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Transplantation of human organs — Donor and recipient near relatives, hence approval of authorisation committee is not necessary.

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[Sonia Ajit Vayklip (Miss.) & Anr v. Hospital Committee, Lilavati Hospital & Research Centre & Ors., AIR 2012 Bombay 93.]

A tribal lady from Chhattisgarh, had challenged the decision of the respondents herein refusing to grant approval for transplantation of her kidney to the body of her younger brother Deepak Ajeet Vayklip. By their report dated 4th January 2012, the Authorisation Committee and the Chairman of the Authorisation Committee and Director of Medical Education and Research, Mumbai have not granted permission to the petitioner No. 1 for donating her kidney to her brother Deepak Ajeet on the ground of mental status of the petitioner No. 1 and also on the ground that the petitioner donor is suffering from right kidney stones and ureteric stones.

The Court observed that as the preamble indicates, the Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues Act, 1994 is enacted to provide for regulation of removal, storage and transplantation of human organs and tissues for therapeutic purposes and for prevention of commercial dealings in human organs and matters connected or incidental thereto. Section 3 of the Act provides that any donor may, in such manner and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed, authorise the removal, before his death, of any human organ or tissue or both of his body for therapeutic purposes in such a manner and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed.

The legislative scheme therefore, is that two types of cases are contemplated:

(i) donor to stranger

(ii) from donor to near relative

No such approval is required from the Authorisation Committee for donation of a human organ or tissue to a near relative, because there would be no commercial element for such donations. Even in the donation to a near relative, there are three restrictions:

(A) where either the donor or the recipient is a foreign national, prior approval of the Authorisation Committee is required.

(B) in case of a minor, no organ or tissue can be removed from the body of the minor before his death for the purpose of transplantation except in the manner as prescribed;

(C) in case of mentally challenged person, no organ or tissue can be removed from the body of the mentally challenged person before his death for the purpose of transplantation. Mentally challenged person is defined as having mental illness or mental retardation.

The Court observed that in cases where donor and recipient are near relatives as defined by the Act, there need be no enquiry by Authorisation Committee to ascertain whether there is any commercial element. Such enquiry is therefore, not at all required to be held in the case of near relatives. Approval of Authorisation Committee would not be necessary in such cases. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the urgency involved and also having regard to the fact that the State of Chhattisgarh has also released a grant of Rs.2 lac in favour of the proposed kidney transplantation of the petitioner No. 2, the Court allowed the petition.

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Time limit for issuing of notice : Sections 148 and 149 of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Y. 1998-99: Assessment order u/s.143(3) passed on 28-2- 2001: Notice u/s.148 issued on 30-3-2009: Not valid: Section 149 amended by Finance Act, 2001, w.e.f. 1-6-2001 reducing the time limit from 10 years to 6 years is applicable.

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[C. B. Richards Ellis Mauritius Ltd. v. ADIT, 21 Taxman. com 535 (Del.)]

For the A.Y. 1998-99 the assessment was completed u/s.143(3) on 28-2-2001. Subsequently, on 30-3-2009, a notice u/s.148 was issued for reopening the assessment. The assessee’s objections were rejected by the Assessing Officer. The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under: “

(i) The issue in dispute gained importance because the time limit for issuance of notice u/s.148 as stipulated and stated in section 149 underwent substitution by the Finance Act, 2001 with effect from 1-6-2001. By the Finance Act, 2001, the period was restricted to six years from the end of the relevant assessment year. Before the said substitution, till 31-5-2001 reassessment proceedings could be initiated for up to 10 years from the end of the relevant assessment year.

(ii) It is an accepted and admitted position that the re-assessment notice dated 30-3-2009 would be barred and beyond time, in case, the period stipulated in substituted section 149 with effect from 1-6-2001 is applied.

However, the contention of the Revenue is that the substituted section is not applicable and section 149 before its substitution by the Finance Act, 2001 would apply. It is stated that the return in question was filed on 20-11-1998 and the law/limitation period prescribed/applicable on the first day of the assessment year determines and decides the time period for issue of notice u/s.147/148. The question raised is whether the amendment substitution of the period with effect from 1-6-2001 in section 149, is procedural or substantive.

(iii) Law of limitation is a procedural law and the provision or the limitation period stipulated on the date when the suit is filed applies. Law of limitation, therefore, being procedural law has to be applied to the proceedings on the date of institution/ filing. No person can have a vested right in the procedure. Therefore, the procedural law on the date when it was enforced is applied.

(iv) Law of limitation does not create any right in favour of a person or define or create any cause of action, but simply prescribes that the remedy can be exercised or availed of by or within the period stated and not thereafter. Subsequently, the right continues to exist but cannot be enforced. The liability to tax under the Act is created by the charging section read with the computation provisions. The assessment proceedings crystallise the said liability so that it can be enforced and the tax if short-paid or unpaid can be collected. If this difference between liability to tax and the procedure prescribed under the Act for computation of the liability (i.e., the procedure of assessment), is kept in mind, there would be no difficulty in understanding and appreciating the fallacy and the error in the primary argument raised by the Revenue.

(v) It is a settled position that liability to tax as a levy is normally determined as per statute as it exists on the first day of the assessment year, but this is not the issue or question in the present case. The issue or question in the present case relates to assessment, i.e., initiation of re-assessment proceedings and whether the time/limitation for initiation of the re-assessment proceedings specified by the Finance Act, 2001 is applicable. The Court is not determining/deciding the liability to tax but has to adjudicate and decide whether the re-assessment notice is beyond the time period stipulated. This is a matter/issue of procedure, i.e., the time period in which the assessment or re-assessment proceedings can be initiated. Thus, the time period/limitation period prescribed on the date of issue of notice will apply.

(vi) In view of the aforesaid reasoning, writ petition is allowed and the re-assessment notice dated 30-3-2009 and the order passed by the Assessing Officer and Assistant Commissioner dismissing the objections of the assessee are quashed.”

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Speculation business: Speculation loss: Section 73, r/w section 28(i)-: A.Ys. 1996-97 and 1998-99: Assessee-company in business of dealing in shares and also earning interest income by granting loans and advances: Incurred loss in purchase and sale of shares: Claimed set-off of above loss against interest income: AO denied set-off relying on Explanation to section 73: Tribunal held that principal business of assessee was granting of loans and advances: Allowed set-off: Tribunal is right.

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[CIT v. Narayan Properties Ltd., 21 Taxman.com 547 (All.)]

The assessee-company was in the business of purchase and sale of shares and was also earning interest income by granting loans and advances. During the previous years relevant to the A.Ys. 1996-97 and 1998-99, the assessee incurred loss in the purchase and sale of shares and earned interest income from loans and advances. It claimed set-off of the above loss against the interest income. The Assessing Officer assessed the interest income as business income. He further treated the business of purchase and sale of shares as speculation business as per Explanation to section 73 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. He, therefore, considered the aforesaid loss as speculation loss and held that it would only be set off against the speculation profit in the subsequent years. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

 On appeal by the Revenue the Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under: “

(i) Section 73(1) provides that any loss, computed in respect of speculation business carried on by the assessee, shall not be set off except against profits and gains, if any of another speculation business. Section 73(1) uses the words ‘business carried on’. The Explanation to section 73 also uses the phrase ‘where any part of the business of the company . . . . . consists in the purchase and sale of shares of other companies’. Section 28(1) provides for charging of income-tax on profits and gains of any business or profession which was carried on by the assessee at any time during the previous year. Section 28(1) r/w section 73(1) which also uses the words ‘business carried on’ clearly indicate that what is chargeable to the income-tax is the business actually carried on and profits and gains of the said business.

The Explanation to section 73 contains an exclusionary clause, according to which the following companies are excluded from the operation of the deeming clause

(i) a company whose gross total income consists mainly of income which is chargeable under the heads ‘Interest on securities’, ‘Income from house property’, ‘Capital gains’ and ‘Income from other sources’, or (ii) a company the principal business of which is the business of banking or granting of loans and advances’.

(ii) The question to be considered is as to whether a company, which fulfils the conditions as mentioned in the exclusionary categories, can be denied the benefit, if the income consists mainly of income as used in first category and the principal business of which as used in the second category from the activities and business which are not the part of the memorandum of association of the company. Section 28(1), section 73(1) and the Explanation to section 73 indicate that the income which is chargeable is the income in the relevant year arising from business or profession carried on by the company. The words ‘carried on’ mean actual carrying of the activity. The words ‘carried on has to be read in context of what actually was done by the company in the relevant year, rather than what was main object in the memorandum of association of the company. Thus, the submission of the Revenue that since in the memorandum of association the activity or business, which is shown to have been carried on by the assessee, is not included, it is not entitled to be considered in exclusionary clause, has to be rejected.

(iii) For qualifying the exclusionary categories as mentioned in the Explanation to section 73, the condition to be fulfilled is that gross total income consists mainly of income which is chargeable under the heads

 (a) ‘Interest on securities’,

(b) ‘Income from house property’,

(c) ‘Capital gains’ and

(d) ‘Income from other sources’.

The said provision uses the words ‘mainly of income’. The words ‘mainly of income’ and similarly in the second category the words ‘principal business of which’ mean substantially or primarily.

(iv) In the instant case, the total gross income of the assessee, which has been shown in the assessment order, is interest income. The assessment order does not refer to any other income. Hence, the condition that income consists ‘mainly of income’ is completely fulfilled. One of the heads of the income for exclusionary category is income from other sources.

 (v) The second category consists of the phrase ‘a company the principal business of which is granting of loans and advances’. The income, which has been treated to be gross income, is income from interest of the assessee from granting loans and advances. Thus, the assessee was covered by exclusionary clause of Explanation to section 73.

(vi) Therefore, the assessee was clearly covered by the exclusionary clause of Explanation to section 73 and the Tribunal rightly set off of the aforesaid loss against the income of the assessee from loans and advances.”

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Settlement of case: Abatement: Sections 245C, 245D and 245HA : A.Ys. 1989-90 to 1993-94: Effect and scope of section 245HA: Where there was no fault of the applicant and he himself is not responsible for delay in getting decision on the settlement application, the application shall not abate.

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[Md. Sanaul Haque & Ors. v. UOI, 250 CTR 218 (Jharkhand)]

Dealing with the effect and scope of section 245HA of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Jharkhand High Court followed the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Star Television News Ltd. v. UOI, 317 ITR 66 (Bom.) and held as under: “In a case where there was no fault of the applicant and he himself is not responsible for delay in getting decision on the settlement application, in that situation, the application shall not abate. The Settlement Commission has to decide the application following the principles laid down in Star Television News Ltd.”

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Penalty: Delay in filing declaration in Form No. 15H: Section 272A(2)(f): A.Ys. 1991-93, 1992-93 and 1994-95: No obligation to file declaration prior to 1-6-1992: Penalty not imposable for that period: Further the penalty to be restricted to the tax amount as per subsequent clarificatory amendment to proviso.

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[CIT v. Krishna Cold Storage, 250 CTR 134 (Guj.)]

For the A.Ys. 1991-92, 1992-93 and 1994-95 penalty u/s.272A(2)(f) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was imposed for delay in filing declaration in Form 15H. The Tribunal held that no penalty was imposable for the period prior to 1-6-1992 because there was no statutory obligation to file the prescribed form u/s.197A. The Tribunal also held that the penalty should be restricted to the amount of tax deductible by giving retrospective effect to the proviso which is clarificatory.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under: “

(i) Failure to file the declaration in Form No. 15H prior to 1-6-1992 not being a default u/s. 272A(2) (f), no penalty could be levied for delay up to 1-6-1992.

(ii) In view of proviso, which is remedial in nature and consequently retrospective in operation, penalty could not exceed the tax deductible.”

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PAN: TDS: Section 206AA, r.w.s. 139A: Constitutional validity; Article 14 of the Constitution of India, 1950: Requirement to furnish PAN: Section 206AA is unconstitutional and has to be read down from statute and made inapplicable to persons whose income is less than taxable limit: Therefore, banking and financial institution shall not invariably insist upon PAN from small investors as well as persons who intend to open an account in bank or financial institution.

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[Smt. A. Kowsalya Bai v. UOI, 22 Taxman.com 157 (Kar.)]

Considering the constitutional validity of section 206AA of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Karnataka High Court held as under: “

(i) The very intent of section 206AA is to make it conditional for every person who wish to have a transaction in the bank or financial institution including small investors/depositors, invariably to have a PAN. This runs contrary to what has been contemplated u/s.139A which was introduced by the Legislature in its wisdom. What is not in dispute is, persons whose income is below the taxable limit need not have a PAN and also they need not furnish income tax declaration/ returns. Of course, under the Finance Act, it is made clear that a person whose income is less than the taxable limit is not taxable.

(ii) Such of the small investors who come forward to invest their savings from earnings as security for their future, by virtue of the present section 206AA necessarily have to give their PAN. The poor and illiterate/uneducated persons are finding it difficult rather to approach the various Government departments, particularly the Income-tax Department to get their PAN.

(iii) It is, therefore, held that it may not be necessary for such persons whose income is below the taxable limit to obtain PAN. Such investments/ savings from their earnings or by way of agriculture or any other source, in banking and financial institutions would also further the financial position from the point of the country’s economy.

(iv) But imposing condition to invariably go for a PAN on such small depositors would cause hindrance and discourage such small investors to come forward to invest their money for secured returns and as security for their future.

(v) The difficulty expressed by the petitioners and similarly placed persons is, imposing condition to invariably go for PAN as per section 206AA would run contrary to section 139A. It is also their grievance that filing of Form 15G to seek exemption from deduction of income tax at source, also is not accepted by the 3rd and 4th respondents and acted upon unless the PAN is produced.

(vi) Section 139A which is introduced way back in April 1991 is in vogue and this provision stands the scrutiny of Article 14 of the Constitution for reasonableness. But, section 206AA which is contrary to section 139A appears to be discriminatory as if it is overriding section 139A introduced earlier.

Though the intention of the Legislature is to bring the maximum persons under the net of income tax, when necessarily it provides for exemption up to taxable limit, it may not insist such persons whose income is below the taxable limit to compulsorily go for PAN. If any mischief of avoiding of tax or any other act of concealing the income is detected, that could be taken care of by penal provisions.

vii) In that view of the matter, in view of the specific provision of section 139A, section 206AA is made inapplicable to persons and read down from the statute for those whose income is less than the taxable limit as per the Finance Act, 1991. However, it is made clear that section 206AA would of course be made applicable to persons whose income is above the taxable limit.

(viii) The banking and financial institutions shall not invariably insist upon PAN from such small investors like the petitioners as well as from persons who intend to open an account in the bank or financial institution.”

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Income: Deemed to accrue or arise in India: Sections 5, 6 and 9 : A.Y. 2001-02: Assessee was an employee of an American company and non-resident from year 1991 to 1999: On termination of employment in 1999, he received certain amount from previous employer as retirement benefit/severance/ vacation engagement: Assessee not ordinary resident in relevant assessment year: Amount received by assessee had not accrued/ deemed to be accrued/paid in India in terms of section 6 and section 9(1)(ii): Amou<

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[CIT v. Anant Jain, 207 Taxman 117 (Del.), 21 Taxman. com 19 (Del.)]

The assessee was an employee of an American company from 1991 till November, 1999 and during this period he was a non-resident Indian. The employment was terminated in the year 1999. In the relevant year, i.e., A.Y. 2001-02 the assessee was ‘not ordinarily resident’. In the relevant year the assessee received certain amount as leave encashment according to the number of years of service, which was subsequently described as severance and vacation encashment paid by the erstwhile employer of the assessee in the USA for services rendered outside India.

The assessee claimed that this amount was not taxable in India under provisions of section 5(1)(c) read with section 9(1)(ii). The Assessing Officer held that the said amount was received by the assessee as his profit in lieu of salary which was payable by the employer under the employer-employee relationship and, therefore, was taxable u/s.17(3)(ii). The CIT(A) held that the receipt of the impugned amount was on account of the past services rendered by the assessee to his previous foreign employer outside India at a time when he was a non-resident and this could not be deemed to have accrued or arisen in India and would not come under the purview of section 9(1)(ii).

The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A). On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under: “

(i) It is clear from the factual findings recorded by both the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal, that the payment in question was received towards retirement benefit/severance/vacation encashment from the erstwhile employer on termination of employment in November, 1999. The erstwhile employer was based in the USA and services were rendered to the erstwhile employer in the USA.

(ii) In view of the aforesaid factual position, elucidated and accepted by both, the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal, the said amount cannot be taxed in India, as the status of the assessee during the year in question was that of ‘not ordinary resident’. The said income did not accrue or arise in India.

(iii) The Tribunal has rightly held that in terms of section 6 and section 9(1)(ii), the amount/income had not accrued/deemed to be accrued/ paid in India.”

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Depreciation: Intangible assets: Section 32(1) (ii): A.Ys. 2002-03 and 2005-06: Know-how, business contracts, business information, etc., described as goodwill are intangible assets eligible for depreciation u/s.32(1)(ii) as ‘business or commercial rights of similar nature’ specified in section 32(1)(ii).

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[Areva T&D India Ltd. v. Dy. CIT, 250 CTR 151 (Del.)]

The assessee had acquired know-how, business contracts, business information, etc., as part of the slump sale described as goodwill. The assessee’s claim for depreciation u/s.32(1)(ii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on such intangible assets was disallowed for the A.Ys. 2002-03 and 2005-06, for the reason that the same were described as goodwill. The Tribunal upheld the disallowance.

On appeal by the assessee, the Delhi High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under: “Intangible assets viz., business claims, business information, business records, contracts, employees and know-how acquired by the assessee under slump sale of running business are in the nature of ‘business or commercial rights of similar nature’ specified in section 32(1)(ii) and therefore, the same are eligible for depreciation.”

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Capital gains: Sections 2(47) and 48: A.Y. 2002-03: Redemption of preference shares amounts to transfer u/s.2(47): Computation: Redeemable preference shares are not bonds or debentures: At time of redemption of preference shares, assessee would be entitled to benefit of indexation u/s.48.

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[CIT v. Enam Securities (P.) Ltd., 345 ITR 64 (Bom.); 208 Taxman 54 (Bom.); 21 Taxman.com 267 (Bom.)]

In the A.Y. 2001-02, the assessee redeemed three lakh preference shares (held for 10 years) at par and claimed long-term capital loss after availing benefit of indexation and claimed the set-off of the same against the long-term capital gain on sale of other shares. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim on the grounds that —

(i) both the assessee and the company in which the assessee held the preference shares, were managed by the same group of persons;

(ii) that there was no transfer; and that the assessee was not entitled to indexation on the redemption of non-cumulative redeemable preference shares. The CIT(A) allowed the claim of the assessee. The Tribunal affirmed the view of the CIT(A).

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under: “

(i) There is a finding of fact that the transaction was not questioned by the Revenue for over ten years: that both the assessee and the company of which the assessee held redeemable preference shares were juridical entities and the mere fact that both were under common management would not necessarily indicate that the transaction was not genuine. There is no reason for this Court to differ with the finding of the Tribunal.

(ii) The judgment of the Supreme Court in Anarkali Sarabhai v. CIT, (1997) 224 ITR 422/90 Taxman 502 concludes the issue that a redemption of preference shares by a company squarely comes within the ambit of section 2(47), since it amounts to a transfer.

(iii) The second proviso to section 48 provides for indexation where long-term capital gain arises from the transfer of a long-term capital asset. The third proviso, however, stipulates that nothing contained in the second proviso shall apply to long-term capital gain arising from the transfer of a long-term capital asset being bonds or debentures other than capital indexed bonds issued by the Government.

The Assessing Officer was of the view that the principal characteristic of a bond is a fixed holding period and a fixed rate of return. According to him, the four per cent non-cumulative redeemable preference shares which the assessee redeemed also had a fixed holding period and a fixed rate of return and on this basis denied the benefit of cost indexation to the assessee. The entire basis on which the Assessing Officer denied the benefit of cost indexation was flawed and was justifiably set right in the order of the Tribunal.

(iv) There is a clear distinction between bonds and share capital, because a bond does not represent ownership of equity capital. Bonds are in essence interest-bearing instruments which represent a loan. This distinction has been accepted by the Supreme Court in R. D. Goyal v. Reliance Industries Ltd., (2002) 40 SCL 503.

(v) Section 48 denies the benefit of indexation to bonds and debentures other than capital indexed bonds issued by the Government. The four percent non-cumulative redeemable preference shares were not bonds or debentures within the meaning of that expression in section 48. In these circumstances, the Tribunal was correct in its decision to that effect.”

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Capital gain: Sections 48 and 55(2): A.Y. 1999- 00: Transfer of self acquired trademark and design: No cost of acquisition: Capital gain not chargeable to tax.

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[CIT v. M/s. Fernhill Laboratories and Industrial Establishment (Bom.); ITA No. 5615 of 2010, dated 12-6-2012]

In the previous year relevant to the A.Y. 1999-00, the assessee transferred self acquired trademark and designs for the considerations of Rs.15 crore and Rs.20 lakh, respectively. The assessee claimed that the capital gain on such transfer is not chargeable to tax in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. B. C. Srinivasa Setty, 128 ITR 249 (SC). The Assessing Officer rejected the assessee’s claim and held that the capital gain is chargeable to tax. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal accepted the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under: “

(i) Prior to the amendment made to section 55(2) by the Finance Act, 2001 effective from 1-4-2002 by adding the words ‘trademark or brand name associated with the business’ self-generated assets such as trademark did not have any cost of acquisition. Therefore, for the period under consideration the computation u/s.48 fails resulting in such transfer of trademarks not being chargeable to capital gains tax.

 (ii) Consequent to amendment made to section 55(2) w.e.f. 1-4-2002 by which the words trademark or brand name associated with the business was introduced into it, the computation provision becomes workable and the consideration for the sale of trademark would be subject to capital gains tax.

(iii) In fact, when the amendment was made to section 55 by the Finance Act, 2001 the CBDT had issued Circular bearing No. 14-2001 explaining the provisions of the Finance Act, 2001. From the said Circular it would be clear that the amendment bringing self-generated intangible assets such as trademarks to capital gains tax only w.e.f. A.Y. 2002-03 onwards. In this case we are concerned with the A.Y. 1999-00 and therefore, the amendment would not have any effect. Consequently, the sale of self-generated trademarks during the A.Y. 1999-00 are not chargeable to capital gains tax.

(iv) So far as the sale of self-generated designs (i.e., not acquired) the same is also not chargeable to capital gains tax not only for the reasons applicable to trademarks, but for the fact that even till this date, no amendment has been made to section 55(2) of the said Act, defining cost of acquisition of design as in the case of trademark, goodwill, etc.”

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Capital gain: Indexed cost: Sections 2(42A), 48 and 49 : A.Y. 2005-06: Acquisition of asset by inheritance: Indexation to be made w.r.t. the holding of asset by previous owner.

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[CIT v. Ms. Janhavi S. Desai (Bom.); ITA No. 126 of 2011 with CO(L) No. 2 of 2012, dated 5-7-2012]

In or about the year 1942, the assessee’s father acquired the immovable property from his father. The assessee’s father expired on 21-8-1988, leaving behind a will bequeathing the property to his wife (assessee’s mother) and the assessee in equal shares. The assessee’s mother expired on 21-2-2000 and her 50% share was inherited by the assessee. In the previous year corresponding to the A.Y. 2005-06, the assessee sold the property for a consideration of Rs.9.5 crore and declared a long-term capital gain of Rs.38,44,247. While computing the capital gain the assessee considered the date of acquisition of the property to be prior to 1-4-1981 and took the cost of acquisition and indexed the same w.r.t. 1-4-1981. The AO held that for the purpose of indexation, the actual date of acquisition by the assessee must be taken. Accordingly, he indexed the cost in respect of 50% w.r.t. 21-8-1988 (date of death of father) and the balance 50% w.r.t. 21-2-2000 (date of death of mother). The CIT(A) allowed the assessee’s appeal and held that the indexation should be w.r.t. 1-4- 1981. The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A) w.r.t. 50% of the property acquired from the father. In respect of the balance 50% acquired from mother, the Tribunal held that the indexation should be w.r.t. 21-8-1988 when the mother acquired the property from the father. The Tribunal held that for the purpose of indexation, the period of holding of the asset by the previous owner should be taken into account.

The Revenue filed appeal in respect of the 50% decided in favour of the assessee and the assessee filed cross-objection in respect of the balance 50%. The Bombay High Court dismissed the appeal and allowed the cross-objection and held as: “

(i) The Explanation to section 49(1) defines the expression ‘previous owner of the property’ to be the last previous owner thereof, who acquired it by a mode of acquisition ‘other than that referred to in clauses (i) to (iv) of s.s (1)’. The last previous owner of the property, who acquired the property by a mode of acquisition other than those referred to in clauses (i) to (iv), was the assessee’s grand-father. The assessee’s father admittedly acquired the property in 1942 from his father.

 (ii) As far as the 50% portion of the property acquired by the assessee from his father is concerned, the cost of acquisition must be determined to be the cost at which the assessee’s grandfather, in any event the assessee’s father acquired the property and not the date on which the assessee acquired it. The Tribunal does not hold otherwise either.

(iii) The Tribunal however held that in respect of 50% of the property inherited by the assessee from her mother, the period of holding would start from 21-8-1988, as she became owner of her 50% share in the property only from that date. This requires consideration. The last previous owner of the assessee’s mother’s 50% share was her husband’s father and at the highest her husband. Thus the assessee must be deemed to have held this 50% share in the property also from 1-4-1981.

(iv) In the circumstances, the questions are answered in favour of the assessee. The period of holding shall be from 1-4-1981 in respect of the entire property.”

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Insertion of Rule 4BBB to Companies (Central Government’s) General Rules and Forms.

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has inserted Rule 4BBB in the Companies (Central Government) General Rules and Forms, 1956, for filing of petition under

(a) Section 17 — Special resolution and confirmation by Central Govt. required for Alteration of Memorandum for change of Registered Office from one state to another and alteration of objects clause.

b) Section 141 — For Rectification by Central Government of Register of Charges.

(c) Section 188 — Circulation of Members Resolutions. A new Form 24AAA for filing petitions to the Central Government/Regional Director under these sections is prescribed. The rules come into effect from 12th August 2012.

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Filing of Cost Audit Report (Form I) and Compliance Report (Form A) in the XBRL mode.

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Further to the order dated 10th May 2012, the Ministry has decided that filing of Cost Audit Reports and Compliance Reports will be allowed after 31st July 2012.

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Extension of time in filing Annual Return by Limited Liability Partnerships.

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In continuation of the Ministry’s Circular No. 13/2012, dated 6-6-2012, the Form 11 being the form for filing Annual return by LLPs has been extended to 31st July 2012 i.e., instead of the limit of 60 days it shall be within 122 days for the year ended 31-3-2012.

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Filing of Balance Sheet and Profit and Loss Account in Extensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) — Mode for financial year commencing on or after 1-4-2011.

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Vide Companies (Filing of documents and forms in Extensible Business Reporting Language) Rules, 2011, notified vide GSR No. 748E, dated 5-10-2011, select class of companies are required to file their Balance Sheet and Profit & Loss Account and other documents as required u/s.220 of Companies Act, 1956 with the Registrar of Companies for the financial year ending on or after 31st March, 2011.

It has now been decided by the Ministry to mandate the following select class of companies to file their Balance Sheet and Profit & Loss Account in XBRL mode for the financial year commencing on or after 1-4-2011:

(i) all companies listed with any stock ex-change(s) in India and their Indian subsidiaries; or

(ii) all companies having paid-up capital of Rupees five crore and above; or

(iii) all companies having turnover of Rupees one hundred crore and above; or

(iv) all companies who were required to file their financial statements for F.Y. 2010-11, using XBRL mode.

However, banking companies, insurance companies, power companies and Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs) are exempted from XBRL filing till further orders.

The applicable taxonomy as per Schedule VI of the Companies Act, 1956 has already been placed on the Ministry’s website www.mca.gov.in. The Business Rules, validation tools, etc. required for preparing the financial statements in XBRL format, as per the revised Schedule-VI and Accounting Standards, are under preparation and would soon be made available by the Ministry. The actual date for enabling XBRL filing will be intimated separately.

All companies referred to above, will be allowed to file their financial statements in XBRL mode without any additional fee/penalty up to 15th November, 2012 or within 30 days from the date of their AGM, whichever is later.

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SEBI’s amended Consent Order Guidelines-2 — the Determination of Settlement Amount

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As discussed in immediately preceding article, SEBI rehauled the Guidelines for Consent Order and Compounding for settlement of violations of specified securities laws. An important aspect of the revised Guidelines is that SEBI has attempted to quantify the settlement amount for most types of violations. The objective is not only let the parties know what the indicative settlement amount would be, but more importantly, to also remove a lot of the discretion and discrimination involved in settlement. Thus, SEBI has laid down a very elaborate formula and quantification process which, though not inflexible, gives a good benchmark amount at which a party may expect that the settlement may take place.

The formula, parameters, etc. are quite complex, but since now these would be the very basis of the settlement process, an introduction to the process is worth considering.

The quantification process, formula, parameters, etc. are aimed at making the settlement and perhaps even the penal process rational rather than subjective and discretionary. An attempt has been made by SEBI to find out what are the losses that the investors/public/markets face, what are the gains made by the parties, etc. and then relate the settlement amount to such amounts rather than an arbitrary figure arrived on a caseto- case basis. However, the qualitative aspect has also been considered by providing for a varying base settlement amount depending upon who is the person accused. For example, promoters of a company face a higher base penalty as compared to others and so do asset management companies, etc. Thus, on the one hand, the losses/ gains are taken into account duly quantified, and on the other hand higher punishment is ensured on those who should know the law better.

Under the earlier Guidelines, there was no basis for an applicant to even arrive at a preliminary amount, much less know at what amount the final settlement could take place. Other orders of similar facts often showed a wide variance in the settlement amount and the rationale for such different settlement terms were not known. To worsen this, SEBI often took a stand that other consent orders were not relevant and are not to be taken as a benchmark which an applicant could use. However, now, SEBI has provided a fairly detailed and complex method of determining the indicative settlement amount. Unless the facts are special or serious, it would appear that the settlement would be at or nearabout this amount arrived as per the prescribed formula.

However, as stated, the formula and parameters are fairly complex to determine. There are other concerns too, but first, a broad description of how the settlement amount is arrived is made. Thereafter, a specific type of violation is taken and the formula and parameters applied.

Let us first understand the broad sequence of steps to arrive at the final settlement amount.

The basic objective is to determine the Indicative Amount. This is the basic amount that is arrived at without negotiation and purely as a result of applying quantitative parameters to the particular set of violations.

Included in Indicative Amount are the legal costs that appear to be on actuals and hence do not require further consideration here.

 Indicative amount is arrived at by taking into account various parameters, weights, etc. There is a Proceeding Conversion Factor (PCF) and the Regulatory Action Factor (PCF) and there is a Benchmark Amount. The Benchmark Amount is an absolute rupee amount that is worked out by applying certain factors depending upon the nature of the violation. The PCF and RAF are then applied to this Benchmark Amount as qualitative weights to increase or decrease it.

Thus, for example the PCF applies weights ranging from 0.75 to 1.20 depending upon when the initiative is taken for coming forward to settle the proceedings. Thus, if a party comes forward for settlement even earlier to the issuance of the showcause notice, then, the settlement amount would be just 0.75 times the Benchmark Amount. However, if he delays the matter to passing of the order by the SAT or the Court, then the settlement amount actually increases by 20% by it being multiplied by a factor of 1.20.

To the above factor, PCF, the Regulatory Action Factor is added. The objective is to further give due weight to earlier adverse actions taken by SEBI against the party in the past. For each such action, a certain weight, depending upon the nature of adverse direction given, is added. For example, if a warning was given, then 0.015 is added. In certain cases of suspension order, the factor can be as high as 0.3.

 Next comes the ‘Benchmark Amount’. This can be viewed as the basic settlement amount. This amount varies depending upon the nature of violations alleged. It would be different for, say, non-disclosure of certain information or non-filing of information, for price manipulation, etc.

For price manipulation, it is arrived at by taking into account several factors involved in each case, such as volumes traded, price change during the relevant period, adding a time value for money for the illegal gains, the profits made/losses avoided and even a reputation risk.

Where parties have aided/abetted the price manipulation including intermediaries, promoters, etc. a separate formula is provided.

For non-disclosure of information as for example under the Takeover Regulations, the Benchmark Amount is calculated as the product of a Base Value and a Base Amount. The Base Value is a weight that takes into account qualitative factors such as multiplicity of violations, size of company, etc. The ‘Base Amount’ is calculated as the higher of a certain fixed amount depending on factors such as percentage of holding not disclosed and period of delay.

Similarly, for other types of violations, certain factors are laid down to help calculate the Benchmark Amount.

It is provided that the minimum Indicative Amount shall be Rs.2 lakh for persons seeking consent application for the first time and Rs.5 lakh for others. Arguably, such a large minimum amount is unfair. Irrespective of the seriousness of the offence, the smallness of the amounts involved, etc. this minimum amount is paid and would obviously affect only small violators. Further, increasing the minimum settlement to Rs.5 lakh for those who are not firsttime applicants is also unfair since the applicant may be coming for a wholly different violation. Securities laws are fairly voluminous and complex and routine violations may happen for which no purpose may be served to either carry out costly adjudication proceedings or levy a heavy penalty.
For residuary cases, where none of the specified parameters apply, the amount would be decided on the facts and circumstances of the case by HPAC/SEBI.
The Guidelines, however, still provide a lot of leeway for SEBI to go away from the quantified parameters. Firstly, in case of serious violations, it can fall back on the maximum penalty that can be levied. Further, there is another provision that says that the settlement amount can be increased or decreased since the amount worked out as above is only the Indicative Amount. Even after this, the final amount so worked out can be reduced, increased or even the proposal rejected outright by SEBI’s Panel of WTM.
The orders are required to be a little more detailed giving the facts and circumstances of the case, the allegations, etc. However, one is not clear how much detailed would the actual orders be till we see a few orders.

There is a fair concern that even now, substantial discretion still remains and is possibly even further entrenched. However, considering that very specific parameters have been laid down, SEBI may need to apply its mind why it accepted a higher or lower settlement amount in a particular case.

Interestingly, now, a host of non-monetary adverse directions can be made part of the settlement including voluntary debarment, sale of shares, dis-gorgement, voluntary surrender of certificate of registration. Thus, the settlement need not be purely on monetary terms, but non-monetary terms may also be added to the settlement amount.

An interesting thing to watch for as the new settlement scheme is applied in various cases is – will SEBI levy penalty that is higher than the amount as per formula under the Consent Guidelines? There are two ways to view this issue. One way is that SEBI should levy higher penalty than the minimum amount as per the Consent formula. The party who makes SEBI go through the whole adjudication process makes it incur additional costs and efforts. Further, in such a case, the charges were proved by SEBI while in case of consent, there is no proof or admission of proof of the violation. The other way to look at it is that the minimum settlement amount as per Consent formula takes into account the fact that the party goes free from stigma. There should be a cost to this. Further, while SEBI saves time, the party also saves time and efforts.

However, there is also a case for delinking the two processes. Settlement is under a different principle and, further, it takes into account only the allegations. However, the adjudication process should not be burdened with this formula. It should examine the exact nature of the facts and circumstances that are found to be proved and the other surrounding circumstances including those statutorily prescribed (such as repetitive nature of violation, gains made, losses caused to public, etc.) and then levy appropriate penalty. If, for example, the violation is proved to be serious and intentional, a high penalty may be levied. If, however, it is technical without any gains to the person or losses to the public, and there are mitigating circumstances, then the penalty may be lower or none.

In the end, the issue that arises is, should a person opt for settlement or not? While obviously the answer will vary from case to case, some general thoughts can be shared. Some parties may not want any stigma of contravention of law on the record and for them, settlement is the only choice except of course where the violation is not permitted under the Guidelines to be settled or where they are fairly confident that they will eventually win, even if appeal is required. For some others, if the violation is technical in nature, it can be explained to concerned parties such as shareholders, etc. and thus they may not opt for settlement if it entails a higher penalty. For most people, it would have to be a careful evaluation of the settlement amount that can be worked out from the formula and the facts of the case. It would also be a matter of principle for parties to clear its name when the allegation is misconceived.

PART D: Read , understand & take some action please

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Corruption is worse than prostitution

 We have to sham this attitude of ‘Sab Chalta Hai’ and the attitude that nothing can move without Corruption.

— Kanwaljeet Arora, CBI judge

We need to keep up the fight against corruption which stifles innovation and is one of the biggest barriers to job creation and economic growth around the world.

— US President, Barack Obama

Please respond and let us do something to contain cancerous corruption which prevents happiness to be reality for large number of citizens.

 RTI Clinic in August 2012: 2nd, 3rd and 4th Saturdays, i.e., 11th, 18th, and 25th, 11.00 a.m. to 13.00 p.m. at BCAS premises.

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PART A : DECISIONS OF THE COURTS

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Section 5(3), (4) to (5) of the RTI Act

A very interesting and unusual matter came before the High Court of Delhi. The same is summarised as under:

  •  “The petitioner challenged the order dated 16th January, 2009 of the Central Information Commission (CIC) imposing penalty u/s.20 of the Right to Information Act, 2005 on the petitioner of Rs. 12,500 deductible in two instalments of Rs.6,250 each from the salary of the petitioner, starting from 3rd March 2009. The petition came up before the Court first on 2nd March, 2009, but no stay was granted. The petitioner on 14th December, 2009 informed that the penalty amount had been paid to the CIC and further submitted that the fault leading to the imposition of penalty was not in his functioning as the Public Information Officer (PIO) of the DDA, but of Shri S. C. Gupta, the then Dy. Director (Housing) of the DDA. It may be noticed that the CIC has vide the impugned order, while levying penalty of Rs.12,500 on the petitioner, levied penalty of Rs.12,500 on the said S. C. Gupta also, deductible from his salary. On the said contention of the petitioner, the said Shri S. C. Gupta was impleaded as respondent No. 4 to the petition and in fact he alone has been served with the notice of petition.”

  •  “It is the case of the petitioner that he, as PIO of DDA had acted with promptitude and has on the very next day of receiving the RTI application, sought information from the respondent No. 4 and the delay in providing information was of the respondent No. 4. It is further the case of petitioner that in pursuance to the directions of the First Appellate Authority to provide further information also, the delay in providing the same was of the said Shri S. C. Gupta.”

  • The CIC however has in the order dated 16th January, 2009 impugned in this petition held that it had in the earlier order dated 26th September, 2008 (which is not before the Court) held that it is the not the delay in response for which the petitioner had been held liable, but the petitioner had failed to provide the information sought and had simply forwarded a report to the information seeker without caring to examine whether the report even addressed the information sought. It was thus held that the petitioner had abdicated his responsibility as PIO. It was further held that the petitioner as the PIO of the DDA was responsible for providing the information and what was being passed on. The said conduct of the petitioner was held to be amounting to deemed refusal of information.

The Court stated:

  •  “It is not in dispute that the petitioner was the designated PIO u/s.5 of the Act of the DDA. U/s.5(3) of the Act it was for the petitioner to deal with the request and render reasonable assistance to the information seeker. The PIO u/s.5(4) is authorised to seek the assistance of any other officer as may be considered necessary for the purpose of providing information and section 5(5) mandates such officers to render all assistance to the PIO. Section 5(5) also deems such officers from whom information is sought, as the PIO for the purpose of any contravention of the provisions of the Act.”

 

  •  “The contention of the petitioner appears to be that he as PIO was merely required to forward the application for information to the officer concerned and/or in possession of the said information and upon receipt of such information from the concerned officer furnish the same to the information seeker. He would thus contend that as long as he as PIO has acted with promptitude and forwarded the application to the officer in possession of the information and furnished the same to the information seeker immediately on receipt of such information, he cannot be faulted with and liability for penalty if any has to be of such other officer from whom he had sought the information and cannot be his.” “The argument aforesaid reduces the office of the PIO to that of a Post Office, to receive the RTI query, forward the same to the other officers in the department/administrative unit in possession of the information, and upon receipt thereof furnish the same to the information seeker. It has to be thus seen from a perusal of the Act, whether the Act envisages the role of a PIO to be that of a mere Post Office.”

  •  The Court then provided definition of ‘dealt with’. In Karen Lambert v. London Borough of Southwark, (2003) EWHC 2121 (Admin) it was held to include everything right from receipt of the application till the issue of decision thereon. U/s. 6(1) and 7(1) of the RTI Act, it is the PIO to whom the application is submitted and it is he who is responsible for ensuring that the information as sought is provided to the applicant within the statutory requirements of the Act. Section 5(4) is simply to strengthen the authority of the PIO within the department; if the PIO finds a default by those from whom he has sought information, the PIO is expected to recommend a remedial action to be taken. The RTI Act makes the PIO the pivot for enforcing the implementation of the Act.

 The Court further noted

  •  “This Court in Mujibur Rehman v. Central Information Commission held that information seekers are to be furnished what they ask for and are not to be driven away through filibustering tactics and it is to ensure a culture of information disclosure that penalty provisions have been provided in the RTI Act. The Act has conferred the duty to ensure compliance on the PIO. He cannot escape his obligations and duties by stating that persons appointed under him had failed to collect documents and information; that the Act as framed casts obligation upon the PIO to ensure that the provisions of the Act are fully complied. Even otherwise, the settled position in law is that an officer entrusted with the duty is not to act mechanically. The Supreme Court as far back as 1995 in Secretary, Haila Kandi Bar Association v. State of Assam, [1995 supp. (3) SCC 736] reminded the high-ranking officers generally, not to mechanically forward the information collected through subordinates. The RTI Act has placed confidence in the objectivity of a person appointed as the PIO and when the PIO mechanically forwards the report of his subordinates, he betrays a casual approach shaking the confidence placed in him and duties the probative values of his position and the report.”
 The Court finally held
 “Thus no fault can be found with order of the CIC apportioning the penalty of Rs.25,000 equally between the petitioner and the respondent no. 4. There is thus no merit in the petition; the same is dismissed.”
[J. P. Agrawal v. Union of India and Ors., W.P. (C) 7232/2009, decided on 4-8-2011. Reported in Right to Information Reporter — RTI RI (2012) 353 (Delhi)]

Section 8(1)(d)&(a) of the RTI Act
  • Two writ petitions were heard together, since common arguments were canvassed and common questions are involved, they were disposed of by this judgment.

  •     The petitioner functions as service provider to the Government of Maharashtra. It provides the facility of Smart Card-based Registration Certificate. It is stated that considering the need for computerisation, the Government switched over to the latest technology in its various departments. In the transport sector, the Government aimed at modernising the Regional Transport Offices which was aimed at streamlining the entire process undertaken at these offices and obviously to make functions of these Regional Transport Offices efficient, prompt and easy. In this backdrop, the Central Government took a policy decision to introduce ‘Smart Card’ with micro processor chip and it was decided to permit the use of Smart Cards for issuing registration certificates in electronic form. It is stated that this micro processor chip-based Smart Card obviously has various advantages over the regular paper-based registration books. A reference is made to the Central Government’s guidelines issued on 17-10-2001. The implementation of this policy required amendments to the Motor Vehicles Act and Rules and therefore, the amendments were made on 31-5-2002 and Rule 2(s) was added to define the term ‘Smart Card’. It is stated that the registration certificate is now issued to the motor vehicle owners in the form of Smart Cards and thereafter, several provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act have been referred to. It was submitted that the Government of Maharashtra floated a PAN India tender for appointing a service provider to comply with requirement of issuance of ‘Smart Cards’. The petitioner participated in the tender process and was declared successful. A contract dated 30-11-2002 came to be executed. It is stated it is not an ordinary contract, but it is an outcome of exhaustive statutory project. The project which the petitioner is implementing must be seen in the backdrop of the policy decision of the Government to provide a more standardised and tamper-proof registration of the vehicles. The policy of the Government is to adopt a technology which will prevent tampering of registration books by the anti-social elements. It is stated that this contract is confidential in nature. The project has been undertaken by the petitioner, but attempts are made to exploit the petitioner for personal gains by various unscrupulous elements. The RTI Act, according to the petitioner, does not give an absolute right to a person to obtain any informa-tion and it is therefore, contended that Shri Sanjay Bhole, the respondent No. 4’s attempt to obtain the information must be seen in this light.

  • SCIC in its order had directed the Transport Commission to furnish the information requested for. The same is challenged in this writ petition. While the Court agreed that clause (a) of section 8(1) is in no way applicable. However, as to clause (d), order notes:

  •    “Clause (d) provides that the information can be disclosed if the competent authority is satisfied that larger public interest warrants such disclosure. Therefore, that clause as admitted by (Advocate of the appellant) Mr. Manohar is not absolute. It does not say that information including commercial confidence, trade secrets or intel-lectual property, the disclosure of which, would harm the competitive position of a third party; cannot be demanded or if demanded, cannot be disclosed even if larger public interest warrants the same. The State Information Commissioner has held that the disclosure of both agreements would not result in disclosure of trade secret or intellectual property. His conclusion is that the tenders were for an important work which affects large number of vehicle owners and drivers of vehicles. The agreements have to be entered into for providing a service in the form of making of Smart Cards for registration of motor vehicles and driving licences at enhanced fees. Further, the conclusion is that the disclosure of information would enable public scrutiny of the process and contracts and therefore, it is desirable in larger public interest that the information is provided.”

Final Order

“In the light of this conclusion, both writ petitions fail. Rule is discharged, but without any order as to costs. At this stage, it is prayed that the ad interim orders passed by this Court be continued so as to enable the petitioners to challenge this judgment in higher court. This request is opposed by the respondent No. 4. In such circumstances, the request made to continue the ad interim orders is rejected and particularly, when the information as directed to be given under the impugned orders is as early as on 23-3-2011.”

[Writ petitions No. 2912 & 3137 of 2011, Shonkh Technology Ltd. & United Telecom Ltd. v. Shri Sanjay Bhole & State IC, Joint Transport Commissioner & PIO decided on 1-7-2011: (‘Information Decisions’ 2012 (1) ID 268) Bombay High Court]

Leases

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Introduction

A lease is one of the
oldest modes of enjoying immovable property. When one speaks about
leases, one often comes across terms, such as tenancy, licence, etc.
Some of these are synonyms while some have different meaning. Although
leases have been around since numerous years, there is yet a fair deal
of confusion surrounding them. Let us try and clear some of the myths
about leases.

Meaning

Section 105 of the Transfer
of Property Act, 1882 (‘the Act’) has defined the term ‘lease’ in
relation to an immovable property to mean:

(a) a transfer of a
right to enjoy such property — the person transferring the property is
called a lessor and the transferee is known as a lessee;

(b) made for a certain time. Expressly or impliedly or made in perpetuity;

(c)
in consideration of a price paid or promised or of money/share in
crops/service or any other thing of value to be rendered periodically or
on specified occasions to the transferor by the transferee who accepts
such terms. The price paid is known as premium and the money, share,
service or other thing to be rendered periodically or occasionally is
known as rent. The premium is also known as pagadi or salami.

As
opposed to a conveyance in which there is an absolute transfer of
ownership of immovable property, in the case of a lease there is only a
limited transfer of a right to enjoy the immovable property.

Once
the lessor grants a lease, he is left with two rights — right to
receive rent and a reversionary right. A reversionary right is the right
of the lessor to receive back the property once the tenure of the lease
expires. The lessor can transfer the reversionary rights. In an
interesting decision, the Supreme Court in the case of R. Kempraj v.
Barton Son & Co., (1969) 2 SCC 594 has held that even in the case of
a perpetual lease, the lessor has a reversionary right.

The
Supreme Court in A. R. Krishnamurthy, 176 ITR 417 (SC) has held that a
lease of land is a transfer of interest in the land and creates a right
in rem and there is a transfer of title in favour of the lessee though
the lessor has right of reversion after the period of the lease
terminates. The grant of a lease is a transfer of an asset. The Supreme
Court in the case of B. Arvind Kumar v. GOI, (2007) 5 SCC 745 has laid
down the essential elements of a lease of immovable property:

(a) There should be a transfer of a right to enjoy an immovable property;

(b) Such transfer may be for a certain term or in perpetuity;

 (c) The transfer should be in consideration of a premium or rent; and

(d)
The transfer should be a bilateral transaction, the transferee
accepting the terms of transfer. A lease agreement is like any other
agreement and can be oral also.

However, this would be subject to the provisions of section 107 of the Act explained later.

Tenure of lease

Unless
the lease provides otherwise a lease of immovable property, for any
purpose other than agricultural or manufacturing, shall be deemed to be a
lease from month to month, which is terminable on the part of either
the lessor or the lessee, by 15 days’ notice expiring within the end of a
month of the tenancy. Some leases contain a clause for renewal of the
lease on the same terms and conditions as the current lease except with
an increase in the rent. It should be noted that the renewal of a lease
is not automatic and it must be expressly so stated in the lease deed.

In
India, a perpetual lease is also valid — R. Kempraj v. Barton Son &
Co., (1969) 2 SCC 594. Whether a lease is a lease in perpetuity or a
monthto- month lease has been the subject-matter of great debate and is
relevant from a stamp duty perspective also (as explained below). Where
the lease deed does not specify any duration, but permits the lessee to
hold the land forever, subject to the right of the lessor to resume the
land by giving one month’s notice, there is no grant in perpetuity — B.
Arvind Kumar v. GOI, (2007) 5 SCC 745. Hence, it is important that the
lease deed clearly specifies the lease period.

Making of a lease

 U/s.107
of the Act, a lease of a period for more than one year or a lease from
year to year must be made only by way of a registered instrument. Any
other lease can be made by way of a registered instrument or by an oral
instrument accompanied by delivery of possession. In cases where a
registered instrument is executed, both the lessor and the lessee must
execute the same.

Thus, section 107 makes it mandatory for any
lease of more than one year to be in the form of a written, registered
instrument. A corollary of a registered instrument is stamping. Failure
to create a lease of more than one year by way of a registered
instrument makes the lease deed inoperative and the Courts are disabled
from using the instrument as evidence — Anthony v. KC Ittoop & Sons,
(2000) 6 SCC 394/Bajaj Auto v. Behari Lal Kohli, (1989) (4 SCC
39/Shantabai v. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 532. However, the Supreme
Court also laid down an important principle in the case of Anthony v. KC
Ittoop & Sons, (2000) 6 SCC 394 in the context of leases made by
non-registered instruments:

“. . . . . . What is mentioned in
the three paragraphs of the first part of section 107 of the TP Act are
only the different modes of how leases are created. The first paragraph
has been extracted above and it deals with the mode of creating the
particular kinds of leases mentioned therein. The third paragraph can be
read along with the above as it contains a condition to be complied
with if the parties choose to create a lease as per a registered
instrument mentioned therein. All other leases, if created, necessarily
fall within the ambit of the second paragraph. . . . . . . . . . . . .

Since
the lease could not fall within the first paragraph of section 107, it
could not have been for a period exceeding one year. The further
presumption is that the lease would fall within the ambit of residuary
second paragraph of section 107 of the TP Act. . . . . . .
Non-registration of the document had caused only two consequences. One
is that no lease exceeding one year was created. Second is that the
instrument became useless so far as creation of the lease is concerned.
Nonetheless the presumption that a lease not exceeding one year stood
created by conduct of parties remains un-rebutted. . . . . .”

Thus, even in cases where leases of more than one year are not registered, a lease of one year is created.

Stamp Duty

Article 36 of Schedule I to the Bombay Stamp Act provides for the stamp duty on a lease deed, sub-lease deed.

The
rate of duty is as shown in Table 1: Hence, whether or not a lease is a
perpetual lease becomes very important from a stamp duty perspective.
In the case of perpetual leases, the duty incidence would be at 4.5% of
the market value of the property based on the Stamp Duty Ready Reckoner.

Even a monthly tenancy would be treated as a perpetual lease
because no definite period is specified. In that case, stamp duty as on a
perpetual lease would be applicable — Collector of Stamps v. Laxmibai
Saheb, AIR 1948 Bom. 336; Santosh Pundalik Madankar v. Ramdas, 1985 Mah.
LJ 973.

If no definite term for lease is fixed and it is terminable by notice, it is a perpetual lease. Though a tenancy may be described as a monthly tenancy within the purview of the Transfer of Property Act, it does not follow that the document evidences a lease for any definite period for the purposes of stamp duty — Hidayat Mohindin v. Karamullah, AIR 1961 AP 1. Similar views have also been taken in the cases of Skinner v. Arunachalam, AIR 1939 Mad. (FB) 356, Mangal Puri v. Baldeo Puri, AIR 1938 All. 304.

Lease v. Licence

A leave and licence of an immovable property is different from a lease as a lease creates an interest in the property which the licence does not since it is only a personal non-transferable right. However, in many cases, a question may arise as to whether a transaction is one of a leave and licence or one of lease. This issue has witnessed a plethora of cases and controversies as the distinction between the two is very fine. Over a period of time the Supreme Court and various High Courts have laid down several tests for distinguishing a licence from a lease, but none of them are conclusive. Some of the important judgments on this issue are Qudrat Ullah v. Municipal Board, (1974) 1 SCC 202, Konchadda Ramamurthy v. Gopinath, (1968) 2 SCR 559, Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. R.N. Kapoor, (1960) 1 SCR 368, Dunlop Rubber Co., AIR 1968 SC 175, Behari Lal v. Chotte, AIR 1963 All. 911, Mohan Sons & Co., 78 Bom. LR 195; Delta International v. Shyam Sunder Ganeriwalla, (1999) 4 SCC 545; ICICI, (1999) 5 SCC 708 (SC). A few tests laid down by these and several other cases are the intention of the parties, their conduct and circumstances surrounding the agreements, substance of the transaction, exclusive possession in case of a lease, creation of interest in the property in case of a lease, etc. Thus, this is an issue on which there is a lot of confusion and arbitariness and there is no litmus test to differentiate one from the other. It may also be noted that there is a thin distinction between lease and leave and licence, which has led to the wide-scale misconception among many people that a leave and licence can only be for 11 months. A lease which is of more than one year is to be compulsorily registered u/s.17(1)(d) of the Registration Act, 1908 and section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. In the event that a licence was held to be a lease, people started making licences of 11 months so that registration would not be compulsory. This led to a general impression that leave and licence agreements can only be for a term of 11 months. In a leave and licence agreement, normally, there is no right given to the licencee to assign his or her rights, whereas in a lease agreement, the licencee subject to the approval of the licensor can assign and or transfer his or her rights.

Lease v. Tenancy

The terms lease and tenancy are synonyms and are often interchangeably used. However, quite often, it is believed that the two terms are different. In fact, even the Bombay Stamp Act, 1958, till some years ago (incorrectly) believed the two to be different and provided two separate Articles under Schedule I — one for transfer of tenancy and one for transfer of a lease. The definition of a lease u/s.105 of the Act would encompass a tenancy also. Generally, tenancy refers to a duration of a month-to-month lease while a lease refers to a longer duration. However, this is only a commercial distinction and has no legal basis.

The Bombay Stamp Act has now removed the distinction between a tenancy and a lease. The stamp duty in the case of a transfer of tenancy and transfer of a lease is now the same, i.e., the same as rate specified for a conveyance under Article 25 ~ 3, 4 or 5% depending upon the location of the immovable property. The duty is leviable on the fair market value of the property as computed under the Stamp Duty Ready Reckoner.

Transfer of reversionary rights

If the landlord/lessor transfers the reversionary rights to the tenant/lessee who has taken the property on lease, then the lessee becomes the full owner of the property. The stamp duty on a transfer of a lease is the same rate as on a conveyance on the fair market value of the property computed as per the Stamp Duty Ready Reckoner. However, in case of a transfer of reversionary rights of a property by the lessor to the lessee, there is a concessional basis of valuation of the property. The value is computed at 112 times the monthly lease rent paid by the tenant and not as per the Ready Reckoner. Thus, the duty in an urban area would be @ 5% of 112 times the monthly rent of the property. This benefit is available only if the tenant is able to prove that he has been in occupation of the property for at least five years. Further, this benefit is not available in case of properties taken on leave and licence.

Doctrine of merger

When a lessee of a property acquires the reversionary rights from the lessor, the Doctrine of Merger applies and the lesser estate (the lease) merges into the larger estate (reversionary rights) — Dr. D. A. Irani, 234 ITR 850 (Bom.). The Court held that once a lessee purchases the leased property from the lessor, the lease is extinguished as the same person cannot be both the landlord and tenant at the same time. There is a drowning or sinking of the inferior right into the superior right. This principle is also recognised under the Transfer of Property Act which specifically provides for the determination of the lease in case the interests of the lessor and the lessee vest in the same person at the same time. In such a case, the period of holding of the asset would be counted from the date on which the reversionary rights were acquired. The fact that the assessee was a lessee earlier for several years would be of no consequence in determining whether or not the gain was a short-term capital gain.

Transfer of lease and section 50C

Decisions of the Income-tax Tribunal have held that a transfer of a tenancy does not attract the provisions of section 50C of the Income-tax Act — Kishori Sharad Gaitonde, AIT 2010 200 ITAT (Mum.); Atul G. Puranik, 132 ITD 499 (Mum.); Munsons Textiles, ITA No. 6320/M/2010; Tejinder Singh (2012) 19 taxmann.
com 4 (Kol.).

Auditor’s duty

The Auditor should enquire of the auditee whether it has complied with the aforesaid provisions in respect of any lease agreements executed into by it. In case the Auditor comes across a lease transaction which does not comply with any provisions of the above Acts, then he will have to consider whether appropriate disclosures should be made in the Notes to Accounts or whether the non-compliance is so material so as to warrant a qualification in his report. He may insist upon a legal opinion to support any claim which the auditee is making. He can caution the auditee of likely unpleasant consequences which might arise. It needs to be repeated and noted that an audit is basically under the relevant law applicable to an entity and an auditor is not an expert on all laws relevant to business operations of an entity. All that is required of him is exercise of ‘due care’ and ‘diligence’.

Tenancy rights — Property in possession of tenant — SARFAESI Act has overriding effect over local Rent Control Act.

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[Vikas Book Ltd. v. Bank of Baroda, Jaipur & Ors., AIR 2012 Rajasthan 93.]

The petition had been filed by the petitioner Vikas Book Ltd. against the respondent No.1 Bank of Baroda and respondent No. 2 Shri Umraomal Chordia, seeking issuance of order or direction against the respondent No. 1 Bank to the effect that the Bank may proceed under the said Act without disturbing the tenancy rights of the petitioner and that the petitioner should not be evicted from the property in question without following the due process of law. It has been averred inter alia in the petition that the petitioner was in occupation as tenant of the residential premises by virtue of the rent note dated 10-5- 2006 executed by the landlord i.e., respondent No. 2 in favour of the petitioner. According to the petitioner, on 7-2-2011, the offices of the respondent No. 1 along with some police personnel came to the said premises and asked the petitioner to vacate the premises.

It has been contended by the respondent Bank that the property in question was mortgaged by the respondent No. 2 towards the security for the repayment of loan advanced to the borrower Vipul Gems along with other properties. Since the said Vipul Gems did not pay the dues of the bank, action was initiated against borrower/ mortgagor u/s.13(4) of the said Act. It has also been contended in the said reply that the petition was filed by the petitioner in collusion with the respondent No. 2 so as to create obstructions in the way of the respondent Bank from taking possession of the disputed property and to frustrate the dues of the bank. The Court held that if the lease was created in contravention of section 65A of the Transfer of Property Act, by the mortgagor in favour of the lessee, neither the mortgagor, nor the lessee can claim any protection to defeat the right of the mortgagee.

The Court observed that in the instant case, there is nothing on record to suggest that the respondent Bank had the knowledge about any tenancy rights created in favour of the petitioners in respect of the mortgaged property in question, while granting credit facilities to the borrower Vipul Gems P. Ltd. The third party interest created before or after the mortgage in question could not frustrate the provisions of the said Act having effect of overriding the other laws for the time being in force.

The Court observed that the petitions had been filed as a collusive and manoeuvred exercise between the petitioners and the respondent No. 2 Umraomal, so as to create the inroads and obstructions in the way of the respondent Bank to take the actual possession of the disputed premises, consequent upon the measures taken by the respondent Bank u/s.13(4) of the said Act. The petitions having been filed by the petitioners as proxy and frivolous litigation at the instance of the respondent mortgagors, the Court held that SARFAESI Act has overriding effect over local Rent Control Act, accordingly the petition of the tenant was dismissed.

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Refund through ECS — Trade Circular No. 11T of 2012, dated 17-7-2012.

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With effect from 1-10-2012 refund through Electronic Clearing Service facility will be optional to the dealers in Mumbai only. The scheme has been explained in this Circular.

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Administrative relief in respect of importexport licences covered in Schedule Entry C-39 — Trade Circular No. 10T of 2012, dated 2-7-2012.

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The Circular explains the scheme as contained in State Government Resolution providing administrative relief for the period 1st April, 2005 to 31st December, 2010 to the dealers who have collected and paid tax in respect of duty paid scrips which were tax-free prior to 1st January, 2011 under the MVAT Act, 2002.

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Amendments to the Schedule entries — Trade Circular No. 9T of 2012, dated 30-6- 2012

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Changes in the various Schedule entries under the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002 are briefly explained in this Circular.

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Not textbook stuff — The NCERT cartoon issue is more about degeneration of political debate.

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At its root, the whole controversy on cartoons in NCERT textbooks underlines the malaise afflicting political debate in the country: passions whipped up in aid of divisive political ambitions. Here, rage and slanging matches trump reasoned debate. One of the stated reasons for the order of the six-member panel constituted to review cartoons — that politicians and bureaucrats can’t be shown in an ‘incorrect’ way — amply reveals that undemocratic spirit. Some of the suggestions of the panel, say, about changing the captions of cartoons that have appeared years ago border on the Orwellian. This is not just tantamount to changing history, it is indicative of school textbooks and curriculum being tinkered with according to ideological inclinations in India. Often, it is one political party or the other raising a furore over such issues, citing the oft-invoked ‘hurt sentiments’ theory.

Which is just another means of reinforcing the social and political faultlines the entire political class thrives on, given that it envisages politics as a competitive identity management project. Just as people’s representatives cannot amend, just because they have a majority, say, the theory of relativity, they cannot decide the school syllabus. There is a National Curriculum Framework, meant to further a consultative approach to framing school textbooks, but that fact is drowned in the cacophony of contesting, and largely manufactured, rage.

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Putting integrity into finance.

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Behaviour that lacks integrity leads to value destruction. This paper analyses some common beliefs, actions, and activities in finance that are inconsistent with being a person or a firm of integrity. Each of these beliefs leads to a system that lacks integrity, i.e., one that is not whole and complete and therefore creates unworkability and destroys value.

Focussing on these phenomena from the integrity viewpoint, makes it possible for managers to focus on the value that can be created by putting the system back in integrity and correcting the non-value maximising equilibrium that exists in capital markets. In effect, integrity is a factor of production just like knowledge, technology, labour, and capital, but it is undistinguished — and its affect (by its presence or absence) is huge. We summarise our new positive theory of integrity that has no normative content, and argue that there are large gains from putting integrity into finance — into both the theory and practice of finance. We define integrity as being whole and complete and unbroken. We argue that if finance scholars, teachers and practitioners take this approach to applications in finance, there are huge gains to be achieved.

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The Big Stick — The time for soft words is over, we need concrete action.

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It is all very well for the Prime Minister to say that he will cut red tape, reassure investors and keep the India growth story intact. He can hardly say the opposite. The whole point is to act, rather than talk or set up yet more committees to produce yet another report on a subject on which an endless number of committees have already produced an equal number of reports. Of the 40,000 MW of power generation capacity added over the last two years, only 6,000 MW of capacity generates power, the rest idles for want of coal or want of regulatory permission to pass on the higher cost of imported coal to willing consumers. Scrap the anti-national Coal Mines Nationalisation Act.

This will not only ensure that the country’s coal sector transforms from a dark realm of loot and thuggery to an efficient supplier of the country’s most abundant fuel, but also reassure potential inves- 36 37 38 Tarunkumar Singhal Raman Jokhakar Chartered Accountants Miscellanea tors that India is serious about economic growth. Muster courage to implement a Cabinet decision to decontrol diesel, and institute competition, including from independent operators, in the retailing of petro-fuels. This will slash the fiscal deficit, reduce inefficiency at India’s oil companies and increase energy efficiency across the spectrum. By reducing the fiscal deficit, the reform would also reduce the current account deficit, thereby easing pressure on the rupee. This move, too, would go a long way in restoring investor confidence.

Make progress on the ground on implementing the goods and services tax, getting the IT infrastructure and procedural framework for seamless integration of the tax ready. This will put pressure on the BJP-led states holding out against the transition. Concrete action of this kind is what we need, to restore investor confidence and get the economy vrooming. Kind words of good intent spoken with sincerity are always welcome. But the big stick that needs to back up soft talk is what has been missing and needs to be found.

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Procedure for rebate of duty on export of services — Notification No. 39/2012-ST, dated 20-6-2012.

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Vide this Notification, rebate has been granted of whole of duty paid on excisable inputs or service tax and cess paid on all input services used in providing services exported in terms of Rule 6A of the Service Tax Rules, subject to complying with conditions and procedures.

The said Notification also contains conditions and limitations of such rebate along with procedures and forms of application for rebate claims.

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Amendment in provisions of continuous supply of services Notification No. 38/2012-ST, dated 20-6-2012.

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Vide this Notification provision of (a) taxable services of telecommunication service, and (b) service portion in execution of a works contract will be treated as continuous supply of service, for the purpose of Rule 2(c) of the Point of Taxation Rules, 2011.

The other three services which were also notified as continuous supply of service vide Notification No. 28/2011-ST, but now removed are

 (i) Commercial or industrial construction;

(ii) Construction of complex and

(iii) Internet telecommunication.

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Amendment in Point of Taxation Rules, 2011 Notification No. 37/2012-ST, dated 20- 6-2012.

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By this Notification, the Point of Taxation Rules, 2011 are amended by

(i) omitting the definition of associated enterprises and taxable services as given in sub-rule 2(b) and 2(f), respectively, from the said rules and

(ii) substituting the words ‘provided or to be provided’ wherever they occur in the said rules, with the words ‘provided or agreed to be provided’.

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Amendment in Service Tax Rules, 1994 — Notification No. 36/2012-ST, dated 20-6-2012.

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Vide this Notification, Service Tax Rules, 1994 have been amended in light of introduction of negative list of services and to facilitate various changes made by the Finance Act, 2012. The new amended rules shall be known as Service Tax (Second Amendment) Rules, 2012. The gist of changes made in the said rules is given below:

(i) Various definitions of the terms used in Rules are inserted in Rule 2.

(ii) Changes brought in Rule 2(1)(d) for effecting the revised reverse charge mechanism.

(iii) Substitution of the word and figures ‘Section 66B’ for the word and figure ‘Section 66’ wherever used in the said rules.

(iv) Insertion of new Rule 6A for determining whether the service is exported or not.

(v) Omission of Rule 5B-Date for determination
of rate.

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Rescinding of certain Notifications — Notification No. 34/2012-ST, dated 20-6-2012.

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In order to switch over to the negative list-based new service tax regime, it was necessary to do away with certain existing provisions which conflict with the new provisions of service tax applicable from 1st July, 2012. Accordingly, vide this Notification, a total of eighty one Notifications have been rescinded

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CENVAT credit — Landscaping of factory garden — Held, it is social responsibility and statutory obligation of employer to maintain eco-friendly environment — Activities related to business and falls within the concept of ‘modernisation, renovation, repair, etc. of premises’ — Service tax paid on such services form cost of final products — Definition of input service wide enough to cover — Credit allowable. Medical and personal accident policy, catering services — Held, activities relating to bu<

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Facts:

 The respondent a manufacturer of excisable goods claimed credit of service tax paid on various services availed like: medical and personal accident insurances, personal vehicle services, landscaping of factory garden, etc. Revenue denied the credit and the order was also upheld by the CCE — Appeals. The Tribunal held that the aforesaid services fall within the phrase ‘activities relating to business’ and therefore, the assessee was eligible to claim the credit. Against such order, the Revenue preferred appeal before the High Court.

Held:

Affirming the order of the Tribunal the Court held that in view of CAS-4, the above services are taken into consideration while fixing the costs of the final products and in such a case, the assessee would be entitled to the CENVAT credit of the tax paid on such services. The Court also observed that the definition of the input service is very broad. What is contained in the definition is illustrative in nature. Landscaping of factory garden falls within the concept of ‘modernisation, renovation, repair, etc. of premises’. It is social responsibility and statutory obligation of employer to maintain eco-friendly environment. Moreover, medical and personal accident premium, vehicle insurance, etc. form part of salaries of employees and are activities relating to business. Therefore, the Tribunal’s order was upheld allowing credit of such items.

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Certain Important Amendments in MVAT Act and Rules

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Introduction

Amendments are effected in the MVAT Act, 2002 and the MVAT Rules, 2005 as a consequence to budget proposals for the year 2012-13. Though there are a number of amendments, few important amendments, having a wide effect are noted below.


Amendments in MVAT Act, 2002

(a) Levy of purchase tax and consequential changes
Under the MVAT Act, 2002, up till today there was no scheme for levy of purchase tax. However, now the same has been introduced by inserting section 6A, and section 6B in the MVAT Act, 2002. As per section 6A purchase tax is provided on cotton, purchased from unregistered dealer and which is branch-transferred out side the state or used in manufacture of tax-free goods or taxable goods, where such manufactured goods are branch-transferred out side the state. As per section 6B, purchase tax is provided on oil seeds in the same circumstances, as discussed in relation to cotton as above.
The rate of purchase tax will be the same as mentioned in the schedule i.e., as applicable on the sale of above goods from time to time. The purchase tax provision of section 6B has come into effect from 1-5-2012 and the provision of section 6A will come into force as and when a date is notified for the said purpose.
The purchase tax so levied will be eligible for set-off as per the scheme of set-off.
Consequential amendments have also been made in section 3(2), 3(4) and s.s 3(5A) has been newly inserted. This is to provide liability for registration based on purchase turnover, which is liable to purchase tax as per the above sections 6A and 6B.

(b) Late fee for delayed filing of return

S.s (6) has been inserted in section 20 of the MVAT Act, 2002, whereby late fee of Rs.5000 is prescribed in case of delayed filing of return. It may be remembered that at present, there is section 29(8) providing for levy of penalty in case of delayed filing of return. However, in case of Vasu Enterprises (Writ petition No. 1451 of 2011, dated 8-9-2011) Bombay High Court held that penalty u/s.29(8) cannot be levied without hearing opportunity. This would require the Sales Tax Department to issue show-cause notice in each case and to pass a speaking order. It appears that, to avoid above exercise, this concept of late fee has been introduced. The said late fee amount will be required to be paid before the delayed return is uploaded. The provision has not come into effect till today, but will be brought into operation by issue of Notification. The penalty provision of section 29(8) will also become inoperative from such date.
The above provision shows harsh approach of the Department towards dealers. There can be several reasons for delay. Some of them will be beyond the control of the dealer. Under the above circumstances, levying mandatory late fee of Rs.5000 is not justified. Further, a dealer may not be liable to pay tax but will be liable to pay late fee, simply because the return is delayed. The constitutional validity of such levy is also debatable as there cannot be said to be ‘quid pro quo’ for providing such a fees.

(c) Mandatory part payment
As per present appeal provisions, in section 26 of the MVAT Act, 2002, the litigant dealer is entitled to get stay order upon filing appeal. The Appellate Authority has discretionary power to fix suitable amount of part payment as a condition for grant of stay. Now a new proviso has been added in section 26(6). By this proviso, it is provided that if the matter has been adjourned on 3 occasions on the request of the appellant or the appellant has failed to attend on 3 occasions, then the part payment should become 15% of the disputed dues or Rs.15 crore, whichever is less. Thus, the appellant will be required to make good the difference between earlier part payment and amount calculated as above. If such payment is not made, then the stay will come to an end and the disputed demand will be open for recovery. Thus, one more strict provision has been introduced.
The above provision will not apply to appeals under the BST Act, 1959. However, for VAT appeals the dealers will be required to be more attentive. It can also be noted that when the appeal is being adjourned, it should be carefully seen whether the adjournment is on behest of the appellant or on account of the Department. The factual position should get recorded accordingly in proceeding sheet, to avoid unnecessary counting of number of adjournments.

(d) Appeals to High Court

As per section 27, appeals can be filed before the Bombay High Court out of order passed by the MST Tribunal. Now, by insertion of section 26A, it is provided that the Commissioner will have power to notify monetary limit for filing appeals before the Bombay High Court. The provision is similar to such provision under the Income-tax Act. It is clarified that such non-filing of appeals due to monetary limits, will not prejudice subsequent cases. This provision is effective from 1-5-2012.

(e) Penalty for remaining unregistered

Section 29(2A) has been inserted in the MVAT Act, 2002 from 1-5-2012, by which penalty is provided for remaining unregistered dealer. The said penalty can apply for unregistered period after the date of coming into effect of above section i.e., 1-5-2012. The said penalty is 100% of the amount of tax payable during unregistered period. However, it will be discretionary qua levy as well as qua quantum in view of judgment of the Bombay High Court in case of Ankit International (46 VST 1).

(f) Tax collection at source (TCS)
A novel concept of TCS has been introduced in the MVAT Act, 2002 by insertion of section 31A.

TCS has been provided in the following two eventualities:

(i) When right for excavation of sand is auctioned. The notified person, auctioning the right will be liable to collect TCS.

(ii) The other eventuality is that the notified person having temporary possession or control over the goods, will be required to collect TCS.

Though, the provision has come into effect, the actual Notification notifying the persons and rate of TCS has still not been issued, therefore the provision is practically still not effective.
It can be seen that there is no provision for lesser collection or no collection, etc. Therefore, even if the buyer, from whom TCS is to be effected, is not liable to pay tax, still will be required to pay the TCS. Therefore, the provision can be claimed to be unconstitutional.

 Certain important changes in MVAT Rules,
2005 Important changes have been effected by Notification dated 1-6-2012.

(a) Returns for unregistered period


As per section 20(1) registered dealers are liable to file returns i.e., returns are required to be filed from effective date of registration. However, now for unregistered period also returns are provided. For this purpose Rule 18(1) has been substituted. As per the said sub-rule, quarterly returns are prescribed for unregistered period and the last return from start of the quarter till date of registration. Thereafter the returns will be as a registered dealer. Of course, the returns for unregistered period can be filed only after getting registration.
The above provision appears to be not in consonance with provisions of section 20(1). However, for the sake of compliance, dealers will be required to file the returns for unregistered period also. It is expected that no late fee will be applicable in such case.

(b) Set-off on natural gas

In Rule 53, sub-rule (1A) has been inserted. By this new sub-rule 3% reduction is provided in respect of calculation of set-off on purchase of natural gas. This reduction will apply in the specified circumstances given in the rule. The language of the rule is not very clear. It appears that except where the natural gas is resold, the reduction will apply.

(c)    Reduction in respect of branch transfer [Rule 53(3)]

Vide Notification dated 31-3-2012 the rate of reduction in case of branch transfer [rule 53(3)] has been enhanced from 2% to 4%. This is effective from 1-4-2012.

(d)    Due date for submission of audit report in Form 704 (Rule 66)

Rule 66 has been amended so as to provide that audit report (Form 704) shall be submitted within eight months from the end of financial year. Earlier the due date for submission was within 10 months. (Thus the audit report for financial year 2011-12 will be required to be submitted by 30th November 2012.)

(e)    Preservation of books of account, registers, etc. (Rule 68)

The books of account and other records, as required to be preserved u/r 68, will have to be preserved now for eight years from the expiry of financial year to which they relate. (Earlier these records were required to be preserved for a period of six years.)

Conclusion

There are many other amendments like changes in rate of tax, rules regarding forms for TCS, etc. However, for sake of brevity all these are not discussed here.

VAT on Builders and Developers in the State of Maharashtra

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Although the title given above is very wide, the scope of this quick write up is limited to liability to pay tax on agreements for sale of flats or units in a building under construction by builders and developers in the State of Maharashtra, keeping in view the likely impact of recent decision of Bombay High Court in the matter of Maharashtra Chamber of Housing Industry and others (51 VST 168).

The controversy regarding liability to pay VAT on agreements for sale flats and units by builders and developers has been looming around for over six years. While the Sales tax Department has been contending that through such agreements the builder enters into a contract to construct building for and on behalf of the purchasers, therefore, such contracts fall under the category of ‘Works Contract’, the builders say these agreements are for sale of immovable property, thus liability to pay VAT does not arise.

It may be noted that in a case where a builder sells readymade flat i.e. after the flat is constructed, there is no controversy, it is considered as a sale of immovable property and there is no question of VAT liability. The debatable issue arises only in those cases where builder enters into an agreement for sale of flat with prospective buyer when the construction is yet to commence or is under progress. Such agreements are normally referred to as “Under Construction Contracts/Agreements”. Till the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of K. Raheja Development Corporation vs. State of Karnataka 141 STC 298 (SC), such contracts were considered to be for sale of immovable property and the Sales Tax Department did not contemplate any levy on the same. However, after the above judgment a debatable position arose.

The Sales Tax Department of Maharashtra holds a view that the judgment is applicable in all cases, hence, will cover all “under construction agreements” for flats/premises. On the basis of this view the Commissioner of Sales Tax issued a Trade Circular, viz. Circular No.12T of 2007 dated 7th February, 2007. Similarly, a new definition of “Works Contract” was introduced by amending section 2(24) of Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act. 2002 (MVAT Act), w.e.f. 20th June 2006, so as to bring the position of the said definition at par with the definition as was under consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of K Raheja. Changes were also made to the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Rules, 2005, vide notification dated 1st June, 2009 (with retrospective effect from 20th June, 2006), in respect of determination of value in case of works contracts involving such agreements.

However, inspite of the above mentioned changes and the judgment of the Supreme Court, the builders as well as the purchasers of such flats and units held a strong view that in most of the cases, it was possible to contend that such agreements (“under construction contracts”) were not covered under the Sales Tax Laws and they were not liable to tax under MVAT Act as a Works Contract.

Amongst others, the facts of K. Raheja’s case were cited vis-à-vis agreement for sale of flats and units as being generally entered into in the State of Maharashtra. The facts of K. Raheja’s case were such that there the value for undivided share in land was shown separately and the cost of construction was shown separately. However, when such is not the position i.e. when the cost of land and construction are not shown separately, then such contracts cannot be made liable to tax. There is no enabling power with the State Government to bifurcate the composite value into land and construction. Hence, if such construction agreements are considered to be for sale of immoveable property and they cannot be taxed as works contracts under Sales Tax Laws.

With this view in mind, the association of builders and developers i.e. Maharashtra Chamber of Housing Industry (MCHI) and others preferred a writ petition before the Bombay High Court challenging the constitutional validity of the amendment to section 2(24) of MVAT Act, consequentially challenging the insertion of Rule 58(IA) of MVAT Rules, 2005 and the Circular dated 7th February, 2007. A few others also filed similar writ petitions, including challenging the notification dated 9th July, 2010. The Bombay High Court recently disposed of this group of writ petitions vide its order dated 10th April, 2012.

Among several arguments, on behalf of petitioners, main arguments were on the ground that the agreement for sale entered into between a builder/ developer and the purchaser of a flat is basically agreement to sale an immovable property. Such an agreement cannot be considered as a ‘works contract’.

A contract which involves sale of immovable property cannot be split by the State Legislature, even if there is an element of a works contract. In other words the State Legislature cannot locate a sale of immovable property and then attempt to trace out what are the goods involved in the execution of the contract; It was also argued that a works contract involves only two elements viz.

(i) the transfer of property in goods; and

(ii) supply of labour and services. If a third element is involved in the contract viz. the sale of immovable property it does not constitute a works contract and hence to such a contract, the legal fiction created by Article 366(29A) does not apply.

The amendment to Section 2(24) has the effect of expanding the definition of the expression sale of goods under Article 366(29A) and is, therefore, beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature. The Trade Circular dated 17th February, 2007, the amendment to Rule 58 and the Notification dated 9th July, 2010 indicate the agreements which are contemplated to be brought within the purview of Section 2(24). Those agreements are agreements simplicitor for the sale of immovable property; A contract which is governed by the Maharashtra Ownership Flats (Regulation of the Promotion of Construction, Sale, Management and Transfer) Act, 1963 (MOFA) cannot be regarded as a works contract. Such a contract is an agreement for the purchase of immovable property in its complete sense.

In a works contract property gets transferred as a result of accretion during the course of the execution of the contract and there is no transfer of immovable property simplicitor. The essence of a works contract is the transfer of property by accretion. Consequently, where a contract involves sale of immovable property, it can never be regarded as involving a works contract.

When a promoter appoints a sub contractor and gets a building constructed, that contract is a works contract under Article 366(29A) and a transfer of the property in the goods involved in the execution of the works contract takes place to the developer. That would be the first deemed sale. When the developer enters into an agreement with a purchaser under the MOFA thereafter, this does not involve a sale of goods since that would amount to a second deemed sale of the same goods which cannot be brought to tax.

On the other hand, the learned Advocate General, appearing on behalf of the State Government, submitted that:

(a) The provisions of Section 2(24) which defines the expression “sale” fall within the compass of Article 366(29A);

(b) A works contract is a contract to execute works and encompasses a wide range of contracts. The expression works contract is not restricted to building contracts having only two elements viz. the sale of material and goods and the supply of labour and services;

(c) The well settled connotation of the expression works contract is that a building contract may also involve in certain situations a sale of land;

(d)    An unduly restrictive or contrived meaning should not be given to the provisions of Article 366(29A) of the Constitution otherwise the object underlying the constitutional amendment would be defeated;

(e)    The purpose underlying the enactment of the deeming fiction in Article 366(29A) was to override the limited definition of the expression sale in the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 and to isolate the sale of goods element involved, inter alia, in a contract which is a works contract;
(f)    A works contract is one where there is a con-tract to do works and it does not cease to be such merely because any other obligation exists.
(g)    In an agreement which is governed by the MOFA, a conveyance of the interest in the flat or at any rate an interest therein is created at the stage of the execution of an agreement under Section 4.

(h)    The Trade Circular and the amendment to Rule 58(1A) are only clarificatory in nature.

The Hon’ble High Court, after considering rival sub-missions, referred to many judgments. The Hon’ble High Court, in its order, also went through the 61st Report of Law Commission, 46th Amendment to the Constitution of India, section 2(24) of MVAT Act, Rule 58(1) & 58(1A) of MVAT Rules, relevant circulars and notifications. Notable amongst others, the High Court referred to a publication i.e. ‘Hud-son’s Building and Engineering Contracts’ (Eleventh edition, page 3). The High Court, at para 22 of its order, noted as follows:

“Hudson’s Building and Engineering Contracts contains an instructive elucidation of a building or engineering contract:

‘A building or engineering contract may be defined, for the purposes of this book, as an agreement under which a person, in this book called variously the builder or contractor, undertakes for reward to carry out for another person, variously referred to as the building owner or employer, works of a building or civil engineering character. In the typical case, the work will be carried out upon the land of the employer or building owner, though in some special cases obligations to build may arise by contract where this is not so, for example, under building leases, and contracts for the sale of land with a house in the course of erection upon it.’

The extract from Hudson is indicative of the fact that in a typical case work will be carried out upon the land of the employer or building owner though in some special cases an obligation to build may arise by contract where this is not so. The author cites the illustration of building leases and contracts for the sale of land with a house in the course of erection upon it. The elaboration of the concept in Hudson is indeed on the same lines as the judgment of the Supreme Court in Builders’ Association which notes the variations implicit in the notion of works contracts.

Therefore, as a matter of first principle, it cannot be postulated that a contract would cease to be a works contract if any more than only two elements are involved in its execution viz. (i) a supply of goods and materials; and (ii) performance of labour and services. In the modern context and having regard to the complexity of work, it would be simplistic to reduce the connotation of works contracts to contracts only involving the aforesaid two elements. When the Forty Sixth Amendment was enacted, no decided case had reduced the substratum of a works contract only to contracts involving the aforesaid two elements. As a matter of principle it would not be permissible to constrict or restrict the scope of works contracts and to exclude from their purview contracts involving situational modifications. Indeed, as Hudson’s treatise notes, a works contract may even involve a factual situation of a building lease or a contract for the sale of land with house in the course of erection upon it.”

The High Court further noted at para 24:

“Works contracts have varying connotations. The scale and complexity of commercial transactions in modern times has increased on a scale that has been unprecedented before.

The modern complexity of business is as much a product of as it is a cause for the complexity of regulatory mechanisms. Traditional forms of contract undergo a change as business seeks to meet new requirements and expectations from service providers in an increasingly competitive market environment. Increasing competition, following the opening up of the Indian economy to increased private investment has had consequences for the land market and the business of building and construction. The nature and complexity of building contracts has changed over time. The obligations which business promoters assume under works contracts may vary from situation to situation and contractual clauses are drafted to meet the demands of the trade, the needs of consumers of services and the requirements of regulatory compliance. So long as a contract provides obligations of a contract for works, and meets the basic description of a works contract, it must be described as such. The assumption of additional obligations under the contract will not detract from the situation or the legal consequences of the obligations assumed.”

While dealing with various provisions of the MOFA, the High Court referred to various decisions under MOFA and under Bombay Stamp Act, 1958, and, noted as follows:-
“The Act imposes restrictions upon a developer in carrying out alterations or additions once plans are disclosed, without the consent of the flat pur-chaser. Once an agreement for sale is executed, the promoter is restrained from creating a mortgage or charge upon the flat or in the land, without the consent of the purchaser. The Act contains a specific stipulation that if a mortgage or charge is created without consent of purchasers, it shall not affect the right and interest of such persons. There is hence a statutory recognition of the right and interest created in favour of the purchaser upon the execution of a MOFA agreement. Having regard to this statutory scheme, it is not possible to accept the submission that a contract involving an agreement to sell a flat within the purview of the MOFA is an agreement for sale of immovable property simplicitor. The agreement is impressed with obligations which are cast upon the promoter by the legislature and with the rights which the law confers upon flat purchasers.

Agreements governed and regulated by the MOFA are not agreements to sell simpiciter, as construed in common law. The legislature has intervened to impose statutory obligations upon promoters; obligations of a nature and kind that are not traceable to the ordinary law of contract.”

The Hon’ble Court, at para 30 of the order, also referred to certain provisions of Maharashtra Apartment Ownership Act, 1970, and noted:

“The provisions of the Apartment Ownership Act, 1970 hence recognise an interest of the purchaser of an apartment, not only in respect of the apartment which forms the subject matter of the purchase, but an undivided interest, described as a percentage in the common areas and facilities.”

In conclusion, while upholding the constitutional validity to of section 2(24) of MVAT Act, the High Court noted that “The submission which has been urged on behalf of the petitioners proceeds on the foundation that a works contract is a contract for the purpose of work which involves only two elements viz. a supply of goods and material and a supply of labour and services. Works contracts have numerous variations and it is not possible to accept the contention either as a matter of first principle or as a matter of interpretation that a contract for work in the course of which title is transferred to the flat purchaser would cease to be a works contract. As the Supreme Court noted in its judgment in Builders’ Association of India vs. Union of India (1989) 2 scc 645, the doctrine of accretion is itself subject to a contract to the contrary. The provisions of the MOFA, enacted in the State of Maharashtra, evince a legislative intent to protect the interest of flat purchasers by creating an interest in the property which is agreed to be acquired, in terms of the statutory provisions.”

The challenge to Rule 58(1A) was rejected on the ground that the legislature had acted within the field of its legislative powers in devising a measure for the tax by rightly excluding cost of land from the value liable to tax.

Circular, dated 7th February, 2007, was held to be clarificatory in nature, and, the notification dated 9th July, 2010 was upheld on the basis that the composition scheme is made available at the option of a registered dealer. There is no compulsion or obligation upon a registered dealer to settle or opt for a composition scheme.

Although, Bombay High Court has dismissed the writ petitions upholding the constitutional validity of the amendments to section 2(24), certain aspects still remain to be answered, one of them may be the basic route of amendment i.e. the K. Raheja’s case, which is pending for consideration before a larger bench of the Supreme Court. A similar issue is also involved in the matter of Larsen & Toubro. Thus, whether an agreement for sale of flats (under construction agreement) can be included in the definition of works contract (and, therefore, can be dissected into three elements i.e. land, labour and goods) or it is to be considered as an agreement for sale of immovable property only (as that is the substance as well as the intention of the parties), the final answer can be provided now only by the Supreme Court.

However, till the Supreme Court provides us guidance in the matter, the sales tax authorities in Maharashtra can enforce the levy of tax on all such transactions of agreements to sale flats (under construction contracts), entered into on or after 20th June, 2006.

The question, therefore, arises how to calculate the quantum of tax which a builder/developer may be liable to pay and whether the same can be passed on to the ultimate purchasers of such flats and units.

Let us now consider the relevant provisions of MVAT in this regard. It may be noted that once it is accepted that such “under construction agreements” are covered by the concept of ‘works contract’ it follows that the builder has to be considered as a contractor and the purchaser of flat as the principal. Thus, all such provisions as are applicable to a normal contractor will apply to the builder also. The following important aspects may be noted in this regard:

1.    The liability to pay tax under the MVAT Act is on the dealer (as defined). A dealer having turnover of sales more than the prescribed limits is liable to take registration.

2.    A registered dealer shall pay tax on his turnover of sales of ‘goods’ at the rates prescribed in the Schedule. Before making payment of tax as above he is entitled to deduct the amount of input tax credit (setoff of taxes paid on purchases) as may be available to him in accordance with the Rules.

3.    An unregistered dealer, although liable to pay tax on his turnover of sales, is not entitled to collect tax from the purchasers and also not entitled to claim input tax credit.

4.    In case of works contract, tax is levied under the concept of ‘deemed sale’ of goods. Thus, the rate of tax applicable has to be considered with reference to the nature of goods involved, the property in which passes from the contractor to the principal in the course of execution of works contract.

5.    As the agreements for sale of flats have one composite value of the transaction, there is no price mentioned separately for land, services and goods, the value of goods involved has to be determined in accordance with the provisions of Rule 58 of MVAT Rules.

6.    Rule 58(1) provides for deduction of various charges in relation to services and Rule 58(1A) provides for deduction in respect of value of land.

7.    In case of construction of building done through sub-contractor/s, deduction is also available for amounts paid to sub-contractor/s.

8.    In case of difficulty in arriving at the value of various services involved in the execution of works contract for the purposes of deduction u/r 58(1) a table is appended to the Rule, listing various types of contracts and a lumpsum percentage of deduction from the total contract value. (In case of construction of building contract, rate of deduction on account of services is provided at 30%.)

9.    For agreements, registered on or after 1st April, 2010, there is a specific composition scheme, designed for these kinds of agreements, whereby a registered dealer (builder) may opt to discharge his tax liability by paying composition money @ 1% of total agreement value. Although the composition scheme contains certain conditions and restrictions such as no deduction u/r 58 and no setoff etc., many may find it easy to follow.

10.    There is another composition scheme, known as 5% Composition Scheme, applicable to construction contracts (as defined). However, the said scheme was designed in the year 2006 with reference to normal construction contracts. (i.e. contracts having basically two elements supply of goods and labour). The Rule to provide deduction for value of land was introduced in the year 2009 and thereafter the composition scheme of 1% was notified, which has a specific reference to agreements entered into by builders and developers including value for transfer of interest in land.

11.    For agreements, registered before 1st April, 2010, till a specific scheme is designed by the Government, the builders may have to go through the exercise of determining value u/r 58, calculate setoff of taxes paid on input and discharge their tax liability.

Natural justice — Officer involved in audit — Officer not competent to assess the dealer — VAT Act, 2004.

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The petitioner dealer filed writ petitions challenging the assessment orders passed by the Joint Commissioner u/s.42 of the Orissa Value Added Tax Act, 2004 as a result of audit prescribed under Rule 49(1) of the Orissa Value Added Tax Rules, 2005, inter alia, contending that the orders of assessment were passed by the Joint Commissioner who was not competent to assess the petitioner, that they were passed violating the principles of natural justice and that the orders were time-barred as they were passed beyond the time stipulated u/ss. (6) and (7) of section 42 of the Act i.e., one year from January 18, 2010, when the audit visit report was approved and given by the Jt. Commissioner.

The High Court held that it was stated by the Department that the audit was directed by the Jt. Commissioner, Sales Tax of the Range and that he was required to constitute an audit team and monitor the progress of the audits assigned to the team. In view of this, it could not be said that the Jt. Commissioner was not involved in the audit process. In order to maintain transparency, any officer who was involved in any manner or had acted in the process of audit and preparation of the audit report in respect of the dealer should not be the Assessing Officer of that dealer. Otherwise, there would be violation of cardinal principles of natural justice. Therefore the orders passed by the Jt. Commissioner were to be set aside.

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Authority for Advance Ruling Jurisdiction — Application for Ruling — Discretionary — Holding and subsidiary.

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[ GSPL India Transco Ltd. & Anr. In re (2012) 49 VST 310 (AAR)]

The applicant, a subsidiary of a subsidiary of a Dr. K. Shivaram Ajay R. Singh Advocates Allied laws Govt. company, filed an application seeking a ruling by the Authority for Advance Rulings on its proposed transactions. The maintainability of the application was challenged by the Dept. contending that since a question identical to the one sought to be raised by the applicant was pending before the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal at the instance of the company of which the applicant was a subsidiary, the application by the applicant raising the identical question was barred by the proviso to s.s (2) of section 96D of the Finance Act, 1994. The AAR on the stated facts held that the question sought to be raised was pending before the Tribunal, though at the instance of the holding company of the applicant. If the argument of the applicant was accepted, the ruling to be given by the Authority would only bind the applicant and the authorities under the Act would be bound to implement that ruling only in the case of the applicant.

That would mean that in the appeal filed by the holding company of the applicant involving the identical question, the Tribunal was free to render a ruling ignoring what was being ruled by the Authority. That could lead to incompatible decisions concerning the same question, being rendered by two different authorities on an identical transaction. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, such a situation should be avoided. This would be in furtherance of the spirit of enacting the bar to the jurisdiction of this Authority to entertain an application for advance ruling, when the identical question was pending before an authority under the Act, the Tribunal or Court. Therefore the application was to be rejected exercising the discretion of the Authority not to allow the application u/s.96D(2) of the Act for the purpose of giving a ruling u/s.96D(4) of the Act.

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Appeal — Tribunal — Adjournment — Medical certificate not necessary while seeking adjournment on medical ground.

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[Megh Raj Bansal v. Customs Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal & Anr., (2012) 13 GSTR 75 (P&H)]

The petitioner, a sub-contractor, was served with a show-cause notice u/s.73 of the Finance Act, 1994, stating that the petitioner had evaded payment of service tax during the relevant period. The stand of the petitioner was that service tax stood paid by the main contractor on the total amount inclusive of the service part, which was allotted to the petitioner by the main contractor. The adjudicating authority, raised demand of certain amount towards tax, interest u/s.75 and penalties u/s.76 and 78. In appeal by the petitioner before the Tribunal, a request for adjournment on medical ground was sought by the petitioner but the same was rejected, as the medical certificate had not been attached. The said order of the Tribunal was challenged in writ before the High Court.

The Court held that while seeking adjournment on medical ground that medical certificate was not expected to be produced. It was the statement made by the counsel, which was expected to be accepted unless the circumstances were brought to the notice of the Court or the Tribunal to decline the request for adjournment sought on medical ground. As no reason could be found to decline the request for adjournment by the counsel for the petitioner, the Tribunal was not justified in not accepting the request for adjournment for the reason that the medical certificate was not attached.

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Microsoft Office 2013

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About this write-up
MS Office is a popular application software and enjoys wide usage across the world. Recently Microsoft released the Customer Preview of the latest version of its Office suite i.e., Microsoft Office 2013 (a.k.a Office 15). This write-up briefly discusses some of the new features proposed to be introduced in the new software, product enhancements to existing features, and some pros & cons associated therewith.

In my last write-up I had mentioned that developments and product announcements/launches were happening in such quick succession, that hardly a day passes by and a new product is launched. As a consequence, products are becoming out of fashion (in relative terms) almost immediately after launch.

When I was penning my previous write-up, I chose to write about the Flamer worm instead of writing about Samsung Galaxy S-III, iOS 6 and Microsoft Surface) . . . . don’t ask me why. Anyhow, I had ended the write up with the note that the next write-up would be about Samsung Galaxy S-III. In all honesty, I was all set to keep this commitment and suddenly out of the blue I read about Microsoft’s latest. All of a sudden it felt like Galaxy S-III had already become ‘old news’ and I had to write about the latest offering (announcement for now) from Microsoft. And so . . . . here we are . . . .

Background

Microsoft Office 2013 (a.k.a Office 15) is a productivity suite from Microsoft Windows and is likely to succeed the hugely popular Microsoft Office 2010. A developmental version (build 2703.1000) was leaked in May 2011. Subsequently, in January 2012, Microsoft released a technical preview of Office 15 (build 3612.1010). Almost six months later, on 16 July 2012 (to be precise) Microsoft unveiled the Customer Preview.

In this write-up, I have tried to highlight some of the new features proposed to be introduced in the new software, product enhancements to existing features, and some pros & cons associated therewith.

Whats new in Office 15

 While there are several features that one can describe, here are a few features that I found exciting:

  • Cloud integration
  • Will respond to touch, Stylus and the good ol’ keyboard
  • The new ‘Metro’ look
  •  Edit PDFs in Word 2013
  •  Will support Open Document Format (‘ODF’) 1.2
  •  Sharing, embedding web elements like YouTube videos
  •  Social media integration — skype, flicker
  •  Enhancements in Excel, Word, Outlook, One Note.

Some of the things that might not excite a few people:

  • Will have to upgrade from Windows XP/Vista
  • Get used to SkyDrive cloud storage.

Cloud integration

Cloud integration is now becoming a de facto ‘must have feature’. Cloud storage has been around for a quite some time (X drive types). Without getting into ‘who started it all’, Google’s chrome OS was a serious attempt to move towards cloud integration. If you recall, the Chrome OS was touted as one of slimmest OS because it required very little time to boot and Google had famously said that there was no need for providing any apps within the OS because everything was on the internet and that most people only boot their PCs and log on to the net — hence all the apps would be on the net. Last year when Apple unveiled its latest offering, it also announced a new service iCloud (5 GB storage). Gone were those days when you need to synchronise your PCs at different locations, no need to carry data in a portable drive or disc. With Office 15, Microsoft too has joined the gang. SkyDrive is default storage location for all your files (effectively SkyDrive is expected local C drive). Subscribers will be given 20GB storage space.

With this version, the Microsoft is moving to a subscription-based model wherein your Office files are tied to your Microsoft ID. Once you sign up, you can download the various desktop apps to a certain number of devices and, as with Windows 8, your settings, SkyDrive files and even the place where you left off in a document will follow you from device to device. Office 365, which is currently being sold to businesses, will be available to home-users as well.

 In addition to receiving future Office upgrades automatically, subscribers will get additional Sky- Drive storage, multiple installs for several users, and added perks such as international calls via Skype. You’ll also be able to stream Office apps to an Internet-connected Windows PC.

Responds to touch, stylus also

The preview page says “Office 15 will take you beyond the mouse and keyboard — to embrace touch and pen input” (one can hope for a much better experience while using One note). While multi-touch laptops aren’t — and probably won’t be — a mainstream choice for business and homeusers anytime soon, touch is an essential component of smartphones and tablets, obviously. The pen may be making a comeback too, judging by the popularity of Samsung’s stylus-equipped Galaxy Note. Office 2013 will allow you to swipe a finger across the screen to turn a page; pinch and zoom to read documents; and write with a finger or stylus — just like you do on your smart phone or tab. Additionally, when you write an email by hand, Office 2013 will automatically convert it to text. The user interface has been modified (especially the Ribbon feature — its flattened up or as Microsoft likes to call it ‘Metrified’). While this may seem a bit odd when you see it on a desktop, but you may appreciate it more when you try using it on a tablet PC or on your smart phone.

The new ‘Metro’ look

Microsoft loves Metro user interface, which was first introduced in Windows Phone 7 around two years ago. Since then Metro has become the user interface of future for Microsoft and the company is putting it in all its products. Office 2013 too has been given a Metro makeover. It is a slick interface, with clean lines, lots of empty space and looks modern.

For the uninitiated

Metro is an internal code name for a typographybased design language created by Microsoft. Originally meant for use in Windows Phone 7. Early uses of the Metro principles began as early as Microsoft Encarta 95 and MSN 2.0. Later on, these principles evolved into Windows Media Center and Zune. Now they are included in Windows Phone, Microsoft’s website, the Xbox 360 dashboard update, and Windows 8. A key design principle of Metro is better focus on the content of applications, relying more on typography and less on graphics (‘content before chrome’). WinJS is a JavaScript library by Microsoft for developing Metro applications with HTML.

There are two aspects to the design changes introduced in Office 2013 — visual changes and usability changes. Microsoft thinks that there is no need for any faux chrome or aero fluff around windows. Hence, the interface has been ‘Metrified’ (that’s how Microsoft likes to say it). The icons have been flattened, things have been cleaned up (i.e., the heavy boundaries, bevelled edges, shadows, etc. . . . . all gone.

 In fact, icons are likely to be a thing of the past. Under Metro there will be hardly any need for icons. While some argue that icons were simple (graphic, easy to remember) indicators for tools like copy, paste, etc., they kinda spruced things up. Microsoft argues that when you have as many as 4000 of such icons it eats away most of your display area.

Microsoft justifies the Metrification by saying that Office 15 is likely to used and seen on screens of different shapes and sizes, consider the screen of a typical smart phone…… would you rather see the screen or the numerous icons. Duh!!! It’s about getting the content front and centre and trying to get the application content out of the way — there when you need it, but out of the way when you don’t. On tablets and smart phones, you want to put the application stuff to one side.

Microsoft thinks that once you get the hang of it, you will appreciate the thought process.

Edit PDF documents in Word 2013

Until now you could only ‘save’ office files in PDF format. To edit these files or other PDF files, either you would have to edit the original office file and then (again) save as PDF or you had to buy third-party software/utilities. Going forward, you will be able to open PDF files and edit them in MS Word 2013 and then save them as word files or as PDF.

Word 2013 will maintain the formatting such as headers, columns, and footnotes and elements such as tables and graphics, of the PDF and permit you to edit them as though they were created in Office 2013 itself.

Users feedback suggests that Office 2013 handled simpler PDF files with ease. But it was not so graceful with the complex ones that had many images and elements.

Will support Open Document Format (‘ODF’) 1.2

Microsoft fought ODF1 as it became an open international standard (ISO/IEC 26300) by creat-ing its own standard OOXML (ISO/IEC 29500) and pushing it through standards organisations. But Microsoft has now apparently accepted that ODF has widespread support with other vendors, governments and organisations.

Microsoft already supports ODF 1.1 in Office 2007 SP1, Office 365, SharePoint and SkyDrive WebApps. Now Office 2013 will support ODF 1.2.

ODF 1.2 has already been widely adopted and is supported by, along with others such as Gnumeric, Google Docs, Zoho Office and AbiWord.

Sharing, embedding web elements like YouTube videos & social media integration — Skype, flicker

Office 2013 uses Sky Drive to enable better sharing of documents. You can invite people to work on to the document or use PowerPoint to give a presentation on the web. Word files can also be published as blogs on several popular blogging services directly from Office 2013.

YouTube videos can be now embedded into the documents directly and users don’t have to save these clips to the local computer. Office 2013 also includes Flickr integration that allows users to search for photographs on the popular photo sharing websites and embed pictures using Office 2013.

Microsoft acquired Skype last year, and Office 2013 will be the first suite to incorporate the popular VoIP service. You can integrate Skype contacts with Microsoft’s enterprise-oriented Lync communications platform for calling and instant messaging. Office subscribers get 60 minutes of Skype international calls each month.

User feedback suggests that there’s room for improvement, though.

Changes in ownership — Approach under Ind AS

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Currently under Indian GAAP, presenting consolidated financial statements is not mandatory for all entities. Only listed entities are required to present consolidated financial statements as per SEBI regulations. Ind AS requires mandatory preparation of consolidated financial statements by all companies, which have subsidiaries. In this article, we aim to understand the accounting for changes in stake held in subsidiaries and associates in the consolidated financial statements of a parent entity.

A. Changes in stake held in a subsidiary without loss of control

When there is a change (increase or decrease) in parent’s ownership in a subsidiary without loss of control, such change is accounted for as a transaction with owners in their own capacity i.e., any acquisition of minority interest is recorded as a capital transaction.

As a result, no gain or loss on such changes is recognised in the income statement. Also, no change in the carrying amounts of assets (including goodwill) or liabilities is recognised as a result of such transactions. Any difference between the consideration paid and the acquired minority interest is adjusted against reserves.

Example 1

Acquisition by parent of Non-Controlling Interest (NCI) of a subsidiary that has other comprehensive income Company P owns 80% of the shares in Company S. On 1st January 2011, P acquires an additional 10% of S for cash of INR 350. The carrying amount of the NCI in S before the acquisition is INR 500, which includes 100 in respect of the NCI’s portion of gains recognised in other comprehensive income in relation to foreign exchange movements.

In P’s consolidated financial statements the decrease in NCI in S is recorded as follows:

The amounts are based on the following calculation:

Example 2

Disposal of shares in an existing subsidiary without losing control

Company P owns 100% of the shares in Company S. On 1st January 2011, P sells 10% of S for cash of INR 350, thereby reducing its interest to 90%. The carrying amount of the net assets of S (including goodwill) in the consolidated financial statements of P on 1st January 2011 before the sale is INR 3,000. S has no other comprehensive income.

 In P’s consolidated financial statements the sale of the 10% interest in S is recorded as follows:

The amounts are based on the following calculation:

P recognises the difference between the adjustment to the carrying amount of NCI and the fair value of the consideration received directly in equity. No adjustments are made to the recognised amounts of assets, including goodwill, and liabilities.

Example 3

Subsidiary issues new shares — Control retained but ownership interest changes

Company S has 100 ordinary shares outstanding and the carrying amount of its equity (net assets) is INR 400. Company P owns 90% of S, i.e., 90 shares. S has no other comprehensive income. S issues 20 new ordinary shares to a third party for INR 150 in cash, as a result of which:

  •  S’s net assets increase to INR 550.
  • P’s ownership interest in S reduces from 90% to 75% (P now owns 90 shares out of 120 issued).
  •  NCI in S increases from INR 40 (400 x 10%) to INR 137.5 (550 x 25%). In P’s consolidated financial statements the increase in NCI in S arising from the issue of shares is recorded as follows:

P recognises the difference between the adjustment to the carrying amount of NCI and the fair value of the consideration received directly in equity. No adjustments are made to the recognised amounts of assets and liabilities or to goodwill.

One of the common situations under which a subsidiary issues new shares which affect the parent’s percentage holding is when employees exercise share options granted to them under Employee Stock Option Plan (ESOP) schemes. Similar to example 3 above, there is a change in ownership interest but control is retained. Therefore, the accounting treatment in the consolidated financial statements to record the change in shareholding is similar to example 3 above.

B. Control acquired by purchasing additional stake in an existing equity method investment

Sometimes controlling stake in an entity is obtained in stages, for example Entity A acquires 20% of interest in entity B on 1st January 2009 and thereafter on 1st January 2010, entity A acquires another 40%.

In such cases, the fair value of any non-controlling equity interest in the acquiree that is held immediately prior to obtaining control is used in the determination of goodwill, i.e., it is re-measured to fair value at the acquisition date with any resulting gain or loss recognised in profit or loss. The basis of fair valuing the original interest is that the economic nature of the investment changes and hence this is akin to disposing of the original investment and recording a new investment in the books.

In such step acquisitions

  • the previously-held non-controlling equity interest is re-measured to its fair value at the acquisition date, with any resulting gain or loss recognised in profit or loss;
  •  the acquirer de-recognises the previouslyheld non-controlling equity interest and recognises 100% of the acquiree’s identifiable assets acquired and liabilities assumed; and
  • any amounts recognised in other comprehensive income relating to the previously-held equity interest are recognised on the same basis as would be required if the acquirer had disposed of the previously-held equity interest.

 Example 4:

Associate becomes subsidiary

 On 1st January 2011, Company P acquired 30% of the voting ordinary shares of Company S for INR 50,000. P accounts its investment in S under Ind AS-28 Investments in Associates.

At 31st December 2011, P recognised equity accounted earnings of INR 8,500 in profit or loss. The carrying amount of the investment in the associate on 31st December 2011 was therefore INR 58,500 (50,000 + 8,500). On 1st January 2011, P acquires the remaining 70% of S for cash of INR 200,000. At this date the fair value of the 30% interest owned already is INR 70,000 and the fair value of S’s identifiable assets and liabilities is INR 250,000.

The transaction would be accounted for as follows:

Note 1

Calculation of goodwill


Note 2

Calculation of gain on previously held interest in S recognised in profit and loss

Another example where similar accounting treatment as above would be followed is when control is obtained through the acquiree repurchasing its own shares. For example, an investor holds a non-controlling equity investment in an investee. If the investee buys back enough of its own shares such that the investor obtains control of the investee, then the investor company needs to adopt consolidation procedures and account the investee company as a subsidiary i.e., Entity A owns 40% interest in entity B. On 1st January 2011, B repurchases a number of its shares such that A’s ownership interest increases to 65%. The repurchase transaction results in A obtaining control of B.

C.    Dilution of ownership interest by disposal of shares resulting in loss of control

Under Ind AS, when a change in controlling interest results in loss of control (e.g., due to sale of investment in the subsidiary), such a change is accounted for in two parts.

  •     Firstly de-recognise the net assets and good-will of the subsidiary and recognise the relating gain or loss in income statement (by comparing it to the fair value of consideration received).

  •     Secondly, recognise any balance investment in the former subsidiary at fair value.

Example 5

Subsidiary becomes associate

Entity A owns 60% of the shares in Entity B. On 1st January 2011, Entity A disposes of a 30% interest in Entity B and loses control over Entity B. The consideration received for the sale of shares of Entity B is INR 700. At the date that Entity A disposes of a 30% interest in Entity B, the carrying amount of the net assets of Entity B is INR 2000. The amount of non-controlling interest in the consolidated financial statements of Entity A on 1st January 2011 is INR 800. The fair value of the remaining 30% investment is determined to be INR 700.

Entity A would record the following entry to reflect its disposal of a 30% interest in Entity B at 1st January 2011:

 

Debit

Credit

 

 

 

Cash
(fair value of consideration

 

 

received)

700

 

Equity
(non-controlling interest)

800

 

Investment
in Entity B

 

 

(at
fair value)

700

 

Net
assets of Entity B

 

 

(including
goodwill)

 

2000

Gain
on disposal

 

200

 

 

 

The gain represents the increase in the fair value of the retained 30% investment of INR 100 [700 — (30% x 2,000)], plus the gain on the sale of the 30% interest disposed of INR 100 [700 — (30% x INR 2,000)].

The remaining interest of 30% represents an associate, the fair value of INR 700 represents the cost on initial recognition and Ind AS 28 — Account

Section A : Disclosure in Notes to Accounts under Revised Schedule VI for Long Term Borowings and details thereof

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3.1 Non-convertible Debentures referred above to the extent of:
(a) Rs.1,593 crore are secured by way of first mortgage/charge on the immovable properties situated at Hazira Complex and at Jamnagar Complex (other than SEZ unit) of the Company.
(b) Rs.5,000 crore are secured by way of first mortgage/charge on the immovable properties situated at Jamnagar Complex (other than SEZ unit) of the Company.
 (c) Rs.1,720 crore are secured by way of first mortgage/charge on all the properties situated at Hazira Complex and at Patalganga Complex of the Company.
(d) Rs.110 crore are secured by way of first mortgage/charge on certain properties situated at village Mouje Dhanot, District Kalol in the State of Gujarat and on fixed assets situated at Hoshiarpur Complex of the Company.
(e) Rs.50 crore are secured by way of first mortgage/charge on certain properties situated at Ahmedabad in the State of Gujarat and on fixed assets situated at Nagpur Complex of the Company.
(f) Rs.44 crore are secured by way of first mortgage/ charge on certain properties situated at Surat in the State of Gujarat and on fixed assets situated at Allahabad Complex of the Company.
(g) Rs.51 crore are secured by way of first mortgage/ charge on movable and immovable properties situated at Thane in the State of Maharashtra and on movable properties situated at Baulpur Complex of the Company.
(h) Rs.500 crore are secured by way of first mortgage/charge on the immovable properties situated at Jamnagar Complex (SEZ unit) of the Company.

3.2 Maturity profile and rate of interest of Non-convertible Debentures are as set out below:

3.3 Finance Lease obligations are secured against leased assets

3.4 Maturity profile and rate of interest of bonds are as set out below:

3.5 Maturity profile of Unsecured Term Loans are as set out below:

Bajaj Electricals Ltd. (31-3-2012)

Long-term Borrowings

4.2 Sales Tax Deferral
Terms of repayment: Sales Tax deferral liability/loan is repayable free of interest over predefined instalments from the initial date of deferment of liability, as per respective schemes of incentive.

Petronet LNG Ltd. (31-3-2012)
Long-term Borrowings

Note:

1. Secured by first ranking mortgage and first charge on pari-passu basis on all movable and immovable properties, both present and future including current assets except on trade receivables on which second charge is created on pari-passu basis.

2. Term of repayment and interest are as follows:

3. In respect of external commercial borrowings of INRNaN million from International Finance Corporation Washington D.C., USA and INRNaN million from Proparco, France, outstanding as on 31st March, 2012, the Company has entered into derivative contracts to hedge the loan including interest. This has the effect of freezing the rupee equivalent of this liability as reflected under the Borrowings. Thus there is no impact of in the Profit & Loss, arising out of exchange fluctuations for the duration of the loan. Consequently, there is no restatement of the loan taken in foreign currency. The interest payable in Indian Rupees on the derivative contracts is accounted for in the Statement of Profit & Loss.

Uttam Galva Steels Ltd. (31-3-2012)
Note 3 long-term borrowing (Rs. in crores)

(i) Details of terms of repayment for the Secured Non-convertible Redeemable Debentures issued by the Company and security provided in respect thereof:

(ii) Details of terms of repayment for the Secured Long-term Borrowings and security provided in respect thereof:

(1) 11.25% Non-convertible Redeemable Debentures are secured by first pari-passu mortgage of all immovable property and hypothecation of all movable properties including movable machineries, machinery spares, tools and accessories both present and future except packing machine supplied by PESMEL Finland.

(2) Term loans from Banks and Financial Institutions namely, Axis Bank, Bank of Baroda, Dena Bank, Exim Bank of India, Oriental Bank of Commerce, Punjab National Bank, State Bank of India, Syndicate Bank, State Bank of Hyderabad, IDFC and ICICI Bank Limited are secured by mortgage and the lenders have paripassu charge on all the present and future movable and immovable assets of the Company except packing machine supplied by PESMEL Finland, but not limited to plant and machinery, machinery spares, tools and accessories in possession or not, stored, or to be brought in companies premises or lying at any other place of the companies representative affiliates and all the intangible assets of the Company. The above security will rank pari-passu amongst the lenders.

(3) ECB loans from ICICI Bank Limited are secured by mortgage of all immovable property and hypothecation of all movable properties including movable machineries, machineries spares, tools and accessories both present and future except packing machine supplied by PESMEL Finland.

(4) ECA from Nordea Bank is secured by hypothecation of packing machine supplied by PESMEL Finland.

(5)    Term loan from ICICI Bank Limited, IFCI, LIC, GIC, and UII ranking pari-passu are secured by mortgage of all immovable property and hy-pothecation of all movable properties including movable machineries, machineries spares, tools and accessories both present and future except packing machine supplied by PESMEL Finland. 25,02,500 Equity shares (previous year 25,02,500 equity shares) held by Promoters are pledged against term loan of Rs.9.55 crore availed from ICICI Bank Limited.

15 Ramco Industries Ltd. (31-3-2012)


Long-term
Borrowings

Term
Loan from

 

 

Banks
Secured

11,409.37

9,056.18

 

 

 

Deposits
from Public

9.85

11.58

 

 

 

Total

11,419.22

9,067.76

 

 

 

(1)Long-term Loans of Rs.11409.37 lac borrowed from banks for expansion of Textile and Wind Mill Division under TUF Scheme are secured by pari-passu first charge on the fixed assets and pari-passu second charge on the current assets of the company.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

In
lacs

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Rate of

Outstanding

Repayment schedule

 

 

 

 

interest

as on

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

31-3-2012

 

2013-14

2014-15

2015-16

2016-17

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

13.25%

164.20

 

131.20

33.00

0.00

0.00

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

13.25%

768.69

 

400.00

368.69

0.00

0.00

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

12.25%

5000.00

 

2500.00

2500.00

0.00

0.00

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

4.77%

3052.50

 

2416.56

635.94

0.00

0.00

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

12.25%

68.92

 

45.84

23.08

0.00

0.00

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

12.50%

245.10

 

89.13

89.13

66.84

0.00

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

11.75%

2109.96

 

529.40

529.40

529.40

521.76

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Total

11409.37

 

6112.13

4179.24

596.24

521.76

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(2)    External Commercial Borrowing Loan of USD 6.00 million amounting to Rs.3052.50 lac borrowed from DBS Bank Ltd., Singapore is secured by pari-passu first charge on fixed assets and pari-passu second charge on current assets in favourof Security Trustee DBS Bank Ltd., Chennai.

As per requirements of Accounting Standard 11, ECB Loan has been valued at 50.875 per USD, at the closing rate on 31-3-2012.

This has resulted in a notional loss of Rs.375.50 lac which has been accounted as per Notification dated 31-3-2009 and 11th May, 2011 amending the Accounting Standard AS-11 relating to the Effects of Foreign Exchange Rates as 79.85 lac towards interest and 295.65 lac towards fixed assets.

(3)    The Working Capital Borrowings of the Company are secured by hypothecation of stocks of raw materials, work-in progress, stores, spares and finished goods and book debts and second charge on fixed assets.

GAPS in GAAP — Account ing for Government Grant

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Government Grants are common in India and therefore accounting for Government Grant could have a significant impact on financial statements. Firstly, whether there is a grant or not; and if there is a grant whether the same is a fixed asset-related grant, revenue grant or promoters contribution will have to be decided. If the grant is a revenue grant, then its immediate impact is recorded in the P&L account, if the grant is a fixed asset grant, the grant income is released systematically to the P&L account in proportion to the depreciation on the related fixed asset. Alternatively, the grant is reduced from the amount of fixed asset capitalised, which will have the same P&L effect. Government grant in the nature of promoter’s contribution is treated as equivalent of shareholders fund and credited to the capital reserve. Needless, to say, the accounting will not only have a significant impact on the financial statements, but will also have a significant incometax impact, including MAT computation. Therefore the manner in which the government grant is accounted for becomes critical.

 In this article the author discusses an EAC opinion on the issue of whether a sales tax exemption under a scheme of the government is a grant or not. This article does not discuss the issue on the nature of the grant, whether fixed asset-related or revenue grant or promoters contribution. The issue of whether sales tax exemption scheme is a grant came to the Expert Advisory Committee (EAC) of the ICAI for an opinion (EAO-VOL-20-05). In the said fact pattern, the company was entitled to sales tax exemption over a period of three years, subject to an upper monetary limit. The upper limit was computed based on the additional investment in plant, machinery and building required for expansion. The EAC considered the definition of government grant in AS-12 Accounting for Government Grants.

As per paragraph 3.2 ‘government grant’ is defined as “Government grants are assistance by government in cash or kind to an enterprise for past or future compliance with certain conditions. They exclude those forms of government assistance which cannot reasonably have a value placed upon them and transactions with government, which cannot be distinguished from the normal trading transactions of the enterprise”. The EAC felt that sales tax exemption is not assistance in cash or kind and is therefore not a government grant within the meaning of this term under AS-12.

 As such AS-12 is not applicable to sales tax exemption. However, there was no further elaboration on this point. The EAC further noted the definition of Revenue in AS-9 Revenue Recognition and was of the view that the entire sales proceed of the company constitutes revenue. It is immaterial whether the sale proceeds result from sales at normal prices or at higher than normal prices that the unit is able to charge due to sales tax exemption.

 In the author’s view, sales tax exemption is a government grant for the following reasons:

(1) It is a sacrifice by the government for achieving a particular social objective (e.g., dispersion of industry). The upper limit on the grant is clearly quantified. It may not be possible to quantify the sales tax exemption for the entire period of grant upfront; nonetheless, it is possible to quantify the amount of exemption included in each sales transaction. The grant is provided subject to fulfilment of certain conditions.

(2) The manner in which a grant is received does not affect the accounting method to be adopted in regard to the grant. Thus a grant is accounted for in the same manner, whether it is received in cash or as a reduction of a liability to the government.

(3) Government grants exclude assistance provided by the government which cannot reasonably have a value placed upon them and transactions with government which cannot be distinguished from the normal trading transactions of the entity. Examples of these assistance are free technical or marketing advice and the provision of guarantees, etc. Sales tax exemption is a scheme granted by the government, subject to fulfilment of conditions relating to investment and operation in underdeveloped areas. Sales tax foregone by the government is in substance a transfer of resources by the government to the company.

In accordance with the EAC opinion, the grant will be included in the revenue amount. Going by the author’s view, the grant would be included in other income if it is concluded that it is a revenue-related grant. If the grant is concluded to be a fixed assetrelated grant it would be presented as deferred income and released over time in proportion to the depreciation of the relevant asset. Alternatively it would be reduced from the fixed asset, which would have the same impact.

As can be seen the accounting and presentation of the grant will not only have a significant impact on the financial statements, but also on the tax and MAT computation. This is therefore an issue, the ICAI would need to reconsider.

levitra

Avoiding Common Errors in XBRL Financial Statements

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“Tagging” of financial information by using eXtensible Business Reporting Language, an accounting specific mark-up language creates XBRL financial statements which can be stored in a financial database such as MCA-21. XBRL tagging process converts the financial information contained in document in PDF, Word or Excel format to a document or file with electronic codes which makes the document computer readable as well as searchable. Once the tagged financial statements are stored in a financial database like MCA-21, not only the financial data in those XBRL financial statements can be compared or analysed by use of computer systems but investors, investment analysts or other users can also download it and carry out comparison and analysis more quickly and efficiently than with data stored in traditional formats such as PDF.

Many people have a misconception that tagging of financial information/data in XBRL is similar to converting a Word document into PDF format and that tagged financial information/data is as accurate as the underlying information/data in the source documents. This is an inappropriate analogy, because the process of tagging financial information involves judgment of the person creating XBRL financial statements and there is a potential for intentional or unintentional errors in the XBRL documents which could result in inaccurate, incomplete or misleading information. This is a problem because it is the XBRL tagged data which not only will be used by the regulators e.g. Ministry of Corporate Affairs, for comparison & analysis purpose but will also be used by investors, investment analysts etc. Therefore, completeness, accuracy and consistency of XBRL tagged data is of paramount importance.

As with any new technology, XBRL, a new financial reporting technology also brings new risks. XBRL can’t be read by the human eye. The data in XBRL is filtered through rendering applications or viewers to visually present tagged data. Companies can easily underestimate the challenges posed by XBRL and make mistakes along the way. This article describes common errors appearing in XBRL financial statements filed at MCA-21 and how these can be prevented. Practitioners can use this information to get an insight into the challenges of XBRL Instance creation and providing assurance over XBRL financial statements being filed at MCA-21. To gain a better insight into the challenges faced by the companies in XBRL filings, we examined the XBRL financial statements of a few listed Companies on a test check basis. As a part of this initiative, we downloaded Form 23AC-XBRL & Form 23ACA-XBRL of the Companies from MCA-21 and detached XBRL financial statements attached to these forms and then compared XBRL financial statements rendered by MCA Validation Tool with the financial statements in traditional format, tracing the errors to the XBRL documents containing the computer code.

Completeness Errors

The Company’s XBRL financial statements are required to fairly present the audited financial statements in traditional format. Therefore, all information and data that is contained in the audited financial statements or additional information required to be reported under the scope of tagging defined by Ministry of Corporate Affairs needs to be formatted in XBRL financial statements.

Examples

Some examples of lack of completeness are: (i) Financial information/data of all subsidiaries not formatted in XBRL financial statements. (ii) Financial information/ data of all related party transactions not formatted in XBRL financial statements. (iii) Parenthetical information, for example tax deducted at source on rent, not tagged in XBRL financial statements. (iv) Detailed Tagging of Notes to Accounts wherever required, if not done also falls under completeness error. (v) Not tagging complete “Cash Flow Statement.” (vi) Not tagging the “Foot notes” in financial statements. “Foot Notes” in financial statements provide additional information which helps in having a better understanding of financial information. The absence of “Foot Notes” in financial statements can not only make the task of understanding the financial information difficult, but user could also reach erroneous conclusions.

Solution

A careful tracing of all financial information/data from source documents to rendered XBRL financial statements can detect many such errors. However, this cannot detect all completeness errors because there is some information/data which is required to be formatted in XBRL financial statements, but the same is not reported in traditional financial statements.

Accuracy Errors

Accuracy of numerical data including amounts, signs, reporting periods and units of measurements is critical for the reliability of data in XBRL financial statements. Accuracy errors, though less common than other type of errors, are more serious in nature because the erroneous data not only distorts the financial statements but is also not suitable for downloading in software for comparison and analysis purpose. In a closed taxonomy environment, XBRL Instance documents cannot truly present the audited financial statements, because many times reporting entity may be required to tag a line item in the financial statements with the residuary tag or club two or more line items together. Although, this doesn’t affect the mathematical accuracy of the financial statements, the data may not be suitable for comparison and analysis purposes.

Example

Data entry errors in reporting amount of Profit & Loss Account under the group heading “Reserves & Surplus” and “Loans & Advances” in the Balance Sheet. Duty Drawback”, “Export Incentive” “Other Claim Receivable” all clubbed together and tagged with “Other Receivables”.

Solution

A careful tracing of all financial statement data to the rendered XBRL financial statements can detect errors in values. However, attribute accuracy needs to be checked by verifying all contextual information. A foot note can be added in XBRL financial statements which can provide a break-up of all line items clubbed and mapped with one taxonomy element or with the residuary tag.

Mapping Errors

Mapping is the process of selecting the right element in Indian GAAP Taxonomy for each line item in the financial statement. Mapping errors can result in misleading information and the user of data could reach to an erroneous conclusion.

Examples

“Loss on Sale of Fixed Assets” tagged with “Loss on Sale of Long Term Investments” although a tag “Loss on Sale of Fixed Assets” is available in the taxonomy. “Interest Accrued but not due on Fixed Deposit” tagged with “Other Cash Bank Balance”. Another example of mapping error is “Deferred Tax Liability (Net)” tagged with “Net Deferred Tax Assets” with a negative sign or vice versa. Although, it doesn’t create any mismatch in the assets & liabilities, it distorts the view of the Balance Sheet.

Solution

Although good XBRL Tools have an in-built feature for searching taxonomy element which can assist in mapping, the importance of judgment involved in the process can’t be undermined. A precise understanding of the Company’s financial statements and of Indian GAAP Taxonomy is required to ensure the correct mapping of line items in financial statements with taxonomy elements.

Validation Errors

The final step in preparing XBRL financial statements for submission to MCA-21 involves:-

(i) Validation Test and

(ii) Pre-scrutiny Test

MCA Validation Tool checks and identifies most, but not all, errors. For example, it does not check the financial information/data in ‘Block Tagging’. It verifies the mathematical accuracy and mandatory information/data in XBRL financial statements.

Pre-scrutiny Test conducts server side validation of the data in XBRL financial statements. An XBRL financial statement must pass the “Validation Test” before the “Pre-scrutiny Test” can be conducted.

Examples

Corporate Identity Number (CIN) of an Associate entity not provided in XBRL financial statements. Another example of validation error is “Basis of Presentation of Accounts” not tagged.

Solution

Validation Test on XBRL financial statements should be conducted on the latest available MCA Validation Tool. In case the validation test throws any errors, the same should be removed before uploading at MCA-21. After the XBRL Instance passes the validation test, Pre-scrutiny Test should be conducted and if there are any errors, the same should be removed before uploading of XBRL financial statements at MCA-21.

Rendering Errors

`Rendering’ is a necessary evil. Tagged data needs to be rendered in order to see it. This puts undue focus on presentation vis-à-vis MCA compliant XBRL and use for financial analysis. This is contrary to the original purpose of XBRL. Many filers have noticed during the last filing year that XBRL rendering has not been as accurate as they would prefer it to be. We tend to think of financial reporting in a visual way – in a way we can view it. That is the old way of thinking about financial reporting. “Tagging” of financial statements provide a choice to the users to grab the entire financial statement or individual values in isolation.

Examples

Financial information/data in “Block Tagging” is not properly rendered making the information illegible e.g. information/ data in foreign currency transactions in Notes to Accounts. Another example of rendering error is of certain foot notes attached to the values which are visible in XBRL Viewer but not rendered in the PDF file.

Solution

Rendering errors are mainly related to XBRL software used in generating XBRL financial statements and vendors of software need to look into this aspect. Rendering engine also needs improvement to properly render the information in XBRL Viewer as well as in PDF files. However, the preparer can also improve the formatting of information/data in XBRL financial statements.

Conclusion

It is of prime importance for companies to be aware of these potential errors, whether their XBRL financial statements are prepared in-house or prepared by a third party service provider. There is a legal liability attached to XBRL mandate for companies and its officers in default for submission of inaccurate or false data in XBRL financial statements. There is also a provision for disciplinary complaint against the practitioners to the professional bodies for deficiency in certification of XBRL financial statements. The deficiency in XBRL financial statements could invite avoidable litigation and adversely affect company’s goodwill.

Ind AS: Functional Currency and Consequential Impact on Deferred Tax

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Executive summary

This
article covers the ‘Functional Currency’ aspect differentiating with
‘Presentation Currency’ as laid in Ind AS 21, which will be a new
concept when India converges to IFRS.

It also highlights the
consequential impact of having two sets of functional currencies (one
for GAAP reporting and other Tax submissions) on deferred tax
computation under Ind AS 12, which again is based on a new approach
i.e., ‘Temporary difference’ as against ‘Timing difference’ under
existing AS-22.
Temporary difference is essentially arrived at by
comparing the balance sheet under tax books with financial books. This
approach is also known as ‘Balance Sheet approach’ and the approach in
AS-22 is termed as ‘P&L approach’.

Introduction

India
has laid down the convergence plan of ‘Indian Accounting Standards’
(AS) with ‘International Financial Reporting Standards’ i.e., IFRS in a
phased manner. The first phase implementation was expected to begin from
April 1, 2011 but due to practical challenges, the implementation is
delayed. ICAI, as part of convergence approach, has come out with 35 Ind
AS which are the same as IFRS except for the carve-outs. The Ministry
of Corporate Affairs (MCA) has notified 35 Ind ASs on February 25, 2011.

Amongst these standards, there is one standard that has the potential
to entirely turn the Indian financial statements topsy turvy and that is
IAS 21 i.e., Ind AS 21. The consequential impact of this standard on
deferred taxes, is not part of the carve-outs and hence would need due
care while the standard is implemented in India.

Currency for accounting and presentation

While
all Indian entities prepare books of accounts in Indian Rupees, we have
never thought of preparing our books in any other currency. There may
be some who did wish of using currency other than Indian Rupee (INR) on
account of huge foreign exchange exposures, but they did not have any
guidance or literature to support them. The spot will now be addressed
in ‘Ind AS 21 — The Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates’.

Once
India starts converging to Ind AS, we will have this standard on
effects of exchange fluctuations, which has considered the aspect of
huge volatility and exposures to operations due foreign currency (i.e.,
other than INR). It requires the managements of companies to adopt a
suitable currency for maintaining their accounts. Since the entities may
vary their exposures to currency in different years, the standard has
mandated the assessment of such book-keeping currency every year.

If any
other currency, say, USD is considered as the currency that influences
the primary economic environment, managements will have to prepare
themselves to consider INR as foreign currency exposure and mark to
market all INR monetary assets and liability at each balance sheet date.
Ind AS 21 — ‘The Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates’ is a
standard that brings a new dimension to the financial statements
prepared in India. Now, the book-keeping currency i.e., Functional
currency will no more be optional or default INR, it will be governed by
specific principles laid down under the standard and functional
currency can be different than the presentation currency.

Functional currency

Let
us appreciate the governing principles of functional currency under Ind
AS 21:

“Functional currency is the currency of the primary economic
environment in which the entity operates.” (para 7)
“The primary
economic environment in which an entity operates is normally the one in
which it primarily generates and expends cash. An entity considers the
following factors in determining its functional currency:
(a) the
currency:

(i) that mainly influences sales prices for goods and
services (this will often be the currency in which sales prices for its
goods and services are denominated and settled); and

(ii) of the country whose competitive forces and regulations mainly determine the sales prices of its goods and services.

(b)
the currency that mainly influences labour, material and other costs of
providing goods or services (this will often be the currency in which
such costs are denominated and settled).” (para 8) Ind AS 21 defines the
functional currency and differentiates it from the presentation
currency. The primary factor that drives the choice of currency is
influenced by stream of revenue and operating costs. Additional factors
that the standard requires to examine are the currency of loan
obligations.

 “Many reporting entities comprise a number of
individual entities (e.g., A group is made up of a parent and one or
more subsidiaries). Various types of entities, whether members of a
group or otherwise, may have investments in associates or joint
ventures. They may also have branches. It is necessary for the results
and financial position of each individual entity included in the
reporting entity to be translated into the currency in which the
reporting entity presents its financial statements. This Standard
permits the presentation currency of a reporting entity to be any
currency (or currencies).
The results and financial position of any
individual entity within the reporting entity whose functional currency
differs from the presentation currency are translated in accordance with
paragraphs 38- 50.” (para 10)

Under existing AS-11 definitions, foreign
currency is a currency other than the reporting currency, and reporting
currency is the currency used for reporting financial statements.
The
rules of translating the subsidiary accounts into reporting currency
are similar to those under Ind AS 21, which prescribes using closing
rate for balance sheet items and transaction rate or average rate for
income statement items (para 38-50).
Point of difference
Under Indian
GAAP, a currency used for preparing as well as reporting i.e.,
presenting financial statements to regulatory authorities, lenders,
investors, etc. is foreign currency is no other than INR. There is no
concept of having the currency to report financial statements
(presentation currency) different from the currency in which books of
accounts are to be maintained (functional currency).

Functional currency: Industry perspective

Under Indian GAAP there is no concept of functional currency identification. It however has reference to ‘Reporting Currency’, which is expected to be the same currency of the country in which it is domiciled.

The definition of functional currency in Ind AS will encompass all the companies whose primary economic environment is not the Indian economy.

The impact of this standard will be more evident on commodity market-linked companies engaged in mining, refining, and trading products, whose primary revenue is governed by international commodity prices prevail-ing on London Metal Exchange in US Dollars. Another industry that may be impacted by the implementation of Ind AS will be Business Process Outsourcing Companies and Software Companies whose primary revenue is again governed in terms of Dollars and Euros. Oil and Gas companies are also prone to get functional currency assessment and application in India since the oil prices are quoted in USD per barrel globally.

It will also be impacting the bullion companies that are listed on Indian stock exchanges and others that are planning to list soon on Indian and international bourses. The revenues of these companies are always traded in USD in India and internationally.

Domestic prices for sales within India, of these companies though in INR, are arrived at by first considering the respective International prices in USD and then making certain adjustments such as duty differentials, domestic market premium, freight differentials, competitive discounts, etc. which in industry terms is called as ‘Shadow Gap’ pricing.

Each company will have to apply its own judgment and access all the criteria of primary environment and other additional factors that influence the choice of its functional currency.

Challenges on adoption of functional currency other than INR in India:

(1)    If the accounting records of these Indian companies are to be prepared under Ind AS, then the financial statements will altogether give a different picture. Since currency fluctuation on, say, USD may now sit in transaction amounts and change company’s profitability.

(2)    Change in mindset and budgets required.

(3)    Will lead to difficulty in decision-making processes by Indian managements specifically in assessing its foreign exchange exposure which so far was on currencies other than INR.

(4)    Continuing a parallel accounting system for Income Tax submission since Direct Tax Code does not provide for similar changes.

(5)    Updation/modification to ERP solutions. It is also worth noting that accounting softwares such as SAP have a functionality to address the dual currency accounting which can take care of both tax reporting using INR as functional currency and IFRS reporting using any other currency.

(6)    Accounting for deferred tax and unwanted volatility in income statement.

Indian Industry including managements, lenders, investors, analysts of financial statements will have to prepare for seeing a currency different than INR as accounting currency in annual financial statements. Many companies internationally have adopted this standard which aligned their accounting currency i.e., functional currency in line with their respective primary economic environments.

In the international markets most of the transactions happen in US Dollars and India is now a part of a global economic platform and thus is very much influenced by USD in its financial statements. The impact is more evident in industries that are primarily dependent on USD and whose profitability is affected by any change in USD: INR exchange rate such as Mining & Metals, Oil & Gas, Software exports and Business Processing Operations among others.

Let us now appreciate the challenge in point 6 above, on how deferred tax is impacted by change in functional currency from INR

Ind AS 12: Income Taxes

A deferred tax asset or liability shall be recognised for all taxable temporary differences.

‘Temporary differences’ are differences between the carrying amount of an asset or liability in the balance sheet and its tax base. The ‘tax base’ of an asset or liability is the amount attributed to that asset or liability for tax purposes.

The primary approach of accounting of deferred tax under Ind AS is using the balance sheet approach. For example, revaluation of fixed assets under Indian the GAAP with no corresponding revaluation in tax books i.e., tax base has no impact on deferred tax computation under AS-22 since the revaluation impact is only a balance sheet adjustment with corresponding impact directly in reserves.

Under Ind AS 12, even though the revaluation does not impact the income statement, there is a requirement to adjust the deferred tax and post the net impact in revaluation reserve. This is because this originates a temporary difference on comparison between the balance sheet value of asset and tax base for that particular asset. This is true for all such differences between the balance sheet value and tax base, that have a potential of reversal either in tax books such as 43B items or financial books itself such as revaluation adjustments.

While comparing the balance sheet values and tax base, the following paragraph of Ind AS 12 brings out the impact of functional currency on deferred tax computation.

“The non-monetary assets and liabilities of an entity are measured in its functional currency (see Ind AS 21 The Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates). If the entity’s taxable profit or tax loss (and, hence, the tax base of its non -monetary assets and liabilities) is determined in a different currency, changes in the exchange rate give rise to temporary differences that result in a recognised deferred tax liability or (subject to paragraph 24) asset. The resulting deferred tax is charged or credited to profit or loss.” (Para 41)

The application of this paragraph will not trigger if the currency in which the company maintains its books of accounts i.e., functional currency and the ones used for calculating taxable profit under tax laws is the same i.e., INR for India. It is pertinent to note that choosing a different currency for presentation of financial statements to stock market, lender, investors, etc., will not attract application of paragraph 41 of Ind AS 12.

However, with the change in accounting standard wherein the accounting records may have to be made under, say, USD (considering primary economic environment criteria under Ind AS 21) and taxable profit or loss is to be calculated under INR, this may cause the temporary difference if the USD:INR exchange rates changes at every balance sheet date.

We will take an example to understand the implications of functional currency on deferred tax.

(1)    Entity A has INR as tax currency and USD as functional currency.
(2)    The value of non-monetary assets as maintained for tax books in INR is Rs.3,150 and as maintained with USD as functional currency stood at $77.73.

The transactions under both sets of books were accounted at respective historical exchange rates and thus the INR numbers of tax books when divided by USD numbers of financial books, will give historical transaction rates, thus different from the closing rate.

(3)    The original and subsequent cost under tax base for the assets are the same as that in financials books, with the exception to the difference that originates due to application of para 41 of Ind AS 12.

(4)    Example considers only non-monetary assets assuming monetary assets are valued at closing rate and thus would not lead to any difference while comparing the tax base using translation rate.

(5)    The exchange rate at March 31 is 1 USD = Rs. 50 and tax rate is 33.99%

Closing deferred tax status of deferred tax liability as on March 31, XXXX of Entity A is as shown in Table 1:


Deferred tax under Ind AS will be calculated as follows:

Under Ind AS, the deferred taxes are measured in the functional currency

As can be seen from the above calculation, the translation of tax base using closing rate has led to a difference of $14.73. It is pertinent to note that this difference is only for deferred tax computation and not for accounting in the financial books.

The notional comparison has reduced the tax base in USD by 14.73 and this leads to creation of a deferred tax liability with a corresponding deferred tax expense in the income statement. The impact of $ 5.01 over net assets of $ 63 will be a material impact on the profits of the company. It will vary depending upon the value of non monetary assets as on the reporting date and movement of exchange rates during the period.

There would not have been any temporary difference in the above example if the functional currency was INR, since tax base and book base would have been the same.

Impact of accounting of deferred tax such functional currency difference

(1)    The accounting for deferred tax on account of such notional differences creates high volatility in the income statement.

(2)    The gain/loss on account of such treatment has no corresponding charge/income in the income statement. It is accounted based on pure out of books comparison of exchange rates on non-monetary items. ($14.05 is notional only for comparison but tax of $ 5.01 is real for accounting.)

(3)    This item has no bearing to operations or profit; instead it pulls down/up financial results from operations due to tax provision and thus calls for suitable disclosures in financial statements to explain the earnings per share to investors, analysts, etc.


It is pertinent to note that i.e. US GAAP, Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 109 prohibits recognition of a deferred tax liability or asset for differences related to assets and liabilities that, under FASB Statement No. 52, Foreign Currency Translation, are re-measured from the local currency into the functional currency using historical exchange rates and that result from (a) changes in exchange rates or (b) indexing for tax purposes.

On the one hand Ind AS 21 aims to reduce the volatility in results on account of currency exposure and on the other hand Ind AS 12 brings in volatility in income taxes on account of notional difference created on account of comparing the balance sheet value and tax base in functional currency at the closing date.

Thus, choice of functional currency other than that used for tax reporting will lead to such temporary differences and will continue to exist until book currency and tax currency are aligned.

Change in functional currency
“When there is a change in an entity’s functional currency, the entity shall apply the translation procedures applicable to the new functional currency prospectively from the date of the change.”

The entity will have to assess the criteria for deciding the functional currency year and apply the accounting impacts for change prospectively. Here the country’s policies also would influence the decision such as restrictions on holding foreign currency and INR being the only legal tender in India.

The entity will also have to explain in notes to financial statement as to why it considers such change in its functional currency.

Presentation currency
Ind AS 21 allows the entity to present its financial statements in any currency and does not restrict any one currency. However, considering the Indian requirements for ROC filing, tax submission, stock exchange filings, etc. the presentation currency will be preferred to be INR.

INR as the presentation currency in Indian market will also be preferred currency for reporting to facilitate easy comparability with its peer group. This can be achieved by either following the rules of translation (using average rate for income statement and closing rate of balance sheet) which will give rise to translation reserve or convenient translation using a single rate for all the items in the balance sheet and income statement.

International precedence
In order to relate to the new concept, financial statements of some international companies who have gone through the change in functional currency may be referred. Following relevant excerpts are for reference:

“StatoilHydro (OSE:STL; NYSE:STO) changed the company structure as per 1st January 2009. The parent company, StatoilHydro ASA, and two subsidiaries, consequently changed their functional currencies to USD from the same date.

The accounts for these companies are therefore now recorded in USD, while the presentation currency for the Group remains NOK. The changes in functional currencies have no cash impact.

The companies changing functional currency will no longer have currency exchange effects, deriving from USD denominated monetary assets and liabilities, related to the ‘Net financial items’. Conversely, monetary assets and liabilities, denominated in other currencies than USD, may now generate such currency effects.”

Radiance Electronics Limited, Singapore

“Certain subsidiaries of the Group have changed their functional currency from SGD and RMB to USD in FY2008A. Revenue for these subsidiaries is mainly denominated in USD while purchases are mostly made in USD. Administrative expenses are denominated based on their country of domicile and are mainly in SGD and RMB.

While the factors used to determine its functional currencies are mixed, the Company is of the opinion that USD best reflects the economic substance of the underlying transactions and circumstances relevant to the foregoing subsidiaries. Accordingly, the subsidiaries adopt USD as its functional currency with effect from the current financial year ended 31st December 2008. This change shall be applied retrospectively to the prior years.

The Company and the Group continues to present its financial statements in SGD consistent with prior years.”

For deferred tax implications under IFRS Tenaris S.A.’s annual financial statements may be referred. It carries a note in its financial statements under ‘Tax reconciliation note’ to explain the investors and readers on the volatility caused due to tax accounting.

Tax note from Tenaris S.A. 2008 financial statements

“Tenaris applies the liability method to recognise deferred income tax expense on temporary differences between the tax bases of assets and their carrying amounts in the financial statements. By application of this method, Tenaris recognises gains and losses on deferred income tax due to the effect of the change in the value of the Argentine Peso on the tax bases of the fixed assets of its Argentine subsidiaries, which have the U.S. Dollar as their functional currency. These gains and losses are required by IFRS even though the devalued tax basis of the relevant assets will result in a reduced Dollar value of amortisation deductions for tax purposes in future periods throughout the useful life of those assets. As a result, the resulting deferred income tax charge does not represent a separate obligation of Tenaris that is due and payable in any of the relevant periods.”

Internationally it was easier for companies to adopt a change in currency of accounting since these are fully convertible economies i.e., they can operate bank accounts in foreign currency. Thus the change in mindset was comparatively easier, however the common challenge was again ERP which had to be equipped with dual currency reporting for tax purposes.

With respect to deferred taxes, we can see that note in financial statements was given to explain notional volatility to guide the analysts and readers of financial statements.

Forward path
It will be a challenging journey for Indian corporates who will adopt Converged IFRS i.e., ‘Ind AS’ and will have to consider the implications of these standards on its accounting and reporting requirements.

From stability of profitability and ultimately EPS perspective, the companies may avoid the volatility of currency exposure, but may not escape the volatility created by foreign exchange rates in computing deferred taxes. In order to explain the volatility on deferred tax front, companies may prefer to give note disclosures as given by international peers.

Alternative approach: Ind AS 12 ‘Income Taxes’
Considering the amount of volatility of foreign exchange rates with INR and its notional impact on financial statements, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India can consider a ‘Carve-out’ while converging to IAS 12 or represent to International Accounting Standards Board for granting an exemption under IAS 12 which will flow in Ind AS 12. This is keeping in mind the deferment of Ind AS implementation in India and practical hardships that will be faced by Indian multinational congloromates.

Comprehensive Commentaries on FCRA 2010

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Title : Comprehensive Commentaries on FCRA 2010

Author : Manoj Fogla

Pages : 444

Price : Rs.895

Foreign Contribution Regulation Act is a complex piece of legislation, often not fully understood by trustees as well as practising Chartered Accountants. There is very little literature available on this subject and there is hardly any book that deals with the subject in depth. Therefore, this book fills a void and is a welcome attempt to provide information and interpretation on FCRA for the benefit of all persons affected by this Act and in particular, voluntary organisations receiving foreign funding and contribution.

The book seeks to address the need, particularly of grassroot level organisations, which are doing yeoman work but struggle to understand the nuances of this legislation where the consequences of non-compliance can be severe. The book also discusses applicability of FCRA to unregistered ‘Self-help Groups’ and ‘Communitybased Organisations’.
The first chapter of the book is appropriately ‘Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) on FCRA’. The book is comprehensive in its coverage and is divided into 46 chapters. Though the book does not have an index it has detailed contents, facilitating the search for the relevant information.
The book covers all the controversies under FCRA ranging from opening of multiple bank accounts, deposits from commercial transactions, applicability of the law to liaison offices, operation of revolving funds, anonymous donations, admission of foreigners on the Governing Board, etc. It also covers various procedural aspects, including procedure for obtaining and renewal of registration, prior permission for accepting foreign contribution, change in bank account, etc. It also has a chapter on online filing of application for registration giving a step-by-step process to be followed along with the screen shots at every stage.
It has 30 Annexures, including a useful Annexure tabulating the relevant provisions under the old FCRA, 1976 and under the current FCRA, 2010. An interesting Annexure reproduces the Charter issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs providing guidelines for Chartered Accountants auditing organisations covered by FCRA.
Though, the book is comprehensive in its coverage, the analysis and commentary is very often of a basic skeleton nature. One would have hoped for a more indepth analysis and discussion on topics, (and there are several of those in FCRA) where there could be more than one interpretation.
Perhaps that is done intentionally in favour of simplicity and to provide in an easy-to-read language all relevant information to persons covered by this enactment.
The book is published jointly by Financial Management Service Foundation (fmsf) and Voluntary Action Network India (VANI). The author and the publishers need to be complimented for spreading awareness on this opaque subject and fulfilling a crying need.
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Recent Controversies in Cross Border Taxation

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Subject : Recent Controversies in Cross Border Taxation

Speaker : Pinakin Desai, Chartered Accountant

Date : 11-7-2012

Venue : Indian Merchant Chambers, Mumbai

 The first Lecture Meeting of BCAS for the year 2012- 13 was addressed by Pinakin Desai on the topic ‘Issues in Cross-Border Taxation’ on 11th July 2012. Deepak Shah, Society’s newly elected President, welcomed everyone on behalf of BCAS. He shared with the august gathering the focus areas of BCAS for the upcoming year — to expand and enrich membership experience, to enhance and strengthen relationships and to provide mentorship — and invited whole-hearted involvement and participation of all BCAS members.

After an overwhelming introduction by the President, Mr. Desai took the stage to do full justice to it. Given the recent upheaval in the tax world, many new controversies have added themselves to an already long list. Mr. Desai, in his talk, discussed some of the most controversial ones. These are briefly discussed below:

1. Overview of General Anti-Avoidance Rules (‘GAAR’)

As per the current GAAR provisions, an arrangement would be termed as ‘impermissible avoidance agreement’ if its main purpose is obtaining tax benefit and it satisfies any of the four conditions specified in section 96(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘Act’). The speaker opined that the condition that the main purpose be obtaining tax benefit was necessary to be provided and is provided by most countries globally. However, presently, the term tax benefit is very loosely worded and could lead to unreasonable conclusions.

Section 96(2) provides that while the objective of an arrangement as a whole may not be to obtain tax benefit, if a step in or a part of the arrangement has been inserted only to obtain tax benefit, the entire arrangement shall be presumed to obtain tax benefit.

GAAR can be used in addition to or in conjunction with other specified anti-avoidance rules already forming part of the Act. Benefit of the tax treaties would be subject to GAAR applicability.

2. Consequences of GAAR

Consequences of invoking GAAR have been laid down in section 98. Draft guidelines on GAAR have been released on 28th June 2012 giving examples of cases where GAAR is invoked. The speaker opined that there appeared to be no co-relation between the transactions and the consequences that followed. There were no principles laid down in the draft guidelines for reading the transactions and applying the appropriate consequence to it.

Further, the consequences per section 98 are not exhaustive; the Assessing Officers have been given wide powers to take appropriate actions where GAAR gets invoked. This is a dangerous tool in the hands of the officers as there is no saying as to how it will be used.
Lastly, it is not clear as to who will GAAR apply to — would it be limited to the parties carrying out the impermissible arrangement or could it be extended to a person who may be only liable to deduct tax at source?

3. Draft GAAR Guidelines:

 Examples The draft guidelines on GAAR have been released for public consultation. The speaker urged all present to actively contribute to the same.

The guidelines would have the same force as the statute to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the statute. The guidelines lay down monetary thresholds for invoking GAAR. GAAR is made effective to income accruing or arising on or after 1st April 2013, which is in sync with international practices. However, there are no grandfathering provisions for existing structures/transactions which may result in income accruing or arising post GAAR becoming applicable.
Key take-away of guidelines:
  •  GAAR provisions codify substance over form doctrine.
  •  Onus of proof is on tax authority.
  •  Special Anti-Avoidance Rules (‘SAAR’) usually override GAAR; exception being abusive behaviour that defeats a SAAR.
  •  If arrangement is only partly impermissible, GAAR is applicable to the part, not the whole.
The speaker, thereafter, briefly dealt with examples in the guidelines which seek to clarify the applicability of GAAR.
He observed that while the guidelines explained tax evasion and tax planning, they failed to bring out the distinction between tax evasion and tax mitigation, thereby leaving ambiguity for borderline cases. Thus, the guidelines still leave ambiguity on what qualifies as tax avoidance. Further, the examples are not exhaustive in any case and do not address the various peculiar transactions.
With respect to FIIs, the guidelines clarify that GAAR will not be applicable to FIIs if the FII opts not to claim treaty benefits. GAAR would also not extend to non-resident investors in FIIs. However, presently, there is no legal provision for this, but only the guidelines.
While SAAR overrides GAAR, one of the questions left open by the guidelines was whether the limitation of benefit clause in a double tax avoidance treaty would qualify as SAAR? Likewise, while guidelines gave examples demonstrating that treaty shopping is impermissible if without commercial substance, they also opened a Pandora’s Box of unaddressed challenges. Some of these issues were discussed by the learned speaker.
The guidelines have recognised the ‘choice principle’ in some examples, i.e., if a person undertakes a transaction purely as a matter of commercial choice, without the motive of tax evasion, GAAR would not apply. However, the speaker opined, that a number of other examples in the guidelines are inconsistent with this principle.
The guidelines should further clarify the following:
  •  GAAR is not a revenue earning measure; GAAR deals with abuse. l Respect business decisions and choice principle.
  •  Notional taxation is not permitted. l Claim of expenses to be evaluated on tax provisions. GAAR covers only artificial claims; not real expenditure.
  •  Co-relative adjustment: a natural hedge to protect reasonable business choice?
  •  Citing of a counterfactual (alternative/nonabusive) arrangement by the tax officer should be required.


4. Indirect transfer of assets in India — Section 9

Transfer outside India of shares of a company set up outside India by a non-resident of India to another non-resident have been made taxable in India of the company whose shares are being transferred derives its value substantially from Indian assets.

Meaning of the term ‘deriving value substantially’ used in the statute is not clear. This has thrown up a variety of issues. For example, say, A holds shares of Company X listed on the New York Stock Exchange (‘NYSE’). Company X holds Company Y which is located outside India and has operations in India and China. In this case, would sale of shares of Company X by A on the NYSE attract capital gains tax in India?
Some of the effects, perhaps intended, of these provisions are:
  • Merger of a foreign company having operations in India with its sister concern located outside India could now lead to capital gains tax in India for the holding company of the merging entities. Such transactions were till date outside the scope of Indian tax laws.
  •  Issues with respect to what would be the cost of acquisition and what would be the period of holding of the ‘deemed Indian assets’ in some situations are as yet unanswered.
  •  Indirect transfers may get treaty protection if the actual asset being transferred is located in a beneficial treaty country.
Reassessment of income for foreign assets
Whether the extended time limit of 16 years for assessees having undisclosed foreign assets would apply to cases of indirect transfer of Indian assets? Likewise, the time limit for reassessment of representative assessees has been extended to 6 years. While ideally, these limits should not apply to indirect transfers; it is difficult to be confident of this under the reigns of the Indian Tax Department.

5.    Other provisions

(i)    Software payments: The purpose of amendment to section 9(1)(vi) appears to bring into tax net ‘shrinkwrapped software’. However, there is no change in treaty position and hence, if treaty provisions made a transaction non-taxable, it will continue to be not taxable. The amendment will, however, apply to non-treaty and domestic transactions.

(ii)    Domestic transfer pricing: While international transfer pricing applies to foreign company holding more than 26% shares of Indian company, domestic transfer pricing may apply to foreign company holding more than 20% shares of Indian company. Disconnect in domestic transfer pricing provision could capture director’s fees, managerial remuneration allocated to Indian PE of a foreign company and paid by the foreign company.

(iii)    Taxation of foreign dividends at concessional rate (section 115BBD): This section does not cover deemed dividend u/s.2(22)(e). Further, section 115BBD does not allow deduction of expenses incurred. In many cases, the expenditure incurred, which is disallowed by section 115BBD, may be higher than the benefit offered by the concessional tax rate of section 115BBD. Further, MAT provisions still apply to this income.

(iv)    Foreign currency borrowings (section 115A r.w.s. 194LC): If loan agreement is executed prior to 1st July 2012 but monies are actually borrowed after that date, section 115A benefits would apply. While section 115A requires approval of Central Government, External Commercial Borrowing (‘ECB’) is permitted under general FEMA approval and does not require a specific Central Government approval. Clarifications/instructions clarifying this issue may be expected.

(v)    Issues arising out of amendments to section 195(7), concessional tax rate on LTCG from sale of unlisted securities by non-residents, requirement of tax residency certificate, section 90(3), annual statement requirement in respect of Liaison Offices were also lightly touched upon.

London risks losing its status as world’s top financial centre.

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London risks losing its status as the world’s top financial centre as the INRNaN-trillion interest-rate fixing probe follows a series of market abuses by banks that eroded trust in a city already shrinking faster than rivals. JPMorgan Chase & Co’s trading loss of at least INRNaN billion, the alleged INRNaN billion fraud at UBS and the investigation of at least a dozen banks including Barclays for rigging global interest rates all happened in London in the last year. The effect is taking a toll on the capital of a country enduring its first double-dip recession since the 1970s, which fired more financial-services workers than any other country in 2011 and again this year.

“My heart sinks every time there is a scandal and the perpetrators are in London, even if it is not always the UK’s responsibility, it is under our noses,”

Sharon Bowles, chairwoman of the European Parliament’s economic and monetary affairs committee, said in an interview.

“There is an effect on the UK’s reputation, and it reinforces the view that even after all the apologies there is much to do.”

London, ranked as the world’s number one financial centre by research firm Z/Yen Group, was where American International Group and Lehman Brothers Holdings booked transactions that helped lead to their downfall. This week saw Bank of England and UK government officials tied to the interest-rate fixing scandal that cost Robert Diamond, London’s best-known banker, his job at Barclays. With the European debt crisis on its doorstep, London now faces calls to cull its bonus culture, rein in risk-taking and beef up a light-touch regulatory system that fuelled a decade long boom.

The danger for London is that Europe is preparing to set up its own regulator for banks, which may exclude the UK or disadvantage firms based in the city. Domestically, the industry is losing longstanding political support from both Conservative and Labour parties — as well as the public. Home to about 250 foreign banks, London is the world’s biggest centre for foreign-exchange trading and cross-border bank lending and trades INRNaN trillion of interest derivatives daily, according to the Bank for International Settlements.

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Liebor? — Determination of the LIBOR must be above suspicion.

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The scandal involving the London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor) — which serves as a benchmark for determining the rate of interest on a great many financial transactions — has already cost Barclays, the UK’s third-biggest bank, dear. It has been fined nearly half-a-billion dollars and lost three powerful men at the top, including CEO Bob Diamond. But the damage to date may be only the tip of the iceberg. If a 2008 internal memo published by Barclays is to be believed, manipulation and subterfuge are not the exclusive preserve of banks. The rot goes much deeper. Barclays, so it would seem, was only taking its cue from the Bank of England and the government. Both wanted to keep interest rates low to stimulate economic activity in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis.

What better way to do that than have friendly banks deliberately under-report the actual rate of interest in order to depress Libor, the market benchmark used to price financial contracts, globally? If true, the implications are much more serious and go well beyond the UK. Allegations of Libor rigging are not new.

For now, Barclays’ claim that it had official sanction to manipulate the rate and report it lower during the crisis has not found many takers. But there is no denying that after the collapse of Lehman Brothers when banks’ borrowing costs increased dramatically, managers and governments were keen to shore up confidence, tempting banks to present a rosier-than-actual picture by reporting lower-than-actual interest rates. There is also no denying the nexus between Western governments and banks.

Most US Treasury Secretaries have cut their teeth on Wall Street. But the Barclays scandal shows the nexus could potentially be wider and far more damaging than suspected so far. Libor determines the interest rate on transactions to the tune of close to INRNaN trillion globally. Like Caesar’s wife, it must be above suspicion.

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Exemption of Services provided by TBI/ STEP — Notification No. 32/2012-ST, dated 20-6-2012.

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Services provided by Technology Business Incubator (TBI) or Science and Technology Entrepreneurship Park (STEP) recognised by the National Science and Technology Entrepreneurship Development Board (NSTEDB) of the Department of Science and Technology, were exempted from whole of service tax vide Notification No. 9/2007-ST w.e.f. 1-4-2007.

Further the services provided by an entrepreneur located within the premises of so recognised TBI/ STEP were also exempted vide Notification No. 10/2007-ST. In the new service tax regime, the benefits of exemption given to entrepreneurs under Notification No. 10/2007-ST is totally rescinded but TBI/STEP are provided with similar benefits as they were enjoying before, vide this Notification No. 32/2012-ST. The new Notification also contains revised formats for information to be furnished in this regard.

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Exemption to specified services received by exporter of goods — Notification No. 31/2012-ST, dated 20-6-2012.

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By this Notification, benefit for promotion of exports has been given which includes exemption of certain specified taxable services received by an exporter of goods and used for export of good, from the whole of service tax. As per the said notification, the exporter shall register himself u/s.69 of the Act, should be holding Import Export Code Number, should be registered with the export promotion council sponsored by the Ministry of Commerce or Ministry of Textile as the case may be and shall comply with procedural aspects specified in this Notification.

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Partial reverse charge mechanism — Notification No. 30/2012-ST, dated 20-6-2012.

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Notification No. 30/2012-ST, dated 20-6-2012 widens the coverage of situations wherein service tax is payable under reverse charge mechanism by including following additional services/situations:

In respect of services specified at Sl. No. 7, 8 & 9, this reverse charge mechanism shall be applicable only where service provider is a non-corporate entity and the service recipient is a corporate entity.

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Exemption on property tax paid on immovable property — Notification No. 29/2012-ST, dated 20-6-2012.

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This Notification exempts taxable service of renting of an immovable property, from so much of service tax leviable thereon, as is in excess of service tax calculated on a value which is equivalent to the gross amount charged for renting of such immovable property less taxes on such property, namely, property tax levied and collected by local bodies. It is further clarified that any amount of interest or penalty paid to the local authority on account of delayed payment of property tax shall not be treated as property tax for the purpose of deduction from the gross amount charged.

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Place of provision of Services Rules, 2012 — Notification No. 28/2012-ST, dated 20-6-2012.

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The Central Government has notified Place of Provision of Services Rules, 2012 which specifies the manner to determine the taxing jurisdiction for a service. Rules are provided in relation to:

(1) Place of provisions of services generally;

(2) Place of provision of performance based services;

(3) Place of provision of services relating to immovable property;

(4) Place of provisions of services relating to events;

(5) Place of provision of services provided at more than one location;

(6) Place of provision of services where provider and recipient are located in taxable territory;

(7) Place of provision of specific services;

(8) Place of provision of goods transportation services;

(9) Place of provision of passenger transportation services;

(10) Place of provision of services provided on board a conveyance.

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Notification No. 27/2012-ST, dated 20-6- 2012.

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Vide this Notification exemption from whole of service tax is granted for services rendered to Foreign Diplomatic Mission or Consular posted in India for official purpose or for the personal use or use of their family members subject to the conditions mentioned in the said notification.

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Abatement of Service tax — Notification No. 26/2012-ST, dated 20-6-2012.

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This Notification has been issued in supersession of Notification No. 13/2012-ST, dated 17-3-2012 which provides for abatement in Service Tax in respect of following specified services at the prescribed rates, subject to conditions enumerated against each service:

The Notification will be effective from 1st July, 2012.

The Notification will be effective from 1st July, 2012.

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Mega Exemption Notification — Notification No. 25/2012-ST, dated 20-6-2012.

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This single consolidated Mega Exemption Notification has been issued in super session of Notification No. 12/2012-ST, dated 17-3-2012 which lists out 39 services which will be exempted from whole of service tax under the new service tax regime. The Notification has also defined the terms used therein at various places for the purpose of smooth interpretation. The Notification will be effective from 1st July 2012.

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Central Sales Tax — Provision for first charge on properties of the dealer for payment of tax — Under local Sales Tax Act — Applicable to recovery of CST — Section 9(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 and section 50 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1994.

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The petitioner being a financial institution raised question of law by filing writ petition before the Delhi High Court arising out of order of DRAT holding that Rajasthan Sales Tax Department has priority on the properties of the dealer for recovery of payment of tax payable under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.

Held

U/s.50 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, the State is having first charge on properties of the dealer for recovery of dues under the Act. Section 9(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act provides for assessment, reassessment, collection and enforcement of payment of tax including interest or penalty payable under the CST Act to be as if a tax, interest or penalty is payable under the general sales tax law of the State. Thus, for all ends and purposes, the mode of mechanism provided under the State Sales Tax Act would equally apply to the central sales tax to be collected under the CST Act. Thus, priority given u/s.50 of the RST Act to the recovery of local sales tax will apply with equal force to the recovery of central sales tax. The High Court accordingly, dismissed writ petition filed by the financial institution.

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Revision — Jurisdiction — Assessment approved by Assistant Commissioner — Cannot be revised by another Assistant Commissioner — Section 67 of The Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969.

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Facts

The dealer applied for grant of permission to pay composition in lieu of sales tax and the assessment was completed by accepting composition on the basis of xerox copy of the application for composition as the original application for composition was not available with the Department. The sales tax officer, following policy of the Department, sought approval of the Assistant Commissioner to pass the order and thereafter passed the assessment order. The Assistant Commissioner issued notice for revision of assessment order passed by the sales tax officer to pay tax as per schedule rate as the dealer was not granted permission to pay composition as required under the Act. The dealer filed writ petition before the Gujarat High Court challenging impugned notice issued by the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax to revise the order of assessment passed by the sales tax officer with the approval of the Assistant Commissioner.

Held

The Assessing Officer based on composition order framed assessment order with the approval of the Assistant Commissioner. The learned Assistant Commissioner, while approving the impugned assessment order, did not raise any objection to passing of composition order. Thus it can be assumed that indirectly, he approved the composition order passed by the Assessing Officer. Once an order is passed with approval of the Assistant Commissioner, another Assistant Commissioner cannot sit in revision over such order. The High Court on merits further held that once the fact of filing of application is not challenged at the time of passing order of composition, subsequently the Department cannot seek to lay the fault at the door of dealer and state that as the application was not found on the record, the composition order could not have been passed. The Department is estopped from contending so. The High Court accordingly, allowed writ petition filed by the dealer and quashed the notice issued by the Department to revise the order. 12

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Third industrial revolution calls for radical changes in our thought and action.

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There is a paradigm shift underway in manufacturing, points out The Economist. New technologies in computing, materials and processes such as three-dimensional printing are making fundamental changes in the way things are made, where 651 (2012) 44-A BCAJ they are made and by whom, whether workers or smart robots.

Three dimensional printing, in which a computeraided printing machine deposits successive layers of different materials to produce solid designs and objects, is a key exemplar of this third industrial revolution. The knowledge and service content of the final value of a manufactured product would go up, and the labour cost would go down. Mass customisation would be in and locating manufacture to low-wage countries would be out. Boston Consulting Group foresees a resurgence of manufacture in a country like the US at the expense of a China, or an India. Several policy ramifications follow.

One, India will find it well-nigh impossible to take the route to prosperity that Asia’s miracle economies, including South Korea and China, followed, of outsourced manufacture to feed demand in developed economies.

Ten years from now, much of the manufacture to meet demand in the US and Germany could well take place in those countries themselves. Two, low wages would only be a drag for attracting investments, whereas smart labour and a huge home market would be a big draw. Three, knowledge would drive the entire economy: not the rote-driven mastery of yesterday’s verities but a ceaseless quest to challenge established wisdom and produce new knowledge. Universities have to not just train manpower but create new knowledge, serving as hubs of new production ideas. Our school and education systems would have to undergo a fundamental change in terms of organisational structure and culture. The way ahead is to universalise not just secondary education but also tertiary education, with extensive modular course offerings.

Four, the financial ecosystem must evolve to mediate funds towards knowledge acquisition, knowledge creation and conversion of knowledge into production. Finally, high-speed broadband must become ubiquitous and cheap, to enable all this.

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Business Expenditure – Disallowance u/s. 40A(3) of payments in cash in excess of specified limit in an assessment made for a block period – Provisions to be applied as applicable for the assessment years in question

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M. G. Pictures (Madras) Ltd. vs. ACIT (2015) 373 ITR 39 (SC)

The appellant/assessee was engaged in production and distribution of motion pictures mainly in Tamil language. There was a search u/s. 132 of the Income-tax Act, at the business premises of the assessee during which certain book of accounts were seized. Consequent to the search, proposal was made for assessment for the block period of ten years 1.4.1986 to 31.3.1996 and thereafter, up to 13.9.1996.

The Assessing Officer disallowed the expenditure where the payments were made in cash in excess of Rs.10,000/- relying on section 40A(3) of the Act as it stood prior to 1.4.1996.The appellant filed appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Madras Bench (‘the Tribunal’). The Tribunal vide order dated 28.6.2000 partly allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to the Assessing Officer for considering the claim whether the income/loss from the film Thirumurthy was to be computed for the assessment year 1996-97 in accordance with Rule 9A of the Income Tax Rules. It was also directed that in making the computation, the Assessing Officer will consider the expenditure and make the disallowance under the provisions of section 40A(3) of the Act, as was applicable for the assessment year in question.

Feeling aggrieved by the order of the Appellate Tribunal, the appellant filed appeal before the High Court. The High Court did not accept the contentions of the appellant which were based on the amended section 158B(b) in Chapter XIVB of Finance Act, 2002 and dismissed the appeal.
Questioning the validity of the aforesaid judgment of the High Court, the appellant preferred an appeal with the leave of the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court noted that in the year 1996, the provisions of section 40A(3) of the Act did not allow any expenditure if it was more than Rs.20,000/- and paid in cash. The only exception that was carved out in such cases was where the assessee could satisfactorily demonstrate to the Assessing Officer that it was not possible to make payment in cheque. Even in those cases, the expenditure was allowable up to Rs.10,000/- and all cash payments made in excess of Rs.10,000/- were to be disallowed as the expenditure. Provisions of section 40A(3) were amended with effect from 1.4.1996. With this amendment, in cases where the cash payment is made in excess of Rs.20,000/-, disallowance was limited to 20% of the expenditure.

The Supreme Court observed that since the date of the amendment fell within the aforesaid block period, the assessee wanted the benefit of this amendment for the entire block period of ten years, i.e., 1.4.1986 to 31.3.1996. According to the Supreme Court, such a plea was unacceptable on the face of it inasmuch as the amendment was substantive in nature, which was made clear in the explanatory notes of amendments as well.

The Supreme Court held that once the amendment was held to be substantive in nature, it could not be applied retrospectively. The only ground on which the assessee wanted benefit of this amendment from 1.4.1986 was that the assessment was of the block period of ten years. The Supreme Court noted that, however, on its pertinent query, learned counsel for the appellant was fair in conceding that there was no judgment or any principle which would help the appellant in supporting the aforesaid contention. According to the Supreme Court, the order of the High Court was perfectly justified.

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“Fraud” Implications under Companies Act 2013

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Introduction
Deceiving any person by fraudulent or dishonest inducement to deliver any property amounts to offence of cheating punishable u/s. 415 to 424 of the Indian Penal Code. Apart from the IPC other laws dealing with taxation and commercial activities also deal with fraudulent acts and their consequences.

Section 447 of the Companies Act, 2013 prescribes a separate punishment for fraud, in relation to affairs of any company which is, imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to 10 years and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be less than the amount involved in the fraud but which may extend to three times the amount involved in fraud. The explanation to section 447 defines ‘fraud’ as under:

“Explanation.- For the purposes of this section-

(i) “fraud” in relation to affairs of a company or any body corporate, includes any act, omission, concealment of any fact or abuse of position committed by any person or any other person with the connivance in any manner, with intent to deceive, to gain undue advantage from, or to injure the interests of, the company or its shareholders or its creditors or any other person, whether or not there is any wrongful gain or wrongful loss;

(ii) “wrongful gain” means the gain by unlawful means of property to which the person gaining is not legally entitled.

(iii) “wrongful loss” means the loss by unlawful means of property to which the person losing is legally entitled.”

It is clear from the above provisions that any act or omission, concealment of any fact or abuse of position committed by any person with intent to deceive, to gain undue advantage from or injure the interest of any company or its shareholders or its creditors or any other person, is guilty of fraud. Various provisions of the Companies Act, 2013, list out different acts, omissions or other conduct which shall amount to fraud punishable u/s. 447 of the Act and the same are as under:

U/s. 212(6) all the above offences are cognisable offences and no person accused of any offence under above sections can be released on bail without giving opportunity to be heard to the Public Prosecutor.

The Companies Act 2013, provides for establishment of Special Courts to try the offences under the Act and pending such establishment the offences are to be tried by a Court of Session exercising jurisdiction over the area (section 440 of the Companies Act, 2013).

Serious Fraud Investigation Office
The Act also provides for establishment of Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO) and till it is established u/s. 211(1), the present SFIO established under administrative orders, referred to in the Proviso to section 211(1) shall be deemed to be SFIO for the purpose of section 211. The Central Government can assign investigation into affairs of any company to SFIO and if there is any offence under investigation by SFIO no other investigation authority including the State Police, can continue or commence investigation under the Companies Act, 2013. Under the provision of the new law the SFIO has been given a statutory status and powers of investigation under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 have been vested in SFIO. S/s. (17) of section 212 makes a specific provision for sharing of any information or documents available with any other investigating authority or income-tax authorities with SFIO and likewise SFIO can share information or documents available with it with any other investigating authority or income-tax authorities.

It is seen from the definition of fraud contained in the explanation to section 447 that a person will be guilty of offence of fraud under the Act if committed with intent to deceive or gain undue advantage from or injure the interests of –

• the company;
• its shareholders;
• its creditors; or
• any other person

Since offence of fraud under the Companies Act, 2013 is in relation to affairs of a company, fraudulent acts committed by “any other person” amount to fraud under the Act if such acts are in relation to the affairs of the company.

Fraud as a civil wrong
Fraud is defined in the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Section 14 of the Contract Act defines free consent inter alia as consent not caused by fraud as defined in section 17 of the Contract Act. Section 17 provides that:

“17. “Fraud” means and includes any of the following acts committed by a party to a contract, or with his connivance, or by his agent, with intent to deceive another party thereto or his agent, or to induce him to enter into the contract:-

(1) the suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who does not believe it to be true;
(2) the concealment of a fact by one having knowledge or belief of the fact;
(3) a promise made without any intention of performing it;
(4) any other fact fitted to deceive;
(5) any such actor omission as the law specially declares to be fraudulent.

Explanation.- Mere silence as to facts likely to affect the willingness of a person to enter into a contract is not fraud, unless the circumstances of the case are such that, regard being had to them, it is the duty of the person keeping silence to speak, or unless his silence is, in itself, equivalent to speech.”

Section 19 further provides that when consent to an agreement is caused by coercion, fraud or misrepresentation, the agreement is avoidable at the option of the party whose consent was so caused. The Indian Contract Act therefore provides that a victim of fraud can avoid the agreement entered into acting on fraudulent acts but there are no provisions making fraud an offence punishable with imprisonment or fine.

CHEATING IS CRIME UDNER IPC:
The Indian Penal Code, 1860 is the law of crimes applicable in India and section 415 of the said Code defines the offence of cheating, as under:

“415. Cheating.- Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to “cheat”.

Explanation.- A dishonest concealment of facts is a deception within the meaning of this section.”

Fraud is not an offence under the law of crimes.

Offence of cheating under the IPC requires:
“(1) deception of any person; (2)(a) fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that person; (i) to deliver any property to any person; or (ii) to consent that any person shall retain any property; or (b) intentionally inducing that person to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property (Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma vs. State of Bihar AIR 2000 SC 2341: (2000) 4 SCC 168: 2000 SCC (Cri) 786: 2000 Cr LJ 298).”

Fraud is a deception deliberately practiced in order to secure unfair or unlawful gain and is a civil wrong. fraud in criminal form is cheating or theft by false pretence, intentional deception of victim by  false  representation or pretense. it needs to be noted that abuse of position with intent to deceive or gain undue advantage does not amount to cheating u/s. 415 iPC. if one compares the words of section 447 of the Companies act, 2013 with the provisions in section 17 of the Contract act and section 415 of iPC, it is clear that offence of fraud under   the Companies act is based on the Contract act, which treats fraud as a civil wrong. it is therefore possible that a person guilty of fraud under the Company Law may not necessarily be guilty of cheating under the indian Penal Code. new provisions contained the Companies act, 2013 defining fraud and establishing the Serious Fraud Investigation Office conferring powers of investigation under the Code of Criminal Procedure are intended to ensure that the directors and other persons managing the affairs of a Company act honestly and diligently to protect the interest of the company they represent and the interests of shareholders and creditors of the Company. any act or omission or concealment or abuse of position to gain advantage for themselves or other persons, on the part of persons managing the company will amount to a fraud punishable u/s. 447. it is an accepted fact that there are successful businessmen in the corporate world who possess positive qualities and survive and prosper by doing business honestly in accordance with the rules and regulations and do not derive any benefits for themselves or others except those which are legitimately due to them. But there are many who achieve success and appear to be playing according to rules but are experts in adopting various tactics to deceive and gain undue advantage for themselves and others. it is for dealing with such unscrupulous persons that the law has been amended and the new provisions are intended to ensure compliance and observance of principles of corporate governance by all companies.

Fraud Under The Companies act, 2013 and English law
new provisions in the Companies act, 2013, are comparable to the definition of fraud under English law. In Eng- land, the provisions contained in the theft act, 1968 were replaced by the fraud act, 2006 which provides that any person by making a false representation or failing to disclose information or by abuse of his position makes any gain for himself or anyone else or inflicting a loss on another shall be guilty of fraud. Provisions in english law are more comprehensive defining false representations, concealment or non-disclosure of information and abuse of position. the other major difference between section 447  of the Companies act 2013 and the fraud act, 2006 in england is that the english law is criminal law applicable to any victim of fraud unlike indian law which restrict the law to the victims who are companies or their shareholders or creditors or other persons like investors who are victims of fraudulent acts. Considering the wide ramifications of frauds in the capital market, insurance & banking sector, non-banking entities like chit funds, ponzi schemes for marketing goods and other money circulation schemes, there is a need to amend our criminal law on the lines of the fraud act, 2006 enacted in england. in other words the provisions relating to fraud in the Com- panies act, 2013 need to be converted into general law having universal application like the indian Penal Code.

Widening The Ambit of Fraud
One other significant provision in the definition of fraud is treatment of abuse of position with intent to gain undue advantage from any person as fraud. such a provision in effect amounts to providing punishment for bribery and corruption in the private sector. to illustrate, if a Purchase Officer of a company takes a kickback from a supplier of raw-material to the company, or a director sells his personal property to the Company at inflated price, such persons will be guilty of abusing their position as Purchase Officer or Director for undue advantage for themselves. The general law of Prevention of Corruption act, 1988, is applicable to Public Servants as defined in the said Act which is not applicable to Directors and Officers of Companies in the private sector because they are not public servants. now with enactment of section 447 in the Companies Act, 2013, Directors and Officers of private sector companies abusing their position for personal gain or to give advantage to any other person can be prosecuted and punished for fraud.

The efficacy of the new provisions creating offence of fraud  ultimately  depends  on  establishment  of  special Courts as contemplated under chapter XXViii of the new act for the purpose of trial of offence under the Companies act, 2013, and expeditious trial and punishment of persons guilty of fraud. speedy trial of fraudsters is the key for improved levels of protection of interests of investors and other stakeholders of corporates, as well as observance of principles of corporate governance by the corporates.

Considering the wide spread incidence of frauds in all sectors of the economy there is a need to examine whether indian Penal Code needs to be amended on the lines of the fraud act, 2006 enacted in england.

Fraud and the Auditor
In terms of section 143(12), an obligation has been cast on the auditor of a company to report to the Central government of fraud which has been committed, or is being committed against the company by officers or employees of the company. the manner of reporting has been prescribed in the rule 13, of the Companies (audit and auditors ) rules 2014 .

The responsibility cast on the auditor, is onerous. To what extent auditors are able to discharge this onus remains to be seen.

Conclusion
the  enactment  of  section  447  in  the  Companies  act 2013, is an indicator of the thinking of the authorities. economic frauds have increased a great deal of the recent past. on account of a lacuna in the law and the lengthy legal process, persons committing such frauds have been able to avoid punishment. one hopes that the provisions in the Companies act 2013, will help to bring to book such fraudsters.

Can email addresses constitute an Intangible Asset?

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Synopsis
With the growth of E-commerce,
wherein Indian companies and start-ups have been investing heavily on
building their customer databases, the accounting treatment of
purchasing the said databases has gained importance with regards to
Indian GAAP. In this Article, the learned author has expressed and
justified the accounting treatment under different scenarios for
purchase of such database of E-mail ID’s based on facts of the cases put
forth in the following article, by referring to technical definitions
and relevant extracts of Accounting Standard-26 ‘Intangible Assets’.

BACKGROUND
Online
Limited (referred to as the company or Online) is specialised in the
online selling of a range of products. The company’s commercial strategy
relies on purchase of databases of email address containing lists of
people who may be interested in purchasing its products. The lists are
provided by the specialised vendors based on the specifications of
Online. These specifications include:
(i) M inimum amount of data, e.g., email address, first name and last name.
(ii)
Based on the potential to buy its products, Online has defined various
categories of data, e.g., income, employment, education, residential
location, past history, age, etc. The person should fall under one or
more of these prescribed categories.
(iii) D ata check against the
existing lists of Online – The purpose of this check is to avoid
duplication with existing email address lists.

The email addresses meeting these specifications are treated as valid email addresses.

Scenario 1
The
specialised vendors carry out search activities to identify valid email
addresses. The company makes payment to these vendors on cost plus
margin basis. Though the company will monitor the quality of work of the
vendor it would nonetheless have to make the payment, even if they have
not found any valid email address. Also, vendors do not guarantee any
exclusivity and they may provide the same email address lists to other
companies also.

Scenario 2
The specialised vendors
carry out search activities to identify valid email addresses. The
company makes payment to these vendors on performance basis. If vendors
do not provide any valid email address, they will not be entitled to any
payment from the company. Also, vendors need to guarantee exclusivity
and they cannot provide the same lists to the competitors of Online.

ISSUE
Can Online recognise the lists of email addresses as an intangible asset under AS 26 Intangible Assets?

TECHNICAL REFERENCES

1. AS 26 defines the terms intangible assets and assets as below:

“An
intangible asset is an identifiable non-monetary asset, without
physical substance, held for use in the production or supply of goods or
services, for rental to others, or for administrative purposes.

An asset is a resource:

(a) Controlled by an enterprise as a result of past events, and
(b) From which future economic benefits are expected to flow to the enterprise.”

2. A s per paragraph 20 of AS 26, an intangible asset should be recognised if, and only if:
(a) It is probable that the future economic benefits that are attributable to the asset will flow to the enterprise, and
(b) T he cost of the asset can be measured reliably.

3. Paragraphs 11 to 13 of AS 26 explain the requirement concerning “identifiability” as below:

“11.
The definition of an intangible asset requires that an intangible asset
be identifiable. To be identifiable, it is necessary that the
intangible asset is clearly distinguished from goodwill. …

12.
An intangible asset can be clearly distinguished from goodwill if the
asset is separable. An asset is separable if the enterprise could rent,
sell, exchange or distribute the specific future economic benefits
attributable to the asset without also disposing of future economic
benefits that flow from other assets used in the same revenue earning
activity.

13. Separability is not a necessary condition for
identifiability since an enterprise may be able to identify an asset in
some other way. For example, if an intangible asset is acquired with a
group of assets, the transaction may involve the transfer of legal
rights that enable an enterprise to identify the intangible asset. …”

4. Paragraphs 14 and 17 of AS 26 provide as under with regard to “control”:

“14.
A n enterprise controls an asset if the enterprise has the power to
obtain the future economic benefits flowing from the underlying resource
and also can restrict the access of others to those benefits. The
capacity of an enterprise to control the future economic benefits from
an intangible asset would normally stem from legal rights that are
enforceable in a court of law. In the absence of legal rights, it is
more difficult to demonstrate control. However, legal enforceability of a
right is not a necessary condition for control since an enterprise may
be able to control the future economic benefits in some other way.

17.
A n enterprise may have a portfolio of customers or a market share and
expect that, due to its efforts in building customer relationships and
loyalty, the customers will continue to trade with the enterprise.
However, in the absence of legal rights to protect, or other ways to
control, the relationships with customers or the loyalty of the
customers to the enterprise, the enterprise usually has insufficient
control over the economic benefits from customer relationships and
loyalty to consider that such items (portfolio of customers, market
shares, customer relationships, customer loyalty) meet the definition of
intangible assets.”

5. Paragraph 18 of AS 26 explains the requirement concerning “Future Economic Benefits”:

“18.
The future economic benefits flowing from an intangible asset may
include revenue from the sale of products or services, cost savings, or
other benefits resulting from the use of the asset by the enterprise.
For example, the use of intellectual property in a production process
may reduce future production costs rather than increase future
revenues.”

6. Paragraph 24 of AS 26 states that if an intangible
asset is acquired separately, the cost of the intangible asset can
usually be measured reliably.

7. Paragraphs 50 and 51 of AS 26 state as under:

“50.
I nternally generated brands, mastheads, publishing titles, customer
lists and items similar in substance should not be recognised as
intangible assets.

51. T his Standard takes the view that
expenditure on internally generated brands, mastheads, publishing
titles, customer lists and items similar in substance cannot be
distinguished from the cost of developing the business as a whole.
Therefore, such items are not recognised as intangible assets.”

DISCUSSION AND ALTERNA TIVE VIEWS
View 1 – The email address lists cannot be recognised as an intangible asset.

An item without physical substance should meet the following four criteria to be recognised as intangible asset under AS 26:
(a) Identifiability
(b) Future economic benefits
(c) Control
(d) R eliable measurement of cost

In
the present case, the email address lists are acquired separately and
the company has the ability to sell them to a third party. Thus, based
on guidance in paragraph 12 of AS 26, the lists satisfy identifiablity
criterion for recognition as intangible asset. Online will use the email
address lists to generate additional sales. Therefore, future economic
benefits are expected to derive from the use of these lists and the
second criterion is also met.

However, the third criterion, viz., control, for  recognition of intangible asset is not met. email addresses are public information and the company cannot effectively restrict their use by other companies. hence, in scenario 1, the control criterion for recognition of intangible asset is not met.

The following additional arguments can be made:

(a)    Purchase of email address lists can be analysed as  outsourcing.  these  lists  are  prepared  by  the suppliers based on the specifications of the com- pany, which is not different from the situation where the company would have built them in-house. hence, guidance in paragraph 50 and 51 of as 26 should apply which prohibit recognition of internally generated intangible assets of such nature.

(b)    These  lists  can  be  viewed  as  marketing  tool,  such as leaflets or catalogues; their purchase price being similar to a marketing expense. in accordance with paragraph 56(c) of as 26, expenditure on advertising and promotional activities cannot be recognised as an intangible asset.

View 2 – the email address lists can be recognised as an intangible asset.

Based on the analysis in view 1, the first two criteria for recognition of an intangible asset (identifiability and future economic benefits) are met.

Regarding the third criterion, viz., future economic benefits are controlled by the company; it may be argued that the company acquires the ownership of the email address lists prepared by the vendor as well as the exclusivity of their use. it is able to restrict the access of third parties to those benefits. Hence, in scenario 2, the third criterion is also met.

Online can reliably measure the cost of acquiring email address lists. indeed, in accordance with paragraph 24 of as 26, the cost of a separately acquired intangible item can usually be measured reliably, particularly when the consideration is in the form of cash.

The  author  believes  that  the  company,  which  sub-contracts the development of intangible assets to other parties (its vendors), must exercise judgment in determining whether it is acquiring an intangible asset or whether it is obtaining goods and services that are being used in the development of a customer relationship by the entity itself. in determining whether a vendor is providing services to develop an internally generated intangible asset, the terms of the supply agreement should be examined to see whether the supplier is bearing a significant proportion of the risks associated with a failure of the project. for example, if the supplier is always compensated irrespective of the project’s outcome, the company on whose behalf the development is undertaken should account for those activities as its own. however, if the vendor bears a significant proportion of the risks associated with a failure of the project, the company is acquiring developed intangible asset, and therefore the requirements relating to separate acquisition of intangible asset should apply.

Under this view, the company will amortise intangible asset over its estimated useful life. the author believes that due to the following key reasons, the asset may have relatively small useful life, say, not more than two years:

(a)    the  company  will  use  email  address  lists  to  generate future sales. once the conversion takes place,  the email address lists will lose their relevance for  the company and a new customer relationship asset comes into existence which is an internally generated asset.

(b)    for  email  addresses  which  do  not  convert  into  customers over the next 12 to 24 months, it may be reasonable to assume that they may not be interested in buying company products.

(c)    email addresses may be subject to frequent changes.

Concluding remarks
in scenario 1, the control criterion is not met. Besides the vendor is providing the company a service rather than selling an intangible asset. therefore the author believes that only view 1 should apply in scenario 1. in scenario 2, view 2 is justified. In scenario 2, the exclusivity criterion and consequently the control requirement is met. secondly, since the payment to the vendor is based on performance the company pays for an intangible asset, rather than for services. however, the amortisation period will generally be very short.

Income Computation & Disclosure Standards – Some Issues

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The 10 Income Computation and Disclosure Standards (ICDS) which have been notified on 31st March 2015 u/s. 145(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 have significant implications on the computation of income for assessment years beginning from assessment year 2016-17.

Under the notification, these standards come into force from 1st April 2016, i.e. assessment year 2016-17, apply to all assessees following mercantile system of accounting, and are to be followed for the purposes of computation of income chargeable to income tax under the head “Profits and gains of business or profession” or “Income from other sources”. The notification also supercedes notification dated 25th January 1996 [which notified 2 Accounting Standards u/s 145(2) – Disclosure of Accounting Policies, and Disclosure of Prior Period and Extraordinary Items and Changes in Accounting Policies], except as regards such things done or omitted to be done before such supersession.

Background
Section 145, which deals with method of accounting, was substituted by the Finance Act, 1995, with effect from assessment year 1997-98. Sub-section (2) to this section, after this amendment, provided that the Central Government may notify in the Official Gazette from time to time accounting standards (“AS”) to be followed by any class of assessees or in respect of any class of income.

The provisions of sub-section (1) were made subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), whereby the income chargeable under the head “Profits and gains of business or profession” or “Income from other sources” was to be computed in accordance with either cash or mercantile system of accounting regularly employed by the assessee, subject to the provisions of subsection (2).

Sub-section (3) provided that where the assessing officer was not satisfied about the correctness or completeness of the accounts of the assessee, or where the method of accounting provided in sub-section (1) or AS notified under sub-section (2) had not been regularly followed by the assessee, the assessing officer could make an assessment in the manner provided in section 144 (i.e. a best judgement assessment).

In 1996, AS notified by ICAI were not mandatory for companies, but were mandatory for auditors auditing general purpose financial statements. On 29th January 1996, two AS (“IT-AS”) were notified by the CBDT, Disclosure of Accounting Policies, and Disclosure of Prior Period and Extraordinary Items and Changes in Accounting Policies.

In July 2002, the Government constituted a Committee for formulation of AS for notification u/s 145(2). In November 2003, this Committee recommended the notification of the AS issued by ICAI without any modification, since it would be impractical for a taxpayer to maintain two sets of books of account. It also recommended appropriate legislative amendments to the Act for preventing any revenue leakage due to the AS being notified by ICAI. These recommendations were not implemented.

With the imminent introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in India in the form of Ind- AS, in December 2010, the Government constituted a Committee of Departmental Officers and professionals to suggest AS for notification u/s. 145(2). The terms of the Committee were as under:

i) to study the harmonisation of AS issued by the ICAI with the direct tax laws in India, and suggest AS which need to be adopted u/s. 145(2) of the Act along with the relevant modifications;

ii) to suggest method for determination of tax base (book profit) for the purpose of Minimum Alternate Tax (MAT) in case of companies migrating to IFRS (IND AS) in the initial year of adoption and thereafter; and

iii) to suggest appropriate amendments to the Act in view of transition to IFRS (IND AS) regime. This Committee submitted an interim report in August 2011. The recommendations of the Committee in such interim report were as under:

1. Separate AS should be notified u/s. 145(2), since the AS to be notified would have to be in harmony with the Act. The notified AS should provide specific rules, which would enable computation of income with certainty and clarity, and would also need elimination of alternatives, to the extent possible.

2. Since it would be burdensome for taxpayers to maintain 2 sets of books of account, the AS to be notified should apply only to computation of income, and books of account should not have to be maintained on the basis of such AS.

3. T o distinguish such AS from other AS, these AS should be called Tax Accounting Standards (“TAS ”).

4. S ince TAS were based on mercantile system of accounting, they should not apply to taxpayers following cash system of accounting.

5. S ince TAS are meant to be in harmony with the Act, in case of conflict, the provisions of the Act should prevail over TAS .

6. S ince the starting point for computation of taxable income was the profit as per the financial accounts, which are prepared on the basis of AS whose provisions may be different from TAS , a reconciliation between the income as per the financial statements and the income computed as per TAS should be presented.

In October 2011, drafts of 2 TAS – Construction Contracts and Government Grants – were released for public comment. In May 2012, drafts of another 6 TAS were released for public comment.

The Committee gave its final report in August 2012. It focused only on formulation of TAS harmonised with the provisions of the Act, since the position regarding the transition to Ind-AS was fluid and uncertain, and therefore even the impact of Ind-AS on book profits relevant for the purposes of MAT could not be ascertained.

It recommended that of the 31 AS issued by ICAI, 7 AS did not need to be examined, since they did not relate to computation of income. Of the remaining 24 AS, 10 related to disclosure requirements, were not yet mandatory or were not required for computation of income. The Committee therefore provided drafts of 14 TAS . The Committee also recommended that TAS in respect of certain other areas be considered for notification – Share based payment, Revenue recognition by real estate developers, Service concession arrangements (example, Build Operate Transfer agreements), and Exploration for and evaluation of mineral resources.

In January 2015, the CBDT released the draft of 12 TAS (renamed as ICDS) for public comment. These did not include 2 TAS recommended by the Committee – Contingencies and Events Occurring After the Balance Sheet Date and Net Profit or Loss for the Period, Prior Period Items and changes in Accounting Policies.

Section 145 was amended by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2014 with effect from 1st April 2015 (assessment year 2015-16), by substituting the term “income computation and disclosure standards” for the term “accounting standards” in sub-section (2). Similarly, sub-section (3) was amended to substitute the “not regular following of accounting standards” with “non-computation of income in accordance with the notified ICDS”.

Finally, in March 2015, the CBDT notified 10 ICDS as under:

ICDS I – Accounting Policies
ICDS II – Valuation of Inventories
ICDS III – Construction Contracts
ICDS IV – Revenue Recognition
ICDS V – Tangible Fixed Assets
ICDS VI – Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates
ICDS VII – Government Grants
ICDS VIII – Securities
ICDS IX – Borrowing Costs
ICDS X – Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets

The draft ICDS prepared by the Committee but not notified were those relating to Leases and Intangible Fixed Assets.

Applicability & Issues
The notified ICDS apply with effect from assessment year 2016-17, while section 145(2) was amended with effect from assessment year 2015-16. Therefore, for assessment year 2015-16, IT-AS would not apply, since the section provides for ICDS to be followed. Further, since ICDS were not notified till March 2015, ICDS were also not required to be followed for that year. Effectively, for assessment year 2015-16, neither IT-AS nor ICDS would apply. ICDS would apply only with effect from assessment year 2016-17.

ICDS would apply to all taxpayers following mercantile system of accounting, irrespective of the level of income. It would not apply to taxpayers following cash system of accounting. It would not apply only to taxpayers carrying on business, but even to other taxpayers, who may have income under the head “Income from Other Sources”. Effectively, since almost every taxpayer would have at least bank interest, which is taxable under the head “Income from Other Sources”, it would apply to most taxpayers. Further, most taxpayers choose to offer income for tax on an accrual basis, to facilitate matching of tax deducted at source (TDS) from their income with their claim for TDS credit as per their return of income.

Would it apply to taxpayers who do not maintain books of accounts? The provisions would certainly apply to all taxpayers who offer their income to tax under these 2 heads of income on a mercantile basis. Can a taxpayer choose to offer his income to tax on a cash basis, where books of account are not maintained, or is it to be presumed that his income has to be taxed on a mercantile or accrual basis in the absence of books of accounts?

In N. R. Sirker vs. CIT 111 ITR 281, the Gauhati High Court considered the issue and held as under:

“It can safely be assumed that ordinarily people keep accounts in cash system, that is to say, when certain sum is received, it is entered in his account and in the case of firms, etc., where regular method of accounting is adopted, sometimes accounts are kept in mercantile system. In the instant case it was not the case of the department that the assessee’s accounts were kept in mercantile system. On the other hand, the assessment orders showed that no proper accounts were kept. That being so it would not be justified to presume that the assessee kept his accounts in the mercantile system. Income-tax is normally paid on money actually received as income after deducting the allowable deductions. In the case of an assessee maintaining accounts in mercantile system, there was some variation, inasmuch as moneys receivable and payable were also shown as received and paid in the books. In order to apply this method, the proved or admitted position must be that the assessee keeps his accounts in mercantile system.”

Similarly, in Dr. N. K. Brahmachari vs. CIT 186 ITR 507, the Calcutta High Court held that unless and until it was found that the assessee maintained his accounts on accrual basis, income accrued but not received could not be taxed.

In CIT vs. Vimla D. Sonwane 212 ITR 489, the Bombay High Court considered a case where the assesse did not maintain regular books of accounts and did not follow mercantile system of accounting. The Bombay High Court held in that case:

“Option regarding adoption of system of accounting is with the assessee and not with the Income-tax Department. The assessee is indeed free even to follow different methods of accounting for income from different sources in an appropriate case. The department cannot compel the assessee to adopt the mercantile system of accounting. As a matter of fact, it was not adopted.”

In Whitworth Park Coal Co. Ltd. vs. IRC [1960] 40 ITR 517, the House of Lords laid down that where no method of accounting had been regularly employed, a non-trader cannot be assessed, (in the Indian context, u/s. 56 under the head ‘Income from other sources’) in respect of money which he has not received. The House of Lords observed:

“…The word ‘income’ appears to me to be the crucial word, and it is not easy to say what it means. The word is not defined in the Act and I do not think that it can be defined. There are two different currents of authority. It appears to me to be quite settled that in computing a trader’s income account must be taken of trading debts which have not yet been received by the trader. The price of goods sold or services rendered is included in the year’s profit and loss account although that price has not yet been paid. One reason may be that the price has already been earned and that it would give a false picture to put the cost of producing the goods or rendering the services into his accounts as an outgoing but to put nothing against that until the price has been paid. Good accounting practice may require some exceptions, I do not know, but the general principle has long been recognised. And if in the end the price is not paid it can be written off in a subsequent year as a bad debt.

But the position of an ordinary individual who has no trade or profession is quite different. He does not make up a profit and loss account. Sums paid to him are his income, perhaps subject to some deductions, and it would be a great hardship to require him to pay tax on sums owing to him but of which he cannot yet obtain payment. Moreover, for him there is nothing corresponding to a trader writing off bad debts in a subsequent year, except perhaps the right to get back tax which he has paid in error.” (p. 533)

“The case has often arisen of a trader being required to pay tax on something which he has not yet received and may never receive, but we were informed that there is no reported case where a non-trader has had to do this whereas there are at least three cases to the opposite effect—Lambe v. IRC [1934] 2 ITR 494, Dewar v. IRC 1935 5 Tax LR 536 and Grey v. Tiley [1932] 16 Tax Cas. 414, and I would also refer to what was said by Lord Wrenbury in St. Lucia Usines & Estates Co. Ltd. v. St. Lucia ( Colonial Treasurer) [1924] AC 508 (PC). I certainly think that it would be wrong to hold now for the first time that a non-trader to whom money is owing but who has not yet received it must bring it into his income-tax return and pay tax on it. And for this purpose I think that the company must be treated as a non-trader, because the Butterley’s case [1957] AC 32 makes it clear that these payments are not trading receipts.” (p. 533)

Therefore, for income falling under the head “Income from other sources”, it is clear that in the absence of books of accounts, and where the assessee has not exercised any option, the income would be taxable on a cash basis.

It is well settled that the method of accounting is vis-a-vis each source of income, since computation of income is first to be done for each source of income, and then aggregated under each head of income. An assessee can choose to follow one method of accounting for some sources of income, and another method of accounting for other sources of income. In J. K. Bankers vs. CIT 94 ITR

107    (All), the assessee was following mercantile system of accounting in respect of interest on loans in respect of its moneylending business, and offered lease rent earned by it to tax on a cash basis under the head “Income from Other Sources”. The Allahabad High Court held that an assessee could choose to follow a different method of accounting in respect of its moneylending business and in respect of lease rent. Similarly, in CIT vs. Smt. Vimla D. Sonwane 212 ITR 489, the Bombay High Court held that “The assessee is indeed free even to follow different methods of accounting for income from different sources in an appropriate case”.

Where an assessee follows cash method of accounting for certain sources of income and mercantile system of accounting for others, ICDS would apply only to those sources of income, where mercantile system of accounting is followed and would not apply to those sources of income, where cash method of accounting is followed. For instance, an assessee may have a manufacturing business, and a separate commission agency business. He may be following mercantile system of accounting for his manufacturing business, and a cash method of accounting for his commission agency business. ICDS would then apply only to the manufacturing business, and not to the commission agency business.

Can a taxpayer opt to change his method of accounting from mercantile to cash basis, in order to prevent the applicability of ICDS? Under paragraph 5 of ICDS I, an accounting policy shall not be changed without reasonable cause. Under AS 5, such a change was permissible only if the adoption of a different accounting policy was required by statute or for compliance with an accounting standard or if it was considered that the change would result in a more appropriate presentation of the financial statements of the enterprise. Would a change in law amount to reasonable cause? If such a change is made from assessment year 2016-17, the year from which ICDS comes into effect, an assessee would need to demonstrate that such change was actuated by other commercial considerations, and not merely to bypass the provisions of ICDS.

Do ICDS apply to a taxpayer who is offering his income to tax under a presumptive tax scheme, such as section 44AD? Under the presumptive tax scheme, books of account are not relevant, since the income is computed on the basis of the presumptive tax rate laid down under the Act. It therefore does not involve computation of income on the basis of the method of accounting, or on the basis of adjustments to the accounts. Therefore, though there is no specific exclusion under the notification for taxpayers following under presumptive tax schemes from the purview of ICDS, logically, ICDS should not apply to such taxpayers. However, where the presumptive tax scheme involves computation of tax on the basis of gross receipts, turnover, etc., it is possible that the tax authorities may take a view that the ICDS on revenue recognition would apply to compute the gross receipts or turnover in such cases.

Would ICDS apply to non-residents? The provisions of ICDS apply to all taxpayers, irrespective of the concept of residence. However, where a non-resident taxpayer falls under a presumptive tax scheme, such as section 115A, on the same logic as that of presumptive tax schemes applicable to residents, the provisions of ICDS should not apply. Further, where a non-resident claims the benefit of a double taxation avoidance agreement (DTAA), by virtue of section 90(2), the provisions of the DTAA would prevail over the provisions of the Income-tax Act, including section 145(2) and ICDS notified thereunder. In other cases of incomes of non-residents, which do not fall under presumptive tax schemes or DTAA, the provisions of ICDS would apply.

It has been stated in each ICDS that the ICDS would not apply for the purpose of maintenance of books of accounts. While theoretically this may be the position, the question arises as to whether it is practicable or even possible to compute the income under ICDS without maintaining a parallel set of books of account, given the substantial differences between AS being followed in the books of accounts and ICDS. Most taxpayers would end up at least preparing a parallel profit and loss account and balance sheet, to ensure that ICDS and its consequences have been properly taken care of while making the adjustments.

Further, the Committee had recommended that a tax auditor is required to certify that the computation of taxable income is made in accordance with the provisions of ICDS. Before certification, a tax auditor would invariably require such parallel profit and loss account and balance sheet to be prepared, to ensure that all adjustments required on account of ICDS have been considered. This will result in substantial work for most businesses, and may even result in the requirement of parallel MIS, one for the purposes of regular accounts, and the other for the purposes of ICDS. One wonders whether the Committee really wanted to avoid the requirement of maintenance of 2 sets of books of account, as stated by it, or has taken into account the practical difficulties, given the complex and myriad adjustments it has suggested through ICDS.

An interesting issue arises in this context. Can an assessee maintain 2 separate books of accounts – one under the Companies Act or other applicable law on a mercantile system, and a parallel set of books of accounts for income tax purposes on a cash basis? If one looks at the provisions of section 145(1), it provides that income chargeable under these 2 heads of income shall be computed in accordance with either cash or mercantile system of accounting regularly employed by the assessee. What is the meaning of the term “regularly employed”? Normally, the system of accounting adopted by the assesse in his books for his dealings with the outside world would be adopted for the purposes of computing the profit or loss for tax purposes also. The accounts are those maintained in the regular course of business. It may therefore be difficult for an assessee to maintain separate books of account with different system of accounting only for income tax purposes.

It may be noted that even after the introduction of ICDS, the computation still has to be in accordance with the method of accounting regularly employed by the assessee. Compliance with ICDS is an additional requirement. Therefore, the computation in accordance with the method of accounting is merely modified by the requirements of ICDS, and not substituted entirely.

Since ICDS is not applicable for the purposes of maintenance of books of account, one wonders as to what is the purpose and ambit of ICDS I on Accounting Policies. Since the purpose of ICDS is not to lay down accounting policies which are to be followed in the maintenance of the books of account, ICDS I should be regarded as merely a disclosure standard and not a computation standard. There are however certain provisions in ICDS I which relate to computation.

For example, the provision that accounting policies adopted shall be such was to represent a true and fair view of the state of affairs and income of the business, profession or vocation, and that for this purpose, the treatment and presentation of transaction and events shall be governed by their substance and not merely by their legal form, and marked to market loss or an expected loss shall not be recognised, unless the recognition of such loss is in accordance with the provisions of any other ICDS, really relates to what accounting policies an assessee should follow in its books of account. This is inconsistent with the preamble to this ICDS, that it is not applicable for the purpose of maintenance of books of account. This is also ultra vires the powers available under the provisions of section 145(2), which provide for computation in accordance with notified ICDS, and no longer contain the power to notify accounting standards.

This anomaly possibly arose on account of the fact that the provisions of section 145(2) were modified only after the Committee provided the draft of the relevant ICDS. Possibly, such provisions of ICDS I may not be valid.

Each ICDS states that in the case of conflicts between the provisions of the Income-tax Act and the ICDS, the provisions of the Act would prevail to that extent. Such a provision is ostensibly to harmonise the provisions of the ICDS with the provisions of the Act. One wonders as to why the Committee did not take into account the various provisions of the Act while framing ICDS. While such a provision is helpful, it would lead to substantial litigation in cases where there is no express provision in the Act, but where courts have interpreted the provisions of the Act in a manner which is inconsistent with the provisions of the ICDS.

There have been 3 specific amendments made to the Income-tax Act by the Finance Act 2015, to ensure that the provisions of the Act are in line with the provisions of ICDS. These 3 provisions are as under:

1.    The definition of “income” u/s. 2(24) has been amended by insertion of clause (xviii) to include assistance in the form of a subsidy or grant or cash incentive or duty drawback or favour or concession or reimbursement (by whatever name called) by the Central Government or a State Government or any authority or body or agency in cash or kind to the assessee, other than the subsidy or grant or reimbursement, which is taken into account for determination of the actual cost of the asset in accordance with the provisions of explanation 10 to clause (1) of section 43. This is to align it with the provisions of ICDS VII on Government Grants.

2.    The provisions of the proviso to section 36(1)(iii) have been modified to delete the words “for extension of existing business or profession”, after the words “in respect of capital borrowed for acquisition of an asset”, to bring the section in line with ICDS IX on Borrowing Costs, whereby interest in respect of borrowings for all assets acquired, from the date of borrowing till the date of first put to use of the asset, is to be capitalised.

3.    A second proviso has been inserted to section 36(1) (vii), to provide that where a debt has been taken into account in computing the income of an assessee for any year on the basis of ICDS without recording such debt in the books of accounts, then such debt would be deemed to have been written off in the year in which it becomes irrecoverable. This is to facilitate the claim for deduction of bad debts, where the debt has been recognised as income in accordance with ICDS, but has not been recognised in the books of accounts in accordance with AS.

Obviously, with the amendment of the Income-tax Act as well, the provisions of the ICDS in this regard read along with the amended Act, which may be contrary to earlier judicial rulings, would now apply.

There could be earlier judicial rulings which are based on the relevant provisions of the accounting standards, and where the court therefore interpreted the law on the basis of such accounting standards. These judicial rulings would now have to be considered as being subject to the requirements of ICDS, as the method of accounting is now subject to modification by the provisions of ICDS.

The third and last category of judicial rulings would be those where the courts have laid down certain basic principles while interpreting the tax law, in particular, the relevant provisions of the tax law. In such cases, such judicial rulings would override the provisions of ICDS, since such rulings have interpreted the provisions of the Act, which would prevail over ICDS.

For instance, various judicial rulings have propounded the real income theory. The Delhi High Court, in the case of CIT vs. Vashisht Chay Vyapar 330 ITR 440 has held, based on the real income theory, that interest accrued on non-performing assets of non-banking financial companies cannot be taxed until such time as such interest is actually received. Would the contrary provisions of ICDS IV on revenue recognition change the position? It would appear that the ruling will still continue to hold good even after the introduction of ICDS.

In case any of the provisions of ICDS is contrary to the Income Tax Rules, which one would prevail? The provisions of ICDS are silent in this regard. Given the fact that rules are a form of delegated legislation, while ICDS is in the form of a notification, which then becomes a part of the legislation, it would appear that the provisions of ICDS should prevail in such cases.

Since ICDS is not applicable for the purpose of maintenance of books of account, it is clear that the provisions of ICDS would not apply to the computation of “book profits” for the purposes of minimum alternate tax under section 115JB.

In fact, most of the ICDS provisions would increase the gap between the taxable income and the book profits, instead of narrowing down the gap. In this context, one wonders whether a recent Telangana & Andhra Pradesh High Court decision would be of assistance. In the case of Nagarjuna Fertilizers & Chemicals Limited 373 ITR 252, the High Court held that where an item of income was taxed in an earlier year but was recorded in the books of account of the current year, on the principle that the same income could not be taxed twice, such income had to be excluded from the book profits of the current year.

Can one use the provisions of AS for interpreting ICDS, where the provisions of both are identical? If one compares the ICDS with the corresponding AS, one notices that the bold portion of the AS has been picked up and modified, and issued as ICDS. Where the provisions of the AS and ICDS are identical, one should therefore be able to take resort to the explanatory paragraphs forming part of the AS, though they do not form part of the ICDS, in order to interpret the ICDS.

Impact & Conclusion

One thing is certain – the provisions of ICDS will create far greater litigation, then what one is now witnessing. That would defeat the very purpose of ICDS of bringing in tax certainty and reduction of litigation. Does reduction of litigation mean introduction of complicated provisions which are unfair to taxpayers? Is there at least one provision in the ICDS which decides a disputed issue in favour of taxpayers?

Does the CBDT believe that what is accepted worldwide as income (profit determined in accordance with IFRS), is not the real income when it comes to taxation? Are the Indian tax authorities an exception to the rest of the world? ICDS does not increase taxes – it merely results in advancement of taxability of income to an earlier year, and postponement of allowability of expenditure to a later year. Is the need for advancement of tax revenues so pressing, that taxpayer convenience and compliance costs are brushed aside?

Looking at the requirements of ICDS, one cannot but help wonder as to whether ICDS has been merely brought in to overcome the impact of adverse judicial rulings, and not really with a view to facilitate transition to IndAS. What ought to have been done by amendments to the law is being sought to be implemented through ICDS.

Assessees would now have to cope with not only frequent changes to the law, but also with frequent changes to ICDS, given the unfinished agenda of 4 draft ICDS yet to be notified, and the further 4 recommended for notification by the Committee. One understands that the Committee is in the process of drafting further ICDS for notification.

One also understands that the CBDT is likely to issue FAQs to clarify various aspects of ICDS. One only hopes that such FAQs will not create further confusion, but would help clear the confusion created by the ICDS.

One wonders as to how such ICDS fits in with the Prime Minister’s promise to improve the ease of doing business. The additional compliance costs in order to comply with ICDS would far outweigh the advantages gained by the tax department by recovering taxes at an earlier stage. Would business be keen to expand or would persons be willing to set up new businesses, given the significant compliance costs? The country would certainly take a significant hit in the “Ease of Doing Business Survey” once ICDS is implemented.

Tax auditors will now be in an extremely difficult situation, if the recommendation relating to requirement of certification of computation of income in accordance with ICDS is implemented. So far, they merely had to certify the true and fair view of the accounts, and the correctness of the information provided in Form 3CD. They did not have to certify the correctness of the claims for various deductions. If an auditor would now have to certify the correctness of the computation of income, this would give rise to various issues as to how such certification could be carried out, particularly in cases where the issue was debatable.

Instead of taxpayers, tax auditors may bear the brunt of the income tax department’s actions in respect of claims for deduction or exemption made which, in the view of the income tax department, is not allowable. Would assessees be willing to remunerate tax auditors for such additional high risks which they would bear in certifying the computation of income? If such a requirement of certification of the computation of income were introduced, it is possible that many chartered accountants may no longer be willing to carry out tax audits.

The biggest beneficiaries of ICDS may be tax lawyers and chartered accountants, who will have to handle the resultant additional litigation. The biggest losers will be the taxpayers, due to additional compliance and litigation costs, and the country, due to loss of productive manhours, and the loss of potential growth in business.

S. 80IB : DEPB receipt eligible for relief

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Part B — Unreported Decisions




19 Flora Exports v. ACIT


ITAT ‘E’ Bench, New Delhi

Before P. M. Jagtap (AM) and

George Mathan (JM)

ITA Nos. 4522 /Del./2004

A.Y. : 2001-02. Decided on : 31-1-2008

Counsel on assessee/revenue : Ved Jain/

Amit M. Govli

S. 80IB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Profits and gains from
industrial undertaking — Profits of the undertaking included DEPB — Whether DEPB
receipt eligible for relief — Held, Yes.

Per George Mathan :

Facts :

The issue in dispute in this appeal was against the action of
the CIT(A) in confirming the order of the Assessing Officer to the extent that
the amount of DEPB received by the assessee who was a supporting manufacturer,
was held to be not forming part of the business profits derived from the
manufacturing activity for the purpose of computing deduction u/s.80IB of the
Act.

The Revenue supported the orders of the lower authorities by
relying on the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Ritesh Industries
Ltd. where it was held that duty draw back was not income derived from an
industrial undertaking and not entitled to special deduction u/s.80I of the Act.

Held :

The Tribunal referred to the Supreme Court decision in the
case of Baby Marine Exports, where it was held that the premium paid by the
export house or the trading house to a supporting manufacturer on FOB was an
integral part of the turnover of the supporting manufacturer and was includible
in the profits of the business and was eligible for deduction u/s.80HHC.
Further, it noted that the Delhi Tribunal in the case of Maharashtra Seamless
Ltd., applying the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
Baby Marine Exports had taken a view that once such receipts were taken as part
of the turnover and formed part of the eligible profits, then the assessee would
be entitled to the deduction u/s.80IB on such DEPB receipts also. Accordingly,
the assessee’s appeal was allowed.

Cases referred to :



(1) Baby Marine Exports 290 ITR 323 (SC)

(2) Maharashtra Seamless Ltd. (ITA No. 1107/Del./2003 dated
30-11-2006 and MA No. 250/Del./2007 dated 20-12-2007)


levitra

S. 37(1), S. 28, S. 36(1)(vii) : Access fee for usage of software is not capital expenditure; Claims for bad debts and alternatively, as business loss, of dues receivable against sales value of shares of clients allowed.

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Part B — Unreported Decisions


(Full texts of the following Tribunal decisions are available
at the Society’s office on written request. For members desiring that the
Society mails a copy to them, Rs.30 per decision will be charged for
photocopying and postage.)


18 Angel Capital & Debt Market Ltd. v. ACIT


ITAT ‘I’ Bench, Mumbai

Before R. K. Gupta (JM) and

Abraham P. George (AM)

ITA No. 7075 /Mum./2005

A.Y. : 2002-03. Decided on : 12-5-2008

Counsel for assessee/revenue : Rajiv Khandelwal/

Bharat Bhushan

(1) S. 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Capital or
revenue expenditure — Payment of access fee for the usage of software —
Whether allowable as revenue expenditure — Held, Yes.


(2) S. 28 and S. 36(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act,
1961 — Assessee, a sharebroker — Dues against the sales value of shares of the
clients sold written off and claimed as bad debts and alternatively, as
business loss — Whether the claim of the assessee allowable — Held, Yes.



Per Abraham P. George :

Facts :

The assessee was a sharebroker and had effectively taken two
grounds in appeal before the Tribunal, the facts whereof were as under :

(1) During the year the assessee had paid the sum of
Rs.11.62 lacs as charges for client access licence of a software viz.,
Derivatives front-office software product for NSE. The amount paid was claimed
as business expenditure. However, the Assessing Officer as well as the CIT(A)
rejected the claim of the assessee and treated the same as capital
expenditure.

(2) The non-recoverable dues of Rs.10.25 lacs from its
clients, which were written off by the assessee in its books of accounts were
claimed as bad debts u/s.36(1)(vii). According to the AO, out of the total sum
receivable from the clients, that part which was not brokerage i.e.,
the value of the shares, was not covered u/s.36(2). Hence, the assessee’s
claim was rejected. The alternative claim of the assessee to allow the claim
u/s.28, by treating the same as business loss was not considered by the AO.

Before the Tribunal the actions of the lower authorities were
justified by the Revenue on the ground that the payment was made for acquisition
of system software and not application software.

Held :

(1) The Tribunal noted that the amount paid by the assessee
was for access to certain software used by sharebrokers for accessing NSE and
controlling its trading functions. By this, according to the Tribunal, the
assessee did not get any enduring benefit. This was so because the assessee was
required to pay the amount periodically in order to have its continuous access.
It was also noted by the Tribunal that the ownership to the software was not
transferred to the assessee. According to the Tribunal, though the software did
help the assessee to be competitive in its line of business and for the
efficient conduct of its day-to-day business, that alone would not be sufficient
to hold the payment as capital expenditure. Further, relying on the test laid
down by the Special Bench in the case of Amway India Enterprises, the Tribunal
allowed the appeal of the assessee.

(2) Relying on the decision of the Special Bench Tribunal in
the case of Oman International Bank SAOG, the Tribunal held that the assessee
having written off the non-recoverable dues, had satisfied the stipulation as
per S. 36(1)(vii). According to it, based on the decision of the Mumbai Tribunal
in the case of B. D. Shroff, the assessee was entitled to succeed even under the
alternative ground viz., by way of trading loss u/s.28.

Cases referred to :




(1) Amway India Enterprises & Others v. Dy. CIT, 21
SOT 1 (Del) (SB);

(2) Dy. CIT v. Oman International Bank, SAOG 100 ITD
257 (SB);

(3) CIT v. B. D. Shroff, (ITA No. 4475 / Mum. /
2000)



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Mandatory digitally signed e-return for companies — Notification No. 49/2010, dated 9-7-2010.

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Part A : Direct Taxes


68 Mandatory digitally signed e-return for companies —
Notification No. 49/2010, dated 9-7-2010.

The CBDT vide Income-tax (Seventh Amendment) Rules, 2010 has
amended Rule 12 which prescribes the manner of filing the income-tax return for
A.Y. 2010-2011. It is now provided that companies need to file their income-tax
e-return digitally signed and hence the process of filing an e-return without
digital signature and sending the acknow-ledgement in Form ITR V has been done
away with. Further individuals and HUFs liable to tax audit u/s.44AB of the Act
are now mandatorily required to need to file the returns electronically with or
without digital signature. The Rule does not change for the firms subjected to
tax audit.

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Press Note 7 (2008) No. 5(10)/2006-FC, dated 16-6-2008 — Consolidated Policy on Foreign Direct Investment.

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Part C : RBI/FEMA


The Reserve Bank of India has issued 3 Circulars. The DIPP
has issued 1 Press Note.

 

61 Press Note 7 (2008) No. 5(10)/2006-FC,
dated 16-6-2008 — Consolidated Policy on Foreign Direct Investment.

This Press Note contains a summary of the FDI policy and regulations
applicable to various sectors and activities. The Press Note has incorporated
policy changes up to March 31, 2008.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 1, dated 11-7-2008 —Security for External Commercial Borrowings — Liberalisation.

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Part C : RBI/FEMA


The Reserve Bank of India has issued 3 Circulars. The DIPP
has issued 1 Press Note.


60 A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 1, dated
11-7-2008 —Security for External Commercial Borrowings — Liberalisation.

Presently, RBI permission is required for creation of charge
on immovable assets, financial securities and issue of corporate or personal
guarantees, on behalf of the borrower in favour of the overseas lender, to
secure the ECB under automatic/approval route.

 

Through this circular RBI has delegated, subject to certain
terms and conditions, the power to grant ‘no objection’ under FEMA for creation
of charge on immovable assets, financial securities and issue of corporate or
personal guarantees, in favour of the overseas lender security trustee, to
secure the ECB to be raised by the borrower.

 

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 53, dated 27-6-2008 — Overseas Direct Investment by Registered Trust/Society.

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Part C : RBI/FEMA


The Reserve Bank of India has issued 3 Circulars. The DIPP
has issued 1 Press Note.


59 A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 53, dated
27-6-2008 — Overseas Direct Investment by Registered Trust/Society.

This Circular permits registered trusts and societies engaged
in manufacturing/educational sector to make investment in the same sector(s),
after obtaining prior approval of RBI, by way of joint venture or wholly-owned
subsidiary outside India. Application for permission has to be made in Form ODI.

 

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 52, dated 11-6-2008 — Deferred Payment Protocols dated April 30, 1981 and December 23, 1985 between Government of India and the erstwhile USSR.

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Part C : RBI/FEMA


The Reserve Bank of India has issued 3 Circulars. The DIPP
has issued 1 Press Note.

 

58 A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 52, dated
11-6-2008 — Deferred Payment Protocols dated April 30, 1981 and December 23,
1985 between Government of India and the erstwhile USSR.

The Rupee value of the special currency basket has been fixed
at Rs.62.5198 with effect from May 23, 2008 as against the earlier value of
Rs.60.5828.

 

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Suspension of collection of taxes during Mutual Agreement Procedure under the India-Danish Double Taxation Avoidance Convention (DTAC) — Instruction No. 7/2008, dated 24-6-2008.

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Part A : DIRECT TAXES

57 Suspension of collection of taxes during
Mutual Agreement Procedure under the India-Danish Double Taxation Avoidance
Convention (DTAC) — Instruction No. 7/2008, dated 24-6-2008.

Competent authorities of India and Denmark have entered into
a Memorandum of Understanding to avoid the unintended hardship to the taxpayers,
as well as for efficient management of collection of revenue for the captioned
subject.

 

Summary of amendments made to the Finance Bill, at the time of
enactment.


The following are the important additional amendments which
were made to the Finance Bill, which have been passed by the Parliament and
enacted in the Finance Act, 2008 :



  • Exemption available u/s.10A and u/s.10B has been extended by one more year


  •  Relief is given u/s.40(a)(ia) for TDS on amounts provided/payments in March
    and paid after the due date of payment of TDS, but before the due date of
    filing the return of income would be allowable as a deduction in that previous
    year itself. It is in line with the deduction available u/s.43B of the Act.
    This amendment is retrospective with effect from A.Y. 2005-06


  • Due date for obtaining the tax audit report has been pre-poned to 30 September


  • For eligibility of deduction u/s.80-IB, if an undertaking begins refining of
    mineral oil on or after April 1, 2009, deduction will be allowed to such
    undertaking only if the following conditions are satisfied :



  • It is wholly owned by a public sector company or any other company in which
    a public sector company or companies hold at least 49% of the voting rights


  • It is notified by the Central Government before June 1, 2008


  • It begins refining during April 1, 2009 and March 31, 2012



  • Since an amendment is made in S. 115JB for addition of deferred tax liability,
    similar adjustment has been provided for a credit in the deferred tax asset
    created during the previous year


  • Notice for scrutiny assessment for Fringe Benefit Tax u/s.115WE shall be
    served on the assessee within a period of 6 months from the end of the
    financial year in which return is furnished. This amendment is applicable from
    April 1, 2008


  • AOP/BOI have been made liable to TDS provisions u/s.194-C if they are subject
    to tax audit


  • Certain powers have been given to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) in
    case of an appeal filed against the assessment order in respect of which the
    proceeding before the Settlement Commission abates u/s.245HA. Similar
    amendment has been provided under the Wealth-tax Act also.


  • S. 292BB has been inserted, wherein if the assessee appears for proceedings, it
    would be deemed that the Notice has been duly served on him as per the provision
    of the Act. Consequently, claims of objection for the notice not served or
    served late, etc., would be precluded. However, in case the assessee has filed
    such an objection and then appeared for the proceedings, the provisions of S.
    292BB would not apply.
levitra

Clarifications from CBDT regarding filing of returns of income for the assessment year 2008-09 — Circular No. 6/2008, dated 18-7-2008.

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Part A : DIRECT TAXES


56 Clarifications from CBDT regarding filing
of returns of income for the assessment year 2008-09 — Circular No. 6/2008,
dated 18-7-2008.

It has been reiterated by the Board that no annexures need to
be filed with the return of income for the captioned assessment year. It has
been emphasised that the CCIT needs to look into strict compliance of this rule.
TDS/TCS, Advance Tax and Self-Assessment Tax credit would be given on the basis
of the details filed in the return of income, subject to relevant instructions
on verification of TDS claims. However, the assessees are advised to retain all
the annexures, which otherwise would have been filed with the return of income.

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Clarifications from CBDT regarding e-payment of taxes — Circular No. 5/2008, dated 14-7-2008.

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Part A : DIRECT TAXES


55 Clarifications from CBDT regarding
e-payment of taxes — Circular No. 5/2008, dated 14-7-2008.

It has been clarified by the Board that in instances where
the taxpayer does not have a bank account, taxes can be paid from some other
person’s bank account. However, the challan should clearly reflect the PAN of
the person whose tax has been paid. Further, it has been clarified that the
rules for e-payment would apply to tax deducted at source and tax collected at
source.

 

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Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 143(1)(a), S. 147. Even when the original assessment is u/s.143(1) and even when reassessment proceedings are initiated within a period of four years, it is still necessary that there should be reasons to believe that income had

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Tribunal New


(Full text of the following Tribunal decisions are available at the Society’s
office on written request. For members desiring that the Society mails a copy to
them, Rs.30 per decision will be charged for photocopying and postage.)


Part B :
Unreported Decisions


15 Pirojsha Godrej Foundation v.

ADIT (Exemptions)

ITAT ‘C’ Bench, Mumbai

Before D. K. Agarwal (JM) and

Pramod Kumar (AM)

ITA No. 1976/Mum./2008

A.Y. : 2001-02. Decided on : 31-5-2010

Counsel for assessee/revenue : P. J. Pardiwala/K. K. Mahajan

Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 143(1)(a), S. 147. Even when the
original assessment is u/s.143(1) and even when reassessment proceedings are
initiated within a period of four years, it is still necessary that there should
be reasons to believe that income had escaped assessment and such reasons are
subject to judicial scrutiny.

Per Pramod Kumar :

Facts :

The assessee was a charitable trust, registered u/s.12A of
the Act, notified, for the relevant period, u/s.10(23C)(iv) of the Act. The
assessee in its return of income filed on 29th October, 2001 declared exemption
u/s.10(23C) and declared nil taxable income. This return was processed u/s.
143(1)(a). On 26th May, 2004, the assessee was served a notice u/s.148 and
income of the assessee was proposed to be reassessed. The Assessing Officer (AO)
had, in the reasons recorded, stated that since the assessee has not invested a
sum of Rs.1.02 crores in accordance with the provisions of S. 11(5), the said
sum of Rs.1.02 crores is chargeable to tax and has escaped assessment.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) and
challenged the validity of the jurisdiction assumed u/s.147 of the Act on the
ground that the AO had resorted to reassessment proceedings without having a
valid reason to believe that the income had escaped assessment. The CIT(A)
upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :


(1) The
recorded reasons that the violation of S. 11(5) r.w. S. 13(1)(d) by the assessee
leads to the amount of Rs.1.02 crores to be included in the assessee’s total
income are clearly contrary to the legal position which is that while the
assessee may lose exemption u/s.10(23)(c) for not adhering to the conditions of
S. 11(5), this does not result in the said amount being chargeable to tax in the
hands of the assessee. The Tribunal held that the reasons for reopening of
assessment have been recorded without application of mind and without
considering the applicable legal position, as expected of an AO while exercising
his powers u/s.147.

(2) The Tribunal after examining the reasons recorded in the
light of the observations of the Bombay High Court in the case of Hindustan
Lever Ltd. (268 ITR 332) and of the Supreme Court in the case of Kelvinator of
India Ltd. (320 ITR 561) concluded that there was no material before the AO that
any income, leave aside the income of Rs.1.02 crores has escaped assessment. The
Tribunal observed that no reasonable person, with basic understanding of the
scheme of income-tax law, can come to the conclusion that the AO has arrived at.
It held that there was no cause and effect relationship between what the AO has
noticed in the attachments to the income-tax return and the conclusion he has
arrived at.

(3) Even when the original assessment is u/s. 143(1) and even
when reassessment proceedings are initiated within a period of four years, it is
still necessary that there should be reasons to believe that income had escaped
assessment and such reasons are subject to judicial scrutiny. No doubt that at
the stage of reassessment proceedings, it is not necessary to establish that
there has been an escapement of income, but essentially there have to be valid
reasons to believe that the income has escaped assessment and these reasons, on
a stand-alone basis, must be considered appropriate for arriving at the
conclusion arrived at by the Officer recording the reasons.

The Tribunal held the very initiation of the reassessment
proceedings, on the facts of this case and on the basis of the reasons recorded
by the AO to be bad in law and quashed the reassessment proceedings. The
Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

Cases referred :

(1) CIT v. Kelvinator of India Ltd., (320 ITR 561) (SC)

(2) Prashant S. Joshi v. ITO, (Writ Petition No. 2287 of
2009, judgment dated 22-2-2010)

(3) Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. R. B. Wadkar, (268 ITR 332) (Bom.)

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Project completion method of accounting — AO cannot adopt two methods of accounting in one project to determine income of assessee — In case of an assessee following project completion method, profit arising on sale of TDR, which was received as considera

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following Tribunal decisions are available at the Society’s office on written
request. For members desiring that the Society mails a copy to them, Rs.30 per
decision will be charged for photocopying and postage.)





  1. ITO v. Chembur Trading Corporation




ITAT ‘C’ Bench, Mumbai

Before Sunil Kumar Yadav (JM) and

D. Karunakara Rao (AM)

ITA No. 2593/Mum./2006

A.Y. : 2000-01. Decided on : 21-1-2009

Counsel for revenue/assessee : Yeshwant U. Chavan/J. P.
Bairagra

Per Sunil Kumar Yadav :

Facts :

The assessee was in the business of construction of
buildings and was regularly following project completion method which method
was accepted by the Revenue. The assessee started project of construction of a
building known as ‘Kailash Towers’ (KT) on a plot of land at Anik Village,
Chembur of which the assessee was the owner. Till 31-3-1994, the assessee
received Rs.32,31,159 as advances for sale of flats in KT. The assessee had
incurred expenditure of Rs.87,35,285 (which included cost of land and also
cost of work done on this project).

While the project was on, the entire plot of land
admeasuring 44544.25 sq.mts. was required by the Government of Maharashtra for
construction of Eastern Express Freeway and also for construction of tenements
for rehabilitation of slum dwellers. An agreement was executed between the
assessee, the Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA) and the Government of
Maharashtra through PWD which agreement detailed modalities as to how the land
was to be acquired and in what manner TDR was to be granted to the assessee.
The agreement was a composite agreement for construction of Eastern Express
Freeway to be carried out by the Government of Maharashtra after acquiring
land from the assessee and also for rehabilitation of the slum dwellers living
in 7500 hutments on the freeway land required for the purpose of Eastern
Express Freeway. 1474 tenements and 92 shops were to be constructed by the
assessee. The assessee was entitled to receive land TDR for handing over land
to the Government and Construction TDR for constructing tenements and shops on
land belonging to it. The grant of TDR was to be in phases. The assessee was
not entitled to any monetary consideration.

During the previous year relevant to the assessment year
under consideration the assessee sold certain TDR and the sale consideration
was reflected on the liability side of the balance sheet. Sale consideration
of TDR was regarded by the assessee as a receipt of the project to be taxed in
the year of completion of the project.

The AO dissected the entire project into two schemes (1)
Transfer of land for construction of Eastern Express Freeway by the Government
of Maharashtra and the Road TDR granted to the assessee in lieu thereof; (2)
Transfer of land and construction of tenements and shops by the assessee
itself and the grant of TDR in lieu thereof. The AO, accordingly, applied
different methods of accounting to both the projects. In respect of road TDR
he taxed the assessee yearwise in the year in which TDR was sold and in
respect of the project for transfer of land and construction of tenements and
shops he accepted project completion method. In A.Y. 2000-01 the AO made an
addition of Rs.1,88,86,810.

The CIT(A) held that Road TDR was directly related to the
said project and sale proceeds against this TDR were to be recognised as a
revenue receipt in the year in which the project was completed.

Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that the agreement was a composite
agreement for handing over land for Expressway and also for construction of
tenements and shops by the assessee on land belonging to it. The Tribunal also
noted that the entire land was acquired in phases and also consideration in
the form of TDR was received in phases. Consideration was received in kind.
The funds received on sale of TDR were utilised for construction of tenements
and shops. The Tribunal held that it was clearly one project and not two
projects as they have been treated by the AO. The Tribunal held that the AO
cannot adopt two methods of accounting in one project to determine the income
of the assessee. It observed that in case of construction activity there are
two recognised methods of accounting viz. (1) Project Completion Method
and (2) Percentage Completion Method. The Tribunal stated that the assessee
has a right or a privilege to adopt any one of the methods of accounting for
determining its profit. In the present case, the assessee had been following
the project completion method to determine the profits of a project for last
so many years, but, during the year under consideration the AO had dissected
the project in two segments and for one segment he applied project completion
method and for the remaining segment, he determined the profit on sale of TDR.
The method of accounting adopted by the AO was held to be neither prevalent
nor recognised by the ICAI or under any law. The Tribunal held that the
assessee had rightly computed its profit on the basis of the project
completion method. Accordingly, it upheld the order of CIT(A) and dismissed
the appeal filed by the Revenue.

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S. 145 — Accounting Standard 7 issued by ICAI — In case of an assessee following mercantile system and ‘percentage completion method’ deduction is allowable of ‘foreseeable losses’ on incomplete projects in respect of which a major part of work was not co

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(Full texts of the
following Tribunal decisions are available at the Society’s office on written
request. For members desiring that the Society mails a copy to them, Rs.30 per
decision will be charged for photocopying and postage.)





  1. Jacobs Engineering India Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT




ITAT ‘J’ Bench, Mumbai

Before N. V. Vasudevan (JM) and

Mehar Singh (AM)

ITA No. 335/Mum./2007 & 336/Mum./2007

A.Ys. : 2002-03 & 2003-04. Decided on : 26-5-2009

Counsel for assessee/revenue : Sunil Lala & Aliasger
Rampurwala/Ajay

Per Mehar Singh :

Facts :

The assessee was engaged in the business of executing works
contracts and was following the mercantile system of accounting and the
‘percentage completion method’. During the previous year relevant to the A.Y.
2002-03 the assessee had debited to P & L and had claimed a deduction of
Rs.18,73,568 being provision for future losses. The AO while assessing the
total income of the assessee held that this sum did not represent actual loss;
under mercantile system of accounting it is only an existing liability which
is deductible and not a liability which will come into existence upon
occurrence of certain events; the decision of the Apex Court in Tuticorin
Alkali Chemical & Fertilisers Ltd. does not contemplate deduction of such an
amount. He, accordingly, disallowed Rs.18,73,568 claimed by the assessee as
provision for foreseeable losses.

The CIT(A) observed that since the work completed during
the year under consideration was not a major part of the contract such a
provision was not allowable as according to him it cannot be established that
such a loss had been fully anticipated. He held that since several parameters
were accounted for only on estimate it was not plausible to anticipate the
result. The CIT(A) confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the
Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal considered Para 13.1 of Accounting Standard 7
(AS-7) which mandates that a foreseeable loss on the entire contract should be
provided for in the financial statements, irrespective of the amount of work
done and the method of accounting followed. The argument on behalf of the
Revenue that AS-7 has not been notified by the Central Government as an
accounting standard for the purposes of S. 145(2) did not find favour with the
Tribunal. The Tribunal held that in principle, anticipated losses on
incomplete projects are allowable as deduction subject to their being
calculated as per AS-7. However, for the purposes of calculation and
quantification of the said loss in terms of AS-7 it restored the matter to the
file of the AO.

Cases referred :



(1) Tuticorin Alakali Chemcial & Fertilisers Ltd. v.
CIT,
(227 ITR 172) (SC)

(2) ITA No. 9701/Bom./1991, dated 10-8-2001

(3) DCIT v. OTIS Elevator Co. India Ltd., (284 ITR
173) (AT) (Mum.)

(4) Aarts Module v. ITO, (ITA No. 9302/Bom./1992)

(5) Mkb (Asia) (P) Ltd. v. CIT, (294 ITR 655) (Gau.)

(6) Metal Box Co. of India Ltd. v. Their Workmen,
(73 ITR 53) (SC)

(7) Gopal Purohit v. DCIT, (20 DTR 99)

(8) CIT v. India Discount Co. Ltd., (75 ITR 191)
(SC)

(9) Kedarnath Jute Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. CIT, (82 ITR
363) (SC)

(10) Sinclair Murray And Co. P Ltd. v. CIT, (97
ITR 615) (SC)

(11) Mazagoan Dock Ltd. v. JCIT, (2009) (29 SOT
356) (Mum.)

(12) Arawali Construction Co. Pvt. Ltd. (124 Taxman 146)
(Raj.)

(13) CIT v. Elecon Engineering Co. Ltd., (1987)
(SC)

(14) Amway India Enterprises v. DCIT, (2008) (111
ITD 112) (Del.) (SB)

(15) Vithal Health Care Pvt. Ltd. v. ITO, (ITA No.
1754/M/04) (AY 01-02)

(16) CIT v. Shirke Construction Equipments Ltd.,
(246 ITR 429) (Bom.)

(17) M/s. Cambay Electric Supply & Industrial Co. Ltd.
v. CIT,
(113 ITR 84) (SC)


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S. 37(1) — Treatment of deferred revenue expenditure — Expenditure on brand promotion and brand building classified in the books of account as deferred revenue expenditure — Allowable as revenue expenditure.

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(Full texts of the
following Tribunal decisions are available at the Society’s office on written
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  1. ACIT v. Raj Oil Mills Ltd.




ITAT ‘A’ Bench, Mumbai

Before D. Manmohan (VP) and

Rajendra Singh (AM)

ITA No. 5781/M/2007

A.Y. : 2003-04. Decided on : 27-5-2009

Counsel for revenue/assessee : Sanjay Agarwal/ Sanjay R.
Parikh

Per Rajendra Singh :

Facts :

The assessee was engaged in the business of manufacturing
and trading of edible and hair oils, cosmetics and hygiene products. For the
relevant year the assessee had incurred total expenditure of Rs.1.53 crore on
brand promotion and brand building. Out of the same, a sum of Rs.33.15 lacs
had been debited to the profit and loss account and the balance amount of
Rs.1.20 crore had been treated as deferred revenue expenditure in the books of
account. In the return of income the assessee had claimed the entire amount of
Rs.1.53 crore as revenue expenditure. According to the AO the accounting
treatment given by the assessee clearly showed that the assessee was to derive
benefits from the said expenditure for a number of years. He therefore
disallowed the amount of Rs.1.20 crore shown by the assessee as a deferred
expenditure and added to the total income. On appeal, the CIT(A) allowed the
appeal of the assessee.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that the Assessing Officer had
disallowed the claim mainly on the basis of the accounting treatment given by
the assessee in the books of accounts. According to it, the advertisement
expenditure was basically incurred for promoting the sale of the products.
While incurring such expenses the assessee may derive some enduring benefits
but as held by the Supreme Court in Empire Jute Co.’s case, test of enduring
benefit was not conclusive in understanding the true nature of expenditure. A
particular expenditure can be considered as capital expenditure only if there
was some advantage in the capital field i.e., when the assessee had
acquired any new assets or any new source of income. In case the expenditure
had been incurred only for conducting the business more efficiently and more
profitably, there being no advantage in the capital field, such expenses had
to be treated as revenue expenditure as held by the Supreme Court in the above
case. In the case of the assessee, by incurring expenditure on advertisement,
it had not acquired any new asset or any new source of income. The expenditure
had been incurred only for better profitability by promoting the sales. Such
expenditure, according to the Tribunal had to be treated as revenue
expenditure, irrespective of the accounting treatment given in the books as
the accounting treatment is not conclusive in understanding the true nature of
expenditure.

Case referred to :

Empire Jute Company (124 ITR 1) (SC).



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S. 145A — Valuation of inventory — Assessee following exclusive method of accounting for modvat valued its inventory excluding modvat credit — AO valued closing stock inclusive of modvat credit, but refused to similarly value opening stock — AO not justif

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following Tribunal decisions are available at the Society’s office on written
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  1. ACIT v. Tokyo Plast International Ltd.




ITAT ‘A’ Bench, Mumbai

Before J. Sudhakar Reddy (AM) and

P. Madhavi Devi (JM)

ITA No. 3290/Mum./2007

A.Y. : 2003-2004. Decided on : 26-5-2009

Counsel for revenue/assessee : S. K. Pahwa/

Ishwer Rathi

Per P. Madhavi Devi :

Facts :

The assessee was following exclusive method of accounting
for modvat i.e., it did not include un-utilised modvat in the value of
the closing stock. According to the AO, the assessee had not valued the
closing stock as per the S. 145A insofar as the duties relatable to the stock
were not included in the value of the closing stock. He therefore made an
addition of Rs.5.10 lacs to the value of the closing stock and also to the
total income of the assessee. The assessee’s contention to give similar
treatment in the value of the opening stock was rejected by the AO. On appeal,
the CIT(A) agreed with the assessee and allowed the appeal.

Held :

The Tribunal relying on the decisions of the Delhi High
Court in the case of Mahavir Aluminium Ltd. and of the Bombay High Court in
the case of CIT v. Mahalaxmi Glass, upheld the order of the CIT(A) and
dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue.

Case referred to :



1. Mahavir Aluminium Ltd. in 297 ITR 77 (Del.)




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S. 220(2) — Liability to pay interest by assessee — AO not justified in charging interest for the intervening period when the CIT(A) allowed the appeal in favour of the assessee to the period when the Tribunal allowed the appeal in favour of the revenue

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following Tribunal decisions are available at the Society’s office on written
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  1. ACIT v. The Southern Paradise and Stud
    Developers Pvt. Ltd.




ITAT E-1 Bench, Mumbai

Before A. L. Gehlot (AM) and

P. Madhavi Devi (JM)

ITA Nos. 2135 and 2136/Mum./2008

A.Ys. 1995-96 and 1996-97. Decided on : 27-5-2009

Counsel for revenue/assessee : Ajay/Arvind Dalal

Per P. Madhavi Devi :

Facts :

According to the Revenue the CIT(A) had erred in deleting
the interest charged u/s.220(2) for the intervening period when the CIT(A)
allowed the appeal in favour of the assessee to the period when the Tribunal
allowed the appeal in favour of the Revenue. It relied on the decisions of the
Madras High Court in the case of Super Spinning Mills Ltd. and of the
Karnataka High Court in the case of Vikrant Tyres Ltd. and the Board Circular.

Held :

The Tribunal agreed with the assessee that the issue was
covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Vikrant Tyres Ltd.
The provisions of S. 220 only revives the old demand notice which had never
been satisfied by the assessee and which notice got quashed during some stage
of the appellate proceedings. In the case of the assessee, no such demand was
pending. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.

Cases referred to :



(1) Vikrant Tyres Ltd., 247 ITR 821 (SC);

(2) Super Spinning Mills Ltd. v. CIT, 244 ITR 814
(Mad.);

(3) Vikrant Tyres Ltd., 202 ITR 456 (Kar.);

(4) Board Circular No. 334, dated 3-1-1982.



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S. 2(14) and S. 45 : Amount received by a member of the housing society from a developer who constructed additional floors in a building owned by the housing society not liable to capital gains tax

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New Page 1

Part B — Unreported Decisions


(Full texts of the following Tribunal decisions are available
at the Society’s office on written request. For members desiring that the
Society mails a copy to them, Rs.30 per decision will be charged for
photocopying and postage.)



20 Deepak S. Shah v. ITO


ITAT ‘D’ Bench, Mumbai

Before R. K. Gupta (JM) and

A. L. Gehlot (AM)

ITA No. 1483/Mumbai/2001

A.Y. : 1995-96. Decided on : 16-6-2008

Counsel for assessee/revenue : Arvind Sonde/

Virendra Ojha

S. 2(14) and S. 45 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Capital
Gains — Amount received by a member of the housing society from a developer
holding TDR, who constructed additional floors in a building owned by the
housing society — Whether Assessing Officer justified in levying capital gain
tax from a member of the housing society — Held, No.

Per A. L. Gehlot

Facts :

The assessee derived income from salaries, dividend, etc. He
was a member of the housing society (‘the Society’). There was an estate
developer (‘the Developer’) who was in possession of TDR, and was looking out
for properties, whereon it could utilise the TDR. In March, 1995, the Society
and the Developer entered into an agreement whereunder the Society gave
permission to the Developer to utilise its TDR in raising the superstructure on
the existing building of the Society. In consideration thereof the members of
the Society, including the assessee, received the aggregate sum of Rs.1.21
crores from the Developer, wherein the share of the assessee was Rs.5.8 lacs.

According to the assessee, the said sum of Rs.5.8 lacs
received by him from the Developer was not taxable. However, according to the
Assessing Officer, the Society through its members had transferred the
development rights to the Developer for the aggregate consideration of Rs.1.21
crore and the same was taxable in the hands of the members of the Society.

On appeal before the CIT(A), he opined that the assessee and
the other members had drafted an agreement with the Developer to make believe
that the compensation receivable was for the hardship caused to the members on
account of construction activity. However, in effect and in reality it was the
benefit that each member was given corresponding to the valuable right that he
possessed in the land and building of the Society. Accordingly he held that the
assessee and other members of the Society had transferred a capital asset within
the meaning of S. 45 and therefore, capital gain was chargeable thereon. In
arriving at the conclusion, the CIT(A) also relied on the Supreme Court decision
in the case of A. R. Krishnamurthy and another.

Before the Tribunal the Revenue relied on the orders of the
lower authorities and also on the decision of the Gauhati Tribunal in the case
of Md. Nasser Ahmed.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that neither the Society nor the members
owned or possessed any TDR. The TDRs were owned and possessed by the Developer
and in terms of the regulations framed by the Municipal Corporation, it was
permissible for the building to utilise the said TDR in or with respect to the
prescribed area, including the land and building owned by the Society. The
members of the Society had consented to suffer the hardships and in terms of the
regulations of the Society or otherwise or in law the members did not have any
say in the matter once the Society decided to give its consent. According to the
Tribunal, the members of the Society had paid for purchase of the flat, which
conferred very limited rights and ‘right to grant permission for additional
construction’ as such did not form part of any rights; but it arose on account
of the volition or voluntary desire of a person. Such permission could not be
obtained by enforcing any rights or obligation arising from the agreement to
purchase the flat and/or the regulations of the Society. Accordingly, the
voluntary consent given by the members cannot constitute or form part of the
bundle of rights which were owned or possessed by the member in or with respect
to the tenure of the flats granted to the member by the Society. The area
occupied by the members was only a ‘measure’ in quantitative terms inasmuch as
the extent of hardship which may be faced cannot be quantified; When an
additional construction was made, the location of the flat, as such, was of no
significance or importance, since everyone suffered the hardship and the extent
could not be determined through any ‘measurer’. It further observed that the
members had not transferred any rights in or with respect to the flat or
suffered any deficiency or limitation in or with respect to the rights in the
flat; in fact they had added the risk of adding load to the building.
Accordingly, it held that the cost of flat cannot be any measure for the purpose
of finding out the cost of the alleged ‘capital asset’ and the alleged
‘transfer’ of such asset.

According to the Tribunal, the decisions relied on by the
CIT(A) as well as the Revenue in its submission, both were distinguishable on
the facts. It further observed that the assessee was neither holding any capital
asset, nor was there any transfer of capital asset. Accordingly it held that S.
45 of the Act was not attracted and the assessee was not liable to capital gain
tax u/s.45 of the Act.

Cases referred to :



(1) A. R. Krishnamurthy and Another v. CIT, 176 ITR
417 (S.C.)

(2) ITO v. Md. Nasser Ahmed, 2 SOT 389 (Gauhati)


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Non Sequitur

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The ‘WORD’

Non Sequitur
is latin for ‘it does not follow’. It is used in speech and reasoning to
describe a statement in which premise and conclusions are totally unrelated but
are used as if they are. In other words, where a conclusion, even if correct, is
sought to be derived from the premise from which such conclusion does not
follow, it is said to be non-sequitur.


2. The expression is often used in legal decisions to
discard, declare irrelevant or unrelated an argument used to establish a
particular fact or a legal position. The fact that a statement or conclusion of
facts or law is non-sequitur does not necessarily imply that the same is
incorrect. What it implies is that the same does not logically follow from the
premise from which it is arrived at. In other words the premise and the
conclusions are unrelated having no cause and effect relationship.

3. A legal decision is a combined effect of finding of
relevant facts — direct and inferential — and application of appropriate legal
principles to the problems disclosed by those facts. Finding of a particular
factual situation from a bundle of facts, not all leading to the same legal
situation, is one area where the conclusion can be termed non-sequitur
i.e.,
not arising from the facts presented. In Alembic Chemical Works Co.
Ltd., v. CIT Gujarat,
1989 AIR 1913, where the issue was whether payment to
a Japanese company for supply of requisite technical know-how was revenue
expenditure being laid out for existing business or capital expenditure on a new
business, the High Court on reading of various clauses of the agreement
concluded that initiation and exploitation of the new process as per the
know-how brought in their wake a new venture requiring an altogether new plant
and, accordingly, held it capital expenditure. In appeal the Supreme Court
basing their decision on terms of the same agreement held the conclusion drawn
by the High Court as non-sequitur.

4. Doctrine of ‘Precedent’ makes the decisions of higher
judicial authorities binding on all lower judicial bodies operating within the
jurisdiction. Doctrine of ‘stare decisis requires Courts to stand by
their earlier decisions, unless a review becomes necessary for reasons of
compelling contemporary social conditions or when additional reasons exist
pointing to a wrong precedent having been created. Legal decisions favouring the
stand of the concerned parties are, therefore, cited to support the views
advocated by them. But, as held by the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v.
Mohd Illiyas,
(2006) ISCC 275, reliance on such decisions without going into
the factual background of the cases before it, is clearly impermissible. A
decision is a precedent on its own facts. It is an authority for what it
actually decides and no more. Their Lordships quoted with approval the
observations of Earl of Halsbury L. C in Leathem (1901) AC 495 (HL) to the
effect that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts of
the case in which such expressions are found. When arguments are based on the
earlier legal decisions of the same or higher judicial authority without due
consideration of the factual background in which those decision were made, the
resulting decision becomes non-sequitur as the conclusion therein does
not follow the cited cases. In Wajid Ali Abid Ali v. CIT Lucknow, 1987
AIR 2074 where the Court was to give meaning to the word ‘cease’ in the context
of a partner ceasing to be a partner and large number of cases were cited, the
Court for the above-stated reason did not consider it necessary to be bogged by
these decisions, holding “These (cases) though throwing light, however, are
non-sequitur
for the issue before us”.

5. In Azadi Bachao Andolan v. UOI reported in 263 ITR
706 where the Supreme Court was to adjudicate on the legality of the Circular
No. 789, dated 13-4-2000 making certificate of residence issued by Mauritius
Authorities as sufficient proof of residence and beneficial ownership, the
argument about the inconsistency of the impugned Circular with the provisions of
the Act, was found to be total non-sequitur for the simple reason that
the impugned Circular No. 789 was a Circular within the meaning of S. 90 and,
therefore, should have legal consequences contemplated by Ss.(2) of S. 90 and
not any other provision of the Act. In other words, the Circular, it was held,
shall prevail even if inconsistent with the provisions of Income-tax Act 1961,
insofar as the parties covered by the provisions of DTAC are concerned, as the
convention overrides the provisions of the Act. The consistency of what is
contained in the Circular, therefore, needs to follow the provisions of S. 90
which alone prevails.

6. Many a time, an order is supported by several reasons out
of which some may be found to be of no relevance to the determination of issue
involved. Mention of such reasons is held non-sequitur even if the
conclusions are upheld in appeal. In State of Maharashtra v. Chandrabhan
Tale,
1983 AIR 803, the Supreme Court was to decide on the legality of the
second proviso to Rule 151(1)(ii)(b) of the Bombay Civil Service Rules 1959
which provided for award of subsistence allowance at rupees one per month to a
government servant who is convicted and sentenced to imprisonment and whose
appeal against the conviction is pending. Concurring with his fellow Judge who
held that rule as illegal, inter alia, for reason of ludicrously low
amount of subsistence allowance, Chinnappa Reddy, J considered the observations
about the nature of public employment opportunity made by the fellow judge as
non-sequitur
and held that “Though the view that public employment
opportunily is national wealth in which all citizens are equally entitled to
share and that no class of people can monopolise public employment in the guise
of efficiency or other ground, is correct, it is non-sequitur“.

He did not favour the right to equal opportunity to public
employment to be treated as a new form of private property and saw no reason to
introduce a new concept of property so as to bring in its wake the vestiges of
the doctrine of leissez faire and create, in the name of efficiency, a
new oligarchy.

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Ab inconvenienti

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The Word

Literal interpretation is normally the rule, unless such an
interpretation leads to injustice, absurdity, extreme hardship or fails to avoid
the mischief sought to be avoided when different rules of interpretation are
applied to arrive at the most probable legislative intent conforming to the
objectives of the legislation. An interpretation is sometimes assailed on ground
of inconvenience likely to be faced if a particular view is taken. Such
challenges based on argumentum ‘ab inconvenienti’, though relevant in
judicial decisions, have a limited force and is generally applied with great
care.


2. “Every Legislation” as observed by Krishna Iyer, J in
Swantraj & Others v. State of Maharashtra,
1974 AIR 517 “is a social
document and judicial construction seeks to decipher the statutory mission,
language permitting, taking the cue from the rule in Heydon’s case of
suppressing the evil and advancing the remedy”. Laws enacted for general
advantage do sometimes result in individual hardship, notably in laws relating
to limitation, registration, attestation and the like. Such individual hardships
or injustice are not taken as having bearing on the legality and do not become
the basis for rejecting a natural construction. Arguments based on inconvenience
assume significance only when the resulting hardship is likely to be faced by
the community at large or affects the general good of the society.

3. The aforesaid view finds expression in Mohinder Singh
Gill and Anr. v. The Chief Election Commissioner,
[1978 AIR 851 (SC)] where
an order of the Election Commission directing repoll in the entire constituency,
on destruction of papers and ballot boxes of some segments in a mob violence,
was challenged as arbitrary and violative of any vestige of fairness. The
failure of the Commission to provide opportunity before directing a repoll was
an argument taken by the appellant against which the plea ‘ab inconvenienti’
was advanced on behalf of the Commission, considering the supposedly large
number of persons affected. Reliance was placed on the earlier decision of the
Supreme Court in Subhash Chander Sinha’s case (1970) 3 SCR 963, where
re-examination was ordered by the Board after the examination was vitiated by
adoption of unfair means on a mass scale. In that case Hidayatullah, J repelled the plea of violation of natural
justice in not affording opportunity of hearing to affected persons. The Court
upheld the action taken without prior opportunity, considering that students
generally had outside assistance in answering question which results in
impossible plurality, frustrating the feasibility of notice and hearing.

4. While agreeing with the ratio of Subhash Chander (supra)
based on argument ‘ab inconvenienti’ dispensing with natural justice of
providing hearing in that case, the Supreme Court in Mohinder Singh Gill (supra)
distinguished that case from the case directing repoll. The Court observed
“attractively ingenious and seemingly precedented, argumentum ‘ab
inconvenienti’
has its limitation and cannot override established
procedures”. Whereas vitiated examination was not a case of any particular
individual who was charged and rested on conduct of a vast majority of examinees
at a particular centre, there is no such plurality in vitiated election as the
candidates concerned stand on a different footing from the electorate in
general. The plea of ‘ab inconvenienti’ was, therefore, held
inapplicable, and not giving the notice was taken an infirmity. As observed by
the Court, there may be a parallel in electoral situation if the Election
Commission cancels a poll because it is satisfied that the procedure adopted has
gone away on a wholesale basis.

5. Even in cases of hardship or inconvenience to persons in
general, Courts are generally reluctant to go by such considerations if the
interpretation/action otherwise conforms to the purpose and objective of the
legislation and such difficulties are possible to be taken care of by other
measures. A few decided cases will bring out the judicial approach in the
matter. In Smt. Ujjain Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1962 AIR 1621 (SC)
the issue was the entertainability of a writ petition challenging the order of
the sales tax officer, which was filed when the appellate proceedings before the
sales-tax authorities were in the midstream. The Court disapproved the argument
‘ab inconvenienti’ of the State. As it is the duty of the Court to
enforce a fundamental right of a party, if any authority has infringed his
rights, considerations based upon inconvenience are, of no relevance”. In a
situation like this, the Court indicated measures to avoid alleged inconvenience
including allowing the petitioner to withdraw the petition with liberty to file
it at a later stage, or, if the party does not agree to withdraw, may adjourn it
sine die till after the remedies are exhausted.

6. Swantraj and Ors v. State of Maharashtra, (supra),
was a case where the issue involved was whether the licence under the Drugs and
Cosmetics Act, 1940 which permitted stocking and selling drugs in a specified
vehicle, covered the brief interval of storage in the godown before loading the
drugs on to the appellant’s van. An argument ‘ab inconvenienti’ was
advanced from the side of the appellant and it was contended that it would be
impossible to furnish the details of very many possible places where for short
intervals drugs may have to be stored awaiting the arrival of the van. Krishna
Iyer, J speaking for the Court, referred to the paramount purpose of the
regulations through licensing as setting in motion vigilant medical watch over
the proper protection of drugs and medicines and held that the objective will be
frustrated if godowns, temporary stores, etc. can be unlicensed. The argument
‘ab inconvenienti’
was held to be affording no answer.

7. In Bengal Immunity Company Ltd. v. The State of Bihar and Ors., (1954) INSC 120, the Court was to decide the constitutionality of inter-state sales tax levied by the State of Bihar in respect of sales made in some other State but delivered in Bihar for consumption purpose. Delivering the dissenting judgment holding it constitutional, J. Das, Venkatararna Ayyer and B. P. Sinha JJ considered, among other, the argument ‘ab inconvenienti’ and disapproved its application. They observed that “even with reference to the inconvenience that might result from the multiplicity of assessment proceedings, it is one which is capable of being removed without disturbing the existing scheme of the Constitution, by Parliament enacting a law constituting an Authority under Article 367 and conferring on it power to receive from the sellers one consolidated statement of all their sales outside their State and determining the precise extent thereof effected in the several States and making that determination final for purposes of assessment by the States. That would, on the one hand, secure to the States the finance legitimately due to them and at the same time, save the sellers from the harassment of multiplicity of proceedings.

8. The  question   as  to  whether   a voluntary income-tax return showing income less than the taxable limit filed on the last day would be a valid return so as to deprive the Department of the power to initiate reassessment proceedings u/s.34(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, was decided in assessee’s favour rejecting the Department’s argument ‘ab inconvenienti’. Countering the argument that if the return is held valid, the Department will be drivert to complete the assessment proceedings within a few hours or lose the right to send a notice u/s.34(l), the Court observed that the Income-tax Officer could have avoided the result by issuing a notice u/ s.23(2) and not remaining inactive until the period was about to expire. All laws of limitation lead to some inconvenience and hard cases. The remedy is for the Legislature to amend the law suitably [The Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v. V Ranchhoddas Karsondas, 1959 AIR 1154 (SC)].

S. 271(1)(c) — Deduction u/s.80HHC — Assessee included miscellaneous income without reducing 90% — Penalty cannot be levied simply because assessee had not reduced 90% of other incomes.

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New Page 2

Part
A: Reported Decisions


48 (2010) 124 ITD 353 (Delhi)

Model Footwear (P.) Ltd. v. ITO

A.Y. 1998-99. Dated : 22-5-2009

 

S. 271(1)(c) — Deduction u/s.80HHC — Assessee included
miscellaneous income without reducing 90% — Penalty cannot be levied simply
because assessee had not reduced 90% of other incomes.

The assessee claimed deduction u/s.80HHC of Rs. 1,52,63,904.
While doing so, the assessee included interest income, miscellaneous income and
excess provision written back in the profit without reducing 90% thereof. The
AO, by applying the Explanation (baa) to S. 80HHC, excluded 90% of aforesaid
amounts and worked out deduction u/s.80HHC. He also initiated penalty
proceedings u/s.271(1)(c).

The CIT(A) confirmed the above additions. Thereafter, the AO
proceeded with penalty proceedings.

The CIT(A) confirmed that penalty u/s.271(1)(c) is leviable
in the assessee’s case.

Held :

The question of excluding interest income and miscellaneous
income is dependent upon the nature of incomes — whether they are directly
connected to operations of the assessee’s business. Simply because the assessee
had claimed deduction without reducing 90% of aforesaid incomes, it cannot be
said that the assessee has concealed income or has made incorrect claim. The
assessee’s claim was a bona fide one and the assessee has disclosed all material
facts. Hence, no penalty u/s.271(1)(c) is to be levied.

Note : The above issue was the main issue involved in the case.
The other issues being minor issues have not been reported.

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S. 271(1)(c) — The constitution of Special Bench itself suggests that there was some force in the claim of the assessee — If there is a debatable issue and action of the assessee is bona fide being based on adoption of one of the possible views, the penal

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New Page 2

Part
A: Reported Decisions


47 (2010) 39 DTR (Del.) (Trib.) 202

Pradeep Agencies Joint Venture v. ITO

A.Ys. : 2003-04 & 2004-05. Dated : 31-3-2010

 

S. 271(1)(c) — The constitution of Special Bench itself
suggests that there was some force in the claim of the assessee — If there is a
debatable issue and action of the assessee is bona fide being based on adoption
of one of the possible views, the penalty is not leviable.

Facts :

The assessee was an AOP and during the relevant assessment
years it filed return of income at nil and it was claimed that it had
distributed the profit amongst its members as per their respective shares which
are determined and defined in the joint venture agreement and all of them have
shown their share as income u/s.67A and, therefore, S. 167B(2) was not
applicable. The assessee supported its claim by relying on the decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Murlidhar Jhawar & Purna Ginning & Pressing
Factory, 60 ITR 95 and also by Board’s Circular No. 75/19/191/62-ITJ, dated 24th
August, 1966.

The contention of the assessee was not accepted by the AO and
income was taxed in the hands of the AOP at maximum marginal rate as per S.
167B(2). The matter went up to the Tribunal and Special Bench was constituted.
The Special Bench held that the assessment made on the AOP is valid as reliance
could not be placed on the Circular as the same had lost its validity in the
light of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of ITO v. Ch. Atchaiah,
218 ITR 239 and also there was amendment in the provisions of the Act by virtue
of which the AO had lost option to the assessee either AOP or its members under
the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961 as compared to the provisions of the
1922 Act.

The penalty was levied on the ground that the assessee has
not come clean on the issue of taxing the income received by AOP u/s.167B(2) and
tried to mislead the Department.

Held :

It has to be kept in mind that quantum proceedings are
different and distinct from the penalty proceedings. In penalty proceedings,
mere confirmation of addition in quantum proceedings cannot be said to be
conclusive factor to hold that penalty is leviable. According to the facts of
the present case, right from the beginning it has been the case of the assessee
that its claim of filing substantial income in the hands of the members of the
AOP was supported by the decision of the Supreme Court, which was even
interpreted by the CBDT in its Circular to be applicable to the provisions of
the Income-tax Act, 1961. It is also the case of the assessee that even if the
legal position had been settled by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case
of Ch. Atchaiah (supra), then also the Circular being a benevolent one could not
be refused to be applied by the Department unless the same is withdrawn. The
constitution of the Special Bench itself suggests that there was some force in
the claim of the assessee or at least the view taken by the assessee could not
be said to be totally devoid of merit. The reference of issue to the Special
Bench is indicative of the fact that there was a lot of debate on the issue
whether the benevolent Circular will prevail even after the decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of Ch. Atchaiah (supra). Thus, it is certainly a case
where two views of the matter were possible. Where there is a debatable issue
and action of the assessee is bona fide being based on adoption of one of the
possible views, the penalty is not leviable even if in the quantum proceedings
it was not finally accepted by the Tribunal.

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S. 80-IA — The eligibility for the claim of deduction u/s.80-IA by applying the restraints of S. 80-IA(3) cannot be considered for every year of the claim of deduction u/s.80-IA, but can be considered only in the year of formation of the business.

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New Page 2

Part
A: Reported Decisions


46 (2010) 39 DTR (Del.) (Trib.) 17

Tata Communications Internet Services Ltd. v.
ITO

A.Y. : 2006-07. Dated : 26-2-2010

 

S. 80-IA — The eligibility for the claim of deduction
u/s.80-IA by applying the restraints of S. 80-IA(3) cannot be considered for
every year of the claim of deduction u/s.80-IA, but can be considered only in
the year of formation of the business.

Facts :

The company was in the business of providing fax mail
services. The company started two new services being Internet services and
Internet telephony services as per the licence issued from the Department of
Telecommunication (DOT). The assessee claimed that as per the provisions of
S. 80-IA(4), the assessee was entitled to the deduction right from the A.Y.
2001-02 as the first invoice was made on 17th October, 2000. The assessee did
not claim deduction u/s.80-IA(4) for the A.Ys. 2001-02, 2002-03 and 2003-04 and
the first year of claim u/s.80-IA(4) was for A.Y. 2004-05 and for the
A.Ys. 2004-05 and 2005-06 the assessee had been granted the deduction where the
assessment orders were passed u/s.143(3) of the Act.

The AO denied the deduction u/s.80-IA(4) for A.Y. 2006-07 on
the ground that this was a new business in which the assessee had used the plant
and machinery previously used in its business of fax mail services.

Held :

The bar as provided in S. 80-IA(3) is to be considered only
for the first year of claim of deduction
u/s.80-IA. Once the assessee has been shown to have used new plant and machinery
which was not previously used for any purpose and it is established that the
undertaking is not formed by splitting up or reconstruction of a business
already in existence the assessee becomes entitled to the deduction u/s.80-IA.
In the subsequent years, the assessee may acquire fresh machinery and plant
whether new or previously used for any purpose. As the deduction is available on
the income of the undertaking and the bar provided u/s.80-IA(3) is in relation
to the formation of undertaking, once the formation is complete the development
of undertaking cannot be put under restraints of S. 80-IA(3) of the Act. The
eligibility for the claim of deduction u/s.80-IA by applying the restraints of
S. 80-IA(3) cannot be considered for every year of the claim of deduction
u/s.80-IA, but can be considered only in the year of formation of the
undertaking.

Even otherwise in the present case, the clause (ii) of S.
80-IA(4) having been inserted in S. 80-IA(3) w.e.f. 1st April, 2005 and the
business of the assessee has been formed and commenced much before 1st April,
2005, the restrictions placed by S. 80-IA(3) to the provisions of S.
80-IA(4)(ii) would not bar that assessee for continuing with its claim of
deduction u/s.80-IA.

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Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 70(1), S. 80IA(5). An assessee running two separate undertakings can set off depreciation of the undertaking whose income is eligible for deduction u/s.80IA against business income of the other undertaking whose income is not eli

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New Page 2

Part
A: Reported Decisions

45 2010 TIOL 338 ITAT (Bang.)

Swarnagiri Wire Insulations Pvt. Ltd. v. ITO

A.Y. : 2006-07. Dated : 21-5-2010

Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 70(1), S. 80IA(5). An assessee
running two separate undertakings can set off depreciation of the undertaking
whose income is eligible for deduction u/s.80IA against business income of the
other undertaking whose income is not eligible for deduction u/s.80IA.

Facts :

The assessee had two undertakings — one carrying on the
business of manufacturing of super-enameled copper winding wires and the other
carrying on the business of generation of power through windmills. The profits
of the undertaking generating power through windmills qualified for deduction
u/s.80IA, whereas the profits of the other business of manufacturing
super-enameled copper winding wires did not qualify for deduction u/s.80IA.
During the year under consideration, the assessee filed a revised computation of
income, claimed business income of Rs.60,00,829 from which it deducted
Rs.73,20,339 being loss/depreciation of undertaking generating power. The
Assessing Officer (AO) held that since the profits of the undertaking generating
power through windmill qualify for deduction u/s.80IA the loss/depreciation of
this undertaking cannot be set off against the income of the undertaking whose
profits do not qualify for deduction u/s.80IA. He, accordingly, denied the
set-off claimed by the assessee, but allowed it to carry forward the
loss/depreciation of undertaking generating power to the subsequent assessment
year.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who
rejected the appeal of the assessee.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

(1) For the purpose of determining the quantum of deduction
as referred in Ss.(1) to S. 80IA in respect of an eligible business, the
computation will have to be done as if such eligible business was the only
source of income to the assessee in all the relevant years of claim commencing
from the initial assessment year.

(2) S. 80IA is a beneficial Section permitting certain
deductions in respect of certain income under Chapter VIA of the Act. A
provision granting incentive for promotion of economic growth and development in
taxing statutes should be liberally construed and restriction placed on it by
way of exception, should be construed in a reasonable and purposive manner so as
to advance the objects of the provision. It is a generally accepted principle
that the deeming provision of a particular Section cannot be breathed into
another Section. Therefore, the deeming provision contained in S. 80IA(5) cannot
override the S. 70(1) of the Act. The CIT(A)’s observation on this regard that
the specific provision of S. 80IA(5) have overriding effect is not acceptable.

(3) The assessee was entitled, as per provisions of the Act,
to claim depreciation on windmill at Rs.78,72,094 and had generated income from
windmill power generation business of Rs.5,51,755. Thus, the loss on account of
business eligible for deduction u/s.80IA was Rs.73,20,339. Since there was a
loss for the previous year, the question of deduction u/s.80IA did not arise.
The Tribunal held that as per S. 70(1), the assessee is eligible to set off this
loss of Rs.73,20,339 from another source under the same head of income. However,
during the subsequent assessment year, this loss has to be notionally carried
forward under the same source and set off before claiming deduction u/s. 80IA of
the Act.

The Tribunal directed the AO to set off the loss of the
assessee on windmill operations from the other source under the same head of
income. The appeal of the assessee was allowed.

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Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 147, S. 148, S. 263. When CIT has after considering the explanations offered by the assessee dropped the proposed proceedings u/s.263, the AO has no locus standi to issue notice u/s.148 on the same set of facts.

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New Page 2

Part
A: Reported Decisions

44 2010 TIOL 350 ITAT (Bang.)

Asea Brown Boveri Ltd. v.
ACIT

A.Y. : 1988-89. Dated : 13-5-2010

 

Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 147, S. 148, S. 263. When CIT has
after considering the explanations offered by the assessee dropped the proposed
proceedings u/s.263, the AO has no locus standi to issue notice u/s.148 on the
same set of facts.

Facts :

The total income of the assessee was originally assessed
u/s.143(3) of the Act. The CIT proposed a revision u/s.263, but later on dropped
the same accepting the explanations offered by the assessee-company. The reasons
which prompted the CIT to issue notice u/s.263 were regarding technical know-how
fees, cash assistance and duty draw-back, consideration of doubtful debts for
the deduction u/s.32AB and matter regarding deduction u/s.80I. The reasons
recorded by the Assessing Officer (AO) for issuing notice u/s.148 and the
reasons reflected in the notice u/s.148 were nothing else but the very same
issues considered by the CIT for the purpose of S. 263 proceedings. The AO
having issued notice u/s.148 completed the assessment u/s.143(3) r.w. S. 147 of
the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A)
challenging the validity of reassessment proceedings and contending that the
reassessment is bad in law and void ab initio. The CIT(A) upheld the order
passed by the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal
where it contended that when the CIT has dropped the proposed proceedings
u/s.263 on arriving at the satisfaction of the explanations offered by the
assessee-company, the AO has no locus standi to issue notice u/s.148 on the same
set of issues and thereafter to frame an assessment u/s147.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that in A.Y. 1987-88 on similar facts and
circumstances, a similar issue had arisen in the case of the assessee and the
Tribunal had in that case found that the Madras High Court has in the case of
CIT v. Ramachandra Hatcheries, (305 ITR 117) (Mad.) considered the same legal
issue i.e., whether S. 147 action is permissible in a case where proceedings
u/s.263 had already been dropped. The Madras High Court has in the said case
held that the AO has no jurisdiction to reopen an assessment u/s.147 so as to
circumvent the order of the CIT passed u/s.263, which had become final unless
and until the order was set aside by any process known to law.

The Tribunal also noted that when a Co-ordinate Bench has
already passed an order on an issue it has to follow the said order of the
Co-ordinate Bench unless the facts are different or new questions of law have
been raised or new materials have been placed. If the facts and circumstances
are the same and the law considered the same and the materials placed before the
Tribunal are also the same, the Tribunal has to follow the earlier decision of
the Co-ordinate Bench as that is the mandate of rule of judicial precedence and
that of judicial discipline. If the Tribunal does not follow the earlier
decision of the Co-ordinate Bench without valid reasons, it would be an
onslaught of the Rule of Law. Not to follow the order of the Co-ordinate Bench
would be ridiculed as a pompous show of self-righteousness. That is why the
Supreme Court has in the case of Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, (178 ITR 548)
(SC) has held that the Tribunal has to follow its own decision and should not
differ from its earlier view simply because a contrary view is possible.

The Tribunal following the order for A.Y. 1987-88 held the
reopening of assessment made by AO to be bad in law and set aside the order
passed by the AO u/s.143(3) r.w. S. 147 of the Act.

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Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 32(2) — Effect of substitution of S. 32(2) w.e.f. A.Y. 2002-03 is that unabsorbed depreciation of the earlier period is allowable under the new provision, but has to be dealt with in accordance with the old provision and is subje

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New Page 2

Part
A: Reported Decisions

43 2010 TIOL 340 ITAT Mum.-SB

DCIT v. Times Guaranty Limited

A.Ys. : 2003-04 & 2004-05. Dated : 30-6-2010

 

Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 32(2) — Effect of substitution of
S. 32(2) w.e.f. A.Y. 2002-03 is that unabsorbed depreciation of the earlier
period is allowable under the new provision, but has to be dealt with in
accordance with the old provision and is subject to the limitation of being
eligible for set-off only against business income and for 8 years. Unabsorbed
depreciation relating to A.Ys. 1997-98 to 2001-02 cannot be set off against
non-business income of A.Y. 2003-04.

Facts :

During the assessment years under consideration the assessee
continued to derive income from the business of merchant banking activity. For
the assessment years under consideration the assessee claimed to set off
unabsorbed depreciation determined in A.Y. 1997-98 and A.Y. 1998-99 against
income under the head ‘Income from Other Sources’. The assessing officer did not
allow the claim.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who
relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Virmani
Industries Private Limited, (216 ITR 607) held that unabsorbed depreciation was
available to an assessee perpetually for set-off against the gross total income.

Aggrieved, the Department preferred an appeal to the
Tribunal. The President constituted a Special Bench to consider the following
question :

“On the facts and circumstances of the case, whether the
unabsorbed depreciation relating to A.Ys. 1997-98 to 1999-2000 is to be dealt
with in accordance with the provisions of
S. 32(2) as applicable for A.Ys. 1997-98 to 1999-2000 as claimed by the
Revenue or the same has to be dealt with in accordance with the provisions as
applicable to A.Ys. 2003-04 and 2004-05 as claimed by the assessee.”

Held :

(1) The amendment to S. 32(2), by the Finance Act, 2001
w.e.f. 1-4-2002 is a substantive amendment. Amendment to a substantive provision
is normally prospective unless expressly stated otherwise or it appears so by
necessary implication. The substantive provision contained in S. 32(2) as
substituted by the Finance Act, 2001 w.e.f. 1-4-2002 is prospectively applicable
to A.Y. 2002-03 onwards.

(2) S. 32(2) is a deeming provision. A deeming provision
cannot be extended beyond the purpose for which it is intended. By a legal
fiction, the amount of depreciation allowance u/s.32(1) which is not fully
absorbed against income for that year is deemed to be the part of depreciation
allowance for the succeeding year(s).

(3) S. 32(1) deals with depreciation allowance for the
current year and S. 32(2) uses the present tense to refer to allowance to which
effect ‘cannot be’ and ‘has not been’ given. This indicates that S. 32(2) speaks
of depreciation allowance u/s.32(1) for the current year starting from A.Y.
2002-03. Brought forward unabsorbed depreciation of earlier years cannot be
included within the scope of S. 32(2). If the intention of the Legislature had
been to allow such b/fd unabsorbed depreciation of earlier years at par with
current depreciation for the year u/s.32(1), u/s.32(2) would have used past or
past perfect tense and not the present tense. Further, the unabsorbed
depreciation for the period from A.Y. 1997-98 to A.Y. 1999-2000 has been
referred to as ‘unabsorbed depreciation allowance’ and given a special name and
cannot fall within S. 32(1) in A.Y. 2002-03.

(4) The effect of the amendment to S. 32(2) is that
unabsorbed depreciation of the earlier period is allowable under the new
provision, but has to be dealt with in accordance with the restrictions
contained in the old provision and is subject to the limitation of being
eligible for set-off only against business income. It can be carried forward
after a period of eight years.

(5) The legal position of current and brought forward
unadjusted/unabsorbed depreciation allowance in the three periods is summarised
as under :

A. In the first period (i.e., up to A.Y. 1996-97)

(i) Current depreciation, that is the amount of allowance
for the year u/s.32(1), can be set off against income under any head within
the same year.

(ii) Amount of such current depreciation which cannot be so
set off within the same year as per (i) above shall be deemed as depreciation
u/s.32(1), that is depreciation for the current year in the following year(s)
to be set off against income under any head, like current depreciation.

B. In the second period (i.e., A.Y. 1997-98 to 2001-02)

(i) Brought forward unadjusted depreciation allowance for
and up to A.Y. 1996-97 (hereinafter called the ‘First unadjusted depreciation
allowance’), which could not be set off up to A.Y. 1996-97, shall be carried
forward for set-off against income under any head for a maximum period of
eight A.Ys. starting from A.Y. 1997-98.

(ii) Current depreciation for the year u/s.32(1) (for each
year separately starting from A.Y. 1997-98 up to A.Y. 2001-02) can be set off
firstly against business income and then against income under any other head.

(iii) Amount of current depreciation for A.Ys. 1997-98 to
2001-02 which cannot be so set off as per (ii). above, hereinafter called the
‘Second unabsorbed depreciation allowance’ shall be carried forward for a
maximum of eight assessment years from the A.Y. immediately succeeding the
A.Y. for which it was first computed, to be set off only against the income
under head ‘Profit and gains of business or profession’.

C.    In the third period (i.e., A.Y. 2002-03 onwards)

(i)    ‘First unadjusted depreciation allowance’ can be set off up to A.Y. 2004-05, that is, the remaining period out of the maximum period of eight A.Ys. [as per (Bi) above] against income under any head.
(ii)    ‘Second unabsorbed depreciation allowance’ can be set off only against the income under the head ‘Profit and gains of business or profession’ within the period of eight A.Ys. succeeding the

A.Y. for which it was first computed.
(iii)    Current depreciation for the year u/s. 32(1), for each year separately, starting from A.Y.
2002-03 can be set off against income under any head. Amount of depreciation allowance not so set off (hereinafter called the ‘Third unadjusted depreciation allowance’) shall be carried forward to the following year.
(iv)    The ‘Third unadjusted depreciation allowance’ shall be deemed as depreciation u/s.32(1), that is depreciation for the current year in the following year(s) to be set off against income under any head, like current depreciation, in perpetuity.
(6)    The argument that the Department having taken a stand in Jai Ushin Ltd. [ITA No. 3412/ (Delhi)/2006] cannot argue to the contrary is not acceptable. Such limitation if placed on the Revenue will also have to apply to the assessee. Further, as a Special Bench is constituted to resolve conflict of opinion amongst different Benches, it will be too harsh to stop the assessee or the Revenue from arguing the case in the way they like.

(7)    The principle that if two interpretations are possible, then the view in favour of the assessee should be adopted cannot be applied in a loose manner so as to debar a superior authority from examining the legal validity of conflicting views expressed by lower authorities. This rule is applicable where the provision in question is such which is capable of two equally convincing interpretations and not otherwise.

S. 158BC and S. 158BD — Search warrant having been issued in the name of assessee’s husband, proceedings u/s.158BC cannot be initiated against the assessee

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  1. (2009) 120 TTJ 320 (Mum.)


Smt. Nasreen Yusuf Dhanani v.
ACIT

IT(SS)A No. 203 (Mum.) of 2002

Block Period : 1-4-1986 to 18-12-1996

Dated : 5-10-2007

 

The Assessing Officer passed the block assessment order in
the assessee’s case making huge additions of unclosed income. The assessee’s
plea that since there was no search warrant in the name of the assessee, the
Assessing Officer should drop the block assessment proceedings initiated in
her name was not considered.


The Tribunal, relying on the decisions in the following
cases, held in favour of the assessee :


(a) Jt. CIT v. Latika V. Waman, (2005) 1 SOT 535
(Mum.)

(b) Dhiraj Suri v. Addl. CIT, (2006) 99 TTJ 525
(Del.)/(2006) 98 ITD 187 (Del.)

The Tribunal noted as under :

(1) Chapter XIV-B is a special procedure for making
assessment of search cases. These provisions of block assessment come into
picture only as a result of search action carried out u/s.132. On reading
the provisions of S. 132(1), it is clear that the section is person-specific
and not premises-specific as argued by the Departmental Representative. The
primary target for conducting a search action is the person who is in
possession of any unclosed income and the search party can enter and search
any building, place, vessel, vehicle or aircraft where the undisclosed
assets or incriminating documents are likely to be found in relation to such
person.

(2) It is an undisputed fact that there is no search
warrant issued in the name of the assessee. In respect of the Panchnama
issued in respect of the bank lockers, it is seen that the Panchnama is in
the names of husband and the assessee for the simple reason that the bank
lockers were in joint names of husband and wife, the name of husband being
first in all the lockers.

(3) As per S. 158BB(1) r.w. S. 132(1), the position is
clear that in order to assess undisclosed income of any person in accordance
with Chapter XIV-B, a search is a prerequisite for the initiation of block
assessment proceedings. Since there is no search warrant issued in the name
of the assessee, the block assessment proceedings u/s. 158BC cannot be
sustained.

(4) If in the course of search of husband, any material
incriminating his wife had been found then the proper course for the
Assessing Officer would have been to issue a notice u/s.158BD. When specific
procedures are prescribed for persons who are searched and for persons in
respect of whom incriminating material is found, the AO cannot bypass the
prescribed procedures and issue notice u/s.158BC on a person who was not
subjected to search.


(5) In the case of the assessee, it was intimated to the
Assessing Officer (AO) vide letter dated 15th December 1997 that there is no
search warrant in her name and, hence, the block assessment pro-ceedings
initiated u/s.158BC need to be drop-ped and, even then, the AO has proceeded
to make assessment u/s.158BC. The entire proceedings undertaken by the AO were
bad in law and hence, the assessment is quashed.



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S. 115JA(3), CBDT Circular No. 763, dated 18-2-1998 — Credit for MAT can be carried forward for a total of six years and not ‘five assessment years’ mentioned in sub-para 2 of para 45.4 of CBDT Circular No.763 — Statutory provisions prevail over a Circula

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  1. 2009 TIOL 404 ITAT (Mad.)


ITO v.
Data Software Research Company (International) Pvt. Ltd.

ITA No. 1602/Mds./2008

A.Y. : 2003-2004. Dated : 16-4-2009

 

Facts :

While assessing the total income of the assessee, a private
limited company, u/s.143(3) the AO had allowed credit for Rs.14,69,706 being
MAT paid in A.Y. 1997-98. Subsequently, the AO issued notice proposing to
withdraw MAT credit of Rs.14,69,706 by passing an order u/s.154. In response
to the show-cause notice the assessee contended that u/s.115JAA(3) MAT credit
can be set off for a period of 5 years immediately succeeding the assessment
year in which the credit became available. The AO did not accept this
contention and passed an order u/s.154 of the Act withdrawing tax credit of
A.Y. 1997-98 on the ground that u/s.115JAA the tax credit of A.Y. 1997-98 was
available for set-off only up to A.Y. 2002-03 and after that it cannot be set
off.


The CIT(A) allowed the assessee’s appeal.


Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal held that there is no ambiguity in the
language of S. 115JAA(3). The carry forward is available for a total of six
(1+5) years. The Tribunal observed that the confusion has arisen because of
the language used in CBDT Circular No. 763, dated 18-2-1998. The Tribunal held
that the period of ‘five assessment years’ mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) of
paragraph 45.3 of the said Circular contradicts what is stated in Ss.(3) of S.
115JAA. The Tribunal stated that it is trite law that statutory provisions
prevail over a Circular in case of a contradiction between the two. The
Tribunal stated that this position has been reiterated by the Apex Court in
CCE v. Ratan Melting & Wire Industries Ltd.,
220 CTR 98 (SC). The Tribunal
upheld the order of the CIT(A) and dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue.


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S. 2(42A), S. 48, S. 49(1)(e), Explanation III to S. 48 — Where assessee transferred the shares held by it to its 100% subsidiary which shares were retransferred by the subsidiary to the assessee and thereafter were sold by the assessee, the assessee was

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  1. 2009 TIOL 383 ITAT (Mum.)


ACIT v.
Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.

ITA No. 2672/Mum./2006

A.Y. : 2000-01. Dated : 2-2-2009

 

Facts :

The assessee company had purchased 2,06,000 equity shares
of M/s. Trumac Engineering Company Ltd. on 7-11-1994. In the financial year
1995-96, the entire lot of 2,06,000 shares were transferred by the assessee to
its 100% wholly-owned subsidiary, M/s. Hamko Financial Services Ltd., (‘the
subsidiary’). In the financial year 1998-99, the subsidiary transferred back
the said shares to the assessee. During the financial year 1999-2000, the
assessee sold 1,56,000 shares out of the said 2,06,000 shares for a
consideration of Rs.70,20,000. The assessee in its return of income for A.Y.
2000-01 claimed loss on sale of these shares at Rs.14,55,72,296 by adopting
the indexation from 1994-95 i.e., the initial date of acquisition by
the assessee. The AO while passing order u/s.143(3) r.w.s. 147 of the Act held
that the assessee was entitled to indexation from the date the shares were
retransferred by the subsidiary to the assessee i.e., financial year
1998-99. Accordingly, the AO computed the indexed cost of acquisition of
shares sold by the assessee to be Rs.11,25,96,594 as against Rs.15,25,92,296
computed by the assessee.


The CIT(A) relying on the decision of the Mumbai Bench of
the Tribunal in the case of DCIT v. Meera Khera in ITA No. 5258/M/1998
of A.Y. 1995-96 and the decision of the Chandigarh Bench of the Tribunal in
the case of Mrs. Pushpa Sofat v. ITO, 81 ITD 1 (Chd.) upheld the
contention of the assessee.


Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal after referring to S. 48, S. 49(1)(e),
Explanation to S. 2(42A) and second proviso to S. 48 held that on a conjoint
reading of these provisions it is evident that in calculating long-term
capital gain on sale of shares of Trumac Engineering Company Ltd., the indexed
cost has to be calculated with reference to the cost, holding period and
indexation factor of the first owner i.e., from 1994-95. It held that
the cost has to be indexed from the date the shares were originally acquired
by the assessee company. It stated that the transfer from the assessee to its
subsidiary and retransfer from the said company has got to be ignored, as
provided in the above provisions of the Act. The Tribunal held that there was
no mistake in the capital gain disclosed by the assessee. Accordingly, it held
that the AO was not justified in denying the benefit of indexation from the
initial date of acquisition. It, accordingly, dismissed the appeal of the
Revenue.


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S. 139A, S. 272B — Penalty u/s.272B cannot be levied on the deductor for not quoting PAN of deductee in the quarterly statements filed in Form No. 26Q.

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  1. 2009 TIOL 370 ITAT (Bang.)


D. V. Steel Corporation v.
ITO (TDS)

ITA No. 907/Bang/2008

A.Y. : 2007-08. Date of Order : 27-2-2009

 

Facts :

The assessee firm filed quarterly statement in Form No. 26Q
for the 4th quarter of financial year 2006-07 without quoting therein PAN of
the deductees. The Assessing Officer was of the view that not quoting PAN of
deductees was contrary to the provisions of S. 139A(5B) of the Act. The AO
issued notice to the assessee asking it to show cause why penalty u/s.272B(1)
should not be levied for not quoting the PAN of the deductees in the
statement. The assessee submitted non-availability of the same to be the
reason for non-furnishing of PAN in the quarterly statement. The AO did not
find this to be a reasonable cause. He levied a penalty of Rs.10,000.


The CIT(A) confirmed the action of the AO.


Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal
where it was contended that not quoting the PAN was for a reasonable cause
since the asses-see was being asked to do something which was im-possible; it
had no statutory right or power to compel the deductee to furnish the PAN; not
quoting PAN was for no fault on the part of the assessee.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that there is no mechanism at the end of
the assessee to compel the deductee to give its PAN. The Tribunal was of the
view that the facts of the present case are identical to those before the
Ahmedabad Bench of Tribunal in the case of Financial Co-operative Bank Ltd.
where it has been held that since the rules and the provisions of the Act did
not cast an obligation on the manager of a bank to ensure that Form No. 60
filed by the customer was duly filled in, the failure to comply with the
provisions of S. 139A was on the part of the customer of the bank and not on
the part of the bank. The Tribunal following the reasoning of the said
decision of the Ahmedabad Bench directed the AO to delete the penalty.


          The
appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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Notification No. 42/2010 — Service Tax, dated 28-6-2010.

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New Page 1

Part B : INDIRECT TAXES

SERVICE TAX UPDATE

Notifications :

86 Notification No. 42/2010 — Service Tax, dated 28-6-2010.

W.e.f. 1-7-2010, by this Notification the Central Government
has exempted taxable services of commercial or industrial construction when
provided wholly within the airport.

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Notification No. 41/2010 — Service Tax, dated 28-6-2010.

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New Page 1

Part B : INDIRECT TAXES

SERVICE TAX UPDATE

Notifications :

85 Notification No. 41/2010 — Service Tax, dated 28-6-2010.

W.e.f. 1-7-2010, by this Notification taxable services as
enlisted in the Notification have been exempted when provided wholly within the
port or other port or airport.

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Notification No. 39/2010 — Service Tax, dated 28-6-2010.

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New Page 1

Part B : INDIRECT TAXES

SERVICE TAX UPDATE

Notifications :

84 Notification No. 39/2010 — Service Tax, dated 28-6-2010.

W.e.f. 1-7-2010, by this Notification Service Tax Rules, 1994
have been amended to provide in respect of services of transportation of
passengers by air, an invoice or bill or challan shall include ticket in any
form.

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Notification No. 38/2010 — Service Tax, dated 28-6-2010.

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New Page 1

Part B : INDIRECT TAXES

SERVICE TAX UPDATE

Notifications :

83 Notification No. 38/2010 — Service Tax, dated 28-6-2010.

W.e.f. 1-7-2010, by this Notification commercial or
industrial construction services provided wholly within the port or other port
for construction, repair, alteration and renovation of wharves, quays, docks,
stages, jetties, piers and railways have been exempted.

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Notification No. 37/2010 — Service Tax, dated 28-6-2010.

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New Page 1

Part B : INDIRECT TAXES

SERVICE TAX UPDATE

Notifications :

82 Notification No. 37/2010 — Service Tax, dated 28-6-2010.

This Notification has amended the principal Notification
17/2009 — Service Tax, dated 7th July, 2009 (as lastly amended by Notification
No. 40/2009 — Service Tax, dated 30th September, 2009) by inserting the new
entry No. 18 to grant exemption to service provided by airport authority or any
other person in any airport in respect of the export of the goods.

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Notification No. 36/2010 — Service Tax, dated 28-6-2010.

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New Page 1

Part B : INDIRECT TAXES

SERVICE TAX UPDATE

Notifications :

81 Notification No. 36/2010 — Service Tax, dated 28-6-2010.

Finance Act, 2010 has brought in the net of service tax eight
new services and has modified the scope of nine existing services. Since these
changes become effective from 1-7-2010, activities that are covered under
taxable service categories due to such additions or modifications, would attract
service tax from this date. This Notification exempts service tax on the partial
or full amount received in advance by the service provider before 1-7-2010 in
respect of services that have become taxable from that date if in respect of
such advances such taxable services are provided after that date. However this
exemption would not apply to commercial training or coaching services and
renting of immovable property service.

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Notification No. 35/2010 — Service Tax, dated 22-6-2010.

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New Page 1

Part B : INDIRECT TAXES

SERVICE TAX UPDATE

Notifications :

80 Notification No. 35/2010 — Service Tax, dated 22-6-2010.

By this Notification Central Government has amended the
Notification 9/2010 dated 27th February, 2010 to defer the levy of service tax
on taxable services provided by Government Railways to any person in relation to
transport of goods by rail to 1st January, 2011.

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S. 48 capital gains — Tax on capital gains would arise in respect of only those capital assets in acquisition of which an element of cost is actually present or is capable of being reckoned — Since rulers of yester years did not acquire their kingdoms by

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  1. (2009) 118 ITD 190 (Mum.)

HUF of H.H. late Sir J. M. Scindia v. ACIT

A.Y. : 1997-98. Dated : 22-8-2007

 

The assessee HUF was issued a notice requiring to show
cause as to why for the purpose of computation of capital gains, value for the
purpose of wealth tax was taken as the value of the plot of land, instead of
the value determined by the Government- approved valuer.

The Scindia Family had acquired the land on the occasion of
marriage of one of the forefathers of J. M. Scindia to one ‘Chimanibai’,
daughter of the then ruler of Deccan, i.e., the Peshwa. The said
property was given to Chimanibai as ‘choli bangdi’ according to the
custom prevailing in those days amongst the royal families.

It was further submitted that neither of the then rulers,
the Peshwas, nor the Scindias incurred any cost for acquiring this property.
In view of this, it was evident that the said plot did not have any cost of
acquisition and therefore it fell outside the purview of capital gains. The
claim of the assessee was rejected by the AO who computed the capital gains
taking Rs.1,50,404 as the cost of acquisition of the land. It was also
contended that the said land was recorded in the old Revenue records as ‘Inam’
land.

On appeal, the CIT(A) did not accept the assessee’s
contention and confirmed the action of the AO. On appeal before the Tribunal,
it was held :

(1) The CIT(A) has recorded the fact that the land was
received in gift by the forebears and inherited by their progeny and its
cost was nil. In support of this proposition, the assessee produced old
Revenue records obtained from Government Archives, which showed that the
said plot of land was recorded as ‘Inam’ land. The extracts furnished stated
that ‘Inam’ documents in respect of the said land were not available, and
the assessee’s stand was rejected by the CIT(A) on that count alone.
Further, in absence of any evidence to show that the land was purchased by
paying cash, the assessee’s contention which was based on factual and
historical background was to be accepted.

(2) It is also settled principle that in order to make
this transaction liable for capital gains tax, it is for the Revenue to show
that the assessee had incurred a cost in acquiring the said plot of land.

(3) As per the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court
in the case of CIT v. H.H. Maharaja Sahib Shri Lokendra Singhji,
(1986) 162 ITR 93, it was clearly held that the liability to pay tax on
capital gains would arise only in case of those capital assets in the
acquisition of which an element of cost is actually present or is capable of
being reckoned and not in case of those assets where the element of cost is
altogether inconceivable.

In the light of the above discussion, the ITAT held that
the capital gain on the transfer of said land was not exigible to tax.


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Exemption to electricity distribution services — Notification No. 32/2010 — Service Tax, dated 22-6-2010.

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Part B : INDIRECT TAXES

SERVICE TAX UPDATE

Notifications :

77 Exemption to electricity distribution services —
Notification No. 32/2010 — Service Tax, dated 22-6-2010.

From the date of this Notification exemption has been granted
to taxable services provided to any person, by a distribution licencee, a
distribution franchisee, or any other person by whatever name called, authorised
to distribute power under the Electricity Act, 2003, for distribution of
electricity.

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