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PROSECUTION AND COMPOUNDING

PROSECUTION – The word Prosecution makes every person’s blood run cold. The
menace of black money, i.e., unaccounted money, and tax evasion have assumed
gigantic proportions. The need to control the menace resulted in taking of
drastic remedial measures by the Government. Prosecution and the resultant
terror of imprisonment serve as a powerful deterrent.
Under the Income Tax
Act, 1961 there are various sections for Penalties and Provisions to
ensure/enforce tax compliance, but the best and most effective measure is
Prosecution. Assessment proceedings are civil proceedings while penalty
proceedings are quasi-criminal and prosecution proceedings are criminal in
nature. Prosecutions for offences committed by an assessee are tried by the
Magistrates in the Criminal Courts of the country and the procedure thereof is
governed by the provisions of the Indian Penal Code where attracted, as well as
the rules in the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Indian Evidence Act. In
simple words, we can say that the Income Tax Department has three ways to
punish the assessee, i.e. Levy Interest, Levy Penalties and Prosecution if he
does not follow provisions as prescribed by the Act. Monetary Punishment does
not have that impact on the assessee that Prosecution proceedings have.

 

The roots of
such harsh/rigorous provisions of Prosecution were found in the Wanchoo
Committee Report. The final report by the said Committee states as follows:

 

NEED FOR VIGOROUS PROSECUTION POLICY


In the
fight against tax evasion, monetary penalties are not enough. Many a
calculating tax dodger finds it a profitable proposition to carry on evading
taxes over the years if the only risk to which he is exposed is a monetary
penalty in the year in which he happens to be caught. The public in general
also tends to lose faith and confidence in tax administration once it knows
that even when a tax evader is caught, the administration lets him get away
lightly after paying only a monetary penalty, when money is no longer a major
consideration with him if it serves his business interests….


The Supreme
Court in Gujarat Travancore Agency vs. CIT (1989) 77 CTR (SC) 174: (1989)
177 ITR 455 (SC)
observed that the creation of an offence by the statute
proceeds on the assumption that society suffers injury by the act of omission
of the defaulter and that a deterrent must be imposed to discourage the
repetition of the offence.

 

OFFENCES AND PROSECUTION UNDER INCOME TAX ACT, 1961


The term
“offence” is not defined under the Income Tax Act. Even the
Constitution does not define the term “offence” for the purpose of
Article 20. Section 3(37) of the General Clauses Act defines
“offence” to mean any act or omission made punishable by any law for
the time being in force. This definition would apply to ascertain whether or
not an offence had been committed and only if there is an offence committed the
offender would be prosecuted and would attract liability for punishment in
accordance with the law in force at the relevant time of the commission of the
offence. The term Prosecution is also not defined under the Income Tax Act;
however, Webster’s dictionary defines Prosecution as “The institution and
carrying on of a suit in a court of law or equity, to obtain some right, or to
redress and punish some wrong; the carrying on of a judicial proceeding on
behalf of a complaining party, as distinguished from the defence.”

 

CBDT recently
tabled its report[1]
on Performance Audit on Administration of Penalty and Prosecution before
Parliament wherein they pointed out various gaps in Administration of
Prosecution by the Department. They made some important recommendations; (a)
more robust mechanism to be employed for identifying cases for prosecution
which takes into account timelines, quantum of tax evasion and contemporary
impact, (b) posting of designated and experienced Nodal officer to handle
prosecution, (c) to identify the stage of pendency of all cases in the various
courts and follow it actively for resolution, (d) CBDT to consider compounding
offences before launching Prosecution so that revenues are collected, (e) CBDT
to deploy prosecution machinery for high-impact cases and avoid focusing on
low-impact cases.

 

Recently, it
has become a trend and it has been observed that notices for launching of
Prosecution are being issued in large numbers. The department went into
overdrive and issued show-cause notices en masse after CBDT released
Standard Operating Procedure to be followed for Prosecution in cases of the
TDS/TCS with a strict time frame to complete the entire process from
identification to passing order u/s. 279(1)/279(2) of the Act. Even for the
technical lapse, the department launched Prosecution or forced the assessee to go
for compounding. During FY 2017-18 (up to the end of November, 2017), the
Department filed Prosecution complaints about various offences in 2225 cases
compared to 784 for the corresponding period in the immediately preceding year,
marking an increase of 184%. Therefore, it has become very important to be
aware of the laws relating to Prosecutions under direct taxes.

 

KINDS OF OFFENCES


Income Tax
Act contains a Chapter XXII dealing with ‘offences and prosecution,’ i.e.
section 275A to section 280D of the Act, refer Appendix. Provisions of the
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 are to be followed relating to all offences under
the Income Tax Act since the said Chapter XXII of the Act does not inter se
deal with the procedures regulating the prosecution. However, if the provisions
of the Code are contrary to what is specially provided for by the Act, then the
Act will prevail.

 

Recently,
Prosecutions have been initiated for various offences including wilful attempt
to evade tax or payment of any tax; wilful failure in filing returns of income;
false statement in verification; and failure to deposit the tax
deducted/collected at source or inordinate delay in doing so, among other
defaults.

 

For this
Article, sections 276B, 276C, 276CC and 277 of the Act are dealt hereunder
since most of the prosecution has been launched on the commission of offence
contained in these sections.

 

SECTION 276B – OFFENCE RELATED TO TAX DEDUCTION


Failure to
deduct tax is not an offence but having deducted but not paid to the Central
Government is an offence. If the accused wants to prove that he was prevented
by reasonable causes, the burden to prove is on the accused. The courts have
taken contrary positions with respect to Prosecution in the event the penalty
proceedings have been dropped. The Punjab and Haryana High Court held in Jag
Mohan Singh vs. ITO (1992) 196 ITR 473 (P&H)
that the offence is
complete on the due date on which the amount should have been deposited but not
deposited and a late deposit will not absolve the accused; the fact that the
income-tax authorities charged interest on such deposit and did not impose
penalty will not absolve the accused from liability to Prosecution. However, in
Banwarilal Satyanarayan & Ors. vs. State of Bihar & Anr. (1989) 80 CTR
(Pat) 31: (1989) 179 ITR 387 (Pat),
it has been held that when the
authority under the IT Act has dropped the penalty proceedings on finding that
assessee had furnished good and sufficient reasons for failure to deduct and/or
pay the tax, within time, the Prosecution for the same default is liable to be
discontinued.

 

SECTION 276C – WILFUL ATTEMPT TO EVADE TAX, ETC.


Section 276C
provides that if a person wilfully attempts to evade any tax, penalty or
interest chargeable or imposable under the Act, then without prejudice to any
penalty that may be imposable on him under any provisions of the Act, he will
be liable for prosecution. The Explanation inserted gives very wide coverage to
what constitutes ‘wilful attempt’. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in ITO vs.
Abdul Razaq (1990) 181 ITR 414 (AP)
held that to spell out a wilful attempt
there must be an assessment on the return filed. The Rajasthan High Court in Gopal
Lal Dhamani vs. ITO (1988) 67 CTR (Raj) 175: (1988)172 ITR 456 (Raj)
held
that what is contemplated is evasion before charging or imposing penalty or
interest; it may include wilful suppression in the returns before assessment
and completion; it is not necessary that an assessment must have been made
prior thereto and it is for the prosecution to prove the ingredients of the
offence before the
Criminal Court.

 

SECTION 276CC – FAILURE TO FURNISH A RETURN OF INCOME


With the
online return filings and various data at the disposal of the assessing
officer, it has become very easy to identify the assessees who despite having
taxable income have failed to file their tax return. This section opens with
the words “wilfully fails to furnish…return”. The word `wilful’
implies the existence of a particular guilty state of mind and it imports the
concept of mens rea. The Supreme Court (SC), in a recent ruling in the
case of Sasi Enterprises vs. ACIT [TS-43-SC-2014] has held that
prosecution proceedings u/s. 276CC of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (the Act) for
failure to file a return of income (ROI) could be initiated even while appellate
proceedings were pending. In deciding this case, the SC has placed reliance on
its earlier judgement in the case of Prakash Nath Khanna (Prakash Nath
Khanna vs. CIT [2004] 266 ITR 1 (SC)).

 

SECTION 277 – FALSE STATEMENT IN VERIFICATION, ETC.


This section punishes a person for providing the
Assessing Officer with information which he knows to be false or does not
believe to be true and thus induces him to make a wrong assessment resulting in
the levy of lower income-tax than is proper and due from the assessee. The
expression `person’ in this section is very wide and need not be restricted to
an assessee only. The Madras High Court in N.K. Mohnot vs. Chief CIT (1992)
195 ITR 72 (Mad)
held Prosecution to be valid against the accused who in a
conspiracy with the other accused and certain employees in the race club
applied for duplicate tax deduction certificates in the names of winners,
forged the signatures of the original winners, made false documents and filed
returns containing false declarations and forged signatures and obtained tax
refund orders which were encashed by them.

 

 SECTION 278E – ‘PRESUMPTION AS TO CULPABLE MENTAL STATE’


The burden of
proving the absence of mens rea is on the accused and provides that the
absence needs to be proved not only beyond ‘preponderance of probability’ but
also ‘beyond reasonable doubt[2]’.
He has to prove that he has no ‘culpable mental state’ which includes
intention, motive or knowledge of a fact or belief in, or reason to believe, a
fact. The Delhi High Court in V.P. Punj vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income
Tax & anr. (2002) 253 ITR 0369
held that in view of section 278E, the
absence of culpable mental state has to be proved by the accused in defence
beyond reasonable doubt — Otherwise the Court has to presume the existence of mens
rea
.

 

SECTION 278B – OFFENCES BY COMPANIES / FIRMS/ ASSOCIATION OF PERSONS (AOP)


In case the
default is committed by a company/firm or AOP, the provisions of section 278B
of the IT Act prescribe that every person who was in charge of the company/firm
or AOP at the time of the commission of the offence will also be deemed to be
guilty and liable for Prosecution. Courts have held that a person in charge for
the purposes of section 278B means a person who is in overall control of the
day-to-day business of the company/firm/AOP.

 

Such person
will not be liable for prosecution if he proves the offence was committed
without his knowledge or that he exercised due diligence to prevent the
commission of such an offence. In case it comes to light that an offence has
been committed with the consent or connivance of or such offence is
attributable to some neglect on the part of a director, manager, secretary or
other officer of an entity, then such person will also be liable for
Prosecution.

 

SECTION 280 – ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE PUBLIC SERVANT


If a public
servant furnishes any information or produces any document in contravention of
the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 138, he would be punishable.
However, such Prosecution can be instituted only with the previous sanction of
the Central Government.

 

THE PROCEDURE FOLLOWED BY THE DEPARTMENT


The Income
Tax Act does not prescribe any specific procedure to be followed. However, the
Department follows its own Manual on Prosecution which lays down the various
rules and regulations for the launch of Prosecution and proceedings thereafter.
The Assessing Officer initiates the process and refers the matter to his
Commissioner with a report on the offence committed. The Commissioner, if
satisfied, will issue a notice to the assessee. If the assessee can prove
‘beyond doubt’ of no culpable mental state, then the Commissioner may direct
the AO not to file a complaint before the Court. It may be noted that if the
accused is aged 70 years or above, no prosecution is to be initiated in view of
instructions of the Board and judgment of Allahabad High Court in Kishan Lal
vs. Union of India (1989) 179 ITR 206 (All).

 

THE PROCEDURE FOLLOWED BY THE COURT


Once the
complaint is received, the Court summons the accused by sending the copy of the
complaint, and if the accused is not present on the day of summoning, then the
Court can issue a warrant against the accused, wherein he may be arrested and
produced before the Court.

 

After giving
the opportunity of hearing to the accused if the Court feels that there is no
apparent case, then the court will dismiss the complaint, whereas if there is
any primary evidence available, then the Court will frame a charge and the
Prosecution proceedings will be continued under Criminal Procedure Code. If the
trial results in a conviction, the appeal to the court will lie under the CPC
to be filed within 30 days of the date of order. Sanction for each of the
offence under which the accused is prosecuted is mandatory, otherwise the
entire proceedings will be void ab initio.

 

In the case
of Champalal Girdharlal vs. Emperior (1933) 1 ITR 384 (Nag) (HC), where
sanction was issued for an offence u/s. 277, however, the accused was found
guilty u/s. 277C, Therefore, it was held that the conviction was illegal.

 

When the
magistrate issues bailable or non-bailable warrant, necessary application for
seeking bail has to be made. If the bail application is rejected, an appeal
lies before the Session Judge and thereafter an application lies u/s. 482 of
the Criminal Procedure Code before the Hon’ble High Court.

 

PROOF OF ENTRIES IN RECORDS OR DOCUMENTS


By insertion
of section 279B of the Act by the Amending Act, 1989, the requirement to produce
a number of original records, documents, seized books of accounts, etc., before
the Courts for establishing the case have been dispensed with. It is now
possible for the Court to admit as evidence the entries on the records or other
documents in the custody of an income-tax authority and all such entries may be
proved either by the production of such records or other documents or by the
production of a copy of the entries certified by the income-tax authorities.

The question
is whether there is any mode of conciliation to avoid the rigours of
Prosecution; and the answer is compounding of offence.

 

COMPOUNDING OF OFFENCES


Section
279(2) of the Act provides that any offence under Chapter XXII of the Act may,
either before or after the institution of proceedings, be compounded by the
Chief Commissioner of Income Tax/Principal Chief Commissioner of Income Tax.
The CBDT has instructed that efforts should be made to convince the assessee to
go for compounding rather than face Prosecution. The Board has also instructed
that a prosecution should not ordinarily be compounded if prospects of success
are good. The number of complaints compounded by the Department during the
current FY (upto the end of November, 2017) stands at 1,052 as against 575 in
the corresponding period of the immediately preceding year, registering a rise
of 83%.

 

THE GENERAL MEANING OF COMPUNDING OF OFFENCES


Compoundable
offences are those which can be conciliated by the parties under dispute. The
permission of the Court is not required in such cases. When an offence is
compounded, the party, which has been distressed by the offence, is compensated
for his grievance.

 

A new set of
compounding guidelines are issued by the Income-tax Department vide
Notification F No. 185/35/2013 IT (Inv.V)/108 dated 23rd December,
2014 (2015) 371 ITR 7 (St) w.e.f 1st January, 2015.

 

The offences
under Chapter – XXII of the Act are classified into two parts (Category ‘A’ and
Category ‘B’) for the limited purpose of compounding of the offences, refer
Appendix. In case of an offence categorised in Category A, which are ‘less
grave’ offences, compounding is allowed only up to three occasions. Those
offences in Category B, or more serious offences, can be compounded only once.
The guidelines list down various other categories of persons who are not
eligible for compounding, for example: Offences committed by a person who was
convicted by a Court of law for an offence under any law, other than the Direct
Taxes laws, for which the prescribed punishment was imprisonment for two years
or more, with or without fine, and which has a bearing on the offence sought to
be compounded.

 

Notwithstanding
anything contained in the guidelines, the Finance Minister may relax
restrictions for compounding of an offence in a deserving case on consideration
of a report from the board on the petition of an appellant.

 

  •   Procedure for
    compounding

1.  Compounding of an offence may be considered
only in those cases in which the assessee comes forward with a written request
for compounding of offence;

2.  The amount of undisputed tax, interest and
penalties relating to the default should have been paid;

3.  The assessee should express his willingness to
pay both the prescribed compounding fees as well as establishment expenses;

4.  The assessee undertakes to
withdraw any appeal filed by him, if any, in case the same has a bearing on the
offence sought to be compounded. In case such appeal has mixed grounds, some of
which may not be related to the offence under consideration, the undertaking
may be taken for appropriate modification on grounds of such appeal;

5.  On receipt of the application for compounding,
the same shall be processed by the Assessing Officer/Assistant or Deputy
Director concerned and submitted promptly alongwith a duly filled in
check-list, to the authority competent to compound, through the proper channel;

6.  The competent authority shall duly consider
and dispose of every application for compounding through a speaking order in
the prescribed format within the time limit prescribed by the board from time
to time. In the absence of such a prescription, the application should be
disposed off within 180 days of its receipt. However, while passing orders on
the compounding applications, the period of time allowed to the assessee for
paying compounding charges shall be excluded from the limitation specified
above;

7.  Where compounding application is found to be
acceptable, the competent authority shall intimate the amount of compounding
charges to the applicant requiring him to pay the same within 60 days of
receipt of such intimation. Under exceptional circumstances and on receipt of a
written request for further extension of time, the competent authority may
extend this period up to further period of 120 days. Extension beyond this
period shall not be permissible except with the previous approval of the Member
(Inv), CBDT on a proposal of the competent authority concerned;

8.  However, wherever the compounding charges are
paid beyond 60 days as extended by the competent authority, the applicant shall
have to pay the additional compounding charge at the rate of 2% per month or
part of the month of the unpaid amount of compounding charges;

9.  The competent authority shall pass the compounding
order within 30 days of payment of compounding charges. Where compounding
charge is not deposited within the time allowed, the compounding application
may be rejected after giving the applicant an opportunity of being heard. The
order of rejection shall be brought to the notice of the Court immediately
through prosecution counsel in the cases where the prosecution had been
instituted. The Division Bench of the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in response
to the writ petition titled Vikram Singh vs. UOI (W.P.(C) 6825/2016)
held that the CBDT cannot insist on a “pre-deposit” of the compounding fee even
without considering the application for compounding. The CBDT instructions to
that extent is undoubtedly ultra vires section 279 of the Act.

 

CONCLUSION


Prosecution
is a serious offence. It is high time that the assessee realise the seriousness
with which the Department has started pursuing prosecution. It is in the
interest of the assessee to comply with the law; at the same time, it is the
responsibility of the CA fraternity to guide and advise their clients in not
violating any of the provisions of the Act. The Department should also take a
holistic view before launching Prosecution and be guided by the conduct of the
taxpayer and the gravity of the situation.
 

 

APPENDIX
– SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS UNDER THE INCOME TAX ACT, 1961

 

Sr. No.

Act or omission which constitutes an offence

Section under I.T. Act, 1961

Maximum Punishment (Rigorous imprisonment)

Minimum Punishment (Rigorous imprisonment)

Classification for Compounding Category

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

Contravention
of an order u/s. 132(3)

275A

Up
to two years and fine

As
decided by the Court

B

2

Failure
to comply with provisions of S.132(1)(iib)

275B

Up
to two years and fine

As
decided by the Court

B

3

Removal,
concealment, transfer or delivery of property to thwart tax recovery (w.e.f.
1-4-1989)

276

Up
to two years and fine

As
decided by the Court

A

4

Liquidator 



(a)
Fails to give notice u/s. 178(1)

 

 

276A (i)

Up
to two years

Not less than six months unless special and
adequate reason given

B

(b)
Fails to set aside the amount u/s. 178(3)

276A (ii)

 

(c)
Parts with assets of company

276A (iii)

 

5

Failure
to comply with the provisions of section 269UC about the transfer of property
without entering into an agreement as specified; failure to surrender or
deliver/possession of the property vested in the Central Government on the
presumptive purchase or contravening the provisions putting a restriction on
registration of documents.

276AB

Up
to two years

Not less than six months unless special and
adequate reason given

B

6

Failure
to pay the tax deducted at source within the specified period.

276B

Up
to seven years and fine

Three months and fine

A

7

Failure
to pay tax collected at source

276BB

Up
to seven years and fine

Three months and fine

A

8

a)
Wilful attempt to evade tax, penalty, interest, etc., chargeable or imposable
under the Act.

276C(1)

If
tax evaded is over Rs. 2,50,000/ – Seven years and fine

 

In
any other case two years and fine

Six months and fine

 

 

Three months and fine

B

 

 b) Wilful attempt to evade payment of tax,
penalty or interest

 276C(2)

Two
years and fine

 Three months and fine

 

 9

Wilful
failure to file a return of income u/s. 139(1) or return of fringe benefit
u/s. 115WD(1) or in response to notice u/s. 115WD(2), 115WH, 142(1), 148 or
153A of the Act

276CC

If
the amount of tax evaded is over Rs. 2,50,000/-, up to seven years and fine

Six
months and fine

B

In
any other case, Simple imprisonment for a term of two years and fine

Three
months and fine

10

Wilful
failure to furnish in due time return in response to notice u/s. 158BC.

276CCC

Simple
imprisonment for a term of three years and fine

Three
months and fine

B

11

Wilful
failure to produce accounts and documents or non-compliance with an order
u/s. 142(2A) to get accounts audited etc.

276D

Up
to one year with fine

 

B

12

Whenever
verification is required under Law, making a false verification or delivery
of a false account or statement.

277

If
the amount of tax evaded is more than Rs. 2,50,000/- –Up to 7 years and fine

Six
months and fine





 Three months and fine

B

In
other cases, two years and fine

13

Falsification
of books of account or document, etc.

277A

Up
to two years and fine

Three
months and fine

B

14

Abetting
or inducing another person to make, deliver a false account, statement or
declaration relating to chargeable income, or to commit an offence u/s.
276C(1)

278

Amount
of tax, penalty or interest evaded more than Rs. 2,50,000/- – up to seven
years and fine

Six
months and fine

A
– Abetment of false return etc. with reference to Category ‘A’ Offences

Any
other case two years and fine

 Three months and fine

Abetment
of false return  etc. with
reference  to Category ‘B’ offences

15

A
person once convicted, under any of the sections 276B, 276(1), 276CC, 276DD,
276E, 277 or 278 is again convicted of an offence under any of the aforesaid sections.

278A

Up
to 7 years and fine

Six
Months and fine

 

16

A
public servant furnishing any information or producing any document in
contravention of s. 138

280

Up
to six months and fine

As
decided by the Court

 

 



[1] Union Government
Department of Revenue – Direct Taxes Report No. 28 of 2013

[2] Circular No. 469
dt. 23-9-1986 (1986) 162 ITR 21(St) (39)

APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 14A – RELEVANCE OF ‘DOMINANT PURPOSE’ OF ACQUISITION OF SHARES/ SECURITIES – PART – II

Introduction


5.   As
mentioned in para 1.3 of Part-I of this write-up [January, 2019 Issue of BCAJ],
the Apex Court dealt with the main issue of applicability of section 14A in
cases where the shares were purchased by the assessee for acquiring/retaining
controlling interest or as stock-in-trade and in the process, it has dealt with
some other issues in the context of these provisions. As further mentioned in
para 3 of Part-I of this write-up, the Delhi High Court in MaxOpp Investments
Ltd’s case for the Assessment Year 2002-2003 [(2012) -347 ITR 272] took
the view that for the purpose of determining the applicability of section 14A,
it is not relevant whether the assessee has made investments for the purpose of
acquiring/retaining controlling interest as the dividend income is exempt. As
such, according to the Delhi High Court, dominant purpose for acquiring shares
is not relevant in this context. On the other hand, as mentioned in para 4 of
Part-I of this write-up, the Punjab & Haryana High Court, in State Bank of
Patiala’s case for the Assessment Year 2008-2009 [(2017) – 391 ITR 218], took
the contrary view in a case where the shares/securities were held by the assessee
as stock-in-trade. The Apex Court in batch of cases [MaxOpp Investments Ltd
vs. CIT and other cases (2018) 402 ITR 640 (SC)
] has brought out the facts,
observations and findings of the Delhi High Court in MaxOpp Investments Ltd’s
case and of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in State Bank of Patiala’s case
primarily to decide the main issue [Ref paras 3.1 to 3.3 and paras 4.1 to 4.3
of Part-I of this write-up].

 

Is dominant purpose relevant ?


6.1     After
noting the divergent views emerged from the High Courts on this issue and the
reasoning given by the High Courts in support of these conflicting opinions,
the Court proceeded to consider this main issue as to whether the purpose of
making investment yielding Exempt Income is relevant for the purpose of applying
the provisions of section 14A and arguments of both the sides in that respect.

 

6.2     The
Court, to begin with, referred to statutory scheme contained in the provisions
of section 14A and Rule 8D and noted that the same should be kept in mind to
examine the divergent views expressed in the judgments of the above referred
High Courts. Further, the Court also 
referred to the views expressed by the Karnataka High Court in CCI Ltd’s
case and in both the judgments of the Calcutta High Court, in G.K.K. Capital’s
case and in Dhanuka & Sons’ case, referred to in para 4.4 of Part-I of this
write-up.

 

6.3     The
Court then briefly recapitulated the main 
arguments canvassed on behalf of the Assessees that: the holdings of
investments in group companies representing controlling interest amounts to
carrying on business as held in various cases; the character of dividend income
from such investments in shares continues to be business income though, by
virtue of the mandatory prescription in section 56 of the Act, such dividend
income is assessable under the head ‘Income from Other Sources’; interest paid
on funds borrowed for such investments is for the purpose of business and not
for earning dividend income and conversely, interest paid on such borrowed
funds does not represent expenditure incurred for earning dividend income and
was not allowable u/s. 57(iii) (prior to introduction of section 14A).

 

6.3.1  Based
on the above principles, it was, interalia, contended on behalf
of the assessee that when the shares were acquired, as part of promoter
holding, for the purpose of acquiring controlling interest in the
investee-company, the dominant object is to keep the controlling interest and
not to earn dividend and even when the dividend is not declared, the Assessee would
not liquidate such shares. As such, no expenditure was incurred ‘in relation
to‘ Exempt Income as contemplated in section 14A as the mandate and requirement
of section 14A requires a direct and proximate nexus between the expenditure
and the Exempt income to attract section 14A. It was further contended that
even if contextual/ purposive interpretation is to be given, that also requires
direct and proximate connection between the expenditure and the Exempt Income.
The section requires that only expenditure actually incurred ‘in relation to’
Exempt Income is to be disallowed so as to remove the double benefit to the
assessee.

 

6.3.2     On
behalf of the Revenue, it was, inter-alia, contended that the view taken
by the Delhi High Court is correct and the objective behind these provisions
manifestly pointed out that the expenditure incurred in respect of Exempt
Income earned has to be disallowed. For this, the reliance was also placed on
the Apex Court’s judgment in Walfort’s case [referred to in para 3.3 of Part-I
of this write-up]. According to the counsel for the Revenue, otherwise the
assessee will get double benefit. Firstly, 
in the form of exemption in respect of income and secondly, by getting
deduction of expenses against other taxable income as well. Therefore, the
expression ‘in relation to’ had to be given expansive meaning in order to
achieve the object of the provision. It was also pointed out that the literal
meaning of section 14A also indicates towards that and that was equally the
purpose of insertion of the provisions as brought out in Explanatory
Memorandum.

 

6.4     After
considering the contentions raised on behalf of both the sides, the Court
proceeded to consider the main issue and observed as under (pg 665):

 

“In the
first instance, it needs to be recognized that as per section 14A(1) of the
Act, deduction of that expenditure is not to be allowed which has been incurred
by the assessee “in relation to income which does not form part of the total
income under this Act”. Axiomatically, it is that expenditure alone which has
been incurred in relation to the income which is not includible in total income
that has to be disallowed. If an expenditure incurred has no causal connection
with the exempted income, then such an expenditure would obviously be treated
as not related to the income that is exempted from tax, and such expenditure
would be allowed as business expenditure. To put it differently, such
expenditure would then be considered as incurred in respect of other income
which is to be treated as part of the total income.”

 

6.4.1   After bringing out the effect of
section14A(1), the Court also stated that there is no quarrel in assigning the
above meaning to section 14A and , in fact, all the High Courts including the
Delhi High Court & Punjab & Haryana High Court have agreed on this
interpretation. Having observed this, the Court focused on the real issue with
regard to interpretation of the expression ‘in relation to’ and observed as
under (pg 665) :

            

“……The
entire dispute is as to what interpretations to be given to the words ”in
relation to” in the given scenario, viz., where the dividend income on the
shares is earned, though the dominant purpose for subscribing in those shares
of the investee-company was not to earn dividend. We have two scenarios in
these sets of appeals. In one group of cases the main purpose for investing in
shares was to gain control over the investee-company. Other cases are those
where the shares of investee-company were held by the assessees as
stock-in-trade (i.e. as a business activity) and not as investment to earn
dividends. In this context, it is to be examined as to whether the expenditure
was incurred, in respective scenarios, in relation to the dividend income or not. 

 

6.5     After
bringing out the real issue on hand and by drawing support from the views
expressed by the Apex Court in Walfort’s case, the Court took the view that for
this purpose the dominant purpose test is not relevant and held as under (pgs
665/666):

       

“Having
clarified the aforesaid position, the first and foremost issue that falls for
consideration is as to whether the dominant purpose test, which is pressed into
service by the assessee would apply while interpreting section 14A of the Act
or we have to go by the theory of apportionment. We are of the opinion that the
dominant purpose for which the investment into shares is made by an assessee
may not be relevant. No doubt, the assessee like MaxOpp Investments Limited may
have made the investment in order to gain control of the investee-company.
However, that does not appear to be a relevant factor in determining the issue
at hand. The fact remains that such dividend income is non-taxable. In this
scenario, if expenditure is incurred on earning the dividend income, that much
of the expenditure which is attributable to the dividend income has to be
disallowed and cannot be treated as business expenditure.  Keeping this objective behind section14A of
the Act in mind, the said provision has to be interpreted, particularly, the
words “in relation to” that does not form part of total income. Considered in
this hue, the principle of apportionment of expenses comes in to play as that
is the principle which is engrained in section 14A of
the Act…..”

                 

6.5.1   In the above context, while disagreeing with
the view expressed by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in State Bank of
Patiala’s case, the Court agreed with the view taken by the Delhi High Court in
the MaxOpp Investments Ltd’s case and held as under (pg 666):

 

“The Delhi
High Court, therefore, correctly observed that prior to introduction of section
14A of the Act, the law was that when an assessee had a composite and
indivisible business which had elements of both taxable and non-taxable income,
the entire expenditure in respect of the said business was deductible and, in
such a case, the principle of apportionment of the expenditure relating to the
non-taxable did not apply. The principle of apportionment was made available
only where the business was divisible. It is to find a cure to the aforesaid
problem that the Legislature has not only inserted section 14A by the Finance
(Amendment) Act, 2001 but also made It retrospective, i.e., 1962 when the
Income-tax Act itself came into force. The aforesaid intent was expressed
loudly and clearly in the Memorandum Explaining the Provisions of the Finance
Bill, 2001.We, thus, agree with the view taken by the Delhi High Court, and are
not inclined to accept the opinion of the Punjab and Haryana High Court which
went by dominant purpose theory. The aforesaid reasoning would be applicable in
cases where shares are held as investment in the investee-company, may be for
the purpose of having controlling interest therein. On that reasoning, appeals
of MaxOpp Investment Limited as well as similar cases where shares were
purchased by the assessees to have controlling interest in the investee-company
have to fail and are, therefore, dismissed.”

 

6.6     The
Court then dealt with another aspect of the main issue that when the shares are
held as stock-in-trade. In this context the Court noted CBDT Circular No 18 dtd
2/11/2015  [referred to in para 4.3(a) of
Part-I of this write-up] wherein the Board has clarified that income from
investments made by a banking concern is attributable to business of banking
and is taxable as business income. In this Circular, the Board has gone by the
judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Nawanshahar’s case which was dealing
with  the claim of the bank u/s. 80P
which was relied on by the  Punjab &
Haryana High Court in State Bank of Patiala’s case. In this context, the Court
observed as under (pg 667):

 

“ Form this, the Punjab and Haryana High Court pointed out that this
circular carves out a  distinction
between “stock-in-trade” and “ investment” and provides that if the motive
behind purchase and sale of shares is to earn profit, then the same would be
treated as trading profit and if the object is to derive income by way of
dividend then the profit would be said to have accrued from investment. To this
extent, the High court may be correct. At the same time, we do not agree with
the test of dominant intention applied by the Punjab and Haryana High Court,
which we have already discarded. In that event, the question is as to on what
basis those cases are to be decided where the shares of other

companies are purchased by the assessees as “ stock-in-trade” and not as
“investment”. We proceed to discuss this aspect hereinafter.”

 

6.6.1  While
finally deciding the above issue against the assessee to the effect that even
in  such cases Sec. 14A will apply as the
purpose of acquisition of shares is not relevant, the Court held as under (pgs
667/668):

 

“ In those
cases, where shares are held as stock-in-trade, the main purpose is to trade in
those shares and earn profits therefrom. However, we are not concerned with
those profits which would naturally be treated as “income” under the head
“Profits and gains from business and profession”. What happens is that, in the
process, when the shares are held as “stock-in-trade”, certain dividend is also
earned, though incidentally, which is also an income. However, by virtue of
section 10(34) of the Act, this dividend income is not to be included in the
total income and is exempt from tax. This triggers the applicability of section
14A of the Act which is based on the theory of apportionment of expenditure
between taxable and non-taxable income as held in Walfort Share and Stock
Brokers P. Ltd. case. Therefore, to that extent, depending upon the facts of
each case, the expenditure incurred in acquiring those shares will have to be
apportioned.”

 

Other
Issues


7.1     The
Court then dealt with the facts emerging from State Bank of Patiala’s case
[referred to in para 4.2 of Part-I of this write-up] wherein the AO had
restricted the disallowance to the amount of Exempt Income [Rs.12.20 Crore] by
applying formula contained in Rule 8D and the CIT (A) had enhanced the amount
of disallowance to the entire amount of allocated expenditure [Rs.40.72 Crore]
beyond Exempt Income. In this context, the Court observed as under (pg 668):

 

“ … In spite of this exercise of apportionment of expenditure carried out
by the Assessing Officer, the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) disallowed
the entire deduction of expenditure. That view of the Commissioner of
Income-tax (Appeals) was clearly untenable and rightly set aside by the
Income-tax Appellant Tribunal. Therefore, on facts, the Punjab and Haryana High
Court has arrived at a correct conclusion by affirming the view of the
Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, though we are not subscribing to the theory of
dominant intention applied by the High Court…”

 

7.1.1     While
disagreeing with the views of Punjab & Haryana High Court in State Bank of
Patiala’s case on the theory of dominant purpose test, the Court further stated
as under (pg 668):

 

”… It is
to be kept in mind that in those cases where shares are held as
stock-in-trade”, it becomes a business activity of the assessee to deal in
those shares as a business proposition. Whether dividend is earned or not
becomes immaterial. In fact, it would be a quirk of fate that when the
investee-company declared dividend, those shares are held by the assessee,
though the assessee has to ultimately trade those shares by selling them to
earn profits. The situation here is, therefore, different from the case like
MaxOpp Investment Ltd. where the assessee would continue to hold those shares
as it wants to retain control over the investee-company. In that case, whenever
dividend is declared by the investee-company that would necessarily be earned
by the assessee and the assessee alone. Therefore, even at the time of
investing into those shares, the assessee knows that it may generate dividend
income as well and as and when such dividend income is generated that would be
earned by the assessee. In contrast, where the shares are held as
stock-in-trade, this may not be necessarily a situation. The main purpose is to
liquidate those shares whenever the share price goes up in order to earn
profits. In the result, the appeals filed by the Revenue challenging the
judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in State Bank of Patiala also
fail, though law in this respect has been clarified hereinabove. 

 

7.2     The Court
then dealt with the effect of section 14A(2) and Rule 8D. In this context, it
may be noted that various the High Courts (including Delhi High Court in MaxOpp
Investments Ltd’s case) have taken a view that before applying Rule 8D to
determine the quantum of disallowance, the AO needs to record his satisfaction
with regard to incorrectness of the quantum of expenditure incurred in relation
to Exempt Income determined by the assessee. Effectively, section 14A(2)
provides that if the assessee has determined the amount of such expenditure
(which may be disallowed) then the AO cannot take resort to Rule 8D for
determination of such expenditure unless the AO, having regards to the accounts
of the assessee, is not satisfied about the quantum of disallowance determined
by the assessee and record reasons for the same. In short, the Rule 8D cannot
be regarded as mandatory for all cases attracting section 14A(1). In this
context, the following observations of the Court are relevant (pgs 668/669):

 

“…we also
make it clear that before applying the theory of apportionment, the Assessing
Officer needs to record satisfaction that having regard to the kind of the
assessee, suo motu disallowance under section 14A was not correct. It will be
in those cases where the assessee in his return has himself apportioned but the
Assessing Officer was not accepting the said apportionment. In that
eventuality, it will have to record its satisfaction to this effect. Further,
while recording such a satisfaction, the nature of the loan taken by the
assessee for purchasing the shares/making the investment in shares is to be
examined by the Assessing Officer.”

 

7.3     As
mentioned earlier, there were number of appeals before the Apex Court. One of
them was filed by Avon Cycles Ltd (Civil appeal No 1423 of 2015) in
which the issue was with regard to disallowance of interest under Rule
8D(2)(ii) in a case where mixed funds were utilised by the assessee for
investment in shares. In this context, the ITAT had held as under (pg 669):

 

“…Admittedly
the assessee had paid total interest of Rs. 2.92 crores out of which interest
paid on term loan raised for specific purpose totals of Rs. 1.70 crores and
balance interest paid by the assessee is Rs. 1.21 crores. The funds utilised by
the assessee being mixed funds and in view of the provisions of rule 8D(2)(ii)
of the Income-tax Rules the disallowance is confirmed at Rs. 10,49,851. We find
no merit in the ad hoc disallowance made by the Commissioner of Income-tax
(Appeals) at Rs. 5,00,000. Consequently, the ground of appeal raised by the
Revenue is partly allowed and the ground raised by the assessee in
cross-objection is allowed.”

 

7.3.1   The High Court had taken a view that the above
being finding other facts, no substantial question of
law arises.

 

7.3.2  This
appeal was dismissed by the Apex Court with following observations (pg 669):

 

“ After
going through the records and applying the principle of apportionment, which is
held to be applicable in such cases, we do not find any merit in Civil Appeal
No. 1423 of 2015, which is accordingly dismissed”

 

7.4     It may also be noted that in the Bombay
High Court judgment (Nagpur Bench) in the case of Jamnalal Sons Pvt. Ltd. [
(2018) 11 ITR –OL 385]
, it appears that the Tribunal had deleted
disallowance of interest expenditure made u/s 14A read with Rule 8D on the
grounds that the assessee had interest free funds available which are far in
excess of the amount invested in shares on which dividend was earned [apart
from other fact that the interest income was also much more than the interest
expenditure]. For this, Tribunal had relied on the judgment of the Bombay High
Court in the case of Reliance Utilities & Power Ltd [(2009) 313 ITR 340]
wherein the Court has held that in such cases, it can be presumed that the
investments were made from the interest free funds. In this case [Jamnalal
& sons’ case], the Revenue had contended before the High Court that the
Punjab & Haryana High Court in Avon Cycles Ltd’s case [referred to in para
7.3 above] has taken a different view from the one taken in Reliance Utilities’
case and also pointed out that appeal of the assessee against this Punjab &
Haryana High Court judgment has been admitted by the Apex Court and is pending.
After considering this, the Bombay High Court has dismissed the appeal of the
Revenue and decided the issue in favour of the assessee for which it also noted
that in the case of HDFC Bank Ltd [(2014) 366 ITR 565], this Court has
reiterated the view taken in Reliance Utilities’ case. One of the appeals filed
before the Apex Court in the MaxOpp Investment Ltd’s case by the Revenue was
also against this Bombay High Court judgment in Jamnalal Sons Pvt Ltd’s case
[Civil Appeal No.2793 of 2018 – Diary No 41203 of 2017] and this appeal of the
Revenue is allowed by the Apex Court.

 

7.5     Few
appeals filed by the Revenue against the assessee involved the issue as to
retrospective applicability of Rule 8D. In this context, the Court stated that
the said Rule is prospective and will apply only from Assessment Year 2008-2009.
This has already been held by the Apex Court in the case of CIT vs. Essar
technologies Ltd. [(2018) 401 ITR 445]
. This was also the view emerging
from the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Godrej & Boyce
Manufacturing Ltd. (2017) 394 ITR 449
[Godrej’s case].

 

CONCLUSION


8.1     In
view of the above judgment of the Apex Court, now it is settled that for the
purpose of determining applicability of section 14A, the dominant purpose test
is not relevant. As such, irrespective of the purpose for which shares are
acquired [i.e. whether for acquiring controlling interest or even for business
activity(to be held as stock-in-trade), provisions of section 14A are
applicable. It is unfortunate that a very sound and rational distinction drawn
by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the State Bank of Patiala’s case
[referred to in para 4.3 of Part-I of this write-up], in the context of shares
held as stock-in-trade, did not appeal the Apex Court in  deciding this issue.

 

8.1.1  It
appears that in a case where shares are held as stock-in-trade and during the
relevant previous year, no dividend income (Exempt Income) is earned therefrom
by the Assessee, the provisions of section 14A should not apply. In this
context, the observations of the Apex Court referred to in paras 6.6, 6.6.1,
7.1, and  7.1.1 above may be useful.

 

8.1.2  Section
14A deals with disallowance of expenditure incurred in relation to Exempt
Income. Therefore, expenditure which is admittedly incurred in relation to
taxable Income [e.g. interest on Term Loan taken and utilised for acquiring
Plant & Machinery meant for manufacturing activity yielding profit which is
not exempt] should be kept outside the purview of disallowance u/s. 14A. As
such, the same should not be considered for the quantification of the amount of
such disallowance . For this, useful reference may be made to the observations
of the Apex Court referred to in para 6.4 above.

 

8.2    Once
the provisions of section 14A(1) are applicable and the quantum of expenditure
in relation to Exempt Income is required to be determined as provided in
section 14A(2), the method prescribed in Rule 8D for determining such quantum
may become relevant. However, if the assessee has suo motu determined the
amount of disallowance u/s 14A then in such cases, the AO cannot invoke Rule 8D
for determining the quantum of such expenditure without recording the reasoned
satisfaction [as contemplated in section14A (2)] that the amount of suo motu
disallowance made by the assessee is not correct. This was the view expressed
by various High Courts including Delhi High Court in MaxOpp Investment Ltd’s
case and Bombay High Court judgment in Ultra Tech Ltd [(2018) 407 ITR 560-
Special Leave Petition [SLP] dismissed (2018) 406 ITR (St) 12]
. This view
also gets support from the observations in the judgment of the Apex Court in
Godrej’s case. This position now gets settled on account of the view expressed
by the Apex Court referred to in para 7.2 above. However, from the view
expressed by the Apex Court, this position may apply only in cases where assessee
in his Return of Income has suo motu apportioned some expenditure
towards the earning of Exempt Income but the AO is not satisfied with the same.
Therefore, practically, it is advisable for the assessees to suo motu
determine the quantum of such disallowance properly so as to avoid
applicability of Rule 8D when working under Rule 8D is adverse to the Assessee.
As such, the application of the Rule 8D is strictly not mandatory.

 

8.2.1  The
above view of the Apex Court, in practice, may raise some further issues,
especially where the Assessee has taken a stand that no such expenditure is
incurred as the observations of the Apex Court are in the context of section
14A(2) and there is no reference to section 14A(3) which refers to the claim of
Nil expenditure and provide that even in such cases, section 14A(2) applies. It
seems that, in such cases, the assessee has to first demonstrate that no such
expenditure is factually incurred.

 

8.3     Considering
the facts of State Bank of Patiala’s case and on account of the view expressed
by the Apex Court referred to in para 7.1 above, in cases where the AO has
restricted the amount of disallowance u/s 14A to the amount of Exempt Income
earned during the year while applying Rule 8D, it would not be possible for the
CIT(A) to enhance the amount of such disallowance beyond the amount of Exempt
Income. In this context, it is worth noting that in the case of the same
assessee (State Bank of Patiala), the Punjab & Haryana High Court [for
Assessment Year 2010-2011 – ITA No 359/2017 dated 14/11/17] appear to have
taken similar view [in the context of order passed by the AO as a result of
order of CIT u/s. 263] by relying on decision in case of same assessee for
other years [i.e Assesstment Year 2009-2010 (2017) 393 ITR 476 and the one
referred to in para 7.1 above]. This judgment of the Punjab & Haryana High
Court dated 14/11/17 in case of the same assessee also subsequently came-up
before the Apex Court in which the SLP is dismissed by the Apex Court by an
order dated 8/10/18 stating that ‘the SLP is dismissed both on the ground of
delay as well as on merits.’ We may clarify that the mere rejection of SLP by
non-speaking order of the Apex Court against the High Court judgment does not
by itself tantamount to confirmation of the judgment of the High Court and
declaration of law by the Apex Court on the issue involved. For implications of
dismissal of SLP, reference may be made to our analysis of the Apex Court
Judgment under the title ‘Impact of rejection of SLP’ in this column in
December, 2000 issue of this Journal.

 

8.3.1  In the above context, in cases where the AO
himself has not restricted the amount of disallowance, some further issues
could arise.

 

8.3.2  Currently,
a debate continues on the issue as to applicability of section 14A in cases
where no Exempt Income is earned by the assessee during the relevant previous
year. Decisions are available on both the sides. It is for consideration
whether the position with regard to restricting the amount of disallowance to
the Exempt Income referred to in para 8.3 above could support the case of the
assessee to contend that if there is no Exempt Income, the provisions of
section 14A should not apply. In this context, it may be noted that the Amritsar
Bench of Tribunal in the case of Lally Motors India Pvt. Ltd [(2018) 170 ITD
370]
has taken adverse view after considering major decisions on both the
sides and also relying on the judgment of the Apex Court [but without
specifically referring to this point arising from the view expressed by the
Apex Court referred to in para 7.1 above] in MaxOpp Investments Ltd’s case. Of
course, if the shares are held as stock-in-trade, the issue should be governed
by the position mentioned in para 8.1.1 above.

 

8.4    Another
issue which is under debate on applicability of section 14A in cases where the
assessee has larger amount of owned funds as well as other interest-free funds
available as compared to the amount invested in shares etc., yielding Exempt
Income. In such a scenario, the courts have effectively confirmed a view that
if the interest-free funds available with an assessee are more than amount
invested in such shares etc. and at the same time, if the assessee has also
borrowed funds on interest, it can be presumed that the investments were made
from the available interest-free funds [Ref HDFC Bank Ltd (2014) 366 ITR 505
(Bom), Max India Ltd. (2017) 398 ITR 209 (P & H), Microlabs Ltd (2016) 383
ITR 490 [Kar HC], Gujarat State Fertilizers & Chemicals Ltd (2018) 409 ITR
378 (GHC), etc.]
In this context, recently, in another case of Gujarat
State Financial Services Ltd [ITA Nos 1252/1253/1255 of 2018]
, the Revenue
contended that in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in MaxOpp Investments
Ltd’s case [considered in this write-up], the legal position is that whenever
the assessee has two sources of funds, interest bearing and non-interest
bearing and also has made investments yielding Exempt Income, disallowance u/s.
14A will have to be made if the issue is to be considered after introduction of
Rule 8D. According to the Revenue, one of the issues decided in MaxOpp
Investment Ltd’s case was this one while dealing with the appeal filed by Avon
Cycle Ltd [referred to in para 7.3 above] in which the issue was with regard to
disallowance under Rule 8D in a case where mixed funds were utilised by the
assessee for such investments.

 

8.4.1   The Gujarat High Court [vide order dtd
15/10/2018], while dealing with the above issue raised by the Revenue,
explained the effect of the judgment of Apex Court in MaxOpp Ltd’s case in this
respect and took the view that this judgment of the Apex Court does not lay
down a proposition that the requirement of Rule 8D(1) of the satisfaction to be
arrived at by the AO before applying the formula given in Rule 8D(2) is done
away with. In other words, according to Gujarat High Court, this judgment of
the Apex Court does not lay down a proposition that the moment it is
demonstrated that the assessee had availed of mixed funds [i.e. interest-free
as well interest bearing funds] and utilised them for making such investments,
the applicability of section 14A read with Rule 8D(2) would be automatic. This
may be useful in cases where Tribunal has given a finding by applying the
presumption of use of interest-free funds in making such investment. In this
context, it is worth noting that the fact of allowing appeal against the Bombay
High Court judgment by the Apex Court in case of Jamnalal & Sons Pvt Ltd.
[referred to in para 7.4 above] was not considered in this case.

 

8.4.2   As mentioned in para 1.1.1 of Part-I of this
write-up, the Rule 8D is amended and, under the amended Rule, the earlier
provisions contained in Rule 8D (2)(ii) providing for disallowance of
proportionate amount of interest expenditure in cases where the mixed funds are
used for making investments is deleted w. e. f 2/6/2016. Therefore, the issues
relating to applicability of that part of the Rule 8D and determining quantum
thereof under that portion of the Rule and large number of decisions dealing
with the same may not be relevant in the post amendment era for that purpose,
though, of course, the same should continue to be relevant for other purposes.

 

8.5        The position is now settled that Rule 8D is prospective as
mentioned in para 7.4 above. This should also apply to amendment in the Rule 8D
w. e. f 2/6/2016 referred to in para 8.4.2 above.

Article 13 (4) of India-France DTAA – Make available condition of India-UK DTAA to be read into India-France DTAA. Advisory services for review of strategic and mergers and acquisitions options, do not qualify as FIS in absence of satisfaction of make available condition.

22. TS-767-ITAT-2018 (Mum) Entertainment
Network (India) Ltd vs. JCIT Date of Order: 21st December, 2018
A.Y.: 2011-12

 

Article 13 (4) of India-France DTAA – Make available
condition of India-UK DTAA to be read into India-France DTAA. Advisory services
for review of strategic and mergers and acquisitions options, do not qualify as
FIS in absence of satisfaction of make available condition.

 

FACTS

Taxpayer, an Indian company made payment to a French Company (FCo)
towards professional services3 rendered during the relevant year.
Taxpayer contended that services rendered by FCo were not technical services
and hence did not qualify as FTS. Without prejudice, by virtue of the Most
Favoured Nation clause (MFN clause) in the India-France DTAA, the make
available condition of India-UK DTAA had to be read into India-France DTAA. In
absence of make available condition being satisfied, payment made to FCo did
not qualify as Fee for included services (FIS). Further, in absence of a
permanent establishment of FCo in India, such income was not liable to tax in
India.

However, AO contended that the services rendered by FCo qualified as FTS
and hence in absence of any withholding, disallowed the payments made to FCo.

 

Aggrieved, Taxpayer appealed before the CIT(A) who upheld the decision
of AO.

 

Consequently, Taxpayer appealed before the Tribunal.

 

HELD

  •             By
    virtue of the MFN clause, make available condition had to be read into
    India-France DTAA. The phrase “make available” means that the knowledge,
    experience, skill, knowhow, etc should be passed on to the service
    recipient such that the service recipient can carry out the services on
    its own.
  •             ICo
    would have to go back to FCo if it wished to avail similar services from
    FCo in future. Hence, the advisory services rendered by FCo, did not make
    available any technical knowledge, experience, skill, etc., to ICo.
  •             Hence,
    services rendered by FCo did not qualify as FIS and hence there was no
    requirement to withhold taxes on payments made to FCo in India4.   

___________________________________________

3.  FCo rendered advisory services by way of review of strategic and
mergers and acquisition options for  ICo.

4.  It appears that FCo did not have a PE in India.

 

TAXABILITY OF LOAN WAIVER POST SC DECISION IN CASE OF MAHINDRA & MAHINDRA

Introduction 

The decision
of the Supreme Court (SC) in the case of Commissioner vs. Mahindra &
Mahindra Ltd
.1
(Mahindra’s case) is a landmark ruling in the context of tax treatment
of loan waiver benefit obtained by a tax payer. The SC held that such waiver is
neither taxable as business perquisite u/s. 28(iv)2  of the Income-tax Act 1961 (ITA), nor taxable
as remission of trading liability u/s. 41(1)3 of the ITA.

 

The SC delivered the judgement after hearing a
batch of connected appeals with the lead case being that of Mahindra. In most
cases before the SC, the loan was utilised by the assessee for acquiring capital
assets (including in Mahindra’s case). But, there were also cases where the
loan was utilised by the assessee for working capital purposes. The SC has
delivered the judgment by analysing the fact pattern of Mahindra’s case as the
lead case.

 

To understand
the controversy in greater detail, it is worthwhile to revisit the history of
judicial development on this aspect.

 

OLD ENGLISH RULING ON NON – TAXABILITY OF REMISSION OF LIABILITY

 

As far back
as 1932, the House of Lords in the British Mexican Petroleum Company Limited
vs. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue
4 (British case) dealt
with a case where the tax payer used to purchase raw material from a supplier
who was also the promoter of the company. At a later date, there was remission
or waiver of indebtedness (including indebtedness which arose due to supplies
effected during the year of remission). The release from liability was not
regarded as a ‘trading receipt’. The Court held “how on earth the
forgiveness in that year of a past indebtedness can add to those profits, I
cannot understand”.

_________________________________________

1   [2018]
404 ITR 1

2   Section
28(iv) of the ITA provides for taxation under the head ‘Profits and gains from
Business or Profession’ of value of any benefit or perquisite whether
convertible into money or not arising from business or profession

3   Section
41(1) of the ITA provides for business taxation of any loss, expenditure or
trading liability which is claimed in past years in the year of remission or
cessation of such loss, expenditure or trading liability.

4   (16
Tax Cases 570) (HL)

 

 

BRITISH CASE FOLLOWED BY INDIAN JUDICIARY

In the case
of Mohsin Rehman Penkar vs. CIT5 before the Bombay High Court
(HC), there was waiver of loan (including waiver of interest expense
component).Following the ratio of the British case, the Bombay HC held “it
is impossible to see how a mere remission which leads to the discharge of the
liability of the debtor can ever become income for the purposes of taxation”
.

 

The ratio of these decisions was followed in the
following illustrative cases dealing with (a) waiver of a trading liability,
e.g. payable towards trading goods, or interest expense, allowed as deduction
from income, (b) waiver of a loan used for working capital purposes, and (c)
waiver of loan used for fixed capital.

 

Illustratively,
the following cases dealt with waiver of trading liability:

  •    Agarchand Chunnilal vs.
    CIT [1948] 16 ITR 430 (Nagpur HC) (A.Y. 1943-44)
  •   C.I.T. vs. Kerala Estate
    Moorlad Chalapuram [1986] 161 ITR 155(SC)(A.Y. 1964-65)

 

Further,
the  following cases dealt with waiver of
loan used for trading purposes:

  •   CIT vs. Phool Chand Jiwan
    Ram [1995] 131 ITR 37 (Delhi)(A.Y. 1957-58)

 

Further, the
following cases dealt with waiver of loan used for fixed capital purposes:

  •    Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd
    vs. CIT [2003] 261 ITR 501(Bom HC) (A.Y. 1976-77);
  •    Iskraemeco Regent Ltd vs.
    CIT [2010] 331 ITR 317(Mad HC (A.Y. 2001-02).

5     [1948] 16 ITR
183

 

 

 

STATUTORY INTERVENTION TO OVERCOME THE RATIO OF BRITISH CASE RESTRICTED TO REMISSION OF TRADING LIABILITY

To overcome
the ratio of British case, a new s/s. (2A) was added in section 10 of the
Indian Income-tax Act 1922 (erstwhile ITA), whereby waiver of trading liability
was expressly made liable to tax by treating the waiver or remission as profits
and gains of business chargeable to tax as such.

 

Section 41(1)
of ITA is successor to section 10(2A) of the erstwhile ITA. Section 41(1)
fictionally treats any amount or benefit received by way of remission or
cessation in respect of loss, expenditure or trading liability allowed in any
past year as profits and gains of business or profession. The fiction is
attracted regardless of discontinuance of business in respect of which the
allowance or deduction was originally made.

 

The question
whether section 41(1) is wide enough to overrule decisions like Phool Chand (supra)
dealing with non-taxability of loan used for working capital became the subject
matter of debate which is discussed a little later in
this article.

 

JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS FAVOURING NON TAXABILITY OF WAIVER OF FIXED CAPITAL LOAN

The judicial
development in context of non-taxability of waiver of loan utilised for fixed
capital like plant and machinery has been quite consistent. The Courts
consistently held that such waiver is neither taxable u/s. 28(iv) of the ITA as
a business perquisite nor taxable u/s. 41(1) of the ITA. Refer, the following
illustrative cases:

  •    Mahindra & Mahindra
    Ltd vs. CIT (supra);
  •   Narayan Chattiar Industries
    vs. ITO [2007] 277 ITR 426(Mad HC);
  •    CIT vs. Chetan Chemicals Pvt
    Ltd [2004] 267 ITR 770(Guj HC) (A.Y. 1982-83);
  •    Iskraemeco Regent Ltd vs. CIT
    (supra);

 

An aberration
to this trend was the Madras HC ruling in the case of CIT vs. Ramaniyam
Homes
6  which after
considering the earlier rulings including its own decision in the case of
Iskraemeco Regent (supra) held that waiver of loan has ‘monetary value’
and is, therefore, taxable u/s. 28(iv) of the ITA.

_________________________________

6     [2016] 384 ITR 530 (A.Y. 2006-07)

 

 

JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS FAVOURING NON TAXABILITY OF WAIVER OF WORKING CAPITAL LOAN

The Bangalore
Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) in the case of Comfund Financial
Services (I) Ltd vs. DCIT
7  held
that section 41(1) of the ITA does not capture remission of a loan liability
used for working capital purposes.

 

In that case,
Deutsche Bank (DB) was one of the promoters of the tax payer company. It also
acted as banker to the tax payer company. DB had extended huge overdraft
facilities to the tax payer company. During the year under reference (A.Y.
1983-84), the outstanding on account of principal amount was Rs. 44.70 crore
and the outstanding on account of interest was Rs. 2.60 crore.

 

On account of huge losses suffered by the tax
payer company, DB decided to write off the above outstanding. In the assessment
of the tax payer, there was no dispute as regards taxability of write-back of
interest amount of Rs. 2.60 crore which was offered to tax u/s. 41(1) of the
ITA. The write-back of principal amount of Rs. 44.70 crore was not offered by
the tax payer to tax on the ground that section 41(1) of the ITA did not apply
to such write-back. However, the Tax Department’s contention was that the
overdraft facility was used to buy securities on trading account, and the cost
of security was allowed as deduction.

 

The ITAT did
not accept the contentions of the Tax Department and held that neither section
41(1) nor section 28(iv) of the ITA was applicable to the facts of the case.
The ITAT, drawing distinction between trading transactions of the tax payer
comprising of purchase of securities and the loan transactions with DB, held that
the remission of loan does not constitute revenue income in the hands of the
tax payer.

 

JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS FAVOURING TAXABILITY OF WAIVER OF WORKING CAPITAL LOAN

However, the
tide turned against the tax payer with the Bombay HC ruling in the case of Solid
Containers Ltd vs. DCIT
8 which held that waiver of working
capital loan is taxable as income. The Bombay HC distinguished its earlier
ruling in the case of Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. (supra) where waiver
of loan used for acquiring capital assets was held to be non-taxable u/s. 41(1)
or section 28(iv) of the ITA. The Bombay HC ruling was followed by the Delhi HC
in the case of Rollatainers Ltd. vs. CIT9  and Logitronics (P.) Ltd. vs. CIT10  where the Delhi HC distinguished between
waiver of loan used for acquiring fixed assets and loan used for working
capital purposes. The Delhi HC held that waiver of loan used for acquiring
fixed assets is not taxable, whereas waiver of loan used for working capital
purposes is taxable as income. While in the case of Solid Containers and
Rollatainers (supras), the taxability was confirmed u/s. 28(iv) of the
ITA, in the case of Logitronics (supra) it is not clear whether the
taxability was confirmed u/s. 41(1) or section 28(iv) of the ITA. None of the
decisions considered the amount to be a chargeable receipt w.r.t section 28(i)
of the ITA, and, with respect, correctly so.

 

__________________________________

7   [1998]
67 ITD 304 (A.Y. 1983-84)

8   [2009]
308 ITR 417

 

 

While
sustaining taxability, the Bombay and Delhi HCs relied on SC decisions in the
cases of CIT vs. T.V. Sundaram Iyengar & Sons Ltd.11 and CIT
vs. Karamchand Thapar
12 for their conclusion on taxability of
waiver of working capital loan. Hence, it is necessary to understand the
purport of these SC rulings.

 

The SC in
Sundaram’s case (supra) held that if the amount is received as trading
transactions, even though it is not taxable in the year of receipt as being of
capital character, the amount changes its character when the amount becomes the
tax payer’s own money because of limitation or by any other statutory or
contractual right. 

 

In the case
of Karamchand (supra), the tax payer was acting as a delcredre agent of
collieries and also as an agent for purchase of coal. Excess collections from
the customers for payment of railways remained unclaimed with the tax payer and
the Tax authority sought to tax the same as revenue income. In this case, the
SC upheld taxability on the reasoning that the initial receipt from the
customers was on trading account as a part of trading transaction. Excess
remaining with the tax payer was a normal feature of the regular business of
the tax payer. The SC held that “we do not see the case as a case of
transaction on capital account; it is a simple case where trading receipts were
more than expenditure”.

___________________________

9 [2011] 339 ITR 54

10 [2011] 333 ITR 386

11 [1996] 222 ITR 344

12[1996] 222 ITR 112

 

 

Having regard
to the context before the SC in the above rulings, with utmost respect, the
authors believe that reliance on these SC cases was not apt. These SC cases are
distinguishable from loan waiver case inasmuch as the SC in Sundaram’s case (supra)
and tax payer’s case was dealing with a receipt which always represented a
trading transaction, at point of receipt. The ratio, with respect, could not
have been extended to waiver of a loan receipt which was never, to begin with,
a trading receipt forming part of the regular trade transaction.

 

BUNCH OF APPEALS BEFORE SC IN MAHINDRA’S CASE INVOLVES BOTH WAIVER OF FIXED CAPITAL AND WORKING CAPITAL LOANS

The Tax
Department appealed to the SC against HC rulings holding that waiver of loan
used for acquiring fixed assets is on capital account and not taxable. The tax
payer in Rollatainer’s case (supra) appealed against the Delhi HC ruling
to the extent it held that waiver of loan used for working capital purposes is
taxable as revenue income13. The tax payer in Ramaniyam Homes (supra)
also appealed to the SC against the Madras HC ruling holding that remission of
loan is taxable as ‘monetary benefit’ u/s. 28(iv) of the ITA. The SC heard all
the appeals together in Mahindra’s case and disposed them under a common judgement.

 

AS A LEAD CASE, SC DECIDED MAHINDRA’S CASE, INVOLVING WAIVER OF FIXED CAPITAL LOAN, IN FAVOUR OF THE TAX PAYER

The SC explicitly dismissed the Tax Department’s
appeal in Mahindra’s case making it clear that waiver of loan used for
acquiring capital assets is neither taxable u/s. 28(iv) of the ITA nor taxable
u/s. 41(1) of the ITA. The SC held that the scope of section 28(iv) of the ITA
is restricted to non-monetary benefits received during the course of business,
whereas waiver of loan is akin to receipt of money.

 

Further, since the loan when borrowed
was not allowed as deduction, waiver thereof is not taxable as remission of
trading liability u/s. 41(1) of the ITA.

_________________________

13    Civil Appeal No. 1214 of 2012

 

 
SC ‘disposed’ off
other appeals involving both fixed capital and working capital loan cases

While
concluding and dealing with other appeals including tax payer’s appeal in
Rollatainer’s case (supra), the SC observed as follows:

 

“17. To
sum up, we are not inclined to interfere with the judgment and order passed by
the High Court in view of the following reasons:

 

(a) Section
28(iv) of the IT Act does not apply on the present case since the receipts of
Rs 57,74,064/- are in the nature of cash or money.

(b) Section
41(1) of the IT Act does not apply since waiver of loan does not amount to
cessation of trading liability. It is a matter of record that the respondent
has not claimed any deduction under section 36 (1) (iii) of the IT Act qua the
payment of interest in any previous year.

 

18. In
view of above discussion, we are of the considered view that these appeals are
devoid of merits and deserve to be dismissed. Accordingly, the appeals are
dismissed. All the other connected appeals are disposed off accordingly,
leaving parties to bear their own cost.”

 

Unfortunately,
the SC did not expressly comment on the aspect of distinction between loan used
for acquiring fixed assets and a loan used for working capital purposes.

 

SC RULING ARGUABLY SETTLES WAIVER OF WORKING CAPITAL LOAN CONTROVERSY

In the view
of the authors, the reasoning adopted by the SC at para 17 of the judgment for
upholding non-taxability was that: (a) section 28(iv) of the ITA does not apply
to a benefit in the nature of cash; and (b) section 41(1) of the ITA does not
apply since waiver of loan is not cessation of trading liability for which
respondent has claimed deduction. These reasonings are as applicable to a loan
for working capital as to a term loan. In fact, the basis on which some of the
decisions turned against the tax payer stands demolished by the SC conclusion
that section 28(iv) of the ITA is inapplicable to a case of loan receipt which
was received in the form of cash or money.

 

Further, it is also arguable that the SC used the
term ‘disposed’ while dealing with other connected appeals as distinguished
from ‘dismissed’ or ‘allowed’ since it was concerned with both the Tax
Department’s and the tax payer’s appeals.

 

Hence, the
authors believe that the ratio of the SC ruling in Mahindra’s case is equally
applicable to waiver of working capital loan.

 

WHETHER WAIVER OF LOAN CAN BE TAXED U/S. 56(2)(x) OF THE ITA?

In Mahindra’s
case, while dealing with non-applicability of section 28(iv) of the ITA to
waiver of loan, the SC observed, “Hence, waiver of loan by the creditor results
in the debtor having extra cash in his hand.
It is receipt in the hands
of the debtor/assessee.” This observation raises concern whether a waiver of
loan granted by lender can be taxed as ‘Income from other sources’ u/s. 56(2)(x)
of the ITA.

 

Section
56(2)(x)14  of the ITA is an
‘anti-abuse’ provision. Section 56(2)(x) of the ITA provides that where any
person receives, in any previous year any sum of money, without
consideration
, the aggregate value of which exceeds fifty thousand rupees,
the whole of the aggregate value of such sum shall be regarded as income
chargeable to tax. The provision has certain exceptions (like gifts from
relatives) which are not relevant for the purposes of current discussion.

 

The authors
believe that the context and language of section 56(2)(x) of the ITA would not
permit such interpretation. Firstly, in context, on a strict construction
basis, the section could apply only in a case where there is physical instead
of a hypothetical receipt, and the chargeability is examined at the stage of
receipt. Secondly, when the amount was received, it was not without
consideration. Thirdly, more often than not, the creditor will grant waiver in
lieu of some condition to be fulfilled by the borrower. For example, the banker
may grant waiver of a part of the amount, provided the balance part is agreed
to be paid within a given time frame. In any such scenario, the waiver is
backed up by consideration and cannot be said to be a grant ‘without
consideration’. Fourthly, in case of a distressed or insolvent company, it
would be a case of inability to recover rather than an intent to place cash in
the hands of the company. All in all, the context of a provision should be
limited to cases which tap the abuse for which the provision is introduced, and
is, arguably, very unlikely to extend to a case of waiver of loan.

______________________________

14    As also its predecessor provisions of s.
56(2)(v) / (vi) / (vii) / (viia) of the ITA

 

 

MINIMUM ALTERNATE TAX (MAT) LIABILITY IS GOVERNED BY BOOK TREATMENT

The entire
discussion in the earlier part of this article is in the  context of computation under normal
provisions of the ITA. In contrast, section 115JB levies a MAT on ‘book profit’
of the company. The ‘book profit’ is largely governed by accounting treatment
adopted for recognition of gains and losses in Profit & Loss account
(P&L) as per applicable accounting standards. It is well settled by a
series of SC rulings starting with Apollo Tyres Ltd. vs. CIT15  that MAT requires strict construction and the
Tax Authority is not permitted to tinker with net profit shown in P&L
beyond what is expressly permitted by MAT provision itself.

 

Incidentally, the Expert Advisory Committee (EAC)
of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India has opined that waiver of
loan should be credited to P&L16. Hence, if gain on account of
waiver of loan is credited to P&L, an issue arises whether such gain is
liable to MAT. This is a controversial issue which is not resolved by Mahindra’s
case since Mahindra’s case was concerned with normal tax treatment.

______________________________________

15  [2002]
255 ITR 273

16  Refer
EAC Opinion dated 24th December 1998

 

 

Mahindra’s
case is helpful to the extent it holds that the benefit of waiver of loan is
not in the nature of ‘income’. The debate which arises is whether a benefit
which does not fall within the scope of charging provisions of sections 4 and 5
of the ITA can be taxed under MAT merely because it is credited to P&L.
This is a highly debatable issue on which there is sharp difference of opinion
within the judiciary, but this part of the controversy is best discussed as an
independent subject.

 

CONCLUSION

Since the
introduction of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, the waiver or re-calibration of
banking loans has been a matter of regular recurrence. The sacrifice made by
financial institutions plays a vital role in the rehabilitation of ailing
enterprises. The stamp of non-taxability on such waiver amount is perceived by
the tax payers as a substantial relief. The SC judgement is consistent with the
understanding that, but for a fictional provision in law, an income can only
accrue provided it originates from a source of income; the grace from a lender
is not reckoned to be a source from which income is expected to accrue to a man
in business. While the authors believe that the judgement is authentic enough
to urge for non-taxability of waiver of working capital loans, a clarification
to that effect from tax administration will go a long way in controlling
litigation in the years to follow. 
 

IMPLEMENTATION OF EXPECTED CREDIT LOSS MODEL FOR NON-BANKING FINANCIAL COMPANIES

Introduction 

 

India has already embarked on the journey
towards adoption of Indian Accounting Standards (IndAS) with effect from the
financial year ended 31st March, 2017 in two phases for prescribed
classes of companies other than the financial service entities. This journey
continues with the next phase of adoption of Ind As by Non-Banking Finance
Companies (NBFC)
in two phases commencing from the accounting period
beginning 1st April, 2018. Whilst there are several implementation
and transition challenges, by far the biggest challenge  for NBFCs lies in implementing and designing
an Expected Credit Loss model for making impairment provisions for financial
assets.

 

The initial plan of the MCA was to implement
Ind AS for the entire gamut of financial service entities covering NBFCs, banks
and insurance entities, which has been deferred by a year for banks and by two
years for insurance companies. Accordingly, the discussion in this article is
restricted only to NBFCs.

 

It may be pertinent to note that the RBI
had constituted a Working Group to deal with the various issues relating
to Ind AS Implementation by Banks which had submitted a detailed
report
in September 2015, which may be equally important and
relevant to NBFCs since there is a fair degree of similarity in their business
models and the same would be also taken into account in the course of our
subsequent discussions. Apart from the said report there has been no
other regulatory guidance from the RBI or other sector specific regulators,
except from the National Housing Bank (NHB), which regulates Housing Finance
Companies, which is discussed subsequently.

 

 

 

DETERMINATION OF EXPECTED CREDIT LOSS (ECL)

 

NBFCs are currently mandated by the RBI to
follow a standardised rule based approach to determine the impairment of loans
in accordance with the prudential norms which requires classification of loans
into standard, sub-standard, doubtful and loss categories by prescribing the
minimum provisioning requirements under each category and hence the underlying
theme is the “incurred loss” model.

 

In contrast, Ind AS-109 dealing with
recognition and measurement of Financial Instruments has significantly modified
this approach for measuring and assessing impairment based on the entity’s assessment
of the expected credit loss over a 12 month period or for the entire duration
for all financial assets under amortised cost or FVTOCI category.
However,
the RBI guidelines do mandate a minimum provision for different categories of
standard assets ranging from 0.4% to 2% which in a way is a form of an ECL
model, though the approach is quite different under Ind AS. This is expected to
be a game changer for all NBFCs and thus merits special attention in terms of
its approach as well as its implementation and transition challenges.

 

 

 

APPROACH TO DETERMINE THE ECL

 

As per Ind AS-109, ECL is required to be
computed on the basis of the probability weighted outcome as the present
value of the difference between the cash flows that are due to the entity in
accordance with the terms of the financial asset and the expected cash flows.

However, Ind AS -109 does not prescribe the methods or techniques for
computing the ECL and hence it is an area which is prone to a lot of subjectivity,
judgement and complexity
for NBFCs.

 

It may be pertinent to note at this stage,
that in March 2012, the RBI had released a ‘Discussion Paper on Introduction
of Dynamic Loan Loss Provisioning Framework for Banks in India’
 which provided a broad framework to compute
expected loss provisioning based on the industry average for some select asset
classes.
Subsequently, vide its circular dated 7th February,
2014 the RBI advised banks to develop necessary capabilitiesto compute their
long term average annual expected loss for different asset classes, for
switching over to the dynamic provisioning framework.

 

Whilst these guidelines (which are still
to be implemented) are applicable to banks, NBFCs may find it useful atleast in
the initial stages to refer to these guidelines for developing their own models
based on the broad computational principles as discussed below.

 

Mathematically, ECL can be represented as under:

 

ECL = EAD*PD*LGD

 

Where:

EAD refers to
the Exposure at Default or the Credit Loss

PD refers to Probability
of Default

LGD refers to
Loss Given Default

 

It would be pertinent at this stage to
discuss the principles, implementation issues and challenges for each of
the above concepts.

 

Credit Loss

 

Ind AS-109 defines credit loss as the difference between all contractual cash flows that are
due to an entity in accordance with the contract and all the cash flows that
the entity expects to receive (i.e. all cash shortfalls), discounted at the
original effective interest rate(or credit-adjusted effective interest rate for
purchased or originated credit-impaired financial assets).

 

An entity shall estimate cash flows by
considering all contractual terms of the financial instrument (for example,
prepayment, extension, call and similar options) through the expected life of
that financial instrument. The cash flows that are considered shall also
include cash flows from the sale of collateral held or other credit
enhancements
that are integral to the contractual terms. There is a
presumption that the expected life of a financial instrument can be estimated
reliably. However, in those rare cases when it is not possible to reliably
estimate the expected life of a financial instrument, the entity shall use the
remaining contractual term of the financial instrument.

 

Assessing the credit loss / EAD is likely to
present several implementation and transition challenges in the Indian context,
the main ones of which are indicated below:

 

a)   Inadequate and inappropriate data: –
The existing guidelines for making provisions for NPAs are based on default
triggers based on time / due dates and may not always capture the estimated
cash flows from the facilities and related collaterals over the life of the
facility. It is thus imperative for NBFCs to evaluate their existing systems
and make suitable modifications and determine the additional data points
keeping in mind the time and cost constraints vis a-vis the benefits.

 

b)   Individual versus collective assessment:-
Whilst for the small ticket and individual facilities it may not be possible,
feasible and cost effective to assess the EAD for each facility, entities would
still need to group these facilities based on shared / common characteristics
like type of facility, type of borrowers, regional and other similar
considerations. However for corporate and large ticket loans, the assessment
would need to be done individually
for which appropriate triggers for
classification would need to be laid down based on assessment of various
factors some of which may involve subjectivity and judgements. An indicative
criteria can be the assessment criteria laid down by the RBI under the BASLE II
and III guidelines for retail and non- retail classification by Banks for
assessing capital adequacy, which though not strictly applicable could be a
useful guide and accordingly for all non-retail exposures, the individual
assessment needs to be done.


c)   Cash flows from and realisability of
Collaterals
:- This is likely to be by far the biggest challenge since
traditionally in our country enforcing of collaterals is a cumbersome legal
process which may in certain cases stretch upto a generation and beyond! These
and other similar factors would need to be assessed whilst evaluating the
present value of the cash flows. Also in many cases, fair value specialists
would need to be employed which would increase the costs and result in
significant judgements and potential bias which may vitiate the true picture.

 

 

 

Probability of Default (PD)

 

PD is an important constituent for computing
the ECL. However, the term is not specifically defined in the Ind As. It is a
financial term describing the likelihood of a default over a particular time
horizon. PD is the risk that the borrower will be unable or unwilling to repay
its debt in full or on time. The risk of default is derived by analysing the
borrower’s capacity to repay the debt in accordance with contractual terms. PD
is generally associated with financial characteristics such as inadequate cash
flow to service debt, declining revenues or operating margins, high leverage,
declining or marginal liquidity, and the inability to successfully implement a
business plan. In addition to these quantifiable factors, various qualitative
factors like the borrower’s willingness to repay along with factors like the
economic, business and industry factors relating to his area of operations also
must be evaluated.To summarise the PD is dependent on the overall credit
rating of the borrower
which would factor in the above aspects, amongst
others.

 

Since it involves a fair degree of judgement
and estimation, entities would need to use appropriate internal statistical
models to assess the PD for various types of exposures
over a 12 month
period or over the life of the exposure
, as per the requirements laid down
under Ind AS discussed subsequently. This has also been reiterated by the RBI
in its Working Group Report. However, the report also refers to the Concept
Paper on Dynamic Provisioning
, discussed earlier, which could be used as a
basis. The Paper has calculated the PD based on a study of data from 9 Banks
which represent approximately 40% of the total business under the following 4
categories of loans and worked out the PD.
The only drawback in this
method is that it is calculated on the basis of the “percentage of
incremental NPAs during the year to the outstanding loans at the beginning of
the year”, whereas ideally the PD should be calculated based on the number of defaults
rather than the amount of default.

 

 

 

Weighted Average PD of Various Asset Classes

Type of Loans

PD

Corporate Loans

0.92

Retail Loans

3.16

Housing Loans

1.28

Other Loans

2.56

Total Loans

1.82

 


The above analysis though not entirely conclusive, fairly reflects the
differences in the PD based on the credit risks of the different types of
portfolio in the Indian scenario. However the same was based on a study which
is over five years old and the validity thereof, in the context of the current
economic and political environment, especially in case of corporate loans which
have a lower PD than retail remains questionable. Hence it is important for an
entity to have a dynamic and flexible statistical tracking mechanism.

 

Though the above discussion is in the
context of Banks, it may serve as a useful indicator / benchmark pending the
creation / generation of their own statistical models for NBFCs. However, NBFCs
are cautioned not to blindly use these without substantiating the same based on
data including, if required,  taking the
help of experts.

 

 

 

Loss Given Default (LGD)

 

Like PD, LGD is
also an important constituent for computing the ECL. However, the term like in
case of PD is not specifically defined in the Ind As. LGD is the amount of
money a lender loses when a borrower defaults on a loan. The most frequently
used method to calculate this loss compares actual total losses to the total
amount of potential exposure sustained at the time that a loan goes into default.
In most cases, LGD is determined after a review of anentity’s entire portfolio,
using cumulative losses and exposure for the calculation. For secured
exposures, it involves assessing the realisable value and assessing the
foreclosure amount of the collaterals, which as we have seen earlier can be a
challenge in our environment. In simple terms, LGD represents the economic
or business loss rather than the accounting loss.

 

Since it involves a fair degree of judgement
and estimation, entities would need to analyse the defaults and the losses
at an overall portfolio level which as discussed earlier can represent a
significant challenge for many Indian entities.
This has also been
reiterated by the RBI in its Working Group Report. However, the report also
refers to the Concept Paper on Dynamic Provisioning, discussed earlier,
together with the Internal Ratings Based Approach under BASLE II for
determining Capital Charge for Credit Risks vide its circular dated December,
2011 by the RBI, to be framed by Banks
, which could be used as a basis. The
Concept Paper has calculated the LGD based on a study of data of a
pool of NPAs from 9 Banks which represent approximately 40% of the total
business under the following 4 categories of loans and worked out the same.
Whilst
the method is not entirely fool proof and free from doubt, it is a good initial
indicator prior to design of appropriate statistical models by the NBFCs.

 

Average LGD Estimates of Various Asset
Classes

Type of Loans

Average LGD (%)

Corporate Loans

36.07

Retail Loans

33.36

Housing Loans

8.02

Other Loans

79.09

Total Loans

45.48

 

 

Like in the case of the PD, the above
analysis though not entirely conclusive, fairly reflects the differences in the
LGD based on the credit risks of the different types of portfolio in the Indian
scenario. However, the same was based on a study which is over five years old
and the validity thereof, in the context of the current economic and political
environment, remains questionable. Further, the lower LGD in the case of
Housing Loans appears to be primarily due to the collateral value of the
property financed, the recovery and enforcement thereof may present challenges.
Hence it is important for an entity to have a dynamic and flexible statistical
tracking mechanism

 

As is the case with the calculation of
PDs, though the above discussion is in the context of Banks, it may serve as a
useful indicator / benchmark pending the creation / generation of their own
statistical models for NBFCs. However, NBFCs are cautioned not to blindly use
these without substantiating the same based on data including, if
required,  taking the help of experts.

 

 

 

STEPS TO CALCULATE THE ECL

 

The first step to calculate the ECL is to
classify the financial assets into different stages or buckets as tabulated
hereunder based on which the subsequent calculations for the extent of
impairment on ECL basis can be determined.

           

 

Stage 1

Stage 2

Stage 3

 

 

 

 

Stage

Financial Asset is originated or purchased

Credit Risk has increased significantly in respect of the financial asset since
initial recognition

The Financial Asset is credit impaired

 

 

 

 

ECL provision required

Twelve months ECL

Life time ECL

Life time ECL

 

 

 

 

Recognition of Interest Revenue (discussed in a subsequent
section

EIR on gross carrying amount

EIR on gross carrying amount

EIR on amortised cost basis

                       

As can be seen from the above, the following
are the key triggers for assessing impairment on the basis of life time
expected credit losses:

  •     Assessment of increase
    in the credit risk; and
  •   Determining receivables
    which are credit impaired
    .

 

Let us now proceed to briefly understand the
principles laid down in Ind AS-109 for assessing both these.

 

Increase in the Credit Risk

Whilst the assessment of increase in the
credit risk is qualitative and judgemental, IndAS-109 has laid down certain
principles which are summarised hereunder:

 

  •    At each reporting date, an
    entity shall assess whether the credit risk on a financial instrument has
    increased significantly since initial recognition. When making the assessment,
    an entity shall use the change in the risk of a default occurring over the
    expected life of the financial instrument instead of the change in the amount
    of expected credit losses. To make such assessment, an entity shall consider reasonable
    and supportable information
    , that is available without undue cost or
    effortthat is indicative of significant increases in credit risk since initial
    recognition.
  •    If reasonable and supportable
    forward-looking information is available without undue cost or effort
    , an
    entity cannot rely solely on past due information when determining
    whether credit risk has increased significantly since initial recognition.
  •    However, when information
    that is more forward-looking than past due status
    (either on an individual
    or a collective basis) is not available without undue cost or effort, an
    entity may use past due information to determine whether there have been
    significant increases in credit risk since initial recognition.
  •   Regardless of
    the way in which an entity assesses significant increases in credit risk, there
    is a rebuttable presumption that the credit risk on a financial asset has
    increased significantly since initial recognition when contractual payments are
    more than 30 days past due.
  •    Ind AS-109 has
    provided a list of information / criteria which may be relevant
    for assessing changes in credit risk. An illustrative list of the same is
    provided below:

a) an actual
or expected significant change in the party’s external credit rating.

b) an actual
or expected significant change in the operating results of the party.

c)
significant changes in the value of the collateral supporting the obligation or
in the quality of third-party guarantees or credit enhancements, which are
expected to reduce the debtor’s economic incentive to make scheduled
contractual payments or to otherwise have an effect on the probability of a
default occurring.

 

Assessing Credit Impaired Financial
Asset:

 

For identifying receivables which are credit
impaired, Ind AS-109 defines a “credit impaired financial asset” as under:

 

“A financial asset is credit-impaired
when one or more events that have a detrimental impact on the estimated future
cash flows ofthat financial asset have occurred. Evidence that a financial
asset is credit-impaired include observable data about the following events:

 

(a) significant
financial difficulty of the issuer or the borrower;

 

(b) a breach of
contract, such as a default or past due event;

 

(c) the lender(s) of the
borrower, for economic or contractual reasons relating to the borrower’s
financial difficulty, having granted to the borrower a concession(s) that the
lender(s) would not otherwise consider;

 

(d) it is
becoming probable that the borrower will enter bankruptcy or other financial
reorganisation;

 

(e) the
disappearance of an active market for that financial asset because of financial
difficulties; or

 

f) the purchase
or origination of a financial asset at a deep discount that reflects the
incurred credit losses.

 

It may not be possible to identify a
single discrete event instead, the combined effect of several events may have
caused financial assets to become credit-impaired.

 

One of the common criteria which is
practically applied in assessing credit impairment is to identify whether there
is a default or a past due event. In this context, Ind AS-109
provides that when defining default for the purposes of determining the risk of
a default occurring, an entity shall apply a default definition that is consistent
with the definition used for internal credit risk management purposesfor the
relevant financial instrument and consider qualitative indicators (for example,
financial covenants) when appropriate.
However, there is a rebuttable
presumption that default does not occur later than when a financial asset is 90
days past due unless an entity has reasonable and supportable information to
demonstrate that a more lagging default criterion is more appropriate.

 

Accordingly, though the Ind AS
provides 30 and 90 day thresholds these are not sacrosanct like the existing
NPA guidelines and need to be evaluated in the context of other qualitative and
judgemental factors which need to be appropriately disclosed.
 

 

Accordingly, it is imperative for NBFCs to
establish their own internal credit risk rating models, subject
to cost and volume considerations for different categories of risks, rather
than blindly adopt the 30 and 90 days rebuttable presumptions indicated above.
Let us now proceed to briefly examine the implementation and transition
challenges

 

 

 

IMPLEMENTATION AND TRANSITION CHALLENGES

 

Framing Internal Credit Risk Rating
Models

 

Currently in the case of NBFCs, there are no
specific regulatory guidelines which provide for the establishment of credit
risk management policies on the lines as prescribed by the RBI under the BASLE
II and III framework for Banks, except the generic requirement under the
Companies Act, 2013 and the Listing Guidelines to frame Risk Management
Policies. Accordingly, the transition from a rule based regulator specified
criteria approach that largely ensures consistency of application across the
system to an ECL framework that is largely subjective based on management
judgement and being data intensive, necessitates fairly sophisticated credit
modelling skills and would represent an enormous challenge not only for the
NBFCs but also for auditors, regulators and supervisors, especially for the
small and medium sized as well as closely held entities.

 

Accordingly, NBFCs are advised and expected
to develop their own internal credit risk rating models as part of their
overall Credit Risk Management Policies under the Supervision of the Board with
implementation support from the Risk Management Committee. For this purpose the
broad steps which need to be followed are outlined below:

 

a)   Framing an internal risk rating module for
different types of financial assistance and different types of financial
instruments, which evaluates each proposal for different types of risks,
security available, financial performance of the borrower etc.

 

b)   Based on the scrutiny of the proposals
against the above parameters a scoring module is developed which assigns scores
on a range of 1-10, 1-100 etc., which in turn is linked to a grade. An
illustrative scoring grid is as under:

 

 

SCORE

GRADE

95-100

AAA

85-94

AA

75-84

A

55-74

B

25-54

C

1-25

D

 

 

Based on the above assessment any facility
granted to a borrower with a grading of C or D would represent increased credit
risk and hence would fall under stage 2 as discussed earlier thereby
necessitating a life time ECL calculation.

 

c)  A comparison of the above internally assessed
ratings can be compared with the externally assigned ratings to the borrowers
by the recognised external credit rating agencies.

 

d)  Periodic review of the above established
ratings through internal assessment coupled with audit assistance in certain
cases. For this purpose a review / assessment is undertaken of the servicing
and repayment of the facility, financial performance of the borrower, the
industry / business environment in which the borrower operates etc.

 


Normally, from a practical perspective, any rating down grade by more than
two notches would imply a default or credit impaired status necessitating the
movement of the exposure to stage 3 as discussed earlier, in addition to the
other specific qualitative parameters discussed.

 

The RBI working
group has discussed certain issues in the context of Banks pertaining to
identification of and the on-going assessment of increase in the credit risk as
under, which may be relevant and a useful indicator for NBFCs on initial transition,
subject to appropriate corroboration thereof with the existing data and the
peculiar nature of operations of each NBFC and pending any specific guidance
relating to NBFCs from the RBI:

 

a)  The Group suggested that the RBI could
prescribe rule based indicative criteria for significant deterioration in
credit risk.

 

b)  Whilst the group felt that the 30 days past
due scenario is quite common, Banks should take this opportunity to educate
their customers of making contractual payments within 30 days and also
simultaneously strengthen their credit monitoring mechanisms.

 

c)  In the context of the 90 days default
criteria, the Group suggested that RBI may continue to define default for
consistency across the banking system keeping in view the Basel framework as
well as the Ind AS 109 prescriptions. Banks may be permitted the discretion to
formulate more stringent standards.

 

d)  The Group also noted that Ind AS 109 envisages
other types of defaults, e.g., breach of covenants, which are not accompanied
by payment defaults. With respect to such defaults (not accompanied by payment
defaults), banks will need to build up adequate records to evidence the impact
of these events on the level of credit risk
and if these events constitute a significant increase in credit risk.

 

e)  Finally, the Group also
noted that
RBI vide its circular DBOD.No.BP.520/21.04.103/2002-03 dated
October 12, 2002 had issued a Guidance Note on Credit Risk Management
that
inter-alia advised banks to adopt credit risk models depending on their size,
complexity, risk bearing capacity and risk appetite, etc. and accordingly
advised Banks to adopt the same, since based on which it is reasonably expected
that banks should be able to put in place at least some basic measures of expected credit losses.

 

Regulatory Challenges

The NHB vide its circular dated 16th
April, 2018 has broadly laid down the following requirements:

 

a)  In terms of the provisions of paragraph 24 of
the Housing Finance Companies (NHB) Directions, 2010 (“Directions”) on
Accounting Standards, in terms of which the Accounting Standards and Guidance
Notes issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India shall be
followed in so far as they are not inconsistent with any of the Directions.

 

b)  All Housing Finance Companies to follow the
extant directions on Prudential Norms, including on asset classification,
provisioning etc. issued by the NHB.


c)  With regards to the implementation of Ind
AS, HFCs are advised to be guided by the extant provisions of Ind AS, including
the date of implementation.

 

A plain reading of
the aforesaid circular seems to suggest the following interpretation
alternatives:

 

a)  HFCs should continue to follow the existing
directions including the prudential and asset classification norms whilst
determining their capital adequacy ratio, which seems to imply that the working
as per the existing NPA norms would continue. Thus it appears that a
separate set of regulatory accounts would need to be maintained.

 

b)  For preparing the statutory accounts, the Ind
AS principles would need to be followed, which implies that the ECL model
should also be followed.

 

c)  Companies should accordingly adopt the
ECL model and compare the provision as per the same with the existing NPA
provisioning guidelines and the higher of the two should be followed since the
intention of the NHB seems to ensure that the regulatory minimum provisions
should be maintained. This is also the recommended alternative as suggested by
the RBI working group in its report.

 

There is currently no similar circular
which has been issued by the RBI for application by the NBFCs other than HFCs,
thereby creating a lot of ambiguity and leaving the field open to varying
interpretations, which could involve substantial time, efforts and costs which
may not be commensurate with the benefits and expose the NBFCs to potential
regulatory scrutiny.It is strongly recommended that appropriate clarifications
are issued by the RBI in this regard.

 

CONCLUSION

 

The above evaluation is just the tip of the
ice-berg on a subject that is quite vast and complex. However, the ECL model is
here to stay and it would impact the way the financial statements are evaluated
and also impact the auditors and prove to be a bonanza for specialists to
develop statistical models who could laugh all the way to the bank!
 

 

THE AUDITOR’S TRAGEDY

On
hearing Ram’s cries of help, Sita insisted that Lakshman go to his rescue.
Lakshman hesitated. If he went out to help Ram, who would protect Sita? He came
up with a solution: he drew a line around their grass hut. ‘Stay within!’ he
told his sister-in-law, ‘Within is culture, where you are safe. Without is the
forest, where no one is safe.’

 

This
story of Lakshman Rekha, the line drawn by Lakshman around Sita’s hut, comes to
us from regional Ramayanas like the Bengali Krittivasa Ramayana and the Telugu
Ranganatha Ramayana, written about seven hundred years ago. It is not found in
the old Sanskrit Ramayana of Valmiki, written two thousand years ago, or even
the oldest regional Ramayana, written in Tamil by Kamban, a thousand years ago.

 

How
do we view the Lakshman Rekha? A symbol of love, created by a young man to
protect his sister-in-law? Or as a symbol of oppression, created by a man to
control the movements of a woman. In the 21st century, much of
feminist literature has conditioned us to see it as the latter. Lakshman, at
best, comes across as patronising patriarch. So it is in business.

 

Rules
are created to protect organisations. Some rules create efficiency while others
de-risk the company. Together they contribute to the prosperity and security of
the company. Together they ensure the organisation becomes controllable,
predictable, and manageable. Various technologies are created to ensure people
follow the rules. There are technologies to communicate the rules: the various
protocols, guidelines, regulations, procedures, and policies. There are
technologies to measure if the rules are being followed or violated. There are
technologies to flag repeat violations and escalate issues. Essentially, rules
help us domesticate and organise ourselves.

 

Then
come the auditors: the internal and external, who check if we have complied.
They go through our documents and our spending patterns and check if investor
wealth is safe, and if implementation aligns with agreed upon strategies and
tactics, and if the organisation fulfills its obligations of society by paying
taxes on time, and explaining all its costs and expenses that erode into
profit. The auditor is the Lakshman of the organisation, protecting the
institution for the Board of Directors and Investors.

 

The
analogy can upset many people for it equates Sita to the institution, and makes
her the property of Ram. It endorses patriarchy. Yet the relationship between
the Board of Directors and the institution is the same as Ram and Sita. Without
the institution (Sita), the Board of Directors (Ram) have no value or purpose,
or even meaning. Their entire existence depends on nourishing and protecting
the institution, and the institution in exchange makes them valuable, and
glamorous, worthy of respect, even worship.

 

It
is the auditor (Lakshman) who ensures that institution is safe. He ensures
rules are followed and even creates rules to ensure other rules are followed.
To the people in the organisation, he can seem like an oppressor. For his
actions limit movement. His demands take away freedom and agility. The larger
the company, the larger the investments, the more the rules, the more important
the auditor, the less nimble is the organisation. It takes away quick
decisions, and puts obstacles on the entrepreneurial spirit.

 

It is the auditor who is hauled up
when it turns out that the promoter has been misusing investor wealth to
increase personal wealth at the cost of the institution. In other words, when
the one who is supposed to be Ram turns into Ravana and gets the institution to
break rules for his own benefit. It is the auditor who has to prove his
honesty, and diligence, when there is a takeover. We often mock the auditor, or
the company secretary, as the oppressor who forces us to comply with rules we
don’t want to, who retards us, makes us inflexible and not very nimble,
especially when we are a large organisation. But he is Ram’s younger brother,
loyal and determined to protect all that his brother stands for. 


(Source:
Devdutt.com, reproduced with permission)

 

INTERNATIONAL TAXATION AND FEMA KAL – AAJ – AUR – KAL

When I qualified as a Chartered Accountant way back in 1961, the words
‘International Taxation’ were not known to Chartered Accountants. The reason is
not difficult to find.

 

Our country had an acute shortage of foreign exchange. Hence the British
Government, who ruled our country before 1947, imposed exchange control
regulations as a temporary measure at the time of the Second World War through
the Defence of India Rules in 1939. Though it was meant to be a temporary
measure to fight the War, its continued need was felt and hence it was made
permanent by legislating the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. It was a
very loose piece of legislation, not precise, leaving a lot to interpretations.

 

After the experience gained over 26 years, the 1947 Act was replaced by
the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (FERA) which came into force from 1st
January, 1974.

 

Because of acute foreign exchange resources of the country, there were
very few inward foreign investments and hardly any outbound foreign investments
and that too, confined to a few high and mighty, the rich and the famous.

 

When I passed my final CA examination of November, 1960, the subject of
foreign exchange and/or international taxation was not on the CA curriculum.
Hence, there were hardly any tax professionals, aware of and practising
international taxation and foreign exchange regulations.

 

FERA, 1973 was a draconian, criminal law in which mens rea,
meaning guilty mind, was presumed. One was presumed to be guilty until one
proved oneself to be innocent – completely contrary to the established
principles of jurisprudence. For every need of foreign exchange, including for
legitimate foreign travel, one had to approach the Reserve Bank of India (RBI)
for release of foreign exchange. If one asked for release of foreign exchange
for five days, RBI would give sanction for three days. There were instances
when during a week of foreign travel, there was Saturday and Sunday in between;
in such cases RBI would rather want one to come back on Saturday morning and go
back on Monday morning and sanction foreign exchange accordingly! Coupled with
shortage of foreign exchange, there was what was known as requirement of ‘P’
form; meaning to get approval for booking your passage or ticket for going
abroad; and chances of getting that were better if one preferred to fly Air
India. Later, the foreign exchange quota was relaxed by allowing first a lump
sum of USD 100, later increased to USD 500 for a foreign trip, irrespective of
its duration. People used to book an excursion ticket by Air India, which was
valid for four months, avail of the sumptuous allowance of USD 500 and go
abroad. This was nothing but official invitation to contravene FERA as such
people used to make other arrangements for their requirement of foreign
exchange. The law was so impractical that the then Prime Minister had gone on
public record saying  that offering a cup
of tea to a Non-Resident by a Resident would amount to contravention  of FERA. Since then, we have come a long way.
Now, not only a cup of tea but complete hospitality to a non-resident is
permitted.

 

The real breakthrough came in July of 1991 when our foreign exchange
reserves were as low as approximately USD 1.1 million, hardly enough for
fifteen days’ imports. The country would have literally gone bankrupt but for
the timely action by the then Finance Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, who pledged
the country’s gold with IMF, announced sweeping reforms and saved the country
from international shame.

 

As a result of such reforms, foreign exchange reserves gradually
increased and both inbound and outbound foreign investments increased
gradually. This started the awareness about foreign exchange regulations,
double taxation avoidance agreements and international taxation amongst the tax
professionals. One saw a gradual increase in seminars and conferences with FERA
and International Taxation as subjects for discussions.

 

As per the experience gained over another 26 years, the Foreign Exchange
Regulations Act, 1973 (FERA) was completely replaced by the Foreign Exchange
Management Act, 1999 (FEMA) which came into force on 1st June, 2000.
FEMA has been a civil law, which is more precise and comparatively easy to
understand and implement. Under FERA, all transactions in foreign exchange and
dealings with Non-Residents were prohibited unless permitted by RBI. Under
FEMA, all Current Account transactions are freely permitted under the automatic
route except for a very few requiring RBI permission but all Capital Account
transactions are prohibited unless permitted by RBI.

 

This opened up the floodgates of professional opportunities for tax
professionals and Foreign Direct Investments into India and India’s investments
overseas have considerably

increased, resulting in the present foreign exchange reserves of the
country in excess of USD 390 billion. Now the tax professionals have understood
the importance of  International Taxation
and its potential for professional practice. The need is further strengthened
with the introduction of Transfer Pricing Regulations in our tax laws from
2001.

 

Since June, 2000, the law in force is Foreign Exchange Management Act,
1999 (FEMA). Hence the emphasis is more on management of foreign exchange
rather than regulation of foreign exchange. Hence, RBI has, since February,
2004, introduced the Liberalised Remittance Scheme (LRS) permitting residents
to access a certain amount of foreign exchange for their personal needs like
foreign travel, education, medical expenses, etc. The LRS scheme started with a
small quota of USD 25,000 to each resident to invest abroad, open a bank
account overseas etc. which gradually increased to USD 50,000, USD 100,000, USD
1,25,000 reduced to USD 75,000 for a short period and  increased to USD 2,50,000 at which it has now
stabilised. Of course, the LRS scheme has brought in its wake new problems but
it is more or less successful.

 

Now the tax professionals have come to know the role of OECD in the realm
of International  Taxation  and 
now  we  find 
many  such  professionals 
practising International Taxation and FEMA and also sharing their
knowledge at conferences and seminars. Study of international taxation, FEMA
and DTAA have opened up certain limited opportunities for international tax
planning but one has to do so very cautiously due to concepts and regulations
like GAAR, POEM, BEPS, MLI, TP, Permanent Establishment, etc. The matter has
become more complicated with the coming into play of FATCA and CRS which have
set into action, automatic exchange of information globally.

 

Over and above the Article for Exchange of Information contained in the
Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements (DTAA) that our country has entered into
with several countries, since many so-called tax haven countries were excluded
or were not inclined to enter into such agreements, now our Government has
proactively entered into Tax Information Exchange  Agreements (TIEA) and also Multilateral
Convention on Mutual Administrative 
Assistance in the matter of Taxation with many other countries.           

 

These have resulted in our country being able to obtain tax information
from all these countries. Moreover, because of the Foreign Account Tax
Compliance Act (FATCA) of USA and the Common Reporting Standard (CRS) adopted
by many other countries resulting in automatic exchange of information, a lot
of information relating to beneficial owners of overseas assets and income has
started flowing in, resulting in Tax Department and Enforcement Directorate
initiating investigation against persons concerned. As a result of all these
steps, more and more persons have been adversely affected by the crackdown on
offshore tax havens.

 

All these, coupled with Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income and
Assets) And Imposition of Tax Act, 2015 (BMA), have opened up immense professional
opportunities    and challenges for tax professionals provided
they have sharpened their skills in the fields 
of international taxation and exchange control regulations. This may
also have implications of taxation in multiple countries requiring filing of
tax returns in other countries and paying taxes there. This will necessitate
the need to claim foreign tax credit in the country of residence in respect of
taxes paid in the source country. Many tax professionals must have already
experienced the impact of automatic exchange of information in respect of their
clients.

 

One important facility in International Taxation is the permission to
Chartered Accountants by CBDT and RBI to issue withholding tax certificate in
Form 15CB for making overseas remittances. This is very much appreciated by all
concerned as  it, being prompt and
professional, saves time in making remittances.

 

However, one negative in the matter of International Taxation is the
attitude of Authorised Dealer Banks. RBI has delegated many powers to banks and
everything has to be routed through banks only. But their lack of knowledge hampers
and delays the process. Today, a professional who is able to advise clients in
the matter of International Taxation is much more respected than one who
confines to auditing and domestic taxation because of the opportunities thrown
open to corporates and entrepreneurs. Now it is no more confined to the high
and mighty, the rich and famous. The tax professionals are experiencing many
inquiries from common businessmen for advice on overseas structures and
regulations concerning the same.

 

The term, Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) has now become an
important topic for discussions and consideration amongst tax professionals
globally and has made inroads into India also. The general tendency amongst
businessmen and industrialists is to look for low tax or no tax countries to
shift their activities. Hence, the existence of tax havens became very relevant
in the last few decades. The profits are artificially shifted to such low-tax
or no-tax jurisdictions. This brings out the issue of form over substance as
such activities do not have much substance. This, in short, is known as BEPS.

 

In recent times the world has become
more transparent in terms of commercial and economic activities. The tax havens
which had no Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement with any country have now
given up because of the fear of extinction and have signed tax information
treaties with all major countries. Frankly, tax haven has now become a dirty
word, as it immediately smells of tax evasion. Treaty abuse had become rampant
and to control the same, OECD formulated Multilateral Instruments (MLI) with a
view to modify bilateral tax treaties and arrest
treaty abuse.

 

Another avenue of international tax planning which had become very
popular was cross-border offshore Trusts for tax saving and estate planning. It
is always a fact that businessmen and entrepreneurs are very quick in
understanding and implementing such measures while the laws and tax authorities
are very slow in understanding such loopholes and catching up with legislation
to counter them. This leads to changes in domestic laws to make such
tax-planning measures very expensive and even useless. There was a time when
offshore Discretionary Trusts settled by Non-Resident relatives for the benefit
of their Resident relatives in India were very popular because any capital
distribution by such Trusts was exempt in the hands of such beneficiaries.
Moreover, the banking secrecy laws of jurisdictions like Switzerland, the
Channel Islands etc., helped proliferation of such Trusts. But now, with global
awareness about their abuse for tax planning, coupled with the KYC requirement
regarding the ultimate beneficial owner (UBO), has led to amendments in
domestic laws making such Trusts almost redundant.

 

Now that we Indians are allowed to own assets worldwide, the importance
of International Taxation has gained considerable importance. The issue of
Cross-Border Wills or Wills for overseas assets also opens up avenues for
international tax practice. One lesser known area is the GST impact on
cross-border transactions. Its impact on import and export of goods and
services, stock transfers, international trading, projects outside India etc.,
needs careful consideration as a part of International Taxation.

 

One important issue that seems to have escaped attention of the tax
professionals and the authorities concerned needs to be resolved.  It is about the fact that when the
Enforcement Directorate (ED) concludes an investigation, even after
adjudicating process, no order is issued when it is in favour of the person
concerned but invariably an order is issued when the same is against the person
and a penalty is levied. It is well-known that under FEMA, there is no
limitation period prescribed but even then, there should be a regulation to
provide for a discipline of time limit within which an order, whether adverse
or favourable, must be issued by ED after completion of the hearing.  We find this very common under all other laws
that an order is invariably issued, whether in favour or against, within a
reasonable time after the hearing is over. Even taking an example under FEMA,
the law provides that the hearing of a compounding application must be
completed within 180 days and thereafter an order is invariably issued within a
maximum of one month. Why shouldn’t the same be made applicable to the ED?

 

All these developments in the arena of International Taxation and FEMA
would mean that specialisation is the only way for tax professionals to
survive, succeed and prosper.  The days
of Jack of All and Master of None are now over. 
Now we have not only to look to the present but to think of the future
and equip ourselves to understand events happening globally in the fields of
economic activities, reforms and international taxation. However, the future
lies in complete removal of exchange control regulations. We have the examples
of England and Singapore and how they have progressed and flourished as
financial centres after abolishing exchange control regulations.

 

 

DEVELOPMENT OF TAX LAWS AND ADMINISTRATION IN INDIA – PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

In a brilliant introduction to his book, The
Law Book – 250 Milestones in the History of Law
, Michael H. Roffer begins
with the statement: “The Law surrounds us. It affects the food we eat, the
water we drink, and the air we breathe. It travels with us. It defines our
relationships with the people with whom we live, work, and share space. It
affects our homes and schools, our offices and stores. The law touches every
aspect of our lives and even our deaths.”
I am inclined to think, in a
lighter vein, that the author had the tax law in his mind more than any other
law, for the tax law (direct & indirect) touches every aspect of life which
he has listed! That is perhaps why Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., made the famous
statement that “Taxes are the price we pay for civilization. I like to pay
my taxes
”. But the question as to how the taxes are imposed and collected,
and upon whom they are levied, and in what manner and how  they are quantified – these questions seem to
have always troubled the tax administrator, the tax payer, the tax lawyer and
ultimately the government.
  


Taxes have been looked upon, traditionally, as the government’s share in
the prosperity of the breadwinner. That is one of the main reasons why
income-tax paid is not allowed as a deductible expense; it has been held to be
the “Crown’s share in the profits”, there being other reasons, too. It would appear
that before the development of “money” as representing the purchasing power of
a person, the taxes were collected in kind, through commodities, even hard
work. Customs duty and taxes on owning of lands are said to be two of the
earliest taxes netting huge revenues for the countries. Only in the year 1798,
William Pitt the Younger, who was the Prime Minister of Great Britain those
days, first proposed a legislation to tax the citizens “upon all the leading
branches of income”
. This law is generally believed to be the first formal
income-tax in history. This tax is believed to have been imposed to replenish
the treasury of that country which had been drained because of its war with
Napoleon Bonaparte. The tax was known as “The Triple Assessment” because
its measure was three times the expenditure which a person had incurred in the
preceding year. There is good reason to believe that the levy succeeded,
because it was followed up by a proposal that a general income-tax be charged
on all leading branches of income. This resulted in a tax legislated for the
first time in history in January, 1799, and it called for a progressive rate of
tax on annual income above 60 pounds; the rate began with 1% and went up to 10%
on incomes above 200 pounds. But it was a disaster, and the public protested
strongly and resisted payment. It was criticised as a “monstrous law” and “an
indiscriminate rapine”; experts claimed that the public received it with
nothing but “disdain and distrust”. Eventually the tax was repealed in 1802,
after a short life of just three years, but the trend had set in, and the law
had caught the eye of governments all over. In the very next year, England
enacted a new income-tax law and this law became the basis for all subsequent
enactments in that country and became the bedrock of that country’s fiscal
policy. Soon, Germany and America adapted the law, resulting in the passing of
several enactments for the levy and collection of income-tax.


In America, several short-lived attempts had been made in this behalf
and in the law passed in 1894, a tax of 2% was imposed on annual income over
4,000 dollars the object stated being “to address economic inequalities”. But
what happened was that in a decision of the Supreme Court of America, Pollock
vs. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co.
, this levy was struck down as
unconstitutional; it was held that the taxes on real and personal property were
direct taxes and in the absence of apportionment among the states they were
unconstitutional. Chastened by this judgment, Howard Taft, the President of
America, wanted to levy income-tax in 1908 after an amendment to the
Constitution to expressly permit the levy. It was the sixteenth amendment and
after being passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives and the
required number of states, it became law in 1913. It was called the Revenue
Act, 1913 and it imposed tax on net income at rates ranging from 1% to 6%.

 

Beginning with William Pitt’s levy in 1798, taxes have been imposed to
recover monies lost on account of warfare, impliedly as a fee for protecting
the citizens against external aggression. In India, the Sepoy Mutiny in 1857
saw the British rulers imposing a tax in 1860 as a temporary measure for 5
years. In 1867, a licence tax on all trades and professions was imposed. In
1868, it became a ‘certificate tax’ and in both licence tax and certificate
tax, agricultural income was excluded. From 1869 to 1873, for a period of 4
years, there was an income-tax including agricultural income. The tax got
revived due to famine and other reasons in 1877, but it was the Act of 1886
which saw the first landmark of income-tax law of India. It remained in force
till 1918, in which year a comprehensive recasting of the income-tax law was
attempted with a measure of success. Inequalities and inconsistencies in the
earlier law were sought to be redressed. The heads of income such as property,
salaries, business earnings and professional income, other sources of income
were introduced in this law. It applied to income under these heads which arose
in British India.


The recommendations of the All India Tax Committee formed the basis of
the Indian Income-Tax Act, 1922 which tax lawyers of repute commend as a
well-drafted, precise legislation with about 60 sections. In this law, the tax
rates were not prescribed in a schedule as was done previously, and the rates
were left to be prescribed by the annual Finance Acts. This has endured till
now. Notable features of the Act were the adjustment of past losses and
inter-head and intra-head losses, liability of the successor to the business to
pay taxes of the predecessor, etc. The Act received wholesale amendments by the
1939 Amendment Act. Notable features of this amending Act were: introduction of
a category of “resident, but not ordinarily resident”, taxation of income
accruing outside British India even if it is not brought into British India,
introduction of provisions to prevent avoidance of tax by creating trusts,
transferring property to relatives (spouse, minor children),
dividend-stripping, bond-washing, introduction of closely-held companies to
avoid dividend income, etc.


The working of the 1922 Act led to certain situations which were thought
by the government to be not in the interests of the growth and development of
income-tax law in India, and a series of recommendations were sought with a
view to bringing about a legislation with more teeth and which was more
comprehensive. Substantial changes were made in the 1947 Taxation of Income
(Investigation Commission) Act,  in 1952,
1953 and 1955 (Dr. John Mathai Committee). More importantly, the Act was
referred to the Law Commission in 1956 in order to make it “on logical lines
and to make it intelligible and simple, without at the same time affecting the
basic structure”. The recommendations of the Law Commission and the committee
headed by Mahavir Tyagi set up in the meantime formed the basis of the present
1961 Act.


The Income Tax Act, 1961 today is a maze no doubt, but to call it “a
national disgrace
” (Nani Palkhivala, preface to the 8th edition
of his treatise on income-tax law) would be unfair, in my humble opinion.
Government has the right to set right distortions practised by the tax payers
to “evade” (not avoid or mitigate or plan) income-tax, and it is also well
established that this can be done even retrospectively. This is particularly so
in modern days when multi-national enterprises indulge in multi-layering and
multi-structuring of the corporate entity, and locate them in different places
around the world and in different tax jurisdictions. The government of the day
must be conceded the right to combat such moves if it feels due taxes are not
being paid and the right to plug the loopholes, if necessary, by making the
amendments retrospective. It cannot be lost sight of that it is always a
running battle between the government and the tax payers, particularly the
multi-national juggernauts, and each side tries its best to outdo the other!
But to be fair to the tax payers, it must also be said that some of the
amendments in the recent past, say in about 10-12 years, have been startling,
upsetting the traditional and well-accepted notions of what is “income”. A
different concept of “taxation of benefits” has come to stay, where the
notional difference between the market value of an asset, movable or immovable,
and the price paid is roped in as income.



It is hard to believe that a provision in the Act which was read down to
make it workable, equitable and fair to both the citizen and the government, by
the Supreme Court in K.P. Varghese (131 ITR 597) (SC) has been
introduced through “the back door”, giving a go-by to the acclaimed principles
of taxation vis-à-vis the power under the Constitution of India explained
lucidly and forcefully, if I may say so with respect, in the judgment. There
are also recent instances of what is not income or even a receipt, being taxed
under some pretext or the other. We have all so far understood the pay-out of
dividend by a company as its expense (though not tax-deductible in the
company’s hands, being appropriation of profits), but we are now told that it
will be taxed as the income of the company, a proposition which is baffling.
The constitutional validity of this tax has undoubtedly been upheld by the
Supreme Court in the recent Tata Tea case and therefore the levy has come to
stay. But one shudders to think of the consequences that may follow in the
coming days. A citizen can be mulcted with taxes both on his income and his
expense, to put it crudely, taking umbrage under the ever-elastic Entry 82 of List
I (Union List) which permits the central government to levy “taxes on income
other than agricultural income”.


The power to tax income, and the general power to levy taxes, is
traceable to Article 246 of the Constitution of India which says that Parliament
has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters specified
in List I of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution. It is also
necessary to note Article 248 which reiterates that Parliament has exclusive
power to make any law with respect to any matter not enumerated in the State
List or the Concurrent List and such power shall include the power to legislate
for the levy of tax not mentioned in either of these Lists. It is in this
background that we need to now look at Article 265, which occurs in the Chapter
titled “Finance, Property, Contracts and Suits”. It is a single-liner, and one
of the most powerful one-liners; one cannot also help noticing that the
marginal head of the article consists of 10 words, and the article itself
contains 12 words, only 2 more than the marginal head!


“ARTICLE 265. Taxes not to be imposed save by authority of law.—No tax
shall be levied or collected except by authority of law”.

 

The government therefore requires the authority of law not only to
“levy” taxes but also to “collect” them. The consequence is that a collection
machinery which is tyrannical or arbitrary or out of proportion with the
gravity of the situation or circumstances can also be held to be
unconstitutional, being in violation of the article. Since an entry includes
all subsidiary and ancillary matters, the power to tax would include the power
to enact law for the effective implementation and collection/recovery of the
tax levied. It can determine the procedure to collect the tax and provide for a
machinery and also make provision for evasion of taxation: Orient Paper
Mills Ltd. vs. State of Orissa (AIR 1961 SC 1438)
. It was, however, held
that the power to seize and confiscate the goods moving from one state to
another, which were not meant for sale, and also levy penalty was not
incidental to the power to levy tax under Article 265 (C.P. Officer vs. K.P.
Abdulla, (1970) 3 SCC 355
).


In a federal set-up like ours, the inter-relationship between the
government at the centre and the state governments is very critical. According
to M.P. Jain, the author, inter-governmental financial relationship “touches
the very heart of modern federalism, as the way in which this relationship
functions affects the whole content and working of a federal polity
”. Since
taxation is part – a very substantial and significant part – of the finances,
the allocation of the taxing powers is considered important in Constitutions.
The scheme of allocation of taxing powers is broadly based on the principle
that the taxes which are of a local nature are legislated upon by the states
and taxes which have a tax-base extending over more than one state, or which
should be taxed uniformly throughout India, or which can be more conveniently
collected by the centre, are allocated to the centre.
The drawing up of a
Union List, State List and Concurrent List has by and large said to have
prevented the problem arising out of overlapping taxes being levied causing
hardship to citizens, though the Concurrent List has now and then caused some
problem or the other. There are some other federations in the world where this
problem (of overlapping taxes) has manifested itself more acutely.


I had earlier referred to the entries in the three Lists in the 7th
Schedule to the Constitution being “elastic” and being the subject of a wide
interpretation. Here, there is a clear distinction between a tax entry and a
non-tax entry. A tax entry, it has been held in several judgments of the
Supreme Court, has to be construed or interpreted broadly and liberally. In Tata
Iron & Steel Co. vs. St. of Bihar (AIR 1958 SC 452)
, this principle of
broad and liberal interpretation of the tax-entries was extended to include the
power to tax retrospectively. An important principle in this context is the
doctrine of “pith and substance” which means this: the true character of the
legislation in question has to be ascertained by having regard to it as a
whole, to its objects and to the scope and effect of its provisions, and if
according to its “true nature and character” the law substantially relates to a
topic assigned to the legislature, which enacted it, then it is not invalid
merely because it incidentally trenches or encroaches on matters assigned to
another legislature. The fact of incidental encroachment does not affect the vires
of the law even as regards the area of encroachment; incidental encroachments
are not forbidden. The law in question has to be read as an organic whole and
not as a mere collection of sections; it should not be disintegrated into
pieces and each piece examined whether it fits into the Constitutional scheme
or division of legislative powers. The classic observations of the Supreme
Court in State of Bombay vs. Balsara (AIR 1951 SC 318) are these:


“It is well-settled that the validity of an Act is not affected if it
incidentally trenches on matters outside the authorised field and, therefore,
it is necessary to enquire in each case what is the pith and substance of the
Act impugned. If the Act, when so viewed, substantially falls within the powers
expressly conferred upon the legislature which enacted it, then it cannot be
held to be invalid merely because it incidentally encroaches on matters which
have been assigned to another legislature”.


Another aspect of Article 265 is that it is open to the legislature to
pass a validating Act to remove the infirmity in the law pointed out by the
judgment, and make the law effective from the date of its enactment and retain
the collections of the taxes under the law invalidated by the court. The
important condition, however, is that the government must have the power to
levy the tax, for in the absence of the power the tax must ever remain invalid:
M.P. Cement Manufacturers Association vs. State of M.P. (2004) 2 SCC 249.
The validation by a validating Act can however be done only by removing the
grounds of illegality (Rai Ramkrishna vs. State of Bihar) (AIR 1963
SC 1967
), or by removing the basis of the decision and not merely by
disregarding or disobeying or “reversing” the judgment: Ahmedabad
Municipality vs. New Shorrock Spg. & Wvg. Co: (1970) 2 SCC 280
.


Legislative competence (in addition to Constitutional validity) is the
deciding factor in examining the validity of a tax. In judging the legislative
competence – which has to be adjudicated at the threshold before any other
challenge is examined – the nature and character of the tax constitute a
significant element. The following aspects are irrelevant: (a) motive in imposing
the tax; (b) wrong reasons given in the statement of objects and reasons; (c)
the form and manner in which the power is exercised; (d) nomenclature of the
tax. In Jullundur Rubber Goods Manufacturers Association vs. UoI (1969) 2
SCC 280
, it was held that so long as the doctrine of “pith and substance”
is satisfied and the “real nature and character of the levy” test is answered
in the affirmative, with reference to the taxable event and the incidence of
the levy, the law imposing tax cannot be invalidated. It cannot also be argued
that the tax under a particular entry shall be levied in a particular manner;
it is open to the legislature to adopt such method of levy as it chooses so
long as the character of the levy falls within the four corners of the particular
entry: Twyford Tea Co. vs. State of Kerala (1970) 1 SCC 189. The pithy
observations of the Supreme Court in Rai Ramkrishna (supra) are
noteworthy:


“The objects to be taxed, so long as they happen to be within the
legislative competence of the legislature can be taxed by the legislature
according to the exigencies of its needs. ……..the quantum of the tax levied by
the taxing statute, the condition subject to which it is levied, the manner in
which it is sought to be recovered are all matters within the competence of the
legislature”.


In Jain Bros. vs. UoI (1969) 3 SCC 311 and Avinder Singh vs.
State of Punjab (1979) 1 SCC 137
, it was held that Art. 265 does not
prohibit double taxation of the same person twice over if the legislature
evinces a clear intention to do so and that the vice of double-taxation cannot
be spun out of the said article. But without an express provision in the law to
impose tax twice over on the same subject, there can be no double-taxation by
implication.


The question of sharing the revenues between the centre and the states
is crucial, not the least due to political reasons. In the USA, there is no
provision in their Constitution for sharing revenues between the centre and the
states, but in actual practice a system of conditional grants has come to be
under which the centre financially supports the states. Moreover, in that
country the power of the states to impose taxes is vast. The situation in
Australia and Canada is more or less the same, and there is a system of
tax-sharing. The Constitution of India also contains provisions to ensure
financial equilibrium in the distribution of collection by way of taxes. It may
be noted that most of the lucrative tax levies, such as corporation tax,
income-tax, goods and services tax, customs duty are within the domain of the
centre. On the other hand, the states require plenty of money for their welfare
and development schemes and they are mostly left with taxes by way of octroi,
entry tax, land revenues, etc. There are, however, political compulsions in
imposing land revenues, as well as considerations such as hardships to the
agriculturists to be taken note of. The makers of the Constitution did
recognise that the revenues of the states were thus inadequate to fulfill their
needs. In the Report of the Expert Committee on Financial Provisions, this was
highlighted. The Constitution therefore provided for sharing of the finances
between the centre and the states. 


There are two major methods by which the finances are shared:
Tax-sharing and Grants-in-aid.There are detailed provisions in our Constitution
in Article 268 onwards and it is beyond the scope of this article to dive deep
into them. The most important aspect of tax-sharing is the establishment of a
Finance Commission which can devise its own formula for the splitting of the
revenues between the centre and the states in a flexible manner and without
being rigid. The Commission is a non-political body and consists of a president
and four members appointed by the President of India. Article 280 makes
elaborate provisions for the powers and functions of the Commission. The
functions include (a) the distribution between the Union and the States of the
taxes can be divided; (b) to lay down the principles to govern the
grants-in-aid of the revenues of the States out of the Consolidated Fund of
India; (c) to lay down the measures to augment the Consolidated Fund of the
States in order to supplement the resources of the panchayats on the basis of
the recommendations of the State Finance Commission; and (d) to lay down
measures to augment the State Consolidated Fund to supplement the resources of
the municipalities on the basis of the recommendations of the State Finance
Commission.


A burning question which has exercised the minds of tax experts,
economists, jurists, tax lawyers and persons of eminence is whether there
should be justice in taxation
. N.T. Wright, an author who wrote several
books on religion, remarked: “A sense of justice comes with the kit of being
human. We know about it, as we say, in our bones
”. John Rawls, in his book A
Theory of Justice
says that the ultimate purpose of a State is justice.
James Madison, the celebrated President of the USA, said “Justice is the end
of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will
be pursued until it be obtained
”. It is believed that taxation and economic
or fiscal policy, which are subsidiary features of a government, do aim to do
justice first and foremost. Thomas Piketty, in his book The Economics of
Inequality
says that a primary factor for the persistence of economic
injustice in this world is tax and fiscal policy, though there may be other
reasons, too. Injustice in taxation has many facets, the main facet being
complexity due to lack of systematic theories which provide general guidance as
to how taxation does function in society, and the difficulty in reasoning it
out; according to David F. Bradford who wrote Untangling the Income Tax,
taxation “can be understood (if at all) by only a tiny priesthood of lawyers
and accountants
”! Judge Learned Hand scathingly described tax law as a
“meaningless procession of cross-reference to cross-reference, exception upon
exception – couched in abstract terms that offer no handle to seize hold of….”.
Moreover, taxation or tax law takes note of and incorporates other disciplines
in it, such as economics, philosophy, at times even politics. In India, if one
has to understand the Income-Tax Act, one has to have more than a working
knowledge of other branches of law – Civil and Criminal Law, Partnership Law,
Hindu Law or Mohammedan Law, Company Law, Intellectual Property Law and so on.
This certainly makes the tax law more interesting, but also complex. In
contemporary tax jurisprudence, we often hear of horizontal and vertical
equity. Horizontal equity requires two persons similarly situated to be treated
similarly. Vertical equity requires two persons differently situated to be
treated differentially to a degree. These are probably different names given to
what is basically understood as fairness. Fairness in tax law, as presently
advised, seems to be a distant goal. Adam Smith must be turning in his grave!


Is there morality in taxation? This question has troubled many tax
jurists and lawyers over the years. We have a fascinating jurisprudence in
India on the subject. The debate will go on forever and jurists will keep on
saying that the two are poles apart, and that everything is fair in war, love
and taxation. The morality aspect is relevant not only in the means which the tax
payer adopts in “arranging his affairs in such a manner that he pays the least
amount of tax”, but it also applies to governments, particularly in the matter
of retrospective taxation. How moral is it to tax the results of a transaction
which, when it was put through, did not attract taxation but which has been
made subject to tax at a future point of time with back-effect? People may have
arranged their monetary affairs on the basis of the earlier law, and if they
are told after ten years that the earlier law is being withdrawn
retrospectively, it does cause enormous financial strain, mental agony and
leads to distrust or mistrust on the government of the day. Today’s world of
globalisation of business and inter-country commerce and investment suffers most
because of retrospective taxation, as we have seen recently in our country. The
debate will go on, and ways and means will be found to tide over such difficult
situations.


A stable tax policy may be a dream, but that should not prevent
governments from adopting a rational and informed view of taxation principles
to be adopted to serve the needs of the country. For a long time we did not
have a “tax policy unit” in the administration of the Income-Tax Act, and if
tax pundits are to be believed, this has resulted in several skewed situations
which benefit neither the government nor the tax payer. Fortunately, we now
have a Tax Policy Unit which carries out a lot of research, both of local and
overseas conditions, and keeps advising the government which can input the
advice to shape its fiscal policy.


The Indian government came out with proposals in 2016 to make use of
e-assessment procedures with the objective of transparency and speed, in
consonance with the “digital India” initiative. Measures are being taken to
showcase the Indian tax administration as an intelligent, sensitive and
non-combative system which will deal with overseas investors in India fairly
and honestly. The recent amendment to introduce a pilot-scheme where
assessments will be made without any interface between the tax officer and the
assessee is a step taken with the right intention and its success will drive
future amendments with a similar purpose. At the same time, the concern of the
tax payers about the unnecessarily aggressive and at times vengeful attitude of
the tax authorities cannot be said to be without basis and must be addressed.
It is very easy to make a deliberately excessive and high-pitched assessment,
create a demand and harass the assessees who will be forced to run from pillar
to post, spend huge amounts as legal expenses, suffer mental agony, run the
risk of assets and bank accounts being attached with consequent stoppage of
business, and so on and so forth. Tax compliance cannot be expected without
showing tax-sensitivity; to tax and to please is impossible, hence the need
today for a friendly and polite and at the same time objective approach, with
only the requirements of the law in mind. Collection of targeted amounts of tax
cannot be the sole objective and setting of targets must also be realistic;
assessments must be rooted to the law and should be in conformity with the
judicial precedents and not merely target-oriented. A target-oriented approach
tends to result in aggression and a flouting of the rule of law. Judicial
review of the assessments and decisions of the tax authorities should be viewed
as a corrective and not as  criticism.
What is required from the tax administration is a broad-minded, professional
and impersonal approach. Computerisation has its place in the procedural
aspects of administering the law, but computers cannot be allowed to make
assessments!


Protracted and interminable tax disputes serve no purpose. The Act
provides for an excellent system of appellate and revisional remedies but of
late murmurs are being heard whether the appellate tiers, both the first and
the second, are discharging their duties impartially and without being
influenced by “oblique” considerations. There was a time when the Appellate
Assistant Commissioners used to write orders which were, quality and learning
wise, no less than those of judgments of High Courts or even the Supreme Court.
It is unfortunate that one does not get to see such orders these days. The tax
tribunal has always done an excellent job but of late one wonders if it can be
said to be immune to the “winds of change” sweeping the country and the mindset
of its people. Innovation and improvisation in the decision-making process is
welcome, but it should be within the framework of the judicial norms and discipline.
The decisions should be informed by objectivity and absence of bias – against
the Department of Income-Tax, against the tax payer and also against the
counsel! – and care should be taken to ensure that judicial adventurism does
not masquerade as judicial innovation or judicial creativity. I will say no
more.


A word about the emerging trends and issues in international taxation,
which has turned out to be a fascinating branch of the income-tax law. These
are mostly issues arising out of interpretation of tax treaties and
transfer-pricing issues. In both, the stakes are mind-boggling. The
jurisprudence is marvellous and provides excellent fodder for intellectual
acrobatics. The IRS has mastered these two branches of tax law; the tax
lawyers, with some unmatched original thinking, have made a huge contribution
to the growth of this branch of the tax law, supplemented by the learning
exhibited by the Tribunal in dealing with those issues. It is a matter of pride
for the profession that the highest number of decisions in this branch has
emerged from our country and it is believed that they are treated with great
respect in judicial forums across the world. This is a very good augury for the
tax administration of the country. It is further believed that this branch of
tax jurisprudence will govern the future tax litigation in our country.


To conclude, I can do no better than quote the learned author,
Padamchand Khincha, from his preface to the book Emerging issues in
International taxation
: “Rightful tax is the price of social order. Tax
is that portion of a citizen’s property which he/she yields to the Government
in return for the benefits enjoyed from the society. Citizens feel that taxes
are (un)wantonly levied, that the pervasiveness of taxes is stifling.
Governments feel that the tax payers are short in discharging their
obligations……………..In this interaction of granting the benefits and demanding
the exaction, the equation is hardly ever balanced.”
Well, very pithily
put. The goal of every tax administration is to find that ever-elusive balance!


JAI HIND!!!

 

Pelting Pessimism

Rudyard Kipling wrote: “Words are
the most powerful drug used by mankind.” The truth in those words shines bright
during election time. Just like ice cream or burger companies, the notable
limited period election flavours are linked to certain themes. One of them is
Pessimism.

 

Pessimism sells. The human mind is
wired for pessimism. Therefore, pessimism sticks – like Fevicol! A recent
article in GQ magazine[1]  said: “When you look at pessimistic people,
probably the single [most-telling] hallmark is — they think that bad events
are permanent and that they’re unchangeable.” A lot of stuff in the media and
politics these days is akin to this.

 

Take the example of talking about
poverty and poisonous political rattling around this subject. Although India
has miles to go, millions of people have been brought out of abject poverty.
Yet politicos, and recently the winking and hugging parliamentarian, can’t stop
talking about poverty. Let’s do a fact check. There were 90.17 m people living
in extreme poverty in January, 2016 (6.8% of population). In January, 2019,
49.16 m people were reported to be living in extreme poverty (3.6% of
population) in India[2].
The current escape rate is 21.7 people/minute, whereas the target escape rate is
7.8 people/minute. Yet the narrative and discourse of pessimism is kept
consistent and incessant. The fact is that great good has happened and greater
good is yet to be done. It is important to acknowledge what is done and it is
imperative to focus on what needs to be done through ideas and action.

 

Business
Standard
tweeted on January 22, 2019: “If everyone had decent
jobs… not very many would spare time for Kumbh”. What kind of “standard” is
this? Is this the way to talk about the faithful who visit the largest
congregation on the planet? Even if many were underemployed, is this the way to
look down upon millions of people by the media? Partisan, irresponsible,
agenda-driven, and biased seems to be a new standard and that too by a business
newspaper – this is appalling. On the other hand, a CII report said that the
fifty-day congregation – the Ardh Kumbh, will create jobs for 6 lakh workers
and generate revenue of Rs 1.2 lakh crore. Pessimism is often a false
projection to blur people’s perception by only flashing the doomsday prophesies
on the screen of the mind.

 

Beware!
False, pretentious, convenient facts abound! Pessimism is projected on an
oversized screen bigger than the falsehood it wants to project. Elections
involved rigging of some booths in earlier times. Elections today are about rigging
people’s perception
on a scale not known before, one that is so immaculate
in design that you won’t even know. The upcoming 17th national
election will have an electorate of nearly 900 million out of which 450 m have
access to internet, there are 270 m Facebook users and 200 m WhasApp users –
which is equal to more than any democracy in the world. We need to be watchful
of all this.

The President of India tweeted on 1st
February about the cost of data – dropping from Rs. 250 per GB (2014) to Rs. 12
(2018). There are innumerable positive data points and there is an unfinished
agenda before the nation to overcome so many problems.


I recently read: “Life can only be
understood backwards; but it must be lived forwards.” We have to look ahead, to
look for the light. I hope we don’t succumb to pessimism. I hope we will look
through to see where the light is. Charlie Chaplin said: “You’ll never find
rainbows if you’re looking down”.

 

And yes the Supreme
Court will deliver its take about the fate of a prayer in schools which comes
from the civilizational soul of India. Strange as it is, some believe that
nation can be separated from
  the bedrock of its
civilization and the offshoots can poison the soil. The universality of those
words is as important and relevant as ever. Let me sign off with that same
aspiration: May all of us be led from untruth to truth, from darkness to
light, from death to immortality.

 


[1] 23rd
September 2018

[2] https://worldpoverty.io
run by Vienna based NGO and funded by German Federal Ministry of Economic
Cooperation and Development. It gathers data available in public domain.

Eternal Vigilance

We are living in a war-like situation.
Technology is invading and virtually taking over our personal and professional
lives. It has become extremely difficult to maintain secrecy, confidentiality
and privacy. The invasion is probably with a vicious attitude and purpose. Our
bank account is vulnerable and our office and personal data is vulnerable.
Hence, we are vulnerable and are exposed to many risks. Everywhere, there is a
crisis of trust. In short there is a serious threat to security, an environment
of uneasiness and suspicion is prevailing.

 

In international politics, there is an often
quoted saying – “In international relations, there are no permanent
friends nor permanent enemies. There are only permanent interests!”

Unfortunately, this principle is becoming applicable even to our personal
relationships.

 

Actually, the use of technology was expected
to enhance our efficiency and make our living more creative and relaxed.
Unfortunately, the experience is exactly the opposite! Therefore, there is an
ever-increasing need for caution in every walk of life. The issue of privacy is
being discussed and debated internationally.

 

Sometimes, the damage occurs not necessarily
due to malicious intentions; but purely on account of negligence, lack of due
care or inadvertence. Nevertheless, the consequences are disastrous. As
chartered accountants, we expect that we should have independence and preserve
and practice client secrecy – privacy. One always should bear in mind that “eternal
vigilance is the cost of independence”.

 

Saint Samarth Ramdas has given a very
beautiful message for the conduct of our life in just four lines –


                             

Not
only in the matters of spiritual but also in state-craft, unbroken alertness is
vital in every aspect.

 

Harikatha
stands for good and holy thoughts. All your actions should be motivated by some
constructive and positive thinking. One should aim at the larger good and not
at narrow selfishness. One should try to spread peace, well-being and
happiness. That is the Divine aspect of our life.

 

Second is “Raj-karan”. It does not
mean “politics” as we understand today. It indicates governance. One has to
conduct one’s affairs in a professional manner.

 

The third is “Savadhpan
meaning vigilance. This is to keep away the negative powers from destroying a
good cause and lastly “Sarvavishayi” means in every walk of life.
Actually, this was Samarth Ramdas’s message to Shivaji Maharaj; and
the latter followed it both in letter and spirit.

 

To conclude, I would say that despite the
present environment of distrust and being vulnerable, to have a peaceful life
one should act with truth, love and compassion at home, in business and in the
profession and in our dealing with society, whilst at the same time being
vigilant. In short, follow the dictate of Swami Ramdas.
 

 

Business expenditure – Disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) – Payments liable to TDS – Effect of insertion of second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) – Declaratory and curative and applicable retrospectively w.e.f. 01/04/2005 – Payee offering to tax sum received in its return – Disallowance not attracted

42.  Principal CIT
vs. Shivpal Singh Chaudhary; 409 ITR 87 (P&H)
Date of order: 5th July, 2018 A. Y. 2012-13 Sections 37, 40(a)(ia) and 201(1) of ITA 1961

 

Business expenditure – Disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) –
Payments liable to TDS – Effect of insertion of second proviso to section
40(a)(ia) – Declaratory and curative and applicable retrospectively w.e.f.
01/04/2005 – Payee offering to tax sum received in its return – Disallowance
not attracted

 

For the A. Y. 2012-13, the Assessing Officer had made certain
disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) of the Act being amount paid to a construction
company for job work on the ground that tax was not deducted at source. The
assessee had filed confirmation from the payee that the payment made by the
assesse to it had been shown in its return.

 

The Commissioner appeals held that the second proviso to section
40(a)(ia) is clarificatory and retrospective and deleted the addition. The
Tribunal upheld the decision of the Commissioner (Appeals).

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and Haryana High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)   The second proviso to section
40(a)(ia) of the Act was inserted by the Finance Act, 2012 w.e.f. 01/04/2013.
According to the proviso, a fiction has been introduced where an assessee who
had failed to deduct tax in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XVII-B,
but is not deemed to be an assessee in default in terms of the first proviso to
sub-section (1) of section 201 it shall be deemed to have deducted and paid the
tax on such sum on the date of furnishing of return of income by the resident
payee referred to in the proviso.

 

ii)   From the first proviso to
section 201(1) and the second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) it is discernible
that according to both the provisos, where the payee has filed the return
disclosing the payment received or receivable, and has also paid the tax on
such income, the assessee would not be treated to be a person in default and a
presumption would arise in his favour.

iii)  The rationale behind the
insertion of the second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) was declaratory and
curative and thus, applicable retrospectively w.e.f. 01/04.2005. However, under
the first proviso to section 201(1) inserted w.e.f. 01/07/2012, an exception
had been carved out which showed the intention of the Legislature not to treat
the assessee as a person in default subject to fulfilment of the conditions as
stipulated thereunder. No different view could be taken regarding the
introduction of the second proviso to section 40(a)(ia), which was intended to
benefit the assessee, w.e.f. 01/04/2013 by creating a legal fiction in the
assessee’s favour and not to treat him in default of deducting tax at source
under certain contingencies and that it should be presumed that the assessee
had deducted and paid tax on such sum on the date of furnishing of the return
by the resident payee.

iv)  In view of the above,
substantial question of law stands answered against the Revenue and in favour
of the assessee.”

GOVERNMENT SUPPLIES UNDER GST

INTRODUCTION & POSITION UNDER PRE – GST REGIME


1.    In
India, administration is divided into three tiers, namely Central Government,
State Government & Municipality/Local Authority. Each tier is entrusted
with specific powers & responsibility to carry out the various activities
and functions. In the said course, the said authority receives various
goods/services and at times, might even supply goods/services. Article 285
& 289 of the Constitution stipulates that the property of Union/ States is
exempted from taxes levied by the States/Union respectively. However, the same
does not apply to Indirect Taxes. The Supreme Court has held1 that
indirect taxes levied by the Union/State shall be borne by the recipient
State/Union since the same would not be governed by immunity provided by the
Constitution vide Articles 285 & 289 respectively.

2.    Therefore,
considering the above constitutional background, not only the Union/States were
liable to bear the indirect taxes levied, viz., VAT, Central Excise &
Service Tax, there was also a liability fastened to discharge service tax on
sale of goods/services provided by the Union/State. For instance, in the
context of sale of goods, under the VAT regime, certain class of person were
deemed to be a dealer with specific intention to tax specific sales, such as
sale of essential commodities at subsidised rates, auctions undertaken by the
Authorities, scrap, etc., carried out by such Government/Local Authority. This
included Customs Department, Department of Union Government/ any State
Government, Local Authorities, Port Trust, Public Charitable Trusts, Railways,
etc.

3.    However,
in the context of services tax, the levy had to be analysed for two different
regimes, one being pre-negative list regime and second being the negative list
regime. Under the positive list regime, only selective services were being
taxed. Further, vide Circular No. 89/7/2006 – ST dated 18.12.2006, CBEC had
clarified that performance of statutory function could not be considered as
rendition of service. However, it was further clarified that “if such authority
performs a service which is not in the nature of statutory activity and the
same is undertaken for a consideration not in the nature of statutory fee/levy,
service tax would be leviable in such cases if the activity undertaken was
classifiable within the ambit of a taxable service”. In other words, the said
Circular prescribed tests to determine the applicability of service tax
vis-à-vis the nature of activity involved.

___________________________________________

1   Sea
Customs Act [AIR 1963 (SC)], Karya Palak Engineer, CPWD vs.
Rajasthan Taxation Board, Ajmer [2004 (171) ELT 3 (SC)]

 

4.    However,
under the negative list regime, the definition of person specifically included
“Government” and provided that all services provided by the Government would be
covered under the negative list, except for following:

(a)   Services
by Department of Posts by way of speed post, express parcel post, life
insurance and agency services provided to a person other than Government

(b)   Services
in relation to an aircraft or a vessel, inside or outside the precincts of a
port or an airport

(c)   Transport
of goods or passengers

(d)   Any2
services other than services covered above provided to business entities.

5.    While
(a) to (c) above were covered under forward charge, i.e., the Government/Local
Authority providing the service would be required to collect and discharge
service tax, service under (d) were covered under reverse charge, i.e., the
business entity receiving the service would be required to discharge tax.
However, upto 31.03.2016, clause (d) covered only support services which was
defined to mean infrastructural, operational, administrative, logistic,
marketing or any other support of any kind comprising functions that entities
carry out in ordinary course of operations themselves but may obtain as
services by outsourcing from others for any reason whatsoever and shall include
advertisement and promotion, construction or works contract, renting of
immovable property, security, testing and analysis.

_____________________________________

2   Substituted
for “Support services” w.e.f 01.04.2016

 

6.    Further,
the Education Guide had also clarified that services which are provided by
government in terms of their sovereign right to business entities, and which
are not substitutable in any manner by any private entity, are not support
services e.g. grant of mining or licensing rights or audit of government
entities established by a special law, which are required to be audited by CAG
u/s. 18 of the Comptroller and Auditor-General’s (Duties, Powers and Conditions
of Service) Act, 1971 (such services are performed by CAG under the statue and
cannot be performed by the business entity themselves and thus do not
constitute support services.)

7.    The
above position was amended w.e.f 01.04.2016 to provide that any service
provided by Government to business entities would be excluded from the scope of
negative list. Further, CBEC vide Circular 192/02/2016 dated 13.04.2016
clarified that whether or not any activity is carried out as statutory function,
the same would be liable to service tax (subject to specific exemptions) so
long as payment is being made for getting a service in return. However, it was
clarified that fines and penalty chargeable by Authority were not leviable to
service tax.

 

LEGAL POSITION UNDER THE GST REGIME


8.    The
charging section for levy of GST provides for levy of tax on all supplies of
goods, except alcoholic liquor for human consumption on the value determined
u/s. 15 and at such rates as may be notified and collected in such manner as
may be prescribed and paid by the taxable person

9.    The
term “taxable person” has been defined u/s 2 (107) to mean a person
who is registered or liable to be registered u/s. 22 or 24. Section 2
(84) defines the term “person” to include, among others a local authority;
Central Government or a State Government. Section 22 provides that every
supplier shall be liable to be registered in the state from where he makes
taxable supplies. Therefore, the issue that would need consideration is whether
the Government (Central/State) or Local Authority can be said to be engaged in
making taxable supplies, either of goods or services? To answer the said
question, one needs to determine whether the activities undertaken by the
Government or Local Authority can be classifiable as supply or not. For the
same, reference to section 7 becomes necessary. Section 7 (1) which defines the
scope of supply to include all forms of supply of goods or services or both
such as sale, transfer, barter, exchange, license, rental, lease or disposal
made or agreed to be made for a consideration by a person in the course or
furtherance of business.

10.   Section
2 (17), which defines the term business provides that business shall include any
activity or transaction undertaken by the Central Government, a State
Government or any local authority in which they are engaged as public
authorities.
In other words, the activities or transactions undertaken by
the Government or Local Authority are deemed to be business and therefore as
long as there is supply of goods/service by such Government/ Local Authority,
they would be classifiable as supply.

 

TAXABILITY UNDER GST REGIME


11.   Therefore,
the question that would need consideration is whether all activities/functions
undertaken by Government/Local Authority has to be treated as supply of goods
or services or not? This question may not be relevant in the context of goods;
however, it would be very relevant in the context of services. This is because
though service has been defined in a very wide manner to mean anything other
than goods, section 7 (1), which defines supply, pre-necessitates the existence
of a contract for treating an activity/transaction as supply. The same is
evident from the fact that section 7 (1) uses the phrase made or agreed to
be made
. This would necessarily require the presence of quid pro quo
for any activity undertaken by the Government/ Local Authority, i.e., the
person making the payment should receive something in return. Some instances
where quid pro quo exists in the activities undertaken by Government/
Local Authority include:

  •    companies
    engaged in telecommunication sector have to pay license fee to the Department
    of Telecommunication for spectrum allocation

  •    builders
    are required to pay various charges to the Local Authority in the form of
    permission charges, lease premium, staircase allowance, etc., for undertaking
    construction activities. Such transactions may amount
    to service
  •    companies
    making payment to ROC in the form of filing fees, fees for increasing
    authorised share capital, etc., thus enabling them to comply with the
    provisions of the law

12.   However,
there can be instances where the element of quid pro quo may not exist.
For instance, in Gupta Modern Breweries vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir
[(2007) 6 SCC 317]
, the Court was required to decide whether the fees
recovered for audit conducted by Excise Authorities on the records of assessee
were in the nature of a fee or tax? In the said case, the Court held that there
was no quid pro quo between the taxpayer and the Government/Authority
and therefore the amounts were in the nature of tax and not fee. Therefore, if
such amounts recovered by the Government are treated as tax and not fees, the
same would not amount to a service to the licensee by the Government. That
being the case, such payments to the Government may not attract GST.

13.   With
regard to taxes levied by Government/Local Authorities under other statutes,
such as property tax, stamp duty, etc., they cannot be treated as being consideration
for any service provided. This view was also expressed by the CBEC in its’
Circular 192/02/2016. One important fact to support this view is perhaps that
tax is a compulsory exaction of funds, not involving any quid pro quo
and no specific performance can be enforced upon payment of the same from the
Government or Local Authority.

14.   Similarly,
penalties or fines levied for violation of any statute, bye-laws, rules or
regulations will also not amount to a service. This would be for the reason that
the penalty or fine would not be paid by the recipient for receiving any
specific service, but are infact in the nature of compulsory payments imposed
on him. For instance, car towing charges collected by the State Government for
a car parked in No-Parking Zone. Even if the owner of car would be paying for
the said charges, yet, the same should not be treated as service supplied by
Government since there was no agreement to receive the said service.

15.   To
support the above view, one may refer to the Judgment by the New Zealand
Tribunal in Case S65 (1996) 17 NZTC 7408 wherein a taxpayer, who was a
solicitor, was the subject of a disciplinary hearing by the New Zealand Law
Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal. The taxpayer argued that the costs he was
ordered to pay were a supply of goods or services to him by the Law Societies.

 

In the said case, it was held that
costs imposed by a disciplinary tribunal were not subject to GST because there
was no “supply”. The costs of prosecuting an allegedly defaulting solicitor
could not be described as the supply of a service; and in the context of the
Goods and Services Tax Act, “services” are generally considered to be some
activity which helps or benefits the recipient. In other words, penalties,
fines, etc., imposed by the Government/ Local Authorities cannot be treated as
consideration for service provided and hence should not attract GST.

 

LIABILITY TO PAY GST


16.   In
a manner similar to the service tax regime, substantial services provided by
the Government/Local Authority to business entities have been covered under
reverse charge mechanism, except for following specific services where the
respective Government/Local Authority is liable to collect and discharge the
tax liability:

  •    Renting of
    immovable property services3
  •    Services
    by the Department of Posts by way of speed post, express parcel post, life
    insurance, and agency services provided to a person other than the Central
    Government, State Government, Union territory
  •    Services
    in relation to an aircraft or a vessel, inside or outside the precincts of a
    port or an airport;
  •    Transport
    of goods or passengers

17.   In
all other cases of services provided by Government to business entities, the
liability to pay service tax has been fastened on the recipient of service.
While the term business entity has not been defined under GST law, the same
will have to be understood as a person carrying on any business, whether or not
liable to pay GST. For instance, a person dealing in non-GST goods, say
alcohol, is required to obtain liquor licenses for dealing in license. Since
such a person would be a business entity, even though there is no GST
applicable on his outward supplies, he would be required to obtain registration
under GST and discharge the applicable tax thereon. This would also require
such a person to comply with the various provisions of the GST law as well.

18.   In
addition to the above, notification 12/ 2017 Central Tax (Rate) also provides
exemption for various other services provided to/by Government/Local
Authorities. Some of the relevant exemptions for services provided by
Government/Local Authorities are listed below:

(a)   Services
by Central Government, State Government, Union territory, local authority or
governmental authority by way of any activity in relation to any function
entrusted to a municipality under Article 243 W of the Constitution
[Entry 4]

(b)   Services
by a governmental authority by way of any activity in relation to any function
entrusted to a Panchayat under Article 243G of the Constitution [Entry 5]

(c)   Services
by the Central Government, State Government, Union territory or local authority
excluding the following services—

(i) services by the Department of Posts
by way of speed post, express parcel post, life insurance, and agency services
provided to a person other than the Central Government, State Government, Union
territory;

(ii) services in relation to an
aircraft or a vessel, inside or outside the precincts of a port or an airport;

(iii) transport of goods or passengers;
or

(iv) any service, other than services
covered under entries (a) to (c) above, provided to business entities [Entry 6]

(d)   Services
provided by the Central Government, State Government, Union territory or local
authority to a business entity with an aggregate turnover of up to twenty lakh
rupees (ten lakh rupees in case of a special category state) in the preceding financial
year. However, the same is not applicable to services covered under (i) to
(iii) in (d) above as well as in case of renting of immovable property services
[Entry 7]

(e)   Services
provided by the Central Government, State Government, Union territory or local
authority to a business entity where consideration does not exceed Rs. 5000.
However, this exemption is not available in case of services covered under (i)
to (iii) above and in case the services are in the nature of continuous supply
of services and the total consideration payable for the supply during the year
exceeds Rs. 5000. [Entry 9]

(f)    Services
provided by the Central Government, State Government, Union territory or local
authority by way of allowing a business entity to operate as a telecom service
provider or use radio frequency spectrum during the period prior to the 1st
April, 2016, on payment of license fee or spectrum user charges, as the case
may be. [Entry 42]

(g)   Services
provided by the Central Government, State Government, Union territory or local
authority by way of-

(i) registration required under any law
for the time being
in force;

 

_________________________________________________________________________________________________

3     Vide notification 3/2018 dated 25.01.2018, services
of renting of immovable property supplied by Central Government, State
Government, Union territory or local authority to a person registered under the
Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 have been brought within the purview
of reverse charge.

 

(ii) testing, calibration, safety check
or certification relating to protection or safety of workers, consumers or
public at large, including fire license, required under any law for the time
being in force [Entry 47]

(h)   Services
provided by the Central Government, State Government, Union territory or local
authority by way of issuance of passport, visa, driving license, birth
certificate or death certificate [Entry 61]

(i)    Services
provided by the Central Government, State Government, Union territory or local
authority by way of tolerating non-performance of a contract for which
consideration in the form of fines or liquidated damages is payable to the
Central Government, State Government, Union territory or local authority under
such contract.
[Entry 62]

(j)    Services
provided by the Central Government, State Government, Union territory or local
authority by way of assignment of right to use natural resources to an
individual farmer for cultivation of plants and rearing of all life forms of
animals, except the rearing of horses, for food, fibre, fuel, raw material or
other similar products. [Entry 63]

(k)   Services
provided by the Central Government, State Government, Union territory or local
authority by way of assignment of right to use any natural resource where such
right to use was assigned by the Central Government, State Government, Union
territory or local authority before the 1st April, 2016. [Entry 64]

(l)    Services
provided by the Central Government, State Government, Union territory by way of
deputing officers after office hours or on holidays for inspection or container
stuffing or such other duties in relation to import export cargo on payment of
Merchant Overtime charges
[Entry 65]

(m)  Services
supplied by a State Government to Excess Royalty Collection Contractor (ERCC)
by way of assigning the right to collect royalty on behalf of the State
Government on the mineral dispatched by the mining lease holders.

19.   Similarly,
following services provided to Government/ Local Authority have been exempted:

(a)   Pure
services (excluding works contract service or other composite supplies
involving supply of any goods) provided to the Central Government, State
Government or Union territory or local authority or a Governmental authority by
way of any activity in relation to any function entrusted to a Panchayat under
Article 243G of the Constitution or in relation to any function entrusted to a
Municipality under Article 243W of the Constitution [Entry 3]

(b)   Composite
supply of goods and services in which the value of supply of goods constitutes
not more than 25 % of the value of the said composite supply provided to the
Central Government, State Government or Union territory or local authority or a
Governmental authority or a Government Entity by way of any activity in
relation to any function entrusted to a Panchayat under Article 243G of the
Constitution or in relation to any function entrusted to a Municipality under
Article 243W of the Constitution
 [Entry 3A]

(c)   Supply
of service by a Government Entity to Central Government, State Government,
Union territory, local authority or any person specified by Central Government,
State Government, Union territory or local authority against consideration
received from Central Government, State Government, Union territory or local
authority, in the form of grants. [Entry 9C]

(d)   Services
by an old age home run by Central Government, State Government or by an entity
registered u/s. 12AA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961) to its residents
(aged 60 years or more) against consideration upto twenty five thousand rupees
per month per member, provided that the consideration charged is inclusive of
charges for boarding, lodging and maintenance [Entry 9D]

(e)   Service
provided by Fair Price Shops to Central Government by way of sale of wheat,
rice and coarse grains under Public Distribution System (PDS) and to State
Governments or Union territories by way of sale of kerosene, sugar, edible oil,
etc., under Public Distribution System (PDS) against consideration in the form
of commission or margin [Entry 11A/ 11B]

(f)    Services
provided to the Central Government, State Government, Union territory
administration under any training programme for which total expenditure is
borne by the Central Government, State Government, Union territory
administration [Entry 72]

 

CERTAIN ISSUES & RULINGS

20.   What
will be the scope of functions entrusted to a municipality under Article 243W?

  •    One
    particular function performed by the Municipality is to provide permission to
    various utility service providers (electricity, gas, etc.,) to carryout
    excavation work to laydown underground wire, pipe-lines, etc., for which
    charges in the form of access charges & reinstatement charges are levied by
    the Municipality.
  •    An
    application for Advance Ruling was made before the Authority in Maharashtra by
    Reliance Infrastructure Limited [2018 (013) GSTL 0449 (AAR)] as to
    whether the above charges would be covered under functions entrusted to a
    Municipality under Article 243W or not? The Authority in the said case held as
    under:

This restoration work would not result
in performing of the sovereign function. The sovereign function has already
been performed by constructing the road or undertaking maintenance works of the
roads. The restoration work can be equated neither to construction work nor to
maintenance work as suo motu undertaken by the Municipal Authorities. The
restoration charges are also not in the nature that the Municipal Authorities
are performing any job of construction for the applicant. The street or pavement
or road that is dug up is a general road. In view of all above, we are of the
firm view that it should not be disputed that the recovering of charges for
restoring the patches which have been dug up by business entities of the nature
as the applicant cannot be equated to performing a sovereign function as
envisaged under Article 243W of the Constitution.

  •    However,
    the Authority in the above case has while appreciating the fact that the
    function of construction and maintenance of road is entrusted to the
    Municipality under Article 243W, erred in not appreciating the fact that the
    reinstatement charges recovered from the utility service providers is merely to
    meet the cost incurred for undertaking the functions entrusted to it under
    Article 243W, i.e., to maintain the roads. This is done by the Municipality by
    appointing contractors, who undertake the activity and charge the Municipality
    for the same. The role of Municipality is to ensure that the said function
    relating to construction and maintenance of road is properly performed, which
    is performed by collecting the said charges from such public utility companies.
    In fact, one can say that in case of access & reinstatement charges
    collected by the Municipality, it is infact a case of service to self rather
    than service to public utility companies as it helps the Municipality to
    perform the function entrusted to it under Article 243W.
  •    Interesting
    aspect to note in the above case is that there were two different charges
    collected by the Municipality, namely reinstatement charges and access charges.
    In the case of access charges, the Authority has arrived at a prima facie
    conclusion that tax would be payable. However, it has failed to appreciate the
    fact that in case of access charges, the Municipality has recovered GST from
    the Applicant. The question that therefore would need analysis is whether there
    would be double taxation, i.e., the supplier of service also charges GST and
    the recipient also discharges GST on the same under reverse charge?
  •    Further,
    in another Ruling in the case of VPSSR Facilities [2018 (013) GSTL 0116
    (AAR)]
    , the Authority held that cleaning services provided to the Northern
    Railways, classifiable as Central Government would not be eligible for
    exemption under Entry 3 since the Railways do not carry out any function
    entrusted to a Municipality under Article 243W. The Authority further held that
    the Municipality was entrusted with functions only in relation to urban areas
    and not in relation to railway properties. If this view is accepted, exemption
    will not be available in case of services provided by Central/State Government
    in relation to carrying out any function entrusted to a Municipality under
    Article 243W.

21.    Whether
exemption under Entry 6 will extend to other services provided by Department of
Posts?

  •    On going
    through the website of Department of Posts, there are three different
    categories of service provided, as under:

 

Premium

Domestic

International

Speed Post

Letter

Letter

Express Parcel

Book Packet

EMS Speed Post

Business Parcel

Registered Newspaper

Air Parcel

Logistics Post

Parcel

International Tracked Packets

 

  •      The
    services relating to speed post & express parcel post are explicitly
    covered under forward charge. However, other services provided to business
    entities by Department of Posts will be covered under clause (d) of Entry 6 of
    notification 12/ 2017 and therefore be liable to tax under reverse charge
    mechanism.
  •      This
    would be important in the case of business delivering goods through posts,
    companies mailing annual reports/notices under normal post, magazines posted on
    license to post without pre-payment, etc., Off-course, one can claim the exemption
    of Rs. 5000 but the same would need to be analysed on a case to case basis.

22.   In
case of exemption under Entry 72, can exemption be denied on the grounds that
only cost is borne by the Government and no service is received by the
Government?

  •      Entry 72
    provides for exemption to services provided to Government under any training
    programme for which total expenditure is borne by them. In such cases, there
    are programmes where the service provider is required to identify candidates
    for providing training and upon completion of training or as per agreed terms,
    the Government makes the payment for such training to the service provider,
    i.e., the service is not provided to the Government but only the cost is borne
    by the Government.
  •      In such
    a case, can the exemption be denied on the grounds that since service is not
    provided to Government but the candidate, the exemption is not available.
  •      The
    answer to the same would be in negative in view of the fact that the definition
    of recipient of service u/s. 2 (93) provides that recipient of supply in case
    where consideration is payable for supply shall be the person liable to pay the
    service and not the person consuming the service. Therefore, since the claim
    for payment for the service is to be made before the Government conducting the
    programme, the payment can be enforced only from the Government and therefore,
    in view of section 2 (93), it is the Government who is the recipient of
    service.

 

TAX DEDUCTED AT SOURCE

23.   Vide
notification  50/2018 – CT (Rate) dated
13.09.2018, in addition to specified class of people referred to in clause (a)
to (c) of section 51, i.e., Department/Establishment of Central Government or
State Government, local authority or Government agencies, following class of
people have been made liable to deduct tax at source on payments to be made on
various supplies received by them:

 

(a)   an
authority or a board or any other body, –

(i)    set
up by an Act of Parliament or a State Legislature; or

(ii)    established
by any Government,

with 51 % or more participation by way
of equity or control, to carry out any function;

(b)   Society
established by the Central Government or the State Government or a Local
Authority under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860);

(c)   public
sector undertakings (not applicable in case of supplies received from another
PSU)

24.   The rate of TDS
applicable on such payments would be 2%, being 1% CGST and 1% SGST/UTGST in
case of intrastate supplies and 2% IGST in case of interstate supplies.

 

CONCLUSION

25.   To
summarise, under the GST regime, while making payment for any activity or
function undertaken by Government or Local Authority, one will need to analyse
the GST implications on multiple fronts, such as :

  •      whether
    the activity undertaken by the Government or Local Authority partakes the
    character of a service or not?
  •      Whether
    the activity is classifiable under the exemption list or not?

26.   The
above exercise will need to be followed rigorously by a business not entitled
for full credit as payment of tax under reverse charge, even on a conservative
basis will have to be taken as cost, which may not be necessary. Off course, a
business eligible to claim full input tax credit might take a conservative view
and not go in to the above hassles by discharging tax on all payments since
there may not be any cash flow issues or unnecessary tax costs.

27.          More care needs to be exercised in
case of services provided to Government/Local Authority in view of the fact
that claiming a wrong exemption can have significant repercussions involving
payment of tax out of pocket saddled with consequential interest and penalties.
One further needs to ensure that in each case, the exemption be analysed on
their own rather than depending on the recipients’ claim of exemption, since
the same may not be always correct.

Section 194IA – The limit of Rs. 50 lakh in section 194-IA(2) is qua the transferee and not qua the amount as per sale deed. Each transferee is a separate income-tax entity and the law has to be applied with reference to each transferee as an individual transferee/person.

26.  [2018] 101 taxmann.com 190 (Delhi-Trib.) Pradeep Kumar
Soni vs. ITO (TDS) (Delhi) ITA No.:
2739/Del./2015
A.Y.:
2014-15.Dated: 10th
December, 2018

 

Section 194IA
  The limit of Rs. 50 lakh in section
194-IA(2) is qua the transferee and not qua the amount as per
sale deed.  Each transferee is a separate
income-tax entity and the law has to be applied with reference to each transferee
as an individual transferee/person.

 

FACTS


The Assessing
Officer (AO) received information from the Sub-registrar that vide an agreement
registered on 3rd July, 2013, the assessee along with 3 other
persons has purchased an immovable property for a consideration of Rs. 1.50
crore. 

 

The AO observed
that the assessee was required to deduct tax u/s. 194-IA @ 1% and deposit the
same to the credit of the Central Government. He, accordingly, called for
information u/s. 133(6) of the Act. In response, the assessee submitted that
each of the four transferees have jointly purchased the property and the share
of every co-owner is Rs. 37.50 lakh which is less than Rs. 50 lakh and
therefore, the provisions of section 194-IA are not applicable. The AO held
that since the consideration for the transfer of immovable property is Rs. 1.50
crore, i.e. more than Rs. 50 lakh, and the same is executed through a single
deed and registered the provisions of section 194-IA are applicable. He passed
an order u/s. 201(1) and 201(1A) of the Act holding the assessee and three
other transferees to be jointly and severally responsible for payment of
taxes. 

 

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.


Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD


The Tribunal
noted that the sale deed inter alia provided that “the Vendees have
become the absolute and undisputed owner of the above said plot in equal
share.” It also noted that section 194-IA(2) provides that section 194-IA(1)
will not apply where the consideration for transfer of immovable property is
less than Rs. 50 lakh. It observed that section 194-IA(1) is application to any
person being a transferee, so section 194-IA(2) is also, obviously, applicable
only with respect to the amount related to each transferee and not with
reference to the amount as per sale deed. It noted that in the instant case,
there are four separate transferees and the sale consideration w.r.t. each
transferee is Rs. 37.50 lakh, hence, less than Rs. 50 lakh each.

 

It held that
each transferee is a separate income-tax entity therefore, the law has to be
applied with reference to each transferee as an individual transferee/person.
The law cannot be interpreted and applied differently for the same transaction,
if carried out in different ways. The point to be made is that, the law cannot be
read as that in case of four separate purchase deed for four persons
separately, section 194-IA was not applicable, and in case of a single purchase
deed for four persons section 194-IA will be applicable.

 

The Tribunal
noted that AO has passed a common order for all four transferees u/s. 201(1).
The Tribunal stated that this was to justify his action since in case of
separate orders for each transferee separately, apparently, provisions of
section 194-IA could not have been made applicable since in each case purchase
consideration is only Rs. 37.50 lakh. This action of the AO shows that he was
clear in his mind that with reference to each transferee, section 194-IA was
not applicable.


The Tribunal
held that the addition made by the AO and confirmed by CIT(A) to be not
sustainable in the eyes of law and deleted the same.

 

The appeal
filed by the assessee was allowed.

FAMILY SETTLEMENTS – PART II

We
continue with our analysis of family settlements….

 

Capital Gains Tax liability


Taxation
is always a key consideration in any transaction more so in a family settlement
which involves properties / assets changing hands. Under the Income-tax Act,
any profits or gains arising from the transfer of a capital asset are
chargeable to capital gains tax. Thus, the primary condition for levy of
capital gains tax is that there must be a “transfer” as
defined in section 2(47) of the I.T. Act. This primary condition must be
satisfied before a tax levy on a capital gain may come in (C.A. Natarajan
vs. CIT, 92 ITR 347 (Mad)
). A family arrangement, in the interest of
settlement, may involve movement of property or payment of money from one
person to another. Several judgments have held that there is no “transfer”
involved in a family arrangement. Therefore, there is no question of capital
gains tax incidence under a family arrangement.   

 

The
following principles emerge from various cases:

 

(a) The transaction of a family settlement entered
into by the parties bona fide for the purpose of putting an end to the dispute
among family members, does not amount to a “transfer”. It is not also
the creation of an interest.

(b)  The assumption underlying the family arrangement is that the
parties had antecedent rights in all the assets and this proposition of law
leads to the legal inference that the same does not amount to any transfer of
title. Section 47 of the Income-tax Act excludes certain transfers and since
the family arrangement is not held to be a transfer, it would not require to be
listed in section 47 unlike a partition which is a transfer and had to be
specifically excluded from section 45. Since section 45 can apply only to
capital gains arising from transfers, family arrangements fall outside the
scope of section 45, in view of the legal position that a family arrangement is
not a transfer at all. 

(c) In a family settlement, the consideration for
assets received is the mutual relinquishment of the rights in joint property
and hence, cost of assets received on settlement is the cost to the previous
owner. 

(d) Even a married daughter can be made a
party to a family settlement between her paternal family members – State
of AP vs. M. Krishnaveni (2006) 7 SCC 365
.
If she surrenders shares
held by her pursuant to a family arrangement, then it would not be a taxable
transfer – P. Sheela, 308 ITR (AT) 350 (Bangl).

(e) In B.A. Mohota Textiles Traders (P.) Ltd.
[TS-234-HC-2017(BOM)
],
the Bombay High Court held that any transfer of
shares by a company would not be the same as transfer by its members even if
the transfer was pursuant to a family arrangement between the family members.

 

While
on the subject of income-tax, one should also bear in mind the applicability of
the provisions of section 56(2)(x) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, which treats
the value of certain property received without consideration / adequate
consideration by an individual donee as his income. The section applies to any
gift of cash, immovable property and certain types of movable property, such
as, shares, jewellery, arts and paintings, etc. While a gift between
specifiedrelatives is exempt, gifts received from other relatives is taxable.
Here an issue which arises is that whether an asset received from a non-defined
relative under a family settlement could be taxed under this section? Is not
the settlement of disputes a valid consideration for the receipt of the asset?
In this respect, the decisions in the case of DCIT vs. Paras D Gundecha,
(2015) 155 ITD 180 (Mum) andSKM Shree Shivkumar vs. ACIT(2014) 65 SOT 232
(Chen)
have held that property received on family settlement is not
taxable u/s. 56(2).

 

Whether Registration and Stamp Duty is required?


One
of the main issues under a family settlement is that whether the instrument
which records the family arrangement between the family members requires
registration under the Registration Act, if it affects the rights or interests
in immovable properties. A natural corollary of registration is the payment of
stamp duty. Stamp duty is leviable as on rates as applicable on a conveyance.
In most states in India, the stamp duty rates on a conveyance are the highest
rates. For instance, in the State of Maharashtra, the rate of conveyance on
immovable properties is 5%. As with all principles which involve a family
settlement, the law relating to registration of family settlement instruments
have been laid down by various Supreme Court and High Court decisions. There
are no express decisions on the issue of whether stamp duty is leviable.
However, the decisions rendered in the context of the Registration Act are
equally applicable. The principles laid down by some important cases, such as, Ram
Charan Das vs. Girja Nandini Devi (1955) 2 SCWR 837; Tek Bahadur Bhujil vs.
Debi Singh Bhujil, (1966) 2 SCJ 290; K. V. Narayanan vs. K. V. Ranganadhan, AIR
1976 SC 1715; Chief Controlling Revenue Authority vs. Shri Abdul Karim Ebrahim
Balwa, (2000) 102 BOMLR 290, etc
., are as under:

 

(a) If a person has an absolute title to the
property and he transfers the same to some other person, then it is treated as
a transfer of interest and hence, registration would be required.


(b) A family arrangement may be even oral in
which case no registration is necessary. The registration may be necessary only
if the terms of the family arrangement are reduced to writing. Here also, a
distinction should be made between a document containing the terms and recitals
of a family arrangement made under the document and a mere memorandum prepared
after the family arrangement has already been made either for the purpose of
the record or for information of the Court for making necessary mutation. In
such a case, the memorandum itself does not create or extinguish any rights in
immovable properties and is, therefore, not compulsorily registerable. 


(c) A family arrangement, the terms of which may be
recorded in a memorandum, need not be prepared for the purpose of being used as
a document on which future title of the parties are founded. When a document is
nothing but a memorandum of what had taken place, it is not a document which
would otherwise require compulsory registration. 


(d)  A family arrangement as such can be
arrived at orally.  Its terms may be
recorded in writing as a memorandum of what had been agreed upon between the
parties. The memorandum need not be prepared for the purpose of being used as a
document on which future title of the parties be founded. It is usually
prepared as a record of what had been agreed upon so that there be no hazy
notions about it in future. It is only when the parties reduce the family
arrangement to writing with the purpose of using that writing as a proof of
what they had arranged and, where the arrangement is brought about by the
document as such, that the document would require registration as it is then
that it would be a document of title declaring for future what rights in what
properties the parties possess.  


(e) If a document would serve the purpose of proof
or evidence of what had been decided between the family members and it was not
the basis of their rights in any form over the property which each member had
agreed to enjoy to the exclusion of the others, then in substance it only
records what has already been decided by the parties. Thus, it is nothing but a
memorandum of what had taken place and therefore, is not a document which would require compulsory registration u/s. 17 of the Registration Act.


(f) Registration is
necessary for a document recording a family arrangement regarding properties to
which the parties had no prior title. In one case, one of the parties claimed
the entire property and such claim was admitted by the others and the first one
obtained the property from that recognised owner by way of a gift or by way of
a conveyance. On these facts, the Court held that the person derived a title to
the property from the recognised owners and hence such a document would have to
satisfy the various formalities of law about the passing of title by transfer.


(g) If the document itself creates an interest
in an immovable property, the fact that it contemplates the execution of
another document will not exempt it from registration u/s. 17(2)(v) of the
Registration Act.


(h) If the family arrangement agreement is required
to be registered and it is not so registered, then the same is not admissible
as an evidence under the Registration Act in proof of the arrangement or under
the Evidence Act. However, the same document is admissible as a corroborative
of another evidence or as admission of the transaction, etc. 


(i)  The essence of the matter is whether the deed
is a part of the partition transaction or merely contains an incidental recital
of a previously completed transaction.

  

Reorganisation of Companies and Family Settlement


Very
often a Family Arrangement also seeks to make the family controlled companies
(whether public or private) as parties thereto so as to make the arrangement
(so far as it relates to family shareholdings in such companies) to be
effective and binding. The moot point here is, when there is a family
settlement which involves reorganisation of some of the properties of one or
more companies in the Group, whether the principles of family settlement would
be applicable even to such reorganisation? 
In other words, when there is a transfer of a property from a company to
another company or to an individual as a part of a family settlement, whether
it would be correct to say that there is no transfer of the property, and
therefore direct and indirect taxes would not apply? There is not much support
on this aspect.

 

The
decision of Sea Rock Investment Ltd., 317 ITR 253 (Karn), dealt
with the case of a company owned by the family members which was made a party
to the family arrangement and which transferred shares held by it to various
family members. The company claimed an exemption from capital gains by stating
that it was pursuant to a family arrangement. The High Court disallowed this
stand by holding that a Company was a separate legal entity distinct from the
family members and hence, it was liable to pay tax on this ground.

 

In
the case of Reliance Natural Resources Ltd vs. Reliance Industries Ltd,
(2010) 7 SCC 1
, the Supreme Court held that a Family Settlement MOU,
signed by the key management personnel of a listed company, did not fall within
the corporate domain. It was neither approved by the shareholders nor was it
attached to the demerger scheme which demerged various undertakings from the
listed company. The Court held that technically, the MOU was not legally
binding on the listed companies.

 

It
is true that a company is a separate legal entity and has an existence
independent from its shareholders and therefore, in normal circumstances, the
property of a company cannot be treated as that of its shareholders. However,
as pointed out above in various Court judgments, Courts make every attempt to
sustain a family arrangement rather than to avoid it, having regard to the
broadest considerations of family peace, honour and security. If the principles
of family settlement are confined only to the properties owned by individuals
and not to those owned through corporate entities, then it would not be
possible to use the instrument of family settlement for settling disputes between
the members of the family and it would be necessary to go through the
litigations. It is submitted that a relook may be needed at the above decisions
or else we could have a plethora of family disputes clogging the legal system.   

 

STAMP DUTY ON OTHER INSTRUMENTS


Sometimes,
the parties to a family settlement may implement it through other modes, such
as a Release Deed, a Gift Deed, etc. Although these are not family settlement
awards in the strict sense of the term, but in the commercial sense they would
also be a part and parcel of the family settlement. Hence, the stamp duty
leviable on such instruments is also covered below.

 

Release Deed


A
release deed is a document by which a person relinquishes his share or interest
in a property in favour of another person. Under Article 55 of the Indian Stamp
Act, a release attracts duty at Rs. 5. However, various states have enacted
their own amendments to this Article. Earlier, a release deed attracted only
Rs. 200. For instance, in the state of Andhra Pradesh it is 3% of the
consideration or market value whichever is higher.

 

The
Bombay High Court, in the case of Asha Krishnalal Bajaj, 2001(2) Bom CR
(PB) 629
held that a Release Deed is not a conveyance and only
attracted stamp duty as on a release deed. In the case of Shailesh
Harilal Poonatar, 2004 (4) All MR 479
,
the Bombay High Court held that
a release deed without consideration under which one co-owner released his
share in favour of another in respect of a property received under a will, was
not a conveyance. Accordingly, it was liable to be stamped not as a conveyance
but as a release deed.

 

To
plug this loophole, in 2005 the duty in the State of Maharashtra was increased
on such instruments to Rs. 5 for every Rs. 500 of market value of the property.
The 2006 Amendment Act has once again made an amendment in Maharashtra to
provide that if the release is without consideration; in respect of ancestral
property and is executed by or in favour of the renouncer’s spouse, siblings,
parents, children, children of predeceased son, or the legal heirs of these
relatives, then the stamp duty would only be Rs. 200. In case of any other
Release Deed, the duty is equal to a conveyance. Thus, for immovable
properties, it would be @ 5% on the market value of the property. What is an
ancestral property becomes an important issue. E.g., if a son releases his
share in a property acquired by his deceased father, so that his mother can
become the sole owner, it would not be a release of an ancestral property.


Similar
provisions are found under the Karnataka Stamp Act. The duty on a release deed
between family members, i.e., spouse, children, parents, siblings, wife of a
predeceased son or children of a predeceased child, is Rs. 1,000. 

 

Gift Deed


Section
2(la) of the Maharashtra Stamp Act defines an “instrument of gift” to include,
in a case where the gift is not in writing, any instrument recording whether by
way of declaration or otherwise the making or acceptance of such oral gift. The
gift could be of movable or immovable property. The term gift has not been
defined and hence, one has to refer to the definition given u/s.122 of the
Transfer of Property Act, which is “a transfer of certain existing movable or
immovable property made voluntarily and without consideration.”

 

An
instrument of gift not being a Settlement or a Will or a Transfer attracts duty
under Article 34 of Schedule-I to the Maharashtra Stamp Act. A gift deed
attracts duty at the same rate as applicable to a Conveyance (under Article 25)
on the Market Value of the Property which is the subject matter of the
gift.  Almost all States whether under
the Indian Stamp Act or under their respective State Acts levy duty at the same
rate as applicable to a Conveyance on the Market Value of the Property which is
the subject matter of the gift.  

 

The
Maharashtra Stamp Act provides for a concession to gifts within the
family. Any gift of property to a family member (i.e., a spouse, sibling,
lineal ascendant / descendant) of the donor, shall attract duty @ 3% or as
specified above, whichever is less. However, if the gift is of a residential
house or an agricultural property and is to a spouse / child or a grandchild,
then the duty is a concessional sum of Rs. 200. In such a case, the
registration fees are also Rs. 200. Thus, there is a very large concession for
a gift of two types of properties, viz, a residential house or an agricultural
land made to six relatives. Both these conditions must be satisfied for the Rs.
200 concessional duty. For a gift of any other property made to any family
member, including these six relatives or for a gift of these two properties
made to any relative other than these six relatives, the concessional duty is
3% of the market value.   



One
misconception often faced is the coverage of lineal ascendants – are females
covered? Can a grandmother, mother and son be treated as a lineal line? The
answer is yes, there is no requirement that lineal ascendancy or descendancy is
limited only to male members or to the same gender. All that is required is
relatives in a straight line. The definition under the Maharashtra Stamp Act is
not as wide as u/s. 56(2) of the Income Tax Act. The relatives covered u/s. 56
of the Income-tax Act but not under the Stamp Act are spouses of siblings;
uncles and aunts; spouses of one’s lineal ascendant / Descendant; lineal
ascendant /descendant of spouse and their spouses.

 

The
Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957 also provides for a concession for gifts
within the family of the donor. The duty is only a flat sum of Rs. 1,000 to Rs.
5,000 depending upon where the property is located. The definition of family
for this purpose means father, mother, husband, wife, son, daughter,
daughter-in-law, brothers, sisters and grandchildren of the donor.

 

The
Rajasthan Stamp Act, 1998 provides a concessional rate of 2.5% for gifts
in favour of father, mother, son, brother, sister, daughter-in-law, husband,
son’s son, daughter’s son, son’s daughter, daughter’s daughter. Further, in
case of gifts in favour of wife or daughter the stamp duty is only 1% or Rs. 1
lakh, whichever is less. stamp duty for a gift in favour of widow by her
deceased husband’s mother, father, brother, or sister or by her own mother,
father, brother, sister, son or daughter is Nil.

 

Epilogue


From
the above discussion, it would be obvious that our present laws relating to
income-tax, stamp duty, registration, etc., are inadequate to deal with family
settlement and, in fact, instead of facilitating the family settlement, they
may hamper it. This is all the more strange given the fact that a large number
of businesses and assets are family owned in India and hence, the possibility
of there being a family dispute is quite high! Hence, it is necessary to make
suitable amendments in various laws so as to facilitate family settlement.

 

ELECTORAL AND POLITICAL REFORMS

Elections are fundamental to democracy. Elections in India are in dire
need for reforms. In this article, the author, a professor at IIM, Bangalore
and Chairman of the Association of Democratic Reforms (ADR) shares his views.
The electoral system has many shortcomings and urgent reforms are the need of
the hour. To commemorate our 70th Republic Day, BCAJ requested him
to write for the Journal so that professionals can be better aware citizens.
    

 

ABSTRACT

 

We discuss as far as
possible the root causes of various problems in elections and democracy. The
different objectives of voters and parties is one such reason. Competitive
politics and the increasing role of money and crime is another. One section of voters
seems to vote on “identity” – caste, religion, language and so on. This makes
campaigns divisive. Some implications of the system beyond elections into the
financial sector are also discussed, and a small link established between
various economic and financial crises and the kind of elections and parties we
have. We propose a solution. The key is not the solution itself, but the
objective: reduce competition among parties, make things transparent, create a
system that unites the country, its citizens and politicians. After all, we all
belong to the same country.

 

        In true democracy every man and woman is taught to think for himself
or herself.

                                                     –  Mahatma Gandhi

 

The need for electoral reforms is felt by everyone. This includes
citizens, the Supreme Court, the Election Commission, government, media and
many well-meaning politicians. There is a long list of features that are good
about our democracy and an equally long list of things that need improvement.
Once in a while, it is important to step back and look at some basic issues and
discuss how these can be sorted out. What are the root causes of what we see in
elections and politics? We try to show that these basic issues lead to the
myriad problems we see during elections, the scams, problems in governance and
so on.

 

At the outset, we
need to recognise that we need elections and political parties. Without them,
democracy cannot function. In the Indian context, there are a few significant
stakeholders. First and foremost are the citizens or voters themselves. Second,
we have the politicians and political parties. To regulate them and conduct
elections, we have the Election Commission. Once in a while, the courts also
step in. They are required to see that the laws of the country are upheld. As a
check and balance, we have the media. Most important, to finance the elections
we have various funders.

 

We need to accept
and recognise two basic issues. One is that political parties and candidates
are committed to winning elections. That is a legitimate pursuit. The second
fact that we ignore is that elections cost money. We are not talking of the
money spent by the Election Commission. Candidates and political parties need
funds to contest elections. Merely pointing out scams and irregularities is not
enough. We need to ask a basic question: what is the root cause of these
problems?

 

One fundamental
issue is the basic divergence in the goals and expectations of two stakeholders
– the citizens and the political system. Citizens ultimately want good
governance. They want that the money they pay as taxes is properly utilised and
develops the country and the people. This includes a long list like education,
health, roads, water, garbage disposal, rural development, poverty eradication
and so on. ADR’s periodic national surveys reinforce this. One of the top
priorities of the people of India, for instance, is employment.

 

Political parties,
on the other hand, have one basic motivation – to win elections and be in
power. This is not the same as wanting to develop the country. There are no
doubt well-meaning politicians who want to do that. But the critical question
is: if development requires long-term work, but the next election is round the
corner, what would they do? Invariably, they choose “winnability” over all other
factors. For instance, creating employment for hundreds of millions is not easy
and would take a long time. It is easier to make promises and give various
subsidies and loan waivers.

 

Let us also look at
it from the politician’s point of view. An honest politician feels overwhelmed
by the competition. There is a huge amount of spending during elections by
other candidates, and all sorts of promises are made. He feels compelled to
compete with others on the same lines. It is said “spending money does not ensure
victory, but not spending any money ensures defeat”.

 

Of late the role of
money in elections has risen dramatically. This is similar to other democracies
around the world. There are some rules and regulations regarding this – limit
on the amount being spent is the principal rule under the law. But as everyone
knows, this is not followed. For instance, two former Chief Election
Commissioners have gone on record during their term in office to say that over
Rs.10,000 crores of cash was pumped into one State election alone.

 

No doubt voters have
become aware and take funds from many candidates and vote for the candidate of
their choice. But we miss the key question: whoever wins, has spent a lot of
money. So will he work for good governance or for recovering the funds spent?
Where will he recover it from?

 

In summary, the
political system is beholden to big money. We have had a series of corporate
scams recently. Not all are linked to political funding, but some are.

 

Let us look at the
other side – the voters. They have to choose between parties and candidates
presented to them. What do they do if they don’t like anyone? Recently, one
Trump appointee was embarrassed by a statement he had made attacking the
candidate Trump. He now says he had to choose him because he thought the
alternative was worse. This is often the predicament of the ordinary voters in
India. They have to vote for someone. Election after election shows that voters
vote out one party and in the next election vote out another party. Rarely do
we see the same party getting re-elected either at the State or even the
national level. In many States, they always change the party in power in every
election.

 

There are other
issues with “mass” voters as well. There are endless discussions on the caste
and religious factor in elections. In short, the identity-based voting and
politics. This has nothing to with India or the developing countries.
Identity-based voting happens all over the world, especially when there are
problems like joblessness, immigration and so on. The recent elections in the
US and the Brexit vote are more or less an outcome of lack of jobs and
immigration. The groups that feel they have lost out are usually based on one
race or language or social class even in the US and the UK. We do not comment
on whether this is right or not. Given the identity-based politics, it is but
natural that political parties will use it during campaigns. In India
particularly, the rhetoric on identity-based politics has steadily increased,
and the level of political debate gone down. The media channels and social
media are having a great time highlighting what one politician said about
another. Rarely do we see a seasoned discussion on the development of a
constituency, State or country. Why does this happen? Politicians feel that to
win they don’t have to do a great job – they simply have to defeat the other
candidates. If voters are moved by identity-based politics, so be it, they seem
to say. Another issue with voters is the accusation that they are also
short-term thinkers like the politicians. Some civil society voter awareness
campaigns say: A buffalo costs Rs. 35,000. Why do you sell your vote for Rs.
5,000? To be fair to voters, they choose between the lesser of many evils (not
to say that politicians are evil). They are also somewhat cynical because they
don’t see the kind of development they expect and feel that no matter who wins,
things will remain more or less the same. So why bother?

 

On the other hand,
there are a large number of well-to-do educated voters. In India as in other
countries, the voting percentage here is very low. India perhaps still does
better than other so-called advanced countries in terms of voting percentage.
The principal reason is that their own life is hardly affected no matter who
wins the elections. So why bother to vote? Also the feeling that my one vote
hardly makes a difference.

 

To summarise this
aspect: the fundamental difference in motivation and expectation between voters
and politicians has over time led to an increasing “distance” or cynicism. One
wants power, the other wants good governance. Power needs money and money has
its own logic. Those who fund elections expect returns from the winner, and
politicians who spend money expect to recover the funds they have spent.

 

A closely related
issue is transparency in funding. Till 2008, Income tax returns of political
parties were not publicly available. It took several years of struggle by ADR
to get these in the public domain. Next, the source of funding is still not
known. The accounting systems of political parties are not up to the standard
of a professionally-run company. Many in fact use the single entry cash-based
system – not a double entry accrual system. The accounts are not properly
audited. Once some degree of transparency was coming in, the doors were shut by
the Electoral Bond system. Now no one can find out who gave how much money to
which candidate or party. In other countries, this is public information. The
flaws of the Electoral Bond system require a separate lengthy discussion. It
has been challenged in the Supreme Court.

 

Along with money
power, there is the issue of crime in politics. Various Supreme Court judgments
and media coverage is ignored. Parties continue to field people with criminal
records. The Table below for the current Lok Sabha elected in 2014 shows that a
combination of crime and money increases the chances of getting elected. The
columns represent the politicians with a serious criminal record, those with
serious criminal record and assets of between Rs. 1 crore and Rs. 5 crore and
so on.

 

LS 2014

Total

Serious Crime

Ser Cr + 1cr

Ser Cr + 5cr

Ser Cr + 10cr

Winners

543

112

93

52

32

Candidates

8163

889

397

176

107

%

6.70%

12.60%

23.40%

29.50%

29.90%

 

 

As shown, the percentage of candidates who win increases steadily as the
crime and money combination increases. There are three key questions: can we
expect good governance when we have such MPs in Parliament? They belong to all
the various major political parties and their leadership knowingly gives
tickets to them. The second question is why do they give tickets to them? The
third question is why do voters elect them? This requires a lot of research.
Preliminary data show that parties field such candidates because of their
“winnability”. Voters are either unaware of the facts or have to choose between
the lesser of evils. Since political parties continue to indulge in the game of
money and muscle power without transparency, there is a need for political
party reforms. A citizen’s initiative led by a former Chief Justice of India
drafted such a Bill but no party is interested in passing it as of now.

 

Before we come to
possible solutions, let us look at the system that we have. No doubt it is a
democracy. But there are broadly four types of democracies with many variations
and permutations and combinations. One is the first-past-the-post system like
we have in India with a British Parliamentary way of electing a Chief Minister
or Prime Minister. The party or coalition with a majority elects their leader.
Second, we have the US Presidential system where the President and the Governor
of each State is directly elected by the voters. In India, we vote for the
local candidate, not for the CM or PM. The elected MLAs and MPs, in turn, elect
them. Third, we have the list or proportional representation system. Here each
voter in effect has two votes – one for a candidate and another for a party.
While candidates are directly elected as in other countries, the votes obtained
by a political party nationwide are then converted by a formula into additional
seats. For instance, in India, we increasingly see that the vote difference
between two parties is very small, but the seat difference is huge. In a few
cases, a party with more votes has even lost a State election (in Karnataka it
happened twice). The proportional representation system tries to correct this.
Fourth, we have the French system of run-off elections. They say anyone with
less than 50% of the votes cast is not a people’s representative. So the top
two candidates have a run-off election in the second round.

 

Each system has its
pros and cons. The Indian-British system is easy to understand for the ordinary
voter. But it has many negatives. The CM in almost every State has to placate
various interests within his or her own party (unless the CM is a mega
politician who single-handedly brings in all the votes). So we see Cabinet
reshuffles and many disgruntled MLAs. It has also contributed to the large
number of political parties that we have. Over 34 parties have at least one MP
in Parliament. While this can be taken positively as celebrating diversity,
winning elections at a local level means getting far less than 50% of the votes
cast. Over 200 MPs have less than 40% of the votes cast and many have won with
less than 30% votes. That is because there are so many parties and candidates
in each constituency. Even at the level of political parties, the winning party
usually gets between 25% and 32% of the national vote in Parliament. The votes
are greatly split, but power is not shared – it is with the ruling party or
coalition. This raises a fundamental question: whom does the Government
represent?

 

The US system of
direct elections is attractive to many groups. However, many others, including
the Constitutional Review Committee headed by a former Chief Justice of India,
and one former President and another Vice President have cautioned against it.
While it brings stability, it gives unbridled power to one individual with no
doubt some checks, and balances like between the Congress, the Senate and the
President in the US. The problem in India is that we are the most diverse
nation in the world. Dozens of languages, hundreds of dialects, hundreds of
castes, all the major religions in the world and so on. Each group wants some
representation. A via media may be to have this at the State level rather than
at the national level. But a lot more foresight about all the implications is
required before we change our system.

 

Many other groups
recommend the proportional representation (PR) system. In particular, the
Dalits, Muslims and the urban educated want this. For instance, BSP got nearly
15% votes in the 2014 national election but got 0 seats. With the PR system,
they would get between 30 and 70 seats depending on the formula used.
Similarly, the Muslim representation will go up and so on. Given our
heterogeneous country, each group will form a pan-India political party over
time and claim seats in Parliament and the State Assemblies.

 

The French system
was endorsed by a minority of commissions and thinkers. Some former CEC’s have
also said that it is easy to implement. The main argument in favour of it is
that no one can buy 50% of the votes and that too twice. The nature of
campaigns and politics has to become more inclusive as a result. The divisive
politics that we see today will come down. The downside according to some is
that it achieves nothing as the winner in the first round usually wins in the
second round as well. That may be true in France, but it remains to be seen how
it works out here.

 

Before we propose
any solution, one important aspect needs to be re-emphasised. We have nearly
2,000 registered political parties, and most States are governed by a regional
party. The voter is often faced with over a dozen candidates in the polling
booth, many of whom are Independents. The political calculation is then simple.
The candidate knows how many are on his side (committed) and how many are never
going to vote for him. He can concentrate on the swing voters. They can be
bought over, or promises made to win them over with freebies, subsidies,
distribution of mobiles, free rations, loan waivers and so on. He can attack
other candidates in increasingly vulgar terms. He can raise communal and caste
issues openly. But we need to understand that he is not really abusing others,
he is really appealing to his own voter base. Thankfully, the role of muscle
power and booth capturing is no longer there thanks to the Election Commission.
But there are other tricks routinely used. Voter lists are tampered with
wherever possible. In one case, over 10,000 voter IDs were found of a
particular religious group in one flat. You can also buy people’s voter IDs to
ensure they do not vote. In some areas, there is a threat of post-poll violence
and people are told to simply not vote. Since the margins of victory in many
constituencies are very low, these tactics can make the difference between
victory and defeat. We have perhaps the youngest voters in the world. To what
extent they are interested in thinking through various issues before voting is
not known. But we cannot blame the youth – the elders also sometimes vote based
on identity or various other factors.

 

While voters are
increasingly giving clear mandates, the era of coalition Governments is not
over. This may be good in some ways as it acts as a check to excesses by a
ruling party. But it also leads to instability, and behind-the-scenes
bargaining for the fishes and loaves of office. Many times a minor party gets
into power within a coalition. At other times the minor parties have a lot of
bargaining power.

 

What is the
collateral damage? To what extent do those in power work for the people and to
what extent do they work for those who fund them? One bare-bones method of
fundraising is something like this. A bold entrepreneur or business house goes
to someone in power and says, give me so much land or other public resources.
He says he will set up a plant and create so many jobs. If he is able to
persuade those in power, he then uses the public resources or land to leverage
large loans, preferably from public sector banks. Naturally, those in power
need some consideration to help them fight elections. Meanwhile, bad loans keep
rising. There are many clever ways of making money and helping those in power.
A book can perhaps be written on that. Politics of the type we have can affect
the financial sector in the long run.

 

On the social front,
we have State after State with huge deficit financing. This is growing and
sometimes seems irreversible. The politics of buying votes from the public
exchequer by giving freebies has led to this.

 

So where are we? We
have a highly competitive political system with over 2,000 parties, of which at
least 50 if not more are serious contenders for winning seats either at the
national or State level. We have a very diverse and heterogeneous population
divided on caste, religion, language and so on. We have an increasing role of
money power. (There are all sorts of interesting stories about how this is used
and practically every Indian has one story to tell). There are all sorts of
tricks being used to win elections – from campaign strategies to media management,
social media, fake news, paid news and what not. This is bound to happen given
the structure we operate in. We have a lot of collateral damage to the banking
sector and the State finances.

 

What can we do? We
propose one possible solution. It may or may not be workable but it addresses
the problems outlined earlier. We need to solve some basic problems – reduce
the role of money power and crime, reduce divisive politics and the politics of
hatred and appeasement. One way is to reduce the competition in politics. The
Japanese have an interesting multi-member constituency. Each is a large domain
and several members can be elected from the same constituency. This was true in
a few constituencies in India also for one or two elections after Independence.

 

What do we then
propose? We need to balance between what is practical and what is ideal. If at
most two candidates can be elected from each constituency, it would mean for
instance that anyone with say 35% or more votes is elected. We can then have at
most two candidates. How does this help? If a popular candidate knows he or she
is very likely to get past 35% of the votes polled, he need not spend so much
money, he need not abuse the other candidates and political parties. It is also
in line perhaps with the Indian ethos where co-operation and consensus is the
social norm, not competition. The winner takes all democracy that we have seen
is largely in the Western framework of competition and individualism. Our joint
family system, the notion of biradri, is more about living together
without animosity to others. Another thing we need to fix is transparency in
funding. Thirdly, we need ordinary people to fund their favourite candidate and
party with small amounts. Instead of selling their votes people need to support
politics. If they want a good government, they should pay for it, even if it is
a small amount.

 

There are many other
issues like which of the four systems of government we need. Or whether we need
an intelligent combination of some of those systems. The media needs to be
regulated. The Election Commission has a long list of recommendations that the
government is not acting on. There have been at least half a dozen major
Commissions that have gone into the issues of Electoral Reforms. Again, the government
has not acted – it is a long-term issue and elections are short-term. The hope
is that as more and more people think about these issues and become active
citizens, change will eventually come.

 

Finally, what about
the coming elections? The idea of active citizens who campaign not for a
candidate or for a party, but for good governance is needed. Social media in
various languages has increased the reach. ADR itself carries out a campaign
saying no votes for crime and for bribes. Voters need to understand that
selling their vote is not only demeaning but also harmful in the long run. The
more such non-partisan groups who carry out such campaigns, especially in
regional languages, the better.

 

DIFFERENTIAL VOTING RIGHTS SHARES – AN INSTRUMENT WHOSE TIME HAS COME?

Differential Voting Rights
Shares (DVRS) are in the news again as SEBI has set up a committee to review
the law relating to them. It appears that SEBI may be considering removal of
some of the severe restrictions on them so as to make their issue easier. This
could bring life into this instrument that otherwise is more or less a dead
instrument due to regulatory constraints. 

 

This proposal has
surprisingly seen severe resistance even at this stage when the Committee is
merely set up. Opposition is of near paranoiac proportion. I submit that the
instrument by itself is useful and should be allowed with reasonable
conditions. It is of course not an instrument for all. It is not even anybody’s
case that this instrument will be very popular amongst corporate and/or
investors. But for many – companies, promoters and investors – it could work
well.

 

Let us first briefly
consider what DVRS are, what is broadly the current legal position, what are
the issues and opposition points and their possible answers and what could be
the way forward.

 

What
are DVRS?


DVRS are a variant of equity
shares
. In other words, DVRS are equity shares. However, DVRS depart from
the usual equal-vote, equal-dividend features of ordinary equity shares.
Instead, they give differential voting and/or dividend rights. DVRS may thus
carry more – or less – voting rights than ordinary equity shares. Thus, for
example, one DVRS may carry just 1/10th voting right. 10 such DVRS would thus
carry one vote, compared to ordinary equity share which has one vote one share.
Or DVRS could carry more voting rights as for example, one DVRS having 10
votes.

 

Similarly DVRS could carry
more (or less) dividends than ordinary equity shares. DVRS could, for example,
be entitled to, say, 5% more dividends than ordinary equity shares. This helps
to compensate for lesser voting rights.Otherwise, such DVRS may carry all the
other features as ordinary equity shares. They may, for example, carry the same
rights on liquidation. There could be variants other than the normal
voting/dividends right however, this article focuses on variants of voting
rights and dividend rights only particularly in listed companies.

 

Legal provisions relating to DVRS


DVRS have always been
possible for private companies. However, flexible requirements for
public/listed companies have been a relatively recent phenomena. The provisions
relating to DVRS are contained in the Companies Act, 2013, rules made
thereunder, SEBI Regulations, circulars, etc. These have evolved over time.
Hence, the regulations are scattered and are cumbersome and time consuming.
Some features of the law can be summarised, albeit in a simplified manner.

 

Issue of DVRS would
generally require approval of shareholders by an ordinary resolution through
postal ballot. It generally would also require approval by SEBI. DVRS would
have to be offered to all shareholders proportionately – thus, DVRS would have
to be either in the form of right shares or as bonus shares. DVRS cannot be
more than 26% of the equity share capital. Existing equity shares cannot be
converted into DVRS.

 

Importantly, DVRS that have
right to a higher dividend or more voting rights than existing equity shares
cannot be issued. This restriction is obviously for protection of existing
shareholders whose rights would get diluted if new shares having more
dividends/voting rights are issued. These requirements end up being
restrictive, time consuming and even finally uncertain. This may also be one of
the major reasons why DVRS did not pick up in India and that the existing ones
are not successful. Even otherwise, the regulations for issue of DVRS are half
hearted. Most other provisions of law refer and provide for ordinary equity
shares and not DVRS. Thus, there is a legislative vacuum in respect of DVRS.
The Committee considering DVRS will thus need to recommend extensive amendments
to several laws.

 

DVRS
issued


Barely 5 companies have
issued DVRS in India. Except one, the other DVRS trade at prices that are at a
huge discount over the price of the corresponding ordinary equity shares. Tata
Motors DVRS, for example, trade at nearly 50% discount over the price of their
equity shares.

Future Enterprises Limited,
however, has its ordinary equity shares and DVRS trading at very small
differential. Part of this may be ascribed to the fact that their DVRS carry
25% less voting rights with right to 2% more dividends, as compared to ordinary
equity shares. The market liquidity of such DVRS is also generally poor.

 

Opposition
to DVRS and some possible responses


There has been severe
opposition to DVRS amongst certain circles, which is strong almost to the level
of being paranoiac/irrational. I submit that much of this opposition is
unjustified and can be refuted.

 

Much
of the fears and concerns can be dealt with if the DVRS are seen as just
another instrument whose value can be determined by informed parties using
relevant valuation models. Higher or lower dividend or voting rights would be
factored in the valuation. A company desiring to give lower voting rights can
compensate this loss by offering a lower issue price and/or with sweetener of
higher dividend rights. The point is that the market would generally take care
of the handicaps/advantages of differential rights by valuing the DVRS. Hence,
the opposition to DVRS would have to be considered in this light.

 

The core opposition to DVRS
is that it would help entrench existing management without their investing
money proportionate to their rights. Promoters and management would thus invest
lesser amount, take lesser risk and yet get higher control. This is
misconceived. Higher votes would result in higher price for such shares that
the promoters have to pay and lower price for the equity shares (DVRS) issued
to other shareholders. If investors consider the right to remove management as
very important to them, they will either pay a very low price for such shares
with lower rights or may not buy them altogether. So long as transparency is
maintained of the rights and disabilities on DVRS, the parties should be free
to work out the value amongst themselves either directly or through response to
public issue or through open markets.

 

It has been said that very
few companies have issued DVRS and these DVRS except 1 have badly performed.
The explanation for this can be several. One is educating the investors of this
instrument. Second is that the regulations themselves are complex and near
prohibitive. Finally, once again, the markets can be expected to take care of
the situation. If investors perceive that such instruments will give them
lesser return or have lower value, they will value them accordingly in the
market, as they would any other security. Banning or creating near prohibitive
conditions is not the answer.

 

Safeguards of corporate Governance and other provisions


Much has changed since the
time when the provisions relating to DVRS were introduced. We have extensive
corporate governance requirements and other new requirements that provide for
transparency and protection of various stakeholders. We have requirements
relating to a certain number of independent directors. The law provides for
extensive regulations relating to related party transactions. There are various
committees including Audit Committee, Nomination and Remuneration Committee,
etc. which look into certain issues. Shareholders earlier could rarely vote
because they could not attend general meetings physically since such meetings
were often held at remote or far off places. Postal ballot and electronic
voting has changed this situation a lot. Thus, there are many safeguards that
keep some check on majoritarian control.

 

Suggestions


As stated earlier, so long
as transparency is maintained and certain basic conditions are complied with,
DVRS should be allowed to be issued.

Rights on existing
instruments should not be changed without the approval of the holders. Take an
example. Presently a company has Rs. 10 crore of ordinary equity shares (1
crore equity shares of Rs. 10 each face value). Now, let us say the promoters
of the company hold 20 lakh ordinary equity shares of promoters. Thus, they are
entitled to 1/5th of the voting rights. If these 20 lakh ordinary equity shares
are converted into 20 lakh DVRS with each DVRS having 10 votes, the result
would be as follows. Total votes would be 280 lakh (200 lakh votes now held by
the promoters and 80 lakh votes by the others). The promoters would have 200
lakh votes which would be about 71%. Thus, their voting share jumped from 20%
to 71%. This results in loss of voting rights and thus value of the other
shareholders. This should not be permitted and the existing law does not permit
it.

 

In case of fresh issue, the
new shares should be offered to all. If it is proposed that the fresh issue is
to a special group, the issue should be transparently valued and the issue
price should not be lower than such price. SEBI could consider providing
formulae for this. The objective is that the value of existing shareholders
should not suffer because of such issue.

 

In the interim, till more
experience is gained, a cap can be placed on the number of DVRS. However,
unlike the present poorly drafted law that provides a cap on the maximum amount
of DVRS as a percentage of total capital, the cap should be on the maximum
voting rights
that such DVRS carry. The cap of 26% of the capital could be
considered. The objective would be that the promoters/management, even if they
allot all the DVRS with higher voting rights to themselves, would be able to
hold only a certain maximum of voting rights through such DVRS.

 

Provisions could be made
whereby certain major decisions require approval by a higher majority. This
would give adequate say to a significant majority of shareholders. This will
help ensure that those in control with DVRS are not able to take such major
decisions that could affect the value of shareholders without their say. Like
certain preference shares, if there is no dividend paid for, say, 3 years, the
DVRS could be made entitled to voting rights.

 

Conclusion


Clearly, then, DVRS are an
instrument whose time has come. One hopes that, firstly, the Committee
wholeheartedly endorses this instrument. Further, it should propose extensive
rehaul of the various laws that deal with issue of securities and ensure that DVRS
are also provided for. They may also provide for conditions to ensure fair
play. In particular, there should be transparency and also education of
investors. Thereafter, the parties – companies, promoters and shareholders –
should be permitted to structure instruments as per their needs and desires and
at a value they mutually decide.
  

 

Appeal to Commissioner (Appeals) – Revision – Power of Commissioner(Appeals) – Application for revision and withdrawal of appeal to Commissioner(Appeals) – Order passed in revision granting relief – Commissioner(Appeals) has no power to decide appeal

41.  Assessing
Officer vs. Dharmendra Vishnubhai Patel; 409 ITR 276 (Guj)
Date of order: 5th February, 2018 Sections 246A and 264 of ITA 1961

 

Appeal to Commissioner (Appeals) – Revision – Power of
Commissioner(Appeals) – Application for revision and withdrawal of appeal to
Commissioner(Appeals) – Order passed in revision granting relief –
Commissioner(Appeals) has no power to decide appeal

 

In this case assessment was made and penalty was levied on the assesse.
On 24/09/2016, the assesse filed an appeal against the order of penalty before
the Commissioner(Appeals). On 16/02/2017, the assessee filed a revision
petition u/s. 264 of the Income-tax Act, 1961
(hereinafter
for the sake of brevity referred to as the “Act”)  against the
order of penalty before the Commissioner. On the same day he also made a
communication to the Commissioner (Appeals) before whom his appeal was pending,
in which, he conveyed his intention to withdraw the appeal. In exercise of his
revisional powers u/s. 264, the Commissioner set aside the order of penalty.
Despite this the Commissioner (Appeals) proceeded to decide the appeal on the
merits and by an order dated 25/09/2017 dismissed the appeal. The assesse filed
writ petition and challenged the validity of the order of the Commissioner
(Appeals).

 

The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

 

“i)   In terms of clause (a) of
sub-section (4) of section 264, revisional powers would not be exercised, inter
alia, in a case where the period of limitation for filing appeals has not
expired and the assesse has not waived the right of appeal. This is essentially
to ensure that in the case of the same assesse a single issue does not receive
consideration at the hands of the two separate and independent authorities, one
exercising appellate jurisdiction and the other revisional jurisdiction.

ii)   The assessee had clearly made
a choice to persuade the Commissioner to exercise his revisional powers u/s.
264 and not pursue his appeal before the Appellate Commissioner. The revisional
authority therefore correctly proceeded to decide the revision petition of the
assesse and on the facts correctly allowed it. It was thereafter not open for
the Commissioner (Appeals) to still examine the merits of such an order.”

Accounting For Uncertainty Over Income Tax Treatments

Background

IAS 12 (Ind AS 12) Income
Taxes specifies requirements for   
current   and   deferred  
tax   assets  and  
liabilities. However, there was no
clarity with respect to recognition and  
measurement   of   uncertain  
tax   treatments.  An‘uncertain tax treatment’
is a tax treatment for which there is uncertainty over whether the relevant
taxation authority will accept the entity’s tax treatment under tax law. For
example,   an   entity’s  
decision   not to include
particular income in taxable profit,
is an uncertain tax treatment if its acceptability   is  
uncertain   under  tax 
law. IFRIC 23 Uncertainty over Income Tax
Treatments is an interpretation of IAS 12 that deals with recognition and
measurement of uncertain tax treatments. A corresponding interpretation is not
yet issued under Ind AS, but is expected shortly.

 

Uncertainty over Income Tax Treatments

In assessing whether
uncertainty over income tax treatments exists, an entity may consider a number
of indicators including, but not limited to, the following:

 

    Ambiguity in the drafting of relevant tax
laws and related guidelines (such as ordinances, circulars and letters) and
their interpretations

    Income tax practices that are generally
applied by the taxation authorities in specific jurisdictions and situations

    Results of past examinations by taxation
authorities on related issues

    Rulings and decisions from courts or other
relevant authorities in addressing matters with a similar fact pattern

    Tax memoranda prepared by qualified in-house
or external tax advisors

    The quality of available documentation to
support a particular income tax treatment.

 

Unit of Account

The Interpretation requires
an entity to determine whether to consider each uncertain tax treatment
separately or together with one or more other uncertain tax treatments. This
determination is based on which approach better predicts the resolution of the
uncertainty. In determining the approach that better predicts the resolution of
the uncertainty, an entity might consider, for example, (a) how it prepares its
income tax filings and supports tax treatments; or (b) how the entity expects
the taxation authority to make its examination and resolve issues that might
arise from that examination. 

 

The author believes that
interdependent tax positions (i.e., where the outcomes of uncertain tax
treatments are mutually dependent) should be considered together. Significant
judgement may be required in the determination of the unit of account. In
making the judgement, entities would need to consider the approach expected to
be followed by the taxation authorities to resolve the uncertainty. The
judgement required in the selection of a unit of account may be particularly
challenging in groups of entities trading in various jurisdictions where the
relevant tax laws or taxation authority treat similar elements differently.

 

Example 1 – Unit of account

Entity A is part of a
multinational group and provides intra-group loans to affiliates. It is funded
through equity and deposits made by its parent. Whilst the entity can show that
its interest margin earned on many loans is at an appropriate market rate,
there are loans where the rate is open to challenge by the taxation
authorities. However, Entity A determines that, across the loan portfolio as a
whole, the existence of rates above and below a market comparator results in an
overall interest margin that is within a reasonable range accepted by the
taxation authorities.

 

Depending on the applicable
tax law and practice in a specific jurisdiction, a taxation authority may accept
a tax filing position on the basis of the overall interest margin if it is
within a reasonable range. However, there might be other taxation authorities
that would examine the interest rate separately for each loan receivable. In
considering whether uncertain tax treatments should be considered separately
for each loan receivable or combined with other loan receivables, Entity A
should adopt the approach that better reflects the way the taxation authority
would examine and resolve the issue.

 

Detection risk

The Interpretation requires
an entity to invariably assume that a taxation authority will examine amounts
it has a right to examine and have full knowledge of all related information
when making those examinations.

 

In some jurisdictions,
examination by taxation authorities is subject to a time limit, sometimes
referred to as a statute of limitations. In others, examination by taxation
authorities might not be subject to a statute of limitations, which means the
authorities can examine the amounts at any time in the future. Some respondents
to the draft Interpretation suggested in their comment letter that an
assessment of the probability of examination would be relevant in this latter
case. However, the IFRS Interpretation Committee (IC) decided not to change the
examination assumption, nor to create an exception to it, for circumstances in
which there is no time limit on the taxation authority’s right to examine
income tax filings.

 

The IC also noted that the
assumption of examination by the taxation authority, in isolation, would not
require an entity to reflect the effects of uncertainty. The threshold for
reflecting the effects of uncertainty is whether it is probable that the
taxation authority will accept an uncertain tax treatment. In other words, the
recognition of uncertainty is not determined based on whether a taxation
authority examines a tax treatment.

 

The Interpretation does not
explain what is meant by ‘results of examinations’. The examination procedures
vary by jurisdiction and, in some jurisdictions, an examination can have
multiple phases. In the author’s view, the communication between an entity and
the taxation authorities during the course of such examinations may provide
relevant information that could give rise to a change in facts and
circumstances before the actual ‘results’ of the examination are formally issued.

 

Example 2 – Detection risk

Entity A is based in
Country B. It is generally known that the taxation authorities in Country B
have limited resources. As a consequence, their examination procedures are
usually limited to a summary assessment of the income tax filings. Scrutiny tax
examinations are only performed in very rare circumstances and if there is a
clear indication of a tax fraud. Entity A has never been subjected to such a
scrutiny examination by the taxation authorities.

 

Prior to the application of
IFRIC 23, Entity A argued that it was unlikely that the taxation authorities
would identify any key income tax exposures not already identified through
their summary assessment, because they could be identified only by analysing
the underlying accounting records. Therefore, Entity A did not recognise any
uncertain tax treatments.

 

With the adoption of IFRIC
23, Entity A would need to consider underlying tax positions even though
scrutiny by the taxation authorities is unlikely. Entity A should assume that
the taxation authority can and will examine amounts it has a right to examine
and have full knowledge of all related information when making those
examinations.

 

Recognition and Measurement

Under IFRIC 23, the key
test is whether it’s probable that the taxation authority would accept the tax
treatment used or planned to be used by the entity in its income tax filings.
If yes, then the amount of taxes recognised in the financial statements would
be consistent with the entity’s income tax filings. Otherwise, the effect of
uncertainty should be estimated and reflected in the financial statements. This
would require the exercise of judgement by the entity. The recognition of
current and deferred taxes including uncertain tax treatments continues to be
on the underlying principle of “probability”. The measurement requirements in
IFRIC 23 do not distinguish between a probability of 51% and a probability of
100%. This is consistent with the objective of IAS 12 (Ind AS 12) that refers
to a probable threshold and with the Conceptual Framework for Financial
Reporting
which refers to a probability threshold for the recognition of
assets and liabilities in general. It should be noted that deferred tax assets
on carry forward of losses can be recognised only if there is convincing
evidence that it will be utilised in future years.

 

Example 3 – Current and deferred tax impact

 

Entity C, constructs and
leases wooden chalet at hill stations, and claims 100% depreciation on the
basis that they are temporary structures. However, the tax laws may not
consider them as temporary structures and therefore there is a risk that the
100% depreciation claim may be disallowed. On application of IFRIC 23, Entity C
should reflect the impact of such uncertainties in the measurement of current
and deferred tax assets and liabilities as at the reporting date.

 

An entity may need to apply
judgement in concluding whether it is probable that a particular uncertain tax
treatment will be acceptable to the taxation authority. An entity may consider
the following:

 

  Past experience related to similar tax
treatments

   Legal advice or case law related to other
entities

  Practice guidelines published by the taxation
authorities

   The entity obtains a pre-clearance from the
taxation authority on an uncertain tax treatment.

 

In defining ‘uncertainty’,
the entity only needs to consider whether a particular tax treatment is probable,
rather than highly likely or certain, to be accepted by the taxation
authorities. If an entity concludes it is probable that the taxation authority
will accept an uncertain tax treatment, the entity shall determine the taxable
profit or loss, deferred taxes, unused tax losses, unused tax credits or tax
rates consistently with the tax treatment used or planned to be used in its
income tax filings. If an entity concludes it is not probable that the taxation
authority will accept an uncertain tax treatment, the entity shall reflect the
effect of uncertainty in determining the related taxable profit or loss,
deferred taxes, unused tax losses, unused tax credits or tax rates. An entity
shall reflect the effect of uncertainty for a unit of uncertain tax treatment
by using either of the following methods, depending on which method the entity
expects to better predict the resolution of the uncertainty:

 

a)   the
most likely amount—the single most likely amount in a range of possible
outcomes. The most likely amount may better predict the resolution of the
uncertainty if the possible outcomes are binary or are concentrated on one
value.

 

b)   the
expected value—the sum of the probability-weighted amounts in a range of
possible outcomes. The expected value may better predict the resolution of the
uncertainty if there is a range of possible outcomes that are neither binary
nor concentrated on one value.

 

If an uncertain tax
treatment affects current tax and deferred tax (for example, if it affects both
taxable profit used to determine current tax and tax bases used to determine
deferred tax), an entity shall make consistent judgements and estimates for
both current tax and deferred tax.

 

Example 4 – Application of Expected Value Method

 

  Entity A’s income tax filing in a
jurisdiction includes deductions related to transfer pricing. The taxation
authority may challenge those tax treatments.

 

  Entity A
notes that the taxation authority’s decision on one transfer pricing matter
would affect, or be affected by, the other transfer pricing matters. Entity A
concludes that considering the tax treatments of all transfer pricing matters
in the jurisdiction together better predicts the resolution of the uncertainty.
Entity A also concludes it is not probable that the taxation authority will
accept the tax treatments. Consequently, Entity A reflects the effect of the
uncertainty in determining its taxable profit.

 

  Entity A estimates the probabilities of the
possible additional amounts that might be added to its taxable profit, as
follows:

 

 

Estimated additional amount, INR

Probability, %

Estimate of expected value, INR

Outcome 1

15%

Outcome 2

200

5%

10

Outcome 3

400

20%

80

Outcome 4

600

10%

60

Outcome 5

800

30%

240

Outcome 6

1,000

20%

200

 

 

100%

590

 

           

   Outcome 5 is the most likely outcome.
However, Entity A observes that there is a range of possible outcomes that are
neither binary nor concentrated on one value. Consequently, Entity A concludes
that the expected value of INR 590 better predicts the resolution of the
uncertainty.

 

  Accordingly, Entity A recognises and measures
its current tax liability that includes INR 650 to reflect the effect of the
uncertainty. The amount of INR 590 is in addition to the amount of taxable
profit reported in its income tax filing.

Example 5 – Application of the Most Likely Outcome Method

 

  Entity B acquires for INR 100 a separately
identifiable intangible asset that has an indefinite life and, therefore, is
not amortised applying IAS 38 (Ind AS 38) Intangible Assets. The tax law
specifies that the full cost of the intangible asset is deductible for tax
purposes, but the timing of deductibility is uncertain. Entity B concludes that
considering this tax treatment separately better predicts the resolution of the
uncertainty.

   Entity B deducts INR 100 (the cost of the
intangible asset) in calculating taxable profit for Year 1 in its income tax
filing. At the end of Year 1, Entity B concludes it is not probable that the
taxation authority will accept the tax treatment. Consequently, Entity B
reflects the effect of the uncertainty in determining its taxable profit and
the tax base of the intangible asset. Entity B concludes the most likely amount
that the taxation authority will accept as a deductible amount for Year 1 is
INR20 and that the most likely amount better predicts the resolution of the
uncertainty.

   Accordingly, in recognising and measuring its
deferred tax liability at the end of Year 1, Entity B calculates a taxable
temporary difference based on the most likely amount of the tax base of INR 80
(INR 100 – INR 20) to reflect the effect of the uncertainty, instead of the tax
base calculated based on Entity B’s income tax filing (INR 0).

   Entity B reflects the effect of the
uncertainty in determining taxable profit for Year 1 using judgements and
estimates that are consistent with those used to calculate the deferred tax
liability. Entity B recognises and measures its current tax liability based on
taxable profit that includes INR 80 (INR 100 – INR 20). The amount of INR80 is
in addition to the amount of taxable profit included in its income tax filing.
This is because Entity B deducted INR 100 in calculating taxable profit for
Year 1, whereas the most likely amount of the deduction is INR 20.

 

Changes in facts and circumstances

An entity shall reassess a
judgement or estimate required by this Interpretation, if the facts and circumstances
on which the judgement or estimate was based change or as a result of new
information that affects the judgement or estimate. For example, a change in
facts and circumstances might change an entity’s conclusions about the
acceptability of a tax treatment or the entity’s estimate of the effect of
uncertainty, or both. An entity shall reflect the effect of a change in facts
and circumstances or of new information as a change in accounting estimate
applying IAS 8 (Ind AS 8) Accounting Policies, Changes in Accounting
Estimates and Errors.
An entity shall apply IAS 10 (Ind AS 10) Events
after the Reporting Period to determine whether a change that occurs after the
reporting period
is an adjusting or non-adjusting event.

 

Examples of changes in
facts and circumstances or new information that, depending on the
circumstances, can result in the reassessment of a judgement or estimate
required by this Interpretation include, but are not limited to, the following:

 

(a)  examinations
or actions by a taxation authority. For example:

(i)  agreement
or disagreement by the taxation authority with the tax treatment or a similar
tax treatment used by the entity;

(ii) information
that the taxation authority has agreed or disagreed with a similar tax
treatment used by another entity; and

(iii) information
about the amount received or paid to settle a similar tax treatment.

(b)  changes
in rules established by a taxation authority.

(c)  the
expiry of a taxation authority’s right to examine or re-examine a tax
treatment.

 

Example 6 – Change in facts and circumstances

Entity A claimed a
tax-deduction for a particular expense item. In the prior year, Entity A had
concluded that it was probable that the taxation authority would accept the tax
deduction. However, during the current year, Entity A is alerted by a similar
issue where a tax deduction was denied in a ruling by the Supreme Court. The
recent court ruling is considered a change in facts and circumstances. As a
result, Entity A has to reassess the uncertain tax treatment, taking into
account the recent Supreme Court decision.

 

Example 7 – Events after the reporting date

 

Scenario A

Entity C had claimed a tax
deduction for a particular expense item in its tax return related to the
financial year ending 31st December 2018. However, for the purpose
of recognising current and deferred taxes in that year, Entity C had concluded
that it is not probable that the taxation authorities will accept the tax
deduction. Accordingly, Entity C had recognised an additional tax liability
relating to the uncertainty. In February 2020, before the approval of the
financial statements for the year ending 31st December 2019, Entity
C receives the final tax assessment for 2018. The tax assessment confirms the
full deductibility of the expense item. The confirmation of tax deduction
received after the reporting period and prior to authorisation of the financial
statements for 2019 is considered as an adjusting event after the reporting
period. Accordingly, the additional tax liability that was recognised in 2018
relating to the uncertainty is released in the 2019 period.

 

Scenario B

Entity B claimed a
tax-deduction pertaining to interest expense on a loan granted by an affiliated
company, amounting to INR 500,000 in its tax return related to the financial
statements for the year ending 31st December 2018. However, for the
purposes of recognising current and deferred taxes for that year, Entity B had
concluded that the taxation authorities will only accept a deduction of INR 100,000.
In March 2020, before the approval of the financial statements for the year
ending 31st December 2019, Entity B learns from its tax advisor that
the taxation authorities have confirmed that they will accept, on a
retrospective basis, another method of determining interest rate at arm’s
length that would lead to a tax deduction of INR 300,000 in year 2018. In this
example, it appears that the taxation authorities have issued a new guideline
on deductibility of interest expenses relating to a loan from an affiliated
company. Accordingly, in contrast to Scenario A above, the information received
in March 2020 is considered as a non-adjusting event after the reporting period
for the 2019 financial statements.

 

Absence of an explicit
agreement or disagreement by the taxation authorities on its own is unlikely to
represent a change in facts and circumstances, or new information that affects
the judgements and estimates made. In such situations, an entity has to
consider other available facts and circumstances before concluding that a
reassessment of the judgements and estimates is required.

 

An uncertain tax treatment
is resolved when the treatment is accepted or rejected by the taxation
authorities. The Interpretation does not discuss the manner of acceptance
(i.e., implicit or explicit) of an uncertain tax treatment by the taxation
authorities. In practice, a taxation authority might accept a tax return
without commenting explicitly on any particular treatment in it. Alternatively,
it might raise some questions in an examination of a tax return. Unless such
clearance is provided explicitly, it is not always clear if a taxation
authority has accepted an uncertain tax treatment. An entity may consider the
following to determine whether a taxation authority has implicitly or
explicitly accepted an uncertain tax treatment:

 

   The tax treatment is explicitly mentioned in
a report issued by the taxation authorities following an examination

   The treatment was specifically discussed with
the taxation authorities (e.g., during an on-site examination) and the taxation
authorities verbally agreed with the approach; or

   The treatment was specifically highlighted in
the income tax filings, but not subsequently queried by the taxation
authorities in their examination.

 

Disclosures

There are no new disclosure
requirements in IFRIC 23. However, entities are reminded of the need to
disclose, in accordance with existing IFRS (Ind AS) standards. When there is
uncertainty over income tax treatments, an entity shall determine whether to
disclose: judgements made in determining taxable profit (tax loss), tax bases,
unused tax losses, unused tax credits and tax rates; and information about the
assumptions and estimates made in determining taxable profit (tax loss), tax
bases, unused tax losses, unused tax credits and tax rates under IAS 1 (Ind AS
1) Presentation of Financial Statements. If an entity concludes it is
probable that a taxation authority will accept an uncertain tax treatment, the
entity shall determine whether to disclose the potential effect of the
uncertainty as a tax-related contingency under IAS 12 (Ind AS 12).

 

Effective date and transition

IFRIC 23 applies to annual
reporting periods beginning on or after 1st January 2019. Earlier
application is permitted. Entities can apply the Interpretation using either of
the following approaches:

 

   Full retrospective approach: this approach
can be used only if it is possible without the use of hindsight. The
application of the new Interpretation will be accounted for in accordance with
IAS 8, which means comparative information will have to be restated; or

 

    Modified retrospective approach: no
restatement of comparative information is required or permitted under this
approach. The cumulative effect of initially applying the Interpretation will
be recognised in opening equity at the date of initial application, being the
beginning of the annual reporting period in which an entity first applies the
Interpretation.

     It
is not clear as to when this interpretation will apply under Ind AS. It is most
likely that this Interpretation may apply from annual reporting periods
beginning on or after 1st April 2019.

 

Key challenges

    Applying the Interpretation could be
challenging for entities, particularly those that operate in more complex
multinational tax environments.

 

    It would be challenging for entities to
estimate the income tax due with respect to tax inspections, when tax
authorities examine different types of taxes together and issue a report with a
single amount due therein.

 

   Entities may also need to evaluate whether
they have established appropriate processes and procedures to obtain
information, on a timely basis, that is necessary to apply the requirements in
the Interpretation and make the required disclosures.

 

    IFRIC 23 requires an entity to assume a
detection risk of 100%. An entity should not take any credit for the
possibility that uncertain tax treatments could be overlooked by the taxation
authority. This is a different approach compared to existing practice that may
lead to changes when the Interpretation is first applied. This could be a
challenging task in some cases.

 

Frequently Asked Questions

 

Will this
Interpretation apply to uncertain treatments of other taxes, for example GST?

 

Although uncertainty exists
in the determination of GST liability, IFRIC 23 is not applicable since GST is
not a tax on income and not in the scope of IAS 12 (Ind AS 12)/IFRIC 23. Rather
they would be covered under IAS 37 (Ind AS 37) Provisions, Contingent
Liabilities and Contingent Assets
. It may be noted that whilst the
underlying principle for recognition in both standards is “probability”, the
measurement basis under the two standards are significantly different.

 

In a
particular jurisdiction, if tax is not deducted at source with respect to
royalty payments to non-resident the entity is subjected to penalty and also
disallowance of the royalty expenses in computation of taxable income. Is the
penalty and disallowance of the royalty expense covered under IFRIC 23?

 

Penalty is not a tax on
income and hence are not covered under IFRIC 23. Rather they would be covered
under IAS 37 (Ind AS 37) Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent
Assets
. The disallowance of royalty expenses which is included in the
taxable income will be subjected to the requirements of IAS 12 (Ind AS 12) and
IFRIC 23.

 

Will
Interest and penalties levied by Income tax Authorities be covered under this
Interpretation?

 

IAS 12 (Ind AS 12) does not
explicitly refer to interest and penalties payable to, or receivable from, a
taxation authority, nor are they explicitly referred to in other IFRS
Standards. A number of respondents to the draft Interpretation suggested in
their comment letter that the Interpretation explicitly include interest and
penalties associated with uncertain tax treatments within its scope. Some said
that entities account for interest and penalties differently depending on
whether they apply IAS 12 (Ind AS 12) or IAS 37 (Ind AS 37) Provisions,
Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets
to those amounts.

 

The IC decided not to add
to the Interpretation requirements relating to interest and penalties
associated with uncertain tax treatments. Rather, the IC noted that if an
entity considers a particular amount payable or receivable for interest and
penalties to be an income tax, then that amount is within the scope of IAS 12
and, when there is uncertainty, also within the scope of this Interpretation.
Conversely, if an entity does not apply IAS 12 to a particular amount payable
or receivable, then this Interpretation does not apply to that amount,
regardless of whether there is uncertainty.

 

An entity
determines that an uncertain tax treatment is not probable but is possible and
hence disclosure as contingent liability is required. Whether the contingent
liability disclosure will also include the consequential interest and penalty
amount?

 

Interest amount will be
included in the contingent liability amount if there is no or very little
likelihood of waiver. On the other hand, penalty amount may be waived by the
tax authorities. If it is probable that the penalties may be waived by the tax
authorities, they are not included in the contingent liability amount.

 

In evaluating
the detection risk, should an entity consider probability of detection by the
Income-tax authorities rather than assuming an examination will occur in all
cases?

 

The IC decided that an
entity should assume a taxation authority will examine amounts it has a right
to examine and have full knowledge of all related information. In making this
decision, the IC noted that IAS 12 (Ind
AS 12) requires an entity to measure tax assets and liabilities based on tax
laws that have been enacted or substantively enacted.

 

A few respondents to the
draft Interpretation suggested that an entity consider the probability of
examination, instead of assuming that an examination will occur. These
respondents said such a probability assessment would be particularly important
if there is no time limit on the taxation authority’s right to examine income
tax filings.

 

The IC decided not to
change the examination assumption, nor create an exception to it for
circumstances in which there is no time limit on the taxation authority’s right
to examine income tax filings. Almost all respondents to the draft
Interpretation supported the examination assumption. The IC also noted that the
assumption of examination by the taxation authority, in isolation, would not
require an entity to reflect the effects of uncertainty. The threshold for
reflecting the effects of uncertainty is whether it is probable that the
taxation authority will accept an uncertain tax treatment. In other words, the
recognition of uncertainty is not determined based on whether a taxation
authority examines a tax treatment.

 

Will the
principles of “virtual certainty” apply for recognition of current and deferred
tax assets in cases where there is uncertainty of tax treatments?

 

When the key test of the
Interpretation would result in the entity recognising tax assets (i.e. based on
the probability that the taxation authorities would accept the entity’s tax
treatment), the entity is not required to demonstrate the ‘virtual certainty’
of the tax authority accepting the entity’s tax treatment in order to recognise
such a tax asset. The underlying principle of “probability” will apply for
recognition of current and deferred tax asset arising from uncertain tax
treatments. Consider the example below.

 

Example 8 – Measurement of tax positions

The management of Entity B
decides to undertake a group-wide restructuring and records a restructuring
liability of INR 1,000,000. Entity B has tax loss carry-forwards of INR
1,200,000. Excluding the restructuring liability, taxable profit for the
current year is INR 2,000,000. Entity B is uncertain whether the local taxation
authorities will accept a deduction for the restructuring costs. However, it
analyses all available evidence and concludes that it is probable that the
taxation authorities will accept the deduction of the INR 1,000,000 in the year
when it is recorded.

 

Entity B therefore
estimates its taxable profit to be INR 1,000,000 and that this will be fully
offset with tax loss carry-forwards from the INR 1,200,000 available. As a
consequence, there is no current income tax charge in the period and Entity B
determines a remaining tax loss carry-forward balance of INR 200,000. As
management has convincing evidence that Entity B will realise sufficient
taxable profits in the future, it records a deferred tax asset for the unused
tax losses of INR 200,000. Though convincing evidence is required to record a
deferred tax asset on carry forward losses (INR 200,000), the acceptability of
uncertain tax treatments (INR 1,000,000) by the tax authorities is based on the
principle of “probability”.

 

Conclusion

For many large sized
entities or those with significant income tax litigations or complications,
this Interpretation may well be a significant change. Management and Audit
Committees should ensure that the Interpretation is properly understood and
complied with. Tax advisors too need to get upto speed on the standard, since
this standard may have significant impact on income tax computation and
assessments. _

Perspectives On Fair Value Under Ind As (Part 1)

INTRODUCTION
In line with the commitment made by our then Honourable Prime Minister, Shri Manmohan Singh at the G-20 summit nearly ten years back to adopt the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), India has already begun its journey to converge with IFRS rather than adopt it. The roadmap by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs for adoption of International Financial IFRS converged Indian Accounting Standards (Ind AS) was announced in two phases for other than financial service entities, which is tabulated hereunder:

Phase

Entities Covered

Applicable Date

 

 

 

I

Entities
having net worth of more than Rs. 500 crores based on the audited Balance
Sheet as on 31st March, 2014 or any subsequent date

Financial
Year ending 31st March, 2017

 

 

 

II

All
other listed entities not covered in Phase I and unlisted entities having net
worth of more than Rs. 250 crores based on the audited Balance Sheet as on 31st
March, 2014 or any subsequent date

Financial
Year ending 31st March, 2018

The consolidated impact of the aforesaid convergence will result in significant differences in the preparation and presentation of financial statements thereby paving the way for greater transparency, enriched quality and enhanced comparability of the financial statements. Whilst there are several challenges consequent to adoption of Ind AS, the single most sweeping challenge would be a significant increase in the focus on fair value accounting which in turn is based on the principle of fair value measurement which is a fundamental concept and the underlying basis for the Ind AS framework. Keeping these factors in mind, this article aims to decipher the concept of fair value under Ind AS, its broad prescriptions, its benefits and perils coupled with certain practical challenges and decisions in its implementation especially on transition, for the Phase II entities tabulated above, keeping in mind the experience of the Phase I entities.
 
CONCEPT OF FAIR VALUE UNDER Ind AS
There are several Ind ASs as tabulated below, which permit or require entities to either measure or disclose the fair value of assets, liabilities or equity instruments.
 

Ind AS No.

Title

 

 

36

Impairment
of Assets

 

 

103

Business
Combinations

 

 

109

Financial
Instruments

 

 

28

Investments
in Associates and Joint Ventures

 

 

38

Intangible
Assets

 

 

102

Share
Based Payments

 

 

16

Property,
Plant and Equipment

 

 

40

Investment
Property

 

 

41

Agriculture

   

The primary purpose under Ind AS 113 is to increase the consistency and comparability of fair value measurement used in financial reporting and to provide a common framework whenever an Ind AS requires or permits fair value measurement irrespective of the type of asset, liability or the entity that holds the same. The basic objective of fair value measurement is to estimate the price at which an orderly transaction would take place between market participants under market conditions that exist at the measurement date. Let us now examine the key requirements of Ind AS 113 as well as each of the above Ind AS’s insofar as the fair value requirements are concerned.
 
Key Requirements of Ind AS 113:
Ind AS 113 addresses how to measure fair value but does not stipulate when fair value needs to be used which is determined by the other Ind ASs as indicated earlier. Further, Ind AS 113 applies to all fair value disclosures that are required or permitted by Ind AS, except for the following:
 
a)Share based payment transactions under Ind AS 102;
b)Leases under Ind AS 17; and
c)Measures that are similar to but are not fair value e.g.  net   realisable   value   under   Ind AS   2,
    Inventories, value in use under Ind AS 36, Impairment.
 
The disclosures required by this Standard are not required for the following:
 
a)Plan assets measured at fair value in accordance with Ind AS 19, Employee Benefits; and
b)Assets for which recoverable amount is fair value less costs of disposal in accordance with Ind AS 36, Impairment of Assets.
 

The fair value measurement framework described in this Standard applies to both initial and subsequent measurement, if fair value is required or permitted by other Ind ASs.
 
The basic objectives of Ind AS 113 are as under:
 
-To define the concept of fair value.
-To set out the framework for measuring the fair value.
-To lay down the disclosure requirements on fair value measurements.
 
Let us now proceed to briefly examine each of the above aspects.
 
Meaning of Fair Value:

IndAS 113 defines fair value as “the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement date”.
 
The basic premise which governs the determination and use of fair value is that it is always determined on a market based approach based on observable market prices or in its absence based on other appropriate valuation techniques which maximise the use of relevant observable inputs and minimise the use of unobservable inputs and is not entity specific. In other words, it means that the fair value has to be determined in accordance with use of the asset by market participants. A common example of such a situation is in the FMCG or Pharma industry when the acquirer acquires the business of a competitor with the objective of eliminating competing brands to promote his own brand. In such cases a fair value is attributed to the competing brand on the basis of its highest and best use (discussed later) by market participants, which principle is also laid down under Ind AS 103.
 
Before proceeding further, it is important to understand the concept of the term price in the context of fair value and also who are regarded as market participants since fair value is always to be determined on a market based approach.
 
The Price:

In keeping with its market based criteria as discussed earlier, fair value is the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction in the principal (or most advantageous) market at the measurement date under current market conditions (i.e. an exit price) regardless of whether that price is directly observable or estimated using another valuation technique.Thus, under normal circumstances, the fair value is the exit price.
 
However, when an asset is acquired or a liability is assumed in an exchange transaction for that asset or liability, the transaction price is the price paid to acquire the asset or received to assume the liability (referred to as an entry price). An example could be a company which has an old truck having a book value of Rs.2,50,000 which acquires a boat in exchange whose transaction price assumed on the basis of similar transactions on an arm’s length basis is Rs. 10,00,000 which could be construed as its fair value. Accordingly the boat will be accounted for at Rs.10,00,000 and a loss of Rs.7,50,000 (10,00,000-2,50,000) would be simultaneously recorded.
 
In most cases, the transaction price will equal the fair value (e.g. when on the transaction date the transaction to buy an asset takes place in the market in which the asset would be sold).Though in practice there may not be various situations where the transaction price may not represent the fair value, Ind AS-113 does recognise that the transaction price might not represent the fair value of an asset or a liability at initial recognition if any of the following conditions exist:
 
a)The transaction is between related parties, unless it can be demonstrated that the transactions are on an arm’s length basis. Keeping in mind the requirements under the Companies Act, 2013 most related party transactions in practice would pass the arm’s length test.
 
b)The transaction takes place under duress or the seller is forced to accept the price in the transaction e.g. if the seller is experiencing financial difficulty. Similarly in the recent past the insolvency proceedings under the Bankruptcy Code may force the sellers to accept certain prices arrived at through the resolution process whichmay not always be fair.
 
c)The unit of account represented by the transaction price is different from the unit of account for the asset or liability measured at fair value e.g. if the asset or liability measured at fair value is only one of the elements in the transaction in a business combination or the transaction includes unstated rights and privileges that are measured separately in accordance with another Ind AS or the transaction price includes transaction costs.
 
d)The market in which the transaction takes place is different from the principal market (or most advantageous market) e.g. those markets might be different if the entity is a dealer that enters into transactions with customers in the retail market, but the principal (or most advantageous) market for the exit transaction is with other dealers in the dealer market.
 
Market Participants:
They represent buyers and sellers in the principal (or most advantageous) market for the asset or liability that have all of the following characteristics:
 
a)They are independent of each other and are not related parties as defined in Ind AS-24.

b)They are knowledgeable and have a reasonable understanding about the asset or liability and the transaction using all available information that might be obtained through due diligence efforts that are usual and customary.
c)They are able and willing to enter into a transaction for the asset or liability.
 
Measurement Date:
It represents a clear and specific date for a particular transaction and the fair value needs to be computed as of that date rather than for a period.
 
After having understood the meaning of certain critical terms let us now proceed to gain some insights into the overall framework for measuring the fair value as laid down in Ind AS 113
 
Framework for Measuring the Fair Value:
The fair value measurement framework as laid down under Ind AS 113 broadly requires a determination of the following:
 
a.The asset or liability being measured.
b.The highest and best use for a non-financial asset.
c.The principal or most advantageous market.
d.The fair value hierarchy.
e.The valuation techniques to be adopted (including the inputs to be used).
 
     a.The Asset or Liability being measured:
 
The asset or liability being measured at fair value could be either of the following:
 
a)A standalone asset or liability e.g. a financial instrument or a non-financial asset like land or equipment; or
 
b)A group of assets or liabilities e.g. a cash generating unit or valuation during the course of a business combination or restructuring transaction.
 
In either of the above situations, for the valuation under accounting depends on its unit of account, which is the level at which it is aggregated or disaggregated for accounting purposes.
 

When measuring fair value an entity shall take into account the following characteristics of the asset or liability which market participants would normally take into account when pricing the asset or liability at the measurement date.:
 
a)    the condition and location of the asset (an example thereof could be a Company which owns a licence only for selling a product in India, the value of the intangible asset represented by the licence cannot be measured by assuming or factoring in the cash flows from the sale of the products outside India); and
 
b)restrictions, if any, on the sale or use of the asset (an example could be a Company which has a land parcel that can be used only for industrial purposes in which case, the value of the land needs to be measured based on the current conditions as well as keeping in mind the restrictions on use).
 
b.Highest and Best Use for a Non-Financial Asset:
As we have discussed above, to arrive at the fair value of an asset or liability, its value needs to be taken from the perspectives of the market participants in an orderly transaction for sale or exchange of an asset. However, many non-financial assets may not always be liquid enough nor have specific contractual terms which the financial assets would normally have.
 
Accordingly, the fair value measurement of a non-financial asset depends upon the following two factors:
 
a)The ability of the market participants to generate economic benefit by using the asset in its highest and best use. This is also referred to as the in exchange valuation premise. In such cases, the asset would provide maximum value to market participants primarily on a standalone basis. Thus, the fair value of the asset would be the price which would be received in a current transaction to sell the asset to market participants who would use the asset on a standalone basis. An example could be the estimated amount at which a particular piece and parcel of land adjacent to an existing factory (for a proposed expansion) could be exchanged on the date of valuation between a willing buyer and a willing seller wherein both the parties have acted knowledgeably, prudently and without compulsion.
 
b)The sale value to another market participant who will use the asset to its highest and best use. This is also referred to as the in use valuation premise. In such cases, it is presumed that an entity’s current use of a non-financial asset is its highest and best use unless market or other factors suggest that a different use by market participants would maximise the value of the non-financial asset. An example could be an FMCG company which acquires another similar entity but intends to discontinue the brands acquired pursuant to the acquisition. In such a situation, the fair value of the brands would nevertheless be computed assuming it from a market participant’s perspective even if the acquirer intends to kill the brand(s).
 
Keeping this in mind, the Standard also specifically provides that the fair value of non-financial assets should be measured based on its highest and best use.
 
The highest and best use refers to the use of an asset by market participants that would maximise the value of the asset or group of assets and liabilities by taking into account the use of the asset, considering the following factors:
 

Factors

Examples
of Evaluation Criteria

Physical
Possibility

    Size or location of the property

       Technical feasibility for applying the
asset for producing different goods

 

 

Legal
Permissibility

     Legal restrictions like zoning
restrictions

       Entry restriction sin certain markets

 

 

Financial
Feasibility

Generation of
adequate cash flows to provide the desired return  on investments to market participants to
put the asset to use

       The costs of converting the asset for
the desired use from a marketparticipants perspective

   
c.The Principal or Most Advantageous Market:
 
The basic premise under Ind AS 113 is that the fair value needs to be determined based on orderly transactions that would take place in the principal or in its absence the most advantageous market as defined earlier. Identifying these markets is one of the key considerations in the entire valuation process.
 
Ind AS-113 provides that an entity need not undertake an exhaustive search of all possible markets to identify the principal market or, in the absence thereof, the most advantageous market, but it shall take into account all information that is reasonably available. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the market in which the entity would normally enter into a transaction to sell the asset or to transfer the liability is presumed to be the principal market or, in the absence of a principal market, the most advantageous market.
 
Whilst it is easier to determine the principal market based on the observed volume or level of activity. Example: a stock exchange having more frequent trading or volume for a listed company’s equity shares, to determine the most advantageous market, in other casesone needs to take into account the transaction costs and transportation costs in the manner discussed below.
 
Transaction Costs and Transportation Costs:
Ind AS-113 defines transaction costs as those costs which are incurred to sell an asset or transfer a liability in the principal (or most advantageous) market (discussed earlier) for the asset or liability that are directly attributable to the disposal of the asset or the transfer of the liability and meet both of the following criteria:
 
a)They result directly from and are essential to that transaction.
 
b)They would not have been incurred by the entity had the decision to sell the asset or transfer the liability not been made (similar to costs to sell, as defined in Ind AS 105).
 
Ind AS-113 defines transportation costs as those costs that would be incurred to transport an asset from its current location to its principal (or most advantageous) market.
 
As per para 25 of Ind AS-113, the price in the principal (or most advantageous) market used to measure the fair value of the asset or liability shall not be adjusted for transaction costs since they are not a characteristic of an asset or a liability but they are specific to a transaction and will differ depending on how an entity enters into a transaction for the asset or liability. Transaction costs shall be accounted for in accordance with other Ind ASs. Further, as per para 26 of Ind AS-113, transaction costs do not include transport costs. If location is a characteristic of the asset (e.g. for a commodity), the price in the principal (or most advantageous) market shall be adjusted for the costs, if any, that would be incurred to transport the asset from its current location to that market.
 
However, as we have seen earlier, both the transaction and transportation costs should be taken into account to determine the most advantageous market for an asset or a liability.
The above is explained with the help of an example to determine the most advantageous market based on the transaction and transportation cost.
 
Determination of the Most Advantageous Market – Facts of the case:
An entity holds an asset which can be sold in two markets situated in different locations with different prices. It enters into transactions in both the markets since there is no principal market for the asset. Certain other details are tabulated below:

Amount in Rs.

Market

Price

Transport Cost

Transaction Cost

Net Price

 

 

 

 

 

X

950

100

100

750

 

 

 

 

 

Y

880

75

40

765

 
Determine the most advantageous market.
 
Solution:

Based on the net prices, the entity would maximise the net amount in market Y (Rs. 765) and hence it appears to be the most advantageous market.
 
However, on further analysis the fair value of market X and Y would be Rs. 850 and Rs. 805 after deducting the transportation cost as per the requirements of para 25 of Ind AS-113, discussed earlier, since location is a characteristic of the asset. However, even though the fair value of market X is greater, market Y remains most advantageous because of the overall greater net price. Accordingly, the fair value of the asset would be Rs. 805.
 
d.Fair Value Hierarchy:
The purpose of laying down a fair value hierarchy in the Standard is to increase consistency and comparability in the fair value measurements and disclosures. The basic premise of applying this hierarchy is to enable an entity to prioritise the observable inputs over those that are unobservable. Further, greater disclosures are mandated in respect of unobservable inputs adopted due to their inherent subjectivity.
 
The Standard establishes a fair value hierarchy that categorises into three levels, as discussed below, the inputs to valuation techniques used to measure fair value. The fair value hierarchy gives the highest priority to quoted prices (unadjusted) in active markets for identical assets or liabilities (Level 1 inputs) and the lowest priority to unobservable inputs (Level 3 inputs).
 
Level 1 inputs:
 

Level 1 inputs are quoted prices (unadjusted) in active markets for identical assets or liabilities that the entity can access at the measurement date and provides the most reliable evidence of fair value.
 
Level 1 inputs will be available for many financial assets and financial liabilities, some of which might be exchanged in multiple active markets (e.g. on different exchanges). Accordingly, the emphasis within Level 1 is on determining both of the following:
 
a)the principal market for the asset or liability or, in the absence of a principal market, the most advantageous market for the asset or liability; and
b)whether the entity can enter into a transaction for the asset or liability at the price in that market at the measurement date.
 
For example, if the equity shares are quoted on more than one exchange generally the price quoted on an exchange which has the maximum trading volume would be both the principal as well as the most advantageous market.
 
On the other hand, in respect of Government Securities, though they may be quoted, the market may not be very active or liquid and hence, the latest available quoted price may not be an appropriate level I input and may need to be adjusted.
 
Level 2 inputs:
 
Level 2 inputs are inputs other than quoted prices included within Level 1 that are observable (those inputs that are developed using market data, such as publicly available information about actual events or transactions, and that reflect the assumptions that market participants would use when pricing the asset or liability) for the asset or liability, either directly or indirectly. If the asset or liability has a specified (contractual) term, a Level 2 input must be observable for substantially the full term of the asset or liability.
 
Level 2 inputs include the following:
 
a)quoted prices for similar assets or liabilities in active markets.
b)quoted prices for identical or similar assets or liabilities in markets that are not active.
c)inputs other than quoted prices that are observable for the asset or liability, for example:
i) interest rates and yield curves observable at commonly quoted intervals;
ii) implied volatilities; and
iii) credit spreads.
d)market-corroborated inputs.
 
Adjustments to Level 2 inputs will vary depending on the factors specific to the asset or liability, which include the following:
 
a)The condition or location of the asset;
b)The extent to which inputs relate to items which are comparable to the asset or liability; and
c)The volume and level of activity in the markets within which the inputs are observed.
 
An adjustment to a Level 2 input that is significant to the entire measurement might result in a fair value measurement categorized within Level 3 of the fair value hierarchy, if the adjustment uses significant unobservable inputs.
 
Some of the common examples of  Level 2 inputs used in valuation are:
 
a)Receive-fixed, pay-variable interest rate swap based on the Mumbai Interbank Offered Rate (MIBOR) swap rate.- A Level 2 input would be the MIBOR swap rate if that rate is observable at commonly quoted intervals for substantially the full term of the swap.

b)Licensing arrangement- For a licensing arrangement that is acquired in a business combination and was recently negotiated with an unrelated party by the acquired entity (the party to the licensing arrangement), a Level 2 input would be the royalty rate in the contract with the unrelated party at inception of the arrangement.

c)Finished goods inventory at a retail outlet – For finished goods inventory that is acquired in a business combination, a Level 2 input would be either a price to customers in a retail market or a price to retailers in a wholesale market, adjusted for differences between the condition and location of the inventory item and the comparable (i.e. similar) inventory items so that the fair value measurement reflects the price that would be received in a transaction to sell the inventory to another retailer that would complete the requisite selling efforts. Generally, the price that requires the least amount of subjective adjustments should be used for the fair value measurement.

d)Building held and used – A Level 2 input would be the price per square metre for the building (a valuation multiple) derived from observable market data, e.g. multiples derived from prices in observed transactions involving comparable (i.e. similar) buildings in similar locations.

e)Cash-generating unit- A Level 2 input would be a valuation multiple (e.g. a multiple of earnings or revenue or a similar performance measure) derived from observable market data (EV/ EBITDA multiple) e.g. multiples derived from prices in observed transactions involving comparable (i.e. similar) businesses, taking into account operational, market, financial and non-financial factors
 
Level 3 inputs:
 
Level 3 inputs are unobservable inputs (those inputs for which market data are not available and that are developed using the best information available about the assumptions that market participants would use when pricing the asset or liability) for the asset or liability. Unobservable inputs shall be used to measure fair value to the extent that relevant observable inputs are not available, thereby allowing for situations in which there is little, if any, market activity for the asset or liability at the measurement date. Accordingly, unobservable inputs shall reflect the assumptions that market participants would use when pricing the asset or liability, including assumptions about risk.
 
An entity shall develop unobservable inputs using the best information available in the circumstances, which might include the entity’s own data. In developing unobservable inputs, an entity may begin with its own data, but it shall adjust those data if reasonably available information indicates that other market participants would use different data or there is something particular to the entity that is not available to other market participants (e.g. an entity-specific synergy). An entity need not undertake exhaustive efforts to obtain information about market participant assumptions. However, an entity shall take into account all information about market participant assumptions that is reasonably available. Unobservable inputs developed in the manner described above are considered market participant assumptions and meet the objective of a fair value measurement.
 
Some of the common examples of Level 3 inputs used in valuation are:
 
a)Long-dated currency swap – A Level 3 input would be an interest rate in a specified currency that is not observable and cannot be corroborated by observable market data at commonly quoted intervals or otherwise for substantially the full term of the currency swap. The interest rates in a currency swap are the swap rates calculated from the respective countries’ yield curves.

b)Three-year option on exchange-traded shares – A Level 3 input would be historical volatility, i.e. the volatility for the shares derived from the shares’ historical prices. Historical volatility typically does not represent current market participants’ expectations about future volatility, even if it is the only information available to price an option.

c)Interest rate swap- A Level 3 input would be an adjustment to a mid-market consensus (non-binding) price for the swap developed using data that are not directly observable and cannot otherwise be corroborated by observable market data.

d)Cash-generating unit – A Level 3 input would be a financial forecast (e.g. of cash flows or profit or loss) developed using the entity’s own data if there is no reasonably available information that indicates that market participants would use different assumptions.
 
e.Valuation Techniques:
 
After having understood the broad principles underlying fair valuation, an entity would need to determine the valuation techniques which are appropriate in the circumstances and for which sufficient data are available to measure the fair value, whereby there is maximum use of observable inputs and minimum use of unobservable inputs, keeping in mind the overall objective of the valuation exercise to estimate the price at which an orderly transaction to sell an asset or transfer a liability would take place between market participants under current market conditions.
 
There are three widely used valuation techniques which are prescribed in Ind AS 113 as under:
 
-Market approach
-Cost approach
-Income approach
 
Each of these are briefly analysed hereunder:
 
The Market Approach:
 
This approach uses prices and other relevant information generated by market transactions involving identical or comparable assets, liabilities or group of assets or liabilities. The valuation techniques consistent with the market approach often use market multiples derived from a set of comparable assets, liabilities or business, as applicable. Multiples might be in ranges with a different multiple for each comparable. The selection of the appropriate multiple within the range requires judgement, considering qualitative and quantitative factors specific to the measurement. Some of the commonly used market multiples are EV/ EBIDTA, revenue or matrix pricing involving comparison with benchmark securities.
 
The Cost Approach:
 
This approach reflects the amount that would be required currently to replace the service capacity of the asset, which is often referred to as the current replacement cost. From the perspective of a market participant seller, the price that would be received for the asset is based on the cost to a market participant buyer to acquire or construct a substitute asset of comparable utility, adjusted for obsolescence (covering amongst others, physical deterioration, technological changes and changes economic conditions like interest rates, currency fluctuations), since a market participant buyer would not pay more for an asset than the amount for which it could replace the service capacity of that asset. For this purpose, the term obsolescence is much broader than depreciation which is provided for financial reporting or tax purposes.
 
The Income Approach:
 
This approach converts the future amounts comprising of cash flows, income or expenses to a single current (discounted) amount. The fair value measure so arrived at reflects the current market expectations of such future amounts. The following are the commonly used valuation techniques under this approach:
 
?????Present value technique
?Option pricing models
?Multi-period excess earnings method
 
Whilst a detailed discussion on each of these techniques is beyond the scope of this article, some broad principles underlying the same are covered hereunder.
 
Present Value Technique:

The present value technique is the most commonly used technique and is the only technique for which guidance is provided in Ind AS 113. This technique links the future estimates or amounts (e.g. cash flows or values) to a present amount using a discount rate. A fair value measurement of an asset or a liability using a present value technique captures all the following elements from the perspective of market participants at the measurement date:
 
a)An estimate of future cash flows for the asset or liability being measured.
b)Expectations about possible variations in the amount and timing of the cash flows representing the uncertainty inherent in the cash flows.
c)The time value of money, represented by the rate on risk-free monetary assets that have maturity dates or durations that coincide with the period covered by the cash flows and pose neither uncertainty in timing nor risk of default to the holder (i.e. a risk-free interest rate).
d)The price for bearing the uncertainty inherent in the cash flows (i.e.an illiquidity discount).
e)Any other factors that market participants would take into account in the circumstances.
f)For a liability, the non-performance risk relating to that liability, including the entity’s (i.e. the obligor’s) own credit risk.
 
Option Pricing Models:
 
These incorporate present value techniques and reflect both the intrinsic and time value of money of an option contract which represents a contract through which a seller gives a buyer the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell a specified number of shares or other securities or commodities or foreign currency at a predetermined price within a set time period.Options are derivatives, which means that their value is derived from the value of an underlying investment or commodity or foreign currency, amongst others.
 
A further detailed discussion on the various option pricing models is beyond the scope of this article since it involves use of various statistical and other models, often quite complex, which are determined by valuation specialists taking into account various sophisticated models and tools.
 
Multi Period Excess Earnings Method:
 
The fundamental principle underlying this method is to isolate the net earnings attributable to the asset being measured. It is generally used to measure the fair value of intangible assets. Under this method, the estimate of an intangible assets fair value starts with an estimate of the expected net income of the enterprise or the group of assets. The other assets in the group are referred to as the contributory assets, which contribute to the realisation of the intangible assets value. Once the underlying value is determined, the contributory charges or economic rents, which represent the charges for the use of the assets based on their respective fair values, are deducted from the total net after tax cash flows projected from the combined group to obtain the “excess earnings” attributable to the intangible asset.
 
Use of Multiple Valuation Techniques:

If multiple valuation techniques are used to measure the fair value, the results thereof should be evaluated considering the reasonableness of the range of values. In such cases, the fair value is the point within the range that is most representative of the fair value in the given scenario.
 
Changes in Valuation Techniques:

As a general rule, valuation techniques shall be applied consistently. However, a change in the valuation technique or application of multiple valuation techniques is appropriate if the change results in a measurement that is equally or more representative of the fair value in the circumstances. Some examples of such circumstances are as under:
 
a)New markets develop or market conditions change.
b)New information is available.
c)Information previously used is no longer available.
d)The valuation techniques improve.
 
Inputs to Valuation Techniques:
 
General Principles:
 
As discussed above, valuation techniques used to measure fair value shall maximise the use of relevant observable inputs and minimise the use of unobservable inputs.
 
Inputs selected for fair value measurement shall be consistent with the characteristics of the asset or liability that market participants would take into account in a transaction for the asset or liability. In some cases those characteristics result in the application of an adjustment, such as a premium or discount (e.g. a control premium or non-controlling interest discount). When these characteristics reflect controlling shareholding, the share price would attract a premium and when it reflects a non-controlling interest, the share price would attract a discount.
 
In all cases, if there is a quoted price in an active market for an asset or a liability, an entity shall use that price without adjustment when measuring fair value, except in the following circumstances as specified in para 79 of Ind AS 113:

 
a)when an entity holds a large number of similar (but not identical) assets or liabilities (e.g. debt securities) that are measured at fair value and a quoted price in an active market is available but not readily accessible for each of those assets or liabilities individually. In such cases, as a practical expedient, an entity may measure fair value using an alternative pricing method that does not rely exclusively on quoted prices (e.g. matrix pricing). However, the use of an alternative pricing method would result in a fair value measurement categorised within a lower level of the fair value hierarchy.

b)    when a quoted price in an active market does not represent fair value at the measurement date. For example, if significant events (such as transactions in a principal-to-principal market, trades in a brokered market or announcements) take place after the close of a market but before the measurement date. An entity shall establish and consistently apply a policy for identifying those events that might affect fair value measurements. However, if the quoted price is adjusted for new information, the adjustment results in a fair value measurement categorised within a lower level of the fair value hierarchy.

c)when measuring the fair value of a liability or an entity’s own equity instrument using the quoted price for the identical item traded as an asset in an active market and that price needs to be adjusted for factors specific to the item or the asset.
 
Inputs based on Bid and Ask Prices:
 

If an asset or a liability measured at fair value has a bid price and an ask price, the price within the bid-ask spread that is most representative of fair value in the circumstances shall be used to measure fair value regardless of where the input is categorised within the fair value hierarchy as discussed above. The use of bid prices for asset positions and ask prices for liability positions is permitted, but is not required mandatorily.
 
Ind AS 113 does not preclude the use of mid-market pricing or other pricing conventions that are used by market participants as a practical expedient for fair value measurements within a bid-ask spread.
 
Fair Value Disclosures:
 
The disclosures under Ind AS 113 aims to equip the users of financial statements with greater transparency in respect of the following matters:
 
a)The extent of usage of fair value in the valuation of assets and liabilities.
b)The valuation techniques, inputs and assumptions used in measuring fair value.
c)The impact of level 3 fair value measurements on the profit and loss account or other comprehensive income.
 
The Standard also lays down the broad disclosure objectives and has stipulated certain minimum disclosure requirements especially in respect of Level 3 fair value measurements, since there is greater subjectivity and judgement involved in using them.
 
The disclosures broadly cover the following aspects:
 
a)Reasons  for non-recurring fair value measure-ments.
b)The fair value hierarchy adopted.
c)The reasons for transfer between the hierarchical levels for recurring fair value measurements.
d)The valuation techniques adopted,including any changes therein, for both recurring and non-recurring fair value measurements.
e)Quantitative information about significant unobservable inputs for recurring level 3 fair value measurements.
f)The amount of total gains and losses recognised in profit and loss and OCI, together withline items in which these are recognised, for recurring fair value measurements categorised within level 3 of the fair value hierarchy.
g)Sensitivity analysis, both narrative and with quantitative disclosures about the significant unobservable inputs. _
   (to be continued)
 

22 Article 12 of India-Singapore DTAA; Section 9(1)(vii) of the Act – repeated performance of management support services leads to satisfaction of ‘make available’ condition

ITA
No. 1503/Del/2014 (Delhi)

Ceva Asia Pacific Holdings vs. DDIT

A.Ys: 2010-11, Date of Order: 8th
January, 2018



Taxpayer, a non-resident company, operated
as a regional headquarter company providing management and support services to
its subsidiaries and related corporations in Asia pacific region. Taxpayer
entered into an administrative support agreement with its Indian affiliate
(ICo) to provide day-to-day administrative and management support services. As
per the agreement, Taxpayer rendered MIS and accounting support service,
information technology support service, marketing and advertising support as
well as treasury functions support services to ICo.

 

AO examined the nature of administrative
support services rendered to ICo, details of employees visiting India as well
as copies of the emails, bills, and ledger accounts with respect to such
services rendered. Based on these documents, AO noted that the services were
rendered by Taxpayer by working closely with employees of ICo in order to
customise its services as per the needs of ICo as well as to improve the
performance of ICo by employing the best practices and industry experience
possessed by Taxpayer in the functions of management, finance, accounts and IT.
AO held that Taxpayer made available administrative support services to ICo and
therefore, payment for such services qualifies as FTS under Article 12(4) of
the Indian-Singapore DTAA.

 

Taxpayer, however, contended that the
services did not satisfy the make available condition and hence did not qualify
as FIS as per Article 12 of India-Singapore DTAA. Hence, Taxpayer appealed
before the DRP who upheld AO’s order.

 

Aggrieved, the Taxpayer appealed before the
Tribunal.

 

Held

  “Make available? means that the person
receiving the service should become wiser on the subject of services. In other
words, service recipient should be able to perform the services on its own.

  While the documents produced by the Taxpayer
indicate that the nature of services rendered by the Taxpayer were preliminary,
basic, or simple support services; the nature of queries raised by ICo and the
nature of information that was transmitted by the Taxpayer to ICo indicated
that the services rendered by the Taxpayer are of such nature that, if they are
rendered for a long period of time, it would enable ICo to perform the services
on its own.

 

  One needs to however, examine various
correspondence between the Taxpayer and ICo, conduct of the Taxpayer and ICo as
well as the nature of services involved, to evaluate if services rendered by
the Taxpayer, in fact, satisfied the “make available” condition or not.

 

  Hence, the matter was remanded back to the
file of AO for deciding whether the services satisfy the “make Available?
criterion or not after taking into account all the relevant information and
documents. _

 

21 Section 9(1) (vi) of the Act; Article 12 of India-Ireland DTAA – payment towards supply of “off-the-shelf software does not qualify as ‘Royalty’ under the India-Ireland DTAA.

ITA NO.1535/MUM/2014

Intec Billing Ireland vs. ADIT

A.Y: 2010-11, Date of Order: 8th January,
2018


Taxpayer, a non-resident company, licensed
an ‘off-the-shelf’/’shrink wrapped’ billing software to an Indian company
(ICo). The software provided comprehensive business solution in transaction
management, billing and customer care issues related to telecom industry
players. 

Taxpayer contended that the software
licensed to ICo was a standard product which was also licensed to various other
customers. Under the license agreement, ICo only acquired a right to use a copy
of the software for its business purposes. The right to make multiple copies
was also limited only for the internal business operations of ICo. ICo had no
right to resell the software or commercially exploit the software. The
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) in the software was exclusively owned by the
Taxpayer. Hence, the payment made by ICo was for a “copyrighted article” and
not for use of “copyright”. Consequently, such payment does not qualify as
“royalty” under Article 12 of the India-Ireland DTAA.

 

AO held that the payment received by
Taxpayer for supply of ‘off-the-shelf’ software to ICo was for grant of  ‘copyright’ and accordingly, the receipts
qualified as ‘Royalty’ u/s. 9(1)(vi) of the Act as well as Article 12 of
India-Ireland DTAA.

 

The Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP) accepted
the fact that the software was a shrink wrapped/ off-the-shelf software.
However, in light of the decisions in CIT vs. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd.
(2012) 345 ITR 494
and DDIT vs. Reliance Infocom Ltd (2014) 159 TTJ 589,
DRP held that the payment made by ICo was for the use of or right to use
copyright and hence, the payment qualified as royalty within the meaning of
Article 12 of the DTAA.

 

Aggrieved, the Taxpayer appealed before the
Tribunal.

 

Held

  The terms
of the agreement clearly indicated that the IPR in the software was owned by
the Taxpayer and ICo was merely granted right to use a ‘copyrighted article’.

 

Taxpayer merely granted right to use the
software to ICo for its own use in India, without any right to use the
copyright therein. Thus, the payment made by ICo did not qualify as royalty as
per Article 12 of the India Ireland DTAA.

 

  In various decisions1,  it has been held that grant of license of
shrink wrapped software does not amount to transfer of copyright and hence the
payment for such license does not qualify as royalty.

 

  The license agreement under consideration
and the software supplied by the Taxpayer to ICo was subject matter of
consideration before the co-ordinate bench of Tribunal wherein it was held that
sale of software to end-customer does not involve transfer of copyright and
hence payment for such license does not qualify as royalty.

 

  Though the decision of the co-ordinate bench
was in the context of India-USA DTAA, the definition of Royalty under the
applicable Indo-Ireland Tax DTAA being pari materia to Indo-US Tax DTAA,
payment for supply of software will not be taxable as royalty in the hands of
Taxpayer even under India-Ireland DTAA.

_________________________________________________________________

 

1   Illustratively, Halliburton Export Inc.
(ITA No. 3631 of 2016), Solid Works Corporation [2012] 51 SOT 34 (Mumbai)
Dassault Systems vs. DDIT (79 taxmann.com 205)

20 Section 9(1)(vii) of the Act; Article 12(4)(b) of India-US DTAA – Payment for MIS services does not make available any technical knowledge or skill and hence does not qualify as FIS under the DTAA; Reimbursement of payment made by a non-resident on behalf of a resident was not taxable as FTS in hands of non-resident.

 TS-569-ITAT-2017(Kol)

The Timken Company vs. ITO

A.Ys: 2002-03 to 2007-08,

Date of Order: 29th November,
2017


Facts 1

Taxpayer, a foreign company was engaged in
the business of manufacturing and sale of bearings. Taxpayer entered into an
agreement with its Indian subsidiary company (ICo), for rendering of management
information services (MIS) outside India. For instance, as part of the MIS
services, Taxpayer rendered product, process and tool design services, capital,
planning and inventory management services, quality assurance services, damage
and failure analysis, tax services and legal services etc. As per the
agreement, compensation payable by ICo to the Taxpayer would cover only
reimbursement towards the cost incurred by the Taxpayer without any profit
element or mark-up.

 

Taxpayer contended that the services
rendered by the Taxpayer to ICo did not make available any technical knowledge,
experience or skill and hence, the payments made by ICo for such services did
not constitute fees for included services (FIS) within the meaning of Article
12(4) of the Indo-US DTAA. It was further contended that income from such
services represents business profits, which, in absence of a PE, were not
taxable in India.  Further, in absence of
a profit element, such business receipts were not taxable in India.

 

The AO held that payments made by ICo were
taxable in India as per Article 12 of Indo-USA DTAA. Aggrieved by the order of
A.O. Taxpayer appealed before CIT(A) who upheld the order of A.O.

 

Aggrieved, the Taxpayer appealed before the
Tribunal.

 

Held 1

    For a payment to qualify as FIS under
Article 12, following two conditions should be satisfied:

 

    Firstly, the payment
should be in consideration for rendering of technical or consultancy services.

    Secondly, the payment
should be in consideration of services which make available technical
knowledge, experience, skill, etc. to the person utilising the services.

 

    Services rendered by the Taxpayer to ICo
were purely advisory services and no technical knowledge or skill was made
available by the Taxpayer to ICo.

 

    The Tribunal referred to the example in the
MOU between India and USA, which supported the view that payment for advisory
services does not qualify as FIS under Article 12.

 

    Further, in absence of a PE in India, the
income form rendering services to ICo was not taxable in India.

 

Facts 2

During the relevant year, Taxpayer also
received payments from ICo as reimbursements towards payments made by the
Taxpayer to third parties for certain services rendered by third parties to
ICo.

 

Taxpayer contended that for a payment to
qualify as FIS, it should be made for rendering technical or consultancy
services. Since Taxpayer did not render any service to ICo, payments received
from ICo as cost reimbursement will not qualify as FIS.  Further, the amount received from ICo was
purely in the nature of reimbursement of expenses incurred by Taxpayer on
behalf of ICo. Thus, such payments were not taxable in India.

 

However, AO contended that payment made by ICo
qualified as FIS under Article 12 of India-USA DTAA. On appeal, CIT(A) held
that the payments were in the nature of reimbursement and AO was not justified
in treating such payments as FIS. Aggrieved, AO appealed before the Tribunal.

 

Held 2

    The services were rendered by third parties
to ICo and Taxpayer merely paid on behalf of ICo. It is such amount which was
reimbursed by ICo to the Taxpayer.

    Taxpayer was not the ultimate beneficiary of
the payment made by ICo nor did it render any service to ICo. It was hence
incorrect for AO to treat such reimbursements as fee for technical services
(FTS).

    Assuming such payments are for services, in
absence of any evidence to show that such services made available technical
knowledge or skill, the payments could not be treated as FIS under the DTAA.

19 Article 13 of India-Germany DTAA; Section 9(1)(i) of the Act –Transfer of shares of foreign company which do not derive substantial value from the shares of ICo is not taxable in India, no withholding obligation in the absence of any tax liability in India.

GEA Refrigeration Technologies GmbH

AAR No. 1232 of 2012

Date of Order: 28th November,
2017


The Taxpayer, a foreign company, acquired
100% shares of another foreign company (FCo1) from foreign shareholders
(Sellers). FCo1 was a family owned company having investments in many countries
including a wholly owned subsidiary in India (ICo). Pursuant to acquisition of
shares in FCo1 by the Taxpayer, there was an indirect change in ownership of
ICo.

 

From the valuation of the assets of FCo1
undertaken by an Independent valuer, it was found that ICo contributed in the
range of 5.23% to 5.57% to the value of total assets of FCo1.

 

Taxpayer as a buyer sought an advance ruling
to determine the taxability of transaction in the hands of the Sellers in terms
of indirect transfer provisions u/s. 9(1)(i) of the Act and India-Germany DTAA
and its consequential  withholding
obligation.

 

The facts are pictorially reproduced as
follows:

 

 

Held:

    Under the Indirect transfer provisions of
the Act, gains arising from a transfer of a share or interest in a foreign
company/ entity that derives, directly or indirectly, its value substantially
from assets located in India is taxable in India. For this purpose, share/
interest is deemed to derive its value substantially from assets located in
India if the value of Indian assets: (a) exceeds INR 10Cr; and (b) the value
represents at least 50% of the value of all assets owned by the foreign
company/ entity.

 

   Where value contribution of ICo to the value
of total assets of FCo1 is minuscule as against the substantial value
requirement of at least 50% provided in the Act, then shares in FCo1 cannot be
said to derive substantial value from shares in ICo to trigger indirect
transfer provisions in India. Hence, income arising on account of transfer of
such shares in FCo1 cannot be taxed in India.

 

    As per India-Germany DTAA, gains derived
from transfer of shares of a company which is a resident of Germany may be
taxed in Germany. Further the capital gain article contains a residuary clause,
in terms of which the gains which other than the gains from transfer of assets
specified in the other clauses of capital gain article is taxable only in the
resident state.

 

    Since the income from transfer is not
taxable under the Act itself, the provisions of the DTAA becomes academic.

 

   Without prejudice, since the Taxpayer as
well as the Sellers were tax residents of Germany, transfer and payment for the
transaction was completed in Germany, capital gains arising from the transfer
of such shares by the shareholders of FCo1 would be taxable only in Germany as
per India-Germany DTAA.

 

    Even if one were to argue that transfer of
100% shares results in transfer of controlling interest, transfer of such
rights would be taxable only in the resident state i.e Germany in this case.
Since the transfer is not taxable in India, there will be no obligation on the
Taxpayer to withhold taxes.

 

18 Article 5 and 12 of India-Belgium DTAA; Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vii) of the Act; Place provided in the stadium for storing lighting equipment under lock and continued presence required having regard to the nature of services rendered by the Taxpayer results in satisfaction of the disposal test.

TS-626-AAR-2017

Production Resource Group

Date of Order: 8th November, 2017


 

Taxpayer, a non-resident company was engaged
in the business of providing technical equipment as well as services including
lighting, sound, video and LED technologies for various events.  Taxpayer entered into a Service Agreement
with the Organizing Committee of the Commonwealth Games, India (OCCG), to
furnish lighting and searchlight services during the opening and closing
ceremonies of the Commonwealth Games India, 2010 on a turnkey basis.

 

As part of the arrangement, Taxpayer was
also required to undertake installation, maintenance, dismantling and removal
of the lighting equipment. Taxpayer was required to be available on call or in
person to service, rectify or repair any equipment supplied under the agreement.
Additionally, it was also required to undertake all related activities, such as
obtaining  authorizations, permits and
licenses; engaging personnel with the requisite skills, ensuring their
availability; procure and/ or supply all necessary equipment; subcontracting;
and shipping and loading, insurance etc.

 

For carrying on the above activities,
Taxpayer was provided with an office space by OCCG. Taxpayer was also provided
an on-site space for storing its tools and equipment inside the Stadium where
the Games were held, under a lock.  While
the agreement was entered into for a period of around 114 days, Taxpayer’s
employees and equipment are present in India only for a period of 66 days for
preparatory activities such as installation and dismantling of equipment.

 

Taxpayer sought an advance ruling on issue
of taxability of its income from OCCG under the DTAA.

 

Held

On the issue of Fixed place PE:

It was held that Taxpayer had a fixed PE in
India for the following reasons:

 

    The provision of lockable space for storing
the tools and equipment inside the Stadium implies that Taxpayer had access to
and control over such space to the exclusion of other service providers engaged
by OCCG including OCCG itself.

 

   Provision of empty workspace to the taxpayer
implies that such workspace is placed at the disposal and under access, control
of Taxpayer. Also, in the facts, the business had to be carried out on site.
For evaluating fixed place PE, it is immaterial if the place of business is
located in the business facilities of another enterprise.

 

   Given the expensive equipment, time lines,
precision and the highly technical nature of the work involved, it is
inconceivable that the space provided to taxpayer along with the required
security would not be at taxpayer’s disposal, with exclusive right to access
and control. Thus, the space is used not merely for storage alone, but having
regard to the nature of business of the Taxpayer, the usage is for carrying out the business itself.

 

    For a fixed PE to emerge, the fixed place
need not be enduring or permanent in the sense that it should be in its control
forever. The context in which a business is undertaken, is relevant. In the
present case, the duration for which the fixed place was at disposal of
Taxpayer was sufficient for the Taxpayer to carry on its business. Further,
there was a continuous effort by the taxpayer till the games were over. Hence,
permanence test was also satisfied. Reliance, in this regard, was placed on the
SC decision in the case of Formula One World Championship Ltd.
(TS-161-SC-2017)
.

 

  Additional factors of arrangement which
support that disposal test is satisfied are:

    Subcontracting of some
activities by the Taxpayer was indicative of the fact that the Taxpayer had an
address, an office, from which it could call for and award subcontracts.

    Without any premises under
its control, hiring and housing key technical and other personnel, who would
need regular and ongoing instructions during the entire period would be
difficult.

    Taxpayer entered into
various contracts for the purpose of its business in a contracting state, and
employed technical and other manpower for use at its site. The site was thus,
an extension of the foreign entity on Indian soil. Reference in this regard was
place on decision in the case of Vishakhapatnam Port Trust (1983) 144 ITR 146.

    Taxpayer Undertook
comprehensive insurance of its equipment. No insurance company would insure any
equipment, structures etc. against any risk of fire, damage or theft,
unless the place where the equipments are stored was safe, in exclusive custody
and at the disposal of the person who applies for the insurance. Goods are not
ordinarily insured when lying at a third person’s premises. This also suggests
that the place where the tools and equipment were stored was at the disposal of
the Taxpayer.

    It was mandatory for the
Taxpayer to acquire all authorisations, permits and licenses. This indicates
that Taxpayer had a definite place at its disposal, as it could otherwise not
be made liable for any default in the absence of the same.

    The act of carrying out
fabrication, maintenance and repair of equipments, and operating the same at
the opening and closing ceremonies would not have been possible if the premises
were not under Taxpayer’s control.

 

On the issue of Royalty

    There is a vital distinction between a
consideration received for assigning the rights for the use of the final
product on the one hand (i.e. equipment in this case) and the consideration for
assigning rights to use the IP i.e. the knowhow, technical experience, skill,
processes and methodology etc.

 

   It is usual for parties to assign exclusive
rights to the client to use the equipment, but to keep intact the element of
uniqueness and novelty in experiencing the lighting display. But how this
experience was created remains a trade secret with the creator of the same.

 

    In the present case, Taxpayer had merely
granted a right to use the equipment and not the right to use any IP in the
equipment, hence payment made by OCCG to the Taxpayer does not amount to
Royalty.

 

On the issue of FTS

    Services rendered by taxpayer were not
standard in nature since they were one of a kind and were customised for use by
a particular customer. Provision of services of lighting, search lights, LED
technology along with technical personnel to operate the same did not involve
mere pressing of a button and receiving the service but were complex activities
and could not be availed without the assistance of highly trained technical
personnel.

 

    Having regard to the MFN clause, the make
available condition in the FIS article of India Portugal DTAA will need to be
read into India-Belgium DTAA.

 

    Since the services rendered by the Taxpayer
to OCCG does not make  available
technical knowledge or skill, payment for such services does not qualify as FTS
under the India-Belgium DTAA.

Transfer Pricing – Secondary Adjustments Under Section 92CE

1.0   Introduction

      As the name suggests,
a Secondary Adjustment [SA] follows and is directly consequent upon a primary
transfer pricing adjustment to the taxpayer’s income. The purpose of a SA, as
articulated in the OECD Guidelines is “to make the actual allocation of
profits consistent with the primary transfer pricing adjustment.” SAs are imposed
by the same country imposing the primary adjustment and are based upon the
domestic tax law provisions of that country. Most often, a SA is expressed as a
constructive or deemed transaction (dividend, equity contribution or loan) and
is premised on the view that not only an underpayment or overpayment which must
be corrected and adjusted (primary adjustment), but also the benefit or use of
those funds must be recognized for tax purposes (the SA).

 

     OECD’s Transfer
Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations (‘OECD
TP Guidelines’) defines the term ‘Secondary Adjustment’ as “a constructive
transaction that some countries will assert under their domestic legislation
after having proposed a primary adjustment in order to make the actual
allocation of profits consistent with the primary adjustment.” SA legislation
is already prevalent in many tax jurisdictions like Canada, United States,
South Africa, Korea, France etc. Whilst the approaches to SAs by
individual countries vary, they represent an internationally recognised method
to realign the economic benefit of the transaction with the arm’s length
position. It restores the financial situation of the relevant related parties
to that which would have existed, if the transactions had been conducted on an
arm’s length basis.

 

       The underlying
economic premise for the SA is perhaps best expressed in the OECD TP
Guidelines, which state: “… secondary adjustments attempt to account for
the difference between the re-determined taxable profits and the originally
booked profits.

 

         OCED Model Convention
only deals with corresponding adjustment. It neither forbids nor requires tax
administrator to make SA. Relevant extract of commentary in OCED model
convention provides that “…nothing in paragraph 9(2) prevents such secondary
adjustments from being made where they are permitted under domestic law of the
contacting state.

 

1.1   International
Approaches to SAs

         Globally, the OECD
prescribes SA to take any form including constructive equity contribution, loan
or dividend.

A.     Deemed Capital
Contribution Approach

 

B.     Deemed Dividend Approach

C.     Deemed Loan Approach.

 

1.2   Secondary Adjustment
– Global Scenario

 

Jurisdiction

Approach
adopted for SA

Member State of European Union:

 

France, Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain

Deemed profit distribution /Constructive dividend

USA

Deemed distributed income /Deemed capital contribution, as
the case may be.

South Africa

Deemed dividend approach for Companies; Deemed donation
approach for persons other than Companies.

UK

Deemed loan (Proposed)

Canada

Deemed
dividend

South Korea

Deemed dividend / Deemed capital contribution, as the case
may be.

 

 

1.3   Secondary Adjustment
under the income-tax Act [the Act] – Section 92CE

 

        India is considered as
one of the most aggressive Transfer Pricing (TP) jurisdictions in the world.
The scope of TP provisions in India is very wide compared to many countries and
the provisions are vigorously implemented resulting in huge adjustments,
demands and lot of litigations. A new provision called “Secondary Adjustment”
is introduced in the Indian TP regulations with insertion of section 92CE by
the Finance Act, 2017.

 

1.4   Meaning of the term
“Secondary Adjustment”

 

        Secondary adjustment,
as defined u/s. 92CE(3)(v), means “an adjustment in the books of accounts of
the assessee and its associated enterprise to reflect that the actual
allocation of profits between the assessee and its associated enterprise are
consistent with the transfer price determined as a result of primary
adjustment, thereby removing the imbalance between cash account and actual
profit of the assessee.”

 

         SA has been recognised
by the OECD and many other jurisdictions. As explained above, normally it may
take the form of characterisation of the excess money as constructive
dividends, constructive equity contributions or constructive loans. However,
section 92CE(2) considers such an adjustment as “deemed advance”.

 

1.5   Applicability of the
Provisions

 

         Section 92CE (1)
provides that in the following cases, the tax payer shall make a SA:

 

        where a primary
adjustment to transfer price (i) has been made suo motu by the assessee
in his return of income; (ii) made by the Assessing Officer has been accepted
by the assessee; (iii) is determined by an advance pricing agreement entered
into by the assessee u/s. 92CC; (iv) is made as per the safe harbour rules
framed u/s. 92CB; or (v) is arising as a result of resolution of an assessment
by way of the mutual agreement procedure under an agreement entered into u/s.
90 or section 90A for avoidance of double taxation.

 

         It is provided that
the SA provisions will take effect from 1st April, 2018 and will,
accordingly, apply in relation to the assessment year 2018-19 and subsequent
years.

 

         Proviso to section
92CE(1) further provides that provisions of SA would not apply in following
situations:

 

         If, the amount of
primary adjustment made in the case of an assessee in any previous year does
not exceed one crore rupees and the
primary adjustment is made in respect of an assessment year commencing on or
before 1st April, 2016 i.e. up to AY 2016-17.

 

1.6   Impact of the
Secondary Adjustment

 

         Section 92CE(2)
provides that “Where, as a result of primary adjustment to the transfer
price, there is an increase in the total income or reduction in the loss, as
the case may be, of the assessee, the excess money which is available
with its associated enterprise, if not repatriated to India within the time as
may be prescribed, shall be deemed to be an advance made by the assessee
to such associated enterprise and the interest on such advance, shall be
computed in such manner as may be prescribed.” (Emphasis supplied)

 

         Primary adjustment to
a transfer price has been defined u/s. 92CE(3)(iv) to mean the determination of
transfer price in accordance with the arm’s length principle resulting
in an increase in the total income or reduction in the loss, as the case may
be, of the assessee; (Emphasis supplied)

 

         “Excess Money” has
been defined u/s. 92CE(3)(iii) to mean the difference between the arm’s length
price determined in primary adjustment and the price at which the international
transaction has actually been undertaken.

 

 

1.7   Example

 

(i)   An Indian company “A” has
sold goods worth Rs. 10 crore to its overseas subsidiary “B”. The arm’s length
price is say Rs.15 crore.

(ii)  The primary adjustment is
made by the AO by applying arm’s length principle amounting to Rs. 5 crore
(15-10).

(iii)  Excess Money Rs. 5 crore.

(iv) “A” will have to debit the
account of “B” by Rs. 5 crore in its books of accounts.

(v)  “A” will have to receive
Rs. 5 crore from “B” within the prescribed time provided in Rule 10CB(1).

(vi) If “A” fails to receive
the sum, then Rs. 5 crore will be deemed advance from “A” to “B” and the
interest on such advance shall be computed in the manner to be prescribed in
Rule 10CB(2).

 

1.8   Time Limit for
repatriation of excess money [Rule 10CB(1)]

 

CBDT vide Notification No. 52 /2017 dated 15
June 2017 inserted Rule 10CB providing for Computation of interest income
pursuant to secondary adjustments.

 

Transfer pricing Adjustments-Situations

Time Limit of 90 days for repatriation of excess money

If assessee makes suo moto primary adjustment in ROI.

From the due date of filing ROI u/s. 139(1) of the Act i.e.
30th November.

If assessee enters in to an APA u/s. 92CD of the Act.

If assessee exercises option as Safe Harbour rules u/s 92CB
of the Act.

If agreement is made under MAP under DTAA u/s. 90 or 90A of
the Act.

If assessee accepts the primary adjustment made as per the
order of Assessing Officer (AO) / Appellate Authority.

From the date of order of AO/ Appellate Authority.

 

 

1.9   Rate of Interest for
computation of interest on excess money not repatriated within time limit [Rule
10CB(2)]

 

Denomination of International Transaction

Rate of Interest

INR

1 year Marginal Cost of Fund Lending Rate (MCLR) of SBI as on
1st April of relevant previous year + 325 basis point

Foreign currency

6-month London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR) as on 30th
September of relevant previous year + 300 basis point

 

 

The rate of interest is applicable on annual basis.

 

1.10 Analysis of section
92CE and Rule 10CB

 

a)   Extra territorial
application – The foreign AE cannot be compelled to accept SA. Even if they pay
up interest, the home jurisdiction may not allow deduction of such interest.
The taxpayer in India will pay tax on such interest but corresponding deduction
may not be available to AE in its home jurisdiction. To that extent there could
be economic double taxation.

b)   Taxpayer would be in a
precarious position if repatriation is not possible due to exchange control
regulation or some other difficulties in AE’s country.

c)   It appears that there may
not be any additional tax consequences in case interest on deemed advance is
not repatriated to India.

 

1.11 Non-Discrimination –
Domestic Law and Tax Treaty

 

      Whether the SA in
India may be challenged citing non-discrimination article in DTAA?

 

         Article 24(5) of UN
Model:

 

         “5. Enterprises of
a Contracting State, the capital of which is wholly or partly owned or
controlled, directly or indirectly, by one or more residents of the other
Contracting State, shall not be subjected in the first-mentioned State to any
taxation or any requirement connected therewith which is other or more
burdensome than the taxation and connected requirements to which other similar
enterprises of the first-mentioned State are or may be subjected.”

 

         In the light of
Article 24(5), it may be observed that this paragraph forbids a Contracting
State to give less favorable treatment in terms of taxation or any requirement
connected therewith to an enterprise owned or controlled by residents of the
other Contracting State.

         In India, there is no
provision for SA if an Indian company transacts with another Indian AE whereas
SA rule is applicable when an Indian company transacts with non-resident AE.

 

         This may tantamount to
discrimination as per non-discrimination provisions in DTAA.

 

         In this regard useful
reference could be made of the decision in case of Daimler Chrysler India
(P.) Ltd. vs. DCIT
[2009] 29 SOT 202 (Pune).

 

1.12 Probable Issues

 

         Several issues could
arise from the enactment of the above provisions. Some of them could be as
follows:

 

(i)    SA in respect of
Transfer Price determined under a Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP)

 

       Combined reading of the
section 92CE(1) and the definition of the “primary adjustment” suggest that SA
can be made only when the primary adjustment has been made in accordance
with the arm’s length principle.
However, in case of a MAP the price may
not be strictly determined based on arm’s length principles and may be a result
of negotiated price. In such a case, whether SA would sustain?

 

(ii)   Adjustment by AO

 

       Section 92CE(1)(ii)
provides for the SA where the assessee has accepted the primary adjustment made
by the AO. Thus, from the plain reading of the provision, it appears that if
the said adjustment is made by CIT(A), then provisions of SA may not be
applicable even if the assessee accepts the same. However, Rule 10CB(1)(ii)
provides that for the purposes of section 92CE(2), the time limit for
repatriation of excess money shall be on or before 90 days from the date of the
order of the AO or the appellate authority, as the case may be, if the primary
adjustments to the transfer price as determined in the aforesaid order has been
accepted by the assessee.

 

       Further, if the order is
passed by the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP) and accepted by the assessee, then
the SA would be applicable as in case of reference to DRP u/s. 144C, the
assessment is ultimately made by the AO only.

 

(iii)  Increased Litigation

 

       Section 92CE(1) lists
situations wherein the primary adjustment is accepted by the assessee. Thus,
acceptance of primary adjustment is a precondition for invoking provisions of
SA. Accordingly, till the time assessee has not exhausted his appellate
options, he cannot be compelled to accept primary adjustment and consequently
SA cannot be made.

 

       Another related issue
will be whether SA would apply with prospective effect i.e. from the date of
final judicial determination or will it apply with reference to the date of the
original assessment order.

 

       Hitherto, an assessee
could accept the primary adjustment by AO to buy the mental peace and avoid
long drawn litigation, but hence forth he will have to continue his fight to
avoid SA.

 

(iv)  Computation of threshold
of Rs. 1 Crore

 

       Proviso to section
92CE(1) provides that SA would not be applicable if, the amount of primary
adjustment
made in the case of an assessee in any previous year does
not exceed one crore rupees.

 

       It is not clear as to whether
this limit would be applicable to the aggregate of adjustments during a
previous year (qua previous year) or qua each transaction or
adjustment. To illustrate, if two adjustments are made each amounting to Rs. 65
lakh, then whether cumulative limit is to be considered or limit on a
standalone basis has to be considered. Also, it is not clear as to where the
primary adjustment in respect of one transaction is exceeding Rs. 1 crore and
the other is only for Rs. 10 lakh, whether the SA would be required for both
the transactions.

 

(v)   Exceptions to the SA

       Proviso to section 92CE
(1) reads as follows:

      Provided that nothing
contained in this section shall apply, if,– (i) the amount of primary
adjustment made in any previous year does not exceed one crore rupees; and
(ii) the primary adjustment is made in respect of an assessment year commencing
on or before the 1st day of April, 2016.”

 

       Use of the conjunction
“and” results in lot of confusion. The literal interpretation of the above
provision suggests that both the conditions need to be fulfilled to claim
exemption from SA. If that interpretation is adopted, then it would lead to
absurd results, such as SA would be required for each and every transaction
from AY 2016-17 (even for Re. 1 of the primary adjustment) and if the amount of
adjustment exceeds Rs. 1 crore then the SA would be required in respect of all
past transactions, may be from the start of the TP regulations.

 

       The logical
interpretation should be to read both the conditions/situations separately. One
should read “or” as a conjunction in place of “and”. This interpretation draws
strength from the Notes on Clauses to the Finance Bill, 2017 where both the
conditions are mentioned separately.

 

(vi)  Adjustment in the Books
of Accounts

 

       The definition of the SA
provides for an adjustment in the books of the assessee and it’s AE.

 

       The above provision
raises several issues:

 

       How can an Indian TP
regulation provide for adjustments in the books of an AE which is situated in
some other sovereign jurisdiction? Any such adjustment would render the books
and audit procedure of the AE questionable.

 

       It is also not provided
in which year’s books of accounts of the assessee such adjustments are to be
made, as by the time TP assessment is made the relevant year’s books must be
closed, audited and finalised. Thus, logically the adjustment has to be made in
the year of finalisation (acceptance) of the primary adjustment. Once assessee
makes SA, it may go against him as it will prove that the accounts of the year
in which the original transaction was effected was not recorded correctly and
therefore true and fair view of the accounts was impacted, (assuming the impact
of primary adjustment and SA are material). Transfer pricing is an art and not
an exact science and therefore to avoid such a situation it must be provided
that any such adjustment shall not affect the true and fair view of audited
accounts.

 

(vii) Transfer Pricing
Regulations in respect of SA

 

       A question may arise as
to whether the SA could be regarded as a fresh “international transaction” as
it would be deemed to be an advance. However, it would be too farfetched; the
SA is result of international transaction and cannot be cause in itself. If we
interpret it otherwise, then we go into a loop. Accordingly, other requirements
pertaining to reporting, documentation etc. should not apply. However, a
clarification to this effect is highly desirable.

 

(viii)          Computation of
Interest

 

       It is provided that the
excess money would be regarded as deemed advance and interest on such advance
shall be computed in the manner prescribed in Rule 10CB(2). However, from the
computation mechanism provided in Rule 10CB(2), it is not clear as to from
which date one needs to compute the interest. Ideally, it should not be from
the date of individual transaction, to avoid complexity in case of multiple
transactions. Logically, it should be from the expiry of the time limit within
which the excess money is required to be repatriated to India.

 

(ix)  Secondary Adjustment –
Double taxation

 

       The provision of SA is a
unilateral one. The other country may or may not agree to it. Even primary
adjustment results in double taxation, the SA would only compound the problem
and put assessee to undue hardships. Whereas each country has a sovereign right
to protect its tax base, bilateral or multilateral treaties could help reduce
the rigours of double taxation.

(x)   Repatriation of amount of
SA

 

       Section 92CE(2) provides
that the excess money owing to SA must be repatriated to India within the
prescribed time period provided in Rule 10CB(1). However, where the SA is made
between an Indian PE of a foreign company and its subsidiary in India, then the
conditions of repatriation would be difficult to comply, unless the Head Office
of the PE remits the amount of SA on behalf of its Indian PE.

 

(xi)  Implications of SA under
FEMA

 

       Section 92CE(2) provides
that the excess money to be considered as deemed advance by an Indian
entity/company to its foreign AE. As per FEMA, an Indian entity can lend money
to its foreign AE only upon fulfilling certain conditions and subject to limits
and compliance procedure. Passing an entry in the books of account without
proper compliances could result in FEMA violations.

 

(xii) Deemed dividends u/s
2(22)(e) of the Act

       Section 2(22)(e) of the
Act provides that payment by way of loan or advance by a company to a specified
shareholder (where the company is holding more than 10% of the voting power) or
to any concern in which he has a substantial interest shall be regarded as
deemed dividend.

 

       A question arises as to
whether deemed advance due to SAs u/s. 92CE would be regarded as deemed
dividend u/s. 2(22)(e) in the event AE satisfies the conditions of requisite
shareholding or is considered as an interested concern?

 

       Two views are possible
in this case:

 

       According to one view,
once a sum is considered as an “advance” all logical consequences under the Act
would follow and accordingly it ought be regarded as advance for the purposes
of section 2(22)(e).

 

       The other and more
plausible view is that section 2(22)(e) should not apply in such a situation
for various reasons. One of the important reason could be that the section
2(22)(e) refers to “any payment by a company….., of any sum… made.. by way of
advance…” and hence the emphasis on actual payment and not
deemed/constructive payment. Since advance arising out of SA are on deemed
basis, such deemed advance cannot be regarded as deemed dividends u/s. 2(22)(e)
of the Act.

 

(xiii)   Other issues

 

a)   Presently, there is no
specific provision to levy any penalty for non-compliances of SA.

b)   Multiple transactions with
multiple AEs – How does an Indian entity allocate the amount of overall / lump
sum primary adjustment arising out of various transactions with many AEs in
order to comply the provisions of SA ?

c)   Whether revised book
profit as a result of recording of SA will be subject to MAT, and if so, in
which year?

d)   The AE may not be in a
position to repatriate the amount of SA because (a) it is incurring losses; or
(b) the country where it is located prohibits such remittance under its
exchange control regulations; or (c) the AE ceases to be AE before the SA is
made; or (d) the AE is not financially sound to repatriate the excess money.
Thus, if repatriation is not possible due to any of the foregoing reasons, will
the impact of SA be perpetual, is not clear.

e)   Whether taxpayer can write
off this advance if it is not recoverable and claim deduction of write off as
there is no express provision to disallow such write off?

f)    It is not clear whether taxpayer will be allowed to set off the amount
of deemed advance against the amount of loan to be repaid to its AE.

g)   Foreign Tax Credit [FTC]:
Issues regarding FTC may arise as to (a) will FTC be available in India if
foreign withholding tax applies on repatriation of deemed advance to India; (b)
If yes, at what rate will such FTC be given; or (c) What would be the nature of
such receipts i.e. if the jurisdiction of the foreign AE treats the payment as
a dividend and accordingly applies withholding tax and will India still grant
FTC, in such cases?

h)   Whether interest on deemed
advance chargeable to tax even if AE declines to accept this as its liability?

i)    Whether SA needs to be
made in relation to deemed international transaction u/s. 92B(2)?

j)    A further question may
arise as to whether SA of interest as recorded in the books of taxpayer will be
considered for the purpose of disallowance u/s. 94B.

 

         For a satisfactory
resolution of the above issues, one hopes that the CBDT would issue the
necessary clarifications at the earliest to avoid cumbersome/repetitive / time
consuming and costly litigation which is already clogging the overburdened
judiciary.

 

1.13 Conclusion

 

         It is true that the
concept of SA is prevalent in many developed jurisdictions. In that sense,
introduction of SAs rules in Indian transfer pricing regime is in conformity
with international practice. However, considering the level of maturity of
transfer pricing regime in India, it is debatable whether this is right time to
introduce SA rules in India. Indian revenue authorities are still striving to
cope up with many contentious issues arising out of transfer pricing disputes.
In the midst of such melee, introducing another dimension of transfer pricing
appears to be a pre-mature act. Debate may arise over whether SAs are
appropriate in the current global arena, where they are not consistently
applied and where various countries take different views on corresponding or
correlative relief. Provisions of SA are complex in nature and would result in
lot of hardships and increased litigation.

 

         Further, in view of
various issues and complications, as discussed above, we wonder whether it
would not have been better if India also had adopted the deemed dividend
approach as adopted by many advanced tax jurisdictions rather than the deemed
loan approach, to obviate most of the probable issues arising due to the deemed
‘advance’ approach. _

Action 13 – The Game Changer In Transfer Pricing Documentation

Backdrop – What is BEPS?
Base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) refers to tax avoidance strategies that exploit gaps and mismatches in tax rules to artificially shift profits to low or no-tax locations. Under the inclusive framework, over 100 countries and jurisdictions are collaborating to implement the BEPS measures and tackle BEPS.
 
The OECD/G20 BEPS Project, set out 15 Action Plans along three key pillars: introducing coherence in the domestic rules that affect cross-border activities, reinforcing substance requirements in the existing international standards, and improving transparency as well as certainty.
 
These action plans will equip governments with domestic and international instruments to address tax avoidance, reduce double taxation and ensure that profits are taxed where economic activities generating the profits are performed and where value is created.
 
Action plan 13 – Transfer Pricing documentation and Country by Country Reporting

With the advent of globalisation, the integration of national economies and markets has increased substantially in recent years, putting a strain on the international tax rules which were designed more than a century ago. In this world of globalisation, companies can do significant tax planning through transfer pricing which may create opportunities for base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS).
 
The OECD introduced Action Plan 13 to enhance transparency for tax administration among various countries. These rules will provide all relevant governments with needed information on their global allocation of the income, economic activity and taxes paid among countries according to a common template and ensure that profits are taxed where economic activities take place and value is created.
The Action Plan 13 has laid down a three-tiered standardised approach to transfer pricing documentation.
 
I.Country-by-Country Report (CbC)1
 
    Large Multinational enterprises (MNEs) are required to file a Country-by-Country Report that will provide annually and for each tax jurisdiction in which they do business the amount of revenue, profit before income tax and income tax paid and accrued. It also requires MNEs to report their number of employees, stated capital, retained earnings and tangible assets in each tax jurisdiction. Finally, it requires MNEs to identify each entity within the group doing business in a particular tax jurisdiction and to provide an indication of the business activities each entity engages in.
 
II.Master File (MF)
 
    The guidance on transfer pricing documentation requires multinational enterprises (MNEs) to provide tax administrations with high-level information regarding their global business operations and transfer pricing policies in a “master file” that is to be available to all relevant tax administrations.
 
III.  Local File (LF)
 
A detailed transactional transfer pricing documentation has to be provided in a “local file” specific to each country, identifying material related party transactions, the amounts involved in those transactions, and the company’s analysis of the transfer pricing determinations they have made with regard to those transactions.
______________________________________________________________________
1 Refer section 286 of Indian Income tax Act, 1961 read with Rule 10DB
 
 
Country-by-Country Reports are to be filed in the jurisdiction of tax residence of the ultimate parent entity. These reports can be shared between jurisdictions through automatic exchange of information, pursuant to government-to-government mechanisms such as the multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, bilateral tax treaties or tax information exchange agreements (TIEAs). The Master file and the Local file have to be filed by MNEs directly to local tax administrations and should be compliant with local MF and LF regulations.
 
Taken together, these three documents will require taxpayers to articulate consistent transfer pricing positions and will provide tax administrations with useful information. This information will enable the tax authorities to gauge whether companies have used transfer pricing as means for profit shifting into low tax jurisdictions.
 
Action Plan 13 – India Perspective

On May 5, 2016, India introduced the concepts of Country-by-Country (“CbC”) reporting requirement and the concept of Master File in the Indian Income Tax Act, 1961 (“the Act”) through Finance Act 2016, effective from 1st April 2016.  The Central Board of Direct Taxes (“CBDT”) on 31st October 2017 released the final rules on CbC reporting and Master File requirements in India (vide notification no. 92/2017).
 
I.Country-by-Country Report (CbC)
 
The Country-by-Country Report requires aggregate tax jurisdiction-wide information relating to the global allocation of the income, the taxes paid, and certain indicators of the location of economic activity among tax jurisdictions in which the MNE group operates. The report also requires a listing of all the Constituent Entities for which financial information is reported, including the tax jurisdiction of incorporation, where different from the tax jurisdiction of residence, as well as the nature of the main business activities carried out by that Constituent Entity. The format of the CbC report (Form No. 3CEAD available on department’s website) is aligned with the BEPS.
 
MNEs with annual consolidated group revenue equal to or exceeding INR 55,000 million (threshold of EUR 750 million as per OECD) are required to file the CbC. The due date for filing the CbC report in India continues to be the due date for filing the income-tax return i.e. 30 November following the financial year. However, for FY 2016-17, the due date is extended to 31st March 2018 (as per the CBDT Circular 26/2017 released on 25th October 2017).
 
The Country-by-Country Report will be helpful for high-level transfer pricing risk assessment purposes. It may also be used by tax administrations in evaluating other BEPS related risks and where appropriate for economic and statistical analysis.
 
CbC Notification – Further, every Indian constituent entity of an MNE headquartered outside India is required to file the CbC report notification in the prescribed format i.e. Form No. 3CEAC (available on department’s website). The CbC report notification is required to be filed atleast two months prior to the due date for filing the CbC report, that is aligned to the due date for filing the income-tax return of the Indian constituent entity. As mentioned above, the due date for filing the CbC report for FY 2016-17 has been extended to 31st March 2018 and accordingly, the due date for the first CbC report notification for FY 2016-17 has also been extended to 31st January 2018. However for subsequent years, the due date of filing the notification will be 30th September.
 
II.Master file
 
The Master file is a document which provides an overview of the MNE group business, including the nature of its global business operations, its overall transfer pricing policies, and its global allocation of income and economic activity in order to assist tax administrations in evaluating the presence of significant transfer pricing risk. In general, the master file is intended to provide a high-level overview in order to place the MNE group’s transferpricing practices in their global economic, legal, financial and tax context. The information in the master file provides a “blueprint” of the MNE groupand contains relevant information that can be grouped in five categories:
 
1.the group’s organisational structure;
2.a description of the group’s business;
3.the group’s intangibles;
4.the intercompany financial activities of the group; and
5.the financial and tax positions of the group.
 
The CBDT has prescribed that Master File has to be prepared as per the format given in Form 3CEAA (available on department’s website). The form comprises of two Parts i.e. Part A and Part B.
 
Part A of Master File – Part A comprises of basic information relating to the MNE and the constituent entities of the MNE operating in India (such as name, permanent account number and address). Part A of the Master File will be required to be filed by every constituent entity of an MNE, without applicability of any threshold;
 
Part B of Master File – Part B comprises of the main Master File information that provides a high level overview of the MNE’s global business operations and transfer pricing policies. Every constituent entity of an MNE that meets the following threshold will be required to file Part B of Master File:
 
-the consolidated group revenue for the accounting year exceeds INR 5,000 million; and
-for the accounting year, the aggregate value of international transactions exceeds INR 500 million, or aggregate value of intangible property related international transactions exceeds INR 100 million..
 
The Master File information required to be submitted as per Rule 10 DA of the Income tax Rules, 1962, is largely consistent with BEPS Action 13 requirements. However, few additional data requirements have been incorporated under Rule 10DA of the Income Tax Rules, 1962, requiring MNE to customise their Master File for India. The below table summarises the requirement as per OECD and Indian rules:
The Master File has to be furnished by the due date of filing the income-tax return i.e. 30th November following the financial year. However, for financial year 2016-17 (“FY 2016-17”), the due date is extended to 31st March 2018. MNEs with multiple constituent entities in India can designate one Indian constituent entity to file the Master File in India, provided an intimation to this effect is made in Form No. 3CEAB (available on department’s website), 30 days prior to the due date for filing the Master File in India i.e. March 1, 2018.
 
III.Local file

In contrast to the master file, which provides a high-level overview of the MNE group, the local file provides detailed pertaining to the intercompany transactions of the local entity. The local file supplements the master file and helps to meet the objective of assuring that the taxpayer has complied with the arm’s length principle in its material transfer pricing positions.
 
In India, the local file has to be maintained as prescribed under section 92D read with Rule 10 D of the Income Tax Act, 1961. No other specific requirements are prescribed for local file.
 
Practical Considerations

The CBDT has prescribed detailed rules on CbC reporting and Master File requirements in India however there are various aspects of the rules which will have practical considerations while implementing these rules. The ensuing paragraphs deal with some considerations that may come up while implementing the said rules.

 

Master
file
requirement

Summary
of OECD BEPS Requirement

Additional
requirements as per Indian final rules

Organization
structure

Chart illustrating
IG’s legal and ownership structure and
 geographical location of operating
entities

Address
of all entities of the IG (draft rules had earlier only prescribed details
of all operating entities)

Description
of IG’s business

    Description of important drivers of
business profit

    Description of supply chain for the
specified category of products

    Functional analysis of the principal
contributors to value creation

    Description of important business
restructuring transactions,

     acquisitions and divestments during the
reporting year

Functions,
assets and risk analysis of entities contributing at least 10% of the IG’s
revenue OR assets OR profits

IG’s
intangible property

    IG’s strategy for ownership, development
and exploitation of intangibles

    List of important intangibles with
ownership

    Important agreements and corresponding
transfer pricing policies in relation to R&D and intangibles

    Names and addresses of all entities of the
IG engaged in development and management of intangible property

    Addresses of entities legally owning
important intangible property and entities involved in important transfers of     interest in intangible property

IG’s

intercompany

financial
activities

 

    Description of how the IG is financed,
induding identification of important financing arrangements with unrelated
lenders

    Identification of entities performing
central financing

     function including their place of
operation and effective
management

    Names and addresses of top ten unrelated
lenders

    Names and addresses of entities providing
central financing functions including their place of  operation and effective management

 

Reporting year for CbC report: The requirement to file the CbC report is applicable to an MNE having consolidated group revenue exceeding the prescribed threshold in the immediately preceding financial year. Which means for Indian constituent entities of a foreign MNE where the ultimate parent entity has calendar year end i.e. 31st December, the CbC report is applicable for FY 2016-17 only if the prescribed consolidated group revenue threshold is exceeded for year ended 31st December 2016. In case of Indian constituent entities of an MNE headquartered in India where the ultimate parent entity has financial year end i.e. 31st March, the CbC report is applicable for FY 2016-17 only if the prescribed consolidated group revenue threshold is exceeded for year ended 31st March 2017.
 
Accounting year that should be considered in case of CbC and Master File:The accounting year for CbC would be an annual accounting period, with respect to which the parent entity of the international group prepares its financial statements. However where a foreign MNE appoints an alternate reporting entity resident in India the CbC report would be required to be prepared and filed in India for the accounting year followed by the alternate reporting entity resident in India i.e. the previous year (April to March).
 
Permanent establishment (PE): It is important to note that an Indian permanent establishment (PE) of a foreign MNEwill be said to be a “constituent entity resident in Indiafor the purpose of section 286 and Rule 10DB. Therefore, an Indian PE of a foreign entity should be treated as a constituent entity resident in India.
-Filing of CbC notification on behalf of other Indian Constituent entity: Where an MNE has more than one constituent entity in India, the rules currently do not prescribe to designate one constituent entity to file the CbC notification on behalf of other Indian Constituent entity. Therefore every constituent entity will have to file the CbC notification separately in Form 3CEAC.
 
Filing of Part A of the Master File: Where there are more than one constituent entity in India, the designated entity can file the Part A of the Master File on behalf of its constituent entities.
 
Threshold for filing the Part B of Master File:The Master file will be prepared for the group for the accounting year followed by the parent entity and therefore, the prescribed threshold for applicability of Part B of Master file should be determined based on the accounting year followed by the parent entity of the group. Accordingly, the threshold for determination of the consolidated group revenue and the aggregate value of international transactions ought to be considered using the period followed by the foreign parent as the Master File is being prepared for that period.
 
Penalties

The below table details the penalties in case of Non Compliance with the CbC and Master File requirements:

Sr. No

Particulars

Default

Penalty

CbC report

INR

Euro

1.

Non-furnishing of CbC report by Indian parent or the alternate
reporting entity resident in India

Each day upto a month from due date

5,000 per day

65 per day

Beyond a month from due date

15,000 per day

200 per day

Continuing default beyond service of penalty order

50,000 per day

665 per day

2.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

3.

Non-submission of information

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Provision of inaccurate information in CbC report

Beyond expiry of the period for furnishing information

5,000 per day

65 per day

Continuing default beyond service of penalty order

50,000 per day from date of service of penalty order

665 per day from date of service of penalty order

Knowledge of inaccuracy at time of furnishing the report but
fails to inform the prescribed authority

 

 

 

 

 

500,000

 

 

 

 

 

6650

Inaccuracy discovered after filing and fails to inform and
furnish correct report within fifteen days of such discovery

Furnishing of inaccurate information or document in response to
notice issued

Master File

1.

Non-furnishing of information and documentation

Failure to furnish the information and document to the
prescribed authority

500,000

6650

Conclusion

The below table summarises the various forms and deadlines for CbC and Master File Compliance

Particulars

Form No

Applicability as per Rules

Indian Timelines for
Compliance

Cbc Report

Form 3CEAD

Consolidated revenue >
INR 55,000 million

First Year – 31 March 2018

Subsequent Year – 30
November

CbC report notification

Form 3CEAC

Indian constituent entities
of MNE Group

First Year – 31 January 2018

Subsequent Year – 30
September

Filing of the Master File

Form 3CEAA

Part A : Every Constituent
Entity of MNE having international / specified domestic transaction 

First Year – 31 March 2018

Subsequent Year – 30
November

Part B : Every Constituent
Entity of MNE meeting the prescribed threshold

Intimation of designated Indian
Constituent entity of a IG for filing Master File

Form 3CEAB

Indian Headquartered and
Foreign MNEs required to file Master File and having multiple constituent
entities resident in India

First Year – 1 March 2018

Subsequent Year – 31 October

Local Transfer Pricing Study
Report

As per section 92D read with
Rule 10D

Every Constituent Entity of
IG having international / specified domestic transaction 

01-Nov-30

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Heading Towards Global Best Practices – Section 94b

On the auspicious day of Vasant Panchami, when Finance Minister Arun Jaitley rose to give the Budget speech for 2017-18, he reaffirmed the government’s intent to make India stand out as a bright spot in the world economic landscape and to ensure that India aligns with best global tax practices.
 
Among several tax amendments, he addressed the issue of thin capitalisation, thereby introducing section 94B to the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’). The intent to introduce this section on thin capitalisation is discussed in the forthcoming paragraphs along with the key issues surrounding this amendment.
 
Limiting deduction of interest paid to Associated Enterprises
Interest expenditure in books of Indian taxpayers is a deductible expenditure u/s. 36(1)(iii) of the Act. Thus, claiming interest expenditure makes debt a more preferable option for taxpayers over equity, by helping them reduce their taxable profits. However, in the past few years, several cases have been identified where cash rich companies have borrowed funds, often from their overseas counterparts, with an intent to shift profits to a low/ no tax jurisdiction.
 
India had no thin-capitalisation rules in place prior to the introduction of Section 94B. Thus, there have been judgements, such as that in case of DIT vs. Besix Kier Dabhol SA {[2012] 26 taxmann.com 169 (Bom)}, wherein the Honourable Bombay High Court has allowed interest expenses to the taxpayer, on the ground that there are no thin capitalisation rules in place under the law. It is pertinent to note here, that in the case at hand, the debt to equity ratio was as typically and astronomically high as 248:1.
 
Further, in line with the recommendations of OECD BEPS Action Plan 4, it has been provided that when any Indian company, or the Permanent Establishment (PE) of a foreign company in India, being the borrower, incurs any expenditure in form of interest (or of similar nature) of INR One crore or more to its Associated Enterprises (AEs), the same shall be restricted to 30% of its earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) or the interest paid or payable to AE, whichever is less.
 
Further, the debt shall be deemed to be treated as issued by an AE, where the related party provides an implicit or explicit guarantee to the lender or deposits a corresponding and matching amount of funds with the lender.
 
In other words, the restriction is applicable where interest or similar consideration incurred to a non-resident AE lender, exceeds INR 1 crore. The excess interest is defined to mean:
 
–    Total interest paid or payable in excess of 30% of EBITDA; or
–    Interest paid or payable to an AE, whichever is less.
 
Such disallowed interest expenditure shall be carried forward up to eight assessment years immediately succeeding the assessment year for which the disallowance is first made. The deduction in the subsequent assessment year is allowed from ‘business income, subject to same restrictions as stated above. Further, this provision is not applicable to entities engaged in the business of banking and insurance. It is also interesting to note here, that the newly inserted section does not harmoniously limit the withholding tax liability or taxability of the AE on such interest income earned.
 
While break-downing section 94B, following inferences can be drawn:

Parameters

Applicability

Payer

    Indian company, other than banking or
insurance company; or

    PE of a foreign company

Payee

– 
Non-resident
Associated Enterprise; or

 

–     Third party lender to whom Non-resident Associated
Enterprise has provided a guarantee or provided matching funds

Amount
of Interest

    Excess of INR 10 million in a particular
financial year

Nature
of Interest

    Deductible expenditure against income
taxable under the head ‘profits and gains from business or profession’

Global Best Practices
Section 94B is yet another attempt by India to assert its strong support to being an active participant in the OECD Action Plans for combating Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS). BEPS Action Plan 4 speaks about limiting base erosion via interest deductions and other financial payments and is primarily designed to limit the deductibility of interest and other economically equivalent payments made to related parties as well as third parties.
 
Some pertinent similarities and deviations between Action Plan 4 and section 94B are tabulated below:
 

Highlights

Particulars

Applicability to Action Plan
4

Applicability to section 94B

Gross/ Net

Whether Gross or Net
interest can be claimed

AP 4 prescribes thin
capitalisation rules to apply to net interest

Section 94B prescribes thin
capitalisation rules to apply to net interest

Fixed Ratio Rule

Prescribing/ Setting a limit
on amount that the taxpayer can claim as deduction in a certain year

10% to 30% of EBITDA

30% of EBITDA

Recipient of Interest

Prescribing disallowance
based on the recipient of interest

AP 4 prescribes disallowance
of net interest irrespective of whether the recipient of such interest is a
group entity or an independent third party

Section 94B prescribes
disallowance on the payment of interest to AEs, beyond the prescribed ceiling

Group Ratio Rule

Prescribing/ setting a limit
on amount that the group can claim as deduction in a certain year

Recommended in AP 4

No mention in Indian
provisions

Carry Forward

Disallowed interest or the
unused interest capacity allowed to be used in subsequent years

Recommended in AP 4

Disallowed interest expense
permitted to be carried forward up to 8 assessment years immediately
succeeding the assessment year for which the disallowance is first made

Carry Back

Disallowed interest or the
unused interest capacity allowed to be used in past years

Recommended in AP 4

No mention of carry back in
Indian provisions

De minimis threshold

Prescribing applicability of
provisions only to apply to transactions above the set limit

Recommended in AP 4; no
prescribed number

Threshold of INR 10
million          (1 crore) prescribed

Definition of Interest

Section 2(28A) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 versus A  4

    Includes interest
payable in any manner in respect of moneys borrowed or debt incurred
(including deposit, claim or other similar right or obligation);

 

–      Includes
any services fee or other charge in respect of moneys borrowed;

 

–      Includes
debt incurred in respect of any credit facility that has not been utilised

Section 2(28A) defines
interest as interest payable in any manner in respect of any moneys borrowed
or debt incurred (including a deposit, claim or other similar right or
obligation) and includes any service fee or other charge in respect of the
moneys borrowed or debt incurred or in respect of any credit facility which
has not been utilised

 
Key Issues/Queries Surrounding Section 94B
 
1.    EBITDA as per tax or as per financial statements?
    EBITDA is neither defined in the Companies Act, 2013, nor in the Income-tax Act, 1961. There is also no clarification in the section whether such item be adopted at the time of disallowance of any interest and whether EBITDA can be used as the base number or based on tax computation.
 
    Action Plan 4 recommends basis of EBITDA as per Tax rules. The idea is that by linking interest deductions to taxable earnings would mean that it is more difficult for a group to increase the limit on net interest deductions without also increasing the level of taxable income in a country. However, the Income-tax Act does not recognise any term as EBITDA or gross total income, causing ambiguity. In such a scenario and in absence of clarity, it would be a better approach to rely on EBITDA as per books of accounts.
 
2.    Double taxation on the interest income element:
    BEPS Action Plan 4 suggests implementation of such thin capitalisation norms in cases where net interest exceeds a prescribed percentage of EBITDA. As against that, Section 94B mentions interest payments (gross payments). While provisions of Section 94B are simpler to implement (since it does not warrant detailed analysis of interest income that can be set off against relevant interest payment), to such extent, it implies enforcing double taxation at the group level. For example, in case an interest payment of India to the UK AE is partially disallowed u/s. 94B in India, to the extent of such partial disallowance, UK would still bear the tax on such interest income.
 
    Unless a specific provision is introduced in tax treaties/the Multilateral instruments signed by various countries, this shall remain an open issue. In absence of requisite clarifications, taxpayers may have to resort to dispute resolution mechanisms to eliminate double taxation.
 
3.    Deemed debt scenarios:
    The first proviso to section 94B(1) speaks of deeming fiction being triggered even in case of an implicit guarantee by an AE. However, the term implicit guarantee has not been defined anywhere in the Act. Also, no such reference is provided in BEPS Action Plan 4. It is therefore a matter of concern as to how the Revenue may evaluate the presence or otherwise of an implicit guarantee from an AE, with an underlying third party debt, especially in cases  when the AE is the parent of the Indian taxpayer.
 
    Assuming a scenario where the tax authorities may allege that an implicit guarantee exists only because a certain Indian company is subsidiary of an MNC, seems too farfetched. In such cases, the onus should be on the tax authorities to justify, with adequate supporting, that an implicit guarantee exists, based on actual arrangement/conduct of the parties involved.
 
4.    Corresponding and matching amount of funds:
    Proviso to Section 94B(1) suggests that debt shall be deemed to have been issued by an AE even where debt is issued by a third party lender but an AE deposits a corresponding and matching amount of funds with the lender. What is not well defined here is where the amount deposited by the AE ought to be equivalent to the amount of debt or a percentage thereof. For example, in a case where the base debt is INR 1 crore, but the amount deposited is INR 80 lakh, will proviso to section 94B(1) be triggered in such a case? Alternatively, would the answer be any different if the deposit was merely INR 5 lakh?
 
    The intent of the law here does not seem to be to cover only those cases where the guarantee is exactly corresponding to the debt involved.  In fact, imposing the criteria of matching funds would leave taxpayers with immense opportunity to immorally avoid any implication of section 94B on their transaction. Hence, keeping the intent of law in mind, it may be understood that corresponding and matching funds is not a mandate in such a case.
 
5.    Will only funds trigger the applicability of the proviso?
    Proviso to section 94B(1) suggests that debt shall be deemed to have been issued by an AE even where debt is issued by a third party lender, but an AE deposits a corresponding and matching amount with the lender. While reading the section, there appears no clarity in a case where the AE offers a collateral to the third party lender in any form other than funds. For example, in case the AE offers an asset as collateral which is not in the form of money/ funds, will proviso to section 94B(1) apply in such a case?
 
    Similar to the point above, the purpose of the law shall be defeated if restricted to only those cases where funds are maintained as collateral. The intent of the law may be read as any form of guarantee extended by an AE, for the applicability of this section to be imposed.
 
6.    Impact of Ind AS on reading of section 94B

    Ind As places focus on substance and contractual arrangement of financial instruments over its mere legal form. Accordingly, redeemable preference shares which were treated as shareholder capital under IGAAP shall be treated as debt under Ind AS since it encompasses all features of debt (i.e. fixed and determined payout; specified maturity date etc.). Also, dividend paid on redeemable preference shares shall be treated as interest in the books of accounts as per Ind AS, as against being treated as dividend as per IGAAP.
 
    One pertinent thing to note here is, whether change in characterisation of dividend as interest under Ind AS would have any direct impact on the interest as per section 94B. While there is no direct clarity on the topic at this stage, it is important to read the same in light of Circular 24 of 2017 (dated 25th July 2017), which clarifies that such dividend on redeemable preference shares, while may be considered as interest as per Ind AS, shall continue to be treated as interest for the purposes of MAT computation. Taxpayers may draw an analogy here that similar impact is to be given when it comes to computation of tax as per normal provisions.
 
In all the above cases, it would be helpful to receive clarification or objective guidelines from the CBDT, to avoid multiple cases of controversy and litigation, and to bring peace and clarity in the minds of taxpayers. _
 

Sale In Course Of Import Vis-À-Vis Works Contract

Introduction

Under VAT era, one of the
important Constitutional exemptions was for sale in course of import. A sale
transaction taking place in course of import could not be taxed as per Article
286 of the Constitution of India. The transaction in course of import was
defined in section 5(2) of CST Act, 1956, which reads as under:

 

““S.5. When is a sale or
purchase of goods said to take place in the course of import or export –

 

(1) —-

(2) A sale or purchase of
goods shall be deemed to take place in the course of the import of the goods
into the territory of India only if the sale or purchase either occasions such
import or is effected by a transfer of documents of title to the goods before
the goods have crossed the customs frontiers of India……..”

 

It can be seen that there
are two limbs to the above section. First, sale occasioning import, and second,
sale by transfer of documents of title to goods before goods Crosses Customs
Frontiers of India. Many a time dispute arises about first limb, as to what is
its scope. There are a number of pronouncements. However, the recent one
decided by Hon. M.S.T. Tribunal in case of Larsen and Toubro Ltd. – Scomi
Engineering, BHD (VAT App.No.353 of 2015 dated 30.10.2017)
can be analysed
to see the scope of said exemption.

 

Facts of the case

Hon. Tribunal has noted
facts as under:

 

“The factual background of
this appeal can be stated as below – Appellant, M/s.Larsen and Toubro Ltd. –
Scomi Engineering, Berhad (“LTSEB” for the sake of brevity), Consortium is a
registered dealer under the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002 (“MVAT Act”
for short) and under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (“CST Act” for short)
bearing Registration No.27870728473V and 27870728473C respectively. The Mumbai
Metropolitan Regional Development Authority invited pre-qualification
applications from entities interested for the design, development,
construction, commissioning, operation and maintenance of Monorail System on
turnkey basis in Mumbai Metropolitan Region. Since the project involved civil
work as well as manufacture of goods of rolling stock, designing etc.
and since Larsen and Toubro Ltd. is having expertise in civil work and Scomy
Engineering, Berhad (based in Malaysia) has expertise in manufacture of goods,
designing, installing etc., both of them jointly submitted an
application for qualifying to bid in response to the said request of MMRDA.
Thereafter, MMRDA issued a request for proposal inviting bids for the design,
development, construction and maintenance of Monorail System. Accordingly, the
consortium of Larsen and Toubro Ltd. and SEB submitted its response and
submitted a proposal for manufacture and import amongst others of rolling stock
from Malaysia. The joint bid was accepted by MMRDA by a letter of acceptance
dated 07/11/2008. Accordingly, a contract was executed between MMRDA on one
part and consortium of Larsen and Toubro Ltd. and SEB on the other part on
09/01/2009. By this contract, MMRDA awarded to LTSEB a contract for planning,
designing, development, construction, manufacture, supply of Monorail System
from Sant Gadge Maharaj Chowk to Wadala and from Wadala to Chembur Station.
Larsen and Toubro and SEB thereafter divided their respective scope of work in
accordance with the bid submitted by them and a contract was executed between
two members of the consortium LTSE and SEB on 29/03/2010. In this contract, the
portion of the work related to SEB was recorded for the design and supply of
certain goods i.e. rolling stock, signaling equipment, switch equipment and
deco equipment from outside India. These goods were manufactured by SEB in
Malaysia in terms of the bid submitted by MMRDA. The appellant LTSE – SEB had
filed an application for determination of disputed question to the Commissioner
of Sales Tax. By this application, the following question was referred to the
Commissioner for determination – “Whether the rolling stocks imported pursuant
to the contract with MMRDA and supplied in the course of execution of Monorail
Project constitutes a transaction in the course of import u/s. 5(2) of the CST
Act, 1956 and not liable to tax u/s.8(1) of the MVAT Act, 2002?”

 

3. After giving elaborate
hearing to both sides, the Commissioner of Sales Tax answered this question in
the negative holding that the import of rolling stocks and supplied to MMRDA in
the course of execution of Monorail Project does not constitute a transaction
in the course of import u/s. 5(2) of the CST Act and it is a local sale liable
to tax under the provisions of the MVAT Act. Being aggrieved by the order of
determination of disputed question, the appellant consortiums have approached
the Tribunal in appeal.”

 

Submission of appellant

The main submission on
behalf of appellant was that the transaction of import was integrated with
local works contract transaction.

 

For throwing light on same
various factors of transaction were explained like, specifications for
manufacture, imported goods not useable elsewhere and meant only for given
contract with MMRDA and other clauses in contract about inspection/testing etc.
were pointed out.

Based on above facts it was
submitted that either it is one direct import transaction between appellant and
MMRDA or even if they are considered to be two sales one between Scomy
Engineering, Berhad (based in Malaysia) and Consortium and other between
consortium and MMRDA, still the second transaction is exempt as it is the sale
which has occasioned import and hence exempt. Reliance was place on Hon.
Supreme Court judgment in case of K. G. Khosala (17 STC 473)(SC) and ABB Ltd.
(55 VST 1)(Delhi).

 

Submission of Department

On behalf of Sales Tax
Department, it was argued that no privity of contract has been made out. There
are two sales and the local sale cannot fall under section 5(2). Reliance was
placed in case of K. Gopinathan Nair and others vs. State of Kerala (97
STC 189)(SC)
.
The manufacturing as per specification was disputed on
ground that only requirements were stated by MMRDA and specification are given
subsequently, which cannot satisfy condition of inextricable link. Judgement in
ABB Ltd. was tried to be distinguished on above facts.   

 

Tribunal’s Observations

The Tribunal thereafter
analysed the agreements. The Tribunal found that the specifications are
mentioned in contract with manufacturing place at Malaysia. About the nature of
consortium existence and inextricable link, the Tribunal observed as under:

 

“20. The issue as to
whether a nexus appears in the contract between MMRDA and movement of goods
from Scomi Engineering, Malaysia. One has to read the terms of the contract as
a whole. It has been argued before us by the learned Senior Counsel Shri.
Sridharan that the Larsen and Toubro and Scomi Engineering formed a consortium
which is neither partnership firm nor a company and nor an association of
persons. It is an unincorporated consortium. It can be seen that unincorporated
consortium cannot be a legal entity in the eyes of law. Scomi Engineering,
which is one of the members of the consortium is itself a manufacturer and
supplier of rolling stock from Malaysia. This suggests that though consortium
members are executing the contract jointly, they have separate existence. If
the contract is perused, on page 140 of the compilation containing contract
agreement, it is mentioned in para A.1.1 that Larsen and Toubro Ltd. is India’s
largest engineering and construction conglomerate with additional interest in
electrical, electronics, etc. Whereas in the same para, it is also
mentioned that Scomi Engineering, Berhad (SEB) is a public limited company
listed on the Kuala lampur Stock Exchange. His business focus is in the energy
and logistic engineering which comprises OCTG machine shops and transportation engineering
such as monorail, buses and special purpose vehicle. It is further mentioned
that wholly owned subsidiary Scomi Rail, Berhad is renowned for its monorail
system. These recitals in the contract show that Larsen and Toubro and Scomi
though formed a consortium, they were specialised in two separate fields and
each had shared execution of that part of work in which each was specialised.
On page 70 of the contract, work share apportionment between consortium members
is demarcated. It shows that 30% of the project value of rolling stock will be
shared exclusively by Scomi Engineering. Similarly, 8% of the project value of
E & M work will be shared exclusively by Larsen and Toubro. It shows that
rolling stock is the responsibility of SEB whereas automatic fair collection
system is the responsibility of Larsen and Toubro. Thus, the contract shows
that the consortium members will operate in two separate fields, one with
engineering work and the other with manufacturing, designing and maintenance of
rolling stock. In the present case, Scomi Engineering, Berhad, Malaysia which
supplied rolling stocks is one of the members of the consortium and therefore
the question naturally arises as to whether the person can sell goods to
himself. Moreover, the parties are covered by the contract between MMRDA and
consortium and therefore we have to look into the terms and conditions of the
said contract to examine as to whether the movement of goods from Malaysia was
in pursuance of the contract between consortium and MMRDA. The terms clearly
show that the contract was executed by MMRDA with full understanding that Scomi
Engineering, Malaysia is one of the members of the consortium which is expert
and skilled in designing and manufacturing of rolling stock and the rolling stock
will be manufactured in Malaysia and will be supplied to MMRDA. Therefore,
there is merit in the argument of Shri. S. Sridharan that merely because
rolling stocks are first sent to Nhava Sheva port and they are delivered to
consortium and then consortium delivered the same to MMRDA, inextricable link
is not broken down.”

 

The Tribunal observed about
various judgments cited before it. The Tribunal also referred to various other
documents filed before it. About application of judgment cited by Sales Tax Department,
the Tribunal observed as under:

 

“38.  Since Shri Sonpal has argued that the
principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of K. Gopinathan
Nair are not fulfilled in the present case, we have perused the said authority.
The main principles laid down in that case are that a sale or purchase can be
treated to be in the course of import if there is a direct privity of contract
between the Indian importer and the foreign exporter and the intermediary
through which such import is effected merely acts as an agent or a contractor
for and on behalf of the Indian importer. Thus, it is also laid down that there
must be either a single sale which itself causes the import or is in the
progress or process of import or though there may appear to be two sale
transactions they are so integrally interconnected that they almost resemble
one transaction. If these tests are considered and the present contract is
seen, it must be seen from the documents filed by appellant that though there
was no express condition in the covenant that rolling stock should be imported
from Malaysia, such understanding between the parties can be inferred since
Scomi Engineering, BHD is one of the Member of the consortium and in the
document of contract, it is mentioned that Scomi Engineering has all the
manufacturing unit in Malaysia. Section 5(2) of the CST Act requires that
movement of the goods from foreign country should be in pursuance of the
contract. From the terms of the contract, it appears that the intended movement
of goods from Malaysia was envisaged by terms of the contract and it was within
the contemplation of the parties and therefore it can be reasonably presumed
that such movement was to fulfill the terms of the contract. When it is so, it
has to be said that the goods moved from Malaysia as a part of single
transaction. Even if for the sake of argument, it is held that there are two
transactions of sale between MMRDA and consortium and the other between Scomi
Engineering, BHD Malaysia and consortium, then also the two transactions are so
connected integrally that they are inseparable. Therefore, we are not inclined
to accept the argument of Shri. Sonpal that conditions laid down in K.
Gopinathan Nair’s case are not satisfied in this case.”

 

Observing as above, the
Tribunal concurred with appellant that the sale is in course of import covered
by section 5(2) of CST Act. 

 

Conclusion     

The nature of sale in
course of import, more particularly when the facts are complex and there is no
express condition of import, is very delicate and required to be decided based
on judgments. The above judgment will be one more important judgment to throw
light on the subject and provide necessary guidance to trade and authorities. _

 

SEZs Under GST Regime

Introduction

A business dealing with foreign customers,
whether or not exclusively, is required to compete with various foreign
competitors who may be operating in more favourable environment in their own
countries. In order to boost such businesses, who intend to pre-dominantly
engage in export activities, India had adopted a model of Special Economic Zone
(SEZ) to provide level playing field to exporters located in SEZs. Being a unit
located in SEZ or being a developer has its’ own advantages with exemptions
under both direct (income tax) as well as indirect tax laws (Service tax, Sales
tax, Central Excise, etc. upto 30th June 2017 and Goods &
Service Tax (GST) w.e.f 1st July 2017). This article primarily
analyses the impact of SEZ operations under the GST regime.

 

Background to SEZ Legislation

The law relating to SEZ is governed by the provisions
of the Special Economic Zones Act, 2005 and various rules, notifications and
circulars issued thereunder. The person who is developing the SEZ is known as
SEZ developer and businesses operating from within the SEZ are known as SEZ
Units. There are elaborate conditions and processes which need to be followed
by both, SEZ developer as well as SEZ unit for getting approvals to set-up/
operate from a SEZ / as an SEZ unit.

 

On the indirect tax background, two
important provisions of the law are Sections 51 & 52. Section 51 of the Act
provides that the provisions of the SEZ Act shall have an overriding effect
over inconsistent provisions contained under other laws while Section 52 of the
Act provides that a SEZ is deemed to be a territory outside the customs
territory of India for the purposes of undertaking the authorized operations.

 

Brief Overview of the Provisions specifically
relating to SEZ under the GST Law

    Section 7 of the Integrated Goods &
Service Tax Act, 2017 (IGST Act) deals with the provision relating to
determination of nature of supply, i.e., whether a supply is to be treated as
interstate or intrastate. Clause (b) of sub-section (5) thereof provides that
supply of goods or services or both “to or by” a Special Economic Zone
developer or a Unit shall be deemed to be a supply in the course of
inter-state trade or commerce.
This specific provision results in a uniform
treatment to supplies to SEZ / by SEZ Units across the country.

 

   Having declared all supplies to/ by an SEZ
Unit as interstate supplies, Section 16 (1) of the IGST Act provides that a
supply of goods / services or both, to a SEZ unit or developer shall be treated
as a “zero-rated supply”. It may be important to note that only supplies
to SEZ Unit/developers are treated as zero rated supplies and not supplies by
SEZ Unit/developers.

 

  Further, Section 16(3) provides that a
person making a zero-rated supply shall be eligible to claim refund under two
options, namely:

 

Outright exemption by
applying for a Letter of Undertaking or Bond and subsequently claim refund of
unutilised input tax credit in terms of provisions of section 54 of the Central
Goods & Service Tax Act, 2017 (CGST Act).

  Rebate option, wherein the
supplier shall discharge the liability on the value of zero rated supply by
utilising balance from electronic credit ledger / cash ledger and claiming
refund thereof of the entire amount of tax paid.

 

  Rule 89 of the CGST Rules, 2017 lays down
various conditions for claiming of refund by suppliers making supply to a SEZ
developer / unit (under either of the above options). Second proviso to Rule 89
(1) requires the supplier to file refund application only after:

   In case of supply of
goods, the goods have been admitted in full in the SEZ for the “authorised
operations” as endorsed by the specified officer of the Zone.

    In case of supply of
services, obtaining evidence regarding the receipt of services for authorised
operations as endorsed by the specified officer of the Zone.

 

    Proviso to section 25 (2) of the CGST Act
provides that a person having multiple business verticals in a State / Union
Territory may apply for separate registration for each business vertical.
However, for SEZs, rule 8 of the CGST Rules, 2017 provides that a unit of a
person located in an SEZ shall be deemed to be a different vertical from the
units located in DTA and mandates the need for separate registration.

 

Some Issues

 

1.   Whether Place of Supply is
relevant in case of supplies made to SEZ unit / developer?

 

  The charging section under the IGST Act
provides that the tax shall be levied on all inter-state supplies of goods or
services or both. Similarly, the charging section under the Central / State GST
Act provides for levy of tax on all intra-state supplies of goods or services or
both.

 

  What shall be treated to be inter-state or
intra-state supply is dealt with under sections 7 & 8 of the IGST Act,
2017. The general crux of the said section is that if the location of supplier
and place of supply are in same state, the transaction has to be treated as
intra-state, else it will be treated as inter-state supply. How to determine
the place of supply is also covered under Chapter V of the IGST Act.

 

   However, there are certain cases where a
deeming fiction has been introduced to treat certain transactions as
inter-state supplies. For instance, supplies in the course of import of goods /
services are deemed to be inter-state supplies u/s. 7 (2) and 7 (4)
respectively. Likewise, the supplies made to or by an SEZ developer / unit are   also  
treated   to   be an inter-state supply u/s. 7 (5) (b).

 

The question that actually arises is whether
the place of supply needs to be determined in all cases where a transaction is
entered into with / by a unit in SEZ? Let us try to understand this with the
help of the following example:

 

     ABC Limited is a SEZ
Unit. They organize a convention in a hotel located in DTA. ABC Limited has
intimated the hotel that they being an SEZ, the supply is to be treated as
inter-state supply and no tax should be charged on them on account of zero
rating u/s. 16. However, the hotel contends that in terms of provision of
section 7 (3) r.w. Section 12 (3), the location of supplier and Place of Supply
is the same, i.e., the hotel and hence the transaction is to be treated as
intra-state and CGST plus SGST will be applicable. They also claim that GST
being a consumption driven tax and consumption having taken place within the
DTA, tax is applicable.

 

    There are two aspects which need  consideration here:

 

    Whether section 7 (3) –
which deals with determination of nature of supply in case of services and is a
general provision shall prevail over a specific provision, i.e., section 7 (5)
(b) which creates a legal fiction by deeming all supplies by or to a SEZ unit /
developer as inter-state?

    Whether the nature of
supply is to be determined basis the “person”, i.e., SEZ Developer / unit or
the actual location where the consumption takes place?

 

    In legal jurisprudence, in the context of
Monopolies & Restrictive Trade Practice Act, 1969, the Supreme Court in the
case of Voltas Limited vs. Union of India [AIR (1995) SC 1881] concluded
that an agreement falling within any of the clauses (a) to (l) will be held to
be an agreement relating to restrictive trade practice because of the legal
fiction and it will be immaterial to consider whether it falls within the
definition of restrictive trade practice in section 2 (o). No exception can be
taken against this view.

 

   In similar context, if a supply is made to /
by a SEZ developer / unit, it will have to be classified u/s. 7 (5) (b) and not
section 7 (1) or section 7 (3). In fact, this can also be a basis to say that
the provisions relating to determination of place of supply covered under
Chapter V of the IGST Act are not applicable to supplies by / to SEZ as they
merely aid in determining the place of supply, which is one factor for
determining whether a transaction is interstate or intrastate. Cases where the
main section itself treats a transaction to be either interstate or intrastate
shall need no reference to the provisions relating to place of supply.

 

    Another aspect to bear in mind is that while
the general provisions u/s. 7(1) and section 7(3) are subject to sections 10
& 12 dealing with the place of supply provisions, section 7(5), which interalia
deals with supplies to or by SEZ is not subject to the provisions of
sections 10 & 12 lending further support to the contention that the place
of supply provisions are irrelevant for such supplies. 

 

    To answer the second sub-question relating
to consumption within the SEZ Area, one important distinction that needs to be
brought out is that section 7 (5) (b) is person centric and not consumption
centric, i.e., the section says supplies “to or by a SEZ developer / unit
located in SEZ” and not “in and from a SEZ developer / unit located in SEZ”.
This distinction is essential, because even for general cases for determination
of place of supply in case of services, more relevance is given to the location
of the person and not the location where the services are actually consumed.
For instance, in case of a person providing event management service to a
company located in Mumbai for the event to be held in Delhi, the place of
supply, which needs to be determined basis the location of such person (refer
section 12 (2) (a)) shall be Mumbai and not Delhi, though the services might
have actually been provided in Delhi. In similar context, even in case of SEZ
Developer / Unit, so long as the services are provided to a SEZ developer/
Unit,
the location from where the services are provided may not be
relevant.

 

    In this context, there is one more scenario
which needs consideration here. Let us take an example of a person in DTA
supplying services to a domestic client but the consumption of the service
takes place in a SEZ, for example subcontracting of services. The supplier of
service has obtained an LUT for making such zero-rated supplies. However, the
question that arises is whether this supply shall be treated as zero-rated
supply considering the fact that the supply is not made to a SEZ developer /
unit but to a contractor who in turn renders services to the SEZ Developer/unit
for consumption by a SEZ developer / unit, admittedly in SEZ Area? It can be
said that this transaction shall perhaps be covered by section 7 (1) / 7 (3)
and not 7 (5) (b). This is because while the supply is consumed in SEZ, the
same is not made to a SEZ Developer / Unit. The supply is made to a person in
DTA and hence, the Place of Supply will have to be determined as per the
provisions of Chapter V of the IGST Act. However, it cannot be said that the
said person has made a supply to SEZ developer/ unit and should be eligible for
zero rating.

 

   To summarise, it can be concluded that:

 

    In case of supplies made
to a SEZ developer / unit, the transaction always has to be treated as
inter-state supplies and the provisions relating to Chapter V of the IGST Act
are not applicable.

    It is the actual supply to
SEZ developer / unit which is relevant and not the place of consumption. There
might be a case where the supply might have been consumed in the DTA, but the
supply is made to SEZ developer / Unit in which case provisions of section 7
(5) (b) shall continue to apply and the transaction shall be treated as zero
rated supply.

 

2.   Whether the provisions
relating to Reverse Charge are applicable on supplies received by a SEZ
developer / unit?

 

    The GST law provides for two specific
instances where Reverse Charge Mechanism shall apply, one being the cases where
supply of specified goods / services is notified to be covered under reverse
charge and second being the case where the supply of goods / services, which
are other wise taxable but no tax is levied on account of the supplier being
unregistered.

 

   At the outset, it should be noted that a
SEZ developer / unit receiving inward supplies (other than those on which
reverse charge is applicable) from registered person are liable to tax subject
to LUT/ Bond. In that context, there is no reason for no tax on inward supplies
on which reverse charge is applicable. Infact, when such supplies are received
from registered suppliers, they can opt to execute LUT / Bond and state so in
their invoice, in which case, the zero rating continues to apply for the SEZ
developer/ unit as well and no tax shall be applicable.

 

    The notified reverse charge, which is in
effect today is applicable on domestic services as well as import of services.
However, the important question that arise is as per the provision of the SEZ
Act, SEZ is deemed to be outside the customs territory of India. Therefore, the
question that arise is whether the reverse charge provisions can be made
applicable to the SEZ?


    In this regard, reference can be drawn to
the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Torrent Energy Limited
vs. State of Gujarat in Special Civil Application 14856 of 2010 decided on
16.04.2014. The facts of the said case were that the Appellants had a power
generation unit in a SEZ. Section 21 of the Gujarat SEZ Act provided for total
exemption from payment of various state taxes to the units situated in SEZ
area. However, vide a subsequent amendment to the VAT Act by introduction of
Section 5A and amendment to Section 9, a liability was created on SEZ units to
pay tax on purchase of zero rated goods used for purposes specified in Section
9 (5). In this case, the Hon’ble High Court found that the levy was not
sustainable on the grounds that any contrary intention emerging from any other
State fiscal statute would not limit the scope of the non-obstante clause when
no overriding effect is given to the provisions under the VAT Act, which were
enacted much after the SEZ Act.

 

    In this context, one can say that under
the GST law, by merely not giving an exclusion to the SEZ in the definition of
India in itself cannot make the non-obstante clause ineffective and the
provisions of the SEZ Act providing that the SEZ shall be deemed to be a unit
located outside the customs territory of India shall continue to prevail.
However, such a view may be subject to litigation at the ground level. Further,
it is important to note that the above matter is currently pending before the
Supreme Court and hence, the matter is yet to attain finality.

 

   However, a conservative view may always be
taken appreciating the fact that a person making zero rated outward supplies is
eligible for refund of accumulated input tax credit. In such a case, the onus
to discharge tax liability on the SEZ shall be as under:

 

Nature of Supply

Tax Position

Import of Services by a SEZ Unit or Developer for authorized
operations

Exempted as per Notification 18/2017 (Integrated Tax – Rate)

Procurement of goods or services notified to be liable under
RCM from registered dealer

No tax since zero rating continues in cases where the vendor
has obtained LUT

Procurement of goods or services notified to be liable under
RCM from unregistered dealer

IGST payable under RCM

Procurement of goods or services (other than notified) from
unregistered dealer

Since the operation of this provision is currently suspended,
no tax payable

 

 

3.   What are the conditions
for claiming refund of tax paid / accumulated input tax credit on supplies to
SEZ developer / unit?

 

    Section 54 of the CGST Act provides for
refund of accumulated input tax credit on account of zero rated supplies made
or taxes paid on zero rated supplies. The section further provides that the
application for refund shall be accompanied by such documentary evidences as
may be prescribed.

 

    The said documentary evidences required for
filing the refund claim have been prescribed in Rule 89 of the CGST Rules,
2017. Second proviso thereof provides that refund shall be granted only if the
supplies made are used for the authorised
operations
of the SEZ Developer / Unit. However, it is important to
note that there is no such requirement under the Act which provides that the
refund shall be allowed for zero rated supplies made. There is no provision under
the CGST Act which provides for any conditions / power to prescribe conditions
for the claim of refund for zero rated supplies, specifically supplies to SEZ
Developer /unit made. Therefore, the question that arises is whether the
provisions of Rule 89 are ultravires to the provisions of the Act or
not?

 

    However, before proceeding further, it is
also important to understand the need for answering the said question. There
can be two kinds of suppliers making supply to SEZ, one being a person
exclusively / pre-dominantly supplying to SEZ resulting in accumulated credit
and the other being a case where a person is pre-dominantly supplying in DTA
with some supplies to SEZ resulting in accumulated credits being adjusted
against liabilities on account of other supplies.

 

    In the first case, this aspect will be
important because not all supplies received by a SEZ Developer/ Unit may be
categorised as being received for authorised operations. For instance, an SEZ
unit, supplying software consultancy services, may be receiving supply from a
canteen operator which the proper officer may not certify as being used for
authorized operations & in such case, even if the supplier has opted for
LUT, he will not be able to claim refund of accumulated credits.

 

    In this context, to decide whether the Rule
89 is ultravires to the Act or not, one can refer to the provisions of
the Supreme Court decision in the case of Indian National Shipowners
Association vs. Union of India
[2010 (017) STR 0J57 (SC)]. The issue in the
said case was the validity of the provisions of reverse charge mechanism on
import of services for the period upto 18.04.2006 where the liability was
created by Rule 2(1)(d)(iv) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 without
corresponding provisions in the Finance Act, 1994. The Court confirmed by the
Bombay High Court ruling [2009 (013) STR 0235 (Bom.)] which held that the Rules
were ultravires to the provision of the Act by holding as under:

 

… Before enactment of section 66A it is
apparent that there was no authority vested by law in the Respondents to levy
service tax on a person who is resident in India, but who receives services
outside India. In that case till section 66A was enacted a person liable was
the one who rendered the services. In other words, it is only after enactment
of section 66A that taxable services received from abroad by a person belonging
to India are taxed in the hands of the Indian residents. In such cases, the Indian
recipient of the taxable services is deemed to be a service provider. Before
enactment of section 66A, there was no such provision in the Act and therefore,
the Respondents had no authority to levy service tax on the members of the
Petitioners-association.

 

21. In the result, therefore, the
petition succeeds and is allowed. Respondents are restrained from levying
service tax from the members of the Petitioners-association for the period from
1-3-2002 till 17-4-2006, in relation to the services received by the vessels
and ships of the members of the Petitioners-association outside India, from
persons who are non-residents of India and are from outside India.

 

    In similar context, till the time provisions
of section 54 are amended empowering the imposition of conditions for grant of
refund, Rule 89 should be treated as ultravires to the provisions of
section 54 and shall have no effect.

4.   How shall supplies by SEZ
to DTA be treated?

 

   While SEZs are formed with specific goal to
promote exports and units within the SEZ are required to achieve specified
export targets, there can be instances when supplies may be made to customers.
Let us try to analyse such scenarios with the help of following examples:

 

Example
relating to supply of goods by an SEZ to a unit located in DTA

 

ABC Limited is a trader and has imported
goods in its’ warehouse in Free Trade Warehousing Zone, which is located within
the SEZ in Gujarat, i.e., the goods have not crossed the customs frontier and
the Bill of Entry for Home Consumption is not filed. ABC Limited has a customer
in DTA in Gujarat willing to buy the said goods. Following issues arise in this
transaction for ABC Limited:

 

a. Will ABC Limited be required to
discharge GST on its’ sale invoice to the customer or customer will discharge
the IGST at the time of filing Bill of Entry for Home Consumption at the time
of removal of goods from the SEZ?

 

b. Whether the supply is to be treated as
intra-state considering that both the location of supplier and place of supply
are in same state?

 

    To answer the above question, let us first
refer to the proviso to section 5 (1), which is the charging section for the
levy of IGST, and provides that the integrated tax on goods imported
into India shall be levied and collected in accordance with the provisions of
section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act 1975 at the point when the duties of
customs are levied as per section 12 of the Customs Act, 1962. Further,
reference to section 7 (2) also becomes necessary which provides that the
supply of goods imported into the territory of India till they cross the
customs frontiers of India shall be treated to be a supply in the course of
inter-state trade or commerce.

 

   What is meant by “imported goods”, while not
defined in IGST Act, is defined under the Customs Act, 1962 as any goods
brought into India from a place outside India but does not include goods which
have been cleared for home consumption”.

 

    In the above example, since the goods are
being sold from the FTWZ itself, which is a bonded warehouse, in other words, a
customs area under a bill of entry for warehousing, i.e., before the goods have
been cleared for home consumption, they are imported goods. In view of section
7 (2), the supply will have to be treated as interstate supply and in view of
proviso to section 5 (1), since the goods are imported goods, there shall be no
levy under the charging section of IGST Act and tax will have to be levied
under the Customs Act only. Further, it is provided that the Bill of Entry for
Home Consumption can be filed either by the buyer in the DTA or the SEZ unit
(on authorization from the buyer) (Refer Rule 22 of Special Economic Zone
(Customs Procedure) Regulations, 2003.

 

    However, it is important to note that the
Central Board of Excise & Customs has given a contrary view in Circular
46/2017 dated 24.11.2017 wherein it has been clarified that the supply of the
nature stated in the above example squarely falls within the definition of
“supply” as per section 7 of the CGST Act and shall be liable to IGST in view
of section 7 (2) treating such supplies as interstate supplies.

 

    However, the above notification clearly
appears to be issued without considering the specific provisions of section 5
(1) clearly keeping the taxability of imported goods outside the purview of
IGST Act and imposing the levy under the Customs Act, 1962 and hence, appears
to be erroneous. Further, the proposition suggested in the Circular hints at
double taxation, as at the time of removal of goods from the SEZ, a Bill of
Entry shall also be required to be filed which will create a tax liability on
the party filing the document as well as the unit within the SEZ shall also be
required to charge IGST on its’ invoice.

 

    Section 7 (5) (b) clearly states that
supplies by SEZ are to be treated as interstate supplies and hence, if at all
ABC Limited decides to file the Bill of Entry with the authorities (after
obtaining the necessary authorisations), the applicable tax shall be IGST by
treating the transaction as an interstate supply.

 

 

   So far as supply of services by SEZ to DTA
is concerned, the same would be a taxable inter-state supply irrespective of
whether the customer is in the same state or not on account of the deeming
fiction under the law.

 

5.   Specific aspects of
dealing with / being a SEZ Developer/ Unit

 

   Dealing with SEZ developer / Unit, it has to
be noted that the supply being made to the SEZ developer / unit is never to be
questioned at the time of application of LUT. For instance, the jurisdictional
officer of the supplier cannot deny the grant of LUT on grounds that since the
supply is of a goods/ service on which credit would not have been eligible had
the zero rating not been prescribed.

 

  Registering for GST as SEZ Developer / Unit
– at the time of obtaining registration, care should be taken to ensure that
the fact the person registering is a SEZ developer/ unit is being selected in
the portal as this is expected to have its’ own challenges. For instance, if a
SEZ developer / unit is not registered as such on the portal, it will face a
peculiar situation where it would have charged IGST on all its DTA supplies
(even where the customer is in same state) but the portal will not allow the
same while filing GSTR 1 since the supplier is not registered as SEZ. This will
also impact the credit claim of the customer resulting in disputes. Similarly,
on inward side as well, all the vendors would have charged IGST but while
filing their GSTR 1, they may not be able to select IGST (of course, this
specific issue is not identified since filing of GSTR 2 has been postponed for
the time being).

 

Conclusions

While the
intention of the law is to ensure that the maximum benefits flow to the SEZ
developer / units to promote exports, the manner in which the provisions have
been drafted has increased the scope of probable tax litigation. While the law
is now in place for more than six months, there is sufficient time for business
in SEZ or dealing with SEZ to take correct tax positions to avoid future pains
!!!
 _

GST on Re-Development Of Society Building, SRA And JDA – Part I

The levy of Goods and Service Tax on land development, re-development of housing society buildings and slum rehabilitation is a contentious issue though these activities were already subject  to the levy of service tax and VAT in the pre-GST regime.
 
In this article implications of GST on the builders / developers, a co-operative housing society (society), its members, landlords, tenants and unauthorised occupants (viz. slum dwellers on encroached land) are discussed.  The most important issue is that whether there is any change under GST regime from the earlier service tax regime. In the opinion of the writers, there is a qualitative and substantive change. Under service tax, , immovable property was outside the scope by way of definition of ‘activity’. The term ‘activity’ was of wider and unrestricted implication. However, in case of GST, a ‘supply’ is liable to tax only if made in the course or in furtherance of business. This has resulted in interesting debate and complexities.
 
GST on re-development of society building
Let us say, a Co-operative Housing Society registered under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 and its members (for the sake of brevity, the society and members are collectively referred to as ‘SM’) decide to redevelop the existing building which is in dilapidated condition and is required to be re-developed as per prevailing Development Control Regulations [DCR]. In case of re-development of the dilapidated building, the municipal regulations in Maharashtra presently allow approx. 3:1 FSI instead of 1:1 which is allowed under normal circumstance.
 
The key contents that are incorporated in the Development Agreement with the developer (DA) are discussed below:
 
SM shall allow the developer to reconstruct building by demolishing the existing one with some additional area, may be by way of constructing additional floors. The developer shall do so by employing his funds and at his attendant cost and risk. To avail the benefit of extra construction is permitted under DCR, the developer is required to purchase necessary Transferable Development Right (TDR) from permissible sources. As per the terms of DA, the developer may be required to construct some extra area for the existing members which is to be given to them free of cost to incentivise the project.
 
Out of the total constructed area after utilising full potentiality of FSI and TDR, the remaining area after allotment to the existing members as warranted by DA belongs to developers which is known as “Developer’s free sale portion” and he can sell it at his discretion and price. SM undertakes to enrol and register the purchasers of such free sale portion as the members of the society upon fulfilment of necessary formalities. The newly enrolled members are entitled to the same rights as of existing members and also have undivided share in the title of the land in the similar manner.
 
In addition to re-development, the developer shall pay to SM cash consideration in form of corpus fund, hardship allowance, rent for alternate accommodation till permanent alternate accommodation is granted in the new building, brokerage, shifting allowance etc.
 
In the above background, we will examine the incidence of GST from the point of view of:
a.The society and its members
b.The developer
 
Taxability of development right in the hands of SM

The issue here is that the SM is supplying development right to the developer to re-develop the building, putting up extra area / floor by using permissible FSI, TDR etc. in return for newly constructed flats with some additional area free of cost and some cash consideration mentioned above in terms of DA. Under GST law, SM may not be liable to tax for the following reasons:
 
Supply not in the course or furtherance of business:
 
For the purpose of determining the liability under GST, it is necessary to look into Charging Section 91  according to which central goods and services tax is leviable on all intra-State supplies of goods or services or both. Thus, ‘supply of goods or services or both’ is the vital element for charge of tax.  Section 7 (a) defining ‘supply’ require that the supply for a consideration by a person should be in the course or in furtherance of business.
 
“S.7 – For the purposes of this Act, the expression “supply” includes––
 
all forms of supply of goods or services or both such as sale, transfer, barter, exchange, license, rental, lease or disposal made or agreed to be made for a consideration by a person in the course or furtherance of business”.
 
Definition of ‘goods’ as per S. 2(52) is as follows:
 
“goods means every kind of movable property other than money and securities but includes actionable claim, growing crops, grass and things attached to or forming part of the land which are agreed to be severed before supply or under a contract of supply”.
 
Thus, goods do not include immovable property. Development right is an immovable property.
 
Definition of ‘service’ u/s. 2(102)
 
“services” means anything other than goods, money and securities but includes activities relating to the use of money or its conversion by cash or by any other mode, from one form, currency or denomination, to another form, currency or denomination for which a separate consideration is charged.

As per the above definition, everything other than goods, money and securities is service. However, the moot issue is whether an immovable property can be said to be a ‘service’. This is a contentious issue as right in land, viz. development right is a benefit arising from land is “immovable property”. This will be discussed little later, since the discussion centres right now on the treatment of immovable property under GST.
 
“Supply of goods or service or both” for the purpose of levy of GST u/s. 7,  has to be in the course or furtherance of business. The society and / or members cannot be said to be in the business of grant of development right, whether the re-development of a society building is undertaken by virtue of compulsion on account of dilapidated condition or not. A society or its members cannot be said to be involved in supply of development right to the developer in the course or in furtherance of business by entering into development agreement. By agreeing to get a new flat in lieu of the old flat, the members of society have not made any supply.  
 
Land and right / benefit in land outside the scope of GST – Sch. III of CGST Act, Transfer of  undivided right in land from the existing members to the new purchasers:
 
Various judgements of the Supreme Court and High Courts on the principle of mutuality and examination of the provisions of Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 and bye-laws of a Co-operative Societies made thereunder that the rights of a member in a co-operative housing society are a  bundle of rights including the right of possession, right to transfer and right to let-out the flats allotted to him etc., etc.
 
In Ramesh Himmatlal Shah vs. Harsukh Jadhavji Joshi, (1975) 2 SCC 105, the Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to clause 47(1)(b) of Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 and observed that a flat in a multi-storeyed building would naturally have a corresponding right over the undivided proportionate share of the land on which the building stands and that a member of the society has interest in the property belonging to the society. In the words of the Hon’ble Apex Court:
 
“We may now turn to the relevant Rules. By Rule 9 “when a society has been registered the Bye-laws of the society as approved and registered by the Registrar shall be the Bye-laws of the society”. Rule 10 contains classification and sub-classification of societies and we are concerned with the fifth class mentioned therein, namely, the “Housing Society” which again is sub-divided into three categories and we are concerned in this appeal with the second category, namely, “Tenant Co-partnership Housing Society”, which is described therein as an example of “Housing Societies which hold both lands and buildings either on leasehold or freehold basis and allot them to their members”.
 
In Gayatri De vs. Mousumi Coop. Housing Society Ltd., (2004) 5 SCC 90, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that in the event of death of a member of a housing society, the heirs of the deceased person would inherit the flat with proportionate interest in the land. For this, the Supreme Court examined the provisions of West Bengal Cooperative Society Act, 1983, and observed as under:
 
“Section 87 of the Act deals with a member’s right of ownership and sub-section (3) of the said section makes it abundantly clear that a plot of land or a house or an apartment in a multi storied building shall constitute a heritable and transferable immovable property within the meaning of any law for the time being in force provided that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, such heritable and transferable immovable property shall not be partitioned or subdivided for any purpose whatsoever”.
 
When a person purchases a flat and incidentally becomes a member of the society, the right, title, interest over the flat is not merely a right to occupy it. It is specie of property, which can be sold. Once a member completes the procedure, the society has no option but to recognising the incoming member as the owner of the flat. The Supreme Court in the case of Hill Properties Ltd. vs. Union Bank of India, (2014) 1 SCC 635, observed as under:
 
“So far as a builder is concerned, the flat-owner should pay the price of the flat. So far as the society or company in which the flat-owner is a member, he is bound by the laws or articles of association of the company, but the species of his right over the flat is exclusively that of his. That right is always transferable and heritable”.
 
In this context, it is required to examine Sch. III of CGST Act which denotes the activities or the transactions that shall be treated neither as a supply of goods or nor supply of services –
 
“Sale of land and, subject to clause (b) of paragraph 5 of Schedule II, sale of building”.
 
In case of re-development of society building, the developer is given right to construct additional area and to sell the same to the purchasers by purchasing TDR from open market. The undivided ownership right in the land of the existing members is thus curtailed and the same is being transferred to the developer for further commercial exploitation including recouping the cost of re-construction of the existing building. Transfer of ownership right in land is out of the scope of “supply” as per Sch. III to the CGST Act.
 
Development right – a right in land being an immovable property whether outside the scope of GST?
 
The expression “land” and “building” in Schedule III includes even right in land / building.  It is relevant to note Entry 18 of List II of Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. It reads as “Land, that is to say, rights in or over land, land tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant, and the collection of rents; transfer and alienation of agricultural land; land improvement and agricultural loans; colonization”.  Therefore, reference to land includes even rights in land.  
 
Relying on the Hon’ble Supreme Court decision in Santosh Jayaswal vs. State of M.P., (1995) 6 SCC 520, in Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 5 SCC 24 : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) explaining the meaning of the expression, “benefits to arise out of land”, perusal of Bombay High Court’s decision in case of Chheda Housing Development Corporation vs. Bibijan Shaikh Farid,  (2007) 3 Mah LJ 402  and  other relevant decisions of the Apex courts and High Courts and various provisions of  Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act 1966 read with section 3 of Transfer of Property Act defining immovable property  indicates the artificial manner in which the development rights are carved out from the land.  Further, sections 17(1) and 2(16) of The Registration Act r.w. S.2(16) of Indian Stamp Act  also establish that development rights are right in immovable property.
 
The expression, “immovable property” has not been defined under the GST law.  Therefore, it would be relevant to note the definition of “immovable property” under the following laws:
 
Section 3(26) of the General Clauses Act, 1897:

Definitions:
 
In this Act, and in all Central Acts and regulations made after the commencement of this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context-
 
(26) “immovable property” shall include land, benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth, or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth;
 
Section 2(ja) of the Maharashtra Stamp Act:
 
In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,-
 
(ja) “immovable property” includes land, benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth, or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth;
 
Section 2(6) of the Registration Act, 1908:
 
In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context-
 
(6)”immovable property” includes land, buildings, hereditary allowances, rights to ways, lights, ferries, fisheries or any other benefit to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything which is attached to the earth, but not standing timber, growing crops nor grass;”
 
A perusal of the above definitions indicates that they are more or less similar.  Thus, immovable property includes interalia benefit arising out of land and things attached to the earth or permanently attached to the earth.
 
It is relevant to note the following extract wherein the expression “benefits to arise out of land” is explained:  
 
Extract from commentary on The Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (TP Act) by Sir. Dinshaw Fardunji Mulla [11th Edition – 2013]”
 
“The definition of ‘immovable property’ in S.3(26) of the General Clauses Act is not exhaustive”.
 
“Immovable property shall include land, benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth, or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth”.
 
“The TP Act defines the phrase ‘attached to the earth, but gives no definition of immovable property beyond excluding standing timber, growing crops and grass.  These are no doubt excluded because they are only useful as timber, corn and fodder after they are severed from the land.  Before they are so severed, they pass on transfer of the land under S. 8 as things attached to the earth”.
 
“A ‘benefit to arise out of land’ is an interest in land and, therefore, immovable property.  The Registration Act, however, expressly includes as immovable property benefits arising out of land, hereditary allowances, rights of way, lights, ferries and fisheries”.
 
“From a combined reading of the definition of ‘immovable property’ in S. 3 of the TP Act and S. 3(5) of the General Clauses Act, it is evident that in an immovable property, there is neither mobility, nor marketability as understood in excise law”.
……
 
The definition of immovable property in the General Clauses Act, TP Act and other laws and judgements cited above have dealt with benefit and right in land. In the absence of a specific definition under GST law, general definition must prevail.
 
Consequently, Development Right being the benefit arising from the land, must be held to be immovable property and outside the scope of GST.
 
Therefore, in view of the specific provision of treating sale of land and sale of building as neither supply of service nor as supply of sale would not make the sale of land / building liable for GST as there is no charge in the first place.  Similarly, the absence of reference to right in land / building in serial no. 5 of Schedule III cannot deem the presence of a charge of GST.  The satisfaction of levy should be arrived at dehors the entries in Schedule III.
 
Whether the amounts paid by developer to SM in terms of DA like hardship allowance, rent, shifting allowance, contribution to the corpus of the society, brokerage and such other amounts as agreed upon can be treated as ‘consideration’ in the hands of SM so as to attract the levy of GST?
 
The consideration flowing from a developer to the SM, in whatever form, is not against any taxable supply. All payments from the developer to the SM is flowing out from DA. Appointing developer to re-develop the existing building is not a taxable supply as we have discussed earlier. The developer makes payment to the members of society in satisfaction of the obligation to the society and its members.  Viewed in this manner, the allotment of a new flat, the payment of compensation being rent for alternate accommodation and hardship allowance is also governed by the principle of mutuality.  Payment of corpus fund to the society by the developer is also in satisfaction of the obligation flowing out from DA as a part of design of the re-development arrangement. Therefore, the SM are not liable for GST as they have not effected any supply under the DA.
 
It may be argued that the developer makes payment to the members and /or the society as compensation for the act of agreeing to the obligation to refrain from an act, or to tolerate an act or a situation, or to do an act treated as supply of service as per section 7(1)(d) read with paragraph no. 5(e) of Schedule II. However, there is no stipulation in the DA which requires the members of society to agree to the obligation to refrain from an act or to tolerate an act or a situation, or to do an act; for which a consideration is stipulated.  The essential ingredient of the contract is redevelopment. Therefore, the members or the society are not liable to GST even under this entry.  There is no supply made by SM to developer though they have been compensated.  
 
Whether the DA involves any taxable supply by developer to SM under GST?
 
Developer is constructing the building, a part of which will be given to the members of SM. The other part of the building will be sold by it for a consideration. For the construction of the building for the members of SM, developer is not receiving any monetary consideration from them, but a right from SM is received to load TDR on its plot so that the developer  would be able to construct extra area in the building for selling  in the market. There are common facilities and common spaces which are owned and used jointly by the owners of these units. These units do not have any independent existence. Therefore, construction of entire building is necessary before handing over the units to the members. In other words, developer cannot construct the building for selling to new customers unless he would construct that part of the building which would be allotted to SM. Hence, the developer is constructing the entire building in order to sell a part of the building.
 
Effectively, the developer is providing service to both SM and the buyers of additional flats under DA as a part of a single supply. The entire revenue in this arrangement flows from the buyers of additional flats, a part of which is paid by developer to the members of SM by way of construction and monetary consideration. The proportionate ownership of the land obtained by the developer from SM would be passed on to the flat buyers. For all these efforts, the developer would be remunerated by way of sale consideration from the additional flats constructed for sale.
 
Support may be found from the definition of consideration contained under CGST Act.
 
2(31) “consideration” in relation to the supply of goods or services or both
 
includes–
 
(a) any payment made or to be made, whether in money or otherwise, in respect of, in response to, or for the inducement of, the supply of goods or services or both, whether by the recipient or by any other person but shall not include any subsidy given by the Central Government or a State Government;
 
(b) the monetary value of any act or forbearance, in respect of, in response to, or for the inducement of, the supply of goods or services or both, whether by the recipient or by any other person but shall not include any subsidy given by the Central Government or a State Government:
…………………”
 
Thus, it can be said that the SM by virtue of entering into DA, induces developer to supply works contract service and to sell additional area to outsiders to recoup the cost of construction and other monetary consideration. In turn they undertake to make the purchasers as members by allotting undivided share in land. The sale consideration will also be the consideration for re-construction of the existing building.
 
Whether the transaction between SM and the developer is barter and liable to tax as such?
 
The definition of ‘supply’ contained in S.7 (supra) includes a barter arrangement. The question arises that whether the grant of development right by SM and the construction of the building by a developer is barter. The answer is that it may be so in technical term but not liable for GST as grant of development right is not liable for GST as already discussed above.
 
Availment of input tax credit (ITC) and reversal thereof attributable to the units allotted free of cost to SM.
 
Units allotted free of cost to SM are not without consideration. The consideration flows from other persons. The service provided by developer is taxable. Hence, ITC under the law is available fully and can be used for the GST payable on the sale of under constructed flats from free sale area.  
 
Without receiving such inputs and input services, it would be impossible to construct that part of the building on which GST is payable. Therefore, it cannot be said that the entire inputs and input services used for construction of the building are not used for providing taxable supply. Therefore, ITC is eligible.  It has been discussed earlier that there is a single supply to SM and the purchasers of free sale area.
 
(To be continued – concluding part will cover taxability of slum rehabilitation projects, land development agreements.) _
 

9 Section 11(4A) – Income from pharmacy shop run by a charitable hospital – Operation of pharmacy shop was intrinsic to the activities of running of hospital and hence, did not constitute business.

DCIT
(Exemption) vs. National Health & Education Society (Mumbai)

Members: Joginder Singh (J.M.) and Manoj
Kumar Aggarwal (A.M.)

I.T.A. No.1958/Mum/2016

Assessment Year: 2012-13.  Date of Order: 10th January, 2018

Counsels for Revenue / Assessee:  H. N. Singh / S. C. Tiwari and Rituja Pawar



FACTS

The assessee trust is registered u/s. 12A
with DIT (Exemptions) and also registered with Charity Commissioner,
Bombay.  During the assessment
proceedings, the AO noted that the trust was running a pharmacy shop in the
hospital and achieved turnover of Rs.42.83 crore with net surplus of Rs.16.73
crore. The turnover of the shop constituted about 12.82% of total hospital
collections. The income from the shop, in the opinion of the AO, constituted
business income in terms of section 11(4A). The assessee defended the same on
the ground that the drugs were supplied only to in-patients upon consultant’s
prescription and the charges of the drugs formed part of final patients’ bills.
However, the AO noted that the Trust Deed did not bar the hospital from selling
medicines to outsiders and the activity of pharmacy shop was systematic
business activity. The AO further noted that the trust was not maintaining
separate books of accounts for the shop. Finally, the net surplus of Rs.16.73
crore earned from the shop was assessed as business income against which
exemption under section 11 was denied.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee contested the same
successfully before the CIT(A), where the CIT(A), relying upon the order of its
predecessor in AYs 2010-11 & 2011-12, allowed the appeal of the assessee on
the premises that operation of the pharmacy shop was intrinsic to the
activities of the assessee and not incidental, and did not constitute business
and therefore, the provisions of section 11(4A) were not applicable.

 

In appeal filed before the Tribunal, the
revenue contested the findings of the CIT(A) on the ground that the assessee
had not maintained separate books of accounts for pharmacy shop and therefore,
failed to fulfill the conditions envisaged by section 11(4A).

 

HELD

The Tribunal noted that the issue had
already been decided in assessee’s favour by first appellate authority for AY
2010-11 & 2011-12. Also, it was noted that the Mumbai Tribunal, in the
assessee’s own case vide ITA No.87/Mum/2015 order dated 17/08/2016 for AY
2010-11, after considering the judgement of the Bombay High Court in Baun
Foundation Trust vs. CCIT [2012 73 DTR 45 (Bom)]
and Mumbai Tribunal in
Hiranandani Foundation vs. ADIT [ITA Nos. 560-563/Mum/2016 order dated
27/05/2016]
had upheld the stand of the CIT(A). Since the revenue was
unable to bring any contrary facts on record and distinguish the facts of
earlier years with that of the impugned assessment year, the Tribunal dismissed
the revenue’s appeal.

8 Sections 50C and 54F – For the purpose of section 54F net consideration is the amount of sale consideration and not the deemed consideration determined u/s. 50C.

ITO vs. Raj Kumar Parashar (Jaipur)

Members: Kul Bharat (J. M.) and Vikram Singh
Yadav (A. M.)

ITA No.: 11 / JP / 2016

AYs: 
2011-12.     Date of Order: 28th September, 2017

Counsel for Revenue / Assessee:  Prithviraj Meena / Hemang Gargieya


FACTS

During the year under consideration, the
assessee had sold a property for a consideration of Rs. 24.6 lakh and deposited
the sale consideration in the capital gain account scheme for the purpose of
purchasing a new house property.  The
entire capital gain earned by the assessee was claimed as exempt u/s. 54F. The
stamp authority    adopted    the   
value   of the property sold at Rs. 96.03 lakh.  Applying the provisions of section 50C, the
AO held the assessee was required to invest / deposit the deemed sale
consideration of Rs. 96.03 lakh. Since the assessee had deposited Rs. 24.6 lakh
only, the AO computed   capital   gain 
at  Rs. 70   lakh  
after allowing Rs. 24.6 lakh as deduction u/s. 54F.

 

On appeal, the CIT(A) referred to the
definition of ‘net consideration’ as given in Explanation to section 54F and
also relying on the decision of the Jaipur bench of Tribunal in the case of Gyanchand
Batra (ITA No. 9 / JP / 2010) dated 13.08.2010
held that the deeming
provision in section 50C would not be applicable to section 54F and
accordingly, allowed the appeal of the assessee.

 

Before the Tribunal, the revenue supported
the order of the AO and contended that the order of the CIT(A) was not in accordance with the express provisions of section 50C.

 

HELD

According to the Tribunal, as per the
provisions of section 54F, where the net consideration in respect of the
original asset is fully invested in the new asset, the whole of the capital
gains is exempt and no part of the consideration can be charged u/s. 45. The
Tribunal agreed with the CIT(A) that the consideration which is actually
received or accrued as a result of transfer has to be invested in the new
asset.  In the instant case, since the
consideration which had accrued to the assessee as per the sale deed was
Rs.24.6 lakhs and the whole of the said consideration was invested in the
capital gains accounts scheme for purchase of the new house property, the
provisions of section 54F(1)(a) were complied with and the assesse was eligible
for deduction in respect of the whole of the capital gains computed u/s.
45. 

 

16 Section 54 – Acquisition of a flat in a building under construction is a case of `construction’ and not `purchase’. Construction of new house may commence before transfer of old house but should be completed within a period of 3 years from the date of transfer of old house.

[2017] 88 taxmann.com 275 (Mumbai-Trib.)

Mustansir I Tehsildar vs. ITO

ITA No. : 6108/Mum/2017

A.Y. : 2013-14     Date of Order: 18th December, 2017



FACTS 

During the previous year relevant to the
assessment year under consideration, on 5-12-2012, the assessee sold his 1/3rd
share in Flat No.2902 of an apartment named Planet Godrej located at Byculla,
Mumbai, for a consideration of Rs.126.83 lakh. Long term capital of Rs. 78.36
lakh accrued to the assessee on transfer of his flat in
Planet Godrej. 

 

The assessee had earlier, vide agreement
dated 5.2.2010, booked a flat at Elegant Tower, which was under construction.
The details of payments made to the builder are as detailed below:-

 

Particulars of payment

Rupees

Before the date of transfer of old house

 

From 12.04.2007 to 03-11-2009

86,38,225

On 21.4.2012

7,28,525

                                                               
Sub-total (a)

93,66,750

Payments subsequent to the date of transfer of old house

 

14.06.2014

3,12,225

22.10.2014

7,28,525

Sub-total (b)

10,40,750

Total (a + b)

1,04,07,500

 

 

Thus, the aggregate payments made by the
assessee towards the new flat were Rs.104.07 lakh. Since the aggregate of
payments made was more than the amount of Capital gain, the assessee claimed
that entire amount of capital gain of Rs.78.36 lakh was deductible u/s. 54 of
the Act. The assessee treated the acquisition of new flat as a case of “Construction”.  As per the provisions of section 54, the new
flat is required to be constructed within 3 years from the date of transfer of
old flat. Since the old flat was transferred on 05-12-2012, the assessee submitted
that the time limit was available up to December, 2015 and the new flat was
acquired before that date.

 

The Assessing Officer (AO) treated the case
of acquisition of new house by the assessee as a case of purchase and not of
construction. He, accordingly, held that the purchase should have been between
06-11-2011 to 04-12-2014.  Accordingly, he held that –

 

(a) the payments aggregating to
Rs.86.38 lakh made between 12-04-2007 to 03-11-2009 falls outside the period
mentioned above and hence not eligible for deduction u/s. 54 of the Act;

 

(b) the capital gains not
utilised for purchase of new asset before the due date for filing return of
income should have been deposited in Capital gains Account Scheme as per the
provisions of section 54 of the Act. The payments of Rs.3,12,225/- and Rs.7,28,525/-made
on 14.6.2014 and 22.10.2014 respectively have violated the provisions of
section 54 of the Act, since the assessee did not deposit them in Capital gains
Account scheme. Accordingly, the AO held that the above said two payments are
not eligible for deduction u/s. 54 of the Act;

 

(c) The payment of
Rs.7,28,525/- made on 21-04-2012 was within the range of period mentioned by
him. Accordingly, he allowed deduction u/s. 54 of the Act only to the extent of
Rs.7,28,525.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
before CIT(A) who following the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case
of CIT vs. Smt. Beena K. Jain (217 ITR 363)(Bom.) held that the
acquisition of the new house by the assessee was a case of purchase and not
construction.  He, confirmed the action
of the AO.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the Tribunal.

 

HELD

The Tribunal noted that the Hon’ble Bombay
High Court in the case of Mrs. Hilla J. B. Wadia (216 ITR 376)(Bom.) has held
that booking of flat in an apartment under construction must also be viewed as
a method of constructing residential tenements.

 

Accordingly, the co-ordinate bench has taken
the view in the case of Sagar Nitin Parikh (ITA No.6399/Mum/2011 dated
03-06-2015)
that booking of flat in an apartment under construction is a
case of “construction”. In view of the above said decision of the
Hon’ble Bombay High Court and the Tribunal, the acquisition of new flat in an
apartment under construction should be considered as a case of “construction”
and not “purchase”. The Tribunal set aside the view taken by the tax
authorities and held that the assessee has constructed a flat and the
provisions of section 54 should be applied accordingly.

 

It also noted that section 54 of the Act
provides the condition that the construction of new residential house should be
completed within 3 years from the date of transfer of old residential house.

 

It noted that the Hon’ble Karnataka High
Court has held in the case of CIT vs. J. R. Subramanya Bhat [1987](165 ITR
571)
that commencement of construction is not relevant for the purpose of
section 54 and it is only the completion of construction. The above said ratio
has been followed in the case of Asst. CIT vs. Subhash Sevaram Bhavnani
[2012](23 taxmann.com 94)(Ahd. Trib.)
. Both these cases support the
contentions of the assessee.

 

The Tribunal held that, for the purpose of
section 54 of the Act, it has to be seen whether the assessee has completed the
construction within three years from the date of transfer of old asset. It noted
that there is no dispute that the assessee took possession of the new flat
within three years from the date of sale of old residential flat.

 

The Tribunal held that the assessee has
complied with the time limit prescribed u/s. 54 of the Act. Since the amount
invested in the new flat prior to the due date for furnishing return of income
was more than the amount of capital gain, the requirements of depositing any
money under capital gains account scheme does not arise in the instant case.
Further, the Hon’ble High Court has held in the case of K.C.Gopalan [(1999)
107 Taxman 591 (Kerala)]
that there is no requirement that the sale
proceeds realised on sale of old residential house alone should be utilised.

 

The Tribunal held that the assessee is
entitled for deduction of full amount of capital gains u/s. 54 of the Act, as
he has complied with the conditions prescribed in that section.  It set aside the order passed by Ld CIT(A)
and directed the AO to allow the deduction u/s. 54 of the Act as claimed by the
assessee.

 

Companies (Amendment) Act, 2017 – Part I: Genesis and Changes in Key Definitions

Companies Act 1956 was replaced in the year 2013 with a new avatar as the Companies Act 2013. When an act was on the statute book for a period of almost 60 years and a new act has come in its place, it was bound to have issues from practical perspectives, besides challenges and shortcomings.

To overcome these issues, the new Act had to undergo several amendments in its first few years. If we look at the evolution of this Act, of the total 470 sections of the Companies Act, 2013 the status as on date is as under:

Particulars

Number
Of sections

Sections
Notified on different dates

428

Sections
yet to be enforced

2

Sections
Deleted

40

Total

470

 

 

Major amendments were done in the year 2015. At the time of these amendments it was felt that the matter needs further relook and hence Companies Law Committee was constituted (CLC) to address these issues. The CLC made its recommendations which culminated in Companies Amendment Bill, 2016.

Companies Amendment Bill, 2016 was introduced in Lok Sabha in March 2016 and was referred to Standing Committee on Finance (Committee) for further examination. After considering various suggestions of the Committee this Bill was renamed as Companies Amendment Bill, 2017 and was reintroduced and passed in Lok Sabha in July 2017.

This Bill was approved by Rajya Sabha on 19th of December 2017 and has received President’s Assent on 3rd January 2018. It was notified on the same day in the official gazette and will be called as The Companies (Amendment) Act, 2017.
OBJECTIVE/GUIDING PRINCIPLES BEHIND AMENDING THE COMPANIES ACT, 2013
The amendments introduced in The Companies (Amendment) Act, 2017 are guided by the following objectives1 :-

(i) addressing difficulties in implementation owing to undue stringency of compliance requirements,

(ii) facilitating ease of doing business for companies, including start-ups, in order to promote growth with employment,

(iii) harmonisation with accounting standards, and other financial and economic legislations,

(iv) rectifying omissions and inconsistencies in the Act, and

(v) Carrying out amendments in provisions relating to qualification and selection of members of NCLT and NCLAT in accordance with the Supreme Court directions.

The key amendments in the Companies (Amendment) Act, 2017, are2 :

a) Simplification of the private placement process, involving doing away with separate offer letter, details/record of applicants to be kept by company and to be filed as part of return of allotment only, and reducing number of filings to Registrar
[section 42].

b) Allowing unrestricted object clause in the Memorandum of Association dispensing with detailed listing of objects, with a view to ease incorporation of companies; Self-declarations to replace affidavits from subscribers to memorandum and first directors [sections 4 and 7].
________________________________________________________________
1  37th Report of the Standing Committee on Finance dated 01-12-2016 Para 1.12  
2  37th Report of the Standing Committee on Finance dated 01-12-2016 Para 1.14  

c) Provisions relating to forward dealing and insider trading in securities to be omitted from Companies Act as these are covered under SEBI regulations [sections 194 and 195].

d) Requirement of approval of Central Government for Managerial remuneration above prescribed limits to be replaced by approval through special resolution by shareholders in general meeting [sections 196 and 197].

e) Companies may give loans to entities in which directors are interested after passing special resolution and adhering to disclosure requirement [section 185].

f) Amendment of definitions of associate company and subsidiary company to ensure that ‘equity share capital’ is the basis for deciding holding-subsidiary relationship rather than “both equity and preference share capital” [section 2].

g) Rationalisation of penal provisions with reduced liability for procedural and technical defaults. Penal provisions for small companies and One Person Companies to be reduced [various sections].

h) Auditor reporting on internal financial controls to be restricted with regard to financial statements [section 143].

i) Frauds involving an amount less than Rupees 10 lakhs to be compoundable offences [section 447].

j) Reducing requirement for maintaining deposit repayment reserve account from 15% each for two years to 20% during the maturing year [section 73].

k) Test of materiality to be introduced for pecuniary interest for testing independence of Independent Directors [section 149].

l) Recognition of the concept of beneficial owner of a company proposed in the Act. Register of beneficial owners to be maintained by a company, and filed with the Registrar. [Section 90].

m) Re-opening of accounts to be limited to 8 years [section 130].

n) Requirement for annual ratification of appointment/continuance of auditor by members to be removed [section 139].

o) Provisions relating to Corporate Social Responsibility to bring greater clarity [section 135].

CHANGES IN KEY DEFINITIONS

Let us now consider a few important amendments made by the Act in the definitions. In total, 14 Definitions have been amended. I am discussing major amendments hereunder.
 
I.  Associate Company – Section 2 (6)

Section before Amendment

After Amendment

Remarks

For the purposes of this clause, ?significant influence
means control of at least twenty per cent of total
share capital, or of business decisions under an agreement;

For the purpose of this clause—

 

(a) the expression “significant influence”
means control of at least twenty percent, of total voting power, or
control of or participation in business decisions under an agreement;

 

(b) the expression “joint venture” means a
joint arrangement whereby the parties that have joint control of the
arrangement have rights to the net assets of the arrangement;’

The definition is made more specific from existing percentage
of share capital to percentage of total voting power.

 

Latter portion of the Explanation is amended from control
of business decisions under an agreement to
“or control of
or participation in business decisions under an agreement.”

 

However, a joint venture is defined but joint
arrangement is still not defined.

 

Probable Impact would be –

?   Total
voting power to be referred to;

?   Control
determined through total voting power only and not by capital

?   Agreement
is essential element to establish control through participation

 

Presently an Associate Company is a related party of
Investor. However, for Associate Company, Investor was not a related party
(i.e. Converse was not true). This anomaly is sought to be removed by
amending Section 2(76) to include an investing company or the venturer of the
company as related party of an investee i.e. an Associate;

 

(For more details please refer amendment to section
2(76) below).

Definition of Associate Company in clause 6 of section 2 is amended so as to substitute existing explanation as under:

GENESIS OF THIS AMENDMENT:
In fact, at the time of representations before Standing Committee, various stake holders had suggested that the words “control of or participation in business decisions under an agreement” from the explanation may be deleted.

The Ministry of Corporate affairs however in response suggested3  as under:

“Various innovative and complex instruments are being used by business entities to exercise control or significant influence over other entities. It is felt that in order to cover various situations including through issue of instruments referred to above through which companies may exercise significant influence over other companies, the phrase “or control of or participation in business decisions under an agreement” needs to be retained in the explanation. “

Suggestion of MCA was accepted and that of the stakeholders rejected. However, in the process, this definition of Significant Influence has undergone a change to incorporate even participation in business decisions under an agreement.

II. Financial Year – Section 2(41), Change of Financial Year in the case of Associate Company of a Company incorporated outside India  

Section before Amendment

After Amendment

Remarks

First Proviso:

Provided
that on an application made by a company or body corporate, which is a
holding company or a subsidiary of a company incorporated outside India and
is required to follow a different financial year for consolidation of its
accounts outside India, the Tribunal may, if it is satisfied, allow any
period as its financial year, whether or not that period is a year:

“Provided
that on an application made by a company or body corporate, which is a
holding company or a subsidiary or associate company of a company
incorporated outside India and is required to follow a different financial
year for consolidation of its accounts outside India, the Tribunal may, if it
is satisfied, allow any period as its financial year, whether or not that
period is a year.”

Post
Amendment, even an Associate Company of a company incorporated outside India
can apply to the Tribunal for a different financial year.

 

This
amendment will facilitate ease of doing business. 

________________________________________________________
3  37th Report of the Standing Committee on Finance dated 01-12-2016 Para 2.4   

III. Section 2(46), Holding Company

Section before Amendment

After Amendment

Remark

?holding company, in relation to one or more other
companies, means a company of which such companies are subsidiary companies;

Explanation—For the purposes of this clause, the
expression “company” includes anybody corporate

 

Presently Body corporate is not included in the
definition of Holding Company.

 

This amendment has far reaching implications for
ascertaining the status of the Subsidiary company as to whether it is Public
or Private. For the said purpose, one will have to ascertain the status of
Body Corporate. (Definition of Public Company u/s. 2(71) may be referred.)

 

Henceforth, Subsidiary Companies who would otherwise be
a Small Company, will now have to ascertain whether they continue to be so,
based on the status of their holding company (body corporate) (Refer section
2(85) of the Companies Act)

 

A body corporate, which may earlier be excluded from
Related Party Disclosure, will now be included as a related party.

 

For more details, please refer amendment to section
2(76) below. 

 

GENESIS OF THIS AMENDMENT:
The Stakeholders in their written memorandum suggested on this clause as under:-

“The proposed insertion should not take place in view of the “ease of doing business” in Indian Companies.”

The Ministry responded as under:

“Attention is invited to section 4 of the erstwhile Companies Act, 1956, wherein the proposed explanation was applicable for both the terms ‘holding company’ and ‘subsidiary company’. The intention behind the change in section 2(46) is to bring harmony between provisions of section 2(87) and 2(46) of the Bill. It goes without saying that overseas holding companies will have to comply with the provisions of the jurisdictions in which these are incorporated. However, it would be appropriate to have this provision to ensure that transactions entered with overseas holding companies are carried out with adequate disclosures and thus any abuse is avoided. The suggestion, therefore, may not be considered.”

The Committee, while endorsing the view of the Ministry, recommended that the proposed amendment in Explanation to Clause 2(v) relating to clause (46) of the Companies Act, 2013 on definition of “holding company” may be retained in order to ensure adequate disclosure in regard to transactions entered with overseas holding companies.

IV. Section 2(49), Interested Director

Interested director was defined u/s. 2(49) as under:

interested director” means a director who is in any way, whether by himself or through any of his relatives or firm, body corporate or other association of individuals in which he or any of his relatives is a partner, director or a member, interested in a contract or arrangement, or proposed contract or arrangement, entered into or to be entered into by or on behalf of a company;

The term interested director was relevant for the purposes of section 174 (Quorum), 184 (Disclosure of interest by director) and section 189 (Register of contracts or arrangements in which directors are interested).Unfortunately, definition of interested director was very wide and leading to the confusion as to which definition is to be used.

FAQs published by ICSI in the year 2014 sought to answer the question but that too with a caution. (Refer last two lines in reply to the question)

Question and reply reads as under:  

Q. Section 2(49) defines the term ‘interested directors’ whereas at various sections reference to section 184 is drawn to mean/define interested director. Section 2(49) is wider than section 184 leading to confusion – which definition should be applied?

Ans. Section 2(49) of the Companies Act, 2013 defines interested director as a director who is in any way, whether by himself or through any of his relatives or firm, body corporate or other association of individuals in which he or any of his relatives is a partner, director or a member, interested in a contract or arrangement, or proposed contract or arrangement, entered into or to be entered into by or on behalf of a company;

Section 184 (2) provides that every director of a company who is in any way, whether directly or indirectly, concerned or interested in a contract or arrangement or proposed contract or arrangement entered into or to be
entered into—

(a) with a body corporate in which such director or such director in association with any other director, holds more than two per cent. shareholding of that body corporate, or is a promoter, manager, Chief Executive Officer of that body corporate; or

(b) with a firm or other entity in which, such director is a partner, owner or member, as the case may be,

shall disclose the nature of his concern or interest at the meeting of the Board in which the contract or arrangement is discussed and shall not participate in such meeting.

Wherever the term ‘interested director’ appears in the Act and the Rules thereon, read sections 2(49) and 184 together.

Section 2(49) is now deleted and thus confusion in the term is sought to be avoided.

V. Section 2(51), Key Managerial             Personnel (KMP)

Section before Amendment

After Amendment

Remarks

“Key
managerial personnel” in relation to a company, means—

 

“Key
managerial personnel”  in relation
to a company, means—

 

This
change in the definition now enables Companies to designate whole time
employees as KMP besides the four designation based categories.

This
is an enabling provision.

(i)
the Chief Executive Officer or the managing director or the manager;

(ii)
the company secretary;

(iii)
the whole-time director;

(iv)
the Chief Financial Officer; and

(v)
Such other officer as may be prescribed.

 

(i)
the Chief Executive Officer or the managing director or the manager;

(ii)
the company secretary;

(iii)
the whole-time director;

(iv)
the Chief Financial Officer;

(v) such other officer, not more than one level below the
directors who is in whole-time employment, designated as key managerial
personnel by the Board; and

(vi)
such other officer as may be prescribed

 

VI.  Section 2(57), Net Worth

Section before Amendment

After Amendment

Remark

“net worth” means
the aggregate value of the paid-up share capital and all reserves created out
of the profits and securities premium account, after deducting the aggregate
value of the accumulated losses, deferred expenditure and miscellaneous
expenditure not written off, as per the audited balance sheet, but does not
include reserves created out of revaluation of assets, write-back of
depreciation and amalgamation

net worth” means
the aggregate value of the paid-up share capital and all reserves created out
of the profits, securities premium account and
debit or credit balance of profit and loss account
, after deducting
the aggregate value of the accumulated losses, deferred expenditure and
miscellaneous expenditure not written off, as per the audited balance sheet,
but does not include reserves created out of revaluation of assets,
write-back of depreciation and amalgamation.

In
absence of clarity, one was not clear about treatment to be given to Debit or
credit Balance in Profit and Loss Account. Unfortunately, while introducing
this amendment, transition to Ind AS of several companies is lost sight of.
It would have been in the fitness of things, if clarification on the
components of Other Comprehensive Income (OCI) was also given. Especially
this assumes importance because OCI includes unrealized gains too.

VII. Section 2(71), Public company

Section before Amendment

After Amendment

Remark

Public company means a company which— (a) is not a private company;
(b) has a minimum paid-up share capital as may be prescribed: …………

“(a) is not a private company; and

The word “and” is added so as to clarify that cumulative conditions
are to be observed. This provision is more clarificatory in nature.   


VIII.  Section 2(76) Related Party

Section before Amendment

After Amendment

Remark

(viii)
any company which is—

(A)
a holding, subsidiary or an associate company of such company; or

(B)
a subsidiary of a holding company to which it is also a subsidiary;

 

“(viii)
anybody corporate which is—

A.
a holding, subsidiary or an associate company of such company;

B.
a subsidiary of a holding company to which it is also a subsidiary; or

C.
an investing company or the venturer of the company;

 

Explanation — For the purpose of this clause, “the investing
company or the venturer of a company” means a body corporate whose investment
in the company would result in the company becoming an associate company of
the body corporate.

“Company”
is replaced with “body corporate” and investing companies/ venturer are also
added to the list.

 

The
amended Explanation has expanded the scope of the definition of related
parties.

 

The
reference to body corporate is consequent upon inclusion of body corporate in
the definition of holding company.

Refer
discussions above for impact on Associate Company [Section 2(6)] and Holding
Company [Section 2(46)].

 

GENESIS OF THIS AMENDMENT:

At the time of representations to the Committee, MCA had suggested as under:

Suggestions were received by the Committee, pointing out that the term “related party”, as currently defined, used the word ‘company’ in Section 2(76)(viii), meaning thereby that those entities that were incorporated in India would come in the purview of the definition. This resulted in the impression that companies incorporated outside India (such as holding/ subsidiary/ associate / fellow subsidiary of an Indian company) were excluded from the purview of related party of an Indian company. It noted that this would be unintentional and would seriously affect the compliance requirements of related parties under the Act. The Committee, therefore, recommended that section 2 (76) (viii) be amended to substitute ‘company’ with ‘body corporate’

IX.Section 2(87) Subsidiary Company

  • Sub section is amended to the effect  that a company will be treated as subsidiary in case the holding company exercises or controls more than 50%  of the total voting power either of its own or together with one or more of its subsidiary companies. Currently, the Act provides for exercise or control of more than half of the total share capital (Which included Preference Capital).  Henceforth, holding of Preference Shares only will not be considered for control and instead only voting power will be considered.
  • Preference shares, which is often a quasi loan is rightly excluded. For example, optionally convertible redeemable preference shares are effectively a loan and the option exists only for the purpose of security of the lender.
  • This change also makes the definition consistent with AS 21 – Consolidated Financial Statements. However, the change falls short of its coherence with the Ind AS.  
  • As regards layers of Subsidiaries, the proviso to Section 2(87) remains and was notified on 20th September 2017.

•It will be interesting to see what happened after introduction of Companies Amendment Bill 2016 as regards the proviso referred to above.
•The Companies Act 2013 permits Central Government to impose a cap on layers of subsidiaries a company can have. Companies Amendment Bill 2016 removed the restrictions on number of layers of a subsidiary company. Standing Committee had no recommendation on this issue. Finally (Quietly?) on 5th April 2017, amendments were circulated which restored the position which existed in the Companies Act 2013. (Source Notice of Amendments, The Companies (Amendment) Bill, 2016, Lok Sabha, April 5, 2017 http://www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/Companies,%202016/Notice%20of%20Amendments,%20Apr%205,%202017.pdf)
•One may now refer to the Companies (Restriction on number of layers) Rules, 2017 which have become effective from 20th September, 2017.

X.Section 2(91) Turnover

Existing Definition

As Amended

Remark

“turnover”
means the aggregate value of the realization of amount made from the
sale, supply or distribution of goods or on account of services rendered, or
both, by the company during a financial year;

turnover”
means the gross amount of revenue recognised in the profit and loss account
from the sale, supply, or distribution of goods or on account of services
rendered, or both, by a
company during a financial year;

Previously
“turnover” was indicative of realisations made.

 

Now the shift is to amount recognised in Profit and Loss
Account. The concept of turnover is important since several obligations of
the company are linked to the turnover.

 

Interestingly
amended definition now refers as “a company “instead of “the company” before
amendment.

 

CONCLUSION

The Standing Committee Report states that more than two thousand suggestions  were received from the stake holders4. Additionally, responses of CLC and views of MCA were considered in finally amending the Act. The amendments also include inputs given by Standing Committee. This entire process, having taken massive amount of interactions and deliberations over a period of about 2 years from 2016 has resulted in the Companies (Amendment) Act, 2017 which seems like a largely  cohesive document as far as definitions are concerned. _
___________________________________________________________
4    37th Report of the Standing Committee on Finance dated 01-12-2016
Para 1.8

An Ode To The Trouble Maker

In the initial stages of the freedom
struggle, a well-intentioned person suggested to Gandhiji that to fight the
mighty British empire was akin to banging one’s head against a wall. It would
be a foolish effort and would only cause grief and pain. Gandhiji’s response
was simple, but underlined his character and spirit. He replied, “you are
probably right, but may be this once the wall will break!”

                

Be it Gandhiji, Washington, Jefferson,
Copernicus or Martin Luther King, they were all trouble makers and
non-conformists. They questioned status quo and were always ready to shake the
system.

 

We humans are social animals and conforming
to certain societal norms is ingrained in our DNA as a survival trait since our
days as hunters and gatherers. Largely, this helps in an organised and
harmonised community living for the collective benefit of all. So, being a
trouble maker does not mean you don’t learn from your parents, peers or the
society. It also does not mean that you act in a manner that causes physical
harm or impinges upon someone else’s legitimate rights.

 

Indeed, non-conformity for the sake of
non-conforming is still conformity. If one chooses to question everything, then
one needs to question such questioning? If one rebels against everything
popular only for the sake of rebellion, then one is, in effect, conforming to
our society’s non-conformist trends. In order to truly be a non-conformist is
to live and present yourself without thinking of people’s perception of you. As
Bill Vaughn said, “If there is anything the non-conformist hates
worse than a conformist, it’s another non-conformist who doesn’t conform to the
prevailing standard of non-conformity.”

 

So, being a rebel just for the sake of being
different is not only meaningless but counter-productive. On the other hand,
blind conformity is equally dangerous, because it means following other people
not because you believe in their ideas or agree with them, but because you want
to fit in instead of standing out.To be a non-conformist in the Gandhian sense,
means to celebrate your uniqueness without allowing society to influence your
decisions and choices. It means to question the present norms and to accept
that which appeals to your conscious and intellect, while challenging those
that are morally repugnant or rationally questionable.

 

History is replete with examples of great
thinkers who were persecuted and hounded by those in positions of authority for
daring to be different. After all, the world hates those who shake up the
system as there is inherent security in maintaining status quo. Galileo died in
isolation, a broken man for advocating the Copernican view that the Earth was not
the centre of the universe. His views were considered blasphemous as it went at
that time against the doctrine of the Church. Galileo responded by stating
that, “I do not feel obliged to believe that the same God who endowed
us with sense, reason and intellect has intended us to forgo their use”.
Albert
Einstein was right when he said, “Great spirits have always encountered
violent opposition from mediocre minds”
or as Mignon McLaughlin said,
“Society honours its living conformists and its dead troublemakers”.

 

So let me reproduce this ode to the trouble
makers by Rob Siltanen, “Here’s to the crazy ones. The misfits. The rebels.
The troublemakers. The round pegs in the square holes. The ones who see things
differently. They’re not fond of rules. And they have no respect for the status
quo. You can quote them, disagree with them, glorify or vilify them. About the
only thing you can’t do is ignore them. Because they change things. They push
the human race forward. And while some may see them as the crazy ones, we see
genius. Because the people who are crazy enough to think they can change the
world, are the ones who do.”

 

Therefore, let us be the ones who refuse to
be satisfied with the way things are and insist upon bringing about positive
changes, even when success is not guaranteed. Maybe it is time to awaken a
little bit of Gandhi in
all of us!!  _

 

51st Residential Refresher Course (RRC) Report

The 51st Residential Refresher Course (RRC) of Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society (BCAS) was held at Hotel
Dreamland, Mahabaleshwar from 11th January 2018 to 14th January 2018. In all, 100 participants from various parts of
India joined this flagship programme of BCAS.
On the first day, CA. Narayan
Pasari, President BCAS
welcomed the participants.
He highlighted the journey
of BCAS RRCs and recent
activities undertaken by BCAS.

He shared his experience about
his journey with BCAS from
joining the Seminar Committee
to the Presidentship. He also
shared the vision of BCAS
to promote young members
( ) to be able professionals
and hence promoted 3 of them
at this RRC.

CA. Uday Sathaye, Chairman
Seminar Committee welcomed
everybody and explained the
importance of RRC in adding
value to the professional life of BCAS members
participating in RRCs. He compared RRC to a Guru.
He acknowledged contribution of Paper Writers,
Group Leaders and Participants in making RRCs
a success and highlighted the relationship that
has been developed over many years particularly
with participants from cities other than Mumbai.
He introduced and shared his thoughts about CA.
Pranay Marfatia, Past President and Chief Guest
of this 51st RRC. He highlighted CA. Pranaybhai’s
contribution towards success of earlier RRCs.
Thereafter, an audio clip was played, as rich
compliments were made by many Past Presidents
of BCAS about CA. Pranaybhai’s Involvement,
Dedication and Contribution to BCAS activities.

CA. Pranay Marfatia, Past President of BCAS then
inaugurated the 51st RRC. He shared his experience
of past RRCs. He spoke on changing paradigm of the
CA Profession. He also shared his views about the
expectation by the regulators and the stake holders from
CA Profession and the future challenges. He concluded
his address with a clear message that there is a need to
be updated on every front in profession and one should
not compromise on any principles.

The First Technical Session was chaired by CA. Pradip
Kapasi, Past President of BCAS. Dr. Rakesh Gupta
dealt with the issues raised by participants during Group
Discussion on his paper titled Case Studies in Taxation.
In his inimitable style covering all the issues in the
fields of Business Income, Capital Gains, Assessment
Proceedings etc., he dealt with the questions raised in the
case studies along with issues communicated by group
leaders and provided answers to the queries raised. His
command over the subject was appreciated by everybody.
On the second Day, the 2nd Technical Session was chaired
by CA. Rajesh Shah, Past President of BCAS. CA. Dhinal
Shah, Central Council Member – ICAI presented paper
titled Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, Challenges
and Professional Opportunities. He commenced his
presentation with the process of registering as Insolvency
Professional (IP) by Chartered Accountants. He
highlighted the important role that Chartered Accountants
can play in the revival of defaulting companies and the
expected challenges to be faced by IP. His presentation
was very helpful to the participants particularly from the
point of view of the subject being a new area of practice.
The Third Technical Session was chaired by CA. Anil
Sathe, Past President of BCAS where CA. Bhadresh
Doshi dealt with ICDS- Significant Issues.

In his unique style, CA. Bhadresh Doshi explained various
points in interpretation issues in ICDS in view of Recent
Delhi High Court Judgements annulling various ICDS.
These issues are very relevant in day to day practice
and the presentation was extremely useful to all the
participants. The contents of paper as well as the lucid
explanations by the paper writer, was a rich and rewarding
experience for the delegates.

In the evening, participants had free time for sightseeing
etc. After dinner, participants enjoyed music and
entertainment programme.

On the third day, the Fourth Technical Session was
chaired by CA. Rajesh Muni, Past President of BCAS.
CA. Anand Bathiya presented paper on Corporate
Governance. He elaborated on the key amendments in
Governance of Listed Companies introduced by SEBI
and the important provisions of The Companies (Am
endment) Act 2017. He also highlighted the significant
amendments affecting the obligations and responsibilities
of the Auditors.

The Fifth Technical Session was chaired by CA. Govind
Goyal, Past President of BCAS where CA. Mandar
Telang presented paper titled GST – Legal Issues. He
enlightened the participants on recurring issues in GST.
He highlighted the practical problems affecting various
sectors of economy through his relevant and analytical
case studies.

He shared his experience of the importance of GST
implication in structuring the business process of various
industries.

An evening session was chaired by CA. Prafullachandra
Oak where CA. Chandrashekhar Vaze presented
his thoughts on “Code of Ethics need for Eternal
Vigilance”. He quoted lots of examples and his
experience from disciplinary cases. He very effectively
highlighted the need of following code of ethics and doing principle centered practice. The points raised by CA.
Vaze were very well received by the participants and he
also answered the questions raised by the participants on
the subject.

On the last day of RRC, a Panel Discussion was anchored
by CA. Sunil Gabhawalla and CA. Sangeeta Pandit
on “CA practice- Challenges & Opportunity- Across
Multiple profession Domains”.

CA. Bhavana Doshi, CA. Anil Sathe, CA. Nandita
Parekh and CA. Anup Shah were the esteemed
Panellists. During the three hours of the discussion, the panellists were very candid and open in their thoughts.
The Panel Discussion covered topics such as how to
obtain Domain Knowledge, develop Entrepreneurship
Skills, Mentor and retain Talent, work in Groups, adapt
to Technology, emerging Areas of Practice and host of
other issues. There was also a discussion on Succession
Planning and Sustainability of CA Firms. The Panel
Discussion was concluded on a very positive note with a
request from the participants that similar session should
be held in all future RRCs.

CA. Uday Sathaye, Chairman Seminar Committee and
CA. Narayan Pasari, President BCAS concluded the
51st RRC by acknowledging all the participants with a Big
Thank You!

Everybody parted with a commitment to meet again
next year.

Yes, but…

Presentation of the Union Budget (UB) has
remained an important date in a Chartered Accountant’s annual timeline. The UB
season creates a (predictable) buzz. By the time this BCAJ reaches you, you
would have got a complete download (and perhaps an overload) of the finance
bill provisions. I thought that I shouldn’t tax you with more of that and
instead share some observations of the buzz and drama of the budget ‘season’.

 

At a high level, the buzz hangs between the
two extreme points of self glorification and mindless criticism. Compared to
the ‘high’ of the stock markets, the pitch of glorification and criticism
remain consistent without going into the red. This editorial is dedicated to
the drama of ‘budget season’ rather than details of ‘budget provisions’. 

 

Precursor: A (tasteful) tradition

The season starts traditionally. The first
‘photo op’ is the Halwa making ceremony, done somewhere in a secret bunker of
the finance ministry. It marks the beginning of the quarantine period of those
officials, who after eating the delicious Halwa on a chilly Delhi day, choose
to remain in isolation till February 1. Two days before the UB, the national
Economic Survey is unveiled, building the tempo and setting the tone. Former
CEA, Kaushik Basu’s tweet sums up well: Reading India’s Economic Survey
2017-18 it is clear that the Survey is in very good shape. I wish I could say
the same for what it surveys.
And then comes the ‘B’ Day. The FM enters the
parliament, personally carrying a (unbranded1) briefcase with (secret)
budget documents in it.

 

The Budget Speech

The budget speech is like the annual sacred
sermon by the highest financial pontiff. As I enter the office, a bit late
since I arrived in Mumbai the same day at dawn, people are ready with
headphones plugged into their computers waiting for the FM to begin.

_______________________________________________________________

1   Emphasis is important considering recent
controversy over branded apparel worn by a politician.

these quintessential words balance and seal the budget speech.
With these words, every FM accentuates the government’s sole and focused
commitment towards the marginalised. The budget speech must also consider four
vital elements – Psychology, Politics, Economics and Strategy2. The
speech will get evaluated by the quality and proportion of each ingredient. Yet
after listening, a common citizen wonders as to why a recent report3  claimed that 73% new wealth created in last
one year went only to the richest 1%. Today the problem is not just poverty,
but inequality (the word that did not find place in the UB speech). The men who
feed us with their tilling and toil, why do they have to commit suicide: one
farmer every 40 minutes since last ten years?

 

Figures and Figures of Speech: Poetry and
Hindi

The speech not only contains large figures
in thousands of crores, but is also generous in use of figures of speech. FM’s
talk was delivered in English yet it was generously embellished with Hindi:
couplets, punch lines, quotes and Sanskrit to reduce monotony and serve
implicit purposes. Switchover to Hindi was often made at places where
commitment towards the under privileged needed accentuation. Memorable ones
from 2018 speech were: those wearing

____________________________________________________________

2   Inspired by Late Nani Palkhivala’s writings on
1981-82 Union Budget

3  
By Oxfam. Amongst other things, the study found that it will take 941
years for a minimum wage worker in rural India to earn what the top paid
executive at a leading Indian garment firm earns in a year.

 

Ratings and Ranting

Post the FM’s
speech, ‘analysis’ race starts on channels and internet. While lesser mortals
require time to read and understand a document that is detailed and mammoth,
such as the country’s budget, the ‘experts’ from every field show up on
channels to give their ‘considered’ views. Some of it sounds like, talking about
the wrapper before seeing the wrapped gift.

 

The day is
abuzz with variety of sound bites, tweets and posts. The ruling party people go
‘Wah Wah’ with clichés like “Pro Farmer” “Path Breaking” “Historic” “Pro Poor”.
The opposition parties just use the thesaurus to find antonyms of those words
to call it: “Pro Rich”, “Anti Poor”, “Inflationary” etc.. Some channels attempt
to unleash a verbal WWE4 like match in their studios with people
‘debating’ and ranting. Rising volume and interruptions by the anchor/panellists
serve as substitutes for reason and respect. One TV channel put a link to rate
the budget while FM was still into his speech. 1500 people had even rated it
before the FM had completed his talk and the UB was not even uploaded on the
MoF website.

___________________________________________________

4   World Wrestling Entertainment

 

 

On the other
hand, professionals start reading the fine print, for they know that Budget
Speech is not the Finance Bill and the devil is always hidden in the details.
While all this is going on, the number of ‘temporary economists’ spiral on
social media. Tweets and Posts glide hash tags (#) to prominence. Most
fascinating observations, are often those that state the obvious: “a good
budget, there was little room for tinkering indirect taxes due to GST being
dealt separately now.” My favourite comment came from an international rating
agency in 2017 (even the Economic Survey of India 2017 mentioned it for its
Poor Standards) – “India’s 2017-2018 budget illustrates the government’s
commitment to improving its fiscal performance over the medium term, despite the
hit to near-term growth from the demonetisation initiative” – stating the
obvious without conveying the expected meaning. Lastly, many industry bodies
find ways to praise the budget. Well, who wants to mess with power, which
continues to remain the largest litigant in India and even a significant
impediment to ease of doing business and to ease of living too!

 

And you wonder…

Yes, the journalists and businesses are ranking and debating, but the
common man is standing – in a line to get his share of benefits of growth. Yes,
India story cannot be talked down, but our complex nation needs a leap
to remain fit for future. Yes, budgets have come and budgets have gone, but
the bridge between intention of FMs and expectation of people is yet to be
completed: by impeccable execution! A big “Yes” to the budget, yet the “But
remains!

 

 

 

Raman Jokhakar

Editor

On Not Building A Top Global Indian Audit Firm

Several thought provoking facts and figures have been presented recently in various forums on the captioned subject. However, some key perspective notes need to be added in, to make clear the present plight of IAF (Indian Audit firms). These are as follows–

 

The Vision

The Vision presented by our Hon. PM Shri Narendra Modi on the CA Day on 1st July 2017 is path-breaking in many ways. For the first time, in India, the recognition has come to the fact that the large firms in the country’s audit practice are not Indian Firms. While it is an open secret, the fact that it has been woven into a distinctive vision for Indian Audit Firms, and that too by the highest office, is what makes it path-breaking. There need be absolutely no confusion going forward that Indian Audit Firms have fallen far far behind. This is the obverse of the vision statement pronounced by our Hon PM. This fact simply cannot be stressed enough. It is the basis for the “wake up call”. It is not that India does not have audit and auditors. It is just that we don’t have Indian Audit firms providing auditing at the forefront – both domestically and globally – an unhealthy change that happened over the last two decades. What makes it all the more poignant and purposeful, is that such clarity and such vision did not come up from within the apex professional body of the country which found itself at the receiving end, instead of being in a position of claiming credit of having stood up for and presented a vision for Indian Firms versus Multinational Audit Firms (MAF).

 

The Structure

A comparative review of Firms in India and the UK or the USA is certainly required and has also been presented. However, this “landscape” requires a panorama photo to accompany it and complete the beautiful picture. Taking the population as a basis, India is truly far behind the West – absolute numbers are of limited value when the denominators are starkly different. The structure of the profession also is totally different in India. Non-regulated entities of the MAF operating in India dominate the scene. This is unlike any other country in the world. ICAI overseas only a small fraction of the head-count when one takes into account this factor. This brings in rampant non-regulation. It brings in a wide spread “non-level playing field” which is the term utilised in the two investigation reports approved by the Central Council of ICAI in 2003 and 2011 on the operations of MAF in India. And to say the least, all this has resulted into an attrition of goodwill and image for the professional bodies, so much so that Government has just finalised plans to create a new regulatory body which will reduce the present professional bodies to educational institutions.

 

Benchmarking

Coming now to the capture of Top 100 or Top 500 companies etc by the MAF, the numbers are very misleading if one does the calculations based on the number of entities. A credible analysis shows that the audit revenue of the MAF crosses Rs. 5,000 crores while the Top 20 IAF taken together stand at less that Rs. 200 Crores, pre-rotation. That is less than 4% market share. The most important fact however is missed when we only compare numbers, and that is the reality that in the West, the coverage by the MAF is a coverage by their own Western-headquartered Firms. While in India, the financial sector suffers a systemic risk since it is foreign firms that have the maximum majority of workshare. Apart from this systemic risk, it is a serious loss of space to generations of young future Indian CAs who find it impossible to enter into “own practice” as it happened for the first 50 years after our independence, before the MAF took over. Another huge issue of concern, is that when India becomes a global economic power 10 years hence, India will not have any global presence in auditing. These truly are our benchmarks. The post audit rotation numbers would be even more dismal – the present market share maybe less than 1 percent. Sometimes, in arguments driven by statistics, the baby does get swept out with the bathwater.

 

History

When we talk of the history of the MAF in India, we should not forget to bring up an important fact pointed out by the respected senior member of our profession, Shri S. Gurumurthy. (Books Unsquared, August 2017, Outlook Magazine, https://www.outlookindia.com magazine/story/the-books-unsquared/299171).
He observed that the RBI is the “original culprit” in allowing FDI into audit through automatic permissions in the consulting route by the MAF, which is not permitted. His prophetic predictions of the detriment to be caused to India through his White Paper of 2001 have sadly come to pass a dozen years later – be it the loss of our profession’s stature, or the many scams. Our Hon PM has said recently that this is a sad thing. This is also confirmed by ICAI in numerous adverse observations in the two Reports against the MAF operations in India. The gains made by the MAF are therefore illegally derived by acquiring as many as the Top 50 IAF over the last 20 years and steadily increasing market share through various means thereafter, and then to add fuel to the fire, using audit rotation to squeeze out IAF by various means, underpricing of services being one such. The errors of Brazil, Argentina, Korea and elsewhere, have got repeated in India – the practice base of local professional firms has been seriously negated.

Non-issues

The other issues on management, technology, thought-leadership and ideology are not relevant at this point. They can be caught up with fairly, for sure. When there is no business left in corporate India for audit by IAF, they are just niceties for the evening cocktail circuit. China has a vision of making its Top 50 CPA firms global and foreign FDI and firms are now banned in auditing of Chinese companies.

 

Conclusion

The horse has bolted – if you care to notice. Despite this, the time to act is now. The good news is that research in 2015 by IIM-A concludes that the advantage of the MAF is only a “market perception” and there is no superiority in the quality of the financial statements audited by MAF. Our policy maker’s vision is clear. India has come to its ‘patanjali’ moment, in terms of corporate consumers’ shift for auditing services to Indian audit firms. The process of making a global Indian audit firm has begun. _

 

New Section 90 In Companies Amendment Act 2017 – Aims At Benami Shareholders, Shoots Everyone Else But Them

Background

‘Shell companies’ have been in the news
recently. On how money is laundered, laws are avoided/evaded, benami properties
are held, etc. through such companies. This is more so
post-demonetisation when it has been alleged that a large sum of money has been
laundered through such companies. A series of actions have been taken. Several
listed companies have got their trading on stock exchanges restricted. Though
many got relief thereafter, it is also seen that investigations have been
initiated into activities of many such companies. Directors of such companies
have also been debarred.

 

It has been perceived that shares of such
companies may be held benami, thus making it difficult to catch the real
culprits. There are of course laws to deal with benami holdings including the
most prominent Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988, which too
was substantially amended in 2016.

 

A further step has now been taken to,
inter alia
, tackle such benami holdings through an amendment to section 89
and through introduction of a new section 90 by the Companies Amendment Act
2017, which has received the assent of the President on 3rd January
2018. However, the provisions, as this article is being written, await
notification.

 

Essentially, the said section 90, in very
wide terms, requires disclosure by individuals who, singly or jointly with
others, hold/control substantial interests in companies. This supplements and
indeed widely extends section 89 which requires disclosure of beneficial
interests in shares. This effectively appears to be intended to require
disclosure not just of benami holdings but also holding by eventual individual
owners.

 

However, the provisions are very widely and
even loosely/ambiguously worded. They will apply not just to listed companies
but also to unlisted/private companies. Further, disclosure, at least one time,
will be required by almost all companies, who then will have to make onward
disclosures to the Registrar.

 

Existing Section 89

Section 89 of the Companies Act 2013 deals
with disclosure of beneficial interests. A person who holds shares in his name
but who does not hold the beneficial interest therein is required to make a
declaration in the prescribed manner. This section corresponds to section 187-C
of the Companies Act, 1956. Now it has been amended by introduction of the
following definition which will be relevant also for section 90 discussed
below:

 

“(10) For
the purposes of this section and section 90, beneficial interest in a share
includes, directly or indirectly, through any contract, arrangement or
otherwise, the right or entitlement of a person alone or together with any
other person to—

 

(i) exercise or
cause to be exercised any or all of the rights attached to such share; or

 

(ii) receive or
participate in any dividend or other distribution in respect of such
share.”.

 

As can be seen, the scope of section 89 is
thus widened.

 

New Section 90

Section 90 goes much further beyond the
provisions of section 89. It requires that individuals who hold or control significant
holding in a company should disclose such fact to the Company. The Company will
record this declaration in a specified register and also make disclosures to
the Registrar. Some relevant extracts from the said section are given below
(emphasis supplied):-

 

90. (1) Every individual, who acting alone or together, or through one or more persons
or trust, including a trust and persons resident outside India
, holds beneficial interests, of not less than
twenty-five per cent. or such
other percentage as may be prescribed, in
shares
of a company
or the right to exercise, or
the actual exercising of significant
influence or control
as defined in clause (27) of section 2,
over the company (herein referred to as “significant beneficial
owner”), shall make a declaration to the company, specifying the nature of
his interest and other particulars, in such manner and within such period of acquisition
of the beneficial interest or rights and any change thereof, as may be
prescribed:

 

Provided that the Central Government may
prescribe a class or classes of persons who shall not be required to make
declaration under this sub-section.

 

(4) Every company shall file a return of
significant beneficial owners of the company and changes therein with the
Registrar containing names, addresses and other details as may be prescribed
within such time, in such form and manner as may be prescribed.

 

(5) A company shall give notice, in the
prescribed manner, to any person (whether or not a member of the company) whom
the company knows or has reasonable cause
?to believe—

 

(a) to be a significant beneficial owner
of the company;

 

(b) to be having knowledge of the
identity of a significant beneficial owner or another person likely to have
such knowledge; or

 

(c) to have been a significant beneficial
owner of the company at any time during the three years immediately preceding
the date on which the notice is issued, and who is not registered as a
significant beneficial owner with the company as required under this section.

…..

 

(7) The company shall,—?(a) where that person fails to give the company the information
required by the notice within the time specified therein; or
?(b) where the information given is not satisfactory, apply to the
Tribunal within a period of fifteen days of the expiry of the period specified
in the notice, for an order directing that the shares in question be subject to
restrictions with regard to transfer of interest, suspension of all rights
attached to the shares and such other matters as may be prescribed.

 

(8) On any application made under
sub-section (7), the Tribunal may, after giving an opportunity of being heard
to the parties concerned, make such order restricting the rights attached with
the shares within a period of sixty days of receipt of application or such
other period as may be prescribed.

 

(9) The company or the person aggrieved
by the order of the Tribunal may make an application to the Tribunal for
relaxation or lifting of the restrictions placed under sub-section (8).

 

(10) If any person fails to make a
declaration as required under sub-section (1),
?he shall be punishable with fine which shall not be less than one
lakh rupees but which may extend to ten lakh rupees and where the failure is a
continuing one, with a further fine which may extend to one thousand rupees for
every day after the first during which the failure continues.

 

(11) If a company, required to maintain
register under sub-section (2) and file the information under sub-section (4),
fails to do so or denies inspection as provided therein, the company and every
officer of the company who is in default shall be punishable with fine which
shall not be less than ten lakh rupees but which may extend to fifty lakh
rupees and where the failure is a continuing one, with a further fine which may
extend to one thousand rupees for every day after the first during which the
failure continues.

 

(12) If any person wilfully furnishes any
false or incorrect information or suppresses any material information of which
he is aware in the declaration made under this section, he shall be liable to
action under section 447.

 

To which categories of companies does this
section apply?

Section 90 applies to all types of
companies, whether public or private, whether listed or unlisted. All persons
who hold such significant beneficial ownership are required to make such
declaration, except where the Central Government has exempted them.

What type of holdings are required to be
disclosed?

The following types of holdings/control are
required to be disclosed:

 

1.  Beneficial interest of at
least 25% (or such other prescribed percentage) in shares of a company

2.  Right to exercise
significant influence or control.

3.  Actual exercising of
significant influence or control.

 

Such holding, etc. would be by an
individual either by himself or together or through other persons including
even persons outside India. The holding/control may be in a private, public or
even a listed company.

 

Implications

The implications of the new provisions are
wide. Almost every company will see such disclosures, unless the holding is so
widely held that no individual or group hold a significant holding/control. It
applies to all companies – private, public or listed. These disclosures will
then have to be recorded and then filed to Registrar. There will be massive
paperwork, even if one-time. A husband-wife company where each holds such 50%
will require disclosure by both persons. Private equity firms will have to make
such disclosures if they hold such significant holdings. Listed companies will
also see such disclosures. Even if none of these are benami holdings. Even
foreign shareholders are covered.

 

The wording is wide and, at some places,
ambiguous. Certain definitions are not given and hence may result in further
ambiguity. Take some examples.

 

If an individual holds/controls ‘together’
with another person, disclosure is required. However, it is not clear what
‘together’ means. Does it have a meaning similar to ‘persons acting in concert’
as defined in detail under the SEBI SAST Regulations?

 

Often directors, trustees, etc. may
exercise voting rights for companies, trusts, etc. Will they too have to
make disclosures? The Central Government may notify persons who are exempted
from making disclosures.

 

Shareholding particularly in groups and
listed companies may be held in complex structures. Is the law sufficient to
unravel such structures to find out who, if any, are ultimate persons who hold
shares or have or exercise control? SEBI and RBI have given guidance under
certain circumstances how to find who are real ultimate owners. But the Act
does not give any guidance.

 

Apparently, the provision will apply to
existing holdings as well as fresh acquisitions. Hence, a one-time declaration
would have to be made.

 

In any case, will the objective of detecting
benami holdings be achieved? The Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions
Act provides for confiscation of the properties and prosecution of persons
involved. Thus, making such a disclosure could be invitation for such serious
actions. The penalties for not making such disclosures, though significant in amount,
are not very large and does not result in any prosecution under the Act.

 

The Company has an obligation to notify
persons who hold shares or control to such extent if it has reason to believe.
If they do not take action, they too may face action.

 

Action by Company which believes a person who
is a significant beneficial owner

 

If the Company has reason to believe that
there is a person who has such holding/control, it needs to notify such person
to make a disclosure. If such person does not make a disclosure, the Company
has to approach the Tribunal to investigate. If it is found by the Tribunal
that there exists such holding, etc., then it may direct that the
transfer of such shares shall be restricted and all rights relating to such
shares shall be suspended.

 

Penalties

There are penalties if such individuals do
not make such disclosure. A penalty of Rs. 1 to 10 lakh plus upto Rs. 1000 for
every day of delay can be levied. False disclosures can result in prosecution.
The Company too faces penalties.

 

Conclusion

Clearly, these provisions need
reconsideration. It is submitted that it should not be notified and brought
into effect. Ideally, a revised and well drafted provision should be introduced
or, second best, through circulars and rules, the implications need to be
diluted and restricted. _

Money Laundering Act: Arrest And Bail

Introduction

Money laundering is a
serious offence which poses a threat not only to the financial systems of a
country but also to its integrity and sovereignty. To curb this offence of
money laundering, India passed the Prevention of Money Laundering Act,
2002
(“the Act”).
It is an Act which has assumed great significance in
the recent times. Several economic offences, such as, insider trading, under
the Prevention of Corruption Act, copyright infringement, cheating, forgery,
fraudulently preventing creditors, etc., have been added to the list of
scheduled offences under the Act and now the Act has been used as a weapon in
the fight against financial crimes. The Act is also important since it has
arrest provisions. The matter of bail in respect of an arrest under the Act is
something which has attracted great attention. Let us examine some of these
crucial provisions.

 

Money Laundering

The offence of Money
Laundering is dealt with by section 3 of the Act. The essential limbs of the
charging section are as under :

 

(i)   Whosoever
directly or indirectly

(ii)  attempts
to indulge or knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or is actually involved
in any process or activity connected with

(iii)  the
proceeds of crime and projecting it as untainted property

(iv) shall
be guilty of offence of money-laundering.

 

Under section 3 of the Act,
the categories of persons responsible for money laundering is extremely wide.
Words such as “whosoever”, “directly or indirectly” and “attempts to indulge”
would show that all persons who are even remotely involved in this offence are
sought to be roped in. The entire section revolves around the term “proceeds
of crime”.

 

The term “proceeds of
crime”
has been defined by section 2(1) (u) to mean any property
derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of
criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such
property or where such property is taken/held outside India, then the property
equivalent in value held within India. It is also relevant to note that not
only must there be proceeds of crime but the accused must either project it or
claim it to be as untainted property in order that it is an offence of money
laundering.

 

The Schedule to the Act
lays down a list of crimes such as drug trafficking, murder, homicide,
extortion, robbery, forgery of a valuable security, will or authority to make
or transfer any valuable security or to receive any money, counterfeiting of  currency, illegal trafficking in arms and
ammunition, poaching, etc. Thus, any proceeds from these crimes is covered by
the definition of proceeds of crime. As the Schedule is exhaustive only those
crimes which are covered by the Schedule and no other offences would fall
within its purview.  The Act divides the
offences under the Schedule into three Parts: Part A, Part B and Part C.  Part A offences are treated as money
laundering no matter howsoever small the amount involved in the offence,
whereas Part B offences are treated as money laundering, if and only if, the
amount involved exceeds Rs.1 crore.  
Part C relates to offences covered under Part A or against property
under the Indian Penal Code which have cross-border implications. An important
addition to Part C is an offence of wilful attempt to evade any tax, penalty or
interest under the Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income and Assets) and
Imposition of Tax Act, 2015.   

           

The term “property”
is defined by section 2(1)(v) to mean any property or assets of every
description, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible
or intangible and includes deeds and instruments evidencing title to, or
interest in, such property or assets, wherever located. It may be noted that
section 3 even covers indirect usage of laundered money. Thus, even if the
money is converted into some other asset, the provisions of section 3 would
apply. U/s. 24, the burden of proving that 
proceeds of crime are untainted property shall be on the accused.

 

Offences

Whoever commits the offence
of money-laundering shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term
from 3 years to 7 years and fine. In case of any offence specified under
paragraph 2 of Part A of the Schedule, maximum term is 10 years.

 

Further, u/s.45, in case of
a scheduled offence specified under Part A of the Schedule to the Act for which
the term is more than 3 years, the accused cannot be released on bail unless
two cumulative conditions are satisfied -the Public Prosecutor has been given
an opportunity to oppose such release and once he opposes, the Court is
satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is
not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence
while on bail. This provision for granting bail overrides anything contained to
the contrary in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which applies to
procedures relating to arrest, bail, confiscation, investigation, prosecution, etc.  It is this bail provision which has garnered
maximum attention.

 

The Supreme Court in Gautam
Kundu vs. Directorate of Enforcement (Prevention of Money-Laundering Act),
(2015) 16 SCC 1,
without going into the Constitutional validity of
section 45, held that the conditions specified u/s. 45 of the Act were mandatory
and needed to be complied with which was further strengthened by the provisions
of section 65 and also section 71 of the Act. Section 65 required that the
provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code should apply in so far as they were
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act and section 71 provided that
the provisions of the Act had overriding effect notwithstanding anything
inconsistent contained in any other law for the time being in force. The Act
had an overriding effect and the provisions of the Code would apply only if
they were not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. Therefore, the
conditions enumerated in section 45 of PMLA had to be complied with even in
respect of an application for bail made u/s.439 of the Code. That coupled with
the provisions of section 24 provided that unless the contrary was proved, the
Court presumed that proceeds of crime were involved in money laundering and the
burden to prove that the proceeds of crime were not involved, was on the
appellant. The same view was followed by the Supreme Court in Rohit
Tandon vs. The ED, Cr. A 1878-1879/2017
.

 

Evolution of the Act

Before analysing the
aforesaid section 45, it would be interesting to understand how the Act has
evolved from 2002 to its present form. When the Act was enacted, there were two
categories of scheduled offences – Part A and Part B of the Schedule to the
Act. Part A offences were treated as money laundering no matter howsoever small
the amount of offence involved, whereas Part B offences were treated as money
laundering, if and only if, the amount involved exceeded Rs. 30 lakh. Part A at
that time contained only two offences – Paragraph 1 contained sections 121 and
121A of the Indian Penal Code, which dealt with waging or attempting to wage
war or abetting waging of war against the Government of India and conspiracy to
commit such offences and  Paragraph 2
dealt with offences under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act,
1985. Except for these two serious offences, all other offences were listed
under Part B of the Schedule.

 

Thus, as originally
enacted, the Act provided that the twin conditions applicable u/s. 45(1) would
only be in cases involving waging of war against the Government of India and
offences under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act. For all
offences under Part B, these conditions were not applicable.

 

The 2009 Amendment
increased offences under Parts A and B of the Schedule. In Part A, offences
under the Indian Penal Code, relating to counterfeiting, offences under the
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, etc., were added. In Part B,
offences from the Indian Penal Code, Securities and Exchange Board of India Act
1992, Customs Act 1962, CopyrightAct 1957, Trademarks Act 1999, Information
Technology Act, etc., were added.

 

By the Amendment Act of
2012, a major change was made by which the entire Part B offences were
incorporated in Part A of the Schedule. Thus, the monetary limit of Rs. 30 lakh
no longer applied to these offences which were now made a part of Part A.

 

By the Finance Act of 2015,
the monetary limit of Rs.30 lakh under the Part B of the Schedule was raised to
Rs.1 crore and Part B of the Schedule incorporated one solo entry, pertaining
to false declarations and false documents under the Customs Act, 1962. Thus,
only in respect of this offence is there a monetary threshold. 

 

Bail Provisions Challenged

It was in this backdrop
that the constitutional validity of the twin conditions laid down u/s. 45(1)
for granting bail to an accused under the Act were challenged before the
Supreme Court in Nikesh Tarachand Shah vs. UOI, WP(Cr.) 67/2017 (SC).
The Supreme Court considered four alternative scenarios in which bail was
sought by a person arrested under the Act:

 

No.

Arrest
Scenario

Whether
s.45(1) applies?

Can
Bail be granted without satisfying twin conditions?

1

Arrested
for money laundering alone without attracting a scheduled offence

No
since Part A to Schedule does not apply

Yes

2

Arrested
for money laundering along with offence under Part B of the Schedule

No
since Part A to Schedule does not apply

Yes

3

Arrested
for money laundering along with offence under Part A of the Schedule for
which the term is 3 years or less

No
since although Part A to Schedule applies, the imprisonment is for 3 years or
less

Yes

4

Arrested
for money laundering along with offence under Part A of the Schedule for
which the term is more than 3 years

Yes
since Part A to Schedule applies and the imprisonment is for more than 3
years

No

 

 

The Court observed that the
likelihood of the accused getting bail in the first three situations was far
greater than in the fourth illustration, merely because he was being prosecuted
for a Schedule A offence which had imprisonment for over 3 years, a
circumstance which had no nexus with the grant of bail for the offence of money
laundering. This was something which could not by itself lead to grant or
denial of bail. It also observed that if an accused was tried for a scheduled
offence independently without the added tag of money laundering, then he could
easily get bail under the Code of Criminal Procedure but if was tried along with
section 3 of the Act, then the twin conditions of section 45 got attracted.
This was unfair,

 

It further observed that
section 45 requires the Court to decide whether it has reasonable grounds for
believing that the accused is not guilty of an offence under Part A. Thus,
while the accused has been arrested for an offence of money laundering, bail
would be denied on grounds germane to the scheduled offence, whereas the person
prosecuted would ultimately be punished for a completely different offen ce –
namely, money laundering. This, was laying down of a condition which had no
nexus with the offence of money laundering at all. Further, a person who may
prove that there were reasonable grounds for believing that he was not guilty
of the offence of money laundering may yet be denied bail, because he was
unable to prove that there were reasonable grounds for believing that he was
not guilty of the scheduled offence.

 

It held that the Act was
enacted so that property involved in money laundering may be attached and
brought back into the economy, as also that persons guilty of the offence of
money laundering must be brought to book. A classification based on sentence of
imprisonment of more than 3 years of an offence contained in Part A of the
Schedule, had no rational relation to the object of attaching and bringing back
into the economy large amounts by way of proceeds of crime. When it came to
Section 45, it was clear that a classification based on sentencing qua a
scheduled offence had no rational relation with the grant of bail for the
offence of money laundering.

 

The Court also observed
that certain similar offences were either incorporated or not incorporated
under Part A and hence, for some twin conditions for bail applied but not so
for the other. For instance, while counterfeiting of Government stamps was
included in the Act as a scheduled offence, counterfeiting of Indian coins was
not. Both were punishable with the same term under the Criminal Procedure Code,
but bail conditions would apply differently for each of them.

 

Another anomaly pointed out
by the Court was that while granting of bail required fulfilment of twin
conditions in respect of a specific situation, granting of anticipatory bail
did not attract any conditions for the very same situation. Thus, if pre arrest
bail was granted, which continued throughout the trial, for an offence under
Part A of the Schedule and money laundering, such a person would be out on bail
without him having satisfied the twin conditions of section 45. However, if in an
identical situation, he was prosecuted for the same offences, but was arrested,
and then he applied for bail, the twin conditions of section 45 would have
first to be met. 

 

Accordingly, for the above
reasons, the Apex Court held that section 45(1) was extremely unjust,
manifestly arbitrary and discriminatory and would directly violate the
fundamental rights of the accused under the Constitution of India. It also held
that the earlier Supreme Court decisions on section 45 of the Act proceeded
onthe footing that section 45 was constitutionally valid and then went on to
apply section 45 to the facts of those cases. Hence, they were not of any
assistance in the case under question where its constitutional validity itself
was challenged.

 

Ultimately, the Apex Court
declared that section 45(1) of the Act insofar as it imposed two further
conditions for release on bail, was unconstitutional as it violated Articles 14
and 21 of the Constitution of India. All the matters in which bail had been
denied, because of the presence of the twin conditions contained in section 45,
were sent back to the respective Courts which denied bail.

 

Conclusion

This is a very important
decision since it deals with bail which is a basic right of an accused who is
imprisoned. The Supreme Court, in an old case of Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia
vs. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565
, had laid down that bail is the
rule and refusal an exception and that a presumably innocent person must have
his freedom to enable him to establish his innocence.This decision has given
strength to the old adage, presumed innocent until proven guilty, otherwise the
section required an accused to demonstrate his defence at the bail stage
itself!
_

 

15 Section 37, CBDT Circular No. 5 of 2012 – Expenditure incurred on AMP by a pharma company, on organising conferences and seminars of doctors, with the main object of updating the doctors of latest developments and to create awareness about new research in medical field which is beneficial to the doctors, cannot be disallowed.

[2018] 89 taxmann.com 249 (Mumbai – Trib.)

Solvay Pharma India Ltd. vs. Pr.CIT

ITA No. : 3585 (Mum) of  2016

A.Y.: 2011-12      Date of Order: 11th January, 2018



Medical Council of India Regulations do not
apply to pharma companies.

 

FACTS

The assessee company incurred Advertisement
expense of Rs. 25,02,929 and Publicity and Propaganda Expense of Rs.
15,94,99,360.  The assessee in his letter
informed the Assessing Officer (AO) that Advertisement expenses are in
compliance with CBDT Circular No. 5/2012 dated 1.8.2012 but did not furnish any
further details.  The AO neither called
for the books of accounts nor called for any evidence such as invoices,
vouchers, etc.  The assessee was neither asked
to file by the AO nor did it suo moto file any corroborative details in respect
of Publicity and Propoganda Expenses.

 

The CIT was of the view that if any
expenditure incurred is claimed u/s. 37 especially those expenditure which the
business entity incurs on items which may broadly be classified as
`Advertisement, Marketing and Business Promotion’ (in short AMP), the
possibility of incurring expenditure on prohibited items as per Explanation
below section 37(1) of the Act exists which must be ruled out by some
examination of corroborative evidence called for and produced before the
AO.  Since the AO did not make any
inquiry, the CIT held the assessment order to be erroneous and prejudicial to
the interest of the revenue.  He rejected
the contentions of the assessee that the MCI regulations are not applicable to
pharma companies but only to medical practitioners.  He also rejected the contention that
expenditure so incurred is not in the nature of freebies to the doctors.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the Tribunal.

 

HELD 

The Tribunal held that the MCI Regulations
are not applicable to the assessee, the question of assessee incurring
expenditure in alleged violation of the regulation does not arise. 

 

CBDT Circular No. 5 of 2012 seeks to
disallow expenditure incurred by pharmaceutical companies interalia in providing
`freebies’ to doctors in violation of the MCI Regulations.  The term “freebies” has neither been defined
in the Income-tax Act nor in the MCI Regulations.  However, the expenditure so incurred by
assessee does not amount to provision of `freebies’ to medical
practitioners.  The expenditure incurred
by it is in the normal course of its business for the purpose of marketing of
its products and dissemination of knowledge etc. and not with a view to giving
something free of charge to the doctors. 
The act of giving something free of charge is incidental to the main
objective of product awareness. 
Accordingly, it does not amount to provision of freebies.  Consequently, there is no question of
contravention of the MCI Regulations and applicability of Circular No. 5 of
2012 for disallowance of the expenditure.

 

Explanation to section 37(1) provides an
embargo upon allowing any expenditure incurred by the assessee for any purpose
which is an offence or which is prohibited by law.  This means that there should be an offence by
an assessee who is claiming the expenditure or there is any kind of prohibition
by law which is applicable to the assessee. 
Here in this case, no such offence of law has been brought on record, which
prohibits the pharmaceutical company not to incur any development or sales
promotion expenses.

 

CBDT Circular
dated 1.8.2012 in its clarification has enlarged the scope and applicability of
`Indian Medical Council Regulation, 2002’ by making it applicable to the
pharmaceutical companies or allied health care sector industries.  Such an enlargement of scope of MCI
regulation to the pharmaceutical companies by the CBDT is without any enabling
provisions either under the provision of the Income-tax Law or by any
provisions under the Indian Medical Council Regulations. The CBDT cannot
provide casus omissus to a statute or notification or any regulation
which has not been expressly provided therein.

 

The beneficial circular may apply
retrospectively but a circular imposing a burden has to be applied
prospectively only. Here, in this case the CBDT has enlarged the scope of
`Indian Medical Council Regulation, 2002’ and made it applicable for the
pharmaceutical companies.  Therefore,
such a CBDT circular cannot be reckoned to have retrospective effect. The free
sample of medicine is only to prove the efficacy and to establish the trust of
the doctors on the quality of the drugs. This again cannot be reckoned as
freebies given to the doctors but for promotion of its products. 

 

The pharmaceutical company, which is engaged
in manufacturing and marketing of pharmaceutical products can promote its sale
and brand only by arranging seminars, conferences and thereby creating
awareness among doctors about the new research in the medical field and
therapeutic areas, etc. Every day there are new developments taking
place around the world in the area of medicine and therapeutic, hence in order
to provide correct diagnosis and treatment of patients, it is imperative that
the doctors should keep themselves updated with the latest developments in the
medicine and the main object of such conferences is to update the doctors of
the latest developments, which is beneficial to the doctors in treating the
patients as well as the pharmaceutical companies. 

 

The Tribunal did not find any merit in the
order passed u/s. 263. It allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

 

14 Section 56(2)(vi) – Amount received by the assessee, at the time of her retirement, from the firm, after surrendering her right, title and interest therein, is for a consideration and therefore, not taxable u/s. 56(2)(vi).

2017] 89 taxmann.com 95 (Pune-Trib.)

Smt. Vasumati Prafullachand Sanghavi vs.
DCIT

ITA No. : 161/Pune/2015

A.Y.: 2008-09 Date of Order:  13th December, 2017


FACTS 

For the assessment year under consideration,
the assessee filed her return of income declaring therein a total income of Rs.
88,330. The Assessing Officer (AO) issued a notice u/s. 147 of the Act on the
ground that the amount of Rs. 21,52,73,777 received by her on relinquishing her
share in the partnership firm Deepak Foods (DF) has escaped assessment.

 

During the year under consideration, the
assessee retired as a partner from Deepak Foods and received an amount of Rs.
21,66,52,000. This amount was claimed in the return of income and was accepted
by the AO in the regular assessment as exempt. 

 

The capital balance of the assessee, on the
eve of retirement from the firm, was Rs. 13,78,223. In the return of income,
the assessee furnished a note stating that the credit balance in capital
account of the assessee includes share of Goodwill received from Deepak Foods
on retirement from the firm.  While
assessing the total income in reassessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer
(AO), by relying upon the decision of the Pune Tribunal in the case of Shevantibhai
C. Mehta vs. CIT [2004] 4 SOT 94 (Pune)
taxed Rs. 21,52,73,777 as income
from long term capital gains.  Further,
the AO, alternatively, assessed the amount of Rs. 21,52,73,777 as income from
other sources. 

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to CIT(A) where it was contended that the similar addition was made in the
assessment of Smt. Shakuntala S. Sanghavi, the other retiring partner, who also
received identical amount.  In her case,
upon completion of the assessment, the CIT in revision proceedings set aside
the order passed by the AO and taxed the amount in an order passed u/s. 263 of
the Act. The Tribunal quashed the revision order of CIT both on facts and on
merits. Consequential order passed by AO u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 263 was also
quashed and original order restored by the Tribunal in the case of Smt.
Shakuntala S. Sanghavi. The assessee relied on the order of the Tribunal in the
case of Shakuntala S. Sanghavi vs. ACIT [ITA No. 956(Pn) of 2013) relating to
AY 2008-09, order dated 22.3.2014]
regarding finality of the issue by the
Tribunal on the taxability of the said receipts.However, the CIT(A) held that
the amounts received by the assessee from Deepak Foods constitute a gift
taxable u/s. 56(2)(vi) of the Act.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the Tribunal.

 

HELD  

The Tribunal observed that the ratio of the
decision of Pune Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Smt. Shakuntala S.
Sanghavi (supra) and order of the Tribunal in the case of ITO vs.
Rajnish M. Bhandari [IT Appeal No. 469 (PN) of 2011, dated 17.7.2012]
and
the judgment of the Bombay High Court in CIT vs. Riyaz A. Sheikh [2014] 221
Taxman 118 (Bom.)
suggest that the receipts of this kind are not to be
taxed under the head `Income from Capital Gains’ as well as under the head
`Income from Other Sources’ in general. 
In view of the order of the Tribunal in the case of Smt. Shakuntala S.
Sanghavi, on similar facts, the non-taxability of the said receipt under the
head `Capital Gains’ as well as under the provisions of section 56 of the Act,
i.e. under the head `Income from Other Sources’ has reached finality.

 

As regards taxability of the said receipt
under the specific provision of section 56(2)(vi) of the Act, the Tribunal
noted that     the     assessee     received   
compensation      of  Rs. 21,66,32,000 from Deepak Foods on her
retirement when she surrendered her right, title, interest in the said
firm.  Therefore, the amount of
compensation cannot be said to have been received without consideration.  It observed that it is not the case of the
revenue that the assessee continues to be a partner even after receipt of the
consideration and that the assessee has not surrendered the rights of every
kind in the firm. 

 

The Tribunal decided the appeal in favour of
the assessee.

 

45 Section 92C – Transfer pricing Computation of arm’s length price (ALP) – A. Y. 2006-07 – Comparable and adjustment – There is no provision in law which makes any distinction between a Government owned company and a company under private management for purpose of transfer pricing audit and/or fixation of ALP – A company cannot be excluded as a comparable only on ground that company has far higher turnover – Where both comparable and assessee were in segment of manufacture of tractors and power tillers and all functions of comparable company and assessee were same, said company should not be rejected as a comparable only because of its higher turnover

CIT vs. Same Deutz – Fahr India (P.)
Ltd.; [2018] 89 taxmann.com 47 (Mad):

 

The assessee-company was in the segment of
manufacture of tractors and power tillers. It entered into international
transactions with its associated enterprise (AE). The Transfer Pricing Officer
(TPO) had rejected the comparable companies selected by the assessee except one
VST Tillers in the transfer pricing documentation on the ground that the said
company recorded huge turnover whereas the turnover of assessee was very small
and, hence, not comparable. TPO had selected HMT Limited as one of the
comparables on functional similarity, but while determining the ALP, he had not
included HMT Limited as a comparable. The Tribunal found, on facts, that both
were comparable and the assessee was in the segment of manufacture of tractors
and power tillers and all the functions of HMT Limited and the assessee were
the same and that TPO ought not to have rejected said company as a comparable
only because of its higher turnover, as it would be impossible to find out
comparables with all similarities, including similarity of turnover.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the decision
of the Tribunal and held as under

 

“i)  The Tribunal very rightly
observed and held that refusal to include a company as a comparable only on the
ground that the company had far higher turnover was not justified. The Tribunal
also very rightly observed that no comparable could have exactly the same
turnover. The Tribunal found, on facts, that both comparable and the assessee
was in the segment of manufacture of tractors and power tillers and all the
functions of HMT Limited and the assessee were the same and that TPO ought not
to have rejected said company as a comparable only because of its higher
turnover, as it would be impossible to find out comparables with all
similarities, including similarity of turnover.

 

ii)  In the grounds of appeal,
it is urged that the Tribunal failed to appreciate that HMT Limited was a
Government owned company and the functions performed under Government
management were altogether different from a private company. There is no provision
of law which makes any distinction between a Government owned company and a
company under private management for the purpose of transfer pricing audit
and/or fixation of ALP. There is no reason why a Government owned company
cannot be treated as a comparable.

 

iii)           It
is reiterated that the Tribunal found, on facts, that the functionality of HMT
Limited and the assessee were the same. In our considered opinion, the decision
of the Tribunal does not warrant interference of this court.”

44 TDS – Fees for technical services or payment for work – Sections 194C and 194J – Fees for technical services or payment for work – Sections 194C and 194J – A. Ys. 2008-09 to 2011-12 – Broadcasting of television channels – Placement charges, subtitling, editing expenses and dubbing charges – Are part of production of programmes – Not fees for professional or technical services – Amounts paid falling u/s. 194C and not section 194J

CIT vs. UTV Entertainment Television
Ltd.; 399 ITR 443 (Bom):

 

The assessee company carried on the business
of broadcasting of television channels. It paid certain amounts on account of
carriage/placement fees, editing/subtitling expenses and dubbing charges. Tax
at source was deducted by the assessee on these amounts u/s. 194C of the Act,
at the rate of 2%. The relevant period is A. Ys. 2008-09 to 2011-12. The
Assessing Officer was of the view that the amounts were in the nature of fees
payable for technical services and, therefore, tax should have been deducted
u/s. 194J. Accordingly he passed orders u/s. 201(1)/201(1A) and raised demand.
The Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal accepted the assesee’s claim and
held that the tax has been rightly deducted at 2% u/s. 194C of the Act.
Accordingly, they set aside the order of the Assessing Officer.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High
Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)  When
services are rendered as part of the contract accepting placement fees or
carriage fees, they were similar to services rendered against the payment of
standard fees paid for broadcasting of channels of any frequency. The placement
fees were paid under a contract between the assessee and the cable operators or
multi system operators. Considering the nature of transactions, the payments
were not in the nature of commission or royalty.

 

ii)  Commissioner (Appeals) had
found that by agreeing to place the channel on any preferred band, the cable
operator did not render any technical service to the distributor or television
channel. He had rightly found that if the contract was executed for
broadcasting and telecasting the channels of the assessee, the payment was
covered by section 194C as it fell within clause (iv) of the definition of
“work”. Therefore, when placement charges were paid by the assessee to the
cable operators and multi system operators for placing the signals on a
preferred band, it was a part of work of broadcasting and telecasting covered
by sub-clause (b) of clause (iv) of the Explanation to section 194C. It was
found that by an agreement to place the channel on a prime band by accepting
placement fees, the cable operator or multi system operator did not render any
technical services. The Commissioner (Appeals) had recorded detailed findings
on the basis of material on record.

 

iii)  Regarding subtitling
charges also, the finding of fact recorded by the Commissioner (Appeals), which
was confirmed by the Tribunal, was that the work of subtitling was also covered
by the definition of “work” in sub-clause (b) of clause (iv) of the Explanation
to section 194C which covered the work of broadcasting or telecasting including
production of programmes for such broadcasting and telecasting and that the
work of subtitling was part of production programmes.

 

iv) The findings of fact
recorded by the appellate authorities and the view taken by the Tribunal were
justified. No question of law arose.”

43 Section 271(1)(c) – Penalty – Concealment of income – A. Y. 2014-15 – Condition precedent – No specific finding that conduct of assessee amounted to concealment of particulars of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars of income – Assessee not found to have furnished inaccurate particulars but making incorrect claim of rebate – Voluntary withdrawal of claim pursuant to notice – No concealment of income – Order imposing penalty unsustainable

Gopalratnam Santha Mosur vs. ITO; 399 ITR
155 (Mad):

 

The relevant year is A. Y. 2014-15. The
assessee sold an immovable property and paid the entire capital gains tax
applicable in respect of the transaction. Thereafter she claimed 50% of the
capital gains tax as rebate under DTAA between India and Canada. The Assessing
Officer issued a notice proposing to disallow the claim for rebate. In
response, the assessee submitted a revised income computation statement,
withdrawing the claim to the rebate and requesting the Assessing Officer to
give effect to the revised tax payable and issue the refund. The assessment
order was passed considering the revised statement. The Assessing Officer also
imposed a penalty of Rs. 23,31,787 u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act for concealment of
income.

 

The assessee filed a writ petition
challenging the order of penalty. The Madras High Court allowed the writ
petition and held as under:

 

“i)  Until and unless the
authority had rendered a specific finding that the conduct of the assessee
amounted to concealment of particulars of her income or had furnished
inaccurate particulars of such income, the provisions of section 271(1)(c)
could not be invoked. The Assessing Officer had to form an opinion that it was
a case where penalty proceedings had to be initiated and reasons were required
to justify and order imposing penalty.

 

ii)  The basic parameters had
not been fulfilled. In response to the notice, the assessee had submitted a
reply stating that after she was served notice u/s. 143(2), she had furnished
all the required documents called for during the course of assessment and that
the Assessing officer had asked for the details on the rebate claimed by her
according to the DTAA and in response to the show-cause notice, the assessee
had mentioned that she had inadvertently claimed a rebate of 50% on the total
tax payable and had submitted a revised computation withdrawing the rebate
claimed. The assessee had filed a revised computation statement and
accordingly, the assessment was completed.

 

iii)  Thus, the withdrawal of
the rebate claim was voluntary and could not be brought within the expression
concealment of particulars or furnishing inaccurate particulars. There was no
concealment of income nor submitting of inaccurate information, as all the
relevant details were furnished by the assessee. There had been no
misrepresentation of the facts to the Assessing Officer and that the
inadvertent claim to rebate on the tax liability which had admittedly been paid
in the other country showed that the intention of the assessee was not to
furnish inaccurate particulars or conceal her income.

 

iv) The Assessing Officer had
not rendered any finding that the details supplied by the assessee in her
return were erroneous or false or that a mere claim for rebate amounted to
furnishing of inaccurate particulars. Thus the order passed u/s. 271(1)(c)
levying penalty was unsustainable.”

 

42 Section 144C – International transactions – Assessment – A. Y. 2009-10 – Draft assessment order – Final assessment order giving effect to directions of DRP – AO not entitled to introduce new disallowance not contemplated in draft assessment order

CIT vs. Sanmina SCI India P. Ltd.; 398
ITR 645 (Mad):

 

Pursuant to a reference u/s. 92CA(1) of the
Act, an order of transfer pricing determining the arm’s length price (ALP) of
international transactions was passed by the Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO)
culminating in an order of draft assessment u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 144C(1) of the
Act. The assessee filed objections before the Dispute Resolution Penal (DRP)
against the draft assessment order. The DRP issued directions in relation to
the transfer pricing adjustment as well as claim to relief u/s. 10A of the Act.
Effect was given to the directions of the DRP. While doing so the Assessing
Officer introduced a new disallowance not contemplated in the draft order of
assessment being the aggregation of income or loss from variations, sources
under the same head of income prior to allowance of relief u/s. 10A and since
the aggregation resulted in a loss, he did not allow relief u/s. 10A of an
amount of Rs. 2.98 crore. The returned loss of an amount of Rs. 19,14,03,268
was thus reduced to the extent of deduction u/s. 10A of an amount of Rs. 2.98
crore. The Tribunal set aside the adjustment effected by the Assessing Officer
in relation to treatment of brought forward losses prior to allowance of
deduction u/s. 10A of the Act. The Department was directed to grant deduction
prior to effecting adjustment of brought forward losses.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High
Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)  The scheme of section 144C
would be wholly violated if the Assessing Officer takes it upon himself to
include in the final order of assessment additions, disallowances or variations
that do not form part of the order of draft assessment. The powers of an Assessing
Officer u/s. 144C(13) have clearly been limited to giving consequence to the
directions of the DRP and cannot extend any further. Any attempt by the
Assessing Officer to delve beyond would result in great prejudice to an
assessee in the light of the express stipulation that no opportunity is to be
provided and an interpretation to further such a conclusion would be wholly
unacceptable and contrary to law.

 

ii)  Acceptance of the
proposition advanced by the Department would amount to giving leave to the
Assessing Officer to pass more than one order of assessment in the course of a
single proceeding, which was not envisaged in the scheme of the Act. Subsequent
assessments either rectifying, revising or reopening the original assessment
were permitted by exercising specified powers under different statutory
provisions. The order of draft assessment u/s. 144C(1) was for all intents and
purposes is an order of original assessment though in draft form.

 

iii)  The order of Tribunal to
this effect was right in law and called for no interference. The variation in
the order of final assessment relating to the priority of set off of losses was
purely misconceived and was in excess of jurisdiction by the Assessing Officer
in terms of section 144C(13) of the Act.”

41 u/s. 80-IA(4) – Infrastructure project – Deduction- A. Y. 2003-04 – Development of infrastructure facility – Effect of section 80-IA(4) – Person developing infrastructure facility and person operating it may be different – Both entitled to deduction u/s. 80-IA(4) on portion of gains received

Principal CIT vs. Nila Baurat Engineering
Ltd.; 399 ITR 242 (Guj):

 

The assessee was engaged in the business of
civil construction and installation of various infrastructure projects. For the
A. Y. 2003-04, the assessee had claimed deduction u/s. 80-IA(4) of the Act, and
the same was allowed by the Assessing Officer. Subsequently, the Assessing
Officer issued notice u/s. 148 for reassessment on the ground that after
completion of the construction work, the assesee had assigned the task of
maintenance and toll collection of the road to one RTIL and hence the deduction
u/s. 80-IA(4) had been granted erroneously. Accordingly, the deduction was
disallowed in the reassessment order. The Tribunal held that the assessee was
entitled to deduction u/s. 80-IA(4).

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High
Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)  Under sub-section (4) of
section 80-IA of the Act, an enterprise carrying on the business of developing,
or operating and maintaining, or developing, operating and maintaining
infrastructure facility would be eligible for deduction. Thus, this provision
itself envisages that in a given project the developer and the person maintains
and operates may be different. Merely because the person maintaining and
operating the infrastructure facility is different from the one who developed
it, that would not deprive the developer of the deduction under the section on
the income arising out of such development.

 

ii)  By virtue of the operation
of the proviso, the developer would not be deprived of the benefit of deduction
under sub-section (1) of section 80-IA on the profit earned by it from its
activity of developing the infrastructure. The proviso does not operate to
deprive the developer of the benefit of the deduction even after the facility
is transferred for the purpose of maintenance and operation but the profit
element would be split into one derived from the development of the
infrastructure and that derived from the activity of maintenance and operation
thereof.

 

iii)  The assessee having
transferred the facility for the limited purpose of maintenance and operation
to RTIL, it would receive a fixed payment of Rs. 328 lakh per annum
irrespective of the toll collection by RTIL. This profit element therefore
would be relatable to the infrastructure development activity of the assessee
and would qualify for deduction u/s. 80-IA of the Act. RTIL would have a claim
for deduction on its profit arising out of maintenance and operation of
infrastructure facility which apparently would exclude the pay out of RS. 328
lakh to the assessee.”

40 U/s. 80-IB(10)(a) – . Housing project – Deduction – Completion certificate – Assessee completing construction and applying for certificate of completion before stipulated date – Delay in issuance of completion certificate beyond control of assessee – Assessee entitled to deduction

Principal CIT vs. Ambey Developer P.
Ltd.; 399 ITR 216 (P&H):

 

The assessee was a builder. For the A. Y.
2010-11, the assesee claimed deduction u/s. 80IB(10)(a) of the Act,  in respect of the housing project completed
by it in the relevant year. The assessee had filed a completion certificate
from the Municipal Town Planner dated 30/12/2011 with a letter written to the
Commissioner dated 29/03/2010 for completion certificate. The Assessing Officer
held that the housing project approved on 01/04/2005 should have been completed
within five years from the end of the month in which it was approved, i.e.
31/03/2010. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim for deduction u/s.
80IB(10) of the Act and added it back to the assessee’s taxable income. The
Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the deduction holding that delay in issuance of
the completion certificate was beyond the control of the assessee and was not
attributable to him. The Tribunal confirmed this.   

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and
Haryana High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)  Though the words used in
clause (ii) of the Explanation to section 80-IB(10)(a) is “shall”, but it would
not necessarily mean that in every case, it shall be taken to be a mandatory
requirement. It would depend upon the intent of the Legislature and not the
language in which the provision is clothed. The meaning and the intent of the
Legislature would be gathered not on the basis of the phraseology of the
provision but taking into consideration its nature, its design and the
consequences which would follow from interpreting it in a particular way alone.

 

ii)  The purport of clause (ii)
of the Explanation to section 80-IB(10)(a) of the Act is to safeguard the
interests of the Revenue wherever the construction has not been completed
within the stipulated period. Thus, it cannot mean that the requirement is
mandatory in nature and would disentitle an assessee to the benefit of  section 80-IB(10)(a) of the Act even where
the assessee had completed the construction within the stipulated period and
had made an application to the local authority within the prescribed time. The
issuance of the requisite certificate is within the domain of the competent
authority over which the assessee has no control.

 

iii)  The construction was
completed before the stipulated date, i.e., 31/03/2010 and the certificate of
completion was applied on 29/03/2010 and was issued to the assessee on
31/12/2011. The assessee in such circumstances could not be denied the benefit
of section 80-IB(10)(a) of the Act.”

39 U/s. 80-IC – Deduction An ‘undertaking or an enterprise’ established after 07/01/2003, and carried out ‘substantial expansion’ within specified window period, i.e., between 07/01/2003 and 01/04/2012, would be entitled to deduction on profits at rate of 100 per cent, u/s. 80-IC post said expansion

Stovekraft India vs. CIT; [2017] 88
taxmann.com 225 (HP)

 

The assessee started its business activity
with effect from 06/01/2005 and treating the F. Y. 2005-2006 (A. Y. 2006-2007),
as initial assessment year, claimed deduction on profits at the rate of 100 per
cent u/s. 80-IC of the Act.  Sometime in
the F. Y. 2009-10, the assessee carried out ‘substantial expansion’ of the
‘Unit’ and by treating the said Financial Year to be the ‘initial assessment
year’, further claimed deduction at the rate of 100 per cent, instead of 25 per
cent, u/s. 80-IC. The Assessing Officer denied the claim of deduction at the
rate of 100 per cent with effect from Financial Year 2009-10 after undertaking
‘substantial expansion’, so carried out holding that the assessee was not
entitled to deduction not at the rate of 100 per cent but on reduced basis at
the rate of 25 per cent, as provided u/s. 80-IC. He concluded that only such of
those units, existing prior to incorporation of section 80-IC in the statute,
i.e. 07/01/2003, could undertake substantial expansion and units established
subsequent to the said date being termed as ‘new industrial units’ were
ineligible for exemption u/s. 80-IC, even though they might had carried out any
expansion, substantial or otherwise. He held that, for the purpose of section
80-IC, the assessee can have only one assessment year as initial assessment
year. The Tribunal upheld the decision of the Assessing Officer.

 

On appeal by the assessee, the Himachal Pradesh
High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held
as under:

 

“i)  What is of importance is
the stipulation under sub-clause (ii) of clause (b) of sub-section 2 of section
80-IC, insofar as State of Himachal Pradesh is concerned. If between 07/01/2003
and 01/04/2012, a ‘Unit’ has ‘begun’ or ‘begins’ to manufacture or produce any
article or thing, specified in the Fourteenth Schedule or commences any
operation ‘and undertakes substantial expansion’ during the said period, then
by virtue of sub-section (3), it shall be entitled to deduction at the rate of
100 per cent of profits and gains for five assessment years, commencing from
‘initial assessment year’ and thereafter at the rate of 25 per cent of the
profits and gains. The only restriction being that such substantial expansion
is not formed by splitting up, or reconstruction, of the business already in
existence. At this stage, it is noted that under sub-section (6) of section
80-IC, there is a cap(10 years) with regard to the total period for which a
‘Unit’ is entitled to such deduction.

 

ii)  Can there be more than one
‘initial assessment year’, as the authorities below have held it not to be so?
Clause (v) of sub-section (8) of section 80-IC, defines what is an ‘initial
assessment year’. It is only for the purpose of this section. Now, ‘initial
assessment year’ has been held to mean the assessment year relevant to the
previous year in which the ‘Unit’ begins to manufacture or produce article or
thing or commences operation or completes substantial expansion. Significantly,
the Act does not stipulate that only units established prior to 07/01/2003
shall be entitled to the benefits u/s. 80-IC. The definition of ‘initial
assessment year’ is disjunctive and not conjunctive. The initial assessment year
has to be subsequent to the year in which the ‘Unit’ completes substantial
expansion or commences manufacturing etc., as the case may be.

 

iii)  A bare look at Explanation
(b) of section 80-IB (11C) and section 80-IB(14)(c) would reflect that, earlier
[till section 80-IC was inserted with effect from 01/04/2004], ‘substantial
expansion’ was not included in the definition of ‘initial assessment year’.
Earlier definition had used words ‘starts functioning’, ‘company is approved’,
‘commences production’, ‘begins business’, ‘starts operating’, ‘begins to
provide services’. But section 80-IC (8)(v) changed wordings [of ‘initial
assessment year’] to ‘begins to manufacture’, ‘commences operation’, or
‘completes substantial expansion’. Thus, legislature consciously extended the
benefit of ‘initial assessment year’ to a unit that completed substantial
expansion.

iv) This is absolutely in
conjunction and harmony with clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 80-IC,
which postulates  two things – (a) an
undertaking or an enterprise has ‘begun’, it is in the past tense or (b)
‘begins’, which is in presenti. Significantly, what is important is the
word ‘and’ prefixed to the words ‘undertakes substantial expansion’ during the
period 07/01/2003 to 01/04/2012.

 

v)  Words ‘commencing with the
initial Assessment Year’ are relevant. It is the trigger point for entitling
the unit, subject to the fulfillment of its eligibility for deduction at the
rate of 100 per cent, for had it not been so, there was no purpose or object of
having inserted the said words in the section. If the intent was only to give
100 per cent deduction for the first five years and thereafter at the rate of
25 per cent for next five years, the Legislatures would not have inserted the
said words. They would have plainly said, ‘for the first initial five years a
unit would be entitled to deduction at the rate of 100 per cent and for the
remaining five years at the rate of 25 per cent’.

 

vi) Thus, the question, which
further arises for consideration, is as to whether, it is open for a ‘Unit’ to
claim deduction for a period of ten years at the rate of 100 per cent or not.
It is legally permissible. The statute provides for the same.

 

vii) Also, ‘substantial
expansion’ can be on more than one occasion. Meaning of expression ‘substantial
expansion’ is defined in clause (8(ix)) of section 80-IC and with each such
endeavour, if the assessee fulfils the criteria then there cannot be any
prohibition with regard thereto. For what is important is not the number of
expansions, but the period within which such expansions can be carried out
within the window period [07/01/2003 to 01/04/2012], and it is here the words
‘begun’ or ‘begins’ and ‘undertakes substantial expansion’ during the said
period, as stipulated under clause (b) sub-section 2 of section 80-IC, to be of
significance. The only rider imposed is by virtue of sub-section (6) of section
80-IA, which caps the deduction with respect to assessment years to which a
unit is entitled to.

 

viii)The Act does not create distinction between the old units,
i.e., the units which stand established prior to 07/01/2003 (the cutoff date),
and the new units established thereafter. Artificial distinction sought to be
inserted by the revenue, only results into discrimination. The object, intent
and purpose of enactment of the section in question is only to provide
incentive for economic development, industrialisation and enhanced employment
opportunities. The continued benefit of deduction at higher rates is available
only to such of those units, which fulfil such object by carrying out
‘substantial expansion’.

 

ix) Both the Assessing Officer
as well as the Appellate Authority(s)/Tribunal erred in not appreciating as to
what was the intent and purpose of insertion of section 80-IC. Thus, in view of
the above discussion, these appeals are allowed and orders passed by the
Assessing Officer as well as the Appellate Authority and the Tribunal, in the
case of each one of the assessees, are quashed and set aside, holding as under:

 

a)  Such of those undertakings
or enterprises which were established, became operational and functional prior
to 07/01/2003 and have undertaken substantial expansion between 07/01/2003 upto
01/04/2012, should be entitled to benefit of section 80-IC, for the period for
which they were not entitled to the benefit of deduction u/s. 80-IB.

 

b)  Such of those units which
have commenced production after 07/01/2003 and carried out substantial
expansion prior to 01/04/2012, would also be entitled to benefit of deduction
at different rates of percentage stipulated u/s. 80-IC.

 

c)  Substantial expansion
cannot be confined to one expansion. As long as requirement of section
80-IC(8)(ix) is met, there can be number of multiple substantial expansions.

 

d)  Correspondingly, there can
be more than one initial assessment years.

 

e)  Within the window period of
07/01/2013 upto 01/04/2012, an undertaking or an enterprise can be entitled to
deduction at the rate of 100 per cent for a period of more than five years.

f)   All this, of course, is
subject to a cap of ten years. [Section 80-IC(6)].”

38 Sections 2(15) and 11 – Charitable trust – Exemption – A. Ys. 2010-11 and 2011-12 – Charitable purpose – Effect of insertion of proviso in section 2(15) – Trust running educational institutions – purchase of land for charitable purposes – inability to utilise land for charitable purpose – Sale of land in plots – sale consideration utilised for charitable purposes – Assessee entitled to exemption –

CIT vs. Sri Magunta Raghava Reddy
Charitable Trust; 398 ITR 663 (Mad):

 

The assessee was a trust running educational
institutions. It purchased lands to an extent of 71.89 acres in the year
1986-87 for the purpose of setting up a medical college and old age home. The
assessee could not obtain the necessary permissions from the competent
authorities and accordingly the said land could not be utilised for the said
purpose. Therefore, the assessee divided the land into plots and sold the plots
and received profits in different years. The profit was utilised for the
charitable purposes. For the A. Ys. 2010-11 and 2011-12, the Assessing Officer
brought to tax, a sum under the head, ”income from business”. The Tribunal held
that the assessee was entitled to exemption u/s. 11.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High
Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)  Merely because the lands
were sold from 1994 onwards, and fetched a higher value, it could not be said
that it was only for profit motive. When there was no prohibition in the
Income-tax Act, 1961, restraining unutilised land to be sold in smaller extent,
such activity of the assessee, could not be construed as predominant business
activity.

 

ii)  The material on record
further disclosed that the sale proceeds of the lands were utilised only for
charitable purposes and not diverted. Even going by the subsequent conduct of
the assessee in utilizing the profits earned, only for charitable purposes, it
was evident that the intention of the assessee was not to engage continuously
in business or trade or commerce. The assessee was entitled to exemption u/s.
11.”

37 Sections 10A, 10B, 254 and 263 – Appellate Tribunal Power to direct consideration of alternative claim – A. Y. 2010-11 – Revision – Commissioner directing withdrawal of exemption u/s. 10B – Appeal against order of Commissioner refusing to consider claim u/s. 10A – Tribunal has power to direct consideration of alternative claim of assessee to exemption u/s. 10A

CIT vs. Flytxt Technology P. Ltd.; 398
ITR 717 (Ker):

 

For the A. Y. 2010-11, the Assessing Officer
had allowed the assessee’s claim for exemption u/s. 10B of the Income-tax Act,
1961 (Hereinafter for the sake of brevity referred to as the “Act”).
The Commissioner invoked his jurisdiction u/s. 263 of the Act and held that the
assessee was not entitled to exemption u/s. 10B of the Act and directed the
Assessing Officer to withdraw the exemption granted u/s. 10B. The assessee
raised an alternative claim for exemption u/s. 10A of the Act. The commissioner
refused to consider the assessee’s claim. The Tribunal directed the Assessing
Officer to decide the issue afresh including the claim of the assessee for the
benefit of section 10A. 

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Kerala High
Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)  Section 254 of the Act
obliged the Tribunal to consider the appeal and pass such orders thereon as it
thinks fit. Even if the power conferred on the Commissioner u/s. 263 only
authorised him to examine whether the order passed by the Assessing Officer was
erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue, that restriction of
the power could not affect the powers of the Tribunal which was bound to
exercise u/s. 254 of the Act.

 

ii)  Therefore, there was no
illegality in the order passed by the Tribunal.”

Welcome GST Flight Delayed But Expected To Land Safely

Introduction of GST has been one of the most important items
on the agenda in various sessions of parliament. And it will be of prime
importance in the upcoming session. As the Government of India is committed to
replace the existing system of various types of indirect taxes, being levied at
present by Central and State Governments, with only one tax called Goods and
Services Tax (GST). All efforts are being made to implement it at the earliest.
We have been waiting for long to welcome its arrival. Although it was expected
from 1st April 2017, but whenever there is something new, certain
precautions are necessary. It is for the first time that the Centre and States
are coming together to administer a law on taxation of goods and services. It
was necessary, therefore, to understand the role and responsibility of each
other individually as well as collectively so as to have a smooth navigation.
It is in this background that a conscious decision has been taken to begin it
from 1st July 2017. We are sure that keeping in mind the impact of
amendment made to the Constitution of India, the Centre as well as States will
work out appropriate strategies to implement GST well before the appointed date
i.e.16th September 2017. Thus, in the present circumstances, 1st
July 2017as the implementation date is most appropriate. As it seems
certain, one can say ‘Although the flight is delayed but expected to land
safely’. Let’s hope to see ‘Der Aaye Durust Aaye’.

The delayed arrival may prove to be a blessing in disguise.
The period of delay may well be utilised in completing the unfinished task of
preparations. The draft law is yet to be finalised. Although, several
suggestions have already been considered in the revised version of Model GST
Act, a few are yet to be incorporated. We hope now that the important one will
not be missed out. Once the final draft is approved, Rules and Forms will
follow. As trade and industry will need at least three months to prepare
them-selves for the new regime, it is expected that the final draft of CGST
Act, SGST Act and IGST Act will be made available to the people by 28th
February, and, the Rules & Forms etc., well before 31st
March 2017.

As the Indian law on GST is being enacted after considering
VAT and GST laws of various other countries, it is expected that Indian GST Law
will be most fair and transparent, which is easy to understand and free from
all kinds of complexities. We wish the proposed Law will take care of all
aspects such as:

(1) Adequate
Revenue to Government

(2) Clarity of Law

(3) Ease of Administration

(4) Ease of Compliance

(5) (No Extra Burden on Businesses (particularly
small businesses)

(6) Due Care of Consumers (who are the ultimate tax
payers)

Apart from finalising the Model GST Law, the GST Council will
have to take a coordinated decision on rates of tax and list of items falling
in each of such rate schedule. This may prove to be a herculean task as it will
have direct impact on the ultimate tax payers i.e. the consumers. Whatever may
be the design of law, if consumer is dissatisfied, if the consumers (who are
the real tax payers) oppose, it would not be possible for any Government to
enforce such a law. It would be necessary, therefore, to decide the rates of
tax and brackets thereof with utmost care.

Another segment which has to be taken care is that of small
and medium size businesses, which constitutes more than 80% of the assessees
base of indirect taxes. The Government may be collecting 80% of its indirect
taxes revenue from 10 to 20% of total number of assessees. The remaining 80 to
90% assessees play a most important role in the production and distribution of
goods, as well as services, in our country. Ignoring the views of such a large
segment may be fatal for any VAT based system of indirect taxation. It is necessary,
therefore, that sincere efforts be made to mitigate the hardship likely to
cause to such small dealers and service providers.

Suggestions to mitigate hardship likely to cause to small
dealers and service providers:

Threshold for Registration

As per Schedule V, appended to revised draft of Model GST
Law, “Every supplier shall be liable to be registered under this Act in the
State from where he makes a taxable supply of goods and/or services if his
“aggregate turnover” in a financial year exceeds twenty lakh rupees:…”

It would be necessary to clarify that the threshold of Rs. 20 lakh should apply to taxable supplies only.
As such the turnover limit of Rs. 20 lakh is too low a limit and if the
exempt/taxfree supplies are also included therein then a very large number of
people will become liable for registration without any substantial revenue to
the Government. It may be necessary, therefore, to use the words aggregate turnover of taxable supplies
instead of “aggregate turnover”
.

Composition Scheme/s

The revised Model GST Law, at present, provides for only one
Composition Scheme, which is applicable to certain dealers having turnover up
to Rs. 50 lakh a year. It does not provide for any kind of composition scheme
for service providers. It may be worth noting here that the activities of ‘works contracts’, ‘leasing’, ‘supply of food and beverages in a hotel/
restaurants’, etc. will now fall in the category of ‘supply of service’.
With several restrictions embedded in the proposed Scheme, it may not be of any
practical utility.

If one looks at the VAT/GST laws of other countries, they are
very liberal in designing such composition schemes. Even in the VAT laws of
various States, within our country, we find several such schemes – some are
general and some of them are sector specific. For example in Maharashtra, at
present, we have the following Composition Schemes: 

1. Retailers Composition Scheme: Applicable to all
registered dealers having total turnover up to Rs. 1 crore. Composition amount
is 1% of total turnover. No input tax credit and no passing of the 1%
composition amount. It is working fine.

2.  Restaurants, Clubs, Hotels and Caterers
Composition Scheme: Applicable to all such establishments, serving
food/beverages for human consumptions, having gradation of less than 3 stars.
There is no turnover limit. Tax (composition amount) payable is 5% of turnover
of sales. No input tax credit and no Tax Invoice. Most of the small hotels,
restaurants and eating houses have opted for this composition scheme.

3. Bakers Composition Scheme: Applicable in a
specified manner.

4. Second Hand Motor Car dealers Composition
Scheme: Applicable to all dealers in respect of that part of business which is
related to reselling of old motor cars after refurbishing, etc. (without any
limit of turnover).

5. Mandap Decorators Composition Scheme: No
turnover limit, composition amount 1% or so. No ITC and no Tax Invoice.

6. Builders/developers Composition Scheme: No
turnover limit, tax @ 1% of agreement value, no ITC and no Tax Invoice.

7. Works Contract Composition Schemes: There are
two different composition schemes for ‘works contractors’. One is applicable to
notified construction contract where composition amount is 5% of total turnover
(total value of contracts). And another is for other works contracts where the
rate of composition is 8% of total turnover (total value of contracts). These
composition schemes are most popular in Maharashtra. (Similar composition
schemes have been designed by other States also). In these schemes, the
contractor is eligible for ITC on his inputs but it is restricted by way of
certain percentages. But, the unique feature is
that the contractor can pass on the tax to his principal. He can charge the tax
separately and can issue ‘Tax Invoice’. The purchaser (principal), if entitled,
can claim input tax credit on the basis of ‘tax invoice’ issued by the
contractor.

In the light of the above, it may be suggested that the GST
law should provide for 3 or 4 or if necessary more such composition schemes
which a dealer/service provider may opt.

Time of Supply:

Section 12, in Chapter IV, defines ‘Time of Supply of Goods’
as follows:-

“12. Time of supply of goods

(1) The liability to pay CGST / SGST on the goods shall arise
at the time of supply as determined in terms of the provisions of this section.

(2) The time of supply of goods shall be the earlier of the
following dates, namely,-

(a) the date of issue of invoice by the supplier or the last
date on which he is required, u/s. 28, to issue the invoice with respect to the
supply; or

(b) the date on which the supplier receives the payment with
respect to the supply:

PROVIDED that ……

Explanation  1.-
For the purposes of clauses (a) and (b), the supply shall be deemed to have been
made to the extent it is covered by the invoice or, as the case may be, the
payment.

Explanation 2.- For the purpose of clause (b), “the
date on which the supplier receives the payment” shall be the date on which the
payment is entered in his books of accounts or the date on which the payment is
credited to his bank account, whichever is earlier.”

It may be suggested that sub clause (b) may kindly be
deleted and the explanation 1 and 2 may also be modified accordingly.

If suitable modifications are not done, at this stage, that
would mean that for each and every advance received, the supplier of goods
would be liable to pay tax as and when such advance amount is received. The
Government may need to consider that there is vast difference between ‘advances
received for supply of goods’ and ‘advances received for supply of services’.
They cannot be equated. The supplies may be of various types of goods falling
under different rate schedules, the advance may be for a specific supply or an
adhoc advance for various supplies, the final sale price of goods may be
decided in advance or may be decided later. The time schedule and the place of
supply may be different for various supplies for which adhoc amount is received
as advance from time to time. In such circumstances, it may be very difficult
for the supplier to work out the exact amount of tax payable on such advance/s.
And it may lead to unnecessary complications and litigations. It may be suggested, therefore, that ‘Time of
Supply of Goods’ should always be issuance of ‘Tax Invoice’, Bill or Cash Memo
,
as the case may be, in accordance with the provisions of section 28 contained
in Chapter VII of the revised draft Model GST Law.

Filing of Returns and Payment of Taxes

Chapter VIII of Model GST Law deals with provisions regarding
furnishing of returns, etc.

Section 32 therein provides for furnishing ‘Invoice wise details of all Outward Supplies
during a month by 10th day of succeeding month.

Section 33 provides for furnishing ‘Invoice wise details of Taxable Inward Supplies’ during a month by
15th day of succeeding month.

Section 34 provides for
furnishing monthly return
by 20th day of succeeding month.

A combined reading of all the provisions shows that every
registered dealer (other than a composition dealer) is liable to furnish at
least 3 returns/statements by 3 different dates every month.

It may be necessary to revisit the entire chapter
concerning filing of returns/statements.

However good may be the intention behind such a proposal, it
will be extremely difficult for all such dealers to comply with the
requirements in the manner so prescribed in the aforesaid Chapter. The worst
affected will be those who fall in the category of small and medium size
‘Taxable Person’.

It may be worth noting that small and medium size enterprises
do not have adequate infrastructure and manpower to comply with such a
requirement, which may be suitable for very big organisations only. The SMEs
are depending upon part time accountants and tax consultants to compile and
upload such returns and statements, etc. At
present, most of them are filing quarterly or six monthly returns.
Thus,
they are visiting their tax consultant not more than four times during a year.
But, in the proposed procedure they will have to visit thrice in a month i.e.
36 times during a year. They are also expected to visit in between to find out
and reconcile differences which may be arising in the monthly Statements
furnished by their suppliers/customers. Consider
cost of compliance to such small dealers and service providers in terms of both
time and money.

It the light of the above, it may be suggested that;

1. The requirement of filing monthly returns
should apply to those only whose annual turnover is more than       Rs. 5 crore (or 10 crore) or the net tax
payable is more than Rs. 10 lakh per annum.

2. All other dealers/taxable persons should be
asked to file quarterly returns.

3. There is
no need to prescribe separate dates for submitting (a) Statement of Outward
Supplies (b) Statement of Inward Supplies and (c) Return. All the three items
should be combined together. In fact, both these statements i.e. of Outward
Supplies and Inward Supplies should form part of the Return itself.

4. As the matching exercise can be done only after
filing of returns, there is no point in forcing the dealers to submit a return
in three parts on three different dates of the same month.

5. If one looks into the provisions of VAT/GST
laws of all those countries where GST has been implemented successfully,  almost all of them have taken due care of ease
of compliance
.

6. The
success of any reform depends upon mutual co-operation. The procedural aspects
need to be designed in such a manner that all the dealers, whether big or
small, are able to comply with the requirements without any hassles.

In its recent advertisement, in Times of India, Central Board
of Excise & Customs (CBEC) has boldly highlighted various advantages of GST
under the heading “a plethora of benefits all around”. Just picking up a major
one, it states: GST – ‘One Nation One Tax’, ‘Advantage for Trade &
Industry’, ‘Benefits to Economy’, ‘Simplified Tax Structure’ and ‘Tax
Compliance Easy’.

Hope the final product will be in concurrence
with the features so highlighted, in a colourful advertisement, published on
the eve of our Republic Day.

Deferred Tax under Ind AS On Exchange Differences Capitalised

Background

Under Indian GAAP, Para 46A of AS
11 The Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates, allowed an option
to companies to capitalise exchange differences arising on borrowings for
acquisition of fixed assets. The exchange differences arising on reporting of
long-term foreign currency monetary items at rates different from those at
which they were initially recorded during the period, or reported in previous
financial statements, insofar as they related to the acquisition of a
depreciable capital asset, can be added to or deducted from the cost of the
asset and shall be depreciated over the balance life of the asset.

Paragraph D13AA of Ind AS 101 First
Time Adoption of Ind AS
provides an option on first time adoption of Ind
AS, to continue with the above accounting. A first-time adopter may continue
the policy adopted for accounting for exchange differences arising from
translation of long-term foreign currency monetary items recognised in the
financial statements for the period ending immediately before the beginning of
the first Ind AS financial reporting.

Paragraph 15 of Ind-AS 12 Income
Taxes
states as follows: A deferred tax liability shall be recognised for
all taxable temporary differences, except to the extent that the deferred tax
liability arises from:

a)  the initial recognition of
goodwill; or

b)  the initial recognition of an
asset or liability in a transaction which:

i.   is not a business combination;
and

ii.  at the time of the transaction,
affects neither accounting profit nor taxable
profit (tax loss).

The exchange differences on
foreign currency borrowings used to purchase assets indigenously are not
allowed as deduction under the Income-tax Act either by way of depreciation or
otherwise. Under Income Tax Act, such expenditure is treated as capital
expenditure. Section 43A of the Income-tax Act contains special provision to
provide for depreciation allowance to the assessee in respect of imported
capital assets whose actual cost is affected by the changes in the exchange
rate. However, section 43A does not allow similar benefit for assets purchased
indigenously out of foreign exchange borrowings.

Issue

A company chooses to continue with
the option of capitalising exchange differences. On first time adoption of Ind
AS and thereafter, whether the Company should create deferred taxes on the
exchange differences capitalised?

Author’s Response

Paragraph 15 requires that no
deferred taxes are recognised on temporary differences that arise on initial
recognition of an asset or liability, which neither affects accounting profit
nor taxable profit. This is commonly referred to as ‘Initial recognition
exception (IRE).’ When IRE applies, deferred taxes are neither recognised
initially nor subsequently as the carrying amount of the asset is depreciated
or impaired.

There is no precise guidance in
the standards on this issue. Based on the above requirements of Ind AS, the
following two views need to be examined:

View 1: IRE exception does not apply and deferred tax needs to
be recognised

   IRE applies
only at the time of initial recognition of an asset or liability. In this case,
difference between tax base and carrying amount is arising subsequent to
initial recognition of the asset. Hence, IRE does not apply and deferred tax
needs to be recognised on amount of exchange differences capitalised (both
increases and decreases) to the asset in this manner. The corresponding
adjustment is made to P&L. With regard to exchange difference arising
before the transition date, adjustment is made to retained earnings. The
reversal of deferred tax will be recognised in P&L as the exchange
difference is depreciated.

  Since
exchange differences do not have an identity independent of the underlying
asset, IRE will not apply (since it is not a new asset) and deferred tax will
need to be created on temporary differences attributable to exchange difference
adjustments.

   An analogy
can be drawn to revaluation reserve (an item that too does not have an identity
independent of the underlying asset) on which Ind AS 12 specifically requires
creation of deferred taxes. A deferred tax liability is created on the
revaluation of fixed asset. Subsequently, the depreciation on the revalued
portion is debited to P&L. Recoupment out of revaluation reserve is not permitted
under Ind AS. As and when depreciation on revaluation is debited to P&L,
the deferred tax liability is debited and a tax credit is taken to P&L.

  An analogy
can also be drawn from land indexation benefit. A temporary difference is
created between book value and tax value of land, because of indexation
benefits allowed under the Income-tax Act for land. On such indexation amounts,
a deferred tax asset is created subject to the probability criterion being met.

   View 1 is
also supported by the fact that the additional capitaliation is not reflected
as a separate asset in the accounting records of the Company (for example, the
fixed asset register).

View 2: IRE exception applies and deferred taxes need not be
recognised

  When the
company adjusts exchange differences to the carrying amount of the asset, the
entry passed is Debit Asset, Credit Borrowings – that affects neither taxable
profit nor accounting profit. One may argue that each addition to the cost of
asset is in substance a new asset. This requires IRE to be applied at the time
of each capitalisation (which may include increase to the fixed assets due to
exchange loss or decreases to the fixed assets if there is exchange gain).
Consequently, IRE applies and no deferred tax should be recognised on difference
between the carrying amount and the tax base of the asset arising due to
capitalisation of exchange differences. The reversal of this portion of
exchange differences will also have no impact.

   Support for
view 2 can be drawn from the requirement of paragraph 46A to depreciate each
period’s capitalisation over the remaining useful life of the underlying asset.
In other words, the additional capitalisation is treated as a separate item to
be depreciated over the remaining useful life of the asset. If it was treated
as the original asset itself, there would be a need to provide for depreciation
on a catch up basis, as if the exchange difference capitalisation had happened
immediately on purchase of the asset.

   View 2 can
also be articulated differently. 
Assuming that the capitalisation requirements were slightly tweaked to
require the exchange difference to be capitalised each time as a separate
intangible item, the IRE exception would certainly apply in that case.

Conclusion

Considering the above discussions, the author
believes that View 1 is more credible.

18. ITA No. 642/ Kol / 2016 (Unreported) ITO vs. Emami Paper Mills Ltd A.Y. 2012-13, Date of Order: 4th January, 2017

Section 9(1)(vii) of the Act, Article 12 of
India-Poland DTAA – A ‘contract of work’ is different from a ‘contract of
service’. In ‘contract of work’, the activity is predominantly physical whereas
in ‘contract of service’, the activity is predominantly intellectual. Hence,
payment made under ‘contract of work’ did not constitute FTS.

Facts  

The Taxpayer is an Indian company. The
Taxpayer engaged a Polish company for dismantling of machinery, sea worthy
packing of the same, stuffing it in containers and loading the containers on
trucks. The Polish company carried out the said services in Sweden. In
consideration for these services, the Taxpayer made certain payments to the
Polish company without withholding tax from the payments.

The AO concluded that the payments made to
the Polish company for dismantling and sea worthy packing of machinery was
highly technical and skill oriented and hence it was in the nature of “fees for
technical services” (FTS) in terms of section 9(1)(vii) of the Act as well as
Article 13(4) of India-Poland DTAA. The CIT(A) reversed the decision of the AO
on the grounds that though technical personnel were involved in the work done
by Polish Company, the payment was for a works contract and not for a contract
of service.

Held

  The
agreement for dismantling of the machinery was part and parcel of the
transaction of purchase of plant and machinery. Perusal of various clauses of
the said agreement showed that the payment was not made for technical services
and did not require any technical skill.

   The
two expressions ‘Contract of work and ‘Contract of service’ convey different
ideas. In ‘Contract of work’, the activity is predominantly physical and
tangible and intellectual only to some extent. Though the work of a gardener,
mason, carpenter or builder who undertakes “contract of work” also involves
intellectual exercise as he has to bestow sufficient care in doing his job, the
physical (tangible) aspect is more dominant than the intellectual aspect. On
the other hand, in ‘Contract of service’, the activity is predominantly
intellectual, or at least, mental.

   Thus,
‘contract of work’ is clearly different from ‘contract of service’. ‘Contract
of work’ does not require any technical knowledge or specific skill.

   In
case of the Taxpayer, Polish company was hired to dismantle the machinery,
which did not require any technical expertise and special skill. Thus, the
agreement was for ‘contract of work’. The payment did not acquire character of
FTS merely because the Taxpayer hired a person resident outside India.

   In
case of the Taxpayer, Polish company was hired to dismantle the machinery which
was in the nature of ‘contract of work’ and not ‘contract of service’. Hence,
payment made by the Taxpayer for the work done by Polish company did not come
within the ambit of FTS.

Guiding Principles for Determination of Place of Effective Management (POEM)

Readers may be aware that the
Finance Act, 2015 had inserted the concept of Place of Effective Management
(POEM) for determining the residential status of a company by amending section
6(3) w.e.f. 1-4-2016. The said section 6(3) was substituted by the Finance Act,
2016  with effect from 1st April
2016 (i.e. the current Financial Year) and accordingly shall apply from the
Assessment Year 2017-18 onwards. Although the term “POEM” was defined in the
Income-tax Act, 1961 (“Act”), the definition was short and crisp. Subsequently,
the Government issued draft guidelines for determination of POEM. After
considering comments and suggestions from various stakeholders and general
public, these guidelines have been finalised in the form of “Guiding
Principles” for determination of POEM. This write-up covers detailed analysis
of these guiding principles and issues arising out of them and/or unresolved
grey areas which may lead to litigation. 

1.0    Introduction

Section 6(3) of the Act, prior to
its amendment vide Finance Act, 2015, provided that a company would be
considered as resident of India under two circumstances, namely, (i) if it is
incorporated in India or (ii) control and management of its affairs is situated
wholly
in India. This definition was prone to misuse. A foreign company
owned and controlled by Indian residents could shift its insignificant part of
control or management outside India to claim its status as non-resident. There
have been cases where foreign companies, though controlled and managed by Indian
residents, were held to be non-resident as their one or two board meetings were
held outside India. In order to address these concerns, the requirement of POEM
was introduced in the Act.

The concept of POEM is not new to
the constituents of international taxation. Essentially it refers to a place
where head and brain of an organisation is located or operates from.

Section 6 (3) as amended with
effect from 1st April 2016, reads as follows:

A company is said to be a
resident in India in any previous year, if—

(i)  it is an Indian company; or

(ii)  its place of effective
management, in that year, is in India.

Explanation.— For the purposes
of this clause “place of effective management” means a place where
key management and commercial decisions that are necessary for the conduct of
business of an entity as a whole are, in substance made.

In the backdrop of the above
amendment, CBDT issued the draft guidelines for determination of POEM on 23rd
December 2015 inviting suggestions and feedback from public at large.
After a year of issuance of the draft guidelines the CBDT has now issued
Circular No. 6 of 2017 dated 24th January 2017 containing the
“guiding principles” for determination of POEM. (Hereinafter referred to as
“Circular”)

2.0 Determining
Criteria

The Circular prescribes various
tests to determine the POEM. They can be broadly classified into:

(i)  Active Business Test having sub
sets of

(a) Passive Income/Total Income Test

(b) Assets Test

(c) Employees Test

(d) Payroll Test

(ii) Control and Management Test

(iii) Location of Head Office and Senior Management Test

(iv) Location of Board of Directors’ Meeting Test and

(v) Secondary Factors Test.

Any foreign company has to be
evaluated based on these tests to determine whether it has a place of effective
management in India or not. Though the objective seems to be to apply these
tests to foreign companies owned or controlled by Indian residents, technically
it applies to any foreign company. 

Let us go through them in detail.

2.1    Active Business
Test

The Circular requires determining
an “active business outside India” with the help of various tests. The POEM of
a foreign company having an “active business outside India” shall be presumed
to be outside India if its majority of Board meetings are held outside India.
(It may be held at a place other than the country of incorporation).

It may be noted here that for the
purpose of determining whether the company is engaged in active business
outside India, the average of the data of the previous year and two years prior
to that shall be taken into account. In case the company has been in existence
for a shorter period, then data of such period shall be considered.

Where the accounting year for tax
purposes, in accordance with laws of country of incorporation of the company,
is different from the previous year, then, data of the accounting year that
ends during the relevant previous year and two accounting years preceding it
shall be considered. For example, for a foreign company following calendar year
(CY) for the previous year 2016-17 (April-March) the data of the foreign
company to be examined are CY 2016, CY 2015 and CY 2014. 

The Circular provides that for the
purposes of these guidelines, –

(a) A company shall be said to be
engaged in “active business outside India”

(i)  if the passive income
is not more than 50% of its total income and,

(ii) less than 50% of its total
assets
are situated in India; and

(iii) less than 50% of total
number of employees are situated in India or are resident in India; and

(iv) the payroll expenses incurred on such employees is less
than 50% of its total payroll expenditure;

All the above tests are cumulative
in nature, meaning in order for a company to qualify as doing an active
business outside India, all the above tests need to be satisfied. However, as
reiterated by the Circular the determination of the POEM is a fact based
exercise with the underlying principle of substance over form and therefore,
failure to satisfy any single test by the foreign company per se, should
not be held against it. Much would depend upon the actual conduct of the
business and exercise of the control and management of its affairs.

2.1.1  Income Test

The income test to be fulfilled by
a foreign company for being considered as engaged in  active business outside India is:

the passive income is
not more than 50% of its total income
”.

The Circular defines both total
income as well as passive income.

Total Income

The income for this purpose is
explained to be (a) as computed for tax purpose in accordance with the laws of
the country of incorporation; or (b) as per books of account, where the laws of
the country of incorporation does not require such a computation.

It is not clear as to whether such
books of account need to be audited or not. However, looking at the spirit of
the Circular, one would be guided by the laws of the host country. If audit is
not mandatory in the host country then even self-certified accounts should be
good enough.

Passive Income

“Passive income” of a company
shall be aggregate of, – (i) income from the transactions where both the
purchase and sale of goods is from/to its associated enterprises; and (ii)
income by way of royalty, dividend, capital gains, interest or rental income.

However, any income by way of
interest shall not be considered to be passive income in case of a company
which is engaged in the business of banking or is a public financial
institution, and its activities are regulated as such under the applicable laws
of the country of incorporation.

Inclusion of trading transactions
between two associated enterprises may cause genuine hardships to some foreign
companies owned by Indian residents which may be dealing within its global AEs
without any t  ransaction with any AE
situated in India.

2.1.2  Assets Test

The assets test to be fulfilled by
a foreign company for an active business outside India is:

less than 50% of its total
assets
are situated in India”
.

The value of assets : 

(a) In case of an individually
depreciable asset, shall be the average of its value for tax purposes in the
country of incorporation of the company at the beginning and at end of the
previous year; and

(b) In case of pool of a fixed
assets being treated as a block for depreciation, shall be the average of its
value for tax purposes in the country of incorporation of the company at the
beginning and at end of the year;

(c) In case of any other asset,
shall be its value as per books of account;

With world accounting converging
to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), valuation of assets
should not be an issue unless the foreign company is situated in a jurisdiction
which does not follow IFRS or no audit requirements are prescribed.

2.1.3   Employees Test  

The employees test to be fulfilled
by a foreign company for an active business outside India is:

less than 50% of total number
of employees are situated in India or are resident in India”.

The Circular provides that the
number of employees shall be the average of the number of employees as at the
beginning and at the end of the year and shall include persons, who though not
employed directly by the company, perform tasks similar to those performed by
the employees;

A question may arise as to
payments made to a retainer be included in the list of employees. Here, one may
be guided by the terms of the engagement, the nature of job profile and actual
conduct of the person etc.

2.1.4  Payroll Test

The test to be fulfilled by a
foreign company for an active business outside India is:

the payroll expenses
incurred on such employees is less than 50% of its total payroll expenditure
”.

The Circular provides that “the
term “payroll” shall include the cost of salaries, wages, bonus and all other
employee compensation including related pension and social costs borne by the
employer.

2.2  Control and Management Test

This test is useful in determining
where exactly head and brain of the company resides.

The Circular provides that in
cases of companies other than those that are engaged in active business outside
India, the determination of POEM would be a two stage process, namely:

(i)  First stage would be
identification or ascertaining the person or persons who actually make the key
management and commercial decision for conduct of the company’s business as
a whole.

(ii) Second stage would be
determination of place where these decisions are in fact being made.

It is also provided that the place
where the management decisions are taken would be more important than the place
where they are executed. Day to day routine operational decisions taken by the
junior and middle level management shall not be relevant for the purposes of
determination of POEM. It is also provided that where by operation of law certain
key decisions are left to the shareholders such as dissolution, liquidation or
deregistration of the company etc. which may typically affect the
existence of company rather than the conduct of the company from management and
commercial perspective etc. would generally be not relevant in
determination of the POEM. 

2.3  Location
of Head Office and Senior Management Test

The Circular provides that
location of Head Office (HO) will be an important factor in determining the
POEM as often key decisions are taken there.

The term HO is defined to mean the
place where the company’s senior management and their direct support staff are
located or, if they are located at more than one location, the place where they
are primarily or predominantly located. A company’s head office is not
necessarily the same as the place where the majority of its employees work or
where its board typically meets.

Location of senior management and
their support staff may play a key role in determination of the place of HO.

According to the Circular the
“Senior Management” in respect of a company means the person or persons who are
generally responsible for developing and formulating key strategies and
policies for the company and for ensuring or overseeing the execution and
implementation of those strategies on a regular and on-going basis. While
designation may vary, these persons may include: (i) Managing Director or Chief
Executive Officer; (ii) Financial Director or Chief Financial Officer; (iii)
Chief Operating Officer; and (iv) The heads of various divisions or departments
(for example, Chief Information or Technology Officer, Director for Sales or
Marketing).

Generally the locale of senior
management or the highest level of management personnel (such as the Managing Director
or the Finance Director) shall determine the location of HO. However, if the
company’s senior management is so highly decentralized that it is difficult to
determine its HO, then HO will not be of much relevance in determining the
POEM.

In case of decisions by video
conferencing, telecommunication etc. the location of maximum number of persons
taking such decision would be relevant in determination of the POEM. In case of
circular resolution or round robin voting etc. the location of the
person who has the authority and who exercises the authority to take decisions
would be a relevant factor in determination of the POEM.  

2.4 Location of Board of Directors’ Meeting
Test
        

The Circular provides that the
location where a company’s Board regularly meets and makes decisions may be the
company’s place of effective management provided, the Board- (i) retains and
exercises its authority to govern the company; and (ii) does, in substance,
make the key management and commercial decisions necessary for the conduct of
the company’s business as a whole.

In deciding the place of board
meetings as the POEM, one must look at the actual conduct of business at the
board meetings, whether key decisions are taken or not. Therefore, merely a
formal board meeting at a particular place by itself would not result in the
POEM.

If the board has delegated its
power or authority to take key decisions to senior management, executive
committee or any other person including a shareholder, promoter, a strategic,
legal or financial advisor etc. then the POEM would at the place of
location of such decision maker/s.

2.5  Secondary Factors for determination of
the POEM

The Circular provides that if the
primary factors (as mentioned above) do not lead to clear identification of POEM
then the following secondary factors can be considered:

(i)  Place where main and
substantial activity of the company is carried out; or

(ii) Place where the accounting
records of the company are kept.

2.6   Summary of the POEM Tests

Based on the various tests
prescribed by the Circular, the POEM of a company can be determined based on
following criteria:

It may be noted that there is no
fixed hierarchy of the above tests.         

3.0  Exceptions and Assurances

After elaborately prescribing
various guidelines to determine the POEM in paragraphs 1 to 8, the Circular in
paragraphs 9 and 10 provides certain exceptions, clarifications and assurances
in determining the POEM. The Circular reiterates that the guiding principles
are only for the purpose of guidance and that no single principle in itself
will be decisive. One needs to take a holistic view of the matter. The
principles need to be applied over a period of time in a given previous year
and not at a particular moment. “Snapshot” approach is not to be adopted.

Following clarifications are
provided in the Circular with regard to determination of the POEM in India:

Following isolated facts in
themselves will not be conclusive evidences that the conditions for establishing
a POEM in India have been satisfied:        

     (i)  Foreign company is a wholly
owned subsidiary of an Indian company;

(ii) Foreign company has a Permanent
Establishment in India;

(iii) One or more directors of a
foreign company reside in India;

(iv) Local management of a foreign
company being situated in India in respect of activities carried out by a
foreign company in India;

(v) The existence in India of
support functions those are preparatory and auxiliary in character.

4.0  Summary
of various tests in determination of POEM as listed above

4.1         Determination of POEM
is a fact based exercise.

4.2          No single factor can be
considered as final. One needs to take a holistic view of the matter.
Determination of the POEM cannot be based on isolated facts.

4.3        In determination of
POEM, one needs to look at substance over form; only substance will prevail in
the end.

4.4        There can be more than
one place of management but there can be only one POEM at a given point of
time.

4.5        If during the previous
year a company is found to be having POEM, both in India and abroad then it
would be deemed to be at a place where it is mainly or predominantly located.

4.6         POEM is to be
considered over a period of time during the previous year and not at a
particular point in time. One should not take a “snapshot view” of the matter.

4.7         POEM should be
determined on a yearly basis. The existence or otherwise of the POEM should be
examined on year to year basis by applying various tests enumerated in the
Circular.

4.8       Just because an
intermediary holding company (say a first level subsidiary abroad of an Indian
Company) has a POEM in India, its downstream subsidiary/Joint venture companies
per se would not be regarded as having their POEMs in India. In other words,
the tests of determination of the POEM shall be applied to every overseas
entity separately and independently.

4.9        Actual conduct of the
Board of Directors or Senior Management Team or an Executive Council is
important rather than formal delegation of powers.

5.0   Threshold Limit

The Press Release issued by the
Ministry of Finance on 24th January 2017 citing issuance of the CBDT
Circular mentioned and discussed above, provides that the POEM guidelines shall
not apply to companies having turnover or gross receipts of Rs. Fifty (50) Crore or less in a financial year.

It appears that the threshold has
been prescribed for the applicability of the guiding principles only and not of
the POEM of a company itself u/s. 6 (3) of the Act. However, this does not seem
to be the intent of the CBDT. A clarification to this effect should be
issued. 

6.0  Invocation of POEM

The Circular contains certain
administrative safe guards by mandating that the Assessing Officer (AO) will
have to obtain a prior approval of the Principal CIT/CIT for initiating an
inquiry of the POEM. The AO also need to obtain an approval from the Collegium
of 3 Principal CITs/CITs before holding that POEM of a non-resident company is
in India.

One hopes that provisions of the
POEM are invoked in rare cases and used as a deterrent than as a revenue raiser
tool. In this context, highest amount of restraint is called for on the part of
the tax administration so as to strike a balance between genuine cases of
overseas ventures and shell companies.

7.0 Summation/Conclusion

The Circular at paragraph 12
contains certain illustrations as to which situations would constitute a POEM
and which would not. Readers are well advised to go through the same.

The sum and substance of these
guiding principles for determination of the POEM is that the facts are supreme.
No one particular criteria can determine the existence or otherwise of a POEM.
One needs to take a holistic view of the matter and that too over a period of
time and not in isolation. In the ultimate, one needs to look at the substance
over form in establishment of the POEM.

The way these guidelines are
drafted, a question arises as to whether the era of Special Purpose Vehicle
(SPV) at an overseas location, for various commercial reasons, is over? All
SPVs by design will have passive income only and may not have substantial or
any business activities except for holding investments in downstream companies.
It appears that only holding cum operating companies which would fulfill the
conditions of active business outside India will be able to establish their
POEMs outside India.

With the release of the final
guidelines for POEM determination, one has to wait and watch the position with
respect to introduction of Controlled Foreign Corporation [CFC] rules as stated
in the BEPS action reports. However, taking a cue from the CFC regulations
worldwide and in the interest of the Indian entrepreneurship it would be better
if the overseas listed companies are kept outside the scrutiny of the POEM.

The Finance Act, 2016 had also
introduced section 115JH in the Act to enable the Government to notify rules in
relation to computation of income, carry forward and set-off of losses,
treatment of unabsorbed depreciation and applicability of transfer pricing in
relation to foreign companies which are treated as being resident in India.
Rules in this regard are still awaited.

The compliance with these final guidelines which
are issued only now especially since POEM is effective from 1-4-2016 (AY
2017-18) and we are already 10 months down the line. This certainly merits
deferment of the provisions of POEM by a year to 1-4-2017 (AY 2018-19).
Otherwise, this retrospective application of Final guidelines for AY 2017-18
could lead to confusion and unwarranted problems for assessees.

17. [2017] 77 taxmann.com 149 (Ahmedabad – Trib.) Elitecore Technologies (P.) Ltd vs. DCIT A.Ys.: 2009-10, Date of Order: 3rd January, 2017

Article 23 of India-Indonesia DTAA, Article
25 of India-Singapore DTAA – Tax credit is to be allowed only to the extent the
corresponding foreign income has suffered tax in India.

Facts

The Taxpayer was a wholly owned subsidiary
of an American company. It was engaged in the business of software development.
Major portion of income arising to the Taxpayer was in the form of passive
income earned by way of release of retention money and income from maintenance
contract entered into with customer. During the relevant previous year, the
Taxpayer did not have any taxable income under the normal provisions of
the Act. However, its book profits were taxed under Minimum Alternate Tax (MAT)
provisions in section 115JB of the Act.

In the course of assessment, the AO noted
that the Taxpayer had claimed foreign tax credit. This credit was in respect of
the taxes withheld in Singapore and Indonesia. Referring to Article 23 of
India-Indonesia DTAA and Article 25 of India-Singapore DTAA, The Taxpayer had
claimed tax credit to the extent of the entire amount of tax withheld.

However, according to the AO the tax credit
was to be allowed only to the extent the corresponding income had suffered tax
in India. The extent to which income had suffered tax in India was to be computed
by taking ratio of gross foreign receipts to the overall turnover of the
Taxpayer and applying that ratio to the actual MAT liability (i.e., doubly
taxed income was considered after allocating all the expenses including the
expenses in relation to India sourced income in the ratio of foreign sourced
turnover to total turnover).

Held

   The
Tribunal observed that there are two aspects to be considered. First, the
quantum of income which is to be treated as taxed. Second, the manner in which
the eligible tax credit is to be computed.

   DTAAs
provide that foreign tax credit shall not exceed the income tax  attributable to doubly taxed income.

   DTAAs
use the expression ‘income’ which essentially implies ‘income’ embedded in the
gross receipt, and not the ‘gross receipt’ itself. Even as per the UN Model
Commentary, the basis of calculation of income tax is total net income.
Therefore, it is the gross income derived from the source state less any
allowable deductions (specific or proportional) connected with such income
which is to be treated as doubly taxed income. Hence, considering the gross
receipts for computing admissible tax credit is not correct.

  In
the present case, there is a peculiar situation. A major portion of foreign
sourced income was passive income in nature.

  Hence,
to that extent, allocation of all the expenses incurred by the Taxpayer to such
earnings will not be justified. Moreover, profit element should be computed on
reasonable basis and not by taking into account the ratio of entire income to
entire turnover of the Taxpayer. The same could have been relevant if the
Taxpayer had not furnished a reasonable computation of income embedded in the
related receipts.

   However,
because of the aforementioned peculiar situation, this decision cannot be the
authority for the general proposition that only marginal or incremental costs
incurred in respect of foreign income should be taken into account and the
overheads cannot be allocated thereto.

   Thus
foreign tax credit is to be computed by apportioning actual tax paid under MAT
in the ratio of doubly taxed income to total profits.

   Tax
credit in respect of both Indonesia and Singapore should be computed separately
as is provided in respective DTAAs. The formula for limitation of tax credit under
Article 23(1) of India-Indonesia DTAA and Article 25(2) of India-Singapore DTAA
is broadly the same. The tax paid under MAT provisions should be apportioned to
income from Indonesia and Singapore respectively.

   Since
tax withheld in Indonesia was higher than the apportioned amount, the tax
credit was to be restricted to the apportioned amount.

   Since
tax withheld in Singapore was lower than the apportioned amount, tax credit for
entire withheld tax was available.

16. [2016] 76 taxmann.com 341 (Ahmedabad – Trib.) Torrent Pharmaceuticals Ltd vs. ITO A.Y.: 2008-09, Date of Order: 25th October, 2016

Section 9(1)(vi) of the Act, Article 12 of
India-Switzerland DTAA – Since MFN clause in India-Switzerland DTAA provides
for negotiation by both countries for lower tax rate or restricted scope, in
absence of amendment to DTAA, MFN benefit could not be availed. In the absence
of automatic application of MFN clause, make available condition cannot be
drawn into India-Switzerland DTAA.

Facts:

The Taxpayer was an Indian company engaged
in manufacturing and marketing of pharmaceutical products. During the relevant
year, the Taxpayer had made payments, inter alia, to a tax resident of
Switzerland (payee), in consideration for rendering consultancy services. The
Taxpayer did not withhold tax from the payments.

The Taxpayer contended that:

  the
payee did not part with any technical knowhow which could be used by the
Taxpayer independently on its own;

   Protocol
to India-Switzerland DTAA contains most favoured nation (“MFN”) clause in
respect of Articles 10 to 12;

   India-Portugal
DTAA containing ‘make available’ condition in respect to payments made for
technical services was executed and notified subsequent to India-Switzerland
DTAA;

   although
such ‘make available’ condition in respect of technical services was explicitly
not contained in India-Switzerland DTAA, it was deemed to have been applicable
by virtue of India-Portugal DTAA;

   accordingly,
scope of FTS under India-Switzerland DTAA should be restricted to the same
scope as that under India-Portugal DTAA; and

   since
the make available condition is not satisfied, the payments made to the payee
do not qualify as Fee for Technical Services (FTS).

Held

   India-Switzerland
DTAA or Protocol thereto does not have ‘make available’ provision in respect of
FTS.

   The
Protocol to India-Switzerland DTAA provides that if, after its execution on
16-02-2000, India enters into any DTAA/Protocol with a member of OECD, and if
India limits its taxation to a rate lower or scope more restricted than that
provided in India-Switzerland DTAA, then Switzerland and India shall enter into
negotiation without undue delay in order to provide similar treatment to
Switzerland as in case of the third State.

   Since
there is no automatic MFN application, and since Switzerland and India have not
amended DTAA in respect of lower rate or restricted scope, the contention of
the Taxpayer that pursuant to India-Portugal DTAA, ‘make available’ condition
should also be applied to India-Switzerland DTAA cannot be accepted.

17. Quick Flight Ltd. vs. ITO (International Taxation)(Ahd) Members: R. P. Tolani (JM) and Manish Borad (AM) ITA No. 1204/Ahd/2014 A.Y.: 2011-12. Date of Order: 4th January, 2017. Counsel for assessee / revenue: Urvashi Shodhan / Rakesh Jha

Sections 115A(1)(b), 206AA – Provisions of
section 206AA cannot be invoked in a case where the payment has been made to
deductees, not having PAN, on the strength of beneficial provisions of section
115A(1)(b).

FACTS  

The assessee company, engaged in the
business of chartering, hiring and leasing aircraft made payment of fees for
technical services to a non-resident viz. M/s Honeywell, USA, not having
PAN.  Tax was deducted at source @ 10%
plus applicable surcharge and cess as per provisions of section 115A of the
Act.  The Assessing Officer (AO) alleged
that tax was required to be deducted @ 20% in view of the provisions of section
206AA of the Act as the assessee was not having PAN and accordingly raised
demand of Rs. 30,250 towards short deduction and Rs. 5,750 towards interest on
short deduction.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the Tribunal.

HELD  

The Tribunal noted that similar issue on
almost identical facts came up before the co-ordinate Bench in the case of Alembic
Ltd. vs. ITO (ITA No. 1202/Ahd/2014)
wherein the co-ordinate Bench observed
that the issue is squarely covered by the decisions of Uniphos Envirotronic
Pvt. Ltd. vs. DCIT (ITA No. 1974/Ahd/2015
 
for AY 2014-15) and the decision of Pune Bench of the Tribunal in the
case of DCIT vs. Serum Institute of India Ltd. and decided the appeal in
favor of the assessee.  The Bench has in
the case of Alembic Ltd. (supra) held that in case where payments have
been made to the deductees on the strength of the beneficial provisions of
section 115A(1)(b) of the Act or as per DTAA rates r.w.s. 90(2) of the Act,
then provisions of section 206AA cannot be invoked by the AO insisting to
deduct tax @ 20% for non-availability of  PAN.

The Tribunal following the decision of the
co-ordinate Bench in the case of Alembic Ltd. (supra) held that in the
present case as well, payment was made towards fees for technical services to a
non-resident through banking channel as approved by RBI and payment is well
covered u/s. 115A(1)(b) of the Act and therefore, special rate of TDS i.e.
11.33% was applicable and was rightly deducted and deposited by the assessee
and the provisions of section 206AA of the Act cannot be made applicable to
this payment.  The Tribunal set aside the
order of CIT(A) and deleted the claim of Rs. 30,250 towards short deduction.

The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the
assessee.

16. Gamzen Plast Pvt. Ltd. vs. ITO (Mum) Members: R. C. Sharma (AM) and Pawan Singh (JM) ITA No. 7449/Mum/2014 A.Y.: 2010-11 Date of Order: 28th October, 2016 Counsel for assessee / revenue: B. V. Jhaveri / Jeevanlal Lavedia

Section 80IC – Losses of the eligible unit
which have been fully set off in earlier years against profits of non-eligible
unit cannot be artificially carried forward.

FACTS  

The assessee company, engaged in the
business of manufacturing, assembling and repairing construction machinery and
piling equipments, started an additional unit in Uttarakhand in the previous
year relevant to AY 2008-09. Since the said unit was located in a declared
backward area it was entitled to Excise Duty exemption for 10 years and also
income-tax exemption u/s. 80IC(3)(ii) of the Act. The production in Uttarakhand
unit commenced in AY 2008-09.

In respect of the eligible unit at
Uttarakhand, the assessee incurred a loss of Rs. 51,55,665 in AY 2008-09 and a
loss of Rs. 2,38,08,961 in AY 2009-10. 
These losses were set off against the profits of non-eligible unit at
Mumbai in AY 2008-09 and AY 2009-10 respectively. Therefore, these losses were
not available to be carried forward and set off in AY 2010-11. However, the
Assessing Officer (AO) while completing the assessment of AY 2010-11 notionally
carried forward the losses of AY 2008-09 and 2009-10 which were already set off
against the profit of non-eligible unit at Mumbai and again set them off
against the profit of Rs. 4,48,33,073 of the eligible unit at Uttarakhand for
AY 2010-11 and allowed only the balance of Rs. 1,58,68,447 as deduction u/s.
80IC of the Act.  Thus, he reduced the
claim of deduction u/s. 80IC by Rs. 2,89,64,626.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the CIT(A) who held that assessee was not correct in setting off loss of
earlier years in the eligible unit against profit of non-eligible unit.  He upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the Tribunal where reliance was placed interalia on the following
decisions –

i)   Velayudhaswamy Spinning
Mills Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT (340 ITR 477)(Mad
);

ii)  ACIT vs. Hamilton
Houseware Pvt. Ltd. (ITA No. 988/Ahm/2009 dated 9.6.2015);

iii)  ACIT vs. Sanjeev Auto
Parts Manufacturers Pvt. Ltd. (ITA No. 1387/PN/2014 for AY 2011-12; dated
17.2.2016
);

iv) DCIT vs. Bajaj
Electricals (ITA No. 909/Mum/2011; AY 2006-07; Order dated 15.5.2015).

HELD  

The undisputed
facts are that losses of AYs 2008-09 and 2009-10 have already been set off
against the income of unit at Mumbai. The said losses were not available to be
carried forward and set off during the year under consideration i.e. AY 2010-11
under these facts and circumstances, applying the legal propositions discussed
above as referred by learned AR, we do not find any merit in the action of
lower authorities for notionally carry forward and set off of losses which have
already been set off in the earlier years against the profit of eligible unit
during AY 2010-11 under consideration. 
The Tribunal also observed that the decisions relied upon by the CIT(A)
were rendered prior to the decision of Madras High Court in the case of Velayudhswamy
Spinning Mills Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT (supra)
. 
It also observed that the decision of ACIT vs. Goldmine Shares &
Finance Pvt. Ltd. (113 ITD 209)(Ahd SB)
has been overruled by the Madras
High Court in the case of Velayudhswamy Spinning Mills Pvt. Ltd. (supra).

This ground of appeal filed by the assessee
was allowed.

15. Krishna Enterprises vs. Addl. CIT (Mum) Members: R. C. Sharma (AM) and Ravish Sood (JM) ITA No. 5402/Mum/2014 A.Y.: 2007-08. Dated: 23rd November, 2016. Counsel for assessee / revenue: Sashank Dandu / A. Ramachandran

Section 50C – AO is not justified in
substituting the value determined by DVO for the sale consideration disclosed
by the assessee in a case where the difference between the sale consideration
of the property as shown by the assessee and FMV determined by the DVO u/s.
50C(2) is less than 10 percent.

FACTS  

On 07.8.2006, the assessee sold four flats
for a consideration of Rs. 1,96,60,000. 
Since the sale agreements were not registered it was submitted that it
was not possible to determine the stamp duty value as per the provisions of
section 50C of the Act.  The Assessing
Officer (AO) referred the valuation of these flats to DVO who declared the
value of the flats to be Rs. 2,07,51,130. 
The difference between the valuation as done by the DVO and the amount
of consideration was added by the AO in assessee’s income u/s. 50C. 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the Tribunal where it was argued on its behalf that the provisions of
section 50C are not applicable to the facts of the case in AY 2007-08 and since
the total addition is only a small percentage (5.5%) of the total consideration
it needs to be ignored for computing long term capital gain by relying on the
ratio of the decision of Pune bench of the tribunal in the case of Rahul
Constructions vs. DCIT (Pune)(Trib) 38 DTR 19 (2010)(ITA No. 1543 / Pn/2007).
 

HELD  

Since the transactions were entered during
the financial year 2006-07 which is prior to 1.10.2009, being the date from
which the amendment to section 50C is effective, as per CBDT Circular No.
5/2010 dated 3.6.2010, the provisions of section 50C are not applicable in so
far as sales deed so executed were not registered with the Stamp Duty Valuation
Authority.  Also, since the difference
between the sale consideration of the property shown by the assessee and the
FMV determined by the DVO u/s. 50C(2) is less than 10%, AO was not justified in
substituting the value determined by the DVO for the sale consideration
disclosed by the assessee. 

The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the
assessee.

18. [2017] 77 taxmann.com 49 (Delhi – Trib.) Gopal Saran Darbari vs. ITO A.Ys.: 2007-08 & 2008-09 Date of Order: 25th October, 2016

Section 54 – Even if an assessee acquires a
new house on credit i.e. the payment for which may be made in future, the
assessee cannot be denied the benefit of deduction u/s. 54.

FACTS 

For AY 2007-08,
the assessee in his return of income filed u/s. 139(1) returned long term
capital gain of Rs. Nil after deduction of Rs. 51,27,000 u/s. 54 of the
Act.  This sum of Rs. 51,27,000 comprised
of Rs. 35,00,000 deposited in Capital Gain Account and Rs. 15,27,000 paid to
Ajay Enterprises, a builder, for booking the flat.  During the course of assessment proceedings,
the Assessing Officer, on examination of receipts issued by the builder,
noticed that the assessee had booked two flats viz. A-907 and C-408 and payment
of Rs. 15,27,000 to the builder comprised of Rs. 5,77,000 for Flat No. A-907
and Rs. 9,50,000 for Flat No. C-408.  The
assessee admitted that the amount of Rs. 9,50,000 invested for flat no. C-408
was wrongly considered u/s. 54.  The
Assessing Officer (AO) worked out capital gain after indexation to be Rs.
49,78,349 and allowed deduction of Rs. 40,77,000 u/s. 54 – comprising of Rs.
35,00,000 deposited in capital gain account and Rs. 5,77,000 paid to builder
for flat A-907.  The AO assessed long
term capital gain to be Rs. 9,01,349.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal
to the CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the Tribunal where it was contended that the assessee has upto 4.12.2008
invested a total sum of Rs. 61,74,683 for purchase of a new house, therefore
there was substantive compliance of section 54 by making required investment in
the new house within the period specified u/s. 54.  For this proposition reliance was placed on
the following decisions –

I)   ITO vs. Smt. Sapana
Dimri [2012] 50 SOT 96 (Delhi)

     ii)  CIT vs. Ms. Jagriti Aggarwal [2011] 339 ITR 610 (P & H)

iii)  Kishore H. Galaiya vs.
ITO [2012] 137 ITD 229 (Mum)

iv) CIT vs. Rajesh Kumar
Jalan [2006] 286 ITR 274 (Gau)

v)  K. S. Ramchandran vs.
ITO [IT Appeal No. 941
(Mds.) of 2011]

HELD 

The Tribunal noted that the assessee had not
surrendered or offered the amount of Rs. 9,50,000 for addition. Before the AO
the assessee stated that the amount of Rs.9.50 lakh should not be considered as
investment u/s. 54.  Even without considering
this amount of Rs. 9.50 lakh, the actual investment by the assessee in purchase
of eligible new house within the specified period of 3 years was more than the
long term capital gain.

Even if an assessee acquires a new house on
credit i.e. the payment for which may be made in future, the assessee cannot be
denied the benefit of deduction u/s. 54 because what is required by sub-clause
(i) is that cost of new house should be equal to or more than the amount of
long term capital gain.

The requirement to invest in a bank account
under the capital gain account scheme is a procedural requirement to ensure
that investment is made in a residential house as claimed in the return of
income. Merely because of technical breach / non-compliance the benefit due to
the assessee by the legislature cannot be denied particularly when there is
substantive compliance made.  Section 54
is a beneficial section and as held by the Apex Court in Bajaj Tempo Ltd.
vs. CIT [1992] 196 ITR 188 (SC)
the provisions of a beneficial section
should be construed liberally.

For the above stated reasons and having
considered the ratio of the decisions relied upon by the assessee, the Tribunal
deleted the addition of Rs. 9,01,349.

The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the
assessee.

14. Kanungo Ferromet Pvt. Ltd vs. Addl. CIT (Mum) Members : Mahavir Singh (JM) and Ramit Kochar (AM) ITA No. 995/Mum/2014 A.Y.: 2005-06. Date of Order: 4th January, 2016. Counsel for assessee / revenue: Rajkumar Singh / Vikash Kumar Agarwal

Section 271E – Penalty u/s. 271E cannot be
levied in a case where repayment is made by an account payee cheque, though in
the name of the director of the company.

FACTS  

During assessment year 2004-05, the assessee
company, in the normal course of its business, advanced a sum of Rs. 15 lakh to
Shri R. Bhaskaran.  The advance was given
for intended business deal by the assessee company which could not materialise
and therefore the said advance payment was returned by Shri R. Bhaskaran, in
the assessment year 2005-06, through account payee cheque in the name of the
Director of the assessee company Shri Om Prakash Kanungo instead of paying it
back directly to the assessee company. 
The assessee company passed a journal entry debiting the loan account of
Shri Om Prakash Kanungo, Director of the company and credited the advance
account of Shri R. Bhaskaran.

The Assessing Officer (AO) held that the
provisions of section 269T are violated since according to him the assessee
company has received the repayment of the sum of Rs. 15 lakh advanced by it to
R. Bhaskaran in cash.  He levied penalty
u/s. 271E of the Act for violation of the provisions of section 269T of the
Act. 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the Tribunal.

HELD  

The repayment is made by account payee
cheque although in the name of one of the directors of the assessee company.
The Tribunal found that there is a reasonable cause rather the payment is
through account payee cheque.  In its
view, there was no violation of provisions of section 269T and consequential
penalty u/s. 271E was without any basis. 

The Tribunal deleted the penalty and allowed
the appeal filed by the assessee.

20. [2017] 77 taxmann.com 153 (Kolkata – Trib.) BMW Industries Ltd. vs. DCIT A.Y.: 2011-12 Date of Order: 2nd December, 2016

Section
80IA  – The expression ‘owned’ referred
to in section 80IA(4)(1)(a) refers to ownership of the enterprise and not the
ownership of the infrastructure facility that is created.

The definition of `Infrastructure
facility’  as mentioned in Explanation to
section 80IA(4)(i) covers any road including toll road.  It need not be coming under expressway or
highway category.

FACTS 

The assessee filed its return of income
showing total income of Rs.20,48,49,810. 
In arriving at the total income the assessee claimed deduction of Rs.
1,49,16,548 u/s. 80IA(4)(i) towards profits derived from developing, operating
and maintaining infrastructure facility. The Assessing Officer (AO) examined
the claim and reduced it by a sum of Rs. 2,78,385 being amount of proportionate
head office expenses allocated by him towards this unit. 

The CIT in
exercise of his powers u/s. 263 was of the view that the order of the AO in so
far as it relates to allowing the claim of the assessee for deduction u/s.
80IA(4)(i) of the Act was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the
revenue.  According to him, the assessee
was merely executing the job of civil construction on the basis of works
contract awarded by Executive Engineer. 
He was also of the view that the roads constructed by the assessee were
not coming under expressway or highway category as mentioned in the Explanation
to the section.  The assessee was not a
developer of an infrastructure facility and was not eligible to claim deduction
u/s. 80IA(4)(i).

HELD

The Tribunal observed that it cannot be said
that the AO failed to deal the specific facts of the case as per law and has
not scrutinised/verified the details in respect of the issues raised in the
show cause notice u/s. 263 of the Act.

The expression “owned” in
sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of sub-section (4) of section 80-IA of the Act
refers to ownership of the enterprise and not the ownership of the
infrastructure facility that is created. The ownership of the enterprise should
be that of a company and not any other person like individual, HUF, Firm etc.
sub-clause (a), clause (i) of sub-section (4) of section 80-IA uses the word
“it” and that denotes the enterprise carrying on the business. The
word “it” cannot be related to the infrastructure facility,
particularly in view of the fact that infrastructure facility includes Rail system,
Highway project, Water treatment system, Irrigation project, a Port, an Airport
or an Inland port which cannot be owned by any one. Even otherwise, the word
“it” is used to denote an enterprise. Therefore, there is no
requirement that the assessee should have been the owner of the infrastructure
facility.

The question as to whether the assessee is
‘developer’ or ‘contractor’ has to be tested in the light of the decisions
rendered on the issue by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of ABG Heavy
Industries (supra) and the order of the Division Bench of ITAT giving
effect to the larger bench (third member) decision in the case of B.T. Patil
& Sons (supra). According to these decisions, what is to be seen is
as to whether the assessee has shouldered out Investment & technical risk
in respect of the work executed and it is liable for liquidated damages if it
failed to fulfill the obligation laid down in the agreement. The liability that
was assumed by the assessee under terms of the contract would be obligations
involving the development of an infrastructure facility. The assessee has also
in its employment technically and administratively qualified team of persons.
If the above conditions are satisfied then it would not be correct to say that
assessee is merely a contractor and not a developer. Without giving adverse
finding on the above tests, the CIT could not conclude that the order of the AO
was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue.

As regards the observation of the CIT that
the roads construed by the Assessee were not coming under expressway or highway
category as mentioned in the Explanation to section 80IA(4)(i) of the Act,
which defines Infrastructure facility for the purpose of claiming deduction
under the aforesaid section the Tribunal held that the definition covers any
road including toll road. It need not be coming under expressway or highway
category.

The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the
assessee.

Declared Goods Vis-à-Vis Steel Structural

Introduction

Classification of goods under particular entry of Fiscal Laws
like VAT is always a debatable issue. Till date there are several judgments
determining classification and also laying down principles of classification.

“Declared good” is given special importance under the Central
Sales Tax Act (CST Act) and State VAT laws. One of the conditions about
taxation of declared goods, under VAT laws, is that the rate should not exceed
prescribed limit i.e., 5% at present.

If goods go out of the category of declared goods, they could
be taxable at a higher rate.    

Iron and Steel

Iron and Steel is one of the items of declared goods. Under
Maharashtra VAT Act (MVAT Act) the entry reads as under:

Entry C-55 under MVAT Act

Entry

Name of Commodity

Rate
of tax

Date of effect

55

Iron and steel, that is to
say,

(i) pig iron, sponge iron
and cast iron including ingots, moulds, bottom plates, iron scrap, cast iron
scrap, runner scrap and iron skull scrap;

(ii) steel semis (ingots,
slabs, blooms and billets of all qualities, shapes and sizes);

(iii) skelp bars, tin bars,
sheet bars, hoe bars and sleeper bars;

(iv) steel bars (rounds,
rods, square flats, octagons and hexagons, plain and ribbed or twisted in
coil form as well as straight lengths).;

(v) steel structurals,
(angles, joints, channels, tees, sheet pilling sections, Z sections or any
other rolled sections);

5%

1.5.2011 to date

The scope of above entry is being decided from time to time.

“Steel Structurals”

This item is covered at sub-entry (v) above. There was debate
about scope of above mentioned sub-entry. 

As per Revenue the scope of ‘steel structural’ is limited up
to items mentioned in bracketed portion. However, as per assessee, steel
structural is a separate item and cannot be controlled by bracket.

The above controversy was resolved recently by Hon. Bombay
High Court in case of Zamil Steel Buildings India Pvt. Ltd. vs. The State of
Maharashtra (MVXA Tax Appeal No.1 of 2016 dated 23.12.2016).

Facts

The facts as narrated in the judgment are as under:

“(b) The Appellant is inter alia a manufacturer of various
structural steel components such as rigid frame columns, rafters, sheets,
angles, etc. in their factory in Pune. The Appellant has been engaged in
the supply of the said structural steel components since 2007. The Appellant
has regularly been filing returns and discharging its liability under the MVAT
Act.

(c) According to the Appellant, these structural steel
components are fabricated/manufactured based on customers’ as well as
geographical requirements etc.

According to the Appellant, these individual components are
then sold to the customers. The customers may subsequently optionally choose to
avail the service of installation and erection by a sister concern of the
Appellant or by a third party. Thus, according to the Appellant, the so-called pre-engineered
buildings only emerge at the site of the customer after erection and after the
completed sale of different components by the Appellant.

(d) Until the year 2011, the Appellant had been collecting
VAT from its customers at the rate of 12.5% on account of RFCs (Rigid Frame
Columns) and Rafters and remitting the same to the revenue. Thereafter,
sometime in 2011, pursuant to a legal opinion obtained by the Appellant, the
Appellant started collecting tax at the rate of 5% and not 12.5% specifically on
rafters and RFCs and started remitting the same to the revenue.

The opinion obtained by the Appellant was based, inter alia,
on a judgment of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Prateek Technocom
vs. State of Rajasthan [(2006) 6 VAT Reporter 9 (Rajasthan)
].
Simultaneously, the Appellant invoked the procedure for determination of
disputed questions (DDQ) under the provisions of the MVAT Act for one of the
products supplied by it i.e. RFCs. The invoice number referred to in the said
DDQ Application (i.e. ZSB-0023/2010-2011 dated 6th April, 2010) describes the
goods sold as “Supply of Pre-Fabricated Building Components (AS PER PACKING
SLIP)”. In turn, the said packing slip describes the commodities sold as “Rigid
Frame Columns and Interior Columns”. Accordingly, under the said DDQ
Application, the Appellant applied to Respondent No.2 to determine as to
whether the RFCs supplied to its customers would fall under Schedule Entry
C-55(v) of the MVAT Act. We must mention here that Schedule Entry C-55(v) attracts
sales tax at the rate of 5%.”

The assessee submitted that the steel structural, (RFC)
though made by welding and not structural as covered by items mentioned in
bracket, is still covered by plain language as given in sub-entry. It was
submitted that the rule of “ejusdem generis” cannot apply on reverse
basis, i.e. prior words cannot be controlled by subsequent words though
subsequent words can be controlled by prior words. It was submitted that the
bracketed items are by way of illustration. Supporting judgments were cited.

On behalf of Revenue, the main plank of argument was that
only items mentioned in bracket will be covered. It was also argued that Iron
and Steel entry intends to cover iron and steel in raw form and not made ups
from iron and steel. Therefore, it was argued that the steel structural in
present case, which is made ups by welding etc., cannot be covered.

The Hon. High Court concurred with the assessee, after giving
elaborate reasoning.

The Hon. High Court held as under:

“27. Looking to these authoritative pronouncements, it is
clear that the utility of a bracket is only as an illustration, explanation or
extra information. It is thus clarificatory. It is not always exhaustive of the
terms outside the bracket. It cannot curtail or limit the scope of the terms
employed outside the bracket. Eventually, no general rule can be laid down. As
held by the Supreme Court, ordinarily, words appearing in brackets are
illustrative and not exhaustive. Therefore, everything would depend upon the
context and purpose with which in an individual statute the words in the
bracket are inserted by the Competent Legislature. Applying these principles,
we are unable to agree with Mr. Sonpal that though the goods of the Appellant
may be “steel structurals”, but if they do not fall within the
description of the terms as set out in the brackets viz. “(angles, joints,
channels, tees, sheet piling sections, Z sections or any other rolled sections
)”,
then they would not be covered either u/s. 14(iv)(v) of CST Act or Schedule
Entry C-55(v) of the MVAT Act. We are unable to agree with Mr. Sonpal that
enumeration of the six items in the bracketed portion are with a specific
purpose of restricting the meaning of the words “steel structurals” preceding
and outside the brackets. In fact, we find that the six items appearing in the
bracketed portion of section 14(iv)(v) of the CST Act and Schedule Entry
C-55(v) of the MVAT Act are clearly not exhaustive, but descriptive of the
words “steel structurals”.”

The High Court further observed as under:

“29. Equally, we are also unable to agree with the argument
of Mr. Sonpal as well as the finding of the MSTT that because the goods sold by
the Appellant are brought into being by a process of welding and not rolling,
the same cannot be classified under Schedule Entry C-55(v) of the MVAT Act. We
find this argument totally without any merit. As mentioned earlier, the items
mentioned in section 14(iv)(v) of the CST Act read with Schedule Entry C-55(v)
of the MVAT Act are goods of special importance in inter-state trade or
commerce. It would be ludicrous to suggest that “steel structurals” that
are manufactured from rolled sections are goods of special importance, whereas
steel structurals” that are brought into being by a welding process are
not goods of special importance. We see nothing in the Statute to make this
distinction. Even otherwise, we find that the authorities below erred in
concluding that even the specific terms namely “angles, joints, channels,
tees, sheet piling sections, Z sections”
should all be “rolled sections”.
As mentioned earlier, section 14(iv)(v) of the CST Act and Schedule Entry
C-55(v) of the MVAT Act deals with “steel structurals (angles, joints,
channels, tees, sheet piling sections, Z sections or any other rolled sections
)”.
According to the authorities below, the words “or any other rolled sections
would apply to all the other items including “steel structurals”. In
other words, according to the Revenue, only rolled steel structurals such as
rolled angles, rolled joists, rolled channels, rolled tees, rolled sheet piling
sections, rolled Z sections or any other rolled sections are covered u/s.
14(iv)(v) of the CST Act and Schedule Entry C-55(v) of the MVAT Act and nothing
else. To put it differently, only goods manufactured by the process of rolling
would be covered under the said provisions. We are unable to agree with this
interpretation for the simple reason that the authorities below have applied
the rule of ‘ejusdem generis’ in reverse. This, and as rightly submitted
by Mr. Sridharan, is impermissible.”

With the above observations the Hon. Bombay High Court
classified the given item, RFC, as steel structural duly covered by entry
C-55(v) as declared goods.

Conclusion

The above judgment not only decides the
controversy but throws light upon various shades of principles of
classification. It will also go a long way to decide scope of entry relating to
Iron and Steel, The wrong impression created so far that the entry for ‘Iron
and Steel’ covers only Iron and steel as raw material has also been clarified. It can include made ups also based on words of the Entry.

19. [2016] 76 taxmann.com 165 (Bangalore – Trib.) S. K. Properties vs. ITO A.Y.: 2007-08 Date of Orderd: 4th November, 2016

Sections
5, 145  – In case of a developer selling
plots, income in respect of sale of plots can be recognised only in the year in
which conveyance deed executed is registered in favour of the buyers and it in
that year that development expenditure incurred as expenditure or expenditure
likely to be incurred on the plot is to be allowed.  This is in consonance with provisions of AS 9
which clearly lays down that matching is required to be done on accrual basis
in respect of income offered to tax. 

FACTS 

The assessee firm, engaged in the business
of development of property, recognised revenue only in the year in which the
plots were sold and conveyance deed registered. It filed its return of income
declaring total income to be Rs. Nil. 
The Assessing Officer (AO), in the course of assessment proceedings was
of the view that revenue should be recognised at every stage of receipt of sale
consideration.  He, therefore, rejected
the method of accounting followed by the assessee and assessed the total income
to be Rs. 2,37,37,172.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the Tribunal where it was contended that revenue in respect of sale of plots
can be recognised only when the risk and rewards and ownership of the plots are
transferred to the buyers till such time the revenue cannot be recognised on
sale of plots.

HELD 

The Tribunal observed that the assessee has
recognised the income in respect of sale of plots by adopting Completed
Contract Method, whereas, the AO is of the view that income should be offered
to tax received on year to year basis based on the stage of receipt of
consideration, irrespective of the fact that the title in the plots have been
passed on to the buyer or not. It also noted that the plots formed part of
stock-in-trade of the assessee firm and are immovable properties.The title in
immovable property can be passed only in terms of the provisions of the
Transfer of Property Act. 

The Tribunal noted the ratio of the decision
of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Wipro Ltd. vs. DCIT [2016] 382
ITR 179 (Kar.)
and held that the provisions of section 2(47) of the Act
have no application to the transactions of stock-in-trade. In this case, the
stock-in-trade is immovable property and the title in immovable property can be
transferred or alienated in accordance with the provisions of the Transfer of
Properties Act. The right, title or interest in the immovable property can be
transferred only by way of registering the conveyance deed executed in this
behalf. Even the Accounting Standard 9 dealing with the recognition of income
also lays down that the income in respect of transfer of immovable property can
be recognised only when the risks, rewards and ownership of the property is
transferred to the buyer.

It held that the matter requires a fresh
examination by the AO in the light of the above position of law. The Tribunal
remanded the matter back to the file of the AO with a direction that the income
in respect of sale of plots can be recognised only in the year in which
conveyance deed executed is registered in favour of the buyers and to allow the
development expenditure incurred as expenditure or the expenditure likely to be
incurred on the plots sold as expenditure. It held that this direction also
goes in line with and is in consonance with the provisions of Accounting
Standard 9 which clearly lays down that matching is required to be done on
accrual basis in respect of the income offered to tax and upheld by Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Taparia Tools Ltd. vs. Jt. CIT [2015] 372 ITR
605 (SC).

Shared Expenditure: Whether Taxable as Service?

Introduction

Taxability of shared expenditure has been a subject of
extensive litigation under service tax for quite some time. It is a common
business practice to share common facilities or outsourced services by group
companies under a common roof. Typically, one company receives the invoice from
outsourced service provider and then the cost is shared by each participating
entity by way of reimbursements generally in proportion of actual usage.
Similarly, sometimes, common expenses like advertisement expense is incurred by
a manufacturer and shared with its dealers as the benefit is derived by both,
the manufacturer and the dealers. In the case of Union of India vs. Mahindra
and Mahindra Ltd. 1989 (43) ET 611 (Cal)
, the High Court observed that the
manufacturer and distributor had mutual interest in maximising sale of its
products. The contract between them was to further this desire and it no way
affected the real nature of transaction which appeared to be of sale on
principal-to-principal basis. However, in the case of Maruti Suzuki India
Ltd. vs. CCE 2008 (23) ELT 566 (Tri.-Del)
, it was held that when the
contract envisages such expenses to be incurred by the dealer and failure to do
so gives a right to the manufacturer to get advertisement done on their own and
recover such expenses from the dealer, such expense incurred by the dealer
would be payment on behalf of manufacturer and requires to be considered
additional consideration for sale and added to the assessable value.

The Mumbai Tribunal in JM Financial Services Ltd. vs. CST
Mumbai-I 2013-TIOL-757-CESTAT-MUM
held to the effect that whether revenue
such as incentive or processing fee or expense like electricity etc., when
shared by the parties on principal-to-principal basis, no service is said to
have been rendered. Also in Reliance ADA Group Pvt. Ltd. vs. CST Mumbai-IV
2016-TIOL-603-CESTAT-MUM,
it was held that when common services are procured
by one company from service providers, that company acts as a manager/trustee
to incur expenses on behalf of participating group companies and then cost
thereof is shared by all the beneficiaries by making reimbursements.These
reimbursements of the cost incurred cannot be regarded as consideration flowing
for taxable service, but it is rather a receipt towards the reimbursement of
cost/expenses in terms of cost sharing agreement with the participating group
companies.Similarly, in case of CST vs. Arvind Mills Ltd. 2014 (35) STR 496
(Guj),
the High Court of Gujarat held that in case of deputation of
employees to subsidiary company, salary and perquisites reimbursed by group
companies, the assessee could not be said to be engaged in providing specified
services to client. Hence, they were not liable for service tax.Identically,
recently in Franco Indian Pharmaceutical (P) Ltd. (2016) 69 taxmann.com 198
(Mumbai-CESTAT),
it was held that services provided to many employees and
respective share in salaries paid by the employer is not taxable as a service
of manpower supply. It was further observed that the position will remain the
same even if appointment letter is not signed jointly and any one company has
hired employees and employees are lent or deputed to other companies.

Recent decision of Supreme Court

Recently, the matter of Gujarat State Fertilizers and
Chemicals Ltd. vs. CCE 2016 (45) STR 489 (SC)
came up for examination of
Supreme Court wherein GSFC had collected incinerating charge from Gujarat Alkalies
& Chemicals (GACL). The service tax department issued a show cause notice
alleging that the said charges are towards storage and warehousing service
provided by GSFC to GACL. The fact of the matter was that both GSFC and GACL
received Hydro Cynic Acid (HCN) from Reliance Industries Ltd. through a common
pipeline which was used by them for manufacturing of their final product and
used by the two companies in 60:40 ratio. Subsequent to the use, incineration
also was required to be undertaken; the expense on this process was shared by
the two in 50:50 ratio. This arrangement was made in terms of an agreement
between GSFC and GACL. The said facts were adequately explained to the service
tax department. However, the contention of GSFC against service tax liability
was not accepted by the adjudicating authority as well as the first and second
Appellate authorities.

The Appellant, GSFC explained that HCN being one of the main
raw materials was received from RIL, Vadodara directly through a pipeline by
gravity from their plant. As per agreement between GSFC and GACL, sodium
cyanide unit, the quantity received in an intermittent hold tank was consumed
in 60:40 ratio. The hold tank existed for sustaining continuous process of both
the plants facilitating smooth operation of suction pumps and specifically
avoiding starvation of pumps which could disturb the process. If there was any
problem at any of the consumers’ end, the supply from RIL would be stopped and
remaining quantity in the tank would be consumed immediately by either of the
plants. Hence storage of HCN did not happen at all. Moreover, the agreement
between the parties clearly provided that though HCN handling and incineration
facilities were installed in GSFC premises, the expenses thereto were to be borne
by both the parties. For incineration, neither GACL paid nor GSFC received any
fee or a charge but shared cost of incineration as per agreement including
those of repair, maintenance or replacement of spare parts and other overheads.
Thus, both GSFC and GACL were equally responsible for storage and consumption
and no one worked for another and the expense was shared in predetermined
proportion. In facts of the case, GSFC contended that in any case, the
arrangement did not involve storage or warehousing service to GACL and
therefore service tax was not attracted.

The revenue at the other end contended that since HCN was
first kept in holding tank and from this it was distributed in 60:40 ratio, the
holding tank would qualify as storage facility. Further, the fact that GSFC
collected incineration charge from GACL, it was correctly held that GSFC
provided service of storage. According to revenue, since there were questions
of fact based on which concurrent findings were reached by authorities, they
should not be interfered with by the Court as the scope of appeal required the
Court to deal with substantial question of law only. 

Considering all the facts and the terms of agreement between
the parties, the Court observed that there was no dispute that joint investment
was made by the parties for creation of common facility. On accepting this
fact, handling and incineration facilities were in the nature of joint venture
between two of them and they simply agreed to share expenditure. The payment
made by GACL was towards its share of expense. In order to attract service
tax, there has to be element of service provided by one person to the other for
which charges for providing service are collected. When this ingredient is
missing in the facts of the case, the question of service tax does not arise.

Conclusion

When the Apex Court has decided in principle that the element
of service does not exist when common expenses are shared by beneficiaries on
principal-to-principal basis, the long drawn litigation should find a
closement. However, considering approach of the revenue for all practical
purposes, it is less likely that at lower levels, raising dispute would stop.

The question in most of the cases did not per
se
involve “classification issue” although different categories of services
were dealt with which mainly included management consultancy, business
auxiliary/support service and manpower supply. The core issue revolved around
whether there exists an element of service when common services are procured or
when there is a pooling of expenses which is later shared by participating
group companies. Under the negative list based taxation of services from July
01, 2012 also, if there is no element of ‘service’ present, the decision should
continue to apply. However, the authorities now under the guise of ‘testing’
negative list based service taxation vis-a-vis the definition of
‘service’ would continue litigation, considering the scenario in the department
of service tax where a majority of demands made in the show cause notices
issued based on facts or legal grounds are routinely confirmed.

37. Appellate Tribunal – Rectification of mistake – Section 254(2) – Mistake can be on part of litigants or his advisors

Binaguri Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT; 389 ITR 648 (Cal):

While assessing the fringe benefit tax, the Assessing Officer
gave the assessee the benefit applicable under rule 8 of the Income-tax Rules
1962. However, invoking section 154, of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter
for the sake of brevity referred to as the “Act”) the Assessing
Officer withdrew the benefit. The Commissioner(Appeals) confirmed the
rectification order. The assessee filed an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal
contending that the Commissioner (Appeals) had erred in holding that Rule 8 had
no applicability while calculating the eligible expenses of a company engaged
in the business of cultivation, manufacture and sale of tea for the purpose of
fringe benefit tax. Based on the Tribunal decisions against the assessee, the
assessee was advised by the advisors not to press the appeal. Accordingly, the
assessee did not press the appeal and the Appellate Tribunal dismissed the
appeal. It was subsequently noticed that the said Tribunal decisions were
reversed by the Calcutta High Court and the issue was decided in favour of the
assessee even before the dismissal order of the Tribunal. Therefore, within two
months of the order of the Tribunal, the assessee applied for restoration of
the appeal u/s. 254(2) of the Act which was rejected by the Tribunal for the
following reasons.

“The learned counsel for
the assessee reiterated the stand of the assessee as contained in the
miscellaneous application. We are of the view that jurisdiction u/s. 254(2) of
the Act can be exercised only to rectify an error apparent on the face of the
record. The contention in the miscellaneous application, even if true, cannot
give rise to any mistake in the order of the Tribunal apparent on the face of
the record. The miscellaneous application, in our view, cannot therefore be entertained
and the same is hereby rejected.”

On appeal by the assessee, the Calcutta High Court allowed
the appeal and held as under:

“i)   Section 254(2) of the Act did not provide
that it had to be a mistake solely on the part of the Appellate Tribunal to
recall an order and that the statutory power could also be exercised in the
case of mistake apparent on the part of the litigants or his advisors.

ii)   Neither the Appellate Tribunal nor the
assessee was aware of the judgment of the jurisdictional High Court. Therefore,
the prayer for leave to withdraw the appeal and the order allowing the prayer
were both based on a mistake. The order of the Tribunal is set aside.

iii) The Tribunal shall hear the appeal on
merits.”

Interest Income of a Credit Society and Deductibility U/S. 80p

Issue for Consideration

Section 80P of the Income-tax Act grants a deduction to an
assessee, being a co-operative society, in respect of such sums that,
inter-alia, includes the whole of the amount of profits and gains of business
attributable to any one or more of such activities which are listed in clauses
(i) to (vii) of clause (a) of sub-section (2). One of the sub-clauses grants a
deduction for a co-operative society engaged in carrying on the business of
banking or providing credit facilities to its members.

The Courts, in the past, have time and again examined the
true meaning of the term ‘attributable’, and have found the same to be of wider
import in contrast to the term ‘derived from’. Based on such interpretation,
the courts have been inclined to include income from activities incidental to
the main business or activity of the assessee, and have held that such incidental
income too was eligible for deduction, inasmuch as such income was profits and
gains attributable to the business.

In the recent past, the Supreme Court, in the case of Totgars
Co-operative Sale Society Ltd., 322 ITR 283
held that income from interest
on deposits with the bank, earned by a credit society, was to be taxed u/s.56
of the Income-tax Act.

The above mentioned decision in Totgars Co-operative Sale
Society’s
case has become a subject matter of controversy leading to
conflicting decisions of the High Courts, whereunder, the Gujarat High Court
followed the said decision, but the Karnataka High Court chose to distinguish
the same on facts, and the Andhra Pradesh High Court held the said decision to
be applicable only to Totgars Co-operative Sale Society Limited. In fact, the
ratio of the said decision and its applicability has also become debatable.

Tumkur Merchants Souharda Credit Cooperative Ltd.’s case

The issue arose in the case of Tumkur Merchants Souharda
Credit Cooperative Ltd. vs. Income-tax officer, 55 taxmann.com 447 (Karnataka).

The assessee, a Cooperative Society registered under the provisions of section
7 of the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959, was engaged in the
activity of carrying on the business of providing credit facilities to its
members. It filed the return of income for the assessment year 2009-10,
declaring a total income of Rs. NIL, after claiming a deduction of
Rs.42,02,079/- under the provisions of section 80P of the Act in respect of its
business income, which, inter alia, included interest from short term
deposits and savings bank accounts aggregating to Rs. 1,77,305.

The assessing authority denied the deduction claimed u/s. 80P
and passed an order of assessment, determining a total income of
Rs.42,02,079/-, as against the declared income of Rs.NIL. Aggrieved by the said
order, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Commissioner of Income Tax
(Appeals) who held that assessee’s interest income earned from short-term
deposits with Allahabad Bank of Rs. 1,55,300/- and savings bank account with
Axis Bank of Rs.22,005/-, totalling to Rs. 1,77,305/- was liable to income tax,
in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Totgars Cooperative
Sale Society Ltd. vs. ITO, 322 ITR 283(SC).

Aggrieved by that part of the order, the assessee preferred
an appeal to the Tribunal, which dismissed the appeal, following the judgment
of the Apex Court in the aforesaid case. Aggrieved by the said order, the
assessee filed the appeal challenging the order passed by the Tribunal
raising the following substantial question of law: ‘”Whether the Tribunal
failed in law to appreciate that the interest earned on short-term deposits
were only investments in the course of activity of providing credit facilities
to members and that the same cannot be considered as investment made for the
purpose of earning interest income and consequently passed a perverse
order?”

The assessee, assailing the impugned order, contended before
the Karnataka High Court, that the interest accrued in a sum of Rs. 1,77,305/-
was from the deposits made by the assessee in a nationalised bank out of the
amounts which was used by the assessee for providing credit facilities to its
members, and therefore the said interest amount was attributable to the credit
facilities provided by the assessee, and formed part of profits and gains of
business. It therefore submitted that the appellate authorities were not
justified in denying the said benefit in terms of sub-section (2) of section
80P of the Act. In support of the contention that the interest income was
eligible for deduction u/s. 80P, it relied on several judgments, and pointed
out that the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment had not laid down any law. In
reply, the Revenue strongly relied on the said judgment of the Supreme Court in
Totgars Co-operative Sale Society Ltd. (supra), and submitted that the
case before the court was covered by the judgment of the Apex Court and no case
for interference was called for.

The Karnataka High Court, on hearing the facts and the rival
contentions, noted the undisputed facts emerging that the assessee was a
co-operative society providing credit facilities to its members, was not
carrying on any other business and that the interest income earned by the
assessee by providing credit facilities to its members was deposited in the
banks for a short duration, which had earned interest in the sum of Rs.
1,77,305/- . 

Analysing the provisions of section 80P, the court found that
the word ‘attributable’ used in the said section was of great importance. It
took note of the fact that the Apex Court had considered the meaning of the
word ‘attributable’ as opposed to ‘derived from’ in the case of Cambay
Electric Supply Industrial Co. Ltd. vs. CIT ,113 ITR 84.
The court found
from the above decision that the word “attributable to” was certainly
wider in import than the expression “derived from”, and whenever the
legislature wanted to give a restricted meaning, they had used the expression
“derived from”. The expression, “attributable to”, being of
wider import, was used by the legislature whenever they intended to gather
receipts from sources other than the actual conduct of the business. 

The court observed that a cooperative society, which was
carrying on the business of providing credit facilities to its members, earned
profits and gains of business by providing credit facilities to its members;
the interest income so derived and the capital, if not immediately required to
be lent to the members, could not be kept idle, and the interest income earned
on depositing such balance in hand was to be treated as attributable to the
profits and gains of the business of providing credit facilities to its members
only; the society was not carrying on any separate business for earning such
interest income; the income so derived was the amount of profits and gains of
business attributable to the activity of carrying on the business of banking or
providing credit facilities to its members by a co-operative society and was
liable to be deducted from the gross total income u/s. 80P of the Act.

The court further observed that the Apex Court in the case of
Totgars Co-operative Sale Society Ltd.(supra), on which reliance was
placed, was dealing with a case where the assessee – cooperative society, apart
from providing credit facilities to the members, was also in the business of
marketing of agricultural produce grown by its members and the sale
consideration received from marketing agricultural produce of its members was retained
in many cases, and the said retained amount which was payable to its members
from whom produce was bought, was invested in a short-term deposit/security;
such an amount which was retained by the assessee – society was a liability and
it was shown in the balance sheet on the liability side; therefore, to that
extent, such interest income could not be said to be attributable either to the
activity mentioned in section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act or u/s. 80P(2)(a)(iii) of
the Act; in the facts of the said case, the Apex Court held that the assessing
officer was right in taxing the interest income u/s. 56 of the Act after making
it clear that they were confining the said judgment to the facts of that case.
It was clear to the Karnataka high court that the Supreme Court in Totgars
Co-operative Sale Society Ltd.(supra)
was not laying down any law.

In the instant case, the court noted that the amount which
was invested in banks to earn interest was not an amount due to any members; it
was not the liability; it was not shown as liability in the accounts and that
the amount which was in the nature of profits and gains, was not immediately
required by the assessee for lending money to the members, as there were no
takers. Therefore, they had deposited the money in a bank so as to earn
interest. The court accordingly held that the said interest income was
attributable to carrying on the business of banking and was liable to be
deducted in terms of section 80P(1) of the Act. The court cited with approval
the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of CIT vs. Andhra
Pradesh State co-operative Bank Ltd.,200 Taxman 220.
               

State Bank Of India (SBI)’s case

The issue again arose in the case of State Bank of India
vs. CIT , 74 taxmann.com 64
before the Gujarat high court. The assessee, a
co-operative society, namely State Bank of India Employees Co-op Credit and
Supply Society Ltd. was registered under the Gujarat Co-operative Societies
Act, 1961 with the object of accepting deposits from salaried persons of the
State Bank of India, Gujarat region, with a view to encourage thrift and
providing credit facility to them. It had launched various deposit schemes such
as Term Deposit, Recurring Deposit, Aid to Your Family Scheme, Members Retiring
Benefit Fund etc., and at the same time, was advancing loans to the
members, such as consumer goods loan, car-vehicle loan, food grain loan and
general purposes loan, etc. It had filed its return of income for
assessment year 2009-10 and 2010-11, declaring total income at Rs. Nil, after
claiming deduction u/s. 80P of the Income-tax Act, 1961 of Rs.29,69,444/- and
Rs.43,64,828/-.respectively.

The matter was taken up in
scrutiny by the Assessing Officer who called for various details, including
justification regarding claim of deduction u/s. 80P of the Act vide notice
u/s. 142(1). The society submitted its replies, narrating the nature of
activities carried out by it, and details of claim of deduction u/s. 80P with
copy of bye-laws, and the Assessing Officer framed assessment u/s. 143(3) of
the Act accepting the claim.

Subsequently, the Commissioner of Income Tax invoked powers
u/s. 263 of the Act, proposing to revise the above order on the ground that
interest income of Rs.16,14,579/- for assessment year 2009-10 and of
Rs.32,83,410/- from the State Bank of India for assessment year 2010-11 was not
exempt u/s. 80P(2)(d) of the Act. In response, the assessee contended that the
interest income was business income, and was exempt u/s. 80P(2)(a)(i) of the
Act. The Commissioner of Income Tax did not find the explanation satisfactory,
on the ground that interest income was not business income, so as to be exempt
u/s. 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act. Hence, the assessment order was held to be
erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue.

Being aggrieved, the appellant carried the matter in appeal
before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, which held that interest income
earned from members on grant of credit did not have nexus with the interest
earned on deposits made with SBI, and could not be said to be the one arising
from business of providing credit facility to its members, by drawing support
from the decision of the Supreme Court in Totgars Co-operative Sales Society
Ltd. vs. ITO 322 ITR 283(SC) .

The assessee being aggrieved, raised substantial questions of
law in appeal for consideration of the Gujarat High Court, which included ;

‘(1)     Whether on the facts and in the
circumstances of the case, ………… ?

(2)      Whether on the facts and in the
circumstances of the case, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in
holding that interest income of Rs……………. on deposits placed with State Bank of
India was not exempt under section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income Tax Act, 1961?

On behalf of the society, it was submitted that the assessee
was a co-operative society formed by the employees of the State Bank of India,
Gujarat Circle, under the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961 in the
category of Employees’ Co-operative Credit Society for the purpose of
encouragement of savings and providing credit facilities to the members of the
Society; it was not engaged in any other activity except giving credit
facilities to its members, who were employees of State Bank of India, and that
the income generated by the assessee was mainly on account of differential rate
of amount of deposits received from the members and the amount of loans given
to the members; the income generated was only from the contributions received
from the members and it did not deal in any way with any person other than the
members; the employer deducted the contribution from the salary of the
employees and the collective contribution received was remitted to the assessee
society, generally on the first of every month, while the loans were given to
the employees on a fixed day of the month (around 15th of the month)
and not every day, and during the intervening period, the idle money collected
by the assessee was deposited with the State Bank of India for the purpose of
earning interest; as and when the amount was required, the deposits with the
State Bank of India are liquidated and utilised for the purposes of the
assessee.

In the above stated facts, it was pleaded that the deposit of
amount with State Bank of India was during the course of business and was part
of the activities of the assessee society and could not be seen in isolation.
It was submitted that the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Totgars
Co-operative Sales Society Limited (supra)
would not be applicable to the
facts of the present case, inasmuch as to apply the said decision, the
necessary facts had to be on record, and that there was no strait-jacket
formula that the above decision would be applicable. Reliance was placed upon
the decision of the Karnataka High Court in Tumkur Merchants Souharda Credit
Cooperative Ltd. vs. ITO, 55 taxmann.com 447,
wherein the court had held
that the word “attributable to” was certainly wider in import than
the expression “derived from” and whenever the legislature used the
expression ‘attributable ‘ they intended to gather receipts from sources other
than the actual conduct of business. Reliance was also placed upon the decision
of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Guttigedarara Credit Co-operative
Society Ltd. vs. ITO, 377 ITR 464
wherein the above view has been
reiterated. Reliance was also placed upon the decision of the Patna High Court
in the case of Bihar State Housing Co operative Federation Ltd. vs. CIT, 315
ITR 286
wherein the court was dealing with the question as to whether on
the facts and in the circumstances of that case, the Tribunal was correct in
holding that the sum of Rs.15,98,590/- received by way of interest on bank
deposit was not ancillary and incidental to carrying on the business of
providing credit facilities to its members and as such, exempt u/s.
80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. It was submitted that the above
decisions would be squarely applicable to the facts of the present case, as the
factual background in which the said decisions were rendered were similar to
the present case.

It was contended that insofar as the interest earned from
deposits was concerned, section 80P(2)(a)(i) did not make any difference nor
was it possible to read any limitation having regard to the language of the
said provision and every income “attributable to any one or more of such
activities” should be deducted from the gross total income. It was
highlighted that one had to bear in mind the object with which the provision
was introduced, viz. to encourage and promote growth of co-operative sector in
the economic life of the country and in pursuance of the declared policy of the
Government. Reference was made to bye-law 7 of the Bye-laws of the appellant
society to point out that the interest income was a part of the corpus of the
society, and when the corpus was invested, the decision of the Supreme Court in
the case of Totgars Co-operative Sales Society Ltd. (supra) would not be
applicable. It was submitted that the interest income was incidental to the
main activity of the appellant of providing credit facility and that in the
above decision of the Supreme Court, the word ‘incidental’ had not come up for
consideration. In conclusion, it was submitted that the appeals deserved to be
allowed by answering the questions in favour of the assessee and against the
revenue.

Opposing the appeals, it was contended by the Revenue that it
was only the interest received from members towards credit facilities extended
to them that would fall within the ambit of the expression profits and gains of
business attributable to the activities of the appellant; interest from bank on
surplus did not have any direct or proximate connection with the activities of
the society , and hence, it would not be entitled to the benefit of section
80P(2) of the Act in respect of such income.

It was submitted that in case of a credit co-operative
society, it was the income derived from such activity that was exempt.
Adverting to the facts of the present case, it was submitted that the decision
of the Supreme Court in the case of Totgars Co-operative Sales Society Ltd. (supra)
was squarely applicable. It was submitted that section 80P of the Act was based
upon the concept of mutuality, and accordingly exempted any income derived by
the society from its members. As the interest earned from the funds deposited
with the banks lacked the degree of proximity between the appellant and its
members, it could not be categorised as an activity in the pursuit of its
objectives, so as to fall within the ambit of section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act.

Reference was made to the decision of the Karnataka High
Court in the case of Totgars Co-operative Sale Society Ltd. (supra), to
point out the nature of the dispute involved in that case. It was submitted
that, in that case, the court was concerned with two activities of the assessee
society: (i) to provide credit facility to its members, and (ii) to market the
agricultural produce of its members. It was submitted that the findings
recorded by the Supreme Court were also in connection with the two activities
and, therefore, to say that the Supreme Court was only concerned with the
surplus of marketing produce was not correct. It was submitted that the
observation regarding the judgment being confined to the facts of that case was
because the assessee was not in the banking business, and all the earlier
decisions in this regard were relating to banking business. It was submitted
that the decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Tumkur
Merchants Souharda Credit Cooperative Ltd.
(supra) was based upon an
incorrect reading of the above decision of the Supreme Court.

The Gujarat High Court, on hearing the parties to the appeal,
noted that the short question that arose for consideration in these appeals was
as to whether the appellant was entitled to claim deduction u/s. 80P(2)(a)(i)
of the Act in respect of the interest earned on the deposits placed with the
State Bank of India. For the purpose of appreciating the controversy in issue,
it extensively referred to the records of the case and appreciated the
contesting views of the parties before the lower authorities. The court also
examined the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Totgars
Co-operative Sale Society Ltd.
(supra), and supplied emphasis where
felt necessary.

Expressing its opinion, the court stated that in case of a
society engaged in providing credit facilities to its members, income from
investments made in banks did not fall in any of the categories mentioned u/s.
80P(2)(a) of the Act; in the case of Totgars Co-operative Sale Society
(supra),
the court was dealing with two kinds of activities: interest
income earned from the amount retained from the amount payable to the members
from whom produce was bought and which was invested in short-term
deposits/securities, and the interest derived from the surplus funds that the
assessee therein invested in short-term deposits with the Government
securities. The Gujarat High Court opined that the above decision was not
restricted only to the investments made out of the retained amount which was
payable to its members, but was also in respect of funds not immediately
required for business purposes. For the above reasons, the Gujarat High Court
did not agree with the view taken by the Karnataka High Court in Tumkur
Merchants Souharda Credit Cooperative Ltd.
(supra) to the effect
that the decision of the Supreme Court in Totgars Co-operative Sale Society
(supra)
was restricted to the sale consideration received from marketing
agricultural produce of its members, which was retained in many cases and
invested in short term deposit/security, and that the said decision was
confined to the facts of the said case and did not lay down any law.

Relying on the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in Totgars
Co-operative Sale Society
(supra), the Gujarat High court held that
in case of a society engaged in providing credit facilities to its members,
income from investments made in banks did not fall within any of the categories
mentioned in section 80P(2)(a) of the Act. In the end, the court did not find
any infirmity in the order passed by the Tribunal warranting interference, and
accordingly held that the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in
holding that interest income of Rs.16,14,579/- and Rs.32,83,410/-respectively
on deposits placed with State Bank of India was not exempt u/s. 80P(2)(a)(i) of
the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Observations

An assessee, a co-operative society engaged in providing
credit facilities to its members, is entitled to deduction for the whole of the
amount of profits and gains of business attributable to such activity. As per
section 80P(2), in the case of a co-operative society engaged in carrying on
the business of providing credit facilities to its members, what is deductible
is the whole of the amount of profits and gains of business attributable to any
one or more such activities.

A co-operative society which is carrying on the business of
providing credit facilities to its members, earns profits and gains from
business by providing such facilities to its members. The interest income so
earned from members, if not immediately required to be lent to the members,
cannot be kept idle. On deposit of such income in a bank so as to earn
interest, such interest income enhances the capital available for the credit to
its members, besides reducing the cost of interest to members. Such interest so
received from bank has the business nexus, in as much as the source thereof is
the business income, and should be treated as attributable to the profits or
gains of the business of providing credit facilities to its members only, more
so where such deposit with the bank is for short period and further so where
the bye-laws or the enactment require the society to employ funds. The income
so derived is the profits or gains of business that is attributable to the
activity of carrying on the business of providing credit facilities to its
members by a co-operative society and should be eligible for being deducted
from the gross total income u/s. 80P of the Act.

Money is stock-in-trade or circulating capital for a credit
society and its normal business is to deal in money and credit. It cannot be
said that the business of such a society consists only in receiving
contribution from its members. Depositing money with banks or such other societies,
as are mentioned in the objects, in a manner that it may be readily available
to meet the demand of its members, if and when it arises, is a legitimate mode
of carrying on of its business.

The interest received by a credit society on bank deposits,
in any case, is ancillary and incidental to carrying on the business of
providing credit facilities to its members, and as such, is deductible under
the provisions of section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act. The nature of credit
business, conducted out of the funds of the employees, clearly creates a
situation where surplus funds are available, which are deposited in a bank,
interest is earned thereon. The placement of such funds, being incidental and
ancillary to carrying on business of providing credit facilities to its
members, and  by reason of section
80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act, the same should be eligible for deduction. 

The business of a credit society essentially consists of
dealing with money and credit. Members put their money in the society at a
small rate of interest. In order to meet their demands, as and when they arise,
the society has always to keep sufficient cash or easily realisable securities.
That is a normal step in the carrying on of the business; in other words, that
is an act done in what is truly the carrying on or carrying out of a business.

It is a normal mode of carrying on credit business to invest
moneys in a manner that they are readily available and that is just as much a
part of the mode of conducting a business as receiving contributions or lending
moneys; that is how the circulating capital is employed and that is the normal
course of business of a credit society. The moneys laid out in the form of
deposits with the bank would not cease to be a part of the circulating capital
of the credit society nor would the deposits cease to form part of its
business. The returns flowing from the deposits would form part of its profits
from its business. In a commercial sense, the managers of the society owe it to
the society to make investments which earn them interest, instead of letting
moneys lie idle. It cannot be said that the funds which were not lent to
borrowers but were laid out in the form of deposits in another bank, to add to
the profit instead of lying idle, necessarily ceased to be a part of the
stock-in-trade of the society, or that the interest arising therefrom did not
form part of its business profits. 

As regards the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Totgars
Co-operative Sales Society Ltd. (supra),
the court, in the facts of that
case, had observed that it was dealing with a case where the assessee –
co-operative society, apart from providing credit facilities to the members,
was also in the business of marketing of agricultural produce grown by its
members; the sale consideration received from marketing agricultural produce of
its members was retained in many cases; the said retained amount which was
payable to its members from whom produce was bought, was invested in a
short-term deposit/security; such an amount which was retained by the assessee
– society was a liability and it was shown in the Balance Sheet on the
liability side. In the above facts, the Supreme Court held that therefore, to
that extent, such interest income could not be said to be attributable either
to the activity mentioned in section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act or u/s.
80P(2)(a)(iii) of the Act. In the facts of the said case, the Supreme Court
held that the Assessing Officer was right in taxing the interest income u/s. 56
of the Act. The court further made it clear that it was confining the said
judgment to the facts of the said case and, therefore, was not laying down any
law.

The Supreme Court in that Totgars’ case has held that
interest on such investments, could not fall within the meaning of the expression
“profits and gains of business” and that such interest income could
not be said to be attributable to the activities of the society, namely,
carrying on the business of providing credit facilities to its members or
marketing of agricultural produce of its members. The court held that when the
assessee society provides credit facilities to its members, it earns interest
income and the interest which accrued on funds not immediately required by the
assessee for its business purposes and which had been invested in specified
securities as “investment” were ineligible for deduction u/s.
80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act.

It is true that the apex court, in the case of Totgars
Co-operative Sale Society Ltd.
(supra), dealt with a case where the
assessee – co-operative society was also providing credit facilities to the
members besides marketing of agricultural produce grown by its members. On the
available facts, it appears that, in that case, the interest income from bank
was received from the sale consideration received from marketing agricultural
produce of its members, which was retained by the society in many cases before
the same was finally handed over to the members. The said retained amount which
was payable to its members from whom produce was bought, was invested in a
short-term deposit/security. Such an amount which was retained by the assessee
– society was a liability and it was shown in the balance sheet on the
liability side. Relying on such facts found by the Supreme Court, the Karnataka
High Court sought to distinguish the said decision and held that it was not
applicable to the facts of the case before it. Significantly, the Apex court
itself qualified its decision by observing that the decision was confined to
the facts of the said case . In the circumstances, it may be fair to not apply
the ratio of the said decision to the facts of any other case, unless the facts
therein are found to be identical, and are established  to have been considered by the Apex court.

It is most relevant to note that the Apex court in Totgars’
case had no occasion to consider the decisions delivered by the highest
court regularly on the subject, holding that the interest income of a
co-operative bank from its investments with banks or government securities was
eligible for deduction u/s. 80P of the Act. We are of the opinion that had they
been brought to the notice of the court, the decision could have been
different. Another factor that requires that the application of the decision of
the court shall be restricted to Totgars’ case only, is that the court, at no
place, was required to consider whether the income in question could be
considered to be attributable to profits and gains of business or not. The
court was rather concerned about whether the income would be treated as
“profits and gains of business” or from other sources. Again, had the court
been persuaded to consider the language of section 80P and the meaning of the
term “attributable”, we are sure the decision could have been different.

It is also true that this culling of the fact by the
Karnataka High court, from the Supreme court’s decision in Totgar’s
case, has been later on found to be not representing the full facts by the
Gujarat high court by examining the order of the high court passed in Totgars’
case. While that may be the case, it is at the same time important to take into
consideration the fact that the Andhra Pradesh High Court, like the Karnataka
High Court, has also held that the interest income is attributable to carrying
on the main business of banking, and therefore it was eligible for deduction
u/s. 80P(1) of the Act. [Andhra Pradesh State Co-operative Bank Ltd.,200
Taxman 220
]. The Andhra Pradesh High Court, while deciding the issue in
favour of the assessee society, did consider the decision of the Apex court in
Totgars’ case. In the circumstances, it may be that the Karnataka High Court
erred in deciding the issue on hand by distinguishing the facts of its case
with that of the facts in Totgar’s case. However the decision could not have
been different once it was appreciated that the income in question was
attributable to the profits and gains of business.

There appears to be merit in the conclusion of the Karnataka
and Andhra Pradesh High Courts, which have based their decisions by following
the ratio of the oft followed decision of the Apex court in Cambay’s case,
dealing with the true meaning of the word ‘attributable’ used in chapter VI-A.
The Apex Court had an occasion to consider the meaning of the word
‘attributable’ in the case of Cambay Electric Supply Industrial Co. Ltd. vs.
CIT 113 ITR 84
as under:

‘As regards the aspect
emerging from the expression “attributable to” occurring in the
phrase “profits and gains attributable to the business of the specified
industry (here generation and distribution of electricity) on which the learned
Solicitor-General relied, it will be pertinent to observe that the legislature,
has deliberately used the expression “attributable to” and not the
expression “derived from”. It cannot be disputed that the expression
“attributable to” is certainly wider in import than the expression
“derived from”. Had the expression “derived from” been
used, it could have with some force been contended that a balancing charge
arising from the sale of old machinery and buildings cannot be regarded as
profits and gains derived from the conduct of the business of generation and
distribution of electricity. In this connection, it may be pointed out that
whenever the legislature wanted to give a restricted meaning in the manner
suggested by the learned Solicitor-General, it has used the expression
”derived from”, as, for instance, in section-80J. In our view, since the
expression of wider import, namely, “attributable to”, has been used, the
legislature intended to cover receipts from sources other than the actual
conduct of the business
of generation and distribution of electricity.’

The word “attributable to” is certainly wider in
import than the expression “derived from”. Whenever the legislature
wanted to give a restricted meaning, they have used the expression
“derived from”. The expression “attributable to” being of
wider import, the said expression is used by the legislature whenever they
intended to gather receipts from sources other than the actual conduct of the
business.

The Apex Court, in various decisions, has consistently held
the view that interest income on investments made by the banks was attributable
to the profits and gains of business and was eligible for deduction u/s. 80P of
the Act. [Karnataka State Co-operative Apex Bank, 252 ITR 194 (SC),
Mehsana District, Central Co-operative Bank Ltd., 251 ITR 522 (SC), Nawanshahar
Central Co-operative Bank Ltd.289
ITR 6 (SC), Bombay State Co-operative
Bank Ltd. 70 ITR 86 (SC)
(para 16), Bangalore Distt. Co-op. Central Bank
Ltd.
233 ITR 282 (SC), Ponni Sugars & Chemicals Ltd. 306 ITR 392
(SC), Ramanathapuram District Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. 255 ITR 423
(SC), Nawanshahar Central Co-operative Bank Ltd.,349 ITR 689 (SC)].
These decisions are an authority for the proposition that, even though the
investment made does not form part of its main activity, stock in trade or working
capital, still the interest income therefrom would qualify for exemption u/s.
80P of the Income-tax Act.

The Apex court in Nawanshahar Central Cooperative Bank
Ltd.’s case (supra), observed as under. “this Court has consistently held
that investments made by a banking concern are part of the business of banking.
The income arising from such investments would, therefore, be attributable to
the business of bank falling under the head “Profits and gains of
business” and thus deductible under section 80-P(2)(a)( i) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961. This has been so held in Bihar State Coop. Bank Ltd. 39
ITR 114 (SC). Karnataka State Coop. Apex Bank, 259 ITR 144 and Ramanathapuram
Distt. Coop. Central Bank Ltd.255 ITR 423(SC).The principle in these cases
would also cover a situation where a cooperative bank carrying on the business
of banking is statutorily required to place a part of its funds in approved
securities.”

Attention is also invited to clause (b) of sub-section 2 of
section 80P, which clause while providing for deduction for certain primary
societies provides for a deduction in respect of “the whole of the amount of
profits and gains of such business” as against “the whole of the amount of
profits and gains of business attributable to any one or more of such
activities”
covered by clause (a) of sub-section 2 of section 80P. A
bare reading of the contrasting provisions clearly shows that scope of clause
(a) is wider than clause (b), plainly on account of the insertion of the terms
‘attributable and activities’. These terms cannot be treated as redundant and
should be given the appropriate meaning.

It is well-settled that a provision for
deduction or tax relief should be interpreted liberally in favour of the
assessee. Such a provision should be construed as to fully achieve the object
of the legislature and not to defeat it. [South Arcot District Cooperative
Marketing Society Ltd.116 ITR 117 (SC), Bajaj Tempo Ltd.196 ITR 188 (SC) and
N.C. Budharaja & Co., 70 Taxman 312(SC).]
Liberally interpreting sub-section
2(a)( i) of section 80P of the Act, the conclusion in favour of the assessee
appears to be a better conclusion.

Stable Vs. Dynamic Tax Laws – Strike The Right Balance!

8th November 2016 could be a day to remember in India’s
history. On that day, the Prime Minister announced demonetisation of 86% of the
national currency, the stated objectives being the drive against terrorism,
corruption, fake currency and tax evasion. How many of these objectives will be
achieved time alone will tell. I had in my earlier editorial pointed out that
demonetisation was a bold decision and for the sheer enormity thereof the Prime
Minister deserved to be lauded. At that time, many had felt that as far as the
drive against tax evasion was concerned demonetisation was only one small step,
and had to be followed up by other actions.

Tax evasion is a malady from which most developing nations
suffer and India is no exception. An insignificant number of citizens
(approximately 2 %) pay taxes, the reason for the same being evasion and not
avoidance. These actions have been taken by the government. We have now,
Chapter X-A, in regard to general anti-avoidance rules (GAAR), the amendment to
section 6 in regard to the tax residence of foreign companies by the invoking
of the Place of Effective Management (POEM) Rules, a strong legislation like
the recently amended being Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, and
the recent amendments to sections 115BBE and 271AAB and the insertion of
section 271AAC in the Income-tax Act 1961. These will be effective from assessment
year 2017-18, except the GAAR the provisions of which will take effect for
assessment year 2018-19.

While the object of the government in using the Prohibition
of Benami Property Transactions Act as well as the provisions of the Income-tax
Act to which I have made a reference, cannot be faulted one really wonders as
to whether the government has the wherewithal to administer all these changes
fairly and effectively. This is because, the ability as well as the mindset of
those on the ground have not undergone much change in the last few decades.
Once these provisions start being implemented, the result would be a
substantial increase in litigation. All economists are unanimous in their view
that for a developing economy to continue on its progress path, stability and
fair implementation of tax laws play a very important role. In the past, there
have been a number of instances where interpretation placed on tax laws by the
Apex Court has been overturned by legislative amendments, in many cases
retrospectively. The Vodafone case is an example of the same. While no one can
challenge the right of the State to make all the amendments to laws that it
desires, it owes to both its own citizens as well as those who invest in the
country, a reasonably stable tax regime on the basis of which their affairs can
be planned.

Coming to using these changes in law to punish those who have
already evaded law and prevent evasion in future, it is necessary to have an
administration, which is competent, fair and humane. Lack of it is the cause
for concern. For example, let us consider the Prohibition of Benami Property
Transactions Act, which has become effective from November, 2016. Undoubtedly,
in principle it is appropriate that the administration of this law has been
entrusted to the Income Tax Department, since tax evasion is one of the prime
purposes of keeping a property Benami. However, the consequence of a property
being treated as the benami in terms of the Act is confiscation. As the law
stands today, the `Initiating Officer’, the Approving Authority for this purpose is below
the rank of Commissioner. Once an approval to the initiation process is given,
the property can be attached. While this is certainly a step anterior to actual
confiscation, it can have very serious consequences as far as the person
against whom the action is initiated is concerned. Those of us, who practice on
the ground, are conscious of how such approvals are granted in a casual and
routine manner. Thereafter once a panel (Adjudicating Authority) constituted
under the statute accepts that the property is benami, it is liable for
confiscation, such confiscation being subject to an appeal before the Tribunal.
While one wholeheartedly agrees that the law had to have the requisite teeth,
what needs to be guarded against is that they should bite the person for whom
they are meant and not maul an innocent person.

Let us then consider the amendment to 115BBE. This was
possibly a reaction to opinions reported in various media that if, demonetised
currency was deposited in the bank account and declared as income in the return
of income for the assessment year 2017-18, one would get away with paying 30%
tax. Therefore the provision was amended to take effect from assessment year
2017-18, providing a much higher rate of tax. The amendment however ought to
have been made effective only for either a specific period or the intent could
have been more specifically provided for. Now with the provision as it stands
it, is likely to be used in situations and against persons for whom it was not
intended.

This government in the past has been accused of tax
terrorism. One would still believe that the intentions of the government are
laudable but those in power must apprise themselves of the realities and
difficulties on the ground. What one certainly wants is not inertia in tax laws
but stability and fair implementation. Laws must necessarily change to ensure
that the war against corruption and tax evasion is won. They must therefore be
stable yet dynamic; the challenge is to strike the right balance. The
government must appreciate that all things cannot be changed overnight and the
situation on the ground will require patient acceptance for some time. I would
therefore like to end with the popular four lines

O
Lord, give me the courage –

To
change the things that I can change

The
willingness to accept those that I cannot –

And
the wisdom to understand the difference
between the two.

I only
hope that the Lord grant the powers that
be this wisdom.

Spiritual Pursuit, Professional Growth And Material Prosperity – Can They Co-Exist?

One often gets confused about professional growth and material
prosperity. Professional growth and material prosperity are not the same.
Professional growth comes from values, reputation and satisfaction of
meaningful contribution to clients’ lives and nation building; whereas,
material prosperity could be achieved dehors of professional growth,
e.g. even an uneducated person can be a multi-millionaire. A good professional
is one who lives a value based life and is spiritually inclined. So what is the
connection between a profession and spirituality?

People think that in order for one to be materially prosperous, one
needs to compromise on values. However, the fact is that for being materially
well off, one need not be spiritually bankrupt. Spiritual pursuit, professional
growth and material prosperity can co-exist. In fact it is often found that the
growth of professional practice is in direct proportion to one’s growth in
spirituality. And material prosperity is in direct proportion of professional
growth.

Let me share with you my understanding of spirituality in a different
perspective and its relevance to professional growth and material prosperity:

(i)   Living in ‘Now’

      Spirituality is not something different
from our day to day living. Doing our daily chores with utmost concentration or
awareness is nothing but a state of being spiritual.

      It reminds me of a story. A young disciple
comes for knowledge to a Zen Master. Days and months pass without any sermon or
teachings from the Master. Finally one day the youngster asks his Master, when
will his teaching start? Master turned to him and smiled, it already started
the day you entered this monastery. Haven’t you observed how I live? At that
time, the disciple realised that every act of the Master was meticulous. He was
hundred per cent present in that moment. He was actually living in “Now”.

      When one decides to bring this awareness
in the profession, the speed of one’s professional growth increases.

(ii)  Work is Worship

      Work’s reward is in work itself. I have
observed that whenever I get satisfaction of my preparations for any seminar to
be addressed by me, the same is well received by the participants. My reward is
earned when I derive joy on completion of preparation and successful delivery
of the lecture. Spirituality is nothing but doing one’s work diligently, as an
offering to Lord. When one does one’s work with good emotions at heart, the
work becomes worship.

      I am reminded of a beautiful story.

      Once upon a time, three masons were
working on a site. A passerby asked the first one, hey what are you doing? He
said “don’t you see, I am laying bricks”; He asked the same question to the
second mason, he replied, “I am constructing a wall”. When he asked the third
person, he said “I am building a temple”. All three were right in their
answers, but the third person was working with divine emotions and therefore
can be termed as spiritual.

(iii) Sharing is Divine

      One of the insecurities people have in
professional life is that of competition. However, we all know that knowledge
when shared gets doubled, one with the giver and the second with the receiver.
Knowledge, unlike products remains with the giver and enriches the receiver
also. In fact, the more we share, more we enrich ourselves. The same thing
applies to our clients as well. The more we educate them; more they respect and
love us.
 

(iv) Trust and Integrity are supreme

      For any professional, trust and integrity
are of paramount importance. People entrust work only if they believe in the
integrity of the professional and have a trust in his abilities and intentions
to deliver. Both these qualities come naturally to a professional who pursues a
spiritual path. Whenever a client comes to know about your spiritual pursuits,
his trust and belief in your integrity increases.

      Non-indulgence in corrupt practices and
other core values are highly appreciated and respected by clients.

(v)  Discipline is Divine

      One of the most appreciated traits of a
professional is discipline. Delivering on time and as promised is well
appreciated. We must always strive to produce more than what we consume and
give more than what we take. When we give more than what we take, we often land
up receiving more than what we expected. This would certainly happen, may not
always be in material terms, but invariably in terms of love, respect and
appreciation.
 

(vi) We are all connected

      We are not human beings having a spiritual
experience; we are spiritual beings having a human experience. In that sense we
are all connected. When we connect with our customers or clients from this
perspective, we strike a bond of love, trust and friendship which leads to
professional growth.

From the above it is clear that spirituality always helps you in your
professional growth.

Does that mean that spirituality never hinders professional growth?

The answer to the above question is both “yes” and “no”. It all depends
on how one defines professional growth. If one equates the professional growth
with material prosperity alone, then in the short term it may be possible that
you earn less or have to pay more taxes if you walk on the path of
spirituality. However, in the long run, one who follows spirituality,
experiences faster professional growth as he would be at peace with himself and
therefore can express himself or shine in his profession.

It may happen that as one progresses on the path of spirituality, one
finds the futility of this material world and professional achievements. At
that time one may consciously decide to go slow in the professional dimension
as one would not like to trade one’s permanent happiness with the temporal one.

Epilogue

Treading on the path of spirituality along with professional goals is
not easy. There are many temptations on the way. At times the system may force
you for indulgence in wrong practices, at times client wants you to do so and
at times you may simply be lured with the quantum of benefit. Here I am
reminded of one beautiful Gujarati bhajan, whose first line is as follows:

“Hari no marag che surano, nahi kayar nu kaam..”

Meaning – the path to God is for the brave and courageous and not for
cowards.

Once we decide to walk on the path of spirituality, “we must be ever
ready to fight against all low tendencies and false values within and without
us and to live honestly the noble sacrifice and service.”

At the end of the day you will find that spirituality leads to
professional growth, which in turn would bring you prosperity – both material
and spiritual.

17. [2016] 161 ITD 546 (Chennai Trib.) DCIT vs. Suthanther Assumtha A.Y.: 2010-11 Date of Order: 9th September, 2016.

Section 32, Appendix I to Rule 5 and
Circular No. 652, dated 14-6-1993: An assessee is entitled for higher
depreciation on pay loaders, dozers and water tankers used by it in its
business of transportation of goods on hire.

FACTS

The assessee was engaged in the business of
transportation and had claimed higher rate of depreciation @ 30% on pay
loaders, dozers and water tankers.

During the relevant assessment year, the
main part of assessee’s transportation business was done for M/s Anand
Transport.

The Assessing Officer (AO) studied the
agreement entered by the assessee with 
Anand Transport and found that assessee had to supply pay loaders for
hatch work, loading material into trucks from wharf, transporting to designated
stock yard by trucks, stacking at stock yard, loading from stock yard into
trucks, carting from stock yard to railway siding and loading of goods into
railway wagon.

According to AO, vehicles which were used in
the business of running them on hire were entitled for higher depreciation.

As per the AO, the cranes and pay loaders
were used by the assessee for his own business of transportation and there was
no hiring of vehicles. Hence AO disallowed higher rate of depreciation.

According to the CIT(A), there was an
element of ‘hiring’ in the business activities of the assessee and hence
directed the AO to allow depreciation @ 30%.

On appeal by the revenue before the
Tribunal:

HELD

There is no dispute that the assessee was
engaged in the business of transportation of coal and iron ore.

Part III(3)(ii) of Appendix I to the Income
Tax Rules allows higher rate of depreciation @ 30% to following category of
Machinery and Plant –

‘Motor buses, motor lorries and motor taxis
used in a business of running them on hire’.

By virtue of Circular No. 652, dated
14-6-1993, higher rate of depreciation @ 30% mentioned in Part III(3)(ii) of
Appendix to the Income Tax Rules would get an extended meaning than what
literally follows on their reading.

As per Circular No. 652 (supra), an
assessee shall be entitled to higher rate of depreciation @ 30% on motor
vehicles used by it in its business of transporting of goods on hire.

In our opinion, the agreement entered by the
assessee with M/s Anand Transport clearly shows that its duty was to transport
the goods provided by Anand Transport from one place to another. We cannot say
that element of ‘hiring’ was absent.

Hence, we do not find any reason to
interfere with the order of the CIT(A) and the assessee would be eligible for
higher rate of depreciation on the vehicles used by it in its business of
transportation of goods on hire.

Note – Reliance
had been placed on Bombay High Court in the case of SC Thakur & Bros.
[2010] 322 ITR 463 and JCIT vs. Avinash Transport in ITA No. 1909/Kol/2012

dated 13.8.2015

15. Tribunal jurisdiction u/s. 254(2) of the Act – Once a matter is disposed off by the Tribunal it would be functus officio – It can only exercise limited jurisdiction to rectify its order – No clarification can be sought

CIT vs. Shri Suresh G. Wadhwa. [
Income tax Appeal no. 904 of 2014 dt : 05/12/2016 (Bombay High Court)].

[Shri Suresh G. Wadhwa vs. JCIT,. [ MA
NO. 387/MUM/2013 Arising out of ITA No 6395/MUM/2010; Bench : I ; dated
04/12/2013 ; A Y: 2009-10. Mum. ITAT ]

The Tribunal passed an order dated 2nd
August, 2013 u/s. 254(1) of the Act relating to the AY : 2009-10. The AO was
not interpreting/understanding the said order correctly. In the above view, the
assessee filed an application u/s. 254(2) of the Act seeking clarification of
the order dated 2nd August, 2013, so as to explain its correct
meaning. By the impugned order, the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s
miscellaneous application seeking a clarification of its order dated 2nd
August, 2013. The Tribunal in the impugned order dated 4th December,
2013 records that under the garb of clarification of an order, a party’s right
to interpret the Tribunal’s order cannot be pre-empted. If the parties are
aggrieved by the interpretation of the Tribunal’s order by the lower
authorities, it would only be fair to challenge the same in an appropriate
proceedings. Notwithstanding the above, the Tribunal allowed the application by
the impugned order clarifying its earlier order dated 2nd August,
2013. This the Tribunal did by holding that though such an application for
clarification may not strictly fall u/s. 254(2) of the Act, yet such an
application would be entertained in exercise of its inherent powers and in
support relied upon the Apex Court order in
Honda Siel Power
Products Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, 295 ITR 466.

The Revenue preferred appeal before
the High Court against the order of the Tribunal passed u/s. 254(2) of the Act.
The Court observed that the Tribunal after passing an order u/s. 254(1) of the
Act has became functus officio in respect of the proceedings which led
to the final order dated 2nd August, 2013 passed in respect of AY :
2009-10. The Tribunal’s powers are for rectification are specifically set out
in section 254(2) of the Act. There is no provision in the Act enabling the
Tribunal to clarify its order after it has became functus officio particularly
when the clarification is not in respect of clerical/typographical errors which
have crept into the order. The Tribunal has no powers of Review. It cannot in
the garb of clarifying its order already passed u/s. 254(1) of the Act, seek to
review the same. The issue is of jurisdiction of the Tribunal to entertain such
an application for clarification. Undoubtedly, an inherent power of procedural
review is available with every Tribunal but not of substantive review. Procedural
review would be cases where the procedure/process of adjudicating the dispute
is not followed, to illustrate an order passed ex parte or when no
notice of hearing is received by party, etc. i.e. the process of
arriving at justice is vitiated. (
Grindlays Bank Ltd. vs.
Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal, 1980 (suppl.) SCC 420
). Seeking clarification and/or amplification of an order
already passed without it falling within the parameters of an rectification
application, would lead to chaos and uncertainty. No order of the Tribunal
would then be final, as it would always be subject to clarification. Once the
Tribunal has passed an order u/s. 254(1) of the Act, it becomes functus
officio
and loses jurisdiction over the lis. It is axiomatic that
once a matter is disposed of by the Tribunal/Court, it would be functus
officio
. The Tribunal can only exercise limited jurisdiction as provided in
section 254(2) of the Act, to rectify its order in view of apparent error on
record or in case of procedural issues leading to an order passed u/s. 254(1)
of the Act. Thus, the Tribunal ought not to have entertained such an application on the part of the assessee.

The reliance placed upon
the decision of the Apex Court in Honda Siel Power Products Ltd. (supra)
is inappropriate. In the facts of that case, a binding decision of a coordinate
bench was cited before the Tribunal during the hearing of the appeal and the
same was not considered in the order of the Tribunal. It was in the above
context, that the Tribunal had allowed the application for rectification made
by the party. However, it was reversed by the High Court. On further appeal,
the Apex Court restored the order of the Tribunal. It held that the Tribunal
allowed the application applied u/s. 254(2) of the Act for rectification as a
binding order cited during the hearing before the Tribunal was not considered
in the impugned order of the Tribunal. In fact, this would be a case of
procedural review as held by the Apex Court in Grindlays Bank (supra)
and also fall within the scope of section 254(2) of the Act. It must be noted
that the Apex Court in Honda Siel Power Product Ltd. (supra) did not
exercise inherent powers in the facts before it, but allowed the application
u/s. 254(2) of the Act. Therefore, the reliance of Honda Siel Power Product
Ltd. (supra)
is misplaced.

The impugned order dated 4th
December, 2013 was quashed and set aside.

14. Reopening of assessment – No reason to believe that the income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment – reopening notice was bad in law. Section 148

CIT vs. Devkumar Haresh
Vaidya. [ Income tax Appeal no 750 of 2014, dt : 05/12/2016 (Bombay High
Court)].

[Devkumar Haresh Vaidya
(IT) vs. ACIT . [ITA No. 7325/MUM/2012; Bench : J ; AY 2007-08 dt: d 31/07/2013
; Mum. ITAT ]

The Assessee filed its ROI
for  AY 2007-08 declaring a total income
of Rs. 24.69 lakh. The same was accepted u/s. 143(1) of the Act. Thereafter,
the AO received information from the Deputy Director of Income Tax
(Investigation), Surat that property situated at New Delhi (said property) was
sold on 23rd August, 2006 for a total consideration of Rs.148.93
crore by the 12 family members, including the assessee and the assessees’s
share in the said amount was Rs.6.21 crore. Consequently, a notice u/s. 148 of
the Act was issued seeking to reopen the assessment for AY: 2007-08. The reason
for reopening the assessment was that said property had been sold to one
Mineral Management Services (I) Ltd. Thus, the sale was assessable to tax in
the A.Y. 2007-08 as it was so assessed in the hands of Mineral Management
Services (I) Ltd. in that year.

The assessee challenged
the notice pointing out that he had offered to tax the entire consideration of
Rs.6.21 crore (Rs. 4 crore in his hands and Rs.2.21 crore as a part of his late
father’s income was offered to tax) in the earlier A.Y. 2006-07. Moreover, he
had also claimed the benefit of section 54EC of the Act in A.Y. 2006-07. This
was accepted by the AO in scrutiny proceedings u/s. 143(3) of the Act. It was
pointed out that the said property was a family property in which his mother
(Devhuti Vaidya) had undivided and indeterminate rights/share in the said
property. Therefore, though the assessee and his family members did not have
possession of the said property, they had filed caveat objecting the
grant of probate to the Will of the assessee’s maternal grand father Mr.
Anantrai Pattani in favour of his maternal uncle Mr. Kumar Pattani. In the
above view, as a part of the settlement arrived at between the assessee and his
family members with his uncle Mr. Kumar Pattani, an Agreement for Sale dated 25th
October, 2005 by which the assessee sold his rights in the said property to one
M/s. Duce Property and Services Pvt. Ltd. and withdrew his objections to grant
of probate to Mr. Kumar Pattani. All this in consideration of  Rs.12 crore (as a
family) and Rs.4 crore as a part thereof being for the transfer of his interest
/ right in the immovable property was also received in A.Y. 2006-07.

All the above facts were
examined by the AO while passing the assessment order for the A.Y. 2006-07 and
held that the assessee had sold his rights/share in the immovable property and
sought benefit of the investment made of the sales proceeds u/s. 54EC of the
Act. It was also pointed out that as is evident from the reasons for reopening
the assessment that the amendment made in section 54EC of the Act effective
from A.Y. 2007-08 which would restrict the benefit of that provision to Rs.50
lakh had triggered the reopening notice.

This was evident from the
following observations recorded in the reasons, which reads as under :“ In
view of above amendment, if the assessee would have shown the capital gain
correctly in the A.Y. 2007-08, then she would not have been eligible for
deduction of more than Rs.50 lakhs even if she would have complied with the
time limit provision of the section 54EC.”

However, the AO by order
passed u/s. 143(3) r/w section 147 of the Act, did not accept the assessee’s
objections. Consequently, the AO brought to tax an amount of Rs.6.21 crore on
the above account. (Rs.4 crore being the assessee’s share and Rs.2.21 crore
being his share in his late father Mr. Haresh Vaidya’s interest, who had
expired in the meantime.).

On appeal, the CIT(A) also
dismissed the assessee’s appeal.

On further appeal, the
Tribunal held that the AO could not have any reason to believe that income
chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. In particular, it held that the
assessee had offered capital gains to tax in the AY 2006-07 and the same was
accepted after examination / consideration while passing an order u/s. 143(3)
of the Act. Thus, the AO having already assessed the income arising on sale of
rights in the said property as evidenced by the Agreement for Sale dated 25th
August, 2005 and letter dated 17th October, 2005 evidencing the
family arrangement coupled with having received the consideration in the
Assessment Year 2005-06 which was also offered to tax in that year could not
have had any reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped
assessment. The impugned order also records the fact that there were disputes
amongst the legal heirs of late Mr. Anantrai Pattani including pending probate
proceedings before the High Court. The dispute between the assessee and his
uncle Mr. Kumar Pattani stood settled on the basis of offer made by the uncle
in his letter dated 17th October, 2005 to the assessee and his
family members to give up their rights in respect of the said property
(including not contesting the probate petition) on his uncle paying a sum of
Rs.12 crore in the aggregate. 

Further, the fact that the
communication received from the Deputy Director of Income Tax (Investigation),
Surat which was the material for issuing the impugned notice, also seems to
indicate that the entire exercise was only for denying the benefit of section
54EC of the Act in view of the amendment thereto with effect from AY 2007-08.
The Tribunal held that reopening notice was bad in law.

The Hon. High Court held
that once the assessee has offered the capital gains to tax on the basis of the
Agreement for Sale dated 25th October, 2005 read with the letter
dated 17th October, 2005 and the receipt of consideration for sale
of his interest in said property and accepted on due examination u/s. 143(3) of
the Act, the AO could not have had any reason to believe that income chargeable
to tax has escaped assessment. In fact, this is a case of change of opinion,
inasmuch as for the A.Y. 2006-07, the AO in scrutiny proceedings accepted that
the transaction qua the respondent is taxable in A.Y. 2006-07 and now
seeks to tax it in A.Y. 2007-08.

The report received from
the DDIT (Inv), Surat essentially seeks to deny the exemption u/s. 54EC of the
Act in view of the amendment thereto. When the capital gains has been offered
to tax in earlier assessment year and accepted by the Revenue in scrutiny
proceedings, then a mere change in law in the subject assessment year with
regard to extent of exemption will not give any reason to believe that income
chargeable to tax in the subject assessment year had escaped assessment.
Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.

13. Rectification – Retrospective Amendment u/s. 115JB – Rectification made by the A.O on the issue in the order passed u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 254 of the Act- Such mistake, if any, was in the order originally passed by the A.O. u/s. 143(3) of the Act – Not permissible: u/s. 154 of the Act

CIT vs. Weizmann Ltd. [
Income tax Appeal no 1020 of 2014 dt : 09/12/2016 (Bombay High Court)].

[M/s Weizmann Ltd.,vs.
ACIT. [ITA No. 768 /MUM/2012; Bench : G ; date:31/10/2013 ; A Y: 2001- 2002.
(MUM) ITAT ]

On 27th February,
2004, the assessment order was passed u/s. 143(3) for the subject assessment
year. The assessing officer accepted the assessee’s claim of book profits u/s.
115JB. The book profits as claimed was after allowing of amounts set aside as
provisions for diminution in the value of assets. The assessee being aggrieved
by the assessment order on certain other issues had preferred an appeal to the
appellate authority and carried its grievance up to the Tribunal. On 29th August,
2007, the Tribunal restored some of the issues by which the assessee was
aggrieved to the Assessing Officer. It is relevant to note that the issue of
allowing of amounts set aside as provision for diminution of the value of
assets was not an issue which was restored to the Assessing Officer for
readjudication.

Consequent to the above,
the Assessing Officer passed an order dated 30th December, 2008 u/s.
143(3) r.w.s 254 of the Act giving effect to the order dated 29th
August, 2007 of the Tribunal.

The Finance (No.2) Act of
2009 amended section 115JB of the Act with retrospective effect from 1st April,
2001. The amendment inter alia added to Explanation I to section 115JB
of the Act, clause (i) providing that for purposes of computing that the book
profits thereunder, the profit shown in the profit and loss account is to be
increased by the amounts set aside as provision for diminution in the value of
assets.

In view of the above amendment the A.O. by
order dated 19th August, 2010 u/s. 154 rectified its order dated 30th
December, 2008 and made addition of Rs. 1,28,60,000/- to the book profit
of the assessee on account of provision for diminution in the value of
investment relying on the amendment made in the provisions of section 115JB
that with retrospective effect on 1-4-2001.

The assessee challenged
the order passed by the A.O. u/s. 154 of the Act by preferring an appeal before
the CIT(A) disputing the addition of Rs. 1,28,60,000/- made by the A.O. to the
book profit on account of provision for diminution in the value of investment.
The ld. CIT(A) did not find merit in the said appeal of the assessee and
dismissed the same.

The assessee preferred an
appeal before the Tribunal. The assessee submitted that the order u/s. 143(3)
r.w.s. 254 of the Act, was passed by the A.O. as per the specific directions
given by the Tribunal while restoring only the limited issues to the file of
the A.O. He submitted that the issue relating to the allowability of provision
for diminution in the value of investment was not before the Tribunal and since
the same was not restored by the Tribunal to the file of the A.O., the
consideration of the same was beyond the scope of order passed by the A.O. u/s
143(3) r.w.s. 254 of the Act. He relied on the decision of Hon’ble Bombay
High Court in the case of CIT vs. Sakseria Cotton Mills Ltd. (1980) 124 ITR 570.

The Tribunal held that it
cannot be said that there was any mistake in the order of the A.O. passed u/s
143(3) r.w.s. 254 of the Act on 30-12-2008 in allowing the deduction on account
of provision for diminution in the value of investment calling for any
rectification u/s. 154 of the Act. Such mistake, if any, was in the order originally
passed by the A.O. u/s. 143(3) of the Act on 27-2-2004 and not in the order
passed on 30-12-2008. The rectification made by the A.O. on this issue to the
order passed u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 254 of the Act by an order dated 19-8-2010
passed u/s. 154 of the Act thus was not permissible. The Tribunal, therefore,
directed the A.O. to delete the addition made by way of rectification order
u/s. 154 of the Act.

The Revenue preferred an
appeal before the High Court. The High Court held that the issue stands concluded
by the decision of this Court in Sakseria Cotton Mills Ltd. (supra) in
favour of the assessee. The distinction sought to be made by the Revenue on the
basis of the amendment to section 115JB of the Act in 2009 with retrospective
effect from 2001 does not address the fundamental issue of non merger of the
order dated 27th February, 2004 with the order dated 30th December,
2008. Therefore, any rectification of the order dated 27th February,
2004 is required to be done within 4 years from 27th February, 2004
as provided u/s. 154 of the Act. It is not disputed before us that issue of the
provisions made for diminution in value of assets which is sought to be
rectified is an issue which was never the subject matter of consideration in
the order dated 30th December, 2008 passed u/s. 143(3) r/w section
254 of the Act. Therefore, in these circumstances, it could not be rectified
u/s. 154 of the Act. In the above view, the revenue appeal was dismissed.

45. Speculative transaction – Business loss – A. Y. 2009-10 – Hedging transactions entered into to cover variation in foreign exchange rate – Impact on business of import and export of diamond – Transactions entered only in regular course of business activity – Not speculative transactions

CIT vs. D. Chetan and Co.; 390 ITR 36 (Bom):

The Assessee was engaged in the business of import and export
of diamonds. For the A. Y. 2009-10, the assessee explained that the amount of
Rs. 78.10 lakhs claimed as loss was on account of hedging transactions entered
into to safeguard variation in exchange rates affecting its transact5ions of
import and export. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim on the ground
that it was a notional loss of a contingent liability debited to the profit and
loss account. The Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal allowed the
assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)   The Tribunal concluded that the transaction
entered into by the assessee was not in the nature of speculative activities.
Further, the hedging transactions were entered into so as to cover variation in
foreign exchange rate which would impact its business of import and export of
diamonds. These concurrent findings of fact were not shown to be perverse in
any manner.

ii)   The Assessing Officer in the assessment order
did not find that the transaction entered into by the assessee was speculative
in nature. At no point of time did the department challenge the assertion of
the assessee that the activity of entering into forward contract was in the
regular course of its business only to safeguard against the loss on account of
foreign exchange variation. The Department never contended that the transaction
was speculative but only disallowed on the ground that it was notional.

iii)   Thus, it was to be concluded that the
transactions entered were only in regular course of business and not speculative.
Therefore, no substantial question of law arose.”

44. Salary – Perquisite – Fringe Benefit Tax – Sections 17 and 115WA of the Act – Once the employer is taxed on the fringe benefits same cannot be taxed as perquisite in hands of employee

Kamlesh K. Singhal vs. CIT; 389 ITR 247 (Guj):

The assessee was employed in ONGC. For the A. Y. 2007-08, the
Assessing Officer issued notice u/s. 148 of the Act, on the ground that his
employer had reimbursed the conveyance maintenance and repair expenditure and
uniform allowance to the assessee but the employer had neither reflected it in
the salary certificate issued nor had deducted the tax at source on those
amounts. Pursuant to the notice, he passed an order u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 147
levying 20% and 100% tax respectively, on the fringe benefits and made
additions to the assessee’s income accordingly. The assessee filed a revision
petition contending that it would amount to double taxation as his employer had
paid fringe benefits tax u/s. 115WA. The Commissioner rejected the petition.

The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the
assessee and held as under:

“i)   Once a certain benefit was held to be a
fringe benefit and the employer was taxed accordingly under Chapter XII-H of
the Act, the same benefit could not be included in the income of the
assessee-employee treating it as a perquisite.

ii)   The disallowance of 20% of the reimbursed
conveyance and repair expenses and 100% of the uniform allowance made by the
assessing Officer was reversed. The Assessing Officer was to pass a
consequential order accordingly. The order passed by the Commissioner was
unsustainable.”

43. Income – Accrual – A. Ys. 2005-06 to 2007-08 – Assessee obtaining contract – Work shared by assessee with another person – Amount received for work shared proportionate to work – Amount received by assessee and such other person shown separately – No evidence of sub-contract – Amount received by other person cannot be added to assessee’s income

CIT vs. G. Balraj; 390 ITR 50 (Karn):

The assessee was a PWD contractor and according to the
assessee, he had entered into an agreement with B Construction, whereby a
particular percentage of the income of the contract was to be shared in a
particular proportion. The assessee had shown his income to the extent of the
amount received by it. However, in the assessment proceedings, the Assessing
Officer finding that as tax was deducted at source from the total amount of the
contract(received by the assessee as well as by B Construction), brought the
entire amount under the contract to tax in the assessee’s hands. The Tribunal
deleted the addition.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)   There was enough material to show that the
amount received from the contract was directly shared by the assessee and B
Construction in accordance with their proportionate share and that it was not a
case where the money/the amount realised from the contract was apportioned as
the income of the assessee and thereafter, a portion of it or a major portion
was paid by the assessee to B Construction. When after receipt of the contract
amount, the shares were identified and taken by both the parties of the joint
venture, it could not be treated as sub-contract.

ii)  There
was no material brought by the Revenue to show that there was any contract
entered into by the assessee to assign the work to B Construction as
sub-contractor. Further, when the respective share was received by the
assessee, it had been shown as the income by the assessee in the return of
income. Similarly, for the respective share of B Construction it had shown its
income of the amount received by it. Under these circumstances, the findings of
the Tribunal that it was a joint venture between the assessee and B
Construction was not contrary to the material or based on conjectures or
surmises.”

42. Educational institution – Exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi) of the Act – A. Y. 2014-15 – Application for approval can be filed before end of financial year and further information if needed can be sought from assessee – Application filed in the financial year rejected on the ground that it was filed prematurely – Not justified

Shri Guru Ram Dass Ji Education Trust vs. CCIT; 389 ITR
423 (P&H):

The assessee-trust was running educational institutions.
Since its receipts exceeded Rs. 1 crore in the F. Y. 2013-14, it made an
application for approval u/s. 10(23C)(vi) of the Act for the A. Y. 2014-15 onwards. The application was rejected on the
ground that the assessee had prematurely filed the application and that it
could only have been filed after the expiry of the F. Y. 2013-14 and before
September 30, 2014.

The Punjab and Haryana High Court allowed the writ petition
filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i)   The fourteenth proviso to section
10(23C) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 states that an application under the
section can be filed on or before 30th September of the relevant assessment
year, from which the exemption is sought. The proviso simply gives an outer
date for making an application and does not say that the application is to be
made between 1st April and 30th September of the
assessment year. If an application is filed prior to 1st April of
the relevant assessment year and after filing thereof, any further information
is still needed by the Department, before taking a final decision thereon, that
information can be sought from the applicant.

ii)   A trust might know or have reason to believe
prior to 1st April that its receipts were likely to exceed Rs. 1
crore. There was no reason why such an institution ought not to be permitted to
make the application even before the 1st day April of the relevant
year.

iii)   All the accounts for the year ending March
31, 2014, when asked for, were duly provided by the assessee much before the
passing of the order. Further, note 1(a) and note 3 to Form 56D clearly
indicated that the application could be filed even prior to 1st
April of the relevant assessment year, from which the exemption was sought.

iv)   The
Chief Commissioner was directed to consider the application filed by the
assessee for the grant of exemption u/s. 10(23C) of the Act, on the merits.”

41. Charitable purpose – Charitable trust – Exemption u/s. 11 of the Act – A. Y. 2008-09 – Expenditure incurred in excess of income from accumulated funds – Trust entitled to exemption

CIT vs. Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti; 390 ITR 59 (Raj):

The assessee, a charitable trust, incurred expenditure for
charitable purposes during the previous year relevant to the A. Y. 2008-09 in
excess of the income derived during the relevant period. The excess expenditure
was incurred by transferring the fund from interest bearing public deposit
account to non-interest bearing public deposit account. The Assessing Officer
held that the excess expenditure having been incurred from charity
fund/accumulated fund of earlier years, the assessee was nor entitled to
exemption u/s. 11(1)(a) of the Act – and accordingly, assessed the income as
the taxable income. The Tribunal held that the assessee was entitled to
exemption u/s. 11 of the Act.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Rajasthan High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)   When the income of a trust is used or put to
use to meet the expenses incurred for religious or charitable purposes, it is
applied for charitable or religious purposes. The application of the income for
charitable or religious purposes takes place in the year in which the income is
adjusted to meet the expense incurred for charitable or religious purposes.

ii)   In other words, even if the expenses for
charitable or religious purposes have been incurred in an earlier year and the
expenses are adjusted against the income of a subsequent year, the income of
that year can be said to have been applied for charitable or religious purposes
in the year in which the expenses were incurred for charitable and religious
purposes had been adjusted.

iii)   The Tribunal holding the assessee entitled to
claim exemption u/s. 11(1)(a) of the Act during the relevant assessment year
was justified.”

40. Capital gain – Exemption u/s. 54EC of the Act – A. Y. 2008 -09 – Investment in specified bonds from the amounts received as an advance is eligible for section 54EC deduction – The fact that the investment is made prior to the transfer of the asset is irrelevant

CIT vs. Subhash Vinayak Supnekar (Bom); ITA No. 1009 of
2014 dated 14/12/2016; (www.itatonline.org)

An Agreement to Sale for the subject property was entered
into on 21st February, 2006. The final sale took place under a Sale
Deed dated 5th April, 2007. The assessee invested an amount of Rs.50
lakh from the advance received under the Agreement to Sale in the Rural Electrification
Corporation Ltd. bonds on 2nd February, 2007. The Assessing Officer
as well as the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) held that the assessee is
not entitled to the benefit of section 54EC of the Act, as the amounts were
invested in the bonds prior to the sale of the subject property on 5th
April, 2007. The Tribunal allowed the claim of the assessee by following the
decision of its coordinate bench in Bhikulal Chandak HUF vs. Income Tax
Officer 126 TTJ 545
wherein it has been held that where an assessee makes
investment in bonds as required u/s. 54EC of the Act on receipt of advance as
per the Agreement to Sale, then the assessee is entitled to claim the benefit
of Section 54EC of the Act.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and as under:

“i)   The short question is whether an amount
received on sale of a capital asset as an advance on the basis of Agreement to
Sale and the same being invested in specified bonds before the final sale,
would entitle the assessee to the benefit of Section 54EC of the Act.

ii)   The Sale Deed dated 5th April, 2007
records in clause (d) thereof the fact that the Agreement to Sale had been
entered into on 21st February, 2006 in respect of the subject
property and the amounts being received by the vendor (respondent assessee)
under that Agreement to Sale. Thus, these amounts when received as advance
under an Agreement to Sale of a capital asset are invested in specified bonds
the benefit of Section 54EC of the Act is available. In the above view, the
Tribunal holds that the facts of the present case are similar to the facts
before the Tribunal in Bhikulal Chandak HUF (supra). The Revenue does
not dispute the same before us. Moreover, on almost identical facts, this Court
in Parveen P. Bharucha vs. DCIT, 348 ITR 325, held that the earnest
money received on sale of asset, when invested in specified bonds u/s. 54EC, is
entitled to the benefit of section 54EC. This was in the context of reopening
of an assessment and reliance was placed upon CBDT Circular No. 359 dated 10th
May, 1983 in the context of section 54E.

iii)   The Revenue had preferred an appeal against
the order of the Tribunal in Bhikulal Chandak HUF (supra) to this Court
(Nagpur Bench) being Income Tax Appeal No.68 of 2009. This Court by an order
dated 22nd August, 2010 refused to entertain the Revenue’s above
appeal from the decision of the Tribunal in Bhikulal Chandak HUF (supra).
In the above view, the question as proposed for our consideration in the
present facts does not give rise to any substantial question of law.”

39. Capital gain – Exemption u/s. 54 of the Act – A.Y. 2003-04 – Sale of residential property on 04/02/2003 – Agreement to purchase another residential property on 08/09/2003 and invested the capital gain within specified time – Assessee entitled to exemption u/s. 54 even if there is delay in completing the transaction

CIT vs. Mrs. Shakuntala Devi; 389 ITR 366 (Karn):

The assessee sold a flat
in Mumbai for a total consideration of Rs. 1,71,00,000/- on 04/02/2003 and the
consequent capital gain was Rs. 1,44,68,032/-. The assessee entered into an
agreement for purchase of the another residential property on 08/09/2003 for a
consideration of Rs. 3,25,00,000/- and invested the capital gain for the same.
The assessee’s claim for exemption u/s. 54 for the A. Y. 2003-04 was rejected
by the Assessing Officer on the ground that the transaction has not been
concluded, no registration of the sale deed has taken place and the balance
consideration was yet to be paid. The Tribunal held that the assessee is
entitled to exemption u/s. 54 of the Act.  

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)   The Tribunal had rightly held that the date
of purchase was to be taken as the basis for reconing the period of two years
prescribed u/s. 54 of the Act extending the benefit following therefrom.

ii)   In the instant case the consideration paid by
the assessee under the memorandum of understanding dated 08/09/2003 would fully
cover the consideration of capital gains portion for being eligible to claim
exemption u/s. 54 of the Act.”

38. Business expenditure – Interest on borrowed capital – Section 36(1)(iii) of the Act – A. Y. 1989-90 – Advance of loans at lower rate of interest to subsidiary concerns in financial difficulty for business purposes – Commercial expediency- Assessee entitled to deduction

Hindalco Co. vs. CIT; 389 ITR 430 (All):

The assessee paid interest at the rate of 16% on its
borrowings from the bank. The Assessing Officer found that the assessee had
advanced loans to its subsidiary companies at a lower rate of interest, 6% or
12%. He determined the rate of interest at 12%, as the rate at which loans were
advanced to the sister concerns and disallowed the difference between the
interest at market rate and the rate at which loans were advanced to sister
companies u/s. 36(1)(iii) of the Act. The Tribunal upheld the disallowance.

On appeal by the assessee, the Allahabad High Court reversed
the decision of the Tribunal and held as follows:

“i)   The financial condition of the assessee’s
sister concerns was not good and to help them run smoothly, the assessee
advanced them loans at a lower rate of interest. Both sister concerns were
subsidiaries of the assessee and there was nothing per se adverse.

ii)   For the welfare and proper functioning of the
sister concerns, the assessee had decided to advance loans so that ultimately
they could function properly, and the assessee being the holding company would
also benefit. Therefore, the loans advanced to its sister concerns were for
commercial expediency and the assessee was entitled to the deduction of
interest u/s. 36(1)(iii) of the Act.”

A Report

Golden Jubilee Residential Refresher Course (GJRRC) of
Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society (BCAS) was held
at ITC Rajputana Palace Hotel, Jaipur from 19th January
2017 to 22nd January 2017. In all, 278 members from 40
cities of India participated to witness this Golden Event.

On the First day, CA. Chetan Shah, President BCAS
welcomed the participants of GJRRC. He introduced CA.
Pinakin Desai, Past President of BCAS who enriched
many members with his profound knowledge and has
presented 28 papers in RRCs. He acknowledged the
efforts of Seminar Committee for raising number of
participants from 225 to 270 to accommodate maximum
members. He highlighted the VISION of the Society to
make optimum use of technology and innovation to reach
out to members across India. He also informed that BCAS
has been selected to impart training on GST with NACEN,
as an “Accredited Training Partner” to the Government of
India.

CA. U day Sathaye, Chairman Seminar Committee
welcomed everybody and explained the importance of
RRCs. He compared RRC to a Guru. He acknowledged
contribution of Paper writers, Group Leaders and Members
in making RRCs a success and highlighted the relationship
that has been developed over many years particularly with
participants from cities other than Mumbai. He appreciated
the response from outstation members which is increasing
every year. He also shared his thoughts about CA. Pinakin
Desai’s contribution in RRCs.

CA. Pinakin Desai, Past President of BCAS inaugurated
GJRRC. He mentioned that in the past, Group Discussion
alone used to expose what is happening around. Now
the scenario has changed. There is a change in subjects,
method of Auditing and Complex Laws are in force. It has
become a necessity that professionals must be techno
savvy. Tax department is tightening the controls, resulting
in the task of professionals becoming difficult. Compliance
of tax laws is becoming burdensome. He concluded with
a clear message that there is a need to be updated on
every front in profession including technology.

The first technical session was chaired by CA. M ayur
Nayak, Past President of BCAS. CA. T. P. Ostwal
answered issues raised by members during Group
Discussion on his paper titled Case Studies on R ecent
Developments and Issues in Cross border Taxation.

In his inimitable style covering day to day issues in the fields
of Equalization Levy, Transfer Pricing, Indirect Transfers,
Residential Status, Place of Effective Management and
Taxability of the Overseas Dividends in the hands of the
Indian shareholders, he dealt with the questions raised
in the case studies along with issues communicated by
group leaders and provided solutions to the problems.

On the Second day, 20th January, 2nd technical session
was chaired by CA. R aman Jokhakar, Past President of
BCAS. CA. H imanshu Kishnadwala presented paper
titled Ind-AS Implementation Issues.

The speaker after initially giving a background on
applicability of IndAS in India and carve-outs from IFRS,
dealt with some issues on IndAS implementation faced
by Phase I companies. He also covered the notification
issued by MCA for companies not covered under IndAS
and who need to follow the ‘upgraded’ standards from 1st
April 2016 onwards.

The Third technical session was chaired by CA. Ashok
Dhere, Past President of BCAS. CA. Pinakin Desai
answered issues raised by members during Group
Discussion on his paper titled Significant Recent
Controversies/Developments under the Income Tax Act –
Case Studies.

The paper writer in his inimitable style explained the various
nuances in interpretation of tax laws. The case studies
were extremely relevant in everyday practice, and the
presentation was extremely useful to all the participants.
In all, the paper as well as the lucid explanations of the
paper writer, was a rich and rewarding experience for the
delegates.

In the evening, all participants visited Chokhi Dhani,
a theme village resort in the outskirts of Jaipur city.
Everybody enjoyed the activities in Chokhi Dhani followed
by sumptuous and tasty Rajasthani dinner. It was really a
memorable evening.

On the Third day, 21st January, the fourth technical session
was chaired by CA. Govind Goyal, Past President of
BCAS. CA. M adhukar H iregange presented paper titled
Role & R esponsibilities of CAs in GST Regime.

He enlightened the participants on the opportunities
available to the chartered accountants in the pre and
post implementation of GST, in the fields like Operational
Consultancy, Network Support and Infrastructure,
Accounting, Compliance, Transitional Support including
Audits/Assurance areas. He felt that Chartered
Accountants are in a better position to assess the impact
of GST on their clients. He enlightened the members
as regards various efforts and initiatives taken by ICAI
by contributing in the law making process. He said this
is a Golden Opportunity for professionals by tracking
development at Industry level and creating awareness by
advising their clients.

The Fifth technical session was chaired by CA. Anil
Sathe, Past President of BCAS. CA. Saurabh Soparkar
answered issues raised by members during Group
Discussion on his paper titled Re-opening and R evision
of Assessments.

The learned speaker, through various case studies,
explained that while the assessment was a concept that
was not new to tax practitioners, it had attained significant
importance in the last decade. He mentioned that earlier,
assessments were the norm and reassessments were
an exception. However in the recent past, the Income
tax Department embarked on reassessments in a large
number of cases, either on account of the scrutiny being
inadequate at the time of assessment or on account of
receipt of information, post-assessment. Judicial forums,
particularly the high Courts and the apex court, looked at
reassessments very seriously and unless the threshold
conditions were satisfied, did not permit the Department
to have a second innings. The Speaker mesmerised
the audience with his command over the subject. His
analysis of the various judicial pronouncements was also
extremely useful.

Golden Jubilee Function

On 21st evening, everyone was waiting eagerly for the
special celebration of the Golden Jubilee RRC. The
function was organised in a different way this year as
compared to similar evening functions at the RRCs in
the past. CA. Nandita Parekh & CA. Ameet Patel, past
president of the BCAS jointly compered the event. They
began by welcoming the Chief Guest Mr. T. N. M anoharan,
Past President of ICAI and Guest of H onour M r. Nilesh
Vikamsey, V ice President of ICAI. Both the guests
addressed the gathering. Mr Manoharan spoke about
his experiences at the past RRCs and he also spoke
about the special qualities of the RRCs organised by the
BCAS. He also spoke about the role played by bodies like
BCAS in the development of the CA profession. Mr Nilesh
Vikamsey too complimented the BCAS on the golden
jubilee of the RRC. He spoke about the recent initiatives
taken by the ICAI for its members. He also cautioned the
delegates about the threat of disruption that technology is
likely to cause amongst the professionals in the country.
He also gave examples of how the ICAI has quickly
responded to the expectations from the Government on
various fronts. Both the guests set the right tone for a
memorable celebration of the GJRRC.

Thereafter, the past chairmen of the Seminar Committee –
CA. Pranay M arfatia, CA. Govind Goyal & CA. R ajesh
S. Shah were felicitated for their contribution to the
RRC. The delegates also remembered the contribution
of Nayan Parikh, another past chairman who could not
remain present on account of health reasons. Rajeev
Shah, convenor of the committee was felicitated for being
a convenor of the committee for 10 years. Vice President
of the Society CA. Narayan Pasari presented his views.

CA. U day Sathaye, Chairman, Seminar Committee was
then felicitated for his contribution in all RRCs. He has
been chairman for 10 RRCs including GJRRC which is the
highest number of chairmanship of Seminar Committee.
He mentioned that the members of the Seminar
Committee take each RRC as a separate programme with
a mission and challenge. He elaborated that the success
of RRCs is achieved with effective Team Management,
Planning, Assessment of Risk, Crisis Management and
Negotiation skills. He gave many examples from earlier
RRCs where members of the Seminar Committee have
overcome various difficulties to provide comfort to the
participants. He acknowledged valuable support of all
previous chairmen of seminar committee namely Late
CA. Shailesh Kapadia, CA. Nayan Parikh, CA. Pranay
Marfatia, CA. Govind Goyal and CA. Rajesh Shah. All
of them had always provided guidance and had actively
participated in all RRCs. He also highlighted the changing face of RRC over last 30 years
in terms of Group Discussion,
Participation of Members
etc. He concluded his views
on a positive note that this
wonderful relationship will
continue with the support of
the members attending RRCs
in future.

Thereafter, several members
were called upon to share their
experiences of the past RRCs.
Some who had come for the
first time also spoke about
their experience of the GJRRC.

The event was made all the more memorable by an Army
Band which marched into the hall in full splendour and
performed some tunes which were enjoyed by all. The
delegates were awed by the ceremonial band.

The event was interspersed with humour and wit and all
the delegates had an enjoyable time.

This celebration function was very ably hosted by CA.
Nandita Parekh and CA. Ameet Patel, Past President of
BCAS.

The finale of the GJRRC was the Panel Discussion on
last day i.e. 22nd January. This was the first time that such
a session was held at the RRC. The experiment was
highly successful. The session was chaired by CA. T.
N. M anoharan. The panelists were CA. Pradip Kapasi,
Past President of BCAS, CA. Gautam Doshi, Past
Chairman of WIRC of ICAI, CA. Dinesh Kanabar and
CA. Sunil Gabhawalla, Joint Secretary of BCAS. The
discussion was moderated by CA. Shariq Contractor,
Past President of BCAS and CA. Jayant Gokhale, Past
Central Council member of ICAI.

The panelists discussed five case studies which covered a
wide range of topics. The large number of issues from the
field of Accounting, Direct Tax, Indirect Tax, International
Tax, FEMA, Stamp Duty etc. were covered extensively by
the panelists.

In the concluding session, CA. U day Sathaye, Chairman
Seminar Committee and CA. Chetan Shah, President
BCAS thanked everybody for making GJRRC a great
success. GJRRC concluded with a commitment to meet
again next year.

SEBI’s Guidance Note On Board Evaluation – Much Needed Road Map

Background

The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) has issued
a Guidance Note on Board Evaluation on 5th January 2017. While not
intended to act as interpretation of the law, it serves as a great and much
needed road map for implementation of several provisions in the Companies Act,
2013, and SEBI Regulations on corporate governance. Auditors have guidance from
the Institute of Chartered Accountants in respect of several areas of their
work and increasingly Company Secretaries have from their alma mater.
However, the Board of Directors and individual directors generally find their
role, obligations and even liabilities having increased manifold but yet do not
have detailed formal guidance as to how they are to carry on their work. This
knowledge gap is felt even more, since most directors may not be well
conversant with the law.

The Guidance Note, to reiterate, does not have a binding
effect. However, I submit that diligent compliance in letter and spirit can be
a good defence in case of action against independent directors by regulators.
Such action can be expected to be manifold considering that corporate governance
is now a law with severe consequences for violations. Indeed, it is possible, I
submit, as also elaborated later, that gross non-compliance of this Guidance
Note could lead to a presumption of violation.

Overview

Requirements of corporate governance earlier were mainly in
the erstwhile Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement. However, now, they are part
of the statutes and indeed they are not only elaborate and detailed but
overlapping too. They are now contained in the Companies Act, 2013 (“the Act”),
and the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations 2015
(“the Regulations”).

On the subject matter of the Guidance Note, there are
requirements on how the Board, its Committees and its members would be
evaluated, selected, recommended for removal, etc. The requirements of
corporate governance in this sense are intended to be self-regulating. The law
lays down that such evaluation should take place, who should carry out such
evaluation and what should be disclosed in respect of such evaluation. However,
the manner in which the evaluation should be carried out has not been specified
leaving a gap which companies may fill in different ways, some more elaborately
and in detail and some summarily or even perfunctorily. The Guidance Note is
intended to fill this gap to help companies and their boards to carry out this
function.

Requirements of law relating to board evaluation

The law prescribes categories of companies to which the
requirements apply. Some important provisions in such law in relation to Board
evaluation, functions of Board, Committees are as follows:-

1. There has
to be a Nomination and Remuneration Committee. It is this Committee that
carries out functions relating to setting up criteria for selection &
evaluation of Board/Directors and related matters.

2.
Independent Directors are also expected to carry out certain evaluation of the
Board, of non-independent directors, the Chairperson, etc. The
Independent Directors, in turn, are evaluated by the Board as a whole, excluding
the director being evaluated.

3.
Generally, detailed functions of Board are laid down including the manner in
which it will function.

However, as is seen above, the law lays down the basic
structure of who shall perform and what functions shall they perform. How they
should perform is left largely unsaid. The Guidance Note provides these
details.

Aspects covered by the Guidance Note

The Guidance Note covers the following aspects

Subject of Evaluation i.e. who is to be evaluated. This
includes the Board as a collective unit, various Committees, independent
directors, executive/non-executive directors, the Chairman and senior
management.

Process of Evaluation including laying down of objectives
and criteria to be adopted for evaluation of different persons.
Depending
on who is to be evaluated, the criteria differs. Thus, the Chairman may be
judged, inter alia, on his leadership qualities. The Board be may judged on how
it performs its strategic functions, how diverse it is in terms of
experience/seniority, cross functional expertise, gender, etc., whether
it allows all members to freely participate, etc. The Independent
Directors would also be evaluated in terms of their distinguishing functions.

Feedback to the persons being evaluated; While the
evaluation may give some clear finding about suitability for continuation or
unsuitability (and hence removal), more often the evaluation may highlight
areas for improvement. Feedback to such persons is helpful.

Action Plan based on the results of the evaluation
process;
Post evaluation, a plan would have to be suggested to fill in the
deficiencies observed by training, etc.

Disclosure to stakeholders on various aspects;
This can be critical as evaluation would not only have to be done but seen to
have been done. The law requires that the policy relating to some of the
evaluation parameters should be disclosed in the Board’s Report. However, it
would be up to the Company whether or not the actual results of the evaluation
are disclosed, the action taken on the evaluation, etc. and the Guidance
Note keeps this discretionary.

Frequency of Board Evaluation; The law requires that
the board evaluation has to be done once in a year. The Guidance Note suggests
that this should be a continuous process in terms of regular feedback.

Responsibility of Board Evaluation: As stated earlier,
depending on who is to be evaluated, the person who carries out this evaluation
changes. Obviously, there cannot be self-evaluation as a rule. Indeed, the
person being evaluated is required to be absent when he or she is being
evaluated. There also ought not also be conflict of interest generally. The
Guidance Note places higher emphasis on the Chairman in terms of steering the
process of Board evaluation generally.

Review of the entire evaluation process periodically.
The evaluation process itself needs to be evaluated from time to time! The
manner in which the evaluation is carried out thus requires a periodic review
and improvement.

Internal vs. External evaluation:- Evaluation can be
internal with each group evaluating the other. Internal evaluation has
advantage of familiarity and close observation over extended periods of time.
However, there may be concerns here whether this can result in mutual back-scratching
or even otherwise whether the evaluation is sufficiently
well-informed/professional. External evaluators may not only bring objectivity
but also professionalism as well as experiences from other evaluations.

Evaluation of Committees

The Committees are required to be evaluated in terms of their
constitution, the functions assigned to it, its actual functioning, its
effectiveness in terms of its objectives, etc.

Detailed guide to board functioning

The Guidance Note talks in great detail about the evaluation
of the Board. While this is meant to be a guide to evaluate it, it by itself
serves also as good guidance on how a Board should function. The Guidance Note
throws detailed light on several aspects such as agenda to be circulated
including how early and how detailed, the manner in which discussions take
place and how they are recorded, the role the Board should really play such as
formulating strategy, relation with the CEO and senior management, what role it
should play in risk management, etc. Thus, while serving as a benchmark for
evaluation, it also actually serves as a road map of actual functioning of the
Board.

Consequences of
non-evaluation/non-following of the Guidance Note

The Guidance Note and the covering circular to it of SEBI
clearly specifies that it is intended to provide guidance and is not to be
interpreted as a law.
However, consider some consequences of
non-compliance relating
to these matters. For example, section 178
(which deals with constitution and role of Nomination and Remuneration
Committee and other matters) has a sub-section (8) that states that in case of
non-compliance, the company is punishable with fine. Further, officers in
default may be punishable with imprisonment upto a year or fine or both. This
may sound fairly serious for a provision relating to corporate governance.
Non-compliance with the SEBI Regulations too has consequences in terms of
penalty and prosecution. SEBI also has powers, and indeed has in the past
applied these powers, to debar persons and has other wide powers too.

It may also happen that wrongdoing in various forms may be
found in a Company. In such an event, the role of every board member would be
examined minutely. If provisions relating to board, directors, etc.
evaluation are not observed, adverse consequences may follow on those who have
defaulted. In such a situation, question will arise whether these provisions
were duly complied with in terms of law.

It is obvious then that the Guidance Note should be taken
seriously.
Even if not meant to be a law, it may be a good preliminary
defence of non-compliance if the provisions of the Guidance Note are observed.
Gross non-compliance could be prima facie evidence of violation of the
provisions.

For example, section 178(2) of the Act provides that “the
Nomination and Remuneration Committee…shall carry out evaluation of every
director’s performance”. In context of the Guidance Note, it may not be
sufficient to show that some evaluation was carried out. The evaluation
itself may be questioned if the provisions of the Guidance Note were not
followed and otherwise it was not found to be sufficiently
detailed.
Following the Guidance Note may help meet the preliminary onus.

Conclusion

There is criticism, which is valid to an extent, that many
western practices of corporate governance may not have direct application in
India where there is dominant position of Promoters both in terms of large
shareholding and board control. However, even in this context, it is recognised
that corporate governance serves a very valuable purpose. Hence, it is now
implemented not as a voluntary code but as mandatory and comprehensive law. The
liability of the Board, directors generally and, in particular, Independent
Directors, key managerial personnel, is ever increasing. Guidance is thus
needed not just on how they should perform but also, in case of any wrong doing
found, how will their actions – which are often subjective and circumstances
based – be judged.

The Guidance Note serves a good purpose in this.
It will not be surprising if more Guidance Notes will be released in the future
for functioning of other pillars of corporate governance. For example, the role
of the Audit Committee is very important, almost next to the Board itself. A
Guidance Note on how SEBI expects it to function would be helpful as an active
guidance as also a benchmark for defence when things go wrong.

Gratuitous Possession of Property

Introduction

Consider a case of a person who
was in need of a house to stay and some close relative of his helped him by
allowing him to stay gratuitously in his spare house. This person continues
staying in this house for a significantly long period of time due to the
goodwill gesture extended to him by his relative. Since possession is often
considered to be nine-tenths of the law
, can he now claim that by virtue of
such a long period of possession, he has acquired a legal right in the property
and hence, he also has a title to the property? Strange as this proposition may
sound, this is a reality which several people are experiencing.

The Delhi High Court had an
occasion to consider a somewhat analogous issue in the case of Sachin vs.
Jhabbu Lal, RSA 136/2016
(analysed in detail in this Feature in the
BCAJ of January 2017
). In that case, the Delhi High Court held that in
respect of a self acquired house of the parents, a son had no legal right to
live in that house and he could live in that house only at the mercy of his
parents up to such time as his parents allow. Merely because the parents have
allowed him to live in the house so long as his relations with the parents were
cordial, does not mean that the parents have to bear his burden throughout
their life.

However, would the position be on
a different footing if a close relative was allowed to stay in a house for a
fairly long period of time out of sympathy, natural love and affection? This
was the issue deliberated by the Supreme Court in the case of Behram Tejani
vs. Azeem Jagani, CA 150/2017 (SC).

Facts of the Case

A person named Mohammed Ali Tejani
(“the deceased”) died, leaving behind a will. Prior to his death, he had a
fractional ownership in various immovable properties, flats in Mumbai. One such
property was a residential flat. The deceased resided in this flat with his
wife and his family members. After his death, his wife and his daughter’s son
(‘grandson’) continued to reside in this flat.

Under his will, the deceased
bequeathed his fractional ownership in all his immovable properties, including
the abovementioned residential flat, to his 4 brothers in equal proportion. He
did not provide for any life interest benefit or carve out any interest in this
flat for his wife or his grandson. The will was sought to be probated.

The grandson prayed before the
Bombay City Civil Court for a temporary injunction restraining the
beneficiaries under the will from dispossessing him and his grandmother from
the aforesaid flat since they were in use and possession of the same.

In reply to this, his 4 grand
uncles, i.e., the deceased’s brothers (also the beneficiaries named by the
deceased under his will) stated that the wife of the deceased was merely
allowed to use and occupy the suit premises by the defendants out of love and
sympathy without any fees or compensation; that the suit premises belonged to
them as co-owners since the testator had bequeathed his right, title and
interest in the building to them. They further stated that nonetheless, out of
sympathy, close blood relationship and out of love and affection, the
deceased’s wife had been allowed to use the suit premises. Further, since she
has no right, title or interest in the suit premises she could have no right to
permit any other person much less her grandson to interfere with the ownership
right of the co-owners. Accordingly, they opposed the grant of any interim
relief to the grandson.

The Bombay City Civil Court
dismissed the injunction prayer of the grandson. It held that the deceased’s
wife herself had no right in this premises. Only on a sympathetic ground she
was allowed to occupy the premises. In such facts, when the grandson came
before the Court claiming equitable relief like injunction, he had to prima
facie
show some rights to claim the relief. If protection was asked for,
one must clearly seek ascertaining his legal rights. He merely claimed that he
was residing with his grandmother and if she herself did not have a right in
the property, then an injunction type of a protection could not be granted in
favour of the grandson.

On appeal, the Bombay High Court
overruled the verdict of the City Civil Court and upheld the grant of a
temporary injunction. It held that legal right of possession alone cannot be
the basis unless it is adjudicated, for overlooking the “settled possession”.
While deciding the possession right the City Civil Court had actually given a
finding against the maternal grandmother and decided that even she had no right
to occupy the premises and therefore, there was no question of permitting her
grandson to reside therein. The concept of “settled possession” could not be
equated with in all matters-“legal possession”. It depended upon the facts and
circumstances of a case.

It further held that the lower
Court proceeded on a wrong footing of law that the possession can be granted
only to the person who has a legal right to occupy the premises and no one
else. It felt that the law must take its due course with a foundation to
dispossess the person in possession of the premises only after a due trial. In
view of the same, it was inclined to observe that the order passed by the City
Civil Judge was against the settled principle of law with regard to the
possession of the property. It was however, made clear that the High Court was
only dealing with the protection of the possession of the premises and not the
ownership and/or title of the maternal grandmother of the plaintiff.

Accordingly, the beneficiaries
under the will of the deceased appealed to the Supreme Court.

Supreme Court’s Verdict

The Apex Court analysed the will
and observed that the will bequeathed the entire interest of the deceased in
the immovable properties in favour of his brothers. Neither the deceased’s wife
nor the grandson had any interest in these properties. She did not have any
right qua the premises in question but was permitted to occupy merely
out of love and affection. The status of the grandmother was thus of a
gratuitous licensee and that of her grandson was purely of a relative staying
with such a gratuitous licensee.

The Court referred to its earlier
decision in the case of Rame Gowda (Dead) by LRS. vs. M. Varadappa
Naidu(Dead), 2004(1) SCC 769
. In that decision, the Supreme Court dealt
with the issue of settled possession by a person. It referred to Salmond on
Jurisprudence which held “that few relationships are as vital to man as that
of possession, and we may expect any system of law, however primitive, to
provide rules for its protection. . . . . . . Law must provide for the
safeguarding of possession….. Legal remedies thus appointed for the protection
of possession even against ownership are called possessory, while those
available for the protection of ownership itself may be distinguished as
proprietary.”

It also analysed its decision in Lallu
Yeshwant Singh (dead) vs. Rao Jagdish Singh, (1968) 2 SCR 203
where it
was held that the Law respects possession even if there is no title to support
it. It will not permit any person to take the law in his own hands and to
dispossess a person in actual possession without having recourse to a court. No
person can be allowed to become a judge in his own cause. Next, in Nair
Service Society Ltd. vs. K.C. Alexander, (1968) 3 SCR 163,
the Apex
Court held that a person in possession of land assumed character of an owner
and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good
title against all the world but the rightful owner. When the facts disclosed no
title in either party, possession alone decided. The court quoted Loft’s maxim ‘Possessio
contra omnes valet praeter eur cui ius sit possessionis (
He that hath
possession hath right against all but him that hath the very right)‘ and
said, “A defendant in such a case must show in himself or his predecessor
a valid legal title, or probably a possession prior to the plaintiff’s and thus
be able to raise a presumption prior in time”.    

The Court thus held that it was
clear that so far as the Indian law was concerned, the person in peaceful
possession was entitled to retain his possession and in order to protect such
possession, he may even use reasonable force to keep out a trespasser. A
rightful owner who had been wrongfully dispossessed of land may retake
possession if he could do so peacefully and without the use of unreasonable
force. If the trespasser was in settled possession of the property belonging to
the rightful owner, the rightful owner shall have to take recourse to law; he
cannot take the law in his own hands and evict the trespasser or interfere with
his possession. The law will come to the aid of a person in peaceful and
settled possession by injuncting even a rightful owner from using force or
taking law in his own hands, and also by restoring him in possession even from
the rightful owner (of course subject to the law of limitation), if the latter
has dispossessed the prior possessor by use of force. It is the settled
possession or effective possession of a person without title which would
entitle him to protect his possession even as against the true owner. The
concept of settled possession and the right of the possessor to protect his
possession against the owner had come to be settled by a catena of
decisions, such as, Munshi Ram and Ors. vs. Delhi Administration,(1968) 2
SCR 455;Puran Singh and Ors. vs. The State of Punjab (1975) 4 SCC 518 and Ram
Rattan and Ors. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (1977) 1 SCC 188.
The Court
further observed that it was difficult to lay down any hard and fast rule as to
when the possession of a trespasser can mature into settled possession. The ‘settled
possession’ must be (i) effective, (ii) undisturbed, and (iii) to the knowledge
of the owner or without any attempt at concealment by the trespasser. The
phrase ‘settled possession’ did not carry any special charm or magic in it; nor
was it a ritualistic formula which could be confined in a strait-jacket. An
occupation of the property by a person as an agent or a servant acting at the
instance of the owner would not amount to actual physical possession.

It laid down the following tests
which could be adopted as a working rule for determining the attributes of
‘settled possession’ :

(i)   that the trespasser must be in
actual physical possession of the property over a sufficiently long period;

(ii) that the possession must be to
the knowledge (either express or implied) of the owner or without any attempt
at concealment by the trespasser and which contains an element of animus
possidendi
. The nature of possession of the trespasser would, however, be a
matter to be decided on the facts and circumstances of each case;

(iii) the process of dispossession
of the true owner by the trespasser must be complete and final and must be
acquiesced to by the true owner; and

(iv) that one of the usual tests to
determine the quality of settled possession, in the case of culturable land,
would be whether or not the trespasser, after having taken possession, had
grown any crop. If the crop had been grown by the trespasser, then even the
true owner has no right to destroy the crop grown by the trespasser and take
forcible possession.

Next, the Supreme Court analysed
the ratio of another of its earlier decisions, Maria Margarida Sequeira
Fernandes and others vs. Erasmo Jack De Sequeira (Dead) through LRS, 2012 (5)
SCC 370.
In this case, the appellant was married to a Naval Officer who
was transferred from time to time outside Goa and hence, on the request of her
brother she gave possession of the premises to him as a caretaker. The
caretaker held her property only on her behalf. The brother filed a suit for injunction
against his sister, the legal owner.

The Supreme Court observed that in
civil cases, pleadings were extremely important for ascertaining the title and
possession of the property in question. Possession was an incidence of
ownership and could be transferred by the owner of an immovable property to
another such as in a mortgage or lease. A licensee held possession on behalf of
the owner. Possession was important when there were no title documents and
other relevant records before the Court, but, once they come before the Court,
it is the title which has to be looked at first and due weightage be given to
it. Possession cannot be considered in vacuum. There was a presumption that
possession of a person, other than the owner, if at all it was to be called
possession, was permissive on behalf of the title-holder. Further, possession
of the past was one thing, and the right to remain or continue in future was
another thing. It was the latter which was usually more in controversy than the
former, and it was the latter which had seen much abuse and misuse before the
Courts. A title suit for possession had two parts – first, adjudication of
title, and second, adjudication of possession. If the title dispute was removed
and the title was established, then, in effect, it became a suit for ejectment
where the defendant must plead and prove why he must not be ejected.

In an action for recovery of
possession of immovable property, upon the legal title to the property being
established, the possession of the property by a person other than the holder
of the legal title was presumed to have been under and in subordination to the
legal title. It is for the person resisting a claim for recovery of possession
or claiming a right to continue in possession, to establish that he has such a
right. To put it differently, wherever pleadings and documents established
title to a particular property and possession was in question, it will be for
the person in possession to give sufficiently detailed pleadings, particulars
and documents to support his claim in order to continue in possession.

In Maria Sequeira’s case, the
brother did not claim any title to the suit property. Undoubtedly, the sister
had a valid title to the property which was clearly proved.The lower Courts had
failed to appreciate that the premises in question was given by the sister to
her brother herein as a caretaker.The brother’s suit for injunction against his
sister was not maintainable, particularly when it was established beyond doubt
that he was only a caretaker and he ought to have given possession of the
premises to the sister who was the true owner of the suit property on demand.
Admittedly, he did not claim any title over the suit property and he had not
filed any proceedings disputing the title of the appellant. The Supreme Court
held that an occupation of the property by a person as an agent or a servant at
the instance of the owner will not amount to actual physical possession.

It further held that the
possession of a servant or agent was that of his master or principal as the
case may be for all purposes and the former cannot maintain a suit against the
latter on the basis of such possession. Merely because the plaintiff was
employed as a servant to look after the property, it cannot be said that he had
entered into such possession of the property as would entitle him to exclude
even the master from enjoying or claiming possession of the property or as
would entitle him to compel the master from staying away from his own property.

In Maria Sequeira’s case, the
Court held that Principles of law which emerged were as under:-

(i)   No one acquired a title to the
property if he or she was allowed to stay in the premises gratuitously. Even by
long possession of years or decades, such person would not acquire any right or
interest in the said property.

(ii)  A caretaker, watchman or
servant can never acquire interest in the property irrespective of his long
possession. The caretaker or servant had to give possession forthwith on
demand.

(iii)  The Courts were not justified
in protecting the possession of a caretaker, servant or any person who was
allowed to live in the premises for some time either as a friend, relative,
caretaker or as a servant.

(iv) The protection of the Court
could only be granted or extended to the person who had a valid, subsisting
rent agreement, lease agreement or license agreement in his favour.

(v)  The caretaker or agent held a
property of the principal only on behalf of the principal. He acquired no right
or interest whatsoever for himself in such property irrespective of his long
stay or possession.

Hence, in Maria Sequeira’s case,
the judgment of the lower Courts were set aside and the Supreme Court directed
that the possession of the suit premises be handed over to the sister, who was
admittedly the owner of the suit property.

Accordingly,
after analysing and following the ratio of the above decisions, the Supreme
Court in Tejani’s case, concluded that a person holding the premises
gratuitously or in the capacity as a caretaker or a servant would not acquire
any right or interest in the property and even long possession in that capacity
would be of no legal consequences. In the circumstances, the City Civil Court
was right and justified in rejecting the prayer for interim injunction and that
decision was correct. However, it clarified that the matter having come up
before the Supreme Court from an interim order and since the main suit itself
was pending, observations made by it were not to be taken as concluding the
controversy and the merits of the matter will be gone into by the Court at the
appropriate stage.

Conclusion

It is apparent that a gratuitous possessor can
claim no vested right in the legal owner’s property. This clear cut verdict
helps to clarify matters. This decision read with the Delhi High Court’s
decision that an adult son cannot claim that he has a legal right to stay in
his parents’ home would go a long way in resolving several possession disputes.

19. [2017] 77 taxmann.com 166 (Ahmedabad – Trib.) DCIT vs. Bombardier Transportation India (P.) Ltd. A.Ys.: 2013-14, Date of Order: 3rd January, 2017

Sections – 9(1)(vi) / 9(1)(vii) of the Act,
Article 12 of India-Canada DTAA – Use of certain equipment in course of
rendition of services does not result in any use of or right to use the
equipment for recipient of service. Hence, payment for such services cannot be
treated as royalty

Facts 1

The Taxpayer, an Indian company, was a
member-company of an international Group engaged in the business of
manufacturing and supply of rail transportation system. It was a wholly owned
subsidiary of a Singapore based Group Company. During the relevant assessment
year, Taxpayer had made payments to its Canadian Group Company towards its
share of costs in relation to the information system support services availed
by Canadian company at group level.

Before the AO the Taxpayer contended as
follows.

  The
payments were made towards information system support services at group level.
The amounts were determined on the basis of cost allocation. The Taxpayer
contended that the since the payments were in the nature of reimbursements,
they could not partake the character of income.

  Provisions
of section 9(1)(vi) of the Act treating the payments as ‘royalty’ could not be
invoked unless there was transfer of all or any of the rights (including
granting of any license) in respect of copyright of a literary, artistic or
scientific work.

  Additionally,
in terms of Article 12(3) of India-Canada DTAA, only payments having an element
of use of IPRs could be considered as royalties whereas the impugned payments
were for standard facilities. Further, the Canadian company had not received
any payment for commercial exploitation of copyright embedded in the
applications.

  Hence,
such payments did not qualify as ‘royalty’.

     However, the AO concluded
that the impugned payments were consideration for “use or right to use any
industrial, commercial or scientific equipment” and hence, taxable u/s.
9(1)(vi) of the Act as well as article 12(3)(b) of India-Canada DTAA. After a
detailed analysis of the payments, he was of the view that a major portion of
the payment was for the use or right to use industrial, commercial or
scientific equipment.

Held 1

(i)  The payments made by the
Taxpayer to Canadian company were in the nature of reimbursements based on cost
allocations and did not involve any income element.

(ii) Though rendition of
service may involve use of certain equipment it does not result in any use of
or right to use the equipment. Even if a part of consideration could be said to
be on account of use of equipment by breaking down all the components of
economic activity for which consideration is paid, it is neither practicable,
nor permissible, to assign monetary value to each of the components and
consider that amount in isolation for deciding character of that amount.

(iii) Even if the payment is
considered as payment for use of software, in absence of transfer of copyright,
it cannot be treated as royalty.

(iv) In Kotak Mahindra
Primus Ltd vs. DDIT [(2007) 11 SOT 578 (Mum)]
, deciding on a similar issue,
the Tribunal observed that the Indian company did not have any control over, or
physical access to, the mainframe computer in Australia, and that since the
payment was for specialised data processing, there cannot be any question of
payment for use of the mainframe computer.

(v) Thus, even if one were to
proceed on the basis that equipment was used in rendition of services, such
payment, or part thereof, cannot be treated as payment for use of equipment.
Further, details furnished by the Taxpayer support the fact of reimbursement.
Hence, the payment was not FTS. In absence of any income embedded in
reimbursement payment, question of withholding of tax did not arise.

Facts 2

The Taxpayer
additionally availed administrative, marketing and procurement services from
the Canadian company. AO contended that the services rendered by the Canadian
company were technical in nature and such services made available, technical,
knowledge, skill and experience to the Taxpayer. Hence, payment for such
services was covered as FTS under article of India-Canada DTAA.

Held 2

(i)  Article 12(4)(a) could be
invoked only if the services provided, inter alia, “make available”
technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how, or processes or consist of
the development and transfer of a technical plan or technical design.

(ii) The services provided by
the Canadian company were simply management support or consultancy services
which did not involve any transfer of technology. The AO had also not contended
that the recipient of service was enabled to perform these services on its own
without any further recourse to the service provider.

(iii) In this context the
connotation of the expression ‘make available’ needs to be examined. Technology
is “made available” when the person acquiring the service is enabled to apply
the technology. in CIT vs. De Beers India Pvt. Ltd [(2012) 346 ITR 467
(Kar)]
, the Court held that the technical or consultancy service rendered
should be such that it “makes available” (i.e., imparts) technical knowledge,
etc. to the recipient whereby he could derive enduring benefit and utilise the
knowledge or know-how on his own in future without the aid of the service
provider.

(iv)  Since
the aforementioned tests were not satisfied in case of the Taxpayer, the
payment for services could not be considered as FIS. The fact that the services
rendered involved provision of certain technical inputs and that such inputs
resulted in providing value addition to the Taxpayer, was not relevant in
determining if make available condition is satisfied or not.

16. [2016] 161 ITD 527 (Pune Trib.) Knox Investments (P.) Ltd. vs. ITO A.Y.: 2007 – 08 Date of order: 26th August, 2016

Section
37(1) – Where assessee, a financial intermediary agent, enters into an
assignment agreement whereby liability of assignor is acquired by assessee at
its NPV, then difference between NPV of the said liability as at end of
relevant financial year and as at end of preceding financial year, till the
repayment of the liability commences, is allowed as finance charges.       

FACTS

The assessee-company was engaged in business
of financial intermediary agents and earned income by way of commission and
professional fees and followed mercantile system of accounting.

During the assessment proceedings, the AO
inquired about the nature of payment of Rs.44,71,126/-that the assessee had
debited as finance charges in its profit and loss account.

In response to the same, the assessee
submitted that Indian Seamless Steels and Alloys Ltd. (ISSAL) had availed
interest free sales-tax deferral Certificate of Entitlement from the Government
of Maharashtra under the Package scheme of Incentives,1988. As per the said
scheme, sales-tax liability of each year was required to be paid by ISSAL to
the Sales-Tax Department of Government of Maharashtra in five equal annual
instalments upon expiry of ten years from the date of availment i.e. to say the
sales tax collected for the financial year 1994-95 was required to be repaid in
five equal annual instalments beginning with financial year 2005-06 and so on.

As a part of financing activity, the
assessee vide agreement dated 9th April 2001, took over
liability of the ISSAL for repayment of sales-tax deferral amounting to Rs.
835.98 lakh (collected by ISAAL for the period 1st April 2000 to 31st
March 2001) for a consideration of  Rs.
268.79 lakh arrived at @10% NPV based on the repayment schedule. The said loan
was repayable by the assessee to Government in five equal instalments starting from
F.Y. 2011-12 and ending on F.Y.2015-16.

This NPV of liability amounting to Rs.
268.79 lakh as on 31.03.2001, got enhanced to 288.63 lakh as on 31.03.2002 and
the same was shown under the head ‘unsecured loans’ for the first time in the
balance sheet of the assessee as on 31.03.2002. The NPV of liability thus got
increased every year till the repayment would commence in the F.Y. 2011-12 and
the difference in NPV at the end of a particular financial year and the
immediately preceding year was claimed as expenditure under the head ‘finance
charges’ in the P&L account of that year.

Following the same method in this year, the
difference in NPV as on 31.03.2007 and as on 31.03.2006 amounting to Rs.
44,71,126/- was debited to the P&L account for the year under consideration
as expenditure under the head ‘finance charges’ and as it was not actually
paid, the said amount was also added to the existing outstanding liability and
shown under the head ‘unsecured loans’.

The AO was of the view that the amount so
debited was not a revenue expenditure as liability did not exist in praesenti
but was a contingent liability. He thus disallowed the claim of finance
charges.

The Commissioner (Appeals), endorsed the
action of the Assessing Officer.

On appeal before the Tribunal:

HELD

The judicial opinion of the various courts
is that a liability depending upon a contingency is not a debt in praesenti
or in futuro till the contingency happens. But if it is debt, the fact
that the amount has to be ascertained does not make it any less a debt if the
liability is certain and what remains is only a quantification of the amount.
The word ‘contingent’ in contrast, refers to possibility of an obligation or
liability to arise on occurrence or non-occurrence of one or more uncertain
future events.

An accrued
liability is an allowable deduction whereas a contingent liability is not an
allowable deduction for the purposes of determination of taxable income.
Therefore the pertinent question that arises for adjudication is whether,
difference in NPV of the liability at the end of a particular financial year
and the immediately preceding year claimed as expenditure under the head
‘finance charges’ in the P&L account of that year (i.e. Rs. 44,71,126/-
debited to P&L for relevant assessment year under consideration), is an
accrued liability or a contingent liability.

In terms of section 145 of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 read with section 211 of the Companies Act, 1956 – a company has to
mandatorily prepare its account on ‘accrual’ basis. The term ‘Accrual’ has been
defined by the Accounting Standard-1 and by section 145 of the Income-tax Act,
1961 as follows -.

‘Accrual’ refers to the assumptions that
revenues and costs are accrued, that is, recognized as they are earned or
incurred (and not as money is received or paid) and recorded in the final
statements of the periods to which they relate.

The Accounting Standard-1 further provides
that as a matter of prudent accounting policy, provisions should be made for
all known liabilities and losses even though the amount cannot be determined
with certainty and represents only the best estimate in the light of available
information. Under the Mercantile System of Accounting, the expenditure items
for which legal liability has been incurred are immediately debited even before
the amount in question is actually distributed.

In terms of section 28 read with section 145
of the Income Tax Act,1961 income chargeable under the head ‘profit and gains
of business or profession’ cannot be determined unless and until the expenses
or obligations which have been incurred are set-off against the receipts.
Therefore, in order to determine the true profits arising from business, the
expenditure actually incurred or liability in respect thereof accrued even
though it may have to be discharged at some future date has to be necessarily
accounted for.

In the present case, the assessee by virtue
of assignment agreement received certain amount which was to be replenished and
repaid by higher sum computed by applying Net Present Value method at a
discounting factor of 10%. The corresponding finance costs debited to profit
& loss account during the year represents incremental increase in the
liability with the efflux of time where the liability gets accrued as it inches
towards maturity. Thus, it was manifest that the incremental liability had
accrued to the assessee in praesenti with the efflux of time notwithstanding
the fact that increase in the liability was required to be actually discharged
on a future date. The gradual increase in liability is dependent on the time
horizon that has elapsed and therefore not an uncertain event by any stretch of
imagination. The liability has definitely accrued in praesenti against
future outflow of resources and the said liability can be determined with great
reliability.

In result, the appeal of the assessee is
allowed.

Denialistan: Top 10 excuses Pakistan trots out after terrorist attacks on India

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Pakistan’s long history of bleeding India with a thousand cuts follows a familiar pattern. Deny, defy, and mollify are the main aspects of its terrorism policy. Here are the top 10 excuses and explanations that Pakistan, also known as Denialistan, wheels out every time it is in the international spotlight for initiating yet another terror strike against India.

1. India has jumped to conclusion too soon: first reaction usually given even as attack is still going on, because the Indian media had already begun to name Pakistan as the place of origin of terrorists. But as the timeline of both Mumbai 26/11 and Pathankot showed, evidence surfaced very early. Ajmal Kasab was caught and squealed like a piglet to the cops while his terrorist friends were still burning down the Taj. In Pathankot, unknown terrorist scum used the phone from a cab driver he killed to tell Ammi in Pakistan he’s going to get his 72 virgins.

2. They are not Pakistanis: next line of defence. Worked very well in the case of the attack on Parliament when all the piglets were killed. They tried it in Mumbai even after Ajmal was captured. Unfortunately for Pakistan, a small, courageous section of Pakistani media outed its own disgusting terrorism backing establishment. In Pathankot, they are trying to throw Kashmiris under the bus, getting PakMil proxies such as United Jihad Council to claim the cannon-fodder were Kashmiri.

3. Where’s the proof? Standard, argumentative line thrown on TV, even when you have slapped them in face with proof (phone records, tapes, transcripts, testimony from captured terrorists, etc). When it gets too uncomfortable, claim the evidence is all fabricated.

4. It is an internal job done by RAW to defame Pakistan: Used when either the truth is blindingly obvious or when the Sloppy Joe Indian side fails to gather enough evidence.

5. They are non-state actors: Invented by the terroristin- uniform Pervez Musharraf, darling of India’s chattering classes and conclave society. Fact that he was caught on phone discussing terrorist deployment in Kargil did not stop them from inviting him to their soirees. But why blame them, the great statesman Atal Bihari Vajpayee rescued him from international ignominy.

6. Pakistan is also a victim of terrorism: Playing the victim card after nurturing tens and thousands of terrorists and creating an ambient ecosystem for terrorism, including state – and constitutionally-mandated bigotry and systemic slaughter of minorities.

7. Pakistan is a frontline ally in war on terror: Line wheeled out to extract rent money from credulous Americans stuck in Afghanistan. Never mind if the US tax $$$ they funnel to Terroristan also kill AMERICAN soldiers in Afghanistan.

8. Islam is a religion of peace: Wheeled out for the rest of the world, although Pakistan has little to do with Islam, apart from being its worst example.

9. Pakistan will act against terrorism in all its forms: Increasingly used of late because plausible deniability has become very difficult.

10. Pakistan will fight shoulder-to-shoulder with India against terrorism: The latest offered by its civilian establishment, now that the country is swirling into a black hole. From its military establishment, which will lose its lolly and perks if this happens: Yeah, dream on.

(Source: Article by Shri. Chidanand Rajghatta in The Times of India dated 12-01-2016)

Double bubble trouble

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Sustaining anything in the region of 7% growth should be good enough in a troubled and risk-laden world.

Three months ago, a Brookings Institution-Financial Times tracking index warned of emerging economies risk “leading the world economy into a slump, with lower growth and a rout in markets”. Those words will echo in many minds at the end of this past week, as the world suddenly looks like a dangerous place, and emerging markets even more so. Over the past year, stocks and currencies have dipped in many emerging markets, including India. Over a five-year period, global stock indices have virtually doubled relative to plunging values in emerging markets. Money has been pulled out of emerging markets for several months. And if the last few days’ trends are anything to go by, the story is far from being over. George Soros is only one of many doomsayers.

Two of the original Bric economies that set the pace for a decade have slipped into recession — and a strengthening dollar has accentuated the decline. In dollar terms, Brazil’s economy has shrunk in the last couple of years by 25 per cent, while Russia’s economy has shrivelled 40 per cent. China, while continuing to grow, is beset by transition issues and has become the primary source of global instability. The big risk is cross-country contagion through bankruptcies — and India has its share of debtladen candidates for that scenario. Yet, through it all, India continues to look stable and healthy.

That’s if you view the country from outside. The perspective from within is quite different. Despite much activity by eager-beaver ministers in the Modi government, change on the ground has been slow and very much on the margin. Corporate profits in relation to GDP are at a decadal low. Corporate investment intentions have shrunk further, even as the number of stalled projects remains virtually unchanged. In the infrastructure sectors, power generation has grown less than three per cent, and the railways have missed their freight traffic targets. Investment by the railways too has fallen short, causing the finance ministry to trim fiscal support. The commercial banks’ books will look worse in coming quarters as the Reserve Bank gets less indulgent about undeclared bad loans — provoking (so one hears) some troubled bank chiefs to beat a path to the Prime Minister’s Office. External trade has continued to shrink. The one bright spot remains tax collection. But one-third of the way into its tenure, the Modi government has not really been able to get on top of its inherited economic problems.

Anxious to show results, government personalities talk of increasing government spending, and easing up on fiscal consolidation. However well-intentioned, the idea runs up against the fact that state deficits are already set to grow on account of state governments taking on the bulk of accumulated discom debt, under the ‘UDAY ’ programme. So the combined deficit of Centre and states will climb over the next couple of years. Unless the government wants to risk hard-won economic stability, there is no room for further fiscal slackening, given that it has implications for government borrowing and will put pressure on interest rates. In any case, the government’s capacity to spend more is a known constraint, as the railways have shown this year.

This will be a frustrating scenario for a government that bravely promised a return to rapid economic growth. But the global as well as domestic situation compels realism in the expectations about what is feasible. Economies don’t grow at eight per cent and more when exports are plunging, and when a good bit of the banking system needs intensive care. In fact, shooting for that target could lead to macroeconomic bungling. Sustaining anything in the region of seven per cent growth, give or take a bit, should be good enough in a troubled and risk-laden world.

(Source: Weekend Ruminations by Shri T N Ninan in Business Standard dated 09-01-2016 )

Amendment in Rules

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N o . VAT. 1 5 1 5 / C R – 1 5 8 / Ta x a t i o n – 1 d a t e d 30.12.2015

Maharashtra Government has amended the Maharashtra Value added Tax Rules, 2005. Rule 52B has been added under which if the claimant dealer has purchased goods covered under Entry 13 of Schedule D -Aerated and Carbonated non-alcoholic beverages, whether or not containing sugar or other sweetening matter or flavor or any other additives and under Entry 14 of Schedule DCigar and cigarettes, then he will be entitled to set-off in respect of the said goods only to the extent of aggregate of the tax paid or payable under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 on interstate resale of the corresponding goods and the taxes paid on the purchase of said goods if resold locally under the Act.

The set-off in respect of said goods shall be claimed only in the month in which corresponding sales of such goods is effected by the claimant dealer. Above conditions are not applicable to the purchases of such goods which are sold in the course of export of goods out of the territory of India. (Applicable wef 1-1-2016).

Restructuring of Maharashtra Sales Tax Department

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Trade Circular 20T of 2015 dated 31.12.2015

With the view to provide single window system to dealers, the Department has undertaken restructuring of work allotment which entails changing the present functional set up into a single desk multi functional setup wherein dealers will be allocated to the officers to be called as Nodal officers. Under this system, each dealer will have a Nodal Officer who will look after functions of amendment and cancellation of registration, returns follow up, audits/ assessments/issue based audits, processing of refunds, issuance of CST forms, cross checks and recovery of dues etc.

Downloading of Digitally Signed Registration Certificate

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Trade Circular 19T of 2015 dated 21.12.2015

In order to ensure immediate availability of the (TIN) registration certificate to the applicant, a facility has been made available to download the digitally signed (TIN) registration certificate from the website www.mahavat.gov.in Detailed procedure explained in this circular. The registration officer shall continue to send the physical copy of (TIN) registration certificate to the applicant on the address mentioned in the application through India post.

M/s. G. E. Capital Transportation Financial Services Ltd. V. State of Haryana and Another, [2013] 63 VST 329 (P&H)

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VAT – Turnover of Sales – Deemed Sale – Transfer of Right to Use Goods – Rentals Received or Receivable in Given Period Only Taxable, Section 2 (2C) (iv) of The Haryana Value Added Tax Act, 2003.

FACTS
The appellant entered into agreement for lease of vehicles. The assessment orders were finalized by taking aggregate amount of all installments payable for the entire term of the lease periodfor the month in which the vehicles were delivered to the lessee. The appellate authorities including the Tribunal dismissed the appeal. The appellant filed appeal before the P & H High Court against the said order of the Tribunal dismissing the appeal.

HELD
The definition of tax period in terms of rule 2 (2f) of the Rules means a period of time usually a month, quarter or a year for which tax payable by a dealer is quantified. The turnover is aggregate of the goods sold or purchased by a dealer during a tax period in terms of rule (2g) of the Rules. Since the transfer of right to use in the vehicles is the sale falling within the definition of section 2(f), therefore, rentals received or receivables during the tax period is the sale price received by the dealer, exigible to tax in a financial year. The right to use vehicles is dependent upon monthly payment of rentals and therefore, the monthly rentals received or receivable by the dealer is a turnover and consequently the sale price. The lease rentals received or receivable during the tax period only, as a right to use goods, is the turnover forming part of sale price. Accordingly, the High Court allowed appeal filed by the appellant company and set aside the order passed by the Tribunal.

M/S.Vikas Poha Mill vs. Divisional Dy. CCT, [2013] 63 VST 132 (Chhatisgarh)

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Sales Tax – Sale of Poha and Murmura – Are Forms of Rice – Are “Cereals” – Exempt from Payment of Tax, Entry 23 of Part II of Schedule II of The Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1956.

FACTS
The Petitioner manufacturer of Poha and Murmura claimed exemption from payment of tax on sale of it being covered by the term “Cereals” under Notification dated March 30, 1994 read with section 14 of the CST Act, 1956. The department rejected the claimas the sale of Poha and Murmura is covered by specific entry 23, Part IV of Schedule II of the Act and also held that it is not covered by the term cereals, as there is a separate schedule entry. The petitioner filed writ petition before the Chhattisgarh High Court against the aforesaid assessment order.

HELD
The State has placed Poha and Murmura in the separate entry for the purpose of exigibility to taxation. However, in the exemption notification the word cereals includes, inter alia “rice” as enumerated in (i) to (x) in section 14 of the CST Act. All the terms used are the basic products, not other forms of the product. The term rice includes beaten and puffed rice both. Thus, the exemption is granted to all the goods, as specified in the State Act, the State can not get any advantage from the fact that there has been a separate entry for exigibility to tax in respect of Poha and Murmura. Accordingly, Poha and Murmura are one form of rice and entitled to exemption under the above stated notification. The exemption has been granted to Cereals which are enumerated after “that is to Say”. The term “Cereals” used in section 14( i) of the CST Act clearly means “rice “ and other like products of rice like Poha and Murmura. Thus, rice including Poha and Murmura are included within the definition of Cereals and as such covered by the notification dated March 30, 1994 for the purpose of exemption. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the writ petition and the matter was referred back to the assessing officer to make assessment a fresh in the light of law decided by the High Court.

[2015-TIOL-12-ARA-ST] M/s J. P. Morgan Services India Private Ltd.

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Provision of a car to an employee by the employer during the course of his employment and only because the employee is in service is covered by section 65B(44)(b) of the Finance Act, 1994 and will not amount to service.

Facts
The applicant desires to hire cars from car leasing companies and under the scheme those cars would be made available to such employees who are firstly continuing to be the employees and secondly who accept the option to have the car for their personal as well as official use and in lieu of this, the company was to charge the said employees the same amount which it would be paying to the car leasing company from which they hire the car. The question before the authority is whether the amount to be charged to its employees for the use of the vehicles is subject to service tax.

Held
The Authority noted that the service of “making available” a car to the employee is being rendered by the applicant. In this context, both the conditions of clause (b) of section 65B (44) are fulfilled. Firstly, it is in the course of the employment because the agreement between the applicant and employee clearly suggests that this will be during the course of his employment only. Second condition is also satisfied that it is only because the employee is in service and in that sense the service becomes in relation to his employment. Since both these conditions are fulfilled, it is held that the transaction will not amount to service.

[2016-TIOL-166-CESTAT-ALL] M/s Tanya Automobiles Pvt. Ltd vs. Commissioner of Central Excise and Service Tax, Meerut-I

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When value of goods used is shown separately in invoice and VAT/Sales Tax has been paid, the transaction has to be treated as sale and cannot be a service transaction.

Facts
Appellant is an Authorised Service Station of Motor Vehicles and was paying service tax on the labour charges only and not on value of spare parts and lubricants used in the course of servicing of the motor vehicles. Department demanded service tax on the entire amount of invoice including the value of spare parts on the contention that without the use of spare parts and consumables in the course of servicing of vehicles, the service is not complete and therefore is an integral part of service. It was further observed that benefit of Notification No. 12/2003-ST is also not available as they are not issuing separate invoices for sale of spares.

Held
The Tribunal noted the decision of Samtech Industries vs. Commissioner of Central Excise [2014-TIOL-643- CESTAT-DEL] upheld by the Hon’ble High Court of Allahabad [2015(38) STR 162] and the CBEC letter dated 27.09.2013 addressed to the CCE, Meerut specifically providing that service tax on cost of goods supplied during repair does not appear sustainable. The Tribunal held that the cost of items supplied/sold with a documentary proof specifically indicating value of goods, demand of service tax on the cost of goods supplied during repair is not sustainable.

[2016-TIOL-149-CESTAT-DEL] M/s National Engineering Industries Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur

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Where commission is paid by the Indian buyers directly to the
appellant instead of the commission alongwith price being first remitted
to the foreign supplier and then the foreign supplier remitting the
commission amount, such direct receipts are deemed to be receipts in
foreign exchange.

Facts
The appellant used to find
buyers in India for the products of a foreign company. The Indian buyers
made payments directly to the foreign seller and the foreign seller
paid commission to the appellant. In some cases buyers opted to pay the
commission directly to the appellant and in such cases commission part
shown in the invoice was not paid on to the seller by the buyer. The
Commissioner (Appeals) held that the service was delivered in India even
though the commission was received from foreign supplier and therefore,
it will not be tantamount to export of service and upheld the primary
order. Aggrieved by the same, the present appeal is filed.

Held
The
Tribunal held that in case of the commission received from foreign
supplier, the service rendered clearly satisfies the requirement of
export of service as has been held in the case of Paul Merchants Limited
vs. CCE, Chandigarh [2013 (29) STR 267 (Tri.-Del). Even in the other
situation where the commission is paid by the Indian buyers to the
appellant, in effect, the commission was paid on behalf of the foreign
supplier only and can be deemed to have been paid in foreign exchange as
the buyers would have had to remit the commission part also to the
foreign supplier who would have in turn sent it to the appellant and
thus this arrangement makes the procedure simple. Further, relying on
the judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of J. B. Boda – 1997
(229) ITR 271 (SC), where such payments are deemed to be received in
foreign exchange the appeal is allowed.

[2016-TIOL-132-CESTAT-MUM] M/s Sharayu Motors vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai.

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When issue is settled by the Larger Bench, penalties can be set aside considering the bonafide of the Appellant. Target incentive received from manufacturer in the nature of trade discount not exigible to service tax.

Facts
The Appellant received certain amount from financial institutions as commission for marketing of Auto Loan products and also an amount from manufacturers of car under the head Target Incentive Scheme. Department demanded service tax under ‘business auxiliary service’ in relation to the aforesaid receipts and also imposed penalties. In the matter of incentives it was argued that the issue is well settled by the judgement of the Tribunal in favour of the Appellant in the case of Commissioner of Service Tax vs. Sai Service Station Ltd [2013-TIOL-1436- CESTAT-MUM} and in case of commission from financial institution, it was stated that the issue is settled against them by the larger bench of the Tribunal in the case of Pagariya Auto Centre vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Aurangabad [2014-TIOL-2875-CESTAT-MUM], however penalties should be set aside in relation thereto.

Held
The Tribunal confirmed the demand along with interest in relation to the amount received from financial institution for promoting their products by considering the decision of the larger bench in the case of Pagariya Auto Centre (supra). However, it was held that since the issue has been settled by the Larger Bench, Appellant could have entertained a bona fide belief and therefore penalties are set aside by invoking provisions of section 80 of the Finance Act,1994. Further relying on the decision of Sai Service Station (supra) demand against the amounts received as incentives is set aside.

[2016-TIOL-12-CESTAT-MUM] M/s Bharat Forge Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Pune-III

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When service tax paid under reverse charge is available as CENVAT
credit, the non-payment would not result in any financial benefit and
therefore deserves waiver of penalty.

Facts
The
Appellant availed External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) and raised
capital in overseas market and availed services of Lead Managers based
abroad having no office in India. The department demanded service tax on
the fees paid to the lead managers abroad u/s. 66A of the Finance Act,
1994 and imposed penalties u/s. 76,77 and 78 of the Act. Entire amount
of service tax was paid before the issue of Show Cause Notice and only
the penalties are disputed.

Held
The Tribunal noted
the prompt payment of service tax before the issue of Show Cause Notice
and the payment of interest soon after passing the adjudication order
which showed the genuineness of the Appellant. It was held that whatever
tax is paid is available as CENVAT credit and thus there is no
intention to avoid payment of service tax. Non-payment would not result
in any financial benefit and therefore penalty is waived u/s. of the
Finance Act, 1994.

[2015] 64 taxmann.com 126 (Mumbai – CESTAT) Commissioner of Central Excise, Nagpur vs. P.B. Bobde

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As hiring and renting can be distinguished from each other, service tax cannot be levied on hiring of cabs under category of rent-a-cab service.

Facts
The Appellant entered into a contract for supply of vehicles on hiring basis & did not pay service tax based on a view that hiring of vehicles is not liable for service tax under category of ‘Rent a cab Service’.

Held
The Tribunal relied upon recent judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Uttrakhand in the case of CC&CE vs. Sachin Malhotra 2014-TIOL-2039-HC-UKAND-ST [digest reproduced in the January 2015 issue of BCAJ]. In that case, the High Court noted that, even though the word “hire” is used in rent-a-cab scheme, both are different transactions. In case of hiring, control of vehicle is retained by owner irrespective of the fact whether he himself drives vehicle or engages a driver and customer merely pays charges for travelling in such vehicle. But in case of “rent-a-cab” service, rent is paid as per terms of contract and vehicle is used by the person as his own & he is free to take it anywhere as per his choice, but subject to terms & conditions of contract. The Hon’ble High Court held that unless control of vehicle is passed on to hirer under rent-a-cab scheme, there does not arise any service tax liability as envisaged by provisions of section 65(91) of the Finance Act, 1994. In the light of this judgment, the matter was decided in favour of assessee.