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(2011) 22 STR 513 (P & H) — Commissioner of Central Excise v. Shiva Builders.

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Revision by Commissioner — Whether the Commissioner can pass order-in-revision when issue is pending in appeal.

Facts:
The assessee, who were builders, preferred an appeal against the suo motu revision order passed by the Commissioner u/s. 35G after passing of the order by the Commissioner (Appeals). The same was allowed by the Appellate Tribunal. On appeal to High Court, the Revenue contended that issue in appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) was different from the issue which was considered during revisionary proceedings and therefore the revision order by the Commissioner was to be considered valid.

Held:
In view of the provisions as laid out u/s. 84(4) of the Finance Act, 1994, the Court held that even if the issue before the Commissioner (Appeals) was different than the one raised by the Commissioner in revision jurisdiction, exercise of revisional jurisdiction u/s. 84(4) of the Finance Act, 1994 on another issue also was not permissible. Revenue’s appeal was dismissed.

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SERVICES OF AIR-CONDITIONED RESTAURANTS

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Introduction and background Service tax is introduced on services provided by air-conditioned restaurants having a licence to serve liquor with effect from 1st May, 2011. The restaurants predominately serve food and as such, the dominant nature of the transaction is that of sale and the service is built-in or an integral part thereof and it is already subject to the levy of VAT. Whether a transaction is a sale or a service is determined with reference to facts of each case. At times, there may be a composite transaction consisting of both sale and service. The debate over this issue is ongoing and often a transaction is looked upon as ‘sale’ as well as ‘service’ under different statutes in India. There has been ongoing debate in relation to taxation of software, intellectual property rights or goods of incorporeal nature, telecommunication service, etc. as to whether these should be taxed as goods or services. Mutual exclusivity of service tax and VAT was recognised and a composite contract was distinguished from an indivisible contract in the case of Imagic Creative Pvt. Ltd., 2008 (9) STR 337 by the Supreme Court and accordingly held to the effect that the element of sale would attract VAT and element of service would attract service tax. In the context of provision of broadband connectivity, in the case of Bharti Airtel Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, 2009 TIOL 99 HC Kar-VAT, the High Court upheld the order of the Assessing Authority that activity of providing connectivity to the subscribers amounted to sale of light energy and taxable under the Karnataka VAT Act, whereas the company had paid due service tax. On filing SLP however, the Supreme Court set aside the order and directed the company to file statutory appeal and further passed an order to dispose of the appeal on merits. The controversy thus is not closed. It is however relevant to note that in the context of supply of food and beverages on board trains in the case of Indian Railways C&T Corporation Ltd. v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi 2010 (20) STR 437 (Del.), the Delhi High Court held that the said transaction did not amount to service of outdoor catering as passengers have no choice of articles served or time and place of service of food. The element of service is incidental and bare minimum of heating food and serving it. The state was empowered to levy VAT on the transaction and incidental element of service was not relevant and the petitioner was at liberty to challenge the levy of service tax. Further citing the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd., 2006 (2) STR 161 (80), it was observed that in respect of composite transactions other than those covered by Article 366(29A) of the Constitution, if no intention is found to segregate the element involving sale of goods from the element involving providing of service or if the transaction does not involve two distinct contracts, one for sale of goods and the other for providing of service, it is not permissible to disintegrate such composite contract so as to levy VAT/sales tax and service tax. In the context of outdoor catering service, distinguishing it from food served in a restaurant, the Supreme Court in Tamil Nadu Kalyana Mandap Assn. v. UOI, 2006 (3) STR 260 (SC) noted, “In the case of an outdoor caterer, the customer negotiates each element of catering service including the price to be paid to the caterer. Outdoor catering has an element of personalised service provided to a customer. Clearly the service element is more weighty, visible and predominant in the case of outdoor catering, it cannot be considered a case of sale of food and drink as in restaurant”. Amidst the controversy as to whether food served in a restaurant is an indivisible contract where dominant objective is sale of food or a composite contract of sale of food and providing services of ambience of air-conditioning, furniture, etc. and other personalised services, service tax is introduced on the service provided by restaurants.

Services provided by restaurants Statutory provisions in relation to the new levy, as contained in the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act) are reproduced below: Section 65(105)(zzzzv) of the Act “ ‘Taxable service’ means any service provided or to be provided to any person, by a restaurant, by whatever name called, having the facility of air-conditioning in any part of the establishment, at any time during the financial year, which has licence to serve alcoholic beverages, in relation to serving of food or beverage, including alcoholic beverages or both, in its premises.”

Criteria for taxability The definition in relation to a restaurant indicates the following criteria for taxability:

  •  Services provided by a restaurant or any establishment providing such services and known by any name such as a fast-food centre, a lunch home, a dhaba, a coffee-shop, a club, etc. The term ‘restaurant’ is not defined in the Act, therefore only the common parlance meaning of the term is to be applied. Any establishment or an eating house serving food and/or beverages whether in a hotel or otherwise to public or a class of public for consumption on the premises is known as a restaurant and is covered in the scope.

  •  Air-conditioning facility may be available for the whole or partial premises of the restaurant or the establishment and at any time during a financial year.

  •  The other concurrent requirement is having a licence to serve alcoholic beverages. However, there is no requirement as to the actual servicing of alcohol using the said licence. The existence of licence to serve is the requirement and any kind of alcoholic beverage such as beer, rum, gin, vodka, whisky, wine, etc. if licensed to serve is covered in the scope.

  •  Service is to be provided to any person in relation to food or beverages including any alcoholic beverages.

  •  The food and/or beverages are served on the premises of the restaurant.

The Government Instruction vide DOF No. 334/3/2011-TRU, dated 28-2-2011 has clarified as follows:

“1. Services provided by a restaurant 1.1 Restaurants provide a number of services normally in combination with the meal and/ or beverage for a consolidated charge. These services relate to the use of restaurant space and furniture, air-conditioning, well-trained waiters, linen, cutlery and crockery, music, live or otherwise, or a dance floor. The customer also has the benefit of personalised service by indicating his preference for certain ingredients, e.g., salt, chilies, onion, garlic or oil. The extent and quality of services available in a restaurant is directly reflected in the margin charged over the direct costs. It is thus not uncommon to notice even packaged products being sold at prices far in excess of the MRP. 1.2 In certain restaurants the owners get into revenue-sharing arrangements with another person who takes the responsibility of preparation of food, with his own materials and ingredients, while the owner takes responsibility for making the space available, its decoration, furniture, cutlery, crockery and music, etc. The total bill, which is composite, is shared between the two parties in terms of the contract. Here the consideration for services provided by the restaurants is more clearly demarcated.

1.3 Another arrangement is whereby the restaurant separates a certain portion of the bill as service charge. This amount is meant to be shared amongst the staff who attend the customers. Though this amount is exclusively for the services, it does not represent the full value of all services rendered by the restaurants.

1.4    The new levy is directed at services provided by high-end restaurants that are air-conditioned and have licence to serve liquor. Such restaurants provide conditions and ambience in a manner that service provided may assume predominance over the food in many situations. It should not be confused with mere sale of food at any eating house, where such services are materially absent or so minimal that it will be difficult to establish that any service in any meaningful way is being provided.

1.5    It is not necessary that the facility of air-conditioning is available round the year. If the facility is available at any time during the financial year, the conditions for the levy shall be met.

1.6    The levy is intended to be confined to the value of services contained in the composite contract and shall not cover either the meal portion in the composite contract or mere sale of food by way of pick -up or home delivery, as also goods sold at MRP. The Finance Minister has announced in his budget speech 70% abatement on this service, which is, inter alia, meant to separate such portion of the bill as relates to the deemed sale of meals and beverages. The relevant Notification will be issued when the levy is operationalised after the enactment of the Finance Bill.”

Further to the above, the Circular No. 139/8/2011-TRU, dated 10-5-2011, clarified the following issues as summarised below:

  •     When there are more than one restaurant belonging to a common entity in a complex and if they are demarcated by separate names, service tax would be levied on the restaurant which is air-conditioned in any part of the establishment and has a licence to serve alcohol and as such, satisfies both the conditions for its coverage.

  •    Taxable services provided by a restaurant in other parts of the hotel such as swimming pool or an open area attached to the restaurant also attract service tax as they are extension of the restaurant.

  •     When food is served as a part of ‘room service’ of a hotel, no service tax is leviable as service is not provided in the premises of air-conditioned restaurant with a licence to serve liquor. It is not chargeable even under short-term accommodation service if the bill for the food is raised separately and does not form part of the declared tariff.

  •     For the levy of service tax, State Value Added Tax (VAT) charged in the invoice would be excluded from the taxable value.

Food picked up at counter or delivered at home

Many a time, food is picked up at the counter of the restaurant and not consumed while sitting in the restaurant or is delivered at home as most food chain outlets or even speciality restaurants provide home delivery service. In these situations, only food is sold and the facility of restaurant not enjoyed. DOF letter dated 28-2-2011 reproduced above has clarified this point.

Valuation of restaurant service

In the context of catering service provided by outdoor caterers and/or mandap-keepers, the Hon. Supreme Court in the case of Tamil Nadu Kalyana Mandapam Association (supra) observed “it is well settled that the measure of taxation cannot affect the nature of taxation and therefore the fact that service tax is levied as a percentage of gross charges for catering cannot alter or affect the legislative competence of the Parliament in the matter”. In the said backdrop, exemption Notification No. 34/2011-ST of 25-4-2011 has amended Notification 1/2006-ST and granted abatement of 70% on the gross value of taxable service provided by a restaurant. The Ministry vide its Circular dated 25-4-2011 has also clarified that the exemption is available on the gross price charged by the restaurant for the taxable service including any portion shown separately, for instance some restaurants recover service charge separately. This would also form part of the value for determining service tax. However, any amount paid ex-gratia e.g., tip to any staff does not amount to consideration paid for the service of the restaurant and therefore would not be included in the value.

Some issues

(i)    A non-air-conditioned restaurant having a licence to sell alcoholic beverage is partly being made air-conditioned and will be functional from 1st January, 2012. Whether and when would service tax be attracted? Whether the entire sale i.e., even the non-air-conditioned part sale would attract tax liability?

Ans. (i) Service tax would be attracted from 1st January, 2012 and on the entire value of billing including billing for serving meals and/or drinks in the non-a/c part of the restaurant. The use of the words ‘at any time during the financial year’ makes it clear. However, prior to 1st January, 2011, the food was served without the facility of air-conditioning, therefore service tax would not be attracted. It may also be noted that service tax is introduced for the first time on the restaurant service from 1st May, 2011 and therefore threshold exemption would be available to the restaurant, subject to other conditions of threshold exemption of rupees ten lakh under Notification 6/2005-ST, dated 1-4-2005.

(ii)    Mr. A went to Restaurant M, a state-of-the art air-conditioned restaurant which would also service alcoholic beverages, but Mr. A does not have alcohol. Whether Mr. A can insist on not charging service tax in the invoice as he did not consume alcohol?

Ans. (ii) Consumption of alcohol is not envisaged in the definition of restaurant service. So long as the restaurant is air-conditioned and has a licence to servce alcoholic beverages, the restaurant is liable to pay service tax.

(iii)    Whether air-conditioned liquor shops having a licence to sell alcohol would be covered by the above provisions?

Ans. (iii) Liquor shops are not restaurants. They sell alcohol but do not serve the same in their premises. It is the service of restaurant facility i.e., having tables, chairs and other furniture along with a bar and/or waiters, etc. along with food and/or beverages including non-alcoholic beverages or both, is covered by the service tax provisions and not the shops selling alcohol.

(iv)    Are coffee-shop chain of restaurants with state-of-the art ambience in air-conditioned halls liable for service tax?

Ans. (iv) If the coffee-shop does not have licence to serve alcoholic beverages, it is not covered by the service tax provisions.

(v)    Whether a restaurant having a mere beer bar where only that part is air-conditioned would be liable for service tax?

Ans. (v) The part of the restaurant is air-conditioned and beer is an alcoholic beverage. Therefore, the value of the food and all beverages served in any part of the restaurant is liable for service tax.

(vi)    An air-conditioned restaurant in Mahabaleshwar uses air-conditioning facility only during the months of March – May. Rest of the year being very cool, air-conditioning is not operated. If the restaurant’s value of taxable sale during May, 2011 was well below the threshold limit of 10 lakh, would it be out of the scope of the levy till March 2012 or so.

Ans. (vi) No. The restaurant would be liable for service tax when it crosses the limit of Rs.10 lakh, even if it does not operate air-conditioning as it has used it for some part of the year. The condition is to have a facility of air-conditioning at anytime during the financial year is satisfied.

Press Release — Central Board of Direct Taxes — No. 402/92/2006-MC (15 of 2011) dated 24-6-2011.

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The Governement of India has signed a protocol amending the DTAA with the Government of Singapore for effective exchange of information in the tax matters.
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Salaried employees exempted from filing tax returns — Notification No. 36/2011, dated 23-6-2011.

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Salaried employees having total taxable income of less than Rs.5 lac have been exempted from filing the tax returns for A.Y. 2011-12, subject to the fulfilment of the following conditions:

  •  The only source of income is salary and income from savings bank interest does not exceed Rs. 10,000.

  •  The PAN of the employee is available with the employer and is mentioned in the Form 16 issued by the employer.

  •  The bank interest income is disclosed to the employer, and is included in employee’s total income, and tax is duly deducted thereon and paid to the Government.

  •  Total tax liability of such person is discharged by way of TDS deducted by the employer which has been duly paid to the Government.

  •  The employee does not derive salary from more than one employer.

  •  The employee has no claim of refund.

  •  No specific notice is issued under the Act to the employee for filing a return of income.
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Requirement to file digitally signed tax returns in certain cases — Notification No. 37/2011, dated 1-7-2011.

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The CBDT has notified that partnership firms filing return in ITR-5 or individuals and HUFs filing returns in ITR-4 and subjected tax audit u/s.44AB would require to digitally sign and submit their income tax returns for A.Y. 2011-12 and onwards.
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IS IT FAIR TO EXPECT AN INDIVIDUAL TO DO TDS (EVEN WITH PRESENT EXEMPTIONS)?

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Introduction It is an accepted fact that the provisions relating to tax deduction at source (TDS) under the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the Act) are very cumbersome, ambiguous and irrational. No amount of input can give you an assurance that the compliances are flawless. There would hardly be any organisation that can claim perfection in compliance with these provisions. As regards the Government organisations — including statutory corporations, nationalised banks, etc., the less said the better.

The law-makers in their wisdom have by and large exempted individuals and HUFs from complying with these provisions. However, there is still much to desire in this respect.

The unfairness In sections 194A (Interest), 194C (Contracts), 194H (Commission), 194I (Rent) and 194J (Professional fees), there are clear provisions that ordinarily, an individual and HUF are not required to deduct tax at source. However, either a sub-section or a proviso in these sections makes an exception that if the individual or the HUF is required to get his/its accounts audited u/s.44AB for the preceding financial year, on the basis of turnover-criterion, then the said individual/HUF would be required to comply with the provisions of TDS.

Again section 194C and 194J provide that if the individual/ HUF is making a payment for personal purpose, then TDS provisions are not applicable. Thus, when a businessman is making a payment to a doctor/ lawyer, etc. for personal matters (non-business), no tax needs to be deducted.

The unfairness lies in not providing similar exemption in section 194A, 194H, 194I. Therefore, if a businessman with tax audit makes personal borrowings for buying a house, he may be required to deduct tax on interest. So also, on brokerage for sale/purchase of house. The same difficulty may arise for rent.

Difficulties in respect of section 195 are too well known. A typical case of an individual buying a house from a non-resident — entails so much of a nightmarish exercise! Either to comply with all formalities for just one single transaction or to obtain exemption u/s.195(2)/ 195(3), involves tremendous hardship.

It can be well understood that the main intention of the statute, to exclude individual and HUF from complying with the requirements for TDS u/s.194C and 194J, was to cover only business transactions and to exclude personal transactions from the ambit of TDS. However, the same logic is not made applied in case of sections 194A, 194H and 194I.

Nevertheless, there is some solace to the individuals and HUF viz. non-applicability of the provisions of section 40(a)(ia). The provisions of section 40(a)(ia) are applicable to any business expense, thus saving the personal expense. But there is an exception to this solace — section 25 which disallows the deduction of interest on housing loan made to a non-resident if TDS requirements are not fulfilled.

The test for deciding, whether individuals and HUFs have to comply with the provisions of TDS, is based on the turnover of the business or professional receipts (same limit as for tax audit u/s.44AB) (i.e., 60 lakh for business and 15 lakh for profession)? However, is it fair that this turnover must be a conclusive criterion for deciding TDS requirement?

Further even compliance procedure of TDS viz. taking TAN, deducting and making TDS payment, filing quarterly returns, issuing TDS certificates, can prove to be extremely cumbersome for individuals and HUFs.

Solution:
One solution that can be thought of may be to lay down a separate criterion which is not based on limits laid down in section 44AB for deciding the TDS compliance by individual or HUF. For instance, the monetary limit for applicability of TDS can be gross payments of Rs.1 crore for individuals and HUFs.

Also, similar exclusion (as in section 194J and 194C) should be provided in case of section 194A, 194H, 194I. Hence, in case of personal expenses none of the provisions dealing with TDS should not apply to individuals and HUFs.

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Raman Gupta Prop. M/s. Raman & Co. v. ACIT ITAT Amritsar Bench, Amritsar Before C. L. Sethi (JM) and Mehar Singh (AM) ITA No. 05/ASR/2010 A.Y.: 2003-04. Decided on: 31-1-2011 Counsel for assessee/revenue: P. N. Arora/ Tarsem Lal

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Section 271D r.w.s 269SS — Penalty for acceptance of loan/deposit otherwise than by account payee cheque/draft — Assessee’s bona fide belief and conduct established a sufficient and reasonable cause — Penalty deleted.

Facts: The assessee had taken cash deposit from three persons amounting to Rs.2.5 lakh from each, aggregating to Rs.7.5 lakh. In response to showcause notice, the assessee explained that on account of urgency, as otherwise the cheque issued by him to the third party would have bounced, he took the cash deposit. Further it was pleaded that he was under the genuine impression that the provisions of section 269SS applied only to the business transactions and not to the personal transactions. However, according to the ACIT, the cheque issued to the third party by the assessee was not for payments to a creditor or discharge of any liability, but the same was issued for payment of a loan to the third party. The ACIT further did not agree with the assessee that the personal transactions were not covered and pointed out that the provisions of section 269SS do not make such distinction. Thus, he imposed a penalty u/s.271D of Rs.7.5 lakh.

According to the CIT(A) none of the exceptions provided u/s.269SS apply to the case of the assessee and the assessee had no compelling reasons to violate the provisions of section 269SS. Accordingly, he confirmed the order imposing penalty.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the assessee was under bona fide belief that the provisions of section 269SS do not apply to the personal transactions and this belief had not been found to be false or untrue. Secondly, it was noted that the loan so taken was immediately deposited in the bank account and the transactions were duly recorded by the assessee in his books of accounts. According to the Tribunal, the assessee had not consciously disregarded the provisions of section 269SS of the Act. Therefore, relying on the decisions of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of CIT v. Speedways Rubber Pvt. Ltd., (326 ITR 31), it held that the assessee had been able to establish a sufficient and reasonable cause for not accepting the loan by account payee cheque/ draft, and accordingly the penalty imposed was deleted.

Note:
In Hemendra Chandulal Shah v. ACIT, (ITA No. 1129/Ahd./2010), where on a direction of the bank a father had taken cash loan from his son to clear the debit balance in his bank account, according to the Ahmedabad Tribunal, there was reasonable cause and penalty u/s.271D could be imposed. The full text of the decision is available in the office of the Society.

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Vineetkumar Raghavjibhai Bhalodia v. ITO ITAT Rajkot Bench, Rajkot Before A. L. Gehlot (AM) and N.R.S. Ganesan (JM) ITA No. 583/RJT/2007 A.Y.: 2005-06. Decided on: 17-5-2011 Counsel for assessee/revenue: Manish Shah/ N. R. Soni

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Explanation to proviso to clause (v)/(vi) of subsection (2) of section 56 — Gifts from relatives exempt from tax — Whether the gift received from HUF is exempt from tax — Held, Yes — Also held that the amount is exempt u/s.10(2) of the Act.

Issue: The issues before the Tribunal were as under:

1. Whether gift received from HUF by a member of HUF falls under the definition of ‘relative’ as provided in the Explanation to clause (vi) of sub-section (2) of section 56 of the Act?

2. Whether amount received by the assessee from his HUF is covered by section 10(2) of the Act?

The Assessing Officer was of the view that HUF is not covered in the definition of ‘relative’. Therefore, the gift received from the HUF was taxable. On appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the view of the AO and further observed that if the Legislature wanted, it would have specifically mentioned so in the definition of ‘relatives’. According to him, the exemption u/s.10(2) was available only if the amount was received on partial/total partition and secondly to the extent of share in the assessed income of the current year. Before the Tribunal, the Revenue supported the orders of the lower authorities.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that a Hindu Undivided Family is a person within the meaning of section 2(31) of the Income-tax Act and is a distinctively assessable unit under the Act. Further, it observed that the Act does not define the expression ‘Hindu Undivided Family’, hence, it must be construed in the sense in which it is understood under the Hindu Law. According to it, HUF constitutes all persons lineally descended from a common ancestor and includes their mothers, wives or widows and unmarried daughters. All these persons fall in the definition of ‘relative’ as provided in Explanation to clause (vi) of section 56(2) of the Act. It did not agree with the views of the CIT(A) that HUF is as good as ‘a body of individuals’ and cannot be termed as ‘relative’. According to it, an HUF is ‘a group of relatives’. Further, from a plain reading of section 56(2)(vi) along with the Explanation to that section and on understanding the intention of the Legislature from the section, the Tribunal found that a gift received from ‘relative’, irrespective of whether it is from an individual relative or from a group of relatives is exempt from tax as a group of relatives also falls within the Explanation to section 56(2) (vi) of the Act. It pointed out that the Act does not provide that the word ‘relative’ represents a single person. Accordingly, the Tribunal held that the ‘relative’ explained in Explanation to section 56(2)(vi) of the Act includes ‘relatives’ and as the assessee received gift from his ‘HUF’, which is ‘a group of relatives’, the gift received by the assessee from the HUF should be interpreted to mean that the gift was received from the ‘relatives’ and therefore, the same was not taxable u/s. 56(2) (vi) of the Act.

As regards the alternative claim for exemption u/s.10(2) — the Tribunal did not agree with the CIT(A) and held that the assessee was entitled to exemption u/s.10(2). According to it, the assessee was a member of HUF and had received the amount out of the income of the family. There was no material on record to hold that the gift amount was part of any assets of HUF. It was out of income of family to a member of HUF, therefore, the same is exempt u/s.10(2) of the Act.

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(2011) 128 ITD 345 (Mum.) Smt. Bharati Jayesh Sangani v. ITO A.Y.: 2005-06. Dated: 4-11-2010

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Section 50C — AO is bound to apply the valuation given by DVO in the valuation report.

Facts:
The assessee purchased a flat for Rs.30,00,000 on 22-10-2003. This property was then sold on 29- 9-2004 for a total consideration of Rs.35,00,000. The stamp duty valuation of the said flat was Rs.1,18,07,180. The assessee was asked to show cause as to why the provisions of section 50C should not be applied. The assessee explained that the value of the property sold within a period of less than one year could not be expected to be as high as 1.18 crore. Further, the building was an old one and in dilapidated condition. The members of the society had resolved to construct a new building by demolishing the old one. Accordingly, the construction contract was entered with builders. As per the contract, the members were to pay certain amounts towards the construction cost and purchase of TDR. Since the assessee did not have money, she sold the flat to a third party with an agreement that the purchaser shall pay the construction cost and purchase cost of TDR to the builder. Further, the assessee explained that when the flat was sold, the building was already demolished and only the plinth was laid for the purpose of construction of new building.

Without prejudice to this main argument, the assessee also requested the Assessing Officer to refer the matter to the Valuation Officer. The DVO valued the said flat at Rs.46.48 lakh. The AO did not concur with the view of DVO as according to him the valuation done by the DVO was very low and further no deduction was required towards TDR. Further, according to the AO, section 50C(2) and section 16A of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957 do not bind the AO to follow the valuation done by the DVO.

Held:
Sub-section (2) of section 50C states that “……..where any such reference is made, the provisions of sub-sections (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6) of section 16A of wealth tax shall apply, with necessary modifications.

Sub-section (6) of section 16A of the Wealth-tax Act states that on receipt of order from the Valuation Officer, the Assessing Officer shall “proceed to complete the assessment in conformity with the estimate of the Valuation Officer”. Hence the AO has no option but to go by the estimate of the Valuation Officer.

The DVOs are experts in the matter of valuation by virtue of special qualification held by them in this field. The AO cannot ignore the report of the DVO.

The words used in sub-section (2) of section 50C that where reference is made to the DVO the provisions of sub-section (6) of section 16A of the Wealth-tax Act shall apply with necessary modifications. The ambit of expression ‘with necessary modifications’ implies striking out the inapplicable fractions of the provision which align strictly with the specifics of the Wealth-tax Act. This will not enable the AO to completely disregard the valuation report by the DVO.

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(2011) 56 DTR (Ahd.) (Trib.) 89 Valibhai Khanbhai Mankad v. DCIT A.Y.: 2006-07. Dated: 29-4-2011

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Section 40(a)(ia) — Payment of hire charges to sub-contractors after obtaining Form 15-I cannot be disallowed u/s.40(a)(ia) on the ground that Form 15J was not filed in time as per Rule 29D.

Facts:
The assessee had made payment of Rs.7,93,34,193 to sub-contractors to whom it awarded subcontract for hiring and from whom he obtained Form 15-I and hence TDS was not deducted. The AO, however, noted that even though the Forms 15-I were obtained from the transporters, the same were not furnished to the CIT in Form 15J as per Rule 29D of the IT Rules, 1962. He therefore, quoting from section 194C(3) as applicable to the relevant assessment year, held that once the assessee failed to furnish Form 15J enclosing therewith Form 15-I to the CIT before 30th June, 2006, he failed to fulfil the conditions laid down u/s. 194C(3)(ii). He accordingly added back the sum paid without TDS u/s.40(a)(ia).

The learned CIT(A) confirmed the addition by holding that responsibility after non-deduction does not stop just at collecting Forms 15-I from the sub-contractors, but also extends to requiring the contractor to furnish Form 15J to the CIT on or before 30th June of the following financial year. It was contended before the learned CIT(A) that Form 15J was submitted to the CIT on 26th February 2009 i.e., after the completion of assessment. The learned CIT(A) rejected this contention holding that such delay defeats the very purpose of the section.

Held:
Once the assessee has obtained Forms 15-I from the sub-contractors, and contents thereof are not disputed or whose genuineness is not doubted, then the assessee is not liable to deduct tax from the payments made to sub-contractors. Once the assessee is not liable to deduct tax u/s.194C, then addition u/s.40(a)(ia) cannot be made.

Non-furnishing of Form 15J to the CIT is an act posterior in time to payments made to subcontractors. This cannot by itself, undo the eligibility of exemption created by second proviso. Third proviso to section 194C(3)(i) which requires the assessee to submit Form 15J is only a procedural formality and cannot undo what has been done by second proviso.

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(2011) 55 DTR (Mumbai) (Trib.) 241 Porwal Creative Vision (P) Ltd. v. Addl. CIT A.Ys.: 2006-07 & 2007-08. Dated: 18-3-2011

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Section 272A(2)(k) — Penalty for failure to file TDS return is leviable only for the delay from the date of payment of taxes by the assessee.

Facts:
There was delay in submitting quarterly statement in Form No. 26Q and for such delay the AO imposed penalty u/s.272A(2)(c) and (k) @ Rs.100 per day of delay. Before the CIT(A), the assessee contended that it was incurring losses and there was financial crisis and therefore due to non-availability of funds there were delays in making the payments and filing the returns. However, the CIT(A) confirmed the penalty levied.

Held:
The clause (c) of section 272A(2) is not applicable as the same related to return/statement u/s.133, 206 and 206C. The case of the assessee is that it had deducted the TDS at the time of crediting amounts in the books of account and the payment could not be made due to financial difficulties and since the payments had not been made, the TDS returns could not be filed, as the same required data relating to payment of TDS.

As regards the default in not paying the tax to the Central Government in time or for non-deducting the tax at source, there are other provisions for ensuring compliance. In case the assessee fails to deduct tax at source or after deducting fails to pay the same to the Central Government, the assessee is deemed to be in default u/s.201(1) and is liable for penalty. The assessee is also liable to pay interest for the period of default till the payment of tax u/s.201(1A). Therefore, the period for levying the penalty has to be counted from the date of payment of tax, because the delay in filing the return till the date of payment of tax is already explained on the ground that the assessee could not pay the taxes for which separate penal provisions exist.

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Educational institution: Exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi): Assessee-society was running a school: Its application for exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi) was rejected on ground that its objects, viz., to manage/maintain a library, reading-room, and conduct classes of stitching, embroidery, weaving, centre for adult education and to make necessary arrangements for overall development and growth of children when required, were non-educational in nature: Rejection not proper.

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[Little Angels Shiksha Samiti v. UOI, 199 Taxman 237 (MP)(Mag), 11 Taxman.com 37(MP)]

The assessee-society was running a school. Its objects were:

(a) establishment of a school for the intellectual development of children;
(b) to conduct the classes and activities for all the levels of study and education;
(c) to manage/maintain a library, reading-room, and conduct classes of stitching, embroidery, weaving centre for adult education and education in the field of entertainment, arts, etc.; and
(d) To make necessary arrangements for the overall development and growth of children when required.

For the A.Ys. 2005-06 and 2006-07, the assesseesociety had been granted exemption u/s. 10(23C) (vi). It filed application for grant of approval for exemption u/s.10(23C)(vi) for A.Y. 2007-08. The Commissioner rejected the assessee’s application on the ground that the objects of the society mentioned in clauses (c) and (d) of the object clause were non-educational and, thus, the society did not exist solely for educational purpose.

The Madhya Pradesh High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee-society and held as under:

“(i) In view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Sole Trustee, Loka Shikshana Trust v. CIT, (1975) 101 ITR 234 the word ‘education’ used in clause (15) of section 2 means the process of training and developing the knowledge, skill, mind and character of the students by normal schooling.

(ii) In the instant case, clause (c) of the objects was to manage and maintain a library, reading-room and conduct classes of stitching, embroidery, weaving and schooling, adult education and education in the field of entertainment, arts, etc. The assessee-society had followed the instructions issued by the Board of Secondary Education in regard to practical examinations for home science and in the aforesaid instructions, stitching, embroidery, weaving subjects had been mentioned. The adult education is also a part of education. If the assessee-society introduced the aforesaid object, it could not be said that the object of the assessee-society was not of educational purpose.

(iii) Clause (d) of the objects was to make necessary arrangement for the complete development of the children. That object was also in consonance with the modern concept of education, because the education is not only to impart education through book reading, but it also includes sports activities and other recreational activities, dance, theatre and even having educational tour within the country and abroad, so that the children can develop their overall talent. It could not be said that the said object was not for educational purpose.

(iv) Apart from that, from the audited accounts of the society, it was clear that it had not used the amount and income for any other business activities. In such circumstances, rejecting the application of the assessee-society at threshold was arbitrary and illegal.

(v) It was also a fact that for prior two years, the assessee-society was granted exemption and after the year 2006-07, the assesseesociety had deleted the clauses (c) and (d) in its memorandum of association. In such circumstances, the order passed by the authority was illegal and against the provisions of section 10(23C)(vi).

(vi) Consequently, the petition was to be allowed. The impugned order was to be quashed. The application filed by the assessee for grant of approval u/s. 10(23C)(vi) was to be accepted.”

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Depreciation: Rate: Section 32: Gas cylinder including valves and regulators: Entry in schedule: Rate 100%: Liquefied petroleum gas cylinder mounted on chasis of truck: Gas cylinder entitled to depreciation at 100%: Cannot be treated as motor vehicle.

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[CIT v. Ananth Gas Supplies, 335 ITR 334 (AP)]

The assessee was dealing in liquefied petroleum gas which it transported in gas cylinders fitted to the chassis of transport vehicles. The assessee claimed depreciation on the cylinders at 100% as applicable to gas cylinders. The Assessing Officer held that the assessee was entitled to depreciation at 40% as applicable to transport vehicles on the ground that the vehicle on which the cylinder was mounted was registered as transport vehicle. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Andhra Pradesh High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) The container mounted on the chassis of the truck was nothing but a gas cylinder and it fits the description of gas cylinder in Appendix I, Part I, item III(ii)F(4) read with Rule 5 of the Rules as including valves and regulators.

(ii) The mere fact that the container was mounted on the chassis of the truck did not deprive it of the character of gas cylinder. It had all the attributes of the cylinder and was not divested of its basic character as cylinder on account of the fact that the item was registered as a transport vehicle.

(iii) The assessee was therefore entitled to claim depreciation at 100% on the liquefied petroleum gas cylinder mounted on the chassis of the truck.”

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Business expenditure: TDS: Disallowance u/s.40(a)(i) r.w.s 194A: Assessee exporting goods: Bills of exchange discounted abroad: Discounting charges not interest: Tax not deductible at source: Discounting charges allowable as deduction.

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[CIT v. Cargill Global Trading P. Ltd., 335 ITR 94 (Del.); 241 CTR 443 (Del.)]

The assessee was in the export business. On the exports to its buyers outside India, the assessee drew bills of exchange on those buyers. These bills of exchange were discounted by the assessee from CSFA which on discounting the bills immediately remitted the discounted amount to the assessee. CSFA was a company incorporated in Singapore and a tax-resident of Singapore. The discount charges were claimed by the assessee as expenses u/s.37. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim for deduction of the discount charges treating the same as interest on the ground that tax was not deducted at source from the amount. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) It is clear from the definition in section 2(28A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, that before any amount paid is construed as interest, it has to be established that the same is payable in respect of any money borrowed or debt incurred.

(ii) The discount charges paid were not in respect of any debt incurred or money borrowed. Instead the assessee had merely discounted the sale consideration. Tax was not deductible at source on the amount. The amount was deductible.”

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Business expenditure: TDS: Disallowance u/s.40(a)(i) r.w.s 195: Payment of interest by branch (PE) to head office abroad: By virtue of convention head office not liable to pay any tax in India: No obligation on branch to deduct tax at source: Interest to be allowed as deduction in the hands of branch.

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[ABN Amro Bank v. CIT, 241 CTR 552 (Cal.)]

The assessee-foreign company incorporated in the Netherlands had its principal branch office in India. Indian branch remits funds to head office as payment of interest. The Indian branch had not deducted tax at source on such interest payment to the head office. The following two issues were for consideration by the Calcutta High Court:

“(i) Whether interest payment made by the Indian branch of the appellant to its head office abroad was to be allowed as a deduction in computing the profits of the appellant’s branch in India?

(ii) Whether in making such payment to the head office, the appellant’s said branch was required to deduct tax at source u/s.195 of the Income-tax Act, 1961?”

The Calcutta High Court held as under:

“(i) An unnecessary complication has been created by the interpretation made of section 40(a) (i) r.w.s 195 by both the appellant and the respondents. A proper meaning has to be ascribed to the expression ‘chargeable’ under the provisions of this Act. Section 195(1) says that if any interest is paid by a person to a foreign company, which interest is chargeable under the provisions of this Act, tax should be deducted at source. The word ‘chargeable’ is not to be taken as qualifying only the phrase ‘any other sum’, but it qualifies the word ‘interest’ also. Where the interest is not so chargeable, no tax is deducted.

(ii) In this case, by virtue of the convention, the head office of the appellant is not liable to pay any tax under the Act. Therefore, there was and still is no obligation on the part of the appellant’s said branch to deduct tax while making interest remittance to its head office or any other foreign branch.

(iii) Therefore, if no tax is deductible u/s.195(1), section 40(a)(i) will not come in the way of the appellant claiming such deduction from its income. Therefore, in the circumstances, the appellant would be entitled to deduct such interest paid, as permitted by the convention or agreement, in the computation of its income.”

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ITO v. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank (2011) TII 103 ITAT-Mum.-ITNL Dated: 12-5-2011

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Section 195, 201/201(1A) of Income-tax Act, Article
13(3) of India-UAE DTAA — Liability to deduct tax on remittance of sale
proceeds of shares, by bank to UAE resident, does not arise as bank is
only acting as an authorised dealer in transferring the funds on behalf
of the share-broker-in absence of liability to deduct tax, the bank
could not be treated as an assessee in default.

Facts:
Abu
Dhabi Commercial Bank (ADCB) was engaged in the business of banking and
operated through branch in India. ADCB made remittances to individuals
being UAE residents, in respect sale proceeds of shares which sales had
resulted in short-term capital gain in India. Remittance was made
without deducting tax at source. Nil tax deduction was supported by CA’s
certificate which provided for nil tax deduction from sale proceeds to
UAE residents as capital gains tax was exempt in India in terms of
Article 13(3) of the DTAA. The Assessing Officer (AO) rejected the
contention of ADCB and held that capital gains earned by UAE residents
would not qualify for exemption under the DTAA as individuals in UAE are
not liable to pay tax on capital gains and hence in absence of existing
tax liability in that country, no benefits under the DTAA would not be
available to them. The AO therefore treated ADCB as an assessee in
default. U/s.201 and also levied interest u/s.201(1A).

Apart
from the treaty benefit, ADCB contended that shares had been purchased
and sold by UAE individuals through their brokers. Hence the term
‘payer’ as contemplated u/s. 204 of the Income-tax Act, referred to the
broker and the bank was only the medium through which remittances were
made. ADCB placed reliance on the Mumbai ITAT decision in the case of
Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corpn. Ltd.1 to contend that a bank
merely acted as an authorised dealer to transfer funds and the Bank
cannot be regarded as ‘payer’. On appeal, the CIT(A) held that though
ADCB could be regarded as payer u/s.204, there was no withholding tax
obligation due to availability of treaty benefit.

On appeal to the Tribunal by the Department and the assessee:

Held:
Reliance
placed by ADCB on decision in the case of Hongkong & Shanghai
Banking Corporation was correct. In the said decision, it had been held
that in respect of remittance of sale proceeds of shares the bank which
merely acted as an authorised dealer, was not under any obligation to
deduct tax at source. Consequently, the action of the AO in treating the
bank as an assessee in default u/s.201 and levying interest u/s.201(1A)
was not justifiable.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 74, dated 30-6-2011 — FDI in India — Issue of equity shares under the FDI Scheme allowed under the Approval Route

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Presently, an Indian company can, subject to compliance with certain guidelines, issue equity shares/preference shares to a person resident outside India, for consideration other than cash, against payment of royalty/lump sum fees for supply of technology/technical know-how under the Automatic Route.

This Circular, in addition to the above, permits issue of equity shares/preference shares to persons resident outside India for consideration other than cash under the Approval Route in the following cases:

1. Import of capital goods/machineries/equipments (including second-hand machineries), subject to compliance with all the following conditions:

(a) The import of capital goods, machineries, etc., made by a resident in India, is in accordance with the Export/Import Policy issued by the Government of India.

(b) There is an independent valuation of the capital goods/machineries/equipments (including second-hand machineries) by a third party entity, preferably by an independent valuer from the country of import along with production of copies of documents/certificates issued by the customs authorities towards assessment of the fair value of such imports.

(c) The application should clearly indicate the beneficial ownership and identity of the importer company as well as the overseas entity.

(d) All such conversions of import payables for capital goods into FDI should be completed within 180 days from the date of shipment of goods.

2. Pre-operative/pre-incorporation expenses (including payments of rent, etc.), subject to compliance with all the following conditions:

(a) Submission of FIRC for remittance of funds by the overseas promoters for the expenditure incurred.

(b) Verification and certification of the preincorporation/ pre-operative expenses by the statutory auditor.

(c) Payments should be made directly by the foreign investor to the company. Payments made through third parties citing the absence of a bank account or similar such reasons will not be eligible for issuance of shares towards FDI.

(d) The capitalisation should be completed within the stipulated period of 180 days permitted for retention of advance against equity under the extant FDI policy.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 73, dated 29-6-2011, Overseas Direct Investment — Liberalisation/Rationalisation.

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This Circular restates and consolidates the existing guidelines relating to:

(1) Transfer by way of sale of shares of a JV/ WOS not involving write-off of the investment.

(2) Transfer by way of sale of shares of a JV/ WOS involving write-off of the investment.

If the transaction does not fulfil the conditions mentioned under the Automatic Route, prior permission of RBI will need to be obtained before undertaking the same.

Indian Party is required to submit the details of divestment within 30 days from the date of divestment to RBI through its bank.

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Supreme Court upholds depositors’ protection laws of States

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The Supreme Court recently (K. K. Baskaran v. State rep. by its Secretary, Tamil Nadu & Ors., C.A. 2341 of 2011) upheld a fairly drastic, even if wellintended, State law for protection of depositors. This law was held to be unconstitutional by a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court and this decision has now been overturned by the Supreme Court. The importance of this decision for this column is particularly due to the fact that it applies to raising funds from the public in almost any form and not just in the form of ‘deposits’ as conventionally understood.

It is worth recounting briefly the background of this law, the circumstances of those times to understand the implications better.

The last few years of the preceding millennium saw a lot of companies and other entities raising monies in various forms at very ‘attractive’ rate of return and then defaulting. The monies were raised in innovative forms and not merely in the conventional form of raising of deposits, though of course, huge amounts were raised as deposits too. The series of defaults that followed revealed several things. Firstly, the promised ‘returns’ were high enough to be impossible to maintain at all times. Secondly, the businesses in which they were invested were risky, partly because the rate of return promised was high. Of course, some monies were straightaway siphoned off and huge commissions/ incentives were paid to agents. Thirdly, many of the schemes were purely ‘Ponzi’ schemes where fresh monies raised were the source of payment of ‘returns’ to earlier deposits, apart from return of principal.

The series of defaults and the resulting uproar resulted in several drastic laws being passed. The Reserve Bank of India Act was amended with strict provisions being inserted to regulate non-banking financial companies. SEBI notified its Regulations relating to Collective Investment Schemes which, ensured the closure of most of such schemes. However, at the State level, various States, over the following few years, passed laws for protection of depositors. Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Bihar, Gujarat, etc. were amongst such States [in Maharashtra, it was “the Maharashtra Protection of Interests of Depositors (in Financial Establishments) Act, 1999]. The broad model and most of the details of the laws of each of such States were more or less the same.

The basic scheme of the State Law was to give relief to the depositors where the monies were raised from them with a fraudulent intent. In case there was default due to this, the law provided for wide-ranging reliefs and punishment. The assets could be traced and attached, even if in other entities or in the names of the promoters/employees, etc. of the company. The definition of fraudulent intent was made artificially wide by including two situations. If monies were raised at returns that were commercially unviable, then the law deems that there was a fraudulent intent. Further, if the monies so raised were invested in businesses that were inherently risky, then, too, the law deems that the there was a fraudulent intent. The law covered corporate as well as several non-corporate entities such as individuals, firms, etc. Importantly, it covered even — corporates governed u/s. 58A of the Companies Act, 1956, and non-banking financial companies governed by regulations of the Reserve Bank of India.

The term ‘deposit’ is widely defined and would include monies in any form and not merely ‘public deposits’ or loans. However, there were certain exceptions provided for, but still, the definition was far wider than the word may normally convey. The law provided for appointment of an authority to take charge of the assets to ensure their disposal for meeting the liabilities to the depositors.

Stringent punishment was also provided. The State laws typically provide that in absence of special and adequate reasons, the punishment shall not be less than imprisonment of three years. The promoter, partner, director, manager or any other person or an employee responsible for the management or conducting the business of such entity is liable to be punished.

In case of default, not only the assets of the entity are to be attached, but if they are not sufficient, the properties of the director, partner or member of such entity can also be attached, if the State Government deems fit.

This law was challenged, inter alia, in the Bombay High Court. The Bombay High Court, by a Full Bench decision, held the law in Maharashtra to be unconstitutional (Shri Vijay C. Puljal v. State of Maharashtra, WP No. 5186 of 2001). However, a Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court upheld the constitutionality of the law in Tamil Nadu.

The decision of the Madras High Court was appealed against and the decision of the Bombay High Court was cited. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Madras High Court and held that of the Bombay High Court as not correct.

Various grounds were raised for holding the law to be unconstitutional including that the State had no power to enact such a law and that the other laws relating to deposits such as section 58A of the Companies Act, 1956, the Reserve Bank of India Act, etc. covered this field.

The Court gave the background in which the law by various States was enacted and particularly highlighted that the object of the Act and the reliefs provided thereunder were different from those under the RBI Act.

First, it described the background of the circumstances which necessitated such a law in the following words:

“The present case illustrates what has been going on in India for quite some time. Non-banking financial companies have duped thousands of innocent and gullible depositors of their hardearned money by promising high rates of interest on these deposits, and then done the moonlight flit, often disappearing into another State or even foreign countries leaving the depositors as well as the State police high and dry.”

The next contention was that: “the said Act is beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature as it falls within Entries 43, 44 and 45 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. It was also submitted that the impugned Act is liable to be struck down as the field of legislation is already occupied by legislation of the Parliament, being the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, Banking Regulation Act, 1949, the Indian Companies Act, 1956 and the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944 as made applicable by Criminal Law (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 1977.”

It was also contended that the Tamil Nadu Act was arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution.

The Court, applying the doctrine of pith and substance to consider under whose powers the field belonged, held that the State did have power to enact laws covering the field.

“12. As noted in the impugned judgment, the Tamil Nadu Act was not focussed on the transaction of banking or acceptance of deposits, but it is designed to protect the public from fraudulent financial establishments who defraud the public by offering lucrative returns on deposits and then disappear with the depositors’ money or refuse to return the same with interest. In our opinion, the impugned Tamil Nadu Act is in pith and substance relatable to Entries 1, 30 and 32 of the State List (List II) of The Seventh Schedule.”

“20. It may be noted that though there are some differences between the Tamil Nadu Act and the Maharashtra Act, they are minor differences, and hence the view we are taking herein will also apply in relation to the Maharashtra Act.”

“26. The doctrine of pith and substance means that an enactment which substantially falls within the powers expressly conferred by the Constitution upon a Legislature which enacted it cannot be held to be invalid merely because it incidentally encroaches on matters assigned to another Legislature.”

The Court then highlighted the objective of the State Law and also its different scope to distinguish this law from the other laws. It observed,:

“30. The Tamil Nadu Act was enacted to find out a solution for the problem of the depositors who were deceived on a large scale by the fraudulent activities of certain financial establishments. There was a disastrous consequence both in the economic as well as social life of such depositors who were exploited by false promise of high return of interest.

31.    By the impugned Act the State not only proposed to attach the properties of such fraudulent establishments and the mala fide transferees, but also provided for the sale of such properties and for distribution of the sale proceeds amongst the innocent depositors. Hence, in our opinion, the doctrine of occupied field or repugnancy, has no application in the present case.”

The Court even more specifically said that the other statutes that also provided for certain matters relating to depositors had different scope even if overlapping. However, since the State Law had a different angle and purpose, it had to be upheld.

“35. The Reserve Bank of India Act, the Banking Regulation Act and the Companies Act do not occupy the field which the impugned Tamil Nadu Act occupies, though the latter may incidentally trench upon the former. The main object of the Tamil Nadu Act is to provide a solution to wipe out the tears of several lakhs of depositors to realize their dues effectively and speedily from the fraudulent financial establishments which duped them or their vendees, without dragging them in a legal battle from pillar to post.”

Thus, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Tamil Nadu and the Maharashtra State laws for protection of depositors. Implicitly, this should mean that the corresponding laws in other States, being pari materia, may also be held to be constitutional.

The implications are quite far reaching because of the wide scope of the State Laws and the powers granted and also the deeming provisions contained therein. While the other laws restricting deposits provide for quantitative restrictions in the form of maximum interest rates, maximum deposits, etc., this law considers qualitative aspects. It considers the intent of the entity raising deposits including the unreasonableness of the returns promised and the nature of investments made. Further, the law can be invoked not just when there is a default, but even earlier if the conditions specified by the law are met.

In conclusion, an old, harsh and wide-ranging law is brought alive again and any entity raising monies in any form need to consider this law, though apparently it is intended to cover entities with fraudulent intent.

Part A: PART A: ORDER of CIC

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Section 24 and Schedule II and section 8(1)(g) & (h) and sections 4(i)(d), 10 and 22:

In the last RTI article of July 2011 in Part B it was reported that CBI is now exempted from RTI. I had also reported that in the Madras High Court the validity of the said Notification is challenged. Now it is learnt that the same is challenged also in the Delhi High Court.

Further development is that IC, Shailesh Gandhi on 1st July passed an order holding that the said Notification is ultra vires.

The complaint of Mr. Justice R. N. Mishra (Retired) v. PIO-CBI was made on 5-2-2011. While the Notification exempting CBI u/s. 24 of the RTI Act was issued on 9-6-2011. So firstly, IC held that the said Notification cannot be made retrospective. The order reads:

“It follows from the above that CBI has been brought within the Second Schedule of the RTI Act, thereby exempting it from the application of the RTI Act in accordance with section 24 of the RTI Act. However, on a plain reading of the Notification, it does not appear to have a retrospective effect. Reliance may be placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court of India in P. Mahendran v. State of Karnataka AIR 1990 SC 405, wherein it observed as follows:

“It is well-settled rule of construction that every statute or statutory rule is prospective, unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective effect. Unless there are words in the statute or in the rules showing the intention to affect existing rights, the Rule must be held to be prospective. If a Rule is expressed in language which is fairly capable of either interpretation it ought to be construed as prospective only. In the absence of any express provision or necessary intention, the rule cannot be given retrospective effect except in matter of procedure.”

The Notification was issued on 9-6-2011 and there is no express stipulation whatsoever, the Notification shall come into force with effect any date prior to 9-6-2011. Moreover, the Notification does not appear to indicate any intention of affecting existing rights and therefore, must be construed as prospective in nature. Hence, information sought in any RTI application filed prior to 9-6-2011 with CBI must be provided in accordance with the provisions of the RTI Act.

IC then examined whether the Notification itself is within the letter and spirit of the RTI Act. The Commission perused the CBI website to find out what are its functions. It then wrote:

“On careful perusal of the material, it can be ascertained that CBI was established for the special purposes of investigation of specific crimes including corruption, economic offences and special crimes. It continues to discharge its functions as a multi-disciplinary investigating agency and evolve more effective systems for investigation of specific crimes. Members of CBI have all the powers, duties, privileges and liabilities which police officers have in connection with the investigation of offences. There is no claim in its mandate and functions, as described above, that CBI is involved in intelligence gathering or is a security organisation. Even the additional functions performed by CBI other than investigation of crimes do not include any function which would lend it the character of an ‘intelligence or security organisation’ u/s. 24(2) of the RTI Act.”

“By enacting the Notification and bringing CBI within the Second Schedule, the Government appears to have increased the scope of section 24(2) of the RTI Act, which was not envisaged by the Parliament. Given the fact that the Right to Information is a fundamental right, any provision by which the said right is sought to be curtailed must be strictly construed. The Government, however, appears to have stretched the interpretation of section 24(2) of the RTI Act far beyond what the Parliament had intended, by including an investigating agency such as CBI within the Second Schedule, which was envisaged exclusively for intelligence or security organisations. The Government has read additional qualification into section 24(2) of the RTI Act which were hitherto not contemplated. By this method the Government could keep adding organisations to the Second Schedule, which do not meet the express criteria laid down in section 24(2) of the RTI Act and ultimately render the RTI Act ineffective. The Government cannot frustrate a law made by the Parliament by resorting to such colourable administrative fiat.”

“Therefore, by enacting the Notification and placing CBI in the Second Schedule, the Government appears to be claiming absolute secrecy for CBI without the sanction of law. The RTI Act was a promise to citizens by the Parliament of transparency and accountability. Given that the previous year has been characterised by unearthing of various scams in the Government which are being investigated by CBI, inclusion of CBI in the Second Schedule by the Government would be a step to avoid the gaze and monitoring of citizens in matters of corruption.”

Finally the Commission concluded:

“In view of the foregoing reasons, the Commission is of the view that the Notification is not in consonance with, either the letter or spirit of the RTI Act, — in particular section 24, — for the following reasons:

(1) As observed above, CBI is not an ‘intelligence or security organisation’, which requirement needs to be satisfied in order for it to be covered u/s. 24 of the RTI Act and therefore, it cannot be included in the Second Schedule.

(2) No reasons have been provided by the DoPT or the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, as required u/s. 4(1)(d) of the RTI Act, to justify the inclusion of CBI in the Second Schedule. In the absence of reasons, inclusion of CBI in the Second Schedule along with National Intelligence Agency and National Intelligence Grid appears to be an arbitrary act. The promise made to citizens u/s. 4(1)(d) of the RTI Act must be fulfilled.

This Commission rules that the said Notification of 9-6-2011 is not in consonance with the letter or spirit of section 24 of the RTI Act, since it constricts the citizen’s fundamental right in a manner not sanctioned by the law.”

CBI had before the Commission also submitted that in any case the information sought is exempt u/s.8(1)(g) and (h) of the RTI Act. The Commission also held that the said clauses also do not cover the denial of information sought by the applicant. Finally the Commission held:

“The Complaint is allowed.

The CPIO is directed to provide to the complainant copy of the FIR lodged by CBI. The CPIO is further directed to send copies of FR-I, FR-II and GEQD Expert report to the complainant. The information should be sent to the complainant after servering the names and other particulars of persons, the disclosure of which would endanger their life or physical safety or identify the source of information or assistance given in confidence for law enforcement or security purpose. The information as directed here should be sent to the complainant before 25th July 2011.”

Everyone is awaiting now the response of CBI to this decision.

This is a landmark decision and the full text is posted on the website of BCAS and PCGT.

[Mr. Justice R. N. Mishra (Retired), Allahabad v. PIO & Head of Branch, CBI Anti-Corruption Branch, Decision No. CIC/SM/C/2011/000117/SG/13230, dated 1-7-2011]

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Slum Redevelopment part I

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Introduction

‘Roti, Kapda aur Makaan’ are the three basic necessities in everyone’s life. While a good number of people in India have been fortunate in obtaining these necessities, there are several who have not been so successful. This has led to India and especially Mumbai having the unique distinction of housing some of the largest slums in the world. Mumbai has over 2,000 slum clusters, each of them housing over 100 to several thousand shanties. Slums and skyscrapers existing cheek by jowl in Mumbai are a common scenario. Slums are a hazard to society, environment and health. Considering these problems, the Maharashtra Government enacted the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 (‘the Act’). It is an Act to make a better provision for the improvement and clearance of slum areas in the State and for their redevelopment and for the protection of occupiers from forceful eviction. The shortage of land for development in Mumbai has forced developers to look at slum redevelopment as an active option. This has led to slum redevelopment schemes gaining popularity. According to a 2010 Research Report, 52% of the upcoming realty projects in Mumbai, spread over 8,600 acres, are slum redevelopment schemes. Another Research Report estimates the land value occupied by Mumbai slums to be Rs.1 lakh crore on a conservative basis.

Considering the rampant nature of slums across India, the Ministry of Housing & Urban Poverty Alleviation has come out with a Scheme titled the Rajiv Awas Yojana (‘RAY’) for slum dwellers and urban poor. It envisages States granting property for slum dwellers. The RAY envisages that each State would prepare a State Slum-free Plan of Action (‘POA’). The preparation of legislation for assignment of property rights to slum dwellers would be the first step for State POA. The POA would need to be in two parts, Part-1 regarding the upgradation of existing slums and Part-2 regarding the action to prevent new slums. In Part-1 the State would need to survey and map all exiting slums in selected cities proposed by the State for coverage under RAY. In Part-2 the Plan would need to assess the rate of growth of the city with a 20-year perspective, and based on the numbers specify the actions proposed to be taken to obtain commensurate lands or virtual lands and promote the construction of affordable EWS houses so as to stay abreast of the demand. The Centre intends to provide to States/UTs financial support and handholding/ capacity development support. The National Steering Committee for slum-free city planning — Rajiv Awas Yojana will monitor the financial and physical progress under the Scheme.

The Central Government approved the launch of the phase-1 of RAY in June 2011. As per the decision of the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs, the Centre will bear 50% of the cost of slum redevelopment. To encourage creation of affordable housing stock, the existing schemes of Affordable Housing in Partnership and Interest Subsidy Scheme for Housing the Urban Poor have been dovetailed into RAY. The Finance Minister has approved Rs.5,000 crores towards RAY under the 5-Year Plan up to 2012.

This Article aims to look at some of the crucial provisions under this very important Act and the process of slum improvement, clearance, redevelopment, etc.

Competent Authority

Under the Act, the State Government appoints one or more persons as the Competent Authority for administering the Act in various areas. For instance, for area belonging to MHADA, MHADA is the Competent Authority, and the Additional Collector, Mumbai is the Competent Authority for all lands in Mumbai city. Similarly, Competent Authorities are appointed for different areas in the State.

The Act also provides for the creation of a Slum Rehabilitation Authority (‘SRA’). The SRA is in charge of the Brihan Mumbai area and is headed by the Chief Minister of Maharashtra. The powers of the SRA are:

(a) To survey and review the existing position regarding slum areas;
(b) To formulate schemes for rehabilitation of slum areas;
(c) To get the slum rehabilitation schemes implemented;
(d) To do all such acts as are necessary for achieving the rehabilitation of slums.

By amendment to the Maharashtra Regional & Town Planning Act 1956, the Slum Rehabilitation Authority has been declared as a planning authority, to function as a local authority for the area under its jurisdiction. SRA has been empowered to prepare and submit proposals for modification to the Development Plan of Greater Mumbai. The SRA can declare any area as slum rehabilitation area for the rehabilitation of slums and in certain cases slum areas become slum rehabilitation area by means of deeming provisions. All such slum rehabilitation areas where slum rehabilitation schemes are proposed and being implemented, come under the jurisdiction of SRA.

The SRA can appoint officers and executives for its better functioning.

Slum rehabilitation area

Interestingly, the word ‘slum’ which is the edifice of this Act has not been defined under the Act. A slum rehabilitation area is an area declared to be one under a scheme. An area would be declared as a slum area if it fulfils the following conditions:

(i) It is a source of danger to the health, safety and convenience of the public because it has inadequate or no basic amenities, or it is insanitary, squalid, over-crowded, etc.

(ii) The buildings therein are unfit for human habitation or are dilapidated, over-crowded, lack ventilation/lighting/sanitation, etc.

Protection of occupiers

On and after the 2001 Amendment Act, protected occupiers cannot be evicted from their dwelling structure. Protected occupiers can be evicted if the State Government is of the opinion that it is necessary to do so.

An occupier has been defined to include the following:

(a) Any person who is paying the owner rent for the land or building;

(b) An owner is in occupation of his land or building;

(c) Rent-free tenant of any land or building;

(d) Licensee in occupation of any land or building; and

(e) Any person who is liable to pay to the owner damages for use and occupation of land or building. Owner has been defined under the Act to mean a person who receives rent of the land or building if it were let and includes:

(a) An agent/trustee who receives such rent on account of the owner (b) A Court-appointed receiver/manager (c) A mortgagee-in-possession. However, the definition of an owner excludes a Slumlord.

A Slumlord is defined to mean a person, who:

(a) Illegally takes possession of lands; or
(b) Enters into or creates illegal tenancies, leave and licence agreements, etc. on such lands; or (c) Constructs unauthorised structures for sale or hire; or
(d) Gives such lands on rental/licence for construction/occupation of unauthorised structures; or
(e) Knowingly gives financial aid to any person for the above; or
(f) Collects rent/charges from occupiers by criminal intimidation/use of force/illegal means.

No person can without the prior approval of the Competent Authority:

(a) institute any suit for the eviction of an occupier from any building or land in a slum area;
(b) apply to any Court for a distress warrant for rent arrears against any occupier.

Slum improvement

(a) If the Competent Authority is satisfied that any slum area is capable of being improved, then it may serve a notice to the owner of the property of its intention to carry out such improvement. It would invite objections and suggestions from them also.

(b) The final decision on whether to commence or abandon or modify/postpone the improve ment is that of the Competent Authority.
(c)    Improvement of the slums may consist of laying of water mainlines/sewers/drains; provision for sanitation facilities, wid ening of roads, street lighting, landscaping, providing social infrastructure, such as playgrounds, parks, police station, hospitals, etc.

(d)    For the above improvement, the Competent Authority may require the occupiers to vacate the premises occupied by them. It may as far as practicable offer alternative accommodation.

(e)    If buildings in a slum area are unfit for hu man habitation or any area is a source of danger to the health, safety and conve nience of the public, then the Competent Authority may serve a notice on the owner to execute such works of improvement as it deems fit.
 
(f)    It has powers to enforce the notice for carrying out works of improvement.

(g)    The Competent Authority may direct that no person shall erect any building in a slum area without its prior permission.

(h)    The Competent Authority can order that any building in a slum area which is not fit for human habitation should be demolished.


Slum clearance

U/s.11 of the Act, if the Competent Authority is satisfied that the most satisfactory method of dealing with a slum is the demolition of all the buildings in that area, then it may by an order direct that such area should be cleared of all buildings in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Such an order is known as a ‘clearance order’ and such area is known as a ‘clearance area’. It must also make provisions for accommodating those dishoused. The order is then forwarded to the Administrator appointed under the Act. The Administrator in Greater Bombay is a person not below the rank of a Divisional Commissioner. He may either confirm or vary or reject the clearance order.

Once an area has been cleared of its buildings, its owner may apply for redevelopment of the land. Alternatively, the Competent Authority itself may decide to redevelop the land at its cost, with prior approval of the Administrator.

Right to appear and practice — General power of attorney holder is not entitled to appear and argue — Advocates Act, 1961.

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[ Madupu Harinarayana v. The ld. 1st Addl. District Judge & Ors., AIR 2011 (NOC) 233 AP] A conspectus of Rules 1 and 2 of Order III of the Code of Civil Procedure, section 2(a) and sections 29, 30, 33, 34 of the Advocates Act, Rule 2 of Rules made by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh u/s. 34(1) of the Advocates Act and Code of Criminal Procedure would show that all the pleadings in a proceeding shall be made by the party in person, or by his recognised agent. A party in person, and a recognised agent, have to make an appointment in writing (vakalatnama) duly authorising the advocate to appear and argue the case. Only an advocate entered on the rolls of the Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh, who has been given vakalat and which has been accepted by such advocate, can have the right of audience on behalf of the party, or his recognised agent, who engaged the advocate. Sections 29 and 30 of the Advocates Act make it clear that advocates are the only recognised class of persons entitled to practise law, and such an advocate should have been enrolled as such under the Advocates Act. Section 32 of the Advocates Act empowers the Court to permit any non-advocate to appear in a particular case. This only means that any person has to seek prior permission of the Court to argue a case if he is not an advocate enrolled under the Advocates Act. Further, it is an offence for a non-advocate to practise under the provisions of the Advocates Act.

It is only advocates, whose names are entered on the rolls of the State Bar Council, who have the right to practise in any Court. If a person practises in any Court without any such authority, and without such an enrolment, it would be committing an offence u/s. 45 of the Act, punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months. Therefore GPA Shri T. D. Dayal was not entitled to appear and argue for the appellant. He had no right of audience in the case or any other case.

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Lubrizol Corporation USA v. ADIT ITA No. 7420/Mum./2010 Dated: 3-6-2011

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Section 195 — Article 5 of US DTAA — Sales, support and marketing activities of independent nature by an Indian affiliate — Not to result in PE for USCO — Contracts entered on principal to principal basis and all operations carried out and concluded outside India.

Facts:
The taxpayer was a manufacturer of high performance chemicals, a company incorporated in and a tax resident of the US (USCO).

Indian Company (ICO) was a JV between IOC (Indian Oil Corporation) and USCO. ICO was primarily engaged in the business of manufacture of various products. In addition, ICO also agreed to render to USCO assistance pursuant to an Exclusive Sales Representation Agreement. In terms of the agreement, ICO solicited orders for the products. All orders received by ICO were forwarded to USCO for acceptance or rejection and ICO did not have any authority in that regard or in regard to prices to be charged.

ICO was required to inform USCO of business opportunities; tenders and competitive bids received from customers, make reasonable efforts to promote sale and distribution of the products of USCO. ICO assumed no responsibility for the quality of the products, creditworthiness of customers etc. Service fees constituted very small portion of overall turnover of the company and was calculated based on shipments of the products resulting from orders which were submitted by ICO.

USCO was of the view that no income was taxable in India since (a) USCO did not carry on business in India; (b) Transfer Pricing Officer had accepted the price to be arms length. (c) In absence of any form of PE no part of income could be taxed in India. To support that there was no PE in India, USCO also urged that ICO could not be considered as dependent agent as it did not ‘secure orders’ on behalf of USCO.

The Assessing Officer took a view that ICO was a virtual projection of USCO in India and it constituted a sole/exclusive agency of USCO in India. Consequently profits being 5% of sales made by USCO were attributed in the hands of USCO, in addition to commission which was paid to ICO.

USCO filed objections before the Dispute Resolution Panel which upheld the order of Assessing Officer. On appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
ICO had an independent business of manufacture of various products in India. It had its own marketing network in India for sale of various products. Commission received by ICO in India accounts for only 0.18% of its sales. USCO did not have a PE in India as

(a) Sales were made on principal-to-principal basis to Indian customers.

(b) ICO did not have the authority to negotiate the terms of the contract and contracts were concluded only when the purchase order was accepted by USCO.

(c) USCO did nott have any right to use ICO’s premises in India.

Thus in absence of PE, no profits could be attributed to USCO and mere presence of someone acting on behalf of USCO was not sufficient to give rise to PE.

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ADIT v. ACM Shipping India Ltd. ITA No. 5085/Mum./2009 Dated: 10-6-2011

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Article 5(4), 7(1), 13(4) of India-UK DTAA, Section 195(2) of Income-tax Act — Commission earned by UK company from its Indian WOS for providing support services taxable as business income — Accrual by virtue of parent company’s business connection/operations in India — Circular No. 23, dated 23-7-1969 cannot be relied on after its withdrawal.

Facts:
UKCO is engaged in international business of shipbroking services and has an extensive worldwide network with international ship-owners. ICO, a wholly-owned Indian subsidiary of UKCO, is engaged in the business of ship-broking and transportation of cargo from India.

ICO entered into a service agreement with UKCO, in terms whereof UKCO was required to provide the following services:

— Identifying potential international ship-owners outside India and referring them to ICO and facilitating their interaction with ICO

— Co-coordinating with ship-owners regarding availability of ships on requisite dates.

As per the agreement, ICO was to pay 50% of commission earned to UKCO.

ICO applied to the Assessing Officer (AO) for remitting payments to UKCO, without deducting tax at source. ICO contended that the commission payable to UKCO was not chargeable to tax in India. The AO rejected the contentions of ICO and held that it was an agent of UKCO as it was effectively procuring business for UKCO. The activities of ICO were carried out wholly and exclusively for UKCO and commission payment to UKCO was 50% of overall commission of ICO’s income. Hence ICO triggered agency PE of UKCO in India and its profits attributable to Indian operations would be taxable in India. The CIT(A) held that commission received by UKCO was not taxable in India as it pertained to remuneration for commercial services rendered outside India.

On an appeal by the Department to the Tribunal:

Held:

Contention of ICO that commission was paid to UKCO for services rendered outside India and the customers instead of paying the commission to UKCO, directly paid UKCO through ICO was selfserving and without any substantive proof.

Commission paid to UKCO by ICO in respect of services may ultimately result in business to ICO in India and commission paid by ICO to UKCO accrued to UKCO by virtue of its business connection in India and the same is liable to tax as business income in India. Reliance on Circular No. 23 was not permissible as the same had been withdrawn in 2009. Even otherwise applicability of the Circular was doubtful as the same had been issued in the context of sale of goods and may not apply in a case of rendering of services.

However the fact that ICO was a wholly-owned subsidiary of UKCO and that ICO worked only for UKCO would have a substantial bearing on the case. In the light of the same, the case was remanded to the Assessing Officer to reconsider the issue.

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Hovels India Ltd. v. ACIT (2011) TII 96 ITAT-Del.-ITNL Dated: 27-5-2011

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Section 5(1), 9(1)(vii), 195 — Article 12 of India-US DTAA — Payment made to non-resident for product testing and certification — Services utilised by resident in a business or profession carried on or for making or earning income from source outside India — Onus on assessee to prove this fact — Onus discharged — No liability to deduct tax at source.

Facts:

Taxpayer (ICO) was engaged in the business of manufacturing electrical products including switchgears, electric fans, cables and wires. It paid to US-based company (USCO), a specialist in product testing and certification for electrical products, for getting its products tested and getting certification. This certification was necessary for enabling ICO to export its products to the USA and European Union (EU).

No tax was deducted at source on the ground that since testing of products was done in a laboratory outside India, no income had accrued or arisen to USCO in India. Further the payment was not in the nature of fees for included services in terms of India- USA DTAA. The Assessing Officer took the view that as the testing and certification of ICO’s products was required to be utilised in the manufacturing activity of ICO, the payment was covered by source rule of section 9(1)(vii) as ‘fees for technical services’ (FTS) and) the services and payments would also be covered under ‘fees for included services’, in terms of Article 12(4)(b) of the DTAA. The expenditure was disallowed u/s. 40(a)(i).

ICO also contended that the service was rendered and utilised outside India. The certification was required to enable ICO to export its products to the USA and EU and such certification was not required for sale of goods in India and the source rule exception u/s. 9(1)(vii)(b) would come into play.

The Assessing Officer rejected these contentions and the order of the AO was confirmed by the CIT(A). On appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

To seek exemption u/s.9(1)(vii)(b), onus was on ICO to prove that the services were utilised either in a business carried on outside India or for the purposes of making or earning any income from any source outside India.

The AO has not been able to bring anything on record to prove that the services have not been utilised outside India. He has not been able to rebut the representation of the taxpayer that certificates were required only for purposes of export. and that such certificates were utilised for export; and that they were not utilised for its business activities in India. Hence, onus which lies on the assessee was discharged. No tax withholding was required and disallowance u/s. 40(a)(i) was not sustainable.

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Recent Global Developments in International Taxation — part I

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In this Article, we have given brief information about the recent global developments in the sphere of international taxation which could be of relevance and use in day-to-day practice and which would keep the readers abreast with various happenings across the globe in the arena of international taxation. We intend to keep the readers informed about such developments from time to time in future.

(1) Australia

(i) Federal Court holds non-resident manager of portfolio of Australian shares for non-resident companies liable to tax in Australia

The Federal Court on 8th September 2010 handed down a decision in Leighton v. FCT, (2010) FCA 1086 that dealt with taxation in Australia of a non-resident manager who was managing a portfolio of Australian shares for two non-resident companies.

Briefly, Mr. Leighton was, during the relevant period, a resident of Monaco and was not a resident of Australia. He was engaged by two companies, who were not tax resident in Australia and were incorporated in the British Virgin Islands and the Bahamas, to manage a portfolio of Australian shares for them and to provide other services incidental to the management services. Mr. Leighton opened a bank account in Australia and engaged a number of Australian brokers and an Australian custodian. The trading instructions were given by Mr. Leighton, on behalf of the two companies, from Monaco. The trading activities generated taxable income during the relevant period.

Non-residents are subject to tax in Australia only on income sourced in Australia. The judgment does not discuss whether the relevant income has a source in Australia and, presumably, assumes that it does.

After considering the facts, the judgment concludes that Mr. Leighton, in acting as a manager, was, during the relevant period, a trustee of a trust for the non-resident companies as beneficiaries. As such, he is liable for tax for the taxable profits under former section 98(3) of the Income Tax Assessment Act, 1936.

(ii) Treaty between Australia and US: US LLC disregarded under treaty

The Australian Taxation Office released Interpretative Decision ATO ID 2010/188 that confirms that:

— A limited liability company (LLC) incorporated in the United States that has a single owner and is disregarded as an entity separate from the owner for the US tax purposes, is not a resident of the US under the tax treaty between Australia and the US.

However, — where the single owner is a treaty resident of the US, it may be entitled to benefits under the treaty in respect of income derived by the LLC.

(iii) ATO rules on private equity investments into Australia: revenue/capital distinction; treaty shopping; source rules; treaty protection

On 11th November 2010, the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) released two final determinations and two draft determinations that deal with taxation of private equity investments into Australia.

Two final determinations were released in draft in 2009 after an unsuccessful attempt by the ATO to collect AUD 678 million in tax and penalties from the TPG Group in respect of the listing of the Myer group in Australia. By the time the ATO issued the assessments, the funds had left Australia. It has been reported that the ATO has yet to collect the outstanding debt.

(iv) Foreign Managed Fund Exemption announced

The Assistant Treasurer announced that taxation law will be amended to implement a new foreign managed fund exemption. The exemption, called the Investment Manager Regime, is intended to apply to investment income of foreign managed funds that is attributable to a permanent establishment in Australia arising from the activities in Australia of a dependent agent of the fund.

It appears that the exemption will apply to tax treaty investors only. Fund management fees will continue to be subject to tax in Australia.

(v) Taxation of trusts clarified by Federal Court

The Federal Court handed down a decision in Colonial First State Investments Limited v. FCT, (2011) FCA 16 that deals with taxation of net income of unit trusts. Specifically, the judgment deals with the effect of a change in a trust deed on the income of beneficiaries of the trust in case of redemption of units. The changes of the deed were affecting both redeeming and remaining unit holders.

(vi) Non-resident may be required to withhold income tax, FBT

The Australian Taxation Office released Taxation Determination TD 2011/1 that expresses a view that where a non-resident entity pays an Australian resident for work performed overseas, the nonresident entity may be required to withhold income tax under the Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) provisions and become subject to Fringe Benefits Tax (FBT) if the non-resident entity has a sufficient connection with Australia, such as, for example, a physical presence in Australia.

The Taxation Determination also states that if the foreign entity does not have PAYG obligations, it will not be subject to FBT.

(vii) Final ruling on business restructures and transfer pricing released

The Australian Taxation Office (ATO) has released Taxation Ruling TR 2011/1, which deals with the application of domestic transfer pricing provisions and Australian tax treaties to business restructuring. The ruling was previously released as Draft Taxation Ruling TR 2010/D2 and expresses a view that in applying to business restructuring arrangements, both domestic transfer pricing provisions and associated enterprises articles of Australia’s tax treaties require following the arm’s-length principle and therefore the 3-step process adopted by the ATO to transfer pricing analysis should equally be applied to business restructuring.

(viii) NDF execution is not trading in currency

The Australian Taxation Office (ATO) released an Interpretative Decision (ID) ATO ID 2011/27 stating that execution of non-deliverable forwards (NDF) is not trading in currency or rights in respect of currency.

In reaching this decision, the ATO noted that NDSs are very similar to wagering contracts and relied on an 19th century judgement for a definition. Further, the connection with the reference currency is too remote for an NDF to confer a right in respect of a currency.

The implication of this ID would be that income from executing NDFs with residents would not qualify for a reduced income tax rate of 10% under the Offshore Banking Unit (OBU) rules.

(ix) Final ruling on interaction of thin capitalisation and transfer pricing rules issued

The Australian Taxation Office (ATO) released final ruling TR 2010/7 on the interaction between the transfer pricing and thin capitalisation provisions. The ruling was previously released in draft as TR 2009/D6 (see TNS: 2009-12-21: AU-2), and was not substantially changed from the earlier draft ruling.

Briefly, the ATO expresses a view that the transfer pricing provisions may apply to a loan that satisfies the safe harbour test under the thin capitalisation provisions. As such, loans should be priced based on commercially realistic outcome. This may include consideration of parental affiliation, as well as other circumstances of the parties (including, for example, the ability of the borrower to borrow from unrelated third parties or prevailing market and economic conditions).

The ruling has retrospective application.

(2) United States

(i) Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 signed

President Obama signed the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 (H.R. 5297) into law on 27th September 2010. Significant business tax measures of the Act are summarised below.

— The Act temporarily excludes 100% of the gain from the sale of qualified small business stock held at least five years.

— The Act extends the carryback period for eligible small business credits from one year to five years.

— The Act allows eligible small business credits to offset both regular and alternative minimum tax liability.

—  The Act temporarily reduces the recognition period to five years for built-in gains of Sub-chapter S corporations that convert from prior Subchapter C status.

— The Act increases the maximum amount a taxpayer may elect to deduct in connection with the cost of qualifying section 179 property placed in service in 2010 and 2011 to USD 500,000. The maximum amount is phased out by the amount by which the cost of qualifying property exceeds USD 2 million. The Act temporarily expands the definition of qualifying section 179 property to include certain real property, i.e., qualified leasehold improvement property, qualified restaurant property, and qualified retail improvement property. The maximum amount of deduction for such real property is USD 250,000.

— The Act extends the additional first-year depreciation deduction which is allowed equal to 50% of the adjusted basis of qualified property placed in service through 2010.

—  The Act increases the maximum amount that a taxpayer may deduct in connection with trade or business start-up expenditures from USD

5,000 to USD 10,000. The maximum amount is phased out by the amount by which the cost of start-up expenditures exceeds USD 60,000, increased from USD 50,000.

— The Act revises the penalties that may be imposed for failure to disclose a reportable transaction to the IRS.

— The Act allows self-employed individuals to deduct the cost of health insurance for themselves and their spouses, dependents, and any children under age 27 for purposes of the social security and Medicare taxes imposed by the Self-Employment Contribution Act (SECA).

— The Act removes cell phones and similar telecommunications equipment from the definition of listed property so that the heightened sub-stantiation requirements and special depreciation rules do not apply.

— The Act imposes the same information reporting requirements (i.e., IRS Form 990-MISC) on tax-payers who are recipients of rental income from real estate as are imposed on taxpayers engaged in a trade or business, with a few exceptions.

— The Act treats as US-source income amounts received, whether directly or indirectly, from a non-corporate US resident or a US domestic corporation for the provision of a guarantee of indebtedness of such person.

— The Act increases the amount of the required estimated tax payments otherwise due by large corporations in July, August, or September, 2015, by 36 percentage points.

A complete description of the provisions of the Act is included in the technical explanation prepared by the US Joint Committee on Taxation (JCX-47-10). The White House also issued a press release with a summary of the principal business provisions that are included in the Act.

(ii)    IRS confirms withdrawal of proposed trans-fer pricing regulations on controlled services transactions and intangibles

The US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has issued Announcement 2010-60 confirming its withdrawal of proposed regulations issued on 10 September 2003 regarding the treatment of controlled services transactions and the allocation of income from intangibles u/s. 482 of the US Internal Revenue Code.

The proposed regulations were withdrawn due to the subsequent issuance of final regulations on these topics on 4th August 2009.

The withdrawal was previously announced on 7th September 2010 in the US Federal Register. For a report, see TNS: 2010-09-09: US-1.

(iii)    IRS announces non-acquiescence in VERITAS transfer pricing case

The US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has issued an Action on Decision (AOD) announcing that it does not acquiesce in the result or the reasoning of the US Tax Court’s decision in VERITAS Software Corporation and Subsidiaries v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 133 T.C. No. 14 (Docket No. 12075-06, 10 December 2009), reported in TNS: 2009-12-21: US-1.

(iv)    Guidance issued on FTC splitting transactions

The US Treasury Department and Internal Revenue Service (IRS) have issued Notice 2010-92 (the Notice) with guidance on foreign tax credit (FTC) splitting transactions. These are transactions in which the FTC is separated (i.e., split) from the associated foreign income and claimed by a US taxpayer prior to the tax year in which such income is subject to tax in the United States.

(v)    Proposed regulations extend reporting re-quirements for US bank interest paid to all non-residents

The US Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) have issued proposed regulations u/s. 6049 of the US Internal Revenue Code (returns regarding payments of interest). The proposed regulations provide guidance on the information reporting requirements for interest paid to non-resident individuals on deposits maintained at US offices of specified financial institutions.

The regulations are proposed to be effective for payments made after 31st December of the year in which the regulations are adopted as final.

The US Treasury Department and the IRS have requested comments on the regulations and a public hearing is scheduled for 28th April 2011.

(vi)    US Treasury Department reissues list of boycott countries that result in restriction of US tax benefits

The US Treasury Department has reissued its list of the countries that require cooperation with or participation in an international boycott as a condition of doing business. The countries listed are Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the United Arab Emirates and the Republic of Yemen. The Treasury Department stated that Iraq was not included in the list but that its future status remained under review. The list is dated 19th January 2011 and was published in the Federal Register on 28th January 2011. The new list is unchanged from the list issued on 23rd November 2010.

(vii)    IRS issues updated Publication 514 — Foreign Tax Credit for Individuals

The US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has released the 2011 revision of Publication 514 (Foreign Tax Credit for Individuals). The Publication is dated 27th January 2011 and is intended for use in preparing 2010 tax returns.

(viii)    IRS announces 2011 offshore voluntary disclosure initiative

The US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has announced a second special voluntary disclosure initiative designed to bring offshore money back into the US tax system and help people with undisclosed income from hidden offshore accounts get current with their taxes (News Release IR-2011-14). The new initiative, called the 2011 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Initiative (OVDI), is available through 31st August 2011.

Taxpayers participating in the 2011 OVDI must file all original and amended tax returns and pay back-taxes and interest for up to eight years as well as accuracy-related and/or delinquency penalties by the deadline.

The overall penalty structure for the 2011 OVDI is higher than the 2009 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program. As a result, taxpayers who did not come forward through the 2009 OVDP, which ended on 15th October 2009, will not be rewarded for procrastinating.
    
The 2011 OVDI imposes a 25% penalty on the amount in the foreign bank accounts in the year with the highest aggregate account balance between 2003 and 2010. Taxpayers in limited situations may be eligible for lower penalties of 5% or 12.5%.

A taxpayer can qualify for a 5% penalty if the taxpayer meets all the following cumulative conditions:

—  the taxpayer did not open the account;

— the taxpayer has exercised minimal and infrequent contact with the account;

— the taxpayer has not withdrawn more than USD 1,000 from the account in any year covered by the 2011 OVDI; and

— the taxpayer can establish that all applicable US taxes have been paid on funds deposited to the account.

The 5% penalty also applies to taxpayers who are foreign residents and who were unaware they were US citizens.

Taxpayers whose offshore accounts or assets did not exceed USD 75,000 in any calendar year covered by the 2011 OVDI can qualify for a 12.5% penalty.

According the IRS News Release, taxpayers hiding assets offshore who do not come forward will risk far higher penalties as well as the possibility of criminal prosecution.

The IRS has also launched a new section on its website (www.IRS.gov) that contains the full terms and conditions of the 2011 OVDI, including:

— an extensive set of Q&A’s for frequently asked questions and answers;

— the procedures for a voluntary disclosure, including contact points and mailing addresses; and

— a list of documents, worksheets, and forms needed to participate in the 2011 OVDI.

The IRS website also includes information on the 2009 OVDP.

(ix)    IRS issues updated Publication 513 — Tax information for visitors to US

The US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has released the 2011 revision of Publication 513 (Tax Information for Visitors to the United States). The publication is dated 23rd February 2011 and is intended for use in preparing 2010 tax returns.

(x)    IRS issues updated Publication 515 — Withholding of Tax on Non-resident Aliens and Foreign Entities

The US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has released the 2011 revision of Publication 515 (Withholding of Tax on Non-resident Aliens and Foreign Entities). The publication is dated 11th March 2011 and is intended for use in 2011.

Publication 515 provides guidance for withholding agents who pay income to foreign persons, including non-resident aliens, foreign corporations, foreign partnerships, foreign trusts, foreign estates, foreign governments and international organisations.

(xi)    IRS announces availability of IRS Free File for US taxpayers abroad

The US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has announced that US taxpayers abroad can now use IRS Free File to prepare their US tax returns and then e-file them free of charge (News Release IR-2011-30). Free File will be available until 17th October 2011 in order to accommodate overseas taxpayers who file on or before the regular deadline of 15th June 2011 as well as taxpayers who claim the six-month extension.

(xii)    IRS releases frequently asked questions on reporting uncertain tax positions

The US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has issued seven frequently asked questions (FAQs) regarding the requirement to report uncertain tax positions (UTPs) on IRS Schedule UTP. The FAQs are intended to supplement the information contained in the 2010 instructions and in the other guidance issued on Schedule UTP.

The IRS noted that additional FAQs on Schedule UTP may be forthcoming.

(xiii)    US Treasury issues final regulations on reporting foreign financial accounts

The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) of the US Department of the Treasury has issued final regulations amending the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) regulations regarding reports of foreign financial accounts. Under the BSA regulations, a US person having a financial interest in or signature or other authority over financial accounts in a foreign country is required to report such accounts by filing Form TD-F 90-22.1, Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR), and to maintain the records of the accounts for five years. No report is required if the aggregate value of the accounts does not exceed USD 10,000.

(xiv)    US individuals sentenced for hiding assets offshore

The US Department of Justice (DOJ) and the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) announced that US Federal District Court judges sentenced US individuals to three years probation for hiding assets in offshore bank accounts (DOJ Press Releases dated 4th March 2011 and 14th March 2011).

(3)    Indonesia

(i)    Introduction of transfer pricing regulations The Director General of Taxation (DGT) has introduced transfer pricing (TP) regulations for Indonesian taxpayers, via Regulation No. PER-43/PJ/2010 which took effect on 6th September 2010. The Regulations are based significantly on the OECD’s TP Guidelines, and its main contents are summarised below.

Scope

The Regulations apply to transactions between related parties which have an impact on the reporting of income or expenses for corporate tax purposes, including:

— the sale, transfer, purchase or acquisition of tangible goods and/or intangible goods;

— payments of rental fees, royalties, or other payments for the provision of or use of both tangible and intangible property;

— income received or costs incurred for the provi-sion of or utilisation of services;

—  cost allocations; and

— the transfer or acquisition of property in the form of a financial instrument, as well as income or costs from the transfer or acquisition of the financial instrument.

The Regulations also endorse the five OECD TP methods, and specifically state that the hierarchy is as follows:

— comparable uncontrolled price (CUP) method;

—  resale price method (RPM);

—  cost plus method (CPM);

—  profit split method (PSM); and

—  transactional net margin method (TNMM).

(ii)    Guidelines for implementing CFC rule

The Tax Office issued Regulation PER-59/PJ/2010 on 30th December 2010, which provides further guidance on the implementation of the controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rule. The CFC rule applies to all Indonesian investment in all foreign countries, except where the foreign company’s shares are listed on a recognised stock exchange.

The salient points of the Regulation are summarised below:

— qualifying shareholders are deemed to receive dividends from the CFC;

— in the fourth month after the annual corporate income tax return deadline, or

— seven months from the end of the financial year, where (i) the company is not obliged to file a tax return or (ii) where the tax filing deadline is not stipulated;

— the deemed dividends are calculated based on the shareholding percentage and the CFC’s after-tax profits;

— the dividends must be reported by the shareholders in the annual corporate income tax returns together with the CFC’s financial statements;

— the CFC rule does not apply if the CFC has distributed dividends to the qualifying shareholders consistently with the prescribed formula and before the above-mentioned deadline;

— dividends received in excess of the deemed dividends must be reported in the shareholders’ corporate income tax returns in the year the dividends are distributed; and

— a foreign tax credit is available on foreign tax paid or withheld on the dividend.

Acknowledgement
We have compiled the above information from the Tax News Service of the IBFD for the months of October, 2010 to March, 2011.

Consulting engineers included in the list of service taxpayers on receipt basis.

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Notification No. 41/2011-ST, dated 27th June, 2011 has been issued amending the Point of Taxation Rules, 2011 to include the taxable service provided by consulting engineers into the category of services in respect whereof tax payment will continue to be on cash basis.
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Implementation of service tax levy on transportation of goods by rail deferred once again — Notification No. 38/2011, 39/2011 and 40/2011-Service Tax, all dated 14-6-2011.

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The Central Government has issued the above three Notifications to further defer the levy of service tax on transportation of goods by rail to January, 2012 by amending the earlier Notification Nos. 7/2010, 8/2010 & 9/2010-Service Tax, all dated 27th February, 2010. However, even after the levy becomes effective rail transportation of defence and military equipments, postal mail bags, luggage of train passengers, food grains, pulses, petroleum products for the public distribution system, organic and chemical manure, motor vehicles, etc. would be exempted from levy. Further 70% abatement norms too would now come into force from 1st January, 2012.
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‘Consumables’ vis-à-vis taxable Works Contracts

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Introduction After works contract transactions were brought under sales tax laws by deeming fiction inserted by clause (29A) in Article 366 of the Constitution of India, the controversy has still continued about the nature of taxable works contract. The transaction becomes taxable works contract transaction, if there is transfer of property in goods, in the execution of works contract, from the contractor to the contractee. The issues are not very much debatable if the transfer of property in goods is apparent. Like, a building contractor may use cement and other building material for construction of a building for which a contract is awarded to him by the contractee. In this case, there is no debate as there is transfer of property in cement and other building material from the contractor to the contractee. It is very apparent and hence it becomes a taxable works contract. The issue arises when the fact towards transfer of property is not apparent and it has to be ascertained on peculiar facts of the case.

Nature of charges allowable as deduction for deciding taxable value of the contract The works contract, being a composite contract, the labour portion also referred to as ‘Service Component’, is required to be deducted from the total value of the contract to arrive at value of the goods transferred. The tax is leviable on such reduced portion. In Gannon Dunkerley & Co. v. State of Rajasthan, (88 STC 204), the Supreme Court, for deciding the value of goods involved in the execution of works contract on which sales tax can be levied, laid down as under:

“The value of the goods involved in the execution of a works contract will, therefore, have to be determined by taking into account the value of the entire works contract and deducting therefrom the charges towards labour and services which would cover:

(a) labour charges for execution of the works;
(b) amount paid to a sub-contractor for labour and services;
(c) charges for planning, designing and architect’s fees;
(d) charges for obtaining on hire or otherwise machinery and tools used for the execution of the works contract;
(e) cost of consumables such as water, electricity, fuel, etc., used in the execution of the works contract the property in which is not transferred in the course of execution of a works contract;
(f) cost of establishment of the contractor to the extent it is relatable to supply of labour and services;
(g) other similar expenses relatable to supply of labour and services; and
(h) profit earned by the contractor to the extent it is relatable to supply of labour and services.

The amounts deductible under these heads will have to be determined in the light of the facts of a particular case, on the basis of the material produced by the contractor.”

One of the items deductible from the contract value is value of consumables. Therefore, if the goods used are proved to be consumable items, then it will be allowed as deduction and if that is the only material used (which is allowed as consumables), then there will not be any transfer of property from contractor to contractee and the whole transaction will be out of scope of taxable works contract under sales tax laws. The issue is about meaning to be assigned to ‘consumables’.

Meaning of consumables Recently, the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court had an occasion to decide the above issue. The reference is to the judgment in case of M/s. Enviro Chemicals v. State of Kerala, (39 VST 434).

In this case, the dealer had used his chemicals for treatment of effluent water coming out of the factory of the contractee, who had awarded this contract to him. The process of treatment is narrated in the judgment as under:

“From the collection tank, the wastewater is pumped at a uniform rate to the flash mixer and subjected to chemical treatment. The chemical is a combination of ferrous sulphate, ferrous chloride and sulphuric acid. These chemicals are obtained by the petitioner from effluents discharge from Travancore Titanium Products. An addition of required dosage of lime is also added. The chemical mixture is named by the assessee as Envirofloc. Due to this, coagulation of the suspended particles and precipitation of dissolved organics take place. The solid particles settle at the bottom and the clear liquid overflows. The overflow from the Clariflocculator is taken to the aeration tank and subjected to activated sludge process. Oxygen is supplied by means of surface aerators.

The overflow from the aeration tank is sent to the hopper bottom settling tank. The outlet of the secondary settling tank is the treated effluent which is discharged to the river and it will be odourless. It will not contain chemicals or any pollutant.”

Considering that no property in the chemicals used is passed to the contractee, the plea of the appellant dealer was that there is no taxable works contract. It was argued that the chemicals used get consumed in the process and hence there is no transfer of property to the contractee so as to constitute taxable works contract under sales tax laws. As there were differing judgments, the issue was referred to the Larger Bench. The Larger Bench has decided the issue by majority.

The Larger Bench has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Xerox Modicorp Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (142 STC 209). In relation to ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the above judgment, the High Court has observed as under:

“13. After having considered the entire case law cited before us and on a conspectus of the provisions, we would think that the learned Special Government Pleader is right in his contention based on the decision of the Apex Court in Xerox Modicorp Ltd.’s case 142 STC 209. It is no doubt true that the contract as such is not placed before us, if it is one which is reduced to writing. But we will proceed on the basis that the process involved is substantially the same as has been indicated by the assessee and which we have extracted. It is undoubtedly true that even after the 46th amendment, sales tax cannot be levied merely because there is a works contract. There must be transfer of property in the form of goods or otherwise than in the form of goods. What is taxable is the transfer of property in goods (See the definition of sale in the Act in this regard). It does not matter whether the transfer of property takes place in the form of goods or in any other form. It is undoubtedly also true that in view of the decision of the Apex Court in M/s. Gannon Dunkerley & Co. and Others v. State of Rajasthan and Others, [1993 (1) SCC 364] that the cost of consumables involved in works contract cannot be taxed.

14.    That the chemical in question is goods, is beyond doubt. It cannot be disputed that the assessee was the owner of the goods in question, namely, the chemical. It is obviously the intention of the parties that the assessee must use the chemical in the effluent treatment process. It is equally indisputable that the assessee has actually used it. No doubt, in the judgment of the Apex Court in Xerox Modicorp Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, [(2005) 142 STC 209], the Apex Court found that the toners and developers are liquids put into the xerox machine and they perform essentially the same function as ink in the printers and the Court also relied on the provision in the contract that the assessees in the said case would charge for the unaccounted stock at prevailing prices. By using the chemical, the petitioner/assessee rendered the effluent compliant with the standards. It could probably be said that in the case of the toner and developers as the function is that of ink in printers, it shows up in the final product of the xerox machines. But, the decision of the Apex Court is not based on there being any requirement that the items which are used should exist in any form in the resultant product, which is the principle laid down by this Court in Teaktex Processing Complex Limited v. State of Kerala, [(2004) 136 STC 435] and also in Microtrol Sterilisation Services Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Kerala, [(2009) 26 VST 213 (Ker.)].”

After referring to the above ratio, in relation to the facts of the dealer in this case, the High Court has observed as under:

“16. When the assessee has used it, will it remain the owner of the chemical any longer? Will not the property in the goods pass to the awarder? We would think that the moment the assessee pours the chemicals into the effluent, he will cease to be the owner and at that point of time the awarder must be deemed to have taken delivery of the same. In our view the fact that upon it being poured into the effluent, it loses its identity and that it is consumed will not detract from the fact that there is delivery of the same to the awarder. The assessee does not have a case that the effluent belongs to the assessee. We do not think that it can be their case that the effluent does not belong to the awarder. Let us pose a question, if a complaint by a third party is raised about the treated effluent, can the awarder absolve itself of the ownership of the same? We would think, it may not be possible. Therefore we would be justified in holding that the effluent and the treated effluent both belonged to the awarder. It is, therefore, into the property of the awarder, namely, the effluent that the assessee supplies the chemical. The Apex Court in its decision in Gannon Dunkerley & Co. v. State of Rajasthan & Others, [(1993) 1 SCC 364] had, inter alia, held that cost of consumables, such as water, electricity, fuel, etc. used in the execution of the works contract, the property in which is not transferred in the course of execution of a works contract, is to be deducted. In section 5C also, the words “not involving any transfer of property in goods” have been incorporated. Just like the toner and developer having been put into xerox machine becoming the property of the customer in the case before the Apex Court in Xerox Modicorp Ltd. case and the sale taking place before the goods are consumed, in the same way, the property in the chemical passed to the awarder the moment they are put into the effluent by the assessee and its subsequent consumption is the consumption after sale and it does not detract from the factum of sale and consequently the exigibility to tax becomes unquestionable.”

Conclusion
The above judgment throws new dimension to the concept of consumables. It appears that if the goods used are consumed without involving into the actual execution, then it will be deductible as consumable. Like, fuel, which is used for running the machinery with which contract may be executed. The fuel is not getting directly involved in the works contract. However, if the goods used directly take part in the contract and which directly or indirectly interact with the materials of the party, then even if they ultimately get consumed, it will be consumable for the contractee, but for the contractor it may amount to transfer of property to the contractee, whereby he will be considered as liable to works contract. It may however be noted that the dissenting Judge has accepted the argument of the dealer that since there is no transfer of property to contractee, there is no taxable works contract. However by majority the transaction is held as taxable. The judgment will have a very substantial impact in the matter of interpretation of nature of taxable works contract.

(2011) 38 VST 392 (Gauhati) Bharat Press v. State of Assam and Others

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VAT-TDS — Exemption — Clarification by Commissioner prevails unless set aside by appropriate authority or Court of Law — Sections 9 and 105 of Assam Value Added Tax Act, 2003.

Facts :
The dealer filed writ petition before the Gauhati High Court against the order passed by the Deputy Secretary to the Government of Assam, Election Department denying exemption to the dealer from paying VAT on printing of compendium, handbook, manuals, etc. in connection with general elections to Lok Sabha, 2009. The dealer had done printing works and supplied it to the Government of Assam and submitted bills without charging tax, being exempt from payment of tax under Schedule Entry 5 of the First Schedule of the Assam VAT Act. Under the said Entry, no tax is payable on sale of ‘Books, Periodicals and Journals.’ The Govt. of Assam informed the dealer that the payment of bills to him will be subject to deduction of VAT. The dealer then sought clarification from the Commissioner of Sales Tax for rate of tax on items supplied, who on physical verification of samples, held that goods supplied by the petitioner to the Govt of Assam are books and exempt from payment of tax, being covered by Schedule Entry 5 of the First Schedule. Despite this the Deputy Secretary to the Government of Assam turned down the request of the petitioner for no deduction of tax from the payment of bills of the petitioner. The dealer filed writ petition before the Gauhati High Court. The High Court allowed the writ.

Held :
The Commissioner of Sales Tax in his order came to the conclusion that the materials supplied by the petitioner are bound books with cover as per Entry at serial No. 5 of the First Schedule, those are exempt from payment of VAT. When the taxing authority exercising his statutory power u/s.105 of the Act is of the opinion that the supplied materials are not taxable, then whoever may be the authority higher in position is not entitled to set at naught the said order, unless the same is quashed by the appropriate Appellate Authority or by a Court of law. The High Court allowed the writ petition.

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Bell Ceramics Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Transaction-3) Bangalore, (2011) 38 VST 388 (Kar.).

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Inter-State sale — Claim of sale against Form C — Cancellation of registration from 1-7-2002 — Rejection of claim not valid for sale subsequent to the date of cancellation where the assessee had no knowledge of it — Section 8 of the CST Act, 1956.

Facts :
The dealer claimed inter-State sale of goods taxable at concessional rate of 4% against form C during the period of assessment for the year 2002-2003. The registration of the purchasing dealer was cancelled from 1-7-2002, therefore, the Department disallowed the inter-State sales against form C effected after 1-7-2002 i.e. after the date of cancellation of registration certificate of the purchasing dealer. In appeal filed before the Tribunal, the disallowance of such claim was confirmed. The dealer filed revision petition before the High Court. The High Court held in favour of the dealer.

Held :
When the purchasing dealer had issued C form for the subsequent period after the date of cancellation of registration and the selling dealer had claimed concessional rate of tax without knowledge as to whether the purchasing dealer has ceased to exist from July 1, 2002, then it cannot be held that the C forms issued by the purchasing dealer are invalid.

It is not for the assessee to actually find out as the registered dealer was in existence as on the date, when the sales were effected when in fact, the registered dealer who is the purchaser has issued C forms to the assessee.

If at all there has been any violation committed by the purchaser, the selling dealer cannot be found fault with, since it was the duty of the purchaser to have informed the petitioner about its ceasing to be in existence and thereby not issuing C forms. The High Court allowed the petition accordingly in favour of the dealer.

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(2011) 38 VST 336 (All) CTT v. Advance Spectra Tec (P) Ltd.

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Works contract — Receipt of goods dispatched from branch outside the State and used in works contract — Inter-state sale — Not liable to tax in the state where used in works contract — Section 3 of the CST Act 1956, section 3F(2)(b)(i) of UP Trade Tax Act, 1948.

Facts :
The dealer was a contractor registered in UP having its office outside the State of UP. For the purpose of execution of works contract in UP the dealer procured material within the State of UP as well as received material from its office outside the State of UP. The Department levied tax under UP Trade Tax Act on value of material received from its office outside the State of UP, which was successfully challenged before the Tribunal. The Tribunal held that the value of goods used in the execution of works contract received from a place outside the State of UP as stock transfer is exempt from payment of tax u/s.3F(2)(b)(i) of the UP Trade Tax Act, 1948. The Department filed revision appeal before the Allahabad High Court against the judgment of the Tribunal.

Held :

Under section 3F of the UP Act, every dealer is liable to pay tax on the net turnover of the transfer of goods involved in execution of works contract, but the amounts representing the sales value of the goods which are covered by sections 3, 4 and 5 of the CST Act, 1956 are deductible from the said turnover in determining the tax liability.

In Santosh and Company v. Commissioner of Trade Tax, (1999) UPTC 823, it was held that the value of the goods brought from outside UP and consumed in UP in works contract is deductible u/s.3F(2)(b) (i) of the UP Act. Following this judgment, the Court held that goods received by the dealer as stock transfer from his office situated outside UP and consumed for execution of pre-existing works contract amounts to sale or purchase of goods in the course of inter-State trade or commerce which is covered u/s.3 of the CST Act. The value of such goods is therefore liable to be deducted u/s.3(F)(2)(b)(i) of the UP Act from net turnover of the assessee. Accordingly the judgment of the Tribunal was confirmed.

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(2011) 38 VST 275 (Bom.) Deepmani v. State of Maharashtra

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Export or goods — Sale of goods to foreigngoing person — Not exempt — Section 5(1) of the CST Act.

Penalty without detailed reasons — Penalty not leviable — Section 9 of the CST Act read with section 36(2)(c) of the BST Act.

Facts :
The dealer claimed exemption from payment of tax on sale of goods to foreign-going person, where delivery of goods is given before the custom area, but payment is received in foreign currency, u/s.5(1) of the CST Act being sale of goods in the course of export, which was disallowed and confirmed by the Tribunal. The Bombay High Court, in reference application filed by the dealer u/s.61 of the BST Act, confirmed the order of the Tribunal.

Held :
The sale of goods is complete, the movement goods were segregated for sale and amount of sale consideration was paid in shop. The delivery of goods was to be given just before the custom area. Therefore, the sale was complete with the factum of delivery of goods. There was no compulsion on the purchaser to export it. Absence of export was not to nullify the transaction of sale.

In order to claim sale of goods as exempt being sale in the course of export, the crucial fact is the sending of goods to a foreign destination where they would be received as imports. In absence of proof of export of goods and no material to prove that it was impossible to divert goods, the claim of export was held as properly disallowed by the Tribunal.

As regards levy of penalty u/s.36(2)(c) of the BST Act for concealment of particulars of sale and purchases liable to tax, the High Court held that the Revenue has to establish that the assessee has knowingly furnished inaccurate particulars of any transaction as such liable to tax. The assessee has relied on interpretation of the provisions which involved complexity of principals of interpretation. The Court while deciding the first issue was required to go into the details of the constitutional provisions followed by various judgments of the Apex Court as well as of this Court. Therefore levy of penalty u/s.36(2)(c) of the BST Act retained by the Tribunal was not confirmed.

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Greek dangers

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If there were to be any reason for the government to arrest the policy drift of recent months, it should be the darkening international horizon. Late last week, the International Monetary Fund warned that risks to the global economy have increased.

The possibility of Greece debt crisis morphing into something more contagious cannot be ruled out. Japan is still struggling with spending cuts after the nuclear accident there. Look anywhere — US spending, China’s housing boom going awry and elsewhere — chances are that the global economy is on the edge again.

It makes much sense to set one’s own house in order. India needs to set many things right — from fuel pricing to inflation to deficit spending. It is, of course, in no way comparable with the Greek situation. And that is not the point. The issue is to be prepared to face uncertainty in the world economy and also any unforeseen external shocks.

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Rich getting richer: 120k Indians hold a third of national income.

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Last year may have been a cruel year for much of the country with slow growth and doubledigit food inflation, but India’s high net worth individuals (HNWIs) prospered — just over 1,20,000 in number or 0.01% of the population their combined worth is close to one-third of India’s Gross National Income.

HNWIs, in this context, are defined as those having investable assets of $ 1 million or more, excluding primary residence, collectibles, consumables, and consumer durables.

According to the 2009 Asia-Pacific Wealth Report, brought out by financial services firms Capgemini and Merrill Lynch Wealth Management, at the peak of the recession in 2008, India had 84,000 HNWIs with a combined net worth of $ 310 billion. To put that figure in perspective, it was just under a third of India’s market capitalisation, that is, the total value of all companies listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange — as of end-March 2008. The average worth of each HNWI was Rs.16.6 crore.

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Double dip ahead

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The real estate market in India is heading for what looks like a double dip. After correcting somewhat from the sharp setback suffered in 2008, with some sectors managing to exceed previous peak prices in 2010, the sector entered 2011 with cautious optimism. But halfway through the year, the outlook has turned distinctly sombre. The current economic deceleration is pouring cold water on demand for office space, always driven by the overall economic climate. The retail segment has yet to absorb the excess supply that has characterised it since the last slowdown. But it is the bread and butter affordable-to-middle volume part of the residential segment that has suffered a clear setback with successive policy rate increases raising interest rates and equated monthly instalments (EMIs) and the promise of more to come. Banks, which had already turned cautious about lending to developers on receiving the signal from the banking regulator, are likely to become even more careful. Private equity, the only hope for cash-strapped developers facing sluggish demand, is unlikely to throw out a lifeline, since they do not relish being locked into a medium-term plateau if not trough.

It’s ironic that there is an astronomical unmet demand for livable urban space among all except the very rich, and it is a colossal failure of both the government and developers that an enormous business opportunity, which can make everyone better off, is not being created out of it. Despite the abolition of the Urban Land Ceiling Act in most parts of the country, there is no perceptible increase in urban land supply which can make possible large additions to affordable housing. This is because urban planning is not promoting mixed development sufficiently, nor is urban infrastructure being built keeping in mind transportation links between new residential areas and job centres. Even under these circumstances, the middle class would pay through the nose for a place to live in the hope of capital gains over time. But there are dampeners galore. Not satisfied with raising EMIs, banks are turning more cautious in the face of regulatory exhortations to be mindful of rising non-performing asset levels. Plus, there is a mountain of anecdotal evidence of how buyers are short-changed by developers.

A Bill to codify customer rights and offer recourse through the creation of a regulator has been hanging fire for a decade. Developers are opposing it tooth and nail and political leaders are in no hurry to upset them. Developers have a point when they say that the need to secure multiple sanctions delays projects and adds to costs. But the existing crop of developers has got into the business with its eyes open. It is popularly believed that they are both repositories and launderers of politicians’ black money. Thus, entrenched corruption at the grass roots (those who process the multiple sanctions required) and protection from top are blocking change and reform. With the central government appearing paralysed by fear of decisive action on such issues, it can only be hoped that some of the more confident and politically secure chief ministers will take the initiative for policy reform.

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PM-in-hiding

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Twenty years ago, Manmohan Singh was a man with a mission. After his first Budget as finance minister, he barged into a post-Budget press conference called by his officials, to personally explain what he was doing. He gave lengthy interviews; he spoke from virtually every available platform, to get across the need for change. Later, when Narasimha Rao announced a series of Independence Day handouts, Dr. Singh gave an interview to say that the country could not spend its way to prosperity (Sonia Gandhi, please note). And towards the end of the Rao government’s tenure, when the atmosphere became thick with deal-making, he spoke out courageously against crony capitalism.

The contrast with today could not be more striking, as the country seems to have a prime minister-inhiding. You see him seated at meetings, looking a trifle lost, or mouthing homilies at government functions (the MAFA syndrome — mistaking articulation for action). Other than that, he is both invisible and silent. This is no way to lead.

If his government is paralysed by inaction, and tarred comprehensively with the corruption brush, it is because Dr. Singh has not been true to his instincts, and too timid as the head of the government. Dayanidhi Maran as a stripling minister wrote to him in 2006, complaining that spectrum pricing should be left to him, not handed over to a group of ministers. Dr. Singh meekly acquiesced. Mani Shankar Aiyar wrote to him two years before the Commonwealth Games, i.e., before the bloated and wasteful spending began, to complain about Mr. Kalmadi’s budget-inflating habits. Yet Mr. Kalmadi was allowed to go his merry way till the damage was done.

When A. Raja cocked a snook at him, what was the response? Dr. Singh’s private secretary made the telltale request that the prime minister’s office be kept at arm’s length. In other words, he knew that skullduggery was going on, but wanted to turn a blind eye. On the spectrum scandal, he himself has explained that once two of his ministerial colleagues were in agreement, he did not think he could intervene! And now it transpires that a former secretary in the finance ministry (E. A. S. Sarma) wrote repeatedly to the prime minister, over two years, warning him of undue favours being done to private gas concessionaires like Reliance and Cairn, at the cost of the exchequer. He never got even a routine acknowledgement. Was Dr. Singh too scared to ask Murli Deora?

So the prime minister cannot say that he did not know. In every case, he was informed, and he chose to do nothing. This is not because he was corrupt; even his worst critics will not say that. Perhaps he felt there was no choice in a coalition other than to turn a blind eye to some goings-on (he once said something like “I am not in the business of losing my government’s majority”). But if an honest and public-spirited man allows scamsters around him to flourish, the stage comes when personal honesty is no longer a valid defence. And belated action under public and court pressure provides no absolution.

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Stop appointing retired officials as Regulators — Recommendation part of Moily’s 10-point agenda to curb corruption

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Law Minister M. Veerappa Moily wants the government to stop the practice of appointing retired bureaucrats as regulators. The proposal is part of a 10-point agenda prepared by him to improve governance and curb corruption.

The agenda has been discussed with the advisor to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on public information, infrastructure and innovations, Sam Pitroda, and Planning Commission member Arun Maira and has been submitted to the Prime Minister.

Moily, who was also Chairman of the second Administrative Reforms Commission, has pointed out that in view of the experience of the existing statutory regulators with retired officers and judges, the job of regulators should be restricted to serving officers and judges in order to improve accountability.

He has stressed this would need to be supplemented through a carefully planned capacitybuilding exercise at periodic intervals, which will bring in domain expertise and enthusiasm in the regulatory system, which is currently lacking. Other recommendations in the 10-point agenda includes a legislation on the lines of US False Claims Act, providing for citizens and civil society groups to seek legal relief in the cases of fraudulent claims against the government.

The proposed law would allow any citizen to bring a suit against any person or agency for a false claim against the government. If the false claim is established in a court of law, the person or agency responsible will be liable for penalty equal to five times the loss sustained by the exchequer or society.

Bringing in the Right to Service, various steps for improving urban land management, measures for improving administration in areas dominated by Naxals and tribals, a performance-related tenure of the government functionaries for making them more accountable, codification of guiding principles in a Civil Service Law, suggestions on functioning of Lok Pal and Lokayukta and unity of command and enforcement and accountability are also included in the 10-point agenda.

For ensuring integrity in appointment to public offices, Moily has suggested that charge-sheeted persons should not be considered for appointment. “This principle should be made applicable for persons contesting elections, also.”

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Managing the Mudrochs — Media markets must remain competitive and open

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The latest controversy in the British media, triggered by unethical professional practices by journalists at Rupert Murdoch’s News of the World, holds important lessons for the Indian media, and not just because Mr. Murdoch has a significant presence in India and seeks more. The most important lesson is that public policy must prevent the emergence of all powerful media moguls like Mr. Murdoch. The extent of concentration in the Indian media, at both the national and regional level, has grown alarmingly. Regrettably, such growth in size and revenue has not always contributed to good journalism, as we now see in Britain, and as is obvious in India. Unlike in many other branches of business, in media there is no evidence that with size of business and operation comes either quality or reliability.

The dominance of one business group in one segment of the media is dangerous, so is the increasing control of such dominant players across different segments of the media, namely, print, television and radio. While the Government has not come forward with the promised broadcast Bill yet, the new FM radio policy has shied away from more stringent curbs on cross-media ownership. The ‘play safe’ policy of auctioning licences to the highest bidder has been preferred obviously because of the controversy surrounding telecom licences, but there is a downside to ‘transparent auctioning’ in the media business. It can privilege the powerful. Companies with deep pockets end up pocketing licences in the name of so-called transparency. A more confident government would have laid down other criteria too, including restricting cross-media ownership.

The sharp practices by Mr. Murdoch’s men and women in Britain draw attention to the hubris of a media intoxicated by power, made worse by the direct control that owners often exercise over editorial content. The consequent blurring of lines between the business bottom line and the editorial line is an assault on the idea of media as the ‘fourth estate’ in a democracy. The Indian media has its Murdochs in every language publication and news channel. While the dominance of one or two media groups in each state and language market has not come in the way of a thousand flowers blooming, it has forced a large number of smaller players to become pawns in the hands of other business persons with deep pockets.

The Niira Radia tapes controversy in India drew attention to some of the unsavoury aspects of a nexus involving professional journalists, owners, politicians and business persons. This is only the tip of the iceberg. In various Indian states, the situation is worse with many Indian language media groups. The number of powerful politicians and business persons owning and openly controlling as well as manipulating the media is on the increase. The controversy surrounding former Union Minister Dayanidhi Maran is an example of the media baron-politician-business person nexus. The Murdoch murk in Britain is a reminder of what could happen in India in the absence of regulation, rules of the game and codes of conduct aimed at preventing such unfair professional and business practices.

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Will the SIT on black money solve the problem?

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It is fundamental indeed that the Constitution empowers the Supreme Court to make orders necessary to ensure that public interest is served. The Parliament and State Legislatures are given powers to make laws and courts are constituted to enforce them. There is no possibility of a conflict of interest or of the jurisdiction of Court and Legislatures if they keep their functions strictly within the limits prescribed by the Constitution or the laws made under it.

Why, then, is there discord or murmur when courts issue orders commanding the authorities to enforce laws and in cases in which such authorities, particularly executive authorities, fail to act in national and public interest? It will not be correct to say that in making such orders Courts encroach on the jurisdiction of either the Legislature or the executive authorities who are empowered to act for enforcing such provisions.

No one can say depositing money and transactions and deposits in a foreign bank in violation of laws should be ignored and such violators allowed to go free without being punished and that it will not affect national security and public interest. Against this background, let us appreciate the value of the appointment of the Special Investigation Team (SIT) by the Supreme Court to ensure that laws are implemented and black money is brought under proper action.

The point that the appointment of an SIT is innovative is uncalled for and misconceived. The Court has appointed an SIT, for example, to investigate the Gujarat riot cases. This is the first time, however, that the Court has appointed an SIT in a case associated with finance and black money. This has been done in the interest of the State and public interest. When the authorities concerned have failed to act, setting up an SIT is a noble cause and a step that urgently needed to be taken. Arguments that there are agencies assigned for such work and the Court should have exercised discretion to direct any such authority to take steps instead of appointing an SIT are also uncalled for. The Bench of Judges that has passed this order was also conscious of this fact. The SIT is constituted by taking officers from all such relevant agencies. Since any such agencies have limited powers, one or the other agency alone may not be able to locate and find black money, fix responsibility for violations and prosecute.

No one should feel hurt if a Court asks authorities to act in the interest of the State and public interest. After all, the Court has issued such orders only when others designated to act failed to do so. Such orders are a welcome relief in the prevailing situation.

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Returns Procesed by CPC – clarifications from CPC to representation by BCAS

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Dear Members,

Considering the problems pointed out by you in relation to intimations received from the Centralised Processing Centre (CPC), Bangalore, the Taxation Committee of the Society had taken up the various issues for discussion with them, and some of the members had visited Bangalore to discuss the various issues with the CPC at their invitation. We are happy to inform you that the Commissioner of Income Tax, CPC, Bangalore not only gave a patient hearing to the representatives of the Society, but also shared various other aspects of functioning of the CPC and difficulties being faced by the CPC due to its limited mandate. Some of the points that he made would facilitate improved e filing of tax returns by members.

We enclose a copy of the representation made to CPC, their responses to the issues raised, minutes of the meeting with the CIT, CPC, and a copy of instructions given to Assessing Officers by the CPC with regard to uploading of outstanding demands.

We hope you will find these useful while e filing the returns of income, and while making online applications for rectification.

We intend to take up some of these issues further with the appropriate authorities, in view of the clarifications received.

Note : We publish herewith the responses of the CPC. The other documents are available on the web site of BCAS

Returns Procesed by CPC – clarifications from CPC to representation by BCAS Pradip Thanawala President Gautam Nayak Chairman Taxation C0mmittee

Representation of Bombay Chartered Accountants Society To CPC on problem faced by the taxpayers and responses of CPC

1. TDS and Advance tax/ Self-assessment tax credit:

Issue by Bombay Chartered Accountants (BCA)

In many cases, the assessees have been granted short/ no credit for TDS, advance Tax or/and self assessment tax as compared to what has been claimed in the Return of Income filed by them.

Response by CPC Centralised Processing Centre (CPC)

The credit for OLTAS payments are considered to extent claimed in the return and available in 26AS as on the date of processing is allowed subject the details of payments in the return being correct. We have noticed tax payment (Advance Tax, SAT) mismatch due to following mistakes:

1. Date of credit is entered in MM/DD/YYYY or YYYY/ MM/DD format where it is required in DD/MM/ YYYY format in the return.

2. The amount paid is rounded off to nearest 10, where the amount should be exact. Many people pay-7,899 to Bank and claim 7,900 or 7,890 which is not allowed. Amount should correct.

3. BSR codes are quoted incorrectly.

4. Date of deposit of cheque is mentioned while date of credit is required.

BCA: Also, in certain cases, the credit for taxes paid as per Form 26AS have also not been granted. Thus, there is no clarity amongst tax payers as to on what basis credit is granted by the CPC for tax payments

CPC: The difference when there is payments shown in 26AS but not considered in processing is mainly due to incorrect entry of points mentioned in 1(i) above. Many times it is noticed that payments claimed are made in respect of incorrect PANs, for different assessment year, for different purpose (people make payment under minor code 400 (tax on regular assessment) even before an intimation or assessment is made. Actually they are paying SAT(Minor code -300). Considering the magnitude of mismatch pertaining to Minor Code 300 and 400, changes are being made to take into consideration credits available in either minor codes. Rectifications may be filed and credit would be given to SAT wrongly paid as Regular tax (minor head 400)

BCA: Further, in certain cases, credit has been given as per Form 26AS. However, the TDS credit claimed by the assessee based on the original certificates available with him/her is greater than that seen in Form 26AS, which might be due to the errors/ non-filing of the TDS return on part of the deductor. In such cases, the only way that remains for claiming the TDS credit is to produce the original TDS certificates for the said amount to the relevant Authority. However, there is lack of clarity regarding the location (regional jurisdiction or CPC – Bangalore) where the said certificates need to be produced.

CPC:
AO can pass further rectification based on the verification of TDS certificates. CPC has processed cases only where TDS credit is covered by TDS guidelines.

BCA: There could be a difference in the year of deduction of TDS, and the year in which credit for TDS is to be granted. This could arise in the case of advances received, where TDS is deducted at the time of receipt, but credit is available in the year in which the income is offered to tax. This could also arise in a situation where the Deductor is following the mercantile system of accounting and the recipient is following the cash method of accounting, or vice versa. In such cases, the tax credit for the said period as per Form 26AS becomes irrelevant. Thus, in such a case, it becomes necessary for the department to understand the manner in which the income is offered to tax and the TDS credit to be given. However, once again, the problem persists as to where the rectification/explanation needs to be given – to the jurisdictional Assessing Officer or to the CPC.

CPC: AO can pass further rectification based on the verification of TDS certificates. CPC has processed cases only where TDS credit is covered by TDS guidelines.

BCA: Consequent to the above, there is incorrect calculation of interest u/s 234A/ 234B/ 234C/ 244A.

CPC: Consequential but once rectification is completed the computations are set right.

2. Adjustment of incorrect demands of earlier years:

In certain cases, certain erroneous demands for the previous years have been incorrectly adjusted against the refund for the year for which intimation is issued. Following are the issues relating to the same:

Arrear demand adjustment will continue to happen as per update uploaded by AO. Assessee will be able to get his refund from the AO who had uploaded the arrear. Eg. For a record of A.Y. 2009-10 where refund arose, if there is a arrear for A.Y. 2003-04, the amount of arrear has been paid by the refund of A.Y. 2009-10, so the assessee can get his refund for A.Y. 2003-04 once the demand if any is nullified by rectification which has to be done by the AO since A.Y. 2003-04 records are available with AO.

BCA: The main reason for such incorrect adjustment seems to be that the demands have been uploaded by Assessing Officers as per their records without proper verification as to the correctness of the outstanding demand. It is essential that all such demands uploaded in the system be reversed, and demands be uploaded only after verification by the Assessing Officer and certification of correctness of demand by the Additional Commissioner. In case of demands raised in the future, they should be uploaded after certification by the Commissioner that there are no pending rectification applications/appellate effects to be given in respect of such demands.

CPC: All arrear demands are adjusted based on data uploaded by respective Assessing Officers. Sufficient training has been given to them to make sure only correct data is uploaded. We are continuously training them appropriately.

BCA:
No advance intimation is given to the assessee before making the adjustment as required by section 245. Such adjustment is therefore not in accordance with law. It is therefore suggested that an e-mail be sent to the assessee before such adjustment, giving him an opportunity as required by the section. In case the assessee points out that there is a pending rectification application/appellate effect to be given with proof in support thereof or that he has not received the relevant notice of demand so far, then no adjustment should be made, and the matter should be taken up by the CPC with the concerned CIT.

CPC: The AO has been given clear instructions to completely verify and authenticate the arrear demand before upload. As a part of this process the AO is expected to contact the taxpayer and confirm the arrear position. Only subsequent to this the arrear demand is uploaded by AO to CPC. Therefore, CPC (having concurrent jurisdiction over the taxpayer along with AO) intimates the taxpayer about the arrear demand adjustment. AOs will be instructed to clarify to the taxpayer that arrear demand (communicated by AO to taxpayer shall be treated as intimation u/s. 245 and CPC (having concurrent jurisdiction) shall adjust this demand against any refund due.


BCA:
In some cases, the assessee has not received any intimation/notice of demand raising the above-mentioned demand. As a result of this, the manner in which the amount of demand is computed is not known to the assessee. Also, the assessee does not have access to the database of the income – tax showing the said demand. Thereby the assessee has to go through hardships of establishing the reasons/ records for the aforesaid erroneous demand.

CPC:
The intimation in all the cases is sent by email, in case of failure due to bouncing of email, the intimation is sent by speed post. In all cases of demand the intimation along with demand notice is sent by email and paper intimation through speed post. It is important that all assessee fill up the email correctly, so that these intimations are received.

BCA: In certain cases, intimation/order for the year in which the demand is raised has been received by the assessee. In most cases, the demands have arisen on account of non granting of credit for TDS, Advance Tax and/or Self Assessment Tax. In most cases, the assessee would have already filed a rectification application against the said incorrect demand. It appears that the various Assessing Officers have, without considering these pending rectification applications, uploaded these erroneous demands onto the Income Tax Database.

CPC: Answered as above.

BCA: In some cases, intimation for the year in which the demand is raised has been received by the assessee. Subsequent to this, the case is taken up for scrutiny and an order under section 143(3) has been passed which shows a ‘Nil’ demand. However, the department has not made the required changes in the data base and accordingly an incorrect demand appears which is wrongly adjusted.

CPC: Same as above. It is the AO’s responsibility to upload only ‘correct’ arrears. In fact AO’s have been clearly instructed not to upload any demand that is stayed or covered by instalments.

BCA: Further, the delay in attending to rectifications of up to 6 months results in incorrect demands being adjusted.

CPC: Online rectification is much faster to process than request received through mail. Rectifications are being expedited

3.    Wrong adjustments while computing income:

BCA: In cases where the assessee has business income and income from other sources, income from other sources is deducted from the Profit and Loss a/c and taken separately under the head ‘Income from Other Sources’ by the assessee. However, as per the intima-tion u/s 143(1), the said income is taxed twice as it is included in the Profit & Loss A/c as well as Income from Other Sources. Similar is the position as regards capital gains, which forms part of profits as per Profit & Loss Account, but which is treated as exempt income or is taxed under the head “Capital Gains”. Such capital gains is also taxed as profits and gains of business.

CPC: The assessee is expected to offer income from Part A P&L Profit before tax in schedule BP and in schedule BP he has to reduce the income offered for taxation under heads of income as provided Sl. 3. When this is not done, there will be taxation twice for all other heads of income which form part of Part A P&L. If depreciation schedules (DEP/DPM/ DOA) are not filled then depreciation is not allowed, depreciation claimed in P&L but not in schedule is not allowable, Depreciation claimed in P&L is supposed to be added back in Schedule BP and depreciation as per IT RULES must be taken into account. This is not done in many cases leading to addition of depreciation from P&L. In schedule BP profit before tax (PBT) should be taken but assessee took Profit after tax so income tax is added back to reach on PBT.

4    No column in ITR forms for set off of unabsorbed Depreciation of earlier years

It has been provided in schedule CFL, which is the place where Carried forward losses in the column: Unabsorbed Non Speculative are to be mentioned for adjustment in Schedule BFLA.

BCA: There is no distinction made between unabsorbed losses and unabsorbed depreciation in the CFL schedule in the ITR. Thus, the assessee faces a problem when he wants to claim only unabsorbed depreciation, which is not time bound.

CPC: Under e-filing, total of unabsorbed depreciation (beyond eight years) has been advised to be entered in the earliest year permissible in CFL schedule. This will allow system to compute adjustment correctly.

5    Wrong computation of interest u/s 234A/ 234B/ 234C/ 244A:

BCA: In some cases, there is incorrect computation of the interest u/s 234A/ 234B/ 234C/ 244A.

CPC: Needs to be looked at case by case.

6    Correspondence with the staff:

BCA: Since the CPC appears to be manned by a call centre, there is no option available to a tax payer in terms of corresponding with anyone in particular at the CPC office. The executive attending queries changes every time the assessee calls and thus a follow up for anything becomes impossible and tiresome as one has to explain the same case all over again. It is therefore suggested that a ticket number should be allotted for each complaint, and record of that complaint and follow up thereon be maintained by the call centre in its system, which will facilitate follow up by the assessee in subsequent calls.

CPC: Ticketing system is already in place and is used by the call center. A call center agent has access to data on all past interactions with the assessee.

BCA: Also, the call centre staff are not fully conversant with the intricacies of the tax returns, and therefore are able to answer only very basic queries. It is suggested that in case a taxpayer is unable to get his queries resolved by the call centre staff, he should be given the option of escalating the issue to a tax officer, who is aware of the intricacies of e-filed returns.

CPC: We have three levels of ticketing praticed by the Call Center.

  •     Level 1 – Consists of queries which are handled directly by the agents.

  •    Level 2 – Consists of queries which are handled by the respective process owners.

  •     Level 3 – Gets escalated to the income tax officer.

7    Special rates of tax:

BCA: In certain cases, where there is Long Term Capital Gain which is set-off against Long Term Capital Losses of earlier years and the Net Long Term Capital Gain becomes NIL, the software used by the CPC for processing the returns has still levied special rate tax on it, without considering the set-off.

CPC: This is due to incorrect entry of section codes in schedule SI. Use of wrong section codes is one of the main reason for income being increased.

8    Rectifications:

BCA: Online Rectifications are not carried out promptly, with time taken from three to sixmonths.

CPC: Initially there were problems in processing them quicker than three months. Now the process has stabilised and the processing is much faster. The delay is largely due to non receipt of Response sheet which has to be filed by taxpayer to complete rectification process in case of any change in bank account particulars. Many people are filing rectification in case of refund failure or due to change in bank details.

BCA: Very often, the rectified order is received without any corrections, except for additional interest being charged.

CPC: In case rectification is due to tax payments mis-match, then the taxpayer is required to file rectification after confirming the credit position and also should re verify the details provided in the return as there could be an issue with both. No additional interest is being charged.

BCA: Once a rectified intimation is received, there is no provision for further rectification of this intimation, as the system does not permit such further rectification applications. The system should be modified to permit such further rectification within the specified time limit permitted by law.

CPC: The multiple rectification facility will be available shortly.

Modifications to form for availability/change of name and increase in fees effective 24th July 2011.

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Vide notification dated 14th July 2011, the Ministry has made certain modifications to the Form 1A — Form for application for name of new company or change of name of existing company, if certified by a practising professional, it will be processed and examined electronically and the name will be approved online. The fees are now increased to Rs.1000.

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Name Availability Guidelines, 2011 effective 24 July 2011.

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has vide General Circular No 45/2011- dated 8th July 2011 issued the Name Availability Guidelines, and the applicants and the Registrar of Companies are advised to adhere to them while applying for or approving a name.

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PAN to be updated by DIN and DPIN holders.

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All DIN holders and DPIN holders need to intimate vide DIN4 their PAN by 30th September, 2011, failing which their DPIN/DIN will be disabled and they will also be liable for a heavy penalty.

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Recovery of debt — DRT has no jurisdiction to prohibit borrower from leaving country without prior permission of Tribunal — Constitution of India, Article 21 — Debts Recovery Tribunal Act, 1993.

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[ State Bank of India v. Prafulchandra V. Patel & Ors., AIR 2011 Gujarat 81]

The appellant State Bank of India preferred application before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Ahmedabad. Though a prayer was made to restrain the defendant borrowers from leaving India without prior permission of the DRT, originally no such order was passed.

The case was not decided for more than six years. After 6 years, the bank filed an interlocutory application for various interim reliefs including the direction to the Regional Passport Authorities to provide passport numbers and addresses of the defendant borrowers, for bringing them from the USA to India and for a direction to surrender the passports. Further prayer was made to direct the defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 3 not to leave India without prior permission of the DRT. The DRT, passed certain interim orders and also restrained defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 3 from leaving India without prior permission of the Tribunal. The borrowers preferred appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. The Appellate Tribunal in its order observed that the borrowers, had not approached the Tribunal for seeking permission to leave the country, and further observed that they could approach the DRT, justifying the travel abroad and seek permission accordingly. At this stage the borrowers filed a writ petition holding that — DRT had no power to control physical movements or to impound the passport. The bank filed appeal against this order.

The Court observed that Article 21 of the Constitution safeguards the right to go abroad against executive interference which is not supported by law; and law here means ‘enacted law’ or ‘State law’. Thus, no person can be deprived of his right to go abroad unless there is a law made by the state prescribing the procedure for so depriving him and the deprivation is effected strictly in accordance with such procedure.

Sub-sections (12), (13A), (17) and (18) of section 19 do not empower the Tribunal to issue any prohibitory order prohibiting the borrower from leaving the country without prior permission. Section 22 deals with the procedure and powers of the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal. It relates to summoning and enforcing the attendance, requiring the discovery and production of documents, receiving evidence on affidavits, issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents, reviewing its decisions, dismissing an application for default or deciding it ex parte, setting aside any order of dismissal of any application for default or any order passed by it ex parte, or any other matter which may be prescribed, but no provision has been made therein or by a separate Notification issued by the Central Govt. empowering the Tribunal to deprive a person of his personal liberty to move abroad as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In absence of any such ‘Enacted Law’ or ‘State Law’, it was held that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to deprive the defendants, the respondents herein, of their right to go abroad.

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International Arbitration — Jurisdiction of Indian Court ousted — Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 section 37(2)(b).

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[ Yograj Infrastructure Ltd. v. Ssangyong Engineering & Const. Co. Ltd., AIR 2011 (NOC) 189 (MP)]

Though contractual work under work order has been carried out in territorial jurisdiction of India the parties had agreed to refer their dispute to arbitration in Singapore in accordance with Singapore International Arbitration Center (SAIC) Rules. According to the said Rule during subsisting of arbitration proceedings under such rules, law of arbitration shall be governed by the International Arbitration Act. Any of party aggrieved by any interim ruling or order of arbitrator, may resort remedy for under Rule 32 of SIAC Rules of the International Arbitration Act. International Arbitration Act (2002 Ed. Statutes of the Republic of Singapore), Chap. 143A, Rule 32 deals with Jurisdiction of the Court. Where parties agreed to refer dispute to arbitration in Singapore in accordance with SIAC rules, whereby during subsisting arbitration proceedings, jurisdiction of the Indian Court was expressly or impliedly ousted. Arbitration being carried out by arbitrator according with SIAC rules. Indian courts has no jurisdiction to entertain any appeal against award of arbitrator. After referring dispute to the arbitrator, parties could not be permitted to approach Court in India, specially when the parties are bound by SIAC Rules. The same cannot be challenged under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 or any other enactment except the International Arbitration Act. No appeal would lie u/s.37(2)(b) of the Act of 1996.

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Guarantor — Recovery of loan — Corporation cannot sell out properties mortgaged to it by guarantors — State Financial Corporation Act — Section 29, section 31.

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[Gunamani Swain & Ors. v. Orissa State Financial Corporation & Ors., AIR 2011 Orissa 83]

The properties in question were the ancestral properties of one the late Manmohan Swain. One Smt. Sanjukata Swain purchased a TATA truck by availing a loan from Orissa State Financial Corporation (‘OSFC’). Accordingly, an agreement was entered into between the parties. In the said loan, the late Manmohan Swain, and other two persons, namely, Ganeswar Swain and Ghanashyam Swain stood as guarantors and created equitable mortgage in respect of the properties in question in favour of OSFC. Since the loan amount was not paid, the OSFC published a notice for sale of the mortgaged properties in the newspaper. The said properties were put to auction and the sale was finalised in favour of Shri Subhransu Sekhar Padhi for a total consideration of Rs.10,09,000. Pursuant to such sale, sale deed was executed between OSFC and Shri Subhansu. Thereafter, OSFC sent a notice by Registered Post to the petitioner Prafulla Chandra Swain, the son of the late Manmohan Swain to take refund of Rs.2,85,486. Being dissatisfied with such action of OSFC, the petitioners filed the writ petition.

The High Court observed that section 29 speaks about the right of financial corporation in case of default in repayment of loan. The default contemplated thereby is of the industrial concern. When an industrial concern makes any default in repayment of any loan or advance or any instalment thereof under the agreement or in meeting its obligation in relation to any guarantee given by the corporation, the financial corporation has the right to take over the management or possession or both of the industrial concern. It further gives right to the corporation to transfer by way of lease or sale and realise the property pledged, mortgaged, hypothecated as assigned to the financial corporation by the industrial concern. The right of financial corporation in terms of section 29 must be exercised only on a defaulting party. Section 29 does not empower the corporation to proceed against the surety even if some properties are mortgaged or hypothecated to it. The said view is further strengthened by the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 29 which lays down appropriation of sale proceeds with reference to only industrial concern and not surety or guarantor. In view of the above, the Court held that the OSFC in exercise of power vested u/s. 29 of the SFC Act cannot sell out the properties mortgaged to it by the guarantors. The Court further observed that section 31 of the SFC Act provides for a special provision for enforcement of claims by the financial corporation against a surety or guarantor. The financial corporation can proceed against a surety or mortgagor invoking the provision u/s. 31 for the default committed by the industrial concern, and also where the financial corporation requires the industrial concern to make immediate repayment of loan or advance in terms of section 30 and the industrial concern fails to make such repayment. To exercise power u/s. 31, the OSFC is required to apply to the District Judge having appropriate jurisdiction. Thus, section 29 is concerned with the property of industrial concern, while section 31 takes within its sweep both the property of industrial concern and that of the surety. The statute provides an additional remedy for recovery of the amount in favour of the OSFC by proceeding against the surety in terms of section 31 of the OSFC Act. Such a power is not vested with the corporation u/s. 29.

Needless to say that public money has to be recovered from the defaulters, who do not repay the loan amount to the financial institutions. This does not mean that financial institutions are at liberty to dispose of the secured asset of the defaulters in unreasonable or arbitrary manner in flagrant violation of the statutory provisions and principles of natural justice.

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Counsel — Withdrawal of Counsel — Permission of Court is necessary — Civil Procedure Code.

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[Anabik Gupta & Ors. v. Swapan Saha, AIR 2011 Gauhati 100]

In a suit when the counter-claim was pending for cross-examination of the witnesses of the opposite party, Shri P. Deshmukhya, counsel for the plaintiff-petitioners, filed an application, stating to the effect, inter alia, that the plaintiff-petitioners had taken away all their papers, documents/files from him as they had decided to engage another lawyer and that he (P. Deshmukhya) and Shri B. K. Acharyya, another counsel, had accordingly withdrawn from the suit. On considering the application, so filed, the learned Munsiff passed an order dispensing with the cross-examination of the defendant, namely, Swapon Saha, (i.e., opposite party No. 1) and fixed the counter-claim, on next date, for cross-examination of further witness of the counter-claimant.

On the date so fixed, while the defendant’s counsel was present, none appeared on behalf of the plaintiffs. The learned Trial Court, then, passed an order dispensing with the cross-examination of the defendant’s witness, closed the evidence of the defendant’s side and fixed the counter-claim, for argument. Before the date, so fixed, the plaintiffpetitioner, namely, Anamika Gupta filed a petition, with the prayer to adjourn the argument and give another opportunity to the plaintiff-petitioners to cross-examine the defendant and his witness. The plaintiff-petitioners stated that Shri Acharyya, advocate, had expressed his inability to conduct the suit and advised the plaintiff-petitioners to engage another lawyer; the plaintiff-petitioners came to know that their engaged counsel had already withdrawn from their case, but the relevant papers/files remained with the said counsel and all the efforts made by the plaintiff-petitioners to obtain the papers/files from the said counsel did not yield any result; thereafter, the plaintiffpetitioner No. 1 applied for certified copies of the plaint, written statement, counter-claim, evidence, orders, etc., which were received in May 2010, and it was after receipt of the said certified copies that they were able to engage, in June 2010, Shri P. Deb, advocate, as their counsel. The Trial Court rejected the application.

Aggrieved by order rejecting the application, the same was challenged before the High Court. The Court observed that while considering the provisions, embodied in Rules 1, 2 and 4 of Order III of CPC, it may be noted that in a civil suit, it is not necessary for a party to remain present, in person, on every date of hearing unless there is a specific order passed, in this regard, by the Court. It is for this reason, therefore, that order III Rule 1 provides that appearance, on behalf of the parties, may be made by recognised agents. A party or his recognised agent may also appoint a pleader and every such appointment shall be filed in the Court. Once duly appointed, the engagement of the pleader subsists until engagement is determined with the leave of the Court. It logically follows that withdrawal of engagement cannot be an arbitrary act and the permission of the Court is necessary to terminate engagement of a counsel.

It is also worth noticing that the appointment of a pleader, filed in the Court, shall be deemed to have remained in force until determined ‘with the leave of the Court’ by (i) a writing, signed by the client or the pleader, as the case may be, and filed in the Court, or (ii) until the client or the pleader dies, or (iii) until all proceedings, in the suit, have ended so far as regards the client. This clearly shows that until the client or the pleader dies or until all proceedings, in the suit, end as far as the client is concerned or until the leave of the Court is obtained determining the relationship of pleader and client, the appointment, once made and filed in a suit, shall continue to remain in force.

In the present case too, when no leave had been granted by the learned Trial Court, mere filing of the petition by the plaintiffs’ pleader intimating the Court that the plaintiffs had taken away all the papers or documents from their counsel had not determined the relationship of client and pleader, which had existed between the plaintiffs’ pleader and the plaintiffs. In such circumstances, the order, dispensing with the cross-examination of the defendant, could not have been made.

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(2011) 22 STR 529 (Tri.-Chennai) — Commissioner of Service Tax, Chennai v. E-Care India Pvt. Ltd.

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Refund of unutilised CENVAT credit in relation to export of services — Refund denied on the ground that the claim pertained to period prior to registration — Lower Appellate Authority held that non-registration not a ground for rejection of refund claim — Appeals rejected.

Facts:
The respondents claimed refund of unutilised credit of service tax in relation to export of services on the basis of Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 as laid out in the Notification No. 23/2004. The claim was rejected on the following grounds:

The respondent took registration later on;

The refund claim pertained to the period prior to the date of registration.

The lower Appellate Authority set aside the order of the original authority on the ground that registration is merely required for the purpose of maintenance of accounts and that non-registration cannot be the ground for enforcing a demand or denying a refund.

Held:
The Tribunal held that the relevant rules required only those assessees to take registration who are required to pay service tax. The respondents were not liable to pay service tax and hence, the order passed by the Appellate Authority did not require interference.

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(2011) 22 STR 609 (Bom.) — Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai v. WNS Global Service (P) Ltd.

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Refund of CENVAT credit on exports — Whether the provider of output service is entitled to claim the refund of unutilised CENVAT credit in respect of exports effected prior to the substitution of Rule 5 with effect from 14-3-2006.

Facts:
The assessee applied for refund of credit in respect of exports effected prior to the substitution of Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 by Notification No. 4/2006 on 14-3-2006 on the ground that the credit could not be utilised. The Revenue raised the dispute that Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 as it stood prior to 14-3-2006 permitted refund of unutilised CENVAT credit only to a manufacturer and not to a provider of output service. The Revenue further contended that substituted Rule 5 states that the rule applies only in respect of the exports made after 14-3-2006.

Held:
The Court observed that the substituted Rule 5 made no distinction between the exports made prior to 14-3-2006 and those made post the said date. Concurring with the decision of the CESTAT, the Court held that the assessee was entitled to the refund of credit, even for exports made before the substitution of Rule 5.

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(2011) 22 STR 517 (Kar.) — Commissioner of Service Tax, Bangalore v. Vee Aar Secure

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Penalty — Non-payment of service tax in respect of security services — Bona fide belief that head office was paying service tax — separate registration obtained and entire tax paid with interest before issue of SCN when pointed out by Department — No intention to evade — Case for waiver of penalty made out.

Facts:
The appeal was preferred by the Revenue against the order of the Appellate Tribunal cancelling the order passed by Revisional Authority levying penalty. The assessee, a security agency, was operating in India at more than one place. The assessee was under the impression that their head office at Delhi paid the service tax on a demand issued to the assessee. On realising that the head office had not paid the service tax, the assessee got themselves registered at Bangalore and paid the service tax and interest thereon for the delayed payment.

Held:
It was held that there was no intention on part of the assessee to avoid payment of service tax and no substantial question of law was involved in the appeal for consideration and accordingly a case of waiver being made out, the appeal was dismissed.

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Integration of Director’s Identification Number (DIN) issued under Companies Act, 1956 with Designated Partnership Identification Number (DPIN) issued under Limited Liability Partnership (LLP) Act, 2008.

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The Ministry vide General Circular No. 44/2011, dated 8th July 2011, has decided to avoid the duplication of issuing DIN and DPIN by integrating them with effect from 9th July 2011. Further, now no fresh DPIN will be issued and the DIN allotted shall be used as DPIN for all purposes under the Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008 and vice versa. If a person has been allotted both DIN and DPIN, his DPIN will stand cancelled and his DIN will be used as DPIN.

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Doctrine of merger — If for any reason an appeal is dismissed on the grounds of limitation and not on merits, that order would not merge with the orders passed by the Appellate Authority.

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[Raja Mechanical Co. (P) Ltd. v. CCE, (2012) 345 ITR 356 (SC)]

The Supreme Court noted that the facts were not in dispute and could not be disputed that there was a delay in filing the prescribed forms before the assessing authority. Therefore, the assessing authority had rejected the claim of the assessee and accordingly, had directed him for payment of the excise duty credit availed of by the assessee. Aggrieved by that order, the assessee had belatedly filed an appeal before the proper Appellate Authority. Since there was delay in filing the appeal and since the same was not within the time that the Appellate Authority dismissed the same. It is that order which was questioned before the Tribunal. Before the Tribunal, the assessee had requested the Tribunal to first condone the delay and next to decide the appeal on the merits, i.e., to decide whether the adjudicating authority was justified in disallowing the benefit of the MODVAT credit that was availed of by the assessee. The Tribunal had not conceded to the second request Kishor Karia Chartered Accountant Atul Jasani Advocate Glimpses of supreme court rulings made by the assessee and only accepted the findings and conclusions reached by the Commissioner of Appeals, who had rejected the appeal.

The question that fell for the consideration and decision of the Supreme Court was whether the Tribunal was justified in not considering the case of the assessee on merits. The assessee’s stand before the Tribunal and before the Supreme Court was that the orders passed by the adjudicating authority would merge with the orders passed by the first Appellate Authority and the Tribunal ought to have considered the appeal filed by the assessee on merits also. According to the Supreme Court such a stand of the assessee could not be accepted in view of the plethora of decisions of the Supreme Court, wherein it has been categorically observed that if for any reason an appeal is dismissed on the ground of limitation and not on merits, that order would not merge with the orders passed by the first Appellate Authority. In that view of the matter, the Supreme Court was of the opinion that the High Court was justified in rejecting the request made by the assessee for directing the Revenue to state the case and also the question of law for its consideration and decision. According to the Supreme Court there was no merit in the appeal.

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C.A. rendering legal services

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It has been reported in a leading newspaper that the Supreme Court has recently held that both litigation and non-litigation matters are covered by the Advocates Act, 1961. Therefore, only persons qualified as Advocates can render services in the legal field. Accordingly, the Society of Indian Law Firms has intimated to ICAI that Chartered Accountants and Firms of Chartered Accountants should not advice their clients on legal matters which are exclusively reserved for Advocates under the Advocates Act, 1961. Let us hope the Council of ICAI issues a clarification on this issue and advises our members as to which type of legal work cannot be undertaken by our members (H.T. 9-7-2012).

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EAC Opinion Treatment and disclosure of interest on fixed deposits in the financial statements of a financial enterprise.

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Facts

The entire equity capital of a public limited company registered under the Companies Act is held by the Government of India. The company was set up as a special purpose vehicle to provide long-term infrastructure finance as per scheme for Financing Viable Infrastructure Projects (‘the financing scheme’).

The company provides infrastructure finance through direct lending, refinancing and take-out finance as per the financing scheme. The company has raised long-term debt by way of loans from Life Insurance Corporation of India, National Small Saving Fund (NSSF), bonds listed in India and foreign currency loans from bilateral and multilateral institutions. Borrowings of the company are backed by sovereign guarantee.

The resources raised by the company are utilised for providing infrastructure finance through direct lending, refinancing and take-out finance as per the financing scheme. Pending disbursement, the resources of the company are held in the form of bank deposits and investments, such as Central/ State Government (PSUs), Certificate of Deposits with scheduled banks, etc. as per investment policy approved by the board of directors of the company.

The company has stated that as the nature of its business is that of an NBFC, the company has been treating interest on bank deposits as income from operations in its books of account and, accordingly, discloses interest on bank deposits as income from operations in the financial statements as well as in the cash flow statements. The Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG), while conducting audit of accounts of the company for the year ended 31st March, 2010 and subsequently for the year ended 31st March, 2011 inter alia, however, commented that interest on fixed deposits with banks has been included under income from operational activities instead of disclosing the same as other income. This has resulted in the overstatement of income from operations and understatement of other income by Rs.56,516.94 lakh.

Query:

In view of the above, the company sought the opinion of the Expert Advisory Committee (EAC) as to whether it is appropriate for the company to treat interest on bank deposits as income from operations in its books of account and accordingly, to consider the disclosure interest on bank deposits as income from operations in the preparation of financial statements, including cash flow statement.

Opinion:

 As far as the disclosure of such interest income in the financial statements including cash flow statement is concerned, the Committee after considering the definition of the term ‘operating activities’ as provided in paragraphs 5, 12 and 30 of AS-3, is of the view that operating activities are the principal revenue producing activities of the enterprise. The main business of the company is to provide longterm infrastructure loans and financial assistance while optimally managing and utilising its funds. Thus, the company is in the business of earning income by managing its funds which also includes the management of surplus funds between the date of receipt of funds to the date when the funds are finally disbursed. Accordingly, the Committee is of the view that interest earned on investment of surplus funds of the enterprise arises from its principal revenue producing activities and therefore, it should be treated and classified as income from operating activities. Further, in the context of cash flow statement, the Committee notes that paragraph 30 of AS-3 specifically states that cash flows arising from interest and dividends received in case of financial enterprise should be classified as ‘cash flow from operating activity’. Therefore, according to EAC, the treatment given by the company in the books of account is appropriate.

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Some historical facts about ICAI

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(i) First Indian to become Member of ICAE W: Shri A. E. Cama was the first Indian to become a member of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales in 1908.

(ii) Accountancy got statutory recognition in India in 1913: When the Indian Companies Act, 1882, was replaced by the Indian Companies Act, 1913, it was for the first time that statutory provision was made for audit of accounts of companies.

(iii) First Accountancy Board: The first Accountancy Board was appointed under the Auditors’ Certificate Rules, 1932, in 1932. Its members were appointed by the Governor General in Council. Later on, in 1939, elective element was brought into the constitution of the Board.

(iv) GDA and Unrestricted Certificate: Scheme for Government Diploma in Accountancy along with apprenticeship under an approved Accountant for 3 years was introduced in 1918. This Diploma was abolished in 1943. Unrestricted Auditors Certificates were granted under the Companies Act, 1913.

(v) C.A. Act, 1949: Chartered Accountants Bill, 1948, was introduced in Constituent Assembly and C.A. Act, 1949 was passed on 1-5-1949.

 The C.A. Act was brought into force on 1-7-1949. Late Shri G. P. Kapadia was elected as the First President and held this position for first three years. (vi) Women Power:

 (a) First lady to qualify as GDA in 1930 was Ms. Shirin K. Engineer. After completion of Articles she was enrolled as R.A. in 1933 and thereafter as CA in 1949.

(b) First lady who topped CA Final Examination in 1984 was Ms. Nandita Shah (Now Nandita Parekh).

(c) First lady elected to the Central Council of ICAI in 1995 was Ms. Priya Bhansali (D/o late President Ashok Kumbhat).

(d) Incidentally, no lady has occupied the position as President of ICAI.

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Filing fees on Form 23B.

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The Ministry vide Circular No. 14/2012, dated 21-6-
2012 had imposed fees on Form 23B (Information by auditor to Registrar)
w.e.f. 22-7-2012. The last date for filing the Form 23B without fee has
been extended for two weeks. Fee shall be charged on any eForm 23B
filed on or after 5th August, 2012.

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Section 40(b) and Interest to partners

The present section 40(b) of the Income-tax Act has
been introduced by the Finance Act, 1992 w.e.f. 1-4-1993 to coincide
with the introduction of the new scheme of taxation of the firm and the
partners. The section provides for the conditions, on compliance of
which the remuneration and the interest to partners, by the firm, shall
not be disallowed in the hands of the firm. In other words the claim of
the firm, for deduction of remuneration and interest to partners, shall
be allowed where it satisfies the conditions stipulated in section
40(b).

For allowance of an interest to the partner, it is
essential that the payment is authorised by and is in accordance with
the terms of the partnership deed and relates to a period falling after
the date of partnership deed and the amount does not exceed the amount
calculated at the rate of 12% simple interest per annum.

It is
usual that the interest is paid to a partner on the capital introduced
by him as increased by the deposits made by him and the share of profits
credited to his account and as reduced by the amounts withdrawn by him
and the share of losses debited to his account. At times, the account is
credited with the share of notional profits arising on revaluation or
is debited with the transfer to reserves created to meet certain
contingencies.

Section 40(b) is silent about the ‘base amount’,
with reference to which the interest of 12% is to be calculated. It also
does not specify the manner in which such base amount is to be
calculated. In the circumstances, issues regularly arise about the
determination of the base amount, with reference to which the interest
payable to a partner is to be ascertained so as to face no disallowance.
Unlike section 115JB, it does not provide for the manner of preparation
of the profit & loss account, nor does it lay down any guidelines
for ascertaining the book profit of the firm, the share of which is to
be credited to the partner’s account.

A controversy has arisen
about the need and necessity to provide depreciation by the firm in its
books of account, while ascertaining the amount of the profit or loss of
the year, to be shared amongst the partners and credited to their
respective accounts. Providing no depreciation or a lower depreciation
results in higher profits being credited to partners’ accounts which in
turn helps in payment of higher interest to them. Is this practice of
not providing depreciation in the books in accordance with the
provisions of the Act, for allowance of interest in the hands of the
firm, is a question that has been addressed by the different benches of
the Tribunal to arrive at the different and conflicting views.

The relevant part of section 40(b), pertaining to interest to partners, reads as under:

“Amounts not deductible.

40.
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in sections 30 to 38, the
following amounts shall not be deducted in computing the income
chargeable under the head ‘Profits and gains of business or profession’,

(b) in the case of any firm assessable as such:

(i) ……………..

(ii)
any payment ………….., or of interest to any partner, which, in
either case, is not authorised by, or is not in accordance with, the
terms of the partnership deed; or

(iii) any payment
……………. , or of interest to any partner, which, in either case,
is authorised by, and is in accordance with, the terms of the
partnership deed, but which relates to any period (falling prior to the
date of such partnership deed) for which such payment was not authorised
by, or is not in accordance with, any earlier partnership deed, so,
however, that the period of authorisation for such payment by any
earlier partnership deed does not cover any period prior to the date of
such earlier partnership deed; or

(iv) any payment of interest
to any partner which is authorised by, and is in accordance with, the
terms of the partnership deed and relates to any period falling after
the date of such partnership deed insofar as such amount exceeds the
amount calculated at the rate of twelve per cent simple interest per
annum; or………………”

The Visakhapatnam Bench of the
Tribunal had an occasion to deal with the issue, wherein the Tribunal
held that the Assessing Officer (‘AO’) was not entitled to recompute the
balance of capital account of the partners, so determined by the
assessee firm. In deciding the said issue, the Bench did not follow the
findings to the contrary of another Bench of the Visakhapatnam Tribunal
on the subject.

Arthi Nursing Home’s case

The
issue under consideration was examined by the Visakhapatnam Tribunal in
the case of Arthi Nursing Home v. ITO, 119 TTJ 415 (Visakha).

 In
that case, Arthi Nursing Home, a partnership firm, had claimed
deduction of interest paid to partners on their respective capital
accounts. Consequent to the findings in the course of the survey
operations conducted on the firm and during the course of assessment
proceedings, it was noticed by the AO that the firm was not providing
for depreciation in the books of account, but was claiming depreciation
in computation of taxable income. The AO was of the view that the firm
by following the practice of not providing the depreciation was
inflating the capital accounts of the partners on which higher interest
was paid. He observed that the said practice was for the purposes of
claiming higher deduction, towards payment of interest, in the hands of
the firm. He was of the view that the firm was required to draw its
profit & loss account by debiting the depreciation. The AO
recomputed the balances in capital accounts of the partners after
charging depreciation. Consequently, the claim for deduction of interest
to partners was disallowed u/s.40(b) as the balance in the capital
accounts of the partners had turned negative after apportioning the
recomputed profits and losses.

 On appeal before the CIT(A), the
action of the AO in disallowing the deduction of interest to partners
u/s.40(b) was confirmed for the following reasons:

  • The
    assessee claimed benefit of depreciation in computing the total income,
    but did not provide the same in computing the profit of the firm to be
    shared amongst the partners. The said practice led to showing higher
    amount of profits in the books of account which inflated the capital
    balances of the partners and the consequent interest to partners;
  • Depreciation,
    like any other head of expenditure, was required to be debited to the
    profit and loss account to arrive at the real profits of the business;
  •  Debiting of depreciation was a cardinal principle of mercantile system of accounting; and
  •  The
    figures of accretion to the capital balances, were exaggerated and
    fictitious, not in accordance with any principles of accountancy.

The
assessee firm’s contention that the AO could not have rewritten books
of account of the firm based on the decisions in the cases of Ambica
Chemical Products v. Dy. CIT, (ITA No. 612/Vizag./1999, dated 31st May,
2005 and 9/Vizag./1999) dated 9th January, 2009, respectively; and ACIT
v. Sant Shoe Store, 88 ITD 524, (Chd.) (SMC) was negatived by the CIT(A)
by holding that the AO had only undertaken an exercise of discovery of
correctness of accounts which was not an exercise of rewriting the books
of account.

Aggrieved with the order of the CIT(A), on appeal
before the Tribunal, the following additional arguments were made by the
firm:

  • Section 40(b) did not provide for the manner of
    computing the profit of the firm for the year and did not have any
    relevance to the claims made in computing the total income; and
  •   
    The firm had been consistently over the years not charging depreciation
    in the books of account, but had claimed depreciation in computing the
    taxable income, which had been accepted by the Revenue authorities.

Likewise, the following additional contentions were raised by the Revenue:

  •    
    Explanation 5 to section 32 of the Act and the Accounting Standards
    prescribed by ICAI required charging of depreciation in the books of
    account; and

  •     The Apex Court in the case of CIT
    v. British Paints India Ltd., (188 ITR 44) held that the books disclosed
    the true state of accounts and the correct income.

The Tribunal after considering the rival submissions upheld the contention of the Revenue authorities for the following reasons:

  •    
    In light of the Apex Court decision in the case of British Paints Ltd.
    (supra), the AO was duty bound to recompute the profit/accretion to the
    capital account of the partners after charging depreciation to the
    profit and loss account;

  •     Explanation 5 to
    section 32 and the Accounting Standards prescribed by the ICAI required
    mandatory charging of depreciation to determine profit and loss of the
    firm for the year; and

  •     The profit and loss
    account prepared without charging depreciation did not reflect the true
    and correct state of affairs of the partnership firm.

The
Tribunal concluded that the AO was justified in correcting the aforesaid
error, thereby disallowing the interest claimed by the assessee firm
u/s.40(b).

Swaraj Enterprises case

The issue under consideration subsequently came up before the Division Bench of the Visakhapatnam

Tribunal in the case of Swaraj Enterprises v. ITO, 132 ITD 488.

In
this case, the assessee firm, like in the case of Arthi Nursing Home
(supra), did not charge depre-ciation in the books of account, but
claimed depre-ciation in computing the total income. As a result the
partners’ accounts were credited with higher share of profits on which
interest was paid to the partners. The AO, by relying on the several
decisions of the High Courts, held that the depreciation was a charge on
profits of the firm and the same should be provided for in computing
the profit that was distributed amongst the partners. He recomputed the
capital account balances of the partners and interest thereof.

On
appeal the CIT(A) relying on the decision in the case of Arthi Nursing
Home (supra) upheld the action of the AO of recomputing the interest to
partners for the purposes of section 40(b).

Aggrieved with the order of the CIT(A), the assessee firm filed an appeal before the Tribunal and contended that:

  •    
    There was no provision under the Act that allowed an AO to rework the
    capital balances of the partners and to recompute the interest to
    partners u/s.40(b);

  •     There was no statutory compulsion for partnership firms to provide for depreciation under the Indian Partnership Act, 1932;

  •    
    The determination of profit for the purposes of the books of account
    and the computation of total income for income tax were two different
    exercises and hence the allowance or disallowance made in computing the
    total income under the Act did not in any way affected the balances in
    the capital accounts of the partners disclosed in the books of account;
    and

  •     Without prejudice, the firm in any case had
    the discretion to select the method of charging depreciation and also
    the rates at which such depreciation was charged, which discretion was
    not vested in the AO.

The Revenue contended that the
depreciation was a charge on the profits of the year and it was a must
for the firm to provide for depreciation to arrive at the true profits
of the firm; that the AO following the British Paints’ case was duty
bound to rework the profit; that action of the firm was not in
accordance with the Accounting Standards and principles and that the
Explanation 5 to section 32 required that the depreciation was charged
to the accounts.

After considering the rival submissions and the decision in the case of Arthi Nursing Home (supra), the Tribunal held as under:

  •    
    The findings of the Apex Court in the case of British Paints Ltd.
    (supra) for reworking the profits were in context of determination of
    taxable income and could not be employed for recomputing the capital
    account of the partners;

  •     The total taxable
    income of the firm remained the same, since the depreciation was already
    claimed in computing the taxable income;

  •    
    Under, the Partnership Act, 1932, there was no statutory compulsion to
    provide for depreciation in the books of account or to follow the
    Accounting Standards prescribed by ICAI;

  •     The
    Companies Act that required an enterprise to follow the mercantile
    method of accounting and employ the Accounting Standards did not apply
    to a partnership firm;

  •     Explanation 5 to section
    32 provided for compulsory depreciation for the purpose of computation
    of taxable income under the Act and nowhere it was provided that it was
    to be applied even in preparing the books of account;

  •    
    U/s.40(b), the AO was allowed only to verify whether the payment of
    interest to any partner was authorised by and was in accordance with the
    terms of partnership deed and whether the period of interest so paid
    fell after the date of partnership deed. The AO could not have reworked
    or redetermined the balance in the capital accounts of the partners; and

  •    
    Even if the depreciation was required to be charged in the books of
    account, the choice to determine the method and the rate of depreciation
    would be at the discretion of the assessee firm and not of the AO.

Based
on the aforesaid findings, the Tribunal ignored its own findings in the
case of Arthi Nursing Home (supra) and upheld the claim of deduction of
inter-est to partners.

Observations

Section 40(b)
is silent as to the amount on which the interest to partners is to be
calculated. As noted, the ‘base amount’ remains to be defined by the
provision. In the context of interest, it has no reference to the books
of account, nor to the book profit unlike the provisions of section
115JB or even those within the section that provide for calculating the
quantum of remuneration payable to the partners. It may not be incorrect
to state that the claim of interest, in the context, is independent of
the books of account.

Unlike section 115JB, this section does not
provide for the method of accounting to be followed, the method of
depreciation to be employed and the rates at which the assets are
required to be de-preciated.

Section 40(b) provides that no
disallowance shall take place where the interest to partners is;
authorised by the partnership deed; in accordance therewith; for the
period falling after the date of partnership deed and the rate of
interest does not exceed 12%. In the circumstances, what is of paramount
importance is that the interest to partners should be authorised by the
deed and if it is so what remains to be seen is that such interest is
paid in the manner provided by the said deed which of course should be
in conformity with the other stipulations stated above. Nothing, beyond
these simple rules, is required to be read in to the provision.

The
computation of total income, under the Act, is largely independent of
the books of account. A debit or credit does not decide the taxability
or allowance of an income or an expenditure. Unless otherwise expressly
stated, the books of account do not determine the taxability or
otherwise under the Act. The allowance or a deduction and the taxability
of an income is governed by the provisions of the Income-tax Act and
not the books of account.

Explanation 5 to section 32 has a very
limited relevance and its application is mainly restricted to the
provisions of section 32(1) and section 43(6) which provide for
determination of the written down value of an asset or a block of
assets. The said provision, at the most, has the effect of altering the
total income that is computed under the Act and does not travel beyond,
to the computation of the book profit, not even for the purposes of
section 115JB.

The Partnership Act, 1932 does not prescribe the
manner in which the books of account are to be maintained, nor do they
provide for the method of accounting to be followed by the firm for
determining its profit or loss. They also do not prescribe for
compulsory depreciation and the rate thereof.

The Companies Act
has no application to the partnership firms and the provisions therein
for mercantile system of accounting, true and fair profit and the
mandatory application of the Accounting Standards do not apply to the
partnership firms.

The Chandigarh Bench of the Tribunal in Sant
Shoe Store’s case was concerned with the allowance of interest on the
capital account of the partners which included credits on revaluation of
the assets, not involving any inflow of funds. The Tribunal even in
such a case approved of the claim of interest made by the firm. Again,
the Tribunal in Ambica Chemical Products approved of the claim of
interest in circumstances where the firm had not provided for
depreciation in the books of account; the claim was allowed to the firm
in two different appeals vide orders passed after a gap of four years
and one of it was passed after the decision in the case of Aarthi
Nursing Home was rendered. A useful reference may be made to the
decision of the Pune Bench in the case of Deval Utensils Factory, 98 TTJ
501 wherein the action of the AO in reworking the capital account
balance, on the basis of which interest was paid to partner was
disapproved.

The rewriting of the books by either side should
be discouraged. If permitted, it may invite the tax-payers to indulge
in creative accounting, for example; by adding back the provision for
taxation where debited to the profit & loss account so as to enhance
the amount of share of profit that is credited to the capital accounts
by holding out that the tax is not an allowable deduction in computing
the total income. The example amplifies the need to stick to the books
of account and the need to avoid importing the computation provisions in
calculation of interest.

The interest to the partners, where
allowed in the hands of the firm, is taxable in the hands of the
partners as business income by virtue of section 28(v). The one that is
disallowed in the hands of the firm, is not taxable in the hands of the
partners by virtue of the proviso to the said section 28(v) of the Act.
The disallowance largely does not result in any loss or gain of revenue
for either side.

This essentially leaves us with the conclusion
that no disallowance shall take place under the provisions of section
40(b) in cases where the interest to partners is authorised by the
partnership deed and the same is calculated as per the terms of the
partnership deed. The case of the firm gets forti-fied where the deed
does not make it mandatory for the firm to charge depreciation in
computing the profit for the year.

Why income from sale of computer soft ware not taxable as royalty?

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While best efforts were made from world over to persuade the then Finance Minister of India to have second thoughts on the retrospective proposals introduced in the Finance Bill, 2012, nothing seems to have appealed. The retrospective amendments as were proposed in the Finance Bill, 2012 have received the President’s assent. In this backdrop, an effort is made to consider whether the Income-tax Department under the so retrospectively amended section 9(1)(vi) of the Act would be able to tax, income from sale of computer software as royalty under the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’) and/or Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements (‘DTAAs’) entered in by India with other countries?

From the following three Circulars issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes at different points in time, one understands that the intention of the Legislature was very clear to tax any income from ‘right for use’ or ‘right to use’ any copyright (viz., computer program) as royalty under the Act:

  • Circular No. 152, dated 27th November 1974;
  • Circular No. 588, dated 2nd January 1991; and
  • Circular No. 621, dated 19th December 1991.

However, the controversy whether income from sale of computer software is taxable as royalty under the Act or not, developed only from the year 2005, with the judgment of the Special Bench of Delhi Tribunal in the case of Motorola Inc. v. DCIT, (95 ITD 269). The decision pertained to A.Ys. 1997-98 and 1998-99, though the first Circular justifying the taxability of income as royalty under the Act was issued in 1974.

Such an unusual scenario could be the result of imperfect drafting of section 9(1)(vi) to support the taxability of sale of computer software as royalty. This article examines whether the retrospective introduction of Explanation 4 to section 9(1)(vi), achieves the object of the Legislature to tax the income from sale of computer software as royalty under the Act. The said retrospective amendment in section 9(1)(vi) reads as under:

“Explanation 4 — For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that the transfer of all or any rights in respect of any right, property or information includes and has always included transfer of all or any right for use or right to use a computer software (including granting of licence) irrespective of the medium through which such right is transferred.”

  • Section 9(1)(vi) provides that any income payable by way of royalty in respect of any right, property or information is deemed to accrue or arise in India. So, to determine the taxability of income u/s.9(1)(vi), an income needs to satisfy the following twin conditions, apart from the principle of ‘source rule of taxation’ in section 9(1)(vi): The income should be covered under the definition of ‘royalty’ i.e., under Explanation 2 to section 9(1) (vi); and
  •  l It has to be in respect of any right, property or information.

The expression ‘any right, property or information’ is explained in the definition of ‘royalty’ viz., intellectual properties, equipments, know-how, experience or skills, etc. In other words, the definition of ‘royalty’ gives colour to or limits the scope of, the expression, which is otherwise very wide in scope.

Explanation 4 retrospectively includes, ‘right for use or right to use computer software’ under the expression ‘any right, property or information’. The text of Explanation 4, however, does not include the said rights of a computer software under the definition of ‘royalty’, which is specifically required as discussed, for applicability of section 9(1)(vi). Even though, the Memorandum explaining the amendments relating to Direct Taxes in the Finance Bill, 2012 mentions that ‘transfer of all or any right in respect of any right, property or information’ used in Explanation 4 defines the rights, property or information referred to in Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vi), the text of Explanation 4 does not refer to Explanation 2. Therefore, one may argue that until the language of Explanation 4 is amended to include the aforesaid rights of computer software under Explanation 2, section 9(1)(vi) may not apply to the said rights of computer software.

 The said argument also draws support from the Karnataka High Court judgment in the case of Jindal Thermal Power Company Ltd. v. DCIT, (321 ITR 31). The High Court while considering the retrospective amendment in context of Explanation to section 9(2) r.w.s. 9(1)(vii) held that since the purport of Explanation 2 is plain in its meaning, it is unnecessary and impermissible to refer to the Memorandum Explaining the provisions. Apart from the above or assuming that the Legislature amends Explanation 4 on the lines as suggested above or the Courts hold otherwise, the question that arises is, what is the meaning of the expression ‘right for use’ or ‘right to use’ a computer software? The provisions of the Act do not define ‘right for use’ or ‘right to use’.

Broadly, there are two schools of thought emerging for interpretation of the aforesaid rights of computer software. One school of thought suggests that the said expression should be construed in its general sense. Whereas, the other school of thought suggests the said expression should be construed in the light of the meaning as given in 2010 OECD Commentary on Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital.

First school of thought

The Memorandum justifies the retrospective insertion, so as to restate the intention of the Legislature to tax the income from use or right to use computer software as royalty under the Act, which was interpreted otherwise by some judicial authorities. The judicial authorities1 in India have given conflicting findings on different questions relating to taxability of income from sale of computer software as royalty. Out of these questions, the Legislature has by Finance Act, 2012 sought to address only the question whether the expression ‘transfer of all or any rights’ includes ‘right for use’ or ‘right to use’?

The Memorandum does not refer to the conflicting judgements. The findings of these conflicting judgements were summarised in a Table in the feature Direct Tax Controversy in the BCAS Journal for the month of December 2011, (page no. 54).

In such a scenario, it would be relevant to understand the meaning of the expression ‘right for use’ or ‘right to use’ a computer software in the light of the findings of Heydon’s case (1584) (3 Co Rep 7a, 7b), better known as Mischief Rule. The Heydon’s case requires that to construe a provision of a statute, it would be just and proper to see what was the position before an amendment and find out what was ‘the mischief’ sought to be remedied and then discover the true rationale for such remedy. The aforesaid rule which is more than four hundred years old requires the following four questions to be answered in order to construe the provisions of section 9(1)(vi):

1. What was the common law before making the amendment in section 9(1)(vi)?

Judicial authorities were divided as regard the taxability of the subject. Some of the findings of the said decisions are:

— Passing on the right to use and facilitating the use of a product for which the owner has a copyright is not the same thing as transferring or assigning rights in relation to copyright and therefore, consideration to authorise the end-user to have an access to and make use of the licensed computer software, does not amount to royalty under the Act.

— On the other hand, some judicial authorities, held that payments made by end-users or distributors for granting of licence to use copyright i.e., computer program in respect of sale of computer software is royalty under the Act. Right of user of computer software involves right to use the computer program. When the right for user is given, right to use copyright is also given and therefore, consideration amounts to royalty under the Act.

2.    What was the mischief and defect for which the Act did not provide?

The mischief and the defect for which the Act did not provide and which seems to be the intent of the Legislature was to tax ‘right for use’ or ‘right to use’ computer program [involved in a sale of/ licence to use computer software] as royalty under the Act.

3.    What remedy the Legislature/Parliament has resolved and appointed to cure the defect?

The remedy effected by the Legislature to cure the aforesaid defect is retrospective insertion of Explanation 4.

4.    What is the true reason for the remedy?

The true reason for the remedy seems that the Legislature wanted to subject ‘right for use’ or ‘right to use’ computer program involved in sale of computer software as royalty under the Act. The Legislature instead of using the expression to achieve its remedy to tax “right for use or right to use computer program embedded in a computer software” has chosen to use the expression “right for use or right to use computer software”, in a way suggesting that words ‘computer software’ and ‘computer program’ are used interchangeably.

In other words, the true expression ‘right for use or right to use a computer software’ is referred to as having a general meaning of act of using the property i.e., computer program embedded in a computer software and right to transfer such usage, respectively. Therefore, if one agrees with the conclusion of first school of thought, then purchase of any computer software viz., either shrinkwrap, bundled, canned or customised software, would be taxable as ‘royalty’ under the Act.

Second school of thought

The second school of thought suggests that the impugned expression should be construed in the light of the meaning as given in 2010 OECD Commentary on Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital. The Para 2 of Article 12 of 2010 OECD Model defines ‘royalty’ as under:

The term ‘royalties’ as used in this Article means payments of any kind received as a consideration for the use of, or the right to use any copyright of literary, artistic or scientific work including cinematograph films, any patent, trademark, design or model, plan, secret formula or process, or for information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience.

The expressions ‘right for use’ or ‘right to use’ as referred in Explanation 4 to section 9(1)(vi) is also found in Article 12(2). Paras 12 to 17 of the OECD Model Commentary on Article 12 cover the various facets of taxability of computer software as royalty. Para 13.1 of the Commentary explains the meaning of the expression ‘right for use’ or ‘right to use’ any copyright in the context of a computer software. This is similar to rights referred to in section 14 of the Copyright Act, 1957 (‘the Copyright Act’) and India has not raised any reservations or disagreements to such construction. The rights referred in section 14 of the Copyright Act for computer program are reproduced below:

  •     to reproduce the work in any material form including the storing of it in any medium by electronic means;

  •    to issue copies of the work to the public not being copies already in circulation;

  •     to perform the work in public, or communicate it to the public;

  •     to make any cinematograph film or sound recording in respect of the work;

  •     to make any translation of the work;

  •     to make any adaptation of the work;

  •     to do, in relation to a translation or an adaptation of the work, any of the acts specified in relation to the work in any of the points mentioned above; and

  •     to sell or give on commercial rental or offer for sale or for commercial rental any copy of the computer program.

So, it is the transfer or granting of licence of rights in section 14 of the Copyright Act which refers to use or right to use the copyright in context of computer software.

Further, there is a case to presume that the expression ‘right for use’ and ‘right to use’ in the context of taxability of computer software as royalty, has acquired a particular meaning, when India has accepted the meaning of that expression as explained in the 2010 OECD Model Commentary. Therefore, it is worth arguing that when India has accepted the meaning of the expression in a particular sense, then the use of the said expression subsequently should also be given similar meaning. The Courts also have in a catena of decisions2 held that internationally accepted meaning and interpretation placed on identical or similar terms employed in various DTAAs should be followed when construing similar terms occurring in the Act. However, the said reference/is subject to certain limitations, and for better understanding of the subject, one may refer to the Article ‘Legitimacy of References to OECD Commentary for interpretation of provisions under the Act and DTAAs’ published in BCAJ, February 2012, (page no. 9).

Therefore, if one agrees with the conclusion of the second school of thought, then it is only the income from the transfer or granting of licence of rights in section 14 of the Copyright Act which means use or right to use copyright in the context of computer soft-ware and accordingly will be taxable as royalty under the Act. In other words, purchase of any computer software viz., either shrinkwrap, bundled, canned or customised software would still continue to remain non-taxable as ‘royalty’ under the Act.

Analysis

Based on the above discussion, if the text of the Explanation 4 to section 9(1)(vi) is brought to test then one feels that the Legislature may still fail to pass the muster to tax the income from sale of computer software as royalty under the Act for want of the following broad reasons:

In Explanation 4, the Legislature has used the words ‘all or any’ which are prefixed to expression ‘right for use’ or ‘rights to use’ computer software. The expression ‘transfer of all or any right for use or right to use a computer software (including granting of licence)’ gives an impression of there being many ‘rights for use’ or ‘rights to use’ a computer software, which can either be transferred or licensed. However, as concluded under the first school of thought, ‘right for use’ or ‘right to use’ computer software in its general sense refers to only a simple case of ‘usage’ of property. One fails to determine the various rights ‘for use’ or rights ‘to use’ involved in context of a computer software and is forced to doubt whether the Explanation 4 supports the construction of the expression as sought under the first school of thought. On the contrary, considering the multiple rights referred in section 14 of the Copyright Act, one may agree that the expression ‘all or any’ could be construed as referring to those multiple rights u/s.14 of the Copyright Act, thereby supporting the meaning as drawn under the second school of thought.

Further, Explanation 3 to section 9(1)(vi) of the Act defines ‘computer software’ to mean computer program recorded on any medium. In a sense, suggesting that even though the Copyright Act distinguishes between ‘original copyrighted computer program’ and ‘copy of said computer program embedded in computer software’, the Income-tax Act, 1961 does not recognise such a distinction for the purpose of taxation and the words ‘computer software’ and ‘computer program’ may be used interchangeably. The same conclusion is also drawn under question no. 4 – What is the true reason for remedy, while discussing the findings of Heydon’s case in the context of computer software, under the first school of thought? So, the expression ‘right for use or right to use a computer software’ may be read as ‘right for use or right to use a computer program’ in respect of computer software.

Conclusion

Considering the above, one may conclude that Explanation 4 to section 9(1)(vi) of the Act, in its present form, may fail to achieve its object for want of the following broad reasons:

  •     Expressions viz., ‘transfer of all or any rights in respect of any right, property or information’, ‘all or any’, ‘rights for use’ or ‘right to use’ are neither defined nor properly referenced in section 9(1)(vi) of the Act;

  •     Expression ‘right for use’ or ‘right to use’ referred to in Explanation 4 to section 9(1)(vi) may suggest a meaning different than meaning in general sense of usage of property and transfer thereof; and

  •     Explanation 4 to section 9(1)(vi) supports the construction of the expressions ‘right for use’ or ‘right to use’ to cover the rights referred to in section 14 of the Copyright Act.

Apart from the above, it would be possible for non-resident taxpayers to take recourse to the beneficial provisions of DTAAs entered in by India with other countries. The Article on taxability of ‘royalty income’ generally defines “royalty as payment of any kind from ‘use or right to use’ any copyright”. It thus restricts the scope of royalty income and one may rely on the 2010 OECD Model Commentary and India’s position thereof for non-taxability of computer software as royalty.

Further, the Central Government has recently issued a Notification giving relief from multiple level of tax deduction at source (‘TDS’) u/s.194J in the context of computer software. The said Notification No. 21 of 2012, dated 13rd June 2012 is issued u/s.197A(1F) effective from 1st July 2012 and provides as under:

  •     The transferee has been defined to be a person who acquires the software. He may be a resident or a non-resident of India and the transferor is defined to be a person from whom the software is acquired, but he has to be a resident of India (as a precursor for applicability of section 194J of the Act).

  •     Acquisition of the software has to be in the course of transfer of software (referred to as ‘subsequent transfers’) and tax should have been deducted at source either u/s.194J or section 195 of the Act, as the case may be, in any of the previous transfers;

  •     The software so acquired under subsequent transfer should not have been modified; and

  •     The transferee should obtain a declaration from the transferor that the tax has been deducted in any of the previous transfers along with PAN of the transferor.

This Notification has a narrow scope and has several limitations, which are as under:

  •     The exemption from multiple level of deduction of tax has only been provided to payments subject to tax deduction as royalty u/s.194J of the Act and not u/s.195 of the Act; and

  •     The acquisition of software under subsequent transfers should be without modification. One generally finds that in a direct arrangement between a copyright owner and end-user, the standard End-User Licence Agreement (‘EULA’) specifically prevents the end-user for resale of acquired software and therefore, the question of multiple level of deduction of tax will not arise in such a scenario. However, in case of copyright owner-distributor- end -user chain, it may be possible to undertake the benefit of the said Notification.

A fact pattern which is generally involved in the case of copyright owner-distributor-end user chain of transfer of software and its TDS implications thereof are explained in the Diagram for ease of understanding and ready reference:

Generally, the copyright owner of a computer program assigns/licenses rights to commercially exploit the copyright to the distributor. The rights to commercially exploit copyright provide for making multiple copies of software along with rights to sell and/or rent computer software qua a geographical location i.e., in the given example could be India. Pursuant to aforesaid rights, the end-user in India acquires the software copy from the distributor, subject to terms and conditions as provided in a EULA.

(Note: It is assumed that under the Scenario 1 and 2, the income from sale of computer software is taxable as ‘royalty’ under the Act and respective DTAAs between India and other countries. The analysis has been limited with respect to TDS implications, which arise in the light of aforesaid notification.)

The important question which is relevant to determine the TDS implications in context of non-residents transferors that is discussed here is ‘Can a non-resident transferor take recourse to Article on ‘Non-discrimination’ under the DTAAs as regard the discriminatory treatment sought by the Notification by limiting the benefit to only resident transferors u/s.194J of the Act?’

Section 40a(ia) r.w.s. 194J and Notification No. 21 of 2012 provides for deduction of royalty expenses for payment to resident transferor for acquisition of software without any deduction of tax. On the other hand, for similar payment to non-resident transferor, if the transferee has not deducted tax u/s.195, then the said expense will not be allowed as deduction u/s.40a(i). Such discrimination is addressed in an indirect manner by Article 24(3) of the respective DTAAs entered in between India and other countries. Article 24(3), generally reads as under:

“Except where the provisions of para 1 of Article 19, para 7 of Article 11, or para 8 of Article 12 apply, interest, royalties, and other disbursements paid by a resident of a Contracting State to a resident of the other Contracting State, shall for the purposes of determining the taxable profits of the first mentioned person, be deductible under the same conditions as if they had been paid to a resident of the first mentioned State.”

Article 24(3) deals with the treatment of the enterprises of Contracting State under the tax laws of that State. The said Article provides that interest, royalties and other disbursements paid to a resident of the other contracting State should be deductible to the same extent as would be deductible if paid to a resident of the same State. The said para of the Article is designed to end a particular form of discrimination resulting from a fact that in certain countries the deduction of interest, royalties and other disbursements is allowed without restriction when the recipient is a resident, but is restricted or prohibited when the recipient is non-resident4.

A similar discriminatory treatment is sought by Notification No. 21 of 2012. Therefore, by taking recourse to Article 24(3) of DTAAs read with Notification No. 21 of 2012, similar exemption from multiple level of TDS may be claimed on payment to non-resident transferors.

Given the aforesaid situation, one is reminded of the proverb, ‘Once burnt is twice shy.’ But the hard lesson of consequences from imperfect drafting do not seem to have learnt and therefore, the Income-tax Department may still fail to tax income from sale of computer software as ‘royalty’ under the Act and may also fail to simultaneously impose onerous and discriminatory treatment of multiple level of TDS u/s.195 of the Act.

Inspire a generation

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When this issue of the journal reaches you, the Olympic Games would have begun in London. Sportsmen, athletes from all over the world would be putting their best foot forward, competing fiercely but fairly to win laurels wearing national pride on their sleeve.

The Olympics held every four years is a mega event. It is a celebration of various qualities of human beings, grit, determination, endurance and many others. When an athlete climbs onto the victory stand a medal adorning his chest swelled with pride, and the national anthem is played, a dream is fulfilled.

While achieving success in sporting events is undoubtedly important, the games mean much more. It is a time that athletes representing different countries mingle with each other and respect for others is built. One of our fellow countrymen who is facing criminal action for alleged corruption in sport wanted to remain present at the games. He had been “invited”, by the organisers. For once, our judicial system acted swiftly and he was prevented from representing our country at the game’s opening ceremony. The person may be disappointed but the Institution he once headed, maintained its track record, with our sportsmen complaining about their substandard equipment and shabby attire just before the games.

Each of the Olympic Games has a motto and this time it is” inspire a generation”. The motto set me thinking. I attempted to list down living individuals, particularly Indians who would fit into the class that would inspire an entire generation, and the difficulty in finding such people was a cause for concern.

In every area – culture, art, sports, professions, science, social service and of course politics if one is to identify titans one has to travel back for at least three to four decades if not more.

Every Maharashtra leader worth his salt praises Shivaji an icon, but one cannot forget that the Maratha warrior breathed his last more than 300 years ago. What has gone wrong? The answer lies within us. Leaders who inspire, those who will be lighthouses for a generation do not fall from heaven. They arise from amongst us. There are a number of individuals whose deeds should inspire their kith and kin, friends and associates may be not a generation. I still recall those images of a Bollywood celebrity being splashed across the front page pointing a finger at a security guard who stood his ground and blew the whistle. In the glare of the media that person and his adherence to the call of duty was quickly forgotten. From that humble security guard to the jawan who stands in biting icy weather at the peak of the Himalayas, there are many such inspiring individuals.

We need to appreciate those who show intrinsic human qualities like honesty, determination and courage albeit in a small measure. For too long have we permitted society to use materialistic parameters to judge the success of a person. If you look at the news which is displayed among all forms of media be it print or electronic, there is great adulation about those who achieve economic success. To borrow a phrase from my last editorial, most of us are concerned at how much wealth a person has earned but we do not bother to question how.

It is true, that it is not easy to find persons whom we can all look up to. But let us look around amongst us and we will find a number of such examples. Let us give them the recognition, respect and the social status they deserve. Once that is done their breed will grow. Man is a social animal. If society starts rewarding those who show some courage in upholding human values however small the deed may be the numbers will swell. Great leaders swim against the tide. But if such leaders are not in sight, let us build small dams so that the tide can be stemmed, the current diverted.

It is because we have drifted from the emphasis on basic human values and embraced materialistic goals that we find a dearth of role models. To conclude, there is no point in sitting back and lamenting that there are no leaders who can inspire. We may not be able to find shining stars but will definitely be able to locate small lights which will show us the path. A candle cannot dispel darkness but it is enough to show the next step. If we sit back waiting for someone to inspire us we will get nowhere. Yes the goal can be quickly reached if we run behind torch bearer, but if there is none, even a small step at a time will also lead us to the destination. When your house is on fire, it is better to use the stairs rather than the elevator. I am sure those working in Mumbai’s Mantralaya will agree. Let us inspire those around us and if we all do so, the future generation will definitely be inspired!

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ANXIETY

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‘Anxiety’ itself is neither helpful not hurtful. It is our response to anxiety that is helpful or hurtful. – Winston Churchill
Anxiety is normal and is part of our existence. The base of ‘anxiety’ is insecurity and possessiveness – hence, fear of loss is the cause of anxiety. ‘Anxiety’ and its twin sister ‘worry’ are killers. It is rightly said that worry over the past, anxiety over the future and frenzy in the present kill energy – energy which is essential for action. ‘Anxiety’ impacts our performance. According to Thomas J. Delong, ‘anxiety is possibly the single largest inhibitor of growth’. The normal response to ‘anxiety’ is flight or fight. However, I believe, anxiety can be a powerful stimulant arousing the senses to function at their sharpest.

We are normally anxious about our family, economic activity, social and professional status, living up to expectations, ours and others, and lastly we are also anxious about our health – though health should take priority over other concerns, because no action can happen without being healthy, both in body and mind. Let us consider a few examples of ‘anxiety’:

  • a doctor is anxious before a major surgery.
  •  a lawyer is anxious before a major case.
  •  an actor is anxious about forgetting his/her lines or success of his or her performance.
  •  a student is anxious about results.
  •  a lover is anxious about relationship.
  •  a sick person is worried about getting well.
  •  a housewife is anxious about her family.
  •  a business person is worried about ‘topline’ and ‘bottomline’.
  •  a chartered accountant is worried about his client.

Unexpected events and contingencies also create and cause anxiety. Hence, I reiterate anxiety is normal and is part and parcel of our existence. All these anxieties are genuine and the answer to anxiety is one and only one and that is possession of a cool mind. With a cool mind and with proper preparation we can face ‘anxiety’. If we are adequately prepared, all anxiety giving issues would look small and there is a good old saying: ‘The art of living is: ‘don’t fret over small things’. The fear of failure is the biggest cause of ‘anxiety’. The response to ‘anxiety’ should also be acceptance of failure, because failure is nothing but a stepping stone to success.

Personally, in recent times I experienced a traumatic experience – I was anxious – about the outcome – anxious to the extent of losing sleep – what brought me out was faith in my god, my guru, my family, my friends and faith in myself and above all proper preparation. I am grateful to Him for both the ‘anxiety’ and the ‘faith’. We forget, anxiety is all about future which robs us of the pleasures of the present.

We have to learn to befriend ‘anxiety’ and use it as a stepping stone and never to yield to ‘anxiety’. I repeat, use ‘anxiety’ to improve ourselves, our environment and our life. Use this emotion as a tool of success and success will be ours.

The answer to ‘anxiety’ is:

 Faith Faith in the concept that from bad emerges good, Faith in the fact that every problem has a solution, Faith that with help and guidance from Him one can overcome every obstacle, Faith in oneself that one will win,

Above all we must learn to bond with people instead of possessing them. If we do this there will be no ‘anxiety of loss’.
Anxiety to achieve our objective actually dilutes our efforts. So stop being anxious. Success in life, I repeat, can be achieved only through clarity, courage and commitment.

 I would conclude by quoting George Bernard Shaw:

‘In this world, there is always danger for those who are anxious (afraid) of it’.

So to have a happy successful life let us hang our anxieties – fears – on the tree and leave them to Him and work with, nay for Him.

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Sections 200(3), 272(2)(k), Rule 31A — When assessee derives no benefit from failure to file e-TDS return, no penalty is called for. In a case where assessee has deposited TDS on time but failed to file e-TDS return because of delay in collecting PANs from landowners, such breach is only technical in nature and no penalty is warranted.

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38. (2012) TIOL 399 ITAT-Mum.
The Collector, Land Acquisition Department of Industries and Commerce v. Addl. CIT (TDS)
A.Ys.: 2007-08 to 2010-11. Dated: 9-3-2012

Sections 200(3), 272(2)(k), Rule 31A — When assessee derives no benefit from failure to file e-TDS return, no penalty is called for. In a case where assessee has deposited TDS on time but failed to file e-TDS return because of delay in collecting PANs from landowners, such breach is only technical in nature and no penalty is warranted.


Facts:

The Person Responsible (PR) in respect of Collector, Land Acquisition, Department of Industries & Commerce, Punjab Chandigarh (PR) had not filed e-TDS quarterly returns on respective due dates and so had defaulted u/s.200(3) of the Act. In response to the show-cause notice issued by the Assessing Officer, the PR submitted that the delay was due to landowners not having submitted their PAN numbers and therefore the delay was for a reasonable cause and no penalty could be levied. The AO rejected this explanation and held PR to be an assessee in default and levied penalty u/s.272A(2) (k) of Rs.6,11,600.

Aggrieved, the PR filed an appeal to the CIT(A) and contended that the interest on compensation was disbursed to landowners not directly but was deposited in the District/High Courts and as per guidelines issued for submission of e-TDS quarterly returns Form No. 26Q with less than 70% PAN data was not accepted for quarter ended 30-9-2007. Since PAN data was not available with PR, the quarterly returns could not be filed. The CIT(A) upheld the order passed by the AO. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal

Held:

The Tribunal noted that the Collector, Land Acquisition, Department of Industries is a government organisation acquiring land on behalf of Punjab Government. The land compensation is paid by the organisation to the landowners through the District/High Courts. The tax is deducted at source on the interest payment to the landowners, but the compensation and interest is deposited in the Court and not paid directly to the landowners. The landowners/agriculturists do not have PAN numbers. The Department was not able to find PAN numbers of these landowners.

Letters written to the landowners to furnish their PAN Numbers, at the available address, but no response was received due to improper addresses. The amount of tax was deducted at source and paid to the credit of the Government on time. The Tribunal held that the assessee was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the returns within the statutory period. Nonfiling of quarterly returns was only a technical and venial breach to the provisions contained in Rule 31A(2). Even otherwise also, the assessee did not derive any benefit whatsoever by not filing the e-TDS returns in time, as the amount of TDS was duly deposited in the Government Treasury within prescribed time. Such delay has not caused any loss to the Revenue/ Income-tax Department. The Tribunal cancelled the penalty levied by the AO. The appeals filed by the assessee were allowed.

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Sections 143(3), 147, 254 — In an assessment completed u/s.143(3) r.w.s. 254, the AO should confine himself to the directions issued by the Tribunal. He does not have jurisdiction to go beyond the directions given by the Tribunal.

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37. (2012) TIOL 383 ITAT-Mum.
Ambattur Flats Ltd. v. ITO
A.Y.: 2001-02. Dated: 22-5-2012

Sections 143(3), 147, 254 — In an assessment completed u/s.143(3) r.w.s. 254, the AO should confine himself to the directions issued by the Tribunal. He does not have jurisdiction to go beyond the directions given by the Tribunal.


Facts:

For A.Y. 2001-02, the original assessment of the assessee-firm, engaged in the business as builder and developer, was completed by estimating the income at 8% of the total contract receipts of Rs.94,57,500.

The assessment was subsequently reopened and in an order passed u/s.143(3) r.w.s. 147 of the Act, the total income was determined at Rs.28,11,700. This income was determined by the AO by adopting a profit rate of 20% of the gross profit. Aggrieved by the order passed u/s.147, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who gave a deduction of Rs.20,00,000 towards cost of land. The total income was modified at Rs.16,12,679. The assessee accepted the order of the CIT(A) but the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

The Tribunal found that the issue about cost of land was never raised before the AO and there was no discussion in the order of the AO on this issue. The Tribunal remitted the issue of deducting the cost of land to the AO and directed him to make necessary adjustments in accordance with law. In proceedings initiated u/s.254 and completed u/s.143(3), the AO collected evidences from sellers and accepted the contention of the assessee that it has incurred Rs.20 lakh towards purchase of land. However, he went further and reworked the profit and ultimately determined the income of the assessee at Rs.32,69,228.

Aggrieved by the order passed u/s.143(3) r.w.s. 254, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who held that the AO was justified in estimating the profit at 12%, which was also the rate adopted by the CIT(A) earlier.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 Held:

The Tribunal noted that the single issue was remitted back by the Tribunal to the file of the AO. Having examined the issue remitted and having concluded that the assessee’s contention on the issue remitted was to be accepted the AO should have stopped there. The Tribunal observed that the action of the AO in going further and reworking the profit was against law. It held that in an order passed u/s.143(3) r.w.s. 254, the AO should confine himself to the directions issued by the ITAT. He does not have jurisidction to go beyond the direction given by the Tribunal.

Since the AO had gone beyond the direction of the Tribunal and had redetermined the income, the Tribunal held the order passed by the AO to be contrary to law and set aside the same. The order of the CIT(A) was vacated. The Tribunal remitted the matter to the AO to determine the income at Rs.16,12,679 as detemined by the CIT(A) and to close the file. The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

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Section 194C — Where the arrangement was more of a sharing of fees under contract, provisions of section 194C cannot be applied. Section 36(1)(ii) — Bonus paid to directors could not have been otherwise paid as dividend. Hence provisions of section 36(1)(ii) cannot be applied. Income v. receipt — Only that part of the receipt as has accrued during the year should be taxed as income.

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36. (2011) 131 ITD 414 (Delhi)
Career Launcher (India) Ltd. v. ACIT,
Circle 3(1), New Delhi
A.Ys.: 2005-06 & 2006-07. Dated: 27-12-2010

Section 194C — Where the arrangement was more of a sharing of fees under contract, provisions of section 194C cannot be applied.

Section 36(1)(ii) — Bonus paid to directors could not have been otherwise paid as dividend. Hence provisions of section 36(1)(ii) cannot be applied.


Facts:

The assessee was into the business of running coaching classes. The assessee had entered into standardised agreements with various persons willing to run similar coaching classes in form of franchisees. The franchisees were allowed to use the trademark, tradename and course material belonging to the assessee, in lieu of which assessee received an amount equal to 25% of the net value earned from the operations. The assessee showed ‘Franchisee payments’ under the head ‘administrative and other expenses’. The Revenue held that payment made by the assessee to the franchisees was in nature of payment to contractor/sub-contractor and hence provisions of section 194C were applicable. Resultantly, the expenses were disallowed u/s.40(a) (ia). The CIT(A) upheld the order.

Held:

As per the agreement, the franchisees make payment to the assessee and not the other way round. However, the accounts of the assessee have been drawn in a manner which shows that the assessee pays to franchisees. This anomaly between the agreement and the accounts has not been explained by either party. This matter has also not been dealt with by the lower authorities. At this juncture, the matter has to be decided as per law and not merely as per entries in the books of account, which may only be indicative in nature, but not conclusive of the matter.

The franchisees set up the premises, equipment and infrastructure at their own cost as per specifications of the assessee. The assessee was to provide entire study material, upgradation thereof, technical knowhow and product details. The franchisee collected fees from students and taxes/duties leviable were borne by them. They retained 75% of the profit from operations and handed over 25% to assessee. Hence, from the facts of the terms, it clearly emerges that the franchisee is not doing work for the assessee and it is a case of running a study centre and apportionment of profits thereof between the assessee and the franchisee. The agreement is not regarding work done on behalf of the assessee rather it is a case of sharing fees under the contract.

Though the term ‘work’ in explanation of section 194C is wide enough, it does not cover the case of the assessee. Thus, the ground was allowed in favour of the assessee. Facts: The assessee paid bonus to directors who were also the shareholders of the assessee-company. The AO held that bonus was paid instead of dividends so as to avoid payment of dividend distribution tax. Hence, by invoking provisions of section 36(1)(ii) bonus was disallowed. The CIT(A) also upheld action of the AO. Held: Section 36(1)(ii) provides that any sum paid to an employee as bonus or commission for services rendered is to be deducted in computing the total income, where such sum would not have been payable to him as profits or dividend if it had not been paid as bonus or commission.

Taking the example of director A, it is clear that if the amount of Rs.7,02,231 had not been paid to him as bonus, the same amount would not have been paid to him as dividend, because he would have got 40.93% as dividend from the total dividend declared. In other words, he would have received higher dividend than the bonus. The position in case of S would be opposite. He was paid bonus of Rs.4,13,077 although his sharehold-ing is only 1.09%. Relevant facts are similar in case of other directors. Thus, it can be said that none of the directors would have received the bonus as dividend in case bonus was not paid. Also the bonus was paid as per resolution of Board of Directors. Therefore, the provision of 36(1)(ii) was not applicable. Facts: Being a coaching class, the assessee received nonrefundable fees in a year. However, the coaching was to be rendered in current year and subsequent year. Hence, the obligation was to be discharged in two accounting years. The assessee booked part fees in this year and part in the subsequent year. However, the AO added the entire amount to income.

The CIT(A) also upheld AO’s observation. Held: The decision as held in case of K. K Khullar v. Dy. CIT, (2008) 304 ITR (AT) 295 was considered. It was held that a distinction has to be made between the terms ‘receipt’ and ‘income’. Income is liable to be taxed and not receipt. Hence, only that part of receipt was taxable to assessee which accrued as income. Thus, the accounting policy followed by the assessee was correct. The CIT(A) erred in treating the nonrefundable deposit as income.

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Section 80-IB(10) — There is no precondition that the assessee should be the owner of the land for claiming deduction — Terrace in front of penthouse should not be considered while measuring built-up area.

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35. (2011) 131 ITD 142
Amaltas Associates v. ITO
A.Y.: 2006-07. Dated: 21-1-2011

Section 80-IB(10) — There is no precondition that the assessee should be the owner of the land for claiming deduction — Terrace in front of pent-house should not be considered while measuring built-up area.


Facts:

The assessee was a builder and developer of housing projects and claimed deduction u/s.80-IB. During the relevant year under consideration, it constructed a housing project and claimed deduction u/s.80-IB. The AO disallowed the deduction u/s.80-IB on the ground that the builder was not the owner of the land and various permissions and approvals were granted in the name of the co-operative society. Further, based on the DVO report, the AO observed that, out of 110 flats, the penthouses on the top floor of each building had a built-up area of more than 1500 sq.ft.

Held:

The contention of the Revenue authorities that the assessee must be the owner of the land to claim deduction u/s.80-IB has no force. There is no such condition for claiming deduction u/s.80- IB. Further, the agreement to sell showed that assessee purchased the property in question for a consideration of Rs.3 lakh. All the responsibilities for carrying out the construction, permission and development of the project lie with the assessee. The dominant control over the land was with assessee. The real owner was only to co-operate with the assessee. Also the assessee was only entitled to enrol members for selling the units within its own rights. Further, the deduction u/s.80-IB is not exclusively to an assessee but to an undertaking developing and building housing project, be it by a contractor or by an owner. Hence, the assessee cannot be denied deduction u/s.80-IB on this ground.

The next issue was of ‘built-up area’ exceeding the prescribed limits of 1500 sq.ft. in case of some of the flats. The AO, based on DVO’s report, had included the area of open terrace in front of the penthouses on the top floor of each building in the total builtup area, thereby increasing the maximum limits. The contention of assessee was that the definition of built-up area means inner measurement of residential unit at floor level including projections and balconies. But open terrace in front of penthouse, not being a covered area and open to sky, should not be considered as a part of built-up area. This contention was accepted by the Tribunal and hence the assessee’s appeal was allowed.

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Section 254(2) and Rules 23 and 25 of Income Tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963 — Assessee’s chartered accountant having filed an affidavit stating that he did not appear at the time of hearing as he had wrongly recorded the date of hearing in his diary and also furnished a photocopy of the diary showing the wrong noting, it has to be accepted that there was sufficient cause for his non-appearance on the date of hearing.

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34. (2012) 145 TTJ 537 (Delhi) (TM)
Five Star Health Care (P.) Ltd. v. ITO A.Y.: 2006-07. Dated: 2-3-2012

Section 254(2) and Rules 23 and 25 of Income Tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963 — Assessee’s chartered accountant having filed an affidavit stating that he did not appear at the time of hearing as he had wrongly recorded the date of hearing in his diary and also furnished a photocopy of the diary showing the wrong noting, it has to be accepted that there was sufficient cause for his non-appearance on the date of hearing.

The assessee filed a miscellaneous application for recalling the said order against the exparte order passed by the Tribunal. The only ground taken by the assessee in its miscellaneous application was that there was a bona fide reason for non-appearance on the part of the assessee on the fixed date of hearing. There was a difference of opinion between the members of the Tribunal and, therefore, the matter was referred to the Third Member u/s.255 (4). The agreed point of difference was

“Whether on facts and in the circumstances of the case, it will be appropriate in law to recall order dated 8th Oct., 2010 passed in ITA No. 1063/Del./2010”. The Third Member held that it would be appropriate to recall the ex-parte order of the Tribunal. It noted as under:

(1) Though in the miscellaneous application there is neither the mention of Rule 25, nor section 254(2), but, from the contents of the application, it is evident that it was under Rule 25 only because u/s.254(2) the assessee can request the rectification of an apparent mistake while under Rule 25, the assessee can request for the recalling of the order of the Tribunal which has been passed ex-parte due to non-appearance of the assessee.

(2) A perusal of Rule 25 shows that, as per proviso, where an appeal has been disposed of as provided in the rule and the respondent appears afterwards and satisfies the Tribunal that there was sufficient cause for his non-appearance on the date of hearing, the Tribunal is at liberty to recall the ex-parte order passed by it and restore the appeal.

(3) In the present case, the chartered accountant has given an affidavit. In support of the affidavit, he has also furnished the photocopy of his diary in which the hearing of the assessee’s appeal was wrongly noted as 9th September, 2010, instead of 7th September, 2010.

(4) Therefore, there was sufficient cause for nonappearance by the assessee on the date of hearing i.e., 7th September, 2010. Proviso to Rule 25 was squarely applicable and the Tribunal was justified in recalling the order of the Tribunal.

(5) Rule 23 provides the procedure to be adopted at the time of hearing the appeal. Tribunal having effectively decided the matter against the respondent-assessee by setting aside the order of the CIT(A) and restoring the matter back to the Assessing Officer without hearing the assessee, the ex-parte order of the Tribunal must be recalled as required by Rule 23 of ITAT Rules.

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Section 40(a)(ia) — Disallowance can be made only in respect of an amount which is sought to be deducted u/ss.30 to 38 and not in respect of reimbursement simplicitor which is profit neutral and not routed through the P & L a/c.

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33. (2012) 145 TTJ 1 (Kol)
Sharma Kajaria & Co. v. Dy. CIT
A.Y.: 2006-07. Dated: 17-2-2012

Section 40(a)(ia) — Disallowance can be made only in respect of an amount which is sought to be deducted u/ss.30 to 38 and not in respect of reimbursement simplicitor which is profit neutral and not routed through the P & L a/c.

In the re-assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer noted that the assessee had made payments to various lawyers for their professional services but had not deducted tax at source u/s. 194J from the same. The Assessing Officer was of the view that the assessee was under statutory obligation to deduct tax at source u/s.194J and, since the assessee had failed to perform this obligation, such payments were disallowed u/s. 40(a)(ia).

The CIT(A) rejected the assessee’s contention that expenditure which is not claimed in and did not appear in the Return and the P & L a/c should not be disallowed by application of section 40(a)(ia). The CIT(A) upheld the Assessing Officer’s order. The Tribunal, setting aside the orders of the lower authorities, noted as under:

(1) Unless a deduction is claimed in respect of the said amounts u/ss.30 to 38, the disallowance u/s.40(a)(ia) cannot come into play at all. The question of disallowance u/s.40(a)(ia) can arise only when something is claimed as a deduction in computation of business income; reimbursements simplicitor, being profit neutral, are not routed through the P & L a/c.

(2) Whether the assessee had claimed the fees paid to outside lawyers as a reimbursement from its clients or not was simply a matter of fact which will be evident from the bills raised on the clients and there was no need for making any inferences in respect of the same.

(3) If in the bills raised on its clients, the assessee had separately itemised the payments made to the outside counsel and claimed reimbursements in respect of the same, then these expenses cannot be of such a nature as to seek deduction in respect of the same. When the expenses are being reimbursed by the clients, these expenses cease to be expenses of the assessee and, therefore, there is no question of deduction in respect of the same.

(4) However, if the assessee has raised composite bills for professional services, on gross basis and without giving details of payouts to outside lawyers on behalf of his clients, the payments to outside lawyers will be in the nature of deduction to be claimed by the assessee.

(5) Without there being any categorical finding to the effect that the payments to outside lawyers were claimed as deductions in computation of profits, the disallowance u/s.40(a)(ia) in respect of such payments is not legally sustainable.

The matter was remanded back to the Assessing Officer for adjudication de novo in light of the above observations.

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Sections 2(47) and 45 — Purchase and sale of land and flat necessary parts of business of construction. Loss arising on sale of these properties is business loss.

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32. (2012) 144 TTJ 1 (Chennai) (TM)
Vijaya Productions (P) Ltd. v. Addl. CIT
A.Y.: 2007-08. Dated: 25-11-2011

Sections 2(47) and 45 — Purchase and sale of land and flat being necessary parts of the regular business of construction carried on by the assessee, the losses arising on sale of these properties have to be considered as loss incurred in the course of carrying on its regular business.

For the relevant assessment year, the Assessing Officer disallowed the assessee’s claim for loss on sale of one flat and land as business loss.

The Assessing Officer was of the opinion that such loss was not proved to have been incurred in the course of the assessee’s business of civil construction but, on the other hand, incurred due to purchase and sale of land. Further, according to him, the purchase and sale were effected in close proximity of time and land value could not have depreciated to such a large extent in a prime location of the city. The CIT(A) allowed the assessee’s claim. The Tribunal held in favour of the assessee. The Tribunal noted as under:

(1) Both the assertions of the Assessing Officer were misplaced.

(2) The assessee was engaged in the business of promoting commercial and residential flats and was authorised by the partnership deed to carry on any line or lines of business.

(3) Even if one considers the authorisation given in the partnership deed ‘to carry on any other line or lines of business’, to be ejusdem generis with the earlier terms of ‘promoting commercial and residential flats’, sale and purchase of land would still come within the ambit of the ‘business’ of the assessee.

(4) In a business of promoting commercial and residential flats and other lines of business, it cannot be said that purchase and sale of land would be alien and not a part of the business.

(5) Further, the land was treated as stock-in-trade and this has not been disputed by the learned Department representative. When stock-intrade is sold result can only be business profit or business loss. The assessee might have been forced to sell it at a loss for a myriad of reasons. It is not for the Revenue to sit on the armchair of a businessman and to decide appropriate point of time in which a sale or purchase has to be effected in the course of his business.

(6) Neither the sale deed, nor the purchase deed had been doubted. Neither books of account have been rejected, nor the seller or purchaser were called up by the Revenue for any verification. Without doubting the purchase and sale deed, the loss could not have been disallowed.

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Archives and archaism.

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The Government of India has a curious habit. It spares no effort on buying documents and personal effects of Gandhiji and storing them in its lightless archives. At the same time, it is most reluctant to grant access to scholars to any papers it remotely considers ‘sensitive’.

The latest example is its purchase of the Gandhi- Hermann Kallenbach papers. Kallenbach, an architect, was a close collaborator of Gandhiji in South Africa. The two issues may appear distinct, but they are not. The history of a country can’t be divided into what is acceptable to the government and what is not: that is not history, it is hagiography.

No Indian scholar has access to papers on vital post-1947 events such as the 1962 war with China, let alone recent matters such as our involvement in Sri Lanka after 1987. India’s archives access policy is perhaps one of the most illiberal anywhere in the world. It should be discarded fast.

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Taxation of Royalties and FTS as Business Profits (Interplay of Sections 44BB, 44D and 44DA)

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1.0 Background

Income in the nature of Royalties and Fees for Technical Services (FTS) in the hands of nonresidents are generally taxed on gross basis as per Article 12 of the applicable Treaty or u/s.115A read with section 9(1)(vi) and (vii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the ‘Act’). Essentially both kinds of income are subset of Business Income. Therefore, ideally they should be taxed on a net basis. However, even under tax treaties these incomes are taxed on gross basis in the State of Source, albeit at a concessional rate. Prior to the enactment of section 44DA on Statue, section 44D was in operation (Applicable to agreements entered into by non-residents up to 31st March 2003) which specifically disallowed deduction of any expenditure in computing Foreign Company’s Income by way of Royalties and FTS. Thus, it resulted in taxation of royalties/FTS on gross basis even in a case where there existed a Permanent Establishment in India. However, the silver lining was applicability of section 44BB which covered payments in connection with supplying of Plant and Machinery on hire which is used or to be used for prospecting for, extraction or production of mineral oils including natural gas. Section 44BB provides for presumptive basis of taxation whereby 10% of the gross amount is deemed to be taxable profits.

2.0 Royalty and FTS

— Sections 9(1)(vi) and (vii) of the Act In this Article, we shall discuss the provisions of Royalty and FTS in the context of sections 44BB, 44D and 44DA only. We shall not go into the other aspects or controversies in respect of Royalty and FTS.

2.1 Royalty

Clause (iva) of the Explanation 2 of the section 9(1)(vi) provides that “the use or right to use any industrial, commercial or scientific equipment but not including the amounts referred to in section 44BB” would constitute royalty. This exception is significant in that it substantially reduces tax liability in the hands of the recipient of royalty income. Section 115A provides that royalties referred to in section 9(1)(vi) are taxed at the rate of 10% on gross basis (other than royalty referred to in section 44DA), whereas if the income is taxed u/s.44BB, then the incidence of tax would be @ 4% on gross basis (excluding applicable Surcharge and Education Cess).

2.2 Fees for Technical services (FTS)

Explanation 2 of section 9(1)(vii) excludes consideration for any construction, assembly, mining or like project undertaken by the recipient from the purview of FTS. The CBDT has issued an Instruction No. 1862, dated October 22, 1990 based on the opinion of the then Attorney General of India Shri Soli J. Sorabjee in the context of interpretation and coverage of section 9(1)(vii) in respect of contract between ONGC and M/s. Scan Drilling Co. Ltd. Accordingly “the expressions ‘mining project’ or ‘like project’ occurring in Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act would cover rendering of services like imparting of training and carrying out drilling operations for exploration or exploitation of oil and natural gas . . . .” Based on the above CBDT Instruction in ONGC v. ACIT, (2007) 12 SOT 584 (Delhi) it was held that imparting training for carrying out of drilling for exploration of oil and natural gas was held to be covered by the exception referred to in Expl. 2 to section 9(1)(vii) and can be taxed on presumptive basis u/s.44BB of the Act. Supervisory services In Income-tax Officer v. SMS Schloemann Siemag Aktiengesellshaft Dusseldorf, (57 ITD 254) it was held that mere ‘supervisory services’ undertaken by the assessee would not amount to undertaking of the construction or assembly of the plant for exclusion from FTS under Expl. 2 to section 9(1)(vii) of the Act.

3.0 Section 44D of the Act

Section 44D of the Act dealt with computation of royalty or FTS received by a foreign company from Government or an Indian concern in pursuance of an agreement entered into before 1st April 2003. Up to 31st March 1976 it provided for a flat deduction of 20% from the gross amount of royalty or FTS. From 1st April 1976 to 31st March 2003 it did not provide for deduction of any expenditure. In other words royalty or FTS (not covered 44BB) earned by a foreign company during this period was taxed on gross basis @ 30/20% (plus applicable Surcharge and Education Cess). Thus, the incidence of taxation was quite high even though the foreign company would have a permanent establishment in India.

4.0 Section 44DA of the Act

Section 44DA was introduced vide the Finance Act, 2003 to replace section 44D of the Act. It also covers income by way of royalty and FTS. The distinguishing features of both the sections are as follows:

Abbreviations :
(i) NR = Non-resident * Plus applicable Surcharge and Education Cess
(ii) FTS = Fees For Technical Services
(iii) PE = Permanent Establishment as defined Clause (iiia) of section 92F

5.0 Interplay of sections

44BB, 44D and 44DA Royalty and FTS are essentially covered by section 9 r.w.s. 115A as well as sections 44BB and 44D and 44DA. The impact of taxation in each of the case differs depending upon the applicability of provisions and existence or otherwise of a PE. The overall implications under various provisions of the Act can be summarised as follows: If Royalty & FTS as per

  •  section 115A tax section 9(1)(vi)/(vii) @10% on gross basis and No PE If No Royalty and ? If income is covered No PE by section 44BB — Presumptive Profit @10% of gross receipts. Effective rate of tax 4% [With an option to tax on net basis u/s.44BB(3)] If Royalty & FTS as per
  • Section 44DA on net section 9(1)(vi)/(vii) basis @ 40% and PE (Rates are quoted without Surcharge and Education Cess) In Geofizyka Torun Sp. zo. o. (2010) 320 ITR 0268 — the AAR explained the relationship between section 44BB and 44DA as under: “If the business is of the specific nature envisaged under 44BB, the computation provision therein would prevail over the computation provision in section 44DA.”

Abbreviations : (i) NR = Non-resident
(ii) P&M = Plant & Machinery
(iii) FTS = Fees For Technical Services
(Rates are quoted without Surcharge and Education Cess)

6.0 Taxability under DTAA

By and large all tax treaties which contain Articles on Royalty and FTS provide for their taxation in the State of Source (SS) on gross basis, albeit, at reduced rates. However, wherever the recipient has a PE in the ‘SS’, and such incomes are effectively connected with that PE, then they are taxed as ‘Business Profits’ [DDIT v. Pipeline Engineering GMBH, (2009) 318 ITR (A.T.) 0210]. Article 7 of DTAAs provides that profits attributable to a PE in ‘SS’ are taxed therein. Article 7 further provides for computation of profits where by deduction of expenses are allowed in accordance with the provisions of and subject to limitations of the taxation laws of SS. In some treaties specific deductions are mentioned, whereas in most treaties they are left to domestic tax laws.

Business Profits, thus taxable in India would be subject to provisions of section 28 to 44C of the Act. However, section 44D contained non-obstante clause which provided that “notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in section 28 to 44C……” income derived by a foreign company in the nature of royalty and FTS to be taxed on gross basis. This resulted in severe difficulties as despite treaty provisions, Royalty and FTS even though attributable to a PE used to be taxed on gross basis. In DDIT v. Pipeline Engineering GMBH, [(2009) 318 ITR (A.T.) 0210] the Mumbai Tribunal held that “the combined reading of the treaty and the act leads to only one conclusion that no deduction is to be allowed against the receipts by way of royalties or fees for technical services in case of non-resident company, even if the business profits in respect of such income are to be computed under Article 7 of the DTAA”.

In order to avoid this anomaly, section 44DA was introduced w.e.f. 1st April 2004, which provided for net basis of taxation where royalty and FTS are effectively connected to a PE and incurred wholly and exclusively for the business carried on by that PE.

7.0 Judicial precedence

Majority of the decisions are in respect of characterisation of income between royalty as defined u/s.9(1)(vi) and business income covered by section 44BB of the Act.

7.1  Choice to opt for presumptive taxation

In DSD INDUSTRIEANLAGEN GmbH v. DDIT, (2009 TII 67 ITAT-Del.-Intl), the Tribunal held that the option to compute the income either on a presumptive basis or under normal provisions of the Act lies with the assessee and that he may exercise this option annually. “The Assessing Officer cannot force the system, which has been followed in the earlier year as per the option by the provision of law itself.”

7.2 Cases pertaining to section 44BB

7.2.1  Mobilisation expenses

In WesternGeco International Limited (2011) 338 ITR 0161 it was held that mobilisation and demobilisation revenues whether in respect of vessels moving into India or moving outside India are taxable in aggregate u/s.44BB on presumptive basis and that “there is no scope for splitting up the amount payable to the assessee.” The assessee however can opt for net basis of taxation u/s.44BB(3).

However, in case of R&B Falcon v. ACIT, (2007) 14 SOT 281 (Delhi) it was held that mobilisation revenue attributable to activities carried out in India are only liable to be included for the purposes of section 44BB.

7.2.2 In the undernoted cases the services of seismic data acquisition and processing were held to be covered under the provisions of section 44BB of the Act:

(i)    WesternGeco International Limited. (2011) 338 ITR 0161

(ii)    Geofizyka Torun SP. ZO.O. (2010) 320 ITR 0268

(iii)    Seabird Exploration FZ LLC (2010) 320 ITR 0286

7.2.3 Time charter

In the undernoted cases the income derived by provision of time charter of seismic vessel were held to be covered by section 44BB of the Act:

(i)    Wavefield Inesis ASA, (2010) 322 ITR 0645

(ii)    Bourbon Offshore Asia Pte. Ltd., (2011) 337 ITR 0122

7.2.4 General applicability of section 44BB

In the undernoted cases section 44BB was held to be applicable:

(i)    DIT v. Jindal Drilling and Industries Ltd., (2010) 320 ITR 0104 (Delhi)

(ii)    ONGC as agent of Foramer France (1999) 70 ITD 468 (Delhi)

(iii)    Paradigm Geophysical Pvt. Ltd. (2008 TIOL 362 ITAT-Del.)

(iv)    Dresser Mineral International Inc., 50 TTJ 273 (Del.)

(v)    Scan Drilling Co. (Delhi ITAT)

(vi)    Lloyd Helicopters International (2001) 249 ITR 162 (AAR)

7.2.5 Some Specific inclusions while considering Gross Receipts u/s.44BB:

(i)    Services tax : Technip Offshore Contracting bv (2009 TIOL 54 ITAT-Del.)

(ii)    Taxes paid on behalf of NR contractor: Compagnie General (48 ITD 424)

8.0 Conclusion

The cases discussed here are not exhaustive. It is neither possible nor intended to cover all case laws on the subject in one article. The object here is to analyse the impact and interplay of sections 9(1)(vi) and (vii), 44BB, 44D and 44DA and 115A and to assess the taxability of Royalty and FTS both on gross as well as net basis.

As India is aggressively exploring its oil and gas resources, more and more foreign companies are setting up their operations in India in the field of prospecting, exploring and production of oil and natural gas and therefore study of these sections of the Act will gain importance in coming days.

Limited Liability Partnership (Winding up and Dissolution) Rules, 2012.

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Limited Liability Partnership (Winding up and Dissolution) Rules, 2012 have been notified in supersession of the Limited Liability Partnership (Winding Up and Dissolution) Rules, 2010 and the same will come into force on the date of publication in the official Gazette.

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Composite contract involving offshore supply of equipment and onshore supply and services should be looked at as an integrated one only when the allocation of profits between the offshore and onshore components is unreasonable and artificially split up. ? Overall position of the entire contract needs to be considered and if no profits are earned by the taxpayer on an overall basis, no income from composite contracts can be taxed in India.

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21. Dongfang Electric Corporation v. DDIT (2012) 23 taxmann.com 170 (Kolkata-Trib.)
Articles 5 and 7 of India-China DTAA A.Y.: 2007-08. Dated: 22-6-2012
Present for the appellant: G. C. Srivastava
Present for the respondent: Sanjay Kumar

Composite contract involving offshore supply of equipment and onshore supply and services should be looked at as an integrated one only when the allocation of profits between the offshore and onshore components is unreasonable and artificially split up.

Overall position of the entire contract needs to be considered and if no profits are earned by the taxpayer on an overall basis, no income from composite contracts can be taxed in India.


Facts:

  • Taxpayer, a Chinese company (FCO), had entered into various contracts with Indian entities for setting up of turnkey thermal power projects. Each of these contracts were divided into two parts — one for supply of equipment and materials of thermal power plant and second for erection and services of units of main plant along with some common facilities.
  • FCO had a project office in India which constituted a permanent establishment (PE) of FCO in India.
  • In terms of the contract, consideration receivable by FCO was separately provided in respect of offshore supply and onshore activities.
  • FCO contented that consideration for offshore supply of equipment was not taxable in India under the Income-tax Act as well as the DTAA. As regards onshore activities, FCO incurred substantial losses which were reported and claimed in return of its income filed in India.
  • The Tax Department treated the entire project as an integrated one and held that contract was manipulated and artificially split up in such a way that FCO’s onshore activities will always result in losses. Further, FCO’s PE had a role in the overall execution of the project and hence, income in India should be computed by attributing profits to the PE under the DTAA as well as transfer pricing provisions under the Income-tax Act.
  •  The matter was referred to transfer pricing officer who attributed profits in India on both offshore and onshore components resulting in taxable income of FCO in India.

 ITAT Ruling:

  •  Reference was made by the ITAT to the AAR ruling in the case of Alstom Transport SA1 where the AAR held that a composite contract for installation and commissioning cannot be split up into separate parts and the contract has to be read as a whole having regard to its object and the purpose it sought to be achieved. This was held by applying the ‘look at’ principle adopted by Supreme Court (SC) in the case of Vodafone2. The prior decisions of SC3 where a dissecting approach in respect of such contracts was adopted are overruled as the decision in the case of Vodafone will have greater precedence as the same is rendered by a Larger Bench of the SC.
  • There may be legitimate issues regarding whether the ‘look at’ approach can be applied in all cases in which separate contracts are entered into for offshore supplies and onshore services. The ratio of the AAR ruling in the case of Alstom Transport can be made applicable in cases where values assigned to onshore services are prima facie unreasonable vis-a-vis values assigned to offshore supplies, which make no economic sense when viewed in isolation with offshore supplies contract. The ratio can be accepted where transactions are to be essentially looked at as a whole and not on a stand-alone basis, when the overall transaction is split in an unfair and unreasonable manner with a view to evade taxes.
  • Presence of ‘cross-fall breach clause’ (ensuring that performance of entire project was treated as single-point responsibility and non-performance of any part would be treated as a breach of whole contract) indicates that the contract could be viewed as an integrated one. However, this fact by itself does not mean that consideration for onshore activities is understated to avoid taxes in India.
  • In FCO’s case, losses were incurred not only in respect of onshore activities, but also on offshore supplies executed from China. If losses are incurred on the entire project, the mere fact that losses were incurred on onshore activities cannot be a sufficient reason to indicate that the arrangement was tax avoidant.
  • Even if the contracts are taken together as an integrated whole and if there are no profits earned under the contracts, there can be no occasion to tax income from such contracts in India.
  • The Tax Department needs to examine the matter in light of the fact that FCO has incurred losses on the entire project on an overall basis. The transfer pricing provisions under the Incometax Act would apply only if the basic position of FCO for claiming overall losses is rejected.
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Gains arising from sale of shares of an Indian company held by Mauritius Tax Resident are not taxable in India under the India-Mauritius DTAA. ? Provisions of General Anti-Avoidance Rules (GAAR), introduced by the Finance Act 2012, are effective from 1st April 2013 and will apply as and when they come in force, notwithstanding the current ruling, to the proposed transaction.

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20. Dynamic India Fund-I, in re
(2012) 23 taxmann.com
266 (AAR-New Delhi)
Article 13 of India-Mauritius DTAA Dated: 18-7-2012
Justice P. K. Balasubramanyan (Chairman) Present for the appellant: P. J. Pardiwalla, Advocate
V. B. Patel, Kalpesh Maroo, Abhishek Goenka, CA Present for the Department: Somanath S. Ukkali, Bangalore

Gains arising from sale of shares of an Indian company held by Mauritius Tax Resident are not taxable in India under the India-Mauritius DTAA.

Provisions of General Anti-Avoidance Rules (GAAR), introduced by the Finance Act 2012, are effective from 1st April 2013 and will apply as and when they come in force, notwithstanding the current ruling, to the proposed transaction.


Facts:

  • The applicant is a company incorporated in Mauritius (FCO) and holds a valid Tax Residency Certificate (TRC) issued by the Mauritius Tax Authority. FCO is a wholly-owned subsidiary of another Mauritius company (FCO1).
  • FCO was set up to invest in growing sectors in India. The funds were pooled from various individual and institutional investors from different parts of the world by FCO1 and invested in the share capital of FCO. The capital was invested by FCO in units and shares of various Indian companies with the sole intention of generating long-term capital appreciation. FCO was registered as a Foreign Venture Capital Investor and had a licence from the Securities Exchange Board of India.
  • Out of its investments, FCO proposed to sell shares of an Indian company. The issue before the AAR was whether such gains were exempt in view of the India-Mauritius treaty.
  • It was the Tax Department’s contention that FCO’s primary motive was to route investments through Mauritius in order to evade tax in India. Further, treaty benefit would be available only if capital gains were taxable in Mauritius, which was not so in the given fact pattern.

AAR ruling:

  • The argument of the Tax Department that it is a case of routing investments through Mauritius to evade capital gains tax in India is not acceptable in light of the SC decision in Azadi Bachao Andolan, where SC held that even if it is a case of treaty shopping, no further inquiry is warranted or justified on the aspect of eligibility of the beneficial capital gains provisions under the Mauritius DTAA provided the Mauritius investor holds a valid TRC.
  • The argument that unless capital gain is taxable in Mauritius, the Mauritius DTAA is not acceptable by virtue of the binding decision of the SC in Azadi Bachao Andolan, which had rejected this contention while granting treaty benefits to the taxpayer.
  • The Finance Act, 2012 introduced Chapter X-A i.e., GAAR provisions and TRC requirement in the Income-tax Act with effective from 1st April 2013. As the same is not effective till date, it cannot be made applicable at this stage in the current case. However, once GAAR provisions become effective, it will be open to the Tax Department to consider applicability of GAAR provisions, notwithstanding the ruling.
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‘Education cess’ is an ‘additional surcharge’ and is included in ‘tax’ under the DTAA, where the language of the DTAA includes ‘surcharge’ as ‘tax’. ? Where the DTAA caps the rate of ‘tax’ payable, cess is not separately payable by taxpayer.

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    19. DIC Asia Pacific Pte Ltd. v. ADIT
    (2012) 22 taxmann.com 310 (Kolkata-Trib.)
    Articles 2, 11 and 12 of India-Singapore DTAA
    Section 2(11) of Income-tax Act
    A.Y.: 2009-10. Dated: 20-6-2012
    Present for the appellant:    Akkal Dudhewewala
    Present for the respondent:     P. K. Chakraborty
    
‘Education cess’ is an ‘additional surcharge’ and is included in ‘tax’ under the DTAA, where the language of the DTAA includes ‘surcharge’ as ‘tax’.

Where the DTAA caps the rate of ‘tax’ payable, cess is not separately payable by taxpayer.


Facts:

  • The taxpayer, a Singapore company (FCO), eligible for India-Singapore treaty benefits, filed a return of income disclosing interest and royalty income. FCO claimed that the said incomes were taxable at flat rate of 15% and 10% under Articles 11 and 12, respectively.
  • The Tax Department rejected the taxpayer’s contentions and levied surcharge and education cess in addition to the rates applicable to respective incomes.

 ITAT Ruling:

  • The expression ‘tax’ is defined in Article 2(1) of the India-Singapore DTAA, in the context of India, to include ‘income tax’ and ‘surcharge’ thereon.
  • Article 2(2) of the DTAA covers within its ambit “any identical or substantially similar taxes which are imposed by either contracting state after the date of signature of the present agreement in addition to, or in place of, the taxes referred to in paragraph 1”. Therefore, though education cess was introduced much after the signing of the India-Singapore DTAA on 24th January, 1994, it is covered under the expression ‘tax’.
  • Education cess, introduced in India in 2004, is nothing but an additional surcharge and is covered by scope of Article 2 of the DTAA. Accordingly, provisions of Article 11 and 12 will find precedence over provisions of Incometax Act and taxability will be restricted to the specific flat rates provided in the respective income Articles of the treaty.
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Where consultancy charges were paid by ICO to non-resident consultants rendering services on ICO’s offshore projects, source rule exclusion carved out u/s.9(1)(vii)(b) is applicable even though the payments are made from India.

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18. M/s. Ajappa Integrated Project v. ACIT (ITA No. 349/Mds./2012)
Section 9(1)(viib), section 40(a)(ia) and section 195 of Income-tax Act A.Y.: 2008-09. Dated: 25-6-2012 Present for the appellant: V. S. Jayakumar, Advocate
Present for the respondent: Shaji P. Jacob

Where consultancy charges were paid by ICO to non-resident consultants rendering services on ICO’s offshore projects, source rule exclusion carved out u/s.9(1)(vii)(b) is applicable even though the payments are made from India.


Facts:

  • The taxpayer an Indian company (ICO) is engaged in the business of rendering technical consultancy services for oil exploration industries in India and abroad. For the purposes of carrying out an oil and gas exploration project in Nigeria, ICO paid fees for technical services to non-residents working for ICO in Nigeria.
  •  ICO did not deduct tax at source while making payments to consultants on the basis of specific exclusion in section 9(1)(vii)(b) of the Incometax Act viz. amount paid for FTS which is utilised for ICO’s business outside India could not be considered as income accruing or arising in India.
  • Rejecting the claim, the Tax Department had disallowed the claim for deduction of FTS by holding that there was non-deduction of tax at source.
  • The CIT(A) held that though ICO had shown that payments were directly related to the Nigerian project, the fact that the payments were made from India and not from Nigeria left some ambiguity in determining whether the exception provided u/s.9(1)(vii)(b) directly applied to the said consultants and whether the income can be regarded as accrued in India.

ITAT Ruling:

  •  Technical fees paid to non-resident consultants on ICO’s projects in Nigeria have to be considered as fees paid for services utilised in the business of the taxpayer outside India. This proposition prevails even though the payment is made from India and not from Nigeria. The exclusion u/s.9(1) (vii)(b) is clearly applicable and income earned by non-residents is not taxable in India.
  •  ICO is justified in holding a bona fide belief that no part of payment had any element of income which was chargeable to tax in India. ICO cannot therefore be fastened with any liability associated with non-deduction of tax at source and consequently the payments cannot be disallowed u/s.40(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act.
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Consultancy services that are not taxable under the narrow definition of FTS article of the DTAA, since the conditions laid down therein are not satisfied, cannot be taxed under the other income article of the DTAA. ? Taxation under residuary article of the DTAA is possible only in cases of income which are not covered under any other articles of the DTAA or when the income is taxable within scope of the residuary article itself.

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17. DCIT v. Andaman Sea Food Pvt. Ltd. (2012) 22 taxmann.com 400 (Kolkata-Trib.) Articles 12 and 23 of India-Singapore DTAA, Section 9(1)(vii) of Income-tax Act A.Y.: 2008-09. Dated: 19-6-2012
Present for the appellant: D. J. Mehta and Sanjay Kumar
Present for the respondent: D. S. Damle

Consultancy services that are not taxable under the narrow definition of FTS article of the DTAA, since the conditions laid down therein are not satisfied, cannot be taxed under the other income article of the DTAA.

Taxation under residuary article of the DTAA is possible only in cases of income which are not covered under any other articles of the DTAA or when the income is taxable within scope of the residuary article itself.


Facts:

  • Taxpayer, an Indian Company (ICO), is engaged in the business of trading and export of sea- food. ICO availed consultancy services in relation to certain foreign exchange derivative transactions from a Singapore company (FCO).
  • ICO was of the view that the consultancy services were rendered outside India and hence the same was not taxable in India under the Incometax Act. In any case, the amount was not taxable under the DTAA, as FCO had not ‘made available’ any services to ICO. ICO made payments to FCO without deducting tax at source.
  • The Tax Department regarded the amount as taxable under the Income-tax Act as the services were utilised by ICO in India. While it accepted that the payments were not taxable under the FTS article of the DTAA as services did not meet make available test, it was contended that as taxability failed under specific articles of the DTAA, its taxability automatically arises under the residuary article i.e., ‘Other Income’ article of the DTAA.

ITAT Ruling:

The ITAT rejected the Tax Department’s contentions and held:

  • Taxing rights for various types of income are assigned to the source state upon fulfilment of conditions laid down in respective clauses of the DTAA. When those conditions are not satisfied, the source state does not have the taxing right in respect of the said income.
  • When a DTAA does not assign taxability rights of a particular income to the source state under the respective article, such taxability cannot be invoked under the other income article. The other income article covers only income which is either covered under specific scope of that article itself or such income which is not covered within the scope of any other article of the DTAA.
  • Under the DTAA, FTS is taxable under Article 12 if the services enable the person acquiring the services to apply technology contained therein. FCO had rendered consultancy services and it did not involve any transfer of technology, nor did it enable ICO to apply technology contained therein. The payments were in the nature of business profits and as FCO did not have a PE in India, the same was not liable to tax in India.
  • In the facts of the case, the income could potentially be covered by the FTS article or business profits article or independent personal services article. However, the fees may not be taxed as the conditions prescribed in the respective articles are not satisfied. If income is covered by one or more specific articles, the residuary (other income) article does not apply.

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Notification No. 25/2012, S.O. 1453(E) dated 2-7-2012 — Income-tax (Seventh Amendment) Rules, 2012 — Amendment in Rule 12 and substitution of forms ITR 5 and ITR 6.

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Rule 12 provided that the prescribed ITR Form SAHAJ — ITR 1 and SUGAM — ITR 4S could not be used by a resident individual or a HUF to file his return of income, if he had:

(a) assets (including financial interest in any entity) located outside India; or

(b) signing authority in any account located outside India. The Rule is amended to provide that not ordinary residents can use SAHAJ — ITR 1 and SUGAM — ITR 4S though they have assests located outside India and have signi

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Instructions to AOs to rectify/reconcile disputed arrears in demand irrespective of limitation of four years u/s.154(7) — Circular No. 4, dated 20-6-2012.

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Instructions to AOs to rectify/reconcile disputed arrears in demand irrespective of limitation of four years u/s.154(7) — Circular No. 4, dated 20-6-2012.

In certain cases, assessees have disputed the figures of arrear demands shown as outstanding against them in the records of the Assessing Officers. The Assessing Officers have expressed their inability to correct/reconcile such disputed arrear demand on the ground that the period of limitation of four years as provided u/ss.(7) of section 154 of the Act has expired. Further, in some cases, the Assessing Officers have uploaded such disputed arrear demand on the Financial Accounting System (FAS) portal of Centralised Processing Center (CPC), which has resulted in adjustment of refund arising out of processing of returns against such arrear demand which has been disputed by such assessees on the grounds that either such demand has already been paid or has been reduced/eliminated in the appeals, etc. The arrear demands, in these cases also were not corrected/reconciled for the reason that the period of limitation of four years has elapsed. The CBDT has now authorised the Assessing Officers to make appropriate corrections in the figures of such disputed arrear demands after due verification/reconciliation and after examining the same on merits, whether by way of rectification or otherwise, irrespective of the fact that the period of limitation of four years as provided u/s.154(7) of the Act has elapsed.

Notification No. 25/2012, S.O. 1453(E) dated 2-7-2012 — Income-tax (Seventh Amendment) Rules, 2012 — Amendment in Rule 12 and substitution of forms ITR 5 and ITR 6.

Rule 12 provided that the prescribed ITR Form SAHAJ — ITR 1 and SUGAM — ITR 4S could not be used by a resident individual or a HUF to file his return of income, if he had:

(a) assets (including financial interest in any entity) located outside India; or

(b) signing authority in any account located outside India.

The Rule is amended to provide that not ordinary residents can use SAHAJ — ITR 1 and SUGAM — ITR 4S though they have assests located outside India and have signing authority in any account located outside India.

Agreement for exchange of information for collection of taxes between India and Jersey — Notification No. 26/2012, dated 10-7-2012. DTAA between India and Norway notified — Notification No. 24/2012, dated 19-7-2012.

Direct Tax Press Release No. 402/92/2006-MC (15 of 2012), dated 20-7-2012.

The CBDT vide its Notification No. 9/2012, dated 17th February, 2012 has exempted salaried employees from the requirement of filing the returns for A.Y. 2012-13.

The exemption is applicable only if all the following conditions are fulfilled:

  • Employee has earned only salary income and income from savings bank account and the annual interest earned from savings bank account is less than Rs.10 thousand.
  •  The total income of the employee does not exceed Rs.5 lakh (Total income means gross total income less deductions under Chapter VIA).
  • The employee has reported his PAN to the employer.

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Section 14A, Rule 8D — Exercising jurisdiction in the larger interest of justice, ITAT directed the AO to compute disallowance u/s.14A @ 2% of the exempt income instead of 4.06% as computed by the AO.

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18. JNJ Holdings P. Ltd. v. ACIT
ITAT ‘J’ Bench, Mumbai
Before B. Ramakotaiah (AM) and S. S. Godara (JM)
ITA No. 3411/M/2009
A.Y.: 2005-06. Decided on: 8-6-2012
Counsel  for  assessee/revenue:  Hiro  Rai/Rupinder Brar
       
Section 14A, Rule 8D — Exercising jurisdiction in the larger interest of justice, ITAT directed the AO to compute disallowance u/s.14A @ 2% of the exempt income instead of 4.06% as computed by the AO.

Facts:

The assessee involved in business of investments and dealing in shares, securities, filed its return declaring total income of Rs.14,60,52,720. In the said return it had shown dividend income of Rs. 76,49,289 as exempt income. In response to the show-cause notice issued by the AO as to why expenses in relation to earning of dividend income should not be disallowed, the assessee explained that it had not incurred any direct expenditure. The AO rejected this contention and computed the disallownce to be Rs.4,36,027 i.e., 4.06% of dividend income.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who directed the AO to recompute the disallowance by following Rule 8D of the Incometax Rules, 1963.

 Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where on behalf of the assessee it was contended that for the assessment year under consideration, Rule 8D is not applicable and that the Tribunal by exercising jursidiction u/s.254(1) of the Act, should determine the reasonable expenditure in peculiar circumstances of the case.

Held:

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was not correct in directing the AO to recalculate the disallowance by following Rule 8D. Keeping in view the fair statement of the AR as well as exercising jurisdiction in the larger interest of justice, the Tribunal directed the AO to compute the disallowance @ 2% of the exempt income instead of 4.06% which the Tribunal felt should meet the ends of justice.

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Section 54G — Exemption of capital gains on transfer of assets in cases of shifting of industrial undertaking to non-urban area — Investment by assessee in land and building for its business in non-urban area — Whether is it necessary that the investment in land and building in non-urban area is for the purposes of the business of the industrial undertaking transferred — Held, No.

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17. Dy. CIT v. Enpro Finance Ltd.
ITAT ‘J’ Bench, Mumbai
Before B. Ramakotaiah (AM) and S. S. Godara (JM)
ITA No. 4428/Mum./2008
A.Y.: 2004-05. Decided on: 27-6-2012 Counsel for revenue/assessee: Rupinder Brar/Mayur Kisnadwala

Section 54G — Exemption of capital gains on transfer of assets in cases of shifting of industrial undertaking to non-urban area — Investment by assessee in land and building for its business in non-urban area — Whether is it necessary that the investment in land and building in non-urban area is for the purposes of the business of the industrial undertaking transferred — Held, No.


Facts:

The assessee-company was carrying on its business of manufacturing activity at its leased premises in Mumbai for more than 45 years. Due to severe competition and high operational overheads in Mumbai, the assessee incurred losses and the activity was commercially not feasible. During the financial year 1999-2000, it decided to shift its undertaking to a non-urban area. As the plant and machinery was very old, the assessee sold them immediately, but for surrendering the tenancy rights it took some time and after protracted negotiations with the lessor, the leased premises on which the industrial undertaking operated was finally surrendered on 1-10-2003 and compensation of Rs.4.12 crore was received. It earned capital gain of an equivalent amount as the cost of acquisition of the leased premise was nil. Out of this amount the assessee invested Rs.1.4 crore in Capital Gain Account Scheme and Rs.1.14 crore in purchase of land and building in non-urban area. The assessee claimed deduction u/s.54G of the amount of Rs.2.54 crore and offered the balance amount as taxable income.

According to AO, the assessee sold its entire plant and machinery in the financial year 1999-2000 and since there was no existence of an undertaking, having sold the entire plant & machinery, the claim u/s.54G, which provides for exemption for shifting of industrial undertaking from urban area to non-urban area is not eligible to the assessee. However, the CIT(A) on appeal allowed the claim of the assessee.

Held:

On closer reading of the provisions of section 54G the Tribunal noted that whereas u/s.54G(1)(a), the requirement is that the new machinery or plant has to be purchased for the purposes of the business of the industrial undertaking, section 54G(1)(b) merely requires that the acquisition of building or land or construction of a building should be for the purposes of its business in such non-urban area. In other words, the phrase ‘of the industrial undertaking’, which is there in clause 1(a) is conspicuously missing in clause 1(b). It further compared the provisions of section 54G with section 54D and noted that while section 54D mandates that, for the capital gains to exempt, the new land or building, have to be used only for either shifting or re-establishing or establishing an industrial undertaking (and no other purpose), the provisions of section 54G of the Act permits the use of capital gains for acquiring land or building or constructing building for the purposes of (any) business in the non-urban area. Thus, according to the Tribunal, the provisions of section 54G can be interpreted that assessee should carry on any business in non-urban area. If the amounts are utilised for acquisition of assets for the purpose of its business, this should qualify for the purpose of exemption u/s.54G as there is no requirement that the land and building should be used for the purpose of the business of industrial undertaking.

The Tribunal also did not agree with argument of the AO that the assessee’s industrial undertaking ceased to exist in 1999-2000. According to it, the assessee was in the process of shifting and even the section itself provides that shifting was ‘in course of or in consequence of’ of such industrial undertaking.

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Section 80IB(10) — If conditions prescribed u/s.80IB(10) are satisfied, claim cannot be denied merely because the assessee had not carried on construction activity itself.

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39. (2012) 23 taxmann.com 176 (Bangalore-Trib.)
Abdul Khader v. ACIT
A.Y.: 2006-07. Dated: 30-4-2012

Section 80IB(10) — If conditions prescribed u/s.80IB(10) are satisfied, claim cannot be denied merely because the assessee had not carried on construction activity itself.


Facts:

The assessee, a builder and developer, was owner of an agricultural land which was converted into stock-in-trade and put the same for development by entering into a joint development agreement. Under the joint development agreement, the assessee contributed land and incurred expenses for statutory approvals. The assessee did not carry on construction activity. The assessee was entitled to 24% share in the said project. The assessee sold 49 flats which it got as its share and claimed as deduction u/s.80IB(10).

The Assessing Officer denied the claim on the ground that the assessee had not carried on the construction activity. This was confirmed by CIT (A). The assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

The Tribunal noted that the assessee contributed land as its contribution of capital and incurred initial expenses for development and building of housing project like sanction of plan, getting the electricity and water connection by making the payments to BWSSB and KEB, etc. It also noted that it is not the case of the Department that the project was not approved or developed and built by the assessee. The only reason for denying the deduction u/s.80IB(10) was that the assessee had not carried out construction activity himself.

The Tribunal also noted that on a joint reading of s.s (10) of section 80IB and Explanation thereto it is clear that deduction is allowable to an undertaking developing and building housing project approved, it is nowhere mentioned that, construction has to be carried out by the undertaking. Moreover, the Explanation clarified that any undertaking which has executed housing project as a works contract awarded by any person is not eligible for claiming this deduction, which clearly shows that even if any undertaking is constructing the housing project under a works contract entered by a person is not eligible for deduction. The only condition for claiming deduction u/s.80IB(10) is that the undertaking is developing and building housing projects approved by a local authority.

It observed that in such type of cases, getting the approval and plan sanction is the first and initial stage which was to be taken by the assessee and for that purose the assessee was required to make investments. So, it cannot be said that assessee did not make any investment for the project under consideration.

The Tribunal held that the deduction u/s.80IB(10) cannot be denied merely on the basis that the assssee did not construct himself. Considering the totality of the facts and the ratio of the decision of Jurisdictional High Court in the case of CIT v. Shravanee Constructions, (2012) 22 taxmann. com 250 (Kar.), the Tribunal set aside the order passed by the CIT(A) and directed the AO to allow deduction u/s.80IB(10) of the Act.

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Exemption to small service providers — Notification No. 33/2012-ST, dated 20-6-2012.

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By this Notification, earlier Notification No. 6/2005-ST has been rescinded and exemption has been granted in relation to taxable services of aggregate value not exceeding ten lakh rupees in any financial year from the whole of service tax leviable thereon.

Further, the definition of ‘aggregate value’ is amended to mean the sum total of value of taxable services charged in the first consecutive invoices issued during a financial year, but does not include value charged in invoices issued towards such services which are exempt from whole of service tax leviable thereon under any other notification.

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Penalty — For not furnishing Vat Audit Report within prescribed time — Discretionary and not automatic — Failure to consider dealer’s explanation — Order set aside — Section 61(2) of The Maharashtra Value Added tax Act, 2002.

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Facts

The dealer could not file Vat Audit Report in time as such the penalty u/s.61(2) of the Act was levied by the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax without considering the explanation offered by the dealer for delay in filing the report and held that the penalty u/s.61 of the Act is automatic. Both the Tribunal and the Joint Commissioner of Sales Tax upheld the penalty order. The dealer filed appeal before the Bombay High Court against the order of the Tribunal.

Held

The Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax had not furnished any reasons for rejecting explanation offered by the dealer while levying penalty and the Joint Commissioner of Sales Tax in appeals had proceeded on the wrong premise that the levy of penalty is automatic and that the reasons furnished by the dealer need not be considered at all. The Tribunal also seems to proceed on that basis. U/s.61(2) of the act penalty is attracted as soon as the wrongful act was committed, but that does not conclude the exercise of the discretion by the assessing authority. The levy of penalty is not automatic. The assessing authority is duty bound to consider the reasons which are furnished by the dealer and to inquire in to whether those reasons are genuine and bona fide. The Tribunal also dealt with reasons, but its order is based on conjecture. The High Court accordingly set aside the order of the Tribunal and remanded back to the assessing authority to pass fresh order and to consider the reasons furnished by the dealer while passing the order.

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Installation charges not recovered separately in case of sale and installation of solar systems — The Department levied service tax on notional basis — 33% of the total consideration — Held, Service tax applicable on installation portion even if not charged separately — Matter remanded back to ascertain the correct amount of the installation service based on the data sheet submitted by the assessee.

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Facts:

The appellant a manufacturer of solar water heater systems sold the same and the value also included the installation of such system at the site of the buyer. Central excise duty was not charged on the same in view of the exemption to solar systems. No separate consideration was charged in the invoice for installation. Simultaneously, the appellant was selling solar systems to distributors also who were charging for installation separately from the end-customers. The Revenue levied service tax on notional value of activity pertaining to installation on the basis of 33% of the invoice amount. The appellant argued that no service tax should be levied. Alternatively, the service tax if at all levied must be on actual service element pertaining to installation activity based on cost data provided by the appellant.

Held:

In view of the collection of installation charges separately by the distributors in case of sales through such distributors, it was held that service tax is applicable on the installation portion even if charges for the same have not been collected separately. The matter was remanded back to the adjudicating authority to quantify the amount of installation charges on which service tax can be levied, based on the data provided by the appellant.

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CENVAT credit — Courier services for sending documents, cheques, demand drafts and business enquiries — Held, eligible for CENVAT credit.

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Facts:

CENVAT credit of service tax taken on courier services was denied and penalty was imposed.

Held:

The lower authorities had not considered the wide gamut of the definition of input service. In view of the wide gamut of the definition and the decisions of the Tribunal in cases of Cadila Healthcare, (2010) 17 STR 134 as well as Meghachem Industries, (2011) 23 STR 472, the Tribunal allowed the appeal of the assessee.

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Activity of retrofitting of CNG/LPG kits as authorised by Regional Transport Authority considered liable for service tax by Revenue — Paid service tax on receiving intimation through sales tax on same amount charged for kits fitted by them —Penalties set aside.

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Facts:

The appellant authorised by Regional Transport Authority retrofitted CNG/LPG engine kits. The Revenue took a view that this was liable for service tax as erection, commissioning and installation service. On being pointed out in August, 2008, the appellant obtained registration and paid the same in September 2008. This was done despite the fact that sales tax in the full value of kits was paid by the assessee and invoice did not show fitting charges separately. Four months later, a show-cause notice was issued proposing to levy penalty u/s.76, 77 and 78 of the Finance Act, 1994.

Held:

Considering the facts and circumstances wherein the assessee promptly paid service tax without contesting the liability on the ground of payment of VAT on full value established their bona fides. The case was considered fit one for which section 73(3) was applicable whereby no show-cause notice was required to be issued or section 80 could have been extended. Penalties were set aside.

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Obtained visa and passport for individuals — Matter covered under CBEC Circular — Appeal was allowed.

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Facts:

The appellant being a travel agent provided services of obtaining visa and passports for a fee/ service charge to individuals. The appellant pleaded that the matter was covered later by CBEC Circular No. 137/6/2011, dated 20-1-2011 which had clarified that these services do not fall under any category of taxable services.

Held:

The service was not taxable and the order was set aside.

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? Refund — Accumulated CENVAT credit — Not pertaining to the month of exports — Held, refund of credits pertaining to past periods can be allowed in subsequent months. ? Eligible documents — Input service invoices raised on head office — Held, credit can be allowed if the services received by the assessee. ? Ineligible documents — Photocopies of invoices, invoices not containing name of the assessee — Credit cannot be allowed. ? Eligible documents — Documents in the name of another entity but o<

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Facts:

The respondent was a 100% EOU engaged in the exports of silk fabrics. Most of their production was exported and therefore, the respondent was not able to utilise the accumulated credits and they filed refund claim for such credits under Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (CCR). The Department rejected the claim since the claim pertained to credits for the input services which had not been used in goods actually exported, while relying on certain Tribunal decisions in Ace Techniks v. Commissioner, (2009) ELT 92 (T). Moreover, certain credit was denied on input service invoices which were raised on head office or where only photocopies of invoices were available or where the invoices were not in the name of the respondent. The respondent argued that in view of CBEC Circular dated 19-1-2010 and the respondent’s own case reported in (2010) 20 STR 219 (Tri.-Bang.), the credit pertaining to a period can be claimed in the subsequent period.

Held:

Quoting Para 3.3 of CBEC Circular dated 19-1-2010, the Tribunal held that there is no bar on refund for the credits pertaining to the input services availed in the previous period. It was also observed that the case of Ace Techniks cited by the Revenue was in relation to inputs and not input services and therefore, not applicable to this case. Regarding eligible documents the Tribunal held as under:

  • Input service invoices raised on head office — held, credit can be allowed if the services are received by the respondent and the respondent can satisfy the authorities that the services have been received by them.
  •  Photocopies of invoices, invoices not containing name of the assessee — held, such documents are not eligible documents.
  •  Documents in the name of another entity but on account of the assessee — held, credit cannot be denied on such invoices in view of the Tribunal’s decision in the case of the respondent’s own case reported in (2010) 20 STR 219 (Tri.-Bang.).

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Refund — Service tax paid subsequently found not payable due to threshold exemption — Refund denied on the ground that nothing was indicated about service tax exemption in the invoice — Held, refund cannot be denied.

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Facts:

In the given case, service tax was demanded from the appellant on the ground that the appellant had exceeded the limit provided for exemption. The appellant immediately paid service tax along with interest. Subsequently, it was discovered that the appellant was within the limits of threshold exemption and therefore the tax was not payable. Consequently, the appellant claimed refund. The claim was rejected by the Dept. on the ground that the fact of exemption was not mentioned in the invoice, and therefore, the value indicated in the invoice was inclusive of service tax element. The Department in support of its claim also stated that since service tax paid had been debited to Profit and Loss account, therefore it had to be held that service tax liability had been included in the value of services charged in the invoice.

 Held:

The Tribunal held that the view taken by the Department is not appropriate. How can the appellant mention the amount of tax when the appellant was exempt? Moreover, mere non-mention of service tax exemption on the invoice does not mean that the appellant has collected any amount of service tax. Also, the fact that service tax paid was booked as expenditure does not mean the appellant was in fault. The order rejecting the refund claim of the appellant was held to be non-sustainable.

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CENVAT credit availed on capital goods — Goods destroyed by fire after availment and utilisation of such credit — Insurance claim paid by the insurance authority covered central excise duty — Revenue sought to recover the CENVAT — Held, Reversal can be sought only if the availment irregular — Appeal dismissed.

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Facts:

The respondent bought certain capital goods on payment of excise duty on the same. The duty portion was claimed as CENVAT credit and thereafter, the same was utilised for the discharge of duty liability on goods cleared. Five years thereafter, the goods got destroyed in fire. The respondent purchased new capital goods and put forward claim to the insurance company in terms of the insurance policy subscribed by them. The insurance company reimbursed the cost of goods including the excise duty element on the same. The Revenue directed the assessee to reverse the CENVAT credit on the ground that the assessee had double benefit. The substantial questions of law were

(a) whether the assessee was eligible to claim credit on goods which were claimed to be destroyed in fire and for which the insurance company had compensated equivalent value of goods along with duty, and

 (b) whether the Tribunal’s order encouraged unjust enrichment.

Held:

Citing the judgment in case of CCE, Pune v. Dai Ichi Karkaria Ltd. reported in (1999) 112 ELT 353 (SC), the Court held that there is no provision in the rules which provides for the reversal of the credit by the Excise Authorities except where it has been irregularly taken. Merely because the insurance company paid the assessee the value of goods including the excise duty paid, that would not render the availment of the CENVAT credit wrong or irregular. The appeal of the Department was dismissed.

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Allowance of input tax credit — Stand of the Department and related procedural aspects — Trade Circular No. 8T of 2012, dated 21-6-2012.

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This is a clarificatory Circular in nature in view of the Bombay High Court decision in case of M/s. Mahalaxmi Cotton Ginning Pressing and Oil Industries, Kolhapur in writ petition No. 33/2012. This Circular states in detail the stand of the Department regarding allowing/disallowing of Input Tax credit and related procedural aspects.

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Professional tax payment electronically — PFT.1012/C.R.29/Taxation 3, dated 14-6-2012.

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By this Notification every PTRC holder has to make payment electronically of tax, interest, penalty or any amount under the law with effect from 1-7-2012.

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Clarification on service tax on remittance from abroad to India — Circular No. 163/14/2012-ST, dated 10-7-2012.

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This Circular has clarified that no service tax will be leviable on the amount of foreign currency remitted to India from abroad as the service has been defined u/s.65B(44) and the definition specifically excludes a transaction in money or actionable claim.

As the remittance of foreign currency from abroad is a transaction in money, therefore, it will fall outside the ambit of service. It is further clarified that even the Indian counterpart bank or financial institution who charges the foreign bank or any other entity for the services provided at the receiving end, is not liable to service tax as the place of provision of such service shall be the location of the recipient of the service, i.e., outside India, in terms of Rule 3 of the Place of Provision of Services Rules, 2012.

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Clarification on point of taxation rules — Circular No. 162/13/2012-ST, dated 6-7-2012.

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This Circular has been issued to clarify issues relating to point of taxation in (i) continuous supply of service — dealing with the transition by way of changes in the Rules w.e.f. 1st April 2012; (ii) works contracts — the transition by way of changes in tax treatment w.e.f. 1st July 2012; and (iii) introduction of partial reverse charge in certain services w.e.f. 1st July 2012. Accordingly,

(i) In the case of continuous supply, where the invoice had been issued or payment received before or on 31st March 2012, the point of taxation is governed by Rule 6 of the Point of Taxation Rules, 2011 as it stood at that point of time.

(ii) In the case of works contracts, which have been subjected to certain changes in service tax treatment effective from 1st July, if there has been a change in the effective rate of tax, the point of taxation will be determined under Rule 4, and if not, it will be determined under Rule 3. Introduction of service tax for a service that was not exempted by Notification, but was outside the scope of taxable service, does not constitute a change in the effective rate of taxation, and will be dealt with under Rule 3. (iii) For services where partial reverse charge has been introduced from 1st July, it will apply only when the point of taxation is on or after 1st July.

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Clarification regarding cess — Circular No. 161/12/2012-ST, dated 6-7-2012.

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The CBEC has circulated the new single accounting code for all taxable services, which is 00441089 for service tax, 00441090 for other receipts, and 00441093 for penalties. The code for ‘deduct refunds’ is 00441094. These codes are effective from 1st July 2012. The old codes will continue to be operative for payment pertaining to the period prior to 1st July 2012.

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Clarification regarding cess — Circular No. 160/11/2012-ST, dated 29-6-2012 and Order N0. 2/2012, dated 29-6-2012.

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There has been some doubt regarding the applicability of provisions of the Finance Act, 2004 relating to education cess and the Finance Act, 2007 relating to secondary and higher education cess as the concerned Acts make reference to section 66 of the Finance Act, 1994, which shall cease to have effect from 1st July, 2012. In this connection, reference to the s.s (1) of section 8 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 is made for interpretation of statutes and thus any reference to section 66 of the Finance Act, 1994 shall be construed as reference to the newly re-enacted provision i.e., section 66B of the same Act. Despite the stated position of law, the matter has been settled by the issue of Removal of Difficulties Order No. 2/2012, dated 29-6-2012.

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Transport of passengers and goods by rail exempted from service tax — Notification No. 43/2012-ST, dated 2-7-2012.

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Vide this Notification, exemption has been granted from whole of service tax leviable on two kinds of services provided by Indian Railways, namely,

(a) Service of transportation of passengers (with or without accompanied belongings) in 1st class or in air-conditioned coach and

(b) Services by way of transportation of goods. The exemption would be effective up to 30th September 2012.

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Service of foreign commission agent utilised for export of goods exempted — Notification No. 42/2012-ST, dated 29-6-2012.

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By this Notification, the service of a commission agent located outside India and used for the export of goods is exempted from service tax up to a value of 10% of the FOB value of the goods exported. However, the exemption is not available for the export of canalised item, project export, export financed under lines of credit extended by the Government of India or by EXIM Bank.

It is also not available for export by the Indian partner with equity participation in an overseas joint venture or wholly-owned subsidiary. The said Notification also contains the procedure in detail and the forms in which the exporter is required to inform Dy. Commissioner/ Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise regarding before claiming exemption.

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Exemption of service provided to SEZ, etc. — Notification No. 40/2012-ST, dated 20-6-2012.

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Vide this Notification, exemption granted to services provided to an unit located in a Special Economic Zone or Developer of SEZ and used for the authorised operations, from the whole of the service tax, education cess and secondary and higher education cess leviable thereon, subject to complying with conditions and procedures.

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Rebate of service tax to exporter — Notification No. 41/2012-ST, dated 29-6-2012.

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This Notification deals with provision and procedure for rebate given in the form of refund of service tax paid on services utilised for goods exported. The rebate is available for export of both excisable and non-excisable goods.

For excisable goods, it applies to services used beyond the place of removal, for export of the goods. For non-excisable goods, it applies to services used for the export of the goods. Rebate is given as per the schedule of rates in the Notification; however if actuals are over twenty per cent more than the notified rate, the rebate can be claimed on the actuals as supported by documents.

The exclusions under definition of ‘input services’ in the Cenvat Credit Rules, as contained in clauses A, B, BA and C of Rule 2(l) apply to rebate also. Rebate is not available if Cenvat credit of service tax paid on specified service used for export of goods has been taken.

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