and Ram
Rattan and Ors. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (1977) 1 SCC 188.
The Court
further observed that it was difficult to lay down any hard and fast rule as to
when the possession of a trespasser can mature into settled possession. The ‘settled
possession’ must be (i) effective, (ii) undisturbed, and (iii) to the knowledge
of the owner or without any attempt at concealment by the trespasser. The
phrase ‘settled possession’ did not carry any special charm or magic in it; nor
was it a ritualistic formula which could be confined in a strait-jacket. An
occupation of the property by a person as an agent or a servant acting at the
instance of the owner would not amount to actual physical possession.

It laid down the following tests
which could be adopted as a working rule for determining the attributes of
‘settled possession’ :

(i)   that the trespasser must be in
actual physical possession of the property over a sufficiently long period;

(ii) that the possession must be to
the knowledge (either express or implied) of the owner or without any attempt
at concealment by the trespasser and which contains an element of animus
possidendi
. The nature of possession of the trespasser would, however, be a
matter to be decided on the facts and circumstances of each case;

(iii) the process of dispossession
of the true owner by the trespasser must be complete and final and must be
acquiesced to by the true owner; and

(iv) that one of the usual tests to
determine the quality of settled possession, in the case of culturable land,
would be whether or not the trespasser, after having taken possession, had
grown any crop. If the crop had been grown by the trespasser, then even the
true owner has no right to destroy the crop grown by the trespasser and take
forcible possession.

Next, the Supreme Court analysed
the ratio of another of its earlier decisions, Maria Margarida Sequeira
Fernandes and others vs. Erasmo Jack De Sequeira (Dead) through LRS, 2012 (5)
SCC 370.
In this case, the appellant was married to a Naval Officer who
was transferred from time to time outside Goa and hence, on the request of her
brother she gave possession of the premises to him as a caretaker. The
caretaker held her property only on her behalf. The brother filed a suit for injunction
against his sister, the legal owner.

The Supreme Court observed that in
civil cases, pleadings were extremely important for ascertaining the title and
possession of the property in question. Possession was an incidence of
ownership and could be transferred by the owner of an immovable property to
another such as in a mortgage or lease. A licensee held possession on behalf of
the owner. Possession was important when there were no title documents and
other relevant records before the Court, but, once they come before the Court,
it is the title which has to be looked at first and due weightage be given to
it. Possession cannot be considered in vacuum. There was a presumption that
possession of a person, other than the owner, if at all it was to be called
possession, was permissive on behalf of the title-holder. Further, possession
of the past was one thing, and the right to remain or continue in future was
another thing. It was the latter which was usually more in controversy than the
former, and it was the latter which had seen much abuse and misuse before the
Courts. A title suit for possession had two parts – first, adjudication of
title, and second, adjudication of possession. If the title dispute was removed
and the title was established, then, in effect, it became a suit for ejectment
where the defendant must plead and prove why he must not be ejected.

In an action for recovery of
possession of immovable property, upon the legal title to the property being
established, the possession of the property by a person other than the holder
of the legal title was presumed to have been under and in subordination to the
legal title. It is for the person resisting a claim for recovery of possession
or claiming a right to continue in possession, to establish that he has such a
right. To put it differently, wherever pleadings and documents established
title to a particular property and possession was in question, it will be for
the person in possession to give sufficiently detailed pleadings, particulars
and documents to support his claim in order to continue in possession.

In Maria Sequeira’s case, the
brother did not claim any title to the suit property. Undoubtedly, the sister
had a valid title to the property which was clearly proved.The lower Courts had
failed to appreciate that the premises in question was given by the sister to
her brother herein as a caretaker.The brother’s suit for injunction against his
sister was not maintainable, particularly when it was established beyond doubt
that he was only a caretaker and he ought to have given possession of the
premises to the sister who was the true owner of the suit property on demand.
Admittedly, he did not claim any title over the suit property and he had not
filed any proceedings disputing the title of the appellant. The Supreme Court
held that an occupation of the property by a person as an agent or a servant at
the instance of the owner will not amount to actual physical possession.

It further held that the
possession of a servant or agent was that of his master or principal as the
case may be for all purposes and the former cannot maintain a suit against the
latter on the basis of such possession. Merely because the plaintiff was
employed as a servant to look after the property, it cannot be said that he had
entered into such possession of the property as would entitle him to exclude
even the master from enjoying or claiming possession of the property or as
would entitle him to compel the master from staying away from his own property.

In Maria Sequeira’s case, the
Court held that Principles of law which emerged were as under:-

(i)   No one acquired a title to the
property if he or she was allowed to stay in the premises gratuitously. Even by
long possession of years or decades, such person would not acquire any right or
interest in the said property.

(ii)  A caretaker, watchman or
servant can never acquire interest in the property irrespective of his long
possession. The caretaker or servant had to give possession forthwith on
demand.

(iii)  The Courts were not justified
in protecting the possession of a caretaker, servant or any person who was
allowed to live in the premises for some time either as a friend, relative,
caretaker or as a servant.

(iv) The protection of the Court
could only be granted or extended to the person who had a valid, subsisting
rent agreement, lease agreement or license agreement in his favour.

(v)  The caretaker or agent held a
property of the principal only on behalf of the principal. He acquired no right
or interest whatsoever for himself in such property irrespective of his long
stay or possession.

Hence, in Maria Sequeira’s case,
the judgment of the lower Courts were set aside and the Supreme Court directed
that the possession of the suit premises be handed over to the sister, who was
admittedly the owner of the suit property.

Accordingly,
after analysing and following the ratio of the above decisions, the Supreme
Court in Tejani’s case, concluded that a person holding the premises
gratuitously or in the capacity as a caretaker or a servant would not acquire
any right or interest in the property and even long possession in that capacity
would be of no legal consequences. In the circumstances, the City Civil Court
was right and justified in rejecting the prayer for interim injunction and that
decision was correct. However, it clarified that the matter having come up
before the Supreme Court from an interim order and since the main suit itself
was pending, observations made by it were not to be taken as concluding the
controversy and the merits of the matter will be gone into by the Court at the
appropriate stage.

Conclusion

It is apparent that a gratuitous possessor can
claim no vested right in the legal owner’s property. This clear cut verdict
helps to clarify matters. This decision read with the Delhi High Court’s
decision that an adult son cannot claim that he has a legal right to stay in
his parents’ home would go a long way in resolving several possession disputes.

19. [2017] 77 taxmann.com 166 (Ahmedabad – Trib.) DCIT vs. Bombardier Transportation India (P.) Ltd. A.Ys.: 2013-14, Date of Order: 3rd January, 2017

Sections – 9(1)(vi) / 9(1)(vii) of the Act,
Article 12 of India-Canada DTAA – Use of certain equipment in course of
rendition of services does not result in any use of or right to use the
equipment for recipient of service. Hence, payment for such services cannot be
treated as royalty

Facts 1

The Taxpayer, an Indian company, was a
member-company of an international Group engaged in the business of
manufacturing and supply of rail transportation system. It was a wholly owned
subsidiary of a Singapore based Group Company. During the relevant assessment
year, Taxpayer had made payments to its Canadian Group Company towards its
share of costs in relation to the information system support services availed
by Canadian company at group level.

Before the AO the Taxpayer contended as
follows.

  The
payments were made towards information system support services at group level.
The amounts were determined on the basis of cost allocation. The Taxpayer
contended that the since the payments were in the nature of reimbursements,
they could not partake the character of income.

  Provisions
of section 9(1)(vi) of the Act treating the payments as ‘royalty’ could not be
invoked unless there was transfer of all or any of the rights (including
granting of any license) in respect of copyright of a literary, artistic or
scientific work.

  Additionally,
in terms of Article 12(3) of India-Canada DTAA, only payments having an element
of use of IPRs could be considered as royalties whereas the impugned payments
were for standard facilities. Further, the Canadian company had not received
any payment for commercial exploitation of copyright embedded in the
applications.

  Hence,
such payments did not qualify as ‘royalty’.

     However, the AO concluded
that the impugned payments were consideration for “use or right to use any
industrial, commercial or scientific equipment” and hence, taxable u/s.
9(1)(vi) of the Act as well as article 12(3)(b) of India-Canada DTAA. After a
detailed analysis of the payments, he was of the view that a major portion of
the payment was for the use or right to use industrial, commercial or
scientific equipment.

Held 1

(i)  The payments made by the
Taxpayer to Canadian company were in the nature of reimbursements based on cost
allocations and did not involve any income element.

(ii) Though rendition of
service may involve use of certain equipment it does not result in any use of
or right to use the equipment. Even if a part of consideration could be said to
be on account of use of equipment by breaking down all the components of
economic activity for which consideration is paid, it is neither practicable,
nor permissible, to assign monetary value to each of the components and
consider that amount in isolation for deciding character of that amount.

(iii) Even if the payment is
considered as payment for use of software, in absence of transfer of copyright,
it cannot be treated as royalty.

(iv) In Kotak Mahindra
Primus Ltd vs. DDIT [(2007) 11 SOT 578 (Mum)]
, deciding on a similar issue,
the Tribunal observed that the Indian company did not have any control over, or
physical access to, the mainframe computer in Australia, and that since the
payment was for specialised data processing, there cannot be any question of
payment for use of the mainframe computer.

(v) Thus, even if one were to
proceed on the basis that equipment was used in rendition of services, such
payment, or part thereof, cannot be treated as payment for use of equipment.
Further, details furnished by the Taxpayer support the fact of reimbursement.
Hence, the payment was not FTS. In absence of any income embedded in
reimbursement payment, question of withholding of tax did not arise.

Facts 2

The Taxpayer
additionally availed administrative, marketing and procurement services from
the Canadian company. AO contended that the services rendered by the Canadian
company were technical in nature and such services made available, technical,
knowledge, skill and experience to the Taxpayer. Hence, payment for such
services was covered as FTS under article of India-Canada DTAA.

Held 2

(i)  Article 12(4)(a) could be
invoked only if the services provided, inter alia, “make available”
technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how, or processes or consist of
the development and transfer of a technical plan or technical design.

(ii) The services provided by
the Canadian company were simply management support or consultancy services
which did not involve any transfer of technology. The AO had also not contended
that the recipient of service was enabled to perform these services on its own
without any further recourse to the service provider.

(iii) In this context the
connotation of the expression ‘make available’ needs to be examined. Technology
is “made available” when the person acquiring the service is enabled to apply
the technology. in CIT vs. De Beers India Pvt. Ltd [(2012) 346 ITR 467
(Kar)]
, the Court held that the technical or consultancy service rendered
should be such that it “makes available” (i.e., imparts) technical knowledge,
etc. to the recipient whereby he could derive enduring benefit and utilise the
knowledge or know-how on his own in future without the aid of the service
provider.

(iv)  Since
the aforementioned tests were not satisfied in case of the Taxpayer, the
payment for services could not be considered as FIS. The fact that the services
rendered involved provision of certain technical inputs and that such inputs
resulted in providing value addition to the Taxpayer, was not relevant in
determining if make available condition is satisfied or not.

16. [2016] 161 ITD 527 (Pune Trib.) Knox Investments (P.) Ltd. vs. ITO A.Y.: 2007 – 08 Date of order: 26th August, 2016

Section
37(1) – Where assessee, a financial intermediary agent, enters into an
assignment agreement whereby liability of assignor is acquired by assessee at
its NPV, then difference between NPV of the said liability as at end of
relevant financial year and as at end of preceding financial year, till the
repayment of the liability commences, is allowed as finance charges.       

FACTS

The assessee-company was engaged in business
of financial intermediary agents and earned income by way of commission and
professional fees and followed mercantile system of accounting.

During the assessment proceedings, the AO
inquired about the nature of payment of Rs.44,71,126/-that the assessee had
debited as finance charges in its profit and loss account.

In response to the same, the assessee
submitted that Indian Seamless Steels and Alloys Ltd. (ISSAL) had availed
interest free sales-tax deferral Certificate of Entitlement from the Government
of Maharashtra under the Package scheme of Incentives,1988. As per the said
scheme, sales-tax liability of each year was required to be paid by ISSAL to
the Sales-Tax Department of Government of Maharashtra in five equal annual
instalments upon expiry of ten years from the date of availment i.e. to say the
sales tax collected for the financial year 1994-95 was required to be repaid in
five equal annual instalments beginning with financial year 2005-06 and so on.

As a part of financing activity, the
assessee vide agreement dated 9th April 2001, took over
liability of the ISSAL for repayment of sales-tax deferral amounting to Rs.
835.98 lakh (collected by ISAAL for the period 1st April 2000 to 31st
March 2001) for a consideration of  Rs.
268.79 lakh arrived at @10% NPV based on the repayment schedule. The said loan
was repayable by the assessee to Government in five equal instalments starting from
F.Y. 2011-12 and ending on F.Y.2015-16.

This NPV of liability amounting to Rs.
268.79 lakh as on 31.03.2001, got enhanced to 288.63 lakh as on 31.03.2002 and
the same was shown under the head ‘unsecured loans’ for the first time in the
balance sheet of the assessee as on 31.03.2002. The NPV of liability thus got
increased every year till the repayment would commence in the F.Y. 2011-12 and
the difference in NPV at the end of a particular financial year and the
immediately preceding year was claimed as expenditure under the head ‘finance
charges’ in the P&L account of that year.

Following the same method in this year, the
difference in NPV as on 31.03.2007 and as on 31.03.2006 amounting to Rs.
44,71,126/- was debited to the P&L account for the year under consideration
as expenditure under the head ‘finance charges’ and as it was not actually
paid, the said amount was also added to the existing outstanding liability and
shown under the head ‘unsecured loans’.

The AO was of the view that the amount so
debited was not a revenue expenditure as liability did not exist in praesenti
but was a contingent liability. He thus disallowed the claim of finance
charges.

The Commissioner (Appeals), endorsed the
action of the Assessing Officer.

On appeal before the Tribunal:

HELD

The judicial opinion of the various courts
is that a liability depending upon a contingency is not a debt in praesenti
or in futuro till the contingency happens. But if it is debt, the fact
that the amount has to be ascertained does not make it any less a debt if the
liability is certain and what remains is only a quantification of the amount.
The word ‘contingent’ in contrast, refers to possibility of an obligation or
liability to arise on occurrence or non-occurrence of one or more uncertain
future events.

An accrued
liability is an allowable deduction whereas a contingent liability is not an
allowable deduction for the purposes of determination of taxable income.
Therefore the pertinent question that arises for adjudication is whether,
difference in NPV of the liability at the end of a particular financial year
and the immediately preceding year claimed as expenditure under the head
‘finance charges’ in the P&L account of that year (i.e. Rs. 44,71,126/-
debited to P&L for relevant assessment year under consideration), is an
accrued liability or a contingent liability.

In terms of section 145 of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 read with section 211 of the Companies Act, 1956 – a company has to
mandatorily prepare its account on ‘accrual’ basis. The term ‘Accrual’ has been
defined by the Accounting Standard-1 and by section 145 of the Income-tax Act,
1961 as follows -.

‘Accrual’ refers to the assumptions that
revenues and costs are accrued, that is, recognized as they are earned or
incurred (and not as money is received or paid) and recorded in the final
statements of the periods to which they relate.

The Accounting Standard-1 further provides
that as a matter of prudent accounting policy, provisions should be made for
all known liabilities and losses even though the amount cannot be determined
with certainty and represents only the best estimate in the light of available
information. Under the Mercantile System of Accounting, the expenditure items
for which legal liability has been incurred are immediately debited even before
the amount in question is actually distributed.

In terms of section 28 read with section 145
of the Income Tax Act,1961 income chargeable under the head ‘profit and gains
of business or profession’ cannot be determined unless and until the expenses
or obligations which have been incurred are set-off against the receipts.
Therefore, in order to determine the true profits arising from business, the
expenditure actually incurred or liability in respect thereof accrued even
though it may have to be discharged at some future date has to be necessarily
accounted for.

In the present case, the assessee by virtue
of assignment agreement received certain amount which was to be replenished and
repaid by higher sum computed by applying Net Present Value method at a
discounting factor of 10%. The corresponding finance costs debited to profit
& loss account during the year represents incremental increase in the
liability with the efflux of time where the liability gets accrued as it inches
towards maturity. Thus, it was manifest that the incremental liability had
accrued to the assessee in praesenti with the efflux of time notwithstanding
the fact that increase in the liability was required to be actually discharged
on a future date. The gradual increase in liability is dependent on the time
horizon that has elapsed and therefore not an uncertain event by any stretch of
imagination. The liability has definitely accrued in praesenti against
future outflow of resources and the said liability can be determined with great
reliability.

In result, the appeal of the assessee is
allowed.

Denialistan: Top 10 excuses Pakistan trots out after terrorist attacks on India

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Pakistan’s long history of bleeding India with a thousand cuts follows a familiar pattern. Deny, defy, and mollify are the main aspects of its terrorism policy. Here are the top 10 excuses and explanations that Pakistan, also known as Denialistan, wheels out every time it is in the international spotlight for initiating yet another terror strike against India.

1. India has jumped to conclusion too soon: first reaction usually given even as attack is still going on, because the Indian media had already begun to name Pakistan as the place of origin of terrorists. But as the timeline of both Mumbai 26/11 and Pathankot showed, evidence surfaced very early. Ajmal Kasab was caught and squealed like a piglet to the cops while his terrorist friends were still burning down the Taj. In Pathankot, unknown terrorist scum used the phone from a cab driver he killed to tell Ammi in Pakistan he’s going to get his 72 virgins.

2. They are not Pakistanis: next line of defence. Worked very well in the case of the attack on Parliament when all the piglets were killed. They tried it in Mumbai even after Ajmal was captured. Unfortunately for Pakistan, a small, courageous section of Pakistani media outed its own disgusting terrorism backing establishment. In Pathankot, they are trying to throw Kashmiris under the bus, getting PakMil proxies such as United Jihad Council to claim the cannon-fodder were Kashmiri.

3. Where’s the proof? Standard, argumentative line thrown on TV, even when you have slapped them in face with proof (phone records, tapes, transcripts, testimony from captured terrorists, etc). When it gets too uncomfortable, claim the evidence is all fabricated.

4. It is an internal job done by RAW to defame Pakistan: Used when either the truth is blindingly obvious or when the Sloppy Joe Indian side fails to gather enough evidence.

5. They are non-state actors: Invented by the terroristin- uniform Pervez Musharraf, darling of India’s chattering classes and conclave society. Fact that he was caught on phone discussing terrorist deployment in Kargil did not stop them from inviting him to their soirees. But why blame them, the great statesman Atal Bihari Vajpayee rescued him from international ignominy.

6. Pakistan is also a victim of terrorism: Playing the victim card after nurturing tens and thousands of terrorists and creating an ambient ecosystem for terrorism, including state – and constitutionally-mandated bigotry and systemic slaughter of minorities.

7. Pakistan is a frontline ally in war on terror: Line wheeled out to extract rent money from credulous Americans stuck in Afghanistan. Never mind if the US tax $$$ they funnel to Terroristan also kill AMERICAN soldiers in Afghanistan.

8. Islam is a religion of peace: Wheeled out for the rest of the world, although Pakistan has little to do with Islam, apart from being its worst example.

9. Pakistan will act against terrorism in all its forms: Increasingly used of late because plausible deniability has become very difficult.

10. Pakistan will fight shoulder-to-shoulder with India against terrorism: The latest offered by its civilian establishment, now that the country is swirling into a black hole. From its military establishment, which will lose its lolly and perks if this happens: Yeah, dream on.

(Source: Article by Shri. Chidanand Rajghatta in The Times of India dated 12-01-2016)

Double bubble trouble

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Sustaining anything in the region of 7% growth should be good enough in a troubled and risk-laden world.

Three months ago, a Brookings Institution-Financial Times tracking index warned of emerging economies risk “leading the world economy into a slump, with lower growth and a rout in markets”. Those words will echo in many minds at the end of this past week, as the world suddenly looks like a dangerous place, and emerging markets even more so. Over the past year, stocks and currencies have dipped in many emerging markets, including India. Over a five-year period, global stock indices have virtually doubled relative to plunging values in emerging markets. Money has been pulled out of emerging markets for several months. And if the last few days’ trends are anything to go by, the story is far from being over. George Soros is only one of many doomsayers.

Two of the original Bric economies that set the pace for a decade have slipped into recession — and a strengthening dollar has accentuated the decline. In dollar terms, Brazil’s economy has shrunk in the last couple of years by 25 per cent, while Russia’s economy has shrivelled 40 per cent. China, while continuing to grow, is beset by transition issues and has become the primary source of global instability. The big risk is cross-country contagion through bankruptcies — and India has its share of debtladen candidates for that scenario. Yet, through it all, India continues to look stable and healthy.

That’s if you view the country from outside. The perspective from within is quite different. Despite much activity by eager-beaver ministers in the Modi government, change on the ground has been slow and very much on the margin. Corporate profits in relation to GDP are at a decadal low. Corporate investment intentions have shrunk further, even as the number of stalled projects remains virtually unchanged. In the infrastructure sectors, power generation has grown less than three per cent, and the railways have missed their freight traffic targets. Investment by the railways too has fallen short, causing the finance ministry to trim fiscal support. The commercial banks’ books will look worse in coming quarters as the Reserve Bank gets less indulgent about undeclared bad loans — provoking (so one hears) some troubled bank chiefs to beat a path to the Prime Minister’s Office. External trade has continued to shrink. The one bright spot remains tax collection. But one-third of the way into its tenure, the Modi government has not really been able to get on top of its inherited economic problems.

Anxious to show results, government personalities talk of increasing government spending, and easing up on fiscal consolidation. However well-intentioned, the idea runs up against the fact that state deficits are already set to grow on account of state governments taking on the bulk of accumulated discom debt, under the ‘UDAY ’ programme. So the combined deficit of Centre and states will climb over the next couple of years. Unless the government wants to risk hard-won economic stability, there is no room for further fiscal slackening, given that it has implications for government borrowing and will put pressure on interest rates. In any case, the government’s capacity to spend more is a known constraint, as the railways have shown this year.

This will be a frustrating scenario for a government that bravely promised a return to rapid economic growth. But the global as well as domestic situation compels realism in the expectations about what is feasible. Economies don’t grow at eight per cent and more when exports are plunging, and when a good bit of the banking system needs intensive care. In fact, shooting for that target could lead to macroeconomic bungling. Sustaining anything in the region of seven per cent growth, give or take a bit, should be good enough in a troubled and risk-laden world.

(Source: Weekend Ruminations by Shri T N Ninan in Business Standard dated 09-01-2016 )

Amendment in Rules

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N o . VAT. 1 5 1 5 / C R – 1 5 8 / Ta x a t i o n – 1 d a t e d 30.12.2015

Maharashtra Government has amended the Maharashtra Value added Tax Rules, 2005. Rule 52B has been added under which if the claimant dealer has purchased goods covered under Entry 13 of Schedule D -Aerated and Carbonated non-alcoholic beverages, whether or not containing sugar or other sweetening matter or flavor or any other additives and under Entry 14 of Schedule DCigar and cigarettes, then he will be entitled to set-off in respect of the said goods only to the extent of aggregate of the tax paid or payable under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 on interstate resale of the corresponding goods and the taxes paid on the purchase of said goods if resold locally under the Act.

The set-off in respect of said goods shall be claimed only in the month in which corresponding sales of such goods is effected by the claimant dealer. Above conditions are not applicable to the purchases of such goods which are sold in the course of export of goods out of the territory of India. (Applicable wef 1-1-2016).

Restructuring of Maharashtra Sales Tax Department

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Trade Circular 20T of 2015 dated 31.12.2015

With the view to provide single window system to dealers, the Department has undertaken restructuring of work allotment which entails changing the present functional set up into a single desk multi functional setup wherein dealers will be allocated to the officers to be called as Nodal officers. Under this system, each dealer will have a Nodal Officer who will look after functions of amendment and cancellation of registration, returns follow up, audits/ assessments/issue based audits, processing of refunds, issuance of CST forms, cross checks and recovery of dues etc.

Downloading of Digitally Signed Registration Certificate

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Trade Circular 19T of 2015 dated 21.12.2015

In order to ensure immediate availability of the (TIN) registration certificate to the applicant, a facility has been made available to download the digitally signed (TIN) registration certificate from the website www.mahavat.gov.in Detailed procedure explained in this circular. The registration officer shall continue to send the physical copy of (TIN) registration certificate to the applicant on the address mentioned in the application through India post.

M/s. G. E. Capital Transportation Financial Services Ltd. V. State of Haryana and Another, [2013] 63 VST 329 (P&H)

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VAT – Turnover of Sales – Deemed Sale – Transfer of Right to Use Goods – Rentals Received or Receivable in Given Period Only Taxable, Section 2 (2C) (iv) of The Haryana Value Added Tax Act, 2003.

FACTS
The appellant entered into agreement for lease of vehicles. The assessment orders were finalized by taking aggregate amount of all installments payable for the entire term of the lease periodfor the month in which the vehicles were delivered to the lessee. The appellate authorities including the Tribunal dismissed the appeal. The appellant filed appeal before the P & H High Court against the said order of the Tribunal dismissing the appeal.

HELD
The definition of tax period in terms of rule 2 (2f) of the Rules means a period of time usually a month, quarter or a year for which tax payable by a dealer is quantified. The turnover is aggregate of the goods sold or purchased by a dealer during a tax period in terms of rule (2g) of the Rules. Since the transfer of right to use in the vehicles is the sale falling within the definition of section 2(f), therefore, rentals received or receivables during the tax period is the sale price received by the dealer, exigible to tax in a financial year. The right to use vehicles is dependent upon monthly payment of rentals and therefore, the monthly rentals received or receivable by the dealer is a turnover and consequently the sale price. The lease rentals received or receivable during the tax period only, as a right to use goods, is the turnover forming part of sale price. Accordingly, the High Court allowed appeal filed by the appellant company and set aside the order passed by the Tribunal.

M/S.Vikas Poha Mill vs. Divisional Dy. CCT, [2013] 63 VST 132 (Chhatisgarh)

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Sales Tax – Sale of Poha and Murmura – Are Forms of Rice – Are “Cereals” – Exempt from Payment of Tax, Entry 23 of Part II of Schedule II of The Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1956.

FACTS
The Petitioner manufacturer of Poha and Murmura claimed exemption from payment of tax on sale of it being covered by the term “Cereals” under Notification dated March 30, 1994 read with section 14 of the CST Act, 1956. The department rejected the claimas the sale of Poha and Murmura is covered by specific entry 23, Part IV of Schedule II of the Act and also held that it is not covered by the term cereals, as there is a separate schedule entry. The petitioner filed writ petition before the Chhattisgarh High Court against the aforesaid assessment order.

HELD
The State has placed Poha and Murmura in the separate entry for the purpose of exigibility to taxation. However, in the exemption notification the word cereals includes, inter alia “rice” as enumerated in (i) to (x) in section 14 of the CST Act. All the terms used are the basic products, not other forms of the product. The term rice includes beaten and puffed rice both. Thus, the exemption is granted to all the goods, as specified in the State Act, the State can not get any advantage from the fact that there has been a separate entry for exigibility to tax in respect of Poha and Murmura. Accordingly, Poha and Murmura are one form of rice and entitled to exemption under the above stated notification. The exemption has been granted to Cereals which are enumerated after “that is to Say”. The term “Cereals” used in section 14( i) of the CST Act clearly means “rice “ and other like products of rice like Poha and Murmura. Thus, rice including Poha and Murmura are included within the definition of Cereals and as such covered by the notification dated March 30, 1994 for the purpose of exemption. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the writ petition and the matter was referred back to the assessing officer to make assessment a fresh in the light of law decided by the High Court.

[2015-TIOL-12-ARA-ST] M/s J. P. Morgan Services India Private Ltd.

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Provision of a car to an employee by the employer during the course of his employment and only because the employee is in service is covered by section 65B(44)(b) of the Finance Act, 1994 and will not amount to service.

Facts
The applicant desires to hire cars from car leasing companies and under the scheme those cars would be made available to such employees who are firstly continuing to be the employees and secondly who accept the option to have the car for their personal as well as official use and in lieu of this, the company was to charge the said employees the same amount which it would be paying to the car leasing company from which they hire the car. The question before the authority is whether the amount to be charged to its employees for the use of the vehicles is subject to service tax.

Held
The Authority noted that the service of “making available” a car to the employee is being rendered by the applicant. In this context, both the conditions of clause (b) of section 65B (44) are fulfilled. Firstly, it is in the course of the employment because the agreement between the applicant and employee clearly suggests that this will be during the course of his employment only. Second condition is also satisfied that it is only because the employee is in service and in that sense the service becomes in relation to his employment. Since both these conditions are fulfilled, it is held that the transaction will not amount to service.

[2016-TIOL-166-CESTAT-ALL] M/s Tanya Automobiles Pvt. Ltd vs. Commissioner of Central Excise and Service Tax, Meerut-I

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When value of goods used is shown separately in invoice and VAT/Sales Tax has been paid, the transaction has to be treated as sale and cannot be a service transaction.

Facts
Appellant is an Authorised Service Station of Motor Vehicles and was paying service tax on the labour charges only and not on value of spare parts and lubricants used in the course of servicing of the motor vehicles. Department demanded service tax on the entire amount of invoice including the value of spare parts on the contention that without the use of spare parts and consumables in the course of servicing of vehicles, the service is not complete and therefore is an integral part of service. It was further observed that benefit of Notification No. 12/2003-ST is also not available as they are not issuing separate invoices for sale of spares.

Held
The Tribunal noted the decision of Samtech Industries vs. Commissioner of Central Excise [2014-TIOL-643- CESTAT-DEL] upheld by the Hon’ble High Court of Allahabad [2015(38) STR 162] and the CBEC letter dated 27.09.2013 addressed to the CCE, Meerut specifically providing that service tax on cost of goods supplied during repair does not appear sustainable. The Tribunal held that the cost of items supplied/sold with a documentary proof specifically indicating value of goods, demand of service tax on the cost of goods supplied during repair is not sustainable.

[2016-TIOL-149-CESTAT-DEL] M/s National Engineering Industries Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur

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Where commission is paid by the Indian buyers directly to the
appellant instead of the commission alongwith price being first remitted
to the foreign supplier and then the foreign supplier remitting the
commission amount, such direct receipts are deemed to be receipts in
foreign exchange.

Facts
The appellant used to find
buyers in India for the products of a foreign company. The Indian buyers
made payments directly to the foreign seller and the foreign seller
paid commission to the appellant. In some cases buyers opted to pay the
commission directly to the appellant and in such cases commission part
shown in the invoice was not paid on to the seller by the buyer. The
Commissioner (Appeals) held that the service was delivered in India even
though the commission was received from foreign supplier and therefore,
it will not be tantamount to export of service and upheld the primary
order. Aggrieved by the same, the present appeal is filed.

Held
The
Tribunal held that in case of the commission received from foreign
supplier, the service rendered clearly satisfies the requirement of
export of service as has been held in the case of Paul Merchants Limited
vs. CCE, Chandigarh [2013 (29) STR 267 (Tri.-Del). Even in the other
situation where the commission is paid by the Indian buyers to the
appellant, in effect, the commission was paid on behalf of the foreign
supplier only and can be deemed to have been paid in foreign exchange as
the buyers would have had to remit the commission part also to the
foreign supplier who would have in turn sent it to the appellant and
thus this arrangement makes the procedure simple. Further, relying on
the judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of J. B. Boda – 1997
(229) ITR 271 (SC), where such payments are deemed to be received in
foreign exchange the appeal is allowed.

[2016-TIOL-132-CESTAT-MUM] M/s Sharayu Motors vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai.

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When issue is settled by the Larger Bench, penalties can be set aside considering the bonafide of the Appellant. Target incentive received from manufacturer in the nature of trade discount not exigible to service tax.

Facts
The Appellant received certain amount from financial institutions as commission for marketing of Auto Loan products and also an amount from manufacturers of car under the head Target Incentive Scheme. Department demanded service tax under ‘business auxiliary service’ in relation to the aforesaid receipts and also imposed penalties. In the matter of incentives it was argued that the issue is well settled by the judgement of the Tribunal in favour of the Appellant in the case of Commissioner of Service Tax vs. Sai Service Station Ltd [2013-TIOL-1436- CESTAT-MUM} and in case of commission from financial institution, it was stated that the issue is settled against them by the larger bench of the Tribunal in the case of Pagariya Auto Centre vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Aurangabad [2014-TIOL-2875-CESTAT-MUM], however penalties should be set aside in relation thereto.

Held
The Tribunal confirmed the demand along with interest in relation to the amount received from financial institution for promoting their products by considering the decision of the larger bench in the case of Pagariya Auto Centre (supra). However, it was held that since the issue has been settled by the Larger Bench, Appellant could have entertained a bona fide belief and therefore penalties are set aside by invoking provisions of section 80 of the Finance Act,1994. Further relying on the decision of Sai Service Station (supra) demand against the amounts received as incentives is set aside.

[2016-TIOL-12-CESTAT-MUM] M/s Bharat Forge Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Pune-III

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When service tax paid under reverse charge is available as CENVAT
credit, the non-payment would not result in any financial benefit and
therefore deserves waiver of penalty.

Facts
The
Appellant availed External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) and raised
capital in overseas market and availed services of Lead Managers based
abroad having no office in India. The department demanded service tax on
the fees paid to the lead managers abroad u/s. 66A of the Finance Act,
1994 and imposed penalties u/s. 76,77 and 78 of the Act. Entire amount
of service tax was paid before the issue of Show Cause Notice and only
the penalties are disputed.

Held
The Tribunal noted
the prompt payment of service tax before the issue of Show Cause Notice
and the payment of interest soon after passing the adjudication order
which showed the genuineness of the Appellant. It was held that whatever
tax is paid is available as CENVAT credit and thus there is no
intention to avoid payment of service tax. Non-payment would not result
in any financial benefit and therefore penalty is waived u/s. of the
Finance Act, 1994.

[2015] 64 taxmann.com 126 (Mumbai – CESTAT) Commissioner of Central Excise, Nagpur vs. P.B. Bobde

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As hiring and renting can be distinguished from each other, service tax cannot be levied on hiring of cabs under category of rent-a-cab service.

Facts
The Appellant entered into a contract for supply of vehicles on hiring basis & did not pay service tax based on a view that hiring of vehicles is not liable for service tax under category of ‘Rent a cab Service’.

Held
The Tribunal relied upon recent judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Uttrakhand in the case of CC&CE vs. Sachin Malhotra 2014-TIOL-2039-HC-UKAND-ST [digest reproduced in the January 2015 issue of BCAJ]. In that case, the High Court noted that, even though the word “hire” is used in rent-a-cab scheme, both are different transactions. In case of hiring, control of vehicle is retained by owner irrespective of the fact whether he himself drives vehicle or engages a driver and customer merely pays charges for travelling in such vehicle. But in case of “rent-a-cab” service, rent is paid as per terms of contract and vehicle is used by the person as his own & he is free to take it anywhere as per his choice, but subject to terms & conditions of contract. The Hon’ble High Court held that unless control of vehicle is passed on to hirer under rent-a-cab scheme, there does not arise any service tax liability as envisaged by provisions of section 65(91) of the Finance Act, 1994. In the light of this judgment, the matter was decided in favour of assessee.

[2015] 64 taxmann.com 26 (New Delhi – CESTAT) Kelly Services India (P.) Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise & Service Tax, Gurgon-II

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Under Explanation to section 67, in case of associated concerns, when assessee paid service tax on book adjustment made prior to 10.05.2008, interest cannot be demanded for period prior to 10.05.2008.

Facts
For services received from overseas associated concern in FY 2006-07 and 2007-08, the assessee made book entries for consideration payable. Consideration for such services was paid in January 2011. An explanation was inserted u/s. 67 w.e.f. 10.05.2008, that in case of associated enterprise, the gross value charged shall include book entries made in the books of accounts of person liable to pay tax. Therefore service tax was discharged based on book entries, under reverse charge in January 2009 along with applicable interest. However, while quantifying interest, only period after 10.05.2008 was considered. However, department contended that interest is required to be paid prior to 10.05.2008 commencing from the date of book entries.

Held
The Hon’ble Tribunal noted that the Appellant did not contest interest paid for the period after 10.05.2008 but, only interest attributable for the period commencing from due date pertaining to the date of book entries up-to 10.05.2008, when explanation was inserted. It was noted that even in the Order-in- Original, the levy of interest is held to have commenced only after 10.05.2008. Relying upon decision of CESTAT in Sify Technologies Ltd. vs. CCE & ST [ Appeal No.ST/279/2010 dated 08-11-2010] on similar issue, the Hon’ble Tribunal observed that legislative intention of such amendment by way adding explanation was to introduce new provision and not to remove any doubts in existing provision. Decision of Larger Bench of the Tribunal in case of Commissioner of Customs vs. Skycell Communications Ltd. [2008 (232) ELT 434] was also relied upon which clarified that Explanation placing restrictions prejudicial to the assessee will not be retrospective. Consequently, the Tribunal held that there is no liability to pay interest on the book adjustments made prior to 10.5.2008.

[2015] 64 taxmann.com 243 (Allahabad – CESTAT) Amit Pandey Physics Classes vs. Commissioner of Central Excise & Service Tax, Kanpur

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Even though some portion of service tax as determined by central
excise officer is paid before issuance of show cause notice (SCN), such
prepayment cannot be reduced while quantifiying penalty u/s. 78.

Facts
The
appellant neither declared services in returns nor paid the service
tax. He admitted his mistake during investigation and paid around 75% of
such liability prior to issuance of SCN. In the SCN, penalty u/s. 78
was imposed on entire service tax liability by ignoring such service tax
already paid. It was contended that service tax liability was not
correctly determined as amount already paid was ignored and hence, after
considering service tax already paid, penalty should be levied only on
25% of service tax which remained unpaid.

Held
The
Hon’ble Tribunal observed that since the assessee was aware of the
provisions of service tax and yet failed to pay tax on due date, central
excise officer correctly determined total service tax liability of
assessee in terms of provisions of section 73(2). Accordingly,
imposition of penalty u/s. 78 was on total tax liability quantified in
SCN was also held to be correct.

[2015] 64 taxmann.com 171 (Mumbai – CESTAT) Owens Corning (India) (P.) Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Belapur

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Possession of components of capital goods in subsequent years is not
necessary for availing balance 50% CENVAT credit as per Rule 4(2)(b) of
CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004

Facts
The Appellant, a
manufacturer of glass fibre, was using ‘bushings’ as components and
availed 50% of CENVAT credit in respect thereof as part of capital
goods. In subsequent year, such ‘bushings’ were re-exported for remaking
& assessee availed balance 50% CENVAT credit. By applying
provisions of Rule 4(2) of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, revenue rejected
subsequent availment on ground that such capital goods were not in their
possession at the time of availment & ‘bushings’ received in
subsequent year are newly manufactured goods.

Held
The
Tribunal noticed that as per Rule 4(2)(b) of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004,
balance CENVAT credit can be availed in sub-sequent financial year
provided capital goods other than components, spares & accessories,
refractories & refractory materials, moulds and dies, are in
possession of manufacturer of final product or output service provider.
It was held that ‘bushings’ being components, condition of possession of
same in subsequent year for availing balance 50% CENVAT credit is not
applicable.

[2015] 64 taxmann.com 203 (New Delhi – CESTAT) Commissioner of Service Tax, Delhi-III vs. Denso Haryana (P.) Ltd.

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Provision of ‘intellectual property service’ is complete on the date
of transfer/permission to use the same. When such date is before
introduction of service tax on such services, even though royalty
payments are received over a period of time including period post
introduction of service, service tax not leviable.

Facts
The
agreement for transfer of technology and right to manufacture and sell
products using same technology was entered into before levy of service
tax on ‘Intellectual Property Services’ came into force. As per payment
terms, consideration was required to be paid by making one-time lump sum
payment in addition to a running royalty based on number of products
manufactured using technology transferred. The revenue initiated
proceedings against appellants to recover service tax under reverse
charge in capacity of service recipient on amounts of royalty paid after
period in which ‘Intellectual Property Services’ were brought into
service tax net, based on the contention that appellants were providing
continuous supply of service.

Held
Relying upon
decision in the case of Modi-Mundipharma (P.) Ltd. vs. CCE [2010] 24 STT
343 (New Delhi – CESTAT), the Tribunal held that transfer of technology
in the present case cannot be held to be continuous supply of service
merely because of periodic payments. Provision for service was complete
as soon as technology was transferred. Revenue’s contention that use of
technology over number of years covered by periodic payments would form
the basis for continuous supply of service was rejected. Since transfer
of technology took place before introduction of service tax on
intellectual property services, it was held as not liable to service
tax.

2015 (40) STR 1069 (Tri.-Mum.) Bank of Baroda vs. CST, Mumbai

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If the assessee has a bona fide belief and service tax liability is paid voluntarily for the period beyond normal period of limitation, liability of interest does not arise.

Facts
The appellant paid service tax under protest along with interest for a disputed matter during the pendency of the proceedings. At the adjudication stage, the matter was contested on merits as well as on limitation. The adjudicating authority confirmed service tax demand with interest but dropped penalties. The service tax liability was not contested further in view of the clarification on the subject matter. However, interest liability was contested for extended period as they had no intention to evade service tax. Department argued that irrespective of the intention to evade service tax or otherwise, interest liability arises.

Held
In view of the clarification, the appellant’s appeal failed on merits. With respect to the liability of interest, the Gujarat High Court in the case of Gujarat Narmada Fertilizers Co. Ltd. 2012 (285) ELT 336 (Guj.), had observed that if the period of limitation had expired and if the assessee has paid service tax voluntarily, SCN was not valid. Further, having regard to the intention of legislature it was held that in any case, it was not open for department to recover interest. The above decision was held to be squarely applicable in the present case since the appellant had a bona fide belief which was undisputed by the department. Accordingly, demand of interest was set aside.

2015 (40) STR 1146 (Tri.-Mum.) CCE, Nasik vs. Deoram Vishrambhai Patel

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Renting of property by individual co-owners is a service provided in individual capacity and not as association of persons.

Facts
The respondents are co-owners of a property which was neither divided nor legally partitioned. A Joint agreement was executed with banks to let out the said premises and collect rent and charges for amenities. Though first appellate authority had decided the case in favour of revenue for a partial demand of service tax, penalties were set aside except penalties u/s. 77 (1) (a) and 77 (2) of the Finance Act, 1994. Department filed an appeal arguing that there was no documentary evidence to prove the partition of property and the agreement was a composite agreement for renting out entire property and commonly used for business. Further it was stated that the Small Scale Service Provider’s exemption was available ‘qua service’ and not ‘qua service provider’ and therefore, in the present case, the exemption was not available. Since there was intentional suppression of facts, penalties u/s. 76 and 78 of the Act were applicable. Relying on Shiv Sagar Estate 1993 (201) ITR 953 (Bom.), the Respondents contested that adjudicating authority grossly erred in holding him and his brothers as association of person.

Held
The Tribunal observed that since service providers were individuals, co-owners of the property were not liable to pay service tax jointly or severally. The property was jointly owned; lease agreements were entered in their individual capacity, the monthly rent was received by each co-owner equally and all the co-owners had obtained separate service tax registration. As was evident from records, they had paid appropriate service tax before initiation of investigation. Therefore, penalties u/s. 76 and 78 were not imposable.

Is a 2008-like financial crisis in the making ? – Volatility in the financial markets shows fears over China are widespread

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Are we headed for a 2008-like financial crisis? George Soros, the man with the reputation of breaking the Bank of England thinks so. “When I look at the financial markets, there is a serious challenge which reminds me of the crisis we had in 2008,” Soros was quoted as saying by Bloomberg. The veteran hedge fund manager is worried about China and thinks it is finding the adjustment difficult. Volatility in the financial markets last week showed that the fear is widely shared across the world.

The Chinese economy is slowing and is being steered towards a more sustainable growth model, which is not dependent on manufacturing exports. However, dealing with past excesses and ensuring a soft landing is an issue. China contributes about 16% to world gross domestic product (GDP) and has provided strength to the global economy after the 2008 financial crisis. A sharp slowdown in China will not only affect overall global growth, but will be particularly harsh for its close trading partners.

A sharp slowdown will have a disproportionate impact on commodity exporters. In fact, the slowdown in China is one of the biggest reasons for the weaknesses in commodity prices.

Weakening economic activity is not the only problem. China is also witnessing serious capital flight. To be sure, policymakers want a weaker currency but are worried about disorderly depreciation. It is being reported that the central bank burnt at least $100 billion in December 2015 alone to defend the renminbi. The worry is that China will once again use weaker currency to support economic activity, which has prompted some of the businesses and households to move out of renminbi-denominated assets. There is also a high-debt angle to the story. According to McKinsey, total debt in China in mid-2014 was at 282% of GDP, which is higher than the debt of some of the advanced economies, such as the US and Germany, and has quadrupled from the level in 2007. Over-investment and slower growth would naturally make debt servicing difficult.

There are layers of issues confronting China at this stage which will keep the financial markets guessing. However, as things stand today, it is difficult to argue that the world is close to a 2008-like financial crisis. In 2008, part of the US economy was engaged in excessive speculation, expecting that good times will continue, and when financial conditions tightened, the result was a collapse in asset prices—a perfect Minsky moment—which brought the financial system to a standstill.

Conditions in China are a little different. China is not essentially struggling to contain speculation and assetprice inflation, but is shifting to a different growth model. It has accumulated excesses in terms of over-investment in various sectors, but debt is mostly concentrated with state-owned enterprises. In fact, households in China are in a lot better shape than they were in the US in 2008. Further, the US was far more financially integrated with the rest of the world than China is today, which will limit the impact. Also, unlike the US, China’s financial system is tightly controlled by the state.

This is not to suggest that a crisis in China will not have any impact on the global economy, but it is unlikely to be close to 2008. However, commodity export-dependent economies will remain in a difficult spot, as demand will remain capped because of a slowdown in China and weak global growth.

What does this mean for India? Policymakers in India will have to remain vigilant and find ways to grow at a time when global growth is likely to remain tepid for an extended period. India will also have to convince global investors that it does not belong to the typical commodityexporting emerging market pack, and is also not suffering from some of the problems that China is facing. Foreign portfolio flows could become more volatile because of a change in investor preference away from emerging markets.

India should, therefore, prepare the ground for attracting foreign direct investment, which is more serious in nature and is likely to be attracted to a long-term growth promise.

(Source: Extracts from the Editorial in Mint dated 11-01-2016)

Property held by a Hindu Female is her Absolute Property – N’est-ce pas?

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Introduction
The above Title, ‘Isn’t a Hindu Female’s Property, her Absolute Property?’, may appear as a rhetoric question to readers! However, having said that it would be interesting to note that the question is not as cut and dried as it appears and this issue has travelled all the way to the Supreme Court on numerous occasions. Thus, while it is quite easy to understand in theory that right to property is a vested right of a Hindu female under the Hindu Succession Act, it becomes quite difficult to understand its implications given the facts and circumstances of a particular case. The issue is thrown into sharper focus by the seeming dichotomy under sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (“the Act”), which deals with property of a Hindu female. A recent Supreme Court decision in the case of Jupudy Pardha Sarathy vs. Pentapati Rama Krishna, Civil Appeal No. 375/2007 (Jupudy’s case) has analysed the position laid down by various judgments on this subject.

Section 14 of the Act
The Act governs the position of a Hindu intestate, i.e., one dying without making a valid Will. The Act applies to Hindus, Jains, Sikhs, Buddhists and to any person who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or a Jew. The Act overrides all Hindu customs, traditions and usages and specifies the heirs entitled to such property and the order of preference among them. Section14 which is the crux of the issue needs to be studied closely.

Section14(1) states that any property possessed by a female Hindu, whenever it may be acquired by her, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Thus, the Act lays down in very clear terms that in respect of all property possessed by a Hindu female, she is the full and absolute owner and she does not have a limited/restricted right in the same. The explanation to this sub-section defined the term, “property” to include both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift (from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage), or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever. Thus, an extremely wide definition of property has been given under the Act. Property includes all types of property owned by a female Hindu although she may not be in actual, physical or constructive possession of that property – Mangal Singh & Ors vs. Shrimati Rattno, 1967 SCR (3) 454. The critical words used here are “possessed” and “acquired”. The word “possessed” has been used in its widest connotation and it may either be actual or constructive or in any form recognised by law. In the context in which it has been used in section 14(1) it means the state of owning or having in one’s hand or power – Gummalapura Taggina Matada Kotturuswami vs. Setra Veerayya and Ors. (1959) Supp. 1 S.C.R. 968. The use of the words ‘female Hindu’ is very wide in scope and is not restricted only to a ‘wife’ – Vidya (Smt) vs. Nand Ram Alias Asoop Ram, (2001) 1 MLJ 120 SC.

In Deen Dayal & Anr. vs. Rajaram, (1971) 1 SCR 298, it was held that, before any property can be said to be “possessed” by a Hindu woman as provided in section 14(1), two things are necessary: (a) she must have a right to the possession of that property and (b) she must have been in possession of that property either actually or constructively. However, this section cannot make legal what is illegal. Hence, if a female Hindu is in illegal possession of any property, then she cannot validate the same by taking shelter under this section.

Section 14(2) carves out an exception to section14(1) of the Act. It states that nothing contained in sub-section (1) of section 14 shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property. Thus, if a female Hindu acquires any property under any instrument and the terms of acquisition, as laid down by such instrument, itself provided for a restricted or a limited estate in the property then she would be treated as a limited owner only. In such an event, she cannot have recourse to section 14(1) and contend that she is an absolute owner.

Whether sub-section (1) or (2) of section 14 apply to a particular case depends upon the facts of the case – Seth Badri Pershad vs. Smt. Kanso Devi, (1969) 2 SCC 586. In this decision it was further held that sub-section (2) of section 14 is more in the nature of a proviso or an exception to sub-section (1). It can come into operation only if acquisition in any of the methods indicated therein is made for the first time without there being any pre-existing right in the female Hindu who is in possession of the property. It further approved of the observations of the Madras High Court Rangaswami Naicker vs. Chinnammal, AIR 1964 Mad 387 that section14(2) made it clear that the object of section 14 was only to remove the disability on women imposed by law and not to interfere with contracts, grants or decrees etc. by virtue of which a women’s right was restricted.

Factual Matrix of Jupudy’s case
A person had 3 wives and his 1st wife had predeceased him. His 3rd wife had no child and so, under his Will, he left her a house to be enjoyed for her life and after her life it was to go to his son from his 2nd wife. He also left her certain washroom facilities and right to fetch water from the well during her lifetime. All of these were also to devolve on his son after her death. The focussed issue before the Apex Court was whether the right to these properties so bequeathed on the 2nd wife was her absolute property by virtue of section 14(1) or whether it was a limited estate u/s. 14(2) since she was made an owner only for her lifetime?

Decisions on Section14
Several decisions of the Supreme Court have analysed section14(1) and section14(2) in depth. Some of the important ones are discussed below.

R.B.S.S. Munnalal and Others vs. S.S. Rajkumar, AIR 1962 SC 1493

The Supreme Court held that by section14(1) the legislature converted the interest of a Hindu female, which under the customary Hindu law would have been regarded as a limited interest, into an absolute interest and by the Explanation thereto gave to the expression “property” the widest connotation. The Court held that the Act conferred upon Hindu females full rights of inheritance, and swept away the traditional limitations on her powers of dispositions which were regarded under the Hindu law as inherent in her estate. She was under the Act regarded as a fresh stock of descent in respect of property possessed by her at the time of her death.

Nirmal Chand vs. Vidya Wanti, (1969) 3 SCC 628

If a lady is entitled to a share in her husband’s properties then the suit properties must be held to have been allotted to her in accordance with section14(1), i.e., as an absolute owner inspite of the fact that the deed in question mentioned that she would have only a life interest in the properties allotted to her share.

Eramma vs. Verrupanna, 1966 (2) SCR 626

The Supreme Court held that mere possession of property by a female does not automatically attract section 14(1) of the Act.

MST. Karmi vs. Amru, AIR 1971 SC 745

A person died leaving behind his wife. His son pre-deceased him. He gave a life-interest through his Will to his Wife. It was held that the life estate given to a widow under the Will of her husband cannot become an absolute estate under the provisions of the Act. Section14(2) would apply to such a situation and it would not become an absolute estate. The female having succeeded to the properties on the basis of her husband’s Will she cannot claim any rights over and above what the Will conferred upon her. This is one of the important decisions which have gone against the tide of conferring absolute ownership on the Hindu female.

V. Tulasamma vs. Sesha Reddi, (1977) 3 CC 99

In this landmark case, the Supreme Court clarified the difference between sub-section (1) and (2) of section 14, thereby restricting the right of a testator to grant a limited life interest in a property to his wife. case involved a compromise decree arising out of decree for maintenance obtained by the widow against her husband’s brother in a case of intestate succession. The compromise allotted properties to her as a limited owner. The Supreme Court held that this was a case where properties were allotted in lieu of maintenance and hence, section14(1) was clearly applicable. Thus, the widow became the absolute owner of these properties.

The Court held that legislative intendment in enacting s/s. (2) was that this subsection should be applicable only to cases where the acquisition of property is made by a Hindu female for the first time without any pre-existing right. Where, however, property is acquired by a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of her pre-existing right to maintenance, such acquisition would be pursuant to her pre-existing right not be within the scope and ambit of section 14(2) even if the instrument allotting the property prescribes a restricted estate in the property. S/s. (2) must, therefore, be read in the context of s/s. (1) so as to leave as large a scope for operation as possible to s/s. (1) and so read, it must be confined to cases where property is acquired by a female Hindu for the first time as a grant without any preexisting right, under a gift, will, instrument, decree, order or award, the terms of which prescribe a restricted estate in the property. It further held that a Hindu woman’s right to maintenance is a personal obligation so far as the husband is’ concerned, and it is his duty to maintain her even if he has no property. If the husband has property then the right of the widow to maintenance becomes an equitable charge on his property and any person who succeeds to the property carries with it the legal obligation to maintain the widow. Though the widow’s right to maintenance is not a right to property, it is undoubtedly a pre-existing right in the property, i.e. it is a jus ad rem, not jus in rem and it can be enforced by the widow who can get a charge created for her maintenance on the property either by an agreement or by obtaining a decree from the civil court.

Smt. Culwant Kaur vs. Mohinder Singh, AIR 1987 SC 2251 / Gurdip Singh vs. Amar Singh 1991 SCC (2) 8

The provisions of section 14(1) of the Act were applied because it was a case where the Hindu female was put in possession of the property expressly in pursuance to and in recognition of the maintenance in her/where the wife acquired property by way of gift from her husband explicitly in lieu of maintenance.

Thota Sesharathamma vs. Thota Manikyamma, (1991) 4 SCC 312

The Apex Court dealt with a life estate granted to a Hindu woman by a Will as a limited owner and the grant was in recognition of pre-existing right. Tulasamma’s decision was followed and section 14(1) was held to apply. The Supreme Court also held that the contrary decision in the case of Mst. Karmi cannot be considered an authority since it was a rather short judgment without adverting to any provisions of section 14(1) or 14(2) of the Act. The judgment neither made any mention of any argument raised in this regard nor there was any mention of the earlier decisions on this issue.

Nazar Singh vs. Jagjit Kaur, (1996) 1 SCC 35 / Santosh vs. Saraswathibai, (2008) 1 SCC 465 / Subhan Rao vs. Parvathi Bai, (2010) 10 SCC 235

Applying Tulasamma’s decision it was held that lands, which were given to a lady by her husband in lieu of her maintenance, were held by her as a full owner thereof and not as a limited owner notwithstanding the several restrictive covenants accompanying the grant. According to the Court, this proposition followed from the words in sub-section (1) of section14, which insofar as is relevant read: “Any property possessed by a female Hindu … shall be held by her as full owner and not as a limited owner.”

Shakuntala Devi vs. Kamla and Others, (2005) 5 SCC 390

A Hindu wife was bequeathed a life interest for maintenance by her husband’s Will with a condition that she would not have power to alienate the same in any manner. As per the Will, after death of the wife, the property was to revert back to his daughter as an absolute owner. It was held that u/s.14(1) a limited right given to the wife under the Will got enlarged to an absolute right in the suit property.

Sadhu Singh vs. Gurdwara Sahib Narike, (2006) 8 SCC 75 / Sharad Subramanyan vs. Soumi Mazumdar (2006) 8 SCC 91

The Supreme Court in these well-considered decisions held that the antecedents of the property, the possession of the property as on the date of the Act and the existence of a right in the female over it, however limited it may be, are the essential ingredients in determining whether subsection (1) of section 14 of the Act would come into play. Any acquisition of possession of property by a female Hindu could not automatically attract section14(1). That depended upon the nature of the right acquired by her. If she took it as an heir under the Act, she took it absolutely. If while getting possession of the property after the Act, under a devise, gift or other transaction, any restriction was placed on her right, the restriction will have play in view of section14(2) of the Act. Therefore, there was nothing in the Act which affected the right of a male Hindu to dispose of his property by providing only a life estate or limited estate for his widow. The Act did not stand in the way of his separate properties being dealt with by him as he deemed fit. His Will could not be challenged as being hit by section 14(1) of the Act. When he validly disposed of his property by providing for a limited estate to his wife, the widow had to take it as the estate fell. This restriction on her right so provided, was really respected by section 14(2) of the Act. Thus, in this case where the widow had no pre-existing right, the limited estate granted to her under her husband’s Will was upheld u/s. 14(2).

Nazar G. Rama Rao vs. T. G. Seshagiri Rao (2008) 12 SCC 392

The Court held that if no issue was framed and also no evidence was led to substantiate the plea that the female was occupying the premises in lieu of maintenance, section 14(1) cannot automatically apply to every case.

Final Verdict in Jupudy’s case
After analysing a host of decisions and the legal principles, the Supreme Court in Jupudy’s case held that the bequest under the Will to the 3rd Wife was in the nature of maintenance even though the express words maintenance were not mentioned in the Will. She was issueless and the husband was duty bound to maintain her. Hence, he gave her the house and access to incidental facilities. Accordingly, section14(1) applied and the limited right stood enlarged into an absolute estate by virtue of a pre-existing right of maintenance. The Court observed that no one disputed the genuineness of the Will and the fact that the 3rd Wife continued to enjoy the said property in lieu of her maintenance and hence, the decision of G. Rama’s case cannot apply here.

Conclusion
Section14(1) is a very important piece of legislation when it comes to ensuring protection of a Hindu female’s rights over property. It ensures that a lady is an absolute owner in respect of her property. However, it is also essential that this is provision is used as a shield and not a sword. Section14(2) ensures that what was originally acquired as a limited owner does not automatically enlarge into absolute ownership. One important principle which emerges from the numerous Court cases is that, applicability of these two sub-sections has to be tested on the facts of each case and there cannot be one straight-jacketed approach to all cases. Due care should be taken in drafting a Will under which a Hindu lady is getting a limited estate to demonstrate that it is in effect a restricted interest and not something in lieu of maintenance.

Will – Transfer of property – Will becomes effective only after death of testator – Limitation Act, does not strictly apply for granting probate.

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The State of Meghalaya & Anr vs. Bimol Deb & Anr. ; AIR 2015 Meghalaya 48 (HC).

Writ petition was filed challenging the order of additional Dy. Commissioner (Revenue), Shillong on granting the probate. It was submitted that, as per the Meghalaya Transfer of Land (Regulation) Amendment Act, 2010, no one can make a Will to transfer the property from one living person to another living person and that the Will in question was not a Will at all, but it was made for the purpose of transfer of land by the testator of the Will.

The Hon’ble Court observed that The Meghalaya Land Transfer Act, 1971 is a law passed by the State legislature. There is no definition that, “transfer of property” shall also include within its meaning “WILL” under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 defines “transfer of property” as an act by which a living person conveys property, in present or in future, to one or more other living persons, or to himself, and one or more other living persons; and ‘to transfer property’ is to perform such act”.

The definition of “WILL” can be found only in the Indian Succession Act, 1925 in Section 2(h) “WILL” means the legal declaration of the intention of a testator with respect to his property which he desires to be carried into effect after his death.”

Now, the word “convey” in section 5 has been further defined in the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 in section 2(10). “Conveyance” includes a conveyance on sale and every instrument by which property, whether movable or immovable, is transferred inter vivos (between living persons) and which is not specifically provided for by Schedule I”.

The upshot of the above legal position is that, ‘transfer of property’ will include only between living person and the same is the meaning of conveyance also which will include only between living persons. However, Will is a testament by a legal declaration bequeathing the right of property to a living person in future. A Will becomes effective only after the death of the testator. A Will is a last wish of a dead person.

Analysing various provisions of The Meghalaya Transfer of Land (Regulation) Amendment Act, 2010, the Court held that, if we read the definition of “Transfer of property” and “Conveyance” quoted and discussed above, it becomes very apparent that, by including “WILL” within the meaning of “Conveyance”, the State legislature has rewritten the definition of “conveyance” which is an illegal exercise of power; but the State legislature in the first place has no power to alter the definition of conveyance legislated by the Parliament. The inclusion of “WILL” has to be struck down as illegal since the State legislature cannot overstep in the field of Union list while legislating law. The issue of succession is solely in the field of the Union list and not in the Concurrent list. Safe legal inference can be drawn that the insertion of WILL in clause 2(d) of the Meghalaya Land Transfer Amendment Act, 2012 quoted above is a blatant case of illegal legislation and is liable to be struck out. The subsequent amendment in section 3A restricting the devolution of property only to immediate family members will have to meet the same fate and to be struck down. The Court also observed that as per the limitation is concerned Article 17 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not strictly apply for granting probate.

Tribunal – Early hearing – Application must be considered :

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Payadhi Foods P. Ltd. vs. UOI 2015 (325) ELT 705 (Cal.) (HC)

The Petitioner filed an application for early hearing of a pending appeal before the CESTAT which was dismissed on the ground that the appeal would be considered in due course.

The Hon’ble court observed that the appeal which was filed in the year 2010 had not reached to its logical conclusion as yet. The Court observed that though it was not oblivious of the reality where the docket of the Tribunal is burdened with enormous litigation filed before it, but equally this Court cannot lose sight of the responsibilities of the statutory authority to render justice effectively and expeditiously. When an application is taken out seeking for an early hearing of the said appeal, the Tribunal ought to have fixed the date but should not have thrown the said application at the threshold that it will be taken up in due course. The court observed that the justice would be sub-serve if the CESTAT is directed to fix up a date and hear out the said appeal within the time frame.

Gift Deed – Cancellation – Suspicious Circumstances – It is settled principles of law that negative cannot be proved

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Smt. Sita Sundar Devi vs. Savitri Devi & Ors. AIR 2015 Patna 217 (HC)

Plaintiff filed the suit for declaration that the gift deed dated 09.05.1967 purportedly executed by him in favour of defendant Nos. 2 to 4 is fraudulent, illegal and void. The plaintiff also prayed for cancellation of the gift deed.

The lower court recorded the finding that the plaintiff had no cause of action and, therefore, was not entitled to any relief. The court below also found that the plaintiff failed to prove that the gift deed was obtained from him by fraud and as such, the gift deed is not a fraudulent, fabricated and illegal document. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s suit was dismissed.

The Hon’ble High Court observed that it is settled principles of law that a registered document is presumed to be genuine unless the contrary is proved. However, this presumption is rebutable. Once the plaintiff denied its execution with his knowledge and alleged fraud describing how the fraud was played on him, it was for the defendant to have explained the facts, which have been denied by the plaintiff.

The plaintiff has shown the circumstances and the reason as to why he would have gifted his entire property to the the defendants, who are not close relatives without making any provision either for himself or for his wife and the daughter, grand-daughters etc. When these facts were brought on record, it was for the defendants to have satisfactorily explained the matter.

The court further observed that, it is the case of the defendants that plaintiff has purchased the stamp, therefore, it was for the defendants to prove this fact because the plaintiff has denied in so many words and it is settled principles of law that negative cannot be proved.

Once the plaintiff denied the facts, the presumption of genuineness of the gift deed stands rebutted and the onus shifted on the defendants to prove positively the fact asserted by the defendants.

It is settled principles of law that for proving fraud, the circumstance is to be shown satisfactorily to the conscience of the Court because no direct evidence will be found. Here, the plaintiff has proved the fact that he has his wife, daughter, grand-daughters and son-in-law whom he loves. Now the question is, can it be believed that one person will gift all the properties to some persons, who are either not related or distantly related without making provision even for himself and his wife? The court held that, this cannot be the natural conduct of a person.

This is one of the strong circumstances which raises a strong suspicion about the genuineness of the gift deed as there is no explanation at all. Can it be believed that the plaintiff’s love and affection towards his wife, daughter, grand-daughters and son-in-law and even towards himself was lesser than the love and affection towards the defendants?

The other aspect is that in fact the plaintiff was in need of money when he was ailing and was being treated. In such circumstances, he would have sold the property for arranging money but he did not sell. Rather, he obtained assistance from the defendants and then gifted everything, which again creates a strong doubt.

All these are the circumstances, which have been proved by the plaintiff, which clearly indicate that in fact the defendants played a fraud on the plaintiff and got the gift deed executed by him.

In view of above, the Court held that the plaintiff had been able to prove that the defendants fraudulently got the gift deed executed. As such the gift deed was not a genuine document and no title passed on the defendants on the basis of this gift deed.

Nominations – Securities – Nominee continues to hold the Securities in trust and as a fiduciary for claimants under succession law : Succession Act 1925 Section 58:

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Jayanand Jayant Salgaonkar vs. Jayshree Jayant Salgaonkar AIR 2015 Bom 296

The issue arose as to whether the decision of a learned single Judge of Court in Harsha Nitin Kokate vs. The Saraswat Cooperative Bank Ltd. & Ors. 2010(112) Bom. LR 2014 was per incuriam and not a good law wherein the Court had considered the provisions of section 109A of the Companies Act, 1956 and Bye-Law 9.11 under the Depositories Act, 1996, and found that once a nomination is made, the securities in question: automatically get transferred in the name of the nominee upon the death of the holder of the shares.

In the present matter the Hon’ble Court observed that The Depositories Act, 1996. is an act to provide for regulation of depositories in securities and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.

This Act has nothing whatever to do with succession or disposition inter vivos. Plainly, the Depositories Act is concerned with the regulation of depositories, i.e., those entities providing depository services, and not in relation to the holders of the securities in such services, or the manner in which those security-holders might choose to conduct their affairs or to leave the distribution of these securities either to be governed by actions and deeds inter vivos, testamentary succession or inheritance.

A nomination, though said to be a ‘testament’, requires no probate or other proof ‘in solemn form’. Witnesses need not be in the presence of the nominator. Witnesses need not act at the instance of the nominator. Witnesses need not see the nominator execute the nomination. No nomination can be assailed on the ground of importunity, fraud, coercion or undue influence; section 61 of the Indian Succession Act is wholly defenestrated, as is section 59. There can be no codicil to a nomination. There is no particular form for a will, but there are requirements attendant to its proper making. These do not apply to all nominations. Even the requirement of witnesses is a matter of prudence rather than statute. If that be so, no nomination per se requires attestation, and if that be so, it is admissible in evidence u/s. 68 of the Evidence Act, 1872 without the evidence of any witness (simply because a witness to a nomination is not, in any sense, an ‘attesting witness’). But no Will can be so read in evidence without such evidence. From the fundamental definitions to the decisions cited, it is clear that a nomination only provides the company or the depository a quittance. The nominee continues to hold the securities in trust and as a fiduciary for the claimants under the succession law. Nominations u/ss 109A and 109B of the Companies Act and Bye-Law 9.11 of the Depositories Act, 1996 cannot and do not displace the law of succession, nor do they open a third line of succession.

Judicial Process – Judicial Composure and Restraint – Judicial accountability and discipline are necessary to the orderly administration of justice.

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State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr vs. Anil Kumar Sharma & Anr. (2015) 6 SCC 716

The substantial question of law that was raised in this appeal was, as to what extent a High Court can exercise its powers in issuing directions on judicial side, relating to the procedure to be adopted in criminal trials. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, referring the observation in A. M. Mathur vs. Pramod Kumar Gupta (1990) 2 SCC 533, observed that judicial restraint and discipline are necessary to the orderly administration of justice. The duty of restraint and the humility of function has to be the constant theme for a Judge, for the said quality in decision-making is as much necessary for the Judges to command respect as to protect the independence of the judiciary.

Judicial restraint in this regard might better be called judicial respect, that is, respect by the judiciary. Respect to those who come before the court as well to other co-ordinate branches of the State, the executive and the legislature. There must be mutual respect. When these qualities fail or when litigants and public believe that the judge has failed in these qualities, it will be neither good for the judge nor for the judicial process.

No person, however high, is above the law. No institution is exempt from accountability, including the judiciary. Accountability of the judiciary in respect of its judicial functions and orders is vouchsafed by provisions for appeal, revision and review of orders.

The Apex Court held that in view of law laid down by the Court, as discussed above, the High Court had clearly erred in law in treating the writ petition, which was filed for quashing of an FIR and had become infructuous, as a Public Interest Litigation, and issuing sweeping directions, without there being sufficient data and material before it to pass directions. There is no requirement u/s. 173 Code of Criminal Procedure for the Investigating Officer to produce the accused along with the charge-sheet. The High Court did not care to see that where there are several accused and only some of them could be arrested and remanded to judicial custody, and others are on bail, how all of them can be produced together by the police.

DAUGHTER’S RIGHT IN COPARCENARY – IV

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The 2005 amendment in the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (“the Act”) by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 (“the Amendment Act”) and the issue of daughter’s right in coparcenary property have now been a subject matter of substantial litigation all over the country. My articles in BCAJ published in January 2009, May 2010 and November 2011 made an attempt to explain the legal position as per the cases decided by several High Courts.

In the article published in May 2010, we had examined the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Valliammal vs. Muniyappan (2008 (4) CTC 773) which had relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sheela Devi & Ors. vs. Lal Chand & Anr. reported in (2006) 8 SCC 581; 2007(1) MLJ 797 (SC) and other decided case law and come to the following conclusion:- “Therefore, it is clear that a daughter would get benefit of the Amendment Act only if her father is alive at the time of coming into force of the Amendment Act.”

Amongst varying controversial issues arising out of the Amendment Act, one of the major issues was as to whether the Amendment Act had retrospective effect and in which type of cases a daughter of a coparcener would get right in coparcenary property by birth.

With a view to make this article self-explanatory, it is necessary to reproduce here Section 6(1) of the Act as amended by the Amendment Act:-

“6. Devolution of interest in coparcenary property.
– (1) On and from the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, in a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law, the daughter of a coparcener shall, –

(a) by birth become a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son;
(b) have the same rights in the coparcenary property as she would have had if she had been a son;
(c) be subject to the same liabilities in respect of the said coparcenary property as that of a son,and any reference to a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to include a reference to a daughter of a coparcener:

Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall affect or invalidate any disposition or alienation including any partition or testamentary disposition of property which had taken place before the 20th day of December, 2004.”

While several High Courts have considered the question of retrospectivity, there was no consistency in the approach. The different views taken by High Courts on the question are reflected in the following case law:-

In the case of Pravat Chandra Pattnaik & Ors. vs. Sarat Chandra Pattnaik & Anr., AIR 2008 Orissa 133, the Orissa High Court held that looking into the substance of the provisions (of section 6), it is clear that the Act is prospective. It creates substantive right in favour of a daughter from the date when the amended Act came into force i.e. 9.9.2005, whenever she may have been born.

In the case of Sugalabai vs. Gundappa A. Maradi & Ors. (2007) 6 AIR Kart. R 501, the Karnataka High Court held that as soon as the Amendment Act was brought into force, the daughter of a coparcener becomes by birth a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son and that there is nothing in the Amendment Act to indicate that the same will be applicable only in respect of a daughter born on or after the commencement of the Amendment Act.

The Madras High Court in the case of Valliammal vs. Muniyappan (2008 (4) CTC 773) held that the father of the daughter claiming interest in the coparcenary property having died prior to the Amendment Act and the succession having opened to the properties in question before such amendment the daughter was not entitled to any share in the coparcenary property.

In the case of Sadashiv Sakharam Patil vs. Chandrakant Gopal Desale – ( (2012)1 Mah LJ 197; (2011) 5 Bom C.R. 726), the Bombay High Court held that for the purpose of getting benefit of the amended provision it is not necessary that the birth of the daughter should also be after commencement of the amending act and that by virtue of the Amendment Act, the daughter of a coparcener becomes by birth a coparcener even if she was born before the Amendment Act coming into force.

In Vaishali Ganorkar vs. Satish Ganorkar (AIR 2012 Bom 101), the division bench of the Bombay High Court (headed by Chief Justice Mr. Mohit Shah) disagreeing with some other High Courts’ decisions to the contrary, held that only daughters born after 9th September 2005 (being the date of commencement of the Amendment Act) would get benefit under the Amendment Act. It also held that the new rights granted to a daughter which would affect vested rights would be on a wholly different footing and cannot be applied retrospectively. Although appeal to Supreme Court against the said decision was dismissed (2012 (5) Bom CR 210) the question of law was kept open.

In another case of Badrinarayan Shankar Bhandari vs. Omprakash Shankar Bhandari reported in AIR 2014 Bom 151, the division bench of the Bombay High Court (also headed by Chief Justice Mr. Mohit Shah) has reconsidered its own earlier decision cited above and held that a bare perusal of sub-section (1) of section 6 would clearly show that the legislative intent in enacting clause (a) is prospective i.e. daughter born on and after 9th September 2005 will become a coparcener by birth but the legislative intent in enacting clauses (b) and (c) are retroactive and give rights to the daughter who was already born before the amendment and who is alive on the date of amendment coming into force. The court has further held that however if the daughter of a coparcener had died before 9th September 2005, her heirs would have no right in the coparcenary property.

It appears that in view of lack of clarity in the language of the provisions of amended section 6(1) of the Act, different High Courts had put emphasis on some particular wording in the Section in support of their decisions. Thus, while there were different decisions from High Courts, there was no finality and the confusion (and resultant litigation) continued.

Now, the controversy as to whether the Amendment Act is retrospective or not has been settled by a very recent decision of the Supreme Court dated 16th October 2015 in the case of Prakash and Ors vs. Phulavati and Ors. (2015 (6) Kar LJ 177) which has not yet been reported in any official reporter.

In that case the plaintiff Phulavati filed a suit before Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division) Belgaum for partition and separate possession to the extent of oneseventh of her share in the coparcenary property held by her late father Yeshwant, who had died on 18th February 1988. During the pendency of the suit the Amendment Act was passed and the plaintiff amended the plaint to claim a share as per the Amendment Act. The suit was contested and the Trial Court partly decreed the same in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff thereupon preferred first appeal before the Karnataka High Court claiming that she had become coparcener under the Amendment Act and was entitled to inherit the coparcenary property equal to her brothers. The High Court followed the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of G. Sekar vs. Geetha and others (AIR 2009 SC 2649) and held that any development of law inevitably applies to a pending proceeding and in fact it is not even to be taken as a retrospective applicability of the law but only the law as it stands on the day being made applicable. Therefore, the High Court considered the case in light of the provisions of the Amendment Act. The High Court (AIR 2011 Kar 78) held that the plaintiff was entitled to a share in the coparcenary property. In appeal by the defendant Prakash to the Supreme Court it was held that the rights of a daughter under the Amendment Act are applicable to living daughters of living coparceners as on 9th September 2005 irrespective of when such daughters are born.

The effect of the Amendment Act is now clear. Therefore the law now stands that a daughter of a coparcener, who is living as on 9th September 2005, shall by birth become a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son and have the same rights in the coparcenary property as she would have had if she would have been a son. It is irrespective when such daughter is born.

Let us hope that this final legal position now prevails without any further complications.

When Regulators Overlap: Competition Commission of India and the Draft Indian Financial Code 2015

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The Indian regulatory landscape is dotted with several sectoral regulators. Each of these specialised sectoral regulators is entrusted the task of maintaining the market dynamics of its own sector and preventing market failure. However, often their regulatory mandates overlap with each other, and nowhere is this blurring of boundaries more pronounced than in the efforts to foster and fuel competition in the Indian economy.

The Competition Commission of India (‘CCI’) is a specialised sector-agnostic regulator tasked with preserving and promoting competition. Given its pansector mandate, it is no surprise that the CCI often ventures into the domain of sectoral regulators. Many sectoral regulators, such as the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, Insurance Regulatory & Development Authority, Securities and Exchange Commission and the Petroleum & Natural Gas Regulatory Board, are also meant to independently encourage competition in their respective markets. Given the already existing jurisdictional tension among regulators with overlapping functions, the Government of India (‘GoI’) has further obscured the sectoral delineations with the Draft Indian Financial Code 2015 (‘Draft 2015 Code’) which was released on July 23, 2015 by the Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Commission (‘FSLRC’).

The Draft 2015 Code seeks to regulate the financial sector and financial agencies, including the Financial Authority, the Reserve Bank of India (‘RBI’), the Financial Redress Agency, the Resolution Corporation, the Financial Stability and Development Council and the Public Debt Management Agency (together called the ‘Financial Regulators’). When in place, it will replace a plethora of existing laws and attempt to bring coherence and efficiency to financial regulation in India.

The Competition Act, 2002 (‘Competition Act’) currently allows sectoral regulators to make references to the CCI on competition law issues and vice versa. Furthering this theme of inter-regulator cooperation, the Draft 2015 Code seeks to impose an obligation on the CCI to make a reference to the Financial Regulator, albeit as a nonvoting participant, when it undertakes any proceedings under the Competition Act where at least one of the parties is a financial services provider. In such cases, the Financial Regulator would be entitled to nominate a member or senior official to attend CCI proceedings. On the other hand, under the Draft 2015 Code, the Financial Regulator would be obligated to make a reference to the CCI to report any conduct of a financial service provider which it believes to be in violation of the Competition Act.

However, the Draft 2015 Code goes further and empowers the CCI to intervene in the issuance of any regulations, guidance or codes proposed by the Financial Regulators, if it feels they will, or are likely to, create any restriction or distortion of competition in the market for financial products or financial services (‘Negative Effect’). The CCI may comment even when the Negative Effect has been created on account of ‘a feature or combination of features of a market that could be dealt with by regulatory provisions or practices’. ‘Features of a market’ include both the structure of the market for financial products/ services as well as the conduct of financial service providers and/or consumers (even if this conduct is not in the market for the concerned financial product/services).

However, the CCI’s powers, as envisaged under the Draft 2015 Code, do not stop at the provision of commentary alone. The Financial Regulator in question is also required to respond to the CCI outlining what action it proposes to take to address the concerns raised by the CCI or provide reasons if it is not adopting any such actions. Nonetheless, if the CCI continues to remain of the opinion that a Negative Effect is/will be created, the CCI may issue binding directions to the Financial Regulator requiring it to take particular actions to remedy the same. These binding directions would need to be submitted to the Central Government and receive parliamentary approval. While the intention behind the Draft 2015 Code may have been to advance and nurture free and fair competition in the market for financial services and products it does raise certain fundamental issues which need closer scrutiny.

Vast increase in the powers of the CCI – While the requirement of parliamentary approval of any binding directions by the CCI does signal an acknowledgment by the FSLRC that these powers should be exercised sparingly by the CCI; given the absence of any specific guidelines to this effect, the end result could be a vast increase in the CCI’s powers. This could result in significant distortion of the boundaries between sectoral regulators and the CCI, particularly when the Financial Regulators are trying to address distinct structural and/or conduct related issues in the market.

CCI review of policy decisions in the financial services/products market – The CCI is a pan-sectoral regulator with the mandate to promote competition across all markets in India. However, the Draft 2015 Code empowers the CCI to influence policy decisions of the Financial Regulators if it is of the opinion that these decisions cause a Negative Effect in the market. While Financial Regulators focus on correcting specific issues in the markets for financial services/products, the CCI’s intervention could alter the focus of the policy actions in question.

Intervention in proceedings before the CCI – As mentioned earlier, any proceeding under the Competition Act where at least one of the parties is a financial services provider, the Financial Regulator would be entitled to nominate a member or senior official to attend the CCI’s proceedings, albeit as a non-voting participant. Such a nomination mechanism appears to be a reasonable way to lend sectoral expertise to the CCI’s proceedings, but the extent to which the said nominee may participate in the proceedings is not clear. Even without a vote, any active intervention by the nominee could influence the proceedings. This is especially so in cases where a Financial Regulator is a party to the proceeding., This provision may create due process issues that could effect enforcement under the Competition Act since the procedural guidelines on the conduct of nominees during the CCI’s proceedings are pending and unclear.

Competition regulators in other jurisdictions have not been granted similar powers of review and oversight into the financial sector. Whilst the Draft 2015 Code is a positive step towards harmonising various financial norms and regulators, it could blur the line between the mandates of financial and competition regulators. Comprehensive guidelines that delineate the extent of CCI oversight on the market for financial services and products in India, as distinct from its own mandate under the Competition Act could bring welcome clarity. Equally, some clarity on the role and participation of other stakeholders in CCI proceedings is also needed.

Treatment of Capital Expenditure on Assets Not Owned by the Company

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Sometimes, circumstances force an entity to incur capital expenditure which is not represented by any specific or tangible assets. For example, an entity may agree with a local authority to pay the cost or part of the cost of roads to be built by the authority. In this case also, the roads will remain the property of the Municipal body. Whether such expenditure should be capitalised or not, is a matter of debate and the solution will depend on facts and circumstances of each case. Consider two scenario’s as given below. The discussion is based on Indian GAAP, but would be equally relevant for Ind-AS purposes as well.

Scenario 1
The Company had to incur expenditure on the construction/ development of certain assets, like electricity transmission lines, railway sidings, roads, culverts, bridges, etc. (hereinafter referred to as enabling assets) for setting up a new refinery. This was required in order to facilitate construction of project and subsequently to facilitate its operations. The ownership of these enabling assets does not vest with the company. The moot question is whether such expenditure can be capitalised or has to be charged to the profit and loss account immediately. This question was raised in 2011 with the Expert Advisory Committee (EAC), and its view and the basis of conclusion was as follows:

View of EAC along with the basis of conclusion [published in CA Journal January 2011]

The expenditure on enabling assets should be expensed by way of charge to the profit and loss account of the period in which the same is incurred. As per the Committee, an expenditure incurred by an enterprise can be recognised as an asset only if it is a resource controlled by an enterprise. For example, the entity having control of an asset can exchange it for other assets, employ it to produce goods or services, charge a price for others to use it, use it to settle liabilities, hold it, or distribute it to owners.

Further, an indicator of control of an item of fixed asset would be that the entity can restrict the access of others to the benefits derived from that asset. In the given case the entity does not have control over the enabling assets and should therefore charge the same as an expense in the profit and loss account.

Author’s comments

In the author’s view, there is sufficient justification in existing literature to support capitalisation of the enabling assets as part of the overall cost of the refinery. This is discussed below.

As per paragraph 9.1 of AS-10, “The cost of an item of fixed asset comprises its purchase price, including import duties and other non-refundable taxes or levies and any directly attributable cost of bringing the asset to its working condition for its intended use; any trade discounts and rebates are deducted in arriving at the purchase price. Examples of directly attributable costs are: (a) site preparation; (b) initial delivery and handling costs; (c) installation cost, such as special foundations for plant; and (d) professional fees, for example fees of architects and engineers. Further paragraph 10.1 states, “Included in the gross book value are costs of construction that relate directly to the specific asset and costs that are attributable to the construction activity in general and can be allocated to the specific asset.”

Paragraph 8 of AS-16 states, “The borrowing costs that are directly attributable to the acquisition, construction or production of a qualifying asset are those borrowing costs that would have been avoided if the expenditure on the qualifying asset had not been made. When an enterprise borrows funds specifically for the purpose of obtaining a particular qualifying asset, the borrowing costs that directly relate to that qualifying asset can be readily identified.” In the given case, the costs incurred on the enabling assets is directly related to the construction of the refinery. The expenses on the enabling assets are required solely for the purpose of bringing the refinery to its working condition for its intended use. For example, without the electricity transmission lines, the refinery will not be ready for its intended purpose.

Interestingly, the EAC [Volume 24 – Query no. 9] had dealt with a similar issue in 2004 with regards to the expenditure incurred on the catchment area of a hydroelectric power project. In the said matter, a dam was being constructed across a river for the purpose of creation of a reservoir so that water is stored and used for the purpose of generating electricity. The reservoir is dependent upon the catchment area for water. Continuous soil erosion results in sedimentation, and reduces the capacity of the reservoir and efficiency of the project (emphasised). Substantial expenditure was incurred towards extensive catchment area treatment measures. In the said matter, EAC opined that the expenditure on the catchment area treatment is capitalised with the cost of the dam. For determining which expenditure is directly attributable to bring the asset to its working condition for its intended use, factors such as whether the concerned expenditure directly benefits or is related to that asset may be considered. In other words, there has to be some nexus between the expenditure and the benefit/relationship with the asset.

The ‘unit of account’ (should not be confused with component accounting) concept is another interesting concept in accounting. Under this concept, it would be argued that what is being constructed is the refinery, and not the roads, culverts, etc. which are all required to construct the refinery. The enabling assets are required not for their own individual purposes but for the purposes of the refinery. The expenditure on the enabling assets is required as part of the cost of constructing the refinery. Therefore the entire project cost including those incurred on the enabling assets will be captured as cost of constructing the refinery. Once that is done, the refinery itself will be bifurcated into various components, so that component accounting can be applied.

In the EAC opinion it is argued that, the entity having control of an asset can exchange it for other assets, employ it to produce goods or services, charge a price for others to use it, use it to settle liabilities, hold it, or distribute it to owners. Further, an indicator of control of an item of fixed asset would be that the entity can restrict the access of others to the benefits derived from that asset. Unfortunately, the argument presupposes the refinery and enabling assets as separate unit of accounts (should not be confused with component accounting). In the author’s view, the unit of account or the asset under construction is the refinery (and not the enabling assets), and all the costs (including on the enabling assets) are related to constructing the refinery. The entity has control over the refinery and restrict the access of others to the benefits derived from the refinery. Thus by looking at the refinery as the unit of account, it is argued that all expenses directly related to constructing the refinery (including costs on enabling assets) should be capitalised.

The EAC opinion will have significant implications for a lot of companies that are in the process of constructing huge projects. In light of the various submissions above, the EAC may reconsider its position. The author is aware that this gap is likely to be plugged in the revised AS 10 under Indian GAAP.

Scenario 2
A mining company has to transport coal through road transport to the nearest railway siding which is around 40 k.m. away from the mines. The existing two lane road is also extensively used by local villagers causing inconvenience, traffic jams and accidents due to which blockage of roads and delay in delivery is a common phenomena. Hence, there was a business necessity and compulsion to widen this road to liquidate the coal stock and to maintain continuity of production. To find a solution to the management problem of transporting the coal, the company widened the two lane road to four lane. The road belongs to and is owned by the State Government. The question is whether expenses incurred for widening of two lanes road to four lanes which is not owned by the company can be recognised as intangible asset.

The appropriate standard would be AS 26 Intangible Assets. As per paragraph 14 of AS 26, an enterprise controls an asset if the enterprise has the power to obtain the future economic benefits flowing from the underlying resource and also can restrict the access of others to those benefits. From the facts of the case neither the land to be acquired for widening the road nor the road will be the property of the company. These will remain the property of the State Government. Further, it is noted that the nearby villagers will also be beneficiaries. From this, it appears that although the work of widening the road will facilitate unrestricted movement of coal for the company, the company does not enjoy control in terms of restriction of access of others to the benefits arising from the widened road facility. Therefore, one may argue that the ex penditure incurred on widening and construction of road on the land which is not owned by the company does not meet the definitions of the terms ‘asset’ and ‘intangible asset’. Accordingly, some may argue that such expenditure cannot be capitalised as an intangible asset.

However the author believes, similar to Scenario 1, the unit of account is not the road but the mine. Hence the above argument of control is not a valid argument. Nonetheless, this fact pattern is different from the one in Scenario 1. In Scenario 1, the expenditure was incurred for and incidental to the construction of an asset (the refinery). The company controls the refinery and hence the capital expenditure including the incidental expenditure incurred for construction should be capitalised as cost of refinery. In Scenario 2, no new asset is created and the expenditure incurred on widening the lane is with respect to an already functioning mine. Paragraph 60 of AS 26 is relevant here, which states “Subsequent expenditure on a recognised intangible asset is recognised as an expense if the expenditure is required to maintain the asset at its originally assessed standard of performance.” This is a matter of judgement. The company should carefully evaluate whether the expenditure incurred on widening the road has increased the originally assessed standard of performance of the mine. If for example, substantially more coal can be produced and transported, because transportation bottlenecks have been removed, one may argue that the originally assessed standard of performance of the mine is increased, and therefore the cost of widening the road will be capitalised as an intangible asset. One will have to make this assessment very carefully.

[2015] 64 taxmann.com 415 (Delhi) Pepsico India Housing (P.) Ltd. v ACIT A.Ys.: 2002-03. Date of Order: 22.12.2015

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Section 92C of the Act – if taxpayer has exported goods to AE at cost and AE, in turn, has sold them at its purchase price, the transaction meets arm’s length standard, ALP adjustment addition is not justified.

Facts
The taxpayer was an Indian company and a membercompany of Pepsico Group. During the relevant assessment year, the taxpayer had exported certain goods, which, based on the functions performed by the taxpayer, could be classified in two categories. In respect of the first category of goods, the taxpayer performed all the functions and undertook risks similar to that of a normal trader in ordinary course of business. In respect of second category of goods, the taxpayer acted as mere facilitator and performed the function of a service provider. The taxpayer grouped all the exports together and benchmarked them.

According to the taxpayer, it enjoyed Star Export House status. To retain it, it had to export certain minimum value of goods. The sellers and the prices of the goods that it exported were finalized by the buyers and the taxpayer acted as mere facilitator. Hence, it exported the goods at the same price at which it purchased them. The loss incurred by it was due to forex rate fluctuations.

In his report, the Transfer Pricing officer (TPO) observed that: the taxpayer had incurred losses by exporting the goods to its AE at the same price at which it purchased; the taxpayer had not even recovered cost incurred on storage, transportation and interest; as per OECD transfer pricing guidelines, two or more transactions can be aggregated only if they are closely interlinked or continuous or form one integral whole and cannot be analysed separately.

The TPO further observed that not recovering remuneration from AE amounts to shifting of profits and, there was no justification for the taxpayer to undertake forex risk. Therefore, TPO determined the ALP and the adjustment to the income of the taxpayer.

Held

It was an admitted fact that the loss incurred by the taxpayer was only on account of foreign exchange fluctuation as the commodities were sold to the AE at the same rate at which these were purchased from the local market.

On a similar issue, in DCIT vs. Global Vantedge P Ltd4 (ITA Nos. 1432 & 2321/ Del/2009 and 116/Del/2011) the ITAT held that ALP adjustment cannot exceed  the amount received by the AE from the customer and the actual value of international transactions (i.e. the amount received by the taxpayer in respect of international transactions).

In the present case, the taxpayer had sold goods to AE at the same price at which they were purchased from the local market. The AE, in turn, had sold them to the customers at the same price at which they were purchased from the taxpayer.

Hence, the international transactions with AE met the arm’s length standard. Therefore, addition on account of arm’s length price of international transactions was not justified.

[2016] 65 taxmann.com 247 (AAR – New Delhi) Cummins Ltd. Date of Order: 12.01.2016

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Article 13 of India-UK DTAA – Fee for supply management service was neither Fee for Technical Services (FTS) nor royalties in terms of Article 13 of India-UK DTAA – not taxable in India in absence of Permanent Establishment (PE) in India.

Facts
The applicant was a company incorporated in the UK. An Indian company (“IndCo”) was engaged in the production of turbochargers. IndCo purchased turbocharger components directly from suppliers in UK and US. The applicant had entered into Material Suppliers Management Service Agreement with IndCo. In terms of the Agreement, IndCo paid supply management service fee @5% of the base prices of the suppliers to the applicant.

The issues before the AAR were:
(i) Whether supply management service fee was FTS or royalties in terms of Article 13 of India-UK DTAA ?

(ii) Depending on answer to (i), as the applicant did not have PE in India, whether the payments were chargeable to tax in India?

(iii) If supply management service fee was not chargeable to tax in India, whether they were subject to transfer pricing provisions under the Act?

(iv) Depending on answer to (i) and (ii), whether IndCo was liable to withhold tax on supply management service fees?

Held

IndCo engaged the applicant only to ensure market competitive pricing from the suppliers. The applicant maintained contract supply agreement with suppliers after identifying the products availability, capacity to produce and competitive pricing. The applicant did not impart its technical knowledge and expertise to IndCo which enabled it to acquire such skills and use them in future. Therefore, the services did not satisfy the ‘make available’ condition under India-UK DTAA .

Relying on the decisions in De Beers India Minerals Private Ltd. (346 ITR 467) and Measurement Technologies Limited (AAR No.966 of 2010), services in the nature of procurement services can never be classified as technical or consultancy in nature and they do not make available any technical knowledge, experience, know-how etc.

The services rendered in this case were managerial in nature. With effect from 11th February, 1994, managerial services were taken out from the ambit of FTS under India-UK DTAA and ‘make available’ clause was inserted. This clearly showed the intention to exclude managerial services and include ‘make available’ requirement.

As the services were related to identification of products and competitive pricing and not to the use of, or the right to use any copyright, patent, trademark, design or model, plan, secret formula or process etc., they cannot qualify as royalties under Article 13 of India-UK DTAA .

Since the applicant had no PE in India, service fee was not chargeable to tax in India and hence, IndCo was not liable to withhold taxes.

PS: AAR held that the issue whether transfer pricing provisions applies is not applicable.

TS-10-ITAT-2016(Mum) Accordis Beheer B V vs. DIT A.Ys.: 2006-07. Date of Order: 13.01.2016

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Article 13(5) of India-Netherlands Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA); Section 112 of the Act – Buy-back of shares under a scheme of arrangement was not “reorganisation” as contemplated in Article 13(5) of India-Netherlands DTAA, transfer did not qualify for participation exemption; however, the transfer qualified for concessional rate u/s. 112 of the Act

Facts
The taxpayer was a resident of Netherlands. It held 38.24% of shares of an Indian company (“IndCo”) whose shares were listed on Indian stock exchanges. During the relevant year, IndCo proposed a scheme of arrangement for buy-back of its shares. The said scheme was approved by the jurisdictional High Court. The taxpayer tendered all the shares held by it and received consideration resulting in capital gains. The taxpayer contended that in terms of Article 13(5)3 of India-Netherlands DTAA , the capital gains were not chargeable to tax in India.

According to the Tax Authority, since the taxpayer sold its shares to IndCo, which was an Indian resident, capital gain did not qualify for participation exemption under Article 13(5) of India-Netherlands DTAA . Further, according to him the concessional rate of 10% provided in the second proviso to section 112 of the Act was not applicable in case of the taxpayer and hence levied tax on capital gain @20%.

The moot point before the Tribunal was whether the shares tendered in the scheme by the taxpayer constituted “reorganisation” in terms of Article 13(5) of India-Netherlands DTAA .

Held
As regards whether buy-back is “reorganisation”

Since the scheme was approved by High Court, there was no colourable device.

Reorganisation should involve major change in financial structure of a corporation, resulting in alteration in rights and interests of security holders. In the present case, upon implementation of the scheme there was no change in the rights and interests of the shareholders. Only change was that pursuant to reduction of share capital the percentage of shareholding of the promoter group had gone up. That cannot be considered as change in the rights and interests of shareholders.

The reorganisation contemplated in section 390 of the Companies Act 1956 consists of either consolidation of shares of different classes, or division of shares into different classes, or both.

Transfer of shares pursuant to a buy-back scheme could not fall under the ambit of the term “reorganisation” since the objective of the scheme was not financial restructuring, but providing exit to non-resident shareholders.

As regards rate of tax

Having regard to the decisions in Cairn U.K. Holdings Ltd. (2013)(359 ITR 268)(Del) and ADIT vs. Abbott Capital India Ltd. (65 SOT 121)(Mum Trib), the taxpayer is entitled to the concessional rate of 10% under section 112 of the Act.

[2015] 64 taxmann.com 162 (AAR – New Delhi) Satyam Computer Services Ltd Date of Order: 01.12.2015

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Sections 9, 195 of the Act – Payment of penalty decreed by Foreign Court, being payment to Government, not subject to tax and hence, will not be subject to tax withholding under the Act.

Facts
The applicant was an Indian company. The shares of the Applicant were listed on Indian stock exchanges. The Applicant had also issued American depository shares which were listed on New York Stock Exchange. SEC of USA had filed complaint with US Court for violation of American Securities Law by the Applicant. The Applicant filed its consent and undertaking with SEC without admitting or denying the allegations in the complaint and agreed to pay penalty. The US Court levied civil penalty on the Applicant. The Court further decreed that “amount ordered to be paid as civil penalties pursuant to this Judgment shall be treated as penalties paid to the government for all purposes, including all tax purposes”.

The AAR examined the issue whether penalty payable pursuant to decree of US Court, which was paid to US Court/Government of USA was liable to tax withholding under the Act.

Held
Penalty pursuant to the decree of Court will not be subject to tax liability. Consequently, question of tax withholding u/s. 195 of the Act will not arise.

[2016] 65 taxmann.com 246 (AAR – New Delhi) Aberdeen Claims Administration Inc. Date of Order: 19.01.2016

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Sections – 4, 5, 9, 45, 48 of the Act –Settlement amounts received by FIIs pursuant to waiver of right to sue for damages caused by fraud in financial statements was compensation for not pursuing the suit and involved surrender of capital asset (viz., “right to sue”); though it was a capital receipt, as the computation provisions failed, capital gains could not be calculated; hence, it was not taxable as capital gains.

Facts
Several FIIs were holding American depository shares and equity shares of an Indian listed company (“IndCo”). There was public disclosure by the CEO of the Indian company about manipulation of financial results of IndCo. As a result, the price of securities of IndCo dropped steeply and the FIIs were forced to dispose of the securities, suffering huge losses. Several investors initiated class action litigation against IndCo. While initially claims of FIIs were also consolidated with those of the other investors, subsequently, the FIIs filed request for exclusion with the Court. The FIIs then separately negotiated the terms of settlement with IndCo and its auditors pursuant to which IndCo and its auditors agreed to pay settlement amount to FIIs.

The issue before the AAR was whether the settlement amount received by FIIs from IndCo and its auditors was taxable in terms of the Act.

The FIIs contended as follows.

As regards sections 4, 5 & 9 of the Act

Since the settlement amounts were not received in the ordinary course of business of the Applicant, and the Applicant is not engaged in the business of suing and seeking settlement from third parties, they would not qualify as “income” for the purposes of the Act.

Since section 9 of the Act refers to only specific streams of income the settlement amounts cannot be said to be deemed to accrue or arise in India in terms thereof.

The settlement amounts were linked to a law suit that arose outside India and was not determined on the basis of value of the underlying shares of IndCo. The suit was linked to allegation of fraud/negligence. The settlement amounts were not sourced in India. Hence, the territorial nexus principle was not fulfilled. This was established from the fact that the FIIs had sold the shares prior to initiation of the action.

Therefore, the settlement amounts cannot be brought to tax u/s. 9 read with Section 4 and Section 5 of the Act. This is on the basis that the settlement amounts were not connected with the Applicant’s business in India but for release of claims of FIIs against IndCo and its auditors. Therefore, the settlement amounts have no territorial nexus with India.

As regards section 45 of the Act
The settlement amounts were received on account of destruction of capital assets (i.e. the right to sue IndCo and its auditors).

Assuming that the settlement amounts were subject to Section 45 of the Act cost of acquisition and cost of improvement of a right to sue cannot be computed. Hence, owing to failure of computation mechanism no Capital Gains could arise under Section 48 and Section 55 (3) of the Act2.

The settlement amounts were received as compensation for the injury inflicted on capital asset of the trading (Equity and ADS shares held FIIs) and therefore not subject to Section 45 of the Act.

A ‘right to sue’ is property (and thus Capital Asset as defined under Section 2 (14) of the Act). Inherently, as a matter of public policy, a ‘right to sue’ is not transferable. Thus, there cannot be any transfer of a right to sue under Indian law. Consequently, any capital receipt arising from a right to sue cannot be considered capital gains u/s. 45 of the Act. The Gujarat High Court has accepted this proposition in Baroda Cement and Chemicals vs. C.I.T. (158 ITR 636). Also, in Vania Silk Mills Pvt. Ltd. vs. C.I.T. (191 ITR 647), the Supreme Court has laid down that receipt on account of destruction of capital assets is not subject to capital gains.

The tax authority contended as follows.
The FIIs were pass-through entities engaged in the business of trading in securities and the loss was incurred by them in the course of that business. The recipients of the settlement amounts were the FIIs (and not participating investors) who were in the business of purchase and sale of securities.

Unlike an investor, Mutual Funds change their portfolios frequently and sometimes prefer even booking losses. The FIIs decide to move out of a market on local as well as international factors. The buying and selling of shares is done very regularly and frequently. These are characteristics of a trader and not of an investor. Merely because in order to attract investments the Government has decided to treat the gains of FIIs as capital gains, the same does not alter the basic character of the activity but only changes the matter of taxability.

Any fall in price of share cannot be regarded as destruction of asset. Rise and fall in prices of securities, be it for one reason or the other, is a normal business incidence and neither the rise in price creates an asset nor the fall in price destroys an asset. Capital receipt arises only when receipt is for destruction of the profit making apparatus or crippling of the recipient’s profitmaking apparatus. However, when the structure of the recipient’s business is so fashioned as to absorb the shock as one of the normal incidents of business activity the compensation received is no more than a surrogatum for the future profits surrendered. Hence, it should be treated as a revenue receipt and not a capital receipt.

The settlement amounts received were not for relinquishment or extinguishment of the right to sue but as a compensation for the loss of potential income suffered in the course of their business operations.

Held

In Union of India vs. Raman Iron Foundry, AIR 1974 SC 265, the Supreme Court has held that the only right which the party aggrieved by the breach of the contract has, is the right to sue for damages, which is not an actionable claim and it is amply clear from the amendment in section 6(e) of the Transfer of Property Act, which provides that a mere right to sue for damages cannot be transferred.

However, in CIT vs. Mrs Grace Collis and other 2001 248 ITR 323, the Supreme Court has held that the expression “extinguishment of any rights therein” does include the extinguishment of rights in a capital asset independent of and otherwise than on account of transfer. Hence, the right to sue can be considered for the purpose of capital gains u/s. 45 of the Act.

In CIT vs. B.C. Srinivasa Setty (1981 128 ITR 294), the Supreme Court has held that the charging section and the computation provisions together constitute an integrated code and a case to which the computation provisions cannot apply was not intended to fall within the charging section. It was further held that none of the provisions pertaining to the head ‘capital gains’ suggests that they include an asset in the acquisition of which no cost of acquisition at all can be conceived. It is clear that if right to sue is considered as a capital asset covered under the definition of transfer within the meaning of section 2(47) of the Act, its cost of acquisition cannot be determined. In the absence of such cost of acquisition, the computation provisions failed and capital gains cannot be calculated. Therefore, right to sue cannot be subjected to income tax under the head ‘capital gains’.

Since the settlement amounts have been received against surrender of right to sue, it cannot be considered for the purpose of capital gains u/s. 45 of the Incometax Act.

The settled legal position is that FIIs are not engaged in trading business. The facts also show that the shares were purchased as investors and not as traders and in the books of accounts also they were treated as capital investment.

While the settlement amounts were relatable to shares (i.e., if shares would not have been purchased the question of class action or right to sue would not have arisen), they were received not as part of business profit or to compensate the future income but as a result of surrender of the claim against IndCo and its auditors. Hence, even in accordance with the principle of surrogatum, such amounts were not assessable as income because they did not replace any business income.

Decoding Residence Rule through not so rhyming POEM – How Melodious is the Indian POEM – an Analysis

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“Residence” is one of the primary factors to fasten the tax liability
on any tax payer in a country, be it an individual, a company or any
other entity. Determination of a residential status of an assessee
assumes significant importance in international taxation. Elaborate
rules are prescribed in tax laws of every country and/ or in tax
treaties prevalent worldwide. One of such rules for residence of
companies accepted and followed worldwide is that of Place of Effective
Management. Finance Act, 2015 amended Section 6(3)(ii) of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 dealing with Residence of companies from the “Control and
Management Principle” to the “Place of Effective Management” (POEM).
POEM is dealt with by both, the OECD and UN in their Model Commentaries.
In December 2015, CBDT came out with Draft Guidelines on determination
of POEM for a Company. This write-up highlights crucial aspects
regarding determination of residential status of a company taking into
account the concept of POEM.

Backdrop
Corporate
Residency has been one of the most important issues across the world.
With businesses moving across countries and with digital economy being
the flavour of the 21st century, countries are in a tiff to make sure
that they don’t lose their pie of taxes. The steps taken by the G20
Nations to prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) are in this
direction. In case of multinational companies, the structures adopted
are such that it becomes difficult to ascertain where its control and
management are situated. Countries worldwide have introduced various
concepts like POEM, Place of Management (POM), Control and Management (C
& M), Central Control & Management etc. to ascertain the
residency based on overall control and management of the company.

Concept of Corporate Residency before the Amendment

As
per Section 6(3) of the Act before the Amendment, the Income-tax law
was as under – “A company is said to be resident in India in any
previous year, if –

(i) It is an Indian company; or
(ii) During that year, the control and management of its affairs is situated wholly in India.” (Emphasis Supplied)

Hence,
a foreign company was treated as resident only if the control and
management of its affairs were situated wholly in India during that
year. It meant, even if a part of control was outside India, the company
was not regarded as resident and hence, it was subjected to tax only on
income sourced in India.

In the erstwhile definition it was
easy for a foreign company (which was controlled and managed from India)
to avoid Indian taxes on global income by artificially shifting/
retaining part of its C & M outside India. Typically, resident
Indians who have set up overseas companies could use the erstwhile
definition to their advantage.

It may be noted that the term
“Control and Management” was not defined in the Act. However, in general
parlance, it was understood that control and management did not mean
conducting day to day management of the company, but it referred to the
head and brain of the company that take major decisions for effective
functioning and managing of the company.

C & M being not
defined in the Act was a major bone of contention between the taxpayers
and revenue authorities. Let us look at some of the judicial rulings on
the interpretation of C & M:

C & M as per Indian Courts
In
Subbayya Chettiar (HUF) vs. CIT (19 ITR 168) (SC) Honourable Supreme
Court observed that C&M signifies the controlling and directive
power, the head and brain; and “situated” implies the functioning of
such power at a particular place with some degree of permanence.

In Narottam & Pereira Ltd. (23 ITR 454),
the Bombay High Court held that Control of a business does not
necessarily mean the carrying on of the business, and therefore, the
place where trading activities or physical operations are carried on is
not necessarily the place of control and Management. The High Court
disregarded the presence of strong manager overseas in favour of
controlling directors being situated in India. It was held that the
direction, management and control, ‘the head, seat and directing power’
of a company’s affair is situated at the place where the directors’
meetings are held and consequently, a company would be resident in India
if the meetings of directors who manage and control the business are
held in India.

In the case of Radha Rani Holdings (P) Ltd. [2007] 16 SOT 495 (Del),
it is provided that the situs of the Board of Directors of the company
and the place where the Board actually meets for the purpose of
determination of the key issues relating to the company, would be
relevant in determining the place of control and management of a
company1.

The meaning of the expression ‘control and management’
as used in section 6(3) (ii) of the Act was the subject matter of
judicial interpretation in the past. The legal position is well-settled
that the expression “control and management” means the place where the
‘head and brain’ of the company is situated and not the place where the
day-today business is conducted.

Professor Klaus Vogel, in his treatise, has observed that what is decisive is not the place where the management directives
take effect, but rather the place where they are given (Klaus Vogel on
Double Taxation Conventions, 3rd Edition, Para 105 on page 262). Thus,
it is “planning” and not “execution” which is decisive.

Finance Act – 2015 and Explanatory Memorandum on POEM

In
order to protect its tax base and to align provisions of the Act with
the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements (DTAA s) entered into by India
with other countries, the concept of POEM was introduced vide amendment
to Section 6(3)(ii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘Act’).

According
to the amended definition, a company would be resident in India if it
is incorporated in India or its ‘place of effective management’ (POEM),
in that year, is situated in India.

POEM has been defined to
mean a place where key management and commercial decisions that are
necessary for the conduct of the business of an entity as a whole are,
in substance made.

The said amendment has significant impact
on various foreign companies incorporated by Indian MNC’s for Outbound
Investments and business operations outside India.

POEM and its Implications

Some
questions which may come to readers’ mind are (i) whether POEM is
different from the concept of C & M and if yes, how? (ii) What is
the impact of such difference? Before answering these questions, let us
analyse the definition of POEM in detail. We may compare and contrast
the concept of C & M while dissecting the definition of POEM.

POEM as defined by the Finance Act, 2015 has four limbs as follows:-

  • Key Managerial and Commercial decisions
  • Necessary for the Conduct of Business
  • Of an entity as a whole
  • in substance made.

Important
Factors relevant to POEM in India 1) Place where Board Meetings are
held O ne of the primary factors which may lead to effective management
rests with the place where the board meetings are held. Key Managerial
and Commercial Decisions are always meant to be understood as strategic
ones taken by the highest authority of the company. The Board of every
company is considered to be the head and brain of the company. However,
mere holding of board meetings might not hold ground if decisions are
made/taken at some other place. C & M Many courts have ruled that
one of the most important factors to determine C & M of a company is
where its head and brain i.e. Board of Directors is situated. Thus
location of board and decisions taken by them was crucial even for
determination of C & M as it is in the case of POEM.

2) Key Managerial and Commercial Decisions:-

The
intention of the legislation becomes clear from the word “key” inserted
in the definition of POEM. It implies that the decisions should be more
of strategic and should be above the day to day operational decisions.
It tries to distinguish the secretarial decisions taken at the board
meetings.

Similar was the stand in determination of C & M.

3) Operational management vs. broader top level management

The
decisions taken by the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Operating
Officer might be managerial and commercial in nature but may not always
“key” in nature. For example, procurement of goods from vendors,
inventory management, offers and discounts for increase in sales etc.
would be classified as managerial and commercial decisions but not
strategic in nature. Such decisions might not be relevant for the
determination of POEM.

However, the decisions of opening a
new branch or launching of a new product, pricing policies, expansion of
the current facilities etc. which would have significant impact on the
business and on the company as a whole might be taken by the Board or
the Top Management of the Company. Such decisions would be more relevant
in establishing POEM.

All these factors are/were relevant in the determination of C & M as well.

4) Other relevant factors

There
are other relevant factors in the determination of POEM. They are the
place where the accounting records are maintained; the Place of
incorporation of the company; the primary residence of the directors of
the company, the details of the stewardship functions by the parent
company etc. The parent company should restrict itself from actual
running of the subsidiary. The guidance or influence of the parent
company should be limited.

All these factors are/were relevant in the determination of C & M as well.

From
the above discussion, one may conclude that POEM is a fact and
circumstance specific concept and hence, all relevant facts and
circumstances must be examined on case by case basis. POEM refers to
comprehensive control over the entity as a whole during the year and is
not the same thing as a part of the control of the entity residing in
India for the whole of the year. It may be possible that a MNC has a
flat structure and shared powers or large scale autonomy in the
organisation where there could be more than one place where C & M
are situated. However, when one looks at the Company as a whole (which
is the requirement under POEM) then, one would be able to narrow down
POEM to one place/country.

OECD/UN perspective on POEM

The
OECD Model Commentary2 states that “The place of effective management
is the place where key management and commercial decisions that are
necessary for the conduct of the entity’s business are in substance
made. The place of effective management will ordinarily be the place
where the most senior person or group or persons (for example Board of
Directors) make its decisions, the place where the actions to be taken
by the entity as a whole are determined”.

According to the UN Model Commentary in determining the POEM, the relevant factors are as follows:–

(i) the place where a company is actually managed and controlled;

(ii)
the place where the decision-making at the highest level on the
important policies essential for the management of the company takes
place;

(iii) the place that plays a leading part in the management of a company from an economic and functional point of view; and

(iv) the place where the most important accounting books are kept.

To summarise, the criteria generally adopted to identify POEM are:

– Where the head and the brain is situated.
– Where defacto control is exercised and not where the formal power of control exists.
– Where top level management is situated.
– Where business operations are carried out.
– Where directors reside.
– Where the entity is incorporated
– Where shareholders make key management & commercial decisions.

Different Shades of POEM, POM and PCMC

POEM
is interpreted differently by different countries. Countries like
China, Italy, South Africa, Russia etc. have adopted the concept of POEM
in their Domestic tax laws. However, countries like The U.K.,
Australia, Germany etc. although do not have the concept of POEM but
they have adopted the concept of ‘Central Management’ and ‘Control or Place of Management
and control as residence test for companies in their Statutes. Further,
POEM has been interpreted by countries in their own ways. This
interpretation can be observed from the reservations and observations of
various countries to the OECD Commentary.

BEPS and POEM
Final
Report of OECD on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), [Action
Point 6 on “preventing the granting on treaty benefits in inappropriate
circumstances”] prefers that in case of Tie-breaker for the
determination of treaty residence of a person other than individual, be
done by the Competent Authorities of respective states.

Draft Guidelines by CBDT on POEM

The
CBDT released draft guidelines for determination of POEM of a Company
on 23rd December 2015. A brief summary of the principles enumerated in
the draft guidelines is as follows –

POEM adopts the concept of substance over form.

The Company may have more than one place of management but it can have only one POEM at any point of time.

Residential
status of a person under the Act is determined every year. Accordingly,
for the purpose of the Act, POEM must be determined on year to year
basis. The determination would be based on facts and circumstances of
each case.

The
process of determining the POEM would primarily be based on whether a
company is engaged in ‘active business’ outside India or otherwise.

For
this purpose, a company shall be said to be engaged in ‘active
business’ outside India if all of the above conditions are satisfied –

For this purpose, an average of the data of the current financial year and two years prior shall be taken into account.

POEM guidelines for companies engaged in active business outside India:

The
POEM of a company engaged in active business outside India shall be
presumed to be outside India if the majority of meetings of the
company’s Board of Directors (BOD) are held outside India.

However,
in case the Board of Directors are standing aside and not exercising
its powers of management and such powers are being exercised by the
holding company or by any other persons resident in India, the POEM
would be considered to be in India.

Issues: Indian
Guidelines provide both objective and subjective criteria. On the one
hand it provides to look at the objective criteria for operations of
business such as earnings, assets, employee base, etc. (see the diagram)
while on the other hand, it also looks at actual control &
Management by BOD. Worldwide only control & management criteria
(decision making by BOD) are used. Indian Provisions for POEM are a
departure from International practice in that sense. POEM guidelines for
companies other than those engaged in active business outside India For
companies other than those engaged in active business outside India
(i.e. passive business), determining the POEM would be a two-stage
process:

First stage would be identifying/ascertaining person or
persons who are making the key management and commercial decisions for
conducting the company’s business as a whole.

Second stage would be the place where these decisions are being made.

Thus,
the place where management decisions are taken would be more important
than the place where the decisions are implemented. Some guiding
principles for determining the POEM are as follows:

Location where the company’s Board regularly meets and makes decisions can be the POEM of the company, provided the Board:

• retains and exercises its authority to govern the company; and

• in substance, makes key management and commercial decisions necessary for the conduct of the company’s business as a whole.


However, mere holding of a formal Board meeting would not be
conclusive. If key decisions by the directors are taken at a place which
is different from the location of the Board meetings, then such place
would be relevant for POEM.

A company may delegate (either
through board resolution or by conduct) some or all authority to
executive committee consisting of key senior management. In these
situations, location of the key senior managers and the place where such
people develop policies and make decisions will be considered as POEM.

The location of the head office
will be very important in considering the POEM because it often
reflects the place where key decisions are made. The following points
need to be considered for determining the location of the head office:


The place where the company’s senior management (which may include the
Managing Director, Whole Time Director, CEO, CFO, COO, etc.) and support
staff are located and that which is considered as the company’s
principal place of business or headquarters would be considered as the
head office.

• If the company is decentralised, then the
company’s head office would be the location where senior managers are
predominantly based or normally return to, following travel to other
locations, or meet when formulating or deciding key strategies and
polices for the company as a whole.

• In cases where the senior
management participates in meetings via telephone or video conferencing,
the head office would be the location where the highest management and
their direct support staff are located.

• In cases where the
company is so decentralised that it is not possible to determine its
head office, then the same may not be considered for determining the
POEM.

• Day-to-day routine operational decisions undertaken by
junior/middle management would not be relevant for determining the POEM.

• In the present age, where physical presence is no longer
required for taking key management decisions, the place where the
majority of the directors/ persons taking the decisions usually reside
would be considered for the POEM.

• If the above guidelines do
not lead to clear identification of the POEM, then the place where the
main and substantial activity of the company is carried out or place
where accounting records of the company are kept would be considered.

POEM to be a fact-based exercise: Examples of isolated instances would not necessarily lead to POEM

Issues:
If
a MNC holds its one of the Global Board Meetings in India, where
significant decisions are taken for its worldwide operations say group
policies are framed – can it lead to POEM? Perhaps not, being isolated
or one of its kind of meetings.

Place where accounting records
are kept may be considered for determination of POEM. This may lead to a
practical problem. What if mirror accounts are kept at two places?

Merely keeping accounting records should not lead to establishment of POEM.

Passive
Income: – Trading with a group company is considered as passive income.
When Transfer Pricing Regulations are in place this kind of provision
is uncalled for.

Objective and Subjective Criteria: – Ultimately
nothing seems to be clear. Each provision is with a caveat leaving to
lot of subjectivity and powers to Assessing Officers.

Local
Management: – It is provided that place of local management may not lead
to POEM but what is ‘local management’ is not defined.

As POEM
is sought to be clarified by way of guidelines, a moot question arises
whether guidelines be binding or override the provisions of law? In
fact, it is provided in the guidelines that they are neither binding on
the Income-tax department nor on the taxpayers. In such an event, what
is the sanctity of such guidelines?

Some Silver Linings

A
foreign company being completely owned by an Indian company would not
necessarily lead to POEM in India (Example – TATA Motors owning Jaguar
PLC).

One or some of the directors of a foreign company residing in India would not necessarily lead to POEM in India.

Local management of the foreign company situated in India would not be conclusive evidence for establishing the POEM in India.

Mere
existence in India of support functions that are preparatory or
auxiliary in nature would not be conclusive evidence for establishing
the POEM in India.

Other key points of the Guidelines

Guidelines
provide that the principles enumerated in the guidelines are only for
the purpose of guidance. In such cases, no single principle will be
decisive in itself.

POEM to be a fact-based exercise – a
‘snapshot’ approach cannot be adopted and activities are to be seen over
a period of time and not at a particular time.

In case the POEM is in India as well as outside India, POEM shall be presumed to be in India if it is mainly/ predominantly in India.

Prior
approval of higher tax authorities would be required by the tax officer
in case he proposes to hold a foreign company as resident in India
based on its POEM. The taxpayer must be given the opportunity to be
heard.

Does Guidelines on POEM sound similar to CFC Rules?

POEM, a step closer to CFC rules
Various
efforts have been undertaken by the Government of India to simplify the
Income-tax law in India5. The Finance Minister Shri Arun Jaitley at the
time of scrapping the Direct Tax Code (DTC) had mentioned that there is
no need of introducing DTC. Suitable amendments to the Income-tax law
would be made for the purpose of simplification.

The erstwhile
DTC contained the ‘Controlled Foreign Corporation’ Rules (CFC rules).
CFC rules, in principle, targets the offshore entities which are used to
park income in low or NIL tax jurisdictions. Similarly, POEM too tries
to achieve a similar objective. The guidelines defining ‘active business
outside India’ and ‘passive income’ are akin to provisions or
objectives of CFC Rules. No country in the world has such conditions for
determination of POEM which tries to achieve dual purposes.

Comments on the draft POEM Guidelines

Arbitrary use of powers

POEM, as a provision in the law specifically targets the unacceptable
tax avoidance structure(s). The use of shell/conduit companies is
discouraged. Considering subjectivity involved while determining POEM,
the draft guidelines are issued to narrow down its wide scope. However,
it has been specified that the guidelines are not binding on tax
authorities nor it is binding on the taxpayers. In such a case
guidelines are infructuous. Tax payers may fear that the provisions of
POEM may be applied harshly and interpreted in the widest possible sense
in favour of revenue.

Residency assumed, unless proved otherwise?
– The draft guidelines in current form seem to suggest that it’s assumed that you are resident barring a few exceptions.
– The wide subjectivity of guidelines can hamper Indian Entrepreneurship in the long run.
– Subsidiaries of Indian MNC’s particularly wholly owned subsidiaries
outside India would be facing an uphill task of establishing that the
POEM is not in India.
– The definition of passive income seems to be very wide and hamper genuine business transactions.

Whether the guidelines would have a retrospect effect??

Considering the wide scope of POEM, it was mentioned in the Explanatory
Memorandum of the Finance Act 2015 that the guiding principles would be
followed soon. However, it is unfortunate that the guiding principles
(in a draft format) have been issued at the fag end of the Financial
Year. In such cases, a question arises that whether these principles
would be applicable with retrospective effect from 1st April, 2015? The
answer seems to be “yes” as these are merely guidelines and not the law.
There is no question of retrospective effect. In fact what guidelines
say is supposed to be followed by companies in the normal course.

Summation
For
the purpose of determining POEM, it is the de facto control and
management and not merely power to control which must be checked. In the
redefined corporate tax residency regime of the domestic tax law (in
line with international principles), place of effective management has
become one of the relevant factors for the purpose of determining
residential status of a company. In such a scenario, the company would
be deemed to be resident of the Contracting State from where it is
effectively controlled and managed. The draft guidelines leave much to
the discretion of the Income-tax Authorities. We hope that the tax au
thorities are made accountable for their actions and certain fundamental
binding principles are laid down so that unnecessary litigation is
avoided. It is expected that the final guidelines will be modified and
litigation prone issues would be addressed. It would be interesting to
see how the Government and Income-tax authorities would view or evaluate
structures of various companies going forward. Prudence suggests that
applicability must be postponed for at least one year so that
unnecessary hardships to tax payers can be avoided. Further, this would
give an opportunity for hygienic check to taxpayers for their outbound
structures.

Sales made to Diplomatic Authorities etc.

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No.VAT.1515/C.R.102/Taxation-dated 15.1.2016

The Government of Maharashtra has amended Notification issued for the grant of refund of tax collected by any registered dealer on his sales made to the diplomatic authorities or international bodies or organisations.

Amendment in Schedule A

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No.VAT.1515/CR-169/Taxation-1 dated 2.1.2016

Maharashtra Government has amended Schedule A by inserting Entry 12B to exempt drugs and medical equipments used in dialysis for treatment of patients suffering from kidney disease as may be notified from time to time by the state government in the official gazette with effect from 2.1.2016.

PUBLIC LECTURE MEETING ON DIRECT TAX PROVISIONS ON THE FINANCE BILL, 2016

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Dear Members,

The wait for most awaited economic event of the country, Union Budget 2016 will be over on 29th February, 2016. The entire country is eager to know how the “Ease of doing business” unfolds. Will the Easwar Committee recommendations be accepted? Whether there will be any guidance on the GST applicability? Will this budget bring in more transperancy and accountability? How will the “Guiding Principles” of POEM take shape?. The Indian businesses are looking forward to long term measures on policy front which provides stability on tax front and enables proper planning. They envisage substantial scalable operations with support of qualitative direction from Modi Government to capitalise on opportunities for emerging markets like India. Whether the Modi Government will go that extra mile and deliver some path breaking measures in the forthcoming Budget, is looked upon with eagerness and anxiety. The future is promising and the pace has to be provided by the Finance Minister through his ultimate accelerator, Union Budget, 2016. The country awaits to see its future…..

In its endeavour to spread the knowledge far and wide, Shri S E. Dastur, Senior Advocate, will present his masterly analysis of the Direct Tax provisions of the Finance Bill, 2016. Details are as follows:

DAY & DATE : Friday, 4th March 2016

TIME    : 6.15 p.m.

VENUE    : Yogi Sabhagruha, Shree SwaminarayanMandir, Dadar (East), Mumbai – 400014

SPEAKER    : Shri S. E. Dastur, Senior Advocate

FEES : Free for all and open to anyone interested on the subject. Seats will be available on first come first served basis.

We trust you will attend this lecture meeting along with your Colleagues, Students & Friends.

Infinite Growth in a Finite World? – Hopium Economics has given us deeply-in-debt individuals, businesses and nations

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Economic growth is a central assumption to political and economic systems. It is the mechanism relied upon for improving living standards, reducing poverty to now solving the problems of over indebted individuals, businesses and nations. All brands of politics and economics assume sustainable, strong economic growth, combined with the belief that governments and central bankers can control the economy to bring this about.

But strong growth is not normal, being a recent phenomenon over the last two centuries. Economic activity and the wealth created have increasingly relied on borrowed money and speculation. It was based upon the profligate use of mispriced natural resources such as oil, water and soil. It relied on allowing unsustainable degradation of the environment.

The human race refuses to accept that it is not possible to have infinite growth and improvement in living standards in a finite world. As author Edward Abbey warned, “Growth for the sake of growth is the ideology of a cancer cell.”

Central to the problem is the level of indebtedness. Debt accelerates consumption, as borrowed funds are used to purchase something today against the promise of paying back the money in the future. Spending that would have taken place normally over a period of years is squeezed into a relatively short period because of the availability of cheap borrowing. Business overinvests misreading demand, assuming that the exaggerated growth will continue indefinitely, increasing real asset prices and building significant overcapacity.

Around 85% of the debt incurred over the last 30-35 years funded the purchase of existing assets or consumption rather than being used for creating new businesses or productive purposes which build wealth.

Global debt now stands at around $200 trillion (over 280% of the world annual produce), an increase of $57 trillion since 2008 when high debt levels brought the world to the brink of collapse.

“Hopium” economics cannot mask the problem of excessive leverage forever. The debt will have to be repaid out of future income or proceeds of asset sales, diminishing growth or savaging investment values. If as is likely, this debt cannot be repaid, then it will be written off, resulting in an unprecedented loss of wealth for savers. Compounding the problems of debt, resources and environment are challenges of slowing rates of innovation, lower improvements in productivity, demographics, inequality and exclusion. The amount of global arable land has remained relatively constant for the last decade at 3.4 billion acres. The annual increase in global population requires water flow equivalent to Germany’s Rhine River. The frequency of extreme weather events is increasing. In a Faustian bargain, policy makers sold the future originally for present prosperity and are now reselling it for a precarious and short-lived stability. There is a striking similarity between the problems of the financial system, irreversible climate change and shortages of vital resources like oil, food and water. In each area, society borrowed from and pushed problems into the future. Short term profits were pursued at the expense of risks which were not evident immediately and that would emerge later.

Kicking the can down the road only shifts the responsibility onto others, especially future generations. By postponing the inevitable, the adjustment becomes larger and more painful.

Economic problems feed social and political discontent, opening the way for extremism. In the Great Depression the fear and disaffection of ordinary people who had lost their jobs and savings gave rise to fascism. Writing of the period, historian A. J. P. Taylor noted, “[The] middle class, everywhere the pillar of stability and respectability … was now utterly destroyed … they became resentful … violent and irresponsible … ready to follow the first demagogic saviour.”

Humanity faces this, its greatest crisis, with, in the words of biologist E. O. Wilson, “palaeolithic emotions”, “medieval institutions” and delusions about its “god-like technology”.

But a new industrial revolution is not on the horizon. It is not clear how new smartphones and connectivity that feed cheap narcissism will address the urgent problems of the world. Progress on crucial problems like improving crop yields, cheap clean energy and its storage is slow.

Many new technologies such as robotics reduce living standards as they replace or deskill most workers. Innovation enriches a few people who control or finance the technology at the expense of the vast majority of the population, entrenching and increasing inequality.

The world is remarkably unprepared for the crisis that is unfolding. During the last half-century each successive crisis has increased in severity, requiring progressively larger measures to ameliorate its effects. Over time, the policies have distorted the economy. The effectiveness of instruments has diminished.

With public finances weakened and interest rates at historic lows, there is now little room for manoeuvre. Resource constraints and environmental problems are increasingly pressing. A new crisis will be like a virulent infection attacking a body whose immune system is already compromised.

Factual debate is replaced by what comedian Stephen Colbert calls “truthiness”, things which were not true but rather things one wishes were or actually believes to be true. Any challenge to the consensus of unlimited opportunity is crushed. As Tertullian wrote, “The first reaction to truth is hatred.”

(Source:Article by Shri Satyajit Das in The Times of India dated 08-01-2016)

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 39 dated January 14, 2016

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Export of Goods and Services – Project Exports

This circular provides that: –

i) The ‘OCCI’ will now be known as ‘Project Export Promotion Council’ (PEPC).

ii) Civil construction contracts can include turnkey engineering contracts, process and engineering consultancy services and Project construction items (excluding steel & Cement) along with civil construction contracts.

The Memorandum of Instructions on Project and Service Exports (PEM) containing the above changes is enclosed with this circular.

FED Master Directions dated January 4, 2016

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On January 4, 2016 RBI has issued the following 17 Master Directions (There is no Master Direction 1 & Master Direction 11). Each Master Direction consolidates / complies various instructions issued by RBI, from time to time, with respect to the Regulations covered in the Master Directions.

RBI will continue to issue directions to Authorised Persons through A.P. (DIR Series) Circulars in regard to any change in the Regulations or the manner in which relative transactions are to be conducted and the Master Direction will also be amended suitably.

2. M aster Direction – Opening and Maintenance of Rupee/Foreign Currency Vostro Accounts of Nonresident Exchange Houses 3. M aster Direction – Money Changing Activities

4. Master Direction – Compounding of Contraventions under FEMA, 1999 5. Master Direction – External Commercial Borrowings, Trade Credit, Borrowing and Lending in Foreign Currency by Authorised Dealers and Persons other than Authorised Dealers

6. Master Direction – Borrowing and Lending transactions in Indian Rupee between Persons Resident in India and Non-Resident Indians / Persons of Indian Origin

7. M aster Direction – Liberalised Remittance Scheme (LRS)

8. M aster Direction – Other Remittance Facilities

9. M aster Direction – Insurance

10. M aster Direction – Establishment of Liaison / Branch /Project Offices in India by foreign entities

12. M aster Direction – Acquisition and Transfer of Immovable Property under Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999

13. Master Direction – Remittance of assets

14. Master Direction – Deposits and Accounts

15. Master Direction – Direct Investment by Residents in Joint Venture (JV) / Wholly Owned Subsidiary (WOS) Abroad

16. Master Direction – Export of Goods and Services

17. Master Direction – Import of Goods and Services

18. Master Direction – Reporting under Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999

19. Master Direction – Miscellaneous

Confidential Information

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Every person, whether a corporation or an individual has his own secrets and/or information which they consider to be confidential in nature. The question that arises is how does one protect such information, which may be of a commercial nature. Of course, a person may choose never to divulge or disclose his secret or confidential information and in a manner of speaking, take the information to his grave, in which case the question of the information ever being misappropriated cannot and does not arise. However, if one had to divulge or disclose the confidential information for its commercial exploitation, then the question of preventing its misappropriation would surely arise.

If the confidential information is patentable in nature then one may choose to apply for a patent and seek protection. The confidential information which makes up the invention in such a case would be published through the patent office, considering the quid pro quo for the grant of a patent is the disclosure of such confidential information/ invention. However, in lieu of the disclosure the person/ corporation would get statutory protection and a monopoly for the term of the patent.

On the other hand, there may be information which is not patentable but which is otherwise not in the public domain and which is proprietary in nature. Such information would be entitled to protection under the law relating to confidential information. The law relating to protecting confidential information is a part of common law and is based on the broad principles that “If a defendant is proved to have used confidential information, directly or indirectly obtained from the plaintiff, without the consent, express or implied, of the plaintiff, he will be guilty of an infringement of the plaintiff’s rights1 ” and that “It depends on the broad principle of equity that he who has received information in confidence shall not take unfair advantage of it. He must not make use of it to the prejudice of him who gave it without obtaining his consent.2”

A classic example of a Company deriving huge benefits out of its confidential information would be the case of Coca-Cola. The formula/recipe to the soft drink is a closely guarded secret known only to the top officials in the Company. A more local and indigenous example could be of the “Tunday Kebabs” in Lucknow. Before the brothers split a few years ago, it was believed that the recipe to their famous kebabs was known only to the male members of the family and not even revealed to the wives or daughters in the family so as to ensure the confidentiality thereof. Evidently, confidential information can be extremely valuable in certain cases. It is this very branch of law, which would in a sense be the broad basis of the non-disclosure and confidentiality agreements that are drawn up regularly, for example between two companies or between an employer and an employee.

This article is addressed towards explaining the basic concepts of the law relating to confidential information. I shall be addressing the basics of the law of confidential information such as when would the law apply, what information can be considered to be confidential, the springboard doctrine and the necessary requisites a Plaintiff must prove in an action for breach of confidence.

Confidential Information
The first and foremost aspect of the law of confidential information is that it is not restricted to cases of contractual obligations of confidentiality3. Hence, even if parties have shared confidential information with one another without entering into a formal agreement for non-disclosure or protecting confidentiality, the law would protect the disclosure of such information subject to the other requirements, explained hereinafter, being met. Hence, even if an employee was not bound by an express term of confidentiality, he would be bound by an implied duty of good faith to his employer not to use or disclose the confidential information.

At this juncture, it may be relevant to note that there is a distinction between preventing disclosure of confidential information and a clause in restraint of trade. As explained by the Bombay High Court in the case of Star India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Laxmiraj Nayak & Anr.5 , a distinction must be drawn between the confidential information imparted and the skill acquired by the employee. It cannot be said that the employee cannot be permitted to exercise his skill merely because it has been acquired by possessing a trade secret of any one. The Bombay High Court, illustrated its point by stating, inter alia, that “No hospital can prevent a heart surgeon from performing heart surgery in some other hospital by saying that the heart surgeon had acquired skill by performing heart surgeries in that hospital. It is a personal skill which the heart surgeon acquired by experience. Same is the case with the salesman who negotiates with the customer for the sale of the product of his employer. He learns from experience how to talk with different people differently and how to canvas for the sale of the product successfully. He knows the selling points of a particular product by experience. He acquires a good and sweet tongue if he is a salesman dealing with the female folks for the products required by them. He learns the art of tackling the illiterate people. He comes to know how to deal with the old and aged people. He knows the quality of his products. He knows the rates. He might perhaps also be knowing the cost of the products and the profit margin of the employer. All these factors cannot be called trade secrets.” Hence, what can be prevented by an employer is the use and disclosure of the confidential information by an employee but not the exercise of a skill by the employee.

The most important aspect, though would be as to what information can be treated as being confidential in nature. Does information become confidential merely because one entitles it as such. Is information to be treated as confidential merely because one party asserts it to be confidential. To illustrate, can Company A in a contract with Company B assert that information pertaining to the composition of its Board of Directors is confidential and cannot be divulged? To my mind, the answer to this question would be in the negative since this information would otherwise be available from a search of the records of the Registrar of Companies and would as such be in the public domain.

Thus, broadly speaking it is information which is not available in the public domain and which therefore, can be treated as being proprietary in nature that could be treated as being information which is confidential in nature. Even, at times information which is otherwise in the public domain may be treated as confidential since the maker of the document has used his brain and thus produced a result which can only be produced by somebody who goes through the same process6 .

The information must have a significant element of originality not already known in the realm of public knowledge. The originality may consist in a significant twist or slant to a well known concept. The originality may also be derived from the application of human ingenuity to well known concepts7. An example of a case where the originality of the information came from an application to a well known concept would be the “Swayamvar” case before the Delhi High Court. In that case, the Plaintiff sought to protect the idea of a TV show based on the concept of a Swayamvar. Even though the concept of a swayamvar was a well known concept and as such in the public domain, the Delhi High Court observed that “The novelty and innovation of the concept of the plaintiff resides in combining of a reality TV show with a subject like match making for the purpose of marriage. The Swayamvar quoted in Indian mythology was not a routine practice. In mythology, we have come across only two Swayamvars, one in Mahabharat where the choice was not left to the bride but on the act of chivalry to be performed by any prince and whosoever succeeded in such performance got the hand of Draupadi. Similarly, in Ramayana choice was not left to the bride but again on performance of chivalrous act by a prince who could break the mighty Dhanusha (Bow). Therefore, originality lies in the concept of plaintiff by conceiving a reality TV programme of match making and spouse selection by transposing mythological Swayamvar to give prerogative to woman to select a groom from a variety of suitors and making it presentable to audience and to explore it for commercial marketing. Therefore the very concept of matchmaking in view of concept of the plaintiff giving choice to the bride was a novel concept in original thought capable of being protected.8 ”

Hence, in each case, the confidential information would have to be identified with a degree of certainty and merely by entitling the information as confidential, the same would not become confidential. The person claiming the information to be confidential must be in a position to identify and assert how the information he claims to be confidential is in fact such information as is not available in the public domain and contains the element of originality as required in such cases.

Another facet of what information may be claimed as confidential pertains to cases where the information is partly public and partly private. In such cases also, the Courts have held that where confidential information is communicated in circumstances of confidence the obligation thus created would endure even after all the information has been published or is ascertainable by the public so as to prevent the recipient from using the communication as a spring-board9 . In Seager vs. Copydex Ltd.10 the Court, observed, inter alia, that “As I understand it, the essence of this branch of the law, whatever the origin of it may be, is that a person who has obtained information in confidence is not allowed to use it as a spring-board for activities detrimental to the person who made the confidential communication, and spring-board it remains even when all the features have been published or can be ascertained by actual inspection by any member of the public …The law does not allow the use of such information even as a spring-board for activities detrimental to the plaintiff.”

The spring board doctrine refers to the fact that the recipient of information which is partly public and partly private cannot take advantage of the private information to spring board the development of his activities. As explained by Lord Denning, when information is mixed as in partly private and partly public, then the recipient must take special care to use only the material which is in the public domain11 .

Hence, the necessity and/or importance of identifying the confidential information would be paramount. Identifying the confidential information, however, is only but one aspect of what a Plaintiff would be required to prove in a case filed for breach of confidence. As held by the Bombay High Court in the recent case of Beyond Dreams Entertainment Private Limited vs. Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited12, a Plaintiff would be required to prove three elements viz. that firstly, it must be shown that the information itself is of a confidential nature, secondly, it must be shown that it is communicated or imparted to the defendant under circumstances which cast an obligation of confidence on him. and that thirdly, it must be shown that the information shared is actually used or threatened to be used unauthorizedly by the Defendants, that is to say, without the licence of the Plaintiff. The High Court also observed that each one of these three elements had its own peculiarities and sub-elements.

Thus, in every case of breach of confidence, a Plaintiff would be required to plead and prove the aforesaid factors. A plaintiff to succeed in a case for breach of confidence would not only have to identify that the information imparted was confidential but also show that it was imparted under circumstances which implied a relationship of confidence and that there has been a threat to disclose and/or divulge such information.

Conclusion
Whilst the law on the subject is extremely vast, I hope that the above summarisation of the basic concepts of the subject, would make clear the minimum requirements that must be borne in mind whilst dealing with confidential information. The draftsman of a contract or a plaint would have to endeavour to determine whether or not there is any confidential information involved and to identify the same. It must be made clear to the recipient of the information that the information being shared is confidential in nature and cannot be divulged. It may be appreciated that it is very important to understand and identify what information is in the public domain and what information is private. It is essential that parties and/or draftsmen endeavour to identify the information which is not in the public domain and/or which cannot be arrived at without applying one’s mind. Parties must bear in mind that merely by labelling information as confidential it would not become confidential and that certain information even though not labelled confidential if given in circumstances implying confidence may be protected.

An endeavour has been made to codify the subject, by the Department of Science and Technology, by publishing a draft legislation titled the National Innovation Act of 2008, the preamble to which provides that it is, inter alia, “An Act to … codify and consolidate the law of confidentiality in aid of protecting Confidential Information, trade secrets and Innovation.” The draft legislation has however, not yet seen the light of the day and we continue to be governed by the vast amount of case law based on the common law principles of preventing breach of confidence.

Salary – Section 17(3) – A. Y. 1994-95 – Premature termination of service in terms of service rules – Payment of sum by employer to employee voluntarily with a view to bring an end to litigation – No obligation on employer to make such payment – Payment not compensation – Not profits in lieu of salary – Not liable to tax

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Arunbhai R. Naik vs. ITO; 379 ITR 511 (Guj):

The assessee was discharged from his services. Against the order of termination, he preferred an appeal to the higher authority in the company but did not succeed. In writ petition filed by the assessee the Single Judge directed reinstatement of his services. During the pendency of the appeal preferred by the employer against the order of the single judge, the assessee and the employer arrived at a settlement, in terms whereof, the amount was to be computed in the manner stated therein and was to be paid to the assessee. The assessee claimed that the amount of Rs. 3,51,308/- so received was capital receipt and was not liable to tax. The Assessing Officer did not accept the claim and the amount was added to the total income. The Tribunal held that the amount was taxable u/s. 17(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

On appeal by the assessee, the Gujarat High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The services of the assessee were terminated in terms of the service rules and the amount was paid only in terms of the settlement, without there being any obligation on the part of the employer to pay any further amount to the assessee with a view to bring an end to the litigation.

ii) There was obligation upon the employer to make such payment and, therefore, the amount would not take the character of compensation as envisaged u/s. 17(3)(i). The amount would, therefore, not fall within the ambit of the expression “profits in lieu of salary” as contemplated u/s. 17(3)(i). The Tribunal was, therefore, not justified in holding that the amount of Rs. 3,51,308 received by the appellant pursuant to the judgment of the High Court was income liable to tax u/s. 17(3) of the Act.”

References and appeals to High Court – Sections 256 and 260A – Revised monetary limit of tax effect of Rs.20 lakh in CBDT’s Circular No. 21/2015 shall apply to pending references in High Courts u/s. 256 as they apply to pending appeals u/s. 260A as the objective of the Circular would stand fulfilled on application to references u/s. 256 pending in HCs where tax effect is less than Rs.20 lakh

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CIT vs. Sunny Sounds (P.) Ltd.; [2016] 65 taxmann.com 162 (Bom):

By a Circular No. 21/2015, CBDT prescribed tax limit of Rs.20 lakh for filing appeals before the High Court and the said limit is applicable for pending appeals also. The Bombay High Court has clarified that the circular is equally applicable to the pending references. The High Court held as under:

“Revised monetary limit of tax effect of Rs.20 lakh in CBDT’s Circular No. 21/2015 shall apply to pending references in High Courts u/s. 256 as they apply to pending appeals u/s. 260A as the objective of the Circular would stand fulfilled on application to references u/s. 256 pending in HCs where tax effect is less than Rs.20 lakh. Accordingly, since tax effect less than Rs.20 lakh, instant reference application returned unanswered and question of law raised left open to be considered in an appropriate case.”

Appeal – A. Y. 2006-07 – CIT(A) can consider the claim though not made in the return or the revised return

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Principal CIT vs. Western India Shipyard Ltd.; 379 ITR 289 (Del):

For the A. Y. 2006-07, the Assessing Officer rejected the assessee’s claim made by way of a letter, during the assessment proceedings, for deduction of the bad debts written off by it on the ground that it could have only been made by way of revised return u/s. 139(5). CIT(A) accepted the claim and granted the deduction. The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) could have considered such claim even during the course of appellate proceedings otherwise than by way of a revised return, he did not examine whether, in fact, the assessee had taken such debts into consideration while computing its total income. For that purpose, the Tribunal remanded the matter to the Assessing Officer for a decision afresh.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The Tribunal was right in holding that while there was a bar on the Assessing Officer entertaining such claim without a revised return being filed by the assessee, there was no such restraint on the CIT(A) during the appellate proceedings. However, while permitting such a claim he ought to have examined whether in fact the bad debts were written off by the assessee in the first instance in the accounts and then taken into consideration while computing the income.

ii) Remand of the matter to the Assessing Officer for that purpose was, therefore, justified.”

Charitable purpose – Exemption – Sections 2(15), proviso, 11 – A. Y. 2009-10 – Object of trust to provide training to needy women in order to equip or train them in skills and make them self reliant – Nursing training provided at centre of Trust free of cost – Occasional sales or generation of funds for furthering objects but not indicative of trade, commerce or business – Proviso to section 2(15) not applicable – Trust entitled to exemption

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DIT vs. Women’s India Trust; 379 ITR 506 (Bom):

The assessee-trust formed to carry out the object of education and development of natural talents of people having special skill, more particularly women. It trained them to earn while learning. It educated them in the field of catering, stitching, toy making, etc. While giving them training, it used material brought from the open market. In the process some finished product such as pickles, jam, etc., were produced and which the assessee sold through shops, exhibitions and personal contacts. The Director of Income-tax held that the assessee has shown sales to the tune of 69,72,052/-. He accordingly held that the proviso to section 2(15) is applicable and hence the assessee was not entitled to exemption. The Tribunal found that the motive of the assessee was not the generation of profit but to provide training to needy women in order to equip or train them in these fields and make them self confident and self reliant. The Tribunal took the view that occasional sales or the trusts own fund generation were for furthering the objects but not indicative of trade, commerce or business. The proviso did not apply. The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to exemption.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Considering the fact that the trust had been set up and was functional for the past several decades and it had not deviated or departed from any of its stated objects and purpose, utilisation of the income, if at all generated, did not indicate the carrying on of any trade, commerce or business.

ii) The Tribunal’s view was to be upheld. The view was taken on an overall consideration and bearing in mind the functions and activities of the trust. In such circumstances it was not vitiated by any error of law apparent on the face of the record.”

Depreciation – Plant – Pond specifically designed for rearing/breeding of the prawns had to be treated as tools of business of the assessee and the depreciation was admissible on these ponds. Judicial Discipline – Division Bench bound by a decision of a co-ordinate Bench – In case of different view, must refer the matter to a larger Bench

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ACIT vs. Victory Aqua Farm Ltd. (2015) 379 ITR 335 (SC)

The
question of law that fell for consideration before the Supreme Court
was as to whether ‘natural pond’ which as per the assessee was specially
designed for rearing prawns would be treated as ‘plant’ within section
32 of the Act for the purposes of allowing depreciation thereon. The
Supreme Court, at the outset, noted that one Division Bench of the High
Court of Kerala in the case of the same assessee (271 ITR 528) had on
earlier occasion decided the aforesaid question in the negative holding
that it is not a ‘plant’. However, another Division Bench by the
impugned judgment dated 14.10.2014, (271 ITR 530) even after noticing
the earlier judgment, had not agreed with the earlier opinion and has
rendered contrary decision.

The Supreme Court, therefore, was
constrained to remark that the Division Bench which has given the
impugned judgment dated 14.10.2004 should have referred the matter to a
larger Bench as otherwise it was bound by the earlier judgment of the
coordinate Bench.

However, since appeals were filed against both
the judgments and the validity of the judgment rendered in the first
case was also questioned by the assessee, the Supreme Court was of the
view that it was necessary to decide these appeals on merits, rather
than remanding the case back to the High Court to be considered by a
larger Bench.

The Supreme Court noted that the assessee was a
company doing business of ‘Aqua Culture’. It grew prawns in specially
designed ponds. In the income tax returns filed by the assessee, the
assessee had claimed depreciation in respect of these ponds by raising a
plea that these prawn ponds were tools to the business of the assessee
and, therefore, they constituted ‘plant’ within the meaning of section
32 of the Act. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim of the
assessee. The two Benches of the High Court took contrary views. The
Supreme Court observed that it was not in dispute that if these ponds
were ‘plants’, then they were eligible for depreciation at the rates
applicable to plant and machinery and case would be covered by the
provisions of section 32 of the Act.

According to the Supreme
Court, it was not even necessary to deal with this aspect in detail with
reference to the various judgments, inasmuch as the Supreme Court in
Commissioner of Income Tax, Karnataka vs. Karnataka Power Corporation
[247 ITR 268] had held that the building which could not be separated
from the machinery and the machinery could not work, without such
special construction had to be treated as plant.

The Supreme
Court recorded that an attempt was made by the learned counsel for the
Revenue to the effect that the pond in question was natural and not
constructed/ specially designed by the assessee. According to the
Supreme Court, it was not so. In the judgment dated 14.10.2004 of the
High Court, which had decided in favour of the assessee, the High Court
had specifically mentioned that the prawns were grown in specially
designed ponds. Further, this very contention that these were natural
ponds had been specifically rejected as not correct. Moreover, from the
order passed by the Assessing Officer, the Supreme Court found that this
was not the reason given by the Assessing Officer to reject the claim.
Therefore, finding of fact on this aspect could not be gone into at this
stage. According to the Supreme Court, the judgment dated 14.10.2004
rightly rested this case on ‘functional test’ and since the ponds were
specially designed for rearing/breeding of the prawns, they had to be
treated as tools of the business of the assessee and the depreciation
was admissible on these ponds. The Supreme Court, therefore, decided the
question in favour of the assessee and as a consequence, appeals of the
Revenue were dismissed and that of the assessee are allowed.

Income – Accrual – As the amounts of interest earned on the share application money to the extent to which it is not required for being paid to the applicants to whom moneys have become refundable by reason of delay in making the refund will belong to the company, only when the trust (in favour of the general body of the applicants) terminates and it is only at that point of time, it can be stated that amount has accrued to the company as its income.

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CIT vs. Henkel Spic India Ltd. (2015) 379 ITR 322(SC)

The assessee, a public limited company, came out with a public issue of shares on January 29, 1992, and the issue was closed on February 3, 1992. The application money received by the company was deposited with collecting banks or the bankers of the company, to which the amounts were transferred for 46 days. The interest earned on such deposits was sought to be taxed by the Assessing Officer as income for the assessment year 1992-93. The assessee’s contention was that the application money which had been received from the applicants for the allotment of shares was required to be and was kept in a separate bank account as required by section 73(3) of the Companies Act and that the interest earned on those moneys could not have been treated as income accrued to the company even before the allotment process was completed. The allotment process was completed only in the following assessment year after receipt of approval for listing the company’s share in Madras, Delhi, Ahmedabad and Bombay Stock Exchanges such approvals having been received on April 27, 1992, May 8, 1992 and July 6, 1992 respectively.

The Assessing Officer, though he had some doubt as to when the interest was credited to the account whether before or after March 31, 1992, counted the period of 46 days from the date of deposit and on that basis, held that the amount of interest accrued for the period prior to March 31, 1992, was liable to be taxed under the head, “Income from other sources” as the assessee had not commenced business in that year.

On appeal, the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) concurred with the view of the Assessing Officer and held that the interest that had accrued on the application money which had been kept in short-term deposits belonged to the assessee and was liable to be taxed in the hands of the assessee on the basis of accrual. The Tribunal, on further appeal by the assessee, upheld the assessee’s view and set aside the orders of the Commissioner as also the Assessing Officer.

On appeal by the Revenue, the High Court held that the company is not, u/s. 73, required to keep the money in a bank account which yields interest. There is, however, no prohibition in sub-section (3) or sub-section (3A) of section 73 against the money being kept in a bank account which yields interest. The interest so earned, however, cannot be regarded as an amount which is fully available to the company for its own use from the time the interest accrued, as that interest is an amount which accrues on a fund which itself is held in trust until the allotment is completed and moneys are returned to those to whom shares are not allotted. No part of this fund, either principal or interest accrued thereon, can be utilised by the company until the allotment process is completed and money repayable to those entitled to repayment has been repaid in full together with such interest as may be prescribed having regard to the length of period of delay in the return of money to them. It is only after the allotment process is completed and all moneys payable to those to whom moneys are refundable are refunded together with interest wherever interest becomes payable, the balance remaining from and out of the interest earned on the application money can be regarded as belonging to the company. The application money as also interest earned thereon will remain within a trust in favour of the general body of the applicants until the process outlined above is completed in all respects. The prohibition contained in sub-section (3A) of section 73 against the moneys standing to the credit in a separate bank account being utilised for purposes other than those mentioned in that sub-section, is absolute and the interest earned on the amounts in such separate bank account will remain a part of that separate bank account and cannot be transferred to any other account. As the amounts of interest earned on the application money to the extent to which it is not required for being paid to the applicants to whom moneys have become refundable by reason of delay in making the refund will belong to the company only when the trust terminates and it is only at that point of time, it can be stated that amount has accrued to the company as its income.

On further appeal, the Supreme Court noted that it was not in dispute that in the year 1993-94, the assessee had shown the income on account of interest received in the income tax returns and paid the tax thereon. The Supreme Court held that there was no error in the order passed by the High Court holding that the interest income accrued only in the assessment year 1993-94 and was taxable in that year only and not in the assessment year 1992-93. The Supreme Court accordingly dismissed the appeal.

Business Income- Remission or Cessation of Trading Liability – Settlement of deferred Salestax liability by an immediate one-time payment to SICOM – Sales-tax Authorities declining to grant credit of payment made to SICOM – No remission or cessation of liability – Section 41(1) (a) not attracted.

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CIT vs. S.I. Group India Ltd. (2015) 379 ITR 326 (SC)

The assessee had an industrial unit in the district of Raigad which was a notified backward area. The Government of Maharashtra issued a package scheme of incentives in 1993 by which a scheme for the deferral of sales tax dues was announced. The assessee had during the period May 1, 1999 and March 31, 2000 collected an amount of Rs.1,79,68,846 towards sales tax. Under the scheme, the amount was payable in five annual installments commencing from April 2010 and the liability was treated as an unsecured loan in the books of account of the assessee. The State Industrial and Investment Corporation of Maharashtra Limited (SICOM) offered to the assessee an option for the settlement of the deferred sales tax liability by an immediate one-time payment. The assessee paid an amount of Rs.50,44,280 to SICOM which, according to the assessee, represented by net present value as determined by SICOM. Payment was made by the assessee to SICOM on June 26, 2000. The difference between the deferred sales tax and its present value amounting to Rs.1.29 crore was treated as a capital receipt and was credited in the books of the assessee to the capital reserve account.

The Assessing Officer in the assessment order for the assessment year 2000-01 brought the aforesaid difference of Rs.1.29 crore to tax u/s. 41(1) of the Incometax Act 1961. The appeal filed by the assessee before the Commissioner (Appeals) for 2000-01 as well as the appeal for 2001-02 came to be dismissed by the appellate authority. The Tribunal dismissed the appeals filed by the assessee for these two assessment years by a common order. The assessee then moved the Tribunal in a miscellaneous application u/s. 254 which was dismissed.

The main contention of the assessee before the High Court was that the principal requirement for the applicability of section 41 of the Act is that the assessee must obtain a benefit in respect of a trading liability by way of a remission or cessation thereof. He argued that in the present case, there was no cessation of the liability of the assessee in respect of the payment of the sales tax dues and even if there was such a cessatioin, no benefit was obtained by the assessee. This contention was supported by the fact that the issue pertaining to the sales tax liability was decided by the Sales Tax Tribunal by its judgment dated February 8, 2008, and the Tribunal had specifically upheld the decision of the assessing authorities declining to grant credit to the assessee of payment which was made to State Industrial and Investment Corporation of Maharashtra Limited (SICOM) of Maharashtra. This contention is accepted by the High Court holding that the net result of the order of the Sales Tax Tribunal dated February 8, 2008, was to uphold the decision of the assessing authority declining to grant credit of the payment made by the assessee to SICOM towards discharge of the deferred sales tax liability. As a matter of fact, on July 22, 2008, a notice of demand was issued under section 38 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act of 1959 to the assessee by the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax, Navi Mumbai in the total amount of Rs.1,33,13,555. Having regard both to the order passed by the Sales Tax Tribunal on February 8, 2008, and the notice of demand issued on July 22, 2008, it was not possible for the court to accept the contention that there was a remission or cessation of liability. Since the record before the court did not disclose that there was a remission or cessation of liability, one of the requirements spelt out for the applicability of section 41(1)(a) had not been fulfilled in the facts of the present case.

According to the Supreme Court, the aforesaid facts, clearly demonstrated that the assessee had not been granted the benefit of the said cession for the assessment years in question. According to the Supreme Court, the High Court had rightly held that one of the requirements for the applicability of section 41(1)(a) of the Act had not been fulfilled in the present case.

The Supreme Court did not find any error in the order of the High Court and the appeals were accordingly dismissed.

Carry Forward of Loss and SECTION 79

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Issue for Consideration
Any loss incurred in the case of a company in which the public are not substantially interested (“closely held company”), in any year prior to the previous year shall not be carried forward and set-off, if there is change in the persons beneficially holding shares of such company with 51% voting power. In other words, the persons holding such voting power as on the last day of the previous year in which such set off is claimed are the same as the persons in the year or years prior to the previous year in which the loss was incurred.

The limitation contained in section 79 is relaxed in cases of change in the voting power in the following cases – (a) death of the shareholder, (b) gift to any relative of the shareholder, or (c) amalgamation or demerger of a foreign holding company, subject to prescribed conditions.

The relevant part of section 79 reads as “Notwithstanding anything contained in this Chapter, where a change in shareholding has taken place in a previous year in the case of a company, not being a company in which the public are substantially interested, no loss incurred in any year prior to the previous year shall be carried forward and set-off against the income of the previous year unless- (a) on the last day of the previous year the shares of the company carrying not less than fifty-one per cent of the voting power were beneficially held by persons who beneficially held shares of the company carrying not less than fifty-one per cent of the voting power on the last day of the year or years in which the loss was incurred.”

It is common to come across cases wherein shares of a closely held company carrying 51% of voting power or more are held by another company (‘immediate holding company’), which company in turn is the subsidiary of yet another company (‘ the ultimate holding company’). An interesting controversy has recently arisen as regards application of section 79 in cases where shares with such voting power held by the immediate holding company are transferred to yet another immediate holding company of the same ultimate holding company.

Can such a change of shareholding from one subsidiary to another subsidiary company of the same holding company disentitle the closely held company from setting-off the carried forward loss, is a question that the courts have been asked to examine. While the Karnataka High Court has held that the closely held company shall be entitled to set-off the carried forward losses, the Delhi High Court has recently prohibited such set-off, ignoring its own decision in an earlier case.

AMCO Power Systems Ltd .’s case
The issue arose before the Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT vs. AMCO Power Systems Ltd. 379 ITR 375, wherein the court was asked to consider the question: “Whether the Tribunal was correct in holding that the assessee would be entitled to carry forward and setoff of business loss despite the assessee not owning 51% voting power in the company as per Section 79 of the Act by taking the beneficial share holding of M/s. Amco Properties & Investments Ltd.?”

Admittedly, up to the assessment year 2000-01, all the shares of the company Amco Power Systems Ltd. were held by AMCO Batteries Ltd.(‘ABL’). In the assessment year 2001-02, the holding of ABL was reduced to 55% and the remaining 45% shares were transferred to its subsidiary, namely AMCO Properties and Investments Limited (‘APIL’). In the assessment year 2002-03, ABL further transferred 49% of its remaining 55% shares to Tractors and Farm Equipments Limited (‘TAFE ‘) and consequently ABL retained only 6% shares, its subsidiary APIL held 45% shares and the remaining 49% shares were with TAFE . Similar shareholding continued for the assessment year 2003-04. For easy understanding, shareholdings of the company for the relevant assessment years is given in the chart below:

For the assessment year 2003-04, the company filed its return of income on 28.11.2003, wherein NIL income was shown, after setting off losses brought forward from earlier years. The return of income was processed u/s. 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the returned income was accepted on 6.2.2004. Subsequently, the case was taken up for scrutiny, and assessment u/s. 143(3) of the Act was completed. The income of the company for the year was determined at Rs.1,34,03,589/. The assessment order did not allow the set off of losses of the earlier years, by invoking section 79 of the Act.

Aggrieved by the order of assessment passed u/s. 143(3) of the Act, the company preferred an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals), inter alia, for denial of set-off of brought forward business loss, on the ground that the provisions of section 79(a) of the Act were not complied with. The Commissioner (Appeals) order confirmed that the company was not found to be entitled to set-off of the brought forward losses, considering the change in beneficial holding of 51% or more, as provided u/s. 79 of the Act.

Being aggrieved by the order of the Commissioner (Appeals), the company filed an appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, challenging the denial of the benefit of set-off of brought forward losses. The Tribunal allowed the appeal of the company, by allowing the benefit of set-off of brought forward losses. The Tribunal, in accepting the submission of the company, held that 51% of the voting power was beneficially held by ABL during the assessment years 2002-03 and 2003-04 also, and the company was thus entitled to carry forward and set-off the business losses of the previous years.

In appeal to the Karnataka High Court, the Revenue urged that, up to the assessment year 2001-02, there was no dispute that ABL continued to have 51% or more shares as its shareholding, as in that assessment year, ABL was holding 55% shares, and its subsidiary APIL was holding 45% shares. For the assessment year 2002-03, when ABL transferred 49% shares (out of its 55%) to TAFE , ABL was left with only 6% shares, meaning thereby, it was left with less than 51% shares. It was contended that, consequently, its voting power was also reduced from 55% to 6%, and the remaining 94% was divided between TAFE and APIL at 49% and 45% respectively. As a result the company was disentitled to claim carry forward and set-off of business losses in the assessment years 2002-03 and 2003-04. It was further submitted that even though APIL was a wholly owned subsidiary of ABL, both companies were separate entities, and could not be clubbed together for ascertaining the voting power. By transfer of its 49% shares to TAFE , the shareholding of ABL was reduced to 6% only. Thus, the provisions of section 79 of the Act were attracted for denial of the benefit of carry forward of losses to the company.

On behalf of the company, it was submitted that it was not the shareholding that was to be taken into consideration for application of section 79, but it was the voting power which was held by a person or persons who beneficially held shares of the company, that was material for carry forward of the losses. It was thus contended that as ABL was holding 100% shares of APIL, which was a wholly owned subsidiary of ABL, and fully controlled by ABL, even though the shareholding of ABL had been reduced to 6%, yet the voting power of ABL remained more than 51%. As such, the provisions of section 79 of the Act would not be attracted in the present case.

The Karnataka High Court noted the fact that ABL was the holding Company of APIL, which was a wholly owned subsidiary of ABL. The Board of Directors of APIL were controlled by ABL, a fact that was not disputed. The submission of the company that the shareholding pattern was distinct from voting power of a company, had force, in as much as, what was relevant for attracting section 79 was the voting power.

The High Court further noted that the purpose of section 79 of the Act was that the benefit of carry forward and setoff of business losses for previous years of a company should not be misused by any new owner, who might purchase the shares of the company, only to get the benefit of set-off of business losses of the previous years against the profits of the subsequent years after the take over. It was for such purpose, that it was provided that 51% of the voting power, which was beneficially held by a person or persons, should continue to be held for enjoyment of such benefit by the company. The court observed that though ABL might not have continued to hold 51% shares, it continued to control the voting power of APIL, and together, ABL had 51% voting power. Thereby, the control of the company remained with ABL as the change in shareholding did not result in reduction of its voting power to less than 51%. Section 79 dealt with 51% voting power, which ABL continued to have even after transfer of 49% shares to TAFE .

The Karnataka High Court noted that the Apex court, while dealing with a case u/s. 79(a) in CIT vs. Italindia Cotton Private Limited, 174 ITR 160 (SC), held that the section would be applicable only when there was a change in shareholding in the previous year, which might result in change in control of the company, and that every such change of shareholding need not fall within the prohibition against the carry forward and set-off of business losses. In the present case, the Karnataka High Court observed that though there might have been change in the shareholding in the assessment year 2002-03, yet, there was no change in control of the company, as the control remained with ABL, in view of the fact that the voting power of ABL, along with its subsidiary company APIL, remained at 51%.

The court also relied on the observation of the apex court in that case to the effect that the object of enacting section 79 appeared to be to discourage persons claiming a reduction of their tax liability on the profits earned in companies which had sustained losses in earlier years. The Karnataka High Court held that, in the case before them, the control over the company, with 51% voting power, remained with ABL. As such, the provisions of section 79 of the Act were not attracted. The court accordingly confirmed the finding of the Tribunal in this regard.

Yum Restaurants (India) Private Limited’s case
The issue came up again recently before the Delhi High Court in the case of Yum Restaurants (India) Private Limited vs. ITO in ITA No. 349 of 2015 dated 13th January, 2016 for the Assessment Year 2009-10.

The assessee, Yum Restaurants (India) Private Limited (‘Yum India’), was a part of the Yum Restaurants Group, whose 99.99% shares were held by its immediate holding company Yum Restaurants Asia Private Ltd.(‘Yum Asia’), with its ultimate holding company being Yum! Brands Inc. USA (Yum USA). 99.99% of shares of Yum India, initially held by ‘Yum Asia’, were transferred, pursuant to restructuring within the group, after 28th November 2008, to Yum Asia Franchise Pte. Ltd. Singapore (‘Yum Singapore’). The group decided to hold shares in Yum India through Yum Singapore and, therefore, the entire share holding in Yum India, was transferred from one immediate holding company, viz., Yum Asia, to another immediate holding company, Yum Singapore, although the ultimate beneficial owner of the share holding in Yum India remained the ultimate holding company viz., Yum USA.

The total income of Yum India was proposed to be assessed at Rs.40,65,40,535 in the draft order framed by the AO. In doing so, the AO, inter alia, disallowed the set off and carry forward of business losses incurred till AY 2008-09. By its order, the DRP upheld the conclusions reached by the AO and rejected Yum India’s submission as regards set off and carry forward of business losses. On the basis of the DRP’s order, the AO completed the assessment and assessed the income of Yum India.

In appeal to the ITAT , Yum India challenged the disallowance of the carry forward of business losses. By its order, the ITAT upheld the disallowances of the carry forward of business losses of earlier years. The ITAT referred to the change in immediate share holding of Yum India from Yum Asia to Yum Singapore and held that, by virtue of section 79 of the Act, since there had been a change of more than 51% of the share holding pattern of the voting powers of shares beneficially held in AY 2008- 09 of Yum India, the carry forward and set off of business losses could not be allowed.

In the appeal filed by Yum India to the Delhi High Court, the company challenged the order of the ITAT , questioning the denial of the carry forward of accumulated business losses for the past years and set off u/s. 79 of the Act.

The Delhi high court noted that the AO did not accept the contention of Yum India, that since the ultimate holding company remained Yum USA, it was the beneficial owner of the shares, notwithstanding that the shares in Yum India were held through a series of intermediary companies.; In his view, section 79 required that the shares should be beneficially held by the company carrying 51% of voting power at the close of the financial year in which the loss was suffered; the parent company of Yum India on 31st March 2008 was the equitable owner of the shares but it was not so as on 31st March 2009; accordingly, Yum India was not permitted to set off the carried forward business losses incurred till 31st March 2008.

The court also noted that, in dealing with the issue, the ITAT had in its order analysed section 79 of the Act and noted that the set off and carry forward of loss, which was otherwise available under the provisions of Chapter VI, was denied if the extent of a change in shareholding taking place in a previous year was more than 51% of the voting power of shares beneficially held on the last day of the year in which the loss was incurred. The ITAT had noted that, in the present case, there was a change of 100% of the shareholding of Yum India. Consequently, there was a change of the beneficial ownership of shares, since the predecessor company (Yum Asia) and the successor company (Yum Singapore) were distinct entities.The fact that they were subsidiaries of the ultimate holding company, Yum USA, did not mean that there was no change in the beneficial ownership. Unless the assessee was able to show that notwithstanding shares having been registered in the name of Yum Asia or Yum Singapore, the beneficial owner was Yum USA, there could not be a presumption in that behalf.

Having examined the facts as well as the concurrent orders of the AO and the ITAT , the Delhi high court found that there was indeed a change of ownership of 100% shares of Yum India from Yum Asia to Yum Singapore, both of which were distinct entities. Although they might be Associated Enterprises of Yum USA, there was nothing to show that there was any agreement or arrangement that the beneficial owner of such shares would be the holding company, Yum USA. The question of ‘piercing the veil’ at the instance of Yum India did not arise. In the circumstances, it was rightly concluded by the ITAT that in terms of section 79 of the Act, Yum India could not be permitted to set off the carried forward accumulated business losses of the earlier years.

Consequently, the Court declined to frame a question at the instance of Yum India on the issue of carry forward and set off of the business losses u/s. 79 of the Act.

Observations:
A company is required to show that there was no change in persons beneficially holding the shares with the prescribed voting power on the last day of the previous year in which the set off is desired. The key terms are; ‘beneficial holding’ and ‘ holding voting power’, none of which are defined in the Act nor in the Companies Act. The cases of fiduciary holding are the usual cases which could be safely held to be cases of beneficial holding. The scope thereof however should be extended to cases of holding through intermediaries, where the ultimate beneficiary is the final holder, who enjoys the fruits of the investment.

This principle can be applied with greater force in cases where the control and management rests with the ultimate holding company. Again ‘holding of voting power’ is a term that should permit inclusion of cases where the shares are held through intermediaries, and the final holder has the exclusive power to decide the manner of voting. If this is not holding voting power, what else could be?

Both the terms collectively indicate the significance of the control and management of the company. In a case where it is possible to establish that there has not been any change in the control and management of the company, that the control and management has remained in the same hands, the provisions of section 79 should not be applied.

The Apex court, in Italindia Cotton Private Limited’s case (supra), held that section 79 would be applicable only when there was a change in shareholding in the previous year which might result in change of control of the company, and that every change of shareholding need not fall within the prohibition against the carry forward and set-off of business losses. The findings of the Apex court have been applied favourably by the Karnataka High Court in AMCO’s case (supra) to hold that, though there might have been a change in the shareholding in the assessment year 2002-03, yet, there was no change of control of the company., The control remained with ABL in view of the fact that the voting power of ABL, along with its subsidiary company APIL, remained at 51%. It is this reasoning that was perhaps missed in the case of Yum India (supra).

In another similar case, Indrama (Investments) Pvt. Ltd., (‘IIPL’) a company held 98% of the shares of one Select Holiday Resorts Private Ltd.(‘SHRPL’) and the balance shares of SHRPL were held by four individuals, who inter alia held 100% shares of IIPL. On merger of IIPL into SHRPL, the shares held by IIPL stood cancelled and the four individuals became 100% shareholders of SHRPL. The claim of the set off of carried forward of loss of prior years by SHRPL was rejected by the AO for assessment years 2004-05 and 2005-06, by application of section 79, holding that there was a change of shareholders holding 51% voting power.

The appeal of SHRPL was allowed by the Commissioner(Appeals) and his order was upheld by the ITAT in ITA No. 1184&2460?Del./2008 dt. 23.12.2010 in the case of DCIT vs. Select Holiday Resorts Private Ltd. The appeal of the Income tax Department to the Delhi High Court was dismissed by the court, reported in 217 Taxman 110. The Special Leave Petition of the Income tax Department was rejected by the Supreme Court. The high court, in this case, equated the case of transfer of shares on a merger, with that of the transmission of shares to the legal heir on death, to hold that there was no change of voting power for attracting provisions of section 79 to enable the AO to deny the set off of the carried forward losses.

The ratio of the decision of the court in SHRPL was not brought to the attention of the ITAT as also of the high court in Yum Restaurant’s case. Also the findings of the Karnataka high court in AMCO’s case(supra) were not brought on record. We are sure that had the judicial development on the subject been brought to the attention of the Delhi High Court in the case of Yum Restaurants (supra), the outcome would have been different.

Section 79 has been amended by the Finance Act, 1988 by the insertion of the first Proviso, that excludes cases of change in shareholding consequent to death or gift. The scope of the amendment has been explained by Cir. No. 528 dated 16.12.1988 and in particular by paragraph 26.3. The CBDT clarifies that the objective behind the amendment is to save the genuine cases of change from the hardships of section 79 of the Act. Kindly see Circular No. 576 dated 31.08.1990. The section has been further amended by the Finance Act, 1999, by insertion of the second Proviso to provide for exclusion of cases involving change in shareholding of an Indian subsidiary on account of amalgamation or demerger of a foreign company – again to save genuine cases of change from hardship of section 79 of the Act.

Clause(b) of section 79(now deleted) provided for nonapplication of section 79 in cases where the change was not effected to avoid payment of taxes or for reduction of taxes. The objectives behind introduction of section 79 and the development in law thereon, as also the amendments made therein from time to time, clearly show that the right to set off of carried forward losses of prior years should not be denied in genuine cases. Kindly see CIT vs. Italindia Cotton Private Limited, 174 ITR 160 (SC), where the court observed to the effect that, the object of enacting section 79 appeared to be to discourage persons claiming a reduction of their tax liability, on the profits earned in companies after take over, which had sustained losses in earlier years.

The Delhi High Court, in Yum India’s case(supra), importantly observed that the company had failed to show that there was any agreement or arrangement that the beneficial owner of such shares would be the holding company, Yum USA. In our opinion, the situation otherwise could have been salvaged, had the company produced evidence to demonstrate that the beneficial owner of shares was Yum USA.

It may not be proper, in our considered opinion, to be swayed by the status of the subsidiaries for taxation of the dividend or other income. It would well be perfectly harmonious to hold the immediate holding company liable for taxation and, at the same time, to look through it for the purposes of section 79, right up to the ultimate holding company. Such an approach would not defeat the purposes of the Act but would serve the cause of the scheme of taxation.

Income characterisation on sale of tax-free bonds

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Taxation in India existed since ancient times. It was a ‘duty’ paid to
the rulers. The incidence and rules of tax have changed. A peep into the
Indian history reveals that income was formally made a subject matter
of tax by Sir James Wilson in 1860. Over these years, the legislation
has been grappling with the ever-evolving concept of income. One of the
biggest ironies of income-tax statute today is its inability to define
‘income’. The reason is its dynamic characterisation.Levy and quantum of
tax in India depends on the genre of income. It is thus critical to
reckon the characterisation of income to impose the appropriate levy.
This exercise of characterising has only become complex with the
evolution of business. A recent addition to this complexity has been
introduction of Income Computation and Disclosure Standards (“ICDS”).

The
objective of introducing ICDS (previously styled as Tax Accounting
Standards) was (i) reduction of litigation; minimization of alternatives
and giving certainty to issues. The prescribed standards (in the form
they are currently) could have far reaching ramifications. It needs to
be closely examined if they have achieved the core objectives with which
they were introduced or are in the process of drifting away into a new
quagmire of controversies. A discussion is inevitable important to have a
firm ground to pitch in the newness that ICDS seeks to inject. This
write-up initiates a discussion on one such instance which interalia
finds no clarity or certainty under the ICDS regime:

An
assessee holds certain tax free bonds. These bonds are sold before the
record date for payment of interest. The question is whether the
difference between the sale price and the purchase price is to be
treated as capital gain or to be segregated into capital gain and
interest accrued till the date of sale? In other words, whether interest
accrues only on the record date or accrues throughout the year?

The
question under consideration is the ‘characterisation of receipt’ on
sale of the bonds before the record date. Whether such receipts in
excess of the purchase price is wholly chargeable to tax as ‘capital
gains’ or should it be apportioned between ‘capital gains’ and ‘tax free
interest income’? A corollary question which crops up is whether such
tax-free interest accrues only on the record date or throughout the year
on a de die in diem basis?

Section 4 of the Income-tax Act,
1961 (“the Act”) imposes a general charge. The ambit of the charge is
outlined in section 5. Section 5 encompasses not only income actually
accruing in India, but also income deemed to accrue in India. ‘Accrual’
as a legal concept refers to the right to receive. It represents a
situation where the relationship of a debtor and creditor emerges.
Section 5 focuses on ‘accrual of income’, but does not outline the
timing of such accrual. Initially, accrual of interest income chargeable
to tax under the head ‘Income from other sources’ is being examined.

Time of accrual of interest income:
Section 56 of the Act mandates that interest on securities is
chargeable to tax under the head ‘Income from other sources’ if not
chargeable as ‘Profits and gains from business or profession’. The term
‘securities’ is not defined in the section. One may possibly borrow the
meaning of ‘securities’ from The Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act,
1956 (“SCRA”). SCRA defines securities to include bonds. Accordingly,
interest on tax free bonds is enveloped within the provisions of section
56. Section 56 (although a charging section) does not provide for time
of accrual of interest income.

Section 145 of the Act requires
that income ‘chargeable’ under the head “Profits and gains from business
or profession” and “Income from other sources” be computed as per the
cash or mercantile system of accounting regularly employed by the
assessee. Section 145(2) empowers the Central Government to notify
Income Computation and Disclosure Standards (“ICDS” for brevity) to be
followed by any class of assessees or in respect of any class of income.
The Central Government has currently notified 10 ICDS(s) vide
Notification No. 32/2015 dated 31.3.2015. These standards are to be
followed in computing the income where the ‘mercantile system’ of
accounting is adopted.

On traversing through the various
ICDS(s), two standards may be relevant in the present context – namely,
ICDS I & IV. The following paragraphs discuss the impact of these
standards on the issue under consideration:

ICDS I [Accounting policies] deals
with three accounting assumptions. The third accounting assumption is
that revenues and costs accrue as they are earned or incurred and
recorded in the previous year to which they relate. Incomes are said to
accrue under the ICDS when they are ‘earned’ and ‘recorded’ in the
previous year to which they relate. The cumulation of ‘earning’ and
‘recording’ of income connote accrual under ICDS.

Accrual as
understood u/s. 5 means a “right to receive” in favour of the assessee.
It is indicative of payer’s acknowledgement of a debt in favour of the
assessee. The question is whether ‘accrual’ u/s. 5 as hitherto
understood, is now to undergo changes in the light of the definition of
the said term under ICDS.

Lack of clarity in ICDS I:
Applying the ICDS definition, interest income accrues when it is earned
and recorded in the previous year. The Standard neither clarifies the
connotation of the term ‘earn’ nor does it specify the time and place of
recording the interest. “Earn” as per the Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary means – “Receive or be entitled to in return for work done or
services rendered, obtain or deserve in return for efforts or merit”.
Earning is a phenomenon of the commercial world. It is depictive of an
event warranting a reflection in the financial statements. Accrual in a
legal sense traverses a little further. The earning of an income has to
translate/transform into a right to receive. An earning of income is the
cause of its accrual. Earning therefore precedes accrual. A lag is thus
conceivable between the two caused by time or other factors. ICDS in
attempting to equate the two is trying to blur the difference. The
attempt may not achieve its purpose as the definition (of accrual) is in
the realm of accounting and not in the sphere of section 5.

Even
otherwise, earning of income can be said to occur – (i) at the time of
investment; (ii) on a de die diem basis; or (iii) specific record dates
given in the instruments. As regards recording, a further question could
be, should the recording be done in – books of accounts or return of
income. Recording is generally referred to in relation to books of
account. If this were to be the inference, what about those assessees
who do not maintain books of account but earn interest? Throughout the
notification [notification no. 32/2015], it is clarified that ICDS does
not apply for the purposes of maintenance of books of accounts, although
the standard applies only to those who adopt the mercantile basis of
accounting. Interestingly therefore, it is arguable that ICDS would not
apply unless the mercantile basis of accounting is adopted. If no
accounting is employed, as books are not maintained, ICDS may not apply.
Although income is offered for tax on accrual basis, being one of the
parameters of section 5.

Ambiguity in ICDS I enhanced by the
language in ICDS IV: ICDS IV [on revenue recognition] provides revenue
recognition mechanism for sale of goods; provision of services and use
of resources by others yielding interest, royalty or dividends. Para 7
of the Standard deals with interest income. It reads as under:

“7.
Interest shall accrue on the time basis determined by the amount
outstanding and the rate applicable. Discount or premium on debt
securities held is treated as though it were accruing over the period to
maturity.”

The Standard specifies that interest shall accrue on
‘time basis’. Accrual of income under ICDS I refers to culmination of
earning and recording. Under ICDS IV, interest as one of the streams of
income, accrues on ‘time basis’. Time basis under ICDS IV is said to
satisfy the criteria of ‘earning’ and ‘recording’. The import of the
expression ‘time basis’ is however not clarified. Interest is inherently
a product of ‘time’. There cannot be any dispute about the involvement
of ‘time factor’ in quantification and claim to receive interest. The
Standard merely states that accrual of interest happens on time basis.
It is not clarified whether time based accrual means (i) an
‘on-going/real time’ accrual or (ii) an accrual based on the ‘specific
timing’ prescribed by the concerned instrument. Both these are offshoots
of time basis. The Standard does not pinpoint the mechanism of
determining the time of accrual. The latter portion of paragraph (7)
explicitly mentions that discount or premium on debt securities accrue
over the period of maturity. It is not a single point accrual. Such
clarity is conspicuously missing in the first portion of the para
dealing with interest income.

Role of Accounting Standards in ICDS interpretation: One
may observe that the language employed in all the notified ICDS is
largely influenced by the Accounting Standards. ICDS IV owes its genesis
to AS 9 [Revenue recognition]. Para 8.2 of the AS 9 mirrors para 7 of
ICDS IV. Para 13 of AS 9 reads as follows:
“13. Revenue arising from
the use of others of enterprise resources yielding interest, royalties
and dividends should only be recognised when no significant uncertainty
as to measurability or collectability exists. These revenues are
recognised on the following bases:
(i) Interest: on a time proportion basis taking into account the amount outstanding and the rate applicable.”

The
aforesaid AS deals with recognition on ‘time proportion basis’. The use
of the term ‘proportion’ in this expression is indicative of the
concept of recognising ‘part or share’ of income or part of a year.
Interest under the AS has thus been viewed to be a time based
phenomenon. The interest is thus mandated to be recognised on a spread
out basis. It is not on one specific date. However, ICDS IV does not
employ the term ‘proportion’. One could therefore believe that the
understanding in AS 9 cannot be imported into ICDS. The conspicuous
absence of ‘proportion’ in ICDS paves way for an interpretation which is
different from that of AS 9. The expression ‘time basis’ employed in
ICDS IV definitely appears to deviate from AS 9 theory of
proportionality. Thus, if interest is to be paid on specific dates,
‘time basis’ could mean accrued on those specific dates. Whereas ‘time
proportion basis’ would have meant accrual upto the year end at least,
if such date happens to be an intervening event between the specified
dates.

“Tax accounting” should not essentially be different from
commercial accounting. Tax accounting recognises and accepts commercial
accounting if it is consistent and statute compliant. Income recognised
as per such commercial accounting is the base from which the taxable
income is determined. Tax laws incorporate specific rules that cause a
sway from commercial accounting in determining the taxable income. This
disparity is caused by the different purposes of commercial accounting
and taxation; difficulties in precise incorporating economic concepts in
tax laws, etc. To reiterate, one of the issues where commercial
accounting may not synchronise with tax principles is “accrual of
income”.

The Guidance Note issued by ICAI on ‘Terms Used in
Financial Statements’ defines accrual and accrual basis of accounting as
under:

“1.05 Accrual
Recognition of revenues and
costs as they are earned or incurred (and not as money is received or
paid). It includes recognition of transactions relating to assets and
liabilities as they occur irrespective of the actual receipts or
payments.

1.06 Accrual Basis of Accounting
The method
of recording transactions by which revenues, costs, assets and
liabilities are reflected in the accounts in the period in which they
accrue. The ‘accrual basis of accounting’ includes considerations
relating to deferrals, allocations, depreciation and amortisation. This
basis is also referred to as mercantile basis of accounting.”

The
accounting definition of accrual and the definition provided by the
ICDS I is similar. The Guidance note on the “Terms used in financial
statements” explains that accrual basis of accounting may involve
deferral, allocation or non-cash deductions (such as depreciation/
amortisation).

For the reasons already detailed earlier, accrual
for tax purposes is different. This could be better appreciated on a
consideration of ICDS III which deals with Percentage of Completion
Method. Under this method, revenue is matched with the contract costs
incurred in reaching the stage of completion. This results in
recognising income attributable to the proportion of work completed
having satisfied the test of ‘earning’ and hence accrual from an
accounting perspective. Such accounting accrual may not satisfy the tax
concept of accrual which connotes a right to receive. Accounting accrual
is driven more by matching principles. Such a method cannot however
alter the meaning of accrual as understood in the context of section 5.
Judiciary, at various fora, has explained the meaning of the term
‘accrual’ in context of section 5. It may be relevant to quote two among
those several judgments on this matter:

(a) The Apex Court in
the case of E.D. Sassoon & Co. Ltd. vs. CIT (1954) 26 ITR 27 (SC)
discussed the concepts of ‘accrual’, ‘arisal’ and ‘receipt’. The
relevant observations are as under:

“’Accrues’, ‘arises’ and
‘is received’ are three distinct terms. So far as receiving of income is
concerned there can be no difficulty; it conveys a clear and definite
meaning, and I can think of no expression which makes its meaning
plainer than the word ‘receiving’ itself. The words ‘accrue’ and ‘arise’
also are not defined in the Act. The ordinary dictionary meanings of
these words have got to be taken as the meanings attaching to them.
‘Accruing’ is synonymous with ‘arising’ in the sense of springing as a
natural growth or result. The three expressions ‘accrues’, ‘arises’ and
‘is received’ having been used in the section, strictly speaking
accrues’ should not be taken as synonymous with ‘arises’ but in the
distinct sense of growing up by way of addition or increase or as an
accession or advantage; while the word ‘arises’ means comes into
existence or notice or presents itself. The former connotes the idea
of a growth or accumulation and the latter of the growth or accumulation
with a tangible shape so as to be receivable
. It is difficult to
say that this distinction has been throughout maintained in the Act and
perhaps the two words seem to denote the same idea or ideas very
similar, and the difference only lies in this that one is more
appropriate than the other when applied to particular cases. It is
clear, however, as pointed out by Fry, L.J., in Colquhoun vs. Brooks
[1888] 21 Q.B.D. 52 at 59 [this part of the decision not having been
affected by the reversal of the decision by the Houses of Lords [1889]
14 App. Cas. 493] that both the words are used in contradistinction to
the word ‘receive’ and indicate a right to receive. They represent a
state anterior to the point of time when the income becomes receivable
and connote a character of the income which is more or less inchoate”

(b) The Apex Court in CIT vs. Excel Industries Limited (2013) 358 ITR 295 (SC) observed:

“19.
This Court further held, and in our opinion more importantly, that
income accrues when there “arises a corresponding liability of the other
party from whom the income becomes due to pay that amount.”

Thus,
judicially ‘accrual’ has been defined to mean enforcement of a right to
receive (from recipient standpoint) with a corresponding obligation to
pay (from payer’s perspective). It has the attribute of accumulation
inherent in it and a growth sufficient to assume a taxable form. It
denotes that the payer of the sums is a debtor. Interestingly, the
position in a construction contract is just the reverse, with the
contractor denoting the sums received as a liability in his books and
hence acknowledging himself to be debtor – a position contrary to what
the tax law demands for accrual.

Supremacy of section 5:
Section 5 outlines the scope of total income. It encompasses income
within its fold on the basis of accrual, arisal or receipt subject to
the residential status of the assessee and locale of income. Thus,
accrual, arisal and receipt form the basis for taxing incomes. This
canon of taxation is sacrosanct and has to be strictly adhered to. ICDS
owes its genesis from a notification which springs out of section 145.
It does not in any manner trespass the supremacy of section 5. It is
pellucid that the scope of the term ‘accrual’ in the context of section 5
remains sacrosanct and immune to ICDS. The definition of ‘accrual’ in
ICDS is the same as the definition housed in Accounting Standard I
issued u/s. 145(2).

This definition of AS 1 u/s. 145(2) has been
in existence from 1996. The presence of such definition, was not
understood to alter the understanding of section 5. The section should
not be different under the ICDS regime. The definition at best has a say
in accounting.

In such setting, ICDS should not in any manner
influence or affect the point of accrual in case of interest income. The
existing understanding of the term ‘accrual’ in the context of section 5
should hold good. The contours of our existing understanding of the
expression ‘accrual’ should be held as steadfast.

Point of accrual of interest income: The
point of accrual of interest income has been addressed by judicial
precedents. The dictum of the Courts does not appear to be unanimous.
The variety in the judgments is captured below:

(a) Interest on securities would be taxable on specified dates when it becomes due and not on accrual basis

In DIT vs. Credit Suisse First Boston (Cyprus) Ltd. 351 ITR 323 (Bombay), the Mumbai High Court observed as under:

“When
an instrument or an agreement stipulates interest to be payable at a
specified date, interest does not accrue to the holder thereof on any
date prior thereto. Interest would accrue or arise only on the date
specified in the instrument. A creditor has a vested right to receive
interest on a stated date in future does not constitute an accrual of
the interest to him on any prior date. Where an instrument provides for
the payment of interest only on a particular date, an action filed prior
to such date would be dismissed as premature and not disclosing a cause
of action. Subject to a contract to the contrary, a debtor is not bound
to pay interest on a date earlier to the one stipulated in the
agreement / instrument. In the present case, it is admitted that
interest was not payable on any date other than that mentioned in the
security.”

(b) Interest gets accrued normally on a day to
day basis, but when there is no due date fixed for payment of interest,
it accrues on the last day of the previous year.

In CIT vs.
Hindustan Motors Ltd. (1993) 202 ITR 839 (Calcutta), the
assessee-company did not charge interest for the relevant previous year
on the amount due to it by its 100% subsidiary. It was explained that
owing to difficult financial position of the subsidiary company, the
board of directors decided not to charge interest in order to enable the
subsidiary to tide over the financial crisis. The Revenue authorities
held that interest accrued on day to day basis whereas the decision not
to charge interest was taken by the assessee-company after the end of
the relevant accounting year, i.e., long after the accrual of interest.
In this context, the Calcutta High Court observed as under:

“In
our view, the income by way of interest on the facts and circumstances
of this case had already accrued from day to day and, in any event, on
31-3-1971, being the last day of the previous year relevant to the
assessment year 1971-72. Therefore, the passing of resolutions
subsequently on 10-5-1971, and/ or on 21-8-1971, in the meeting of board
of directors of the assessee- company is of no effect.”

(c) Interest accrues de die in diem [daily]

The Apex Court in the case of Rama Bai vs. CIT (1990) 181 ITR 400 (SC)

“…we
may clarify, is that the interest cannot be taken to have accrued on
the date of the order of the Court granting enhanced compensation but
has to be taken as having accrued year after year from the date of
delivery of possession of the lands till the date of such order.”

The
accrual of interest on de die in diem basis has been approved by CIT
vs. MKKR Muthukaruppan Chettiar (1984) 145 ITR 175 (Mad).

Apart
from these schools of thought, various circulars have propounded the
proposition that interest income must be offered to tax on an annual
basis. Some of such circulars are as under (although not in the context
of tax free bonds):

(a) Circular no. 243 dated 22.6.1978

Whether
interest earned on principal amount of deposits under reinvestment
deposit/recurring deposit schemes, can be said to have accrued annually
and, if so, whether depositor is entitled to claim benefit of deduction
in respect of interest which has accrued

1…..

2..

3.
The question for consideration is whether the interest at the
stipulated rate earned on the principal amount, can be said to have
accrued annually and if so whether a depositor is entitled to claim the
benefit of deduction, u/s. 80L, in respect of such interest which has
accrued.

4. Government has decided that interest for each
year calculated at the stipulated rate will be taxed as income accrued
in that year. The benefit of deduction u/s. 80L will be available on
such interest.

This was a concessional circular to help
assessees avail the benefit of section 80L over the years. The circular
does not provide any definitive timing of accrual. As evident in para 4,
the timing of taxation was a ‘decision’ of the Government and not the
enunciation of any principle.

(b) Circular no. 371 dated 21.11.1983

Interest on cumulative deposit scheme of Government undertakings – Whether should be taxed on accrual basis annually
1.
The issue regarding taxability of interest on cumulative deposit scheme
announced by Government undertakings has been considered by the Board.
The point for consideration is whether interest on cumulative deposit
scheme would be taxable on accrual basis for each year during which the
deposit is made or on receipt basis in the year of receiving the total
interest.

2. The Central Government has decided that the
interest on cumulative deposit schemes of Government undertakings should
be taxed on accrual basis annually.

3. The Government
undertakings will intimate the accrued interest to the depositors so as
to enable them to disclose it in their returns of income filed before
the income-tax authorities.

This circular also provides for
annual accretion of interest. Accrual does not await the due or maturity
date. The above convey a ‘decision’ of the Government. It does not
enunciate a principle of law.

(c) Circular no. 409 dated 12.2.1985

Interest on cumulative deposit schemes of private sector undertakings – Whether should be taxed on accrual basis annually

1.
The issue regarding taxability of interest on cumulative deposit
schemes of the private sector undertakings has been considered by the
Board. The point for consideration is whether interest on cumulative
deposit schemes would be taxable on accrual basis for each year during
which the deposit is made or on receipt basis in the year of receiving
the total interest.

2. The Central Government has decided that
interest on cumulative deposit schemes of private sector undertakings
should be taxed on accrual basis annually.

3. The private sector
undertakings will intimate the individual depositors about the accrued
interest so as to enable them to disclose it in their returns of income
filed before the income-tax authorities.

(d) Circular 3 dated 2.3.2010 [relevant extracts]

“In
case of banks using CBS software, interest payable on time deposits is
calculated generally on daily basis or monthly basis and is swept &
parked accordingly in the provisioning account for the purposes of
macro-monitoring only. However, constructive credit is given to the
depositor’s/ payee’s account either at the end of the financial year or
at periodic intervals as per practice of the bank or as per the
depositor’s/payee’s requirement or on maturity or on encashment of time
deposits; whichever is earlier.

4. In view of the above
position, it is clarified that since no constructive credit to the
depositor’s/ payee’s account takes place while calculating interest on
time deposits on daily or monthly basis in the CBS software used by
banks, tax need not be deducted at source on such provisioning of
interest by banks for the purposes of macro monitoring only. In such
cases, tax shall be deducted at source on accrual of interest at the
end of financial year or at periodic intervals as per practice of the
bank or as per the depositor’s/payee’s requirement or on maturity or on
encashment of time deposits; whichever event takes place earlier;

whenever the aggregate of amounts of interest income credited or paid or
likely to be credited or paid during the financial year by the banks
exceeds the limits specified in section 194A.

The circular
states that there could be multiple point of accrual for interest
incomes. It seeks to fasten tax withholding at the earliest point in
time.

Thus, the issue of time of accrual has received varied
interpretation on the basis of source of interest (vide a decree,
compensation, investment, etc.), terms of interest (whether payable on a
specific due date or otherwise), legal obligation and surrounding
circumstances. The alternatives discussed above can be captured in the
flowchart below:

Based on the alternatives outlined above, it is
to be examined whether interest accrues on the date of sale of bonds.
The question is whether timing of accrual (of interest) has a bearing on
the characterisation of receipts from sale of bonds. The impact can be
understood under the twin possibilities envisaged in the above diagram
as discussed below:

*
This principle may not apply in the present context since generally
interest is payable either on the stipulated dates or on withdrawal/
maturity. The case on hand contemplates a sale of instrument. The terms
of the bond may not permit interest receipt upto the date of transfer of
bonds

(a) If interest is payable on specific dates:

When
interest payable on specific due dates, the accrual of income concurs
with such dates (for the reasons already detailed earlier). If the due
date falls prior to the sale, the interest accrues in the hands of the
seller. If it is subsequent to the date of sale, the interest accrues in
the hands of buyer. The accrual of interest is distinct from sale of
bonds and the consideration involved therein.

Tax free bonds are
‘capital assets’ for the investor (assuming that the concerned assessee
is not in the business of investment in bonds). Sale of such capital
asset should culminate in capital gains or loss. There is no interest
receipt from the third party buyer as there is no debt due by the buyer
to the seller. The third party buyer of bonds is under no obligation to
pay ‘interest’. The liability to pay interest lies with the company
issuing the bonds. The diagram below explains the flow of transaction.

(b) If the interest is not payable on specific dates:

As
mentioned earlier, interest may not be received upto the date of
transfer of bonds. The receipt in such situations could be on maturity
if not on specific dates. The receipt of interest would be by the buyer
(on maturity) or specific dates. Interest accumulates, but does not
become ‘due’ and ‘payable/receiveable’ till the appointed date. The
seller thus parts away with the bonds and the legal right to receive
interest. Correspondingly, the payment made by the buyer is towards the
principal and interest element inbuilt in the bond. The question in such
an eventuality is whether the consideration receivable by the seller on
sale of bonds:

(a) Should be wholly considered as full value of consideration for sale of bonds [taxable as capital gains]; or

(b)
Should the consideration be split into consideration for sale [as
capital gains] and interest income [as other sources income].

As
mentioned earlier, tax free bonds are capital assets. Consideration on
transfer of bonds would ordinarily result in capital gains. Even if the
sale is made on ‘cum interest’ basis, one could still argue that the
amount received would constitute full value of consideration towards
transfer. Although the price paid by the third party may factor in the
interest component, the amount paid is towards ‘value’ of the bond. It
is not interest payment.

Accumulation of interest would step-up
the sale consideration. It does not alter the characterization of income
from capital gains to interest. At best, one could split the
consideration between ‘purchase price’ (of the bond) and ‘right to
receive interest’ (assuming interest component is factored in the
price). In which case, it would be sale of two separate capital assets
or an asset (tax bonds) along with congeries of rights associated
therewith.

It may be relevant to quote the observation of the
Mumbai High Court in the case of DIT vs. Credit Suisse First Boston
(Cyprus) Ltd. (referred above) wherein the Court observed:

“12.
The appellant’s submission ignores the fact that such securities or
agreements do not regulate the price at which the holder is to sell the
same to a third party. The holder is at liberty to sell the same at any
price. The interest component for the broken period i.e. the period
prior to the due date for interest is only one of the factors that may
determine the sale price of the security. There are a myriad other
factors, both personal as well as market driven, that can be and, in
fact, are bound to be taken into consideration in such transactions. For
instance, a person may well sell the securities at a reduced price in
the event of a liquidity crisis or a slow down in the market and/or if
he is in dire need of funds for any reason whatsoever. Market forces
also play a significant part.

For instance, if the rate of
interest is expected to rise, the securities may well be sold at a
discount and conversely if the interest rates are expected to fall, the
securities may well earn a premium. This, in turn, would also depend
upon the period of validity of the security and various other factors
such as the financial position and commercial reputation of the debtor.

13.
The appellant’s contention is also based on the erroneous presumption
that what is paid for is the face value of the security and the interest
to be paid for the broken period from the last date of payment of
interest till the date of purchase. What, in fact, is purchased is the
possibility of recovering interest on the date stipulated in the
security. It is not unknown for issuers of securities, debentures and
bonds, to default in payment of interest as well as the principal. The
purchaser therefore hopes that on the due date he will receive the
interest and the principal. The purchaser therefore, purchases merely
the possibility of recovery of such interest and not the interest per
se. It would be pointless to even suggest that in the case of Government
securities, the possibility of a default cannot arise. The
interpretation of law does not depend upon the solvency of the debtor or
the degree of probability of the debts being discharged. Indeed the
solvency, reputation and the degree of probability of recovering the
interest are also factors which would go into determining the price at
which such securities are bought and sold. There is nothing in the Act
or in the DTAA, to which we will shortly refer that warrants the
position in law being determined on the basis of such factors viz. the
degree of probability of the particular issuer of the security, bond or
debenture or such instruments, honouring the same.”

Based on
the above, one can conclude that excess of receipt on sale of bonds
over their costs should be categorised as ‘capital gains or loss’. The
splitting of consideration into two heads of income (with interest
falling under Income from other sources) is not a natural phenomenon. It
should be done when statutorily provided for. The law has specifically
provided for such split mechanism wherever deemed necessary. For
instance, circular 2 of 2002 explains tax treatment of deep discount
bonds. It provides that such bonds should be valued as on the 31st March
of each Financial Year (as per RBI guidelines).

The difference
between the market valuations as on two successive valuation dates will
represent the accretion to the value of the bond during the relevant
financial year and will be taxable as interest income (where the bonds
are held as investments) or business income (where the bonds are held as
trading assets). Where the bond is transferred at any time before the
maturity date, the difference between the sale price and the cost of the
bond will be taxable as capital gains in the hands of an investor or as
business income in the hands of a trader. For computing such gains, the
cost of the bond will be taken to be the aggregate of the cost for
which the bond was acquired by the transferor and the income, if any,
already offered to tax by such transferor (in earlier years) upto the
date of transfer. Thus, gains from such bonds, is specifically split
into interest and capital gains by a specific mechanism provided by the
circular.

Similarly, section 45(2A) [conversion of capital
assets into stock-in-trade] splits consideration into business income
and capital gains income. The statute may also provide for the reverse.
If the consideration includes more than one form of income, the statute
could conclude the whole of such consideration to be one form of income.
Further, section 56(2)(iii) [composite rent] concludes the whole of
consideration to be income from other sources although it contains
portion of rental incomes. Such ‘dissecting’ or ‘unified’ approach is
not prescribed for sale of bonds (whether sold cum-interest or
ex-interest).

The term ‘accrual’ connotes legal right to
receive. It is the enforcement of right to receive (from a recipient’s
standpoint) with a corresponding obligation to pay (from payer’s
perspective) [Refer CIT vs. Excel Industries Ltd (2013) 358 ITR 295
(SC)]. Thus, for an income to accrue, the right (of the income
recipient) and obligation (of the payer) must co-exist. Applying this
theorem in the present context, the question is whether the company
issuing bonds is under an obligation to pay interest when such bonds are
sold on ‘cum interest’ basis. Generally, interest on bonds would be
payable either on a periodic basis or on maturity. Bonds which are
issued without any terms on interest payouts are seldom in vogue. If
this proposition is accepted, then interest can be said to accrue only
on specific dates (being on periodic payout dates or maturity date). In
which case, interest always accrues to the buyer if the bonds are sold
on cum-interest basis. Consequently, consideration received on sale of
bonds would wholly constitute full value of consideration on transfer.
There is no interest element therein.

It may also be relevant to note that the definition of interest provided in the Act. Section 2(28A) defines interest as under:

“(28A)
“interest” means interest payable in any manner in respect of any
moneys borrowed or debt incurred (including a deposit, claim or other
similar right or obligation) and includes any service fee or other
charge in respect of the moneys borrowed or debt incurred or in respect
of any credit facility which has not been utilised”

The definition can be bisected as under –

(a)
interest payable in any manner in respect of any moneys borrowed or
debt incurred (including a deposit, claim or other similar right or
obligation); or

(b) any service fee or other charge in respect
of the moneys borrowed or debt incurred or in respect of any credit
facility which has not been utilised.

In the present context,
the payment is not towards moneys borrowed or debt or any service fee or
other charge in this regard. It is for purchase of assets. One cannot
therefore ascribe the color of interest to a consideration paid for
purchase of assets. The receipt of consideration cannot partake the
character of interest as there is no debt owed by the buyer to the
seller. There is a ‘seller-purchaser’ relationship. Thus, unless there
is a ‘lender-borrower’ relationship, the liability to pay or right to
receive interest does not arise.

The discussion would be
incomplete without a reference to the Apex Court verdict in the case of
Vijaya Bank Limited vs. CIT (1991) 187 ITR 541 (SC). In this case, the
assessee (bank) received interest on securities purchased from another
bank (as well as in the open market). The assessee claimed that
consideration paid towards acquisition of these securities was
determined with reference to their actual value and interest which
accrued to it till the date of sale. Accordingly, such outflow should be
allowed as a claim against interest income earned by the assessee
subsequent to purchase. In this context, the Apex Court observed as
under:

“In the instant case, the assessee purchased
securities. It is contended that the price paid for the securities was
determined with reference to their actual value as well as the interest
which had accrued on them till the date of purchase. But the fact is,
whatever was the consideration which prompted the assessee to purchase
the securities, the price paid for them was in the nature of a capital
outlay and no part of it can be set off as expenditure against income
accruing on those securities. Subsequently when these securities yielded
income by was of interest, such income attracted section 18.”

The
Apex Court adjudged that consideration paid for purchase of securities
is in the nature of ‘capital outlay’. It is not expenditure on revenue
account having nexus to interest income which it earned subsequently.
The entire consideration was thus concluded to be towards purchase of
bonds. When this dictum is viewed from seller’s standpoint, the entire
consideration received should constitute capital gains. There is no
interest element therein.

The possible counter to the aforesaid
discussion is that interest accrues on a de die diem basis.
Consideration received from the buyer which factors the interest element
has to be split between capital receipt and interest income. If such
split is not carried out, there may be a dual taxation. This could be
better explained through an illustration:

Mr X purchased a bond
for Rs.100. He wishes to sell this bond to Mr Y on a cum interest basis
at Rs.110. Interest accrued till the date of sale is Rs.10. In such an
eventuality, Mr X would have to bear capital gains tax on Rs.10 [being
110 (sale consideration) – 100(cost)]. Mr Y would have to discharge tax
on interest income (of Rs.10). Therefore, on an interest income of Rs.10
paid by the company, there is a taxable income of Rs.20 (being Rs.10
factored in capital gains computation of Mr X and Rs.10 as interest
income in the hands of Mr Y). One may argue that such absurd result is
unintended and cannot be an appropriate view.

However, this line
of argument can be answered by stating that there is no equity in tax.
This is an undisputed principle. The parties to the transaction being
taxed on Rs.20 (although being economically benefited by Rs.10) would
only reflect a bad bargain. Further, Mr Y would have to shoulder tax on
interest income (Rs.10) but would avail a deduction or a loss
subsequently of Rs.10 (being part of the purchase consideration of
bonds).

The learned author Sampath Iyengar in his treatise Law
of Income tax (11th edition at page 2661 – Volume II) has made a
reference on this matter (although in the context of section 18 of the
Act):

“15. Charge of interest on sale or transfer of
securities – (1) No splitting of interest as between seller and
purchaser – When an interest bearing security is sold during the
currency of an interest period, the question arises as to how far the
purchaser is liable in respect of interest accrued due before the date
of his purchase. It frequently happens that the purchaser pays to the
seller the value for interest accrued till the date of the sale, and
that the seller receives the equivalent of interest up to the date of
the sale from the purchaser. Nevertheless, for the purposes of revenue
law, the only person liable to pay tax is the person who is the owner of
the securities at the date when the interest falls to be paid. Such
owner is the person liable in respect of the entire amount of interest.
Though as between the transferor and the transferee, interest may be
computed de die in diem, it does not really accrue from day to day, as
it cannot be received until the due date. This section makes it clear
that the assessment is upon the person entitled to receive, viz, the
holder of the security on the date of maturity of interest. Further, the
machinery sections of the Act do not provide for taking separately the
vendor and the purchaser or to keep track of interest adjustments
between the transferor and transferees. Tax is exigible when the income
due is received and is on the person who receives. The principle is that
the seller does not receive interest; he receives the price of
expectancy of interest, and expectancy of interest is not a
subject-matter of taxation. The only person who receives interest is the
purchaser. Where an interest bearing security is sold and part of the
sale price represents accrued but hitherto unpaid interest that accrued
interest is not chargeable to tax, unless it can be treated as accruing
from day to day.”

To conclude, accrual is an intersection of
legal right to receive and a corresponding obligation to pay. Accrual
of interest on bonds is influenced by the contractual terms. A holder of
bond contractually holds the right to receive the interest. The
transfer of bonds results in passing on the interest (receivable from
the bond-issuing company) from the seller to the buyer. This benefit of
accumulated interest is discharged by the buyer in form of
consideration. The payment made by the buyer is for acquisition of bonds
which factors the interest element. The buyer however does not pay
‘interest’ to the seller. It is only the purchase consideration. It is
inconceivable that the purchaser would step into the shoes of the bond
issuing company and pay interest along with consideration for purchase
of bonds. Payment receivable by the seller of bonds would wholly be
included in the capital gains computation. There is no interest element
contained therein.

Financial statements form the substratum for
income-tax laws. They are two sides of the same coin, yet they operate
in their individual domains. There are inherent variations in commercial
and tax profits. Today’s accounting norms are distilled, refined and
robust. With an ‘ever evolving’ story of tax and accounting world, the
relationship remains complementary but not interchangeable. In any departure, commercial accounting norms would be subservient to tax principles.
Therefore, the attempt by ICDS to elevate the accounting principles to
match with the concept of accrual under the tax principles may not have
achieved its avowed objective.

Justice Easwar Committee Report – A Real Godsend

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When the Modi Government came to power there were huge expectations that significant tax reforms would be initiated. However, the first one and a half year belied these expectations. While the Prime Minister talked about ease of doing business, adopting a liberal tax regime, the situation on the ground has been totally different.

Possibly the disappointment of the business community, coupled with electoral reverses has spurred the government into action. The first indications of this change came in the form of the recent circulars issued by the CBDT. The circular raising the monetary limits in regard to litigation pursued by the Income tax department, before the Tribunal and High Courts, and that too with retrospective effect, reduced the pendency before these two forums. The instructions in regard to the manner in which scrutiny assessments were to be completed, when the selection was under CASS, also reflected a refreshing change in attitude.

In this light, the first recommendations of the Justice Easwar Committee are commendable and deserve to be substantially accepted by the Finance Ministry. The Committee was formed on 27th October 2015, to suggest amendments to the Income-tax Act 1961 (the Act), and the procedures thereunder. The terms of reference of the Committee were:

(a) identifying provisions that gave rise to litigation on account of difference in interpretation,
(b) studying provisions that hampered ease of doing business,
(c) identifying provisions of the act for simplification, and
(d) suggesting alternatives and modifications to ensure certainty and predictability of tax laws.

The Committee has a term of one year from the date of its constitution and was to issue its first recommendations by 31st January 2016. The Committee adhered to the timeline and its suggestions are indeed laudable. A perusal of the first batch of suggestions in the draft report indicates that, they are fair, recognise the problems faced by taxpayers on the ground and are capable of immediate implementation. The recommendations have been divided into two parts – one constituting amendments to the Act itself which could be incorporated in the Finance Bill and the other being directions to be issued by the CBDT in the form of circulars or instructions.

The Committee has addressed a number of provisions which have resulted in substantial litigation. The treatment of transaction in shares and securities as business income instead of capital gains, the irrational disallowances under section 14A, the problems caused by the invoking of section 50C at the time of registering of the conveyance when the transaction of transfer had taken place earlier, the notional income arising in the hands of the purchaser of property on account of difference between the purchase price and the stamp duty valuation have all been dealt with.

The problems faced by assessees on account of overzealous bureaucrats have also been mentioned. Audit objections, which are often the result of either an erroneous interpretation of the law or non-appreciation of the ambit of provisions, resulting in reopening and revision of assessments, even though the department really does not agree with the objections. This results in a spate of litigations and with the assessee succeeding in a majority of cases, there is no real ultimate collection of revenue. The amendments suggested to section 147 and 263 of the Act will effectively reduce this menace.

While the implementation of the above suggestions will reduce litigation, other recommendations reflect a fair mind. It is proposed that if an assessee has bona fide, relied on a decision of the Tribunal, a High Court or the Supreme Court and an addition is made to his income, no penalty should be levied. One really wonders whether the department would be in a position to accept this proposal, but it certainly establishes the principles of justice and equity have been recognised. It has also been recommended that even if penalty is levied, the collection should be kept in abeyance if the appeal on merits is pending adjudication before the Tribunal.

For more than a decade, high-pitched assessments and the consequential coercive collection of taxes has made the life of tax payers miserable. The pressure of unreasonable collection targets often forced even wellmeaning officers to resort to irrational assessments. A rethink about the stay provisions which have been recommended by the Committee would go a long way in reducing if not solving the problem.

Though the principle that a tax proceeding is not adversarial is well established, it is rarely adhered to on the ground. A specific provision enabling a taxpayer to make a fresh claim for an exemption, deduction or relief after he has filed the return of income, during the course of an assessment is welcome. If this suggestion is accepted it may reduce unnecessary litigation.

On the equity front the Committee has suggested substantial changes in regard to issue of refunds, interest thereon and adjustment of refunds against tax dues which are really not collectible. Obtaining tax credit is another area which was a headache for both, the assessees and the professionals. The Committee has also dealt with this area and the recommendations are pragmatic.

Finally, the proposal to postpone, the implementation of the Income Computation Disclosure Standards (ICDS), will be welcomed by both, taxpayers and professionals. In fact, the Committee has aptly indicated reservations of tax payers concerning ICDS in their present form.

In all, the first batch of suggestions are worthy of an applause. However, much more needs to be done on the front of accountability of the tax administration. There are suggestions in regard to time limits for disposal of petitions under sections 273A, 220(2A) etc., but a lot more is expected from the Committee. Structural changes, reform in tax policy may possibly be done in the second instalment of the report.

One hopes that the Finance Minister accepts the recommendations of the Committee and proposes appropriate amendments through the Finance Bill while presenting the forthcoming budget. Coupled with this, if there is a change in the mindset of the tax officers and reduction in corruption, a healthy atmosphere where doing business is really easy will have been created. It is said that taxes are the price one pays for civilisation. If taxes are administered fairly and humanely, citizens of this country will be more than willing to pay this price.

I’M NEVER GONNA DIE

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This statement ‘I am never going to die’ gives a feeling of ego. People find it as a manifestation of an egoistic mind. But actually looking from a different perspective, e – represents effective and go – indicates movement. The word ‘ego’ means going effectively.

Right from our childhood and also while studying we are taught that the soul is immortal and only the body dies, yet we seek immortality. Immortality can be achieved only by ‘going effectively’. ‘Going effectively’ means leaving footprints on the ‘sands of time’. When I recollect the people who had / have made an impact on the life of others, then many names surface on the sea of my mind and some will also come in your mind. Some of these are Mother Teresa, Swami Vivekanand, Mahatma Gandhi and even Steve Jobs. The issue is: are they alive today? The answer is yes because they have impacted the life of others. Hence, in order to remain alive as an immortal soul even after death, one requires great perseverance, a selfless dedication to rise as a phoenix from any difficulty for the service of mankind even after falling again and again.

In order to attain this immortality, one has to strive. It is not just visualisation, but efforts are required to crystallise this and to achieve this we have to develop patience and have patience to listen to and patience to learn to serve others.

When I ask someone ‘How are you?’; I need to actually listen to the reply. I need to absorb and understand what he wants to say. Only then I can be a good listener and will be able to serve the person better.

Why worry and hurry on an ongoing basis. Life is a gift of God in a box with different compartments, I need to open it in a gentle way and feel the magic of every moment and what each compartment has in store for me.

Though, while living, I feel that this life is too short to cherish each and every moment and to take part in this wonderful voyage. It is almost difficult with all kinds of flaws and weaknesses to enhance value in the society. Even then one has to utilise this greatest gift from the Almighty to add beauty to the deeds and actions carried out and to covet for immortality. I need to dance with the rhythm of God. I need to accept what the divine power has bestowed upon me and he will guide me in finding a place in the heart of those I serve.

I would further add that there is no need to drink nectar to remain alive. In the true sense, there is no death. Death is when people forget us. There will be a day when your remains will leave this world, but your aroma will still be there. The fragrance of your thoughts, the charm of your dreams will be in the breeze. The only essence one requires is a calm conscience, a profound silence with the inner self, an ethical and rational life and by rendering lasting service. Service in the welfare of others is the best way of achieving immortality.

Now, the answer to the question: Where I am going to live after disappearance of the physique? Well, I am going to find address in people’s heart. It is possible for each (one) of us to develop this within us, the desire to serve others without seeking even a ‘thank you!’

I would conclude by quoting:

I will be a shining star which will pass on little light even in darkest time.
I will be available in the colours of leaves to fulfill achievable desires of the world.
I will be the clear water to let you feel profoundness of life.
I will accompany the first ray from the sun to enlighten light in life.
I will be the innocent smile on the face to make your soul feel happy.
I will be the rainbow to fill your life with all the colours to make you feel bliss.
I will be the calm moonlight to make you free from all the worries of the world.
I will be the whole ocean to give you the feeling of deepest thoughts and the shells of happiness.

If nothing else, by this communication to wish you all a healthy and happy life, and with this wish arising from my heart – I will live in your heart.

[2015] 64 taxmann.com 374 (Bombay) Commissioner of Central Excise & Service Tax, Kolhapur Commissionerate vs. Karan Agencies

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Activity of conducting or managing business for owner cannot be classified under category of ‘Business Support Services’ and profits retained therefrom are not liable to service tax.

Facts
The Assessee entered into a contract with the owner for conducting business of manufacturing and sale of liquor. Under the agreement, a fixed amount was paid to the owner and entire balance profit was retained by assessee. The books of accounts were maintained in the name of owner. Revenue raised demand of service tax under category of ‘Business Support Services’. The Tribunal held that, ‘Business Support Service’ covers only services of supporting nature to main activity and in the instant case, principal activities are done (i.e. activities of manufacturing and sale of liquor) for the owner. It was also noted that owner has paid service tax on fixed charges paid/retained by him under ‘franchisee services’. Aggrieved by the same, the Department preferred an appeal before the High Court.

Held
The Hon. High Court held that findings in the Tribunal’s order are essentially based on clauses of conducting agreement which has been referred to extensively and read together and harmoniously to conclude that the arrangement or deal in the present case is of such a nature that a unit is taken over for conducting and managing by the Assessee. The Assessee is responsible for any profits being generated or losses sustained. The nature of the transaction therefore would not fall within the meaning of support services for business or commerce.

Huge penalties being levied by SEBI following A recent Supreme Court decision

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Introduction
SEBI has recently passed several orders levying huge penalties, running into crores for defaults like non-filing of documents/information. What is interesting is that levy of such huge and flat penalties is said to be mandatory and inevitable following the mandate of the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of SEBI vs. Roofit Industries Ltd. SEBI’s view is that such levy is unavoidable, it is effectively being held, even where there are no aggravating factors.

Summary of decision of Supreme Court and its immediate impact
The Supreme Court was dealing with the provisions of section 15A(a) of the SEBI Act, 1992 which provides for “a penalty of one lakh rupees for each day during which such failure continues or one crore rupees, whichever is less”. The penalty of Rs. 1 lakh per day of such failure, the Court held, is absolute and non-discretionary. Thus, if there was a delay/failure of, say, 75 days, the penalty would be Rs. 75 lakh. However, if the delay was of more than 100 days, then the penalty would be Rs. 1 crore.

While the decision is on penalty u/s. 15A(a), in view of almost identical wording in other penalty provisions (except 15F(a) and 15HB of the SEBI Act), it will apply to those provisions too. Further, there are several similar provisions in the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 and the Depositories Act, 1996 to which the ratio of this decision will apply. To take an example of violation under another such provision, in case of insider trading, the penalty u/s 15G of the SEBI Act would be a flat Rs. 25 crore. If three times the profits from insider trading exceeds Rs. 25 crore, the penalty will be such higher figure.

Note, however, that these provisions in all the three statutes have been amended with effect from 8th September 2014. The amended provisions now provide for a relatively far smaller minimum penalty. However, for all such violations during the period 29th October 2002 to 7th September 2014, such flat and huge penalty would be imposable. Considering that such violations of non-filing of documents/information (e.g., non-filing of information relating to change in holdings under the Takeover/Insider Trading Regulations) have been routinely found in numerous cases, all such cases will face such large penalties.

Indeed, within a very short time after this decision, SEBI levied penalties as follows:-

1. Presha Metallurgical Ltd. and others (Rs. 8 crore)

2. Vipul Shah (Rs. 4 crore)

3. Sunciti Financial Services Private Limited (Rs. 2 crore)

4. Alok Electricals Private Limited and others (Rs. 1 crore)

Detailed Discussion on Decision
The essential facts before the Supreme Court in this matter were as follows (there were several cases of broadly the same category in appeal and the facts discussed here relate to one of them – Alkan Projects). SEBI had levied a penalty of Rs. 1 crore on one of such parties for nonsubmission of information sought by it. The information was required to investigate certain alleged manipulation, etc. in the shares of Roofit Industries Ltd. Alkan appealed to the Securities Appellate Tribunal (“SAT ”). SAT noted that while the violation was clearly established, Alkan was in a bad financial position. It was impossible to recover such a large penalty, and thus it did not serve any purpose. In the event of non recovery, SEBI could prosecute Alkan but that, as SAT noted, would take a long time, considering the already existing backlog of similar cases. SAT also noted that the provisions of section 15J provided for certain factors to be considered for levy of penalty. While “impecuniosity” of the party was not specifically listed as a factor, SAT nevertheless held that it should also be considered while deciding the amount of penalty. SAT accordingly reduced the penalty from Rs. 1 crore to Rs. 15,000.

SEBI appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court set aside the order of SAT . It held that section 15J listed three exhaustive factors for consideration of penalty. No other factor, including “impecuniosity”, can be considered, the Court held. The wording of section 15(A)(a) was also definite and prescribed a penalty of Rs. 1 lakh per day (albeit with an upper limit of Rs. 1 crore) which the Court held to be absolute. According to the Hon’ble Court, the “clear intention” for such high penalty “…is to impose harsher penalties for certain offences, and we find no reason to water them down”.

The Supreme Court also held that the amended penalty provision left no discretion with the adjudicating officer (AO) and thereby, even “the scope of section 15J was drastically reduced” for this purpose. The Supreme Court also dealt with section 15I and whether it allows for discretion to the AO in such matters. According to the Hon’ble Court, the amendments taking away such discretion “ought to have been reflected in the language of section 15I, but was clearly overlooked”. However, it also noted that, post amendment with effect from 8th August 2014, the discretion was reintroduced into the law.

Following this decision, SEBI has levied huge penalties in several cases. It is apparent, from the clear wording of such orders of penalty, that it will follow the same course in all other cases before it of violations during this long period of approximately 12 years while this provision was in force. Mitigating factors would not go to reduce the penalty. Further, aggravating factors would not go to increase the penalty. It appears that sections 15I and 15J are thus by and large rendered otiose, of course for these limited purposes. (Note:- Ironically, the Supreme Court, in view of the peculiar facts of the case, and also on account of its ruling on whether the failure was a continuing one, held that the penalty would be a lower amount, since the failure was committed before 29th October 2002).

Critique
With due respect, the decision of the Supreme Court needs reconsideration.

Section 15I does specifically provide for discretion to the Adjudicating Officer. It provides that if the Adjudicating Officer “..is satisfied that the person has failed to comply with the provisions of any of the sections specified in subsection (1), he may impose such penalty as he thinks fit in accordance with the provisions of any of those sections.” The Hon’ble Court has, however, taken a view that section 15I should also have been amended to remove the discretion for cases where such penalty is leviable but this was “clearly overlooked” by the law makers.

The Court has held that the factors listed in section 15J are exhaustive, in view of the word – “namely”. Thus, it has held that other mitigating factors cannot be considered. It is submitted that a better interpretation of the section is that it obligates the AO to consider these factors and thus is a qualitative provision. If these factors are absent penalty may be reduced/not levied. If one or more of such factors are present, then depending on the intensity of such factors, higher penalty may be levied. Further, it is also submitted, considering the discretion inbuilt in section 15I, there is no bar in considering other mitigating or aggravating factors present in circumstances of each case.

Indeed, considering the contradictory and even ambiguous provisions of sections 15I and 15J, the Court could have, it is submitted with due respect, taken a view that discretion still exists for the AO.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court should have also considered that these penalty provisions have actually been applied fairly consistently in the past by SEBI (and upheld by SAT ) by applying penalties in a discretionary manner.

The Hon’ble Court should have also considered the absurd consequences of such an interpretation. To take an example, a violation of insider trading resulting in a profit of Rs. 1000 would nonetheless result in a penalty of Rs. 25 crore.

The view of SAT that impecuniosity should also be considered as a factor is also not devoid of merit. A penalty of, say, Rs. 1 crore on a person known to be insolvent is, as SAT rightly pointed out, only on paper. I had pointed out earlier in this column that the huge/record penalty of Rs. 7,269 crore levied by SEBI on PACL suffers from this same anomaly and defect and is thus equally meaningless/ on paper only.

It is also seen that before 29th October 2002 and on and after 8th September 2014, no such large and mandatory penalty was imposable. Even after 2014, though a minimum penalty is imposable, such minimum amount is relatively far small. It is inconceivable, in my view, that law makers could have considered levy of such huge and flat penalty, particularly considering that the matters with which the provisions relate to are not serious. Where they are serious, fairly large amount of penalties has indeed been provided for. If at all, it is respectfully submitted, the Hon’ble Court should have read down these provisions, instead of effectively reading down section 15I and 15J. I may add that the Supreme Court in Swedish Match’s case ([2004] 54 SCL 549 (SC)) did consider, in passing though, with the issue whether a penalty of Rs. 25 crore for non-compliance of making an offer is inevitable. However, the views there were not as emphatic and direct as in Roofit’s case.

Even otherwise, SEBI has also taken, in my view, a flawed stand with regard to another Supreme Court’s decision, viz., SEBI vs. Shriram Mutual Fund (68 SCL 216 (SC). SEBI considers (wrongly, in my opinion) this decision as holding that penalty should mandatorily follow a violation and there is no discretion to SEBI in the matter. While SEBI has not levied sky high penalties, as it has done following Roofit’s case, one hopes that this stand too is modified and made consistent with what the Hon’ble Court really mandated in that case.

Be that as it may, SEBI seems to be on a roll and is almost gleefully levying huge penalties. To me, it seems inevitable that the matter will go back to the Supreme Court. It is hoped that the Hon’ble Court reconsiders its view and holds that discretion still remains in matter of levy of penalty.

2015 (40) STR 881 (Guj) Riva Packaging Solutions Pvt. Ltd. vs. Comm. of Service tax

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Territorial jurisdiction of the High Court

Facts
In the present case, dispute/show cause notice (SCN) was issued in Dadra & Nagar Haveli and an order confirming demand was passed. The Appellant challenged the order by filing an appeal before CESTAT’s Ahmedabad bench. CESTAT confirmed the demand. Thereafter the appeal was preferred before the Gujarat High Court.

Held
The High Court, on noticing that the dispute/SCN related to Dadra & Nagar Haveli, held that the Gujarat High court has no territorial jurisdiction to hear and decide the matter though the impugned order was passed by CESTAT ’s Ahmedabad bench. Accordingly, the Appeal was dismissed.

2015 (40) STR 833 (Sikkim) Future Gaming & Hotel Services (Pvt) Ltd vs. UOI

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An explanation cannot enlarge the scope of a provision

Facts
The Appellant, a lottery distributor purchased lottery tickets from the State Government and thereafter, sold them to stockists and resellers after adding profit margin. This Court in the Appellant’s own case under the earlier provisions of law had already held that the activity of promoting, marketing, organising or in any other manner assisting in organising games of chance including lottery, was an activity falling under the expression “betting and gambling” which is in the domain of the State Legislature and the Centre had no power to tax such an activity. Post the judgement, in the Finance Act 2015, an explanation had been inserted in the definition of service to enlarge the definition as to cover the activities of lottery distributors.

Held
The High Court observed that, the principal requirement of the definition of ‘service’ is that the activity should be carried out by one person for another and such activity should be for a consideration. Since the Appellant was acting in a principal to principal relationship with the State Government buying and selling the lottery tickets and was not rendering any service to the state, the activity could not fall in the definition of ‘service’ per se. It was further held that, if an activity is not covered in the definition of ‘service’, then the same cannot be made taxable by way of an insertion of explanation, as an explanation cannot enlarge the scope of a provision. Accordingly, explanation was declared to be ultra vires and struck down.

2015 (40) STR 1066 (Del.) Alar Infrastructures Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE, Delhi-I

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Limitation period of 1 year as provided u/s. 11B of Central Excise Act, 1944 would apply to refund claims of taxable services only.

Facts
Refund claim of the appellant was rejected as time-barred vide section 11B of Central Excise Act, 1944 without considering the appropriateness of taxability on services. Appellant claimed that it exported services and facts of the present case were identical to other three appeals heard jointly by CESTAT wherein refund was allowed.

Held
Having regard to pertinent judicial pronouncements, it was observed that only if refund claims pertain to taxable services, limitation period of 1 year would apply vide section 11B (supra). Accordingly, the matter was remanded back to decide the matter as per the terms provided by Delhi High Court in the present case.

Concept of “Gross Receipts” vis-à-vis MVA T Rules, 2005

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Introduction
Under the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002 (MVAT Act) and the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Rules, 2005 (MVAT Rules), the dealers are entitled to a set off. However, they are subject to conditions as may be prescribed in the Rules. For example, Rule 52 of MVAT Rules which prescribes eligibility to set off reads as under:

“52. Claim and grant of set-off in respect of purchases made during any period commencing on or after the appointed day.

(1) In assessing the amount of tax payable in respect of any period starting on or after the appointed day, by a registered dealer (hereinafter, in this rule, referred to as ‘the claimant dealer’) the Commissioner shall subject to the provisions of [rules 53,54,55 & 55B] in respect of the purchases of goods made by the claimant dealer on or after the appointed day, grant him a set-off of the aggregate of the following sums, that is to say,

(a) the sum collected separately from the claimant dealer by the other registered dealer by way of [tax] on the purchases made by the claimant dealer from the said registered dealer of goods being capital assets and [goods the purchases of which are debited to the profit and loss account or, as the case may be, the trading account],

(b) tax paid in respect of any entry made after the appointed day under the Maharashtra Tax on the Entry of Motor Vehicles into Local Areas Act, 1987, and

(c) the tax paid in respect of any entry made after the appointed day under the Maharashtra Tax on the Entry of Goods into Local Areas Act, 2003.

(d) the purchase tax paid by the claimant dealer under this Act.”

Thus, to find out actual availability of set off reference is required to be made to Rules like Rules 53 & 54. Rule 53 prescribes reduction in set off whereas Rule 54 is about a negative list.

Rule 53(6)(b)
One of the Rules prescribing reduction in set off is rule 53(6). Rule 53(6)(b) is applicable to dealers in general. The said rule is reproduced below for ready reference.

“53. Reduction in set-off. –

(6) If out of the gross receipts of a dealer in any year, receipts on account of sale are less than fifty % of the total receipts, –

(a) …

(b) in so far as the dealer is not a hotel or restaurant, the dealer shall be entitled to claim set-off only on those purchases effected in that year where the corresponding goods are sold or resold within six months of the date of purchase or are consigned within the said period, not by way of sale to another State, to oneself or one’s agent or purchases of packing materials used for packing of such goods sold, resold or consigned:

Provided that for the purposes of clause (b), the dealer who is a manufacturer of goods not being a dealer principally engaged in doing job work or labour work shall be entitled to claim set-off on his purchases of plant and machinery which are treated as capital assets and purchases of parts, components and accessories of the said capital assets, and on purchases of consumables, stores and packing materials in respect of a period of three years from the date of effect of the certificate of registration.

Explanation.- For the purposes of this sub-rule, “receipts” means the receipts pertaining to all activities including business activities carried out in the State but does not include the amount representing the value of the goods consigned not by way of sales to another State to oneself or one’s agent.” It can be seen that the rule provides for reduction or, in other words, restricted set off, when the receipts from sales are less than 50% of gross receipts. The Explanation under rule 53(6)(b) also provides meaning of gross receipts. There are disputes about meaning of gross receipts and how to compute it.

It can also be noted that if receipts from sales are less than 50% of gross receipts then set off is eligible only in respect of purchases which are sold within six months from the date of purchase. Therefore, the goods which are not sold like, consumed capital goods or goods which are not sold within six months are not eligible for set off.

Mutual Funds
Recently there was a controversy in relation to availability of set off to Mutual Funds. The Hon. M. S.T. Tribunal had an occasion to decide such an issue in case of UTI Mutual Fund (VAT SA 100 to 102 of 2014 dt.22.9.2015). The facts as narrated in the judgment are as under:

“The Appellant is a mutual fund registered with the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) and is regulated under the SEBI (Mutual Funds) Regulations, 1996. UTI Gold Exchange Traded Fund (UTI GETF) is one of the schemes of the Appellant and the same is also regulated by SEBI under the SEBI MF regulations.

3. As per the SEBI MF regulations, the balance sheet and revenue accounts of each scheme are required to be prepared separately and audited separately and no consolidated balance sheet of various schemes of a Mutual Fund is prepared. Thus, each scheme has a separate entity including separate receipts, funds, assets liabilities, etc.

4. As per the MVAT provisions, VAT is applicable on the turnover of sale of goods and the definition of goods specifically excludes securities. Therefore only UTI GETF is subject to VAT and not the other schemes of the Appellant as other schemes invested in securities and not in gold.

The Appellant obtained VAT registration simultaneously with the launch of UTI GETF and not earlier despite the other schemes of the Appellant dealer being in operation much before that. Thus the Appellant is assumed the role of dealer only on the launch of UTI GETF scheme and only this scheme should be considered and not any other scheme of the Appellant.”

From the above, it can be seen that the Mutual Fund has receipts from various schemes like relating to securities, gold etc.. Over all, the sales receipts are from the sale of gold whereas there are other receipts towards securities etc.. The main issue involved was whether the gross receipts should be computed considering receipts from all the schemes or only from gold scheme separately.

The argument was that under MVAT Act, only sale of goods can be considered as receipts and not other receipts which do not involve goods like shares, securities etc..

The Hon. Tribunal has dealt with the issue in the following words:
“The Learned representative of revenue has relied on the judgment of this Tribunal reported in the case of M/s. UTI Mutual Fund (present Appellant) vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 2013 (ST1) GJX 0626 STMAH wherein it is observed:-

“The set-off u/s. 48(1)(a)(ii) of MVAT Act is circumscribed with limitations. The limitations are (i) circumstances, (ii) conditions (iii) restrictions, as may be specified in the Rules. Rule 53 prescribe reduction in set-off in full or part, particularly Rule 53(6)(b) MVAT Rules prescribe restriction. Restriction is in the nature of duration of purchase and its sale. The restriction is where the receipts on account of sale are less than 50% of the total receipts, the setoff is permissible only on those purchases effected in that year where corresponding goods sold or resold within six months from the date of purchases. The “receipts” are explained in explanation. ”Receipts” means the receipts pertaining to all activities, including business activities carried out in the State.”

On the plain reading of section 48(1)(a)(ii) of MVAT Act r/w Rule 53(6)(b) and Explanation of MVAT Rules, it is clear that the receipts would include all activities of the dealer including business activities. Receipts which are concerning the activities not involving the sale of goods, are also included in “Total Receipts” in Rule 53(6) of MVAT Rules. The submission of Smt. N. R. Badheka does not have a legal base in law. Rule 53(6)(b) and explanation are within delegated powers conferred by section 48(1) of MVAT Act.”

26. The Learned Advocate Smt. Badheka has strongly contended that UTI GETF is dealing in equity and therefore only the receipts pertaining to the activity of UTI GETF ought to have been considered for grant of set off u/r. 53(6)(b) of MVAT rules. However, on going through the explanation attached to 53(6)(b), we find that the receipt means receipts pertaining to all activities including business activities carried out in the state and therefore in our considered opinion, the other activities of UTI Mutual Fund are also required to be taken into consideration while calculating the receipts for the purposes of set off as they are also business activities carried out in the State.

27. The basic rule of interpretation is laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India and Others vs. Priyankan Sharan and Another (LIS/ SC/2008/1228) wherein it is observed:

“It is a well settled principle in law that the Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statutes is an edict of the Legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent”.

28. It is well settled that in the matter of grant of set off or exemption, the relevant provisions are required to be construed strictly. No liberal interpretation is permissible in such matters. On going through the explanation attached to Rule 53(6(b) of MVAT Rules, it clearly appears that receipts for the purpose of said rules means the receipts pertaining to all the activities including business activities of the dealer carried out in the State. The contention of Learned Advocate Smt. Badheka that only the activities of UTI GETF should be taken into consideration for the purposes of grant of set off u/r. 53(6)(b) is thus devoid of merit and cannot be accepted.”

Conclusion
Thus the interpretation lays down that the gross receipts should be computed considering receipts from all activities in Maharashtra. It will include receipts from sale of goods as well as non sale activities also. Further, Mutual fund is considered as one entity and cannot be considered scheme wise.

The ratio laid down above will also apply to other dealers. The dealers in Maharashtra are required to consider the above interpretation while computing the setoff.

Welcome GST – Part IV VAT (GST) in the European Union (‘EU’)

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Introduction
Note: The earlier write ups, under this series, covered the GST legislation in one country (comprising of several States). In comparison, the EU is unique in the sense that it comprises of several countries which have their own laws and tax legislation, but these laws conform to a common charter i.e. the EU directives.

The EU is a politico-economic union of 28 Member States that are located primarily in Europe. Presently, the following countries are members of the EU: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

The EU operates through a system of supranational institutions and intergovernmental-negotiated decisions by the Member States. The supranational institutions are: the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council of the European Union, the European Commission, the Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Central Bank, and the Court of Auditors.

For the purposes of achieving a ‘single market’, the EU has developed a standardised system of laws and policies that apply in all Member States ensuring free movement of people, goods, services, and capital across Member States. The EU Value Added Tax (‘EUVAT’) is one such legislation. This tax is levied on goods and services supplied within the EU. While the EU’s supranational institutions themselves do not collect the tax, EU Member States are each required to adopt a VAT legislation that complies with the EU VAT code (read below about co-ordinated administration of value added tax within the EU).

EU VAT Area
The EU VAT area is a territory consisting of territory of all Member States of the EU and certain other countries which follow the EU rules on VAT . The principle is also valid for some special taxes on products like alcohol and tobacco. Goods are only considered as imported or exported if they enter or leave the EU area.

Authority and scope of the tax

The EU VAT system is regulated by a series of European Union directives issued by the European Council, the most important of which is the Sixth VAT Directive [Council Directive1 2006/112/EC of 28t November 2006 on the common system of value added tax]. The primary aim of the EU VAT directive is to harmonise VAT (content and implementation) within the EU VAT area. Besides this, the directive also specifies that VAT rates must be within a certain range. Some other key objectives of this directive are:

  • harmonisation of content and layout of the VAT declaration
  • regulation of accounting, providing a common legal accounting framework
  • detailed description of invoices2 and receipts3, meaning that Member States
  • have a common invoice framework
  • regulation of accounts payable
  • regulation of accounts receivable
  • standard definition of national accountancy and administrative terms.

The directive is updated from time to time, to address various issues arising from the movement of men, capital, material and services within the Member States and it includes “the place of supply of services” rules which have been in force since 1st January 2010. More recently, the directive was amended to rationalise the place of supply of services in respect of electronic services.

Co-ordinated administration of value added tax within the EU
VAT collected at each stage in the supply chain is remitted to the tax authorities of the concerned Member State and forms part of that State’s revenue. A small proportion goes to the EU in the form of a levy (‘VAT -based own resources’). Previously, in spite of the customs union, the differing VAT rates and the separate VAT administration processes resulted in a high administrative and cost burden for crossborder trade. The EU has tried to resolve this by developing the co-ordinated administration of VAT within the EU VAT area.

Key initiatives under the co-ordinated administration include:

Cross-border VAT is declared in the same way as domestic VAT , and thus, facilitates the elimination of border controls between Member States, saving costs and reducing delays. It also simplifies administrative work for freight forwarders.

‘Mini One Stop Shop’ simplification scheme (read more below) is one of the measures adopted to achieve the ‘Single market’ objective.

The value added tax principle

Output VAT: VAT on output supplies charged by a business and paid by its customers.
Input VAT: VAT that is paid by a business to other businesses on the supplies that a business receives
Input tax credit: A business is generally able to recover input VAT to the extent that the input VAT is attributable to its taxable outputs.

Input VAT is recovered by offsetting it against the output VAT for which the business is required to account to the government, or, if there is an excess, by claiming a repayment (refund) from the government. The net effect of this is that each supplier in the chain remits tax on the value added, and ultimately the tax is paid by the end consumer. The final consumer does not receive a credit for the VAT paid.

Destination based tax
Generally, VAT is charged on the ‘destination principle’ i.e. the supply of goods or services is taxed in the Member State where the goods or services are delivered commonly known as the ‘Member State of arrival’.

The mechanism for achieving this result is as follows:
The exporting Member State zero-rates the VAT. This means that the Member State of the exporting merchant does not collect VAT on the sale, but still gives the exporting merchant a credit for the VAT paid on the purchase by the exporter (in practice, this often means a cash refund).

The importing Member State ‘reverse charges’ the VAT . This means that the importer is required to pay VAT to the importing Member State at its rate. In many cases, a credit is immediately given for this as input VAT . The importer then charges VAT on resale in the normal way.

Exceptions are made to the destination based principle and are also made in case of:

supplies of goods such as: distance supply (i.e. mail order catalog sales or e-commerce supplies), supplies within EU to exempt/non-taxable legal persons and excise products (i.e. energy products, alcohol and alcoholic beverages and manufactured tobacco).

supplies of services such as: supply of transport, supply of real estate services, etc.

In such cases the tax is sometimes based on the ‘origin principle’ and collected in the State of origin, commonly known as ‘Member State of dispatch’. Supply of goods

Domestic supply
A domestic supply of goods is a taxable transaction where goods are received in exchange for consideration within one Member State. Thus, one Member State charges VAT on the goods and allows a corresponding credit upon subsequent resale of those goods.

Intra-Community acquisition
An intra-community acquisition of goods for a consideration is a taxable transaction on crossing two or more Member States. The place of supply is determined to be the destination Member State, and VAT is normally charged at the rate applicable in the destination Member State. However, there are special provisions for distance selling.

Distance sales

Distance sales treatment allows the vendor to apply domestic place of supply rules (ie., rules in the Member State of dispatch) for determining which Member State collects the VAT . This means that VAT is charged at the rate applicable in the Member State of dispatch. However, there are exceptions to this, for instance:

  • When a vendor in one Member State sells goods directly to individuals and VAT-exempt organisations in another Member State and the aggregate value of goods sold to consumers in that Member State is below the specified threshold4 in any 12 consecutive months, then such a sale of goods may qualify for a distance sales treatment.
  • supply of excisable goods to the UK (like tobacco and alcohol).

In the abovementioned cases of distance supply, where the supply of goods is made to final consumers in a Member State of arrival, the exporting vendor may be required to charge VAT at the rate applicable in the Member State of arrival. If a supplier provides a distant sales service to several EU Member States, a separate accounting of sold goods in regard to VAT calculation is required. The supplier then must seek a VAT registration (and charge applicable rate) in each such country where the volume of sales in any 12 consecutive months exceeds the local threshold.

Supply of services
A supply of services is the supply of anything that is not a goods. The general rule for determining the place of supply is the place where the supplier of the services is established (registered/incorporated), such as a fixed establishment where the service is supplied, the supplier’s permanent address, or where the supplier usually resides. VAT is then charged at the rate applicable in the Member State where the place of supply of the services is located and is collected by that Member State. This general rule for the place of supply of services (the place where the supplier is established) is subject to several exceptions. Most of the exceptions switch the place of supply to the place where the services are received. Such exceptions include the:

  • supply of transport services,
  • supply of cultural services,
  • supply of artistic services,
  • supply of sporting services,
  • supply of scientific services,
  • supply of educational services,
  • supply of ancillary transport services,
  • supply of services related to transfer pricing services,
  • and many miscellaneous services including
  • supply of legal services,
  • supply of banking and financial services,
  • supply of telecommunications,
  • supply of broadcasting,
  • electronically supplied services,
  • supply of services from engineers and accountants,
  • supply of advertising services, and
  • supply of intellectual property services.

The place of supply of services related to real estate is where the real estate is located. There are special rules for determining the place of supply of services delivered electronically. The mechanism for collecting VAT when the place of supply is not in the same Member State as the supplier is similar to that used for Intra-Community Acquisitions of goods, i.e. zero-rating by the supplier and reverse charge by the recipient of the services (if a taxable person). But if the recipient of the services is not a taxable person (i.e. a final consumer), the supplier must generally charge VAT at the rate applicable in its own Member State. If the place of supply is outside the EU, no VAT is charged.

(*It may be relevant to mention here that the current Place of Provision of Service Rules, 2012 which are effective from 1st July 2012 are based on the above rules)

Threshold and Registration
The threshold limits for registration are generally fixed by the Member State. The Sixth directive on EU VAT provides the threshold limit only in case of specific supplies such as distance supply, etc.

Businesses may be required to register for VAT in EU Member States, other than the one in which they are based if they supply goods via mail order to those states over a certain threshold. Businesses that are established in one Member State but receive supplies in another Member State may be able to reclaim VAT charged in the second State if they have a value added tax identification number. A similar directive, the Thirteenth VAT Directive, also allows businesses established outside the EU to recover VAT in certain circumstances.

REGISTERING FOR VA T USING MINI ONE STOP SHOP (MOSS)
To comply with the place of supply rules, businesses need to decide whether or not they want to register to use the EU VAT Mini One Stop Shop (MOSS) simplification scheme. Registration for MOSS is voluntary. If suppliers decide against the MOSS, registration will be required in each Member State where B2C supplies of e-services are made. With no minimum turnover threshold for the new EU VAT rules, VAT registration will be required regardless of the value of e-service supply in each Member State. EU MOSS registrations opened on 1st October 2014. (To be continued in the next issue of BCAJ)

Hiralal Chunilal Jain vs. Income tax Officer ITAT Mumbai “H” bench ITA No. 4547, 2545 & 1275/Mum/2014 A. Ys. 2009-10 & 2010-11. Date of Order: 01.01.2016

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Section 69C – Addition made only on the basis of bogus parties identified by the Sales tax department deleted.

Facts
The assessee, an individual, runs a proprietary business of trading in ferrous and non-ferrous metals. During the assessment proceedings, the AO found that the assessee had purchased goods worth Rs.7.21 lakh from Shiv Sagar Steel whose name was appearing in the list of bogus parties forwarded by the sales tax authorities and the name of the assessee was appearing as a beneficiary in the list. The AO directed the assessee to produce the party. However, the supplier was not produced by the assessee. Summons issued to the party could not be served on the given address. The AO held the purchase transaction as bogus and treated the entire purchase of Rs.7.21 lakh as unexplained expenditure u/s.69C.

Aggrieved by the order of the AO, the assessee appealed before the CIT(A) and submitted that the AO had relied upon the information supplied by the investigation wing of the Sales Tax Department (STD) but he had not supplied the copy of the statement of the party recorded by the STD. Further, the assessee was also not allowed to cross examine the party. According to the assessee, he had discharged his obligation by submitting details of purchases, sales and bank transactions. He had also produced stock register before the AO. There was no evidence that payments for the so called bogus purchases had come back to the assessee. All purchases and sales were recorded in the books of accounts, quantitative details were also maintained and the AO had also accepted the sales.

The CIT(A) noted that the STD had treated the suppliers of goods as suspicious dealer since during the investigation, the supplier had admitted that they had issued accommodation bills. Further, he also noted that the assessee was not able to produce the party. According to the CIT(A),it was quite possible that the assessee purchased the goods from the grey market and took accommodation bills from the said party. Therefore, he held that an addition of 20% of the purchase would be justified in order to fulfil the gap difference of Gross Profit (GP) for the alleged purchase as well to plug any leakage of revenue.

Before the Tribunal, in addition to what was submitted before the CIT(A), the assessee pointed out that the CIT(A) had ignored the vital fact that the Net Profit ratio was 1.7% and the GP ratio was about 7%. He also relied upon the decisions of the Mumbai Tribunal in the cases of Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Rajeev G. Kalathil (67 SOT 52) and Asstt. Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Tristar Jewellery Exports Private Limited (ITA 8292/Mum/2011 dated 31.07.2015) and the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs. Nikunj Eximp Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. (372 ITR 619).

Held
The Tribunal noted that the AO had not rejected the sales made by the assessee and had made the addition only on the basis of the information received from the STD. The assessee was also maintaining the quantitative details and stock register. According to the Tribunal, the AO should have made an independent inquiry. He also did not follow the principles of natural justice before making the addition. It also noted that the CIT(A) had reduced the addition to 20%, but he had not given any justification, except stating that the same was done to plug the probable leakage of revenue. Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal reversed the order of the CIT(A) and allowed the appeal of the assessee.

C.R. Developments Pvt. Ltd. vs. JCIT ITAT `C’ Bench, Mumbai Before R. C. Sharma (AM) and Sanjay Garg (JM) ITA No. 4277/Mum/2012 A. Y.: 2009-10. Dateof Order: 13th May, 2015. Counsel for assessee / revenue : S. M. Bandi / Asghar Zain

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Sections 22, 28 – Notional income in respect of three unsold shops cannot be charged to tax under the head `Income from House Property’.

Facts
The assessee company, engaged in the business of construction and development, held 3 unsold shops as stock-in-trade. In the return of income, the assessee had not offered any notional income in respect of these shops on the ground that three shops held at the end of the year were its trading assets and therefore their annual value is not chargeable under the head `income from house property’ as profit on sale thereof shall be chargeable to tax under the head of income from business. The AO did not agree with the assessee’s contention and brought the notional rental income in assessee’s hands u/s.23.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who restored the matter back to the file of the AO with the direction to make an enquiry as to what would be the possible rent that the property might fetch.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where, on behalf of the assessee reliance was placed on the decision of the Mumbai Bench of ITAT in the case of M/s Perfect Scale Company Pvt. Ltd., [ITA Nos.3228 to 3234/Mum/2013, order dated 6-9-2013], wherein it was held that in respect of assets held as business, income from the same is not assessable u/s.23(1) of the Act whereas on behalf of the Revenue, reliance was placed on the order of Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of Ansal Housing Finance & Leasing Co. Ltd., 354 ITR 180 (Delhi) in support of the proposition that even in respect of unsold flats by the developer is liable to be taxed as income from house property.

Held
The Tribunal noted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s Chennai Properties & Investments Ltd. vs. CIT, reported in (2015) 56 taxmann.com 456 (SC), vide judgment dated 9-4-2015 has held that the action of the AO in charging rental income received by an assessee engaged in the activity of letting out properties under the head Income from House Property was not justified. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that since the assessee company’s main object, is to acquire and held properties and to let out these properties, the income earned by letting out these properties is main objective of the company, therefore, rent received from the letting out of the properties is assessable as income from business.

On the very same analogy in the instant case, the assessee is engaged in business of construction and development, which is main object of the assessee company. The three flats which could not be sold at the end of the year were shown as stock-in-trade. Estimating rental income by the AO for these three flats as income from house property was not justified insofar as these flats were neither given on rent nor the assessee has intention to earn rent by letting out the flats. The flats not sold were its stock-intrade and income arising on its sale is liable to be taxed as business income. The Tribunal held that it did not find any justification in the order of AO for estimating rental income from these vacant flats u/s.23 which is assessee’s stock in trade as at the end of the year. Accordingly, the Tribunal directed the AO to delete the addition made by estimating letting value of the flats u/s.23 of the Act.

[2015] 173 TTJ 507 (Mum) Hasmukh N. Gala vs. ITO A. Y.: 2010-11. Date of Order: 19.8.2015

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Section 54 – Conditions of section 54 stand complied when the assessee pays booking advance to a builder and the builder issues him a letter of allotment specifying the flat number and the specific details of the property. Deduction u/s. 54 cannot be denied on the ground that the new property was still under construction or that the legal title in the new residential house has not passed to the assessee within the specified period.

Facts
The assessee, an individual, was carrying on business of trading in glass. During the previous year relevant to the assessment year under consideration, the assessee had vide sale agreement dated 8th December, 2009 sold a residential house for a consideration of Rs. 1,02,55,000. Long term capital gain computed on sale of this residential house, amounting to Rs. 88,37,096, was claimed to be exempt u/s. 54 of the Act on the ground that the assessee had on 6th February, 2010 issued a cheque of Rs. 1 crore to a builder for purchase of Flat Nos. 1 and 2 in a building known as Ramniwas at Malad(E). The assessee produced a copy of receipt of payment made by him and also an allotment letter dated 15th October, 2010 from the builder.

In the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer (AO) noticed that the construction of the new house was not completed even after two years from the date of transfer of old house. He held that giving of an advance could not be treated as a `purchase’ for the purposes of section 54 of the Act. The AO, denied the claim made u/s. 54 of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO on the ground that the assessee, though, has parted with money but has not acquired possession or domain over the new residential house.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held
The Tribunal observed that the legal title has not passed or transferred to the assessee within the specified period and that the new property was still under construction. However, it also noted that the allotment letter by the builder does mention the flat number and has other specific details of the property. It noted the observations of the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Kuldeep Singh (2014) 270 CTR 561 (Del.) where the Delhi High Court having noted the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sanjeev Lal vs. CIT (2014) 269 CTR 1 (SC) and also having referred to the decisions of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Smt. Shashi Varma vs. CIT (1999) 152 CTR 227 (MP) and of the Calcutta High Court in the case of CIT vs. Smt. Bharati C. Kothari (2000) 244 ITR 106 (MP) opined that when substantial investment was made in the new property, it should be deemed that sufficient steps had been taken and it would satisfy the requirements of section 54 of the Act.

It observed that the parity of reasoning explained by the Delhi High Court squarely applied to the case being decided. It also noted that the co-ordinate Bench in the case of Shri Khemchand Fagwani vs. ITO (ITA No. 7876/Mum/2010, order dated 10th September, 2014), has allowed the claim of exemption under similar circumstances.

Following the precedents, the Tribunal allowed the claim made u/s. 54 of the Act.

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

2016-TIOL-54-ITAT-AHM Ishwarcharan Builders Pvt. Ltd. vs. DCIT – CPC TDS, Ghaziabad A. Ys.: 2013-14 and 2014-15. Date of Order: 23.12.2015

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Sections 200A and 234E – Adjustment in respect of levy of fees u/s. 234E is beyond the scope of permissible adjustments contemplated u/s. 200A. In the absence of enabling provision, such levy could not be effected in the course of intimation u/s. 200A.

Facts
The assessee company received intimations issued u/s. 200A wherein while processing TDS statements, fee u/s. 234E was levied for assessment years 2013-14 and 2014-15.

Aggrieved by the levy of fees u/s. 234E in an intimation issued u/s. 200A, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld the levy.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held
The Tribunal observed that the issue in all the appeals was squarely covered in favor of the assessee by the decision of ITAT Amritsar Bench in the case of Sibia Healthcare Private Ltd. vs. DCIT 2015-TIOL-798-ITATAMRITSAR vide order dated 9th June, 2015, wherein the Division bench interalia observed that post 1st June, 2015, in the course of processing of TDS statement and issuance of intimation u/s. 200A in respect thereof, an adjustment could also be made in respect of “fee, if any, shall be computed in accordance with the provisions of section 234E.”

The Tribunal further held that as the law stood, prior to 1st June, 2015, there was no enabling provision for raising a demand in respect of levy of fees u/s 234E. It held that section 200A, at the relevant point of time, permitted computation of amount recoverable from, or payable to, the tax deductor after making adjustment on account of “arithmetical errors” and “incorrect claims apparent from any information in the statement, after making adjustment for `interest, if any, computed on the basis of sums deductible as computed in the statement. No other adjustments in the amount refundable to, or recoverable from, the tax deductor, were permissible in accordance with the law as it existed at that point of time.

The Tribunal deleted the levy of late filing fees u/s. 234E, in all the eleven appeals, by way of impugned intimations issued.

The appeals filed by the assessee were allowed.

[2015] 155 ITD 167/61 (Chandigarh) Harpreet Singh vs. ITO A.Y. 2010-11. Date of Order – 31st July, 2015

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Section 271(1)(c), read with section 22, of the Income-tax Act, 1961- No penalty can be imposed in a case where assesse suo motu revises his return declaring additional income and has paid taxes thereon before any detection of concealment by revenue authorities.

FACTS
The assessee filed his return declaring certain rental income. Subsequently, the assessee suo moto revised its return wherein he included certain additional amount of rental income.

Since original return was not filed u/s. 139(1) within prescribed time, the Assessing Officer opined that return filed subsequently could not be treated as revised return. The Assessing officer thus completed assessment u/s. 143(3). He also passed a penalty order u/s. 271(1)(c) for concealment of particulars relating to rental income.

The Commissioner (Appeals) confirmed penalty order.

On second appeal:

HELD
The Tribunal observed that in the instant case the assessee had offered additional rental income and paid the taxes thereon before any detection of concealment by the revenue authorities. No notice or query was raised regarding the rental income offered by the assessee for taxation. Therefore, it cannot be said that the assessee either concealed the income or furnished the inaccurate particulars of income. In this case, the rental income inadvertently omitted in the original return was voluntarily offered for taxation during the course of assessment proceedings. The assessee submitted that during the course of assessment proceedings, the assessee realized its mistake and pointed out the same to the Assessing Officer.

There was no detection of concealed income by the revenue authorities. The assessee voluntarily offered the rental income for taxation and the same was accepted by the Assessing Officer in the assessment order passed u/s. 143(3) of the Act. Considering the entire facts and circumstances of the present case, it was held that no penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) can be validly levied. Therefore, the penalty levied by the Assessing Officer and confirmed by the Commissioner (Appeals) is cancelled.

[2015] 155 ITD 140/61 taxmann.com 178 (Chandigarh) DCIT vs. Gulshan Verma A.Y. 2005-06. Date of Order : 14th July, 2015

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Section 68 – Where assessee received certain unsecured loan from a non resident, in view of fact that the said amount was advanced through an account payee cheque from NRE account of lender, no addition can be made u/s. 68 in respect of the said loan.

FACTS
The asseessee had taken an unsecured loan from one party ‘S’ residing in USA. The amount was obtained from an NRE account maintained by the lender with ‘C’ bank.

According to the Assessing Officer, the assessee failed to submit any evidence, viz. a copy of bank account of the lender in the country of his residence from where the funds were transferred to his NRE account maintained with ‘C’ bank. The Assessee also failed to submit any evidence regarding the remittance into the NRE account.

In the absence of the above-mentioned documents, the Assessing Officer held that the creditworthiness of the lender was not established and added the loan amount to the total income of the assessee u/s. 68.

The Commissioner (Appeals) confirmed the above treatment.

On Second appeal:

HELD
The Tribunal observed that in order to discharge the onus u/s. 68, the assessee must prove the following ingredients:-

1. The identity of the creditor
2. The capacity of the creditor to advance the money.
3. The genuineness of the transaction

There was no dispute regarding the identity of the creditor. The assessee had submitted a certificate from the manager of ‘C’ bank stating that ‘S’ holder of NRE account had transferred Rs. 4,25,000/- through a cheque on the account of the assessee.

The assessee had also produced the bank statement of ‘C’ bank before the authorities to demonstrate that ‘S’ had transferred the said amount to him. The assessee had also produced confirmation letter in the form of an affidavit of ‘S’ duly attested by ‘T’, Notary Public State of Meryland wherein ‘S’ had stated that he is a resident of USA. He had also confirmed giving of interest free unsecured loan from ‘C’ bank by way of cheque. The lower authorities were not in question about the authenticity of the affidavit. The only doubt was that the lender had not disclosed his source of income. The lower authorities also verified the passport of the lender.

There is no dispute that ‘S’ was maintaining an NRE account which was opened with an initial deposit of $10,000, i.e., Rs. 4,48,829/-. The ‘C’ bank had issued a certificate to this effect. The Assessing Officer raised an objection that the assessee failed to file a copy of the bank account of the lender in the country of his residence. The assessee had also submitted a copy of ITR filed in USA by ‘S’ for the period 01.01.04 to 31.12.04, wherein the annual income of $22,201 had been declared. There is no dispute about the financial capacity of the lender as well.

Considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case and the income which the lender had reported in ITR, there was no reason to doubt the creditworthiness or the financial capacity of the lender and thus there can be no addition u/s. 68.

Therefore, the impugned addition was deleted.

Search and seizure – Retention of seized articles – Section 132A – A. Y. 2012-13 – IT authorities requisitioning silver articles of assessee from railway police for purpose of investigation – Assessment order taking note of such seizure but no addition on account of seized articles – IT authorities to hand over seized articles to assessee

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K. S. Jewellers Pvt. Ltd. vs. DIT; 379 ITR 526 (Guj):

The railway police seized silver ornaments from the authorised person of the assessee and registered a case u/s. 124 of the Bombay Police Act. The Railway police informed the Income-tax Department about seizure of the silver ornaments pursuant to which the Income-tax Department requisitioned the ornaments for the purpose of investigation under the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Assessment order took note of the seizure but no addition was made on that count. Assessee’s applications for release of the articles were ignored.

The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“i) The silver ornaments weighing 219.841 kgs. were requisitioned by the Income-tax Authorities in exercise of the powers of section 132A in the F. Y. 2011- 12. Thereafter the assessment was framed by the Assessing Officer of the assessee for the A. Y. 2012-13, whereby after taking note of such requisition made by the authorities, the return as filed by the assessee was accepted without making any addition on account of such seizure.

ii) Under the circumstances, without entering into the merits of the validity of the authorisation issued u/s. 132A and in view of the assessment order made in the case of the assessee, the Income-tax Authorities could no longer continue with the seizure of the ornaments and the seized ornaments were required to be returned to the assessee.

iii) The respondent authorities are directed to forthwith hand over the seized silver ornaments to the petitioner within a period of four weeks from today.”

Penalty – Concealment – Section 271(1)(c) – A. Y. 2008-09 – Capital gains – Exemption – Whether assesee entitled to exemption u/s. 54 or section 54F or neither pending before High Court – Addition itself debatable – Penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) not justified

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CIT vs. Dr. Harsha N. Biliangudy; 379 ITR 529 (Karn):

For the A. Y. 2008-09, the assessee’s claim for deduction u/s. 54/54F was pending before High Court for consideration. The Tribunal deleted the penalty imposed by the Assessing Officer u/s. 271(1)(c).

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The imposition of penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) was for concealment of material particulars of income by the assessee or furnishing inaccurate particulars of such income. It was not the case of the Revenue that the assessee had furnished details with regard to the income derived from the sale and purchase of the properties. The question as to whether the assessee was to be given the benefit u/s. 54 or section 54F or was not to be given the benefit, was yet to be finalized by the High Court, where the appeal against the assessment proceedings was still pending.

ii) The assessee had given full description of the property which was sold by him and of the property purchased by him. Merely because the assessee was not to be given the benefit u/s. 54 as the property sold by the assessee was not a residential property it could not be said that there was concealment of material information by the assessee because complete details of the property sold by the assessee were given by him in the returns filed by him.

iii) Where penalty was imposed in respect of any addition where the High Court has admitted the appeal on substantial question of law, then the sustainability of the addition itself becomes debatable, and in such circumstances penalty could not be levied u/s. 271(1)(c).”

Exemption u/s. 10A – A. Y. 2000-01 – Relevance of date of notification of STPI – Assessee having been notified by STPI on 04/03/2000 is eligible for exemption u/s. 10A for entire A. Y. 2000-01 – AO was not justified in restricting the benefit for the period after 04/03/2000

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CIT vs. Soffia Software Ltd.; 281 CTR 594 (Mad):

The assessee was notified by the STPI on 04/03/2000 as eligible for exemption u/s. 10A of the Income-tax Act, 1961. For the A. Y. 2000-01, the assessee claimed exemption u/s. 10A of the Act. The Assessing Officer restricted the exemption to the period after 04/03/2000/-. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The CIT(A) as well as the assessing authority fell into error by holding that registration as an STPI is a requirement for the assessee to claim the benefit u/s. 10A. Section 10A applies if an industrial undertaking has begun or begins to manufacture or produce articles or things during the previous year relevant to the assessment year.

 ii) In this case, the date of STPI notification is 04/03/2000. Therefore the assessee has begun or begins to manufacture or produce articles or things during the previous year relevant to the assessment year in the STPI unit and it will be entitled to deduction u/s. 10A in respect of profit attributed to export turnover. The Circular issued u/s. 10B cannot be made applicable to a case falling u/s. 10A.

iii) Furthermore, the circular which has been relied upon by the CIT(A) dated 06/01/2005, has no relevance to the A. Y. 2000-01. The assessee is eligible for exemption u/s. 10A for the entire A. Y. 2000-01.”

Business expenditure – Disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) – A. Y. 2008-09 – Reimbursment of service charges is not taxable – Tax not deductible at source from such amount – Expenditure cannot be disallowed u/s 40(a)(ia) of the Act

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CIT vs. DLF Commercial Project Corporation; 379 ITR 538 (Del):

For the A. Y. 2008-09, the Assessing Officer made an addition of Rs. 19,09,83,236/- u/s. 40(a)(ia), for non deduction of tax at source on reimbursement of expenditure paid to DLF though the latter entity had deducted tax at source on the payments made by it as a facilitator on behalf of the assessee. The Tribunal deleted the addition.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“It is undisputed that DLF deducted tax at source on payments made by it under various heads on behalf of the assessee. Further, it is also not disputed that the assessee deducted TDS on the service charges paid by it to DLF on reimbursement expenses. In such circumstances this Court holds that the entire amount paid by the assessee to DLF is entitled to deduction as expenditure.”

Business expenditure – Disallowance u/s. 14A – Variable ‘A’ prescribed in the formula in Rule 8D(2)(ii) (to make disallowance in case of common interest expenditure) would exclude both interest attributable to tax exempt income as well as taxable income

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Principal CIT vs. Bharti Overseas (P.) Ltd.; [2015] 64 taxmann.com 340 (Delhi):

Considering the scope of Rule 8D(2)(ii) for computing disallowance u/s. 14A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Delhi High Court held as under:

“i) The object behind section 14A (1) is to disallow only such expense which is relatable to tax exempt income and not expenditure in relation to any taxable income. This object behind section 14A has to be kept in view while examining Rule 8D (2) (ii). In any event a rule can neither go beyond or restrict the scope of the statutory provision to which it relates.

ii) Rule 8D (2) states that the expenditure in relation to income which is exempt shall be the aggregate of (i) the expenditure attributable to tax exempt income, (ii) and where there is common expenditure which cannot be attributed to either tax exempt income or taxable income then a sum arrived at by applying the formula set out thereunder. What the formula does is basically to “allocate” some part of the common expenditure for disallowance by the proportion that average value of the investment from which the tax exempt income is earned bears to the average of the total assets. It acknowledges that funds are fungible and therefore it would otherwise be difficult to allocate the sum constituting borrowed funds used for making tax-free investments. Given that Rule 8D(2)(ii) is concerned with only ‘common interest expenditure’ i.e. expenditure which cannot be attributable to earning either tax exempt income or taxable income, it is indeed incongruous that variable A in the formula will not also exclude interest relatable to taxable income.”

Comments and Suggestions on Draft Guiding Principles for Determination of Place of Effective Management (POEM) of a Company

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30th December 2015

To
The Director
Tax Policy & Legislation – I,
Central Board of Direct Taxes,
Room No 147-D, North Block,
New Delhi 110001.

Dear Sir,

Comments and Suggestions on Draft Guiding Principles for Determination of
Place of Effective Management (POEM) of a Company

On 23rd December 2015, the Central Board of Direct Taxes has released the draft Guiding Principles for Determination of Place of Effective Management of a Company for public comments and suggestions.

We give below our representation on, and suggestions in respect of the draft.

General

1. In principle, we welcome the issuance of guidelines, to bring further clarity on what constitutes a POEM in India, and which will help to reduce the subjectivity. This will help to reduce possible litigation in this regard.

2. While the purpose of the guidelines is to reduce the subjectivity as to what constitutes POEM in India, and to have greater certainty as to the existence or non-existence of a POEM in India, we believe that the draft guidelines are too subjective in nature, and leave too much room for interpretation by the assessing authorities. The guidelines, if issued in the present draft form, will therefore not serve the purpose behind the issue of such guidelines. We set out below some of the reasons as to why we believe the guidelines are too subjective. We suggest that, at least in the initial stages, the guidelines should be more objective, to prevent misuse of discretion by assessing officers.

Definition of “Passive Income”

3. The definition of “passive income” includes income by way of royalty, dividends, capital gains, interest or rental income. There are often instances where such incomes could be active incomes. For example, royalty for a research and development company or for a company providing value added services to a telecommunications company, interest for a bank or financial services company, rental income for a mall, etc., are incomes arising out of active business activity, and cannot be regarded as passive incomes. Such incomes of such types of companies need to be classified as active incomes.

Companies Carrying on Active Business
4. In case of companies carrying on active business outside India, in paragraph 7, it has rightly been laid down that the POEM shall be presumed to be outside India if the majority meetings of the board of directors of the company are held outside India. This is an objective test. However, paragraph 7.1 completely negates such objective test laid down under paragraph 7, by stating that if, on the basis of facts and circumstances, it is established that the board of directors are standing aside and not exercising their powers, which powers are being exercised by either the holding company or any other person resident in India, the POEM should be regarded as being in India.

This paragraph fails to appreciate the commercial reality that every company exists for the benefit of its shareholders. Therefore, it is inevitable that every holding company always exercises some amount of control over its subsidiaries, and that certain crucial decisions are always taken in principle by the holding company, particularly in case of wholly owned subsidiaries. The board of directors, which takes the final detailed decisions, is very often guided by the views expressed by and the needs of the holding company, though they may also have their independent views in relation to the relevant matter, and do consider the impact of their decisions on the subsidiary.

Further, though directors may be resident in India, it is not necessary that by virtue of their residence, decisions are being taken in India, since very often the directors would be visiting the country where the subsidiary is carrying on operations, and taking decisions during the course of such visits, in consultation with the local management of the subsidiary.

Paragraph 7.1, which is supposed to be an exception, rather than the norm, is likely to be taken as the norm by assessing officers, rather than the exception, rendering the provisions of paragraph 7 redundant. A view will likely be taken by most assessing officers, where even a couple of or a few decisions are taken by the holding company, which are confirmed by the board of the subsidiary outside India, or where a majority of the directors are resident in India, that the POEM is in India. This will lead to unwarranted litigation.

We therefore strongly recommend that paragraph 7.1 be deleted altogether.

Companies Carrying on Passive Business
5. The guiding principles laid down in paragraph 8.2 are many, and it is not clear as to in which order of precedence they are to be considered. It is possible that some guiding principles may indicate existence of POEM, while others may indicate non-existence of POEM. In such cases, invariably the assessing officer may take the view in favour of existence of POEM, while the assessee is of the view that there is no POEM, given the subjectivity of the guiding principles, leading to avoidable litigation.  It is therefore suggested that the guiding principles should be given in order of precedence, step by step, similar to the tie-breaker test contained in Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements for determination of residence. This will bring clarity and objectivity to the tests. This is important, at least in the initial years of the introduction of the concept of POEM.

Approval of CIT
6. Paragraph 11 provides that in case the assessing officer proposes to hold a company, on the basis of its POEM, as being resident in India, then he needs to seek the prior approval of the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner.

In order to prevent unnecessary harassment of foreign companies, it is suggested that even in cases where an assessing officer wishes to investigate the existence of POEM in India of a foreign company, he should seek such prior approval, giving his reasons for such investigation. Besides, instead of approval by the Commissioner/ Principal Commissioner, the approval required both for investigation, as well as for holding a foreign company as resident in India on the basis of existence of its POEM in India, should be that of the Chief Commissioner/Principal Chief Commissioner.

Other Suggestions
7. It is suggested that it should be clarified that in case a foreign company is regarded as being resident in India, based on its POEM being in India, it should yet to be entitled to all treaty benefits under the treaty of India with the country in which the foreign company is located.

8. Since the guidelines would be issued only in January 2016, it is suggested that the concept of POEM should be introduced only with effect from assessment year 2017-18. An amendment should be made to the Income Tax Act, 1961 through the Finance Act 2016, making the amendment in section 6(3) applicable with effect from assessment year 2017-18, instead of with effect from assessment year 2016-17.

For Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society
Raman Jokhakar
President Chairman,

Gautam Nayak
International Taxation Committee

Levy of Tax on Interest on NRE Deposits

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20th January, 2016

The Editor,
Bombay Chartered Accountants Journal
Mumbai.

Dear Sir,

Re: Levy of Tax on Interest on NRE Deposits

Presently, interest received on NRE Deposits by a Non Resident Indian (NRI) is exempt under section 10(4) of the Income-tax Act. However, the NRIs working and residing in advanced / western countries such as USA, UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, France, Germany etc. are liable for tax in the respective home countries on their global income. In this respect, the Taxation Laws in foreign countries are at par with the Law in India [Section 5(1) of the Act] which mandates that a resident in India is liable to pay tax in India on all incomes from whatever source derived.

Now, in view of FAT CA in USA and other similar Laws in other countries, such NRIs are required to declare their Indian Financial Assets and income there from in their Home Countries and pay tax thereon, irrespective of Tax Treatment extended by Indian Government to the NRIs in respect of Income from their Foreign Exchange Deposits /Financial Assets. Therefore, it makes no sense for India to continue to have provisions like Section 10(4) exempting interest income of NRIs from certain bank deposits and Government Securities as the law abiding NRIs are bound to declare such Indian Income and pay tax thereon at full rate in their respective countries of residence.

Therefore, I feel that such Income should be taxed at a reasonable rate, say between 10-15%, so that the Tax Revenue is reasonably shared between the source country(i.e. India) and the country of NRI’s residence (Home Country). The NRI would not be a loser because he would get tax credit / set off in respect of taxes paid / withheld in India against his tax liability in his Home Country.

The tax rate under various Tax Treaties signed by India prescribe tax rate between 10% to 15%. Therefore, it would be eminently feasible to levy tax on NRE deposits @ 10% without causing any additional tax burden on NRIs or causing flight of capital /NRI deposits from India. Such a levy of tax needs to be properly explained/ communicated to the NRIs.

To facilitate easy tax compliance, the Law may prescribe rate of TDS on Interest earned by NRIs (including Interest earned by them on NRO deposits) @ 10%. However, in case of those NRIs who have such Interest income below basic exemption limit, they should be entitled to submit Tax Return like any other Indian Citizen and claim various exemptions and deductions available under the Law and claim refund of TDS which should be granted expeditiously.

In this manner, India can garner substantial tax revenue from NRIs without posing any additional tax burden on the NRIs or causing flight of NRI Deposits.

Yours sincerely,

Tarunkumar Singhal