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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 147 dated 20th June, 2014

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Risk Management and Inter-bank Dealings: Guidelines relating to participation of Residents in the Exchange Traded Currency Derivatives (ETCD) market

Presently:
1. D omestic participants in the currency futures and exchange traded options markets are not required to have any underlying exposure. While domestic participants in the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets are compulsorily required to have underlying exposure.
2. Banks are not allowed to offset their positions in the ETCD market against the positions in the OTC derivatives market and are also not allowed to carry out any proprietary trading in the ETCD market.

This circular provides that: –
1. Domestic participants in the currency futures and exchange traded currency options will have to comply with the following terms and conditions:
a. Domestic participants are allowed to take a long (bought) as well as short (sold) position up to US $ 10 million per exchange without having to establish the existence of any underlying exposure.
b. D omestic participants who want to take a position exceeding US $ 10 million in the ETCD market will have to establish the existence of an underlying exposure. The procedure to be followed for the same is given in the circular.

2. Banks can:
a. U ndertake proprietary trading in the ETCD market within their Net Open Position Limit (NOPL)/limit imposed by the exchanges for the purpose of risk management and preserving market integrity.
b. N et/offset their positions in the ETCD market against the positions in the OTC derivatives markets.

There will be no upper limit on the position that can be taken by any participant, resident or non-resident, in the ETCD market, except limits that are imposed by SEBI for risk management and preserving market integrity.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 146 dated 19th June, 2014

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Notification No. FEMA. 309/2014-RB dated 4th June, 2014

Export and Import of Currency: Enhanced facilities for residents and non-residents

Presently,
a person resident in India can take outside India or having gone out of
India on a temporary visit, can bring into India (other than to and
from Nepal and Bhutan) Indian currency notes up to an amount not
exceeding Rs.10,000. This circular has raised the said limit of Rs.
10,000 to Rs. 25,000 and provides that: 1. A ny person resident in India
can take outside India (other than to Nepal and Bhutan) or having gone
out of India on a temporary visit, can bring into India (other than from
Nepal and Bhutan) Indian currency notes up to an amount not exceeding
Rs.25,000.
2. A ny person resident outside India, who is not a
citizen of Pakistan and Bangladesh and who is also not a traveller
coming from and going to Pakistan and Bangladesh, and visiting India,
can take outside India/ bring into India Indian currency notes up to an
amount not exceeding Rs.25,000. This facility is available only the
person is exiting India/entering India only through an airport. Thus,
this facility of bringing into India or taking out of India, Indian
currency notes up to Rs. 25,000 is not available to persons’ resident
outside India who are coming into India/going out of India via land/sea
borders.

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Can consent orders be appealed against? — can rejection of consent application be appealed against?

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Background
SAT has recently held on 30th
June, 2013 in the case of Reliance Industries Limited (Appeal No. 1 of
2013) that consent orders cannot be appealed against. Further, even
rejection of application for settlement by consent cannot be appealed
against. The bar on appeal is absolute and total. This, as SAT explains,
has arisen on account of a retrospective amendment to the provisions
relating to settlement by consent. It is almost certain that this order
of SAT would be appealed against, to the Supreme Court. It also adds a
fresh layer of complexity to the process of settlement by consent
orders. This article reviews this order of SAT and in the context of an
existing earlier controversy.

As readers are aware, violations
of securities laws can not only result in serious penal consequences but
the process of investigation and punishment itself is long and costly
for both sides. The stigma of having violated securities laws and having
suffered penal consequences also tarnishes the record of a person. In
the United States, the system of plea bargaining is said to result in
90% of cases being settled through that route. A similar scheme was
introduced in India by SEBI in April, 2007. A person who has been
alleged to have violated securities laws or even if he expected that he
would be so charged, could approach SEBI and offer terms of settlement.
An independent committee (called “High Powered Advisory Committee”) was
set up, headed by a retired Judge of the High Court. The time to settle
the matter (or for rejection of such application) was usually very
short, often only a few months. Importantly, the person charged with
violations did not have to plead guilty.

SEBI’s power to settle questioned
Numerous
matters have already been settled by this process. These Guidelines
were further revised substantially in 2012. In the meantime, a petition
was filed before the Delhi High Court questioning power of SEBI to
settle violations through the consent mechanism. It appears that this
petition is still pending disposal.

Retrospective amendment of the law
Seemingly
to pre-empt the issue whether SEBI has such powers, an Ordinance has
been passed amending the SEBI Act and related statutes. The Ordinance
has made several provisions. Firstly, it gave explicit powers to SEBI to
settle such matters by consent. Secondly, it provided that such matters
shall be settled in accordance with Regulations. Formalising the
process of settlement by Regulations instead of Guidelines was perhaps
intended to give additional legal sanctity. Thirdly, and most
importantly, the amendments were given retrospective effect. This was
clearly intended to overcome any concern that SEBI did not have any
authority. Now, this Ordinance has been put to a test and we have a
pronouncement on one aspect of these provisions.

Decision of SAT
The
Securities Appellate Tribunal (“SAT ”), in Reliance’s case, has now
considered an issue arising out of the amendments made by that
Ordinance, and Regulations issued pursuant thereto. The essential
question was whether an appeal can lie against an order of SEBI
rejecting an application for Consent Order. SAT has held that, under the
amended law, such applicant has absolutely no right of appeal.

Allegations in the case
The
allegations in the case under consideration were as follows. Reliance
was accused to have carried out certain transactions in the stock market
in connivance with certain other persons. Illegal profits of Rs. 513.12
crore were alleged to have thereby been made. In a preceding show cause
notice, allegations of insider trading were also made. However, these
were later dropped.

The matter took several turns before it came
before SAT . A show cause notice was issued for which an application
for settlement by consent was made. This application was rejected. A
fresh show cause notice was issued. Reliance asked for documents in
connection with the show cause notice which were refused by SEBI. An
appeal was filed. Application for consent was also filed. In the
meantime, though SEBI had consistently maintained that the demand for
documents by Reliance was unjustified, it provided copies of the
requirement documents. However, shortly after providing such documents
and though Reliance sought time to examine the voluminous documents,
SEBI rejected the application for consent on the ground that the matter
could not be settled through consent. This was on the ground that the
matter fell into the category specified in the Guidelines of serious
fraudulent/unfair trade practices that could not be settled.

While
this was going on, and the appeal before the SAT was pending, the
Ordinance, as discussed earlier, was passed and the law was changed
retrospectively. In the background of all this, SAT passed the order as
discussed earlier.

SAT holds that amended law absolutely bars appeals
The
distinction between the earlier law and the law amended by the
Ordinance as explained by SAT is worth emphasising. The earlier section
relating to consent orders was contained in section 15T(2) of the SEBI
Act. It barred appeal against an order made “with the consent of the
parties.” This would have left orders rejecting application for consent
appealable. The Ordinance omitted Section 15T(2) with retrospective
effect from 20th April, 2007 and inserted section 15JB from same date.
Section 15JB barred appeal “against any order” under that section
dealing with application for consent orders. SAT thus held that, in view
of such retrospective amendment, even the SEBI’s order rejecting the
consent application was not appealable.

Adverse observations by SAT
Though
the SAT dismissed the appeal, it made several adverse observations
while giving the ruling. The following few important ones are worth
noting.

a) It said that SEBI was wrong in delaying matter for
years not giving documents required by the applicant on various grounds,
and thereafter providing the documents to the applicant.

b) It
also said that SEBI was wrong in denying adequate opportunity to the
applicant to present its case. SEBI gave, after a long delay, voluminous
documents desired by the applicant. However, without giving time to
examine such documents as desired by applicant, it passed an ex-parte
order rejecting the application.

c) SEBI’s argument that the
consent application was not maintainable because it fell within a
restricted category was also not accepted by SAT , since this ought to
have been known to SEBI from inception. Even more so since SEBI still
had discretion to consider, on facts, cases falling in such categories.

Despite
these observations, SAT effectively said that its hands were tied by
the amendments which had retrospective effect and barred appeal against
any order.

Possible future Scenario
It appears almost
certain, particularly considering the stakes involved (as mentioned
earlier, the allegation is that illegal gains of Rs. 513.12 crores were
made), that the Order of SAT would be appealed against before the
Supreme Court. Many more grounds may also be raised before the Supreme
Court including the vires of the amendments, whether they give unbridled
powers to SEBI, whether SEBI need not observe rules of natural justice
while considering such applications, etc. In particular, it is also
possible that the retrospective amendment itself could be questioned,
particularly since it takes away right of appeal even in existing cases.
The adverse observations of SAT most certainly would come to aid of the
applicant.

Hopefully, assuming the appeal is made, the supreme Court will also resolve other issues relating to mechanism of consent orders and those arising out of the retrospective amendments.  the  Court  may  decide  once  and  for  all whether seBi has powers, under the earlier law and the amended  law,  of  passing  Consent  orders.  this  ruling may also thus clear the air on whether Consent orders passed till now are valid in law. it may be particularly recollected that the earlier law did  not  have  specific and clear provisions empowering SEBI to pass consent orders. the amended law, though it did give such powers, had raised fresh concerns as discussed in earlier posts.

Apart from such basic issues, it is submitted that even otherwise the  ruling  of  sat  that  the  orders  relating  to consent application are wholly non-appealable is questionable. the law provides for several pre-conditions and procedures subject to which the consent order may be passed. further, the principles of natural justice would in any case have to be followed. such order would also have  to  be  in  accordance  with  regulations  made.  the order of seBi would, it is respectfully submitted, thus    be questionable on several grounds. it is submitted that sat’s  blanket  denial  of  such  grounds  of  questioning  in appeal of such orders is not correct.

Thus,  it  would  be  interesting  to  watch  the  progress  of this  case. the  journey  would  surely  be  long. assuming the order of sat is appealed against, the matter could be restored back to SEBI for fresh consideration of the application for consent. the outcome of such proceedings themselves could be matter of appeal.

Even if the appeal is rejected (or not made), the matter would go back to SEBI for considering the allegations on merits, which could go into a fresh round of appeals.

Conclusion – Whether Consent Settlement Mechanism will lose its Meaning?
An observation in passing is worth making. Consent orders can be compared with arbitration. Like arbitration, Consent orders too are meant for speeding up and even substituting litigation. as in arbitration, appeals are barred in Consent orders too. however, if even Consent orders end up in prolonged litigation instead of speeding it up, then the purpose is defeated. and thus, the classic and oftquoted words of lament of the supreme Court (in Guru Nanak Foundation vs. Rattan Singh & Sons) could apply to consent orders too:-

“Interminable, time consuming, complex and expensive court procedures impelled jurists to search for an alternative forum, less formal, more effective and speedy for resolution of disputes avoiding procedure claptrap and this lead them to arbitration act 1940. the way in which the proceedings under the act are conducted and without exception challenged in courts has made lawyers laugh and legal philosophers weep. experience shows  and law reports bear testimony that the proceedings under the act have become highly technical, accompanied by unending prolixity at every stage, providing a legal trap to the unwary. an informal forum chosen by the parties for expeditious disposal of their disputes has by the decisions of the courts been clothed with legalese of unforeseen complexity.”

Partnership – Dissolution of Firm – Expiry of tenure of firm – Dissolution is automatic: Section 42, 59 and 63: Partnership Act, 1932.

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Kuriachan Chacko and Ors vs. The Registrar of Firms, Office of Inspector General of Registration, AIR 2014 Kerala 109

The Registrar of firm rejected the request of the petitioners to record the amendment brought about to Clause No. 12 of Partnership Deed dated 12-11-2002, whereby the specified tenure of ‘five years’ was sought to be amended as ’30 years’ with some other modifications, which was refused to be registered on the ground that the tenure of the firm was already over in 2007. The petitioners constituted a firm in the name and style as “M/s. LIS Ernakulam.”

Admittedly, the tenure of the firm was stipulated as ‘five years’. But according to the petitioners, as per Resolution 3 dated 30-10-2006, the members of the firm, had amended Clause No. 12 of the partnership deed, stipulating that the duration of the firm shall be for a minimum period of ’30 (thirty) years’; and that the firm shall not stand dissolved on the death of any of the partners and shall continue the business of the firm with the legal representatives of such deceased partner’s. The petitioners contend that, even though the resolution was taken as early as in the year 2006, it was unfortunately omitted to be brought to the notice of the respondent, for being incorporated in the Register. The lapse was noticed only in September, 2013 and immediately thereupon, the first petitioner who is described as the Managing Trustee/Partner as per Partnership Deed, preferred representation before the respondent, also forwarding a copy of the Minutes dated 30-10-2006 and an affidavit to that effect, seeking to have the modifications incorporated in the relevant Register. After considering the request, it was rejected by the respondent as mentioned hereinbefore, which in turn is under challenge in the Writ Petition.

The Hon’ble Court observed that the point to be considered is whether resolution stated as taken on 30-10-2006, amending Clause 12 of Deed of Partnership, modifying the tenure of the firm from five years to 30 years could be directed to be incorporated in the Register, for the reason that sub-Rule (2) of Rule 4 of the Partnership (Registration of Firms) Rules 1959 has been declared as illegal and ultra vires and struck off from the relevant Rules.

Evidently, sub-Rule (2) of Rule 4 of the Rules prescribes a time limit of 15 days from the occurrence of the event with reference to statement/notice in relation to the firm under s/s. 60, 61, 62, 63(1) and 63(2). Section 60 deals with recording of alteration in firm name and principal place of business. Section 61 is in respect of noting of closing and opening of branches. Coming to Section 62, it is in respect of noting of changes in names and addresses of the partners. Section 63 deals with recording of changes in and dissolution of the firm. Even a plain or casual reading is enough to hold that the situations contemplated under s/s. 60, 61 and 62 are not attracted to the situation of the case in hand.

On expiry of tenure of firm, dissolution is automatic. Amendment of tenure from five years to 30 years was not brought to notice of Registrar nor incorporated in Register at time firm was in existence. Amendment sought to be incorporated subsequent to dissolution cannot be allowed as the firm stood automatically dissolved and lost colour and characteristics of a registered firm. Therefore, refusal to incorporate amendment was proper.

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Co-operative Society – Membership – Discretion to refuse Membership to person not duly qualified – Not violative:Of Art 19(1)(c) Constitution of India and section 24(1): Gujarat Co-op Soc. Act, 1962

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Laxmi Niwas Co-op Housing Soc. Ltd. vs. District Registrar & Ors AIR 2014 Gujarat 159 (Full Bench) The appellant is a Co-op Society registered under the Gujarat Co-op Society Act.

A Society validly constituted under the provisions of the Act has the right to admit any new member provided such member is duly qualified for admission under the provisions of the Act. Rules and the Bye laws of such society. Subsection (1) of section 24 however, gives a discretion to the Society to refuse admission to a new member who has applied and has requisite qualifications, subject however, that sufficient cause exists for refusing such membership. What is `sufficient cause,’ although, has not been defined under the Act, sub-section (3) of section 24 makes it mandatory for the society to give reasons in writing within a specified period and in terms of the scheme provided in sub-section (4) to sub-section (6), such reason is subject to challenge before the Registrar by way of an appeal. Although sub-section (6) of section 24 states that decision of the Registrar under sub-section (4) shall be final and shall not be called in question in any court, it is well settled that such provision does not stand in the way of the High Court for exercising judicial review. Decision of the Society being subject to appeal before a statutory authority and being subject to further judicial review before the concerned High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, none of the aforesaid provisions of section 24 can be said to be ultra vires any of the provisions of the Constitution of India.

Further, providing for the deemed membership to a person, who is not communicated the decision of the society to which he is seeking the membership within a period of three months, as provided in section 22(2) of the Act, does not violate Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution of India. There are several such deeming provisions in various statutes and it is a consistent view of the courts that such provision is valid provided the applicant has the requisite qualifications. Thus, the provisions of section 24 or section 22(2) of the Act do not violate any of the provisions of the Constitution.

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Appellate Tribunal – Rectification of Mistake –Issue of limitation of demand raised but not considered – Rectification justified – Section 35C(2) of Central Excise Act, 1944.

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Commissioner of C. Ex. Mumbai III vs. N.T.B. International Pvt. Ltd. 2014 (302) ELT 481 (Bom.)

The
question that arose in the appeal was whether or not the exercise of
jurisdiction u/s. 35C (2) of the Act by the Tribunal to rectify an error
is justified .

By a final order dated 1st September, 2004
passed u/s. 35C of the Act, the Tribunal inter alia, upheld the duty
demand of Rs. 42.07 lakh. On 27th December 2004, the Respondent-Assessee
filed an application for rectification of mistake u/s. 35C(2) of the
Act seeking to rectify the order dated 1st September 2004. In its
rectification application, the Respondent-Assessee pointed out that
though the issue of limitation was raised before the Tribunal and also
urged at the hearing, the order did not deal with the same, thus leading
to an error apparent from the record warranting rectification of the
final order dated 1st September, 2004 of the Tribunal.

On 20th
December, 2005, the Tribunal after hearing the parties, allowed the
application for rectification of the mistake and held that the longer
period of limitation was not invocable in the present facts.
Consequently, the duty demand was reduced on appeal by revenue.

The
Hon’ble Court observed that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal u/s.
35C(2) of the Act is to rectify mistakes apparent from the record i.e.,
the mistake must be obvious and selfevident. The discovery of mistakes
must not require a long process of reasoning. The question whether there
is a mistake in the order sought to be rectified or not should not be a
subject of debate. Once a mistake is brought to the notice of the
Tribunal, it is duty bound to correct the mistake in its order, where an
issue has been argued and/ or submission made on the issue and the same
is not recorded and/or considered in the order, it follows that there
is a mistake apparent from the record.

Thus, non-consideration
of an issue urged before the Tribunal but not dealt with by it would
give rise to a mistake apparent from the record.

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Advocate appearing as litigant in person – Is not practicing his profession – Cannot be permitted to argue with his robes: Section 30: Advocates, 1961.

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R. Muthukrishnan vs. UOI & Ors.AIR 2014 Madras 133.

The petitioner in the writ petition is an Advocate and the writ petition has been designed as a Public Interest Litigation with a prayer to issue a writ of Declaration, declaring that the Direct Benefit Transfer Scheme for Liquefied Petroleum Gas announced by the Union of India is inconsistent with public law and constitutional requirements. When the case was posted for admission, the petitioner appeared in person with his robes. The petitioner was asked as to whether he being the petitioner in this writ petition would be entitled to argue with his robes. The petitioner insisted that he is an Advocate enrolled with the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu and in terms of the Rules framed under the Advocates Act, in particular the Rules governing Advocates given in Appendix I of the Rules, is duty bound to wear Bands and Gown while appearing, failing which he would be contravening the statutory provisions and therefore, was entitled to represent the matter with his robes. On such insistence, this Court framed the following preliminary question for consideration:-

Whether an Advocate is entitled to argue in a PIL, with his robes, on the ground that he is appearing as an advocate, or is entitled to argue with his robes when he is a petitioner in person in a Public Interest Litigation.

The Hon’ble Court observed that the contention raised by the petitioner is thoroughly misconceived. In the present case, the petitioner is appearing before the Court not as an Advocate of an any party, but on behalf of himself as he is the sole writ petitioner in the writ petition. Though the prayer in the writ petition is designed as a Public Interest Litigation, it is the specific case of the petitioner that he is also aggrieved and like him there are several others and therefore, he has filed this writ petition. If such is the case, we have no hesitation in holding that the petitioner himself is the litigant and he shall not be entitled to any rights and privileges as an Advocate while appearing in person for his own cause.

The Court further observed that a person cannot appear or plead before a Court of law in dual capacity, one as party and other as an Advocate and if an Advocate is appearing as party-in-person, he should in order to maintain the norms and decorum of the legal profession, appear before the Court of law as party in person putting off the band and robes prescribed for legal practitioner.

The Petitioner pleading his own cause though under the guise of a Public Interest Litigation, cannot seek recourse to any of the provisions of the Advocates Act, more particularly section 30 of the Act, inasmuch as no question has arisen as regards the right of the petitioner under the provisions of the Advocates Act and no rights conferred on him under the Act has been denied to him, while he is appearing in person. The word “practise” connotes exercise of a profession and when the petitioner an Advocate is a litigant in person, he does not practise his profession and therefore, he is not entitled to argue his case with his robes.

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IS PRIVACY SACRED?

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“Gentlemen do not read other gentlemen’s mail” –
this sentence of the then Secretary of State of US, Henry Stimson
(1929-1933), is the most famous sentence uttered about codes and
ciphers.

Secretary Stimson disbanded the “Black Chamber” which
was founded in 1919 following World War I. The mission of this Chamber
was to break into the communication of other nations, with the
overarching objective of breaking into diplomatic communication.

Circa
2013. Edward Snowden, a US citizen, who worked as a National Security
Agency (NSA) contractor through Booz Allen Hamilton, leaked the details
of top-secret U.S. and British government mass surveillance programmes,
including the interception of US and European telephone metadata and the
PRISM and Tempora Internet surveillance programmes. With his US
passport being revoked, he travelled from Hong Kong to Russia, where he
was given asylum.

It’s been a year since his exile in Moscow and
he continues to be an enigma for many people across the world. In fact,
the celebrated Hollywood director, Oliver Stone, is working on a film
about Snowden.

There are many others who believe in individual privacy.


Aaron Swartz was a computer programmer, writer, political organiser and
Internet activist. In January, 2011, Swartz was arrested by police on
state breaking-andentering charges, after downloading academic journal
articles from JSTOR . Charged with violations of the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, Aaron was found dead on 11th January, 2013 in his Brooklyn
apartment, where he had hanged himself. He was quoted as having said,
“there is no justice in following unjust laws.”

• Bradley
Manning, a US Army soldier, was arrested in May 2010 in Iraq on
suspicion of having passed classified material to the website,
WikiLeaks, which was the largest set of restricted documents ever leaked
to the public. He has been recently sentenced to 35 years in prison.
Manning has famously said, “I want people to see the truth, because
without information, you cannot make informed decisions as a public.”


Julian Assange is an Australian editor, activist, publisher and
journalist. He is known as the editor-in-chief and founder of WikiLeaks,
which publishes secret information, news leaks and classified media
from anonymous news sources and whistleblowers. Since November 2010,
subject to a European arrest warrant in response to a Swedish police
request for questioning in relation to a sexual assault investigation.

In
June 2012, following the final dismissal by the Supreme Court of the
United Kingdom, Assange failed to surrender to his bail and sought
refuge in the Ecuadorian embassy in London, where he has since been
granted diplomatic asylum. Assange has made a telling statement. “I give
private information on corporations to you for free and I’m a villain.
Zuckerberg gives your private information to corporations for money and
he’s Man of the Year.”

This new breed of “hacktivist” (hackers
who are activists) fundamentally believe that surveillance means tyranny
and they revolt against such tyranny. The rise of these hacktivists
across the world has raised an important question on data privacy —
should governments be allowed to snoop on all private data?

As
recent disclosures by Snowden have revealed, every email and
communication was being monitored and it did not spare even heads of
State.

In fact, the Brazilian President, Dilma Rousseff,
launched a blistering attack on the US in a speech at the UN general
assembly on 24th September, 2013.

She protested against the
indiscriminate interception of a private citizen by the US, stating that
it is a breach of international law. In a telling comment, she said:

“A
sovereign nation can never establish itself to the detriment of another
sovereign nation. The right to safety of citizens of one country can
never be guaranteed by violating fundamental human rights of citizens of
another country.”

There has been a chorus of protests from the
European heads of State protesting spying on emails and communication.
Finland’s Prime Minister, Jyrki Katainen has said, “According to our
fundamental rights, all the citizens, including politicians, have
similar rights and illegal monitoring of cellphones isn’t acceptable.”

Governments
justify surveillance of data based on their need for intelligence
gathering, data mining and prevention of security threats. Hacktivists
believe that personal privacy is a fundamental right.

Governments
argue that collecting haystacks of data is essential to look for
potential security and other threats to the State. Hacktivists argue
that the records of all intimate moments of individuals are captured by
the Governments from private communication network and sites, without
specific authorisation and need and hence, it is a violation of the
citizen’s rights. Security agencies seize digital material from
citizens, who store it on their computers or send it to their
acquaintances by emails or social networking sites. These agencies could
not have possibly entered their houses and walked off with diaries and
other physical material, without proper authorisation. If such stuff
cannot be captured from the analogue or physical world, how is it right
that it is captured from the digital world? Such broad information
capture and interception of communication is justified on the grounds of
“national security.” But, as revealed by Snowden, it is done routinely
without any suspicion, warrant or probable cause. Hacktivists argue that
this is violation of human rights and such private and intimate
information should not be in the government database.

So, is privacy sacred?
The debate has just begun…

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“Fraud” Implications under Companies Act 2013

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Introduction
Deceiving any person by fraudulent or dishonest inducement to deliver any property amounts to offence of cheating punishable u/s. 415 to 424 of the Indian Penal Code. Apart from the IPC other laws dealing with taxation and commercial activities also deal with fraudulent acts and their consequences.

Section 447 of the Companies Act, 2013 prescribes a separate punishment for fraud, in relation to affairs of any company which is, imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to 10 years and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be less than the amount involved in the fraud but which may extend to three times the amount involved in fraud. The explanation to section 447 defines ‘fraud’ as under:

“Explanation.- For the purposes of this section-

(i) “fraud” in relation to affairs of a company or any body corporate, includes any act, omission, concealment of any fact or abuse of position committed by any person or any other person with the connivance in any manner, with intent to deceive, to gain undue advantage from, or to injure the interests of, the company or its shareholders or its creditors or any other person, whether or not there is any wrongful gain or wrongful loss;

(ii) “wrongful gain” means the gain by unlawful means of property to which the person gaining is not legally entitled.

(iii) “wrongful loss” means the loss by unlawful means of property to which the person losing is legally entitled.”

It is clear from the above provisions that any act or omission, concealment of any fact or abuse of position committed by any person with intent to deceive, to gain undue advantage from or injure the interest of any company or its shareholders or its creditors or any other person, is guilty of fraud. Various provisions of the Companies Act, 2013, list out different acts, omissions or other conduct which shall amount to fraud punishable u/s. 447 of the Act and the same are as under:

U/s. 212(6) all the above offences are cognisable offences and no person accused of any offence under above sections can be released on bail without giving opportunity to be heard to the Public Prosecutor.

The Companies Act 2013, provides for establishment of Special Courts to try the offences under the Act and pending such establishment the offences are to be tried by a Court of Session exercising jurisdiction over the area (section 440 of the Companies Act, 2013).

Serious Fraud Investigation Office
The Act also provides for establishment of Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO) and till it is established u/s. 211(1), the present SFIO established under administrative orders, referred to in the Proviso to section 211(1) shall be deemed to be SFIO for the purpose of section 211. The Central Government can assign investigation into affairs of any company to SFIO and if there is any offence under investigation by SFIO no other investigation authority including the State Police, can continue or commence investigation under the Companies Act, 2013. Under the provision of the new law the SFIO has been given a statutory status and powers of investigation under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 have been vested in SFIO. S/s. (17) of section 212 makes a specific provision for sharing of any information or documents available with any other investigating authority or income-tax authorities with SFIO and likewise SFIO can share information or documents available with it with any other investigating authority or income-tax authorities.

It is seen from the definition of fraud contained in the explanation to section 447 that a person will be guilty of offence of fraud under the Act if committed with intent to deceive or gain undue advantage from or injure the interests of –

• the company;
• its shareholders;
• its creditors; or
• any other person

Since offence of fraud under the Companies Act, 2013 is in relation to affairs of a company, fraudulent acts committed by “any other person” amount to fraud under the Act if such acts are in relation to the affairs of the company.

Fraud as a civil wrong
Fraud is defined in the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Section 14 of the Contract Act defines free consent inter alia as consent not caused by fraud as defined in section 17 of the Contract Act. Section 17 provides that:

“17. “Fraud” means and includes any of the following acts committed by a party to a contract, or with his connivance, or by his agent, with intent to deceive another party thereto or his agent, or to induce him to enter into the contract:-

(1) the suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who does not believe it to be true;
(2) the concealment of a fact by one having knowledge or belief of the fact;
(3) a promise made without any intention of performing it;
(4) any other fact fitted to deceive;
(5) any such actor omission as the law specially declares to be fraudulent.

Explanation.- Mere silence as to facts likely to affect the willingness of a person to enter into a contract is not fraud, unless the circumstances of the case are such that, regard being had to them, it is the duty of the person keeping silence to speak, or unless his silence is, in itself, equivalent to speech.”

Section 19 further provides that when consent to an agreement is caused by coercion, fraud or misrepresentation, the agreement is avoidable at the option of the party whose consent was so caused. The Indian Contract Act therefore provides that a victim of fraud can avoid the agreement entered into acting on fraudulent acts but there are no provisions making fraud an offence punishable with imprisonment or fine.

CHEATING IS CRIME UDNER IPC:
The Indian Penal Code, 1860 is the law of crimes applicable in India and section 415 of the said Code defines the offence of cheating, as under:

“415. Cheating.- Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to “cheat”.

Explanation.- A dishonest concealment of facts is a deception within the meaning of this section.”

Fraud is not an offence under the law of crimes.

Offence of cheating under the IPC requires:
“(1) deception of any person; (2)(a) fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that person; (i) to deliver any property to any person; or (ii) to consent that any person shall retain any property; or (b) intentionally inducing that person to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property (Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma vs. State of Bihar AIR 2000 SC 2341: (2000) 4 SCC 168: 2000 SCC (Cri) 786: 2000 Cr LJ 298).”

Fraud is a deception deliberately practiced in order to secure unfair or unlawful gain and is a civil wrong. fraud in criminal form is cheating or theft by false pretence, intentional deception of victim by  false  representation or pretense. it needs to be noted that abuse of position with intent to deceive or gain undue advantage does not amount to cheating u/s. 415 iPC. if one compares the words of section 447 of the Companies act, 2013 with the provisions in section 17 of the Contract act and section 415 of iPC, it is clear that offence of fraud under   the Companies act is based on the Contract act, which treats fraud as a civil wrong. it is therefore possible that a person guilty of fraud under the Company Law may not necessarily be guilty of cheating under the indian Penal Code. new provisions contained the Companies act, 2013 defining fraud and establishing the Serious Fraud Investigation Office conferring powers of investigation under the Code of Criminal Procedure are intended to ensure that the directors and other persons managing the affairs of a Company act honestly and diligently to protect the interest of the company they represent and the interests of shareholders and creditors of the Company. any act or omission or concealment or abuse of position to gain advantage for themselves or other persons, on the part of persons managing the company will amount to a fraud punishable u/s. 447. it is an accepted fact that there are successful businessmen in the corporate world who possess positive qualities and survive and prosper by doing business honestly in accordance with the rules and regulations and do not derive any benefits for themselves or others except those which are legitimately due to them. But there are many who achieve success and appear to be playing according to rules but are experts in adopting various tactics to deceive and gain undue advantage for themselves and others. it is for dealing with such unscrupulous persons that the law has been amended and the new provisions are intended to ensure compliance and observance of principles of corporate governance by all companies.

Fraud Under The Companies act, 2013 and English law
new provisions in the Companies act, 2013, are comparable to the definition of fraud under English law. In Eng- land, the provisions contained in the theft act, 1968 were replaced by the fraud act, 2006 which provides that any person by making a false representation or failing to disclose information or by abuse of his position makes any gain for himself or anyone else or inflicting a loss on another shall be guilty of fraud. Provisions in english law are more comprehensive defining false representations, concealment or non-disclosure of information and abuse of position. the other major difference between section 447  of the Companies act 2013 and the fraud act, 2006 in england is that the english law is criminal law applicable to any victim of fraud unlike indian law which restrict the law to the victims who are companies or their shareholders or creditors or other persons like investors who are victims of fraudulent acts. Considering the wide ramifications of frauds in the capital market, insurance & banking sector, non-banking entities like chit funds, ponzi schemes for marketing goods and other money circulation schemes, there is a need to amend our criminal law on the lines of the fraud act, 2006 enacted in england. in other words the provisions relating to fraud in the Com- panies act, 2013 need to be converted into general law having universal application like the indian Penal Code.

Widening The Ambit of Fraud
One other significant provision in the definition of fraud is treatment of abuse of position with intent to gain undue advantage from any person as fraud. such a provision in effect amounts to providing punishment for bribery and corruption in the private sector. to illustrate, if a Purchase Officer of a company takes a kickback from a supplier of raw-material to the company, or a director sells his personal property to the Company at inflated price, such persons will be guilty of abusing their position as Purchase Officer or Director for undue advantage for themselves. The general law of Prevention of Corruption act, 1988, is applicable to Public Servants as defined in the said Act which is not applicable to Directors and Officers of Companies in the private sector because they are not public servants. now with enactment of section 447 in the Companies Act, 2013, Directors and Officers of private sector companies abusing their position for personal gain or to give advantage to any other person can be prosecuted and punished for fraud.

The efficacy of the new provisions creating offence of fraud  ultimately  depends  on  establishment  of  special Courts as contemplated under chapter XXViii of the new act for the purpose of trial of offence under the Companies act, 2013, and expeditious trial and punishment of persons guilty of fraud. speedy trial of fraudsters is the key for improved levels of protection of interests of investors and other stakeholders of corporates, as well as observance of principles of corporate governance by the corporates.

Considering the wide spread incidence of frauds in all sectors of the economy there is a need to examine whether indian Penal Code needs to be amended on the lines of the fraud act, 2006 enacted in england.

Fraud and the Auditor
In terms of section 143(12), an obligation has been cast on the auditor of a company to report to the Central government of fraud which has been committed, or is being committed against the company by officers or employees of the company. the manner of reporting has been prescribed in the rule 13, of the Companies (audit and auditors ) rules 2014 .

The responsibility cast on the auditor, is onerous. To what extent auditors are able to discharge this onus remains to be seen.

Conclusion
the  enactment  of  section  447  in  the  Companies  act 2013, is an indicator of the thinking of the authorities. economic frauds have increased a great deal of the recent past. on account of a lacuna in the law and the lengthy legal process, persons committing such frauds have been able to avoid punishment. one hopes that the provisions in the Companies act 2013, will help to bring to book such fraudsters.

Can email addresses constitute an Intangible Asset?

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Synopsis
With the growth of E-commerce,
wherein Indian companies and start-ups have been investing heavily on
building their customer databases, the accounting treatment of
purchasing the said databases has gained importance with regards to
Indian GAAP. In this Article, the learned author has expressed and
justified the accounting treatment under different scenarios for
purchase of such database of E-mail ID’s based on facts of the cases put
forth in the following article, by referring to technical definitions
and relevant extracts of Accounting Standard-26 ‘Intangible Assets’.

BACKGROUND
Online
Limited (referred to as the company or Online) is specialised in the
online selling of a range of products. The company’s commercial strategy
relies on purchase of databases of email address containing lists of
people who may be interested in purchasing its products. The lists are
provided by the specialised vendors based on the specifications of
Online. These specifications include:
(i) M inimum amount of data, e.g., email address, first name and last name.
(ii)
Based on the potential to buy its products, Online has defined various
categories of data, e.g., income, employment, education, residential
location, past history, age, etc. The person should fall under one or
more of these prescribed categories.
(iii) D ata check against the
existing lists of Online – The purpose of this check is to avoid
duplication with existing email address lists.

The email addresses meeting these specifications are treated as valid email addresses.

Scenario 1
The
specialised vendors carry out search activities to identify valid email
addresses. The company makes payment to these vendors on cost plus
margin basis. Though the company will monitor the quality of work of the
vendor it would nonetheless have to make the payment, even if they have
not found any valid email address. Also, vendors do not guarantee any
exclusivity and they may provide the same email address lists to other
companies also.

Scenario 2
The specialised vendors
carry out search activities to identify valid email addresses. The
company makes payment to these vendors on performance basis. If vendors
do not provide any valid email address, they will not be entitled to any
payment from the company. Also, vendors need to guarantee exclusivity
and they cannot provide the same lists to the competitors of Online.

ISSUE
Can Online recognise the lists of email addresses as an intangible asset under AS 26 Intangible Assets?

TECHNICAL REFERENCES

1. AS 26 defines the terms intangible assets and assets as below:

“An
intangible asset is an identifiable non-monetary asset, without
physical substance, held for use in the production or supply of goods or
services, for rental to others, or for administrative purposes.

An asset is a resource:

(a) Controlled by an enterprise as a result of past events, and
(b) From which future economic benefits are expected to flow to the enterprise.”

2. A s per paragraph 20 of AS 26, an intangible asset should be recognised if, and only if:
(a) It is probable that the future economic benefits that are attributable to the asset will flow to the enterprise, and
(b) T he cost of the asset can be measured reliably.

3. Paragraphs 11 to 13 of AS 26 explain the requirement concerning “identifiability” as below:

“11.
The definition of an intangible asset requires that an intangible asset
be identifiable. To be identifiable, it is necessary that the
intangible asset is clearly distinguished from goodwill. …

12.
An intangible asset can be clearly distinguished from goodwill if the
asset is separable. An asset is separable if the enterprise could rent,
sell, exchange or distribute the specific future economic benefits
attributable to the asset without also disposing of future economic
benefits that flow from other assets used in the same revenue earning
activity.

13. Separability is not a necessary condition for
identifiability since an enterprise may be able to identify an asset in
some other way. For example, if an intangible asset is acquired with a
group of assets, the transaction may involve the transfer of legal
rights that enable an enterprise to identify the intangible asset. …”

4. Paragraphs 14 and 17 of AS 26 provide as under with regard to “control”:

“14.
A n enterprise controls an asset if the enterprise has the power to
obtain the future economic benefits flowing from the underlying resource
and also can restrict the access of others to those benefits. The
capacity of an enterprise to control the future economic benefits from
an intangible asset would normally stem from legal rights that are
enforceable in a court of law. In the absence of legal rights, it is
more difficult to demonstrate control. However, legal enforceability of a
right is not a necessary condition for control since an enterprise may
be able to control the future economic benefits in some other way.

17.
A n enterprise may have a portfolio of customers or a market share and
expect that, due to its efforts in building customer relationships and
loyalty, the customers will continue to trade with the enterprise.
However, in the absence of legal rights to protect, or other ways to
control, the relationships with customers or the loyalty of the
customers to the enterprise, the enterprise usually has insufficient
control over the economic benefits from customer relationships and
loyalty to consider that such items (portfolio of customers, market
shares, customer relationships, customer loyalty) meet the definition of
intangible assets.”

5. Paragraph 18 of AS 26 explains the requirement concerning “Future Economic Benefits”:

“18.
The future economic benefits flowing from an intangible asset may
include revenue from the sale of products or services, cost savings, or
other benefits resulting from the use of the asset by the enterprise.
For example, the use of intellectual property in a production process
may reduce future production costs rather than increase future
revenues.”

6. Paragraph 24 of AS 26 states that if an intangible
asset is acquired separately, the cost of the intangible asset can
usually be measured reliably.

7. Paragraphs 50 and 51 of AS 26 state as under:

“50.
I nternally generated brands, mastheads, publishing titles, customer
lists and items similar in substance should not be recognised as
intangible assets.

51. T his Standard takes the view that
expenditure on internally generated brands, mastheads, publishing
titles, customer lists and items similar in substance cannot be
distinguished from the cost of developing the business as a whole.
Therefore, such items are not recognised as intangible assets.”

DISCUSSION AND ALTERNA TIVE VIEWS
View 1 – The email address lists cannot be recognised as an intangible asset.

An item without physical substance should meet the following four criteria to be recognised as intangible asset under AS 26:
(a) Identifiability
(b) Future economic benefits
(c) Control
(d) R eliable measurement of cost

In
the present case, the email address lists are acquired separately and
the company has the ability to sell them to a third party. Thus, based
on guidance in paragraph 12 of AS 26, the lists satisfy identifiablity
criterion for recognition as intangible asset. Online will use the email
address lists to generate additional sales. Therefore, future economic
benefits are expected to derive from the use of these lists and the
second criterion is also met.

However, the third criterion, viz., control, for  recognition of intangible asset is not met. email addresses are public information and the company cannot effectively restrict their use by other companies. hence, in scenario 1, the control criterion for recognition of intangible asset is not met.

The following additional arguments can be made:

(a)    Purchase of email address lists can be analysed as  outsourcing.  these  lists  are  prepared  by  the suppliers based on the specifications of the com- pany, which is not different from the situation where the company would have built them in-house. hence, guidance in paragraph 50 and 51 of as 26 should apply which prohibit recognition of internally generated intangible assets of such nature.

(b)    These  lists  can  be  viewed  as  marketing  tool,  such as leaflets or catalogues; their purchase price being similar to a marketing expense. in accordance with paragraph 56(c) of as 26, expenditure on advertising and promotional activities cannot be recognised as an intangible asset.

View 2 – the email address lists can be recognised as an intangible asset.

Based on the analysis in view 1, the first two criteria for recognition of an intangible asset (identifiability and future economic benefits) are met.

Regarding the third criterion, viz., future economic benefits are controlled by the company; it may be argued that the company acquires the ownership of the email address lists prepared by the vendor as well as the exclusivity of their use. it is able to restrict the access of third parties to those benefits. Hence, in scenario 2, the third criterion is also met.

Online can reliably measure the cost of acquiring email address lists. indeed, in accordance with paragraph 24 of as 26, the cost of a separately acquired intangible item can usually be measured reliably, particularly when the consideration is in the form of cash.

The  author  believes  that  the  company,  which  sub-contracts the development of intangible assets to other parties (its vendors), must exercise judgment in determining whether it is acquiring an intangible asset or whether it is obtaining goods and services that are being used in the development of a customer relationship by the entity itself. in determining whether a vendor is providing services to develop an internally generated intangible asset, the terms of the supply agreement should be examined to see whether the supplier is bearing a significant proportion of the risks associated with a failure of the project. for example, if the supplier is always compensated irrespective of the project’s outcome, the company on whose behalf the development is undertaken should account for those activities as its own. however, if the vendor bears a significant proportion of the risks associated with a failure of the project, the company is acquiring developed intangible asset, and therefore the requirements relating to separate acquisition of intangible asset should apply.

Under this view, the company will amortise intangible asset over its estimated useful life. the author believes that due to the following key reasons, the asset may have relatively small useful life, say, not more than two years:

(a)    the  company  will  use  email  address  lists  to  generate future sales. once the conversion takes place,  the email address lists will lose their relevance for  the company and a new customer relationship asset comes into existence which is an internally generated asset.

(b)    for  email  addresses  which  do  not  convert  into  customers over the next 12 to 24 months, it may be reasonable to assume that they may not be interested in buying company products.

(c)    email addresses may be subject to frequent changes.

Concluding remarks
in scenario 1, the control criterion is not met. Besides the vendor is providing the company a service rather than selling an intangible asset. therefore the author believes that only view 1 should apply in scenario 1. in scenario 2, view 2 is justified. In scenario 2, the exclusivity criterion and consequently the control requirement is met. secondly, since the payment to the vendor is based on performance the company pays for an intangible asset, rather than for services. however, the amortisation period will generally be very short.

(Unreported) [ITA No. 1407 & 1405/Ahd/2009] ITO vs. Dholera Port Ltd. and ITO vs. Adani Port-Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. A.Ys.: 2008-09, Decided on: 30-05-2014

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Article 13 India-UK DTAA – where the services provided by UK Company did not “make available” technical knowledge, skill etc., the payment was not taxable as FTS under Article 13 of India-UK DTAA.

Facts:
The taxpayer was an Indian company. The taxpayer had engaged a British company (“UKCo”) for conducting navigation studies to evaluate the economic feasibility of the port. For the services rendered, the taxpayer made payment to UKCo. According to the taxpayer, technical knowledge, skill or know-how was not “made available” by UKCo and hence, in terms of Article 13(4)(c) of India- UK DTAA , the payment was not FTS.1

Held:
• The agreement between taxpayer and UKCo stipulated that the report to be provided by UKCo was confidential, the taxpayer was not only prohibited from transferring the report to a third person but also prohibited from using the knowhow in performing services for any other client in future. The taxpayer was also prohibited from sub-licensing any of the rights granted.
• Based on the case law explaining the expression “make available,” the technology can be said to be “made available” only if the fruits of the services were transferred to the services recipient.
• Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case, the payment for the services provided was not made for “making available” technical knowledge, experience, knowhow to the taxpayer and therefore, it was not taxable as FTS under India-UK DTAA .

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(2011) 22 STR 591 (Tri.-Ahmd.) Flex Art Foil Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Daman.

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Transfer of CENVAT credit on conversion of partnership firm to Pvt. Ltd. — Credit reversed on audit objection but re-credit taken — Whether permission is required to be taken under Rule 10 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

Facts:
The partnership firm under the name and style as M/s. Sushmit Packaging was converted into a private limited company under the name of M/s. Flex Art Folio Pvt. Ltd. (the appellants in the case). The appellants took the credit in terms of the provision 10 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 and informed the Revenue. On an audit objection that credit could not be availed suo motu, the appellants reversed the credit taken. However, it was again taken on realising that no permission was required under the said rule. According to the appellant, it was not the case of suo motu refund in accordance with the Rule 10 of the said rules and relied on the decision in the case of Hewlett Packard (India) Sales Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner, 2007 (6) STR 155 (Tribunal). The Revenue contended that even if no permission was required under the said rules, admissibility of the credit on merit was not adjudged by the lower authorities.

Held:
It was held that the denial of credit on the ground that formal permission from the Central Excise Officers was not taken was not justified. However, the matter was remanded to the proper Central Excise Officer since the availability or otherwise of the credit on merits was not adjudged by the lower authorities.

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(2011) 22 STR 583 (Tri.-Bang.) — Durferrit Asea Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Guntur.

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Refund of unutilised CENVAT credit — Whether the appellant is eligible for the refund of claim of the CENVAT credit accumulated despite the nonregistration of appellant’s head office as a service tax distributor and non-distribution of service tax credit as per the laid down procedures — Rule 5 and Rule 7 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

Facts:
The appellants claimed refund of unutilised credit of Rs.77,150 for the invoices in the name of the head office which was not registered as service tax distributor. The Adjudicating Authority vide order-in-original rejected the refund claim on the ground that in the absence of registration, head office could not distribute the CENVAT credit to the appellant which was an EOU. The appellants contended that the non-observance of procedure of distribution of credit will not come in the way of the refund of the amount of the credit.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that the appellants had no other units in the relevant division. There was no requirement to follow Rule 7 (Registration as ISD), wherein the appellants had only one manufacturing unit. The eligibility of the appellants as regards availment of the CENVAT credit on the service tax paid on the input services was not questioned by the Commissioner (Appeals). Further, the provisions of Rule 7 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 come into play only if the appellants wished to get themselves registered as the input service credit distributor, which was not the situation in the instant case. Therefore, the appellants’ claim was allowed by the Tribunal.

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(2011) 22 STR 581 (Tri.-Del.) K. S. Transformers (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur-I.

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Refund — Unjust enrichment — Section 11B of the Central Excise Act — Service tax on job work found not leviable during specific period. Service tax was however charged by the job worker — Manufacturer did not claim CENVAT credit but issued debit note after a gap of time — Refund claim denied as assessee did not claim immediately — No investigation done to prove debit note wrong — No tax liability without letters of law — Assessee’s appeal allowed.

Facts:
The principal manufacturer issued debit note to the appellant who was a job worker on finding that the service tax on the job work was not leviable during the material period. The appellant was denied refund on the ground that the debit note was issued by the manufacturer after a long time. According to the appellant, they should not suffer by not getting back the money wrongly paid to the Revenue and if the assessee could show that the burden was not passed on or it was reversed, the claim of refund could not be denied. The decisions in the case of Commissioner of Service Tax, Bangalore v. Shiva Ciba Analyticals (I) Ltd., 2009 and Union of India v. A. K. Spintex Ltd., 2009 (234) E.L.T. 41 (Raj.) were relied upon. According to the Revenue, the appellant was disentitled to the refund as they did not immediately claim the refund and relied on the judgment of the Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur-II v. Adarsh Gaur Gum Udyog, 2000 (120) E.L.T. 138 (Trib.).

Held:
It was held that the Revenue’s plea does not sustain in light of the failure on part of the Revenue to prove that the debit note was wrong. Further, it was held that when there is no liability to pay tax, the appellant should not suffer and that no taxes can be realised without the letters of law. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed.

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(2011) 22 STR 578 (Tri.-Ahmd.) — Ultratech Cement Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Bhavnagar.

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CENVAT credit of service tax — Whether vehicles used in residential colony of assessee and insurance on residential buildings includible within the scope of ‘input services’.

Facts:
The appellant was denied the credit of service tax paid on the vehicles used in the residential colony of the appellant as also the credit of service tax paid on the insurance of the residential building on the ground that the same could not be considered to be ‘input service’. It was contended that the issue involved in the present case was related to the credit of service tax paid on the services used in activities related to business which covered all activities related to functioning of a business.

Held:
Referring to a number of case laws and relying on the decisions in the case of Manikgarh Cement v. CCE & Cus., Nagpur 2008 (9) STR 554 (Tri.- Mumbai) and Millipore India Ltd. v. CCE., Bangalore 2009 (13) STR 616 (Tri.-Bang.), respectively, it was held that the definition of input service being quite wide, an activity used for business purposes was held as ‘input service’ and the assessee was entitled to the credit of service tax paid on vehicles used in the residential colony of assessee and insurance on residential buildings.

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(2011) 22 STR 558 (Tri.-Ahmd.) Commissioner of Central Excise, Bhavnagar v. Gujarat Travels.

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Tour operator service — Vehicle not registered as a tourist vehicle but registered with the Regional Transport Authority under the PCOP (Contract Carriage Permit) — Whether liable to pay service tax — Appellate Authority holding that assessee not covered prior to 10-9-2004 when ambit expanded to cover any mode of transport — No reason to interfere in order.

Facts:
The respondents operating the tours in an omni-bus registered with the Regional Transport Authority covered under PCOP (Contract Carriage Permit) were not paying service tax on the ground that the tour was not being conducted in a tourist vehicle as defined in the Motor Vehicle Act. The respondents cited the case of Secretary, Federation of Bus Operators Association of Tamil Nadu, Chennai v. UOI and Ors., 2006 (2) STR 411 (Mad.), wherein it was held that the tour conducted by a contract carriage (and not by a tourist vehicle) do not fall within the definition of Tour Operator.

Held:
It was held that there was no reason to interfere in the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) holding that the respondents were not required to pay service tax. The Revenue’s appeal was rejected.

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(2011) 22 STR 553 (Tri.-Bang.) Commissioner of Central Excise, Hyderabad v. Vijay Leasing Company.

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Activity of mineral extraction, classification issue — Whether mining service or site formation and clearance service — Activity of site formation, etc. incidental to contract of mining undertaken — Activity not taxable under site formation and clearance service during relevant period i.e., prior to introduction of mining service w.e.f. 1-6-2007.

Refund — Whether tax paid on self-assessment is refundable — Self-assessment cannot be considered as assessment made by officer u/s. 73 of the Finance Act — Assessee justified in filing refund claim.

Facts:
The respondents being engaged in providing services of mining to their clients/principals got themselves registered under the category of ‘site formation and clearance, excavation and earthmoving and demolition’ service and accordingly paid service tax under the said category for the period 16-6-2005 and 30-9-2006. Pursuant to the introduction of separate service under the category of mining service w.e.f. 1-6-2007, they filed a refund claim for an amount of Rs.1,58,11,007 on the ground that their service would fall under the new category. The Revenue contended that the contract entered by the respondents with the principals indicated that the services were of excavation, drilling and demolition services. Moreover, the respondents having discharged the service tax liability on self-assessment could not file a refund claim. The respondents contended that the removal of overburdens and excavation of ore undertaken as per the contract would clearly fall under the category of mining services and was liable to be taxed accordingly. Further that the self-assessment would not amount to assessment done by an officer and hence there was no restriction for claiming the refund.

Held:
Relying on the High Court judgment in the case of Central Office Mewar Palaces Org. v. UOI, [2008 (12) STR 545 (Raj.)], the respondents were held to be entitled to the refund claim. Appeal of the Revenue was rejected.

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Limitation — Delay of 53 days in filing appeal — Delay attributed to resignation of both employee handling service tax matters and his successor — Delay condoned — Section 86 of the Finance Act, 1994.

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Facts:
The appellant pleaded that the delay of 53 days in filing the appeal was owing to the resignation tendered by the employees handling service tax matters. The delay on part of the appellant was neither willful nor on account of any negligence and was beyond the appellant’s control.

Held:
The Tribunal held that the reasons given for the delay in application for condonation were justifiable and were aptly supported by an affidavit by a senior functionary and hence the delay of 53 days was condoned.

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(2011) 22 STR 533 (Tri.-Chennai) Trichy Inst. of Management Studies (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Trichy.

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Commercial training or coaching services — Parallel colleges, liability — Levy in respect of training and coaching which forms essential part of course, leading to issue of degrees, etc., not justified — Section 65(27) of Finance Act, 1994.

Facts:
The assessee was conducting classes for students enrolled in distance education programme of Alagappa University. The appellant contended that the coaching classes being in the nature of parallel colleges should be exempted from the payment of service tax. Further, as per the MOU executed between the Alagappa University and the institution run by the appellant, the institution was recognised as a centre for enrolling candidates for distance education programmes. The case of Malapuram Distt. Parallel College Association v. Union of India, 2006 (2) STR 321 (Ker.) was cited in support.

Held:
Applying the ratio of the High Court judgment in case of Malapuram Distt. Parallel College Association v. Union of India, 2006 (2) STR 321 (Ker.), it was held that service tax was not to be levied in respect of training and coaching provided by the appellant. Although it formed an essential part of the course or curriculum of a university leading to issuance of certificate or diploma or degree to the students recognised by law, is not justified to be commercial coaching. The appeal was allowed accordingly.

(2011) 22 STR 539 (Tri.-Bang.) — Mphasis Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Bangalore.

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Filing of Balance Sheet and Profit and Loss Account in XBRL mode.

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has issued General Circular No. 43/2011 on 7th July 2011 pertaining to the filing of Balance Sheet and Profit and Loss Account in XBRL mode, wherein it is clarified that the same will be applicable for financial statements closing on or after 31-3-2011. Further the Statutory Auditor needs to certify that the financial statements have been prepared in XBRL mode for filing on MCA-21 portal.

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E-filing of income-tax return in respect of companies under liquidation.

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs vide general Circular dated 6th July 2011 has issued guidelines to the Official Liquidators for E-filing of Income-tax return in respect of companies under liquidation.

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Payment of MCA fees by NEFT mode.

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The Ministry has introduced payment of MCA fees via NEFT mode, in addition to already existing payment methods of credit card, Internet banking and physical challan to eliminate inconveniences caused due to payment processing delays.

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Digitally signed certificates to be issued by the ROC.

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As a step towards the ‘Green Initiative’ and with a view to reduce the time gap, 13 type of certificates and standard letters will be issued issued electronically under the digital signature of the Registrar of Companies as per the Circular No. 39/2011, dated 21-6-2011. These certificates pertain to the forms for creation, modification and satisfaction of charges, incorporation certificate and certificates pursuant to change of name, objects clause, etc.

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List of defaulting companies, directors and professionals.

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The MCA vide Circular dated 20-6-2011 has issued a clarification to Circular No. 33/2011, dated 1-6-2011 with regard to compliance of provisions under the Companies Act, 1956. The Ministry has clarified that the Circular shall be applicable to those defaulting companies and Directors which have not filed the Balance Sheet and Annual Return for any of the financial years 2006-07, 2007-08, 2008-09 and 2009- 10 with the ROC as required u/s. 220 and/or u/s. 159 of the Act, 1956 and the Circular would be effective from 3rd July onwards.

The defaulters list, has been updated and has been posted on the MCA21 site.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 2, dated 15- 7-2011 — Regularisation of Liaison/Branch Offices of foreign entities established during the pre-FEMA period.

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Presently, prior approval of RBI is required for establishing a Liaison Office (LO)/Branch Office (BO) in India by a person resident outside India.

This Circular advices persons resident outside India who have established LO/BO in India and have not obtained permission from RBI to do so within a period of 90 days from the date of issue of this Circular for regularisation of establishment of such offices in India, in terms of the extant FEMA provisions.

Similarly, foreign entities who may have established LO or BO with the permission from the Government of India must also approach RBI along with a copy of the said approval for allotment of a Unique Identification Number (UIN).

These applications/requests must be submitted to the Chief General Manager-in-Charge, Reserve Bank of India, Foreign Exchange Department, Foreign Investment Division, Central Office, Fort, Mumbai-400001 in form FNC and should be routed through the bank where the account of such LO/ BO is maintained.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 1, dated 4-7- 2011 — Redemption of Foreign Currency Convertible Bonds (FCCBs).

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This Circular permits Indian companies to refinance their outstanding FCCB under the Automatic Route up to US $ 500 million with immediate effect, subject to compliance with the following:

(i) Fresh ECB/FCCB must be raised with the stipulated average maturity period and applicable all-in-cost being as per the extant ECB guidelines.

(ii) Amount of fresh ECB/FCCB must not exceed the outstanding redemption value at maturity of the outstanding FCCB.

(iii) Fresh ECB/FCCB must not be raised six months before the maturity date of the outstanding FCCB.

(iv) Purpose of ECB/FCCB must be clearly mentioned as ‘Redemption of outstanding FCCBs’ in Form 83 at the time of obtaining Loan Registration Number from the Reserve Bank.

(v) Designated bank is required to monitor the end use of funds.

(vi) Must comply with all other requirements of ECB policy under the Automatic Route, such as eligible borrower, recognised lender, enduse, prepayment, refinancing of existing ECB and reporting arrangements.

ECB/FCCB beyond US $ 500 million for the purpose of redemption of the existing FCCB will be considered under the approval route. ECB/FCCB availed of for the purpose of refinancing the existing outstanding FCCB will be reckoned as part of the limit of US $ 500 million available under the Automatic Route as per the extant norms.

Restructuring of FCCB involving change in the existing conversion price is not permissible. Proposals for restructuring of FCCB not involving change in conversion price will be considered under the Approval Route depending on the merits of the proposal.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 75, dated 30- 6-2011 — Buyback/Prepayment of Foreign Currency Convertible Bonds (FCCBs).

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Presently, buyback/prepayment of FCCB requires prior approval of RBI.

This Circular has:

1. Extended the date for completion of buyback/ prepayment to 31st March, 2012.

2. Liberalised the procedure for buyback/prepayment of FCCB as under:

A. Automatic Route

Indian companies can prematurely buyback FCCB, subject to compliance with the following:

(i) Buyback value of the FCCB must be at a minimum discount of 8% on book value.

(ii) Funds used for the buyback must be out of existing foreign currency funds held either in India (including funds held in the EEFC account) or abroad and/or out of fresh ECB raised in conformity with the current ECB norms.

(iii) Where fresh ECB is raised, it must co-terminus with the outstanding maturity of the original FCCB. If it is raised for less than three years the all-in-cost ceiling should not exceed 6 months Libor plus 200 bps as applicable to short-term borrowings. If it is raised for more than three years, the all-in-cost for the relevant maturity of the ECB will apply. 

B. Approval Route

Indian companies can buyback FCCB up to redemption value of US $ 100 million out of their internal accruals, subject to compliance with the following:

(i) Minimum discount of 10% of book value for redemption value up to US $ 50 million.

(ii) Minimum discount of 15% of book value for the redemption value over US $ 50 million and up to US $ 75 million.

(iii) Minimum discount of 20% of book value for the redemption value of over US $ 75 million and up to US $ 100 million.

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(2011) 22 STR 656 (Tri.-Ahmd.) Fascel Ltd. v. Commissioner of S.T.

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Penalty — Actual amount not declared in ST-3 Return and intention to evade tax alleged — Tax demand with interest confirmed — Duty liability worked by appellants and no investigation by Revenue except issuance of SCN based on P/L account — Penalties set aside — Section 80 considered.

Facts:
The appellants engaged in providing telephone services were issued a show-cause notice (SCN) demanding service tax on noticing that the appellants had paid the service tax on lower amount than the income shown in the profit and loss account (P/L account). The appellants pleaded that the SCN was issued without any investigation/ verification and merely on the basis of the P/L account. Relying on the decision in the case of Martin & Harris Laboratories Ltd. v. CCE, Gurgaon 2005 (185) ELT 421 (Tri.-Delhi) and a host of other decisions, it was submitted that the Annual Report and P/L account were public documents and therefore on the ground of limitation, the whole demand was liable to be set aside. Moreover, the very fact that there was excess payment in one year and short payment in another year showed that there was no suppression, mis-declaration/fraud, etc. to invoke the extended time, whereas the Revenue contended that in view of the fact that ST-3 return did not reflect the correct position, suppression/ mis-declaration was rightly invoked.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that the appellants had reasonable cause for the alleged wrongful payment of service tax and hence it was held that the case was fit for invoking section 80 of the Finance Act, 1994 and the penalties were set aside.

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(2011) 22 STR 650 (Tri.-Bang.) — Vikas Coaching Centre v. Commissioner of Custom, Central Excise & S.T., Guntur.

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Valuation — Commercial training or coaching services — Whether hostel and mess charges includible while calculating the liability of service tax on their services.

Facts:
The appellants provided the service of ‘Commercial training or coaching’. In addition to the said taxable service, they also provided optional hostel and mess facility. The students opting for the hostel and mess facility were charged separately for the same. The appellants relied on the decision of the Tribunal in the case of Aditya College of Competitive Exams v. CCE, Visakhapatnam 2009 (16) STR 154 (Tri.-Bang.). According to the Revenue, hostel and mess charges were includible in the value of taxable service.

Held:
It was held that for calculating liability of service tax for providing commercial training or coaching service, the hostel and mess charges were not includible.

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2011 (22) STR 638 (Tri.-Chennai) — Commr. of Service Tax, Chennai v. State Bank of India.

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Whether provisions relating to suppression of facts invokable — Jurisdictional officer not intimated by concerned branch of SBI about providing both taxable and exempted service — No declaration made in ST-3 returns — Provisions of Rule restricting utilisation of credit clear — Tax evasion detected on audit — Longer period of limitation invokable.

Facts:
A branch of the State Bank provided both taxable and exempted service. During February 2005 the respondents utilised CENVAT credit exceeding the admissible limit of 20% amount as provided in the then Rule 6(3) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004. The Department alleged that the said branch of SBI did not disclose to the Department that they provided exempted output service also and that they have taken service tax in excess of the admissible 20% amount. The said evasion came to light when the accounts of SBI were audited by the Departmental audit officers. As per the Revenue, this was a clear contravention of service tax law on part of the respondents with an intention to evade payment of service tax. Moreover, the longer period of limitation was rightly invoked. Citing the case of Pushpam Pharmaceuticals Co. v. Collector of Central Excise, Bombay, 1995 (78) ELT 401 (SC), it was inter alia contended that there was no intention to evade service tax and that the head office of the respondents had issued a circular asking the branches to utilise CENVAT credit keeping in view the admissible 20% amount. However, copy of such circular was not produced.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that several ingredients required for the purpose of invoking longer period of limitation u/s. 73 of the Finance Act, 1994 were available in the case such as misstatement, suppression as well as contravention of provision with intent to evade payment of tax. Accordingly, it was held that the period of limitation was invokable in this case. The appeal was remanded to the lower Appellate Authority as regards the merit of the case.

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(2011) 22 STR 625 (Tri.-Chennai) — Parmeshwari Textiles v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Tiruchirapalli.

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Refund of service tax paid on technical testing and analysis service availed by exporter — Exemption under Notification No. 41/2007-ST by way of refund denied stating that service provider’s invoices not specific to export goods — Policy of Govt. not to burden exports with domestic taxes — Impugned order set aside.

Facts:

The appellant was denied refund by the lower appellate authority in respect of service tax paid for technical testing and analysis service on the ground that the appellant had not fulfilled the conditions specified in Notification No. 41/2007-ST, dated 6-10-2007 and that the service provider’s invoices were not specific to the export goods. The appellant contended that the order of the lower Appellate Authority denying the refund was not justified and was given without taking in consideration the facts.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that it is the policy of the Government to encourage exports and not to burden the export consignments with domestic taxes like the service tax which is paid in relation to the input service. The order passed by the original authority allowing the refund of input service tax in respect of the export goods was upheld by the Tribunal.

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Waiver of approval of Central Government for payment of remuneration to professional managerial person by companies having no profits or inadequate profits.

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The Ministry vide Notification dated 14th July 2011 made amendments to Schedule XIII part II section II pertaining to remuneration payable by companies having no profits or inadequate profits. Conditions to be fulfilled for waiver of approval of the Central Govt. for managerial personnel of subsidiary companies have also been listed.

Approval is now waived if managerial personnel do not have any interest in the capital of the company or its holding company, directly or indirectly or through other statutory structures or related to the directors or promoters of the company or its holding company at any time during the period of two years prior to the date of appointment and have a graduate-level qualification with expertise in the field of their profession.

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Business expenditure: Deduction only on actual payment: Section 43B: Provision for pension: Liability accrues from year to year: Payable on retirement/resignation: Assessee entitled to deduction.

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[CIT v. Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd., 334 ITR 341 (Del.)] The assessee followed the mercantile system of accounting. It had a super-annuation scheme for its employees. In order to retain managerial employees, the assessee also introduced a pension scheme for such managerial employees which was over and above the benefits available under the super-annuation scheme of the company. This scheme was non-funded and applicable to all managerial employees. The liability on this account for the A.Y. 2001-02 of Rs.3,61,63,024 was provided following AS-15 based on actuarial valuation. The assessee claimed deduction of this amount. The AO disallowed the claim relying on the provisions of section 43B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the ground that even if it was an ascertained liability, the deduction could not be allowed in the absence of contribution to the pension fund. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as:

“(i) The Commissioner (Appeals) correctly viewed that the pension scheme of the assessee did not envisage any regular contribution to any fund or trust or entity. The pension scheme provided that pension would be paid by the assessee to its employee on his or her attaining the retirement age or resigning after having rendered services for a specified number of years.

(ii) Thus, where the liability on this account accrued from year to year, it was payable on retirement/resignation of the eligible employees. It could not be disallowed u/s.43B.”

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Accrual of income in India: Salary: Section 5: Assessee a non-resident Indian, was employee of a Hong Kong-based ship management company: For services rendered in international waters outside country he was paid salary which was received by him on board of ship: As per his instructions, a portion of his salary, in form of ‘allocation’, had been remitted to NRE account of assessee in India: No portion of salary liable to tax in India.

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[DIT (International Taxation), Bangalore v. Dylan George Smith, 11 Taxman.com 348 (Kar.)]

The assessee was an individual. For the relevant years i.e., A.Ys. 2003-04 and 2004-05 he was a non-resident Indian. He was employed with a foreign company engaged in the management of crew and vessels. He was working on the ships of the foreign company. Payments towards salary was first received by the assessee on board the ship and later on as per his instructions, remittance of a portion of salary in the form of ‘allocation’ had been made to the NRE account of the assessee in India. The assessee claimed that his income had accrued outside India and was also received outside India on board the ships belonging to the Hong Kong Company and as the income had not arisen within India, he was not liable to pay tax in India. The Assessing Officer rejected the assessee’s claim and held that the income fell under the purview of section 5(2) of the Act. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal accepted the assessee’s claim. The Tribunal held that the assessee was an employee of the Hong Kongbased ship management company. He never had any contractual relationship with any Indian Company. He received the salary from Hong Kong for services rendered in their agent’s ships, namely, M V Vergina and M T Tamyara in international territorial waters. Payments towards salary was first received by the assessee on board the ships and later on as per his instructions, remittance of a portion of salary in the form of ‘allocation’ had been made to the NRE account of the assessee in India. The Tribunal followed its order in ITA 1137(B)/2008 that the salary accrued outside India could not be taxed in India merely because it was received in India.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) In the instant case, though the assessee was an Indian, at the relevant point of time he was a non-resident. He was working for a foreign company. For the services rendered in the international waters outside the country he was paid salary. He received the salary on board the ships. A particular amount was allocated to be transferred to his NRE account in India. Merely because a portion of his salary was credited to his account in India, that would not render him liable to tax in India when the service was rendered outside India, salary was paid outside India and his employer was a foreign employer.

(ii) The provisions of the Act were not attracted to the salary of the assessee. Therefore, the Tribunal was justified in upholding the order passed by the CIT(A) and in setting aside the order passed by the Assessing Officer.

(iii) Hence, there was not any merit in the instant appeal. Accordingly, the appeal was to be dismissed.”

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Accrual of income: A.Y. 1997-98: Interest: Waiver of interest before end of accounting year: Interest does not accrue.

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[Bagoria Udyog v. CIT, 334 ITR 280 (Cal.)] The assessee had advanced an amount to a party H. The assessee claimed that it had agreed to waive the interest and therefore no interest accrued for the A.Y. 1997-98. The Assessing Officer held that interest had accrued. Before the Commissioner (Appeals) the assessee produced the agreement dated 28-2-1997, whereby the assessee had agreed not to charge interest to H w.e.f. 1-4-1996. The Commissioner (Appeals) accepted the contention of the assessee and deleted the addition. The Tribunal restored the addition on the ground that the assessee had submitted that there was no business connection with H.

In appeal by the assessee, the assessee clarified that no such concession was made by the assessee. The Calcutta High Court allowed the assessee’s claim and held as under:

“(i) The Tribunal accepted the position of law that a waiver of interest was permissible. It further accepted the finding of the Commissioner (Appeals) that sufficient cause was shown by the assessee for non-production of the agreement before the Assessing Officer.

(ii) The addition of deemed interest was not justified.”

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Revision: Section 263: Block assessment: Addition made on basis of seized documents deleted by ITAT: Appeal pending before High Court: Revision directing the AO to consider the tax implications of the same seized documents not valid.

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[CIT v. Mukesh J. Upadhyaya (Bom.), ITA No. 428 of 2010 dated 13-6-2011] In the instant case, in the block assessment order dated 31-12-2002, the Assessing Officer made an addition of Rs.90 lakh on the basis of the documents seized from the premises of Vishwas R. Bhoir. The said addition was deleted by the Tribunal. Against the said order of the Tribunal the Revenue preferred an appeal before the Bombay High Court, which was pending. In the meantime, the CIT passed a revision order u/s.263 on 16.03.2005 directing the Assessing Officer to consider the tax implication of the page Nos. 1 to 13 of Bundle No. 12, seized from the residence of Vishwas R. Bhoir. The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT on the ground that the addition of Rs.90 lakh was made after due consideration of both the documents referred to by the CIT. The Tribunal recorded a finding of fact that the two documents cannot be read independent of each other. The Tribunal held that once the taxability under both the documents has been considered by the Assessing Officer and also by the CIT(A), it is not open to the CIT to invoke the jurisdiction u/s.263 of the Act and direct the Assessing Officer to consider the taxability under those two documents once again.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court held as under: “In our opinion, no fault can be found with the decision of the Tribunal in setting aside the order of the CIT u/s.263 of the Act.”

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Closing stock: Value: Section 145A: Excise duty on sugar manufactured but not sold is not to be included in the value of the closing stock.

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[CIT v. Loknete Balasaheb Desai S. S. K. Ltd., (Bom.); ITA No. 4297 of 2009 dated 22-6-2011]

The assessee was engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of white sugar. In the A.Y. 2001-02, the Assessing Officer held that the excise duty on sugar manufactured but not sold and lying in closing stock was a liability incurred by the assessee u/s.145A(b) ought to have been considered for valuation and disallowed u/s.43B of the Act. Following the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in ACIT v. D & H Secheron Electrodes P. Ltd.; 173 Taxman 188 (MP), it was held that the Assessing Officer was not justified in adding excise duty to the price of the unsold sugar lying in stock on 31-3-2001.

On appeal by the Revenue the following question was raised before the Bombay High Court:

“Whether in the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the ITAT was justified in holding that u/s.145A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 the excise duty element cannot be added to the value of unsold sugar lying in stock on the last day of the accounting year?”

The High Court held as under:

“(i) The argument of the Revenue is that the excise duty liability is incurred on manufacture of sugar and since section 145A(b) specifically used the expression ‘incurred’, the Tribunal ought to have held that the excise duty liability has to be taken into consideration in valuing the unsold sugar in stock on the last day of the accounting year.

(ii) The expression ‘incurred by the assessee’ in section 145A(b) is followed by the words ‘to bring the goods to the place of its location and condition as on the date of valuation’. Thus the expression incurred by the assessee’ relates to the liability determined as tax, duty, cess or fee payable in bringing the goods to the place of its location and condition of the goods. Explanation to section 145A(b) makes it further clear that the income chargeable under the head ‘profits and gains of business’ shall be adjusted by the amount paid as tax, duty, cess or fee. Therefore, the expression ‘incurred’ in section 145A(b) must be construed to mean the liability actually incurred by the assessee.

(iii) The Apex Court in the case of CCE v. Polyset Corporation & Anr.; 115 ELT 41 (SC) has held that the dutiability of excisable goods is determined with reference to the date of manufacture and the rate of excise duty payable has to be determined with reference to the date of clearance of the goods. Therefore, though the date of manufacture is the relevant date for dutiability, the relevant date for the duty liability is the date on which the goods are cleared. In other words, in respect of excisable goods manufactured and lying in stock, the excise duty liability would get crystallised on the date of clearance of the goods and not on the date of manufacture.

(iv) Therefore, till the date of clearance of the excisable goods, the excise duty payable on the said goods does not get crystallised and consequently the assessee cannot be said to have incurred the excise duty liability. In respect of the excisable goods lying in stock, no liability is determined as payable and consequently, there would be no question of incurring excise duty liability.

(v) In the present case, it is not in dispute that the manufactured sugar was lying in stock and the same were not cleared from the factory. Therefore, in the facts of the present case, the ITAT was justified in holding that in respect of unsold sugar lying in stock, central excise liability was not incurred and consequently the addition of excise duty made by the Assessing Officer to the value of the excisable goods was liable to be deleted.”

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Reassessment: Section 147 and section 148: Development agreement dated 17-9-2004 terminated in view of default of developer: Suit filed by developer ultimately settled by order of High Court dated 2-5-2011: Capital gain not taxable in A.Y. 2005-06: Notice u/s.148 for taxing the capital gain in A.Y. 2005-06 is not valid.

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[Amar R. Shanbhag v. ITO (Bom.); W.P. No. 552 of 2011 dated 18-7-2011] The assessee individual had entered into development agreement with a developer on 17-9-2004. The agreed consideration was Rs.4 crore. As the developer failed to pay the amount of Rs.30 lakh before 31-10-2004, the assessee petitioner on 28-3-2005 terminated the development agreement. Thereafter, on the developer issuing the cheques for Rs.30 lakh on 30-6-2005, the development agreement was restored. In view of the further default on the part of the developer, on 19-5-2010, the petitioner once again terminated the development agreement. Thereupon, the developer filed a suit in the Bombay High Court, which was ultimately settled on 2-5-2011, wherein the consideration was enhanced from Rs.4 crore to Rs.7.5 crore. It was also ordered that the petitioner delivers the possession of the property to the developers as on the date of the order i.e., 2-5-2011.

In the meanwhile, the Assessing Officer issued notice u/s.148 dated 25-3-2010 proposing to tax the capital gain arising from the development agreement in the A.Y. 2005-06. The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the petitioner-assessee and quashed the said notice u/s.148 and held as under:

“(i) It cannot be said that there was any reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment in the A.Y. 2005-06, so as to initiate reassessment proceedings u/s. 147 r.w.s 148 of the Act.

(ii) So long as the consent terms filed on 2-5-2011 hold the field, the question of bringing to tax the capital gains under the development agreement dated 17-9-2004 in A.Y. 2005-06 does not arise at all.

(iii) In the result, the impugned notice dated 25-3-2010 issued u/s.148 of the Act is quashed and set aside.”

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Appeal to the High Court — Delay in filing the appeal — High Court to examine the cases on merits and should not dispose of cases merely on the ground of delay.

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[CIT v. West Bengal Infrastructure Development Finance Corporation Ltd., (2011) 334 ITR 269 (SC)] Looking to the amount of tax involved in the case, the Supreme Court was of the view that the High Court ought to have decided the matter on the merits. According to the Supreme Court, in all such cases where there is delay on the part of the Department, the High Court should consider imposing costs, but certainly it should examine the cases on the merits and should not dispose of cases merely on the ground of delay, particularly when huge stakes are involved.

Accordingly, the order of the High Court was set aside and the matter was remitted to the High Court to decide the case de novo in accordance with law.

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Natural Justice — Order passed in violation of principles of natural justice should not be quashed, but the matter should be remanded to grant an opportunity of hearing.

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[ITO v. M. Pirai Choodi, (2011) 334 ITR 262 (SC)] The assessee had preferred a writ appeal against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 21st February, 2007, made in writ petition No. 3247 of 2007, where the learned Judge refused to quash the assessment order dated 29th December, 2006, for the A.Y. 2004-05 made u/s.143(3) of the Incometax Act, on the ground that the assessee had got an alternative remedy to prefer a statutory appeal before the Appellate Tribunal.

The Division Bench of the High Court observed that it is a general rule that it may not be proper to entertain the writ petition when effective alternative remedy by way of statutory appeal is available. But, the above general rule is subject to exceptions as laid by the Apex Court in Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 107, where the Apex Court has held that in spite of availability of the alternative remedy, the High Court may still exercise its writ jurisdiction in at least three contingencies: viz., (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (ii) where there is failure of the principles of natural justice; or (iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged.

According to the High Court, the present case rightly attracted the second exception, viz., the failure of the principles of natural justice in the sense that the respondent-Department refused to admit the agricultural income of Rs.11,32,232.42 for the A.Y. 2004-05 of the assessee by placing reliance on the statement of the Village Administrative Officer, overlooking the materials furnished by the assessee to substantiate his agricultural activity, viz., (1) Chitta Adangal for the relevant periods, (2) Proof for purchase of agricultural inputs and sale of agricultural products, (3) Yearwise chart showing the expenses incurred for the agricultural activities, (4) Application of capital in the crops/herb, and (5) Books of account for business activities for the relevant period.

According to the assessee, in spite of the documentary evidence furnished to substantiate the agricultural income to the tune of Rs.11,32,232.42 for the A.Y. 2004-05, the respondent/assessing authority had chosen to overlook the same and refused to admit the said agricultural income for the A.Y. 2004-05, merely based on a statement alleged to have been obtained from the Village Administrative Officer behind the back of the assessee.

Admittedly, the assessee was not present when the statement of the Village Administrative Officer was obtained by the assessing authority. The High Court found some force in the contention of the assessee that such a statement obtained from the Village Administrative Officer behind the back of the assessee, depriving him of an opportunity to cross-examine the Village Administrative Officer, would amount to violation of the principles of natural justice and, therefore, would vitiate the assessment order.

Hence, the High Court was satisfied that there was a glaring violation of the principles of natural justice apparent on the face of the records, which fact was not properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ petition on the ground of alternative remedy. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the writ appeal and the order of the learned Single Judge was set aside. Consequently, the impugned assessment order was quashed.

On an appeal, the Supreme Court observed that in this case, the High Court had set aside the order of assessment on the ground that no opportunity to cross-examine was granted, as sought by the assessee. The Supreme Court was of the view that the High Court should not have set aside the entire assessment order. At the highest, the High Court should have directed the Assessing Officer to grant as opportunity to the assessee to cross-examine the concerned witness. The Supreme Court was of the view that even on this particular aspect, the assessee could have gone in appeal to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). The assessee had failed to avail of the statutory remedy. In the circumstances, the Supreme Court was of the view that the High Court should not have quashed the assessment proceedings vide the impugned order.

Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned order.

Liberty was however granted to the assessee to move the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals).

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Rectification of mistake — Tribunal should have regard to all the facts — Capital or revenue expenditure — Business loss — Loss incurred due to fluctuation of foreign exchange rate — To be decided in the light of CIT v. Woodward Governor India P. Ltd.

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[Perfetti Van Melle India (P) Ltd. v. CIT, (2011) 334 ITR 259 (SC)]

The assessment order for A.Y. 1998-99 was passed on 10th January, 2001, in which foreign exchange fluctuation loss amounting to Rs.38,30,000 was disallowed by the Assessing Officer.

The assessee filed an appeal before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) who upheld the disallowance on the ground that the exchange fluctuation related to long-term loan, and it could not be allowed as revenue expenditure.

Against the order of the Commissioner of Incometax (Appeals), the assessee filed an appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal vide order dated 22nd April, 2004, upheld the disallowance of loss of Rs.38,30,000.

Thereafter, the assessee filed an appeal before the High Court. While disposing of the appeal, it was observed by the High Court on 6th December, 2004, that:

“In view of paragraphs 13 and 14 of the Tribunal’s order, it is not possible for us to accept the contention that the assessee had produced books of account. It is for the Tribunal, which is a fact-finding authority, to examine the same and to record a finding. If the appellant had produced all the necessary documents in this behalf, then the Tribunal should have examined the same. In fact, in such a situation, instead of approaching this Court, the assessee ought to have moved the Tribunal u/s.254(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. It would be open to the appellant to move the Tribunal within 15 days from today. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.”

Thereafter, the assessee filed an application u/s. 254(2) of the Act, before the Tribunal and that application was dismissed by the Tribunal vide its order dated 15th June, 2005.

On an appeal, the High Court was of the view that ex facie, the appeal challenging two different orders passed by the Tribunal dated 22nd April, 2004, and 15th June, 2005, in one single appeal was not maintainable.

The High Court held that as far as the order dated 22nd April, 2004 was concerned, the same was challenged by the assessee by the way of appeal and vide order dated 6th December, 2004, that appeal had been disposed of by the High Court. The assessee could not reagitate the same issue again.

Coming to the order dated 15th June, 2005, passed by the Tribunal, the High Court noted that the Tribunal while dismissing the application for rectification, vide impugned order had held that:

“Our attention was invited to para 13 of the order in which the Tribunal has observed that it was for the assessee, which possesses exclusive knowledge as to the utilisation of the loan, to prove the same by leading evidence to that effect by producing the books of account and showing the entries made therein and that the assessee has not discharged this burden either before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) or before the Tribunal. It is stated that the Tribunal has noted in para 14 of the order that in A.Y. 1997-98 the assessee had filed some details and documents on the basis of which the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) accepted the claim, but has gone further to record that for the year under appeal no such details were filed. The submission of the assessee before us is that the loss was allowed by the income-tax authorities in the A.Ys. 1996-97 and 1997-98 and a different treatment for the same is not warranted since the facts were the same for the year under appeal also. It is submitted that inasmuch as the Tribunal has overlooked this aspect of the matter, there is an error apparent from the record. It was alternatively submitted that the Tribunal should give a finding about the nature of the loss, whether it is capital or revenue. However, it was fairly admitted before us that this claim was not made before the income-tax authorities or before the Tribunal.”

The High Court observed that according to this order, it had been admitted before the Tribunal that the claim was not made before the incometax authorities or before the Tribunal. The Tribunal further held that:

“We have considered the matter. Given the findings of the Tribunal in paras 13 and 14 of its order, the present application cannot be accepted. It may perhaps be that the evidence produced in the earlier years was relevant for the purpose of deciding the merits of the assessee’s claim, but when the Departmental Authorities have held that for the year under appeal there was no evidence brought on record to show the utilisation of the loan, and where such a finding has been upheld by the Tribunal, the provisions of section 254(2) of the Act cannot be invoked. We do appreciate the assessee’s anxiety and it may even be open to the assessee to argue that the evidence adduced by the assessee for the earlier years would be sufficient to discharge the assessee’s burden for the year under appeal, but even if there is grievance on this score, it could not perhaps be redressed by resorting to section 254(2) of the Act. At best it may amount to an error of judgment or may even amount to the Tribunal insisting on the same evidence being formally placed on record for the year under appeal, which may appear to be ritualistic, but since the Tribunal has gone on the basis of the question of burden, it is not possible for us to accept the present application. We are also unable to give a finding as to the nature of loss, keeping in view the very fair admission that the question was not raised before the Tribunal or the income-tax authorities.”

According to the High Court, the appeal was wholly misconceived and without any basis and there was no reason to disagree with the findings given by the Tribunal and there was no infirmity in the impugned order passed by the Tribunal. The Supreme Court held that having examined the facts and circumstances of the case, which pertained to the A.Y. 1998-99, and particularly in the light of the order passed for the earlier A.Ys. 1996-97 and 1997-98, as also having regards to the assessment orders passed in the following year (1999-2000) and in view of its judgment in the case of CIT v. Woodward Governor India P. Ltd. reported in (2009) 315 ITR 254 (SC), the Tribunal was wrong in refusing to rectify its own order u/s. 254(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, particularly when it had failed to appreciate that in any event the expenditure could have fallen on the capital account, which was specifically pleaded by the assessee as an alternate submission.

For the aforestated reasons, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and the matter was remitted to the Tribunal. The Tribunal was directed to decide the matter de novo in accordance with the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Woodward Governor India P. Ltd. (2009) 312 ITR 254 (SC) as well as on the merits of this case.

levitra

Legislation by incorporation — Schedule VI vis-à-vis MAT

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Schedule VI to the Companies Act, 1956 (‘the Companies Act’) prescribed under section 211 of the Companies Act, sets out the form and contents for disclosure of the profit and loss account and balance sheet of a company. Schedule VI to the Companies Act originally notified by the Central Government vide Notification No. 414, dated 21st March 1961 was divided into 4 parts (referred to as ‘the Old Schedule VI’). Recently, the Central Government has by Notification No. 447(E), dated 28th February 2011, and Notification No. 653(E), dated 30th March 2011, revised Schedule VI to the Companies Act, which shall come into effect for the financial years ending on or after 1st April 2011 (referred to as ‘the Revised Schedule VI’).

Section 115JB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’) requires every assessee-company to prepare its profit and loss account in accordance with Part II and Part III of the Schedule VI for the purpose of determining net profit, for the computation of ‘book profit’. In other words, Part II and Part III of the Schedule VI are legislatively incorporated under the provisions of section 115JB of the Act.

Legislation by incorporation is a legislative device by which certain provisions of a particular Act are incorporated by reference into another Act, such that the provisions so incorporated become part and parcel of the later Act, as if they had been ‘bodily transposed into it’. In other words, the legal effect of such incorporated provisions are often held to be actually written in the later Act with the pen, or printed in it. The said observations were made by Lord Esher, M. R. while explaining the aforesaid principle in one of the earliest decisions on the subject1.

However, the aforesaid incorporated provisions in MAT, only prescribe the contents of the profit and loss account of the company and the principles for recognition, measurement, presentation, etc. of financial items are prescribed under the Accounting Standards as applied by the company in adopting the accounts at its annual general meeting.

A question which requires attention is whether the Revised Schedule VI as amended by the Central Government can be said to be legislatively incorporated under the provisions of section 115JB of the Act and accordingly net profit for the purpose of computation of book profit will be determined based on the format of profit and loss account as prescribed under the Revised Schedule VI.

The answer to this question depends upon the manner of construction and interpretation of whether Part II and Part III of the Old Schedule VI are introduced in MAT provision of the Act merely as reference/citation or have been incorporated under section 115JB. Legislation by incorporation may be undertaken by either merely citing a provision of one statute in another statute or by incorporating the said provision in another statute.

Therefore, before embarking upon answering the question under consideration, it is necessary to understand the principles of identifying the differences between the two and implications on the construction of a provision of a particular statute, which is merely referred to in another statute vis-à-vis being incorporated. In the former case, a modification, repeal or re-enactment of the statute that is referred will also have the effect in the statute in which it is referred, but in the latter case any change in the incorporated statute by way of amendment or repeal shall have no repercussion on the incorporating statute. The legal decisions have time and again tried to differentiate between the two, but the distinction is one of difference in degree and is often blurred2. There are no clear-cut guidelines which have been spelt out.

However, there are four exceptions which have been observed by the Courts3 to the implications on the construction of a provision as discussed above, wherein a repeal or amendment of an Act which incorporated in a later Act shall have effect on the later Act, irrespective of whether the said provision was merely referred or incorporated in the other statute. These exceptions are as under:

  •  where the later Act and the earlier Act are supplemental to each other;

  •  where the two Acts are in pari materia;

  •  where the amendment of the earlier Act if not imported in the later Act would render the later Act wholly unworkable; and

  •  where the amendment of the earlier Act either expressly or by necessary intendment also applies to the later Act.

On the touchstone of the aforesaid exceptions applied to the case under consideration, one may observe as under:

  •  the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the Companies Act, 1956 are not supplemental to each other i.e., existence of either of the said Acts is not dependant of each other;

? the two Acts are not in pari materia i.e., both the Acts legislate in two different fields of law;

? the non-incorporation of the Revised Schedule VI under MAT provisions would not make the said provisions unworkable, since one would be able to compute net profit based on the Old Schedule VI; and

  •  there is no mention by the Central Government of simultaneous amendment of MAT provisions, when Schedule VI was replaced under the Companies Act.

Considering this, one may observe that none of the four exceptions are applicable to the impugned issue.

Though it makes a case stronger to tilt the balance of construction that Part II and Part III of the Old Schedule VI are incorporated and not referred under MAT provisions, yet one may not conclude such construction without further discussion. It is necessary to understand the factors which may help in answering the aforesaid question. A matter of probe into the semantics of the provision along with the legislative intention and/ or taking an insight into the working of the enactment may help in determining which of the view is to be adopted. Part II and Part III of the Old Schedule VI are incorporated in all its phases from section 115J to section 115JB of the Act.

Reference is invited to the relevant provisions of section 115JB of the Act, which are reproduced below for ready reference:

“ ……………….. (2) Every assessee, being a company, shall, for the purposes of this section, prepare its profit and loss account for the relevant previous year in accordance with the provisions of Parts II and III of Schedule VI to the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956):

Provided that while preparing the annual accounts including profit and loss account, —

(i) the accounting policies;

(ii) the accounting standards followed for preparing such accounts including profit and loss account;

(iii) the method and rates adopted for calculating the depreciation,

shall be the same as have been adopted for the purpose of preparing such accounts including profit and loss account and laid before the company at its annual general meeting in accordance with the provisions of section 210 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956):” (Emphasis supplied)

From the perusal of the aforesaid provisions of section 115JB(2), one would notice that the Legislature by applying the principle of legislation by incorporation introduced two provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. The differences in the language used for incorporating the said provisions highlight the mechanism of merely citing a provision vis-à-vis incorporating the provision.

The accounting policies, accounting standards and the method and rate of depreciation as considered while preparing the annual accounts of the company u/s.210 of the Companies Act are legislatively incorporated by reference for the purpose of calculation of book profit u/s.115JB of the Act and whereas Part II and Part III of the Old Schedule VI to the Companies Act are legislatively incorporated under the mechanism of incorporation.

The distinction lies in the usage of words ‘shall be the same’, which makes a case of a provision merely referred and not being incorporated. The usage of those words highlight the intention of the Legislature of applying the same policies, standards and depreciation rate and method under the Companies Act as used for preparation of annual accounts, also for the purpose of computation of book profit. Therefore, in case there are amendments to, repeals of provisions of Accounting Standards and method and rate of depreciation under the provisions of the Companies Act, the same effects will have to be considered for the computation of book profit.

One finds that similar usage of words, being ‘shall be the same’ is missing under the incorporation of Part II and Part III of Schedule VI to the Companies Act. Therefore, such similar construction and mechanism may not hold good for the purpose of interpretation of Part II and Part III of the Schedule VI to the Companies Act, which have been incorporated and not merely referred under the provisions of section 115JB(2) of the Act.

In a recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Dynamic Orthopedics Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT, (321 ITR 300), the Apex Court while referring the matter relating to the computation of book profit under MAT provisions to the Larger Bench, made following observations with respect to the semantics of MAT provisions under the Act. These observations on legislation by incorporation which may hold good for all the three avatars of MAT provisions viz. section 115J, section 115JA, and section 115JB are reproduced below:

“….Section 115J of the Act legislatively only incorporates provisions of Parts II and III of Schedule VI to 1956 Act. Such incorporation is by a deeming fiction. Hence, we need to read section 115J(1A) of the Act in the strict sense. If we so read, it is clear that by legislative incorporation, only Parts II and III of Schedule VI to 1956 Act have been incorporated legislatively into section 115J of the Act. Therefore, the question of applicability of Parts II and III of Schedule VI to 1956 Act does not arise….

…. It needs to be reiterated that once a company falls within the ambit of it being a MAT company, section 115J of the Act applies and, under that section, such an assessee-company was required to prepare its profit and loss account only in terms of Parts II and III of Schedule VI to 1956 Act ….. Hence, what is incorporated in section 115J is only Schedule VI and not section 205 or section 350 or section 355 ….. ” [Emphasis supplied]

The aforesaid decision reiterates the understanding that Part II and Part III of Schedule VI only are legislatively incorporated under the provisions of MAT. Therefore, any repeal, amendment or revision of Part II and Part III of Schedule VI to the Companies Act may not have effect on the operation of computation of book profit, until the Revised Schedule is incorporated under the MAT provisions of the Act.

Based on the aforesaid discussions, one may conclude that the Revised Schedule VI to the Companies Act cannot be taken into consideration, until necessary amendments are made requiring the assessee companies to determine the net profit for the purpose of computation of book profit under MAT provisions as per the Revised Schedule VI to the Companies Act.

This conclusion and article may be incomplete if the significant in-principle differences between the Old Schedule VI and the Revised Schedule VI are not highlighted. These differences are touched upon only in brief:

  •     The Revised Schedule only contains Part I and Part II. It does not have Part III of the Old Schedule VI which provided for interpretation of the various expressions such as ‘provision’, ‘reserve’, ‘liability’, etc. and Part IV of the Old Schedule VI which dealt with balance sheet abstract and company’s general business profile.

  •     The Revised Schedule VI prescribes the format of profit and loss account for the company, as against the Old Schedule VI, which did not provide for such format; and

  •     The Old Schedule VI prescribed the principles on which the profit and loss account of the company was required to be prepared for the purpose of disclosure, which one fails to find under the Revised Schedule VI;

This issue is of importance from the perspective of the Direct Tax Code Bill, 2010 (draft) (‘DTC’) which in Clause 104 has provision analogous to section 115JB of the Act. Clause 104 of DTC provides reference to Clause 105 of DTC for the purpose of determination of net profit as shown in the profit and loss account prepared in accordance with Part II and Part III of Schedule VI to the Companies Act. Assuming Clause 104 and Clause 105 of draft DTC come into effect in their present form, one may interpret that Part II and Part III of the Revised Schedule VI are incorporated in the said clauses, considering the fact that the Revised Schedule VI to the Companies Act will be existing on the statute when draft DTC becomes an Act. However, it may be intriguing to notice that the Revised Schedule VI does not have Part III and therefore, the Legislature may have to make necessary amendments; otherwise the formula may become unworkable. Similar consequences may also be envisaged for companies subjected to MAT provisions for financial years ending on or after 1st April 2011, if we propose that Part II and Part III of the Old Schedule VI are merely referred to in section 115JB of the Act.  This subject may require further attention with the intention of the Government to introduce different set of Accounting Standards (i.e., Ind-AS and otherwise) applicable to different categories of companies and thereby leading to different tax bases of net profit as shown in the profit and loss account prepared in accordance with Part II and Part III of the Schedule VI to the Companies Act.

If the above discussion and conclusions are drawn to their logical end, then one envisages that companies subjected to MAT provisions of the Act may have to prepare two sets of their profit and loss account, wherein net profit as shown in the profit and loss account will have to be prepared in accordance with:

  •     Part II and Part III of the Revised Schedule VI for the compliance of provision of Companies Act, 1956; and

  •     Part II and Part III of the Old Schedule VI for the computation of book profit under the Act.

Taxation of Capital Gains under Direct Taxes Code

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1.  Background
1.1 Direct Taxes Code Bill, 2010, (DTC) introduced in the Parliament on 27-8-2010 is now under consideration of the Standing Committee for Finance. After its report is submitted, the Parliament will consider the Bill and the proposals of the Standing Committee before enacting the Code. Therefore, if DTC is enacted by the Parliament in 2011, the income for the F.Y. 1-4-2012 to 31-3-2013 and onwards will be assessed as provided in the Code. There are 319 sections divided into 20 Chapters and 22 Schedules in DTC. Chapter III-D containing sections 46 to 55 deals with provisions for computation of income under the head ‘Capital Gains’. Further, Schedule 17 provides for determination of cost of acquisition in certain cases.

1.2 Prior to introduction of the DTC Bill, 2010, the Government had issued the DTC Bill, 2009 with a Discussion Paper for public debate on 12-8-2009. The DTC Bill, 2009, proposed to introduce several changes in the provisions relating to capital gains. There was a proposal to do away the present distinction between short-term and long-term capital gains. It was also proposed to abolish the present exemption/concession available to capital gains on sale of listed securities on which STT is paid. The concessional rate for long-term/short-term capital gains was also proposed to be abolished and there was a proposal to levy tax on capital gains at the normal rate applicable to other income.

1.3 Several representations were made to the Government objecting to these proposals. Based on the above representations, a Revised Discussion Paper was issued by the Government on 15-6-2010 and the revised DTC Bill, 2010, was introduced in the Parliament in August, 2010.

1.4 In the revised Discussion Paper of June, 2010, it was clarified that the original proposals of DTC – 2009 for taxation of capital gains have been modified as under:

(a) Income from capital gains will not be considered as income from ordinary sources.

(b) Asset held for more than one year from the end of the financial year will be considered as long-term capital asset.
(c) Securities Transaction Tax (STT) will continue.
(d) For long-term capital gains indexation benefit will continue. The existing date of 1-4-1981 will now be fixed as 1-4-2000.
(e) Capital Gains Savings Scheme will be introduced.
(f) A new scheme for taxation of capital gains on investment assets has been proposed to reduce the burden of tax.
(g) Income of FIIs from share trading will be considered as capital gains and not business income.

2. Concept of capital gains


The existing concept of capital gains is significantly changed in the Code. The word ‘asset’ is defined in section 314(24) to mean (a) a business asset or (b) an investment asset. ‘Business asset’ is defined in section 314(38) to mean ‘business trading asset’ or ‘business capital asset’. ‘Business trading asset’ is defined in section 314(42) to mean stock-in-trade, consumable stores or raw materials held for the purpose of the business. ‘Business capital asset’ is defined in section 314(39) to mean a tangible, intangible or any other capital asset, other than land, which is used for the purpose of business. ‘Investment asset’ is defined in section 314(141) to mean (a) any capital asset which is not a business capital asset, (b) any security held by a FII or (c) any undertaking or division of a business. Any surplus on transfer of a business capital asset is to be treated as business income. Hence, the provisions for computation of capital gains apply in respect of surplus (loss) on transfer of ‘investment asset’ only.

3. Computation of capital gains


3.1 Section 49 of the Code provides that the computation of capital gains on transfer of an investment asset shall be made by deducting from the full value of the consideration on transfer of such asset, the cost of acquisition of such asset. The gains (losses) arising from the transfer of investment assets will be treated as capital gains (losses). The net gain will be included in the total income of the financial year in which the investment asset is transferred, irrespective of the year in which the consideration is actually received. However, in the case of compulsory acquisition of an asset, capital gains will be taxed in the year in which the compensation is actually received.

3.2 It may be noted that the word ‘Transfer’ is defined in section 314(267). This definition is very elaborate as compared to section 2(47) of the Income-tax Act (ITA). The above definition provides that ‘Transfer’ in relation to a ‘Capital Asset’ includes the following:

(i) Sale, exchange or extinguishment of any asset or any rights in it;

(ii) Compulsory acquisition under any law;
(iii) Conversion of capital asset into stock-intrade;
(iv) Buyback of shares u/s.77A of the Companies Act;
(v) Contribution of any asset towards capital in a company or unincorporated body;
(vi) Distribution of assets on liquidation of a company or dissolution of unincorporated body;
(vii) Any transaction allowing possession or enjoyment of an immovable property. This provision is more or less similar to section 2(47) (v) and (vi) of ITA with the only difference that if enjoyment of any immovable property is given to participant of unincorporated body it will be considered as a transfer under DTC;
(viii) Amount received/receivable on maturity of Zero Coupon Bond, on slump sale or on damage/ destruction of any insured asset;
(ix) Transfer of securities by a person having beneficial interest in the securities held by a depository as registered owner;
(x) Distribution of money or asset to a participant in an unincorporated body on his retirement;
(xi) Any disposition, settlement, trust, covenant, agreement or arrangement.

3.3 The capital gains arising from the transfer of personal effects and agricultural land is exempt from income tax. The term ‘personal effects’ is defined in section 314(190) and the term ‘agricultural land’ is defined in section 314(12). This definition states that the land, wherever situated, if used for agricultural purposes will be treated as agricultural land.

3.4 In general, the capital gains will be equal to the full consideration from the transfer of the investment asset minus the cost of acquisition, cost of improvement thereof and transfer-related incidental expenses. However, in the case of an investment asset which is transferred anytime after one year from the end of the financial year in which it is acquired, the cost of acquisition and cost of improvement will be adjusted on the basis of cost inflation index.

3.5 Capital gains from all investment assets will be aggregated to arrive at the total amount of current income from capital gains. This will, then, be aggregated with unabsorbed capital loss at the end of the preceding financial year to arrive at the total amount of income under the head ‘Capital gains’. If the result of the aggregation is a loss, the total amount of capital gains will be treated as ‘nil’ and the loss will be treated as unabsorbed current capital loss at the end of the financial year. This unabsorbed loss will be carried forward for adjustment against capital gains in subsequent years. There is no time limit for such carry forward and set-off of losses.

4.    Exemption from capital gains tax
4.1 Section 47 of the Code provides that certain transfers of investment assets will not be consid-ered as a transfer and no capital gains tax will be payable. This section is on the same lines as existing section 47 of ITA. However, it is significant to note that clause (xiii) of existing section 47 of ITA which provides for exemption from tax when a partnership firm is converted into a company, subject to certain conditions, is absent in section 47 of the Code. This will mean that if the Code is enacted without this clause in section 47, a partnership firm which is converted into company after 1-4-2012 will not be entitled to claim this exemption. It may also be noted that section 47 (1)(J) of the Code provides for exemption from tax when a non-listed company converts itself into an LLP, on the same lines as provided in section 47 (xiii b) of ITA. Again, 47(1)(n) of the Code provides for exemption from tax when a sole proprietary concern is converted into a limited company. This provision is similar to section 47(xiv) of ITA.

4.2 Section 46 of the Code provides that the exemption granted u/s.47 of the Code in respect of certain transfers of investment assets and u/s.55 of the Code in respect of certain rollover of investment assets will become taxable in the F.Y. in which the conditions specified in section 47 or 55 are violated. This provision is on the same lines as in the existing sections 47A, 54, 54B, 54F, 54EC, etc. of ITA.

4.3 Section 48 of the Code explains about the F.Y. in which the income arising on non-compliance with the conditions laid down in section 47 will become taxable. This section also explains about the F.Y. in which enhanced additional compensation received on compulsory acquisition of property will be taxable. Further, the section also explains as to when an immovable property will be considered to have been transferred. These provisions are similar to sections 45(1), 45(4), 45(5) and 46 of ITA with some modifications.

4.4 It is significant to note that the existing sec-tion 45(4) of ITA provides that if any capital asset is transferred by way of distribution of capital as-sets to any partner or partners on dissolution of a firm or AoP or otherwise, the difference between the market value of the asset and its cost will be taxable as capital gains in the hands of the Firm or AoP. This position will continue under the Code in view of item 6(ii) of the table below section 48(1) r.w.s 50(2)(d) of the Code. However, in the case of retirement of a partner, the Courts have held that the word ‘otherwise’ in the existing section 45(4) applies when a partner retires from the Firm or AoP and takes away any asset of the Firm or AoP as part of the amount due on retirement. Now, section 48(2)(b) of the Code, read with item 7 of the table below section 48(1) and section 50(2) (f), provides that “Any money or asset received by a participant (Partner/Member) on account of his retirement from an unincorporated body (Firm, LLP, AoP, BoI) shall be deemed to be the income of the recipient of the F.Y. in which the money or asset is received”. This will mean that if the amount due to the retiring partner as per the books of the Firm, AoP or BoI is Rs.1.5 crore but the amount received and market value of the asset received on his retirement is Rs.2.5 crore, the retiring partner will have to pay tax on capital gains under the Code.

4.5 Under section 51(2) of the Code, in the case of equity shares of a company and units of equity-oriented fund of a M.F., held for more than one year, the capital gain will be exempt from tax if STT is paid. It may be noted that there is difference in the wording of section 51(2) and 51(3). U/s.51(2) the requirement is holding of shares, etc. for more than one year, whereas u/s.51(3) the period for holding other assets is at least one year after the end of the F.Y. in which the asset is acquired.

4.6 In the above case if the STT is paid and the shares/units are held for less than one year, 50% of the capital gain will be exempt and tax at normal rate will be payable on the balance of 50%.

4.7 It may be noted that under item No. 32 of Schedule 6 it is provided that the capital gain arising from transfer of the following assets will not be liable to tax under DTC:

(i)    Agricultural land in a rural area as defined in section 314(221)r.w.s 314 (284). This definition is similar to the definition in section 2(14)(iii) of ITA.

(ii)    Personal effects as defined in section 314 (190) which is similar to section 2(14)(ii) of ITA.

(iii)    Gold Deposit Bonds.

5.    Full value of consideration
5.1 The provisions relating to computation of capital gains on transfer of an investment asset and determination of the full value of the consideration are contained in sections 49 and 50 of the Code. These provisions are similar to the provisions of sections 45(2), 45(3), 45(5), 48 and 50C of ITA with certain modifications. In the case of sale of land or building, section 50(2)(h) of the Code provides that stamp duty value of the asset will be considered as full value of the consideration. The term ‘Stamp duty value’ is defined in section 314(246) on the same lines as in section 50C of ITA with the exception that there is no provision for refer-ence to valuation officer in the event such value is disputed by the assessee. Further, section 50(2) r.w.s 314(267) and 314(93) of the Code provides that in respect of conversion of investment asset into stock-in-trade, distribution of assets to partici-pants on dissolution of the unincorporated body or retirement of a participant, etc. the fair market value of the asset on the date of transfer will be determined according to the method prescribed by the CBDT.

5.2 It may be noted that u/s.45(3) of the ITA it is provided that when the partner/member of a firm, LLP, AoP or BoI in which he becomes a partner/ member and contributes a capital asset as his capital contribution in the entity, the amount credited to this account in the entity will be considered as full value of the consideration and capital gain tax will be payable by him on this basis. This benefit is not available at present when a person becomes a shareholder in a company and he is allotted shares in the company against any transfer of any asset to the company. Now, section 50(2)(c) of the Code provides that the amount recorded in the books of the company or an unincorporated body as value of the investment asset contributed by the shareholder or participant will be the full value of the consideration and the capital gain will be computed in the hands of the transferor on that basis.

6.    Cost of acquisition and indexation
6.1 As stated earlier, section 49 of the Code provides that capital gain on transfer of an investment asset is to be computed by deducting from the full value of the consideration, the cost of acquisition and the cost of improvement. The term ‘Cost of acquisition’ is defined in section 53 read with the 17th Schedule. The term ‘Cost of improvement’ is defined in section 54. These provisions are more or less on the same lines as sections 48, 49 and 55 of ITA. It may, however, be noted that when the investment asset is received by way of gift, will, inheritance, etc., it is provided that the cost will be the cost of acquisition in the hands of previous owner. However, the period during which the previous owner held the asset cannot be added in computing the total period for which the assessee has held the asset, as there is no provision for this purpose corresponding to the provision in section 2(42A) of ITA. Existing section 55(3) of ITA provides that if the cost of the asset in the hands of the previous owner cannot be ascertained, the market value on the date on which the previous owner acquired the asset will be considered as his cost. Now, section 53(7)(c) of the Code provides that if the cost of investment asset in the hands of the previous owner cannot be determined or ascer-tained, the said cost will be taken as ‘nil’. Similarly, in the case of the assessee if a self-generated asset or any other investment asset is acquired and the cost of such asset cannot be determined or ascertained for any reason, it shall be considered as ‘nil’.

6.2 Section 52 of the Code gives mode of computation of indexation of certain investment assets in specified cases. The method prescribed in this section is similar to the provision in the existing section 48 of ITA. However, some modification in the scheme under the Code is made as under:

(i)    Under section 2(29A)r.w.s 2(42 A) of ITA, a capital asset which is held for more than three years is considered as a ‘long-term asset’. U/s.51(3) of the Code, it is provided that if the investment asset is held for more than one year from the end of the financial year in which the asset is acquired, the benefit of indexation of cost will be available.

In other words, if the investment asset is acquired on 1-5-2010, it will be considered as long-term capital asset if it is sold on or after 1-4-2012 under the Code. In the following discussions such investment asset is referred to as a ‘long-term asset’.

(ii)    In the case of any investment asset, if it is a long-term asset as explained in (i) above, the assessee will be entitled to deduct indexed cost of the asset as provided in section 52 of the Code from the full value of the consideration for computation of capital gain. The method for working out indexed cost is the same as in section 48 of ITA. However, the base date for determining the indexed cost will be 1-4-2000 under DTC instead of 1-4-1981 provided in ITA.

(iii)    At present, section 55(2)(b) of ITA provides that if a capital asset is acquired before 1-4-1981, the assessee has an option to substitute the fair market value of the asset as on 1-4-1981 for its cost.

Now, section 53(1)(b) of the Code provides that if the investment asset is acquired before 1-4-2000, the assessee will have the option to substitute fair market value on 1-4-2000 for its cost.

7.    Relief on reinvestment of consideration
Section 55 of the Code provides for relief for roll-over of long-term investment asset in the case of an Individual or HUF. This provision is similar to the existing provisions for relief on reinvestment of capital gains in sections 54, 54B and 54F of ITA with the following modifications:

(i)    At present, the exemption is available if ‘capital gain’ on sale of a capital asset is reinvested in the specified assets u/s.54, 54B or 54EC of ITA. In case of section 54F of ITA, the ‘Net consideration’ on sale is required to be reinvested. Now, u/s.55 of the Code, the benefit of exemption is available on reinvestment of ‘Net consideration’ in all the cases.

(ii)    The rollover relief is available for only two categories of long-term assets viz. (a) agricultural land, and (b) any other investment asset.

(iii)    In the case of agricultural land there is no distinction between rural and urban land. The only condition is that it is assessed to land revenue or local cess and used for agricultural purposes. Further, this land should be an agricultural land during two years prior to the F.Y. in which it is transferred and was acquired by the assessee at least one year before the beginning of the F.Y. in which it is transferred. If these conditions are satisfied and the assessee invests the net consideration on sale of such agricultural land for the purchase of one or more pieces of agricultural land within a period of three years from the end of the F.Y. in which the original agricultural land was sold, he will get exemption in proportion to the amount so invested.

(iv)    In the case of any other long-term investment asset, the above rollover benefit will be available, if the net consideration is invested in the purchase or construction of a residential house within a period of three years from the end of the F.Y. in which the original asset was sold. For getting this benefit there are two conditions as under:

(a)    The assessee should not be the owner of more than one residential house (other than the residential house in which such investment is made) on the date of sale of original asset.

(b)    The residential house in which the above investment is made to get rollover benefit should not be transferred within one year from the end of the F.Y. in which such investment is made.

It is also provided in section 55 of the Code, that the above rollover benefit will be available if the investment in the new asset is made within a period of one year before the sale of the original asset.

(vi)    It is also provided in the above section that the net consideration on sale of the original asset should be reinvested for acquiring the new asset, as stated above, before the end of the F.Y. in which the original asset is sold or within six months from the date of such sale, whichever is later. If this is not done, the net consideration or balance thereof should be deposited with Capital Gains Deposit Scheme to be framed by the Government. The amount so deposited should be used within three years from the end of the F.Y. in which the original asset is sold. If it is not so used, the same will be taxable in F.Y. in which the period of three years expires.

(vii)    From the above, it will be evident that the present concession of investing the capital gain on sale of residential house for purchase of another residential house even if the assessee is owner of more than one residential house u/s.54 of the ITA will not be available. Further, the benefit of investment in approved bonds up to Rs.50 lakh u/s.54EC of ITA will also not be available.

8.    Income of FII

As stated earlier, definition of investment asset u/s.314(141) of the Code includes any shares or securities held by a Foreign Institutional Investor (FII). In view of this, FII engaged in trading of shares or securities in India will not be entitled to claim exemption under the applicable DTAA on the ground that it is carrying on business in India and has no permanent establishment in India. Under the Code, the surplus from these transactions will be considered as income from capital gains.

9.    Slump sale

The definition of investment asset also includes any undertaking or division of a business. Section 53(5) provides that if there is any slump sale of any undertaking or division of a business, the cost of acquisition of such asset will be the ‘net worth’ of such undertaking or division. If such undertaking or division is sold after the end of one year from the end of the financial year in which it was acquired or established, the benefit of indexation u/s.51 and 52 of the Code will be available. Net worth of such undertaking or division will be worked out as may be prescribed by the CBDT u/s.314(166). The term ‘Slump sale’ is defined in section 314(234) on the same lines as section 2(42C) of ITA.

10.    Aggregation of capital gains and losses

10.1 Income from capital gains (short-term or long-term) from various investment assets, whether positive or negative, shall be first aggregated and any carried forward loss under this head from earlier years shall be deducted therefrom. If the net result is loss, it shall be carried forward to next year. There is no time limit for such carry forward of losses. If the net result is positive, it shall be aggregated with income under other heads. It may be noted that there is a departure from the provisions of ITA where income from long-term capital gains is taxed at a separate lower specified rate. Under DTC long- term or short-term capital gains is taxable at the normal rate applicable to other income.

10.2 It may be noted that there is no provision for adjustment of short-term or long-term capital losses carried forward from F.Y. 2011-12 (A.Y. 2012-13)    and earlier years against capital gains for F.Y. 2012-13 and subsequent years under DTC.

11.    Treatment of losses in certain specified cases

11.1    Section 64 and 65 of DTC provide for treatment of losses in specified cases as under:

(i)    On conversion of unlisted company into LLP
— It may be noted that as stated earlier, u/s.47(1) (J) exemption from capital gain is given in the case of conversion of an unlisted company into a LLP. There are certain conditions for this purpose which are similar to section 47(xiii b) of ITA. Section 64(1) provides that unabsorbed current loss from ordinary sources in the case of an unlisted company shall be available for set-off in the case of LLP against its current aggregate income from ordinary sources of subsequent years. Similarly, unabsorbed current capital loss of the company shall be set off against current capital gains in the case of LLP in the subsequent years. This section is similar to section 72A(6A) of ITA. If the conditions laid down in section in section 47(1)(J) of DTC are not complied with, the set-0ff of loss so allowed in any F.Y. can be withdrawn by rectification of the assessment order.

(ii)    On Business Reorganisation
— It may be noted that as stated earlier, u/s.47(1)(n) exemption from capital gain is given in the case of conversion of sole proprietary concern into a limited company. There are certain conditions for this purpose which are similar to section 47(xiv) of ITA. U/s.64(2) it is provided that unabsorbed current loss from ordinary sources in the case of sole proprietor shall be set off against current income from ordinary sources of the company. Similarly, unabsorbed current capital loss in the case of sole proprietor will be set off against current capital gain in the subsequent year in the case of the company. If the conditions laid down in section 47 (1)(n) of DTC are not complied with, the set-off of loss so allowed in any F.Y. can be withdrawn by rectification of assessment order.

11.2    Treatment of unabsorbed losses on change in Constitution

(i)    Changes in constitution of unincorporated body — Section 65 provides that in the case of change in the constitution of an unincorporated body (i.e., Firm, LLP, AoP or BoI) on account of death/retirement of a participant, the unabsorbed loss of that entity (including capital loss) shall be reduced in proportion of the loss attributable to the deceased/retiring participant and allowed to be carried forward and set off in the subsequent years as under:

(a)    Proportionate unabsorbed loss from ordinary sources shall be carried forward and set off against current income from ordinary sources in the subsequent years.

(b)    Proportionate unabsorbed capital loss shall be carried forward and set off against current capital gain in the subsequent year.

This section is similar to section 78 of ITA with the difference that section 78 of ITA applies to a Firm or LLP, whereas section 65 of DTC applies to a Firm, LLP, AoP or BoI.

(ii)    Changes in shareholding of closely-held companies
— Section 66 of DTC is similar to section 79 of ITA. It provides that in the case of a closely-held company, if the persons holding not less than 51% of voting power on the last day of the F.Y. when the loss under the ordinary sources or capital gains was incurred, are not holding this voting power on the last day of the F.Y. when the income from such sources is earned, such unabsorbed loss cannot be the set-off against the income from such sources in that F.Y. The only difference between section 79 of ITA and section 66 of DTC is that section 79 does not apply to set off of unabsorbed depreciation, whereas u/s.66 of DTC loss includes depreciation.


12.    Filing return of loss

Section 67 provides that if the return of tax bases showing loss is not filed before the due date for filing the return, the loss under the head ordinary sources, special sources, capital gains, speculation, horse races activities, etc. shall not be allowed to be carried forward or set off in the subsequent years. This section is similar to section 80 of ITA. Here also it may be noted that section 80 does not refer to unabsorbed depreciation, but u/s.67 loss will include depreciation also.

13.    Some issues
From the above discussion about provisions relating to taxation of capital gains proposed to be introduced in DTC w.e.f. 1-4-2012, it is evident that the existing provisions will stand substantially modified. Some of the following issues require consideration.

(i)    The word ‘Asset’ is defined to mean (a) a business asset or (b) an investment asset. Again, a business asset is further classified as business trading asset and business capital asset. So far as business trading asset is concerned, it will be allowed as revenue expenditure in computing business income. As regards business capital asset, only depreciation will be allowed. Thus, only investment asset will form part of the computation of capital gains.

(ii)    The existing distinction between long-term and short-term capital asset is now proposed to be modified. It an investment asset is held for more than one year after the end of the F.Y. in which it is acquired, it will be considered as a long-term capital asset.

(iii)    The existing concept of determination of indexed cost for computing long-term capital gain has been retained. The base date for this purpose will be 1-4-2000, instead of 1-4-1981.

(iv)    The existing provision for granting exemption in respect of long-term capital gain on sale of securities, where STT is paid, will continue. As regards short-term capital gain in such transactions, only 50% of such capital gain will be taxable at normal rate. Therefore, the effective tax rate shall not exceed 15%.

(v)    If net result under the head capital gain (long-term or short-term) is positive, it will be added to income under other heads and tax will be payable at normal rate of tax applicable to the total income. If the net result is capital loss, the same will be carried forward without any time limit. There is no concessional rate for taxation of long-term capital gain as provided in section 112 of ITA.

(vi)    There is, however, no provision in DTC for adjustment of short-term or long-term capital losses carried forward under ITA from F.Y. 2011-12 (A.Y. 2012-13) and earlier years against capital gains for F.Y. 2012-13 and subsequent years.

(vii)    Existing section 47(xiii) of ITA provides that conversion of a partnership firm into limited company does not attract any capital gains tax if certain conditions are complied with. There is no corresponding provision in DTC. Similarly, there is no provision in DTC for such exemption when a partnership firm is converted into an LLP.

(viii)    As discussed in para 5.1 above, there is no provision in DTC for reference to valuation officer if the assessee objects to the stamp duty valuation in respect of sale of immovable property. Therefore, stamp duty valuation will now become mandatory.

(ix)    As discussed in para 7(vii) above, there is no provision in DTC similar to section 54EC of ITA to enable an assessee to deposit up to Rs.50 lakh, out of long-term capital gains in notified Bonds. Thus, assessees selling small value investment assets will not be able to claim exemption from long-term capital gains tax to this extent.

Let us hope that some of the above anoma-lies are removed before DTC is enacted by the Parliament.

Mumbai Blasts

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On 13th July 2011, Mumbai experienced three bomb blasts at crowded places. The death toll resulting from these blasts is already 26. Mumbai, a cosmopolitan, multi-religious and multi-ethnic city, the financial hub of the country, has been a soft target for terrorists. It has been a target atleast nine times in the last decade. The attacks have been coming with greater intensity and frequency since 2003. The recent blasts took place when the citizens of Mumbai had not yet forgotten the blasts at seven suburban railway stations in 2006, and the deadly attacks at CST railway station and two five-star hotels in south Mumbai in 2008.

The Mumbai police have not yet been successful in identifying the terrorist groups responsible for the latest bomb attacks. They are still groping in the dark. The blame game by the politicians to score brownie points has begun.

While this time around, the response from various agencies after the blast showed improvement, what is worrying is the inaction and the apathy towards preventing the terrorist attacks. The State Government had set up the State Security Council after the terrorist attacks in 2008. The Council in turn, set up six study groups for making recommendations. However, after the initial meeting held after setting up of the Council, the State Government did not feel it necessary to convene even a single meeting of the Council, till the recent bomb blasts.

Various promises were made after the terrorist attacks in 2008; most of them remain unfulfilled. The plan was to set up a sophisticated commando unit – Force One – similar to National Security Guards. The Force One has been set up, but it is facing various issues in terms of equipment, space and motivated officers. The Marine Wing of the Police was to be strengthened with 28 bulletproof speedboats equipped with radar and GPS. However, only 12 such boats have been deployed till now. Photographs published in the print media suggest that even these boats have not been functional due to shortage of diesel. If that is true, it is rather pathetic and disappointing. Over 2000 CCTVs were to be installed. One does not know how many have been actually installed; and out of those installed, how many are functioning and how the data is used.

Padma Bhushan Mr. Julio Ribeiro, while speaking at the 63rd Founding Day celebrations of the Society, referred to systemic destruction of the professionalism of the State Police. Rampant interference by the political bosses has made even the Commissioner of Police of Mumbai rather ineffective. In the long run, these factors do contribute to reduced security for the citizens.

The Home Minister P. C. Chidambaram, in a press conference, stated that it was difficult to defend a country with a population of a billion plus, while Rahul Gandhi, (the Prime Minister in-waiting?) said that there was always one percent chance that the terrorists would succeed in their attacks. While there is truth in what these gentlemen said, these statements do not provide any solace to the citizens. Citizens of Mumbai are not impressed! The common man is worried about the inadequate efforts and the indifference shown towards the security of Mumbai.

The general public and the elite showed tremendous awareness after the 2008 attacks, but became reticent soon thereafter. Most of us do not really know what we can do to secure ourselves and our fellow citizens. The Government and the police need to educate the citizens on this front. It is also our duty to understand what we can do on our part, to make life safer and more secure. We need to be vigilant, and ask questions to the Government and bureaucrats on various issues to keep them on their toes. As they say “God helps those who help themselves”.

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COMPASSION

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“Empathy is . . . . . your pain in my heart” — Author unknown

More than 2500 years ago, Gautam Buddha gave the world a message “Be Compassionate”. Since those times there have been many saints who served mankind with compassion. Mother Teresa taught us compassion by putting it in practice . . . . . . It is a quality which is truly divine, and one which raises an ordinary human being to great heights.

It is time we intellectuals, the so-called cream of the society learn to be compassionate. We have to agree that as children we were far more compassionate than we are as adults. Compassion flows naturally from a child. It is only when the child grows up, and sees things happening around him, that he starts becoming less and less aware of others’ suffering. He starts becoming more and more thick-skinned and insensitive to the pain and unhappiness of others.

As explained by Rashmi Bansal in “I have a dream” there are two kinds of people in the world. Those who think and those who feel. As we grow up, we increasingly become ‘thinkers’ from being ‘feelers’. As thinkers we tend to believe that “the suffering of others is their problem. We have nothing to do with it and have no responsibility towards our brethren. We see the world as a place with boundaries. What is mine and what is not mine. Anything happening in that part of the world which is not mine is not my problem. I do not have any obligation towards people in the other part”.

It is time we changed our mindset. There has to be a paradigm shift. We have to look at the world as a whole, and everyone in it as a part of one family. “Vasudhaiva kutumbakam” say our scriptures. We have to move out of our apathy to become not only sympathetic, but truly empathetic.

There is a difference between sympathy and empathy. Sympathy flows from pity. In sympathising one’s ego is at play. One believes that “I am helping”. This is not so in empathy. Empathy has no involvement of EGO. In sympathy, it is pity which drives one to help. In empathy it is compassion in one’s heart that makes one act. One remembers the lines of Gandhiji’s favourite bhajan:

But how can one graduate from being sympathetic to being empathetic? A learned thinker was explaining on the TV that unless one suffers some pain, one does not act. A person suffering from diabetes tends to ignore it as there are no symptoms, no pain. If one has a headache, or even a small cut on the finger, one promptly attends to it because there is pain. If we merely read about the sufferings of others, or watch it on the TV, it does not impact us. But if we actually see ‘suffering’ it moves us to act. Emperor Ashoka changed when he saw the suffering of the dying on the battlefield of Kalinga. From a Conquering Emperor, he became a Messenger of Peace.

If people, particularly those who are young, visit places like orphanages, hospitals and schools for the poor people, particularly in the rural areas, it is likely that they will become sensitive. Emotions will stir their hearts. Perhaps some may even realise that it is merely by chance and their good fortune that they have been born in better economic environments. They could well have been in the place of those poor and downtrodden people. I believe such visits will certainly make them empathetic and they will become alive to the needs of the hungry, the homeless and the disadvantaged. Many will learn to stretch out a helping hand. They will also experience the joy of giving which leads to true happiness. I conclude by quoting His Holiness the Dalai Lama:

“Kindness and compassion are among the principal things that make our lives meaningful. They are a source of lasting happiness and joy. They are the foundations of a good heart, the heart of one who acts out of a desire to help others.”

Let us be compassionate.

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Whatsap

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About this article:
WhatsApp is an instant
messaging app (application software for phones). For many this app is a
cheap substitute for SMS text messaging and can be called a
non-Blackberry version of the Blackberry messenger. This app works
across platforms and is easy to use. Readers may find this write-up
informative.

I still remember the day when a close friend of
mine kept pushing me to install this app on my phone. All the while,
trying to convince me that this app was really worth a shot. I was a bit
reluctant and the simple reason was that I would have to pay money to
purchase the app. An unpalatable thought at the time, it would be a
first for me (so far I have installed as many as 91 apps on my phone and
the ratio of paid vs free apps is 2:89). My friend kept chiding me that
the cost in comparison to the benefit was negligible, but I just
couldn’t swallow the thought of paying for an app.

While you may
say that I am tight-fisted, I would prefer the name frugal. But trust
me I am not the only one. If you are not convinced, check out the Maruti
Suzuki ad — where the salesman is trying to sell a luxury yacht to a
‘rich man’, the scene begins with the salesman praising one feature
after another . . . impressive one would say . . . instead the ‘rich
man’ asks ‘kitna deti hai’ (meaning how much mileage does it give) and
then comes the tag line — “for a country obsessed with mileage, we
produce the most fuel-efficient cars”. Just like the ‘rich man’ in the
ad, there are countless number of cell phone users (many of whom own
pretty fancy smart phones), who find SMSing an expensive mode of
communication. And they should, after all you can speak to one another
for as low as 1p per second, then why pay such a high price for a lowly
SMS, more so when you know that the phone companies are making a fast
buck on the SMS. Well now you have an alternative — WhatsApp.

WhatsApp
provides an alternative texting service that closely resembles standard
SMS text messaging. Simply put, WhatsApp messenger is a smart-phoneto-
smartphone messenger. I guess this is where I take the role of the
salesman trying to sell you the yacht (dont worry, your time will come
and you can ask kitna deti hai). Here are a few reasons why you should
install and use this app:

  • This app works on iPhone (IOS),
    Blackberry (Blackberry OS), Nokia (Symbian) as well as Samsung
    (Android). Arguably, that’s much better than the Blackberry Messenger
    (‘BBM’) which is limited to Blackberry devices.

  • Unlike standard
    text messaging, though, you can set a status message which other
    WhatsApp users can see, both in the Favourites page and in the main
    contact list.

  • And not only can you send photos, but you can also
    attach audio and video notes, and even your geographic location to
    WhatsApp messages. Plus, it provides an easy way to save your message
    history as a text file (see pic).

  • You could send a million
    messages, but pay a pittance. The messages can be sent to friends and
    family across the world (just like BBM) for the same cost.

  • The
    BBM requires you to know your friends’ PIN, well you can say goodbye to
    that now. Once you and your friends have installed WhatsApp, you don’t
    need anything else. This is actually one of the best parts — WhatsApp
    almost automatically identifies who all in your phonebook have installed
    WhatsApp and lets you chat with them instantly. In fact they will
    automatically appear in your Favourites.

  • WhatsApp gives you the
    option to remain on always/to remain connected with your buddies. If you
    choose to go offline, don’t worry the messages will be stored on the
    server and will be pushed to your phone as soon as you log on.

  • Messages
    are usually received very quickly and notifications appear via push,
    which you can configure in the phone’s settings if you want.

  • Like BBM it allows you to form groups (up to 10 people) where you can share messages with a group of friends.

  • Overall,
    WhatsApp Messenger is a huge benefit to the iPhone community and to
    smartphone users in general, because it lets you keep the text messages
    flowing to your friends for free . . . . . . arguably, for the same
    price that they cost cell phone providers to deliver. Come to think of
    it, you have nothing to lose but your expensive texting plans.

Well!!!!! Now’s the part where you ask kitna deti hai?

To
begin with, it will cost you US $1 (for the iPhone that is, for the BB,
Nokia and Samsung you can use it for free for one full year).

Unlike
standard SMS messaging, WhatsApp uses your phone’s data plan to send
and receive messages. So if you use the app a lot, then your data usage
will increase. (You can monitor these stats from within the app).
Similarly, if you travel outside of your phone carrier’s supported area,
it’s possible that you’ll incur data roaming charges if you leave that
option enabled. Staying attached to a Wi-Fi connection should alleviate
most of those concerns (but as a side effect, constant pinging to the
Wi-Fi network will drain your battery power very fast).

For
those of you who are extra security-conscious, you might be concerned
that your phone number is known to the app’s developer and that all
messages go through its servers. The privacy page on the WhatsApp
Website states that the company will Do No Evil with your data and the
developer lets you know that messages are stored on its system only
until they have been retrieved, at which point they are deleted.
WhatsApp also confirmed that WhatsApp text messages, like most e-mail
messages, are sent across the Internet unencrypted (contact data is
encrypted, however). That’s not necessarily a problem; just something
certain types of users may need to be aware of.

The only other
limitation is the requirement that your friends also have WhatsApp
Messenger app installed on their phones. However, if you’re the early
adopter within your circle and none of your friends have downloaded the
app yet, then you’re not going to have anyone to talk with. Luckily, the
app makes it easy to invite your friends to download the app, either by
sending them an e-mail or a standard text message.

If you liked
what you’ve read above and want to try this app, you can visit
(itunes/blackberry world/ OVI/android mart) and download this software.
The whole process is fairly simple. The app walks you through the quick
set-up process the first time you open it. You register your phone
number with the WhatsApp service. It verifies your identity by sending a
code (ironically, via a standard text message) that you then enter into
the set-up screen. After that, the app asks for permission to look
through your address book for contact numbers that are already
registered with WhatsApp and then places them into your your list of
Favourites. Then you’re finished and ready to start texting with your
friends. Once you and your friends have gone through this short
procedure, texting via WhatsApp Messenger is similar to standard SMS
messaging . . . . only much cheaper.

I would love to hear about your experience after using this software. You can send your emails to sam.client@gmail.com

Disclaimer:
This
write-up is not intended to promote or malign any particular product,
feature or any company. Further the write-up should not be considered as
an endorsement of any one product over the other. The sole purpose of
this write-up is to share knowledge and user experience.

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Joint Ventures: No more proportionate consolidation under IFRS

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On 12th May 2011, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) issued its new consolidation and related standards, replacing the existing accounting for subsidiaries and joint ventures (now joint arrangements), and making limited amendments in relation to accounting for associates.

In our previous article we had covered IFRS 10, the new standard on consolidated financial statements.

In this article we focus on IFRS 11, Joint Arrangements and IAS 28 (2011), Investments in Associates and Joint Ventures, giving our perspectives on the requirements that are modified and that are expected to have an impact on the preparers and users of IFRS financial statements.

The primary changes introduced under IFRS 11 are:

  • It carves out from IAS 31 on jointly controlled entities, those cases in which although there is a separate vehicle, that separation is ineffective in certain ways. These arrangements are treated similar to jointly controlled assets/ operations and are now called joint operations; and

  • Eliminates the free choice of equity accounting or proportionate consolidation for accounting for investments in joint ventures. These must now be accounted always using the equity method.


Identifying joint arrangements

A joint arrangement is an arrangement over which two or more parties have a joint control, being contractually agreed sharing of control i.e., unanimous consent is required for decisions about the relevant activities.

In order to identify a joint arrangement, IFRS 11 requires a two-step analysis to be performed: (1) assess whether collective control exists of an arrangement; and (2) then assess whether the contractual arrangement gives two or more parties joint control over the arrangement.

What is the meaning of control?

IFRS 11 does not define the term ‘control’. As such, reference may be had to the definition of ‘control’ under IFRS 10. As discussed in detail in our last article on IFRS 10, the assessment of control may undergo a change under IFRS 10 as compared to IAS 27 (2008). For instance, only substantive rights held by the investor and others are considered in assessing control. To be substantive, rights need to be exercisable when decisions about the relevant activities need to be made, and their holders need to have a practical ability to exercise the rights. It may be noted that the ‘rights that need to be exercisable when decisions about the relevant activities need to be made’ is different from the current requirement under IAS 27 (2008) of ‘rights that are currently exercisable’.

De facto control in case of joint arrangements

Joint control exists only when it is contractually agreed that decisions about relevant activities require the unanimous consent of the parties that control the arrangement collectively. When, for instance, the parties can demonstrate past experience of voting together in the absence of a contractual agreement to do so, this will not satisfy that requirement. However, it is possible to establish a joint de facto control i.e., control is based on de facto circumstances and the parties sharing control have contractually agreed to share that control.

For instance, A and B hold 24.5% each in Company C, while the remaining 51% shares are held by numerous shareholders, none of them holding more than 1% shares each and do not have any shareholder agreement amongst them. If A and B contractually agree that on decisions relating to the relevant activities of Company C, the casting of their combined voting power of 49% requires their unanimous consent; it may be concluded that A and B have joint control over Company C on a de facto basis.

Key differences from IAS 31

IFRS 11 does not modify the overall definition of an arrangement subject to joint control, although in a few cases, the joint control evaluation may undergo a change on account of application of control definition under IFRS 10.

Classifying joint arrangements

After determining that joint control exists, joint arrangements are divided into two types, each having its own accounting model, defined as follows:

  • A joint operation is one whereby the jointly controlling parties, known as the joint operators, have rights to the assets and obligations for the liabilities, relating to the arrangement;

  • A joint venture is one whereby the jointly controlling parties, known as the joint venturers, have rights to the net assets of the arrangement.

The key to determining the type of arrangement, and therefore the subsequent accounting, is the rights and obligations of the parties to the arrangement. For instance, two parties set up a separate entity, whereby the main feature of its legal form is that the parties (and not the entity) have rights to the assets and obligations for the liabilities of the entity, and the contractual arrangement between the parties establishes the parties’ rights to the assets, responsibility for all operational or financial obligations and the sharing of profit or loss. Though the arrangement is structured through a separate entity, as the legal form of the separate vehicle does not confer separation between the parties and the vehicle, the joint arrangement is a joint operation.

An entity determines the type of joint arrangement by considering the structure, the legal form, the contractual arrangement and other facts and circumstances.

Structure of joint arrangements

A joint arrangement not structured through a separate vehicle can be classified only as a joint operation. A separate vehicle is a separately identifiable financial structure, including separate legal entities or entities recognised by statutes, regardless of whether those entities have a legal personality.

A joint arrangement structured through a separate vehicle can be either a joint venture or a joint operation. As such, a separate vehicle is necessary but not a sufficient condition for a joint venture. If there is a separate vehicle, then the remaining tests are applied.

Legal form of the arrangement

If the legal form of the separate vehicle does not confer separation between the parties and the separate vehicle i.e., the assets and liabilities placed in the separate vehicle are the parties’ assets and liabilities, then the joint arrangement is a joint operation.

Contractual arrangement

When the contractual arrangement specifies that the parties have rights to the assets and obligations for the liabilities relating to the arrangement, then the arrangement is a joint operation.

It may be noted that in relation to ‘obligations for the liabilities’, it seems that the contractual obligation for liabilities is something that needs to reflect a primary obligation, rather than a secondary one; and something that represents a non-contingent, ongoing obligation, rather than an obligation that will be settled if and when a certain event occurs (say, a default in case of guarantees issued or calling of uncalled capital).

Other facts and circumstances

The test at this step of the analysis is to identify whether, despite the legal form and contractual arrangements indicating that the arrangement is a joint venture, other facts and circumstances give the parties rights to substantially all of the economic benefits relating to the arrangement and cause the arrangement to depend on the parties on a continuous basis for settling its liabilities, and therefore the arrangement is a joint operation.

In practice, most joint arrangements in India, which are structured as separate companies, may meet the separation criteria and hence qualify as a joint venture and not as a joint operation.

Financial statements of joint venturers

IFRS 11 prescribes accounting treatment for joint operators, whereas IAS 28 (2011) prescribes the accounting treatment for joint venturers.

In its consolidated financial statements, a joint venturer accounts for its interest in the joint venture using the equity method in accordance with IAS 28 (2011), unless under IAS 28 (2011), the entity is exempted from applying the equity method.

Under the equity method, the investment in a joint venture is recognised initially at cost, and subsequently adjusted for the post- acquisition changes in the share of the joint venture’s net assets. The joint venturer’s share of profit or loss and other comprehensive income of the joint venture are included in its profit or loss and other comprehensive income, respectively.

In its separate financial statements, a joint venturer accounts for its interest in the joint venture in accordance with IAS 27 (2011) Separate financial statements i.e., at cost or in accordance with IFRS 9/IAS 39. Such a choice is available even if the joint venturer is exempted from preparing consolidated financial statements. This requirement is in line with the existing requirements.

Key differences from IAS 31

IAS 31 provides an accounting policy choice for a joint controller’s interest in a jointly controlled entity, whereby either the equity method or pro-portionate consolidation can be used. In future, only the equity method shall be permitted. As such, the joint co ntroller’s share of net income and net assets that are adjusted against the individual items of income/expenses/assets/liabilities shall now be presented as a single line item in the statement of financial position and statement of comprehensive income. In other words, a single line ‘Investment in Joint Venture’ and a single line ‘equity profit pick-up’ adjustment on such investments will be recorded.

Financial statements of joint operators

In both its consolidated and separate financial statements, a joint operator recognises its assets, liabilities and transactions, including its share of those incurred jointly. These assets, liabilities and transactions are accounted for in accordance with the relevant IFRS.

Transactions between a joint operator and a joint operation

When a joint operator sells or contributes assets to a joint operation, such transactions are in effect transactions with other parties to the joint operation. The joint operator recognises gains and losses from such transactions only to the extent of the other parties’ interests in the joint operation. The full amount of any loss is recognised immediately by the joint operator, to the extent that these transactions provide evidence of impairment of any assets to be sold or contributed.

When a joint operator purchases assets from a joint operation, it does not recognise its share of the gains or losses until those assets have been sold to a third party. The joint operator’s share of any losses is recognised immediately, to the extent that these transactions provide evidence of impairment of those assets.

Other parties to the joint arrangement
Other parties to the joint venture

For the purpose of consolidated financial statements, the other parties to the joint venture first determine whether they exercise significant influence. If significant influence exists, then the interest is recognised in accordance with IAS 28 (2011); else it is recognised in accordance with IAS 39/IFRS 9.

For separate financial statements, other parties to a joint venture account for their interest in the joint venture in accordance with IAS 39/IFRS 9. If significant influence exists, then the interest may also be recognised at cost.

Other parties a joint operation

The other party to a joint operation accounts for its investment in the same way as a joint operator if it has rights to the assets and obligations for the liabilities. If such a party does not have such rights and obligations, then it accounts for its interest in accordance with the IFRS applicable to that interest for instance IAS 28 (2011) or IAS 39/IFRS 9 as the case may be.

Summary

Overall, the implementation of IFRS 11 will require significant judgment in several respects, while the requirement to apply equity method of accounting to account for interests in joint ventures may have a significant impact on the entity’s financial statements. While the standard is not mandatorily effective until periods beginning on or after 1 January 2013, it is expected that preparers will want to begin evaluating their involvement with joint arrangements sooner than that, as the changes under the new standard generally will call for retrospective application.

At this moment, it is unclear by when the corresponding changes will be introduced under the Ind-AS framework. However, it is advisable for Indian companies to evaluate the impact of this new standard, as it is inevitable that Ind-AS will ultimately incorporate the changes due to the new standard.

Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. — (31-3-2011)

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From Significant Accounting Policies

The Company uses foreign currency forward contracts and currency options to hedge its risks associated with foreign currency fluctuations relating to certain firm commitments and forecasted transactions. The Company designates these hedging instruments as cash flow hedges applying the recognition and measurement principles set out in the Indian Accounting Standard 39 ‘Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement’ (Ind AS-39).

The use of hedging instruments is governed by the Company’s policies approved by the Board of Directors, which provide written principles on the use of such financial derivatives consistent with the Company’s risk management strategy.

Hedging instruments are initially measured at fair value, and are re-measured at subsequent reporting dates. Changes in the fair value of these derivatives that are designated and effective as hedges of future cash flows are recognised directly in shareholders’ funds and the ineffective portion is recognised immediately in the profit and loss account.

Changes in the fair value of derivative financial instruments that do not qualify for hedge accounting are recognised in the profit and loss account as they arise.

Hedge accounting is discontinued when the hedging instrument expires or is sold, terminated, or exercised, or no longer qualifies for hedge accounting. At that time for forecasted transactions, any cumulative gain or loss on the hedging instrument recognised in shareholders’ funds is retained there until the forecasted transaction occurs. If a hedged transaction is no longer expected to occur, the net cumulative gain or loss recognised in shareholders’ funds is transferred to the profit and loss account for the period.

From Notes to Accounts The Company, in accordance with its risk management policies and procedures, enters into foreign currency forward contracts and currency option contracts to manage its exposure in foreign exchange rates. The counter-party is generally a bank. These contracts are for a period between one day and eight years.

The Company does not have any outstanding foreign exchange forward contracts, which have been designated as Cash Flow Hedges as at 31 March, 2011 and as at 31 March, 2010.

The Company has the following outstanding derivative instruments as at 31 March, 2011:

The following are outstanding currency option contracts, which have been designated as Cash Flow Hedges, as at:

Net gain on derivative instruments of Rs.20.20 crores recognised in Hedging Reserve as of 31 March, 2011 is expected to be reclassified to the profit and loss account by 31 March, 2012.

The movement in Hedging Reserve during the year ended 31 March, 2011, for derivatives designated as Cash Flow Hedges is as follows:

In addition to the above Cash Flow Hedges, the Company has outstanding foreign exchange forward contracts and currency option contracts with notional amount aggregating Rs.4432.67 crores (31 March, 2010: Rs.3316.41 crores) whose fair value showed a gain of Rs.27.45 crores as at 31 March, 2011 (31 March, 2010: Rs.4.67 crores). Although these contracts are effective as hedges from an economic perspective, they do not qualify for hedge accounting and accordingly these are accounted as derivative instruments at fair value with changes in fair value recorded in the profit (Previous year: exchange gain Rs.91.46 crores) on foreign exchange forward contracts and currency option contracts have been recognised in the year ended 31 March, 2011.

As of the balance sheet date, the Company has net foreign currency exposures that are not hedged by a derivative instrument or otherwise amounting to Rs.857.03 crores (31 March, 2010: Rs.764.85 crores).

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Tata Steel Ltd. — (31-3-2011)

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From Significant Accounting Policies

Foreign currency transactions

Foreign Currency Transactions (FCT) and forward exchange contracts used to hedge FCT are initially recognised at the spot rate on the date of the transaction/contract. Monetary assets and liabilities relating to foreign currency transactions and forward exchange contracts remaining unsettled at the end of the year are translated at year-end rates.

The company has opted for accounting the exchange differences arising on reporting of longterm foreign currency monetary items in line with Companies (Accounting Standards) Amendment Rules 2009 relating to Accounting Standard 11 (AS- 11) notified by Government of India on 31 March, 2009. Accordingly the effect of exchange differences on foreign currency loans of the Company is accounted by addition or deduction to the cost of the assets so far it relates to depreciable capital assets and in other cases by transfer to ‘Foreign Currency Monetary Items Translation Difference Account’ to be amortised over the balance period of the long-term monetary items or period up to 31 March, 2011, whichever is earlier.

The differences in translation of FCT and forward exchange contracts used to hedge FCT (excluding the long-term foreign currency monetary items accounted in line with Companies (Accounting Standards) Amendment Rules 2009 on Accounting Standard 11 notified by Government of India on 31 March, 2009) and realised gains and losses, other than those relating to fixed assets are recognised in the Profit and Loss Account. The outstanding derivative contracts at the balance sheet date other than forward exchange contracts used to hedge FCT are valued by marking them to market and losses, if any, are recognised in the Profit and Loss Account.

Exchange difference relating to monetary items that are in substance forming part of the Company’s net investment in non-integral foreign operations are accumulated in Foreign Exchange Fluctuation Reserve Account.

From Notes to Accounts

Profit and Loss Account


The Company has opted for accounting the exchange differences arising on reporting of longterm foreign currency monetary items in line with Companies (Accounting Standards) Amendment Rules 2009 relating to Accounting Standard 11 (AS- 11) notified by Government of India on 31 March, 2009 which allows foreign exchange difference on long-term monetary items to be capitalised to the extent they relate to acquisition of depreciable assets and in other cases to amortise over the period of the monetary asset/liability or the period up to 31 March, 2011, whichever is earlier.

As on 31 March, 2011, Rs. Nil (31-3-2010: Credit of Rs.206.95 crores) remains to be amortised in the ‘Foreign Currency Monetary Items Translation Difference Account’ after taking a credit of Rs.261.44 crores (2009-10: Charge of Rs.85.67 crores) in the Profit & Loss Account and Rs 2.07 crores (net of deferred tax Rs.3.57 crores) [2009-10: Rs.47.35 crores (net of deferred tax Rs.24.38 crores)] adjusted against Securities Premium Account during the current financial year on account of amortisation. The Depreciation for the year ended 31 March, 2011 is higher by Rs.0.48 crore (2009-10: Rs.0.41 crore) and the Profit before taxes for the year ended 31 March, 2011 is higher by Rs.208.99 crores (2009-10: Lower by Rs.561.60 crores).

Other Disclosures

25. Derivative Instruments (I) The Company has entered into the following derivative instruments:

(a) The Company uses foreign currency forward contracts to hedge its risks associated with foreign currency fluctuations. The use of foreign currency forward contracts is governed by the Company’s strategy approved by the Board of Directors, which provide principles on the use of such forward contracts consistent with the Company’s Risk Management Policy. The Company does not use forward contracts for speculative purposes.

Outstanding Short-Term Forward Exchange Contracts entered into by the Company on account of payables:

Outstanding Short-Term Forward Exchange Contracts entered into by the Company on account of receivables:
(Forward exchange contracts outstanding as on 31 March 2011 include Forward Purchase of United States Dollars against Indian National Rupees for contracted imports.)

Outstanding Long-Term Forward Exchange Contracts entered into by the Company:

(Long-Term Forward Exchange Contracts outstanding as on 31 March, 2011 have been used to hedge the Foreign Currency Risk on repayment of External Commercial Borrowings and Export Credit Agency Borrowings of the Company.)

(b) The Company also uses derivative contracts other than forward contracts to hedge the interest rate and currency risk on its capital account. Such transactions are governed by the strategy approved by the Board of Directors which provide principles on the use of these instruments, consistent with the Company’s Risk Management Policy. The Company does not use these contracts for speculative purposes.

Outstanding Interest Rate Swaps to hedge against fluctuations in interest rate changes:

All the above swaps and forward contracts are accounted for as per accounting policies stated in Notes on Balance sheet and Profit and Loss Account, Schedule M 1(f).

(II) The year-end foreign currency exposures that have not been hedged by a derivative instrument of otherwise are given below:

26. Previous year’s figures have been recast/ restated where necessary.

27. Figures in Italics are in respect of the previous year.

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GAPs in GAAP Monetary v. Non-monetary Items

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Issue raised in GAPS in GAAP — July 2007 Under revised AS-11 The Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates, the accounting treatment for monetary items and non-monetary items is different. Monetary items are revalued at each reporting date and the gain or loss is recognised in the income statement. Non-monetary items are reported at the exchange rate at the date of the transaction. They are not revalued at each reporting date and hence there is no exchange gain/loss. Thus the classification of an item as monetary or non-monetary is critical.

Monetary items have been defined as ‘are money held and assets and liabilities to be received or paid in fixed or determinable amounts of money’. Nonmonetary items are defined as ‘assets and liabilities other than monetary items.’ Paragraph 12 of the standard briefly elaborates what monetary and nonmonetary items are, as follows: “Cash, receivables and payables are examples of monetary items. Fixed assets, inventories, and investments in equity shares are examples of non-monetary items.”

The Expert Advisory Committee (EAC) of the ICAI has opined on the issue of monetary and non-monetary items (EAO-VOL-19-1.13). This opinion was given in the context of the pre-revised AS-11, but is relevant under revised AS-11 as well. The issue was whether foreign exchange advances received (and converted into Indian rupees) for export of a fixed quantity of goods, which are adjusted against future supplies, are monetary or non-monetary items.

The EAC noted the definition of ‘monetary items’ as ‘money held and assets and liabilities to be received or paid in fixed or determinable amounts of money’. The EAC was of the view that the words ‘received or paid’ do not necessarily envisage receipt or payment in cash. What is of essence in the definition of monetary items is that the value of the asset or liability should be fixed or determinable in monetary terms. In the present case, the EAC felt that the liability of the company in respect of the advance taken from the foreign customer is fixed in monetary terms, though it will be discharged through exports rather than through payment in cash. As such, the EAC was of the view that the advance received from the foreign customer is a monetary liability. Consequently monetary items denominated in a foreign currency should be revalued at each reporting date and exchange gain/ loss is recognised in the income statement.

Under IAS-21 The Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates, monetary items are defined as ‘Monetary items are units of currency held and assets and liabilities to be received or paid in a fixed or determinable number of units of currency.’ Paragraph 16, of IAS-21 provides further elaboration as follows.

Monetary items Paragraph 16 “The essential feature of a monetary item is a right to receive (or an obligation to deliver) a fixed or determinable number of units of currency. Examples include: pensions and other employee benefits to be paid in cash; provisions that are to be settled in cash; and cash dividends that are recognised as a liability. Similarly, a contract to receive (or deliver) a variable number of the entity’s own equity instruments or a variable amount of assets in which the fair value to be received (or delivered) equals a fixed or determinable number of units of currency is a monetary item. Conversely, the essential feature of a non-monetary item is the absence of a right to receive (or an obligation to deliver) a fixed or determinable number of units of currency. Examples include: amounts prepaid for goods and services (e.g. prepaid rent); goodwill; intangible assets; inventories; property, plant and equipment; and provisions that are to be settled by the delivery of a non-monetary asset.”

Therefore as can be seen from the above, though the definition of monetary items and non-monetary items is the same under IAS-21 and AS-11, they have been interpreted differently. The interpretation in paragraph 16 of IAS 21 and that contained in the EAC opinion take the exact opposite position. If one were to apply paragraph 16 above, one would conclude that advance received for future export of goods, is a non-monetary item. However, based on EAC opinion, this would be a monetary item.

Given that Indian GAAP is attempting to converge with IFRS, such interpretation differences would create unnecessary GAAP differences. In the given instance, intuitively, it appears that the right answer is not to revalue the advances received, which has been fully converted into Indian rupees. The advance has been received for future supply of fixed quantities of goods; has been fully converted into Indian rupees, and hence revaluing them at each reporting date and recognising exchange gain/loss is inappropriate. Such exchange gain/loss is merely a book entry that is reversed in the future (as sales in this example). If the recommendation of EAC were to be followed in this instance, it would give rise to a theoretical gain or loss in one period and an opposite effect when the transaction is concluded. This would substantially distort the profit and loss account between two periods.

A similar issue was raised (Query 37, Vol. XXVIII) much later with regards to treatment of advance paid in foreign currency for acquisition of fixed assets. This time the opinion of the EAC is in line with the interpretation in IAS-21. The Committee opined “the words received or paid in the definition of the term monetary items do not necessarily envisage receipt or payment in cash. What is of essence is that the value of the asset or liability should be fixed or determinable in monetary items. Accordingly, where the advance is related to a fixed price contract for the receipt of a specified quantity of goods, it will be a non-monetary asset, since it represents a claim to receive a specified quantity of goods and not a right to receive money.”

The change in the point of view by the EAC in this case, is a step in the right direction and will align the interpretation on this issue with global practice.

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(2011) 22 STR 513 (P & H) — Commissioner of Central Excise v. Shiva Builders.

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Revision by Commissioner — Whether the Commissioner can pass order-in-revision when issue is pending in appeal.

Facts:
The assessee, who were builders, preferred an appeal against the suo motu revision order passed by the Commissioner u/s. 35G after passing of the order by the Commissioner (Appeals). The same was allowed by the Appellate Tribunal. On appeal to High Court, the Revenue contended that issue in appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) was different from the issue which was considered during revisionary proceedings and therefore the revision order by the Commissioner was to be considered valid.

Held:
In view of the provisions as laid out u/s. 84(4) of the Finance Act, 1994, the Court held that even if the issue before the Commissioner (Appeals) was different than the one raised by the Commissioner in revision jurisdiction, exercise of revisional jurisdiction u/s. 84(4) of the Finance Act, 1994 on another issue also was not permissible. Revenue’s appeal was dismissed.

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SERVICES OF AIR-CONDITIONED RESTAURANTS

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Introduction and background Service tax is introduced on services provided by air-conditioned restaurants having a licence to serve liquor with effect from 1st May, 2011. The restaurants predominately serve food and as such, the dominant nature of the transaction is that of sale and the service is built-in or an integral part thereof and it is already subject to the levy of VAT. Whether a transaction is a sale or a service is determined with reference to facts of each case. At times, there may be a composite transaction consisting of both sale and service. The debate over this issue is ongoing and often a transaction is looked upon as ‘sale’ as well as ‘service’ under different statutes in India. There has been ongoing debate in relation to taxation of software, intellectual property rights or goods of incorporeal nature, telecommunication service, etc. as to whether these should be taxed as goods or services. Mutual exclusivity of service tax and VAT was recognised and a composite contract was distinguished from an indivisible contract in the case of Imagic Creative Pvt. Ltd., 2008 (9) STR 337 by the Supreme Court and accordingly held to the effect that the element of sale would attract VAT and element of service would attract service tax. In the context of provision of broadband connectivity, in the case of Bharti Airtel Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, 2009 TIOL 99 HC Kar-VAT, the High Court upheld the order of the Assessing Authority that activity of providing connectivity to the subscribers amounted to sale of light energy and taxable under the Karnataka VAT Act, whereas the company had paid due service tax. On filing SLP however, the Supreme Court set aside the order and directed the company to file statutory appeal and further passed an order to dispose of the appeal on merits. The controversy thus is not closed. It is however relevant to note that in the context of supply of food and beverages on board trains in the case of Indian Railways C&T Corporation Ltd. v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi 2010 (20) STR 437 (Del.), the Delhi High Court held that the said transaction did not amount to service of outdoor catering as passengers have no choice of articles served or time and place of service of food. The element of service is incidental and bare minimum of heating food and serving it. The state was empowered to levy VAT on the transaction and incidental element of service was not relevant and the petitioner was at liberty to challenge the levy of service tax. Further citing the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd., 2006 (2) STR 161 (80), it was observed that in respect of composite transactions other than those covered by Article 366(29A) of the Constitution, if no intention is found to segregate the element involving sale of goods from the element involving providing of service or if the transaction does not involve two distinct contracts, one for sale of goods and the other for providing of service, it is not permissible to disintegrate such composite contract so as to levy VAT/sales tax and service tax. In the context of outdoor catering service, distinguishing it from food served in a restaurant, the Supreme Court in Tamil Nadu Kalyana Mandap Assn. v. UOI, 2006 (3) STR 260 (SC) noted, “In the case of an outdoor caterer, the customer negotiates each element of catering service including the price to be paid to the caterer. Outdoor catering has an element of personalised service provided to a customer. Clearly the service element is more weighty, visible and predominant in the case of outdoor catering, it cannot be considered a case of sale of food and drink as in restaurant”. Amidst the controversy as to whether food served in a restaurant is an indivisible contract where dominant objective is sale of food or a composite contract of sale of food and providing services of ambience of air-conditioning, furniture, etc. and other personalised services, service tax is introduced on the service provided by restaurants.

Services provided by restaurants Statutory provisions in relation to the new levy, as contained in the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act) are reproduced below: Section 65(105)(zzzzv) of the Act “ ‘Taxable service’ means any service provided or to be provided to any person, by a restaurant, by whatever name called, having the facility of air-conditioning in any part of the establishment, at any time during the financial year, which has licence to serve alcoholic beverages, in relation to serving of food or beverage, including alcoholic beverages or both, in its premises.”

Criteria for taxability The definition in relation to a restaurant indicates the following criteria for taxability:

  •  Services provided by a restaurant or any establishment providing such services and known by any name such as a fast-food centre, a lunch home, a dhaba, a coffee-shop, a club, etc. The term ‘restaurant’ is not defined in the Act, therefore only the common parlance meaning of the term is to be applied. Any establishment or an eating house serving food and/or beverages whether in a hotel or otherwise to public or a class of public for consumption on the premises is known as a restaurant and is covered in the scope.

  •  Air-conditioning facility may be available for the whole or partial premises of the restaurant or the establishment and at any time during a financial year.

  •  The other concurrent requirement is having a licence to serve alcoholic beverages. However, there is no requirement as to the actual servicing of alcohol using the said licence. The existence of licence to serve is the requirement and any kind of alcoholic beverage such as beer, rum, gin, vodka, whisky, wine, etc. if licensed to serve is covered in the scope.

  •  Service is to be provided to any person in relation to food or beverages including any alcoholic beverages.

  •  The food and/or beverages are served on the premises of the restaurant.

The Government Instruction vide DOF No. 334/3/2011-TRU, dated 28-2-2011 has clarified as follows:

“1. Services provided by a restaurant 1.1 Restaurants provide a number of services normally in combination with the meal and/ or beverage for a consolidated charge. These services relate to the use of restaurant space and furniture, air-conditioning, well-trained waiters, linen, cutlery and crockery, music, live or otherwise, or a dance floor. The customer also has the benefit of personalised service by indicating his preference for certain ingredients, e.g., salt, chilies, onion, garlic or oil. The extent and quality of services available in a restaurant is directly reflected in the margin charged over the direct costs. It is thus not uncommon to notice even packaged products being sold at prices far in excess of the MRP. 1.2 In certain restaurants the owners get into revenue-sharing arrangements with another person who takes the responsibility of preparation of food, with his own materials and ingredients, while the owner takes responsibility for making the space available, its decoration, furniture, cutlery, crockery and music, etc. The total bill, which is composite, is shared between the two parties in terms of the contract. Here the consideration for services provided by the restaurants is more clearly demarcated.

1.3 Another arrangement is whereby the restaurant separates a certain portion of the bill as service charge. This amount is meant to be shared amongst the staff who attend the customers. Though this amount is exclusively for the services, it does not represent the full value of all services rendered by the restaurants.

1.4    The new levy is directed at services provided by high-end restaurants that are air-conditioned and have licence to serve liquor. Such restaurants provide conditions and ambience in a manner that service provided may assume predominance over the food in many situations. It should not be confused with mere sale of food at any eating house, where such services are materially absent or so minimal that it will be difficult to establish that any service in any meaningful way is being provided.

1.5    It is not necessary that the facility of air-conditioning is available round the year. If the facility is available at any time during the financial year, the conditions for the levy shall be met.

1.6    The levy is intended to be confined to the value of services contained in the composite contract and shall not cover either the meal portion in the composite contract or mere sale of food by way of pick -up or home delivery, as also goods sold at MRP. The Finance Minister has announced in his budget speech 70% abatement on this service, which is, inter alia, meant to separate such portion of the bill as relates to the deemed sale of meals and beverages. The relevant Notification will be issued when the levy is operationalised after the enactment of the Finance Bill.”

Further to the above, the Circular No. 139/8/2011-TRU, dated 10-5-2011, clarified the following issues as summarised below:

  •     When there are more than one restaurant belonging to a common entity in a complex and if they are demarcated by separate names, service tax would be levied on the restaurant which is air-conditioned in any part of the establishment and has a licence to serve alcohol and as such, satisfies both the conditions for its coverage.

  •    Taxable services provided by a restaurant in other parts of the hotel such as swimming pool or an open area attached to the restaurant also attract service tax as they are extension of the restaurant.

  •     When food is served as a part of ‘room service’ of a hotel, no service tax is leviable as service is not provided in the premises of air-conditioned restaurant with a licence to serve liquor. It is not chargeable even under short-term accommodation service if the bill for the food is raised separately and does not form part of the declared tariff.

  •     For the levy of service tax, State Value Added Tax (VAT) charged in the invoice would be excluded from the taxable value.

Food picked up at counter or delivered at home

Many a time, food is picked up at the counter of the restaurant and not consumed while sitting in the restaurant or is delivered at home as most food chain outlets or even speciality restaurants provide home delivery service. In these situations, only food is sold and the facility of restaurant not enjoyed. DOF letter dated 28-2-2011 reproduced above has clarified this point.

Valuation of restaurant service

In the context of catering service provided by outdoor caterers and/or mandap-keepers, the Hon. Supreme Court in the case of Tamil Nadu Kalyana Mandapam Association (supra) observed “it is well settled that the measure of taxation cannot affect the nature of taxation and therefore the fact that service tax is levied as a percentage of gross charges for catering cannot alter or affect the legislative competence of the Parliament in the matter”. In the said backdrop, exemption Notification No. 34/2011-ST of 25-4-2011 has amended Notification 1/2006-ST and granted abatement of 70% on the gross value of taxable service provided by a restaurant. The Ministry vide its Circular dated 25-4-2011 has also clarified that the exemption is available on the gross price charged by the restaurant for the taxable service including any portion shown separately, for instance some restaurants recover service charge separately. This would also form part of the value for determining service tax. However, any amount paid ex-gratia e.g., tip to any staff does not amount to consideration paid for the service of the restaurant and therefore would not be included in the value.

Some issues

(i)    A non-air-conditioned restaurant having a licence to sell alcoholic beverage is partly being made air-conditioned and will be functional from 1st January, 2012. Whether and when would service tax be attracted? Whether the entire sale i.e., even the non-air-conditioned part sale would attract tax liability?

Ans. (i) Service tax would be attracted from 1st January, 2012 and on the entire value of billing including billing for serving meals and/or drinks in the non-a/c part of the restaurant. The use of the words ‘at any time during the financial year’ makes it clear. However, prior to 1st January, 2011, the food was served without the facility of air-conditioning, therefore service tax would not be attracted. It may also be noted that service tax is introduced for the first time on the restaurant service from 1st May, 2011 and therefore threshold exemption would be available to the restaurant, subject to other conditions of threshold exemption of rupees ten lakh under Notification 6/2005-ST, dated 1-4-2005.

(ii)    Mr. A went to Restaurant M, a state-of-the art air-conditioned restaurant which would also service alcoholic beverages, but Mr. A does not have alcohol. Whether Mr. A can insist on not charging service tax in the invoice as he did not consume alcohol?

Ans. (ii) Consumption of alcohol is not envisaged in the definition of restaurant service. So long as the restaurant is air-conditioned and has a licence to servce alcoholic beverages, the restaurant is liable to pay service tax.

(iii)    Whether air-conditioned liquor shops having a licence to sell alcohol would be covered by the above provisions?

Ans. (iii) Liquor shops are not restaurants. They sell alcohol but do not serve the same in their premises. It is the service of restaurant facility i.e., having tables, chairs and other furniture along with a bar and/or waiters, etc. along with food and/or beverages including non-alcoholic beverages or both, is covered by the service tax provisions and not the shops selling alcohol.

(iv)    Are coffee-shop chain of restaurants with state-of-the art ambience in air-conditioned halls liable for service tax?

Ans. (iv) If the coffee-shop does not have licence to serve alcoholic beverages, it is not covered by the service tax provisions.

(v)    Whether a restaurant having a mere beer bar where only that part is air-conditioned would be liable for service tax?

Ans. (v) The part of the restaurant is air-conditioned and beer is an alcoholic beverage. Therefore, the value of the food and all beverages served in any part of the restaurant is liable for service tax.

(vi)    An air-conditioned restaurant in Mahabaleshwar uses air-conditioning facility only during the months of March – May. Rest of the year being very cool, air-conditioning is not operated. If the restaurant’s value of taxable sale during May, 2011 was well below the threshold limit of 10 lakh, would it be out of the scope of the levy till March 2012 or so.

Ans. (vi) No. The restaurant would be liable for service tax when it crosses the limit of Rs.10 lakh, even if it does not operate air-conditioning as it has used it for some part of the year. The condition is to have a facility of air-conditioning at anytime during the financial year is satisfied.

Press Release — Central Board of Direct Taxes — No. 402/92/2006-MC (15 of 2011) dated 24-6-2011.

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The Governement of India has signed a protocol amending the DTAA with the Government of Singapore for effective exchange of information in the tax matters.
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Salaried employees exempted from filing tax returns — Notification No. 36/2011, dated 23-6-2011.

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Salaried employees having total taxable income of less than Rs.5 lac have been exempted from filing the tax returns for A.Y. 2011-12, subject to the fulfilment of the following conditions:

  •  The only source of income is salary and income from savings bank interest does not exceed Rs. 10,000.

  •  The PAN of the employee is available with the employer and is mentioned in the Form 16 issued by the employer.

  •  The bank interest income is disclosed to the employer, and is included in employee’s total income, and tax is duly deducted thereon and paid to the Government.

  •  Total tax liability of such person is discharged by way of TDS deducted by the employer which has been duly paid to the Government.

  •  The employee does not derive salary from more than one employer.

  •  The employee has no claim of refund.

  •  No specific notice is issued under the Act to the employee for filing a return of income.
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Requirement to file digitally signed tax returns in certain cases — Notification No. 37/2011, dated 1-7-2011.

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The CBDT has notified that partnership firms filing return in ITR-5 or individuals and HUFs filing returns in ITR-4 and subjected tax audit u/s.44AB would require to digitally sign and submit their income tax returns for A.Y. 2011-12 and onwards.
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IS IT FAIR TO EXPECT AN INDIVIDUAL TO DO TDS (EVEN WITH PRESENT EXEMPTIONS)?

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Introduction It is an accepted fact that the provisions relating to tax deduction at source (TDS) under the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the Act) are very cumbersome, ambiguous and irrational. No amount of input can give you an assurance that the compliances are flawless. There would hardly be any organisation that can claim perfection in compliance with these provisions. As regards the Government organisations — including statutory corporations, nationalised banks, etc., the less said the better.

The law-makers in their wisdom have by and large exempted individuals and HUFs from complying with these provisions. However, there is still much to desire in this respect.

The unfairness In sections 194A (Interest), 194C (Contracts), 194H (Commission), 194I (Rent) and 194J (Professional fees), there are clear provisions that ordinarily, an individual and HUF are not required to deduct tax at source. However, either a sub-section or a proviso in these sections makes an exception that if the individual or the HUF is required to get his/its accounts audited u/s.44AB for the preceding financial year, on the basis of turnover-criterion, then the said individual/HUF would be required to comply with the provisions of TDS.

Again section 194C and 194J provide that if the individual/ HUF is making a payment for personal purpose, then TDS provisions are not applicable. Thus, when a businessman is making a payment to a doctor/ lawyer, etc. for personal matters (non-business), no tax needs to be deducted.

The unfairness lies in not providing similar exemption in section 194A, 194H, 194I. Therefore, if a businessman with tax audit makes personal borrowings for buying a house, he may be required to deduct tax on interest. So also, on brokerage for sale/purchase of house. The same difficulty may arise for rent.

Difficulties in respect of section 195 are too well known. A typical case of an individual buying a house from a non-resident — entails so much of a nightmarish exercise! Either to comply with all formalities for just one single transaction or to obtain exemption u/s.195(2)/ 195(3), involves tremendous hardship.

It can be well understood that the main intention of the statute, to exclude individual and HUF from complying with the requirements for TDS u/s.194C and 194J, was to cover only business transactions and to exclude personal transactions from the ambit of TDS. However, the same logic is not made applied in case of sections 194A, 194H and 194I.

Nevertheless, there is some solace to the individuals and HUF viz. non-applicability of the provisions of section 40(a)(ia). The provisions of section 40(a)(ia) are applicable to any business expense, thus saving the personal expense. But there is an exception to this solace — section 25 which disallows the deduction of interest on housing loan made to a non-resident if TDS requirements are not fulfilled.

The test for deciding, whether individuals and HUFs have to comply with the provisions of TDS, is based on the turnover of the business or professional receipts (same limit as for tax audit u/s.44AB) (i.e., 60 lakh for business and 15 lakh for profession)? However, is it fair that this turnover must be a conclusive criterion for deciding TDS requirement?

Further even compliance procedure of TDS viz. taking TAN, deducting and making TDS payment, filing quarterly returns, issuing TDS certificates, can prove to be extremely cumbersome for individuals and HUFs.

Solution:
One solution that can be thought of may be to lay down a separate criterion which is not based on limits laid down in section 44AB for deciding the TDS compliance by individual or HUF. For instance, the monetary limit for applicability of TDS can be gross payments of Rs.1 crore for individuals and HUFs.

Also, similar exclusion (as in section 194J and 194C) should be provided in case of section 194A, 194H, 194I. Hence, in case of personal expenses none of the provisions dealing with TDS should not apply to individuals and HUFs.

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Raman Gupta Prop. M/s. Raman & Co. v. ACIT ITAT Amritsar Bench, Amritsar Before C. L. Sethi (JM) and Mehar Singh (AM) ITA No. 05/ASR/2010 A.Y.: 2003-04. Decided on: 31-1-2011 Counsel for assessee/revenue: P. N. Arora/ Tarsem Lal

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Section 271D r.w.s 269SS — Penalty for acceptance of loan/deposit otherwise than by account payee cheque/draft — Assessee’s bona fide belief and conduct established a sufficient and reasonable cause — Penalty deleted.

Facts: The assessee had taken cash deposit from three persons amounting to Rs.2.5 lakh from each, aggregating to Rs.7.5 lakh. In response to showcause notice, the assessee explained that on account of urgency, as otherwise the cheque issued by him to the third party would have bounced, he took the cash deposit. Further it was pleaded that he was under the genuine impression that the provisions of section 269SS applied only to the business transactions and not to the personal transactions. However, according to the ACIT, the cheque issued to the third party by the assessee was not for payments to a creditor or discharge of any liability, but the same was issued for payment of a loan to the third party. The ACIT further did not agree with the assessee that the personal transactions were not covered and pointed out that the provisions of section 269SS do not make such distinction. Thus, he imposed a penalty u/s.271D of Rs.7.5 lakh.

According to the CIT(A) none of the exceptions provided u/s.269SS apply to the case of the assessee and the assessee had no compelling reasons to violate the provisions of section 269SS. Accordingly, he confirmed the order imposing penalty.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the assessee was under bona fide belief that the provisions of section 269SS do not apply to the personal transactions and this belief had not been found to be false or untrue. Secondly, it was noted that the loan so taken was immediately deposited in the bank account and the transactions were duly recorded by the assessee in his books of accounts. According to the Tribunal, the assessee had not consciously disregarded the provisions of section 269SS of the Act. Therefore, relying on the decisions of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of CIT v. Speedways Rubber Pvt. Ltd., (326 ITR 31), it held that the assessee had been able to establish a sufficient and reasonable cause for not accepting the loan by account payee cheque/ draft, and accordingly the penalty imposed was deleted.

Note:
In Hemendra Chandulal Shah v. ACIT, (ITA No. 1129/Ahd./2010), where on a direction of the bank a father had taken cash loan from his son to clear the debit balance in his bank account, according to the Ahmedabad Tribunal, there was reasonable cause and penalty u/s.271D could be imposed. The full text of the decision is available in the office of the Society.

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Vineetkumar Raghavjibhai Bhalodia v. ITO ITAT Rajkot Bench, Rajkot Before A. L. Gehlot (AM) and N.R.S. Ganesan (JM) ITA No. 583/RJT/2007 A.Y.: 2005-06. Decided on: 17-5-2011 Counsel for assessee/revenue: Manish Shah/ N. R. Soni

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Explanation to proviso to clause (v)/(vi) of subsection (2) of section 56 — Gifts from relatives exempt from tax — Whether the gift received from HUF is exempt from tax — Held, Yes — Also held that the amount is exempt u/s.10(2) of the Act.

Issue: The issues before the Tribunal were as under:

1. Whether gift received from HUF by a member of HUF falls under the definition of ‘relative’ as provided in the Explanation to clause (vi) of sub-section (2) of section 56 of the Act?

2. Whether amount received by the assessee from his HUF is covered by section 10(2) of the Act?

The Assessing Officer was of the view that HUF is not covered in the definition of ‘relative’. Therefore, the gift received from the HUF was taxable. On appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the view of the AO and further observed that if the Legislature wanted, it would have specifically mentioned so in the definition of ‘relatives’. According to him, the exemption u/s.10(2) was available only if the amount was received on partial/total partition and secondly to the extent of share in the assessed income of the current year. Before the Tribunal, the Revenue supported the orders of the lower authorities.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that a Hindu Undivided Family is a person within the meaning of section 2(31) of the Income-tax Act and is a distinctively assessable unit under the Act. Further, it observed that the Act does not define the expression ‘Hindu Undivided Family’, hence, it must be construed in the sense in which it is understood under the Hindu Law. According to it, HUF constitutes all persons lineally descended from a common ancestor and includes their mothers, wives or widows and unmarried daughters. All these persons fall in the definition of ‘relative’ as provided in Explanation to clause (vi) of section 56(2) of the Act. It did not agree with the views of the CIT(A) that HUF is as good as ‘a body of individuals’ and cannot be termed as ‘relative’. According to it, an HUF is ‘a group of relatives’. Further, from a plain reading of section 56(2)(vi) along with the Explanation to that section and on understanding the intention of the Legislature from the section, the Tribunal found that a gift received from ‘relative’, irrespective of whether it is from an individual relative or from a group of relatives is exempt from tax as a group of relatives also falls within the Explanation to section 56(2) (vi) of the Act. It pointed out that the Act does not provide that the word ‘relative’ represents a single person. Accordingly, the Tribunal held that the ‘relative’ explained in Explanation to section 56(2)(vi) of the Act includes ‘relatives’ and as the assessee received gift from his ‘HUF’, which is ‘a group of relatives’, the gift received by the assessee from the HUF should be interpreted to mean that the gift was received from the ‘relatives’ and therefore, the same was not taxable u/s. 56(2) (vi) of the Act.

As regards the alternative claim for exemption u/s.10(2) — the Tribunal did not agree with the CIT(A) and held that the assessee was entitled to exemption u/s.10(2). According to it, the assessee was a member of HUF and had received the amount out of the income of the family. There was no material on record to hold that the gift amount was part of any assets of HUF. It was out of income of family to a member of HUF, therefore, the same is exempt u/s.10(2) of the Act.

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(2011) 128 ITD 345 (Mum.) Smt. Bharati Jayesh Sangani v. ITO A.Y.: 2005-06. Dated: 4-11-2010

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Section 50C — AO is bound to apply the valuation given by DVO in the valuation report.

Facts:
The assessee purchased a flat for Rs.30,00,000 on 22-10-2003. This property was then sold on 29- 9-2004 for a total consideration of Rs.35,00,000. The stamp duty valuation of the said flat was Rs.1,18,07,180. The assessee was asked to show cause as to why the provisions of section 50C should not be applied. The assessee explained that the value of the property sold within a period of less than one year could not be expected to be as high as 1.18 crore. Further, the building was an old one and in dilapidated condition. The members of the society had resolved to construct a new building by demolishing the old one. Accordingly, the construction contract was entered with builders. As per the contract, the members were to pay certain amounts towards the construction cost and purchase of TDR. Since the assessee did not have money, she sold the flat to a third party with an agreement that the purchaser shall pay the construction cost and purchase cost of TDR to the builder. Further, the assessee explained that when the flat was sold, the building was already demolished and only the plinth was laid for the purpose of construction of new building.

Without prejudice to this main argument, the assessee also requested the Assessing Officer to refer the matter to the Valuation Officer. The DVO valued the said flat at Rs.46.48 lakh. The AO did not concur with the view of DVO as according to him the valuation done by the DVO was very low and further no deduction was required towards TDR. Further, according to the AO, section 50C(2) and section 16A of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957 do not bind the AO to follow the valuation done by the DVO.

Held:
Sub-section (2) of section 50C states that “……..where any such reference is made, the provisions of sub-sections (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6) of section 16A of wealth tax shall apply, with necessary modifications.

Sub-section (6) of section 16A of the Wealth-tax Act states that on receipt of order from the Valuation Officer, the Assessing Officer shall “proceed to complete the assessment in conformity with the estimate of the Valuation Officer”. Hence the AO has no option but to go by the estimate of the Valuation Officer.

The DVOs are experts in the matter of valuation by virtue of special qualification held by them in this field. The AO cannot ignore the report of the DVO.

The words used in sub-section (2) of section 50C that where reference is made to the DVO the provisions of sub-section (6) of section 16A of the Wealth-tax Act shall apply with necessary modifications. The ambit of expression ‘with necessary modifications’ implies striking out the inapplicable fractions of the provision which align strictly with the specifics of the Wealth-tax Act. This will not enable the AO to completely disregard the valuation report by the DVO.

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(2011) 56 DTR (Ahd.) (Trib.) 89 Valibhai Khanbhai Mankad v. DCIT A.Y.: 2006-07. Dated: 29-4-2011

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Section 40(a)(ia) — Payment of hire charges to sub-contractors after obtaining Form 15-I cannot be disallowed u/s.40(a)(ia) on the ground that Form 15J was not filed in time as per Rule 29D.

Facts:
The assessee had made payment of Rs.7,93,34,193 to sub-contractors to whom it awarded subcontract for hiring and from whom he obtained Form 15-I and hence TDS was not deducted. The AO, however, noted that even though the Forms 15-I were obtained from the transporters, the same were not furnished to the CIT in Form 15J as per Rule 29D of the IT Rules, 1962. He therefore, quoting from section 194C(3) as applicable to the relevant assessment year, held that once the assessee failed to furnish Form 15J enclosing therewith Form 15-I to the CIT before 30th June, 2006, he failed to fulfil the conditions laid down u/s. 194C(3)(ii). He accordingly added back the sum paid without TDS u/s.40(a)(ia).

The learned CIT(A) confirmed the addition by holding that responsibility after non-deduction does not stop just at collecting Forms 15-I from the sub-contractors, but also extends to requiring the contractor to furnish Form 15J to the CIT on or before 30th June of the following financial year. It was contended before the learned CIT(A) that Form 15J was submitted to the CIT on 26th February 2009 i.e., after the completion of assessment. The learned CIT(A) rejected this contention holding that such delay defeats the very purpose of the section.

Held:
Once the assessee has obtained Forms 15-I from the sub-contractors, and contents thereof are not disputed or whose genuineness is not doubted, then the assessee is not liable to deduct tax from the payments made to sub-contractors. Once the assessee is not liable to deduct tax u/s.194C, then addition u/s.40(a)(ia) cannot be made.

Non-furnishing of Form 15J to the CIT is an act posterior in time to payments made to subcontractors. This cannot by itself, undo the eligibility of exemption created by second proviso. Third proviso to section 194C(3)(i) which requires the assessee to submit Form 15J is only a procedural formality and cannot undo what has been done by second proviso.

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(2011) 55 DTR (Mumbai) (Trib.) 241 Porwal Creative Vision (P) Ltd. v. Addl. CIT A.Ys.: 2006-07 & 2007-08. Dated: 18-3-2011

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Section 272A(2)(k) — Penalty for failure to file TDS return is leviable only for the delay from the date of payment of taxes by the assessee.

Facts:
There was delay in submitting quarterly statement in Form No. 26Q and for such delay the AO imposed penalty u/s.272A(2)(c) and (k) @ Rs.100 per day of delay. Before the CIT(A), the assessee contended that it was incurring losses and there was financial crisis and therefore due to non-availability of funds there were delays in making the payments and filing the returns. However, the CIT(A) confirmed the penalty levied.

Held:
The clause (c) of section 272A(2) is not applicable as the same related to return/statement u/s.133, 206 and 206C. The case of the assessee is that it had deducted the TDS at the time of crediting amounts in the books of account and the payment could not be made due to financial difficulties and since the payments had not been made, the TDS returns could not be filed, as the same required data relating to payment of TDS.

As regards the default in not paying the tax to the Central Government in time or for non-deducting the tax at source, there are other provisions for ensuring compliance. In case the assessee fails to deduct tax at source or after deducting fails to pay the same to the Central Government, the assessee is deemed to be in default u/s.201(1) and is liable for penalty. The assessee is also liable to pay interest for the period of default till the payment of tax u/s.201(1A). Therefore, the period for levying the penalty has to be counted from the date of payment of tax, because the delay in filing the return till the date of payment of tax is already explained on the ground that the assessee could not pay the taxes for which separate penal provisions exist.

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Educational institution: Exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi): Assessee-society was running a school: Its application for exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi) was rejected on ground that its objects, viz., to manage/maintain a library, reading-room, and conduct classes of stitching, embroidery, weaving, centre for adult education and to make necessary arrangements for overall development and growth of children when required, were non-educational in nature: Rejection not proper.

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[Little Angels Shiksha Samiti v. UOI, 199 Taxman 237 (MP)(Mag), 11 Taxman.com 37(MP)]

The assessee-society was running a school. Its objects were:

(a) establishment of a school for the intellectual development of children;
(b) to conduct the classes and activities for all the levels of study and education;
(c) to manage/maintain a library, reading-room, and conduct classes of stitching, embroidery, weaving centre for adult education and education in the field of entertainment, arts, etc.; and
(d) To make necessary arrangements for the overall development and growth of children when required.

For the A.Ys. 2005-06 and 2006-07, the assesseesociety had been granted exemption u/s. 10(23C) (vi). It filed application for grant of approval for exemption u/s.10(23C)(vi) for A.Y. 2007-08. The Commissioner rejected the assessee’s application on the ground that the objects of the society mentioned in clauses (c) and (d) of the object clause were non-educational and, thus, the society did not exist solely for educational purpose.

The Madhya Pradesh High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee-society and held as under:

“(i) In view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Sole Trustee, Loka Shikshana Trust v. CIT, (1975) 101 ITR 234 the word ‘education’ used in clause (15) of section 2 means the process of training and developing the knowledge, skill, mind and character of the students by normal schooling.

(ii) In the instant case, clause (c) of the objects was to manage and maintain a library, reading-room and conduct classes of stitching, embroidery, weaving and schooling, adult education and education in the field of entertainment, arts, etc. The assessee-society had followed the instructions issued by the Board of Secondary Education in regard to practical examinations for home science and in the aforesaid instructions, stitching, embroidery, weaving subjects had been mentioned. The adult education is also a part of education. If the assessee-society introduced the aforesaid object, it could not be said that the object of the assessee-society was not of educational purpose.

(iii) Clause (d) of the objects was to make necessary arrangement for the complete development of the children. That object was also in consonance with the modern concept of education, because the education is not only to impart education through book reading, but it also includes sports activities and other recreational activities, dance, theatre and even having educational tour within the country and abroad, so that the children can develop their overall talent. It could not be said that the said object was not for educational purpose.

(iv) Apart from that, from the audited accounts of the society, it was clear that it had not used the amount and income for any other business activities. In such circumstances, rejecting the application of the assessee-society at threshold was arbitrary and illegal.

(v) It was also a fact that for prior two years, the assessee-society was granted exemption and after the year 2006-07, the assesseesociety had deleted the clauses (c) and (d) in its memorandum of association. In such circumstances, the order passed by the authority was illegal and against the provisions of section 10(23C)(vi).

(vi) Consequently, the petition was to be allowed. The impugned order was to be quashed. The application filed by the assessee for grant of approval u/s. 10(23C)(vi) was to be accepted.”

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Depreciation: Rate: Section 32: Gas cylinder including valves and regulators: Entry in schedule: Rate 100%: Liquefied petroleum gas cylinder mounted on chasis of truck: Gas cylinder entitled to depreciation at 100%: Cannot be treated as motor vehicle.

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[CIT v. Ananth Gas Supplies, 335 ITR 334 (AP)]

The assessee was dealing in liquefied petroleum gas which it transported in gas cylinders fitted to the chassis of transport vehicles. The assessee claimed depreciation on the cylinders at 100% as applicable to gas cylinders. The Assessing Officer held that the assessee was entitled to depreciation at 40% as applicable to transport vehicles on the ground that the vehicle on which the cylinder was mounted was registered as transport vehicle. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Andhra Pradesh High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) The container mounted on the chassis of the truck was nothing but a gas cylinder and it fits the description of gas cylinder in Appendix I, Part I, item III(ii)F(4) read with Rule 5 of the Rules as including valves and regulators.

(ii) The mere fact that the container was mounted on the chassis of the truck did not deprive it of the character of gas cylinder. It had all the attributes of the cylinder and was not divested of its basic character as cylinder on account of the fact that the item was registered as a transport vehicle.

(iii) The assessee was therefore entitled to claim depreciation at 100% on the liquefied petroleum gas cylinder mounted on the chassis of the truck.”

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Business expenditure: TDS: Disallowance u/s.40(a)(i) r.w.s 194A: Assessee exporting goods: Bills of exchange discounted abroad: Discounting charges not interest: Tax not deductible at source: Discounting charges allowable as deduction.

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[CIT v. Cargill Global Trading P. Ltd., 335 ITR 94 (Del.); 241 CTR 443 (Del.)]

The assessee was in the export business. On the exports to its buyers outside India, the assessee drew bills of exchange on those buyers. These bills of exchange were discounted by the assessee from CSFA which on discounting the bills immediately remitted the discounted amount to the assessee. CSFA was a company incorporated in Singapore and a tax-resident of Singapore. The discount charges were claimed by the assessee as expenses u/s.37. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim for deduction of the discount charges treating the same as interest on the ground that tax was not deducted at source from the amount. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) It is clear from the definition in section 2(28A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, that before any amount paid is construed as interest, it has to be established that the same is payable in respect of any money borrowed or debt incurred.

(ii) The discount charges paid were not in respect of any debt incurred or money borrowed. Instead the assessee had merely discounted the sale consideration. Tax was not deductible at source on the amount. The amount was deductible.”

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Business expenditure: TDS: Disallowance u/s.40(a)(i) r.w.s 195: Payment of interest by branch (PE) to head office abroad: By virtue of convention head office not liable to pay any tax in India: No obligation on branch to deduct tax at source: Interest to be allowed as deduction in the hands of branch.

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[ABN Amro Bank v. CIT, 241 CTR 552 (Cal.)]

The assessee-foreign company incorporated in the Netherlands had its principal branch office in India. Indian branch remits funds to head office as payment of interest. The Indian branch had not deducted tax at source on such interest payment to the head office. The following two issues were for consideration by the Calcutta High Court:

“(i) Whether interest payment made by the Indian branch of the appellant to its head office abroad was to be allowed as a deduction in computing the profits of the appellant’s branch in India?

(ii) Whether in making such payment to the head office, the appellant’s said branch was required to deduct tax at source u/s.195 of the Income-tax Act, 1961?”

The Calcutta High Court held as under:

“(i) An unnecessary complication has been created by the interpretation made of section 40(a) (i) r.w.s 195 by both the appellant and the respondents. A proper meaning has to be ascribed to the expression ‘chargeable’ under the provisions of this Act. Section 195(1) says that if any interest is paid by a person to a foreign company, which interest is chargeable under the provisions of this Act, tax should be deducted at source. The word ‘chargeable’ is not to be taken as qualifying only the phrase ‘any other sum’, but it qualifies the word ‘interest’ also. Where the interest is not so chargeable, no tax is deducted.

(ii) In this case, by virtue of the convention, the head office of the appellant is not liable to pay any tax under the Act. Therefore, there was and still is no obligation on the part of the appellant’s said branch to deduct tax while making interest remittance to its head office or any other foreign branch.

(iii) Therefore, if no tax is deductible u/s.195(1), section 40(a)(i) will not come in the way of the appellant claiming such deduction from its income. Therefore, in the circumstances, the appellant would be entitled to deduct such interest paid, as permitted by the convention or agreement, in the computation of its income.”

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ITO v. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank (2011) TII 103 ITAT-Mum.-ITNL Dated: 12-5-2011

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Section 195, 201/201(1A) of Income-tax Act, Article
13(3) of India-UAE DTAA — Liability to deduct tax on remittance of sale
proceeds of shares, by bank to UAE resident, does not arise as bank is
only acting as an authorised dealer in transferring the funds on behalf
of the share-broker-in absence of liability to deduct tax, the bank
could not be treated as an assessee in default.

Facts:
Abu
Dhabi Commercial Bank (ADCB) was engaged in the business of banking and
operated through branch in India. ADCB made remittances to individuals
being UAE residents, in respect sale proceeds of shares which sales had
resulted in short-term capital gain in India. Remittance was made
without deducting tax at source. Nil tax deduction was supported by CA’s
certificate which provided for nil tax deduction from sale proceeds to
UAE residents as capital gains tax was exempt in India in terms of
Article 13(3) of the DTAA. The Assessing Officer (AO) rejected the
contention of ADCB and held that capital gains earned by UAE residents
would not qualify for exemption under the DTAA as individuals in UAE are
not liable to pay tax on capital gains and hence in absence of existing
tax liability in that country, no benefits under the DTAA would not be
available to them. The AO therefore treated ADCB as an assessee in
default. U/s.201 and also levied interest u/s.201(1A).

Apart
from the treaty benefit, ADCB contended that shares had been purchased
and sold by UAE individuals through their brokers. Hence the term
‘payer’ as contemplated u/s. 204 of the Income-tax Act, referred to the
broker and the bank was only the medium through which remittances were
made. ADCB placed reliance on the Mumbai ITAT decision in the case of
Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corpn. Ltd.1 to contend that a bank
merely acted as an authorised dealer to transfer funds and the Bank
cannot be regarded as ‘payer’. On appeal, the CIT(A) held that though
ADCB could be regarded as payer u/s.204, there was no withholding tax
obligation due to availability of treaty benefit.

On appeal to the Tribunal by the Department and the assessee:

Held:
Reliance
placed by ADCB on decision in the case of Hongkong & Shanghai
Banking Corporation was correct. In the said decision, it had been held
that in respect of remittance of sale proceeds of shares the bank which
merely acted as an authorised dealer, was not under any obligation to
deduct tax at source. Consequently, the action of the AO in treating the
bank as an assessee in default u/s.201 and levying interest u/s.201(1A)
was not justifiable.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 74, dated 30-6-2011 — FDI in India — Issue of equity shares under the FDI Scheme allowed under the Approval Route

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Presently, an Indian company can, subject to compliance with certain guidelines, issue equity shares/preference shares to a person resident outside India, for consideration other than cash, against payment of royalty/lump sum fees for supply of technology/technical know-how under the Automatic Route.

This Circular, in addition to the above, permits issue of equity shares/preference shares to persons resident outside India for consideration other than cash under the Approval Route in the following cases:

1. Import of capital goods/machineries/equipments (including second-hand machineries), subject to compliance with all the following conditions:

(a) The import of capital goods, machineries, etc., made by a resident in India, is in accordance with the Export/Import Policy issued by the Government of India.

(b) There is an independent valuation of the capital goods/machineries/equipments (including second-hand machineries) by a third party entity, preferably by an independent valuer from the country of import along with production of copies of documents/certificates issued by the customs authorities towards assessment of the fair value of such imports.

(c) The application should clearly indicate the beneficial ownership and identity of the importer company as well as the overseas entity.

(d) All such conversions of import payables for capital goods into FDI should be completed within 180 days from the date of shipment of goods.

2. Pre-operative/pre-incorporation expenses (including payments of rent, etc.), subject to compliance with all the following conditions:

(a) Submission of FIRC for remittance of funds by the overseas promoters for the expenditure incurred.

(b) Verification and certification of the preincorporation/ pre-operative expenses by the statutory auditor.

(c) Payments should be made directly by the foreign investor to the company. Payments made through third parties citing the absence of a bank account or similar such reasons will not be eligible for issuance of shares towards FDI.

(d) The capitalisation should be completed within the stipulated period of 180 days permitted for retention of advance against equity under the extant FDI policy.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 73, dated 29-6-2011, Overseas Direct Investment — Liberalisation/Rationalisation.

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This Circular restates and consolidates the existing guidelines relating to:

(1) Transfer by way of sale of shares of a JV/ WOS not involving write-off of the investment.

(2) Transfer by way of sale of shares of a JV/ WOS involving write-off of the investment.

If the transaction does not fulfil the conditions mentioned under the Automatic Route, prior permission of RBI will need to be obtained before undertaking the same.

Indian Party is required to submit the details of divestment within 30 days from the date of divestment to RBI through its bank.

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Supreme Court upholds depositors’ protection laws of States

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The Supreme Court recently (K. K. Baskaran v. State rep. by its Secretary, Tamil Nadu & Ors., C.A. 2341 of 2011) upheld a fairly drastic, even if wellintended, State law for protection of depositors. This law was held to be unconstitutional by a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court and this decision has now been overturned by the Supreme Court. The importance of this decision for this column is particularly due to the fact that it applies to raising funds from the public in almost any form and not just in the form of ‘deposits’ as conventionally understood.

It is worth recounting briefly the background of this law, the circumstances of those times to understand the implications better.

The last few years of the preceding millennium saw a lot of companies and other entities raising monies in various forms at very ‘attractive’ rate of return and then defaulting. The monies were raised in innovative forms and not merely in the conventional form of raising of deposits, though of course, huge amounts were raised as deposits too. The series of defaults that followed revealed several things. Firstly, the promised ‘returns’ were high enough to be impossible to maintain at all times. Secondly, the businesses in which they were invested were risky, partly because the rate of return promised was high. Of course, some monies were straightaway siphoned off and huge commissions/ incentives were paid to agents. Thirdly, many of the schemes were purely ‘Ponzi’ schemes where fresh monies raised were the source of payment of ‘returns’ to earlier deposits, apart from return of principal.

The series of defaults and the resulting uproar resulted in several drastic laws being passed. The Reserve Bank of India Act was amended with strict provisions being inserted to regulate non-banking financial companies. SEBI notified its Regulations relating to Collective Investment Schemes which, ensured the closure of most of such schemes. However, at the State level, various States, over the following few years, passed laws for protection of depositors. Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Bihar, Gujarat, etc. were amongst such States [in Maharashtra, it was “the Maharashtra Protection of Interests of Depositors (in Financial Establishments) Act, 1999]. The broad model and most of the details of the laws of each of such States were more or less the same.

The basic scheme of the State Law was to give relief to the depositors where the monies were raised from them with a fraudulent intent. In case there was default due to this, the law provided for wide-ranging reliefs and punishment. The assets could be traced and attached, even if in other entities or in the names of the promoters/employees, etc. of the company. The definition of fraudulent intent was made artificially wide by including two situations. If monies were raised at returns that were commercially unviable, then the law deems that there was a fraudulent intent. Further, if the monies so raised were invested in businesses that were inherently risky, then, too, the law deems that the there was a fraudulent intent. The law covered corporate as well as several non-corporate entities such as individuals, firms, etc. Importantly, it covered even — corporates governed u/s. 58A of the Companies Act, 1956, and non-banking financial companies governed by regulations of the Reserve Bank of India.

The term ‘deposit’ is widely defined and would include monies in any form and not merely ‘public deposits’ or loans. However, there were certain exceptions provided for, but still, the definition was far wider than the word may normally convey. The law provided for appointment of an authority to take charge of the assets to ensure their disposal for meeting the liabilities to the depositors.

Stringent punishment was also provided. The State laws typically provide that in absence of special and adequate reasons, the punishment shall not be less than imprisonment of three years. The promoter, partner, director, manager or any other person or an employee responsible for the management or conducting the business of such entity is liable to be punished.

In case of default, not only the assets of the entity are to be attached, but if they are not sufficient, the properties of the director, partner or member of such entity can also be attached, if the State Government deems fit.

This law was challenged, inter alia, in the Bombay High Court. The Bombay High Court, by a Full Bench decision, held the law in Maharashtra to be unconstitutional (Shri Vijay C. Puljal v. State of Maharashtra, WP No. 5186 of 2001). However, a Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court upheld the constitutionality of the law in Tamil Nadu.

The decision of the Madras High Court was appealed against and the decision of the Bombay High Court was cited. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Madras High Court and held that of the Bombay High Court as not correct.

Various grounds were raised for holding the law to be unconstitutional including that the State had no power to enact such a law and that the other laws relating to deposits such as section 58A of the Companies Act, 1956, the Reserve Bank of India Act, etc. covered this field.

The Court gave the background in which the law by various States was enacted and particularly highlighted that the object of the Act and the reliefs provided thereunder were different from those under the RBI Act.

First, it described the background of the circumstances which necessitated such a law in the following words:

“The present case illustrates what has been going on in India for quite some time. Non-banking financial companies have duped thousands of innocent and gullible depositors of their hardearned money by promising high rates of interest on these deposits, and then done the moonlight flit, often disappearing into another State or even foreign countries leaving the depositors as well as the State police high and dry.”

The next contention was that: “the said Act is beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature as it falls within Entries 43, 44 and 45 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. It was also submitted that the impugned Act is liable to be struck down as the field of legislation is already occupied by legislation of the Parliament, being the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, Banking Regulation Act, 1949, the Indian Companies Act, 1956 and the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944 as made applicable by Criminal Law (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 1977.”

It was also contended that the Tamil Nadu Act was arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution.

The Court, applying the doctrine of pith and substance to consider under whose powers the field belonged, held that the State did have power to enact laws covering the field.

“12. As noted in the impugned judgment, the Tamil Nadu Act was not focussed on the transaction of banking or acceptance of deposits, but it is designed to protect the public from fraudulent financial establishments who defraud the public by offering lucrative returns on deposits and then disappear with the depositors’ money or refuse to return the same with interest. In our opinion, the impugned Tamil Nadu Act is in pith and substance relatable to Entries 1, 30 and 32 of the State List (List II) of The Seventh Schedule.”

“20. It may be noted that though there are some differences between the Tamil Nadu Act and the Maharashtra Act, they are minor differences, and hence the view we are taking herein will also apply in relation to the Maharashtra Act.”

“26. The doctrine of pith and substance means that an enactment which substantially falls within the powers expressly conferred by the Constitution upon a Legislature which enacted it cannot be held to be invalid merely because it incidentally encroaches on matters assigned to another Legislature.”

The Court then highlighted the objective of the State Law and also its different scope to distinguish this law from the other laws. It observed,:

“30. The Tamil Nadu Act was enacted to find out a solution for the problem of the depositors who were deceived on a large scale by the fraudulent activities of certain financial establishments. There was a disastrous consequence both in the economic as well as social life of such depositors who were exploited by false promise of high return of interest.

31.    By the impugned Act the State not only proposed to attach the properties of such fraudulent establishments and the mala fide transferees, but also provided for the sale of such properties and for distribution of the sale proceeds amongst the innocent depositors. Hence, in our opinion, the doctrine of occupied field or repugnancy, has no application in the present case.”

The Court even more specifically said that the other statutes that also provided for certain matters relating to depositors had different scope even if overlapping. However, since the State Law had a different angle and purpose, it had to be upheld.

“35. The Reserve Bank of India Act, the Banking Regulation Act and the Companies Act do not occupy the field which the impugned Tamil Nadu Act occupies, though the latter may incidentally trench upon the former. The main object of the Tamil Nadu Act is to provide a solution to wipe out the tears of several lakhs of depositors to realize their dues effectively and speedily from the fraudulent financial establishments which duped them or their vendees, without dragging them in a legal battle from pillar to post.”

Thus, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Tamil Nadu and the Maharashtra State laws for protection of depositors. Implicitly, this should mean that the corresponding laws in other States, being pari materia, may also be held to be constitutional.

The implications are quite far reaching because of the wide scope of the State Laws and the powers granted and also the deeming provisions contained therein. While the other laws restricting deposits provide for quantitative restrictions in the form of maximum interest rates, maximum deposits, etc., this law considers qualitative aspects. It considers the intent of the entity raising deposits including the unreasonableness of the returns promised and the nature of investments made. Further, the law can be invoked not just when there is a default, but even earlier if the conditions specified by the law are met.

In conclusion, an old, harsh and wide-ranging law is brought alive again and any entity raising monies in any form need to consider this law, though apparently it is intended to cover entities with fraudulent intent.

Part A: PART A: ORDER of CIC

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Section 24 and Schedule II and section 8(1)(g) & (h) and sections 4(i)(d), 10 and 22:

In the last RTI article of July 2011 in Part B it was reported that CBI is now exempted from RTI. I had also reported that in the Madras High Court the validity of the said Notification is challenged. Now it is learnt that the same is challenged also in the Delhi High Court.

Further development is that IC, Shailesh Gandhi on 1st July passed an order holding that the said Notification is ultra vires.

The complaint of Mr. Justice R. N. Mishra (Retired) v. PIO-CBI was made on 5-2-2011. While the Notification exempting CBI u/s. 24 of the RTI Act was issued on 9-6-2011. So firstly, IC held that the said Notification cannot be made retrospective. The order reads:

“It follows from the above that CBI has been brought within the Second Schedule of the RTI Act, thereby exempting it from the application of the RTI Act in accordance with section 24 of the RTI Act. However, on a plain reading of the Notification, it does not appear to have a retrospective effect. Reliance may be placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court of India in P. Mahendran v. State of Karnataka AIR 1990 SC 405, wherein it observed as follows:

“It is well-settled rule of construction that every statute or statutory rule is prospective, unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective effect. Unless there are words in the statute or in the rules showing the intention to affect existing rights, the Rule must be held to be prospective. If a Rule is expressed in language which is fairly capable of either interpretation it ought to be construed as prospective only. In the absence of any express provision or necessary intention, the rule cannot be given retrospective effect except in matter of procedure.”

The Notification was issued on 9-6-2011 and there is no express stipulation whatsoever, the Notification shall come into force with effect any date prior to 9-6-2011. Moreover, the Notification does not appear to indicate any intention of affecting existing rights and therefore, must be construed as prospective in nature. Hence, information sought in any RTI application filed prior to 9-6-2011 with CBI must be provided in accordance with the provisions of the RTI Act.

IC then examined whether the Notification itself is within the letter and spirit of the RTI Act. The Commission perused the CBI website to find out what are its functions. It then wrote:

“On careful perusal of the material, it can be ascertained that CBI was established for the special purposes of investigation of specific crimes including corruption, economic offences and special crimes. It continues to discharge its functions as a multi-disciplinary investigating agency and evolve more effective systems for investigation of specific crimes. Members of CBI have all the powers, duties, privileges and liabilities which police officers have in connection with the investigation of offences. There is no claim in its mandate and functions, as described above, that CBI is involved in intelligence gathering or is a security organisation. Even the additional functions performed by CBI other than investigation of crimes do not include any function which would lend it the character of an ‘intelligence or security organisation’ u/s. 24(2) of the RTI Act.”

“By enacting the Notification and bringing CBI within the Second Schedule, the Government appears to have increased the scope of section 24(2) of the RTI Act, which was not envisaged by the Parliament. Given the fact that the Right to Information is a fundamental right, any provision by which the said right is sought to be curtailed must be strictly construed. The Government, however, appears to have stretched the interpretation of section 24(2) of the RTI Act far beyond what the Parliament had intended, by including an investigating agency such as CBI within the Second Schedule, which was envisaged exclusively for intelligence or security organisations. The Government has read additional qualification into section 24(2) of the RTI Act which were hitherto not contemplated. By this method the Government could keep adding organisations to the Second Schedule, which do not meet the express criteria laid down in section 24(2) of the RTI Act and ultimately render the RTI Act ineffective. The Government cannot frustrate a law made by the Parliament by resorting to such colourable administrative fiat.”

“Therefore, by enacting the Notification and placing CBI in the Second Schedule, the Government appears to be claiming absolute secrecy for CBI without the sanction of law. The RTI Act was a promise to citizens by the Parliament of transparency and accountability. Given that the previous year has been characterised by unearthing of various scams in the Government which are being investigated by CBI, inclusion of CBI in the Second Schedule by the Government would be a step to avoid the gaze and monitoring of citizens in matters of corruption.”

Finally the Commission concluded:

“In view of the foregoing reasons, the Commission is of the view that the Notification is not in consonance with, either the letter or spirit of the RTI Act, — in particular section 24, — for the following reasons:

(1) As observed above, CBI is not an ‘intelligence or security organisation’, which requirement needs to be satisfied in order for it to be covered u/s. 24 of the RTI Act and therefore, it cannot be included in the Second Schedule.

(2) No reasons have been provided by the DoPT or the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, as required u/s. 4(1)(d) of the RTI Act, to justify the inclusion of CBI in the Second Schedule. In the absence of reasons, inclusion of CBI in the Second Schedule along with National Intelligence Agency and National Intelligence Grid appears to be an arbitrary act. The promise made to citizens u/s. 4(1)(d) of the RTI Act must be fulfilled.

This Commission rules that the said Notification of 9-6-2011 is not in consonance with the letter or spirit of section 24 of the RTI Act, since it constricts the citizen’s fundamental right in a manner not sanctioned by the law.”

CBI had before the Commission also submitted that in any case the information sought is exempt u/s.8(1)(g) and (h) of the RTI Act. The Commission also held that the said clauses also do not cover the denial of information sought by the applicant. Finally the Commission held:

“The Complaint is allowed.

The CPIO is directed to provide to the complainant copy of the FIR lodged by CBI. The CPIO is further directed to send copies of FR-I, FR-II and GEQD Expert report to the complainant. The information should be sent to the complainant after servering the names and other particulars of persons, the disclosure of which would endanger their life or physical safety or identify the source of information or assistance given in confidence for law enforcement or security purpose. The information as directed here should be sent to the complainant before 25th July 2011.”

Everyone is awaiting now the response of CBI to this decision.

This is a landmark decision and the full text is posted on the website of BCAS and PCGT.

[Mr. Justice R. N. Mishra (Retired), Allahabad v. PIO & Head of Branch, CBI Anti-Corruption Branch, Decision No. CIC/SM/C/2011/000117/SG/13230, dated 1-7-2011]

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Slum Redevelopment part I

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Introduction

‘Roti, Kapda aur Makaan’ are the three basic necessities in everyone’s life. While a good number of people in India have been fortunate in obtaining these necessities, there are several who have not been so successful. This has led to India and especially Mumbai having the unique distinction of housing some of the largest slums in the world. Mumbai has over 2,000 slum clusters, each of them housing over 100 to several thousand shanties. Slums and skyscrapers existing cheek by jowl in Mumbai are a common scenario. Slums are a hazard to society, environment and health. Considering these problems, the Maharashtra Government enacted the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 (‘the Act’). It is an Act to make a better provision for the improvement and clearance of slum areas in the State and for their redevelopment and for the protection of occupiers from forceful eviction. The shortage of land for development in Mumbai has forced developers to look at slum redevelopment as an active option. This has led to slum redevelopment schemes gaining popularity. According to a 2010 Research Report, 52% of the upcoming realty projects in Mumbai, spread over 8,600 acres, are slum redevelopment schemes. Another Research Report estimates the land value occupied by Mumbai slums to be Rs.1 lakh crore on a conservative basis.

Considering the rampant nature of slums across India, the Ministry of Housing & Urban Poverty Alleviation has come out with a Scheme titled the Rajiv Awas Yojana (‘RAY’) for slum dwellers and urban poor. It envisages States granting property for slum dwellers. The RAY envisages that each State would prepare a State Slum-free Plan of Action (‘POA’). The preparation of legislation for assignment of property rights to slum dwellers would be the first step for State POA. The POA would need to be in two parts, Part-1 regarding the upgradation of existing slums and Part-2 regarding the action to prevent new slums. In Part-1 the State would need to survey and map all exiting slums in selected cities proposed by the State for coverage under RAY. In Part-2 the Plan would need to assess the rate of growth of the city with a 20-year perspective, and based on the numbers specify the actions proposed to be taken to obtain commensurate lands or virtual lands and promote the construction of affordable EWS houses so as to stay abreast of the demand. The Centre intends to provide to States/UTs financial support and handholding/ capacity development support. The National Steering Committee for slum-free city planning — Rajiv Awas Yojana will monitor the financial and physical progress under the Scheme.

The Central Government approved the launch of the phase-1 of RAY in June 2011. As per the decision of the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs, the Centre will bear 50% of the cost of slum redevelopment. To encourage creation of affordable housing stock, the existing schemes of Affordable Housing in Partnership and Interest Subsidy Scheme for Housing the Urban Poor have been dovetailed into RAY. The Finance Minister has approved Rs.5,000 crores towards RAY under the 5-Year Plan up to 2012.

This Article aims to look at some of the crucial provisions under this very important Act and the process of slum improvement, clearance, redevelopment, etc.

Competent Authority

Under the Act, the State Government appoints one or more persons as the Competent Authority for administering the Act in various areas. For instance, for area belonging to MHADA, MHADA is the Competent Authority, and the Additional Collector, Mumbai is the Competent Authority for all lands in Mumbai city. Similarly, Competent Authorities are appointed for different areas in the State.

The Act also provides for the creation of a Slum Rehabilitation Authority (‘SRA’). The SRA is in charge of the Brihan Mumbai area and is headed by the Chief Minister of Maharashtra. The powers of the SRA are:

(a) To survey and review the existing position regarding slum areas;
(b) To formulate schemes for rehabilitation of slum areas;
(c) To get the slum rehabilitation schemes implemented;
(d) To do all such acts as are necessary for achieving the rehabilitation of slums.

By amendment to the Maharashtra Regional & Town Planning Act 1956, the Slum Rehabilitation Authority has been declared as a planning authority, to function as a local authority for the area under its jurisdiction. SRA has been empowered to prepare and submit proposals for modification to the Development Plan of Greater Mumbai. The SRA can declare any area as slum rehabilitation area for the rehabilitation of slums and in certain cases slum areas become slum rehabilitation area by means of deeming provisions. All such slum rehabilitation areas where slum rehabilitation schemes are proposed and being implemented, come under the jurisdiction of SRA.

The SRA can appoint officers and executives for its better functioning.

Slum rehabilitation area

Interestingly, the word ‘slum’ which is the edifice of this Act has not been defined under the Act. A slum rehabilitation area is an area declared to be one under a scheme. An area would be declared as a slum area if it fulfils the following conditions:

(i) It is a source of danger to the health, safety and convenience of the public because it has inadequate or no basic amenities, or it is insanitary, squalid, over-crowded, etc.

(ii) The buildings therein are unfit for human habitation or are dilapidated, over-crowded, lack ventilation/lighting/sanitation, etc.

Protection of occupiers

On and after the 2001 Amendment Act, protected occupiers cannot be evicted from their dwelling structure. Protected occupiers can be evicted if the State Government is of the opinion that it is necessary to do so.

An occupier has been defined to include the following:

(a) Any person who is paying the owner rent for the land or building;

(b) An owner is in occupation of his land or building;

(c) Rent-free tenant of any land or building;

(d) Licensee in occupation of any land or building; and

(e) Any person who is liable to pay to the owner damages for use and occupation of land or building. Owner has been defined under the Act to mean a person who receives rent of the land or building if it were let and includes:

(a) An agent/trustee who receives such rent on account of the owner (b) A Court-appointed receiver/manager (c) A mortgagee-in-possession. However, the definition of an owner excludes a Slumlord.

A Slumlord is defined to mean a person, who:

(a) Illegally takes possession of lands; or
(b) Enters into or creates illegal tenancies, leave and licence agreements, etc. on such lands; or (c) Constructs unauthorised structures for sale or hire; or
(d) Gives such lands on rental/licence for construction/occupation of unauthorised structures; or
(e) Knowingly gives financial aid to any person for the above; or
(f) Collects rent/charges from occupiers by criminal intimidation/use of force/illegal means.

No person can without the prior approval of the Competent Authority:

(a) institute any suit for the eviction of an occupier from any building or land in a slum area;
(b) apply to any Court for a distress warrant for rent arrears against any occupier.

Slum improvement

(a) If the Competent Authority is satisfied that any slum area is capable of being improved, then it may serve a notice to the owner of the property of its intention to carry out such improvement. It would invite objections and suggestions from them also.

(b) The final decision on whether to commence or abandon or modify/postpone the improve ment is that of the Competent Authority.
(c)    Improvement of the slums may consist of laying of water mainlines/sewers/drains; provision for sanitation facilities, wid ening of roads, street lighting, landscaping, providing social infrastructure, such as playgrounds, parks, police station, hospitals, etc.

(d)    For the above improvement, the Competent Authority may require the occupiers to vacate the premises occupied by them. It may as far as practicable offer alternative accommodation.

(e)    If buildings in a slum area are unfit for hu man habitation or any area is a source of danger to the health, safety and conve nience of the public, then the Competent Authority may serve a notice on the owner to execute such works of improvement as it deems fit.
 
(f)    It has powers to enforce the notice for carrying out works of improvement.

(g)    The Competent Authority may direct that no person shall erect any building in a slum area without its prior permission.

(h)    The Competent Authority can order that any building in a slum area which is not fit for human habitation should be demolished.


Slum clearance

U/s.11 of the Act, if the Competent Authority is satisfied that the most satisfactory method of dealing with a slum is the demolition of all the buildings in that area, then it may by an order direct that such area should be cleared of all buildings in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Such an order is known as a ‘clearance order’ and such area is known as a ‘clearance area’. It must also make provisions for accommodating those dishoused. The order is then forwarded to the Administrator appointed under the Act. The Administrator in Greater Bombay is a person not below the rank of a Divisional Commissioner. He may either confirm or vary or reject the clearance order.

Once an area has been cleared of its buildings, its owner may apply for redevelopment of the land. Alternatively, the Competent Authority itself may decide to redevelop the land at its cost, with prior approval of the Administrator.

Right to appear and practice — General power of attorney holder is not entitled to appear and argue — Advocates Act, 1961.

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[ Madupu Harinarayana v. The ld. 1st Addl. District Judge & Ors., AIR 2011 (NOC) 233 AP] A conspectus of Rules 1 and 2 of Order III of the Code of Civil Procedure, section 2(a) and sections 29, 30, 33, 34 of the Advocates Act, Rule 2 of Rules made by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh u/s. 34(1) of the Advocates Act and Code of Criminal Procedure would show that all the pleadings in a proceeding shall be made by the party in person, or by his recognised agent. A party in person, and a recognised agent, have to make an appointment in writing (vakalatnama) duly authorising the advocate to appear and argue the case. Only an advocate entered on the rolls of the Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh, who has been given vakalat and which has been accepted by such advocate, can have the right of audience on behalf of the party, or his recognised agent, who engaged the advocate. Sections 29 and 30 of the Advocates Act make it clear that advocates are the only recognised class of persons entitled to practise law, and such an advocate should have been enrolled as such under the Advocates Act. Section 32 of the Advocates Act empowers the Court to permit any non-advocate to appear in a particular case. This only means that any person has to seek prior permission of the Court to argue a case if he is not an advocate enrolled under the Advocates Act. Further, it is an offence for a non-advocate to practise under the provisions of the Advocates Act.

It is only advocates, whose names are entered on the rolls of the State Bar Council, who have the right to practise in any Court. If a person practises in any Court without any such authority, and without such an enrolment, it would be committing an offence u/s. 45 of the Act, punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months. Therefore GPA Shri T. D. Dayal was not entitled to appear and argue for the appellant. He had no right of audience in the case or any other case.

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Lubrizol Corporation USA v. ADIT ITA No. 7420/Mum./2010 Dated: 3-6-2011

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Section 195 — Article 5 of US DTAA — Sales, support and marketing activities of independent nature by an Indian affiliate — Not to result in PE for USCO — Contracts entered on principal to principal basis and all operations carried out and concluded outside India.

Facts:
The taxpayer was a manufacturer of high performance chemicals, a company incorporated in and a tax resident of the US (USCO).

Indian Company (ICO) was a JV between IOC (Indian Oil Corporation) and USCO. ICO was primarily engaged in the business of manufacture of various products. In addition, ICO also agreed to render to USCO assistance pursuant to an Exclusive Sales Representation Agreement. In terms of the agreement, ICO solicited orders for the products. All orders received by ICO were forwarded to USCO for acceptance or rejection and ICO did not have any authority in that regard or in regard to prices to be charged.

ICO was required to inform USCO of business opportunities; tenders and competitive bids received from customers, make reasonable efforts to promote sale and distribution of the products of USCO. ICO assumed no responsibility for the quality of the products, creditworthiness of customers etc. Service fees constituted very small portion of overall turnover of the company and was calculated based on shipments of the products resulting from orders which were submitted by ICO.

USCO was of the view that no income was taxable in India since (a) USCO did not carry on business in India; (b) Transfer Pricing Officer had accepted the price to be arms length. (c) In absence of any form of PE no part of income could be taxed in India. To support that there was no PE in India, USCO also urged that ICO could not be considered as dependent agent as it did not ‘secure orders’ on behalf of USCO.

The Assessing Officer took a view that ICO was a virtual projection of USCO in India and it constituted a sole/exclusive agency of USCO in India. Consequently profits being 5% of sales made by USCO were attributed in the hands of USCO, in addition to commission which was paid to ICO.

USCO filed objections before the Dispute Resolution Panel which upheld the order of Assessing Officer. On appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
ICO had an independent business of manufacture of various products in India. It had its own marketing network in India for sale of various products. Commission received by ICO in India accounts for only 0.18% of its sales. USCO did not have a PE in India as

(a) Sales were made on principal-to-principal basis to Indian customers.

(b) ICO did not have the authority to negotiate the terms of the contract and contracts were concluded only when the purchase order was accepted by USCO.

(c) USCO did nott have any right to use ICO’s premises in India.

Thus in absence of PE, no profits could be attributed to USCO and mere presence of someone acting on behalf of USCO was not sufficient to give rise to PE.

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ADIT v. ACM Shipping India Ltd. ITA No. 5085/Mum./2009 Dated: 10-6-2011

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Article 5(4), 7(1), 13(4) of India-UK DTAA, Section 195(2) of Income-tax Act — Commission earned by UK company from its Indian WOS for providing support services taxable as business income — Accrual by virtue of parent company’s business connection/operations in India — Circular No. 23, dated 23-7-1969 cannot be relied on after its withdrawal.

Facts:
UKCO is engaged in international business of shipbroking services and has an extensive worldwide network with international ship-owners. ICO, a wholly-owned Indian subsidiary of UKCO, is engaged in the business of ship-broking and transportation of cargo from India.

ICO entered into a service agreement with UKCO, in terms whereof UKCO was required to provide the following services:

— Identifying potential international ship-owners outside India and referring them to ICO and facilitating their interaction with ICO

— Co-coordinating with ship-owners regarding availability of ships on requisite dates.

As per the agreement, ICO was to pay 50% of commission earned to UKCO.

ICO applied to the Assessing Officer (AO) for remitting payments to UKCO, without deducting tax at source. ICO contended that the commission payable to UKCO was not chargeable to tax in India. The AO rejected the contentions of ICO and held that it was an agent of UKCO as it was effectively procuring business for UKCO. The activities of ICO were carried out wholly and exclusively for UKCO and commission payment to UKCO was 50% of overall commission of ICO’s income. Hence ICO triggered agency PE of UKCO in India and its profits attributable to Indian operations would be taxable in India. The CIT(A) held that commission received by UKCO was not taxable in India as it pertained to remuneration for commercial services rendered outside India.

On an appeal by the Department to the Tribunal:

Held:

Contention of ICO that commission was paid to UKCO for services rendered outside India and the customers instead of paying the commission to UKCO, directly paid UKCO through ICO was selfserving and without any substantive proof.

Commission paid to UKCO by ICO in respect of services may ultimately result in business to ICO in India and commission paid by ICO to UKCO accrued to UKCO by virtue of its business connection in India and the same is liable to tax as business income in India. Reliance on Circular No. 23 was not permissible as the same had been withdrawn in 2009. Even otherwise applicability of the Circular was doubtful as the same had been issued in the context of sale of goods and may not apply in a case of rendering of services.

However the fact that ICO was a wholly-owned subsidiary of UKCO and that ICO worked only for UKCO would have a substantial bearing on the case. In the light of the same, the case was remanded to the Assessing Officer to reconsider the issue.

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Hovels India Ltd. v. ACIT (2011) TII 96 ITAT-Del.-ITNL Dated: 27-5-2011

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Section 5(1), 9(1)(vii), 195 — Article 12 of India-US DTAA — Payment made to non-resident for product testing and certification — Services utilised by resident in a business or profession carried on or for making or earning income from source outside India — Onus on assessee to prove this fact — Onus discharged — No liability to deduct tax at source.

Facts:

Taxpayer (ICO) was engaged in the business of manufacturing electrical products including switchgears, electric fans, cables and wires. It paid to US-based company (USCO), a specialist in product testing and certification for electrical products, for getting its products tested and getting certification. This certification was necessary for enabling ICO to export its products to the USA and European Union (EU).

No tax was deducted at source on the ground that since testing of products was done in a laboratory outside India, no income had accrued or arisen to USCO in India. Further the payment was not in the nature of fees for included services in terms of India- USA DTAA. The Assessing Officer took the view that as the testing and certification of ICO’s products was required to be utilised in the manufacturing activity of ICO, the payment was covered by source rule of section 9(1)(vii) as ‘fees for technical services’ (FTS) and) the services and payments would also be covered under ‘fees for included services’, in terms of Article 12(4)(b) of the DTAA. The expenditure was disallowed u/s. 40(a)(i).

ICO also contended that the service was rendered and utilised outside India. The certification was required to enable ICO to export its products to the USA and EU and such certification was not required for sale of goods in India and the source rule exception u/s. 9(1)(vii)(b) would come into play.

The Assessing Officer rejected these contentions and the order of the AO was confirmed by the CIT(A). On appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

To seek exemption u/s.9(1)(vii)(b), onus was on ICO to prove that the services were utilised either in a business carried on outside India or for the purposes of making or earning any income from any source outside India.

The AO has not been able to bring anything on record to prove that the services have not been utilised outside India. He has not been able to rebut the representation of the taxpayer that certificates were required only for purposes of export. and that such certificates were utilised for export; and that they were not utilised for its business activities in India. Hence, onus which lies on the assessee was discharged. No tax withholding was required and disallowance u/s. 40(a)(i) was not sustainable.

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Recent Global Developments in International Taxation — part I

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In this Article, we have given brief information about the recent global developments in the sphere of international taxation which could be of relevance and use in day-to-day practice and which would keep the readers abreast with various happenings across the globe in the arena of international taxation. We intend to keep the readers informed about such developments from time to time in future.

(1) Australia

(i) Federal Court holds non-resident manager of portfolio of Australian shares for non-resident companies liable to tax in Australia

The Federal Court on 8th September 2010 handed down a decision in Leighton v. FCT, (2010) FCA 1086 that dealt with taxation in Australia of a non-resident manager who was managing a portfolio of Australian shares for two non-resident companies.

Briefly, Mr. Leighton was, during the relevant period, a resident of Monaco and was not a resident of Australia. He was engaged by two companies, who were not tax resident in Australia and were incorporated in the British Virgin Islands and the Bahamas, to manage a portfolio of Australian shares for them and to provide other services incidental to the management services. Mr. Leighton opened a bank account in Australia and engaged a number of Australian brokers and an Australian custodian. The trading instructions were given by Mr. Leighton, on behalf of the two companies, from Monaco. The trading activities generated taxable income during the relevant period.

Non-residents are subject to tax in Australia only on income sourced in Australia. The judgment does not discuss whether the relevant income has a source in Australia and, presumably, assumes that it does.

After considering the facts, the judgment concludes that Mr. Leighton, in acting as a manager, was, during the relevant period, a trustee of a trust for the non-resident companies as beneficiaries. As such, he is liable for tax for the taxable profits under former section 98(3) of the Income Tax Assessment Act, 1936.

(ii) Treaty between Australia and US: US LLC disregarded under treaty

The Australian Taxation Office released Interpretative Decision ATO ID 2010/188 that confirms that:

— A limited liability company (LLC) incorporated in the United States that has a single owner and is disregarded as an entity separate from the owner for the US tax purposes, is not a resident of the US under the tax treaty between Australia and the US.

However, — where the single owner is a treaty resident of the US, it may be entitled to benefits under the treaty in respect of income derived by the LLC.

(iii) ATO rules on private equity investments into Australia: revenue/capital distinction; treaty shopping; source rules; treaty protection

On 11th November 2010, the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) released two final determinations and two draft determinations that deal with taxation of private equity investments into Australia.

Two final determinations were released in draft in 2009 after an unsuccessful attempt by the ATO to collect AUD 678 million in tax and penalties from the TPG Group in respect of the listing of the Myer group in Australia. By the time the ATO issued the assessments, the funds had left Australia. It has been reported that the ATO has yet to collect the outstanding debt.

(iv) Foreign Managed Fund Exemption announced

The Assistant Treasurer announced that taxation law will be amended to implement a new foreign managed fund exemption. The exemption, called the Investment Manager Regime, is intended to apply to investment income of foreign managed funds that is attributable to a permanent establishment in Australia arising from the activities in Australia of a dependent agent of the fund.

It appears that the exemption will apply to tax treaty investors only. Fund management fees will continue to be subject to tax in Australia.

(v) Taxation of trusts clarified by Federal Court

The Federal Court handed down a decision in Colonial First State Investments Limited v. FCT, (2011) FCA 16 that deals with taxation of net income of unit trusts. Specifically, the judgment deals with the effect of a change in a trust deed on the income of beneficiaries of the trust in case of redemption of units. The changes of the deed were affecting both redeeming and remaining unit holders.

(vi) Non-resident may be required to withhold income tax, FBT

The Australian Taxation Office released Taxation Determination TD 2011/1 that expresses a view that where a non-resident entity pays an Australian resident for work performed overseas, the nonresident entity may be required to withhold income tax under the Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) provisions and become subject to Fringe Benefits Tax (FBT) if the non-resident entity has a sufficient connection with Australia, such as, for example, a physical presence in Australia.

The Taxation Determination also states that if the foreign entity does not have PAYG obligations, it will not be subject to FBT.

(vii) Final ruling on business restructures and transfer pricing released

The Australian Taxation Office (ATO) has released Taxation Ruling TR 2011/1, which deals with the application of domestic transfer pricing provisions and Australian tax treaties to business restructuring. The ruling was previously released as Draft Taxation Ruling TR 2010/D2 and expresses a view that in applying to business restructuring arrangements, both domestic transfer pricing provisions and associated enterprises articles of Australia’s tax treaties require following the arm’s-length principle and therefore the 3-step process adopted by the ATO to transfer pricing analysis should equally be applied to business restructuring.

(viii) NDF execution is not trading in currency

The Australian Taxation Office (ATO) released an Interpretative Decision (ID) ATO ID 2011/27 stating that execution of non-deliverable forwards (NDF) is not trading in currency or rights in respect of currency.

In reaching this decision, the ATO noted that NDSs are very similar to wagering contracts and relied on an 19th century judgement for a definition. Further, the connection with the reference currency is too remote for an NDF to confer a right in respect of a currency.

The implication of this ID would be that income from executing NDFs with residents would not qualify for a reduced income tax rate of 10% under the Offshore Banking Unit (OBU) rules.

(ix) Final ruling on interaction of thin capitalisation and transfer pricing rules issued

The Australian Taxation Office (ATO) released final ruling TR 2010/7 on the interaction between the transfer pricing and thin capitalisation provisions. The ruling was previously released in draft as TR 2009/D6 (see TNS: 2009-12-21: AU-2), and was not substantially changed from the earlier draft ruling.

Briefly, the ATO expresses a view that the transfer pricing provisions may apply to a loan that satisfies the safe harbour test under the thin capitalisation provisions. As such, loans should be priced based on commercially realistic outcome. This may include consideration of parental affiliation, as well as other circumstances of the parties (including, for example, the ability of the borrower to borrow from unrelated third parties or prevailing market and economic conditions).

The ruling has retrospective application.

(2) United States

(i) Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 signed

President Obama signed the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 (H.R. 5297) into law on 27th September 2010. Significant business tax measures of the Act are summarised below.

— The Act temporarily excludes 100% of the gain from the sale of qualified small business stock held at least five years.

— The Act extends the carryback period for eligible small business credits from one year to five years.

— The Act allows eligible small business credits to offset both regular and alternative minimum tax liability.

—  The Act temporarily reduces the recognition period to five years for built-in gains of Sub-chapter S corporations that convert from prior Subchapter C status.

— The Act increases the maximum amount a taxpayer may elect to deduct in connection with the cost of qualifying section 179 property placed in service in 2010 and 2011 to USD 500,000. The maximum amount is phased out by the amount by which the cost of qualifying property exceeds USD 2 million. The Act temporarily expands the definition of qualifying section 179 property to include certain real property, i.e., qualified leasehold improvement property, qualified restaurant property, and qualified retail improvement property. The maximum amount of deduction for such real property is USD 250,000.

— The Act extends the additional first-year depreciation deduction which is allowed equal to 50% of the adjusted basis of qualified property placed in service through 2010.

—  The Act increases the maximum amount that a taxpayer may deduct in connection with trade or business start-up expenditures from USD

5,000 to USD 10,000. The maximum amount is phased out by the amount by which the cost of start-up expenditures exceeds USD 60,000, increased from USD 50,000.

— The Act revises the penalties that may be imposed for failure to disclose a reportable transaction to the IRS.

— The Act allows self-employed individuals to deduct the cost of health insurance for themselves and their spouses, dependents, and any children under age 27 for purposes of the social security and Medicare taxes imposed by the Self-Employment Contribution Act (SECA).

— The Act removes cell phones and similar telecommunications equipment from the definition of listed property so that the heightened sub-stantiation requirements and special depreciation rules do not apply.

— The Act imposes the same information reporting requirements (i.e., IRS Form 990-MISC) on tax-payers who are recipients of rental income from real estate as are imposed on taxpayers engaged in a trade or business, with a few exceptions.

— The Act treats as US-source income amounts received, whether directly or indirectly, from a non-corporate US resident or a US domestic corporation for the provision of a guarantee of indebtedness of such person.

— The Act increases the amount of the required estimated tax payments otherwise due by large corporations in July, August, or September, 2015, by 36 percentage points.

A complete description of the provisions of the Act is included in the technical explanation prepared by the US Joint Committee on Taxation (JCX-47-10). The White House also issued a press release with a summary of the principal business provisions that are included in the Act.

(ii)    IRS confirms withdrawal of proposed trans-fer pricing regulations on controlled services transactions and intangibles

The US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has issued Announcement 2010-60 confirming its withdrawal of proposed regulations issued on 10 September 2003 regarding the treatment of controlled services transactions and the allocation of income from intangibles u/s. 482 of the US Internal Revenue Code.

The proposed regulations were withdrawn due to the subsequent issuance of final regulations on these topics on 4th August 2009.

The withdrawal was previously announced on 7th September 2010 in the US Federal Register. For a report, see TNS: 2010-09-09: US-1.

(iii)    IRS announces non-acquiescence in VERITAS transfer pricing case

The US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has issued an Action on Decision (AOD) announcing that it does not acquiesce in the result or the reasoning of the US Tax Court’s decision in VERITAS Software Corporation and Subsidiaries v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 133 T.C. No. 14 (Docket No. 12075-06, 10 December 2009), reported in TNS: 2009-12-21: US-1.

(iv)    Guidance issued on FTC splitting transactions

The US Treasury Department and Internal Revenue Service (IRS) have issued Notice 2010-92 (the Notice) with guidance on foreign tax credit (FTC) splitting transactions. These are transactions in which the FTC is separated (i.e., split) from the associated foreign income and claimed by a US taxpayer prior to the tax year in which such income is subject to tax in the United States.

(v)    Proposed regulations extend reporting re-quirements for US bank interest paid to all non-residents

The US Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) have issued proposed regulations u/s. 6049 of the US Internal Revenue Code (returns regarding payments of interest). The proposed regulations provide guidance on the information reporting requirements for interest paid to non-resident individuals on deposits maintained at US offices of specified financial institutions.

The regulations are proposed to be effective for payments made after 31st December of the year in which the regulations are adopted as final.

The US Treasury Department and the IRS have requested comments on the regulations and a public hearing is scheduled for 28th April 2011.

(vi)    US Treasury Department reissues list of boycott countries that result in restriction of US tax benefits

The US Treasury Department has reissued its list of the countries that require cooperation with or participation in an international boycott as a condition of doing business. The countries listed are Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the United Arab Emirates and the Republic of Yemen. The Treasury Department stated that Iraq was not included in the list but that its future status remained under review. The list is dated 19th January 2011 and was published in the Federal Register on 28th January 2011. The new list is unchanged from the list issued on 23rd November 2010.

(vii)    IRS issues updated Publication 514 — Foreign Tax Credit for Individuals

The US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has released the 2011 revision of Publication 514 (Foreign Tax Credit for Individuals). The Publication is dated 27th January 2011 and is intended for use in preparing 2010 tax returns.

(viii)    IRS announces 2011 offshore voluntary disclosure initiative

The US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has announced a second special voluntary disclosure initiative designed to bring offshore money back into the US tax system and help people with undisclosed income from hidden offshore accounts get current with their taxes (News Release IR-2011-14). The new initiative, called the 2011 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Initiative (OVDI), is available through 31st August 2011.

Taxpayers participating in the 2011 OVDI must file all original and amended tax returns and pay back-taxes and interest for up to eight years as well as accuracy-related and/or delinquency penalties by the deadline.

The overall penalty structure for the 2011 OVDI is higher than the 2009 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program. As a result, taxpayers who did not come forward through the 2009 OVDP, which ended on 15th October 2009, will not be rewarded for procrastinating.
    
The 2011 OVDI imposes a 25% penalty on the amount in the foreign bank accounts in the year with the highest aggregate account balance between 2003 and 2010. Taxpayers in limited situations may be eligible for lower penalties of 5% or 12.5%.

A taxpayer can qualify for a 5% penalty if the taxpayer meets all the following cumulative conditions:

—  the taxpayer did not open the account;

— the taxpayer has exercised minimal and infrequent contact with the account;

— the taxpayer has not withdrawn more than USD 1,000 from the account in any year covered by the 2011 OVDI; and

— the taxpayer can establish that all applicable US taxes have been paid on funds deposited to the account.

The 5% penalty also applies to taxpayers who are foreign residents and who were unaware they were US citizens.

Taxpayers whose offshore accounts or assets did not exceed USD 75,000 in any calendar year covered by the 2011 OVDI can qualify for a 12.5% penalty.

According the IRS News Release, taxpayers hiding assets offshore who do not come forward will risk far higher penalties as well as the possibility of criminal prosecution.

The IRS has also launched a new section on its website (www.IRS.gov) that contains the full terms and conditions of the 2011 OVDI, including:

— an extensive set of Q&A’s for frequently asked questions and answers;

— the procedures for a voluntary disclosure, including contact points and mailing addresses; and

— a list of documents, worksheets, and forms needed to participate in the 2011 OVDI.

The IRS website also includes information on the 2009 OVDP.

(ix)    IRS issues updated Publication 513 — Tax information for visitors to US

The US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has released the 2011 revision of Publication 513 (Tax Information for Visitors to the United States). The publication is dated 23rd February 2011 and is intended for use in preparing 2010 tax returns.

(x)    IRS issues updated Publication 515 — Withholding of Tax on Non-resident Aliens and Foreign Entities

The US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has released the 2011 revision of Publication 515 (Withholding of Tax on Non-resident Aliens and Foreign Entities). The publication is dated 11th March 2011 and is intended for use in 2011.

Publication 515 provides guidance for withholding agents who pay income to foreign persons, including non-resident aliens, foreign corporations, foreign partnerships, foreign trusts, foreign estates, foreign governments and international organisations.

(xi)    IRS announces availability of IRS Free File for US taxpayers abroad

The US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has announced that US taxpayers abroad can now use IRS Free File to prepare their US tax returns and then e-file them free of charge (News Release IR-2011-30). Free File will be available until 17th October 2011 in order to accommodate overseas taxpayers who file on or before the regular deadline of 15th June 2011 as well as taxpayers who claim the six-month extension.

(xii)    IRS releases frequently asked questions on reporting uncertain tax positions

The US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has issued seven frequently asked questions (FAQs) regarding the requirement to report uncertain tax positions (UTPs) on IRS Schedule UTP. The FAQs are intended to supplement the information contained in the 2010 instructions and in the other guidance issued on Schedule UTP.

The IRS noted that additional FAQs on Schedule UTP may be forthcoming.

(xiii)    US Treasury issues final regulations on reporting foreign financial accounts

The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) of the US Department of the Treasury has issued final regulations amending the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) regulations regarding reports of foreign financial accounts. Under the BSA regulations, a US person having a financial interest in or signature or other authority over financial accounts in a foreign country is required to report such accounts by filing Form TD-F 90-22.1, Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR), and to maintain the records of the accounts for five years. No report is required if the aggregate value of the accounts does not exceed USD 10,000.

(xiv)    US individuals sentenced for hiding assets offshore

The US Department of Justice (DOJ) and the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) announced that US Federal District Court judges sentenced US individuals to three years probation for hiding assets in offshore bank accounts (DOJ Press Releases dated 4th March 2011 and 14th March 2011).

(3)    Indonesia

(i)    Introduction of transfer pricing regulations The Director General of Taxation (DGT) has introduced transfer pricing (TP) regulations for Indonesian taxpayers, via Regulation No. PER-43/PJ/2010 which took effect on 6th September 2010. The Regulations are based significantly on the OECD’s TP Guidelines, and its main contents are summarised below.

Scope

The Regulations apply to transactions between related parties which have an impact on the reporting of income or expenses for corporate tax purposes, including:

— the sale, transfer, purchase or acquisition of tangible goods and/or intangible goods;

— payments of rental fees, royalties, or other payments for the provision of or use of both tangible and intangible property;

— income received or costs incurred for the provi-sion of or utilisation of services;

—  cost allocations; and

— the transfer or acquisition of property in the form of a financial instrument, as well as income or costs from the transfer or acquisition of the financial instrument.

The Regulations also endorse the five OECD TP methods, and specifically state that the hierarchy is as follows:

— comparable uncontrolled price (CUP) method;

—  resale price method (RPM);

—  cost plus method (CPM);

—  profit split method (PSM); and

—  transactional net margin method (TNMM).

(ii)    Guidelines for implementing CFC rule

The Tax Office issued Regulation PER-59/PJ/2010 on 30th December 2010, which provides further guidance on the implementation of the controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rule. The CFC rule applies to all Indonesian investment in all foreign countries, except where the foreign company’s shares are listed on a recognised stock exchange.

The salient points of the Regulation are summarised below:

— qualifying shareholders are deemed to receive dividends from the CFC;

— in the fourth month after the annual corporate income tax return deadline, or

— seven months from the end of the financial year, where (i) the company is not obliged to file a tax return or (ii) where the tax filing deadline is not stipulated;

— the deemed dividends are calculated based on the shareholding percentage and the CFC’s after-tax profits;

— the dividends must be reported by the shareholders in the annual corporate income tax returns together with the CFC’s financial statements;

— the CFC rule does not apply if the CFC has distributed dividends to the qualifying shareholders consistently with the prescribed formula and before the above-mentioned deadline;

— dividends received in excess of the deemed dividends must be reported in the shareholders’ corporate income tax returns in the year the dividends are distributed; and

— a foreign tax credit is available on foreign tax paid or withheld on the dividend.

Acknowledgement
We have compiled the above information from the Tax News Service of the IBFD for the months of October, 2010 to March, 2011.

Consulting engineers included in the list of service taxpayers on receipt basis.

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Notification No. 41/2011-ST, dated 27th June, 2011 has been issued amending the Point of Taxation Rules, 2011 to include the taxable service provided by consulting engineers into the category of services in respect whereof tax payment will continue to be on cash basis.
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Implementation of service tax levy on transportation of goods by rail deferred once again — Notification No. 38/2011, 39/2011 and 40/2011-Service Tax, all dated 14-6-2011.

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The Central Government has issued the above three Notifications to further defer the levy of service tax on transportation of goods by rail to January, 2012 by amending the earlier Notification Nos. 7/2010, 8/2010 & 9/2010-Service Tax, all dated 27th February, 2010. However, even after the levy becomes effective rail transportation of defence and military equipments, postal mail bags, luggage of train passengers, food grains, pulses, petroleum products for the public distribution system, organic and chemical manure, motor vehicles, etc. would be exempted from levy. Further 70% abatement norms too would now come into force from 1st January, 2012.
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‘Consumables’ vis-à-vis taxable Works Contracts

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Introduction After works contract transactions were brought under sales tax laws by deeming fiction inserted by clause (29A) in Article 366 of the Constitution of India, the controversy has still continued about the nature of taxable works contract. The transaction becomes taxable works contract transaction, if there is transfer of property in goods, in the execution of works contract, from the contractor to the contractee. The issues are not very much debatable if the transfer of property in goods is apparent. Like, a building contractor may use cement and other building material for construction of a building for which a contract is awarded to him by the contractee. In this case, there is no debate as there is transfer of property in cement and other building material from the contractor to the contractee. It is very apparent and hence it becomes a taxable works contract. The issue arises when the fact towards transfer of property is not apparent and it has to be ascertained on peculiar facts of the case.

Nature of charges allowable as deduction for deciding taxable value of the contract The works contract, being a composite contract, the labour portion also referred to as ‘Service Component’, is required to be deducted from the total value of the contract to arrive at value of the goods transferred. The tax is leviable on such reduced portion. In Gannon Dunkerley & Co. v. State of Rajasthan, (88 STC 204), the Supreme Court, for deciding the value of goods involved in the execution of works contract on which sales tax can be levied, laid down as under:

“The value of the goods involved in the execution of a works contract will, therefore, have to be determined by taking into account the value of the entire works contract and deducting therefrom the charges towards labour and services which would cover:

(a) labour charges for execution of the works;
(b) amount paid to a sub-contractor for labour and services;
(c) charges for planning, designing and architect’s fees;
(d) charges for obtaining on hire or otherwise machinery and tools used for the execution of the works contract;
(e) cost of consumables such as water, electricity, fuel, etc., used in the execution of the works contract the property in which is not transferred in the course of execution of a works contract;
(f) cost of establishment of the contractor to the extent it is relatable to supply of labour and services;
(g) other similar expenses relatable to supply of labour and services; and
(h) profit earned by the contractor to the extent it is relatable to supply of labour and services.

The amounts deductible under these heads will have to be determined in the light of the facts of a particular case, on the basis of the material produced by the contractor.”

One of the items deductible from the contract value is value of consumables. Therefore, if the goods used are proved to be consumable items, then it will be allowed as deduction and if that is the only material used (which is allowed as consumables), then there will not be any transfer of property from contractor to contractee and the whole transaction will be out of scope of taxable works contract under sales tax laws. The issue is about meaning to be assigned to ‘consumables’.

Meaning of consumables Recently, the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court had an occasion to decide the above issue. The reference is to the judgment in case of M/s. Enviro Chemicals v. State of Kerala, (39 VST 434).

In this case, the dealer had used his chemicals for treatment of effluent water coming out of the factory of the contractee, who had awarded this contract to him. The process of treatment is narrated in the judgment as under:

“From the collection tank, the wastewater is pumped at a uniform rate to the flash mixer and subjected to chemical treatment. The chemical is a combination of ferrous sulphate, ferrous chloride and sulphuric acid. These chemicals are obtained by the petitioner from effluents discharge from Travancore Titanium Products. An addition of required dosage of lime is also added. The chemical mixture is named by the assessee as Envirofloc. Due to this, coagulation of the suspended particles and precipitation of dissolved organics take place. The solid particles settle at the bottom and the clear liquid overflows. The overflow from the Clariflocculator is taken to the aeration tank and subjected to activated sludge process. Oxygen is supplied by means of surface aerators.

The overflow from the aeration tank is sent to the hopper bottom settling tank. The outlet of the secondary settling tank is the treated effluent which is discharged to the river and it will be odourless. It will not contain chemicals or any pollutant.”

Considering that no property in the chemicals used is passed to the contractee, the plea of the appellant dealer was that there is no taxable works contract. It was argued that the chemicals used get consumed in the process and hence there is no transfer of property to the contractee so as to constitute taxable works contract under sales tax laws. As there were differing judgments, the issue was referred to the Larger Bench. The Larger Bench has decided the issue by majority.

The Larger Bench has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Xerox Modicorp Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (142 STC 209). In relation to ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the above judgment, the High Court has observed as under:

“13. After having considered the entire case law cited before us and on a conspectus of the provisions, we would think that the learned Special Government Pleader is right in his contention based on the decision of the Apex Court in Xerox Modicorp Ltd.’s case 142 STC 209. It is no doubt true that the contract as such is not placed before us, if it is one which is reduced to writing. But we will proceed on the basis that the process involved is substantially the same as has been indicated by the assessee and which we have extracted. It is undoubtedly true that even after the 46th amendment, sales tax cannot be levied merely because there is a works contract. There must be transfer of property in the form of goods or otherwise than in the form of goods. What is taxable is the transfer of property in goods (See the definition of sale in the Act in this regard). It does not matter whether the transfer of property takes place in the form of goods or in any other form. It is undoubtedly also true that in view of the decision of the Apex Court in M/s. Gannon Dunkerley & Co. and Others v. State of Rajasthan and Others, [1993 (1) SCC 364] that the cost of consumables involved in works contract cannot be taxed.

14.    That the chemical in question is goods, is beyond doubt. It cannot be disputed that the assessee was the owner of the goods in question, namely, the chemical. It is obviously the intention of the parties that the assessee must use the chemical in the effluent treatment process. It is equally indisputable that the assessee has actually used it. No doubt, in the judgment of the Apex Court in Xerox Modicorp Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, [(2005) 142 STC 209], the Apex Court found that the toners and developers are liquids put into the xerox machine and they perform essentially the same function as ink in the printers and the Court also relied on the provision in the contract that the assessees in the said case would charge for the unaccounted stock at prevailing prices. By using the chemical, the petitioner/assessee rendered the effluent compliant with the standards. It could probably be said that in the case of the toner and developers as the function is that of ink in printers, it shows up in the final product of the xerox machines. But, the decision of the Apex Court is not based on there being any requirement that the items which are used should exist in any form in the resultant product, which is the principle laid down by this Court in Teaktex Processing Complex Limited v. State of Kerala, [(2004) 136 STC 435] and also in Microtrol Sterilisation Services Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Kerala, [(2009) 26 VST 213 (Ker.)].”

After referring to the above ratio, in relation to the facts of the dealer in this case, the High Court has observed as under:

“16. When the assessee has used it, will it remain the owner of the chemical any longer? Will not the property in the goods pass to the awarder? We would think that the moment the assessee pours the chemicals into the effluent, he will cease to be the owner and at that point of time the awarder must be deemed to have taken delivery of the same. In our view the fact that upon it being poured into the effluent, it loses its identity and that it is consumed will not detract from the fact that there is delivery of the same to the awarder. The assessee does not have a case that the effluent belongs to the assessee. We do not think that it can be their case that the effluent does not belong to the awarder. Let us pose a question, if a complaint by a third party is raised about the treated effluent, can the awarder absolve itself of the ownership of the same? We would think, it may not be possible. Therefore we would be justified in holding that the effluent and the treated effluent both belonged to the awarder. It is, therefore, into the property of the awarder, namely, the effluent that the assessee supplies the chemical. The Apex Court in its decision in Gannon Dunkerley & Co. v. State of Rajasthan & Others, [(1993) 1 SCC 364] had, inter alia, held that cost of consumables, such as water, electricity, fuel, etc. used in the execution of the works contract, the property in which is not transferred in the course of execution of a works contract, is to be deducted. In section 5C also, the words “not involving any transfer of property in goods” have been incorporated. Just like the toner and developer having been put into xerox machine becoming the property of the customer in the case before the Apex Court in Xerox Modicorp Ltd. case and the sale taking place before the goods are consumed, in the same way, the property in the chemical passed to the awarder the moment they are put into the effluent by the assessee and its subsequent consumption is the consumption after sale and it does not detract from the factum of sale and consequently the exigibility to tax becomes unquestionable.”

Conclusion
The above judgment throws new dimension to the concept of consumables. It appears that if the goods used are consumed without involving into the actual execution, then it will be deductible as consumable. Like, fuel, which is used for running the machinery with which contract may be executed. The fuel is not getting directly involved in the works contract. However, if the goods used directly take part in the contract and which directly or indirectly interact with the materials of the party, then even if they ultimately get consumed, it will be consumable for the contractee, but for the contractor it may amount to transfer of property to the contractee, whereby he will be considered as liable to works contract. It may however be noted that the dissenting Judge has accepted the argument of the dealer that since there is no transfer of property to contractee, there is no taxable works contract. However by majority the transaction is held as taxable. The judgment will have a very substantial impact in the matter of interpretation of nature of taxable works contract.

(2011) 38 VST 392 (Gauhati) Bharat Press v. State of Assam and Others

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VAT-TDS — Exemption — Clarification by Commissioner prevails unless set aside by appropriate authority or Court of Law — Sections 9 and 105 of Assam Value Added Tax Act, 2003.

Facts :
The dealer filed writ petition before the Gauhati High Court against the order passed by the Deputy Secretary to the Government of Assam, Election Department denying exemption to the dealer from paying VAT on printing of compendium, handbook, manuals, etc. in connection with general elections to Lok Sabha, 2009. The dealer had done printing works and supplied it to the Government of Assam and submitted bills without charging tax, being exempt from payment of tax under Schedule Entry 5 of the First Schedule of the Assam VAT Act. Under the said Entry, no tax is payable on sale of ‘Books, Periodicals and Journals.’ The Govt. of Assam informed the dealer that the payment of bills to him will be subject to deduction of VAT. The dealer then sought clarification from the Commissioner of Sales Tax for rate of tax on items supplied, who on physical verification of samples, held that goods supplied by the petitioner to the Govt of Assam are books and exempt from payment of tax, being covered by Schedule Entry 5 of the First Schedule. Despite this the Deputy Secretary to the Government of Assam turned down the request of the petitioner for no deduction of tax from the payment of bills of the petitioner. The dealer filed writ petition before the Gauhati High Court. The High Court allowed the writ.

Held :
The Commissioner of Sales Tax in his order came to the conclusion that the materials supplied by the petitioner are bound books with cover as per Entry at serial No. 5 of the First Schedule, those are exempt from payment of VAT. When the taxing authority exercising his statutory power u/s.105 of the Act is of the opinion that the supplied materials are not taxable, then whoever may be the authority higher in position is not entitled to set at naught the said order, unless the same is quashed by the appropriate Appellate Authority or by a Court of law. The High Court allowed the writ petition.

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Bell Ceramics Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Transaction-3) Bangalore, (2011) 38 VST 388 (Kar.).

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Inter-State sale — Claim of sale against Form C — Cancellation of registration from 1-7-2002 — Rejection of claim not valid for sale subsequent to the date of cancellation where the assessee had no knowledge of it — Section 8 of the CST Act, 1956.

Facts :
The dealer claimed inter-State sale of goods taxable at concessional rate of 4% against form C during the period of assessment for the year 2002-2003. The registration of the purchasing dealer was cancelled from 1-7-2002, therefore, the Department disallowed the inter-State sales against form C effected after 1-7-2002 i.e. after the date of cancellation of registration certificate of the purchasing dealer. In appeal filed before the Tribunal, the disallowance of such claim was confirmed. The dealer filed revision petition before the High Court. The High Court held in favour of the dealer.

Held :
When the purchasing dealer had issued C form for the subsequent period after the date of cancellation of registration and the selling dealer had claimed concessional rate of tax without knowledge as to whether the purchasing dealer has ceased to exist from July 1, 2002, then it cannot be held that the C forms issued by the purchasing dealer are invalid.

It is not for the assessee to actually find out as the registered dealer was in existence as on the date, when the sales were effected when in fact, the registered dealer who is the purchaser has issued C forms to the assessee.

If at all there has been any violation committed by the purchaser, the selling dealer cannot be found fault with, since it was the duty of the purchaser to have informed the petitioner about its ceasing to be in existence and thereby not issuing C forms. The High Court allowed the petition accordingly in favour of the dealer.

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(2011) 38 VST 336 (All) CTT v. Advance Spectra Tec (P) Ltd.

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Works contract — Receipt of goods dispatched from branch outside the State and used in works contract — Inter-state sale — Not liable to tax in the state where used in works contract — Section 3 of the CST Act 1956, section 3F(2)(b)(i) of UP Trade Tax Act, 1948.

Facts :
The dealer was a contractor registered in UP having its office outside the State of UP. For the purpose of execution of works contract in UP the dealer procured material within the State of UP as well as received material from its office outside the State of UP. The Department levied tax under UP Trade Tax Act on value of material received from its office outside the State of UP, which was successfully challenged before the Tribunal. The Tribunal held that the value of goods used in the execution of works contract received from a place outside the State of UP as stock transfer is exempt from payment of tax u/s.3F(2)(b)(i) of the UP Trade Tax Act, 1948. The Department filed revision appeal before the Allahabad High Court against the judgment of the Tribunal.

Held :

Under section 3F of the UP Act, every dealer is liable to pay tax on the net turnover of the transfer of goods involved in execution of works contract, but the amounts representing the sales value of the goods which are covered by sections 3, 4 and 5 of the CST Act, 1956 are deductible from the said turnover in determining the tax liability.

In Santosh and Company v. Commissioner of Trade Tax, (1999) UPTC 823, it was held that the value of the goods brought from outside UP and consumed in UP in works contract is deductible u/s.3F(2)(b) (i) of the UP Act. Following this judgment, the Court held that goods received by the dealer as stock transfer from his office situated outside UP and consumed for execution of pre-existing works contract amounts to sale or purchase of goods in the course of inter-State trade or commerce which is covered u/s.3 of the CST Act. The value of such goods is therefore liable to be deducted u/s.3(F)(2)(b)(i) of the UP Act from net turnover of the assessee. Accordingly the judgment of the Tribunal was confirmed.

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(2011) 38 VST 275 (Bom.) Deepmani v. State of Maharashtra

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Export or goods — Sale of goods to foreigngoing person — Not exempt — Section 5(1) of the CST Act.

Penalty without detailed reasons — Penalty not leviable — Section 9 of the CST Act read with section 36(2)(c) of the BST Act.

Facts :
The dealer claimed exemption from payment of tax on sale of goods to foreign-going person, where delivery of goods is given before the custom area, but payment is received in foreign currency, u/s.5(1) of the CST Act being sale of goods in the course of export, which was disallowed and confirmed by the Tribunal. The Bombay High Court, in reference application filed by the dealer u/s.61 of the BST Act, confirmed the order of the Tribunal.

Held :
The sale of goods is complete, the movement goods were segregated for sale and amount of sale consideration was paid in shop. The delivery of goods was to be given just before the custom area. Therefore, the sale was complete with the factum of delivery of goods. There was no compulsion on the purchaser to export it. Absence of export was not to nullify the transaction of sale.

In order to claim sale of goods as exempt being sale in the course of export, the crucial fact is the sending of goods to a foreign destination where they would be received as imports. In absence of proof of export of goods and no material to prove that it was impossible to divert goods, the claim of export was held as properly disallowed by the Tribunal.

As regards levy of penalty u/s.36(2)(c) of the BST Act for concealment of particulars of sale and purchases liable to tax, the High Court held that the Revenue has to establish that the assessee has knowingly furnished inaccurate particulars of any transaction as such liable to tax. The assessee has relied on interpretation of the provisions which involved complexity of principals of interpretation. The Court while deciding the first issue was required to go into the details of the constitutional provisions followed by various judgments of the Apex Court as well as of this Court. Therefore levy of penalty u/s.36(2)(c) of the BST Act retained by the Tribunal was not confirmed.

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Greek dangers

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If there were to be any reason for the government to arrest the policy drift of recent months, it should be the darkening international horizon. Late last week, the International Monetary Fund warned that risks to the global economy have increased.

The possibility of Greece debt crisis morphing into something more contagious cannot be ruled out. Japan is still struggling with spending cuts after the nuclear accident there. Look anywhere — US spending, China’s housing boom going awry and elsewhere — chances are that the global economy is on the edge again.

It makes much sense to set one’s own house in order. India needs to set many things right — from fuel pricing to inflation to deficit spending. It is, of course, in no way comparable with the Greek situation. And that is not the point. The issue is to be prepared to face uncertainty in the world economy and also any unforeseen external shocks.

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Rich getting richer: 120k Indians hold a third of national income.

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Last year may have been a cruel year for much of the country with slow growth and doubledigit food inflation, but India’s high net worth individuals (HNWIs) prospered — just over 1,20,000 in number or 0.01% of the population their combined worth is close to one-third of India’s Gross National Income.

HNWIs, in this context, are defined as those having investable assets of $ 1 million or more, excluding primary residence, collectibles, consumables, and consumer durables.

According to the 2009 Asia-Pacific Wealth Report, brought out by financial services firms Capgemini and Merrill Lynch Wealth Management, at the peak of the recession in 2008, India had 84,000 HNWIs with a combined net worth of $ 310 billion. To put that figure in perspective, it was just under a third of India’s market capitalisation, that is, the total value of all companies listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange — as of end-March 2008. The average worth of each HNWI was Rs.16.6 crore.

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Double dip ahead

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The real estate market in India is heading for what looks like a double dip. After correcting somewhat from the sharp setback suffered in 2008, with some sectors managing to exceed previous peak prices in 2010, the sector entered 2011 with cautious optimism. But halfway through the year, the outlook has turned distinctly sombre. The current economic deceleration is pouring cold water on demand for office space, always driven by the overall economic climate. The retail segment has yet to absorb the excess supply that has characterised it since the last slowdown. But it is the bread and butter affordable-to-middle volume part of the residential segment that has suffered a clear setback with successive policy rate increases raising interest rates and equated monthly instalments (EMIs) and the promise of more to come. Banks, which had already turned cautious about lending to developers on receiving the signal from the banking regulator, are likely to become even more careful. Private equity, the only hope for cash-strapped developers facing sluggish demand, is unlikely to throw out a lifeline, since they do not relish being locked into a medium-term plateau if not trough.

It’s ironic that there is an astronomical unmet demand for livable urban space among all except the very rich, and it is a colossal failure of both the government and developers that an enormous business opportunity, which can make everyone better off, is not being created out of it. Despite the abolition of the Urban Land Ceiling Act in most parts of the country, there is no perceptible increase in urban land supply which can make possible large additions to affordable housing. This is because urban planning is not promoting mixed development sufficiently, nor is urban infrastructure being built keeping in mind transportation links between new residential areas and job centres. Even under these circumstances, the middle class would pay through the nose for a place to live in the hope of capital gains over time. But there are dampeners galore. Not satisfied with raising EMIs, banks are turning more cautious in the face of regulatory exhortations to be mindful of rising non-performing asset levels. Plus, there is a mountain of anecdotal evidence of how buyers are short-changed by developers.

A Bill to codify customer rights and offer recourse through the creation of a regulator has been hanging fire for a decade. Developers are opposing it tooth and nail and political leaders are in no hurry to upset them. Developers have a point when they say that the need to secure multiple sanctions delays projects and adds to costs. But the existing crop of developers has got into the business with its eyes open. It is popularly believed that they are both repositories and launderers of politicians’ black money. Thus, entrenched corruption at the grass roots (those who process the multiple sanctions required) and protection from top are blocking change and reform. With the central government appearing paralysed by fear of decisive action on such issues, it can only be hoped that some of the more confident and politically secure chief ministers will take the initiative for policy reform.

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PM-in-hiding

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Twenty years ago, Manmohan Singh was a man with a mission. After his first Budget as finance minister, he barged into a post-Budget press conference called by his officials, to personally explain what he was doing. He gave lengthy interviews; he spoke from virtually every available platform, to get across the need for change. Later, when Narasimha Rao announced a series of Independence Day handouts, Dr. Singh gave an interview to say that the country could not spend its way to prosperity (Sonia Gandhi, please note). And towards the end of the Rao government’s tenure, when the atmosphere became thick with deal-making, he spoke out courageously against crony capitalism.

The contrast with today could not be more striking, as the country seems to have a prime minister-inhiding. You see him seated at meetings, looking a trifle lost, or mouthing homilies at government functions (the MAFA syndrome — mistaking articulation for action). Other than that, he is both invisible and silent. This is no way to lead.

If his government is paralysed by inaction, and tarred comprehensively with the corruption brush, it is because Dr. Singh has not been true to his instincts, and too timid as the head of the government. Dayanidhi Maran as a stripling minister wrote to him in 2006, complaining that spectrum pricing should be left to him, not handed over to a group of ministers. Dr. Singh meekly acquiesced. Mani Shankar Aiyar wrote to him two years before the Commonwealth Games, i.e., before the bloated and wasteful spending began, to complain about Mr. Kalmadi’s budget-inflating habits. Yet Mr. Kalmadi was allowed to go his merry way till the damage was done.

When A. Raja cocked a snook at him, what was the response? Dr. Singh’s private secretary made the telltale request that the prime minister’s office be kept at arm’s length. In other words, he knew that skullduggery was going on, but wanted to turn a blind eye. On the spectrum scandal, he himself has explained that once two of his ministerial colleagues were in agreement, he did not think he could intervene! And now it transpires that a former secretary in the finance ministry (E. A. S. Sarma) wrote repeatedly to the prime minister, over two years, warning him of undue favours being done to private gas concessionaires like Reliance and Cairn, at the cost of the exchequer. He never got even a routine acknowledgement. Was Dr. Singh too scared to ask Murli Deora?

So the prime minister cannot say that he did not know. In every case, he was informed, and he chose to do nothing. This is not because he was corrupt; even his worst critics will not say that. Perhaps he felt there was no choice in a coalition other than to turn a blind eye to some goings-on (he once said something like “I am not in the business of losing my government’s majority”). But if an honest and public-spirited man allows scamsters around him to flourish, the stage comes when personal honesty is no longer a valid defence. And belated action under public and court pressure provides no absolution.

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Stop appointing retired officials as Regulators — Recommendation part of Moily’s 10-point agenda to curb corruption

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Law Minister M. Veerappa Moily wants the government to stop the practice of appointing retired bureaucrats as regulators. The proposal is part of a 10-point agenda prepared by him to improve governance and curb corruption.

The agenda has been discussed with the advisor to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on public information, infrastructure and innovations, Sam Pitroda, and Planning Commission member Arun Maira and has been submitted to the Prime Minister.

Moily, who was also Chairman of the second Administrative Reforms Commission, has pointed out that in view of the experience of the existing statutory regulators with retired officers and judges, the job of regulators should be restricted to serving officers and judges in order to improve accountability.

He has stressed this would need to be supplemented through a carefully planned capacitybuilding exercise at periodic intervals, which will bring in domain expertise and enthusiasm in the regulatory system, which is currently lacking. Other recommendations in the 10-point agenda includes a legislation on the lines of US False Claims Act, providing for citizens and civil society groups to seek legal relief in the cases of fraudulent claims against the government.

The proposed law would allow any citizen to bring a suit against any person or agency for a false claim against the government. If the false claim is established in a court of law, the person or agency responsible will be liable for penalty equal to five times the loss sustained by the exchequer or society.

Bringing in the Right to Service, various steps for improving urban land management, measures for improving administration in areas dominated by Naxals and tribals, a performance-related tenure of the government functionaries for making them more accountable, codification of guiding principles in a Civil Service Law, suggestions on functioning of Lok Pal and Lokayukta and unity of command and enforcement and accountability are also included in the 10-point agenda.

For ensuring integrity in appointment to public offices, Moily has suggested that charge-sheeted persons should not be considered for appointment. “This principle should be made applicable for persons contesting elections, also.”

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Managing the Mudrochs — Media markets must remain competitive and open

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The latest controversy in the British media, triggered by unethical professional practices by journalists at Rupert Murdoch’s News of the World, holds important lessons for the Indian media, and not just because Mr. Murdoch has a significant presence in India and seeks more. The most important lesson is that public policy must prevent the emergence of all powerful media moguls like Mr. Murdoch. The extent of concentration in the Indian media, at both the national and regional level, has grown alarmingly. Regrettably, such growth in size and revenue has not always contributed to good journalism, as we now see in Britain, and as is obvious in India. Unlike in many other branches of business, in media there is no evidence that with size of business and operation comes either quality or reliability.

The dominance of one business group in one segment of the media is dangerous, so is the increasing control of such dominant players across different segments of the media, namely, print, television and radio. While the Government has not come forward with the promised broadcast Bill yet, the new FM radio policy has shied away from more stringent curbs on cross-media ownership. The ‘play safe’ policy of auctioning licences to the highest bidder has been preferred obviously because of the controversy surrounding telecom licences, but there is a downside to ‘transparent auctioning’ in the media business. It can privilege the powerful. Companies with deep pockets end up pocketing licences in the name of so-called transparency. A more confident government would have laid down other criteria too, including restricting cross-media ownership.

The sharp practices by Mr. Murdoch’s men and women in Britain draw attention to the hubris of a media intoxicated by power, made worse by the direct control that owners often exercise over editorial content. The consequent blurring of lines between the business bottom line and the editorial line is an assault on the idea of media as the ‘fourth estate’ in a democracy. The Indian media has its Murdochs in every language publication and news channel. While the dominance of one or two media groups in each state and language market has not come in the way of a thousand flowers blooming, it has forced a large number of smaller players to become pawns in the hands of other business persons with deep pockets.

The Niira Radia tapes controversy in India drew attention to some of the unsavoury aspects of a nexus involving professional journalists, owners, politicians and business persons. This is only the tip of the iceberg. In various Indian states, the situation is worse with many Indian language media groups. The number of powerful politicians and business persons owning and openly controlling as well as manipulating the media is on the increase. The controversy surrounding former Union Minister Dayanidhi Maran is an example of the media baron-politician-business person nexus. The Murdoch murk in Britain is a reminder of what could happen in India in the absence of regulation, rules of the game and codes of conduct aimed at preventing such unfair professional and business practices.

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Will the SIT on black money solve the problem?

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It is fundamental indeed that the Constitution empowers the Supreme Court to make orders necessary to ensure that public interest is served. The Parliament and State Legislatures are given powers to make laws and courts are constituted to enforce them. There is no possibility of a conflict of interest or of the jurisdiction of Court and Legislatures if they keep their functions strictly within the limits prescribed by the Constitution or the laws made under it.

Why, then, is there discord or murmur when courts issue orders commanding the authorities to enforce laws and in cases in which such authorities, particularly executive authorities, fail to act in national and public interest? It will not be correct to say that in making such orders Courts encroach on the jurisdiction of either the Legislature or the executive authorities who are empowered to act for enforcing such provisions.

No one can say depositing money and transactions and deposits in a foreign bank in violation of laws should be ignored and such violators allowed to go free without being punished and that it will not affect national security and public interest. Against this background, let us appreciate the value of the appointment of the Special Investigation Team (SIT) by the Supreme Court to ensure that laws are implemented and black money is brought under proper action.

The point that the appointment of an SIT is innovative is uncalled for and misconceived. The Court has appointed an SIT, for example, to investigate the Gujarat riot cases. This is the first time, however, that the Court has appointed an SIT in a case associated with finance and black money. This has been done in the interest of the State and public interest. When the authorities concerned have failed to act, setting up an SIT is a noble cause and a step that urgently needed to be taken. Arguments that there are agencies assigned for such work and the Court should have exercised discretion to direct any such authority to take steps instead of appointing an SIT are also uncalled for. The Bench of Judges that has passed this order was also conscious of this fact. The SIT is constituted by taking officers from all such relevant agencies. Since any such agencies have limited powers, one or the other agency alone may not be able to locate and find black money, fix responsibility for violations and prosecute.

No one should feel hurt if a Court asks authorities to act in the interest of the State and public interest. After all, the Court has issued such orders only when others designated to act failed to do so. Such orders are a welcome relief in the prevailing situation.

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Returns Procesed by CPC – clarifications from CPC to representation by BCAS

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Dear Members,

Considering the problems pointed out by you in relation to intimations received from the Centralised Processing Centre (CPC), Bangalore, the Taxation Committee of the Society had taken up the various issues for discussion with them, and some of the members had visited Bangalore to discuss the various issues with the CPC at their invitation. We are happy to inform you that the Commissioner of Income Tax, CPC, Bangalore not only gave a patient hearing to the representatives of the Society, but also shared various other aspects of functioning of the CPC and difficulties being faced by the CPC due to its limited mandate. Some of the points that he made would facilitate improved e filing of tax returns by members.

We enclose a copy of the representation made to CPC, their responses to the issues raised, minutes of the meeting with the CIT, CPC, and a copy of instructions given to Assessing Officers by the CPC with regard to uploading of outstanding demands.

We hope you will find these useful while e filing the returns of income, and while making online applications for rectification.

We intend to take up some of these issues further with the appropriate authorities, in view of the clarifications received.

Note : We publish herewith the responses of the CPC. The other documents are available on the web site of BCAS

Returns Procesed by CPC – clarifications from CPC to representation by BCAS Pradip Thanawala President Gautam Nayak Chairman Taxation C0mmittee

Representation of Bombay Chartered Accountants Society To CPC on problem faced by the taxpayers and responses of CPC

1. TDS and Advance tax/ Self-assessment tax credit:

Issue by Bombay Chartered Accountants (BCA)

In many cases, the assessees have been granted short/ no credit for TDS, advance Tax or/and self assessment tax as compared to what has been claimed in the Return of Income filed by them.

Response by CPC Centralised Processing Centre (CPC)

The credit for OLTAS payments are considered to extent claimed in the return and available in 26AS as on the date of processing is allowed subject the details of payments in the return being correct. We have noticed tax payment (Advance Tax, SAT) mismatch due to following mistakes:

1. Date of credit is entered in MM/DD/YYYY or YYYY/ MM/DD format where it is required in DD/MM/ YYYY format in the return.

2. The amount paid is rounded off to nearest 10, where the amount should be exact. Many people pay-7,899 to Bank and claim 7,900 or 7,890 which is not allowed. Amount should correct.

3. BSR codes are quoted incorrectly.

4. Date of deposit of cheque is mentioned while date of credit is required.

BCA: Also, in certain cases, the credit for taxes paid as per Form 26AS have also not been granted. Thus, there is no clarity amongst tax payers as to on what basis credit is granted by the CPC for tax payments

CPC: The difference when there is payments shown in 26AS but not considered in processing is mainly due to incorrect entry of points mentioned in 1(i) above. Many times it is noticed that payments claimed are made in respect of incorrect PANs, for different assessment year, for different purpose (people make payment under minor code 400 (tax on regular assessment) even before an intimation or assessment is made. Actually they are paying SAT(Minor code -300). Considering the magnitude of mismatch pertaining to Minor Code 300 and 400, changes are being made to take into consideration credits available in either minor codes. Rectifications may be filed and credit would be given to SAT wrongly paid as Regular tax (minor head 400)

BCA: Further, in certain cases, credit has been given as per Form 26AS. However, the TDS credit claimed by the assessee based on the original certificates available with him/her is greater than that seen in Form 26AS, which might be due to the errors/ non-filing of the TDS return on part of the deductor. In such cases, the only way that remains for claiming the TDS credit is to produce the original TDS certificates for the said amount to the relevant Authority. However, there is lack of clarity regarding the location (regional jurisdiction or CPC – Bangalore) where the said certificates need to be produced.

CPC:
AO can pass further rectification based on the verification of TDS certificates. CPC has processed cases only where TDS credit is covered by TDS guidelines.

BCA: There could be a difference in the year of deduction of TDS, and the year in which credit for TDS is to be granted. This could arise in the case of advances received, where TDS is deducted at the time of receipt, but credit is available in the year in which the income is offered to tax. This could also arise in a situation where the Deductor is following the mercantile system of accounting and the recipient is following the cash method of accounting, or vice versa. In such cases, the tax credit for the said period as per Form 26AS becomes irrelevant. Thus, in such a case, it becomes necessary for the department to understand the manner in which the income is offered to tax and the TDS credit to be given. However, once again, the problem persists as to where the rectification/explanation needs to be given – to the jurisdictional Assessing Officer or to the CPC.

CPC: AO can pass further rectification based on the verification of TDS certificates. CPC has processed cases only where TDS credit is covered by TDS guidelines.

BCA: Consequent to the above, there is incorrect calculation of interest u/s 234A/ 234B/ 234C/ 244A.

CPC: Consequential but once rectification is completed the computations are set right.

2. Adjustment of incorrect demands of earlier years:

In certain cases, certain erroneous demands for the previous years have been incorrectly adjusted against the refund for the year for which intimation is issued. Following are the issues relating to the same:

Arrear demand adjustment will continue to happen as per update uploaded by AO. Assessee will be able to get his refund from the AO who had uploaded the arrear. Eg. For a record of A.Y. 2009-10 where refund arose, if there is a arrear for A.Y. 2003-04, the amount of arrear has been paid by the refund of A.Y. 2009-10, so the assessee can get his refund for A.Y. 2003-04 once the demand if any is nullified by rectification which has to be done by the AO since A.Y. 2003-04 records are available with AO.

BCA: The main reason for such incorrect adjustment seems to be that the demands have been uploaded by Assessing Officers as per their records without proper verification as to the correctness of the outstanding demand. It is essential that all such demands uploaded in the system be reversed, and demands be uploaded only after verification by the Assessing Officer and certification of correctness of demand by the Additional Commissioner. In case of demands raised in the future, they should be uploaded after certification by the Commissioner that there are no pending rectification applications/appellate effects to be given in respect of such demands.

CPC: All arrear demands are adjusted based on data uploaded by respective Assessing Officers. Sufficient training has been given to them to make sure only correct data is uploaded. We are continuously training them appropriately.

BCA:
No advance intimation is given to the assessee before making the adjustment as required by section 245. Such adjustment is therefore not in accordance with law. It is therefore suggested that an e-mail be sent to the assessee before such adjustment, giving him an opportunity as required by the section. In case the assessee points out that there is a pending rectification application/appellate effect to be given with proof in support thereof or that he has not received the relevant notice of demand so far, then no adjustment should be made, and the matter should be taken up by the CPC with the concerned CIT.

CPC: The AO has been given clear instructions to completely verify and authenticate the arrear demand before upload. As a part of this process the AO is expected to contact the taxpayer and confirm the arrear position. Only subsequent to this the arrear demand is uploaded by AO to CPC. Therefore, CPC (having concurrent jurisdiction over the taxpayer along with AO) intimates the taxpayer about the arrear demand adjustment. AOs will be instructed to clarify to the taxpayer that arrear demand (communicated by AO to taxpayer shall be treated as intimation u/s. 245 and CPC (having concurrent jurisdiction) shall adjust this demand against any refund due.


BCA:
In some cases, the assessee has not received any intimation/notice of demand raising the above-mentioned demand. As a result of this, the manner in which the amount of demand is computed is not known to the assessee. Also, the assessee does not have access to the database of the income – tax showing the said demand. Thereby the assessee has to go through hardships of establishing the reasons/ records for the aforesaid erroneous demand.

CPC:
The intimation in all the cases is sent by email, in case of failure due to bouncing of email, the intimation is sent by speed post. In all cases of demand the intimation along with demand notice is sent by email and paper intimation through speed post. It is important that all assessee fill up the email correctly, so that these intimations are received.

BCA: In certain cases, intimation/order for the year in which the demand is raised has been received by the assessee. In most cases, the demands have arisen on account of non granting of credit for TDS, Advance Tax and/or Self Assessment Tax. In most cases, the assessee would have already filed a rectification application against the said incorrect demand. It appears that the various Assessing Officers have, without considering these pending rectification applications, uploaded these erroneous demands onto the Income Tax Database.

CPC: Answered as above.

BCA: In some cases, intimation for the year in which the demand is raised has been received by the assessee. Subsequent to this, the case is taken up for scrutiny and an order under section 143(3) has been passed which shows a ‘Nil’ demand. However, the department has not made the required changes in the data base and accordingly an incorrect demand appears which is wrongly adjusted.

CPC: Same as above. It is the AO’s responsibility to upload only ‘correct’ arrears. In fact AO’s have been clearly instructed not to upload any demand that is stayed or covered by instalments.

BCA: Further, the delay in attending to rectifications of up to 6 months results in incorrect demands being adjusted.

CPC: Online rectification is much faster to process than request received through mail. Rectifications are being expedited

3.    Wrong adjustments while computing income:

BCA: In cases where the assessee has business income and income from other sources, income from other sources is deducted from the Profit and Loss a/c and taken separately under the head ‘Income from Other Sources’ by the assessee. However, as per the intima-tion u/s 143(1), the said income is taxed twice as it is included in the Profit & Loss A/c as well as Income from Other Sources. Similar is the position as regards capital gains, which forms part of profits as per Profit & Loss Account, but which is treated as exempt income or is taxed under the head “Capital Gains”. Such capital gains is also taxed as profits and gains of business.

CPC: The assessee is expected to offer income from Part A P&L Profit before tax in schedule BP and in schedule BP he has to reduce the income offered for taxation under heads of income as provided Sl. 3. When this is not done, there will be taxation twice for all other heads of income which form part of Part A P&L. If depreciation schedules (DEP/DPM/ DOA) are not filled then depreciation is not allowed, depreciation claimed in P&L but not in schedule is not allowable, Depreciation claimed in P&L is supposed to be added back in Schedule BP and depreciation as per IT RULES must be taken into account. This is not done in many cases leading to addition of depreciation from P&L. In schedule BP profit before tax (PBT) should be taken but assessee took Profit after tax so income tax is added back to reach on PBT.

4    No column in ITR forms for set off of unabsorbed Depreciation of earlier years

It has been provided in schedule CFL, which is the place where Carried forward losses in the column: Unabsorbed Non Speculative are to be mentioned for adjustment in Schedule BFLA.

BCA: There is no distinction made between unabsorbed losses and unabsorbed depreciation in the CFL schedule in the ITR. Thus, the assessee faces a problem when he wants to claim only unabsorbed depreciation, which is not time bound.

CPC: Under e-filing, total of unabsorbed depreciation (beyond eight years) has been advised to be entered in the earliest year permissible in CFL schedule. This will allow system to compute adjustment correctly.

5    Wrong computation of interest u/s 234A/ 234B/ 234C/ 244A:

BCA: In some cases, there is incorrect computation of the interest u/s 234A/ 234B/ 234C/ 244A.

CPC: Needs to be looked at case by case.

6    Correspondence with the staff:

BCA: Since the CPC appears to be manned by a call centre, there is no option available to a tax payer in terms of corresponding with anyone in particular at the CPC office. The executive attending queries changes every time the assessee calls and thus a follow up for anything becomes impossible and tiresome as one has to explain the same case all over again. It is therefore suggested that a ticket number should be allotted for each complaint, and record of that complaint and follow up thereon be maintained by the call centre in its system, which will facilitate follow up by the assessee in subsequent calls.

CPC: Ticketing system is already in place and is used by the call center. A call center agent has access to data on all past interactions with the assessee.

BCA: Also, the call centre staff are not fully conversant with the intricacies of the tax returns, and therefore are able to answer only very basic queries. It is suggested that in case a taxpayer is unable to get his queries resolved by the call centre staff, he should be given the option of escalating the issue to a tax officer, who is aware of the intricacies of e-filed returns.

CPC: We have three levels of ticketing praticed by the Call Center.

  •     Level 1 – Consists of queries which are handled directly by the agents.

  •    Level 2 – Consists of queries which are handled by the respective process owners.

  •     Level 3 – Gets escalated to the income tax officer.

7    Special rates of tax:

BCA: In certain cases, where there is Long Term Capital Gain which is set-off against Long Term Capital Losses of earlier years and the Net Long Term Capital Gain becomes NIL, the software used by the CPC for processing the returns has still levied special rate tax on it, without considering the set-off.

CPC: This is due to incorrect entry of section codes in schedule SI. Use of wrong section codes is one of the main reason for income being increased.

8    Rectifications:

BCA: Online Rectifications are not carried out promptly, with time taken from three to sixmonths.

CPC: Initially there were problems in processing them quicker than three months. Now the process has stabilised and the processing is much faster. The delay is largely due to non receipt of Response sheet which has to be filed by taxpayer to complete rectification process in case of any change in bank account particulars. Many people are filing rectification in case of refund failure or due to change in bank details.

BCA: Very often, the rectified order is received without any corrections, except for additional interest being charged.

CPC: In case rectification is due to tax payments mis-match, then the taxpayer is required to file rectification after confirming the credit position and also should re verify the details provided in the return as there could be an issue with both. No additional interest is being charged.

BCA: Once a rectified intimation is received, there is no provision for further rectification of this intimation, as the system does not permit such further rectification applications. The system should be modified to permit such further rectification within the specified time limit permitted by law.

CPC: The multiple rectification facility will be available shortly.

Modifications to form for availability/change of name and increase in fees effective 24th July 2011.

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Vide notification dated 14th July 2011, the Ministry has made certain modifications to the Form 1A — Form for application for name of new company or change of name of existing company, if certified by a practising professional, it will be processed and examined electronically and the name will be approved online. The fees are now increased to Rs.1000.

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Name Availability Guidelines, 2011 effective 24 July 2011.

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has vide General Circular No 45/2011- dated 8th July 2011 issued the Name Availability Guidelines, and the applicants and the Registrar of Companies are advised to adhere to them while applying for or approving a name.

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PAN to be updated by DIN and DPIN holders.

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All DIN holders and DPIN holders need to intimate vide DIN4 their PAN by 30th September, 2011, failing which their DPIN/DIN will be disabled and they will also be liable for a heavy penalty.

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Recovery of debt — DRT has no jurisdiction to prohibit borrower from leaving country without prior permission of Tribunal — Constitution of India, Article 21 — Debts Recovery Tribunal Act, 1993.

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[ State Bank of India v. Prafulchandra V. Patel & Ors., AIR 2011 Gujarat 81]

The appellant State Bank of India preferred application before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Ahmedabad. Though a prayer was made to restrain the defendant borrowers from leaving India without prior permission of the DRT, originally no such order was passed.

The case was not decided for more than six years. After 6 years, the bank filed an interlocutory application for various interim reliefs including the direction to the Regional Passport Authorities to provide passport numbers and addresses of the defendant borrowers, for bringing them from the USA to India and for a direction to surrender the passports. Further prayer was made to direct the defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 3 not to leave India without prior permission of the DRT. The DRT, passed certain interim orders and also restrained defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 3 from leaving India without prior permission of the Tribunal. The borrowers preferred appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. The Appellate Tribunal in its order observed that the borrowers, had not approached the Tribunal for seeking permission to leave the country, and further observed that they could approach the DRT, justifying the travel abroad and seek permission accordingly. At this stage the borrowers filed a writ petition holding that — DRT had no power to control physical movements or to impound the passport. The bank filed appeal against this order.

The Court observed that Article 21 of the Constitution safeguards the right to go abroad against executive interference which is not supported by law; and law here means ‘enacted law’ or ‘State law’. Thus, no person can be deprived of his right to go abroad unless there is a law made by the state prescribing the procedure for so depriving him and the deprivation is effected strictly in accordance with such procedure.

Sub-sections (12), (13A), (17) and (18) of section 19 do not empower the Tribunal to issue any prohibitory order prohibiting the borrower from leaving the country without prior permission. Section 22 deals with the procedure and powers of the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal. It relates to summoning and enforcing the attendance, requiring the discovery and production of documents, receiving evidence on affidavits, issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents, reviewing its decisions, dismissing an application for default or deciding it ex parte, setting aside any order of dismissal of any application for default or any order passed by it ex parte, or any other matter which may be prescribed, but no provision has been made therein or by a separate Notification issued by the Central Govt. empowering the Tribunal to deprive a person of his personal liberty to move abroad as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In absence of any such ‘Enacted Law’ or ‘State Law’, it was held that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to deprive the defendants, the respondents herein, of their right to go abroad.

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International Arbitration — Jurisdiction of Indian Court ousted — Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 section 37(2)(b).

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[ Yograj Infrastructure Ltd. v. Ssangyong Engineering & Const. Co. Ltd., AIR 2011 (NOC) 189 (MP)]

Though contractual work under work order has been carried out in territorial jurisdiction of India the parties had agreed to refer their dispute to arbitration in Singapore in accordance with Singapore International Arbitration Center (SAIC) Rules. According to the said Rule during subsisting of arbitration proceedings under such rules, law of arbitration shall be governed by the International Arbitration Act. Any of party aggrieved by any interim ruling or order of arbitrator, may resort remedy for under Rule 32 of SIAC Rules of the International Arbitration Act. International Arbitration Act (2002 Ed. Statutes of the Republic of Singapore), Chap. 143A, Rule 32 deals with Jurisdiction of the Court. Where parties agreed to refer dispute to arbitration in Singapore in accordance with SIAC rules, whereby during subsisting arbitration proceedings, jurisdiction of the Indian Court was expressly or impliedly ousted. Arbitration being carried out by arbitrator according with SIAC rules. Indian courts has no jurisdiction to entertain any appeal against award of arbitrator. After referring dispute to the arbitrator, parties could not be permitted to approach Court in India, specially when the parties are bound by SIAC Rules. The same cannot be challenged under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 or any other enactment except the International Arbitration Act. No appeal would lie u/s.37(2)(b) of the Act of 1996.

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Guarantor — Recovery of loan — Corporation cannot sell out properties mortgaged to it by guarantors — State Financial Corporation Act — Section 29, section 31.

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[Gunamani Swain & Ors. v. Orissa State Financial Corporation & Ors., AIR 2011 Orissa 83]

The properties in question were the ancestral properties of one the late Manmohan Swain. One Smt. Sanjukata Swain purchased a TATA truck by availing a loan from Orissa State Financial Corporation (‘OSFC’). Accordingly, an agreement was entered into between the parties. In the said loan, the late Manmohan Swain, and other two persons, namely, Ganeswar Swain and Ghanashyam Swain stood as guarantors and created equitable mortgage in respect of the properties in question in favour of OSFC. Since the loan amount was not paid, the OSFC published a notice for sale of the mortgaged properties in the newspaper. The said properties were put to auction and the sale was finalised in favour of Shri Subhransu Sekhar Padhi for a total consideration of Rs.10,09,000. Pursuant to such sale, sale deed was executed between OSFC and Shri Subhansu. Thereafter, OSFC sent a notice by Registered Post to the petitioner Prafulla Chandra Swain, the son of the late Manmohan Swain to take refund of Rs.2,85,486. Being dissatisfied with such action of OSFC, the petitioners filed the writ petition.

The High Court observed that section 29 speaks about the right of financial corporation in case of default in repayment of loan. The default contemplated thereby is of the industrial concern. When an industrial concern makes any default in repayment of any loan or advance or any instalment thereof under the agreement or in meeting its obligation in relation to any guarantee given by the corporation, the financial corporation has the right to take over the management or possession or both of the industrial concern. It further gives right to the corporation to transfer by way of lease or sale and realise the property pledged, mortgaged, hypothecated as assigned to the financial corporation by the industrial concern. The right of financial corporation in terms of section 29 must be exercised only on a defaulting party. Section 29 does not empower the corporation to proceed against the surety even if some properties are mortgaged or hypothecated to it. The said view is further strengthened by the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 29 which lays down appropriation of sale proceeds with reference to only industrial concern and not surety or guarantor. In view of the above, the Court held that the OSFC in exercise of power vested u/s. 29 of the SFC Act cannot sell out the properties mortgaged to it by the guarantors. The Court further observed that section 31 of the SFC Act provides for a special provision for enforcement of claims by the financial corporation against a surety or guarantor. The financial corporation can proceed against a surety or mortgagor invoking the provision u/s. 31 for the default committed by the industrial concern, and also where the financial corporation requires the industrial concern to make immediate repayment of loan or advance in terms of section 30 and the industrial concern fails to make such repayment. To exercise power u/s. 31, the OSFC is required to apply to the District Judge having appropriate jurisdiction. Thus, section 29 is concerned with the property of industrial concern, while section 31 takes within its sweep both the property of industrial concern and that of the surety. The statute provides an additional remedy for recovery of the amount in favour of the OSFC by proceeding against the surety in terms of section 31 of the OSFC Act. Such a power is not vested with the corporation u/s. 29.

Needless to say that public money has to be recovered from the defaulters, who do not repay the loan amount to the financial institutions. This does not mean that financial institutions are at liberty to dispose of the secured asset of the defaulters in unreasonable or arbitrary manner in flagrant violation of the statutory provisions and principles of natural justice.

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Counsel — Withdrawal of Counsel — Permission of Court is necessary — Civil Procedure Code.

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[Anabik Gupta & Ors. v. Swapan Saha, AIR 2011 Gauhati 100]

In a suit when the counter-claim was pending for cross-examination of the witnesses of the opposite party, Shri P. Deshmukhya, counsel for the plaintiff-petitioners, filed an application, stating to the effect, inter alia, that the plaintiff-petitioners had taken away all their papers, documents/files from him as they had decided to engage another lawyer and that he (P. Deshmukhya) and Shri B. K. Acharyya, another counsel, had accordingly withdrawn from the suit. On considering the application, so filed, the learned Munsiff passed an order dispensing with the cross-examination of the defendant, namely, Swapon Saha, (i.e., opposite party No. 1) and fixed the counter-claim, on next date, for cross-examination of further witness of the counter-claimant.

On the date so fixed, while the defendant’s counsel was present, none appeared on behalf of the plaintiffs. The learned Trial Court, then, passed an order dispensing with the cross-examination of the defendant’s witness, closed the evidence of the defendant’s side and fixed the counter-claim, for argument. Before the date, so fixed, the plaintiffpetitioner, namely, Anamika Gupta filed a petition, with the prayer to adjourn the argument and give another opportunity to the plaintiff-petitioners to cross-examine the defendant and his witness. The plaintiff-petitioners stated that Shri Acharyya, advocate, had expressed his inability to conduct the suit and advised the plaintiff-petitioners to engage another lawyer; the plaintiff-petitioners came to know that their engaged counsel had already withdrawn from their case, but the relevant papers/files remained with the said counsel and all the efforts made by the plaintiff-petitioners to obtain the papers/files from the said counsel did not yield any result; thereafter, the plaintiffpetitioner No. 1 applied for certified copies of the plaint, written statement, counter-claim, evidence, orders, etc., which were received in May 2010, and it was after receipt of the said certified copies that they were able to engage, in June 2010, Shri P. Deb, advocate, as their counsel. The Trial Court rejected the application.

Aggrieved by order rejecting the application, the same was challenged before the High Court. The Court observed that while considering the provisions, embodied in Rules 1, 2 and 4 of Order III of CPC, it may be noted that in a civil suit, it is not necessary for a party to remain present, in person, on every date of hearing unless there is a specific order passed, in this regard, by the Court. It is for this reason, therefore, that order III Rule 1 provides that appearance, on behalf of the parties, may be made by recognised agents. A party or his recognised agent may also appoint a pleader and every such appointment shall be filed in the Court. Once duly appointed, the engagement of the pleader subsists until engagement is determined with the leave of the Court. It logically follows that withdrawal of engagement cannot be an arbitrary act and the permission of the Court is necessary to terminate engagement of a counsel.

It is also worth noticing that the appointment of a pleader, filed in the Court, shall be deemed to have remained in force until determined ‘with the leave of the Court’ by (i) a writing, signed by the client or the pleader, as the case may be, and filed in the Court, or (ii) until the client or the pleader dies, or (iii) until all proceedings, in the suit, have ended so far as regards the client. This clearly shows that until the client or the pleader dies or until all proceedings, in the suit, end as far as the client is concerned or until the leave of the Court is obtained determining the relationship of pleader and client, the appointment, once made and filed in a suit, shall continue to remain in force.

In the present case too, when no leave had been granted by the learned Trial Court, mere filing of the petition by the plaintiffs’ pleader intimating the Court that the plaintiffs had taken away all the papers or documents from their counsel had not determined the relationship of client and pleader, which had existed between the plaintiffs’ pleader and the plaintiffs. In such circumstances, the order, dispensing with the cross-examination of the defendant, could not have been made.

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(2011) 22 STR 529 (Tri.-Chennai) — Commissioner of Service Tax, Chennai v. E-Care India Pvt. Ltd.

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Refund of unutilised CENVAT credit in relation to export of services — Refund denied on the ground that the claim pertained to period prior to registration — Lower Appellate Authority held that non-registration not a ground for rejection of refund claim — Appeals rejected.

Facts:
The respondents claimed refund of unutilised credit of service tax in relation to export of services on the basis of Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 as laid out in the Notification No. 23/2004. The claim was rejected on the following grounds:

The respondent took registration later on;

The refund claim pertained to the period prior to the date of registration.

The lower Appellate Authority set aside the order of the original authority on the ground that registration is merely required for the purpose of maintenance of accounts and that non-registration cannot be the ground for enforcing a demand or denying a refund.

Held:
The Tribunal held that the relevant rules required only those assessees to take registration who are required to pay service tax. The respondents were not liable to pay service tax and hence, the order passed by the Appellate Authority did not require interference.

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(2011) 22 STR 609 (Bom.) — Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai v. WNS Global Service (P) Ltd.

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Refund of CENVAT credit on exports — Whether the provider of output service is entitled to claim the refund of unutilised CENVAT credit in respect of exports effected prior to the substitution of Rule 5 with effect from 14-3-2006.

Facts:
The assessee applied for refund of credit in respect of exports effected prior to the substitution of Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 by Notification No. 4/2006 on 14-3-2006 on the ground that the credit could not be utilised. The Revenue raised the dispute that Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 as it stood prior to 14-3-2006 permitted refund of unutilised CENVAT credit only to a manufacturer and not to a provider of output service. The Revenue further contended that substituted Rule 5 states that the rule applies only in respect of the exports made after 14-3-2006.

Held:
The Court observed that the substituted Rule 5 made no distinction between the exports made prior to 14-3-2006 and those made post the said date. Concurring with the decision of the CESTAT, the Court held that the assessee was entitled to the refund of credit, even for exports made before the substitution of Rule 5.

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