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Income — Income deemed to accrue or arise in India — Fees for technical services — Technical services do not include construction, assembly and design — Contract for design, manufacture and supply of passengers rolling stock including training of personnel — Dominant purpose of contract was supply of passenger rolling stock — Training of personnel ancillary — Amount received under contract could not be deemed to accrue or arise in India:

76 CIT vs. Bangalore Metro Rail Corporation Ltd [2022] 449 ITR 431 (Karn)
A. Y.: 2011-12
Date of order: 30th June, 2022
Section: 9(1)(vii) of ITA 1961:

Income — Income deemed to accrue or arise in India — Fees for technical services — Technical services do not include construction, assembly and design — Contract for design, manufacture and supply of passengers rolling stock including training of personnel — Dominant purpose of contract was supply of passenger rolling stock — Training of personnel ancillary — Amount received under contract could not be deemed to accrue or arise in India:

The assessee entered into a contract with a consortium consisting of BEML, H, MC and ME, of which, BEML was the consortium leader, for design manufacture, supply, testing and commissioning of passenger rolling stock, including training of personnel and supply of spares and operation. The total cost of the contract was Rs. 1672.50 crores. The Department conducted a survey under section 133A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and observed that a sum of Rs. 182 crores had been paid by the assessee to the consortium. The Department was of the view that the assessee ought to have deducted tax at source before making the payment. Accordingly, a show-cause notice dated 27th December, 2011was issued calling upon the assessee to show cause why it should not be treated “as an assessee-in-default” under section 201(1) of the Act for not deducting tax at source and remitting it to the Government. The assessee submitted its reply contending, inter alia, that the contract was one for supply of coaches and other activities such as design, testing, commissioning and training were only incidental to achieving the dominant object and therefore, it would constitute a sale of goods and hence, the provisions of section 194C or section 194J would not apply. It also contended that the assessee was not aware how the consortium partners had utilized the 10 per cent. of the contract amount given as “mobilisation amount”. The AO, not being satisfied with the assessee’s reply, treated it as ”an assessee-in-default” and levied tax and interest thereon under section 201(1A) of the Act.

The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s appeals.

On appeals by the Department, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)    A careful perusal of Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 shows that fees for technical services do not include construction, assembly and mining operation, etc.

ii)    The contract was one for designing, manufacturing, supply, testing, commissioning of passenger rolling stock and training personnel. The total contract was for Rs. 1,672.50 crores whereas, the training component was about Rs. 19 crores. All cheques had been issued in favour of BEML. Firstly, the Revenue had taken a specific stand before the Tribunal that the contract was a composite contract. Secondly, the dominant purpose of the contract was for supply of rolling stocks and the cost towards service component was almost negligible. Thirdly, the word “assembly” must include the manufacture or assembly of rolling stock by BEML, being the consortium leader. Fourthly, the entire payment had been made in favour of BEML. Fifthly, the Revenue had not raised any objection with regard to payment of 90 per cent. of the project costs, so far as deduction u/s. 194J was concerned.

iii)    For these reasons the questions raised by the Revenue were not substantial questions for consideration. The tax and interest thereon levied u/s. 201(1A) were not valid.”

Charitable purpose — Exemption under section 11 — Effect of s13 — Transactions between trustee and related party — Diversion of income of charitable institution must be proven for application of s.13 — No evidence of diversion of funds — Exemption could not be denied to the charitable institution

75 CIT(Exemption) vs. Shri Ramdoot Prasad Sewa Samiti Trust

[2022] 450 ITR 288 (Raj)

A. Y.: 2012-13

Date of order: 8th December, 2022

Sections: 11 and 13 of ITA 1961

Charitable purpose — Exemption under section 11 — Effect of s13 — Transactions between trustee and related party — Diversion of income of charitable institution must be proven for application of s.13 — No evidence of diversion of funds — Exemption could not be denied to the charitable institution

The respondent-assessee is a trust registeredunder section 12AA of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The assessee had claimed exemption under section 11 of the Act for the A. Y. 2012-13. The AO noticed that the assessee had made total purchases of raw materials worth Rs. 12.24 crores (rounded off) out of which purchases of Rs. 9 crores were made from Pawansut Trading Company Pvt Ltd. Upon further scrutiny it was found that the one Kishorepuri Ji Maharaj was the main trustee of the assessee-trust and also the director of the said company and from whom purchases worth 75 per cent. were made. The AO was of the opinion that such substantial purchases made from a related party had to be at arm’s length. The AO thereupon referred to section 13 of the Act and without any further discussion concluded that the assessee-trust has made purchases on unreasonable rates from Pawansut Trading Pvt Ltd, New Delhi who is person specified under section 13(3). The AO held that the management of the trust has used the property of the trust for their personal benefits without justification which attracts the provisions of section 13(1)(c)(ii) r.w.s. 13(2)(g) of the Act as such the assessee is not eligible to claim exemption under sections 11 and 12 of the Act.

The Commissioner (Appeals) called for the remand report and thereafter deleted the disallowance by observing that the rates of purchase by the assessee from the related party were same as with unrelated party. Further, there were no findings in the assessment order on the basis of which additions were made except that purchases have been made from the related party. The appellant has also proved that such purchases were made at the same rate as paid to unrelated party. The Tribunal confirmed the view of the Commissioner (Appeals).

The Rajasthan High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue and held as under:

“i)    Clause (g) would be applicable in a case where any income or property of a trust or institution is diverted during the previous year in favour of any person referred to in sub-section (3). Sub-section (3) in turn relates to persons or institutions which are closely related such as the author of the trust or the founder of the institution, any trustee of the trust or manager of the institution etc. Clause (g) would apply where any income or property of the trust or institution is “diverted” during the previous year in favour of any person referred to in sub-section (3). The crux of this provision is diversion of income. Mere transaction of sale and purchase between two related persons would not be covered under the expression “diversion” of income. Diversion of income would arise when the transaction is not at arm’s length and the sale or purchase price is artificially inflated so as to cause undue advantage to other person and divert the income.

ii)    The assessee and P Ltd. were entities covered under sub-section (3) of section 13. However, the Assessing Officer never examined whether the transactions between the assessee and the company were at arm’s length. He merely referred to statutory provisions and without further discussion came to the conclusion that disallowance had to be made. The Commissioner (Appeals) not only criticised this approach of the Assessing Officer but also independently examined whether the transaction was at arm’s length. It was found that the rate paid to the related person was the same as paid to the unrelated party.

iii)    The Tribunal confirmed this view and correctly so. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law the Tribunal was correct in allowing exemption u/s. 11 of the Act, to the assessee.”

Capital or revenue receipt — Interest — Interest earned from fixed deposits of unutilised foreign external commercial borrowing loans during period of construction — Interest received was capital receipt

74 Principal CIT vs. Triumph Realty Pvt Ltd (No. 1)[2022] 450 ITR 271 (Del)

A. Y.: 2012-13

Date of order: 31st March, 2022

Capital or revenue receipt — Interest — Interest earned from fixed deposits of unutilised foreign external commercial borrowing loans during period of construction — Interest received was capital receipt

The assessee availed foreign external commercial borrowings of Rs. 82.37 crores for the purpose of acquisition of a capital asset, i. e., renovation and refurbishment of hotel acquired by the assessee under the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Securities Interest Act, 2002. The entire loan was disbursed in a single tranch in the A. Y. 2012-13 and during this year, the assessee could utilise only Rs. 33.70 crores. Therefore, the assessee had temporarily made fixed deposits of the external commercial borrowing funds till utilisation for fixed asset or capital expenditure. The assessee had paid interest of Rs. 13.38 crores on the borrowings and had earned interest of Rs. 4.03 crores on the fixed deposits. The net interest of Rs. 9.35 crores was added to the preoperative expenditure pending capitalization.

The Tribunal allowed the capitalisation of interest on fixed deposit receipts earned during the period of construction.

The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue and held as under:

“The Tribunal had not erred in allowing the capitalisation of interest on fixed deposits earned during the period of construction by the assessee. No question of law arose.”

Business expenditure — Deduction only on actual payment — Electricity duty — Assessee, a licensee following mercantile system of accounting — Merely an agency to collect electricity duty from consumers and to pay it to State Government — Provisions of section 43B not applicable

73 Principal CIT vs. Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd

[2022] 449 ITR 605 (P&H)

A. Y.: 2008-09

Date of order: 3rd August, 2022

Section: 43B of ITA 1961

Business expenditure — Deduction only on actual payment — Electricity duty — Assessee, a licensee following mercantile system of accounting — Merely an agency to collect electricity duty from consumers and to pay it to State Government — Provisions of section 43B not applicable

The assessee was a licensee under the Electricity Act, 2003 and distributed power in the State of Haryana. For the A. Y. 2008-09, the AO made a disallowance with respect to the electricity duty under section 43B of the 1961 Act.

The Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal deleted the disallowance.

On appeals by the Revenue, the Punjab & Haryana High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)    Under section 43B(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 a deduction otherwise allowable under the Act in respect of any sum payable by the assessee by way of tax, duty, cess or fee, by whatever name called, under any law for the time being in force, shall be allowed (irrespective of the previous year in which the liability to pay such sum was incurred by the assessee according to the method of accounting regularly employed by him) only in computing the income referred to in section 28 of the previous year in which such sum is actually paid by him. Section 43B contains a non obstante clause. It was inserted by Finance Act, 1983 with an intent to curb the malpractice at the hands of certain taxpayers, who claimed statutory liability as a deduction without discharging it and pleaded the mercantile system of accounting as a defence.

ii)    The liability to pay electricity duty lies on the consumer and it is to be paid to the State Government. Section 4 of the Punjab Electricity (Duty) Act, 1958 casts a duty on the licensee to collect the electricity duty from the consumers and to pay it to the State Government. The licensee is only a collecting agency.

iii)    The contention of the Department that section 43B of the 1961 Act would be attracted merely for the reason that the assessee followed the mercantile system of accounting was rejected. The Department was required to show that the electricity duty was payable by the assessee. There was no such provision contained in the 1958 Act which showed that the liability to pay the electricity duty was upon the assessee. Rather section 4 of the 1958 Act read with the provisions contained in the Punjab Electricity (Duty) Rules, 1958 made it clear that the assessee was merely an agency assigned with a statutory function to collect electricity duty from the consumers and to pay it to the State Government. Therefore, the provisions of section 43B of the 1961 Act would not be applicable to the assessee.”

Assessment — International transactions — Proceedings under section 144C mandatory — Draft assessment order proposing variations to returned income must be submitted to DRP — Order of remand — Order passed on remand must also be submitted to DRP — Failure to do so is an incurable defect

72 Principal CIT vs. Appollo Tyres Ltd

[2022] 449 ITR 398 (Ker)

A. Y.: 2009-10

Date of order: 23rd September, 2021

Section: 144C of ITA 1961

Assessment — International transactions — Proceedings under section 144C mandatory — Draft assessment order proposing variations to returned income must be submitted to DRP — Order of remand — Order passed on remand must also be submitted to DRP — Failure to do so is an incurable defect

For the A. Y. 2009-10, for determination of the arm’s length price of the assessee’s international transactions, a reference was made to the Transfer Pricing Officer under section 92CA of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The AO served on the assessee the draft assessment order under section 144C(1) of the Act. The assessee filed objections to the draft assessment order under section 144C of the Act upon which the Dispute Resolution Panel(DRP) issued directions to the AO. The AO passed a final assessment order against which the assessee appealed before the Tribunal. The Tribunal allowed the appeal in part and remitted the matter to the AO for fresh assessment on the issues referred to the AO. The AO thereupon passed a revised final assessment order under section 144C of the Act. The assessee filed an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) against the revised final assessment order who allowed the appeal in part. Against this order the Department filed an appeal to the Tribunal while the assessee filed cross objections questioning the legality and propriety of the revised final assessment order of the AO. The Tribunal dismissed the Department’s appeal and allowed the assessee’s cross objections.

The Kerala High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Department and held as under:

“i)    In cases to which section 92CA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is attracted, the assessment could be completed only by following the procedure u/s. 144C of the Act. At the first instance the Assessing Officer u/s. 144C(1) forwards a draft of the proposed order of assessment known as draft order to the assessee, in the event the Assessing Officer proposes a variation to the income return which is prejudicial to the assessee. The assessee u/s. 144C(2) has the option within 30 days to accept the variation or file objections to the proposed draft variation of the Assessing Officer. The issues at divergence being proposed variation and objections of the assessee are made over to the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP) u/s. 144C(15). The DRP follows the procedure stipulated by section 144C(5) to (12) and finally issues directions to the Assessing Officer. The directions of the DRP are binding on the Assessing Officer and the final assessment order is issued by the Assessing Officer in terms of the DRP directives. The Assessing Officer does not have jurisdiction to make a revised final assessment order without recourse to the DRP. The omission in redoing the procedure u/s. 144C is not a curable defect. Once there is a clear order of setting aside of an assessment order with the requirement of the Assessing Officer/Transfer Pricing Officer to undertake a fresh exercise of determining the arm’s length price, the failure to pass a draft assessment order, would violate section 144C(1) of the Act result. This is not a curable defect in terms of section 292B of the Act.

ii)    The requirement of redoing the same procedure upon remand to the Assessing Officer u/s. 144C is mandatory and omission in following the procedure is an incurable defect. Hence the order was not valid. The filing of appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) could not be treated as a waiver of an objection available to the assessee in this behalf u/s. 144C. Section 253(1)(d) provides for appeal only when order has been made u/s. 143(3) read with section 144C of the Act.

iii)    For the above reasons and the discussion the questions are answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.”

Article 4 of India – Singapore tax treaty – Tie Breaker in case of individual breaks in favor of Singapore since the assessee stayed in a rental house with his family in Singapore. The Indian house was rented and the assessee paid tax on Singapore income.

15 Sameer Malhotra vs. ACIT
[2023] 146 taxmann.com 158 (Delhi – Trib.)
[ITA No: 4040/Del/2019]
A.Y.: 2015-16
Date of order: 28th December, 2022

Article 4 of India – Singapore tax treaty – Tie Breaker in case of individual breaks in favor of Singapore since the assessee stayed in a rental house with his family in Singapore. The Indian house was rented and the assessee paid tax on Singapore income.

FACTS

The assessee received salary income from the Indian Company (ICO) for the period 1st April, 2014 to 25th November, 2014 and from Singapore Company (Sing Co) from 15th December, 2015 to 31st March, 2015. The assessee did not offer salary received from Sing Co to tax in India on the basis that under India-Singapore DTAA he was a resident of Singapore. The AO held that the assessee was a resident of India under Act as he was physically present in India for more than 182 days. Further, the assessee was an Indian resident even under the tie-breaker test of the DTAA. CIT(A) upheld the order of the AO. Being aggrieved, assessee appealed to Tribunal.
 

HELD

  • The assessee shifted with his family to Singapore, stayed there for the whole of the remaining period in the relevant assessment year and earned the income while serving in Singapore itself.

  • The assessee had an apartment on rent in Singapore, obtained a Singapore driving license, had overseas Bank Account, showed Singapore as his country of residence in various official forms and even paid taxes in Singapore while working from there.

  • With respect to tie-breaker test the Tribunal held that:

  • Permanent Home – The permanence of home can be determined on qualitative and quantitative basis. Although the assessee owned a home in India, it was not available to him as it was rented out by him.

  • Centre of Vital Interests Test: The CIT(A) held that the centre of vital interests of the asssessee was in India and not in Singapore, as the majority of the savings, investments and personal bank accounts are in India. However, the assessee worked in Singapore during the period under consideration and stayed there along with his family for the purpose of earning income. Thus, his personal and economic relations remained in Singapore only.

  • Habitual Abode: Habitual abode does not mean the place of permanent residence, but in fact it means the place where one normally resides. Since the assessee had an apartment on rent in Singapore and resided therein only, he had a habitual abode in Singapore.

  • Based on above, it was held that assessee was a tax resident of Singapore. Accordingly, as per Article 15(1) of the India-Singapore DTAA, which states that remuneration derived by a resident of a contracting state in respect of an employment shall be taxable only in that State unless the employment is exercised in the other contracting state, the assessee’s income earned in Singapore was held to be non-taxable in India.

Article 5 of India-Switzerland DTAA – Liaison Office (LO) does not constitute PE as long as it is adhering to the approval conditions imposed by RBI

14 S.R Technics Switzerland Ltd vs. ACIT (International Taxation)

[ITA No: 6616/Mum/2018]

A.Y.: 2015-16

Date of order: 25th November, 2022

Article 5 of India-Switzerland DTAA – Liaison Office (LO) does not constitute PE as long as it is adhering to the approval conditions imposed by RBI

FACTS

Assessee, a Swiss Company was engaged in the maintenance, repair and overhaul for aircrafts, engines and components. It had a subsidiary company in Switzerland (Swiss Sub Co). Swiss Sub Co had set up a LO in India. The AO alleged that the said LO constituted the PE of the assessee in India. The assessee appealed to the DRP. The DRP upheld the order of the AO. Being aggrieved, the assessee appealed to the Tribunal.

HELD

Tribunal took note of following factual aspects:

  • Employees of the LO do not negotiate, finalize or discuss contractual aspects including pricing with the assessee’s customers.
  • Employees of LO are acting as a communication link between the assessee and customers.
  • The LO did not carry any activity, beyond that permitted by the RBI
  • LO did not have any infrastructure, facilities or stock of goods to carry out maintenance activities or render services.
  • Staff was not of seniority who can negotiate with the customers, sign and finalize the contracts
  • Activities carried by LO are preparatory and auxiliary in nature. RBI accepted the functioning of the LO indicating that the LO could not carry on any business or trading activity.

When the AO had himself observed that the undisclosed income surrendered by the assessee, during survey, was nothing but the accumulation of the profit which it had been systematically enjoying, then, drawing of a view to the contrary and holding the same as not being sourced out of latter’s business but having been sourced from its income from undisclosed sources within the meaning of Section 69 of the Act is beyond comprehension.

56 Kulkarni & Sahu Buildcon Pvt Ltd vs. DCIT

TS-969-ITAT-2022 (Rajkot)

A.Y.: 2012-13     

Date of Order: 12th December, 2022

Section: 69

When the AO had himself observed that the undisclosed income surrendered by the assessee, during survey, was nothing but the accumulation of the profit which it had been systematically enjoying, then, drawing of a view to the contrary and holding the same as not being sourced out of latter’s business but having been sourced from its income from undisclosed sources within the meaning of Section 69 of the Act is beyond comprehension.

FACTS

The assessee company, engaged in the business of civil construction, e-filed its return of income declaring an income of Rs. 1,32,56,660. In the course of assessment proceedings the assessee was asked to explain the excess WIP of Rs. 30,71,500 as also excess stock of building material which included shuttering material of Rs. 24,60,000 unearthed by the survey team in the course of survey proceedings conducted on 2nd November 2011.

The assessee had surrendered, in the course of survey proceedings, the sum of Rs. 55,31,500 which sum was credited to its Trading Account. The (AO contended that the same was not separately offered in computation of income. The AO was of the view that as the excess stock or unexplained investment or cash surrendered during the course of survey operations was nothing but the accumulation of the profits of the assessee, which it had been systematically enjoying, and hence on being detected was surrendered in the course of survey operation as undisclosed income, thus, the same was liable to be assessed as the assessee’s undisclosed income against which no deduction for any expenditure would be allowable.

The AO excluded the amount of the undisclosed income surrendered by the assessee from its declared net profit and brought the same to tax separately as its income under the head “business income” under section 69 of the Act. The claim of depreciation on shuttering material was also denied by the AO.

Aggrieved, assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) which was dismissed.

Aggrieved, assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD

The Tribunal observed that the AO while framing the assessment had categorically observed that the excess stock or unexplained investment or cash surrendered during the course of survey operation was nothing but the accumulation of the profit which the assessee had been systematically enjoying and was detected during the survey action and surrendered as its undisclosed income. The Tribunal held that the aforesaid observation of the AO in a way relates the amount surrendered by the assessee during the course of survey operation to the accumulated profit which the assessee had been systematically enjoying and thus, by no means could solely be related to the year under consideration.

The Tribunal was of the view that the aforesaid observation of the AO finds support from the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Anantharam Veerasingaiah & Co. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax [(1980) 123 ITR 457 (SC)] wherein it was observed by the Supreme Court that secret profits or undisclosed income of an assessee earned in an earlier assessment year may constitute a fund, even though concealed, from which the assessee may draw subsequently for meeting expenditure or introducing amounts in his account books.

The Tribunal observed that it is unable to comprehend that when the AO had himself observed that the excess stock or undisclosed investment or cash surrendered during the course of survey operation was nothing but the accumulation of profits which the assessee had been systematically enjoying and the difference was detected during the course of survey operation, therefore, on what basis a contrary view was taken by him to justify the treating of the same as the investment made by the assessee from its unexplained sources.

The Tribunal held that that the undisclosed income of Rs. 55,31,500 surrendered by the assessee during the course of survey operation had rightly been offered to tax by the assessee under the head “business income”, and in light of the clearly established source of the corresponding investment the same could not have been held to be the deemed income of the assessee under section 69 of the Act. Our aforesaid conviction is all the more fortified by the order of the Tribunal in the case of M/s Shree Sita Udyog vs. DCIT & Ors, Bhilai in ITA No. 249 to 255/RPR/2017, dated 22nd July, 2022 wherein, involving identical facts, it was observed by the Tribunal that the amount surrendered by the assessee qua the investment in the excess stock was liable to be taxed under the head “business income” and not under the head “income from other sources.”

Authorities directed to correct the demand raised due to deposit of TDS by the assessee vide a wrong challan.

55 WorldQuant Research (India) Pvt Ltd vs.
CIT, National Faceless Appeal Centre
TS-963-ITAT-2022 (Mumbai)
A.Y.: 2021-22
Date of Order: 13th December, 2022

Authorities directed to correct the demand raised due to deposit of TDS by the assessee vide a wrong challan.

FACTS

Aggrieved by the demand, the assessee raised on account of short payment of TDS under section 195 of the Act due to error in depositing TDS under wrong challan.

During the year under consideration, the assessee paid a dividend to a non-resident shareholder and deducted tax under section 195 of the Act. However, while depositing the amount of TDS, the assessee deposited the taxes vide challan no. 280 which is applicable for payment of advance tax, self-assessment tax, tax on regular assessment, tax on distributed income to unit holders, etc. The assessee ought to have correctly deposited the taxes vide challan no. 281 which is applicable for taxes deducted at source. The relevant TDS return was filed by the assessee on 31st March, 2021.

Upon noticing the error of having deposited the amount of TDS vide an incorrect challan the assessee filed a letter with DCIT-15(3)(1) as well as with DCIT-TDS (OSD) requesting to consider the deposit of taxes on dividend under challan no. 281 though erroneously deposited vide challan no. 280. However, vide Intimation dated 5th April, 2021 issued under section 200A/206CB for Q2 a demand of Rs. 2,95,78,630 was raised on account of short payment of taxes.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who after taking note of the letters filed by the assessee held that the assessee has simply requested both the AO (including TDS) to treat the tax paid through challan No. 280 as tax paid as TDS, however, has not made any formal request for correction of challan from 280 to 281 with the AO (TDS). He further held that the AO (TDS) only after receipt of a formal request for change/correction in challan No. from 280 to 281, can act within the time limit prescribed as per the notification. The CIT(A) dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where during the course of the hearing, on behalf of the assessee, the Tribunal’s attention was drawn to a letter dated 12th August, 2022 filed before DCIT–TDS [OSD TDS Circle 2(3)] praying for correction of challan. In the said letter reference has also been made to an e-mail dated 12th April, 2021, to DCIT TDS praying for rectification of challan.

HELD
During the course of the hearing, upon the direction of the Tribunal to the Revenue to update the Tribunal about the status of the applications filed by the assessee, the DR filed an e-mail informing the Bench that the DCIT-TDS(OSD) has escalated the issue to CPC-TDS.

The Tribunal held that the assessee has pursued this matter with the concerned authorities and not only requested to consider the deposit of taxes on dividends by the company but has also prayed for correction of the challan from challan No. 280 to challan No. 281. It observed that from the copy of the e-mail dated 6th December, 2022, filed by the learned DR, the Tribunal found that the office of DCIT (OSD) TDS has escalated the issue to CPC – TDS for either necessitating the required changes in the challan from the backend or enabling the system to allow the TDS–AO to do the same from his login at TRACES AO – Portal.

Therefore, the Tribunal directed the concerned authority to make every possible endeavour of carrying out the necessary correction in the challan within a period of 2 months from the date of receipt of this order and grant the relief to the assessee as per law.

Theatre owner is not liable to deduct tax at source on convenience fee charged by BookMyShow to the end customer and retained by it.

54 Srinivas Rudrappa. vs. ITO

TS-1026-ITAT-2022 (Bang.-Trib.)

A.Y.: 2013-14 & 2014-15

Date of Order: 2nd December, 2022

Section: 194H, 201, 201(1A)

Theatre owner is not liable to deduct tax at source on convenience fee charged by BookMyShow to the end customer and retained by it.

FACTS

The assessee, a proprietor of a theatre, was engaged in the business of exhibition of films. A survey under section 133A was conducted in the business premises of M/s Bigtree engaged in providing services through their online platform BookMyShow, facilitating booking of cinema tickets by providing an online ticketing platform for customers and sale of cinema tickets, food and beverages coupons, and events through its website www.bookmyshow.com.

In the case of cinema owners, when the end customers booked cinema tickets through the BookMyShow portal and made the payment to Bigtree, the payment was raised towards ticket cost along with convenience fees that were charged over and above the ticket charges. The ticket cost was remitted by Bigtree to the cinema owners after deducting TDS while it retained the convenience fee which constituted revenue in the hands of Bigtree.

The AO was of the opinion that the convenience fee retained by Bigtree was in lieu of commission/service charges payable by the cinema owner (assessee) and amounts to constructive payment made by the cinema owner (assessee) to Bigtree. The AO was of the opinion that the tax should be deducted at source under section 194H of the Act. He issued a show cause to the assessee, asking why the assessee should not be treated as `assessee-in-default’ as per provisions of sections 201 and 201(1A) of the Act.

In response, the assessee submitted that it is not availing services of Bigtree for sale of online cinema tickets, but has permitted Bigtree to list assessee’s cinema tickets on the Bigtree platform. The assessee also submitted that, the relationship between the assessee and Bigtree is of principal-to-principal, and, therefore, the conditions laid down in section 194H do not stand satisfied.

The AO held that the assessee was liable to deduct tax at source on the amount of convenience fee retained by Bigtree. He rejected the contention that the assessee is giving permission to Bigtree to list assessee’ cinemas tickets on the Bigtree’s platform and is not availing services from Bigtree for booking the tickets.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal interalia on merits.

HELD

The Tribunal went through the agreement and observed that Bigtree was facilitating the end customer for booking cinema tickets for which a transaction/convenience fee was charged from him. Further, as Bigtree was making a payment to the assessee after deducting the transaction/convenience fee and there was no occasion for the assessee to deduct tax at source and also that Bigtree was acting on behalf of the end customer and not the assessee. The Tribunal noted that in the present case, no expenditure is claimed by the assessee in respect of any payments alleged to be in the nature of commission / service fee.

The Tribunal also noted that there was no non-compete clause wherein a complete/partial control of Bigtree by the assessee could be established. Bigtree on its online platform sells tickets of other / many theatre owners apart from the assessee. For example if the theatre has a total 200 seats, if in the event no tickets are sold by the Bigtree, there is no penalty that is levied on Bigtree. It is totally the discretion of the customers to use Bigtree for booking the tickets. The agreement of the assessee with Bigtree is a non-exclusive agreement for selling cinema tickets of the assessee through its platform. The only income earned by the Bigtree is the convenience fee that it collects from the customers/movie viewers. Even there are no discount given by the assessee to the Bigtree on account of the tickets purchased by the customer from their platform.

The Tribunal held that the transaction/service fee collected by Bigtree from the end customers was actually the margin charged from the end customers for provision of such services. Also, the fact that the end customer paid service tax on such additional/convenience fee and no service tax was charged on the ticket charges. This, according to the Tribunal, established that the assessee did not cast any obligation on Bigtree to sell tickets on its platform.

The Tribunal was of the opinion that one aspect which needs to be considered is the situation where tickets are liable to be refunded. The Tribunal raised a question that if the theatre owner was not able to start/play the movie who would be liable to refund the ticket price – Bigtree or the theatre owner? This issue needs to be ascertained and risk analysed.

The Tribunal directed the AO to carry out the necessary verification and consider the claim of the assessee in accordance with law.

Other Information – Auditor’s Responsibility beyond Financial Statements

INTRODUCTION

As we have evidenced over the years, information included in the Annual Reports of the companies is increasing year after year. Such information is used by users of financial statements for their analysis and decision-making. Therefore, the “Other Information” is a fundamental part of the Annual Report. Such “Other Information” may have also been used as a part of the audit work such as evaluation of going concern assumption, various transactions reported in CARO related to loans, etc. For example, CARO requires auditors to report on loans granted by the company. Such information shall also form a part of the Board’s report which is Other Information included in the Annual Report. Similarly, there could be legal or regulatory matters discussed in Other Information which may be part of key audit matters in the auditor’s report.

The audit report includes a section titled “Other Information”. This section describes the management’s and auditor’s responsibilities relating to Other Information and the outcome of the audit procedures carried out on such Other Information. Standard on Auditing (SA) 720 (Revised)The Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to Other Information describes the reporting responsibilities on such Other Information by the auditor in his / her audit report. This aims to enhance the credibility of financial statements.

This article discusses certain specifics about reporting by the auditor on such Other Information.

Other Information section in an audit report

In this section, the auditor states:

–    Management’s responsibility of Other Information

–    Identified Other Information received prior to the audit report date and for a listed entity, expected to be received thereafter

–    That the audit opinion does not cover Other Information

–    Auditor’s responsibility for Other Information

–    If information is received prior to the audit report date, whether the auditor has identified any material misstatement of Other Information to report

APPLICABILITY TO PRIVATE COMPANIES AND NON-CORPORATE ENTITIES

The audit report on financial statements of private companies or unlisted companies also needs to include a section titled “Other Information” if any such information is received by the date of the audit report. Further details regarding the distinction between listed and unlisted entities are discussed in the below paragraphs.

In the case of unlisted non-corporate entities, auditors would not be in a position to report on Other Information because many a times such entities do not prepare annual reports whereas, by definition, Other information refers to information included in an entity’s annual report. Therefore, SA 720 (Revised) requires reporting on Other Information in the case of unlisted corporate entities only.

ELEMENTS OF OTHER INFORMATION

Other Information is a defined term in SA 720 (Revised). It is defined as “Financial or non-financial information (other than financial statements and the auditor’s report thereon) included in an entity’s annual report.” The SA further explains that the Annual Report may be referred to as such or may be referred to by any other name. The legal environment or custom may require the entity to report to owners, the information on the entity’s operations and financial statements. Such a report is considered as an Annual Report which may be a single document or a set of documents. Usually, the Annual Report contains a Management Report, Chairman’s statement , Corporate Governance Report, etc. All of this information are elements of Other Information.

Such Other Information may contain various aspects related to the entity and its operations. For example, it may contain information about the company, Chairman’s statement may include business- related relationships and specifics related to contracts entered into with key suppliers or customers, segment-wise performance of the company, market presence of the company, what are the risks that the company is expected to face, what opportunities it foresees in the market in the future year, information about human resources, sustainability disclosures and report thereon, new products the company plans to launch, so on and so forth. Over the years, the volume of such information is increasing. Such information may be in quantitative form or narrative form. All this information is other than the financial statements and is part of Other Information.

However, if there are any reports published outside the Annual Report to meet the needs of a specific group of users, such reports usually will not meet the definition of Other Information such as Diversity Report, various reports filed with government agencies and Registrar of Companies, etc. If any of such reports are included in the Annual Report itself, then those will meet the definition of Other Information and will be scoped in SA 720 (Revised).

OBTAINING OTHER INFORMATION

Before reporting, the auditor should discuss with the management which documents comprise annual report. Based on such discussion, the auditor should make arrangements with the management to obtain such information in a timely manner and before the date of the audit report, if possible. Such documents should be the final version of the information going to be included in the Annual Report. This can be done by appropriately wording the audit engagement letter. The Audit Committee and Board of Directors should be requested to review the Other Information.

IDENTIFICATION OF OTHER INFORMATION IN THE AUDIT REPORT THAT IS SCOPED AS PART OF THE AUDIT

The audit report identifies Other Information so that the reader can understand what has been scoped by the auditor as Other Information. Usually, the audit report includes a sentence for such identification as “The other information comprises the information included in the Company’s annual report, but does not include the standalone financial statements and our auditor’s report thereon.” However, SA 720 (Revised) clarifies that it does not apply to preliminary announcements of financial information or securities offering documents, including prospectuses.

AUDITOR’S RESPONSIBILITY FOR OTHER INFORMATION

The auditor is not required to “audit” the Other Information. He auditor is required to only read Other Information to consider whether there is a material inconsistency between the Other Information and the financial statements. This ensures that the credibility of the audited financial statements is not undermined by material inconsistencies between the audited financial statements and Other Information. The auditor’s procedures would include:

–    Reading the Other Information to ensure consistency with financial statements and information obtained as part of the audit

–    Comparing the Other Information or ratios with the financial statements and auditor’s understanding of the entity

–    Checking clerical accuracy with the data presented in the financial statements

–    Obtaining a reconciliation with the information included in the financial statements, if required. For example, the Other Information may include revenues for specific key products whereas financial statements shall include the total revenue of the entity. The product-wise revenue should reconcile with total revenue in the financial statements by excluding the revenue related to the products that are not included in Other Information. Another example could be the bonuses paid to the key management team of the entity, which are included in the statement of profit and loss along with salaries and bonuses of all the employees in the entity.

If there is a material inconsistency, it may indicate that either there is a material misstatement in the financial statements or in the Other Information. Either of such a situation undermines the credibility of financial statements and the auditor’s report thereon. In such cases, economic decisions of the users of the financial statements will be affected.

Upon reading of Other Information for the purpose of identifying any material inconsistencies, if the auditor becomes aware of any apparent material misstatement of fact, the auditor should discuss the matter with the management.

The auditor is not required to “identify” and settle material inconsistencies or material misstatements of fact in Other Information. However, he auditor may become aware that such Other Information includes material inconsistency or material misstatement. In such cases, the auditor should not be allowing the audited financial statements to be included in the document that contains such materially false or misleading Other Information or material omission of fact. The auditor should discuss the matter with the management and request the management to rectify the inconsistency in Other Information or not to include such information as part of the Annual Report in which financial statements are being included.

DATE OF THE AUDIT REPORT AND ANNUAL REPORT MAY BE DIFFERENT

The auditor should agree with the management on the timing of availability of the final version of the information that will be included in the Annual Report, so that he / she can discharge the responsibility towards it as casted by SA 720 (Revised). Such information should be in the near final draft stage and written representation to this effect should be obtained from the management.

Other Information obtained till the date of the audit report

The auditor is required to report on the Other Information obtained until the date of the audit report. If the auditor expects to receive such information after the audit report date, then the auditor is required to state so in the audit report in he case of a listed entity. In the case of an unlisted entity, though it is not mandated in SA 720 (Revised), it states that the auditor may consider it appropriate to do so. It provides an example of a situation when management is able to represent to the auditor that such Other Information will be issued after the date of the auditor’s report.

No Other Information was obtained till the date of the audit report

Even if no Other Information is obtained till the date of the audit report, the auditor is required to state such a fact in the audit report of a listed entity. In the case of an unlisted entity, if no Other Information is available to the auditor at the date of the audit report, he auditor is not required to report anything on the “Other Information” through the auditor’s report. Thus, even if reporting on Other Information is applicable for unlisted entities, such reporting is triggered only if part or all of such Other Information is obtained before the date of the audit report. Other Information obtained after the date of the audit report is discussed below.

Other Information obtained after the date of the audit report

When all or part of Other Information is made available to the auditor after the date of his audit report, in case of both listed and unlisted entities, auditor’s responsibility under SA 720 (Revised) continues i.e., the auditor needs to read such other information to ensure that it does not contain any material misstatement. In such cases, the auditor should obtain written representation from the management that such Other Information will be provided to the auditor before it is issued so that the he can fulfill his duties.

STATUTORY REPORTS AND OTHER INFORMATION

The Annual Report contains certain reports required to be included as per law, for example, Board’s Report. All such statutory reports which are required to be included in the Annual Report are elements of “Other Information”.

The Annual Report may contain certain information that the entity provides voluntarily. Such information also forms part of “Other Information” within the scope of SA 720 (Revised).

THE SUMMARY REPORT INCLUDED IN ANNUAL REPORT AND A DETAILED REPORT IS PLACED OUTSIDE

There may be situations where a summary of the report is included in the Annual Report giving reference to the detailed report placed outside such as on the website, etc. For example, entities may prepare a Business Responsibility and Sustainability Report in detail but provide only the summary in its Annual Report and give a link to the detailed report.

If such a detailed report is required to be part of the Annual Report, it is considered as part of “Other Information” irrespective of its placement. However, in other cases, a mere reference to such a report will not bring it in the scope of “Other Information”.

INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN INFORMATION ON THE WEBSITE AND INFORMATION OBTAINED AS PART OF THE AUDIT

SA 720 (Revised) clarifies that when other information is only made available to users via the entity’s website, the version of the other information obtained from the entity, rather than directly from the entity’s website, is the relevant document for the auditor under the SA.

EXAMPLES OF MATERIAL MISSTATEMENTS OF FACTS IN OTHER INFORMATION

As part of his audit work, the auditor receives a plethora of information regarding the entity, its environment, its operations and products, etc. Some of the examples where Other Information contains material misstatements of facts could be:

–    As part of the impairment analysis, the auditor has been provided with future cash flow projections for value-in-use calculation made by the management. But Management Discussion and Analysis included in Annual Report gives materially different projections about its future years.

–    Corporate Governance Report in the Annual Report includes reference to whistle-blower complaints received during the year. However, the auditor was not provided any information on such events during the audit process.

Similarly, when the audit opinion is modified, i.e., the financial statements contain or may possibly contain material misstatement, the Other Information included in the Annual Report would also carry such material misstatement. In such situations, the Other Information section in the audit report shall also include auditor’s remarks about material misstatements in Other Information.

CONCLUSION

Unlike other auditing standards which focus on the audit of financial statements, SA 720 (Revised) discusses the auditor’s responsibility for the information that is outside financial statements. Therefore, the auditor needs to ensure that such information is appropriately identified in the audit report and the auditor has discharged his / her duty in respect of such Other Information along with the audit of financial statements. The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India has also issued an implementation guide on SA 720(Revised). It deals with various aspects and possible situations that the auditor may face while reporting on Other Information.

Guidance for Executing Audit of Small and Medium Enterprises by Small and Medium Practitioners

INTRODUCTION

Auditing is a process of reviewing the financial transactions of the entity, verifying records for the transactions which are material, assessing the risks of material misstatements based on the overall samples selected and then giving an assurance to the readers of the audited financial statements that they reflect the true and fair view of the affairs of the entity.

The process of auditing requires going through various types of documents like payment vouchers, purchase invoices, sales invoices, expenses invoices, receipt records, bank statements, contracts and agreements entered into by the entity which has a bearing on the financial results, filings for regulatory compliances, assessments/demands under various statutes, maintenance of records as per various regulations, etc.

Challenge lies in documenting the audit process for SME entities. The primary reason for this challenge is that the organisational structure is lean and majority of the decisions are centralised with a few persons managing the business. Sometimes, decisions are taken off the cuff during informal meetings and there may be no official documents for the process followed for decision making. Further, there may be explanations provided which may be genuine and convincing, however they would not be recorded in any form. The auditors of these SME entities are also Small and Medium Practitioners (SMPs) who may not have professional staff with adequate exposure to elaborate documentation and process flow experience.

It is with this background that this article has been conceived to provide some insights on the importance of documenting the audit work carried out during the year and thereby ensuring that the auditor is not caught on the wrong foot during any scrutiny of the audit either due to some wrongdoing by the auditee or during the random selection by the peer reviewer.

It is rightly said “What is not documented is not audited”

PROCESS OF COLLATING AUDIT EVIDENCE

One should understand the different types of audit evidences which can be used. The evidence collection methodology will vary depending upon the purpose for which it is sought. However, here are some of the most commonly used forms of evidence.

1. Physical Verification

This entails confirming the existence of assets and/or their condition. This type of examination is the major source to obtain audit evidence on fixed assets and inventory.

Auditor should ensure to carry out physical verification of fixed assets as well as inventory on test check basis and keep the working sheets of such physical verification countersigned by the personnel of the auditee.

It must also be ensured to take all the working sheets of the physical verification carried out by the personnel of the auditee and have a reconciliation of the same with the accounting records as part of the audit working papers.

2. Confirmations

Whenever there are balances of vendors, customers and banks whose correctness has to be established by the auditors in the financial statements, the auditor should place reliance on confirmations from such third parties.

It is always possible that all the balances for which confirmations are called for may not be matching with the balances in the auditee’s books of accounts. In such cases, the auditor should ensure to obtain reconciliation and be satisfied with the reasons for the reconciliation and document the same.

3. Documentary evidence

There may be transactions in current times which are negotiated over emails. Further, there may be the authorisation of the transactions on the documents moving between the parties. In such cases, the auditor should ensure to vouch and trace parts of the documents to take comfort in the genuineness of the transactions for the auditing procedure.

4. Analytical procedures

At the macro level to verify the true and fair representation of financial statements, auditors usually use these procedures by performing their own calculations.

An example can be relating to working out material consumption. Here auditor may compare the prices of the material consumed against the average price of such material throughout the year which may be available from the public domain. This will provide comfort that there is no inflated consumption.

For quantitative consumption, inquire about the quantum of materials which are required for the sale of different items manufactured or if the entity maintains a Bill of Material then obtain the same. Extrapolate the total consumption of various materials which are required for producing the items sold or in inventory. Compare the same against the consumption of various materials as per the financial records in quantity. If the variation is not material then the auditor can take comfort in the consumption-related financial data.

This process of analytical procedures can be applied using various ratios and formulas for working out variances and then seeking explanations from the management for such variances.

The entire process as well as findings should be well documented as part of audit documentation.

5. Oral evidence

Normally at the commencement of the audit, auditors will typically interrogate company executives regarding business operations and also from their past audit experience design the auditing procedures to be performed and the extent of checking to be carried out in various areas of audit.

6. Accounting Systems

This typically serves as a source of auditing evidence. It allows the auditor to access financial reporting documents and anything interconnected with financial statements.

Audit staff should be trained to document the internal flow of documents within the accounting system and their authorisations before it gets finally recorded in the accounting system. There should be a record of the selection of the entries which have been checked from various registers or ledgers in the accounting system. They should also record the selection criteria and the materiality considered for selection based on the size and nature of transactions audited.

7. Re-performance

For the purpose of testing internal controls in financial reporting, the auditor should walk through a limited number of transactions in each category of the business cycle getting recorded in the financial statements. This will enable them to test the controls which have been set by the entity and also identify shortcomings in key internal control processes.

This will act as additional support in carrying out an audit through sampling basis considering the level of controls in operation and the comfort which can be derived by the auditors based on their walk-through.

8. Observational Evidence

When there are fewer layers of operational personnel in SME entities, auditors would have to rely on observational skills too. They should take notes of how the entity processes some of its work. They should specifically observe how the entity goes about handling operations, policies, and protocols to find weaknesses.

This will enable the auditor to understand the business of the entity as well as structure its audit plan in a better manner.

BENEFITS AND NATURE OF DOCUMENTATION

Documentation will ensure better planning and make effective supervision and review possible. It results in clarity of thoughts and expressions and evidence of work performed and compliance with Standards.

Here are some extracts reproduced from ICAI’s Peer Review Manual 2020, which can serve as a guiding light for SMP’s documentation compliance –

Audit documentation is very important in the areas of quality control of the audit. Audit documentation should be prepared in such a manner that other auditor who is not involved with the audit engagement previously can understand the work that he performs when he reviews the documents.

The general guidelines which can be adopted by the audit firm for the preparation of working papers are:

a) Clarity and Understanding

b) Completeness and Accuracy

c) Pertinence

d) Logical Arrangement

e) Legibility and Neatness

f) Safe and retrievable

g) Initial and Date

h) Summary of conclusions

WHAT INFORMATION MUST DOCUMENTS PROVIDE?

The following is the key information that should be a part of the audit documentation:

(a) The nature, timing and extent of the audit procedures performed to comply with the SAs and applicable legal and regulatory requirements.

(b) The evidence that the auditor obtains, the procedures that they use for testing and the result of testing should be properly and clearly documented in the audit working papers. This is to ensure that the reviewer could easily perform the quality review and to prove that the relevant Standards are implemented.

(c) The auditor should clearly document significant matters related to financial statements, their ethics, as well as their process, during the audit.

(d) Testing or sampling requires auditors’ use of their professional judgment and it is important to document these judgments.

Further, the ICAI has issued SA 230 – “Audit Documentation” which should be read in conjunction with other Standards on Auditing (SAs) having a bearing on documentation.

There is guidance for the maintenance of the Permanent Audit File and Current Audit File. This article addresses the process of audit documentation for SME clients by SMPs.

PERMANENT AUDIT FILE

A permanent audit file contains those documents, the use of which is not restricted to one time period and extends to subsequent audits also, e.g. Engagement letter, Communication with the previous auditor, Memorandum of Association, Articles of Association, Organization structure, List of directors/partners/trustees/bankers/lawyers, etc.

During each year’s audit, there may be some developments which shall have bearing or reference for more than one time period in the future. Accordingly, it should be ensured to update the permanent file with such further documentation. Examples of such changes which would need updating permanent file are changes in Articles of Association, Joint Venture agreement, long term supply contract, change in KMPs/directors, etc.

The following table illustrates the contents of a permanent file:

Title Information
Contained
Engagement
  • Letter of Engagement
  • Correspondence with the retiring auditor
    (NOC)
Constitution
  • Copies of Memorandum and Articles of
    Association in case of corporate entities or
  • Partnership agreement in case of
    partnership firm or
  • Act, Regulation, byelaws, trust deeds, as
    applicable under which the entity functions
Background
and Organisation Structure
  • Nature and history of the business
  • Profile of ownership
  • Registered office details
  • Management structure
    including organisation chart
  • Industry specification with reference to client’s size, economic
    factors affecting the industry, seasonal fluctuations and demands
Background
and Organisation Structure
  • Facility locations, plant capacity, owned
    or leased, age, capital expenditure budget, etc. Products specifying diverse
    ranges along with classification
  • Purchase volumes, main suppliers, policies
  • Inventory norms, inventory levels during the last five years and
    related ratios.
  • Sales volumes including exports, main customers, methods of
    distribution, pricing policies, credit policy
  • Personnel showing numbers, analyses by departments or function,
    method of remuneration, contracts, union agreements, HR policy
  • Copy of audited financial statement for the previous five years,
    if it exists.
  • Study and evaluation of internal controls
  • Significant audit observations of past
  • Statistical information showing 5 years comparison of performance
    indicators (major accounting ratios) Industry Statistics.
Systems
(for larger Audits, this section could be held on a separate file)
  • Details of methods of accounting including cost accounting, flow
    charts, specimens of accounting documents, code structure and list of
    accounting records
  • EDP-systems security, source code security, authorisation and
    backup policy
Contracts,
agreements, Minutes
  • Leases agreements photocopies/ extracts of the same
  • Title deeds inspected annually by an auditor
  • Royalty agreements
  • Minutes of continuing importance such as Directors’ meetings,
    Members’ meeting
Group
  • Group structure – subsidiaries, associates
  • Joint venture
  • Names of auditors
Other
professional advisor’s list
  • Bankers
  • Solicitors
  • Investment Analysts
  • Registrars
  • Credit Rating Agency
Miscellaneous
  • Details of other client information of a permanent nature

CURRENT AUDIT FILE

A current audit file contains those documents relevant to that time period of audit. The Current Audit File comprises of one or more files, in physical or electronic form, meaningfully arranged containing the records that comprise the audit documentation for a specific engagement.

The auditor should ensure that the file is providing evidence that the engagement was carried out in accordance with the basic principles mentioned in SA 200- Overall Objectives of the Independent Auditor and the Conduct of an Audit in Accordance with Standards on Auditing.

The following table illustrates the contents of an audit file:

Title Information
Contained
Engagement
  • Acceptance of annual reappointment
Accounts
  • Copy of draft financial statement
  • Copy of final signed financial statement
Reports
and Final Papers
  • Copies of all draft and final reports issued to the client
  • Correspondence with other auditors and experts
  • Comments received from client and letter of  representation
  • Observations on accounts and points carried forward to next year
  • Final journal entries
  • Company accounts checklist – directors’ report
  • Audit completion report
Audit
Plan
  • Planning programme
  • Time and cost summary
  • Briefing notes
  • Copy of planning letter to client
  • Points carried forward from the previous year
Balance
sheet, statement of profit and loss account and cash flow statement audit –
systems testing
  • Lead schedules/ Notes
  • Audit programmes
  • Detailed working papers and conclusions
  • Company accounts and Accounting Standards, if any, checklists
  • Queries raised and explanations received
  • Third-party confirmations and certificates
  • Weaknesses identified and a copy of the letter of  weaknesses sent to the client
Accounts
preparation
  • Schedules/ Notes
  • Trial balance
  • Cross-reference to audit work performed
Audit
Programme
  • Audit procedure (compliance and substantive)
  • Detailed working papers and conclusions
  • Queries raised and explanations received
Extracts
from minutes relating to accounting
  • Directors’ meetings
  • Members’ meetings
  • Audit committee meetings
  • Investment and other Board committee meetings
Statistical
information
  • Performance indicators collected which have a bearing on the
  • extent, nature, and timing of substantive tests

ASSEMBLY OF AUDIT FILE

The audit firm shall have adequate policies and procedures to ensure compliance with SA 230 in respect of the assembly of files. The final audit file is required to be assembled within 60 days after the date of the Auditor’s Report. However, after the assembly of the file, no document should be added or deleted subject to exceptional circumstances wherein the auditor shall mention the specific reasons for making them and when and by whom they were made and reviewed.

GENERAL EXAMPLES OF DOCUMENTS TO BE MAINTAINED

Some of the examples of documents which shall be maintained by an audit firm for an audit engagement are as follows:

Miscellaneous
– Others
1  Audit engagement letter (with reference to
SA 210)
2  Opening and closing trial  balance
3 Last year’s signed financial
statement
4 List of various
registrations obtained under other laws
5 List of Branches
Direct Tax
Reporting
6 Copy of computation of
income of last year
7 Summary
of disallowances to be made and allowances as per section 43b of I T Act
8 Deferred
tax working
9 Form 26AS
10 Advance tax payment challans
Indirect Tax
Reporting
11 Applicability of GST
12 Applicability of Customs
13 Respective returns copy
14 Respective challans copy
15 Respective
order status, if any
16 Reconciliation
statement of turnover declared and booked, wherever required
 Company Law
17  Shareholding pattern
18  List of Directors
19  List of KMP
20  Register extracts of transactions with
related parties
21 Minutes
of meetings
Compliance Under
Allied Laws
22 PF
payment challans and returns copy, if any
23 Profession
tax payment challans  and returns copy,
if any
24 ESIC
payment challans and returns copy, if any
25 LWF     payment challans and returns copy, if
any
26 SEBI
compliances

CONCLUSION

The basic aim of this article is to drive through the importance of documenting the findings throughout the journey of the audit. It also strives to provide an insight into the different ways in which comfort can be drawn by the auditor to arrive at the conclusion of the financial statements to be true and fair. These processes and documentation will also act as safeguards against any regulatory proceedings and protect the auditor from adversities of fines and penal consequences. This exercise also acts as a reference check of the process followed during the audit as well it acts as a lighthouse for the audits of the future years. All in all it increases the efficiencies in the audit process and enables the audit firm to scale up the audit quality maturity model.

Conundrum on Section 45(4) – Pre- and Post-SC Ruling in the case of Mansukh Dyeing

BACKGROUND

The general concept of a partnership, firmly established by law, is that a firm is not an ‘entity’ or ‘person’ in law but is merely an association of individuals and a firm name is only a collective name of those individuals who constitute the firm. In other words, a firm name is merely an expression, only a compendious mode of designating the persons who have agreed to carry on business in partnership.

Prior to the insertion of section 45(4), it was a judicially well-settled position that cash/capital assets received by the partner on retirement or dissolution of the partnership firm neither resulted in the transfer of any asset from the perspective of the firm nor resulted in transfer of partnership interest from the perspective of partners1. The judicial decisions were rendered on the premise that (a) a partnership firm is not a distinct legal entity (b) a partnership firm has no separate rights of its own in the partnership assets (c) the firm’s property or firm’s assets are property or assets in which all partners have a joint or common interest (d) distribution of asset or property by the firm to its partners is nothing but a mutual adjustment of rights between the partners and there is no question of any extinguishment of the firm’s rights in the partnership assets (e) what a partner receives on retirement/dissolution is nothing but the realisation of pre-existing right and that does not result in any transfer.

In addition to the above, statutory exemption was provided under section 47(ii) on capital gains in the hands of a partnership firm on the distribution of capital assets on the dissolution of a firm.


1. See Supreme Court (‘SC’) rulings in case of CIT v Dewas Cine Corporation [1968] 68 ITR 240, Malabar Fisheries Co v CIT [1979] 120 ITR 49 from the perspective of firm and Sunil Siddharthbhai v CIT [1985] 156 ITR 509, Addl. CIT v Mohanbhai Pamabhai [1987] 165 ITR 166, Tribuvandas G Patel v CIT [1999] 236 ITR 511, CIT v. R. Lingamullu Raghukumar [2001] 247 ITR 801 (SC) from the perspective of partners

Insertion of Section 45(4) to the Income-tax Act, 1961 (“Act”):

Section 45(4) was introduced vide Finance Act, 1987 with effect from 1 April 1988 and is as under:

“The profits or gains arising from the transfer of a capital asset by way of distribution of capital assets on the dissolution of a firm or other association of persons or body of individuals (not being a company or a co-operative society) or otherwise, shall be chargeable to tax as the income of the firm, association or body, of the previous year in which the said transfer takes place and, for the purposes of section 48, the fair market value of the asset on the date of such transfer shall be deemed to be the full value of the consideration received or accruing as a result of the transfer.”

Upon insertion of section 45(4), vide Finance Act, 1987, s. 47(ii) was omitted. There was, however, no amendment made to the definition of ‘transfer’ in s. 2(47).

Explanatory Memorandum (‘EM’) to Finance Bill, 1987 explained the intent of legislature behind the insertion of section 45(4) which provided that there should be a distribution of capital asset by a firm to trigger section 45(4)2. CBDT Circular No. 495 dated 22 September 1987 explaining the provisions of the Finance Act, 1987 provided the following rationale for insertion of section 45(4):

“24.3 Conversion of partnership assets into individual assets on dissolution or otherwise also forms part of the same scheme of tax avoidance. Accordingly, the Finance Act, 1987 has inserted new sub-section (4) in section 45 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The effect is that profits and gains arising from the transfer of a capital asset by a firm to a partner on dissolution or otherwise shall be chargeable as the firm’s income in the previous year in which the transfer took place and for the purposes of computation of capital gains the fair market value of the asset on the date of transfer shall be deemed to be the full value of the consideration received or accrued as a result of the transfer.”


2. Refer para 36 of EM to Finance Bill, 1987

Controversies arisen under section 45(4):

Insertion of section 45(4) gave rise to its fair share of controversies and resulted in litigation. By and large, prior to the SC ruling in the case of Mansukh Dyeing and Printing Mills [2022] 145 taxmann.com 151, controversies arose on interpretation of section 45(4) which were the subject matter of judicial scrutiny can be summed up as under:

  • Provisions of section 45(4) are triggered where the firm distributes capital asset on dissolution of a firm. Such will be the position even where no amendment is carried out to the definition of ‘transfer’ contained in section 2(47)3.
  • Provisions of section 45(4) are not triggered where the firm settles the retiring partner in cash including by taking into account the balance credited on revaluation of a capital asset4.
  • Provisions of section 45(4) are triggered where a firm distributes capital to a retiring partner during the subsistence of the firm. Such will be the position even where no amendment is carried out to the definition of ‘transfer’ contained in section 2(47)5.
  • However, there were two stray decisions on the subject. One is that of Madhya Pradesh HC ruling in the case of CIT v Moped and Machines [2006] 281 ITR 52 wherein HC held that to trigger section 45(4), it is essential that there must be a transfer of capital asset and in absence of an amendment to the definition of the term ‘transfer’ contained in section 2(47), there cannot be a charge under section 45(4). Second is that of Madras HC ruling in the case of National Company v ACIT [2019] 263 Taxman 511 wherein HC held that provisions of section 45(4) are not triggered where a subsisting firm distributes capital asset to a retiring partner. Strangely, Revenue has not preferred an appeal before SC against both these rulings.

3. CIT v Vijayalakshmi Metal Industries [2002] 256 ITR 540 (Madras), M/s Suvardhan v CIT [2006] 287 ITR 404 (Karnataka HC), CIT v Southern Tubes [2008] 326 ITR 216 (Kerala HC), CIT v Kumbazha Tourist Home [2010] 328 ITR 600 (Kerala HC), ITO v Pradeep Agencies [Tax Appeal No. 309 and 310 of 2004, order dated 10 December 2014] (Bombay HC)
4. CIT v R.K. Industries [Income Tax Appeal No. 773 of 2004) (Bombay HC, order dated 3 October 2007), CIT v Little & Co [Income Tax Appeal No. 4920 of 2010, order dated 1 August 2011] (Bombay HC), CIT v Dynamic Enterprises [2014] 359 ITR 83 (Karnataka Full Bench), PCIT v Electroplast Engineers [2019] 263 Taxman 120 (Bombay HC)
5. CIT v Rangavi Realtors / CIT v A N Naik & Associates [2004] 265 ITR 346 (Bombay HC)

Discussion on Bombay HC ruling in case of Rangavi Realtors (supra) and A N Naik Associates (supra):

In these two cases before Bombay HC, pursuant to a family settlement, the business carried on by the firm was distributed to the partner on retirement. The firm was reconstituted by the retirement of existing partners and the admission of new partners. One of the contentions put forth before HC by the taxpayer was whether the charge would fail under section 45(4) in absence of an amendment to section 2(47). As regards this contention, Bombay HC leaned in favour of the interpretation that section 45(4) created an effective charge without it being necessary to amend the definition of transfer in section 2(47). Relevant extracts from the Bombay HC ruling are hereunder:

“23. Considering this clause as earlier contained in section 47, it meant that the distribution of capital assets on the dissolution of a firm, etc., were not regarded as “transfer”. The Finance Act, 1987, with effect from April 1, 1988, omitted this clause, the effect of which is that distribution of capital assets on the dissolution of a firm would henceforth be regarded as “transfer”. Therefore, instead of amending section 2(47), the amendment was carried out by the Finance Act, 1987, by omitting section 47(ii), the result of which is that distribution of capital assets on the dissolution of a firm would be regarded as “transfer”. Therefore, the contention that it would not amount to a transfer has to be rejected. It is now clear that when the asset is transferred to a partner, that falls within the expression “otherwise” and the rights of the other partners in that asset of the partnership are extinguished. That was also the position earlier but considering that on retirement the partner only got his share, it was held that there was no extinguishment of right. Considering the amendment, there is clearly a transfer and if, there be a transfer, it would be subject to capital gains tax.”

One more contention dealt with by the Bombay High Court was with regard to the controversy of whether the expression “otherwise” qualifies the transfer of a capital asset or whether it qualifies dissolution. Dealing with this controversy, Bombay HC observed as under:

“21. The expression “otherwise” in our opinion, has not to be read ejusdem generis with the expression, “dissolution of a firm or body or association of persons”. The expression “otherwise” has to be read with the words “transfer of capital assets” by way of distribution of capital assets. If so read, it becomes clear that even when a firm is in existence and there is a transfer of capital assets it comes within the expression “otherwise” as the object of the Amending Act was to remove the loophole which existed whereby capital gain tax was not chargeable. In our opinion, therefore, when the asset of the partnership is transferred to a retiring partner the partnership which is assessable to tax ceases to have a right or its right in the property stands extinguished in favour of the partner to whom it is transferred. If so read, it will further the object and the purpose and intent of the amendment of section 45. Once, that be the case, we will have to hold that the transfer of assets of the partnership to the retiring partners would amount to the transfer of the capital assets in the nature of capital gains and business profits which is chargeable to tax under section 45(4) of the Income-tax Act. We will, therefore, have to answer question No. 3 by holding that the word “otherwise” takes into its sweep not only cases of dissolution but also cases of subsisting partners of a partnership, transferring assets in favour of a retiring partner.”

It may be noted that against the Bombay HC ruling, taxpayers had filed SLP6 before SC and the same was granted. On grant of SLP, appeals were converted into Civil Appeals.


6. Civil Appeal No. 6255 of 2004 and Civil Appeal No. 6256 of 2004

Surprising SC ruling in the case of Mansukh Dyeing (supra):

In the case of Mansukh Dyeing (supra), SC was concerned with appeals for A.Y. 1993-94 and 1994-95. In this case, the revaluation of capital assets was carried out in A.Y. 1993-94 and corresponding credit was given to the Partners’ Capital Account (A/c). The total amount of revaluation was Rs. 17.34 crore. Amount to the extent of Rs. 20-25 lacs were withdrawn by the partners either during A.Y. 1993-94 or A.Y. 1994-95. Further, there was a conversion of the partnership firm into a company under Part IX of the Companies Act, 1956 in A.Y. 1994-95. However, not much information is available about conversion.

While concluding the assessment for A.Y. 1993-94, the assessing officer taxed the amount of Rs. 17.34 Cr. as being assessable to tax under section 45(4) by considering that the process of revaluation together with the credit of revaluation amount to the accounts of the partners attracted section 45(4) of the Act. Mumbai Tribunal [ITA No. 5998 & 5999/Mum/2002, order dated 26 October 2006] and Bombay HC [[2013] 219 Taxman 91 (Mag.)] deleted the additions on the ground that in the absence of distribution of capital asset to a partner, section 45(4) was not triggered. SC, however, upheld the addition made under section 45(4) for AY 1993-94 and thereby restored the order of the assessing officer. Relevant extracts from SC ruling at para 7.5 are as under:

“7.5 In the present case, the assets of the partnership firm were revalued to increase the value by an amount of Rs. 17.34 crores on 01.01.1993 (relevant to A.Y. 1993-1994) and the revalued amount was credited to the accounts of the partners in their profit-sharing ratio and the credit of the assets’ revaluation amount to the capital accounts of the partners can be said to be in effect distribution of the assets valued at Rs. 17.34 crores to the partners and that during the years, some new partners came to be inducted by introduction of small amounts of capital ranging between Rs. 2.5 to 4.5 lakhs and the said newly inducted partners had huge credits to their capital accounts immediately after joining the partnership, which amount was available to the partners for withdrawal and in fact some of the partners withdrew the amount credited in their capital accounts. Therefore, the assets so revalued and the credit into the capital accounts of the respective partners can be said to be “transfer” and which fall in the category of “OTHERWISE” and therefore, the provision of Section 45(4) inserted by Finance Act, 1987 w.e.f. 01.04.1988 shall be applicable”

In terms of the SC ruling revaluation of capital asset coupled with credit of such amount to Partners’ Capital A/c would ‘in effect’ result in the distribution of asset and such can be considered as ‘transfer’ under the category ‘otherwise’. Consequently, provisions of section 45(4) are triggered.

Considering the rationale of the SC ruling, provisions of erstwhile section 45(4) are triggered merely on the revaluation of a capital asset even where the actual distribution of that asset has not taken place.

Questions to ponder on post SC ruling in case of Mansukh Dyeing (supra):

  • Explanatory Memorandum (EM) to the Finance Bill, 1987 and CBDT Circular No. 495 require the distribution of a capital asset to trigger provisions of section 45(4). Accordingly, can it be suggested that the SC ruling in the case of Mansukh Dyeing (supra) (which neither refers to EM to Finance Bill, 1987 nor CBDT Circular) is against the Legislative intent and thereby not laying down the correct law? It may be noted that Circulars are binding on Court. Once SC has interpreted the law, such interpretation becomes binding and if such interpretation is against the EM/Circular, such EM/Circular may not be regarded as placing correct interpretation of the law – refer the SC rulings in the cases of CCE v. Ratan Melting & Wire Industries [2008] 17 STT 103, and ACIT v Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority [2022] 143 taxmann.com 278.
  • At para 7.6 of the ruling in case of Mansukh Dyeing (supra), SC has completely agreed with the Bombay HC ruling in the case of A N Naik Associates (supra). To reiterate, the Bombay HC ruling was delivered in the factual background that the firm had transferred capital asset (business undertaking) in favour of a retiring partner. If one refers to various observations from Bombay HC ruling in case of A N Naik Associates (supra), it has been held that transfer of capital asset by a firm to its partner results in the extinguishment of a capital asset and hence there is a transfer which falls within the term ‘otherwise’. Absent distribution of capital asset by firm (as it was in case of Mansukh Dyeing (supra)), there cannot be transfer. In view of the same, there is a conflict between para 7.5 and 7.6 of SC ruling which is irreconcilable.
  • Whether revaluation of stock-in-trade may also trigger section 45(4) in the light of the SC ruling in the case of Mansukh Dyeing (supra)? Taxability of stock in trade is not governed by the capital gains chapter and section 45(4) cannot be triggered on revaluation of stock in trade. Further, the head of income ‘Profits and gains from business or profession’ does not contain a provision similar to section 45(4) and hence no amount can be brought to tax under the head ‘Profits and gains from business or profession’. Additionally, one may rely on the SC ruling in the case of Chainrup Sampatram v CIT [1953] 24 ITR 581 to urge that valuation of stock cannot be ‘source of profit’ and hence revaluation of stock in trade cannot trigger section 45(4).
  • Whether the revaluation of a capital asset which is credited to Revaluation Reserve A/c (and not to Partner’s Capital A/c) triggers section 45(4) in the light of SC ruling in case of Mansukh Dyeing (supra)? At para 7.5 of SC ruling, it is held that revaluation of capital asset coupled with credit to Partners’ A/c is regarded as ‘in effect’ distribution of a capital asset. Absent credit to Partners’ A/c, there is, arguably, no distribution of capital asset and hence section 45(4) is not triggered.
  • In view of SC ruling Mansukh Dyeing (supra), where a firm carries out ‘downward revaluation’ (i.e., devaluation) of a capital asset and the same is debited to Partners’ Capital A/c, can capital loss be granted to the firm? Arguably, when section 45(4) refers to profits or gains, it includes losses – see CIT v Harprasad & Co (P) Ltd. [1975] 99 ITR 118 (SC), CIT v Sati Oil Udyog Ltd. [2015] 372 ITR 746 (SC). Accordingly, downward revaluation coupled with a debit to Partner’s Capital A/c results in an effective distribution of a capital asset for section 45(4) per ratio of SC ruling in the case of Mansukh Dyeing (supra). The capital loss so computed is incurred by the firm.
  • Consider a case where the firm carries out revaluation of a capital asset and credits the same to Partners’ Capital A/c which resulted in the trigger of section 45(4). In view of the SC ruling in Mansukh Dyeing (supra), as and when a firm transfers a capital asset to a third party, whether capital gains arise in the hands of a firm? If yes, whether amount considered in computing gains under section 45(4) be allowed as the cost of acquisition? Though not free from doubt, the firm may contend that once the distribution of capital asset has taken place, no capital gains arise on the transfer of capital asset to a third party. In case capital gain is again taxed in the hands of the firm, arguably, the amount considered in computing under section 45(4) shall be available as a cost to the firm. Any other view will result in double taxation, and such cannot be an intent of the Legislature – see Escorts Ltd. v Union of India [1993] 199 ITR 43 (SC), CIT v Hico Products (P) Ltd [2001] 247 ITR 797 (SC).
  • Consider a case where Mr. A, Mr. B and Mr. C are partners of a partnership firm. Mr. C decides to retire from the firm. No revaluation of partnership asset is carried out in the books of the partnership firm. However, the partnership deed provides that the outgoing partner’s dues shall be settled at fair value. An independent valuer carries out the valuation of partnership assets and thereby determines the share of Mr. C in the partnership. The amount determined to be payable to Mr. C is more than the amount standing in his Capital A/c. Accordingly, the excess amount (difference between the fair value of Mr. C’s share in partnership and the amount standing in the capital A/c of Mr. C) is debited to continuing partners’ capital A/c (capital A/cs of Mr. A, and Mr. B) and credited to Mr. C’s capital A/c. Further, Mr. C retires by withdrawing cash from the partnership firm. In such a case, even post SC ruling in case of Mansukh Dyeing (supra), in absence of revaluation of capital asset in the books of accounts coupled with no credit to the retiring Partner’s Capital A/c, it is arguable that provisions of section 45(4) are not triggered.

Does SC ruling in the case of Mansukh Dyeing (supra) suffer from ‘per incuriam’?

As mentioned above, assesses have filed SLP before the SC against the Bombay HC ruling in the case of Rangavi Realtors (supra) and A N Naik Associates (supra), and the same have been granted.

In the case of M/s Suvardhan v. CIT [2006] 287 ITR 404, the Karnataka HC upheld that the charge under section 45(4) would be attracted to a case of distribution of a capital asset by the partnership firm on its dissolution. HC rejected assessee’s argument that a charge would fail in absence of an amendment to the definition of ‘transfer’ contained in section 2(47). While concluding, Karnataka HC relied on the Bombay HC decision in the case of A.N. Naik Associates (supra) on the scope of section 45(4). While rendering the decision, Karnataka HC made the following observations:

“A reading of the said provision would show that the profits or gains arising from transfer of capital assets by way of distribution of capital assets on dissolution of a firm shall be chargeable to tax as income of the firm in the light of transfer that has taken place. Transfer has been defined under section 2(47) of the Act. What is contended before us that if section 2(47) read with section 45(4), there is no transfer at all, and if there is any transfer, it is not by the assessee but by the retiring partner. Therefore, according to Sri Parthasarathi, orders are bad in law. To consider this aspect of the matter, we have to notice section 47 of the Income-tax Act. Section 47 is a special provision which would say as to which are the transactions not regarded as transfer. A reading of the said section 47 of the Act would show that several transactions were considered as no-transfer for the purpose of section 45 of the Act.

On the other hand, as rightly pointed out by Sri Seshachala, learned counsel for the Department, a similar question was considered by the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. A.N. Naik Associates [2004] 265 ITR 3462. In the said judgment, Bombay High Court has noticed the effect of Act of 1987. After noticing, the Bombay High Court has ruled that section 45 of the Income-tax Act is a charging section. Bombay High Court further ruled that:

“…From a reading of sub-section (4) to attract capital gains tax what would be required would be as under: (1) transfer of capital asset by way of distribution of capital assets: (a) on account of dissolution of a firm; (b) or other association of persons; (c) or body of individuals; (d) or otherwise; the gains shall be chargeable to tax as the income of the firm, association, or body of persons. The expression ‘otherwise’ has to be read with the words ‘transfer of capital assets’. If so read, it becomes clear that even when a firm is in existence and there is a transfer of capital assets it comes within the expression ‘otherwise’. The word ‘otherwise’ takes into its sweep not only cases of dissolution but also cases of subsisting partners of a partnership, transferring assets to a retiring partner….” (p. 347)

Bombay High Court has noticed section 2(47) and thereafter ruled reading as under:

“…The Finance Act, 1987, with effect from April 1, 1988, omitted this clause, instead of amending section 2(47), the effect of which is that distribution of capital assets on the dissolution of a firm would be regarded as transfer….” (p. 347)

9. We are in respectful agreement with the judgment of the Bombay High Court. When the Parliament in its wisdom has chosen to remove a provision, which provided ‘no transfer’, there is no need for any further amendment to section 2(47) of the Act as argued before us. In our view, despite no amendment to section 2(47), in the light of removal of Clause (ii) to section 47, transaction certainly would call for tax at the hands of the authorities.”

Further, in the case of Davangere Maganur Bassappa v ITO [2010] 325 ITR 139, Karnataka HC was concerned with a case where the taxpayer firm was dissolved, and assets of the firm were distributed to partners. The taxpayer firm contended that no capital gains were triggered in the hands of the firm. Karnataka HC, relying on its earlier ruling in the case of M/s Suvardhan (supra), held that the taxpayer firm was liable to pay capital gains tax under section 45(4).

Against the Karnataka HC in the case of M/s Suvardhan (supra), Special Leave to Petition (SLP) was preferred by the taxpayer before SC7. SC granted Special Leave Petition, vide order dated 5 January 2007, on the ground that SLP has already been granted in the case of A N Naik (supra) and the Karnataka HC relied upon the Bombay HC ruling in the case of A N Naik Associates (supra) while passing the order. Similarly, against the Karnataka HC in the case of Davangere Maganur Bassappa (supra), the taxpayer filed SLP before SC8. SC granted SLP, vide order dated 29 March 2010, on the ground that SLP was granted in the case of M/s Suvardhan (supra). On granting the SLP, both the appeals in case of M/s Suvardhan and Davangere Maganur Bassappa were converted into Civil Appeal No. 98/2007 and 2961/2010 respectively before SC.


7. SLP (Civil) No. 21078 of 2006
8. SLP (Civil) No. 8446 of 2010

Post grant of SLP, four cases viz. Rangavi Realtors (supra), A N Naik Associates (supra), M/s Suvardhan (supra) and Davangere Maganur Bassappa (supra) were placed before Three Judge Bench. Taxpayers in the cases of Rangavi Realtors (supra) and A N Naik Associates (supra) withdrew their appeals and consequently, Civil Appeals were dismissed. Hence, no ratio was laid down by Court in their cases. In the cases of M/s Suvardhan (supra) and Davangere Maganur Bassappa (supra), SC dismissed the Civil Appeals without assigning any specific reasons. It must be noted that M/s Suvardhan (supra) and Davangere Maganur Bassappa (supra) do not deal with the mere dismissal of SLP. In these cases SLPs were granted, but resultant Civil Appeals were dismissed. Considering the same, one may rely on the following observations from SC ruling in the case of Kunhayammad v State of Kerala [2000] 245 ITR 360 (as approved by Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Ltd. [2019] 4 SCC 376) to contend that once the order is passed by SC, doctrine of merger is applicable, and order of HC becomes the order of SC.

“Once a special leave petition has been granted, the doors for the exercise of appellate jurisdiction of this Court have been let open. The order impugned before the Supreme Court becomes an order appealed against. Any order passed thereafter would be an appellate order and would attract the applicability of doctrine of merger. It would not make a difference whether the order is one of reversal or of modification or of dismissal affirming the order appealed against. It would also not make any difference if the order is a speaking or non- speaking one. Whenever this Court has felt inclined to apply its mind to the merits of the order put in issue before it though it may be inclined to affirm the same, it is customary with this Court to grant leave to appeal and thereafter dismiss the appeal itself (and not merely the petition for special leave) though at times the orders granting leave to appeal and dismissing the appeal are contained in the same order and at times the orders are quite brief. Nevertheless, the order shows the exercise of appellate jurisdiction and therein the merits of the order impugned having been subjected to judicial scrutiny of this Court

We may look at the issue from another angle. The Supreme Court cannot and does not reverse or modify the decree or order appealed against while deciding a petition for special leave to appeal. What is impugned before the Supreme Court can be reversed or modified only after granting leave to appeal and then assuming appellate jurisdiction over it. If the order impugned before the Supreme Court cannot be reversed or modified at the SLP stage obviously that order cannot also be affirmed at the SLP stage.”

Relying on the above, one may contend that order passed by Karnataka HC in the cases of M/s Suvardhan (supra) and Davangere Maganur Bassappa (supra) achieved finality and thereby order passed by Karnataka HC stood merged with order of SC. Judicial discipline requires that the decision of a Larger Bench must be followed by Bench with a lower quorum – refer to Union of India v Raghubir Singh (Dead) [1989] 2 SCC 754 (Constitution Bench) and Trimurthi Fragrances (P) Ltd. v Govt. of NCT of Delhi [TS-729-SC-2022] (Constitution Bench). Accordingly, a question that may arise is whether observations made by Karnataka HC as regards the requirement of transfer of a capital asset by way of distribution of capital assets to trigger provisions of section 45(4) are approved by SC? If yes, since the earlier ruling was rendered by Three Judges’ Bench, will the same not become binding on a Two Judge Bench in the case of Mansukh Dyeing (supra)? Further, will it mean that the ruling rendered in the case of Mansukh Dyeing (supra) without referring to a Larger Bench ruling in the case of M/s Suvardhan (supra) and hence suffers from ‘per incuriam’?

Since we are purely treading on a legal issue, one shall remain guided by Senior Counsel.

Is there a possibility that SC may examine/re-examine the ratio laid down in the case of Mansukh Dyeing (supra) in near future?

In the case of Hemlata S Shetty v ACIT [ITA No.1514/Mum/2010 and ITA No. 6513/Mum/2011, order dated 1 December 2015), Mumbai Tribunal was concerned with a case of money received by a partner on his retirement from the firm. In this case, the taxpayer had contributed Rs. 52.5 lacs as capital on being admitted as a partner on 16 September 2005. Subsequently, the partnership firm acquired immovable property in 2006 which was held as stock in trade and not as capital asset. From the facts, it appears that, immediately, post-acquisition of immovable property, revaluation was carried out and revaluation was credited to Partner’s Capital A/c. On 27 March 2006, the taxpayer retired from the partnership firm and received a sum of Rs. 30.88 Crores. The source of money for the discharge of the amount payable to the partner on his retirement was not known. Tax authorities sought to bring the difference between the amount received on retirement and the amount contributed by the tax taxpayer as capital gains. Tribunal, relying on various judicial precedents, held that the amount received on the retirement of a partner does not result in transfer and hence no capital gains are chargeable in the hands of the taxpayer. Against the Tribunal ruling, Revenue preferred an appeal before Bombay HC [reported in PCIT v Hemlata S Shetty [2019] 262 Taxman 324]. Bombay HC held that the amount received by the partner on retirement is not taxable in her hands and further held that capital gains liability (if any) can arise in the hands of the partnership firm.

Against the Bombay HC ruling, Revenue preferred SLP before SC – [SLP (C) No. 21474/2019]. This matter came up for hearing before SC on 10 November 2022. While hearing the matter, Counsels appearing for parties informed SC that a similar matter was heard by a co-ordinate bench [SLP (Civil) No. 3099/2014 – which is a matter of Mansukh Dyeing (supra)]. Accordingly, the case of Hemlata S Shetty before SC was parked in view of the pendency of the final Judgement of Mansukh Dyeing (supra). As the SC has, now, delivered the ruling in case of Mansukh Dyeing (supra), it is likely that SC may refer to the ruling while disposing of SLP in the case of Hemlata S. Shetty (supra) which is scheduled to be heard on 15 February 2023. Interested parties may keep a close watch on this proceeding before SC.

Whether ratio laid down by SC in case of Mansukh Dyeing (supra) has bearing on section 9B and / or substituted section 45(4)?

Vide Finance Act, 2021, with effect from AY 2021-22, section 9B was inserted and section 45(4) was substituted. Section 9B(1) provides that where a specified person (partner) receives a capital asset or stock in trade in connection with the dissolution or reconstitution of a specified entity (firm) then the firm shall be deemed to have transferred capital asset or stock in trade to partner. Substituted provisions of section 45(4) are triggered where a specified person (partner) receives during the previous year any money or capital asset or both from a specified entity in connection with the reconstitution of such specified entity.

An important question that may arise is that under the new regime where revaluation of capital asset and/or stock in trade is carried out and same is credited to Partner’s Capital / Current A/c, provisions of section 9B or section 45(4) are triggered9? In terms of SC ruling in the case of Mansukh Dyeing (supra) may urge that on revaluation of capital asset coupled with credit to Partner’s capital A/c is regarded as transfer. Relying on the SC ruling, tax authorities may urge that once there is a transfer of a capital asset, the asset cannot remain in a vacuum. The recipient of an asset has to exist, and the partner can only be the recipient. Accordingly, on revaluation, there is effective receipt of capital asset/stock in trade by a partner which triggers provisions of section 9B. Since section 45(4) is also triggered on a receipt basis, for similar reasons, there is a trigger of substituted section 45(4) also.


9. For the purpose of present analysis, we have proceeded on the assumption that revaluation and credit to the account of partners’ is along with reconstitution or dissolution of firm. It may be noted that mere revaluation of asset which is not coupled with reconstitution / dissolution, there is neither trigger of section 45(4) nor section 9B

For the following reasons, in view of author, revaluation of capital asset/stock in trade and credit to partner’s capital account does not trigger section 9B and section 45(4).

  • The dictionary meaning of the term ‘receipt’ means ‘to take into possession’, ‘conferred’, ‘have delivered’, ‘given’, ‘paid’, ‘take in’, ‘hold’ etc. On revaluation of capital asset and/or stock in trade, revalued asset remains within the coffers of a firm, and it is not the possession of the partner or conferred/given / paid to the partner. Absent receipt by the partner, there is no trigger of section 9B.
  • Section 9B and substituted section 45(4) are worded differently from erstwhile section 45(4). Under the old provision, in terms of sequence, distribution had to follow, and such distribution was deemed to be a transfer. In the amended provision, in terms of sequence, there should be a receipt of an asset by a partner and such receipt will be considered to be a transfer. Hence, before alleging that there is a transfer, there is an onus to establish that there is a receipt of an asset by the partners. The onus is to first establish that the act of revaluation results automatically in a receipt. The expression “distribution” does not appear in section 9B / 45(4). SC ruling in the case of Mansukh Dyeing (supra) that revaluation could amount to distribution cannot be applied in a case where there is no reference to the expression “distribution”.
  • Section 45(5)(b) uses the term ‘received’ for the purpose of taxing the enhanced compensation received on compulsory acquisition of an asset. In the context of section 45(5), reference may be made to the Karnataka HC ruling in the case of CCIT v Smt. Shantavva [2004] 267 ITR 67. In this case, the taxpayer received the amount of enhanced compensation in pursuance of an interim order which was subject to a final order. HC held that the amount received pursuant to the interim order cannot be considered as amount received for the purpose of section 45(5)(b). HC held that, ‘received’ shall mean ‘receipts of the amount pursuant to a vested right or enforceable decree’. In case of revaluation of an asset, the partner does not get any vested / binding right to demand the asset from the firm. During the subsistence of a firm, what all partners can demand is their share of profit and nothing beyond that. Additionally, as held by SC in the case of Sunil Siddharthbhai v CIT [1985] 156 ITR 509, the value of the partnership interest depends upon the future transactions of the partnership and the value of the partnership interest may diminish in value depending on accumulating liabilities and losses with a fall in the prosperity of the partnership firm. Accordingly, artificial credit on revaluation cannot be considered as a receipt in the hands of partners.
  • Where a partner receives any capital asset or stock in trade from the firm in connection with dissolution or reconstitution, section 9B(1) creates a fiction that there is deemed transfer of a capital asset or stock in trade by the firm to partner. Perhaps the fiction is created to overcome the past SC rulings10 wherein it was held that the distribution of an asset by the firm to its partners does not result in any transfer. The opening para of section 9B(2) provides that any profits and gains arising from deemed transfer shall be an income of the firm. Section 9B(2) creates a charge of income in the hands of the firm. In order to create a charge in the hands of the firm, there shall be profits and gains in the hands of the firm – see opening para of section 9B(2). There is no fiction created under section 9B to provide that deemed transfer results in deemed profits or deemed gains in the hands of firm. It is a well-settled principle that deeming fiction shall be construed strictly and cannot be extended beyond the purpose for which it is created – see State Bank of India v D. Hanumantha Rao [1998] 6 SCC 183 (SC), CIT v V S Dempo Company Ltd. [2016] 387 ITR 354 (SC). Accordingly, to trigger section 9B(2) there shall be commercial profits or gains. On mere revaluation, no profits or gains are derived by the firm – see CIT v Hind Construction Ltd. [1972] 83 ITR 211, Sanjeev Woollen Mills v CIT [2005] 279 ITR 434 (SC). The firm stands where it was. Further, it is a well-settled principle that one cannot earn income out of oneself – see Sir Kikabhai Premchand v CIT [1953] 24 ITR 506 (SC). Accordingly, it may also be urged that the firm cannot earn profits or gains out of itself to trigger provisions of section 9B(2).
  • On close scrutiny, a charge under section 45(4) is triggered where any profits and gains arising from the receipt of a capital asset or money in the hands of a partner. Section 45(4) seems to deem two aspects (a) profits and gains arising from receipt of a capital asset or money in the hands of a partner as income of the firm and (b) year of taxation to be the year of receipt of a capital asset or stock in trade. Like, section 9B, section 45(4) does not deem that receipt of a capital asset or money results in profits or gains in the hands of a partner. Accordingly, to trigger section 45(4) there shall be commercial profits or gains. Mere revaluation of the asset of the firm and credit to the account of the partner does not result in any commercial profits or gains in the hands of a partner. Partners’ interest in the firm remains the same with or without revaluation. The economic wealth of the partner would depend upon the inherent value of his share in the firm irrespective of whether revaluation is carried out or not. Mere revaluation cannot change the economic wealth or standing of a partner. Even where the partner was to assign his stake in the firm to a third party, he would have derived the same value, which he would derive irrespective of whether the revaluation of an asset was carried out by the firm or not. Absent commercial profit or gains, provisions of section 45(4) cannot be triggered.
  • Mere revaluation of an asset, even when there is no reconstitution will automatically result in the receipt of assets by partners without attracting any charge in absence of dissolution or reconstitution. Having already received the asset at some stage, there would be no further receipt possible in as much as the same asset cannot be received twice.

10. Dewas Cine Corporation (supra), Malabar Fisheries Co (supra)

Reopening of Assessments under section 147 with effect from 1st April 2021

1. INTRODUCTION

The law applicable to the reopening of assessments is enshrined in sections 147 to 151. That law was changed by the Finance Act 2021 with effect from 1st April 2021.

The objective for the change is explained in the Explanatory Memorandum explaining the provisions of the Finance Bill 2021:

There is a need to completely reform the system of assessment or reassessment or re-computation of income escaping assessment and the assessment of search related cases. The Bill proposes a completely new procedure of assessment of such cases. It is expected that the new system would result in less litigation and would provide ease of doing business to taxpayers.

This Article discusses –

(i) Change in the law of reopening of assessments by the Finance Act 2021 with effect from 1st April 2021.

(ii) The consequences of the aforesaid change in the law.

(iii) Judgement of Hon. Supreme Court in UOI vs Ashish Agarwal (2022) 444 ITR 1 (SC)

(iv) How should the assessee reply to notices issued by the Assessing Officer under section 148A(b)?

(v) When should the assessee challenge, in a Writ Petition before the High Court, the order passed by the Assessing Officer under section 148A(d) as well as the notice issued by the Assessing Officer under section 148?

2. CHANGE IN LAW WITH EFFECT FROM 1ST APRIL 2021

With effect from 1st April 2021 the Finance Act 2021 changed the law applicable to reopening of assessments under section 147 read with sections 148 to 151. The New Scheme of reopening is based on the procedure laid down by the Hon. Supreme Court in GKN Driveshaft (India) Ltd vs ITO1 . In that case the Hon. Supreme Court held that on issuance of the notice under the erstwhile section 148 the assessee should file a return of income in response to such notice and seek reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer (AO) for issuing such notice. The AO is bound to furnish reasons to the assessee within a reasonable time. On receipt of the reasons, the assessee is entitled to file objections to the issuance of notice under section, 148 and the AO is bound to dispose of the objections by passing a speaking order. Only after following this procedure, the AO could proceed with the reassessment. This procedure, prescribed by the Hon. Supreme Court under the Old Law (applicable up to 31st March 2021), has now been incorporated in the New Law (applicable from 1st April 2021).


1. (2003) 259 ITR 19 (SC)

3. COMPARISON OF THE LAW

APPLICABLE UP TO 31ST MARCH 2021 (OLD LAW) AND THE LAW APPLICABLE FROM 1ST APRIL 2021 (NEW LAW)

The salient features of the Old Law and the New Law are highlighted in the table below –

Section Old
Law up to
31st
March, 2021
New
Law from
1st
April, 2021 inserted by Finance Act, 2021
147: Income escaping assessment •  Under the Old Law, before initiating
proceedings to reopen the assessment, the Assessing Officer (AO) had to
record ‘reasons to believe’ that income had escaped assessment.•  On the basis of those reasons, the AO was
required to form a belief that there is escapement of income and therefore
action is required under section 147.
•  Under the New Law, section 147 does not use
the phrase reason to believe that any income has escaped assessment but
rather states if any income has escaped assessment.•  So, now the reason to believe that any
income has escaped assessment is not necessary.•  Rather there is a requirement of having
prescribed information (as defined in Explanation 1 to
    section 1482) suggesting that
income has escaped assessment.
148 (2): Issue of notice where income
has escaped assessment
•  Under the old section 148 the AO was only
required to record reasons for reopening before issuing notice under section
148.•  Courts interpreted the phrase ‘reason to
believe’ to lay down several legal principles to prevent abuse of power by
the AO. [Refer CIT vs Kelvinator of India Limited (2010) 320 ITR 561
(SC)].
•  New section 148 provides that no notice can
be issued unless there is information (as defined in Explanation 1 to section
1483) which suggests that income has escaped assessment.
Explanation 1 to Section 148 Did
not exist under the Old Law
•  Under the New Law the AO can issue a notice
under section 148 only when the AO has information which suggests that the
income has escaped assessment.•  The statutory definition of ‘information
which suggests that the income has escaped assessment’ is provided in
Explanation 1 to section 1484.Note: In Explanation 1 to section 148 any
information flagged in the case of the assessee for the relevant assessment
year in accordance with the risk management strategy formulated by the Board
from time to time – this means information received by the AO from the Insight
Portal
of the Department.
Explanation 2 to Section 148 Did
not exist under the Old Law
•  Explanation 2 to section 148 lays down that
in cases of search, survey and requisition, initiated or made on or after 1st
April 2021, the AO shall be deemed to have information which suggests that
income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment.•  So, in cases of search, survey and
requisition, NO information as defined in Explanation 1 to section 148 is
required by the AO to issue notice under section 148.
148A: Conducting inquiry and providing
opportunity before issue of notice under section 148
Did
not exist under the Old Law
•  Under the New Law before issuing notice
under section 148 the AO has to follow the procedure prescribed under section
148A and pass an order under section 148A (d).Thus, under section 148A, the AO has to –(1)
Conduct enquiry with respect to information which suggests that income
chargeable  to tax has escaped
assessment. Such enquiry is to be conducted with the prior approval of the
Specified Authority as prescribed in section 151. [Section 148A (a)]
(2)
Issue a notice upon the assessee to show cause why notice under
section 148 should not be issued on basis of information which suggests that
income chargeable  to tax has escaped
assessment and enquiry conducted under section 148A (a). The AO must provide time
of minimum 7 days
and
maximum 30 days to the assessee to respond to the show-cause notice.This
provision provides opportunity of being heard to the assessee before issue of
notice under section 148. 
[Section 148A (b)](3)
Consider the reply

of the assessee to the show-cause notice. [Section 148A (c)](4)
Decide
on
the basis of material available on record and reply of the assessee by
passing an order within one month of the assessee’s reply whether or not it
is a fit case for issuing notice under section 148 with the prior approval of
the Specified Authority as prescribed in section 151.The
AO has to consider the reply of the assessee, in response to the show-cause
notice under section  148A (b), before
passing an order under section 148A (d).

[Section 148A (d)]
149 (1): Time limit for issuing notice
under section 148
Under the Old Law –

•  General cases: 4 years

•  Where income escaping assessment more than 1
lakh: 6 years

•  Where there was undisclosed Foreign Asset
(including Financial Interest): 16 years.

Under the New Law –

•  General cases: 3 years

•  Where likely escapement of income in the
form of asset/expense/entry is more than Rs. 50 lakhs: 10 years

[the
term “asset” is defined in the Explanation to section 149 (1)5]

•  No separate category for undisclosed Foreign
Asset

151: Sanction for issue of notice •  If four years have elapsed from the end of
the relevant assessment year,
•  If three years or less than three years have
elapsed from the end of the relevant
    then the AO had to take approval/sanction
of PCCIT or CCIT or PCIT or CIT for issuing notice under section 148.•  If less than four years have elapsed from
the end of the relevant assessment year, then the AO himself had to be a
JCIT. Otherwise, the AO had to take approval/sanction of JCIT for issuing
notice under section 148.
assessment
year, then the AO has to take approval/sanction of PCIT or PDIT or CIT or DIT
for the purposes of conducting enquiries, issuing show-cause notice and
passing order under section 148A, and for issuing notice under section 148.•  If, however, more than three years have
elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year, then the AO has to take
approval/sanction of PCCIT or PDGIT or CCIT or DGIT for the aforesaid
purposes.

2. For statutory definition of the phrase ‘information which suggests that the income has escaped assessment’ please refer to Point 7.2 of Para 7
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
5. For discussion on the condition term ‘likely escapement of income in the form of asset/expense/entry is more than 50 lakhs’ please refer to Point 7.3 of Para 7

4. TIME LIMIT FOR COMPLETING THE REASSESSMENT UNDER THE NEW LAW

Section 153 (2): No order of assessment, reassessment or recomputation shall be made under section 147 after the expiry of nine months from the end of the financial year in which the notice under section 148 was served:

Provided that where the notice under section 148 is served on or after the 1st day of April, 2019, the provisions of this sub-section shall have an effect, as if for the words “nine months”, the words “twelve months” had been substituted.

5. JUDGMENT OF HON. SUPREME COURT IN UOI VS ASHISH AGARWAL (2022) 444 ITR 1 (SC)

  • Following the CBDT clarification by way of Explanations to the Notifications dated 31st March, 2021 and 27th April, 2021 issued under The Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020 (TOLA), the AOs across the Country issued several reassessment notices under section 148 as per the Old Law even after 1st April 2021 (not complying with the procedural safeguards introduced in New Law by the Finance Act 2021).
  • This raised an interesting question: Whether, in view of TOLA, the Old Law or the New Law should apply to 148 notices issued from 1st April 2021 to 30th June 2021?
  • On Writ Petitions filed by the assessee, the High Courts of Allahabad6, Delhi7, Rajasthan8, Calcutta9, Madras10, and Bombay11, over the course of several decisions, quashed the 148 notices issued by the AOs from 1st April 2021 to 30th June 2021 under the Old Law. The High Courts held that once the Finance Act 2021 came into force on 1st April 2021, the Old Law ceased to exist and the same could not be revived through a Notification of the CBDT under TOLA.
  • The Department filed appeals before the Hon. Supreme Court against the common judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Ashok Kumar Agarwal vs Union of India12 (which directed the quashing of 148 notices issued from 1st April 2021 to 30th June 2021).
  • In UOI vs Ashish Agarwal (supra) the Hon. Supreme Court favourably allowed the Department’s appeals.
  • The Hon. Supreme Court held –
  • We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the various High Courts in holding that the New Law should apply on or after 1st April 2021 for reopening of even the past assessment years.
  • However, at the same time, the judgments of several High Courts would result in no reassessment proceedings at all, even if the same is permissible under the Finance Act 2021 and as per amended sections 147 to 151 of the IT Act. The Revenue cannot be made remediless and the object and purpose of reassessment proceedings cannot be frustrated.
  • Thus, the Hon. Supreme Court allowed an opportunity to the Department to continue with the reassessment proceedings initiated under the Old Law by following the procedure prescribed under the New Law.
  • The CBDT issued Instruction No. 01/2022, Dated 11th May 2022 interpreting the Judgement of Hon. Supreme Court in UOI vs Ashish Agarwal (supra) and issuing instructions to the AOs for completion of the reopened assessments.

6. Ashok Kumar Agarwal vs UOI [2021] 439 ITR 1 (Allahabad HC)
7. Man Mohan Kohli vs ACIT [2022] 441 ITR 207 (Delhi HC)
8. Bpip Infra Pvt. Ltd. vs Income Tax Officer & Others [2021] 133 taxmann.com 48 (Rajasthan HC); Sudesh Taneja vs ITO [2022] 135 taxmann.com 5 (Rajasthan HC)
9. Manoj Jain vs UOI [2022] 134 taxmann.com 173 (Calcutta HC)
10. Vellore Institute of Technology vs CBDT 2022] 135 taxmann.com 285 (Madras HC)
11. Tata Communications Transformation Services vs ACIT [2022] 137 taxmann.com 2 (Bombay HC)
12. 2021] 439 ITR 1 (Allahabad HC)

The AOs passed order under section 148A (d) after ostensibly considering replies of the assessee to notice under section 148A (b), in accordance with the Judgement of Hon. Supreme Court in UOI vs Ashish Agarwal (supra). However, in several cases such replies were not properly considered by the AOs.

Due to defects in the order passed by the AOs under section 148A (d) the assessees have filed Writ Petitions before various High Courts challenging the order passed by the AOs under section 148A (d) as well as the notice issued by the AOs under section 148.

These Writ Petitions are yet to be disposed of by the High Courts.

This has given rise to the second round of litigation as in view of the assessee the Department has failed to give effect to judgment of Hon. Supreme Court in UOI vs Ashish Agarwal (supra) in the right spirit.

6. THE JUDGMENT OF THE HON. SUPREME COURT IN UOI VS ASHISH AGARWAL (SUPRA) AND THE CBDT INSTRUCTION NO. 01/2022, DATED 11TH MAY 2022 ARE NOW NOT RELEVANT

The judgment of the Hon. Supreme Court in UOI vs Ashish Agarwal (supra) and the CBDT Instruction No. 01/2022, Dated 11th May 2022 were applicable to notices under section 148 issued by the AOs during the period 1st April 2021 to 30th June 2021. But for notices issued under section 148A (b), and under section 148, from 1st July 2021 onwards the judgment of the Hon. Supreme Court in UOI vs Ashish Agarwal (supra) and the CBDT Instruction No. 01/2022, dated 11th May 2022 are no longer relevant. For notices issued 1st July 2021 onwards we need to, without relying on UOI vs Ashish Agarwal (supra) and the CBDT Instruction No. 01/2022, dated 11th May 2022, check (action points related to new notices are discussed below) whether the notices meet the requirements of the New Law.

The action points related to new notices issued by the AOs under section 148, under the New Law, are discussed below.

7. WHAT SHOULD YOU DO IF YOU NOW RECEIVE NOTICE UNDER SECTION 148A (B) UNDER THE NEW LAW?

Reassessment notices issued under section 148 on or after 1st July 2022 have to be as per the New Law. So, before issuing notice under section 148 under the New Law notice under section 148A (b) must first be issued by the AO.

Upon receipt of notice under section 148A (b), you must check the following points.

Point 7.1: Whether the Notice is pertaining to AY 2016-17 and subsequent years?

Although, under the New Law, the Department can reopen assessments up to ten years from the end of the relevant assessment year, by virtue of the first Proviso to the new section 149 –

No notice under section 148 shall be issued at any time in a case for the relevant assessment year beginning on or before 1st day of April, 2021, if a notice under section 148 could not have been issued at that time on account of being beyond the time limit specified under the provisions of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of this section as it stood immediately before the commencement of the Finance Act 2021.

By virtue of this Proviso, reopening of assessment for any assessment year prior to AY 2016-17 would be time-barred and bad in law. That is because under the Old Law assessment could be reopened up to six years where the income escaping assessment was one lakh rupees or more (and where there was no undisclosed Foreign Asset). For AY 2015-16 and earlier years more than six years have already elapsed on 31st March 2022. So, under the New Law, the notices under section 148 read with section 148A (b) have to be now in relation to AY 2016-17 and later years.

Point 7.2: Whether the information provided by the AO along with the Notice under section 148A (b) suggest that income has escaped assessment?

Explanation 1 to Section 148 defines ‘information which suggests that income has escaped assessment’. We should check whether the information provided by the AO along with the notice under section 148A (b) meets the said definition.

Explanation 1 to section 148

For the purposes of this section and section 148A, the information with the Assessing Officer which suggests that the income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment means –

(i) any information in the case of the assessee for the relevant assessment year in accordance with the risk management strategy formulated by the Board from time to time; or

[Note: Information in accordance with the ‘risk management strategy formulated by the Board’ means information available on the Insight Portal of the Department and received by the AO from the Insight Portal.]

(ii) any audit objection to the effect that the assessment in the case of the assessee for the relevant assessment year has not been made in accordance with the provisions of this Act; or

(iii) any information received under an agreement referred to in section 90 or section 90A of the Act; or

(iv) any information made available to the Assessing Officer under the scheme notified under section 135A;
or

(v) any information which requires action in consequence of the order of a Tribunal or a Court.

Point 7.3: Whether the concerned AY is within 3 years, or beyond 3 years (but within 10 years) from the end of the relevant assessment year sought to be reopened?

As per section 149 (1), no notice under section 148 shall be issued beyond three years from the end of the relevant assessment year unless the AO has in his or her possession books of account or other documents or evidence which reveal that the income chargeable to tax is represented in the form of:

(a) an asset,

(b) expenditure in respect of a transaction or in relation to an event or occasion; or

(c) an entry or entries in the books of account,
and the amount of income which has escaped assessment amounts to or likely to amount to fifty lakh rupees or more.

As per Explanation to section 149(1), “asset” shall include immovable property, being land or building or both, shares and securities, loans and advances and deposits in bank account.

Further, as per section 149 (1A), where the income chargeable to tax represented in the form of an asset or expenditure has escaped assessment, and the investment in such asset or expenditure, in relation to an event or occasion, has been made or incurred, in more than one previous year relevant to the relevant assessment years, notice under section 148 shall be issued for every such assessment year.

Point 7.4: Whether the Notice is issued with the prior approval of the Specified Authority as laid down in section 151?

Sanctioning Authority under section 151 is –

(i) Where three or less than three years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year: Principal Commissioner or Principal Director or Commissioner or Director

(ii) Where more than three years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year: Principal Chief Commissioner or Principal Director General or Chief Commissioner or Director General

Sanction by an unauthorized authority would render the approval bad in law. When the statue authorizes a specific officer to accord approval for issuing notice under section 148, then it is for that officer only, to accord approval and not for any other officer even superior in rank13.


13. (i) CIT (Central-1) vs Aquatic Remedies (P.) Ltd. [2020] 113 taxmann.com 451 (SC); (ii) Ghanshyam K Khabrani vs ACIT 2012 (3) TMI 266 (Bombay HC); (iii) Reliable Finhold Ltd vs Union of India [2015] 54 taxman.com 318 (Allahabad HC); (iv) Dr. Shashi Kant Garg vs CIT (2006) 285 ITR 158 / [2006] 152 Taxman 308 (Allahabad HC); (v) Sardar Balbir Singh vs Income Tax Officer [2015] 61 taxmann.com 320 (ITAT Lucknow)

Point 7.5: Whether sanction is obtained by the AO prior to issuance of Notice?

The AO must bring on record documents to demonstrate that he or she had obtained the sanction of the appropriate authority before issuing notice under section 148 or 148A. If the AO issues the notice for reopening the assessment before obtaining the sanction, the reopening proceeding is void ab initio.

Point 7.6: Whether a period of at least seven days has been provided to the assessee to respond to the Notice?

There have been instances where less than seven days have been given to the assessee to respond to the notice issued under section 148A (b). This results in a violation of the procedure laid down by law.

Violation of the Principles of Natural Justice is not a curable defect in appeal14. Lack of opportunity before the AO cannot be rectified by the Appellate Authority by giving such opportunity.


14 Tin Box Co. vs CIT (2001) 249 ITR 216 (SC)

7A Raise objections in reply to the Notice, file a robust reply, and seek an opportunity of a personal hearing.

On checking the notice under section 148A (b), if you find any defects and shortcomings highlighted above, you must raise objections to the notice in your reply. Further, you should file a detailed submission on the merits of your case and ask the AO to provide an opportunity of a personal hearing before the AO passes the order under section 148A (d). Filing of robust submission at the first stage i.e., reply to notice under section 148A (b) will help the assessee before the High Court (in case of a Writ Petition) or in appellate proceedings subsequent to completion of reassessment proceedings.

8. WHAT SHOULD YOU DO WHEN YOU NOW RECEIVE AN ORDER UNDER SECTION 148A (D) ALONG WITH NOTICE UNDER SECTION 148 UNDER THE NEW LAW?

On the basis of material available on record, including the reply of the assessee, the AO has to pass an order under section 148A (d), with the prior approval of the Specified Authority, within one month from the end of the month in which the reply of the assessee is received by the AO.

Upon receipt of an order under section 148A (d) you must check the following points.
Point

8.1: Whether Notice under section 148 has been served along with the Order under section 148A(d)

As per amended section 148 of the Act, under the New Law, the AO has to serve a notice under section 148 along with a copy of the order passed under section 148A (d).

Point 8.2: Whether in the order passed under section 148A (d) the AO has recorded a finding of income escaping assessment on the basis of “information” which suggests that income has escaped assessment?

When no finding of escapement of income is recorded in the order passed under section 148A (d) on basis of “information” as defined in Explanation 1 to section 148, but on some other ground, then the order under section 148A (d) will be invalid.

The Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs Jet Airways (I) Ltd15 held, under the Old Law, that if after issuing a notice under section 148 of the Act, the AO accepts the contention of the assessee and holds that income, for which he had initially formed a reason to believe had escaped assessment, has, as a matter of fact, not escaped assessment, it is not open to him to independently assess some other income; if he intends to do so, a fresh notice under section 148 of the Act would be necessary, the legality of which would be tested in event of a challenge by the assessee.


15. [2011] 331 ITR 236 (Bombay HC)

Point 8.3: Whether the AO has passed a detailed speaking Order under section 148A(d) after considering the reply of the assessee?

It is a well-settled law that the AO has to pass a speaking order disposing of the objections of the assessee. If the order is without dealing with the contentions and issues raised by the assessee in its reply to the notice under section 148A(b), then such an order would not be in accordance with the law. Such an order can be challenged in Writ Petition before the High Court.

Point 8.4: Whether the Order passed by the AO has the sanction of the Specified Authority?

Please refer to Point 7.4 above.

Point 8.5: Whether the Order is passed by the AO within one month?

The AO must pass an order under section 148A (d) within one month from the end of the month in which the reply of the assessee, in response to the notice under section 148A(b), is received by the AO.

Where the order under section 148A(d) is passed after a period of one month, such an order would be considered time barred and bad in law. Such an order can be challenged in Writ Petition before the High Court.

Point 8.6: Whether the information on the basis of which assessment is reopened was furnished to the AO during the original assessment?

[Please refer to Paragraph 5. Power to Review and Change of Opinion above]

Point 8.7: Whether your case is a search or search-related case?

No notice under section 148A is required for search cases, search-connected matters, cases where information has been obtained pursuant to a search, and cases where information has been received under section 135A of the Act.

Point 8.8: Whether the AO has followed the procedure prescribed under section 148A in a survey case?

As stated above in Point 13, Section 148A will not be attracted in certain cases, including search cases. Further, Explanation 2 to Sec. 148 lays down that in cases of search, survey and requisition, initiated or made on or after 1st April 2021, the AO shall be deemed to have information that suggests that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. So, in cases of search, survey, and requisition, no information as defined in Explanation 1 to Sec. 148 is required by the AO to issue a notice under section 148.

However, the due procedure prescribed under section 148A needs to be followed in section 133A survey cases before issuing notice under section 148 – please refer to the Proviso to Section 148.

Therefore, in survey cases, section 148A of the Act is attracted and the AO has to issue a notice under section 148A (b) and pass an order under section 148A (d) in survey cases.

Point 8.9: Whether Opportunity of a personal hearing has been granted?

If the assessee asks for a personal hearing in response to the notice issued under section 148A (b), then the AO must grant the opportunity of a personal hearing. If the AO has not granted the opportunity of personal hearing despite the assessee asking for it, then the principle of natural justice is vitiated.

8A Filing Return of Income

Pursuant to the order under section 148A(d), the AO shall serve the assessee with a notice under section 148 asking the assessee to file the return of Income. In response, the assessee should file a return of income. The assessee can challenge the order under section 148A(d) as well as the notice under section 148, by filing a Writ Petition before the High Court, either before or after the filing of the return of income in response to notice under section 148. Filing of return of income does not cause any prejudice to the filing of Writ Petition.

Note: Penalty – As per section 270A(2)(c) of the Act, a person shall be considered to have under-reported his income, if the income reassessed is greater than the income assessed or reassessed immediately before such reassessment. Therefore, disclosing of income in the return in compliance with section 148 of the Act may not help during penalty proceedings.

9. When should you file a Writ Petition before the High Court?

Where you find, while checking Points 1 to 15 mentioned above, that there is any lapse or violation, then you can file a Writ Petition on receipt of the notice under section 148 of the Act along with an Order under section 148A(d) of the Act.

You may, however, note that a Writ Petition before the High Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is different from an appeal before the High Court under section 260A of the Act. One cannot file the Writ Petition in a routine manner when an alternative remedy is available.

If you choose not to file a Writ Petition but to go ahead with the reassessment (under the Faceless Assessment Regime), then you will have to go for the regular route of appeal to CIT (Appeals), ITAT, High Court and Supreme Court.

10 CONCLUSION

The New Law mandates that the AO shall carry out the procedure prescribed under section 148A before issuing a notice under section 148. Only after carrying out that procedure (conducting an enquiry, issuing a show-cause notice, considering the assessee’s reply to the show-cause notice and passing a speaking order whether it is a fit case for issuing notice under section 148) the AO can issue a notice under section 148 and reopen an assessment.

Further, the AO must have in his or her possession ‘information which suggests that income has escaped assessment’ as defined in Explanation 1 to section 148. Without such statutorily defined information, the AO cannot issue a notice under section 148 and reopen an assessment.

Also, if more than three years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year then the AO can issue notice under section 148 only when the AO has in his or her possession books of account or other documents or evidence which reveal that the income chargeable to tax, represented in the form of (i) an asset (immovable property, being land or building or both, shares and securities, loans and advances and deposits in bank account); or (ii) expenditure in respect of a transaction or in relation to an event or occasion; or (iii) an entry or entries in the books of account, which has escaped assessment amounts to or is likely to amount to fifty lakh rupees or more.

For passing an order under section 148A (d) the AO has to obtain prior sanction or approval of appropriate authority specified in section 151.

The assessee should take note of these changes and check that the statutory procedure is followed by the AO for reopening the assessment. If the AO fails to follow such procedure, and if there are shortcomings and defects in the show-cause notice issued by the AO under section 148A (b) and in the order passed by the AO under section 148A (d), then the assessee should challenge the notice issued by the AO under section 148, by filing a Writ Petition before the High Court.

Let us hope that the AOs follow the new procedure in the right spirit so that unnecessary reopening of past assessments is prevented, and the taxpayers are spared the brunt of costly litigation.

We the people of India…

Last month, on 26th January, 2023, we celebrated the 73rd Republic Day, which is the anniversary of the day when we adopted the Constitution. In a couple of years, we will celebrate the Amrut Mahotsav of our Republic. The Constitution is the pillar of any civilised society, as it ensures and assures the Rule of Law. It is perhaps time to reflect on some of the aspects of the Indian Constitution, considering the present circumstances.

The Preamble to the Constitution reads as follows:

“WE, THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a SOVEREIGN SOCIALIST SECULAR DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC and to secure to all its citizens:

JUSTICE, social, economic and political;

LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship;

EQUALITY of status and of opportunity; and to promote among them all FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the Nation.”

Our forefathers, who were part of the Constituent Assembly, enacted and adopted this Constitution on 26th November 1949, after careful debate and consideration. It plays an important role in shaping the destiny of the country.

The words “Socialist, Secular and Integrity” were added to the Preamble of the Indian Constitution in 1976 during the Emergency, by the 42nd Constitutional Amendment, altering the structure of the Preamble in a hushed manner. Many amendments made during the Emergency period in India were reversed by the succeeding government. However, these three words remained part of the Preamble since then.

India adopted the socialistic pattern of society, where public and private enterprises coexist. Some drastic socialistic steps were taken during the 1970s, such as the Nationalisation of leading private sector banks and general insurance companies, the Gold Control Act, the Land Ceiling Act, etc. Entrepreneurship and the free-market economy were stifled with the ‘license, permit, and quota system (raj)’. It was only in 1991, that India opened her economy and embarked on the path of liberalization. The rest is history.

Socialism, which failed all over the world, including Russia, has not worked in India as well. Lee Edward1  writes “Socialism?has failed everywhere it has been attempted for over a century, from the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 to present-day?Chavez-Maduro socialism in Venezuela.” People talk about socialism to get votes, but there is hardly anyone who would want to go to North Korea, or who would have jumped over the wall from West Germany to East Germany. It is the epitome of inefficiencies, corruption, and red-tapism. There is a strong case for dropping the word “Socialist” from the Preamble of the Constitution.


1. https://www.heritage.org/progressivism/commentary/dismantling-the-mythsthe-socialist-paradise

India is a multi-faith country and not a secular state. India is also a civilizational state and not just a geographical entity. The division of the population into minority and majority mocks the word ‘equality’. The word ‘secular’ being inappropriate, should be replaced with ‘multi-faith’, or delete it entirely, as Justice, Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity cover sufficiently.

The Constitution promises social, economic, and political justice and equality of status and opportunity to all. However, in practice, we find one class is preferred over the other. Caste-based reservation is a classic example of discrimination based on birth and injustice to meritorious students, employees, and job aspirants, resulting in a brain drain. It is a national shame that governments stretch this to the extent of 70 per cent in jobs and education, extending these to education and job reservations to various vote banks. Reservation which was originally contemplated as a temporary measure for 10 years only is continuing even after 75 years showing the need to rethink the manner in which it is provided. Reservation, if at all considered necessary, should be based on economic criteria only.

In fact, the division of the population based on caste, creed, religion, etc. has made the Indian population unequal in their rights, privileges, opportunities, and justice. Let’s obliterate these divisions. ‘Divide and Rule’ was a policy of the Britishers, and the colonial legacy still continues from the founding document. These ‘special cases’ break citizens into groups and creates inequality before law. It is a time to set up a ‘classless’ and ‘casteless’ society.

There is a strong case and need for the Uniform Civil Code, whereby all citizens have equal rights and obligations irrespective of their caste, creed, religion, language, or region. There is a dire need to integrate India socially and culturally through INDIANNESS. If NRIs can live as Indians abroad without being divided into any considerations of caste, creed, or religion, why can’t we live in India as “Indians”?

In the words of the late Nani A. Palkhivala, “We are all individuals. The sense of belonging to one country, the sense that we are all parts of one indivisible society – in short, our identity as a nation – has yet to be evolved.”

When we talk of rights as citizens of India, we must discharge our duties as citizens. Every citizen must be made accountable for his/her conduct. It is the duty of every citizen to contribute to the growth and development of the country, upholding the highest moral values and ethical practices. Each of us must play one’s role diligently in building a strong nation. For this, we must live in a disciplined manner.

India has already crossed the population of China and becomes the most populous country in the world with 141 crore people. India as the largest democratic country in the world has a major responsibility to share. Today the entire world is looking to India to provide leadership for solving its problems. Fortunately, we have strong leadership at the Centre, which is seized of this development and doing its best.

We the people of India have a greater role to play in leading the world.

Today India has become the world’s fifth-largest economy and soon it will ascend to the first three. If we want to become a superpower, we must act and behave like one. We must rise above the ‘caste, class, region, and religion-based politics’ and embrace development. Our aim should be to uplift every citizen from poverty and provide him with the basic necessities of life and equal opportunities. Instead of fighting with each other; let’s fight illiteracy, poverty, corruption, inefficiencies, prejudices and injustice.

India has become the most populous country in the world, the time has come to become the most popular country as well! We as an enlightened class of society, have a greater role to play. Are we ready?

Ahilyabai Holkar
(31.05.1725 – 13.08.1795)

Ahilyabai, the daughter-in-law of Malharrao Holkar – Jagirdar of the Malwa region in Madhya Bharat, was known for her bravery, governance and philanthropy. She shifted her capital town to a place called Maheshwar, South of Indore, on the banks of the river Narmada. After the demise of Malharrao, she ruled Malwa between 1766 to 1795.

Ahilyabai’s father, Mankoji Shinde was the Patil (Chief) of the Choundi Village, in Jamkhed taluka of Ahmednagar district. In those times, when females were deprived of education, Mankoji taught her to read and write. Once Malharrao Holkar, a sardar of Bajirao Peshwa, was passing by Choundi village. He saw this eight-year old girl and was impressed by her smartness. He got her married to his son Khanderao.

Unfortunately, Khanderao was killed in a battle in the year 1754. In those days’ sati system was in vogue – i.e. a widow sacrifices her life into the funeral pyre of her husband. Malharrao stopped her from going ‘sati’. After Malharrao’s death in the year 1766, she took up the charge of the Malwa region. During wars, she used to be in the forefront. Later, she appointed Tukojirao Holkar as her General. He was the adopted son of Malharrao. English author Lawrence has described her as Katherin the Great (Russia) Queen Elizabeth (Briton) and Queen Margaret (Denmark) of India.

Ahilyabai was known for her sense of justice and fairness. She established many temples, constructed the ghats to many rivers, renovated many temples all over India. She made a provision for maintenance of all such temples. She looked after the beautification of Indore and Maheshwar. She also constructed residential hostels (dharmashalas) at the places of pilgrimage. These included Dwarka, Nashik, Varanasi, Ujjain and so on. When she saw the Somnath Temple destroyed by Mohammad Gazani, she constructed another Shiv temple near Somnath. Through all these temples, she promoted and supported great social work.

Malharrao had full trust in her administrative abilities. After his death, she requested Peshwas to allow her to rule the Malwa region.

She used to hear the complaints of the common people and settle all the grievances. She constructed roads and forts in Malwa and developed the ‘village’ of Indore into a city. She constructed wells, lakes, ghats and dharmashalas at many places in India.

Ahilyabai prevented many widows from going sati. She encouraged them to adopt children. She punished many corrupt officers. Citizens of Indore have instituted a prestigious award in her name for a dedicated social worker. The University of Indore is named after her, so also the University of Solapur.

Ahilyabai tried to control the nuisance of the dacoits belonging to Bhil and Gond communities. She supported many poets, scholars, artists, sculptors, entrepreneurs in Malwa as well as in Maharashtra. She also set up a textile mill in Maheshwar.

All Indian historians, as well as British and American historians recognise the fact that she was a saintly figure. That is why she is described as ‘Punyashloka Ahilyadevi (a holy person). In those days, transport facilities and roads were not underdeveloped. Still, she did lot of developmental work in many cities of India.

She supported farmers, relieved them of unjust taxes and trained them in maintaining cows. She worked to eradicate superstitions; and inhuman customs like sati. She argued that there was no mention of such a custom anywhere in Ramayana, Mahabharata or any other ancient literature. She earned a reputation for her sense of justice and judicial wisdom. She punished even senior officers and relatives if they erred.

Ahilyabai evolved a novel scheme of giving 12 trees to each of the poor farmers. They were expected to look after the trees. Every year, the fruits of 7 of the 12 trees were to be retained by them while fruits of 5 trees were to be given to the State. The State distributed them among poor people. Interestingly, this is believed to be the origin of the present day 7/12 extract of land records.

Unfortunately, she lost her 13-year-old grandson. So also, her son-in-law died in a battle. Her health deteriorated and she left for her heavenly abode on 13th August, 1795.

Namaskaar to this Great Woman of our country.

BOOK EXTRACT

BANKING DECEITS: ROGUE CREDIT CULTURE

“A diamond is forever” is the tag line of De Beers, the world’s household name for diamonds. Nirav Modi diamonds, which aspired to be the Indian De Beers brand equivalent, however failed to get its name etched as a diamond jeweller forever.

The unassuming Nirav Modi, owner of the once famed brand, grew up in Belgium, got admitted to Wharton School but failed to continue. He moved back to India in 1990 when he was 19. He trained for the diamond jewellery business under the sharp eyes of his uncle Mehul Choksi, promoter of another scam-hit, stock-market listed company, Gitanjali Gems.

In 1999, Nirav Modi branched out on his own, under the banner of Firestar Diamonds, starting his own diamond jewellery-making facility in India. Meanwhile the diamond industry was undergoing two major shifts. First, brands loomed large on the landscape that was once ruled by mom-and-pop boutiques and family jewellers. Clients began moving to branded jewellery – assurance of ethics was needed to repose trust. Second, design started taking precedence – shifting to ‘wearable’ creativity instead of just traditional diamonds and stones.

Nirav Modi took full advantage of these shifts in consumer preference. He realized that the luxury jewellery market was red hot, pushing into the ultra-luxe retail jewellery market in 2010. With the tagline “Haut Diamantaire”, he launched an eponymous jewellery business branded NIRAV MODI with 8 boutiques worldwide, including high street luxury stores in London, New York and Hong Kong.

Nirav Modi was just flying higher and higher in the $275 billion global jewellery market. Firestar group turnover grew to a whopping Rs 14,700 crore ($2 billion) by 2016-17 and he expressed his vision of having 100 stores by 2025. His name became the stamp of corporate India’s growing global status.

His diamonds sparkled on Hollywood red-carpets, adorning the necks and earlobes of celebrities like Kate Winslet. Back home in India, the Nirav Modi brand was splashed on hoardings across Delhi and Mumbai bearing the image of its global brand ambassador, actor and former Miss World, Priyanka Chopra.

Then came out the fraud – the mega heist structured by the borrower, aided by the lender. Nirav Modi used the classical method of relying on bank insiders, greasing palms and dodging technology, more than using it.

His lender, Punjab National Bank (PNB) stunned markets when it declared in February 2018 that its Mumbai branch in Fort area has lost over Rs 11,000 crore ($1.5 billion). Nirav Modi, three of his relatives (his wife, brother and uncle Mehul Choksi) and three firms (Diamonds R US, Solar Exports and Stellar Diamonds) in which Modi and Choksi were partners, got embroiled in one of the largest scams in the Indian financial market.

How was the fraud committed? It began with the diamond firms approaching PNB for financing import of rough diamonds. The much popular Letter of Credit (LC) facilities were opened by the bank, in favour of Nirav Modi’s firms, which allowed credit for a certain period. Nirav Modi bribed his way to obtain the LCs without any security, which is the primary requirement for any such facility. What these LCs allowed were imports for which payment can be made by the importer to the bank later that is, after the agreed credit period.

Based on the strength of the LCs, Nirav Modi firms got PNB to open Letters of Undertakings (LoUs) apparently for one year (though legally, it could not exceed three months), on foreign branches of certain Indian banks (LoU is a bank guarantee which allows bank’s customer to raise money from another Indian bank’s foreign branch in the form of short-term credit). When these LoUs were shown at the foreign branches, these banks remitted funds to PNB’s Nostro Accounts (accounts PNB had with the overseas banks). The available funds were then drawn and utilized by Nirav Modi’s team.

It was expected that Nirav Modi’s firms would settle their obligations with PNB on the expiry of the LoU period. This last leg did not happen; and this was the problem and obviously the swindle!

About 150 LoUs were fake – issued by a few PNB employees. Based on these unauthorized LoUs, PNB employees misused SWIFT network to transmit messages to foreign banks communicating details of sanctioned LoUs; by wilfully not recording these SWIFT messages in the bank’s core system. These omissions made the transactions by-pass the main PNB banking control system.   

When the news of the fraud got flashed all over – ironically on a Valentine’s Day – Nirav Modi’s abrupt upsurge to eminence came crashing down.

Why did he cheat? A logical reason could be his need for continuous funding. The pace of growth of his business was so fast and furious, it was perhaps difficult for him to fund his enormous marketing cost, super-model remunerations, new luxury-stores and investing in working capital.

Nirav Modi tagline “Say Yes, Forever” was literally followed by the lax Indian bank by continuing to heed his request for incessant loan-guarantees, fraudulently or otherwise.

Nirav Modi’s troubles mirror those of another Indian tycoon, Vijay Mallya. [Both Nirav Modi and Vijay Mallya are holed up in UK with the Indian government desperately trying to lock them up in Indian jails.]

When corporate tycoons run away with the money they have borrowed from banks, what credit culture are we talking about? It is sheer corporate crime of the highest order.  

Instances abound on entrepreneurs running away after loan defaults, especially when they have the ability to pay but do not do so. These instances raise doubts on the prevalent credit habits among the Indian corporates. It is true that all businesses cannot be painted with the same brush. But thousands including big names like Winsome Diamonds, Zoom Developers, Varun Industries, S Kumars and DSQ Software have taken the banking system to the cleaners.

Exasperated over the behaviour of certain borrowers, India’s largest banker lamented in 2017 that they no longer trusted ‘steel companies’. It was a sad day. Arundhati Bhattacharya, ex-State Bank of India chief, slammed steel firms for being non-transparent in their data presentation to the banks – disappointed over the way the industry misrepresented by twisting facts, while seeking loans. It was a bank-chief’s way of expressing annoyance over corporate India’s attitude towards taking bank funding and servicing thereof.

Many woes of non-payment in the Indian economy are due to past instances of political gridlocks, delayed permissions and economic slowdown. But it does not provide the license to any borrower, not to repay its liabilities willingly. Poor business conditions leading to banking defaults are excusable, but not when the borrower wilfully defaults. Sadly, numerous borrowers default in paying bank debts even when economic situations improve. This is poor corporate culture.

Tailpiece

Credit is oxygen to business. Its adequate flow is a necessity for any business to function effectively. The loans disbursed need to be supervised and recovered by the lenders, in accordance with the lending terms. But what if the borrower does not, purposefully? This is a significant issue of banking fraud. Money borrowed if properly utilised for intended purposes are often duly paid-back. But if the borrowed sums are either siphoned off, money laundered or used for unapproved projects, it becomes a huge hoax.  

Not returning money borrowed are deceptions which render short term gains to the borrowers but obliterate their long term wellbeing.

Extract from the book: CORPORATE FRAUDS: BIGGER, BROADER, BOLDER  by Robin Banerjee
Chapter 6 titled “Banking Deceits”, Pages 114-118

ABOUT THE BOOK

Think of East India Company. This business outfit came to India to do business and then stayed on to loot for 200 years. And this is not a solitary instance of corporate artifice.

Look around, and you will find businesses are cheating on you and me.

Take instances like banking mischiefs, which have been long known. It happens both ways. When banks are cheated and when banks cheat on us.

Many rich hide their wealth. Money laundering, creating shell companies, offshore banking and hiding ill-gotten wealth from the taxmen, are practised by many of the who’s who of our society.

Converting black money into white and vice versa is rather popular. Try to buy a home, and the chances are that a proportion needs to be paid in black. And you will need to figure out ways to acquire it!

Stock markets are somewhere we place our confidence to maximise our savings. But it’s full of potholes. Instances of insider trading, penny stocks, short selling, falsified profit numbers of companies are rather common.
Our way of knowing how companies perform is through their accounting numbers. But there are various ways to doctor them. This is a colossal  value destroyer.

There are numerous such stories and anecdotes in the book – over 350 of them. Simply written in understandable form, for all of us to understand. A recommended reading for all professionals.

SHOCK

A very interesting case was going on in the Court. The issue was very sensitive, and there were many stakeholders. The case had many social and financial ramifications. One party to the dispute was very influential and financially sound. The opponent party was aggrieved was not so resourceful.

The influential party had engaged a very reputed counsel who had an enviable track record of success. He and his client both were celebrities. The other party was a mediocre person. He could not afford a senior counsel. He had engaged a not so well-known junior counsel.  People had concluded that it was then a one-sided battle.

However, contrary to the expectations of all, the junior counsel fought it brilliantly. He had taken it as a challenge. And merits were really on his side. In the good old days, such merits had a good value in courts of law. Today, truth has to live with a lot of fear, and it does not come out that easily. It gets buried under money or muscle power!

Many experienced lawyers say that they win the cases not because of merits or their arguing skills, but just because the opponent’s lawyer is often not well prepared. In this case, the senior counsel, as usual, was very well prepared and had not taken it lightly. Still, the junior posed a great challenge to the senior. He made such brilliant arguments so beautifully that the people in the courtroom were pleasantly surprised. They were impressed. The senior was often put into a defensive position.

The balance had clearly tiled on the juniors side. The mediocre party was completely satisfied with his counsel’s performance.

He could barely afford the juniors counsel’s fees but had no means to purchase the decision.

The court was adjourned. The decision was to be announced the next day. The senior counsel was a little embarrassed, while the junior appeared to be triumphant. Many people congratulated him and even the media persons were all praise for him. The curiosity about the decision was mounting!.

The next day the proceedings resumed. The influential party and his counsel were very cool. The other party was very anxious. There was a pin-drop silence when the court started reading the judgement. The contents appeared to be quite balanced, though a little in favour of the smaller party.

However, unfortunately, the final verdict went against the junior; everybody was stunned! The influential party and his counsel were smiling as if they knew the outcome beforehand.

The junior counsel stood up and exclaimed –“I am shocked by this decision!” The court looked at him with a frown. It took it as an offence. People were confused about reacting, although they held the same opinion. There were anxious moments in the Court.

However, a very senior and respected counsel came to the rescue of junior counsel. He said, “My Lord, please forgive my learned young friend. He is new and has not much experience. Had he been experienced enough, he would not have been even half as much shocked as he is today!”

BOMBAY HIGH COURT ON RIGHTS OF SHAREHOLDERS – A RULING RELEVANT TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

BACKGROUND
A recent decision of the Bombay High Court not only lays down and confirms important principles of law but also has implications for corporate governance and rights of shareholders (‘activists’ or otherwise). The decision has seen differing views and reactions. Some support it as laying down correctly the law. Others hold that a more purposeful view of the provisions could have been taken as they believe the conclusions drawn impact the spirit of good corporate governance. Be as it may be, these important legal conclusions of the court are valuable to review. This decision is in the matter of Zee Entertainment Enterprises Ltd. vs. Invesco Developing Markets Fund ((2021) 131 Taxmann.com 321 (Bom.)).

This ruling is under appeal before the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court. Interestingly, parallel proceedings are also pending before the National Company Law Tribunal/National Company Law Appellate Tribunal for the same matter. Indeed, the core question of whether the NCLT has sole jurisdiction over such matters to the exclusion of the High Court is itself being pursued. Thus, we are likely to see further developments, including possibly a different view of the facts and/or law, in the matter.

SUMMARY OF CORE FACTS AND ISSUES
The core issue is whether shareholders have the unfettered right to call a general meeting and place resolutions for consideration by shareholders? Does the Board of Directors have any discretion or power to review and reject any of such resolutions or they are bound to call (or, in default, the shareholder group would itself call) such general meeting? Is the only thing the Board is expected to check is whether the procedural requirements of calling such general meetings are complied with? Or can the Board consider the merits of such resolutions in terms of their legality, whether such resolutions could result in violations of law by the company, etc.?

The matter concerned Zee Entertainment Enterprises Ltd. (ZEEL), a listed company. Two shareholders (‘the Shareholders’), holding, in the aggregate, 17.88% of the equity share capital of ZEEL, served a requisition under section 100 of the Companies Act, 2013 on ZEEL to convene an extraordinary general meeting (EGM) to consider primarily two categories of resolutions (aggregating to nine resolutions in all). The first three resolutions proposed the removal of three existing directors. The remaining six resolutions proposed the appointment of six specified individuals as independent directors. Two of the first three resolutions became redundant since two of the specified directors resigned voluntarily. Interestingly, the promoters of the company held only 3.99%.

The independent directors of ZEEL met and considered the matter. The Board of ZEEL considered various legal opinions and concluded that the notice of EGM was invalid and hence decided not to call the EGM. The reasons for holding that the notice was invalid were several and which were considered by the High Court. Since, under section 100, if the Board does not call the EGM, the Shareholders themselves could call it, ZEEL approached the High Court with three prayers. The first was to declare that the notice was illegal, ultra vires, invalid, bad in law and incapable of implementation. The second sought a declaration that the rejection by ZEEL to convene the EGM was valid in law. The third prayer sought an injunction against the Shareholders from holding the EGM themselves.

These prayers, including the grounds for rejection of such requisition, became the issues for consideration by the Court.

DOES THE HIGH COURT HAVE ANY JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN SUCH PETITIONS OR DOES THE NCLT HAVE SOLE JURISDICTION?
The Shareholders claimed that, in view of Section 430 of the Act, the High Court had no jurisdiction and the NCLT/NCLAT had sole jurisdiction over this matter. The Court rejected this contention stating that the relevant Rules that set out the provisions which NCLT has sole jurisdiction on does not include Section 100 and other relevant provisions. Thus, the Court concluded that it did have jurisdiction over such matters.

CAN SHAREHOLDERS PASS RESOLUTIONS WHICH HAVE LEGAL INFIRMITIES? CAN THE BOARD REJECT A REQUISITION ON SUCH GROUNDS?
This was the core and substantive issue before the Court. The Shareholders claimed that so long as the requirements of Section 100 are complied with, the Board was bound to call the EGM. Indeed, it was argued that Section 100 mandated the Board to do this by use of the word ‘shall’. The only principal substantive requirement the Board of Directors are required to check is whether the procedural requirements of Section 100 are complied with (e.g., the minimum percentage of shareholders specified (10%) have sought the holding of such EGM). This is the sole test that is relevant to decide whether the requisition is ‘valid’ (as specified in section 100(4)) or not. Effectively, the argument, as the Court highlighted, was that even if the resolutions could have resulted in ZEEL committing illegalities, the Board had no say and was bound to call the EGM.

ZEEL countered this by pointing several issues in the resolutions which made them illegal to be proceeded with and would also mean committing illegalities by ZEEL if such resolutions were passed. The appointment of six independent directors could possibly exceed the limit of 12 directors on the Board. ZEEL operated in areas that were regulated by Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (‘MIB’). Any change in the Board required prior approval of the MIB. The resolutions, however, proposed the appointment first and made it subject to approval, meaning the approval, if received, would be a post-facto approval. Thus, the removal or appointment of directors would mean violation of the MIB rules for which the company would suffer.

Appointment of independent directors could be made, in law, only by following a specified procedure. The Nomination and Remuneration Committee is required to review the merits of the proposed independent directors and recommend them to the Board. The Board thereafter, at their discretion, appoints such directors and this appointment has to be then approved by the shareholders. Thus, it was a three-step process mandated by law. ZEEL contended that the requisition sought to bypass the first two steps and, thus, again, the company would be held to commit violation if it allowed the resolutions. Indeed, it was contended, the shareholders could only ‘approve’ an appointment already made and not directly appoint an independent director itself.

ZEEL even questioned whether the directors proposed for appointment by certain substantial shareholders could be held to be ‘independent’, despite their respective merits and qualifications. In the ordinary course, nominee directors are by definition, not independent directors.

Thus, ZEEL contended on these and other grounds that if the EGM was allowed to be proceeded with and the resolutions passed, ZEEL would be committing several violations of law.

The High Court, in the very eloquently written judgment, held that the Board could not proceed with a requisition that would, if implemented, result in the company committing violations of law. Citing early precedents from the UK (where the law had thereafter changed, but the rulings still had merit) and also elsewhere, as well as decisions of Indian courts, the Court held that the Board was not bound to convene an EGM if the resolutions resulted in the company committing illegalities. Particularly for listed companies (and ZEEL was a listed company), there were certain specified requirements to be followed for the appointment of independent directors, and these could not be bypassed. The prior approval of the MIB for changes in the Board was required while the resolutions proposed that it could be obtained later on.

An issue arose whether the Board of Directors could consider extreme situations and possibilities to decide whether the resolutions may end up in the company committing illegalities. The Court held that the Board could and cited the philosopher Karl Popper and held that the test of illegality was to be checked from every angle, even extreme ones. It observed, ‘Any hypothesis has to be tested, repeatedly, for failure; including testing at the margins or extremities. It is no use saying that a hypothesis fits a median situation. The question is whether the hypothesis survives a test or collision against a polarity? If it does, then it is sound; if not, it must fail throughout and considered unsound’. To demonstrate this, the Court asked the counsel for the Shareholders whether a resolution proposing that the company engage in gambling business (illegal in India) could be allowed? The counsel replied that this was an extreme or outlandish proposition. The Hon’ble Court held that even such extreme tests were necessary to test the proposition raised. If the argument of the Shareholders was accepted, even a ‘madcap resolution’ would end up being allowed.

The Court also made another important point. It observed that even the Board of Directors itself could not propose such resolutions in the manner in which they were proposed as there would be violations of law. The shareholders are not on any higher pedestal, and the same criteria are applied. Had the Board proposed such resolution, could a shareholder object before a court against such proposals and seek injunctions? The Court answered in the affirmative.

Thus, the Court affirmed the decision of the Board of ZEEL to reject the requisition and granted the injunctions prayed. The EGM was directed not to be held by the Board or by the requisitioning shareholders.

IMPLICATIONS ON RIGHTS OF SHAREHOLDERS AND ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GENERALLY
With due respect, some aspects are worthy of consideration and debate. Concerns have been raised whether the court ruling would disempower shareholders and put brakes on even healthy shareholder activism. It could, it is argued, excessively empower an existing board having support of a small minority of shareholders and exclude the majority shareholders from exercising their rights. In particular, the issue raised was whether the process of screening prospective directors through the Nomination and Remuneration Committee was for the benefit of shareholders or could be used to supplant and exclude them? Indeed, this would mean that the shareholders could not even appoint directly those board members who would form this Committee. These, it is respectfully submitted, are valid points but it is also respectfully submitted that the answer lies in an amendment of the law, which, perhaps in hindsight, does seem to have lacuna which the present decision has thrown up.

In any case, it is respectfully submitted, that the Hon’ble Court is right in holding that the Board could not allow resolutions to be passed and implemented resulting in the company violating legal requirements. As the Court pithily observed, ‘Sometimes, it happens that a company must be saved from its own shareholders, however well-intentioned’.

IBC AND MORATORIUMS

INTRODUCTION
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (‘the Code’) has become one of the most dynamic and fast-changing legislations. Not only has the Government been modifying it from time to time, but the Judiciary is also playing a very active role in ironing out creases and resolving controversies. The Code provides for the insolvency resolution process of corporate debtors. The Code gets triggered when a corporate debtor commits a default in payment of a debt, which could be financial or operational. The initiation (or starting) of the corporate insolvency resolution process under the Code may be done by a financial creditor (in respect of default of financial debt) or an operational creditor (in respect of default of an operational debt) or by the corporate itself (in respect of any default).

One of the important facets of this resolution process is a moratorium on legal proceedings against the corporate debtor contained u/s 14 of the Code. This provision has seen a great deal of judicial development in recent times. Let us analyse this crucial section in greater detail.

MORATORIUM
Once the insolvency resolution petition against the corporate debtor is admitted by the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), and after the corporate insolvency resolution process commences, the NCLT declares a moratorium prohibiting institution or continuation of any suits against the debtor; execution of any judgment of a Court / authority; any transfer of assets by the debtor; and recovery of any property against the debtor. The moratorium continues till the resolution process is completed. Thus, total protection is offered to the debtor against any suits / proceedings. In Alchemist Asset Reconstruction Company Ltd. vs. Hotel Gaudavan (P.) Ltd. [2018] 145 SCL 428 (SC), it was held that even arbitration proceedings are stayed during this period.

An extract of the relevant provisions is given below:

Moratorium.
14. (1) Subject to provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3), on the insolvency commencement date, the Adjudicating Authority shall by order declare moratorium for prohibiting all of the following, namely:—
(a) the institution of suits or continuation of pending suits or proceedings against the corporate debtor including execution of any judgment, decree or order in any court of law, tribunal, arbitration panel or other authority;
(b) transferring, encumbering, alienating or disposing of by the corporate debtor any of its assets or any legal right or beneficial interest therein;
(c) any action to foreclose, recover or enforce any security interest created by the corporate debtor in respect of its property including any action under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (54 of 2002);
(d) the recovery of any property by an owner or lessor where such property is occupied by or in the possession of the corporate debtor.
…………………….
(2) The supply of essential goods or services3 to the corporate debtor as may be specified shall not be terminated or suspended or interrupted during the moratorium period.
…………………….
(3) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply to:—
(a) such transactions, agreements or other arrangements as may be notified by the Central Government in consultation with any financial sector regulator or any other authority.
(b) a surety in a contract of guarantee to a corporate debtor.’

(4) The order of moratorium shall have effect from the date of such order till the completion of the corporate insolvency resolution process:
Provided that where at any time during the corporate insolvency resolution process period, if the Adjudicating Authority approves the resolution plan under sub-section (1) of section 31 or passes an order for liquidation of the corporate debtor under section 33, the moratorium shall cease to have effect from the date of such approval or liquidation order, as the case may be.”

The Supreme Court in P. Mohanraj vs. Shah Brothers Ispat P Ltd. [2021] 125 taxmann.com 39 (SC) has explained that the object of a moratorium provision such as s.14 of the Code was to see that there was no depletion of a corporate debtor’s assets during the insolvency resolution process so that it could be kept running as a going concern during this time, thus maximising value for all stakeholders. The idea was that it facilitated the continued operation of the business of the corporate debtor to allow it breathing space to organise its affairs so that new management may ultimately take over and bring the corporate debtor out of financial sickness, thus benefitting all stakeholders, which would include workmen of the corporate debtor. The Apex Court further explained that while s.14(1)(a) referred to monetary liabilities of the corporate debtor, s.14(1)(b) referred to the corporate debtor’s assets. Together, these two clauses formed a scheme that shielded the corporate debtor from pecuniary attacks against it in the moratorium period so that the corporate debtor got breathing space to continue as a going concern in order to rehabilitate itself ultimately. Relying on this explanation, the Supreme Court did not allow cheque bouncing proceedings to continue against the corporate debtor u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. It held that a quasi-criminal proceeding that is contained in Chapter XVII of the Negotiable Instruments Act would, given the object and context of s.14 of IBC, amount to a ‘proceeding’ within the meaning of s.14(1)(a) of the Code. Hence, the moratorium would attach to such a proceeding.

In the case of Sandeep Khaitan vs. JSVM Plywood Industries Ltd. [2021] 166 SCL 494 (SC) the Apex Court dealt with an issue of whether the High Court has inherent powers under s.482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 to make such orders against the corporate debtor to give effect to any order under that Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice? The Court held that the power under s.482 of the CrPC may not be available to the Court to allow the breach of a statutory provision. The words ‘to secure the ends of justice’ in s.482 cannot mean to overlook the undermining of a Statute, i.e., the provisions of s.14 of the Code.

Similarly, in Anand Rao Korada v Varsha Fabrics P Ltd. [2019] 111 taxmann.com 474 (SC), in order to recover labour dues, the High Court ordered the auction of the assets of the corporate debtor after issuance of the moratorium. The Supreme Court set aside this Order and held that if the assets of the company were alienated during the pendency of the proceedings under the IBC, it would seriously jeopardise the interest of all the stakeholders. The sale or liquidation of assets had to be in accordance with the IBC only.

RECOVERY OF PROPERTY
In Rajendra K Bhutta vs. MHADA [2020] 160 SCL 95 (SC), a society redevelopment project was blessed by the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority (MHADA). The developer went into insolvency, MHADA wanted to take over possession of the land given to the developer for demolition and redevelopment. The Supreme Court disallowed this owing to the moratorium u/s. 14(1)(d). It held that under s.14(1)(d) what was referred to was the ‘recovery of any property’ of the corporate debtor. It was clear that when recovery of property was to be made by an owner under s.14(1)(d), such recovery would be of property that was ‘occupied by’ a corporate debtor. The expression ‘occupied by’ would mean or be synonymous with being in actual physical possession of or being actually used by, in contra-distinction to the expression ‘possession’, which would connote possession being either constructive or actual and which, in turn, would include legally being in possession, though factually not being in physical possession. Since it was clear that the Joint Development Agreement had granted a license to the developer (i.e., the corporate debtor) to enter upon the property, with a view to do all the things that were mentioned in it, it is obvious that after such entry, the property would be ‘occupied by’ the developer. Section 14(1)(d) of the Code, when it speaks about recovery of property ‘occupied’ refers to actual physical occupation of the property. Hence, MHADA’s plea for repossession of the land was turned down.

NATURAL PERSONS NOT PROTECTED
In the above referred decision of P.Mohanraj (supra), the Supreme Court also held that it is clear that the moratorium provision contained in s.14 of the IBC would apply only to the corporate debtor, the natural persons, i.e., its Directors in charge of its affairs continued to be statutorily liable under the Negotiable Instruments Act. Accordingly, criminal proceedings could continue unabated against the Managing Director / Other Directors who have drawn the bounced cheque.

Similarly, in Anjali Rathi vs. Today Homes & Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. [2021] 130 taxmann.com 253 (SC), the Supreme Court allowed proceedings to be carried out against the promoters of a corporate debtor which was a developer for failing to honour the terms of settlement entered into with home buyers.

PERSONAL GUARANTOR NOT SHIELDED
Another novel issue arose in SBI vs. V. Ramakrishnan [2018] 96 taxmann.com 271 (SC) of whether the moratorium extended to the personal guarantor of a corporate debtor also? The Court held that the moratorium under s.14 cannot possibly apply to a personal guarantor. This decision has since been given the shape of law by inserting sub-section (3) in s.14 which expressly provides that the moratorium under s.14 will not apply to a surety in a contract of guarantee to a corporate debtor.

WILFUL DEFAULTER PROCEEDINGS CONTINUE
An interesting question arose before the Calcutta High Court in the case of Gouri Prasad Goenka vs. State Bank of India, LSI-473-HC-2021(CAL). Here the corporate debtor had gone into insolvency resolution. However, the question was whether wilful defaulter proceedings could be initiated against the promoter, in view of the moratorium imposed u/s 14? The Court held that whole-time directors and promoters who were in charge of the affairs of the defaulting company during the relevant period, when the default was committed, could not be said to be absolved of their act of wilful default committed prior to final approval and acceptance of a resolution plan. The moratorium in no way prevented this. The wilful defaulter declaration proceeding were to disseminate credit information for cautioning banks and financial institutions so as to ensure that further bank finance was not made available to them and not for recovery of debts or assets of the corporate debtor, which could hamper the corporate resolution process.

PMLA ATTACHMENT OF ASSETS
In Directorate of Enforcement vs. Manoj Kumar Agarwal [2021] 126 taxmann.com 210 (NCL-AT), the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal was determining whether an attachment order passed by the Enforcement Directorate under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 before the start of the resolution process of the corporate debtor could survive in view of s.14?

The NCL-AT held that the aim and object of the PMLA for attaching the property alleged to be involved in money laundering was to avoid concealment, transfer or dealing in any manner which may result in frustrating any proceedings relating to the confiscation of such proceeds of crime under PMLA. Thus, Provisional Attachment Order was issued for a period not exceeding 180 days from the date of Order. Now if s.14(1)(b) of IBC relating to the moratorium was seen, the NCLT was required to pass an order declaring a moratorium, inter alia prohibiting ‘transferring, encumbering, alienating or disposing of by the Corporate Debtor any of its assets or any legal right or beneficial interest therein? thus the moment an insolvency was initiated, the property of the corporate debtor was protected by such a moratorium. Thus, both the provisions sought to protect the property of corporate debtor from transfer etc. till further actions take place. It further held s.14 would be attracted in all such cases. Once the moratorium was ordered, even if the Enforcement Directorate moved the Adjudicating Authority under PMLA, further action before the Adjudicating Authority under PMLA must be said to have been prohibited. Section 14 of IBC will hit the institution and continuation of proceedings before Adjudicating Authority under PMLA.

CONCLUSION
The provisions relating to the moratorium are very important to protect the assets and going concern of the corporate debtor. However, Courts are quick to ensure that while it is a shield for the debtor it cannot be used as a shield by its promoters / directors.

NO CONSTRUCTIVE CREDITS!

INTRODUCTION
In the previous article, we discussed clause (h) of Section 17(5) of the CGST Act, 2017 which deals with the restriction on claim of input tax credit in cases where goods are lost, stolen, destroyed, written off or disposed of by way of gift or free samples. In this article, we will discuss clauses (c) & (d) of Section 17(5) which restrict claim of input tax credit on goods or services received in the construction of an immovable property.

PROVISIONS UNDER GST REGIME
Let us first refer to the relevant provisions for ease of reference:

‘(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) of Section 16 and sub-section (1) of Section 18, input tax credit shall not be available in respect of the following, namely:

(c) works contract services when supplied for construction of an immovable property (other than plant and machinery) except where it is an input service for further supply of works contract service;

(d) goods or services or both received by a taxable person for construction of an immovable property (other than plant or machinery) on his own account including when such goods or services or both are used in the course or furtherance of business.

Explanation — For the purposes of clauses (c) and (d), the expression ‘construction’ includes re-construction, renovation, additions or alterations or repairs, to the extent of capitalisation, to the said immovable property’;

Clause (c) above restricts the availability of input tax credit in respect of works contract services supplied for construction of immovable property other than plant and machinery while clause (d) restricts the availability of input tax credit on goods or services or both received for construction of immovable property other than ‘plant or machinery’ on his own account including when such goods or services or both are used in the course or furtherance of his own business. On a plain reading, one may feel that clauses (c) and (d) are similar, with the only distinction being that the former applies to works contract services received while the latter applies to independent goods or services being received for the same activity, i.e., construction of immovable property. However, there are various nuances, which will be discussed later.

THERE SHOULD BE AN IMMOVABLE PROPERTY
This is the primary condition for an inward supply to be covered under the blocked credit list. It, therefore, becomes important to analyse the scope of the term ‘immovable property’. While the same is not defined under the GST law, one may refer to the definition u/s 2(26) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which defines the same as under:

‘Immovable Property includes land, benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth, or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth.’

Even the Real Estate (Regulation & Development) Act, 2016 defines the term ‘immovable property’ in a similar manner:

‘Immovable property includes land, buildings, rights of ways, lights or any other benefit arising out of land and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything which is attached to the earth, but not standing timber, standing crops or grass.’

Ongoing through the above set of definitions, it is apparent that land, along with anything attached or fastened to it, is an immovable property. However, when something is attached/ fastened to an immovable property, the nature of attachment/ fastening needs to be looked into before concluding if such thing is also a part of the immovable property. In Triveni Engineering & Industries Limited [2000 (120) ELT 0273 SC], the Hon’ble SC had held that installation or erection of turbo alternator on the concrete base specially constructed on the land cannot be treated as a common base and, therefore, it follows that the resultant structure would be an immovable property and therefore, cannot be treated as ‘excisable goods’.

On the contrary, in the case of Solid & Correct Engineering Works [2010 (252) E.L.T. 481 (S.C.)], the Court held that attachment of plant with nuts and bolts intended to provide stability and prevent vibration not covered as attached to the earth and hence not immovable property. It was more so as such attachment was easily detachable from foundation and not permanent in nature.

In Craft Interiors Private Limited [2006 (203) ELT 529 (SC)], the SC dealt with the issue of whether furniture attached to an immovable property can be treated as immovable property or not? The SC held that furniture items, such as storage cabinets, kitchen counters, etc., which are erected at customer site and cannot be dismantled/removed in complete or semi-knocked conditions, are immovable in nature and, therefore, not excisable. On the other hand, the Court also held that items like desks and chairs, are easily movable and therefore, excisable.

In WeWork India Management Private Limited [2020 (37) GSTL 136 (AAAR – GST – Kar)], the issue before the Appellate Authority was eligibility to claim the input tax credit on detachable sliding & glass partitions. Observing that the sliding/ partitions could be removed without any damage, the Authority held that the same was a movable property and, therefore, the same was not hit by clause (c)/(d) of Section 17(5).

Therefore, while determining whether a property is movable or not, following needs to be taken care of:

• What is the degree of permanency of the attachment to the land?
• Whether the goods attached/ fastened can be detached without causing substantial damage to it?
• Is the identity of the goods post-removal lost?

THE IMMOVEABLE PROPERTY SHOULD NOT BE IN THE NATURE OF PLANT AND MACHINERY
In case the resultant immovable property is in the nature of ‘plant and machinery’, the credit is not blocked. What constitutes ‘plant and machinery’ has been explained by way of explanation to Section 17(5) as under:

‘For the purposes of this Chapter and Chapter VI, the expression ‘plant and machinery’ means apparatus, equipment, and machinery fixed to earth by foundation or structural support that are used for making outward supply of goods or services or both and includes such foundation and structural supports but excludes —

(i) land, building or any other civil structures;
(ii) telecommunication towers; and
(iii) pipelines laid outside the factory premises’.

The terms ‘apparatus’, ‘equipment’ and ‘machinery’ are not defined under the CGST Act, 2017 or the rules made thereunder. Therefore, to understand the said terms, let us refer to their dictionary meaning:

  

 

Apparatus

Equipment

Machinery

Oxford Dictionary

The equipment needed for a particular activity or purpose

The items needed for a particular purpose

Machines as a whole or parts of machine

Collin’s Dictionary

Apparatus is the equipment, such as tools and machines, which is
used to do a particular job or activity

Equipment consists of the things which are used for a particular
purpose

Machines, machine parts, or machine systems collectively

MacMillan Dictionary

The machines, tools and equipments needed for doing something,
especially something technical or scientific

The tools, machines, or other things that you need for a
particular job or activity

The moving or working parts of a machinery

Black’s Law Dictionary

An outfit of tools, utensils or
instruments adapted to accomplishment of any branch of work or for
performance of experiment or operation. A group or set of organs concerned in
performance of single function.

Whatever is needed in equipping; the articles comprised in an
outfit

Complex combination of mechanical parts

(continued)

 

A generic word of the most comprehensive significance
which may mean
implements
and an equipment of things provided, and adapted as a means to some end

 

 

 

Ongoing through the above, anything which can perform a specific function or operation or undertaking any process can qualify as apparatus or equipment or machinery and will, therefore, consequently be treated as ‘plant and machinery’.

The above explanation refers only to such plant and machinery which has been fixed to earth by foundation or structural support, i.e., this explanation is specifically for cases where there can be a dispute as to whether the ‘plant and machinery’ are classifiable as immovable property or not. For instance, elevators for a building are plant and machinery, but are of such a nature that once installed, it is impossible to uninstall them without any damage to the structure. However, it is apparent that the elevator is machinery, and therefore, the legislature has specifically carved out an exception that permits the claim of input tax credit for such transactions.

However, in the case of Las Palmas CHS [2020 (41) GSTL 548 (AAAR-Mah)], the issue raised before the Appellate Authority was whether input tax credit could be claimed on receipt of inward supply of elevator, if the cost of such elevator was recovered from the members? The Authority held in the negative as Section  17(5)(c) applied only when the input works contract services were used for further making an outward supply of works contract services. However, it seems that the Authority has not analysed whether the elevator qualified as ‘plant and machinery’ and thereby eligible for input tax credit.

In P K Mahapatra [2020 (40) GSTL 99 (AAAR – GST – Chhattisgarh)], the issue before the Appellate Authority was to determine whether input tax credit could be claimed on the installation of private railway siding? Once again, the Authority denied the benefit concluding that the same amounted to an immovable property, without going into whether the railway siding could have been treated as plant and machinery or not? In fact, the CESTAT has, in the case of India Cements Ltd. [2017 (3) GSTL 144 (Tri – Hyd)], already held that CENVAT credit can be claimed on railway siding.

This takes us to the includes clause which provides that foundation and structural supports in relation to apparatus, equipment or machinery will also be included within the scope of ‘plant and machinery’. This would primarily cover expenses incurred towards civil works done for installing the goods purchased. However, in Maruti Ispat & Energy Private Limited [2018 (18) GSTL 847 (AAR – GST)], the Authority held that input tax credit on inputs/ input services used for constructing a foundation for installation of ‘plant and machinery’ was hit by Section 17(5)(c) as the same was ‘other structures’ referred to in Explanation to Section 17(5) defining the scope of ‘plant and machinery’.

What is important is the third clause, i.e., the excludes clause, which excludes the following from the scope of ‘plant and machinery’:
(i) land, building or any other civil structures;
(ii) telecommunication towers; and
(iii) pipelines laid outside the factory premises.

It is imperative to note that an inward supply may fall under the means or includes clause and therefore be classifiable as ‘plant and machinery’. However, if such inward supply gets covered under any of the above entries provided in the excludes clause, the same would not be considered ‘plant and machinery’ and, therefore, covered under the blocked credits.

The above provisions bring to limelight the interplay between the concept of land, building and civil structures and ‘plant and machinery’. Indeed, in the past, various decisions have held that if the land, building or any other civil structure thereon is so constructed to act as a plant, the functional utility of the asset would be pre-dominant and the asset could indeed be classified as a ‘plant and machinery.’ For instance, the House of Lords, in the case of IRC vs. Barclay Curle & Co. has held that a concrete dry dock is a plant [76 ITR 62 (House of Lords)]. Similarly, one may also refer to the following decisions, though in the context of Income Tax, where different civil structures have been held to be a plant:

• Dam – Tata Hydro Electric Power Supply [(122 ITR 288 (Bom)]
• Nursing Home – Dr. B Venkata Rao [243 ITR 81(S.C)]
• Cold Storage – Kanodia Cold Storage [(100 ITR 155(All)]

• Safe deposit vault – Central Bank of India [(102 ITR 270 (Bom)]

The claim of input tax credit on the above structures, which otherwise are classifiable as plant is hit, in view of the excludes clause in the definition of ‘plant and machinery’. The next two entries, i.e., telecommunication towers and pipelines laid outside the factory premises, are industry-specific restrictions on claim of credit, similar to the restriction on the claim of an input tax credit on the purchase of motor vehicles and there, does not appear to be much scope to escape from the purview of Section 17(5)(c) for the  specific industries.

PLANT OR MACHINERY

As stated above, explanation to Section 17(5) defines the scope of ‘plant and machinery’ as a whole. However, clause (d) carves out an exception for ‘plant or machinery’ and not ‘plant and machinery’. This, unless one undertakes a liberal or purposive interpretation, the Explanation to Section 17(5) cannot be used to examine whether a particular item is ‘plant or machinery’ as the same deals with ‘plant and machinery’. Therefore, the common parlance meaning needs to be applied while analysing the said terms.

The dictionary meanings of term ‘plant’ are reproduced below for reference:

Oxford Dictionary – Machinery used in an industrial or manufacturing process.

Collin’s Dictionary – Plant is a large machinery that is used in industrial processes.

MacMillan Dictionary – Large machines and equipment’s used in factory.

Black’s Law Dictionary – The fixtures, tools, machinery and apparatus which are necessary to carry on a trade or business. Physical equipment to produce any desired result or an operating unit.

The above dictionary definitions give plant a wider scope for interpretation, and machinery is included within the purview of the term ‘plant’. The term ‘plant’ was interpreted on multiple occasions by Courts in the context of Income Tax, where it was defined to be an instrument which is utilized to carry on the business, and which is not merely the setting in which the business is carried on. The Courts have on multiple occasions held that when an immovable property has been so constructed as to facilitate the carrying on of the operations of a particular business, the said immovable property can be treated as ‘plant’ and not merely ‘building’.

One may refer to the decisions in the case of C.I.T vs. Kanodia Warehousing Corpn [121 ITR 996(All)], Benson vs. Yard Arm Club Ltd. [1979 Tax L.R 778(Cr.D)], C.I.T vs. Bank of India Ltd. [118 ITR 809 ,818-9 (Bom)], George Mathew vs. C.I.T [43 ITR 535 at 540 (Kar)], Mangalore Ganesh Beedi Works vs. C.I.T [52 ITR 615 (Mysore)] and C.I.T vs. Elecon Engineering Co Ltd. [96 ITR 672 at 686-689 (Guj)] affirmed by the Supreme Court [166 ITR 66 (S.C)] where an extremely wide meaning has been given to the term ‘plant’.

If a view that a particular immovable property is classifiable as a plant survives, one can escape from the purview of Section 17(5)(d) since the entry itself does not apply. Therefore, the phrase “on his own account” becomes irrelevant in such a case. However, the same would not apply for Section 17(5)(c) since the same refers to ‘plant and machinery’, which is specifically defined u/s 17(5).

THERE SHOULD BE CONSTRUCTION OF AN IMMOVABLE PROPERTY

Clauses (c) and (d) of Section 17(5) apply for the activity of construction. The term ‘construction’ has been defined by way of an explanation as under:

For the purposes of clauses (c) and (d), the expression ‘construction’ includes re-construction, renovation, additions or alterations or repairs, to the extent of capitalisation, to the said immovable property;

The definition is provided in an inclusive manner, and therefore, the general parlance meaning of the word ‘construction’ would be applicable. Generally, the word construction is used in a situation where a new building or a structure comes into existence when none existed beforehand. In distinction, reconstruction would be a more appropriate term where an existing building is demolished, and a fresh structure is being brought into existence. Nevertheless, it was held that the general meaning of construction would take in its’ fold not only the creation of a new building but also a case of demolition of an existing building and re-construction of the building (Sadha Singh S Mulla Singh vs. District Board AIR 1962 Pun 204).

While the terms ‘construction’ and ‘re-construction’ both envisage a situation of a new civil structure coming into existence, the later inclusive words like renovation, addition or alteration or repairs are all intended to cover existing structures where certain activity is carried out. In this context, it may be useful to refer to the erstwhile service tax legislation wherein a distinction was made between construction, repair, renovation or restoration of a building or civil structure and ‘completion and finishing services’. Separate sub-clauses governed these activities under the positive list regime of service tax, and abatement was denied for ‘completion and finishing services’. Similarly, a separate valuation rule was provided for ‘completion and finishing services’. Various controversies arose in the said legislation where the assessee argued the classification of activities like plumbing, glazing, electrical work, painting, etc., as construction activities being eligible for the abatement/lower valuation, whereas the Revenue contended that the activities do not constitute construction but completion and finishing services. For example, whether plumbing activities would constitute completion and finishing or construction activity is a matter pending before the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner vs. Sai Shraddha Plumbing Private Limited 2019 (28) GSTL J71 (SC). The outcome of the said decision may perhaps open up an opportunity for claiming input tax credit.

Further, the Explanation restricts the scope of construction activity. Accordingly, a receipt of works contract services u/s 17(5)(c) or goods or services or both u/s 17(5)(d) can be said to be towards the construction of immovable property only to the extent the cost has been capitalized in the books of accounts.

To capitalize means to expense the cost over the useful life rather than in the period in which it is incurred. In accounting, capitalisation occurs when a cost is included in the value of an asset. The matching principle requires companies to record expenses in the same accounting period in which the related revenue is incurred. For example, office supplies are generally expensed in the period when they are incurred since they are expected to be consumed within a short period of time. However, some larger office equipment may benefit the business over more than one accounting period. These items are fixed assets, such as computers, cars, office buildings, significant renovation and repair works to the building, etc. The cost of these items is recorded on the general ledger as the historical cost of the asset. Hence, these costs are said to be capitalized,
not expensed.

Therefore, if the taxpayer has satisfied this condition also, whereby he has capitalised the cost of works contracts service or goods/ services received for repairs, renovation, alteration, etc. of immovable property, only then does the restriction under clauses (c) and (d) of Section 17(5) get triggered.

This also raises an interesting question. Let us take an example of a partnership firm that has constructed a shopping mall, to be given on rental basis post-construction. The activity of renting is liable to GST and for the purpose of income tax, is treated as income from house property. Being a partnership firm, it is not required to get its accounts audited under the Partnership Act or under the Income Tax Act, 1961 as Section 44AB does not apply since the rental income is treated as ‘income from house property’ and not ‘business income’. In such a circumstance, the firm can always take a view to expense out the entire construction cost upfront, in which case the inward supply received cannot be said to be used for construction of an immovable property and therefore, would entitle the partnership firm to claim full input tax credit. This view of course would be subject to litigation.

MEANING OF ‘OWN ACCOUNT’
One of the phrases used in Section 17(5)(d) and not in Section 17(5)(c) is that the construction of the immovable property should be on recipients ‘own account’. The term ‘own account’ is defined in various dictionaries
as under:

Collin’s Dictionary – If you take part in a business activity on your own account, you do it for yourself, and not as a representative or employee of a company

MacMillan Dictionary – for yourself, not for someone else

Lexico – For one’s own purpose; for oneself

Black’s Law Dictionary – To have a good legal title; to hold as property; to have a legal or rightful title to; to have; to possess.

Therefore, the construction of an immovable property on his ‘own account’ means something that a person or a company does for itself. The rights and benefits of the constructed immovable property are enjoyed by the person who has actually got the construction
work done.

This interpretation of term ‘own account’ is likely to cause disputes. A mall owner, while constructing a mall, has the intention to lease the entire mall and earn income from it. Although the asset appears in its books, and therefore legally one may say the construction is for own account, it can be argued that the intention is not to use it for his own operations but allow other tenants to use it, thereby the benefit of the construction is not to his ‘own account’. Therefore, the same should not be covered under the blocked credits list.

This aspect has already seen judicial scrutiny in the case of Safari Retreats Pvt. Ltd. & Others vs. Chief Commissionerof CGST [2019-TIOL-1088-HC-ORISSA-GST] wherein the Hon’ble High Court allowed ITC on the construction of a mall by laying a principle that the creation of an asset will generate revenue which will be subject to GST. The Appeal against the said order is pending before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, and the matter is awaiting finality.

CONCLUSION
The intention of clauses (c) and (d) is clear, which is to deny the input tax credit in relation to immovable property. However, the manner in which the provisions are worded and the possibility of varied interpretation makes the said clauses a land mine for litigation. Already, the Hon’ble Orissa HC, in the case of Safari Retreats, has agreed with one of the views perhaps contrary to the legislative intent. However, the fact cannot be ruled out that the intention of the Government is to deny the input tax credit on such inward supplies, and therefore, retrospective amendment of this provisions may not be ruled out. Consequently, one has to be careful while taking a position w.r.t claim of input tax credit having an overlap with clauses (c) and (d) of Section 17(5) of the CGST Act, 2017.

QUALIFIED OPINION – IMPAIRMENT TESTING NOT CARRIED OUT FOR INVESTMENT IN A MATERIAL SUBSIDIARY

DISH TV INDIA LTD (31st MARCH 2021)

From Auditors’ Report (Standalone)
Basis of Qualified Opinion
As stated in Note 41 to the accompanying standalone financial statements, the Company has a non-current investment in and other non-current loans to its wholly-owned subsidiary amounting to Rs. 515,412 lacs and Rs. 74,173 lacs respectively. The wholly-owned subsidiary has negative net current assets and has incurred losses in the current year, although it has a positive net worth as of 31st March 2021. As described in the aforementioned note, management, basis its internal assessment, has considered such balances as fully recoverable as of 31st March 2021. However, the management has not carried out a detailed and comprehensive impairment testing in accordance with the principles of Indian Accounting Standard – 36, “Impairment of Assets” and Indian Accounting Standard – 109, “Financial Instruments”. In the absence of sufficient appropriate evidence to support management’s conclusion, we are unable to comment upon adjustments, if any, that may be required to the carrying value of these non-current investments and non-current loans and its consequential impact on the accompanying standalone financial statements.

Our opinion for the year ended 31st March 2020 was also modified in respect of this matter.

From Auditors’ Report on Internal Financial Controls regarding Financial Statements
Qualified Opinion
According to the information and explanations given to us and based on our audit, the following material weakness has been identified in the operating effectiveness of the Company’s internal financial controls with reference to financial statements as of 31st March 2021: As explained in Note 41 and Note 42 to the standalone financial statements, the Company has performed an internal assessment to estimate the fair value of its investment in its subsidiary, which in our view is not a detailed and comprehensive test in accordance with the principles of Indian Accounting Standard – 36 “Impairment of Assets” and Indian Accounting Standard – 109 “Financial Instruments”. As a result, the Company’s internal financial control system towards estimating the fair value of its investment in its subsidiary were not operating effectively, which could result in the Company not providing for adjustment, if any that may be required to the carrying values of non-current investment and other non-current loans, and its consequential impact on the earnings, reserves and related disclosures in the accompanying standalone financial statements.

From Notes to Financial Statements
Note 41
The Company has non-current investments (including equity component of long term loans and guarantees)
in and non-current loans to its wholly-owned subsidiary, Dish Infra Services Private Limited (‘Dish Infra’), amounting to Rs. 515,412 lacs and Rs. 74,173 lacs respectively. Dish Infra’s net worth is positive although it has incurred losses in the current year. Based on internal assessment, the management believes that the realisable amount from Dish Infra will be higher than the carrying value of the non-current investments and other non-current loans. Hence, no impairment has been considered. The internal assessment is based on the ability of Dish Infra to monetise its assets including investments in new-age technologies, which will generate sufficient cash flows in the future.

From Directors’ Report
Details of Audit Qualification, as per Auditors’ Report dated 30th June 2021, on the Standalone Financial Results of the Company for the Financial Year 2020-21: Not reproduced

Management Response:
(a) The Company as of 31st March 2021, has non-current Investment (including equity component of long term loans and guarantees) in and non-current loans to its wholly-owned subsidiary, Dish Infra Services Private Limited (‘Dish Infra’), amounting to Rs. 5,15,412 lacs and Rs. 74,173 lacs respectively. Dish Infra’s net worth is positive although it has incurred losses in the current year. Based on internal assessment, Management believes that the realisable amount from Dish Infra will be higher than the carrying value of the non-current investments and other non-current financial assets. Hence, no impairment has been considered. The internal assessment is based on the ability of Dish Infra to monetise its assets including investments in new-age technologies, which will generate sufficient cash flows in the future.

(b) The Company has a well-defined system in place to access the appropriateness of the carrying value of its investments and estimation is performed with proper laid down process based on valuation models, usually applied in such cases. The model is refined from time to time to provide appropriateness, accuracy and fair value at a particular point in time. Our internal valuation team has performed the assessment of valuation models, specifically in the testing of key assumptions, the accuracy of inputs used in the models to determine the fair value.

 

TAXABILITY OF EXPORT COMMISSION PAID TO A NON-RESIDENT AGENT

Rapid globalisation and the increasing use of technology has resulted in a significant increase in foreign remittances from India. Given the onerous responsibility of a practitioner to certify the tax liability of the non-resident recipient to a foreign remittance, it is imperative that one is aware of the various interpretations available, and takes an informed view while issuing Form 15CB.

Over a series of articles, the authors seek to analyse the withholding tax implications and some of the issues arising on some of the common remittances. While all forms of remittances may not be covered in this article, the authors’ objective is to provide comprehensive coverage of the limited types of remittances.

In this first part of the series, we have analysed payments regarding export commission.

1. BACKGROUND
Let us consider the payment of export commission to an agent situated outside India. The activities undertaken by such an agent would typically include marketing the goods in the country of sale, identifying the buyer, coordinating with the buyer on the logistical aspects of the sale, and placing the order for the goods with the buyer. The activities of such an agent may also include receiving goods from the principal and delivering it to the buyer. For such activities, the agent may charge a fixed commission to its principal situated in India.

2. WHETHER THE INCOME OF SUCH AGENT WOULD ACCRUE OR ARISE IN INDIA?
Section 5 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’) provides that income of a non-resident would be taxable in India if such income:

a. Is received or is deemed to be received in India; or

b. Accrues or arises or is deemed to accrue or arise in India.

In the case of export commission paid to a non-resident agent, generally such income is paid outside India and is therefore, not received in India. Therefore, one would need to evaluate whether such income is accruing or arising in India or is deemed to accrue or arise in India.

In this regard, Circular No. 23 of 1969 throws some light on the matter by providing the following:

“3.4 A foreign agent of Indian exporter operates in his own country and no part of his income arises in India..”

Therefore, the Circular provided that in respect of a non-resident agent, commission income from export would not be considered as accruing or arising in India.

While the Circular has since been withdrawn, the principle emanating from the Circular should apply even after the withdrawal.

There are various judicial precedents which have held that the income of such agent would not be considered as accruing or arising in India.

The Delhi ITAT in the case of Welspring Universal vs. JCIT [2015] 56 taxmann.com 174, held:

“4…….In the context of rendering of services for procuring export orders by a non-resident from the countries outside India, there can be no way for considering the actual export from India as the place for the accrual of commission income of the non-resident. One should keep in mind the distinction between the accrual of income of exporter from exports and that of the foreign agent from commission. As a foreign agent of Indian exporter operates outside India for procuring export orders and further the goods in pursuance to such orders are also sold outside India, no part of his income can be said to accrue or arise in India.”

Interestingly, in the above case, the Tribunal distinguished between the source of income for the foreign agent vis-à-vis that for the exporter. The source of income for the exporter, as held by the Chennai ITAT in the case of DCIT vs. Alstom T & D India Ltd. (2016) 68 taxmann.com 336, would be the place where the manufacturing activities are undertaken or where the export contract has been entered into. On the other hand, for the foreign agent, the source of his income i.e. commission on the sale of goods would depend on where the services are rendered by such agent.

Prior to the amendment in Explanation to section 9(1)(vii) of the Act, the Supreme Court in the case of Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries Ltd. vs. DCIT (2007) 288 ITR 408 held that even if the services are considered as fees for technical services (‘FTS’), if such services are not rendered in India, the income arising from such services would not be considered as accruing or arising in India. While the above decision of the Apex Court has been overruled by the amendment vide Finance Act 2010 (with retrospective effect from 1st June, 1976), the principle arising from the decision would still apply in the case of services rendered (to the extent the same is not considered as FTS) outside India.

The Karnataka High Court in the case of PCIT vs. Puma Sports India (P.) Ltd. (2021) 434 ITR 69 held that commission paid to a non-resident agent for placing orders with manufacturers outside India would not be liable to tax in India as such services were rendered as well as utilized outside India. Therefore, no taxing event had taken place within the territories of India. The Supreme Court dismissed the SLP filed by the Revenue against the above High Court order (2022) 134 taxmann.com 60.

3. WHETHER SUCH INCOME IS DEEMED TO ACCRUE OR ARISE IN INDIA UNDER SECTION 9(1)(i)
The next question which arises is whether such income is deemed to accrue or arise in India under section 9 of the Act. While the question as to whether such income is considered as FTS under section 9(1)(vii) of the Act has been analysed in the ensuing paragraphs, let us first evaluate whether section 9(1)(i) of the Act could bring the commission income of a non-resident agent from services rendered to the principal outside India, to tax in India.

Section 9(1)(i) of the Act deems the following income to accrue or arise in India:

a.    Income accruing or arising, directly or indirectly, through or from any business connection in India;

b.    Income accruing or arising, through or from any property in India;

c.    Income accruing or arising, through or from any asset or source of income in India; or

d.    Income accruing or arising, through the transfer of a capital asset situated in India.

With regards to the first limb, the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. R.D. Aggarwal and Co. (1965) 56 ITR 20, has laid down the broad principle for defining the term ‘business connection’. In the context of section 42(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, similar to the provisions of section 9(1)(i) of the Act, the Apex Court held as follows:

“The expression “business connection” undoubtedly means something more than “business”. A business connection in section 42 involves a relation between a business carried on by a non-resident which yields profits or gains and some activity in the taxable territories which contributes directly or indirectly to the earning of those profits or gains. It predicates an element of continuity between the business of the non-resident and the activity in the taxable territories: a stray or isolated transaction is normally not to be regarded as a business connection. Business connection may take several forms: it may include carrying on a part of the main business or activity incidental to the main business of the non-resident through an agent, or it may merely be a relation between the business of the non-resident and the activity in the taxable territories, which facilitates or assists the carrying on of that business. In each case the question whether there is a business connection from or through which income, profits or gains arise or accrue to a non-resident must be determined upon the facts and circumstances of the case.

A relation to be a “business connection” must be real and intimate, and through or from which income must accrue or arise whether directly or indirectly to the non-resident. ….

….  Income not taxable under section 4 of the 1922 Act of a non-resident becomes taxable under section 42(1) of the 1922 Act, if there subsists a connection between the activity in the taxable territories and the business of the non-resident, and if through or from that connection income directly or indirectly arises.”

Therefore, in order for business connection [other than the provisions of Significant Economic Presence (‘SEP’), which have been discussed subsequently in this article] to exist, there needs to be a business activity continuously undertaken in the country. In other words, in the absence of any business activities undertaken in India, a business connection may not be constituted.

This is also evident from Explanation 1 to section 9(1)(i) of the Act which provides as follows:

“(a) in the case of a business, other than the business having business connection in India on account of significant economic presence, of which all the operations are not carried out in India, the income of the business deemed under this clause to accrue or arise in India shall be only such part of the income as is reasonably attributable to the operations carried out in India ;”

Therefore, except in the case of a business connection on account of the SEP provisions, only such part of the income as is reasonably attributable to operations carried out in India can be considered as income deemed to accrue or arise in India.

In this regard, the Supreme Court, in the case of CIT vs. Toshoku Ltd. (1980) 125 ITR 525, had analysed whether the export commission paid to non-resident agents would be considered as income deemed to accrue or arise in India.

In that case, the assessee was an exclusive sales agent of tobacco in Japan and France for an Indian exporter. The assessee, for its services rendered, received commission from the Indian exporter. Without evaluating whether ‘business connection’ of the non-resident assessee was constituted in India, the Supreme Court held that in the absence of any activities undertaken by the non-resident assessee in India, no income could be considered as attributable to any operations in India and therefore, no income could be considered as deemed to accrue or arise in India.

The second limb of section 9(1)(i) of the Act refers to income accruing through or from a property situated in India. Arguably, sale of goods may not be considered as sale of property. Moreover, even in case such sale of goods is considered as sale of property, one may be able to argue that section 9(1)(i) refers to income accruing through or from a property situated in India and income from the sale of such property would not qualify as income from a property (such as rental income) nor as income through a property. Additionally, one can also argue that the commission income, being income from services rendered in relation to the sale of goods, is one step further away from income from sale of property and income through or from property.

The third limb of section 9(1)(i) of the Act refers to income accruing or arising through or from any asset or source in India. As discussed above, income from services rendered towards sale of goods may not be considered as income accruing or arising through or from any asset in India. Interestingly, the AAR in the case of Rajiv Malhotra, In re (2006) 284 ITR 564, held that export commission would be considered as income accruing or arising through or from a source of income in India.

In that case, the assessee was organising an exhibition in India and had appointed foreign agents to furnish information to foreign participants about the exhibition and for booking space in the exhibition. Such agents would be rendering the services outside India, and no services by the agents were rendered in India. The agents were responsible for planning, directing and executing the sales campaign for the assessee and the exhibition in the foreign jurisdictions. The agent would receive the commission only on participation by the exhibitors in the exhibition in India.

The AAR held that the fact that the income of the agent was dependent on the participation by the exhibitors (customers) in India would mean that the source of income for the non-resident agent would be considered to be in India. The AAR further also held that the fact that the services by the agents were rendered outside India would be of no consequence.

The above decision of the AAR was also followed in the decision by the same authority in the case of SKF Boilers and Driers (P.) Ltd., In re (2012) 343 ITR 385.

In the view of the authors, with the utmost respect to the AAR, the above decisions of the AAR may not be considered as an appropriate analysis of the matter on account of the following reasons:
a. The AAR did not consider the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Toshoku Ltd. (supra), wherein the commission received by non-resident agents was considered to be accruing or arising outside India and hence not taxable; and

b. The AAR did not consider the impact of Explanation 1(a) to section 9(1)(i) of the Act. Even if the decision of the AAR is considered, the fact that no operations of the agent are actually undertaken in India would result in no attribution of income of the agent to be deemed to accrue or arise in India.

Therefore, subject to the applicability of the SEP provisions, analysed in para 6 below, export commission earned by a non-resident agent would not be deemed to accrue or arise in India under section 9(1)(i) of the Act.

4. WHETHER THE SERVICES RENDERED BY THE AGENT CAN BE CONSIDERED AS FEES FOR TECHNICAL SERVICES
The other sub-clauses of section 9(1) of the Act – dealing with salary, interest and royalty would not be applicable in this case. One would now need to analyse whether the services rendered by the commission agent would be considered as FTS under section 9(1)(vii) of the Act. There are various decisions discussing various facets of the FTS clause, and this article does not cover all such case laws on the matter. This article covers those case laws relevant to the type of payment, i.e. export commission and the taxability thereof.

The crux of the matter is whether the consideration received by a commission agent would be considered as towards rendering of services. In this regard, one may refer to the Ahmedabad ITAT in the case of DCIT vs. Welspun Corporation Ltd. (2017) 77 taxmann.com 165, wherein it has been held that the agent receives the commission on securing order and not for the provision of the services. The reasoning provided by the ITAT is as under:

“Even proceeding on the assumption that these non-resident agents did render the technical services, which, is an incorrect assumption any way, what is important to appreciate is that the amounts paid by the assessee to these agents constituted consideration for the orders secured by the agents and not the services alleged rendered by the agents. The event triggering crystallization of liability of the assessee, under the commission agency agreement, is the event of securing orders and not the rendition of alleged technical services. In a situation in which the agent does not render any of the services but secures the business any way, the agent is entitled to his commission which is computed in terms of a percentage of the value of the order. In a reverse situation, in which an agent renders all the alleged technical services but does not secure any order for the principal i.e. the assessee, the agent is not entitled to any commission. Clearly, therefore, the event triggering the earnings by the agent is securing the business and not rendition of any services. In this view of the matter, the amounts paid by the assessee to its non-resident agents, even in the event of holding that the agents did indeed render technical services, cannot be said to be ‘consideration for rendering of any managerial, technical or consultancy services’…..The work actually undertaken by the agent is the work of acting as agent and so procuring business for the assessee but as the contemporary business models require the work of agent cannot simply and only be to obtain the orders for the product, as this obtaining of orders is invariably preceded by and followed by several preparatory and follow up activities. The description of agent’s obligation sets out such common ancillary activities as well but that does not override, or relegate, the core agency work. The consideration paid to the agent is also based on the business procured and the agency agreements do not provide for any independent, standalone or specific consideration for these services.”

Therefore, the Ahmedabad ITAT in the above case held that the consideration received by the agent is towards the procurement of business and not for services rendered.

However, generally, the revenue authorities also seek to tax the export commission as FTS, given the sheer number of judicial precedents on the issue. Therefore, it is important to analyse whether such commission can be classified as FTS under section 9(1)(vii).

The term ‘fees for technical services’ broadly covers the following categories of services:

• Managerial services;

• Technical services; and

• Consultancy services.

The terms ‘managerial’, ‘technical’ or ‘consultancy’ have not been defined in the Act, and therefore, one would need to understand these terms in common parlance.

4.1 MANAGERIAL SERVICES
Black’s Law Dictionary defines the terms ‘manage’ to mean the following:

“To conduct; to carry on the concerns of a business or establishment.”

Further, the term ‘manager’ is defined to mean the following:

“One who has charge of corporation and control of its business or branch establishment, and who is vested with a certain amount of discretion and independent judgment.”

Having looked at the dictionary meaning of the term ‘manage’, the question arises as to what is meant by managerial services, specifically – managing a particular function of an entity such as purchase or sales or managing the entity as a whole, akin to a director of a company.

The issue as to what is meant by ‘managerial services’ and whether the services rendered by a commission agent would constitute managerial services have been analysed by the Mumbai ITAT in the case of Linde AG vs. ITO (1997) 62 ITD 330, albeit in the context of a procurement agent. In the said case, the assessee procured certain materials and spares required to set up a fabrication plant in Gujarat. These purchases were charged from the Indian concern, i.e. Gujarat State Fertilizers Company, at cost plus 4% procurement charges. Referring to the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of J.K. (Bombay) Ltd. vs. CBDT & Anr. (1979) 118 ITR 312 in the context of section 80-O of the Act, the ITAT held as under:

“Their Lordships of Delhi High Court referred to an article on ‘Management Sciences’ in 14 Encyclopaedia 747, wherein it is stated that the management in organisations include at least the following:

(a) discovering, developing, defining and evaluating the goals of the organisation and the alternative policies that will lead towards the goals;

(b) getting the organisation to adopt the policies;

(c) scrutinising the effectiveness of the policies that are adopted and

(d) initiating steps to change policies when they are judged to be less effective than they ought to be.

The third category is managerial service. The managerial service, as aforesaid, is towards the adoption and carrying out the policies of a organisation. It is of permanent nature for the organisation as a whole. In making the stray purchases, it cannot be said that the assessee has been managing the affairs of the Indian concern or was rendering managerial services to the assessee.”

Therefore, while holding that procurement services would not constitute managerial services, the ITAT explained that managerial services would refer to carrying out the organisation’s policies as a whole.

In this regard, as the broad range of services rendered by an export agent as well as a procurement agent is similar, albeit, for two different ends of a transaction, their taxability would also be similar. Therefore, any decision in respect of taxability of income of a procurement agent (for procurement outside India) would equally apply to the export commission earned by an agent.

The Authority for Advance Rulings in the case of Intertek Testing Services India (P.) Ltd., In re (2008) 307 ITR 418 held the term ‘managerial services’ to mean the following:

“Thus, managerial services essentially involves controlling, directing or administering the business.”

In the context of export commission, the Delhi High Court in the case of DIT (International Taxation) vs. Panalfa Autoelektrik Ltd. (2014) 272 CTR 117, held as follows:

“The services rendered, the procurement of export orders, etc. cannot be treated as management services provided by the non-resident to the respondent-assessee. The non-resident was not acting as a manager or dealing with administration. It was not controlling the policies or scrutinising the effectiveness of the policies. It did not perform as a primary executor, any supervisory function whatsoever.”

This differentiation between ‘execution’ and ‘management’ has also been explained by the Mumbai ITAT in the case of UPS SCS (Asia) Ltd. vs. ADIT (2012) 50 SOT 268, wherein it has been held that:

“Ordinarily the managerial services mean managing the affairs by laying down certain policies, standards and procedures and then evaluating the actual performance in the light of the procedures so laid down. The managerial services contemplate not only execution but also the planning part of the activity to be done. If the overall planning aspect is missing and one has to follow a direction from the other for executing particular job in a particular manner, it cannot be said that the former is managing that affair. It would mean that the directions of the latter are executed simplicity without there being any planning part involved in the execution and also the evaluation of the performance. In the absence of any specific definition of the phrase “managerial services” as used in section 9(1)(vii) defining the “fees for technical services”, it needs to be considered in a commercial sense. It cannot be interpreted in a narrow sense to mean simply executing the directions of the other for doing a specific task. …….. On the other hand, ‘managing’ encompasses not only the simple execution of a work, but also certain other aspects, such as planning for the way in which the execution is to be done coupled with the overall responsibility in a larger sense. Thus it is manifest that the word ‘managing’ is wider in scope than the word ‘executing’. Rather the latter is embedded in the former and not vice versa.”

The Chennai ITAT in the case of DCIT vs. Mainetti (India) P. Ltd. (2011) 46 SOT 137 held that canvassing for orders would not constitute managerial services.

Similarly, Madras High Court in the case of Evolv Clothing Co. (P.) Ltd. vs. ACIT (2018) 407 ITR 72 held that market survey undertaken incidental to the services of a commission agent would also not be considered as fees for technical services under section 9(1)(vii).

Further, as regards whether one can argue that one is providing managerial services if one is managing the purchase/sales function, the ITAT in the case of Linde AG (supra) held as under:

“The Learned Departmental Representative brought to our notice a concept of ‘marketing management’ but such marketing services are to be, as aforesaid, on a regular basis, i.e. when the purchases of the assessee on a permanent or semi-permanent or at regular interval basis. It does not include the purchases made only to be utilised for a particular venture taken up by the assessee, which in this case is fabrication of a new scientific plant. It being a one-time job and not marketing management of making purchases by the assessee for the new concern.”

Therefore, one can conclude based on the above observation by the Mumbai ITAT that if the purchase or sales function of the entire organisation has been completely outsourced to an agent, then the services rendered by such agent may be considered as managerial services. For example, if an entity within the entire MNE group is in charge of undertaking the entire purchase or sales function of all the entities within the MNE and such entity is also deciding the policies of such function, one may possibly consider such services managerial services.

4.2 TECHNICAL SERVICES
The second limb of the definition of FTS is ‘technical service’. The Merriam – Webster dictionary defines the term ‘technical’ to mean “as having special and usually practical knowledge especially of a mechanical or scientific subject”

Similarly, the Collins dictionary defines the term as “of, relating to, or specializing in industrial, practical, or mechanical arts and applied sciences”.     

Therefore, in common parlance, one may say that technical services would mean services which require application of industrial, mechanical or applied sciences.

The Madras High Court in the case of Skycell Communications Ltd. & Anr. vs. DCIT & Ors (2001) 251 ITR 53 has provided guidance as to what would be considered as ‘technical services’ as under:

“Thus while stating that “technical service” would include managerial and consultancy service, the Legislature has not set out with precision as to what would constitute “technical” service to render it “technical service”. The meaning of the word “technical” as given in the New Oxford Dictionary is adjective 1. of or relating to a particular subject, art or craft or its techniques: technical terms (especially of a book or article) requiring special knowledge to be understood: a technical report. 2. of involving, or concerned with applied and industrial sciences: an important technical achievement. 3. resulting from mechanical failure: a technical fault. 4. according to a strict application or interpretation of the law or the rules: the arrest was a technical violation of the treaty.

Having regard to the fact that the term is required to be understood in the context in which it is used, “fee for technical services” could only be meant to cover such things technical as are capable of being provided by way of service for a fee. The popular meaning associated with “technical” is “involving or concerning applied and industrial science”.”

Interestingly, the Memorandum of Understanding to the DTAA between India and US provides as follows:

“Article 12 includes only certain technical and consultancy services. But technical services, we mean in this context services requiring expertise in a technology.”

While the term ‘technology’ refers to machines and processes, the term ‘technical’ would be wider and would cover applied and mechanical sciences and would mean a kind of specialized or complex knowledge.

Therefore, the meaning under the MOU in the India – US DTAA may be restricted in application to the India – US DTAA only as it provides a narrower meaning than used in common parlance.

Having understood the meaning of the term ‘technical services’, the issue arises is whether the services rendered by a commission agent could be considered as ‘technical services’. In this regard, the Delhi High Court in the case of Panalfa Autoelektrik Ltd. (supra) held as follows:

“The non-resident had not undertaken or performed “technical services”, where special skills or knowledge relating to a technical field were required. Technical field would mean applied sciences or craftsmanship involving special skills or knowledge but not fields such as arts or human sciences.”

On the other hand, the Cochin ITAT in the case of ITO vs. Device Driven (India) (P.) Ltd. (2014) 29 ITR (T) 263 held that export commission in case of software was considered as technical services. In this regard, the ITAT held as under:

“Software is a highly technical product and it is required to be developed in accordance with the requirements of the customers. Even after the development, it requires constant monitoring so that necessary modifications are required to be carried out in order to make it suitable to the requirements. The work of the assessee company also does not end upon developing and installing the software at the client’s site. As stated earlier, it requires on-site monitoring, especially when the customized software is developed. Hence, in our view, it cannot be equated with the commodities, where the role of the Commission agent normally ends after supply of goods and receipt of money. Hence, in the case of software companies, the sales agent should also possess required technical knowledge and then only he could procure orders for the company by understanding the needs of clients and further convincing them..….. As per the clauses of the agreement, which are extracted above, the Commission agent is responsible in securing orders and for that purpose only he has to assist the assessee company in all respects including identifying markets, making introductory contacts, arranging meeting with prospective clients, assisting in preparation of presentations for target clients. His duty does not end on securing the orders, but he has to monitor the status and progress of the project, meaning thereby the Commission agent is responsible for ensuring supply of the software and also for receiving the payments. All these activities, in our view, could be carried on only by a person who is having vast technical knowledge and experience. Hence, we agree with the tax authorities’ view that the payment made to Shri Balaji Bal constitutes the payment made towards technical services.”

Interestingly, the Cochin ITAT equated the nature of product sold by the agent with the nature of services rendered by the agent. With due respect to the Cochin ITAT, the authors are of the view that it may not be appropriate to equate the product sold with the service rendered. The ITAT in the above case did not list out any specific services required to be rendered by an agent distributing software that would be different from that distributing other commodities. For example, even if one sells an iron rod, one is required to have certain knowledge of the product sold to enable him to match the client’s requirement with the product and sell the product. Further, identifying markets, arranging meeting with prospective clients, preparing presentations for target clients, and ensuring that the product is smoothly delivered is something an agent selling any product may be required to undertake.

In this regard, the Ahmedabad ITAT in the case of Welspun Corporation Ltd. (supra) has succinctly segregated the nature of service from the nature of product sold. It has held as follows:

“Just because a product is highly technical does not change the character of activity of the sale agent. Whether a salesman sells a handcrafted souvenir or a top of the line laptop, he is selling nevertheless. It will be absurd to suggest that in the former case, he is selling and the latter, he will be rendering technical services. The object of the salesman is to sell and familiarity with the technical details, whatever be the worth of those technical details, is only towards the end of selling. In a technology driven world that we live in, even simplest of day to day gadgets that we use are fairly technical and complex. Undoubtedly when a technical product is being sold, the person selling the product should be familiar with technical specifications of the product but then this aspect of the matter does not any way change the economic activity.”

On the other hand, it is also important to highlight that the above Cochin ITAT decision was upheld by the Kerala High Court in the case of the same assessee in Device Driven (India) P Ltd. vs. CIT (2021) 126 taxmann.com 25. However, the Kerala High Court did not analyse the services rendered by the agent to determine whether the services were ‘technical services’ but relied more on the argument that the services were rendered for earning source outside India, and therefore, not accruing or arising in India.

4.3 CONSULTANCY SERVICES
The last limb of the definition of the term FTS is ‘consultancy services’.

In common parlance, ‘to consult’ would mean ‘to advise’. With regards to the overlap with technical services, the MOU in the India – US DTAA provides as under:

“By consultancy services, we mean in this context advisory services. The categories of technical and consultancy services are to some extent overlapping because a consultancy service could also be a technical service. However, the category of consultancy services also includes an advisory service, whether or not expertise in a technology is required to perform it.”

The Supreme Court in the case of GVK Industries Ltd. & Anr. vs. ITO & Anr. (2015) 371 ITR 453 evaluated the meaning of ‘consultancy services’ under section 9(1)(vii). In the said case, a non-resident company rendered services related to raising finance for the assessee, which included, inter alia, financial structure and security package to be offered to the lender, making an assessment of export credit agencies worldwide and obtaining commercial bank support on the most competitive terms, assisting the appellant loan negotiations and documentation with lenders and structuring, negotiating and closing the financing for the project in a co-ordinated and expeditious manner.

“The word ‘consultation’ has been defined as an act of asking the advice or opinion of someone (such as a lawyer). It means a meeting in which a party consults or confers and eventually it results in human interaction that leads to rendering of advice. The NRC had acted as a consultant. It had the skill, acumen and knowledge in the specialized field i.e. preparation of a scheme for required finances and to tie-up required loans. The nature of service rendered by the NRC, can be said with certainty would come within the ambit and sweep of the term ‘consultancy service’ and, therefore, it has been rightly held that the tax at source should have been deducted as the amount paid as fee could be taxable under the head ‘fees for technical services’.”

Similarly, the AAR in the case of Guangzhou Usha International Ltd., In re (2015) 378 ITR 465 held that where the agent was not only identifying new products but also generating new ideas for the principal after market research, evaluating credit, finance, organisation, production facility, etc. and on the basis of the evaluation, giving advice to the principal, the services rendered by such agent would be considered as ‘consultancy services’.

However, the Delhi High Court in the case of Panalfa Autoelektrik Ltd. (supra) as well as the Mumbai ITAT in the case of Linde AG (supra) have held that services rendered by an agent would not constitute ‘consultancy services’.

On similar lines, the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Grup Ism (P.) Ltd. (2015) 378 ITR 205 held that export commission would not be considered as ‘consultancy services’ even though the nomenclature of the transaction as per the agreement was of ‘consultancy services’. It held as follows:

“‘Consultancy services’ would mean something akin to advisory services provided by the non-resident, pursuant to deliberation between parties. Ordinarily, it would not involve instances where the non-resident is acting as a link between the resident and another party, facilitating the transaction between them, or where the non-resident is directly soliciting business for the resident and generating income out of such solicitation. The mere fact that CGS confirmed that it received consultancy charges from the assessee would not be determinative of the issue. The actual nature of services rendered by CGS and MAC needs to be examined for this purpose.”

From the above jurisprudence, it is clear, in the view of the authors, that export commission by itself would not be considered as ‘consultancy services’. However, if the agent provides advisory services along with the export commission, one may need to evaluate the predominant nature of services to determine the characterisation of the transaction.

5. WHETHER THE WITHDRAWAL OF CIRCULAR NO. 23 OF 1969 WOULD RESULT IN TAXABILITY

As discussed above, the CBDT Circular No. 23 of 1969 had clarified non-taxability in India for commission earned by a foreign non-resident agent. This Circular was subsequently withdrawn stating that it did not reflect the correct position under section 9 of the Act. In this regard, the question therefore, arises is whether the withdrawal of the Circular can result in the taxation of the commission earned by a foreign agent.

In this regard, the Delhi ITAT in the case of Welspring Universal vs. JCIT (supra) held as follows:

“11. ….The legal position contained in section 5(2) read with section 9, as discussed above about the scope of total income of a non-resident subsisting before the issuance of circular nos. 23 and 786 or after the issuance of circular no. 786 has not undergone any change. It is not as if the export commission income of a foreign agent for soliciting export orders in countries outside India was earlier chargeable to tax, which was exempted by the CBDT through the above circulars and now with the withdrawal of such circulars, the hitherto income not chargeable to tax, has become taxable. The legal position remains the same de hors any circular in as much as such income of a foreign agent is not chargeable to tax in India because it neither arises in India nor is received by him in India nor any deeming provision of receipt or accrual is attracted. It is further relevant to note that the latter Circular simply withdraws the earlier circular, thereby throwing the issue once again open for consideration and does not state that either the export commission income has now become chargeable to tax in the hands of the foreign residents or the provisions of section 195 read with sec. 40(a)(i) are attracted for the failure of the payer to deduct tax at source on such payments.

12. Ex consequenti, we hold that the amount of commission income for rendering services in procuring export orders outside India is not chargeable to tax in the hands of the non-resident agent and hence no tax is deductible under section 195 on such payment by  the payer.”

The authors are also of a similar view that the legal position upheld by various courts does not change, and the export commission earned by a non-resident agent may still not be liable to tax in India.

6. WHETHER THE PROVISIONS OF SEP CAN TRIGGER IN THE CASE OF EXPORT COMMISSION
The Finance Act, 2018 has introduced the significant economic presence (‘SEP’) provisions in India. Explanation 2A to section 9(1)(i) of the Act extends the definition of business connection to include SEP and SEP has been defined to mean the following:

(a) transaction in respect of any goods, services or property carried out by a non-resident with any person in India including provision of download of data or software in India, if the aggregate of payments arising from such transaction or transactions during the previous year exceeds such amount as may be prescribed; or

(b) systematic and continuous soliciting of business activities or engaging in interaction with such number of users in India, as may be prescribed:

Further, the Proviso to the Explanation also provides that the transactions or activities shall constitute SEP, whether or not:

(i) the agreement for such transactions or activities is entered in India; or

(ii) the non-resident has a residence or a place of business in India; or

(iii) the non-resident renders services in India

In other words, the SEP provisions apply even if such services are rendered outside India if it is undertaken with any person in India and if the aggregate payments during the year exceed the threshold prescribed.

Further, the CBDT vide Notification No. 41/2021/F.No.370142/11/2018-TPL dated 3rd May, 2021, has notified the thresholds to mean INR 2 crore in the case of payments referred to in clause (a) above and 3 million users in clause (b) above.
The authors have analysed the SEP provisions in detail in their article in the March, 2021 edition of BCAJ Journal.

Therefore, now, if the services rendered by the commission agent exceed INR 2 crore in a financial year, such non-resident agent may be considered as having a business connection in India due to the SEP provisions under section 9(1)(i) of the Act.

7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this article, the authors have analysed the taxability of export commission in detail. To summarize, the commission earned by a non-resident in respect of agency services rendered for exports, where no activities are undertaken in India, would not be taxable in India under the Act. However, one would need to evaluate if there are any additional services rendered by such an agent, such as managing the entire purchase or sale function of an organisation which could result in taxability under the Act or the relevant tax treaty as FTS. Moreover, one may need to also evaluate if the payments to the agent during the year exceed INR 2 crore, in which case the SEP provisions may apply, resulting in taxability of the commission earned by such non-resident agent on account of the business connection being constituted in India. In such a scenario, one may still be able to apply the provisions of the DTAA and such income may not be taxable in the absence of a PE of such agent in India, subject to the requirement of documents such as tax residency certificate, etc as well as fulfilling the conditions as may be provided in the OECD Multilateral Instrument, if applicable.
 

S. 148 – Reopening of assessment – Within 4 years – original assessment completed u/s. 143(3) – Change of opinion on the same set of facts – Not permissible

10 M/s. Gemstar Construction Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India & 3 Ors. [W.P. No 1005 of 2008; Date of order: 6th January, 2022 (Bombay High Court)]

S. 148 – Reopening of assessment – Within 4 years – original assessment completed u/s. 143(3) – Change of opinion on the same set of facts – Not permissible

The petitioner challenged the notice dated 12th December, 2007 issued u/s 148 of the Act, on the ground, inter-alia, that respondents are relying on the same material to take a different view. The Assessing Officer had passed the assessment order dated 17th March, 2005, and conclusively took one view. Therefore, it could not be open to reopen the assessment based on the very same material with a view to take another view.

The reasons for issuing notice u/s 148 is contained in a communication dated 27th December, 2007 and the same reads as under:-
“On close scrutiny of the assessment record, it is observed that the assessee company has claimed deduction u/s. 80IB(10) as it is engaged in the development and building approved housing project. Contrary to the provisions of the statute, the housing project includes shops. As a result, the company is not entitled to deduction u/s. 80IB(10). In the light of the aforesaid fact that I have reason to believe that the granting of deduction u/s. 80IB(10) of Rs.1,42,50,816/- has resulted escapement of income within the meaning of Section 147.”

In the assessment order itself, it was recorded that a show-cause notice was issued on 17th January, 2005 requiring the assessee to substantiate the claim of deduction. In paragraph 7.1 of the assessment order, it was recorded that the petitioner has filed detailed submissions vide letter dated 10th March, 2005 and has shown cause as to why it was entitled to the claim of deduction under section 80IB(10).

It is settled law that the Assessment Officer has no power to review an assessment that has been concluded. The Assessing Officer, before he passed the assessment order, had in his possession all primary facts necessary for assessment and then he made the original assessment. When the primary facts necessary for assessment are fully and truly disclosed, the Assessing Officer is not entitled to a change of opinion to commence proceedings for reassessment. Where on consideration of the material on record, one view is conclusively taken by the Assessing Officer, it would not be open to reopen the assessment based on the very same material with a view to take another view.

The Court observed that this is not a case where the assessment is sought to be reopened on the reasonable belief that income had escaped the assessment on account. This is a case wherein the assessment is sought to be reopened on account of change of opinion of the Assessing Officer about the manner of computation of deduction under section 80IB(10) of the Act.

The Court was satisfied that not only material facts were disclosed to the petitioner truly and fully, but they were carefully scrutinized, and figures of income, as well as deduction, were viewed carefully by the Assessing Officer.

In the circumstances, the petition was allowed and the notice under section 148 of the Act, dated 12th December, 2007, was quashed.

S. 148 – Reopening of assessment – Non-application of mind by AO while recording the reasons – Non-application of mind by PCIT while granting approval u/s. 151 of the Act – CBDT directed to train their officers

9 Sharvah Multitrade Company Private Limited. v/s. Income Tax Officer Ward 4(3)(1) & Anr;  [W.P. No. 3581 of 2021; Date of order: 20th December, 2021; A.Y.: 2015-16 (Bombay High Court)]

S. 148 – Reopening of assessment – Non-application of mind by AO while recording the reasons – Non-application of mind by PCIT while granting approval u/s. 151 of the Act – CBDT directed to train their officers

The Petitioner had challenged the issuance of notice for A.Y. 2015-2016 dated 31st March, 2021 issued u/s 148 of the Act, and the order rejecting the objections dated 23rd July, 2021.

The assessment had been completed u/s 143(3) of the said Act on 28th September, 2017. The Petitioner submitted that the reasons recorded for reopening indicate total non-application of mind in as much as in the tabular form, it is stated that Sharvah Multitrade Company Private Limited for F.Y. 2014-15 had been a beneficiary through fund trail of Rs. 3.72 Crores. Then again, it is mentioned that the above mentioned bogus entities managed, controlled and operated by M/s. Sharvah Multitrade Company Private Limited for providing bogus accommodation entries, hence, all the transactions entered into between the above-mentioned entities and the assessee/beneficiary are bogus accommodation entries in nature.

The Court observed how can a company provide bogus entry to itself. Sharvah Multitrade Company Private Limited is alleged to be a beneficiary identified through fund trail, and its PAN number is shown to be AAQCS2595H. Petitioner, who is the assessee, is also Sharvah Multitrade Company Private Limited, and its PAN number is AAQCS2595H. Therefore, this clearly shows total non-application of mind by the Assessing Officer Mr. Suryavanshi. His statement in the reasons “…………… and after careful application of mind ……..” is risible. Thus there was total non-application of mind by the A.O. while recording the reasons.

The Court further observed that there had been total non-application of mind while filing the affidavit in reply to the petition by the same officer – Mr. Shailendra Damodar Suryavanshi, Income Tax Officer, Ward 4(3)(1), Mumbai. In the affidavit in reply, the same Mr. Suryavanshi states, “as Annexure – 2 is the copy of the approval u/s 151 of the Act ”. There was no annexure – 1 mentioned anywhere. Moreover, in the affidavit filed in the Court, even this annexure was missing. This further displayed total non-application of mind by this officer.

The Department Counsel tendered a copy of the approval u/s 151 of the said Act, which he had in his file where it says “In view of reasons recorded, I am satisfied that it is a fit case to issue notice u/s 148 ”. PCIT, Mumbai Anil Kumar, signed this.

The Court observed that if this PCIT only read the reasons recorded, he would have raised a query about how can an entity provide bogus entry to itself. That shows total non-application of mind by the said Mr. Anil Kumar as well.

The Court further observed that one Vijay Kumar Soni, Range 4(3), Mumbai, has recommended a grant of approval. That shows non-application of mind even by this Vijay Kumar Soni. The Court wondered whether the officers of respondents ever bothered to read the papers before writing the reasons or recommending for approval or while granting approval.

The Court observed that in the objections filed by petitioner vide its letter dated 10th May, 2021, the petitioner raised these points and alleged lack of application of mind. The said Mr. Suryavanshi while rejecting the objections, by an order dated 23rd July 2021, first of all, makes a false statement that “the assessee’s above submissions and objections have been carefully considered and the same are dealt with as under ” but he does not deal with the objection of the assessee of lack of application of mind. The said Mr. Suryavanshi is totally silent about the objections raised on non-application of mind.

In view of the above, the Court allowed the petition and quashed the impugned reassessment proceedings for A.Y. 2015-16 as wholly without jurisdiction, illegal, arbitrary, and liable to be quashed.

A copy of this order was directed to be sent to the Chairman, CBDT, to formulate a scheme whereby the officers are trained on how to apply their minds and what all points should be kept in mind while recording the reasons. The Chairman, CBDT, may also advise the concerned Commissioners not to grant approval u/s 151 of the said Act mechanically but after considering the reasons carefully and scrutinizing the same.

TDS — Credit for — Assessee an airline pilot and employee of airline company — Company deducting tax at source but not paying it into government account — Assessee cannot be denied credit for tax deducted at source

39 Kartik Vijaysinh Sonavane vs. Dy. CIT [2021] 440 ITR 11 (Guj) A.Ys.: 2009-10 and 2011-12; Date of order 15th November, 2021 S. 205 of ITA, 1961

TDS — Credit for — Assessee an airline pilot and employee of airline company — Company deducting tax at source but not paying it into government account — Assessee cannot be denied credit for tax deducted at source

The assessee was a pilot by profession and an airline company employee. The company deducted tax at source of Rs. 7,20,100 and Rs. 8,70,757 for the A. Ys. 2009-10 and 2011-12 respectively in his case but did not deposit it in the Central Government account. The assessee was denied credit for the tax deducted at source and recovery notices for tax with interest were raised against the assessee.

The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“The Department was precluded from denying the assessee the benefit of the tax deducted at source by the employer during the relevant financial years. Credit shall be given to the assessee and if in the interregnum any recovery or adjustment was made by the Department, the assessee shall be entitled to the refund thereof with the statutory interest, within eight weeks.”

TDS — Commission — Expenses incurred on doctors by assessee, a pharmaceutical company — Doctors not legally bound to prescribe medicines suggested by assessee — No principal-agent relationship — Payments cannot be construed as commission — No liability to deduct tax at source

38 ClT(TDS) vs. INTAS Pharmaceuticals Ltd. [2021] 439 ITR 692 (Guj) A.Ys.: 2011-12 to 2013-14; Date of order: 11th August, 2021 S. 194H of ITA, 1961

TDS — Commission — Expenses incurred on doctors by assessee, a pharmaceutical company — Doctors not legally bound to prescribe medicines suggested by assessee — No principal-agent relationship — Payments cannot be construed as commission — No liability to deduct tax at source

The assessee was a pharmaceutical company. Pursuant to a survey u/s 133A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 carried out at the premises of the assessee, e-mails and other correspondences that ensued between the sales executive and the general manager, seized during the survey operations, suggested that the doctors had acted as the agents of the assessee, by prescribing the medicines of the assessee over a period of time, and therefore, the expenses incurred by the assessee on the doctors towards taxi fares, air fares, etc., for attending regional conferences or scientific conferences were required to be treated as commission received or receivable as contemplated u/s 194H. The Assessing Officer treated the assessee as an assessee-in-default u/s 201(1) for non-deduction of tax at source u/s 194H of the Act on such payments.

The Commissioner (Appeals) restricted the addition to expenditure incurred on the doctors under various heads and held that the expenses incurred on other stakeholders did not fall within the definition of the term commission. Both the Department and the assessee filed appeals before the Tribunal. The Tribunal partly allowed the assessee’s appeals and dismissed the appeals filed by the Department.

On appeals by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) According to the provisions contained in section 194H of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the Explanation to the section, any payment received or receivable by a person for rendering medical services is excluded from the purview of section 194H. The Explanation to section 194H cannot be interpreted so widely as to include any payment receivable, directly or indirectly for services in the course of buying or selling goods.

ii) In the absence of an element of agency between the assessee and the doctors, the provisions of section 194H could not be invoked. The doctors were not bound to prescribe the medicines as suggested by the assessee. There was no legal compulsion on the part of the doctors to prescribe a particular medicine suggested by the assessee, and therefore, the doctors had not acted as the agents of the assessee.

iii) There was no illegality or infirmity in the order of the Tribunal in holding that the expenditure incurred on the doctors could not be classified as commission. No question of law arose.”

TDS — Commission to insurance agent — Scope of S. 194D — Arrangement for foreign travel of agents — Expenses paid directly to service providers — Tax not deductible at source on payments to service providers

37 CIT  vs. SBI Life Insurance Company Ltd. [2021] 439 ITR 566 (Bom) Date of order: 22nd October, 2021 S. 194D of ITA, 1961

TDS — Commission to insurance agent — Scope of S. 194D — Arrangement for foreign travel of agents — Expenses paid directly to service providers — Tax not deductible at source on payments to service providers

The assessee respondent is engaged in the business of underwriting life insurance policies. The assessee’s business comprises of individual life and group business. The Assessing Officer noticed that the assessee had incurred foreign travel expenses for its agents who were working for soliciting or procuring insurance business for the assessee and opined that foreign travel expenses incurred by the assessee on its agents were covered under the words “income by way of remuneration or reward whether by way of commission or otherwise” used in section 194D of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Since the assessee had not deducted tax at source, the Assessing Officer treated the assessee as an assessee in default.

The order was set aside by the Commissioner (Appeals) and this was affirmed by the Tribunal.

The Bombay High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue and held as under:

“i) U/s 194D the obligation to deduct is on the person who is paying and the deduction to be made at the time of making such payment.

ii) Factually and admittedly no amount had been paid to the agents by the assessee as a reimbursement of expenses incurred by the agent on foreign travel. The assessee had made arrangement for foreign travel for all the agents and paid expenses directly to those service providers. Therefore, as no amount was paid to the agents by the respondent, the obligation to deduct Income-tax thereon at source also would not arise.”

Reassessment — Notice u/s 148 — Validity — Assessment not finalised in pursuance of return of income — Notice u/s 148 issued before issuing notice u/s 143(2) for assessment u/s 143(3) — Impermissible

36 Loku Ram Malik vs. CIT [2021] 440 ITR 159 (Raj) A.Y.: 1999-00; Date of order: 3rd May, 2017 Ss. ss. 143, 143(2), 143(3) & 148 of ITA, 1961

Reassessment — Notice u/s 148 — Validity — Assessment not finalised in pursuance of return of income — Notice u/s 148 issued before issuing notice u/s 143(2) for assessment u/s 143(3) — Impermissible

The assessee showed the investment in a plot of land at a certain value in his return of income filed on 6th December, 1999. The Assessing Officer processed the return u/s 143(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on 11th August, 2000. Thereafter, the assessee revised the balance sheet and profit and loss account on 16th August, 2000 enhancing the investment in such property. The Assessing Officer issued a notice u/s 148 on 14th September, 2000, based on the revised balance sheet filed by the assessee and then issued a notice u/s 143(2) on 3rd October, 2000.

In appeal, the assessee challenged the validity of the notice u/s. 148. The Tribunal upheld the issuance of notice u/s 148 though the Assessing Officer could have issued a notice u/s 143(2) to make the regular assessment u/s 143(3).

The Rajasthan High Court allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i) The order u/s 143(1)(a) was confirmed on 11th August, 2000 when the return was filed and the notice u/s 148 came to be issued before the assessment could have been done.

ii) The Tribunal had committed an error in upholding the notice issued u/s 148.”

Reassessment — Notice after four years — Condition precedent — Notice not specifying failure to disclose any material facts truly and fully by assessee — Notice and subsequent order invalid

35 Coca-Cola India P. Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT [2021] 440 ITR 20 (Bom) A.Y.: 1998-99; Date of order: 21st September, 2021 Ss. 147 & 148 of ITA, 1961

Reassessment — Notice after four years — Condition precedent — Notice not specifying failure to disclose any material facts truly and fully by assessee — Notice and subsequent order invalid

For the A.Y. 1998-99, the assessee filed a second revised return declaring a loss as a result of demerger of its bottling division. The Deputy Commissioner issued notices u/s 143(2) and 142(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 along with a questionnaire. The assessee furnished the reasons for filing the revised returns of income and provided clarifications in response to the various queries raised and the balance sheet and the profit and loss account. Thereafter, the Deputy Commissioner passed an order dated 30th March, 2001 u/s 143(3), computing the assessee’s total income at nil after setting off earlier years’ losses. Aggrieved by certain disallowances made by the Deputy Commissioner, the assessee filed an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals). The Commissioner, by an order u/s 263 directed the Deputy Commissioner to pass a fresh assessment order after considering the issues identified in his order. Thereafter, an order u/s 143(3) read with section 263 was passed. After the expiry of four years, the Deputy Commissioner issued a notice u/s 148 to reopen the assessment u/s 147.

The assessee filed a writ petition and challenged the notice. The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“i) According to the proviso to section 148 of the Income-tax Act, if the notice is issued to reopen the assessment u/s 147 after the expiry of four years from the relevant assessment year, it will be time barred unless the assessee had failed to disclose material facts that were necessary for the assessment of that A.Y. and if there is no failure to disclose, it would render the notice issued as being without jurisdiction.

ii) The reasons recorded for reopening of the assessment did not state that there was failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for the assessment of the assessment year 1998-99. The notice issued u/s 148 after a period of four years for reopening the assessment u/s 147 and the consequential order passed were quashed and set aside.”

Reassessment — Notice after four years — Condition precedent — Notice issued on basis of information received subsequent to search and seizure of another party — Nexus between undisclosed loan activity of searched party and assessee not established — Notice and consequential assessment order quashed and set aside

34 Peninsula Land Ltd. vs. ACIT [2021] 439 ITR 582 (Bom) A.Y.: 2012-13; Date of order: 25th October, 2021 Ss. 132, 147 & 148 of ITA, 1961

Reassessment — Notice after four years — Condition precedent — Notice issued on basis of information received subsequent to search and seizure of another party — Nexus between undisclosed loan activity of searched party and assessee not established — Notice and consequential assessment order quashed and set aside

For the A.Y. 2012-13, an order u/s 143(3) read with section 153A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was passed on 30th December, 2016 against the assessee. After a period of four years, the Assessing Officer issued a notice u/s 148 dated 30th March, 2019 for reopening the assessment u/s 147 of the Act. He recorded reasons that information was received from the Deputy Director that a search and seizure operation was conducted u/s 132 in the case of an entity EE and based on the statement recorded of the partner of EE and documentary evidence found in the search, an undisclosed activity of money lending and borrowing in unaccounted cash was found being operated at the premises of EE, that the assessee had indulged in lending of cash loan and the amount of Rs. 30 lakhs had escaped assessment within the meaning of section 147. Consequent reassessment order was passed on 5th September, 2019.

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i) Under the substituted section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 if the Assessing Officer has reason to believe that income has escaped assessment that is enough to confer jurisdiction to reopen the assessment. But the Assessing Officer has no power to review an assessment which has been concluded. After a period of four years even if the Assessing Officer has some tangible material to come to the conclusion that there is an escapement of income from assessment, he cannot exercise the power to reopen unless he discloses what was the material fact which was not truly and fully disclosed by the assessee.

ii) The reasons for the reopening of assessment have to be tested or examined only on the basis of the reasons recorded at the time of issuing a notice u/s 148 seeking to reopen the assessment. These reasons to believe cannot be improved upon or supplemented much less substituted by affidavit or oral submissions. The reasons for reopening an assessment should be those of the Assessing Officer alone who is issuing the notice and he cannot act on the dictates of any another person in issuing the notice. The tangible material upon the basis of which the Assessing Officer entertains reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment can come to him from any source, but the reasons for the reopening have to be only of the Assessing Officer issuing the notice.

iii) In the reasons for the reopening, the Assessing Officer had not stated anywhere that one BS was an employee of the assessee. Further, he did not even disclose when the search and seizure u/s 132 was carried out in the case of the entity EE, whether it was before the assessment order dated 30th December, 2016 against the assessee was passed or afterwards. The reasons for reopening were absolutely silent on how the search and seizure on EE or the statement referred to or relied upon in the reasons recorded had any connection with the assessee.

iv) The notice dated 30th March, 2019 issued u/s 148 and the subsequent order dated 5th September, 2019 passed were without jurisdiction and hence, quashed and set aside. Any consequent notice or demand, if issued, was also quashed and set aside.”

Perquisite — Exceptions — Treatment of prescribed ailment in approved hospital — Application for approval filed by hospital before outbreak of Covid-19 pandemic — Renewal denied on ground that State Government Authority had revoked approval granted to assessee for treating Covid-19 patients — Order of Principal CIT rejecting application unsustainable

33 Park Health Systems Pvt. Ltd. vs. Principal CIT [2021] 439 ITR 643 (Telangana) Date of order: 28th September, 2021 S. 17(2)(viii) Proviso (II)(B) of ITA, 1961

Perquisite — Exceptions — Treatment of prescribed ailment in approved hospital — Application for approval filed by hospital before outbreak of Covid-19 pandemic — Renewal denied on ground that State Government Authority had revoked approval granted to assessee for treating Covid-19 patients — Order of Principal CIT rejecting application unsustainable

The assessee was a hospital, and it was granted approval by the Principal Chief Commissioner under proviso (ii)(b) to section 17(2)(viii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 initially in the year 2011-12, with each renewal being valid for three years and the last of the renewal granted being valid till 21st March, 2020. The assessee made an application on 13th January, 2020 seeking renewal of approval granted two months prior to the expiry of the validity period of the existing approval granted. While the application was pending for renewal of approval, the Covid-19 pandemic struck and the assessee was granted approval by the State Government Department of Public Health and Family Welfare for providing treatment for Covid-19 patients. Thereafter, based on complaints, the State Government Medical and Health Officer, on 3rd August, 2020 revoked the permission granted to the assessee. The assessee submitted its explanation and sought for recalling the revocation order. While the explanation offered by the assessee was under consideration by the State authorities, the second respondent issued a notice dated 12th October, 2020 calling upon the assessee to show cause why the cancellation order of the State Government should not be considered for deciding the application for recognition under proviso (ii)(b) to section 17(2)(viii). The assessee submitted in its letter to the Principal Chief Commissioner that when it made the application for renewal of approval, there was no Covid-19 pandemic outbreak, that the State Government Department of Public Health and Family Welfare revoked the permission for Covid-19 treatment only and not for other medical treatments, that the State authority’s action was based on misinformation and baseless propaganda made by the media without taking into consideration the actual facts, that the assessee was under the process of getting permission again for Covid-19 treatment from the State Government Department of Public Health and Family Welfare and requested to grant the renewal of application under proviso (ii)(b) to section 17(2)(viii). The Principal Chief Commissioner rejected the application for renewal of approval by an order dated 19th October, 2020.

On a writ petition challenging the order, the Telangana High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“i) The order rejecting the renewal of approval under proviso (ii)(b) to section 17(2)(viii) had been passed by the Principal Chief Commissioner by traversing beyond the notice and was in violation of principles of natural justice causing prejudice to the assessee. The order read with the notice showed that it was passed as a chain reaction to the order of the State Government, which dealt with determination of corona virus disease as a respiratory disease and it was a prescribed disease under clause (a) of sub-rule (2) of rule 3A of the Income-tax Rules, 1962.

ii) The order indicated that it had taken into consideration various issues which had not been mentioned in the notice issued to the assessee. The only ground mentioned in the notice was with regard to the State Government revoking the mandate given for covid treatment, whereas the order, apart from dealing with the revocation of mandate for covid treatment by the State Government, also dealt with other aspects as to the nature of the corona virus disease being a respiratory disease and the assessee having resorted to excessive, exorbitant and unconscionable pricing being a misconduct or an offence, without putting the assessee on notice of the allegations and to offer its explanation. The claim of the Principal Chief Commissioner that Covid-19 treatment was a respiratory disease was not backed by any material or scientific data. Since the notice issued relied only on the revocation of permission for providing medical treatment for Covid-19 by the State Government, and the revocation having been lifted by the State authority by proceedings dated 13th September, 2020 and the assessee was permitted to provide treatment for Covid-19 patients, the very basis of the notice dated 12th October, 2020 issued was removed.

iii) The order rejecting the renewal of approval granted under proviso (ii)(b) to section 17(2)(viii) was unsustainable.”

ACCOUNTING FOR SPONSORSHIP ARRANGEMENTS

INTRODUCTION
Companies may enter into sponsorship agreements for World Cup events or Olympic games as a means of building their brands or advertising their products. Consider a scenario, where an entity enters into an arrangement with the owners of the Cricket World Cup event to use the World Cup brand in its products or activities for one year ending one month after the event is concluded. To gain that right, the entity pays INR 100 million.

Question 1
On Day 1, Should the entity account for this amount as an intangible asset or advance against future sales promotion expenses?

Question 2
Assume that the entity shall exploit the brand for the entire year starting from the date of acquisition and ending one month after the event is concluded. How will the INR 100 million be debited to profit and loss, when the amount is capitalised as an intangible asset and when it is presented as an advance? Will the P&L charge differ under either approach?

Accounting Standard References from Ind AS 38 Intangible Assets

Paragraph 8
An intangible asset is an identifiable non-monetary asset without physical substance.

An asset is a resource: (a) controlled by an entity as a result of past events; and (b) from which future economic benefits are expected to flow to the entity.

Paragraph 29
“Examples of expenditures that are not part of the cost of an intangible asset are:
(a) costs of introducing a new product or service (including costs of advertising and promotional activities);
(b)…….
(c)………..”

Paragraph 69
“……Other examples of expenditure that is recognised as an expense when it is incurred include:
(a) ………
(b) …..
(c) expenditure on advertising and promotional activities (including mail order catalogues).
(d) …………….”

Paragraph 70
Paragraph 68 does not preclude an entity from recognising a prepayment as an asset when payment for goods has been made in advance of the entity obtaining a right to access those goods. Similarly, paragraph 68 does not preclude an entity from recognising a prepayment as an asset when payment for services has been made in advance of the entity receiving those services.

Paragraph 97
The depreciable amount of an intangible asset with a finite useful life shall be allocated on a systematic basis over its useful life. Amortisation shall begin when the asset is available for use, i.e., when it is in the location and condition necessary for it to be capable of operating in the manner intended by management. ……….The amortisation method used shall reflect the pattern in which the asset’s future economic benefits are expected to be consumed by the entity. If that pattern cannot be determined reliably, the straight-line method shall be used.

Response to Question 1
View A: INR 100 million should be recognised as an intangible asset

The sponsorship arrangement can be accounted for as an acquisition of a right to use the World Cup brand, and therefore can be recognized as an asset. The right to use the Cricket World Cup Brand represents a license to use a brand for a defined period, in this case, one year.

The definition of an intangible asset requires that the asset is identifiable, controlled by the entity, and that future economic benefits are expected to flow to the entity from the use of the asset. These requirements are met, as the asset is identifiable through a contractual right, the entity has control over the licence and future economic benefits will flow to the entity from that licence.

View B: INR 100 million should be recognised as an advance for future services to be received
Paragraph 29 of Ind AS 38, provides examples of costs that do not form part of the cost of an intangible asset. One of the examples is the cost of introducing a new product or service including cost of advertising and sales promotion expenses. This requirement seems to suggest that sales promotion activities are expenditure and are not capitalised as intangible asset. The benefit of the sales promotion activity is to enhance the value of the brand and the customer relationship of the entity, which in turn generates revenue. As the brand and customer relationship of the entity are internally generated brands, and are not recognised as assets of the company, expenses to enhance those internally generated intangibles should not be recognised as an intangible asset. Additionally, the Cricket World Cup brand will not be used in isolation but will be used in conjunction with the entity’s brand, and therefore the arrangement is a co-branding arrangement.

In substance, the right to use the World Cup Brand is no different from an advertising activity, that enhances the value of the entity’s brand value. This is an internally generated brand and should not be capitalised as an intangible asset. Till such time the services are received; INR 100 million should be presented as an advance (or prepaid expense) in accordance with paragraph 70.

Response to Question 2
Basis paragraph 97 the intangible asset is amortized from the date the asset is available for use till the date the license is used, i.e., amortisation ends one month after the event is concluded. The amortisation method used shall reflect the pattern in which the asset’s future economic benefits are expected to be consumed by the entity. If that pattern cannot be determined reliably, the straight-line method shall be used. The pattern of consumption will be significant when the actual event is unfolding; however, because it cannot be estimated reliably, the amortisation will happen on a straight-line basis, over the one-year period of the licence.

When INR 100 million is presented as an advance, the expensing will not be different from the one that is undertaken with respect to amortisation of intangible assets. Typically, for a supply of services, an expense is recognised when the entity receives the services. Services are received when they are performed by a supplier in accordance with a contract which is equally over the contractual period of one year, as the World Cup brand is utilised over that period.

CONCLUSION
The question raised in this article is a very interesting question with respect to whether a payment for future services constitutes an advance for a service or an intangible asset. Under the present case, the author believes that the argument to capitalize the INR 100 million as an intangible asset is much stronger, because the payment represents a payment for acquiring a licence to use the World Cup Brand. Additionally, it may be noted that many global companies have capitalised such payments under IFRS as intangible assets. However, the other view of presenting the payment as an advance, cannot be ruled out.

With regards to the expensing in the profit or loss, the charge will generally be agnostic to whether the payment is capitalised as an intangible asset or presented as an advance. If presented as an advance, the cash outflow will be classified as operating, and if presented as intangible asset, the cash outflow will be classified as investing. As regards EBITDA, it will be higher (favourable) when the payment is treated as an intangible compared to when presented as an advance, because EBITDA will not include the amortisation charge, but expensing of the advance will be included in the EBITDA.

CONTROVERSIES

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Charitable institutions generally receive donations (voluntary contributions) from various donors for carrying out their charitable activities. Earlier, till A.Y. 1972-73, section 12(1) provided that voluntary contributions would not be included in income, while section 12(2) provided that voluntary contributions from another trust referred to in section 11, would be deemed to be income from property held in trust for charitable purposes. These voluntary contributions now fall within the definition of ‘income’ by virtue of insertion of section 2(24)(iia) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, with effect from A.Y. 1973-74. Such contributions (other than corpus donations) are also deemed to be income from property held under trust for charitable purposes, by virtue of section 12(1) of the Act, since A.Y. 1973-74. The exemption under section 11 of a charitable trust, registered under section 12A/12AA (now section 12AB), is therefore now computed by considering such voluntary contributions and adjusting the same by the application and accumulation of income, for charitable purposes, by applying the various sub-sections of section 11.

At times, charitable institutions receive grants from other institutions or persons, Indian or foreign, Government or non-government, with the condition that such grants are to be utilised only for specific purposes (“tied-up grants”). In most such cases, there is also a stipulation that in case the tied-up grants are not used for the specified purposes within a specific period of time, the unutilised amounts are to be refunded to the grantor of the aid.

The issues in the context of taxation have arisen before the courts as to whether such tied-up grants could be termed as voluntary contributions and whether, where not utilized during the year, are income of the recipient institution, as the same are to be refunded and represent a liability to be discharged in the future. While the Bombay High Court has taken the view that such grants are voluntary contributions, the Delhi High Court has taken the view that such receipts are not voluntary contributions and are liabilities and not in the nature of income of the recipient institution. A similar view has been taken by the Gujarat High court following the Delhi High court decision.

GEM & JEWELLERY EXPORT PROMOTION COUNCIL’S CASE
The issue had first come up before the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs. Gem & Jewellery Export Promotion Council 143 ITR 579.

In this case relating to A.Y. 1967-68, the assessee was a company set up for the advancement of an object of general public utility, i.e., to support, protect, maintain, increase and promote exports of gems and jewellery, including pearls, precious and semi-precious stones, diamonds, synthetic stones, imitation jewellery, gold and non-gold jewellery and articles thereof, whose income was applied only for charitable purposes as defined in section 2(15).

The assessee received grants-in-aid from the Government of India for meeting the expenditure on specified projects. Some of the conditions on which those grants-in-aid were given were the following:
1. The funds should be kept with the State Bank of India, the total expenditure should not be more than the expenditure approved by the Central Government for each project; separate accounts should be kept for Code and non-Code projects and the accounts were to be audited by chartered accountants approved by the Government.
2. Any amount unspent was to be surrendered to the Government by the end of the financial year unless allowed to be adjusted against next year’s grant.
3. The grant should be spent upon the object for which it had been sanctioned. The assets acquired wholly or substantially out of grant-in-aid would not, without prior sanction of the Central Government, be disposed of, encumbered or utilised for purposes other than those for which the grant was sanctioned.

At that point of time, relying on section 12(1), which provided that any income derived from voluntary contributions applicable solely to charitable or religious purposes would not be includible in the total income, the assessee claimed that the grants-in-aid were in the nature of voluntary contributions, and were therefore not taxable, whether spent or not. The assessing officer taxed such unspent grants-in-aid, allowing accumulation of 25% of such amount.

In first appeal, the assessee’s claim was allowed, holding that such grants-in-aid were not taxable, being voluntary contributions. Before the Tribunal, the Department argued that the grants-in-aid could not be considered as voluntary contribution for the purpose of section 12(1), having regard to the fact that the grants were made subject to conditions mentioned above. The Tribunal confirmed the first appellate order, holding that the amounts given by the Government were voluntary contributions and were not in the nature of any price paid for any benefit or privilege, nor were they for any consideration. According to the Tribunal, the conditions imposed by the Government did not change the nature of the payment, which was initially a voluntary contribution.

Before the Bombay High Court, on behalf of the revenue, it was argued that while making contributions, the Government imposed certain conditions and having regard to the fact that the conditions governed the grants, the grants could not be considered to be a donation or a voluntary contribution or, in other words, it was not a pure and simple gift by the Government.

The Bombay High Court observed that it was well known that grants-in-aid were made by the Government to provide certain institutions with sufficient funds to carry on their charitable activities. The institutions or associations to which the grant was made had no right to ask for the grant. It was solely within the discretion of the Government to make grants to institutions of a charitable nature. The Government did not expect any return for the grants given by it to such institutions. There was nothing which was required to be done by these institutions for the Government, which can be considered as a consideration for the grant.

The Bombay High Court noted the meaning of the words ‘voluntarily contributed’ as held in Society of Writers to the Signet vs. CIR 2 TC 257, as “the meaning of the word ‘voluntary’ is ‘money gifted voluntarily contributed in the sense of being gratuitously given’.” The Bombay High Court held that the conditions attached to the grant did not affect the voluntary nature of the contribution. The conditions were merely intended to see that the amounts were properly utilised, and therefore did not detract from the voluntary nature of the grant.

The Bombay High Court accordingly held that the grants-in-aid were voluntary contributions, and were exempt under section 12(1), as it then stood.

SOCIETY FOR DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES’ CASE
The issue again came up before the Delhi High Court in the case of DIT vs. Society for Development Alternatives 205 Taxman 373 (Del).

In this case, relating to A.Y. 2006-07 and 2007-08, the assessee was a society, which was registered under Section 12A and Section 80G. It was undertaking activities relating to research, development and dissemination of (i) Technologies for fulfillment of basic needs of rural households (ii) Solutions for regeneration of natural resources and the environment and (iii) Community based institution strengthening methods to improve access to for the poor.

It had received grants for specific purposes/projects from the government, non-government, foreign institutions etc. These grants were to be spent as per the terms and conditions of the project grant. The amount, which remained unspent at the end of the year, got spilled over to the next year and was treated as unspent grant. The Assessing Officer treated such unspent grants as income of the assessee, invoking the provisions of section 12(1). This section then provided that any voluntary contributions received by a trust created wholly for charitable or religious purposes (other than corpus donations) were, for purposes of section 11, deemed to be income from property held under trust wholly for charitable or religious purposes.

The Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the addition, noting that:
1. The amounts were received/sanctioned for a specific purpose/project to be utilized over a particular period.
2. The utilisation of the said grants was monitored by the funding agencies who sent persons for inspection and also appointed independent auditors to verify the utilisation of funds as settled terms.
3. The assessee had to submit inter/final progress/work completion reports along with evidences to the funding agencies from time to time.
4. The agreements also included a term that separate audited accounts for the project would be maintained.
5. The unutilised amount had to be refunded back to the funding agencies in most of the cases.
6. All the terms and conditions had to be simultaneously complied with, otherwise the grants would be withdrawn.
7. The assessee had to utilise the funds as per the terms and conditions of the grant. If it failed to utilise the grants for the purpose for which grant was sanctioned, the amount was recovered by the funding agency.

The Commissioner (Appeals) was therefore of the view that the assessee was not free to use the funds voluntarily as per its sweet will and, thus, these were not voluntary contributions as per Section 12. He concluded that these were tied-up grants, where the appellant acted as a custodian of the funds given by the funding agency to channelise the same in a particular direction. The Tribunal upheld the order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals).

The Delhi High Court agreed with the findings of the Tribunal, holding that these were not voluntary contributions, and were therefore not income under section 12(1).

A similar view has been taken by the Gujarat High Court in the case of DIT(E) vs. Gujarat State Council for Blood Transfusion, 221 Taxman 126, for AY 2009-10, holding that the grant received from the State Government was not income of the trust for the purposes of section 11.

OBSERVATIONS
Though both the Bombay and Delhi High Court decisions were decided in favour of the assessee and held that the tied-up grants were not taxable, since the law in both the years was different, the ratio of these decisions is opposite to that of each other – while the Bombay High Court has held that tied-up grants are ‘voluntary contributions’, the Delhi High Court has taken the view that these tied-up grants are not ‘voluntary contributions’.

The Bombay High Court, in examining whether the tied-up grants were voluntary contributions or not, looked at the receipt from the perspective of the grantor – was the grant voluntary, or was it for some consideration, and held that since it was voluntary from the viewpoint of the donor, the receipt was a voluntary contribution; and applying the then applicable law, it held that voluntary contributions were not income, as the definition of ‘income’ at the relevant time did not include voluntary contributions. The Bombay High Court did not have to consider the subsequent amendment, under which such amounts were independently in the nature of income.

The law presently applicable provides that a ‘voluntary contribution’ is an income, and hence it has become necessary to examine whether a tied-up grant, not spent by the year end or not accumulated, is a voluntary contribution, more so where it is attached with the condition of refunding the unspent amount. Following the Bombay High Court, the receipt is a voluntary contribution, and once so accepted, the same has to be subjected to the rules of application and accumulation. In contrast, where the Delhi High court is followed, the receipt in the first place shall not be construed as a voluntary contribution and would not be subjected to the rules of application and accumulation.

In order for a receipt to be regarded as a voluntary contribution and for it to bear the character of income, the recipient has to have some element of domain over the receipt – the freedom to apply such income as it desires. If the recipient has to necessarily spend the receipt as per the directions of the grantor, and under the supervision of the donor, it has no control over such spending and over such amounts. Such receipts should be considered as held in trust for the grantor and when spent, the expenditure be held to be the expenditure of the grantor, and not that of the recipient trust, which disburses the amounts. Besides, where the unspent amount is refundable, it is a liability and cannot be regarded as income at all.

The Hyderabad bench of the Tribunal has therefore held, in the case of Nirmal Agricultural Society vs. ITO 71 ITD 152, that ‘The grants which are for specific purposes do not belong to the assessee-society. Such grants do not form corpus of the assessee or its income. Those grants are not donations to the assessee so as to bring them under the purview of section 12 of the Act. Voluntary contributions covered by section 12 are those contributions freely available to the assessee without any stipulation which the assessee could utilise towards its objectives according to its own discretion and judgment. Tied-up grants for a specified purpose would only mean that the assessee, which is a voluntary organisation, has agreed to act as a trustee of a special fund granted by Bread for the World with the result that it need not be pooled or integrated with the assessee’s normal income or corpus. In this case, the assessee is acting as an independent trustee for that grant, just as same trustee can act as a trustee of more than one trust. Tied-up amounts need not, therefore, be treated as amounts which are required to be considered for assessment, for ascertaining the amount expended or the amount to be accumulated.’

According to the Tribunal, such unspent grants should be shown as a liability, and the expenditure incurred for the specified purposes adjusted against such liability, and not be treated as the expenses of the assessee. Only any non-refundable credit balance in the liability account of the grantor would be treated as income in the year in which such non-refundable balance was ascertained.
 
A similar view has been taken by the Mumbai bench of the Tribunal in the case of NEIA Trust v ADIT ITA No 5818-5819/Mum/2015 dated 24th December 2019 (A.Y. 2011-12 and 2012-13), where the Tribunal has held:
‘upon perusal of stated terms & conditions, it could not be said that the funds received by the assessee were not in the nature of voluntary contributions rather they were more in the nature of specific grants on certain terms and conditions and liable to be refunded, in case the same were not utilized for specific purposes. It is trite law that entries in the books of accounts would not be determinative of the true nature / character of the transactions and the same could not be held to be conclusive. Therefore, the mere fact that the assessee credited the receipts as corpus contribution, in our considered opinion, would not make much difference and would not alter the true nature of the stated receipts. The said funds / receipts, as stated earlier, were more in the nature of specific grants and represent liability for the assessee and liable to be refunded in case of non-utilization.’

The Hyderabad Bench decision in Nirmal Agricultural Society’s case has also been followed by the Tribunal in the cases of Handloom Export Promotion Council vs. ADIT 62 taxmann.com 288 (Chennai) and JB Education Society vs. ACIT 55 taxmann.com 322 (Hyd).

Besides, in the cases of various Government Corporations set up to implement Government policies, grants received from the Government by such corporations have been held not to constitute income of the Corporation, since the Corporation acts as an agency of the Government in spending for the Government schemes. The funds therefore really belong to the Government, until such time as the funds are spent. This view has been taken by the High Courts in the following cases:
•    CIT vs. Karnataka Urban Infrastructure Development and Finance Corpn. 284 ITR 582 (Kar.)
•    Karnataka Municipal Data Society vs. ITO 76 taxmann.com 167 (Kar)

The position may be slightly different in case of grants from the Government and a few specified bodies, with effect from A.Y. 2016-17. Clause (xviii) of section 2(24) has been inserted in the definition of ‘income’, which provides for taxation of grants from the Central Government, State Government, any authority, body or agency as income. Such grants would therefore be taxable as income of the recipient trust, and the fact anymore may or may not be material that the receipt is not a voluntary contribution. This inserted provision in any case would not apply to grants received from other non-governmental organisations.

In case the Government tied-up grant is refundable if not spent, can it be regarded as income at all post insertion of clause (xviii)? One way to minimize the harm on the possible application of clause (xviii) of section 2(24) could be to tax such unspent receipts in the year in which the fact of the non-utilisation is final; even in such a case, a possibility of claiming deduction for the refund of unspent amount should be explored. Alternatively, in that year, the expenditure, where incurred, should be treated as an application of income. The other possible view is that clause (xviii) applies only to recipient persons, other than charitable organisations, to whom the specific provisions of clause (iia) of section 2(24) applies, rather than generally applying the provisions of clause (xviii) to all and sundry.

The better view therefore seems to be that of the Delhi and Gujarat High Courts, that tied-up grants are not voluntary contributions and/or income of the recipient institution.

Book profits — Company — Provision for bad and doubtful debts — Corresponding amount reduced from loans and advances on assets side of balance sheet and at end of year loans and advances shown net of provision for bad debts — Provision not to be added in computation of book profits

32 Principal CIT. vs. Narmada Chematur Petrochemicals Ltd. [2021] 439 ITR 761 (Guj) A.Y.: 2004-05; Date of order: 14th July, 2021 S. 115JB of ITA, 1961

Book profits — Company — Provision for bad and doubtful debts — Corresponding amount reduced from loans and advances on assets side of balance sheet and at end of year loans and advances shown net of provision for bad debts — Provision not to be added in computation of book profits

The assessee claimed deduction u/s 80HHC of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and after setting off unabsorbed loss and depreciation of the preceding years, the assessee filed a nil return for the A.Y. 2004-05 and declared the book profits under the provisions of section 115JB. The Assessing Officer made various disallowances in his order u/s 143(3).

The Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the addition made on account of bad and doubtful debts holding that the provision for bad and doubtful debt was not a provision for a liability but for diminution in value of assets and therefore, clause (c) of the Explanation to section 115JB would not be applicable. The assessee and the Department filed appeals before the Tribunal. The Tribunal held that since the assessee had simultaneously obliterated the provision from its accounts by reducing the corresponding amount from the loans and advances on the assets side of the balance-sheet and consequently, at the end of the year shown the loans and advances on the assets side of the balance sheet as net of the provision for bad debts, it would amount to a write-off and such actual write-off would not be hit by clause (i) of the Explanation to section 115JB.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The Tribunal was right in deleting the addition on account of the provision for bad and doubtful debts in the computation of the book profits for computation of minimum alternate tax liability in the light of clause (i) of the Explanation to section 115JB. No question of law arose.”

Section 195 read with Section 40(a)(i) of the Act – Section 40(a)(i) is applicable on failure to deduct tax on payments made for FTS and does not encompass fees for professional service

6 Chandan Mohon Lal vs. ACIT  [TS – 1123 – ITAT –  2021 (Del)] ITA No: 1869/Del/2019 A.Y.: 2015-16; Date of order: 9th December, 2021

Section 195 read with Section 40(a)(i) of the Act – Section 40(a)(i) is applicable on failure to deduct tax on payments made for FTS and does not encompass fees for professional service

FACTS
The assessee was an advocate practicing in the field of Intellectual Property Laws. During the relevant year, the assessee had made payments to various persons/entities outside India towards professional/technical fees without deducting TDS. AO disallowed expenditure under Section 40(a)(i) of the Act. AO held that payments were chargeable to tax as they were made to persons from non DTAA countries, and in respect of DTAAs countries, the assessee had not furnished TRCs. CIT(A) affirmed AO’s order. Being aggrieved, the assessee appealed to ITAT.

HELD
Reimbursement of expenses
• The assessee had made foreign remittances in respect of (a) amounts recovered in a court proceeding on behalf of the client in litigation (b) official fee for international application (c) publication and trade fair services.

• Payments representing reimbursements for official purposes and trade fair services were not in the nature of income chargeable to tax. Accordingly, provisions of Section 195 were not applicable.

Fees for technical services vs. Professional fees
• Non-resident attorneys had rendered the following professional services outside India:

? Filing of application for grant/registration of IPRs.
??Filing of Form/responses/petitions in relation to activity leading to, or in the process of, grant/registration.

??Maintenance of such grant/registration or services in relation thereto, as required under law, such as, annuity payment, renewal fee, restoration of patent, etc.

??Undertaking compliances for effecting change in the ownership/address etc., of such intellectual property.

• Non-resident attorneys had rendered services outside India. Accordingly, income received in respect thereof could not be treated as income received in India, or deemed to be received in India, or as income accrued or arisen in India.

• The Act considers legal/professional services and FTS as two distinct and separate categories. A conjoint reading of Sections 40(a)(i) and 40(a)(ia) brings out a clear distinction between FTS and fees for professional services. Section 40(a)(ia) encompasses both FTS and fees for professional services. However, Section 40(a)(i) is applicable only in case of failure to deduct tax on payments made for FTS.
• This could be because, as per Section 5 and Section 9 of the Act, legal/professional fee payment to a non-resident does not accrue or arise in India, or is not deemed to accrue or arise in India.

• In reaching its conclusion, ITAT placed reliance on under noted decisions1 where similar view was expressed.

Source Rule exclusion
• Indian/overseas clients had engaged the assessee for availing certain services. In turn, the assessee had engaged foreign attorneys to perform certain services required to be performed in foreign jurisdictions. Clients were not concerned whether work was done by the assessee or someone else.

• Thus, the source of income of the assessee through services rendered by non-resident attorneys in foreign jurisdictions was located outside India.

_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
1    NQA Quality Systems Registrar Ltd. vs. DCIT: 92 TTJ 946; ONGC vs. DCIT, Dehradun: 117 taxmann.com 867 (Delhi-Trib.); Deloitte Haskins & Sells vs. ACIT: [2017] 184 TTJ 801 (Mumbai –Trib.)

Exemption u/s 54 was available even if the new residential property was purchased in the joint names of assessee, her daughter and son in law

26 ITO vs. Smt. Rachna Arora [2021] 90 ITR(T) 575 (Chandigarh – Trib.) ITA No.: 1112 (Chd) of 2019 A.Y.: 2015-16      Date of Order: 31st March, 2021                    

Exemption u/s 54 was available even if the new residential property was purchased in the joint names of assessee, her daughter and son in law    

FACTS
Assessee sold a residential property and invested entire amount on purchase of a new residential property in joint names of assessee with her daughter and son in law and claimed exemption under Section 54. Assessing Officer held that assessee was entitled for claim of exemption only to extent of her share in new residential property.

The CIT (A) allowed the assessee’s appeal.

Consequently, the revenue filed an appeal before the ITAT.

HELD
The ITAT confirmed the order passed by the CIT(A) and dismissed the revenue’s appeal on the following grounds:

The CIT(A) had followed the ratio contained in the decision of Jurisdictional High Court in the case of CIT vs. Dinesh Verma 2015 233 Taxman 409 (Punj. & Har.)

The Hon’ble High Court in the case of Dinesh Verma (supra) held that the assessee would be entitled to the benefit of exemption u/s 54B only on the amount invested by him after the sale of his original property and not on the amount invested by his wife jointly in the same property. The high court also held that the plain reading of provisions of section 54 of the Act indicated that in order to claim the benefit of exemption u/s 54, the assessee should, invest the capital gain arising out of sale of residential property in purchase of another residential property within stipulated time. Nothing contained in Section 54 precluded the assessee to claim the exemption in case the property was purchased jointly with close family members, who are not strangers or unconnected to her provided the assessee invested the entire amount of Long Term Capital Gain.

Based on the principle, he held that in the instant case, since the entire investment is made by the assessee herself, albeit in joint names with daughter and son-in-law, the assessee is entitled to exemption u/s 54. The ITAT also observed that the Ld. DR was neither able to controvert the facts of the present case as noted by the CIT(A) nor had he pointed out how the decision in the case of Dinesh Verma (supra) was applicable against the assessee in the facts of the present case.

A society formed with the primary object of construction of chambers for its members and their allotment is eligible to be registered u/s 12AA since the objects amount to advancement of object of general public utility within the meaning of Section 2(15) of the Income Tax Act

25 Building Committee (Society) Barnala vs. CIT (Exemption) [2021] 89 ITR(T) 1 (Chandigarh – Trib.) ITA No.: 1295 (Chd) of 2019 Date of Order: 18th May, 2021

A society formed with the primary object of construction of chambers for its members and their allotment is eligible to be registered u/s 12AA since the objects amount to advancement of object of general public utility within the meaning of Section 2(15) of the Income Tax Act

FACTS
Assessee-society applied for registration u/s 12AA. However, the CIT (Exemption) rejected the application of the assessee inter alia holding that genuineness of the activities of the assessee could not be established; and that the assessee had not incurred any expenditure for activities of general public importance. Main ground for rejecting the application was that purpose for which the society was formed was for the benefit of specific group of professionals which does not come within the purview of ‘advancement of object of general public utility’ under Section 2(15) of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed appeal to the ITAT.

HELD
The ITAT analysed the case on hand in the context of provisions of Section 2(15) which define ‘charitable purpose’ and Section 12AA which provide for grant of registration.

The ITAT observed that the bye-laws of the society provided that society was established for the welfare, construction and allotment of chambers in the District Court Complex, Barnala for the members of District Bar Association, Barnala. It further provided that all the incomes/earnings would be solely utilized and applied towards the promotion of its aims and objectives only as set forth in the memorandum of association, and that the society will work on no profit and no loss basis. Bye-laws also provided social welfare activities such as growing of trees for environments, de-addiction drug campaign, welfare of girl child, and also provide legal awareness among the general public.

The CIT (Exemptions) proceeded only on the basis that since the society was formed for construction of building for members, benefits thereof only restricted to the members, and not to the general public at large and failed to comprehend the role of Bar Association in judicial dispensation. Attainment of justice for all the parties of the case and the society at large is the main object of our judicial system.

The Bench and Bar were the essential partners in judicial dispensation, and therefore, considering the importance of Bar Association in every adjudicating body, particular space was being earmarked and maintained for Bar Association and for litigants. Thus, since working space for professionals was an integral part of infrastructure for judicial dispensation, the ITAT held that the CIT (Exemptions) was wrong in rejecting the assessee’s application u/s 12AA, disregarding the bye-laws and not considering the object of the assessee from a larger perspective.
    

Since income from TDR is inextricably linked to the project and its cost, the cost of building has to be deducted against the income from sale of TDR. TDR receipts cannot be considered in isolation of assessee’s obligation under the SRA agreement to complete the SRA project

24 DBS Realty vs. ACIT  [TS-1096-ITAT-2021(Mum)] A.Ys.: 2010-11 and 2011-12; Date of order: 24th November, 2021 Section: 28

Since income from TDR is inextricably linked to the project and its cost, the cost of building has to be deducted against the income from sale of TDR. TDR receipts cannot be considered in isolation of assessee’s obligation under the SRA agreement to complete the SRA project

FACTS
The assessee, a partnership firm, engaged in the business of real estate development entered into an agreement with the Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA) to develop a project over a plot of land spread over 31.9 acres. The said plot of land was purchased by the assessee for a consideration of Rs. 44.21 crore and handed over to SRA as per SRA scheme. As per the terms of the agreement with SRA, the assessee was to develop the SRA project at its own cost. In return of the land surrendered to SRA and the project cost to be incurred the assessee was granted Land TDR of 93,623 sq. mts. and construction TDR of 4,78,527 sq. mts.

Since the assessee was required to fund the entire cost of the project itself, the TDR granted to the assessee in a phased manner was sold from time to time to incur the cost of the project. In the process, the assessee received various amounts aggregating to about Rs. 304 crore in financial years 2009-10 to 2013-14.

In the course of assessment proceedings for the assessment year under consideration, the Assessing Officer (AO) called upon the assessee to explain why the amount received from the sale of TDR should not be treated as income of the assessee in respective assessment years. In response, the assessee submitted that since it is following percentage completion method for recognising the revenue from the SRA project and since 25% of the total estimated project is not completed till date, TDR income cannot be treated as income but has to be shown as current liability.

The AO did not accept the contentions of the assessee and held that the amount received by the assessee from sale of TDR has to be added to the income of the assessee in the respective assessment years.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it contended that-

(i) sale of TDR is integrally connected to the SRA project, hence, cannot be considered in isolation;

(ii) since SRA is not funding the project, the assessee has to incur the cost of project by utilizing the amount received from sale of TDR;

(iii) the very idea of granting TDR to the assessee is for enabling it to finance the project;

(iv) since the project is not complete even to the extent of 25%, no amount is taxable, much less, the amount received from sale of TDR, that too, without looking at the corresponding cost incurred by the assessee.

HELD
The Tribunal noted that the issue for its consideration is whether the amount received by the assessee from the sale of TDR granted in respect of the SRA project is taxable in the year of receipt or the assessee’s method of revenue recognition following percentage of completion method is acceptable. It also noted that the assessee has received certain amount from the sale of TDR in A.Ys. 2012-13 and 2013-14 as well.

While completing the assessment, the AO accepted the method of accounting followed by the assessee. However, PCIT held the assessment orders to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue since AO failed to tax the amount received by the assessee from the sale of TDR. While setting aside the assessments, the PCIT directed the AO to assess the amounts received from the sale of TDR.

However, while deciding the assessee’s appeals challenging the aforesaid direction of PCIT, the Tribunal held that percentage completion method followed by the assessee is a well-recognised method as per ICAI guidelines and judicial precedents; the sale of TDR cannot be considered in isolation of assessee’s obligation under the SRA agreement to complete the SRA project; the assessee was under obligation to complete the project as per the agreement; the TDR was granted to provide finance to the assessee to complete the project. Thus, the assessee’s income from TDR cannot be considered independently without taking the corresponding expenses, more so when the TDR receipts are directly linked to execution of the project. Since income from TDR is inextricably linked to the project and its cost, the cost of building has to be deducted against the income from sale of TDR.

Since the project has been stalled due to dispute and litigations and the assessee has not been able to complete the project, the bench observed that though assessee has earned income from sale of TDR, however, no income from SRA project, as yet, has been offered to tax. It also observed that the Tribunal has in appeals against orders passed under Section 263 has recorded findings touching upon the merits of the issue, which indeed, are favourable to the assessee and the said order of the Tribunal was not available before the AO or CIT(A) the applicability of the said order to the facts of the case needs to be examined.  The Tribunal set aside the order of CIT(A) and restored the issue to the file of the AO for fresh adjudication after examining the applicability of the order of the Tribunal for A.Ys. 2012-13 and 2013-14.

Where premises were let along with furniture and fixture and rent for furniture and fixtures has been bifurcated by the assessee, deduction under Section 24(a) held to be allowable even for rent of furniture and fixture, etc Reimbursement of member’s share of contribution for repairing the entire society building held to be not taxable as it has no income element in it

23 Lewis Family Trust vs. ITO  [TS-1121-ITAT-2021(Mum)] A.Y.: 2012-13 ; Date of order: 30th November, 2021 Sections: 23, 24

Where premises were let along with furniture and fixture and rent for furniture and fixtures has been bifurcated by the assessee, deduction under Section 24(a) held to be allowable even for rent of furniture and fixture, etc

Reimbursement of member’s share of contribution for repairing the entire society building held to be not taxable as it has no income element in it

FACTS I
The assessee, in its return of income, declared rental income of Rs 57,56,998 under the head `Income from House Property’ and claimed deduction under Section 24(a) of the Act. The Assessing Officer (AO) on perusal of the leave and license agreement, found that the assessee trust had let out premises along with furniture, fixtures and decoration, air-conditioning, etc, and the rent for furniture and fixtures has been separately bifurcated by the assessee. The AO held that rent of premises amounting to Rs. 34,54,199 is only taxable under the head `income from house property’ and deduction under Section 24(a) allowable in respect thereof and rent of furniture, fixtures, etc amounting to Rs. 23,02,799 would get taxed under the head `income from other sources’ and therefore, standard deduction @ 30% thereon would not be allowable.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) where it contended that the total rent has been bifurcated into rent for premises and hire charges for furniture, fixtures, etc. only for the purpose of enabling property tax charged by MCGM at a lower amount and there was no intention to defraud the income-tax department; furniture is attached with the property and cannot be removed without damaging the wall or the floor; and that without furniture rent cannot be equivalent to the amount agreed upon. The CIT(A) confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

FACTS II
During the previous year relevant to the assessment year under consideration, the assessee made a payment of Rs. 4,45,266 towards members’ share of contribution for repairing the entire society building. This payment was made by account payee cheque through regular banking channels by the assessee to the housing society. Since repairs costs were to be borne by the tenant, the assessee got a sum of Rs. 4,45,266 reimbursed from the lessee bank. The AO taxed this sum of Rs. 4,45,266 under the head `income from other sources’.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD I
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had received composite rent from its tenant State Bank of Patiala. The lessee bank had treated the entire payment of rental and hire charges as the composite payment and had charged tax at source in terms of Ssection 194I of the Act. It observed that this aspect is not a relevant consideration for determining the taxability of rental under the head of income in the hands of the assessee. However, it noted that for A.Y. 2010-11, the AO, in order giving effect to order of CIT(A), had accepted the stand of the assessee vide his order dated 19th March, 2014 and in scrutiny assessments framed for A.Ys. 2016-17 and 2018-19 also the stand of the assessee has been accepted. Applying the principle laid down by the Apex Court in Radhasoami Satsang [193 ITR 321 (SC)], namely that the revenue cannot take a divergent stand for one particular year, ignoring the rule of consistency, the Tribunal allowed this ground of appeal filed by the assessee.

HELD II
The Tribunal held that since the assessee had merely got the reimbursement of the amount paid by it to the society, there is no income element in it. Hence, it held that the reimbursement received by the assessee cannot be taxed under the head `income from other sources’.

CSR expenses, if given by way of donation to a trust eligible for 80G deduction, can be claimed under Section 80G. Restriction under Explanation 2 Section 37 does not apply to claim under section 80G

22 Naik Seafoods Pvt. Ltd. vs. PCIT  [TS-1157-ITAT-2021(Mum)] A.Y.: 2016-17; Date of order: 26th November, 2021 Sections: 37, 80G, 263

CSR expenses, if given by way of donation to a trust eligible for 80G deduction, can be claimed under Section 80G. Restriction under Explanation 2 Section 37 does not apply to claim under section 80G

FACTS
During the previous year relevant to the assessment year under consideration, assessee company in its computation of total income disallowed a sum of Rs. 2.80 lakh being CSR expenses debited to Profit & Loss Account but claimed the same under Section 80G. While assessing assessee’s total income under Section 143(3) of the Act, the Assessing Officer (AO) did not disallow the claim so made under Section 80G.

The PCIT issued a show-cause notice to the assessee interalia observing that claim of Rs. 1.40 lakh has been made under Section 80G regarding CSR expenses of Rs. 2.80 lakh. CSR expenses are the assessee’s responsibility as per the Companies Act, 2013, and if it is spent through other trusts, then also, as per Rule 4(2) of CSR Rules, it is spent on behalf of the assessee. Therefore, the assessee cannot give a donation of CSR expenses even if it is given to a trust eligible for an 80G deduction. Hence, the same is not allowable. Failure of AO to consider CSR expense as disallowable as rendered the assessment order erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interest of the revenue.

In response, the assessee made its submission (the submission made by the assessee to the PCIT on this issue is not reproduced in the order of the tribunal). However, the PCIT rejected the submission by holding that since both CSR expense and 80G donations are two different modes of ensuring fund for public welfare, treating the same expense under two different heads would defeat the very purpose of it. In the budget memorandum as well, the legislative intent was to ensure that companies with certain strong financials make the expenditure towards this purpose and by allowing deduction, the Government would be subsidizing one-third of it by way of revenue foregone thereon and hence the same was required to be disallowed in the assessment. Failure of the AO to examine the CSR expense as disallowable expense and to examine disallowance of deduction under Section 80G rendered the order erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. He set aside the order of the AO with a direction to the AO to examine the above aspects with regard to allowability of deduction claimed under Section 80G as per law and frame a fresh assessment after affording an opportunity to the assessee of being heard.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where relying on the decisions of the Bangalore Bench of the Tribunal in the case of FNF India Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT in ITA No. 1565/Bang./2019 dated 5th January, 2021 and Goldman Sachs Services Pvt. Ltd. vs. JCIT in ITA(TP) No. 2355/Bang./2019 it supported the action of the AO by contending that Explanation 2 under Section 37 is restricted to Section 37 only and nothing more and since the Explanation has been inserted below Section 37, it can be invoked only when expenditure is claimed as deduction as being for the purpose of business under Section 37 of the Act. Since the assessee has not claimed the said expenditure under Section 37 but has claimed it under Section 80G and the Act nowhere states that expenditure disallowed in terms of Explanation 2 to Section
37 cannot be allowed by way of deduction in terms of Section 80G.

HELD
The Tribunal noted that the Bangalore bench of the Tribunal in FNF India Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT (supra) while deciding the issue of deduction under Section 80G relating to donations which is part of CSR has remitted the issue to the AO to verify the additions necessary to claim deduction under Section 80G of the Act with a clear direction to the AO. Since in the present case the AO himself allowed the deduction under Section 80G, as claimed by the assessee, and the issue is debatable issue and the AO has taken one of the possible view, the Tribunal held that PCIT cannot invoke the provisions of Section 263 of the Act in order to bring on record his possible view.

AUDIT QUALITY MATURITY MODEL – WHAT IS YOUR SCORE?

The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) has issued the Audit Quality Maturity Model – Version 1.0 (“AQMM” or the “Model“) in June, 2021. In the ICAI Council meeting held on 9th January, 2021, it was decided that both the Peer Review Board and the Centre for Audit Quality (CAQ) would need to develop an ecosystem that is acceptable to both. Such a collaborative approach would have the advantage of the CAQ developing the quality standards and the Peer Review Board testing the said standards.

Quality has always been the focus of ICAI. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court told Bar Council of India’s lawyer, while asking to refrain from lowering the standards of entrance exams for law schools, “Look at how ICAI does it for Chartered Accountants. They control intake and also the quality.” The audit profession always had an enhanced focus on quality. The Model spells out the expectations from the audit firms in terms of audit quality, and Peer Review Board can test the implementation of these standards.

AQMM is initially recommendatory. In the Explanatory Memorandum on Applicability of AQMM, it is stated that the ICAI Council will review, after one year, the date from which it would become mandatory. Its applicability to firms is determined based on the firm’s audit clients. If a firm has the below types of audit clients, AQMM applies to them:
– A listed entity; or
– Banks other than co-operative banks (except multi-state co-operative banks); or
– Insurance companies.
Firms auditing only branches are not covered in the applicability.

MODEL TO MEASURE AUDIT QUALITY OF DIFFERENT FIRMS
When the user or consumer selects any service or product, he looks for the highest quality. Then why should audit as a service not have the highest quality that audit firm can deliver? It should have. However, how to measure the quality of audit that different firms provide? The final output, i.e. the audit report, is written based on Standards on Auditing. Nevertheless, the underlying audit on which it is based is a quality that stakeholder expects. Has the firm evaluated its audit quality? To answer these questions, ICAI has issued AQMM – the Model that has a scoring system based on the firm’s competencies. With this, the firm will be able to evaluate, in an objective manner, the quality of its audit and will also get guidance on its quality improvement areas. Every competency against which the firm scores low points indicates room for improvement.

Even though it is recommendatory, the drive has to come from within. By very nature itself, the audit profession has far-reaching consequences if quality is not followed. It is not similar to any other generic service available in the market. Through his audit report, the auditor assures various stakeholders of the financial statements of entities that carry out businesses affecting the entire economy. Every audit firm should regularly evaluate whether its service is of the highest quality. Just like good product brands enjoy a good reputation in the market due to their highest standards on quality, audit as a service also need to go through rigorous quality checks before it is delivered to the stakeholders. One may argue that when auditing standards are followed, it is good enough to ensure that audit quality is maintained. However, such an argument is not correct. The auditing standards help the auditor obtain reasonable assurance on the financial statements that he seeks to provide his opinion. However, complying with auditing standards, which is bare minimum expectation from auditor, by itself does not speak of audit quality. If one understands the difference between a product and another similar product that has gone through quality tests, AQMM exactly does that to the audit as a service. It adds quality tests to an audit being delivered by the auditor.

For an audit firm’s quality system, a quality audit is a critical part of the system. The audit landscape has changed over the years and is changing rapidly. Technology supports the audit in a big way – be it data analytics, various audit software being used by the audit firms or artificial intelligence in various audit tools.

VARIOUS QUALITY CONTROL MEASURES
There are several initiatives taken by the regulators to improve and review the audit quality. For example, ICAI has already issued Standard on Quality Control (SQC) 1, which requires the firms to establish system of quality controls. ICAI has also established the Financial Reporting Review Board (FRRB) that reviews general purpose financial statements and auditor’s reports to determine compliance with disclosure and presentation requirements. ICAI has also established Peer Review Board to conduct peer reviews. Since 2007, the Central Government has constituted Quality Review Board. AQMM is another such initiative that aims to improve audit quality.

AUDIT COMPETENCIES INCLUDED IN AQMM
AQMM is meant to identify which audit competencies are good, which are lacking and develop a roadmap for upgrading where the competencies are lacking. It is a self-evaluation guide for the audit firms to know their level of audit maturity. The guide looks at the overall firm as a whole and not only audit process. It considers the firm’s HR department, administration, IT support, legal department, etc. From an operations perspective, it considers the engagement team, leadership team, audit tools, networking team, MIS, etc.

The Model considers a firm’s competencies in the following three main areas:

1. Practice Management – Operation.
2. Human Resource Management.
3. Practice Management – Strategic / Functional.

Each of these areas is further sub-divided into specific elements in that area. The Model provides a scoring mechanism, i.e. the firm shall based on self-evaluation, calculate its score based on the score criteria and basis given in the Model. Therefore, this Model is like a marking mechanism for the audit firms to understand their Audit Quality Maturity. The Model provides various competencies that the firm should have. A score is given based on the presence or absence of such competency. For example, if the firm has the stated competency, it will get the score indicated in the Model. If the firm does not have such competency, it gets a zero score for such (non)competency. The Model also provides negative points for certain negative observations, which are described later in the article. The total maximum score that the Model provides is 600 points divided as a maximum of 280 points for Practice Management – Operation, a maximum of 240 points for Human Resource Management and a maximum of 80 points for Practice Management – Strategic / Functional. However, the Model does not give the basis for allotting a specific score to a particular competency. Therefore, there could be differing views where one may argue that a specific competency should have been given more weightage than to the other.

Let us understand the competencies included in each of the above areas.

1. Practice Management – Operation
The total of 280 points in this area is sub-divided into the following competencies:

Competencies

Maximum score

Practice areas of the firm

12

Work flow – practice manuals

16

Quality review manuals or audit tool

24

Service delivery – effort monitoring

36

Quality control for engagements

80

Benchmarking of service delivery

16

Client sensitisation

16

Technology adoption

64

Revenue, budgeting and pricing

16

Total

280

As expected, this area has maximum scoring because a large part of audit quality is reflected in the operational practice management of the firm. Within this, quality control for engagements carries the highest score. Quality control includes: competencies related to partner / quality review; percentage of engagements with ‘satisfactory’ rating based on a quality review; proportion of engagements without findings requiring significant improvements by ICAI or other regulatory bodies; audit documentation in compliance with Standard on Quality Control (SQC) 1; availability of accounting and auditing knowledge resources in soft copy archive form for Q&As, thought leaderships, dedicated technical desk, etc.; time spent on understanding the business of the client, identification of risks and planning audit engagement, etc.
How can firms improve their score in this area?

Though the scoring matrix gives a detailed break-up for various competencies, there are specific competencies that, in my view, the firms should focus on initially. These are very important from an audit quality perspective and will help them significantly improve the score.
These are:

1. Develop standard templates for the firm for engagement letters, management representation letters, audit documentation, audit reports, etc. The firms can also consider using templates issued by ICAI.

2. Develop standard checklists to ensure compliance with accounting and auditing standards.

3. Develop a practice manual of the firm that contains audit methodology ensuring compliance with auditing standards and their implementation.

4. Focus on the audit planning stage, including maintenance of documentation for hours budgeted, etc. Discuss and document client’s business understanding, risk assessment of material misstatement in accordance with Standard on Auditing 315, Identifying and Assessing the Risk of Material Misstatement through Understanding the Entity and its Environment.

5. Monitor audit progress, backlogs, unfinished engagements and client interactions so that audit can be completed within agreed timelines.

6. Use of audit tools, analytics, artificial intelligence-based audit procedures, etc.

7. Implement quality review process in the firm.

2. Human Resource Management
The total of 240 points in this area is sub-divided into the following competencies:

Competencies

Maximum score

Resource planning and monitoring as per
firm’s policy

28

Employee training and development

44

Resources turnover and compensation
management

104

Qualification skill set of employees and use
of experts

32

Performance evaluation measures carried out by the firm

32

Total

240

As this area relates to Human Resources (HR), its focus is on resources turnover and compensation. This competency has a maximum score compared to any other competency in the three main areas. Audit quality largely depends on the staff working on the engagement. Therefore, HR forms a critical area to ensure that quality staff is available for audits and resources turnover is well managed to ensure timelines are met. It is given that resources turnover cannot be eliminated, and therefore, the Model recognises this fact by stating the question as “Does the firm identify measures to keep the employee turnover minimal?” Compensation structuring goes hand in hand with resources turnover. This also includes building appropriate team structure, maintaining minimal employee turnover ratio, retention policy, identification of employee relationship with the firm, statutory contributions and other benefits made available by the firm, revolving door for audit staff, engagement level reviews and performance evaluation, access to technology and favourable remote working policies, gender diversity, holiday policies, staff well-being policies, employee surveys, recruitment policies and compensation mapped to knowledge and experience, etc. Many firms run specific programs to increase gender diversity. With additional family responsibilities compared to men, women may find path to leadership difficult which demands more of their time. There could have been more specific parameters to assess the quality of the resources and score based on such parameters, for example, the average number of years of audit experience per person the firm has, industry specialisation of the firm, etc.

How can firms improve their score in this area?

To start with, firms may consider implementing the following steps:
1. Develop a pyramid structure required to carry audits.
2. Determine training hours in a year per employee.
3. Maintain minimal employee turnover ratio, develop revolving door policy, holiday policy, compensation
policy.
4. Develop written key performance indicators for employees and partners.

3. Practice Management – Strategic / Functional
The total of 80 points in this area is sub-divided into the following competencies:

Competencies

Maximum score

Practice management

20

Infrastructure – Physical and others

48

Practice credentials

12

Total

80

Though this area shows a lesser score than the other two areas, this also has negative scoring. For negative scoring (non)competencies, the score considered is zero when such criteria are absent. If such criteria are present, it will give a negative score to the firm in this Model. For example, if the practice has an advisory as well as a decision, to not allot work due to unsatisfactory performance by the CAG office, it gets a negative five score. But if the firm does not have such non-competency, then the score is zero. Similar is the case if the firm has a negative assessment in the report of the Quality Review Board or if there has been a case of professional misconduct on the part of a member of the firm where he has been proved guilty.

Therefore, though the total shows a lesser maximum score in this area, there are many attributes that need to be considered here. Infrastructure competency in this area has a lot of significance. It includes branch network, centralised/decentralised branch activities, information security, data analytics tools, adequate infrastructure such as internet, etc., for remote working. As the name of the competency goes, it covers both types of infrastructures – physical and others. In the current times, physical infrastructure is losing relevance. As we have seen during the Covid pandemic, remote working has become a new normal. Technology has overcome the need for having a physical infrastructure, office space, meeting rooms, etc. For similar reasons, it is possible for the firms to work for clients in different geographies globally without having a branch presence in such geography. During Covid times, many global companies have outsourced their work to low-cost countries. It is possible for such country entrepreneurs to deliver the output only because of technology, without having any place of business in the client’s country/region. Therefore, the competency of physical infrastructure has become irrelevant now. Another concern over this competency is its relevance to audit quality. Having more branches and, therefore, getting higher score in the Model has no relation to the firms’ audit quality. A small firm with no branch may also have a very good quality in its audits. Therefore, keeping other factors the same, if such a firm scores less than other firms with more branches, does such score really speak of audit quality? Of course, not. The other competency of Practice Management includes balanced mix of experienced and new assurance partners, the firm’s independence as per ICAI Code of Ethics, Companies Act, 2013 and other regulatory requirements, whistle-blower policy, etc.

If based on the evaluation of performance by a government body or regulatory authority has resulted in debarment or blacklisting of the firm, it will have negative scoring.

How can firms improve their score in this area?

Some of the initial steps firms can consider in this area are:
1. Develop network through branches, affiliates, etc.
2. Get good connectivity through an intranet, internet, VPN and other means.

DETERMINING A FIRM’S LEVEL
Based on the total score, the Model defines four levels of firms. Level 1 is very nascent, and level 4 is a firm that has adopted standards and procedures significantly. These four levels are based on percentage in each section as less than 25%, 25% to 50%, 50% to 75% and above 75%. AQMM also clarifies that the status should not be publicised or mentioned by audit firms on any public domain such as professional documents, visiting cards, letterheads or signboards, etc., as it may amount to solicitation in view of the provisions of the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949.

CONCLUSION
Though AQMM is recommendatory, it is an excellent tool for self-evaluation by audit firms. Having said that, one may argue that a lesser score does not necessarily mean that audit quality is not ensured by the firm. But there needs to be an objective assessment of the quality, and AQMM would go a long way in such assessment. If audit firms follow the Model and improve their competencies, it will bring high quality across the audit profession. Therefore, it is a welcome step of providing such a standard Model to audit firms. In the coming years, if the firms voluntarily adopt this Model and improve their competencies, they will gain higher credibility in the eyes of the client given that their product, i.e. audit, has assured quality.

[The views expressed in this article by the author are personal.]

DOES TRANSFER OF EQUITY SHARES UNDER OFFER FOR SALE (OFS) DURING THE PROCESS OF LISTING TRIGGER ANY CAPITAL GAINS?

The calendar year 2021 was a blockbuster year for Indian primary markets, with 63 companies collectively garnering Rs. 1.2 lakh crore through initial public offerings. The Indian primary market witnessed the largest and most subscribed public offers in this period. A large part of public offering was by way of Offer For Sale (OFS), i.e. promoters offloading (selling) their stake in companies to financial institutions / public. What follows the transfer of equity shares is the determination of capital gains income and income-tax liability thereon.

Finance Act, 2018 brought a paradigm shift in taxation of long-term capital gains arising from the transfer of equity shares and equity-oriented mutual funds. Finance Act, 2018 withdrew the exemption granted on long-term capital gains arising on transfer of equity shares and equity-oriented mutual funds. With the withdrawal of exemption, special provisions in the form of Sections 112A and 55(2)(ac) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’) were inserted to determine capital gains income.

This article seeks to examine capital gains tax liability arising from the transfer of equity shares under an OFS in an IPO process under the new taxation regime.

BRIEF BACKGROUND OF THE PROVISIONS
Section 112A of the Act provides for a tax rate of 10% in case where (a) total income includes income chargeable under the head capital gains (b) capital gains arising from the transfer of long-term capital asset being equity shares (c) securities transaction tax is paid on acquisition and transfer of those equity shares1.

Section 55(2)(ac) of the Act provides a special mechanism for computation of cost of acquisition in respect of assets covered by Section 112A. Cost of acquisition of equity shares acquired prior to 1st February, 2018 is higher of (a) or (b) below:

(A) Cost of acquisition of an asset.
(B) Lower of:

1. Fair market value of the asset as on 31st January, 2018, and
2. Full value of consideration received or accruing on the transfer of equity shares.

The essence of the insertion of Section 55(2)(ac) is to provide grandfathering in respect of gains up to 31st January, 2018 regarding equity shares. This is with a rider that adopting fair market value does not result in the generation of loss.


1   Section 112A(4) of the act provides relief
from payment of securities transaction tax on acquisition of shares in respect
of certain transaction covered by Notification No. 60/2018 Dated 1st
October, 2018.

CASE UNDER EXAMINATION AND ANALYSIS

Mr. A, an individual, is the promoter of A Ltd. Mr. A had subscribed to equity shares of A Ltd. on 1st April, 2011 when the company was unlisted at their face value of Rs. 10. Since then, Mr. A has been holding these equity shares as a capital asset. Mr. A decides to sell the equity shares under the IPO process as an offer for sale at Rs. 1,000 per share in February, 2022. The question to be examined is: what should be the cost of acquisition of the shares, and how should one compute the capital gains?
In this case, the transfer of shares is covered by Section 112A of the Act since (a) total income of Mr. A includes income chargeable under the head ‘capital gains’; (b) capital gains arise from the transfer of long-term capital asset2 being equity shares; (c) in terms of Section 98 (entry no. 6) r.w.s. 97(13)(aa) of Finance (No.2) Act, 2004, Mr. A is required to pay securities transaction tax on the transfer of equity shares; (d) the requirement of payment of securities transaction tax on acquisition of equity shares is relieved in terms of Notification No. 60/2018 dated 1st October, 20183 as shares were acquired when equity shares of A Ltd. were not listed on a recognised stock exchange.

The provisions of Section 112A cover the case on hand and therefore the cost of acquisition of equity shares shall be determined in terms of Section 55(2)(ac), which requires identification of three components, namely cost of acquisition, fair market value as on 31st January, 2018 and full value of consideration. In the facts of the case, the cost of acquisition of each equity share is Rs. 10, and the full value of consideration accruing on the transfer of each share is Rs. 1,000. What remains for determination is the fair market value of the asset as on 31st January, 2018 to compute the cost of acquisition under Section 55(2)(ac).

Before determining the fair market value of equity shares as on 31st January 2018, one may refer to Section 97(13)(aa) of Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004, which provides that sale of unlisted equity shares under an OFS to the public in an initial public offer and where such shares are subsequently listed on recognised stock exchange shall be considered as taxable securities transaction and securities transaction tax is leviable on the same.

From the above, it is pertinent to note that when the equity shares are transferred under an OFS, such shares are unlisted and are listed on a recognised stock exchange only subsequent to the transfer. Further, the practical experience of applying for shares under an IPO suggests that consideration for equity shares is paid, and equity shares are credited to the purchaser’s account, prior to the date of listing of equity shares on a recognised stock exchange. This also corroborates that when the promoter transfers the equity shares under an OFS, such shares are still unlisted.

2   Equity
shares held by Mr. A qualifies as ‘long-term capital asset’ as equity shares
are held for a period exceeding 12 months.

3   Notification
No. 60/2018/F. No.370142/9/2017-TPL.

Determination of fair market value of equity shares as on 31st January, 2018

Clause (a) of Explanation to Section 55(2)(ac) of the Act provides a methodology for the determination of fair market value.

Sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of Explanation to Section 55(2)(ac) provides that where equity shares are listed on a recognised stock exchange as on 31st January, 2018, the highest price prevailing on the recognised stock exchange shall be the fair market value. In the present case, shares will only be listed post the IPO in February, 2022 (i.e. Equity shares were not listed on a recognised stock exchange as on 31st January, 2018). Accordingly, the case is not covered by said sub-clause.
Sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of Explanation to Section 55(2)(ac) does not apply to the present case as the subject matter of transfer is equity shares and not units of equity-oriented mutual fund/business trust.
Sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of explanation to Section 55(2)(ac) provides that where equity shares are not listed on any recognised stock exchange as on 31st January, 2018, but listed as on the date of transfer, the fair market value of equity shares shall be the indexed cost of acquisition up to F.Y. 2017-18.

The literal reading of sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of Explanation to Section 55(2)(ac) of the Act suggests that the case of Mr. A will not be covered by said sub-clause as equity shares are not listed as on the date of transfer.

Considering the above, an important issue arises that when the fair market value of an asset cannot be determined basis the methodology provided in clause (a) of Explanation to Section 55(2)(ac), what shall be the impact of the same?

TAX AUTHORITIES MAY PUT FORTH FOLLOWING ARGUMENTS
With the withdrawal of exemption under Section 10(38) of the Act, the intent of insertion of Section 55(2)(ac) of the Act is to provide grandfathering of gains on equity shares up to 31st January, 2018. The legislature, in its wisdom, may provide the grandfathering in any manner.

In respect of equity shares, which are not listed on a recognised stock exchange as on 31st January, 2018, legislature has provided for the benefit of indexation in terms of sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of Explanation to Section 55(2)(ac) of the Act.
In the case under consideration, Mr. A’s equity shares were unlisted as on 31st January, 2018 and the transfer of shares took place subsequently. And although the equity shares held by Mr. A were not listed as on the date of transfer, considering the legislative intent, the case of Mr. A shall be covered by sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of Explanation to Section 55(2)(ac) of the Act. Accordingly, capital gains computation does not fail. In this regard, reference may be made to Supreme Court (‘SC’) ruling in the case of CIT vs. J. H. Gotla [1985] 156 ITR 323. In this case, the taxpayer had suffered a significant business loss in the earlier assessment years, which were carried forward. The taxpayer gifted certain oil mill machinery to his wife. A partnership firm was floated where the wife and minor children were partners. Income earned by wife and minor children from the firm was clubbed in the hands of the taxpayer, who claimed set-off of clubbed income against the business losses carried forward. Tax authorities denied such set off on the ground that for setting off losses business was required to be carried on by taxpayer and in this case, business was carried out by the firm and not the taxpayer. SC allowed the set-off of losses in the hands of the taxpayer against the clubbed income and made the following observations on interpretation of the law:

“Now where the plain literal interpretation of a statutory provision produces a manifestly unjust result which could never have been intended by the legislature, the Court might modify the language used by the legislature so as to achieve the intention of the legislature and produce a rational construction. The task of interpretation of a statutory provision is an attempt to discover the intention of the legislature from the language used. If the purpose of a particular provision is easily discernible from the whole scheme of the act which, in the present case, was to counteract, the effect of the transfer of assets so far as computation of income of the assessee was concerned, then bearing that purpose in mind, the intention should be found out from the language used by the legislature and if strict literal, construction leads to an absurd result, i.e., result not intended to be subserved by the object of the legislation found out in the manner indicated above, then if other construction is possible apart from strict literal construction, then that construction should be preferred to the strict literal construction. Though equity and taxation are often strangers, attempts should be made that these do not remain so always so and if a construction results in equity rather than in injustice, then such construction should be preferred to the literal construction.”

In the present case, legislative intent for providing grandfathering benefit in respect of equity shares which are not listed as on 31st January, 2018 and transferred subsequently can be gathered from the language employed in sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of Explanation to Section 55(2)(ac) of the Act and accordingly, the said sub-clause covers the case of Mr. A.

AS AGAINST THE ABOVE, THE TAXPAYER MAY SUBMIT AS UNDER
The computation of capital gains is carried out in terms of Section 48 of the Act. The computation of capital gains begins with the determination of full value of consideration which is reduced by (a) expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively in connection with transfer, (b) cost of acquisition of capital asset, and (c) cost of improvement of a capital asset. Accordingly, the before mentioned are four important elements of computing capital gains.

Section 55(2) of the Act provides for the determination of the cost of acquisition of capital assets for the purpose of Sections 48 and 49 of the act. Section 55(2)(ac) is a special provision for determining the cost of acquisition in certain specified cases. Unlike Section 55(2)(b) of the act4, Section 55(2)(ac) of the Act is not optional. Once the taxpayer’s case is covered by provisions of Section 55(2)(ac), the cost of acquisition of a specified asset has to be determined under that Section.

Clause (a) of Explanation to Section 55(2)(ac) defines the term ‘fair market value’ in an exhaustive manner, and accordingly, no other methodology can be read into Section 55(2)(ac) of the Act to determine the fair market value.

In order to determine the cost of acquisition under Section 55(2)(ac), one of the important components is the fair market value of the asset as on 31st January, 2018. In the absence of a determination of the same, the exercise of determination of cost of acquisition under Section 55(2)(ac) of the Act cannot be completed.

The SC, in the case of CIT vs. B. C. Srinivasa Setty [1981]128 ITR 2945, held that since the cost of acquisition of self-generated goodwill cannot be conceived, the computation of capital gains fails. On failure of computation provision, it was held that such asset is not covered by Section 45 of the Act and hence not subjected to capital gains. Similarly, in the case of Sunil Siddharth Bhai vs. CIT [1985] 156 ITR 509 (SC)6, where the taxpayer had contributed capital asset to a partnership firm, it was held that full value of consideration accruing or arising on transfer of capital asset cannot be determined and accordingly such asset is beyond the scope of capital gains chapter. Also, in the case of PNB Finance Ltd. vs. CIT [2008] 307 ITR 757, on the transfer of undertaking by the taxpayer pursuant to the nationalisation of the bank, SC held that undertaking comprises of various capital assets and in the absence of determination of cost of acquisition of undertaking, the charge fails and accordingly, capital gains cannot be charged.

4   Section
55(2)(b) of the act provides an option to taxpayer to either adopt the actual
cost of acquisition or fair market value as on 1st April, 2001 where capital
asset is acquired prior to 1st April, 2001.

5   Rendered
prior to insertion of Section 55(2)(a) of the Act.

6   Rendered
prior to insertion of Section 45(3) of the Act.

Reference may also be made SC ruling in case of  Govind Saran Ganga Saran vs. CST [1985] 155 ITR 144 rendered under Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 (‘Sales Tax Act’) as applied to the Union Territory of Delhi. The case revolved around the interpretation of Sections 14 and 15 of the Sales Tax Act. Cotton yarn was classified as one of the goods of special importance in inter-state trade or commerce as envisaged by Section 14 of the Sales Tax Act. Section 15 of the Sales Tax Act provided that sales tax on goods of special importance should not exceed a specified rate and further that they should not be taxed at more than one stage. The issue arose because the stage itself had not been clearly specified, and accordingly, it was not clear at what stage the sales tax shall be levied. The Financial Commissioner held that in the absence of any stage, there was a lacuna in the law and consequently, cotton yarn could not be taxed under the sales tax regime. The Delhi High Court reversed the decision of the Financial Commissioner. However, SC held that the single point at which the tax may be imposed must be a definite ascertainable point, and in the absence of the same, tax shall not be levied. While rendering the ruling, SC has made the following observations which are worth quoting:

“The components which enter into the concept of a tax are well known. The first is the character of the imposition known by its nature which prescribes the taxable event attracting the levy, the second is a clear indication of the person on whom the levy is imposed and who is obliged to pay the tax, the third is the rate at which the tax is imposed, and the fourth is the measure or value to which the rate will be applied for computing the tax liability. If those components are not clearly and definitely ascertainable, it is difficult to say that the levy exists in point of law. Any uncertainty or vagueness in the legislative scheme defining any of those components of the levy will be fatal to its validity.”

The SC ruling in the case of Govind Saran Ganga Saran (supra) has been approved by Constitution Bench of SC in case of CIT vs. Vatika Township (P.) Ltd. [2014] 367 ITR 466. In the facts of the case, the measure or value to which the rate will be applied is uncertain in the absence of determination of cost of acquisition, and accordingly, a levy will be fatal.

The cardinal principles of interpreting tax statutes centre around the observations of Rowlatt J. In the case of Cape Brandy Syndicate vs. Inland Revenue Commissioner [1921] 1 KB 64, which has virtually become the locus classicus. In the opinion of Rowlatt J.:
“. . . . . . . . . in a Taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used.”8

AUTHOR’S VIEW
Considering that: (a) in terms of a literal reading, fair market value of equity shares as on 31st January 2018 cannot be determined, (b) computation provision and charging provision both together form an integrated code, and on the failure of computation provision, charge fails, (c) judicial precedents holding that uncertainty or vagueness in legislative scheme lead to the levy becoming invalid, and (d) requirement of taxing provisions to be construed in terms of language employed only, in the view of the author, the taxpayer stands on a firm footing that in the absence of a determination of the fair market value of equity shares as on 31st January, 2018 in terms of methodology supplied in Section 55(2)(ac) of the act, cost of acquisition of equity shares cannot be determined. In the absence of a determination of the cost of acquisition, the computation mechanism fails. Accordingly, one may vehemently urge that the equity shares transferred under the OFS are beyond the capital gains chapter.

One may also note that the issue discussed herein may not be restricted in its applicability to promoters transferring their equity shares under an offer for sale. It may equally apply to private equity players, institutions, financial investors, individuals etc., who have either subscribed to the shares of an unlisted company or have purchased the shares of an unlisted company from the market and are selling the shares under an offer for sale.

One shall note that courts may be slow in adopting a position of total failure of charge and transfer of capital asset falling beyond the provisions capital gains chapter. Further, considering the impact of the position stated above, one may expect high-rise litigation.

[The views expressed by author are personal. One may adopt any position in consultation with advisors.]

________________________________________________________________
8    The above passage has been quoted with approval in several SC rulings. Illustratively, refer PCIT vs. Aarham Softronics [2019] 412 ITR 623 (SC), CIT vs. Yokogawa India Ltd. [2017] 391 ITR 274 (SC), Orissa State Warehousing vs. CIT [1999] 237 ITR 589 (SC), Smt. Tarulata Shyam vs. CIT [1977] 108 ITR 345 (SC), Sole Trustee, Loka Shikshana Trust [1975] 101 ITR 234 (SC), CIT vs. Ajax Products Ltd. [1965] 55 ITR 741 (SC), CIT vs. Shahzada Nand and Sons [1966] 66 ITR 392 (SC).

THE GHOST OF B.C. SRINIVASA SETTY IS NOT YET EXORCISED IN INDIA

In this article, the taxability of capital gains arising on the transfer of internally generated goodwill and other intangible assets has been deliberated upon. We have also discussed whether the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in CIT vs. B.C. Srinivasa Setty [1981] 128 ITR 294 (SC) still holds the field in the case of self-generated goodwill and other internally generated intangible assets. Before we do so, it would be relevant to understand briefly the history of past litigation on this issue and the series of judicial amendments made.

DECISION IN B.C. SRINIVASA SETTY’S CASE AND INSERTION OF SECTION 55(2)(a)
The question as to whether ‘goodwill’ generated in a newly commenced business can be described as an ‘asset’ for the purposes of Section 45 came for consideration before a 3-judge bench of the hon’ble supreme court in the case of B.C. Srinivasa Setty’s case (supra).

While concluding that the self-generated goodwill was undoubtedly an asset of the business, the court, however held that self-generated goodwill was not an asset within the contemplation under Section 45.

The court took note of the provisions relating to capital gains and laid down the important principle that the charging section and the computation provisions together constitute an integrated code. When there is a case to which the computation provisions cannot apply, it is evident that such a case was not intended to fall within the charging section. The court observed that Section 48(ii) required deduction of the cost of acquisition from the full value of consideration in computing the capital gains chargeable under Section 45. Thus, the court held that what is contemplated under the provisions of Section 45 and 48 is an asset for which it is possible to envisage a cost of acquisition. Taking note of the fact that in case of goodwill of a new business acquired by way of generation, no cost element can be identified or envisaged, the court reached the conclusion that the goodwill of a new business, though an asset could not be regarded as an asset within the contemplation of the charge under Section 45.

In paragraph 12 of the said judgement, the court has observed that in the case of internally generated goodwill, it is not possible to determine the date when it comes into existence. It has been observed that the date of acquisition of the asset is a material factor in applying the computation provisions pertaining to capital gains. It has been held that the ‘cost of acquisition’ mentioned in Section 48 implies a date of acquisition.

To overcome the above decision in B.C. Srinivasa Setty’s case (supra), Section 55(2)(a) was inserted vide Finance Act, 1987 with effect from 1st April, 1988. The said section originally contained two clauses. Clause (i) dealt with capital asset being goodwill of a business acquired by purchase from a previous owner, and clause (ii) dealt with the residual clause.

However, a reading of the memorandum to Finance Bill, 1987 would indicate that the amendment sought to deal with two classes of goodwill being – a) purchased goodwill and b) self-generated goodwill.

Section 55(2)(a)(ii), which dealt with the latter, i.e.  self-generated goodwill, provided that for the purposes of Sections 49 and 50, the cost of acquisition of such self-generated goodwill would be taken to be nil.

The said section has been amended from time to time to include various classes of intangible assets.

PERIOD OF HOLDING AND LEVY OF TAX IN CASE OF SELF-GENERATED GOODWILL AND INTERNALLY GENERATED INTANGIBLE ASSETS

As discussed earlier, in order to overcome the decision in B.C. Srinivasa Setty’s (case), Section 55(2)(a)(ii) [currently Section 55(2)(a)(iii)] was inserted to deem the ‘cost of acquisition’ of the self-generated goodwill and other classes of internally generated intangible assets to be nil.

However, while making such an amendment, the legislature has not made any amendment to the provisions of the act to provide for the manner of computation of the period of holding in case of such assets.

As discussed earlier, it was observed by the Supreme Court that the date of acquisition in case of self-generated goodwill cannot be determined. The court has also observed that the date of acquisition is a material factor in applying the computation provisions relating to capital gains. It has also been held that the ‘cost of acquisition’ mentioned in Section 48 implies a date of acquisition.

The date of acquisition is a material factor in applying computation provisions considering that 2nd proviso to Section 48 replaces the ‘cost of acquisition’ in Section 48(ii) with ‘indexed cost of acquisition’ in case of gains arising from transfer of a long-term capital asset. The determination of whether a capital asset is a long-term capital asset would entail the determination of the period of holding in the hands of the assessee, which would, in turn, require the date of acquisition. Since the date of acquisition in the case of self-generated goodwill cannot be determined, the computation under Section 48 would not be possible.

By providing that the cost of acquisition in case of self-generated goodwill and other internally generated intangible assets as referred to in Section 55(2)(a) would be nil, the legislature may overcome the issue relating to the benefit of indexation under 2nd proviso to Section 48. However, this is not the end of the matter.

It would be pertinent to note that once the capital gains under Section 48 are computed and the charge under Section 45 is attracted, the tax payable on such capital gains would have to be determined based on whether such capital gain is a ‘short-term capital gain’ under Section 2(42B) or a ‘long-term capital gain’ under Section 2(29B). This exercise would, in turn, involve the determination of whether the capital asset is a ‘short-term capital asset’ under Section 2(42a) or a ‘long-term capital asset’ under Section 2(29AA).

A combined reading of sub Sections 42A, 42B, 29AA and 29B of Section 2 would indicate the following:

•    The period of holding of a capital asset will have to be determined in the hands of the assessee. In determining the same one will have to reckon the actual period for which the capital asset has been held by the assessee.

•    Having determined the period of holding in respect of the capital asset in the hands of an assessee, one will have to examine whether the capital asset would fall within the definition of ‘short-term capital asset’ under Section 2(42A) read with the provisos thereto based on such period of holding.

•    If such capital asset meets the definition of ‘short-term capital asset’, the gain arising from the transfer of the same would amount to short-term capital gain by virtue of Section 2(42B).

•    If such capital asset does not meet the definition of ‘short-term capital asset’ under section 2(42A), it will become a ‘long-term capital asset’ by virtue of  Section 2(29AA). Thus, in order to invoke the residuary provision of Section 2(29AA), such a capital asset must clearly not be a ‘short-term capital asset’ within the meaning of Section 2(29AA). Thus, where it cannot be conclusively concluded that a capital asset is not a ‘short-term capital asset’, it cannot, by virtue of the residuary provision under Section 2(29aa), become a ‘long-term capital asset’.

•    This is clear from the fact that ‘long-term capital asset’ has been defined to mean a capital asset that is not a ‘short-term capital asset‘. Firstly, the use of the word ‘means’ in Section 2(29AA) indicates that the definition given under Section 2(29aa) to the term ‘long-term capital asset’ is exhaustive. In this regard, reliance is placed on Kasilingam vs. P.S.G. College of Technology [1995] SUPP 2 SCC 348 (SC), wherein it has been held that the use of the term ‘means’ indicates that the definition is a hard and fast definition. Secondly, Section 2(29AA) defines a ‘long-term capital asset’ to mean a capital asset which is not a short-term capital asset. Thus, only where a capital asset is conclusively found not to be a ‘short-term capital asset’ within the meaning contemplation of Section 2(42A), it would fall within the purview of Section 2(29AA), and any gain arising from the transfer of the same would be a ‘long-term capital gain’ by virtue of Section 2(29B).

Since the period of holding of self-generated goodwill and other internally generated intangible assets cannot be determined, it would not be possible to conclusively rule out that such capital assets are not ‘short-term capital assets’ under Section 2(42A). Resultantly, such assets cannot be ‘long-term capital assets’. As a result, it would not be possible to determine whether the capital gains arising from the transfer of such assets are ‘short-term capital gains’ or ‘long-term capital gains’.

A fortiori, the applicable tax rates in respect of such capital gains cannot be determined as the nature of capital gains is unknown.

It may be noted that the impossibility in determination of the period of holding would further impact an assessee who acquires it from such previous owner who generated the goodwill or other intangible assets, under any of modes provided in clauses (i) through (iv) of Section 49(1).

In such case, by virtue of explanation 1(b) to Section 2(42A), in determining the period of holding in the hands of such assessee, the period of holding of the previous owner is required to be included. Since, the period of holding in the hands of the previous owner cannot be determined, the period of holding in the hands of the assessee would also be
indeterminate.

Can one argue that where the period of holding in the case of the previous owner is indeterminate, such period will have to be ignored for the purposes of explanation 1(b) to Section 2(42A)? However, such a view is clearly contrary to the mandate of the said explanation which provides that the period of holding of the previous owner ‘shall be included’.

Such being the case, it would also not be possible to determine the tax rates applicable to an assessee who acquires self-generated goodwill or internally generated intangible assets under the modes mentioned in Section 49(1)(i) to (iv), upon subsequent transfer of such assets by him.  In Govind Saran Ganga Saran vs. CST, 1985 SUPP SCC 205 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 447 at page 209:

‘6. The components which enter into the concept of a tax are well known. The first is the character of the imposition known by its nature which prescribes the taxable event attracting the levy, the second is a clear indication of the person on whom the levy is imposed and who is obliged to pay the tax, the third is the rate at which the tax is imposed, and the fourth is the measure or value to which the rate will be applied for computing the tax liability. If those components are not clearly and definitely ascertainable, it is difficult to say that the levy exists in point of law. Any uncertainty or vagueness in the legislative scheme defining any of those components of the levy will be fatal to its validity.’

From the above extract, it can be observed that there are four components of tax:

•    The first component is the character of the imposition,
•    The second is the person on whom the levy is imposed,
•    The third is the rate at which tax is imposed, and
•    The fourth is the value to which the rate is applied for computing tax liability.

Further, the court has held that if there is any ambiguity in any of the above four concepts, the levy would fail.

In the following cases, the ratio laid down in Govind Saran Ganga Saran’s case (supra) has been  followed:

•    CIT vs. Infosys Technologies Ltd. [2008] 297 ITR 167 (SC) (para 6);
•    CIT  vs. Vatika Township (P.) Ltd. [2014] 367 ITR 466 (SC) (para 39);
•    Commissioner of Customs (Import) vs. Dilip Kumar & Co. [2018] 95 taxmann.com 327 (SC) (para 42);
•    CIT vs. Govind Saran Ganga Saran [2013] 352 ITR 113 (Karnataka) (para 15);
•    CIT vs. Punalur Paper Mills Ltd. [2019] 111 taxmann.com 50 (Kerala) (para 9).

Thus, it is clear that the rate of tax is one of the important components of tax and any uncertainty in the legislative scheme in defining it will be fatal to the levy.
Thus, in case of self-generated goodwill and other intangible assets, the charge under Section 45 in respect of capital gains upon transfer of the same would fail as the rate of tax cannot be determined. The charge would fail not only in respect of the assessee who acquired it through self-generation but also another assessee who acquires it from the former under modes provided in Section 49(1).

COMPARISON WITH SECTION 45(4) AS RECAST BY FINANCE ACT, 2021
Section 45(4), as inserted by Finance Act, 2021 with effect from 1st April, 2021, creates a charge in respect of profits or gains arising from a receipt of any money or capital asset or both by a specified person from a specified entity in connection with the reconstitution of such specified entity. It also provides the formula for the determination of such profits
or gains.

The said section provides that such profits or gains shall be chargeable to income tax as income of such specified entity under the head ‘capital gains’ and shall be deemed to be the income of such specified entity of the previous year in which the specified person received such money or capital asset or both.

It may be noted that in a given case, a specified person may receive two or more capital assets from the specified entity, comprising of a combination of short-term and long capital assets. In such a case, it would not be possible to apportion the aggregate profits or gains between short-term and long-term capital gains as no such mechanism has been provided in Section 45(4).

Further, there may be cases where only cash is received by the specified person from the specified entity. In such case, there is no transfer of a capital asset (be it long-term or short-term) by the specified entity to the specified person.

However, irrespective of the above situations, the entire profit or gain as determined by applying the provisions of Section 45(4) would be chargeable to tax in the hands of the specified entity under the head ‘capital gains’.

Thus, Section 45(4) is indifferent to whether there is actually a transfer of a capital asset, let alone whether such capital asset is long-term or short-term. Likewise, it is indifferent to the classification of the gains as ‘short-term capital gains’ or ‘long-term capital gains’. The trigger point in Section 45(4), unlike Section 45(1), is not the transfer of a short-term or long-term capital asset, but is rather the receipt of any money or capital asset or both by a specified person from a specified entity in connection with the reconstitution of such specified entity.

Further, Section 45(4), unlike Section 45(1), provides the mechanism for the computation of the profits and gains. The said computation is independent of the existence of any capital asset or, if it existed, the nature of such capital asset (i.e. short-term or long-term), unlike the computation under  Section 48.

At this juncture, the question that would arise is what rate of tax would apply to the capital gains under Section 45(4). This is for the reason that the tax rate is dependent on the classification of the gains as ‘short-term capital gains’ or ‘long-term capital gains’ as discussed earlier.

According to the authors, the normal tax rates applicable to the assessee as per the first schedule to the relevant finance act would be applicable. This would be similar to the case of short-term capital gains other than those referred to in  Section 111A.

A reference may be made to Section 2(1) of the Finance Act, 2021. The said Section, subject to exceptions under Sections 2(2) and 2(3) of the said Act, provides for charge of income-tax at the rates specified in part I of the first schedule. In other words, the tax rates mentioned in Section 2(1) read with part I of the first schedule of the Finance Act, 2021 would generally apply for computing the tax chargeable subject to the exceptions provided in Sections 2(2) and 2(3) of the said Act. One of the exceptions under Section 2(3) of the Finance Act, 2021 is with respect to cases falling under Chapter XII of the Income Tax Act where the said Chapter prescribes a rate. In such a case, the rate provided in the said Chapter would be applicable and not the rates provided in Part I of First Schedule to the Finance Act, 2021.

It may be noted that Section 111A, falling within Chapter XII, deals with short-term capital gains arising from transfer of certain capital assets and provides the rate of tax in respect of the same. Sections 112 and 112A deal with long-term capital gains and provide the tax rates in respect of the same. However, with regard to short-term capital gains other than those covered under Section 111A, no rate of tax is provided either in Chapter XII or any other provisions of the Income Tax Act. Thus, by virtue of Section 2(1) read with Section 2(3) of the Finance Act, 2021, with respect to such short-term capital gains, the rates provided  in Part I of First Schedule to Finance Act, 2021 would apply.

The capital gains under Section 45(4) are not covered by Sections 111A, 112 and 112A. Such gains, therefore, form part of normal income and would suffer normal rates of tax as provided in Part I of First Schedule to Finance Act, 2021.

From the above, it can be observed that wherever the legislature has sought to do away with the requirement of the classification of the gains as short-term or long-term, it has done so.

However, the above would not apply in the case of self-generated goodwill and other internally generated intangible assets. Unless the period of holding of these assets is found, it cannot be determined whether they are ‘long-term capital assets’ or ‘short-term capital assets’ and the gains arising from the transfer thereof as short-term capital gain or long-term capital gain. In the absence of such determination, it would not be known whether such gain would fall under Section 112 and hence covered by Section 2(3) of the Finance Act. Unless its case is conclusively excluded from Section 2(3) of the Finance Act, Section 2(1), which provides for the normal rate cannot be pressed into service. Thus, the determination of the correct rate of tax becomes impossible, thereby frustrating the very levy.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, it would not be unreasonable to take a stand that the charge under Section 45 and the subsequent levy of tax in respect of capital gains arising from transfer of capital assets, being self-generated goodwill and other intangible assets, would fail, despite the amendment under Section 55(2)(a). Thus, it would not be wrong to state that the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of B.C. Srinivasa Setty’s case (supra) is still good law, and the same continues to hold the field.

CARO 2020 SERIES: NEW CLAUSES AND MODIFICATIONS REPORTING ON FINANCIAL POSITION

(This is the seventh article in the CARO 2020 series that started in June, 2021)

BACKGROUND

One of the most important assumptions underlying the preparation of the financial statements is ‘going concern’. The trigger for the same rests on two underlying pillars- namely, cash losses and the ability to meet the existing financial liabilities within the foreseeable future, generally within one year from the balance sheet date.

The reporting requirements discussed hereunder on the above two pillars are very relevant in the scenarios whereby the companies are facing financial stress, or net worth has been eroded or in case of companies where there are significant doubts on their continuing as a going concern. These situations are particularly relevant in current times of stress on the business due to the COVID pandemic.

SCOPE OF REPORTING
The scope of reporting can be analysed under the following clauses:

Clause No.

Particulars

Nature of change, if any

Clause 3(xvii)

Cash Losses:

New Clause

Whether the company has
incurred cash losses in the financial year and in the immediately preceding
financial year, if so, state the amount of cash losses.

Clause 3(xix)

Financial Position
Including Financial Ratios:

New Clause

On the basis of the
financial ratios, ageing and expected dates of realisation of financial
assets and payment of financial liabilities, other information accompanying

(continued)

 

the financial statements,
the auditor’s knowledge of the Board of Directors and management plans,
whether the auditor is of the opinion that no material uncertainty exists as
on the date of the audit report that company is capable of meeting its
liabilities existing at the date of balance sheet as and when they fall due
within a period of one year from the balance sheet date.

 

PRACTICAL CHALLENGES IN REPORTING

The reporting requirements outlined above entail certain practical challenges, which are discussed below:

Cash Losses [Clause 3(xvii)]

Keeping in mind the above reporting requirements, the following are some of the practical challenges that could arise in reporting under this Clause:

a) No clarity on the definition of Cash Losses: The term ?cash losses’ is neither defined under the Companies Act, 2013 nor in the Accounting Standards / Indian Accounting Standards. However, the ICAI, in its Guidance Note on Terms Used in the Financial Statements issued in 1983, has defined the term ?Cash Profit’ as ?the net profit as increased by non-cash costs, such as depreciation, amortisation, etc. When the result of the computation is negative, it is termed as cash loss’. This definition is too inclusive and needs to be updated to keep pace with the changing trends and developments on the accounting front in the past couple of decades, like accounting for Deferred Tax, Unrealised Forex gains or losses, fair value adjustments, actuarial gains and losses for employee benefits etc. While the ICAI Guidance Note has touched upon some of these aspects, there is no authentic guidance/clarity, making it open to differing interpretations and difficulty in comparing and analysing different entities. It would be desirable to disclose the mode of arriving at the cash loss in the financial statements. Necessary changes could be considered by the ICAI and / or the regulators.

b) Companies adopting Ind AS: For such entities, the profit/loss after tax excludes items considered under Other Comprehensive Income (OCI) and hence it is imperative that proper care is taken to identify and give effect to only the cash components of items recognised in OCI like realised fair value/revaluation changes and forex gains and losses. For this purpose the cash component recognised under OCI should be considered for the period under report. Further, for computation of the cash profit/loss for the immediately preceding financial year, the restatements, if any, as per Ind AS-8 – Accounting Policies, Changes in Accounting Estimates and Errors, especially for prior period errors relating to periods earlier than the corresponding previous year. This should be clearly disclosed whilst reporting under this clause.

Financial Position including Financial Ratios [Clause 3(xix)]:

Before proceeding further it would be pertinent to note the following statutory requirements:

Additional Disclosures under amended Schedule III:

While reporting under this Clause, the auditor will have to keep in the mind the amended Schedule III disclosures which are as under:

The following ratios need to be disclosed:
a) Current Ratio

b) Debt Equity Ratio

c) Debt Service Coverage Ratio

d) Return on Equity Ratio

e) Inventory Turnover Ratio

f) Trade Receivables Turnover Ratio
g) Trade Payables Turnover Ratio

h) Net Capital Turnover Ratio

i) Net Profit Ratio

j) Return on Capital Employed

k) Return on Investment

Explanation to be provided for any changes by more than 25% compared to the preceding year.

Whilst reporting, the auditor should refer to the above disclosures for the relevant ratios such as current ratio, inventory turnover ratio, trade receivables turnover ratio, trade payables turnover ratio and capital turnover ratio, amongst others, made in the financial statements to ensure that there are no inconsistencies.

Before proceeding further, it is important to analyse the definition of Financial Assets and Financial Liabilities under Ind AS-32 since these terms are neither defined under the Companies Act, 2013 nor under Indian GAAP, since the reporting is with respect to these items as opposed to the other items in the financial statements.

Accordingly, companies to whom Ind AS is not applicable should also consider the said  definitions for identifying financial assets and liabilities.

Definition of Financial Assets and Financial Liabilities under Ind AS-32

A financial asset is any asset that is:
(a) cash;

(b) an equity instrument of another entity;

(c) a contractual right:

(i) to receive cash or another financial asset from another entity; or

(ii) to exchange financial assets or financial liabilities with another entity under conditions that are potentially favourable to the entity; or

(d) a contract that will or may be settled in the entity’s own equity instruments and is:
(i) a non-derivative for which the entity is or may be obliged to receive a variable number of the entity’s own equity instruments; or

(ii) a derivative that will or may be settled other than by the exchange of a fixed amount of cash or another financial asset for a fixed number of the entity’s own equity instruments. For this purpose the entity’s own equity instruments do not include puttable financial instruments classified as equity instruments in accordance with paragraphs 16A and 16B, instruments that impose on the entity an obligation to deliver to another party a pro rata share of the net assets of the entity only on liquidation and are classified as equity instruments in accordance with paragraphs 16C and 16D, or instruments that are contracts for the future receipt or delivery of the entity’s own equity instruments.

A financial liability is any liability that is:
(a) a contractual obligation :

(i) to deliver cash or another financial asset to another entity; or

(ii) to exchange financial assets or financial liabilities with another entity under conditions that are potentially unfavourable to the entity; or

(b) a contract that will or may be settled in the entity’s own equity instruments and is:

(i) a non-derivative for which the entity is or may be obliged to deliver a variable number of the entity’s own equity instruments; or

(ii) a derivative that will or may be settled other than by the exchange of a fixed amount of cash or another financial asset for a fixed number of the entity’s own equity instruments. For this purpose, rights, options or warrants to acquire a fixed number of the entity’s own equity instruments for a fixed amount of any currency are equity instruments if the entity offers the rights, options or warrants pro rata to all of its existing owners of the same class of its own non-derivative equity instruments. Apart from the aforesaid, the equity conversion option embedded in a convertible bond denominated in foreign currency to acquire a fixed number of the entity’s own equity instruments is an equity instrument if the exercise price is fixed in any currency. Also for these purposes the entity’s own equity instruments do not include puttable financial instruments that are classified as equity instruments in accordance with paragraphs 16A and 16B, instruments that impose on the entity an obligation to deliver to another party a pro rata share of the net assets of the entity only on liquidation and are classified as equity instruments in accordance with paragraphs 16C and 16D, or instruments that are contracts for the future receipt or delivery of the entity’s own equity instruments. As an exception, an instrument that meets the definition of a financial liability is classified as an equity instrument if it has all the features and meets the conditions in paragraphs 16A and 16B or paragraphs 16C and 16D.

Keeping in mind the above reporting requirements, the following are some of the practical challenges that could arise in reporting under this Clause:

a) Inclusive nature of various parameters/data points: This clause requires the auditors to comment based on the following parameters/data points:

• Financial Ratios

• Ageing and expected dates of realisation of financial assets and repayment of financial liabilities

• Other information accompanying the financial statements in the Annual Report e.g. Directors Report, MD&A etc.

• Auditors knowledge of the plans of the Board of Directors and other management plans.

Whilst the parameters described in this clause appear to be inclusive, the auditors would have to go on the basis of the data and information which is available, except for the financial ratios, which are now mandatory as per Schedule III requirements. Certain specific challenges, especially for non-NBFC entities and MSMEs, are highlighted subsequently since they may not have all the information stated above, or the same may be sketchy or incomplete.

b) Companies adopting Ind AS: Such companies are likely to face certain specific challenges which need to be kept in mind whilst considering the various reporting requirements which are as under:

• The financial liabilities need to be considered based on the legal form rather than the substance of the arrangements as is required in terms of Ind AS-32 and 109. Accordingly, redeemable preference shares though considered financial liabilities/borrowings under Ind AS will not be considered for reporting under this clause since legally they are in the nature of share capital. Similarly, optionally or fully convertible debentures though considered compound financial instruments or equity under Ind AS will not be considered for reporting.

• Ind AS-107 requires disclosure of the maturity analysis of the financial liabilities showing the contractual repayments under different liquidity buckets. The auditors shall cross-check the work papers for reporting under this clause with Ind AS disclosures.

c) Challenges for non NBFCs and Small and Medium Enterprises: Non NBFCs, may not have a formalised Asset Liability Management (ALM) system, which is required to be maintained in terms of the RBI guidelines to identify liquidity and maturity mismatches. Accordingly, the auditors of such entities would need to take greater care to review the data and come to appropriate conclusions to report under this clause. It would not be a bad idea to impress upon the Management of such entities to adopt the RBI guidelines and build up an appropriate ALM framework to the extent possible and based on cost-benefit analysis. In the case of MSMEs, whilst it may not be possible to have formalised ALM reporting systems, the auditors would have to ensure that data about the ageing of financial assets and liabilities is generated based on appropriate assumptions as per the conditions in which the entity is working. Further, in terms of capabilities, MSME entities may not be equipped enough to ensure the quality of the data and the controls governing the same. A greater degree of professional scepticism needs to be exercised in such cases, as discussed below.

d) Applying significant judgements and heightened level of professional scepticism: The auditors would have to use professional judgement and an increased level of professional scepticism in respect of the following matters whilst performing their audit procedures for reporting under this clause:

(i) Financial Ratios:
• Financial ratios may not always provide conclusive evidence, and hence auditors will have to also consider various other documents / information as discussed in the following bullets rather than relying only on the quantitative thresholds which they represent. An example is that of an ideal current ratio of 1.33:1 which is the benchmark to reflect strong liquidity. However, for a capital intensive industry even a lower current ratio may be acceptable due to higher level of funds blocked in long term capital intensive assets.

• These ratios cannot be standardised for all the entities, and the same needs to be tailored to the industries. A comparison would also be required with the peer group/competitors. It would be a good practice for auditors to obtain from the Management the basis of certain key ratios based on specific facts and circumstances.

• Each entity operates under different conditions hence ratios relevant to entities shall be considered whilst reviewing the data.

• While calculating ratios auditor should ensure that proper classification is done for current and non-current assets and liabilities. The same may not always be in line with the definition under Schedule III or under the Accounting Standards since certain items which may be current under these definitions may not necessarily be payable within the following year. An example could be the provision made for leave encashment which could be entirely classified as current as per the definitions under Schedule III or the accounting standards since legally the entity does not have an unconditional right to defer settlement beyond the next twelve months if all the employees decide to encash their leave though practically this is a remote possibility. Accordingly, for analysis and reporting under this clause, only the current portion as identified by the actuary would need to be considered since that is the most likely amount which would be settled within the next twelve months.

(ii) Expected date of realisation of financial assets and financial liabilities:  In the case of NBFCs it will be easy to verify the expected date of realisation of assets and liabilities as those entities will have Asset Liabilities Management mechanism to analyse the due dates, as required in terms of the RBI guidelines. However, such a mechanism may not exist in case of other entities. Consequently, the auditor will have to put extra effort while reviewing the expected date of realisation of assets and repayment of liabilities in entities other than NBFCs, especially where the contractual terms are not specified. The auditors should prevail upon such entities to develop and strengthen their MIS and internal controls to capture the necessary data, and the same should be subject to proper verification in accordance with relevant auditing standards.
(iii) Other Information accompanying the Financial Statements:  These documents generally comprise the Directors Reports and Management Discussion and Analysis Report, wherever required to be prepared. As per SA-720 – The Auditor’s Responsibility in Relation to Other Financial Information, the auditors are expected only to review the said information included as a part of the Annual Report accompanying the audited financial statement for any material factual inconsistencies and also include the same in the audit report. Further, in many cases there  are practical challenges in getting this data before finalising the accounts and issuing the audit report. However the auditor should ensure that at least draft versions of these documents are made available by the Management. Finally, he should not only read the same for inconsistencies but also perform certain procedures as outlined below.

(iv) Review of the Board of Directors and Management Plans:
• Since the plans are forward-looking, the auditors would not be in a position to confirm the correctness thereof. However, while reviewing these plans, they will have to look into the historical performance and review various assumptions considered for the preparation of these plans and corroborate the same based on their understanding of the entity and the business in which it operates and other publicly available information.

•  Auditors will also have to ensure that approved plans are in line with industries / peer group estimates.

(v) Audit Documentation: While taking the above judgements, auditors would have to ensure adequate documentation of the audit procedures performed as above to arrive at appropriate conclusion(s). In addition, they should also obtain Management Representation on specific aspects as deemed necessary. However, the Management Representation Letter shall not be a substitute for audit procedures to be performed but would serve as additional evidence.

CONCLUSION
The additional reporting responsibilities have placed very specific responsibilities on the auditors to provide early warning signals on the financial health of an entity.  As is the case with most of the other clauses, where the auditors are expected to be playing varied and versatile roles, this clause is no exception since they are expected to play the role of a soothsayer!.

MLI SERIES- ARTICLE 6 – PURPOSE OF A COVERED TAX AGREEMENT AND ARTICLE 7 – PREVENTION OF TREATY ABUSE

1. BACKGROUND
Multinational companies and large global conglomerates transitioned from country-specific operating models to global business models – thanks to the continuously-improving information and communication technology, internet reach and integrated supply chains. However, the tax laws failed to catch up with the speed and advancement of such business models, leading to gaps in the interplay between domestic and international tax laws resulting in double non-taxation of income. Companies artificially shifted profits to low tax jurisdictions or tax havens where they had little or no business, famously referred to as ‘Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (‘BEPS’). BEPS led to widespread tax evasion causing serious concerns to the already revenue deficit developing economies unable to collect their fair share of taxes.

The bilateral tax treaties signed by the countries also could not prevent improper use of treaties by companies to pay no or minimum taxes leading to treaty shopping or tax treaty abuse. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (‘OECD’) has been trying to address such issues through its model tax convention or commentary by introducing concepts such as ‘beneficial owner’,conduit companies’, ‘object and main purpose of arrangement or transaction’ etc. over the years. However, multi-nat`ional companies continued treaty shopping and evaded billions in taxes.

Considering the above, a need was felt for international cooperation to tackle the BEPS risks by arriving at a consensus-based solution. The OECD developed a strategy to address BEPS issues in a harmonized and comprehensive manner to counter weaknesses in the taxation system and confront gaps and mismatches in tax treaties. Hence, the concept of Multilateral Instrument (‘MLI’) was introduced whereby existing tax treaties stood modified to incorporate treaty-related BEPS measures via a single instrument called MLI. Multiple action plans were devised as a part of the BEPS project, and one such plan was Action Plan 6 – Prevention of tax treaty abuse.

2. OVERVIEW OF ACTION PLAN 6

BEPS Action Plan 6 deals with a variety of measures to control treaty abuse. It recommended a three-way approach to deal with treaty abuse, i.e., a) introduction of a preamble to the treaty; b) introduction of purpose based anti-abuse provision called ‘principal purpose test’; and c) introduction of objective based anti-abuse provision called ‘limitation on benefits’. These recommendations have been considered in the MLI.

The MLI contains multiple articles, which are divided into 7 parts. Part III, containing Articles 6 to 11, deals with the prevention of treaty abuse. Article 6 covering ‘Purpose of Covered Tax Agreement’ and Article 7 on ‘Prevention of Treaty Abuse’ has been discussed in this article.

Primarily, BEPS Action Plan 6 includes, inter-alia, introduction of title and preamble to every treaty as a minimum requirement along with the insertion of the clause on principal purpose test as well as limitation on benefits.

3. ARTICLE 6 OF MLI – PREAMBLE AS MINIMUM STANDARD

The preamble text which is introduced / replaced by MLI reads as under:

‘Intending to eliminate double taxation with respect to the taxes covered by this agreement without creating opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax evasion or avoidance (including through treaty-shopping arrangements aimed at obtaining reliefs provided in this agreement for the indirect benefit of residents of third jurisdictions)’.

The main crux of the preamble as the minimum standard is to indicate the intention of the treaty countries to:

a) Eliminate double taxation;

b) Restrict opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax evasion/avoidance strategies; and

c) Discourage treaty shopping or treaty abuse.

There is a possibility that the existing treaties may already have a preamble on similar lines. However, considering that multiple nations have commonly agreed upon the comprehensive text, it is desired that the countries adopt modified language of preamble as a substitute or in absence of the current text. However, if two countries believe that the language of preamble in the tax treaty is sufficient, they may continue with the text of preamble in the tax treaty by making a reservation without adopting change as suggested above.

The preamble forms part of the tax treaty and sets the tone and context in the right manner. It constitutes a statement of the object and purpose of the tax treaty.

With regards to the methodology of incorporating new preamble into existing treaties, it being a minimum standard, the countries who subscribe to MLI are presumed to have agreed to the change unless otherwise notified. If a country remains silent on its position without expressing any explicit reservation, it will be presumed that the country has agreed to the adoption of the minimum standard.

4. OPTIONAL ADDITION TO PREAMBLE
MLI provides an option to add following text in the preamble discussed above:

?Desiring to further develop their economic relationship and to enhance their cooperation in tax matters’

The additional text is offered as an option to the signatories of MLI with respect to the treaties that do not already have such a language as a part of its preamble. Only when both the countries expressly agree to adopt additional language will their tax treaty stand modified to include said text as part of the preamble. For example, the UK and Australia have opted for the inclusion of additional language as a part of the preamble. Hence, the UK-Australia tax treaty will have this additional language in addition to the language required as a minimum standard.

5. INDIA’S POSITION TO PREAMBLE AND OPTIONAL ADDITION
India is silent on the adoption of Article 6. Therefore, preamble text as stated above, being a minimum standard shall be deemed to have been adopted by India for its tax treaties. However, India has not opted for optional addition, and hence the same will not be included in the tax treaties.

6. IMPACT OF PREAMBLE ON INDIA’S EXISTING TREATIES

The impact of India’s adoption under Article 6 on few important tax treaties entered into by India is discussed below:

Country

Whether
the country is a signatory to MLI?

Whether
treaty with India is notified for MLI purpose?

Impact

Singapore

Yes

Yes

The existing preamble in the tax treaties contain objective of
prevention of double taxation and fiscal evasion.

The preamble language is likely to get widened with new preamble
which provides for
?without creating
opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax evasion or
avoidance and anti-treaty shopping objective.’

 

Netherlands

United Kingdom

France

UAE

Mauritius

Yes

No

New preamble shall not be added and
hence existing treaty shall continue to operate as it is.

The existing preamble provides for
its object as ‘the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of
fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital gains and for the
encouragement of mutual trade and investment.’

Germany

Yes

No

New preamble not to be added and hence existing treaty shall
continue to operate without any change.

USA

No

Not
Applicable

India-USA treaty shall remain
unchanged. However, based on BEPS Action Plan, countries may amend treaty
based on bilateral negotiations.

China

Yes

No

Neither country had notified counterparty. However, both the
countries recently amended tax treaty based on the bilateral negotiations.
The treaty has been amended based on the measures recommended in BEPS Action
Plan.

 

The amended tax treaty includes new preamble including optional
additional text. The same is reproduced as under:

 

‘Desiring to further develop their economic
relationship and to enhance their cooperation in tax matters, Intending to
eliminate double taxation with respect to taxes on income without creating
opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax evasion or
avoidance (including through treaty-shopping arrangements aimed at obtaining
reliefs provided in this Agreement for the indirect benefit of residents of
third States).’

7. INTENT OF PREAMBLE
The main intention behind binding countries which are signatory to the MLI to include new preamble as a minimum requirement is to ensure prevention of inappropriate use of tax treaties leading to double non-taxation or reduced taxation. However, recognizing what is ‘appropriate’ vis-à-vis ‘inappropriate’ use of tax treaty is often complex and strenuous.

In a situation where a company is set up with no / minimum business activity in a particular jurisdiction it may be viewed to be a typical case of inappropriate use of tax treaty. Further, in case of a company being engaged in genuine commercial activities which incidentally leads to double non-taxation may not viewed to be a case of inappropriate use of tax treaty. In such cases, the effect of double non-taxation is not on account of any tax evasion arrangement but in line with the overall object and intent of the tax treaty.

The tax treaty also intends to encourage economic development and co-operation amongst countries. One such case is of India-Mauritius tax treaty wherein the preamble manifests the philosophy of encouraging mutual trade and investment as object of the treaty. In the landmark judgment of Union of India vs. Azadi Bachao Andolan ([2003] 263 ITR 706), the Supreme Court referred to the text of the preamble of the Mauritius Treaty and legitimized treaty shopping as being consistent with India’s intention at the time when the Mauritius treaty was entered. It is pertinent to evaluate whether Supreme Court would have rendered the decision on similar lines if preamble would not bear reference to the text relating to economic development. Further, it would be interesting to see how Courts interpret tax treaties considering the text of new preamble in the tax  treaties.

Mandatory adoption of new preamble is a step in right direction as an anti-abuse measure which keeps a check on treaty shopping and would help countries in collecting taxes in a fair and equitable manner.

8. ARTICLE 7 OF MLI – PREVENTION OF TREATY ABUSE
The BEPS Action Plan 6 Report provides for three alternatives to mitigate treaty abuse viz. the principal purpose test (‘PPT’), simplified limitation of benefit (‘SLOB’) provision and detailed limitation of benefit (‘DLOB’) provision. Under Action Plan 6, as a minimum standard, countries are provided with a choice between adopting the following options for prevention of Treaty Abuse:

(i) Only PPT.

(ii) PPT along with SLOB.

(iii) PPT along with DLOB.

(iv) DLOB supplemented by a mechanism that would deal with conduit arrangements not already dealt with in tax treaties.

The MLI provides for the PPT and SLOB provisions. However, it does not include a draft of the DLOB provision since it may require substantial bilateral customization and may be difficult to incorporate in a multilateral instrument. Further, since the PPT, by itself, can constitute compliance with the minimum standard, the same has been provided for as the default option for prevention of treaty abuse under Article 7 of MLI. However, countries are free to adopt either of the other three approaches as provided above.

9. CONCEPT OF PPT
The concept of PPT provides that where having regard to all relevant facts and circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude that one of the principal purposes of any transaction or arrangement was to obtain treaty benefit, such benefit would be denied unless it is established that the granting of such benefit would be in accordance with the object and purpose of the provisions of the treaty.

The concept of PPT may be dissected as under:

(i) Overriding Provision – The provisions of the PPT are notwithstanding other provisions of the treaty, namely they override the other provisions of the treaty.

(ii) Subjective Test – The test of PPT is subjective. While all relevant facts and circumstances needs to be considered in determining fulfilment of PPT, what constitutes the principal purpose of an arrangement and whether the principal purpose was to obtain a treaty benefit may be subject to varying interpretations.

(iii) Onus of Proof – The onus of proof (namely reasonable basis) required for the tax department to contest non-compliance of PPT is lower than the onus of proof (namely establish with certainty) required for the taxpayer to contend that granting of benefit is in accordance with the object and purpose of the treaty.

(iv) Application of PPT – PPT may fail even if one of the principal purposes of the transaction or arrangement was to obtain treaty benefit. One way to interpret this could be that where the transaction or arrangement would not have taken place or would have taken place in a different manner in the absence of the treaty benefit, then in such cases principal purpose may be said to have been to obtain treaty benefit.

(v) Transaction or Arrangement – The MLI does not define the terms ‘transaction’ or ‘arrangement’. However, the term ‘arrangement’ is defined in section 102(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘IT Act’), although for the limited purpose of Chapter XA relating to the General Anti-Avoidance Rule. However, these terms could be interpreted widely and may also include setting up an entity in a particular jurisdiction.

(vi) Benefit – The term ‘benefit’ has also not been defined in the MLI. However, the same has been defined in section 102(3) to include a payment of any kind, whether intangible or intangible form. Further, section 102(10) defines ‘tax benefit’ to include reduction, avoidance or deferral of tax, increase in refund, reduction in incomeor increase in loss. The term ‘benefit’ in the context ofMLI is also intended to be wide in nature to cover the above.

(vii) Taxability in case PPT is not satisfied – Where PPT is not satisfied, the benefit under the treaty may be denied. However, the taxability may not be altered under the treaty by recharacterizing the transaction, disregarding an arrangement, looking through the transaction etc.

(viii) Object and purpose of tax treaty – Even where the PPT is not satisfied, treaty benefit may still be granted where it is proved that the granting of such benefit is in accordance with the objects and purpose of the treaty. The object and purpose of treaty may be gauged from the treaty’s preamble, text of the relevant provision etc. Typically, treaties/treaty provisions include elimination of double taxation, promotion of exchange of goods and services, movement of capital and persons, fostering economic relations, trade and investment, provision of certainty to taxpayers, elimination of discrimination etc. as their objects.

Some of the situations where PPT may be applied to deny treaty benefits are setting up of an intermediate holding company for treaty shopping, assignment of the right to receive a dividend to a beneficial treaty country, holding of board meetings in a particular country to demonstrate residence of the entity in such country etc. Further, some of the situations where the treaty benefit may be provided under the exception to the PPT Rule (i.e. treaty benefit in accordance with object and purpose of tax treaty) include choice of a treaty country for setting up a new manufacturing plant as compared to setting up in a country with no treaty, allowing benefit to an investment fund or a collective investment vehicle set up in a country where majority investors are of that country while some minority investors may be of a different country etc.

In addition to the PPT, the MLI also provides an option to include an additional para empowering the competent authority of a contracting state to grant the treaty benefit upon request from the person even where the same has been denied as a result of the operation of PPT. This shall be the case where the competent authority determines that such benefits would have been granted even in the absence of the transaction or arrangement.

10. APPLICATION OF PPT TO COVERED TAX AGREEMENTS
The PPT applies ‘in place of’ or ‘in absence of’ any existing similar provisions in the treaty. Where a similar PPT provision (which either covers all benefits or is applicable to specific benefits under treaty) is already present in the treaty and the same is notified by both the parties to the CTA, the said provision would be replaced by the PPT under the MLI. Thus, the scope of existing PPT provisions under a CTA would get expanded by the operation of the MLI. Where no such provision is present, the PPT under MLI would be added to the treaty. Further, where only one of the parties to the CTA notifies a similar existing provision in the treaty or where none of the parties to the CTA notify a similar existing provision, the PPT under MLI would apply and prevail over the existing provision and the MLI PPT would supersede the existing provision to the extent that such existing provision is incompatible with the MLI PPT.

However, the optional para empowering the competent authority to grant treaty benefit would only apply where both the parties to CTA have chosen to adopt the same.

11. CONCEPT OF SLOB
As discussed earlier, the SLOB provision is an optional provision which may be adopted as a supplement to the PPT. It provides for objective conditions for entitlement to benefits under a CTA. Basically, the SLOB test provides that a resident of a contracting state would be entitled to treaty benefits which are otherwise available under the CTA only where such resident:

(i) Is a ‘qualified person’; or

(ii) Is engaged in active conduct of business; or
(iii) At least 75% beneficial interest in such person is directly or indirectly owned by equivalent beneficiaries; or

(iv) Is granted benefit by the competent authority irrespective subject to fulfilment of PPT.

However, the following benefits under the treaty are not subject to the SLOB test:

(i) Determination of residence of dual resident entities (Para 3 of Article 4).

(ii) Corresponding adjustment (Para 2 of Article 9).

(iii) Mutual agreement procedure (Article 25).

Some of the important concepts for test of SLOB are outlined below:

Qualified person

(i) Individual,

 

(ii) Contracting jurisdiction,
political subdivision or local authority thereof or instrumentality thereof,

 

(iii) Entity whose principal class of
shares is regularly traded on stock exchange(s),

 

(iv) Mutually agreed NGOs,

 

(v) Entities established and operated
to administer retirement benefits etc.,

 

(vi) Person other than individual, if
at least 50% of shares of the person are owned directly or indirectly by
persons who are residents and qualify for treaty benefit under (i) to (v)
above. The shares should be held on at least half the days of a twelve-month
period that includes the time when the benefit would otherwise be provided.

Active conduct of business

(i) Person must be engaged in active conduct of business in the
residence state and income derived from the other state emanates from or is
incidental to such business.

 

(ii) Following activities do not qualify as “active conduct of
business”:

 

? Holding company,

 

? Overall supervision or administration of a group of companies,

 

? Group financing (including cash pooling),

 

? Making or managing investments.

Equivalent beneficiaries

(i) Treaty
benefit would be available if equivalent beneficiaries directly or indirectly
own at least 75% of the beneficial interest of the resident income recipient.
The interest must be held on at least half of the days of any twelve-month
period that includes the time when the benefit would otherwise be accorded.

 

(ii) Equivalent
beneficiary means a person, who would have been entitled to an equivalent or
more favourable benefit either under its domestic law or treaty or any other
international instrument.

12. APPLICATION OF SLOB TO CTAs
The SLOB applies to a CTA only where both the parties to CTA have chosen to apply it. Where only one of the parties or none of the parties have adopted the SLOB, the PPT would apply.

Further, where one of the parties to a CTA has chosen to apply the SLOB while the other party has not, the first party has an option to opt-out of Article 7 in its entirety namely Article 7 (including PPT) would not apply in such a case. In order to discourage such a situation, MLI provides the party not applying the SLOB to opt for either of the following:

(i) Symmetrical application of SLOB: SLOB would apply symmetrically under CTAs with parties that have originally chosen to apply SLOB. For example, where State X has opted for SLOB while State Y has opted only for PPT, State Y may opt for application of SLOB symmetrically to X-Y treaty. In such a case from the perspective of State Y, SLOB clause would apply only for the limited purpose of X-Y treaty. SLOB would not be applicable to any of the Y’s treaties with other States where such other States have not chosen to apply SLOB.

(ii) Asymmetrical application of SLOB: In the earlier example, where State Y opts for asymmetrical application, State X would test both PPT and SLOB while granting treaty benefits while State Y would only test for PPT.

It may be noted that opting for either of symmetrical or asymmetrical option is not mandatory for State Y. If none of the options is opted, the SLOB shall not apply, and only PPT shall apply. However, State X would then have an option of opting out of the entire Article 7, and if such option is exercised, neither PPT nor SLOB shall apply. However, in such a scenario it is expected that countries should endeavour to each a mutually satisfactory solution that meets minimum standard for preventing treaty abuse. In the context of Indian treaties, considering that India has opted for Article 7, the application of PPT or PPT and SLOB would depend upon how the other country chooses to apply Article 7. The impact of Article 7 on select Indian tax treaties is discussed in the subsequent paragraphs.

SLOB also applies ‘in place of’ or ‘in absence of’ similar provisions in the CTA. Where a treaty already has existing similar SLOB provisions, the states may notify the same and the MLI SLOB shall apply in place of the existing SLOB provision upon notification by both the states. The application of SLOB would be similar to that or PPT as discussed in
para 10.1.

13. INDIA’S POSITIONS ON ARTICLE 7
India has chosen to apply PPT as an interim measure in its final notification. However, where possible, it intends to adopt a LOB provision, in addition to or in replacement of PPT, through bilateral negotiation. India has not opted to apply the optional provision empowering the competent authority to grant treaty benefit even where PPT is not met. Further, India has also opted to apply the SLOB to all  its treaties.

14. IMPACT OF ARTICLE 7 ON INDIA’S TREATIES
The impact of MLI on some of India’s prominent tax treaties is outlined in the Table below. The analysis in the below Table is considering that India has opted for PPT and SLOB provisions.

Treaty Partner

Notification
by Treaty Partner

Impact
of Article 7 of MLI

USA

Not adopted MLI

Since USA has not adopted MLI, none of the
provisions of MLI would apply to India – US Treaty. Accordingly, neither PPT
nor SLOB would apply to India – US Treaty.

Mauritius
/ China

Not
covered treaty with India as a CTA

Since treaty with
India is not notified as a CTA by Mauritius, none of the provisions of MLI
(including PPT and SLOB) would apply to India – Mauritius treaty.

 

Neither India nor
China have notified India-China tax treaty as CTA. However, both the
countries recently

(continued)

 

 

amended tax treaty based on the bilateral negotiations.
India-China tax treaty has been amended vide protocol notified by CBDT vide
Notification No. 54/ 2019 dated 17th July, 2019 where PPT has been
incorporated under Article 27A of the treaty.

Japan / France

Only
PPT

Only PPT would
apply to the treaty.

UAE / Australia / Singapore
/ Netherlands / Luxembourg / UK

PPT plus
optional provision empowering competent authority to grant treaty benefit
despite failure of PPT

Only PPT would apply.

 

Since India has not adopted the optional
provision empowering competent authority, the same would not apply to any of
India’s CTAs.

Russia

PPT and SLOB

Both PPT and SLOB
would apply.

Denmark

PPT and
Symmetrical Application of SLOB

Both PPT and SLOB would apply.

Greece

PPT and Asymmetrical Application of SLOB

Greece would
apply
only PPT in granting
treaty benefit while India would apply both PPT and SLOB in granting treaty
benefit

15. INTERPLAY OF PPT, SLOB AND GAAR

In the case of CTA where both PPT and SLOB apply, since SLOB deals with whether a particular “person” per-se is eligible for treaty benefit and provides for objective criteria as compared to PPT, the fulfilment of SLOB needs to be tested first. Where the SLOB itself is not fulfilled, treaty benefit would not be available irrespective of the fulfilment of PPT.

Once the SLOB is fulfilled, as a next step, the arrangement or transaction resulting in the income would also need to satisfy the PPT. Where SLOB is met, however, in case where a particular arrangement or transaction does not meet PPT, treaty benefit in respect of income from such arrangement or transaction may still be denied.

It is also pertinent to consider the interplay of PPT and General Anti-Avoidance Rules (‘GAAR’) under the IT Act. The table below provides a comparative analysis of these provisions.

Particulars

PPT

GAAR

Subject matter of test

Transaction or arrangement.

Arrangement which inter-alia includes a transaction.

Applicability

One of the principal
purposes is to obtain treaty benefit.

 

Tainted element test not
required to be fulfilled.

(i)
Main purpose is to obtain tax benefit; and

(ii) Any of the four tainted elements are
present (namely creates rights or obligations not at arm’s length, results in
misuse or abuse of provisions, lacks commercial substance or entered in
manner not ordinarily employed for bona fide purpose).

Consequences

Denial
of treaty benefit.

Disregarding or recharacterization of
arrangement, disregarding parties to arrangement, reallocation of income
between parties, reassessment of residency or situs, looking through
corporate structure etc.

Carveouts

Treaty benefit provided
where the same is in accordance with object and purpose of treaty.

None.

Safeguards
for judicious application

None.

Invocation to be approved by
Approving Panel.

Grandfathering

None.

Income from investments made prior to 1st April, 2017
grandfathered.

Threshold

None.

Applicable only where the tax benefit
exceeds Rs. 3 crores in a financial year.

It may be noted from the above that the test under PPT is more stringent than under GAAR. Accordingly, it is less likely that GAAR would apply where the PPT is satisfied. However, it would be interesting to see the manner in which GAAR provisions may apply where treaty benefit is provided under the exception to the PPT rule taking into account the object or purpose of the treaty.

16. CONCLUSION
With the introduction of the preamble in all CTAs, the same is likely to assume increasing significance in the interpretation of tax treaties and the provision of benefits thereunder, including by judicial forums. Any double non-taxation or treaty shopping case is likely to be subject to extensive scrutiny. Further, group holding structures, cross border transactions and arrangements planned by multinational corporations would need extensive examination with respect to the fulfilment of PPT in addition to already existing anti-avoidance measures. Further, since many countries have not opted for SLOB, the impact of SLOB provisions would be limited to select treaties entered into by India.

The importance of commercial substance and rationale is likely to assume prime significance and it is imperative that business decisions be driven by commercial factors rather than primarily by tax reasons. Going forward, the significance of adequate documentation for demonstrating the commercial rationale of entering into any transaction / arrangement cannot be undermined.

THE MISSING MIDDLE – MADHYODAYA

Can we say that DONE includes NOT DONE/HALF DONE, just as income includes loss? How do we factor in the impact of not doing something? While Budget making is super difficult as there are innumerable impossible expectations from diverse interest groups, one can break up its OUTCOMES into the following baskets:

1.    Antyodaya  – pulling out those in dire need for basics – health, education, food, homes, water. These must reach them to bring them out of despair and helplessness and find dignity and opportunities.

2.    Madhyodaya – rising of the taxpayers, MSMEs, risk-takers, working-class, consumers etc.; the middle class

3.    Bhavishyodaya – beneficial creation whose outcome is in the future and will result in situation change. Includes infrastructure, investments, and the like that are like sowing seeds, building today that will bring enduring benefit and transform the landscape of living and doing business.

1 and 3 only aim to bring as many people into the middle class: the oil and wheel of the economy. Yet, Madhyodaya is often ignored, although the middle class should become as big as it can, where most populace should ideally be. Balance of these results in Sarvodaya – the RISE of ALL.

For Madhyodaya to occur, amongst other things, we need an entire system purged of a lot of dross by Arresting absurdities, undoing unFAIRNESS, and reducing REVENUE BLINDNESS . UNDOING these is equally important as DOING so many other things, and they are mutually exclusive. The Union Budget could have looked more closely  at these.

__________________________________________________________________
1    Coined by Shri Deen Dayal Upadhyay, one of the founding fathers of the BJP.
2  
 Perpetual endemic that affects tax officers, and doesn’t allow them to
apply the law fairly due to blindness caused by collection targets.
Take STT, as an example: It was introduced when the tax on capital gains was abolished, and a more efficient source-based mechanism was brought in 2004. However, this government brought tax back, but ‘forgot’ or ‘ignored’ or ‘winked’ at the STT’s reversal, I guess. So today, you pay STT and tax on CG. Although it is tax, you cannot adjust it against tax on capital gains. It is an irrecoverable tax (unlike TDS or TCS) on loss where you still pay even when you incur loss – an unheard of structure in the tax world. For 2022-23 STT is estimated 60% higher at Rs. 20,000 Cr (collection of STT in 2019-20 was Rs. 6,000 Cr and Rs.12,500 Cr in September 2021 compared to an estimate of Rs. 12,500 Cr for the  year 2021-22).

Crypto tax seems to suggest such a line of thinking to tax it without set off amongst other things when several crore people are reported to hold crypto. Since it is not currency – it can have GST implications. It is imperative that north block understands that the middle class is constantly trying to grow their tax paid savings to beat insidious inflation and taxes to stay afloat. On a lighter note, a wise man commented: the plausible cause of no tinkering of personal taxes and procedures could be the debilitated Rs. 4,000 crore  tax portal!

While we congratulate FM for doing away with 1,486 union laws from GOI’s attic, the point is this: let’s do the same in tax laws and eradicate the absurd, unfair, arbitrary, outdated, complex, litigative and all that with the potential for abuse by administrators!

 
Raman Jokhakar
Editor            

RAMPRASAD BISMIL

We are in the platinum jubilee year of our independence. Therefore, through this column, I am making a small attempt to introduce to the readers those martyrs and patriots who sacrificed everything for our independence; and about whom most of us may not be aware of the inspiring details. It is our sacred duty to offer our Namaskaars to them. I wrote on Lokmanya Tilak (BCAJ issue of August, 2021) and Madanlal Dhingra (BCAJ issue of December, 2021).

Today, I am writing about a not very commonly known martyr – Ramprasad Bismil. He was hanged by the Britishers at Gorakhpur on 19th December, 1927. He was born in 1897 to a very poor family at Shahjahanpur in Uttar Pradesh. His father Murlidhar left his job in the municipality and became a small trader. Income was very meagre.

Ramprasad learnt Hindi and Urdu. Since, his father, who was not very educated, refused to give money for buying books, Ramprasad started ‘stealing’ the money from his house. His father stopped it. Ramprasad went into bad company and took up habits of smoking and other drugs. As a result, he ducked the 5th standard twice. At his mother’s request, he was admitted to an English School. There was a priest in a nearby temple who influenced Ramprasad. He then became rather religious. Thanks to a good friend called Sushilchandra Sen, he gave up all bad habits. A gentleman named Munshi Indrajit introduced him to Arya Samaj, founded by Swami Dayanand Saraswati. Ram got inspiration by reading good books. His father drove him out of the house. While wandering in the jungle, he came across Guru Somdev. Under his guidance, Ram learnt yoga, religion and political science. He studied upto 9th standard.

Bhai Paramanand, another revolutionary involved in Lahore conspiracy had written a book ‘Tavarikh-e-Hind’ which greatly influenced Ram and he vowed to dedicate his life to the struggle for India’s freedom. He met Lokmanya Tilak at the Lucknow Congress. Ram joined the revolutionary group. The revolutionary movement needed funds. Ram borrowed Rs. 400 from his mother and sold literature about revolutions. He wrote and published a book ‘How America secured freedom’.  Also, a small booklet titled ‘My message to my countrymen’. Both these things were banned by the British Government. Ram earned Rs. 600 and repaid his mother’s loan. He helped the revolutionaries in procuring knives, rifles, pistols and other weaponry. He gained knowledge about the weapons and their prices. He secured a revolver from a Superintendent who was about to retire. The Superintendent was afraid; but Ram ‘created’ a document that he was the son of a resourceful landowner, and ‘obtained’ signatures of three persons to convince the Superintendent! Then he sold some banned revolutionary publications under the ‘guise’ of an ambulance service group in the Congress session.

There was an occasion when his three pseudo revolutionary friends attempted to kill him by betrayal. Ram escaped very luckily. The police were hunting for Ram. His mother who was always supportive, advised him to escape to Gwalior.

There, he started farming and animal husbandry; but never gave up his revolutionary movement. He wrote many books – like Bolshevic revolution, Man ki Tarang, Catherin, Swadeshi Rang; and also translated a few books – like Yogic Sadhana written by Maharshi Aurobindo. He is still recognised as a good writer in Hindi literature.

Then he again started paying attention to his very poor family. His publication business was not very successful. So, he took up a job as a manager in a factory. Then he collected some capital and started a factory of silk clothes. It was running well. From the money earned, he got his sister married. He entrusted the factory to a trusted friend and again turned to freedom struggle. He was focused on raising funds for the revolutionary movement, including looking after their families.

Once he was travelling from Shahjahanpur to Lucknow by train. He observed that on every station, the station master used to handover a money-bag to the guard of the train. There was not much security arrangement. So Ram planned an attack on a train at Kakori Station. He did it on 9th August, 1925 on the train ‘8 down’. The British Government was stunned! All the people involved in this attack except Chandrashekhar Azad were arrested. The trial continued for about 18 months; and 4 persons – Ramprasad, Ashfakulla, Roshansingh and Rajendra Lahiri were sentenced to death. Ram went to the gallows with a smiling face, chanting mantras from Sanskrit scriptures. His mother met him on the previous day and expressed her pride for his supreme sacrifice. Ram pledged that he would like to be born 1000 times of the same mother and sacrifice everything for the country.

While in jail, he had at least two good opportunities to escape. However, he avoided it on one occasion since Roshansingh’s brother who was a clerk in that jail would have come into serious trouble. On another occasion, a policeman expressed his trust in Ram and avoided tying him by a chain. Ram honoured the trust reposed in him and did not run away!

He secretly wrote his autobiography “Bismil ki Atmakatha” while in jail. It was published in 1929 but immediately banned. Finally, it was again published when India became free.

Friends, for want of space, I have avoided many details which reveal the calibre and character of this great son of our country! It is important to note that Ramprasad did all this within a short life of just 30 years! I feel, our country’s present plight is because we forgot them!

Namaskaars to Ramprasad Bismil.   

THE FIRST ‘VIRTUAL’ RRC! IS IT HERE TO STAY? A REPORT ON THE 54TH BCAS RRC

THE FIRST ‘VIRTUAL’ RRC! IS IT HERE TO STAY?

A REPORT ON THE 54TH BCAS RRC

Greater attendance from more cities, the first-ever virtually hosted ‘refresher’ programme and a puppeteer-ventriloquist to boot! These are some of the highlights of the annual Gyan Ganga, also known as the Annual Residential Refresher Course (RRC) of the Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society (BCAS), that was organised in the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic from the 7th to the 10th of January, 2021.

This was the 54th edition of the flagship event and it was attended by more than 160 participants from 39 cities and towns apart from Mumbai.

The organisers treated the difficulties, restraints and restrictions posed by the pandemic as opportunities to seek out the best in terms of the Chief Guest, the panellists, faculty, thought providers and so on. Overlapping and sometimes clashing engagements, physical locations and distances were no longer a limitation. Acknowledging the need to ‘admit rather than to restrict’, the doors of the RRC were virtually thrown open to non-members, a few of whom attended and took benefit of the landmark annual event.

From left: Uday Sathaye, Suhas Paranjpe, Narayan Pasari

Countless calls and virtual meetings resulted in drawing up a programme that promised to provoke and trigger fresh thought, debate and conversation. Of course, the time-tested mix of panel discussions, paper presentations, group discussions and talks was not neglected.

As members are aware, one of the main attractions of an RRC is the opportunity to interact with a melange of like-minded professionals and experts from diverse fields, practices and regions.

Any misgivings about the ability to attract an audience in the pandemic were washed away with the early registration of one of our senior-most Past Presidents, Pradyumna Shah, under whose aegis and Presidentship the very first RRC was held in the year 1968-69.

Invigorated by this vote of confidence, the days leading up to D-Day were spent in smoothening out technical issues, preparing videos and notes on how to log in, mock trials with panellists, paper presenters and so on to check the reception quality and also to test their bandwidths!

The first morning (7th January) was earmarked for young delegates to participate in the ice-breaking event, the ‘40s under 40’ programme led by our own youth, or Yuva Shakti, Anand Bathiya and Chirag Doshi.

President Suhas Paranjpe then went on to start the inaugural session by welcoming the participants and briefing them about the BCAS. Seminar, Public Relations and Membership Development Committee Chairman Narayan Pasari spoke about the RRC and gave details of the schedule.

Clockwise from top left: Adv Ajay Singh, Prof. Sunil Sharma, CA Sumit Seth, CA Vikram Pandya, CA Abhay Desai, CA Abhitan Mehta

In acknowledgement of the stellar contribution of our Past President under whose leadership the seed of the RRC was planted half a century ago, the BCAS felicitated Pradyumna Shah who, at the young age of 91, leads by example, proving that learning never stops. Vice-President Abhay Mehta read out the citation that was presented to him.

This was followed by the release of a book authored by another Past President, Uday Sathaye. BCAS also launched its ‘Gift A Membership Scheme’ under the benign gaze of the esteemed Guest of Honour, Mr. Dilip Piramal, Chairman, VIP Industries. In his address, Mr. Piramal spoke candidly on the subject ‘The New Normal – Doing Business in India’. An interactive session, deftly moderated by Joint Secretary Mihir Sheth and the SPRMD Committee Member Dr. Sangeeta Pandit followed.

Mr. Dilip Piramal reflected upon his life experiences and motivated the online audience with his frankness, simplicity and humility on a number of contemporary issues posed to him by the moderators.

Treasurer Chirag Doshi proposed the vote of thanks to the Chief Guest. Also present at the opening session were the Conveners of the Committee, Kinjal BhutaMrinal Mehta and Preeti Cherian.

The inaugural session was followed by the much anticipated curtain-raiser Panel Discussion which saw Jayesh Sheth, Raj Mullick, Vishal Gada and Rutvik Sanghvi lay threadbare the intricacies relating to ‘Business in Digital Economy – An Overall Perspective from Direct Tax, Indirect Taxes, Accounting & FEMA’. The panel was moderated and deftly steered by Past President Chetan Shah and Treasurer Chirag Doshi.

On the second morning, 8th January, Abhitan Mehta started the Group Discussion on ‘Revenue Recognition Accounting – Direct Taxes & Indirect Taxes Aspects’. For each Group Discussion Paper, the participants were divided into four online groups with a Group Leader and an Observer in each for interactive deliberations and discussions on the subject.

Later, the participants took active interest in the Paper Presentation by Sumit Sheth on the subject ‘CARO Reporting & Other Recent Company Law Issues’. This session was chaired by Past President Ashok Dhere. In the evening, Abhitan Mehta returned in a lengthy session in which he presented his replies to the paper that had been discussed in the morning. This session was chaired by Vice-President Abhay Mehta.

Day 3 commenced with the Group Discussion on ‘Case Studies in Direct Taxes (Special Emphasis on Corporate Taxation Schemes & Issues, Penalties & Prosecutions & COVID Impact)’ by Advocate Ajay Singh. In-depth discussions took place among all the four groups. This was followed by the Paper Presentation by Abhay Desai on ‘Intricate Issues in GST, Special Emphasis on Input Tax Credit, Place of Supply, Point of Taxation & Valuation’. This session was chaired by Past President Govind Goyal.

Glimpses of the 54th BCAS RRC

The array of speakers, paper-writers, moderators and others who enriched the
proceedings of the RRC

Yet another stimulating Paper Presentation followed. This one was by Vikram Pandya on the ‘Use & Impact of Artificial Intelligence & Data Analytics for Professionals’. Dr. Sangeeta Pandit chaired this session.

And then it was time to release the much-awaited BCAS App. This was formally done by President Suhas Paranjpe and other office-bearers with much fanfare. The contribution of Joint Secretary Mihir Sheth in the making of the App was hailed and recognised.

The evening ended with a unique entertainment programme by Satyajit Padhaye, a CA and also an ace puppeteer and ventriloquist, which was enjoyed by all the participants and their families. This programme was chaired by Past President Pranay Marfatia.
Day 4 started with replies by Advocate Ajay Singh on his paper ‘Case Studies in Direct Taxes (Special Emphasis on Corporate Taxation Schemes & Issues, Penalties & Prosecutions & COVID Impact)’. This session was chaired by Past President Anil Sathe.

The pièce de résistance of the 54th RRC was the talk by Prof. Sunil Sharma, Faculty, IIM-Ahmedabad, on ‘Strategic Thinking & Organisational Alignment’ which was chaired by Past President Rajesh Muni. The occasion also marked the e-release of the e-book‘Gita for Professionals’ authored                                                                                       by Chetan Dalal.

The virtual RRC concluded with acknowledgements and thanksgiving to all those who had worked towards delivering a successful RRC, especially the ‘Tech Team’ comprising Anand Kothari, Gaurav Save, Mehul Gada, Rimple Dedhia and Ronak Rambhia who had worked tirelessly to deliver a seamless experience.

Till we meet again in 2022 at the 55th RRC!

    

 

PREFACE

‘Dear Esteemed Readers,

In the words of our dear Father of the Nation, Mahatma Gandhi, “Be the change you wish to see in the world”. This phrase aptly describes our respected vadil, our Past President, Shri Pradyumnabhai N Shah.

The seeds of the Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society’s Residential Refresher Course (RRC) were planted under his Presidentship in the year 1968-69. Over the past five decades, countless members, nay generations, have reaped the fruits of this bountiful tree, while sheltering and prospering under its benevolent reach.

One of the early registrations at the 54th edition of the RRC this year, the first one in virtual mode, was none other than our dear Shri Pradyumnabhai himself. All of 92 years of age, his hunger for learning and his commitment to the Society and profession are truly inspirational.

The Seminar, Public Relations & Membership Development Committee (SPR&MD Committee) of the BCAS, which organises the RRC every year, was privileged to honour the contributions of our dear Shri Pradyumnabhai with a citation presented at the hands of the esteemed Chief Guest, Shri Dilip Piramal, Chairman, VIP Industries.

Pradyumnabhai, thank you for showing us the path, for being the torchbearer for the RRC. We, at the BCAS, will be eternally grateful for the legacy you have bestowed on all – the past, the current and the future generations of members – all part of this vibrant Society.’

 

Section 44AD – Eligible assessee engaged in an eligible business – Partner of firm – Not carrying on business independently – Not applicable

6. Anandkumar vs. Asst. CIT Tax, Circle-2, Salem [Tax Case Appeal No. 388 of 2019; 23rd December, 2020; Madras High Court] [‘A’ Bench, Chennai in I.T.A. No. 573/CHNY/2018; A.Y.: 2012-13; ITAT order dated 30th January, 2019]

Section 44AD – Eligible assessee engaged in an eligible business – Partner of firm – Not carrying on business independently – Not applicable

 

The assessee is an individual, a partner in M/s Kumbakonam Jewellers, M/s ANS Gupta & Sons and M/s ANS Gupta Jewellers. The assessee filed his return of income for the A.Y. under consideration admitting a total income of Rs. 43,53,066. The assessment was finalised u/s 143(3) by an order dated 3rd March, 2015 disallowing the claim made by the assessee u/s 44AD. While filing the return, the assessee had applied the presumptive rate of tax at 8% u/s 44AD and returned Rs. 4,68,240 as income from the remuneration and interest received from the partnership firm. The A.O. did not agree with the assessee and opined that section 44AD is available only for an eligible assessee engaged in an eligible business and that the assessee was not carrying on business independently but was only a partner in the firm. Further, the assessee did not have any turnover and receipts of account of remuneration and interest from the firms cannot be construed as gross receipts mentioned in section 44AD.

 

On appeal, the CIT (Appeals), Salem dismissed the same by order dated 22nd December, 2017. The Tribunal also dismissed the assessee’s appeal.

 

The Hon. High Court observed that section 44AD is a special provision for computing profits and gains of business on presumptive basis which was introduced in the Act with effect from 1993. At the outset, it needs to be noted that section 44AD is a special provision and it carves out an exception in respect of certain businesses, and from clause (b)(ii) of the Explanation u/s 44AD which prescribes the limit of Rs. 2 crores as total turnover or gross receipts, it is a clear indication that this provision is meant for small businesses. Further, section 44AD(1) commences with a non-obstante clause and states that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in sections 28 to 43C in the case of an eligible assessee engaged in an eligible business, a presumptive rate of tax at 8% can be adopted. One more important aspect is that 8% is computed on the basis of the total turnover or gross receipts of the assessee. Therefore, four important aspects to be noted in section 44AD are that the assessee who claims such a benefit of the presumptive rate of tax should an eligible assessee as defined in clause (a) of the Explanation to section 44AD, he should be engaged in an eligible business as defined in clause (b) of section 44AD and 8% of the presumptive rate of tax is computed on the total turnover or gross receipts. Therefore, to avail the benefit of such provision, the assessee has to necessarily satisfy the A.O. that he comes within the framework of section 44AD.

 

The assessee’s case is that he has received the remuneration and interest from the partnership firm and according to him this remuneration and interest received are gross receipts, and they being less than Rs. 1 crore arising from an eligible business, he is entitled to claim the benefit of the presumptive rate of tax. Further, the assessee’s contention is that he is an eligible assessee and the remuneration and interest received from the partnership firm being gross receipts from an eligible business, the A.O. ought to have allowed the benefit u/s 44AD.

 

The Revenue submitted that the assessee is not doing any business, but the firm is carrying on business in which the assessee is a partner and therefore the condition that it should arise from an eligible business is not satisfied. In the Statement issued by the ICAI, it has been stated that the word ‘turnover’ for the purpose of the clause may be interpreted to mean the aggregate amount for which sales are effected or services rendered by an enterprise, whereas in the case of the assessee neither has he performed any sales nor rendered any services but merely received remuneration and interest from the firm and the partnership firm has already debited the remuneration and interest in their profit and loss account, and therefore it cannot be taken as turnover or gross receipts.

 

The assessee should be able to satisfy the four main criteria mentioned in sub-section (1) of section 44AD r/w Explanations (a) and (b) in the said provision. Therefore, the assessee should establish that he is an eligible assessee engaged in an eligible business and such business should have a total turnover or a gross receipt. Admittedly, the assessee who is an individual in the instant case, is not carrying on any business. Therefore, the remuneration and interest received by the assessee from the partnership firm cannot be termed to be the turnover of the assessee (individual). Similarly, it will also not qualify for gross receipts.

 

Admittedly, the assessee has not done any sales nor rendered any services but has been receiving remuneration and interest from the partnership firms which amount has already been debited in the profit and loss account of the firms. Therefore, the Revenue was right in the contention that remuneration and interest cannot be treated as gross receipts.

 

The Court noted that the Tribunal observed that the intention of section 40(b) is that the partner should not be disentitled from claiming reasonable remuneration where he is a working partner and should not be denied reasonable interest on the capital invested by him in a firm and these changes if not made in the accounts of the firm, then the pro-rata profits of the firm would be higher resulting in higher tax for the firm. Therefore, the payments have to be construed indirectly as a type of distribution of profits of a firm or otherwise the firm would have been taxed. Therefore, the Tribunal observed that the Legislature in its wisdom chose such remuneration and interest to be a part of profits from business or profession and that can never translate into gross receipts or turnover of a business of being a partner in a firm. The Tribunal took note of the position prior to the substitution of section 44AD by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009 with effect from 1st April, 2011. Prior to the said substitution, this provision allowed the application of presumptive tax rate only for the business of civil construction or supply of labour for civil construction. By virtue of the substitution, the applicability of presumptive rate of tax was expanded to include any business which had turnover or gross receipts of less than Rs. 1 crore. The Tribunal noted the Explanatory notes to the provisions of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009 vide Circular No. 5/2010 dated 3rd June, 2010 wherein the CBDT had explained why the scope of the said provision was enlarged.

 

The Court observed that section 44ADA is a special provision for computing profits and gains of profession on presumptive basis and uses the expression ‘Total gross receipts’. As already seen in section 44AD, the words used are ‘total turnover’ or ‘gross receipts’ and it pre-supposes that it pertains to a sales turnover and no other meaning can be given to the said words and if so done, the purpose of introducing section 44AD would stand defeated. That apart, the position becomes much clearer if we take note of sub-section (2) of section 44AD which states that any deduction allowable under the provisions of sections 30 to 38 for the purpose of sub-section (1) be deemed to have been already given full effect to and no further deduction under those sections shall be allowed. Thus, conspicuously section 28(v) has not been included in sub-section (2) of section 44AD which deals with any interest, salary, bonus, commission or remuneration, by whatever name called, due to or received by a partner of a firm from such firm.

 

Thus, the Tribunal rightly rejected the plea raised by the assessee and confirmed the order passed by the CIT(A) and the A.O. The appeal filed by the assessee was accordingly dismissed.

 

It is my great hope someday, to see science and decision makers rediscover what the ancients have always known. Namely that our highest currency is respect

– Nassim Nicholas Taleb

Income from undisclosed sources – Bogus purchases – A.O. disallowing entire purchases – Estimation by Commissioner (Appeals) of profit element embedded in purchases at 17.5% affirmed by Tribunal based on facts – Justified

Housing project – Special deduction – Sections 80-IB(10) and 80-IB(10)(c) – Eligibility for deduction – Condition precedent – Single approval from local authority for development and construction of residential units more than and less than 1,500 sq. ft. in area – Development permission which includes residential units more than 1,500 sq. ft. irrelevant for deciding eligibility for deduction – Assessee entitled to deduction

39. Principal CIT vs. Pratham Developers [2020] 429 ITR 114 (Guj.) Date of order: 2nd March, 2020 A.Y.: 2010-11

 

Housing project – Special deduction – Sections 80-IB(10) and 80-IB(10)(c) – Eligibility for deduction – Condition precedent – Single approval from local authority for development and construction of residential units more than and less than 1,500 sq. ft. in area – Development permission which includes residential units more than 1,500 sq. ft. irrelevant for deciding eligibility for deduction – Assessee entitled to deduction

 

The assessee developed housing projects. It claimed deduction u/s 80-IB(10) in respect of five projects. The A.O. found that one of the projects was undertaken
on land introduced by the partners. He held that the assessee was not the sole owner of the land on which the housing project was constructed and disallowed the deduction. In respect of another project PV, the A.O. held that out of the layout plan for 158 residential units, 55 residential units were of built-up areas of 2,199 sq. ft. which exceeded the prescribed built-up area of 1,500 sq. ft. as envisaged u/s 80-IB(10)(c). Accordingly, the A.O. disallowed the deduction claimed by the assessee u/s 80-IB(10).

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) found that all the residential units developed by the assessee under the scheme PV were below the prescribed built-up area of 1,500 sq. ft., that as regards the 55 residential units the development agreement entered into between the land owners and its associate concern showed that the scheme was developed by its associate concern and that they did not form part of the housing project developed by the assessee. The Commissioner (Appeals) held, on the facts that the assessee was a separate concern which fulfilled the conditions prescribed u/s 80-IB(10), that the project which consisted of the 55 residential units was a separate project developed by another assessee, and that the assessee was entitled to deduction u/s 80-IB(10) in respect of the 103 residential units in the project which fulfilled the criteria prescribed as to the size of the plot, and the built-up area of each residential unit being of less than 1,500 sq. ft. The Tribunal affirmed the order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals).

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

‘i)    The condition laid down u/s 80-IB(10)(c) was fulfilled when the assessee claimed the deduction with respect to the residential units, which had built-up area less than 1,500 sq. ft. Under section 80-IB(10) there was no provision requiring the assessee to obtain a commencement certificate from the local authority for development and construction of the residential units having more than 1,500 sq. ft. area. Therefore, whether such development permission included the area for the residential units which were more than 1,500 sq. ft. would not be relevant for deciding the eligibility for deduction u/s 80-IB(10).

 

ii)    In view of the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal, there was no legal infirmity in their orders allowing the deduction u/s 80-IB(10).’

 

Export – Exemption u/s 10A – Effect of section 10A and notification of CBDT issued u/s 10A – Assessee providing human resources services – Entitled to deduction u/s 10A

38. CIT vs. NTT Data Global Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. [2020] 429 ITR 546 (Karn.) Date of order: 12th November, 2020 A.Y.: 2007-08

Export – Exemption u/s 10A – Effect of section 10A and notification of CBDT issued u/s 10A – Assessee providing human resources services – Entitled to deduction u/s 10A

 

The assessee is a private limited company and is in the business of software development and professional services. For the A.Y. 2007-08 the assessee claimed deduction u/s 10A. The A.O. recomputed the deduction u/s 10A by reducing the recruitment fee from the export turnover.

 

The Commissioner held that income from human resource services is not eligible for deduction u/s 10A and accepted the alternative plea to tax only net income from the business of manpower supply. The Tribunal held that transmitting the data of qualified information technology personnel is human resource services and information technology-enabled services. Accordingly, the appeal preferred by the assessee was allowed.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

‘i)    The expression “computer software” has been defined in Explanation 2 to section 10A and means even any customised electronic data or any product or service of a similar nature as may be notified by the Board. Thus, the Legislature has empowered the Board to notify the products or services of similar nature which would be covered under clause (b) and treated as “customised electronic data” and also, “any product or service of similar nature”. The Board has issued a notification dated 26th September, 2000 which admittedly contains human resources as well as information technology-enabled products or services.

 

ii)    The role of the assessee company was to create an electronic database of qualified personnel and transmit data through electronic means to the client. The Commissioner (Appeals) had found that the assessee was in the business of supply of manpower from India to its foreign clients after their recruitment in India. Thus, irrespective of whether or not the assessee provided training to its employees or to the employees who were recruited by its clients, since the assessee was engaged in providing human resource services, its case was squarely covered by notification dated 26th September, 2000. Therefore, the assessee was entitled to the benefit of deduction u/s 10A.’

 

Export – Exemption u/s 10A – (i) Conditions precedent for claiming exemption u/s 10A – Separate accounts need not be maintained – Undertaking starting manufacture on or after 1st April, 1995 must have 75% of sales attributed to export; (ii) Sub-contractors giving software support to assessee on basis of foreign inward remittance – Claim by sub-contractors would not affect assessee’s claim u/s 10A

37. CIT (LTU) vs. V. IBM Global Services India Pvt. Ltd. [2020] 429 ITR 386 (Karn.) Date of order: 3rd November, 2020 A.Y.: 2000-01

 

Export – Exemption u/s 10A – (i) Conditions precedent for claiming exemption u/s 10A – Separate accounts need not be maintained – Undertaking starting manufacture on or after 1st April, 1995 must have 75% of sales attributed to export; (ii) Sub-contractors giving software support to assessee on basis of foreign inward remittance – Claim by sub-contractors would not affect assessee’s claim u/s 10A

 

The assessee was in the business of export of software solutions and maintenance services. For the A.Y. 2000-01, the assessee claimed exemption u/s 10A. The A.O., inter alia, held that the assessee had a software technology park unit as well as other units and all overhead expenses had been charged in relation to the other unit and no expenditure was claimed in respect of the software technology park unit for which exemption u/s 10A had been claimed. He also held that the assessee had not fulfilled the stipulations laid down in the Software Technology Parks of India Scheme or the conditions laid down by the Reserve Bank of India regarding maintenance of separate accounts and other conditions and, therefore, the assessee was not entitled to exemption u/s 10A. He further held that the audit report did not exclude payment made to sub-contractors or other expenses incurred abroad. He held that the turnover brought into the country was 56.056% which was below 75% as stipulated u/s 10A. Accordingly, he disallowed the exemption u/s 10A.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the appeal partly. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal preferred by the Revenue and allowed the appeal preferred by the assessee in part.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

‘i)    Section 10A is a special provision in respect of newly-established undertakings in free trade zones. The exemption is dependent on fulfilment of the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2). Sub-section (2) does not contain any requirement with regard to maintenance of separate accounts. Wherever the Legislature intended to incorporate the requirement of maintenance of either separate accounts or separate books of accounts, it has expressly said so. The requirement of maintenance of separate accounts has been provided in the STPI registration scheme and no consequences for non-compliance therewith have been prescribed. Therefore, the requirement is directory.

 

ii)    From a perusal of section 10A(2)(ia) it is evident that it applies to an undertaking which begins to manufacture or produce any article or thing on or after 1st April, 1995 and whose exports of such articles or things are not less than 75% of the total sales thereof during the previous year. Thus, the total export has to be not less than 75% of the total sales.

 

iii)   The A.O. in his remand report to the Commissioner (Appeals) had stated that the assessee had been able to bifurcate the software technology park receipts, section 80HHE receipts and domestic receipts. The direct expenses relating to domestic receipts and export receipts had also been segregated and direct expenses of export turnover were apportioned on the basis of the percentage of turnover of the software technology park unit and section 80HHE receipts.

 

iv)   The Commissioner (Appeals) had concluded that since the assessee had identified the turnover relating to the software technology park units and there was a reasonable basis for quantifying direct and indirect expenses pertaining to the software technology park units, the income pertaining to the software technology park units and therefore, exemption u/s 10A could be worked out. The Tribunal had held that the assessee had units spread over various parts of the country and even abroad, and hence the only plausible method of reasonably allocating the overhead expenses was by relating them to the turnover. The Tribunal had upheld the order to the extent of Rs. 68,72,88,748 holding this to be a reasonable figure. These concurrent findings of fact were based on meticulous appreciation of evidence on record. The Tribunal had rightly held that the allocation of the overhead expenses had to be made on the basis of the turnover.

 

v)   The Commissioner (Appeals) had held that the sub-contractors had given software support activity to the assessee and not to the customers of the assessee. The employees of the sub-contractors operated from the software technology park unit itself and the sub-contractors had claimed exemption u/s 10A on the basis of the foreign inward remittance certificate, which had no bearing with regard to the assessee’s claim to exemption u/s 10A. The question of double deduction did not arise.

Disallowance of expenditure relating to exempt income – Section 14A r/w/r 8D of ITR, 1962 – Condition precedent for disallowance – Proximate relationship between expenditure and exempt income – Onus to establish such proximity on Department – A.O. must give a clear finding with reference to the assessee’s accounts how expenditure related to exempt income

36. CIT vs. Sociedade De Fomento Industrial Pvt. Ltd. (No. 2) [2020] 429 ITR 358 (Bom.) Date of order: 6th November, 2020


 

Disallowance of expenditure relating to exempt income – Section 14A r/w/r 8D of ITR, 1962 – Condition precedent for disallowance – Proximate relationship between expenditure and exempt income – Onus to establish such proximity on Department – A.O. must give a clear finding with reference to the assessee’s accounts how expenditure related to exempt income

 

The assessee was a miner and exporter of mineral ores. For the A.Y. 2009-10 the A.O. computed disallowance u/s 14A read with rule 8D at 0.5% on the average investment. He rejected the assessee’s claim that it did not incur any expenditure to earn the dividend income, that it invested the surplus funds through bankers and other financial institutions and all the forms were filled up by them, and that it only issued cheques. He was of the view that without devoting time and without analysing the nature of the investment, the assessee could not have invested in the mutual funds.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) partly allowed the appeal. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s appeal and deleted the disallowances.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

‘i)    Section 14A inserted by the Finance Act, 2001 with retrospective effect from 1st April, 1962 aims to disallow expenditure incurred in relation to income which did not form part of the total income and has to be read with Rule 8D of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 which provides the method of calculation of the disallowance. Section 14A statutorily recognises the principle that tax is leviable only on the net income. The profits and gains of business or profession are taxed after deducting expenditure from income. In that regard, there is no need for the assessee to establish a one-to-one correlation between income and expenditure. Rule 8D provides the methods for determining the amount of expenditure in relation to income not includible in the total income and comes into play once an expenditure falls within the mischief of section 14A.

 

ii)    The onus is on the Revenue to establish that there is a proximate relationship between the expenditure and the exempt income. The application of section 14A and rule 8D is not automatic in each and every case, where there is income not forming part of the total income. Though the expenditure u/s 14A includes both direct and indirect expenditure, that expenditure must have a proximate relationship with the exempted income. Before rejecting the disallowance computed by the assessee, the A.O. must give a clear finding with reference to the assessee’s accounts as to how the other expenditure claimed by the assessee out of the non-exempt income is related to the exempt income. There must be a proximate relationship between the expenditure and the exempt income and only then would a disallowance have to be effected.

 

iii)   The Tribunal was right in deleting the additions made by the A.O. u/s 14A read with rule 8D. The Tribunal had found that the A.O. had only discussed the provisions of section 14A(1) but had not justified how the expenditure incurred by the assessee during the relevant year related to the income not forming part of its total income and had straightaway applied Rule 8D. There must be a proximate relationship between the expenditure and the exempt income and only then would a disallowance have to be effected. There was no valid reason to interfere with the Tribunal’s well-reasoned order.’

 

Capital gains – Sections 2(14), (42A), (47) and 45 – (i) Capital asset – Stock option is a capital asset – Gains on exercising option – Capital gains; (ii) Salary – Stock option given to consultant – No relationship of employer and employee – Gains on exercising stock option – Assessable as capital gains

35. Chittharanjan A. Dasannacharya vs. CIT [2020] 429 ITR 570 (Karn.) Date of order: 23rd October, 2020 A.Y.: 2006-07


 

Capital gains – Sections 2(14), (42A), (47) and 45 – (i) Capital asset – Stock option is a capital asset – Gains on exercising option – Capital gains; (ii) Salary – Stock option given to consultant – No relationship of employer and employee – Gains on exercising stock option – Assessable as capital gains

 

The assessee was a software engineer who was employed with a company registered in India from 1995 to 1998. He was deputed to a U.S. company in 1995 as an independent consultant. The assessee served in the US from 1995 to 1998 as an independent consultant and later as an employee of the US company from 2001 to 2004. The assessee thereafter returned to India and was employed in the Indian subsidiary. While on deputation to the US, the assessee was granted stock option by the US company whereunder he was given the right to purchase 30,000 shares at an exercise price of US $0.08 per share. The assessee also had an option of cashless exercise of stock options which was an irrevocable direction to the broker to sell the underlying shares and deliver the proceeds of the sale of the shares after deducting the exercise / option price which was to be delivered to the US company. In the cashless exercise, the underlying shares were not allotted to the assessee and he was only entitled to receive the sale proceeds less the exercise price.

 

The assessee in the A.Y. 2006-07 exercised his right under the stock option plan by way of cashless exercise and received a net consideration of US $283,606 and offered this as long-term capital gains as the stock options were held for nearly ten years. The A.O. by an order u/s 143(3) split the transaction into two and brought to tax the difference between the market value of the shares on the date of exercise and the exercise price as ‘income from salary’ and the difference between the sale price of shares and market value of shares on the date of exercise of ‘income from short-term capital gains’.

 

The Tribunal held that the assessee was to be regarded as an employee for the purposes of the plan and the benefits arising therefrom were to be treated as income in the nature of salary in the hands of the assessee.

 

The Karnataka High Court allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and held as under:

 

‘i)    The Supreme Court in Dhun Dadabhoy Kapadia and Hari Brothers (P) Ltd. held that the right to subscribe to shares of a company was treated to be a capital asset u/s 2(14). The stock option being a right to purchase the shares underlying the options is a capital asset in the hands of the assessee u/s 2(14) which is also evident from Explanation 1(e) to section 2(42A) which uses the expression “in case of a capital asset being a right to subscribe any financial asset”. The cashless exercise of option therefore is a transfer of capital asset by way of a relinquishment or extinguishment of the right in the capital asset in terms of section 2(47).

 

ii)    From a perusal of the communication dated 3rd August, 2006 sent by the US company to the assessee, it was evident that the assessee was an independent consultant and not an employee of the US company at the relevant time. Thus, there was no relationship of employer and employee between it and the assessee. The assessee never received the shares in the stock options. At the time of grant of options to the assessee in the year 1996, section 17(2)(iia) was not there in the statute. The difference between the option / exercise price of the stock option and the fair market value of the shares on the date of exercise of the stock option was assessable as capital gains.

 

iii)   The Revenue in case of several other assessees had accepted the fact that on cashless exercise of option there arises income in the nature of capital gains. However, in the case of the assessee the aforesaid stand was not taken. The Revenue could not be permitted to take a different view.’

 

TDS UNDER SECTION 195 IN POST-MLI SCENARIO

In our earlier articles of June, August and September, 2018, we had covered the various facets of TDS under section 195 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the Act), including some practical issues on the same. With the increase in global trade, TDS on payments to non-residents has gained importance in recent years. The year 2020 was unforgettable for various reasons – the ongoing pandemic and the lockdown that followed being one of them. However, the international tax landscape in India also underwent a significant change in 2020 with the Multilateral Instrument (MLI) coming into effect on 1st April, 2020. The MLI has modified various DTAAs. Further, the return to the classical system of taxing dividends and the abolishment of the Dividend Distribution Tax regime in the Finance Act, 2020 also extended the scope of TDS u/s 195 as dividend payments hitherto were not subject to such TDS by virtue of the exemption u/s 10(34).

Given the host of changes that the world, particularly the tax world, has undergone in 2020, this article attempts to analyse the impact of these changes on compliance u/s 195 especially for a practitioner who is certifying the taxability of foreign remittances in Form 15CB.

1. BACKGROUND

Section 195 requires tax to be deducted at the ‘rates in force’ in respect of interest or ‘other sum chargeable under the provisions of this Act’ in respect of payment to a non-resident. Further, section 2(37A), defining the term ‘rates in force’ in respect of income subject to TDS u/s 195 refers to the rate specified in the Finance Act of the relevant year, or the rate as per the respective DTAA in accordance with section 90. Therefore, TDS u/s 195 in theory results in the finality of the tax deducted on the income chargeable to tax in India in respect of a non-resident recipient as against the TDS under the other provisions of the Act, wherein TDS is only a form of collection of tax in advance and does not signify the final amount of tax payable in the hands of the deductee. This finality of the tax places a higher responsibility on a professional certifying the taxability u/s 195(6) in Form 15CB. Further, given the penal provisions for furnishing inaccurate information u/s 195, it is extremely important for a practitioner issuing Form 15CB to keep himself updated on the various changes in the international tax world. The ensuing paragraphs seek to address the practical issues arising on account of the recent changes in the international tax arena.

2. UNDERTAKING TDS COMPLIANCE BEFORE MLI

Before evaluating the impact of MLI on undertaking TDS compliances u/s 195, it may be worthwhile to briefly evaluate some of the best practices a professional would follow to avail the benefit under the DTAA before the MLI was effective.

While our earlier articles have covered most of these practices, in order to get a holistic view of the matter the same have been briefly covered below.

i. Tax Residency Certificate (TRC)
Section 90(4) provides that the benefit of a DTAA shall be available to a non-resident only in case such non-resident obtains a TRC from the tax authorities of the relevant country in which such person is a resident.

While the provision seeks to deny benefits of a DTAA to a non-resident who does not provide a valid TRC, the Ahmedabad Tribunal in the case of Skaps Industries India (P) Ltd. vs. ITO [2018] 94 taxmann.com 448 (Ahmedabad – Trib.) held that section 90(4) does not override the DTAA and, therefore, if the taxpayer can substantiate through any other document his eligibility to claim the benefit under the DTAA, the said benefit should be granted to him. One may refer to our article in the August, 2018 issue of this Journal for a detailed discussion on the ruling. In a recent decision, the Hyderabad Tribunal in the case of Sreenivasa Reddy Cheemalamarri vs. ITO [2020] TS-158-ITAT-2020 (Hyd.) has also followed the ruling of the Ahmedabad Tribunal in Skaps (Supra).

However, from the perspective of deduction u/s 195, it is always advisable to follow a conservative approach and therefore in a scenario where the recipient has not provided a valid TRC, the benefit under the DTAA may not be granted. The recipient would always have the option of filing a return of income and claiming refund and substantiating the eligibility to claim the benefit of the DTAA before the tax authorities, if required.

Further, if the TRC does not contain all the information as required in Rule 21AB of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 (Rules), one needs to also obtain a self-declaration from the recipient in Form 10F.

As TRC generally contains the residential status of the recipient as on the date of certificate or for a particular period, it is important that one obtains the TRC and Form 10F which is applicable for the period in which the transaction is undertaken.

ii. Declarations
In addition to the TRC, one generally also obtains the following declarations before certifying the taxability of the transaction u/s 195:
a.    Declaration that the recipient does not have a PE in India and if a PE exists, the income from the transaction is not attributable to such PE;
b.    Declaration that the main purpose of the transaction is not tax avoidance. However, one also needs to evaluate the transaction in detail and not merely rely on the declaration under GAAR as one needs to be fairly certain of the taxability before certifying the same;
c.    Declaration in respect of specific items of income that the recipient is the beneficial owner of the income and that it is not contractually or legally obligated to pass on the said income to any other person;
d.    Declaration that the Limitation of Benefits (LOB) clause, if any, in the DTAA has been met. Similar to the above declarations, one needs to evaluate the transaction in detail to ensure that the transaction or the recipient, as the case may be, satisfies the conditions mentioned in the LOB clause and not merely rely on the declaration.

3. IMPACT ON ACCOUNT OF MLI


i. Background of the MLI

Following the recommendations in the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project of the OECD in which discussion more than 100 countries participated, the MLI, a document which seeks to modify more than 3,000 bilateral tax treaties (modified tax treaties are called Covered Tax Agreements or CTAs), was released for ratification. India is one of the nearly 100 countries which are signatories to the MLI.

India signed the MLI on 7th June, 2017 and deposited the ratified document along with a list of its Reservations and Options on 25th June, 2019. Article 34(2) of the MLI provides that the MLI shall enter into force for a signatory on the first day of the month following the expiration of a period of three calendar months from the date of deposit of the ratified instrument. In the case of India, therefore, the MLI entered into force on 1st October, 2019.

Further, Article 35(1)(a) of the MLI provides that the MLI shall come into effect in respect of withholding taxes on the first day of the calendar year (or financial year in the case of India) that begins after the latest date on which the MLI enters into force for each of the Contracting Jurisdictions to the CTA. In other words, the MLI shall have an effect of modifying a particular DTAA on the first day of a calendar year (or financial year) beginning after the MLI has entered into force for both the countries which are signatory to the DTAA.

As the MLI has entered into force for India in October, 2019, it has come into effect and would result in the modification to the DTAA from 1st April, 2020 where the MLI has entered into force for the other signatory to the DTAA prior to 1st April, 2020 as well. The MLI had entered into force for many Indian treaty partners in 2019 or earlier and therefore the MLI has come into effect for those DTAAs from 1st April, 2020.

India has listed 93 of its existing DTAAs to be modified by the MLI. However, as the MLI works on a matching concept, the respective DTAA would be modified only if both the countries, signatories to the DTAA, have included the said DTAA in their final list of treaties to be modified. For example, while India has included the India-Germany DTAA in its final list, Germany has not and therefore the India-Germany DTAA will not be modified by the MLI. Some of the other notable Indian DTAAs which are not modified by the MLI are those with the USA, Brazil and Mauritius. Similarly, out of the 95 signatories to the MLI, as on date 59 countries have deposited the ratified document. Moreover, out of the 59 countries which have deposited the document, some of them have done so only recently and therefore it is important at the time of undertaking compliance of section 195 and dealing with a DTAA to verify whether the DTAA has been modified by the MLI and, if so, from which date. One can use the MLI Matching Database on the OECD website to know whether a particular DTAA has been modified and from which date.

Treaty
Partner

Whether
modified by MLI

Effective
date for withholding taxes from when MLI modifies DTAA 1

Albania

Yes

1st April, 2021

Armenia

No

NA

Australia

Yes

1st April, 2020

Austria

Yes

1st April, 2020

Bangladesh

No

NA

Belarus

No

NA

Belgium

Yes

1st April, 2020

Bhutan

No

NA

Botswana

No

NA

Brazil

No

NA

Bulgaria

No

NA

Canada

Yes

1st April, 2020

China (People’s Republic of)

No

NA

Colombia

No

NA

Croatia

No

NA

Cyprus

Yes

1st April, 2021

Czech Republic

Yes

1st April, 2021

Denmark

Yes

1st April, 2020

Egypt

Yes

1st April, 2021

Estonia

Yes

1st April, 2022

Ethiopia

No

NA

Fiji

No

NA

Finland

Yes

1st April, 2020

France

Yes

1st April, 2020

Georgia

Yes

1st April, 2020

Germany

No

NA

Greece

No

NA

Hong Kong (China)

No

NA

Hungary

No

NA

Iceland

Yes

1st April, 2020

Indonesia

Yes

1st April, 2021

Iran

No

NA

Ireland

Yes

1st April, 2020

Israel

Yes

1st April, 2020

Italy

No

NA

Japan

Yes

1st April, 2020

Jordan

Yes

1st April, 2021

Kazakhstan

Yes

1st April, 2021

Kenya

No

NA

Korea

Yes

1st April, 2021

Kuwait

No

NA

Kyrgyz Republic

No

NA

Latvia

Yes

1st April, 2020

Libya

No

NA

Lithuania

Yes

1st April, 2020

Luxembourg

Yes

1st April, 2020

Macedonia

No

NA

Malaysia

No

NA

Malta

Yes

1st April, 2020

Mauritius

No

NA

Mexico

No

NA

Mongolia

No

NA

Montenegro

No

NA

Morocco

No

NA

Mozambique

No

NA

Myanmar

No

NA

Namibia

No

NA

Nepal

No

NA

Netherlands

Yes

1st April, 2020

New Zealand

Yes

1st April, 2020

Norway

Yes

1st April, 2020

Oman

Yes

1st April, 2021

Philippines

No

NA

Poland

Yes

1st April, 2020

Portugal

Yes

1st April, 2021

Qatar

Yes

1st April, 2020

Romania

No

NA

Russian Federation

Yes

1st April, 2020

Saudi Arabia

Yes

1st April, 2021

Serbia

Yes

1st April, 2020

Singapore

Yes

1st April, 2020

Slovak Republic

Yes

1st April, 2020

Slovenia

Yes

1st April, 2020

South Africa

No

NA

Spain

No

NA

Sri Lanka

No

NA

Sudan

No

NA

Sweden

Yes

1st April, 2020

Switzerland

Yes

1st April, 2020

Syria

No

NA

Tajikistan

No

NA

Tanzania

No

NA

Thailand

No

NA

Trinidad & Tobago

No

NA

Turkey

No

NA

Turkmenistan

No

NA

Uganda

No

NA

Ukraine

Yes

1st April, 2020

United Arab Emirates

Yes

1st April, 2020

United Kingdom

Yes

1st April, 2020

Uruguay

Yes

1st April, 2021

USA

No

NA

Uzbekistan

No

NA

Vietnam

No

NA

Zambia

No

NA

As highlighted earlier, the above list of DTAAs modified is only as on 15th January, 2021, therefore it is advisable to review the latest list and positions as on the date of the transaction.

The MLI has introduced various measures to combat tax avoidance in DTAAs. While some of the measures are objective, there are certain subjective measures as well and can lead to some ambiguity for a payer who is required to deduct TDS as one needs to evaluate various factual aspects of the income as well as the recipient, which may not always be available with the payer to conclude on the applicability of such measures to a particular payment.

While MLI is a vast subject, the ensuing paragraphs seek to evaluate the impact of the MLI on undertaking compliance u/s 195 and the challenges thereof. Accordingly, there may be some provisions of the MLI, for example, the clause relating to method to be employed for elimination of double taxation, which would not have an impact on TDS u/s 195 and therefore have not been covered in this article. Another similar example is the modification relating to dual resident entities (other than individuals), wherein the provisions of section 195 would not apply as payment to such a dual resident entity (thereby meaning a resident of India under the Act as well as the other country under its domestic tax law) would be considered as payment to a resident and not to a non-resident under the Act.

ii. Principal Purpose Test (PPT)
Article 7 of the MLI provides that ‘Notwithstanding any provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement, a benefit under the Covered Tax Agreement shall not be granted in respect of an item of income or capital if it is reasonable to conclude, having regard to all relevant facts and circumstances, that obtaining that benefit was one of the principal purposes of any arrangement or transaction that resulted directly or indirectly in that benefit, unless it is established that granting that benefit in these circumstances would be in accordance with the object and purpose of the relevant provisions of the Covered Tax Agreement.’

Therefore, the PPT test acts as an anti-avoidance provision in a treaty scenario and seeks to deny a benefit under a DTAA if it is reasonable to conclude that obtaining the said benefit was one of the principal purposes of the arrangement or transaction. However, it may be highlighted that the PPT and GAAR, although having similar objectives, operate differently. Further, the PPT has a wider coverage as compared to GAAR and therefore a transaction which satisfies GAAR may not satisfy the PPT, resulting in denial of the benefit under the DTAA.

a. Issue 1: How does the PPT impact the compliance u/s 195

The first issue one needs to address is whether the PPT has any impact on the TDS u/s 195. As the PPT seeks to address the issue of eligibility of a taxpayer to obtain the benefit of a CTA, it would impact the tax to be deducted in cases where the DTAA benefit is claimed at the time of deduction.

In other words, if one is applying a DTAA (which has been modified by the MLI, thereby making it a CTA) on account of the beneficial provision under the DTAA at the time of undertaking TDS, one would need to ensure that the PPT test is satisfied to claim the benefit of the DTAA / CTA.

The second aspect that needs to be addressed in this issue is whether the payer needs to evaluate the applicability of the PPT at the time of deduction of tax u/s 195 or can one argue that the PPT needs to only be applied by the tax authorities at the time of assessment of the recipient of the income.

In order to address this aspect, one would need to refer to section 163(1)(c) which makes the payer an agent of the non-resident recipient. Moreover, as highlighted earlier, unlike the other TDS provisions in the Act, in most cases section 195 in theory results in the finality of the tax being paid to the government in the case of payment to a non-resident.

Therefore, the Act places a significant onerous responsibility on the payer to ensure that the due tax is duly deducted u/s 195 in the case of payments to a non-resident. Keeping this in mind, it is therefore necessary for the payer to apply the PPT while granting treaty benefits at the time of deduction of tax u/s 195.

b. Issue 2: How can one apply the PPT while undertaking compliances u/s 195
Once it is determined that the PPT needs to be evaluated at the time of application of section 195, the main issue which arises is that the PPT being a subjective intention-based test to determine treaty eligibility, how can one apply the same while undertaking compliance u/s 195 and what documentation should one obtain while certifying the taxability of the said transaction? As highlighted earlier, the major challenge in application of a subjective test at the time of withholding is that the payer and the professional certifying the taxability of the transaction u/s 195 are not aware of all the facts to conclude one way or another.

There are three views to address this issue.

View 1: Given the onerous responsibility tasked on the payer to collect the tax due on the transaction in the hands of the non-resident recipient and the subjective nature of the PPT, one can consider following a conservative approach by not providing any benefit under the DTAA at the time of deducting tax u/s 195 and asking the recipient to claim a refund of the excess tax deducted by filing a return of income. This would ensure that if any benefit under the DTAA is eventually claimed (by way of the recipient seeking a refund), the payer and the professional certifying the taxability are not responsible and the tax authorities can verify the subjective PPT in the hands of the recipient, who can provide the necessary information to satisfy the PPT directly to the tax authorities.

While this view is a conservative view, it may not always be practically possible as in many cases the recipient may not be willing to undertake additional compliance of filing a return of income, especially in a scenario where there is no tax payable under the DTAA.

View 2: Another conservative view is to approach the tax authorities to adjudicate on the issue by following the provisions of section 195(2) or section 197. This would eliminate any risk that the payer or the professional may undertake. However, this may not always be practically possible as there would be a delay in the remittance and this process is time-consuming, especially in scenarios where the payer makes many remittances to various parties during the year as this would entail approaching the tax authorities before every remittance.

View 3: Alternatively, as is the case with other declarations such as a ‘No PE declaration’ or a beneficial ownership declaration, one can take a declaration that obtaining the benefit under the DTAA is not one of the principal purposes of the arrangement or the transaction.

As per this view, the question arises whether such a declaration is to be obtained from the payer or from the recipient. The PPT needs to be tested qua the transaction as well as qua the arrangement. While the payer would in most cases be aware whether the principal purpose of a transaction is to avail DTAA benefits, an arrangement being a wider term may not entail the payer in necessarily being aware of all the details. Therefore, one must ensure that the declaration is to be obtained from the recipient of the income which is claiming the DTAA benefits.

This view is a practical one and follows the doctrine of impossibility, whereby in the absence of facts to the contrary it is not possible for a professional to certify that the transaction is designed to avoid tax and, therefore, the benefit of the DTAA should not be granted. While the payer would be aware whether the principal purpose of the transaction (not necessarily the arrangement) is to obtain benefit of the DTAA, in the absence of any facts provided to the professional, it is not possible for a professional to suspect otherwise.

Further, the Supreme Court in the case of GE India Technology Centre (P) Ltd. vs. CIT [2010] 193 Taxman 234 (SC) held, ‘(7)….where a person responsible for deduction is fairly certain then he can make his own determination as to whether the tax was deductible at source and, if so, what should be the amount thereof.’

Therefore, where the payer is ‘fairly certain’ having regard to the facts and circumstances about the taxability of a particular transaction, one need not approach the tax authorities.

However, it is advisable for a professional certifying the taxability of the transaction to question the nature of the transaction from an anti-avoidance perspective before taking the declaration or management representation. For example, if the transaction is towards payment of dividend by an Indian company to a Mauritian company, if such Mauritian company was set up at the time when the DDT regime was applicable, it may give credence to the fact that the investment through Mauritius was not made with the principal purpose of obtaining the DTAA rate on dividends paid.

In other words, the professional would need to question and evaluate, to the extent practically possible, as to why a particular transaction was undertaken in a particular manner and with adequate documentation to substantiate such reasoning. Such an evaluation may be required as unlike an audit report, where one provides an ‘opinion’ on a particular aspect, Form 15CB requires a professional to ‘certify’ the taxability after examination of relevant documents and books of accounts.

iii. Holding period for dividends
Article 8(1) of the MLI provides that, ‘Provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement that exempt dividends paid by a company which is a resident of a Contracting Jurisdiction from tax or that limit the rate at which such dividends may be taxed, provided that the beneficial owner or the recipient is a company which is a resident of the other Contracting Jurisdiction and which owns, holds or controls more than a certain amount of the capital, shares, stock, voting power, voting rights or similar ownership interests of the company paying the dividend, shall apply only if the ownership conditions described in those provisions are met throughout a 365-day period that includes the day of the payment of the dividends….’

Accordingly, Article 8(1) of the MLI restricts the participation exemption or benefit granted to a holding company receiving dividends to cases where the shares have been held by the holding company for at least 365 days, including the date of payment of dividends. Such provision, therefore, denies the benefit of the lower tax rate to a company shareholder who has acquired the shares for a short period only to meet the minimum holding requirement for availing such benefit.

This provision, being an objective factual test to avail the benefit of lower tax rate on dividends under the DTAA, can be examined by the professional certifying the tax u/s 195 as this information, being information regarding the shareholding of the Indian payer company, is readily available with the payer company.

However, it may be highlighted that the provision requires the holding period to be maintained for any period which includes the date on which the dividend is paid and not necessarily the period preceding the date of payment of dividend.

For example, Sing Co acquires 50% of the shares of I Co on 1st January, 2021. The dividend is declared by I Co on 30th June, 2021. In this case, while the 365-day holding period has not been met on the day of payment or declaration of dividend, the holding period requirement under Article 8(1) of the MLI would still be satisfied if Sing Co continued holding the said shares till 31st December, 2021 and would still be eligible for the lower rate of tax.

This gives rise to an issue to be addressed as to whether the lower rate of tax under Article 10(2)(a) of the India-Singapore DTAA should be considered at the time of undertaking the TDS compliance at the time of payment of dividend.

In our view, as on the date of the dividend payment the number of days threshold has not been met, the benefit of the lower rate of tax under Article 10(2)(a) of the DTAA should not be granted and TDS should be deducted in accordance with Article 10(2)(b) of the DTAA. In such a scenario, Sing Co can always file its return of income claiming a refund of the excess tax deducted once it satisfies the holding period criterion.

iv. Permanent Establishment (PE)
The MLI has extended the scope of the definition of a PE under a DTAA to include the following:
a.     A dependent agent who does not conclude contracts on behalf of the non-resident will still constitute a PE of the non-resident if such agent habitually plays a principal role in the conclusion of contracts of the non-resident.
b.     The exemption from the constitution of a PE provided to certain activities undertaken in a Source State through a fixed place of business would not be available if the activities along with activities undertaken by a closely-related enterprise in the Source State are not preparatory or auxiliary in nature.
c.     In the case of a construction or installation PE, the number of days threshold that needs to be met will include connected activities undertaken by closely-related enterprises as well.

Now the question arises, how does a professional identify the applicability of the extended scope of the definition of PE in remittances to non-residents and whether a mere declaration that a PE is not constituted would be sufficient.

With regard to point (a) above, for the extended scope of PE in respect of the transaction itself, one should be able to identify the facts of the said transaction before certifying the taxability thereof and a mere declaration on this aspect may not be sufficient.

Similarly, with regard to points (b) and (c) above, one may be able to analyse the applicability of the MLI in case of transactions undertaken by the non-resident recipient himself in India as they would relate to the transaction the taxability of which is to be certified. However, with regard to the activities undertaken by the closely-related enterprises, one may be able to follow the doctrine of impossibility and obtain a declaration from the recipient provided one has gone through all the relevant documents related to the transaction itself.

4. STEP-BY-STEP EVALUATION
Having understood the impact of the MLI on the compliances to be undertaken u/s 195, the table below provides a brief guidance on the step-by-step process that a professional needs to follow before certifying
the transaction in Form 15CB once it is determined that the DTAA is more beneficial than the taxability under the Act:

Step
number

Particulars

1

Obtain TRC from recipient (check whether TRC is a valid TRC for
the period in which the transaction is undertaken)

2

Obtain Form 10F if TRC does not contain information as required
in Rule 21AB of the Rules (check whether Form 10F is for the period in which
the transaction is undertaken)

3

Check whether GAAR provisions apply to the said transaction and
obtain suitable declaration

4

Check whether any specific LOB clause in the DTAA applies. If
so, whether the conditions for LOB have been met and obtain suitable
declaration

5

Check whether DTAA modified by MLI as on date of transaction
(follow steps 6 to 7 if MLI modifies DTAA)

6

Check whether the conditions of PPT are satisfied and obtain
suitable declaration

7

In case of dividend income earned by a company, verify if the
holding period for the shares is met as on date of transaction

8

Check if the transaction constitutes a PE for the recipient in
India or if income from the transaction can be attributable to the profits of
any PE of the recipient in India and obtain suitable declaration (in case MLI
modifies DTAA, the declaration should include the modified definition of PE)

9

In case of dividend, interest, royalty or income from fees for
technical services, check if the recipient is the beneficial owner or if the
beneficial owner is a resident of the same country in which the recipient is
a resident and obtain suitable declaration

5. CONCLUSION
The introduction of the MLI has added complexities to the process of undertaking compliance u/s 195. A professional who is certifying the taxability would now need to evaluate various other aspects in relation to the transaction to satisfy himself, with documentary evidence, that the various provisions of the MLI have been duly complied with. Further, merely obtaining declarations may not be sufficient as one needs to be fairly certain, after going through the relevant documents, of the taxability of the transaction u/s 195 before certifying the same.

 

1   The effective date for withholding taxes has been provided
from an Indian
perspective and may vary in the other jurisdiction

TAXABILITY OF MESNE PROFITS

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
The term ‘mesne profits’ relates to the damages or compensation recoverable from a person who has been in wrongful possession of immovable property. It has been defined in section 2(12) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as under:

‘(12) “mesne profits” of property means those profits which the person in wrongful possession of such property actually received or might with ordinary diligence have received therefrom, together with interest on such profits, but shall not include profits due to improvements made by the person in wrongful possession.’

At times, the tenant or lessee continues to use and occupy the premises even after the termination of the lease agreement either due to efflux of time or for some other reasons. In such cases, the courts may direct the occupant of the premises to pay the mesne profits to the owner for the period for which the premises were wrongfully occupied. The taxability of the amounts received as mesne profits in the hands of the owner of the premises has become a subject matter of controversy. While the Calcutta High Court has taken the view that mesne profit is in the nature of damages for deprivation of use and occupation of the property and, therefore, it is a capital receipt not chargeable to tax, the High Courts of Madras and Delhi have taken the view that it is a recompense for deprivation of income which the owner would have enjoyed but for the interference of the persons in wrongful possession of the property and, consequently, it is a revenue receipt chargeable to tax.

LILA GHOSH’S CASE

The issue had earlier come up for consideration of the Calcutta High Court in the case of CIT vs. Smt. Lila Ghosh (1993) 205 ITR 9.

In that case, the assessee was the owner of the premises in question which were given on lease. The lease expired in 1970. However, the lessee did not give possession to the assessee. The assessee filed a suit for eviction and mesne profits. The decree was passed in favour of the assessee by the trial court and it was affirmed by the High Court as well as by the Supreme Court. The assessee then applied for the execution of the decree. The Court appointed a Commissioner to determine the claim of quantum of mesne profits. While the execution of the said decree and the determination of the quantum of the mesne profits were pending, the Government of West Bengal requisitioned the demised property on 24th December, 1979. The said requisition order was challenged by the assessee before the High Court through a writ application filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

During its pendency, a settlement was arrived at between the assessee and the State of West Bengal which was recorded by the Court in its order dated 28th February, 1980. Under the terms of the settlement, the property in question was to be acquired by the State under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and compensation of Rs. 11 lakhs for the acquisition was to be paid to the assessee. There was no dispute relating to this compensation received. Apart from the compensation, the assessee also received a sum of Rs. 2 lakhs from the State of West Bengal against the assignment of the decree for mesne profits obtained and to be passed as a final decree against the tenant.

While making the assessment for the assessment year 1980-81, the A.O. assessed the said sum of Rs. 2 lakhs representing mesne profits as revenue receipt in the hands of the assessee under the head ‘Income from Other Sources’. It was taxed as income of the assessment year 1980-81 since it had arisen to the assessee in terms of an order of the Court dated 28th February, 1980. On appeal by the assessee before the CIT(A), it was submitted that the mesne profits were nothing but damages and, therefore, capital receipt not chargeable to tax. It was also contended that in case the assessee’s contention in this respect was to be rejected and the mesne profits of Rs. 2 lakhs be held to be revenue receipts, the same could not be taxed in one year since it related to the period from 19th May, 1970 to 24th December, 1979. However, the CIT(A) rejected all the contentions of the assessee and held that the mesne profits of Rs. 2 lakhs were revenue receipts and assessable under the head ‘Income from Other Sources’ in the A.Y. 1980-81.

On further appeal by the assessee, the Tribunal held that the mesne profits of Rs. 2 lakhs had arisen as a result of the transfer of the capital asset and the same was assessable under the head ‘capital gains’. According to the Tribunal, the assessee had received the sum of Rs. 2 lakhs for transferring her right to receive the mesne profits which was her capital asset. The contention of the assessee that no capital gain was chargeable inasmuch as no cost of acquisition was incurred for the so-called capital asset was rejected by the Tribunal. The Tribunal held that it was possible to determine the cost of acquisition of the asset in question which, according to the Tribunal, consisted of the amount spent by the assessee towards stamp duty and other legal expenses incurred for obtaining the decree. From the decision of the Tribunal, both the assessee as well as the Revenue had sought reference to the High Court.

After referring to the definition of ‘mesne profits’ as per the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the High Court referred to the observations of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Girish Chunder Lahiri vs. Shashi Shikhareswar Roy [1900] 27 IA 110 in which it was stated that the mesne profits were in the nature of damages which the court may mould according to the justice of the case. Further, the Supreme Court’s observations in the case of Lucy Kochuvareed vs. P. Mariappa Gounder AIR [1979] SC 1214 were also referred to, which were as under:

‘Mesne profits being in the nature of damages, no invariable rule governing their award and assessment in every case can be laid down and “the Court may mould it according to the Justice of the case”.’

Accordingly, the High Court held that the mesne profits were nothing but damages for loss of property or goods. The Court further held that such damages were not in the nature of revenue receipts but in the nature of capital receipt. While holding so, the High Court relied upon the decisions in the case of CIT vs. Rani Prayag Kumari Debi [1940] 8 ITR 25 (Pat.); CIT vs. Periyar & Pareekanni Rubbers Ltd. [1973] 87 ITR 666 (Ker.); CIT vs. J.D. Italia [1983] 141 ITR 948 (AP); and CIT vs. Ashoka Marketing Ltd. [1987] 164 ITR 664 (Cal.).

The Court disagreed with the views expressed by the Madras High Court in CIT vs. P. Mariappa Gounder [1984] 147 ITR 676 wherein it was held that mesne profits awarded by the Court for wrongful possession were revenue receipts and, therefore, liable to be assessed as income. The Calcutta High Court observed that neither the decision of the Privy Council in Girish Chunder Lahiri (Supra) nor the decision of the Supreme Court in Lucy Kochuvareed (Supra) was either cited or noticed by the learned Judges of the Madras High Court. It was also observed that even the decisions of the Patna High Court in Rani Prayag Kumari Debi (Supra) and that of the Kerala High Court in Periyar & Pareekanni Rubbers Ltd. (Supra), wherein it was held that damages or compensation awarded for wrongful detention of the properties of the assessee was not a revenue receipt, were neither noticed nor considered by the Madras High Court.

As far as the Tribunal’s direction to tax the amount received as capital gains was concerned, the High Court held that there was no assignment of the decree for mesne profits. No final decree in respect of mesne profits was passed in favour of the assessee and the State Government had reserved the right to itself for getting an assignment from the assessee in respect of the final decree for mesne profits, if any, passed against the tenant for its use and occupation of the said property. Therefore, the High Court held that the assessee had not earned any capital gains on the transfer of a capital asset.

The High Court held that the mesne profits received was a capital receipt and, hence, not liable to tax.

THE SKYLAND BUILDERS (P) LTD. CASE
The issue thereafter came up for consideration before the Delhi High Court in the case of Skyland Builders (P) Ltd. vs. ITO (2020) 121 taxmann.com 251.

In this case, the assessee company had let out the property in the year 1980 for five years to Indian Overseas Bank. The parties had agreed to increase the rent by 20% after the expiry of the first three years. The lessee bank did not comply with the terms and increased the rent by 10% only. Therefore, the assessee terminated the lease agreement w.e.f. 31st January, 1990 by serving notice upon the lessee. Since the lessee failed to vacate the premises, the assessee filed a suit for damages / mesne profit and restoration of the premises to the owner. The suit of the assessee was decreed vide judgment / decree issued dated 27th July, 1998 for mesne profit and damages, including interest. In compliance with the Court’s order, the lessee Indian Overseas Bank paid Rs. 77,87,303 to the assessee company. In the original return for the A.Y. 1999-2000, mesne profits of Rs. 77,87,303 was declared as taxable income, whereas in the revised return the assessee claimed it as a capital receipt and excluded it from its taxable income.

The A.O. did not accept the contention of the assessee that it was a capital receipt and relied upon the decision of the Madras High Court in P. Mariappa Gounder (Supra) in which it was held that mesne profits were also a species of taxable income. The A.O. taxed it as ‘Income from other sources’ and allowed a deduction of legal expenses incurred in securing the mesne profits.

Before the CIT(A), apart from claiming that the mesne profits were not taxable, the assessee raised an alternative plea that even if it was treated as income in the nature of arrears of rent, even then it could not have been taxed in the year under consideration merely based on its realisation during the year and, rather, should have been taxed in the respective years to which it pertained. It was claimed that the enabling provision to tax the arrears of rent in the year of its receipt was inserted in section 25B with effect from the A.Y. 2001-02 and it was not applicable for the year under consideration. However, the CIT(A) did not accept the contentions of the assessee and held it to be a revenue receipt liable to be taxed as income. Insofar as section 25B was concerned, the CIT(A) observed that it did not bring about any change in law and it only set at rest doubts regarding taxability of income relating to earlier years in the previous year concerned in which the arrears of rent were received.

The Tribunal also rejected the assessee’s claim with regard to the non-taxability of mesne profits as income under the Act on the ground that it was a capital receipt. It followed the decisions of the Madras High Court in the cases of P. Mariappa Gounder (Supra) and S. Kempadevamma vs. CIT [2001] 251 ITR 87. It did not follow the decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Smt. Lila Ghosh (Supra) on the ground that the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of S. Kempadevamma (Supra) was rendered after that and it was binding in nature, being a later decision. The Tribunal also held that the sum which was granted by the Civil Court as mesne profit in respect of the tenanted property could be presumed to be a reasonably expected sum for which property could be let from year to year, and the same value could have been taken as annual letting value of the property in dispute as per section 23(1). With regard to the alternate plea of the assessee concerning the provisions of section 25B introduced subsequently, the Tribunal relied upon the decision in the case of P. Mariappa Gounder in which it was held that the mesne profit is to be taxed in the assessment year in which it was finally determined. The Tribunal’s decision has been reported at 91 ITD 392.

In further appeal before the High Court, the following arguments were made on behalf of the assessee:
•    The income falling under the specific heads enumerated in the Act as being taxable income alone was liable to tax and the income which did not fall within the specific heads was not liable to be taxed under the Act.
•    By its definition, ‘mesne profits’ were a kind of damages which the owner of the property, which was a capital asset, was entitled to receive on account of deprivation of the opportunity to use that capital asset on account of the wrongful possession thereof by another. Therefore, such damages which were awarded for deprivation of the right to use the capital asset constituted a capital receipt.
•    Section 25B introduced w.e.f. 1st April, 2001 could not be applied to bring the mesne profits and interest thereon to tax in the A.Y. 1999-2000 even though they pertained to the earlier financial years. Further, the amount received from the erstwhile tenant could not be regarded as rent under the rent agreement which ceased to exist. The assessee had received damages and not rent since there was no subsisting relationship of landlord and tenant between the assessee and the bank post the termination of their tenancy.
•    Reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Saurashtra Cement Ltd. 325 ITR 422 wherein it was held that the amount received towards compensation for sterilisation of the profit-earning source, not in the ordinary course of business, was a capital receipt in the hands of the assessee. In this case, the liquidated damages received from the supplier on account of the delay caused in delivery of the machinery was held to be a capital receipt not liable to tax.
•    The facts before the Madras High Court in the case of P. Mariappa Gounder were different from the facts of the present case. In that case, the assessee had entered into an agreement to purchase a property which was not conveyed by the vendor to the assessee as it was sold to another person who was put in possession. The Court decreed specific performance of the assessee’s agreement with the original owner and the assessee’s claim for mesne profits against the other purchaser who was in possession was also accepted. Thus, it was not a case of grant of mesne profits against the erstwhile tenant who continued to occupy the premises despite termination of the tenancy. But it was a case where another purchaser of the same property held on to the possession of the property and the mesne profits were awarded against him.
•    The decision of the Madras High Court in the case of P. Mariappa Gounder was not followed by the Calcutta High Court in a subsequent decision in the case of Smt. Lila Ghosh (Supra). It was the view of the Calcutta High Court which was the correct view and should be followed.
•    Reliance was also placed on the Special Bench decision of the Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Narang Overseas (P) Ltd. vs. ACIT (2008) 111 ITD 1 wherein the view favourable to the assessee was adopted, in view of conflicting decisions of the High Courts, and mesne profits were held to be capital receipts.

The Revenue pleaded that the decision of the Madras High Court in P. Mariappa Gounder had been affirmed by the Supreme Court (232 ITR 2). It was submitted that the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Smt. Lila Ghosh was a decision rendered before the Supreme Court decided the appeal in the case of P. Mariappa Gounder. Further, the view taken by the Madras High Court in P. Mariappa Gounder was reiterated by it in the case of S. Kempadevamma (Supra). The Revenue also placed reliance on the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Uberoi Sons (Machines) Ltd. 211 Taxman 123, wherein it was held that the arrears of rent received as mesne profits are taxable in the year of receipt, and that section 25B of the Act which was introduced vide amendment in 2000 with effect from A.Y. 2001-02 was only clarificatory in nature.

In reply, the assessee submitted that the real issue in the case before the Delhi High Court in Uberoi Sons (Machines) Ltd. (Supra), was in which previous year the arrears of rent received by the assesse (as mesne profits) could be brought to tax and the issue was not whether mesne profits received by the landlord / assesse from the erstwhile tenant constituted revenue receipt or capital receipt.

The Delhi High Court held that if the test laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Saurashtra Cement Ltd. (Supra) had been applied to the facts of the case, then the only conclusion that could be drawn was that the receipt of mesne profits and interest thereon was a revenue receipt. This was because the capital asset of the assessee had remained intact, and even the title of the assessee in respect of the capital asset had remained intact. The damages were not received for harm and injury to the capital asset, or on account of its diminution, but were received in lieu of the rent which the appellant would have otherwise derived from the tenant. Had it been a case where the capital asset would have been subjected to physical damage, or of diminution of the title to the capital asset, and damages would have been awarded for that, there would have been merit in the appellant’s claim that damages were capital receipt.

The High Court held that the issue was no longer res integra as it stood concluded not only by the decision of the Supreme Court in P. Mariappa Gounder but also by the co-ordinate Bench of the Delhi High Court itself in Uberoi Sons (Machines) Ltd. In that case, the Court not only held that section 25B was clarificatory and applied to the assessment year in question, but also held that the receipt of mesne profits constituted revenue receipt. The Court also held that the issue of invocation of section 25B was intimately linked to the issue of whether the said receipts were revenue receipts, or capital receipts, and had it not been so there would be no question of the Court upholding the applicability of section 25B. Therefore, the submission of the assessee that the ratio of the decision in Uberoi Sons (Machines) Ltd. was not that income by way of mesne profits constituted revenue receipts, was found to be misplaced by the Court.

The Delhi High Court in this case did not follow the decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Smt. Lila Ghosh for two reasons: due to the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in P. Mariappa Gounder approving the Madras High Court’s view, and due to the decision of the co-ordinate Bench of the Delhi High Court in the case of Uberoi Sons (Machines) Ltd. following the Madras High Court’s view and taking note of its approval by the Supreme Court. The ratio of the decision of the Special Bench in the Narang Overseas case (Supra) of the Tribunal was also not approved by the High Court for the same reason that the jurisdictional High Court’s decision prevailed over it.

Accordingly, the High Court held that mesne profits and interest on mesne profits received under the direction of the Civil Court for unauthorised occupation of the immovable property of the assessee by Indian Overseas Bank, the erstwhile tenant of the appellant, constituted revenue receipts and were liable to tax u/s 23(1) of the Act.

OBSERVATIONS


In order to determine the tax treatment of mesne profits, it is necessary to first understand the meaning of the term ‘mesne profits’ and the reason for which the owner of the property becomes entitled to receive it. Though the term ‘mesne profits’ is not defined under the Income-tax Act, it is defined under section 2(12) of the Civil Procedure Code. (Please see the first paragraph.)

The definition makes it very clear that mesne profits represent the damages that emanate from the property, the true owner of which has been deprived of its possession by a trespasser. It is not rent for use of the property. The Supreme Court in the case of Lucy Kochuvareed vs. P. Mariappa Gounder AIR 1979 SC 1214 has considered mesne profits to be damages. The relevant observations of the Supreme Court are reproduced below:

‘Mesne profits being in the nature of damages, no invariable rule governing their award and assessment in every case can be laid down and “the Court may mould it according to the justice of the case”. Even so, one broad basic principle governing the liability for mesne profits is discernible from section 2(12) of the CPC which defines “mesne profits” to mean “those profits which the person in wrongful possession of property actually received or might with ordinary diligence have received therefrom together with interest on such profits, but shall not include profits due to improvements made by the person in wrongful possession”. From a plain reading of this definition, it is clear that wrongful possession of the defendant is the very essence of a claim for mesne profits and the very foundation of the defendant’s liability therefor. As a rule, therefore, liability to pay mesne profits goes with actual possession of the land. That is to say, generally, the person in wrongful possession and enjoyment of the immovable property is liable for mesne profits.’

The basis for quantification of mesne profits is the gain that the person in wrongful possession of the property made or might have made from his wrongful occupation and not what the owner of the property has lost on account of deprivation from the possession of the property. This aspect of the nature of the receipt has been explained by the Delhi High Court in the case of Phiraya Lal alias Piara Lal vs. Jia Rani AIR 1973 Del 18 as follows:

‘When damages are claimed in respect of wrongful occupation of immovable property on the basis of the loss caused by the wrongful possession of the trespasser to the person entitled to the possession of the immovable property, these damages are called “mesne profits”. The measure of mesne profits according to the definition in section 2(12) of the Code of Civil Procedure is “those profits which the person in wrongful possession of such property actually received or might with ordinary diligence have received there from, together with interest on such profits”. It is to be noted that though mesne profits are awarded because the rightful claimant is excluded from possession of immovable property by a trespasser, it is not what the original claimant loses by such exclusion but what the person in wrongful possession gets or ought to have got out of the property which is the measure of calculation of the mesne profits. (Rattan Lal vs. Girdhari Lal, AIR 1972 Delhi ll). This basis of damages for use and occupation of immovable property which are equivalent to mesne profits is different from that of damages for tort or breach of contract unconnected with possession of immovable property. Section 2(12) and order Xx rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure apply only to the claims in respect of mesne profits but not to claims for damages not connected with wrongful occupation of immovable property. The measure for the determination of the damages for use and occupation payable by the appellants to the respondent Jia Rani is, therefore, the profits which the appellants actually received or might with ordinary diligence have received from the property together with interest on such profits.’

The mesne profit cannot be viewed as compensation for the loss of income which the owner of the property would have earned but for deprivation of its possession, or as compensation for the loss of the source of income. It will be more appropriate to consider the mesne profit as compensation or damages for the loss of enjoyment of the property instead of the loss of income arising from the property. Mesne profits is for the injury or damages caused to the owner of the property due to deprivation of the possession of the property. Mesne profits become payable due to wrongful possession of the property with the trespasser, irrespective of whether or not that property before deprivation was earning any income for its owner. It might be possible that the property concerned might not be a let-out property and, therefore, yielding no income for its owner. Even in a case where the property was self-occupied by the owner which is not resulting in any income, the mesne profits become payable if that property has come in wrongful possession of the trespasser. Therefore, it is inappropriate to consider the mesne profits as compensation for loss of income which the owner would have earned otherwise. Any such compensation received due to the injury or damages caused to the assessee is required to be considered as a capital receipt not chargeable to tax, unless it is received in the ordinary course of business as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Saurashtra Cement Ltd. (Supra).

Mesne profits cannot be brought to tax as income under the head ‘Income from House Property’ as it cannot be said to be representing the annual value and that it will not come within the purview of taxation at all. Section 22 creates a charge of tax over the ‘annual value’ of the property. The ‘annual value’ is required to be determined in accordance with the provisions of section 23. As per section 23, the annual value is the sum which the property might reasonably be expected to get from year to year or the actual rent received or receivable in case of let-out property, if it is higher than that sum. The sum of mesne profits per se, which may pertain to a period of more than one year, cannot be considered as an ‘annual value’ of the property concerned for the year in which it accrued to the assessee by virtue of court order or received by the assessee. Therefore, the mesne profits cannot be held to be an annual value of the property u/s 23(1). For this reason and for the reasons stated in the next paragraph, it is respectfully submitted that part of the Delhi High Court’s decision in Skyland Builders (Supra) requires reconsideration where it held that the mesne profits were taxable u/s 23(1).

The erstwhile provisions of section 25B dealing with the taxability of arrears of rent or the corresponding provisions of section 25A, as substituted with effect from 1st April, 2017, can be pressed into play only if the receipt is in the nature of ‘rent’ in the first place. The Supreme Court in the case of UOI vs. M/s Banwari Lal & Sons (P) Ltd. AIR 2004 SC 198 has referred to the Law of Damages & Compensation by Kameshwara Rao (5th Ed., Vol. I, Page 528) and approved the learned author’s statement that right to mesne profits presupposes a wrong, whereas a right to rent proceeds on the basis that there is a contract. Therefore, the rent is the consideration for letting out of the property under a contract and there is no question of any wrongful possession of the property by the tenant. In a manner, the mesne profits and the rent are mutually exclusive.

Furthermore, the erstwhile sections 25AA and 25B and the present section 25A provide for taxation of an arrear of rent received from a tenant or unrealised rent realised subsequently, in the year of receipt under the head ‘Income from House Property’, irrespective of the ownership of the property in the year of taxation. The objective behind these provisions is to overcome the difficulties that used to arise in the past on account of the year of taxation and also in relation to the recipient not being the owner in the year of receipt. All of these provisions, for the purposes of activating the charge, require that the amount received represented (a) rent and (b) such rent was in arrears or unrealised and which rent was (c) subsequently realised. These three conditions are cumulative in nature for applying the deeming fiction of these provisions. Applying these cumulative conditions to the receipt of ‘mesne profits’, it is apparent that none of the conditions could be said to have been satisfied when a person receives damages for deprivation of the use of the property. The receipt in his case is neither for letting out the property nor does it represent the rent, whether in arrears or unrealised. It is possible that for measuring the quantum of damages and the amount of mesne profits the amount of prevailing rent is taken as a benchmark but such benchmarking cannot be a factor that has the effect of converting the damages into rent for the purposes of taxation of the receipt under the head ‘Income from House Property’. In fact, the right to receive mesne profits starts from the time where the relationship of the owner and tenant terminates and the right to receive rent ends.

The next question is whether the receipt of mesne profits could be considered as income under the head ‘Income from Other Sources’, importantly, u/s 56(2)(x). Apparently, the case of the receipt is to be tested vis-à-vis sub-clause (a) of clause (x) which brings to tax the receipt of any sum of money in excess of Rs. 50,000. Obviously, the receipt of mesne profits is on account of damages and cannot be considered to be without consideration and for this reason alone section 56(2)(x) cannot be invoked to tax such a receipt under the head ‘Income from Other Sources’. It is possible that the head is activated for charging the part of the receipt where such part represents the interest on the amount of damages for delay in payment thereof. But then that is an issue by itself.

It is, therefore, correct to hold that the Income-tax Act does not contain a specific provision to tax mesne profits under a specific head of income listed u/s 14. It is a settled position in law that for a receipt to be taxed as an income it should be fitted into a pigeon-hole of a particular head of income or the residual head and in the absence of a possibility thereof, a receipt cannot be taxed.

The next thing to assess is whether the receipt of mesne profits is an income at all or is in the nature of an income. Maybe not. For a receipt to qualify as income it perhaps is necessary that it represents the fruits of the efforts or labour made, or the risks and rewards assumed, or the funds employed. None of the above could be said to be present in the case of mesne profits where the receipt is for deprivation of the use of property. Such a receipt is not even for transfer of any property or right therein and cannot fit into the head capital gains. The receipt is for the unlawful action of the erstwhile tenant and is certainly not payment for the use of the property by him. No efforts are made by the recipient nor have any services been rendered by him. He has not employed any funds nor has he assumed any risks and the question of him being rewarded for the risks does not arise at all.

Lastly, as regards the decision of the Supreme Court in P. Mariappa Gounder confirming the ratio of the decision of the Madras High Court in the same case and the following of the said decision by the Delhi High Court in Skyland Builders (P) Ltd., it is respectfully stated that the Delhi High Court in the latter case did not concur with the view of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Smt. Lila Ghosh only for the reason that the Court noted that the Madras High Court’s view in the case of P. Mariappa Gounder that the mesne profits were revenue receipts was approved by the Supreme Court. With respect, in that case there was a complete failure on the part of the assessee to highlight the fact that the Supreme Court in deciding the case before it had considered only a limited issue concerning the year in which the mesne profits were taxable which arose from the Madras High Court’s decision. The Apex Court in that case had not considered whether the mesne profits was a capital receipt or revenue receipt and this fact of the non-consideration of the main issue by the Court was not pointed out to the Delhi High Court. Had that been highlighted, we are sure that the decision of the Delhi High Court would have been otherwise. This limited aspect of the Supreme Court’s decision becomes very clear on a perusal of the decisions of the High Court and the Supreme Court in P. Mariappa Gounder. The relevant part of both the decisions is reproduced as under:

Madras High Court – Two controversies arise in these references under the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’). One is whether mesne profits decreed by a court of law can be held to be taxable income in the hands of the decree holder? The other question is about the relevant year in which mesne profits are to be charged to income-tax.

Supreme Court – The question which arises for consideration in this appeal is as to in which assessment year the appellant is liable to be assessed in respect of mesne profits which were awarded in his favour.

Further, the Mumbai Special Bench in the case of Narang Overseas (P) Ltd. (Supra) has extensively dealt with this aspect of the limited application of the Supreme Court’s decision at paragraphs 6 to 23 and concluded as follows:

‘The above discussion clearly reveals that the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of P. Mariappa Gounder (Supra) only decides the issue regarding the year of taxability of the mesne profits. That judgment, therefore, cannot be said to be an authority for the proposition that the nature of mesne profits is revenue receipts chargeable to tax. Accordingly, the contention of Revenue that the issue regarding the nature of mesne profits is covered by the aforesaid decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court cannot be accepted.’

This decision of the Special Bench has remained unchallenged by the Income-tax Department in an appeal before the High Court as is noted by the Bombay High Court in the case of Goodwill Theatres Pvt. Ltd. [2016] 241 Taxman 352. The appeal filed by the Income-tax Department against the decision of the Special Bench was dismissed for non-removal of the office objections.

Insofar as the reliance placed by the Delhi High Court on its earlier decision in the case of Uberoi Sons (Machines) Ltd. (Supra) is concerned, it is worth noting that the following questions of law were framed for consideration of the High Court in that case:
(i) Whether the ITAT was, in the facts and circumstances of the case, correct in law in quashing the re-assessment order passed by the Assessing Officer under section 147(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961?
(ii) Whether the ITAT was correct in law in holding that the excess amount payable to the assessee towards mesne profits / compensation for unauthorised use and occupation of the premises accrued to the assessee only upon the passing of the decree by the Civil Court on 14th October, 1998?

It can be noticed that the question about the nature of mesne profits, whether revenue or capital, was not raised before the Delhi High Court even in the Uberoi case. Therefore, in our considered opinion the decision of the Supreme Court cannot be a precedent on the subject of the taxability or otherwise of mesne profits. The Court in that simply confirmed that the year of taxation would be the year of the order of the civil court as was decided by the Madras High Court. Any High Court decision not touching the issue of taxability of the receipt cannot be pressed into service for deciding the issue of taxability or otherwise of the receipt.

It may be noted that the question whether mesne profits were capital receipts or revenue receipts had also arisen before the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs. Goodwill Theatres Pvt. Ltd. [2016] 241 Taxman 352. The High Court had dismissed the appeal of the Revenue on the ground that the decision of the Special Bench in the case of Narang Overseas (P) Ltd. (Supra) had remained unchallenged, as the appeal filed against that decision before the High Court was dismissed for non-removal of office objections. The Supreme Court, however, on an appeal by the Income-tax Department challenging the order of the High Court has remanded the issue back to the High Court for its adjudication on merits which is reported at [2018] 400 ITR 566.

It is very difficult to persuade ourselves to believe that the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Saurashtra Cement Ltd. (Supra) could be applied to the facts of the case to hold that the mesne profits was revenue receipts taxable under the Act. The Supreme Court in the said case was concerned with the facts unrelated to mesne profits. In that case, the capital asset was subjected to physical damage leading to the diminution of the title to the capital asset, and damages had been awarded for that, which damages were found to be capital receipt. It was the assessee who had relied upon the decision to contend that the mesne profits was not taxable. Instead, the Court applied the decision in holding against the assessee that applying the ratio therein the receipt could be exempted from taxation only where there was a damage or destruction to the property and diminution to title. Nothing can be stranger than this. The said decision nowhere stated that any receipt unrelated to damage to the capital asset would never be a capital receipt not liable to tax. The Supreme Court in that case of Saurashtra Cement Ltd. held that the amount received towards compensation for sterilization of the profit-earning source, not in the ordinary course of business, was a capital receipt in the hands of the assessee. In that case, the liquidated damages received from the supplier on account of delay caused in delivery of the machinery were held to be a capital receipt not liable to tax.

The facts in Skyland Builders were better than the facts in P. Mariappa Gounder where the receipt of mesne profits was from a person who was never a tenant of the assessee while in the first case the receipt was from an erstwhile tenant who deprived the owner of the possession, meaning there was a prior letting of the premises to the payer of the mesne profits and the receipt from such a person could have been better classified as mesne profits not taxable under the head ‘Income from House Property’.

The better view, in our considered opinion, therefore, is the view expressed by the Calcutta High Court that mesne profits are in the nature of capital receipts not chargeable to tax.

Business expenditure – Section 37(1) – Capital or revenue expenditure – Payment made by assessee under agreement to an entity for additional infrastructure for augmenting continuous supply of electricity – No asset acquired – Expenditure revenue in nature and allowable

34. CIT vs. Hanon Automotive Systems India Private Ltd. [2020] 429 ITR 244 (Mad.) Date of order: 16th October, 2020 A.Y.: 2010-11

Business expenditure – Section 37(1) – Capital or revenue expenditure – Payment made by assessee under agreement to an entity for additional infrastructure for augmenting continuous supply of electricity – No asset acquired – Expenditure revenue in nature and allowable

Under an agreement to establish additional infrastructure facility to ensure uninterrupted power supply to it, the assessee made a lump sum payment to a company. The A.O. held that the amount paid by the assessee was to improve its asset and was non-refundable and even if the assessee received ‘services’ from the company in future, it would be separately governed by a ‘separate shared services agreement’ and hence the amount paid was not ‘wholly and exclusively’ for the assessee’s business and that it was spent towards the acquisition of a capital asset. The A.O. disallowed the expenditure claimed u/s 37(1) and also rejected the assessee’s alternate claim to depreciation.

The Commissioner (Appeals) held that the expenditure was capital expenditure, but allowed depreciation. The Tribunal held that the expenditure was revenue in nature and allowed the assessee’s claim for deduction.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

‘i)    The Tribunal had rightly examined the nature of the transaction and held that the lump sum payment made by the assessee for the development of infrastructure for uninterrupted power supply to it was revenue expenditure u/s 37(1).

ii)    Though the assessee had parted with substantial funds to the company, the capital asset continued to remain the property of the company.’

Appeal to High Court – Territorial jurisdiction – Section 260A of ITA, 1961 and Article 226 of Constitution of India – Company located in Karnataka and assessed in Karnataka – Appeal to Appellate Tribunal in Bombay – Appeal from order of Tribunal – Bombay High Court had no jurisdiction to consider appeal

33. CIT vs. M.D. Waddar and Co. [2020] 429 ITR 451 (Bom.) Date of order: 27th October, 2020 A.Y.: 2008-09


 

Appeal to High Court – Territorial jurisdiction – Section 260A of ITA, 1961 and Article 226 of Constitution of India – Company located in Karnataka and assessed in Karnataka – Appeal to Appellate Tribunal in Bombay – Appeal from order of Tribunal – Bombay High Court had no jurisdiction to consider appeal

 

The assessee company was located in Raichur District, Karnataka. Its registered office, too, was in Karnataka. For Income-tax purposes, the assessee fell within the jurisdiction of the Assistant Commissioner, Belgaum, Karnataka. For the A.Y. 2008-09, the A.O., Belgaum reopened the assessment u/s 147, issued a notice u/s 148 and completed the reassessment in March, 2013.

 

Assailing that assessment order, the assessee appealed to the Commissioner (Appeals), Bangalore. Eventually, both the assessee and the Revenue further appealed to the Appellate Tribunal, Panaji Bench. The Tribunal held in the assessee’s favour.

 

The Revenue then filed an appeal before the Bombay High Court. The question before the High Court was as under:

 

‘An Income-tax Appellate Tribunal exercises its jurisdiction over more than one State, though it is located in one of those States. Its order is sought to be challenged. Which High Court should have the jurisdiction to rule on the Tribunal’s order? Is it the High Court in whose territorial jurisdiction the Tribunal is located? Or is it the High Court in whose territorial jurisdiction the authority that passed the preliminary order operates?’

 

The High Court held as under:

 

‘i)    In the Ambica Industries case the Supreme Court has held that in terms of Article 227 as also clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court will exercise its discretionary jurisdiction and also issue writs of certiorari over orders passed by the subordinate courts within its territorial jurisdiction. Besides, if any cause of action arises within its territorial limits, it will exercise its jurisdiction. According to Ambica Industries, when the appellate court exercises jurisdiction over a Tribunal situated in more than one State, the High Court located in the State where the first court is located should be considered to be the appropriate appellate authority. The mere physical location of an inter-State Tribunal cannot be determinative of the High Court’s jurisdiction for an aggrieved party to challenge that Tribunal’s order.

 

ii)    The assessee was located in Karnataka and so were the Income-tax authorities. The primary order, too, emanated from Karnataka; so did the first appellate order. All challenges, including the appeal before the Tribunal were in continuation of that primary adjudication or consideration before the Assessing Officer at Belgaum, Karnataka. The Bombay High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.’

Article 15, India-UAE DTAA – Section 5, section 17(2)(vi) of the Act – ESOP benefit had accrued at the stage of grant when assessee was resident – Section 17(2)(vi) provides time when ESOP is to be taxed – Hence ESOP benefit will be taxable notwithstanding that assessee is non-resident on exercise date – ESOP benefit is taxable in country where services are rendered – Residential status at the time of exercise of ESOP is not relevant

10. [2021] 123 taxmann.com 238 (Mum.)(Trib.) Unnikrishnan V.S. vs. ITO ITA Nos.: 1200 & 1201 (Mum) of 2018 A.Ys.: 2013-14 and 2014-15 Date of order: 13th January, 2021


 

Article 15, India-UAE DTAA – Section 5, section 17(2)(vi) of the Act – ESOP benefit had accrued at the stage of grant when assessee was resident – Section 17(2)(vi) provides time when ESOP is to be taxed – Hence ESOP benefit will be taxable notwithstanding that assessee is non-resident on exercise date – ESOP benefit is taxable in country where services are rendered – Residential status at the time of exercise of ESOP is not relevant

 

FACTS

The assessee was an employee of an Indian bank. He was deputed to the UAE Representative Office (RO) from 1st October, 2007. Since deputation, the assessee was a non-resident, including in the years in dispute. During the relevant years, the assessee was granted stock options by the Indian bank in June, 2007 which vested equally in June, 2008 and June, 2009. The assessee exercised the vested options in F.Ys. 2012-13 and 2013-14 when he was a non-resident. On exercise of options, the employer had withheld tax which the assessee claimed as refund in his tax return. According to the assessee, he was granted ESOP benefit in consideration of services rendered to the RO outside India and hence the income neither accrued nor arose in India, nor was it deemed to accrue or to arise in India or received in India. Alternatively, it was not taxable in India as per Article 15(1) of the India-UAE treaty since the employment was not exercised in India.

 

But as per the A.O., ESOP benefit was granted in consideration of services rendered in India in 2007 when the assessee was a resident. Accordingly, the A.O. held that ESOP benefit was taxable in India under the Act as also under the DTAA.

 

The CIT(A) upheld the order of the A.O. Being aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before the Tribunal.

 

HELD

Taxability under Act

•    While ESOP income had arisen to the assessee in the year of exercise, admittedly the related rights were granted to the assessee in 2007 and in consideration of the services which were rendered by the assessee prior to the rights being granted – which were rendered in India all along.

•    At the stage when the ESOP benefit was granted in 2007, the income may have been inchoate, yet it had accrued or arisen in India in the year of exercise.

•    Section 17(2)(vi) decides the timing of taxation of the ESOP in the year of exercise but does not dilute the fact that ESOP benefit had arisen at the time when the ESOP rights were granted when the assessee was a resident. Section 17(2)(vi) merely deferred its taxability to the year of exercise. Accordingly, income was taxable in the year of exercise notwithstanding that the assessee was a non-resident during those years.

•    Reference to the UN Model Convention 2017 Commentary also makes it clear that ESOP benefit relates back to the point of time, and even periods prior thereto, when the benefit is granted. Hence, it cannot be considered as accruing or arising at the point of exercise.

 

Taxability under Article 15 of DTAA

•    ESOP benefit could be taxed as ‘other similar remuneration’ appearing alongside salaries and wages in Article 15 of the India-UAE DTAA.

•    Article 15(1) provides that other remuneration (which includes ESOP benefit) can be taxed in the state where employment is exercised. Accordingly, ESOP benefit in respect of employment in the UAE was taxable in the UAE even if the ESOP was exercised after returning to India and on cessation of non-resident status. Similarly, ESOP benefit in respect of service rendered in India was taxable in India notwithstanding that ESOP benefit was exercised when the assessee was a non-resident.

•    The decisions such as in ACIT vs. Robert Arthur Kultz [(2013) 59 SOT 203 (Del.)] and Anil Bhansali vs. ITO [(2015) 53 taxmann.com 367 (Hyd.)] relied upon by the taxpayer, in fact, favour the Revenue since they lay down the proposition that if ESOP benefit is received for rendering services partly in India and partly outside India, only the pro-rata portion relatable to services rendered in India is taxable in India.

 

Note: The Tribunal seems to have premised its decision on the fact that ESOP benefit in the present case was granted in lieu of services rendered in India prior to the date of grant. Hence, the Tribunal did not consider employment exercised in the UAE (October, 2007 to June, 2009) during substantial part of grant to vest period (June, 2007 to June, 2009) as diluting accrual of the salary income in India. Incidentally, during the erstwhile Fringe Benefits Tax (FBT) regime, FAQs 3 to 5 of CBDT Circular No. 9/2007 dated 20th December, 2007 clarified that FBT on ESOPs will trigger on pro-rata basis for employment exercised in India during grant to vest period. This Circular is not referred to in the Tribunal decision.

 

 

     I begin to speak only when I’m certain what I’ll say isn’t better left unsaid

– Cato

 

I attribute my success to this: I never gave or took any excuse

– Florence Nightingale

Article 12(4), Article 14, Article 23(2) of India-Japan DTAA – The words ‘tax deducted in accordance with the provisions’ of Article 23 of DTAA mean taxes withheld by source state which are in harmony, or in conformity, with provisions of DTAA – Article 12(4), read with Article 14, of DTAA as exclusion of FTS in Article 12(4) is attracted only if services were covered under Article 14, scope of which is limited to individuals – Income earned by partnership firm was plausibly taxable under Article 12 and bona fide view adopted by a source country is binding on country of residence while evaluating tax credit claim

9. [2020] 122 taxmann.com 248 (Mum.)(Trib.) Amarchand & Mangaldas & Suresh A. Shroff  & Co. vs. ACIT ITA No.: 2613/Mum/2019 A.Y.: 2014-15 Date of order: 18th December, 2020

Article 12(4), Article 14, Article 23(2) of India-Japan DTAA – The words ‘tax deducted in accordance with the provisions’ of Article 23 of DTAA mean taxes withheld by source state which are in harmony, or in conformity, with provisions of DTAA – Article 12(4), read with Article 14, of DTAA as exclusion of FTS in Article 12(4) is attracted only if services were covered under Article 14, scope of which is limited to individuals – Income earned by partnership firm was plausibly taxable under Article 12 and bona fide view adopted by a source country is binding on country of residence while evaluating tax credit claim

FACTS
The assessee was a law firm assessed as a partnership firm in India. It had received fee from Japanese clients after withholding tax @10% under Article 12 of the India-Japan DTAA.

The A.O. denied Foreign Tax Credit (FTC) on the ground that the income was covered under Article 14 – Independent Personal Service (IPS) Article. In terms of Article 14, income from professional services can be taxed in Japan only if the assessee has a fixed base in Japan. Since the assessee did not have a fixed base in Japan, the A.O. held that withholding of tax was not in accordance with the DTAA provisions.

On appeal, the CIT(A) upheld the order of the A.O. Being aggrieved, the assessee appealed before the Tribunal.

HELD
•        Article 23(2)(a) of the India-Japan DTAA requires India to grant credit for tax deducted in Japan in accordance with the provisions of the DTAA. The words ‘in accordance with the provisions’ would mean taxes withheld in the source state which could be reasonably said to be in harmony, or in conformity, with provisions of the DTAA.
•        While interpreting the above words, one is required to take a judicious call as to whether the view adopted by the source jurisdiction was reasonable and bona fide, though such a view may be or may not be the same as the legal position in the residence jurisdiction.
•        Article 12 and Article 14 overlap as regards coverage of professional service. However, Article 12(4) excludes payment made to an individual for independent personal services mentioned in Article 14.
•        Since the income was received by a partnership firm, exclusion in Article 12(4) was not applicable. Therefore, income was rightly subjected to tax in Japan. Accordingly, the assessee was qualified to claim FTC under the India-Japan DTAA.

Third proviso to section 50C(1) – Insertion of the proviso and subsequent enhancement in its limit to 10% is curative in nature to take care of unintended consequences of the scheme of section 50C, hence relate back to the date when the statutory provision of section 50C was enacted, i.e., 1st April, 2003

13. Maria Fernandes Cheryl vs. ITO (Mumbai) Pramod Kumar (V.P.) and Saktijit Dey (J.M.) ITA No. 4850/Mum/2019 A.Y.: 2011-12 Date of order: 15th January, 2021 Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: None / Vijaykumar G. Subramanyam

Third proviso to section 50C(1) – Insertion of the proviso and subsequent enhancement in its limit to 10% is curative in nature to take care of unintended consequences of the scheme of section 50C, hence relate back to the date when the statutory provision of section 50C was enacted, i.e., 1st April, 2003

FACTS

During the year under appeal, the assesse had sold her flat for a consideration of Rs. 75 lakhs. The valuation of the property for the purpose of charging stamp duty was Rs. 79.91 lakhs. She computed capital gains based on the sale consideration of Rs. 75 lakhs. But according to the A.O., the assessee had to adopt the Stamp Duty Valuation (SDV) which was Rs. 79.91 lakhs for the purpose of computing the capital gains. The CIT(A), on appeal, confirmed the A.O.’s order.

On appeal by the assessee, the Tribunal noted that the variation in the sale consideration as disclosed by the assessee vis-à-vis the valuation adopted by the SDV authority was only 6.55%. The Tribunal then queried the Departmental Representative (DR) as to why the assessee not be allowed the benefit of the third proviso to section 50C(1) as the variation was much less than the prescribed permissible variation of up to 10%.

In reply, the DR contended that the said provision is applicable by virtue of the Finance Act, 2018 with effect from 1st April, 2019. And for the permissible variation of 10%, as against variation of 5% as per the originally enacted third proviso to section 50C, it was contended that the enhancement is effective only from 1st April, 2021. Reference was also made to the Explanatory Notes to the Finance Act, 2020 with regard to increase in the safe harbour limit of 5% under sections 43CA, 50C and 56 to 10%. According to the DR, the insertion of the third proviso to section 50C could not be treated as retrospective in nature.

In conclusion, the DR also submitted that in case the Tribunal was in favour of granting relief to the assessee, then the relief may be provided as a special case and it may be clarified that this decision should not be considered as a precedent.

HELD


According to the Tribunal if the rationale behind the insertion of the third proviso to section 50C(1) was to provide a remedy for unintended consequences of the main provision, then the insertion of the third proviso should be considered as effective from the same date on which the main provision, i.e., section 50C, was brought into effect.

The Tribunal noted that the CBDT itself, in Circular No. 8 of 2018, has accepted that there could be various bona fide reasons explaining the small variations between the sale consideration of immovable property as disclosed by the assessee vis-à-vis the SDV. Further, it also noted that the Tribunals as well as the High Courts in the following cases have held that a curative amendment to avoid unintended consequences is to be treated as retrospective in nature even though it may not state so specifically:
•    Agra Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Rajeev Kumar Agarwal vs. ACIT (45 taxmann.com 555);
•    Delhi High Court in CIT vs. Ansal Landmark Township Pvt. Ltd. (61 taxmann.com 45);
•    Ahmedabad Tribunal in the case of Dharmashibhai Sonani vs. ACIT (161 ITD 627); and
•    Madras High Court in CIT vs. Vummudi Amarendran (429 ITR 97).

According to the Tribunal, the insertion of the third proviso to section 50C(1) was in the nature of a remedial measure to address a bona fide situation, where there was little justification for invoking an anti-avoidance provision – a curative amendment to take care of unintended consequences of the scheme of section 50C.

As for the enhancement of the tolerance band to 10% by the Finance Act, 2020, the Tribunal noted that the CBDT Circular itself acknowledges that it was done in response to the representations of the stakeholders for enhancement in the tolerance band. According to the Tribunal, once the Government acknowledged this genuine hardship of the taxpayer and addressed the issue by a suitable amendment in law, there was no reason to justify any particular time frame for implementing this enhancement of the tolerance band or safe harbour provision.

Therefore, the Tribunal held that the insertion of the third proviso to section 50C and the enhancement of the tolerance band to 10% were curative in nature and, therefore, the same relate back to the date when the related statutory provision of section 50C, i.e., 1st April, 2003, was enacted.

The Tribunal did not agree with the DR’s submission to mention in the order that ‘relief is being provided as a special case and this decision may not be considered as a precedent’. According to the Tribunal, ‘Nothing can be farther from a judicious approach to the process of dispensation of justice, and such an approach, as is prayed for, is an antithesis of the principle of “equality before the law,” which is one of our most cherished constitutional values. Our judicial functioning has to be even-handed, transparent, and predictable, and what we decide for one litigant must hold good for all other similarly placed litigants as well. We, therefore, decline to entertain this plea…’

Section 56(2)(vii) – Prize money received in recognition of services to Indian Cricket from BCCI is exempt

12. Maninder Singh vs. ACIT (Delhi) N.K. Billaiya (A.M.) and Sudhanshu Srivastava (J.M.) ITA No. 6954/Del/2019 A.Y.: 2013-14 Date of order: 6th January, 2021 Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: G.S. Grewal and Simran Grewal / Rakhi Vimal

Section 56(2)(vii) – Prize money received in recognition of services to Indian Cricket from BCCI is exempt

 

FACTS

The assessee is a former Indian cricketer. During the year under appeal, he received an award of Rs. 75.09 lakhs from the BCCI in recognition of his services to Indian Cricket. Placing reliance on the CBDT Circular No. 447 dated 22nd January, 1986, the assessee did not include this amount in his return of income. But, according to the A.O., CBDT Circular No. 2 of 2014 supersedes Circular No. 447 relied upon by the assessee. Therefore, he added the amount of Rs. 75.09 lakhs to the total income of the assessee. The CIT(A), on appeal, confirmed the order of the A.O.

 

HELD

The Tribunal referred to the second proviso to section 56(2)(vii). As per the said provisions, section 56(2)(vii) does not apply to any sum of money or any property received from any trust or institution registered u/s 12AA. The Tribunal noted that the BCCI is registered u/s 12AA. Therefore, it did not find any merit in the impugned addition made by the A.O. Accordingly, the Tribunal directed the A.O. to delete the addition of Rs. 75.09 lakhs made by him.

Section 115JB – Where additional revenue was not shown by assessee in books of accounts, the A.O. could not tinker with book profit by adding additional revenue on account of subsequent realisation of export while computing book profit u/s 115JB

26. [2020] 80 ITR (Trib.) 528 (Bang.)(Trib.) DCIT vs. Yahoo Software Development (P) Ltd. ITA No.: 2510 (Bang.) of 2017 A.Y.: 2009-10 Date of order: 27th April, 2020


 

Section 115JB – Where additional revenue was not shown by assessee in books of accounts, the A.O. could not tinker with book profit by adding additional revenue on account of subsequent realisation of export while computing book profit u/s 115JB

 

FACTS

The assessee filed a revised return of income by including certain additional revenue in the total income (and claimed deduction u/s 10A in respect of the additional revenue).

 

But it did not modify the books of accounts, nor did it modify the calculation of book profit u/s 115JB.

 

However, the A.O. increased the book profit by adding the additional revenue on account of subsequent realisation of export. The CIT(A) sustained the addition made by the A.O. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal before the ITAT.

 

HELD

The ITAT, following the ratio of the Supreme Court decision in Apollo Tyres Ltd. vs. CIT [2002] 122 Taxman 562/255 ITR 273, allowed the assessee’s appeal.

 

In the said decision, the Court was concerned with the issue of the power of the A.O. to question the correctness of the profit and loss account prepared by the assessee in accordance with the requirements of Parts II and III of Schedule VI to the Companies Act (in the context of section 115J as then applicable).

 

In Apollo Tyres (Supra), the Court observed that it was not open to the A.O. to re-scrutinise the accounts and satisfy himself that these accounts had been maintained in accordance with the provisions of the Companies Act. Sub-section (1A) of section 115J did not empower the A.O. to embark upon a fresh inquiry in regard to the entries made in the books of accounts of the company and to probe into the accounts accepted by the authorities under the Companies Act. If the statute mandates that income prepared in accordance with the Companies Act shall be deemed income for the purpose of section 115J, then it should be that income which is acceptable to the authorities. If the Legislature intended the A.O. to reassess the company’s income, then it would have stated in section 115J that ‘income of the company as accepted by the A.O. Thus, according to the Apex Court, the A.O. did not have the jurisdiction to go behind the net profit shown in the profit and loss account except to the extent provided in the Explanation to section 115J.’

 

Thus, applying the ratio of the abovementioned judgment, the ITAT took the view that the A.O. cannot tinker with / re-compute book profit arrived at on the basis of books maintained in accordance with the Companies Act.

 

Section 54F – Where possession of flat was taken within period of two years from date of transfer of original asset, assessee was entitled to benefit of section 54F irrespective of the date of agreement

25. [2020] 80 ITR(T) 427 (Del.)(Trib.) Rajiv Madhok vs. ACIT ITA No.: 2291 (Del.) of 2017 A.Y.: 2012-13 Date of order: 29th May, 2020

Section 54F – Where possession of flat was taken within period of two years from date of transfer of original asset, assessee was entitled to benefit of section 54F irrespective of the date of agreement

 

FACTS

The assessee offered to tax long-term capital gain (LTCG) on sale of shares effected on 2nd September, 2011. He also claimed deduction u/s 54F on purchase of a new residential house, on the premise that the property was constructed within the time allowed u/s 54F. However, according to the A.O. the residential house was purchased prior to the time period provided in section 54F. The CIT(A) upheld the addition. Consequently, the assessee filed an appeal before ITAT.

 

HELD

The only dispute arising in this case was pertaining to the date of purchase of the new residential property as contemplated u/s 54F – whether the date of agreement with the builder was to be considered as the date of purchase of the new asset or the date of payment in entirety and the date of possession received subsequently was to be considered as the date of purchase of the new asset. The stand taken by the Department was that the date of agreement with the builder was to be considered as the date of purchase of the new asset, while that of the assessee was that the date of payment in entirety and the date of possession received subsequently was to be considered as the date of purchase of the new asset.

 

In the instant case, the assessee sold shares on 17th August, 2011 and entered into an agreement with the builder on 29th September, 2009. However, the final amount of consideration was paid to the builder in April, 2012 and possession of the flat received in July, 2012.

 

The ITAT took into consideration the relevant clause in the deed for purchase of the new house which read as under:

‘46.0 The allottee understands and confirms that the execution of this agreement shall not be construed as sale or transfer under any applicable law and the title to the allottee hereby allotted shall be conveyed and transferred to the allottee only upon his fully discharging all the obligations undertaken by the allottee, including payment of the entire sale price and other applicable charges / dues, as mentioned herein and only upon the registration of the conveyance / sale deed in his favour. Prior to such conveyance, the allottee shall have no right or title in the apartment.’

 

The ITAT observed that in the backdrop of the aforesaid clause the date of possession of the flat was the date of actual purchase for the purpose of claiming exemption u/s 54F. In arriving at the decision, the ITAT analysed the decision rendered by the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs. Smt. Beena K. Jain [1994] 75 Taxman 145 [1996] 217 ITR 363, upholding the decision of the ITAT. In the said decision, the High Court observed that: ‘the Tribunal has looked at the substance of the transaction and come to the conclusion that the purchase was substantially effected when the agreement of purchase was carried out or completed by payment of full consideration on 29th July, 1988 and handing over of possession of the flat on the next day.’

 

The ITAT also observed that clause 46.0 of the buyer’s agreement in the assessee’s case was identical to clause 12 of the deed of agreement between the assessee and the builder as noted in the case of Ayushi Patni vs. DCIT [2020] 117 taxmann.com 231 (Pune-Trib.) ITA No. 1424 & 1707 (Pune) of 2016 and held that in view of identical facts and circumstances, the ratio of the above decision in the case of Ayushi Patni (Supra) was squarely applicable to the facts of the instant case.

 

Thus, the ITAT concluded that the new asset was purchased within two years from the date of transfer of the original asset, i.e., shares, and thus the assessee was entitled to benefit of section 54F.

Section 54 – Exemption from capital gains cannot be denied where the assessee sold more than two residential properties and made reinvestment in one residential property

FACTS
The assessee, an individual deriving income from various heads of income, had submitted his return of income for the year under consideration. The return was duly processed u/s 143(1). Subsequently, the assessment was sought to be reopened based on information about the sale of immovable property and the assessee was asked to reconcile the same. The assessee filed a reply stating that he had not made any transaction for the year concerned and the transaction might have been wrongly reflected using his PAN. The assessee further requested the A.O. to recheck with the sub-registrar. Accordingly, the A.O. issued notice u/s 133(6) to the Sub-Registrar and received information that the assessee had effected sale of an immovable property being a residential flat for which no capital gains tax had been offered. The assessee furnished a capital gains working, submitting that the amount had been reinvested in purchasing another residential property. The A.O. contented that since the claim of capital gains and reinvestment thereof was not made in the return of income, the same was to be rejected and made an addition of Rs. 35 lakhs.

The A.O. also received information from the ITO that during the assessment proceedings of the assessee’s wife, it was found that a property jointly owned by the two had been sold during the year and the proceeds were reinvested in acquiring the same property for which exemption was claimed in the assessee’s case.

On appeal before the CIT(A), the CIT(A) accepted the capital gains workings submitted by the assessee and held that the assessee is eligible for exemption, even though the same was not claimed in the return of income. The A.O. had relied on the Supreme Court decision in the case of  Goetze (India) Ltd. vs. CIT to deny the claim for exemption. The CIT(A) held that the decision had categorically held that the appellate authorities could accept such a claim.

As far as the jointly owned property was concerned, the CIT(A) observed that since the capital gains on the same had been reinvested, the assessee would be eligible for capital gains exemption. Thus, the CIT(A) held that the assessee would be eligible for exemption u/s 54 on the sale of the second property also.

Aggrieved, the Revenue filed an appeal before the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal held that exemption u/s 54 is granted to the assessee for reinvestment made in the residential house. The section nowhere restricts that the assessee should have sold only one property and claimed the exemption u/s 54 for only one property. In the instant case, the assessee has sold two residential properties and reinvested in one residential property. The entire conditions of section 54, both pre and post the amendment to section 54 [vide Finance Act (No. 2) of 2014, w.e.f. A.Y. 2015-16] had been satisfied. Thus, the order of the CIT(A) was upheld and Revenue’s appeal was dismissed.

Section 56(2) – The A.O. was erroneous in mechanically applying the provisions of section 56(2) to the difference between the stamp duty value and the actual sale consideration – The addition made by the A.O. without making a reference to the DVO despite the assessee submitting valuation report was unjustified

23. [2020] 208 TTJ 835 (Mum.)(Trib.) Mohd. Ilyad Ansari vs. ITO A.Y.: 2014-15 Date of order: 6th November, 2020

Section 56(2) – The A.O. was erroneous in mechanically applying the provisions of section 56(2) to the difference between the stamp duty value and the actual sale consideration – The addition made by the A.O. without making a reference to the DVO despite the assessee submitting valuation report was unjustified

FACTS

The assessee was engaged in the business of readymade garments. During the year under consideration, he purchased a flat jointly with his wife for a total consideration of Rs. 40,00,000 which was part of an SRA project. The builder, unable to complete the project, decided to exit from it at the half-way stage. An attempt to revive the project also failed, leading to the flat being sold at a distress price of Rs. 40,00,000 to the assessee. The sale was registered and thereafter the builder disappeared without completing the project. The agreement was made by the builder for a flat admeasuring 1,360 sq. feet. However, when the assessee got the possession, he found that it had been sold to two persons. The actual area of the flat, too, was only 784 sq. feet against the agreement area of 1,360 sq. feet. During the course of assessment proceedings, the A.O. noticed that the stamp duty valuation of the flat is Rs. 2,20,49,999 but the assessee had purchased it only for Rs. 40,00,000.

The assessee was required to explain why the difference is not to be treated as income u/s 56(2)(vii). The assessee filed a valuation report of Perfect Valuation & Consultants, a Government registered valuer, who valued the flat at Rs. 82.60 lakhs. During the assessment proceedings, the assessee filed this valuation report disputing the valuation made by the Stamp Valuation Authority (SVA). However, the A.O. did not refer the matter of valuation to the District Valuation Officer, though the valuation of the SVA was disputed by the assessee by way of the valuation report. The A.O. made an addition of Rs. 1,80,49,999 u/s 56(2)(vii)(b) in the hands of the assessee. The assessee filed an appeal before the CIT(A) against this order. But the CIT(A) also did not consider the valuation report submitted by the assessee, holding that the assessee had not disputed the valuation made by the SVA and confirmed the addition. Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before the Tribunal.

HELD


The A.O. ignored the valuation report of the Government registered valuer submitted by the assessee. The provisions of section 56(2) had been mechanically applied without making any effort to determine the actual cost of the property. It ought to have been done since the property was acquired in semi-construction stage and later abandoned due to disputes amongst the builders. Besides, there was a dispute as regards the area acquired by the assessee as the same flat had been sold to two parties. In view of these circumstances, it was even more necessary for the A.O. to refer it to the valuation officer. Even at the stage of appellate proceedings when the assessee produced the valuation officer’s report that valued other flats in the very same building at Rs. 1,00,76,000, the CIT(A) should have called for remand report and in turn the valuation officer’s report which the CIT(A) had failed to do.

Thus, it was held that the addition made by the A.O. was totally unjustified and the assessee’s appeal was allowed.

Section 36(1)(iii) – Interest on funds borrowed for acquisition of land held as inventory is allowable u/s 36(1)(iii) – The provisions of Accounting Standards and the provisions of the Act are two different sets of regulations. It is well settled that if there is a contradiction between the two, the provisions of the Act shall prevail – There is no restriction in the provisions of section 36(1)(iii) that the interest can be disallowed if incurred for the purpose of inventory as provided in AS 16

22. [2020] 118 taxmann.com 541 (Bang.)(Trib.) DCIT vs. Cornerstone Property Investment (P) Ltd. A.Ys.: 2013-14 and 2014-15 Date of order: 14th August, 2020

Section 36(1)(iii) – Interest on funds borrowed for acquisition of land held as inventory is allowable u/s 36(1)(iii) – The provisions of Accounting Standards and the provisions of the Act are two different sets of regulations. It is well settled that if there is a contradiction between the two, the provisions of the Act shall prevail – There is no restriction in the provisions of section 36(1)(iii) that the interest can be disallowed if incurred for the purpose of inventory as provided in AS 16

FACTS

The facts as observed by the A.O. in the assessment order were that the assessee held land as inventory. It utilised the proceeds from the issue of debentures for acquiring lands and for making advances for purchase of lands and repayment of loans borrowed earlier. The A.O. also observed that in the earlier year, too, the borrowed funds were utilised for purchase of lands. The total interest expenditure of Rs. 16,39,35,373 being interest on ICDs, interest on NCDs and other ancillary borrowings was directly attributable to purchase of lands. There was no dispute about the use of borrowed funds for which the entire interest expenditure of Rs. 16,39,35,373 was incurred.

Of this total interest expenditure, the assessee claimed deduction for only a part, i.e., Rs. 6,81,01,384, which was disallowed by the A.O.

The CIT(A) deleted the amount of interest disallowed by the A.O. relying on various judgments.

Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where the assessee contended that the facts of the present case are squarely covered by the order of the Tribunal rendered in the case of DLF Ltd. vs. Addl. CIT [IT Appeal No. 2677 (Delhi) of 2011, order dated 11th March, 2016].

HELD


Inventory is a qualifying asset as it is held for more than 12 months and therefore interest attributable to it is required to be capitalised in the books of accounts as per AS 16. The Tribunal rejected the argument of the authorised representative of the assessee that AS 16 does not apply to inventory. It held that the provisions of Accounting Standards are the provisions which are applicable for the maintenance of the accounts of the company and interest is allowable according to section 36(1)(iii). The provisions of Accounting Standards and the provisions of the Act are two different sets of regulations and it is well settled that if there is a contradiction between the two, the provisions of the Act shall prevail. Since in the present case the interest is paid not for the purpose of acquisition of any capital asset but for inventory, the Tribunal did not find any restriction in provisions contained in section 36(1)(iii) which provide that the interest can be disallowed if incurred for the purpose of inventory as provided in AS 16. The Tribunal noted that there is not even an allegation that the interest is not paid on capital borrowed for the purpose of business. The Tribunal noted the observations in the case of DLF Ltd. (Supra) and also the ratio of various benches of the Tribunal where deduction of interest has been allowed u/s 36(1)(iii) even where the assessee has followed project completion method.

The Tribunal, following the decision of the Bombay High Court and also of various co-ordinate benches of the Tribunal, declined to interfere with the order of the CIT(A).

‘PROCEEDS OF CRIME’ – PMLA DEFINITION UNDERGOES RETROSPECTIVE SEA CHANGE

The concept of ‘proceeds of crime’ is most vital and pervades the entire fabric of The Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA). Previously, it was an exhaustive definition and consisted of only the following three constituents:
•    Any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence;
•    The value of any such property;
•    The property equivalent in value held within the country or abroad (where property considered proceeds of crime is taken or held outside the country).

The erstwhile definition was found narrow and inadequate to deal with the ever-growing menace of money-laundering. Therefore, the Enforcement Directorate had consistently represented to the Government that the definition of ‘proceeds of crime’ was ambiguous. The ambiguity adversely impacted three important aspects, viz., the ability of the Directorate to investigate the money trail, the adjudication of attachments by the PMLA Adjudicating Authority and Tribunal, and also the trial of the offence of money-laundering under PMLA. Accordingly, amendment in the definition of ‘proceeds of crime’ was long called for.

RETROSPECTIVE AMENDMENT

The erstwhile definition was eventually amended by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2019 by adding the Explanation to the definition w.e.f. 1st August, 2019. The definition of ‘proceeds of crime’ in section 2(1)(u) after such amendment reads as under:

‘Proceeds of crime’ means any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence, or the value of any such property, or where such property is taken or held outside the country, then the property equivalent in value held within the country or abroad.
Explanation – For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that ‘proceeds of crime’ include property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence.

A review of the Explanation shows that the purpose of inserting it was to expand the parameters of ‘proceeds of crime’. The Explanation seeks to widen the scope of the definition by bifurcating the same into the following two properties as stand-alone constituents of the ‘proceeds of crime’:
•    Property derived or obtained from a scheduled offence;
•    Property which is directly or indirectly derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence.

From the initial words in the Explanation, ‘For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that’, it is evident that the Explanation is intended to apply retrospectively.

The Supreme Court has held1 that an Explanation may be added in declaratory form to retrospectively clarify a doubtful point of law and to serve as proviso to the main section.

 

1   Y.P. Chawla vs. M.P. Tiwari AIR 1992 SC 1360,
1362

INGREDIENTS OF ‘PROCEEDS OF CRIME’

A review of the definition of ‘proceeds of crime’ in section 2(1)(u) as expanded by the new Explanation calls for a detailed examination of the following terms and expressions:
•    property [section 2(1)(v)]
•    person [section 2(1)(s)]
•    derived or obtained
•    directly or indirectly
•    as a result of criminal activity relating to
•    scheduled offence [section 2(1)(y)]
•    value (of property) [section 2(1)(zb)]

‘property’ is defined in section 2(1)(v). Its specific constituents: corporeal, incorporeal, movable, immovable, tangible and intangible are self-explanatory;
‘person’ is defined in section 2(1)(s). Its constituents are largely similar to its definition in the Income-tax Act with which all of us are familiar;
‘derived’ is a term that has been interpreted in the context of the expression ‘attributable to’ in a number or tax cases. The word ‘derived’ means ‘derived from a source’, or means ‘arise from or originate in’2.
Black’s Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition) defines ‘obtain’ as ‘to get hold of by effort; to get possession of; to procure; to acquire in any way.’
‘indirect’ has been defined in Black’s Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition) as follows:
‘Not direct in relation or connection; not having an immediate bearing or application; not related in natural way. Circuitous, not leading to aim or result by plainest course or method or obvious means, roundabout, not resulting directly from an act or cause but more or less remotely connected with or growing out of it’.
The expression ‘as a result of criminal activity relatable to’ is connected with ‘scheduled offence’. The expression ‘as a result of criminal activity relatable to’ is wider in scope than the expression ‘as a result of the scheduled offence’. A property may be derived or obtained from commission of a scheduled offence. Alternatively, it may be directly / indirectly derived or obtained as a result of criminal activity relatable to a scheduled offence. Both types of properties are now clarified to be considered ‘proceeds of crime’ on a stand-alone basis.

Accordingly, it stands to reason that property and receipts arising from any and every crime are not covered in this definition. Only the following kinds of receipt and property would be covered in the definition of ‘proceeds of crime’:
•    Property / receipts which are derived or obtained from the scheduled offence;
•    Property / receipts which are the result of criminal activity relatable to a scheduled offence.

‘scheduled offence’ is defined in section 2(1)(y). This definition consists of Part A, Part B and Part C with a clear mention of the statutes and matters covered therein. These do not call for any interpretation.
‘value’ (of property) is defined in section 2(1)(zb) to mean the fair market value of any property on the date of its acquisition.

In view of the expanded definition of ‘proceeds of crime’, a few important aspects are reviewed as follows:

 

2   CIT vs. Jameel Leathers and Uppers 246 ITR 97

CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF DEFINITION OF ‘PROCEEDS OF
CRIME’

The Constitutional validity of the definition of ‘proceeds of crime’ has been examined by courts in several cases.

Thus, in B. Rama Raju vs. Union of India (2011) 12 taxmann.com 181 (AP), the vires of the definition of ‘proceeds of crime’ in section 2(1)(u) was called in question on the following ground:

‘Section 2(u) of the Act defines “proceeds of crime” expansively to include property or the value thereof, derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of criminal activity relating to scheduled offence even if in the hands of a person who has no knowledge or nexus with such criminal activity allegedly committed by others. The expansive definition thus inflicts grossly unreasonable consequences on innocent persons and is, therefore, unconstitutional offending Articles 14, 20, 21 and 300A of the Constitution’. [Emphasis supplied.]

After examining various aspects, the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that section 2(1)(u) which defines the expression ‘proceeds of crime’ is not unconstitutional.

Similarly, in Alive Hospitality & Foods vs. Union of India (MANU/GJ/1313/0013), it was contended before the Gujarat High Court that the definition of ‘proceeds of crime’ was too broad and, therefore, arbitrary and invalid. While rejecting this contention, the High Court made the following observations:

‘The contention that the definition of “proceeds of crime” [section 2(u)] is too broad and is therefore arbitrary and invalid since it subjects even property acquired, derived or in the possession of a person not accused, connected or associated in any manner with a crime and thus places innocent persons in jeopardy, is a contention that also does not merit acceptance’. [Emphasis supplied]

Likewise, in Usha Agarwal vs. Union of India (MANU/SIK/0040/2013), the High Court of Sikkim held that the definition of ‘proceeds of crime’ has the object of preventing and stemming criminal activities related to money-laundering at its very inception and could not be considered arbitrary.

TAINTED PROPERTIES HELD OUTSIDE INDIA – DEEMED
‘PROCEEDS OF CRIME’

In several cases, it is found that properties derived or obtained by committing a scheduled offence are taken away and held outside India. In such situations, the question arises whether the Enforcement Directorate can initiate proceeding against any property of the accused which is held in India to the extent of the value of the proceeds of crime held overseas. This question was addressed by the Delhi High Court in Abdullah Ali Balsharaf vs. Directorate Enforcement (2019) 101 taxmann.com 466 (Delhi). The High Court held that the Enforcement Directorate would be entitled to initiate proceedings against any property held in India to the extent of the value of the ‘proceeds of crime’ held overseas.

It may be noted that the definition of ‘proceeds of crime’ was amended by the Finance Act, 2015 w.e.f. 14th May, 2015 which inserted the words ‘or where such property is taken or held outside the country, then the property equivalent in value held within the country’. Thus, the conclusion of the Delhi High Court is consistent with the said amendment.

In Deputy Director vs. Axis Bank (2019) 104 taxmann.com 49 (Delhi), the Delhi High Court considered a similar situation and came to the same conclusion by making observations to the following effect:

‘The empowered enforcement officer has the authority of law in PMLA to attach not only a “tainted property” – that is to say a property acquired or obtained, directly or indirectly, from proceeds of criminal activity constituting a scheduled offence – but also any other asset or property of equivalent value of the offender of money-laundering, the latter not bearing any taint but being alternative attachable property (or deemed tainted property) on account of its link or nexus with the offence (or offender) of money-laundering’. [Emphasis supplied.]

CLAIM OF BANK – A VICTIM OF FRAUD – CANNOT BE
DEFEATED EVEN IF PROPERTY REPRESENTS ‘PROCEEDS OF CRIME’

In Indian Bank vs. Government of India (2012) 24 taxmann.com 217 (Madras), the question before the Madras High Court was whether the claim of a bank that was a victim of fraud committed by its borrower can be defeated on the ground that the property represented ‘proceeds of crime’?

While answering this question in the negative, the High Court explained the material facts and rationale underlying its conclusion as follows:
•    Nationalised banks are the victims of a fraud committed by the company and its officers. It is the banks’ money which has actually been made use of by the company and its directors to buy properties in their names. Where do these victims stand vis-a-vis the accused in such cases?
•    The PMLA, thus, not only seeks to punish the offenders, but also seeks to punish the victims of such offences.
•    Section 8(6) and section 9, which seek to punish the victims of crime along with the accused, appear to be a disincentive for the victims.
•    For the victims of crime, there would virtually be no difference between the accused and the Central Government, as in any case they would have to lose their property to either of the two.
•    If the order of adjudication made by the Adjudicating Authority becomes final, after the conviction of the company and its directors by the criminal Court, the Central Government would confiscate such property in terms of section 8(6). Thereafter, the property would vest in the Central Government free of all encumbrances u/s 9. In other words, the banks, who were the victims of fraud, may have to lose the property to the Central Government for no fault of theirs except that they were defrauded by the company.
•    If a property is proved to be involved in money laundering, the Adjudicating Authority has only one choice, viz., to make the attachment absolute, wait for the final adjudication by the criminal Court and either release the property to the accused if he is acquitted in the criminal Court, or confiscate the property to the Central Government if the accused is convicted by the criminal Court. Therefore, section 8 in its entirety is accused-centric and Central Government-centric. It does not take into account the plight of the victims of crime.
•    In view of the inherent lacuna in the Act, I think the banks cannot be left high and dry.
•    The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act would show that the primary object for which the Act came into existence was for prevention of laundering of proceeds of drug crimes committed by global criminals / terrorists, involved in illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. The more the Act is used for tackling normal offences punishable under the Indian Penal Code, committed within the territories of India, the more the result would be disastrous for the victims of crime. Therefore, sections 5, 8 and 9 cannot be used by the respondents to inflict injury upon the victims of the crime.

PROPERTIES REGARDED AS NOT ‘PROCEEDS OF CRIME’

In a number of cases, Courts and Tribunals have rejected the claim of the Enforcement Directorate that a particular property is ‘proceeds of crime’. A few illustrative cases may be reviewed as follows:

(i) Mortgaged properties acquired prior to fraud – not ‘proceeds of crime’
Often, circumstances show that mortgaged properties were acquired by owners much before the alleged fraud was committed by the accused persons. In such a situation, a question that needs to be addressed is whether such properties were purchased out of the ‘proceeds of crime’ as defined in section 2(1)(u). This question was addressed in Bank of Baroda vs. Deputy Director (2019) 103 taxmann.com 30 (PMLA-AT). In that case, it was held that mortgaged properties which were acquired by owners much before the alleged fraud was committed by the accused person cannot be considered ‘proceeds of crime’.

(ii) Amount of loan received against mortgage of property – not ‘proceeds of crime’
Obtaining loan on mortgage of property is a common business transaction. Often, the allegation is made that the property mortgaged for the loan is acquired from the ‘proceeds of crime’. However, in Branch Manager, Central Bank of India vs. Deputy Director (2019) 107 taxmann.com 102 (PMLA-AT), it was held that where property was mortgaged with the bank much prior to the date of commission of the offence of money-laundering, the property so mortgaged cannot be regarded as acquired out of the ‘proceeds of crime’.

(iii) Amount of loan obtained by misrepresentation – not ‘proceeds of crime’
In Smt. Nasreen Taj vs. Deputy Director (2017) 88 taxmann.com 287 (PMLA-AT), a loan was taken for purchase of land. It was found that the land was purchased before the grant of loan. It was also found that the loan was obtained by misrepresentation in collusion with a bank employee. It was held that the amount of such loan could not be regarded as ‘proceeds of crime’. While reaching this conclusion, the High Court explained the material facts and rationale underlying its conclusion as follows:
•    The complainant in the criminal case is the bank who is the victim. Had the bank not filed a criminal complaint, perhaps the conspiracy might not have been discovered.
•    In a case like the present one if the security of the bank is treated as ‘proceeds of crime’ and is confiscated under the Act, in future no bank in such circumstances would make a complaint to the authorities.
•    The trial in the prosecution complaint would take a number of years. The victim cannot wait for such a long period of time, although after trial and final determination the victim is entitled to recover the amount by selling immovable properties u/s 8(8).
•    The intention of the Act could not have been to affect a third person or an innocent person as is sought to be done in the instant case.
•    If the impugned order is correct, it would be a patently absurd situation that not only substantial securities of the Bank are not available for the benefit of the bank but are vested in the Central Government as ‘proceeds of crime’. Such a result does not advance the objects of the Act.

CONCLUSION

The recent amendment to the definition of ‘proceeds of crime’ has expanded the list of properties considered as involved in the offence of money-laundering or in a scheduled offence. Consequent to the amendment, the area of scrutiny of substantive transactions by a Chartered Accountant while reporting compliance of statutory laws, applicable to transactions involving properties, is widened substantially.

The said amendment makes it incumbent upon a Chartered Accountant to modify his checklist of forensic audit of substantive transactions to ensure that he fully complies with his reporting obligations.

Intaxication: Euphoria at getting a refund from the IRS, which lasts until you realise it was your money to start with
– From a Washington Post word contest

INITIATIVES DURING PANDEMIC – PERSONAL EXPERIENCES

INTRODUCTION

The pandemic was / is unprecedented, a time of extraordinary change for everyone in every facet of life. It has affected people in most parts of the world directly or indirectly. People have lost their near and dear ones, their occupation / livelihood, or limited their lifestyle with the focus only on basic needs. It has changed drastically how we think and behave. It has bought most families nearer (in some cases even caused strife). Life used to be very mechanical in metros while we were chasing our materialistic / professional dreams. It was challenging irrespective of our educational qualifications, the profession or occupation in which we were engaged. The fear of contracting the virus and uncertainty thereafter created a tremendous scare in all of us. However, for us professionals commitment to clients is paramount and in their time of need we need to support them even more.

At our firm we went back to the basics – our purpose, vision and mission. We took a month to understand that this is a long haul and saw how we could support the clients as our first job and then looked at support to all other stakeholders; we also got what we call our knowledge edge initiatives. We started immediately as most of the staff and partners were suddenly free. Many of the measures taken by us in this period have been adverted to in this article which had a positive impact on the entire eco-system of stakeholders. In retrospect, however, there was much more that we could have done.

 
ASSESSING THE SITUATION

The first thing to be done in such uncertain times is to take stock of the things on hand, understand how the lockdown would impact everyone. Some of the areas we chose to concentrate on were as follows:

* Ensuring the safety of the employees. Some might have been stuck on outstation assignments. Arrangement of the basic needs, stay and travel was essential for them.

* Assessing the work in progress and completing the services possible for clients.

* Getting each and every employee in the firm updated and given in-depth knowledge – level wise.

* Suo motu reducing the fees of the first quarter work as a signal of support to the clients on 1st April, 2020.

* Looking at what value-added service to provide to all clients without visiting them. This was focused more on specific training / knowledge dissemination.

* Improving the connect of the team leaders with their teams and also with the partners. Understanding their needs and seeing how we could fill the gap.

* Restricting the drawals and deferral of salaries for a period of five months. Once the situation was in control, adding the deferral month-wise.

* Investing in automation for office use as well as for clients’ use.

* Faster geographical as well as size expansion was possible. Virtual opening / puja done.

Assessment of possible support to clients in the difficult situation

We believed that once a client engaged us, it was our moral responsibility to provide all possible value-addition during the difficult time. When a firm has been retained for regular advice or periodic audit, even a small value addition would make a big difference. The CA profession is based on trust and these measures would build / enhance trust. We voluntarily reduced the fee to the extent of 25% for three months and gave other support of value-added services based on information already with us without charging any fee.

Assessment of the possible inflow of information from the client

As a CA firm, we need to get the relevant information on time from our clients for delivery of quality service. Whatever problems we had faced in terms of manpower, infrastructure, etc., the same or even more has been the case with our clients, too. Further, the clients had many other priorities and therefore follow-up on calls and recording of the conversations on email was encouraged. Based on the correct assessment of the possible reduced inflow of cash from the clients, the working capital was planned and even a loan was taken.

Assessment of jobs which can be done and which can be deferred

The statutory compliances did get postponed. It was important for us as well as for our clients to assess what jobs could be done during the lockdown and what jobs could be deferred. Some parts of the jobs could be completed and the rest would have to await the opening up for completion.

Assessment of jobs nearing due dates and action plan

Since the lockdown was announced suddenly, the work stopped abruptly. There were many time-bound assignments / compliances. It was certain that the due dates of all the compliances would be extended, but there could have been other implications. In business many things are inter-related. If one task gets delayed, then another one also gets delayed, and so on, and at the end the impact is on the financials and the cashflow. All jobs like review of ledgers, reconciliations, online verifications, even examination of documents / agreements where available, were taken up. Advice on best practices in the lockdown was also shared with every client.

Assessment of manpower availability and action plan

Just before the complete lockdown, or immediately after the announcement, many employees and workers left for their hometowns by whatever means they could find. The trade / industry employer had to assess how many employees were available for working from their homes during the lockdown and what infrastructure they had in their place of stay. For us, articles / assistants from rural areas somehow reached their hometown but of them some are still (even after nine months) to get back to office.

Assessment of the IT infrastructure availability and action plan

The CA firms can use technology to some extent but the profession cannot be fully automatised. The CA profession is intellect-driven and not machine-driven. Our firm has been using office management software and servers for many years for data management, albeit partially. We were able to catch up on that. We were able to adapt partially to the work-from-home philosophy. We quickly prepared a policy for that and a standard operating programme for the same. As we were maintaining most of the data in the cloud, the employees could get the same and helped us to continue with quite a few of the jobs on hand. However, we had some issues where data was in servers.

Assessment of the working infrastructure at the homes of the employees

Work-from-home has its own challenges, especially in metros where houses are generally small. If everyone works from home, there has to be a proper place to sit and work. Continuous working in uncomfortable positions leads to health issues and reduces productivity. Normally, internet bandwidth is not very high at homes. The internet speed available on cell phones is not sufficient for office work, making conference calls, etc. Further, even to make simple calls there could be a challenge when someone else in the home is talking.

We informed our employees to go for best possible internet connection and also for a basic working table and chair. However, those employees who had gone to their villages where internet facilities are not available, just couldn’t work from home.

 
PLANNING AND THE EXECUTION OF THE JOB

Having assessed the available resources, the infrastructure and the jobs to be done, proper planning had to be done to execute the same. Since the situation was unusual, the execution of the regular jobs was also a challenge. Further, as a CA firm we have to maintain the quality of the deliverables. The quality was to be achieved through more involved monitoring. In the work-from-home situation, the monitoring also needs extra planning and efforts. The seniors in the firms made the plan for the effective monitoring of the execution and the deliverables through regular conference calls, video calls, etc. The use of office management software like Windows Office 365, iFirm and such other software has been of great use. Sharing the data and monitoring have been both convenient and effective. The hands-off approach (delegation) was given up and micro-management with daily calls and follow-up was taken up till the employees started coming back to office.

MANAGING THE CASHFLOW

One of the most challenging aspects has been managing the cashflow. Where the clients have cashflow issues, the CA firm cannot expect timely payments from them. The biggest expense in a CA firm is the employee payouts. A cut in the salary was inevitable for not only the employees but also for drawings of the partners. However, a cut in the salary should not result in an employee leaving the firm. An efficient employee is an asset to the firm. Retaining an efficient employee is very important for its growth. The salary cut was based on the ‘Manu Principle’, i.e., more cut in case of an employee earning more and less cut in case of an employee earning less. Striking the balance between cashflow and keeping the morale of the employees high has been very important. We brought down the targets to ensure that bonus would be possible for most based on performance. However, we did defer the increments this year.

 
KNOWLEDGE ENHANCEMENT INITIATIVES

As a CA firm, knowledge / skill across the firm was a key to our success. However, in the normal course the knowledge acquired tended to be on the need-to-have basis. This pandemic gave us an opportunity due to the availability of time. The explosion of online education, most of it freely available, supported this endeavour.

HEALTH ADVISORY TO THE EMPLOYEES AND MENTORING

An abrupt change in lifestyle affects health, especially in the case of senior citizens at home. The employees were advised to be very health-conscious, maintaining hygiene, social distancing, using face masks, avoiding crowded places, etc. This pandemic has created huge mental pressure due to a lack of knowledge about its spread and its impact. We believed that moral support by the employer to the personal health of the employees and their family members would boost their morale. Getting an adequate insurance cover for all for Covid-19 was done to provide some succour.

 
Regular mentoring of the employees during such times is very important. Not only does it enhance the capability of the employee, but it also improves the productivity and loyalty to the firm. Though mentoring was an irregular activity in our firm earlier, its importance was felt even more during this pandemic. Confidence-building, personality development, knowledge enhancement have been achieved to a reasonable extent through training and mentoring. Many took on longer period commitment to paid coaching to enhance themselves.

Daily discussion on the clause-by-clause analysis of the tax laws

Every day, two hours (for two months intermittently) of discussion through video call among the employees on clause-by-clause analysis of the tax laws has enhanced the knowledge of the employees tremendously. A lot of clarity emerged on the provisions of the laws. Such discussions helped us, in spite of our presence in multiple locations, to have a uniform view on the provisions of the laws.

 
Deliberation on the landmark decisions

The regular deliberation on landmark case laws among the core group in the advisory and litigation team of the firm was very useful. Such discussions helped us in the interpretation of the ratio of the judgment and its effective use in the given situation.

Preparation or updating of the audit programme, checklist and process document

We used the available time for updating the audit programme, the checklist and standard operating procedure in all streams of operations, such as audit, advisory, dispute resolution, etc. We also looked at various operations like human resources management, client engagement, deliverables, data management, accounts administration, all of which are a must for efficient management and growth of the firm and to deliver quality service. These had been on the backburner for years.

Office re-organisation

In normal times, everyone in the firm would be busy. Once the deliverables are delivered, the file is closed. There will be no time to re-look at the file except when there is a requirement subsequently. This added up to the quantity of paper in the office and data in the hard disc / server. Such unwanted accumulation of data would make it difficult to retrieve the relevant data in the future. During the pandemic, the spare time was used for cleaning of the unwanted papers / files in the office, unwanted data in the hard disc / server and proper organisation of the relevant data and audit papers / documents in some of our offices.

 
Training the employees of the client

Efficient service to the clients sometimes depends on the quality of data provided by the employees of the client. Where the employee of the clients is properly trained about the compliance required, the form in which the data is to be provided would certainly help the CA firm. During the pandemic, time was utilised for training either all the employees of our clients, or through tailor-made training programmes. Such knowledge enhancement of the employees of the clients has been a value-added activity.

 

Webinar – Knowledge sharing

Continuous education is a must for every chartered accountant. Sharing knowledge is a good way of learning. A well-structured webinar delivered by an expert would always be well attended. However, it should be as per the Code of Conduct of the ICAI. We conducted several webinars on various subjects inviting our clients and known CAs. We also ensured that we took the opportunity to accept any invitation to speak, especially if it was a challenging subject.

 

Certificate courses

Since time was available and employees of companies / professionals were available at home, we conducted a number of GST certificate courses. We allowed / mandated / encouraged the employees to attend such courses. Many senior employees were allowed to teach in internal learning sessions and then joined the seniors for public seminars.

 
Book-writing, revisions and writing, updating the articles

During the pandemic, we could reconsider updating our old books and take on some planned books. We were able to write more than 70 articles and update several existing articles on the website. The updation of the website to some extent has also been done.
 

Self-empowerment initiatives

The pandemic has provided a great opportunity to introspect and take self-empowerment initiatives. Many great institutions all over the world have been offering online courses in various subjects. Some of them are free and others are for a fee. It was time to set goals and make positive choices and take control of our own lives. It was time to understand our strengths and weaknesses and to develop the belief within. It is true that every challenge is an opportunity to grow. Some of us have participated in a few such self-empowerment programmes.

Expansion

As we were able to spare some time, we started a branch in a metro city (on 10th August, 2020). Mentoring was possible because of the slack and now we are ready to open offices in three Tier II cities before March, 2021. We also decided to have smaller offices due to the focus on online training and seminars.

 
CONCLUSION

It is a fact that we could choose to react to this dreadful epidemic by focusing on professionalising the firm, empowering ourselves and our employees. The future might not be the same as was the past. The future appears to be more virtual. We believe that it is better to invest in technology, adapt to the change and go digital. The flip side of the pandemic was that it provided a lot of time to introspect and look at the issues on the backburner. The familiar ‘I am too busy’ trope was not available and professionals like us did much more to strengthen the depth of knowledge, catching up with training, took up updating books and articles and, importantly, the one-to-one interpersonal activities increased significantly.

On the whole, we got better prepared for the delivery of services remotely as well as attracting clients due to higher visibility and sharing. Our multi-locational presence has helped us to leverage and support each other because the situation was not so bad in a few locations. Thanks to all these foundation-strengthening activities, we are poised for major growth in F.Y. 2021-22 even though the pandemic is still affecting some locations.


Money is like a sixth sense – and you can’t make use of the other five without it

– William Somerset Maugham

DIGITAL MARKETING? NAAH, IT’S DIGITAL BRANDING

A practising Chartered Accountant is bound by the Code of Ethics (‘CoE’) and is not permitted to advertise herself or her services. Honestly, a CA’s service holds dignity and doesn’t require any kind of solicitation. However, it must be noted that many other entities hire CAs and can brand for more or less all services that a Chartered Accountant offers and market and brand them. From that perspective, a Chartered Accountant is at a disadvantage as she is not on a level playing field. Therefore, we cannot ignore the fact that building a brand for oneself is equally important in today’s world.

I’m sure all of you have come across the following kinds of questions:
•        I am not sure if my firm or I can be on social media or digital platforms because our Code of Ethics does not allow that;
•        CA, as a profession, runs purely on referrals and social or digital media may not help;
•        I know few people who are on these platforms but I’m not sure how effective that is;
•        I feel it’s a waste of time and I have better technical things to concentrate on.

Let us now quickly look at answering these questions by simply understanding the basics of Digital Branding.

WHAT IS DIGITAL
BRANDING?

Today, for everything we search on Google, but do you know Google is merely a search engine and it does not create most of the content? All it does is smartly present to you content which is created by millions of users and subject matter experts like us.

Digital Branding is a process of creating an online identity and brand story of your firm or of yourself. It involves using online channels like websites, social media, SEOs, etc., so that when someone is in need of answers she can get them via Google search or other social media.

To put it simply, Digital Marketing is like pulling customers to you by advertising which is restricted and against the code of ethics, whereas Digital Branding is like creating a digital presence so that those who are in need of advice / service get contact details to approach you.

In the current professional services era, you can think of your brand as the visibility of your digital reputation.

WHY IS DIGITAL
BRANDING IMPORTANT?

Technology is something that disrupts every industry every now and then and firms that do not adjust with technology may cease to exist. We have so many examples of mobile giants like Blackberry, Nokia, etc. However, being professionals we are assured that our knowledge and expertise will not be replaced just like Kodak paper was replaced with Digital Photography. But does that mean technology will not disrupt how CAs are working or getting new clients?

Let us take a look at just the last six months. How many of us had earlier heard about Zoom (a company that was set up in 2011)? But today we will hardly find any professionals who have not heard of or used Zoom. Yes, the pandemic was unprecedented and the entire world was under lockdown so we were all forced to switch to the Digital World. And everyone co-operated in the switch. However, does every change follow the same process? What if, after a few years of working, we suddenly realise that something else has changed slowly but certainly and that we are now the odd person out?

Do we need to wait for a pandemic to teach us the next lesson or do we start blending in with a five-year plan? It’s high time to envisage the importance of digital branding. Agreed, that our profession runs on a referral model, but imagine someone referring you to a potential client and they do not find any digital presence while Googling (searching your firm’s name on Google). There are high chances they may not even approach you. Secondly, the belief that ICAI COE doesn’t allow us to be on digital / social media platforms, or that it’s a risky thing to do, isn’t true.

Currently, there are around 1.5 lakh practising CAs but the real competition is online companies which place advertisements and many other semi-qualified CAs or other professionals offering to do the same work as CAs. Not that all users are interested in hiring those online companies or the semi-qualified individuals – but their ability to approach professionals is limited to Google and other social media, but we are virtually not present there.

WHY HAVING A DIGITAL BRAND WILL
WORK FOR US

Digital Media has its own set of advantages and we have already witnessed one of its major advantages in the pandemic. It was a Eureka! moment for a lot of people who realised that we may not need to travel all the way to just speak face-to-face. We can just do a video call, have negotiations, meetings and discussions and close the deal. Let us try and understand the various advantages that the Digital Platform offers us:

Cost-effective – Unlike other traditional modes of branding, it is cost-effective. About 90% of the digital media platforms are free to use. The cost, most of the time, is the ‘TIME’ that you invest in using the Digital Platform;
Global market – With the www revolution, we are not bound by physical boundaries. Anything we post on social media can be accessed by anyone in the world. Connecting has become seamless. For example, a website of a person working in a remote village can be accessed by a person sitting in the US or Europe, vs. the physical billboard outside our office;
Flexibility – A user can access the details while travelling or early in the morning, or late night, whether on laptop or mobile; digital platforms give flexibility to users to read, watch or listen at a time and place of their choice, as well as it gives us the flexibility to post or just simply schedule the posting as well;
Interactive – All digital platforms are much more interactive than traditional modes. Websites offer chatbox option, social media provide Direct Message Option and hence when the interaction is quick, there are high chances that users with queries can turn into clients with consultancy;
Tracking results and analytics – A majority of the digital platforms provide analytics which can help track the results of each post.

Clause (6) of the First Schedule, Code of Ethics, says that a ‘Chartered Accountant in practice shall be deemed to be guilty of professional misconduct, if he solicits clients or professional work either directly or indirectly by circular, advertisement, personal communication or interview or by any other means’.

Often, a practising CA is reluctant to use digital or social media believing it to be a push mode and an indirect way of soliciting. This is where Digital Branding wins over Digital Marketing. Before we look at different modes of digital branding, let us understand the difference with some quick examples:

Digital
Marketing / Push Mode

Digital
Branding / Pull Mode

Updating status on various social media or sending direct
messages to your connects asking them for collaboration or direct work

Regularly updating status on various notifications which show
your expertise to readers which may ultimately (in the long run) help win a
client

Yourself writing client reviews or attaching screenshots which
may brag about your work

Your clients tagging you or giving you a review on ‘Google My
Business’ page of how happy they were with your services

Replying to comments on your posts with ‘Reach out to us to
avail services’

Replying to comments with your knowledge and leaving an ‘In case
you have further queries, you may feel free to reach out to us’

When we talk about having a digital presence, we are nowhere soliciting or advertising our services but just building a brand on digital platforms by generating rich and useful content.

 

WHAT ARE THE VARIOUS MODES OF
DIGITAL BRANDING?

In this section of the article, we will sketchily look at the modes of Digital Branding and how it may help to build your brand to eventually help you / your firm grow.

Mode I: Search Engine Optimisation
Search engine optimisation (SEO) is the process of growing the quality and quantity of website traffic by increasing the visibility of a website or a web page to users of a web search engine like Google Search or other Social Media Search. In short, SEO is utilising specific goal-oriented strategies to ensure that we rank higher up in search results pages. Firms using SEOs to optimise their content (whether websites or Google My Business) will be the ones clients get their answers from when they first Google and eventually land up assigning their work to the firms. The broad channel categories of SEO Branding include these modes:

A) Website:
Your firm’s website should be optimised with words that show your niche. A good website should ideally be mobile-friendly as well as optimised for computer screens. Your website is your first digital impression; a poorly designed one is like having an office in an area where no one prefers to travel. Websites should be easy to navigate and should answer basic questions like what’s your specialisation, your location and what information and tools you provide and, most importantly, the call to action button, i.e., where a visitor can contact you in case she has a query. If words in a website are used wisely, it can enrich the SEO and provide better search results.

B) Google My Business Account:
The fact is that around 65% of the CA firms do not have their own Google My Business (‘GMB’) account. A GMB account basically is Google’s way of verifying small businesses. So when someone searches exactly about your business, Google shows details about the business on the right-hand side of the search result. If a GMB account is not created, it may show other firms’ results instead. Besides, a verified GMB account means your official website appears first in search results when someone searches your firm’s name instead of some random online aggregator websites.

Having a GMB account builds your brand in multiple ways – it improves SEO for a professional web page, helps you build reputation by taking reviews from clients and colleagues for your page and all of this is absolutely without charge. To summarise, a GMB account is a ‘should have’ and not a ‘good to have’.

Mode II: Social Media Branding
Social Media (‘SM’) Branding is the use of social media platforms to connect with your audience. This involves publishing great and engaging content with your SM profiles, listening to and engaging your followers and analysing your results. Co-reading this with paragraph 2.14.1.7(vii) & (x) of Clause 7, First Schedule of COE, it is to be noted that though one can use the prefix ‘CA’ on SM profiles and have a firm page on SM accounts, utmost care should be taken that no exaggerated claims are made (such as, Best CA for GST, Best CA in Mumbai and so on). Hence, the perception that as a practising CA one may / should not have an SM presence doesn’t really hold true. Let’s quickly look at the channels of SM and how these may help in branding:

(a) LinkedIn / Twitter / Facebook / Instagram:
It is a known fact that the number of users on the above SM in India (including professionals, too, considering LinkedIn and Twitter) are in their billions and not having a presence on these SM won’t really help. These platforms work in an easy way: Every time you publish a post or share an update which the readers find useful, they tend to share the same and the reach increases. The more content you generate on SM, the more people will know you and the better brand you will build for yourself. Firms regularly sharing relevant updates build a reputation which in the long run will get them more clients. (Think about it like this – Since childhood you have seen ads and hoardings of Activa two-wheelers and as a first-time user when you plan to buy a two-wheeler, Activa would be the first brand that will come to your mind. The same happens with clients who look for services the first time.) So, if you have regularly maintained your brand on SM, they will be inclined towards you.

(b) Quora:

This is my personal favourite SM platform. Quora has a competitive edge as only about 500 practising CAs are currently using it. What makes it unique is the purpose of the user visiting it. It’s neither search nor social media but somewhere in between. The content posted here is easy to find even months and years later, unlike other SM where it gets buried or disappears. If any potential clients using Quora find an answer posted by you / your firm, there are 85% chances of them connecting with you when they look for any formal consultancy. This is primarily because of the satisfaction they received with your simple answers. Practising professionals who are active on Quora create an avenue to get new clients for themselves simply by answering questions. Needless to add, the brand is also worth cultivating because the platform has a global reach.

Mode III: Content Branding

Content branding is a strategic approach focused on creating and distributing valuable, relevant and consistent content to attract and retain a clearly defined audience. In our profession, content branding entails writing books, articles, blogs or any kind of write-ups (collectively defined as write-up). Paragraph 2.14.1.6(iv)D of Clause (6), First Schedule of COE countenances using the designation CA in the write-ups. So, every time a person reads your write-up which shows your specialisation, they are building an image of you and next time they wish to have a consultancy on that topic, they may be inclined to approach you because you created a reputation on the topic with your content.

Mode IV: Audio / Visual Branding
If truth be told, the modern generation prefers audio / visual stimulus that is easily accessible and gets to the point over the idea of having to read something, and hence audio / visual branding these days becomes imperative. It’s really simple – a random user (who may be a potential client) wanting to learn how to log-in to the GST portal will prefer to watch a video on the same or attend a webinar rather than reading about it. So, when it’s about technical substance, people prefer reading write-ups, but when it comes to practical stuff, a webinar or an educational video will have the upper hand. And this is what audio / visual branding is all about – creating a marquee for yourself / your firm.

And this definitely works, given the following motives:
•        Hosting a webinar or uploading a video gives you an opportunity to position yourself as an expert in the topic;
•        It is an indirect way of soft sales;
•        The level of interaction it provides gives comfort to the audience; and
•        Lastly, it’s the new trend and we do not want to stay out of sync with it.

While we have delved into how audio / visual branding helps strengthen our Digital Presence, it is also to be noted that there is no violation of the code of ethics here provided we are cautious about not mentioning the firm’s name in the videos [ruled by Paragraph 2.14.1.6(iv) – Q of Clause 6, First Schedule of COE]. However, sharing videos on your own SM profile still does the work.

To summarise, while the COE does restrict direct ways of advertising, we should avoid Digital Marketing but definitely cannot avoid having a Digital Brand for ourselves or our firm. The modes of digital branding discussed here, when used with the correct strategies for each digital / SM platform, can work wonders for us even without soliciting work.

As a first step, this is what should be done:
•        Creating, reviewing and revamping your individual and your firm’s digital / SM channels (redesigning website to enrich the SEO, having a GMB account, initiating and start using Quora, review each of the SM profiles);
•        Plan your first webinar / YouTube video which can showcase your expertise and make it reach more people;
•        Stop hard-selling, rather work on building a reputation on these channels; and
•        Connect with relevant professionals on LinkedIn / Twitter and follow them.

For, it goes without saying that
NETWORK = NET WORTH

Do you think you’re sitting still right now?
– You’re on a planet orbiting a star at 30 km/s
– That star is orbiting the centre of a galaxy at 230 km/s
– That galaxy is moving through the universe at 600 km/s
Since you started reading this, you have travelled about 3,000 km

If your hate could be turned into electricity,
it would light up the whole world
– Nikola Tesla

 

THE LONG FORM AUDIT REPORT FOR BANKS GETS EVEN LONGER

INTRODUCTION

The Long Form Audit Report (LFAR) has for long been used as a tool by the RBI through the Statutory Auditors to identify and assess gaps and vulnerable areas in the working of banks. According to the RBI, the objective of the LFAR is to identify and assess the gaps and vulnerable areas in the business operations, risk management, compliance and efficacy of internal audit and provide an independent opinion on the same to the Board of the bank.

As recently as on 5th September, 2020, RBI notified a revised format of the LFAR, applicable from the financial year 2020-21, which repeals the earlier format and other instructions issued on 17th April, 2002. Whilst almost all the earlier requirements have been retained, there have been several specific matters which have been included for reporting keeping in mind the large-scale changes in the size, complexities, risks and business models related to banking operations in the last two decades.

The LFAR is an integral part of the statutory audit of banks which needs to be factored right from the planning to the reporting stage of the audit process. In designing the audit strategy and plan, the auditor should consider the LFAR requirements and conduct need-based limited transaction testing.

The following are the main sources of information for the purpose of compiling the information for LFAR reporting:
a) Audited financial statements and the related groupings, trial balances and account analysis / schedules;
b) Minutes of the meetings of the Board and the various committees;
c) Internal and concurrent and other audit reports;
d) RBI inspection reports;
e) Other supporting MIS data / information produced by the entity which should be verified for accuracy /completeness as per the normally accepted audit procedures in terms of the SAs;
f) Policies and procedures laid down by the management.

This article attempts to provide an overview of the major changes in the reporting so as to sensitise both the Central Statutory Auditors and the Branch Auditors.


COVERAGE

As was the case with the earlier format, the indicative areas of coverage are separately indicated for the Central Statutory Auditors and the Branch Auditors. However, in cases where there is only one Statutory Auditor, which is generally the case with private sector banks or the branches of foreign banks, the auditors should ensure that the contents under both the sections are read harmoniously such that nothing significant is missed out. Since the areas to be covered are only indicative, the RBI in its Circular has made it clear that any material additions / changes in the scope may be done by giving specific justification and with prior intimation to the Audit Committee. Accordingly, the auditors should not adopt a boilerplate approach.

Major changes in the indicative content are discussed and analysed in the subsequent sections.


FOR CENTRAL STATUTORY AUDITORS

Credit Risk areas
Credit Risk in the context of banking refers to the risk of default or non-payment or non-adherence to contractual obligations by a borrower. The revenue of banks comes primarily from interest on loans and thus loans form a major source of credit risk. Whilst the basic reporting requirements are the same as before, there are several additional areas which need to be reported / commented upon and which can be broadly categorised as under:

Area

 

Additional areas to be
commented / reported upon

 be commented / reported
upon

Loan policy

Specific observations are required regarding the business model /
business strategy as per the policy as against the actual business / income
flow of the bank

Review / monitoring / post-sanction follow-up / supervision

The following are some of the additional matters requiring
specific comments / reporting:

      Comments on the overall effectiveness of
credit monitoring system
covering both on-balance sheet and off-balance
sheet exposures, along with the quality of reporting both within the bank and
to outside agencies (like RBI, CRILC,
CIBIL
),
etc.

     
Comments on the functioning and effectiveness of the system of
identifying and reporting of Red-Flagged Accounts based on Early
Warning System (EWS) indicators
for which reference should be made to the
Master Directions on Frauds-Classification and Reporting dated 1st
July, 2016 issued by the RBI
(also applicable to Branch Auditors)

Restructuring / resolution of stressed accounts

This is an entirely new section which has been introduced
keeping in mind the emphasis on restructuring in the backdrop of the enhanced
level of stressed assets in the banking system. The specific matters on which
comments are required are summarised hereunder:

     
Deviations observed in restructured accounts / stressed accounts under
resolution with reference to internal / RBI guidelines

    
Special emphasis should be given on the stance of the bank with
respect to the following matters:

a)   
formulation of board-approved policies including timelines for resolution;

b)    the
manner in which decisions are taken during review period;

c)   
board-approved policies regarding recovery, compromise settlements,
exit of exposure through sale of stressed assets, mechanism of deciding
whether a concession granted to a borrower would have to be treated as
restructuring or not, implementation of resolution in accordance with the
laid-down conditions, among others;

Special attention would have to be paid in the current financial
year regarding the relaxations and concessions provided as a result of
COVID-19

Asset quality (also applicable to branch auditors)

This is also an entirely new section given the emphasis
on asset classification and the consequential provisioning and attempts by banks
and borrowers to subvert the same. The specific matters on which comments are
required are summarised as below:

       
Continuous monitoring of classification of accounts into Standard,
SMA, Sub-standard, Doubtful or Loss as per the Income Recognition and Asset
Classification Norms by the system, preferably without manual intervention,
determining the effectiveness of identifying the consequential NPAs and the
appropriate income recognition and provisioning thereof;

Asset quality (continued)

     Procedure followed by the bank in
upgradation of NPAs, updation of the value of securities with reference to
RBI regulations and compliance by the bank with divergences observed during
earlier RBI inspection(s) with requisite examples of deviations, if any

It is imperative for the auditors to thoroughly review the
latest RBI Guidelines and Circulars and also read the latest RBI inspection
reports since greater granularity in reporting is now expected vis-a-vis
the earlier reporting requirements

Recovery policy (also applicable to branch auditors)

The following are some of the additional matters requiring
specific comments / reporting dealing with the Insolvency and Bankruptcy
Resolution Process:

     
System of monitoring accounts under Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code,
2016 (IBC)

     
Verifying the list of accounts where insolvency proceedings had been
initiated under IBC, but subsequently were taken out of insolvency u/s 12A of
the
IBC by the Adjudicating Authority based
on the approval of 90% of the creditors.
The auditors may satisfy themselves regarding the reasons of the creditors,
especially the bank concerned, to agree to exiting the insolvency resolution
process, and may comment upon deficiencies observed, if any

Large advances

The Guidelines now specifically require comments on adverse
features considered significant in top 50 standard large advances and the
accounts which need management’s attention.
In respect of advances below
the threshold, the process needs to be checked and commented upon, based on a
sample testing. This is a very onerous responsibility which has been
cast on the auditors and needs to be factored in whilst selecting their
sample for testing. Earlier there was no specific quantitative threshold laid
down for reporting. Care should be taken to ensure that the sample which is
selected also covers cases beyond the top 50 standard accounts. Further, it
appears that this threshold is for the bank as a whole

(Attention is also invited to the reporting requirements for
Branch Auditors discussed subsequently wherein different quantitative
thresholds are specified for individual branches)

Audit reports

Major adverse features observed in the reports of all audits / inspections,
internal or external, carried out at the credit department during the
financial year should be suitably incorporated in the LFAR, if found
persisting

Market risk areas
Market risk mostly occurs from a bank’s activities in capital markets, commodities markets and dealings in foreign currencies. This is due to the unpredictability of equity markets, movement of exchange and interest rates, commodity prices and credit spreads. The major components of a bank’s market risk include interest rate risk, equity risk, commodity price risk and foreign exchange risk.

This section covers reporting on investments and derivatives (the latter being specifically added) apart from CRR / SLR and ALM reporting requirements. Some of the specific additional areas requiring comments / reporting are as under:

•    Merit of investment policy and adherence to the RBI guidelines.
•    Deviations from the RBI directives and guidelines issued by FIMMDA / FIBIL / FEDAI which primarily deal with valuation of investments and foreign exchange exposures should be suitably highlighted.
•    With respect to the RBI directives, special focus should be placed on compliance with exposure norms, classification of investments into HTM / AFS / HFT category and inter-category shifting of securities.
•    Veracity of liquidity characteristics of different investments in the books, as claimed by the bank in different regulatory / statutory statements.
•    The internal control system, including all audits and inspections, IT and software being used by the bank for investment operations should be examined in detail.

Since there is a lot of emphasis on compliance with the RBI guidelines, it is important for auditors to be aware of the relevant guidelines dealing with investments and derivatives, the important ones being as under:

•    Master Circular – Prudential Norms for Classification, Valuation and Operation of Investment Portfolio by Banks dated 1st July, 2015 and other related matters.
•    General Guidelines for Derivative Transactions vide RBI Circulars dated 20th April, 2007, 2nd August, 2011 and 2nd November, 2011 together with specific operational guidelines for Currency Option, Exchange Traded Interest Rate Futures, Interest Rate Options and Commodity Hedging vide separate Master Directions.
•    Guidelines for Inter-Bank Foreign Exchange Dealings vide Master Directions on Risk Management and Inter-Bank Dealings dated 5th July, 2016.

 Governance, assurance functions and operational risk areas

This is a new section introduced in place of the existing section on Internal Controls. Whilst the basic reporting requirements are the same as before, there are several additional areas which need to be reported / commented upon and which can be broadly categorised as under:

Area

Additional areas to be commented /
reported upon

Governance and assurance functions

This is an entirely new section given the emphasis on
proper and robust governance and risk management keeping in mind the large-scale
changes in the business model of banks. The specific matters on which
comments are required are summarised hereunder:

     
Observations on governance, policy and implementation of
business strategy
and its adequacy vis-à-vis the risk
appetite statement
of the bank

     
Comments on the effectiveness of assurance functions (risk management,
compliance and internal audit)

     
Comments on the adequacy of risk-awareness, risk-taking and
risk-management, risk and compliance culture

 

The following are some of the specific matters which are
relevant for an effective governance, assurance and risk management system in
a bank:

a)    Oversight
and involvement in the control process by the Board, Audit Committee and
Those Charged With Governance,
some of which are specifically mandated
by the RBI, like framing of policies on specific areas,
constitution of specific Board Level Committees and undertaking calendar of
reviews.

b)    Mandatory
Risk Based Internal Audit vide RBI Circular Ref: DBS.CO.PP.BC.
10/11.01.005/2002-03, 27th December, 2002.

c)    Mandatory
Concurrent Audit vide RBI Circular Ref: DBS.CO.ARS. No. BC.
2/08.91.021/2015-16 dated 16th July, 2015

Balancing of books / Reconciliation of control and subsidiary
records

Item-wise details of system-generated transitory accounts not
nullified at the year-end should be given separately with ageing of such
items

Inter-branch reconciliation, suspense accounts, sundry deposits,
etc.

The following are some of the additional matters requiring
specific comments / reporting:

     
Sufficiency of audit trail with respect to entries in such accounts

     
Age-wise analysis of unreconciled entries for each type of entry as on
balance sheet date along with subsequent clearance thereof, if any, should be
provided

Frauds / vigilance (also applicable to branch auditors)

Special focus should be given to the potential risk areas which
might lead to perpetuation of fraud. For this purpose, reference should be
made to Early Warning System (EWS) indicators as per the Master Directions
on Frauds-Classification and Reporting dated 1st July, 2016 issued
by the RBI

KYC / AML requirements (also applicable to branch auditors)

This is also an entirely new section given the need and
importance for banks to comply with various AML regulations and also
regulations countering the financing of terrorism and to prevent them from
becoming involved with criminal or terrorist activity. The specific matters on
which comments are required are summarised hereunder:

     
Whether the bank has duly updated and approved KYC and AML policies in
synchronisation with RBI circulars / guidelines.

     
Whether the said policies are effectively implemented by the bank.

       
Assessment of the effectiveness of provisions for preventing money
laundering and terrorist financing.

The KYC and AML Guidelines are prescribed in the Master
Directions on KYC dated 8th December, 2016 as amended from time to
time issued by the RBI.

As per the directions, all banks are required to frame a KYC
policy which must contain at least the following key elements as laid down in
the Master Directions:

a)    
Customer Acceptance Policy.

b)    Risk
Management.

c)    Customer Identification Procedures.

d)   
Monitoring of Transactions.

e)   
Maintenance of Records under the PML Act.

f)    
Reporting Requirements to Financial Intelligence Unit – India and
sharing of information.

Para-banking activities

There is now a separate section which has been included in
respect of such activities which are specifically permitted to be undertaken
by the RBI, either departmentally or through subsidiaries. These activities
are generally non-fund based and are a major source of revenue for banks. The
specific matters on which comments are required are summarised hereunder:

     
Whether the bank has an effective internal control system with respect
to para-banking activities undertaken by it.

        A
list of such para-banking activities undertaken by the bank should also be
provided.

The RBI has issued a Master Circular dated 1st July,
2015 as amended from time to time on such activities.
Some of the main
para-banking activities which banks are permitted to undertake either
departmentally or through subsidiaries in terms of the aforesaid Circular are
Equipment Leasing, Hire Purchase and Factoring, Primary

Para-banking activities (continued)

Dealership Business, Mutual Fund Business, Insurance Business,
etc.


CAPITAL ADEQUACY

Whilst the existing requirement of attaching the Capital Adequacy computation certificate in accordance with the BASEL III guidelines along with the comments on the effectiveness of the system of calculating the same and reporting of any concerns relating thereto are retained, there is now an additional requirement to give certain comments with regard to the International Capital Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP) Document, which is briefly discussed hereunder.

ICAAP Document

ICAAP is a process which needs to be undertaken by banks in terms of BASEL III under Pillar 2 Supervisory Review Process (SRP), which envisages the establishment of suitable risk management systems in banks and their review by the RBI. One of the principles under SRP envisages that the RBI would review and evaluate banks’ internal capital adequacy assessments and strategies, as well as their ability to monitor and ensure their compliance with the regulatory capital ratios which gets reflected in the ICAAP document, which is required to be submitted to the Board of Directors for review and then forwarded to the RBI based on which it would take appropriate supervisory action if they are not satisfied with the result of this process. In this context, the following matters are required to be specifically commented upon:
•    Whether stress test is done as per RBI Guidelines;
•    Whether assumptions made in the document are realistic, encompassing all relevant risks;
•    Whether the banks’ strategies are aligned with their Board-approved Risk Appetite Statement.

The ICAAP requirements are part of the BASEL III Guidelines as prescribed in the Master Circular dated 1st July, 2015 as amended from time to time issued by the RBI.


GOING CONCERN AND LIQUIDITY RISK ASSESSMENT

Going concern assessment
This is an entirely new section which has been introduced keeping in mind the specific reporting responsibilities and considerations under the SAs. The matters which need to be commented upon are as under:
•    Whether the going concern basis of preparation of financial statements is appropriate;
•    Evaluation of the bank’s assessment of its ability to continue to meet its obligations for the foreseeable future (for at least 12 months after the date of the financial statements) with reasonable assurance for the same;
•    Any material uncertainties relating to going concern.

For considering the above matters the auditors should consider the guidance in SA-570 (Revised), Going Concern, issued by the ICAI. Further, an important indicator to assess the Going Concern assumption is whether the bank has been placed under the Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) framework as laid down under the RBI guidelines vide RBI Circular Ref: RBI/2016-17/276 DBS.CO.PPD.BC. No. 8/11.01.005/2016-17 dated 13th April, 2017 which gets triggered on breach of certain thresholds on Capital Adequacy, Profitability and Leverage Ratio. The auditors should verify the correspondence with the RBI and other documentary evidence to ensure / identify the status of the supervisory actions indicated / initiated by the RBI, as per the above-referred Circular.

Liquidity assessment

This is also an entirely new section which has been introduced considering its linkage with the going concern assessment and the recent guidelines framed by the RBI relating to Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and Net Stability Funding Ratio (NSFR). The matters which need to be commented upon are as under:
•    As a part of the assessment of the bank on going concern basis, the auditor should consider the robustness of the bank’s liquidity risk management systems and controls for managing liquidity;
•    Identifying any external indicators that reveal liquidity or funding concerns;
•    Availability of short-term liquidity support;
•    Compliance with norms relating to LCR and NSFR (as and when applicable).

The RBI has issued Guidelines for Maintenance of LCR vide RBI Circular Ref: RBI/2013-14/635 DBOD.BP.BC. No. 120 / 21.04.098/2013-14 dated 9th June, 2014 and related Circulars in terms of which banks are required to maintain an LCR, computed as the ratio of HIGH QUALITY LIQUID ASSETS TO THE NET CASH OUTFLOW OVER THE NEXT 30 DAYS which should be >= 100% effective 1st January, 2019.


INFORMATION SYSTEMS

The reporting under this section has been modified to include comments and reporting on certain specific matters, in addition to the existing requirements. These are briefly indicated hereunder:

Robustness of IT Systems:
•    Whether the software used by the bank were subjected to Information System & Security Audit, Application Function testing and any other audit mandated by RBI.
•    Adequacy of IS Audit, migration audit (as and where applicable) and any other audit relating to IT and the cyber security system.
•    Compliance with the findings of the above audits.

The following are the main RBI Circulars which are relevant in the context of the above reporting:
•    RBI Circular Ref: DBS.CO.OS MOS.BC. /11/33.01.029 / 2003-04 dated 30th April, 2004 on Information System Audit;
•    RBI Circular Ref: DBS.CO.ITC.BC. No. 6/31.02.008/2010-11 dated 29th April, 2011 Guidelines for IS Audit.

IT Security Policy (Including Cyber Security Policy)
•    Whether the bank has a duly updated and approved IT Security and IS Policy;
•    Whether the bank has complied with the RBI advisory / directives relating to IS environment / cyber security issued from time to time.

The following are the main RBI Circulars which are relevant in the context of the above reporting:
•    RBI Circular Ref: DBS.CO.ITC.BC. No. 6/31.02.008/2010-11 dated 29th April, 2011 (covering the IT Security Framework);
•    RBI Circular Ref: RBI/2015-16/418 DBS.CO/CSITE/BC. 11/33.01.001/2015-16 dated 2nd June, 2016 (covering the Cyber Security Framework).

Critical systems / processes
•    Whether there is an effective system of inter-linkage including seamless flow of data under Straight Through Process (STP) amongst various software / packages deployed.
•    Outsourced activities – Special emphasis has been placed on outsourced activities and bank’s control over them, including bank’s own internal policy for outsourced activities. In determining the reporting obligations in respect of outsourcing activities, the auditors should refer to the RBI Circular Ref: RBI/2006/167 DBOD.NO.BP. 40/ 21.04.158/ 2006-07 dated 3rd November, 2006. The said Circular requires the bank to put in place a comprehensive outsourcing policy, duly approved by the Board, which needs to cover the following aspects:
    a) Selection of activities;
  b) To ensure that core management functions including Internal Audit, Compliance function and decision-making functions like determining compliance with KYC norms for opening deposit accounts, according sanction for loans (including retail loans) and management of investment portfolio are not outsourced;
    c) Selection of service providers;
    d) Parameters for defining material outsourcing;
    e) Delegation of authority depending on risks and materiality;
    f) Systems to monitor and review the operations.

OTHER MATTERS
The specific additional areas requiring comments / reporting are as under:
Depositor Education and Awareness Fund (DEAF) Scheme 2014
Specific comments are required on the system related to compliance with the DEAF norms, which are laid down in the RBI Circular Ref: DBOD. DEAF Cell. BC. No. 101/ 30.01.002/2013-14 dated 21st March, 2014 the salient features of which are as under:
(a) Under the provisions of section 26A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 the amount to the credit of any account in India with any bank which has not been operated upon for a period of ten years or any deposit or any amount remaining unclaimed for more than ten years shall be credited to the Fund, within a period of three months from the expiry of the said period of ten years;
(b) The Fund shall be utilised for promotion of depositors’ interests and for such other purposes which may be necessary for the promotion of depositors’ interests as specified by RBI from time to time;
(c) The depositor would, however, be entitled to claim from the bank the deposit or any other unclaimed amount or operate the account after the expiry of ten years, even after such amount has been transferred to the Fund;
(d) The bank would be liable to pay the amount to the depositor / claimant and claim refund of such amount from the Fund.

Customer Services
Specific comments are required on business conduct including customer service by the bank describing instances, if any, of wrong debit of charges from customer accounts (also applicable to Branch Auditors), mis-selling, ineffective complaint disposal mechanism, etc. In this context, reference should be made to the RBI Master Circular on Customer Service in Banks dated 1st July, 2015 in terms of which banks are required to have a proper Customer Services Governance Framework coupled with Board Approved Customer Service Policies on specific aspects like Deposits, Cheque Collection, Customer Compensation, Grievance Redressal, amongst others.

In respect of all the above matters, involving compliance with the specific RBI guidelines, it is imperative for the auditors to thoroughly review the latest RBI Guidelines and Master Circulars / Directions and also read the latest RBI Inspection reports since greater granularity in reporting is now expected vis-a-vis the earlier reporting requirements.


FOR BRANCH AUDITORS

Whilst the basic reporting requirements are similar to those before, there are several additional areas which need to be reported / commented upon which can be broadly categorised as under:

Area

Additional areas to be commented /
reported upon

Cash, balances with the RBI, SBI and other banks

     
Reconciliation of the balance in the branch books in respect of cash
with its ATMs with the respective ATMs, based on the year-end scrolls
generated and differences, if any

      
Bank Reconciliation entries remaining unresponded for more than 15
days

     
Unresponded entries with respect to currency chest operations

Large advances

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

     
Details in the specified format for all outstanding advances in
excess of 10% (earlier 5%)
of outstanding aggregate balance of fund-based
and non-fund-based advances of the branch or Rs. 10 crores (earlier Rs. 2
crores),
whichever is less

    
Comment on adverse features considered significant in top 5
standard large advances
and which need management’s attention

Credit appraisal

      
Cases of quick mortality in accounts, where the facility became
non-performing within a period of 12 months from the date of first sanction;

       
Whether the applicable rate of interest is correctly fed into the
system;

Credit appraisal (continued)

     
Whether the interest rate is reviewed periodically as per the
guidelines applicable to floating rate loans linked to MCLR / EBLR

      
(External Benchmark Lending Rate). [Refer to RBI Circular Ref: RBI
/2019-20/53 DBR. DIR. BC. No. 14/13.03.00/2019-20 dated 4th September,
2019 for Benchmark-Based Lending].

     
Whether correct and valid credit rating,
if available, of the credit facilities of
bank’s borrowers from RBI accredited Credit Rating Agencies has been fed into
the system

Deposits

     
Whether the scheme of automatic renewal of deposits applies to FCNR(B)
deposits;

     
Where such deposits have been renewed, whether the branch has
satisfied itself as to the ‘non-resident status’ of the depositor and whether
the renewal is made as per the applicable regulatory guidelines and the
original receipts / soft copy have been dispatched

Gold / bullion

      Does
the system ensure that gold / bullion is in effective joint custody of two or
more officials, as per the instructions of the controlling authorities;

Gold / bullion (continued)

      Does
the branch maintain adequate and regular records for receipts, issues and
balances of gold / bullion.

      Does
the periodic verification reveal
any excess / shortage of stocks as
compared to book records which have been promptly reported to the controlling
authorities

Books and records

     
Details of any software / systems (manual or  otherwise) used at the branch which are not
integrated with the CBS;

     Any
adverse feature in the IS audit having an impact on the branch accounts;

    
Prompt generation and expeditious
clearance of entries in the exception reports generated



CONCLUSION

The amendments / additional reporting requirements seem to reflect the mindset of the regulators to place enhanced responsibilities and expectations on the auditors in the already existing long list of reporting requirements in the LFAR which has become longer and more onerous with correspondingly longer sleepless nights!

 

Neediness: The need to be approved by others highlights the
fact that you do not approve of yourself
– Strategic Revolt

We don’t control our body, property, reputation, position,
and, in a word, everything not of our own doing
– Epictetus

TAXABILITY OF PRIVATE TRUST’S INCOME – SOME ISSUES

Taxability as to the income of the trustees of a private trust is something which at times eludes answers. This is despite the fact that most of the taxation law in this regard is contained in just a few sections, viz., sections 160 to 167.

SPECIFIC TRUST VS. DISCRETIONARY TRUST

Section 161 provides inter alia that tax shall be levied upon and recovered from the representative assessee in the like manner and to the same extent as it would be leviable upon the person represented. This phrase, ‘in like manner and to the same extent’, came to be interpreted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of C.W.T. Trustees of H.E.H. Nizam’s Family (Remainder Wealth) Trust, 108 ITR 555, page 595 in which the Court explained the three-fold consequences:

a) There must be as many assessments on the trustees as there are beneficiaries with determinate and known shares, though for the sake of convenience there may be one assessment order specifying separately the tax due in respect of the income of each of the beneficiaries;
b) The assessment of the trustees must be made in the same status as that of the particular beneficiary whose income is sought to be taxed in the hands of the trustee; and
c) The amount of tax payable by the trustees must be the same as that payable by each beneficiary in respect of the share of his income, if he were to be assessed directly.

Thus, it is clear that income in case of specific trust cannot be taxed in the hands of the trustees as one unit u/s 161(1) and tax on the share of each beneficiary shall be computed separately as if it formed part of the beneficiaries’ income. It is because of this reason that the Madras High Court in the case of A.K.A.S. Trust vs. State of Tamil Nadu, 113 ITR 66, held that a single assessment on the trustees by clubbing the income of all beneficiaries whose shares were defined and determined was not valid.

As opposed to specific trust there is a discretionary trust which means that the trustees have absolute discretion to apply the income and capital of the trust and where no right is given to the beneficiary to any part of the income of the trust property. Section 164 of the Act itself provides that a discretionary trust is a trust whose income is not specifically receivable on behalf of or for the benefit of any one person, or wherein the individual shares of the beneficiaries are indeterminate or unknown.

Therefore, section 161(1) can apply only where income is specifically received or receivable by the representative assessee on behalf of or for the benefit of the single beneficiary, or where there are more than one, the individual shares of the beneficiaries are defined and known. Tax in such a case would be levied on the representative assessee on the portion of the income to which any particular beneficiary is entitled and that, too, in respect of such portion of income. On the other hand, if income is not receivable or received by the representative assessee specifically on behalf of or for the benefit of the single beneficiary, or where the beneficiaries being more than one, their shares are indeterminate or unknown, the assessment on the representative assessee qua such income would be in accordance with the provision of section 164.

APPLICABILITY OF MAXIMUM MARGINAL RATE

The next issue is that relating to the interpretation of sub-section (1A) of section 161 which provides that in case of a specific trust where income includes profits and gains of business, tax shall be charged on the whole of the income in respect of which such person is so liable at the maximum marginal rate. Therefore, whenever there is any income of profits and gains of business in the case of specific trust, the whole income would suffer the tax at the maximum marginal rate irrespective of the tax which could have been levied upon the beneficiary as per the plain text of that section. But it has been held in CIT vs. T.A.V. Trust 264 ITR 52, 60 (Kerala) that where there are business income as well as other income in case of specific trust, then, too, income from the business earned by the trust alone shall be taxed at the maximum marginal rate and the other income has to be assessed in the hands of the trustees in the manner provided in section 161(1), i.e., in the hands of the beneficiaries. It would be appropriate if the observations of the High Court are extracted:

‘Now reverting to section 161(1A) of the Act it must be noted the sub-section (1A) only says, “notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1)”: in other words, it does not say “notwithstanding anything contained in this Act”. Thus, though the provisions of sub-section (1A) override the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 161, it does not have the effect of overriding the provisions of section 26 of the Act and consequently computation of the income from house property has to be made under sections 22 to 25 of the Act since the Tribunal had entered a categorical finding that the shares of the beneficiaries are definite. As already noted, as per sub-section (1A), where any income in respect of which a representative assessee is liable consists of, or includes, income by way of profits or gains of business, tax shall be charged on the whole of the income in respect of which such person is so liable at the maximum rate. The income so liable referred to in the said sub-section is only the business income of the trust and not any other income. It is only the income by way of profits and gains of business that can be charged at the maximum marginal rate. Any other interpretation, according to us, is against the very scheme of the Act and further such an interpretation will make the provisions of sub-section (1A) of section 161 unconstitutional. It is a well settled position that if two constructions of a statute are possible, one of which would make it intra vires and the other ultra vires, the Court must lean to that construction which would make the operation of the section intra vires (Johri Mal vs. Director of Consolidation of Holdings, AIR 1967 SC 1568).

This was an important interpretation placed by the Kerala High Court which is available to the taxpayers and can be pressed in appropriate cases.

According to section 164(1), income of the discretionary trust shall suffer tax at the maximum marginal rate, meaning that there would not be any basic exemption available except in situations provided under the provisos appended thereto. However, the Gujarat High Court in Niti Trust vs. CIT 221 ITR 435 (Guj.) has held that if there is a long-term capital gain, the maximum marginal rate applicable is 20% and such income would suffer the tax @ 20%. A similar position has been explained and taken by the Mumbai Bench of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in the case of Jamshetji Tata Trust vs. JDIT (Exemption) 148 ITD 388 (Mum.) and in Mahindra & Mahindra Employees’ Stock Option Trust vs. Additional CIT 155 ITD 1046 (Mum).

It may, however, be noted that the maximum marginal rate (MMR) as per the existing tax structure otherwise would work out to approximately 42.74%. Therefore, it can be taken in case of discretionary trust that if income includes any income on which special tax rate is applicable, that special rate being MMR for that income would be applicable qua such income and the rest of the income would suffer the tax rate (MMR) of 42.74% approximately.

‘ON BEHALF OF’ ‘FOR THE BENEFIT OF’


Private trust in itself is not a ‘person’ under the Act. Trustees who receive or are entitled to receive income ‘on behalf of’ or ‘for the benefit of any person’ are assessed to tax as taxable entities. Although section 160(1) uses the twin expressions ‘on behalf of’ and ‘for the benefit of’, but section 5(1)(a) which prescribes the scope of total income, uses the expression ‘by or on behalf of’ and therefore the question arises as to whether the implications of both the expressions are similar or are different.

The Supreme Court in the case of W.O. Holdswords & Ors. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, 33 ITR 472, had occasion to examine both the phrases in the context of the position of trustees. The Court held that trustees do not hold the land from which agricultural income is derived on behalf of the beneficiary but they hold it in their own right though for the benefit of the beneficiary. Besides, a trust is defined in the English Law as ‘A trust in the modern and confined sense of the word is the confidence reposed in a person with respect to property of which he has possession or over which he can exercise a power to the intent that he may hold the property or exercise the power for the benefit of some other person or objects’ (vide Halsbury’s Laws of England, Hailsham Edition, Volume 33, page 87, para 140).

Thus, it is more than evident that legal estate is vested in the trustees who hold it for the benefit of the beneficiary. Section 3 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882 is also clear and categorical on this point to the effect that the trustees hold the trust property for the benefit of the beneficiaries but not ‘on their behalf’.

Section 56(2)(x) introduced by the Finance Act, 2017 provides inter alia that any sum of money and / or property received by a person without consideration, or property received by a person without adequate consideration, would constitute income. There is some threshold limit in certain situations given under that section but that is not relevant for the purpose of the present discussion. Exceptions given in the proviso to section 56(2)(x) provide inter alia that money or property received from an individual by a trust created or established solely for the benefit of a relative of an individual would not be hit by clause (x) of section 56(2). Thus, if the settlor is an individual and the beneficiary is a relative of such individual, receipt of money and / or property by the trustees for the benefit of the relative would not be hit by the provisions of section 56(2)(x).

But whether the property settled by the individual settlor for the benefit of a non-relative would become taxable income u/s 56(2)(x) is a question which would engage all of us.

Section 4, which is the charging section, provides inter alia that income tax shall be charged for any assessment year in accordance with and subject to the provisions of the Act in respect of total income of the previous year of every person. Section 5 provides inter alia that total income of any previous year of a person includes all income from whatever source derived which is received or deemed to be received in India in such year by or on behalf of such person. Therefore, any income which is not received by the person or on behalf of such person cannot be brought within the scope of total income. In other words, income received for the benefit of such person is not contemplated to be covered u/s 5 and cannot be brought to tax in the hands of such person. Therefore, when the trustees receive the property for the benefit of the beneficiary, such receipt falls outside the scope of total income even if the beneficiary is a non-relative qua the settlor as the receipt of the property by the trustees cannot be said to be received by the beneficiary or received on behalf of the beneficiary. Therefore, the applicability of section 56(2)(x) even in the case of a non-relative beneficiary in the light of the above interpretation may not be easy for the Revenue. However, such interpretation is liable to be fraught with strong possibility of litigation.

In sum, taxability of private trust has been saddled with lots of controversies many of which have been sought to be given quietus with amendments made from time to time, but such controversies are never-ending.

 

The point of modern propaganda isn’t only to misinform or push an agenda. It is to exhaust your critical thinking, to annihilate truth
– Gary Kasparov

Teachers should prepare the student for the student’s future, not for the teacher’s past
– Richard Hamming

BURDEN OF DEALING WITH GOVERNMENT AND LESSONS FOR PROFESSIONALS

The recent compliance season of FYE 2019-20 in Covid’s shadow was another instance in the uninterrupted tradition of inciting difficulty in dealing with the government BY the government. The late announcement of extension for the due date of 31st October when the FM had earlier postponed dates except this tax audit date much in advance, appeared to display deep and vehement disregard for income-tax payers by the CBDT in spite of announcements such as ‘honouring the honest taxpayer’.
 

The unceasing inefficiencies, digital dysfunctionalities and lack of service require no summary. The point here is to nudge those vested with exclusive power, responsibility and obligation to make amends.

 

Let’s also look in the mirror and relearn some lessons. I have divided them under three groups:

 

REMEMBER:

1. Our job often is to report and help compliance.

2. Beyond a point, we need not call for extensions as much as we like to uphold what we believe is right.

3. The client is the primary owner of the compliance responsibility.

4. Signing off with a client doesn’t mean ‘delivering anyhow’ or ‘delivering no matter what’. That happens only in super-hero movies.

5. Promises and rhetoric are for optics. The final test of one’s word is the resultant experience. (GST, for example – great idea, terrible implementation!)

6. We ‘suffer’ when something goes wrong; but government cannot ‘suffer’ or ‘feel’.

7. Government has low commitment. Its words are need-based and breaches have no consequence1.You and I have a personal honour to keep our word, unlike the government.

8. Vote banks are more important than taxpayer banks. The taxpayers and tax professionals are at the bottom of their priority list.

 

 

1   Remember the FM adding
LTCG on STT-paid securities sale or MAT on SEZ profits that were tax-free


NEVER:

9. Carry the burden of clients. Few understand the pain that professionals go through.

10. Breach the ‘respectable distance’ we must keep from clients.

11. Emotionally identify (like doctors) with client problems, rather, identify their problems, give solutions and offer assistance.

12. Compromise on health. Your health is of paramount importance. Health once damaged can be irreparable and even(tually) fatal.

13. Feel that a contract of service by a Chartered Accountant is a contract of guarantee or insurance.

14. Work without an engagement letter defining scope and fees, timelines, deliverables and client readiness as a precondition. Never.

 

ALWAYS:

15. Explain the rules of services – Compliance is a sub-set of client preparedness and provision of useable data well in time.

16. Let clients sense that you cannot be taken for granted, especially for those perennial late-comers, shabby record-keepers, and low quality hirers.

17. Remind clients of their responsibilities, timelines to supply data and the consequences of not doing so.

18. Keep educating clients on the difference between products and services – products can be delivered off the shelf, not services.

19. Let clients know that delays have a ripple effect. Delay or breaking the tempo impacts other assignments. Have a start date and an end date.

20. Know the difference between material and immaterial for both amounts and issues in an assignment.

21. Consider variable fees – benefits for early birds.

 

Till we don’t do enough of the above, compliance professionals will be sinking deeper into a hole – health-wise and money-wise. Increasing compliances may seem lucrative and remunerative but will be taken over by machine. The role of CAs in our mind must be re-imagined and recalibrated constantly. This is not a guess, estimate or premonition. It is written on the wall!

 

 

 

 

Raman Jokhakar

Editor

 

ARE YOU CHASING THE GOLDEN DEER?

The pandemic brought us on our knees. In the name of growth, development and progress, mankind has gotten itself to a juncture where we are made to ponder – Are we chasing a golden deer? A few words about the legendary golden deer shall be in place.

Fulfilling the wish of Kaikeyi, King Dashrath sent Ram to forest exile for 14 years. Travelling through the woods, Ram, accompanied by his wife Sita and brother Laxman, reached the banks of the river Godavari and built an ashram there.

Ravana, to fulfil the wish of his sister Surpanakha who wanted Sita to be abducted to avenge the humiliation of her nose being cut off, was ready to do as desired by her. He requested Maricha, his uncle, to turn into a golden deer and graze around Ram’s ashram. Reluctantly, Maricha agreed to disguise himself and turn into a golden deer. As the golden deer grazed near Ram’s ashram, Sita noticed the enchanting beauty of the deer. The ‘Aranyakanda’ from Valmiki’s Ramayana describes the deer thus:

‘A beautiful golden deer with silver spots.
A deer that glowed as it moved with the sparkle of a hundred gems.
Sapphires, moonstones, black jets and amethysts,
studded on its lithe, golden body’.

Lured by its beauty, Sita insisted on having the deer and convinced Ram to chase it and bring it to her. Much against the wishes of Laxman, Ram chased the deer. After a long chase away from the ashram, Ram shot the deer, at which point of time it took the original form of Maricha and cried out for help in Ram’s voice. The rest of the narrative is history. However, for the purpose of the present contemplation I think we as professionals need to do some soul-searching in answer to this question at an individual level.

Our endeavour or life-long pursuit is seeking a state of everlasting happiness for ourselves and our near and dear ones. In this pursuit, we set out to achieve our degrees, get ourselves on a career path, slog our backs out without respite from dawn to dusk, making huge sacrifices in the process, bring up our families though finding it difficult to spend time with them, make money (the limits of which are never set) – but by the time we start feeling that we have ‘arrived’, it is time to ‘depart’!

The following lines are deeply entrenched in my mind’s eye right from the days when I commenced my career as a Chartered Accountant –

‘You’re counted among the best in your profession.
Because you’ve got talent, you’ve used it.
But have you been using yourself up in the process?
You slogged and made sacrifices –
Remember all those late nights at the office
And those hectic afternoons when you almost went mad with the tension?
Those skipped lunches, those fried snacks,
Those endless cups of coffee to keep the adrenalin flowing? Cigarettes? Booze?
Success has its price. You’ve paid it.
That’s why you are where you are.
Fair enough. But what lies ahead?
A long roll downhill? Hypertension? Heart disease? Ulcers? Diabetes?
A fragile old age, brought about prematurely’?

Does it sound like a rollercoaster ride bereft of all thrills, leaving you tired and exhausted? Do you think you have been successful but have no sense of accomplishment? Is it a futile attempt to reach the horizon?

What are you consumed by in your daily grind?
Is there a sense of accomplishment in what you do?
What gives meaning to what you do?
Does your success bring you fulfilment?
Are your goals aligned to a higher purpose?

At whatever stage of life you may be at, it’s never too late to answer the question, Are You Chasing The Golden Deer? because an unexamined life is not worth living.

USHERING IN UTOPIA

Your Editorial, EPIC SPEECH ON ‘BABUCRACY’ (BCAJ, December, 2020), is really an eye-opener. If such conditions are ushered in, we will be in UTOPIA. You have wonderfully brought out the quintessence of the Minister’s lamentations. Standards of general honesty are very low in our country. One Nitin Gadkari cannot bring in sweeping changes. People should raise their levels of integrity. Rama Rajyam cannot be established overnight. So many years of Independence have not made any marked change of attitude… You have done well, Editor, and let us hope for a transformation.

                                                                                                                   – R. Krishnan

WHO OR WHAT’S A CAP?

Mr. Thinkeshwar was a senior Chartered Accountant in practice for many years. His real name was Ishwar. However, he used to think so much that people started calling him ‘Thinkeshwar’. He was very sensitive and quite aware of social issues. He had genuine sympathy for the pains and miseries of the people, was a social activist and a good writer, too.

In the months of June and July, 2020 when Covid-19 was at its peak, he read a news item about how ‘Corona Afflicted People’ (CAP) were treated in society. One person tested Corona positive while he was in his office. Immediately, the boss asked him to leave. The CAP said there was no conveyance available. He was working in an essential service office – in a bank. But the boss ordered him to quit immediately and refused to even meet him. The driver refused to take him home in the car. The poor fellow walked about six km. to reach home. The security person was surprised to see him back so early. The news had already reached all the occupants of the society and the watchman was instructed not to let him enter the building. His family members were watching from their balcony. They threw his clothes and personal things down and asked him to go and stay in some hotel or any other place. He pleaded with each one of them – boss, colleagues, bank customers, driver, watchman, family members – about how he had done good things for them. But no one was in a mood to listen.

Thinkeshwar was moved by such true stories and started writing a very emotional article.

Suddenly, a thought occurred to him which gave him the shivers – what would happen if he himself became a CAP! He imagined certain scenes and dialogues:

With partners: ‘I slogged for the development of the firm with utmost good faith and sacrificed my personal life.’

Partners: ‘See, our agreement is to share only the profits of the firm, not each other’s personal difficulties’.

With articles: ‘I was generous to you – granting leaves, giving concessions in timings, imparting good training’.
Articles: ‘That’s nothing. It was your duty and our right.’

With staff: ‘I treated you so nicely and affectionately. Never did any bossing, paid salaries and bonus on time.’
Staff: ‘So what? We worked on lower salary. We would have earned much more outside (although everybody had tried outside). On the contrary, we obliged you by working with you.’

To clients: ‘I sacrificed my personal life to provide better service to you, carried all your anxieties on my head and remained in stress always. I helped you in many difficult situations on low fees, which were never received promptly, and undertook so much risk in certifying your accounts.’
Clients: ‘Sorry. That was your professional duty. We could have hired some other CA at a much cheaper cost but due to our “relations” we kept on obliging you. And we believe there is some law that prohibits prompt and regular payment of fees to CA’s!’

To family members: ‘I slogged at the cost of my health and sacrificed all personal pleasures. I committed so many sins to provide you a happy life.’
Family: ‘What’s great about that? It is the fate of all CAs. It’s your destiny. We are not going to share your sins and pains.’

Many similar scenes took place in Mr. Thinkeshwar’s vivid imagination – with Revenue Officers, friends, relatives and neighbours, but everybody disowned him.

Poor CAP’s, he thought to himself. He remembered the story of ‘Valya the dacoit’ who became Valmiki to write the Ramayan. And then suddenly he trembled as he realised that CAP also stands for CA’s in Practice.

He smiled to himself and happily started writing ‘Light Elements’ for BCAJ with a heavy heart.

SEBI: REVISING ITS OWN ORDERS AND ENHANCING PENALTIES

BACKGROUND
One of the many penal powers that SEBI has under the SEBI Act, 1992 (‘the Act’) is to levy fairly hefty penalties on those who have violated the provisions of various securities laws. The penalty is often up to three times the gains or Rs. 25 crores, whichever is higher. A person on whom a penalty has been levied can appeal to the Securities Appellate Tribunal (‘SAT’) and, if he does not succeed, further to the Supreme Court.

However, the question is, can SEBI review and revise its own orders?

The penalty is levied by an Adjudicating Officer (‘AO’) who, though subordinate to SEBI, is expected to act independently. It may happen that the ‘AO’ has, in the eyes of SEBI, made an error and thus the alleged wrongdoer escapes with a lower or even no penalty. Can this error be corrected? An incorrect order not only lets a wrongdoer escape but also creates a precedent for related matters in similar context and future cases.

The Act provides for a review and revision of the orders passed by the ‘AOs’. The Act was amended in 2014 with effect from 28th March, 2014 and sub-section (3) was introduced to section 15-I to permit such revision. Broadly stated, SEBI can initiate proceedings to revise an adjudication order and enhance the penalty if the order is found erroneous and not in the interests of the securities markets. The review proceedings have to be initiated within three months of the original order, or disposal of appeal by SAT against such order, whichever is earlier.

SEBI has passed several review orders under this provision. In fact, it recently enhanced the penalty on credit rating agencies in the matter of IL&FS from Rs. 25 lakhs as per the original order to Rs. 1 crore. Let us analyse the provision in more detail and consider briefly some pertinent cases.

SECTION 15-I(3) ANALYSED

Section 15-I of the SEBI Act lays down the procedure for adjudication by an ‘AO’ under various provisions that prescribe the penalty for specific wrongs. Section 15-I(3) lays down the provisions relating to revising orders passed by the ‘AO’ and reads as under (emphasis supplied):

Power to adjudicate

(3) The Board may call for and examine the record of any proceedings under this section and if it considers that the order passed by the adjudicating officer is erroneous to the extent it is not in the interests of the securities market, it may, after making or causing to be made such inquiry as it deems necessary, pass an order enhancing the quantum of penalty, if the circumstances of the case so justify:

Provided that no such order shall be passed unless the person concerned has been given an opportunity of being heard in the matter:

Provided further that nothing contained in this sub-section shall be applicable after expiry of a period of three months from the date of the order passed by the adjudicating officer or disposal of the appeal under section 15T, whichever is earlier.

Specific aspects of this provision are discussed in the following paragraphs.

ORDER SHOULD BE ‘ERRONEOUS’

This is the basic and most important prerequisite for enabling SEBI to take up revision of such orders. There has to be a manifest error in the order. The error may be of fact or of law. The error may be of not levying a penalty where the law requires it, or levying a lower penalty. An error must also be distinguished from taking a different view from amongst two or more views plausible. It is submitted that the view taken by the ‘AO’ has to be erroneous in the sense that such view could not possibly be taken. An error may not be very difficult to identify and demonstrate. However, in case of law there may be some subtleties. If two views are possible on reading the relevant provision of law, merely because the ‘AO’ took one of the plausible views does not mean that the order is erroneous. However, if the view in law is not possible to be taken, then the order is erroneous.

The other issue is, when can the amount of penalty levied be said to be erroneous? Certain provisions levy a minimum penalty and thus if the ‘AO’ levies penalty below this statutory minimum, the order is obviously erroneous. There can be other similar errors. The interesting question is that if the ‘AO’ levies penalty within a certain range permissible under law, can the order be held to be erroneous and a higher penalty be levied? As we shall see later, SEBI has levied higher penalty, albeit on facts, in certain orders.

THE ORDER IS ‘NOT IN THE INTEREST OF SECURITIES MARKETS’

The error should be of such a nature that it is not in the interests of securities markets. This provision is obviously very broad in nature and gives a wide brush for the SEBI to paint with. The securities markets consist of investors, companies, various intermediaries, exchanges, etc. There is also generally the credibility of the securities markets. Further, and more importantly (as also pointed out in orders under this provision), an error whereby a wrongdoer escapes with lower or no penalty creates an unhealthy precedent for others and indirectly serves as a disincentive for those who scrupulously follow the law.

The two conditions are simultaneous

The order should be erroneous and such error should be one that is not in the interests of the securities markets. Both these conditions have to be shown by SEBI before it can take up review of such an order and pass a revised one.

Opportunity of being heard
This is a basic principle of natural justice and is inbuilt in the provision. The party should be given a fair opportunity of being heard since the revision may result in enhancement of the penalty.

Enhancement of the quantum of penalty
The order can be revised and the amount of penalty can be increased. An interesting contention was raised in a couple of cases that enhancement means that the earlier order should have levied at least some penalty. And, therefore, if there was no penalty levied, there is no question of enhancement! SEBI has rejected this technical argument and has held that a penalty can be levied even if no penalty was levied earlier.

Interestingly, SEBI has even taken a view in some orders that the revision need not necessarily be for enhancing the penalty. It may even be for correcting a wrong interpretation of law by the ‘AO’.

Time limit
The provision shall not apply after a period of three months from the date of the original order or disposal of the appeal by SAT in relation to such order, whichever is earlier. While the wording is not wholly clear on this point, SEBI has taken a view that the time limit applies to initiation of the proceedings and the final revised order may be passed in due course even after such time.

Whether appeal to SAT against original order would bar such revision till appeal is disposed of?

SAT has refused to bar the continuation of such proceedings for revision even when the original order was under appeal before it (in the case of India Ratings and Research Private Limited vs. SEBI, order dated 1st July, 2020). However, it also ordered in that case that the revised order should not be given effect to.

Whether the provisions relating to revision under the Income-tax Act, 1961 are pari materia with the provisions under the Act?

A stand often raised by parties when faced with such revision proceedings is that the provision under the Act should be interpreted and applied in the same strict manner as the provision for revision of orders under the Income-tax Act for which there are numerous precedents laying down principles. However, SEBI has rejected this stand generally. It has taken a view that the scheme, object and even wording of the provision under the Income-tax Act are sharply different. Hence, section 15-I(3) of the (SEBI) Act has to be viewed independently and broadly.

SOME ORDERS PASSED UNDER THIS PROVISION

Over the years, SEBI has passed several orders revising the original order. Some of those orders are worth reviewing briefly.

In an order dated 13th November, 2014 in the case of Crosseas Capital Services Private Limited, no penalty was levied in a certain case of self-trades through automated trading. On facts, SEBI reviewed this order and held that a penalty was leviable and also directed the party to review its systems to ensure that such acts are not repeated. SEBI also rejected the argument that ‘enhancement’ can be only where the earlier order had levied at least some penalty. Orders of similar nature were passed against a stock-broker and his client in two other cases –

a) In the case of broker Adroit Financial Services Private Limited and its client AKG Securities and Consultancy Limited, vide order dated 13th January, 2015, and
b) In the case of broker Marwadi Shares and Finance Limited and its client Chandarana Intermediaries Brokers Private Limited, vide order dated 13th October, 2015.

Vide order dated 11th January, 2017, in the matter of Saradha Realty India Limited, SEBI passed an interesting direction. The original order of the ‘AO’ had let off certain directors of the company who had resigned although they were directors at the time when the violations took place. The penalty was thus levied, jointly and severally, only on the existing directors. SEBI passed a revised order levying such penalty on all the persons who were directors at the time when the violations took place. The amount of penalty itself was not enhanced.

In a recent order (dated 20th November, 2020 in the matter of Oxyzo Financial Services Private Limited), SEBI held that the ‘AO’ had made a wrong interpretation of the applicable provision and thus revised it as per the correct interpretation. However, since even otherwise there was no violation by the party of the applicable law, no penalty was levied even in the revised order.

In three recent orders, all dated 22nd September, 2020, SEBI enhanced the penalty levied from Rs. 25 lakhs to Rs. 1 crore in each case. These were the cases of credit rating agencies in respect of credit rating in the matter of IL&FS. SEBI held that, especially in view of the significant amounts involved and the impact on investors, a higher penalty was deserved.

CONCLUSION


Often, adjudication proceedings are initiated many years after an alleged violation. These proceedings themselves may take a long time to conclude. The revision proceedings would then add yet another layer to the time and proceedings. Thankfully, there is a short time limit of a maximum of three months of the original order to initiate such proceedings.

However, the wordings of the provision for revision are broad and even vague at places. The scope ought to be narrow particularly considering that the original order has to be ‘erroneous’. Merely because SEBI holds another, different view should not result in invocation of this provision if the view in the original order is also an alternate and acceptable one. Further, merely because a higher penalty was leviable by itself should not result in invocation of this provision. One hopes that, in appeal, clearer principles would be laid down.

SUPREMACY OF THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT

INTRODUCTION
The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (‘the DV Act’) is a beneficial Act and one which asserts the rights of women who are subject to domestic violence. Various Supreme Court and High Court judgments have upheld the supremacy of this Act over other laws and asserted from time to time that this is a law which cannot be defenestrated.

In the words of the Supreme Court (in Satish Chander Ahuja vs. Sneha Ahuja, CA No. 2483/2020), domestic violence in this country is rampant and several women encounter violence in some form or other or almost every day; however, it is the least reported form of cruel behaviour. The enactment of this Act of 2005 is a milestone for protection of women in the country. The purpose of its enactment, as explained in Kunapareddy Alias Nookala Shankar Balaji vs. Kunapareddy Swarna Kumari and Anr. (2016) 11 SCC 774 was to protect women against violence of any kind, especially that occurring within the family, as the civil law does not address this phenomenon in its entirety. In Manmohan Attavar vs. Neelam Manmohan Attavar (2017) 8 SCC 550, the Supreme Court noticed that the DV Act has been enacted to create an entitlement in favour of the woman of the right of residence. Considering the importance accorded to this law, let us understand its important facets.

WHO IS COVERED?

It is an Act to provide for more effective protection of the rights, guaranteed under the Constitution of India, of those women who are victims of violence of any kind occurring within the family.

It provides that if any act of domestic violence has been committed against a woman, then she can approach the designated Protection Officers to protect her. In V.D. Bhanot vs. Savita Bhanot (2012) 3 SCC 183, it was held that the Act applied even to cases of domestic violence which have taken place before the Act came into force. The same view has been expressed in Saraswathy vs. Babu (2014) 3 SCC 712.

Hence, it becomes essential to find out who can claim shelter under this Act. An aggrieved woman under the DV Act is one who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with an adult male and who alleges having been subjected to any act of domestic violence by him. A domestic relationship means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, or are family members living together as a joint family.

WHAT IS DOMESTIC VIOLENCE?

The concept of domestic violence is very important and section 3 of the DV Act defines the same as an act committed against the woman which:
(a) harms or injures or endangers the health, safety, or well-being, whether mental or physical, of the woman and includes causing abuse of any nature, physical, verbal, economic abuse, etc.; or
(b) harasses or endangers the woman with a view to coerce her or any other person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any dowry or other property or valuable security; or
(c) otherwise injures or causes harm, whether physical or mental, to the aggrieved person.

Thus, economic abuse is also considered to be an act of domestic violence under the DV Act. This term is defined in a wide manner and includes deprivation of all or any economic or financial resources to which a woman is entitled under any law or custom or which she requires out of necessity, including household necessities, stridhan property, etc.

SHARED HOUSEHOLD

Under the Act, the concept of a ‘shared household’ is very important and means a household where the aggrieved lives, or at any stage has lived, in a domestic relationship with the accused male and includes a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household. Section 17 of the DV Act provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, every woman in a domestic relationship shall have the right to reside in the shared household, whether or not she has any right, title or beneficial interest in the same. Further, the Court can pass a relief order preventing her from being evicted from the shared household, against others entering / staying in it, against it being sold or alienated, etc. The Court can also pass a monetary relief order for maintenance of the aggrieved person and her children. This relief shall be adequate, fair and reasonable and consistent with her accustomed standard of living.

In S.R. Batra and Anr. vs. Taruna Batra (2007) 3 SCC 169 a two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court held that the wife is entitled only to claim a right u/s 17(1) to residence in a shared household and a shared household would only mean the house belonging to or taken on rent by the husband, or the house which belongs to the joint family of which the husband is a member.

Recently, a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court had an occasion to again consider this very issue in Satish Chander Ahuja vs. Sneha Ahuja, CA No. 2483/2020 and it overruled the above two-Judge decision. The Court had to decide whether a flat belonging to the father-in-law could be restrained from alienation under a plea filed by the daughter-in-law under the DV Act. The question posed for determination was whether a shared household has to be read to mean that household which is the household of a joint family / one in which the husband of the aggrieved woman has a share. It held that shared household is the shared household of the aggrieved person where she was living at the time when the application was filed or in the recent past had been excluded from its use, or she is temporarily absent. The words ‘lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship’ had to be given its normal and purposeful meaning. The living of a woman in a household has to refer to a living which has some permanency. Mere fleeting or casual living at different places shall not make a shared household. The intention of the parties and the nature of living, including the nature of household, have to be looked into to find out as to whether the parties intended to treat the premises as a shared household or not. It held that the definition of shared household as noticed in section 2(s) did not indicate that a shared household shall be one which belongs to or (has been) taken on rent by the husband. If the shared household belongs to any relative of the husband with whom the woman has lived in a domestic relationship, then the conditions mentioned in the DV Act were satisfied and the said house will become a shared household.

The Supreme Court also noted with approval the decisions of the Delhi Court in Preeti Satija vs. Raj Kumari and Anr., 2014 SCC Online Del 188, which held that the mother-in-law (or a father-in-law, or for that matter ‘a relative of the husband’) can also be a respondent in the proceedings under the DV Act and remedies available under the same Act would necessarily need to be enforced against them; and in Navneet Arora vs. Surender Kaur and Ors., 2014 SCC Online Del 7617, which held that the broad and inclusive definition of the term ‘shared household’ in the DV Act was in consonance with the family patterns in India where married couples continued to live with their parents in homes owned by the parents. However, the Supreme Court also sounded a note of caution. It held that there was a need to observe that the right to residence u/s 19 of the DV Act was not an indefeasible right of residence in a shared household, especially when the daughter-in-law was pitted against an aged father-in-law and mother-in-law. Senior citizens in the evening of their lives were also entitled to live peacefully and not be haunted by marital discord between their sons and daughters-in-law. While granting relief the Court had to balance the rights of both the parties.

LIVE-IN RELATIONSHIPS

A live-in relationship is also considered as a domestic relationship. In D. Velusamy vs. D. Patchaiammal (2010) 10 SCC 469 it was held that in the DV Act Parliament has taken notice of a new social phenomenon which has emerged in India, known as live-in relationship. According to the Court, a relationship in the nature of marriage was akin to a common law marriage and must satisfy the following conditions:
(i)   The couple must hold themselves out to society as being akin to spouses;
(ii)    They must be of a legal age to marry;
(iii)   They must be otherwise qualified to enter into a legal marriage, including being unmarried;
(iv) They must have voluntarily cohabited and held themselves out to the world as being akin to spouses for a significant period of time; and
(v)  The parties must have lived together in a ‘shared household’.

SEPARATED COUPLES

The Supreme Court had an interesting issue to consider in the case of Krishna Bhattacharjee vs. Sarathi Choudhury, Cr. Appeal No. 1545/2015 ~ whether once a decree of judicial separation has been issued, could the woman claim relief under the DV Act. The Supreme Court held after considering various earlier decisions in the cases of Jeet Singh vs. State of U.P. (1993) 1 SCC 325; Hirachand Srinivas Managaonkar vs. Sunanda (2001) 4 SCC 125; Bai Mani vs. Jayantilal Dahyabhai, AIR 1979 209; Soundarammal vs. Sundara Mahalinga Nadar, AIR 1980 Mad 294, that there was a distinction between a decree for divorce and a decree of judicial separation; in divorce there was a severance of the status and the parties did not remain as husband and wife, whereas in judicial separation the relationship between husband and wife continued and the legal relationship continued as it had not been snapped. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the decree of judicial separation did not act as a deterrent for the woman from claiming relief under the DV Act since the relationship of marriage was still subsisting.

SENIOR CITIZENS ACT

Just as the DV Act is a beneficial statute meant for protecting the rights of women, so also the ‘Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007’ is a Central Act enacted to provide for more effective provisions for the maintenance and welfare of parents and senior citizens. More often than not, there arises a divergence between the DV Act and the Senior Citizens Act and hence it is essential to understand this law also.

The Senior Citizens Act provides for the setting up of a Maintenance Tribunal in every State which shall adjudicate all matters for their maintenance, including provision for food, clothing, residence and medical attendance and treatment. Section 22(2) of this Act mandates that the State Government shall prescribe a comprehensive action plan for providing protection of the life and property of senior citizens. To enable this, section 32 empowers it to frame Rules under the Act. Accordingly, the Maharashtra Government has notified the Maharashtra Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Rules, 2010. Rule 20, which has been framed in this regard, provides that the Police Commissioner of a city shall take all necessary steps for the protection of the life and property of senior citizens.

Section 23 covers a situation where property has been transferred by a senior citizen (by gift or otherwise) subject to the condition that the transferee must provide the basic amenities and physical needs to the transferor. In such cases, if the transferee fails to provide the maintenance and physical needs, the transfer of the property is deemed to have been vitiated by fraud, coercion or under undue influence and can be held to be voidable at the option of the transferor.

Eviction from house under Senior Citizens Act
One of the most contentious and interesting facets of the Act has been whether the senior citizen / parent can make an application to the Tribunal seeking eviction from his house of the relative who is harassing him. Can the senior citizen / parent get his son / relative evicted on the grounds that he has not been allowing him to live peacefully? Different High Courts have taken contrary views in this respect. The Kerala High Court in C.K. Vasu vs. The Circle Inspector of Police, WP(C) 20850/2011 has taken the view that the Tribunal can only pass a maintenance order and the Act does not empower the Tribunal to grant eviction reliefs. A single Judge of the Delhi High Court in Sanjay Walia vs. Sneha Walia, 204 (2013) DLT 618 has held that for an eviction application the appropriate forum would be a Court and not the Maintenance Tribunal.

However, another single Judge of the Delhi High Court in Nasir vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors., 2015 (153) DRJ 259 has held that the object of the Act had to be kept in mind and which was to provide simple, inexpensive and speedy remedy to the parents and senior citizens who were in distress by a summary procedure. The provisions had to be liberally construed as the primary object was to give social justice to parents and senior citizens. Accordingly, it upheld the eviction order by the Tribunal. It held that directions to remove the children from the property were necessary in certain cases to ensure a normal life for the senior citizens. The direction of eviction was a necessary consequential relief or a corollary to which a senior citizen would be entitled and it accordingly directed the police station to evict the son.

A similar view was taken in Jayantram Vallabhdas Meswania vs. Vallabhdas Govindram Meswania, AIR 2013 Guj. 160. The Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in J. Shanti Sarup Dewan vs. Union Territory, Chandigarh, LPA No. 1007/2013 held that there had to be an enforcement mechanism set in place, especially qua the protection of property as envisaged under the said Act, and that the son was thus required to move out of the premises of his parents to permit them to live in peace and civil proceedings could be only qua a claim thereafter if the son so chose to make one, but that, too, without any interim injunction.

Senior Citizens Act or D.V. Act – Which reigns supreme?
What happens when a woman claims a right under the DV Act to a shared household belonging to her in-laws in which she and her husband resided and at the same time the in-laws seek to evict her by resorting to the Senior Citizens Act? We have already seen that the Supreme Court in the case of Satish Chander (Supra) has categorically established that a shared household would even include a house owned by and belonging to the in-laws. In such a scenario, which Act would reign supreme? A three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider this very singular issue in Smt. S. Vanitha vs. The Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District & Ors., CA 3822/2020 Order dated 15th December, 2020. The facts were that the in-laws sought to evict their estranged daughter-in-law from their house by resorting to the Senior Citizens Act. The Tribunal issued an eviction order. The woman claimed that as the lawfully-wedded spouse she could not be evicted from her shared household in view of the protection offered by section 17 of the DV Act. By relying on the decision in Satish Chander (Supra) she claimed that the authorities constituted under the Senior Citizens Act had no jurisdiction to order her eviction.

J. Dr. Chandrachud, speaking on behalf of the Bench, observed that the Maintenance Tribunal under the Senior Citizens Act may have the authority to order an eviction, if it is necessary and expedient to ensure the maintenance and protection of the senior citizen or parent. Eviction, in other words, would be an incident of the enforcement of the right to maintenance and protection. However, this remedy could be granted only after adverting to the competing claims in the dispute.

The Bench observed that section 36 of the DV Act contained a non-obstante clause to ensure that the remedies provided were in addition to other remedies and did not displace them. The Senior Citizens Act was undoubtedly a later Act and also stipulated that its provisions would have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other enactment. However, the Court held that the provisions of the Senior Citizens Act giving it overriding force and effect would not by themselves be conclusive of the intent to deprive a woman who claimed a right in a shared household under the DV Act. It held that the principles of statutory interpretation dictated that in the event of two special acts containing non-obstante clauses, the later law typically prevailed and here the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 was the later statute. However, interestingly, the Apex Court held that in the event of a conflict between two special acts, the dominant purpose of both statutes would have to be analysed to ascertain which one should prevail over the other. In this case, both pieces of legislation were intended to deal with salutary aspects of public welfare and interest.

It held that a significant object of the DV Act was to provide for and recognise the rights of women to secure housing and to recognise the right of a woman to reside in a matrimonial home or a shared household, whether or not she has any title or right in the shared household. Allowing the Senior Citizens Act to have an overriding force and effect in all situations, irrespective of competing entitlements of a woman to a right in a shared household within the meaning of the DV Act, 2005, would defeat the object and purpose which the Parliament sought to achieve in enacting the latter legislation. The law protecting the interest of senior citizens was intended to ensure that they are not left destitute, or at the mercy of their children or relatives. Equally, the purpose of the DV Act could not be ignored by a sleight of statutory interpretation. Both sets of legislations had to be harmoniously construed.

Hence, it laid down a very important principle, that the right of a woman to secure a residence order in respect of a shared household could not be defeated by the simple expedient of securing an order of eviction by adopting the summary procedure under the Senior Citizens Act! It accordingly directed that, in deference to the dominant purpose of both the legislations, it would be appropriate for a Maintenance Tribunal under the Senior Citizens Act to grant only such remedies of maintenance that do not result in obviating competing remedies under other special statutes such as the DV Act. The Senior Citizens Act could not be deployed to override and nullify other protections in law, particularly that of a woman’s right to a shared household u/s 17 of the DV Act.

CONCLUSION


It is evident that the DV Act is a very important enactment and a step towards women’s empowerment. Courts are not hesitant to uphold its superiority over other laws and under various scenarios.  

DEPARTMENT AUDIT

INTRODUCTION
For long taxes in India and the world over have worked on the principle of self-assessment, meaning a registered taxpayer (RTP) would himself assess his liability and discharge the same as per the provisions applicable under the respective statute by filing the prescribed returns. Once the self-assessment process is concluded, the tax authorities initiate the process of verifying the correctness of the taxes paid by the RTP under the self-assessment scheme which involved interaction with the RTPs / their consultants.

Under the pre-GST regime, with the presence of multiple taxes, there were multiple assessments in different forms that an RTP had to undergo. The VAT law provided for a concept of assessment which was done on a year-on-year basis requiring the RTP to visit the tax department with box-loads of files to demonstrate various claims and positions taken by him, while the Central Excise / Service tax followed a detailed Audit structure, which was commonly known as EA-2000 Audit, and in respect of which a detailed manual for the tax officials on how an Audit on taxpayer records should be carried out was also issued.

Apart from these, there were provisions for investigation, special audits, etc., under the respective statutes which empowered the tax authorities to undertake further verification. The same practice has also been followed under the GST regime with the law providing for different methods of assessment such as Provisional Assessment (section 60), Scrutiny in different scenarios (sections 61 to 64), Audit by Tax Authorities (section 65), Special Audit (section 66) and investigation (section 66).

ASSESSMENT VS. SCRUTINY VS. AUDIT VS. INVESTIGATION

The term assessment has been defined u/s 2(11) to mean determination of tax liability under this Act and includes self-assessment, re-assessment, provisional assessment, summary assessment and best judgment assessment. The above definition demonstrates that while there can be different forms of assessments, their purpose is to determine the tax liability of a person, whether or not such person is registered.

But while the term ‘scrutiny’ has not been specifically defined, the way the provisions u/s 61 have been worded indicate that scrutiny is to be seen vis-à-vis the correctness of the particulars furnished in the returns. Therefore, the scope of scrutiny would generally cover cases where there is a mismatch between GSTR1 and GSTR3B or non-disclosure of certain information in the returns, etc. In other words, the basis for scrutiny proceedings should only be the returns filed and nothing else. In that sense, this is similar to intimation issued u/s 143 (1) of the Income-tax Act.

The term ‘audit’, on the other hand, has been defined u/s 2(13) to mean the examination of records, returns and other documents maintained or furnished by the registered person under this Act or the rules made thereunder or under any other law for the time being in force to verify the correctness of turnover declared, taxes paid, refund claimed and input tax credit availed, and to assess his compliance with the provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder.

Lastly, the term investigation, which generally encompasses ‘inspection, search, seizure and arrest’, is undertaken by the tax authorities when they have reason to suspect suppression by an RTP whether of liability on supply of goods / services or claim of input tax credit. Any proceedings under this category can be initiated only after approval by the competent authority and empowers the tax authorities to confiscate the records of the RTP.

A plain reading of the above clearly indicates the distinction in the concept behind each of the steps and the very distinction needs to be respected. The same can be summarised as under:

•    Assessment – determination of tax liability,
•    Scrutiny – to verify the correctness of the returns filed,
•    Audit – to verify the overall compliance with the provisions of GST, including returns filed, credits / refunds claimed, etc.,
•    Investigation – to undertake verification based on specific information received relating to suppression by an RTP– either in respect of liability or input tax credit.
A primary question which generally arises and is also experienced in daily proceedings is whether there can be parallel proceedings. For example, can scrutiny of an RTP be undertaken when the audit for the same period is already going on? Or can an RTP be subjected to parallel proceedings – audit by one wing and investigation by another? In a recent decision in the case of Suresh Kumar PP vs. Dy. DGGI, Thiruvananthapuram [2020 (41) GSTL 308 (Ker.)], the single-member Bench had refused to intervene when parallel proceedings, audit u/s 65 and investigation were initiated. In fact, the HC held that interferences in process issued for auditing of books as well as order of seizure of the documents would help the Department in correlating the entries in document and at the time of auditing of the account.

When appealed before the Division Bench [reported in 2020 (41) GSTL 17 (Ker.)], while the High Court held that there was no infirmity in the audit and investigation proceedings being continued simultaneously, the Revenue itself submitted that once the investigation proceedings are initiated, the audit proceedings shall stand vacated. This is an important takeaway from this judgment (although in favour of Revenue) for RTPs who are facing parallel proceedings at the same time for the same period. The RTP can always contend that since the Department has taken a stand in one case that once investigation commences audit proceedings shall be discontinued, the same should be followed in other cases as well. However, it remains to be seen whether or not the Revenue follows this stand in all the cases.

In this background, we shall now discuss the provisions relating to audit u/s 65 for which many RTPs have already started receiving notices and some important aspects which revolve around the same.

SCOPE OF AUDIT

The term ‘audit’ has been defined u/s 2(13) and reproduced above. On going through the same, it is apparent that the scope of audit is to be restricted to ‘examination of records, returns and other documents maintained or furnished by the registered person’.

While the term ‘record’ has not been defined, the term ‘document’ has been defined u/s 2(41) to include written or printed record of any sort and electronic record as defined in clause (t) of section 2 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (21 of 2000). Section 145 further provides that any document, which is maintained in a microfilm or reproduced as image embodied in a microfilm or a facsimile copy of a document or statement contained in a document and included in printed material produced by a computer or any information stored electronically in any device or media including hard copies made of such information, shall be deemed to be a document for the purposes of this Act. It is, therefore apparent that all documents which are stored in a scanned copy should be sufficient during the audit purpose. This should apply also for copies of purchase invoices, sales invoices, etc., which, during the audit, tax authorities generally insist upon for physical verification.

The second important takeaway from the definition of ‘audit’ which to some extent also defines the scope of ‘audit’, is that the examination is to be of the documents maintained or furnished by the registered person, i.e., things which are within the reach of the RTP being audited. Therefore, what can be the subject matter of audit is only such documents / records which are maintained / furnished by the RTP and are within his control. Therefore, the audit team cannot insist on a reconciliation based on figures appearing in form 26AS and demand tax on the mismatch since the form 26AS is not maintained / furnished by the RTP, but prepared by the Government based on disclosures made by the RTPs’ clients / suppliers. This view finds support from the decision of the Tribunal in the case of Sharma Fabricators & Erectors Private Limited vs. CCE, Allahabad [2017 (5) GSTL 96 (Tri. All.)] where the Tribunal had set aside the demand raised based on TDS certificates issued by the clients and not the books of accounts of the RTP.

A similar issue is likely to arise in case of mismatch between GSTR3B and GSTR2A. GSTR3B is the monthly return wherein an RTP also lodges a claim for input tax credit while GSTR2A is the document wherein the supplies disclosed by the supplier in GSTR1 are disclosed and auto-populated and made available to the recipient. A strong view can be taken that GSTR3B and GSTR2A are not comparable documents as GSTR2A is not maintained / furnished by the recipient. However, such a stand may not be accepted by the Department after the introduction of Rule 36(4) as the scope of audit is to look at the overall correctness of the returns furnished by the RTP and compliance with the various provisions of the Act and Rules framed therein.

In fact, on the issue of whether an audit can be conducted when there is apprehension that certain amounts were kept outside of the accounts, the Supreme Court has, while admitting the appeal in the case of Commissioner vs. Ranka Wires Private Limited [2006 (197) ELT A83 (SC)], sought an affidavit from the Revenue as to why the audit was conducted when the show cause notice alleged that certain amounts were kept out of the accounts. This indicates that even the Supreme Court is of the view that in a case where the dispute revolves around transactions outside the books of accounts of the RTP, the same is a fit case for investigation and not audit.

LEGAL VALIDITY

Under the Service Tax regime, the power to conduct audit was derived from Rule 5A of the Service Tax Rules, 1994. However, there were no enabling powers under the Finance Act, 1994 empowering the Central Government to frame rules relating to Department Audit. For this reason, the Delhi High Court has, in the case of Mega Cabs Private Limited vs. UoI [2016 (43) STR 67 (Del. HC)] held Rule 5A as ultra vires the provisions of the Finance Act, 1994. This dispute continued even after the introduction of GST where the notice for conducting audits was challenged on the grounds that the savings clause under the CGST Act, 2017 did not save the right of the Revenue to conduct audit u/r 5A of the Service Tax Rules, 1994. There have been conflicting decisions of the High Courts in this regard and therefore the dispute will reach finality only with a judgment of the Apex Court.

However, the above decision may not continue to apply under GST. The basis for the conclusion in the case of Mega Cabs (Supra) was that there was no enabling provision under the Finance Act, 1994 which empowered the Central Government to make Rules relating to audit. However, under the GST regime there are specific provisions which empower the Government to undertake Department Audit and frame rules in regard to the same.

AUDIT U/S 65 – PROCEDURAL ASPECTS
The detailed procedure to be followed while conducting audit has been provided for u/s 65 of the CGST Act, 2017. In addition, the CBIC has also issued a detailed Manual for steps to be followed before, during and after the audit.

Selection of registered person for audit

This is the first step of the audit process. This requires following of the risk-assessment method for selection of the RTP who shall undergo audit. The entire process would be facilitated based on the available registered person-wise data, the availability of which would be ensured by the Audit Commissionerate. Based on the process of risk assessment undertaken, the list of RTPs selected for the audit would be shared with the Audit Commissionerate, along with the risk indicators, i.e., area of focus for the Audit Team. The Audit Commissionerate would also be at liberty to select RTPs at random for undertaking of audit based on local risk perception in each category of small, medium and large units as well as those registered u/s 51 and 52 to verify compliance thereof.

The Manual also speaks of accrediting such RTPs, who have a proven track record of compliance with tax laws, though the procedure for such accreditation is yet to be provided. RTPs who have received accreditation shall not be subjected to audit up to three years after the date of the last audit.

Authorisation for conducting audit

The first formal step after selection of the RTP liable to be audited is authorisation u/s 65(1) to conduct the said audit, either by the Commissioner or any officer authorised by a general or specific order. U/r 101 it has been provided that the period of audit shall be a financial year or part thereof, or multiples thereof. This is the enabling provision for initiating the audit process and unless a valid authorisation has been obtained, the entire proceedings would be treated as null and void.

One may refer to the decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Devilog Systems India vs. Collector of Customs, Bangalore [1995 (76) ELT 520 (Kar.)] where a notice not issued by a ‘proper officer’ was held to be invalid. On the other hand, recently the Delhi High Court has, in the case of RCI Industries & Technologies Limited vs. Commissioner, DGST [2021-VIL-31-Del.], held that if an officer of the Central GST initiates intelligence-based enforcement action against an RTP administratively assigned to a State GST, the officers of the former would not transfer the said case to their counterparts in the latter Department and they would themselves take the case to its logical conclusion.

A question might arise as to whether or not the auditee should be given an opportunity of being heard before his name is selected for the purpose of conducting audit u/s 65(1). This aspect has been dealt with by the High Court in the case of Paharpur Cooling Towers Limited vs. Senior Joint Commissioner [2017 (7) GSTL 282 (Cal.)] wherein, in the context of VAT, the Court held that subjecting an assessee to audit does not result in adverse civil consequence and therefore the question of giving a hearing before selection does not arise.

However, while selecting an RTP for special audit, the Delhi High Court has held in the case of Larsen & Toubro Ltd. [2017 (52) STR 116 (Del.)] that since an order for special audit is likely to cause prejudice, hardship and displacement to the assessee, the requirement of issuance of a show cause notice ought to be read into section 58A of the Delhi Value Added Tax Act, 2004 so as to grant reasonable opportunity for representation.

Pre-Audit preparation

This is where the actual audit process concerning an RTP commences. The first step is to prepare the Registered Person Master Profile (RPMF) which contains details that can be extracted from the Registration Certificate, such as application for registration, registration documents and returns filed by the registered person as well as from his annual return, E-way Bills, reports / returns submitted to regulatory authorities or other agencies, Income-tax returns, contracts with his clients, audit reports of earlier periods as well as audits conducted by other agencies, like office of the C&AG, etc., most of which will be available in the GSTN.

The Manual speaks about a utility ‘RTPs at a Glance’ made available to the Audit Team which would contain a comprehensive data base about an RTP. It appears primarily to be a facility exclusively for the Audit Team and not for the auditee. The Manual also requires that before the start of each audit the RPMF should be updated based on the details available or sourced from the auditee and the same should be updated periodically after completion of audit. Various documents gathered during the audit, such as audit working papers, audit report duly approved during Monitoring Meeting, etc., along with the latest documents should also form part of the RPMF.

AUTHORS’ VIEWS

The Audit Manual speaks about RPMF which needs to be collated and updated by the Jurisdictional Audit Commissionerate. This is a novel concept aimed at improving the quality of the process and would also help the Audit Team become aware about the auditee. However, maintenance of records in the specified format prescribed in the Audit Manual is not something new but one that was also used during the EA 2000 Audit. Past experience indicates that the Audit Teams generally shift the onus to compile and collect the basic details which is cast on them on to the auditees and such an exercise is started only when the audit nears completion and the file is to be put before the monitoring committee for review.

In fact, in the notices currently received it is seen that even the RPMF is being sent to the auditee for submission along with intimation in Form GST ADT 01 and the list of documents required for the audit. Therefore, perhaps to this extent, the process laid down by the Manual appears to have failed to achieve the stated objective. This is because only after the profiling activity is undertaken is the audit allocated to the audit parties.

Audit intimation

The next step, after undertaking profiling of the RTP / auditee, is to allocate the audit to the audit parties. The audit parties are expected to issue intimation in Form GST ADT 01 giving the auditee at least 15 days to provide the details required for the audit as provided for u/s 65(3). An indicative list of information to be requisitioned by the audit party has been provided in Annexure III of the Audit Manual.

Section 65 clearly requires that a general / specific order be issued by the Commissioner / an officer authorised by him stating that the RTP has been selected for Department Audit for the period specified therein. Such a list has already been released by the Maharashtra State authorities where the audit will be conducted by the respective State Audit Team. Any RTP receiving intimation for audit should check:

•    Whether the notice has been received from his jurisdiction, i.e., an RTP allotted to State cannot be audited by Central authorities and vice versa;
•    The second point to check is whether the general order specifically mentions the RTP. If not, a request for a specific order should be made in writing to the Audit Team as absence of the same would render the entire proceedings being without the authority of law and any proceedings emanating from such an exercise might not survive the test of law.

Vide Explanation to section 65, it has been clarified that the term ‘commencement of audit’ shall be the date on which the records and other documents called for by the tax authorities are made available by the registered person, or the actual institution of audit at the place of business, whichever is later. This is important because section 65 provides that once the audit process commences, the same must be concluded within three months which period can be extended by the Commissioner for a further period of up to six months for reasons to be recorded in writing.

It is therefore of utmost importance that the RTP under audit maintain proper communication regarding submission of documents and once all the documents sought by the Audit Team are submitted, a formal letter intimating them about the same should be filed. This is important because under the service tax regime, while dealing with the issue of what constitutes commencement of audit, the Tribunal has in the case of Surya Enterprises vs. CCE & ST, Chennai II [2020 (37) GSTL 320 (Tri. Che.)] held that mere issuance of a letter requesting for submission of documents could not be considered as initiation of audit. The Department had to demonstrate that the audit was commenced by producing its register of audit visit.

Desk Review

On the basis of the response of the auditee, the Audit Party is expected to undertake a Desk Review to understand the operations, business practice and identify potential audit issues. The Desk Review proposed in the Manual is an exhaustive process to be undertaken by the Audit Party for the preparation of the audit plan, which includes:
•    Referring to RPMF which would throw up various points meriting inclusion in the audit plan;
•    Analysis of exports turnover, turnover of non-taxable / exempted goods and service to obtain a clear picture of the transactions not considered for tax payment and arrive at a prima facie opinion on the correctness of such claims;
•    Determine the various mismatches, such as GSTR1 vs. GSTR3B, credits as per 3B vs. 2A, etc., which should be discussed in the Audit Plan for verification at the time of audit;
•    Undertake ratio analysis, trend analysis and revenue risk analysis based on the documents obtained up to that stage and reconciling the same with the Third Party Information, such as Form 26AS, ITR, etc., and analysing the variances;
•    Prepare a checklist (different checklists have been prescribed for traders and composite dealers)

Audit plan

The next activity is to prepare the audit plan based on the above activities undertaken by the Audit Team. The Manual specifically highlights the importance of the Audit Plan and the steps preceding its preparation. It also specifies the preferable format in which the Audit Plan is to be prepared and requires that the same should be discussed with the Assistant / Deputy Commissioner and finalised after approval of the Commissioner / Joint or Additional / Deputy or Assistant, as the case may be.

Audit verification

The next step is to undertake audit verification. Section 65(2) provides that the audit ‘may’ be conducted at the POB of the RTP or in their office. The purpose of audit verification, as per the Manual, is to perform verification activities and obtain audit evidence by undertaking verification of data / documents submitted at the time of desk review and verification of points mentioned in the Audit Plan.

The primary activity to be carried out during Audit Verification is evaluation of internal controls which has been dealt with extensively in the Manual as it lays down different techniques to be followed for this process, including walk-through, ABC analysis, etc., and requires the various findings to be recorded in the working papers, the formats of which have also been specified in Annexure VIII of the Manual.

Additionally, the auditor is also required to undertake verification of all the points mentioned in the Audit Plan. The primary point to verify is whether any weakness in internal control of the auditee has resulted in loss of revenue to the Government. The Audit Team is also expected to verify various documents submitted to Government Departments which can be used for cross-verification of information filed for the assessment of GST.

Audit observations
The next step as per the Manual is to communicate the various audit observations to the auditee and obtain his feedback on the same. The Manual categorically states that an audit observation is not a show cause notice but only an exercise for understanding the perspective of the auditee on a particular issue and clearly states that wherever a suitable reply is provided by the auditee, the same may be removed from the findings and excluded from the draft audit report after approval of the seniors.

However, the Manual further states that where the response of the auditee is not forthcoming, the observation should be included in the draft audit para specifically stating the non-submission of response by the auditee.

This is an important step in the Manual. Even under the EA 2000 Audit it has been seen that whenever an observation letter is shared with the auditee, it is more in the nature of a show cause notice, rather than seeking the viewpoint of the auditee on a particular issue and in the observation para itself there is a statement saying that the payment of the tax amount, along with interest and penalty, be made and compliance be reported to the Audit Team. This contrasts with the purpose of the concept of communication of observation as it takes the shape of a recovery notice rather than a routine communication.

Unless the Audit Team is sensitised about this aspect, the Audit Manual will lose its purpose as it is unlikely the approach of the Audit Team would change even after issuance of this Manual. It has also been seen that the Team expects a reply to the observation para, at times in one to two days. The Audit Team needs to be sensitised to the fact that the auditee resources must also carry out their regular activity and they can, at no point of time, be fully dedicated only to the Department Audit process. Even otherwise, certain observation paras may involve legal issues that may need more time, including the auditee obtaining legal advice for drafting a reply to the same in which case a reply at such a short notice may not be feasible. Therefore, it is essential that a standardised format for sharing of audit observation and sufficient time to the auditee for replying to the same be prescribed.

Preparation of audit report

Once the above exercise is concluded, the Audit Team is expected to prepare a draft audit report for onward submission to senior officers and should be placed before the Monitoring Cell Meeting (MCM) for discussion on various points raised therein. It is during the MCM that the decisions of issuing notices, including invocation of extended period of limitations, are taken or issuance of a show cause notice can be waived.

Based on the decisions taken during the MCM, a Final Audit Report (FAR) has to be prepared which will also be conveyed to the auditee. Section 65(6) provides that on conclusion the ‘Proper Officer’ shall within 30 days inform the auditee about the findings, the reasons for such findings and his rights and obligations. The same shall be intimated in form GST ADT 02 as notified vide Rule 101(5). It is only after the issuance of the final audit report u/s 65(6) that recovery proceedings u/s 73 or 74 can be initiated.

It is imperative to note that generally the recovery proceedings are initiated before the issuance of the FAR. At the time of receipt of a show cause notice, the auditee needs to ensure whether the same is received prior to the issuance and receipt of the FAR or afterwards. It is imperative to note that even under the pre-GST regime, (recently) in Sheelpa Enterprises Private Limited vs. Union of India [2019 (367) ELT A17 (Guj.)] the High Court has admitted a writ petition challenging the validity of a show cause notice issued prior to the issuance of the FAR.

The Final Audit Report shall comprise of the decision taken on the audit paras, including cases where the show cause notice is issued / to be issued and cases where a decision to not initiate proceedings has been taken.

Respecting timelines

Section 65, Rule 101 of the CGST Rules, 2017 and the Audit Manual issued by the CBIC strongly reiterate the importance of adhering to timelines, both for initiation of audit as well as conclusion. The fact that this aspect has been specifically included in the statute demonstrates the intention of the Legislature to ensure timely compliance of the proceedings. This is a positive aspect because under the EA 2000 there were no strict timelines prescribed, but rather only guidelines which meant that the EA 2000 audit in many cases kept going on for a long stretch of time.

While this is a positive move on the part of the Legislature to include the timelines in the statute itself, it will also cast an onerous responsibility on the auditees to ensure that they have submitted all the information sought by the Audit Team within the prescribed time. Besides, proper documentation and acknowledgement of submission of documents would also be important since it is possible that the Audit Team might dispute the date of ‘commencement of audit’ itself citing receipt of incomplete data. It is therefore advisable that the fact of non-availability of certain details (for instance, state-wise trial balance) be intimated to the Audit Team at the initial stage itself.

The RTP should also note that in case of delay in submission, there might be adverse action taken on account of non-submission. For example, if an RTP has claimed certain exemption and the supporting documents for which are not submitted within the timelines prescribed by the Audit Team, it is possible that they may end up with an observation letter which would result in unnecessary initiation of a protracted litigation since the experience suggests that an observation para generally culminates in issuance of a show cause notice.

Therefore it is imperative that an RTP who has already received audit notice or is likely to receive one, prepares basic documentation which can be shared immediately with the Audit Team as and when asked, such as state-wise trial balances, details of exports along with FIRC details, basis for claim of exemption, reconciliation of earnings / expenditure in foreign currency with GST filings, etc. Perhaps a lot of the information sought by the Audit Team is generally required during the audit u/s 35. It would therefore be prudent that the RTP / consultants prepare the supporting file during the audit u/s 35 itself so that not only is there no duplication of work, but they also become aware of any specific issues.

An assessee, who was also registered under service tax, will agree that a lot of litigations under that tax were on account of non-submission of the above information. Of course, the Courts have time and again held that demand cannot be based merely on account of a difference in two figures and should be supported with proper evidence. One may refer to the decision of the Tribunal in the case of Go Bindas Entertainment Private Limited vs. CST, Noida [2019 (27) GSTL 397 (Tri. All.)].

Other points to note

An audit process involves substantial human element and therefore needs to be handled carefully on all fronts, be it sharing of information or interacting with the Audit Team owing to the subjectiveness of the auditor. The auditee / their consultants must bear this aspect in mind while interacting. It is important that at no point of time should they antagonise the Audit Team. This is important because if such a situation arises, it is likely that the Audit Team might raise meritless observations which would culminate in the issuance of show cause notices and the initiation of unnecessary protracted litigations.

One important aspect which needs to be noted by the readers, although out of context but arising from the Department Audit process, is that whenever a notice is issued by the Audit Team it is generally issued invoking the extended period of limitation alleging fraud, wilful misstatement, etc., with the intention to evade payment of tax. Such audit notices generally allege that ‘had the audit not been conducted, the fact of the said contravention, which can be either non-payment of tax / excess claim of input tax credit and so on, would have gone unnoticed’. It is imperative to note that merely making such a statement is not sufficient for invocation of extended period of limitation. There must be some demonstration that there prevailed an intention to evade payment of tax and the allegation of fraud, wilful misstatement, etc., should be demonstrated with supporting documentation by the Audit Team. The Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal has, in the case of Popular Caterers vs. Commissioner, CGST, Mumbai West [2019 (27) GSTL 545 (Tri. Mum.)], held that suppression can’t be alleged merely because the Audit Team found certain credits inadmissible.

The High Court has, in the case of Haiko Logistics Private Limited vs. UoI [2017 (6) GSTL 235 (Del.)] raised serious questions on the act of seizure of documents undertaken during the audit process.

Similarly, no summons can be issued in pursuance of the audit process. The Tribunal in the case of Manak Textiles vs. Collector of Central Excise [1989 (42) ELT 593 (Tri. Del.)] held that a statement made to an audit party is not valid as the Audit Party has no authority to record any statement. This principle should apply under GST also as audit is conducted u/s 65 while powers to record statements are governed u/s 70.

CONCLUSION

While the Audit Manual indicates the intention of the CBIC to make the entire process smooth and systematic, it remains to be seen how the same is implemented. Past experience shows that the Department Audit is generally an exhausting process resulting in unwarranted litigation, which in India is protracted and costly. It is therefore important that the RTP prepare for audit on an annual basis, irrespective of whether a notice for the same is received or not, and keep the documentation ready to the extent possible.  

ACCOUNTING FOR CROSS HOLDING

INTRODUCTION

There is no existing guidance under Ind AS for the accounting of cross holdings. This article provides guidance on the accounting of cross holdings between two associate companies. Consider the following fact pattern:

Entity Ze has an associate Ve (20% of Entity Ve and significant influence).

Entity Ve has an associate Ze (20% of Entity Ze and significant influence).

Both Entity Ze’s and Entity Ve’s share capital is 200,000 shares at 1 unit each.

Entity Ze’s profit excluding its share in Ve = INR 1000; Entity Ve’s profit excluding its share in Ze = INR 1000.

ISSUES

•    How does an entity account for cross holdings in associates in accordance with paragraph 27 of Ind AS 28 Investments in Associates and Joint Ventures in the Consolidated Financial Statements?
•    Does an entity adjust EPS calculation for the cross holdings?

RESPONSE
References to Ind AS
Paragraph 26 of Ind AS 28 applies consolidation procedures to equity method of accounting as follows:

‘Many of the procedures that are appropriate for the application of the equity method are similar to the consolidation procedures described in Ind AS 110. Furthermore, the concepts underlying the procedures used in accounting for the acquisition of a subsidiary are also adopted in accounting for the acquisition of an investment in an associate or a joint venture.’

Paragraph 27 of Ind AS 28 states:

‘A group’s share in an associate or a joint venture is the aggregate of the holdings in that associate or joint venture by the parent and its subsidiaries. The holdings of the group’s other associates or joint ventures are ignored for this purpose. When an associate or a joint venture has subsidiaries, associates or joint ventures, the profit or loss, other comprehensive income and net assets taken into account in applying the equity method are those recognised in the associate’s or joint venture’s financial statements (including the associate’s or joint venture’s share of the profit or loss, other comprehensive income and net assets of its associates and joint ventures), after any adjustments necessary to give effect to uniform accounting policies (see paragraphs 35 and 36A).’

Paragraph B86 of Ind AS 110 Consolidated Financial Statements states:

‘Consolidated financial statements:… (c) eliminate in full intragroup assets and liabilities, equity, income, expenses and cash flows relating to transactions between entities of the group (profits or losses resulting from intragroup transactions that are recognised in assets, such as inventory and fixed assets, are eliminated in full).’

Paragraph 33 of Ind AS 32 Financial Instruments: Presentation states:

‘If an entity re-acquires its own equity instruments, those instruments (“treasury shares”) shall be deducted from equity. No gain or loss shall be recognised in profit or loss on the purchase, sale, issue or cancellation of an entity’s own equity instruments. Such treasury shares may be acquired and held by the entity or by other members of the consolidated group. Consideration paid or received shall be recognised directly in equity.’

GROSS APPROACH
Entity Ze’s profit and Entity Ve’s profit are dependent on each other, which can be expressed by simultaneous equations as follows:

a = INR 1000 + 0.2b
b = INR 1000 + 0.2a

Solving the simultaneous equation results in:

a = INR 1250 and b = INR 1250

Therefore, Entity Ze’s profit is INR 1250, and Entity Ve’s profit is INR 1250.

NET APPROACH

This approach ignores the cross holding and simply takes up the investor’s share of the associate’s profit, excluding the equity income arising on the cross shareholding. Thus, the additional profit in the financial statements of both Entity Ze and Entity Ve is limited to INR 200 each (1000*20%).

A literal view of paragraph 27 of Ind AS 28 is that Entity Ze recognises its share of Entity Ve’s profits, including Entity Ve’s equity accounted profits. However, in the case of cross holdings this approach results in a portion of Ze’s profits being double counted. Consequently, the net approach, which only accounts for 20% of the associate’s profit, is more appropriate. In this fact pattern, the net approach results in Entity Ze and Entity Ve both recognising profit of INR 1200 (rather than INR 1250 as per the gross approach). The difference of INR 50 represents the equity effect of the cross holdings and therefore is not recognised in profit. In other words, the INR 50 represents (with respect to the associate that is preparing its consolidated accounts) a portion of its own profit being double counted.

Additionally, the equity method of accounting employs consolidation-type procedures such as the elimination of unrealised profits. Income arising on an investment held by a subsidiary in a parent is eliminated under paragraph B86(c) of Ind AS 110 Consolidated Financial Statements. Consequently, in applying consolidation procedures in equity accounting, income arising from associate’s investment in the investor should also be eliminated.

Consequently, the net approach is the only acceptable method.

EPS CALCULATION

The number of ordinary shares on issue is adjusted using the net approach. Consequently, an adjustment reduces the entity’s equity balance and its investment  in the associate by its effective 4% interest (20*20%) in its own shares. The result is similar to the treatment of treasury shares that are eliminated from equity and, accordingly, excluded in determining the EPS. In calculating earnings per share, the weighted average number of ordinary shares is reduced by the amount of the effective cross holding. Therefore, Entity Ze’s and Entity Ve’s ordinary shares are reduced to 192,000 (200,000*[100-4]; i.e. 96%) for the purpose of the earnings per share calculation.

Some may argue that the associate is not part of the group and therefore the shares held in the investor are not ‘treasury shares’ as defined in Ind AS 32. However, it may be noted that the view in the preceding paragraph does not rely on viewing the associate’s holding as treasury shares. Rather, it relies on the fact that Ind AS 28.26 states that many of the procedures that are appropriate for the application of the equity method are similar to the consolidation procedures described in Ind AS 110. If a subsidiary holds shares in a parent, these are eliminated under paragraph B86(c) of Ind AS 110. The same procedure should therefore apply to equity accounting.

Though this issue is discussed in the context of cross holdings between associates, it will apply equally to jointly controlled entities that are equity accounted.

Search and seizure – Sections 132, 143(2) and 158BC of ITA, 1961 – Block assessment u/s 158BC – Issue and service of notice u/s 143(2) is mandatory – Non-issuance of notice – Assessment vitiated

39. CIT vs.
Sodder Builder and Developers (P) Ltd.;
[2019] 419 ITR
436 (Bom.)
Date of order:
16th July, 2019

 

Search and
seizure – Sections 132, 143(2) and 158BC of ITA, 1961 – Block assessment u/s
158BC – Issue and service of notice u/s 143(2) is mandatory – Non-issuance of
notice – Assessment vitiated

 

A search and seizure operation u/s 132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was
conducted in the assessee’s premises. A notice was issued u/s 158BC to assess
the undisclosed income. The Assistant Commissioner passed an assessment order
u/s 158BC. The records indicated that no notice u/s 143(2) was issued to the
assessee.

 

The assessee contended that non-issuance of such a notice vitiated the
assessment made under the special procedure under Chapter XIV-B. The Tribunal
accepted the assessee’s claim and allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of
the Tribunal and held as under:

 

‘i)   In the present case,
admittedly, no notice u/s 143(2) of the said Act was ever issued to the
assessee. By applying the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Asst.
CIT vs. Hotel Blue Moon (210) 321 ITR 362 (SC)
, we will have to hold
that the assessment made in the present case stands vitiated.

 

ii)   Therefore, even if we were to
hold in favour of the Revenue with regard to the other substantial questions of
law framed at the time of admission of this appeal, the assessment made in the
present matter would nevertheless stand vitiated for want of mandatory notice
u/s 143(2) of the said Act.

 

iii)  The assessment made by the
Assistant Commissioner pursuant to the notice issued u/s 158BC was vitiated for
want of the mandatory notice u/s 143(2).’

 

 

Search and seizure – Sections 68, 132, 153A and 153C of ITA, 1961 – Assessment of third person – Jurisdiction of AO – Addition made u/s 68 not based on material seized during search – Not sustainable

38. Principal
CIT vs. Ankush Saluja;
[2019] 419 ITR
431 (Del.)
Date of order:
14th November, 2019
A.Y.: 2007-08

 

Search and
seizure – Sections 68, 132, 153A and 153C of ITA, 1961 – Assessment of third
person – Jurisdiction of AO – Addition made u/s 68 not based on material seized
during search – Not sustainable

 

A search and seizure operation u/s 132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was
conducted in the S group. Cash and jewellery which belonged to the assessee
were found and seized from the residence of the assessee’s father in whose name
the search warrant of authorisation was issued. The satisfaction note was
recorded by the AO in this regard and a notice u/s 153C read with section 153A
was issued against the assessee. In response thereto, the assessee filed his
return of income. The AO treated the unsecured loans as unexplained cash credit
u/s 68 of the Act and made an addition to that effect.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) held that the addition u/s 68 was not based
on any incriminating document found and seized during the search and,
therefore, the addition could not be sustained. The Tribunal upheld the order
of the Commissioner (Appeals).

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of
the Tribunal and held as under:

‘i)   There were concurrent
findings of fact to the effect that the additions made by the Assessing Officer
u/s 68 were not based on any incriminating document found or seized during the
search action u/s 132. In this view of the matter, the assumption of
jurisdiction u/s 153C by the Assessing Officer was not justified and
accordingly the additions made u/s 68 could not be sustained.

 

ii)   No question of law arose.’

 

Reassessment – Sections 147 and 148 of ITA, 1961 – Condition precedent for notice – Tangible material to show escapement of income from taxation – Agricultural income disclosed in return and accepted – Subsequent advisory by IT Department that claims of agricultural income should be investigated – Notice based solely on advisory – Not valid

37. Ravindra
Kumar (HUF) vs. CIT;
[2019] 419 ITR
308 (Patna)
Date of order:
6th August, 2019
A.Y.: 2011-12

 

Reassessment –
Sections 147 and 148 of ITA, 1961 – Condition precedent for notice – Tangible
material to show escapement of income from taxation – Agricultural income
disclosed in return and accepted – Subsequent advisory by IT Department that
claims of agricultural income should be investigated – Notice based solely on
advisory – Not valid

 

For the A.Y. 2011-12, the assessee had filed return of income which
included agricultural income. On 22nd March, 2018, the AO issued
notice u/s 133(6) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 requiring the assessee to furnish
the information relating to the agricultural income disclosed in his return.
The assessee did not respond to this notice. The notice was followed by a
notice u/s 148. The reassessment notice was based on an advisory issued by the
Income-tax Department. The advisory directed the AO to verify whether there was
any data entry error in the returns filed, to provide feedback where assessment
was complete and in cases where assessment was pending, to thoroughly verify
the claims on agricultural income. The assessee filed a writ petition and
challenged the notice.

 

The Patna High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

 

‘i)   A power to reopen an
assessment would vest in the Assessing Officer only if there is tangible material
in his possession for coming to a conclusion that there was escapement of
income chargeable to tax, from assessment, and the reasons with the Assessing
Officer must have a live link with the formation of belief.

 

ii)   The Assessing Officer
mentioned in the “reasons” supplied that the assessee had not
produced certain evidence in support of agricultural income and in the absence
of which the claim towards agricultural income could not be substantiated. The
admission by the Assessing Officer regarding absence of material could not lead
to the formation of belief that the disclosure was incorrect and chargeable to
tax u/s 147 of the Act. The reason was firstly that such opportunity was very
much available to the Assessing Officer at the stage of filing of the returns
when in exercise of powers u/s 142/143 such directions could have been issued
for production of records and a failure of the assessee to satisfy the
Assessing Officer on such count could have led to a best judgment assessment
u/s 144 at the stage of original assessment; but having not done so, such
recourse could not be adopted by relying upon the statutory provisions of
section 147 of the Act.

 

iii)  Secondly such enabling powers
were only to be exercised where there was tangible material available with the
Assessing Officer and not in the absence thereof. In view of the clear fact
situation available on the record where such reopening was simply founded on
the advisory dated 10th March, 2016 issued by the Department and
where the reasons so present for the formation of belief was not resting on any
tangible material in possession of the Assessing Officer, the entire exercise
was illegal and de hors the provisions of section 147 / 148’.

 

Article 7 of India-US DTAA – Explanation (a) to section 9(1)(v)(c) of the Act – Interest paid by an Indian branch of a foreign bank to its head office / overseas branches was not taxable under the Act – Explanation (a) to section 9(1)(v)(c) deeming such interest as income is prospective in nature

19. JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A. vs. DCIT
ITA No. 3747/Mum/2018 & 363/Mum/2019
A.Ys.: 2011-12 and 2012-13

Date of order: 30th December, 2019

Article 7 of India-US DTAA – Explanation (a) to section 9(1)(v)(c) of the Act – Interest paid by an Indian branch of a foreign bank to its head office / overseas branches was not taxable under the Act – Explanation (a) to section 9(1)(v)(c) deeming such interest as income is prospective in nature

FACTS

The assessee, an Indian branch (BO) of a US banking company, paid interest to its head office (HO) and sister branches abroad. The HO contended that the payment by the BO to the HO was payment to self and was covered under the principle of mutuality. Hence, interest received by it was not taxable in India. The AO accepted the contention of the assessee and completed the assessment on that basis.
Administrative CIT exercises power u/s 263 of the Act. According to the CIT, under the India-USA DTAA, interest is taxable in the source country. Since the assessee had its PE in India (i.e., the BO), interest was taxable in India. He further held that since the assessee had opted to be governed under beneficial provisions of the DTAA, the single entity approach under the Act gave way to the distinct and independent entity or separate entity approach under the DTAA. Hence, the BO and the HO were two separate entities. The CIT further referred to Explanation (a) to section 9(1)(v)(c) of the Act which was effective from 1st April, 2016 and mentioned that since the amendment was clarificatory in nature, it applied retrospectively. He also referred to the CBDT Circular No. 740 dated 17th April, 1996 mentioning that a branch of a foreign company in India is a separate entity for taxation under the Act. The CIT distinguished the Tribunal Special Bench decision in Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation vs. DDIT [2012] 19 taxmann. com 364 (Mum.) on the ground that the Tribunal had no occasion to consider the reasoning mentioned by him in the context of the DTAA. The CIT concluded that interest received by the HO and other branches abroad was taxable in India.
Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal with the Tribunal.
HELD
The Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation vs. DCIT1 held that since the interest paid by the BO to the HO is in the nature of payment made to self, it will be governed by the principle of mutuality. Hence, it was not taxable under the Act. Applying the same principle, interest received by the HO (and other branches) from the BO was not taxable in India.
Explanation (a) to section 9(1)(v)(c) of the Act, which deems that interest paid by the BO of a bank to its HO is taxable in India, applies prospectively from 1st April, 2016 and cannot be invoked to tax interest of any earlier financial year.

Article 12 of India-Singapore DTAA – Receipt from Indian group companies towards information technology and business support services did not qualify as royalty / FTS under India- Singapore DTAA

18. ACIT vs. M/s FCI Asia Pte. Ltd.
ITA Nos. 2588 & 2589/Del/2015
A.Ys.: 2009-10 and 2010-11

Date of order: 6th January, 2020

Article 12 of India-Singapore DTAA – Receipt from Indian group companies towards information technology and business support services did not qualify as royalty / FTS under India- Singapore DTAA

FACTS
The assessee, a Singapore company, was engaged in providing IT support services as well as business support services to its affiliates in India. The IT support services included services such as centralised data centre, disaster recovery management and backup storage. The business support services included common services towards purchasing, communications and international relationship matters, legal and insurance
support services.
The assessee contended that the services rendered by it were standardised IT-related services. Although the affiliates were provided access to IT infrastructure, they were not conferred with any use or right to use the equipment which remained under the control of the assessee. Thus, payment for such services did not amount to royalty under the Act as well as the India- Singapore DTAA. Besides, the IT support services as well as business support services did not enable the affiliates to apply technical knowledge independently or to perform such services independently without any recourse to the assessee. Hence, in the absence of a ‘make available’ clause under the India-Singapore DTAA being satisfied, such services did not qualify as Fees for Technical services under the India-Singapore DTAA.
However, the AO contended that in the course of rendering services, the assessee granted a right to its affiliates to access the data centre / storage capacity maintained by
it. Thus, payments made by the affiliates were towards the use of, or the right to use, industrial, commercial and scientific equipment. Hence, the payments were in the nature of royalty under the Act as well as under Article 12 of the India-Singapore DTAA.
Aggrieved, the assessee appealed before CIT(A) who ruled in his favour. The aggrieved AO preferred an appeal before the Tribunal.
HELD
The services rendered by the assessee in relation to the centralised data centre, WAN bandwidth management, disaster recovery management, backup and offsite storage management and security management merely involved provision of a ‘facility’ and not a right to use the equipment. Hence, the payment received for such services did not qualify as royalty.
Support services such as purchasing, communications and international relationship matters, legal and insurance support services did not enable the service recipient to make use of the said technical or managerial services independently. Further, there was no training involved under the agreement. Thus, consideration for such services did not qualify as FTS.


Article 12 of India-Finland DTAA – Consideration for distribution, updation and maintenance of software, without right of exploitation of intellectual property, was not in nature of royaltyunder India-Finland DTAA

17. TS-810-ITAT-2019 (Mum.)
Trimble Solutions Corporation vs. DCIT
ITA No. 6481/Mum/2017; 6482/Mum/2017
A.Y.: 2011-12

Date of order: 16th December, 2019

Article 12 of India-Finland DTAA – Consideration for distribution, updation and maintenance of software, without right of exploitation of intellectual property, was not in nature of royaltyunder India-Finland DTAA

FACTS

The assessee, a company incorporated in Finland, was engaged in the business of developing and marketing specialised off-the-shelf software products. The assessee appointed non-exclusive distributors for the distribution of the software to end-customers in India. In addition, the assessee also provided software upgrades, maintenance and support services with regard to such software.
During the year under consideration, the assessee received income from the sale of software as well as payments for maintenance and support services from the distributors in India. The assessee contended that the software was provided to its distributors for the purpose of resale / distribution to the end-customers for use as copyrighted article but no right was granted to use copyright in software. Further, the payments received for software upgrades, maintenance and support services with regard to software were also not for transfer of any right in copyright of a copyrighted article. Thus, payments received from distributors cannot be characterised as royalty under the India-Finland DTAA.
The AO, however, was of the view that distribution of software to end-customers through distributors resulted in transfer or use of copyright in software. In any case, postinsertion of Explanations 4 and 5 to section 9(1)(vi), grant of a license was also ‘royalty’. The AO read the definition of royalty under the Act into the India-Finland DTAA and held that payments received from distributors would qualify as royalty even under the India-Finland DTAA. The AO further held that payments received for maintenance and support services (including upgrades) were part of, and inextricably linked to, supply and use of software. Hence, payment for such services was also in the nature of royalty.
Aggrieved, the assessee approached the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP), which rejected the objections of the assessee.
Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before the Tribunal.

HELD

  •  Article 12 of the India-Finland DTAA envisages consideration for the use of, or the right to use, certain specific works which could include intellectual properties (such as copyright, patents, etc.) by the owner of such intellectual properties from any other person.
  •  The Tribunal noted the following factors from the agreement entered into between the assessee and the distributors:
• Distributors were granted non-exclusive license to market and distribute software products developed by the assessee;
• Distributors did not have the right to use the source code of such software products;
• Distributors were not permitted to modify, translate or recompile, add to, or in any way alter software products (including its documentation);
• Distributors were not permitted to create source code of software products supplied under the agreements;
• Distributors were not expressly permitted to reproduce or make copies of software products under the agreements (except backup copy as required by the customer);
• Distributors were not vested with rights of any nature in intellectual property developed and owned by the assessee in software products;
• All trademarks and trade names which distributors used in connection with products supplied, remained the exclusive property of the assessee. At all times, the assessee had title to all rights to intellectual property, software and proprietary information, including all components, additions, modifications and updates.
The assessee had granted only the right to distribute software products and not the right to reproduce or make copies of software. Thus, in the absence of vesting of any right of commercial exploitation of intellectual property contained in copyrighted article (i.e., software product), the amount received by the assessee from its distributors was in the nature of business income.
In terms of Article 3(2) of the India-Finland DTAA, the definition of a term under domestic law can be applied only if it is not defined in the DTAA. Royalty is defined in the India-Finland DTAA. Hence, amendment of its definition under domestic law had no bearing on the definition under the DTAA. Therefore, the contention of the AO / DRP that the definition of ‘royalty’ under the Act was to be read into the DTAA was incorrect.
Accordingly, payments received by the assessee from distributors were not in the nature of royalty under Article 12 of the DTAA.

Article 15 of India-Korea DTAA – Technical advisory services provided by non-resident individual to Indian company were in nature of IPS under Article 15 of India-Korea DTAA which, in absence of fixed base in India, were not taxable in India

16. TS-803-ITAT-2019 (Ahm.)
J. Korin Spinning Pvt. Ltd. vs. ITO
ITA No. 2734/Ahm/2016
A.Y.: 2015-16
Date of order: 13th December, 2019

Article 15 of India-Korea DTAA – Technical advisory services provided by non-resident individual to Indian company were in nature of IPS under Article 15 of India-Korea DTAA which, in absence of fixed base in India, were not taxable in India
FACTS
The assessee, an Indian company, entered into an agreement with Mr. L, a resident of  South Korea, under which he was required to act as technical adviser and provide technical advice in relation to certain aspects of the production process of the assessee. The assessee paid a consideration to Mr. L for the said services.
According to the assessee, the services provided by Mr. L were in the nature of Independent Personal Services (IPS) in terms of Article 15 of the India-Korea DTAA. Since Mr. L did not have a fixed base available to him in India, consideration for the  services was not taxable in India. Hence, the assessee did not withhold tax u/s 195 from the payments made to him.
The AO, however, contended that the services rendered by Mr. L were industrial in ature since they related to setting up of the assessee’s factory and cannot be categorised as IPS. Hence, they qualified as fee for technical services (FTS) u/s 9(1)(vii) as well as Article 13 (Royalties and FTS) of the DTAA.
The CIT(A) dismissed the assessee’s appeal. Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before the Tribunal.

HELD

  •  Mr. L was a technical expert in certain fields of textiles. He was engaged by the assessee to provide technical advice on some aspects of the assessee’s production process.
  •  Mr. L was an individual and resident of Korea.
  •  The agreement was between the assessee and Mr. L individually and not with any ‘firm’ or ‘company’.
  •  The agreement mentioned Mr. L as ‘Technical Adviser’ to the assessee. Hence, the services rendered by him qualified as IPS.
  •  Mr. L and his technical team were required to fly to India on need basis for rendering services to the assessee. This indicated that Mr. L did not have a fixed base in India.
  •  Since Mr. L did not have a fixed base in India, the consideration received by him was not taxable in India as per Article 15 of the India-Korea DTAA.

Section 56(2)(viib) – When there was no case of unaccounted money being brought in the garb of share premium, the provisions not attracted

11. Clearview Healthcare Pvt. Ltd. vs. ITO
(Delhi)
Member: H.S. Sidhu (J.M.) ITA No. 2222/Del/2019 A.Y.: 2014-15 Date of order: 3rd January, 2020 Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: Kapil Goel /
Pradeep Singh Gautam

 

Section 56(2)(viib) – When there was no
case of unaccounted money being brought in the garb of share premium, the
provisions not attracted

 

FACTS

The issue before the Tribunal was about taxability or otherwise of share
premium received on shares issued by the assessee company u/s 56(2)(viib). The
assessee was incorporated on 29th January, 2010. During the year
under appeal, the company had issued shares at premium. According to the AO,
the difference between the share premium received and the share valuation
determined under Rule 11UA amounting to Rs. 9.20 lakhs was the income of the
assessee as per the provisions of section 56(2)(viib). On appeal, the CIT(A)
confirmed the AO’s order.

 

Before the Tribunal, the assessee referred to the Explanatory Memorandum
to the Finance Act, 2012 and contended that the legislative intent was to apply
the said provisions only where, in the garb of share premium, money was
received which was not clean and was unaccounted. According to the assessee,
the lower authorities have applied the provisions of section 56(2)(viib)
without any finding that the money was not clean money. It was also pointed out
that in the subsequent year, on 1st December, 2014, the company’s
shares were sold by one of its shareholders to a non-resident at a price which
was higher than the price at which the shares were issued by the company. And
the said price was accepted by the tax authorities in the shareholder’s tax
assessment.

HELD

The Tribunal agreed with the assessee that the provisions of section
56(2)(viib) would apply only when money received was not clean and was
unaccounted money, received in the garb of share premium as mentioned in the
Explanatory Memorandum to the Finance Act, 2012.

 

According to the
Tribunal, a subsequent transaction with a foreign buyer which was at a higher
amount and on the basis of detailed due diligence, also justified that the
share premium received by the assessee was not excessive and was fair.

 

Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case and by applying
the principles from the decision of the Chennai Tribunal in the case of Lalithaa
Jewellery Mart Pvt. Ltd. (ITA Nos. 663, 664
and 665/Chennai/2019
decided on 14th June, 2019)
and legislative intent behind
the insertion of section 56(2)(viib), the Tribunal held that the addition made
by the AO on account of alleged excess share premium was unjustified when those
very shares were sold in the next financial year at a much higher amount after
proper due diligence to a non-resident buyer; and further there was no case of
unaccounted money being brought in in the garb of the stated share premium,
hence the addition made u/s 56(2)(vii) was deleted.

Proviso to section 2(15) r/w/s 11 and 12 – As part of running an educational institution and imparting training to the students, the assessee had undertaken research projects for the industry and earned consultancy fees from them – Since the dominant object was to impart education, the proviso to section 2(15) does not apply

10. Institute of Chemical Technology vs. ITO
(Mum.)
Members: Saktijit Dey (J.M.) and Rifaur Rahman
(A.M.) I.T.A. Nos. 6111 and 6922/Mum/2016
A.Ys: 2011-12 and 2012-13 Date of order: 15th January, 2020 Counsel for Revenue / Assessee: Nishant Thakkar
and Jasmine Amalsadwala / Kumar Padmapani Bora

 

Proviso to
section 2(15) r/w/s 11 and 12 – As part of running an educational institution
and imparting training to the students, the assessee had undertaken research
projects for the industry and earned consultancy fees from them – Since the
dominant object was to impart education, the proviso to section 2(15)
does not apply

 

FACTS

The assessee was
established as the Department of Chemical Technology by the University of
Bombay on 1st October, 1933. With the passage of time, the assessee
was granted autonomy and subsequently got converted into an independent
institution in January, 2002. In September, 2008 the assessee was granted
deemed university status. When the assessee was a part of Mumbai (earlier
Bombay) University, the income earned by it formed part of the income of Mumbai
University and was exempt u/s 10(23C). For the impugned assessment years, the
assessee in its return of income declared nil income after claiming exemption
u/s 11.

 

During the year
under consideration the assessee had received consultancy fees. Applying the
provisions of section 2(15) read with 
sections 11 and 12, the AO disallowed its claim of exemption with regard
to the consultancy fee received. The assessee’s claim of exemption u/s 11 in
respect of other income was allowed by the AO.

 

The assessee explained that as a part of the curriculum and with a view that the students / fellows of the Institution gain
actual working experience, the assessee had undertaken research projects for
the industry and earned consultancy fees from the industry clients. Out of the
fees received, only 1/3rd amount was retained by the assessee and
the balance amount was paid to the faculty who undertook the research projects.
The amount retained by the assessee was mainly to cover the cost of
infrastructure / laboratory facilities provided for undertaking the research
and administrative expenditure. Thus, it was submitted, the activities undertaken
by the assessee were not in the nature of business but only for research and
training purposes and therefore were part of its main activity of imparting
education on the latest technical developments in the field of chemical
technology. However, the AO didn’t agree with the explanation offered by the
assessee.

 

Relying on the
decision of the Tribunal in the assessee’s own case for the assessment year
2010-11, the Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the disallowance / addition made by
the AO.

 

Before the Tribunal,
the assessee submitted that in respect of the aforesaid decision of the
Tribunal relied on by the CIT(A), the Tribunal had no occasion to consider the
assessee’s argument that the proviso to section 2(15) was not
applicable. According to the assessee, the proviso to section 2(15)
would be applicable only when the activity was for ‘advancement of any other
object of general public utility’.
The assessee contended that the
consultancy service provided was part of its educational activity, therefore ancillary
and incidental to its main object of providing education. Therefore, even
though the assessee had received consultancy fee, the same was received in
furtherance of its object of educational activity, hence it cannot be treated
as an activity in the nature of trade, commerce or business and thereby treat
the same as for a non-charitable purpose.

 

HELD

The Tribunal agreed
with the assessee that applicability or otherwise of the proviso to
section 2(15) in the case of the assessee was not examined or dealt with by the
Tribunal in A.Y. 2010–11. According to it, the contention of the assessee
regarding applicability of the proviso to section 2(15) does require
examination keeping in view the decision of the Bombay High Court in DIT(E.)
vs. Lala Lajpatrai [2016] 383 ITR 345
, wherein the Court held that the
test to determine as to what would be a charitable purpose within the meaning
of section 2(15) was to ascertain what was the dominant object / activity.
According to the Court, if the dominant object was the activity of providing
education, it will be charitable purpose under section 2(15) even though some
profit arose from such activity. Since the aforesaid claim of the assessee was
not examined by the Departmental authorities, the Tribunal restored the matter
to the file of the AO for re-examination and directed him to adjudicate the
issue keeping in view the additional evidence filed by the assessee and the
decisions cited before him.

 

Note: Before the Tribunal, the assessee had also alternatively claimed
exemption under sections 10(23C)(iiiab) and / or 10(23C)(vi) and furnished
additional evidence. The Tribunal directed the AO to also consider the same.

Section 80P(4): Provisions of section 80P(4) exclude only co-operative banks and the same cannot be extended to co-operative credit societies

20. [2019] 107 taxmann.com 53
(Trib.)(Ahd.)(SB)
ACIT vs. People’s Co-op. Credit Society Ltd. ITA Nos. 1311, 2668 to 2670, 2865, 2866,
2871 & 2905 (Ahd.) of 2012
A.Ys.: 2007-08 to 2009-10 Date of order: 18th April, 2019

 

Section 80P(4):
Provisions of section 80P(4) exclude only co-operative banks and the same
cannot be extended to co-operative credit societies

FACTS

The assessee, a
co-operative credit society, providing credit facilities to its members and
carrying on banking business, claimed deduction u/s 80P(2)(a)(i). The AO
disallowed the same holding that provisions of section 80P(4) are applicable to
the assessee.

 

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who allowed the appeal.

 

The Revenue then
preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD

In view of the
contrary decisions by various benches of the Tribunal, a Special Bench (SB) was
constituted by the President to consider the question whether a co-operative
credit society is to be considered as a co-operative bank and whether by virtue
of the provisions of section 80P(4), a co-operative credit society shall be
disentitled to claim deduction u/s 80P(2)(a)(i).

 

At the time of
hearing before the Tribunal, the learned representatives agreed that the issues
before the SB of the Tribunal are now covered in favour of the assessee by
various decisions of the Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court – including in the
cases of Pr. CIT vs. Ekta Co-operative Credit Society Ltd. [2018] 91
taxmann.com 42/254, Taxman 33/402 ITR 85 
and CIT vs. Jafari Momin Vikas Co-operative Credit Society
Ltd. [2014] 49 taxmann.com 571/227, Taxman 59 (Mag.) 362 ITR 331 (Guj.).

 

The Tribunal, having considered the ratio of the decisions of the
Jurisdictional High Court in the cases of Pr. CIT vs. Ekta Co-operative
Credit Society Ltd. (Supra)
and CIT vs. Jafari Momin Vikas
Co-operative Credit Society Ltd. (Supra)
, held that the legal position
is quite clear and unambiguous. As held by the Jurisdictional High Court, the
benefit of section 80P(2)(a)(i) cannot be denied in the case of co-operative
credit societies in view of their function of providing credit facilities to
the members and the same are not hit by the provisions of section 80P(4).

 

The appeals filed
by the Revenue were dismissed.

Rule 37BA(3) r/w/s 199: Credit for Tax Deducted at Source has to be allowed in the year in which the corresponding income is assessed even though the tax is deposited by the deductor in the subsequent assessment year

19. [2019] 112 taxmann.com 354 (Trib.)(Pune) Mahesh Software Systems (P) Ltd. vs. ACIT ITA No. 1288/Pune/2017 A.Y.: 2011-12 Date of order: 20th September, 2019

Rule 37BA(3) r/w/s 199: Credit for Tax Deducted at Source has to be allowed in the year in which the corresponding income is assessed even though the tax is deposited by the deductor in the subsequent assessment year

FACTS
The assessee raised an invoice and offered to tax income arising therefrom in March, 2011. The assessee claimed credit for tax deducted thereon. However, the deductor deposited TDS only in April, 2011, i.e., in the succeeding financial year. Consequently, the TDS claimed by the assessee did not appear in Form 26AS for the year in which the income was booked. The AO, relying on sub-rule (1) of Rule 37BA, did not allow the credit in A.Y. 2011-12.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the order of the AO.

The assessee then filed an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD

The Tribunal observed that the AO had relied on sub-rule (1) of Rule 37BA for denying the benefit of TDS during the year under consideration. It provides that credit for TDS shall be given to the person to whom payment has been made or credit has been given on the basis of information furnished by the deductor. Thus, what is material for sub-rule (1) is the beneficiary of credit and not the time when credit ought to be allowed. The CIT(A), in addition, had relied on sub-rule (4) of Rule 37BA which again provides that credit for TDS shall be granted on the basis of information relating to TDS furnished by the deductor.

The Tribunal observed that the point of time at which the benefit of TDS is to be given is governed by  sub-rule (3) of Rule 37BA which very clearly provides that – ‘credit for tax deducted at source and paid to the Central Government, shall be given for the assessment year for which such income is assessable.’

In view of the above, the Tribunal held that the credit of TDS had to be allowed in the year under consideration even though the TDS was deposited by the deductor in the subsequent assessment year.

The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

Section 142A(6): It is mandatory for the Valuation Officer to submit the Valuation Report within six months from the date of receipt of the reference – Delay in filing the report cannot be condoned

18. [2019] 75 ITR (Trib.) 219 (Hyd.) Shri Zulfi Revdjee vs. ACIT ITA No. 2415/Hyd/2018 A.Y.: 2013-14 Date of order: 5th September,
2019

 

Section 142A(6): It is mandatory for the
Valuation Officer to submit the Valuation Report within six months from the date
of receipt of the reference – Delay in filing the report cannot be condoned

 

FACTS

The assessee sold a
property during F.Y. 2012-13. He filed the return of income disclosing capital
gains arising from the sale of the said property. The AO sought to make an
addition u/s 50C of the Act. However, since the assessee objected to it, he
referred the file to the Departmental Valuation Officer (DVO) for valuation of
the property. The DVO submitted the report after the expiry of the period
stipulated u/s 142A(6). Further, he also considered the value of the house as
on the date of registration of agreement. The assessee, inter alia,
raised an objection that the report submitted by the DVO is beyond the
stipulated time limit of six months, as specified u/s 142A(6), and consequently
the assessment is barred by limitation.

 

The assessee
preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved, the
assessee filed an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD

The Tribunal
observed that u/s 142A the valuation report by the DVO has to be submitted
within six months from the date of receipt of the reference. However, the DVO
submitted his report after 15 months from the end of the month in which
reference was made to him. The Tribunal considered whether the time limit for
submission of report could be enlarged or condoned. It noted that the word used
in sub-section (6) of section 142A is ‘shall’, while in other sub-sections it
is ‘may’. In B.K. Khanna & Co. vs. Union of India and others, the
Delhi High Court [156 ITR 796 (Del.)]
has held that where the words
‘may’ and ‘shall’ are used in various provisions of the same section, then both
of them contain different meanings and the word ‘shall’ shall mean ‘mandatory’.
In sub-section (6), since the word ‘shall’ is used, the time limit specified
therein is mandatory and, thus, delay cannot be condoned. The Tribunal held
that the report of the DVO had to be filed within the time limit prescribed
under section 142A(6) and, thus, the Assessment Order passed on the basis of
the DVO’s report is not sustainable.

 

The Tribunal
allowed this ground of appeal filed by the assessee.

 

Section 10(13A), Rule 2(h) of Fourth Schedule – For the purpose of computing qualifying amount u/s 10(13A) of the Act, the amount received as performance bonus does not assume character of salary

17. [2020] 113
taxmann.com 295 (Trib.)(Kol.)
Sudip Rungta vs.
DCIT ITA No.
2370/Kol/2017
A.Y.: 2011-12 Date of order: 10th
January, 2020

 

Section 10(13A), Rule 2(h) of Fourth Schedule – For the purpose of
computing qualifying amount u/s 10(13A) of the Act, the amount received as
performance bonus does not assume character of salary

 

FACTS

The assessee was a salaried employee who, for the year under
consideration, filed his return of income declaring total income of Rs.  2,61,97,296. During the year under
consideration, he had received a basic salary of Rs. 30,00,000 and performance
bonus of Rs. 1,50,00,000. In the return he had claimed exemption of HRA of Rs.
8,47,742. The AO called for details of the rent paid and calculation of the
amount of exemption. In response, the assessee submitted that the total rent
paid during the year was Rs. 8,20,000 and for the purposes of computing
exemption, only the basic salary had been regarded as ‘salary’.

 

The AO held that
‘performance bonus’ is covered under the term ‘salary’ as per the meaning
assigned to the definition of ‘salary’ for the purpose of calculating exemption
u/s 10(13A). ‘Performance bonus’ cannot be comprehended as an allowance or
perquisite as defined in Rule 2(h) of the Fourth Schedule to be excluded from
the purview of ‘salary’. Thus, the assessee’s total salary for computation of
exemption u/s 10(13A) for the year under assessment comes to Rs. 30,00,000 plus
Rs. 1,50,00,000, which totals Rs. 1,80,00,000; and 10% of this comes to Rs.
18,00,000. Since the assessee has paid rent of Rs. 8,20,000 which is much less
than the amount of Rs. 18,00,000, the assessee is not entitled to any benefit u/s
10(13A) of the Act. Thus, the AO denied the benefit u/s 10(13A) of the Act.

 

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A), who only confirmed the action of
the AO.

 

The assessee then
preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it was submitted that clause (h) of
Rule 2A  specifically provides that
‘salary’ includes dearness allowance if the terms of employment so provide, but
excludes all other allowances and perquisites. Accordingly, the performance bonus
received by the appellant did not form part of ‘salary’ for the purposes of
computing exemption u/s 10(13A) of the Act.

 

HELD

The Tribunal noted
that the decision of the Hon’ble Kerala High Court in the case of CIT vs.
B. Ghosal (125 ITR 444)
is on identical facts wherein on the same set
of facts, the Court had held that ‘performance bonus’ does not form part of
‘salary’ as defined in clause (h) of Rule 2A for the purposes of section
10(13A) of the Income tax Act, 1961.

 

Considering the facts narrated above, the Tribunal noted that total rent
paid by the assessee during the year is Rs. 8,20,000. The basic salary for the
purpose of computation of house rent disallowance is Rs. 3,00,000 (10% of Rs.
30,00,000 being basic salary). Therefore, excess of rent paid over 10% of
salary is Rs. 5,20,000 (Rs. 8,20,000 minus Rs. 3,00,000). Therefore, the
assessee is entitled for house rent allowance at Rs. 5,20,000 u/s 10(13A) of
the Act. The AO is directed to allow the exemption of HRA at Rs. 5,20,000.

 

The Tribunal
allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

 

ITP-3(1)(4) vs. M/s Everlon Synthetics Pvt. Ltd. [ITA No. 6965/Mum/2013; Date of order: 23rd May, 2016; A.Y.: 2006-07; Mum. ITAT] Section 147: Reassessment – Within four years – Regular assessment u/s 143(3) – Issue of one-time settlement with bank and consequential relief granted by the bank was discussed and deliberated by the AO – Reopening notice issued on same ground is bad in law

12. The Pr.
CIT-3 vs. M/s Everlon Synthetics Pvt. Ltd. [Income tax Appeal No. 1039 of 2017]
Date of order:
4th November, 2019
(Bombay High
Court)

 

ITP-3(1)(4) vs.
M/s Everlon Synthetics Pvt. Ltd. [ITA No. 6965/Mum/2013; Date of order: 23rd
May, 2016; A.Y.: 2006-07; Mum. ITAT]

 

Section 147:
Reassessment – Within four years – Regular assessment u/s 143(3) – Issue of
one-time settlement with bank and consequential relief granted by the bank was
discussed and deliberated by the AO – Reopening notice issued on same ground is
bad in law

 

The assessee is
engaged in the business of manufacture of polyester and texturised / twisted
yarn and management consultancy. The assessee filed its return of income on 29th
November, 2006. The AO completed the assessment on 24th November,
2008 u/s 143(3) of the Act, accepting ‘Nil’ return of income as filed by the
assessee. Thereafter, on 28th March, 2011, a notice was issued u/s
148 of the Act to the assessee, seeking to re-open the assessment. The reason
in support of the re-opening notice was in regards to cessation of liability
u/s 41 of the Act.

 

The assessee
objected to the re-opening notice on the ground that it was based on ‘change of
opinion’ and, therefore, without jurisdiction. However, this contention was not
accepted by the AO. This resulted in the assessment order dated 30th
August, 2011 u/s 143(3) r/w/s 147 of the Act, adding the sum of Rs. 1.37 lakhs
to the income of the assessee by holding it to be a revenue receipt.

 

Aggrieved by
this order, the assessee company filed an appeal to the CIT(A). The CIT(A)
recorded a finding of fact that during the course of regular scrutiny
proceedings u/s 143(3), the issue of the assessee’s one-time settlement with
the bank and consequential relief granted by the bank was discussed and
deliberated by the AO. In fact, queries were raised by the AO with regard to
the one-time settlement; the assessee, by its communication dated 11th
November, 2008, responded with complete details of the one-time settlement with
its bankers, including the details of relief / waiver obtained. The CIT(A) held
the settlements to the extent of Rs. 2.06 crores as revenue receipt, as
reflected in the Profit and Loss Account, and the fact that the amount of Rs.
1.37 crores was transferred to the capital account was deliberated upon by the
AO before passing an order u/s 143(3) of the Act. Thus, the CIT(A) held that
the re-opening notice was without jurisdiction as it was based on a mere change
of opinion.

 

Being aggrieved
by the order of the CIT(A), the Revenue filed an appeal to the Tribunal. The
Tribunal held that the issue of one-time settlement with the bank and the
treatment being given to the benefit received on account of settlement, was a
subject matter of consideration by the AO. It found on facts that during the
regular assessment proceedings, the issue of one-time settlement was inquired
into by the AO and the appellant had furnished all details in its letter dated
11th November, 2008. It also records the fact that the impugned
notice was only on the basis of audit objection and the AO had not applied his
mind before issuing a re-opening notice and merely acted on the dictate of the
audit party. In the circumstances, the Tribunal upheld the view of the CIT(A)
that the re-opening notice is without jurisdiction.

 

Aggrieved by
the order of the ITAT, the Revenue filed an Appeal to the High Court. The
Revenue submitted that the issue of one-time settlement found no mention in the
assessment order passed u/s 143(3). Thus, no opinion was formed by the AO while
passing the regular assessment order. Therefore, there was no bar on him on
issuing the re-opening notice. It was, thus, submitted that the issue requires
consideration and the appeal be admitted.

 

The Court
observed that during the scrutiny assessment proceedings, queries were raised
and the petitioner filed a detailed response on 11th November, 2008
giving complete details to the AO of the one-time settlement and the manner in
which it was treated. This finding of fact was not shown to be perverse in any
manner. The re-opening notice is not based on any fresh tangible material but
proceeds on the material already on record with the AO and also considered before
passing the order u/s 143(3). The submission
of Revenue that consideration of an issue by the AO must be reflected in the
assessment order, is in the face of the decision of the Court in GKN
Sinter Metals Ltd. vs. Ms Ramapriya Raghavan 371 ITR 225
which approved
the view of the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in CIT vs. Nirma Chemicals
Ltd., 305 ITR 607
, to the effect that an assessment order cannot deal
with all queries which the AO had raised during the assessment proceedings. The
AO restricts himself only to dealing with those issues where he does not agree
with the assessee’s submission and gives reasons for it. Otherwise, it would be
impossible to complete all the assessments within the time limit available.

 

Thus, the Court held that once a query is raised during assessment
proceedings and the assessee has responded to the query to the satisfaction of
the AO, then there has been due consideration of the same. Therefore, issuing
of the re-opening notice on the same facts which were considered earlier,
clearly amounts to a change of opinion and is, thus, without jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the Revenue appeal is dismissed.

 

 

Reassessment – Sections 147 and 148 of ITA, 1961 – Notice after four years – Failure to disclose material facts necessary for assessment – No duty to disclose investments – Notice for failure to disclose investment – Not valid

36. Bhavik
Bharatbhai Padia vs. ITO;
[2019] 419 ITR
149 (Guj.)
Date of order:
19th August, 2019
A.Y.: 2011-12

 

Reassessment –
Sections 147 and 148 of ITA, 1961 – Notice after four years – Failure to disclose
material facts necessary for assessment – No duty to disclose investments –
Notice for failure to disclose investment – Not valid

 

For the A.Y. 2011-12, the assessee-petitioner received a notice u/s 148
of the Income-tax Act, 1961 dated 30th March, 2018. The reasons
assigned by the AO for reopening are as under:

‘As per information available with this office during the year under
consideration the assessee had made investment of Rs. 50,00,000 in the pension
policies of LIC of India. The assessee has filed his return of income for the
A.Y. 2011-12 declaring total income at Rs. 72.78 lakhs. The information was
received from the Income-tax Officer (I & CI)-1, Ahmedabad on 27th
March, 2018. On a perusal of the information, it is found that the assessee has
made investment of Rs. 50,00,000 in the pension policies of LIC of India during
the F.Y. 2010-11 relevant to the A.Y. 2011-12. During the inquiries conducted
by the Income-tax Officer (I & CI), the investment of Rs. 50,00,000 made by
the assessee remains unexplained. Thus, there is an escapement of Rs. 50,00,000
and the case requires to be reopened u/s 147 of the Act.’

 

The assessee filed his objections to the notice
issued u/s 148 of the Act pointing out that he had disclosed all the income
liable to be offered and to be brought to tax in its return of income. The
assessee further pointed out in his objections that as the assessee did not
have any business income during the A.Y. 2011-12, he was not obliged to
disclose his investment of Rs. 50,00,000 in the pension policies of the LIC of
India in his return of income. The assessee further pointed out that he had
salary, income from other sources and capital gains and in such circumstances,
he was required to file form ITR-2 for the A.Y. 2011-12. It was also pointed
out that the Form ITR-2 does not include the column for the disclosure of
investments. In such circumstances, the assessee could not have been expected
to disclose his investments in his return of income. The assessee further
pointed out that his total income for the A.Y. 2011-12 was Rs. 71.50 lakhs. He
had sufficient past savings and the current year’s income to make an investment
of Rs. 50,00,000 in the LIC policies. He also pointed out to the respondent
that just because he had made an investment of Rs. 50,00,000 his case should
not be reopened, as he could be said to have made full and true disclosure of
his income. By an order dated 8th October, 2018, the AO rejected the
objections. The assessee filed a writ petition and challenged the order.

 

The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

 

‘The notice for reassessment had been issued after four years on the
ground that the assessee had failed to disclose investments. It was not in
dispute that the form of return of income, i.e., ITR-2, then in force had no
separate column for the disclosure of any investment. The notice was not
valid.’

 

 

Income Declaration Scheme, 2016 – Scope of – Amount paid as advance tax can be adjusted towards amount due under Scheme

35. Alluri
Purnachandra Rao vs. Pr. CIT;
[2019] 419 ITR
462 (Tel.)
Date of order:
18th September, 2019
A.Ys.: 2010-11
to 2015-16

 

Income
Declaration Scheme, 2016 – Scope of – Amount paid as advance tax can be adjusted
towards amount due under Scheme

The petitioner filed the subject declaration under the Income
Declaration Scheme, 2016 in Form 1 on 30th June, 2016 for the A.Ys.
2010-11 to 2015-16 declaring undisclosed income of Rs. 40,98,706. In terms of
the Income Declaration Scheme, the petitioner was liable to pay a sum of Rs.
18,44,418 towards tax, surcharge and penalty on this undisclosed income. In
that regard, the petitioner claimed credit of a sum of Rs. 12,11,611 being his
tax deducted at source (TDS). He also claimed credit of a sum of Rs. 1,10,000,
being the advance tax / prepaid tax paid by him for the assessment year
2013-14. After adjusting the aforesaid credits, he paid the balance sum of Rs.
5,22,807 in three instalments as required.

 

The Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-6, Hyderabad, rejected the
declaration filed by the petitioner on the ground that he had failed to pay the
tax, surcharge and penalty on the undisclosed income declared by him before the
due date, i.e., 30th September, 2017. This was because he did not
give credit to the advance tax of Rs. 1,10,000 paid by the petitioner for the
A.Y. 2013-14. The petitioner filed a writ petition and challenged the order of
the Principal Commissioner.

 

The Telangana High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

 

‘i)   The Income Declaration
Scheme, 2016, was promulgated under sections 184 and 185 of the Finance Act,
2016 enabling an assessee to pay tax at 30% on undisclosed income along with
surcharge and penalty at 25% on the tax payable. Under section 187 of the Act,
read with Notification No. S. O. 2476(E) dated 20th July, 2016
([2016] 386 ITR [ST] 5), the tax, surcharge and penalty were to be paid in
three instalments between 30th November, 2016 and 30th
September, 2017.

 

ii)   The Central Board of Direct
Taxes issued Circular No. 25 of 2016, dated 30th June, 2016 ([2016]
385 ITR [ST] 22), furnishing clarifications on the Income Declaration Scheme;
question No. 4 thereunder was whether credit for tax deducted at source, if
any, in respect of the income declared should be allowed. The answer to this
was in the affirmative and to the effect that credit for tax deducted at source
should be allowed in those cases where the related income was declared under the
Scheme and credit for the tax had not already been claimed in the return of
income filed for any assessment year. Once the tax deducted at source relevant
for the period covered by the declaration filed under the Income Declaration
Scheme is given credit in accordance with the clarification of the Central
Board of Direct Taxes itself, there is no reason why advance tax paid for the
very same period, which has not been given credit to earlier, should not be
adjusted against the amount payable under the Scheme.

 

iii)  The assessee’s declaration
pertained to the A.Ys. 2010-11 to 2015-16. Advance tax of Rs. 1,10,000 had been
paid by him for the A.Y. 2013-14. Admittedly, there was no regular assessment
for that year, whereby the advance tax could have been adjusted. Therefore,
there was no rationale in denying the assessee credit of this amount while
computing the amount payable by him under the Income Declaration Scheme. If the
amount paid by the assessee for the A.Y. 2013-14, being a sum of Rs. 1,10,000,
were adjusted, the payments made by him on 21st November, 2016 (Rs.
1,50,000), 28th March, 2017 (Rs. 1,50,000) and 27th
September, 2017 (Rs. 2,22,807) would be sufficient to discharge his liability
in respect of the tax, surcharge and penalty payable by him towards his
undisclosed income declared under the Income Declaration Scheme. Hence the
rejection of the declaration was not valid.

 

iv)  The writ petition is
accordingly allowed setting aside the impugned proceedings dated 6th
February, 2018 passed by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-6, Hyderabad,
rejecting the declaration filed by the petitioner under the Income Declaration
Scheme, 2016. The said declaration shall be considered afresh by the Principal
Commissioner of Income Tax-6, Hyderabad, duly giving credit not only to the tax
deducted at source but also to the advance tax paid by the petitioner for the
A.Y. 2013-14. This exercise shall be completed expeditiously and, in any event,
not later than four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the order, be
it from whatever source.’

 

 

Exemption u/s 10(10AA) of ITA, 1961 – Leave salary (government employees) – Government employees enjoy protection and privileges under Constitution and other laws which are not available to other employees and government employees form a distinct class; they are governed by different terms and conditions of employment – Consequently, retired employees of PSUs and nationalised bank cannot be treated as government employees and, thus, they are not entitled to get full tax exemption on leave encashment after retirement / superannuation u/s 10(10AA)

34. Kamal Kumar
Kalia vs. UOI;
[2019] 111
taxmann.com 409 (Delhi)
Date of order:
8th November, 2019

 

Exemption u/s
10(10AA) of ITA, 1961 – Leave salary (government employees) – Government
employees enjoy protection and privileges under Constitution and other laws
which are not available to other employees and government employees form a
distinct class; they are governed by different terms and conditions of
employment – Consequently, retired employees of PSUs and nationalised bank
cannot be treated as government employees and, thus, they are not entitled to
get full tax exemption on leave encashment after retirement / superannuation
u/s 10(10AA)

 

The petitioners, who were employees of Public Sector Undertakings and
nationalised banks, filed a writ contending that although they were Central and
State Government employees, they were discriminated against. They were granted
complete exemption in respect of the cash equivalent of leave salary for the
period of earned leave standing to their credit at the time of their
retirement, whether on superannuation or otherwise. However, all others,
including the employees of PSUs and nationalised banks, are granted exemption
only in respect of the amount of leave salary payable for a period of ten
months, subject to the limit prescribed.

 

The Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petition and held as under:

 

‘i)   So far as the challenge to
provisions of section 10(10AA) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the ground of
discrimination is concerned, there is no merit therein. This is because
employees of the Central Government and the State Government form a distinct
class and the classification is reasonable having nexus with the object sought
to be achieved. The Central Government and State Government employees enjoy a
“status” and they are governed by different terms and conditions of employment.
Thus, Government employees enjoy protection and privileges under the
Constitution and other laws, which are not available to those who are not
employees of the Central and State Governments.

 

ii)   There is no merit in the
submission of the petitioner that the employees of PSUs and nationalised banks
are also rendering services for the government and such organisations are
covered by Article 12 of the Constitution of India as “State”. Merely because
PSUs and nationalised banks are considered as “State” under article 12 of the
Constitution of India for the purpose of entertainment of proceedings under
Article 226 of the Constitution and for enforcement of fundamental rights under
the Constitution, it does not follow that the employees of such public sector
undertakings, nationalised banks or other institutions which are classified as
“State” assume the status of Central Government and State Government employees.

 

iii)  Therefore, the instant
petition is rejected, insofar as the petitioners’ challenge to the provisions
of section 10(10AA) is concerned.’

 

Charitable purpose – Meaning of – Sections 2(15) and 11 of ITA, 1961 – Preservation of environment is an object of general public utility – Polluting industries setting up company for prevention of pollution – Object not to earn profit – Fact that members of company would benefit is not relevant – Company entitled to exemption u/s 11

33. CIT vs.
Naroda Enviro Projects Ltd.;
[2019] 419 ITR
482 (Guj.)
Date of order:
29th July, 2019
A.Ys.: 2009-10

 

Charitable
purpose – Meaning of – Sections 2(15) and 11 of ITA, 1961 – Preservation of environment
is an object of general public utility – Polluting industries setting up
company for prevention of pollution – Object not to earn profit – Fact that
members of company would benefit is not relevant – Company entitled to
exemption u/s 11

 

The assessee company was incorporated on 19th October, 1995
and was later converted into a company limited by shares incorporated u/s 25 of
the Companies Act, 1956. The assessee company was engaged in the activity of
preservation of environment by providing pollution control treatment for
disposal of liquid and solid industrial waste. The assessee company was
registered u/s 12AA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 as a charitable institution.
For the A.Y. 2009-10 the assessee had filed its return of income declaring total
income (loss) of Rs. 258 (Rupees two hundred and fifty eight only) along with
the auditor’s report u/s 12A(b) of the Act in Form 10B claiming exemption u/s
11 of the Act. The AO took the view that the assessee company is not entitled
to seek exemption u/s 11 and held as under:

 

‘i)   The assessee is carrying on
business activity under the pretext of charitable activity. The incidental
profit cannot be for all the years and not to the extent reflected in the table
given in the order.

 

ii)   The objects specified in the
memorandum of association are important but the same have to be considered with
reference to the real practice adopted for running the activity, i.e., whether
it is charitable or for the purpose of making profit. The object included in
definition of “charitable purpose” as defined in section 2(15) should be
evidenced by charity; otherwise even environment consultant will also claim
exemption u/s 11 being a trust or a company u/s 25.

 

iii) The action is carried out for
the benefit of members to discharge their onus of treatment of chemicals, etc.
with substantial charge with intention to earn profit under the shelter of
section 25 of the Companies Act.

 

iv) Hence it is held that the assessee is rendering service of pollution
control as per the norms laid down by the Gujarat State Pollution Control Board
or any other authority responsible for the regulation of pollution in relation
to any trade, commerce or business carried out by the industries located in the
industrial area of Naroda, Vatva and Odhav for a uniform cess or fee or any
other consideration, irrespective of the nature of use or application, or
retention, of the income of such activity. Since the aggregate value of
receipts are more than Rs. 10,00,000 both the provisos to section 2(15)
are applicable to the assessee company and it is not entitled for exemption.’

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal held that taking an overall
view, the dominant objects of the assessee were charitable as the dominant
object was not only preservation of the environment, but one of general public
utility and, therefore, the assessee was entitled to seek exemption u/s 11 of
the Act.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of
the Tribunal and held as under:

 

‘i)   The assessee was a company
engaged in the activity of preservation of the environment by providing
pollution control treatment for disposal of liquid and solid industrial waste.
The benefit accrued to the members of the company. The members were none other
than the owners of the polluting industries. These members were obliged in law
to maintain the parameters as prescribed by the Gujarat Pollution Control Board
and in law for the purpose of discharge of their trade effluents, in other
words, discharge of solid and liquid waste. If they did not do so, they would
be liable to be prosecuted and their units would also be liable to be closed.

 

ii)   However, this, by itself, was
not sufficient to take the view that the company had not been set up for a
charitable purpose. The birth of this company also needed to be looked into
closely. The fact that the members of the assessee company were benefited was
merely incidental to the carrying out of the main or primary purpose and if the
primary purpose was charitable, the fact that the members of the assessee
benefited would not militate against its charitable character nor would it make
the purpose any less charitable.

iii)  Prior to the introduction of
the proviso to section 2(15) of the Act, the assessee company was
granted registration u/s 12A of the Act. From this it was clear that prior to
the introduction of the proviso to section 2(15) of the Act, the
authority, upon due consideration of all the relevant aspects, had arrived at
the satisfaction that the assessee company was established for charitable
purposes. The company continued to be recognised as a charitable institution.
The certificate issued u/s 12A, after due inquiry, was still in force.

 

iv)  The driving force was not the
desire to earn profit, but the object was to promote, aid, foster and engage in
the area of environment protection, abatement of pollution of various kinds
such as water, air, solid, noise, vehicular, etc., without limiting its scope.
In short, the main object was preservation and protection of the environment.

 

v)   The Commissioner (Appeals) and
the Appellate Tribunal had concurrently held that taking an overall view, the
dominant objects of the assessee were charitable as the dominant object was not
only preservation of the environment, but one of general public utility and,
therefore, the assessee was entitled to seek exemption under section 11 of the
Act. The Tribunal was the last fact-finding body. As a principle, this court
should not disturb the findings of fact in an appeal under section 260A of the
Act unless the findings of fact are perverse.’