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[2013] 148 ITD 70 (Ahmedabad – Trib.) GE India Industrial (P.) Ltd. vs. CIT(A) A.Y. 2004-05: Date of order: 04-01-2013

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Section 271(1)(c), section 275(1)(a) – CIT(A)
enhanced assessee’s income and initiated penalty proceedings –
Assessee’s plea to keep penalty proceedings in abeyance till disposal of
appeal by Tribunal was rejected – Held – as per section 275(1)(a), the
CIT(A) will get six months time to dispose of penalty proceedings from
end of month in which order of Tribunal is received by Commissioner or
Chief Commissioner – The CIT(A) was directed to keep penalty proceedings
in abeyance till disposal of quantum appeal by Tribunal.

Facts:
Assessment
u/s. 143(3) was completed by the AO by making a few disallowances. On
further appeal, the CIT(A) deleted certain disallowances but also
enhanced the income of the assessee. The CIT(A) initiated penalty
proceedings u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act for disallowances made by him.

The
assessee contended before the CIT(A) that since the assessee proposed
to file an appeal before the Tribunal on the quantum proceedings, the
penalty should be kept in abeyance till the disposal of appeal by
Tribunal. Reliance was placed on the section 275(1)(a), wherein it is
provided that where an appeal has been filed before Tribunal, the time
limit for disposal of penalty proceeding is six months from the end of
the month in which the order of the Tribunal is received by the
Commissioner/Chief Commissioner. However, the request of the assessee
was not accepted by ld. CIT(A) and hence the assessee filed a stay
petition.

Held:
As per the section 275(1)(a) of the
Act, the AO cannot pass an order imposing penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) of the
Act till relevant assessment is subject matter of appeal before ld.
CIT(A) (i.e., the first appellate authority). By the same analogy, the
assessee’s prayer for stay of penalty proceedings undertaken by ld.
CIT(A) till the disposal of appeal by the Tribunal does not appear to be
unreasonable.

If the CIT(A) is allowed to proceed with the
penalty proceedings, prejudice will cause to the assessee as it will
have to face multiplicity of the proceedings. In case assessee succeeds
in quantum appeal, the penalty order passed by CIT(A) will have no legs
to stand while in a situation the assessee fails, CIT(A) will get ample
time of six months to dispose of the penalty proceedings. Therefore, to
prevent multiplicity of proceedings and harassment to the assessee, the
CIT(A) was directed to keep the penalty proceedings in abeyance till the
disposal of quantum appeal by the Tribunal.

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(2014) 105 DTR 1 (Del) Sahara India Financial Corporation Ltd. vs. DCIT A.Y.: 2009-10 Date of order: 10-01-2014

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Disallowance of expenditure u/s. 14A cannot exceed the exempt income earned.

Facts:
The assessee earned exempt income amounting to Rs. 68,37,583 against which the assessee voluntarily disallowed the expenses of the investment division on pro rata basis amounting to Rs. 26,646. However, the Assessing Officer applied the provisions of Rule 8D and added Rs. 2,16,51,917 representing the excess of the expenses disallowable as per Rule 8D over the expenses already disallowed by the assessee. While doing so, the Assessing Officer also disallowed the proportionate interest expenditure rejecting the claim of the assessee that it had sufficient interest-free funds in the nature of share capital and reserves. The CIT (A) also upheld the said disallowance and revised it upward marginally to Rs. 2,19,47,772.

Held:
If the method of Rule 8D is applied mechanically, it leads to manifestly absurd results in as much as for tax-free income of Rs. 68,37,583, disallowance of Rs. 2,16,51,917 [enhanced by CIT(A) at Rs. 2,19,47,772] is made u/s. 14A which exceeds the exempt income. The interpretation of provisions of section 14A r/w Rule 8D is leading to unanticipated absurdities which cannot be the intention of legislature. Under these circumstances, help of external aids of construction for interpretations of statute is called for. Looking at the varying interpretation offered by various courts and benches of tribunal in relation to section 14A, it is difficult to precisely decide the issue. The Tribunal followed the decision of Chandigarh Tribunal in the case of Punjab State Co-op & Marketing Federation Ltd. [ITA No. 548/Chd/2011] and held that disallowance u/s. 14A cannot exceed tax free income. A holistic view is required to be taken that disallowance in terms of section 14A can be maximum to the extent of exempt income which is Rs. 68,37,583 in this case. It implies that reasonable expenditure less than the exempt income can be disallowed. Therefore, in the interest of justice it was held that it will be reasonable to estimate and disallow, 50% of exempt income as relatable to exempt income u/s. 14A r/w Rule 8D.

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(2014) 104 DTR 289 (Del) DCIT vs. Messe Dusseldorf India Pvt. Ltd. A.Y.: 2005-06 Date of order: 19-03-2014

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Amount received by the assessee-company from its parent company towards its erosion of net worth constitutes capital receipt.

Facts I:
The assessee had received an amount of Rs. 34,511,880 from its promoters which were foreign companies, which was treated as capital receipt and classified under capital reserve in the accounts. It was claimed that the said amount was received to resurrect the financial position and to rejuvenate the company. The amount was received essentially for restoration of its capital structure, i.e, net worth required for the revival of company in. However, the Assessing Officer held that the receipt in question was in the revenue field. Before the ITAT also, it was argued by the Department that the amount is a non-refundable, non-distributable and non-convertible contribution by a shareholder, and was used for the purpose of its current business and hence, was required to be regarded as a revenue receipt. It was further pointed out that the RBI permitted the assessee to receive the amount in question for recoupment of accumulated losses.

Held:
It was held that the amount was received for restoration of the capital structure by recoupment of net worth. The assessee company had incurred accumulated losses and this has resulted in erosion of net worth. It received non refundable financial assistance from its shareholder company. The RBI also approved the same with subjectmatter given as “financial assistance towards erosion of net worth.” Therefore, the ITAT , upholding the factual finding of the CIT (A) that the amount was received towards erosion of net worth of the company, held that it should be regarded as a capital receipt.

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Refund: Interest: S/s. 237 and 243 : A. Y. 2010-11: Assessee, a civil contractor, receiving payments from Govt. Depts. after TDS: CPC issuing only part of refund: Mismatch between details uploaded by deductor and details furnished by assessee in return: Mismatch not attributable to assessee: Assessee entitled to refund with interest:

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Rakesh Kumar Gupta vs. UOI; 365 ITR 143 (All):

The
assessee is a civil contractor. In the previous year relevant to the A.
Y. 2010-11, the assessee had received certain payments from Government
Departments from which a total sum of Rs. 3,14,766/- was deducted as tax
at source by the Government Departments. The assessee filed the return
of income and claimed refund of Rs. 2,32,370/-. The Central Processing
Centre, Bangalore, issued a refund of Rs. 43,740/-. No intimation was
given to the assessee as to why the balance amount of Rs. 1,88,630/- was
not refundable. Assessee’s application u/s. 154 of the Income-tax Act,
1961 for refund of the balance did not get any response.

Therefore,
the assessee filed a writ petition praying for a writ of mandamus for
the balance refund with interest. The Allahabad High Court allowed the
writ petition and held as under:

“i) No effort was made by the
Assessing officer to verify whether the deductor had made the payment of
the tax deducted at source in the Government account. There was a
mismatch between the details uploaded by the deductor and the details
given by the assessee in the return. The assessee suffered the tax
deduction at source but had not been given due credit in spite of the
fact that he had been issued a tax deducted at source certificate by a
Government Department.
ii) T here was presumption that the deductor
had deposited the tax deducted at source amount in the Government
account especially when the deductor is a Government Department.
iii)
Denying the benefit of the tax deducted at source to the assessee
because of the fault of the deductor not only caused harassment and
inconvenience but also made the assessee feel cheated.
iv) T here was
no fault on the part of the assessee. The fault, if any, lay with the
deductor. Nothing had been indicated that the fault lay with the
assessee in furnishing false details. Therefore, the authority was to
refund an amount of Rs. 1,88,631/- with interest in accordance with the
law.”

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Recovery of tax: Stay of recovery: A. Ys. 2007-08 and 2008-09: Tribunal rejected the stay application only on the ground that the assessee had not made out a case of irreparable loss without considering the other issues raised by the assessee:

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Rejection not proper: Coca-Cola India P. Ltd. vs. ITAT: 364 ITR 567 (Bom):

When the appeal for the A. Ys. 2007-08 and 2008-09 were pending before the Tribunal, the Assessing Officer rejected the stay application made by the assessee without considering the issues raised by the assessee. The Tribunal also rejected the stay application only on the ground that the assessee had not made out a case of irreparable loss which could not be compensated in terms of money in case the stay was not granted, without considering the issues raised by the assessee.

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i) I n an application for stay, though the Assessing Officer is not expected to analyse the entire evidence there must be some consideration of the facts and an indication thereof in the order. The Assessing Officer did not advert to any of the factors indicated in the order of the Special Bench in the case of L. G. Electronics India P. Ltd.
ii) T he Appellate Tribunal also in its order did not address itself to the relevant facts and issues. It merely rejected the application on the ground that the assesee had not made out a case of irreparable loss which could not be compensated in terms of money in case the stay was not granted.
iii) T he question of irreparable loss is not the only consideration while dealing with an application for stay. The assessee had serious issues to urge, some of which had so far not been dealt with either in the assessment order or in the orders on the stay application. The orders in question are liable to be quashed.
Iv) The rule is made absolute in terms of prayers (a) and (b).”

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Income: Business income or house property income: S/s. 22 and 28(i) : A. Y. 1996-97: Assessee owned a shopping mall: Let out a portion of mall and used balance portion for its business: Rental income is business income and not house property income:

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CIT Vs. Prakash Agnihotri; [2014] 46 taxmann.com 145 (All):

The assessee owned an immovable property, i.e., a shopping mall. During relevant year, assessee let out a portion of said mall. The assessee claimed that rental income derived from mall was taxable as income from business. The Assessing Officer rejected the claim and assessed the rental income under the head “Income from house property.” The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) T he law is well settled that whether a particular letting is a business has to be decided in the circumstances of each case and each case has to be looked into from the businessman’s point of view to find out whether letting was the doing of business or exploitation of his property by an owner.

ii) There being categorical findings of fact by the appellate authority as well as the Tribunal that letting out was for the purposes of business after considering all relevant facts and the fact that the premises City Centre, the Mall, has been taken back by the assessee and further in major portion of the premises assessee was already carrying out his own business, it is opined that assessee has rightly shown his rental income as business income.”

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Income: Capital or revenue receipt: A. Y. 2007-08: Assessee engaged in generation of power: Sale of carbon credits: Not an offshoot of business: No asset generated in the course of business but generated due to environmental concerns: Sale receipt is a capital receipt: No cost of acquisition: Profit is not assessable to tax:

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CIT vs. My Home Power Ltd.; 365 ITR 82 (AP):

The assessee was carrying on the business of power generation. In the A. Y. 2007-08, the assessee claimed that the receipts on sale of carbon credits is a capital receipt and not income. The assesee further claimed that there was no cost of acquisition and accordingly that the profit on sale of carbon credit is not assessable to tax. The Assessing Officer rejected the claim and assessed the receipts as business income. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

In appeal before the High Court, the Revenue contended that the generation of carbon credits is intricately linked to the machinery and processes employed in the production process by the assessee. The Revenue also contended that the Tribunal is not correct in holding that there is no cost of acquisition or cost of production to get entitlement for the carbon credits. The Andhra Pradesh High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) T he Tribunal has factually found that ‘carbon credit is not an offshoot of business but an offshoot of environmental concerns. No asset is generated in the course of business but it is generated due to environmental concerns.’
ii) We agree with this factual analysis as the assessee is carrying on the business of power generation. The carbon credit is not even directly linked with power generation.
iii) O n the sale of excess carbon credits the income was received and hence as correctly held by the Tribunal it is capital receipt and it cannot be business receipt or income.
iv) In the circumstances, we do not find any element of law in this appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.”

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Assessment: S/s. 143(3) and 144C: A. Y. 2009- 10: Transfer pricing proceedings: Pursuant to order of TPO, AO passed a final order u/s. 143 (3) instead of passing a draft assessment order u/s. 144C: There being a failure on part of AO to adhere to statutory provisions of Act, impugned order was to be quashed: AO could not cure defect existing in impugned order:

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Vijay Television (P) Ltd. vs. Dispute Resolution Penal: [2014] 46 taxmann.com 100 (Mad):

The
case of the petitioner company was taken up for scrutiny assessment for
the A. Y. 2009-2010. Since the petitioner company had entered into
international transactions during the relevant year, the case was
referred to the Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO) for determination of the
arm’s length price. The TPO passed an order on 30-01-2013 and pursuant
to the said order, the Assessment Officer, instead of passing a
provisional order u/s. 144C of the Income-tax Act, 1961, passed a final
assessment order u/s. 143(3) on 26-03-2013. After realising the folly
that a final order ought not to have been passed pursuant to the order
passed by the TPO, the Assessment Officer issued a Corrigendum on
15-04-2013 modifying the final order of assessment passed on 26-03- 2013
to be read as a draft assessment order purported to have been passed
u/s. 144C of the Act. On receipt of the corrigendum, the petitioner
company filed their objections before the Dispute Resolution Panel,
Chennai on 26/04/2013 specifically questioning the validity of the
corrigendum issued by the Assessing Officer. It was specifically
contended that the corrigendum issued by the Assessing Officer is
without jurisdiction and such an order was passed beyond the period of
limitation. The Dispute Resolution Penal refused to entertain the
objections filed by the petitioner company. The assessee-petitioner
filed writ petition challenging the orders.

The Madras High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“i)
U /s. 144C of the Act, it is evident that the Assessing Officer is
required to pass only a draft assessment order on the basis of the
recommendations made by the TPO after giving an opportunity to the
assessee to file their objections and then the Assessing Officer shall
pass a final order. According to the learned senior counsel for the
petitioners, this procedure has not been followed by the Assessing
Officer (second Respondent) inasmuch as a final order has been
straightaway passed without passing a draft assessment order.
ii) A s
rightly pointed out by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners,
in the order passed on 26-03-2013, the second respondent even raised a
demand as also imposed penalty. Such demand has to be raised only after a
final order has been passed determining the tax liability. The very
fact that the taxable amount has been determined itself would show that
it was passed as a final order. In fact, a notice for demand u/s. 156 of
the Act was issued pursuant to such order dated 26-03-2013 of the
second respondent. Both the order dated 26-03-2013 and the notice for
demand thereof have been served simultaneously on the petitioner.
Therefore, not only the assessment is complete, but also a notice dated
28-03-2013 was issued thereon calling upon the petitioner to pay the tax
amount as also penalty u/s. 271 of the Act. Thereafter, the petitioner
was given an opportunity of hearing on 12-04-2013. Subsequently, the
second respondent realised the mistake in passing a final order instead
of a draft assessment order which resulted in issuing a corrigendum on
15-04-2013. In the corrigendum it was only stated that the order passed
on 26-03-2013 u/s. 143(3) of the Act has to be read and treated as a
draft assessment order as per section 144C r.w.s. 93CA (4) r.w.s. 143
(3) of the Act. In and by the order dated 15- 04-2013, the second
respondent granted thirty days time to enable the assessee to file their
objections.
iii) S uch an order dated 26-03-2013 passed by the
second respondent can only be construed as a final order passed in
violation of the statutory provisions of the Act. The corrigendum dated
15-04-2013 is also beyond the period prescribed for limitation. Such a
defect or failure on the part of the second respondent to adhere to the
statutory provisions is not a curable defect by virtue of the
corrigendum dated 15-04-2013. By issuing the corrigendum, the
respondents cannot be allowed to develop their own case. Therefore,
following the order passed by the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court in the case of Zuari Cement Limited vs. Assistant
Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle 2 (1) passed in WP No. 5557 of 2012
dated 21-02-2013, which was also affirmed by the Honourable Supreme
Court by dismissing the Special Leave Petition filed thereof, on
27-09-2013, the orders, which are impugned in this writ petition are
liable to be set aside. Accordingly, the orders, which are impugned in
this writ petition are set aside and the writ petition is allowed.”

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Assessment: Time limit for completion of assessment: Limitation: Extention of period: Section 153 Expl 1(ii): A. Y. 1986-87 to 1989- 90: Stay of assessment proceedings by order of Court: Limitation restarts immediately on vacation of the stay order and not on receipt by the Department of the order vacating the stay:

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CIT vs. Chandra Bhan Bansal; [2014] 46 taxmann.com 108 (All):

On 08-11-1989, the Assessing Officer issued notices u/s. 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for reopening of the assessment. Assessee filed writ petition challenging the reopening. The Allahabad High Court admitted the petition by an order dated 24-03-1992 and granted stay of the assessment proceedings. Thereafter, on 01-08-1995 the High Court dismissed the petition and accordingly stay was vacated on that day. The Assessing Officer passed the reassessment order on 04-01-1996. The assessee challenged the validity of the reassessment order on the ground that the reassessment order passed on 04-01- 1996 is barred by limitation since a valid reassessment order could have been passed only upto 30-09-1995. The Tribunal accepted the assessee’s claim.

In the appeal, it was contended by the Revenue that the order vacating the stay was communicated to the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax (Investigation) on 18-12-1995 and accordingly, the reassessment order passed on 04-01-1996 is within the period of limitation and hence is a valid order. The Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) T he statutory scheme of Explanation 1(ii) of section 153 clearly indicates that for computing the period of limitation the period during which the assessment proceedings is stayed shall be excluded. In excluding the above period, the concept of communication of the order of the Court cannot be imported. The exclusion of the period has been provided because of stay or injunction by any Court during which the assessment proceedings are stayed

ii) T he submission of the revenue that the limitation will start again only when the order is communicated to the Department cannot be accepted. The other reason for not accepting the above submission is equally potent. Explanation 1(v) and (vi) to section 153 are also part of the same statutory scheme. In Explanation 1(v) and (vi) to section 153 the statutory scheme provides for computing the period of limitation from the date when the order under s/s. (1) of section 245D and 245Q is received by the Commissioner.

iii) T hus, the legislature has provided for excluding the period from the date of communication of the order where they so intended. The use of concept of communication of receiving the order in the same provision which is absent in Explanation 1(ii) concerned clearly indicates that for the purposes of Explanation 1(ii), the communication of the order of the Court vacating the stay or injunction is not contemplated.

iv) In view of aforesaid, the Tribunal is justified in law in coming to the conclusion that the assessments made by the Assessing Officer was barred by limitation on 30-9-1995.

v) The question is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The appeal is dismissed.”

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Leaving A Legacy

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“The only thing that you take with you when you are gone is what you leave behind.”

– John Allison

All of us know that we have to go some day. We are temporary residents of this world, and sooner or later we have to quit this place and depart. We also equally know that just as we came into this world empty handed, we have to go from this world empty handed. Even Alexander the Great directed that, on his death, his empty hands should be displayed outside his coffin, to give this message. No matter how much one may amass, and how so powerful one may be, someday one has to go and one cannot take anything with oneself. The only choice with us, then, is to choose what should happen to one’s wealth when one goes away. Whom to give? How much to give? And to decide on how much to dispose off while one is alive and how much to amass to leave it for one’s heirs.

It is human to leave behind one’s wealth for one’s children. One wants to provide for the future needs of the children. One wants to provide not only for the needs and comforts, but even luxuries. However, this may not be in the best interest of our children.

One has to remember what our scriptures teach us. They teach us that “Lakshmi” is “Chanchal” – volatile and does not like to stay at the same place for long. Our elders also tell us that rarely does wealth stay in a family for three generations. The first one gathers wealth, the second manages to preserve it, and the third squanders it. History tells us that people usually squander any money that they inherit and if they don’t squander it, their children surely will. Will this be the fate of what we leave behind for our children?

Hence, one has also to think of how much one should leave for them so that they do not lose all their initiative to work and excel in life. The dilemma is, how much is sufficient to look after their needs and comforts. The next issue is, how to distribute this wealth. How much should go to each of the heirs. Most of the time the wealth left behind itself becomes a source of discord, disharmony, quarrels, and even litigation.

I am reminded of the Chinese proverb that says, “Give a man a fish and you feed him for one day. Teach a man how to fish and you feed him for a life time.” The same is also true about wealth. It is better to spend and teach a child to earn a living than to provide him with enough wealth.

All these point to one thing. Leave behind legacies for children but make them fit to be able to use it judiciously and not to squander it. It should help them to be better human beings. If one has wealth more than what one’s children will ever need, better give away the excess during one’s lifetime or, through one’s wills, to charities. There are enough people who need money even to provide for their basic needs.

While it is important to provide for the needs of our children, it is equally important to teach them about money itself. They must understand that money beyond a certain basic level of providing one’s needs cannot bring true happiness. Properly handled it can ensure one’s financial future, but if not handled carefully it can fly off in no time. In our lifetime we must imbibe in them the right values of earning, preserving and spending money. It is only then that wealth will remain in the family. It is not only on how to invest money, but also how to earn it and spend it that are important.

I conclude by quoting:

“If you have just two pennies in the world, spend one on a loaf of bread; the other on a flower. The bread will give you the means to live, the flower a reason for living.”

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Assessment: Company: Amalgamation w.e.f. 01/04/2009: A. Y. 2010-11: Notice dated 20/06/2012 u/s. 142 to amalgamating (transferor) for assessment of the company for A. Y. 2010-11 is not valid:

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Khurana Engineering Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT; 364 ITR 600 (Guj):

Under
a scheme of amalgamation, the transferor company was amalgamated with
the assessee company w.e.f. 01-04-2009. On 20-06-2012, the Assessing
Officer issued notice u/s. 142 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 to the
amalgamating (transferor) company for assessment of the company for the
A. Y. 2010-11.

The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition
filed by the assessee-amalgamated company challenging the said notice
and held as under:

“i) A s per the order of the High Court
allowing the scheme of amalgamation, the appointed date for amalgamation
is 01-04-2009. The transferor company would no longer be amenable to
assessment proceedings for the A. Y. 2010-11.

ii) T he notice for producing documents for such assessment would, therefore, be invalid. Impugned notice is quashed.”

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[2014] 46 taxmann.com 135 (New Delhi – CESTAT) Hema Engg. Indus. Ltd. vs. CST, New Delhi.

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Whether services provided on job work basis and exempted under Notification No. 8/2005 – ST are considered as “Exempted Services” for the purpose of Rule 6 of CENVAT Credit rules, 2004 requiring reversal of CENVAT Credit? Held, No.

Facts:
The Appellant was engaged in undertaking a job work by way of electroplating/painting on the semi-finished goods and claimed exemption in service tax vide Notification No. 8/2005 – ST. The Appellant availed the credit of service tax on various services so received for their job work and utilised the same for payment of service tax on taxable services provided by them. The Revenue contended that Appellant is providing taxable as well as exempted services hence cannot utilise CENVAT Credit more than 20% of the tax payable in terms of the provisions of Rule 6 of the CENVAT Credit Rules (CCR).

Held:
The Hon’ble Tribunal held that clearances effected in terms of the provisions of Notification No. 8/2005-S.T. cannot be held to be exempted clearance so as to invoke the provisions of Rule 6(2) of CCR. It further held that, this issue is no more res integra and stands decided by the Larger Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Sterlite Industries India Ltd. vs. CCE 2005 (183) ELT 353 (Tri- Mum.)(LB) wherein it was held that if no duty was payable in respect of goods manufactured in terms of Notification No. 214/86, i.e., job work Notification, the final product cannot be held to be exempted so as to attract the provisions of the erstwhile Rule 57CC inasmuch as the Notification No. 214/86 is pari materia to Notification No. 8/2005-S.T., the ratio of the said decision would apply.

Note: Readers may note that, same principal is also applicable in the case of exemption granted in Entry 30(c) of the mega exemption Notification No. 25/2012-ST dated 20-06-2012.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 1 dated 3rd July, 2014

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Financial Commitment (FC) by Indian Party under Overseas Direct Investments (ODI ) – Restoration of Limit

Presently,
the limit for Overseas Direct Investments (ODI) /Financial Commitment
(FC) to be undertaken by an Indian Party under the automatic route is
100% of the net worth of the Indian Party as per its last audited
balance sheet.

This circular has restored the said limit to the
one that existed prior to 14th August, 2013. Hence now the limit for
Overseas Direct Investments (ODI)/Financial Commitment (FC) to be
undertaken by an Indian Party under the automatic route is 400% of the
net worth of the Indian Party as per its last audited balance sheet.
However, where the financial commitment of the Indian Party exceeds US$ 1
billion (or its equivalent) in a financial year prior permission of RBI
will need to be obtained even if the total FC of the Indian Party is
within the limit of 400% of its net worth as per the last audited
balance sheet.

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TS-400-ITAT-2014 (Del) GE Energy Parts Inc. vs. ADIT A.Ys.: 2001-02, Decided on: 04-07-2014

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The Tribunal admits Linkedin profiles of expatriate employees as additional evidence to determine the existence of PE in India.

Facts:
The
tax authority had conducted a survey at the premises of Liaison Office
(“LO”) of GE International Operations Company Inc. In the course of
survey, the tax authority obtained certain documents, recorded
statements of various persons and inquired about income-generating
activities of GE group, employees working from LO and their roles and
responsibilities, etc.

It was found that generally the business
heads were expatriates appointed to head Indian operations and the
support staff being provided by GE India Industrial Private Limited and
other third parties. While the expatriates were on the payroll of GE
International Inc., they worked for various GE group businesses.

The
tax authority sought information in respect of expatriate employees
such as nature of job, duties and responsibilities, terms, conditions
and duration of employment, entity for which they were working,
emoluments and basis of incentives/bonuses, self-appraisal of work done
in India, etc. The tax authority received only part response mentioning
that the employees were merely acting as communication channel for the
overseas entity.

Hence, in absence of necessary facts, the tax
authority furnished additional evidence in the form of Linkedin profile
of the employees and contended that since these were available in public
domain, they should be admitted as additional evidence. The additional
evidence was provided to disprove the claim that these employees were
merely acting as a communication channel. This evidence was never
refuted.

Held:
• Linkedin profiles are not hearsay
because it is the employee himself who has given the details relating to
him and no third party is involved in creating the profiles. The data
is in public domain.

• In terms of section 60 of the Evidence
Act, oral evidence must be direct. It is well-settled law that admission
though not conclusive is binding and decisive unless it is withdrawn or
proved to be erroneous. Linkedin profiles are in the nature of
admission of the person whose profile it is.

• It is up to the taxpayer to rebut the information contained in Linkedin profiles by bringing on record contrary facts.


The evidence sought to be filed by the tax authority was only
supporting in nature and it would assist in appreciating the facts in
judicial manner.

Accordingly, the Tribunal admitted Linkedin
profiles as additional evidence. However, in the interim order, the
Tribunal did not conclude on the existence of PE.

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TS-355-ITAT-2014(Del) Nortel Networks India International Inc. vs. DDIT A.Ys.: 2003-04, 2004-05 & 2005-06, Decided on: 13-06-014

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Article 5, 7 India-USA DTAA – On facts, having regard to the activities performed in India, the Indian group company was PE of the USA company and 50% of profit was attributable to the PE.

Facts:
The taxpayer was a company incorporated in USA and member-company of Nortel group. Nortel group was a leading supplier of hardware and software products for GSM cellular radio telephone system.

Nortel group also had an Indian company (“ICo”), which had entered into a composite contract with an Indian telecom company (“TelCo”) for supply of equipment. Immediately after signing the contract, ICo assigned it in favour of the taxpayer without any consideration.

The equipment to be supplied under the contract was acquired by the taxpayer from its group company in Canada. The Canadian company had a Liaison Office (“LO”) in India. Employees of various Group companies visited India for facilitating execution of the contract and worked from the premises of the LO or ICo.

The performance under the contract was guaranteed by Nortel group.

The AO was of the view that the taxpayer was merely a “paper company” created to avoid taxes in India by assignment of the contract by ICo and the overall execution/ work was done through ICo only. The Taxpayer thus triggered a Permanent establishment (PE) in India by virtue of activities done by ICo, the LO and the services provided by employees of Group companies visiting India.

Held:
• The contract was indivisible turnkey contract for supply, installation, testing, commissioning, etc. Responsibility for negotiating, securing and executing the contract as well as installation and commissioning were undertaken by ICo. Accordingly, ICo was a fixed place of business and dependent agent PE of the taxpayer.
• The LO of Canadian company was rendering all kinds of services to all group companies including the taxpayer. Hence, it constituted fixed place PE of the taxpayer.
• The taxpayer approached the customer, negotiated the contract; installed and tested the equipment. All these activities were undertaken through ICo and LO. Experts of group companies visited India in connection with the project and carried out business of the taxpayer through the premises of the LO and ICo. The contract did not merely require loading the equipment in ship but a number of other activities which were carried out in India and remuneration for these activities was included in consideration payable for the contract. Though represented as sale consideration for the equipment, the amount represented payment for works contract under which entire installation and customisation were carried out in India.

• The activities of the taxpayer in India through ICo, LO and employees of Group companies constituted its PE under Article 5 of India-USA DTAA . These activities were core activities of the taxpayer and hence, they were not preparatory and auxiliary activities.

• The accounts furnished by taxpayer, being not audited, had no sanctity. The only explanation for the trading loss in an intra-group transaction could be avoidance of tax. Hence, the group accounts should be examined to have correct picture. Computation of income of PE depends on the facts of each case and in the present case, after allowing expenses relatable to PE, selling, general marketing and R&D expenses, attribution of 50% of the profits to PE would be reasonable.

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TS-341-ITAT-2014(Del) Jyotinder Singh Randhawa vs. ACIT A.Y. 2009-10, Decided on: 16-06-2014

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Section 6, the Act – Benefit u/s. 6 to Indian citizens leaving India ‘for the purposes of employment outside India’ also applies to selfemployed professionals going abroad for business or profession.

Facts:
The taxpayer was an Indian citizen. He was a professional golfer. During the relevant tax year his stay in India was 167 days. While filing his tax return, the taxpayer claimed his residential status as non-resident.

According to the AO, the contention of the taxpayer that he had left India for the purpose of employment and therefore, should be entitled to the benefit under Explanation to section 6(1) of the Act was not valid. Hence, the AO concluded that the taxpayer could be treated as non-resident only if he was in India for less than 365 days during the 4 years preceding the relevant tax year, and was in India for less than 60 days during the relevant tax year. Since the taxpayer could not prove this, the AO treated him as resident during the tax year and accordingly, added the income which had accrued to, and received by, the taxpayer outside India .

Held:
The taxpayer is a professional golfer and a self-employed professional sports person who participates in Golf tournaments conducted in various countries. Relying on the decision of Kerala High Court in CIT vs. Abdul Razak [2011] 337 ITR 350 (Ker), the Tribunal held that to determine residential status under the Act, the term ‘leaves India for the purposes of employment outside India’ also means going abroad in the course of self-employment for own business or profession and accordingly, treated him as non-resident.

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TS-383-ITAT-2014(HYD) GFA Anlagenbau Gmbh vs. ACIT A.Ys.: 2005-06, 2006-07, 2007-08, 2008-09, 2009- 10, Decided on: 02-07-2014

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Section 9(1)(vii) of the Act; Article 5, 12, India-
Germany DTAA – in absence of a building or construction site owned or
operated by German company, mere rendition of supervisory services will
not constitute supervisory PE; the payment for such services should be
taxable as Fee For Technical Services (FTS).

Facts:
The
taxpayer was a company incorporated in Germany. It was engaged in
supervision, erection and commissioning of plant and machinery for steel
and allied plants in India. During the relevant tax year, it had
rendered technical and supervisory services to several Indian companies
by engaging experienced foreign technicians at the work sites and other
locations in India to carryout technical and supervisory services. The
taxpayer categorized the receipts for such services as FTS u/s.
9(1)(vii) of Act, as also under Article 12 of India-Germany DTAA .

The
total stay of technicians for one of the project in India exceeded 183
days. The AO contended that PE of the taxpayer was constituted in India
in terms of Article 5(2)(i) of India-Germany DTAA as the activities of
the taxpayer in India continued for a period exceeding 6 months.

Further,
since the activities were effectively connected with the PE, in terms
of Article 12(5) read with Article 7, receipts from the services was
taxable as business profits and consequently, in terms of section 44DA
was chargeable to tax @40%.

Held:
As regards the Act
Relying
on the decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Clouth Gummiwerke
Aktiengesellschaft vs. CIT [1999] 238 ITR 861 (AP), the Tribunal held
that payments received for the supervisory activities carried out in
India were taxable in terms of section 9(1)(vii) of the Act as FTS.

Further,
as the taxpayer had rendered the services at the project sites of its
clients and since it did not own and operate such sites independently,
they did not constitute the fixed place PEs under the Act.

As regards India-Germany DTAA
Relying
on the decision of Special Bench of the Tribunal in Motorola Inc vs.
DCIT [2005] 95 ITD 269 (Delhi)(SB) and the decision of Mumbai Tribunal
in Airlines Rotables Ltd vs. JDIT [2011] 131 TTJ 385 (Mum), the Tribunal
held that the taxpayer did not have a fixed place PE in India under
Article 5(1).

Supervisory activities by themselves cannot
constitute PE under Article 5(2)(i) if they were not in connection with
building, construction or assembly activities of the taxpayer. In the
present case, since the taxpayer was merely providing supervisory
services, without having a building or construction site or fixed place
at its disposal,it did not constitute a PE.

Thus, the activities
being technical in nature, they were clearly covered under the FTS
definition of the India- Germany DTAA and the same were not ‘effectively
connected’ to a PE as the taxpayer did not have a fixed place of
business through which its activities were carried out.

Relying
on Valentine Maritime (Gulf) LLC vs. ADIT [2011] 45 SOT 359 (Mum), the
Tribunal also observed that unless the contracts are otherwise linked
with each other they should be considered individually for the duration
test.

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(Unreported) [ITA No 80/Del/2013] JC Bamford Investments vs. DDIT A.Y.: 2008-09, Decided on: 04-07-2014

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Article 13(2), India-UK DTAA – though recipient of royalty was not beneficial owner, DTAA benefit cannot be denied since the beneficial owner as well as recipient of income was resident of UK.

Facts:
The taxpayer was a company incorporated in, and tax resident of, the UK. The taxpayer was a member of a group of companies. Another UK company (“UKCo”), also a member-company of the group, had entered into a Technology Transfer Agreement (“Agreement”) with a third group company incorporated in, and a tax resident of, India (“IndCo”) for grant of license to certain intellectual property (“IP”).

Subsequently, UKCo, IndCo and the taxpayer entered into a tripartite agreement under which UKCo sub-licensed IP to the taxpayer in consideration of the payment of royalty by the taxpayer to UKCo. Hence, IndCo was required to pay royalty to the taxpayer. The taxpayer, in turn, paid 99.5% of the royalty to UKCo and retained merely 0.5% with it.

According to the taxpayer, the payment received by it was subject to concessional tax rate of 15% in terms of Article 13(2) of India-UK DTAA . According to the tax authority, Article 13(2) applied only if the recipient of royalty was “beneficial owner” of the royalty whereas the taxpayer was merely a conduit between UKCo and IndCo and not a “beneficial owner” and hence, the normal tax rate of 20% was applicable.

Held:
In terms of section 90(2) of the Act, between the provisions of the Act and DTAA, whichever is more beneficial should apply. In case of the taxpayer, since provisions of DTAA are more beneficial, they should apply. However, the relevant DTAA provision is subject to the condition that the recipient of the royalty should be “beneficial owner”.
The phrase “beneficial owner” is not defined under the Act or DTAA. In common parlance, a “beneficial owner” is one who is entitled to income in his own right. Also, “Beneficial owner” is one who is free to decide: (a) whether or not the capital or other assets should be used or made available for use by others; or (b) on how the yields there from be used; or (c) both. Sometimes, a “beneficial owner” may turn out to be a person different from the immediate recipient or formal owner or recipient of the income.

The benefits of DTAA are meant to be given only to the resident of either State and not to a resident of a third State. Benefit of lower rate under Article 13(2) should not be given if the “beneficial owner” is not a resident of UK. However, the benefit is not lost merely because the formal recipient, a resident of UK, is not the beneficial owner. The underlying intention is to give benefit only to a resident of UK. In the present case, since the recipient as well as the beneficial owner were both resident of UK, benefit of lower rate of tax under DTAA cannot be denied.

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Impact of Retrospective Amendments to Section 9 of the Income-tax Act, 1961

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Fundamental principles for retrospective amendments to tax laws (especially direct taxes) are that such amendments should be made in exceptional cases and should be constitutionally valid. India has witnessed a series of retrospective amendments in its Income-tax law in the past decade. Most or a majority of them are to subvert the decisions of Judicial Authorities in favour of the tax payers resulting into uncertainty, distrust and ambiguity in tax laws. This article throws light on retrospective amendments in Indian Tax Law, their impact and resulting issues, primarily in the arena of taxation pertaining to non-residents.

1.0 Introduction
“Government should collect taxes from citizens the way a bee collects honey from the flowers – quietly without inflicting pain.” – Chanakya.

There are three pillars of Tax System in India- namely, Legislature, Execution/Administration and the Judiciary. The Parliament has the sovereign right to legislate tax laws, which are executed or administered by the tax department and the judiciary keeps watch, vigil and resolves disputes through just and proper interpretation of the law. All the three pillars derive their powers and limitations from the Indian Constitution.

Entry 82 of the List I to the Seventh Schedule, referred to in Article 246 of the Constitution of India, gives power to the Union Government to levy “Taxes on income other than agricultural income” and Entry 85 of the same Schedule gives power to levy “Corporation tax”.

2.0 Constitutional Validity of Retrospective Amendments

A question arises whether enactment of retrospective legislation is within the powers conferred by the Constitution?

The Parliament has the sovereign power to legislate and this includes prospective as well as retrospective legislations. Where the legislature can make a valid law, it may provide not only for the prospective operation of the material provisions of the said law, but it can also provide for the retrospective operation of the said provisions1.

In the undernoted cases, the Supreme Court examined the validity of retrospective amendments to laws and accorded them Constitutional validity.

(i) Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel and Co. vs. UOI and another 2
(ii) Rai Ramakrishna vs. State of Bihar1
(iii) I. N. Saksena vs. State of M.P.3
(iv) National Agricultural vs. UOI4

To be constitutionally valid, any retrospective amendment has to broadly satisfy the following tests:

i) T he retrospective operation of the Act should not alter the character of the tax imposed by it so as to make the state incompetent to legislate5;
ii) R estrictions imposed by the Act should not be so unreasonable that they contravene the fundamental rights of the tax payer granted by the Constitution of India under Article 19(1)(g)6;
iii) R etrospective legislation should not be violative of a constitutional provision.

In Kesavananda Bharati’s case, the Supreme Court held that any legislation which has an impact of amending the basic structure of the Constitution or denying the fundamental rights, is considered as unconstitutional.

3.0 I mpact of Retrospective Amendments

3.1 Can the payer be held in default for failure to deduct tax at source u/s. 201 of the Income-tax Act, 1961?

Deduction of tax at source is a machinery provision. Section 195 of the Act casts obligation on every payer to deduct tax at source from the payment made to a nonresident. There is no threshold for the same. In case a payer fails to deduct tax at source, he will be held as an assessee in default u/s. 201 of the Act and shall be liable to pay the amount of tax together with interest thereon.

Therefore, in case of Vodafone International Holdings’ case where it acquired the shares of a Non-Resident (NR) company from the Hutch Group, which through its step down subsidiaries ultimately held the Indian telecommunication business of the erstwhile Hutch in India; it was held to be assessee in default u/s. 201 of the Act for failure to deduct tax at source while making payment to the NR company of Hutch Group. Vodafone contended that no tax was required to be deducted as shares were located outside India and the income of the NR Company was not taxable in India u/s. 9 of the Act. Vodafone won the case in the Supreme Court of India where the Apex Court held that the present provisions do not cover a situation of indirect transfer to the Indian tax net by adopting “look at” approach.

Subsequently, section 9 of the Act was amended vide the Finance Act, 2012 with retrospective effect from 01-04- 1962 to bring indirect transfer of shares within the ambit of deemed income in India by providing for “look through” approach whereby corporate veil of intermediary companies can be lifted to determine whether the substantial value of the transfer is attributed to assets located in India.

Since the amendment is made retrospective, it has an impact of nullifying the Supreme Court decision in favour of Vodafone, subject to the outcome of the writ petitions challenging constitutional validity of such retrospective amendment

The Expert Committee in its draft report on Retrospective Amendments Relating to Indirect Transfer has recommended that “no person should be treated as an assessee in default u/s. 201 of the Act read with section 9(1)(i) of the Act as amended by the Finance Act, 2012, or as a representative assessee of a non-resident, in respect of a transaction of transfer of shares of a foreign company having underlying assets in India as this would amount to the imposition of a burden of impossibility of performance.”

The recommendation of the Expert Committee is justified in the sense that how can one deduct tax at source when the income is brought to tax by retrospective amendments. The only argument in favour of revenue could be that it claims that these amendments were only clarificatory in nature. Courts have upheld retrospective application of amendments where they were found to be in the nature of explanatory, declaratory, curative or clarificatory nature.10

3.2 Can the expenses be disallowed u/s 40(a)(i) in the hands of the payer for failure to deduct tax at source?

In the case Metro and Metro vs. Additional Commissioner of Income-tax11, the Agra bench of the ITAT held that testing fees paid by the Indian company without deduction of tax at source to the TUV Product Und Umwelt GmbH – a tax resident of Germany, cannot be disallowed u/s. 40(a)(i) of the Act on the ground that the payer failed to deduct tax at source. In the instant case such fees became taxable in India only as a result of the amendment in section 9(1), by virtue of the Finance Act, 2010. The assessee relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ishikawajimaharima Heavy Industries Ltd. vs. DIT12 to conclude that fees paid by it were not taxable as services were rendered outside India.

The ITAT ruled in favour of the assessee and held that no disallowance can be made in view of the decision of the coordinate bench in the case of Channel Guide India Ltd vs. ACIT13 wherein, following the views expressed by the Ahmedabad bench in the case of Sterling Abrasives Ltd. vs. ITO (ITA No. 2234 and 2244/Ahd/2008; order dated 2008), it is held that law cannot cast the burden of performing the impossible task of tax withholding with retrospective effect, and, accordingly, the disallowance u/s. 40(a)(i) cannot be made in a situation in which taxability is confirmed only as a result of retrospective amendment of law.

The Cochin Bench of the income-tax appellate tribunal14 [ITAT] in case of Kerala Vision Ltd. vs. ACIT held that the payment made for pay channel charges is taxable as royalty with the introduction of retrospective amendments in the act, but the same could not be disallowed u/s. 40(a)(i)Of the act, as it was not taxable before the introduction of the amendment.

3.3    Can Assessee be asked to pay interest and penalty for shortfall in payment of Tax?

Article 20 (1) of the indian Constitution provides that (i) no person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence and (ii) he shall not be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the  offence.  thus,  penal  laws  generally,  cannot  have retrospective operation.15

Expert Committee headed by dr. P. shome recommended that no penalty should be levied in respect of the income brought to tax on application of retrospective amendments u/s. 271(1)(c) (for concealment of income) and 271C (for failure to deduct tax at source) of the act.

Similarly, the expert  Committee  also  recommended  that in all cases where demand of tax is raised on account of the retrospective amendment relating to indirect transfer u/s. 9(1)(i) of the act, no interest u/s. 234a, 234B, 234C and 201(1a) of the act should be charged in respect of that demand, so that there is no undue hardship caused to the taxpayer.

3.4    Reopening of Assessments:

In Babu Ram vs. C. C. Jacob and others16 the supreme Court held that the retrospective amendment is not applicable to the matter which has already attained finality before  introduction  of  the  amendment.  The  apex  Court further observed that the prospective declaration of law is  a devise innovated by the apex Court to avoid reopening of settled issues and to prevent multiplicity of proceedings. It is also a device adopted to avoid uncertainty and litigation. By the very object of prospective declaration of law, it is deemed that all actions taken contrary to the declaration of law, prior to its date of declaration are validated. This is done in the larger public interest. in matters, where decisions opposed to the said principle have been taken prior to such declaration of law, cannot be interfered with on the basis of such declaration of law.17

It would be interesting to note here that where the supreme Court has expressly made its ratio prospective, the high Court cannot give it retrospective  effect.  By  implication, all contrary actions taken prior to such declaration stand validated.18

Post retrospective amendments to section 9 vide the finance act, 2012, for taxing indirect transfer to tax in india, CBdt has issued a letter to CCits and dgits19    stating that the amended laws would not be applicable to assessments that are already completed. the  letter states that “in case where assessment proceedings have been completed u/s. 143(3) of the act, before 1st april, 2012 and no notice for reassessment has been issued prior to that date; such cases shall not be re-opened u/s. 147/148 of the act on account of the above mentioned clarificatory amendments introduced by the Finance Act, 2012.” It further clarifies that “assessment or any other order which stand validated due to the said clarificatory amendments in the Finance Act, 2012 would of course be enforced.” this will have an impact on all cases which are pending at different stages of appeal.

Thus, the  letter seem to be providing relief to only those tax payers whose assessments have been completed and no appeals are pending at any level.

4.0 Retrospective Amendments and Tax Treaties

Tax  treaties,  being  bilateral  agreements,  signed  by  two sovereign states, would prevail over domestic tax laws wherever there are conflicting provisions. Section 90 (2) provides  that  between  provisions  of  the  act  and  a  tax Treaty, whichever is more beneficial to the tax payer shall apply. Various terms are defined in Article 3 of a Tax Treaty or certain articles dealing with different types of income, for example,  dividend,  interest,  royalty,  fees  for  technical services (fts) etc.

Wherever, any particular term is defined in the tax treaty, and if there is a retrospective amendment to the definition of that term in the act, then such amendment will have no impact on provisions of tax treaty. For example, in CIT vs. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft20 the Bombay high Court held that the amendment in the definition of the “Royalty” with retrospective date will have no impact on interpretation of tax treaty. Payments made by the indian Company (BHEL) were held to be in the nature of “commercial profits” under the  india-germany  tax  treaty  (old)  and  were  held  not to be taxable in india in absence of Pe. The income-tax department’s argument of applying ambulatory approach for interpretation of the term “royalty” in view of its amendment under the income-tax act, was overruled by the high Court stating that, assessee has right to opt for provisions of the tax treaty u/s. 90(2) read with CBdt Circular 333 dated 2nd April, 1982 as they are more beneficial to him.

In B4U International Holdings Ltd. vs. DCIT21, the mumbai tribunal  held  that  hire  charges  for  transponder  satellite would not constitute “royalty” applying provisions of india- usa dtaa, notwithstanding retrospective amendments in the definition of “Royalty” u/s. 9(1)(vi) of the Act by the finance act, 2012.

In Sanofi Pasteur Holding SA vs. Dept. of Revenue22 the A. P.  high Court held that “the retrospective amendment   to section 9(1) so as to supersede the verdict in Vodafone international and to tax off-shore transfers does not impact the provisions of the india-france dtaa because the dtaa overrides the act.” the Court also rejected the revenue’s contention that as the “alienation” is not defined in the dtaa, it should have the meaning of the term “transfer” in section 2(47) as retrospectively amended. The Court ruled that as per article 31 of the Vienna Convention, a treaty has to be interpreted in good faith and in accordance with the ordinary meaning. it further held that, though article 3(2) provides that a term not defined in the treaty may be given the meaning in the act, this is not applicable because the term “alienation” is not defined in the Act.

In Director of Income-tax vs. Nokia Networks OY23, it was held that the assessee had opted to be governed by the dtaa and the language of the dtaa differed from the amended  section  9  of  the  act.  The  amendment  cannot be read into the DTAA. On the wording of the dtaa, a copyrighted article does not fall within the purview of royalty.

Article 3 of the un model Convention (MC) and the OECD MC as well as almost all indian tax treaties provide that any term not defined in the tax treaty shall have the meaning that it has at that time under the laws of that state, for the purpose of taxes to which the treaty applies. In other words, the meaning of a particular term is not defined in the treaty, then tax laws of the state which applies provisions  of a  tax treaty (i.e., state of source generally for determining taxability  of  income)  would  be  applicable.  for  example, the term “FTS” is not defined in India’s tax treaties with mauritius and uae. In such a scenario amendments made to the term fts in the act with retrospective effect would be applicable to any entity earning such income from india who is resident of these countries.

Article 7 in certain tax treaties (for example,  dtaa  with usa and uK) provide that  deductibility  of  expenses  of  the Permanent establishment (Pe) shall be subject to the provisions of the domestic tax laws. In such a scenario, if there is a retrospective amendment in the act, concerning computation of business profits of a PE, then such revised provisions would be applicable.


5.0 Expert Committee on Retrospective Amendments to section 9 relating to indirect Transfer of Shares

Retrospective  amendments  are  supposed  to  cure  the unintended  defect  or  lacuna  in  the   legislations   and/  or to bring clarity in law. However, the recent trend of retrospective amendments is very disturbing, which is to overrule or nullify the effect of favourable decisions of the Courts  and  tribunals  in  favour  of  the  tax  payer,  albeit, the Government has inherent right to correct infirmities in the law which may have been surfaced in a decision of a Court or tribunal resulting in a favourable decision to the tax payer. Thus, any retrospective amendment which may have an effect of neutralizing a Court ruling, by itself, would not render it unconstitutional unless, it alters the character of the tax imposed by the state so much, that it renders  the state incompetent to legislate and/or  its  operation  is so unreasonable that it results in to contravention of the fundamental rights of tax payers guaranteed by indian Constitution. At the same time, where the retrospective legislation is introduced to overcome a judicial decision,  the power cannot be used to subvert the decision without removing the statutory basis of the decision.24  further, such amendment cannot be made retrospectively only for the purpose of nullifying a judgment where there was no lacuna or defect in the original law.25

In 2012, the then Prime minister constituted an expert Committee  on  general  anti  avoidance  rules  (gaar), to undertake stakeholder consultations and finalise the guidelines for gaar after far more widespread consultations so that there is a greater clarity on many fronts26.

In the meantime the finance act, 2012, inserted following two explanations to section 9(1)(i) of the act with retrospective effect from 01-04-1962.

“Explanation  4.—for  the  removal  of  doubts,  it  is  hereby clarified that the expression “through” shall mean and include and shall  be  deemed  to  have  always  meant and included “by means of,” “in consequence of” or “by reason of.”

Explanation  5.—for  the  removal  of  doubts,  it  is  hereby clarified that an asset or a capital asset being any share or interest in a company or entity registered or incorporated outside india shall be deemed to be and shall always be deemed to have been situated in india, if the share or interest derives, directly or indirectly, its value substantially from the assets located in india.”

The above explanations were inserted to nullify the effect of the land mark decision of the supreme Court in case of Vodafone International Holdings BV vs. Union of India27 where in the apex Court held that indirect transfer of asset (in this case it was “shares”) by one non-resident to another non-resident of a foreign company which owned an indian company through various intermediary companies, was not covered by section 9 of the act and hence not taxable in india. as the stake involved was very high (about rs. 14,200 crore), government amended section 9 of the income-tax act with retrospective effect. However, it resulted in lot of opposition, criticism and negative impact about stability  and reliability of indian tax laws in the minds of foreign investors, thus impacting flow of foreign investments. At that time the expert Committee headed by dr. Parthasarathy shome was already examining gaar provisions. So, the government expanded the scope of the expert Committee on gaar to include the examination of the applicability of the amendment on taxation of non-resident transferring assets, where the underlying asset is in india.

The said expert Committee submitted its draft report in 2012 titled “draft report on retrospective amendments relating to indirect transfer”, wherein it concluded that “retrospective application of tax law should occur in exceptional or rarest of rare cases, and with particular objectives:

(i)    to correct apparent mistakes/anomalies in the statute;
(ii)    to apply to matters that are genuinely clarificatory in nature, i.e., to remove technical defects, particularly in procedure, which have vitiated the substantive law; or,
(iii)    to “protect” the tax base from highly abusive tax planning schemes that have the main purpose of avoiding tax, without economic substance, but not to “expand” the tax base.

Moreover, retrospective application of a tax law should occur only after exhaustive and transparent consultations with stakeholders who would be affected.”

The   “Tax  Administration   Reform   Commission”   (TARC) headed by Dr. Parthasarathy shome harshly criticised “Retrospective Amendments.” TARC submitted its first report   on   30th   may,   2014.   the   report28   states   that: “retrospective amendments have further undermined the trust between taxpayers and the tax administration. Many seem to feel that it has become the order of the day. Many of the retrospective amendments  have  been  introduced to counter interpretation in favour of the taxpayer upheld earlier by the judiciary. the most famous is the introduction of provisions for taxation of ‘indirect transfer’ with effect from 1st april, 1962, to overrule a supreme Court judgment which held that indian tax authorities did not have territorial jurisdiction to tax offshore transactions, and therefore, the taxpayer was not liable to withhold the taxes29. An overnight change in the interpretation of a provision, which earlier held ground for decades, provides scope for tax officials to rake up settled positions. This approach to retrospective amendments has resulted in protracted disputes, apart from having deeply harmful effects on investment sentiment and the macro economy.

6.0 Some Typical Retrospective Amendments pertaining to Non-residents have been tabulated in the table on the following page:

Reflecting the challenges behind just and correct application of retrospective amendments there is a constitutional or statutory protection against it in several countries. Countries such as Brazil, Greece, Mexico, Mozambique, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela, Romania, Russia, Slovenia and sweden have prohibited retrospective taxation30.

7.0 Conclusion
The Parliament has the sovereign right to amend the income-tax act and such amendments can be retrospective in nature. however, retrospective  amendments  results in uncertainty and distrust between tax payers and tax department. Imagine the plight of a tax payer who fights through various stages of appeal up to supreme Court by substantial devotion of time, efforts and money, gets  a favourable judgment and the act is amended to render the said judgment ineffectual. Retrospective amendments results in tremendous hardships to tax payers especially in a scenario where there is no accountability on the part of the tax administration.

TRAC has recommended that retrospective amendment should be avoided as a principle. it further commented that “retrospective amendments clustered during 2009- 12 may reflect this lackadaisical approach. In turn, this reflects complete lack of accountability at any level except on grounds of lagging behind in revenue collection.”

Retrospective amendments to section 9 of the act vide finance  act,  2012  to  tax  indirect  transfers  vitiated  the investment climate in india. Taking a cue from the criticism by the expert Committee and protest from tax payers, the present nda government has taken a stand to exercise the power of retrospective amendments with extreme caution and judiciousness keeping in mind the impact of each such measure on the economy and over- all  economic  climate.  The  finance  minister  in  his  Budget speech has stated that NDA government will not ordinarily bring about any change retrospectively which creates a fresh liability. Such an assurance on the floor of the Parliament will certainly boost investors’ and tax payers’ confidence.

Place of Provision of Services Rules

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Notification No. 14/2014-ST dated 11th July, 2014

Place of Provision of Service Rules, 2012 were provided in the principal Notification No. 28/2012 – Service Tax, dated 20th June, 2012 vide number G.S.R. 470 (E), dated 20th June, 2012. The same are now amended vide this Notification No. 14/2014. These amendments are going to bring a major shift on the liability of service tax in respect of some services.
Commission Agent service: Under the amended rules, commission agent is covered under Rule 9(c) of the POP Rules, which means, the place of provision of service will 89 be the location of service provider. So, if an overseas agent provides commission agent service to an Indian exporter, it will not attract reverse charge as the location of service provider is in non-taxable territory. Consequently, if any commission agent renders service in India for any foreign goods, the commission agent is liable to pay service tax, even though he may receive the commission in foreign exchange.

Hiring of Aircrafts or Vessels: Rule 9(d) of the POP Rules, 2012 has been amended to exclude Aircrafts and Vessels from the scope of this rule. Before this amendment, Aircrafts or Vessels taken or hire from abroad up to a period of one month did not attract service tax under reverse charge. But, now that these two modes of transport are excluded from Rule 9(d), the place of provision is the location of service recipient as per Rule 3. Therefore, from 1st October 2014, if Aircraft or Vessel is taken on hire from a non-taxable territory for a period up to one month, it attracts service tax under reverse charge.

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Changes in Point of Taxation Rules, 2011

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Notification No. 13/2014-ST dated 11th July, 2014

The Point of Taxation Rules, 2011 were framed by the principal Notification No. 18/2011 – Service Tax, dated 1st March, 2011 vide number G.S.R. 175 (E), dated 1st March, 2011 and amended by Notification No. 37/2012-Service Tax, dated 20th June, 2012 vide number G.S.R.479 (E), dated 20th June, 2012.

Now, by this Notification No. 13/2014, certain amendments have been made to the earlier notifications as summarised below:

1. Determination of point of taxation in case of specified services or persons: Rule 7:

The point of taxation for the services specified in section 68(2) that is services falling under the ambit of reverse or partial charge mechanism shall be the month in which the payment is made to the vendor, subject to a condition that such payment is made within six months from the date of invoice. If the payment is not made within six months, the point of taxation shall be determined as if this rule does not exist.

However, the point of taxation shall be date immediately following three months if the payment is not made within three months from the date of invoice. Hence, effectively the time period has been reduced from six months to three months.

2. Rule 10: POT for instances where invoice for reverse or partial charge has been issued before 01-10- 2014 and payment is pending as on said date:
The new rule provides that notwithstanding anything contained vide first proviso to Rule 7, if the invoice in respect of a service for which POT is determinable vide Rule 7 has been issued before 01-10-2014 but payment has not been made as on the said day, the POT shall be:
i. If payment is made within a period of six months from the date of invoice – POT Is the date of invoice; ii. If payment is not made within a period of six months from the date of invoice – POT shall be determined as if this rule does not exist.

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Interest on delayed payment of service tax

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Notification No. 12/2014-ST dated 11th July, 2014

Vide this notification, varying rates of interest on the basis of extent of delay in payment of service tax have been provided as under:

New rates shall be applicable w.e.f. 1st October, 2014.

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Service Tax (Determination of Value ) Rules, 2006- Changes

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Notification No. 11/2014-ST dated 11th July, 2014

In Rule 2A of the Service Tax Valuation Rules, category ‘B’ and ‘C’ of works contract i.e.,

(a) the services of maintenance or repair or reconditioning or restoration or servicing of any goods;

(b) maintenance or repair or completion and finishing services such as glazing or plastering or floor and wall tiling or installation of electrical fittings of immovable property; are merged into one single category, with service portion as 70%. This change will come into effect from 1st October, 2014.

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Reverse or Partial Charge Mechanism- Changes

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Notification No. 10/2014-ST dated 11th July, 2014

In this connection, the principal notification notification No. 30/2012 – Service Tax, dated 20th June, 2012, vide number G.S.R. 472 (E), dated 20th June, 2012 was last amended by notification No. 45/2012-Service Tax, dated 7th August, 2012 vide number G.S.R. 621 (E), dated 7th August, 2012.

Now, by this Notification No.10/2014, certain amendments have been effected in percentages of service tax payable by the service provider and service recipient for certain specified services, which are summarised as under:

In relation to services provided by a recovery agent to a banking company or financial institution or NBFC – the recipient of service has to pay 100% of service tax.

In relation to services provided by director of a company or body corporate – the recipient of service has to pay 100% of service tax.

In relation to services provided or agreed to be provided by way of renting of a motor vehicle designed to carry passengers on non-abated value to any person who is not engaged in the similar line of business – the percentage has been revised from 60:40 to 50:50 by service provider and service receiver respectively.

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E-payment of service tax made mandatory

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Notification No. 09/2014-ST dated 11th July, 2014

With effect from 01-10-2014, electronic payment of service tax is made mandatory for all assessees. However, a proviso has been added wherein the powers have been given to the Assistant Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner to allow the assessees for reasons recorded in writing to deposit service tax by any mode other than internet banking.

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Abatements – changes

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Notification No. 08/2014-ST dated 11th July, 2014

Various abatements have been granted by the principal Notification No. 26/2012 – Service Tax, dated 20th June, 2012, vide number G.S.R. 468 (E), dated the 20th June, 2012 and amended by notification No.9/2013- Service Tax, dated the 8th May, 2013 vide G.S.R. 296 (E), dated 8th May, 2013. Now this Notification No. 08/2014 makes further amendments as follows :

1. For services of GTA in relation to transportation of goods:

The condition of non-availment of CENVAT Credit on inputs, input services and capital goods is required to be satisfied by the service provider. The ambiguity whether the same is not to be availed by the service provider or receiver is ironed out by inserting the phrase ‘by service provider’ in Entry 7.

2. For services provided in relation to Chit:
The following condition has been added stating that CENVAT Credit on inputs, capital goods and input services, used for providing the taxable service, has not been taken under the provisions of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

3. For services of renting of any motor vehicle designed to carry passengers:

i. The phrase ‘motor vehicle designed to carry passengers’ is replaced with ‘motor cab’. Hence, effectively the services of renting of motor cab is only covered under this entry.
ii. The following conditions are substituted for the existing conditions:
CENVAT Credit on inputs and capital goods are not to be taken;

CENVAT Credit of input services of rent a cab has been taken as under:

Full credit if received from a person who is paying service tax on 40% of value; Upto 40% of such credit, if service tax is paid on the entire value,

CENVAT Credit of input services other than above shall not be taken.

4. For services of transport of passengers by a contract carriage other than motor cab:

i. A new entry since the services provided by contract carriage is brought into tax net in this notification. The abatement specified for such services shall be 60% subject to a condition that CENVAT Credit on inputs, capital goods and input services, used for providing the taxable service, has not been taken under the provisions of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.
ii. Further, this entry also covers the services provided by radio-taxis from the date the phrase ‘radio taxi’ is deleted from the negative list to be notified by the Central Government in the Official Gazette.

5. For transport of goods in a vessel:
The abatement has been increased from 50% to 60%.

6. For services provided by a tour operator:

The credit of input services received from tour operator is being made available which is not allowed hitherto.

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Changes in exemption procedure for SEZs

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Notification No. 07/2014-ST dated 11th July, 2014

Services provided to developer of or unit in SEZ are exempted by adopting certain procedure laid out in the principal Notification No. 12/2013 – Service Tax, dated 1st July, 2013, vide number G.S.R. 448 (E), dated 1st July, 2013 and amended by Notification No. 15/2013-Service Tax, dated 21st November, 2013 vide number G.S.R. No.744 (E), dated 21st November, 2013.

In order to remove certain time delays and simplify certain benefits, Notification No. 07/2014 makes following amendments in the earlier notifications:

(a) Central Excise Officer would issue Form A-2, within 15 days from receipt of Form A-1;

(b) Exemption would be available from the date when list of services on which SEZ is entitled to upfront exemption is endorsed by the authorised officer of SEZ in Form A-1, provided Form A-1 is furnished to the jurisdictional Central Excise Officer within 15 days of its verication. If furnished later, exemption would be available from the date on which FormA-1 is so furnished;

(c) Pending issuance of Form A-2, exemption will be available subject to condition that authorisation issued by the Central Excise officer will be furnished to the service provider within a period of three months from provision of service;

(d) For services covered under reverse charge, the requirement of furnishing service tax registration number of service provider shall be dispensed with;

(e) A service shall be treated as exclusively used for SEZ operations if the recipient of service is a SEZ unit or developer, invoice is in the name of such unit/developer and the service is used exclusively for furtherance of authorised operations in the SEZ.

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Changes in Mega Exemption Notification

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Notification No. 06/2014-ST dated 11th July 2014

The
exemptions to certain activities are governed by the principal
Notification No 25/2012-ST dated 20-06-2012 have been amended by
Notification No.04/2014 – Service Tax, dated 17th February, 2014, vide
number G.S.R. 91(E), dated 17th February, 2014.

Now, by
this Notification No. 6/2014-ST dated 11-07- 2014, amendments have been
made to the said principal notification. Such amendments are summarised
below :

(a) E xemption to Services by way of technical testing
or analysis of newly developed drugs, including vaccines and herbal
remedies, on human participants is now withdrawn;
(b) E xemption to Services provided for transportation of passengers by air-conditioned contract carriage is withdrawn;
(c)
E xemption in respect of services provided to the Government or local
authority or the governmental authority, will be limited to services by
way of water supply, public health, sanitation conservancy, solid waste
management or slum improvement and upgradation;
(d) S ervices provided by common bio-medical waste treatment facility operators to clinical establishments are exempted;
(e)
S ervices by way of transportation by rail or vessel from one place in
India to another of the following goods are exempted : i. organic
manure, ii. cotton, ginned or baled;
(f) S ervices by way of
transportation by GTA , by way of transport in a goods carriage the
following goods are exempted : i. organic manure, ii. cotton, ginned or
baled;
(g) S ervices by way of loading, unloading, packing, storage or warehousing of rice, cotton, ginned or baled are exempted;
(h)
Life micro-insurance products as approved by the Insurance Regulatory
and Development Authority, having maximum amount of cover of Rs. 50,000
are exempted;
(i) S ervices received by the Reserve Bank of India,
from outside India in relation to management of foreign exchange
reserves are exempted;

(j) S ervices provided by a tour operator
to a foreign tourist in relation to a tour conducted wholly outside
India are exempted;
(k) T he concept of ‘auxiliary educational services is omitted and exempted services are notified as under:
(i) transportation of students, faculty and staff;
(ii) catering services including any mid-day meals scheme sponsored by the Government;
(iii) security or cleaning or house-keeping services in such educational institutions;
(iv) services relating to admission to such institution or conduct of examination;

(l) T he exemption of renting of immovable property service received by educational institutions, stands withdrawn;
(m)
S ervices provided by hotel, inn, guest house, club or campsite, by
whatever name called, for residential or lodging purposes, having
declared tariff of a unit of accommodation of Rs. 1,000 or more per day
are taxable. The word ‘commercial’ has been deleted to cover the
services provided by dharmashalas or ashrams or any other such entities;
(n)
Selling of space or time slots for advertisements has been excluded
from negative list with the exception of selling of space for
advertisements in the print media.

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Maharashtra Act No. XXVII of 2014

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Maharashtra Act No. XXVII of 2014 published after having received assent of the governor in the Maharashtra Government Gazette on 26-06-2014.

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Notification No. VAT 1514/CR 46/Taxation 1 dated 11-07-2014

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By this notification, the government of Maharashtra amends Schedule A and C with effect from 01-08-2014.

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Notification No. VAT 1514/C.R.44/Taxation-1 dated 09-07- 2014

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By this notification Government of Maharashtra has exempted late fees above Rs.1,000/- for dealers who have not filed any returns for the period up to February, 2014 on condition that they file returns up to 30-09-2014 along with payment of tax and interest applicable.

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Notification No. VAT 1514/CR 30/Taxation 1. dated 23-06-2014

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Draft rules for Border Check Post published for the information of all persons and to invite objections or suggestions if any.

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[2014] 46 taxmann.com 97 (Chennai – CESTAT) Mallika Jeyabalan vs. CCE, Madurai

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Whether training given relating to various procedures and statutory compliances to be made in relation to export of goods can qualify as “vocational training” and exempt under Notification No. 24/2004-S.T.? Held, Prima facie, Yes

Facts:
The Appellants are providing training relating to various procedures and statutory compliances to be made in relation to export of goods and claimed exemption vide Notification No. 24/2004-S.T. contending it would qualify to be “vocational training.” For this, the Appellants relied on the following decisions:

• Ashu Export Promoters (P) Ltd. v. CST [2012] 34 STT 47 (New Delhi- CESTAT )
• Wigan & Leigh College (India) Ltd. v. Jt. CST [2008] 12 STT 157 (Bang. – CESTAT )

Revenue argued that “vocational training” would only cover courses with specific syllabus and approved by Government and hence sought to tax Appellants’ activity under the category of “commercial training and coaching” for the period 01-04-2004 to 31-03-2009.

Held:
The Hon’ble Tribunal gave a prima facie view that, the decisions relied upon by the Appellant will apply to the training impugned in this case also and granted waiver and stayed collection of all the dues arising from the impugned order.

Note: In Ashu Exports Promoter’s case, Appellant was engaged in the activity of imparting training in the field of export-import, merchandising and retail management. The Hon’ble Tribunal while considering dictionary meaning of the term ‘vocational’ held that it means “relating to an occupation or employment”. Further, in relation to education and training it gives the meaning “directed at a particular occupation or its skill.” The Tribunal held that when engagement in occupation or employment becomes outcome of vocational training pedantic approach as that is made out by Revenue by restricting its meaning is undesirable.

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A Report on 8th Residential Study Course on Service Tax & VAT

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The Indirect Taxes and Allied Laws committee of the BCAS had organised the 8th Residential Study Course on Service Tax & VAT (RSC) from Friday 13th June, 2014 to Sunday 15th June, 2014 at Khanvel Resort, Silvassa. In all 139 delegates from 25 cities of 11 States attended this keenly awaited Study Course, devoted to indirect taxes. This RSC was attended by many young chartered accountants including 15 lady participants. Many of them attended for the first time.


L to R : Mr. Naushad A. Panjwani (President), Mr. Shailesh Sheth, Mr. Sunil B. Gabhawalla, Mr. Govind G. Goyal

The Course comprised of group discussion on three case study papers and two presentation papers by eminent faculties.


L to R : Mr. Naushad A. Panjwani, Mr. Nitin P. Shingala, Mr. Kaustuv Sen,Mr. Suhas S. Paranjpe

The Course began with a welcome address by Nitin Shingala, Vice President of the Society. Thereafter, Govind Goyal, Chairman of the Committee, presented his opening remarks and Naushad Panjwani, the President, shared his experience with the officials of the Revenue Department from the Ministry of Finance and updated the members about the revenue’s current perception about the defaulting tax payers including expectations of Finance Ministry’s from our CA fraternity. Suhas Paranjpe, convenor, proposed vote of thanks.

Advocate Kaustuv Sen presented his paper in the first technical session, in which he discussed various issues concerning ‘Service Tax Implications on Cross Border Transactions.’ In his paper, he elaborately discussed various practical issues. Advocate Shailesh Sheth chaired the session and touched upon all the issues discussed by the paper writer in a very lucid manner. Members got the benefit of hearing two experts on the same platform. Saurabh Shah presented vote of thanks.


L to R: Mr. Shailesh Sheth,Mr. V. Sridharan, Mr. Saurabh P. Shah, Mr. Rajeev Luthia

On the second day, Senior Advocate V. Sridharan explained certain important judgements of House of Lords and ECJ with its relevance in interpreting Indian Tax Laws. The session was interactive as well as informative. Sunil Gabhawalla chaired the session. Rajeev Luthia thanked the speaker and the chair.


L to R: Mr. Sunil B. Gabhawalla, Mr. A.R. Krishnan, Mr. N. Venkataraman, Ms. Bhavana G. Doshi

Thereafter, Senior Advocate N. Venkataraman presented his paper on various critical issues dealing with ‘Taxation of Works Contract Transactions’ and discussed case studies in the light of various judgements including landmark cases of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. A. R. Krishnan, the chairman of the session, summarised various issues addressed by learned paper writer. Sagar Shah performed the pleasant task by thanking the speaker and the chair.


L to R: Mr. Sagar N. Shah, Mr. Bharat K. Oza, Mr. Uday V. Sathaye, Mr. Bakul B. Modi

The technical discussion was followed by refreshing group activities in the evening. Young members played cricket while many others visited Dudhani Lake and enjoyed boating. The day ended with delicious food and a musical night.


L to R: Mr. V. Raghuraman, Mr. Mandar U. Telang

On the third day, Bhavana Doshi gave a presentation on ‘Intangible-Indirect Issues.’ Based on her wide experience, she made her session lively wherein many participants openly interacted. Uday Sathaye, past-President, chaired the session. Bharat Oza presented a vote of thanks.

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Border Check Posts

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17th July, 2014
To
Mr. Ajit Pawar
The Finance Minister
Government of Maharashtra,
Mantralaya
Madam Cama Road, Churchgate,
Mumbai 400020

and

Mr. Nitin Karir
The Commissioner of Sales Tax,
8th floor Sales Tax Office,
Mazgaon,
Mumbai 400010

Respected Sirs,

Sub: Border Check Posts

This
is with reference to Government Notification dated 23rd June 2014
regarding erection of barriers and establishment of check posts, we
would like to invite your kind attention as follows:

• The provisions of this notification are intended to be effective just after a week from now i.e. from 25th July 2014.
• This notification, although dated 23rd June 2014, but has come to the knowledge of people in the last week only.
• Most of the dealers and their consultants still have to understand the exact procedure to be followed.

It seems that the forms, rules and procedures, etc. have not yet been
discussed by the Department with the trade and industry.
• The
requirements of this notification need wide spread publicity so as to
create an awareness among all those who are concerned with movement of
goods from the State of Maharashtra to other states and also from other
states to the State of Maharashtra.
• There are several aspects,
which need to be clarified so as to have smooth implementation of Law
and hassle free movement of goods.
• The regular business of trade and industry should not hamper because of hasty implementation of new provisions.

As transporters play a big role in the entire process the provisions
and the resultant procedure need to be thoroughly discussed with them.

In the initial stage, it may be necessary to setup help desks and
internet kiosks at convenient locations throughout the State so as to
help the small dealers, truck drivers and others to upload required
information.
• The movement of essential goods and tax free goods needs clarification.

There are several questions, which need to be answered satisfactorily
such as if a purchaser, outside the State, is neither a registered
dealer, nor having PAN/TAN , etc., whether in such cases goods cannot be
sold to them by a supplier from Maharashtra?, what about e-commerce
transactions?, whether same procedure will apply for internal movement
of goods in case of import and exports?, whether a driver is permitted
to register with his driving license number, etc.?

There are
several such other issues, which we feel the Government may thoroughly
discuss with trade, industry and transporters. And till then, may we
request your good selves to kindly consider postponing the
implementation of these provisions by a few months.

Hoping for your kind consideration.

Thanking you.
Yours faithfully

Nitin Shingala                                                     Govind G. Goyal
President, BCAS                                            Chairman Indirect Taxes Committee, BCAS

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Judiciary on tight purse strings

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The chief justices and jurists have consistently pointed out that the share the judicial system gets from the budgets, the Union or the states, is meagre. Two months ago, Chief Justice Lodha said that it is getting only between 0.4 and 0.11 per cent of budgetary allocations. The percentage has remained static for years. The other Cinderellas such as health and education have started getting a better share and attention due to social concerns and public awareness. However, courts are still neglected, as vouched for by the current chief justice.

In contrast, the allocation for the justice system is 1.2 per cent in Singapore, 1.4 per cent in the US and 4.3 per cent in the UK. The miserly allotment the Indian judiciary gets includes what it generates from court fees, stamp duty and other miscellaneous heads, which also go to the general pool.

This creates a grim picture in terms of human suffering. More than 30 million cases are pending before the courts. Some judges have said that it would take decades to clear the matters already pending before them. Against the Law Commission recommendation of 50 judges for one million people, the current ratio is 10.5 for one million. Nearly half the judges’ posts are vacant. Tribunals, nearly 40 at last count, are in a worse condition. The consequences are dismal to millions of people awaiting justice. Jails are overflowing with persons awaiting trial. Substantial numbers have already undergone imprisonment for periods they would have been sentenced if they were convicted.

Unappealing service conditions and hidden pressures keep away the best talents at the bar from accepting judicial posts. Good lawyers have to sacrifice sizeable income if they are elevated to the bench. Judges must also be made of “sterner stuff” to resist political and corporate arm-twisting, as seen in recent episodes of mysterious recusals. As a result, the legal eagles have invited a situation in which they have to argue intricate points of law before a less-endowed brethren. It could be called poetic justice, but for the fact that the clients are the sufferers.

It is well-known that the government is the largest single litigant and 60 per cent of the cases involve central laws. Therefore, the Union should contribute adequately to the expenditure on better administration of the courts. New laws are manufactured at every turn without estimating the expenditure involved. In the US, bills are said to annex a financial allocation after a “judicial impact assessment”.

(Source: The Economic Times, dated 02-07-2014)

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Times to reform our judicial appoinment

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The sordid manner in which senior lawyer Gopal Subramanium’s appointment as a judge of the Supreme Court (SC) has been thwarted points to the urgency of reforming judicial appointments. Subramanium’s name was delinked from the other three forwarded by the judges’ collegium to the government for elevation to the bench, based, reportedly, on certain reports of the CBI and the Intelligence Bureau. These agencies have regularly made use of Mr. Subramanium’s legal services. So, this sudden discovery of character flaws can only be attributed to the preferences of the new political dispensation.
(Source: The Economic Times, dated 27-06-2014)

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Agenda for un-legislation

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One of the long overdue steps promised by the new government is to repeal old and irrelevant laws that clutter the statute books. This country is known for having the largest number of legislation, the central Acts alone numbering about 3,000 and state laws which might total at least three times more. The situation recalls the truism of Cicero: more laws, less justice.

Whenever a socio-legal crisis arises, the government promises more laws to get over the embarrassment. If there is a rape epidemic, the concerned minister will undertake to pass a law to end it for all times; if a SUV driven by drunken youth runs over pavement sleepers, let there be another law. The possibilities are endless. In the end, all these theatrics fade from public memory.

Before passing more Acts in the 16th Parliament, the lawmakers could think of un-legislating a long list of outdated laws that have defied the ravages of time. Even scrubbing them with amendments will not make them relevant. The Law Commission had made a study of such statutes in 1998 and presented a lengthy list of legislation which could be jettisoned, benefitting the public and the courts. It had named 166 central Acts, one of which goes to the days of the East India Company, namely, the Coastal Vessels Act, 1838. The country could do away with the Bikrama Singh’s Estates Act, 1883 and the Mirzapur Stone Mahal Act, 1886.

The Livestock Importation Act, 1898, was originally meant to regulate the import of livestock liable to be affected by infectious disorders. It was recommended for repeal, but it was dusted and kept alive with an amendment in 2001 adding “livestock products” to the definition of “livestock”. The Glanders and Farcy Act, 1899, appoints inspectors to search and destroy diseased horses, asses and mules. The Dourine Act, 1910, deals with the castration of diseased horses and compensation to be paid to the owner.

There are statutes that still refer to His/Her Majesty. Acts such as the Prisoners’ Removal Act, 1884, hark back to the days when convicts were shipped to Mauritius or Singapore. There are at least 11 such colonial era statutes still in force, which might interest only students of legal history.

Lugging outworn laws over centuries is not peculiar to this country. There are ridiculous rules everywhere that made Bumble say that law is an ass. It is reported that in 29 states in the US, it is legal to fire someone for being gay. In Thailand, it is illegal to step on money. Divorce is illegal in the Vatican. A Chinese law makes it compulsory for children to visit their parents and attend to their spiritual needs. The long list would make us preen with the pride of rationality. But wait, it is a humbling thought that in this country any sale of property above Rs. 100 should be registered.

One way to make the lawmakers look periodically at the stack of rule books is to implant a terminator clause in each legislation. It should lapse after, say a quarter century, unless they are amended and updated. The courts should also ignore such laws. Some countries have such a clause in their laws, but India has not incorporated that principle, and thus allowed forensic weeds to grow.
(Source: Extracts from an article in Business Standard, dated 18-06-2014)

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Energy Pricing

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The energy sector badly needs reform. India has notoriously poor electricity supply, which has hampered the growth of the manufacturing sector. Meanwhile, energy costs for consumers are not noticeably low, in spite of huge government subsidies on fuel and on electricity – which are largely responsible for high deficits. Policy mismanagement and pricing distortions across the energy space are responsible in large measure for this situation. At the retail end of the chain, prices of diesel, compressed natural gas, liquefied petroleum gas and kerosene are controlled, and so are power tariffs. However, India imports 80 per cent of its crude and 30 per cent of its natural gas. It is also among the world’s largest coal importers. The high international prices of these commodities are not passed on to end-users. Hence, companies supplying electricity and retailing petroleum products suffer losses. Not coincidentally, these companies are owned by the government, since private players are unwilling to enter this space.

A complex subsidy mechanism is applied to oil refining and marketing. The oil and gas subsidy came to about Rs. 1.45 lakh crore in the last fiscal year. It was shared between oil-producing public sector undertakings and the central government. Meanwhile, power sector losses run at about Rs. 60,000 crore per annum. Cash-strapped state-owned power distribution companies cannot repay loans, or even settle with suppliers such as Coal India and National Thermal Power Corporation, the country’s largest power producer. Despite power shortages, there has been controversy over tariff hikes in the Mundra projects of the Adani and Tata groups. Both projects run on imported coal, which became more expensive. Large gas-based power capacities are also sitting idle. Power sector losses have led to a banking crisis. The latest bailout involved restructuring almost Rs. 2 lakh crore in unpaid loans by state power distribution companies. The states issued bonds as part of a debt restructuring package.

The fiscal burden on the energy account is, therefore, huge. The situation cannot be rectified without charging the end-user rational prices.

(Source: Business Standard, dated-18-06-2014)

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 8 dated 18th July, 2014

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Money Transfer Service Scheme – Delegation of work to Regional Offices

This circular has amended the guidelines with respect to Money Transfer Service Scheme. Henceforth, any person who wants to act as an Indian Agent under MTSS is required to make an application for permission to the respective Regional Office of the Foreign Exchange Department of the RBI under whose jurisdiction its registered office falls.

DIPP time schedule

DIPP has put the following Time schedule for processing proposals under NRI/EOU/RT schemes

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 7 dated 18th July, 2014

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Rupee Drawing Arrangement – Delegation of work to Regional Offices

This circular has amended the guidelines with respect to Opening and Maintenance of Rupee/Foreign Currency Vostro Accounts of Non-resident Exchange Houses as under: –

1. Banks entering into Rupee/Foreign Currency Drawing Arrangements with Exchange Houses for the first time now have to submit the application, in the prescribed format, to the respective Regional Office of the Foreign Exchange Department of the RBI under whose jurisdiction their registered office falls.

2. Banks now have to submit the Annual Review note, by 30th June every year, to the respective Regional Office of the Foreign Exchange Department of RBI under whose jurisdiction their registered office falls.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 6 dated 18th July, 2014

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Press Note 4 (2014 Series) issued by DI PP dated 26th June, 2014

 Foreign Direct Investment – Reporting under FDI Scheme
This circular states that henceforth:-

1. Indian companies while submitting Form FCGPR & Form FCTRS must use the NIC codes as mentioned in the National Industrial Classification, 2008 (NIC 2008) and not the old NIC codes as mentioned in NIC 1987.

2. Indian companies must use the uniform State and District code list (available on the RBI website) while submitting Form FCGPR.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 5 dated 17th July, 2014

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Notification No. FEMA 311/2014-RB dated 24th June, 2014

Liberalised Remittance Scheme (LRS) for resident individuals-Increase in the limit from USD 75,000 to USD 125,000

This circular now permits individuals resident in India to remit up to US $ 125,000 per financial year, under the Liberalised Remittance Scheme for acquisition of immovable property outside India.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 4 dated July 15, 2014 Notification No. FEMA.306/2014-RB dated May 23, 2014

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Foreign Direct Investment (FDI ) in India – Issue/ Transfer of Shares or Convertible Debentures – Revised pricing guidelines
This circular contains the revised pricing guidelines with respect to issue/transfer of shares in/convertible debentures of an Indian Company to Non-Resident investors by the Company/Residents investors and vice versa.

The pricing guidelines (existing & revised) are as under: –


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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 3 dated 14th July, 2014

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Notification No. FEMA. 308 /2014-RB dated 30th June, 2014

Issue of Partly Paid Shares and Warrants by Indian Company to Foreign Investors

Presently, the following instruments are recognised as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) compliant instruments – equity shares, compulsorily and mandatorily convertible preference shares/debentures as well as equity shares or compulsorily and mandatorily convertible preference shares/debentures containing an optionality clause but without any option/right to exit at an assured price.

This circular has expanded the list of FDI compliant instruments by including therein partly paid equity shares and warrants issued by an Indian company in accordance with the provision of the Companies Act, 2013 and/or SEBI guidelines, as applicable. These partly paid equity shares and warrants will be eligible instruments for the purpose of both FDI and Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI) schemes.

Non-Resident Indians (NRI) can also invest in the partlypaid shares and warrants on non-repatriation basis in terms of the provisions contained in Schedule 4 to Notification No. FEMA. 20/2000-RB, dated 3rd May, 2000, as amended from time to time.

Detailed guidelines in respect of the same are contained in this circular.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 2 dated 7th July, 2014

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Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 – Import of Rough, Cut and Polished Diamonds

This circular states that with immediate effect, importers of Rough, Cut and Polished Diamonds can import the same on Clean Credit basis (i.e., credit given by a foreign supplier to its Indian customer/buyer, without any Letter of Credit (Suppliers’ Credit)/Letter of Undertaking (Buyers’ Credit)/Fixed Deposits from any Indian financial institution) for a period not exceeding 180 days from the date of shipment.

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Master Circulars dated 1st July, 2014

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RBI has issued 15 Master Circulars. These Master Circulars consolidate the existing instructions on the subject at one place. These Master Circulars will be updated from time to time as and when the fresh instructions are issued. These Master Circulars may be referred to for general guidance and concerned persons may refer to respective circulars/notifications for detailed information, if so needed.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 151 dated 30th June, 2014

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Remittances to non-residents – Deduction of Tax at Source

This circular states that henceforth the RBI will not issue any instructions under the FEMA with respect to deduction of tax at source at the time of making remittances to the non-residents. Banks are, as a result, now required to comply with the requirement of the applicable tax laws in this regards.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 149 dated 25th June, 2014

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Know Your Customer (KYC) norms/Anti-Money Laundering (AML) standards/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT)/Obligation of Authorised Persons under Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002 – Money Changing Activities – Change in period of maintenance and preservation of records

This circular provides that Authorised Persons are now required to maintain and preserve records for a period of at least five years as against the present requirement of to maintaining and preserving records for a period of at least ten years.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 148 dated 20th June, 2014

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Notification No. FEMA 303/2014-RB dated 21st May, 2014)

Risk
Management and Inter-bank Dealings: Guidelines relating to
participation of Foreign Portfolio Investors (FPIs) in the Exchange
Traded Currency Derivatives (ETCD) market

Presently, persons
resident outside India are not allowed to participate in the currency
futures and exchange traded currency options market in India

This
circular now permits eligible foreign portfolio investors (FPI) to
enter into currency futures or exchange traded currency options
contracts subject to the following terms and conditions: –
a. F PI
can access to the currency futures or exchange traded currency options
for the purpose of hedging the currency risk arising out of the market
value of their exposure to Indian debt and equity securities.
b. F
PI are permitted to participate in the currency futures/exchange traded
options market through any registered/recognised trading member of the
exchange concerned.
c. F PI are permitted to take position – both
long (bought) as well as short (sold) – in foreign currency up to US $
10 million or equivalent per exchange without having to establish
existence of any underlying exposure. This limit will be both day-end as
well as intra-day.
d. FPI cannot take a short position beyond US $ 10 million at any time.
e.
F PI can take a long position beyond US $ 10 million in any exchange if
it has an underlying exposure. The onus of ensuring the existence of an
underlying exposure is on the FPI concerned.
f. E xchanges are free
to impose additional restrictions as prescribed by SEBI for the purpose
of risk management and fair trading.
g. E xchange/clearing
corporation has to provide FPI wise information on day end open position
as well as intra-day highest position to the respective custodian
banks. The custodian banks will aggregate the position of each FPI on
the exchanges as well as the OTC contracts booked with them (i.e., the
custodian banks) and other banks. If the total value of the contracts
exceeds the market value of the holdings on any day, the concerned FPI
will be liable to such penal action as may be laid down by the SEBI and
RBI.

RBI has issued the Notifications No.FED.1/ED (GP) – 2014
dated 10th June, 2014 (Currency Futures (Reserve Bank) Amendment
Directions, 2014) and No. FED. 2/ED (GP) – 2014 dated 10th June, 2014
(Exchange Traded Currency Options (Reserve Bank) Amendment Directions,
2014) to give effect to the above.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 147 dated 20th June, 2014

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Risk Management and Inter-bank Dealings: Guidelines relating to participation of Residents in the Exchange Traded Currency Derivatives (ETCD) market

Presently:
1. D omestic participants in the currency futures and exchange traded options markets are not required to have any underlying exposure. While domestic participants in the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets are compulsorily required to have underlying exposure.
2. Banks are not allowed to offset their positions in the ETCD market against the positions in the OTC derivatives market and are also not allowed to carry out any proprietary trading in the ETCD market.

This circular provides that: –
1. Domestic participants in the currency futures and exchange traded currency options will have to comply with the following terms and conditions:
a. Domestic participants are allowed to take a long (bought) as well as short (sold) position up to US $ 10 million per exchange without having to establish the existence of any underlying exposure.
b. D omestic participants who want to take a position exceeding US $ 10 million in the ETCD market will have to establish the existence of an underlying exposure. The procedure to be followed for the same is given in the circular.

2. Banks can:
a. U ndertake proprietary trading in the ETCD market within their Net Open Position Limit (NOPL)/limit imposed by the exchanges for the purpose of risk management and preserving market integrity.
b. N et/offset their positions in the ETCD market against the positions in the OTC derivatives markets.

There will be no upper limit on the position that can be taken by any participant, resident or non-resident, in the ETCD market, except limits that are imposed by SEBI for risk management and preserving market integrity.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 146 dated 19th June, 2014

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Notification No. FEMA. 309/2014-RB dated 4th June, 2014

Export and Import of Currency: Enhanced facilities for residents and non-residents

Presently,
a person resident in India can take outside India or having gone out of
India on a temporary visit, can bring into India (other than to and
from Nepal and Bhutan) Indian currency notes up to an amount not
exceeding Rs.10,000. This circular has raised the said limit of Rs.
10,000 to Rs. 25,000 and provides that: 1. A ny person resident in India
can take outside India (other than to Nepal and Bhutan) or having gone
out of India on a temporary visit, can bring into India (other than from
Nepal and Bhutan) Indian currency notes up to an amount not exceeding
Rs.25,000.
2. A ny person resident outside India, who is not a
citizen of Pakistan and Bangladesh and who is also not a traveller
coming from and going to Pakistan and Bangladesh, and visiting India,
can take outside India/ bring into India Indian currency notes up to an
amount not exceeding Rs.25,000. This facility is available only the
person is exiting India/entering India only through an airport. Thus,
this facility of bringing into India or taking out of India, Indian
currency notes up to Rs. 25,000 is not available to persons’ resident
outside India who are coming into India/going out of India via land/sea
borders.

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Can consent orders be appealed against? — can rejection of consent application be appealed against?

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Background
SAT has recently held on 30th
June, 2013 in the case of Reliance Industries Limited (Appeal No. 1 of
2013) that consent orders cannot be appealed against. Further, even
rejection of application for settlement by consent cannot be appealed
against. The bar on appeal is absolute and total. This, as SAT explains,
has arisen on account of a retrospective amendment to the provisions
relating to settlement by consent. It is almost certain that this order
of SAT would be appealed against, to the Supreme Court. It also adds a
fresh layer of complexity to the process of settlement by consent
orders. This article reviews this order of SAT and in the context of an
existing earlier controversy.

As readers are aware, violations
of securities laws can not only result in serious penal consequences but
the process of investigation and punishment itself is long and costly
for both sides. The stigma of having violated securities laws and having
suffered penal consequences also tarnishes the record of a person. In
the United States, the system of plea bargaining is said to result in
90% of cases being settled through that route. A similar scheme was
introduced in India by SEBI in April, 2007. A person who has been
alleged to have violated securities laws or even if he expected that he
would be so charged, could approach SEBI and offer terms of settlement.
An independent committee (called “High Powered Advisory Committee”) was
set up, headed by a retired Judge of the High Court. The time to settle
the matter (or for rejection of such application) was usually very
short, often only a few months. Importantly, the person charged with
violations did not have to plead guilty.

SEBI’s power to settle questioned
Numerous
matters have already been settled by this process. These Guidelines
were further revised substantially in 2012. In the meantime, a petition
was filed before the Delhi High Court questioning power of SEBI to
settle violations through the consent mechanism. It appears that this
petition is still pending disposal.

Retrospective amendment of the law
Seemingly
to pre-empt the issue whether SEBI has such powers, an Ordinance has
been passed amending the SEBI Act and related statutes. The Ordinance
has made several provisions. Firstly, it gave explicit powers to SEBI to
settle such matters by consent. Secondly, it provided that such matters
shall be settled in accordance with Regulations. Formalising the
process of settlement by Regulations instead of Guidelines was perhaps
intended to give additional legal sanctity. Thirdly, and most
importantly, the amendments were given retrospective effect. This was
clearly intended to overcome any concern that SEBI did not have any
authority. Now, this Ordinance has been put to a test and we have a
pronouncement on one aspect of these provisions.

Decision of SAT
The
Securities Appellate Tribunal (“SAT ”), in Reliance’s case, has now
considered an issue arising out of the amendments made by that
Ordinance, and Regulations issued pursuant thereto. The essential
question was whether an appeal can lie against an order of SEBI
rejecting an application for Consent Order. SAT has held that, under the
amended law, such applicant has absolutely no right of appeal.

Allegations in the case
The
allegations in the case under consideration were as follows. Reliance
was accused to have carried out certain transactions in the stock market
in connivance with certain other persons. Illegal profits of Rs. 513.12
crore were alleged to have thereby been made. In a preceding show cause
notice, allegations of insider trading were also made. However, these
were later dropped.

The matter took several turns before it came
before SAT . A show cause notice was issued for which an application
for settlement by consent was made. This application was rejected. A
fresh show cause notice was issued. Reliance asked for documents in
connection with the show cause notice which were refused by SEBI. An
appeal was filed. Application for consent was also filed. In the
meantime, though SEBI had consistently maintained that the demand for
documents by Reliance was unjustified, it provided copies of the
requirement documents. However, shortly after providing such documents
and though Reliance sought time to examine the voluminous documents,
SEBI rejected the application for consent on the ground that the matter
could not be settled through consent. This was on the ground that the
matter fell into the category specified in the Guidelines of serious
fraudulent/unfair trade practices that could not be settled.

While
this was going on, and the appeal before the SAT was pending, the
Ordinance, as discussed earlier, was passed and the law was changed
retrospectively. In the background of all this, SAT passed the order as
discussed earlier.

SAT holds that amended law absolutely bars appeals
The
distinction between the earlier law and the law amended by the
Ordinance as explained by SAT is worth emphasising. The earlier section
relating to consent orders was contained in section 15T(2) of the SEBI
Act. It barred appeal against an order made “with the consent of the
parties.” This would have left orders rejecting application for consent
appealable. The Ordinance omitted Section 15T(2) with retrospective
effect from 20th April, 2007 and inserted section 15JB from same date.
Section 15JB barred appeal “against any order” under that section
dealing with application for consent orders. SAT thus held that, in view
of such retrospective amendment, even the SEBI’s order rejecting the
consent application was not appealable.

Adverse observations by SAT
Though
the SAT dismissed the appeal, it made several adverse observations
while giving the ruling. The following few important ones are worth
noting.

a) It said that SEBI was wrong in delaying matter for
years not giving documents required by the applicant on various grounds,
and thereafter providing the documents to the applicant.

b) It
also said that SEBI was wrong in denying adequate opportunity to the
applicant to present its case. SEBI gave, after a long delay, voluminous
documents desired by the applicant. However, without giving time to
examine such documents as desired by applicant, it passed an ex-parte
order rejecting the application.

c) SEBI’s argument that the
consent application was not maintainable because it fell within a
restricted category was also not accepted by SAT , since this ought to
have been known to SEBI from inception. Even more so since SEBI still
had discretion to consider, on facts, cases falling in such categories.

Despite
these observations, SAT effectively said that its hands were tied by
the amendments which had retrospective effect and barred appeal against
any order.

Possible future Scenario
It appears almost
certain, particularly considering the stakes involved (as mentioned
earlier, the allegation is that illegal gains of Rs. 513.12 crores were
made), that the Order of SAT would be appealed against before the
Supreme Court. Many more grounds may also be raised before the Supreme
Court including the vires of the amendments, whether they give unbridled
powers to SEBI, whether SEBI need not observe rules of natural justice
while considering such applications, etc. In particular, it is also
possible that the retrospective amendment itself could be questioned,
particularly since it takes away right of appeal even in existing cases.
The adverse observations of SAT most certainly would come to aid of the
applicant.

Hopefully, assuming the appeal is made, the supreme Court will also resolve other issues relating to mechanism of consent orders and those arising out of the retrospective amendments.  the  Court  may  decide  once  and  for  all whether seBi has powers, under the earlier law and the amended  law,  of  passing  Consent  orders.  this  ruling may also thus clear the air on whether Consent orders passed till now are valid in law. it may be particularly recollected that the earlier law did  not  have  specific and clear provisions empowering SEBI to pass consent orders. the amended law, though it did give such powers, had raised fresh concerns as discussed in earlier posts.

Apart from such basic issues, it is submitted that even otherwise the  ruling  of  sat  that  the  orders  relating  to consent application are wholly non-appealable is questionable. the law provides for several pre-conditions and procedures subject to which the consent order may be passed. further, the principles of natural justice would in any case have to be followed. such order would also have  to  be  in  accordance  with  regulations  made.  the order of seBi would, it is respectfully submitted, thus    be questionable on several grounds. it is submitted that sat’s  blanket  denial  of  such  grounds  of  questioning  in appeal of such orders is not correct.

Thus,  it  would  be  interesting  to  watch  the  progress  of this  case. the  journey  would  surely  be  long. assuming the order of sat is appealed against, the matter could be restored back to SEBI for fresh consideration of the application for consent. the outcome of such proceedings themselves could be matter of appeal.

Even if the appeal is rejected (or not made), the matter would go back to SEBI for considering the allegations on merits, which could go into a fresh round of appeals.

Conclusion – Whether Consent Settlement Mechanism will lose its Meaning?
An observation in passing is worth making. Consent orders can be compared with arbitration. Like arbitration, Consent orders too are meant for speeding up and even substituting litigation. as in arbitration, appeals are barred in Consent orders too. however, if even Consent orders end up in prolonged litigation instead of speeding it up, then the purpose is defeated. and thus, the classic and oftquoted words of lament of the supreme Court (in Guru Nanak Foundation vs. Rattan Singh & Sons) could apply to consent orders too:-

“Interminable, time consuming, complex and expensive court procedures impelled jurists to search for an alternative forum, less formal, more effective and speedy for resolution of disputes avoiding procedure claptrap and this lead them to arbitration act 1940. the way in which the proceedings under the act are conducted and without exception challenged in courts has made lawyers laugh and legal philosophers weep. experience shows  and law reports bear testimony that the proceedings under the act have become highly technical, accompanied by unending prolixity at every stage, providing a legal trap to the unwary. an informal forum chosen by the parties for expeditious disposal of their disputes has by the decisions of the courts been clothed with legalese of unforeseen complexity.”

Partnership – Dissolution of Firm – Expiry of tenure of firm – Dissolution is automatic: Section 42, 59 and 63: Partnership Act, 1932.

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Kuriachan Chacko and Ors vs. The Registrar of Firms, Office of Inspector General of Registration, AIR 2014 Kerala 109

The Registrar of firm rejected the request of the petitioners to record the amendment brought about to Clause No. 12 of Partnership Deed dated 12-11-2002, whereby the specified tenure of ‘five years’ was sought to be amended as ’30 years’ with some other modifications, which was refused to be registered on the ground that the tenure of the firm was already over in 2007. The petitioners constituted a firm in the name and style as “M/s. LIS Ernakulam.”

Admittedly, the tenure of the firm was stipulated as ‘five years’. But according to the petitioners, as per Resolution 3 dated 30-10-2006, the members of the firm, had amended Clause No. 12 of the partnership deed, stipulating that the duration of the firm shall be for a minimum period of ’30 (thirty) years’; and that the firm shall not stand dissolved on the death of any of the partners and shall continue the business of the firm with the legal representatives of such deceased partner’s. The petitioners contend that, even though the resolution was taken as early as in the year 2006, it was unfortunately omitted to be brought to the notice of the respondent, for being incorporated in the Register. The lapse was noticed only in September, 2013 and immediately thereupon, the first petitioner who is described as the Managing Trustee/Partner as per Partnership Deed, preferred representation before the respondent, also forwarding a copy of the Minutes dated 30-10-2006 and an affidavit to that effect, seeking to have the modifications incorporated in the relevant Register. After considering the request, it was rejected by the respondent as mentioned hereinbefore, which in turn is under challenge in the Writ Petition.

The Hon’ble Court observed that the point to be considered is whether resolution stated as taken on 30-10-2006, amending Clause 12 of Deed of Partnership, modifying the tenure of the firm from five years to 30 years could be directed to be incorporated in the Register, for the reason that sub-Rule (2) of Rule 4 of the Partnership (Registration of Firms) Rules 1959 has been declared as illegal and ultra vires and struck off from the relevant Rules.

Evidently, sub-Rule (2) of Rule 4 of the Rules prescribes a time limit of 15 days from the occurrence of the event with reference to statement/notice in relation to the firm under s/s. 60, 61, 62, 63(1) and 63(2). Section 60 deals with recording of alteration in firm name and principal place of business. Section 61 is in respect of noting of closing and opening of branches. Coming to Section 62, it is in respect of noting of changes in names and addresses of the partners. Section 63 deals with recording of changes in and dissolution of the firm. Even a plain or casual reading is enough to hold that the situations contemplated under s/s. 60, 61 and 62 are not attracted to the situation of the case in hand.

On expiry of tenure of firm, dissolution is automatic. Amendment of tenure from five years to 30 years was not brought to notice of Registrar nor incorporated in Register at time firm was in existence. Amendment sought to be incorporated subsequent to dissolution cannot be allowed as the firm stood automatically dissolved and lost colour and characteristics of a registered firm. Therefore, refusal to incorporate amendment was proper.

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Co-operative Society – Membership – Discretion to refuse Membership to person not duly qualified – Not violative:Of Art 19(1)(c) Constitution of India and section 24(1): Gujarat Co-op Soc. Act, 1962

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Laxmi Niwas Co-op Housing Soc. Ltd. vs. District Registrar & Ors AIR 2014 Gujarat 159 (Full Bench) The appellant is a Co-op Society registered under the Gujarat Co-op Society Act.

A Society validly constituted under the provisions of the Act has the right to admit any new member provided such member is duly qualified for admission under the provisions of the Act. Rules and the Bye laws of such society. Subsection (1) of section 24 however, gives a discretion to the Society to refuse admission to a new member who has applied and has requisite qualifications, subject however, that sufficient cause exists for refusing such membership. What is `sufficient cause,’ although, has not been defined under the Act, sub-section (3) of section 24 makes it mandatory for the society to give reasons in writing within a specified period and in terms of the scheme provided in sub-section (4) to sub-section (6), such reason is subject to challenge before the Registrar by way of an appeal. Although sub-section (6) of section 24 states that decision of the Registrar under sub-section (4) shall be final and shall not be called in question in any court, it is well settled that such provision does not stand in the way of the High Court for exercising judicial review. Decision of the Society being subject to appeal before a statutory authority and being subject to further judicial review before the concerned High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, none of the aforesaid provisions of section 24 can be said to be ultra vires any of the provisions of the Constitution of India.

Further, providing for the deemed membership to a person, who is not communicated the decision of the society to which he is seeking the membership within a period of three months, as provided in section 22(2) of the Act, does not violate Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution of India. There are several such deeming provisions in various statutes and it is a consistent view of the courts that such provision is valid provided the applicant has the requisite qualifications. Thus, the provisions of section 24 or section 22(2) of the Act do not violate any of the provisions of the Constitution.

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Appellate Tribunal – Rectification of Mistake –Issue of limitation of demand raised but not considered – Rectification justified – Section 35C(2) of Central Excise Act, 1944.

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Commissioner of C. Ex. Mumbai III vs. N.T.B. International Pvt. Ltd. 2014 (302) ELT 481 (Bom.)

The
question that arose in the appeal was whether or not the exercise of
jurisdiction u/s. 35C (2) of the Act by the Tribunal to rectify an error
is justified .

By a final order dated 1st September, 2004
passed u/s. 35C of the Act, the Tribunal inter alia, upheld the duty
demand of Rs. 42.07 lakh. On 27th December 2004, the Respondent-Assessee
filed an application for rectification of mistake u/s. 35C(2) of the
Act seeking to rectify the order dated 1st September 2004. In its
rectification application, the Respondent-Assessee pointed out that
though the issue of limitation was raised before the Tribunal and also
urged at the hearing, the order did not deal with the same, thus leading
to an error apparent from the record warranting rectification of the
final order dated 1st September, 2004 of the Tribunal.

On 20th
December, 2005, the Tribunal after hearing the parties, allowed the
application for rectification of the mistake and held that the longer
period of limitation was not invocable in the present facts.
Consequently, the duty demand was reduced on appeal by revenue.

The
Hon’ble Court observed that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal u/s.
35C(2) of the Act is to rectify mistakes apparent from the record i.e.,
the mistake must be obvious and selfevident. The discovery of mistakes
must not require a long process of reasoning. The question whether there
is a mistake in the order sought to be rectified or not should not be a
subject of debate. Once a mistake is brought to the notice of the
Tribunal, it is duty bound to correct the mistake in its order, where an
issue has been argued and/ or submission made on the issue and the same
is not recorded and/or considered in the order, it follows that there
is a mistake apparent from the record.

Thus, non-consideration
of an issue urged before the Tribunal but not dealt with by it would
give rise to a mistake apparent from the record.

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Advocate appearing as litigant in person – Is not practicing his profession – Cannot be permitted to argue with his robes: Section 30: Advocates, 1961.

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R. Muthukrishnan vs. UOI & Ors.AIR 2014 Madras 133.

The petitioner in the writ petition is an Advocate and the writ petition has been designed as a Public Interest Litigation with a prayer to issue a writ of Declaration, declaring that the Direct Benefit Transfer Scheme for Liquefied Petroleum Gas announced by the Union of India is inconsistent with public law and constitutional requirements. When the case was posted for admission, the petitioner appeared in person with his robes. The petitioner was asked as to whether he being the petitioner in this writ petition would be entitled to argue with his robes. The petitioner insisted that he is an Advocate enrolled with the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu and in terms of the Rules framed under the Advocates Act, in particular the Rules governing Advocates given in Appendix I of the Rules, is duty bound to wear Bands and Gown while appearing, failing which he would be contravening the statutory provisions and therefore, was entitled to represent the matter with his robes. On such insistence, this Court framed the following preliminary question for consideration:-

Whether an Advocate is entitled to argue in a PIL, with his robes, on the ground that he is appearing as an advocate, or is entitled to argue with his robes when he is a petitioner in person in a Public Interest Litigation.

The Hon’ble Court observed that the contention raised by the petitioner is thoroughly misconceived. In the present case, the petitioner is appearing before the Court not as an Advocate of an any party, but on behalf of himself as he is the sole writ petitioner in the writ petition. Though the prayer in the writ petition is designed as a Public Interest Litigation, it is the specific case of the petitioner that he is also aggrieved and like him there are several others and therefore, he has filed this writ petition. If such is the case, we have no hesitation in holding that the petitioner himself is the litigant and he shall not be entitled to any rights and privileges as an Advocate while appearing in person for his own cause.

The Court further observed that a person cannot appear or plead before a Court of law in dual capacity, one as party and other as an Advocate and if an Advocate is appearing as party-in-person, he should in order to maintain the norms and decorum of the legal profession, appear before the Court of law as party in person putting off the band and robes prescribed for legal practitioner.

The Petitioner pleading his own cause though under the guise of a Public Interest Litigation, cannot seek recourse to any of the provisions of the Advocates Act, more particularly section 30 of the Act, inasmuch as no question has arisen as regards the right of the petitioner under the provisions of the Advocates Act and no rights conferred on him under the Act has been denied to him, while he is appearing in person. The word “practise” connotes exercise of a profession and when the petitioner an Advocate is a litigant in person, he does not practise his profession and therefore, he is not entitled to argue his case with his robes.

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IS PRIVACY SACRED?

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“Gentlemen do not read other gentlemen’s mail” –
this sentence of the then Secretary of State of US, Henry Stimson
(1929-1933), is the most famous sentence uttered about codes and
ciphers.

Secretary Stimson disbanded the “Black Chamber” which
was founded in 1919 following World War I. The mission of this Chamber
was to break into the communication of other nations, with the
overarching objective of breaking into diplomatic communication.

Circa
2013. Edward Snowden, a US citizen, who worked as a National Security
Agency (NSA) contractor through Booz Allen Hamilton, leaked the details
of top-secret U.S. and British government mass surveillance programmes,
including the interception of US and European telephone metadata and the
PRISM and Tempora Internet surveillance programmes. With his US
passport being revoked, he travelled from Hong Kong to Russia, where he
was given asylum.

It’s been a year since his exile in Moscow and
he continues to be an enigma for many people across the world. In fact,
the celebrated Hollywood director, Oliver Stone, is working on a film
about Snowden.

There are many others who believe in individual privacy.


Aaron Swartz was a computer programmer, writer, political organiser and
Internet activist. In January, 2011, Swartz was arrested by police on
state breaking-andentering charges, after downloading academic journal
articles from JSTOR . Charged with violations of the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, Aaron was found dead on 11th January, 2013 in his Brooklyn
apartment, where he had hanged himself. He was quoted as having said,
“there is no justice in following unjust laws.”

• Bradley
Manning, a US Army soldier, was arrested in May 2010 in Iraq on
suspicion of having passed classified material to the website,
WikiLeaks, which was the largest set of restricted documents ever leaked
to the public. He has been recently sentenced to 35 years in prison.
Manning has famously said, “I want people to see the truth, because
without information, you cannot make informed decisions as a public.”


Julian Assange is an Australian editor, activist, publisher and
journalist. He is known as the editor-in-chief and founder of WikiLeaks,
which publishes secret information, news leaks and classified media
from anonymous news sources and whistleblowers. Since November 2010,
subject to a European arrest warrant in response to a Swedish police
request for questioning in relation to a sexual assault investigation.

In
June 2012, following the final dismissal by the Supreme Court of the
United Kingdom, Assange failed to surrender to his bail and sought
refuge in the Ecuadorian embassy in London, where he has since been
granted diplomatic asylum. Assange has made a telling statement. “I give
private information on corporations to you for free and I’m a villain.
Zuckerberg gives your private information to corporations for money and
he’s Man of the Year.”

This new breed of “hacktivist” (hackers
who are activists) fundamentally believe that surveillance means tyranny
and they revolt against such tyranny. The rise of these hacktivists
across the world has raised an important question on data privacy —
should governments be allowed to snoop on all private data?

As
recent disclosures by Snowden have revealed, every email and
communication was being monitored and it did not spare even heads of
State.

In fact, the Brazilian President, Dilma Rousseff,
launched a blistering attack on the US in a speech at the UN general
assembly on 24th September, 2013.

She protested against the
indiscriminate interception of a private citizen by the US, stating that
it is a breach of international law. In a telling comment, she said:

“A
sovereign nation can never establish itself to the detriment of another
sovereign nation. The right to safety of citizens of one country can
never be guaranteed by violating fundamental human rights of citizens of
another country.”

There has been a chorus of protests from the
European heads of State protesting spying on emails and communication.
Finland’s Prime Minister, Jyrki Katainen has said, “According to our
fundamental rights, all the citizens, including politicians, have
similar rights and illegal monitoring of cellphones isn’t acceptable.”

Governments
justify surveillance of data based on their need for intelligence
gathering, data mining and prevention of security threats. Hacktivists
believe that personal privacy is a fundamental right.

Governments
argue that collecting haystacks of data is essential to look for
potential security and other threats to the State. Hacktivists argue
that the records of all intimate moments of individuals are captured by
the Governments from private communication network and sites, without
specific authorisation and need and hence, it is a violation of the
citizen’s rights. Security agencies seize digital material from
citizens, who store it on their computers or send it to their
acquaintances by emails or social networking sites. These agencies could
not have possibly entered their houses and walked off with diaries and
other physical material, without proper authorisation. If such stuff
cannot be captured from the analogue or physical world, how is it right
that it is captured from the digital world? Such broad information
capture and interception of communication is justified on the grounds of
“national security.” But, as revealed by Snowden, it is done routinely
without any suspicion, warrant or probable cause. Hacktivists argue that
this is violation of human rights and such private and intimate
information should not be in the government database.

So, is privacy sacred?
The debate has just begun…

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“Fraud” Implications under Companies Act 2013

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Introduction
Deceiving any person by fraudulent or dishonest inducement to deliver any property amounts to offence of cheating punishable u/s. 415 to 424 of the Indian Penal Code. Apart from the IPC other laws dealing with taxation and commercial activities also deal with fraudulent acts and their consequences.

Section 447 of the Companies Act, 2013 prescribes a separate punishment for fraud, in relation to affairs of any company which is, imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to 10 years and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be less than the amount involved in the fraud but which may extend to three times the amount involved in fraud. The explanation to section 447 defines ‘fraud’ as under:

“Explanation.- For the purposes of this section-

(i) “fraud” in relation to affairs of a company or any body corporate, includes any act, omission, concealment of any fact or abuse of position committed by any person or any other person with the connivance in any manner, with intent to deceive, to gain undue advantage from, or to injure the interests of, the company or its shareholders or its creditors or any other person, whether or not there is any wrongful gain or wrongful loss;

(ii) “wrongful gain” means the gain by unlawful means of property to which the person gaining is not legally entitled.

(iii) “wrongful loss” means the loss by unlawful means of property to which the person losing is legally entitled.”

It is clear from the above provisions that any act or omission, concealment of any fact or abuse of position committed by any person with intent to deceive, to gain undue advantage from or injure the interest of any company or its shareholders or its creditors or any other person, is guilty of fraud. Various provisions of the Companies Act, 2013, list out different acts, omissions or other conduct which shall amount to fraud punishable u/s. 447 of the Act and the same are as under:

U/s. 212(6) all the above offences are cognisable offences and no person accused of any offence under above sections can be released on bail without giving opportunity to be heard to the Public Prosecutor.

The Companies Act 2013, provides for establishment of Special Courts to try the offences under the Act and pending such establishment the offences are to be tried by a Court of Session exercising jurisdiction over the area (section 440 of the Companies Act, 2013).

Serious Fraud Investigation Office
The Act also provides for establishment of Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO) and till it is established u/s. 211(1), the present SFIO established under administrative orders, referred to in the Proviso to section 211(1) shall be deemed to be SFIO for the purpose of section 211. The Central Government can assign investigation into affairs of any company to SFIO and if there is any offence under investigation by SFIO no other investigation authority including the State Police, can continue or commence investigation under the Companies Act, 2013. Under the provision of the new law the SFIO has been given a statutory status and powers of investigation under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 have been vested in SFIO. S/s. (17) of section 212 makes a specific provision for sharing of any information or documents available with any other investigating authority or income-tax authorities with SFIO and likewise SFIO can share information or documents available with it with any other investigating authority or income-tax authorities.

It is seen from the definition of fraud contained in the explanation to section 447 that a person will be guilty of offence of fraud under the Act if committed with intent to deceive or gain undue advantage from or injure the interests of –

• the company;
• its shareholders;
• its creditors; or
• any other person

Since offence of fraud under the Companies Act, 2013 is in relation to affairs of a company, fraudulent acts committed by “any other person” amount to fraud under the Act if such acts are in relation to the affairs of the company.

Fraud as a civil wrong
Fraud is defined in the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Section 14 of the Contract Act defines free consent inter alia as consent not caused by fraud as defined in section 17 of the Contract Act. Section 17 provides that:

“17. “Fraud” means and includes any of the following acts committed by a party to a contract, or with his connivance, or by his agent, with intent to deceive another party thereto or his agent, or to induce him to enter into the contract:-

(1) the suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who does not believe it to be true;
(2) the concealment of a fact by one having knowledge or belief of the fact;
(3) a promise made without any intention of performing it;
(4) any other fact fitted to deceive;
(5) any such actor omission as the law specially declares to be fraudulent.

Explanation.- Mere silence as to facts likely to affect the willingness of a person to enter into a contract is not fraud, unless the circumstances of the case are such that, regard being had to them, it is the duty of the person keeping silence to speak, or unless his silence is, in itself, equivalent to speech.”

Section 19 further provides that when consent to an agreement is caused by coercion, fraud or misrepresentation, the agreement is avoidable at the option of the party whose consent was so caused. The Indian Contract Act therefore provides that a victim of fraud can avoid the agreement entered into acting on fraudulent acts but there are no provisions making fraud an offence punishable with imprisonment or fine.

CHEATING IS CRIME UDNER IPC:
The Indian Penal Code, 1860 is the law of crimes applicable in India and section 415 of the said Code defines the offence of cheating, as under:

“415. Cheating.- Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to “cheat”.

Explanation.- A dishonest concealment of facts is a deception within the meaning of this section.”

Fraud is not an offence under the law of crimes.

Offence of cheating under the IPC requires:
“(1) deception of any person; (2)(a) fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that person; (i) to deliver any property to any person; or (ii) to consent that any person shall retain any property; or (b) intentionally inducing that person to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property (Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma vs. State of Bihar AIR 2000 SC 2341: (2000) 4 SCC 168: 2000 SCC (Cri) 786: 2000 Cr LJ 298).”

Fraud is a deception deliberately practiced in order to secure unfair or unlawful gain and is a civil wrong. fraud in criminal form is cheating or theft by false pretence, intentional deception of victim by  false  representation or pretense. it needs to be noted that abuse of position with intent to deceive or gain undue advantage does not amount to cheating u/s. 415 iPC. if one compares the words of section 447 of the Companies act, 2013 with the provisions in section 17 of the Contract act and section 415 of iPC, it is clear that offence of fraud under   the Companies act is based on the Contract act, which treats fraud as a civil wrong. it is therefore possible that a person guilty of fraud under the Company Law may not necessarily be guilty of cheating under the indian Penal Code. new provisions contained the Companies act, 2013 defining fraud and establishing the Serious Fraud Investigation Office conferring powers of investigation under the Code of Criminal Procedure are intended to ensure that the directors and other persons managing the affairs of a Company act honestly and diligently to protect the interest of the company they represent and the interests of shareholders and creditors of the Company. any act or omission or concealment or abuse of position to gain advantage for themselves or other persons, on the part of persons managing the company will amount to a fraud punishable u/s. 447. it is an accepted fact that there are successful businessmen in the corporate world who possess positive qualities and survive and prosper by doing business honestly in accordance with the rules and regulations and do not derive any benefits for themselves or others except those which are legitimately due to them. But there are many who achieve success and appear to be playing according to rules but are experts in adopting various tactics to deceive and gain undue advantage for themselves and others. it is for dealing with such unscrupulous persons that the law has been amended and the new provisions are intended to ensure compliance and observance of principles of corporate governance by all companies.

Fraud Under The Companies act, 2013 and English law
new provisions in the Companies act, 2013, are comparable to the definition of fraud under English law. In Eng- land, the provisions contained in the theft act, 1968 were replaced by the fraud act, 2006 which provides that any person by making a false representation or failing to disclose information or by abuse of his position makes any gain for himself or anyone else or inflicting a loss on another shall be guilty of fraud. Provisions in english law are more comprehensive defining false representations, concealment or non-disclosure of information and abuse of position. the other major difference between section 447  of the Companies act 2013 and the fraud act, 2006 in england is that the english law is criminal law applicable to any victim of fraud unlike indian law which restrict the law to the victims who are companies or their shareholders or creditors or other persons like investors who are victims of fraudulent acts. Considering the wide ramifications of frauds in the capital market, insurance & banking sector, non-banking entities like chit funds, ponzi schemes for marketing goods and other money circulation schemes, there is a need to amend our criminal law on the lines of the fraud act, 2006 enacted in england. in other words the provisions relating to fraud in the Com- panies act, 2013 need to be converted into general law having universal application like the indian Penal Code.

Widening The Ambit of Fraud
One other significant provision in the definition of fraud is treatment of abuse of position with intent to gain undue advantage from any person as fraud. such a provision in effect amounts to providing punishment for bribery and corruption in the private sector. to illustrate, if a Purchase Officer of a company takes a kickback from a supplier of raw-material to the company, or a director sells his personal property to the Company at inflated price, such persons will be guilty of abusing their position as Purchase Officer or Director for undue advantage for themselves. The general law of Prevention of Corruption act, 1988, is applicable to Public Servants as defined in the said Act which is not applicable to Directors and Officers of Companies in the private sector because they are not public servants. now with enactment of section 447 in the Companies Act, 2013, Directors and Officers of private sector companies abusing their position for personal gain or to give advantage to any other person can be prosecuted and punished for fraud.

The efficacy of the new provisions creating offence of fraud  ultimately  depends  on  establishment  of  special Courts as contemplated under chapter XXViii of the new act for the purpose of trial of offence under the Companies act, 2013, and expeditious trial and punishment of persons guilty of fraud. speedy trial of fraudsters is the key for improved levels of protection of interests of investors and other stakeholders of corporates, as well as observance of principles of corporate governance by the corporates.

Considering the wide spread incidence of frauds in all sectors of the economy there is a need to examine whether indian Penal Code needs to be amended on the lines of the fraud act, 2006 enacted in england.

Fraud and the Auditor
In terms of section 143(12), an obligation has been cast on the auditor of a company to report to the Central government of fraud which has been committed, or is being committed against the company by officers or employees of the company. the manner of reporting has been prescribed in the rule 13, of the Companies (audit and auditors ) rules 2014 .

The responsibility cast on the auditor, is onerous. To what extent auditors are able to discharge this onus remains to be seen.

Conclusion
the  enactment  of  section  447  in  the  Companies  act 2013, is an indicator of the thinking of the authorities. economic frauds have increased a great deal of the recent past. on account of a lacuna in the law and the lengthy legal process, persons committing such frauds have been able to avoid punishment. one hopes that the provisions in the Companies act 2013, will help to bring to book such fraudsters.

Can email addresses constitute an Intangible Asset?

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Synopsis
With the growth of E-commerce,
wherein Indian companies and start-ups have been investing heavily on
building their customer databases, the accounting treatment of
purchasing the said databases has gained importance with regards to
Indian GAAP. In this Article, the learned author has expressed and
justified the accounting treatment under different scenarios for
purchase of such database of E-mail ID’s based on facts of the cases put
forth in the following article, by referring to technical definitions
and relevant extracts of Accounting Standard-26 ‘Intangible Assets’.

BACKGROUND
Online
Limited (referred to as the company or Online) is specialised in the
online selling of a range of products. The company’s commercial strategy
relies on purchase of databases of email address containing lists of
people who may be interested in purchasing its products. The lists are
provided by the specialised vendors based on the specifications of
Online. These specifications include:
(i) M inimum amount of data, e.g., email address, first name and last name.
(ii)
Based on the potential to buy its products, Online has defined various
categories of data, e.g., income, employment, education, residential
location, past history, age, etc. The person should fall under one or
more of these prescribed categories.
(iii) D ata check against the
existing lists of Online – The purpose of this check is to avoid
duplication with existing email address lists.

The email addresses meeting these specifications are treated as valid email addresses.

Scenario 1
The
specialised vendors carry out search activities to identify valid email
addresses. The company makes payment to these vendors on cost plus
margin basis. Though the company will monitor the quality of work of the
vendor it would nonetheless have to make the payment, even if they have
not found any valid email address. Also, vendors do not guarantee any
exclusivity and they may provide the same email address lists to other
companies also.

Scenario 2
The specialised vendors
carry out search activities to identify valid email addresses. The
company makes payment to these vendors on performance basis. If vendors
do not provide any valid email address, they will not be entitled to any
payment from the company. Also, vendors need to guarantee exclusivity
and they cannot provide the same lists to the competitors of Online.

ISSUE
Can Online recognise the lists of email addresses as an intangible asset under AS 26 Intangible Assets?

TECHNICAL REFERENCES

1. AS 26 defines the terms intangible assets and assets as below:

“An
intangible asset is an identifiable non-monetary asset, without
physical substance, held for use in the production or supply of goods or
services, for rental to others, or for administrative purposes.

An asset is a resource:

(a) Controlled by an enterprise as a result of past events, and
(b) From which future economic benefits are expected to flow to the enterprise.”

2. A s per paragraph 20 of AS 26, an intangible asset should be recognised if, and only if:
(a) It is probable that the future economic benefits that are attributable to the asset will flow to the enterprise, and
(b) T he cost of the asset can be measured reliably.

3. Paragraphs 11 to 13 of AS 26 explain the requirement concerning “identifiability” as below:

“11.
The definition of an intangible asset requires that an intangible asset
be identifiable. To be identifiable, it is necessary that the
intangible asset is clearly distinguished from goodwill. …

12.
An intangible asset can be clearly distinguished from goodwill if the
asset is separable. An asset is separable if the enterprise could rent,
sell, exchange or distribute the specific future economic benefits
attributable to the asset without also disposing of future economic
benefits that flow from other assets used in the same revenue earning
activity.

13. Separability is not a necessary condition for
identifiability since an enterprise may be able to identify an asset in
some other way. For example, if an intangible asset is acquired with a
group of assets, the transaction may involve the transfer of legal
rights that enable an enterprise to identify the intangible asset. …”

4. Paragraphs 14 and 17 of AS 26 provide as under with regard to “control”:

“14.
A n enterprise controls an asset if the enterprise has the power to
obtain the future economic benefits flowing from the underlying resource
and also can restrict the access of others to those benefits. The
capacity of an enterprise to control the future economic benefits from
an intangible asset would normally stem from legal rights that are
enforceable in a court of law. In the absence of legal rights, it is
more difficult to demonstrate control. However, legal enforceability of a
right is not a necessary condition for control since an enterprise may
be able to control the future economic benefits in some other way.

17.
A n enterprise may have a portfolio of customers or a market share and
expect that, due to its efforts in building customer relationships and
loyalty, the customers will continue to trade with the enterprise.
However, in the absence of legal rights to protect, or other ways to
control, the relationships with customers or the loyalty of the
customers to the enterprise, the enterprise usually has insufficient
control over the economic benefits from customer relationships and
loyalty to consider that such items (portfolio of customers, market
shares, customer relationships, customer loyalty) meet the definition of
intangible assets.”

5. Paragraph 18 of AS 26 explains the requirement concerning “Future Economic Benefits”:

“18.
The future economic benefits flowing from an intangible asset may
include revenue from the sale of products or services, cost savings, or
other benefits resulting from the use of the asset by the enterprise.
For example, the use of intellectual property in a production process
may reduce future production costs rather than increase future
revenues.”

6. Paragraph 24 of AS 26 states that if an intangible
asset is acquired separately, the cost of the intangible asset can
usually be measured reliably.

7. Paragraphs 50 and 51 of AS 26 state as under:

“50.
I nternally generated brands, mastheads, publishing titles, customer
lists and items similar in substance should not be recognised as
intangible assets.

51. T his Standard takes the view that
expenditure on internally generated brands, mastheads, publishing
titles, customer lists and items similar in substance cannot be
distinguished from the cost of developing the business as a whole.
Therefore, such items are not recognised as intangible assets.”

DISCUSSION AND ALTERNA TIVE VIEWS
View 1 – The email address lists cannot be recognised as an intangible asset.

An item without physical substance should meet the following four criteria to be recognised as intangible asset under AS 26:
(a) Identifiability
(b) Future economic benefits
(c) Control
(d) R eliable measurement of cost

In
the present case, the email address lists are acquired separately and
the company has the ability to sell them to a third party. Thus, based
on guidance in paragraph 12 of AS 26, the lists satisfy identifiablity
criterion for recognition as intangible asset. Online will use the email
address lists to generate additional sales. Therefore, future economic
benefits are expected to derive from the use of these lists and the
second criterion is also met.

However, the third criterion, viz., control, for  recognition of intangible asset is not met. email addresses are public information and the company cannot effectively restrict their use by other companies. hence, in scenario 1, the control criterion for recognition of intangible asset is not met.

The following additional arguments can be made:

(a)    Purchase of email address lists can be analysed as  outsourcing.  these  lists  are  prepared  by  the suppliers based on the specifications of the com- pany, which is not different from the situation where the company would have built them in-house. hence, guidance in paragraph 50 and 51 of as 26 should apply which prohibit recognition of internally generated intangible assets of such nature.

(b)    These  lists  can  be  viewed  as  marketing  tool,  such as leaflets or catalogues; their purchase price being similar to a marketing expense. in accordance with paragraph 56(c) of as 26, expenditure on advertising and promotional activities cannot be recognised as an intangible asset.

View 2 – the email address lists can be recognised as an intangible asset.

Based on the analysis in view 1, the first two criteria for recognition of an intangible asset (identifiability and future economic benefits) are met.

Regarding the third criterion, viz., future economic benefits are controlled by the company; it may be argued that the company acquires the ownership of the email address lists prepared by the vendor as well as the exclusivity of their use. it is able to restrict the access of third parties to those benefits. Hence, in scenario 2, the third criterion is also met.

Online can reliably measure the cost of acquiring email address lists. indeed, in accordance with paragraph 24 of as 26, the cost of a separately acquired intangible item can usually be measured reliably, particularly when the consideration is in the form of cash.

The  author  believes  that  the  company,  which  sub-contracts the development of intangible assets to other parties (its vendors), must exercise judgment in determining whether it is acquiring an intangible asset or whether it is obtaining goods and services that are being used in the development of a customer relationship by the entity itself. in determining whether a vendor is providing services to develop an internally generated intangible asset, the terms of the supply agreement should be examined to see whether the supplier is bearing a significant proportion of the risks associated with a failure of the project. for example, if the supplier is always compensated irrespective of the project’s outcome, the company on whose behalf the development is undertaken should account for those activities as its own. however, if the vendor bears a significant proportion of the risks associated with a failure of the project, the company is acquiring developed intangible asset, and therefore the requirements relating to separate acquisition of intangible asset should apply.

Under this view, the company will amortise intangible asset over its estimated useful life. the author believes that due to the following key reasons, the asset may have relatively small useful life, say, not more than two years:

(a)    the  company  will  use  email  address  lists  to  generate future sales. once the conversion takes place,  the email address lists will lose their relevance for  the company and a new customer relationship asset comes into existence which is an internally generated asset.

(b)    for  email  addresses  which  do  not  convert  into  customers over the next 12 to 24 months, it may be reasonable to assume that they may not be interested in buying company products.

(c)    email addresses may be subject to frequent changes.

Concluding remarks
in scenario 1, the control criterion is not met. Besides the vendor is providing the company a service rather than selling an intangible asset. therefore the author believes that only view 1 should apply in scenario 1. in scenario 2, view 2 is justified. In scenario 2, the exclusivity criterion and consequently the control requirement is met. secondly, since the payment to the vendor is based on performance the company pays for an intangible asset, rather than for services. however, the amortisation period will generally be very short.

(Unreported) [ITA No. 1407 & 1405/Ahd/2009] ITO vs. Dholera Port Ltd. and ITO vs. Adani Port-Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. A.Ys.: 2008-09, Decided on: 30-05-2014

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Article 13 India-UK DTAA – where the services provided by UK Company did not “make available” technical knowledge, skill etc., the payment was not taxable as FTS under Article 13 of India-UK DTAA.

Facts:
The taxpayer was an Indian company. The taxpayer had engaged a British company (“UKCo”) for conducting navigation studies to evaluate the economic feasibility of the port. For the services rendered, the taxpayer made payment to UKCo. According to the taxpayer, technical knowledge, skill or know-how was not “made available” by UKCo and hence, in terms of Article 13(4)(c) of India- UK DTAA , the payment was not FTS.1

Held:
• The agreement between taxpayer and UKCo stipulated that the report to be provided by UKCo was confidential, the taxpayer was not only prohibited from transferring the report to a third person but also prohibited from using the knowhow in performing services for any other client in future. The taxpayer was also prohibited from sub-licensing any of the rights granted.
• Based on the case law explaining the expression “make available,” the technology can be said to be “made available” only if the fruits of the services were transferred to the services recipient.
• Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case, the payment for the services provided was not made for “making available” technical knowledge, experience, knowhow to the taxpayer and therefore, it was not taxable as FTS under India-UK DTAA .

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(2011) 22 STR 591 (Tri.-Ahmd.) Flex Art Foil Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Daman.

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Transfer of CENVAT credit on conversion of partnership firm to Pvt. Ltd. — Credit reversed on audit objection but re-credit taken — Whether permission is required to be taken under Rule 10 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

Facts:
The partnership firm under the name and style as M/s. Sushmit Packaging was converted into a private limited company under the name of M/s. Flex Art Folio Pvt. Ltd. (the appellants in the case). The appellants took the credit in terms of the provision 10 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 and informed the Revenue. On an audit objection that credit could not be availed suo motu, the appellants reversed the credit taken. However, it was again taken on realising that no permission was required under the said rule. According to the appellant, it was not the case of suo motu refund in accordance with the Rule 10 of the said rules and relied on the decision in the case of Hewlett Packard (India) Sales Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner, 2007 (6) STR 155 (Tribunal). The Revenue contended that even if no permission was required under the said rules, admissibility of the credit on merit was not adjudged by the lower authorities.

Held:
It was held that the denial of credit on the ground that formal permission from the Central Excise Officers was not taken was not justified. However, the matter was remanded to the proper Central Excise Officer since the availability or otherwise of the credit on merits was not adjudged by the lower authorities.

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(2011) 22 STR 583 (Tri.-Bang.) — Durferrit Asea Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Guntur.

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Refund of unutilised CENVAT credit — Whether the appellant is eligible for the refund of claim of the CENVAT credit accumulated despite the nonregistration of appellant’s head office as a service tax distributor and non-distribution of service tax credit as per the laid down procedures — Rule 5 and Rule 7 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

Facts:
The appellants claimed refund of unutilised credit of Rs.77,150 for the invoices in the name of the head office which was not registered as service tax distributor. The Adjudicating Authority vide order-in-original rejected the refund claim on the ground that in the absence of registration, head office could not distribute the CENVAT credit to the appellant which was an EOU. The appellants contended that the non-observance of procedure of distribution of credit will not come in the way of the refund of the amount of the credit.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that the appellants had no other units in the relevant division. There was no requirement to follow Rule 7 (Registration as ISD), wherein the appellants had only one manufacturing unit. The eligibility of the appellants as regards availment of the CENVAT credit on the service tax paid on the input services was not questioned by the Commissioner (Appeals). Further, the provisions of Rule 7 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 come into play only if the appellants wished to get themselves registered as the input service credit distributor, which was not the situation in the instant case. Therefore, the appellants’ claim was allowed by the Tribunal.

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(2011) 22 STR 581 (Tri.-Del.) K. S. Transformers (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur-I.

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Refund — Unjust enrichment — Section 11B of the Central Excise Act — Service tax on job work found not leviable during specific period. Service tax was however charged by the job worker — Manufacturer did not claim CENVAT credit but issued debit note after a gap of time — Refund claim denied as assessee did not claim immediately — No investigation done to prove debit note wrong — No tax liability without letters of law — Assessee’s appeal allowed.

Facts:
The principal manufacturer issued debit note to the appellant who was a job worker on finding that the service tax on the job work was not leviable during the material period. The appellant was denied refund on the ground that the debit note was issued by the manufacturer after a long time. According to the appellant, they should not suffer by not getting back the money wrongly paid to the Revenue and if the assessee could show that the burden was not passed on or it was reversed, the claim of refund could not be denied. The decisions in the case of Commissioner of Service Tax, Bangalore v. Shiva Ciba Analyticals (I) Ltd., 2009 and Union of India v. A. K. Spintex Ltd., 2009 (234) E.L.T. 41 (Raj.) were relied upon. According to the Revenue, the appellant was disentitled to the refund as they did not immediately claim the refund and relied on the judgment of the Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur-II v. Adarsh Gaur Gum Udyog, 2000 (120) E.L.T. 138 (Trib.).

Held:
It was held that the Revenue’s plea does not sustain in light of the failure on part of the Revenue to prove that the debit note was wrong. Further, it was held that when there is no liability to pay tax, the appellant should not suffer and that no taxes can be realised without the letters of law. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed.

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(2011) 22 STR 578 (Tri.-Ahmd.) — Ultratech Cement Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Bhavnagar.

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CENVAT credit of service tax — Whether vehicles used in residential colony of assessee and insurance on residential buildings includible within the scope of ‘input services’.

Facts:
The appellant was denied the credit of service tax paid on the vehicles used in the residential colony of the appellant as also the credit of service tax paid on the insurance of the residential building on the ground that the same could not be considered to be ‘input service’. It was contended that the issue involved in the present case was related to the credit of service tax paid on the services used in activities related to business which covered all activities related to functioning of a business.

Held:
Referring to a number of case laws and relying on the decisions in the case of Manikgarh Cement v. CCE & Cus., Nagpur 2008 (9) STR 554 (Tri.- Mumbai) and Millipore India Ltd. v. CCE., Bangalore 2009 (13) STR 616 (Tri.-Bang.), respectively, it was held that the definition of input service being quite wide, an activity used for business purposes was held as ‘input service’ and the assessee was entitled to the credit of service tax paid on vehicles used in the residential colony of assessee and insurance on residential buildings.

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(2011) 22 STR 558 (Tri.-Ahmd.) Commissioner of Central Excise, Bhavnagar v. Gujarat Travels.

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Tour operator service — Vehicle not registered as a tourist vehicle but registered with the Regional Transport Authority under the PCOP (Contract Carriage Permit) — Whether liable to pay service tax — Appellate Authority holding that assessee not covered prior to 10-9-2004 when ambit expanded to cover any mode of transport — No reason to interfere in order.

Facts:
The respondents operating the tours in an omni-bus registered with the Regional Transport Authority covered under PCOP (Contract Carriage Permit) were not paying service tax on the ground that the tour was not being conducted in a tourist vehicle as defined in the Motor Vehicle Act. The respondents cited the case of Secretary, Federation of Bus Operators Association of Tamil Nadu, Chennai v. UOI and Ors., 2006 (2) STR 411 (Mad.), wherein it was held that the tour conducted by a contract carriage (and not by a tourist vehicle) do not fall within the definition of Tour Operator.

Held:
It was held that there was no reason to interfere in the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) holding that the respondents were not required to pay service tax. The Revenue’s appeal was rejected.

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(2011) 22 STR 553 (Tri.-Bang.) Commissioner of Central Excise, Hyderabad v. Vijay Leasing Company.

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Activity of mineral extraction, classification issue — Whether mining service or site formation and clearance service — Activity of site formation, etc. incidental to contract of mining undertaken — Activity not taxable under site formation and clearance service during relevant period i.e., prior to introduction of mining service w.e.f. 1-6-2007.

Refund — Whether tax paid on self-assessment is refundable — Self-assessment cannot be considered as assessment made by officer u/s. 73 of the Finance Act — Assessee justified in filing refund claim.

Facts:
The respondents being engaged in providing services of mining to their clients/principals got themselves registered under the category of ‘site formation and clearance, excavation and earthmoving and demolition’ service and accordingly paid service tax under the said category for the period 16-6-2005 and 30-9-2006. Pursuant to the introduction of separate service under the category of mining service w.e.f. 1-6-2007, they filed a refund claim for an amount of Rs.1,58,11,007 on the ground that their service would fall under the new category. The Revenue contended that the contract entered by the respondents with the principals indicated that the services were of excavation, drilling and demolition services. Moreover, the respondents having discharged the service tax liability on self-assessment could not file a refund claim. The respondents contended that the removal of overburdens and excavation of ore undertaken as per the contract would clearly fall under the category of mining services and was liable to be taxed accordingly. Further that the self-assessment would not amount to assessment done by an officer and hence there was no restriction for claiming the refund.

Held:
Relying on the High Court judgment in the case of Central Office Mewar Palaces Org. v. UOI, [2008 (12) STR 545 (Raj.)], the respondents were held to be entitled to the refund claim. Appeal of the Revenue was rejected.

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Limitation — Delay of 53 days in filing appeal — Delay attributed to resignation of both employee handling service tax matters and his successor — Delay condoned — Section 86 of the Finance Act, 1994.

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Facts:
The appellant pleaded that the delay of 53 days in filing the appeal was owing to the resignation tendered by the employees handling service tax matters. The delay on part of the appellant was neither willful nor on account of any negligence and was beyond the appellant’s control.

Held:
The Tribunal held that the reasons given for the delay in application for condonation were justifiable and were aptly supported by an affidavit by a senior functionary and hence the delay of 53 days was condoned.

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(2011) 22 STR 533 (Tri.-Chennai) Trichy Inst. of Management Studies (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Trichy.

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Commercial training or coaching services — Parallel colleges, liability — Levy in respect of training and coaching which forms essential part of course, leading to issue of degrees, etc., not justified — Section 65(27) of Finance Act, 1994.

Facts:
The assessee was conducting classes for students enrolled in distance education programme of Alagappa University. The appellant contended that the coaching classes being in the nature of parallel colleges should be exempted from the payment of service tax. Further, as per the MOU executed between the Alagappa University and the institution run by the appellant, the institution was recognised as a centre for enrolling candidates for distance education programmes. The case of Malapuram Distt. Parallel College Association v. Union of India, 2006 (2) STR 321 (Ker.) was cited in support.

Held:
Applying the ratio of the High Court judgment in case of Malapuram Distt. Parallel College Association v. Union of India, 2006 (2) STR 321 (Ker.), it was held that service tax was not to be levied in respect of training and coaching provided by the appellant. Although it formed an essential part of the course or curriculum of a university leading to issuance of certificate or diploma or degree to the students recognised by law, is not justified to be commercial coaching. The appeal was allowed accordingly.

(2011) 22 STR 539 (Tri.-Bang.) — Mphasis Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Bangalore.

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Filing of Balance Sheet and Profit and Loss Account in XBRL mode.

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has issued General Circular No. 43/2011 on 7th July 2011 pertaining to the filing of Balance Sheet and Profit and Loss Account in XBRL mode, wherein it is clarified that the same will be applicable for financial statements closing on or after 31-3-2011. Further the Statutory Auditor needs to certify that the financial statements have been prepared in XBRL mode for filing on MCA-21 portal.

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E-filing of income-tax return in respect of companies under liquidation.

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs vide general Circular dated 6th July 2011 has issued guidelines to the Official Liquidators for E-filing of Income-tax return in respect of companies under liquidation.

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Payment of MCA fees by NEFT mode.

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The Ministry has introduced payment of MCA fees via NEFT mode, in addition to already existing payment methods of credit card, Internet banking and physical challan to eliminate inconveniences caused due to payment processing delays.

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Digitally signed certificates to be issued by the ROC.

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As a step towards the ‘Green Initiative’ and with a view to reduce the time gap, 13 type of certificates and standard letters will be issued issued electronically under the digital signature of the Registrar of Companies as per the Circular No. 39/2011, dated 21-6-2011. These certificates pertain to the forms for creation, modification and satisfaction of charges, incorporation certificate and certificates pursuant to change of name, objects clause, etc.

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List of defaulting companies, directors and professionals.

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The MCA vide Circular dated 20-6-2011 has issued a clarification to Circular No. 33/2011, dated 1-6-2011 with regard to compliance of provisions under the Companies Act, 1956. The Ministry has clarified that the Circular shall be applicable to those defaulting companies and Directors which have not filed the Balance Sheet and Annual Return for any of the financial years 2006-07, 2007-08, 2008-09 and 2009- 10 with the ROC as required u/s. 220 and/or u/s. 159 of the Act, 1956 and the Circular would be effective from 3rd July onwards.

The defaulters list, has been updated and has been posted on the MCA21 site.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 2, dated 15- 7-2011 — Regularisation of Liaison/Branch Offices of foreign entities established during the pre-FEMA period.

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Presently, prior approval of RBI is required for establishing a Liaison Office (LO)/Branch Office (BO) in India by a person resident outside India.

This Circular advices persons resident outside India who have established LO/BO in India and have not obtained permission from RBI to do so within a period of 90 days from the date of issue of this Circular for regularisation of establishment of such offices in India, in terms of the extant FEMA provisions.

Similarly, foreign entities who may have established LO or BO with the permission from the Government of India must also approach RBI along with a copy of the said approval for allotment of a Unique Identification Number (UIN).

These applications/requests must be submitted to the Chief General Manager-in-Charge, Reserve Bank of India, Foreign Exchange Department, Foreign Investment Division, Central Office, Fort, Mumbai-400001 in form FNC and should be routed through the bank where the account of such LO/ BO is maintained.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 1, dated 4-7- 2011 — Redemption of Foreign Currency Convertible Bonds (FCCBs).

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This Circular permits Indian companies to refinance their outstanding FCCB under the Automatic Route up to US $ 500 million with immediate effect, subject to compliance with the following:

(i) Fresh ECB/FCCB must be raised with the stipulated average maturity period and applicable all-in-cost being as per the extant ECB guidelines.

(ii) Amount of fresh ECB/FCCB must not exceed the outstanding redemption value at maturity of the outstanding FCCB.

(iii) Fresh ECB/FCCB must not be raised six months before the maturity date of the outstanding FCCB.

(iv) Purpose of ECB/FCCB must be clearly mentioned as ‘Redemption of outstanding FCCBs’ in Form 83 at the time of obtaining Loan Registration Number from the Reserve Bank.

(v) Designated bank is required to monitor the end use of funds.

(vi) Must comply with all other requirements of ECB policy under the Automatic Route, such as eligible borrower, recognised lender, enduse, prepayment, refinancing of existing ECB and reporting arrangements.

ECB/FCCB beyond US $ 500 million for the purpose of redemption of the existing FCCB will be considered under the approval route. ECB/FCCB availed of for the purpose of refinancing the existing outstanding FCCB will be reckoned as part of the limit of US $ 500 million available under the Automatic Route as per the extant norms.

Restructuring of FCCB involving change in the existing conversion price is not permissible. Proposals for restructuring of FCCB not involving change in conversion price will be considered under the Approval Route depending on the merits of the proposal.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 75, dated 30- 6-2011 — Buyback/Prepayment of Foreign Currency Convertible Bonds (FCCBs).

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Presently, buyback/prepayment of FCCB requires prior approval of RBI.

This Circular has:

1. Extended the date for completion of buyback/ prepayment to 31st March, 2012.

2. Liberalised the procedure for buyback/prepayment of FCCB as under:

A. Automatic Route

Indian companies can prematurely buyback FCCB, subject to compliance with the following:

(i) Buyback value of the FCCB must be at a minimum discount of 8% on book value.

(ii) Funds used for the buyback must be out of existing foreign currency funds held either in India (including funds held in the EEFC account) or abroad and/or out of fresh ECB raised in conformity with the current ECB norms.

(iii) Where fresh ECB is raised, it must co-terminus with the outstanding maturity of the original FCCB. If it is raised for less than three years the all-in-cost ceiling should not exceed 6 months Libor plus 200 bps as applicable to short-term borrowings. If it is raised for more than three years, the all-in-cost for the relevant maturity of the ECB will apply. 

B. Approval Route

Indian companies can buyback FCCB up to redemption value of US $ 100 million out of their internal accruals, subject to compliance with the following:

(i) Minimum discount of 10% of book value for redemption value up to US $ 50 million.

(ii) Minimum discount of 15% of book value for the redemption value over US $ 50 million and up to US $ 75 million.

(iii) Minimum discount of 20% of book value for the redemption value of over US $ 75 million and up to US $ 100 million.

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(2011) 22 STR 656 (Tri.-Ahmd.) Fascel Ltd. v. Commissioner of S.T.

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Penalty — Actual amount not declared in ST-3 Return and intention to evade tax alleged — Tax demand with interest confirmed — Duty liability worked by appellants and no investigation by Revenue except issuance of SCN based on P/L account — Penalties set aside — Section 80 considered.

Facts:
The appellants engaged in providing telephone services were issued a show-cause notice (SCN) demanding service tax on noticing that the appellants had paid the service tax on lower amount than the income shown in the profit and loss account (P/L account). The appellants pleaded that the SCN was issued without any investigation/ verification and merely on the basis of the P/L account. Relying on the decision in the case of Martin & Harris Laboratories Ltd. v. CCE, Gurgaon 2005 (185) ELT 421 (Tri.-Delhi) and a host of other decisions, it was submitted that the Annual Report and P/L account were public documents and therefore on the ground of limitation, the whole demand was liable to be set aside. Moreover, the very fact that there was excess payment in one year and short payment in another year showed that there was no suppression, mis-declaration/fraud, etc. to invoke the extended time, whereas the Revenue contended that in view of the fact that ST-3 return did not reflect the correct position, suppression/ mis-declaration was rightly invoked.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that the appellants had reasonable cause for the alleged wrongful payment of service tax and hence it was held that the case was fit for invoking section 80 of the Finance Act, 1994 and the penalties were set aside.

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(2011) 22 STR 650 (Tri.-Bang.) — Vikas Coaching Centre v. Commissioner of Custom, Central Excise & S.T., Guntur.

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Valuation — Commercial training or coaching services — Whether hostel and mess charges includible while calculating the liability of service tax on their services.

Facts:
The appellants provided the service of ‘Commercial training or coaching’. In addition to the said taxable service, they also provided optional hostel and mess facility. The students opting for the hostel and mess facility were charged separately for the same. The appellants relied on the decision of the Tribunal in the case of Aditya College of Competitive Exams v. CCE, Visakhapatnam 2009 (16) STR 154 (Tri.-Bang.). According to the Revenue, hostel and mess charges were includible in the value of taxable service.

Held:
It was held that for calculating liability of service tax for providing commercial training or coaching service, the hostel and mess charges were not includible.

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2011 (22) STR 638 (Tri.-Chennai) — Commr. of Service Tax, Chennai v. State Bank of India.

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Whether provisions relating to suppression of facts invokable — Jurisdictional officer not intimated by concerned branch of SBI about providing both taxable and exempted service — No declaration made in ST-3 returns — Provisions of Rule restricting utilisation of credit clear — Tax evasion detected on audit — Longer period of limitation invokable.

Facts:
A branch of the State Bank provided both taxable and exempted service. During February 2005 the respondents utilised CENVAT credit exceeding the admissible limit of 20% amount as provided in the then Rule 6(3) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004. The Department alleged that the said branch of SBI did not disclose to the Department that they provided exempted output service also and that they have taken service tax in excess of the admissible 20% amount. The said evasion came to light when the accounts of SBI were audited by the Departmental audit officers. As per the Revenue, this was a clear contravention of service tax law on part of the respondents with an intention to evade payment of service tax. Moreover, the longer period of limitation was rightly invoked. Citing the case of Pushpam Pharmaceuticals Co. v. Collector of Central Excise, Bombay, 1995 (78) ELT 401 (SC), it was inter alia contended that there was no intention to evade service tax and that the head office of the respondents had issued a circular asking the branches to utilise CENVAT credit keeping in view the admissible 20% amount. However, copy of such circular was not produced.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that several ingredients required for the purpose of invoking longer period of limitation u/s. 73 of the Finance Act, 1994 were available in the case such as misstatement, suppression as well as contravention of provision with intent to evade payment of tax. Accordingly, it was held that the period of limitation was invokable in this case. The appeal was remanded to the lower Appellate Authority as regards the merit of the case.

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(2011) 22 STR 625 (Tri.-Chennai) — Parmeshwari Textiles v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Tiruchirapalli.

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Refund of service tax paid on technical testing and analysis service availed by exporter — Exemption under Notification No. 41/2007-ST by way of refund denied stating that service provider’s invoices not specific to export goods — Policy of Govt. not to burden exports with domestic taxes — Impugned order set aside.

Facts:

The appellant was denied refund by the lower appellate authority in respect of service tax paid for technical testing and analysis service on the ground that the appellant had not fulfilled the conditions specified in Notification No. 41/2007-ST, dated 6-10-2007 and that the service provider’s invoices were not specific to the export goods. The appellant contended that the order of the lower Appellate Authority denying the refund was not justified and was given without taking in consideration the facts.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that it is the policy of the Government to encourage exports and not to burden the export consignments with domestic taxes like the service tax which is paid in relation to the input service. The order passed by the original authority allowing the refund of input service tax in respect of the export goods was upheld by the Tribunal.

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Waiver of approval of Central Government for payment of remuneration to professional managerial person by companies having no profits or inadequate profits.

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The Ministry vide Notification dated 14th July 2011 made amendments to Schedule XIII part II section II pertaining to remuneration payable by companies having no profits or inadequate profits. Conditions to be fulfilled for waiver of approval of the Central Govt. for managerial personnel of subsidiary companies have also been listed.

Approval is now waived if managerial personnel do not have any interest in the capital of the company or its holding company, directly or indirectly or through other statutory structures or related to the directors or promoters of the company or its holding company at any time during the period of two years prior to the date of appointment and have a graduate-level qualification with expertise in the field of their profession.

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Business expenditure: Deduction only on actual payment: Section 43B: Provision for pension: Liability accrues from year to year: Payable on retirement/resignation: Assessee entitled to deduction.

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[CIT v. Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd., 334 ITR 341 (Del.)] The assessee followed the mercantile system of accounting. It had a super-annuation scheme for its employees. In order to retain managerial employees, the assessee also introduced a pension scheme for such managerial employees which was over and above the benefits available under the super-annuation scheme of the company. This scheme was non-funded and applicable to all managerial employees. The liability on this account for the A.Y. 2001-02 of Rs.3,61,63,024 was provided following AS-15 based on actuarial valuation. The assessee claimed deduction of this amount. The AO disallowed the claim relying on the provisions of section 43B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the ground that even if it was an ascertained liability, the deduction could not be allowed in the absence of contribution to the pension fund. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as:

“(i) The Commissioner (Appeals) correctly viewed that the pension scheme of the assessee did not envisage any regular contribution to any fund or trust or entity. The pension scheme provided that pension would be paid by the assessee to its employee on his or her attaining the retirement age or resigning after having rendered services for a specified number of years.

(ii) Thus, where the liability on this account accrued from year to year, it was payable on retirement/resignation of the eligible employees. It could not be disallowed u/s.43B.”

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Accrual of income in India: Salary: Section 5: Assessee a non-resident Indian, was employee of a Hong Kong-based ship management company: For services rendered in international waters outside country he was paid salary which was received by him on board of ship: As per his instructions, a portion of his salary, in form of ‘allocation’, had been remitted to NRE account of assessee in India: No portion of salary liable to tax in India.

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[DIT (International Taxation), Bangalore v. Dylan George Smith, 11 Taxman.com 348 (Kar.)]

The assessee was an individual. For the relevant years i.e., A.Ys. 2003-04 and 2004-05 he was a non-resident Indian. He was employed with a foreign company engaged in the management of crew and vessels. He was working on the ships of the foreign company. Payments towards salary was first received by the assessee on board the ship and later on as per his instructions, remittance of a portion of salary in the form of ‘allocation’ had been made to the NRE account of the assessee in India. The assessee claimed that his income had accrued outside India and was also received outside India on board the ships belonging to the Hong Kong Company and as the income had not arisen within India, he was not liable to pay tax in India. The Assessing Officer rejected the assessee’s claim and held that the income fell under the purview of section 5(2) of the Act. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal accepted the assessee’s claim. The Tribunal held that the assessee was an employee of the Hong Kongbased ship management company. He never had any contractual relationship with any Indian Company. He received the salary from Hong Kong for services rendered in their agent’s ships, namely, M V Vergina and M T Tamyara in international territorial waters. Payments towards salary was first received by the assessee on board the ships and later on as per his instructions, remittance of a portion of salary in the form of ‘allocation’ had been made to the NRE account of the assessee in India. The Tribunal followed its order in ITA 1137(B)/2008 that the salary accrued outside India could not be taxed in India merely because it was received in India.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) In the instant case, though the assessee was an Indian, at the relevant point of time he was a non-resident. He was working for a foreign company. For the services rendered in the international waters outside the country he was paid salary. He received the salary on board the ships. A particular amount was allocated to be transferred to his NRE account in India. Merely because a portion of his salary was credited to his account in India, that would not render him liable to tax in India when the service was rendered outside India, salary was paid outside India and his employer was a foreign employer.

(ii) The provisions of the Act were not attracted to the salary of the assessee. Therefore, the Tribunal was justified in upholding the order passed by the CIT(A) and in setting aside the order passed by the Assessing Officer.

(iii) Hence, there was not any merit in the instant appeal. Accordingly, the appeal was to be dismissed.”

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Accrual of income: A.Y. 1997-98: Interest: Waiver of interest before end of accounting year: Interest does not accrue.

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[Bagoria Udyog v. CIT, 334 ITR 280 (Cal.)] The assessee had advanced an amount to a party H. The assessee claimed that it had agreed to waive the interest and therefore no interest accrued for the A.Y. 1997-98. The Assessing Officer held that interest had accrued. Before the Commissioner (Appeals) the assessee produced the agreement dated 28-2-1997, whereby the assessee had agreed not to charge interest to H w.e.f. 1-4-1996. The Commissioner (Appeals) accepted the contention of the assessee and deleted the addition. The Tribunal restored the addition on the ground that the assessee had submitted that there was no business connection with H.

In appeal by the assessee, the assessee clarified that no such concession was made by the assessee. The Calcutta High Court allowed the assessee’s claim and held as under:

“(i) The Tribunal accepted the position of law that a waiver of interest was permissible. It further accepted the finding of the Commissioner (Appeals) that sufficient cause was shown by the assessee for non-production of the agreement before the Assessing Officer.

(ii) The addition of deemed interest was not justified.”

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Revision: Section 263: Block assessment: Addition made on basis of seized documents deleted by ITAT: Appeal pending before High Court: Revision directing the AO to consider the tax implications of the same seized documents not valid.

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[CIT v. Mukesh J. Upadhyaya (Bom.), ITA No. 428 of 2010 dated 13-6-2011] In the instant case, in the block assessment order dated 31-12-2002, the Assessing Officer made an addition of Rs.90 lakh on the basis of the documents seized from the premises of Vishwas R. Bhoir. The said addition was deleted by the Tribunal. Against the said order of the Tribunal the Revenue preferred an appeal before the Bombay High Court, which was pending. In the meantime, the CIT passed a revision order u/s.263 on 16.03.2005 directing the Assessing Officer to consider the tax implication of the page Nos. 1 to 13 of Bundle No. 12, seized from the residence of Vishwas R. Bhoir. The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT on the ground that the addition of Rs.90 lakh was made after due consideration of both the documents referred to by the CIT. The Tribunal recorded a finding of fact that the two documents cannot be read independent of each other. The Tribunal held that once the taxability under both the documents has been considered by the Assessing Officer and also by the CIT(A), it is not open to the CIT to invoke the jurisdiction u/s.263 of the Act and direct the Assessing Officer to consider the taxability under those two documents once again.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court held as under: “In our opinion, no fault can be found with the decision of the Tribunal in setting aside the order of the CIT u/s.263 of the Act.”

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Closing stock: Value: Section 145A: Excise duty on sugar manufactured but not sold is not to be included in the value of the closing stock.

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[CIT v. Loknete Balasaheb Desai S. S. K. Ltd., (Bom.); ITA No. 4297 of 2009 dated 22-6-2011]

The assessee was engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of white sugar. In the A.Y. 2001-02, the Assessing Officer held that the excise duty on sugar manufactured but not sold and lying in closing stock was a liability incurred by the assessee u/s.145A(b) ought to have been considered for valuation and disallowed u/s.43B of the Act. Following the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in ACIT v. D & H Secheron Electrodes P. Ltd.; 173 Taxman 188 (MP), it was held that the Assessing Officer was not justified in adding excise duty to the price of the unsold sugar lying in stock on 31-3-2001.

On appeal by the Revenue the following question was raised before the Bombay High Court:

“Whether in the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the ITAT was justified in holding that u/s.145A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 the excise duty element cannot be added to the value of unsold sugar lying in stock on the last day of the accounting year?”

The High Court held as under:

“(i) The argument of the Revenue is that the excise duty liability is incurred on manufacture of sugar and since section 145A(b) specifically used the expression ‘incurred’, the Tribunal ought to have held that the excise duty liability has to be taken into consideration in valuing the unsold sugar in stock on the last day of the accounting year.

(ii) The expression ‘incurred by the assessee’ in section 145A(b) is followed by the words ‘to bring the goods to the place of its location and condition as on the date of valuation’. Thus the expression incurred by the assessee’ relates to the liability determined as tax, duty, cess or fee payable in bringing the goods to the place of its location and condition of the goods. Explanation to section 145A(b) makes it further clear that the income chargeable under the head ‘profits and gains of business’ shall be adjusted by the amount paid as tax, duty, cess or fee. Therefore, the expression ‘incurred’ in section 145A(b) must be construed to mean the liability actually incurred by the assessee.

(iii) The Apex Court in the case of CCE v. Polyset Corporation & Anr.; 115 ELT 41 (SC) has held that the dutiability of excisable goods is determined with reference to the date of manufacture and the rate of excise duty payable has to be determined with reference to the date of clearance of the goods. Therefore, though the date of manufacture is the relevant date for dutiability, the relevant date for the duty liability is the date on which the goods are cleared. In other words, in respect of excisable goods manufactured and lying in stock, the excise duty liability would get crystallised on the date of clearance of the goods and not on the date of manufacture.

(iv) Therefore, till the date of clearance of the excisable goods, the excise duty payable on the said goods does not get crystallised and consequently the assessee cannot be said to have incurred the excise duty liability. In respect of the excisable goods lying in stock, no liability is determined as payable and consequently, there would be no question of incurring excise duty liability.

(v) In the present case, it is not in dispute that the manufactured sugar was lying in stock and the same were not cleared from the factory. Therefore, in the facts of the present case, the ITAT was justified in holding that in respect of unsold sugar lying in stock, central excise liability was not incurred and consequently the addition of excise duty made by the Assessing Officer to the value of the excisable goods was liable to be deleted.”

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Reassessment: Section 147 and section 148: Development agreement dated 17-9-2004 terminated in view of default of developer: Suit filed by developer ultimately settled by order of High Court dated 2-5-2011: Capital gain not taxable in A.Y. 2005-06: Notice u/s.148 for taxing the capital gain in A.Y. 2005-06 is not valid.

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[Amar R. Shanbhag v. ITO (Bom.); W.P. No. 552 of 2011 dated 18-7-2011] The assessee individual had entered into development agreement with a developer on 17-9-2004. The agreed consideration was Rs.4 crore. As the developer failed to pay the amount of Rs.30 lakh before 31-10-2004, the assessee petitioner on 28-3-2005 terminated the development agreement. Thereafter, on the developer issuing the cheques for Rs.30 lakh on 30-6-2005, the development agreement was restored. In view of the further default on the part of the developer, on 19-5-2010, the petitioner once again terminated the development agreement. Thereupon, the developer filed a suit in the Bombay High Court, which was ultimately settled on 2-5-2011, wherein the consideration was enhanced from Rs.4 crore to Rs.7.5 crore. It was also ordered that the petitioner delivers the possession of the property to the developers as on the date of the order i.e., 2-5-2011.

In the meanwhile, the Assessing Officer issued notice u/s.148 dated 25-3-2010 proposing to tax the capital gain arising from the development agreement in the A.Y. 2005-06. The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the petitioner-assessee and quashed the said notice u/s.148 and held as under:

“(i) It cannot be said that there was any reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment in the A.Y. 2005-06, so as to initiate reassessment proceedings u/s. 147 r.w.s 148 of the Act.

(ii) So long as the consent terms filed on 2-5-2011 hold the field, the question of bringing to tax the capital gains under the development agreement dated 17-9-2004 in A.Y. 2005-06 does not arise at all.

(iii) In the result, the impugned notice dated 25-3-2010 issued u/s.148 of the Act is quashed and set aside.”

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Appeal to the High Court — Delay in filing the appeal — High Court to examine the cases on merits and should not dispose of cases merely on the ground of delay.

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[CIT v. West Bengal Infrastructure Development Finance Corporation Ltd., (2011) 334 ITR 269 (SC)] Looking to the amount of tax involved in the case, the Supreme Court was of the view that the High Court ought to have decided the matter on the merits. According to the Supreme Court, in all such cases where there is delay on the part of the Department, the High Court should consider imposing costs, but certainly it should examine the cases on the merits and should not dispose of cases merely on the ground of delay, particularly when huge stakes are involved.

Accordingly, the order of the High Court was set aside and the matter was remitted to the High Court to decide the case de novo in accordance with law.

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Natural Justice — Order passed in violation of principles of natural justice should not be quashed, but the matter should be remanded to grant an opportunity of hearing.

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[ITO v. M. Pirai Choodi, (2011) 334 ITR 262 (SC)] The assessee had preferred a writ appeal against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 21st February, 2007, made in writ petition No. 3247 of 2007, where the learned Judge refused to quash the assessment order dated 29th December, 2006, for the A.Y. 2004-05 made u/s.143(3) of the Incometax Act, on the ground that the assessee had got an alternative remedy to prefer a statutory appeal before the Appellate Tribunal.

The Division Bench of the High Court observed that it is a general rule that it may not be proper to entertain the writ petition when effective alternative remedy by way of statutory appeal is available. But, the above general rule is subject to exceptions as laid by the Apex Court in Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 107, where the Apex Court has held that in spite of availability of the alternative remedy, the High Court may still exercise its writ jurisdiction in at least three contingencies: viz., (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (ii) where there is failure of the principles of natural justice; or (iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged.

According to the High Court, the present case rightly attracted the second exception, viz., the failure of the principles of natural justice in the sense that the respondent-Department refused to admit the agricultural income of Rs.11,32,232.42 for the A.Y. 2004-05 of the assessee by placing reliance on the statement of the Village Administrative Officer, overlooking the materials furnished by the assessee to substantiate his agricultural activity, viz., (1) Chitta Adangal for the relevant periods, (2) Proof for purchase of agricultural inputs and sale of agricultural products, (3) Yearwise chart showing the expenses incurred for the agricultural activities, (4) Application of capital in the crops/herb, and (5) Books of account for business activities for the relevant period.

According to the assessee, in spite of the documentary evidence furnished to substantiate the agricultural income to the tune of Rs.11,32,232.42 for the A.Y. 2004-05, the respondent/assessing authority had chosen to overlook the same and refused to admit the said agricultural income for the A.Y. 2004-05, merely based on a statement alleged to have been obtained from the Village Administrative Officer behind the back of the assessee.

Admittedly, the assessee was not present when the statement of the Village Administrative Officer was obtained by the assessing authority. The High Court found some force in the contention of the assessee that such a statement obtained from the Village Administrative Officer behind the back of the assessee, depriving him of an opportunity to cross-examine the Village Administrative Officer, would amount to violation of the principles of natural justice and, therefore, would vitiate the assessment order.

Hence, the High Court was satisfied that there was a glaring violation of the principles of natural justice apparent on the face of the records, which fact was not properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ petition on the ground of alternative remedy. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the writ appeal and the order of the learned Single Judge was set aside. Consequently, the impugned assessment order was quashed.

On an appeal, the Supreme Court observed that in this case, the High Court had set aside the order of assessment on the ground that no opportunity to cross-examine was granted, as sought by the assessee. The Supreme Court was of the view that the High Court should not have set aside the entire assessment order. At the highest, the High Court should have directed the Assessing Officer to grant as opportunity to the assessee to cross-examine the concerned witness. The Supreme Court was of the view that even on this particular aspect, the assessee could have gone in appeal to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). The assessee had failed to avail of the statutory remedy. In the circumstances, the Supreme Court was of the view that the High Court should not have quashed the assessment proceedings vide the impugned order.

Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned order.

Liberty was however granted to the assessee to move the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals).

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Rectification of mistake — Tribunal should have regard to all the facts — Capital or revenue expenditure — Business loss — Loss incurred due to fluctuation of foreign exchange rate — To be decided in the light of CIT v. Woodward Governor India P. Ltd.

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[Perfetti Van Melle India (P) Ltd. v. CIT, (2011) 334 ITR 259 (SC)]

The assessment order for A.Y. 1998-99 was passed on 10th January, 2001, in which foreign exchange fluctuation loss amounting to Rs.38,30,000 was disallowed by the Assessing Officer.

The assessee filed an appeal before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) who upheld the disallowance on the ground that the exchange fluctuation related to long-term loan, and it could not be allowed as revenue expenditure.

Against the order of the Commissioner of Incometax (Appeals), the assessee filed an appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal vide order dated 22nd April, 2004, upheld the disallowance of loss of Rs.38,30,000.

Thereafter, the assessee filed an appeal before the High Court. While disposing of the appeal, it was observed by the High Court on 6th December, 2004, that:

“In view of paragraphs 13 and 14 of the Tribunal’s order, it is not possible for us to accept the contention that the assessee had produced books of account. It is for the Tribunal, which is a fact-finding authority, to examine the same and to record a finding. If the appellant had produced all the necessary documents in this behalf, then the Tribunal should have examined the same. In fact, in such a situation, instead of approaching this Court, the assessee ought to have moved the Tribunal u/s.254(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. It would be open to the appellant to move the Tribunal within 15 days from today. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.”

Thereafter, the assessee filed an application u/s. 254(2) of the Act, before the Tribunal and that application was dismissed by the Tribunal vide its order dated 15th June, 2005.

On an appeal, the High Court was of the view that ex facie, the appeal challenging two different orders passed by the Tribunal dated 22nd April, 2004, and 15th June, 2005, in one single appeal was not maintainable.

The High Court held that as far as the order dated 22nd April, 2004 was concerned, the same was challenged by the assessee by the way of appeal and vide order dated 6th December, 2004, that appeal had been disposed of by the High Court. The assessee could not reagitate the same issue again.

Coming to the order dated 15th June, 2005, passed by the Tribunal, the High Court noted that the Tribunal while dismissing the application for rectification, vide impugned order had held that:

“Our attention was invited to para 13 of the order in which the Tribunal has observed that it was for the assessee, which possesses exclusive knowledge as to the utilisation of the loan, to prove the same by leading evidence to that effect by producing the books of account and showing the entries made therein and that the assessee has not discharged this burden either before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) or before the Tribunal. It is stated that the Tribunal has noted in para 14 of the order that in A.Y. 1997-98 the assessee had filed some details and documents on the basis of which the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) accepted the claim, but has gone further to record that for the year under appeal no such details were filed. The submission of the assessee before us is that the loss was allowed by the income-tax authorities in the A.Ys. 1996-97 and 1997-98 and a different treatment for the same is not warranted since the facts were the same for the year under appeal also. It is submitted that inasmuch as the Tribunal has overlooked this aspect of the matter, there is an error apparent from the record. It was alternatively submitted that the Tribunal should give a finding about the nature of the loss, whether it is capital or revenue. However, it was fairly admitted before us that this claim was not made before the income-tax authorities or before the Tribunal.”

The High Court observed that according to this order, it had been admitted before the Tribunal that the claim was not made before the incometax authorities or before the Tribunal. The Tribunal further held that:

“We have considered the matter. Given the findings of the Tribunal in paras 13 and 14 of its order, the present application cannot be accepted. It may perhaps be that the evidence produced in the earlier years was relevant for the purpose of deciding the merits of the assessee’s claim, but when the Departmental Authorities have held that for the year under appeal there was no evidence brought on record to show the utilisation of the loan, and where such a finding has been upheld by the Tribunal, the provisions of section 254(2) of the Act cannot be invoked. We do appreciate the assessee’s anxiety and it may even be open to the assessee to argue that the evidence adduced by the assessee for the earlier years would be sufficient to discharge the assessee’s burden for the year under appeal, but even if there is grievance on this score, it could not perhaps be redressed by resorting to section 254(2) of the Act. At best it may amount to an error of judgment or may even amount to the Tribunal insisting on the same evidence being formally placed on record for the year under appeal, which may appear to be ritualistic, but since the Tribunal has gone on the basis of the question of burden, it is not possible for us to accept the present application. We are also unable to give a finding as to the nature of loss, keeping in view the very fair admission that the question was not raised before the Tribunal or the income-tax authorities.”

According to the High Court, the appeal was wholly misconceived and without any basis and there was no reason to disagree with the findings given by the Tribunal and there was no infirmity in the impugned order passed by the Tribunal. The Supreme Court held that having examined the facts and circumstances of the case, which pertained to the A.Y. 1998-99, and particularly in the light of the order passed for the earlier A.Ys. 1996-97 and 1997-98, as also having regards to the assessment orders passed in the following year (1999-2000) and in view of its judgment in the case of CIT v. Woodward Governor India P. Ltd. reported in (2009) 315 ITR 254 (SC), the Tribunal was wrong in refusing to rectify its own order u/s. 254(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, particularly when it had failed to appreciate that in any event the expenditure could have fallen on the capital account, which was specifically pleaded by the assessee as an alternate submission.

For the aforestated reasons, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and the matter was remitted to the Tribunal. The Tribunal was directed to decide the matter de novo in accordance with the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Woodward Governor India P. Ltd. (2009) 312 ITR 254 (SC) as well as on the merits of this case.

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Legislation by incorporation — Schedule VI vis-à-vis MAT

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Schedule VI to the Companies Act, 1956 (‘the Companies Act’) prescribed under section 211 of the Companies Act, sets out the form and contents for disclosure of the profit and loss account and balance sheet of a company. Schedule VI to the Companies Act originally notified by the Central Government vide Notification No. 414, dated 21st March 1961 was divided into 4 parts (referred to as ‘the Old Schedule VI’). Recently, the Central Government has by Notification No. 447(E), dated 28th February 2011, and Notification No. 653(E), dated 30th March 2011, revised Schedule VI to the Companies Act, which shall come into effect for the financial years ending on or after 1st April 2011 (referred to as ‘the Revised Schedule VI’).

Section 115JB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’) requires every assessee-company to prepare its profit and loss account in accordance with Part II and Part III of the Schedule VI for the purpose of determining net profit, for the computation of ‘book profit’. In other words, Part II and Part III of the Schedule VI are legislatively incorporated under the provisions of section 115JB of the Act.

Legislation by incorporation is a legislative device by which certain provisions of a particular Act are incorporated by reference into another Act, such that the provisions so incorporated become part and parcel of the later Act, as if they had been ‘bodily transposed into it’. In other words, the legal effect of such incorporated provisions are often held to be actually written in the later Act with the pen, or printed in it. The said observations were made by Lord Esher, M. R. while explaining the aforesaid principle in one of the earliest decisions on the subject1.

However, the aforesaid incorporated provisions in MAT, only prescribe the contents of the profit and loss account of the company and the principles for recognition, measurement, presentation, etc. of financial items are prescribed under the Accounting Standards as applied by the company in adopting the accounts at its annual general meeting.

A question which requires attention is whether the Revised Schedule VI as amended by the Central Government can be said to be legislatively incorporated under the provisions of section 115JB of the Act and accordingly net profit for the purpose of computation of book profit will be determined based on the format of profit and loss account as prescribed under the Revised Schedule VI.

The answer to this question depends upon the manner of construction and interpretation of whether Part II and Part III of the Old Schedule VI are introduced in MAT provision of the Act merely as reference/citation or have been incorporated under section 115JB. Legislation by incorporation may be undertaken by either merely citing a provision of one statute in another statute or by incorporating the said provision in another statute.

Therefore, before embarking upon answering the question under consideration, it is necessary to understand the principles of identifying the differences between the two and implications on the construction of a provision of a particular statute, which is merely referred to in another statute vis-à-vis being incorporated. In the former case, a modification, repeal or re-enactment of the statute that is referred will also have the effect in the statute in which it is referred, but in the latter case any change in the incorporated statute by way of amendment or repeal shall have no repercussion on the incorporating statute. The legal decisions have time and again tried to differentiate between the two, but the distinction is one of difference in degree and is often blurred2. There are no clear-cut guidelines which have been spelt out.

However, there are four exceptions which have been observed by the Courts3 to the implications on the construction of a provision as discussed above, wherein a repeal or amendment of an Act which incorporated in a later Act shall have effect on the later Act, irrespective of whether the said provision was merely referred or incorporated in the other statute. These exceptions are as under:

  •  where the later Act and the earlier Act are supplemental to each other;

  •  where the two Acts are in pari materia;

  •  where the amendment of the earlier Act if not imported in the later Act would render the later Act wholly unworkable; and

  •  where the amendment of the earlier Act either expressly or by necessary intendment also applies to the later Act.

On the touchstone of the aforesaid exceptions applied to the case under consideration, one may observe as under:

  •  the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the Companies Act, 1956 are not supplemental to each other i.e., existence of either of the said Acts is not dependant of each other;

? the two Acts are not in pari materia i.e., both the Acts legislate in two different fields of law;

? the non-incorporation of the Revised Schedule VI under MAT provisions would not make the said provisions unworkable, since one would be able to compute net profit based on the Old Schedule VI; and

  •  there is no mention by the Central Government of simultaneous amendment of MAT provisions, when Schedule VI was replaced under the Companies Act.

Considering this, one may observe that none of the four exceptions are applicable to the impugned issue.

Though it makes a case stronger to tilt the balance of construction that Part II and Part III of the Old Schedule VI are incorporated and not referred under MAT provisions, yet one may not conclude such construction without further discussion. It is necessary to understand the factors which may help in answering the aforesaid question. A matter of probe into the semantics of the provision along with the legislative intention and/ or taking an insight into the working of the enactment may help in determining which of the view is to be adopted. Part II and Part III of the Old Schedule VI are incorporated in all its phases from section 115J to section 115JB of the Act.

Reference is invited to the relevant provisions of section 115JB of the Act, which are reproduced below for ready reference:

“ ……………….. (2) Every assessee, being a company, shall, for the purposes of this section, prepare its profit and loss account for the relevant previous year in accordance with the provisions of Parts II and III of Schedule VI to the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956):

Provided that while preparing the annual accounts including profit and loss account, —

(i) the accounting policies;

(ii) the accounting standards followed for preparing such accounts including profit and loss account;

(iii) the method and rates adopted for calculating the depreciation,

shall be the same as have been adopted for the purpose of preparing such accounts including profit and loss account and laid before the company at its annual general meeting in accordance with the provisions of section 210 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956):” (Emphasis supplied)

From the perusal of the aforesaid provisions of section 115JB(2), one would notice that the Legislature by applying the principle of legislation by incorporation introduced two provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. The differences in the language used for incorporating the said provisions highlight the mechanism of merely citing a provision vis-à-vis incorporating the provision.

The accounting policies, accounting standards and the method and rate of depreciation as considered while preparing the annual accounts of the company u/s.210 of the Companies Act are legislatively incorporated by reference for the purpose of calculation of book profit u/s.115JB of the Act and whereas Part II and Part III of the Old Schedule VI to the Companies Act are legislatively incorporated under the mechanism of incorporation.

The distinction lies in the usage of words ‘shall be the same’, which makes a case of a provision merely referred and not being incorporated. The usage of those words highlight the intention of the Legislature of applying the same policies, standards and depreciation rate and method under the Companies Act as used for preparation of annual accounts, also for the purpose of computation of book profit. Therefore, in case there are amendments to, repeals of provisions of Accounting Standards and method and rate of depreciation under the provisions of the Companies Act, the same effects will have to be considered for the computation of book profit.

One finds that similar usage of words, being ‘shall be the same’ is missing under the incorporation of Part II and Part III of Schedule VI to the Companies Act. Therefore, such similar construction and mechanism may not hold good for the purpose of interpretation of Part II and Part III of the Schedule VI to the Companies Act, which have been incorporated and not merely referred under the provisions of section 115JB(2) of the Act.

In a recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Dynamic Orthopedics Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT, (321 ITR 300), the Apex Court while referring the matter relating to the computation of book profit under MAT provisions to the Larger Bench, made following observations with respect to the semantics of MAT provisions under the Act. These observations on legislation by incorporation which may hold good for all the three avatars of MAT provisions viz. section 115J, section 115JA, and section 115JB are reproduced below:

“….Section 115J of the Act legislatively only incorporates provisions of Parts II and III of Schedule VI to 1956 Act. Such incorporation is by a deeming fiction. Hence, we need to read section 115J(1A) of the Act in the strict sense. If we so read, it is clear that by legislative incorporation, only Parts II and III of Schedule VI to 1956 Act have been incorporated legislatively into section 115J of the Act. Therefore, the question of applicability of Parts II and III of Schedule VI to 1956 Act does not arise….

…. It needs to be reiterated that once a company falls within the ambit of it being a MAT company, section 115J of the Act applies and, under that section, such an assessee-company was required to prepare its profit and loss account only in terms of Parts II and III of Schedule VI to 1956 Act ….. Hence, what is incorporated in section 115J is only Schedule VI and not section 205 or section 350 or section 355 ….. ” [Emphasis supplied]

The aforesaid decision reiterates the understanding that Part II and Part III of Schedule VI only are legislatively incorporated under the provisions of MAT. Therefore, any repeal, amendment or revision of Part II and Part III of Schedule VI to the Companies Act may not have effect on the operation of computation of book profit, until the Revised Schedule is incorporated under the MAT provisions of the Act.

Based on the aforesaid discussions, one may conclude that the Revised Schedule VI to the Companies Act cannot be taken into consideration, until necessary amendments are made requiring the assessee companies to determine the net profit for the purpose of computation of book profit under MAT provisions as per the Revised Schedule VI to the Companies Act.

This conclusion and article may be incomplete if the significant in-principle differences between the Old Schedule VI and the Revised Schedule VI are not highlighted. These differences are touched upon only in brief:

  •     The Revised Schedule only contains Part I and Part II. It does not have Part III of the Old Schedule VI which provided for interpretation of the various expressions such as ‘provision’, ‘reserve’, ‘liability’, etc. and Part IV of the Old Schedule VI which dealt with balance sheet abstract and company’s general business profile.

  •     The Revised Schedule VI prescribes the format of profit and loss account for the company, as against the Old Schedule VI, which did not provide for such format; and

  •     The Old Schedule VI prescribed the principles on which the profit and loss account of the company was required to be prepared for the purpose of disclosure, which one fails to find under the Revised Schedule VI;

This issue is of importance from the perspective of the Direct Tax Code Bill, 2010 (draft) (‘DTC’) which in Clause 104 has provision analogous to section 115JB of the Act. Clause 104 of DTC provides reference to Clause 105 of DTC for the purpose of determination of net profit as shown in the profit and loss account prepared in accordance with Part II and Part III of Schedule VI to the Companies Act. Assuming Clause 104 and Clause 105 of draft DTC come into effect in their present form, one may interpret that Part II and Part III of the Revised Schedule VI are incorporated in the said clauses, considering the fact that the Revised Schedule VI to the Companies Act will be existing on the statute when draft DTC becomes an Act. However, it may be intriguing to notice that the Revised Schedule VI does not have Part III and therefore, the Legislature may have to make necessary amendments; otherwise the formula may become unworkable. Similar consequences may also be envisaged for companies subjected to MAT provisions for financial years ending on or after 1st April 2011, if we propose that Part II and Part III of the Old Schedule VI are merely referred to in section 115JB of the Act.  This subject may require further attention with the intention of the Government to introduce different set of Accounting Standards (i.e., Ind-AS and otherwise) applicable to different categories of companies and thereby leading to different tax bases of net profit as shown in the profit and loss account prepared in accordance with Part II and Part III of the Schedule VI to the Companies Act.

If the above discussion and conclusions are drawn to their logical end, then one envisages that companies subjected to MAT provisions of the Act may have to prepare two sets of their profit and loss account, wherein net profit as shown in the profit and loss account will have to be prepared in accordance with:

  •     Part II and Part III of the Revised Schedule VI for the compliance of provision of Companies Act, 1956; and

  •     Part II and Part III of the Old Schedule VI for the computation of book profit under the Act.

Taxation of Capital Gains under Direct Taxes Code

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1.  Background
1.1 Direct Taxes Code Bill, 2010, (DTC) introduced in the Parliament on 27-8-2010 is now under consideration of the Standing Committee for Finance. After its report is submitted, the Parliament will consider the Bill and the proposals of the Standing Committee before enacting the Code. Therefore, if DTC is enacted by the Parliament in 2011, the income for the F.Y. 1-4-2012 to 31-3-2013 and onwards will be assessed as provided in the Code. There are 319 sections divided into 20 Chapters and 22 Schedules in DTC. Chapter III-D containing sections 46 to 55 deals with provisions for computation of income under the head ‘Capital Gains’. Further, Schedule 17 provides for determination of cost of acquisition in certain cases.

1.2 Prior to introduction of the DTC Bill, 2010, the Government had issued the DTC Bill, 2009 with a Discussion Paper for public debate on 12-8-2009. The DTC Bill, 2009, proposed to introduce several changes in the provisions relating to capital gains. There was a proposal to do away the present distinction between short-term and long-term capital gains. It was also proposed to abolish the present exemption/concession available to capital gains on sale of listed securities on which STT is paid. The concessional rate for long-term/short-term capital gains was also proposed to be abolished and there was a proposal to levy tax on capital gains at the normal rate applicable to other income.

1.3 Several representations were made to the Government objecting to these proposals. Based on the above representations, a Revised Discussion Paper was issued by the Government on 15-6-2010 and the revised DTC Bill, 2010, was introduced in the Parliament in August, 2010.

1.4 In the revised Discussion Paper of June, 2010, it was clarified that the original proposals of DTC – 2009 for taxation of capital gains have been modified as under:

(a) Income from capital gains will not be considered as income from ordinary sources.

(b) Asset held for more than one year from the end of the financial year will be considered as long-term capital asset.
(c) Securities Transaction Tax (STT) will continue.
(d) For long-term capital gains indexation benefit will continue. The existing date of 1-4-1981 will now be fixed as 1-4-2000.
(e) Capital Gains Savings Scheme will be introduced.
(f) A new scheme for taxation of capital gains on investment assets has been proposed to reduce the burden of tax.
(g) Income of FIIs from share trading will be considered as capital gains and not business income.

2. Concept of capital gains


The existing concept of capital gains is significantly changed in the Code. The word ‘asset’ is defined in section 314(24) to mean (a) a business asset or (b) an investment asset. ‘Business asset’ is defined in section 314(38) to mean ‘business trading asset’ or ‘business capital asset’. ‘Business trading asset’ is defined in section 314(42) to mean stock-in-trade, consumable stores or raw materials held for the purpose of the business. ‘Business capital asset’ is defined in section 314(39) to mean a tangible, intangible or any other capital asset, other than land, which is used for the purpose of business. ‘Investment asset’ is defined in section 314(141) to mean (a) any capital asset which is not a business capital asset, (b) any security held by a FII or (c) any undertaking or division of a business. Any surplus on transfer of a business capital asset is to be treated as business income. Hence, the provisions for computation of capital gains apply in respect of surplus (loss) on transfer of ‘investment asset’ only.

3. Computation of capital gains


3.1 Section 49 of the Code provides that the computation of capital gains on transfer of an investment asset shall be made by deducting from the full value of the consideration on transfer of such asset, the cost of acquisition of such asset. The gains (losses) arising from the transfer of investment assets will be treated as capital gains (losses). The net gain will be included in the total income of the financial year in which the investment asset is transferred, irrespective of the year in which the consideration is actually received. However, in the case of compulsory acquisition of an asset, capital gains will be taxed in the year in which the compensation is actually received.

3.2 It may be noted that the word ‘Transfer’ is defined in section 314(267). This definition is very elaborate as compared to section 2(47) of the Income-tax Act (ITA). The above definition provides that ‘Transfer’ in relation to a ‘Capital Asset’ includes the following:

(i) Sale, exchange or extinguishment of any asset or any rights in it;

(ii) Compulsory acquisition under any law;
(iii) Conversion of capital asset into stock-intrade;
(iv) Buyback of shares u/s.77A of the Companies Act;
(v) Contribution of any asset towards capital in a company or unincorporated body;
(vi) Distribution of assets on liquidation of a company or dissolution of unincorporated body;
(vii) Any transaction allowing possession or enjoyment of an immovable property. This provision is more or less similar to section 2(47) (v) and (vi) of ITA with the only difference that if enjoyment of any immovable property is given to participant of unincorporated body it will be considered as a transfer under DTC;
(viii) Amount received/receivable on maturity of Zero Coupon Bond, on slump sale or on damage/ destruction of any insured asset;
(ix) Transfer of securities by a person having beneficial interest in the securities held by a depository as registered owner;
(x) Distribution of money or asset to a participant in an unincorporated body on his retirement;
(xi) Any disposition, settlement, trust, covenant, agreement or arrangement.

3.3 The capital gains arising from the transfer of personal effects and agricultural land is exempt from income tax. The term ‘personal effects’ is defined in section 314(190) and the term ‘agricultural land’ is defined in section 314(12). This definition states that the land, wherever situated, if used for agricultural purposes will be treated as agricultural land.

3.4 In general, the capital gains will be equal to the full consideration from the transfer of the investment asset minus the cost of acquisition, cost of improvement thereof and transfer-related incidental expenses. However, in the case of an investment asset which is transferred anytime after one year from the end of the financial year in which it is acquired, the cost of acquisition and cost of improvement will be adjusted on the basis of cost inflation index.

3.5 Capital gains from all investment assets will be aggregated to arrive at the total amount of current income from capital gains. This will, then, be aggregated with unabsorbed capital loss at the end of the preceding financial year to arrive at the total amount of income under the head ‘Capital gains’. If the result of the aggregation is a loss, the total amount of capital gains will be treated as ‘nil’ and the loss will be treated as unabsorbed current capital loss at the end of the financial year. This unabsorbed loss will be carried forward for adjustment against capital gains in subsequent years. There is no time limit for such carry forward and set-off of losses.

4.    Exemption from capital gains tax
4.1 Section 47 of the Code provides that certain transfers of investment assets will not be consid-ered as a transfer and no capital gains tax will be payable. This section is on the same lines as existing section 47 of ITA. However, it is significant to note that clause (xiii) of existing section 47 of ITA which provides for exemption from tax when a partnership firm is converted into a company, subject to certain conditions, is absent in section 47 of the Code. This will mean that if the Code is enacted without this clause in section 47, a partnership firm which is converted into company after 1-4-2012 will not be entitled to claim this exemption. It may also be noted that section 47 (1)(J) of the Code provides for exemption from tax when a non-listed company converts itself into an LLP, on the same lines as provided in section 47 (xiii b) of ITA. Again, 47(1)(n) of the Code provides for exemption from tax when a sole proprietary concern is converted into a limited company. This provision is similar to section 47(xiv) of ITA.

4.2 Section 46 of the Code provides that the exemption granted u/s.47 of the Code in respect of certain transfers of investment assets and u/s.55 of the Code in respect of certain rollover of investment assets will become taxable in the F.Y. in which the conditions specified in section 47 or 55 are violated. This provision is on the same lines as in the existing sections 47A, 54, 54B, 54F, 54EC, etc. of ITA.

4.3 Section 48 of the Code explains about the F.Y. in which the income arising on non-compliance with the conditions laid down in section 47 will become taxable. This section also explains about the F.Y. in which enhanced additional compensation received on compulsory acquisition of property will be taxable. Further, the section also explains as to when an immovable property will be considered to have been transferred. These provisions are similar to sections 45(1), 45(4), 45(5) and 46 of ITA with some modifications.

4.4 It is significant to note that the existing sec-tion 45(4) of ITA provides that if any capital asset is transferred by way of distribution of capital as-sets to any partner or partners on dissolution of a firm or AoP or otherwise, the difference between the market value of the asset and its cost will be taxable as capital gains in the hands of the Firm or AoP. This position will continue under the Code in view of item 6(ii) of the table below section 48(1) r.w.s 50(2)(d) of the Code. However, in the case of retirement of a partner, the Courts have held that the word ‘otherwise’ in the existing section 45(4) applies when a partner retires from the Firm or AoP and takes away any asset of the Firm or AoP as part of the amount due on retirement. Now, section 48(2)(b) of the Code, read with item 7 of the table below section 48(1) and section 50(2) (f), provides that “Any money or asset received by a participant (Partner/Member) on account of his retirement from an unincorporated body (Firm, LLP, AoP, BoI) shall be deemed to be the income of the recipient of the F.Y. in which the money or asset is received”. This will mean that if the amount due to the retiring partner as per the books of the Firm, AoP or BoI is Rs.1.5 crore but the amount received and market value of the asset received on his retirement is Rs.2.5 crore, the retiring partner will have to pay tax on capital gains under the Code.

4.5 Under section 51(2) of the Code, in the case of equity shares of a company and units of equity-oriented fund of a M.F., held for more than one year, the capital gain will be exempt from tax if STT is paid. It may be noted that there is difference in the wording of section 51(2) and 51(3). U/s.51(2) the requirement is holding of shares, etc. for more than one year, whereas u/s.51(3) the period for holding other assets is at least one year after the end of the F.Y. in which the asset is acquired.

4.6 In the above case if the STT is paid and the shares/units are held for less than one year, 50% of the capital gain will be exempt and tax at normal rate will be payable on the balance of 50%.

4.7 It may be noted that under item No. 32 of Schedule 6 it is provided that the capital gain arising from transfer of the following assets will not be liable to tax under DTC:

(i)    Agricultural land in a rural area as defined in section 314(221)r.w.s 314 (284). This definition is similar to the definition in section 2(14)(iii) of ITA.

(ii)    Personal effects as defined in section 314 (190) which is similar to section 2(14)(ii) of ITA.

(iii)    Gold Deposit Bonds.

5.    Full value of consideration
5.1 The provisions relating to computation of capital gains on transfer of an investment asset and determination of the full value of the consideration are contained in sections 49 and 50 of the Code. These provisions are similar to the provisions of sections 45(2), 45(3), 45(5), 48 and 50C of ITA with certain modifications. In the case of sale of land or building, section 50(2)(h) of the Code provides that stamp duty value of the asset will be considered as full value of the consideration. The term ‘Stamp duty value’ is defined in section 314(246) on the same lines as in section 50C of ITA with the exception that there is no provision for refer-ence to valuation officer in the event such value is disputed by the assessee. Further, section 50(2) r.w.s 314(267) and 314(93) of the Code provides that in respect of conversion of investment asset into stock-in-trade, distribution of assets to partici-pants on dissolution of the unincorporated body or retirement of a participant, etc. the fair market value of the asset on the date of transfer will be determined according to the method prescribed by the CBDT.

5.2 It may be noted that u/s.45(3) of the ITA it is provided that when the partner/member of a firm, LLP, AoP or BoI in which he becomes a partner/ member and contributes a capital asset as his capital contribution in the entity, the amount credited to this account in the entity will be considered as full value of the consideration and capital gain tax will be payable by him on this basis. This benefit is not available at present when a person becomes a shareholder in a company and he is allotted shares in the company against any transfer of any asset to the company. Now, section 50(2)(c) of the Code provides that the amount recorded in the books of the company or an unincorporated body as value of the investment asset contributed by the shareholder or participant will be the full value of the consideration and the capital gain will be computed in the hands of the transferor on that basis.

6.    Cost of acquisition and indexation
6.1 As stated earlier, section 49 of the Code provides that capital gain on transfer of an investment asset is to be computed by deducting from the full value of the consideration, the cost of acquisition and the cost of improvement. The term ‘Cost of acquisition’ is defined in section 53 read with the 17th Schedule. The term ‘Cost of improvement’ is defined in section 54. These provisions are more or less on the same lines as sections 48, 49 and 55 of ITA. It may, however, be noted that when the investment asset is received by way of gift, will, inheritance, etc., it is provided that the cost will be the cost of acquisition in the hands of previous owner. However, the period during which the previous owner held the asset cannot be added in computing the total period for which the assessee has held the asset, as there is no provision for this purpose corresponding to the provision in section 2(42A) of ITA. Existing section 55(3) of ITA provides that if the cost of the asset in the hands of the previous owner cannot be ascertained, the market value on the date on which the previous owner acquired the asset will be considered as his cost. Now, section 53(7)(c) of the Code provides that if the cost of investment asset in the hands of the previous owner cannot be determined or ascer-tained, the said cost will be taken as ‘nil’. Similarly, in the case of the assessee if a self-generated asset or any other investment asset is acquired and the cost of such asset cannot be determined or ascertained for any reason, it shall be considered as ‘nil’.

6.2 Section 52 of the Code gives mode of computation of indexation of certain investment assets in specified cases. The method prescribed in this section is similar to the provision in the existing section 48 of ITA. However, some modification in the scheme under the Code is made as under:

(i)    Under section 2(29A)r.w.s 2(42 A) of ITA, a capital asset which is held for more than three years is considered as a ‘long-term asset’. U/s.51(3) of the Code, it is provided that if the investment asset is held for more than one year from the end of the financial year in which the asset is acquired, the benefit of indexation of cost will be available.

In other words, if the investment asset is acquired on 1-5-2010, it will be considered as long-term capital asset if it is sold on or after 1-4-2012 under the Code. In the following discussions such investment asset is referred to as a ‘long-term asset’.

(ii)    In the case of any investment asset, if it is a long-term asset as explained in (i) above, the assessee will be entitled to deduct indexed cost of the asset as provided in section 52 of the Code from the full value of the consideration for computation of capital gain. The method for working out indexed cost is the same as in section 48 of ITA. However, the base date for determining the indexed cost will be 1-4-2000 under DTC instead of 1-4-1981 provided in ITA.

(iii)    At present, section 55(2)(b) of ITA provides that if a capital asset is acquired before 1-4-1981, the assessee has an option to substitute the fair market value of the asset as on 1-4-1981 for its cost.

Now, section 53(1)(b) of the Code provides that if the investment asset is acquired before 1-4-2000, the assessee will have the option to substitute fair market value on 1-4-2000 for its cost.

7.    Relief on reinvestment of consideration
Section 55 of the Code provides for relief for roll-over of long-term investment asset in the case of an Individual or HUF. This provision is similar to the existing provisions for relief on reinvestment of capital gains in sections 54, 54B and 54F of ITA with the following modifications:

(i)    At present, the exemption is available if ‘capital gain’ on sale of a capital asset is reinvested in the specified assets u/s.54, 54B or 54EC of ITA. In case of section 54F of ITA, the ‘Net consideration’ on sale is required to be reinvested. Now, u/s.55 of the Code, the benefit of exemption is available on reinvestment of ‘Net consideration’ in all the cases.

(ii)    The rollover relief is available for only two categories of long-term assets viz. (a) agricultural land, and (b) any other investment asset.

(iii)    In the case of agricultural land there is no distinction between rural and urban land. The only condition is that it is assessed to land revenue or local cess and used for agricultural purposes. Further, this land should be an agricultural land during two years prior to the F.Y. in which it is transferred and was acquired by the assessee at least one year before the beginning of the F.Y. in which it is transferred. If these conditions are satisfied and the assessee invests the net consideration on sale of such agricultural land for the purchase of one or more pieces of agricultural land within a period of three years from the end of the F.Y. in which the original agricultural land was sold, he will get exemption in proportion to the amount so invested.

(iv)    In the case of any other long-term investment asset, the above rollover benefit will be available, if the net consideration is invested in the purchase or construction of a residential house within a period of three years from the end of the F.Y. in which the original asset was sold. For getting this benefit there are two conditions as under:

(a)    The assessee should not be the owner of more than one residential house (other than the residential house in which such investment is made) on the date of sale of original asset.

(b)    The residential house in which the above investment is made to get rollover benefit should not be transferred within one year from the end of the F.Y. in which such investment is made.

It is also provided in section 55 of the Code, that the above rollover benefit will be available if the investment in the new asset is made within a period of one year before the sale of the original asset.

(vi)    It is also provided in the above section that the net consideration on sale of the original asset should be reinvested for acquiring the new asset, as stated above, before the end of the F.Y. in which the original asset is sold or within six months from the date of such sale, whichever is later. If this is not done, the net consideration or balance thereof should be deposited with Capital Gains Deposit Scheme to be framed by the Government. The amount so deposited should be used within three years from the end of the F.Y. in which the original asset is sold. If it is not so used, the same will be taxable in F.Y. in which the period of three years expires.

(vii)    From the above, it will be evident that the present concession of investing the capital gain on sale of residential house for purchase of another residential house even if the assessee is owner of more than one residential house u/s.54 of the ITA will not be available. Further, the benefit of investment in approved bonds up to Rs.50 lakh u/s.54EC of ITA will also not be available.

8.    Income of FII

As stated earlier, definition of investment asset u/s.314(141) of the Code includes any shares or securities held by a Foreign Institutional Investor (FII). In view of this, FII engaged in trading of shares or securities in India will not be entitled to claim exemption under the applicable DTAA on the ground that it is carrying on business in India and has no permanent establishment in India. Under the Code, the surplus from these transactions will be considered as income from capital gains.

9.    Slump sale

The definition of investment asset also includes any undertaking or division of a business. Section 53(5) provides that if there is any slump sale of any undertaking or division of a business, the cost of acquisition of such asset will be the ‘net worth’ of such undertaking or division. If such undertaking or division is sold after the end of one year from the end of the financial year in which it was acquired or established, the benefit of indexation u/s.51 and 52 of the Code will be available. Net worth of such undertaking or division will be worked out as may be prescribed by the CBDT u/s.314(166). The term ‘Slump sale’ is defined in section 314(234) on the same lines as section 2(42C) of ITA.

10.    Aggregation of capital gains and losses

10.1 Income from capital gains (short-term or long-term) from various investment assets, whether positive or negative, shall be first aggregated and any carried forward loss under this head from earlier years shall be deducted therefrom. If the net result is loss, it shall be carried forward to next year. There is no time limit for such carry forward of losses. If the net result is positive, it shall be aggregated with income under other heads. It may be noted that there is a departure from the provisions of ITA where income from long-term capital gains is taxed at a separate lower specified rate. Under DTC long- term or short-term capital gains is taxable at the normal rate applicable to other income.

10.2 It may be noted that there is no provision for adjustment of short-term or long-term capital losses carried forward from F.Y. 2011-12 (A.Y. 2012-13)    and earlier years against capital gains for F.Y. 2012-13 and subsequent years under DTC.

11.    Treatment of losses in certain specified cases

11.1    Section 64 and 65 of DTC provide for treatment of losses in specified cases as under:

(i)    On conversion of unlisted company into LLP
— It may be noted that as stated earlier, u/s.47(1) (J) exemption from capital gain is given in the case of conversion of an unlisted company into a LLP. There are certain conditions for this purpose which are similar to section 47(xiii b) of ITA. Section 64(1) provides that unabsorbed current loss from ordinary sources in the case of an unlisted company shall be available for set-off in the case of LLP against its current aggregate income from ordinary sources of subsequent years. Similarly, unabsorbed current capital loss of the company shall be set off against current capital gains in the case of LLP in the subsequent years. This section is similar to section 72A(6A) of ITA. If the conditions laid down in section in section 47(1)(J) of DTC are not complied with, the set-0ff of loss so allowed in any F.Y. can be withdrawn by rectification of the assessment order.

(ii)    On Business Reorganisation
— It may be noted that as stated earlier, u/s.47(1)(n) exemption from capital gain is given in the case of conversion of sole proprietary concern into a limited company. There are certain conditions for this purpose which are similar to section 47(xiv) of ITA. U/s.64(2) it is provided that unabsorbed current loss from ordinary sources in the case of sole proprietor shall be set off against current income from ordinary sources of the company. Similarly, unabsorbed current capital loss in the case of sole proprietor will be set off against current capital gain in the subsequent year in the case of the company. If the conditions laid down in section 47 (1)(n) of DTC are not complied with, the set-off of loss so allowed in any F.Y. can be withdrawn by rectification of assessment order.

11.2    Treatment of unabsorbed losses on change in Constitution

(i)    Changes in constitution of unincorporated body — Section 65 provides that in the case of change in the constitution of an unincorporated body (i.e., Firm, LLP, AoP or BoI) on account of death/retirement of a participant, the unabsorbed loss of that entity (including capital loss) shall be reduced in proportion of the loss attributable to the deceased/retiring participant and allowed to be carried forward and set off in the subsequent years as under:

(a)    Proportionate unabsorbed loss from ordinary sources shall be carried forward and set off against current income from ordinary sources in the subsequent years.

(b)    Proportionate unabsorbed capital loss shall be carried forward and set off against current capital gain in the subsequent year.

This section is similar to section 78 of ITA with the difference that section 78 of ITA applies to a Firm or LLP, whereas section 65 of DTC applies to a Firm, LLP, AoP or BoI.

(ii)    Changes in shareholding of closely-held companies
— Section 66 of DTC is similar to section 79 of ITA. It provides that in the case of a closely-held company, if the persons holding not less than 51% of voting power on the last day of the F.Y. when the loss under the ordinary sources or capital gains was incurred, are not holding this voting power on the last day of the F.Y. when the income from such sources is earned, such unabsorbed loss cannot be the set-off against the income from such sources in that F.Y. The only difference between section 79 of ITA and section 66 of DTC is that section 79 does not apply to set off of unabsorbed depreciation, whereas u/s.66 of DTC loss includes depreciation.


12.    Filing return of loss

Section 67 provides that if the return of tax bases showing loss is not filed before the due date for filing the return, the loss under the head ordinary sources, special sources, capital gains, speculation, horse races activities, etc. shall not be allowed to be carried forward or set off in the subsequent years. This section is similar to section 80 of ITA. Here also it may be noted that section 80 does not refer to unabsorbed depreciation, but u/s.67 loss will include depreciation also.

13.    Some issues
From the above discussion about provisions relating to taxation of capital gains proposed to be introduced in DTC w.e.f. 1-4-2012, it is evident that the existing provisions will stand substantially modified. Some of the following issues require consideration.

(i)    The word ‘Asset’ is defined to mean (a) a business asset or (b) an investment asset. Again, a business asset is further classified as business trading asset and business capital asset. So far as business trading asset is concerned, it will be allowed as revenue expenditure in computing business income. As regards business capital asset, only depreciation will be allowed. Thus, only investment asset will form part of the computation of capital gains.

(ii)    The existing distinction between long-term and short-term capital asset is now proposed to be modified. It an investment asset is held for more than one year after the end of the F.Y. in which it is acquired, it will be considered as a long-term capital asset.

(iii)    The existing concept of determination of indexed cost for computing long-term capital gain has been retained. The base date for this purpose will be 1-4-2000, instead of 1-4-1981.

(iv)    The existing provision for granting exemption in respect of long-term capital gain on sale of securities, where STT is paid, will continue. As regards short-term capital gain in such transactions, only 50% of such capital gain will be taxable at normal rate. Therefore, the effective tax rate shall not exceed 15%.

(v)    If net result under the head capital gain (long-term or short-term) is positive, it will be added to income under other heads and tax will be payable at normal rate of tax applicable to the total income. If the net result is capital loss, the same will be carried forward without any time limit. There is no concessional rate for taxation of long-term capital gain as provided in section 112 of ITA.

(vi)    There is, however, no provision in DTC for adjustment of short-term or long-term capital losses carried forward under ITA from F.Y. 2011-12 (A.Y. 2012-13) and earlier years against capital gains for F.Y. 2012-13 and subsequent years.

(vii)    Existing section 47(xiii) of ITA provides that conversion of a partnership firm into limited company does not attract any capital gains tax if certain conditions are complied with. There is no corresponding provision in DTC. Similarly, there is no provision in DTC for such exemption when a partnership firm is converted into an LLP.

(viii)    As discussed in para 5.1 above, there is no provision in DTC for reference to valuation officer if the assessee objects to the stamp duty valuation in respect of sale of immovable property. Therefore, stamp duty valuation will now become mandatory.

(ix)    As discussed in para 7(vii) above, there is no provision in DTC similar to section 54EC of ITA to enable an assessee to deposit up to Rs.50 lakh, out of long-term capital gains in notified Bonds. Thus, assessees selling small value investment assets will not be able to claim exemption from long-term capital gains tax to this extent.

Let us hope that some of the above anoma-lies are removed before DTC is enacted by the Parliament.

Mumbai Blasts

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On 13th July 2011, Mumbai experienced three bomb blasts at crowded places. The death toll resulting from these blasts is already 26. Mumbai, a cosmopolitan, multi-religious and multi-ethnic city, the financial hub of the country, has been a soft target for terrorists. It has been a target atleast nine times in the last decade. The attacks have been coming with greater intensity and frequency since 2003. The recent blasts took place when the citizens of Mumbai had not yet forgotten the blasts at seven suburban railway stations in 2006, and the deadly attacks at CST railway station and two five-star hotels in south Mumbai in 2008.

The Mumbai police have not yet been successful in identifying the terrorist groups responsible for the latest bomb attacks. They are still groping in the dark. The blame game by the politicians to score brownie points has begun.

While this time around, the response from various agencies after the blast showed improvement, what is worrying is the inaction and the apathy towards preventing the terrorist attacks. The State Government had set up the State Security Council after the terrorist attacks in 2008. The Council in turn, set up six study groups for making recommendations. However, after the initial meeting held after setting up of the Council, the State Government did not feel it necessary to convene even a single meeting of the Council, till the recent bomb blasts.

Various promises were made after the terrorist attacks in 2008; most of them remain unfulfilled. The plan was to set up a sophisticated commando unit – Force One – similar to National Security Guards. The Force One has been set up, but it is facing various issues in terms of equipment, space and motivated officers. The Marine Wing of the Police was to be strengthened with 28 bulletproof speedboats equipped with radar and GPS. However, only 12 such boats have been deployed till now. Photographs published in the print media suggest that even these boats have not been functional due to shortage of diesel. If that is true, it is rather pathetic and disappointing. Over 2000 CCTVs were to be installed. One does not know how many have been actually installed; and out of those installed, how many are functioning and how the data is used.

Padma Bhushan Mr. Julio Ribeiro, while speaking at the 63rd Founding Day celebrations of the Society, referred to systemic destruction of the professionalism of the State Police. Rampant interference by the political bosses has made even the Commissioner of Police of Mumbai rather ineffective. In the long run, these factors do contribute to reduced security for the citizens.

The Home Minister P. C. Chidambaram, in a press conference, stated that it was difficult to defend a country with a population of a billion plus, while Rahul Gandhi, (the Prime Minister in-waiting?) said that there was always one percent chance that the terrorists would succeed in their attacks. While there is truth in what these gentlemen said, these statements do not provide any solace to the citizens. Citizens of Mumbai are not impressed! The common man is worried about the inadequate efforts and the indifference shown towards the security of Mumbai.

The general public and the elite showed tremendous awareness after the 2008 attacks, but became reticent soon thereafter. Most of us do not really know what we can do to secure ourselves and our fellow citizens. The Government and the police need to educate the citizens on this front. It is also our duty to understand what we can do on our part, to make life safer and more secure. We need to be vigilant, and ask questions to the Government and bureaucrats on various issues to keep them on their toes. As they say “God helps those who help themselves”.

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COMPASSION

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“Empathy is . . . . . your pain in my heart” — Author unknown

More than 2500 years ago, Gautam Buddha gave the world a message “Be Compassionate”. Since those times there have been many saints who served mankind with compassion. Mother Teresa taught us compassion by putting it in practice . . . . . . It is a quality which is truly divine, and one which raises an ordinary human being to great heights.

It is time we intellectuals, the so-called cream of the society learn to be compassionate. We have to agree that as children we were far more compassionate than we are as adults. Compassion flows naturally from a child. It is only when the child grows up, and sees things happening around him, that he starts becoming less and less aware of others’ suffering. He starts becoming more and more thick-skinned and insensitive to the pain and unhappiness of others.

As explained by Rashmi Bansal in “I have a dream” there are two kinds of people in the world. Those who think and those who feel. As we grow up, we increasingly become ‘thinkers’ from being ‘feelers’. As thinkers we tend to believe that “the suffering of others is their problem. We have nothing to do with it and have no responsibility towards our brethren. We see the world as a place with boundaries. What is mine and what is not mine. Anything happening in that part of the world which is not mine is not my problem. I do not have any obligation towards people in the other part”.

It is time we changed our mindset. There has to be a paradigm shift. We have to look at the world as a whole, and everyone in it as a part of one family. “Vasudhaiva kutumbakam” say our scriptures. We have to move out of our apathy to become not only sympathetic, but truly empathetic.

There is a difference between sympathy and empathy. Sympathy flows from pity. In sympathising one’s ego is at play. One believes that “I am helping”. This is not so in empathy. Empathy has no involvement of EGO. In sympathy, it is pity which drives one to help. In empathy it is compassion in one’s heart that makes one act. One remembers the lines of Gandhiji’s favourite bhajan:

But how can one graduate from being sympathetic to being empathetic? A learned thinker was explaining on the TV that unless one suffers some pain, one does not act. A person suffering from diabetes tends to ignore it as there are no symptoms, no pain. If one has a headache, or even a small cut on the finger, one promptly attends to it because there is pain. If we merely read about the sufferings of others, or watch it on the TV, it does not impact us. But if we actually see ‘suffering’ it moves us to act. Emperor Ashoka changed when he saw the suffering of the dying on the battlefield of Kalinga. From a Conquering Emperor, he became a Messenger of Peace.

If people, particularly those who are young, visit places like orphanages, hospitals and schools for the poor people, particularly in the rural areas, it is likely that they will become sensitive. Emotions will stir their hearts. Perhaps some may even realise that it is merely by chance and their good fortune that they have been born in better economic environments. They could well have been in the place of those poor and downtrodden people. I believe such visits will certainly make them empathetic and they will become alive to the needs of the hungry, the homeless and the disadvantaged. Many will learn to stretch out a helping hand. They will also experience the joy of giving which leads to true happiness. I conclude by quoting His Holiness the Dalai Lama:

“Kindness and compassion are among the principal things that make our lives meaningful. They are a source of lasting happiness and joy. They are the foundations of a good heart, the heart of one who acts out of a desire to help others.”

Let us be compassionate.

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Whatsap

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About this article:
WhatsApp is an instant
messaging app (application software for phones). For many this app is a
cheap substitute for SMS text messaging and can be called a
non-Blackberry version of the Blackberry messenger. This app works
across platforms and is easy to use. Readers may find this write-up
informative.

I still remember the day when a close friend of
mine kept pushing me to install this app on my phone. All the while,
trying to convince me that this app was really worth a shot. I was a bit
reluctant and the simple reason was that I would have to pay money to
purchase the app. An unpalatable thought at the time, it would be a
first for me (so far I have installed as many as 91 apps on my phone and
the ratio of paid vs free apps is 2:89). My friend kept chiding me that
the cost in comparison to the benefit was negligible, but I just
couldn’t swallow the thought of paying for an app.

While you may
say that I am tight-fisted, I would prefer the name frugal. But trust
me I am not the only one. If you are not convinced, check out the Maruti
Suzuki ad — where the salesman is trying to sell a luxury yacht to a
‘rich man’, the scene begins with the salesman praising one feature
after another . . . impressive one would say . . . instead the ‘rich
man’ asks ‘kitna deti hai’ (meaning how much mileage does it give) and
then comes the tag line — “for a country obsessed with mileage, we
produce the most fuel-efficient cars”. Just like the ‘rich man’ in the
ad, there are countless number of cell phone users (many of whom own
pretty fancy smart phones), who find SMSing an expensive mode of
communication. And they should, after all you can speak to one another
for as low as 1p per second, then why pay such a high price for a lowly
SMS, more so when you know that the phone companies are making a fast
buck on the SMS. Well now you have an alternative — WhatsApp.

WhatsApp
provides an alternative texting service that closely resembles standard
SMS text messaging. Simply put, WhatsApp messenger is a smart-phoneto-
smartphone messenger. I guess this is where I take the role of the
salesman trying to sell you the yacht (dont worry, your time will come
and you can ask kitna deti hai). Here are a few reasons why you should
install and use this app:

  • This app works on iPhone (IOS),
    Blackberry (Blackberry OS), Nokia (Symbian) as well as Samsung
    (Android). Arguably, that’s much better than the Blackberry Messenger
    (‘BBM’) which is limited to Blackberry devices.

  • Unlike standard
    text messaging, though, you can set a status message which other
    WhatsApp users can see, both in the Favourites page and in the main
    contact list.

  • And not only can you send photos, but you can also
    attach audio and video notes, and even your geographic location to
    WhatsApp messages. Plus, it provides an easy way to save your message
    history as a text file (see pic).

  • You could send a million
    messages, but pay a pittance. The messages can be sent to friends and
    family across the world (just like BBM) for the same cost.

  • The
    BBM requires you to know your friends’ PIN, well you can say goodbye to
    that now. Once you and your friends have installed WhatsApp, you don’t
    need anything else. This is actually one of the best parts — WhatsApp
    almost automatically identifies who all in your phonebook have installed
    WhatsApp and lets you chat with them instantly. In fact they will
    automatically appear in your Favourites.

  • WhatsApp gives you the
    option to remain on always/to remain connected with your buddies. If you
    choose to go offline, don’t worry the messages will be stored on the
    server and will be pushed to your phone as soon as you log on.

  • Messages
    are usually received very quickly and notifications appear via push,
    which you can configure in the phone’s settings if you want.

  • Like BBM it allows you to form groups (up to 10 people) where you can share messages with a group of friends.

  • Overall,
    WhatsApp Messenger is a huge benefit to the iPhone community and to
    smartphone users in general, because it lets you keep the text messages
    flowing to your friends for free . . . . . . arguably, for the same
    price that they cost cell phone providers to deliver. Come to think of
    it, you have nothing to lose but your expensive texting plans.

Well!!!!! Now’s the part where you ask kitna deti hai?

To
begin with, it will cost you US $1 (for the iPhone that is, for the BB,
Nokia and Samsung you can use it for free for one full year).

Unlike
standard SMS messaging, WhatsApp uses your phone’s data plan to send
and receive messages. So if you use the app a lot, then your data usage
will increase. (You can monitor these stats from within the app).
Similarly, if you travel outside of your phone carrier’s supported area,
it’s possible that you’ll incur data roaming charges if you leave that
option enabled. Staying attached to a Wi-Fi connection should alleviate
most of those concerns (but as a side effect, constant pinging to the
Wi-Fi network will drain your battery power very fast).

For
those of you who are extra security-conscious, you might be concerned
that your phone number is known to the app’s developer and that all
messages go through its servers. The privacy page on the WhatsApp
Website states that the company will Do No Evil with your data and the
developer lets you know that messages are stored on its system only
until they have been retrieved, at which point they are deleted.
WhatsApp also confirmed that WhatsApp text messages, like most e-mail
messages, are sent across the Internet unencrypted (contact data is
encrypted, however). That’s not necessarily a problem; just something
certain types of users may need to be aware of.

The only other
limitation is the requirement that your friends also have WhatsApp
Messenger app installed on their phones. However, if you’re the early
adopter within your circle and none of your friends have downloaded the
app yet, then you’re not going to have anyone to talk with. Luckily, the
app makes it easy to invite your friends to download the app, either by
sending them an e-mail or a standard text message.

If you liked
what you’ve read above and want to try this app, you can visit
(itunes/blackberry world/ OVI/android mart) and download this software.
The whole process is fairly simple. The app walks you through the quick
set-up process the first time you open it. You register your phone
number with the WhatsApp service. It verifies your identity by sending a
code (ironically, via a standard text message) that you then enter into
the set-up screen. After that, the app asks for permission to look
through your address book for contact numbers that are already
registered with WhatsApp and then places them into your your list of
Favourites. Then you’re finished and ready to start texting with your
friends. Once you and your friends have gone through this short
procedure, texting via WhatsApp Messenger is similar to standard SMS
messaging . . . . only much cheaper.

I would love to hear about your experience after using this software. You can send your emails to sam.client@gmail.com

Disclaimer:
This
write-up is not intended to promote or malign any particular product,
feature or any company. Further the write-up should not be considered as
an endorsement of any one product over the other. The sole purpose of
this write-up is to share knowledge and user experience.

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Joint Ventures: No more proportionate consolidation under IFRS

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On 12th May 2011, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) issued its new consolidation and related standards, replacing the existing accounting for subsidiaries and joint ventures (now joint arrangements), and making limited amendments in relation to accounting for associates.

In our previous article we had covered IFRS 10, the new standard on consolidated financial statements.

In this article we focus on IFRS 11, Joint Arrangements and IAS 28 (2011), Investments in Associates and Joint Ventures, giving our perspectives on the requirements that are modified and that are expected to have an impact on the preparers and users of IFRS financial statements.

The primary changes introduced under IFRS 11 are:

  • It carves out from IAS 31 on jointly controlled entities, those cases in which although there is a separate vehicle, that separation is ineffective in certain ways. These arrangements are treated similar to jointly controlled assets/ operations and are now called joint operations; and

  • Eliminates the free choice of equity accounting or proportionate consolidation for accounting for investments in joint ventures. These must now be accounted always using the equity method.


Identifying joint arrangements

A joint arrangement is an arrangement over which two or more parties have a joint control, being contractually agreed sharing of control i.e., unanimous consent is required for decisions about the relevant activities.

In order to identify a joint arrangement, IFRS 11 requires a two-step analysis to be performed: (1) assess whether collective control exists of an arrangement; and (2) then assess whether the contractual arrangement gives two or more parties joint control over the arrangement.

What is the meaning of control?

IFRS 11 does not define the term ‘control’. As such, reference may be had to the definition of ‘control’ under IFRS 10. As discussed in detail in our last article on IFRS 10, the assessment of control may undergo a change under IFRS 10 as compared to IAS 27 (2008). For instance, only substantive rights held by the investor and others are considered in assessing control. To be substantive, rights need to be exercisable when decisions about the relevant activities need to be made, and their holders need to have a practical ability to exercise the rights. It may be noted that the ‘rights that need to be exercisable when decisions about the relevant activities need to be made’ is different from the current requirement under IAS 27 (2008) of ‘rights that are currently exercisable’.

De facto control in case of joint arrangements

Joint control exists only when it is contractually agreed that decisions about relevant activities require the unanimous consent of the parties that control the arrangement collectively. When, for instance, the parties can demonstrate past experience of voting together in the absence of a contractual agreement to do so, this will not satisfy that requirement. However, it is possible to establish a joint de facto control i.e., control is based on de facto circumstances and the parties sharing control have contractually agreed to share that control.

For instance, A and B hold 24.5% each in Company C, while the remaining 51% shares are held by numerous shareholders, none of them holding more than 1% shares each and do not have any shareholder agreement amongst them. If A and B contractually agree that on decisions relating to the relevant activities of Company C, the casting of their combined voting power of 49% requires their unanimous consent; it may be concluded that A and B have joint control over Company C on a de facto basis.

Key differences from IAS 31

IFRS 11 does not modify the overall definition of an arrangement subject to joint control, although in a few cases, the joint control evaluation may undergo a change on account of application of control definition under IFRS 10.

Classifying joint arrangements

After determining that joint control exists, joint arrangements are divided into two types, each having its own accounting model, defined as follows:

  • A joint operation is one whereby the jointly controlling parties, known as the joint operators, have rights to the assets and obligations for the liabilities, relating to the arrangement;

  • A joint venture is one whereby the jointly controlling parties, known as the joint venturers, have rights to the net assets of the arrangement.

The key to determining the type of arrangement, and therefore the subsequent accounting, is the rights and obligations of the parties to the arrangement. For instance, two parties set up a separate entity, whereby the main feature of its legal form is that the parties (and not the entity) have rights to the assets and obligations for the liabilities of the entity, and the contractual arrangement between the parties establishes the parties’ rights to the assets, responsibility for all operational or financial obligations and the sharing of profit or loss. Though the arrangement is structured through a separate entity, as the legal form of the separate vehicle does not confer separation between the parties and the vehicle, the joint arrangement is a joint operation.

An entity determines the type of joint arrangement by considering the structure, the legal form, the contractual arrangement and other facts and circumstances.

Structure of joint arrangements

A joint arrangement not structured through a separate vehicle can be classified only as a joint operation. A separate vehicle is a separately identifiable financial structure, including separate legal entities or entities recognised by statutes, regardless of whether those entities have a legal personality.

A joint arrangement structured through a separate vehicle can be either a joint venture or a joint operation. As such, a separate vehicle is necessary but not a sufficient condition for a joint venture. If there is a separate vehicle, then the remaining tests are applied.

Legal form of the arrangement

If the legal form of the separate vehicle does not confer separation between the parties and the separate vehicle i.e., the assets and liabilities placed in the separate vehicle are the parties’ assets and liabilities, then the joint arrangement is a joint operation.

Contractual arrangement

When the contractual arrangement specifies that the parties have rights to the assets and obligations for the liabilities relating to the arrangement, then the arrangement is a joint operation.

It may be noted that in relation to ‘obligations for the liabilities’, it seems that the contractual obligation for liabilities is something that needs to reflect a primary obligation, rather than a secondary one; and something that represents a non-contingent, ongoing obligation, rather than an obligation that will be settled if and when a certain event occurs (say, a default in case of guarantees issued or calling of uncalled capital).

Other facts and circumstances

The test at this step of the analysis is to identify whether, despite the legal form and contractual arrangements indicating that the arrangement is a joint venture, other facts and circumstances give the parties rights to substantially all of the economic benefits relating to the arrangement and cause the arrangement to depend on the parties on a continuous basis for settling its liabilities, and therefore the arrangement is a joint operation.

In practice, most joint arrangements in India, which are structured as separate companies, may meet the separation criteria and hence qualify as a joint venture and not as a joint operation.

Financial statements of joint venturers

IFRS 11 prescribes accounting treatment for joint operators, whereas IAS 28 (2011) prescribes the accounting treatment for joint venturers.

In its consolidated financial statements, a joint venturer accounts for its interest in the joint venture using the equity method in accordance with IAS 28 (2011), unless under IAS 28 (2011), the entity is exempted from applying the equity method.

Under the equity method, the investment in a joint venture is recognised initially at cost, and subsequently adjusted for the post- acquisition changes in the share of the joint venture’s net assets. The joint venturer’s share of profit or loss and other comprehensive income of the joint venture are included in its profit or loss and other comprehensive income, respectively.

In its separate financial statements, a joint venturer accounts for its interest in the joint venture in accordance with IAS 27 (2011) Separate financial statements i.e., at cost or in accordance with IFRS 9/IAS 39. Such a choice is available even if the joint venturer is exempted from preparing consolidated financial statements. This requirement is in line with the existing requirements.

Key differences from IAS 31

IAS 31 provides an accounting policy choice for a joint controller’s interest in a jointly controlled entity, whereby either the equity method or pro-portionate consolidation can be used. In future, only the equity method shall be permitted. As such, the joint co ntroller’s share of net income and net assets that are adjusted against the individual items of income/expenses/assets/liabilities shall now be presented as a single line item in the statement of financial position and statement of comprehensive income. In other words, a single line ‘Investment in Joint Venture’ and a single line ‘equity profit pick-up’ adjustment on such investments will be recorded.

Financial statements of joint operators

In both its consolidated and separate financial statements, a joint operator recognises its assets, liabilities and transactions, including its share of those incurred jointly. These assets, liabilities and transactions are accounted for in accordance with the relevant IFRS.

Transactions between a joint operator and a joint operation

When a joint operator sells or contributes assets to a joint operation, such transactions are in effect transactions with other parties to the joint operation. The joint operator recognises gains and losses from such transactions only to the extent of the other parties’ interests in the joint operation. The full amount of any loss is recognised immediately by the joint operator, to the extent that these transactions provide evidence of impairment of any assets to be sold or contributed.

When a joint operator purchases assets from a joint operation, it does not recognise its share of the gains or losses until those assets have been sold to a third party. The joint operator’s share of any losses is recognised immediately, to the extent that these transactions provide evidence of impairment of those assets.

Other parties to the joint arrangement
Other parties to the joint venture

For the purpose of consolidated financial statements, the other parties to the joint venture first determine whether they exercise significant influence. If significant influence exists, then the interest is recognised in accordance with IAS 28 (2011); else it is recognised in accordance with IAS 39/IFRS 9.

For separate financial statements, other parties to a joint venture account for their interest in the joint venture in accordance with IAS 39/IFRS 9. If significant influence exists, then the interest may also be recognised at cost.

Other parties a joint operation

The other party to a joint operation accounts for its investment in the same way as a joint operator if it has rights to the assets and obligations for the liabilities. If such a party does not have such rights and obligations, then it accounts for its interest in accordance with the IFRS applicable to that interest for instance IAS 28 (2011) or IAS 39/IFRS 9 as the case may be.

Summary

Overall, the implementation of IFRS 11 will require significant judgment in several respects, while the requirement to apply equity method of accounting to account for interests in joint ventures may have a significant impact on the entity’s financial statements. While the standard is not mandatorily effective until periods beginning on or after 1 January 2013, it is expected that preparers will want to begin evaluating their involvement with joint arrangements sooner than that, as the changes under the new standard generally will call for retrospective application.

At this moment, it is unclear by when the corresponding changes will be introduced under the Ind-AS framework. However, it is advisable for Indian companies to evaluate the impact of this new standard, as it is inevitable that Ind-AS will ultimately incorporate the changes due to the new standard.

Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. — (31-3-2011)

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From Significant Accounting Policies

The Company uses foreign currency forward contracts and currency options to hedge its risks associated with foreign currency fluctuations relating to certain firm commitments and forecasted transactions. The Company designates these hedging instruments as cash flow hedges applying the recognition and measurement principles set out in the Indian Accounting Standard 39 ‘Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement’ (Ind AS-39).

The use of hedging instruments is governed by the Company’s policies approved by the Board of Directors, which provide written principles on the use of such financial derivatives consistent with the Company’s risk management strategy.

Hedging instruments are initially measured at fair value, and are re-measured at subsequent reporting dates. Changes in the fair value of these derivatives that are designated and effective as hedges of future cash flows are recognised directly in shareholders’ funds and the ineffective portion is recognised immediately in the profit and loss account.

Changes in the fair value of derivative financial instruments that do not qualify for hedge accounting are recognised in the profit and loss account as they arise.

Hedge accounting is discontinued when the hedging instrument expires or is sold, terminated, or exercised, or no longer qualifies for hedge accounting. At that time for forecasted transactions, any cumulative gain or loss on the hedging instrument recognised in shareholders’ funds is retained there until the forecasted transaction occurs. If a hedged transaction is no longer expected to occur, the net cumulative gain or loss recognised in shareholders’ funds is transferred to the profit and loss account for the period.

From Notes to Accounts The Company, in accordance with its risk management policies and procedures, enters into foreign currency forward contracts and currency option contracts to manage its exposure in foreign exchange rates. The counter-party is generally a bank. These contracts are for a period between one day and eight years.

The Company does not have any outstanding foreign exchange forward contracts, which have been designated as Cash Flow Hedges as at 31 March, 2011 and as at 31 March, 2010.

The Company has the following outstanding derivative instruments as at 31 March, 2011:

The following are outstanding currency option contracts, which have been designated as Cash Flow Hedges, as at:

Net gain on derivative instruments of Rs.20.20 crores recognised in Hedging Reserve as of 31 March, 2011 is expected to be reclassified to the profit and loss account by 31 March, 2012.

The movement in Hedging Reserve during the year ended 31 March, 2011, for derivatives designated as Cash Flow Hedges is as follows:

In addition to the above Cash Flow Hedges, the Company has outstanding foreign exchange forward contracts and currency option contracts with notional amount aggregating Rs.4432.67 crores (31 March, 2010: Rs.3316.41 crores) whose fair value showed a gain of Rs.27.45 crores as at 31 March, 2011 (31 March, 2010: Rs.4.67 crores). Although these contracts are effective as hedges from an economic perspective, they do not qualify for hedge accounting and accordingly these are accounted as derivative instruments at fair value with changes in fair value recorded in the profit (Previous year: exchange gain Rs.91.46 crores) on foreign exchange forward contracts and currency option contracts have been recognised in the year ended 31 March, 2011.

As of the balance sheet date, the Company has net foreign currency exposures that are not hedged by a derivative instrument or otherwise amounting to Rs.857.03 crores (31 March, 2010: Rs.764.85 crores).

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Tata Steel Ltd. — (31-3-2011)

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From Significant Accounting Policies

Foreign currency transactions

Foreign Currency Transactions (FCT) and forward exchange contracts used to hedge FCT are initially recognised at the spot rate on the date of the transaction/contract. Monetary assets and liabilities relating to foreign currency transactions and forward exchange contracts remaining unsettled at the end of the year are translated at year-end rates.

The company has opted for accounting the exchange differences arising on reporting of longterm foreign currency monetary items in line with Companies (Accounting Standards) Amendment Rules 2009 relating to Accounting Standard 11 (AS- 11) notified by Government of India on 31 March, 2009. Accordingly the effect of exchange differences on foreign currency loans of the Company is accounted by addition or deduction to the cost of the assets so far it relates to depreciable capital assets and in other cases by transfer to ‘Foreign Currency Monetary Items Translation Difference Account’ to be amortised over the balance period of the long-term monetary items or period up to 31 March, 2011, whichever is earlier.

The differences in translation of FCT and forward exchange contracts used to hedge FCT (excluding the long-term foreign currency monetary items accounted in line with Companies (Accounting Standards) Amendment Rules 2009 on Accounting Standard 11 notified by Government of India on 31 March, 2009) and realised gains and losses, other than those relating to fixed assets are recognised in the Profit and Loss Account. The outstanding derivative contracts at the balance sheet date other than forward exchange contracts used to hedge FCT are valued by marking them to market and losses, if any, are recognised in the Profit and Loss Account.

Exchange difference relating to monetary items that are in substance forming part of the Company’s net investment in non-integral foreign operations are accumulated in Foreign Exchange Fluctuation Reserve Account.

From Notes to Accounts

Profit and Loss Account


The Company has opted for accounting the exchange differences arising on reporting of longterm foreign currency monetary items in line with Companies (Accounting Standards) Amendment Rules 2009 relating to Accounting Standard 11 (AS- 11) notified by Government of India on 31 March, 2009 which allows foreign exchange difference on long-term monetary items to be capitalised to the extent they relate to acquisition of depreciable assets and in other cases to amortise over the period of the monetary asset/liability or the period up to 31 March, 2011, whichever is earlier.

As on 31 March, 2011, Rs. Nil (31-3-2010: Credit of Rs.206.95 crores) remains to be amortised in the ‘Foreign Currency Monetary Items Translation Difference Account’ after taking a credit of Rs.261.44 crores (2009-10: Charge of Rs.85.67 crores) in the Profit & Loss Account and Rs 2.07 crores (net of deferred tax Rs.3.57 crores) [2009-10: Rs.47.35 crores (net of deferred tax Rs.24.38 crores)] adjusted against Securities Premium Account during the current financial year on account of amortisation. The Depreciation for the year ended 31 March, 2011 is higher by Rs.0.48 crore (2009-10: Rs.0.41 crore) and the Profit before taxes for the year ended 31 March, 2011 is higher by Rs.208.99 crores (2009-10: Lower by Rs.561.60 crores).

Other Disclosures

25. Derivative Instruments (I) The Company has entered into the following derivative instruments:

(a) The Company uses foreign currency forward contracts to hedge its risks associated with foreign currency fluctuations. The use of foreign currency forward contracts is governed by the Company’s strategy approved by the Board of Directors, which provide principles on the use of such forward contracts consistent with the Company’s Risk Management Policy. The Company does not use forward contracts for speculative purposes.

Outstanding Short-Term Forward Exchange Contracts entered into by the Company on account of payables:

Outstanding Short-Term Forward Exchange Contracts entered into by the Company on account of receivables:
(Forward exchange contracts outstanding as on 31 March 2011 include Forward Purchase of United States Dollars against Indian National Rupees for contracted imports.)

Outstanding Long-Term Forward Exchange Contracts entered into by the Company:

(Long-Term Forward Exchange Contracts outstanding as on 31 March, 2011 have been used to hedge the Foreign Currency Risk on repayment of External Commercial Borrowings and Export Credit Agency Borrowings of the Company.)

(b) The Company also uses derivative contracts other than forward contracts to hedge the interest rate and currency risk on its capital account. Such transactions are governed by the strategy approved by the Board of Directors which provide principles on the use of these instruments, consistent with the Company’s Risk Management Policy. The Company does not use these contracts for speculative purposes.

Outstanding Interest Rate Swaps to hedge against fluctuations in interest rate changes:

All the above swaps and forward contracts are accounted for as per accounting policies stated in Notes on Balance sheet and Profit and Loss Account, Schedule M 1(f).

(II) The year-end foreign currency exposures that have not been hedged by a derivative instrument of otherwise are given below:

26. Previous year’s figures have been recast/ restated where necessary.

27. Figures in Italics are in respect of the previous year.

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GAPs in GAAP Monetary v. Non-monetary Items

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Issue raised in GAPS in GAAP — July 2007 Under revised AS-11 The Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates, the accounting treatment for monetary items and non-monetary items is different. Monetary items are revalued at each reporting date and the gain or loss is recognised in the income statement. Non-monetary items are reported at the exchange rate at the date of the transaction. They are not revalued at each reporting date and hence there is no exchange gain/loss. Thus the classification of an item as monetary or non-monetary is critical.

Monetary items have been defined as ‘are money held and assets and liabilities to be received or paid in fixed or determinable amounts of money’. Nonmonetary items are defined as ‘assets and liabilities other than monetary items.’ Paragraph 12 of the standard briefly elaborates what monetary and nonmonetary items are, as follows: “Cash, receivables and payables are examples of monetary items. Fixed assets, inventories, and investments in equity shares are examples of non-monetary items.”

The Expert Advisory Committee (EAC) of the ICAI has opined on the issue of monetary and non-monetary items (EAO-VOL-19-1.13). This opinion was given in the context of the pre-revised AS-11, but is relevant under revised AS-11 as well. The issue was whether foreign exchange advances received (and converted into Indian rupees) for export of a fixed quantity of goods, which are adjusted against future supplies, are monetary or non-monetary items.

The EAC noted the definition of ‘monetary items’ as ‘money held and assets and liabilities to be received or paid in fixed or determinable amounts of money’. The EAC was of the view that the words ‘received or paid’ do not necessarily envisage receipt or payment in cash. What is of essence in the definition of monetary items is that the value of the asset or liability should be fixed or determinable in monetary terms. In the present case, the EAC felt that the liability of the company in respect of the advance taken from the foreign customer is fixed in monetary terms, though it will be discharged through exports rather than through payment in cash. As such, the EAC was of the view that the advance received from the foreign customer is a monetary liability. Consequently monetary items denominated in a foreign currency should be revalued at each reporting date and exchange gain/ loss is recognised in the income statement.

Under IAS-21 The Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates, monetary items are defined as ‘Monetary items are units of currency held and assets and liabilities to be received or paid in a fixed or determinable number of units of currency.’ Paragraph 16, of IAS-21 provides further elaboration as follows.

Monetary items Paragraph 16 “The essential feature of a monetary item is a right to receive (or an obligation to deliver) a fixed or determinable number of units of currency. Examples include: pensions and other employee benefits to be paid in cash; provisions that are to be settled in cash; and cash dividends that are recognised as a liability. Similarly, a contract to receive (or deliver) a variable number of the entity’s own equity instruments or a variable amount of assets in which the fair value to be received (or delivered) equals a fixed or determinable number of units of currency is a monetary item. Conversely, the essential feature of a non-monetary item is the absence of a right to receive (or an obligation to deliver) a fixed or determinable number of units of currency. Examples include: amounts prepaid for goods and services (e.g. prepaid rent); goodwill; intangible assets; inventories; property, plant and equipment; and provisions that are to be settled by the delivery of a non-monetary asset.”

Therefore as can be seen from the above, though the definition of monetary items and non-monetary items is the same under IAS-21 and AS-11, they have been interpreted differently. The interpretation in paragraph 16 of IAS 21 and that contained in the EAC opinion take the exact opposite position. If one were to apply paragraph 16 above, one would conclude that advance received for future export of goods, is a non-monetary item. However, based on EAC opinion, this would be a monetary item.

Given that Indian GAAP is attempting to converge with IFRS, such interpretation differences would create unnecessary GAAP differences. In the given instance, intuitively, it appears that the right answer is not to revalue the advances received, which has been fully converted into Indian rupees. The advance has been received for future supply of fixed quantities of goods; has been fully converted into Indian rupees, and hence revaluing them at each reporting date and recognising exchange gain/loss is inappropriate. Such exchange gain/loss is merely a book entry that is reversed in the future (as sales in this example). If the recommendation of EAC were to be followed in this instance, it would give rise to a theoretical gain or loss in one period and an opposite effect when the transaction is concluded. This would substantially distort the profit and loss account between two periods.

A similar issue was raised (Query 37, Vol. XXVIII) much later with regards to treatment of advance paid in foreign currency for acquisition of fixed assets. This time the opinion of the EAC is in line with the interpretation in IAS-21. The Committee opined “the words received or paid in the definition of the term monetary items do not necessarily envisage receipt or payment in cash. What is of essence is that the value of the asset or liability should be fixed or determinable in monetary items. Accordingly, where the advance is related to a fixed price contract for the receipt of a specified quantity of goods, it will be a non-monetary asset, since it represents a claim to receive a specified quantity of goods and not a right to receive money.”

The change in the point of view by the EAC in this case, is a step in the right direction and will align the interpretation on this issue with global practice.

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