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Outotec GmbH vs. DDIT [2015] 58 taxmann.com 232 (Kolkata – Trib.) A.Ys.: 2010-11, 2011-12, Dated: June 16, 2015

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Article 5, 7, 12 India-Germany DTAA – when the title in an equipment is transferred outside India, the sale of equipment cannot be taxed in India merely because tests for the installation of equipment are carried out in India.

Facts:
The taxpayer was a German Company, engaged in the business of providing specialised solutions to customers in metals and minerals processing industry. During the relevant tax year, the taxpayer supplied equipment to several Indian companies. The equipment supplied by the taxpayer was to be a part of the overall plant to be installed by customers. Additionally, in relation to certain projects undertaken in India, the taxpayer constituted a supervisory permanent establishment (PE), unrelated to the supply contract. The equipment was designed outside India and was sourced by the taxpayer from vendors outside India. The taxpayer was not involved in the manufacturing of equipment.

The equipment was sold, and title ownership to the customers was transferred, outside India. In case of non- fulfilment of the performance guarantee, customer was entitled only to liquidated damages.

The taxpayer also sold basic engineering designs and drawings for installation of the equipment/plant.

The tax authority contended that since portion of purchase price was payable only upon successful completion of acceptance tests in India, part of the sale price was taxable in India. It further regarded payment towards basic engineering designs as royalty for use rejecting the contention of the taxpayer that it was a sale of copyrighted article.

Held:

  • Since all the activities relating to designing, fabrication and manufacturing as also sale of equipment took place outside India and since title/ownership in the equipment stood also transferred outside India; such offshore transaction was not taxable in India.
  • The acceptance tests are part of normal commercial arrangements and partake the character of trade warranties. The balance payment of contract price, to be received by the taxpayer upon completion of such tests is a deferred payment in the nature of warranty and cannot be equated with transfer of goods in India.
  • Breach of warranty could result in payment of damages and does not by itself mean that the property/title in the goods did not pass to buyer outside India. The clause of acceptance tests and liquidated damages were also in the nature of warranty provision.
  • The basic engineering packages sold by the taxpayer are largely designed on the basis of standard technologies available with it and modified based on customer’s requirement.
  • Since Indian customers were not using designs and drawings for any commercial exploitation, it involved use of copyrighted article rather than use of a copyright to be regarded as royalty.
  • In absence of any connection between the supervisory PE of the taxpayer in India and the offshore supply activity, the consideration for offshore supply cannot be regarded as attributable to the PE in India.
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Kreuz Subsea Pte. Ltd. vs. DDIT [2015] 58 taxmann.com 371 (Mumbai – Trib.) A.Ys.: 2010-11, Dated: June 12, 2015

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Article 5(3), (6), India-Singapore DTAA –purely installation and construction activity undertaken by Singapore company in respect of certain projects in India, would be covered under Article 5(3) and not 5(6).

Facts:
The taxpayer was tax resident of Singapore. It had undertaken installation and construction activity in respect of certain projects. The DRP held that the presence of taxpayer in India in excess of 90 days constituted PE in India under Article 5(6) of India-Singapore DTAA .

According to the taxpayer, it was purely into installation and construction activity, which would clearly fall within Article 5(3) of treaty. Consequently, its activities would not constitute PE due to its presence in India for less than 183 days under Article 5(3) of DTAA .

Held:

  • Article 5(3) is a specific provision dealing with ‘Service PE’, on account of construction, installation or assembly project. Under this Article, service PE would be constituted if project continues for a period of more than 183 days in any fiscal year.
  • Article 5(6) provides that, if an enterprise is “furnishing services” in the contracting State through its employees for a period of 90 days or more, then it is deemed to have Service PE.
  • The threshold period under Article 5(6) is 90 days. If such activities are carried out for a related enterprise, then threshold period is 30 days. Article 5(6) explicitly provides that it applies to “services” other than those covered by Articles 5(4) and 5(5). However, it is silent as regards its relationship with Article 5(3). Thus, Article 5(6) covers various services which are not covered by paras 4 and 5 of article 5 and technical services as defined in Article 12.
  • In contradistinction, Article 5(3) is a specific provision. Therefore, such specific activities cannot be read into Article 5(6). There cannot be overlapping of activities carried out within the ambit of Article 5(3) and furnishing of services as stated in Article 5(6).
  • Both the Articles should be read independent of each other, or else there would be no requirement of making separate provisions. If the activities related to construction or installation are specifically covered under Article 5(3), then one need not to go to Article 5(6). Hence, purely installation services should be covered under Article 5(3) only and not under Article 5(6).
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ITO vs. Nokia India (P.) Ltd. [2015] 59 taxmann.com 120 (Delhi – Trib.) A.Ys.: 2006-07, Dated: July 8, 2015

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Article 5, 7, 13 of India-Finland DTAA – payments made to a Finland company for services performed outside India were not taxable in India as the services did not ‘make available’ any technical knowledge, skill, etc.

Facts:
The taxpayer was an Indian company (“ICo”). ICo was a member-company of a Finland based company (“FinCo”). ICo was setting up a plant in India. To ensure that the plant complied with global manufacturing facility standards of FinCo, ICo engaged another Finland company to review plans prepared by Indian consultants in respect of HVAC, electrical and fire protection systems. The services were to be performed only outside India. However, employees of Finland company intermittently visited India only for attending meetings with the taxpayer. According to the taxpayer, the payments were not taxable under India- Finland DTAA . Hence, it did not deduct tax from the same.

Held:

  • The scope of services of Finland company was review of systems description, diagrams, cost estimates, building designs, preliminary system design and quality control, equipment list/selection criteria , layout proposals, conducting inspections etc; and meetings in India and Finland, in connection therewith.
  • These services were not for imparting any technical knowledge or experience that could be used by the taxpayer independently in its business and without recourse to Finland company. Thus, they did not ‘make available’ any technical knowledge, skill or experience nor did they consist of development and transfer of a technical plan or technical design to the taxpayer. Accordingly, the payments did not qualify as FTS under India-Finland DTAA .
  • Further, as per India-Finland DTAA , if the services do not qualify as FTS, the taxability should be examined as per Article 7 (read with Article 5) of the India-Finland DTAA .
  • In terms of Article 7(1), ‘Business Profits’ earned by a Finland company is taxable in India only if it carries on business in India through a PE in India. If a Finland company does not have a PE in India, no portion of the income from services provided to a customer in India are taxable in India.
  • In the instant case, Finland comapny did not have any office/place of business in India; the services were performed primarily from outside India; and its employees made intermittent visits to India only for the purpose of attending meetings with the taxpayer. Accordingly, it did not have a PE in India.
  • Therefore, payments received by Finland company were not taxable in India in terms of India-Finland DTAA .
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Lloyd’s Register Asia (India Branch Office) vs. ACIT [2015] 58 taxmann.com 58 (Mumbai – Trib.) A.Ys.: 2005-06, Dated: June 10, 2015

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S/s. 44C, the Act – the scope of head office expenses u/s 44C does not include “license fees” or the “management charges”

Facts:
The taxpayer was an Indian branch of a UK Company (“UKCo”). The holding company of UKCo was engaged in the business of survey and inspection of ships, industrial inspection activity and drawing appraisal. In 2003, holding company entered into a license agreement with all its subsidiaries and granted license to use its brand in consideration of payment of royalty and the license fees. Further, it entered into a separate “Management Services Agreement” for providing certain services.

According to the tax authority, license fees and management charges were in nature of head office expenses u/s. 44C of the Act. However, as per the taxpayer, these payments were merely routed through head office but were not really head office expenses as the said section is only applicable to general and administration expenditure as referred to in Explanation (iv) to section 44C-that too in the nature of executive and general administration expenditure enumerated in clause (a) to (d).

Held:
The payment of ‘license fee’ is purely for using of brand/ trademark and other business intangibles, which are in the nature of intellectual property.

These are neither in the nature of rent, rates, taxes, repairs, insurance, salary, wages, bonus, commission, etc., or travelling by any employee. Thus, the entire payment of license fees do not fall within the ambit of section 44C as illustrated in clauses (a) to (c) of the Explanation.

Clause (d) of the Explanation mentions “such other matters connected with executive and general administration as may be prescribed”. CBDT has not yet prescribed any such expenditure. “Management charges” are specialised services under various heads. None of these services are in the nature of head office expenditure as illustrated in sub clause (a) to (d).

As neither the “license fees” nor the “management charges” falls within the ambit and purview of section 44C, no adjustment to the total income for the purpose of disallowance was required.

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Issues in Claiming Foreign Tax Credit in India

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Getting credit in respect of tax deducted or paid in a Source Country
(Foreign Tax Credit) is one of the significant objectives of any tax
treaty as it relieves incidence of double taxation. Normally, tax credit
is given by the State of Residence which enjoys the comprehensive right
of taxation. Such credit is given in respect of taxes paid by the tax
payer in the State of Source. However, several issues arise while
claiming tax credits in the State of Residence as to timing difference,
evidence of payment, rate of conversion of foreign currency etc. This
article besides discussing some basic concepts of Tax Credits focuses on
such issues relating to claiming foreign tax credits in India.

1. Background on BEPS

Two
methods of granting foreign tax credits are in vogue, namely, (i) Full
Credit and (ii) Ordinary Credit. Indian tax treaties generally follow
the Ordinary Credit Method. Similarly, section 91 of the Income-tax Act,
1961 (“Act”) also prescribes ordinary tax credit method. Two methods of
tax credit are explained in brief herein below:

(i) Full Credit Method

Under
this method, total tax paid in the country of source is allowed as
credit against the tax payable in the country of residence.

(ii) Ordinary Credit Method

Taxes
paid in the country of source are allowed as credit by the country of
residence only to the extent of the incremental tax liability due to
inclusion of such income. If taxes paid in country of source are higher,
the tax payer would not get the refund of such taxes. However, if the
taxes paid in the country of source are lower than the incremental tax
liability in the country of residence then the tax payer need to pay the
balance amount of taxes.

Example:
A Ltd (Indian company)
has the following income:- Income from India – Rs. 200,000/- [Tax rate –
30%] Income from foreign country – Rs. 50,000/- [Tax rate – 40%]

Total Income Taxable (India) – Rs. 2,50,000/-

Besides
the above two methods, Indian tax treaties provide two more types of
tax credit methods, namely, (i) Tax Sparing and (ii) Underlying Tax
Credit. The same are explained as follows:

(i) Tax Sparing

State of residence allows credit for deemed tax paid on income which is otherwise exempt from tax in the state of source.

(ii) Underlying Tax Credit

This
is a method which helps in eliminating economic double taxation
(example: – Dividend income). Under this method, the country of
residence grants credit not only for taxes paid which are withheld from
dividend income but also for the taxes paid on the profits out of which
such dividend has been paid. The examples of Indian tax treaties which
allow underlying tax credit are: Australia, Mauritius, Singapore, USA
and UK. Now let us discuss some practical issues that may arise in
claiming foreign tax credit in India. For the sake of simplicity and
understanding, let us examine issues of claiming foreign tax credit
faced in various situations by an Indian Resident, namely, Mr. Darshan
Dholakia (an imaginary name for understanding various illustrations).

2. Timing issues on account of different tax years

2.1 It is a known fact that different countries follow different tax years and rules for
(i) Levy
(ii) Computation and
(iii) Collection of Tax

Therefore,
it becomes a challenging task for the taxpayer to claim the credit of
foreign taxes paid in his country of residence at the time of
discharging his tax liability in a cross border transaction where the
incidence of tax is in two States i.e. Country of Source and Country of
Residence.

2.1.1 Illustrations

a. India follows Financial Year (FY) from 1st April – 31st March as the tax year;
b. USA follows Calendar Year (i.e. 1st January – 31st December) as the tax year;

2.1. 2 Income from Salaries

Let
us consider a situation where Mr. Darshan Dholakia, an Indian resident
goes to US for employment on 31st December 2014. This is his first visit
abroad in his lifetime. Therefore, for the FY 2014-15 he remains
Resident and Ordinary Resident in India. He is required to pay taxes in
India on his worldwide income for the FY 2014-15 i.e. including his
salaries in US for the period from 1st January 2015 to 31st March 2015.
In US he would be taxed on a Calendar Year basis, i.e. CY 2015. Under
the circumstances, how does he compute his tax liability in India and US
and claim credit in India in respect of taxes paid in US, especially
for the overlapping period (from 1st January 2015 to 31st March 2015)
which falls in two different tax years in two jurisdictions?

2.1.3
In the above illustration, Mr. Darshan needs to include his income from
US for the period from 1st January 2015 to 31st March 2015 in his
Indian tax return for the FY 2014-15. He can claim the credit of
proportionate taxes paid to US Govt. (by way of deduction or otherwise)
on such income by producing necessary evidences to this effect.

2.1.4
At a later date, if there is any voluntary upward / downward revision
in computation of the taxable income of Mr. Darshan in US, then he shall
revise his Income-tax return in India u/s. 139(5). His claim for credit
of US taxes shall alter accordingly.

Further, if the assessment
of his income in India has been completed, then Mr. Darshan may not be
able to file the revised return of income in India and in such cases, he
shall inform the Income-tax department in writing and the AO shall
modify his tax liability.

2.1.5 Business Income

What
if Mr. Darshan is earning business income from his proprietary concern
in US which is taxable in India as he is a Resident and Ordinary
Resident of India? In such a situation how his US income which is
ascertained on a Calendar Year basis, will be considered for tax in
India where income is assessed based on the Financial Year?

a.
Whether Mr. Darshan needs to compute profits of his US business for the
period from January 2015 to March 2015 while filing his return for the
FY 2014-15? OR

b. Can he include US profits for the CY 2015 in FY 2015 -16?

In
situation (a) above, it is assumed that profits of the business accrue
on a day to day basis and therefore there is a need to compute US
Profits separately for the overlapping period. Even if it is assumed
that profits of the business accrue only at the year end, upon drawing
of profit and loss account, one is confronted with provisions of section
44AB which requires one to get one’s accounts audited if the turnover
or gross receipts from all businesses put together exceeds Rs. one crore
in a previous year. The Previous year is defined u/s. 3 of the Act as
the Financial Year i.e. from April to March. So applying this
interpretation Mr. Darshan has no choice but to maintain accounts of his
US business from April to March for the purpose of complying with
Indian tax regulations.

In the above scenario, many practical
difficulties could arise as to claiming of tax credit. It may so happen
that tax may be paid for the US business post 31st March 2015. If it is
so, how can Mr. Darshan claim credit as the provisions of India-US DTAA
provides for credit of “taxes paid” and not “payable”. Even assuming
taxes are paid whether Mr. Darshan needs to apportion the same based on
profits ascertained for the period from 15th January to 15th March? What
if he has incurred losses in the period from 15th April to 15th
December? There are no clear answers to these issues. Therefore, one may
consider following alternative interpretation (which covers situation
(b) above).

In the above scenario, many practical difficulties could arise as to claiming of tax credit. It may so happen that tax may be paid for the US business post 31st March 2015. If it is so, how can Mr. Darshan claim credit as the provisions of India-US DTAA provides for credit of “taxes paid” and not “payable”. Even assuming taxes are paid whether Mr. Darshan needs to apportion the same based on profits ascertained for the period from 15th January to 15th March? What if he has incurred losses in the period from 15th April to 15th December? There are no clear answers to these issues. Therefore, one may consider following alternative interpretation (which covers situation (b) above).

Profits or losses are determined only at the year-end or when accounts are made up as per statutory requirements. There is no doubt that profit or loss is embedded in every transaction, but its actual determination is done only when accounts are drawn up for a particular period as business exigencies depends on so many factors, such as season, demand and supply etc. and these factors are best captured over a period of time. This view has been supported by the Apex Court in case of Ashokbhai Chimanbhai [(1965) AIR 1343] wherein it was held as follows:

“In the gross receipts of a business day after day or from transaction to transaction lie embedded or dormant profit or loss. On such dormant profits or loss, undoubtedly, taxable profits, if any, of the business will be computed. But dormant profits cannot be equated with accrued profits charged to tax u/s. 3 and 4 of the Income-tax Act, 1922. The concept of accrual of profits of a business involves the determination by the method of accounting at the end of the accounting year or any shorter period determined by law; and unless a right to the profits comes into existence, there is no accrual of profits.”

One more principle propounded by the above ruling is “right to receive” profits, which gets crystallised only on determination of profits or losses in accordance with provisions of law. All though the above ruling is in the context of 1922 Act, principles laid down can be applied to the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961 as well.

Applying the above ruling Mr. Darshan may offer in India the profits/losses earned in US business for the CY 2015 along with profits/losses of FY 2015-16 as the CY 2015 falls within FY 2015-16. This has to be done on a consistent basis. Similarly, he has to club the turnover of the US Business for CY 2015 with the turnover of Indian Business for 2015-16. Here he can argue that for the purpose section 44AB the previous year for the US Business is Calendar Year and therefore, he has considered the turnover of CY 2015 for the AY 2016-17.

It is pertinent to note that the above discussion would also be applicable in case of an Indian enterprise having a branch office in USA.

3.    Tax credit in case of deductions under special provisions

Consider a situation where Mr. Darshan Dholakia, an Indian Tax Resident, has earned foreign sourced income which in India is entitled to deductions say 50% or enjoying tax holidays on account of some provisions of the Act, (for example Exemptions u/s. 10AA to a Unit in SEZs from Exports Profits). A question may arise in relation to the admissibility of foreign taxes paid outside India on the whole of such income as credit against the income-tax liability in India?

In such cases, it has been held by the undernoted Courts that proportionate credit must be granted:-

a. The Rajasthan High Court [1994] 209 ITR 394 (RAJ.) at the time of reversing the decision of the Tribunal in the case of Dr. K. L. Parikh vs. ITO, 1982 (14 TTJ 117), held that the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the assessee was entitled to credit for the entire amount of tax deducted at source in Iran u/s. 91(1) of the Act and not in proportion to the income included in the total income of the assessee after considering the provisions of section 80RRA of the Act and relief was granted proportionately up to 50% of FTC.

b.    A similar view was upheld by the Andhra Pradesh

High Court in the case of CIT vs.. M.A. Mois (1994) 210 ITR 284.

4.    Exchange rate implications while determining income and the tax liability thereon

4.1  Rule 115 of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 provides that “The rate of exchange for the calculation of the value in rupees of any income accruing or arising or deemed to accrue or arise to the assessee in foreign currency or received or deemed to be received by him or on his behalf in foreign currency shall be the telegraphic transfer buying rate of such currency as on the specified date.”

4.2 Clause 2 of Explanation to Rule 115(1) provides that specified date means-

a. In respect of
salaries

Last day of the month immediately

 

preceding
the month in which

 

the
salary is due, or is paid in

 

advance or in arrears

b. Interest on securities

Last day of the month immediately

 

preceding
the month in which the

 

income is due

c. House  property, 
business

Last day of the previous year

income, other sources
other

 

income by way of
dividends

 

and income on
securities

 

d. Income  from  business 
in

Last day of the month immediately

relation to shipping
business

preceding the month in which

 

such
income is deemed to accrue

 

or arise in India

e. Dividends

Last day of the month immediately

 

preceding
the month in which

 

dividend
is declared, distributed or

 

paid by company

f.  Capital gains

Last day of the month immediately

 

preceding
the month in which the

 

capital asset is transferred

Since the foreign income is to be converted into INR for the purpose of computation, it appears to be a fair proposition that the conversion rate provided on the specified date under rule 115 shall also apply to convert the tax paid in foreign country into its rupee equivalent for the purpose of computing the available foreign tax credit. However, some tax treaties provide for foreign tax credit only on payment basis. In such cases, credit may be availed only on payment of taxes, but the taxes paid in foreign currency should be converted at the same rate at which the underlying income is converted in Indian Rupees. This is necessary for avoiding any artificial tax benefit (or tax loss) on account of currency conversion.

5    Computation of relief where there is income from more than one foreign country (Income from one Country and loss in the other Country)

Under provisions of the Act, tax is levied on a resident on his global income and therefore, income from all sources whether in India or outside shall be taxable in India subject to DTAA provisions which may/may not tax the income in the country of source.

5.2 In a case where Mr. Darshan Dholakia is carrying on business in more than one country and he has suffered loss from a business outside India say in UK and has profit in Hong Kong, a question may arise as to how shall the relief be granted in order to discharge his tax liability in India.

5.3 In the context of section 91 of the Act (which deals with Unilateral Tax relief where India has no tax treaty), in the case of Bombay Burmah Trading – 259 ITR 423, the Bombay High Court has held as under:

“If one analyses S. 91(1) with the Explanation, it is clear that the scheme of the said section deals with granting of relief calculated on the income country wise and not on the basis of aggregation or amalgamation of income from all foreign countries. Basically u/s. 91(1), the expression ‘such doubly taxed income’ indicates that the phrase has reference to the tax which the foreign income bears when it is again subjected to tax by its inclusion in the computation of income under the Income-tax Act. Further S. 91(1) shows that in the case of double income-tax relief to the resident, the relief is allowed at the Indian rate of tax or at the rate of tax of the other country whichever is less. Therefore, the relief u/s.91 (1) is by way of reduction of tax by deducting the tax paid abroad on such doubly taxed income from tax payable in India. Under the circumstances, the scheme is clear. The relief can be worked out only if it is implemented country wise. If incomes from foreign countries were to be aggregated, it would be impossible to compare the rate of tax of the foreign country with the rate under the Indian Income-tax Act.”

5.4 Similarly, in cases where DTAA exists between India and the country of source, the said DTAAs being bilateral in nature, one may infer that tax relief shall be computed country wise and not after aggregating the foreign sourced income.
Thus, in the given example, Mr. Darshan will be able to claim relief of taxes paid in Hong Kong u/s. 91 of the Act, whereas the loss from UK will be available for set-off in India, provided his income from UK is otherwise taxable in India. In any case for his income/ loss from UK, provisions of the India-UK DTAA shall apply.

6    Claiming credit for tax paid in a country outside India with whom DTAA exists but the type of taxes paid are not covered

6.1 In this context, we have a direct decision in the case of TATA Sons Ltd. – 43 SOT 27, wherein, the assessee had paid State Income Taxes in USA and Canada. However, the India-USA and India-Canada DTAA covers only the Federal taxes paid and the assessee had sought to claim relief u/s. 91 of the Act in respect of the State Income taxes paid outside India.

6.1 The issue before the Tribunal was whether the assessee would be eligible for claiming credit u/s. 91 in light of provisions of section 90(2) of the Act?

6.2 It was held by the Hon. Tribunal that “State Income Taxes cannot be allowed as a deduction and also cannot be taken into account for giving credit is absurd and results in a contradiction. A tax payment which is not treated as admissible expenditure on the ground that it is payment of Income-tax has to be treated as eligible for tax credit. While section 91 of Act allows credit for Federal and State taxes, the DTAA allows credit only for Federal taxes. The result is that section 91 is more beneficial to the assessee and by virtue of section 90(2) of Act, provisions of section 91 must prevail over the DTAA even though this is a case where India has entered into a DTAA. Accordingly, even an assessee covered by the scope of the DTAA will be eligible for credit of State taxes u/s. 91 of Act despite the DTAA not providing for the same.”

6.3 It may be noted that the above case refers to the payment of State Income tax in the US and Canada. Assessee first claimed these taxes as expenditure u/s. 37(1) of the Act on the ground that the respective DTAA covers only Federal (Central) Taxes. This claim of the Assessee was rejected by the Tribunal vide its order dated 24th November 2010. However, the Assessee sought further clarifications and in a fresh order dated 23rd February 2011, the Hon. Tribunal held that the Assessee was eligible to claim credit for State Income tax paid in US and Canada u/s. 91 of the Act read with section 90(2), notwithstanding existence of DTAA with both these countries.


7    Claim for refund of tax in a case where more tax is paid in a foreign country compared to the tax payable in India on the same income

7.1 The answer to the above issue can be better explained with the help of an example.

A Ltd. (Domestic Company) – Foreign taxes paid:- INR 150/– Income-tax payable:- INR 100/– Credit allowed:- INR 100/-

–    Excess credit:- INR 50/- (150-100)

7.2 A question may arise as to whether the tax payer is eligible for a refund (if available) or he would be allowed to claim the excess tax paid as credit which may be carried forward and may be set off against the liability of the subsequent year?

No refund is allowed in respect of excess foreign taxes paid to any tax payer in India for the obvious reason that such tax is paid to the foreign government. In absence of any rules or provision allowing carry forward of unavailed/excess tax credit, the same cannot be carry forward to the next year. However, some countries do allow carry forward of excess tax credits. Canada, Japan, Singapore, UK and USA do allow carry forward of excess foreign tax credit for the period ranging from three years to an indefinite time period.

8    How shall tax relief be computed and granted in the case of a person being

i.    A Company whose tax liability is determined under the Minimum Alternate Tax (MAT) provisions?

ii.    A person other than a company whose tax liability is determined under the Alternate Minimum Tax (AMT) provisions?
Under the provisions of the Act, a company is subjected to tax either as per normal provisions of the Act or MAT whichever is higher. Similarly tax payers other than the company, are taxed as per normal provisions of the Act or AMT whichever is higher.

8.2 Therefore a question arises whether a tax payer who is subjected to tax in India either under MAT or AMT would be eligible to claim credit of foreign taxes paid on the same income?

8.3  Bombay High Court in the case of Bombay

Burmah Trading Corporation Limited (2003) 259 ITR 423 held that “basically u/s. 91(1), the expression ‘such doubly taxed income’ indicates that the phrase has reference to the tax which foreign income bears when it is again subjected to tax by its inclusion in the computation of income under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1961”.

8.4 In the light of the above decision, it would appear that wherever MAT or AMT is applicable to foreign income, it would amount to double taxation and the tax payer would be eligible to claim applicable tax credits in respect of foreign taxes paid abroad on the same income.

9    Can the taxes (based on turnover) paid to foreign government be allowed as deduction computing the total income of the assessee?

In this matter, there is a direct decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of K.E.C International Ltd (2000) 256 ITR 354 wherein the tax payer paid turnover tax in Thailand. Income-tax ideally should mean a tax which is levied on income, something which is directly linked to income of the tax payers and not indirect taxes such as Service tax, VAT or Sales Tax or Turnover Tax etc. Since the tax paid was indirect in nature and not Income-tax, it was held to be allowable as a business deduction. The Court held that in such a case, provisions of section 40(a)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked for disallowance.

10    What if there is additional tax required to be paid on assessment in Foreign Countries? Will the same automatically increase income in India?

If the tax payer challenges various additions to his returned income in the foreign country at some higher forum, then there will not be any tax implications in India. However, if the tax payer does not challenge the additions made in the foreign country, then he is under obligation to revise his return of income in India. If the return is time barred, then necessary recourse provided under the Act will be applicable.

11    Difference in Characterisation of Income

It may be possible that business profits are offered for tax as fees for technical services (FTS) in India (say Country of Source) whereas, the Country of Residence (say, Singapore) thinks that the tax is wrongly paid as FTS and in absence of PE there was no tax liability in India. In such a scenario, Singapore may deny the tax credit and the tax payer may have to resort to Mutual Agreement Procedure.

12    Conclusion

Section 91 of the Act provides for unilateral tax relief. India has signed more than 80 comprehensive Double Tax Avoidance Agreements which also provide for tax credits. By and large Indian tax treaties provide for Ordinary Tax Credits. Prominent issues in claiming foreign tax credits are timing difference, evidences of payment and the rate of exchange for conversion of income and taxes in Indian currency.

Tax payers must remember that any income received from a foreign jurisdiction has to be computed under the Indian tax laws, by applying provisions of the Act. Rules of computation may differ in two different jurisdictions. Therefore, the credit of foreign taxes paid is always restricted to the additional tax liability in India on account of inclusion of foreign income.

The Finance Act, 2015 has amended section 295 and inserted clause (ha) to empower the CBDT to make Rules for the procedure for the granting of relief or deductions of foreign taxes against the income-tax payable in India. Many issues may get resolved once these Rules are notified by the CBDT.

Bombay High Court judgment in the case of Tata Sons Ltd., Writ Petition No. 2818 of 2012 decided on 20.1.2015

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Trade Circular 11T of 2015 dated 13.7.2015

In this Circular, the Sales Tax Commissioner has explained the judgement in case of Tata Sons Ltd., that VAT can be levied on transfer of right to use goods of intangible nature i.e. trade mark, technical knowhow ,copy right and other intangible goods even if transferred to multiple users.

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Online Grant of Registration under the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act , 2002 and Central Sales Tax Act, 1956

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Trade Circular 10T of 2015 dated 7.7.2015

For online application under MVAT or CST Act, if officer finds all the documents are complete & correct TIN number will be allotted within a day of allocation of application.

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Providing E Payment facility for the Maharashtra Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas Act, 2002

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Trade Circular 9T of 2015 dated 1.7.2015

With effect from 1.7.2015 payment under the Maharashtra Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Area Act, 2002 can be made optionally electronically through GRAS. The detailed procedure has been explained in this Circular.

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M/s. Jinsasan Distributors vs. Commercial Tax Officer (CT), [2013] 59 VST 256(Mad)

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VA T-Input Tax Credit – Allowed in Assessment – Subsequent Cancellation of Registration Certificate of Selling Dealer – Can Not Affect Right of Purchasing Dealer – ITC cannot be Reversed, Section 19 of The Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax Act, 2006.

FACTS
The petitioners had claimed input tax credit of tax paid on purchase of goods from registered dealer u/s. 19 of The TNVAT Act. Subsequently, department took action against the selling dealers, who sold the goods to the petitioners for one or other reason and cancelled registration certificates of selling dealers from retrospective effect. Based on this, the VAT department issued notices in some cases calling upon petitioners to show cause as why input tax credit should not be reversed, in some cases passed revised assessment orders reversing input tax credit availed. All the affected petitioners filed writ petition before the Madras High Court challenging the notices, revised assessment orders and provisional assessment orders.

HELD
It was not is dispute that the registration certificates of the selling dealers were cancelled with retrospective effect and, therefore, to reverse the input tax credit on the plea that registration certificates have been cancelled with retrospective effect cannot be countenanced. Whatever benefits that accrued to the petitioners based on valid documents in the course of sale and purchase of goods, for which tax was paid cannot be declined. The transaction that took place when the registration certificates of selling dealers were in force cannot be denied to the petitioners on the above plea. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the writ petition filed by petitioners and all the notices revised assessment orders and the provisional assessment orders, in so far they sought to deny the benefit of the input tax credit on the above ground were set aside.

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Co-operative Society – Special Deduction – Matter remanded to the Commissioner to decide as to whether the society is entitled to deduction u/s. 80P(2)(a)(iii) and whether benefit earned under Sampath Incentive Scheme, 1997 was a capital receipt

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DCIT vs. Budhewal Co-operative Sugar Mills Ltd. [2015] 373 ITR 35 (SC)

For the assessment year 1993-94, the appellant , a co-operative sugar mill engaged in the business of manufacturing sugar and allied products from the sugarcane supplied to it by its member farmers (sugarcane growers), claimed deduction of Rs.16,75,462 under the provisions of section 80P(2)(d) of the Act. During the pendency of the appeal before the Tribunal, the following two additional grounds were sought to be taken under Rule 11 of the Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963:

“1. That the appellant was entitled to claim of deduction u/s. 80P(2)(a)(iii) of the Act being co-operative society engaged in marketing of agriculture produce of its members. Hence, its total income was not liable to be taxed.

2. That in the alternative, the appellant was entitled to be allowed claim for deduction amounting to Rs.1,74,64,478 representing benefit earned under the Sampath Incentive Scheme, 1997, being the capital receipt in contradistinction to revenue receipt as wrongly returned while computing the total income.”

The Hon’ble Tribunal, vide judgment dated 24th September, 2002, declined the request of the appellant to raise the abovementioned two additional grounds on the ground that the entire material was not before the subordinate authorities and detailed investigation of facts for want of facts would not be possible.

The High Court held that the appellant sugar-mill was engaged in the manufacturing of sugar products from the sugarcane supplied by members, who were admittedly sugarcane growers. Since the appellant sugar-mill was engaged in the marketing of agricultural produce of its members, therefore, it was entitled for the exemption as provided u/s. 80P(2)(a)(iii) of the Act.

The High Court drew support from its Full Bench judgment in the case of the Budhewal Co-operative Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. CIT [2009] 315 ITR 351 (P&H) [FB], wherein it was held that co-operative society engaged in the manufacturing and sale of sugar out of the sugarcane grown by its members is entitled for deduction u/s. 80P(2) (a)(iii) of the Act.

The High Court noted that the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of CIT vs. Ponni Sugars and Chemicals Ltd. [2008] 306 ITR 392 (SC) has held that keeping in mind the object behind the payment of the incentive subsidy, that the payment received by the assessee under the Scheme was not in the course of a trade but was of capital nature. According to the High Court in the present case also, the grant was not for the purpose of bringing into existence new assets but was for the purpose of making payment to the sugarcane growers, therefore, same should be treated as capital receipt.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Supreme Court remanded the matter to the file of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), in view of the order passed by it in Morinda Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. CIT [2013] 354 ITR 230 (SC).

The Supreme Court however clarified that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case and that the assessee was entitled to raise the contention before the Commissioner that in so far as the second issue was concerned, it was covered in its favour by the decision of the Supreme Court in CIT vs. Ponni Sugars and Chemicals Ltd. [2008] 306 ITR 392 (SC)].

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Appeal to the Supreme Court – No question of law arises from the finding of fact that the sale and lease back transactions was a sham

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Avasarala Technologies Ltd. vs. JCIT (2015) 373 ITR 34 (SC)

The assessee claimed depreciation on certain machinery allegedly purchased from Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board (APSEB), vide sale deed dated 29-9-1995, which, as per the assessee, was given to the APSEB itself on lease. All the authorities found, as a fact, that there was no such purchase of machinery and the transaction in question was sham. On that basis, it was concluded that since the machinery was not purchased by the assessee, it never became the owner of the machinery and therefore could not claim any depreciation thereof. The Supreme Court held that these were pure findings of facts recorded by the authorities below and did not give rise to any question of law.

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Appeal to the High Court – Circular No. 3 of 2011 (which stipulates monetary limit for appeals by Department) should not be applied ipso facto, particularly, when the matter has cascading effect.

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CIT vs. Century Park (2015) 373 ITR 32 (SC)

The High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue as not maintainable without going into merits since the net tax effect in respect of the subject matter of the appeal was less than Rs.10,00,000 in view of the Circular No.3 of 2011. On appeal by the Revenue, the Supreme Court [vide order dated 1st April, 2015] granted liberty to the Department to move the High Court to point out that the Circular dated 9th February, 2011, should not be applied ipso facto, particularly, when the matter has a cascading effect. The Supreme Court observed that there are cases under the Income-tax Act, 1961, in which common principle may be involved in subsequent group of matters or large number of matters. According to the Supreme Court, in such cases if the attention of the High Court is drawn, the High Court would not apply the Circular ipso facto.

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Depreciation – Once the assessee proves the ownership of the assets and its use for the business purpose, he is entitled to depreciation u/s. 32

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K. M. Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. CIT (2015) 373 ITR 42 (SC)

The appellant-assessee had set up its unit some time in September, 1985 to carry on the business of manufacturing and compressing oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen amonis, carbonic acid, action (including dissolved) argon, cooking gas and other types of industrial gases or kind substances etc. For running the aforesaid plant, the assessee had also bought 1,250 gas cylinders. However, since the unit had not started functioning, these gas cylinders were leased out to M/s. Saraveshwari Gases (P) Limited, Ghaziabad and M/s. Malik Industries. In the return filed by the assessee, he claimed depreciation on those gas cylinders at the rate of 100 %, as provided under the rules on the aforesaid item.

The Assessing Officer, however, rejected the claim of depreciation on the ground that hiring business was not proved. The appeal filed by the assessee before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) was accepted on the ground that the income received from leasing the aforesaid equipments would be treated as business income and on that basis he allowed the depreciation.

The aforesaid order of the CIT(Appeals) was set aside by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, and the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was upheld by the High Court. The High Court has concurred with the opinion of the Tribunal on the ground that the cylinders were not purchased for leasing business and one of the parties to whom the cylinders were leased out is the manufacturer and seller of the cylinders. It was further stated that the cylinders were dispatched to the other party only a day before the closing of the accounting period.

On an appeal by the Appellant-assessee, the Supreme Court held that the aforesaid reasons given by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and the High Court in denying the depreciation did not appear to be valid reasons in law. Insofar as the purchase of gas cylinders by the assessee was concerned, this fact was not disputed. It was also not disputed that these gas cylinders were purchased for business purpose. In fact, the plea of the assessee that the manufacturing unit had not started functioning and this had necessitated the assessee to lease out these gas cylinders to the aforesaid two parties to enable it to earn some income, rather than keeping those cylinders idle, was also not in dispute. On the contrary, the income which was generated from leasing out those gas cylinders was treated as “business income”. Once the income from leasing those gas cylinders was accepted as the “business income”, which was taxed at the hands of the assessee as such, there was no reason how the depreciation on these gas cylinders could have been disallowed on the ground that the cylinders were not purchased for “leasing business”.

According to the Supreme Court, the aforesaid facts clearly demonstrated that the assessee had proved ownership of these gas cylinders and use of these gas cylinders for business purpose. Once these ingredients were proved, the assessee was entitled to depreciation u/s. 32 of the Income-tax Act. The Supreme Court, therefore, set aside the judgment of the High Court, and held that the assessee was entitled to depreciation as claimed for the assessment year in question.

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Order for Levy of Fees u/s. 234E and Intimation u/s. 200A

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Issue for Consideration
A person deducting tax at source is
required, u/s. 200(3), to prepare and furnish a statement in the
prescribed form (Form No.s 24 Q, 26B, 26Q,27A and 27Q) with
DGIT(Systems) or NSDL in accordance with Rule 31A within the prescribed
time. Likewise, section 206 C requires a person responsible for
collection of tax at source to prepare and furnish a statement in Form
27C in accordance with Rule 37C within the prescribed time.

Section
234E of the Income tax Act, with effect from 1st January, 2012, makes
an assessee liable to pay, by way of fee, a sum of Rs. 200 for every day
of default in filing a statement within the time prescribed in section
200(3) or section 206C(3). However, the fee shall not exceed the amount
of tax deductible or collectible. The amount of fee payable is required
to be paid before filing the statements. The constitutionality of that
levy of fees has been upheld by various high courts. A delay in
furnishing the statement is thus made liable to a fee u/s. 234E.

Section
200A inserted by the Finance (No.2) Act, 2009, w.e.f. 01.04.2010,
provides for the processing of a statement of TDS, furnished u/s 200(3),
to enable the processor to ascertain the correctness of TDS and in
doing so carry out permissible adjustments and levy interest for delay
in payment of the deducted tax. The processor is also required to
prepare and generate an intimation of the sum payable or refundable to
the deductor, and send the same to him. These provisions of the
processing and issue of intimation are modified w.e.f. 01.06.2015 to
provide for the computation of the fee payable u/s. 234E while issuing
an intimation. Simultaneously, section 206 CB is inserted by the Finance
Act, 2015 to provide for processing of the statement of TCS and issue
of intimation w.e.f. 01.06.2015, for the first time.

In recent
times, a number of intimations are issued by the processor u/s 200A,
inter alia levying the fee payable u/s. 234E of the Act and demanding
the same vide such intimations. An aspect common to such intimations is
that all of them are issued before 1st June, 2015.

The
intimations issued before 1st June, 2015, levying and demanding fee u/s
234E, are being challenged by the tax deductors on the ground that the
processor had no authority to demand, under an intimation, any fee prior
to 1st June, 2015 – as such authority is available only from 1st June,
2015. In addition, it is also contended that the processor and/or an AO
in any case had no authority to pass any orders for computing and
levying such fee u/s. 234E of the Act in as much as no power is vested
in them for doing so.

The Amritsar bench of the Income Tax
Appellate Tribunal, under the circumstances held that an intimation,
issued u/s. 200A, demanding the fees u/s 234E, was not valid in law
where it was issued on or before 1st June, 2015. The Chennai bench of
the Tribunal, while concurring with the view, held that the AO was
empowered to pass a separate order for levy of such fee outside the
intimation u/s. 200A of the Act.

Sibia Healthcare’s case
The
issue first arose in the case of the Sibia Healthcare Private Limited,
171 TTJ 145(Asr.). The AO in that case, had processed the statement of
TDS filed for the third quarter of the financial year 2012-13 by the
assessee and had in the process thereof levied the fees u/s. 234 E for
the default of delay in filing the statement. The assessee in the appeal
before the tribunal had called into question the correctness of the
order of the CIT(A) upholding levy of fees, u/s 234 E of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 and challenged such levy by way of intimation dated 11th
January 2014 issued u/s. 200A.

The Tribunal noted that it was a
case in which there was admittedly a delay in filing of the TDS returns,
and the AO(TDS), in the course of the processing of the TDS return, had
raised a demand under an intimation issued u/s. 200A of the Act, for
levy of fees u/s. 234 E for delayed filing of TDS statement. Aggrieved
by the levy of fees, the assessee carried the matter in appeal before
the CIT(A), but without any success. The assessee, not being satisfied,
filed a further appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal, on the above
facts, concerned itself with the question as to whether or not, for the
period prior to 1st June 2015, fees u/s. 234 E of the Act in respect of
defaults in furnishing TDS statements, could be levied in issuing
intimation u/s. 200A of the Act.

The Tribunal noted that there
was no enabling provision for raising a demand in respect of levy of
fees u/s. 234E prior to 1st June, 2015 . It noted that at the relevant
point of time, section 200A permitted computation of amount recoverable
from, or payable to, the tax deductor after making the adjustments on
account of “arithmetical errors” and “incorrect claims apparent from any
information in the statement ” and for “interest, if any, computed on
the basis of sums deductible as computed in the statement”. No other
adjustments in the amount refundable to, or recoverable from, the tax
deductor, were permissible in accordance with the law as it existed at
that point of time.

In the considered view of the Tribunal; the
adjustment in respect of levy of fees u/s. 234E was beyond the scope of
‘permissible adjustments’ contemplated u/s. 200A; as an intimation was
an ‘appealable order’ u/s. 246A(a), the CIT(A) ought to have examined
legality of the adjustment made under the said intimation in the light
of the scope of section 200A which the CIT(A) had not done and instead
he had justified the levy of fees on the basis of the provisions of
section 234E. The answer to the question whether such a levy could be
effected in the course of intimation u/s. 200A. was clearly in the
negative.

Importantly, the Tribunal noted that no other
provision enabling a demand in respect of the levy had been pointed out
to the Tribunal, and it was thus an admitted position that in the
absence of the enabling provision u/s. 200A, no such levy could be
effected. The Tribunal also held that the said intimation was issued
beyond the time permissible in law by noting that a demand u/s. 200A, in
the facts of the case, was to be issued latest by 31st March 2015 and
the defect of delay in issuing the intimation thus was not curable.
Bearing in mind the entirety of the case, the impugned levy of fees u/s.
234 E was found by the tribunal to be unsustainable in law. The
Tribunal therefore, upholding the grievance of the assessee, deleted the
levy of fee u/s. 234E of the Act.

G. Indhirani & Other cases
The
issue again came up before the Chennai bench of the Income tax
Appellate Tribunal in the case of G. Indhirani in ITA No. 1020
&1021/Mds./2015 and other cases. The appeals of the different
assessees directed against the respective orders of the CIT(A), Salem
were heard together and disposed of by a common order as the issue
involved was common. The only issue for consideration of the Tribunal
was with regard to the levy of fee u/s 234E of the Income-tax Act, while
processing the statement furnished by the assessees, u/s. 200A of the
Act.

On behalf of the assessees, it was submitted that the statement filed by the assessee has to be processed only in the manner in which it was laid down u/s. 200A of the Act; levy of fee u/s. 234E of the Act could not be a subject matter of processing the statement u/s. 200A of the Act; such an adjustment was permissible only vide an amendment made in section 200A by the Finance Act, 2015, with effect from 01.06.2015, whereby the parliament empowered the AO to levy fee u/s. 234E of the Act while processing a statement u/s. 200A of the Act; prior to 01.06.2015, the AO had no authority to levy fee, if any, u/s. 234E of the Act; the Amritsar Bench of the Tribunal in I.T.A. No. 90/Asr/2015 vide order dated 09.06.2015, held that prior to 01.06.2015, there was no enabling provision in section 200A for raising a demand in respect of levy of fee u/s. 234E of the Act. It was further contended that the fee levied u/s. 234E of the Act, while processing the statement filed u/s. 200A of the Act was not justified in as much as such a levy of fee, while processing the statement, was beyond the scope of section 200A of the Act.

Attention was invited to section 234E of the Act to highlight that when an assessee failed to deliver the statement within the prescribed time, he was liable to pay by way of fee a sum of Rs. 200/- for every day during the period of the failure. Referring to the words used in the section 234E “he shall be liable to pay”, it was pointed out that the assessee was liable to pay fee and the section did not empower the AO to levy the fee which was clear by reading of section 234E(3) of the Act that provided for payment of the fee before delivery of statement u/s. 200(3) of the Act. It was thus clear that the fee had to be paid by the assessee voluntarily before filing the statement u/s. 200(3) of the Act and the AO had no power to levy the fee before the amendment.

On the contrary,on behalf of the Income tax Department, it was submitted that section 234E of the Act provided for payment of fee in cases where the assessee failed to deliver the statement as prescribed in section 200(3) of the Act and therefore, the AO had every authority to levy fee either by a separate order or while processing the statement u/s. 200A of the Act.

On consideration of the rival submissions on either side and perusal of the relevant material on record, the Tribunal noted that section 200A of the Act provided for processing of the statement of tax deducted at source by making adjustment as provided therein; the AO could not make any adjustment other than the one prescribed in section 200A of the Act; it was obvious that prior to 01.06.2015, there was no enabling provision in section 200A of the Act for making adjustment in respect of the statement filed by the assessee with regard to tax deducted at source by levying fee u/s. 234E of the Act; the parliament for the first time enabled the AO to make adjustment by levying fee u/s. 234E of the Act with effect from 01.06.2015.

The Tribunal accordingly held that while processing the statement u/s. 200A of the Act, the AO could not make any adjustment by levying fee u/s. 234E prior to 01.06.2015 in the following words; “In the case before us, the Assessing Officer levied fee u/s. 234E of the Act while processing the statement of tax deducted at source u/s. 200A of the Act. Therefore, this Tribunal is of the considered opinion that the fee levied by the Assessing Officer u/s. 234E of the Act while processing the statement of tax deducted at source is beyond the scope of adjustment provided u/s. 200A of the Act. Therefore, such adjustment cannot stand in the eye of law.”

The assessee next contended that the AO had no authority to levy the fee u/s. 234E in view of the language of the said section 234E which provided that ‘the assessee’ “shall be liable to pay” ‘by way of fee’. The language in the assessee’s opinion clearly conveyed that the assessee had to voluntarily pay the fee and the AO had no authority to levy fee. This argument was found to be very attractive and fanciful by the Tribunal, but was also found to be devoid of any substance.

The Tribunal held that;

  •    the assessee shall pay the fee as provided u/s. 234E(1) of the Act before delivery of the statement u/s. 200(3) of the Act when section 234E clearly stated that the assessee was liable to pay fee for the delay in delivery of the statement with regard to tax deducted at source,

  •     if the assessee failed to pay the fee for the periods of delay, then the assessing authority had all the powers to levy fee while processing the statement u/s. 200A of the Act by making adjustment after 01.06.2015,
  •    prior to 01.06.2015, the AO had every authority to pass an order separately levying fee u/s. 234E of the Act,

  •    what was not permissible was levy of fee u/s. 234E of the Act while processing the statement of tax deducted at source and making adjustment before 01.06.2015, it did not mean that the AO could not pass a separate order u/s. 234E of the Act levying fee for the delay in filing the statement as required u/s. 200(3) of the Act.

The Tribunal proceeded to examine the contention of the assessee that the AO had no power to levy fee u/s. 234E in the light of the provisions of Indian Penal Code and in particular section 396 of the Code that provided for punishment for dacoity with murder as also for the liability to fine. It also examined section 408 of the said Code which provided for payment of fine in addition to the punishment in cases of criminal breach of trust by a clerk or servant. Similarly, the other provisions of the Code that provided for fine were referred to by the Tribunal to observe as follows; “The language used by the Parliament in Indian Penal Code is “shall also be liable to fine”. This means that the Magistrate or Sessions Judge, who tries the accused for an offence punishable under the provisions of Indian Penal Code, in addition to punishment of imprisonment, shall also levy fine. If the contention of the Ld. counsel for the assessees is accepted, then the Magistrate or Sessions Judge, as the case may be, who is trying the accused for the offence punishable under Indian Penal Code, may not have authority to levy fine. .. It is well known principle that the fine prescribed under the Indian Penal Code has to be levied by the concerned Magistrate or Sessions Judge who is trying the offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code. Therefore, the contention of the Ld. counsel that merely because the Parliament has used the language “he shall be liable to pay by way of fee”, the assessee has to pay the fee voluntarily and the Assessing Officer has no authority to levy fee could not be accepted. No one would come forward to pay the fee voluntarily unless there is a compulsion under the statutory provision. The Parliament welcomes the citizens to come forward and comply with the provisions of the Act by paying the prescribed fee before filing the statement u/s. 200(3) of the Act. However, if the assessee fails to pay the fee before filing the statement u/s. 200(3) of the Act, the assessing authority is well within his limit in passing a separate order levying such a fee in addition to processing the statement u/s. 200A of the Act. In other words, before 01.06.2015, the assessing authority could pass a separate order u/s. 234E levying fee for delay in filing the statement u/s. 200(3) of the Act. However, after 01.06.2015, the assessing authority is well within his limit to levy fee u/s. 234E of the Act even while processing the statement u/s. 200A and making adjustment.”

The Tribunal, in the facts of the case however, was of the considered opinion that the AO had exceeded his jurisdiction in levying fee u/s. 234E while processing the statement and making adjustment u/s. 200A of the Act and therefore, the impugned intimation of the lower authorities levying fee u/s. 234E of the Act could not be sustained in law. At the same time while holding so in the assessee’s favour, it was made clear by the Tribunal that it was open to the AO to pass a separate order u/s. 234E of the Act for levying fee provided the limitation for such a levy had not expired.

Observations

The constitutional validity of section 234E of the Act has been examined by the Bombay High Court in the case of and Rashmikant Kundalia (Bom.), 373 ITR 248 and is upheld by the court. However, in a series of the decisions of the court in the cases of Narath Mapila LP School, [WP (C)    31498/2013(J)](Ker.), Adithya Bizor P. Solutions(Karn.) [WP No. 6918-6938/2014(T-IT), Om Prakash Dhoot (Raj.) [WP No. 1981 of 2014], a stay has been granted on the recovery of the demands raised in respect of fees u/s. 234E.

The power of the AO, while processing the statement of TDS u/s. 200A, to levy fee u/s. 234E and demand the same vide an intimation issued on 1st June, 2015 or thereafter is not in dispute. Also not in dispute is the fact that such fee cannot be demanded under an intimation that is issued before that date. The amendment of section 200A by the Finance Act, 2015 has made up for the deficiency, if any, by enabling the levy of the fee while processing the statement of TDS and demanding the payment of such levy under an intimation. The dispute appears to be about the power of the AO to levy a fee u/s. 234E outside the intimation u/s. 200A of the Act. Can an income-tax authority levy and demand the fee prescribed u/s. 234E on the basis of provisions of section 234E alone? Can it pass an order outside the provisions of section 200A for demanding the levy of fee? Is it prevented from demanding such fee in view of specific language of section 234E that require an assessee to pay the fee and pay the same before filing the statement u/s. 200(3) of the Act? These are the questions that require Section 234E of the Act, was inserted by the Finance Act 2012 brought into effect from 1st July 2012 reads as under:

234E. Fee for defaults in furnishing Statements

(1)    Without prejudice to the provisions of the Act, where a person fails to deliver or cause to be delivered a statement within the time prescribed in sub-section (3) of section 200 or the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 206C, he shall be liable to pay, by way of fee, a sum of two hundred rupees for every day during which the failure continues.

(2)    The amount of fee referred to in s/s. (1) shall not exceed the amount of tax deductible or collectible, as the case may be.

(3)    The amount of fee referred to in s/s. (1) shall be paid before delivering or causing to be delivered a    statement    in    accordance    with    sub-section    (3) of section 200 or the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 206C.

(4)    The provisions of this section shall apply to a statement referred to in sub-section (3) of section 200 or the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 206C which is to be delivered or caused to be delivered for tax deducted at source or tax collected at source, as the case may be, on or after the 1st day of July, 2012

On a bare reading of the provisions of section 234E, one gathers that the liability to pay the fee is that of the assessee who had defaulted in filing the statement of TDS within the time prescribed u/s. 200(3). It is also clear that the fee is to be paid before the filing of the statement of TDS u/s. 200 by the assessee. It is further clear from a bare reading of the amended provisions of section 200A, in particular clauses (c) and (d), that with effect from 1st June 2015, the fee, if any, shall be computed in accordance with the provisions of section 234E while processing the statement of TDS and the sum payable by, or the amount of refund due to, the deductor shall be determined after adjustment of the amount computed under clause (b) and clause (c) against any amount paid u/s. 200 or section 201 or section 234E and any amount paid otherwise by way of tax or interest or fee and an intimation shall be prepared or generated and sent to the deductor specifying the sum determined to be payable by, or the amount of refund due to, him under clause (d) and the amount of refund due to the deductor in pursuance of the determination under clause (d) shall be granted to the deductor.

It is true that there was no express or specific provisions on or before 1st June, 2015 that empowered an authority to levy such fee and demand the payment of the same. However, such an interpretation would mean that the provisions of section 234E, though introduced w.e.f 1st July, 2012 has no teeth and are redundant till 31st May, 2015. Such an interpretation shall also render many provisions of the Act redundant where they provide for a levy or payment for an offence specified in the respective provision without express provision for levy and demand thereof. It also would mean that for each provision for any tax, interest, fee, levy, fine there should be an express and corresponding provision authorising an income-tax authority to effectively levy the same and demand the same from the assessee failing which the charge would remain ineffective.

The Chennai bench of the Tribunal in G. Indrihani’s case is right in holding that the AO or the authority is empowered to pass an appropriate order for levy of the fees u/s 234E and to demand the same under such an order. The effect of the amendment in section 200A is limited to authorising the AO or any other authority to levy the fee or ascertain the correctness of the fee paid while processing the statement of TDS and demand the same vide an intimation, a power which was not hitherto available till 31st May, 2015. An independent power to pass an order had always been vested in the AO or other authority once a liability to fee for the default was imposed under the Act.

Income Computation & Disclosure Standards – Some Issues

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The 10 Income Computation and Disclosure Standards (ICDS) which have been notified on 31st March 2015 u/s. 145(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 have significant implications on the computation of income for assessment years beginning from assessment year 2016-17.

Under the notification, these standards come into force from 1st April 2016, i.e. assessment year 2016-17, apply to all assessees following mercantile system of accounting, and are to be followed for the purposes of computation of income chargeable to income tax under the head “Profits and gains of business or profession” or “Income from other sources”. The notification also supercedes notification dated 25th January 1996 [which notified 2 Accounting Standards u/s 145(2) – Disclosure of Accounting Policies, and Disclosure of Prior Period and Extraordinary Items and Changes in Accounting Policies], except as regards such things done or omitted to be done before such supersession.

Background
Section 145, which deals with method of accounting, was substituted by the Finance Act, 1995, with effect from assessment year 1997-98. Sub-section (2) to this section, after this amendment, provided that the Central Government may notify in the Official Gazette from time to time accounting standards (“AS”) to be followed by any class of assessees or in respect of any class of income.

The provisions of sub-section (1) were made subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), whereby the income chargeable under the head “Profits and gains of business or profession” or “Income from other sources” was to be computed in accordance with either cash or mercantile system of accounting regularly employed by the assessee, subject to the provisions of subsection (2).

Sub-section (3) provided that where the assessing officer was not satisfied about the correctness or completeness of the accounts of the assessee, or where the method of accounting provided in sub-section (1) or AS notified under sub-section (2) had not been regularly followed by the assessee, the assessing officer could make an assessment in the manner provided in section 144 (i.e. a best judgement assessment).

In 1996, AS notified by ICAI were not mandatory for companies, but were mandatory for auditors auditing general purpose financial statements. On 29th January 1996, two AS (“IT-AS”) were notified by the CBDT, Disclosure of Accounting Policies, and Disclosure of Prior Period and Extraordinary Items and Changes in Accounting Policies.

In July 2002, the Government constituted a Committee for formulation of AS for notification u/s 145(2). In November 2003, this Committee recommended the notification of the AS issued by ICAI without any modification, since it would be impractical for a taxpayer to maintain two sets of books of account. It also recommended appropriate legislative amendments to the Act for preventing any revenue leakage due to the AS being notified by ICAI. These recommendations were not implemented.

With the imminent introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in India in the form of Ind- AS, in December 2010, the Government constituted a Committee of Departmental Officers and professionals to suggest AS for notification u/s. 145(2). The terms of the Committee were as under:

i) to study the harmonisation of AS issued by the ICAI with the direct tax laws in India, and suggest AS which need to be adopted u/s. 145(2) of the Act along with the relevant modifications;

ii) to suggest method for determination of tax base (book profit) for the purpose of Minimum Alternate Tax (MAT) in case of companies migrating to IFRS (IND AS) in the initial year of adoption and thereafter; and

iii) to suggest appropriate amendments to the Act in view of transition to IFRS (IND AS) regime. This Committee submitted an interim report in August 2011. The recommendations of the Committee in such interim report were as under:

1. Separate AS should be notified u/s. 145(2), since the AS to be notified would have to be in harmony with the Act. The notified AS should provide specific rules, which would enable computation of income with certainty and clarity, and would also need elimination of alternatives, to the extent possible.

2. Since it would be burdensome for taxpayers to maintain 2 sets of books of account, the AS to be notified should apply only to computation of income, and books of account should not have to be maintained on the basis of such AS.

3. T o distinguish such AS from other AS, these AS should be called Tax Accounting Standards (“TAS ”).

4. S ince TAS were based on mercantile system of accounting, they should not apply to taxpayers following cash system of accounting.

5. S ince TAS are meant to be in harmony with the Act, in case of conflict, the provisions of the Act should prevail over TAS .

6. S ince the starting point for computation of taxable income was the profit as per the financial accounts, which are prepared on the basis of AS whose provisions may be different from TAS , a reconciliation between the income as per the financial statements and the income computed as per TAS should be presented.

In October 2011, drafts of 2 TAS – Construction Contracts and Government Grants – were released for public comment. In May 2012, drafts of another 6 TAS were released for public comment.

The Committee gave its final report in August 2012. It focused only on formulation of TAS harmonised with the provisions of the Act, since the position regarding the transition to Ind-AS was fluid and uncertain, and therefore even the impact of Ind-AS on book profits relevant for the purposes of MAT could not be ascertained.

It recommended that of the 31 AS issued by ICAI, 7 AS did not need to be examined, since they did not relate to computation of income. Of the remaining 24 AS, 10 related to disclosure requirements, were not yet mandatory or were not required for computation of income. The Committee therefore provided drafts of 14 TAS . The Committee also recommended that TAS in respect of certain other areas be considered for notification – Share based payment, Revenue recognition by real estate developers, Service concession arrangements (example, Build Operate Transfer agreements), and Exploration for and evaluation of mineral resources.

In January 2015, the CBDT released the draft of 12 TAS (renamed as ICDS) for public comment. These did not include 2 TAS recommended by the Committee – Contingencies and Events Occurring After the Balance Sheet Date and Net Profit or Loss for the Period, Prior Period Items and changes in Accounting Policies.

Section 145 was amended by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2014 with effect from 1st April 2015 (assessment year 2015-16), by substituting the term “income computation and disclosure standards” for the term “accounting standards” in sub-section (2). Similarly, sub-section (3) was amended to substitute the “not regular following of accounting standards” with “non-computation of income in accordance with the notified ICDS”.

Finally, in March 2015, the CBDT notified 10 ICDS as under:

ICDS I – Accounting Policies
ICDS II – Valuation of Inventories
ICDS III – Construction Contracts
ICDS IV – Revenue Recognition
ICDS V – Tangible Fixed Assets
ICDS VI – Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates
ICDS VII – Government Grants
ICDS VIII – Securities
ICDS IX – Borrowing Costs
ICDS X – Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets

The draft ICDS prepared by the Committee but not notified were those relating to Leases and Intangible Fixed Assets.

Applicability & Issues
The notified ICDS apply with effect from assessment year 2016-17, while section 145(2) was amended with effect from assessment year 2015-16. Therefore, for assessment year 2015-16, IT-AS would not apply, since the section provides for ICDS to be followed. Further, since ICDS were not notified till March 2015, ICDS were also not required to be followed for that year. Effectively, for assessment year 2015-16, neither IT-AS nor ICDS would apply. ICDS would apply only with effect from assessment year 2016-17.

ICDS would apply to all taxpayers following mercantile system of accounting, irrespective of the level of income. It would not apply to taxpayers following cash system of accounting. It would not apply only to taxpayers carrying on business, but even to other taxpayers, who may have income under the head “Income from Other Sources”. Effectively, since almost every taxpayer would have at least bank interest, which is taxable under the head “Income from Other Sources”, it would apply to most taxpayers. Further, most taxpayers choose to offer income for tax on an accrual basis, to facilitate matching of tax deducted at source (TDS) from their income with their claim for TDS credit as per their return of income.

Would it apply to taxpayers who do not maintain books of accounts? The provisions would certainly apply to all taxpayers who offer their income to tax under these 2 heads of income on a mercantile basis. Can a taxpayer choose to offer his income to tax on a cash basis, where books of account are not maintained, or is it to be presumed that his income has to be taxed on a mercantile or accrual basis in the absence of books of accounts?

In N. R. Sirker vs. CIT 111 ITR 281, the Gauhati High Court considered the issue and held as under:

“It can safely be assumed that ordinarily people keep accounts in cash system, that is to say, when certain sum is received, it is entered in his account and in the case of firms, etc., where regular method of accounting is adopted, sometimes accounts are kept in mercantile system. In the instant case it was not the case of the department that the assessee’s accounts were kept in mercantile system. On the other hand, the assessment orders showed that no proper accounts were kept. That being so it would not be justified to presume that the assessee kept his accounts in the mercantile system. Income-tax is normally paid on money actually received as income after deducting the allowable deductions. In the case of an assessee maintaining accounts in mercantile system, there was some variation, inasmuch as moneys receivable and payable were also shown as received and paid in the books. In order to apply this method, the proved or admitted position must be that the assessee keeps his accounts in mercantile system.”

Similarly, in Dr. N. K. Brahmachari vs. CIT 186 ITR 507, the Calcutta High Court held that unless and until it was found that the assessee maintained his accounts on accrual basis, income accrued but not received could not be taxed.

In CIT vs. Vimla D. Sonwane 212 ITR 489, the Bombay High Court considered a case where the assesse did not maintain regular books of accounts and did not follow mercantile system of accounting. The Bombay High Court held in that case:

“Option regarding adoption of system of accounting is with the assessee and not with the Income-tax Department. The assessee is indeed free even to follow different methods of accounting for income from different sources in an appropriate case. The department cannot compel the assessee to adopt the mercantile system of accounting. As a matter of fact, it was not adopted.”

In Whitworth Park Coal Co. Ltd. vs. IRC [1960] 40 ITR 517, the House of Lords laid down that where no method of accounting had been regularly employed, a non-trader cannot be assessed, (in the Indian context, u/s. 56 under the head ‘Income from other sources’) in respect of money which he has not received. The House of Lords observed:

“…The word ‘income’ appears to me to be the crucial word, and it is not easy to say what it means. The word is not defined in the Act and I do not think that it can be defined. There are two different currents of authority. It appears to me to be quite settled that in computing a trader’s income account must be taken of trading debts which have not yet been received by the trader. The price of goods sold or services rendered is included in the year’s profit and loss account although that price has not yet been paid. One reason may be that the price has already been earned and that it would give a false picture to put the cost of producing the goods or rendering the services into his accounts as an outgoing but to put nothing against that until the price has been paid. Good accounting practice may require some exceptions, I do not know, but the general principle has long been recognised. And if in the end the price is not paid it can be written off in a subsequent year as a bad debt.

But the position of an ordinary individual who has no trade or profession is quite different. He does not make up a profit and loss account. Sums paid to him are his income, perhaps subject to some deductions, and it would be a great hardship to require him to pay tax on sums owing to him but of which he cannot yet obtain payment. Moreover, for him there is nothing corresponding to a trader writing off bad debts in a subsequent year, except perhaps the right to get back tax which he has paid in error.” (p. 533)

“The case has often arisen of a trader being required to pay tax on something which he has not yet received and may never receive, but we were informed that there is no reported case where a non-trader has had to do this whereas there are at least three cases to the opposite effect—Lambe v. IRC [1934] 2 ITR 494, Dewar v. IRC 1935 5 Tax LR 536 and Grey v. Tiley [1932] 16 Tax Cas. 414, and I would also refer to what was said by Lord Wrenbury in St. Lucia Usines & Estates Co. Ltd. v. St. Lucia ( Colonial Treasurer) [1924] AC 508 (PC). I certainly think that it would be wrong to hold now for the first time that a non-trader to whom money is owing but who has not yet received it must bring it into his income-tax return and pay tax on it. And for this purpose I think that the company must be treated as a non-trader, because the Butterley’s case [1957] AC 32 makes it clear that these payments are not trading receipts.” (p. 533)

Therefore, for income falling under the head “Income from other sources”, it is clear that in the absence of books of accounts, and where the assessee has not exercised any option, the income would be taxable on a cash basis.

It is well settled that the method of accounting is vis-a-vis each source of income, since computation of income is first to be done for each source of income, and then aggregated under each head of income. An assessee can choose to follow one method of accounting for some sources of income, and another method of accounting for other sources of income. In J. K. Bankers vs. CIT 94 ITR

107    (All), the assessee was following mercantile system of accounting in respect of interest on loans in respect of its moneylending business, and offered lease rent earned by it to tax on a cash basis under the head “Income from Other Sources”. The Allahabad High Court held that an assessee could choose to follow a different method of accounting in respect of its moneylending business and in respect of lease rent. Similarly, in CIT vs. Smt. Vimla D. Sonwane 212 ITR 489, the Bombay High Court held that “The assessee is indeed free even to follow different methods of accounting for income from different sources in an appropriate case”.

Where an assessee follows cash method of accounting for certain sources of income and mercantile system of accounting for others, ICDS would apply only to those sources of income, where mercantile system of accounting is followed and would not apply to those sources of income, where cash method of accounting is followed. For instance, an assessee may have a manufacturing business, and a separate commission agency business. He may be following mercantile system of accounting for his manufacturing business, and a cash method of accounting for his commission agency business. ICDS would then apply only to the manufacturing business, and not to the commission agency business.

Can a taxpayer opt to change his method of accounting from mercantile to cash basis, in order to prevent the applicability of ICDS? Under paragraph 5 of ICDS I, an accounting policy shall not be changed without reasonable cause. Under AS 5, such a change was permissible only if the adoption of a different accounting policy was required by statute or for compliance with an accounting standard or if it was considered that the change would result in a more appropriate presentation of the financial statements of the enterprise. Would a change in law amount to reasonable cause? If such a change is made from assessment year 2016-17, the year from which ICDS comes into effect, an assessee would need to demonstrate that such change was actuated by other commercial considerations, and not merely to bypass the provisions of ICDS.

Do ICDS apply to a taxpayer who is offering his income to tax under a presumptive tax scheme, such as section 44AD? Under the presumptive tax scheme, books of account are not relevant, since the income is computed on the basis of the presumptive tax rate laid down under the Act. It therefore does not involve computation of income on the basis of the method of accounting, or on the basis of adjustments to the accounts. Therefore, though there is no specific exclusion under the notification for taxpayers following under presumptive tax schemes from the purview of ICDS, logically, ICDS should not apply to such taxpayers. However, where the presumptive tax scheme involves computation of tax on the basis of gross receipts, turnover, etc., it is possible that the tax authorities may take a view that the ICDS on revenue recognition would apply to compute the gross receipts or turnover in such cases.

Would ICDS apply to non-residents? The provisions of ICDS apply to all taxpayers, irrespective of the concept of residence. However, where a non-resident taxpayer falls under a presumptive tax scheme, such as section 115A, on the same logic as that of presumptive tax schemes applicable to residents, the provisions of ICDS should not apply. Further, where a non-resident claims the benefit of a double taxation avoidance agreement (DTAA), by virtue of section 90(2), the provisions of the DTAA would prevail over the provisions of the Income-tax Act, including section 145(2) and ICDS notified thereunder. In other cases of incomes of non-residents, which do not fall under presumptive tax schemes or DTAA, the provisions of ICDS would apply.

It has been stated in each ICDS that the ICDS would not apply for the purpose of maintenance of books of accounts. While theoretically this may be the position, the question arises as to whether it is practicable or even possible to compute the income under ICDS without maintaining a parallel set of books of account, given the substantial differences between AS being followed in the books of accounts and ICDS. Most taxpayers would end up at least preparing a parallel profit and loss account and balance sheet, to ensure that ICDS and its consequences have been properly taken care of while making the adjustments.

Further, the Committee had recommended that a tax auditor is required to certify that the computation of taxable income is made in accordance with the provisions of ICDS. Before certification, a tax auditor would invariably require such parallel profit and loss account and balance sheet to be prepared, to ensure that all adjustments required on account of ICDS have been considered. This will result in substantial work for most businesses, and may even result in the requirement of parallel MIS, one for the purposes of regular accounts, and the other for the purposes of ICDS. One wonders whether the Committee really wanted to avoid the requirement of maintenance of 2 sets of books of account, as stated by it, or has taken into account the practical difficulties, given the complex and myriad adjustments it has suggested through ICDS.

An interesting issue arises in this context. Can an assessee maintain 2 separate books of accounts – one under the Companies Act or other applicable law on a mercantile system, and a parallel set of books of accounts for income tax purposes on a cash basis? If one looks at the provisions of section 145(1), it provides that income chargeable under these 2 heads of income shall be computed in accordance with either cash or mercantile system of accounting regularly employed by the assessee. What is the meaning of the term “regularly employed”? Normally, the system of accounting adopted by the assesse in his books for his dealings with the outside world would be adopted for the purposes of computing the profit or loss for tax purposes also. The accounts are those maintained in the regular course of business. It may therefore be difficult for an assessee to maintain separate books of account with different system of accounting only for income tax purposes.

It may be noted that even after the introduction of ICDS, the computation still has to be in accordance with the method of accounting regularly employed by the assessee. Compliance with ICDS is an additional requirement. Therefore, the computation in accordance with the method of accounting is merely modified by the requirements of ICDS, and not substituted entirely.

Since ICDS is not applicable for the purposes of maintenance of books of account, one wonders as to what is the purpose and ambit of ICDS I on Accounting Policies. Since the purpose of ICDS is not to lay down accounting policies which are to be followed in the maintenance of the books of account, ICDS I should be regarded as merely a disclosure standard and not a computation standard. There are however certain provisions in ICDS I which relate to computation.

For example, the provision that accounting policies adopted shall be such was to represent a true and fair view of the state of affairs and income of the business, profession or vocation, and that for this purpose, the treatment and presentation of transaction and events shall be governed by their substance and not merely by their legal form, and marked to market loss or an expected loss shall not be recognised, unless the recognition of such loss is in accordance with the provisions of any other ICDS, really relates to what accounting policies an assessee should follow in its books of account. This is inconsistent with the preamble to this ICDS, that it is not applicable for the purpose of maintenance of books of account. This is also ultra vires the powers available under the provisions of section 145(2), which provide for computation in accordance with notified ICDS, and no longer contain the power to notify accounting standards.

This anomaly possibly arose on account of the fact that the provisions of section 145(2) were modified only after the Committee provided the draft of the relevant ICDS. Possibly, such provisions of ICDS I may not be valid.

Each ICDS states that in the case of conflicts between the provisions of the Income-tax Act and the ICDS, the provisions of the Act would prevail to that extent. Such a provision is ostensibly to harmonise the provisions of the ICDS with the provisions of the Act. One wonders as to why the Committee did not take into account the various provisions of the Act while framing ICDS. While such a provision is helpful, it would lead to substantial litigation in cases where there is no express provision in the Act, but where courts have interpreted the provisions of the Act in a manner which is inconsistent with the provisions of the ICDS.

There have been 3 specific amendments made to the Income-tax Act by the Finance Act 2015, to ensure that the provisions of the Act are in line with the provisions of ICDS. These 3 provisions are as under:

1.    The definition of “income” u/s. 2(24) has been amended by insertion of clause (xviii) to include assistance in the form of a subsidy or grant or cash incentive or duty drawback or favour or concession or reimbursement (by whatever name called) by the Central Government or a State Government or any authority or body or agency in cash or kind to the assessee, other than the subsidy or grant or reimbursement, which is taken into account for determination of the actual cost of the asset in accordance with the provisions of explanation 10 to clause (1) of section 43. This is to align it with the provisions of ICDS VII on Government Grants.

2.    The provisions of the proviso to section 36(1)(iii) have been modified to delete the words “for extension of existing business or profession”, after the words “in respect of capital borrowed for acquisition of an asset”, to bring the section in line with ICDS IX on Borrowing Costs, whereby interest in respect of borrowings for all assets acquired, from the date of borrowing till the date of first put to use of the asset, is to be capitalised.

3.    A second proviso has been inserted to section 36(1) (vii), to provide that where a debt has been taken into account in computing the income of an assessee for any year on the basis of ICDS without recording such debt in the books of accounts, then such debt would be deemed to have been written off in the year in which it becomes irrecoverable. This is to facilitate the claim for deduction of bad debts, where the debt has been recognised as income in accordance with ICDS, but has not been recognised in the books of accounts in accordance with AS.

Obviously, with the amendment of the Income-tax Act as well, the provisions of the ICDS in this regard read along with the amended Act, which may be contrary to earlier judicial rulings, would now apply.

There could be earlier judicial rulings which are based on the relevant provisions of the accounting standards, and where the court therefore interpreted the law on the basis of such accounting standards. These judicial rulings would now have to be considered as being subject to the requirements of ICDS, as the method of accounting is now subject to modification by the provisions of ICDS.

The third and last category of judicial rulings would be those where the courts have laid down certain basic principles while interpreting the tax law, in particular, the relevant provisions of the tax law. In such cases, such judicial rulings would override the provisions of ICDS, since such rulings have interpreted the provisions of the Act, which would prevail over ICDS.

For instance, various judicial rulings have propounded the real income theory. The Delhi High Court, in the case of CIT vs. Vashisht Chay Vyapar 330 ITR 440 has held, based on the real income theory, that interest accrued on non-performing assets of non-banking financial companies cannot be taxed until such time as such interest is actually received. Would the contrary provisions of ICDS IV on revenue recognition change the position? It would appear that the ruling will still continue to hold good even after the introduction of ICDS.

In case any of the provisions of ICDS is contrary to the Income Tax Rules, which one would prevail? The provisions of ICDS are silent in this regard. Given the fact that rules are a form of delegated legislation, while ICDS is in the form of a notification, which then becomes a part of the legislation, it would appear that the provisions of ICDS should prevail in such cases.

Since ICDS is not applicable for the purpose of maintenance of books of account, it is clear that the provisions of ICDS would not apply to the computation of “book profits” for the purposes of minimum alternate tax under section 115JB.

In fact, most of the ICDS provisions would increase the gap between the taxable income and the book profits, instead of narrowing down the gap. In this context, one wonders whether a recent Telangana & Andhra Pradesh High Court decision would be of assistance. In the case of Nagarjuna Fertilizers & Chemicals Limited 373 ITR 252, the High Court held that where an item of income was taxed in an earlier year but was recorded in the books of account of the current year, on the principle that the same income could not be taxed twice, such income had to be excluded from the book profits of the current year.

Can one use the provisions of AS for interpreting ICDS, where the provisions of both are identical? If one compares the ICDS with the corresponding AS, one notices that the bold portion of the AS has been picked up and modified, and issued as ICDS. Where the provisions of the AS and ICDS are identical, one should therefore be able to take resort to the explanatory paragraphs forming part of the AS, though they do not form part of the ICDS, in order to interpret the ICDS.

Impact & Conclusion

One thing is certain – the provisions of ICDS will create far greater litigation, then what one is now witnessing. That would defeat the very purpose of ICDS of bringing in tax certainty and reduction of litigation. Does reduction of litigation mean introduction of complicated provisions which are unfair to taxpayers? Is there at least one provision in the ICDS which decides a disputed issue in favour of taxpayers?

Does the CBDT believe that what is accepted worldwide as income (profit determined in accordance with IFRS), is not the real income when it comes to taxation? Are the Indian tax authorities an exception to the rest of the world? ICDS does not increase taxes – it merely results in advancement of taxability of income to an earlier year, and postponement of allowability of expenditure to a later year. Is the need for advancement of tax revenues so pressing, that taxpayer convenience and compliance costs are brushed aside?

Looking at the requirements of ICDS, one cannot but help wonder as to whether ICDS has been merely brought in to overcome the impact of adverse judicial rulings, and not really with a view to facilitate transition to IndAS. What ought to have been done by amendments to the law is being sought to be implemented through ICDS.

Assessees would now have to cope with not only frequent changes to the law, but also with frequent changes to ICDS, given the unfinished agenda of 4 draft ICDS yet to be notified, and the further 4 recommended for notification by the Committee. One understands that the Committee is in the process of drafting further ICDS for notification.

One also understands that the CBDT is likely to issue FAQs to clarify various aspects of ICDS. One only hopes that such FAQs will not create further confusion, but would help clear the confusion created by the ICDS.

One wonders as to how such ICDS fits in with the Prime Minister’s promise to improve the ease of doing business. The additional compliance costs in order to comply with ICDS would far outweigh the advantages gained by the tax department by recovering taxes at an earlier stage. Would business be keen to expand or would persons be willing to set up new businesses, given the significant compliance costs? The country would certainly take a significant hit in the “Ease of Doing Business Survey” once ICDS is implemented.

Tax auditors will now be in an extremely difficult situation, if the recommendation relating to requirement of certification of computation of income in accordance with ICDS is implemented. So far, they merely had to certify the true and fair view of the accounts, and the correctness of the information provided in Form 3CD. They did not have to certify the correctness of the claims for various deductions. If an auditor would now have to certify the correctness of the computation of income, this would give rise to various issues as to how such certification could be carried out, particularly in cases where the issue was debatable.

Instead of taxpayers, tax auditors may bear the brunt of the income tax department’s actions in respect of claims for deduction or exemption made which, in the view of the income tax department, is not allowable. Would assessees be willing to remunerate tax auditors for such additional high risks which they would bear in certifying the computation of income? If such a requirement of certification of the computation of income were introduced, it is possible that many chartered accountants may no longer be willing to carry out tax audits.

The biggest beneficiaries of ICDS may be tax lawyers and chartered accountants, who will have to handle the resultant additional litigation. The biggest losers will be the taxpayers, due to additional compliance and litigation costs, and the country, due to loss of productive manhours, and the loss of potential growth in business.

BLACK MONEY ACT: A MALEVOLENT LAW

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Black money is a cancer in our economic system, not yet terminal or life-threatening, and unquestionably deserves closer scrutiny by the government. However, the kind of action that has been taken on this front of late is difficult to understand. The replacement of the dreaded Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) was supposed to put an end to harassment by tax sleuths and enforcement officials. But, through various recent actions, the government has opened the door to such behaviour once again.

In this article, I have tried to capture various issues which have cropped up with the enactment of the Black Money law. Even after the CBDT has tried to address few issues by rolling out circular of frequently asked questions, still there is a lack of clarity in many areas on applicability of this dreadful law.

Constitutional Validity of Change in Date of Commencement of Act
To start with the list of issues, firstly, the move of the Finance Ministry to advance the date of operation of the black money law from April 1, 2016 to July 1, 2015 is highly questionable. Could the government have “amended” a law passed by the Parliament which had already received the assent of the President through an Executive Order? If the date from which the law would come into force was part of the Bill passed by both Houses of Parliament, then how anybody other than Parliament could have changed it. The government should have gone to the Parliament for amending it.

Section 86 (1) of the Act empowers the Central government to order to remove difficulties not inconsistent with the provisions of the main Act as a delegate of Parliament. But in the instant situation, the government has actually amended section 1(3) of the main Act by altering the date when the Act shall come into force from 1st April, 2016, to 1st July, 2015 in a notification issued by an officer of the rank of Under Secretary to remove any “difficulty” that comes in the way of giving effect to the provisions of the Act through an order. But the “difficulty” that the section refers to cannot apply to the date from which the law would come into force. Further, a delegated legislation cannot amend the parent legislation.

Duration of Compliance Window
It was expected that the government would provide a compliance window of 3 to 6 months, though the author’s view is that a period of 6 to 9 months would have to be provided for those, who may want to take this one time opportunity and to get the proper valuation of their assets done in terms of complicated Rules for valuation. The 3-month window will certainly be a practical difficulty faced by persons who are genuinely interested in making a disclosure of undisclosed foreign assets. Supposedly, a person having investments and assets in, let us say, 7 tax havens (Switzerland, Cayman Islands, Bermuda, Luxembourg, Jersey, Singapore and Mauritius) and wants to come clean by making declaration of undisclosed assets. Further, calculating the fair value of unlisted shares will be a pain and above that it will be a task to satisfy the tax authority that the disclosure made under the one-time compliance window is correct. An individual who holds shares in an unlisted firm will have to find out the fair value of all assets that firm holds which will be time-consuming. It will not be easy to complete the valuation exercise in three months time frame allotted (at the time of writing this article, approximately one month of the time frame has already elapsed) for one-time compliance window, but the downside of not declaring could be severe in view of the automatic exchange of information becoming effective soon. If this three-month compliance scheme is compared with the tax authority’s 2 year time frame to complete an assessment, such short compliance scheme may cause undue hardship and be a burden to declarants to satisfy the requirements prescribed under the scheme. If the information comes to the notice of the tax department post this window, the payout would be much more and there would be the risk of imprisonment and prosecution. More so if anyone, even by mistake, makes an incorrect declaration, then the entire declaration will be treated as null and void. The tax and penalty paid will not be refunded and the information given in the form will be used against the person for initiating proceedings by any demand raised against the declarant.

CONFUSION OVER NON-REFUNDABLE TAX AND PENAL TY UPON REJECTION OF THE DECLARA TION UNDER CO M-LIANCE WINDOW SCHEME

If the declaration is regarded as void under section 68 of the Act (Chapter VI – Compliance Window Scheme), then whether the tax and penalty paid would be refunded? This question requires clarification from the CBDT. However, having regard to the provisions of section 66 and section 68, such tax and penalty may not be refunded to the declarant and the declaration shall be deemed never to have been filed under Chapter VI of the Act. Now, since the declaration is deemed never to have been filed, the Assessing Officer may issue a notice under the normal provisions of this Act. Consequently, the declaration may be required to pay tax and penalty, as per the provisions of the Act. However, the declarant should be allowed to claim set-off of the amount of tax and penalty already paid under this chapter for the assets declared vide the declaration (which was regarded as void under section 68) and therefore only the remaining amount of tax and/or penalty should be required to be paid.

PROBLEM ON OBTAINING INFORMATION ON BANKS ACCOUN TS BY THE DECLARANT

Under Indian Income Tax Act, the tax department can go back up to 16 years whereas under the Black Money Act (which prescribes no time limit) the resident is expected to disclose, as per the circular issued, income or assets even for a period beyond 16 years also. This could be 20, 30 or even 40 years depending on when an account was opened or even sums inherited by a person or person from whom assets were inherited did not pay taxes on such assets. Some of the accountholders in the Liechtenstein bank LGT had opened accounts in the late 1960s and 1970s. Foreign banks do not have account details beyond 10 years. If a person cannot furnish all details, then he would not be able to comply and the tax department will reject the application which is made under the one-time compliance window. However, in a case where there are undisclosed assets other than bank accounts in the declaration, it is uncertain whether the entire declaration would be rejected or only the bank account declaration would stand reject on account of non-compliance of the details so prescribed by the Government.

In some countries like the UAE, there is no income tax and also no legal requirement to maintain books of accounts for tax purpose. In such cases, it will be difficult for individuals to get details of all transactions in the bank account.

Prior Information received by Govt under DTAA
Declarant under the compliance window has no means to know whether the Government has received any prior information under DTAA on or before 30 June 2015 about his undisclosed assets. Supposedly, where a declarant has disclosed the information under the compliance window scheme and is later on informed by the Government that they had information about these undisclosed assets, then that declarant would have to exclude such undisclosed assets from the declaration and will also lose immunity from prosecution under Income-tax Act, Wealth Tax Act, Customs Act, FEMA and Companies Act. But the question here arises, on what grounds that declarant should rely on Government’s statement of having prior information. So, declarants may contest the Government’s assertion by filing RTI application to disclose documentary evidence substantiating Government’s claim that information under DTAA was received on or before 30th June 2015.

Valuation of Immovable Properties acquired abroad

Properties acquired abroad will be taxed on the basis of a valuation report of a valuer recognised by the foreign government. Clarification is required regarding the evidence the declarant will have to produce to prove that the valuer is recognised by that particular foreign government and to get valuation done. In most of the foreign countries, there is no system of a registered valuers notified by the Government and valuation is generally carried out by private asset valuation companies. This becomes more difficult and time-consuming for a person to first conduct a search for finding a registered valuer otherwise the declaration made would be rejected and deemed to have never been made leading to more severe and harsh consequences like higher penalty and fear of prosecution.

Valuation of Any other assets

The rules prescribed by the Government provide for valuation of any other asset. Clarification is required regarding its definition. Whether that will include intangible assets as well. Further regarding its valuation the rules provide that FMV shall be higher of cost and the price that the asset would fetch if sold in the open market on the valuation date in an arm’s-length transaction. Whether a valuation report is required for this?

Indian Nationals returning to India after few years

Professionals who return to India after having worked abroad may have opened retirement pension accounts like 401K account in US. CBDT has clarified that assets acquired when the person was a non-resident do not fall under the definition of undisclosed assets and will not be taxed under the Black Money Act or Income-tax Act. However, a question arises whether the balance in the 401k accounts will have to be disclosed by a resident in the Income Tax Return under the Schedule for Foreign Assets? Since CBDT’s circular has stated that non-reporting of foreign assets in Income-tax return and makes the person liable for penalty of Rs 10 lakh under the Act. Further, the threshold limit of Rs. 5 lakh prescribed by the Government for which the penalty is not applicable is in respect of bank account only. So, such 401k balances does not represent as bank account and the threshold limit would also not be applicable in this regard. Clarification needs to be sought from CBDT on this issue since the penalty will be harsh for a mere non-disclosure even if there is no detriment to the Government as the asset was created out of income earned when the individual was a non-resident and which is not taxable in India.

Further, there is a practical difficulty of retrieving details of such balance for those who returned to India from abroad long back. It makes no sense in putting such people to hardship without any commensurate benefit to the Government. It would be better if CBDT instructs Assessing Officers not to impose penalty in cases where non-disclosure causes no loss to the Revenue.

Inheritance of property

The CBDT in the circular containing a list of frequently asked questions has stated that in case of inheritance of property from the father and which has been sold by the son in an earlier year, son can make the declaration in respect of such property as legal representative where source of investment in the property by the father was unexplained. What happens if son is not aware of the source? Can he be liable under this Act, in case he fails to make such disclosures? Similarly, there is conflict between the Act and the Circular issued by the CBDT, where in the Circular it appears as if the non-residents are also being covered by the Act, while section 3 of the Act provides the applicability of this act to ordinarily residents only.

Further, would it be correct to argue that non-disclosure would only attract penalty of Rs. 10 lakh u/s. 42? Tax and penalty of 120% would be attracted only on income accrued on such inherited property that is not disclosed post inheritance?

Threat of Abetment

The Act imposes liability for abetting or inducing another to wilfully attempt to evade tax or to make false statements/ declarations in relation to foreign income and assets. The objective of this provision is to target professional advisors such as private banks, accountants, lawyers and other consultants whose actions may potentially be covered under ‘abetment or inducement’. This move is intended to make the Act comprehensive in its scope. That said, it is bound to cause concern among practitioners as there is no clear guidance on what precautions or due diligence will be sufficient to indicate practitioners acted within their rights or that they did not beach their code of conduct. Imposition of such liability on professional advisors and intermediaries may adversely affect advising of Indian clients by practitioners may apprehend the risk of undue harassment at the hands of Revenue officials.

There is a dire need for the Government to step in and clear the air on many issues and by not just issuing a press release stating the views in the media reports are based on surmises and may not be factually accurate or correctly reflecting the legal position. Thus, until and unless the Government lends an ear to the problems faced and helps in resolving them, this dreadful Black Money Law will only be a tool of tax terrorism.

“Black Money”- do our laws really address the problem?

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The Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income and Assets) and Imposition of Tax Act, 2015 received the assent of the President on 26th May, 2015. Subsequent to its enactment, rules were notified, and the CBDT came out with certain clarifications. The first reactions from experts seem to suggest that the law is stringent, and despite the “clarifications” is unclear about a large number of issues. The Act imposes a maximum penalty of three times the tax, and a minimum of an amount equal to the tax, for those who avail of the onetime window available to declarants who make a declaration of undisclosed assets prior to September, 2015. Apart from this, the law prescribes, punitive action by way of prosecution. If the object of the law was to achieve a whopping tax collection, that may not be achieved. This issue contains an article by T.P. Ostwal, discussing some of the significant provisions of the Act.

Money of residents which is siphoned off after evading tax, certainly causes significant damage a to a country’s economy. I had said in an earlier editorial that bringing back such foreign funds should be one of the priorities of the government. This is because such money goes out of all channels of distribution “black or white“, and consequently slows down economic activity. Thus, while all black money creation is bad, such money stashed abroad is worse. In such a situation, though garnering tax revenue and penalising offenders is certainly one of the objectives, bringing back such money into the “white” economy should be another. Does legislation like the Black Money Act have such an objective?

It is nobody’s case that those committing infringement be treated leniently but, one wonders if the law provides a marginal incentive to those who introduce the money into normal banking channels, the objective that I mentioned in the earlier paragraph can be achieved. For example, if under the scheme, if a person invests the monies lying outside India in low interest bonds issued by the government, and in return is charged a lower penalty, it would augment the government’s resources and the money would enter the legal economy. This is not a new concept and some earlier schemes did contain such provisions. I am conscious of the fact that when the Voluntary Disclosure Scheme 1997 was under challenge, there was an assurance given to the Supreme Court that there would be no further amnesty schemes. However a way has to be found so that the objective is achieved without violating the assurance /undertaking given to the Supreme Court.

It appears that when a tax law is framed the only objective of those who draft the legislation is to garner maximum taxes for the government. Undoubtedly this is a laudable objective. What must be borne in mind is that there are other angles and nuances that must be appreciated. This is often not done.

Two examples quickly come to mind. They are in the form of two provisions in the Income tax Act, one which has been with us for a decade and a second which was legislated recently. It is well known that a real estate business is one of the largest sectors where the parallel economy prospers. Transactions in real estate take place at prices which are significantly different from those recorded in the documents. It is extremely difficult to tax such unrecorded consideration given the lack of evidence. To counter this a provision was brought in whereby the stamp duty valuation was treated as the full value of consideration received if this was more than the consideration stated in the document,. The provision contains reasonably sufficient safeguards to ensure that genuine cases did not suffer. The provision enabled the tax gatherer to tax the difference in the hands of the seller.

What is important is that the difference in the stamp value valuation and the prices recorded in the document is a definite indicator that the balance consideration received by the seller and paid by the purchaser has entered the parallel economy. No attempt seems to have been made to bring this into the official channel. . Similarly, the provision of adopting the stamp duty valuation is now extended to those carrying on business in real estate. Once again the tax gatherer is happy collecting tax while no effort seems to have been made to bring such money which is outside the system into the mainstream. What really happens is that such money which lies outside the economy does not lie idle. It is invested, reinvested or “turned over” in business cycles and grows. Therefore, the volume in the parallel economy doubles itself in 5 to 6 years.

What one really needs to attempt is the creation of an environment, either through incentives or otherwise to bring such money back into the recorded economy. It is only then that the problem of black money with all its attendant ills will be reduced. I do appreciate that this is easier said than done; but law makers, particularly in the tax field must keep this in mind. This may call for some innovative solutions but an attempt must be made.

When will this objective of reducing the black money volume be achieved? This will be achieved only when the concept of “ease of doing business” does not remain on paper but is brought into reality on the ground. Archaic laws must be repealed, unfair provisions in laws amended and existing laws administered fairly and in a humane manner. Then the volume of black money will be reduced.

As India celebrates its 68th Independence Day, will the law makers, politicians and bureaucrats take some action in this regard?

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Love

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“Love is to the Human Heart, what sun is to flowers”
–Swami Chinmayanandji

At a recent workshop on “Harmonising Personal & Professional Life for Effective Leadership” organised by Dharma Bharathi Mission and the BCAS Foundation, Swami Sachidananda Bharathi addressed the participant and said:

“In order to be harmonious, healthy, peaceful and happy persons, we need to know something about the deepest yearnings of the human heart. It is found that there are four deepest yearnings that are common to most human hearts:

1. Yearning for love
2. Yearning for acceptance
3. Yearning for dignity
4. Yearning of equality.”

Hereunder are a few thoughts on LOVE:

It is sad that in this world – we all are deprived of love. There is hardly a time in human history when there is no conflict – of race, of religion, for water, for territory and so on.

Love is inborn in human beings, yet it is not manifested much in reality.

Osho says:
“Love is a phenomenon, where the ego disappears and you are fully conscious.”

You need Power, only when you want to do
something Harmful, Otherwise Love is
Enough to get everything done.
–Charlie Chaplin

The best love is the kind that awakens that soul; that makes us reach for more, that plants the fire in our hearts and brings peace to our minds.

As Swamiji said:
“Without love, we cannot really grow and blossom to our full potentials. Without love, we also cannot be really happy and healthy. Love sustains us. Love nourishes us. It is the source of life and existence. That is why religions and spiritual masters refer to God as ‘Love Infinite’… The greatest hunger in the world today is not for food, but for love. Mother Teresa had pointed out that ‘the tragedy of the modern world is lack of love’. She also had said: “Where there is hatred you can sow love; where there is injury you can sow pardon! Spread love everywhere you go!”

Most of the individuals are narcissists – they love themselves (though many do not deserve it!). Many love others – family, citizen, even animals (especially dogs & cats), and plants. One of my friend’s wife tells me that she loves plants and she regularly talks to them and they blossom (smile!) in response.

There is selfish love. There is selfless love which is the best gift of God to many, e.g. Mother Teresa. To love another person is to see the face of God.

Happiest are the people who love and are loved.

Martin Luther King Jr. Wrote:
I have decided to stick to love. Hate is too great a burden to bear.

Let us all decide the same.

(August is the month of my birthday. So, it is a special month of love, and this is my ‘BHET’).

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Business expenditure – Accounting – Sections 37 and 145 – A. Ys. 1996-97 to 1999-00 – Accounting standards issued by ICAI not to be disregarded – Accounting standard employed by assessee, issued by ICAI but not notified by Central Government – Not a ground to discard – Lease equalisation charges – Deductible from lease rental income

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CIT vs. Pact Securities and Financial Services; 374 ITR 681 (T&AP):

For the A. Y. 1998-99, the assessee showed gross lease rental of Rs. 1,14,91,395/- as income. Out of this, a sum of Rs. 48,56,224/- was claimed as deduction of lease equalization charges from the lease rental income following the guidance note on accounting of leases, Issued by the ICAI. The Assessing Officer disallowed the lease equalisation charges. The Tribunal allowed the claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Telangana and Andhra Pradesh High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) The Assessing Officer could not have disregarded the method of accounting followed by the assessee in respect of the lease rental as it was based on a guidance commended for adoption by a professional body such as the ICAI. The guidance note reflected the best practices adopted by accountants the world over. The fact that at the relevant point of time, it was not mandatory to adopt the methodology professed by the guidance note issued by the ICAI was irrelevant because as long as there was a disclosure of the change in the accounting policy in the accounts, which had the backing of a professional body such as the ICAI, it could not be discarded by the Assessing Officer.

(ii) Notwithstanding the fact that the opinion of ICAI was expressed in a guidance note which had not attained a mandatory status, would not provide a basis to the Assessing Officer to disregard the books of account of the assessee and in effect the method of accounting of leases followed by the assessee.

iii) Merely because the Central Government has not notified in the Official Gazette “accounting standards” to be followed by any class of assesses or in respect of any class of income, it could not be stated that the accounting standards prescribed by the ICAI or the accounting standards reflected in the “guidance note” cannot be adopted as an accounting method by an assessee.

iv) T he questions of law are answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.”

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Appeal to High Court – Competency of appeal – Rule of consistency – Sections 92B and 260A – A. Y. 2007-08 – Decision of Tribunal on identical issues relating to section 92B – No appeals from decisions – Presumption that the decision has been accepted – Appeal on similar issue to High Court not maintainable

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CIT vs. Tata Autocomp Systems Ltd.; 374 ITR 516 (Bom):

The Revenue had filed an appeal before the High Court against the order of the Tribunal relating to section 92B. Appeal was not preferred against the decisions of the Tribunal on identical issue in other cases:

The Bombay High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue and held as under:

“i) T he order of the Tribunal, inter alia, had followed the decisions of the Bombay Bench of the Tribunal to reach the conclusion that the arm’s length price in the case of loans advanced to associate enterprises would be determined on the basis of the rate of interest being charged in the country where the loan is received/ consumed.

ii) T he Revenue had not preferred any appeal against those decisions of the Tribunal on the above issue. No reason had been shown as to why the Revenue sought to take a different view in the present case from that taken in those decisions of the Tribunal. The Revenue having not filed any appeal against those decisions, had in fact accepted the decisions of the Tribunal. The appeal was not maintainable.”

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Business Expenditure – Disallowance u/s. 40A(3) of payments in cash in excess of specified limit in an assessment made for a block period – Provisions to be applied as applicable for the assessment years in question

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M. G. Pictures (Madras) Ltd. vs. ACIT (2015) 373 ITR 39 (SC)

The appellant/assessee was engaged in production and distribution of motion pictures mainly in Tamil language. There was a search u/s. 132 of the Income-tax Act, at the business premises of the assessee during which certain book of accounts were seized. Consequent to the search, proposal was made for assessment for the block period of ten years 1.4.1986 to 31.3.1996 and thereafter, up to 13.9.1996.

The Assessing Officer disallowed the expenditure where the payments were made in cash in excess of Rs.10,000/- relying on section 40A(3) of the Act as it stood prior to 1.4.1996.The appellant filed appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Madras Bench (‘the Tribunal’). The Tribunal vide order dated 28.6.2000 partly allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to the Assessing Officer for considering the claim whether the income/loss from the film Thirumurthy was to be computed for the assessment year 1996-97 in accordance with Rule 9A of the Income Tax Rules. It was also directed that in making the computation, the Assessing Officer will consider the expenditure and make the disallowance under the provisions of section 40A(3) of the Act, as was applicable for the assessment year in question.

Feeling aggrieved by the order of the Appellate Tribunal, the appellant filed appeal before the High Court. The High Court did not accept the contentions of the appellant which were based on the amended section 158B(b) in Chapter XIVB of Finance Act, 2002 and dismissed the appeal.
Questioning the validity of the aforesaid judgment of the High Court, the appellant preferred an appeal with the leave of the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court noted that in the year 1996, the provisions of section 40A(3) of the Act did not allow any expenditure if it was more than Rs.20,000/- and paid in cash. The only exception that was carved out in such cases was where the assessee could satisfactorily demonstrate to the Assessing Officer that it was not possible to make payment in cheque. Even in those cases, the expenditure was allowable up to Rs.10,000/- and all cash payments made in excess of Rs.10,000/- were to be disallowed as the expenditure. Provisions of section 40A(3) were amended with effect from 1.4.1996. With this amendment, in cases where the cash payment is made in excess of Rs.20,000/-, disallowance was limited to 20% of the expenditure.

The Supreme Court observed that since the date of the amendment fell within the aforesaid block period, the assessee wanted the benefit of this amendment for the entire block period of ten years, i.e., 1.4.1986 to 31.3.1996. According to the Supreme Court, such a plea was unacceptable on the face of it inasmuch as the amendment was substantive in nature, which was made clear in the explanatory notes of amendments as well.

The Supreme Court held that once the amendment was held to be substantive in nature, it could not be applied retrospectively. The only ground on which the assessee wanted benefit of this amendment from 1.4.1986 was that the assessment was of the block period of ten years. The Supreme Court noted that, however, on its pertinent query, learned counsel for the appellant was fair in conceding that there was no judgment or any principle which would help the appellant in supporting the aforesaid contention. According to the Supreme Court, the order of the High Court was perfectly justified.

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Lodha Builders Pvt Ltd. & five other group companies vs. ACIT ITAT“E” Bench, Mumbai Before D. Karunakara Rao, (A. M.) and VivekVarma, (J. M.) I.T.A. No.475 to 481/M/2014 A.Y. 2009-10. Decided on: 27-06-2014 Counsel for Assessee/Revenue: P.J. Pardiwala, Sunil MotiLala, Paras S. Savla and Gautam Thacker/Girija Dayal

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Section 269SS/269T and section 271D/E – Transactions involving the receipts and payments of loans and advances among the group settled by way of “journal entries” – Penalty imposed deleted on the ground of “reasonable cause.”

Facts:
The assessees and five other appellants belong to the Lodha group which is engaged in the business of land development and construction of real estate properties. There were large number of transactions aggregating to Rs. 495.23 crore involving the receipts and payments of loans and advances among the group settled by way of “journal entries”. During the assessment proceedings, the AO asked the assessee to show cause as to why loans were accepted/repaid otherwise than by the account payee cheque/draft.

In this regard, assessee informed that the said loans/advances were transacted with the sister concerns only by way of “journal entries” and there were no cash transactions involved. The core transactions were undertaken by way of cheques only. It was further explained that the assessees resorted to the journal entries for transfer/assignment of loan among the group companies for business consideration. Journal entries were passed to transfer/ assign liabilities or to take effect of actionable claims/ payments received by group companies on behalf of the assessee. It was contended by the assessee that the said transactions with the sister concerns were for commercial expediencies which should be kept outside the scope of the provisions of sections 269SS/269T of the Act. The journal entries were also passed in thebooks of accounts for reimbursement of expenses and for sharing of the expenses within the group to which the provisions of section 269SS of the Act have no application and for this, the assesses relied on the judgment of the Madras High Court in the case of CIT vs. Idhayam Publications Ltd. [2007] 163 Taxman 265. It also relied on the CBDT Circular No.387, dated 6th July, 1984 and contended that the purpose of introducing section 269SS of the Act was to curb cash transactions only and the same was not aimed at transfer of money by transfer/assignment of loans of other group companies.

The Addl. CIT relied on the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Triumph International (I) Ltd., dated 12-06-2012 reported in 22 taxmann.com 138/345 ITR 370 where it was held that where the loan/deposit were repaid by debiting the amount through journal entries, it must be held that the assessee has contravened the relevant provisions. According to him even bona fide and genuine transactions, if carried out in violation of provisions of section 269SS of the Act would attract the provisions of section 271D of the Act. Accordingly, he levied a penalty of Rs. 495.24 crore u/s. 271D.

On appeal, the CIT(A) relied on the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Triumph International (I) Ltd. dated 17-08-2012, for the proposition that receiving loans and repayments through “journal entries” constitutes “violation” within the meaning of provisions of section 269SS and 269T of the Act.

Held:
According to the Tribunal, the CIT(A) ignored the finding of the Bombay High Court in the case of Triumph International (I) Ltd. which judgment was relied on by him viz., that “the transactions in question were undertaken not with a view to receive loans/deposits in contravention of section 269SS but with a view to extinguish the mutual liability of paying/receiving the amounts by the assessee and its sister concern to the customers. In the absence of any material on record to suggest that the transactions in question were not reasonable or bona fide and in view of section 273B of the Act, we see no reason to interfere with the order of the Tribunal in deleting the penalty..”. Further, referring to the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Triumph International (I) Ltd. dated 12-06-2012, the Tribunal agreed with the revenue that the journal entries are hit by the relevant provisions of section 269SS of the Act. However, it added that as per the said judgment completing the “empty formalities” of payments and repayments by issuing/receiving cheque to swap/square up the transactions, was not the intention of the provisions of section 269SS of the Act, when the transactions were otherwise bona fide or genuine. Such reasons of the assessee constitute “reasonable cause within the meaning of section 273B of the Act. The Tribunal further noted that there is no finding of AO that the impugned transactions constituted unaccounted money and are not bona fide or not genuine. In the language of the Bombay High court, “neither the genuineness of the receipt of loan/deposit nor the transaction of repayment of loan by way of adjustment through book entries carried out in the ordinary course of business has been doubted in the regular assessment”.

According to the Tribunal, admittedly, the transactions by way of journal entries were aimed at the extinguishment of the mutual liabilities between the assessees and the sister concerns of the group and such reasons constitute a reasonable cause. The Tribunal further noted that the causes shown by the assessee for receiving or repayment of the loan/deposit otherwise than by accountpayee cheque/bank draft, was on account of the following, namely: alternate mode of raising funds; assignment of receivables; squaring up transactions; operational efficiencies/ MIS purpose; consolidation of family member debts; and correction of errors. According to it, all these reasons were, prima facie, commercial in nature and they cannot be described as non-business by any means. The tribunal agreed with the assessee as to why should the assessee under consideration take up issuing number of account payee cheques/bank drafts which can be accounted by the journal entries. What is the point inissuing hundreds of account payee cheques/account payee bank drafts betweenthe sister concerns of the group, when transactions can be accounted in books using journal entries, which is also an accepted mode of accounting? In its opinion, on the factual matrix of these cases under consideration, journal entries should enjoy equal immunity on par with account payee cheques or bank drafts. Therefore, the tribunal held that though the assessee had violated the provisions of section 269SS/269T of the Act in respect of journal entries, the assessee had shown reasonable cause and, therefore, the penalty imposed u/s. 271D/E of the Act were not sustainable.

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[2014] 46 taxmann.com 217 (New Delhi – CESTAT) Delhi Transport Corporation vs. CST, New Delhi

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Whether provision in the agreement to bear service tax liability by service receiver would absolve the service provider from his statutory liability to pay the same to Government? Held, No.

Facts:
Appellant provided taxable service of “sale of space or time for advertisement” to various advertising agencies. The agreements entered into with these service receivers contained a clause that the liability to tax including service tax would be borne by the recipient of the service. Appellant therefore claimed that it neither obtained registration nor collected and paid service tax from service receivers under the bonafide belief that by virtue of the agreement, liability to remit service tax stood transferred to the recipient. The assessee also pointed out that, in terms of specific clause in the agreement, disputes arose between Appellant and service receivers some of which are subject matter of arbitration proceedings and that, advertisers had not reimbursed the Appellant for the service tax component. It was also submitted that, in one of such proceedings, the High Court has given a direction, that in the event service tax liability is imposed, such liability shall be on the service receiver in terms of the agreement. Accordingly reliance was placed on the Apex Court judgment in the case of Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. vs. Dewan Chand Ram Saran [2012] 21 taxmann.com 20.

Revenue rejecting the contention of the assessee invoked extended period of limitation which is assailed by the assessee on the ground of bonafide belief.

Held:
The Tribunal rejecting the claim of bonafide belief held that, nothing is alleged, asserted nor established that there is any ambiguity in the provisions of the Act, which might justify a belief that the Appellant/service provider was not liable to service tax. It further held that it is axiomatic that no person can harbour a “bonafide belief” that a legislated liability could be excluded or transferred by a contract. It is a well settled position that legislation is not rejected or amended by private agreement.

Decision of the Apex Court relied by the assessee was distinguished on the ground that, in that case Court only observed that, transferring of the burden of liability to tax to a contractor was not prohibited and qua the terms of the agreement between the parties, the contractor was liable to bear the burden. However, it is not an authority for the proposition that if the Appellant’s tax burden is shifted to the advertisers under the private agreement, the Appellant is immune to tax so far as revenue authorities are concerned. Appeal was accordingly dismissed.

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2014(34) STR 890 (Tri-Mum.) Vodafone Cellular Ltd. vs. CCE, Pune-III

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Whether the time limit of one year as provided u/s.
11B of the Central Excise act, 1944 is applicable to service tax rebate
cases specifically when the Notification does not provide any time
limit for filing such rebate claim?

Facts:
Rebate claim
filed by the appellants vide Notification No. 11/2005 was rejected on
ground that services provided in India to international inbound roamers
registered with Foreign Telecom Network operator but located in India at
the time of provision of service, was not export of services vide
Export of Service Rules, 2005 and that the refund claim was not filed
within one year and therefore, the claim was time barred. Further,
doctrine of unjust enrichment was also not fulfilled.

The
appellant contended that the Tribunal in its own case, relying on Paul
Merchants Ltd. vs. CCE 2013 (29) STR 257 (Tri.), had delivered a
favourable decision and had held that that the services provided by
appellant were “export of services” since the services were rendered to
foreign telephone service providers, who were located outside India and
the principle of unjust enrichment is not applicable for export
transactions vide section 11B (2) (a) of the Central Excise Act, 1944.
Also, there was no time limit to file rebate claim under Notification
No. 11/2005. Relying on the various High Court decisions, the appellants
advanced the argument that the ratio of Central Excise decisions will
not be applicable to service tax export matters and therefore, the time
limit prescribed in section 11B of the Central Excise Act for filing of
refund claim does not apply to service tax rebate claim filed under
Notification No. 11/2005.

The respondents claimed that the
decision of Paul Merchants Ltd. (supra) was challenged before High Court
and the case was admitted. Further, the decision delivered in
appellant’s own case was also challenged before the High Court and
therefore, the decisions given were in jeopardy. Since section 11B is
made applicable to service tax vide section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994,
time limit of one year is applicable even to the rebate claims filed
under Notification No. 11/2005. Even if it was assumed that there was no
time limit prescribed, the authority should exercise their powers
within reasonable period, i.e., one year.

Held:
The
decisions delivered in case of Paul Merchants Ltd. (supra) and in
appellant’s own case were not granted any stay. Therefore, on merits,
the appellants were eligible for rebate claim. Since the transaction was
one of export, the principle of unjust enrichment was not applicable in
view of specific provisions u/s. 11B. Time limit of one year was
applicable even to rebate claims vide section 11B of the Central Excise
Act, 1944 read with section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994. Even if it was
assumed that there was no time limit, it is a settled law that though
the law is silent, a reasonable time limit should be read into the Law.

Relying
on decisions of GOI vs. Citadel Fine Pharmaceuticals 1989 (42) ELT 515
(SC) and Everest Flavours Ltd. 2012 (282) ELT 481 (Bom.), 7 rebate
claims were remanded back for the limited purpose of verification as to
whether the claims were time barred or not in view of decision delivered
therein and two rebate claims were allowed.

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2014 (34) S.T.R. 758 (Tri.-Ahmd.) M/s. Demosha Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of C. Ex. & St. Daman

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If invoices are in the name of head office, whether CENVAT Credit can be distributed to only 1 of its units prior to 1st April, 2012? Held, Yes.

Facts:
During the period from September, 2006 to July, 2011, the appellants availed CENVAT Credit of input services, invoices of which were raised at the registered/head office. The head office, not being registered as Input Service Distributor, did not raise any invoice on the appellants to distribute CENVAT Credit. Accordingly, CENVAT Credit availed by the appellants was disallowed in absence of valid document for availment of CENVAT credit vide Rule 9(1) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004. The department contended that in absence of registration as Input Service Distributor, the appellants were not allowed to distribute CENVAT Credit only to one unit.

Held:
It was not disputed that the appellants had more than one unit, the invoices received by head office related to actual provision of services and that the appellants had availed more than eligible CENVAT Credit of service tax paid. In a similar case of Doshion Limited vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Ahmedabad 2013 (288) ELT 291 (Tri- Ahmd.), it was held that there was no requirement for proportionate distribution of CENVAT Credit. Further, there was no loss to Revenue. Also, in absence of any legal requirement, the procedural irregularity had to be ignored. Further in case of Modern Petrofils vs. Commissioner of Central Excise 2010 (20) STR 627 (Tri. Ahmd.), the invoices were raised in the name of head office as against factory and the appellants were not registered as Input Service Distributor. The Tribunal held that since admissibility of input services was not disputed, the omissions were curable defects and CENVAT Credit was allowed. Since there were no provisions for distribution of proportionate CENVAT Credit as Input Service Distributor to various units before 1st April, 2012 and in view of ratio of decisions cited above, the appeal was allowed.

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2014 (34) STR 796 (Tri. – Ahmd) Jayesh Silk Mills vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Surat

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In absence of any prescribed time limit, whether application for restoration of appeal can be filed anytime? Held, No.

Facts:
The Tribunal directed the appellants to deposit entire amount of duty demanded as pre-deposit vide Order dated 5th July, 2005. However, due to non-compliance with the said requirement, the appeal was dismissed vide Order dated 5th October, 2005. Subsequently, the appellants deposited 50% duty on 30th December, 2005 and 20th February, 2006 and requested the Tribunal to restore the Appeal. The Tribunal extended the time limit for predeposit till 30th November, 2006. Further, the payment made was supposed to be reported on 1st December, 2006. Since, the amount was not deposited within even such extended time limit, the Appeal was dismissed vide Order dated 13th December, 2006.

The appellants filed an application for restoration of appeal after four years with the reasoning of financial difficulty and closure of business, they could not deposit balance amount. Further, since there were various decisions in favour of the appellants, the appellants requested to restore the Appeal without insisting on deposit of balance dues.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that the Mumbai Tribunal in case of Kiritkumar J. Shah vs. C.C.E, Nagpur 2011 (22) STR 246 (Tri.-Mum.), had held that three months, being the maximum time allowed for filing appeal, should be considered to be time limit even for filing application for restoration of appeal and that there cannot be any justification to file application at the sweet will of the assessee. Relying on the Mumbai Tribunal’s decision and having regard to inordinate delay in filling such application, the application for restoration was not considered and no merits of the case were not decided.

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2014 (34) STR 789 (Tri. – Bang.) Patel Engineering Works vs. C.C., C.E., & S.T., Visakhapatnam- I

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Whether value of goods supplied while providing services would be included in valuation under service tax? Held, No.

Facts:
The
appellants undertook maintenance and repairs of ships. They discharged
service tax on the value of services provided. However, the adjudicating
authority confirmed service tax demand on value of goods supplied while
undertaking maintenance, management or repair service. Further, service
tax on GTA services availed was not paid by the appellants. The
appellants stated that Notification Nos. 12/2003 and 1/2006 specifically
excluded value of goods sold and they discharged service tax on correct
amount with respect to GTA services.

Held:
The
Tribunal observed that the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in case of G. D.
Builders & Others vs. UOI 2013 (32) STR 673 (Del) held that Section
67 of the Finance Act, 1994 enables the Government to levy service tax
only on the consideration received for rendering taxable service and it
prohibits inclusion of value of goods supplied while rendering services.
Following the Hon’ble Delhi High Court’s decision, the Tribunal
remanded back the matter with the order to quantify and exclude the
value of goods supplied/sold along with provision of services from
service tax levy.

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2014 (34) STR 778 (Tri. – Ahmd.) JCT Electronics Ltd. vs. Commr. Of Ex. & S.T., Vododara

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Whether adjustment of excess service tax paid can be done in any of the next months/ quarters? Held, No.

Facts:
The appellants paid excess service tax which was adjusted suo motu by them after a long lapse of period. The appellants contested that such service tax adjustment was appropriate vide Rule 6(4A) and 6(4B) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 since the amount involved was less than Rs. 1 lakh. According to Service Tax Department, such adjustment could be made in the next month or next quarter provided intimation was filed to the department within 15 days of such adjustment. The case of the department was that since the appellant did not follow the procedure prescribed, their adjustment was not acceptable. The first Appellate authority confirmed the demand along with interest and also imposed penalties u/s. 76 and 77 of the Finance Act, 1994. The appellants argued that they have adjusted their own money and hence, penalty was unwarranted in the present case.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that the phrase used under Rule 6(4A) was “subsequent month or quarter” and not “subsequent months and quarters.” Further, the appellants had not fulfilled all conditions as required under the said Rules. Distinguishing the case of Siemens Limited vs. CCE, Pondicherry 2013 (29) STR 168 (Tri.), it was held that since, in the present case, there was no reasonable explanation provided by the appellant, the first Appellate authority was correct in demanding service tax along with interest. However, since the appellants had a bonafide belief with respect to adjustment of excess service tax paid, the penalties were set aside.

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2014 (34) STR 753 (Tri. – Ahmd.) Quintiles Technologies (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commr. of S.T., Ahmd.

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Whether refund of CENVAT Credit is available with respect to export of exempted services? Held, Yes.

Facts:
The appellant was engaged in exporting taxable as well as exempt business auxiliary services. The appellants had, therefore, filed refund claims for unutilised CENVAT credit under Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 read with Notification No. 5/2006-CE (NT) dated 14th March, 2006. The appellants argued that exempted services shall form part of export turnover as well as total turnover and therefore, they were eligible for 100% CENVAT Credit. However, the department was of the view that while calculating refund claim, exempted services exported shall not be considered as “Export Turnover” though the same is includible in the total turnover and accordingly, CENVAT Credit proportionate to exempted services exported shall not be admissible.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that the definition of “Export turnover of services” under Clause D of Rule 5(1) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, does not make any distinction with respect to payments received from export services. The logic of giving cash refund of taxes used in relation to export of goods/services is to have “Zero Rated exports.” Therefore, following the decision delivered in case of Zenta Pvt Ltd. 2012 (27) STR 519 (Tri.), it was held that even exempted export services should be added to export turnover of services and the appellants were allowed refund of total unutilised CENVAT Credit.

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2014 (34) STR 583 (Tri-Chennai) Sundaram Brake Lininigs vs. CCE, Chennai-II

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Whether accidental and medical insurance obtained
by the Manufacturer for employees and their family members are eligible
input services for claiming CENVAT Credit?

Facts:
The
appellants, being manufacturer of excisable goods, availed CENVAT Credit
on accidental and medical insurance premium paid for the employees and
their family members. The appellants relied on the decisions of the
Karnataka High Court in case of CCE vs. Micro labs Ltd.- 2012 (26) STR
383 (Kar.) and CCE vs. Stanzen Toyotetsu India (P) Ltd.-2011 (23) STR 44
(Kar.) wherein group insurance and health insurance policy of employees
was held to be qualified “input service.”

Revenue relied on the
decision of the Gujarat High Court in case of CCE vs. Cadila healthcare
Ltd. – 2013 (30) STR 3 (Guj) wherein it was concluded that all services,
the cost of which became part of the cost of the business, cannot be,
prima facie considered as an input service.

Held:
The
Tribunal observed that the employer took accidental insurance policy for
the workers of the company to cover its business risk and similarly,
health insurance for providing proper treatment to the employees falling
sick. Insurance bring employees back to work without loss of man-hours
and disruption of manufacturing lines of the company. Thus, such
insurance cannot be considered as having no relation with the
manufacturing activity. However, insurance premium attributable to the
families of employees had no direct nexus with the manufacturing
activity and will not be qualified as input service. Following the
decision of the Karnataka High Court in Micro labs Ltd. (supra), the
order was set aside and matter was remanded back to the adjudicating
authority to quantify the insurance premium attributable to family
members which was held ineligible as CENVAT credit.

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2014 (34) STR 586 (Tri-Del.) Radico Khaitan Ltd. vs. CCE., Delhi

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Whether service tax refund claim can be rejected on the sole technical ground that refund claim was not shown as ‘receivable’ in the Balance Sheet? Held, No.

Facts:
After paying service tax on advances received, the agreement for provision of services was terminated and consequently, no services were provided by the appellants. The appellants filed refund claim which was rejected by the Revenue.

The appellants contested that they had refunded the value of taxable service along with service tax to the customer and sufficient documents were already shown for the amounts received and refunded back to the customer. Furthermore, chartered accountant’s certificate was provided for refund of service tax amount to the customer. Further legality of claim has substantiated through guidance note, circular and judicial pronouncements and since the amount was already refunded to customer, there was no question of unjust enrichment.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that there was no dispute regarding eligibility of refund claim but, prima facie the claim was rejected since the amounts were not shown in the Balance Sheet as ‘receivable’. The rejection made on such a short ground cannot be held to be just and fair. Therefore, the Tribunal held that irrespective of the non-reflection of refund amount in the Balance Sheet, the same needs to be refunded inasmuch as the same was not required to be paid by the assesse.

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2014 (34) STR 596 (Tri-Del.) Jenson & Nicholson (India) Ltd. vs. CCE., Noida

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Whether financial services of techno-economic feasibility of rehabilitation and modalities of finance, are eligible input service? Held, Yes.

Facts:
The appellants manufacturers of paints and varnishes had various factories. The appellants, being a sick company applied to BIFR for finalising rehabilitation package and in the process availed services of techno feasibility study of rehabilitation and obtained report on further fund raising. The appellants took CENVAT Credit on such services which was denied by revenue authorities.

The appellants contested that the services were obtained in view of order of BIFR and the same were financial services covered very well within the definition of input services. In any case, these services were “activities relating to business” specifically covered under the definition of input services.

Held:
In terms of BIFR’s orders, the appellants availed such services with respect to techno-economic feasibility of rehabilitation and modalities of finance. Without such feasibility report, it was not possible for BIFR to finalise the rehabilitation package for the appellants. Therefore, such services had nexus with its manufacturing activity and are covered within the term “activities relating to business” and therefore, CENVAT Credit was allowed to the appellants.

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2014 (34) STR 610 (Tri-Ahmd.) Arvind Mills Ltd. vs. Comm. Of ST, Ahmedabad

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Whether activity, of supplying qualified/skilled employees to subsidiary/group companies, is taxable under “manpower recruitment and supply agency service”? Held, No.

Facts:
The appellants manufacturers of fabrics and readymade garments supplied qualified/skilled employees to its subsidiary/group companies. Department alleged that the transaction was covered under manpower recruitment and supply agency services. Relying on the Divisional Bench decision in case of M/s. Paramount Communication Ltd. vs. CCE, Jaipur 2013-TIOL-37-CESTAT -DEL, the appellants contested that the services were not in the nature of manpower recruitment and supply agency services.

Held:
The appellants had deputed its employees to subsidiary/ group companies engaged in similar line of business. There was no allegation or findings about deputation of employees to any concern other than its own subsidiary/group companies. The employees did not work under the direction/ supervision and control of subsidiary/group companies but completed the work as directed by the appellants.

Manpower recruitment or supply agency phrase under service tax laws, stipulated “any commercial concern” within its purview and the appellants were merely a composite textile mill and not a commercial concern engaged primarily in recruitment or supply of manpower. The Hon’ble Tribunal relied on the decision in the case of Paramount Communication Ltd. (supra) wherein it was observed that in case the personnel works for two sister concerns, the rendition of services was by the personnel to both the companies and it was not a case of one company providing services to another. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed.

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[2014] 46 taxmann.com 22 (Karnataka) – CST vs. Peoples Choice

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Whether the proceedings initiated by an order dated after the amendment, in respect to the period prior to the amendment by invoking the provision before amendment is vitiated after the amendment? Held, Yes.

Facts:

Department issued show cause notice as on 06-10-2004 calling upon the respondent to show cause as to why the service tax for security services rendered for the period from 16th October, 1998 to 31st March, 2004 should not be demanded under the provisions of section 73(1)(a) of the Act, invoking the extended period of limitation, and why it should not be recovered u/s. 73(2)(a) of the Act. The provisions contained in section 73(1)(a) of the Act were substituted vide Finance Act, 2004 with effect from 10-09-2004. The provision prevailing prior to 10-09-2004 was providing for value of taxable services escaping assessment, while after its substitution vide Finance Act, 2004, it provided for recovery of service tax not levied or paid or short-levied or short-paid or erroneously refunded.

Held

The High Court held that admittedly, on the date of show cause notice, i.e., 06-10-2004, the provisions contained in section 73(1)(a) of the said Act, prevailing prior to 10-09- 2004, were not in existence. In other words, the statutory provision under which the show cause notice issued was not in existence as on that date, and therefore as rightly held by the Tribunal SCN is not valid.

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2014 (34) STR 814 (Guj.) Astik Dyestuff Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE & Customs, Gujarat

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Whether Sales commission is eligible input service for availment of CENVAT Credit? Held, No. In case of contradictory decisions of the two High Courts, whether it is mandatory to refer the matter to Larger Bench? Held, No.

Facts:
The appellant availed of CENVAT Credit on commission services procured during the period July, 2008 to April, 2009. The Adjudicating Authority and Tribunal relying on the decision of the jurisdictional High Court in the case of CCE, Ahmedabad-II vs. Cadila Healthcare Limited 2013(4) STR 3 (Guj.) and disallowed CENVAT Credit on sales commission. Being aggrieved, the appellants filed appeal before the Hon’ble High Court with following substantial questions of law:

• Whether the Tribunal was justified in passing the order without considering contrary decisions of the Punjab & Haryana High Court and the Gujarat High Court on the same subject and also that the department had not filed appeal against the Punjab & Haryana High Court’s decision?

• Whether the Tribunal was justified in relying only on the Gujarat High Court’s decision since service tax is a central levy and such discrimination would violate Article 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India?

• Whether there was injustice on the part of the Tribunal and the order was illegal and absurd?

• Whether sales commission was not in the nature of sales promotion, an activity specifically covered in inclusive part of definition of input services for availment of CENVAT Credit?

The appellants contended that they were entitled to CENVAT Credit on sales commission in view of CBEC Circular dated 29th April, 2011 which is binding on the department. The appellants relied on various decisions in support of their contention. The appellants argued that in view of the favourable decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Ambika Overseas 2012 (25) STR 348 (P & H), the appellants was entitled to CENVAT Credit and since there were contrary decisions of the two High Courts, the appellants requested to refer the matter to the Larger Bench.

Held:
If there is conflict between the jurisdictional High Court’s decision and CBEC Circular, decision of the jurisdictional High Court is binding on the department.

Decision of the jurisdictional High Court in case of Cadila Healthcare Limited (supra) has been challenged before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the said order is not stayed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

Decision of the jurisdictional High Court is binding on the department rather than decision of the other Courts even in case there are contradictory decisions prevailing on the subject matter.

Since decision of Cadila Healthcare Limited (supra) is pending before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the matter cannot be referred to the Larger Bench. Even otherwise, the High Court did not see any reason to take a contrary view than as given in Cadila Healthcare Limited (supra).

Just because there were contrary decisions, matter cannot be referred to the Larger Bench when the High Court was in agreement with the view taken by the jurisdictional High Court.

Accordingly, the Hon’ble High Court held that the Tribunal was right in relying on the decision of Cadila Healthcare Limited (supra) CENVAT Credit of sales commission services.

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2014 (34) S.T.R. 809 (A.P.) Commr. of Cus. & C. Ex. Hyderabad-III vs. Grey Gold Cements Ltd.

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Whether CENVAT Credit of service tax paid on outward transportation of final goods from place of removal is allowed? Held, Yes.

Facts:
Respondent availed CENVAT Credit on input services of transportation of goods from place of removal. The adjudicating authority disallowed such CENVAT Credit, however the first Appellate authority relying on CBEC Circular F. No. 137/3/2006-CX.4, dated 02-02-2006 decided the case in favour of the respondent. Department appealed against the order and the matter was referred to the Larger Bench. The Larger Bench relying on the judgement of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Ludhiana 2009 (14) S.T.R. 3 (P & H), CBEC Circular and the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s decision in the case of All India Federation of Tax Practitioners vs. UOI 2007 (7) STR 625 (SC), held that service tax is a destination based consumption tax to be borne by customers. The Larger Bench also held that if CENVAT Credit is denied on transportation services, it would be a tax on business rather than being a consumption tax. The argument advanced by the department that CENVAT Credit cannot be allowed for services the value of which do not form part of value under Excise Law was not accepted by the Larger Bench.

Held:
The Hon’ble High Court agreed with the analysis of the Larger Bench of Tribunal and dismissed the appeal by the department.

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[2014] 46 taxmann.com 45 (SC) Union of India vs. Hindustan Zinc Ltd.

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Whether, as per Rule 57CC of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 (Rule 6 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004), CENVAT Credit on inputs is required to be reversed/paid if by-products arising in the manufacturing process is cleared at nil rate of duty? Held, No.

Facts:
The assessee obtained zinc ore concentrate from the mines on payment of excise duty which is used as an input for the production of zinc. In the process of manufacturing, sulphuric acid was produced as a by-product which is also a dutiable product. However, clearance of sulphuric acid as a by-product to fertiliser plants was chargeable at nil rate of duty in terms of Notification No. 6/2002-CE. Revenue contended that as per Rule 57CC of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 (Rule 6 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004), the assessee was obliged to maintain separate accounts and records for the inputs used in the production of zinc and sulphuric acid and in the absence of the same the assessee was obliged to pay 8% as an amount on the sale price of exempt sulphuric acid.

The assessee filed writ petitions under Article 226 before the High Court challenging the vires of Rule 57CC and constitutional validity of Rule 6 of the CCR, 2004 on the ground that the Central Government by subordinate legislation cannot fix rates of duties which is the prerogative of the Parliament u/s. 3 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 read with Central Excise Tariff Act, 1975. The High Court decided the petition in favour of the respondents on the interpretation of Rule 57CC and Rule 57D itself, without going into the question relating to the vires. On appeal by the department, the Apex Court decided the matter on merits and held as under:

Held:
The Apex Court observed that emergence of sulphur dioxide in the calcination process of concentrated ore is a technological necessity and then conversion of the same into sulphuric acid as a non-polluting measure cannot elevate the sulphuric acid to the status of final product. Technologically, commercially and in common parlance, sulphuric acid is treated as a by-product in extraction of non-ferrous metals by companies not only in India but all over the world.

It was further observed that the given quantity of zinc concentrate will result in emergence of zinc sulphide and sulphur dioxide according to the chemical formula on which respondents have no control. The ore concentrates (zinc or copper) are completely utilised for the production of zinc and copper and no part can be traced in the sulphuric acid which is cleared out. The Court held that, when in the case of the respondents, no quantity of zinc ore concentrate has gone into the production of sulphuric acid, and that entire quantity of zinc concentrate is used for the production of zinc, applicability of Rule 57CC cannot be attracted. Accordingly, the Hon’ble Court affirmed the decision of the High Court holding that the mischief of recovery of 8% under Rule 57CC on exempted sulphuric acid is not attracted.

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2014(34) STR 906 (SC) Ghanshyam Dass Gupta vs. Makhan Lal

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Whether the High Court can decide the appeal ex parte on merits in case of non-appearance on behalf of appellant in view of Explanation to Order 41 Rule 17 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure? Held, No.

Facts:
The appellant engaged a lawyer for conducting his appeal before the High Court. Later on, the lawyer was elevated as judge of the High Court and consequently, he returned the brief. Though the appellant engaged another lawyer, due to oversight of the clerk, Vakalatnama of the new advocate was not placed on record and therefore the new lawyer was not intimated of the final hearing. On the day of final hearing, the old lawyer informed that he had been returned the brief and therefore there was no effective appearance made on behalf of the appellant. Even the respondent was absent. The learned judge however, decided the appeal on merits by a detailed judgment.

The appellant contended that the High Court was not justified in deciding the appeal on merits since there was no representation on behalf of the appellant. The appellant alleged that the only course open to the High Court was either to dismiss the appeal on default or adjourn the same, in view of Explanation to Order 41 Rule 17(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC).

The respondent’s counsel contested that since the appeal was of the year 2003 which came up for the final hearing after nine years, the High Court can decide the matter on merits even in the absence of the appellant.

Held:
After discussing the Explanation to Order 41 Rule 17 (1) of CPC in detail, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the explanation was introduced to give an opportunity to the appellant to convince the Appellate Court that there was a sufficient cause for non-appearance. Such an opportunity would be lost, if the Court decides the appeal on merits. Following the decision in case of Abdul Rahman and Others vs. Athifa Begum and Others (1996) 6 SCC 62, the Hon’ble Supreme Court allowed the appeal, restored the appeal and directed the High Court to dispose off the appeal in accordance with Law.

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Belated refund applications and refund under MVA T Act, 2002

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Introduction
Under the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002 (MVAT Act), there are a number of new procedures as compared to the earlier regime of the BST Act. The major departure is in regard to getting refund as per the records of the dealer.

Earlier, there used to be speaking assessments orders in all cases. Therefore, irrespective of the data in the return in the course of assessments, dealers were able to put before the assessing authority the correct position, as per record and also used to get refunds as per the said records. Thus, even if refund was not claimed in the return, the dealer could, in the course of assessment, put forth his claim.

Refund as per returns under MVA T Act, 2002
Under the MVAT Act, there is a prescribed procedure for getting refunds as per returns. The procedure for granting refunds is given in section 51 of the MVAT Act, 2002. If a dealer is entitled to a refund, as per returns filed by him, then he can file an application u/s. 51 (form 501) for claiming the said refund. The department can process the application and if satisfied, refund will be granted.

However, there is time limit for filing such an application for refund. Upto 2008-09, the said time limit was three years. On 01-05-2011 section 51(7) was amended, so as to curtail the time limit from three years to 18 months. As per the interpretation of the Department, the said curtailed period was to apply from the year 2009-10. However, the matter was contested before the Hon’ble Bombay High Court and in case of Vaibhav Steel Corporation (69 VST 460), it was held that refund being a substantive right, the amendment should apply prospectively and can not apply to prior periods. Accordingly, in the above case, though application for the year 2009-10 was filed after 18 months but as it was within 36 months, the Hon’ble High Court directed the authorities to process the application.

Refund application for 2010-11

In the case of Vaibhav Steel Corporation, the issue was about 2009-10. Therefore, there was uncertainty about application of the said ruling to the period 2010-11. It was contended by the department that the said ruling will not apply to the period 2010-11.

Recent judgment in case of Sagar Enterprises
Recently, the Hon’ble Bombay High Court had one more occasion to deal with the above controversy. In the judgment in the case of Sagar Enterprises (WP No. 12191 of 2013, dated 15-07-2014), in addition to the period 2009-10, year 2010-11 was also involved, the Hon’ble High Court has observed as under;

“2. The claim of the Petitioner is for refund. That arises in the backdrop of the returns for the Financial Years 2009- 2010 and 2010-2011 under the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2 002. The Petitioner claims that as per section 61 of the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002 the Audit Report was filed before the due date prescribed. The Audit Report for the aforesaid period resulted in refund to the tune of Rs.17,51,801/- and Rs. 7,24,218/- respectively.

3. The Petitioner claims that he approached the Authorities for refund being a dealer covered by the Act, but what has been brought to his notice is the circular under which the Commissioner notified that all such applications and to seek refund ought to be within the period prescribed by s/s. (7) of section 51 of the Act. It is urged that the circular insists that the Maharashtra Act No. XV/2011 by which section 16(4) was inserted w.e.f. 01-05-2011 would govern the claim. Meaning thereby, that an application for refund cannot be entertained unless it is made within 18 months from the end of the year containing the period to which the return relates.

4. The learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner states that the words “18 months” were substituted for the original words “three years” by the Maharashtra Act No. XV/2011 w.e.f. 01-05-2011. This cannot govern the claim for refund for the prior period. In fact the Assessment Orders passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax, Business Audit Branch, Mumbai and the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Refund Audit Branch are referred to in the petition. Thus, it is submitted that so long as the claim of the Petitioner pertains to the Accounting Years 2009- 2010 and 2010-2011 the applications for refund could have been filed within a period of three years and not the curtailed period. The circular, therefore, travels much beyond the legal provision and in any event the circular cannot govern and control interpretation of the subject legal provision, is the submission of the Petitioner’s Advocate.

5. Mr. Vagyani, learned Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the Respondents, on instructions, states that though such stand has been taken and reiterated in the affidavit filed by the Joint Commissioner (Respondent No. 3) in reply to this Writ Petition, now he has received instructions to state before this Court that the Petitioner’s refund applications shall be processed after they being treated as filed under the unamended provision. The refund applications shall be processed and an order will be passed thereon as expeditiously as possible and before 31st August, 2014.

6. We accept these statements made by Mr.Vagyani on instructions, as undertakings given to this Court. We direct that the refund applications of the Petitioner be processed and disposed of accordingly. No further extension will be granted under any circumstances.”

In light of above, it appears that for 2010-11 also the time limit to submit refund applications was three years. Therefore, the dealers, who have not uploaded applications within 18 months but have submitted it within 18 months thereafter with covering letters etc., will be eligible to take benefit of above judgment.

However, the issue still remains where the applications have not been filed within 36 months. The issue also remains for the other years where there has been a delay in submitting refund applications.

In the above writ petition, the learned advocate for the petitioner brought to the notice of the Hon’ble High Court 252 other cases for which there is delay and hence, the refunds have remained pending. The Hon’ble High Court has called for details and thereafter further action will be taken.

From the above legal position, it appears that the claims of refunds should be considered by Department in substance without rejecting them on technicalities. The dealers can expect relief in regard to refunds irrespective of filing of belated application etc.

Set off vis-à-vis details from vendors

At present under the MVAT Act, set-off is allowed/ disallowed based on cross checking of J1 & J2 annexures given with VAT Audit report in Form 704.

In case of mismatch, set-off is disallowed. In assessment/ appeals department directs furnishing of revised J1/J2 to allow set-off or the copy of Form 704 of vendor etc. On non-production of above, set-off is disallowed.

Before the Tribunal, in the case of Modern Steel (VAT App. No. 47 & 48 of 2014 dt.13-06-2014 readwith Corrigendum dt. 09-0702014). Similar facts arose.

The facts and direction of the Hon. M.S.T. Tribunal are as follows:-

“4. In the Second Appeal, Shri C. B. Thakar, the learned Advocate submitted that the set-off cannot be disallowed on the ground that the purchase are not disclosed by the vendor in the audit report in Form 704 or even has not filed the audit report. He, therefore, submitted that the appeal be remanded for verification of the purchases and enquiry concerning the transactions of M/s. Munirs Dismantling Company/Corporation.

6.    On perusal of the appeal order and assessment order concerning the disallowing of set-off of m/s. munirs Dismantling Company/Corporation, we find that  both  the authorities have not enquired into as to whether the reports are filed and tax is paid on the said transactions also. We do not find that both the authorities have verified the purchases of m/s. munirs dismantling Company/ Corporation. the enquiry conducted by both the authorities is incomplete and require further inquiry and verification. In this view, the order passed by the appellate authority is not sustainable disallowing set-off of rs.1,99,500/- and is liable to be set aside and matter needs to be remanded to the appellate authority for verification and further inquiry.

7.    If set-off is allowed, the same would be available for adjustment of CST dues and there would be no demand in CST appeal. For the reason, it is necessary to set aside the order in CST appeal also. for the forgoing reasons, we pass the following order:

VAT Second Appeals Nos. 47 & 48 of 2013 are allowed. The disallowing of set off on purchase transactions of m/s. munirs dismantling Company/Corporation is set aside. The appellate authority is directed to verify the transactions of m/s. munirs dismantling Company/Corporation and find whether the tax is paid into Government Treasury and decide the claim of set-off in accordance with law and on assessment of the set-off, the refund if found due may be adjusted as per the provisions of law against CST demand and shall recompute the sales tax liability.

Accordingly, appeals are disposed off. Proceedings are closed.” the hon. tribunal has clearly ruled that simply on basis of non disclosure by vendor or non production of copy of form  704  of  vendor,  set-off  cannot  be  disallowed.  The verification of payment of tax by vendor is required to be brought on record.

This  judgment  gives  useful  guidance  in  the  matter  of verification of set off claim by the Department.

Matching on electronic system may be a good tool in hands of department to initiate further inquiry. however,  it cannot be the basis for disallowing set off. Accordingly verification of payment by due legal procedure is necessary on part of department.

It is expected that department will follow the direction of the  tribunal  in  pith  and  substance  and  not  subject  the buyers to unwarranted and unjustified set-off disallowance and levy of interest and penalty.

ACIT vs. Gopalan Enterprises. ITAT Bangalore ‘B’ Bench Before N. V. Vasudevan (JM) and Jason P. Boaz (AM) ITA No. 241/Bang/2013 A.Y.: 2004-05. Decided on: 13-06-2014. Counsel for revenue/assessee: L. V. Bhaskar Reddy/B. K. Manjunath.

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S/s. 28, 37, 80IB (10) – Even in an assessment u/s 143(3) r.w.s. 147 addition to income on account of bogus purchases will qualify for deduction u/s. 80IB (10).

Facts:
The assessment of total income of the assessee, a partnership firm, engaged in the business of property development was completed vide order dated 26-12-2006 passed u/s. 143(3) of the Act.

The Assessing Officer based on information received from AO of a sister concern of the assessee reopened the assessment u/s. 147 of the Act.

The assessee raised objections regarding validity of the service of notice u/s. 148 of the Act and non-furnishing of reasons recorded. The assessee was furnished with the reasons recorded by the AO on 24-12-2010.

The assessee did not participate in the proceedings for assessment and the assessment was completed u/s. 144 of the Act. In the assessment order, the AO having discussed about fictitious purchases found in the case of assessee’s sister concern concluded that an addition of Rs. 1,66,41,525 was required to be made on account of fictitious purchases. He also stated that since there was no reply from the assessee, the fictitious purchases are treated as debited to revenue/income for which section 80IB is not applicable. He, accordingly, added Rs. 1,66,41,525 to the total income of the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) where without prejudice to its contention that the expenditure is incurred for the purpose of business and therefore is allowable prayed that in view of the decision of Tribunal in the case of S. B. Builders & Developers vs. ITO (45 SOT 335)(Mum) the deduction u/s. 80IB(10) be allowed on enhanced profits. The CIT(A) upheld the addition but allowed the alternative claim of the assessee.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The AO came to the conclusion that the fictitious claim of purchases to the extent of Rs. 1,61,41,525 was considered as not relatable to the receipts which are eligible for deduction u/s. 80IB(10) of the Act because the assessee did not give any reply or participate in the assessment proceedings. In our view, such conclusion by the AO was without any basis. The AO ought to have identified it with reference to the evidence available on record as to whether fictitious purchases are relatable to the receipts which are eligible for deduction u/s. 80IB(10) of the Act.

Be that as it may, in the proceedings before the CIT(A), the assessee has categorically made a claim that the fictitious expenses are relatable to the receipts which are eligible for deduction u/s. 80IB(10) of the Act. The CIT(A), in our view, has only directed to verify the claim of the assessee and if it is found correct to allow deduction u/s. 80IB(10) of the Act in respect of enhanced income. In our view, the claim made by the assessee was that the expenses disallowed were inextricably linked with the profits on which the claim for deduction u/s. 80IB(10) was made. As rightly pointed out by the ld. Counsel for the assessee, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its decision in the case of CIT vs. Sun Engineering Works Pvt. Ltd. (198 ITR 297) (SC) has visualised a situation where the assessee cannot be permitted to challenge reassessment proceedings at an appellate or revisional proceeding and seek relief in respect of items earlier rejected or claimed relief in respect of items not claimed in the original assessment proceedings. The Hon’ble Court has, however, given a rider that if such claims are relatable to escaped income, the same can be agitated. In our view, the claim for fictitious purchases if it is relatable to profits/receipts which are eligible for deduction u/s. 80IB(10) of the Act, the disallowance of such expenses will go to enhance the income/ profits eligible for deduction u/s. 80IB(10) of the Act on which the assessee will be entitled to claim deduction u/s. 80IB(10) of the Act. It cannot be said that the disallowed expenditure cannot be considered as profits derived from the housing project or as operational profit.

The Tribunal confirmed the directions given by CIT(A).

The appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.

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K. Prakash Shetty vs. ACIT ITAT Bangalore ‘B’ Bench Before N. V. Vasudevan (JM) and Jason P. Boaz (AM) ITA No. 265 to 267/Bang/2014 A.Y.: 2006-07, 2008-09 and 2009-10. Decided on: 05-06-2014. Counsel for assessee/revenue: H. N. Khincha/ Farahat H. Qureshi

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S/s. 271(1)(c), 271AAA, 292BB – Show cause notice issued u/s. 274 of the Act not spelling out the grounds on which penalty is sought to be imposed is defective. Consequently, an order imposing penalty is invalid.

Facts:
The assessee was an individual who belonged to M/s. Gold Finch Hotel Group. There was a search u/s. 132 of the Act on 20-11-2009 in the case of the assessee. On 30-12-2011, assessment orders were passed u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 153A for AY 2006-07, 2008-09 and 2009-10. In each of these years, the income returned in response to notice issued u/s. 153A exceeded the returned income declared in return of income filed u/s. 139. The difference between the income returned u/s. 139 and income returned u/s. 153A of the Act was due to disclosure made by the assessee consequent to search u/s. 132 of the Act.

For AY 2006-07, the Assessing Officer (AO) initiated penalty proceedings u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act and for AY 2008-09, he initiated penalty proceedings u/s. 271(1) (c)/271AAA of the Act and for AY 2009-10, he initiated penalty proceedings u/s 271AAA of the Act. In respect of all the three years, the AO imposed penalty u/s. 271(1) (c) of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who confirmed the order passed by the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal, where it challenged the validity of orders imposing penalty on the ground that the show cause notice issued u/s. 274 of the Act was defective for AY 2006-07 and that for AY s 2008-09 and 2009-10 notice u/s. 274 of the Act had been issued for imposing penalty u/s. 271AAA of the Act, but the order imposing penalty was passed u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act.

Held:
The show cause notice issued u/s. 274 of the Act is defective as it does not spell out the grounds on which the penalty is sought to be imposed. The show cause notice is also bad for the reason that in A.Y.s 2008-09 and 2009-10 the show cause notice refers to imposition of penalty u/s. 271AAA whereas the order imposing penalty has been passed u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act. It held that the aforesaid defect cannot be said to be curable u/s. 292BB of the Act, as the defect cannot be said to be a notice which is in substance and effect in conformity with or according to the intent and purpose of the Act. Following the decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT & Anr vs. Manjunatha Cotton and Ginning Factory (359 ITR 565) (Kar), the Tribunal held that the orders imposing penalty in all assessment years to be invalid and consequently it cancelled the penalty imposed.

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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Capital gain: Exemption u/s. 54: A. Y. 2007- 08: Sale of bungalow jointly owned with wife: Purchase of adjacent flats one in the name of assessee and other jointly with wife and used as single residential house: Assessee entitled to exemption u/s. 54 in respect of investment in both houses:

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CIT vs. Devdas Naik (Bom): ITA No. 2483 of 2011 dated 10/06/2014: In the A. Y. 2007-08, the assessee sold a bungalow jointly owned with wife for a consideration of Rs. 3 crore. With this sum they bought three flats, one in the assessee’s name, another in the name of assessee and his wife and third in the name of the wife. The assessee claimed exemption u/s. 54 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of his investment by him in two flats. The two flats were adjacent, converted into single residential house with one common kitchen, though purchased from two different sellers under two distinct agreements. The Assessing Officer held that the assessee was entitled to exemption u/s. 54 in respect of only one flat and disallowed the claim in respect of the second flat. The Tribunal relied on the decision of the Special Bench in ITO vs. Ms. Sushila M. Jhaveri;107 ITD 327 (Mum)(SB) and allowed the assesee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Admitted fact is that the flats were converted into one unit and for the purpose of the residence of the assessee. It is in these circumstances the Commissioner held that the acquisition of the flats may have been done independently but eventually they are a single unit and house for the purpose of residence. This factual finding could have been made the basis for recording a conclusion in favour of the assessee. We do not find that such a conclusion can be termed as perverse.

ii) R eliance placed by the Tribunal on the order passed by it in the case of Ms. Sushila M. Jhaveri and which reasoning found favour with this Court is not erroneous or misplaced. The language of the section has been noted in both the decisions and it has been held that so long as there is a residential unit or house, then the benefit or deduction cannot be denied.

iii) I n the present case, the unit was a single one. The flats were constructed in such a way that they could be combined into one unit. Once there is a single kitchen, then, the plans can be relied upon.

iv) We do not think that the conclusion is in any way impossible or improbable so as to entertain this appeal. In this peculiar factual backdrop, this appeal does not raise any substantial question of law. The appeal is devoid of any merits and is dismissed.”

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Business expenditure: Disallowance u/s. 43B r.w.s. 36(1)(va): A. Y. 2006-07: Employees’ contribution to PF: Paid by the employer-assessee to the Fund before the due date for filing of return of income for the relevant year: Allowable as deduction in the relevant year u/s. 43B r.w.s. 36(1)(va):

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CIT vs. M/s. Hindustan Organic Chemicals Ltd. (Bom); ITA No. 399 of 2012 dated 11-07-2014:

For
the A. Y. 2006-07, the Assessing Officer disallowed the claim for
deduction of the employees’ contribution to the Provident Fund on the
ground that the same was paid by the employer after the due date under
the Provident Fund Scheme. The CIT(A) allowed the deduction to the
extent of the payment made during the grace period and disallowed the
balance claim of Rs. 1,82,77,138/- paid by the assesee beyond the grace
period but before the due date for filing the return of income under the
Income-tax Act, 1961. Considering the amendment of section 43B by the
Finance Act, 2003 w.e.f. 01-04-2004 and the Judgment of the Supreme
Court in the case of CIT vs. Alom Extrusion Ltd.; 319 ITR 306 (SC), the
Tribunal allowed the assess’s claim for deduction of the said amount.

In
appeal, the Revenue contended that admittedly there was a delay in
payment of the employees’ contribution to PF amounting to Rs.
1,82,77,138/- and therefore, as per the provisions of section 43B
r..w.s. 36(1)(va) of the Act, deduction on account of the said
contribution towards PF was not allowable if the payments were made
after the due dates specified in the relevant Act.

The Bombay High Court rejected the contention of the Revenue, upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)
We find that the ITAT was fully justified in deleting the addition of
Rs. 1,82,77,138/- on account of delayed payment of Provident Fund of
employees’ contribution.

ii) We therefore find that no
substantial question of law arises as sought to be contended by Mr.
Malhotra on behalf of the Revenue.”

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Export – Deduction u/s. 80HHC – Turnover to include sale of goods dealt in and sale of scrap is not includible

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Commnr. of Income Tax-VII, New Delhi vs. Punjab Stainless Steel Industries (Civil Appeal No.5592 of 2008 dated 5th May, 2014)

The assessee was a manufacturer and exporter of stainless steel utensils. In the process of manufacturing stainless steel utensils, some portion of the steel, which could not be used or reused for manufacturing utensils, remained unused, which was treated as scrap and the respondent-assessee disposed of the said scrap in the local market and the income arising from the said sale was also reflected in the profit and loss account. The respondent-assessee not only sold utensils in the local market but also exported the utensils.

For the purpose of availing deduction u/s. 80HHC of the Act for the relevant Assessment Year, the assessee was not including the sale proceeds of scrap in the total turnover but was showing the same separately in the Profit and Loss Account.

For the purpose of calculating the deduction, according to the provisions of section 80HHC of the Act, one has to take into account the profits from the business of the assessee, export turnover and total turnover. The deduction, subject to several other conditions, incorporated in the section, is determined as under:

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Total Turnover

According to the Revenue, the sale proceeds from the scrap should have been included in the ‘total turnover’ as the respondent-assessee was also selling scrap and that was also part of the sale proceeds.

The assessee had objected to the aforestated suggestion of the Revenue because inclusion of the sale proceeds of scrap into the total turnover would reduce the amount deductible under the provisions of section 80HHC of the Act.

By virtue of the judgment delivered by the High Court, the accounting method followed by the respondent assessee had been approved and therefore, Revenue filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court observed that to ascertain whether the turnover would also include sale proceeds from scrap, one has to know the meaning of the term ‘turnover’. The term ‘turnover’ has neither been defined in the Act nor has been explained by any of the CBDT circulars.

The Supreme Court held that in the aforestated circumstances, one has to look at the meaning of the term ‘turnover’ in ordinary accounting or commercial parlance.

Normally, the term ‘turnover’ would show the sale effected by a business unit. It may happen that in the course of the business, in addition to the normal sales, the business unit may also sell some other things. For example, an assessee who is manufacturing and selling stainless steel utensils, in addition to steel utensils, the assessee might also sell some other things like an old air conditioner or old furniture or something which has outlived its utility. When such things are disposed of, the question would be whether the sale proceeds of such things would be included in the ‘turnover.’ Similarly, in the process of manufacturing utensils, there would be some scrap of stainless steel material, which cannot be used for manufacturing utensils. Such small pieces of stainless steel would be sold as scrap. Here also, the question is whether sale proceeds of such scrap can be included in the term ‘sales’ when it is to be reflected in the Profit and Loss Account.

In ordinary accounting parlance, as approved by all accountants and auditors, the term ‘sales,’ when reflected in the Profit and Loss Account, would indicate sale proceeds from sale of the articles or things in which the business unit is dealing. When some other things like old furniture or a capital asset, in which the business unit is not dealing are sold, the sale proceeds therefrom would not be included in ‘sales’ but it would be shown separately.

In simple words, the word “turnover” would mean only the amount of sale proceeds received in respect of the goods in which an assessee is dealing in. For example, if a manufacturer and seller of air-conditioners is asked to declare his ‘turnover,’ the answer given by him would show the sale proceeds of air-conditioners during a particular accounting year. He would not include the amount received, if any, from the sale of scrap of metal pieces or sale proceeds of old or useless things sold during that accounting year. This clearly denotes that ordinarily a businessman by word “turnover” would mean the sale proceeds of the goods (the things in which he is dealing) sold by him.

So far as the scrap is concerned, the sale proceeds from the scrap may either be shown separately in the Profit and Loss Account or may be deducted from the amount spent by the manufacturing unit on the raw material, which is steel in the case of the respondent assessee, as he is using stainless steel as raw material, from which utensils are manufactured. The raw material, which is not capable of being used for manufacturing utensils will have to be either sold as scrap or might have to be re-cycled in the form of sheets of stainless steel, if the manufacturing unit is also having its re-rolling plant. If it is not having such a plant, the manufacturer would dispose of the scrap of steel to someone who would re-cycle the said scrap into steel so that the said steel can be re-used.
When such scrap is sold, in according to the Supreme Court, the sale proceeds of the scrap could not be included in the term ‘turnover’ for the reason that the respondentunit is engaged primarily in the manufacturing and selling of steel utensils and not scrap of steel. Therefore, the proceeds of such scrap would not be included in ‘sales’ in the Profit and Loss Account of the respondent-assessee.

The situation would be different in the case of the buyer, who purchases scrap from the respondent-assessee and sells it to someone else. The sale proceeds for such a buyer would be treated as “turnover” for a simple reason that the buyer of the scrap is a person who is primarily dealing in scrap. In the case on hand, as the respondent-assessee was not primarily dealing in scrap but is a manufacturer of stainless steel utensils, only sale proceeds from sale of utensils would be treated as his “turnover.”

The Supreme Court referred to the “Guidance Note on Tax Audit U/s. 44AB of the Income Tax Act” published by The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India and observed that the meaning given by the ICAI clearly denotes that in normal accounting parlance the word “turnover” would mean “total sales.” The said sales would definitely not include the scrap material which is either to be deducted from the cost of raw material or is to be shown separately under a different head. The Supreme Court did not find any reason for not accepting the meaning of the term “turnover” given by a body of Accountants, which is having a statutory recognition.

For the aforesaid reasons, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.

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Fresh Claim outside Return of Income or in Appeal

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Synopsis
Admissibility of a claim (which is not made by filing of revised return) before assessing officer/appellate authority, have always been a vexed issue. There are various judicial pronouncements that support the contention that an additional claim can be raised before the appellate authorities, even if it has not been raised before the Assessing Officer nor claimed in the return of income. However, recently the Chennai Tribunal in the case of Chiranjeevi Wind Energy, has held that such claim cannot be entertained.

In this Article, the learned Authors have done a detailed analysis of this decision in view of various judicial pronouncements.

An assessee is required to file his return of income, u/s. 139(1), before the due date specified in Explanation 2 to that section. In case he discovers any omission or any wrong statement in such return of income, he can file a revised return before the expiry of one year from the end of the relevant assessment year, or before the completion of assessment, whichever is earlier, in accordance with the provisions of section 139(5).

Very often, the assessee discovers a mistake or omission in the return of income after the expiry of the time prescribed for revision of his return of income u/s. 139(5). This generally happens during the course of assessment proceedings u/s. 143(2), which normally take place only towards the end of the time limit for completion of assessment, which is two years from the end of the relevant assessment year. The issue arises whether in such cases the assessee can make a claim for a deduction, before the assessing officer or before the appellate authorities, which has not been claimed in the return of income, when he is not in a position to revise his return of income. The Income-tax Department is of the view that such a claim can be made only through a revised return of income filed in time. Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Goetze (India) Ltd vs. CIT 284 ITR 323, the department contends that no such claim can be made outside the revised return of income. The case of the assessees has been that any rightful claim whenever made, should be allowed, if not by the assessing officer, at least by the Commissioner(Appeals) or the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, a stand that is objected to by the Income-tax department on the ground that any claim not considered by the assessing officer cannot be considered by the Commissioner (Appeals) or the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.

While the Mumbai bench and other benches of the tribunal has taken the view that the decision of the Supreme Court in Goetze India’s case does not apply to the claim made before the appellate authorities, who can consider any additional claim at their discretion, the Chennai bench of the tribunal has recently taken a contrary view holding that a claim not made before the assessing officer could not be considered by the Commissioner (Appeals).

Mahindra & Mahindra’s case
The issue came up before the Mumbai bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal in the case of Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd vs. Addl. CIT 29 ITR (Trib) 95.

In this case, during the course of the assessment proceedings, the assessee filed a letter with the assessing officer pointing out that the sale proceeds of R & D assets had been added to taxable income u/s. 41(1) in the computation of income, but the sale proceeds had already been reduced from R & D expenses claimed for the year u/s. 35(2AB). Effectively, the same income had been offered to tax twice through oversight. It was therefore claimed by the assessee, during the course of the assessment proceedings, that the addition made to the taxable income u/s. 41(1), in computing the total income, be ignored.

The assessing officer rejected the assessee’s claim on the ground that such a claim was not arising out of the return of income and that such a claim could only be made by filing a revised return of income, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Goetze India’s case(supra). The action of the assessing officer was confirmed by the Commissioner (Appeals).

On appeal by the assessee, the Tribunal noted that the Bombay High Court, in the case of Pruthvi Brokers & Shareholders Pvt. Ltd. 349 ITR 336, had held that even if a claim was not made before the assessing officer, it could be made before the appellate authorities. The tribunal therefore held that an assessee was entitled to raise not merely additional legal submissions before the appellate authorities, but was also entitled to raise additional claims before them. According to the Tribunal, the appellate authorities had the discretion whether or not to permit such additional claims to be raised, but it could not be said that they had no jurisdiction to consider the same. They therefore had the jurisdiction to entertain a new claim, but that they may choose not to exercise their jurisdiction in a given case was another matter.

The Tribunal therefore held that the claim of the assessee, made before the assessing officer and also made before the appellate authorities, was to be allowed, subject to verification of the evidence filed by the assessee before the assessing officer.

Chiranjeevi Wind Energy’s case
The issue again came up before the Chennai bench of the Tribunal in the case of Chiranjeevi Wind Energy Ltd. vs. ACIT 29 ITR (Trib) 534.

In this case, the assessee had claimed deduction of Rs. 10,78,976 u/s. 80-IB before the assessing officer which deduction was allowed by the assessing officer. The assessee however raised an issue of additional/ higher deduction of Rs. 50,61,142 u/s. 80-IB before the Commissioner(Appeals), on the ground that the action by the assessing officer, in disallowing certain other claims, has resulted in assessment of the total income at a higher figure and as a consequence thereof the assessee was qualified to claim a higher deduction u/s. 80IB. The Commissioner(Appeals) did not entertain such a claim presumably, on the ground that such a claim was permissible only by filing a revised return of income by relying on the decision of the Supreme court in the Goetze (India)’s case (supra).

On further appeal by the assessee, it was contended by the assessee that it was entitled to a higher deduction on account of the additions to the qualifying income returned by it. The Tribunal noted that the claim made by the assessee of Rs. 10,78,976, was allowed by the assessing officer. Higher deduction claim was never made before the assessing officer and was made before the Commissioner(Appeals) for the first time. It therefore rejected the assessee’s claim for allowance of higher deduction u/s. 80-IB.

Observations
It is a matter of serious concern that the Chennai bench of the Tribunal, in a somewhat brief decision, brushed off the claim of the assessee without considering the developed case law on the subject, in favour of the entertainment of the claim. No specific reason has been given by the tribunal but for stating that the claim was not made before the assessing officer, not realising that the need for the claim arose for the first time on account of the higher assessment by the assessing officer. It was the ground that became available to the assessee on account of the change in circumstances and the same did not exist at the time of filing the return of income.

The Bombay High Court, in the case of Pruthvi Brokers & Shareholders (supra) has discussed the issue in great detail. It observed as under:

“A long line of authorities establish clearly that an assessee is entitled to raise additional grounds not merely in terms of legal submissions, but also additional claims not made in the return filed by it.

From a consideration of decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Jute Corpn. of India Ltd. vs. CIT 187 ITR 688, it is clear that an assessee is entitled to raise not merely additional legal submissions before the appellate authorities, but is also entitled to raise additional claims before them. The appellate authorities have the discretion whether or not to permit such additional claims to be raised. It cannot however be said that they have no jurisdiction to consider the same. They have the jurisdiction to entertain the new claim. That they may choose not to exercise their jurisdiction in a given case is another matter.”

The high court in that case further held that the decision in the Jute Corporation’s case (supra)  did  not curtail  the ambit of the jurisdiction of the appellate authorities stipulated earlier. it did not restrict the new/additional grounds that might be taken by the assessee before the appellate authority only to those that were not available when the return was filed or even when the assessment order  was  made.  The  appellate  authorities  therefore have jurisdiction to deal not merely with additional grounds which became available on account of change of circumstances or law, but with additional grounds which were available even when the return was filed. Similarly, in National Thermal Power Corpn. Ltd. vs. CIT 229 ITR 383, the  supreme  Court  held  that  the  power  of  the tribunal is expressed in the widest possible terms. It noted that the purpose of the assessment proceedings before the taxing authorities is to assess correctly the tax liability of an assessee in accordance with law. As observed by the supreme Court, if, for example, as a result of a judicial decision given while the appeal is pending before the tribunal,  it  is  found  that  a  non-taxable  item  is  taxed  or a permissible deduction is denied, the assessee is not prevented from raising that question before the tribunal for the first time, so long as the relevant facts are on record in respect of that item. It therefore held that the tribunal is not prevented from considering questions of law arising in assessment proceedings although not raised earlier.

The Bombay high Court, in another judgment in the case of Balmukund Acharya vs. Dy CIT ITA No.217 of 2001 dated 19-12-2008 (reported on www.itatonline.org), has taken the view that even in the case of an intimation u/s.143(1), where the assessee had erroneously offered certain capital gains to tax in the return of income and the returned income was accepted, in appeal, the assessee was entitled to claim that the income which was wrongly offered to tax cannot be taxed.

Importantly, the Supreme Court, in Goetze India’s case (supra), has made it clear that the issue in that case was limited to the power of the assessing authority, and did not  impinge  on  the  power  of  the  income  tax appellate tribunal u/s. 254.

Therefore,   given   the   wide   powers   of   the   appellate authorities, an additional claim can be raised before the appellate authorities, even if it has not been raised before the assessing officer nor claimed in the return of income.

It is interesting to note that the CBdt, as far back as in 1955, vide its Circular no. 14-XL(35) dated 11-04-1955, have stated that:

“Officers of the Department must not take advantage of ignorance of an assessee as to his rights. It is one of their duties to assist a taxpayer in every reasonable way, particularly in the matter of claiming and securing reliefs and in this regard the Officers should take the initiative in guiding a taxpayer where proceedings or other particulars before them indicate that some refund or relief is due    to him. This attitude would, in the long run, benefit the department for it would inspire confidence in him that he may be sure of getting a square deal from the department. Although, therefore, the responsibility for claiming refunds and reliefs rests with assessee on whom it is imposed by law, officers should —

(a)        Draw their attention to any refunds or reliefs to which they appear to be clearly entitled but which they have omitted to claim for some reason or other;
(b)    Freely advise them when approached by them as to their rights and liabilities and as to the procedure to be adopted for claiming refunds and reliefs.”

The law developed, post Goetze (india)’s case, has made it abundantly clear that:

a)    an assessee is entitled to make a fresh claim for deduction or relief before the appellate authorities, during the course of the appellate proceedings, irrespective of the claim not being made by revising the return of income or before the assessing officer during the course of the assessment proceedings. The decision in Goetze (India)’s case has not prohibited such a claim before the appellate authorities.
b)    an assessing officer when confronted with the valid claim, though not made in the return of income or the revised return of income, is required to consider the same on merits and not reject simply on the ground that the claim was made outside the return of income.

In CIT vs. Jai Parabolic Springs Ltd. 306 ITR 42 (Del), the  delhi high Court held that the tribunal had power to allow deduction for expenditure to assessee to which it was otherwise entitled to even though no claim was made by the assessee in the return of income. in this case, the decision of Supreme Court in Goetze (India) Ltd. was considered. Again, the Cochin tribunal in the case of Thomas Kurian 303 ITR (AT) 110 (Coch), held that the Cit(a) had the power to entertain a claim not made in the return of income. In   Lupin Agrochemicals Ltd. ITA No. 3178 (Mum), the case of Goetze (I) Ltd. was considered and it was held that said decision did not prevent an assessee to make legal claim in assessment proceedings and that such claim could be made even in appellant proceedings. In Abbey Chemicals 94 TTJ (Ahd) 275, it was held that the Cit(a) having allowed assessee’s claim for exemption u/s. 10B after considering the facts of the case as well as the case law, could not recall his order by taking recourse to section 154, as the error of judgement, if any, committed by the CIT (A), tcould not be qualified as a “mistake” within the meaning of section 154.

The position in respect of the eligibility of the assessee to place a fresh claim, before the assessing officer, is equally good. in Chicago Pneumatic Ind. Ltd. 15 SOT 252 (Mum), the mumbai tribunal  held  that  the  a.o.  was obliged to give relief to the assessee even where the same was not claimed by the assessee by way of    a revised return. In the above case, it was observed   that the government was entitled to collect only the tax legitimately due to it and therefore one had to look into the duties of the a.o. rather than his powers to avoid undue  hardship  to  the  assessees.  the  hon.  Tribunal also referred to the CBDT Circular No. 14 (XL-35) dt. 11.04.1955, which directed the officers as back in 1955 to draw attention of the assessees to refunds and reliefs to which they were entitled but had failed to claim for some reason  or  the  other.  The  case  also  referred  to  another Circular No. F-81/27/65-IT (B) dt. 18.05.1965 and stated that the above circulars were binding on the departmental authorities.  the  above  decision  was  considered  and followed  by  the  hon.  mumbai  tribunal  in  the  case  of Emerson Network Power Ind. 27 SOT 593 (Mum) wherein the Mumbai tribunal held that the assessing officer was obliged to consider the legitimate claim of the assessee made before him but not made in the return of income or by a revised return. In  Rajasthan Commercial House v/s. DCIT,  26 SOT 51 (Uro) (Jodh),  the jodhpur tribunal held that relief claimed by the assessee could be allowed by the a.o. when such claim was made by the assessee vide a rectification application u/s. 154. Also see Dodsal Pvt. Ltd. ITA No. 680/M/04 (Mum). Lastly, the Bombay high court in the case of Balmukund Acharya ITA No. 217 of 2001 (Bom) dated 19-12-2008 again confirmed the power and the duty of the assessing officer when it inter alia held that the authorities under the act were under  an obligation to act in accordance with law and that tax could be collected only as provided under the act and that if any assessee, under a mistake, misconception or on not being properly instructed was over assessed, the authorities under the act were required to assist him and ensure that only legitimate taxes due were collected.

Today, the state of affairs are such that, leave aside the tax payers being advised of reliefs due to them, any claim for such relief by them is denied by Assessing Officers, and when entertained by the appellate authorities, is strongly resisted in appeal, sometimes even by taking the matter to the high Court or supreme Court. What is perhaps required is a change in approach of the income- tax department, where only fair share of taxes is collected, and not maximum tax by any means.  This would perhaps require not just changes to law, but change in attitude of the tax authorities. No government should be happy by short changing its citizens and surely not when they are ignorant of their rights and reliefs.

Rethinking Education!

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Two unrelated events of the recent past have been the triggers for this editorial. The first is the grants announced by the Finance Minister in the recent budget, for setting up of various educational institutions across the country. The second was my experience at a traffic signal, one morning. With the traffic in full flow, two collegegoing youths on a bike crossed a red signal with gay abandon and laughed at an old man crossing the road, who was scared out of his wits. We have gone wrong somewhere, and it is a time to rethink.

I have touched upon four issues in this piece, the structure of the education pyramid, the efficacy and the reach of subsidies, the focus of education and its objective.

It appears to me that far greater attention is given to the post-graduation institutions, as compared to primary education. The quality and coverage of school education is abysmal. We still have a large population of the rural India which has very limited or no access to basic education. Primary schools have inadequate infrastructure, both in terms of physical facilities and human resources. So while we have single teacher schools with leaking roofs, we also boast of the state of the art IITs and IIMs which are temples of higher learning for students across the world. The education pyramid appears to be inverted, with an alarming scarcity of schools and a proliferation of higher education institutions where education is big business. This has to change. In a country where resources are scarce, there needs to be a rethink of priorities. The government must concentrate on funding primary and secondary education for the masses. These schools for the public survive on government support alone. For the time being development of higher education institutions can be left to public private partnerships or other modes of funding with the government acting as a regulator and facilitator.

While on resources, there also needs to be a revisit on whether the subsidies that the state gives are reaching those who deserve them. For example, in aided institutions, education for the girl child up to higher secondary level is virtually free. One wonders whether it is really necessary to provide such a universal subsidy. I fully support a subsidy to the deserving girl child to ensure that she does not drop out of school, but should this benefit the girl who visits McDonald’s after she walks out of school? Further, governments must also formulate consistent policies in funding. Today, there is a newspaper report stating that a State Government is contemplating commencing non-salary grants after a school runs for 10 years. If this stand is taken, how can schools survive for 10 years when there is restriction on fees which they can charge? The second aspect to consider is, whether our country gets the return it deserves when it subsidises education in certain higher education institutions. Take the case of a doctor or engineer who studies in a government-aided college, and having completed his education goes abroad for higher studies and subsequently migrates. While our country has borne the cost of his education, another will reap the benefits of his skills. Should the country not be compensated for this loss in some manner? I am deeply conscious that this is easier said than done, but maybe some thinking in this regard is called for.

Then, let us look at the focus of education. It is true that India has a very young population. If these young people are to be contributors in nation building, it is necessary for them to acquire skills sets. It is therefore right to have skill development as the focus. Having said that, I believe that if the country is to become an economic powerhouse and retain that status, then substantial attention has to be paid to fundamental research, something which has not happened in the past 4 to 5 decades. Skills are required to solve problems “for now”, while basic research will solve them permanently. One finds that state support to fundamental research is limited. When budgets are pruned, research institutions’ grants are immediately cut. Even industry support to basic research is not very encouraging. This is probably because governments have a “five year” perspective while industry is averse to investment in projects with long gestation periods and uncertainty of results. With the government investing in or subsidising higher education, the area of research is one which deserves the maximum attention.

It also needs to be considered as to what the objective of education is. The obvious objective of education is the acquisition of knowledge. But is the acquisition of knowledge which will enable one to make a better living the only object? Our education must endeavour to make students better human beings and fine citizens. It is in school that empathy and respect for the views for others, tolerance and morals can be imbibed. What needs to happen is a concentrated effort to inculcate values. This is undoubtedly a difficult task. If a child is taught values in school but they are trampled on at home, and in the society that he lives in, a child is likely to be confused. Even then it is necessary to make such an attempt. The endeavour of all of us is to leave material wealth for the next generation. Instead if our schools teach values and make our students good citizens, the world will be a better place to live in. In the words of Abraham Lincoln, “the philosophy of the school room in one generation will be the philosophy of the government in the next”.

Anil.J.Sathe
Editor

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Jai Surgicals Ltd. vs. ACIT ITAT “D”, New Delhi Before R. S. Syal, (A.M.) and C. M. Garg, (J.M.) ITA No.844/Del/2013 A.Y.: 2009-10. Decided on: 26-06-2014 Counsel for Assessee/Revenue: Sanjay Jain/S.N. Bhatia

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Explanation to section 37(1) – Payments to Related Party made without obtaining prior approval of the Central Government in accordance with the provisions of section 297 of the Companies Act, 1956 was merely an irregularity and cannot be disallowed treating the same as an offence or prohibited by law.

Facts:
The assessee is engaged in the business of manufacture and export of surgical blades. The AO noted that the assessee had entered into transactions of payment of job work charges to a related party, viz., M/s. Razormed Inc. during thefinancial year relevant to the assessment year under consideration without obtaining prior approval of the Central Government inaccordance with the provisions of section 297 of the Companies Act, 1956. The assessee submitted that the post facto approval for the said transactions was obtained from the Company Law Board on payment of compounding charges for the condonation of delay and hence, there was no violation of law. However, the AO opined that the facts of post facto approval and the condonation of delay were not relevant because on the day of payment of such expenditure, there was no prior approval of the job charges paid to M/s. Razormed Inc., which triggered the Explanation to section 37(1) of the Act. He accordingly, added the sum of Rs. 41.24 lakh paid by the assessee towards job work charges. On appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the order of the AO.

Held:
The Tribunal referred to the provisions of section 297 of the Companies Act, 1956 more particularly s/s. (5) of the said provision. As per the said provisions if the consent is not accorded to any contract under the section, then anythingdone in pursuance of the contract is voidable at the option of the Board of the Company. Thus, according to the Tribunal, if the Board, despite no prior sanction, agrees to go ahead with the contract referred to in s/s. (1) of section 297 of the Companies Act, such contract would be valid. In the case of the assessee, the tribunal noted that the Board had not objected to the contracts between the assessee and Razormed Inc., thus making such contract for doing of job work valid. Thus, there was no violation of section 297 of the Companies Act inasmuch as the so-called violation as per s/s. (1) stood regularised by s/s. (5) of section 297 to the Companies Act, 1956, thereby making this transaction of payment of job charges in accordance with the provisions of the Companies Act.

Thus, according to the Tribunal, the payment made by the assessee was neither an offence nor prohibited by law, but it only committed a breach by not obtaining the necessary approval from the Central Government in time.Thus, the payment is otherwise for a lawful purpose. Further, referring to Explanation to section 37(1), the Tribunal observed that in order that the said provisions is applied, it is essential to examine the object and consideration for the expenditure incurred. If the purpose of the expenditure is either an offence or is prohibited by law, then it would suffer disallowance. If, however, the purpose of the expenditure is neither to commit an offence nor is prohibited by any law, then there can be no question of disallowance. Thus, according to it, if the expenditure is otherwise lawful and neither amounted to offence nor is prohibited by law, but the procedural requirements for incurring it were not complied with, only the irregularity will creep in, but such irregularity would not make the expenditureitself as unlawful so as to be brought within the scope of the Explanation.

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2014-TIOL-324-ITAT-MUM Javed Akhtar vs. ACIT ITA No. 39/Mum/2011 A.Y.: 2006-07. Date of Order: 07-05-2014

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Section 37 – Where the professional and residential set up of an assessee are in the same apartment, that portion of cost of lift installed by the assessee, in the premises of the society, which can be considered to be for professional purposes can be claimed as revenue expenditure.

Facts:
The assessee, a lyricist and well known film personality, operated his profession from the premises on 6th and 7th floor of Juhu Sagar Samrat Co-op. Housing Society Ltd. The building of the society was an old seven storied building having one lift. Since the lift used to get out of order very frequently, it caused substantial hardship to the persons visitng the assessee for professional purposes. Since the society was reluctant to spend money to replace the lift, the assessee spent a sum of Rs. 17,32,436 for installation of a new lift. This sum was debited to P & L Account as Society Development Expenditure and was claimed as a deduction.

The Assessing Officer (AO) disallowed the claim on the ground that lift was an essential part of the building and therefore, the expenditure was capital in nature. However, since the ownership thereof did not belong to the assessee, he denied even depreciation thereon.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who held that 50% of expenditure claimed by the assessee be capitalised and depreciation thereon be allowed.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

The Tribunal noted that the building in question was consisting of 7 floors and 14 flats out of which the assessee was owner of two flats. From one flat the assessee was doing his professional work and the other flat was used for residential purposes.

The advantage and facility of the new lift is not restricted exclusively for the professional activity of the assessee but it was also enjoyed by assessee as well as family members of the assessee other than the professional purpose. The usage of the lift by the other members of the society was not considered to be relevant for the purpose of allowablity of deduction. The assessee had incurred the expenditure keeping in view its professional and family requirements. For allowing the expenditure u/s. 37 of the Income Tax Act, the mandatory condition is that the expenditure has to be laid out wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business or profession of the assessee. However it should not be on the capital field. Since the assessee did not acquire any advantage in the capital account or any new asset for its professional purpose and the lift in question is not an apparatus of generating the professional income, therefore, the Tribunal held that it cannot be considered as an expenditure of capital nature as it does not create any new asset belonging to the assessee. It agreed with the view of the CIT(A) to the extent that 50% of the expenditure to be considered for professional purpose. Therefore, 50% of the total expenditure which was considered to be for professional purposes and was held to be allowable as revenue expenditure.

The Tribunal partly allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

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2014-TIOL-391-ITAT-AHM General Mechanical Works vs. ACIT ITA No. 2032 /Ahd/2010 A.Y.: 2002-03. Date of Order: 14-03-2014

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S/s. 28, 37(1) – A reasonable amount of profit is to be estimated and taxed when purchases are found to be bogus. The entire amount of purchases found to be bogus cannot be disallowed.

FACTS:
The assessee was engaged in the business of undertaking contract for mechanical work viz., fabrication and erection of steel structures, piping, stop log gates, coarse screens, travelling water screens mainly for various Thermal Power Projects undertaken.

The Assessing Officer (AO) observed that in an inquiry conducted by the Department in the case of M/s. Prakash Marbles Engineering Company, for AY 2002-03 it was found that bogus purchase by way of accommodation bills for purchase of material (without the material being received) were procured from Shri Jabbarsingh Chauhan, Proprietor of M/s. Girnar Sales Corporation and Shri Navin Raval, proprietor of M/s. Shiv Metal Corporation. It was found that these parties had issued bogus bills to various parties in the market and the assessee was one of them. During the financial year relevant to assessment year 2002-03 the purchases of the assessee from these two parties amounted to Rs. 14,32,750.

The AO relying on the affidavit of the persons who had issued the bills and observing that the assessee had failed to prove the genuineness of purchases by way of furnishing confirmation from the seller concerned or producing the seller for taking necessary statement disallowed the sum of Rs. 14,32,750 representing aggregate amount of bogus purchases from these two parties.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted the decision of the co-ordinate `A’ Bench of ITAT in the case of Shri Alap Shirishbhai Derasary vs. ACIT (ITA No. 1101, 1102 & 1103/Ahd/2009 for AY 2002-03, 2003-04 and 2004-05, order dated 21-09- 2012) where the Bench confirmed addition @ 12.50% on the bogus purchases. It also noted that the decision relied upon by the DR in the case of ITO vs. Shri Gumanmal Misrimal (ITA No.s. 2536 & 2537/Ahd/2008 for AY 2003- 04 & 2004-05) where the Bench was dealing with a case where bogus purchases from very same parties viz., Girnar Sales Corporation and M/s. Shiv Metal Corporation. The Bench in this case confirmed profit of 30% of the amount of bogus purchases.
The Tribunal observed that the assessee had not proved the purchases to be genuine. The supplier had given affidavits that they have given bogus bills to the assessee. Therefore, the burden was heavily on the assessee to prove that the transactions are genuine which was not established by it. It is established fact that these are bogus purchases to the extent of Rs. 14,32,750. It held that the decision in the case of Shri Gumanmal Misrimal (supra) squarely applies to the facts of the present case. The Tribunal directed the AO to calculate 30% net profit on bogus purchases.
The appeal filed by the assessee was partly allowed.

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2014-TIOL-396-ITAT-COCHIN Kerala Vision Ltd. vs. ACIT ITA No. 794/Coch/2013 A.Y.: 2009-10. Date of Order: 06-06-2014

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S/s. 40(a)(ia), 194J – In a case where non-deduction of tax at source was supported by the ratio of the decision of a HC, disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) of the Act cannot be made on account of non-deduction of tax due to a retrospective amendment.

FACTS:
The assessee company was engaged in the business of distributing cable signals. The assessee was liable to make payment to various channel companies like Star Den Media Ltd., Zee Turner Limited, M.S.M. Discovery P. Ltd., etc., for receiving from them, satellite signals in its capacity as a multi system operator. During the previous year relevant to the assessment year 2009-10, the assessee paid amounts aggregating to Rs. 163.30 lakh as “Pay Channel Charges” to satellite companies.

In view of the ratio of the decision of Madras High Court in the case of Skycell Communications Ltd. (251 ITR 53) (Mad) and the decision of Delhi High Court in the case of Asia Satellite Telecommunications Co. Ltd. vs. DIT (332 ITR 340)(Del) the assessee did not deduct tax at source from payment of Pay channel charges to various satellite companies.

The Assessing Officer (AO) held that the payment of Pay channel charges is ‘royalty’ and consequently such payment is liable for deduction of tax at source. He also held that the decision rendered by the Madras High Court in the case of Skycell Communications Ltd. (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the assessee’s case. He disallowed a sum of Rs. 163.30 lakh u/s. 40(a)(ia) of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it contended that the disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) should not be made on the basis of a subsequent amendment made with retrospective effect.

HELD:
Transmitting television channels or signals by receiving these signals through satellite is included in the definition of “Process” under Explanation 6 which has been inserted by the Finance Act, 2012 with retrospective effect. Therefore, payment made by the assessee as “Pay Channel Charges” falls in the category of “royalty” as defined in Clause (i) of Explanation 2 to section 9(1) of the Act.

The Tribunal noted that that the view entertained by the assessee that the pay channel charges cannot be considered as royalty gets support from the decision rendered by the Delhi High Court in the case of Asia Satellite Telecommunication Co. Ltd. (supra). It also noted that the following decisions have held that the assessee cannot be held to be liable to deduct tax at source relying on the subsequent amendments made in the Act with retrospective effect –

Sonata Information Technology Ltd. vs. DCIT (2012-TII-132-ITAT -MUM-INTL)

Infortech Enterprises Limited vs. Addl CIT (2014-TII- 26-ITAT -HYD-TP)

Channel Guide India Ltd. vs. ACIT (2012-TII-139- ITAT -MUM-INTL)

The Tribunal held that though the Explanation 6 to section 9(1)(vi) inserted by the Finance Act, 2012 is clarificatory in nature, yet in view of the fact that the view entertained by the assessee gets support from the decision of the Delhi High Court, the assessee cannot be held to be liable to deduct tax at source from the Pay Channel Charges. The AO was not justified in disallowing the claim of Pay Channel Charges by invoking the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) of the Act. The Tribunal set aside the order passed by CIT(A) and directed the AO to delete the impugned disallowance.
The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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[2013] 148 ITD 70 (Ahmedabad – Trib.) GE India Industrial (P.) Ltd. vs. CIT(A) A.Y. 2004-05: Date of order: 04-01-2013

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Section 271(1)(c), section 275(1)(a) – CIT(A)
enhanced assessee’s income and initiated penalty proceedings –
Assessee’s plea to keep penalty proceedings in abeyance till disposal of
appeal by Tribunal was rejected – Held – as per section 275(1)(a), the
CIT(A) will get six months time to dispose of penalty proceedings from
end of month in which order of Tribunal is received by Commissioner or
Chief Commissioner – The CIT(A) was directed to keep penalty proceedings
in abeyance till disposal of quantum appeal by Tribunal.

Facts:
Assessment
u/s. 143(3) was completed by the AO by making a few disallowances. On
further appeal, the CIT(A) deleted certain disallowances but also
enhanced the income of the assessee. The CIT(A) initiated penalty
proceedings u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act for disallowances made by him.

The
assessee contended before the CIT(A) that since the assessee proposed
to file an appeal before the Tribunal on the quantum proceedings, the
penalty should be kept in abeyance till the disposal of appeal by
Tribunal. Reliance was placed on the section 275(1)(a), wherein it is
provided that where an appeal has been filed before Tribunal, the time
limit for disposal of penalty proceeding is six months from the end of
the month in which the order of the Tribunal is received by the
Commissioner/Chief Commissioner. However, the request of the assessee
was not accepted by ld. CIT(A) and hence the assessee filed a stay
petition.

Held:
As per the section 275(1)(a) of the
Act, the AO cannot pass an order imposing penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) of the
Act till relevant assessment is subject matter of appeal before ld.
CIT(A) (i.e., the first appellate authority). By the same analogy, the
assessee’s prayer for stay of penalty proceedings undertaken by ld.
CIT(A) till the disposal of appeal by the Tribunal does not appear to be
unreasonable.

If the CIT(A) is allowed to proceed with the
penalty proceedings, prejudice will cause to the assessee as it will
have to face multiplicity of the proceedings. In case assessee succeeds
in quantum appeal, the penalty order passed by CIT(A) will have no legs
to stand while in a situation the assessee fails, CIT(A) will get ample
time of six months to dispose of the penalty proceedings. Therefore, to
prevent multiplicity of proceedings and harassment to the assessee, the
CIT(A) was directed to keep the penalty proceedings in abeyance till the
disposal of quantum appeal by the Tribunal.

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(2014) 105 DTR 1 (Del) Sahara India Financial Corporation Ltd. vs. DCIT A.Y.: 2009-10 Date of order: 10-01-2014

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Disallowance of expenditure u/s. 14A cannot exceed the exempt income earned.

Facts:
The assessee earned exempt income amounting to Rs. 68,37,583 against which the assessee voluntarily disallowed the expenses of the investment division on pro rata basis amounting to Rs. 26,646. However, the Assessing Officer applied the provisions of Rule 8D and added Rs. 2,16,51,917 representing the excess of the expenses disallowable as per Rule 8D over the expenses already disallowed by the assessee. While doing so, the Assessing Officer also disallowed the proportionate interest expenditure rejecting the claim of the assessee that it had sufficient interest-free funds in the nature of share capital and reserves. The CIT (A) also upheld the said disallowance and revised it upward marginally to Rs. 2,19,47,772.

Held:
If the method of Rule 8D is applied mechanically, it leads to manifestly absurd results in as much as for tax-free income of Rs. 68,37,583, disallowance of Rs. 2,16,51,917 [enhanced by CIT(A) at Rs. 2,19,47,772] is made u/s. 14A which exceeds the exempt income. The interpretation of provisions of section 14A r/w Rule 8D is leading to unanticipated absurdities which cannot be the intention of legislature. Under these circumstances, help of external aids of construction for interpretations of statute is called for. Looking at the varying interpretation offered by various courts and benches of tribunal in relation to section 14A, it is difficult to precisely decide the issue. The Tribunal followed the decision of Chandigarh Tribunal in the case of Punjab State Co-op & Marketing Federation Ltd. [ITA No. 548/Chd/2011] and held that disallowance u/s. 14A cannot exceed tax free income. A holistic view is required to be taken that disallowance in terms of section 14A can be maximum to the extent of exempt income which is Rs. 68,37,583 in this case. It implies that reasonable expenditure less than the exempt income can be disallowed. Therefore, in the interest of justice it was held that it will be reasonable to estimate and disallow, 50% of exempt income as relatable to exempt income u/s. 14A r/w Rule 8D.

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(2014) 104 DTR 289 (Del) DCIT vs. Messe Dusseldorf India Pvt. Ltd. A.Y.: 2005-06 Date of order: 19-03-2014

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Amount received by the assessee-company from its parent company towards its erosion of net worth constitutes capital receipt.

Facts I:
The assessee had received an amount of Rs. 34,511,880 from its promoters which were foreign companies, which was treated as capital receipt and classified under capital reserve in the accounts. It was claimed that the said amount was received to resurrect the financial position and to rejuvenate the company. The amount was received essentially for restoration of its capital structure, i.e, net worth required for the revival of company in. However, the Assessing Officer held that the receipt in question was in the revenue field. Before the ITAT also, it was argued by the Department that the amount is a non-refundable, non-distributable and non-convertible contribution by a shareholder, and was used for the purpose of its current business and hence, was required to be regarded as a revenue receipt. It was further pointed out that the RBI permitted the assessee to receive the amount in question for recoupment of accumulated losses.

Held:
It was held that the amount was received for restoration of the capital structure by recoupment of net worth. The assessee company had incurred accumulated losses and this has resulted in erosion of net worth. It received non refundable financial assistance from its shareholder company. The RBI also approved the same with subjectmatter given as “financial assistance towards erosion of net worth.” Therefore, the ITAT , upholding the factual finding of the CIT (A) that the amount was received towards erosion of net worth of the company, held that it should be regarded as a capital receipt.

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Refund: Interest: S/s. 237 and 243 : A. Y. 2010-11: Assessee, a civil contractor, receiving payments from Govt. Depts. after TDS: CPC issuing only part of refund: Mismatch between details uploaded by deductor and details furnished by assessee in return: Mismatch not attributable to assessee: Assessee entitled to refund with interest:

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Rakesh Kumar Gupta vs. UOI; 365 ITR 143 (All):

The
assessee is a civil contractor. In the previous year relevant to the A.
Y. 2010-11, the assessee had received certain payments from Government
Departments from which a total sum of Rs. 3,14,766/- was deducted as tax
at source by the Government Departments. The assessee filed the return
of income and claimed refund of Rs. 2,32,370/-. The Central Processing
Centre, Bangalore, issued a refund of Rs. 43,740/-. No intimation was
given to the assessee as to why the balance amount of Rs. 1,88,630/- was
not refundable. Assessee’s application u/s. 154 of the Income-tax Act,
1961 for refund of the balance did not get any response.

Therefore,
the assessee filed a writ petition praying for a writ of mandamus for
the balance refund with interest. The Allahabad High Court allowed the
writ petition and held as under:

“i) No effort was made by the
Assessing officer to verify whether the deductor had made the payment of
the tax deducted at source in the Government account. There was a
mismatch between the details uploaded by the deductor and the details
given by the assessee in the return. The assessee suffered the tax
deduction at source but had not been given due credit in spite of the
fact that he had been issued a tax deducted at source certificate by a
Government Department.
ii) T here was presumption that the deductor
had deposited the tax deducted at source amount in the Government
account especially when the deductor is a Government Department.
iii)
Denying the benefit of the tax deducted at source to the assessee
because of the fault of the deductor not only caused harassment and
inconvenience but also made the assessee feel cheated.
iv) T here was
no fault on the part of the assessee. The fault, if any, lay with the
deductor. Nothing had been indicated that the fault lay with the
assessee in furnishing false details. Therefore, the authority was to
refund an amount of Rs. 1,88,631/- with interest in accordance with the
law.”

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Recovery of tax: Stay of recovery: A. Ys. 2007-08 and 2008-09: Tribunal rejected the stay application only on the ground that the assessee had not made out a case of irreparable loss without considering the other issues raised by the assessee:

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Rejection not proper: Coca-Cola India P. Ltd. vs. ITAT: 364 ITR 567 (Bom):

When the appeal for the A. Ys. 2007-08 and 2008-09 were pending before the Tribunal, the Assessing Officer rejected the stay application made by the assessee without considering the issues raised by the assessee. The Tribunal also rejected the stay application only on the ground that the assessee had not made out a case of irreparable loss which could not be compensated in terms of money in case the stay was not granted, without considering the issues raised by the assessee.

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i) I n an application for stay, though the Assessing Officer is not expected to analyse the entire evidence there must be some consideration of the facts and an indication thereof in the order. The Assessing Officer did not advert to any of the factors indicated in the order of the Special Bench in the case of L. G. Electronics India P. Ltd.
ii) T he Appellate Tribunal also in its order did not address itself to the relevant facts and issues. It merely rejected the application on the ground that the assesee had not made out a case of irreparable loss which could not be compensated in terms of money in case the stay was not granted.
iii) T he question of irreparable loss is not the only consideration while dealing with an application for stay. The assessee had serious issues to urge, some of which had so far not been dealt with either in the assessment order or in the orders on the stay application. The orders in question are liable to be quashed.
Iv) The rule is made absolute in terms of prayers (a) and (b).”

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Income: Business income or house property income: S/s. 22 and 28(i) : A. Y. 1996-97: Assessee owned a shopping mall: Let out a portion of mall and used balance portion for its business: Rental income is business income and not house property income:

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CIT Vs. Prakash Agnihotri; [2014] 46 taxmann.com 145 (All):

The assessee owned an immovable property, i.e., a shopping mall. During relevant year, assessee let out a portion of said mall. The assessee claimed that rental income derived from mall was taxable as income from business. The Assessing Officer rejected the claim and assessed the rental income under the head “Income from house property.” The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) T he law is well settled that whether a particular letting is a business has to be decided in the circumstances of each case and each case has to be looked into from the businessman’s point of view to find out whether letting was the doing of business or exploitation of his property by an owner.

ii) There being categorical findings of fact by the appellate authority as well as the Tribunal that letting out was for the purposes of business after considering all relevant facts and the fact that the premises City Centre, the Mall, has been taken back by the assessee and further in major portion of the premises assessee was already carrying out his own business, it is opined that assessee has rightly shown his rental income as business income.”

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Income: Capital or revenue receipt: A. Y. 2007-08: Assessee engaged in generation of power: Sale of carbon credits: Not an offshoot of business: No asset generated in the course of business but generated due to environmental concerns: Sale receipt is a capital receipt: No cost of acquisition: Profit is not assessable to tax:

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CIT vs. My Home Power Ltd.; 365 ITR 82 (AP):

The assessee was carrying on the business of power generation. In the A. Y. 2007-08, the assessee claimed that the receipts on sale of carbon credits is a capital receipt and not income. The assesee further claimed that there was no cost of acquisition and accordingly that the profit on sale of carbon credit is not assessable to tax. The Assessing Officer rejected the claim and assessed the receipts as business income. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

In appeal before the High Court, the Revenue contended that the generation of carbon credits is intricately linked to the machinery and processes employed in the production process by the assessee. The Revenue also contended that the Tribunal is not correct in holding that there is no cost of acquisition or cost of production to get entitlement for the carbon credits. The Andhra Pradesh High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) T he Tribunal has factually found that ‘carbon credit is not an offshoot of business but an offshoot of environmental concerns. No asset is generated in the course of business but it is generated due to environmental concerns.’
ii) We agree with this factual analysis as the assessee is carrying on the business of power generation. The carbon credit is not even directly linked with power generation.
iii) O n the sale of excess carbon credits the income was received and hence as correctly held by the Tribunal it is capital receipt and it cannot be business receipt or income.
iv) In the circumstances, we do not find any element of law in this appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.”

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Assessment: S/s. 143(3) and 144C: A. Y. 2009- 10: Transfer pricing proceedings: Pursuant to order of TPO, AO passed a final order u/s. 143 (3) instead of passing a draft assessment order u/s. 144C: There being a failure on part of AO to adhere to statutory provisions of Act, impugned order was to be quashed: AO could not cure defect existing in impugned order:

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Vijay Television (P) Ltd. vs. Dispute Resolution Penal: [2014] 46 taxmann.com 100 (Mad):

The
case of the petitioner company was taken up for scrutiny assessment for
the A. Y. 2009-2010. Since the petitioner company had entered into
international transactions during the relevant year, the case was
referred to the Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO) for determination of the
arm’s length price. The TPO passed an order on 30-01-2013 and pursuant
to the said order, the Assessment Officer, instead of passing a
provisional order u/s. 144C of the Income-tax Act, 1961, passed a final
assessment order u/s. 143(3) on 26-03-2013. After realising the folly
that a final order ought not to have been passed pursuant to the order
passed by the TPO, the Assessment Officer issued a Corrigendum on
15-04-2013 modifying the final order of assessment passed on 26-03- 2013
to be read as a draft assessment order purported to have been passed
u/s. 144C of the Act. On receipt of the corrigendum, the petitioner
company filed their objections before the Dispute Resolution Panel,
Chennai on 26/04/2013 specifically questioning the validity of the
corrigendum issued by the Assessing Officer. It was specifically
contended that the corrigendum issued by the Assessing Officer is
without jurisdiction and such an order was passed beyond the period of
limitation. The Dispute Resolution Penal refused to entertain the
objections filed by the petitioner company. The assessee-petitioner
filed writ petition challenging the orders.

The Madras High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“i)
U /s. 144C of the Act, it is evident that the Assessing Officer is
required to pass only a draft assessment order on the basis of the
recommendations made by the TPO after giving an opportunity to the
assessee to file their objections and then the Assessing Officer shall
pass a final order. According to the learned senior counsel for the
petitioners, this procedure has not been followed by the Assessing
Officer (second Respondent) inasmuch as a final order has been
straightaway passed without passing a draft assessment order.
ii) A s
rightly pointed out by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners,
in the order passed on 26-03-2013, the second respondent even raised a
demand as also imposed penalty. Such demand has to be raised only after a
final order has been passed determining the tax liability. The very
fact that the taxable amount has been determined itself would show that
it was passed as a final order. In fact, a notice for demand u/s. 156 of
the Act was issued pursuant to such order dated 26-03-2013 of the
second respondent. Both the order dated 26-03-2013 and the notice for
demand thereof have been served simultaneously on the petitioner.
Therefore, not only the assessment is complete, but also a notice dated
28-03-2013 was issued thereon calling upon the petitioner to pay the tax
amount as also penalty u/s. 271 of the Act. Thereafter, the petitioner
was given an opportunity of hearing on 12-04-2013. Subsequently, the
second respondent realised the mistake in passing a final order instead
of a draft assessment order which resulted in issuing a corrigendum on
15-04-2013. In the corrigendum it was only stated that the order passed
on 26-03-2013 u/s. 143(3) of the Act has to be read and treated as a
draft assessment order as per section 144C r.w.s. 93CA (4) r.w.s. 143
(3) of the Act. In and by the order dated 15- 04-2013, the second
respondent granted thirty days time to enable the assessee to file their
objections.
iii) S uch an order dated 26-03-2013 passed by the
second respondent can only be construed as a final order passed in
violation of the statutory provisions of the Act. The corrigendum dated
15-04-2013 is also beyond the period prescribed for limitation. Such a
defect or failure on the part of the second respondent to adhere to the
statutory provisions is not a curable defect by virtue of the
corrigendum dated 15-04-2013. By issuing the corrigendum, the
respondents cannot be allowed to develop their own case. Therefore,
following the order passed by the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court in the case of Zuari Cement Limited vs. Assistant
Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle 2 (1) passed in WP No. 5557 of 2012
dated 21-02-2013, which was also affirmed by the Honourable Supreme
Court by dismissing the Special Leave Petition filed thereof, on
27-09-2013, the orders, which are impugned in this writ petition are
liable to be set aside. Accordingly, the orders, which are impugned in
this writ petition are set aside and the writ petition is allowed.”

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Assessment: Time limit for completion of assessment: Limitation: Extention of period: Section 153 Expl 1(ii): A. Y. 1986-87 to 1989- 90: Stay of assessment proceedings by order of Court: Limitation restarts immediately on vacation of the stay order and not on receipt by the Department of the order vacating the stay:

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CIT vs. Chandra Bhan Bansal; [2014] 46 taxmann.com 108 (All):

On 08-11-1989, the Assessing Officer issued notices u/s. 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for reopening of the assessment. Assessee filed writ petition challenging the reopening. The Allahabad High Court admitted the petition by an order dated 24-03-1992 and granted stay of the assessment proceedings. Thereafter, on 01-08-1995 the High Court dismissed the petition and accordingly stay was vacated on that day. The Assessing Officer passed the reassessment order on 04-01-1996. The assessee challenged the validity of the reassessment order on the ground that the reassessment order passed on 04-01- 1996 is barred by limitation since a valid reassessment order could have been passed only upto 30-09-1995. The Tribunal accepted the assessee’s claim.

In the appeal, it was contended by the Revenue that the order vacating the stay was communicated to the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax (Investigation) on 18-12-1995 and accordingly, the reassessment order passed on 04-01-1996 is within the period of limitation and hence is a valid order. The Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) T he statutory scheme of Explanation 1(ii) of section 153 clearly indicates that for computing the period of limitation the period during which the assessment proceedings is stayed shall be excluded. In excluding the above period, the concept of communication of the order of the Court cannot be imported. The exclusion of the period has been provided because of stay or injunction by any Court during which the assessment proceedings are stayed

ii) T he submission of the revenue that the limitation will start again only when the order is communicated to the Department cannot be accepted. The other reason for not accepting the above submission is equally potent. Explanation 1(v) and (vi) to section 153 are also part of the same statutory scheme. In Explanation 1(v) and (vi) to section 153 the statutory scheme provides for computing the period of limitation from the date when the order under s/s. (1) of section 245D and 245Q is received by the Commissioner.

iii) T hus, the legislature has provided for excluding the period from the date of communication of the order where they so intended. The use of concept of communication of receiving the order in the same provision which is absent in Explanation 1(ii) concerned clearly indicates that for the purposes of Explanation 1(ii), the communication of the order of the Court vacating the stay or injunction is not contemplated.

iv) In view of aforesaid, the Tribunal is justified in law in coming to the conclusion that the assessments made by the Assessing Officer was barred by limitation on 30-9-1995.

v) The question is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The appeal is dismissed.”

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Leaving A Legacy

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“The only thing that you take with you when you are gone is what you leave behind.”

– John Allison

All of us know that we have to go some day. We are temporary residents of this world, and sooner or later we have to quit this place and depart. We also equally know that just as we came into this world empty handed, we have to go from this world empty handed. Even Alexander the Great directed that, on his death, his empty hands should be displayed outside his coffin, to give this message. No matter how much one may amass, and how so powerful one may be, someday one has to go and one cannot take anything with oneself. The only choice with us, then, is to choose what should happen to one’s wealth when one goes away. Whom to give? How much to give? And to decide on how much to dispose off while one is alive and how much to amass to leave it for one’s heirs.

It is human to leave behind one’s wealth for one’s children. One wants to provide for the future needs of the children. One wants to provide not only for the needs and comforts, but even luxuries. However, this may not be in the best interest of our children.

One has to remember what our scriptures teach us. They teach us that “Lakshmi” is “Chanchal” – volatile and does not like to stay at the same place for long. Our elders also tell us that rarely does wealth stay in a family for three generations. The first one gathers wealth, the second manages to preserve it, and the third squanders it. History tells us that people usually squander any money that they inherit and if they don’t squander it, their children surely will. Will this be the fate of what we leave behind for our children?

Hence, one has also to think of how much one should leave for them so that they do not lose all their initiative to work and excel in life. The dilemma is, how much is sufficient to look after their needs and comforts. The next issue is, how to distribute this wealth. How much should go to each of the heirs. Most of the time the wealth left behind itself becomes a source of discord, disharmony, quarrels, and even litigation.

I am reminded of the Chinese proverb that says, “Give a man a fish and you feed him for one day. Teach a man how to fish and you feed him for a life time.” The same is also true about wealth. It is better to spend and teach a child to earn a living than to provide him with enough wealth.

All these point to one thing. Leave behind legacies for children but make them fit to be able to use it judiciously and not to squander it. It should help them to be better human beings. If one has wealth more than what one’s children will ever need, better give away the excess during one’s lifetime or, through one’s wills, to charities. There are enough people who need money even to provide for their basic needs.

While it is important to provide for the needs of our children, it is equally important to teach them about money itself. They must understand that money beyond a certain basic level of providing one’s needs cannot bring true happiness. Properly handled it can ensure one’s financial future, but if not handled carefully it can fly off in no time. In our lifetime we must imbibe in them the right values of earning, preserving and spending money. It is only then that wealth will remain in the family. It is not only on how to invest money, but also how to earn it and spend it that are important.

I conclude by quoting:

“If you have just two pennies in the world, spend one on a loaf of bread; the other on a flower. The bread will give you the means to live, the flower a reason for living.”

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Assessment: Company: Amalgamation w.e.f. 01/04/2009: A. Y. 2010-11: Notice dated 20/06/2012 u/s. 142 to amalgamating (transferor) for assessment of the company for A. Y. 2010-11 is not valid:

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Khurana Engineering Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT; 364 ITR 600 (Guj):

Under
a scheme of amalgamation, the transferor company was amalgamated with
the assessee company w.e.f. 01-04-2009. On 20-06-2012, the Assessing
Officer issued notice u/s. 142 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 to the
amalgamating (transferor) company for assessment of the company for the
A. Y. 2010-11.

The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition
filed by the assessee-amalgamated company challenging the said notice
and held as under:

“i) A s per the order of the High Court
allowing the scheme of amalgamation, the appointed date for amalgamation
is 01-04-2009. The transferor company would no longer be amenable to
assessment proceedings for the A. Y. 2010-11.

ii) T he notice for producing documents for such assessment would, therefore, be invalid. Impugned notice is quashed.”

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[2014] 46 taxmann.com 135 (New Delhi – CESTAT) Hema Engg. Indus. Ltd. vs. CST, New Delhi.

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Whether services provided on job work basis and exempted under Notification No. 8/2005 – ST are considered as “Exempted Services” for the purpose of Rule 6 of CENVAT Credit rules, 2004 requiring reversal of CENVAT Credit? Held, No.

Facts:
The Appellant was engaged in undertaking a job work by way of electroplating/painting on the semi-finished goods and claimed exemption in service tax vide Notification No. 8/2005 – ST. The Appellant availed the credit of service tax on various services so received for their job work and utilised the same for payment of service tax on taxable services provided by them. The Revenue contended that Appellant is providing taxable as well as exempted services hence cannot utilise CENVAT Credit more than 20% of the tax payable in terms of the provisions of Rule 6 of the CENVAT Credit Rules (CCR).

Held:
The Hon’ble Tribunal held that clearances effected in terms of the provisions of Notification No. 8/2005-S.T. cannot be held to be exempted clearance so as to invoke the provisions of Rule 6(2) of CCR. It further held that, this issue is no more res integra and stands decided by the Larger Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Sterlite Industries India Ltd. vs. CCE 2005 (183) ELT 353 (Tri- Mum.)(LB) wherein it was held that if no duty was payable in respect of goods manufactured in terms of Notification No. 214/86, i.e., job work Notification, the final product cannot be held to be exempted so as to attract the provisions of the erstwhile Rule 57CC inasmuch as the Notification No. 214/86 is pari materia to Notification No. 8/2005-S.T., the ratio of the said decision would apply.

Note: Readers may note that, same principal is also applicable in the case of exemption granted in Entry 30(c) of the mega exemption Notification No. 25/2012-ST dated 20-06-2012.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 1 dated 3rd July, 2014

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Financial Commitment (FC) by Indian Party under Overseas Direct Investments (ODI ) – Restoration of Limit

Presently,
the limit for Overseas Direct Investments (ODI) /Financial Commitment
(FC) to be undertaken by an Indian Party under the automatic route is
100% of the net worth of the Indian Party as per its last audited
balance sheet.

This circular has restored the said limit to the
one that existed prior to 14th August, 2013. Hence now the limit for
Overseas Direct Investments (ODI)/Financial Commitment (FC) to be
undertaken by an Indian Party under the automatic route is 400% of the
net worth of the Indian Party as per its last audited balance sheet.
However, where the financial commitment of the Indian Party exceeds US$ 1
billion (or its equivalent) in a financial year prior permission of RBI
will need to be obtained even if the total FC of the Indian Party is
within the limit of 400% of its net worth as per the last audited
balance sheet.

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TS-400-ITAT-2014 (Del) GE Energy Parts Inc. vs. ADIT A.Ys.: 2001-02, Decided on: 04-07-2014

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The Tribunal admits Linkedin profiles of expatriate employees as additional evidence to determine the existence of PE in India.

Facts:
The
tax authority had conducted a survey at the premises of Liaison Office
(“LO”) of GE International Operations Company Inc. In the course of
survey, the tax authority obtained certain documents, recorded
statements of various persons and inquired about income-generating
activities of GE group, employees working from LO and their roles and
responsibilities, etc.

It was found that generally the business
heads were expatriates appointed to head Indian operations and the
support staff being provided by GE India Industrial Private Limited and
other third parties. While the expatriates were on the payroll of GE
International Inc., they worked for various GE group businesses.

The
tax authority sought information in respect of expatriate employees
such as nature of job, duties and responsibilities, terms, conditions
and duration of employment, entity for which they were working,
emoluments and basis of incentives/bonuses, self-appraisal of work done
in India, etc. The tax authority received only part response mentioning
that the employees were merely acting as communication channel for the
overseas entity.

Hence, in absence of necessary facts, the tax
authority furnished additional evidence in the form of Linkedin profile
of the employees and contended that since these were available in public
domain, they should be admitted as additional evidence. The additional
evidence was provided to disprove the claim that these employees were
merely acting as a communication channel. This evidence was never
refuted.

Held:
• Linkedin profiles are not hearsay
because it is the employee himself who has given the details relating to
him and no third party is involved in creating the profiles. The data
is in public domain.

• In terms of section 60 of the Evidence
Act, oral evidence must be direct. It is well-settled law that admission
though not conclusive is binding and decisive unless it is withdrawn or
proved to be erroneous. Linkedin profiles are in the nature of
admission of the person whose profile it is.

• It is up to the taxpayer to rebut the information contained in Linkedin profiles by bringing on record contrary facts.


The evidence sought to be filed by the tax authority was only
supporting in nature and it would assist in appreciating the facts in
judicial manner.

Accordingly, the Tribunal admitted Linkedin
profiles as additional evidence. However, in the interim order, the
Tribunal did not conclude on the existence of PE.

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TS-355-ITAT-2014(Del) Nortel Networks India International Inc. vs. DDIT A.Ys.: 2003-04, 2004-05 & 2005-06, Decided on: 13-06-014

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Article 5, 7 India-USA DTAA – On facts, having regard to the activities performed in India, the Indian group company was PE of the USA company and 50% of profit was attributable to the PE.

Facts:
The taxpayer was a company incorporated in USA and member-company of Nortel group. Nortel group was a leading supplier of hardware and software products for GSM cellular radio telephone system.

Nortel group also had an Indian company (“ICo”), which had entered into a composite contract with an Indian telecom company (“TelCo”) for supply of equipment. Immediately after signing the contract, ICo assigned it in favour of the taxpayer without any consideration.

The equipment to be supplied under the contract was acquired by the taxpayer from its group company in Canada. The Canadian company had a Liaison Office (“LO”) in India. Employees of various Group companies visited India for facilitating execution of the contract and worked from the premises of the LO or ICo.

The performance under the contract was guaranteed by Nortel group.

The AO was of the view that the taxpayer was merely a “paper company” created to avoid taxes in India by assignment of the contract by ICo and the overall execution/ work was done through ICo only. The Taxpayer thus triggered a Permanent establishment (PE) in India by virtue of activities done by ICo, the LO and the services provided by employees of Group companies visiting India.

Held:
• The contract was indivisible turnkey contract for supply, installation, testing, commissioning, etc. Responsibility for negotiating, securing and executing the contract as well as installation and commissioning were undertaken by ICo. Accordingly, ICo was a fixed place of business and dependent agent PE of the taxpayer.
• The LO of Canadian company was rendering all kinds of services to all group companies including the taxpayer. Hence, it constituted fixed place PE of the taxpayer.
• The taxpayer approached the customer, negotiated the contract; installed and tested the equipment. All these activities were undertaken through ICo and LO. Experts of group companies visited India in connection with the project and carried out business of the taxpayer through the premises of the LO and ICo. The contract did not merely require loading the equipment in ship but a number of other activities which were carried out in India and remuneration for these activities was included in consideration payable for the contract. Though represented as sale consideration for the equipment, the amount represented payment for works contract under which entire installation and customisation were carried out in India.

• The activities of the taxpayer in India through ICo, LO and employees of Group companies constituted its PE under Article 5 of India-USA DTAA . These activities were core activities of the taxpayer and hence, they were not preparatory and auxiliary activities.

• The accounts furnished by taxpayer, being not audited, had no sanctity. The only explanation for the trading loss in an intra-group transaction could be avoidance of tax. Hence, the group accounts should be examined to have correct picture. Computation of income of PE depends on the facts of each case and in the present case, after allowing expenses relatable to PE, selling, general marketing and R&D expenses, attribution of 50% of the profits to PE would be reasonable.

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TS-341-ITAT-2014(Del) Jyotinder Singh Randhawa vs. ACIT A.Y. 2009-10, Decided on: 16-06-2014

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Section 6, the Act – Benefit u/s. 6 to Indian citizens leaving India ‘for the purposes of employment outside India’ also applies to selfemployed professionals going abroad for business or profession.

Facts:
The taxpayer was an Indian citizen. He was a professional golfer. During the relevant tax year his stay in India was 167 days. While filing his tax return, the taxpayer claimed his residential status as non-resident.

According to the AO, the contention of the taxpayer that he had left India for the purpose of employment and therefore, should be entitled to the benefit under Explanation to section 6(1) of the Act was not valid. Hence, the AO concluded that the taxpayer could be treated as non-resident only if he was in India for less than 365 days during the 4 years preceding the relevant tax year, and was in India for less than 60 days during the relevant tax year. Since the taxpayer could not prove this, the AO treated him as resident during the tax year and accordingly, added the income which had accrued to, and received by, the taxpayer outside India .

Held:
The taxpayer is a professional golfer and a self-employed professional sports person who participates in Golf tournaments conducted in various countries. Relying on the decision of Kerala High Court in CIT vs. Abdul Razak [2011] 337 ITR 350 (Ker), the Tribunal held that to determine residential status under the Act, the term ‘leaves India for the purposes of employment outside India’ also means going abroad in the course of self-employment for own business or profession and accordingly, treated him as non-resident.

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TS-383-ITAT-2014(HYD) GFA Anlagenbau Gmbh vs. ACIT A.Ys.: 2005-06, 2006-07, 2007-08, 2008-09, 2009- 10, Decided on: 02-07-2014

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Section 9(1)(vii) of the Act; Article 5, 12, India-
Germany DTAA – in absence of a building or construction site owned or
operated by German company, mere rendition of supervisory services will
not constitute supervisory PE; the payment for such services should be
taxable as Fee For Technical Services (FTS).

Facts:
The
taxpayer was a company incorporated in Germany. It was engaged in
supervision, erection and commissioning of plant and machinery for steel
and allied plants in India. During the relevant tax year, it had
rendered technical and supervisory services to several Indian companies
by engaging experienced foreign technicians at the work sites and other
locations in India to carryout technical and supervisory services. The
taxpayer categorized the receipts for such services as FTS u/s.
9(1)(vii) of Act, as also under Article 12 of India-Germany DTAA .

The
total stay of technicians for one of the project in India exceeded 183
days. The AO contended that PE of the taxpayer was constituted in India
in terms of Article 5(2)(i) of India-Germany DTAA as the activities of
the taxpayer in India continued for a period exceeding 6 months.

Further,
since the activities were effectively connected with the PE, in terms
of Article 12(5) read with Article 7, receipts from the services was
taxable as business profits and consequently, in terms of section 44DA
was chargeable to tax @40%.

Held:
As regards the Act
Relying
on the decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Clouth Gummiwerke
Aktiengesellschaft vs. CIT [1999] 238 ITR 861 (AP), the Tribunal held
that payments received for the supervisory activities carried out in
India were taxable in terms of section 9(1)(vii) of the Act as FTS.

Further,
as the taxpayer had rendered the services at the project sites of its
clients and since it did not own and operate such sites independently,
they did not constitute the fixed place PEs under the Act.

As regards India-Germany DTAA
Relying
on the decision of Special Bench of the Tribunal in Motorola Inc vs.
DCIT [2005] 95 ITD 269 (Delhi)(SB) and the decision of Mumbai Tribunal
in Airlines Rotables Ltd vs. JDIT [2011] 131 TTJ 385 (Mum), the Tribunal
held that the taxpayer did not have a fixed place PE in India under
Article 5(1).

Supervisory activities by themselves cannot
constitute PE under Article 5(2)(i) if they were not in connection with
building, construction or assembly activities of the taxpayer. In the
present case, since the taxpayer was merely providing supervisory
services, without having a building or construction site or fixed place
at its disposal,it did not constitute a PE.

Thus, the activities
being technical in nature, they were clearly covered under the FTS
definition of the India- Germany DTAA and the same were not ‘effectively
connected’ to a PE as the taxpayer did not have a fixed place of
business through which its activities were carried out.

Relying
on Valentine Maritime (Gulf) LLC vs. ADIT [2011] 45 SOT 359 (Mum), the
Tribunal also observed that unless the contracts are otherwise linked
with each other they should be considered individually for the duration
test.

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(Unreported) [ITA No 80/Del/2013] JC Bamford Investments vs. DDIT A.Y.: 2008-09, Decided on: 04-07-2014

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Article 13(2), India-UK DTAA – though recipient of royalty was not beneficial owner, DTAA benefit cannot be denied since the beneficial owner as well as recipient of income was resident of UK.

Facts:
The taxpayer was a company incorporated in, and tax resident of, the UK. The taxpayer was a member of a group of companies. Another UK company (“UKCo”), also a member-company of the group, had entered into a Technology Transfer Agreement (“Agreement”) with a third group company incorporated in, and a tax resident of, India (“IndCo”) for grant of license to certain intellectual property (“IP”).

Subsequently, UKCo, IndCo and the taxpayer entered into a tripartite agreement under which UKCo sub-licensed IP to the taxpayer in consideration of the payment of royalty by the taxpayer to UKCo. Hence, IndCo was required to pay royalty to the taxpayer. The taxpayer, in turn, paid 99.5% of the royalty to UKCo and retained merely 0.5% with it.

According to the taxpayer, the payment received by it was subject to concessional tax rate of 15% in terms of Article 13(2) of India-UK DTAA . According to the tax authority, Article 13(2) applied only if the recipient of royalty was “beneficial owner” of the royalty whereas the taxpayer was merely a conduit between UKCo and IndCo and not a “beneficial owner” and hence, the normal tax rate of 20% was applicable.

Held:
In terms of section 90(2) of the Act, between the provisions of the Act and DTAA, whichever is more beneficial should apply. In case of the taxpayer, since provisions of DTAA are more beneficial, they should apply. However, the relevant DTAA provision is subject to the condition that the recipient of the royalty should be “beneficial owner”.
The phrase “beneficial owner” is not defined under the Act or DTAA. In common parlance, a “beneficial owner” is one who is entitled to income in his own right. Also, “Beneficial owner” is one who is free to decide: (a) whether or not the capital or other assets should be used or made available for use by others; or (b) on how the yields there from be used; or (c) both. Sometimes, a “beneficial owner” may turn out to be a person different from the immediate recipient or formal owner or recipient of the income.

The benefits of DTAA are meant to be given only to the resident of either State and not to a resident of a third State. Benefit of lower rate under Article 13(2) should not be given if the “beneficial owner” is not a resident of UK. However, the benefit is not lost merely because the formal recipient, a resident of UK, is not the beneficial owner. The underlying intention is to give benefit only to a resident of UK. In the present case, since the recipient as well as the beneficial owner were both resident of UK, benefit of lower rate of tax under DTAA cannot be denied.

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Impact of Retrospective Amendments to Section 9 of the Income-tax Act, 1961

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Fundamental principles for retrospective amendments to tax laws (especially direct taxes) are that such amendments should be made in exceptional cases and should be constitutionally valid. India has witnessed a series of retrospective amendments in its Income-tax law in the past decade. Most or a majority of them are to subvert the decisions of Judicial Authorities in favour of the tax payers resulting into uncertainty, distrust and ambiguity in tax laws. This article throws light on retrospective amendments in Indian Tax Law, their impact and resulting issues, primarily in the arena of taxation pertaining to non-residents.

1.0 Introduction
“Government should collect taxes from citizens the way a bee collects honey from the flowers – quietly without inflicting pain.” – Chanakya.

There are three pillars of Tax System in India- namely, Legislature, Execution/Administration and the Judiciary. The Parliament has the sovereign right to legislate tax laws, which are executed or administered by the tax department and the judiciary keeps watch, vigil and resolves disputes through just and proper interpretation of the law. All the three pillars derive their powers and limitations from the Indian Constitution.

Entry 82 of the List I to the Seventh Schedule, referred to in Article 246 of the Constitution of India, gives power to the Union Government to levy “Taxes on income other than agricultural income” and Entry 85 of the same Schedule gives power to levy “Corporation tax”.

2.0 Constitutional Validity of Retrospective Amendments

A question arises whether enactment of retrospective legislation is within the powers conferred by the Constitution?

The Parliament has the sovereign power to legislate and this includes prospective as well as retrospective legislations. Where the legislature can make a valid law, it may provide not only for the prospective operation of the material provisions of the said law, but it can also provide for the retrospective operation of the said provisions1.

In the undernoted cases, the Supreme Court examined the validity of retrospective amendments to laws and accorded them Constitutional validity.

(i) Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel and Co. vs. UOI and another 2
(ii) Rai Ramakrishna vs. State of Bihar1
(iii) I. N. Saksena vs. State of M.P.3
(iv) National Agricultural vs. UOI4

To be constitutionally valid, any retrospective amendment has to broadly satisfy the following tests:

i) T he retrospective operation of the Act should not alter the character of the tax imposed by it so as to make the state incompetent to legislate5;
ii) R estrictions imposed by the Act should not be so unreasonable that they contravene the fundamental rights of the tax payer granted by the Constitution of India under Article 19(1)(g)6;
iii) R etrospective legislation should not be violative of a constitutional provision.

In Kesavananda Bharati’s case, the Supreme Court held that any legislation which has an impact of amending the basic structure of the Constitution or denying the fundamental rights, is considered as unconstitutional.

3.0 I mpact of Retrospective Amendments

3.1 Can the payer be held in default for failure to deduct tax at source u/s. 201 of the Income-tax Act, 1961?

Deduction of tax at source is a machinery provision. Section 195 of the Act casts obligation on every payer to deduct tax at source from the payment made to a nonresident. There is no threshold for the same. In case a payer fails to deduct tax at source, he will be held as an assessee in default u/s. 201 of the Act and shall be liable to pay the amount of tax together with interest thereon.

Therefore, in case of Vodafone International Holdings’ case where it acquired the shares of a Non-Resident (NR) company from the Hutch Group, which through its step down subsidiaries ultimately held the Indian telecommunication business of the erstwhile Hutch in India; it was held to be assessee in default u/s. 201 of the Act for failure to deduct tax at source while making payment to the NR company of Hutch Group. Vodafone contended that no tax was required to be deducted as shares were located outside India and the income of the NR Company was not taxable in India u/s. 9 of the Act. Vodafone won the case in the Supreme Court of India where the Apex Court held that the present provisions do not cover a situation of indirect transfer to the Indian tax net by adopting “look at” approach.

Subsequently, section 9 of the Act was amended vide the Finance Act, 2012 with retrospective effect from 01-04- 1962 to bring indirect transfer of shares within the ambit of deemed income in India by providing for “look through” approach whereby corporate veil of intermediary companies can be lifted to determine whether the substantial value of the transfer is attributed to assets located in India.

Since the amendment is made retrospective, it has an impact of nullifying the Supreme Court decision in favour of Vodafone, subject to the outcome of the writ petitions challenging constitutional validity of such retrospective amendment

The Expert Committee in its draft report on Retrospective Amendments Relating to Indirect Transfer has recommended that “no person should be treated as an assessee in default u/s. 201 of the Act read with section 9(1)(i) of the Act as amended by the Finance Act, 2012, or as a representative assessee of a non-resident, in respect of a transaction of transfer of shares of a foreign company having underlying assets in India as this would amount to the imposition of a burden of impossibility of performance.”

The recommendation of the Expert Committee is justified in the sense that how can one deduct tax at source when the income is brought to tax by retrospective amendments. The only argument in favour of revenue could be that it claims that these amendments were only clarificatory in nature. Courts have upheld retrospective application of amendments where they were found to be in the nature of explanatory, declaratory, curative or clarificatory nature.10

3.2 Can the expenses be disallowed u/s 40(a)(i) in the hands of the payer for failure to deduct tax at source?

In the case Metro and Metro vs. Additional Commissioner of Income-tax11, the Agra bench of the ITAT held that testing fees paid by the Indian company without deduction of tax at source to the TUV Product Und Umwelt GmbH – a tax resident of Germany, cannot be disallowed u/s. 40(a)(i) of the Act on the ground that the payer failed to deduct tax at source. In the instant case such fees became taxable in India only as a result of the amendment in section 9(1), by virtue of the Finance Act, 2010. The assessee relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ishikawajimaharima Heavy Industries Ltd. vs. DIT12 to conclude that fees paid by it were not taxable as services were rendered outside India.

The ITAT ruled in favour of the assessee and held that no disallowance can be made in view of the decision of the coordinate bench in the case of Channel Guide India Ltd vs. ACIT13 wherein, following the views expressed by the Ahmedabad bench in the case of Sterling Abrasives Ltd. vs. ITO (ITA No. 2234 and 2244/Ahd/2008; order dated 2008), it is held that law cannot cast the burden of performing the impossible task of tax withholding with retrospective effect, and, accordingly, the disallowance u/s. 40(a)(i) cannot be made in a situation in which taxability is confirmed only as a result of retrospective amendment of law.

The Cochin Bench of the income-tax appellate tribunal14 [ITAT] in case of Kerala Vision Ltd. vs. ACIT held that the payment made for pay channel charges is taxable as royalty with the introduction of retrospective amendments in the act, but the same could not be disallowed u/s. 40(a)(i)Of the act, as it was not taxable before the introduction of the amendment.

3.3    Can Assessee be asked to pay interest and penalty for shortfall in payment of Tax?

Article 20 (1) of the indian Constitution provides that (i) no person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence and (ii) he shall not be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the  offence.  thus,  penal  laws  generally,  cannot  have retrospective operation.15

Expert Committee headed by dr. P. shome recommended that no penalty should be levied in respect of the income brought to tax on application of retrospective amendments u/s. 271(1)(c) (for concealment of income) and 271C (for failure to deduct tax at source) of the act.

Similarly, the expert  Committee  also  recommended  that in all cases where demand of tax is raised on account of the retrospective amendment relating to indirect transfer u/s. 9(1)(i) of the act, no interest u/s. 234a, 234B, 234C and 201(1a) of the act should be charged in respect of that demand, so that there is no undue hardship caused to the taxpayer.

3.4    Reopening of Assessments:

In Babu Ram vs. C. C. Jacob and others16 the supreme Court held that the retrospective amendment is not applicable to the matter which has already attained finality before  introduction  of  the  amendment.  The  apex  Court further observed that the prospective declaration of law is  a devise innovated by the apex Court to avoid reopening of settled issues and to prevent multiplicity of proceedings. It is also a device adopted to avoid uncertainty and litigation. By the very object of prospective declaration of law, it is deemed that all actions taken contrary to the declaration of law, prior to its date of declaration are validated. This is done in the larger public interest. in matters, where decisions opposed to the said principle have been taken prior to such declaration of law, cannot be interfered with on the basis of such declaration of law.17

It would be interesting to note here that where the supreme Court has expressly made its ratio prospective, the high Court cannot give it retrospective  effect.  By  implication, all contrary actions taken prior to such declaration stand validated.18

Post retrospective amendments to section 9 vide the finance act, 2012, for taxing indirect transfer to tax in india, CBdt has issued a letter to CCits and dgits19    stating that the amended laws would not be applicable to assessments that are already completed. the  letter states that “in case where assessment proceedings have been completed u/s. 143(3) of the act, before 1st april, 2012 and no notice for reassessment has been issued prior to that date; such cases shall not be re-opened u/s. 147/148 of the act on account of the above mentioned clarificatory amendments introduced by the Finance Act, 2012.” It further clarifies that “assessment or any other order which stand validated due to the said clarificatory amendments in the Finance Act, 2012 would of course be enforced.” this will have an impact on all cases which are pending at different stages of appeal.

Thus, the  letter seem to be providing relief to only those tax payers whose assessments have been completed and no appeals are pending at any level.

4.0 Retrospective Amendments and Tax Treaties

Tax  treaties,  being  bilateral  agreements,  signed  by  two sovereign states, would prevail over domestic tax laws wherever there are conflicting provisions. Section 90 (2) provides  that  between  provisions  of  the  act  and  a  tax Treaty, whichever is more beneficial to the tax payer shall apply. Various terms are defined in Article 3 of a Tax Treaty or certain articles dealing with different types of income, for example,  dividend,  interest,  royalty,  fees  for  technical services (fts) etc.

Wherever, any particular term is defined in the tax treaty, and if there is a retrospective amendment to the definition of that term in the act, then such amendment will have no impact on provisions of tax treaty. For example, in CIT vs. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft20 the Bombay high Court held that the amendment in the definition of the “Royalty” with retrospective date will have no impact on interpretation of tax treaty. Payments made by the indian Company (BHEL) were held to be in the nature of “commercial profits” under the  india-germany  tax  treaty  (old)  and  were  held  not to be taxable in india in absence of Pe. The income-tax department’s argument of applying ambulatory approach for interpretation of the term “royalty” in view of its amendment under the income-tax act, was overruled by the high Court stating that, assessee has right to opt for provisions of the tax treaty u/s. 90(2) read with CBdt Circular 333 dated 2nd April, 1982 as they are more beneficial to him.

In B4U International Holdings Ltd. vs. DCIT21, the mumbai tribunal  held  that  hire  charges  for  transponder  satellite would not constitute “royalty” applying provisions of india- usa dtaa, notwithstanding retrospective amendments in the definition of “Royalty” u/s. 9(1)(vi) of the Act by the finance act, 2012.

In Sanofi Pasteur Holding SA vs. Dept. of Revenue22 the A. P.  high Court held that “the retrospective amendment   to section 9(1) so as to supersede the verdict in Vodafone international and to tax off-shore transfers does not impact the provisions of the india-france dtaa because the dtaa overrides the act.” the Court also rejected the revenue’s contention that as the “alienation” is not defined in the dtaa, it should have the meaning of the term “transfer” in section 2(47) as retrospectively amended. The Court ruled that as per article 31 of the Vienna Convention, a treaty has to be interpreted in good faith and in accordance with the ordinary meaning. it further held that, though article 3(2) provides that a term not defined in the treaty may be given the meaning in the act, this is not applicable because the term “alienation” is not defined in the Act.

In Director of Income-tax vs. Nokia Networks OY23, it was held that the assessee had opted to be governed by the dtaa and the language of the dtaa differed from the amended  section  9  of  the  act.  The  amendment  cannot be read into the DTAA. On the wording of the dtaa, a copyrighted article does not fall within the purview of royalty.

Article 3 of the un model Convention (MC) and the OECD MC as well as almost all indian tax treaties provide that any term not defined in the tax treaty shall have the meaning that it has at that time under the laws of that state, for the purpose of taxes to which the treaty applies. In other words, the meaning of a particular term is not defined in the treaty, then tax laws of the state which applies provisions  of a  tax treaty (i.e., state of source generally for determining taxability  of  income)  would  be  applicable.  for  example, the term “FTS” is not defined in India’s tax treaties with mauritius and uae. In such a scenario amendments made to the term fts in the act with retrospective effect would be applicable to any entity earning such income from india who is resident of these countries.

Article 7 in certain tax treaties (for example,  dtaa  with usa and uK) provide that  deductibility  of  expenses  of  the Permanent establishment (Pe) shall be subject to the provisions of the domestic tax laws. In such a scenario, if there is a retrospective amendment in the act, concerning computation of business profits of a PE, then such revised provisions would be applicable.


5.0 Expert Committee on Retrospective Amendments to section 9 relating to indirect Transfer of Shares

Retrospective  amendments  are  supposed  to  cure  the unintended  defect  or  lacuna  in  the   legislations   and/  or to bring clarity in law. However, the recent trend of retrospective amendments is very disturbing, which is to overrule or nullify the effect of favourable decisions of the Courts  and  tribunals  in  favour  of  the  tax  payer,  albeit, the Government has inherent right to correct infirmities in the law which may have been surfaced in a decision of a Court or tribunal resulting in a favourable decision to the tax payer. Thus, any retrospective amendment which may have an effect of neutralizing a Court ruling, by itself, would not render it unconstitutional unless, it alters the character of the tax imposed by the state so much, that it renders  the state incompetent to legislate and/or  its  operation  is so unreasonable that it results in to contravention of the fundamental rights of tax payers guaranteed by indian Constitution. At the same time, where the retrospective legislation is introduced to overcome a judicial decision,  the power cannot be used to subvert the decision without removing the statutory basis of the decision.24  further, such amendment cannot be made retrospectively only for the purpose of nullifying a judgment where there was no lacuna or defect in the original law.25

In 2012, the then Prime minister constituted an expert Committee  on  general  anti  avoidance  rules  (gaar), to undertake stakeholder consultations and finalise the guidelines for gaar after far more widespread consultations so that there is a greater clarity on many fronts26.

In the meantime the finance act, 2012, inserted following two explanations to section 9(1)(i) of the act with retrospective effect from 01-04-1962.

“Explanation  4.—for  the  removal  of  doubts,  it  is  hereby clarified that the expression “through” shall mean and include and shall  be  deemed  to  have  always  meant and included “by means of,” “in consequence of” or “by reason of.”

Explanation  5.—for  the  removal  of  doubts,  it  is  hereby clarified that an asset or a capital asset being any share or interest in a company or entity registered or incorporated outside india shall be deemed to be and shall always be deemed to have been situated in india, if the share or interest derives, directly or indirectly, its value substantially from the assets located in india.”

The above explanations were inserted to nullify the effect of the land mark decision of the supreme Court in case of Vodafone International Holdings BV vs. Union of India27 where in the apex Court held that indirect transfer of asset (in this case it was “shares”) by one non-resident to another non-resident of a foreign company which owned an indian company through various intermediary companies, was not covered by section 9 of the act and hence not taxable in india. as the stake involved was very high (about rs. 14,200 crore), government amended section 9 of the income-tax act with retrospective effect. However, it resulted in lot of opposition, criticism and negative impact about stability  and reliability of indian tax laws in the minds of foreign investors, thus impacting flow of foreign investments. At that time the expert Committee headed by dr. Parthasarathy shome was already examining gaar provisions. So, the government expanded the scope of the expert Committee on gaar to include the examination of the applicability of the amendment on taxation of non-resident transferring assets, where the underlying asset is in india.

The said expert Committee submitted its draft report in 2012 titled “draft report on retrospective amendments relating to indirect transfer”, wherein it concluded that “retrospective application of tax law should occur in exceptional or rarest of rare cases, and with particular objectives:

(i)    to correct apparent mistakes/anomalies in the statute;
(ii)    to apply to matters that are genuinely clarificatory in nature, i.e., to remove technical defects, particularly in procedure, which have vitiated the substantive law; or,
(iii)    to “protect” the tax base from highly abusive tax planning schemes that have the main purpose of avoiding tax, without economic substance, but not to “expand” the tax base.

Moreover, retrospective application of a tax law should occur only after exhaustive and transparent consultations with stakeholders who would be affected.”

The   “Tax  Administration   Reform   Commission”   (TARC) headed by Dr. Parthasarathy shome harshly criticised “Retrospective Amendments.” TARC submitted its first report   on   30th   may,   2014.   the   report28   states   that: “retrospective amendments have further undermined the trust between taxpayers and the tax administration. Many seem to feel that it has become the order of the day. Many of the retrospective amendments  have  been  introduced to counter interpretation in favour of the taxpayer upheld earlier by the judiciary. the most famous is the introduction of provisions for taxation of ‘indirect transfer’ with effect from 1st april, 1962, to overrule a supreme Court judgment which held that indian tax authorities did not have territorial jurisdiction to tax offshore transactions, and therefore, the taxpayer was not liable to withhold the taxes29. An overnight change in the interpretation of a provision, which earlier held ground for decades, provides scope for tax officials to rake up settled positions. This approach to retrospective amendments has resulted in protracted disputes, apart from having deeply harmful effects on investment sentiment and the macro economy.

6.0 Some Typical Retrospective Amendments pertaining to Non-residents have been tabulated in the table on the following page:

Reflecting the challenges behind just and correct application of retrospective amendments there is a constitutional or statutory protection against it in several countries. Countries such as Brazil, Greece, Mexico, Mozambique, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela, Romania, Russia, Slovenia and sweden have prohibited retrospective taxation30.

7.0 Conclusion
The Parliament has the sovereign right to amend the income-tax act and such amendments can be retrospective in nature. however, retrospective  amendments  results in uncertainty and distrust between tax payers and tax department. Imagine the plight of a tax payer who fights through various stages of appeal up to supreme Court by substantial devotion of time, efforts and money, gets  a favourable judgment and the act is amended to render the said judgment ineffectual. Retrospective amendments results in tremendous hardships to tax payers especially in a scenario where there is no accountability on the part of the tax administration.

TRAC has recommended that retrospective amendment should be avoided as a principle. it further commented that “retrospective amendments clustered during 2009- 12 may reflect this lackadaisical approach. In turn, this reflects complete lack of accountability at any level except on grounds of lagging behind in revenue collection.”

Retrospective amendments to section 9 of the act vide finance  act,  2012  to  tax  indirect  transfers  vitiated  the investment climate in india. Taking a cue from the criticism by the expert Committee and protest from tax payers, the present nda government has taken a stand to exercise the power of retrospective amendments with extreme caution and judiciousness keeping in mind the impact of each such measure on the economy and over- all  economic  climate.  The  finance  minister  in  his  Budget speech has stated that NDA government will not ordinarily bring about any change retrospectively which creates a fresh liability. Such an assurance on the floor of the Parliament will certainly boost investors’ and tax payers’ confidence.

Place of Provision of Services Rules

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Notification No. 14/2014-ST dated 11th July, 2014

Place of Provision of Service Rules, 2012 were provided in the principal Notification No. 28/2012 – Service Tax, dated 20th June, 2012 vide number G.S.R. 470 (E), dated 20th June, 2012. The same are now amended vide this Notification No. 14/2014. These amendments are going to bring a major shift on the liability of service tax in respect of some services.
Commission Agent service: Under the amended rules, commission agent is covered under Rule 9(c) of the POP Rules, which means, the place of provision of service will 89 be the location of service provider. So, if an overseas agent provides commission agent service to an Indian exporter, it will not attract reverse charge as the location of service provider is in non-taxable territory. Consequently, if any commission agent renders service in India for any foreign goods, the commission agent is liable to pay service tax, even though he may receive the commission in foreign exchange.

Hiring of Aircrafts or Vessels: Rule 9(d) of the POP Rules, 2012 has been amended to exclude Aircrafts and Vessels from the scope of this rule. Before this amendment, Aircrafts or Vessels taken or hire from abroad up to a period of one month did not attract service tax under reverse charge. But, now that these two modes of transport are excluded from Rule 9(d), the place of provision is the location of service recipient as per Rule 3. Therefore, from 1st October 2014, if Aircraft or Vessel is taken on hire from a non-taxable territory for a period up to one month, it attracts service tax under reverse charge.

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Changes in Point of Taxation Rules, 2011

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Notification No. 13/2014-ST dated 11th July, 2014

The Point of Taxation Rules, 2011 were framed by the principal Notification No. 18/2011 – Service Tax, dated 1st March, 2011 vide number G.S.R. 175 (E), dated 1st March, 2011 and amended by Notification No. 37/2012-Service Tax, dated 20th June, 2012 vide number G.S.R.479 (E), dated 20th June, 2012.

Now, by this Notification No. 13/2014, certain amendments have been made to the earlier notifications as summarised below:

1. Determination of point of taxation in case of specified services or persons: Rule 7:

The point of taxation for the services specified in section 68(2) that is services falling under the ambit of reverse or partial charge mechanism shall be the month in which the payment is made to the vendor, subject to a condition that such payment is made within six months from the date of invoice. If the payment is not made within six months, the point of taxation shall be determined as if this rule does not exist.

However, the point of taxation shall be date immediately following three months if the payment is not made within three months from the date of invoice. Hence, effectively the time period has been reduced from six months to three months.

2. Rule 10: POT for instances where invoice for reverse or partial charge has been issued before 01-10- 2014 and payment is pending as on said date:
The new rule provides that notwithstanding anything contained vide first proviso to Rule 7, if the invoice in respect of a service for which POT is determinable vide Rule 7 has been issued before 01-10-2014 but payment has not been made as on the said day, the POT shall be:
i. If payment is made within a period of six months from the date of invoice – POT Is the date of invoice; ii. If payment is not made within a period of six months from the date of invoice – POT shall be determined as if this rule does not exist.

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Interest on delayed payment of service tax

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Notification No. 12/2014-ST dated 11th July, 2014

Vide this notification, varying rates of interest on the basis of extent of delay in payment of service tax have been provided as under:

New rates shall be applicable w.e.f. 1st October, 2014.

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Service Tax (Determination of Value ) Rules, 2006- Changes

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Notification No. 11/2014-ST dated 11th July, 2014

In Rule 2A of the Service Tax Valuation Rules, category ‘B’ and ‘C’ of works contract i.e.,

(a) the services of maintenance or repair or reconditioning or restoration or servicing of any goods;

(b) maintenance or repair or completion and finishing services such as glazing or plastering or floor and wall tiling or installation of electrical fittings of immovable property; are merged into one single category, with service portion as 70%. This change will come into effect from 1st October, 2014.

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Reverse or Partial Charge Mechanism- Changes

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Notification No. 10/2014-ST dated 11th July, 2014

In this connection, the principal notification notification No. 30/2012 – Service Tax, dated 20th June, 2012, vide number G.S.R. 472 (E), dated 20th June, 2012 was last amended by notification No. 45/2012-Service Tax, dated 7th August, 2012 vide number G.S.R. 621 (E), dated 7th August, 2012.

Now, by this Notification No.10/2014, certain amendments have been effected in percentages of service tax payable by the service provider and service recipient for certain specified services, which are summarised as under:

In relation to services provided by a recovery agent to a banking company or financial institution or NBFC – the recipient of service has to pay 100% of service tax.

In relation to services provided by director of a company or body corporate – the recipient of service has to pay 100% of service tax.

In relation to services provided or agreed to be provided by way of renting of a motor vehicle designed to carry passengers on non-abated value to any person who is not engaged in the similar line of business – the percentage has been revised from 60:40 to 50:50 by service provider and service receiver respectively.

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E-payment of service tax made mandatory

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Notification No. 09/2014-ST dated 11th July, 2014

With effect from 01-10-2014, electronic payment of service tax is made mandatory for all assessees. However, a proviso has been added wherein the powers have been given to the Assistant Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner to allow the assessees for reasons recorded in writing to deposit service tax by any mode other than internet banking.

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Abatements – changes

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Notification No. 08/2014-ST dated 11th July, 2014

Various abatements have been granted by the principal Notification No. 26/2012 – Service Tax, dated 20th June, 2012, vide number G.S.R. 468 (E), dated the 20th June, 2012 and amended by notification No.9/2013- Service Tax, dated the 8th May, 2013 vide G.S.R. 296 (E), dated 8th May, 2013. Now this Notification No. 08/2014 makes further amendments as follows :

1. For services of GTA in relation to transportation of goods:

The condition of non-availment of CENVAT Credit on inputs, input services and capital goods is required to be satisfied by the service provider. The ambiguity whether the same is not to be availed by the service provider or receiver is ironed out by inserting the phrase ‘by service provider’ in Entry 7.

2. For services provided in relation to Chit:
The following condition has been added stating that CENVAT Credit on inputs, capital goods and input services, used for providing the taxable service, has not been taken under the provisions of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

3. For services of renting of any motor vehicle designed to carry passengers:

i. The phrase ‘motor vehicle designed to carry passengers’ is replaced with ‘motor cab’. Hence, effectively the services of renting of motor cab is only covered under this entry.
ii. The following conditions are substituted for the existing conditions:
CENVAT Credit on inputs and capital goods are not to be taken;

CENVAT Credit of input services of rent a cab has been taken as under:

Full credit if received from a person who is paying service tax on 40% of value; Upto 40% of such credit, if service tax is paid on the entire value,

CENVAT Credit of input services other than above shall not be taken.

4. For services of transport of passengers by a contract carriage other than motor cab:

i. A new entry since the services provided by contract carriage is brought into tax net in this notification. The abatement specified for such services shall be 60% subject to a condition that CENVAT Credit on inputs, capital goods and input services, used for providing the taxable service, has not been taken under the provisions of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.
ii. Further, this entry also covers the services provided by radio-taxis from the date the phrase ‘radio taxi’ is deleted from the negative list to be notified by the Central Government in the Official Gazette.

5. For transport of goods in a vessel:
The abatement has been increased from 50% to 60%.

6. For services provided by a tour operator:

The credit of input services received from tour operator is being made available which is not allowed hitherto.

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Changes in exemption procedure for SEZs

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Notification No. 07/2014-ST dated 11th July, 2014

Services provided to developer of or unit in SEZ are exempted by adopting certain procedure laid out in the principal Notification No. 12/2013 – Service Tax, dated 1st July, 2013, vide number G.S.R. 448 (E), dated 1st July, 2013 and amended by Notification No. 15/2013-Service Tax, dated 21st November, 2013 vide number G.S.R. No.744 (E), dated 21st November, 2013.

In order to remove certain time delays and simplify certain benefits, Notification No. 07/2014 makes following amendments in the earlier notifications:

(a) Central Excise Officer would issue Form A-2, within 15 days from receipt of Form A-1;

(b) Exemption would be available from the date when list of services on which SEZ is entitled to upfront exemption is endorsed by the authorised officer of SEZ in Form A-1, provided Form A-1 is furnished to the jurisdictional Central Excise Officer within 15 days of its verication. If furnished later, exemption would be available from the date on which FormA-1 is so furnished;

(c) Pending issuance of Form A-2, exemption will be available subject to condition that authorisation issued by the Central Excise officer will be furnished to the service provider within a period of three months from provision of service;

(d) For services covered under reverse charge, the requirement of furnishing service tax registration number of service provider shall be dispensed with;

(e) A service shall be treated as exclusively used for SEZ operations if the recipient of service is a SEZ unit or developer, invoice is in the name of such unit/developer and the service is used exclusively for furtherance of authorised operations in the SEZ.

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Changes in Mega Exemption Notification

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Notification No. 06/2014-ST dated 11th July 2014

The
exemptions to certain activities are governed by the principal
Notification No 25/2012-ST dated 20-06-2012 have been amended by
Notification No.04/2014 – Service Tax, dated 17th February, 2014, vide
number G.S.R. 91(E), dated 17th February, 2014.

Now, by
this Notification No. 6/2014-ST dated 11-07- 2014, amendments have been
made to the said principal notification. Such amendments are summarised
below :

(a) E xemption to Services by way of technical testing
or analysis of newly developed drugs, including vaccines and herbal
remedies, on human participants is now withdrawn;
(b) E xemption to Services provided for transportation of passengers by air-conditioned contract carriage is withdrawn;
(c)
E xemption in respect of services provided to the Government or local
authority or the governmental authority, will be limited to services by
way of water supply, public health, sanitation conservancy, solid waste
management or slum improvement and upgradation;
(d) S ervices provided by common bio-medical waste treatment facility operators to clinical establishments are exempted;
(e)
S ervices by way of transportation by rail or vessel from one place in
India to another of the following goods are exempted : i. organic
manure, ii. cotton, ginned or baled;
(f) S ervices by way of
transportation by GTA , by way of transport in a goods carriage the
following goods are exempted : i. organic manure, ii. cotton, ginned or
baled;
(g) S ervices by way of loading, unloading, packing, storage or warehousing of rice, cotton, ginned or baled are exempted;
(h)
Life micro-insurance products as approved by the Insurance Regulatory
and Development Authority, having maximum amount of cover of Rs. 50,000
are exempted;
(i) S ervices received by the Reserve Bank of India,
from outside India in relation to management of foreign exchange
reserves are exempted;

(j) S ervices provided by a tour operator
to a foreign tourist in relation to a tour conducted wholly outside
India are exempted;
(k) T he concept of ‘auxiliary educational services is omitted and exempted services are notified as under:
(i) transportation of students, faculty and staff;
(ii) catering services including any mid-day meals scheme sponsored by the Government;
(iii) security or cleaning or house-keeping services in such educational institutions;
(iv) services relating to admission to such institution or conduct of examination;

(l) T he exemption of renting of immovable property service received by educational institutions, stands withdrawn;
(m)
S ervices provided by hotel, inn, guest house, club or campsite, by
whatever name called, for residential or lodging purposes, having
declared tariff of a unit of accommodation of Rs. 1,000 or more per day
are taxable. The word ‘commercial’ has been deleted to cover the
services provided by dharmashalas or ashrams or any other such entities;
(n)
Selling of space or time slots for advertisements has been excluded
from negative list with the exception of selling of space for
advertisements in the print media.

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Maharashtra Act No. XXVII of 2014

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Maharashtra Act No. XXVII of 2014 published after having received assent of the governor in the Maharashtra Government Gazette on 26-06-2014.

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Notification No. VAT 1514/CR 46/Taxation 1 dated 11-07-2014

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By this notification, the government of Maharashtra amends Schedule A and C with effect from 01-08-2014.

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Notification No. VAT 1514/C.R.44/Taxation-1 dated 09-07- 2014

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By this notification Government of Maharashtra has exempted late fees above Rs.1,000/- for dealers who have not filed any returns for the period up to February, 2014 on condition that they file returns up to 30-09-2014 along with payment of tax and interest applicable.

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Notification No. VAT 1514/CR 30/Taxation 1. dated 23-06-2014

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Draft rules for Border Check Post published for the information of all persons and to invite objections or suggestions if any.

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[2014] 46 taxmann.com 97 (Chennai – CESTAT) Mallika Jeyabalan vs. CCE, Madurai

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Whether training given relating to various procedures and statutory compliances to be made in relation to export of goods can qualify as “vocational training” and exempt under Notification No. 24/2004-S.T.? Held, Prima facie, Yes

Facts:
The Appellants are providing training relating to various procedures and statutory compliances to be made in relation to export of goods and claimed exemption vide Notification No. 24/2004-S.T. contending it would qualify to be “vocational training.” For this, the Appellants relied on the following decisions:

• Ashu Export Promoters (P) Ltd. v. CST [2012] 34 STT 47 (New Delhi- CESTAT )
• Wigan & Leigh College (India) Ltd. v. Jt. CST [2008] 12 STT 157 (Bang. – CESTAT )

Revenue argued that “vocational training” would only cover courses with specific syllabus and approved by Government and hence sought to tax Appellants’ activity under the category of “commercial training and coaching” for the period 01-04-2004 to 31-03-2009.

Held:
The Hon’ble Tribunal gave a prima facie view that, the decisions relied upon by the Appellant will apply to the training impugned in this case also and granted waiver and stayed collection of all the dues arising from the impugned order.

Note: In Ashu Exports Promoter’s case, Appellant was engaged in the activity of imparting training in the field of export-import, merchandising and retail management. The Hon’ble Tribunal while considering dictionary meaning of the term ‘vocational’ held that it means “relating to an occupation or employment”. Further, in relation to education and training it gives the meaning “directed at a particular occupation or its skill.” The Tribunal held that when engagement in occupation or employment becomes outcome of vocational training pedantic approach as that is made out by Revenue by restricting its meaning is undesirable.

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A Report on 8th Residential Study Course on Service Tax & VAT

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The Indirect Taxes and Allied Laws committee of the BCAS had organised the 8th Residential Study Course on Service Tax & VAT (RSC) from Friday 13th June, 2014 to Sunday 15th June, 2014 at Khanvel Resort, Silvassa. In all 139 delegates from 25 cities of 11 States attended this keenly awaited Study Course, devoted to indirect taxes. This RSC was attended by many young chartered accountants including 15 lady participants. Many of them attended for the first time.


L to R : Mr. Naushad A. Panjwani (President), Mr. Shailesh Sheth, Mr. Sunil B. Gabhawalla, Mr. Govind G. Goyal

The Course comprised of group discussion on three case study papers and two presentation papers by eminent faculties.


L to R : Mr. Naushad A. Panjwani, Mr. Nitin P. Shingala, Mr. Kaustuv Sen,Mr. Suhas S. Paranjpe

The Course began with a welcome address by Nitin Shingala, Vice President of the Society. Thereafter, Govind Goyal, Chairman of the Committee, presented his opening remarks and Naushad Panjwani, the President, shared his experience with the officials of the Revenue Department from the Ministry of Finance and updated the members about the revenue’s current perception about the defaulting tax payers including expectations of Finance Ministry’s from our CA fraternity. Suhas Paranjpe, convenor, proposed vote of thanks.

Advocate Kaustuv Sen presented his paper in the first technical session, in which he discussed various issues concerning ‘Service Tax Implications on Cross Border Transactions.’ In his paper, he elaborately discussed various practical issues. Advocate Shailesh Sheth chaired the session and touched upon all the issues discussed by the paper writer in a very lucid manner. Members got the benefit of hearing two experts on the same platform. Saurabh Shah presented vote of thanks.


L to R: Mr. Shailesh Sheth,Mr. V. Sridharan, Mr. Saurabh P. Shah, Mr. Rajeev Luthia

On the second day, Senior Advocate V. Sridharan explained certain important judgements of House of Lords and ECJ with its relevance in interpreting Indian Tax Laws. The session was interactive as well as informative. Sunil Gabhawalla chaired the session. Rajeev Luthia thanked the speaker and the chair.


L to R: Mr. Sunil B. Gabhawalla, Mr. A.R. Krishnan, Mr. N. Venkataraman, Ms. Bhavana G. Doshi

Thereafter, Senior Advocate N. Venkataraman presented his paper on various critical issues dealing with ‘Taxation of Works Contract Transactions’ and discussed case studies in the light of various judgements including landmark cases of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. A. R. Krishnan, the chairman of the session, summarised various issues addressed by learned paper writer. Sagar Shah performed the pleasant task by thanking the speaker and the chair.


L to R: Mr. Sagar N. Shah, Mr. Bharat K. Oza, Mr. Uday V. Sathaye, Mr. Bakul B. Modi

The technical discussion was followed by refreshing group activities in the evening. Young members played cricket while many others visited Dudhani Lake and enjoyed boating. The day ended with delicious food and a musical night.


L to R: Mr. V. Raghuraman, Mr. Mandar U. Telang

On the third day, Bhavana Doshi gave a presentation on ‘Intangible-Indirect Issues.’ Based on her wide experience, she made her session lively wherein many participants openly interacted. Uday Sathaye, past-President, chaired the session. Bharat Oza presented a vote of thanks.

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Border Check Posts

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17th July, 2014
To
Mr. Ajit Pawar
The Finance Minister
Government of Maharashtra,
Mantralaya
Madam Cama Road, Churchgate,
Mumbai 400020

and

Mr. Nitin Karir
The Commissioner of Sales Tax,
8th floor Sales Tax Office,
Mazgaon,
Mumbai 400010

Respected Sirs,

Sub: Border Check Posts

This
is with reference to Government Notification dated 23rd June 2014
regarding erection of barriers and establishment of check posts, we
would like to invite your kind attention as follows:

• The provisions of this notification are intended to be effective just after a week from now i.e. from 25th July 2014.
• This notification, although dated 23rd June 2014, but has come to the knowledge of people in the last week only.
• Most of the dealers and their consultants still have to understand the exact procedure to be followed.

It seems that the forms, rules and procedures, etc. have not yet been
discussed by the Department with the trade and industry.
• The
requirements of this notification need wide spread publicity so as to
create an awareness among all those who are concerned with movement of
goods from the State of Maharashtra to other states and also from other
states to the State of Maharashtra.
• There are several aspects,
which need to be clarified so as to have smooth implementation of Law
and hassle free movement of goods.
• The regular business of trade and industry should not hamper because of hasty implementation of new provisions.

As transporters play a big role in the entire process the provisions
and the resultant procedure need to be thoroughly discussed with them.

In the initial stage, it may be necessary to setup help desks and
internet kiosks at convenient locations throughout the State so as to
help the small dealers, truck drivers and others to upload required
information.
• The movement of essential goods and tax free goods needs clarification.

There are several questions, which need to be answered satisfactorily
such as if a purchaser, outside the State, is neither a registered
dealer, nor having PAN/TAN , etc., whether in such cases goods cannot be
sold to them by a supplier from Maharashtra?, what about e-commerce
transactions?, whether same procedure will apply for internal movement
of goods in case of import and exports?, whether a driver is permitted
to register with his driving license number, etc.?

There are
several such other issues, which we feel the Government may thoroughly
discuss with trade, industry and transporters. And till then, may we
request your good selves to kindly consider postponing the
implementation of these provisions by a few months.

Hoping for your kind consideration.

Thanking you.
Yours faithfully

Nitin Shingala                                                     Govind G. Goyal
President, BCAS                                            Chairman Indirect Taxes Committee, BCAS

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Judiciary on tight purse strings

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The chief justices and jurists have consistently pointed out that the share the judicial system gets from the budgets, the Union or the states, is meagre. Two months ago, Chief Justice Lodha said that it is getting only between 0.4 and 0.11 per cent of budgetary allocations. The percentage has remained static for years. The other Cinderellas such as health and education have started getting a better share and attention due to social concerns and public awareness. However, courts are still neglected, as vouched for by the current chief justice.

In contrast, the allocation for the justice system is 1.2 per cent in Singapore, 1.4 per cent in the US and 4.3 per cent in the UK. The miserly allotment the Indian judiciary gets includes what it generates from court fees, stamp duty and other miscellaneous heads, which also go to the general pool.

This creates a grim picture in terms of human suffering. More than 30 million cases are pending before the courts. Some judges have said that it would take decades to clear the matters already pending before them. Against the Law Commission recommendation of 50 judges for one million people, the current ratio is 10.5 for one million. Nearly half the judges’ posts are vacant. Tribunals, nearly 40 at last count, are in a worse condition. The consequences are dismal to millions of people awaiting justice. Jails are overflowing with persons awaiting trial. Substantial numbers have already undergone imprisonment for periods they would have been sentenced if they were convicted.

Unappealing service conditions and hidden pressures keep away the best talents at the bar from accepting judicial posts. Good lawyers have to sacrifice sizeable income if they are elevated to the bench. Judges must also be made of “sterner stuff” to resist political and corporate arm-twisting, as seen in recent episodes of mysterious recusals. As a result, the legal eagles have invited a situation in which they have to argue intricate points of law before a less-endowed brethren. It could be called poetic justice, but for the fact that the clients are the sufferers.

It is well-known that the government is the largest single litigant and 60 per cent of the cases involve central laws. Therefore, the Union should contribute adequately to the expenditure on better administration of the courts. New laws are manufactured at every turn without estimating the expenditure involved. In the US, bills are said to annex a financial allocation after a “judicial impact assessment”.

(Source: The Economic Times, dated 02-07-2014)

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Times to reform our judicial appoinment

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The sordid manner in which senior lawyer Gopal Subramanium’s appointment as a judge of the Supreme Court (SC) has been thwarted points to the urgency of reforming judicial appointments. Subramanium’s name was delinked from the other three forwarded by the judges’ collegium to the government for elevation to the bench, based, reportedly, on certain reports of the CBI and the Intelligence Bureau. These agencies have regularly made use of Mr. Subramanium’s legal services. So, this sudden discovery of character flaws can only be attributed to the preferences of the new political dispensation.
(Source: The Economic Times, dated 27-06-2014)

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Agenda for un-legislation

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One of the long overdue steps promised by the new government is to repeal old and irrelevant laws that clutter the statute books. This country is known for having the largest number of legislation, the central Acts alone numbering about 3,000 and state laws which might total at least three times more. The situation recalls the truism of Cicero: more laws, less justice.

Whenever a socio-legal crisis arises, the government promises more laws to get over the embarrassment. If there is a rape epidemic, the concerned minister will undertake to pass a law to end it for all times; if a SUV driven by drunken youth runs over pavement sleepers, let there be another law. The possibilities are endless. In the end, all these theatrics fade from public memory.

Before passing more Acts in the 16th Parliament, the lawmakers could think of un-legislating a long list of outdated laws that have defied the ravages of time. Even scrubbing them with amendments will not make them relevant. The Law Commission had made a study of such statutes in 1998 and presented a lengthy list of legislation which could be jettisoned, benefitting the public and the courts. It had named 166 central Acts, one of which goes to the days of the East India Company, namely, the Coastal Vessels Act, 1838. The country could do away with the Bikrama Singh’s Estates Act, 1883 and the Mirzapur Stone Mahal Act, 1886.

The Livestock Importation Act, 1898, was originally meant to regulate the import of livestock liable to be affected by infectious disorders. It was recommended for repeal, but it was dusted and kept alive with an amendment in 2001 adding “livestock products” to the definition of “livestock”. The Glanders and Farcy Act, 1899, appoints inspectors to search and destroy diseased horses, asses and mules. The Dourine Act, 1910, deals with the castration of diseased horses and compensation to be paid to the owner.

There are statutes that still refer to His/Her Majesty. Acts such as the Prisoners’ Removal Act, 1884, hark back to the days when convicts were shipped to Mauritius or Singapore. There are at least 11 such colonial era statutes still in force, which might interest only students of legal history.

Lugging outworn laws over centuries is not peculiar to this country. There are ridiculous rules everywhere that made Bumble say that law is an ass. It is reported that in 29 states in the US, it is legal to fire someone for being gay. In Thailand, it is illegal to step on money. Divorce is illegal in the Vatican. A Chinese law makes it compulsory for children to visit their parents and attend to their spiritual needs. The long list would make us preen with the pride of rationality. But wait, it is a humbling thought that in this country any sale of property above Rs. 100 should be registered.

One way to make the lawmakers look periodically at the stack of rule books is to implant a terminator clause in each legislation. It should lapse after, say a quarter century, unless they are amended and updated. The courts should also ignore such laws. Some countries have such a clause in their laws, but India has not incorporated that principle, and thus allowed forensic weeds to grow.
(Source: Extracts from an article in Business Standard, dated 18-06-2014)

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Energy Pricing

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The energy sector badly needs reform. India has notoriously poor electricity supply, which has hampered the growth of the manufacturing sector. Meanwhile, energy costs for consumers are not noticeably low, in spite of huge government subsidies on fuel and on electricity – which are largely responsible for high deficits. Policy mismanagement and pricing distortions across the energy space are responsible in large measure for this situation. At the retail end of the chain, prices of diesel, compressed natural gas, liquefied petroleum gas and kerosene are controlled, and so are power tariffs. However, India imports 80 per cent of its crude and 30 per cent of its natural gas. It is also among the world’s largest coal importers. The high international prices of these commodities are not passed on to end-users. Hence, companies supplying electricity and retailing petroleum products suffer losses. Not coincidentally, these companies are owned by the government, since private players are unwilling to enter this space.

A complex subsidy mechanism is applied to oil refining and marketing. The oil and gas subsidy came to about Rs. 1.45 lakh crore in the last fiscal year. It was shared between oil-producing public sector undertakings and the central government. Meanwhile, power sector losses run at about Rs. 60,000 crore per annum. Cash-strapped state-owned power distribution companies cannot repay loans, or even settle with suppliers such as Coal India and National Thermal Power Corporation, the country’s largest power producer. Despite power shortages, there has been controversy over tariff hikes in the Mundra projects of the Adani and Tata groups. Both projects run on imported coal, which became more expensive. Large gas-based power capacities are also sitting idle. Power sector losses have led to a banking crisis. The latest bailout involved restructuring almost Rs. 2 lakh crore in unpaid loans by state power distribution companies. The states issued bonds as part of a debt restructuring package.

The fiscal burden on the energy account is, therefore, huge. The situation cannot be rectified without charging the end-user rational prices.

(Source: Business Standard, dated-18-06-2014)

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 8 dated 18th July, 2014

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Money Transfer Service Scheme – Delegation of work to Regional Offices

This circular has amended the guidelines with respect to Money Transfer Service Scheme. Henceforth, any person who wants to act as an Indian Agent under MTSS is required to make an application for permission to the respective Regional Office of the Foreign Exchange Department of the RBI under whose jurisdiction its registered office falls.

DIPP time schedule

DIPP has put the following Time schedule for processing proposals under NRI/EOU/RT schemes

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 7 dated 18th July, 2014

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Rupee Drawing Arrangement – Delegation of work to Regional Offices

This circular has amended the guidelines with respect to Opening and Maintenance of Rupee/Foreign Currency Vostro Accounts of Non-resident Exchange Houses as under: –

1. Banks entering into Rupee/Foreign Currency Drawing Arrangements with Exchange Houses for the first time now have to submit the application, in the prescribed format, to the respective Regional Office of the Foreign Exchange Department of the RBI under whose jurisdiction their registered office falls.

2. Banks now have to submit the Annual Review note, by 30th June every year, to the respective Regional Office of the Foreign Exchange Department of RBI under whose jurisdiction their registered office falls.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 6 dated 18th July, 2014

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Press Note 4 (2014 Series) issued by DI PP dated 26th June, 2014

 Foreign Direct Investment – Reporting under FDI Scheme
This circular states that henceforth:-

1. Indian companies while submitting Form FCGPR & Form FCTRS must use the NIC codes as mentioned in the National Industrial Classification, 2008 (NIC 2008) and not the old NIC codes as mentioned in NIC 1987.

2. Indian companies must use the uniform State and District code list (available on the RBI website) while submitting Form FCGPR.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 5 dated 17th July, 2014

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Notification No. FEMA 311/2014-RB dated 24th June, 2014

Liberalised Remittance Scheme (LRS) for resident individuals-Increase in the limit from USD 75,000 to USD 125,000

This circular now permits individuals resident in India to remit up to US $ 125,000 per financial year, under the Liberalised Remittance Scheme for acquisition of immovable property outside India.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 4 dated July 15, 2014 Notification No. FEMA.306/2014-RB dated May 23, 2014

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Foreign Direct Investment (FDI ) in India – Issue/ Transfer of Shares or Convertible Debentures – Revised pricing guidelines
This circular contains the revised pricing guidelines with respect to issue/transfer of shares in/convertible debentures of an Indian Company to Non-Resident investors by the Company/Residents investors and vice versa.

The pricing guidelines (existing & revised) are as under: –


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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 3 dated 14th July, 2014

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Notification No. FEMA. 308 /2014-RB dated 30th June, 2014

Issue of Partly Paid Shares and Warrants by Indian Company to Foreign Investors

Presently, the following instruments are recognised as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) compliant instruments – equity shares, compulsorily and mandatorily convertible preference shares/debentures as well as equity shares or compulsorily and mandatorily convertible preference shares/debentures containing an optionality clause but without any option/right to exit at an assured price.

This circular has expanded the list of FDI compliant instruments by including therein partly paid equity shares and warrants issued by an Indian company in accordance with the provision of the Companies Act, 2013 and/or SEBI guidelines, as applicable. These partly paid equity shares and warrants will be eligible instruments for the purpose of both FDI and Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI) schemes.

Non-Resident Indians (NRI) can also invest in the partlypaid shares and warrants on non-repatriation basis in terms of the provisions contained in Schedule 4 to Notification No. FEMA. 20/2000-RB, dated 3rd May, 2000, as amended from time to time.

Detailed guidelines in respect of the same are contained in this circular.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 2 dated 7th July, 2014

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Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 – Import of Rough, Cut and Polished Diamonds

This circular states that with immediate effect, importers of Rough, Cut and Polished Diamonds can import the same on Clean Credit basis (i.e., credit given by a foreign supplier to its Indian customer/buyer, without any Letter of Credit (Suppliers’ Credit)/Letter of Undertaking (Buyers’ Credit)/Fixed Deposits from any Indian financial institution) for a period not exceeding 180 days from the date of shipment.

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Master Circulars dated 1st July, 2014

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RBI has issued 15 Master Circulars. These Master Circulars consolidate the existing instructions on the subject at one place. These Master Circulars will be updated from time to time as and when the fresh instructions are issued. These Master Circulars may be referred to for general guidance and concerned persons may refer to respective circulars/notifications for detailed information, if so needed.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 151 dated 30th June, 2014

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Remittances to non-residents – Deduction of Tax at Source

This circular states that henceforth the RBI will not issue any instructions under the FEMA with respect to deduction of tax at source at the time of making remittances to the non-residents. Banks are, as a result, now required to comply with the requirement of the applicable tax laws in this regards.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 149 dated 25th June, 2014

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Know Your Customer (KYC) norms/Anti-Money Laundering (AML) standards/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT)/Obligation of Authorised Persons under Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002 – Money Changing Activities – Change in period of maintenance and preservation of records

This circular provides that Authorised Persons are now required to maintain and preserve records for a period of at least five years as against the present requirement of to maintaining and preserving records for a period of at least ten years.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 148 dated 20th June, 2014

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Notification No. FEMA 303/2014-RB dated 21st May, 2014)

Risk
Management and Inter-bank Dealings: Guidelines relating to
participation of Foreign Portfolio Investors (FPIs) in the Exchange
Traded Currency Derivatives (ETCD) market

Presently, persons
resident outside India are not allowed to participate in the currency
futures and exchange traded currency options market in India

This
circular now permits eligible foreign portfolio investors (FPI) to
enter into currency futures or exchange traded currency options
contracts subject to the following terms and conditions: –
a. F PI
can access to the currency futures or exchange traded currency options
for the purpose of hedging the currency risk arising out of the market
value of their exposure to Indian debt and equity securities.
b. F
PI are permitted to participate in the currency futures/exchange traded
options market through any registered/recognised trading member of the
exchange concerned.
c. F PI are permitted to take position – both
long (bought) as well as short (sold) – in foreign currency up to US $
10 million or equivalent per exchange without having to establish
existence of any underlying exposure. This limit will be both day-end as
well as intra-day.
d. FPI cannot take a short position beyond US $ 10 million at any time.
e.
F PI can take a long position beyond US $ 10 million in any exchange if
it has an underlying exposure. The onus of ensuring the existence of an
underlying exposure is on the FPI concerned.
f. E xchanges are free
to impose additional restrictions as prescribed by SEBI for the purpose
of risk management and fair trading.
g. E xchange/clearing
corporation has to provide FPI wise information on day end open position
as well as intra-day highest position to the respective custodian
banks. The custodian banks will aggregate the position of each FPI on
the exchanges as well as the OTC contracts booked with them (i.e., the
custodian banks) and other banks. If the total value of the contracts
exceeds the market value of the holdings on any day, the concerned FPI
will be liable to such penal action as may be laid down by the SEBI and
RBI.

RBI has issued the Notifications No.FED.1/ED (GP) – 2014
dated 10th June, 2014 (Currency Futures (Reserve Bank) Amendment
Directions, 2014) and No. FED. 2/ED (GP) – 2014 dated 10th June, 2014
(Exchange Traded Currency Options (Reserve Bank) Amendment Directions,
2014) to give effect to the above.

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